[Cite as Baker v. Mansfield, 2021-Ohio-2476.]

 COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CYNTHIA BAKER 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsCITY OF MANSFIELD, OHIO 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Case No. 20 CA 77 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 19 CV 398N 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 19, 2021 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

JAMES H. BANKS JAMES F. MATHEWS 

Post Office Box 40 TONYA J. ROGERS 

Dublin, Ohio 43017 ADAM J. ARES 

 BAKER, DUBLIKAR, BECK, 

 WILEY & MATHEWS 

 400 South Main Street 

 North Canton, Ohio 44720 

 CHRISTOPHER L. BROWN 

 DEPUTY LAW DIRECTOR 

 30 North Diamond Street 

 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 2

Wise, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Cynthia Baker appeals the November 10, 2020, Judgment Entry 

of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of 

Appellee City of Mansfield. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} This case arises from a water main break which occurred on December 5, 

2018. The following facts, taken from the record, are not in dispute: 

{¶3} At approximately 6:04 a.m. on December 5, 2018, the City of Mansfield 

("City") Police Dispatch Department received a call of a possible water main break at the 

intersection of North Walnut Street and West Third Street in the City of Mansfield, Ohio. 

(Affidavit of David Remy, ¶ 5). The potential water main break was reported to the City of 

Mansfield Public Works Department at 6:05 a.m. A foreman from the Water Repair 

Department was sent to investigate and upon arriving at the scene, determined the 

underground water main erupted, causing a crater in North Walnut Street which resulted 

in water flooding the crater and overflowing onto the street. (Remy Aff. ¶¶ 5, 8). A crew 

from the Water Repair Department was assembled and dispatched to the scene to shut 

off the water main. (Remy Aff. ¶ 9). Once the water was shut off, the crew began pumping 

water out of the hole created by the broken water main. Due to the significant volume of 

water released by the broken water main, the Water Repair Department was forced to 

utilize every pump available in the City. (Remy Aff. ¶10). 

{¶4} Once the water was pumped out of the area, the crew commenced repairing 

the broken water main. As the water was completely shut off for the surrounding area and 

there was a large hole created by the water main break, the Water Repair Department 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 3

worked for nearly 20 hours straight until approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 6, 2018, 

to have the water main repaired so the water could be turned back on for area businesses. 

(Remy Aff. ¶12). 

{¶5} Additionally, it took approximately 16 tons of gravel to fill the hole created 

by the water main break. (Remy Aff. ¶13). As the hole was filled but the street was not 

yet resurfaced, the Water Repair Department blocked off the area until the Street 

Department was available to pave the area. Due to the weather and other pending 

projects, the Street Department repaved the area on December 13, 2018. (Remy Aff. 

¶17). 

{¶6} Appellant Cynthia Baker is the owner of real property located at 46 N. 

Walnut Street, Mansfield, Ohio. She maintains businesses at this location known as 

Downtown Wigs and Downtown Beauty Salon. (Complaint ¶3). Appellant Baker alleges 

that on the morning of December 5, 2018, she learned of a broken water main near her 

business. (Comp. ¶7). She states that upon arriving, she discovered water flowing 

through the basement walls of her business with approximately four feet of accumulation 

in the basement. (Baker Affidavit ¶6). Portions of the furnace and hot water tank were 

submerged in water. The basement walls were bulging, and several foundational bricks 

had been knocked out of place. (Baker Aff. ¶7). Appellant had to engage water removal 

services. (Baker Aff. ¶9). As a result of the water, Appellant lost property that she had 

stored in the basement, the furnace and hot water tank were inoperable, and damage 

occurred to the foundation of the property. (Baker Aff. ¶9). The Plaintiff had to close her 

business for a time while the water was removed and repairs were made. (Baker Aff. ¶ 

¶12, 13). 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 4

{¶7} On February 15, 2019, Appellant Baker submitted a formal claim’s 

complaint to the City of Mansfield Claims Committee. The claim sought damages in the 

amount of approximately $14,500.00. Because the claim exceeded the $10,000 threshold 

for a claim to be considered by the City Claims Committee, the claim was turned over to 

the City of Mansfield's Risk Pool Carrier, Public Entities Risk Services of Ohio, Inc. 

(PERSO), which investigated the claim. 

{¶8} Following its investigation, PERSO determined there was no liability on the 

part of the City of Mansfield and denied coverage. On March 29, 2019, PERSO issued a 

letter to the Appellant notifying her of the denial. 

{¶9} On June 4, 2019, Appellant filed the Complaint which is the basis of this 

action. Said Complaint asserts five alleged causes of action: (1) a claim for the City's 

denial of her formal Complaint, which Appellant alleges was done "knowingly, 

intentionally, negligently, willfully and wantonly and with reckless disregard for the rights 

of appellant and the safety of the plaintiff.” (Comp. ¶15); (2) a claim for negligence wherein 

Appellant alleges "the defendant was aware of the propensity for destruction of and/or 

danger to the property of the plaintiff but acted and/or failed to act in reckless disregard 

for the same." (Comp. ¶19); (3) a claim for negligent hiring, failure to train, or failure to 

supervise the Water and Sewer Departments (Comp. ¶¶22-23); (4) negligence (Comp. 

¶28); and (5) a claim that the City acted willfully, wantonly or recklessly. (Comp. ¶31). 

{¶10} On September 3, 2020, Appellee City of Mansfield filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment. 

{¶11} On October 13, 2020, Appellant filed a response to the Motion for Summary 

Judgment. 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 5

{¶12} On October 20, Appellee filed its reply. 

{¶13} By Judgment Entry filed November 10, 2020, the trial court granted 

Appellee City of Mansfield's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

{¶14} Appellant now raises the following errors for review: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 

AFFIDAVIT AND THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED THERETO SUBMITTED IN 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 

{¶16} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT STATUTORY 

IMMUNITY UNDER R.C. CHAPTER 2744 SHIELDS DEFENDANT CITY OF 

MANSFIELD, OHIO FROM LIABILITY. 

{¶17} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS SUCH THAT THE JUDGMENT BELOW MUST BE 

REVERSED.” 

 Summary Judgment Standard 

{¶18} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique 

opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. 

The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36. Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in pertinent 

part: 

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, 

if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 6

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it 

appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that 

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is 

adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is 

made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation 

construed most strongly in his favor. 

{¶19} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter a summary judgment 

if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment 

bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying 

those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion that the non-moving party 

has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some 

evidence which demonstrates the non-moving party cannot support its claim. If the 

moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set 

forth specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila 

v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 

1996-Ohio-107. 

{¶20} It is based upon this standard that we review Appellant's Assignments of 

Error. 

 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 7

I. 

{¶21} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

disregarding her Affidavit and documents attached thereto submitted in opposition to 

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree. 

{¶22} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E), affidavits submitted in support of and opposition 

to summary judgment must be “made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 

as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 

competent to testify to the matter stated in the affidavit.” Information in affidavits that is 

not based upon such personal knowledge and which does not fall within any of the 

permissible exceptions to the hearsay rule may be properly disregarded by the trial court. 

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Thompson & Ward Leasing Co., 158 Ohio App.3d 369, 374, 2004–

Ohio–3972, ¶ 13, citing Pond v. Carey Corp. (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 109, 111. 

{¶23} Further, we do not find that Appellant’s employment with the City as the 

Community Development Director prior to 2014 creates a reasonable inference that she 

was privy to the inner workings of the Water Department at any time, let alone six to seven 

years later. 

{¶24} Without personal knowledge regarding the inner-workings of the City of 

Mansfield Water Department and what the City did not know, Appellant’s affidavit cannot 

be considered admissible evidence to prove her claims. 

{¶25} Additionally, the trial court found that the documents attached to the affidavit 

either lacked foundation (a list of claims allegedly paid by the City, compiled by Appellant) 

or were inadmissible hearsay (a newspaper article). The court likewise disregarded a 

copy of a letter and check put forth as an attempt to establish a prior water problem in 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 8

2017, finding that said documents failed to indicate that the City of Mansfield had any 

involvement as to that alleged water problem. 

{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in disregarding 

Appellant’s affidavit in this matter. 

{¶27} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶28} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in finding that Appellee was entitled to statutory immunity. We disagree. 

{¶29} Questions of immunity are matters of law, so they are particularly apt for 

resolution by way of summary judgment. FirstEnergy Corp. v. Cleveland, 179 Ohio 

App.3d 280, 2008-Ohio-5468, 901 N.E.2d 822, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). 

{¶30} The Ohio Supreme Court has outlined a three-tier analysis for determining 

whether a political subdivision is entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. 

 The first tier is the general rule that a political subdivision is immune 

from liability incurred in performing either a governmental function or 

proprietary function. R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). However, that immunity is not 

absolute. R.C. 2744.02(B). The second tier of the analysis requires a court 

to determine whether any of the five exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 

2744.02(B) apply to expose the political subdivision to liability. * * * If any of 

the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) do apply and no defense in 

that section protects the political subdivision from liability, then the third tier 

of the analysis requires a court to determine whether any of the defenses 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 9

in R.C. 2744.03 apply, thereby providing the political subdivision a defense 

against liability. (Citations omitted.) 

{¶31} Colbert v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 2003–Ohio–3319, 790 N.E.2d 781, 

¶ 7–9. 

{¶32} R.C. §2744.01(G)(2)(c) provides: 

 (G)(1) “Proprietary function” means a function of a political 

subdivision that is specified in division (G)(2) of this section or that satisfies 

both of the following: 

 (a) The function is not one described in division (C)(1)(a) or (b) of this 

section and is not one specified in division (C)(2) of this section; 

 (b) The function is one that promotes or preserves the public peace, 

health, safety, or welfare and that involves activities that are customarily 

engaged in by nongovernmental persons. 

 (2) A “proprietary function” includes, but is not limited to, the 

following: 

 *** 

 (c) The establishment, maintenance, and operation of a utility, 

including, but not limited to, a light, gas, power, or heat plant, a railroad, a 

bus line or other transit company, an airport, and a municipal corporation 

water supply system; 

{¶33} The City concedes that R.C. §2744.01(G)(2)(c) includes the Water 

Department's operation as a proprietary function and that the city is “liable for injury, 

death, or loss to person or property caused by the negligent performance of acts by their 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 10

employees with respect to proprietary functions of the political subdivision.” R.C. 

§2744.02(B)(2). 

{¶34} The City argues that the defenses found in R.C. §2744.03(A)(3) and (5) 

shield it from liability. R.C. §2744.03(A)(3) and (5) provide, in pertinent part: 

 (3) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the action or 

failure to act by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability 

was within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy-making, 

planning, or enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities 

of the office or position of the employee. 

 *** 

 (5) The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, 

death, or loss to person or property resulted from the exercise of judgment 

or discretion in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, 

supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the 

judgment or discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, 

or in a wanton or reckless manner. 

{¶35} The above defenses extend to the exercise of judgment or discretion by 

employees of a political subdivision. Id. at ¶32. 

{¶36} Under R.C. §2744.03(A)(3), immunity exists even if the discretionary 

actions were done recklessly or with bad faith or malice. Elston v. Howland Local Schools,

113 Ohio St.3d 314, 2007–Ohio–2070, 865 N.E.2d 845. 

{¶37} In FirstEnergy Corp. v. Cleveland, 182 Ohio App.3d 357, 2009–Ohio–2257, 

912 N.E.2d 1156, the court found that the city water department's work with regard to 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 11

repairing water main breaks and a water leak, which resulted in damage to underground 

facilities, involved the exercise of judgment or discretion. In the absence of evidence 

showing the city acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless 

manner, the court found the city was entitled to immunity under R.C. §2744.03(A)(5). Id.

at ¶ 23, 912 N.E.2d 1156. Courts have made similar rulings in FirstEnergy Corp. v. 

Cleveland, 179 Ohio App.3d 280, 2008–Ohio–5468, 901 N.E.2d 822 (finding how the city 

used its equipment to make repairs to broken water lines required the exercise of 

judgment in stopping the water leaks); and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Digioia–Suburban 

Excavating, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 89708 and 89907, 2008–Ohio–1409 (finding city was 

entitled to immunity for employee's alleged negligence in turning off the wrong water main 

when a leak occurred). See also Williams v. Brewer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93829, 2010-

Ohio-5349. 

{¶38} The record demonstrates that the City, upon notification of the water main 

break, swiftly deployed manpower and equipment to repair the water hydrant hub and 

some twelve-inch pipe. The City then filled the hole with sixteen tons of gravel and a week 

later re-surfaced the road. 

{¶39} The evidence in this case demonstrates that the city dispatched its 

employees immediately upon learning of the break. That it took several hours after 

notification of the leak to locate the shut-off valve does not demonstrate that the city did 

not positively exercise discretion and judgment in trying to stop the leak as expeditiously 

as possible. Despite Appellant’s arguments otherwise, the city did not fail to act, and we 

find no unexplained and unjustified delay in responding to the water main break or, in light 

of the difficulty of the operation, in shutting down the valves to isolate the leak. Here, we 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 12

find that the employees of the Water Department exercised their discretion in deciding 

how to perform the repair of the water main and in their selection of the equipment and 

materials used. 

{¶40} Appellant has provided no evidence, other than her own self-serving 

affidavit, that the city failed to train its employees, that it wrongfully denied her claims or 

that it has the capability or ability to perform regular inspections of the underground water 

pipes or to respond to issues prior to a leak or a break occurring. There is no evidence 

demonstrating a requirement for a water utility in the state of Ohio to implement a 

maintenance management system. And in any event, whether to implement such a 

system would be a discretionary policy decision subject to immunity under R.C. 

§2744.03(A)(3), which provides immunity where an employee's actions or failure to act 

were within the policy-making, planning, or enforcement powers of the duties and 

responsibilities of the employee's office or position. 

{¶41} The city's response to the water main break that occurred in this case was 

not merely routine; it required the exercise of discretion and judgment as to how to use 

equipment and materials, and there is a lack of malicious purpose, bad faith, or wanton 

or reckless conduct. Accordingly, the city is immune from liability under R.C. 

§2744.03(A)(5), and the trial court properly granted the city's motion for summary 

judgment. 

{¶42} We find Appellant's second assignment of error not well-taken and hereby 

overrule same. 

 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 13

III. 

{¶43} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred 

in granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. We disagree. 

{¶44} In the case sub judice, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Appellee, finding that the only evidence submitted by Appellant to establish a genuine 

issue of material fact was the self-serving affidavit of Appellant. The trial court found, as 

set forth above in our analysis under Assignment of Error I, that the averments contained 

in the affidavit were not based on personal knowledge and that same relied on hearsay 

or speculation. 

{¶45} In Patterson v. Licking Twp., 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-3, 2017-Ohio5803, ¶ 16, this Court, citing Bank of New York v. Bobo, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA22, 

2015–Ohio–4601, 50 N.E.3d 229, held: 

 A self-serving affidavit that is not corroborated by any evidence is 

insufficient to establish the existence of an issue of material fact. Wells 

Fargo Bank v. Blough, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA49, 2009–Ohio–

3672, 2009 WL 2220065, ¶ 18; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Doucet, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP–453, 2008–Ohio–589, 2008 WL 384234, ¶ 13 

(“We also find that Doucet's self-serving affidavit, which was not 

corroborated by any evidence, is insufficient to establish the existence of 

material issues of fact.”). “ ‘To conclude otherwise would enable the 

nonmoving party to avoid summary judgment in every case, crippling the 

use of Civ.R. 56 as a means to facilitate the early assessment of the merits 

of claims, pre-trial dismissal of meritless claims and defining and narrowing 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 14

issues for trial.’ ” [Internal quotations omitted.] Blough at ¶ 18, quoting 

McPherson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21499, 

2003–Ohio–7190, 2003 WL 23094976, ¶ 36. 

{¶46} "In Ohio, a moving party's contradictory affidavit cannot be used to obtain 

a summary judgment." Sims v. Coley, 5th Dist. Licking App. No. 18 CA 00007, 2018-Ohio3703, ¶24. 

{¶47} Here, Appellant presented no evidence outside of her own statements and 

inadmissible hearsay to demonstrate negligence. Thus, construing the evidence most 

strongly in favor of Appellant, we find that the City was entitled to summary judgment in 

this matter. 

{¶48} We find Appellant's third assignment of error not well-taken and hereby 

overrule same. 

{¶49} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Richland County, 

Ohio, is affirmed. 

By: Wise, J. 

Delaney, J., concurs. 

Hoffman, P. J., concurs separately. 

 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 15

Hoffman, P.J., concurring 

{¶50} I concur in the majority’s overall analysis and disposition of Appellant’s 

three assignments of error. 

 {¶51} I write separately only to note my disagreement with the majority’s blanket 

proposition of law a self-serving affidavit that is not corroborated by any evidence is 

insufficient to establish the existence of an issue of material fact. (Maj. Op. at ¶45).1

Nevertheless, under the circumstances in this case, I agree Appellant’s evidence is 

insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. 

 

1 For a similar result see my concurring opinions in M & T Bank v. Woods, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 17 CAE 

07 0050, 2017-Ohio-8500, ¶37 and Combs v. Spence, 5th District Licking No. 2006 CA 0034, 2007-Ohio2210, ¶36. 
Richland County, Case No. 20 CA 77 16