* The Honorable John C. Godbold, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation

. PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/24/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

____________ PUEBLO OF SAN ILDEFONSO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 95-2197 DANIEL RIDLON and REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. CIV 93-1467)

____________ Peter C. Chestnut, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Pla intiff-Appellant. Stephen D. Aarons, Santa Fe, New Mexico for Defenda nts-Appellees.

____________ Before TACHA, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD * and HOLLOWAY, Senior Circuit Judges.

____________-2-

GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Pueblo of San Ildefonso (“Pueblo”), a federally r ecognized Indian tribe, filed an action under 25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013, the Na tive American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), to secu re the return of a piece of Native American pottery from Appellees Daniel Ridlo n and the Regents of the University of California. On cross-motions for sum mary judgment the District Court construed Ridlon’s motion as a motion to dism iss for want of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the Pueblo’s action purs uant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). We vacate the judgment of the district court.

I. Factual Background In 1978 twelve-year old Daniel Ridlon discovered a piece of Native American pottery while hiking on property owned by Los Alamos County, New Mexico. The pottery consists of two ancient bowls s ealed together that contain a bundle of macaw feathers tied with yucca twine. Sh ortly after his discovery Ridlon turned the pottery over to the Bradbury Muse um, a federally-funded museum operated by the Regents of the University of California. The Museum has continually possessed and displayed the pottery since shortly after its discovery in 1978. In 1988 the Museum refused Ridlon’s demands for ret urn of the pottery and Ridlon successfully sued the Museum and Los Alamos County in New Mexico-3-

state court for conversion. See Opinion of the Federal District Court, No. 93- 1467, at 2 (D.N.M. Sept. 14, 1995). However, the s tate court vacated its judgment and allowed the Pueblo to intervene assert ing a right to repatriation of the pottery under NAGPRA. Id . Los Alamos County subsequently assigned its rights in the pottery to the Pueblo. The state cour t concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the NAGPRA claim and dismissed th e action without prejudice. Id

. Thereafter the Pueblo filed the present action seek ing repatriation under NAGPRA, protection of its property interest under t he Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, and declaratory relief pursuant to the Dec laratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The U.S. District Court, D.N.M., dis missed the action, finding that neither NAGPRA nor the treaty provided an adequate basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id . at 4. The court also declined to exercise supple mental jurisdiction over the parties’ state law ownership claims. Id . at 6. Because resolution of the NAGPRA issue is determinative of this matter, we do not reach the Pueblo’s other grounds for appeal. We exercise subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and NAGPRA’s jurisdictional and repatriation provisions , 25 U.S.C. §§ 3013 and 3005(a) respectively. Section 3013 vests federal courts with jurisdiction over “any action brought by any person alleging a violat ion of this chapter.” The Pueblo claims a violation of NAGPRA’s repatriation provision, § 3005(a), which1 Section 3001(8) defines “museum” as “any institution or State or local government

agency (including any institution of higher learning) that receives federal funds a nd has possession of, or control over, Native American cultural items.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(8)(1990).

2An item of cultural patrimony is “an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have been considered inalienable by such Native American group at the time the object was separated from such group.” 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D). -4- applies to “Native American human remains and objec ts possessed or controlled by Federal agencies and museums.” Since the Bradbu ry Museum is a “museum” as defined by NAGPRA 1 and has possessed and controlled the pottery since shortly after its discovery, the district court has a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the Pueblo’s repatriation claim.

II. Native American Graves Protection & Repatriation Act Enacted in 1990, NAGPRA safeguards the rights of Native Americans by protecting tribal burial sites and rights to items of cultural significance to Native Americans. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1995). Cultural items protected under NAGPRA include Native American human remains, funer ary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony. 2 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(1990). The Pueblo asserts that the pottery is an object of cul tural patrimony and that the Regents had no right to possession of the pottery u nder NAGPRA. Brief of the-5-

Pueblo at 6. NAGPRA has two distinct schemes governing the retur n of Native American cultural items to tribes, with the analysi s turning upon whether the item is presently held by a federal agency or museum or is discovered on federal lands after November 16, 1990, NAGPRA’s effective date. First, the Act addresses items excavated on federal lands after November 16, 1990 and enables Native American groups affiliated with those items to clai m ownership. See 43 C.F.R. § 10.1 (1995); H.R. Rep. No. 101-877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368. Second, NAGPRA provi des for repatriation of cultural items currently held by federal agencies, including federally-funded museums. Id

. The parties dispute the applicability of NAGPRA. Th e district court found that the Pueblo’s claim fell short of providing an adequate basis of subject matter jurisdiction. Op. of the Dist. Ct. at 4. The court relied upon NAGPRA’s ownership provision which limits the effect of thatsection to “. . . Native American cultural items which are excavated or disc overed on Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990 . . .” Id . (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)). Since “[t]he pottery at issue was discovered priorto the enactment of the NAGPRA on land owned by a county, notthe federal government or an Indian tribe,” the di strict court held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismisse d the case. Id

. On appeal the Pueblo contends that the district cou rt’s reliance on the-6-

ownership provision was misplaced because the Puebl o brought its claim under NAGPRA’s repatriation provisions, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3004 and 3005, which are not limited to items found on federal lands after Novem ber 16, 1990. Brief of the Pueblo at 7. NAGPRA requires repatriation of items of cultural patrimony that are presently in the possession or control of feder ally-funded museums provided other requirements of repatriation are met. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3004, 3005 (1990). The Pueblo asserts that NAGPRA’s express statutory language, administrative regulations and legislative history support the conclusion that the Pueblo’s claim for repatriation of the pottery fall s within the purview of NAGPRA and does provide a basis for federal subjectmatter jurisdiction. We agree and, therefore, vacate the judgment of the di strict court. A. Statutory Language As a preliminary matter, we note that by § 3013, NA GPRA explicitly vests jurisdiction in federal courts: The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by any person alleging a violation of this chapter [NAGPRA] and shall have the authority to issue such orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this chap ter. 25 U.S.C. § 3013 (1990). The Pueblo sought repatriation of the pottery pursu ant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 3004 and 3005, which address repatriation of objects pre sently in the possession or control of federal agencies, including federally-fu nded museums like the-7-

Bradbury Museum. Nothing in the express language o f these sections indicates that repatriation is limited by when or where the o bject subject to repatriation was found. Where statutory language is clear and unambi guous, that language is controlling and courts should not add to that langu age. U.S. v. Thompson , 941 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1991); Aulston v. U.S. , 915 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied , 500 U.S. 916 (1991). The language of the repatri ation section supports federal subject matter jurisdiction in thi s case. First, 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a) entitled “Repatriation o f Native American human remains and objects possessed or controlled by Fede ral agencies and museums,” provides
If, pursuant to § 3004 of this title, the cultural affiliation with a particular Indian tribe . . . is shown with respect to . . . objects of cultural patrimony, then the Federal agency or museum, upon the request of the Indian tribe . . . and pursuan t to subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section, shall expeditiously return such objects. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(2)(1990). As the title of § 30 05 indicates, repatriation applies to items presently in possession of federal ly-funded museums, including items possessed on November 16, 1990, NAGPRA’s effe ctive date. Unlike the restrictive ownership provision, nowhere does the l anguage of this section suggest that repatriation is limited to post-November 16, 1 990 excavations on federal lands. Although the district court correctly concl uded that NAGPRA’s ownership-8-

provision only applies to items found after Novembe r 16, 1990 on federal lands, the court should not have imposed date and location restrictions on repatriation where nothing in NAGPRA’s statutory scheme or langu age requires such limitations. Second, the only section of the Act that expressly contains a limiting date is the ownership section, § 3002, which relates only t o items excavated or discovered on federal lands after November 16, 1990 . The district court concluded that, because the pottery was discovered in 1978 on non-federal land, the ownership provision did not apply to the pottery. However, the Pueblo did not sue under the ownership section. The Pueblo sued u nder § 3005, claiming a right of repatriation of the pottery. Because NAGPRA’s e xpress language does not limit repatriation to items found after November 16 , 1990, NAGPRA applies to the Pueblo’s repatriation claim as a matter of law. B. Administrative Interpretations Administrative interpretations support the Pueblo’s contention that repatriation is not limited by when a Native Americ an object was found. First, regulations issued to carry out the provisions of N AGPRA distinguish between ownership and repatriation. “An administrative age ncy’s interpretation of a statute which the agency is entrusted to administer is entitled to considerable deference by a reviewing court.” Bernstein v. Sull ivan , 914 F.2d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1990).-9-

NAGPRA Regulations are subdivided into two distinctsubparts that separately address repatriation and ownership. Sub part B concerns the disposition of Native American items discovered or excavated, e ither inadvertently or intentionally, on federal lands after November 16, 1990. 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.3(a) & 10.4(a) (1995). Subpart C addresses repatriation o f Native American objects in possession of federal agencies and museums. 43 C.F. R. §§ 10.8 - 10.10 (1995). Regulations concerning repatriation do not contain a limiting date and, therefore, support the conclusion that the Pueblo stated a cla im under NAGPRA to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Conclusion We VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.