alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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ARBOR SOFTWARE CORPORATION CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENTS
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#### Dwayne JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Thomas L. CAREY, Warden; et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-16368.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 2007 *.

Filed April 19, 2007.

Dwayne Jones, Corcoran, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Krista Leigh Pollard, Esq., Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.

*741Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dwayne Jones, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition contending that the California Board of Parole Hearings (“the Board”) violated his due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a § 2254 petition, *see McQuillion v. Duncan,*306 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm the district court.

Jones contends that he has been over-incarcerated because he has been held beyond his minimum parole eligibility release date. He asserts that although California Penal Code § 3401(b) provides that an inmate is not entitled to receive a parole date unless the Board finds the inmate suitable for parole, § 3401(b) does not apply to him. We reject this contention for the reasons stated by the district court. *See Cal. Dep’t. of Corr. v. Morales,*514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1599-1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (describing § 3401(b) as applying to a prisoner who was serving a 15-years-to-life prison sentence identical to the one Jones is serving).

In addition, we reject Jones’ contentions that California Penal Code § 190 required the Board to apply additional conduct credits in calculating his minimum parole eligibility release date. Jones has not stated with any specificity what credits of which he was deprived, and his contentions are undermined by exhibits submitted by the government showing that he was granted both pre-prison and post-sentence conduct credits. *See Jones v. Van De Kamp,*66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir.1995).

We further hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones an evidentiary hearing. *See Campbell v. Wood,*18 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir.1994).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 12-12230

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00038-JRH-WLB

MARION RINKER,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,

COLUMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM,

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION,

CHARLES R. NAGLE,

Superintendent of Schools, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

_________________________

(May 21, 2013)

Before HULL, WILSON and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.

 *

Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

Case: 12-12230 Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Page: 1 of 2 
2

PER CURIAM:

After full review and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that 

Plaintiff-Appellant Marion Rinker has demonstrated no reversible error in the 

district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants-Appellees, 

Columbia County Board of Education; Columbia County School System, 

Department of Transportation; Superintendent of Schools Charles R. Nagle; 

Dewayne Porter, Director of Transportation; Assistant Superintendent Robert 

Jarrell; Columbia County Board of Education Chairman Regina Buccafusco; 

Columbia County Board of Education Vice-Chairman Mike Sleeper; and Columbia 

County Board of Education Members Mildred Blackburn, Wayne Bridges, and 

Roxanne Whitaker. We affirm the grant of summary judgment based on the

district court’s thorough and well-reasoned order dated March 29, 2012.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 12-12230 Date Filed: 05/21/2013 Page: 2 of 2
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JUNE 30, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH STATEMENTS.
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</TABLE>
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2226 

To authorize appropriations for assistance under the Low-Income Home 

Energy Assistance Act of 1981, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 1, 2015 

Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. TAKAI, Mr. NORCROSS, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN, Ms. NORTON, Ms. WILSON of Florida, Ms. 

CLARKE of New York, Ms. LEE, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Mr. HIGGINS, Mr. 

RANGEL, Mr. POLIS, Mr. SABLAN, Mr. LOBIONDO, Ms. ADAMS, Mr. 

KING of New York, Mr. LANCE, Mr. TAKANO, and Mr. LEWIS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy 

and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on Education and the 

Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To authorize appropriations for assistance under the LowIncome Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Home Energy Utility 

5 Assistance Act’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2226 IH

1 SEC. 2. LIHEAP FUNDING. 

2 Section 2602(b) of the Low-Income Home Energy 

3 Assistance Act of 1981 (42 U.S.C. 8621(b)) is amended 

4 by striking ‘‘$5,100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2005 

5 through 2007’’ and inserting ‘‘$5,100,000,000 for each of 

6 fiscal years 2016 through 2025’’. 

7 SEC. 3. PARTICIPANT APPLICATIONS. 

8 Section 2605(b)(8) of the Low-Income Home Energy 

9 Assistance Act of 1981 (42 U.S.C. 8624(b)(8)) is amend10 ed— 

11 (1) by striking ‘‘and (B)’’ and inserting ‘‘(B)’’; 

12 and 

13 (2) by inserting ‘‘, and (C) the State will ensure 

14 that households seeking assistance provided under 

15 the program are not required to file more than one 

16 application per year’’ after ‘‘under this title’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2195 

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 

to eliminate exceptions to the limitations imposed on the authority of 

the Secretary of the Army to take certain actions in connection with 

the transfer of AH–64 Apache helicopters from the Army National 

Guard. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 1, 2015 

Mr. ROTHFUS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015 to eliminate exceptions to the limitations imposed on the authority of the Secretary of the Army 

to take certain actions in connection with the transfer 

of AH–64 Apache helicopters from the Army National 

Guard. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserving National 

5 Guard Combat Readiness Act of 2015’’. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2195 IH

1 SEC. 2. ELIMINATION OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBI2 TION OF CERTAIN ACTIONS IN CONNECTION 

3 WITH TRANSFER OF AH–64 APACHE HELI4 COPTERS. 

5 Section 1712 of the National Defense Authorization 

6 Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291) is amend7 ed— 

8 (1) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘but subject 

9 to the exceptions provided in subsection (e),’’; and 

10 (2) by striking subsections (e) and (f). 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Cheryl Williams, Appellant.

The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s challenges to two prospective jurors for cause because no basis for their exclusion from the jury was shown. Both prospective jurors unequivocally stated that their contact with police officers would not affect their determination in the instant case and that they did not believe that police officers were more credible than any other witnesses.

The defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of her motion for a severance, since her own confession and trial testimony were substantially identical with the extrajudicial statement of her nontestifying codefendant *(see, Parker v Randolph,*442 US 62; *People v McNeil,*24 NY2d 550, *cert denied sub nom. Spain v New York,*396 US 937; *People v Cruz, 66*NY2d 61, *cert granted*— US —, 106 S Ct 2888; *People*
      *616
      *v Berzups,*49 NY2d 417). Since the defendant did not clearly show that her codefendant would testify if they were tried separately and that such testimony would tend to exculpate her, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion *(see, People v Bornholdt,*33 NY2d 75, *cert denied sub nom. Victory v New York,*416 US 905). The defendant’s additional claims regarding the denial of her motion for a severance have not been preserved for review as a matter of law, and we decline to address them in the interest of justice.

The evidence adduced at the trial was sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to all of the counts of which she was convicted *(see, Jackson v Virginia,*443 US 307; *People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620).

Any possible prejudice created by the prosecutor’s summation was cured by the court’s curative instructions *(see, People v Campan,*110 AD2d 845), and the defendant was not prejudiced by the court’s failure to charge in the language requested by her since the charge that was given by the court adequately covered the subject of her request *(see, People v Dory,*59 NY2d 121; *People v Dengler,*109 AD2d 847).

Finally, while the defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment on the basis of her age, since she was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the instant offenses, and because of her lack of prior criminal history, the determination of whether to grant youthful offender status rests within the discretion of the court *(see, People v Selg,*110 AD2d 918; *People v Parris,*109 AD2d 853; *People v Williams,*78 AD2d 642), and it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in the instant case. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Mangano and Thompson, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markm an Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_________________________________________ Clerk October 5, 2012 

# Order

October 5, 2012

145142(55)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

SC: 145142

v COA: 302335

Oakland CC: 2008

- 221029

- FH

BRIAN JAMES VEILLEUX,

Defendant

- Appellant.

______________________________________

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion by defendant

- appellant for extension of

the time for filing his su pplemental brief is considered and it is granted.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1814 

To permanently reauthorize the Land and Water Conservation Fund. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 15, 2015 

Mr. GRIJALVA (for himself, Mrs. DINGELL, Mr. POLIS, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. 

THOMPSON of California, Mr. RUIZ, Mr. TAKAI, Ms. KUSTER, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Ms. TSONGAS, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. GUINTA, 

Mr. GIBSON, Mr. COSTELLO of Pennsylvania, Mr. DOLD, Mr. REICHERT, 

Mr. LOBIONDO, and Mr. KING of New York) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To permanently reauthorize the Land and Water 

Conservation Fund. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT REAUTHORIZATION OF LAND AND 

4 WATER CONSERVATION FUND. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 200302 of title 54, United 

6 States Code, is amended— 

7 (1) in subsection (b), in the matter preceding 

8 paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘During the period endVerDate Sep 11 2014 19:21 Apr 21, 2015 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1814.IH H1814

tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1814 IH

1 ing September 30, 2015, there’’ and inserting 

2 ‘‘There’’; and 

3 (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ‘‘through 

4 September 30, 2015’’. 

5 (b) PUBLIC ACCESS.—Section 200306 of title 54, 

6 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 

7 following: 

8 ‘‘(c) PUBLIC ACCESS.—Not less than 1.5 percent of 

9 amounts made available for expenditure in any fiscal year 

10 under section 200303, or $10,000,000, whichever is great11 er, shall be used for projects that secure recreational pub12 lic access to existing Federal public land for hunting, fish13 ing, and other recreational purposes.’’. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Town of Oyster Bay, Appellant, v John C. Baker, Respondent.

[946 NYS2d 257]

In an action, inter alia, for permanent injunctive relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jaeger, J.), dated May 25, 2011, as denied that branch of its motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using certain real property in connection with the defendant’s landscaping business.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief based on a violation of its zoning ordinances, a town need not satisfy the traditional three-part test for injunctive relief, but is required “only [to] show that it has a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and that the equities are balanced in its favor” *(First Franklin Sq. Assoc., LLC v Franklin Sq. Prop. Account,*15 AD3d 529, 533 [2005]; *see Town of Southampton v County of Suffolk,*88 AD3d 988, 989 [2011]; *Town of Huntington v Pierce Arrow Realty Corp.,*216 AD2d 287, 288 [1995]; *Incorporated Vil. of Freeport v Jefferson Indoor Mar.,*162 AD2d 434, 436 [1990]). To obtain relief, a town must “come forward with a strong prima facie showing that the defendants are violating its zoning ordinance” *(Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky,*154 AD2d 455, 455 [1989]; *see Town of Oyster Bay v Dyott,*246 AD2d 531 [1998]). Here, the Town of Oyster Bay failed to make a prima facie showing that the nonconforming use of the subject property had been abandoned and, thus, that the use of the subject property as a landscaping business was not a lawful, preexisting nonconform*825ing use. Consequently, the Supreme Court correctly denied that branch the Town’s motion which was to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from using his real property in connection with his landscaping business *(see Town of Islip v Modica Assoc. of NY 122, LLC,*45 AD3d 574, 575 [2007]; *Town of Southampton v Sendlewski,*156 AD2d 669, 670 [1989]; *Town of Oyster Bay v Sodomsky,*154 AD2d 455 [1989]; CPLR 4401). Dillon, J.P., Eng, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2011 NY Slip Op 31448(U).]
#### Joseph Spose, Jr., et al., Appellants, v Ragu Foods, Inc., et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents. Postler and Jaeckle Construction, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Memorandum: Plaintiff Joseph Spose, Jr., was performing duct work at a warehouse construction site. As he was climbing a ladder, a rung broke and he sustained injuries when he fell to the ground. Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes absolute liability on an owner and contractor where an employee’s injuries result from the failure to provide equipment for the protection of workers *(Bland v Manocherian,*66 NY2d 452, 459; *Haimes v New York Tel. Co.,*46 NY2d 132, 137; *Heath v Soloff Constr.,*107 AD2d 507, 510). Comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff is no defense to a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1) *(Bland v Manocherian, supra,*pp 460-461; *Rea v Elia Bldg. Co.,*79 AD2d 1102). Therefore, the denial of plaintiff *981Joseph Spose, Jr.’s motion for partial summary judgment was error.

Defendants argued and Special Term agreed that plaintiff wife is not entitled to summary judgment on her derivative cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1) because questions of fact exist as to her husband’s comparative negligence. That was error. A spouse’s derivative claim is dependent upon the cause of action of the injured party. Here, since the injured husband’s claim cannot be reduced for his own comparative negligence, the wife’s derivative claim cannot be reduced for "[h]er right to recover is derived, both in a literal and legal sense, from the injuries] suffered by her spouse” *(Maidman v Stagg,*82 AD2d 299, 305).

Finally, defendants argue, for the first time on this appeal, that plaintiff wife may not maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium based upon her husband’s claim under Labor Law § 240 (1) because there is no statutory provision for such action. No case law has been cited to support such a position, and since the issue was not presented to the court below it is not a proper subject on this appeal. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Bergin, J. — partial summary judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.