J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDDIE BENSON MILAN

Appellant No. 2413 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0003108-2019

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDDIE BENSON MILAN

Appellant No. 2414 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 26, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0003459-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2022

Appellant Eddie Benson Milan appeals from the October 26, 2021,

judgments of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester 

County (“trial court”), following his open guilty plea to possession of drug 

paraphernalia, driving under the influence (“DUI”) (third offense), fleeing or 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 2 -

attempting to eluding a police officer, resisting arrest, and recklessly 

endangering another person (“REAP”).1 Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly, on 

April 23, 2019, Appellant was charged with, among other things, possession 

of drug paraphernalia at docket number 3108-2019 (“First Case”). On August 

18, 2019, Appellant was charged with multiple crimes, including DUI, 

fleeing/eluding a police officer, resisting arrest and REAP at docket number 

3459-2019 (“Second Case”). On March 12, 2021, Appellant pleaded guilty to 

the aforementioned crimes in both cases. On October 14, 2021, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 60 to 120 months’ 

imprisonment. 

On October 19, 2021, Appellant filed post-sentence motions, 

challenging, inter alia, the trial court’s discretionary aspects of sentencing. 

With respect to both cases, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to consider his mitigating circumstances. Separately, with 

respect to the Second Case, Appellant argued that the trial court abused its 

discretion in imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. 

On October 26, 2021, following a hearing, the trial court re-sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of 45 to 90 months’ incarceration in the 

Second Case. Specifically, the trial court re-sentenced Appellant to 18 to 36 

months’ incarceration for DUI, and a consecutive term of 18 to 36 months in 

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2) 3733(a); and 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5104, 2705, respectively. 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 3 -

prison for fleeing/eluding a police officer. The court also imposed a 

consecutive term of 9 to 18 months’ incarceration for resisting arrest. Lastly, 

the court directed Appellant to serve a sentence of 12 to 24 months in prison 

for REAP concurrently with his sentence of 18 to 36 months’ imprisonment for 

fleeing/eluding a police officer. That day, the trial court also re-sentenced 

Appellant to 12 months’ probation for possessing drug paraphernalia in the 

First Case. The probationary sentence was to run consecutively with the 18-

to-36-months’ sentence imposed in the Second Case for fleeing/eluding a 

police officer. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal,2 Appellant presents two issues for our review. First, he 

argues that his aggregate sentence is excessive because the trial court failed 

to consider mitigating factors. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent 

sentences in the Second Case. 

____________________________________________

2 When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s discretion, our standard of 

review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is 

more than just an error in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court 

will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record 

discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 575 (Pa. Super. 2002)), 

appeal denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013). 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 4 -

It is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary aspect of 

sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 

(Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence, an appellant’s appeal should be considered as a petition 

for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. 

Super. 2010):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 

2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 979 (Pa. 2002). 

Here, Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements of the fourpart Moury test. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court, preserved the 

issue on appeal through his post-sentence motions, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 5 -

2119(f) statement in his brief.3 We, therefore, must determine only if 

Appellant’s sentencing issues raise a substantial question.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 

828 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have found that a substantial question exists 

“when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 

the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 895 (Pa. 

2009). “[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and 

the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial 

question exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 

2013), affirmed, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015). 

It is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of sentencing 

errors. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 

2006). When we examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists, “[o]ur inquiry must focus on the 

reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the 

appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” 

____________________________________________

3 Rule 2119(f) provides that “[a]n appellant who challenges the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence in a criminal matter shall set forth in his brief a concise 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to 

the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 6 -

Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-87 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005)). 

A Rule 2119(f) statement is inadequate when it “contains incantations of 

statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 528 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted).

Here, Appellant asserts in his Rule 2119(f) statement that (1) his 

sentence is excessive because the court did not take into account mitigating 

factors and (2) the trial court should have imposed concurrent, rather than 

consecutive, sentences in the Second Case. Based on Appellant’s 2119(f) 

statement, we conclude that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial 

question. 

Appellant’s excessiveness claim principally is premised on his argument 

that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating circumstances. In this 

regard, we have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate 

consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for 

our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 

2010)); see also Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(explaining allegation that sentencing court failed to consider certain 

mitigating factor generally does not raise a substantial question); 

Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(“[a]n allegation that a sentencing [judge] ‘failed to consider’ or ‘did not 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 7 -

adequately consider’ certain factors does not raise a substantial question that 

the sentence was inappropriate,”), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 

1996); Commonwealth v. Bershad, 693 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Pa. Super. 1997) 

(finding absence of substantial question where appellant argued the trial court 

failed to adequately consider mitigating factors and to impose an 

individualized sentence). Consistent with the foregoing cases, we conclude 

that Appellant failed to raise a substantial question with respect to his 

excessiveness claim premised on inadequate consideration of mitigating 

factors. 

Even if we were to find a substantial question, Appellant still would not 

be entitled to relief. Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the 

trial court heard testimony and argument concerning Appellant’s mitigating 

circumstances, especially his age and health issues, and considered the same 

in crafting his sentence. See N.T., Sentencing, 10/14/21, at 2-4, 15-18, 24.

Moreover, we consistently have recognized that excessiveness claims 

premised on imposition of consecutive sentences also do not raise a 

substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 

A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (stating, “[a] court’s exercise of 

discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively does not

ordinarily raise a substantial question[.]”), appeal denied, 126 A.3d 1282 

(Pa. 2015); see also Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 887 n.7 

(Pa. Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-47 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Thus, consistent with the foregoing cases, we conclude that 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 8 -

Appellant failed to raise a substantial question with respect to his 

excessiveness claim premised on the imposition of consecutive sentences.

Finally, Appellant suggests that his sentence in the Second Case is illegal 

because the trial court failed to merge DUI, fleeing/eluding a police officer and 

resisting arrest for sentencing purposes.

4

 In support, Appellant suggests that 

the offenses stemmed from a single criminal act. Without providing any legal 

authority, Appellant asserts that “[i]t is arguable that DUI and fleeing or 

eluding, as both are traffic code offenses, and DUI could satisfy fleeing or 

eluding if there is a failure to stop, should run concurrent.” Appellant’s Brief 

____________________________________________

4 Although Appellant seemingly raises a merger issue, he does not develop 

any cogent argument with citation to the record and legal authority for why 

the trial court erred in declining to merge the offenses in the Second Case. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument section of the parties’ briefs 

“shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and 

shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctly 

displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009), (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to 

provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to 

develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim 

is waived.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906 (2010); see also 

Commonwealth v. Murchinson, 899 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(deeming appellant’s claims waived under Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) because he did 

not develop meaningful argument with specific references to relevant case law 

and to the record to support his claims); Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 

A.2d 542, 546 (Pa. Super. 2005) (recognizing that failure to provide “such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent” may result in 

waiver); Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 856 A.2d 62, 77 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(declining to review appellant’s claim where there was limited explanation and 

development of the argument). Despite this glaring omission, we decline to 

find waiver. 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 9 -

at 22. Appellant further claims that “resisting arrest satisfies the elements of 

fleeing and eluding.” Id. 

A claim that crimes merge for sentencing purposes raises a challenge to 

the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 

1029-30 (Pa. Super. 2016). We review this legal issue de novo, and our scope 

of review is plenary. Id. The merger statute, Section 9765 of the Judicial

Code, provides:

No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements 

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other

offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court 

may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (emphasis added). Section 9765 prohibits merger 

“unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single 

criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are 

included in the statutory elements of the other.” Commonwealth v. 

Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1029 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 

1051 (Pa. 2017). 

Here, even assuming that the offenses in the Second Case arose from a 

single criminal act, Appellant still would not obtain relief because DUI, 

fleeing/eluding a police officer and resisting arrest do not have any statutory 

elements in common. Under Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code:

An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical 

control of the movement of a vehicle [when t]he individual is 

under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree 
J-S17039-22

J-S17040-22

- 10 -

which impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be 

in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). The offense of fleeing/eluding a police officer 

occurs when “[a]ny driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to

bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a 

pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the 

vehicle to a stop[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). With respect to resisting arrest:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with 

the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful 

arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone 

else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to 

overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104. Because the offenses are not completely subsumed 

within each other (and Appellant does suggest otherwise), the trial court did 

not err in failing to merge them for sentencing purposes. 

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2022