alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk June 17, 2009

p0610 

# Order

June 17, 2009

137980

AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ Cross-Defendant,

v SC: 137980 COA: 279588 Livingston CC: 05-021833-NF SHARON LAMSON, Next Friend of the Estate of JAMES RAYMOND LAMSON, Legally Incapacitated Person, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/ Cross-Plaintiff/Appellant,

and

AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Cross-Defendant/ Appellee,

and

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH, Intervenor.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the November 18, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

H ATHAWAY

, J., would grant leave to appeal.
#### In the Matter of Asem Eldaghar, Appellant, v New York City Housing Authority et al., Respondents.

Submitted April 2, 2007;

decided May 1, 2007

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied *[see*8 NY3d 804].
<PAGE>


                                                                      Exhibit 28

SMITH, GOOLSBY,
ARTIS & REAMS, P.S.C.

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
P.O. BOX 551     1330 CARTER AVE.
ASHLAND, KENTUCKY  41105-0551
(606) 329-1171   FAX (606) 325-0590

Board of Directors
Classic Bancshares, Inc.

                         INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT

We have reviewed the accompanying consolidated statement of condition as of
December 31, 2001 and the related consolidated statements of income and
comprehensive income for the three and nine month periods ended December 31,
2001 and 2000, and the consolidated statements of stockholders equity for the
nine months ended December 31, 2001, and the consolidated statements of cash
flows for the nine month periods ended December 31, 2001 and 2000, in accordance
with Statement of Standards for Accounting and Review Services issued by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The financial statements are
the responsibility of the corporation's management.

A review of interim financial information consists principally of applying
analytical procedures to financial data and making inquiries of persons
responsible for financial and accounting matters. It is substantially less in
scope than an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion regarding the
financial statements taken as a whole. Accordingly, we do not express such an
opinion.

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material modifications that should
be made to the accompanying financial statements for them to be in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.

We have previously audited, in accordance with auditing standards generally
accepted in the United States of America, the consolidated statement of
financial condition as of March 31, 2001, and the related consolidated
statements of income, comprehensive income, stockholders' equity and cash flows
for the year then ended (not presented herein) and in our report dated June 15,
2001, we expressed an unqualified opinion on those consolidated financial
statements. In our opinion, the information set forth in the accompanying
consolidated statement of financial condition as of March 31, 2001, is fairly
stated, in all material respects, in relation to the consolidated statement of
financial condition from which it has been derived.



/s/ SMITH, GOOLSBY, ARTIS & REAMS, P.S.C.
-----------------------------------------
SMITH, GOOLSBY, ARTIS & REAMS, P.S.C.
Ashland, Kentucky
February 8, 2002
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

VICTORIA L. JONES

, as Personal *

Representative of the Estate of * No. 12

- 653 V

WILLIAM R. JONES, * Special Master Christian J. Moran

*

Petitioner, *

v. * Filed: July 17 , 2014

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Attorneys’ fees and costs; award

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * in the amount to which

* respondent does not object.

Respondent. *

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

John R. Howie

, Howie Law, P.C., Dallas, TX , for Petitioner;

Gordon Shemin

, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED DECISION ON FEES AND COSTS 1

On July 16 , 2014, respondent filed a stipulation of fact concerning final

attorney s ’ fees and costs in the above

- captioned matter. Previously, petitioner

informally submitted a draft application to respondent for $37,377.78 in attorneys’

fees and costs. Respondent found petitioner’s application to be rea sonable.

Accordingly, t he Court awards this amount.

On September 28 , 2012

, William Jones filed a petition for compensation

alleging that the influenza vaccine , which he received on October 19, 2011 , caused

him to suffer Guillain

- Barre Syndrome

. On January 6, 2013, William Jones passed

away, and his wife, Victoria L. Jones, was substituted as the p etitioner in this case.

Ms. Jones received compensation based upon the parties’ stipulation. Decision

,

1 T he E

- Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107

- 347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (Dec. 17,

2002), requires that the Court post this decision on its website. Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 18(b)

, the parties have 14 days to file a motion proposing redaction of medical information or other

information described in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

- 12(d)(4). Any redactions ordered by the special

master will appear in the document posted on the website.2

issued June 1 2 , 2 014 . Because petitioner received compensa tion, she is entitled to

an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

- 15(e).

Petitioner seek s a total of $ 37,377.78 in atto rneys’ fees and costs for her

counsel. Additionally, in compliance with General Order No. 9, petitioner state s

that she incurred no out

- of

- pocket litigation expenses while pursuing this claim.

Respondent has no objection to the amount requested for attorneys’ fees and costs.

After reviewing the request, the Court awards the following:

A lump sum of $ 37,377.78 in t he form of a check made payable to

petitioner and petitioner ’ s attorney, John R. Howie , for attorneys’

fees and other litigation costs available under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

15(e).

The Court thanks the parties for their cooperative efforts in resolving this

ma tter. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

Any questions may be directed to my law clerk, Mary Holmes, at (202) 357

-

6353.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Christian J. Moran

Christian J. Moran

Special Master
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2157 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2157

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend for one year tax-
  free distributions from individual retirement plans for charitable 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 30, 2015

 Mr. Grayson introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend for one year tax-
  free distributions from individual retirement plans for charitable 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TAX-FREE DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL 
              RETIREMENT PLANS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (F) of section 408(d)(8) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``December 31, 
2014'' and inserting ``December 31, 2015''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to distributions made in taxable years beginning after December 31, 
2014.
                                 <all>
```
1 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No

. 1 2 3 , 756

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

S TATE OF K ANSAS , Appell ee ,

v.

M ICHAEL D. F ERGUSON , Appell ant

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from S edgwick District Court; J EFFREY S YRIOS , judge. Opinion filed October 29 , 20 2 1

. A ffirmed.

Submitted by the parties for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21

- 6820(g) and (h).

Before G REEN , P .J., C LINE , J., and B URGESS , S. J

.

P ER C URIAM : Michael D. Ferguson pled guilty to aggravated assault and domestic battery . The district court granted him a downward dispositional departure , sentencing
him to 24 months ' probation , with an underlying pris on sentence of 37 months.

Within six months of sentenci ng, Ferguson twice admitted to multiple probation
violat ions . After the second instance , the district court revoked Ferguson's probation and modified his sentence to run the felony and misdemeanor sentences concurrent , lowering Ferguson's controlling sentence from 37 to 31 months. Ferguson appealed, alleging the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We granted his motion for

summary disposition under Supreme C ourt Rule 7.041 A (2021 Kan. S

. Ct. R. 48)

.2 The district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court had the authority

to revoke Ferguson's probation under both K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22

- 3716( c )(7)(B) ( when defendant violates probation conditions after receiving dispositional departure), and K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22

- 3716( c )(7)(C) (when defendant commits new felony or
misdemeanor whil e on probation). Ferguson first received sanctions after stipulatin g to violating his probation by twice failing to report and for failing to attend substance abuse
treatment. Less than a month later , Ferguson stipulated to violating his probation again by (1) failing to attend substance abuse treatment as directed, (2) threatening the victim from his original crimes, (3) contacting that victim, (4) re

- offending by violating a p rotection
f rom a buse order, and (3) re
- offending by possessin g drug paraphernalia . A reasonable person could have revoked Ferguson's probation based on those violations

.

Affirmed.
##### 



12 York Gate
Regents Park
London NW1 4QS
United Kingdom
    
    Telephone
+44 (0)20 7486 0111
Fax
+44 (0)20 7935 6852
    
    Email
email@blickrothenberg.com
Web
www.blickrothenberg.com
    

(BLICK ROTHENBERG LOGO)
 EXHIBIT 14.2 The Board of Directors
    
    Our ref:
    
    RJL/KJM/19434/CMRadcom Limited12 Hanochoshet Street
    
    5 May 2004Tel-Aviv 69710ISRAEL
 Dear Sirs Radcom (UK) Limited We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
(File No. 333-07964, No. 333-13244, No. 333-13246, No. 333-13248, No.
333-13250, No. 333-13254, No. 333-14236 and No. 333-111931) on Form S-8 of
Radcom Limited of our report dated January 21st, 2003, relating to the
consolidated balance sheets of Radcom (UK) Limited as of December 31st, 2002
and the related consolidated statement of operations, changes in shareholders
equity and cash flows for the year then ended, which report appears in the
Annual Report on Form 20-F of Radcom Limited for the fiscal year ended 31st
December 2003. Yours faithfully /s/ Blick Rothenberg
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N
NO. 03-14-00512- CR

Crae RobertP ease, A ppellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 6 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, NO. C-1 -CR- 13- 2207 63, H ONO RAB LE B OB P ERKI NS, JUDGE P RESIDING
O R D E R A N D ME M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
P ER CURIAM

The repor ter’s rec ord was due to be filed in this Court on October 13, 2014. To date, the repor ter’s rec ord has not been filed. Acc ording to the app el l an t , h e has not made pay ment
arr ang ements for the repor ter’s rec ord beca

use he lacks sufficie nt resour ces to pay for it. Although appellant f

iled an af fidavit of indig ency

in the trial court within the t ime for pe rfe cting his appea l, no finding of indig ency

has bee n made. SeeTex. R. App. P . 20.2. To avoid further delay s and protec t the rig hts of the parties, the appea l is abate d and the trial court is instructed to deter mine, following a hear ing if nece ssary , wh et her appellant is prese ntly indige nt. See id
. I f it finds that the appellant cannot pay or g ive secur ity for the appellate
rec ord, it shall order the prepa ration of the repor

ter’s rec ord at no cost to appellant. See id
. A supplemental cler

k’s rec ord including copies of all finding s, conclusions, order , and a transcr iption of any hear ing that is held shall be tender ed for filing in this Court no later than J anuar

y 30, 2015.I t is so ordered this 19th day of De cembe r 2014.

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton, and F ield Abated a nd Remanded Filed: De cembe r 19, 2014 Do Not Publish

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         8161770
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  1170
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               8192963
<PP&E>                                         522759
<DEPRECIATION>                                 125036
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 13125804
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          712810
<BONDS>                                        602451
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       13942453
<OTHER-SE>                                     2131910
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   13125804
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               1858033
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             43497
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1831471)<F2>
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1831471)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1831471)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>Fully diluted EPS not computed on loss.
<F2>Includes $70,054 interest income.
</FN>



</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0477 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. JOHN HILL,

Defendant and Appellant.

**O RDER**  Upon consideration of Appellant’s unopposed motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including June 17, 2024 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s reply brief on appeal. No further extensions will be granted.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 14 2024

05/14/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0477
WILLIAMS FORK RESERVOIRLatitude: 40.019Longitude: -106.214Elevation: 7808

WILLIAMS FORK RESERVOIR

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Middle Fork Camp Site Page...



Middle Fork Camp

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Loveland Basin Site Page...



Loveland Basin

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Jones Pass Site Page...



Jones Pass
#### Dawn M. Close, Appellant, v Darien Lake Theme Park and Camping Resort, Inc., Respondent.

[949 NYS2d 303]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Patrick H. NeMoyer, J.), entered January 28, 2011 in a personal injury action. The order granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries that she sustained on a water ride in an amusement park owned by defendant. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, Supreme Court properly granted the motion of defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. “[B]y engaging in a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” *(Morgan v State of New York,*90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]; *see Anand v Kapoor,*15 NY3d 946, 947-948 [2010]; *1446
      *Turcotte v Fell,*68 NY2d 432, 439 [1986]; *Maddox v City of New York,*66 NY2d 270, 277-278 [1985]). Awareness of the risk is “ ‘to be assessed against the background of the skill and experience of the particular plaintiff’ ” *(Morgan,*90 NY2d at 486, quoting *Maddox,*66 NY2d at 278). Here, “defendant sustained its burden of proving its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ... by presenting evidence that the plaintiff understood and voluntarily assumed the risks inherent in the activity at issue” *(Leslie v Splish Splash at Adventureland,*1 AD3d 320, 321 [2003]). Contrary to plaintiffs contention, she failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant engaged in reckless or intentional conduct or whether there existed a dangerous condition that concealed or unreasonably increased the risks of the ride *(see Youmans v Maple Ski Ridge, Inc.,*53 AD3d 957, 959 [2008]; *see also Loewenthal v Catskill Funland,*237 AD2d 262, 263-264 [1997]). Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0586

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JACOB CHRISTIAN PALMER,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 25, 2022, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 19 2022

10/19/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0586
#### Joann Steiger et al., Respondents, v Daniel J. Mason et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

— In a medical malpractice action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Daniel J. Mason and M & E Obstetrics and Gynecology Group, P. C., appeal from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Widlitz, J.), entered May 7, 1985, as is in favor of the plaintiffs and against them in the principal sum of $500,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Although we conclude that there were numerous instances in this two-week trial in which the plaintiffs’ counsel acted *392with excessive zeal in questioning the defendant Mason, we do not believe that they rise to a level that requires reversal. Counsel was entitled to some leeway in his examination of this adverse witness, who was protected by the prompt objections of counsel. An experienced Trial Judge was in control of the proceedings throughout, and despite his exasperation with both counsel he did not declare a mistrial, nor does it appear that any request for such action was made. The conduct of counsel thus does not warrant reversal and a new trial.

Nor do the limitations imposed by the court on the cross-examination of the plaintiff Joann Steiger require a new trial. The manner in which cross-examination is conducted is largely within the discretion of the trial court *(see, Feldsberg v Nitschke,*49 NY2d 636, 643). The court did not abuse that discretion by requiring that the appellants’ counsel, in attempting to impeach the plaintiff Joann Steiger by the use of her deposition testimony, read both the oral answer and the change she had made in the transcript. A deposed party is entitled to change her answer before executing the deposition (CPLR 3116), and the fact that counsel was required to read both the oral answer and the change did not preclude him from probing that inconsistency or the inconsistency between the oral answer and the plaintiff Joann Steiger’s trial testimony.

Finally, we would not reverse on the basis of the court’s ruling that prevented Mrs. Steiger from being confronted on cross-examination with a bill of particulars her attorney had verified. The bill contained a claim for lost earnings opportunity but the plaintiffs made no such claim at the trial. No detailed analysis of the legal merits of the ruling is necessary since its effect is simply too insignificant to warrant overturning the verdict.

We do not regard the verdict with respect to damages as excessive under the applicable standards of review. Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

      Flow Volume                    
csv

      Flow                    
csv

#### All data considered provisional and subject to revision.

      Flow Volume                    
json

      Flow                    
json
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wilbert Eborn, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hellenbrand, J.), rendered June 17, 1982, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find the defendant’s contention that the prosecutor was permitted to bolster the complainant’s testimony relating to his identification of the defendant to be without merit. During the questioning of a police officer by the prosecutor, the officer voluntarily stated, "After [the complainant] identified him [the defendant]”. The trial court immediately interrupted the witness’s testimony, and gave curative instructions to the jury to disregard the statement by the witness. Thus, the testimony by the officer did not constitute improper bolstering because it was not elicited by the prosecution and was stricken by the court *(cf. People v Trowbridge,*305 NY 471).

The defendant’s further contentions with respect to the prosecutor’s summation and the charge to the jury are not preserved for our review (CPL 470.05), and we decline to address them in the interest of justice in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Mangano, J. P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.