### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs D ec em be r 5, 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. AT OYAL. EV ERYAN D C HARLIE LET EZ FLEMI NG

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-05331 Car olyn Wad e Blackett , Judge

No. W2005-00547-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jun e 28, 2007

The de fenda

nts, A toy a L

. Every

and Charlie L etez Fleming , wer e indicted f or fe lony murder in the perpe tration of ag g ravated child neg lect re sulting in the death of the two-y ear -old v ic tim, Amber

Cox Cod y . Ajur

y c on vic te d th e de fe nd ants of mis de me ano r r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm ent ( Cla ss A misdemeanor) . Both de fenda nts were sentenc ed to eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s. Defe ndant Every was plac ed on full probation. Defe ndant Fleming was sentenc ed to serve six wee ks, with the
rema inder on proba

tion. The defe ndants’ appe als of their c onvictio n s have be en consolidate d. Def endant Eve ry

poses two issues: 1 ) whether misdemea nor re ckless enda

ng erme nt is a lesser included off

ense of first deg ree murder in the perpe tration of ag g ravated child abuse; a nd (2) whe ther the evidenc e is suf

ficient to suppor

t the conviction. Def

endant F leming c ontends that the trial cour t err ed in its failure to g rant (1) his pretria l motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of ac tion; and (2) his motion for judg ment of ac quittal for fa ilure to “pre sent sufficie nt fac ts to constitu t e felony murder.” After

revie w, we a ffirm the de fenda nts’ judgme nts of conviction. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

W i l l i a m D

. M a s s e y a

n d L o r n a M c C l u s ky, M e mp h i s , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l an t , A t o ya

L

. E v e r y.
J ef fr ey J o n es , Ba rt l et t , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e ap p el l an t , C h ar l i e Let ez Fl em i n g. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Bria

n Clay J ohnson, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Thomas Hende rson and Ke vin Rardin, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.B u rto n w a s a c o -d e fen d a n t i n d ic te d o n the sa m e c h a rg e o f f e lo n y m u rd e r. S h e w a s c o n v ic te d o f cr im ina lly 1

n e g lige n t ho m ic id e b u t i s n o t a p a rty to this a p p e a l.
-2- OP IN ION
Amber Cox C ody , the two-y ear -old victim, was es co rt ed to a van ope rate d by Children’s Rainbow L ear

ning Ce nter (da

y car e) by her f ather at 7 : 1 8 a.m. on J une 25, 2003. The victim was strapped into a c arse at by

Def endant F leming, the van attendant. Matthew Cody , the victim’s fathe r, signe d the transpor

tation log maintaine d by

the daycar e. The victim’s lifeless body was discove red
a t a pp ro ximate ly

3:3 0 p. m. that a ft e rn oo n by Sha wn da B ur ton , the va

n dr ive r. Th e vic timwa s st ill

1 in her c arse at. The cause of death was hy pothermia with dehydration, accordingto Dr. O. C. Smith, the e xami nin g fo re ns ic patho log ist

. Andre a Miche lle Peete, the dir ector of the da

y car e, desc ri b ed t h e duti es of the thr ee defe ndants in reg ard to tra n s p o rt ati on of the c hildren. A tra nsportation log w as maintained by Def endant F leming, the van attenda nt. He wa s responsible for enter ing the time that children we re picked up, an d t h e parent or guardia n signe d it in acknowledg ment. A time for dr op-off at the da y c are wa s a lso to b e c omp le te d b y the va n atte nd ant.
Ms. Peete testified that she had ins tructed the van driver (Burton), the attendant (F leming) , and the a ssi sta

nt d ir e c tor

(E ve ry ) to wa lk the le ng th of the va n’ s int e ri or , c he c kin g in and un de rn e a th
eac h seat to ensur e that all childre n wer e off the van. The transportation log for J un e 25, 2003, ref lected Def

endant Fleming ’s entry that the victim was delivere d to the daycar e at 8:05 a.m. The transportation log had sig nature blocks for the van atte n dant, van dr iver, a nd the direc tor to sign. Only Def endant F leming sig ned on June 25.

I n his statement to police , Def endant Fleming admitted that he had only chec ked the va

n by looking over the seats from the front of the van. Def endant Every

admitted, in her stateme nt, that sh e did no t c he c k th e va

n f or the p re se nc e of

c hil dr e n o n Jun e 25 . Sh e e la bo ra te d b y sayingthat, routinely , no one che cked the logs in the morning but took the w ords of the attendant and the dr iver
a s su ff ic ie nt.
Acc ording to Trac ey

Merr iwether , a teac her at the daycar e, B urton told her, on the morning of June 25, that the victim had not come t hat day

. An eight-inch, bright y ellow taghung from the
v an ’ s r e ar v i e w m i r r o r c o n t a i n i n g t h e w o r d s , “ A r e a l l t h e k i d s o f f t h e v an ?”
Th e jur y fo un d b oth

De fe nd ants Ev e ry

and F le min g g uil ty

of mis de me ano r r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt.-3- An a ly sis

De fe nd ant E ve ry ’s I ssu e s
I n D e fe nd ant E ve ry ’s fir st i ssu e on a pp e a l, s he c on te nd s th a t mi sd e me ano r r e c kle ss endang erme nt is not a lesser included of fense of first degree felony murder in the pe rpetration of
a g g ra vate d c hil d n e g le c t.
The State c ontends that this issue was wa ived by the def endant f or fa ilure to include it as one of her gro u n ds in either her orig inal or ame nded motions for newtrial. I t is also clear from the
rec ord that De fenda

nt Every specific ally

reque sted that misdemeanor rec kless endang erme nt be char g ed as a

lesser inc luded offe nse. We ag ree with the State’s contention.

Be cause we c onclude that the defe ndant waived the i ssue, we do not r eac h the merits of the issue. Tenne ssee Rule of Appellate Procedur e 3(e ) provides that alleg ed er ror in jury

instructions must be specific ally

stated in a motion for new trial or be treated as waived. A trial judg e is oblige d to g ive the pa

rt ie s an o pp or

tun ity to o bje c t to pr op os e d le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e ins tr uc tio ns . I f a

pa rt y fails to object, then the inclusion of t he lesser included offense may not be used in a motion for new trial or on appea l

. T.C.A. § 40-18-110( d) (2006) . Fur thermore , the def

endant r equeste d the ins tr uc tio n th a t sh e no w a lle g e s is erro r. Th is cou rt ha s n o o bli g a tio n to g ra nt r e lie f “ to a

pa rt y responsible for

an er ror or who failed to take whateve r ac tion was rea sonably available to preve nt or nullify the har mful eff ect of an error.” Tenn. R. App. P . 36(a) . The de fenda nt reque sted the jury instruction at issue and now stands c onvicted of the re q u es t ed charg e. The defe ndant has wa ived appellate revie w of the issue.

I n her se cond issue, De fenda nt Every challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support the c on vic tio n f

or mis de me ano r r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt. When presente d such an issue, our standard of revie w i s “whe ther, after viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, any rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential
e le me nts of

the c ri me be y on d a

re a so nab le do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ). Al l que sti on s invo lvi ng the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, the we ig ht a

nd va lue to be g ive n th e e vid e nc e , a

nd a ll f a c tua l is su e s r a ise d by the e vid e nc e are re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t. See State v. Eva

ns, 108 S.W .3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003) . Be cause a ver dict o f gu i l t removes the presumption of innocenc e and imposes a presumption of g uilt, the burden shifts to th e defenda nt upon conviction to de monstrate why the evidenc e is insuff icient to suppor

t the verdic t. I d. at 237. On a pp e a l, the State is e nti tle d to the str on g e st le g iti mate vie w of the e vid e nc e and to a ll r e a so na

ble and leg itimate infere nces that may be dra wn there from. State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000).

Re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt i s st a tut or ily de fi ne d a s f

oll ow s:-4-

(a) A per son commits an offense who rec klessly eng ag es i n conduct that places
or may pla c e ano the r p e rs on

in i mmi ne nt d anger of deathor se ri ou s b od ily i n j u r y. ( b ) Re c k l e s s e n d an g e r m e n ti s a

C l a s s A m i s d e m e an o r ; h o w e v e r , r e c k l e ss e n d an g e r m e n tc o m m i t t e d

w i t ha d e a d l y w e a

p o ni s a C l a s s E f e l o n y. T.C.A. § 39-13-103 ( 2006). “Rec kless” re fe rs t o a per son who ac ts reckle ssly with respec t to circumstance s surroundingthe conduc t or the re sult of the conduc t when the pe rson is awa re of but
c on sc iou sly

di sre gards a subs tan ti al a ndun ju st if iab le r is k t hat th e ci rcumsta nc e s e xist
or the re su lt w ill oc c ur . T he ri sk mus t be of

su c h a natur e and

de g re e that it s disreg ard constitutes a g ross deviation from the standard of car e that an o rd i n ary person would ex erc ise under a ll the circumstanc es as view ed fr om the acc used pe rs on ’s sta

nd po int

. T.C.A. § 39-11-302( c) ( 2006).
Th e defe nd ant a

rgue s th a t a

c on vic tio n f

or mis de me ano r r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt c ou ld withstand scrutiny

only if Def endant Every was awa

re that the victim wa s left on the va n and then failed to inspec t the van. The defe ndant relies upon lang uag e in State v. Ducke r, 27 S.W.3d 889, 897 (Tenn. 2000) , which stated that the defe ndant in a case of a g g ravated child abuse must have knowing ly

abandone d the childre n in a ca r. The e lements of re ckless enda ng erment, however , inv olv e a le sse r d e g re e of c ulp a

bil ity , that of a re c kle ss d isr e g ard of a su bs tanti a l and

un jus tif ia ble risk.
Def

endant Eve ry

had a duty and had bee n instructed to per sonally inspect the va

n interior for the pre sence of childre n. She admitted that she did not do so on the date of the victim’s death. Her failure to inspect was a

conscious disreg ard of

a substantial risk which res u l t ed i n t he victim’s abandonme nt and ultimate death.
We conclude that a rational j u ry could have found beyond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant eng ag ed in re ckless conduc t that placed the victim in imminent dang er of death or ser ious bodily injury and that the de fenda

nt knew or should have known of this dang er.
Def endant F leming’ s I ssues
De fe nd ant F le min g ’s fi rs t is su e c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in re fu sin g to gra

nt h is pretria l motion t o dismiss for f ailure to state a

cause of ac tion. The State urg es us to treat the issue as wa ived due to De fenda nt Fleming ’s fa ilure to include in the appellate briefs a

n argument in support other than incor poration of his pretria l memorandum supporting the motion. W e ag ree that this does not conform to the int ent of Tennessee Rule of Ap pe lla te Pr o c e d

u r e 2 7 ( a ) ( 7 ) , r e qu i r i n g ar g u m e n tan d c o u l d b e t r e a t e d

a s w a i v e d

. T e n n
. R

. C t. Crim. App. 10(b). Howe ver, we will a ddress the issue, which we perc eive a s essentially arguing the fac ts of the ca se. The de fenda nt contended the indictment was faulty in that the defe ndant could not-5-

be g uil ty of a g g ra

vate d c hil d ne g le c t, the un de rl ying fe lony , unle ss t

he de fe nd ant k

ne w t he vic tim
was on the van. T h e tr ia l c o u rt r u le d th a t t h e d e f e n d an t’ s mo ti o nf

a il e d to s tate a le g a l o r f a c tu al basis upon which re lief could be g rante d and found the indictment to be fac ially valid. After

revie w, we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r deny ing the motion.
This issue is a question of l aw and, acc ording ly , our re view is de novo with no pre sumption of cor rec tness as to the trial cour t’s ruling . State v. Hill, 954 S.W .2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997)

. Th e ind ic tme nt f

or fi rs t de g re e fe lony

mur de r r e a d a s f

oll ow s: THE GRAND J URORS of the State of Tenne ssee, duly selec ted, empane led, sworn and c harg ed to inquire for the body of the c ounty

of Shelby , Tenne ssee, upon the ir oath, pr e se nt t

hat: SHAWNDA BU RTON CHARL I E L ETEZ FL EMI NG AT OY A L . E VE RY
on June 25 , 2 00 3, in S he lby County , T e nn e sse e , a

nd be fo re the fi nd ingof

thi s ind ic tme nt, did

un lawf ull y and wi th t he int e nt t o c omm it a g g ra vate d c hil d n e g le c t, as def ined in T.C.A. 3915-402, k i l l AM BER COX- CODY, a c hild six (6) y ear s of
a g e or le ss, duri ng the pe rp e tr a tio n o f a g g ra vate d c hil d n e g le c t, i n th a t th e de fe nd ants , t h e s a i d S H A WN D A B U R T O N an d C H A R LIE LE T E Z F LE M IN G an d A T O Y A L. EVERY, did unlawfully

and knowing ly

other than by

acc id ental mea

ns, neg lect AMBE R COX-CODY, a c hild six (6) y ear s of ag e o r less, by failing to verify

that sh e , th e sa id A MB ER C OX -C OD Y, wa s n ot o n th e da y c are va n u se d b y the sa id defe ndants to transport childre n, so as to adve rsely aff ect the he alth and we lfare of the said child, such act resulting in the death of t he said c hild, in viol ation of T.C.A. 39-13-202, a g ainst the pea ce a nd dignity

of the State of T ennesse e.
I nd ivi du a ls a c c us e d o f a

c ri me are g ua

ra nte e d th e ri g ht t o be inf

or me d of t he natur e and

c a us e of the a ccusation by

the Six th and Four

teenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tut i o n and Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion

Ar tic le I , Se c tio n 9

. Th e c on sti tut ion a l pro vis ion s hav e be e n inte rp re te d to
re qu ir e that an ind ic tme nt pr ov ide : (1) no tic e to t he a c c us e d o f t

he of fe ns e c ha rg e d; ( 2) the c ourt

wi th
an ad equ ate ground

up on wh ic h a pr op e r j ud g me nt m ay

be e nte re d; a

nd (3 ) t he de fe nd ant w ith protec tion ag ainst double jeopar dy . Wy att v. State, 24 S.W .3d 319, 324 (Tenn. 2000)

. Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 4 0- 13 -2 02 pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: Th e ind ic tme nt mus t st a te the fa c ts c on sti tut ingthe of fe ns e in o rd ina

ry and c on c ise lang uag e, without prol i x i ty or re petition, in a manner so a s to enable a person of
c omm on un de rs tand ingto k

no w what is inte nd e d a

nd wi th t hat de g re e of

c e rt a int y wh ic h w ill e na

ble the c ourt , o n c on vic tio n, to p ro no un c e the pr op e r j ud g me nt.
We c onclude that the indictment in this case meets the a bove re quirements. The ref ore, w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on De fe nd ant F le min g ’s mot ion to d ism iss

.-6-

De fe nd ant F le min g , in

his la st i ssu e , c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto gra

nt h is motion for judgme nt of ac quittal on the indicted offe nse.
The ba sis for a judg ment of ac quittal is found in Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b)
and re a ds a s f

oll ow s: On def endant’ s motion or its own initiative, the cour t s h all order the entry

of jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l of on e or mor e of

fe ns e s c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt, prese ntment, or information afte r the evidenc e on either side is closed if the e vidence is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in a

c on vic tio n o f s uc h o ff

e ns e or of fe ns e s.
A t rial court, in considering a mot ion for judg ment of ac quittal, must favor the State with the str on g e st l e g iti mate vie w of the e vid e nc e , in c lud inga ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s to be dr awn

the re fr om, and must discard a

ny counter vailing e vidence

. State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The tr ial co u rt ’s conc ern is the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , not the weig ht of the evidenc e pre sented. State v. B lanton, 926 S.W .2d 953, 957 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. De fe nd ant F le min g argue s t h a t t h e s u b j e c t m o t i on sh ou ld h a ve be e n gra

nte d b e c a us e the State had not shown a “ knowing neg lect,” i.e ., that Def endant F leming kne w th e v i ct i m was lef t on the van. The evidenc e presented showed that Def endant Fleming admitted he did not make a persona l thoroug h inspection of the va n as wa s his duty . I t further showed that he cer

tified on the daycar e’s tran s p o rtati o n lo g th a t th e v ic ti m h a d v a c a te d th e v an a t th e d ay c ar e
. We c o n c lu d e th a t a rational jur y c ou ld h ave fou nd the de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t to be kn ow ingne g le c t be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of the mot ion fo r jud g me nt of a c qu itt a l. We w ou ld further note that t he jury ’s findi ng that the defendant wa s g uilty of a le sser include d offe nse re ndere d thi s is su e moo t.
Conclusion

We c on c lud e , a ft e r r e vie w, that no e rr or is pr e se nt a nd a c c or din g ly

a ff ir m th e de fe nd ants ’ judgme nts of conviction.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE