[Cite as State v. G.C., 2016-Ohio-717.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 15AP-536 

 (C.P.C. No. 14CR-2997) 

v. : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

[G.C.], : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on February 25, 2016 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, for 

appellee. 

Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. Strait, for 

appellant. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, G.C., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of two counts of rape in violation R.C. 2907.02. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On May 30, 2014, investigators responded to a call on Neil Avenue, in 

Columbus, Ohio, regarding a sexual assault upon a 14-year-old female. The victim had 

informed her older sister, L.D., that appellant had forced her to have sex earlier that day. 

Investigators first spoke with L.D., appellant's wife, and she confirmed that her younger 

sister had made the allegation against her husband. The victim then related that appellant 

had pulled off her shorts and underwear and proceeded to have vaginal intercourse with 
No. 15AP-536 2 

her. The victim stated that appellant did not wear a condom during the assault. She also 

told investigators that appellant had vaginally raped her 20 to 30 times in the past year. 

When confronted with the allegations, appellant admitted that he had engaged in vaginal 

intercourse with the victim four or five times in the past year, but he denied that he had 

ejaculated in the victim. 

{¶ 3} On June 6, 2014, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellant on three 

counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02, and three counts of unlawful sexual contact 

with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04. On March 11, 2015, appellant entered a plea of 

guilty to Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment charging him with rape, felonies of the first 

degree. Upon motion of the prosecutor and pursuant to an agreement with appellant, the 

trial court entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining counts in the indictment. 

{¶ 4} The transcript of the plea hearing reveals that the trial court complied with 

the requirements of Crim.R. 11 in accepting appellant's guilty plea and convicting him of 

two counts of rape. At the plea hearing, the trial court personally addressed appellant and 

informed him of each of the constitutional and statutory rights he would be relinquishing 

by pleading guilty. During the plea colloquy appellant responded in the affirmative when 

the trial court asked if he could "read and write English reasonably well?" (Mar. 11, 2015 

Tr. 5-6.) When the trial court asked appellant "[h]ow much education have you completed 

in your life," appellant responded: "High school." (Mar. 11, 2015 Tr. 5.) 

{¶ 5} Appellant also confirmed that he was a citizen of the United States. The 

trial court then explained to appellant that the court could impose a prison term of up to 

22 years with an additional 5 years of post-release control. The court further explained to 

appellant that Ohio law required that he be classified as a Tier III sex offender subject to a 

lifetime reporting requirement. 

{¶ 6} Following the colloquy, the trial court stated: 

THE COURT: Let the record reflect that the Defendant was 

here in open court with counsel and that the Defendant was 

informed of all constitutional rights and has made a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. I also find 

that the Defendant understands the nature of the charges, the 

effect of the pleas, as well as the maximum penalties that can 

be imposed. 
No. 15AP-536 3 

Therefore, I find the Defendant guilty of Count One and Count 

Three, rape, a violation of Section 2907.02 of the Revised 

Code, felonies of the first degree. 

(Mar. 11, 2015 Tr. 14.) 

{¶ 7} The trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing for April 10, 2015, and 

ordered a presentence investigation ("PSI"). In the course of the presentence 

investigation, appellant made statements to an interviewer to the effect that he was 

unable to respond to the interviewer's questions because he is not English proficient. The 

investigator made the following comments in the report: 

**It should be noted that when the pre-sentence interview 

began, the offender advised he was unable to answer any 

questions and needed an interpreter. He was asked why he 

didn't need one prior in Court and he advised he didn't 

understand what he was being asked. His attorney advised 

probation that he and the Court did not believe there have 

been any issues with his ability to understand and speak and 

this was a "new" development. Please see attitude section for 

details. As a result, all details below came from his intake 

packet** 

(Emphasis omitted.) (PSI, 6.) 

{¶ 8} In the "Attitude" section of the PSI the investigator noted the following: 

After receiving notification from the offender's attorney that 

[an interpreter] was not needed, this raises several questions 

as to the attitude given by the offender and his "sudden" 

inability to understand what is going on. 

(PSI, 10.) 

{¶ 9} On April 6, 2015, appellant's trial counsel moved the court for approval of 

interpreter fees for the sentencing hearing. The memorandum in support provides as 

follows: 

On June 27, 2014, Defendant provided an Affidavit of 

[Indigency] to the Court requesting the appointment of 

Counsel * * *. During much of the pendency of the case, 

Counsel and Defendant communicated adequately, until 

recently when defendant wished to have several matters 

explained to him in his native language of Bengali. Counsel 

has made arrangements with Assist Interpretation and 
No. 15AP-536 4 

Translation Services to procure the services of a Bengali 

interpreter. Fees for the service are billed at $65.00 per hour. 

Counsel estimates one hour of service. Counsel feels such fees 

are necessary for the effective representation of Defendant. 

The trial court subsequently approved the payment of interpreter fees "for good cause 

shown." (Apr. 21, 2015 Entry.) At the start of the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

administered the interpreter's sworn oath. The trial court subsequently journalized the 

interpreter's written "Oath." 

{¶ 10} As a result of the April 10, 2015 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced 

appellant to a 6-year term of imprisonment as to Count 1 of the indictment consecutive to 

an 11-year term as to Count 3 of the indictment, for an aggregate prison term of 17 years. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this court on May 27, 2015, and a motion for leave to 

file a delayed appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A). On June 10, 2015, this court granted 

appellant's motion for leave to appeal. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 11} Appellant sets forth a single assignment of error as follows:

The trial court erred by entering judgment of conviction based 

upon guilty pleas that were not knowing, intelligent and 

voluntary. 

 III. Standard of Review 

{¶ 12} " 'When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders 

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.' " State v. Triplett, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-30, 2011-Ohio-4480, ¶ 9, 

quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). Crim.R. 11(C) addresses guilty 

pleas in felony cases, and requires a trial judge to determine whether the criminal 

defendant is fully informed of his or her rights and understands the consequences of his 

or her pleas. Id. 

{¶ 13} Ordinarily, " '[i]n considering whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of the circumstances 

through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court complied with 

constitutional and procedural safeguards.' " State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. No. 09CA878, 
No. 15AP-536 5 

2009-Ohio-7064, ¶ 48, quoting State v. Jodziewicz, 4th Dist. No. 98CA667 (Apr. 16, 

1999). Appellant, however, failed to allege that he lacked English proficiency either prior 

to or during his plea hearing. Nor did appellant raise the issue by way of a presentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. Rather, appellant elected to 

proceed with the sentencing hearing with the aid of an interpreter. Appellant, therefore, 

raises his claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to his 

inability to understand English for the first time in his appeal to this court. 

{¶ 14} Appellant's failure to raise the validity of his plea in the trial court 

constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal, absent plain error. State v. Esqueda, 10th Dist. 

No. 96APA01-118 (Sept. 30, 1996); State v. Newcomb, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-404, 2004-

Ohio-4099; United States v. Garcia-Perez, 190 Fed.Appx. 461 (6th Cir.2006). Under 

Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed 

although they were not brought to the attention of the court." To prevail on a claim of 

plain error, the proponent must show that an error occurred, that the error was clear or 

equivalently obvious under current law, and that the error affected a substantial right. 

State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). 

IV. Legal Analysis 

{¶ 15} In his sole assignment of error appellant contends that the trial court erred 

when it convicted him of two counts of rape without appointing an interpreter to insure 

that appellant entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty. The record 

establishes that appellant was born in Bangladesh, India, but that he took up permanent 

residence in the United States in 2007. 

{¶ 16} Appellant concedes that, on its face, the transcript of the plea hearing 

establishes compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Appellant argues, however, that his guilty 

plea was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of constitutional and statutory 

rights because he is not English proficient and because the trial court failed to provide 

him with the services of a Bengali interpreter at his plea hearing. 

{¶ 17} "[I]n a criminal case the defendant is entitled to hear the proceedings in a 

language he can understand." State v. Pina, 49 Ohio App.2d 394, 399 (2d Dist.1975). 

"Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a criminal defendant 

requires the assistance of an interpreter." State v. Saah, 67 Ohio App.3d 86, 95 (8th 
No. 15AP-536 6 

Dist.1990). The decision regarding whether a defendant is entitled to a court-appointed 

language interpreter is based on the trial court's assessment of the defendant's apparent 

ability to comprehend and communicate in the English language. State v. Castro, 2d Dist. 

No. 14398 (Sept. 20, 1995). An imperfect grasp of the English language may be sufficient 

as long as the defendant has the ability to understand and communicate in English. Id. 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2311.14 and Sup.R. 88 set forth the circumstances under which the 

appointment of a foreign language interpreter is mandated. R.C. 2311.14(A)(1) provides in 

pertinent part: 

Whenever because of a hearing, speech, or other impairment 

a party to or witness in a legal proceeding cannot readily 

understand or communicate, the court shall appoint a 

qualified interpreter to assist such person. 

{¶ 19} Sup.R. 88 provides in relevant part: 

(A) When appointment of a foreign language 

interpreter is required. 

A court shall appoint a foreign language interpreter in a case 

or court function in either of the following situations: 

(1) A party or witness who is limited English proficient or 

non-English speaking requests a foreign language interpreter 

and the court determines the services of the interpreter are 

necessary for the meaningful participation of the party or 

witness; 

(2) Absent a request from a party or witness for a foreign 

language interpreter, the court concludes the party or witness 

is limited English proficient or non-English speaking and 

determines the services of the interpreter are necessary for the 

meaningful participation of the party or witness. 

{¶ 20} Appellant argues that the appointment of a foreign language interpreter for 

his plea hearing was mandatory under both the statute and rule. The State of Ohio, 

plaintiff-appellee, maintains that the appointment of an interpreter in this case was purely 

discretionary, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error 

when it failed to appoint an interpreter for appellant's plea hearing. We agree. 
No. 15AP-536 7 

{¶ 21} Appellant did not request the appointment of an interpreter for his use in 

the plea hearing. In the absence of a request by a party or witness, R.C. 2311.14 requires 

the trial court to appoint a foreign language interpreter only if a party cannot readily 

understand or communicate in English. Castro at ¶ 9. Similarly, Sup.R. 88 mandates 

appointment of a foreign language interpreter, in the absence of a request, only if the 

court concludes the party is limited English proficient or non-English speaking and 

further determines the services of the interpreter are necessary for the meaningful 

participation of the party. State v. Noor, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-165, 2014-Ohio-3397, ¶ 69. 

{¶ 22} Prior to appellant's plea hearing, there was nothing before the trial court 

that would have supported a finding that appellant was not English proficient and that a 

foreign language interpreter was necessary for his meaningful participation in the 

proceedings. Furthermore, the transcript of the plea hearing belies appellant's posthearing claim that he is not English proficient. The transcript reveals that the trial court 

personally addressed appellant and that appellant responded appropriately in English to 

all of the court's inquiries. Neither appellant nor his trial counsel ever suggested to the 

trial court that appellant was not English proficient and that a foreign language 

interpreter was necessary for appellant's meaningful participation in the proceedings. 

{¶ 23} At the time of the plea hearing, the trial court record reveals, at most, that 

English was not appellant's native language. Thus, the record contains no support for 

appellant's contention that R.C. 2311.14 and Sup.R. 88 mandated the appointment of an 

interpreter for appellant's plea hearing. State v. Oluoch, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-45, 2007-

Ohio-5560, ¶ 42 (rejecting the appellant's contention that his counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance for failing to obtain an interpreter during the appellant's plea hearing where 

the record established that no language barrier precluded the appellant from 

understanding what transpired during the plea hearing); Al-Tamimi v. Warren, 

E.D.Mich. No. 2:06-12427 (Nov. 15, 2007) (The petitioner did not shown that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a foreign language interpreter for his plea 

hearing where the petitioner stated at the plea hearing that he could read, write, and 

understand the English language and responded appropriately to the trial judge's 

questions, indicating comprehension of those questions.). 
No. 15AP-536 8 

{¶ 24} Though appellant subsequently told an investigator that he could not 

understand English, appellant did not move the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea 

prior to sentencing. Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, "a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea should be freely and liberally granted." State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). 

When such a motion is made "the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine 

whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea." Id. 

{¶ 25} Nevertheless, appellant now argues that because the trial court 

subsequently approved reimbursement of interpreter fees for the sentencing hearing, the 

trial court impliedly acknowledged that an interpreter was mandatory for the sentencing 

hearing. Accordingly, appellant maintains that his guilty plea must not have been 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We disagree. 

{¶ 26} Initially, we note that appellant did not move the court for the mandatory 

appointment of an interpreter under R.C. 2311.14 and Sup.R. 88. Rather, appellant moved 

the court for approval of the fees for the interpreter counsel had retained for the 

sentencing hearing. Counsel estimated that the interpreter would be needed for 

approximately one hour at a rate of $65 per hour. The grounds for appellant's motion 

were appellant's indigence and his recently expressed wish "to have several matters 

explained to him in his native language of Bengali." (Apr. 6, 2015 Motion for Approval of 

Fees.) Nothing in the motion or the memorandum in support suggests that appellant is so 

lacking in English proficiency that he was unable to enter a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea of guilty. Nor did appellant move the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea 

pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1. 

{¶ 27} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.024, pertaining to "Investigation services and experts 

for indigent[s]" and Loc.R. 77.12 of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

pertaining to "Reimbursable Services," an indigent defendant may move the court to 

approve payment of expenses associated with certain services, including the services of 

interpreters, where such services "are reasonably necessary for the proper representation 

of [an indigent] defendant" charged with a felony. State v. Torres, 174 Ohio App.3d 168, 

2007-Ohio-6651 (8th Dist.). Under the statute and local rule, the decision whether to 

approve payment for expenses is discretionary. Id. at ¶ 15 (Abuse of discretion is the 

standard for reviewing the decision of the trial court in granting, setting, or denying a 
No. 15AP-536 9 

defendant's motion for funds to employ an interpreter.). The trial court in this case 

simply granted appellant's motion for the payment of interpreter fees "for good cause 

shown." Under the circumstances, the fact that the trial court granted appellant's motion 

for reimbursement only means that the trial court found, given appellant's indigence and 

his recently expressed wish to have several matters explained to him in his native 

language of Bengali, that appellant has shown good cause for approval of expenses 

associated with the services of an interpreter at the sentencing hearing. Nothing in the 

trial court's ruling can be reasonably construed as a finding that the appointment of an 

interpreter for the plea hearing was mandatory. The trial court never made a 

determination in this case that appellant is not English proficient and that a foreign 

language interpreter was necessary for appellant's meaningful participation at the plea 

hearing. And, as set forth above, the transcript of proceedings of the plea hearing provides 

no basis for the trial court to draw that conclusion. 

{¶ 28} Absent a request for an interpreter either prior to or during the plea 

hearing, and in the absence of any claim by appellant or indication in the record that 

appellant was so lacking in English proficiency that he was unable to enter a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty, we perceive no error on the part of the trial court 

in failing to appoint an interpreter for appellant's plea hearing. See State v. Lopez, 8th 

Dist. No. 90240, 2008-Ohio-3534 (Even though the defendant was not a United States 

citizen, trial court did not err in failing to appoint an interpreter for the plea hearing 

where the record reflected that the defendant had been in the United States for nine years, 

was able to understand and respond appropriately to the trial judge's questions regarding 

the defendant's name, age, citizenship, education, and marital status and that the 

defendant was able to engage in a clear dialogue with the trial court about how he came to 

the United States.). Appellant is a United States citizen who has lived and worked in the 

United States since 2007, he did not request a foreign language interpreter for the plea 

hearing, his counsel had no difficulty communicating with appellant in English, and 

appellant responded appropriately in English to the trial court's inquiries during the plea 

colloquy. 
No. 15AP-536 10 

{¶ 29} Furthermore, our examination of the transcript of the sentencing hearing 

also belies appellant's claim that he is not English proficient. The transcript of the 

sentencing hearing provides in relevant part, as follows: 

THE COURT: Now that we have the interpreter sworn for the 

purposes of this hearing, before we go any further, [G.C., Sr.], 

I wanted to speak to you about the interpreter that you have 

requested today. You have made that request, am I correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Now, you have previously been before the Court 

back on March 11 of this year 2015, where we had proceedings 

in which you entered a guilty plea to two counts of rape, a 

felony in the first degree; is that right? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you remember being here for that hearing? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: During that hearing were you able to 

understand all of my questions and understand what was 

going on at that time? 

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, he said he understands 

everything, but some points he could not realize.1

THE COURT: At that hearing did your counsel go over 

everything carefully and all of the forms that you signed 

before you signed them? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: So you went over all of the forms and you 

understood everything that was on the forms that you signed? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Now, you indicate that there might have been 

something in my questions that you didn't understand? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

 

1 It is not clear whether the interpreter, appellant or appellant's counsel made this statement. 
No. 15AP-536 11 

THE COURT: Do you recall specifically what it was that you 

felt that you had some question about in my questions to you? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

* * * 

THE COURT: Is there anything else from counsel with regard 

to the use of the interpreter at this time? 

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Nothing additional, Your 

Honor. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the only thing I would 

add I feel confident during the pendency of my 

representation of [G.C., Sr.] we were able to communicate 

well. He confirmed that to me through the interpreter today.

And I don't want to get ahead of myself by addressing 

anything in the PSI that states there may have been some 

manipulation on his part to request an interpreter at this late 

hour, what I truly -- this is a life-changing event for [G.C., Sr.], 

and when we got to the point where it had truly sunk in what 

is going to be happening with his life for the next several years 

I think there was a certain amount of comfort he had with his 

native language, and we wanted to do that. Our 

communication has always been strong, and I thank the Court 

for allowing an interpreter today. 

THE COURT: Okay. Now, does the Defendant have anything 

to say about any reason that this hearing should not go 

forward today? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. It's not my belief 

that would be the case. We have had several communications 

this morning with the services of the interpreter, and he 

indicated to me a number of times he wished to proceed with 

the proceedings this morning.

[PROSECUTING ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I guess I would 

ask the interpreter to be interpreting anything that we are 

saying because that hasn't happened. 

(Emphasis added.) (Apr. 10, 2015 Tr. 2-5.) 
No. 15AP-536 12 

{¶ 30} In addition to appellant's responses to the trial court inquiries and the 

representations of appellant's counsel, appellant's wife, L.D., made the following 

statement at the sentencing hearing: 

Your honor, [appellant] may pretend that he doesn't 

understand English well enough, but he has worked at * * * 

from 2007 to 2011. Per precautions, one must be able to read, 

speak and understand English language well enough to 

perform the duties at * * *, and [appellant] has done very well 

while working * * *. 

(Apr. 10, 2015 Tr. 15.) 

{¶ 31} When the trial court offered appellant the opportunity of elocution, he 

stated: "Your Honor, I'll not do this anymore in my life. I'll change my life. I will not do 

any, do it again forever, and I will be a very good person in the future and what I did I 

apologize for that." (Apr. 10, 2015 Tr. 24.)2 

{¶ 32} Our review of the sentencing hearing transcript provides no support for 

appellant's claim that he is not English proficient and that an interpreter was necessary 

for his meaningful participation at the prior plea hearing. Thus, it provides no support for 

his claim that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, due to the trial court's 

failure to provide him with a foreign language interpreter. Rather than strengthening 

appellant's claim that he is not English proficient, appellant's contention that the 

interpreter did not provide a complete translation of the sentencing colloquy refutes his 

claim that he is not English proficient. The transcript of the sentencing hearing shows 

that appellant was able to provide appropriate responses to the trial court's inquiries even 

in the absence of a complete translation. Nor does an alleged incomplete translation of 

the sentencing colloquy alter the fact that appellant elected to proceed with the sentencing 

hearing after consulting legal counsel with the benefit of an interpreter. 

{¶ 33} Based on this court's review of the record, including the transcripts of the 

plea hearing and sentencing hearing, as well as the PSI report, we find that the trial court 

did not commit any error, let alone an obvious error, when it accepted appellant's guilty 

plea in the absence of a foreign language interpreter. Lopez; see also State v. Kunz, 6th 

Dist. No. WD-10-047, 2011-Ohio-3115 (Although victim may have struggled with some 

 

2 Appellant does not dispute appellee's representation that appellant made this statement in English. 
No. 15AP-536 13 

words and he spoke with imperfect grammar during his trial testimony, the trial court did 

not commit plain error by failing to appoint an interpreter where the victim was able to 

communicate what he witnessed.); State v. Frunza, 8th Dist. No. 82053, 2003-Ohio4809, ¶ 19 (Interpreter's absence during jury selection did not rise to the level of 

prejudicial error where the appointment of the interpreter was discretionary and the 

appellate court was unable to determine from the record whether the appellant was 

prejudiced by the interpreter's absence.); State v. Miller, 6th Dist. No. 90-OT-037 

(July 12, 1991) (The appellant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

notwithstanding his claim on appeal that he was unable to understand the proceedings 

because of his deafness, where the record shows that the trial court took corrective action 

when the appellant indicated a lack of comprehension, and the appellant articulated 

comments, including an apology to the victim, when permitted his right of elocution.). 

Having concluded that the trial court did not err when it found that appellant entered a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty, we overrule appellant's assignment of 

error. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 34} Having overruled appellant's sole assignment of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

BROWN and HORTON, JJ., concur. 

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