2021 IL App (4th) 210049-U 

NO. 4-21-0049 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re M.K., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

Mark Z.,

Respondent-Appellee).

 

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 Appeal from the 

 Circuit Court of

 Livingston County 

 No. 19JA71 

 Honorable 

 Jennifer H. Bauknecht,

 Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that denied the State’s 

 expedited petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights because the trial 

 court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

 

¶ 2 Respondent, Mark Z., is the father of M.K. (born March 2010). In December

2019, the State filed an amended petition for adjudication of wardship seeking to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights in an expedited manner. See 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2018). In 

November 2020, the trial court found M.K. was a neglected minor and respondent was an unfit 

parent pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018). 

¶ 3 In December 2020, the court conducted a dispositional hearing and adjudicated 

M.K. a ward of the court. However, the court denied the State’s request to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights because it found (1) the Department of Children and Family 

Services (DCFS) did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, (2) the State had not shown an 

FILED

June 11, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
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aggravating circumstance, and (3) termination was not in M.K.’s best interest. 

¶ 4 The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable 

efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We 

conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because 

the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 A. Procedural History

¶ 7 In November 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging in relevant 

part that M.K. was a neglected minor, as defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 

ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2018)), in that respondent “inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allows to 

be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, which causes *** 

impairment of physical health[.]” The State further alleged that respondent created a substantial 

risk of physical injury and an environment injurious to M.K.’s welfare due to domestic violence. 

On the same day that the petition was filed, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and

placed temporary custody and guardianship with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.

¶ 8 In December 2019, the State filed an amended petition requesting the court 

terminate respondent’s parental rights because he was an unfit parent in that he “failed to protect 

the minor from conditions within her environment injurious to the minor’s welfare, pursuant to 

750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) [(West 2018)].” The State further alleged it was in M.K.’s best interest to 

have respondent’s parental right terminated and sought that determination on an expedited basis. 

¶ 9 B. The Joint Adjudicatory and Parental Termination Hearing

¶ 10 In June 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing at which it also 

considered whether respondent’s parental rights should be terminated because he was an unfit 
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parent as alleged in the amended petition. We note that a report of proceedings for the hearing 

does not appear in the record. The docket entry for that date indicates that the State presented the 

testimony of two witnesses and the court admitted into evidence (1) a DVD of an interview with 

respondent and (2) pictures of M.K. depicting bruising on her face.

¶ 11 In July 2020, the trial court conducted a continued adjudicatory hearing at which 

respondent moved for a directed finding on the issue of unfitness. The court continued the matter 

and allowed the parties to submit written arguments. In his brief in support of his motion for 

directed finding, respondent argued that the State had failed to demonstrate that aggravating 

factors existed to justify the expedited termination of parental rights and “there was no showing 

that reasonable efforts are inappropriate and unsuccessful.”

¶ 12 The State responded that section 2-21(5) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West 

2018)) controlled and set forth the procedure for expedited termination proceedings. At the 

adjudicatory stage, the State was required to prove (1) by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the child is abused or neglected and (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an 

unfit person. The State maintained that whether an aggravating factor existed and reasonable 

efforts had been made were issues to be proved at the dispositional or best interest stage of the 

expedited proceedings. The State explained, “Because this case is currently in the adjudicatory 

phase of the proceedings the State will make no further argument regarding reasonable efforts or 

aggravating circumstances and will merely assert that the State has every intention of providing 

such evidence at the appropriate stage of the proceedings: the dispositional/best interest hearing.” 

¶ 13 In November 2020, the trial court concluded the adjudicatory hearing and entered 

a written order finding that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that M.K. 

was abused and neglected. The docket entry stated as follows: “Court finds that State has met the 
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burden of proof by preponderance of evidence and finds minor abused and that there is clear and 

convincing evidence that State has met the burden of proof on counts with mother and father.” 

The court continued the case for a best-interest and dispositional hearing. 

¶ 14 C. The Dispositional Hearing

¶ 15 In December 2020, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing and 

considered whether it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 16 1. The State’s Evidence 

¶ 17 Taylor McDonald testified that she was the caseworker on the case since it was 

opened in November 2019. McDonald testified that M.K. was involved in a prior termination 

case when she was three years old, seven years before the instant hearing. That case was opened 

because M.K.’s mother had substance abuse problems. Respondent stated to McDonald that, in 

that prior case, he completed domestic violence, anger management, and parenting services. The 

outcome of the case was that M.K. was returned home to respondent.

¶ 18 McDonald testified that throughout the entire life of the case, M.K. had been with 

her maternal grandmother, who wished to adopt M.K. McDonald stated that M.K.’s grandmother

(1) provided for all of her material needs, (2) was with her every day, and (3) helped her go to 

school, doctor’s appointments, and counseling. McDonald stated M.K. had a strong bond and 

relationship with her grandmother, and M.K. told McDonald that she wanted to remain in that 

placement. 

¶ 19 McDonald further testified that M.K. was in school but the school was conducting 

e-learning. M.K. “has some acquaintances at school.” Regarding ties to the community, 

McDonald stated that M.K. had a babysitter and friends in the neighborhood.

¶ 20 On cross-examination, McDonald acknowledged that since the beginning of the
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COVID-19 pandemic, no parenting classes had been offered. Regarding “substance abuse or 

mental health programs, outpatient counselling,” “[t]hey are doing everything virtually, 

assessments and everything.” McDonald testified that she made a referral to “IHR” for 

respondent. (We note that IHR stands for the Institute of Human Resources, also known as IHR 

Counseling Services, which provides mental health and substance abuse services in Pontiac, 

Illinois.) McDonald agreed that respondent gets frustrated easily, is dyslexic, and has a hard time 

comprehending what he reads, all of which adds to his frustration. McDonald acknowledged she 

did not know whether respondent had access to the internet “but the virtual classes are usually 

over [a] phone call or Zoom.” McDonald did not know if respondent was familiar with Zoom. 

(We note that “Zoom” is an online video conferencing program which requires an internet 

connection to operate.) McDonald stated respondent had not had any visitations with M.K. 

because there was a no-contact order from a criminal case that arose out of the physical abuse 

that opened the parental termination case.

¶ 21 2. The Respondent’s Testimony

¶ 22 Respondent testified that he had an eleventh grade education and had a hard time 

reading—including the things the caseworker gave him—because he was dyslexic. Respondent 

loved his daughter and wanted to remain in her life. Respondent stated he was willing to go to 

classes, take counseling, and do anything else DCFS wanted him to do, and he would “try my 

best as much as I can.” Respondent stated that he had completed those services before when he 

first got custody of his daughter. Respondent said the process was difficult because of his 

dyslexia but with hard work he was able to do it and would be able to do it again.

¶ 23 Respondent stated that he lived “out of town this time” in Graymont, Illinois, 

which did not have any counselors or facilities where he could receive services. Respondent 
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stated it was difficult for him to get to Pontiac to take classes through IHR. Respondent testified

that he had never done a “Zoom meeting” and did not even know what Zoom was. Respondent 

added that he recently got a new phone and was willing to try Zoom if his phone could operate 

the program. 

¶ 24 Respondent admitted that he gets frustrated easily, which creates a problem, but 

he was willing to take direction from a counselor or teacher to learn better methods.

¶ 25 Respondent testified that when he got along with M.K., they enjoyed doing 

outdoor activities together. Respondent stated that M.K. was a good, loving, smart, fun child, but

she also had problems. Respondent stated he believed he could deal with those problems, “but 

sometimes I think I need to work on myself, too.” Respondent stated, “We need to bond a lot 

more. We need more time with one another.” Respondent said he could discipline M.K. safely 

and would avoid corporal punishment as much as possible. 

¶ 26 On cross-examination, respondent stated that he told his caseworker he was 

willing to engage in services and had asked for transportation to an appointment at IHR. 

Respondent did not understand what the meeting was for, and it caused him frustration, 

particularly because “I had to drive in illegally because I was trying my hardest to get there.”

(We note that the dispositional report stated that respondent had spent time in prison for driving 

on a revoked license.) Respondent was further frustrated because each time he went to IHR, 

someone there asked him questions about M.K. that respondent could not answer because he had 

a no-contact order. 

¶ 27 Respondent agreed that he first met with McDonald over a year ago and at the 

meeting, he told her that he did not intend to engage in services because he had completed them 

once before. Respondent acknowledged that McDonald had told him “[f]rom day one” that he 
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needed to complete services. Respondent stated he tried to get into classes but he did not 

understand what “they” wanted from him and could not provide answers to their questions. 

Respondent stated that he had been to IHR three times. Respondent did not know what his 

appointments were for, whether to complete assessments or do counseling. Respondent stated, “I 

don’t know what’s going on over there. That’s why I was getting frustrated because they kept 

telling me the same stuff over and over,” and respondent did not understand any of it. 

¶ 28 Respondent testified that he could deal with M.K.’s mental health and behavioral 

problems, although he also stated that “people” did not know what her problems were and they 

were still trying to figure it out. Respondent clarified that he “heard what they [diagnosed M.K. 

with]; but they keep throwing different stuff at her. So, I don’t know.” The State asked, “How 

are you going to deal with [M.K.’s] problems if you don’t know what they are?” Respondent 

answered, “Well, it looks like I’ve got to go to counseling and figure that stuff out.”

¶ 29 3. Arguments of Parties

¶ 30 The trial court asked the State for clarification on how to proceed given the dual 

purpose of the hearing: dispositional and best interests. The State said the best way to handle the 

issues was by addressing them separately and taking them in order. Regarding the dispositional 

hearing, the State requested a finding that M.K. be adjudicated a ward of the court, that DCFS 

had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, and that respondent be 

declared unfit (for reasons other than financial circumstances alone) to care for, protect, or 

discipline the minor and that it was in M.K.’s best interest for custody and guardianship to be 

granted to DCFS. 

¶ 31 Regarding the termination portion of the proceedings, the State recommended that 

it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The State argued that 
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aggravating circumstances were present based on respondent’s domestic abuse, which the State 

characterized as “a pattern.” 

¶ 32 As to reasonable efforts towards reunification, the State argued that reasonable 

efforts had been made because respondent (1) had completed identical services several years ago 

but still abused M.K., (2) stated multiple times he refused to participate in services, and (3) had 

not started any services in the six months since McDonald made referrals. The State also argued 

that the statutory best interest factors all weighed in favor of keeping M.K. with her grandmother 

and against returning her to respondent.

¶ 33 In response, respondent argued that “the uniqueness and I think the risks attendant 

here being in substitute care I don’t believe favors the State; and I think it favors denying the 

petition in this particular case.” Respondent noted that the dispositional report painted a very 

different picture than the State. Far from “flourishing” in foster care, M.K. was “not making 

significant progress in therapy, continues to struggle with relationship permanency, unable to 

maintain friends because of bullying, often has outbursts and throws things, hits the foster parent, 

spits in her face. *** That to me is not a young lady that *** is flourishing in her current 

placement to me.”

¶ 34 Respondent further argued that (1) the State had not demonstrated an aggravating 

circumstance and (2) the case was similar to any other physical abuse case. Respondent 

emphasized that the purpose of the Act was to reunify families when possible and argued that 

because M.K. and respondent both had problems, respondent should be allowed a fair chance to 

engage in services. Respondent was not familiar with technology and had transportation 

problems, both of which exacerbated his difficulties engaging in services because of COVID-19 

restrictions. Respondent concluded that he thought termination was premature and not in M.K.’s 
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best interest.

¶ 35 Regarding the dispositional portion of the proceedings, the guardian ad litem

(GAL) agreed that the State had met its burden that M.K. should be adjudicated a neglected 

minor and made a ward of the court. Regarding termination and the child’s best interests, the 

GAL acknowledged that the State could “list off all the checkmarks.” However, the GAL added 

the following, “I think a strong argument can be put forward in this particular case that there was 

never an attempt to reunify this family. There was never an attempt really to see what could or 

couldn’t be completed. I understand that there was services that were offered in this particular 

case; and I understand that those services were not completed; but I can’t say that there was a 

real attempt at reunification of this family.” For those reasons, the GAL recommended that it was 

not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

¶ 36 4. The Trial Court’s Findings

¶ 37 The trial court first discussed the State’s arguments that aggravating 

circumstances were present. The court “d[id]n’t think from a factual standpoint that this rises to 

the level of I’m going to say aggravating circumstances as argued by the State for a couple of 

reasons.” First, the court disagreed with the State’s characterization of the physical abuse. 

Instead of a “beating,” the court found that respondent’s actions constituted “excessive corporal 

punishment.” Further, the court noted that the State was not proceeding on a theory of repeated 

abuse, of which the court further noted it had no competent evidence, just the two original 

instances. 

¶ 38 The trial court agreed that there had not been reasonable efforts at reunification. 

The court noted that M.K. had problems dating back to before she was born and her mother used 

heroin (“And I see [grandmother] agreeing with me because she knows that I know a lot about 
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[mother].”). The court stated that there was not a reasonable effort to reunify the family and the 

conduct of respondent was not “so abhorrent and so aggravating that he is not entitled to at least 

an opportunity to correct that condition.” 

¶ 39 The court noted that respondent had learning disabilities, “really can’t read; and 

that makes it extremely difficult for him; and I believe whenever he’s been in court he’s been 

respectful but obviously is limited in regards to his cognitive abilities to understand a lot of 

things that happen.” The court believed that under those circumstances, it expected more help to 

be offered, but “instead we have him kind of flailing out there with COVID and everything is 

shut down. Nobody can for periods of time get into whatever type of services that they need.”

¶ 40 The trial court found that respondent clearly had an interest in M.K., noted that 

respondent twice considered surrendering parental rights but ultimately decided not to, “and I 

think that’s because he genuinely does not understand some of the stuff that’s being thrown at 

him on a regular basis in connection with this case.” The court continued, stating as follows:

“So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited termination is 

appropriate. I do think that *** the system made a decision to fast track this for 

termination; and all of the efforts and eggs were put in that basket and to the 

detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we 

have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also 

provide the services for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.

So, I do, I do not believe that the services that have been offered to date 

have been reasonable or geared towards a return home goal. I do believe as father 

sits there that h[e] is unfit and unable to care for the minor child and that the 

return or that the goal should be return home within 12 months.”
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¶ 41 The trial court added that it was not addressing visitation because M.K.’s 

counselor needed to be consulted and communication figured out, stating, “And dad also hit the 

nail on the head because he understands that he also has his own issues to work on, and so this is 

a very good time for you to do that and focus all your efforts on that.” The court warned 

respondent that if he did not start services quickly and was not engaged in them by the time the 

court held another permanency hearing, “we are back where we’re at right now.” The court 

admonished respondent that he needed to cooperate with DCFS, participate in services and 

referrals to correct the conditions that led to M.K.’s removal, and if he failed to make progress, 

his parental rights could be terminated.

¶ 42 The trial court entered a written order in which it found that it was in the best 

interest of M.K. and the public that M.K. be made a ward of the court and adjudicated a 

neglected minor. The court further found respondent “unfit” and it was in the best interest of the 

minor to remove the minor from his custody. The court found that “reasonable efforts and 

appropriate services aimed at family preservation and reunification have not been made.” The 

court placed guardianship and custody with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.

¶ 43 This appeal followed. 

¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 45 The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable 

efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We 

conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because 

the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest. 

¶ 46 A. Aggravating Circumstances

¶ 47 As an initial matter, we conclude the State waived any argument that the trial 
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court erred by requiring the State to show aggravating circumstances to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights at the dispositional hearing. To be clear, we fully agree with the State that no such 

showing is required. See In re Tyianna J., 2017 IL App (1st) 162306, ¶ 63, 70 N.E.3d 282. All of 

the necessary elements are set forth in section 2-21(5) of the Act. Nonetheless, at all times before 

the trial court, the State argued that it had demonstrated aggravating circumstances and failed to 

argue that it need not prove an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, in its brief to the trial court at 

the adjudicatory hearing, the State informed the court that evidence of aggravating circumstances 

should be considered at the dispositional hearing and the State intended to make such a showing. 

¶ 48 The doctrine of invited error bars a party from requesting the trial court to proceed 

in a certain manner and later claiming on appeal that the trial court erred by following that 

request. People v. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 73, 89 N.E.3d 898. It is well settled that a 

party cannot complain of an error it injected into the proceedings, induced the court to make, or 

to which that party consented. Id.; see also In re S.R., 2014 IL App (3d) 140565, ¶ 26, 24 N.E.3d 

63. Generally, the State is subject to waiver and forfeiture the same as any other litigant (see 

People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21), and we hold it to that standard here.

¶ 49 B. Requirements for Expedited Termination

¶ 50 Even if we excused the waiver, the outcome would be the same. As we explain, 

the trial court found that the State failed to prove an essential element in section 2-21(5)—

namely, reasonable efforts at reunification—and that finding was not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence.

¶ 51 1. The Law

¶ 52 Section 2-21(5) of the Act provides the requirements that must be satisfied for a 

trial court to terminate parental rights at a dispositional hearing. In essence, that section provides 
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a road map for expedited termination proceedings in the trial court. That section provides as 

follows: 

“The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent at the initial dispositional 

hearing if all of the following conditions are met:

(i) the original or amended petition contains a request for termination of 

parental rights and appointment of a guardian with power to consent to adoption; 

and

(ii) the court has found by a preponderance of evidence, introduced or 

stipulated to at an adjudicatory hearing, that the child comes under the jurisdiction 

of the court as an abused, neglected, or dependent minor under Section 2-18; and

(iii) the court finds, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence admitted 

at the adjudicatory hearing that the parent is an unfit person under subdivision D 

of Section 1 of the Adoption Act; and 

(iv) the court determines in accordance with the rules of evidence for 

dispositional proceedings, that:

(A) it is in the best interest of the minor and public that the child be 

made a ward of the court;

(A-5) reasonable efforts [at reunification] are inappropriate or such 

efforts were made and were unsuccessful; and

(B) termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian 

with power to consent to adoption is in the best interest of the child 

pursuant to Section 2-29.” 705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West 2018). 

¶ 53 In this case, the State filed an amended petition seeking termination in December
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2019. At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court first found M.K. was an abused and neglected 

minor by a preponderance of the evidence. Then, after considering that same evidence, the court 

determined that respondent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence. 

¶ 54 At the dispositional hearing, the court needed to consider (1) whether it was in the 

best interest of M.K. and the public that she be made a ward of the court, (2) whether reasonable 

efforts at reunification were inappropriate or were made and were unsuccessful, and (3) whether 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interest.

¶ 55 2. Best Interest Finding

¶ 56 The State complains that the trial court never made any findings about whether 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interests. However, the court 

essentially made that finding when it determined that reasonable efforts at reunification had not 

been made and that respondent and M.K. should have the opportunity to work towards 

reunification. 

¶ 57 This court has long held that trial courts are not required to recite and evaluate 

every best interest factor either orally at the hearing or in a written order. In re Tajannah O., 

2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19, 8 N.E.3d 1258. “To the contrary, our law is clear that a trial 

court need not articulate any specific rationale for its decision, and a reviewing court need not 

rely on any basis used by a trial court below in affirming its decision.” In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. 

App. 3d 239, 263, 810 N.E.2d 108, 127 (2004). 

¶ 58 A reviewing court “will not disturb a trial court’s decision that terminates an 

individual’s parental rights at the best-interest stage of a combined hearing under section 2-21(5) 

of the Act unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re N.B., 2019 

IL App (2d) 180797, ¶ 43, 125 N.E.3d 444. A decision is against the manifest weight of the 
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evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. In re Nylani M., 2016 IL App 

(1st) 152262, ¶ 48, 51 N.E.3d 1067.

¶ 59 Here, the trial court engaged in a lengthy and detailed discussion about the issues 

argued by the parties. Although the parties, and consequently the court, focused on 

(1) aggravating circumstances and (2) reasonable efforts at reunification, the court’s discussion 

clearly sets forth—and supports—its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was not in M.K.’s best interest. The trial court’s determinations on these factors necessarily 

reflect its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best 

interest.

¶ 60 In particular, the trial court stated “unfortunately the delay [caused by COVID-19] 

only made things worse for the relationship between [respondent] and [M.K.]” The court 

repeatedly expressed frustration that “everything is shut down” due to the pandemic and both 

respondent and M.K. suffered as a result of their unique circumstances. The court also 

emphasized that (1) M.K. “has a lot of problems,” (2) those problems stem from the mother 

using heroin while pregnant, and (3) those problems “go back much further than this incident.”

The court further emphasized that “[t]here’s a lot of work to be done here,” and respondent 

“clearly has an interest in [M.K.].” “So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited 

termination is appropriate.” “[A]ll of the efforts and eggs were put in [the expedited termination] 

basket and to the detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we 

have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also provide the services 

for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.”

¶ 61 In sum, the trial court expressed a clear belief that it was in M.K.’s best interest to 

have the opportunity for a relationship with and to return home to respondent. The court 
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recognized that respondent had difficulties but believed they could be overcome and classes 

could be completed. Additionally, the court emphasized that respondent had successfully 

completed services in the past and was hindered by a no-contact order from the criminal case, 

also before the same judge. Further, the court recognized that M.K. had many of her own 

difficulties which presented challenges for her grandmother. Given the uniqueness of these

circumstances, the court concluded that it was not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights without further efforts at reunification. That decision was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 62 3. Reasonable Efforts Towards Reunification

¶ 63 Alternatively, the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were not made was 

also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In this case, respondent had stable housing, 

had successfully completed services in the past, and cared for M.K. for several years before she 

was removed from his care. The court expressed clear concern that respondent was not given a 

sufficient opportunity to engage in services due to (1) his dyslexia and resulting illiteracy, 

(2) lack of transportation, and (3) lack of availability of services due to COVID-19. The court 

believed that extra care was required from DCFS because it was clearly aware of respondent’s 

literacy problems. The court also noted that DCFS should have been more helpful and diligent in 

helping defendant arrange services remotely because of the pandemic. 

¶ 64 Certainly, DCFS had made some efforts, and the trial court considered the 

adequacy of those efforts. The court credited respondent’s testimony that he did not know what 

was required and the DCFS was not explaining it to him in a way he could understand. 

¶ 65 We give extra deference to trial courts when they consider competing versions of 

events and find one credible. See In re Ta.T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 57. The trial court is 
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in the best position to determine what was reasonable under the circumstances. In re Jay H., 395 

Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070, 918 N.E.2d 284, 290. The court is intimately familiar with (1) the 

parties, (2) the locality, (3) conditions on the ground, etc. See id.; Williams v. Williams, 2018 IL 

App (5th) 170228, ¶ 64, 120 N.E.3d 167. At the dispositional and best-interest stage, the court is 

allowed to consider anything it finds helpful. Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1069-70. We do not 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court or second-guess what information it determined 

was helpful and appropriate to consider because we are not in a position to do so. In re 

Parentage of W.J.B., 2016 IL App (2d) 140361, ¶ 25, 68 N.E.3d 977. 

¶ 66 The trial court’s findings are abundantly clear that it believed respondent was 

unfit and M.K. should not be returned to his care. But the court was equally clear that it believed 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best interests because there had not 

been sufficient efforts towards reunification. Given this context and our highly deferential 

standard of review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings at the dispositional hearing were 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 69 Affirmed.