UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAINT JERMAINE ENDELEY Plaintiff ,

v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE and NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE, Defendants. Civil Action No. 17-733 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION On April 6, 2017, the United States fired fifty-nine Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Al Shayrat airfield in Syria. See Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. Strike in Syria, Release No. NR-126-17 (Apr. 6, 2017). 1 In a statement announcing the missile strike, President Trump explaine d that Syria had “launched a ho rrible chemical weapons attack” on its own citizens and that, in re sponse, he had “ordered a ta rgeted military strike on the airfield in Syria from where the chemi cal attack was launched.” Stateme nt by President Trump on Syria, White House, Office of the P ress Secretary (Apr. 6, 2017). 2 The purpose of the missile strike, as President Trump further explai ned, was “to prevent and deter th e spread and use of deadly chemical weapons.” Id. President Trump did not seek authorization from Congress befo re

1 Available at https://www.defense.gov/News/N ews-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/1144598/statement-fr om-pentagon-spokesman-capt-jef f-davis-on-us-strike-in-syria (last visited Aug. 2, 2017).

2 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pr ess-office/2017/04/06/stateme nt-presidenttrump-syria (las t visited Aug. 2, 2017).2 ordering the strike, nor did he identify any preexisting congre ssional authorizati on for the use of military force. Four days after the strike, plai ntiff Saint Jermaine Endeley f iled this pro se action against the Department of Defense and the National Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency. 3 See Dkt. 2. Plaintiff alleges that the missile strike “was uncons titutional under [t]he War Powers Resolution because the President did not seek approv al from Congress;” that “[t]he office of the President has publicly admitted more military act ion is to follow;” and that “[t]he President does not have authority to launch a war in Syria with out a resolution from Congress.”
Id . at 3. In addition, he alleges th at “[t]he Department of Defe nse illegally used [t]he Patriot Act and unconstitutionally expanded [its] authority under the provi sions of the law.” Id. Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an “injunction ending military ac tion against the government of Syria” and barring “any further military action . . . without a pproval from Congress through a resolution.” Id. at 4. Viewing the complaint in the li ght most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that it fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter ju risdiction. Accordi ngly, the Court will, on its own motion, DISMISS the action for lac k of jurisdiction. 4

3 Although the caption of the complaint refers to the National Clandestine Service, the substantive averments of the complaint make no mention of it.

4 The Court concludes that Plaintiff has established that he is “unable to pay [th e filing] fee[]” typically required t o initiate a civil ac tion in this court, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see also id. § 1914, and will therefore grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis , see Dkt. 1.3 I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Plaintiff commenced this action on April 10, 2017, by filing su it in the United States District Court for the South ern District of New York. Dkt. 2. He alleges that four days earlier, “[o]n April 6, 2017, [t]he defense de partment launched approxim ately [fifty-nine] Tomahawk missiles into Syria as a respons e to President Bashir Al-Assad’ s recent chemical attack on civilians.” Id. at 3. This “attack” represented “ part of [President Trump’s] strategy of deterrence against the use of chemical w eapons by the Syrian government” a nd, according to Plaintiff, resulted in the “destr[uction] [ of] an airbase that belonged to a Syrian government institution.”
Id. He further alleges that the P resident “did not seek approval from Congress” before ordering the strike, id. , and that allegation is indisput ably correct. As the Presiden t explained in his notice to Congress (which is subj ect to judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201), in ordering the strike, he relied on his “constitutional aut hority to conduct foreign rela tions and” to serve “as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.” L etter from the President to th e Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Apr. 8, 2017). 5 In that same notice, moreover, the President cautioned that he was prepared to “take additional ac tion, as necessary and appropriate, to further [the] important nati onal interests” of the United St ates. Id. Expanding on that statement, Plaintiff avers that “the office of the President ha s publicly admitted more military action is to follow.” Dkt. 2 at 3. Recognizing the need to plead fact s sufficient to establish Art icle III standing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actio ns have caused him to “suffer[]” injury. Id. In particular, he

5 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pr ess-office/2017/04/08/letter-p resident-speakerhouse-representatives-and-presiden t-pro-tempore (last visited A ug. 2, 2017).4 contends that “[his] firm has adiplomatic mission to remove Pr esident Assad by delegitimizing his government and ensuring a fr ee election where the Syrian pe ople can elect a new leader” and that, in pursuit of this mission, “[his] firm is currently [eng aged] in lobbying efforts with the United States government and [ the] United Nations.” Id. Those efforts have been “complicate[d]” by the April 6 strike, according to Plaintiff, because “[t]he government of Syria is less likely to listen to United States officials if” U.S. mi litary forces are “attacking [Syrian] government institutions.” Id. He asserts that both the airstri kes and the potential for furth er attacks on Syrian government institutions have “create[d] more obstacles to an eventual peace deal” and have thus required th at his firm devote additional “t ime, labor, and money” to the firm’s “diplomatic mission.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges th at he has “spent significant tim e, labor, [and] money on ensuring goo d government practices in the United States government” and that “it is [his] job t o regulate administra tive agencies when they act unconstitutionally.” Id. On April 11, 2017, the United States District Court for the Sou thern District of New York transferred Plaintiff’s suit to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1406(a) on the ground that venue is proper here but not in New Yo rk. Dkt. 3 at 2. The transfer ring court did not rule on Plaintiff’s pending motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis , see Dkt. 1, noting that “[w]hether [Plaintiff] should be permitted to pr oceed further without paym ent of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court,” Dkt. 3 at 2. Although it is the Court’s responsibility to effect service on behalf of litigants proceeding in forma pauperis , 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the Court has postponed doing so pending its eva luation of the threshold juri sdictional issues discussed below.5 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Plaintiff’s claims require s ome parsing. To start, it is uncle ar whether he intends to assert a stand-alone claim under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitut ion, 6 or, instead, merely intends to assert statutory claims. He alle ges, for example, that the mis sile strike “was unconstitutional under [t]he War Powers Resolution ” and that “[t]he Executiv e Branch acted without constitutional authority required under [t]he War Powers Resolution .” Dkt. 2 at 3 (emphases added). Although one might reasonabl y construe these allegatio ns only to assert a claim “under the War Powers Resolution,” and n ot a separate claim under Arti cle I, Section 8, the Court is required to construe Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and, accordingly, will assume that he i ntends to allege bot h statutory and constitutional claims. Plaintiff also asserts that the U nited States’ missile strike o n Syria was an “unconstitutional[] expan[sion] [ of] [Defendants’ ] authority un der the provisions of the” USA PATRIOT Act. Dkt. 2 at 3. The U SA PATRIOT Act, however, does not address the President’s authority (or the Department of D efense’s authority) to use mil itary force. Once again construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, however, the Court will assume that he ac tually intends to reference the Authoriz ation for Use of Military Forc e (“AUMF”), Pub. L. No. 107-40,

6 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (co ngressional powers to tax, p ay debts, “and provide for the common Defence and general Welfar e of the United States”); id. cl. 11 (congressi onal power to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Ru les concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id . cls. 12 & 13 (congressional power s to “raise and support Armi es” and “provide and maintain a Navy”); id . cl. 14 (congressional power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. cl. 15 (congressional power to “provide for calling forth the M ilitia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”); id. cl. 16 (congressional power to “ provide for organizing, arming , and disciplining, the Mil itia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”).6 115 Stat. 224 (2001), enacted by Congr ess the week after the Se ptember 11th terrorist attacks. The AUMF authorizes the Preside nt “to use all necessary and app ropriate force against those nations, organizations, or pers ons he determines planned, autho rized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc curred on September 11, 2001, or harbo red such organizations or persons.” Pub. L. No. 107–40, § 2(a). So construed, Plaintiff ’s complaint alleges that the missile strike on “an airbase t hat belonged to a Syrian governm ent institution” went beyond the scope of the AUMF, which (he say s) authorizes the President to “attack terrorist organizations that target the United States” but does not permit “an attack o n another government.” Dkt. 2 at
3. Thus, liberally construed, Plainti ff’s complaint alleges that the President’s use of force to attack the Al Shayrat airfiel d, and his threat to use additiona l force “as necessary and appropriate . . . to further [the] important na tional interests” of the Uni ted States, exceeded and threatens further to exceed his author ity under Article 1, § 8 of the Con stitution, the War Powers Resolution, and the AUMF. As redress, Plaintiff seeks a “court injunction ending military action against the government of Syr ia and a limitation on Presidentia l authority to expand the [AUMF].” Id. at 4. In addition, he asks the Court to prohibit the Departme nt of Defense from “begin[ning] any further military action against the government of Syria without approval from Congress through a resolution” a nd to order the Department to “ submit a plan to Congress detailing their military operations in Syria against terrorist organizations.” Id.
II. ANALYSIS In every case, the Court must sa tisfy itself that it has subjec t matter jurisdiction. See LeFande v. District of Columbia , 841 F.3d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs bear the burd en of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction, and the nature of tha t burden varies depending on the7 stage of the proceeding. See, e.g. , Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (explaining that “[t]he party i nvoking federal jurisdiction bea rs the burden of establishing” the court’s jurisdiction “in the s ame way as any other matter on wh ich [it] bears the burden of proof,
i.e. , with the manner and degree of e vidence required at the succes sive stages of the litigation”). Here, Plaintiff has merely filed acomplaint; the complaint has not yet been served, and counsel for Defendants has yet to appear. The fact that this c ase is at its earliest stage, however, does not mean that the Court nee d not consider whether it has j urisdiction. To the contrary, as the D.C. Circuit has observed, “a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte prior to service on the defendants pursu ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when . . . it is evident that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Evans v. Suter , No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished) (per curiam); see also, e.g. , Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit Banc , 264 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. J an. 24, 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam) (same); Wiley v. Wilkins , 134 F. Supp. 3d 308, 309 (D.D.C. 2015) (same); Weisser v. Obama , No. 13-cv-1257, 2013 WL 4498980, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2013) ( same); Caldwell v. Kagan , 777 F. Supp. 2d 177, 179 (D.D.C. 2011) (sa me). When making thi s assessment based on the complaint alone, the Court must , of course, “accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Smith v. Obama , 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 289 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd. , 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007)), and must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Kucinich v. Obama , 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 (D.D.C. 2011). Assessing the Court’s subject ma tter jurisdicti on begins with A rticle III of the Constitution, which vests federal courts with authority to adju dicate “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Because federal c ourts are courts of limited8 jurisdiction, this gr ant of power also marks the outer boundary of their authority to act. “In an attempt to give meaning” to the c ase or controversy requirement , “courts have developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciabi lity doctrines,’ among which ar e standing[,] ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States , 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). All four of these doctrines are germane to the present case. First, the “Court lacks power t o resolve a dispute unless [the] plaintiff has standing.” Abulhawa v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury , No. 15-cv-2186, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 883609, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2017). At the motion to dismiss stage, t his means that Plaintiff “must . . . allege a ‘concrete and particular ized’ injury that is ‘fairly t raceable to the challenged action of the defendant[s]’ and ‘likely’ t o be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” West v. Lynch , 845 F.3d 1228, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560–61). Moreover, although the Supreme Court has “always insist ed on strict compliance with [t he] jurisdictional standing requirement,” it has demanded an “especially rigorous” inquiry in cases requiring the courts “to decide whether an action take n by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Raines v. Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997); see also Smith , 217 F. Supp. 3d at 289 (quoting same in discussi ng standing to challenge the Pr esident’s use of military force). Even drawing all inferences in P laintiff’s favor, his complaint fails this test. Plaintiff does not allege that he has been “ordered into a war that [he] contend[s] is illegal,” Smith , 217 F. Supp. 3d at 296, or that his property was damaged or d estroyed, cf. ElShifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States , 607 F.3d 836, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Rather, he alleges that “[his] firm is currently [ engaged] in lobbying efforts wit h the United States government and [the] United Nations on bringing an end to President Assad’s go vernment and liberating the9 Syrian people” and that U.S. “m ilitary action against the Syria n government only created more obstacles to an eventual peace deal.” Dkt. 2 at 3. The imposi tion of these additional obstacles, according to the complaint, has “complicate[d]” the mission of Plaintiff’s firm, resulting in additional expenditures of “time, labor, and money.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges, moreover, that his work “includes military conf licts and the legality of Depar tment of Defense actions in these conflicts.” Id. From this, he posits that “it is [his] job to regulate admini strative agencies when they act unconstitutionally” and that these efforts have requir ed “significant time, labor, [and] money” in order to “ensur[e] good government practices in the U nited States government.” Id. None of these allegations rise to the level required to sustain Article III standing. An “injury in fact” sufficient to s atisfy Article III must be “actual or imminent, notconjectural or hypothetical.” Arpaio v. Obama , 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560). Because Plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive reli ef, he “must [allege facts sufficient to show] that he . . . ‘is immediat ely in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged official conduct.’” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983); see also Williams v. Lew , 819 F.3d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[W] here a plaintiff ‘see ks prospective . . . injunctive re lief, he must establish an ongoi ng or future injury that is certainly impending ; he may not rest on past injury.’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Arpaio , 797 F.3d at 19)). And he must also alleges facts su fficient to show that it is “l ikely, as opposed to merely speculative, that [any such immin ent] injury [would] be redress ed by a favorable decision.” Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). Aside from one line in his com plaint in which he alleges that “ the office of the President has publicly admitted [that] more military action is to follow” in Syria, Dkt. 2 at 3, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegatio ns of “likely” future injury. This is not a case—like10 Massachusetts v. Laird , 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), to tak e one example—involving anarmed conflict lasting months, years , or decades. To be sure, the Un ited States has been involved in an extended armed conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) in the region.
See , e.g ., Statement by the President on ISIL (Sept. 10, 2014). 7 But that is not what Plaintiff challenges. Rather, he challenges the legal authority of the D epartment of Defense—and, presumably, the President—to tak e “military action against the Syrian government,” and, as to that use of force, he identifie s only the April 6, 2017, missil e strike on the Al Sh ayrat airfield.
See Dkt. 2 at 3. The prospect that an other, similar strike will oc cur in the foreseeable future (and without congressional authorizat ion) is, by any measure, specul ative. On top of that speculation, moreover, the complaint asks th at the Court speculate that Plai ntiff will be involved in lobbying “the United States government and [the] United Nations on bring ing an end to President Assad’s government and liberating the Syr ian people” at that time; that whatever use of force that might occur would “complicate[]” his lobbying effort; and that he and his firm might achieve their desired result (with a less “s ignificant” expenditure of “time, labor, and money”) but for some future U.S. military operations. Id. Such “speculation upon speculation” does not suffice to support Article III standing. 8 See Abulhawa , 2017 WL 883609, at *7.

7 Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives .gov/the-press-office/2014/09/ 10/statementpresident-isil-1 (last visited Aug. 2, 2017). See also Letter from the Preside nt to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a nd the President Pro Tempore of t he Senate (June 6, 2017) (“As part of a comprehensive strate gy to defeat ISIS, U.S. Armed For ces are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes and other necessary operations against I SIS forces in Iraq and Syria.”), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pr ess-office/2017/06/06/text-le tter-presidentspeaker-house-representatives-and-president-pro (last visited A ug. 2, 2017).

8 Plaintiff’s contention that itis his “job to regulate admini strative agencies when they act unconstitutionally,” Dkt. 2 at 3, i s both conclusory and bewild ering; nothing in Article III vests courts with authority to adjudica te claims in the absence of a concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiff.11 The speculative nature of Plaintiff’s allegations also implicat es the second relevant jurisdictional hurdle— the ripeness requirement. “Ripeness is ajusticiability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through a voidance of premature adjudica tion, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ove r administrative policies.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of
the Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 807–08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148– 149 (1967)); see also Devia v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n , 492 F.3d 421, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The doctrine is premised, in pa rt, on Article III’s case or con troversy limitation and, in part, on prudential considerations “for refusing to exercise jurisdictio n.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n , 538 U.S. at 808 (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. , 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). “[E]ven in a case raising only pr udential concerns,” however, “ the question of ripeness may be considered on a court’s own motion.” Id. As a “constitutional minim[um],” the ripeness doctrine—like, an d closely akin to, the standing doctrine—excludes claims seeking relief for future inj uries that are hypothetical or speculative. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 165 F.3d 43, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Thus, “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States , 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts, moreover, m ust go beyond this “constitutional minim[um] and t ake into account prudential conc erns[,] which in some cases may mandate dismissal even if there is not a constitutional bar to the exercise of [their] jurisdiction.” Wyo. Outdoor Council , 165 F.3d at 48. These concerns, in turn, require considerati on of “the fitness of the issues for judici al decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs , 387 U.S. at 149; see also Texas , 523 U.S. at 301 (same). “The ‘primary focus’ of the prudentia l aspect of the ripeness doctri ne is to balance ‘the petitioner’s12 interest in prompt considerati on of allegedly unlawful [governm ent] action against the [government’s] interest in cryst allizing its policy before that policy is subj ected to judicial review and the court’s interest s in avoiding unnecessary adjudi cation and in deciding issues in a concrete setting.’” Wyo. Outdoor Council , 165 F.3d at 49 (quoting Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA , 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff’s claims fail at ever y step of this analysis. For th e same reasons the he has failed to allege facts sufficient to e stablish standing, he has failed to identify any non-speculative dispute that is ripe for adj udication. That is, he has not all eged any facts that would permit the Court to conclude that any “futu re” use of force against the go vernment of Syria is likely to “occur as anticipated, or indeed ” that it will “ occur at all.” Texas , 523 U.S. at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor has he alleged facts that would render the dis pute “fit” for resolution; it is asking far too much to seek to embroil the fe deral courts in a dispute about the scope of the President’s authority to use military force based on nothing more than assumptions about what a foreign government might someday do and how the President and Congress might respond. If there were ever a ca se that is not “fit” for judic ial resolution, this is it. And, finally, Plaintiff’s current hardship i s far too amorphous and tenuous t o survive the ripeness inquiry. This is not a case, like Abbott Labs for example, in which the gove rnment has taken an action “that has a direct effect on the day-to-day business” of Plaint iff or his firm. 387 U.S. at 152. The April 6 airstrike is his tory. The sole question, then, is whether some ongoing conduct or imminent future action is causi ng Plaintiff a concrete hardship , and he alleges no facts that would allow the Court to draw such a conclusion. The flip side of the ripeness doctrine is mootness. This rule has obvious application to Plaintiff’s contention that the April 6 missile strikes were th emselves unlawful. Plaintiff does13 not—and could not—seek monetary relief, and the Court cannot en join or otherwise provide a non-monetary remedy (such as decl aratory relief) for a past eve nt. The only possible escape from this dilemma is the “the rul e regarding issues capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Campbell v. Clinton , 203 F.3d 19, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Ra ndolph, J., concurring inthe judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). That rule applie s where “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to b e fully litigated prior to it s cessation or expira tion, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation tha t the same com plaining party w [ill] be subjected to the same action again.” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am ., AFL-CIO v. Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Assoc. of the U.S. & Can. , AFL-CIO , 721 F.3d 678, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotati on marks omitted). Of particular relevance here, “the ‘wrong’ that is, or is not, ‘capable of repet ition’ must be defined in terms of the precise controversy it spawns, to wit, in terms of the legal que stions it presents for decisio n.” Id. at 688 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Court doubts that there is a “reasonable expectation” that “the precise controversy” at i ssue will recur. But, given the array of other bases for concluding that Plaintiff has not presente d a justiciable controversy, the Court need not decide that issue. Finally, Plaintiff’s request that the Court opine in the abstra ct on the scope of the President’s authority to employ military force runs afoul of ye t another justiciability canon—the “political question” doctrine. Tha t “doctrine ‘excludes from j udicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choic es and value determinations co nstitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congre ss or the confines of the Exec utive Branch.’” Smith , 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. , 607 F.3d at 840). A claim presents a political question if any one of the following factors, see El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. , 607 F.3d at 841, is present:14 [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the i ssue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of decidin g without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discreti on; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution w ithout expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [ 5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already mad e; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Although “[d]i sputes involving for eign relations . . . are quintessential source s of political questions,” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. , 607 F.3d at 841 (internal quotation marks omitte d), it would be a mistake to as sume “that every case or controversy which touches fore ign relations lies beyond judicia l cognizance,” id . (quoting Baker , 369 U.S. at 211), or that “in the context of military action, the courts” will never “have a role,”
id. Rather, courts must approac h questions touching on foreign rela tions and national defense with particular attention to the r elevant context and the respe ctive spheres of competence of the coordinate branches of government. Judges in this circuit have tak en different views on the applic ation of the political question doctrine to disputes cha llenging the President’s use o f military force. Compare Campbell , 203 F.3d at 24–25 (Silberman, J., concurring) (concluding tha t, because the plaintiffs’ claims under the War Powers Clause and the War Powers Resolutio n “implicat[ed] the political question doctrine,” their claims were “not justiciable” in that case, and were, moreover, “generally unsuited to judicial resolution”), with id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurri ng) (concluding that, if the challenge had been “brought by plaintiffs w ith standing, ” the court “could determine” whether the Presid ent’s “air campaign i n Yugoslavia . . . excee ded his authority under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution”). The Court, howeve r, need not step into this fray,15 because this case implicates the concerns underlying the politi cal question doctrine under any plausible application. Given the inherent uncertainty in determining whether the Pres ident might seek to use force against the Syrian govern ment in the future, and, if so, under what circumstances he might do so, the Court cannot address th e merits of Plaintiff’s claim s without unduly treading on the domain of a coordinate branc h of government. In speculating ab out what the Syrian government might do and how the President might respond, the Court could not avoid injecting itself into the most sensitive issues of forei gn affairs and national security; it could not avoid inserting itself into the policy-making process; a nd it could not avoid the risk that its pronouncements might prove both unnecessary and at odds w ith the judgments of those charged with speaking for the United States in foreign affairs. See Baker , 369 U.S. at 217. Most manife stly, it is not the Court’s role to provide its view s, in the absence of a concrete case or controversy, about the scope of the President’s author ity. As then-Chief Justice Jay explained long ago, that responsibility is textually committed to those employed in the executive branch to advise the President. See 4 The Founders’ Constitution, Art. 3, Cl. 1, Doc. 34 (Letter o f Aug. 8, 1793, from Chief Justice John Jay to President George Washington). Although the edges of the political question doctrine may, at t imes, be fuzzy, this is not a close case. The Court, accordin gly, concludes that Plaintiff’s request that the Court establish “limitation[s] on Presidential au thority” under the AUMF; enjoi n the Department of Defense from taking “any further military action against the government of Syria without approval from Congress;” and “limit the Presid ent’s power to declare war agai nst another government that has not attacked the United States, ” Dkt. 2 at 4, is also precluded by the political ques tion doctrine.16 CONCLUSION The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis , Dkt. 1, and will DISMISS the action for lac k of jurisdiction. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: August 3, 2017