IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

MAY 21, 2002 Session

PIONEER SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v.

PROFESSIONAL COUNSELING SERVICES, INC.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Dyer County

No. 00C438; The Honorable Ron E. Harmon, Chancellor

No. W2001-03053-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 31, 2002

This appeal arises from the Appellant’s purchase of a home in the Appellee’s subdivision which the

Appellant intended to use as a group home for mentally handicapped persons. The Appellee filed

a petition against the Appellant in the Chancery Court of Dyer County seeking injunctive relief. The

petition alleged that the subdivision’s restrictive covenant prohibited any business use or other use

of property in the subdivision other than a private residence or single family dwelling. The

Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim. Following a trial, the trial court denied the Appellee’s

request for an injunction. The trial court ordered that the Appellant include at least two residents of

the subdivision on the selection committee used to select residents for the group home. The trial

court stated that it retained jurisdiction of the case for enforcement of the judgment as needed upon

petition of either party. 

The Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision, including placing at least two residents of

the subdivision on the selection committee. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part,

Reversed in Part and Remanded

ALAN E. HIGHERS,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID R. FARMER,J., joined and

HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J., concurred separately.

John W. Palmer, Jason L. Hudson, Dyersburg, TN, for Appellant

David A. Riddick, Jackson, TN, for Appellee

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Pamela A. Hayden-Wood, Assistant Attorney

General, Nashville, TN, for Amicus Curiae, State of Tennessee
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OPINION

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Appellee, Pioneer Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Homeowners

Association”), is a non-profit corporation which consists of owners of lots within Pioneer

Subdivision in Dyersburg, Tennessee. The Appellant, Professional Counseling Services, Inc.

(“Professional Counseling”) purchased a home located on lot twenty-three in the Pioneer

Subdivision. On August 18, 2000, Homeowners Association filed a petition against Professional

Counseling in the Chancery Court of Dyer County to enforce a restrictive covenant. The petition

sought injunctive relief to prevent Professional Counseling from using the home as a group home

for mentally handicapped persons and guardians. The petition relied on a Pioneer Subdivision

restrictive covenant which prohibits any business use or other use of property in the subdivision

other than a private residence or single family dwelling. The petition also relied on a Dyersburg

zoning ordinance which prohibits group homes and nursing homes in residential areas. 

On September 5, 2000, Professional Counseling filed an answer and counterclaim alleging

violations of the Fair Housing Act and section 13-24-101, et seq. of the Tennessee Code. The

counterclaim sought damages and an injunction restraining Homeowners Association from

interfering with the group home. On September 14, 2000, Homeowners Association filed an answer

to the counterclaim. On October 31, 2000, Professional Counseling submitted interrogatories,

requests for admission, and requests for production of documents to Homeowners Association.

Professional Counseling also submitted their answers to interrogatories and requests for production

of documents. On December 18, 2000, Homeowners Association filed a motion to compel discovery

alleging that Professional Counseling’s answers to interrogatories were inadequate. Also on

December 18, 2000, Professional Counseling filed a motion for a protective order limiting the scope

of discovery arguing that the additional discovery information sought by Homeowners Association

was irrelevant. On December 19, 2000, the trial court held a hearing on the two motions. On

January 16, 2001, the trial court entered an order limiting the scope of interrogatories and requests

for production of documents as to the financial status and records of Professional Counseling. 

On March 20, 2001, the trial was held. On April 20, 2001, the trial court entered an order

denying Homeowners Association’s request for an injunction. The trial court ordered Professional

Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee used

to select residents for the group home. The trial court stated that it retained jurisdiction of the case

for enforcement of the judgment as needed upon petition of either party. On May 18, 2001,

Professional Counseling filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. On July 23, 2001, the trial court

entered an order denying the motion to alter or amend judgment. On August 23, 2001, Homeowners

Association filed a motion requesting the trial court for an order directing how members of the

selection committee were to be chosen. On November 8, 2001, the trial court ordered that the two

members of the selection committee would be selected by Homeowners Association. This appeal

followed.
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II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a non-jury case is de novo upon the record. See Wright v. City

of Knoxville, 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). There is a presumption of correctness as to the

trial court’s factual findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See TENN. R.

APP. P. 13(d). For issues of law, the standard of review is de novo, with no presumption of 

correctness. See Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn. 1996).

III. Law and Analysis

The following issues are presented for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by limiting the scope of discovery as to the financial status and

records of Professional Counseling;

2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule that the proposed use of the home violated Pioneer

Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and that the proposed use of the home fell under a zoning

exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq.;

3. Whether the trial court erred by ordering Professional Counseling to include at least two residents

of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee used to select residents for the group home; and

4. Whether the trial court erred by retaining jurisdiction of the case to allow the parties to submit

future disputes to the trial court for hearing.

We will examine each issue in turn.

The first issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by limiting the scope

of discovery as to the financial status and records of Professional Counseling. The decision to limit

the scope of discovery “lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not

be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Loveall v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 694 S.W.2d

937, 939 (Tenn. 1985) (citing Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 326

(10th Cir. 1981)). From our review of the record, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion to

limit the scope of discovery regarding Professional Counseling’s finances. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s decision to limit the scope of discovery as to the financial status and records of

Professional Counseling. 

The second issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by failing to rule

that the proposed use of the home violated Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and that the

proposed use of the home fell under a zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq. The trial

court stated that the group home violated Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and the

Dyersburg zoning ordinance. The trial court found, however, that the group home fell within the

zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq. The trial court stated that Pioneer Subdivision’s

restrictive covenant and the Dyersburg zoning ordinance say “you cannot operate an enterprise such

as this in your development. No question about that. In the infinite wisdom of our elected officials,

that has been changed by a law that says you can if you do certain things. And that statute overrides
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the zoning. It overrides the subdivision restrictions.” We must decide whether the trial court erred

by finding that the group home fell within the zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq.

The purpose of section 13-24-101, et seq. is “to remove any zoning obstacles which prevent

mentally retarded, mentally handicapped or physically handicapped persons from living in normal

residential surroundings.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-24-101(a) (Supp. 2001). Section 13-24-102

classifies a group home of eight or fewer mentally retarded, mentally handicapped or physically

handicapped persons and two guardians as a “single family residence” for zoning purposes. TENN.

CODEANN.§ 13-24-102 (1999). Section 13-24-103 states that “[t]his part takes precedence over any

provision in any zoning law or ordinance in Tennessee to the contrary.” TENN.CODE ANN. § 13-24-

103 (1999). Professional Counseling intends to use the home in Pioneer Subdivision as a group

home for eight or fewer mentally handicapped individuals and two guardians. The statute clearly

states that a use of a home in this manner is classified as a “single family residence” which is exempt

from “any zoning obstacles.” We find that Professional Counseling’s proposed use of the home falls

within section 13-24-101, et seq. which overrides the Pioneer Subdivision restrictive covenant and

the Dyersburg zoning ordinance. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the proposed

use of the home falls within section 13-24-101, et seq.

The third issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by ordering

Professional Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection

committee used to select residents for the group home. We agree that the trial court erred by

ordering Professional Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the

selection committee when that issue was not submitted to the trial court in the pleadings. 

It is a fundamental rule of law that in order to receive relief, a party must plead, request, and

prove the relief with the opposing party having the opportunity to offer proof opposing the requested

relief. Rule 54.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states:

A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or 

exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. 

Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 

default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 

party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party 

has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings; but the 

court shall not give the successful party relief, though such party 

may be entitled to it, where the propriety of such relief was not 

litigated and the opposing party had no opportunity to assert 

defenses to such relief.

TENN. R. CIV. P. 54.03.

 In addressing the necessity for matters to be alleged in the pleadings and supported by

evidence before they can be adjudicated by the chancery court, Gibson’s Suits in Chancery states:
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A Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction of any matter not submitted

to it in a pleading for adjudication; nor can the defendant be called on

to respond to anything not alleged against him. Neither can a Court

consider any evidence which does not directly, or indirectly, tend to

prove or disprove the allegations contained in the pleadings. A decree

can neither be based on allegations without corresponding proof, nor on

proof without corresponding allegations. All decrees must be the 

concurring result of allegations justified by proof, and proof justified by

allegations. A decree based on pleadings without proof, will be reversed

on appeal, but will be good against collateral attack. A decree based on 

proof, without pleadings, will not only be reversed on appeal, but will also

yield to a collateral attack because such a decree is coram non judice, and

absolutely void. The jurisdiction of the Court is circumscribed by the 

pleadings, and the pleadings are circumscribed by the Law.

Gibson’s Suits in Chancery § 218 (7th ed. 1988).

This fundamental rule of law has been upheld by the courts of Tennessee. In the case of

Cardwell v. Hackett, 579 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), the plaintiff sued the defendant for

implied warranty of a mobile home purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant. The trial court

rendered a judgment for the return of the purchase price of the mobile home to the plaintiff and a

return of the mobile home to the defendant. In reversing the judgment on appeal, this Court stated,

“Thus, his judgment is a rescission of the contract and an effort to restore the parties to status quo.

It seems to us that this is error . . . because the pleadings do not encompass a suit for rescission.”

Id. at 191.

In the case of Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Jackson, et al., 181 S.W.2d 625

(Tenn. 1944), our supreme court stated, “No rule is better settled than that both allegations and proof

are essential to a decree or judgment and that there can be no valid decree unless the matter on which

the decree is rested is plainly within the scope of the pleadings.” Id. at 629.

The court also noted with approval:

In order to give a judgment the merit and finality of an adjudication

between the parties, it must be responsive not only to the proof but

to the issues tendered by the pleadings, because pleadings are the 

very foundation of judgments and decrees. A judgment will be void

which is a departure from the pleadings, and based upon a case not

averred therein, since if allowed to stand it would be altogether

arbitrary and unjust and conclude a point upon which the parties had

not been heard . . . . Therefore, the rule is firmly established that

irrespective of what may be proved a court cannot decree to any

plaintiff more than he claims in his bill or other pleadings.
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Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

The relief requested by Homeowners Association in their pleadings was based upon a

violation of Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and Dyersburg’s zoning ordinance.

Homeowners Association requested the trial court to order an injunction enjoining Professional

Counseling from using the property as a group home. Homeowners Association did not request or

offer evidence in support of placing residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee for

the group home. The trial court ordered Professional Counseling to include at least two residents

of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee. This relief granted was not within the scope of

the pleadings. Under the state of the record before us, the relief granted should have been confined

to the relief sought in the pleadings. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s decision ordering

Professional Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection

committee. 

The fourth issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by retaining

jurisdiction of the case to allow the parties to submit future disputes to the trial court for hearing.

The recitation by the trial court that it was retaining jurisdiction of the case was mere surplusage

because the parties have the right to submit future disputes related to the original judgment to the

trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order retaining jurisdiction of the case to allow

the parties to submit future disputes to the trial court for hearing.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part,

and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed

equally against the Appellant, Professional Counseling Services, Inc., and its surety, and the

Appellee, Pioneer Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc., for which execution may issue if

necessary.

___________________________________ 

ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE