Filed 6/13/24 P. v. Sanchez CA5

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LAURO SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

F086695

(Super. Ct. No. F09905025)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. John F. Vogt, 

Judge.

Rex A. Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and De Santos, J.
2.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, appellant Lauro Sanchez was found guilty by jury of premeditated 

attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 1), second degree robbery 

(§ 211, count 2), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 3). In addition, the 

jury found true enhancements for the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 

count 3); the personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, 

subd. (d), counts 1 & 2); and the personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a), counts 1-3). The trial court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole 

on count 1, plus 25 years to life for personal use of a firearm proximately causing great 

bodily injury.

In 2022, Sanchez filed a petition seeking resentencing on his conviction for 

premeditated attempted murder under section 1172.6. Following the appointment of 

counsel, the submission of briefs by the parties, and a hearing, the superior court denied 

Sanchez’s petition, finding that he had failed to state a prima facie case for relief. 

On appeal, appellant’s counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts and 

procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to 

independently review the record pursuant to both People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 

216 and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Sanchez also filed a supplemental brief, 

asking this court to review matters pertaining to his underlying criminal conviction. 

On May 31, 2024, Sanchez filed a motion requesting the appointment of an 

interpreter to assist him with translating legal documents, and an extension of time to file 

another supplemental brief. We deny Sanchez’s motion and affirm the court’s denial of 

his petition for resentencing. 

1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated. 
3.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts underlying Sanchez’s criminal conviction are not available from the 

record of conviction. 

At the hearing on Sanchez’s section 1172.6 petition, the prosecutor explained that 

the jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting, and thus, the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine was not a theory of murder liability upon which the prosecutor 

had relied. The record, which contains the jury instructions given to the jury, is 

consistent with the prosecutor’s representation; the jury was not instructed on aiding and 

abetting. There were also no jury instructions on the felony murder rule or the natural 

and probable consequences doctrine. 

DISCUSSION

I. Sanchez is Ineligible for Section 1172.6 Resentencing Relief as a Matter of 

Law

Sanchez was convicted by jury of premeditated attempted murder, with 

enhancements for the personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) and personally 

discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted 

murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The jury’s true finding on the premeditation allegation 

does not, alone, foreclose the possibility that Sanchez was convicted of attempted murder 

upon a natural and probable consequences theory. (See People v. Favor (2012) 54

Cal.4th 868, 879-880.) However, the jury’s finding that Sanchez personally inflicted 

great bodily injury in the commission of the attempted premeditated murder, and 

personally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), in 

addition to the lack of any instructions on the natural and probable consequences doctrine 

or aiding and abetting, foreclose such a possibility. 

Section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides: “Any person who personally inflicts 

great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony 

or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of 
4.

imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Italics added.) By enacting section 

12022.7, “the Legislature intended to impose an additional penalty for causing great 

bodily injury only on those principals who perform the act that directly inflicts the injury, 

and that one who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict the physical injury is not 

subject to the enhanced penalty of section 12022.7.” (People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d

568, 571.) “Accordingly, ‘one who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict the 

physical injury is not subject to the enhanced penalty of section 12022.7.’ ” (People v.

Slough (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 419, 423.) 

Based upon the jury’s verdict and findings, Sanchez is ineligible for section 

1172.6 resentencing relief as a matter of law. The jury necessarily found that Sanchez 

had acted with express, rather than imputed malice. The trial court therefore properly 

denied Sanchez’s petition at the prima facie stage. 

II. Sanchez’s Request for an Interpreter

In a supplemental letter brief filed with this court and in a separately filed motion, 

Sanchez requested the appointment of an interpreter to assist him with the translation of 

legal documents so that he could file another supplemental brief with this court. He also 

sought an extension of time for that purpose. 

This court does not have the ability to provide Sanchez with an interpreter that can 

translate legal documents for him. Translation services are generally handled through 

appointed counsel. Sanchez’s request is therefore denied. 

Sanchez also requested that this court provide further correspondence to him in 

both English and Spanish. That request is also denied. Trial counsel will receive a copy 

of this court’s opinion. We encourage Sanchez to communicate with his court-appointed 

attorney. 

III. The Racial Justice Act

Sanchez’s requests that we review transcripts from his underlying criminal case, 

including voir dire of the jury, and the convictions of defendants of other races, 
5.

ethnicities, or national origins who have committed similar offenses, to ascertain whether 

a violation of the Racial Justice Act has occurred. 

Effective January 1, 2021, the Racial Justice Act (§§ 745, 1473, subd. (f), 1473.7, 

subd. (a)(3)), states that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, 

obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” (§ 745, 

subd. (a), added by Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5). 

Violations of the Racial Justice Act occur under the following circumstances: 

(1) “[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, 

an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the 

defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)); (2) “the judge, an 

attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or 

juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ... or otherwise 

exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race” (id., 

subd. (a)(2)); (3) when “[t]he defendant was charged or convicted of a more serious 

offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged 

in conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution 

more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people 

who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the 

convictions were sought or obtained” (id., subd. (a)(3)); or (4) where “[a] longer or more 

severe sentence was imposed on the defendant than was imposed on other similarly 

situated individuals convicted of the same offense, and longer or more severe sentences 

were more frequently imposed for that offense on people that share the defendant's race, 

ethnicity, or national origin than on defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national 

origins in the county where the sentence was imposed” (id., subd. (a)(4)).

Section 745, subdivision (b) provides that a “defendant may file a motion pursuant 

to this in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for writ of 
6.

habeas corpus or a motion under [s]ection 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction, 

alleging a violation of” the Racial Justice Act. 

However, a defendant may not raise a claim under the Racial Justice Act for the 

first time on direct appeal. This proposition was recently rejected by the First District, 

Division 3 Court of Appeal in People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804. In People v. 

Lashon, the appellate court reviewed the Racial Justice Act, including amendments that 

took effect on January 1, 2024, and concluded that language with section 745, providing 

that claims under the Racial Justice Act may be raised “on direct appeal” did not mean 

that a defendant could bypass the trial court and assert a Racial Justice Act claim in the 

Court of Appeal in the first instance. (People v. Lashon, at pp. 810, 812, § 745, subd. 

(b).) 

Sanchez’s request for this court to review the record for a violation of the Racial 

Justice Act seeks to go even further than the scenario addressed in People v. Lashon. 

Sanchez seeks to assert a claim under the Racial Justice Act for the first time on appeal 

from a section 1172.6 petition proceeding. As his claim is not authorized by statute, we 

reject Sanchez’s request. 

DISPOSITION

The superior court’s order denying Sanchez’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.