alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Eleftherios Doukas, Appellant, v America on Wheels, Levittown, New York, Inc., Respondent.

*779The plaintiff alleges that he sustained a dislocated shoulder and consequential nerve damage when he fell at the defendant’s roller skating rink. At the time of the fall, the plaintiff was taking a lesson, for which he had paid the defendant an additional fee. According to the plaintiff, when he began to lose his balance, he reached out for the railing, pursuant to his teacher’s instructions. He heard a "big crack” and then fell to the floor. The plaintiff’s expert, who has a PhD in physical education and teaches roller skating to novice skaters, testified that beginners should never be given instructions in close proximity to the railing, nor should they be told to grab the railing because injuries are more likely to result from contact with the railing than would result in a free fall. The expert was not permitted to testify as to whether the act of reaching for the rail caused plaintiff’s injury.

After the jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, the court set aside the verdict and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to make out a prima facie case. We reverse.

"To set aside a verdict on grounds of insufficiency, the reviewer must find 'that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial’ ” *(O’Boyle v Avis Rent-A-Car Sys.,*78 AD2d 431, 438-439, quoting from *Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499). Moreover, the evidence must be viewed from the perspective most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences resolved in his favor *(see, Negri v Stop & Shop,*65 NY2d 625; *O’Neil v Port Auth.,*111 AD2d 375).

Here, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant’s instruction was negligent. Consequently, the trial court erred when it dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. However, because the court failed to charge the jury that it also had to find that the negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, we cannot reinstate the verdict in his favor *(cf. Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,*50 NY2d 507, 520; *Galioto v Lakeside Hosp.,*123 AD2d 421), and there must be a new trial.

Finally, we reject the plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff’s expert lacked the requisite medical expertise to testify as to his opinion of the cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Questions concerning the qualifications of an expert witness are within the ambit of the trial court’s discretion *(see, Tarlowe v Metropoli*
      *780
      *tan Ski Slopes,*28 NY2d 410; *People v Diaz, 70*AD2d 885, *affd*51 NY2d 841), and in this case the court did not exercise its discretion in an unreasonable manner. Mollen, P. J., Brown, Niehoff and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JoAnn Bockeno, Appellant.

Memorandum: The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree; from it the jury could reasonably infer that she engaged in sexual contact for the purpose of sexual gratifica*1009tion. Although defendant was charged under the indictment with committing sexual abuse while “acting in concert” with codefendant, the court did not err by instructing the jury to determine her guilt or innocence based on her separate criminal conduct. The proof supported the court’s charge and defendant was convicted of crimes for which she was indicted *(see, People v Duncan,*46 NY2d 74, 79-80, *cert denied*442 US 910; *People v Iannone,*45 NY2d 589, 594-595; *cf. People v Lewis,*105 AD2d 758). Finally, we reaffirm our prior holding that the capacity of the child witnesses to testify under oath had been established *(see, People v Bockeno,*107 AD2d 1051). Defense counsel did not object to the voir dire examination by the Trial Judge of the children in the presence of the jury. This issue is not properly preserved for our review upon the law (CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v West, 56*NY2d 662, 663) and reversal is not warranted in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). We have examined the other contentions raised by defendant and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Gorman, J.— sexual abuse, first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Doerr, Boomer and Schnepp, JJ.
# C_2009322EN.01001301.xml

| 30.12.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 322/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.12.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 322/13

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5421 — Panasonic/Sanyo)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 322/03

On 29 September 2009, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5421. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5421. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the  incorporation  by reference in  Registration  Statement  Nos.
333-76820, 333-54092, 333-36462, 333-45511,  333-100637,  333-89478, 333-106138,
333-108411,  333-110115  and  333-111416  of Altair  Nanotechnologies  Inc.  and
subsidiaries  on Form S-3,  Registration  Statement Nos.  333-64495,  333-33481,
333-99099,  and 333-108419 of Altair  Nanotechnologies  Inc. and subsidiaries on
Form S-8 of our report dated March 10, 2004,  appearing in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Altair  Nanotechnologies  Inc. and  subsidiaries for the year ended
December 31, 2003.



/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
------------------------------
Salt Lake, Utah
March 25, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND FOR THE YEAR THEN
ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
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</TABLE>
## In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 14

- 00103

- CV

NANCY HART AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS, Appellant

V.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Rockwall County, Texas

Trial Court No. C114

- 089

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess2 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nancy Hart, appellant, has filed a motion seeking to dismiss this appeal. 1 Pursuant to Rule

42.1(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the motion is granted. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P.

42.1(a)(1).

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Ralph K. Burgess

Justice

Date Submitted: April 7, 2015

Date Decided: April 8, 2015

1 Originally appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court

pursuant to its docket equalization e fforts. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 73.001 (West 2013). We are unaware of

any conflict between precedent of the Fifth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 41.3.
Exhibit 32

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the foregoing Report
on Form 10-Q pursuant to Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 or any other securities law.

Each of the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Broadway Financial Corporation at the dates
and for the periods indicated.



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: August 14, 2009 |  | By:  /s/ Paul C. Hudson
|                      |  | Paul C. Hudson         
|                      |  | Chief Executive Officer
|                      | 
|Date: August 14, 2009 |  | By:  /s/ Samuel Sarpong
|                      |  | Samuel Sarpong         
|                      |  | Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7164

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

JULIAN ESTER MAE SMITH, a/k/a Pinky,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

Chief District Judge. (CR-96-5-2-V-5)

Submitted: October 21, 1997 Decided: November 25, 1997

Before HAMILTON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Julian Ester Mae Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Harry Thomas Church,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court's order denying for lack

of jurisdiction Appellant's motion for a reduction in sentence. We

have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. United States v. Smith, No. CR-96-5-2-V-5 (W.D.N.C.

July 30, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2



Informational Addendum to Report on Form 10-Q

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Not Filed Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934



The undersigned Chief Financial Officer of OYO Geospace Corporation does hereby certify as follows:



Solely for the purpose of meeting the requirements of Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and solely to the extent this certification may be applicable to this Report on Form 10-Q, the undersigned hereby certify that this Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in this Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of OYO Geospace Corporation.



/s/ Thomas T. McEntireName:

Thomas T. McEntireTitle:

Chief Financial OfficerFebruary 8, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the March
31, 1997 Financial Statements included in Form 10-Q and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
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<PP&E>                                           5,265
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,995
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,396
<BONDS>                                          3,860
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                         2,899
<OTHER-SE>                                         242
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,995
<SALES>                                              0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    20
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    12
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  55
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    136
<INCOME-TAX>                                        57
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 80
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        80
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .68
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .68
        

</TABLE>
1

GLEN CANYON DAM AMWG AD HOC COMMITTEE

TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HUMPBACK CHUB

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

ATTENDANCE LIST

NAME REPRESENTING PHONE 

Sam Spiller FWS 602/841-5329 sam_spille

Rob Clarkson USBR 602/216-3858 rclarkson@Paul Marsh ASU 480/965-2977 fish.dr@asPam Hyde Southwest Rivers 928/214-6492 pam@souMike Yeatts Hopi Tribe 928/523-6573 michael.yeRandy Peterson USBR 801/524-3758 rpeterson@Rick Johnson GCT 928/774-7736 johnson@Don Metz FWS 602/242-0210 don_metz@Glen Knowles FWS 602/242-0210 glen_knowSteve Gloss GCMRC-USGS 928/556-7069 sgloss@usMark Steffen Trout 928/522-0617 steffenflyrTom Czapla UCRRP 303/969-7322 X228 tom_czaplBill Davis CREDA 480/733-6666 X122 bdavis@eGary Burton WAPA 720/962-7259 burton@wLloyd Greiner CREDA 623/975-7469 lgreiner1@
1 

HUMPBACK CHUB MEETING TO DISCUSS COMPLIANCE POLICY 

AND REMOVAL/MANAGEMENT CONCERNS/NEEDS 

FEBRUARY 13, 2003 

ATTENDANCE LIST 

NAME REPRESENTING PHONE E-MAIL 

Nick Carrillo FWS 602/841-5009 nick_carrillo@fws.go

v

Don Metz FWS 602/242-0210 don_metz@fws.gov

Glen Knowles FWS 602/242-0210 glen_knowles@fws.g

ov

Debra Bills FWS 602/242-0210 debra_bills@fws.gov

Richard Valdez RAVA 435/752-9606 valdezra@aol.com

Bruce D. Taubert AZG&FD 602/789-3301 btaubert@gf.state.az.

us

Bill Persons AZG&FD 602/789-3375 bpersons@gf.state.az

.us

Bob Broscheid AZG&FD 602/789-3605 bbroscheid@gf.state.

az.us

Rob Simmonds FWS 928/367-1953 rob_simmonds@fws.

gov

Steve Gloss GCMRC-USGS 928/556-7069 sgloss@usgs.gov

Randy Peterson USBR 801/524-3758 rpeterson@uc.usbr.g

ov

Pam Sponholtz FWS 926/556-7456 pam_sponholtz@fws.

gov

Sam Spiller FWS 602/841-5329 sam_spiller@fws.gov
GLEN CANYON DAM AMWG AD HOC COMMITTEE

TO DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE HUMPBACK CHUB

FEBRUARY 12, 2003

ATTENDANCE LIST

2

Bruce D. Taubert AZG&FD 602/789-3301 btaubert@Bill Werner AZG&FD 602/789-3607 bwerner@Fred Worthley GRB-CA 818/543-4676Bill Persons AZG&FD 602/789-3375 bpersons@Rich Valdez RAVA/SWCA 435/752-9606 valdezra@Rob Simmonds FWS 928/367-1953 rob_simmPam Sponholtz FWS 926/556-7456 pam_sponClayton Palmer WAPA 801/524-3522 cspalmer@Wayne Cook UCRC 801/531-1150 wcook@u
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abraham HOLLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-30092.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 2007.*

Filed April 19, 2007.

Helen J. Brunner, Esq., Carl H. Blackstone, Esq., USSE-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jerome Kuh, Esq., Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tacoma, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Franklin D. Burgess, District *742Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-03-05311-FDB.

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Abraham Holley appeals from the 59-month sentence imposed following remand under *United States v. Ameline,*409 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Holley contends that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.2, for reckless endangerment during flight. We disagree. The record shows that Holley resisted arrest and attempted to flee by driving erratically, at high speed, and on the wrong side of the road. Based on these facts, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in applying the § 3C1.2 enhancement. *See United States v. Reyes-Oseguera,*106 F.3d 1481, 1483-84 (9th Cir.1997) (reviewing for clear error the district court’s factual determination that defendant’s conduct constituted reckless endangerment under § 3C1.2 and holding that the adjustment is proper if the defendant’s behavior while resisting arrest recklessly creates a substantial risk to a law enforcement officer or other persons).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Cregan *v.*Marston *et al.*

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.*

July 18, 1890.)

Master and Servant—Personal Injuries—Defective Apparatus.

Deceased was shoveling coal for defendants, in the hold of a canal-boat, and the coal was raised in buckets attached to rope falls operated by steam. One of these falls broke, and a bucket fell on deceased, killing him. The fall that broke was worn on the outside, and pulpy on the inside, and its condition was known to the engineer, whose duty it was to inspect the ropes, and renew them when worn. Defendants provided new and good ropes for this purpose, which the engineer could get on application. Held, that defendants were liable for the negligence of the engineer in permitting the continued use of a defective rope.

Appeal from circuit court, Kings county.

Action by Margaret E. Cregan as administratrix of Patrick Cregan, deceased, against William H. Marston and others, for the wrongful death of her husband. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Deceased was engaged in shoveling coal into buckets in the hold of a canal-boat. These buckets were raised by a rope fall operated by a steam-engine. The fall attached to one of the buckets broke, and the bucket fell on deceased, killing him instantly. The hoisting machinery, including the rope falls, was in charge of the engineer, whose duty it was to examine the ropes, and replace old and worn ones with new, which were kept on hand for that purpose. The rope that broke was worn on the outside, and pulpy on the inside, and this was known to the engineer.

Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Pratt and Dtkman, JJ.

*C. Godfrey Patterson,*for appellants. *Charles J. Patterson,*for respondent.

Pratt, J.

The cases of *Daley*v. *Railroad Co.,*147 Mass. 101, 16 N. E. Rep. 690; *Baker*v. *Railroad Co.,*95 Pa. St. 211; and *Car Co.*v. *Parker,*100 Ind. 181,—are all .in point to show that the circuit judge properly laid down the law to the jury. The general principle on which those cases go is well settled in the courts of this state. The duty of supplying proper machinery to employes rests upon the master, and cannot be so delegated as to shift the responsibility. The rule is a beneficent one, and any restriction of it would be contrary to sound policy, and principles of humanity. The fact that sound machinery could have been obtained and used by the engineer upon application is not enough to relieve defendants from responsibility. The charge to the jury was as favorable to defendants as- they had a right to demand, and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs. All concur.