IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-51259

HAROLD L. RYALS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS; MIDLAND COUNTY; CHERYL 

BECKER,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:14-CV-4

Before KING, JOLLY, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Harold L. Ryals, Texas prisoner # 1940539, moves this court for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the district court’s dismissal 

of his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim. In the 

district court, Ryals consented to having his § 1983 complaint adjudicated 

before a magistrate judge. In relevant part, the magistrate judge determined 

that Ryals’s claims against the Attorney General of Texas regarding his two 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 26, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 14-51259

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prior convictions for failing to register as a sex offender were barred by the rule 

established in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Further, as to Midland 

County, the magistrate judge found Ryals’s allegations insufficient to support 

a claim of municipal liability under § 1983. Finally, as to Cheryl Becker, the 

magistrate judge concluded that she was entitled to qualified immunity, in 

part because Ryals failed to demonstrate any constitutional violations.

By filing in this court a motion for leave to proceed IFP, Ryals is 

challenging the magistrate judge’s determination that his appeal was not 

taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). A 

motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal “must be directed solely to the trial 

court’s reasons for the certification decision.” Id. This court’s inquiry into 

Ryals’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points 

arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” See Howard v. King, 

707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). If it is apparent that an appeal would be meritless, we may dismiss 

the appeal as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24.

In support of his motion for leave to proceed IFP, Ryals contends, inter 

alia, that his claims fall within an exception to the rule established in Heck. 

He also asserts that his conviction has been “called into question” by a state 

district court. Finally, he claims that habeas relief is unavailable, and thus his 

§ 1983 complaint is the only avenue left for him to pursue his claims. 

Ryals’s arguments here are unavailing, as no exception to the Heck rule 

applies in this case. Ryals cites a number of cases in support of his argument 

that an exception applies. However, the cases are entirely inapposite to the 

present issue, and, indeed, the cases make no mention of the Heck rule. In 

addition, Ryals’s assertion that his conviction has been “called into question,” 

thus satisfying the Heck condition, is entirely without support. Thus, because 

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there is no evidence showing that Ryals’s convictions have been reversed or 

otherwise called into question, save for his unsupported assertions, Ryals’s 

claims are barred by Heck. See Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 190-91 (5th 

Cir. 1998) (en banc). Finally, this court has rejected Ryals’s argument that his 

asserted inability to obtain habeas relief is an exception to the Heck rule. See 

Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that inability to 

obtain habeas relief did not serve as an exception to the Heck rule). Moreover, 

Ryals has only alleged an inability to obtain habeas relief; he has not asserted 

that he has no procedural vehicle to challenging his convictions. See id.

Addressing the dismissal of his claims against Midland County based on 

the failure to allege municipal liability, Ryals argues that the magistrate judge 

was wrong to apply a heightened pleading standard to his pro se complaint. 

Even liberally construed, Ryals fails to state a claim of municipal liability as 

to Midland County. Put simply, Ryals’s challenge to Midland County’s 

enforcement of the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program is an indirect 

challenge to his convictions for failing to register as a sex offender, and 

accordingly, the challenge is barred by Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

Next, as to the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his § 1983 suit against 

Becker, Ryals makes no argument challenging the magistrate judge’s 

conclusion that qualified immunity precluded the claim against Becker that 

she unlawfully denied him access to documents in his juvenile case. Thus, 

Ryals does not address the “trial court’s reasons for the certification decision.” 

See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202. Although pro se briefs are afforded liberal 

construction, see Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993), when an 

appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it is the 

same as if the appellant had not appealed that issue. See Brinkmann v. Dallas 

County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).

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We need not address Ryals’s remaining arguments, which are directed 

at the magistrate judge’s alternative holdings. The balance of Ryals’s 

remaining arguments necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for 

failing to register as a sex offender. Thus, his claims are barred by Heck and 

are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until the Heck condition is satisfied. See 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Cronn v. Buffington, 150 F.3d 538, 541 & n.2 (5th 

Cir. 1998). Additionally, Ryals fails to address the district court’s reasoning 

for dismissing his Eighth Amendment claim, thus raising no issue for appeal. 

See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748. 

In view of the foregoing, Ryals has not shown that he will raise a 

nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20. Accordingly,

his motion to proceed IFP on appeal is denied, and his appeal is dismissed as 

frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Our dismissal of 

Ryals’s appeal as frivolous and the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights 

suit count as two strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. 

Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). We warn Ryals that if he 

accumulates a third strike pursuant to § 1915(g) he will be barred from 

proceeding IFP while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING 

ISSUED.

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