2022 IL App (2d) 200712-U 

No. 2-20-0712 

Order filed November 23, 2022 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County. 

) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 17-CF-1574 

) 

FARID S. RAKIN, ) Honorable 

) Patricia S. Fix, 

Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Trial court did not commit reversible error in denying suppression of defendant’s 

statement, questioning jurors during voir dire, or admitting certain lay opinion 

evidence, but defendant must be resentenced. 

¶ 2 A jury found the defendant, Farid Rakin, guilty of the first degree murder of Ciera Davis 

after he fired seven shots toward her car, striking her in the head and chest and killing her. He was 

sentenced to 60 years in prison. He appeals, arguing that his confession was involuntary, improper 

voir dire amounted to plain error, the trial court should not have admitted a witness’s opinion about 
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the victim’s intentions, and the trial court improperly relied on elements of the offense to increase 

his sentence. We affirm Rakin’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On the night of June 4, 2017, Rakin helped organize a birthday party at 1632 11th Street in 

Waukegan that extended into the early morning hours of June 5. Davis attended. She had long 

been friends with Rakin, but recently Rakin had started and then ended a brief sexual relationship 

with her. Also present was Rakin’s girlfriend, Nicole Maise, with whom Rakin had recently 

reunited. Davis and Maise got into a fight. People at the party forced Davis to leave. Once outside, 

Davis hit Rakin’s car with a stick, poured gasoline on it, and then began to ram his car with her 

own. While in her car, Davis was shot twice. She was taken to a hospital where she was 

pronounced dead. 

¶ 5 The police arrived on the scene within an hour after the shooting. The police found Davis’s 

car in the street, in neutral with the engine running. The car was positioned diagonally, near the 

entrance to a common driveway that led to the party house and the house to the north of it. The 

front wheels of the car were turned roughly parallel to the street. The driver’s side door was open 

but no one was inside. There was blood on the driver’s seat. There were bullet holes in the front 

passenger side window and door. The front windshield was intact. 

¶ 6 During their investigation, the police recovered a gun later found to have fired the bullets 

that struck and killed Davis. There were no fingerprints or DNA on the gun. One of the partygoers 

identified Maise as the shooter, and Maise was initially charged with the murder of Davis. 

Waukegan police detective Charles Schletz and his partner spoke with Maise, who denied shooting 

Davis, and the charges against her were dismissed. Another witness to the shooting identified 
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Rakin as the shooter and said Rakin’s son, Trevor Smith, had handed him the gun used in the 

shooting. A warrant for Rakin’s arrest was issued. 

¶ 7 On August 22, 2017, officers learned that Rakin was at a motel in Racine, Wisconsin, and 

they executed the warrant. When Rakin was arrested, Maise was with him, and the police found 

illegal drugs in the motel room. Both Rakin and Maise were taken to the Racine police station. 

¶ 8 Rakin was interviewed by Schletz and his partner, who videorecorded the questioning. The 

interview began at 12:20 p.m. and lasted for about one hour and 50 minutes. Schletz read the 

Miranda warnings and Rakin indicated that he understood each of his rights. The tone of the 

interview was conversational throughout. Schletz frequently exhorted Rakin to say what had 

happened but did not yell or verbally abuse Rakin. 

¶ 9 Schletz began to talk about Davis. Rakin asked why the police had arrested Maise. Schletz 

started to explain why Maise had been charged earlier with Davis’s shooting, but Rakin clarified 

that he meant what had happened “today.” Schletz said Maise was being detained “for safety” and 

explained that, while the Racine police were concerned with the drugs found at the motel, he and 

his partner were interested in “what happened in Waukegan.” Rakin again asked about Maise and 

whether she was in custody; Schletz said she was there for questioning but had not been charged. 

Rakin said Maise was not involved with the drugs found at the motel. 

¶ 10 Schletz continued speaking about Davis’s shooting. He spoke at length, telling Rakin that

the police knew from witnesses what had happened, that he saw Rakin as a respected person and 

someone who felt bad about Davis’s death, and that it was clear that Davis had been “out of 

control.” Asked what happened, Rakin recounted his relationships with Davis and Maise and their 

fight at the party. Schletz noted that Maise was identified by one person as the shooter. Rakin

said she was not involved and had been inside the house when Davis was shot. Schletz described 
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Maise crying during her earlier interview and saying Rakin would do right by her and would not 

hurt her. Rakin continued describing the events of that night. After Davis had been forced to leave 

the party, people called him outside, telling him that Davis was pouring gasoline on his car. 

(Rakin’s Dodge was parked in a common driveway near the house next door.) Rakin said that he 

saw Davis pouring the gasoline but did not care as he had insurance. He went back inside, but he 

was again called outside when Davis began ramming his car with her car, an Oldsmobile Bravada. 

¶ 11 After seeing Davis ram his car, Rakin tried to open the front passenger side door of the 

Bravada but it was locked. Davis then backed up and drove forward to ram Rakin’s car again, 

hitting Rakin’s knee as he moved out of the way. Rakin said that his leg was injured and that he 

still could not stand for more than five seconds. However, he did not complain of any pain during 

the interview.

¶ 12 Schletz asked Rakin if he thought Davis was trying to run him over. Rakin said no. 

Although Davis had struck him with her car, she was not trying to hit him. She was trying to 

smash his car. He asserted that “she didn’t try to run me over and I didn’t think she was going to 

try to run me over.” He denied shooting at Davis. Asked whether, when she was shot, Davis had 

been trying to leave or trying to hit him, Rakin repeated that she was not trying to hit him. She 

was just enraged. 

¶ 13 Schletz told Rakin that the police had found the gun used to shoot Davis, Rakin’s 

fingerprints were on it, and there was video of Rakin going to the area where the gun was found. 

Schletz suggested that the shooting of Davis could be seen as a sad but understandable accident 

that occurred because she was out of control. Schletz again mentioned Maise’s earlier arrest for 

the shooting and her identification by one person as the shooter, saying that they needed the 

defendant’s account and that, although the warrant had been quashed, the charges against Maise 
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had not been dropped while the investigation was continuing. Over the next 40 minutes or so, 

Schletz repeated these themes—the strength of the evidence against Rakin, including 

eyewitnesses’ statements and the gun that supposedly bore Rakin’s fingerprints; Schletz’s opinion 

that Rakin was not a cold-blooded killer but someone who cared about and protected those around 

him; and the argument that if Rakin admitted that he shot Davis, it would protect people Rakin

cared about (Maise and Rakin’s son) from prosecution. Rakin continued refusing to answer 

questions about the shooting itself. 

¶ 14 About an hour after the interview started, Schletz noted that, while Rakin was 49 years old, 

the women he was involved with were much younger and thus were more unfortunate: Davis “only 

got” 25 years to live before she was killed, and Maise was just 27, had a young child, and was 

“crying her eyeballs out” over facing possible jail time for the drugs in the motel room and Davis’s 

murder. Rakin repeated that Maise had “nothing to do with” any of it and offered to sign a 

statement taking responsibility for the drugs found at the motel. However, he did not respond to 

Schletz prodding him to confess to the shooting. 

¶ 15 Schletz told Rakin that what Rakin said would affect the charges that he would eventually 

face, commenting that “Not everybody that kills somebody *** is charged with the same thing or 

gets charged.” Rakin received this skeptically, leaning back in his chair with his arms folded, and 

said the police would not believe his story. Schletz said he could believe “almost anything” based 

on the position of Davis’s car in the street. Yawning prodigiously, Rakin began to describe the 

events preceding Davis’s shooting again, emphasizing that Maise was not outside at the time and 

was not involved, saying that the last thing he wanted was for anything to happen to his girl. But, 

yawning more, he declined to talk about the shooting itself, saying he just did not want to go into 

it. Rakin also rejected Schletz’s suggestion that he could reduce the charges brought against him 
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by giving a statement admitting to shooting Davis. He noted that, with a weapon involved, he 

would spend the rest of his life in jail even on lesser charges. Schletz continued to suggest that the 

charges against Rakin could be reduced, depending on what he told them, and might be only second 

degree murder or aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Not getting a response, Schletz dropped 

this tack and began to emphasize that he and his partner would be “straight” with Rakin and Maise, 

just as they were when they went to the State’s attorney earlier about dropping the charges against 

Maise. When Schletz suggested that Rakin could “straighten this shit out” and retire to a family 

home in Mississippi, Rakin skeptically asked how that could happen, and Schletz admitted he did 

not know but urged Rakin to “take a chance” by giving his account of the shooting. Rakin 

continued to offer little or no response for another 20 minutes as Schletz talked. 

¶ 16 About an hour and a half after the interview started, Rakin leaned forward with his head 

down and appeared to be thinking. Rakin then asked Schletz what the police were going to do 

with Maise. Schletz said he had told Maise that he would come back and talk with her after they 

finished talking with Rakin. Rakin then asked if the interview was being recorded, and Schletz 

said it was. Schletz said that he and his partner were being “fair.” Schletz offered to let Rakin talk 

to Maise “after this.” Rakin was silent for a moment. He asked if he could talk to Maise first and 

Schletz said no. If, however, Rakin told them about Davis’s shooting, they would tell the Racine 

police that he was willing to take responsibility for the drugs in the motel room, and he could talk 

with Maise. Schletz said he would not leave Maise in jeopardy just to gain advantage, again noting 

that he had helped Maise when she was charged with the shooting earlier. Rakin acknowledged 

this, saying Maise had told him that some officers helped her to get released. Schletz said he and 

his partner had to “go against” their bosses to argue for Maise’s release. 
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¶ 17 Rakin paused in thought again. He then asked whether, if he took responsibility for the 

shooting, the police would let Maise go. Schletz said, “absolutely” if Rakin told them about the 

shooting, he would speak with the State’s attorney and tell him “what happened.” Rakin asked if 

they would let Maise go that day. Schletz said “yes” and promised that he and his partner would 

“call the State’s attorney” and would “tell him there’s no reason to charge her and completely 

quash all the charges.” Rakin then began talking, admitting that the shooting “basically” happened 

the way Schletz had been theorizing during the interview. When describing Davis’s actions in 

ramming his car and striking his knee in the process, Rakin said that Davis had been trying to hit 

him, but only so he would move out of the way so that she could keep ramming his car. Someone 

near him had a gun and was talking about “handling” Davis; Rakin took the gun away from him 

because he did not like the bloodthirsty tone of the person’s comments. He fired at Davis with his 

nondominant hand, intending to scare her away. He did not realize that he had killed her, as he 

left immediately after shooting. 

¶ 18 Rakin was indicted on two counts of first degree murder, alleging that he shot Davis (1) 

with the intent to kill her or inflict great bodily harm, or (2) knowing that his actions created a 

strong probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2016)). His 

counsel moved to suppress the videotaped statement described above on the basis that it was 

involuntary because it was procured by Schletz’s misrepresentations and promises. Counsel also 

moved to suppress a statement Rakin made to police a day later, arguing that that second statement

was involuntary and was made after Rakin invoked his wish to remain silent and for an attorney. 

After a hearing, the trial court suppressed Rakin’s second statement but not his first, finding the 

first statement voluntary in light of Rakin’s, age, intelligence, experience with the criminal justice 
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system, the short duration and conversational tone of the questioning, and the lack of physical 

coercion. 

¶ 19 Prior to trial, Rakin filed a motion in limine to bar Marqueta Bronson from testifying 

speculatively about Davis, specifically, that Bronson knew Davis died from the second shot 

because she could just feel it, that Bronson could just tell that Davis intended that the ramming of 

Rakin’s car right before she was shot would be the last one, that Davis was intending to get out of 

there when she put the car in drive the last time, that there was no need for any more shots, and 

that it was cold-blooded murder. The State did not object and the trial court granted the motion. 

¶ 20 During jury selection, the trial court questioned the jurors regarding the principles 

enunciated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). As to three of the four 

principles, the trial court questioned the prospective jurors regarding whether they (1) understood 

and (2) accepted the principles. As to the first principle, however, the trial court failed to ask

several of the prospective jurors whether they not only understood but also accepted the 

presumption of innocence. Five of the seated jurors were drawn from the incorrectly questioned 

juror panels. 

¶ 21 At trial, the State introduced the testimony of four occurrence witnesses. Chavone White 

arrived at the party about 1 a.m. She saw a fight between Davis and another woman that left 

broken glass on the floor. People made Davis leave the house and White began sweeping up the 

glass. As she was going out the door to leave a little while later, she heard four or five shots. She 

did not see the shooting. She dropped to the ground and stayed there until it seemed safe to get 

up. She then went to her car to leave. She saw Davis’s body, which looked “lifeless,” being put 

in another vehicle. She left. 
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¶ 22 Rickey Matthews, a felon, arrived at the party at 7 or 8 p.m. He saw Davis, an old 

acquaintance, and spoke with her. He stayed outside, talking with people, smoking marijuana,

eating, and drinking. Later in the evening, he saw Davis come out of the house. She was angry, 

loud, and cursing. Davis grabbed a stick and began hitting Rakin’s car but did not damage it. 

People gathered around her and tried to get her to leave. Davis then got into her car and began 

ramming Rakin’s car, driving into it and then backing up and hitting it again. She rammed it four 

times. Matthews testified that, when Davis was “coming back I guess to do it again,” he heard 

shots ring out. Rakin was shooting at Davis from an arm’s length away from Matthews, near the 

street and sidewalk. Matthews had not seen Rakin actually get hit by Davis’s car, but Rakin 

jumped out of the way right before he fired at Davis. Rakin was about 10 feet away from Davis’s 

car when he fired four or five shots. Matthews saw Davis slumped in her car and then someone 

took her to the hospital in another car. He left as the police were arriving. 

¶ 23 Shalanda Barnett was a close friend of Davis’s sister. She arrived at the party early and 

saw Davis already there. Rakin arrived later with Maise. After a while, Davis and Maise got into 

a fight. When Davis left the house, Barnett followed her. Davis began to hit Rakin’s car with a 

stick. Barnett physically restrained her and also called Davis’s sister to talk to Davis, but Davis 

was still very upset. At that point, Barnett “wrestled her down” and took Davis’s keys. Barnett, 

who was asthmatic, then went to her own car to get her inhaler. When she was in her car she heard 

a loud bang and looked in her rearview mirror to see Davis driving forward and back and striking 

Rakin’s car. Barnett was beginning to turn her car around when she heard a gunshot. She looked 

back and saw Davis’s car in the middle of the street, or half in the street, rolling backwards. Barnett 

finished turning around and drove toward Davis’s car, where someone put Davis in the back of 

Barnett’s vehicle. Barnett took Davis to the hospital but when she arrived Davis was dead. 
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¶ 24 The fourth witness, Bronson, testified that she was standing in the adjacent driveway near 

Rakin’s car when Davis began ramming it. Davis rammed Rakin’s car at least eight or nine times. 

Asked whether Davis was leaving the driveway, Bronson confusingly said that Davis was, but she 

wasn’t, and also that Davis was “getting ready to take off.” The defense objected to this statement 

as speculation that violated the motion in limine; the trial court sustained the objection on a 

different basis, narrative. Bronson then testified that Davis was pulling back “maybe 10” feet on 

each reverse, although that night she had told a detective that it was only a few feet. 

¶ 25 Bronson testified that she saw Rakin come outside and try to stop Davis by “possibly hitting 

the hood.” Rakin then went inside but came back out and went to the middle of the street and 

pulled out a gun. Meanwhile, Davis continued to ram Rakin’s car. When Davis backed up for the 

last time, she hit Bronson’s car, which was parked across the street. When Bronson said that Davis 

was trying to get away, the trial court sustained a defense objection to the statement. 

¶ 26 Bronson said that she saw Rakin shoot twice at Davis’s car and, after a brief pause, shoot 

another four or five times. Asked if Davis’s car was backing up when Rakin shot, Bronson said it 

looked like Davis was about “to pull off.” The trial court overruled the defense objection. The 

State asked why Bronson thought Davis put the car in drive and Bronson repeated that it seemed 

to her that Davis was preparing to pull off. The trial court again overruled a defense objection. 

Asked if she heard the gear shift or change, Bronson initially said yes. However, she later testified 

that she did not hear the gear change and that she would be lying if she said she did. 

¶ 27 Bronson described the car as “rolling” after the second shot. Asked which direction it was 

rolling, she said, “I would say heading straight” and that Davis was heading as if she was about to 

make a U-turn, saying, “You know, you straighten the wheel up and take off?” A defense objection 

was overruled. Bronson then said again that it looked to her like Davis was preparing to take off. 
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Before cross-examination, the defense moved to strike all of Bronson’s testimony about her 

perceptions of where Davis was going to drive. The trial court denied the motion, saying that the 

defense could address the movements of Davis’s car through cross-examination. Instead, the 

defense used cross-examination to establish that Bronson had been drinking throughout the night, 

had been at another party before arriving at this one, described her own condition that night as 

“drunk,” and had been taking ecstasy and smoking marijuana as well. 

¶ 28 The State then introduced forensic evidence through witnesses. Police who responded to 

the scene testified to their observations, the photographs they took, the footage from their body 

cameras, and the position of the seven spent shell casings they found in the driveway and the 

driveway apron area. Three casings were found in the northernmost side of the common driveway, 

between Rakin’s car and and the sidewalk; three more were found on that side of the driveway but 

closer to the sidewalk and driveway apron into the street; and one was found at the edge of the 

street on the southern side of the driveway. A handgun was found behind Rakin’s home and a 

semiautomatic handgun was found in a wooded area about a block away. The bullets found in 

Davis’s body and at the scene matched the semiautomatic. One of the forensic witnesses testified 

about the way that such guns eject cartridge casings. He agreed that such casings could bounce or 

roll or be kicked in ways that would affect the positions where they were found. Rakin’s car had 

some damage to the rear and had been pushed forward into the siding of the house it was parked 

behind, creating a large indentation. Davis’s car had damage to the front bumper and the right rear 

bumper, as well as the shot-out front passenger window and driver’s window, and a bullet hole in 

the right front door. 

¶ 29 A forensic pathologist testified about the path of two bullets that struck Davis. One entered 

her right cheek, passed through her brain, and partly exited her left ear, moving from front to back, 
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right to left, and slightly upwards. The other bullet entered Davis’s right chest, traveled through 

her left chest, and exited her upper left arm. The wounds likely rendered Davis unconscious 

immediately or within a short time. Toxicology reports showed the presence of THC and that 

Davis had a blood alcohol concentration of .086. 

¶ 30 Schletz testified about his interview of Rakin, and the video recording of that interview 

was played for the jury. The State then rested. 

¶ 31 The sole defense witness was Rakin. He testified that he had helped organize the party and 

asked Davis not to attend because he did not want a fight. He related that Davis did attend and 

fought with Maise. After the fight, Davis was escorted outside and people began preparing to 

leave. It was about 3 or 4 a.m. He was inside when someone came to get him, saying that Davis 

was trying to set his car on fire. He went outside and saw Davis hitting his car window with a 

stick. She then poured gasoline on his car and threw the gas can at him, getting gas on him. Rakin 

went inside, changed his shirt, and put a jacket on. Maise was still inside. He was not worried 

about damage to his car as he had insurance. People again came in to get him, telling him that 

Davis was ramming his car. He went outside and saw her ramming his car. It was loud and people 

were screaming. 

¶ 32 He went up to Davis’s car and tried to open the front passenger door but it was locked. 

Davis backed up. Rakin stood between Davis’s car and his own, trying to get her to stop, but she 

drove forward. Rakin moved out of the way but Davis’s car struck his knee as it rammed his car. 

Rakin fell to the ground. He stood up and pulled out a gun. Davis backed up and drove forward

to ram his car again, once more forcing him to jump out of the way. She then backed up and drove 

forward again. As she rammed his car, Rakin decided to fire. Davis was driving toward him and 

he felt that he was in danger and was scared that she might hit him or run him over. Although he 
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was left-hand dominant, he fired with his right hand, intending to disable Davis’s car. The shooting 

lasted only a few seconds. He did not intend to hurt her. It worked; her car stopped moving. 

Rakin began walking away. He could not run because his knee was in severe pain. A block or so 

away he disposed of the gun in a wooded area and left. He did not know Davis had died until the 

next day when someone told him. He was later arrested with Maise in Racine. 

¶ 33 Rakin admitted that he lied to Schletz about the gun during the interview. It was his own 

gun, which he had brought to the party. Rakin’s goal in talking with Schletz was to clear Maise’s 

name by establishing that she did not shoot Davis. Schletz dominated the conversation and Rakin 

did not feel he really had a chance to tell Schletz his side of the story. Asked to explain his 

statements to Schletz that he did not believe that Davis was trying to kill him, Rakin said that he 

was trying to express that, although she was not trying to kill him, she was enraged and was trying 

to hit him with her car. He shot intending to stop her car and did not mean to shoot her.

¶ 34 On cross-examination, Rakin reiterated that Davis was not trying to kill him. Killing her 

was an accident. Although he was trying to save his own life as Davis’s car was again coming 

toward him, he shot with his non-dominant hand at the vehicle. Rakin testified that he had never 

shot a gun before, but conceded that the gun belonged to him and that he knew how to load and 

shoot it. Questioned again about his statements that he did not believe that Davis was trying to hit 

him with her car or kill him, Rakin said: 

“I am saying *** that she was enraged so she did not care if I was collateral damage. 

I don’t believe her intention was to run me over, but by she being out of control she could 

have still ran me over whether she was intending to or trying to or not.” 

He continued, “Any time during the encounter after I was hit, once I was hit then I knew it was a 

chance that I could have been hit again.” 
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¶ 35 Regarding the interview with Schletz, Rakin acknowledged that the police were respectful 

and did not abuse him, and he had had the chance to eat and sleep shortly before he was arrested. 

Although his knee was hurting, the pain was not so bad that it affected his ability to answer the 

questions. He had taken some college courses and could speak articulately with Schletz. He 

understood his rights and understood the questions he was asked. He had not spent long in the 

interview room before the interview started. No one yelled at him and he did not ever think Schletz 

was mad at him. 

¶ 36 The jury was instructed on first degree murder, second degree murder, and self-defense, 

and asked to also find whether Rakin personally fired a gun and caused someone’s death. The jury 

found Rakin guilty of first degree murder and found that he had fired a gun causing death. The 

trial court denied his motion for a new trial. 

¶ 37 At sentencing, the State presented three family members of Davis who read letters into the 

record. The defense presented five letters in mitigation. Rakin spoke in allocution, apologizing 

to Davis’s family and saying that he had not meant to cause them pain. The State then spoke about 

several of the statutory factors in mitigation and argued that none of them applied. Specifically, 

the State argued that Rakin knew that his actions were likely to cause serious physical harm. It 

argued that the embarrassment, humiliation, and even the physical pain he suffered were not 

“strong provocation” that would justify his actions, especially in light of his age and maturity 

compared to Davis. No one else induced or facilitated his actions. Further, he had a lengthy and 

substantial criminal record beginning as a juvenile, which included several gun offenses, he had 

no intellectual disability or mental illness, and he had no physical condition that would be 

worsened by imprisonment. As for factors in aggravation, the State highlighted Rakin’s criminal 
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history and also argued that a lengthy sentence was necessary to deter others from committing 

similar crimes. The State requested a sentence of 75 years. 

¶ 38 The defense argued that, in fact, several factors in mitigation applied. As to provocation, 

Davis was drunk and angry enough to repeatedly ram Rakin’s car, and she hit him with her car. 

Rakin’s criminal history reflected repeated possessory offenses of drugs and weapons, but his only 

crime of violence occurred back in 1989. The defense disagreed that a longer sentence was needed 

to deter others, arguing that the shooting was an impulsive act in a chaotic situation and was less 

likely to serve as deterrence to others. The defense also stressed the stable and caring family man 

depicted in the letters in mitigation, noting that that side of Rakin was new to the court, which had 

only seen him on trial for murder. Observing that even the statutory minimum would be a de facto

life sentence as, with the mandatory 25-year add-on, Rakin could not be released until he was more

than 90 years old, the defense asked for the minimum of 45 years. 

¶ 39 The trial court stated that it had considered all of the evidence presented at trial as well as 

at the sentencing hearing, Rakin’s statement in allocution, the arguments of both sides, and the 

statutory factors. It then chose to highlight certain factors: 

“I have to consider as a factor in aggravation that the defendant’s conduct caused and 

threatened serious physical harm. I appreciate and hear the defense arguments that this 

was an impulsive act, albeit, intentional as found by the jury. However, when somebody 

picks up a handgun and it’s loaded, by [its] very nature that action, once that handgun is 

discharged, causes and threatens serious bodily harm to another, which is the problem with 

handguns in our society.” 

Regarding provocation, the trial court found that although the act was impulsive and “alcohol, 

jealousy, and anger fueled the actions of everyone that evening,” that did not justify or excuse 
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Rakin’s actions. The trial court expressed sadness in observing that Rakin’s mother had died 

when he was 11 years old, and now Rakin’s actions in shooting Davis meant that her 6-year old 

child had lost his own mother. The trial court considered Rakin’s criminal history, commenting 

that it found it “stupefying” that, by the age of 50, Rakin had been sentenced to 33 years in prison 

on his various offenses (although, with good time credits, he had spent less time than that in 

prison). This consistent criminal activity contradicted the depiction of a loving family man and 

provider shown in the letters in mitigation. The trial court imposed a sentence of 60 years. 

¶ 40 Rakin moved to reconsider his sentence, arguing in part that the trial court erred in 

considering that his conduct caused and threatened serious physical harm, as this factor was 

inherent in the offense as charged. In its ruling, the trial court acknowledged that it had stated that 

it was considering the physical harm caused by Rakin’s actions, and that that was an improper 

factor to consider. Nevertheless, it denied Rakin’s motion to reconsider the sentence, saying that 

it “suspect[ed]” that, when it made that statement, it “was looking at the totality of the 

circumstances and the totality of the events,” and the sentence was appropriate under the totality 

of the circumstances. This appeal followed. 

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 42 On appeal, Rakin argues that (1) his videotaped statement was involuntary and 

inadmissible because it was procured by police promises and deception, (2) the trial court’s errors 

in questioning potential jurors under Supreme Court Rule 431(b) amounted to plain error because 

the evidence was closely balanced, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Bronson 

to testify about Davis’s supposed intention to leave the scene, and (4) the trial court improperly 

relied on a factor inherent in the offense when sentencing him. We examine each argument in 

turn. 
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¶ 43 A. Voluntariness of Statement to Police

¶ 44 Rakin first argues that Schletz promised leniency for Maise and himself if he confessed to 

the shooting, and Schletz also lied about the evidence against him. Because of this, he argues, his 

statement was involuntary and inadmissible. 

¶ 45 The requirement that a defendant’s confession be voluntary flows from two aspects of the 

United States constitution: the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., 

amend. XIV), under which the United States Supreme Court has condemned certain interrogation 

techniques which, either in themselves or in their effect on “the unique characteristics of a 

particular suspect,” are “offensive to a civilized system of justice,” and also from the fifth 

amendment’s proscription against compelled self-incrimination (U.S. Const., amend. V). People 

v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). 

Because of these constitutional concerns, a confession that is not voluntary must be excluded. Id.

at 253. The State bears the burden of showing that the confession was voluntary. Id. at 254. 

¶ 46 In considering whether a confession is voluntary, a court considers factors relating to the 

defendant himself, including the defendant’s age, intelligence, background, experience, education, 

mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning; and also the circumstances of 

the questioning, such as the legality and duration of the detention, whether the suspect was given 

Miranda warnings, the duration of the questioning, and the interrogator’s use of threats, promises, 

or deception to induce the confession. Id. at 253-54; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (1998). 

None of these factors is dispositive; a court must consider all of the circumstances in the case 

before it. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 253. In applying these factors the court must bear in mind the 

ultimate question to be answered, which is “ ‘whether the defendant made the statement freely, 

voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will 
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was overcome at the time he or she confessed.’ ” People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 160 (2008)

(quoting People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996)). A reviewing court accepts the factual 

findings of the trial court unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but considers 

de novo the overarching question of whether the State met its burden to show that the defendant’s 

statement was made voluntarily. People v. Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 29. 

¶ 47 Here, Rakin does not take issue with the trial court’s assessment of his age, intelligence, 

experience, and other factors related to each unique defendant, or with its findings that the 

questioning was legal, included appropriate Miranda warnings, and did not last overly long. 

Indeed, the State argues that all of these factors favor the conclusion that Rakin’s statement was 

voluntary, and Rakin does not really dispute that assertion. Instead, Rakin focuses on the last 

factor mentioned in Richardson: the interrogator’s use of threats, promises, and deception to 

induce the defendant to confess. Rakin argues that Schletz capitalized on Rakin’s obvious concern 

for Maise’s situation as well as his desire not to see his son charged for allegedly handing Rakin a 

gun, and that Schletz made promises of leniency toward Maise1 that went beyond simply urging 

Rakin to be truthful and amounted to a prohibited quid pro quo in return for his confession to 

shooting Davis. Rakin also points to Schletz’s suggestion that Rakin could face lesser or even no 

charges if he confessed, and to Schletz’s lies about Rakin’s fingerprints being found on the gun 

1 It appears to be an open question whether a promise of leniency for someone other than 

the defendant can qualify as equally coercive as a promise of leniency for the defendant himself—

neither Rakin nor the State raised this specific argument or cited any case law on the issue. We 

therefore express no opinion on the issue and for the purposes of the current case simply proceed 

as if a promise of leniency for someone else can qualify as equally coercive.
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used in the shooting and there being inculpatory video of the events of that night. (In fact, there 

was no forensic evidence tying Rakin to the shooting.) He argues that, in light of all of these 

promises and deceptions, his confession cannot be considered voluntary and should have been 

suppressed. 

¶ 48 Rakin’s legal argument rests primarily on two cases: a century-old supreme court decision, 

People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624 (1922), and an appellate court decision, People v. Ruegger, 32 Ill. 

App. 3d 765 (1975). These cases do not demonstrate error here, however, as we explain. 

¶ 49 The Heide decision includes some powerful language that seems to compel the conclusion 

Rakin urges here, that a confession induced by police promises is inadmissible. “The rule is that 

a confession obtained under any promise or hope of immunity is not admissible in evidence,” and 

“a confession becomes incompetent whenever any degree of influence has been exerted by any 

person *** tending to cause duress or hope of leniency.” Heide, 302 Ill. at 627. These statements 

suggest that, where the police have promised or even created a hope of leniency if a defendant 

confesses, the confession cannot be used, regardless of the other circumstances of the questioning 

and characteristics of the defendant. 

¶ 50 The absolutist approach of Heide is no longer the standard, however. Instead, as the 

supreme court has more recently confirmed, police promises, threats, and deception are simply 

one factor among the many to be weighed in determining whether a confession is voluntary. See 

Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 30 (“No single factor is dispositive” and police threats or promises 

may be considered one aspect of “whether there was any physical or mental abuse by the police,”);

see also Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 253 (no one factor is dispositive; rather, a court must consider 
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all of the circumstances in the case before it).2 In accord with this multifactorial “totality of the 

circumstances” approach, appellate courts have repeatedly held that a defendant’s statement is not 

per se inadmissible if all of the circumstances, taken together, indicate that it was made voluntarily. 

See People v. Lee, 2012 IL App (1st) 101851, ¶ 34; see also People v. Veal, 149 Ill. App. 3d 619, 

623 (1986) (“even where promises or suggestions of leniency have been made, the confession is 

not necessarily inadmissible”; instead, “[t]he ultimate question is whether, considering the totality 

of the attendant circumstances, defendant’s will was overcome at the time he confessed”); People 

v. Jones, 8 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853 (1972) (“although threats or promises may have been made, [if] 

the evidence as a whole shows that a statement was made voluntarily,” it is admissible in evidence). 

¶ 51 Here, when considering all of the relevant factors, including Rakin’s age, intelligence, 

ample experience with the criminal justice system, and the relatively short duration and respectful 

atmosphere of the interrogation, we conclude that Schletz’s promises and suggestions of leniency 

and lies to Rakin did not overcome his will and render his confession involuntary. Rakin stresses 

that he did not confess to the shooting until Schletz said that if Rakin confessed to the shooting, 

the police would let Maise go. That is not quite the way the interview unfolded, however. Rakin 

did make it clear that he was worried about what would happen to Maise, asking about her situation 

right at the start of the interrogation. Schletz told him accurately that, although the Racine police 

might want to know whether she was involved with the drugs in the motel room, he and his partner 

2 For an excellent historical analysis of the legal basis for the Heide decision and the 

evolution toward the adoption of the “totality of the circumstances” standard, including the 

relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, see People v. Phillips, 2018 IL App (3d) 130270, 

¶ 65 (Holdridge, J., dissenting). 
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(who were solely interested in Davis’s shooting) did not view her as a suspect. Asserting that 

Maise had nothing to do with either the drugs or the shooting, Rakin immediately stated that the 

drugs were his. However, he still refused to say who shot Davis, let alone that he did. Instead, for 

an hour and a half, Rakin continued to say that he would not talk about the shooting, despite Schletz 

stressing (among other things) Maise’s trust in Rakin and her vulnerability as a young woman with 

a child. During that time, Rakin demonstrated his intelligence and knowledge of the criminal 

justice system by bluntly dismissing Schletz’s attempts to suggest that, by “telling his side of the 

story,” Rakin could influence the charges brought against him and affect the length of any sentence 

he might eventually receive. Rakin accurately noted that, with a gun involved, any admission he 

might make would result in him going to prison for the rest of his life, regardless of the charges. 

¶ 52 Moreover, although Schletz stated that Maise still faced an outstanding warrant or possible 

charges in connection with Davis’s shooting as long as that shooting remained unresolved, he also 

repeated that he did not believe that she was involved. It was not until after a long pause during 

which Rakin appeared to be confronting the likelihood that he would be charged with Davis’s 

shooting regardless of whether he made a statement, that Rakin asked Schletz whether, if he 

confessed to shooting Davis, the police would release Maise. Rakin, not Schletz, initiated this 

offer, apparently seeking to negotiate some advantage for those he cared about in return for his 

confession. Nor was Schletz’s response quite the immediate and specific promise of leniency that 

Rakin portrays. Although Schletz responded “absolutely” to Rakin’s question, Schletz 

immediately followed that up by clarifying the limited extent of his power, saying only that he 

would make recommendations or suggestions to others. Schletz promised that he would 

“absolutely” speak to the Racine police and the State’s attorney on Maise’s behalf, not that she 

would “absolutely” be released and any charges against her dropped. See People v. Hubbard, 55 
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Ill. 2d 142, 152 (1984) (promise to tell the prosecutor of the defendant’s cooperation was not a 

“promise of leniency”); People v. Eckles, 128 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278 (1984) (police promises to tell 

the prosecutor and judge of the defendant’s cooperation were not specific promises of leniency, as 

would be required to raise an issue about voluntariness of the defendant’s confession). The record 

does not support Rakin’s argument that Schletz made a specific promise of leniency for Maise or 

improperly offered a deal in return for Rakin’s confession to the shooting. 

¶ 53 Rakin also points out that Schletz engaged in deception, falsely telling Rakin that his 

fingerprints were found on the murder weapon and that there was incriminatory video footage of 

him near the location where the gun was found. Deception by police interrogators is not per se

unlawful. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 76. However, it can contribute to a coercive 

atmosphere and weigh against a finding of voluntariness. Id. 

¶ 54 Here, Rakin’s statements during the interrogation show that he accepted Schletz’s 

misrepresentations as true, and thus they can fairly be said to have factored into his decision to 

confess to shooting Davis. Nevertheless, in considering the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding Rakin’s confession, the great weight of the factors support a finding that Rakin 

confessed voluntarily. On the specific issue of Rakin’s ability to assess the evidence against him, 

we note that, although there was no forensic evidence linking Rakin to the shooting, there was 

considerable eyewitness testimony that he shot Davis. Even if Rakin had known that there was no 

forensic evidence against him, he also knew how many people were present when the shooting 

occurred and could assess the likelihood that he would be identified as the shooter through alternate 

means. For all of these reasons, we agree with the trial court that Rakin’s will was not overcome 

by Schletz’s questioning of him and that his confession was made voluntarily. 

¶ 55 B. Improper Rule 431(b) Questioning 
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¶ 56 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) requires a trial court, as part of voir 

dire, to 

“ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and 

accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the 

charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must 

prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required 

to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not testify 

it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be 

made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the defendant objects.” 

¶ 57 As can be seen from the plain language of the rule, the trial court must ask potential jurors 

both whether they understand these principles and whether they accept them. Id.; see also People 

v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶¶ 44-45 (discussing Illinois Supreme Court cases requiring strict 

compliance with the rule). It is undisputed that the trial court in this case did not comply with Rule 

431(b), as it failed to ask several panels of potential jurors whether they not only understood but 

also accepted the first principle, the presumption of innocence. The question before us is the proper 

effect of this failure, given that the defendant failed to object to the error either when it was made 

or in his posttrial motion for a new trial. The defendant raises this error for the first time on appeal. 

¶ 58 “It is well settled in Illinois that an appellant who fails to raise an issue before the trial court 

forfeits the issue and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.” Williams v. Bruscato, 2019 IL 

App (2d) 170779, ¶ 24 (citing In re Shauntae P., 2012 IL App (1st) 112280, ¶ 93). That rule of 

forfeiture may be relaxed in narrow circumstances if the error qualifies as “plain error,” that is, a 

substantial error. 
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“Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) memorializes the plain-error 

doctrine: 

‘Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights 

shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.’

The plain-error doctrine does not create a ‘general saving clause’ to allow defendants to 

escape the consequences of their nonfeasance. [Citation.] Instead, it offers a narrow 

exception to the rule of procedural default for unpreserved errors. [Citation.] Whether 

there is plain error is a question of law, which we review de novo.” People v. Williams, 

2022 IL 126918, ¶ 48. 

¶ 59 In order to successfully qualify for application of the plain error doctrine, a defendant must 

first show that the trial court committed a clear or obvious error. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 

545 (2010). After meeting this threshold, the defendant must then show “either that (1) the 

evidence *** was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a 

fair *** hearing.” Id. If the defendant cannot meet this burden, then the error remains forfeited. 

Id. 

¶ 60 Here, the threshold inquiry is satisfied: the State agrees that the trial court’s failure to 

question all of the prospective jurors about whether they accepted the presumption of innocence 

was a clear or obvious error. It is also well-established that the second avenue for plain-error relief 

is not open to Rakin, as errors in applying Rule 431(b) do not necessarily result in a biased jury 

and thus are not structural errors that by themselves require reversal. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, 

¶ 47 (citing People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 610-11 (2010)). Thus, Rakin’s failure to preserve 

this error in the trial court can be overcome only if he can show that the evidence was “so closely 
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balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant.” Id. ¶ 48 

(citing People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007)). In evaluating whether the evidence was 

closely balanced, a court must perform a commonsense qualitative analysis—that is, one that 

considers all of the evidence in context, including the plausibility of each side’s explanation of that 

evidence—not simply a quantitative review that considers only the amount of evidence introduced 

by each side. Id. ¶¶ 50, 53. 

¶ 61 In this case, the closeness-of-the-evidence inquiry really applies only to one issue: whether 

the State disproved Rakin’s claim that he shot Davis in self-defense (or imperfect self-defense). 

At trial, Rakin did not dispute that he knowingly shot toward Davis or that his shots caused her 

death, and thus the only question was whether that shooting was justified in whole or in part. Rakin 

argues that the evidence regarding self-defense (imperfect or otherwise) was closely balanced and 

that he put forward a plausible defense that was corroborated by other evidence. The record does 

not support his argument. 

¶ 62 “Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once it is raised, the State has the burden of 

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, in addition to 

proving the elements of the charged offense.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 50. A claim of 

self-defense has six elements. Id. “If the State negates any one of these elements, the defendant's 

claim of self-defense necessarily fails.” Id. 

¶ 63 Among the elements for self-defense is that the defendant actually and subjectively 

believed a danger existed that required the use of the force that was applied. Id. Here, the evidence 

on that element was not closely balanced, and thus the defense as a whole was not established. 

Although it was clear that Davis was enraged and was intentionally ramming Rakin’s car, the State 

showed, through Rakin’s own words in his videotaped statement, that he was not subjectively 
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afraid that Davis was trying to run him over or kill him. Rather, he believed that she was focused 

on damaging his car, saying that Davis “didn’t try to run me over and I didn’t think she was going 

to try to run me over.” He repeated this at least twice more, saying that Davis was not trying to 

hit him with her car or run him over, even though she was enraged and willing to strike him if he 

got in her way. At trial, Rakin contradicted his earlier statement, testifying that he felt he was in 

danger and was afraid that Davis might hit him or run him over. A jury could well discount this 

testimony as being based on legal strategy and less credible, however, especially in light of his 

admission that he had lied to Schletz about where he got the gun. Rakin also testified that, far 

from firing blindly out of fear (or going back inside the house), he “decided” to shoot toward Davis

to stop her car, and he even thought things through enough that he decided to fire the gun (which 

he asserted he had never fired before) with his nondominant hand. This testimony was far less 

credible than his earlier version of events in his confession. 

¶ 64 The forensic evidence also supported the conclusion that Rakin was not in imminent danger 

when he shot Davis. Although Davis was driving forward and backward along the northern half 

of the driveway in order to ram Rakin’s car, Rakin fired from the side of the car, not in front of it. 

The shots that killed Davis came through the front passenger side window, not through the 

windshield. This in itself showed that Rakin was not in Davis’s path when he shot her, supporting 

the version of events that he told the police and undermining his trial testimony that he was afraid 

she would hit him. And although the shell casings could have been kicked or moved as people left 

the party, their distribution is generally along the length of the driveway, supporting the inference 

that Rakin walked toward Davis’s car as he fired, an action that again undermined his insistence 

that he shot toward her out of fear. (Although the distribution of the shell casings could also 

indicate that Rakin was retreating as he fired, he never suggested that he retreated in either his 
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police statement or at trial, nor did any other witness.) For all of these reasons, the evidence 

regarding Rakin’s lack of a subjective belief that he was in danger was not closely balanced. As 

Rakin has not shown plain error, his forfeiture of his Rule 431(b) argument is not excused. Hillier, 

237 Ill. 2d at 545. We therefore decline to consider this argument. 

¶ 65 C. Admissibility of Bronson’s Statements

¶ 66 Rakin next challenges the trial court’s admission of several statements by Bronson that he 

contends were nothing more than improper speculation about Davis’s state of mind. He points out 

that the defense specifically sought and obtained a pretrial order barring such testimony. The State 

argues that the admitted statements were simply Bronson’s inarticulate description of the 

movements of Davis’s car, which were based on her observations of those movements and were 

therefore admissible. The State concedes, however, that Bronson’s description also contained her 

own interpretation that the movements of Davis’s car showed that Davis planned to leave and was

backing into the street, turning her steering wheel, and preparing to drive forward down the street, 

away from Rakin. The State argues that Bronson’s statements about Davis’s plans were 

unsolicited and were incidental to her testimony about her observations of the car’s movements, 

which she had trouble explaining, and therefore their admission was not an abuse of discretion. 

Alternately, the State argues that Bronson’s statements were harmless error. 

¶ 67 The statements at issue are as follows. 

“Q [prosecution]. And was the female’s car backing up at the time the defendant was 

shooting? 

THE WITNESS: My opinion on the outside of the car from what I—it looking like she was 

[preparing] to pull off. 

* * * 
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Q. Why do you think she threw the car in drive? 

A. Well, it perceived to me like she was [preparing] to pull off. 

* * * 

Q. In which direction was it rolling? 

A. She was reversing. So I would say heading straight. So like heading like she was 

[preparing] to bust a U-turn. You know how you straighten the wheel up and take off? 

* * * 

A. She was [preparing] to take off, I thought is what it looked like.” 

Although the defense objected to the first three statements, the trial court overruled the objections. 

The defense then moved to strike all of these statements, but the trial court denied the motion, 

saying that the defense could go into the basis for Bronson’s statements on cross-examination if it 

wished. 

¶ 68 The determination of whether evidence is admissible is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and we will not reverse that determination unless there has been a clear abuse of its 

discretion. People v. Montano, 2017 IL App (2d) 140326, ¶ 74. A trial court abuses its discretion 

when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the trial court, or when its ruling rests on an error of law. People v. Olsen, 2015 IL 

App (2d) 140267, ¶ 11. 

¶ 69 Rakin argues that the trial court’s rulings allowing Bronson’s statements to stand were an 

abuse of discretion. “It is well settled in Illinois that the testimony of a lay witness must be 

confined to statements of fact of which the witness has personal knowledge.” People v. Brown, 

200 Ill. App. 3d 566, 579 (1990); see also Ill. R. Evid. 602 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Witnesses can testify 

about a person’s actions, words, or facial expressions, as such testimony is based on observation 
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and therefore is within the scope of a witness’s firsthand knowledge. People v. Ward, 2021 IL 

App (2d) 190243, ¶ 65. However, a witness cannot testify to the intentions of another person. Id. 

¶ 72. 

¶ 70 The State does not dispute these general principles but argues that Bronson’s testimony 

falls within an exception to them. Opinion testimony by a lay witness is permissible when it is

“based upon his or her observations where it is difficult to reproduce for the jury the totality of the 

conditions perceived and where the opinion given is one that persons, in general, are capable of 

making and understanding.” People v. Crump, 319 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542 (2001). We observe that 

Illinois Rule of Evidence 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) similarly reflects this approach to opinion 

testimony by lay witnesses: 

“If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of 

opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally 

based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the 

witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” 

The State argues that Bronson had difficulty describing what she saw as Davis backed her car out 

of the driveway the final time, but the movements of a car turning after backing out of a driveway 

before proceeding down a street are familiar to most persons and Bronson’s opinions about what 

the movements she observed signified were rationally based on her perceptions and were helpful 

to the jury’s understanding of her testimony. Thus, the State argues, the trial court’s decision to 

allow the testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 71 Although it is a close question, we agree with the State that, while Bronson could not testify 

to Davis’s intentions, she could testify to her own interpretation of the movements of Davis’s car. 
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Before making the statements at issue, Bronson testified that she saw Davis drive forward and 

backward along the driveway several times as Davis rammed Rakin’s car. Davis then backed out 

of the driveway into the roadway far enough that Davis’s car hit Bronson’s vehicle parked across 

the street from the driveway. Bronson heard shots. Although Bronson conceded that she did not 

hear Davis change gears, she believed that Davis put her car in drive and the car began moving in 

a way that made Bronson think it was about to proceed down the street. After the second shot, 

however, Davis’s car began rolling. This testimony provided background information about the 

basis for Bronson’s opinion that Davis was turning her car as the shooting occurred. Thus, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting that testimony to stand. 

¶ 72 We also agree with the State that, even if the trial court erred by allowing Bronson’s 

opinion testimony, that error was harmless in light of the other evidence. An evidentiary issue is 

harmless when no reasonable probability existed that the jury would have acquitted the defendant 

absent the error. In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 180 (2006). In determining whether an error is 

harmless, relevant considerations include (1) whether the error might have contributed to the 

conviction; (2) whether the other properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supported the 

conviction; and (3) whether the improperly admitted evidence had minimal effect because it was 

“ ‘merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.’ ” In re Brandon P., 2014 IL 

116653, ¶ 50 (quoting In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43 (2008)). 

¶ 73 The question of whether Davis was driving toward Rakin’s car to ram it again or turning 

the car before driving away was certainly relevant to some elements of Rakin’s self-defense claim, 

such as whether he faced imminent danger from Davis and the reasonableness of any belief he had 

that he needed to use deadly force to defend himself. See People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 50 

(listing the elements of self-defense). However, Rakin’s defense required that he show all six 
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elements, and the absence of any one element was fatal. Id. As we have discussed, Rakin’s 

confession effectively negated one of those elements—that he feared for his life when he shot 

toward Davis—because he repeatedly told Schletz that he did not. In light of the fact that Rakin 

admitted that he shot Davis and caused her death, and that he himself negated an essential element 

of his self-defense claim, his conviction was overwhelmingly supported by the properly admitted 

evidence. 

¶ 74 We also note that Bronson’s opinion testimony was cumulative to other evidence, and was 

less likely to have been relied upon than that other evidence. Specifically, there was photographic 

evidence that Davis’s car came to rest in a diagonal position in the street, its wheels were turned 

in the direction of the street rather than the driveway, and bullets had struck the side window rather 

than the front windshield. This was objective evidence regarding the movements of Davis’s car 

in relation to Rakin for the jury to consider, unlike Bronson’s testimony, which was impeached by 

the contradictory and confusing nature of her testimony as well as her admission that she was 

drunk and had consumed marijuana and ecstasy during the hours before the shooting. 

¶ 75 Considering all of these factors, we conclude that, even if the trial court had abused its 

discretion in admitting Branson’s interpretation of Davis’s car’s movements, there was no 

reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Rakin absent that error. See In re E.H.,

224 Ill. 2d at 180. 

¶ 76 D. Consideration of Improper Sentencing Factors 

¶ 77 Rakin’s final argument is that the trial court erred by improperly considering, as a factor in 

aggravation, that his conduct caused or threatened to cause serious physical harm. Rakin argues 

that this factor is inherent in his offense of conviction—first degree murder—and thus should not 

have been separately considered by the trial court. Similarly, the trial court’s comments indicated 
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that it gave weight to the fact that Rakin used a gun to kill Davis, although Rakin’s sentence already 

included a mandatory add-on for his discharge of a firearm. 

¶ 78 “It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, 

and the trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 

2d 203, 209 (2000). However, “[a]lthough the trial court is vested with wide discretion in 

sentencing, such discretion is not without limitation.” Id. Section 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) of the Unified 

Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2016)) permits a court to consider, as an 

aggravating factor in sentencing, that a defendant’s conduct “caused or threatened serious harm.” 

However, it is improper for a court to rely on this factor when the causation of serious harm is 

inherent in the offense. 

“Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted 

cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense. [Citation.] Stated 

differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis 

for imposing ‘a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.’ [Citation.] 

Such dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a ‘double enhancement.’ [Citation.] 

The prohibition against double enhancements is based on the assumption that, in 

designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the legislature 

necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 

12 (2004). 

¶ 79 Rakin was convicted of first degree murder, a conviction that necessarily includes as an 

element that he caused the death of another. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2016). Thus, it would 

be improper for the trial court to have considered, as an aggravating factor, that he caused serious 

harm to Davis if the harm considered by the trial court was that Rakin caused Davis’s death. See 
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People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 272 (1986). Similarly, as Rakin received a mandatory statutory 

25-year add-on to his sentence for personally discharging a gun (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(d)(iii) (West 

2016)), the trial court should not have considered, as an aggravating factor, that he used a gun to 

kill Davis. 

¶ 80 The State points out that, even with a murder conviction, a trial court may consider the 

harm caused by a defendant’s conduct as it pertains to circumstances apart from the victim’s death, 

such as the force employed, the physical manner in which the victim’s death was brought about, 

or the nature and circumstances of the offense. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 271. But a careful review 

of the trial court’s comments shows that, in discussing the harm factor, the court was focused on 

the fact that Rakin had access to and used a gun, and caused Davis’s death—not on other 

circumstances of Rakin’s conduct and the harm he caused or threatened. 

¶ 81 At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: 

“I have to consider as a factor in aggravation that the defendant’s conduct caused and

threatened serious physical harm. I appreciate and hear the defense arguments that this 

was an impulsive act, albeit, intentional as found by the jury. However, when somebody 

picks up a handgun and it’s loaded, by [its] very nature that action, once that handgun is 

discharged, causes and threatens serious bodily harm to another, which is the problem with 

handguns in our society.” 

The State suggests that these comments could be construed as referring to the threat of harm that 

shooting poses to others in the vicinity, especially when the shooting takes place in a residential 

area, as in this case. But the record simply offers no support for this argument—the trial court 

never referred to the residential setting or the danger to others posed by Rakin’s shooting, only to 

the fact that Rakin had picked up a loaded handgun and shot at Davis. Under Saldivar and its 
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progeny, this was improper double consideration of elements of the offense and the mandatory 

add-on. 

¶ 82 Rakin moved for a reconsideration of his sentence, arguing that the comment above showed 

that the trial court improperly relied on a factor inherent in his conviction. In ruling on the motion, 

the trial court admitted that the transcript of the sentencing hearing showed that it did consider, as 

an aggravating factor, that Rakin caused harm to Davis, and it admitted that doing so was improper. 

It also once again emphasized that Rakin used a gun to kill Davis: 

“The Defense accurately points out that I did state *** that I considered a factor in 

aggravation that the Defendant’s conduct caused or threatened serious physical harm. 

I suspect when I stated those things, I was looking at the totality of the situation and 

the totality of the events because the Defense is accurate that to consider the Defendant’s 

conduct, specifically, as an aggravating factor, that it caused or threatened serious harm, 

and the fact that it is inherent in the offense of first degree murder, would not be a reason 

to enhance the sentence. 

The Court did, though I hope, accurately express my continuing remarks regarding 

what I considered in the sentencing when I came to the sentence of 60 years indicating that 

I considered the factors in totality with the actual facts that I heard at the trial, which caused 

the situation where Ms. Davis was unable to escape all of those bullets that were discharged 

at her in her vehicle, seven, two of them proving to be fatal. 

I also indicated that I also considered the Defendant’s prior criminal history of 

delinquency and his criminal activity and other factors in aggravation. 
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I indicated that having due regard for the character of the offender, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the public interest on that, a disposition of imprisonment 

was appropriate. 

And I indicated I came to the number that I came to because of the Defendant’s 

other extensive prior criminal history. 

And then, taking all those factors in their totality into consideration, the Court felt 

that *** a sentence of 60 years, given the number of times that the Defendant had been to 

prison previously was an appropriate sentence.” 

Notably, after admitting error, the court did not cure its error by asserting that it did not really rely 

on any improper factors in setting Rakin’s sentence. Instead it stated that it also relied on proper 

factors such as Rakin’s criminal history in setting Rakin’s sentence, and denied the motion. 

¶ 83 The trial court’s assumption that its consideration of proper aggravating factors would 

necessarily cure its consideration of an improper factor is mistaken. Where, as here, the record 

shows clearly that the trial court relied in part on an improper factor in fashioning a defendant’s 

sentence, we must remand for resentencing unless we can determine the weight given to the 

improper factor. People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 13. 

¶ 84 “A sentence based on improper factors will not be affirmed unless the reviewing court can 

determine from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor 

was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence.” People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1, 21 

(2008). Here, as in Heider, the trial court repeatedly commented, both at sentencing and in ruling 

on the motion to reconsider, on the serious harm caused to Davis as well as the fact that Rakin 

used a readily available gun to kill Davis. See id. at 22 (highlighting the trial court’s emphatic 

statements about the improper factor). And we cannot conclude that the court’s consideration of 
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the improper factors was insignificant, as the sentence the court imposed on Rakin was 15 years 

above the minimum of 45 years. Compare id. at 24-25 (reliance on improper factor could not be 

deemed insignificant when the defendant received 4 years more than the minimum of a 6- to 30-

year sentencing range). As we cannot rule out the possibility that the trial court’s consideration of 

improper factors affected its judgment about the proper sentence, we must vacate that sentence. 

¶ 85 Rakin asks that, upon remand, his case be assigned to a different judge for resentencing. 

Our supreme court has suggested that this is a proper course of action “to remove any suggestion 

of unfairness” (id. at 25; see also People v. Woods, 2018 IL App (1st) 153323, ¶ 39), and the State 

does not object. We therefore grant this request. 

¶ 86 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 87 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed as to 

Rakin’s conviction. His sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for resentencing to the 

chief judge of the criminal division to assign a new judge for resentencing. 

¶ 88 Conviction affirmed; sentence vacated and cause remanded for resentencing.