IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRlCT OF OREGON 

MORASCH MEATS, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FREVOL HPP, LLC; ALL NATURAL 

FRESHNESS, INC.; GERALD LUDWICK; 

and PAIGE M. RAIFSNIDER LUDWICK 

Defendants. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3: l 6-cv-00269-PK · 

FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Morasch Meats, Inc. ("Morasch") brings this action against defendants Frevol 

HPP, LLC ("Frevol"), All Natural Freshness, Inc. ("All Natural"), Gerald Ludwick ("Mr. 

Ludwick), and Paige M. Raifsnider Ludwick ("Mrs. Ludwick"). Morasch asserts claims for 

breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and conversion. Now 

before the court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss1 and Alternative Motion for a More Definite 

Statement (#12). For the reasons provided below, both of the motions should be denied. 

BACKGROUND2 

The patties' dispute arises out of a series of three contracts. In the first agreement, F revol 

and Mr. Ludwick agreed to provide Morasch with a high pressure processing machine ("HPP 

machine") to be used for industrial food pasteurization (the "Equipment Agreement"). Comp!. 'if 

1 Defendants couch their primary motion as a motion to strike, but as explained below, it is 

~roperly construed as a motion to dismiss. 

Except where expressly indicated otherwise, I construe the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint, 

any matters incorporated by reference therein, and of any matters properly subject to judicial 

notice in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 1 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 1 of 8
7 (#1). All Natural served as the sales agent for Prevo! and Mr. Ludwick in relation to the 

Equipment Agreement. Id. In the second agreement, Prevo! and Mr. Ludwick agreed that 

Morasch's HPP machine would serve as the exclusive showcase product that Prevo! and Mr. 

Ludwick would use to sell HPP machines to others (the "Showcase Agreement"). Id. at~ 8. 

Pursuant to the Showcase Agreement, Morasch was entitled to a commission on Frevol's and Mr. 

Ludwick's N011h American sales ofHPP machines. Id. In the third agreement, Morasch agreed 

to appoint AU Natural as an authorized, non-exclusive independent representative to promote 

Morasch's high pressure processing of third-party products (ihe "Commission Lead Agreement"). 

Id. at~9. 

Morasch now brings this suit on all tlu·ee agreements, alleging that Defendants breached 

the agreements, interfered with Morasch's contractual relationship with Prevo!, and converted 

Morasch's property. The present motion concerns only Morasch's claim for intentional 

interference with contractual relations. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" specifically, 

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level, "[t]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of 

facts that merely creates a suspicion [of! a legally cognizable right of action." Id. (quoting 5 C. 

Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)); see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. S(a). Instead, the plaintiff must plead affirmative factual content, as opposed to a 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 2 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 2 of 8
conclusory allegation that the elements of a claim have been satisfied, that "allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations 

contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to 

judicial notice." Swartz v. KP1V!G LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, "all 

material allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to 

be drawn from them." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Cahill v. 

Liberty lvlut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir.1996)). The comi also "presume[s] that general 

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Nat'! Org. for 

Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 561 (1992)). The court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions "cast in the fonn 

of factual allegations." Western ,\fining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981 ). 

When granting a 12(b)(6) motion, "a district comi should grant leave to amend even if no request 

to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be 

cured by the allegation of other facts." Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N Cal. Collection Serv., 911 

F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir.1990). 

II. Motion for a More Definite Statement 

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12( e) governs motions for a more. definite statement and 

provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a 

responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 

cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a 

responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details 

desired. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 3 

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Motions for more a more definite statement are "disfavored" and "proper only where the 

complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot asce11ain the nature of the claim being 

asserted." Ramos v. US. Bank Nat. Ass'n, No. 08-CV-1150-PK, 2009 WL 1475023, at *7 (D. 

Or. May 20, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 

874 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D.Cal.1994)); accord Velasquez v. HSBC Fin. Corp., No. 08-4592 

SC, 2009 WL 112919, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2009) ("Rule 12(e) motions are viewed with 

disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading requirements of the Federal 

Rules." (citation omitted)). Such motions should be denied "if the complaint is specific enough 

to give notice to the defendants of the substance of the claim asse11ed." kfillenium Drilling Co. 

v. House-}vfeyers, No. 2:12-CV-00462-MMD, 2013 WL 2152756, at *2 (D. Nev. May 16, 2013) 

(citation omitted). Importantly, "where the detail sought by a motion for more definite statement 

is available through discovery, the motion should be denied." Ramos, 2009 WL 1475023, at *7 

(citing Bee1y v. Hitachi Home Elecs. (Am.), 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D.Cal.1993)). "A motion 

for a more definite statement must be considered in light of the liberal pleading standards of Rule 

8(a)." Velasquez, 2009 WL 112919, at * 1 (citing Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 

1461 (C.D.Cal.1996)). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to Dismiss 

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied. Defendants move to "strike" Morasch's 

claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. However, Defendants' brief makes 

clear that they actually move to dismiss the claim on the grounds that it fails to state a plausible 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 4 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 4 of 8
claim against Mr. Ludwick. 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) governs motions to strike. 

That rule permits a comi to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, 

immaterial, impe1iinent, or scandalous matter." Morasch's intentional interference claim is 

obviously not a defense. Therefore, Defendants cannot move to strike the claim on the grounds 

that it is "insufficient." See id. (permitting the comi to strike an insufficient defense). Moreover, 

Defendants do not argue that the claim is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. 

Rather, Defendants argue that the intentional interference claim is not plausible. In support, 

Defendants rely heavily on the United States Supreme Comi's 12(b )( 6) decisions in Iqbal and 

Twombly. Therefore, I construe Defendants' primary motion as a motion to dismiss. 

Morasch alleges that Mr. and Mrs. Ludwick intentionally interfered with its contractual 

relationship with Frevol. The paliies agree that Oregon law governs Morasch's intentional 

interference claim. Under Oregon law: 

To state a claim for intentional inte1ference with economic relations, a plaintiff 

must allege each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a professional or 

business relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a prospective 

economic advantage), (2) intentional interference with that relationship, (3) by a 

third paiiy, (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose, 

(5) a causal effect between the interference and damage to the economic 

relationship, and (6) damages. 

}vfcGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 535, 901 P.2d 841 (1995) (citations omitted), cited 

with approval in, Int'! Longshore & Warehouse Union v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 

3d 1075, 1105 (D. Or. 2014). Defendants argue Morasch has failed to sufficiently plead 

the second, fomih, and fifth element of its claim. I disagree. 

With respect to intent, the second element, Morasch must prove that Mr. Ludwick 

knew that interference was "substantially ce1iain to occur" from his actions. See Aylett v. 

3 Morasch asse1is its intentional interference claim against both Mr. Ludwick and Mrs. Ludwick. 

Defendants do not argue that Morasch fails to state a claim against Mrs. Ludwick. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 5 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 5 of 8
Universal Frozen Foods Co., 861 P.2d 375, 379 (Or. App. 1993) (citing Straube v. 

Larson, 600 P.2d 371, 374 (Or. 1979)), cited with approval in, Greenwood v. Tillamook 

Cty., No. 05-CV-0058 BR, 2006 WL 2400075, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 16, 2006). In order to 

establish improper means, the fourth element, Morasch must prove that Mr. Ludwick 

violated "some objective, identifiable standard, such as a statute or other regulation, or a 

recognized rnle of common law, or, perhaps, an established standard of a trade or 

profession." Int'/ Longshore & Warehouse Union, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 1108 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 982 P .2d 

1117, 1124 (Or. 1999)). 

In its Complaint, Morasch alleges Mr. Ludwick was a party to the Equipment 

. Agreement. Comp!.~ 7 (#1). The agreement required Morasch to pay $1,550,000 in 

exchange for the HPP machine and additional related equipment. Id. at ~~ 10-11. 

Morasch further alleges that Mr. Ludwick interfered with the agreement by 

misappropriating both the funds paid by, and the equipment intended for, Morasch under 

the terms thereof. Id. at~~ 12-14, 16, 17, 39. 

Because Mr. Ludwick was allegedly a patty to the Equipment Agreement, 

Morasch is entitled to the reasonable inference that Mr. Ludwick knew that he was 

substantially ce1tain to interfere with the agreement by misappropriating money and 

equipment required by its terms. See Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732 (In ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, "all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from them." (citing Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338)). 

Moreover, it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Ludwick's alleged misappropriation violated 

Oregon law. See also Comp!.~~ 43-46 (alleging Mr. Ludwick's liability for conversion 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 6 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 6 of 8
in relation to some of the misappropriated equipment). Thus, Morasch has sufficiently 

alleged the second and fomih elements of its intentional interference with contractual 

relations claim. See Aylett, 861 P.2d at 379 (citing Straube, 600 P.2d at 374). 

Morasch has also sufficiently alleged the fifth element of its intentional 

interference with contractual relations claim--causation. Morasch alleges that its 

contractual relationship with Prevo! was damaged "as a direct and proximate result of Mr. 

and Mrs. Ludwicks' interference." Comp!. if 41 (# 1 ). Morasch further alleges that the 

Ludwicks' misappropriation of funds and equipment caused Morasch to pay $432,000 in 

additional expenses and costs and deprived Morasch of the fully operational HPP 

machine and additional equipment that it bargained for under its agreements with Prevo!. 

See id at ififl3, 16-18. Therefore, Morasch has sufficiently alleged the fifth element of its 

intentional interference with contractual relations claim. 

Consequently, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 

II. Motion for a More Definite Statement 

Defendants' Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement should be denied 

as well. Aside from their arguments for dismissal, Defendants have not made any 

substantive argument for why they are entitled to a more definite statement. 

Morasch's Complaint is specific enough to put Defendants on notice of the nature 

ofMorasch's claims. See Ramos, 2009 WL 1475023, at *7 (Motions for more a more 

definite statement are "disfavored" and "proper only where the complaint is so indefinite 

that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being asse1ied." (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077)). Indeed, the Complaint 

goes above and beyond what is required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 7 

Case 3:16-cv-00269-PK Document 15 Filed 05/05/16 Page 7 of 8
Velasquez, 2009 WL 112919, at *1 ("A motion for a more definite statement must be 

considered in light of the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a)." (citing Bureerong, 922 

F. Supp. at 1461)). Defendants' Alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement should 

therefore be denied as well. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons provided above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion 

for a More Definite Statement (#12) should be denied. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be refe11'ed to a district judge. Objections, if 

any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno 

objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that 

date. If objections are filed, then a response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

Dated this 5th day of May, 2016. 

r/) (r ) )) Isl\ {;i;tC \ z:~t)& / 

Honorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION-PAGE 8 

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