No. _____________

________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

_________________________________________________________

GARY MARTINS

Defendant - Appellant

VS.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Plaintiff – State

_________________________________________________________

Review Sought from the Court of Appeals

Cause No. 14-14-00688-CR

_________________________________________________________

Conviction in the 176th Judicial District Court

Harris County, Texas

Cause No. 1371501

________________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

_________________________________________________________

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

PENNY WYMYCZAK-WHITE

TBN 22100350

723 Main St. Ste. 808

Houston, Texas 77002

713/225-5296 (direct)

713/227-5290 (fax)

pennywhitetx@aol.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

PD-1485-15

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 11/16/2015 12:17:24 PM

Accepted 11/17/2015 1:47:42 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
1

IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant herein states that the names of all parties and counsel to this 

appeal are:

Presiding Judge:

The Honorable Stacey Bond

Representing the State:

Jamie Felicia (at trial)

Allen Curry (on appeal)

Harris County District Attorney’s Office

1201 Franklin Street 5

th Floor

Houston, Texas 77002

Representing Appellant:

Jerald K. Graber

917 Franklin, Suite 510

Houston, Texas 77002

Penny Wymwczak-White (on appeal)

Attorney at Law

723 Main St. Ste. 808

Houston, Texas 77002

The appellant:

Gary Martins
2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL.....................................................1

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................3

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT...........................................4

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY...................................................4

GROUND FOR REVIEW.......................................................................................5

ARGUMENT............................................................................................................6

Appellant’s Sole Ground for Review: The Court of Appeals Erred 

in Finding the Evidence Sufficient to Support Appellant’s 

Conviction for Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child, Where the 

Evidence Failed to Show that Appellant Intentionally or Knowingly 

Engaged in the Alleged Conduct Against the Complainant. .................................6

PRAYER FOR RELIEF..........................................................................................8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..............................................................................9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................9

APPENDIX.............................................................................................................10

Opinion by Court of Appeals Dated October 15, 2015........................................10
3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Koah v. State, 

604 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)...............................................................6

Whatley v. State, 

445 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)...............................................................7

STATUTES

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2014). ..................................6

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2011)............................................................6

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (West 2011) ...........................................................6

RULES

Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b)..............................................................................................7

Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(d)..............................................................................................7
4

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

This appeal presents novel issues of fact and law. Appellant believes that 

oral argument will assist the Court in reach a fair and just decision.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal lies from Appellant’s jury trial and felony conviction.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was charged with aggravated sexual assault of a child, alleged to 

have occurred on September 7, 2012. (C.R. 21). Trial before a jury commenced on 

August 13, 2014. (C.R. 183). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. (C.R. 183). 

The jury was authorized to convict Appellant for aggravated sexual assault of a 

child, or indecency with a child. (C.R. 91). The jury found Appellant guilty of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child. (C.R. 98). The trial court assessed punishment 

at thirteen years confinement. (C.R. 102). Judgment was entered on August 15, 

2014. (C.R. 102). No motion for new trial was filed. Notice of appeal was filed on 

August 15, 2014. (C.R. 105). The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction 

on October 15, 2015, in a memorandum opinion. No motion for rehearing was 

filed.
5

GROUND FOR REVIEW

Appellant’s Sole Ground for Review: The Court of Appeals Erred in Finding 

the Evidence Sufficient to Support Appellant’s Conviction for Aggravated 

Sexual Assault of a Child, Where the Evidence Failed to Show that Appellant 

Intentionally or Knowingly Engaged in the Alleged Conduct Against the 

Complainant.
6

ARGUMENT

Appellant’s Sole Ground for Review: The Court of Appeals Erred in Finding 

the Evidence Sufficient to Support Appellant’s Conviction for Aggravated 

Sexual Assault of a Child, Where the Evidence Failed to Show that Appellant 

Intentionally or Knowingly Engaged in the Alleged Conduct Against the 

Complainant.

The indictment returned against Appellant alleged that he placed his finger 

in the female sexual organ of the complainant. (C.R. 21). The complainant testified 

that Appellant was asleep at the time of the alleged offense. (3 R.R. 153, 155). Her 

testimony is corroborated by Sandra Sanchez, the nurse who testified that the 

complainant reported to her that Appellant was asleep when he touched her. (3 

R.R. 63). The fact that Appellant was asleep was further shown by his wife, 

Jeanette Martins, who stated that Appellant appeared to be sleeping when she 

entered the master bedroom. (2 R.R. 152). 

The State was required to prove that Appellant acted intentionally or 

knowingly in placing his finger in the sexual organ of the complainant. Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2014). A person acts intentionally with 

respect to the nature of his conduct when it is his conscious objective to engage in 

the conduct. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2011); Koah v. State, 604 

S.W.2d 156, 160 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). A person acts knowingly with 

respect to the nature of his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct. 

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (West 2011); Koah v. State, 604 S.W.2d at 160 
7

n.1. It stands to reason that if Appellant was asleep at the time of the alleged 

conduct, he could not have acted intentionally or knowingly within the meaning of 

the Penal Code.

This Court should grant this petition on the grounds that the Court of 

Appeals has decided an important question of state law. Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b). In 

addition, this Court should grant this petition on the grounds that the Court of 

Appeals appears to have misconstrued a statute. Rule 66.3(d). This Court should 

decide whether the undisputed evidence that Appellant was acting in his sleep 

would allow a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable that he acted 

intentionally or knowingly. 

The court of appeals relied on this Court’s decision in Whatley v. State, 445 

S.W.3d 159, 166-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), which upheld an aggravated sexual 

assault conviction despite evidence that the defendant was sound asleep during the 

commission of the alleged underlying conduct. However, the issue in Whatley was 

framed in terms of whether the defendant had acted voluntarily. 445 S.W.3d at 

160, 167. This Court even noted that “[t]his is a distinct inquiry from the knowing 

or intentional mens rea requirement established by the provisions of § 

22.021(a)(1)(B).” 445 S.W.3d at 166. This Court should grant this petition, and 

decide whether Whatley is controlling precedent in Appellant’s appeal.
8

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Appellant prays this Honorable Court to grant this petition, and to 

summarily reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and to enter a judgment of 

acquittal. In the alternative, Petitioner prays this Court to grant this petition and 

order full briefs filed on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

Penny Wymyczak-White 

PENNY WYMYCZAK-WHITE

TBN 22100350

723 Main St. Ste. 808

Houston, Texas 77002

713/225-5296 (direct)

713/227-5290 (fax)

pennywhitetx@aol.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 16th day of November, 2015, a true and correct 

copy of the forgoing motion for substitution of counsel was served by fax and 

email to Alan Curry, (713) 755-5809 (F), Alan.Curry@dao.hc.tx, and to the State’s 

Prosecuting Attorney, (512) 463-5724 (F), information@spa.texas.gov.

Penny Wymyczak-White 

PENNY WYMYCZAK-WHITE

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that under the provisions and restrictions of Rules 9.4(i)(1) 

& 9.4(i)(2)(D), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the foregoing petition for 

discretionary review consists of 508 words.

Penny Wymyczak-White 

PENNY WYMYCZAK-WHITE
10

APPENDIX

Opinion by Court of Appeals Dated October 15, 2015
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 15, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00688-CR

GARY MARTINS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1371501

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant Gary Martins of aggravated sexual assault of a child.1 

The jury sentenced appellant to confinement for thirteen years in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In one issue, appellant argues 

that the evidence to support his conviction is legally insufficient. We affirm. 

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 7, 2012, appellant’s wife, Jenetta Martins, arrived home to a quiet 

and dark townhouse. Jenetta testified that when she walked towards her bedroom, she 

 

1

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2011). 
2

felt “sick, like something was wrong.” The home was dark and the television was turned 

off. This was unusual because appellant routinely fell asleep on the couch while 

watching television. Earlier that night, Jenetta had placed J.S., her eight-year-old niece, 

in the master bedroom to sleep. When Jenetta walked into the bedroom, she saw 

appellant and J.S. lying next to each other in the bed. Both appeared to be asleep. 

Jenetta woke J.S. and carried her to the living room, where she noticed that her shorts 

were folded down in the back. Jenetta asked J.S. if appellant had touched her. J.S. said 

no. Jenetta asked J.S. again if appellant had touched her. J.S. asked if Jenetta would be 

mad at her and whether Jenetta would tell appellant what J.S. said next. Jenetta 

responded that she would not. J.S. then told Jenetta that appellant had touched her. J.S. 

indicated that appellant rubbed her buttocks and then demonstrated with her finger how

appellant touched her between her legs and moved his finger back and forth. 

J.S. testified at trial that appellant placed his hand in her underwear, put his finger 

in her “pee side,” and moved it back and forth. J.S. also testified that she told appellant 

to stop several times because he was hurting her, but that he did not listen to her 

“because he was sleeping and couldn’t stop when [she] told him to.” J.S. demonstrated

for the jury where appellant had touched her on a doll. The location that J.S. indicated

corresponded with the female sexual organ. 

After J.S. made her outcry to Jenetta, she was taken to the hospital for an exam by 

a forensic nurse. The nurse, Sandra Sanchez, testified at trial that, during the exam, she 

found a 0.4 centimeter by 0.2 centimeter bruise on J.S.’s hymen. A photo depicting the 

bruise was entered into evidence. As part of the exam, J.S’s underwear was collected as 

evidence and tested by personnel at the Harris County Institute of Forensic Science. A 

stain on the underwear returned a presumptive positive for blood. Male DNA detected 

inside the underwear was consistent with appellant’s DNA profile. Two weeks after the 

assault, Lisa Holcomb, a forensic interviewer at the Children’s Assessment Center in 
3

Houston, interviewed J.S. Holcomb testified at trial that J.S. disclosed the same abuse 

to her during the interview. 

The jury convicted appellant of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Appellant’s 

sole argument on appeal is that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 

support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he acted intentionally or 

knowingly in penetrating the female sexual organ of J.S. 

Analysis

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider “all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that 

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gear v. State, 340 

S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A person commits aggravated sexual assault 

if he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of a child by 

any means. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2011). Appellant does 

not argue that he did not penetrate the female sexual organ of J.S. Rather, he asserts

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show that he acted intentionally or 

knowingly. A person acts intentionally “when it is his conscious objective or desire to 

engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 

2011). A person acts knowingly “when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 

certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). Appellant claims that no rational jury could 

have found that he acted with either culpable mental state because the evidence at trial 

shows that he was asleep at the time that he penetrated the female sexual organ of J.S. 

J.S. testified that she repeatedly told appellant to stop touching her, but that he 

continued without regard to her numerous protests. J.S. testified that she believed that 

appellant was unable to stop because he was asleep. Jenetta testified that appellant 

appeared to be sleeping when she entered the bedroom to find appellant and J.S. in bed 
4

together after the assault occurred. Appellant argues that these bits of testimony, taken 

together, render it impossible for a rational jury to conclude that he acted with the 

requisite state of mind for aggravated sexual assault. 

The task of evaluating testimony and drawing reasonable inferences from the 

facts belongs exclusively to the jury. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

We do not substitute our judgment for the jury’s when reviewing the evidentiary 

sufficiency of the verdict that they rendered. Johnson v. State, 421 S.W.3d 893, 896

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We only determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion after hearing the evidence 

before them. Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746. 

The jury weighed all of the evidence, forensic and non-forensic. From the 

evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that, in spite of the testimony of J.S. to 

the contrary, appellant was not actually asleep and acted either intentionally or 

knowingly in penetrating the female sexual organ of J.S. J.S. was eight years old when 

appellant assaulted her and ten years old when she testified at trial. The forensic 

examiner testified that J.S. also appeared to be developmentally delayed. Both age and 

impaired development could have affected her ability to understand whether appellant 

was really unable to control his actions or whether he was just feigning sleep. J.S. slept 

over at appellant’s home often and had a close relationship with him and his wife. It is 

rational to infer that such a child would have honestly believed her own mistaken 

testimony and trusted that appellant was not acting intentionally to hurt her and was 

instead ignoring her protests because he was asleep. See Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 

159, 166–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (aggravated sexual assault conviction upheld 

despite child’s forensic interview in which she seemed convinced that appellant, her 

stepfather, was asleep when he touched her).

The jury also considered forensic evidence that could have rationally supported a 
5

finding of intentional or knowing action. J.S. suffered an injury to her hymen—one 

which the forensic nurse testified was uncommonly severe for the digital penetration 

that J.S. reported being victim to. An injury so deep within the female sexual organ 

could have given rise to a reasonable inference of intentional penetration by the 

appellant. Similarly, a rational jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant’s 

actions were intentional or knowing after hearing that male DNA matching appellant’s 

genetic profile was found inside the underwear of J.S. 

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have convicted appellant on the evidence 

presented to the jury. Therefore, the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 167. Having overruled 

appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Marc W. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Brown.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).