17-2969 Farid v. Barr BIA Lamb, IJ A079 713 969 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 15th day of July, two thousand nineteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **DENNIS JACOBS,** 7 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 8 **RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **MUHAMMAD ABDUL FARID, AKA** 13 **MOHAMMAD ABDUL FAREED,** 14 15 Petitioner **,** 16 17 **v. 17-2969** 18 **NAC** 19 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES** 20 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 21 22 Respondent **.** 23

**_____________________________________** 24 25 **FOR PETITIONER:** Sanjay Chaubey, New York, NY. 26 27 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 282 Attorney General; Keith I. 1 McManus, Assistant Director; 2 Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney, 3 Office of Immigration Litigation, 4 United States Department of 5 Justice, Washington, DC. 6 7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 10 is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. 11 Petitioner Muhammad Abdul Farid, a native and citizen of 12 Pakistan, seeks review of an August 25, 2017 decision of the 13 BIA affirming a March 13, 2017 decision of an Immigration 14 Judge (“IJ”) denying his motion to reopen. In Muhammad Abdul 15 Farid, No. A079 713 969 (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 2017), aff’g No. 16 A079 713 969 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 13, 2017). We assume 17 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 18 procedural history in this case, and the issues on appeal. 19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 20 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen 21 v. Gonzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the 22 agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. 23 Ali v. Gonzales , 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). An alien 24 generally may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days 25 after the final administrative decision is rendered. 263 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1 1003.23(b)(1). It is undisputed that Farid’s motion was 2 untimely because he filed it more than ten years after an IJ 3 ordered him removed. As discussed below, he failed to 4 establish that either ineffective assistance of counsel or 5 lack of notice excused his late filing. 6 **Ineffective Assistance** 7 An untimely motion to reopen may be excused based on 8 ineffective assistance of counsel. Rashid v. Mukasey , 533 9 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008). To prevail on an ineffective 10 assistance claim, an alien must substantially comply with the 11 procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada , 19 I. 12 & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), which include setting forth the 13 agreement with former counsel, notifying former counsel of 14 the allegations, and filing a complaint with a disciplinary 15 authority. See Twum v. INS , 411 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 2005). 16 “[A]n alien who has failed to comply substantially with the 17 Lozada requirements in h[is] motion to reopen before the BIA 18 forfeits h[is] ineffective assistance of counsel claim in 19 this Court.” Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 409 20 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2005). 21 Farid alleged that his former counsel failed to inform 224 him of his removal order. Because Farid concedes that he did 1 not satisfy any of the procedural requirements, he has 2 forfeited this ineffective assistance claim. Id. Although 3 he argues that he was not required to comply because the 4 ineffective assistance is clear from the record, the record 5 belies this claim. See Yi Long Yang v. Gonzales , 478 F.3d 6 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding substantial compliance with 7 Lozada when relevant facts were clear on record, IJ explicitly 8 relied on counsel’s competence, and counsel was “subsequently 9 disbarred for malpractice as an immigration attorney”). The 10 record reflects that Farid had personal notice of his October 11 2006 hearing because the date was set at a prior hearing at 12 which he was present. Moreover, as the BIA found, there is 13 nothing in the 2006 removal order to indicate that it was 14 entered in absentia, reflecting that Farid was also present 15 when the oral decision was read. Farid also argues that he 16 could not comply with Lozada because he did not know his prior 17 counsel’s name or address, but counsel’s name and address 18 were listed on a hearing notice and therefore were available 19 to Farid. 20 **Notice of Hearing** 21 Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the order was entered 225 in absentia, the 90-day time limitation may still be excused 1 if Farid did not receive proper notice of his hearing. See 2 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). How ever, the hearing notice 3 in the record reflects that it was provided in writing at the 4 hearing and that Farid was given oral notice in a language he 5 understood. See Certified Administrative Record at 85-86. 6 Such notice is sufficient. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A) 7 (written notice provided in person specifying time and place 8 of new hearing sufficient). 9 **Sua Sponte Reopening** 10 Although the agency has the authority to reopen an 11 immigration proceeding sua sponte even if the motion is 12 untimely, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), we 13 lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s “entirely 14 discretionary” decision not to exercise that authority, Ali , 15 448 F.3d at 518. Although we may remand if the agency 16 “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, 17 that a reopening would necessarily fail,” that exception does 18 not apply here because the agency simply found that Farid did 19 not present exceptional circumstances that would warrant 20 reopening. Mahmood v. Holder , 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 21 2009); see In re J-J- , 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 226 1997) (“The power to reopen on our o wn motion is not meant to 1 be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise 2 circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result 3 in hardship.”). 4 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 5 DENIED in part and DISMISSED in remaining part. As we have 6 completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court 7 previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any 8 pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is 9 DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in 10 this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 11 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 12 34.1(b). 13
FOR THE COURT: 14 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 15 Clerk of Court 16 17