### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE ATJAC KSON O ct obe r 23, 200 8 S es sio n THE ESTAT E OF CHARLE S THO MAS McCRAW, Dece as ed v . Jo AN LI KI NS Direc t Appeal fromthe Chancer y Court for Fayette County No. P-3- 325 Allen W. Wallace, Chancellor

No. W2008-00564-C OA-R3-C V - Filed February 12, 2009

Th is a pp e a l ari se s f

ro m a de c e de nt’ s te stame nta ry ob lig atio n to dis tribu te his e state in a c c or d w ith a mari tal di sso lutiona gre e me nt. Th e trial c ou rt de te rmine d th at th ede c e de nt’ s c od ic il o bli gate d h is estate to pay join t d eb t s t hat the dec edent incur red w ith his fiancè, and his estate could not see k contribution from fianc è for paying m ore than half of the debts. The trial court also determined that thi s d ist ri bu tio n d id n ot v iol atethemari tal di sso lutiona gre e me nt that dec e de nt ha d ne go tiate d w ith his ex-wife . We affirm the trial court on these two de terminations. We, how ever , reverse the trial court’s f inding that the estate was not require d to reimburse f iancèfor payments that she made on the debts af

ter the de cede nt’s death and before the trial court ordered theestate to pay the debt. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Af firme d in part; Reve rsed in part; and Remanded D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined. Thomas M. Minor, Somerville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, B everly McCraw, Exe cutrix of the Estate of Charles Thomas McCraw. Le e S. Saun de rs , So me rv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , J oA n L iki ns . OP IN ION F acts & P roce dural Hi story De c e de nt D r. Th oma s Mc Cr aw ( “ De c e de nt” ) a nd Exe c utrix B e ve rl y

Mc Cr aw ( “ Ms. McCraw ”) w ere marrie d for a pproxi mately

36 year s. In 1969, while they wer e mar ried, Dec edent e x ecute d a will (“Will”) leavinghis entire estate to Ms. McCraw. Theparties we re divorce d in 1994, and pursuant to their divorc e, De cede nt and Ms. McCrawexecuted a Ma rital Di sso lut ion

Agre e me nt ( “ MD A” ). Th e MD A p ro vid e d th at D e c e de nt w ou ld r e dr a ft his 19 69 wi ll to give Ms. McCraw “ an irre vocable life estate in all Husband’s re alty , with fee vestingThe M D A s t at es t he f ol l ow i ng: 1

7. H us band’ s W i l l

. H us band agr ee s a nd c ont r ac t s t hat he s h al l im m edi at el y r e- dr af t a nd r evi s e hi s L as t W i l l and T es t am ent ( a c op y of w hi ch i s at t ached her et o as E xh i bi t A ) t o gi ve W i f e a n i r r evoc abl e l i f e es t at e i n a l l H us band’ s re al t y, w i t h fe e ve s t i ng i r r evoc abl y i n t he par t i es ’ c hi l dr en, a nd t hat al l H us band’ s per s onal t y s hal l be i r r evoc abl y t r ans f er r ed di r ec t l y t o t he par t i es’ ch i l dr en. H u sban d s h al l pro v i d e W i fe w i t h a c o p y o f h i s re-draft ed an d revi sed W i l l w i t h i n 60 da y s o f t h e en t ry of t he Fi nal D ec r ee of D i vor ce i n t hi s c aus e. The par t i es a cknowl edge t hat t hi s M ar i t al D i s s ol ut i on A gree m ent s hal l be s uffi ci ent t o e nfor ce t he t er m s of H usband’s r e- draf t ed and re vi s ed W i l l , as s et f or t h he r ei nabove , i n t he eve nt of H us band’ s de at h, unl es s W i f e ha s s i gned a n a gr ee m ent a l t er i ng t he t erm s an d p ro v i si o n s o f H u sb an d ’s W i l l . T h e p arti es fu rthe r ag ree t h at t h i s p ro v i si o n o f t h e p arti es’ M ar i t al D i s s ol ut i on A gree m ent i s no t eff ect ed by T enness ee C od e A nn ot at ed § 32-1- 20 1, T enness ee C o d e A n n o ta te d § 3 2 -1 -2 0 2 , o r a n y o th e r la w to th e c o n tra ry .

D ec ede nt ’ s Fi r s t Codi ci al t o hi s l as t w i l l a nd t es t am ent s t at es t he f ol l ow i ng: 2
I h e re b y c h a n g e m y W ill to g iv e m y fo rm e r w if e , B e v e r ly M c C ra w , a life e sta te o n ly in rea l t y o w n ed b y m e a t t h e ti m e o f m y d ea t h w i t h t h e re m ain d er v esti n g i n m y ch i l d ren i n eq u al sh are s. I fu rth e r m o d ify m y W ill to d e v ise to m y c h ild re n a ll m y p e rs o n a lty in e q u a l sh a re s.
-2- irrevoc ably

in the parties’ children” and to g ive his persona l property to the their childre n. The 1 MDA also provide d that the Dec edent c ould only alter the terms and pr ovisions of the revised will with Ms. M cCraw ’s signed appr oval. Upon ente ringa fina l decr ee of divorce , the trial cour

t approve d and incor

porate d the MDA into its order. On January 17, 1995, Dec edent e x ecute d a ty ped codic il (“F irst Codicil”) to his will in conformity with the MDA and the court’s F inal Dec ree of Divorc e. 2 Severa l year s after

his divorce, De cede nt became eng ag ed to J oAn L ikins (“Ms. L ikins”). At some point, Dece dent purc hased a n ATV (f our-whe eler). At that time, Dec edent wr ote on the inside of the fr ont cover

of the four -whe eler ’s broc hure ( “Second Codicil”) . The messa g e stated “Ha ppy Birthda y . In case of my

demise or inca

pacity this unitbelong s to J oAn L ikins, 5-22-99 /s/ Dr. Charles McCra

w.” Since the date of

purcha se, Ms. L ikins has retaine d possession of the AT V, and it w a s h e r u

nd e rs tand ingthat sh e owne d th e AT V f ro m th e date it w a s p ur c ha se d. Ms. L iki ns did

no t, h ow e ve r, re c e ive po sse ssi on of tit le to t he fo ur -whe e le r, and

sh e is n ot n ame d in the fi na nc ingdo c ume nts

. Dec edent a

nd Ms. L ikins also signed jointly for se vera l loans. On May 24, 1999, De c e de nt a

nd Ms. L iki ns re c e ive d a

$7 5, 75 0. 00 joi nt l oa

n f ro m th e B ank

of Ma so n a nd us e d it to purcha se the re al prope rty next door to where Ms. L ikins li ves. This proper ty contains two homes, which she r ents out. Dec edent a nd Ms. L ikins also took out a $16,150.10 jointloan from the B ank of Ma son on May 6, 2000. This loan was a combination of two smaller loa ns that Dec edent a

nd Ms. L ikins owed jointly , and the a dditional money was used to do wor

k on the renta l property

and diga pond at De cede nt’s home. We here inafter ref er to both the $75,750.00 and $16,150.10 loans a s the parties’ “joint loans.”T h e p a rtie s d o n o t ap p e a l t h is d e te rm in a tio n . 3 -3- Be fore his death, De cede nt ga ve Ms. L ikins a sealed e nvelope a ddresse d to Dece dent’s attorney . The e nvelope state d, “JoAn give to L ee if Idon’t make it. Yours f

oreve r /s/ Dr. Charle s McCraw , P.S. M ake c opies of eve ry thing.” Inside the enve lope was a letter dated June 30, 2000. Dec edent wr ote the letter (“Thir d Codicil”) on his profe ssional letterhea d; the letter stated, “ Dea r JohnShe lto n a

nd L e e : Ple a se take c areof

JoAn and John a : My

kid s a nd the re[sic ] Mothe r w ill not: Pl ease know I

love them with all my

hear t: Our L OANS ar e to be pa id by my Estate: Thank you /s/ Dr. Charles McCra w.” Dec edent died on July

6, 2000, and upon his death, Ms. McCraw pe titioned the trial court to establish a lost will and codicil. The trial c ourt admitted the will and codic il as Dec edent’ s L a st Wi ll a

nd F ir st C od ic il t

he re to. Sub se qu e ntl y , M s. L iki ns so ught t o inte rv e ne and a dmi t Dec edent’ s two handwritten letter s as holographic codicils. Although Ms. McCraw f iled a response that the letters f ailed to meet the r equire ments of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 32-1- 101, et seq. a

nd violated the MDA, the trial court a dmitted the handwritten c odicils to probate on Ap ri l 5, 20 02 . T he tr ia l c ourt re se rv e d th e iss ue of

wh e the r t he c od ic ils vio late d th e MD A. Ms. L iki ns fi le d a

Mo tio n f or De c larator

y Judgme nt a

nd To Qu ie t T itl e in R e a l Pr op e rt y , a nd Ms. McCrawfiled a Complaint to Contest Hologra phic Codicils, alleg ing undueinfluence and lac k of t e s t am e nt ar

y c a p a c i ty. On July 26 , 2 00 2, the tr ia l c ourt

he ld a he ari ngto d e te rm ine wh e the r t he ho logra

ph ic codicils violated the MDA. T he trial c ourt enter ed an order on Septe mber 6, 2002, a ddressing whether the holographic codicils violated the ter ms of the MDA. The trial court f ound that the Se c on d Co dic il, writt e n o n M ay 22 , 1 99 9, wa s in

vio latio n o f t

he MD A b e c a

us e it p ur po rt e d to bequeath personal pr operty at Dec edent’ s death. The trial c ourt also found, howe ver, that the 3 Third Codicil, written on J une 30, 2000, did not violate the MDA; the e state, there fore , was obligated to pay

any unpaid balanc e of the joint debts. The trial court he ld that by the terms of the Third Codicil Dec edent’ s estate ha d no right of contribution ag ainst Ms. L ikins, but the cour t also found that the e state wa s not require d to reimburse Ms. L ikins for the pay ments that she made on the joint loan af

ter De cede nt’s death. Both pa rties petitioned the trial c ourt to alter or amend its September 6, 2002 or der, a nd Ms. Mc Cr aw a lso re qu e ste d a n inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l at th at ti me . T he tr ia l c ourt de nie d b oth mot ion s to ame nd

and the re qu e st f

or an inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l. I n th is o rd e r, the tr ia l c ourt a lso gra nte d th e Es tate a

lie n o n th e re a l pr op e rt

y to s e c ur e re imb ur se me nt f or the amou nt t he e state pa id i n c a se the Es tate wa s e nti tle d to c ontr ibutio n f ro m Ms . L iki ns . M s. L iki ns fi le d a Mo tio n to Di sso lve the L ie n, but th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d L iki ns ’ M oti on

to D iss olv e L ie n, de c lari ngits September 6, 2002, or der a s a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02. Ms. McCraw, on be half of the estate , appea led the trial c ourt’s September 6, 2002 order

to this C ourt. We found, howeve r, that the trial cour

t had not resolved Ms. Mc Craw’ s Complaint t o Contest Hologr aphic Codicils or Ms. L ikins’ Motion for Dec laratory J udgment and to Quite Title in Real Proper ty , and we-4-

dismiss ed the a

ppeal. Estate of McCraw v. Likins , N o . W2 0 0 4

- 0 1 1 7 2

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 5 WL 1522024 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2005). The pa rties re turned to the trial c ourt and e ntere d a Consent Orde r of Dismissal of Motion for De clar atory

J udg ment and to Quiet Title. That same day , the trial cour t entere d an Or der of Vo luntary

No n- Sui t, d ism iss ingMs. Mc Cr aw’ s Co mpl a int to C onte st H olo gra

ph ic Cod ic ils wi th pr e jud ic e and

a sse ssi ngc os ts a g a ins t Ms . M c Cr a w. No w that th e reis a

fi na l di sp os iti on , M s. McCrawappea ls the trial court’s or der e ntere d September 6, 2002. Issues Pr esente d On appe al, the par

ties prese nt three separate issues. First, Ms. McCra w argues that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in ob lig atin gDe c e de nt’ s E state to r e pa y the De c e de nt’ s jo int

de bts wi th M s. L ikins while denying it the right to see k contribution from Ms. L ikins. S econd, Ms. Mc Craw a lle g e s th at th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y ho ldi ngthat th e June 30 , 2 00 0 c od ic il d id n ot v iol ate the te rm s of De cede nt and Ms. McCraw ’s MDA. We will addre ss these two issues tog ether . In addition, Ms. L ikins raises a third issue, that the tria l court er red in de terminingthat Dec edent’ s Estate wa s not require d to reimburse Ms. L ikins for the pay ments that she made on the joint debts after Dec edent’ s death. Stand ard of Review Be cause the trial cour

t adjudicated this ca se without a jury , we r eview the decision de novo up on

the re c or d a

nd pr e sume the c or

re c tne ss o f t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s fa c tua l f

ind ing s. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Fowler v. W ilbanks , 48 S.W .3d 738, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We will not reve rse the trial court’s f

actua l findings unless they are contra

ry to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 190 (Tenn. 2000) . I f the trial c ourt’s fa ctual de te rm inatio ns are ba se d o n it s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty , th is C ourt wi ll n ot r e e va luate that assessment abse nt clear and convinc ing e vidence to the contra ry . J on es v . Garre tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002) . I f the trial c ourt fails to make f indings of f

act, howe ver, our re vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Archer v . Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 416 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995). O n the other ha nd, we r eview thetrial court’ s application of law de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Bo wde n v . W ar d, 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

. Simi larl y , w e re vie w m ixed qu e sti on s o f l aw a

nd fa c t de novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)

. P aying Join t De bts f

romthe EstateWithout Maintain ing a Righ t of Contribu tion Ms. McCraw’ s argument on this iss ue is twofold: First she a rgues that the languag e in the Third Codicil does not prohibit Dece dent’s Estate f rom seekingcontribution from Ms. L ikins for paying he r joint debts with Dece dent. Second, Ms. McCra w argues that to the extent that the Third Codicil does prohibit the Estate fr om seekingcontribution, it removes asse ts from Dec edent’ s estate a

nd, there by , violates the MDA.D ec ede nt ’ s W i l l s t at ed, 4

I d ire c t t h a t all my j us t de bt s , s ucc es s i on a nd i nher i t anc e t axe s a nd f uner al e xpens es be fi r s t pa i d by t h e E x ecut r i x of t hi s m y L as t W i l l and T es t am ent out of fun ds com i ng i nt o her hands as s uch E x e c u trix

. D ec ede nt ’ s di vor ce at t or ney t es t i fi ed t hat D ec ede nt ha d a s ophi s t i ca t ed know l edge i n bus i nes s de al i ngs a nd 5 hi s l ega l know l edge w as be yond t hat of a l ay per s on. -5- In her f irst argument, Ms. McCraw a lleg es that the Third Codicil does not extinguish the Estate’s right to see k contribution from Ms. L ikins. Ms. McCraw quotes Prichard on Wil ls and Administration of Estates § 1015 (5 ed.) f or the proposition that “a

mere bequest doe s not th rele ase or exti nguish the leg atee s debt to the testator whe re suc h intent does not clea rly appea r on the fa c e of

the wi ll. ” Re fe rringto D e c e de nt’ s a nd Ms. L iki ns ’ j oint debts , th e Th ir d Co dic il states “our

loans are to be paid by

my estate.” Ms. McCraw a

rgues that the languag e in the Third Codicil does not prohibit Decede nt’s Estate fr om seekingcontribution from the c o-make r of Dec edent’ s joint l oans. Ms. L iki ns , o n th e oth e r h and , a rgue s th at th e langua g e in t he Th ir d Co dic il e xpre ssl y direc ts Dece dent’s estate to pay the joint loans completely . Be cause Dec edent’ s Wi ll alrea dy obligated the Estate to pa y Dec edent’ s debts, Dec edent, who w as a sophisticate d party , intended 4 5 for his Estate pa

y both his and Ms. L ikins’ obligation on the loan. Construingthe languag e in the Wil l and Third Codicil toge ther, we agree with the trial court that De cede nt did not int end for Ms. L iki ns to b e ind e bte d to De c e de nt’ s E state wh e n it pa id t he joi nt l oa

ns . M s. L iki ns a lso asser ts that the court may

consider e x trinsic evidenc e of the fac ts and circ umstances surr ounding De c e de nt’ s e xec uti on

of the Th ir d Co dic il, su c h a s h e r r e latio ns hip wi th D e c e de nt. An e state ha s n ot o nly

a ri ght, but an o bli g atio n to c oll e c t and pr e se rv e e state a sse ts, including a

duty to collect debts due to the estate. See Perry v . W ooten , 24 Tenn. 524 (1845) ; Mc Fa rli n v . M

c Fa rli n , 785 S.W .2d 367, 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). When one of seve ral pa rties that are jointly

liable on common debts pay s more than his shar e to discharg e the de bt, he acquir es a right of

contribution ag ainst those debtors who we re e qually liable on the debt. W inebarger v. W

inebarger , 6 53 S.W. 2d

74 6, 74 8–49 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 98 3) ; Hardy v . Miller , No. M1998-00940-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL1565549, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2001) ( no perm. app. filed

). Th is r ule is a n e qu ita ble princ ipl e that, a

mon goth e r t

hin g s, a pp lie s to partne rships, joint ventures, and joint debts. Ne wso n v . S ha c k le for d, 43 S.W .2d 384, 385 (Tenn. 19 31 ); Hardy, 2 0 0 1 W L1 5 6 5 5 4 9 , at* 5

– 6

. T h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s th ata

b s e ntp r o o f

t o th e c o ntr ar

y, co-oblig ors must contribute equa lly to discharg e their c ommon obligations. W inebarger , 653 S.W. 2d at 74 8–49 . G e ne ra lly , th e re fo re , D e c e de nt’ s e state may se e k c ontr ibutio n f

ro m Ms

. L iki ns fo r t

he joi nt d e bts that it

dis c ha rg e s. Dec edent may , howeve r, have rele ased or exti nguished his Estate’s right to contribution in the Third Codicil. The g ener al rule is that a me re be quest in a will does not rele ase or exti nguish debt owed to the e state whe re a n intent to relea se does not cle arly appea r on the fa ceA s t hi s Cour t ponde r ed i n C a n n o n v . E w in , 6
“i f [ D ece dent ] di d not i nt end t o r el eas e t he debt , w hy w ou l d [he] gi ve w i t h on e hand and t ake back w ith th e o th e r? W h y w o u ld [h e ] ad o p t th e d e v ic e o f g iv in g to th e d e b to r t h e a m o u n t o f th e d e b t, w ith t he i nt ent i on t hat t he l egacy w ou l d be pai d and t hen h anded back t o pay t he debt ?”
C a n n o n v . E rw in , 7 7 S .W .2 d 9 9 0 , 9 9 3 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 3 4 ). If th a t w a s D e c e d e n t’s in te n t t h e n th e T h ird C o d ic il w o u ld b e p u rp o se le ss. -6- of a w ill. Can no n v . E

win , 77 S.W .2d 990, 992 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934). It is well established, howeve r, that the c ardina l rule of will construc tion is that a c ourt should seek to discover the testator’s intent and g ive ef fec t to that intent unless itcontravenes a rule of la w or public policy

. Stickley v. Carmichael , 850 S.W .2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1992) . When asce rtaininga testator’ s intent, “it is necessa

ry to look to the entire will and codic il, if any , and not to isolated parts.” Id. (qu o t i n g Martin v. Taylor , 521 S.W .2d 581, 584 (Tenn. 1975) ). As this Court has stated, the testator’ s intention mustbe asc erta ined from “ that which he ha s written” in the will, and not from what he “may be supposed to haveintended to do,” a nd extrinsi c evide nce of

the condition, situation and surrounding s of the testator himself may

be conside red only

as aids in the interpr etation of the la nguag e used by the testator, a

nd “the testator’s intention must ult imately be dete rmined fr om the langua g e of

the ins tr ume nt w e ighe d in

the light o f t

he te stator ’s surr ound ing s, and no proof

, howeve r conc lusive in its nature, ca n be admitted with a view of setting up a

n intention not jus tified by the languag e of the writingitself.” In reCro we ll , 1 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 5 5 6 , 5 5 9 (T enn . C t

. Ap p . 2 0 0 4 )( qu o t i n g Nichols v. Todd , 101 S.W .2d 486, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936))

. Whe n c on sid e ri ngthe langua g e in b oth De c e de nt’ s Wil l and

Th ir d Co dic il, we a gre e wi th the trial cour

t that Dece dent intended his Estate to pa y the joint debts without seeking c ontr ibutio n f

ro m Ms . L iki ns . D e c e de nt’ s Wil l a lr e a dy ob lig ate d h is E state to p ay of f h is d e bts , wh i c hl e g a l l y

e nt i t l e d th e E s t at e t o s e e k

c o ntr i b ut i o na g a i n s tany

c o - o b l i g o r s o f

th o s e d e b t s . In the Third Codicil, Dec edent e x presse d a diffe rent intent whe n he re quested that Ms. L ikins and her da ughter be car ed for

and wr ote “our

loans areto be paid by

my estate.” We believe that the langua g e pe rt a ini ngto t

he pa y me nt o f d e bts c le arl y

and un ambi guo us ly

ob lig ate d th e e state to pay the joint loans and exti nguished Ms. L ikins’ obligation to both the B ank of Ma son and Dec edent’ s Estate. 6
In h e r s e c on d a

rgume nt, Ms. Mc Cr aw a lle g e s th at if the Th ir d Co dic il p ro hib its Dec edent’ s Estate fr om seekingcontribution from Ms. L ikins, itviolates the MDA. In her brief, Ms. Mc Cr aw c on c e de s th at th e MD A p e rm itt e d D e c e de nt t o s e ll, dis po se , g if t awa y a ll o f h is pr op e rt y , a nd inc ur a dd iti on a l debt d

uringhis lif

e . Sh e argue s, ho we ve r, that if the Th ir d Co dic il prohibits a right of contribution, it alters the provisions of the L ast Wil l and Fir st Codicil by removingassets fr om the Estate without her a gree ment.I n 20 01 , t he T enness ee Su prem e C ou r t co nsi dere d t he eff ect o f a M D A t hat provi ded w i f e w i t h hal f of her 7 h u sb a n d ’s re tire m e n t b e n e fits. Johns on v . J ohns on , 3 7 S. W

. 3d 8 92 , 8 94 (T enn. 2 00 1). Post

- r et i r em ent , h usband el ect ed to re c e iv e a p o rtio n o f h is re tire m e n t p a y a s d isa b ili ty b e n e fits. I d. I nt er pret i ng t he M D A , t he s up r em e c ou r t hel d t hat w i f e w as e nt i t l ed t o ha l f of t he ent i r e am ount t hat hus band w oul d or di nar i l y rece i v e fr om r et i r em ent , bot h pa y a nd b e n e fits. Id. at 8 9 6 -9 7

. B ec au se w i fe’s in t ere st i n h u sb an d ’s reti rem en t b en efit s ves t ed a s o f t h e d at e t h at the t ri al co u rt ent er ed t he di vo r ce decr ee, hu sb an d’s uni l at er al deci s i on t o el ect benefi t s i n pl ace of part of hi s pay w as an im p e rm issib le m o d ific a tio n o f m a rita l p ro p e rty a n d v io la te d th e d iv o rc e d e c re e . Id. at 8 9 7 -9 8

. T h i s ca se b efo re u s i s, h o w e v e r , d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m Johns on b e c a u se a leg a te e ’s in te re st in p ro p e rty c o n v e y e d th ro u g h a w ill c a n n o t v e st u n til th e tes ta to r d ie s. J. H

. D ought y v. H am m ond , 3 4 1 S .W .2 d 7 1 3 , 5 5 3 -5 4 (T e n n . 1 9 6 0 ).

-7- Although a

marital dissolution agr eeme nt may be incor porate d into a final dec ree of divorce , it is a contrac t and is subject to the rules g overningthe construc tion of contrac ts. Johnson v. J

ohnson , 37 S.W .3d 892, 896 (Tenn. 2001) . Be cause an MDA is, in essenc e, a c ontr a c t be tw e e n a

hu sb and and wi fe in c onte mpl atio n o f a pe nd ingdiv or c e , w e se e k to a sc e rt a in their intention from the c ontrac t as a whole and g ive ef fec t to it. Briceno v . Briceno , No. M2006- 01927-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL4146280 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007) ( no perm. app. filed ). As with other contr acts, it is the court’s ta sk to consider the usua l, natural, a nd ordinary

meaning of the c ontrac tual languag e to asc erta in the parties’ intent. Johnson , 37 S.W .3d at 896. Where the contra ctual ter

ms are a mbiguous a

nd the cour

t cannot asc erta in the parties’ intent from the literal interpr etation of the la nguag e, a c ourt must apply established rule s of construc tion. Planters Gin Co. v. Fede ral Compress &W arehouse Co. , 78 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) . “A contra ct is ambiguous only when it is of unce rtain mea ning a nd may fairly be under stood in more way s than one.” Johnson , 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d at8 9 6 (qu o t i n g Farmers-Pe oples Bank v . Clemmer , 519 S.W .2d 801, 805 (Tenn. 1975) ). An MDA is not ambiguous merely “bec ause the parties may differ as to interpre tations of cer tain of its provisions.” Id

. at8 9 6 (qu o t i n g Coo k e v ille Gyne cology &Obstetrics, P.C. v. Southeastern Data Sy s., Inc., 88 4 S. W.2 d 4 58 , 4 62 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1994)). Although w e find no c ase la w direc tly on point, this Court often consider s whether a de c e de nt’ s d isp os iti on

of his e state vio late s a

c ontr a c tua l ob lig atio n to c re ate or re ta in a wi ll i n the context of mutual wills and will contracts, and we believe that the case In re Estate of 7 Cammack i s i n s tr u c t i v e o nth i s p o i nt

. InCammack, husband and w ife e x ecute d mutual and rec iproca l wills and entere d into a contra ct that wife would not chang e her will if husband prede cea sed her

. In re Estate of Cammac k, No. M1999-02382-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL1679492, at *1 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2000)( no perm. app. filed ). B oth wi lls le ft the bu lk o f t

he e state to the survivingspouse but provided that upon de ath of the sur vivor the estate passed to husband’ s children. Id. The c ontrac t provided that husband willed his estate to wife with the unde rstanding that she would devise it to husband’s c hildren. Id. Upon husband’s de ath, wife rec eived most of husband’s e state. Id. at *1–2. Subsequently , wife be g an g ifting pr operty she inherited f

rom husband to her own children. Id. Although husba nd’s childre n asser

ted that wife was dissipating the e state , a

nd , th e reby , in

br e a c h o f h e r c ontr a c t w ithhu sb and , th is C ourt fo un d th at no thi ngin the contra ct pre vented wif e fr om selling or distributingthe estate

. Id. at *4. The c ourtThi s Cour t c am e t o t he oppos i t e conc l us i on i n M er r i t tv. Yat es , N o . M1 9 9 9

- 0 0 7 7 5

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 0 WL 8 1 4 8 3 4 7 6 (T en n . C t
. A p p . O ct
. 10 , 20 0 0 ) ( no per m . app . f i l ed )

. I n t hat c as e, how eve r , t he cour t not ed t he f ol l ow i ng: W i t h t hi s r ul i ng w e by no m ea ns s ugges t t hat [ w i f e] m ay not r ea s onabl y us e f or he r ow n be nef i t t he pr oper t y w hi ch s he r ec ei ved f r om [ hus band]

. W e m er el y r ec ogni ze t hat t he m ut ual w i l l s m ad e by [ hus band and w i f e] s i m pl y l i m i t [ w i f e’ s ] us e of t he pr oper t y t o re a so n a b le use , and t hat [ w i f e] m ay n o t d isp o se o f th e p ro p e rty in a m a n n e r in c o n siste n t w ith th e o b v io u s in te n t o f th e w ill s. Id

. a t *3. -8- deter mined that the contra ct re quired wife to refr ain from c hang ing he r will after husband died and wife did not breac h that promise. Id. at *4. 8
In th is c a se , w e do no t inte rp re t th e MD A t o p ro hib it D e c e de nt f ro m ob lig atin ghis e state to p ay the joi nt d e bts c omp le te ly . D e c e de nt’ s Wil l un ambi guo us ly state s th at hi s E state wa s to first pay his debts. The MDA only provided that De cede nt revise his Will to give Ms. McCraw a lif e e state in D e c e de nt’ s r e a l pr op e rt y and to g ive his pe rs on a l pr op e rt y and the re ma ind e r i nte re st in the rea l property

to his and Ms. McCraw’ s children. The MDA also set for th that the MDA itself would be suff

icient to enfor ce the terms of De cede nt’s revised Will unless Ms. McCraw signe d an agree ment alteringthe terms and pr ovisions of Dece dent’s Will. Nothi ngin the MDA p r o h i b i t e d

D e c e d e ntf

r o mu s i n go r

d i s p o s i n go f

h i s e s t at e d

ur i n gh i s l i f

e t i m e . O nth e c o ntr ar

y, Ms. McCraw te stified befor e the tria l court that she unde rstood that the prope rty dispositi ons made in De cede nt’s Wil l and Fir st Codicil di d not take ef fec t until Decede nt’s death, a nd she anticipated that Dece dent had ong oing livingexpenses and could incur more de bt. Dece dent was, ther efor e, fr ee to incur debts, such as his joint debts with Ms. L ikins, and we do not believe that by doing so he remove d assets of the e state. Additionally , we do not find that De cede nt a lte re d h is w ill by

re qu ir inghis Es tate to p ay a ll o bli g atio ns , in c lud ingMs. L iki ns , o n th e de bts he incur red during his lifetime. We, ther efor e, af firm the trial c ourt’s holdingthat Dec edent’ s estate is oblig ed to pay

the joint debts without any right of contribution. Re im bur se m e nt Appellee raises the additional issue that Dec edent’ s estate must reimburse her f or pay ments she made on the joint loans after D ece dent died. F rom Dec edent’ s death on July 6, 20 00 until the tr ia l c ourt

or de re d D e c e de nt’ s e sta

te to p ay the joi nt l oa

ns on July 26 , 2 00 2, Ms. L ikins made pay

ments that weredue on the $75,750.00 se cure d loan. Tenne ssee Code Anno tate d § 32 -3 -1 01 state s th at [a] will shall be construed, in re fer enceto the rea l and per sonal estate c omprised in it, to s peak a

nd take e ffe ct as if it had be en executed immediate ly befor e the death of the testator, a

nd shall convey

all the re al estate belong ing to the te stator, or in which the te stator had a ny interest at the te stator’s dec ease , unless a contr ary intention appear

by its words in context

.-9-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 32- 3-101 (2007) . We, theref ore, c onstrue that De cede nt’s instruction to pay the joint loans refe rs to pay ment of the de bt as it ex isted upon his death. Any other interpr etation would enable the estate to avoid part of its oblig ation by defe rringpay

ment of the de bt as longas possible. Ms. L ikins, therefor e, is entitled to the full amount of the joint debts as of the date of Dec edent’ s death. We find that De cede nt’s estate should re imburse Ms. L ikins for the re gular pay ments she made f

rom Dec edent’ s death until the trial cour t entere d its J uly

26, 2002 order , the amount to be deter

mined by the trial cour

t on remand. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons we aff irm in part and r ever se in part. Costs of this appea l are taxed to the Appellant, The Estate of Charle s Thomas McCraw , and its surety , for whic h execution may

issue if nec essar

y .

___________________________________

DAVI D R. FARMER , JUDGE