alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           3,830
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,952
<ALLOWANCES>                                       675
<INVENTORY>                                     21,311
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                36,626
<PP&E>                                          32,786
<DEPRECIATION>                                  12,552
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  63,064
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,488
<BONDS>                                          4,035
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            55
<OTHER-SE>                                      50,899
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    63,064
<SALES>                                         40,693
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                40,693
<CGS>                                           29,838
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,064
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   271
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 250
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (1,267)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       473
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (794)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (794)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.15)



</TABLE>
Exhibit
10.23


 


THE
GLIMPSE GROUP, INC


 


Amendment
to Master Acquisition Agreement II


 


Dated
as of November 12, 2018


 


This
Amendment (this “Agreement”) is made and entered into as of the date first set forth above (the “Effective Date”)
by and between THE GLIMPSE GROUP, INC., a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) and Liron Lerman (“Seller”).


 


RECITAL


 


WHEREAS,
the Company and the Seller entered into a Master Acquisition Agreement dated October 28, 2016 (the “Agreement”); and


 


WHEREAS,
the Company and the Seller entered into an Amendment to Master Acquisition Agreement dated March 15, 2018 (the “First Amendment”);
and


 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, terms, covenants, and conditions set forth herein, and the performance of each, the
parties hereto, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:


 


AGREEMENTS


 


1.
The First Amendment is null and void.


 


2.
Any and all references made in Section 12(a)–12(d) of the Agreement to “ten percent (10%)” is changed to “eight
percent (8%)”, including a pro-rata change in the vesting schedule detailed in Section 12(e) Vesting.


 


	 	(a)
    	For
    clarification, any unvested portion of the remaining 2% granted to Michael Spilsbury shall be returned to the Seller, as applicable.


 


3.
Except as set forth herein, the Agreement, and all terms and conditions set forth therein, remains in full force and effect.


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and Employee have caused this extension of the Employment Agreement to be duly executed as of the Effective
Date.


 


	 	COMPANY:
	 	 
	 	THE
    GLIMPSE GROUP, INC.
	 	 	 
	 	By:
    	 /s/ Lyron L. Bentovim  
	 	 	 
	 	Name:
    	Lyron
    L. Bentovim
	 	Title:
    	President
    & CEO
	 	 	 
	 	SELLER:
    Liron Lerman 
	 	 	 
	 	By:
    	
	 	 	 
	 	Name:
Exhibit 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of LaSalle Re Holdings Limited (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James
F. Billett, Jr., Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18, U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ James F. Billett, Jr.

James F. Billett, Jr.
Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
August 14, 2002
#### American Bluing Co., Inc., Respondent, v Bennett Distributors, Inc., Appellant.

Memorandum: The court erred in granting plaintiff summary judgment for the price of goods sold because defendant has raised a factual issue with respect to whether the purchaser was defendant broker, or defendant’s customer to whom the goods were shipped. Defendant alleged, and plaintiff did not deny, that before the date of the invoice showing a sale to defendant and shipment to defendant’s customer, plaintiff had directed defendant to notify its customers that billing and payment would be handled directly between plaintiff and defendant’s customers, although orders would still be placed through defendant. Therefore, an issue of fact exists as to whether defendant or defendant’s customer is responsible for payment to plaintiff *(see, Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs.,*46 NY2d 1065). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Kuszynski, J. — summary judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          18,127
<SECURITIES>                                    63,944
<RECEIVABLES>                                      237
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,485
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  86,032
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,015
<BONDS>                                            206
<COMMON>                                           135
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      82,676
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    86,032
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   486
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,721
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  58
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,021)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,021)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,021)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.99)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.99)
        

</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

The Board of Directors 

Capital Title Group, Inc. 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements Nos. 333-66375 and 333-112982 on Form S-8 of Capital Title Group, Inc. of ourreport dated February 16, 2004 with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Capital Title Group, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity andcomprehensive income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December 31, 2003, annual report on Form 10-K of Capital Title Group, Inc. 

 

Our report refers to the Company adopting the provisions of Statement ofFinancial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 141, *Business Combinations*, and SFAS No. 142, *Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets*, which changed the Company’s method of accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets effectiveJanuary 1, 2002. 

 

/s/    KPMG LLP 

 

Phoenix, Arizona 

March 2, 2004
#### Betty Buechler et al., Appellants, v "John" Billings et al., Respondents.

— In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Delaney, J.), dated May 20, 1986, as granted the defendants’. motion to change venue from Westchester County to Suffolk County.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The court properly exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion for a change of venue from Westchester County to Suffolk County. Thompson, J. P., Niehoff, Eiber, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
#### O’NEIL v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

May 14, 1894.)

Witness—Credibility—Party to Action.

Where plaintiff is a witness in his own behalf, and is neither contradicted nor corroborated, a verdict in favor of defendant will not be disturbed on appeal as against the weight of evidence, as the uncontradicted testimony of a party to an action is not controlling.

Appeal from circuit court, Kings county.

Action by Leonard J. O’Neil against the Third Avenue Railroad Company for personal injuries. There was a judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BROWN, P.. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.

Tredwell & Catlin (Rufus O. Catlin), for appellant.

Hoadly, Lauterbach & Johnson (Wm. N. Cohen and Frederick P. Delafleld, of counsel), for respondent.

PRATT, J.

This was an action for damages for personal injuries. The material allegation in the complaint is as follows: “That when said car slowed up sufficiently for that purpose, plaintiff started and undertook to get off, but while in the act of stepping down from said car into the street the said defendant negligently, carelessly, and recklessly started, increased, and accelerated the speed of said car.” As to the course, manner, and result of the accident the plaintiff was the principal witness in his own behalf, and he was not contradicted nor impeached, nor was he corroborated upon some vital points in the case. It is not very clear that the plaintiff was free himself from negligence which contributed to the accident, but that question was submitted to the jury under the following words: “This plaintiff must show you that he was free from fault here, and that the defendant was at fault,” so that, in that regard, the plaintiff had no cause of complaint. The court also said in its charge: “Where a person is interested in an action, it is for the jury to say, after having heard Ms testimony, what credit they will give to it.” The plaintiff took no exception to the charge, and the jury were at liberty to find a verdict for the defendant upon either of the above propositions. Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191-200, 25 N. E. 402. See, also, Belton v. Baxter, 58 N. Y. 411, and Hart v. Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 622.

The only further questions available to plaintiff to reverse that judgment are those relating to rulings upon the admission and rejection of evidence upon the trial. The evidence of the clerk as to the rule about reporting cases, and that the office had received no report, we think was relevant, and properly admitted, when all the facts and circumstances of the case are considered. It was proving the absence of a circumstance which would naturally follow if the contention of the plaintiff was true. The exception to the ruling of the judge made at request of the defendant, “that the nonproduction of a witness who knows nothing of the accident does not justify an inference against the defendant,” is too plainly right to require comment. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### Edward Holtzman, Respondent, v Werner R. Stutz, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant. Helen Stutz, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

— In an action to recover damages for breach of contract and to recover for necessaries, the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Marbach, J.), entered November 4, 1985, which is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the sum of $27,360, without interest, after a nonjury trial.

Ordered that the judgment is modified on the law and the facts, by reducing the award from $27,360 to $23,360. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

*641The plaintiff is a psychiatrist who allegedly furnished professional services to the defendant’s wife. At the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $27,360. Making its findings from the Bench, the court discussed the alternate theories of contract and necessaries but ultimately grounded its award on a contract theory. Nevertheless, the court did make the finding that the services rendered were necessaries and declared that had it awarded judgment on the basis of necessaries the amount would have been reduced by $4,000.

On this appeal by the defendant, it is apparent that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on a contract theory. At a time when only $640 worth of services had been rendered to his wife, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff notifying him that he would not be responsible for any further charges incurred by his wife for the services.

While it is clear that the defendant was not bound by any contract to pay for services rendered to his wife beyond the sum of $640, there can be no doubt that on this record that the services rendered were necessaries. That being the case, we accept the alternate theory and findings made by the trial court, and in accordance with those findings reduce the amount of the judgment by $4,000. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Mangano and Lawrence, JJ., concur.
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EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report of Prescient Applied Intelligence, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-KSB for the year ending December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Thomas W. Aiken, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ Thomas W. AikenThomas W. Aiken Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer March 31, 2006
##### 



Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hyperion Solutions Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, David W. Odell, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

Dated: November 7, 2003

/s/ DAVID W. ODELL

David W. Odell
Chief Financial Officer
#### Elizabeth Alden, Appellant, v Onondaga County Sheriff’s Department, Respondent.

Submitted June *4, 2007;*

decided June 12, 2007

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the orders appealed from do not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Judge Pigott taking no part.
NO. 12-14-00135-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN RE: §

KEVIN REVELS, § ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

RELATOR §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Relator Kevin Revels was convicted of aggravated assault on a correctional officer with a 

deadly weapon. This court affirmed his conviction. See generally Revels v. State, No. 

12-93-00325-CR (Tex. App.–Tyler June 29, 1995, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). In 

this proceeding, he seeks an order remanding cause number 12-93-00325-CR with instructions 

that the trial court dismiss the case and discharge him from prison. We construe Relator’s 

“Petition Requesting Court to Dismiss Case” as a postconviction petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 

A writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive means to challenge a final felony conviction. 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 § 3 (West Supp. 2013); Bd. of Pardons & Paroles ex 

rel. Keene v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals, 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). But 

only the court of criminal appeals has jurisdiction to grant postconviction habeas relief from a 

final felony conviction. See Keene, 910 S.W.2d at 483. Accordingly, we dismiss Relator’s 

postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction.

Opinion delivered May 30, 2014.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MAY 30, 2014

NO. 12-14-00135-CR

KEVIN REVELS,

Relator

V.

HON.PAM FLETCHER,

Respondent

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

ON THIS DAY came to be heard the postconviction petition for writ of 

habeas corpus filed by KEVIN REVELS, who is the defendant in Cause No. 14,115-CR

pending on the docket of the 349th Judicial District Court of Houston County, Texas. Said 

postconviction petition for habeas corpus having been filed herein on May 29, 2014, and the 

same having been duly considered, it is the opinion of the Court that this Court is without 

jurisdiction of this original proceeding, it is therefore CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and 

ORDERED that the said postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus be, and the same is, 

hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.

By per curiam opinion.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
#### In the Matter of Raymond Ciervo, Respondent. Menelaos Metalios, Intervenor-Appellant; Italic Ciervo et al., Respondents.

*584The conservatee, Mrs. Benfari, executed a power of attorney in favor of her brother, Joseph P. Ciervo, in October 1983. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Joseph P. Ciervo executed a contract for the sale of the subject premises to the appellant for $175,000 in April 1985. Joseph P. Ciervo then died in an automobile accident in early May 1985 before the closing was scheduled to take place. Mrs. Benfari’s niece petitioned the court for the appointment of a conservator, and presented evidence that Mrs. Benfari had been incompetent since at least January 1985. The court appointed Raymond Ciervo, Joseph P. Ciervo’s son, as conservator.

The power of attorney executed by Mrs. Benfari did not provide for the authority conferred thereby to continue in the event of her subsequent disability or incompetence. Consequently, the contract which was executed after she was already mentally incompetent was voidable at the option of Mrs. Benfari’s conservator *(see, Bankers Trust Co. v Martin,*51 AD2d 411; General Obligations Law § 5-1601 [1]). Inasmuch as the contract price was lower than either the appraised value or the highest bid, the court properly granted the conservator permission to accept the highest bid, and, *inter alia,*set aside the voidable contract. Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Brown and Eiber, JJ., concur.