Opinion filed January 27, 2011

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

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No. 11-09-00081-CV

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IN THE MATTER OF M.L.C., A JUVENILE

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 5877

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury found that M.L.C. had engaged in two counts of delinquent conduct: theft of 

property valued between $50 and $500 and felony aggravated assault. The trial court proceeded 

with the disposition and ordered that M.L.C. be committed to the Texas Youth Commission. We 

affirm.

On appeal, M.L.C. presents two issues challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the jury’s findings that he committed theft and that the assault was aggravated. We will 

review all of the evidence and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); In re M.C.S., Jr., No. 02-

09-00332-CV, 2010 WL 4138554 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2010, no pet.); see TEX.
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FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(f) (Vernon Supp. 2010); see also In re M.R., 846 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 1992), writ denied, 858 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. 1993). The jury, as the trier of fact, 

is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 

testimony. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (Vernon 2007), art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979). 

As such, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness’s testimony. 

Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); In re R.P., 37 S.W.3d 76, 78 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.). 

Theft

In his first issue, M.L.C. contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he stole 

the cell phone or that he knew it was stolen when he received it. A person commits the offense 

of theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of that 

property. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 2010). Appropriation of property is 

unlawful if it is without the owner’s effective consent or if the property is stolen and the actor 

appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another. Id. § 31.03(b). 

It is undisputed that M.G., a friend of M.L.C., stole a cell phone belonging to Guadalupe 

Barraza from a school locker that was shared by M.G. and Barraza. M.G. hesitantly testified that 

M.L.C. told her to take the phone, that he gave her $20, and that there was peer pressure from 

others for her to take the phone or suffer getting beaten up by M.L.C.’s sister. When confronted 

at school with the theft, M.L.C. was uncooperative. He told the assistant principal that he knew 

where the phone was but that he “no longer had the phone.” M.L.C. later told the assistant 

principal that he paid for the phone, that it was his, and that he did not care if it was stolen. At 

trial, M.L.C. testified that he returned the phone when he found out it had been stolen. Barraza 

testified, however, that her phone was never returned to her. We hold that the evidence is 

sufficient to support the jury’s verdict; there was evidence from which a rational jury could have 

found that M.L.C. appropriated the phone knowing that it had been stolen. The first issue is 

overruled.

Aggravated Assault

In his second issue, M.L.C. contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he 

committed the offense of aggravated assault. The jury found that M.L.C. committed the offense 

of aggravated assault upon Bill McGrew by hitting or striking him on the head with a glass 

ashtray. It is undisputed that M.L.C. struck McGrew on the head with a glass ashtray. What is 
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disputed is whether this assault constitutes simple assault or aggravated assault. The offense of 

aggravated assault can be committed in two different ways, either of which will support a 

conviction. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon Supp. 2010). Under Section 22.02(a)(1), 

the offense is committed if the person commits an assault and “causes serious bodily injury to 

another.” Under Section 22.02(a)(2), the offense is committed if the person commits an assault 

and “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.” The petition and 

the jury charge in this case included each of these alternate means of committing aggravated 

assault.

We agree with M.L.C. that the evidence does not show that he caused “serious bodily 

injury” to McGrew. Serious bodily injury means “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 

death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of 

the function of any bodily member or organ.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon 

Supp. 2010). The evidence showed that McGrew’s head wound bled profusely, leaving pools of 

blood on a sheet, and that it required thirteen stitches, but there was no evidence regarding a risk 

of death, disfigurement, or protracted impairment.

We disagree with M.L.C.’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to show that the 

ashtray was a deadly weapon. A deadly weapon can be “anything that in the manner of its use or 

intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). The 

record shows that the remains of the shattered ashtray were introduced into evidence as an 

exhibit for the jury to see. Officer Demetrius Lee was the only witness who testified regarding 

the ashtray being a deadly weapon. He was asked: “In your training and experience as a police 

officer, could a glass ashtray striking someone in the head be used as a deadly weapon?” The 

officer answered affirmatively. The injuries inflicted on the victim may also be considered in 

determining whether a deadly weapon was used. Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004). The evidence indicated that McGrew’s head bled profusely. A picture 

showing the pools of blood at the scene of the offense was admitted into evidence as an exhibit. 

Officer Lee testified that he went to the hospital and observed that the bandage around 

McGrew’s head was soaked in blood. Though the testimony regarding the ashtray being a 

deadly weapon was not well developed, that testimony along with the exhibits and the injury 

suffered by McGrew were sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that M.L.C. committed the 

offense of aggravated assault by means of his use of the ashtray as a deadly weapon. The jury 
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could have found that the ashtray, in the manner of its use in this case, was capable of causing 

death or serious bodily injury. M.L.C.’s second issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JIM R. WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE

January 27, 2011

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Strange, J.