No. 2 January 19, 2018 337

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Lorraine BATES,

Charles Ehrman Bates, Eileen Burke,

Jaci Evans, as Successor Personal Representative

for the Estate of Thomas Marier, and

Dalla Francis, as Personal Representative for

the Estate of George Alexander,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

an Illinois insurance company and

CNO Financial Group, INC.,

a Delaware corporation,

Defendants.

(US District Court No. 3:13-CV-00580-PK;

US Court of Appeals No. 14-35397; SC S064742)

On certified question from the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; certified order dated

February 24, 2017; certified accepted March 21, 2017; argued 

and submitted November 7, 2017.

Rachele R. Selvig, Cauble Cauble & Selvig, LLP, Grants 

Pass, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the plaintiffs.

Adam J. Kaiser, Alston & Bird LLP, New York, New York, 

argued the cause and filed the brief for the defendants. Also 

on the brief were John M. Aerni, New York, New York, and 

Vicki L. Smith, Lane Powell PC, Portland.

Erin K. Olson, Law Office of Erin Olson, PC, Portland, 

filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers 

Association. Also on the brief was Emily Teplin Fox, Portland.

Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, 

Nakamoto, Flynn, and Duncan, Justices.*

______________

* Landau, J., retired December 31, 2017, and did not participate in the decision of this case. Nelson, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case.
338 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

BALMER, C. J.

The certified question is answered.

Case Summary: The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Oregon 

Supreme Court: Does a plaintiff state a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(b), which 

prohibits the financial abuse of a vulnerable person, for “wrongful withholding 

of money or property where it is alleged that an insurance company has in bad 

faith delayed the processing of claims and refused to pay benefits owed under an 

insurance contract?” Held: Plaintiffs did not state a claim because they alleged 

that defendants failed to pay out required insurance benefits to vulnerable insurance beneficiaries, but under ORS 124.110(1)(b), a plaintiff must allege that a 

defendant wrongfully “continues to hold” “money or property *** acquired” from 

the plaintiff. That requirement was not met here, the Court explained, because 

an insured’s contractual right to insurance benefits are not “money or property” 

that the insurance company “acquired” in the context of ORS 124.110(1).

The certified question is answered.
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 339

BALMER, C. J.

This case is before the court on a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit under ORS 28.200 and ORAP 12.20. See generally 

Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 

361, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (discussing factors court considers

in exercising discretion to accept certified questions). The 

certified question relates to claims under ORS 124.110 

for financial abuse of “vulnerable persons”—here, elderly

persons—who purchased long-term care insurance from 

defendant Bankers Life & Casualty Co. (Bankers) and 

sought to receive insurance benefits under their policies.1

The Ninth Circuit certified to this court, and we accepted, 

the following question:

“Does a plaintiff state a claim under Oregon Revised 

Statutes 124.110(1)(b) for wrongful withholding of money 

or property where it is alleged that an insurance company has in bad faith delayed the processing of claims and 

refused to pay benefits owed under an insurance contract?”

Bates v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 849 F3d 846, 847 (9th Cir 

2017).

For the reasons that follow, we answer in the negative: Allegations that an insurance company, in bad faith, 

delayed the processing of claims and refused to pay benefits owed to vulnerable persons under an insurance contract 

do not state a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(b) for wrongful 

withholding of “money or property.”2

We take the facts from the Ninth Circuit’s certification order, supplemented by the federal court pleadings. The 

certification order states:

“Plaintiffs are elderly Oregonians or their successors 

who purchased long-term healthcare insurance policies 

sold by [Bankers and its parent company]. These policies 

1 For convenience, we refer to plaintiffs’ claim under ORS 124.110 as a claim 

for “elder financial abuse.”

2 It should go without saying that we express no opinion as to what other 

claims plaintiffs may or may not have against Bankers based on the allegations 

in this case. Plaintiffs asserted other claims in the federal court litigation, but 

none are before us, and our opinion is limited to the issue of whether plaintiffs 

have stated a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(b).
340 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

are designed to provide health services for elderly people 

who can no longer care for themselves and are intended to 

cover expenses for in-home care providers, assisted living 

facilities, and nursing homes.

“Plaintiffs allege that Bankers developed onerous procedures to delay and deny insurance claims. Examples of 

these procedures include failing to answer phone calls, 

losing documents, denying claims without notifying policyholders, denying claims for reasons that did not comport 

with Oregon law, and paying policyholders less than what 

they were owed under their policies. Bankers allegedly collected premium payments and, without good cause, delayed 

and denied insurance benefits to which Plaintiffs were entitled under their policies.”

Bates, 849 F3d at 847.

The federal district court dismissed plaintiffs’ elder 

financial abuse claim for failure to state a claim, concluding 

that Oregon’s elder financial abuse statute applies only in 

the “bailment or trust scenarios expressly referenced in the 

statutory language.” Bates v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 993 

F Supp 2d 1318, 1345 (D Or 2014). Plaintiffs appealed the 

judgment dismissing the elder financial abuse claim, and 

the Ninth Circuit, after briefing and argument, certified the 

question set out above.

Because the certified question asks us to consider 

whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under ORS 124.110

(1)(b), we accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations 

in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Philibert v. Kluser, 360 Or 698, 700, 385 

P3d 1038 (2016). Under that standard, we accept the factual 

assertions in the complaint, including plaintiffs’ allegations 

that Bankers failed to act in good faith and intentionally 

adopted practices that would hinder policyholders in obtaining benefits to which they were contractually entitled. The 

issue before us, then, is the legal question whether Bankers’ 

alleged conduct constitutes elder financial abuse under ORS 

124.110(1)(b).

ORS 124.110 provides, in part:

“(1) An action may be brought under ORS 124.100 for 

financial abuse in the following circumstances:
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 341

“*****

“(b) When a vulnerable person requests that another 

person transfer to the vulnerable person any money or property that the other person holds or controls and that belongs 

to or is held in express trust, constructive trust or resulting trust for the vulnerable person, and the other person, 

without good cause, either continues to hold the money or 

property or fails to take reasonable steps to make the money 

or property readily available to the vulnerable person when:

“(A) The ownership or control of the money or property

was acquired in whole or in part by the other person or 

someone acting in concert with the other person from the 

vulnerable person; and

“(B) The other person acts in bad faith, or knew or 

should have known of the right of the vulnerable person 

to have the money or property transferred as requested or 

otherwise made available to the vulnerable person.”

(Emphasis added.) The successful plaintiff in an elder financial abuse action can recover three times the plaintiff’s economic and noneconomic damages, as well as attorney fees. 

ORS 124.100(2)(a) - (c).

Plaintiffs qualify as vulnerable persons under the 

statute. See ORS 124.100(1)(e) (“vulnerable person” includes 

an “elderly person”); ORS 124.100(1)(a) (“elderly person” 

means a person 65 years of age or older). They claim that 

in imposing various impediments to their efforts to collect 

insurance benefits due to them Bankers retained “money 

or property” that belonged to plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs 

articulate their claim in several slightly different ways, they 

essentially seek to bring themselves within the words of the 

elder financial abuse statute by arguing that the insurance 

benefits that Bankers was contractually obligated to pay 

them constituted “money or property” that “belong[ed] to” 

them. ORS 124.110(1)(b). As they assert, “[P]laintiffs are 

contractually entitled to the benefits under the long-term 

care policies; hence, that money belongs to them.” When 

Bankers did not pay those benefits in a timely manner, they 

contend, Bankers (in the words of the statute) “without 

good cause, either continue[d] to hold the money or property or fail[ed] to take reasonable steps to make the money 
342 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

or property readily available” to them. Id. Because Bankers 

“act[ed] in bad faith, or knew or should have known of the 

right of [plaintiffs] to have the money or property transferred as requested or otherwise made available to [plaintiffs],” ORS 124.110(1)(b)(B), plaintiffs conclude, Bankers 

engaged in elder financial abuse.3

Plaintiffs are straightforward in asserting that 

ORS 124.110(1)(b) provides a cause of action “against insurance companies that wrongfully retain benefits that belong 

to vulnerable shareholders.” They argue that the federal 

district court erred in holding that claims under subsection (1)(b) require that a vulnerable person allege that the 

other persons have “acquired” the money or property “from 

the vulnerable person” and then refused to return it, thus 

limiting such claims to trust and bailment relationships. 

They point out that the statute is not expressly limited to 

those kinds of relationships, but also covers money or property that “belongs to” the vulnerable person. Responding to 

Bankers’ claim that plaintiffs’ interpretation would allow an 

elder financial abuse action whenever an insurance company 

incorrectly denies an insurance claim, plaintiffs emphasize 

that bad faith is a critical element of a financial abuse action. 

This case, they state, is not about mere denials of insurance 

benefits, “but about a systemic bad faith scheme.”

Bankers responds that ORS 124.110(1)(b) simply does not apply to its insurer-insured relationship with 

plaintiffs. Bankers asserts that it does not “hold” or “control” 

any “money or property” owned by plaintiffs; rather, plaintiffs purchased insurance from Bankers in exchange for the 

3 In addition to alleging failure to pay benefits, plaintiffs’ complaint also contains allegations that Bankers improperly required policy holders to continue 

paying premiums—with Bankers sometimes continuing to receive automatic 

withdrawals from plaintiffs’ bank accounts—even though the policies’ “waiver” 

provision suspended premiums while policy holders or their spouses received benefits. The taking and improper withholding of premiums may present a different 

legal issue under ORS 124.110(1)(a) or (b)(B) than plaintiffs’ central claim that 

Bankers violated that statute by failing to pay policy benefits to which they were 

contractually entitled. However, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that 

plaintiffs were not making a claim regarding the wrongful retention of premium 

payments; in any event, that issue is not raised by the certified question, which 

focuses on whether Bankers “delayed the processing of claims and refused to pay 

benefits owed under [the] insurance contract[s].” Accordingly, we do not address 

those allegations.
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 343

payment of premiums. Those payments became Bankers’ 

money, and, in return, plaintiffs received insurance policies. 

Bankers’ obligation, it asserts, is to pay the benefits to which 

plaintiffs are entitled under the policy terms, but that does 

not make the amounts that Bankers is contractually obligated to pay “the money or property” of plaintiffs.

Bankers also points out that the statute specifically 

refers to circumstances in which a person holds a vulnerable 

person’s money or property “in express trust, constructive 

trust or resulting trust,” and argues that those examples 

indicate that the intent of ORS 124.110(1)(b) is not to authorize an elder financial abuse claim in connection with an 

ordinary arms-length consumer transaction, such as the 

purchase of insurance, but only when a person is holding 

money that it has “acquired” from and that “belongs to” the 

vulnerable person or is being held by the other person as a 

trustee or bailee on behalf of the vulnerable person.

Finally, Bankers argues that the use of the article 

“the” in the phrase “the money or property,” which appears 

multiple times in the statute, makes clear that “the money or 

property” that the other person “continue[s] to hold” despite 

the request for its return by the vulnerable person (paragraph (1)(b); subparagraph (1)(b)(B)), is “the money or property” that the other person previously had acquired from the 

vulnerable person (subparagraph (1)(b)(A)). In other words, 

Bankers contends, the statute applies only when a vulnerable person seeks the return of the same money or property 

that he or she transferred to another person, which is not 

the circumstance in this case.

To resolve this interpretive dispute, we begin with 

the text of the statute. A careful reading of the financial 

abuse statute supports the interpretation urged by Bankers.

ORS 124.110(1) provides that an action may be 

brought for “financial abuse” in three different circumstances, only two of which have any relevance to the interpretive exercise here.4

 ORS 124.110(1)(a)—which is not the 

basis for plaintiffs’ claim—allows a financial abuse action 

4 The third circumstance, set out in ORS 124.110(1)(c), is when a person violates a restraining order issued under ORS 124.020 regarding sweepstakes. 
344 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

“[w]hen a person wrongfully takes or appropriates money or 

property of a vulnerable person.” (Emphasis added.) That 

provision’s use of the emphasized words indicates that it 

refers to the improper acquisition by another person of the 

vulnerable person’s money or property—such as by fraud, 

conversion, or theft. See Hoffart v. Wiggins, 226 Or App 545, 

548-49, 204 P3d 173 (2009) (noting that action under subsection (1)(a) requires that any taking must be “wrongful” 

and distinguishing action under subsection (1)(b), which 

does not require initial wrongful taking, but does require 

bad faith refusal to return money acquired from vulnerable 

person when requested).

Paragraph (1)(b), in contrast, applies to circumstances where the vulnerable person entrusts his or her 

money or property to the other person and later requests its 

return, but the other person in bad faith refuses to return it. 

Under that provision, an action for financial abuse requires 

proof of several elements. The first element in time (although 

it appears in the middle of the provision) is that “[t]he ownership or control of the money or property was acquired in 

whole or in part by the other person *** from the vulnerable person.” ORS 124.110(1)(b)(A). That element does not 

require that there be wrongful conduct in the acquisition of 

the money or property, but it does require that the money 

or property at issue be acquired in whole or in part by the 

person from the vulnerable person. The second element is 

the vulnerable person’s request to the other person that the 

other person “transfer” to the vulnerable person any money 

or property that “belongs to” the vulnerable person, and the 

third element is that the other person “without good cause” 

continue to hold the money or property that “belongs to” the 

vulnerable person. ORS 124.110(1)(b). The fourth element is 

that the other person have acted “in bad faith, or knew or 

should have known of the right of the vulnerable person to 

have the money or property transferred as requested.” ORS 

124.110(1)(b)(B).

Plaintiffs’ argument that Bankers’ failure to pay 

insurance benefits to them constitutes elder financial abuse 

runs into an initial, and fatal, textual barrier. Plaintiffs’ 

position essentially reads out of the statute the first element of the claim—that Bankers have acquired “ownership 
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 345

or control of the money or property from [plaintiffs].” If, as 

plaintiffs assert, “the money or property” is their contractual right to receive insurance benefits under the policies, 

Bankers did not “acquire[]” that contractual right “from” 

plaintiffs. Rather, plaintiffs paid insurance premiums to 

Bankers in exchange for insurance policies. Plaintiffs are 

not seeking the return of the money they transferred to 

Bankers in the form of premium payments, but instead the 

contractual benefits they are entitled to under Bankers’ 

insurance policies, which are not the same thing. A “premium” is “[t]he amount paid at designated intervals for 

insurance; esp., the periodic payment required to keep an 

insurance policy in effect.” Blacks’s Law Dictionary 1371 

(10th ed 2009). “Insurance” is “a contract whereby one 

undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified 

or ascertainable amount of benefit upon determinable risk 

contingencies.” ORS 731.102(1). Because “the money or property” that plaintiffs transferred to Bankers—premiums—

is factually and legally different from the insurance policy benefits they now claim Bankers is withholding from 

them, plaintiffs are unable to establish the first element of 

their elder financial abuse claim, and that claim fails at 

the threshold. That, of course, was the basis for the federal 

district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ elder financial abuse 

claim. Bates, 993 F Supp 2d at 1344-45.

Before this court, plaintiffs elaborate on several 

arguments in support of their proposed interpretation of 

the elder financial abuse statute that the federal district 

addressed only summarily or not at all. We turn briefly to 

those contentions. Plaintiffs argue that Bankers “acquired” 

the money or property that “belong[ed] to” plaintiffs at the 

time that Bankers failed to pay (and thus “continue[d] to 

hold”) the insurance benefits that were due to plaintiffs. 

But the statutory phrase “acquired *** from the vulnerable person” suggests a change in possession that is missing from plaintiffs’ reading. Plaintiffs’ interpretation would 

require “acquired” to mean something closer to “retained,” a 

meaning that does not make sense in the context of a statute addressing intentional transfers of money or property 

such as trusts. Moreover, the statutory wording “continues 

to hold” confirms that the statute is focused on the wrongful 
346 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

retention of money or property already owned by the vulnerable person, rather than the failure to pay an obligation 

owed to the vulnerable person, which is the gravamen of 

plaintiffs’ allegations here.

Plaintiffs also argue that the federal district court 

incorrectly interpreted the elder financial abuse statute as 

applying only to money transferred by a vulnerable person 

to another person in “bailment or trust scenarios.” Bates, 

993 F Supp 2d at 1345. In doing so, they seek to expand 

the meaning of the words “money or property” that “belongs 

to” them (and that Bankers wrongfully failed to transfer to 

them) to include the insurance benefits to which they are 

contractually entitled.

Plaintiffs are correct that the words “money or property *** that belongs to ** * the vulnerable person” indicate 

that ORS 124.110(1)(b) may apply outside the strict “trust” 

confines specifically identified in the statute and mentioned 

by the district court, but that does not mean that the statute 

applies here. We often apply the interpretive rule noscitur 

a sociis (“it is known by its associates”), see Antonin Scalia 

and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 

Legal Texts 195 (2012), to help us determine the meaning 

of a word or phrase by considering other words in the same 

sentence or provision. Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc., 

359 Or 694, 702, 375 P3d 463 (2016). The words “belongs 

to” are immediately followed in the statute by a more specific description of circumstances in which the subsection 

applies: “or is held in express trust, constructive trust or 

resulting trust for the vulnerable person.” That context suggests that by including the words “belongs to” the legislature intended the statute to cover circumstances—in addition to an express, constructive, or resulting trust—where 

one person refuses pay money to a vulnerable person. But, 

contrary to plaintiffs’ apparent view that the statute covers

any wrongful failure to pay money owed to a vulnerable 

person, the statute only applies to money or property “that 

the other person holds or controls and that belongs to” the 

vulnerable person, and the trust examples help us understand that “belongs to” at least must be read to apply in 

trust-like situations—and not simply to any failure to pay a 
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 347

contractual or other debt owed to a vulnerable person as a 

result of an arms-length consumer transaction.

That conclusion is reinforced by the statute’s use of 

the article “the” in all but one of the references to “money or 

property.” That usage indicates that the money or property 

at issue must be the money or property of the vulnerable 

person that the other person acquired as the first element of 

an elder financial abuse claim, described above—not money 

or property of the other person (here, Bankers) which that 

person may be obligated by contract to pay to the vulnerable 

person. Given the text and context, it is difficult to escape 

the conclusion that the legislature intended ORS 124.110

(1)(b) to apply only where the other person holds the same 

money or property that the other person acquired from the 

vulnerable person and that still “belongs to” the vulnerable person. As noted, the insurance benefits plainly are not 

the same “money or property” that Bankers acquired from 

plaintiffs. Depending on the policy terms and the individual 

circumstances of plaintiffs, they may have paid insurance 

premiums and yet be contractually entitled to no benefits at 

all—for example, if they never needed long-term care—or 

they may be entitled to benefits far in excess of the premiums 

they paid. That is the nature of insurance. Plaintiffs make 

no coherent legal argument that the legislature intended 

that the inchoate right to receive contractual benefits in 

certain circumstances—here, benefits under an insurance 

policy—is to be equated with “money” for purposes of ORS 

124.110(1)(b). And while such a contract right might be considered “property” in the broadest sense of the word, what 

plaintiffs received in exchange for those premiums were 

insurance policies. Neither those policies, nor plaintiffs’ 

contractual right to benefits under those policies, constituted “the money or property” that Bankers “acquired” from 

plaintiffs, and Bankers’ failure to pay those benefits under 

the contract terms, even if wrongful, therefore was a not a 

violation of the elder financial abuse statute.5

5 In a different federal district court decision involving Oregon’s elder financial abuse statute, the court rejected a claim involving an insurance policy on 

similar grounds:

“Plaintiff’s claim is based on her payment of insurance premiums to State Farm

and State Farm’s alleged refusal to provide sufficient insurance coverage. 
348 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

Plaintiffs also assert that their complaint states a 

claim under the elder financial abuse statute for the same 

reasons as the plaintiffs’ claim in Hoffart. The Court of 

Appeals’ analysis of the statute in that case is entirely consistent with our analysis here, but the facts in Hoffart contrast with those here and demonstrate why Hoffart does not 

support plaintiffs’ claim.

In Hoffart, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had made out an elder financial abuse claim under ORS 

124.110(1)(b) by alleging that they had entrusted money to 

defendants to invest on their behalf, that the defendants 

had agreed to return “the entire sum of money * ** to plaintiffs upon their request,” and that the defendants in bad 

faith had refused to return the principal amount of the 

plaintiffs’ investment. 226 Or App at 547-48.6 Hoffart illustrates a situation where the defendants held and invested 

money that “belonged to” plaintiffs and had agreed to 

return that money on request. Here, however, plaintiffs 

paid insurance premiums to Bankers in exchange for insurance policies, which, as noted, are contracts to pay certain 

These allegations do not assert a claim for wrongfully taken or appropriated 

property, as plaintiff paid those premiums in exchange for coverage under an 

insurance policy. Whether State Farm breached the terms of that policy is 

properly brought as a breach of contract rather an elder abuse claim.”

Yoakam v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., No 6:15-cv-00478-AA, 2017 WL 

132845, at *2 (D Or Jan 11, 2017) (citations omitted). Yoakam apparently involved 

a claim under ORS 124.110(1)(a), rather than ORS 124.110(1)(b), see discussion 

above, 362 Or at 343-44, and thus is not directly relevant here, but its distinction 

between premiums paid for insurance and insurance policy benefits is consistent 

with the discussion in the text.

6 As Hoffart implies, the other person’s obligation to return the “money” that 

he or she acquired from the vulnerable person does not mean that the very same 

actual currency or other legal tender must be returned. Because money is fungible, the obligation can be met by returning the amount of money that the other 

person “holds or controls and that belongs to” the vulnerable person. Relatedly, 

Hoffart did not address, and we need not decide here, whether interest that 

may have accrued on money held on behalf of the vulnerable person also must 

be returned on request, along with the principal, even though the interest was 

not itself “acquired” by the other person from the vulnerable person under ORS 

124.110(1)(b)(A). We note, however, that paragraph (1)(b) refers to the transfer, 

on request, to the vulnerable person of “any money or property the other person 

holds or controls” on behalf of the vulnerable person, and subparagraph (1)(b)(A) 

describes the money at issue as “the money or property [that] was acquired in 

whole or in part by the other person” from the vulnerable person, suggesting that 

the obligation to return money to the vulnerable person may include interest that 

accrued on the acquired money while it was held or controlled by the other person.
Cite as 362 Or 337 (2018) 349

amounts of benefits “upon determinable risk contingencies.” 

ORS 731.102(1). The money plaintiffs paid to Bankers as 

premiums became Bankers’ money; it no longer “belonged 

to” plaintiffs. Bankers comingled that money with premiums paid by other insurance purchasers, spent some on 

operational expenses, and invested the rest; it continued 

to hold the remainder of the money, either as investment 

assets or in reserve funds to pay future claims. In return, 

plaintiffs received insurance policies that gave them contractual rights to insurance benefits.

In sum, plaintiffs’ central argument appears to turn 

on their view that when their circumstances met the policy 

criteria and they became contractually entitled to insurance benefits under the policies that they had purchased 

from Bankers, that contractual right was “money or property” that belonged to them, and Bankers’ failure, in bad 

faith, to transfer that money or property to them on request 

constituted elder financial abuse. Even if we were to accept 

that premise, plaintiffs cannot show that that same money 

or property had been “acquired” by Bankers from them, as 

plainly required by ORS 124.110(1)(b)(A).

Finally, we briefly address competing arguments 

raised by plaintiffs and Bankers based on other aspects 

of the financial abuse statute. Plaintiffs note that various 

categories of persons—such as financial institutions, adult 

foster homes, and health care facilities—have statutory 

immunity from civil elder financial abuse claims, and that 

insurance companies do not, ORS 124.115, suggesting that, 

for that reason, we should find that their complaint states a 

claim against Bankers. Bankers, on the other hand, argues 

at length that the comprehensive regulation of insurance 

companies, including those offering long-term care policies, 

demonstrates that the legislature did not intend disputes 

about benefits under long-term care insurance policies to be 

actionable under the elder financial abuse statute. Neither 

plaintiffs nor Bankers, however, identify any specific provision of the elder financial abuse statute or the insurance 

code that would affect the application of the statute to the 

allegations here or otherwise cause us to modify the statutory interpretation set out above. Those arguments may 

have force in other contexts, but because we conclude that 
350 Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.

the allegations in this complaint do not state a claim for 

relief under ORS 124.110(1)(b), we have no occasion to consider them further in this opinion.

The certified question is answered.