J-A28021-21 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 957 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Orphans’ Court at

No(s): 2020-6726

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2022

Appellant L.W. (Mother) appeals from the order granting the petition of

Lycoming County Children and Youth Services (the Agency) and involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to J.S. (the Child). We affirm. 

The orphans’ court set forth the following findings of fact:

[The Child] was born [in] April [of] 2018. He is the child of [S.S.

(Father)] . . . and [Mother] . . . . Mother and Father were not

married at the time of the Child’s birth. 

The Agency has extensive history with this family, with whom they

have been involved since 2015. The Agency’s prior involvement

resulted in the voluntary termination of Mother’s parental rights

to her two older children, one of whom was also Father’s child. 

The Agency filed a dependency petition on July 22, 2019, alleging

that Mother was demonstrating the same pattern of neglectful

parenting of the Child as she did with her two older children. More

specifically, the petition alleged that the Child had been diagnosed

with failure to thrive, and Mother did not follow through with

doctors’ directions regarding the Child’s milk intolerance. The

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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petition also alleged that Mother failed to pick up prescribed

medications and formula for the Child in a timely manner and

missed several scheduled medical appointments for the Child.

The Child was placed in the emergency custody of the Agency on

July 31, 2019, due to Mother’s lack of follow-through with medical

treatment, housing, and parenting. A shelter care hearing was 

held on August 2, 2020, at which time it was determined that

sufficient evidence was presented to prove that return of the Child

to the home of Mother and Father would not be in the Child’s best

interest.

A dependency hearing was held on August 12, 2019, after which

the [dependency] court adjudicated the Child dependent. The 

[dependency] court noted significant concerns in regard to

Mother’s lack of insight with regard to the Child’s medical issues,

and determined that she had not placed his medical needs as a

priority. As the [dependency] court found that allowing the Child

to remain in the home of Mother and Father would be contrary to

the Child’s welfare, legal and physical custody of the Child was to

remain with the Agency and the Child was to remain the approved

kinship home.[1] Mother was directed to focus on feeding the Child

by providing foods at visits that the Child can eat, to maintain

suitable housing, continue to attend all medical appointments with

the Child, maintain regular contact with the Agency, maintain

contact with the Outreach worker, and continue to work with

Expectations for Women.

A permanency review hearing was held on December 6, 2019. 

The [dependency] court noted that there had been moderate

compliance with the permanency plan, in that Mother maintained

suitable housing and had appropriate home conditions. Mother

cooperated with Outreach services and consistently attended

visits with the Child. Mother was found to have made some

progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

placement, but had made no efforts to secure employment. 

During this review period, Mother requested visits in her home

and also requested overnight visits. Overnight visits were not

approved but the Agency was directed to transition Mother’s visits

from the visitation center to supervised visits at Mother’s home. 

Following the hearing, the [dependency] court reaffirmed

____________________________________________

1 The Child was placed with the foster parents who had adopted his biological 

siblings, T.B. and M.B. N.T. Hr’g, 6/7/21, at 78-79. 
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dependency and the Child remained in the legal and physical

custody of the Agency with continued placement in his foster care

home.

A permanency review hearing was held on March 10, 2020. The 

[dependency] court found that there had been moderate

compliance with the permanency plan by Mother and moderate

progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

the original placement. During the review period, Mother

maintained her housing and continued to have appropriate home

conditions, despite having sizeable outstanding utility bills. 

Mother was cooperative with Outreach services and attended all

medical appointments for the Child. Mother enjoyed supervised

visits in her home, and her care of the Child improved under the

Agency’s guidance, but the guardian ad litem [(GAL)] voiced

concern about Mother’s capability to independently care for the

Child and requested that an evaluation be conducted by Dr. Denise

Feger at Crossroads Counseling. The [dependency] court ordered

Mother to undergo the evaluation for the purpose of determining

Mother’s ability to properly care for the Child. The [dependency] 

court remained concerned about Mother’s lack of employment,

and her lack of knowledge of paying bills and budgeting. Following

the hearing, the [dependency] court reaffirmed dependency and

legal and physical custody of the Child remained with the Agency

for continued placement in his current foster home.

A permanency review hearing was held on June 29, 2020. The 

[dependency] court found that Mother had minimal compliance

with the permanency plan and made minimal progress towards

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement. During the review period, Mother maintained housing

and continued to have appropriate home conditions. However,

significant concerns were raised about Mother’s behaviors during

the [COVID-19] pandemic, which included allowing multiple

individuals to live in her house . . . . Mother failed to undergo the

[c]ourt-ordered evaluation with Dr. Denise Feger, despite multiple

attempts by Dr. Feger’s office to contact her to schedule a video

evaluation due to the pandemic. Additionally, although Mother

was generally cooperative with Outreach services, Mother refused

assistance to prepare for job searching and interviewing. The 

[dependency] court remained concerned about Mother’s lack of

motivation to obtain employment, and the impact her limited

income has on her ability to meet her financial obligations.

Following the hearing, the [dependency] court reaffirmed

dependency and legal and physical custody of the Child remained
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with the Agency for continued placement in his current foster

home.

A permanency review hearing was held on September 15, 2020.

The [dependency] court found that Mother had minimal

compliance with the permanency plan and made minimal progress

towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the

original placement. During the review period, Mother maintained

housing and continued to have appropriate home conditions[,] but

Mother had no understanding of her living expenses and relied

completely on her father to handle the payment of her expenses. 

Mother was cooperative with Outreach Services. However, Mother

was still not actively seeking employment and had limited income

through Social Security. Mother no-showed [for] six visits [with 

the Child during] this review period and no-showed for two

appointments with Dr. Feger prior to finally undergoing her

evaluation. Following the hearing, the [dependency] court

reaffirmed dependency and legal and physical custody of the Child

remained with the Agency for continued placement in his current

foster home. With some hesitation, the [dependency] court

granted the Agency’s Motion for Compelling reasons not to

proceed with filing a petition to terminate parental rights. Mother

was strongly encouraged to take action to accomplish the

recommendations outlined in Dr. Feger’s evaluation, and

cautioned that if she did not become more proactive in addressing

the areas of concern the [dependency] court would not see a basis

to grant compelling reasons in the future.

A permanency review hearing was held on December 15, 2020.

The [dependency] court found that Mother had moderate

compliance with the permanency plan and made moderate

progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

the original placement. During the review period, Mother

maintained housing and continued to have appropriate home

conditions. Mother reported that she recently obtained

employment, but had not begun working. In the limited

opportunities that Mother had available due to COVID-19, Mother

demonstrated improvement in feeding the Child appropriate foods

with regard to his allergies. Following the hearing, the 

[dependency] court reaffirmed dependency and legal and physical

custody of the Child remained with the Agency for continued

placement in his current foster home. Mother was directed that

prior to the next hearing she shall either obtain and start

employment sufficient to support herself and the Child or provide

documentation that her disability income is sufficient to do so.
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A permanency review hearing was held on March 12, 2021, and

March 18, 2021. The [dependency] court found that Mother had

moderate compliance with the permanency plan but made only

minimal progress towards alleviating the circumstances which

necessitated the original placement. During the review period,

Mother maintained housing and continued to have appropriate

home conditions. Mother consistently attended visits with the

Child. Mother had not completed the neuropsychological

evaluation or scheduled an appointment at CSG for a Peer

Specialist, as recommended by Dr. Feger. The [dependency] 

court found that Mother was basically in the same position that

she was in at the time of the last review hearing and that she

continually failed to follow-through with items that the Agency has

recommended and the [dependency] court has directed.

Following the hearing, the [dependency] court reaffirmed

dependency and legal and physical custody of the Child remained

with the Agency for continued placement in his current foster

home. The [dependency] court further found that there were no

longer compelling reasons to not pursue termination of Mother’s

parental rights. The [dependency] court advised Mother that she

was reaching a point in the case where the Agency most likely

would be filing a petition to terminate her parental rights, and if

she wished to prevent that, she needed to take immediate action

and be 100 percent compliant with all of the directives that have

been outlined by the Agency.

A permanency review hearing was held on April 16, 2021. The 

[dependency] court found that Mother had minimal compliance

with the permanency plan and had made no progress towards

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement, in that she continued to be at the same level of

progress since the Child was placed. During the review period,

Mother did verify her employment. However, her employment

may have been a factor in Mother missing some visits with the

Child, which resulted in Mother being placed on call-in status with

regard to visits. At visits, Mother had not made any significant

improvements and continually needed prompting by the staff with

regard to the food that she brings for the Child in light of his milk

allergy. Mother had not obtained the neuropsychological

evaluation and could not be referred to one until she found a

primary physician. Mother had made no attempts to find a family

physician, nor had she attempted to make arrangements for care

for the Child if he was returned to her care. Following the hearing,

the [dependency] court reaffirmed dependency and legal and
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physical custody of the Child remained with the Agency for

continued placement in his current foster home.

The Agency filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental 

rights on April 1, 2021. A petition for change of goal to adoption 

was filed on May 12, 2021. The petition for involuntary 

termination alleged termination was warranted under 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). The hearing on the petition was

held on June 7, 2021, and June 28, 2021.[2] [Angela Lovecchio, 

Esq. served as the Child’s GAL and legal counsel.3]

* * *

There is no dispute that Mother has been very vocal about her 

desire to maintain a place of importance in her [c]hild’s life and to 

have the Child returned to her custody. Mother’s visits began as 

“observed,” meaning that staff was always present/nearby to offer 

support and assistance as needed, and remained at that status at 

the time of the hearing. Mother visits with [the] Child 2 days per 

week for 2 hours at a time. For a short time, the visits occurred 

in Mother’s home under Agency supervision; however those visits 

were changed to video visits following an issue with bed bugs in 

Mother’s home and, later, due to COVID-19. In-person visits have 

resumed at the Agency’s family support center.

William Pearson, visitation caseworker for the Agency, testified 

that Mother’s strengths were her attendance rate, which was 

approximately 91% and that Mother and the Child had a nice 

relationship and enjoyed each other’s company. Due to several 

no-shows at the scheduled visitation time, the Agency notified 

____________________________________________

2 “Father signed a consent to adopt on April 16, 2021, and was not present at 

the hearings.” Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree at 1 (formatting altered). Father 

and his counsel were excused from the hearings. Id. 

3 The orphans’ court found that because of the Child’s age, the Child could not 

express a position regarding this termination matter and there was no conflict 

for Attorney Lovecchio serving as both the GAL and legal counsel for the Child. 

Order, 5/4/21. The appointment of the GAL as the Child’s legal counsel 

complies with the mandate of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) and In re Adoption of 

L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 183 (Pa. 2017), and this Court may not sua sponte

review whether there was a conflict in the Child’s best and legal interests. 

See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020). In any 

event, the record shows there was no conflict in the Child’s best and legal 

interests.
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Mother by letter dated August 31, 2020, that she was required to 

call the Agency prior to each visit to notify them of her intent to 

attend the visit. Because her visit on Thursday mornings is

scheduled to begin at 8:00 a.m., Mother is required to notify the 

agency by 4:30 p.m. on Wednesday if she plans to attend. 

Recently, Mother has missed visits on Thursday morning because 

she has failed to call in on Wednesday. Mother has attributed her

failure to make this call to having to work late at her job.

* * *

Although Mr. Pearson testified that Mother has supplied safe 

supervision and appropriate redirection during the visits, he 

acknowledged that it has been nearly 2 years since the visits 

started and it took Mother nearly that long to grasp how serious 

the Child’s milk allergy is, and how to read labels to ensure that 

she is not providing him with foods that have milk or milk byproducts as an ingredient.

* * *

Bruce Anderson, licensed psychologist under contract with the 

Agency, performed an evaluation of Mother on October 21, 2020. 

Mr. Anderson indicated that Mother’s ability to abstract was rather 

limited. He testified that this means when the Child presents with 

difficult or different issues or behaviors, Mother may experience 

difficulties figuring out what to do. He opined that Mother may 

become overwhelmed when the needs of the Child go beyond the 

normal routine, and that only if Mother has full-time support and 

not just occasional service providers would she be capable of 

handling these challenges. Mr. Anderson recommended that 

Mother continue working with her Outreach worker to maintain 

suitable and appropriate housing, continue having her father [i.e., 

the Child’s maternal grandfather,] be her payee and assist her 

with payment of her expenses, and seek the assistance of the 

Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (OVR) if she wished to obtain 

employment. Additionally, an addendum to the report included 

the recommendation that Mother obtain a neuropsychological 

evaluation, which may have shed light on the root causes of 

Mother’s inability to follow-through with things and learn from her 

past mistakes when it comes to appropriately caring for her 

children.

In March of 2020, Mother was ordered to undergo a behavioral 

health assessment with Dr. Denise Feger of Crossroads 

Counseling. At the time of the permanency review hearing in June 
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2020, Mother still had not completed the evaluation. Dr. Feger 

testified that her office remained open during the entire pandemic 

for virtual services but that they had a difficult time getting ahold 

of Mother. Mother no-showed 2 previously scheduled 

appointments before finally attending the evaluation on 

September 4, 2020. Dr. Feger testified that the purpose of the 

evaluation was to determine whether Mother has the ability to 

independently care for the Child. Among other things, Dr. Feger 

recommended that Mother do the following:

1. Obtain a peer specialist

2. Engage in OVR services

3. Engage in out-patient counseling

4. Obtain a mental health intake

5. Create a partnership with the foster parents

6. Continue with Outreach services to address parenting and 

protective capacity

7. Obtain a neuropsychological evaluation

* * *

Aimee Gatzke, Agency caseworker, testified regarding the goals 

established for Mother in the service plan and Dr. Feger’s 

recommendations and the level of progress Mother made towards 

achieving those goals. Regarding the need for safe and stable 

housing, Ms. Gatzke testified that Mother was able to maintain her 

housing. However, there was an issue with bed bugs in Mother’s 

home which Mother became aware of in November of 2020 but 

did not address until February of 2021. Additionally, Mother’s 

finances are managed by her father as her payee, and while her 

rent is current, her limited Social Security income does not leave 

Mother with sufficient income to pay all her expenses. Mother has 

no understanding of her actual expenses beyond her rent, and for 

much of the length of her involvement with the Agency lacked the 

motivation to obtain employment to supplement her Social

Security income. Despite repeated recommendations by her 

Outreach worker, ongoing caseworker, and Dr. Feger to engage 

the services of OVR, Mother never followed through with making 

an appointment, and testified that she obtained employment on 

her own. Mother failed to understand that the recommendation 

was made so Mother could receive assistance finding not just a
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job, but sustainable employment that will not interfere with her 

government benefits and allow her to adequately provide for her 

own needs and those of the Child. 

Mother did not follow-through with the recommendation that she 

form a partnership with the foster family. Although both Mother 

and the foster mother testified that Mother’s communication has 

increased to approximately one time per week, the conversations 

were often superficial and repetitive, and not frequent enough for 

Mother to gain an understanding of what the foster parents have 

done to resolve/manage the Child’s medical and dietary needs. 

Mother testified that she turned in the paperwork to obtain a peer 

specialist but has “gotten nowhere” with it. Mother did not 

attempt to schedule counseling until March of 2021 despite being 

recommended to do so in September of 2020. Mother still has not 

undergone the neuropsychological evaluation that was 

recommended. When questioned about her lack of urgency to 

accomplish these tasks and her lack of follow-through, Mother is 

unable to provide an explanation.

* * *

[Dr. Feger performed a fitness/bonding assessment regarding 

Mother and the Child on April 6, 2020.] Dr. Feger testified that 

there is a bond between Mother and the Child, and that the Child 

identifies Mother as his “mommy.” However, Dr. Feger’s 

evaluation and subsequent testimony at the hearing explained 

that the Child does not view [Mother] as [his] “mommy” in the 

traditional sense because his relationship with Mother is not one 

that relates to a primary caretaker. Child spends only a couple 

hours per week with Mother, and their time together is always 

supervised. Mother cares for the Child “moderately superficially” 

in the visitation setting but there are a secondary set of caregivers 

— the foster parents — who have served a far greater role for the 

Child.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree, 7/7/21, at 1-9, 11-15, 18 (some formatting 

altered). 

On July 7, 2021 the orphans’ court issued an opinion and decree

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Id. at 20-23. 
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On July 19, 2021, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

adopting the reasoning of its July 7, 2021 opinion and decree. See Orphans’ 

Ct. Op., 7/29/21, at 1-2. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) when 

[Mother] has not failed to perform parental duties of a period 

of at least six months and made every effort to have a 

relationship with her child.

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) when 

there was insufficient evidence that the Child was without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary and 

causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied as 

[Mother] made substantial progress to remedy the incapacity 

and provide the Child with essential parent care, control and 

subsistence necessary.

3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5) and 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) in finding that (1) the Child has been 

removed from parental care for at least six months and twelve 

months respectively; (2) the conditions which led to removal 

or placement of the Child continues to exist; (3) and 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child

when [Mother] has remedied the conditions and the needs and 

welfare of the Child would not be best served by termination.

4. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b), when 

there is a bond between the Child and [Mother] and the best 

interests of the Child would not be served by termination.

Mother’s Brief at 7-8 (formatting altered). 
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Our Supreme Court has explained that

appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when 

considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion 

standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial 

courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of 

law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

This Court has explained:

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,] which requires a bifurcated 

analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 
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evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. . . .

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid.

* * *

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection 

of section 2511(a).

In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1178-79 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). 

We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence 

is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Although Mother challenges the orphans’ court decision involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and 

(8), because we may affirm with regard to only one subsection, we address 

the orphans’ court’s decision under subsection (a)(8) because it is dispositive. 

See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1179. 
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Section 2511(a)(8)

Mother contends that the Agency failed to meet its evidentiary burden 

with respect to Section 2511(a)(8), and the orphans’ court erred in 

terminating her parental rights under that subsection. Mother’s Brief at 30-

32. Mother acknowledges that the Child had been in care for more than twelve 

months, which satisfies the time requirement of Section 2511(a)(8). Id. at 

31. However, Mother argues that the conditions which led to the placement 

of the Child no longer exist. Id. at 30-31. Specifically, Mother claims that 

she had a 91% attendance rate for visitation with the Child both in-person 

and via video calls. Id. at 31. Mother also notes that prior to the COVID-19 

pandemic, Mother had visitation with the Child at her home. Id. Mother 

asserts that she made progress in providing appropriate foods for the Child 

and there were no safety issues raised during her visitation sessions. Id. at 

31-32. Further, Mother asserts that she has “maintained her housing, 

cooperated with Outreach services, maintained her father as her payee, 

obtained employment, underwent a Psychological Evaluation with Bruce 

Anderson and a Behavioral Health Evaluation with Dr. Feger.” Id. at 32. 

Mother concludes that she made significant progress in meeting her goals and 

remedying the conditions that led to the Child’s removal from her care. Id. 

The Agency and the GAL did not file appellee briefs, and instead 

submitted letters indicating that they relied on the orphans’ court opinion. 

Section 2511(a)(8) provides:
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(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by 

the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). 

There are three factors that must be established in order to terminate 

parental rights under this subsection:

an agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) 

that the child has been removed from the care of the parent for 

at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the conditions which had led 

to the removal or placement of the child still exist; and (3) that 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1005 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The C.L.G. Court explained that with respect to the second factor under 

Section 2511(a)(8), “a reasonable possibility that” the parent “could remedy 

the condition” that led to the child’s removal is irrelevant to an analysis under 

Section 2511(a)(8), “which requires only that the conditions continue to exist, 

not an evaluation of parental willingness or ability to remedy them.” Id. at 

1007. Further, this Court has explained that “a child’s life simply cannot be 

put on hold in the hope that a parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting” and the courts “will not toll the well-being and 
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permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” Id. (citation omitted and formatting 

altered). 

As to the third factor under subsection (a)(8), this Court explained that 

“the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in 

addition to the behavior of the parent.” Id. at 1008-09. Further, “while both 

Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the needs and 

welfare of the child, [a court is] required to resolve the analysis relative to 

Section 2511(a)(8)” before addressing Section 2511(b). Id. at 1009. 

Here, the orphans’ court concluded:

The court finds that the Agency has proven by clear and 

convincing evidence that grounds for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights exist under [Section 2511(a)(8)]. The Child was 

removed from the home and placed in the legal and physical 

custody of the Agency on July 31, 2019, and has been in Agency’s 

custody ever since. The Child had been removed from his 

Mother’s care for approximately 20 months at the time of the filing 

of the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights. At 

each of the permanency review hearings for the Child, Mother was 

found to have only minimal to moderate compliance with the 

permanency plan and made no substantial progress towards 

alleviating the conditions which necessitated the Child’s 

placement. As described above, Mother continues to experience 

the same difficulties meeting both her and the Child’s needs as 

she did at the time of placement, despite numerous attempts by 

the Agency to connect her with services designed to enable and 

empower her to do so. Meanwhile, the Child has had his basic 

needs met by his [foster] family, and has flourished with proper 

medical care and nutrition, love, and support. It is clear to this 

court that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the Child.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree at 17 (formatting altered). 
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As stated above, Mother does not dispute the first requirement of 

Section 2511(a)(8), i.e., the Child has been removed from her care for more 

than twelve months. Briefly, the record establishes that the Child was placed 

in the emergency custody of the Agency on July 31, 2019, and the Agency 

filed the instant petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights on 

April 1, 2021, more than twelve months later. See N.T. Hr’g, 6/7/21, at 10,

112-21; see also Pet. for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 4/1/21, 

at ¶ I(12), (41). Accordingly, the record supports the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that the Agency established the first requirement of Section 

2511(a)(8). See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1005. 

As to the second factor, the orphans’ court found that “Mother continues 

to experience the same difficulties meeting both her and the Child’s needs as 

she did at the time of placement, despite numerous attempts by the Agency 

to connect her with services designed to enable and empower her to do so.” 

See Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree at 17. The orphans’ court credited the 

testimony of Ms. Gatzke and Mr. Anderson that Mother continued to struggle 

with managing her responsibilities to provide a stable and secure home for 

the Child and to meet the Child’s daily needs. See id. at 12-14. 

Our review of the records indicates that Ms. Gatzke testified that she is 

an Agency caseworker and has been assigned to the Child and Mother since 

September 2019. See N.T. Hr’g, 6/7/21, at 102-03. Ms. Gatzke described

the problems with the Child’s health and Mother’s non-compliance with 

medical advice when the Child was in Mother’s care. See id. at 104-08. Ms. 
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Gatzke testified Mother requires regular reminders to attend the Child’s 

medical appointments (that the foster parents arrange), and Ms. Gatzke

expressed concern that Mother would not remember to attend to the Child’s 

needs without reminders from Agency caseworkers. See id. at 149-50. Ms. 

Gatzke believes that Mother could not establish a budget for herself. See id.

at 119-22, 127-28. Further, Mother had not followed Agency advice about 

applying for public assistance and employment services. See id. at 133-34, 

137. 

Mr. Anderson, a licensed psychologist, evaluated Mother on October 21, 

2020. See id. at 27. Mr. Anderson opined that Mother would be capable of 

caring for a child in the sense of following a normal routine, but she would 

have difficulty handling more difficult medical or behavioral problems involving 

the Child. See id. at 35. 

Additionally, Dr. Feger testified that she performed a comprehensive 

behavioral health evaluation of Mother on September 4, 2020. See N.T. Hr’g, 

6/28/21, at 6. Dr. Feger explained that she had “significant concerns 

connected to protective capacity largely connected to [Mother’s] ability to 

meet the expectations from the original behavioral health evaluation, as well 

as her ability to advance her current visitation and maintain her home 

environment.” See id. at 20. Dr. Feger observed that Mother appeared to 

be overwhelmed by managing both her own needs and goals and those of the 

Child at the same time. See id. at 27. 
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Accordingly, the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that the 

conditions that led to the Child’s removal from Mother’s care continued to exist 

more than twelve months after the Child’s removal. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 

1007. We note Mother’s argument that she made significant progress in 

remedying the conditions during the time Child was in placement, preceding 

the filing of the instant petition. However, after considering Mother’s efforts, 

the orphans’ court concluded that her actions were not enough to remedy the 

conditions which led to placement. See id. (explaining that an analysis under 

Section 2511(a)(8), requires only a determination that the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, and “not an 

evaluation of parental willingness or ability to remedy them”).

As to the third element of subsection (a)(8), i.e., that termination would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the Child, the orphans’ court concluded 

that “the Child has had his basic needs met by his [foster] family, and has 

flourished with proper medical care and nutrition, love, and support[]” and

that termination would best serve the Child’s needs and welfare. See

Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree at 17. 

N.B., the foster mother, testified that she and her husband provide for 

the Child’s daily needs and that the Child developed from an underweight 

fifteen-month-old baby who did not yet walk or talk to a healthy three-yearold who enjoys playing with his biological siblings in their care. See N.T. Hr’g, 

6/7/21, at 77-86. Further, Dr. Feger testified that she had significant concerns 

about Mother’s lack of progress in working towards reunification. See N.T. 
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Hr’g, 6/28/21, at 25. As stated above, Dr. Feger observed that Mother 

appeared to be overwhelmed by managing both her own needs and goals and 

those of the Child at the same time. See id. at 27. However, Dr. Feger 

testified that she does not make recommendations regarding termination. 

See id. at 37. 

Accordingly, the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law that the Agency provided sufficient evidence that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the Child as required by the third requirement of subsection (a)(8). See

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008-09. 

In sum, having reviewed the record, the orphans’ court’s opinion, and 

Mother’s arguments in this appeal, we conclude that the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings that the Agency presented clear and 

convincing evidence for terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(8). See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1179. 

Section 2511(b)

Mother contends that because the Agency failed to carry its burden to 

prove grounds for termination existed under Section 2511(a), the orphans’

court should not have considered whether termination was appropriate under 

Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 34. Mother alternatively argues that the 

orphans’ court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights because 

termination would sever a bond between Mother and the Child, causing injury 

to the Child. Id. at 34-36. Mother refers to Dr. Feger’s testimony that Mother 
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and the Child have an established bond, although Mother’s relationship to the 

Child is more like that of a child-care provider or a babysitter than that of a 

parent. Id. at 34-35. Mother also notes that Mr. Pearson testified that Mother 

has a good relationship with the Child, she regularly attends visitation with 

the Child, and those visits go well. Id. at 35-36. 

On this record, we agree with the orphans’ court that it acted within its 

discretion in concluding that the statutory grounds for termination have been 

met under Section 2511(a)(8). Therefore, we next review the orphans’ court’s

conclusions as to whether the termination serves the needs and welfare of the 

Child, pursuant to Section 2511(b). See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1178. 

Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

“[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008 (citation omitted). 

The C.L.G. Court explained that regarding Section 2511(b):
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Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. 

The court must also discern the nature and status of the parentchild bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the bond.

Moreover, [t]he court should also consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships to the child, because severing close 

parental ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and 

beneficial relationship. Most importantly, adequate consideration 

must be given to the needs and welfare of the child.

Id. at 1009-10 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Further, this Court has explained that the existence of “some bond” 

between a parent and a child “does not necessarily defeat termination of her 

parental rights.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Rather, 

the question is whether the bond between the parent and the child “is the one 

worth saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the 

child. Id. The K.Z.S. Court affirmed the termination of the mother’s parental 

rights where the child had a stronger bond with foster mother than child had 

with mother, and child saw foster mother as his primary caregiver. Id. at 

755, 764. 

Instantly, the orphans’ court explained:

Dr. Feger testified that there is a bond between Mother and the 

Child, and that the Child identifies Mother as his “mommy.” 

However, Dr. Feger’s evaluation and subsequent testimony at the 

hearing explained that the Child does not view her as “mommy” 

in the traditional sense because his relationship with Mother is not 

one that relates to a primary caretaker. [The] Child spends only 

a couple hours per week with Mother, and their time together is 

always supervised. Mother cares for the Child “moderately 

superficially” in the visitation setting but there are a secondary set 
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of caregivers — the foster parents — who have served a far 

greater role for the Child. Essentially, the relationship between 

Mother and [the] Child equates to that of an occasional child-care 

provider or babysitter.

Additionally, the existence of some bond with Mother does not 

necessarily defeat termination of her parental rights. . . . The Child 

is currently in a loving and stable home, with two of his biological 

siblings. When the Child was removed from Mother’s care at 

approximately 15 months of age, he was behind on his gross 

motor skills, had extremely high lead content in his blood, had 

chronic ear infections, and was extremely underweight. Within

two months of being placed in this foster home, the Child began 

walking and had gained sufficient weight that he no longer needed 

to have weight checks. The Child’s foster mother testified that 

they did nothing out of the ordinary — they simply made and

attended the Child’s medical appointments and monitored his diet 

to avoid lactose. This type of consistency and follow-through that 

has allowed the Child to thrive while in their care is exactly what 

Mother lacks the ability to achieve.

Mother has been offered numerous services by the Agency since 

her initial involvement in 2015. These services were designed to 

assist Mother with obtaining stable housing and maintaining home 

conditions, basic parenting, budgeting, connecting with 

community resources, and follow-through. The Child has been in

this placement for approximately 23 months, and is in a loving 

and stable home where all his needs are met. Dr. Feger testified 

that from a clinical standpoint it would be at least 1-2 additional 

years before Mother could achieve reunification, and the 

environment in which he would be placed if reunification efforts 

are successful does not parallel his current environment.

The foster parents have provided everything the Child needs and 

this has naturally established a bond and attachment between the 

Child and the individuals whom he identifies as his primary 

caretakers. There are significant concerns about Mother’s ability 

to address her own needs and simultaneously establish a 

protective capacity to ensure a safe and secure environment for 

the Child. Mother’s history may be the most accurate prediction 

of her future and the Child’s permanency cannot and should not 

be delayed until Mother gains the skills necessary to 

independently and consistently provide appropriate care for the 

Child. The Child is clearly bonded with the [foster] parents, who 

have provided for his physical and emotional needs for 
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approximately half of his life, and who are willing to offer him 

permanency. Although there is a bond between Mother and [the] 

Child that would require some explanation as to the absence of 

his “mommy,” the Court is satisfied that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would not cause irreparable harm to the Child. 

This Court further finds that permanency in the form of adoption 

by those who have met his needs since July 31, 2019, is in the 

best interest of the Child.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. & Decree at 18-20. 

Our review of the record indicates that Dr. Feger acknowledged that 

Mother loves and cares about the Child and she wants to be successful in 

reunification with the Child. See N.T. 6/28/21, at 27. However, Dr. Feger 

opined that while a bond existed between Mother and the Child, it is not as 

strong as the Child’s bond with the foster parents, and that severing the bond 

between Mother and the Child would be in the Child’s best interests. See id.

at 16-19. 

Based on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the orphans’

court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law that the Agency established the 

grounds for termination under Section 2511(b) by clear and convincing 

evidence. See M.T., 101 A.3d at 1179; C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010. The record 

evidence supports the orphans’ court’s finding that although there was a bond 

between Mother and the Child, the Child does not identify Mother as his 

primary caretaker, and the Child would suffer more from the severing of the 

bond between him and foster parents than from severing the bond between 

Mother and the Child. See K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 755, 764. Further, we 

conclude that the orphans’ court appropriately considered the developmental, 
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physical, and emotional needs and the welfare of the Child and determined 

that they were best served by the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010. Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’

court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826. 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2022