alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### NUMBER 13 - 10 - 00 024 - CR 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ LEYDIANA ZUNIGA , A ppellant ,
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

.

____________________________________________________________

On a ppeal from the 4 04 th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Vela Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam Appellant, Leydiana Zuniga , attempted to perfect an appeal from a conviction for theft . We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. This Court's appellate jurisdiction in a criminal case is invoked by a timely filed notice of appeal. Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Absent a timely filed notice of appeal, a court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to address the2

merits of the appeal and can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The trial court imposed sentence in this matter on September 28, 2009 . Appellant filed h er notice of appeal on November 25, 2009

. On March 10, 2010 , the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that it appeared that the appeal was not timely perfected and that the appeal would be dismissed if the defect wa s not corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of the Court = s directive. Appellant has not filed a response to the Court = s directive. Unless a motion for new trial has been timely filed, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days afte r the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an appealable order. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.2(a)(1). Where a timely motion for new trial has been filed, the notice of appeal must be filed within ninety days a fter the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court. See id. 26.2(a)(2). The time within which to file the notice may be enlarged if, within fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice, the party files the notice of appeal and a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. 26.3. Appellant = s notice of appeal, filed fifty

- eight days after sentence was imposed, was untimely, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Slaton , 981 S.W .2d at 210. Appellant may be entitled to an out

- of

- time appeal by filing a post

- conviction writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; however, the availability of that remedy is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. See T EX

. C ODE C RIM

.3

P ROC

. A NN . art. 11.07, ' 3(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Ex parte Garcia , 988 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The appeal is DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. PER CURIAM Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).
D eliv ered and filed the 27th day of August , 20 10

.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50720 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAUL ALMAGUER-REYES, Defendant-Appellant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

No. 98-50807 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus CARLOS ROCHA-AREVALOS, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. DR-97-CR-488-1 USDC No. DR-98-CR-131-1

- - - - - - - - - - June 16, 1999 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The appellants pleaded guilty to illegally reentering theNo. 98-50720 c/w No. 98-50807

- 2 - country after having been deported. They argue that the district court erred when it increased their offense levels by 16 under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for their prior state drug convictions. They contend that, because their state felony drug convictions would be only misdemeanors under federal law, their prior convictions were not “drug-trafficking crime[s]” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) and did not constitute “aggravated felon[ies]” for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Their argument is foreclosed by United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez , 130 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1997). The appellants’ sentences are AFFIRMED.
* Circuit Judge of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

** Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-20869

THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff -Appellant, v. BEN W. “BUD” CHILDERS, as Fort Bend County Attorney; MARK MILLIS; THE MILLIS GROUP INC.; ROYAL LAKES LIMITED; MICHAEL D. ROZELL; BUD O’SHIELES; GRADY PRESTAGE; ANDY MEYERS; BOB LUTTS, individually and as County Commissioners of Fort Bend County, Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas

(H-98-CV-643) September 18, 2000
Before WOOD * , DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: **
After review ing the record and considering the briefs and argument of counsel, we affirm the judgment and order of the district court essentially for the reasons assigned in the court’s July 31, 1999 Memorandum and Order.
AFFIRMED.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-11227

IN THE MATTER OF: TLI, INC.

Debtor,

TLI, INC.,

Appellant-Cross-Appellee,

versus

DM LYNN CREDITORS’ TRUSTEE,

Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(H-92-CR-19-ALL)

September 14, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This matter is before the court on appeal of a judgment of the district court

relating to an order of the bankruptcy court. Having considered the briefs and

arguments of counsel, and pertinent parts of the record, and finding neither error

nor abuse of discretion, the judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
#### JOHN E. MYERS, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TOWNSHIP OF CEDAR GROVE, *ET AL.,*DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS.

See same case below: 66 *N. J. Super.*530.

*Mr. Samuel Rosenblatt*and *Mr. Nicholas H. Hagoort, Jr.,*for the petitioners.

*Mr. Francis F. Welsh*for the respondent.

May 29, 1961.

Granted.
#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

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#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

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      Max Water Temperature                    
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# L_2010041EN.01007501.xml

| 16.2.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 41/75 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.2.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 41/75

---

Corrigendum to Commission Decision 2010/75/EU of 5 February 2010 concerning a financial contribution from the Union towards a coordinated monitoring programme on the prevalence of Listeria monocytogenes in certain ready-to-eat foods to be carried out in the Member States

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 37 of 10 February 2010
  )

The publication of Decision 2010/75/EU should be considered as null and void.

---
EF ARKANSAS R AT US HIGHWAY 24, NR LEADVILLE, CO.Latitude: 39.272Longitude: -106.306Elevation: 9900

EF ARKANSAS R AT US HIGHWAY 24, NR LEADVILLE, CO.

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Fremont Pass Site Page...



Fremont Pass

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Hoosier Pass Site Page...



Hoosier Pass

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Buckskin Joe Site Page...



Buckskin Joe
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks

Consistent with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency previously declared on September 14, 2001, in Proclamation 7463, with respect to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States.

Because the terrorist threat continues, the national emergency declared on September 14, 2001, and the powers and authorities adopted to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond September 14, 2021. Therefore, I am continuing in effect for an additional year the national emergency that was declared on September 14, 2001, with respect to the terrorist threat.

This notice shall be published in the *Federal Register* and transmitted to the Congress.

[FR Doc. 2021-19788

Billing code 3295-F1-P
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Annual Report of SRS Labs, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Ulrich Gottschling,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350, as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, tohis knowledge:

 

1.             The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.             The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated: February 24, 2009 | By:    | /s/ ULRICH  GOTTSCHLING                                  |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|                          |   | Ulrich  Gottschling                                      |
|                          |   | *Chief Financial Officer  (Principal Financial Officer)* |

 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jessie J. Barnes, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 813]

Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G. Reed, A.J.), rendered May 26, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second degree (two counts), grand larceny in the third degree (two counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts) and criminal mischief in the third degree (two counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law and a new trial is granted.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a jury trial of two counts each of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), grand larceny in the third degree (§ 155.35 [1]), grand larceny in the fourth degree (§ 155.30 [7]), and criminal mischief in the third degree (§ 145.05 [2]). The convictions arise from two residential burglaries committed by defendant in the Town of Victor on the same day. We agree with defendant that County Court erred in ordering him to wear a stun belt and then shackles at trial without first making “findings on the record” concerning the necessity for such restraints *(People v Buchanan,*13 NY3d 1, 4 [2009]; *see People v Cruz,*17 NY3d 941, 944-945 [2011]; *see generally Deck v Missouri,*544 US 622, 624 [2005]). Although the court set forth a reasonable explanation for its use of restraints in response to a post-trial motion by defendant challenging, inter alia, the propriety of the use of the restraints, the court’s post hoc explanation does not suffice inasmuch as the court was required to have considered the relevant factors and made a sufficient inquiry “before” making a finding that restraints were necessary *(Buchanan,*13 NY3d at 4 [emphasis added]).

We reject the People’s contention that reversal is not required because the error is harmless. Even assuming, arguendo, that the error is harmless with respect to the use of the shackles *(see People v Clyde,*18 NY3d 145, 153-154 [2011]), we note that the Court of Appeals did not apply harmless error analysis in *1580
      *Buchanan*to the improper use of a stun belt, and *Cruz*(17 NY3d at945 n) makes clear that the improper use of a stun belt is not subject to harmless error analysis.

We reject defendant’s further contentions that the court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment based on the prosecutor’s allegedly improper impeachment of him before the grand jury regarding his criminal record (see *People v Burton,*191 AD2d 451 [1993], *lv denied*81 NY2d 1011 [1993]), and that the court erred in denying his motion for a trial order of dismissal based on legally insufficient evidence (see *generally People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). We need not address defendant’s remaining contentions in light of our decision to grant defendant a new trial. Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Carni, Lindley and Martoche, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF


THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Blount International, Inc. (the “ Company ”) on Form 10-Q/A for the period ended March 31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “ Report ”), I, Joshua L. Collins, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


(i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(ii) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the report.


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Blount International, Inc. and will be retained by Blount International, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


Date: November 22, 2013





/s/ Joshua L. CollinsJoshua L. CollinsChairman andChief Executive Officer
# C_2021402EN.01001101.xml

| 5.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 402/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 402/11

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.10212 — Andel/Energi Danmark)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 402/08)

1.

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | Andel a.m.b.a. (‘Andel’, Denmark), |
| --- | --- |

—

Andel a.m.b.a. (‘Andel’, Denmark),

| — | Energi Danmark A/S (‘Energi Danmark’, Denmark). |
| --- | --- |

—

Energi Danmark A/S (‘Energi Danmark’, Denmark).

Andel acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of Energi Danmark.

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares.

2.

| — | for Andel: energy production, energy distribution, fiber infrastructure, and energy sales and solutions, |
| --- | --- |

—

for Andel: energy production, energy distribution, fiber infrastructure, and energy sales and solutions,

| — | for Energi Danmark: physical and financial trading of electricity, certificates trading, trading of natural gas, oil, carbon, and wind energy, and portfolio management. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Energi Danmark: physical and financial trading of electricity, certificates trading, trading of natural gas, oil, carbon, and wind energy, and portfolio management.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

4.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.10212 — Andel/Energi Danmark

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

---
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Steven E. West, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Sunterra Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;and 

 

b. Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report; and 

 

c. Disclosed in this annual report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and; 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors: 

 

a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
(7 App. Div. 311)

#### PEOPLE ex rel. HART v. LA GRANGE et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June 29, 1896.)

1. Officer—Removal—Abolishing Office.

The board of fire commissioners of New York City have no power to abolish an office merely for the purpose of removing the incumbent in ordei that they may appoint another to perform the same duties.

2. Same—Review—Good Faith.

The court has the power to inquire into the good faith of the action of the fire commissioners of New York City in abolishing an office in the department.

Appeal from special term, New York county.

Application by William H. Hart for a writ of mandamus to compel O. H. La Grange and others, constituting the board of commissioners of the fire department of New York City, to reinstate relator in an office from which he had been removed. From an order granting a peremptory writ, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.

W. L. Findley, for appellants.'

R. D. Hatch, for respondent.

PATTERSON, J.

There was abundant evidence produced in the court below to require the issuance of the peremptory writ of .mandamus in this matter. The only question before the court was whether the action of the commissioners of the fire department in discharging the relator was a legitimate exercise of the power they, possessed to abolish the 'office he held, and thereby dispense with his services, or was a mere pretext to remove him in order that they might put some one in his place. It is manifest that the relator was discharged on the mere pretense that his office was to be abolished,' and a man named McLewee was immediately assigned to do the same work that the relator had done. This man, McLewee, had been an employé of the fire department, filling a place which had been abolished by a resolution of the board, which resolution remained unrescinded at the time this relator was removed from his position; and it is painfully apparent .that the relator was thrust aside simply for the purpose of retaining McLewee in employment and under the pay of the board, although the place he had filled had been abolished. Not only was the alleged reason for the discharge of the relator and the retention of McLewee (who was virtually a discharged employé) a mere sham, but McLewee was ineligible to fill the place even had the relator’s office been abolished, for he had not passed the civil-service examination required by law, and in no sense could McLewee be regarded as a transferee from one position to another.

The courts have the right to inquire into the good faith of the action of the commissioners in a case of this kind, and the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
1 –ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

GARY ALLEN HARRINGTON,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:16-cv-00200-CL

v. ORDER

STATE OF OREGON, et al. and

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Magistrate Judge Mark D. Clarke filed a Findings and Recommendation (ECF No. 39), 

and the matter is now before this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Plaintiff filed objections to the report. Accordingly, I have reviewed the file of this case de novo. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 

F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). Because I find no error and conclude the report is correct, 

Magistrate Judge Clarke’s Findings and Recommendation (ECF No. 39) is adopted in full.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2016.

_______/s/ Michael J. McShane________

Michael McShane

United States District Judge

Case 1:16-cv-00200-CL Document 45 Filed 11/03/16 Page 1 of 1