### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-17-00584- CV

William Ric hard Holms, Appellant

v. West Travis County P ubl ic Utility Age ncy and Don Rauschub er, A ppellees

F ROM CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 2 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CV- 17- 0036 01, H ONO RAB LE TO DD T. WO NG, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Wil liam Richard Holms appea ls the county court at law’s order g ranting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the West Travis County Public Utility Ag ency (WTCP UA) and dismiss ing Holms’s claims ag ainst WTCP UA wi t h prejudice

. We hold that g overnme ntal immunit y bars Holms’s claims ag ainst the WTCP UA.

BACK GR OUND 1

Holms seeks monetary damag es from WTCP UA, including a ref und for o v e r p a y me n ts ma d e d

u e to e xc e s s iv e w a

te r b il ls

. WT CP U A is th e p u b li c u ti li ty a g e n c y th a

t p r o v id e s r e ta il
water service to Holms’s residenc e. Af ter rec eiving normal water bills for over a y ear , Holms’s

We take the fac tual alleg ations in Holms’s pleading s as true for the limit ed purp ose of 1 t h i s ap peal, as the county court at law was require d to do in ruling on the plea to the jurisdic t i o n . See, e .g. , Texas De

p’t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).water bill incre ased to $401.63 in Aug ust 2015 and rema ined highe r than normal for sever al months.

Holms called WTCP UA to inquire about these bills, but never theless paid them in full. After Holms made sever al billing inquiries, Don Rauschuber , W T C P UA ’s g ener al manag er, visited Holms’s residenc e, examined the water meter, and had it repla ced with a new one. Acc ording to Holms, his
water bills returne d to normal there afte r, but Rauschuber indicated that no cre dit could be issued to Holms for the alleg ed over-billin g. Ho l m s initially complained to the P ublic Utility Commi ssion of Texas (PUC), but the PUC deter mined that it lacke d jurisdiction over the WTCP UA. The rec ord does not indicate whether Holms challeng ed the PUC’s deter mination nor whether he soug ht redr ess throug h the board of the WTCP UA, and there fore those issues are not befor e this Court. Holms did, howeve r, sue WTCP UA and Rauschuber asser ting three theories of liability : brea ch of contra ct, tort (alle g in g “ n e g li g e n c e a

n d n eg lige nt repr esenta tion,” misrepre sentation, neg lige nt misrepre sentation,
actua l fraud, c onstructive fr aud, and c ivil conspiracy ), and de ceptive tr ade pr actice s. 2
WTCP UA filed a plea to the jurisdiction asser ting g overnme ntal immunit y . Holms then filed an amende d petition, urg ing the same claims as his orig inal petition. The county court at law held a hear ing on the plea on Aug ust 15, 2017, and g rante d it two day s later, dismiss ing Holms’s claims ag ainst WTCP UA with prejudice

. On Aug ust 25, 2017, Holms filed a motion to rec onsider and motion for new trial. On that same date, without leave of court, Holms filed a second amende d petition adding a reque st for decla ratory judgme nt as well as claims under the Texas Constit ution’s

Rauschuber , who was not serve d with proce ss, has not appea red in this litigation and is not 2 part of this appe al. Our r eview is limited only to Holms’s claims ag ainst the WTCP UA. 2g

u a r a n te e s o f d u e p r o c e s s a

n d e q u a l p r o te c ti o n . O n Sep te mb e r 5 , 2 0 1 7 , H o lm s f il e d a th ir d a

me n d e d 3 petition, also without leave of court, adding a reque st for injunctive and equitable re l i ef and abandoning the dece ptive-trade -pra ctices alleg ation. On September 6, 2017, Holms pe rfe cted this

a p p e a l, in voking Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a) (8) (providing for interlocutor y revie w of an o rd er fr o m a county court at law that “g rants or denies a plea to the j urisdiction by a
g overnme ntal unit as that term is define d in Section 101.001”). I n two issues, Holms arg ues that 4
the county court at law err ed in (1) g ranting WTCP UA’s plea to the jurisdiction, and (2) dismiss ing his claims ag ainst WTCP UA with prejudice without allowing him an opportunity to amend to cure
any jurisdictional defe ct in his pleading s.

STANDARD OF REVIEW “Sovere ign immunit y and g o vernme ntal immunit y are rela ted common law doctrines protec ting the g overnme nt f rom suit.” Harris County v. Annab , 547 S.W .3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018) (citing Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman , 342 S.W .3d 54, 57–58 (Tex. 2011)). “Sovere i gn i mmunity protec ts the state and its various divisions, such as ag encie s and boards, from sui t and liability , wher eas g overnme ntal immunit y provides simil ar protec tion to t h e political subdivisions of the state, such as co u nties, cities, and school districts.” Norman , 342 S.W .3d at 57–58. “Gove rnmental immunit y has two components: immunit y from liability and immunit y from suit.” W est Travis Cty. Pub. Util. Agency v . Travis Cty. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 12 , 537 S.W .3d 549,

Holms’s second amende d petition also add ed an alleg ation of violation of implied 3 con t ra ct , which is functionally the s ame as his exis ting breac h-of- contra ct allega tion for purposes of our jurisdictional ana ly sis. “Gove rnmental unit” includes “a political subdivision of this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & 4 Rem. Code § 101.001(3)( B)

. 3553 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, p et

. d en i ed ) (citing Tooke v. City of Mex ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 332

(Tex. 2006) ). Gover

nmental “immunity

from liability

. . . bars enfor ceme nt of a judgme nt a g ainst

a g o v e r n me n ta l e n

ti ty , ” w h il e “ im

mu n it y f r o m s u it

. . . b a

r s s u it a g a in s t th e e n ti ty a lt o g e th e r . ” To o k e , 197 S.W .3d at 332. Be cause “immunity from suit defe ats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” it “is proper ly

asser ted in a plea

to the jurisdiction.” Texas Dep’t of Parks & W ildlif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 225–26 (Tex. 2004).

As subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we revie w order s on jurisdictional pleas de novo. Id

. at 226. “When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the pleading s,” as WTCP UA’s plea does here , “we deter mine if the plea d er h as alleg ed fac ts that aff irmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause .” Id

. “We construe th e p l eadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff[] and look to the pleade r’s intent.” Id

. “I f the pl ea d i n gs do not contain sufficie nt fac ts to aff

irmatively demo n s t rate the trial court’s jurisdiction but [also] do not aff irmatively demonstrate incura

ble defe cts in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficie ncy and the plaintiffs should be aff

orded the opportunity to a mend.” Id

. at 226–27 (citing County of Came ron

v. Brown , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)). “I f the pleading s aff irmatively neg ate the exis tence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity

to amend.” Id . at 227.

ANALYSIS
I. Holms asserts that the trial court had jurisdiction over his claims beca use (1)
WTCP UA is not a g overnme ntal entity entitled to immunit y ; (2 ) W T C P UA’s enabling statute is

4silent as to immunit y and thus immunit y is waived; (3) various statutory waiver s of immunit y apply

to WTCP UA; (4) WTCP UA is being sued for “propr ietary ” functions to which immunit y does not apply ; (5) WTCP UA is permitted to sue its customers and, there fore , customers should be permitted
to s u e WTCP UA; and (6) dismiss ing his claims ag ainst WTCP UA violates Holms’s due-pr ocess and equal- protec tion rig hts. Be cause none of these arg uments support a waiver of WTCP UA’s immunit y on the fac ts alleg ed, we overr ule Holms’s first issue. E.g. , Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227.
A “[p] laintiff bear s the burden to aff irmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction by alleg ing a valid waiver of immunit y , which may be either by ref ere nce to a statute or
to express leg islative permission.” McCandless v. Pasadena I n d e p
. S c h

. D is t. , N o . 0 3

- 0 9

- 0 0 2 4 9

- CV,
2010 WL 1253581, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 2, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Texas Dep’ t of Transp. v. Jones , 8 S.W .3d 636, 637 (Tex. 1999)). Under the doctrine of sovere ign immunit y , “no
state can be sued in her own courts without her consent, and then onl y in the m anner indicated by that consent.” Hosner v. DeYoung , 1 Tex. 764, 769 (1847). Conseque ntly , “it is the L eg islature’s sole provin ce t o waive or abrog ate sovere ign immunit y .” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 253 S.W .3d 653, 660 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002)). “Pol i t ical subdivisions of the state

. . . share in the
state’s inhere nt immunit y ” throug h the doctrine of g overnme ntal immunit y . W asson Interests, Ltd.

v. City of Jack sonville , 489 S.W .3d 427, 429–30 (Tex. 2016). As a political subdivision of the State, “[a] g overnme ntal unit

. . . may be sued if the L eg islature has waived immu n i t y in ‘cle ar and unambig uous lang uag e.’” Harris County , 547 S.W .3d at 613 (quoting Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034; Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit , 369 S.W .3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2012)). As a public utilit y ag ency , WTCP UA is a political subdivision of the State of Texas. See Tex. L oc. Gov’t
5Code § 572.052(c) (2) (providing that “[ a] public utilit y ag ency is a political subdivision of this

state”)

. We have therefo re re co g nized that WTCP UA is immune from suit absent a “cle ar and unambig uous” leg islative waiver of that immunit y . W est Travis Cty. Pub. Util. Agenc y , 537 S.W .3d

a t 5 5 4

. A c c o r d in g ly , w e r e

je c t H o lm s ’ s a

r g u me n t th a t WT CP U A is n o t a g o v e r

n me n ta l e n

ti ty e n ti tl e d to immuni ty

. Holms contends that g overnme ntal immunit y does not apply to WTCPUA beca use its enabling “statute” is “silent” as to immunit y . But as set forth above, the leg islature waives 5
immunit y only throug h clea r and unambig uous lang uag e. Harris County , 547 S.W .3d at 613. We there fore reje ct Holms’s arg ument that t h e s i l en ce of WTCP UA’s enabling instrument waives its immunit y from suit. Holms identifies sever al statutes which he claims waive WTCP UA’s immunit y from suit: sections 101.021 and 101.0215(a) of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), the L ocal Gover nment Contract Claims Act, and the Uniform Dec lara tory J udg ment Act (UDJA). WTCP UA’s immunit y is not waived under

any of these sta tutes.
T CA s e c tion 101.021 specifie s particu la r c ir c u ms ta n c e s u n d e r w h ic h a “ g o v e r

n me n ta l unit” may be held liable for “prope rty damag e, persona l injury , and death.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021. Be cause Holms has not alleg ed that he suffe red proper ty damag e, persona l injury , or death, section 101.021 does not confe r j urisdiction over his tort claims. Id. ; see also, e.g. , City

WTCP UA was not established throug h leg islation, but under a 2011 concur rent ordinanc e 5 adopted by the City of Be e Cave, Hay s County , and West Travis County Municipal Utility District N o . 5 p u r s u a n t to T e xa s L o c a l G o v e r

n me n t Co d e Ch a

p te r 5 7 2

. S

e e T e x. L o c . G o v ’ t Co d e § § 5 7 2

. 0 5 1 e t s e q . ( e n ti tl e d “ Pu

b li c U ti li ty A g e n c ie s f

o r Pr o v is io n o f Wa

te r o r Se w e r Se r

v ic e ” ) ; . 0 5 2 ( a ) ( p r o v id in g that “[p] ublic entities may cre ate a public utilit y ag ency by concur rent ordinanc es”)

. Holms has not arg ued that ther e is any

waiver of immunity

in Texas L ocal Gove rnment Code Chapter 572. 6of Killeen v. Cheney , No. 03-18-00139- CV, 2018 WL 5832088, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 8,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that TCA “provide s a limit ed waiver of g overnme ntal immunit y for certa in torts” and that “sec tion 101.021 of t he Act, entitled ‘Gove rnmental L iability ,’ allows a plaintiff to bring suit aga i n s t a g overnme ntal unit for three cate g ories of claims when cer tain statutory criter ia are met: (1) claims for injury ar i s i n g fr o m use of motor vehicles; (2) claims for injury cause d by a condition or use of tang ible persona l proper ty ; and (3) premises-de fec t claims”).
TCA section 101.0215(a) provides that “[a] municipality is liable under this chapter for damag es arising from its g overnme ntal functions,” which it define s as “those functions that are enjoined on a municipality b y l aw an d ar e gi ven it by the state as part of the state’s sovere ignty , to be ex erc ised by the m unicipality in the i ntere st of t he gene ral p u b l i c.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.0215(a) (empha sis added)

. Holms emphasizes that the TCA classifies cer tain functions

as g overnme ntal, including “wa ter and sewe r service .” Id. § 101.0215(a) (32). But as noted above, “the wor ds ‘under

this chapter’ limit the liability of t he municipality

for the listed func tions under section 10 1

. 0 2 1 5 to the conditions require d under section 101.021.” Bellnoa v. City of Austin , 894 S.W .2d 821, 826 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ). I n other words, “sec tion 101.0215 is not an independent waiver of immunit y .” Id. And bec ause H olms does not alleg e “property damag e,
persona l injury , [or] death,” WTCP UA is no t l i able “under this chapte r,” reg ardle ss of whether it

was eng ag ed in providing “w at er and sewe r service .” See id. ; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021.

Simi larly , Holms’s relianc e on the L ocal Gover n m en t Contract Claims Act is misplaced. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code §§ 271.151–.160. As rele vant her e, under that statute:

7[a] local g overnme ntal entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter

i n t o a contra ct and that enter s into a contra ct subject to this subchapte r waives sovere ign immunit y to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for brea ch of the contra ct, subject to the ter ms and conditions of this subchapter.

Id

. § 2 71.152. The statute define s a “contr act subject to this subchapte r” as “a written contra ct stating the essential terms of the ag ree ment for providing g oods or service s to the local g overnme ntal entity that is proper ly executed on behalf of the local g over n m en t al entity .” Id. § 271.151(2) (empha sis added). U nder the terms of the contract at issue he re, H olms was not bound to provide
g oods or servic es to WTCP UA. Consequently , there is no “contra ct subject to this subchapter ” at issue in this case . See Lubbock Cty. W ater Control & Improve ment Dist. v. Church & Akin, L.L.C

. , 442 S.W .3d 297, 3 0 8

– 0 9 (Tex. 2014) (holding that a lessee that paid the g overnor lessor rent did
not provide service s to the g overnme ntal entity for purposes of the L ocal Gover nment Contract Claims Act). The UDJA also does not confe r jurisdiction over Holms’s claims. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.001 et seq . “While the DJ A waives sovere ign immunit y for cer tain claims, i t i s n o t a gen era l waiver of sovere ign immunit y .” Texas Parks & W ildlif e Dep’ t v. Sawyer Tr. , 354 S.W .3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011). Ot h er t han waiving immunit y for cer tain ty pes of “cla ims ch al l en gi n g the validity of ordinanc es or statutes

. . . the DJ A does not alter a trial cour t ’s jurisdiction.” Id. ; see, e.g. , City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009). “Rather , the DJ A is mere ly a proce dural device for deciding case s alre ady within a court’s jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Texas Ass’n of

Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)). Be cause “a litigant’s couching its reque sted relief in terms of decla ratory relief does not alter the underlying

8nature of the suit

. . . sovere ign immunit y will bar an otherwise proper DJ A claim that has the eff ect of establishing a rig ht to relief ag ainst the State for which the L eg islature has not waived sovere ign immunit y .” Id. (citations omitted). As Holms has not established such a waiver , the UDJA cannot

cure the jurisdictional defe ct.

H o lm s n e xt a

r g u e s th a t g o v e r n me n ta l im mu n it y is in a p p li c a b l e b e c a u s e h is c la im s a

r is e from WTCP UA’s exercise of a proprieta ry rathe r than g overnme ntal function. “The g overnme ntal/ proprieta ry dichotomy

rec og nizes that immunit y protec ts a g overnme ntal unit from suits based on its perf ormanc e of a g overnme ntal function but not a proprieta ry function.” W

asson Interests, Ltd.

v. City of Jack sonville , 559 S.W .3d 142, 146 (Tex. 2018). Howeve r, the provision of water service is expressly classified as a g overnme ntal function, and not a proprieta ry one. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Re m. Co d e § 1 0 1

. 0 2 1 5 ( a ) ( 3 2 ) ( in c lu d in g “ w a te r a n d s e w e r s e r

v ic e ” in l i s t o f “ g o v e r

n me n ta l f u n c ti o n s ” that “ar e enjoined on a mu n i ci p al i t y by law and are g iven it by the state as part of the state ’s

sovere ignty ”); see also Tex. Const. art. XI , § 13(a) (providing that the leg islature has the authority
to “def ine for all purposes those functions of a municipality that are to be considere d g overnme ntal and tho s e t h at are proprieta ry , including rec lassify ing a function’s classifica tion assig ned under prior statute or c ommon law”).

Holms further arg ues that WTCP UA has waived its immunit y from suit by suing its

own customers. But such waiver occur s “whe re the g overnme ntal entity has joined into the litigation
proce ss by asser

ting its own aff

irmative claims for monetary relief .” Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W .3d 371, 376–77 (Tex. 2006). Be cause WTCP UA has not asser ted aff irm ati ve claims for mone tary

relief , it has not thereby

waived its immunity

.

9Finally , Holms asser ts that dismiss al of his suit on the basis of g overnme ntal immunit y violates his rig hts to due proce ss and equal protec tion under the United States and Texas Constit utions. See U.S. Const. amend. XI V; Texas Const. art. I , §§ 3, 19. Texas and fede ral courts have reje cted simil ar arg uments, holding that g overnme ntal immunit y violates neither due proce ss

n o r e q u a l p r o te c ti o n . S

e e , e
. g
. , P YCA I

n d u s
. v
. H a r r is o n Ct y
. W a s te W a te r M g m t. D is t. , 8 1 F

. 3 d 1 4 1 2 , 1420 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996) ; Grimes v. Pearl River Valley W ater Supply Dist. , 930 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1991); Trevathan v. State , 740 S.W .2d 500, 502–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ deni ed); Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. , 733 S.W .2d 290, 296–97 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref

’d n.r.e.) ; Tarrant Cty. Hosp

. Dist. v. Ray , 712 S.W .2d 271, 273 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1986, writ ref

’d n.r.e.) ; Duson v. Midland Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 627 S.W .2d 428, 429 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1981, no writ). We find no re ason to depa rt from these prec edents he re.

II.
I n his second issue, Holms arg ues that the county court at law err ed in dismiss ing his claims ag ainst WTCP UA with preju d i ce without allowing him to amend his live pleading to cure
any jurisdictional defe ct there in.

G e n e r a ll y , a p la in

ti f f is e n ti tl e d to a

me n d h is p le a d in g s b e f

o r e h is c la im s a

r e d is mi s s e d

w it h p r e ju d ic e . Te

x a s A & M U n iv

. S y s
. v
. Ko s e o g lu , 2 3 3 S. W. 3 d 8 3 5 , 8 4 0 ( T e x. 2 0 0 7 )

. A n e xc e p ti o n
to this rule exis ts wher e the pleading s are incura bly defe ctive with respe ct to jurisdiction. Id. (noting that the plaintiff deser

ved “the opportunity to amend his pleading s if the defe cts can b e cu re d ”) (e m p h as i s ad ded); see Rusk Stat e Hosp. v. Black , 392 S.W .3d 88, 96 (Tex. 2012) (reitera ting tha t dismiss al is proper wher e the pleading s or rec ord conclusively neg ate the exis tence of jurisdiction).

10I n Koseoglu , the Texas Supreme Court noted t hat t he plaintiff “ has made no sug g estion as to how

to cure the jurisdictional defe ct” in the pleading befor e the lower court when it dismissed the case . 233 S.W .3d at 840. We rea ch the same conclusion here

. None of the base s Holms has offere d to support a wa iver of WTCPUA’s immunity confe rs jurisdiction on the fac ts alleg ed.

CONCLUSION
We aff irm the county court at law’s order d i smissi ng Holms’s claims ag ainst
WTCP UA with pre

judice.

__________________________________________ Gisela D. Tr iana, Justi ce Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Triana Affir med Filed: Mar ch 13, 2019

11