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MARGARET PROFETTO v. CURTIS W. LOMBARDI

(AC 37756)

Gruendel, Alvord and Prescott, Js.*

Argued February 17—officially released April 19, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Britain, Hon. Lois Tanzer, judge trial referee.)

Curtis W. Lombardi, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Irving H. Perlmutter, with whom, on the brief, was

Andrew M. Ullman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Curtis W. Lombardi,

appeals from the trial court’s judgment of foreclosure

by sale of a judgment lien that had been placed on the

defendant’s residential property by the plaintiff, Margaret Profetto.1 The purpose of the judgment lien was to

secure the order of the court, Burke, J., contained in

the parties’ dissolution judgment, that required the

defendant to pay the plaintiff $72,172.31 plus interest

at the rate of 6 percent from the date of that judgment.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court should

have concluded that the foreclosure of a judgment lien

was ‘‘not the appropriate vehicle to enforce a family

support judgment’’ in a dissolution action. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The court dissolved the parties’

three year marriage on October 4, 2013. In the judgment

of dissolution, the court concluded that an award of

alimony to either party was not appropriate due to the

relatively short duration of the marriage. There were

no children issue of the marriage. The court entered

orders with respect to, inter alia, the parties’ personal

property and their responsibility for existing debts. The

court also entered the following order regarding the

defendant’s obligation to repay the plaintiff for certain

loans she had made to him during the marriage, as

evidenced by promissory notes: ‘‘[T]he [defendant] shall

transfer to the [plaintiff] the amount of $72,172.31 with

postjudgment interest of six (6%) percent accruing as

of the date of this judgment . . . .’’

On October 23, 2013, to secure the payment of that

judgment, the plaintiff filed in the land records a certificate of judgment lien against the defendant’s real property located at 106 Treble Road in Bristol.2 The property

is the defendant’s residence. Because the judgment had

not been paid in whole or in part, the plaintiff commenced the present foreclosure action on December 5,

2013. Although the defendant did not file a motion to

dismiss the action, the court, Hon. Lois Tanzer, judge

trialreferee, acknowledged and addressed his challenge

to the court’s jurisdiction over the foreclosure action

in a memorandum of decision issued on February 18,

2015. The defendant had claimed that the foreclosure of

a judgment lien was permitted for ‘‘money judgments’’

only, and that the court’s order in the dissolution judgment was not a ‘‘money judgment.’’3 The court determined that the order at issue was not alimony or any

other type of ‘‘family support judgment,’’4 but, rather,

was a judgment for a sum certain5 with interest and

therefore a ‘‘money judgment.’’ Accordingly, the court

concluded that the judgment could be enforced by the

foreclosure of a judgment lien pursuant to General Statutes § 52-350f,6

that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the parties’ controversy, and that the trial
was to continue as scheduled. Following a two day trial,

the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on

March 5, 2015, and ordered a foreclosure by sale of the

judgment lien. This appeal followed.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the court’s

order in the dissolution judgment that required the

defendant to pay the plaintiff $72,172.31 plus interest

was a money judgment subject to enforcement by the

foreclosure of a judgment lien, or a family support judgment that was not subject to enforcement pursuant to

the postjudgment procedures detailed in chapter 906

of the General Statutes. The trial court concluded that

the order requiring the repayment of $72,172.31 plus

interest, which was a debt that arose from loans made

between the parties during the marriage, was a money

judgment and not a family support judgment. We agree.

The defendant’s claim on appeal is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that raises a matter of statutory

interpretation. See LoRicco Towers Condominium

Assn. v. Patani, 90 Conn. App. 43, 48–49, 876 A.2d 1211,

cert. denied, 276 Conn. 925, 888 A.3d 93 (2005). ‘‘Issues

of statutory construction raise questions of law, over

which we exercise plenary review. . . . The process

of statutory interpretation involves the determination

of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to

the facts of the case, including the question of whether

the language does so apply.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut,

Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838,

847, 937 A.2d 39 (2008).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that

meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship

to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is

plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or

unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Alvord Investment, LLC v.

Zoning Board of Appeals, 282 Conn. 393, 401–402, 920

A.2d 1000 (2007). ‘‘The test to determine ambiguity is

whetherthe statute, when read in context, is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Alexson v. Foss, 276 Conn.

599, 605, 887 A.2d 872 (2006).

In the present case, the judgment of dissolution contained no orders for alimony or child support. A money

judgment may be enforced by postjudgment procedures, including the foreclosure of a judgment lien.

See General Statutes §§ 52-350f and 52-380a. A money

judgment is defined as an order for the payment of a

sum of money, but expressly excludes a family support

judgment. See General Statutes § 52-350a (13). A family
support judgment is an order for payment of a legal

obligation for support or alimony to a spouse or former

spouse or child. See General Statutes § 52-350a (7). The

relevant statutes are clear and unambiguous, and the

court’s order for the defendant to repay a loan made

by the plaintiff to the defendant during the marriage

falls squarely within the definition of a money judgment

and outside the definition of a family support judgment.7

The plaintiff is not constrained, as argued by the

defendant, to seek enforcement of the court’s order in

this case through postjudgment motions filed in the

parties’ dissolution action. The fact that a court’s ruling

is issued during the course of a dissolution proceeding

does not automatically make such a ruling a family

support judgment. In Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn. App. 718,

719, 546 A.2d 329 (1988), the parties argued as to

whether postjudgment interest could be awarded on

the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.

The plaintiff claimed that those proceeds ‘‘derived from

a family judgment’’ and, therefore, were not subject

to postjudgment procedures. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 720. The defendant claimed that the order

constituted a money judgment. This court held: ‘‘It is

apparent that an order for the payment of money from

the sale of real estate constitutes a ‘money judgment’

and not a ‘family support judgment,’ as those terms are

defined, despite the judgment’s origin in an action on

the family docket. One party cannot, at its whim,

deprive another of monies due and owing simply by

changing the characterization of the obligation owed.

While similarities exist between support payments and

property settlements, we recognize that each serves a

distinct purpose. Support, which is generally modifiable, often serves to satisfy an ongoing obligation,

whereas a property settlement constitutes a finalresolution of a dispute, and as such, warrants the penalty of

interest when satisfaction is not obtained. We therefore

conclude that the trial court properly ordered that postjudgment interest be paid.’’ Id., 720–21.

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that it

had jurisdiction over the present action to foreclose a

judgment lien.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded

for the purpose of setting a new sale date.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 The plaintiff was formerly known as Margaret P. Lombardi.

2 General Statutes § 52-380a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A judgment

lien, securing the unpaid amount of any money judgment, including interest

and costs, may be placed on any real property by recording, in the town

clerk’s office in the town where the real property lies, a judgment lien

certificate . . . .

‘‘(c) A judgment lien on real property may be foreclosed or redeemed in

the same manner as mortgages on the same property. . . .’’

3 General Statutes § 52-350a (13), which is in chapter 906 titled ‘‘Postjudgment Procedures,’’ defines a money judgment in relevant part as ‘‘a judgment,

order or decree of the court calling in whole or in part for the payment of
a sum of money, other than a family support judgment. . . .’’

4 General Statutes § 52-350a (7) defines a family support judgment as ‘‘a

judgment, order or decree of the Superior Court or a family support magistrate for payment of a legal obligation for support or alimony to a spouse,

former spouse or child and includes any such order for periodic payments

whether issued pendente lite or otherwise.’’

5 A ‘‘money judgment’’ for chapter 906 purposes must be a sum certain.

See Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn. App. 79, 92 n.9, 78 A.3d 860 (2013).

6 General Statutes § 52-350f provides: ‘‘A money judgment may be enforced

against any property of the judgment debtor unless the property is exempt

from application to the satisfaction of the judgment under section 52-352a,

52-352b, 52-352d or 52-361a or any other provision of the general statutes

or federal law. The money judgment may be enforced, by execution or by

foreclosure of a real property lien, to the amount of the money judgment

with (1) all statutory costs and fees as provided by the general statutes, (2)

interest as provided by chapter 673 on the money judgment and on the costs

incurred in obtaining the judgment, and (3) any attorney’s fees allowed

pursuant to section 52-400c.’’

7 The defendantrelies on two cases to support his argument that a proceeding to foreclose a judgment lien is not available to enforce an order contained

in a judgment of dissolution. The first case he cites is Scott v. Scott, Superior

Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. FA-09-4111226-S (May

7, 2014) (58 Conn. L. Rptr. 172). This court is not bound by the holdings in

Superior Court decisions, and, moreover, we do not find that case persuasive.

The second case cited by the defendant is Kupersmith v. Kupersmith,

146 Conn. App. 79, 78 A.3d 860 (2013). Kupersmith is not applicable to the

facts of this case. In Kupersmith, this court held that a writ of execution

was a permissible postjudgment procedure to enforce the monetary terms

of a postdissolution stipulation pertaining to a child support arrearage. Id.,

86. The defendant claims that Kupersmith limits such remedies to child

support arrearages only. We did not limit our holding as argued by the

defendant, and, furthermore, we allowed the enforcement through chapter

906 postjudgment procedures even though the court-approved stipulation

was a family support judgment for a sum certain rather than a money

judgment. Id., 92.