alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Stephen Thompson et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[943 NYS2d 769]—

*1025In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated September 29, 2010, which denied the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The petitioners failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to serve a timely notice of claim. Their attorney’s excuse that he only recently discovered that the petitioners had a claim against the respondents was unacceptable *(see Bridge-view at Babylon Cove Homeowners Assn., Inc. v Incorporated Vil. of Babylon,*41 AD3d 404, 405-406 [2007]; *Matter of Nieves v Girimonte,*309 AD2d 753 [2003]; *Ribeiro v Town of N. Hempstead,*200 AD2d 730, 730-731 [1994]).

Additionally, the petitioners failed to establish that the respondents had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter *(see*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]). The petitioners contend that the respondents acquired timely actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim by virtue of a police accident report made by a police officer at the scene of the accident. However, for a report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation *(see Matter of Taylor v County of Suffolk,*90 AD3d 769, 770 [2011]; *Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel,*68 AD3d 991, 992 [2009]; *Matter of Wright v City of New York,*66 AD3d 1037, 1038 [2009]). Here, the police accident report did not provide the respondents with actual notice of the petitioners’ claim of negligence by the respondents in the happening of this accident or of the petitioners’ claim that they were injured as a result of the respondents’ negligence *(see Matter of Taylor v County of Suffolk,*90 AD3d at 770; *Matter of Wright v City of New York,*66 AD3d at 1038; *Matter of National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v Town of Eastchester,*48 AD3d 467, 468 [2008]; *see also Williams v Nassau County Med. Ctr.,*6 NY3d 531, 537 [2006]). Furthermore, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the more than nine-month delay after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period did not substantially prejudice the respondents in maintaining their defense on the merits *(see Matter of Liebman v New York City Dept. of Educ.,*69 AD3d 633 [2010]; *Matter of Smith v Baldwin Union Free School Dist.,*63 *1026AD3d 1078 [2009]; *Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist.,*50 AD3d 138, 152-153 [2008]). Dillon, *J.P.,*Balkin, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 11


             STATEMENT REGARDING COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


     Net income per common share of $.54 for the year ended June 30, 1999 was
calculated by dividing net income of $933,136 for the year ended June 30, 1999
by the weighted average number of common shares outstanding of 1,725,843. Net
income per common share of $0.61 for the year ended June 30, 1998 was calculated
by dividing net income of $1,069,480 for the year ended June 30, 1998 by the
weighted average number of common shares outstanding of 1,763,678. Net income
per common share of $0.46 for the year ended June 30, 1997 was calculated by
dividing net income of $831,586 for the year ended June 30, 1997 by the weighted
average number of common shares outstanding of 1,790,311. Because the conversion
was not effective until November 22, 1996, earnings per share data for the year
ended June 30, 1997 is comprised of the earnings for the post-Conversion period.
The number of shares purchased by the ESOP which have not been allocated or
committed to be released to participant accounts are not assumed to be
outstanding in calculating the weighted average number of common shares
outstanding.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-60083

Summary Calendar

MARIA DOLORES MARTINEZ,

Petitioner

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A088 776 982

Before REAVLEY, GRAVES, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Maria Dolores Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions this 

court for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

dismissing her appeal from the denial of her motion to reopen removal 

proceedings. She argues that the record does not support the determination 

that she was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal based on her 2011 

voluntary departure because the information contained in Form I-826 and 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 26, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 17-60083 Document: 00514528813 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/26/2018
No. 17-60083

2

Form I-213 is not reliable. She contends that the Department of Homeland 

Security should have presented evidence regarding how the information 

contained in those forms was obtained.

Martinez failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding the 

reliability of Form I-826 and Form I-213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Omari v. 

Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 320-22 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction 

to consider the claim. Omari, 562 F.3d at 324-25.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the denial of the 

motion to reopen was proper based on Martinez’s failure to comply with the 

statutory and regulatory requirements for reopening. See Singh v. Gonzales, 

436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(3). Furthermore, Martinez has abandoned any challenge to this 

determination by failing to brief the issue. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 

830, 833 (5th Cir. 2003). We do not address the BIA’s alternate finding, that 

the record established that Martinez was properly advised of her right to an 

immigration hearing before voluntarily departing, in light of the BIA’s 

conclusion that Martinez failed to meet the filing requirements for reopening. 

See Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1994).

In light of the foregoing, the petition for review is DISMISSED IN PART 

for lack of jurisdiction and DENIED IN PART.

 Case: 17-60083 Document: 00514528813 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/26/2018
## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S NO. WR-81,919-01
EX P ARTE RICK

Y LOCKRIDG E, App licant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 09-01048-CRF -272 IN THE 272 DISTRICT COURT N D F ROM BRAZ OS COUNTY
Per curiam . Y

eary, J., f iled a dissentin g opinion . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Ar t i cl e 1 1
. 07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W
. 2 d 8 2 4 , 8 2 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of two counts of online solicitation of a minor and he was sentenc ed to six year s’ imprisonment on eac h count, to run
concur rently . He did not appe al his conviction. This Court, in Ex parte Lo , held unconstitutional the online solicitation of a minor statute for which Applicant was convicted. Ex parte L o , 4 2 4 S
. W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Applicant filed this habea s application based on the Lo decision and asks that both counts of his conviction be2

set aside. The trial court r ecommends that relief be g rante d in this cause. We agree . Relief is g rante d. The judgme nt in Cause No. 09-01048-CRF- 272, in the 272 District Court n d of Br az o s County is set aside and Applicant is rema nded to the custody of the Sheriff of Br azos County to answe r the char g es as set out in the indictment so that the indictment may be disposed of in acc o rd an ce wi th this Court’s opinion in Ex parte Lo. The trial court shall issue any nece ssary bench w arr ant within 10 day s after the mandate of this Court issues. Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Te xa s D e p a r tm e nt o f Crim in al J ustice–Corre ctional Institut ions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Deliver ed: Fe bruar

y 10, 2016 Do not publish
#### Meghan BUSSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOTOROLA, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Adecco Employment Services, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-12120

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 21, 2006.

Chris Kleppin, Glasser, Boreth, Ceasar & Kleppin, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas Holland Loffredo, Erika Renee Royal, Erica S. Shultz, Holland & Knight, LLP, Ft Lauderdale, FL, Curtis L. Mack, Diana D. Súber, McGuire Woods LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before DUBINA and PRYOR,* Circuit Judges.

*

 Due to the death of Honorable Paul H. Roney, United States Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, on 16 September 2006, this decision is rendered by a quorum. 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States with instructions to reconsider our panel opinion decision, 141 Fed.Appx. 819 (11th Cir.2005), in the light of *Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). *Bussell v. Motorola, Inc.,*— U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 38, 166 L.Ed.2d 7 (2006) (mem). After consideration of the supplemental briefs, we reinstate our previous decision because it is not affected by *Burlington Northern.*

In *Burlington Northern,*the Supreme Court considered the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The Court held that “the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace,” and “the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant.” 126 S.Ct. at 2409. Neither holding applies to Bussell’s appeal. The only alleged retaliatory acts of which Bussell complained were employment related, and the alleged retaliatory acts were either not retaliatory or were not acts that “would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.”

OPINION REINSTATED.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 172 (Thursday, September 9, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 50587]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19547]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 11524]


Notice of Determinations; Culturally Significant Objects Being 
Imported for Exhibition--Determinations: ``Andr[eacute] Kert[eacute]sz: 
Postcards From Paris'' Exhibition

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: I 
hereby determine that certain objects being imported from abroad 
pursuant to agreements with their foreign owners or custodians for 
temporary display in the exhibition ``Andr[eacute] Kert[eacute]sz: 
Postcards from Paris'' at the Art Institute of Chicago, in Chicago, 
Illinois, the High Museum of Art, Atlanta, Georgia, and at possible 
additional exhibitions or venues yet to be determined, are of cultural 
significance, and, further, that their temporary exhibition or display 
within the United States as aforementioned is in the national interest. 
I have ordered that Public Notice of these determinations be published 
in the Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chi D. Tran, Program Administrator, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6471; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#88fbedebfce1e7e6babcbdb1c8fbfce9fceda6efe7fe"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="85f6e0e6f1eceaebb7b1b0bcc5f6f1e4f1e0abe2eaf3">[email protected]</span></a>). The mailing address is U.S. 
Department of State, L/PD, 2200 C Street NW (SA-5), Suite 5H03, 
Washington, DC 20522-0505.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The foregoing determinations were made 
pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, and Delegation of Authority No. 
236-3 of August 28, 2000.

Matthew R. Lussenhop,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2021-19547 Filed 9-8-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Keith J. Laing, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), entered June 6, 1986, as, upon the respondent’s motion, dismissed the complaint insofar as it was asserted against it at the end of the plaintiff’s opening statement.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff instituted this action to recover damages resulting from his fall over an allegedly raised section of sidewalk. The plaintiff contends that a tree inspection report of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation pertaining to a homeowner’s request for tree pruning which noted a cracked sidewalk is a "written acknowledgement from the city” of the defective sidewalk condition within the meaning of Administrative Code of the City of New York former § 394a-1.0 (d) (now § 7-201 [c]; hereinafter the Pothole Law).

Prior notice laws such as the provision at issue are to be strictly construed. Their words are not to be given an " 'artificial, forced or unnatural meaning’ ” *(Zigman v Town of Hempstead,*120 AD2d 520, 521) nor given "a strained interpretation to defeat their obvious intent” *(Freeman v County of Nassau,*95 AD2d 363, 364). The City Council’s rejections of amendments proposing an intra-agency duty to inform the Commissioner of Transportation of defective sidewalk conditions directly contravenes the plaintiff’s attempt to read such a duty into the law (Excerpt of City Council Stated Meeting, Nov. 15, 1979, at 20, 27-28, 34, 51, 58). Moreover, *340paragraph 4 of the Pothole Law states that "[wjritten acknowledgement shall be given by the department of transportation of all notices received by it” (Administrative Code § 7-201 [c] [4]). Where similar expressions are used in a statute, it is presumed that they are used in the same sense throughout, in the absence of an indication to the contrary (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 236; *see, Matter of Albano v Kirby,*36 NY2d 526). In view of the language of paragraph 4, the tree inspection report is not "written acknowledgement from the city” of a defective sidewalk condition. Because the plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory condition precedent to maintaining his claim against the city *(see, Cipriano v City of New York,*96 AD2d 817) and has not shown that this case presents an exception to the requirement *(see, Zigman v Town of Hempstead,*120 AD2d 520, *supra),*his complaint was properly dismissed insofar as it was asserted against the city. Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Kunzeman and Harwood, JJ., concur.
# C_2021205EN.01000201.xml

| 31.5.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 205/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.5.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 205/2

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.10147 — Mitsui & Co/Mitsui Chemicals/Honshu Chemical Industry)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 205/02)

On 5 May 2021, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M10147. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M10147. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21
- 6389

ANTHONY HARRIS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. J. PHILIP MORGAN; MARYLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL , Respondents

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. George L. Russell, III , District Judge. ( 1:18

- cv - 01024

- GLR )

Submitted : May 25, 2021 Decided: May 28, 2021

Before DIAZ and QUATTLEBAUM , Circuit Judges , and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge

.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Anthony Harris, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Anthony Harris seeks to appeal the district court’s order dism issing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as procedurally defaulted . The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a s ubstantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists c ould find the district court’s assessme nt of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck
v. Davis , 137 S. Ct. 759, 773

- 74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 140

- 41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000))

. Limiting our review of the record to the issues raised in Harris’ informal brief , we conclude that Harris has not made the requisite showing. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b); see also Jackson v. Lightsey , 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014) ( “ The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is lim ited to issues preserved in that brief. ” )

. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

      Precipitation                    
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      Ave Air Temp                    
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      Max Air Temp                    
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      Min Air Temp                    
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      Inst Air Temperature                    
csv

      Swe                    
csv

#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

      Precipitation                    
json

      Snow Depth                    
json

      Ave Air Temp                    
json

      Max Air Temp                    
json

      Min Air Temp                    
json

      Inst Air Temperature                    
json

      Swe                    
json
#### George Mercier, Appellant, v Vincent Powell, Respondent.

Submitted February 13, 2007;

decided March 27, 2007

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely *(see*CPLR 5513 [b]).
JORDANELLE RESERVOIRLatitude: 40.598Longitude: -111.423Elevation: 6187

JORDANELLE RESERVOIR

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Wolf Creek Peak Site Page...



Wolf Creek Peak

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Beaver Divide Site Page...



Beaver Divide

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Thaynes Canyon Site Page...



Thaynes Canyon

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Trial Lake Site Page...



Trial Lake
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1884 Reported in Senate (RS)]

<DOC>

                                                       Calendar No. 261
114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1884

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 25, 2015

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

                            October 8, 2015

               Reported by Mr. Johnson, without amendment

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 206 West Commercial Street in East Rochester, New York, as the 
      ``Officer Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. OFFICER DARYL R. PIERSON MEMORIAL POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 206 West Commercial Street in East Rochester, New York, 
shall be known and designated as the ``Officer Daryl R. Pierson 
Memorial Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Officer 
Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office Building''.
                                                       Calendar No. 261

114th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 1884

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
   at 206 West Commercial Street in East Rochester, New York, as the 
      ``Officer Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                            October 8, 2015

                       Reported without amendment
```