### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-01-00257-CV
Allen Dennis

Rambo, Appell ant
v. Marsha N. Rambo, Appelle e
FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 261S T JUDICIAL DIST RICT

NO. 91- 9474, HON ORABLE P AUL DA VIS, JUD GE PR

ESIDING
De nnis Ra mbo ap pe als t he dis t r ic t court ’s order of enf orcemen t related to is sues ar ising fro m the p ar t ies’ divo rc e de cr ee. Raising five iss ue s, De nnis conten ds that the d

i stri ct court erred in ruli ng that expenses i

ncurred by

hi s f ormer wif e M ars ha Ra m bo on t he ir d au gh t er ’s be ha lf at the SU WS th erape uti c progra

m and the Mi ssi on Moun tai n Sc hool i n M ontan a wer e he al th ca re expenses co ver ed by t he pa rt ies’ 19 92 d ivor ce d ecr ee a nd t ha t t he co ur t er r ed in o r de r ing him to pay $21,978.28, t he cu rr en t ba lan ce o win g o f his o ne - ha lf po r t io n o f t ho se ex pe nse s. Ad dit io na lly , De nnis contends that the district court erredin ord eri n g h i m to pa y a $ 75 00 de

b t h e w as ord er ed to p ay in the di vorce decree beca use the statute o f l

im itations had run an

d there was no wri

tt en acknowl edgm

ent of the debt to t ake the debt out of t he o per at ion o f the st at ut e o f li mitat ions. We af f i rm the e nf orcem en t order. Backgr ound De nnis and Marsh

a Ram bo were div

orced i n A ugust 1992. In

Oct obe r 2 000 , Ma rsha in itiated this po st -d ivor ce e nfor cement act ion r ega rd ing t wo claims: (1 ) he alth c ar e exp ense s she2

in curredo n be ha lf o f t he Ra mbo s’ da ug ht er at t he t we nt y-o ne da y o ut do o rt he r ap eu t ic p r o gr am, SUWS, and t he Missio n Mo unt ain Scho ol in Mo nt ana whi ch Marsha c ontended Denn

is was requi red to pay hal f of pursuant to t he di

vorce decree; an

d (2) to enf

orce c ol l ection of a de

bt (the “Lan

ie r debt”) of $ 7500 f

rom D en nis wh i ch had be en ass i gne d to her p ost-di

vorce . Expenses for the SUWS Program and the Mission Mountain School

In the enf orcemen t action, Marsha contended tha t pursuant to the div

orce decree De nnis wa s r es po nsib le f

or on e-h al f of t he exp ense s re late d t o t heir d aug ht er ’s pa rt icipat ion in t he SUW S The

rapeu tic Program and he r attend ance a t the Mi ssi on Moun tai n Sc hool i n M ontan a. The di vorce dec ree provi des i n perti nen t part: As addi tion al chi l d sup port , [Den nis] is o rd er ed a nd de cr eed t o p ay fif t y-pe rc ent (50%) of al l h ea l th ca reex pen se s n ot pa i d b y i n su ra n ce th at are in

cur red by or on be ha lf of the pa rti es ’ chi l dre n, i nc l udi ng , wi thou t l i m i tati on, medi cal , pres cri

ption drug, p sy chi atri c, ps ychologi

cal , den tal and orthodonti

c ch arges . T his pr ovisio n shall not be i n ter pr ete d to in

cl ude expenses f

or psych ologica l testi ng, t ra vel to and fr om t he hea lth ca re pr ovid er , o r no n-p re scr ipt ion medica t ion. The dec ision to incu r he alth c ar e exp ense s shall be made so lely by [Ma rsha ]. The re aso nabl eness o f t he ch ar ge s s ha ll be p r es ume d u po n p r es en t at io n o f t he bill. Dis al lowan

ce of the bil

l b y a h ealth i nsurer shall

not excuse t he obli

gation of [Dennis ] to mak e pay men t. [Marsha] is or der ed a nd

de cr ee d t o fur nish t o [ De nnis ] co pie s o f all st at ement s and bi l l s f or h eal th c are ex pe ns esnot

covered by

in surance, and [ Dennis] is or der ed a nd decreed to pay [hi s] share of

the statements an

d bi ll s wi thin fi fteen (15) day s of recei

pt ei ther by pay in g the heal th care provider

dire ct ly or by re imbursing [ Mar sha] for any advance pay

men t o ver and above her share of the expenses. At t he hea ring, t he only issue Dennis r aised re gar ding t hese pr ovisio ns was whethe r t he expe nses M ar sha inc ur r ed fo rt he ir dau ght er t o p ar t icipat e in the SU WS pr og ra m and at t end t he3

Miss i on Mo un t ain School were “

heal th care” expen

ses un der the decree. Wh

il e acknowledgi

ng that it was Mar sha’s so le right to in cur h eal th ca re expenses on b ehal

f of their daugh

ters, and although he had paid M ar sha $ 850 0 t ow ar d t he SUWS pro gram and the Mi ssion Mountain Sch oo l ex penses, De nnis compl

ai ns that these ex

penses were “di scretionary

” expenses an

d he i s n ot li able to pay oneha l f of d i scre tion ary ex pen ses . Afte r ho lding a hea ring, t he dis trict court ma

de t he fo llowing findings r ega rd ing t he expenses for the SUWS program an d the Mission M ou nt ain School: (1 ) Mars ha and Dennis’s daughter i nc urred medi cal ex pe ns esnot c ove

red by i ns ura nc e i n th e a moun t of $60,9 56.55; (2) Dennis’s shar e o f the expe nses is $ 30, 478 .2 8 and he has paid $85 00 l ea vi ng a curren t ba l an ceof $21,978.28; and ( 3) t he expe nses incu rr ed w er e r eas ona ble and ne ces sar y and should be consi

dered
medi cal ex pen ses as that term

i s de f i ne d. On appeal , Denni

s contends that these ex

penses were dis cretionary

and wer e no t h ea l th ca reex pen se s. He

con ten dsth at th e ev i den ce

f ai l ed to sh ow h owthe twe nty -one d ay outdoor t he r ap eu t ic S UW S pr o gr am w as ad minis t er ed , wh y i t was inc ur re d, whet her it w as ne ces sar y and whether a heal th care professi

onal prescrib ed

the p rogram . Ad

di tion al l y , Den nis con tend s tha t there
was no evi

dence that showed wh

ether a l ic ensed couns el or o r doct or admi ni stered either the program
orthe s chool. Al

though the statements of ac count from the Mi ssion Mountain

School ref

le ct charges f orth er ap y , tu i

ti on an d oth er costs an d s erv i ce s of the program and the s chool, Denn is contends that t her e is no t hing o n t he statements i ndicatin g whether the school wa s f or ps y ch ol ogical , ph

y si cal or heal th care needs or wassi

mpl y a priv ate school. Wi

thout such ev

ide nce, Den ni s contends that

t he dis trict co ur t er r ed in

ru ling t hat t he e xpe nse s w er e he alt h ca re exp ens es fo r w hich h e is lia ble fo r h alf.4 We review a trial

court ’s f in din gs of f act for legal

and f ac tu al sufficiency of t he evi dence by t he same standar ds t hat ar e applied in reviewing the evidence suppo rt ing a j ury’s response. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W.2d770, 772 (Tex. 1996). In revie win g an ev i den ti ar y com pl ai n t,
we review the l egal

suf fi ci ency of the ev ide

nce b y f irst exam in in g the record for evi dence that
su pp orts the f i ndi ngs whi l e ignori

ng a l l evi den ce to the c ontrary . Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. , 767 S.W.2d 686, 6 90 ( Tex. 198 9); Holley v . Watts , 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982). I f there is n o evi dence to support the f

i ndi ngs , then we ex am i ne the e nti re rec ord to determ

i ne i f the c ontrary prop osi ti on is establ is hed as a m

atter of law. Id. In revi

ewi ng the f actual suf fi ci ency of the evi dence we first examine whether th ere i s s ome e vi

de nc e to supp ort th e f

i nd i ng s; i f so, t hen aft er examining t he en ti rere cord, we wi l l

re v er se on l y i f th e f i n di n gsar e s o con

tra ry to t he o ver whelming weight and preponderanceof

th e ev i den ce

as to b e c l ea rl y wr on g a n d u n j us t. Cain v. Bain , 706 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex . 1986)
. At t he hea ring, Nat alie, t he Rambos’ daught er, and Marsha t estified about Nat alie’s lifeas a teenager an

d their ex perien ces wi th t he SU WS pr o gr am a nd t he Mis sio n Mo un t ain Sc ho o l. At age f i f teen , Natal

i e was steal i ng, l y i ng, m an ipulat ing, u sing dr ugs , a lcoho l, and t oba cco , a nd
ru nningaway

f rom h ome . A f ter s evera l yea rs of out-p atien

t, psy ch ol ogi cal cou ns el i ng wh i ch di d n ot
seem to hel p Natalie, Marsha, upon the reco mm endation of Ri ck Reyn

olds, a psy

chol ogist, decide d to pursue a f

ull -tim e, in -patient, therapy

pla n. The SUW S programwas an in tervention-ty

pe program wher eby Natali e was taken to Salt Lake Ci ty an d transfer re d i n to th e cu st od y of an ad oles cent program in w hic h sh e p ar t icip at ed in intens ive co unse ling, t eam-bu ilding, se lf-reliance , a nd outdoor the rapy . Con

cu rrentl y , sh e c om plete d the h

i gh-s ch ool cu rri cul um at the M i ss i on

Mo un t ain Sch

ool in Montana. Natali

e testif ie d t h at the pro gram was centered around daily

counsel in g and therapy5

sess ions. Acco rd ing t o N at alie, t her apy pe rmeat ed “e ver ything downt o mea l t ime. ” A dd it io na lly, she t est ifi ed t hat if she had no t go ne to the Miss i on Mountain

School sh

e would probabl

y b e dead.

We dis agree wi

th Denn is ’s suggestion that particular evi dence n ot presented

t o t he di str ict court was ne cess ary bef ore the court could de

termi ne that the ex

pens es f or the SU W S program and the Mi ssi on Moun tai n Sc hool were he al th ca re ex pen ses . Addi

tional ly , we dis agree wi

th Dennis’s co nt ent ion t hat t her e wa s no evi den ce showi ng th at the program

an d the sch ool we re f or ps ycho lo gic al, ph ysic al, or health care needs. Natali e and Mars

ha provided testim

ony a nd ev ide nce about how t he SU WS pr og ra m and t he Missio n Mo unt ain Scho ol o per at ed a nd how the experi

ences there had gr ea t ly imp ac t ed Na t alie ’s life ps ych o lo gi ca lly. Ad di t io na lly, no evi dence was

presented to show that these expen

ses were i ncurred f or any purpose other than to assis t Natali e’s psy

chol ogical well-b ei ng. We hol

d that the evidence pre sented was sufficient to suppo rt the dist rict co urt ’s finding that t he SUW S programan d M iss io n Mo un t ain School ex penses were heal

th care expenses under the di

vorce decree that we r e n o t co ve r ed by ins ur an ce , fo rwh ich De nnis wa s r es po nsib le f or pay i ng h al f . Den nis’ s i ssues on

e throug h th ree a re ove rruled. The Lanier Debt

In Dennis’s f our th and fifth issu es, he co nt ends t hat t he dist rict co ur t er re d in o rd er ing him to pa y to Ma rs ha ove r a p eri od of ti me $ 75 00 , w

h i ch h e or i gi n al l y h ad b een ord er ed to pa y to Sidn ey Lani er under the div orce decree. Further he contends that the l etter off ered as evi

dence by6

Mar sha and w hich she as ser t s is his wr itt en ac kno wledg ment of the debt wasnot suff ic ie nt as a m atter of l aw to take the deb

t out of the ope

rati on of the statute of l

i m i tations. The di vorce decree ordered Dennis to pay one-h alf (1/2 ) o f t he de bt du e a nd o win g t o Sid ne y E. La nie r , Jr . , an d/ o rBo nnie Lani er i nc urred pri orto Jul y 1, 1991, sai

d to tal sum

bei ng $15,000, one-half of

whi ch i s the am ount of $7,500
. Mar sha states in h

er petition that Sidney

La nie rne ve rde man de d t ha t De nnis mak e a pa yment o n t his de b t. Fur t her , she st at es t hat Lanier for mally assigne d t he de bt t o he r in a p ro per wr itt en as signment
onMa y 8, 2000. Marsha all eged that Denni s waiv

ed any stat ute o f l

im itations defens e when h e acknowl edged

the debt and off

ered to pay her

th e $ 75 00 de

b t ov er ti me i n a l ette r he w rote to her dated August 1, 2000. Marsha se eks to enforce the terms Den ni s set out in hi s l etter of August 2000. At the heari

ng, as ev ide nceof t he assi

gnm ent of the debt, Marsh

a subm itted a copy of a documen

t t itled “ass ign

me nt of debt repay

me nt” whi ch was si gned b y Si dney Lani er and M ar sha and dat ed M ay 8, 200 0. It pr ovid ed t hat Sidne y Lanier a ssigned t o M ar sha “all right s, t itle and in terest in and t o t he $7 500 debt r ep ayme nt du e fr o m Allen De nnis Ram bo to Si dne

y Edward Lan i er, as descri bed i n [the di vorce decree].” Further, Marsha sub mi tt ed a copy of a l

etter dated August 1, 2000, wri tten to h er by D en nis . Marsha contended that the f oll owing portions of

Denn is ’s l etter consti tuted hi s wri

tten ackn owle dgm ent of th e $7500 de

bt:
I’m wri ti ng you th i s l ette r to address the is sue of Si d’s l oan, as documen

ted in our div orce de cr ee . At t his t ime, full pay me nt of the $7500 is

im possib le . However, I can pay you $4500 an

d send m onthly in stall me nts of $200 each

un t il t he ba lan ce is p aid in full. As fa ras int er es t o n t he lo an , yo u w ill hav e to t ake m e t o c ou rt t o r ece ive that.7

. . . . La st ly, I would l

ike a copy of a

ll records sho wing t he to tal expenditur es on Nat alie’s stay at Mi ssi on Moun tai n Sc hool , i nc l udi ng w ha t was p aid by

i ns uran ce.

. . . . . A l so, befo re I se nd t he $4 500 , I will have to have a co py of t he loa n assignment f rom Sid t o yo u, as w ell as, t he o t her items ment ione d ab ove. W hen these reque sts ar

e met, I can ei ther m ail you the che ck or dep osi

t it to y our acc ount. Mar sha accepted the payment terms Den ni s proposed in h

is August l etter . Denni

s testif ie d that al though he ha d s een a cop y of the as si gn men t of the debt f rom Sidn ey Lani er to Marsha a

nd copi es of t he Missio n Mo unt ain Scho ol invo ices and he had recei ved a writt en demand from Marsha’s attorney to pay the $ 7500, h

e h ad n ot pai d Ma

rsha as he had propose d i

n h i s A ugust 2000 l

etter. Fo llowing the heari

ng, the di strict court ruled that Si dney Lani er properly

assi gned t o Ma r sha his in t er es t in

the $ 7500 d

eb t owed to hi

m by Den nis un der th e di vorce decre e. Fu

rther, t he co ur t rule d t ha t De nnis pr o pe r ly ack now ledge d t he de bt in w r it ing an d t ha t Ma r sha ac ce pt ed his pay me n t te rms. The

court ordered Denni s to pay Marsh a the $7500 accordin

g to the propo sed payment sc he du le s ug ge st ed in his A ugu st 2 000

l ette r b y pa y i ng Ma rs ha $45 00 w i thi n th i rty da y s of t he j udgm

en t an d th e $ 30 00 b al

an ce i n f i f tee n , e qu al , m

on th l y i n sta l l men ts o f $20 0 pe r mo nt h. Ad di tion al l y , the c ourt ord er ed

th at a l l ov erdu e p ay

men ts shal l b ear in terest at the rate of 12% per year un til pai d. The st at ut e o f li

mitat ion fo r a n act ion o n debt is f our years . SeeTex . Ci

v. Pra c. & Re m. Code Ann . § 16. 004 ( a) ( 3) ( We st Su pp . 20 02 )
. Ho we ve r , se ct io n 1 6. 06 5 o f t he T ex as Civil Practi ce an

d Rem edi es Code prov

i des the fol l owin g:8

An acknowledgmen

t o f the j ustness of

a c l ai m th at a pp ea rs to be bar re d by lim

itat ions is no t ad miss ible in ev

i de nc e to d ef

ea t the l aw of li mi tations i f m

ade af ter t he tim

e that t he claim is due u nless t he ac kno wledg ment is in wr iting a nd is signe d by t he pa rty to be ch arged
. Te x. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Co de Ann. § 16 .0 65 ( West 199 7) . T he pa rties do n ot dispute th at th e statu te of l i m i tations has expi

red on the deb t. In order f or awr itt en inst ru ment t o be suf fi ci ent to t ake a debt otherwise barred out of t he o pe r at io n o f t he st at ut e o f limit at io ns, it mus t un eq uiv o ca lly and un co nd it io na lly acknowl edge t he just ness o f the debt and ex pres s a wi l l i

ngn ess to pay . Bright &

Co. v. Holbein Family Mineral Trust , 995 S. W.2 d 74 2, 745 (T ex. App. —S an Ant oni o 1999, p et . de nied); see also Andrew s v. Cohen , 664 S.W.2d 826, 828-29 (Tex. App.—Tyl er 1984, wr it r ef

’d n .r.e.); Siegel v. McGavock Drilling Co. , 530 S.W .2d 894 , 896 (Tex. C i v. A pp.—A mari l l o 1975, w

ri t ref ’d n .r.e.). The ef

fect of t he ac kn o wle dg men t is t ha t it cr ea t es a n ew pr o mise t o pa y t he o ld debt by ackno wledg ing and agr eeing to pay

the ol d deb t. Siegel , 530 S.W.2d at 896. Once an ack now ledgment is execu t ed, t he l i ab i l i ty of the debtor depends n

ot upon the old obl

iga tion but upo n t he ne w p r o mise as ex pr es se d in t he ackn owl edgm en t. Id. If an a ckno wledg ment o f the exist ence of a n ol d d eb t is q ua lifie d b y a condi tional prom i se to pa y , a prom i se dif f ere nt f rom the one so expr esse d will not be implied and t he
cre di tormus t fulfill t he named co ndit ion as a pr er equ isite t o t he de bt or ’s liabili t y on t he new promi

se. A n d re ws , 664 S.W.2d at 829 (citin g York v. Hughes , 286 S.W . 165 (T ex . Com m ’n App. 1926 )). Wh ether a w r it t en inst rume nt su fficie nt ly ac kn o wle dg es a d eb t ba rr ed by limit at io ns is a q ue sti on of l aw. Bright , 995 S.W.2d at 745.

On ap pe al, Den

n i s c on ten dsth at i n h i s l ette r to Ma rs ha he con di ti one d re pa y men t of t he debt on

f i rs t rec ei vi ng f rom her a copy

o f t he lo an as sig nme nt fr o m Sid ne y La nie rt o he ras we ll9

as recei vi ng a copy of all

recor ds showing the expen ditures on Nat ali

e’s sta y at M i ss i on

Mo un t ain Sc ho o l. He c ont ends t hat beca use he never receiv ed the se i tem s f rom Ma rs ha the con di ti on h ad not been me t , and thus a pr er equ isite t o his liability on t he new pr omise w as no t met. Fur t her , he contends tha

t be ca us e the p rereq

ui si te c ond i ti on h ad not been me t, he had no t ac kn o wle dg ed t he o ld debt or creat ed a new prom is e to pay the debt. As aut ho r it y fo r his prop osi

ti on h e re l i esupon Andrew s v. Cohen , 664 S.W .2d 826 (Tex . App.—Ty

l er 198 4, wri

t ref ’d n .r.e.). In A n d re ws , th e d ebtor wrote the c red i tora let t er and c ond itio ned r epa yment o f the ol d debt on the credi tor dis m i ssi ng a l l l awsui ts pres en tly pen di ng b etween the parti

es. Id. at 828 . T he
cre di torrejec ted t his condi

tion but then s ought a ruli ng f rom the court t hat despi

te the debtor’s new
con di ti on an d t he cr ed it o r ’s r eje ct io n o f it , t he de bt o rha d n ev er t he les s inthe le tt er acknowl edged

t he ol d debt and agree d to pay

i t. Id. The A n d

re ws co ur t held t hat beca use t he cr edit or re ject ed t he debto r’s new condition f

or p aym ent there w as n o w ill

ing ness t o p ay expr esse d by t he de bt or and there f ore th e deb

tor h ad n ot ackn owl ed ge d th e ol d d eb t n or m ade a n ew pr om i se to pay th e ol d d eb t. Id. at 829. In

the c ase be f ore us, i n the A ugust 2000 l

etter D enn is st at ed s pec ifi cally that he
wo uld pay M arsha $750 0 o ver t ime; Mars ha ac cep t ed t his pro po sal. D ennis’s c ond itio n t hat he
re ceive c er t ain informat ion befo re send ing Mar sha a ny mo ne y is di sti

ng ui sh ab l e f rom the con di ti on in the A n d re ws case where the debtor’s condi tion wasthat al l l

awsui ts be di sm is sed or he would pay nothin g. Here, Denni

s provide d a proper acknowl edgm ent that he owed $7500 to Marsh a. Fu rther, Dennis’s condi tion that bef

ore sendi ng Marsh a a check he rec ei ve i nf orm ati on ab out the e xp en se s f

or t he Miss i on Moun

tai n S ch ool an d a cop y of t he do cument assigning the Lani er debt to Marsha goes to t he t iming o f w

hen he woul d send pa

ym ents t o M ar sha, and no t t o t he issue abo ut whet her he10

wo uld pa y h er at a l l . U n der D en n i s’ s ow n ter m s i n th e A ug us t 20 00 l ett er he ac kn o wle dg ed his l i ab i l i ty t o M ar sha o f the $75 00; how ever , he was not obligat ed t o s end M ar sha mo ney unt ilshe pro vided him

with a copy of the assi

gnm ent and copies of the Missi on Mount ain

in voices. Fin ally,
acc or ding to testim

ony a t t he h earin g, Den ni s rece i ve d c opiesof

the i nv oi ce s f rom the Miss i on Moun tai n Sc hool and a copy

of the as si

gnm en t of the debt from

Si dne y Lan i er to Marsha
. We hold that i

n the A ugust 2000 let t er , De nnis ac kn o wle dg ed his liabilit y fo rt he o ld $7500 debt and promi sed Marsh a that he would pay

her the mone y ove r tim e thereby creating a

new pro mise to pay

the $7500. Further he testif ie d that he recei

ved the requested in

form ation; h e was there f ore obli gated to send M arsha m

oney accordin g to hi s proposed p ay

me nt plan

se t o ut in his August 2000 le

tt er. We f

in d no error in the di strict co urt ’s order t hat Denn is pay Marsha $7500
acc or ding to th e te

rm s ou tl i n ed i n Den n i s’ s A ug us t 20 00 l ette

r. D en n i s’ s f our th an d f i f th is sues are overruled. The order of the di strict court is aff irm ed.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Be f ore J us ti ce s K i dd, Ye akel

an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: January

10, 2002 Do No t Publis

h