In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1685

PATTI LARDAS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SLAVKO GRCIC, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 193 — William T. Hart, Judge.

____________________

   
2 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

No. 15‐1704

DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,

Debtor‐Appellant,

v.

JOSEPH E. COHEN, Chapter 7 Trustee,

Trustee‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 6958 — William T. Hart, Judge.

____________________

No. 16‐2913

JOHN LAURENCE KIENLEN,

Creditor‐Appellee,

v.

DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,

Debtor‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 10832 — William T. Hart, Judge.

____________________
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 3

No. 16‐4210

PATTI LARDAS,

Plaintiff,

and

DANNY CHRISTOFALOS,

Intervenor‐Appellant,

v.

SLAVKO GRCIC, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 193 — William T. Hart, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and

HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. These four related appeals arise

from a long‐running and acrimonious business dispute be‐

tween appellants Patti Lardas and her nephew Danny Chris‐

tofalos on one side and appellees Slavko Grcic and associates

on the other. Appeal Nos. 15‐1685 (Lardas I) and 15‐1704 (Co‐

hen) were consolidated for oral argument, which took place

on October 28, 2015. Appeal No. 16‐4210 (Lardas II) concerns
4 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

the district court’s denial of a motion by Christofalos to re‐

open proceedings in Lardas I, and we treat it as a successive

appeal. Appeal No. 16‐2913 (Kienlen) is also successive to the

earlier consolidated appeals. We can decide Kienlen and Lar‐

das II without further oral argument. The briefs and record

adequately present the facts and legal issues, and oral argu‐

ment would not significantly aid our decision‐making pro‐

cess. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). We affirm the judgments

and orders on appeal in Lardas I, Lardas II, and Kienlen, and we

dismiss the appeal in Cohen as moot.

I. Lardas I (No. 15‐1685)

In Lardas I, a diversity jurisdiction action, plaintiff Patti

Lardas brought claims of fraudulent inducement and breach

of contract against defendants Slavko Grcic; his sons, Milovan

and Draza Grcic; Thomas Karacic; and Karacic’s employer, the

Amalgamated Bank of Chicago.1

The crux of Lardas’s controlling amended complaint is

that the Grcics tricked her into participating in a global settle‐

ment agreement pursuant to which, among other things, her

nephew Christofalos was to receive a 99% interest in an entity

called Wauconda Shopping Plaza, LLC (“WSP”), with Slavko

Grcic retaining a 1% interest in the entity as well as a lien on

Christofalos’s interest. According to Lardas, the Grcics

hatched an elaborate scheme—along with Karacic and the

Amalgamated Bank—to force WSP to default on a loan and,

ultimately, to foreclose on Christofalos’s 99% stake and have

the Grcics take control.

                                                  1 Christofalos was originally a co‐plaintiff in this action, but the dis‐

trict court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice. Lardas filed

an amended complaint as the sole plaintiff.
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 5

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Lardas

lacked standing to pursue her claims. Though the defendants

cited Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district

court reviewed their motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In so

doing, the court treated the motion as a facial attack on Lar‐

das’s standing, accepting as true the factual allegations in the

amended complaint as well as the contents of the settlement

agreement appended to the complaint. The court took no ad‐

ditional evidence. See Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

572 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Facial challenges require

only that the court look to the complaint and see if the plaintiff

has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.”);

see also Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015)

(“[W]hen evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter juris‐

diction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court should use Twombly–Iq‐

bal’s ‘plausibility’ requirement, which is the same standard

used to evaluate facial challenges to claims under Rule

12(b)(6).”). The district court dismissed Lardas’s case without

prejudice, agreeing with the defendants that Lardas lacked

standing to pursue her claims. Lardas v. Drcic [sic], Nos. 14 C

193 & 14 C 6958, 2015 WL 444321, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2015).

Because the district court decided the question of standing

without resolving factual disputes, we review de novo the

court’s judgment of dismissal. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285,

289 (7th Cir. 2016).

To pursue a civil claim in federal court, a plaintiff must

allege and then prove that she has standing—i.e., that she suf‐

fered a concrete and particularized injury‐in‐fact that is trace‐

able to the defendant’s conduct and that is likely to be re‐

dressed by a favorable decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.

Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–
6 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

81 (2000). Taking Lardas’s allegations at face value, the de‐

fendants schemed to deprive her nephew Christofalos of his

interest in WSP. The problem here is that Lardas had no cur‐

rent or even contingent interest in WSP. In fact, Lardas had

transferred her entire interest in a predecessor entity to Chris‐

tofalos back in 2000. She never held a stake in WSP itself.

Through the settlement agreement, Lardas released any and

all claims (known and unknown) against the Grcics in ex‐

change for their release of any and all claims (known and un‐

known) against her. She does not allege that the Grcics vio‐

lated the terms of that exchange by, for instance, suing her or

otherwise seeking to recover anything from her.

In a post‐judgment motion for reconsideration, which the

district court correctly treated as a motion under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 59(e), Lardas argued for the first time that

Christofalos was a third‐party beneficiary of her settlement

agreement with the Grcics, such that the alleged scheme to

deprive Christofalos of his interest in WSP in turn deprived

Lardas of the benefit of her bargain. As a procedural matter,

Lardas should have raised this argument during the initial

briefing on defendants’motion to dismiss. Rule 59(e) does not

entitle a party to advance after judgment a non‐jurisdictional

argument that could have been presented prior to judgment.

See Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 233 F.3d

524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). A Rule 59(e) motion may allow a dis‐

trict judge to exercise discretion to consider such a new argu‐

ment. E.g., Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 683 F.3d 805, 813

(7th Cir. 2012); see also Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651,

658–60 (7th Cir. 2013) (same point for Rule 60(b)). Cases such

as Miller and Mendez show, however, that this is a matter of

judicial discretion, not a party’s entitlement.
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 7

In any event, the new argument is without merit. Chris‐

tofalos was himself a party to the same settlement agree‐

ment—not a third‐party beneficiary—and he paid $600,000

for the LLC membership interest he acquired from Slavko

Grcic. Even if we assume that Christofalos might have had his

own claims against Grcic or others arising from the settlement

agreement (and any such claims would have wound up in his

bankruptcy estate, addressed in the other related appeals),

Lardas has alleged no injury personal to her. Nor has she of‐

fered any plausible reason why she should be able to assert a

claim on behalf of Christofalos. Lardas lacks standing to pur‐

sue the claims she asserts, and the district court correctly dis‐

missed her case. That dismissal is AFFIRMED.

II. Cohen (No. 15‐1704)

Before Grcic and his associates could perfect their sup‐

posed scheme to acquire Christofalos’s interest in WSP, Chris‐

tofalos filed for bankruptcy protection. Cohen represents a

challenge by Christofalos to a bankruptcy court order issued

under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) authorizing the trustee to sell Chris‐

tofalos’s interest in WSP, as well as any interest he might have

in the Lardas litigation and a separate state court case. The

buyers? None other than the Grcics, who paid $15,000 for

these assets in what might have been an attempt to buy peace.

Christofalos’s appeal of the sale order rests on two rather

remarkable premises. He argues first that by listing his stake

in WSP as an exempt asset worth just one dollar, he actually

was putting all interested parties on notice that he sought an

“unlimited exemption” for that property, regardless of what

the property might be worth or what it might potentially sell

for. He argues second that the Grcics paid too much for the
8 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

assets they acquired—the implication being that the bank‐

ruptcy court should have ordered the trustee to drive an eas‐

ier bargain and settle for less money for the estate’s creditors

in the process. The bankruptcy court rejected Christofalos’s

arguments on their merits, and the district court affirmed.

2015 WL 444321, at *3–4.

We do not reach the merits. Christofalos’s challenge to the

trustee’s sale is moot. See DJL Farm LLC v. U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, 813 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2016) (per cu‐

riam) (“[A] case must be dismissed ‘if an event occurs while a

case is pending ... that makes it impossible for the court to

grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.’”) (ci‐

tations omitted).2

                                                  2 Federal district courts exercise appellate jurisdiction over “final

judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy judges in “cases

and proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Federal circuit courts of appeals in

turn exercise appellate jurisdiction over “final decisions, judgments, or‐

ders, and decrees” entered by district judges in their appellate capacity.

§ 158(d)(1); see also Smith v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 845 F.3d 256,

2016 WL 7404760, at *2 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In the bankruptcy context, both

the bankruptcy court decision and the district court decision must be fi‐

nal.”). Christofalos’s appeal in Cohen concerns not a final order of the

bankruptcy court granting or denying a discharge butrather an event dur‐

ing the life of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy—the sale of an asset. While in pre‐

vious cases we have recognized that an order approving or denying sale

of a debtor’s property is immediately appealable, the Supreme Court’s re‐

cent decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015),

could be read to create a question about the viability of those prior hold‐

ings. Bullard held that an order declining to approve a proposed Chapter

13 repayment plan is not immediately appealable. The Court concluded

that the relevant “proceeding,” within the meaning of section 158(a), is the

“entire process culminating in confirmation or dismissal.” Id. at 1693. At

oral argument, we asked the parties whether the logic of Bullard extends
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 9

Christofalos opposed the sale of his interest in WSP

through a motion to compel the trustee to abandon that prop‐

erty and through an objection to the trustee’s motion to sell.

The bankruptcy court denied the motion to compel abandon‐

ment and approved the sale over Christofalos’s objection. At

that point, if Christofalos wanted to seek judicial review of the

sale order, he should have moved for a stay pursuant to Fed‐

eral Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(a)(1)(A), thereby pre‐

serving the status quo.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), the reversal on appeal of an au‐

thorized sale “does not affect the validity of a sale ... to an

entity that purchased ... property in good faith ... unless such

authorization and such sale ... were stayed pending appeal.”

In light of this safe harbor provision, we have “repeatedly

held that when a party challenges the bankruptcy court’s or‐

der approving the sale of estate property to a good faith pur‐

chaser, it must obtain a stay of that order pending appeal, lest

the sale proceed and the appeal become moot.” In re River

West Plaza‐Chicago, LLC, 664 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011), quot‐

ing In re CGI Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994)

(collecting cases).

The safe harbor in section 363(m) does not apply if the sale

was not conducted in good faith. Hower v. Molding Systems En‐

gineering Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2006). But the

good faith requirement is narrow, addressing only the buyer’s

integrity during the course of the sale proceedings. “Typically,

                                                 

to the approval of discrete asset sales, and we ordered supplemental brief‐

ing on the question. We do not resolve here the extent to which Bullard

may affect the immediate appealability of a sale order because we find

that Christofalos’s challenge is moot. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal

on that well‐trodden ground.
10 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

the misconduct that would destroy a purchaser’s good faith

status ... involves fraud, collusion between the purchaser and

other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly un‐

fair advantage of other bidders.” In re Andy Frain Services, Inc.,

798 F.2d 1113, 1125 (7th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

Christofalos did not request a stay of the sale order. In‐

stead, the sale was consummated, and the Grcics are now ac‐

tively managing the shopping plaza and its tenants. Money

has changed hands, years have passed, and third parties have

acted in reliance on the sale.

Christofalos argues that the Grcics acted in bad faith by

offering $15,000 for an asset he believes to have been under‐

water. Christofalos’s argument is not legally sound, and it

makes no sense on the facts of this case. He cites no case or

other authority for the proposition that a buyer who pays (in

the debtor’s view) too much for an asset acts in bad faith to‐

ward the debtor or other creditors. There may be perfectly

good reasons to pay something for a highly leveraged asset

that is currently worthless. Fair market values rise and fall,

and the purchase allows the buyer to make an investment that

may pay off if the value later rises.

As a factual matter, moreover, even if the shopping plaza

was financially underwater in 2014, that is not the actual asset

the trustee sold: rather, the trustee sold Christofalos’s interest

in WSP, which was apparently encumbered only by the lien

in Slavko Grcic’s favor, and which was part of a package. The

package of assets the trustee sold included three separate as‐

sets of the bankruptcy estate: Christofalos’s interest in WSP

and his interest in two lawsuits against the Grcics. The Grcics

paid $15,000 not only to acquire WSP but also to terminate the

litigation against them. Parties in civil cases often choose to
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 11

pay relatively small sums to settle claims, even claims that

seem far‐fetched or vexatious. We cannot understand how, in

paying $15,000 for two unliquidated claims and an asset that

Christofalos swore was worth only one dollar, the Grcics

could be the parties who might be deemed to have acted in

bad faith. There is no evidence that their conduct in the bank‐

ruptcy proceedings perpetrated a fraud on anyone, amounted

to collusion with the trustee, or caused an unfair disadvantage

to other bidders, of which there were none. See In re Andy

Frain Services, Inc., 798 F.2d at 1125.

In its sale order, the bankruptcy court explicitly found that

the Grcics were “good faith purchasers” and that the sale was

“conducted at arms‐length without fraud, collusion, or undue

influence by the purchasers.” The bankruptcy court reached

these findings after three hearings and the submission of affi‐

davits by the Grcics, the contents of which Christofalos failed

to rebut. These findings are reviewable only for clear error,

Hower, 445 F.3d at 938, and there was no such error here. The

Grcics purchased Christofalos’s interests in WSP and the two

lawsuits in good faith, and Christofalos failed to seek a stay

pending appellate review. His challenge to the trustee sale is

moot, and his appeal is DISMISSED.

III. Kienlen (No. 16‐2913)

In Kienlen, Christofalos challenges the bankruptcy court’s

November 23, 2015 order following an adversary proceeding

brought by J. Laurence Kienlen, a creditor. The bankruptcy

court conducted a trial on the adversary complaint pursuant

to Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and

it made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1). The court entered

judgment in Kienlen’s favor, denying Christofalos’s petition
12 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

for a Chapter 7 discharge. The court based its denial on 11

U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A), which authorizes denial of discharge

where the debtor has “knowingly and fraudulently ... made

a false oath or account.” See Stamat v. Neary, 635 F.3d 974, 978

(7th Cir. 2011) (to prevail on a § 727(a)(4)(A) claim, an object‐

ing party must establish that “(1) the debtor made a statement

under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor knew

the statement was false; (4) the debtor made the statement

with fraudulent intent; and (5) the statement related materi‐

ally to the bankruptcy case”) (citation omitted). The district

court affirmed the denial of discharge. Christofalos v. Kienlen,

No. 15 C 10832, 2016 WL 3268164, at*3 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2016).

We review de novo the district court’s judgment; we likewise

review de novo the bankruptcy court’s legal determinations,

but we review its findings of fact for clear error. In re Herman,

737 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2013); Zedan v. Habash, 529 F.3d 398,

403 (7th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

In its order denying discharge, the bankruptcy court ob‐

served that Christofalos made a “host of false statements and

omissions in his schedules and statement of financial affairs.”

For instance, the court found that Christofalos falsely repre‐

sented that he had issued no financial statements to financial

institutions within two years of his petition. Christofalos also

grossly undervalued his real property located in Mundelein,

Illinois. He failed to identify a source of rental income, omit‐

ted a property located in Florida, and falsely asserted that he

had relinquished all interest in another property following his

divorce. He also omitted a vehicle and falsely represented that

he had no contingent and unliquidated claims. The bank‐

ruptcy court found as a matter of fact after trial that Christofa‐

los knew these representations were false and that he made
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 13

them with fraudulent intent. The court explained: “Christofa‐

los could not have cared less whether his schedules and state‐

ment of financial affairs were accurate.”

On appeal, Christofalos quarrels with some of the bank‐

ruptcy court’s factual findings, but without citing record evi‐

dence.3 He nevertheless concedes that he made multiple er‐

rors in his bankruptcy disclosures. To obtain reversal, he con‐

tends that these errors were “completely inconsequential and

immaterial” because they worked neither to his benefit nor to

the detriment of any creditor.

                                                  3 Christofalos designated only the adversary pleadings, the transcript

of the bankruptcy court’s November 23, 2015 oral decision, and the bank‐

ruptcy court’s subsequent judgment as the record on appeal in the district

court. He did not designate or otherwise produce any transcripts or exhib‐

its from the trial, either in the district court or in this court. We cannot

entertain claims that factual findings were clearly erroneous when the

party claiming error fails to include in the appellate record the evidence

we would need to evaluate the claim. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1)(A),

(b)(1)(A) (providing that the bankruptcy appellant must designate items

to be included in the record on appeal and must order transcripts of “such

parts of the proceedings ... as the appellant considers necessary for the

appeal”); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(b)(5) (“If the appellant intends to

argue on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evi‐

dence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant must include in the rec‐

ord a transcript of all relevant testimony and copies of all relevant exhib‐

its.”); cf. In re Dorner, 343 F.3d 910, 912, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2003) (where bank‐

ruptcy clerk failed to transmit record that debtor‐appellant had desig‐

nated, but where appellant failed to supplement record on appeal in cir‐

cuit court and “elected to proceed as if there were no problem,” circuit

court found on skeletal record “no reason to think that the bankruptcy

judge committed a clear error or abused his discretion”); id. at 914–15 (“A

litigant whose position in the court of appeals depends on extra‐record

evidence loses forthwith.”).
14 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

That assertion is not plausible. If Christofalos had suc‐

ceeded in concealing or misrepresenting his assets, he might

well have obtained a discharge while at the same time retain‐

ing property that rightfully belonged to the bankruptcy estate

for the benefit of his creditors. In any case, materiality in the

bankruptcy context has a broad meaning: “a fact is material

‘if it bears a relationship to the debtor’s business transactions

or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business deal‐

ings, or the existence and disposition of the debtor’s prop‐

erty.’” Stamat, 635 F.3d at 982, quoting Retz v. Samson (In re

Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Skavysh v. Katsman

(In re Katsman), 771 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing

that fraud in the bankruptcy context encompasses intent to

deceive, which “need not connote intending to obtain a pecu‐

niary benefit”). The bankruptcy court was notrequired to find

an affirmative detriment to Christofalos’s creditors (or an af‐

firmative benefit to Christofalos) in concluding that Christofa‐

los made fraudulent statements within the meaning of

§ 727(a)(4)(A). After all, the “successful functioning of the

Bankruptcy Code hinges both upon the bankrupt’s veracity

and his willingness to make a full disclosure.” Stamat, 635 F.3d

at 983 (citation omitted).

Christofalos pleads for clemency, contending that it was

not he but his attorney who could not have “‘cared less’ about

the accuracy of the schedules” and that it would be a “gross

injustice to penalize Christofalos for the incompetence of his

counsel.” The brief making this argument was filed by the

same attorney, Maurice Salem, who accuses himself of incom‐

petence. Whether attorney Salem committed malpractice or

violated the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct is not be‐

fore this court. But Salem himself testified in the adversary

proceeding that he reviewed the schedules and statement of
Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210 15

financial affairs with his client, paragraph by paragraph. That

evidently unrebutted testimony supports the bankruptcy

court’s conclusion that Christofalos’s misstatements were not

inadvertent but were intentional and fraudulent. The denial

of Christofalos’s petition for a Chapter 7 discharge is

AFFIRMED. Given the gravity of the apparent misconduct

here, we are referring this case to the United States Attorney

for the Northern District of Illinois for further review.

IV. Lardas II (No. 16‐4210)

In Lardas II, Christofalos appeals the denial of his “Motion

to Reopen Case and Assign a Receiver” and his subsequent

motion for reconsideration, both of which he filed in Lardas’s

case in district court while that case remained under advise‐

ment in this court in Appeal No. 15‐1685. Christofalos cited

no authority for his “Motion to Reopen.” Because he is no

longer a plaintiff in his aunt’s case—the district court dis‐

missed the original complaint and Lardas re‐filed as sole

plaintiff—we assume he sought both permissive intervention

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) and then relief

from a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). The district

court denied Christofalos’s motions, Lardas v. Grcic, No. 14 C

193, 2016 WL 7367946, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016). Having

reviewed the district court’s decision and Christofalos’s brief,

we summarily affirm.

The relief Christofalos seeks would be unusual under any

circumstances. “Permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) is

wholly discretionary,” Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Bab‐

bitt, 214 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000), while Rule 60(b) provides

an “extraordinary remedy” for exceptional situations,

Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009) (cita‐
16 Nos. 15‐1685, 15‐1704, 16‐2913, 16‐4210

tion omitted). Christofalos asserts that he is entitled to inter‐

vene in his aunt’s lawsuit because the bankruptcy trustee

“abandoned” his claim against the Grcics. That assertion is

simply wrong. As noted, the trustee sold Christofalos’s claim,

along with his interest in WSP and another lawsuit, to the

Grcics. We dismiss as moot Christofalos’s challenge to that

sale. Christofalos has no remaining interest in his prior claim.

We also affirm the dismissal of Lardas’s suit for lack of stand‐

ing, so even if Christofalos had some remaining claim, there

is no live case in which he might intervene. The district court

was right to deny Christofalos’s last‐ditch effort to prolong

this multi‐front litigation. The district court’s decision is

AFFIRMED.