alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2010079DE.01005802.xml

| 25.3.2010 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 79/58 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.3.2010

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 79/58

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 670/2009 der Kommission vom 24. Juli 2009 mit Durchführungsbestimmungen zur Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1234/2007 des Rates hinsichtlich der öffentlichen Intervention im Wege der Ausschreibung für den Ankauf von Hartweizen oder Rohreis sowie zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 428/2008 und (EG) Nr. 687/2008

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 194 vom 25. Juli 2009
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 194 vom 25. Juli 2009

Auf Seite 24, Artikel 2 Absatz 2 Buchstabe b:

anstatt:

| „b) | die Mindestauslagerungskapazität jedes Lagerraums entspricht einem Absatz je Arbeitstag von mindestens 5 % der eingelagerten Menge, d. h. 1 000 Tonnen bei Hartweizen bzw. 500 Tonnen bei Reis.“ |
| --- | --- |

„b)

die Mindestauslagerungskapazität jedes Lagerraums entspricht einem Absatz je Arbeitstag von mindestens 5 % der eingelagerten Menge, d. h. 1 000 Tonnen bei Hartweizen bzw. 500 Tonnen bei Reis.“

muss es heißen:

| „b) | die Mindestauslagerungskapazität jedes Lagerraums entspricht einem Absatz je Arbeitstag von mindestens 5 % der eingelagerten Menge oder 1 000 Tonnen bei Hartweizen und 500 Tonnen bei Reis.“ |
| --- | --- |

„b)

die Mindestauslagerungskapazität jedes Lagerraums entspricht einem Absatz je Arbeitstag von mindestens 5 % der eingelagerten Menge oder 1 000 Tonnen bei Hartweizen und 500 Tonnen bei Reis.“

---
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

§

EX PARTE No. 08

- 18

- 00146

- CR

§

TYRONE CAMERON

. Appeal from the

§

County Criminal Court No. 1

§

of El Paso County, Texas

§

(TC# 20170C10013 )

§

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tyrone Cameron is appealing an order denying pre

- trial habeas corpus relief. In his habeas

application, Appellant challenged the con stitutionality of the information charging him with

harassment. The State subsequently dismissed the criminal prosecution against Appellant thereby

rendering this appeal moot

. It is well established that an appellate court does not have jurisdiction

to d ecide moot controversies and render advisory opinions. See T EX

. C ONST

. art. II, § 1; National

Collegiate Athletic Association v. Jones , 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). If events occurring during

the pendency of the appeal cause the matter before the court to become moot, the appellate court

is prohibited from deciding it. See Heckman v. Williamson County , 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.

2012). When the premise of a habeas co rpus application is destroyed by subsequent developments,

the legal issues raised thereunder are moot. See Ex parte Guerrero , 99 S.W.3d 852, 8532

(Tex.App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. Accordingly, we grant Appellant’s

motion and dismiss the appeal as moot.

January 11, 2019 YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-1261

___________________________ Stacy K. Arnold lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. City of St. Joseph, Missouri; St. Joseph Public Library; Officer Rebecca Hailey, In

her personal and professional capacity lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - St. Joseph

____________ Submitted: September 14, 2021 Filed: September 17, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before ERICKSON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Stacy Arnold appeals after the district court 1 dismissed some of her claims and adversely granted summary judgment as to her

1 The Honorable Beth Phillips, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.remaining claims. After careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments on

appeal, we conclude the district court properly determined Arnold lacked standing as to her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, see Buckler v. United States , 919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019) (reviewing de novo grant of motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); City of Kennett v. EPA , 887 F.3d 424, 430 (8th Cir. 2018) (reviewing de novo standing determination on summary judgment); and properly granted summary judgment as to her claims for damages, see McReynolds v. Schmidli , 4 F.4th 648, 652 (8th Cir. 2021) (reviewing de novo grant of summary judgment). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
#### PEOPLE v. MUTUAL BREWING CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 27, 1896.)

Proceeding against the Mutual Brewing Company.

No opinion. Order modified by directing the return to the purchaser of $250, less the expenses of the sale. Order settled by Justice BARTLETT, and signed.
#### State of Connecticut *v.*Murray R. Gold

The defendant’s “Motion to Compel a Finding or Proceed on the Record and Transcript” filed in connection with his motion for a review of bail in his appeal from the Superior Court for the judicial district of Waterbury is granted to the extent that the trial court is directed to file with this court a *654finding, such as circumstances permit, setting forth the basis for its ultimate conclusion, including any claims of law made together with its conclusions thereon.

*Victor M. Ferrante*and, of the New York bar, *William M. Kunstler,*in support of the motion.

Submitted March 12

decided March 19, 1975
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION                  As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009 of Integrated BioPharma, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), E. Gerald Kay, the Chief Executive Officer of Integrated BioPharma, Inc. (the "Company"), certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.        Section 1350, that to his knowledge:

|  | (1)      | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2)      | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.                 A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.                 Dated:     October 13, 2009

                                   By: /s/ E. Gerald Kay                                           E. Gerald Kay                                           Chief Executive Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 22, 2017

p0315

Order 

Clerk

March 22, 2017

154925

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 154925

COA: 326930

Wayne CC: 14-010443-FC

JARELL ANTONIO HOUGH,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 18, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
EXHIBIT 23





INDEPENDENT AUDITORS CONSENT





We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements Nos. 333-18981, 333-18983,
333-18985, 333-18987, 333-18989, 333-29153, 333-63493, 333-36646, 333-46126 and 333-67710 all on Form S-8 of SRS Labs, Inc., of our report dated March 15, 2002, appearing in SRS Labs, Inc.s Annual Report on Form 10K for the year ended December
31, 2001.





Deloitte & Touche LLP





/s/    DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP





Costa Mesa, California


March 28,
2001
#### Bryant Villatoro et al., Respondents, v Ambassador Apartments, Inc., et al., Appellants, et al., Respondent.

Submitted February 13, 2007;

decided April 3, 2007

Motion by Alfred S. Friedman Management Corp. for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that as to said appellant the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion by Ambassador Apartments, Inc. for leave to appeal denied.
EX-10.23





 Exhibit 10.23 

Certain identified information marked with [***] has been excluded from the exhibit because it is both not material and is the type that the registrant
treats as private or confidential. 
 AMENDMENT # 2 TO EXCLUSIVE LICENSE AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN IONQ, INC. DUKE UNIVERSITY AND UNIVERSITIY OF MARYLAND 

This Amendment #2 to the Exclusive License Agreement entered into by and between Duke University, a nonprofit educational and research
institution organized under the laws of North Carolina (“DUKE”) and IonQ, Inc. (“Licensee”) is effective as of the date of last signature below. 

Background: UMD and Licensee executed an Exclusive License Agreement dated effective July 19, 2016 and amended September 22, 2017 (collectively
“Exclusive License Agreement”). In connection with the Exclusive License Agreement, DUKE and Licensee executed an Exclusive Option Agreement, effective July 15, 2016 (“Option Agreement”). Under the terms and conditions of the
Option Agreement, DUKE granted Licensee, and Licensee accepted, an exclusive option during the Option Period (as defined in the Option Agreement) to obtain a worldwide exclusive license, with the right to sublicense, under the Exclusive License
Agreement to DUKE’s rights in Option IP (the “Option”). DUKE has disclosed certain Option IP to Licensee and Licensee elects to exercise its Option to license such Option IP by executing this Amendment #2 to the Exclusive License
Agreement. To that end, DUKE and Licensee hereby agree that the Exclusive License Agreement is amended as follows: 
 1. The definition of Licensed
Inventions in Section 1.09 is modified to add at the end of the definition: “and [***] and the related detailed descriptions.” 
 2. Appendix
A to the Exclusive License Agreement shall be replaced with the attached Appendix A. 
 3. All other terms and conditions of the Exclusive License Agreement
shall apply to the Option Intellectual Property (as that term is defined in the Option Agreement) optioned by Licensee pursuant to the Option Agreement and identified in this Amendment as if such intellectual property had been included in the scope
of the Exclusive License Agreement as of its Effective Date. 
 4. Except for the amendments set forth herein, all other terms and conditions of the
Exclusive License Agreement remain in full force and effect. 
  

									
	ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO	 		 		 	
			
	DUKE UNIVERSITY	 		 	IONQ, INC.
					
	BY	 	 /s/ Robin L. Rasor
	 		 	BY	 	 /s/ Christopher Monroe

	NAME: Robin L. Rasor, MS, CLP	 		 		 	
	Title: Executive Director	 		 		 	
			
	Office of Licensing &Ventures	 		 	NAME: Christopher Monroe
				
		 		 		 	TITLE: CEO
	October 4, 2018	 		 	
	DATE	 		 		 	DATE: 4 October, 2018













 APPENDIX A – Duke Patents 

[***]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ADAM MICHAEL HARRIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 16-10382 

D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00140-APG

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Adam Michael Harris appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 22-month term of supervised release imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Harris contends that the term of supervised release is substantively 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 11 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-10382 

unreasonable in light of the fact that he is not amenable to supervision and has 

largely met the goals of supervised release, committing only “technical” violations. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Collins, 684 

F.3d 873, 887 (9th Cir. 2012). The 22-month term of supervised release is 

substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and 

the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007). Harris’s past failures to comply with the requirements of supervision, even 

if “technical,” do not “obviate the need for further supervision,” but rather suggest 

that additional supervision may be necessary to facilitate Harris’s rehabilitation 

and protect the public. See United States v. Hurt, 345 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (9th 

Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I,James S. Osterman, certify that:

 

1.             I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Qfor the period ended June 30, 2005 of Blount International, Inc.;

 

2.             Based on my knowledge, this quarterlyreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respectto the period covered by this quarterly report;

 

3.             Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this quarterly report;

 

4.             The registrant’s other certifying officerand I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))for the registrant and we have:

 

(a) designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

 

5.             The registrant’s other certifying officerand I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committeeof the registrant’s board of directors:

 

(a) all significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal controls.

 

Date: August 4,2005

 

 
| /s/ James S.  Osterman     |   |
|----------------------------|--------|
| James S.  Osterman         |
| Chairman of the  Board and |
| Chief Executive  Officer   |

 

----
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN JEROME WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

E. HAZEL, Sgt.; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-17466 

D.C. No. 4:16-cv-01136-HSG 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2018**

Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Stephen Jerome Williams appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-tocourts and due process claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo a district court’s dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUN 20 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-17466

Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Williams’s action on the basis of 

qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to every reasonable 

officer that he was violating Williams’s constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion 

for reconsideration because Williams failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. 

See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth 

standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e)).

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of NMT Medical, Inc.
(the Company) for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Richard E. Davis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



(1) the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |  |  |                                                            
|-------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 23, 2005 |  |  |  | /S/ RICHARD E. DAVIS                                       
|                     |  |  |  | Richard E. Davis Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### Russell *et al. v.*Seawell.

Appeal from Jefferson Chancery Court.

Heard before -the Hon. John C. Carmichael.

White & Howze, for appellants.

R. C. Redus, for appellee.

*716The bill in this case was filed by the appellee, Julia P. Seawell, against the appellants; and sought to enforce an alleged statutory lien, arising from haying recovered two judgments in the probate court under sections 1920 and 1921 of the Code.

The defendants demurred to the bill on the ground that the certificates of the clerk and the judgments recovered in the probate court failed to show the owners of the judgments; and, therefore, were ineffectual to create a lien. This court holds that this omission rendex*s the registratioxx fatally defective and wholly inoperative to create a liexx, as provided 'by the *statute.*— Dun*can v.*Ashcraft, 121 Ala. 552; *Appling v. Stovall.*123 Ala. 39S. There was, thei*efore, error in overruling the demurrer interposed by the defendants to the bill on this ground.

The decree is reversed axxd a decree rendered sustaining the demurrer interposed by the appellant.,

Opinion by

Haralson, J.