### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 29, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP1871 Cir. Ct. No. 2020SC364 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

S HAWNA H ATHAWAY ,
P LAINTIFF - R ESPONDENT ,

V .
R ONALD J. G REENWOOD ,
D EFENDANT - A PPELLANT .

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse County:
TODD W. BJERKE , Judge. Affirmed

. ¶ 1 GRAHAM, J. 1 Ronald J. Greenwood appeals from a judgment of replevin requiring him to return a dog to Shawna Hathaway. I conclude that the

1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 752.31(2)( a) (2019

- 20 ). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019

- 20 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2020AP1871

2 evidence is sufficient to support the circuit court ’s determin ation that Hathaway is
the dog’ s legal owner . A ccordingly, I affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Hathaway and Greenwood started dating in or around 2017

. I t is undisputed that , at that time , Greenwood owned the dog in question , named “Todd

. ” 2 Hathaway took Todd with her when her relationship with Greenwood ended in January 2020 . A pproximately three weeks later, Greenwoo d reported
Todd stolen to the police. A police officer told Hathaway that she would be
arrested unless she returned Todd to Greenwood, and Hathaway eventually complied. She then filed this replevin action in sm all claims court seeking Todd ’s

return.
¶ 3 The matter proceeded to a bench trial. Hathaway testified that
Gree nwood told her that Todd was “her dog” as far back as September 2019 , and that she “believed him

. ” After tha t, Hathaway licensed Todd in her name. See
W IS

. S TAT

. § 174.05 (providing that “ t he owner of a dog more than 5 months of
age

... shall annually

... pay the dog license tax and obtain a license ” ) . She also began taking Todd to the vet

. At trial, Hathaway introduced a receipt dated October 1, 2019 , for an animal license for Todd , and she intr oduced Todd’s rabies
certificate , a lso from October 1, 2019.

2 The parties dispute the manner in which Greenwood originally acquired the dog

. At trial, Gree nwood testified that he bought Todd in 2013 , and he introduced a document purporting to be a bill of sale. Hathaway testified that Greenwoo d told her “that someone left [Todd] at his house and never came back.”No. 2020AP1871

3 ¶ 4 Hathaway testified that she had her own apartment when she was dating Greenwood , but the apartment would not allow dogs. She and Todd stayed mostly at Greenwood’s house, and she took Todd to stay with h er when she was
able to do so

. Hathaway was at Greenwood’s house “ every day ” to look after
Todd

. Greenwood explicitly referred to Todd on s ocial media a s “her [Hathaway’s] dog” and as Hathaway’s “ comfort animal. ” Hathaway introduced screenshots of Greenwood’s social media posts as evidence. O ne such post is a
close

- up of Hathaway and Todd embracing each other , and the caption, written by Greenwood, reads: “ Is it a comfort animal with his human or an animal with his comfort human???”

¶ 5 Greenwood te stified that he acquired Todd as a puppy , that Todd
never lived with Hath a way , and that he never gave Todd to Hathaway. According to Greenwood, he allowed Hathaway to license Todd and ta ke him to the vet, but
he offered t o pay for th o se expenses. And t he reason Greenwood waited three weeks to call the police was because he had asked Hathaway to bring him back, and she promised that she would do so

. ¶ 6 The following exchange occurred when Hathaway cross

- examined
Greenwood: Q.

... [D] id you want me to believe that that was

my dog because you thought that it would help me?
A. I would

– I’d say that I really played up the attachment of you guys because of your emotional state. I was trying to make you feel better about your life. Yeah, I was definitely trying to make you feel like you were welcome and a part of things here.... Q. Did you tell me he was my dog?
A. I do n’t think I

– I didn’t tell you

– I didn’t ever want to expr ess that he was legally your dog , but heNo. 2020AP1871

4 definitely liked hanging out with you. He liked being on your lap. He liked

– Q. That’s not what I asked you.
A. I

– no, I never had intent to let you think for one second that you owned that dog and he was yours. Q. You just wanted me to believe that so I would feel better?
A. I wanted you to get better, yes.
¶ 7 Although Greenwood represented that he licensed Todd with the

state “every April 1st like you’re supposed to , ” he did not produce any records or receipts

. The record reflects that the circuit court at least implicitly found Hathaway ’s testimony to be more credible than the testimony offered by Greenwood. This credibility determination appears to have been based on the fact that, contrary to Greenwood’s representation, there was no evidence that he licensed the dog until after Hathaway filed this replevin action . The court
described this conduct as self

- serving and could “only [be] see[n]

... as an act t o try to support [ Greenwood’s ] case.”

¶ 8 T he circuit court determined that the dog belonged to Hathaway

. Among other things, the court relied on Greenwood’s references to Todd as Hathaway’s dog and her “comfort animal.” The court also reli ed on the veterinary
records and the license from October 1, 2019, which showed that Todd was
licensed in Hathaway’s name.

¶ 9 While the circuit court was issuing its r uling, Greenwood questioned , “ I don’t know how you c ould just take someone’s propert y and lice nse it. ” T he court responded , “ B ecause there’s probably an agreement that [the dog] was [Hathaway’s] property.” Greenwood questioned, “I don’t see that agreement anywhere,” and the court responded , “ [T] hat’s what I’m finding here today.”No. 2020AP1871

5 Greenwood pointed to the bil l of sale from 2013, but the court to ld Greenwood
that it “doesn’t matter.” Although t he cou rt did not spell out its reasoning , I
i nterpret this statement to mean that Greenwood’s or iginal ownership was no t relevant because the court found that Greenwood later agreed to give the dog to Hathaway.

¶ 10 The circuit court entered a judgment of replevin requiring Greenwood to return the dog to Hathaway. Greenwood now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 In a replevin action, “the ultimate fact question” is “which party is entitled to possession of the disputed property

. ” Ford Motor Co. v. Lyons , 137 Wis. 2d 397, 468, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1987). As stated above, the circuit court found that, although Greenwood was Todd ’s original owner, the parties reached an agreement during their relationship that he belonged to Hathaway. 3 Greenwood challenges the sufficiency of the evi dence to support that finding.

¶ 12 An appellate court will review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict an d will search the record for evidence to support the court’s factual findings. See Outagamie Cnty. v. Michael H. , 2014 WI 127 , ¶¶7, 21, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603. During
a bench trial , the circuit court is the “ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the

3 Throughout his a ppellate brief , Greenwood references the circuit court’s statement that “there’s probably an agreement ” that the dog was Hathaway’s property. (Emphasis added) Reading this statement in isolation, Greenwood suggests that the circuit court was unable to de finitely find the existence of an agreement. I disagree. As shown above, when the transcript is read in context, it becomes apparent that the court made a finding that there was an agreement between the part ies about the dog’s ownership.No. 2020AP1871

6 witnesses. ” State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc. , 2002 WI App 207, ¶19, 257 Wis. 2d 421, 651 N.W.2d 345

. If the evidence could support multiple inferences, I will accept the one drawn by the court. Id. On appeal, I will uphold the circuit
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. W IS

. S TAT . § 805.17(2); Phelps v. Physicians Ins

. Co
. , 2009 WI 74, ¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.

¶ 13 Here, I conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the cir cuit court’s finding that the parties reached an agreement during their relationship that Todd belonged to Hathaway. First, the court credited Hathaway’s testimony that
Greenwood told her that Todd was hers in Sept ember 2019. Second, the court relied on documentary evidence demonstrating that , after that point, Hathaway
treated Todd as her own . This evidence included record s that , beginning in October 2019, Hathaway took Todd to the vet and licensed Todd in her na me

. Third, the court relied on evidence that Gr eenwood also treated the dog as if it belonged to Hathaway by allowing Hathaway to take the dog to the ve t and to
license him , and by describing Todd on social media as “h er dog” and her “comfort animal.”

¶ 14 Greenwood argues that the court placed undue emphasis on Hathaway’s pet license receipt and the veterinary records. He contends that reliance on Hathaway’s act of licensing Todd was improper because , u nder W IS

. S TAT

. § 174.001(5), “ owner ” is defined as one who “ owns, harbors or keeps ” the dog . Greenwood argues that Hathaway could have register ed Todd “ not as [ the ] owner, but as someone who ‘harbors or keeps’ the dog.”

¶ 15 T his arg ument is unpersuasive. To the extent that Greenwood means to argue that a pet license may not conclusively prove ownership, I agree. However, t he statutory language in no way precludes courts fro m consideringNo. 2020AP1871

7 licensing records and weighing their probative value when determining own ership

. In thi s case, the court did exactly that: both par ties pointed to pet licensing records to support their claims of ownership, but the cou rt u ltimately found Hathaway’s
license

— dating back to October of 2019

— more probative than the license
Greenwood obtained aft er this case was filed, which the court viewed as “an act to try to support [his] case.” This was a proper exerci se of the court’s role of weigh ing the evidence when acting as factfinder.

¶ 16 Greenwood also argues that the circuit court pl aced undue emphasis

on the veterinary records submitted by Hathaway

. As with his argument about pet licensing documents, this argument challenges the weight that the court gave to
these documents

. Greenwood argues that the veterinary records “fail to sup port the court’s conclusion that they prove ownership” because they identify Hathaway as “client” rather than “owner.” But t he fact that the documents do not identify Hathaway as a n “owner” does not undermine their relevance. Based on the fact
that Hatha way handled Todd’s veterinary appointments, the court could and did infer that the parties agreed that Hathaway would exercise control over Todd and treat him as her own. The record does not support Greenwood’s assertion that the court placed u ndue emphas is on these records.

¶ 17 Finally, Greenwood faults the court for “failing to adequately analyze the legal elements of what constitutes a gift.” T hose elements are : (1 ) intent to give, (2 ) actual or constructive delivery, (3 ) termination of giver’s dominion, and (4 ) the recipient’s control over the gift. Peters v. Peters Auto Sales, Inc. , 37 Wis. 2d 3 46, 350, 155 N.W.2d 85 (1967).

¶ 18 During the circuit court proceedings, n either party suggested that the

court was required to use the legal framework for a gift to determi ne the legalNo. 2020AP1871

8 ownership of the dog . Greenwood argues for the first time on appeal that the court
should have made determinations about each of these elements and that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the m

. In response to Greenwood’s new argument on appeal , Hathaway argues that the delivery and dominion elements are
relaxed when a court determines whether persons living in the same household have made and received a gift

. See Potts v. Garionis , 127 Wis. 2d 47, 52

- 54, 3 77 N.W.2d 204 (Ct. App. 1985).

¶ 19 W hen, as here, a party fails to specifically raise an issue before the
circuit court in a manner that allows the court to address the issue and correct any potential error , the party fo rfeits that issue on appeal. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist. , 2010 WI 86, ¶45, n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177. Although forfeiture “is a rule of judicial administration” and I have discretion to overlook it, State v. Kaczmarski , 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702, there are good reasons to apply the rule in many cases . Among other things, t he rule requiring litigants to raise issues in the circuit court “gives both parties and the circuit court notice of the issue [s] and a fair opportunity ” to address
them , and it “enable[s] the circuit court to avoid or correct any error with minimal disruption of the judicial process, eliminating the need for appeal.” State v. Ndina , 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (footnote omitted).

¶ 20 As such, if Greenwood believed tha t the circuit court was required to
make specific findings with regard to the legal elem ents of a gift, Greenwood should have brought that legal framework to the attention of the ci rcuit court

— either during the trial or through a motion for reconsideration. Greenwood’s
failure to articulate what he believes to be the applicable legal standard until appeal d eprived Hathaway of an opportunity to develop the record with evidenceNo. 2020AP1871

9 releva n t to that standard

. I t also deprived the circuit court of an opportunity to correct any error.
¶ 21 Although I have concluded that Greenwood forfeited the argument about the elements of a gift , I pause to note that , had Greenwood brought this legal
framework to the circuit court’s attention , the court co uld easily have found the
element s satisfied based on the same evidence and inferences discussed above.
T he testimony that Greenwood told Hathaway that Todd was her dog and that
H athaway believed this statement supports an inf erence that Greenwood inte nded to give the dog to Hath a way . Th e evide nce that Hathaway subsequently registered
Todd in her name and took him to the vet , and that Greenwood’s social media post referencing the dog as “her dog” and her “comfort animal , ” could support findings of constructive delivery, termination of Greenwood’s dominion over the dog, and Hathaway’s exer cise of control over the gift.

¶ 22 In sum, I conclude that the evidence present ed to the circuit court, evaluated against the backdrop of the court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, supports the court’s determination that the dog belonged to Hathaway. While the evidence may a lso support other inferences, I will accept the reasonable
inference s drawn by the circuit court

. Peppertree Resort Villas , 257 Wis. 2d 421, ¶ 19

.
CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the circuit court did not err when it found that the dog b elonged to Hathaway an d entered a judgment of replevin.No. 2020AP1871

10 By the Court.

— Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5

.