2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-11-2002

Jones v. Comm Social Security

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-4143

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Recommended Citation

"Jones v. Comm Social Security" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 562.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-4143 

 ___________ 

 MARVA D. JONES 

 

 v. 

 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

 MARVA JONES, 

 Appellant 

 _______________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the District of New Jersey 

 D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-04780 

 (Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise) 

 ___________________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 June 4, 2002 

 Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and WEIS, Circuit Judges 

(Filed September 11, 2002 ) 

 __________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 __________________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 This is an appeal from an order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s 

denial of Social Security benefits. 

 I. 

 Marva Jones, an assembly line packer from 1980 to 1986, fractured her left ankle 

on October 11, 1987. Her initial request for Social Security benefits was denied on 

February 6, 1990, and Jones did not appeal. Jones then fractured her right ankle on 

January 30, 1994. On December 24, 1996, Jones again applied for Social Security 

benefits, contending she had been unable to work since her left ankle fracture in 1987. 

She claims her left ankle swells after several minutes of standing and that she suffers 

intolerable back pain, prohibiting her from lifting or carrying. Jones’s medical expert 

testified Jones has degenerative arthritic conditions in her left ankle. 

 Jones’s 1996 application for benefits was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. The administrative law judge found Jones met the required twenty 

quarters of insurance coverage in 1991 but concluded Jones had not introduced sufficient 

evidence to establish she was "disabled" between February 7, 1990 (the date after the 

denial of her first application) and December 31, 1991 (the last date she was covered by 

insurance). The Appeals Council denied review. The District Court affirmed the order 
and this appeal followed. 

 II. 

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. 

 III. 

 Social Security regulations provide a five-step procedure for evaluating disability 

claims. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520, 416.920. The District Court found Jones was not 

"disabled" between February 7, 1990 and December 31, 1991. Therefore, she did not 

clear the second of the five requirements proving she has a "severe impairment" 

disabling her while she met the status requirements. See 20 C.F.R. 404.130, 

404.315. At issue is whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for 

the Commissioner’s factual findings, which were affirmed. 42 U.S.C. 405(g); 

Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). 

"Substantial evidence" constitutes "[s]uch relevant evidence as a reasoning mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 

1981). 

 The parties agree Jones last met the status requirements on December 31, 1991. 

To recover benefits, Jones was required to have a severe "physical or mental impairment" 

demonstrable by clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. 423(d). 

Subjective symptoms, without more, cannot ordinarily result in a disability finding. 

Jones contends her left ankle fracture remained debilitating enough to qualify under 

Listing 1.03A. But Jones failed to produce a single medical record from the relevant 

time period, February 7, 1990 to December 31, 1991. Additionally, the administrative 

law judge found Dr. Scott’s treatment notes from January 8, 1990 demonstrated Jones’s 

left ankle had a good range of motion and acceptable motor strength. Jones did not 

receive further treatment from Dr. Scott until January 30, 1994, after she fractured her 

right ankle and more than two years after her last date insured. Nor is there evidence 

Jones sought treatment from another health provider in the interim. In sum, Jones did not 

demonstrate she suffered a "severe impairment" from February 7, 1990 to December 31, 

1991, the critical period for her claim. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a). 

 Jones contends the administrative law judge recognized the "severity" of her 

impairment, which should have satisfied the "step two" requirement. But the 

administrative law judge properly situated the available medical evidence within the 

dates of Jones’s insurance coverage: 

 Although it appears that the fracture of [Jones’s] left ankle took more than a 

 year to heal, a delay which might have provided a basis for a successful 

 appeal of her prior application, as of September of 1989, her treating 

 physician noted that the x-rays showed excellent healing of her fracture. . . . 

 Indeed, there are no treatment notes or other medical findings after her 

 fracture healed and prior to 1991 that would indicate that the severity of her 

 current complaints with respect to her left ankle pre-existed the date last 

 insured. 

Therefore, considering the third, fourth, and fifth steps along the sequential chain was 

unnecessary. The administrative law judge met its responsibilities under Cotter. See 642 

F.2d at 705 ("We need from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he 

considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was 

rejected."). Jones’s left ankle may well have constituted a "severe impairment" during a 

prior period, but the administrative law judge could only consider the time period 

beginning February 7, 1990. After that date, substantial evidence suggests Jones did not 

have a "severe impairment." 

 Jones also contends both the District Court and the administrative law judge failed 

to explain why they did not accept Dr. Mylod’s 1998 testimony, which purportedly 

established Jones’s impairment at the 1.03A level before December 1991. But as the 

District Court noted, Listing 1.03A normally covers the hips and knees, not the ankles. 

Dr. Mylod’s opinion that an ankle is a similar "weight-bearing joint" was insufficient. 

The specific impairment must be included on the list with the required severity. 20 

C.F.R. 404.1525(c). Listing 1.03A makes no reference to ankles. Additionally, as 

noted, Dr. Scott’s notes from January 8, 1990 indicate Jones’s left ankle had a good range 

of motion. Listing 1.03A requires "persistent joint pain" and "signs of marked limitation 
of motion or abnormal motion." Therefore, a finding that Jones suffered from a 1.03A 

impairment was precluded. We see no error. 

 Finally, Jones contends the administrative law judge wrongly failed to consider 

the testimony of Dr. S. Tsai, the Commissioner’s psychiatrist. But Dr. Tsai made his 

report on January 24, 1990, before the denial of Jones’s first application for benefits. It 

predated the February 6, 1990 notice on Jones’s first claim. Therefore, the administrative 

law judge could determine Dr. Tsai’s report was part of the previous record and could not 

be considered with reference to her second application for benefits. On both the latter 

two issues, the administrative law judge acknowledged possibly conflicting evidence but 

nonetheless determined Jones did not suffer from a "severe impairment" during the 

relevant period. That determination was supported by substantial evidence. 

 IV. 

 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 

 /s/Anthony J. Scirica 

 

 Circuit Judge