### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ja nuary 11, 200 5 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RA YM OND BA ILEY
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 02-04607 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2004-00512-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled May 20, 2005

The Appe llant, Ray mond B ailey , was convicted by a Shelby Countyjury

of espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapping and ca

rjac king. Following a sente ncing hearing, B ailey was sente nced to c onsecutive
s en t en ce s o f t we n ty
- e i g h ty e ar s f o r e s p e c i a l l y

a g g r a v a t e d k i d n ap p i n g a n d t w e l v e y e ar s f o r c ar j a c ki n g. On appe al, Bailey raises the following issues: (1) whe ther the e vidence was suff icient to support the verdic ts; (2) whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in allowing the introduction of undisclosed e vidence ; (3) whether the trial court err ed in allowing the S tate to pre sent evidenc e of his drug possession at the time of his a

rre st; (4) whether

Bailey ’s sentenc es violate Blakely v. W ashington ; and (5) whether the cumulative er

rors re quire a

new tria l. After revie w of the record, we conclude t hat i ssues (1), ( 2), (4 ), a nd(5 ) a

re wi tho ut m e ri t. Wi th reg ard to is su e (3 ), we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in admitting the e vidence but conclude that the err or wa s harmless. Ac cording ly , the judg ment of the trial court is af

firmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and J. C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

C

. A n n e T i p t o n , M e m p h i s , T e n n e s s e e , A t t o r n e y f o r t h e A p p e l l a n t , R a ym o n d B a i l e y.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Rache l E . Wil lis , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Be tsy

Carnesa le, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.-2- OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On Octobe r 11, 2001, at a pproxi mately

9:30 p.m., Bev er ly

Grice dropped of

f her
a c qu a int a nc e “ Mo okie ” Go lst e in at a bu s st op be tw e e n Came li a and S ome rv ill e on Crump in Memphis. As Golstein stood o u t s i d e t h e opened passeng er door thanking Grice for the ride, the Appellant ran dow n a hill beside the c ar and jumped inside. The Appe llant held a g un to Grice ’s neck and s houted, “Bitch, drive.” The victim drove approxim ately fifty to seventy -five f eet be fore sto pp ing he r v e hic le a t a

re d li g ht. At

that po int , th e Ap pe lla nt o rd e re d th e vic tim to p a ss h e r p ur se to him and turn on the in t er i o r l i g hts. The victim nervously strug g led to turn on the lig hts and eventua lly pulled down t he passeng er side sun visor, which ac tivated a lig ht on the visor. Whil e the Appellant wa s rummag ing thr oug h Grice ’s purse w ith the gun on his left leg , the victim attempted to gr ab the g un, and a strug g le ensued. The victim then jumped out of the c ar and ran throug h L amar Terr ace Apartments to a store and called 9-1-1. Grice described the per petrator as a f

ive foot four inch tall black male around twe nty -four y ear s old with gold tee th.
Memph is Po li c e O f

f ic e r F e li c ia Sh ip arr iv e d a t th e s c e n e a t ap p r o xim a te ly 9 :5 0 p

. m. and sp ok e wi th the vic tim

. Gric e de sc ri be d the pe rp e tr a tor a s a fi ve fo ot thr e e inc he s ta ll, tw e nty -o ne to twenty -five y ear s old, medium complecte d black male, weig hing 150 pounds. She advised that he
was we aring a hooded ja cket a nd blue jeans and had four g old teeth.

Severa l day s later Grice’ s wre cked 1998 Oldsmobile I ntrig ue wa s rec overe d and impounded for f inge rprinting

. No print s of value wer e li fted from the vehicle. After reg aining possession of her vehicle, a cell phone w as found in t h e car, which she took to Serg eant Pea rlman. The phone ’s
owner ship was trac ed to Will iam I som. I som c ould not ex plain why his phone was inside Grice’ s c a r a n d c l a i m e d t h a th i s p h o n e h a d b e e n s t o l e n i n a r o b b e r y t h e w e e k

b e f o r e

. S u b s e q u e n t l y, Pe arl ma n in c lud e d a

pic tur e of

I so m in a

ph oto sp re a d p re se nte d to t he vi cti m, an d th e vic tim confirme d that the ca

rjac ker’ s photogr aph wa s not included in the photosprea d.

Grice saw he r assa i l an t s ev er al weeks afte r the c arja cking when she was picking up her g oddaug hter at the home of Stella Wells, the gir l’s g randmother

. That nig ht she attempted to conta ct Serg eant Joseph Pearlman, who w as the off icer with the Robbery

Burea u o f t h e Memphis Police Depa rtment assig ned to her

case , but Pearlman’ s office was closed. On t he following Monday , Grice
me t w ithPe arl ma n a ndtol d h im that sh e c ould arran ge for h e r a ssaila nt t o c ome to We lls ’ h ome ag ain. On Nove mber 1, 2001, Ser gea n t P earlman waited in his ca r in the housing projec t where Wells l ived, and a

pprehe nded the Appe llant as he enter ed Wells’ home, and tra nsported him to 201 Poplar for que stioning. Pearlman took Polaroid photos of t he Appellant, and the victim indicated that the Appellant was indeed her assailant by writing on the photo, “ this is the g uy that car jacke d me.”

At tr ia l, the vic tim de sc ri be d h e r a ssaila nt a s a bla c k man w ithda

rk skin, tr imm e d f

a c ia l hair along his jaw l i n e, a l o w h ai rcut, and at least four g old teeth. She testified that on Nove mber 1,-3-

20 01 , h e wa s w e ari ng a

lig ht c olo re d c a mou fl a g e sw e a tsh irt w itha ho od wh ic h he re mov e d f ro m hi s head a fter e ntering her car

. She subsequently identified the Appellant in the courtroom, stating that she rec og nized his fac e and his voic e althoug h he had g ained weig ht and no longe r had g old teeth.

A ttr i a l , t h e A p p e l l a n tr e l i e d u p o n t h e d e f e n s e o f a l i b i ; h o w e v e r , h e c h o s e n o tt o t e s t i f y. Roderick Ale x ander , the Appellant’ s cousin, testified t hat he was with t he Appe llant at the home of Marvin Owe ns and Stephanie Evans from ar ound 4:00 p.m. until at least midnig ht on October 11, 2001, while re pairing the Appellant’ s Cadillac. Owe ns and Evans c onfirmed that the A ppellant was prese nt at their home during this ti me period.
The jury returne d g uiltyverdic ts of esp ec i al l yag g ravated kidnapping and ca rjac king a s i n d i c t e d

. F o l l o w i n g a

s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g , t h e tr i a l c o u r ti m p o s e d c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s o f t w e n t yeig ht y ear s for e specia lly ag g ravated kidnapping and twelve y ear s for c arja cking. T h is appea l followed.

Ana lys is

I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence The Appe llant arg ues t

h at the evidenc e in this case w as insufficie nt to support his convictions beca use the State failed to prove his identity as the pe rp et ra tor. We apply the rule that where the sufficie ncy

of evide nce is c halleng ed, the r eleva nt question for the re viewing court is “whe ther, a fter viewing the evidenc e in the light most favora ble to the [S tate], any rational trier of fa ct could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 33 U. S. 30 7, 31 9, 99 S. Ct . 2 78 1, 27 89 (1979 ); se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) . The scope of our examination of the evidenc e is not equivalent to that of the jury ’s. I n a cha lleng e to the suff iciency of the e v id e n c e , th is c o u r t d o e s n o t r e try th e d e f e n d a n t. We e mp h a s iz e th a t o u r e xa mi n a ti o n in a sufficie ncy

revie w is not to revisit i n co n sistent, contradicting , implausible, or non-cr edible proof , as t hese issues are resolved solely by the j ury

. See State v . Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Rather , we look to the re cord to de termine whe ther ther e wa s substantive probative e vidence to support the verdic t. The sec ond inquiry , the question of leg al suffic iency , then follows: whether the re cord c ontains evidenc e fr om which the jury could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a rea sonable doubt. Every rea sonable hypothesis of innocenc e nee d not be dispelled; it i s o nly ne c e ssa ry that th e re e xists proof whi ch su pp orts the e le me nts of the c ri me . T he State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable infe renc es which may be draw n there from. Sta te v . H ar ris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . All questions involvi ng the
cre dibilit y of witnesses, the weig ht and value to be g iven to the evidenc e, and a ll factua l issues are resolved by

the trier of

fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.
T h e Ap p el l ant ar g ues that the only direc t evidence connec ting him with the crimes is the victim’s ey e-w itness identification, which he asserts is unreliable

. He c ontends that, althoug h the phy sical desc riptions of the Appellant g iven by the vi ctim to the 9-1-1 operator and the r esponding police off icer are virtually

the same, the y

differ signific antly

from the g ener al appe arance of the-4-

Appellant both upon his a rre st and at trial. I n her initial re ports, the victim described he r assa ilant as being five fe et three in ch es t o fi v e feet four inches tall, twenty -one to twe nty -five y ear s old, approximately 150 pounds in weig ht, and having gold teeth. At trial, the information fr om police
rec ords at the time of his ar rest re flec ts that the Appellant was five fee t e ight inche s tall, weig hed 185 po un ds , w a s th irty -t wo y e ars old , a ndhad no gold te e th. Se rg e a nt P e arl ma n te sti fi e d th a t it is commonly known t hat “many times people have caps, g old teeth caps, that they can just t ake in a nd
ou t.” Th e re c or d re fl e c ts that the vic tim po sit ive ly ide nti fi e d the Ap pe lla nt on th ree s epar a te
occas io ns : a t th e tim e of his a rr e st, a t th e pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng , a nda t tria l. A t tria l, the vic tim admitted that the incident occ urre d at nig ht and that there was li ttle lighting

. She stated, howe ver, sh e “ g ot a ve ry g oo d lo ok ” a t th e Ap pe lla nt’ s f a c e fo r “ se c on ds .” Th e Ap pe lla nt te sti fi e d that de sp ite the fa ct that the Appe llant no longe r had g old teeth, she recog nized the Appellant as the pe rpetrator “immediately ” upon seeing him at the home of Stella Wells by “that voice and then that fa ce. Like I said, I will never f

org et that fac e.” During cross-e x amination, the victim r emained steadfa st in he r po sit ive ide nti fi c a tio n o f the Ap pe lla nt a s h e r a ssaila nt. The jury resolves que stions of fact r eg arding the identification of a defendant as the person who committed t h e cr i m e fo r which he is on trial. State v. Strickland , 885 S.W .2d 85, 87 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . Cr awf or d , 635 S.W .2d 704, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) ). The testimonyof a victim a lone is sufficient to establish identity

. State v. W illiams , 623 S.W .2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) . “Inconsiste n c y , in a c cura cy and omissions in t he desc ription of a def endant by a wi tne ss w ho is o the rw ise able to pos iti ve ly ide nti fy the de fe nd a nt ar e qu e sti on s for the jury in determining th e we i gh t to be g iven the testimony .” State v. Radley , 29 S.W .3d 532, 537 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). We w ill no t a lte r a jury ve rd ic t un le ss the ina c c ur a c ie s o r inc on sis te nc ie s a re so improbable or unsat i s fa ct o ry as to cre ate a rea sonable doubt of the a ppellant’s g uilt. Id . By returning a g uiltyverdic t, the jury in this case conc luded that the Appe llant was indee d the per son wh o c omm itt e d the cri me s. Th e vic tim ’s te sti mon y is n ot s o u ns a tis fa c tory

or imp ro ba ble a s to
c re a te a re a so na ble do ub t a s to the Ap pe lla nt’ s g uil t. T he re fo re , we fi ndthe e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o convict the Appe llant of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping and ca rjac king.

II. Undi sclosed Evid ence Next, the Appellant contends that the tria l court er red in p er m i t t i n g the introduction of undisclosed evidenc e. At trial, Reginald Grice, the husband of the victim, testified that whe n the Appell an t was be ing e scorted into the c ourtroom at the g ener al sessions preliminary hearing, the Appellant made ey e contac t w ith his wife and moved his hand acr oss his throat in a slashing motion. Deputy D a v id M a y s te s ti f ie d , “ I b r o u g h t M r

. B a il e y in to th e h o ld in g ar e a in s id e th e c o u r tr oom. I noticed he w as making mot i o n s o u t i n to the crow d, out into the audience at someone in the audienc e.” H aving detec ted this action, May s testified that he told the Appe llant to stop, but seve ral min ute s late r, the Ap pe lla nt a g a in ma de the mot ion a c ro ss his thr oat, this tim e “ mou thi ng the wo rd s, I ’ll kill y ou.” May s stated he immediately escorted the Appellant to a holding c ell in the back of the courtroom. The Appellant’s thre aten i n g ac t i o n s resulted in a motion to incre ase bond at the preliminary

hearing, w hich was g rante d.-5-

During motion hearing s on the morni n g of the sche duled trial, the State informed the Appellant of its intent to introduce proof of t he Appellant’s threatening g estures at the preliminary hearing. After

hearing a narr ation of the e vidence soug ht to be introduced, the trial court f ound the pr of fe re d e vid e nc e re le va nt to the iss ue s of ide nti fi c a tio n a nd a s a thr e a t or int imi datio n o f a

wi tne ss. I n g ranting its admissi on, the trial court instructed that def ense c ounsel would be g iven the op po rtun ity

to i nte rv ie w b othRe g ina ld G ri c e a ndMa y s b e fo re the State c a lle d the m a s w itn e sse s. The Appe llant’s challeng e to the introduction of the t hreatening g esture e vidence is two-fold. First, he contends that its introduction violated Rule 16, Tenn. R. Crim. P., and Brady v. M aryland , 37 3 U .S. 83 , 8 3 S. Ct. 11 94 (1 96 8) . Ru le 16 pr ov ide s: Upon re quest of a defe ndant the State shall permit the def endant to inspec t and copy
or ph oto g ra ph : . . . the s ubstanc e of

a ny or a l st a te me nt w hic h th e State int e nd s to of fe r in ev ide nc e a t the tr ia l mad e by the de fe nd a nt w he the r b e fo re or a ft e r a rr e st in response to interrogations by any person then kno w n t o t h e defendant to be a law enforce ment officer

. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (A) ( emphasis adde d).

B e c aus e ne ith e r the state me nt “ I ’l l ki ll y ou ” no r the thre a te nin g g e stu re s w e re ma de in response to interrog ations by a law enforc ement off

icer , they are not gove rned by

Rule 16. I ndeed, Rule 16(a) (2) spe cifica lly provides that stateme nts to state witnesses are not subject to disclosure throug h pretria l discovery

. Moreove r, the Appellant’s a rg ument of a

Brady vio la tio n f

a ils be c aus e Brady require s only

the disclosu re of

exculpatory

evidenc e, i.e. , evidenc e tending to establish a criminal def

endant’ s innocenc e. Brady , 373 U.S. 83 at 87, 83 S. Ct

. 1196-97. He re, the evidenc e is i n cu l p at o ry , as it ref

lects the Appe llant’s intimi dation of a w itness’ prosec ution of the ca se and ide nti fi c a tio n o f the Ap pe lla nt.

In his seco n d ch al l en ge, t h e A p p el l an tco n t en d s t h att h e e v i d en ce wa s erro n eo u s l y i n tro d u ced

“ thr ou g h w itnesse s u nd isc los e d to the de fe ns e .” Al tho ug h n o s pe c if ic dis c ov e ry

ru le or statut e is identified by

the Appellant a s a basis for his arg ument, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated s e c ti o n4 0-17-106 (200 3 ) go v er n s “the duty of the district attorne y g ener al to endorse on eac h indictment or prese ntment, at the term at which the same is found, the names of such witnesses as the district attorney g ener al intends shall be summoned in the cause, and sig n such indictment or pre sentment name ther eto.” How ever , this dutyis directory and does not in and of i tself disqualify a witness fr om testify ing. Se e Sta te v . H ar ris , 839 S.W .2d at 69. Relief is re qu i re d only upon a showing of prejudice , bad faith, or undue advantag e. Id

. I n this case , the Appellant cannot c laim surprise, as he wa s the party

responsible for the t hreatening g esture at the pre liminary hearing. Mor eover , the g esture was rec orded as a re sult of a hea ring for a n incre ase in the A ppellant’s bond. Althoug h the State failed to c omply

with the provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-17-106, we conclude that the trial court’s fashioned r emedy , in the absenc e of any showing of bad f aith on the part of the State, did not require e x clusion of the witnesses.T he A p p el l ant was never i nd i ct ed or charged fo r drug po ss ess i o n. 1

-6- III. Evid ence of Other Cr im es The Appe llant cont en d s t h at the trial court improperly admitted evidenc e, in violation of Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) , tha t he pos se sse d 2.4 g rams of c ra c k co c a ine a t the tim e of his
arr est three wee ks after

the offe nse occ urre d. Serg eant Pea rlman testified that a fter the Appellant 1

was a rre sted on Novembe r 1, 2001, and w as wa iting alone in an interview room, a c amer a ca ptured him removing a bag containing 2.4 g rams of c rac k cocaine from his sock.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) pr ov ide s th a t:

Evidence of other c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts is not admissible to prove the c hara cter of
a p e r s o n i n o r d e r

t o s h o w a c t i o n i n c o n f

o r m i t y w i t h th e c h ar a c t e r tr a i t

. It m a y, howeve r, be admissible for other purposes. The conditions which must be satisfied before a l l o wi n g i n q u i ryo n cr o s s -e x am i n at i o n ab o u ts p ec i fi c i n s t an ce s of conduc t are : (1) The court upon re quest must hold a hearing outside the jury ' s prese nce; (2) The court must determine that a m at er i al i ssue exist s other than c onduct conform i n g wi t h a chara cter trait and must upon reque st state on the re cord the materia l issue, the ruling , and the r easons f or admitting the evidenc e; and
(3) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweig hed by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice.
Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). The court must als o determine that the def endant c ommitt ed the c rime by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. State v. Parton , 694 S.W .2d 299, 303 (Tenn. 1985)

. After conducting a hea

ring outside the prese nce of the jury , the t ri al co u rt found cle ar and convincing evidenc e of the Appellant’s possession of c rac k cocaine at the time of his ar rest and followed the pr ocedur e for admitting evide nce unde r Rule 404(b). The court c oncluded, “ I think that the jury wo uld be e nti tle d to c on sid e r the de fe nd a nt’ s dr ug us e s a s a

po ssi ble mo ti v e f

o r [c ar ja c k in g ]. So under those cir cumstance s, it’s - - admittedly it’s al m o s t a t i e. . . . I

rea lly can’ t say that the probative va lue is outweig hed. .

. . I ’m g oing to have to let it in.” Howe ver, the court instructe d the jury that it could c onsider this e vidence for motive only . Given that the tria l court followed pr oper pr oc e du ra l pr oto c ol i n it s d e te rm inatio n, we mus t g ive thi s d e c isi on g re a t de fe re nc e a ndon ly re ve rs e for a n abuse of

discretion. Sta te v . D ub os e , 953 S.W .2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997)

. Although Rule 404( b) bar s the admission of evide nce of prior crimes and wrong s to prove
c ha ra c te r, it d oe s a llo w s uc h e vid e nc e fo r o the r p ur po ses. Suc h p ur

po se s in c lud e mot ive , in te nt, identity , the abse nce of

mistake or ac ci d en t , o r t h e ex istence of a lar g er c ontinuing plan. State v. Gilliland , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 2 6 6 , 2 7 1 n

. 6 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Bu nc h v . S tate , 605 S.W .2d 227, 229 (Tenn.A s a R a n g e II o ff e n d e r, the A p p e llan t wa s se n te n c e d to twe n ty-eig h t yea rs fo r t h e c la ss A felo n y o f esp e c ia lly 2
agg r ava t ed ki dnappi ng an d w as s ent enc ed t o t wel ve y ear s for t he cl as s B f el ony of ca r j ack i ng

. T he pres umpt i ve s ent enc e fo r Ra nge II carjacki ng i s t welve y ears, a nd the p res um p t i ve m i ni m um for R ange II espec i al l y aggravat ed ki d nap p i ng i s 37. 5 y ear s , bei ng t he mi dp oi nt r ang e f or a cl as s A fel ony

. W e woul d agr ee t hat t hes e s ent enc es di d not vi ol at e B l akely.

-7- 1980)). Clea

rly , the Appellant’s involvement in the car jacking and kidnapping did not arise fr om the same c riminal episode a s h is p o s s e s s io n o f c r a c k c o c a in e , w h ic h o c c u rr e d th r e e w e e k s late r

. We conclude that the t rial court’s admission of t his evidenc e to prove moti ve is speculative at best. Our
ex amination of the re cord r evea ls no direct or indire ct evidenc e that the Appe llant committed the offe nses to obtain drug funds. Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the admission of drug possession wa s err or.
Violation of a rule of evide nce may not require reve rsal if the err or "was more probably than
no t h arm les s. " State v. Jam es , 81 S.W .3d 751, 763 (Tenn. 2 0 0 2). This court will not reve rse a conviction “e x cept f

or er rors whic h aff

irmatively

appea r to ha ve aff

ecte d the result of the trial on the
me ri ts. ” Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 52(a). We e va luate e rr or in l ig ht o f a ll o the r p ro of int ro du c e d at tria l. Sta te v . M

all ar d , 40 S.W .3d 473, 489 (Tenn. 2001)

. Our re view of the rec ord establishes that the evidenc e in this case w as more tha n sufficie nt to support a g uiltyverdic t without testi mony conce rning t h e Ap p ell ant’s drug possession. We conclude that the e videntiary err or did not aff irmatively

aff ect the outc ome of the tria l on the merits.

IV . Se nt e nc ing
The Appe llant arg ues that the trial court’s imposit ion of enha nced se ntence s and imposition of c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c e s v io late h is Si xth A me n d me n t r ig h t to tria l b y ju r y a s r e c o g nized by the Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. _____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). At oral arg ument, the Appellant withdrew his challeng e to the l eng th of hi s sentence s under Bl ake ly be c aus e t h e s e n t e n c e s i m p o s e d w e r e l e s s t h a n t h e “ s t a t u t o ry m a x i m u m ” a s d e f i n e d b y Bl ake ly

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 2 we limit our review to the challeng ed im position of consecutive se ntence s under Bl ake ly . First, we would note that this issue is waived bec ause it wa s not r ai s ed b y the Appellant at the sentenc ing hearing. See State v. Edwin Gomez and J onathan S. Londono , M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005), pet. for reh-g filed , (Apr. 20, 2005)

. Moreove r, our supreme court he ld in Gomez that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 does not violate the Six th Amendment g uarantee of a jury trial and wa s, thus, not affec ted by the Bl ake ly decision. Id . Ac c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

V. Cum ulative Error

L astly , the Appellant arg ues t hat the cumulation of e rror s require s reve rsal. This ar g ument
mus t f a il bec aus e we ha ve fo un d o nly on e e rr or , w hic h w e ha ve c on c lud e d w a s h arm le ss. Acc ording ly , we f

ind this i ssue without merit.-8- CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing r easons, the judgme nt of the Criminal Court of Shelby County is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE