Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 170 / Tuesday, September 7, 2021 / Notices 50173 

1MLP means Mid-Level Practitioner. 21 CFR 

1300.01(b). 

In accordance with §§ 201.16(c) and 

207.3 of the Commission’s rules, each 

document filed by a party to the 

investigations must be served on all 

other parties to the investigations (as 

identified by either the public or BPI 

service list), and a certificate of service 

must be timely filed. The Secretary will 

not accept a document for filing without 

a certificate of service. 

Authority: These investigations are 

being conducted under authority of title 

VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; this notice 

is published pursuant to § 207.21 of the 

Commission’s rules. 

By order of the Commission. 

Issued: September 1, 2021. 

Lisa Barton, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2021–19316 Filed 9–3–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Uvienome Linda Sakor, N.P.; Decision 

and Order 

I. Introduction 

On June 19, 2019, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Uvienome 

Sakor, N.P., also known as Uvienome 

Linda Sakor, N.P., (hereinafter, 

Respondent) of Douglasville, Georgia. 

OSC, at 1. The OSC proposed the 

revocation of Respondent’s Certificate of 

Registration No. MS1972101, the denial 

of any pending applications for renewal 

or modification of that registration, and 

the denial of any applications for 

additional DEA registrations for two 

reasons. Id. First, it alleged that 

Respondent ‘‘materially falsified 

multiple renewal applications . . . filed 

with the DEA.’’ Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(1)). Second, it alleged that 

Respondent ‘‘pled guilty to a felony 

relating to controlled substances.’’ OSC, 

at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2)). 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that 

Respondent entered a guilty plea in 

Georgia Superior Court to one count of 

Forgery in the First Degree ‘‘for 

attempting to fill a forged controlled 

substance prescription.’’ OSC, at 2. This 

OSC allegation acknowledged that, 

under Georgia’s First Offender Act, 

Respondent was discharged from 

probation, was exonerated of any 

criminal purpose, and is not considered 

to have a criminal conviction. Id. 

Second, the OSC alleged that 

Respondent entered into a Consent 

Order with the Georgia Board of Nursing 

(hereinafter, GBN) for her failure to 

report her Forgery guilty plea as 

required by Georgia statute. Id. It also 

alleged that the Consent Order placed 

Respondent on probation for two years. 

Id. 

Third, the OSC alleged that 

Respondent submitted three materially 

false registration renewal applications 

after her guilty plea because she did not 

respond affirmatively to the first 

Liability question. Id. at 2–3. Similarly, 

the OSC alleged that Respondent 

submitted two materially false 

registration renewal applications after 

the beginning of the Consent Order’s 

probationary period because she did not 

respond affirmatively to the third 

Liability question. Id. at 3. 

Fourth, the OSC alleged that 

Respondent’s guilty plea to the state 

Forgery charge implicates 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2). Id. 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 4 (citing 21 

CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Respondent of the opportunity to 

submit a corrective action plan. OSC, at 

4–5 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

The Government forwarded its 

Request for Final Agency Action 

(hereinafter, RFAA), along with the 

evidentiary record, to this office on 

September 5, 2019. Attached to the 

RFAA is the Declaration of a DEA 

Diversion Investigator (hereinafter, DI) 

that is signed and sworn to under 

penalty of perjury. RFAA Exhibit 

(hereinafter, RFAAX) 6 (Declaration of 

Diversion Investigator, dated September 

5, 2019 (hereinafter, DI Declaration)). 

The DI Declaration states that the DI 

‘‘personally served’’ the OSC on 

Respondent at her registered location on 

June 24, 2019. Id. at 3. I credit the DI’s 

sworn statement. 

Respondent waived her right to a 

hearing and filed a written statement. 

RFAAX 3 (Respondent’s Written 

Statement, dated July 17, 2019 

(hereinafter, Written Statement)), at 1. 

Her Written Statement explicitly 

references the OSC. Id. 

Based on all of the evidence in the 

record, I find that the Government’s 

service of the OSC was legally 

sufficient. In addition, based on all of 

the evidence in the record, I find that 

Respondent timely filed her Written 

Statement. 21 CFR 1301.43. 

I issue this Decision and Order based 

on the Government’s submission, which 

includes the Written Statement, and is 

the entire record before me. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). 

II. Findings of Fact 

A. Respondent’s DEA Controlled 

Substance Registration 

Respondent is the holder of DEA 

Certificate of Registration No. 

MS1972101 at the registered address of 

6559 Church St., Douglasville, GA 

30134–1885. RFAAX 1 (Certification of 

Registration History, dated September 4, 

2019), at 1. Pursuant to this registration, 

Respondent is authorized to dispense 

controlled substances in schedules III 

through V as a MLP-nurse 

practitioner.1 Id. Respondent’s 

registration expired on February 28, 

2021, and is in an ‘‘active pending 

status.’’ Id. 

B. The Investigation of Respondent 

According to the DI assigned to this 

matter, ‘‘a large number of prescriptions 

that had been issued by . . . 

[Respondent] had been filled’’ at a 

pharmacy the DI was investigating, and 

Respondent is the sister of the 

pharmacy’s owner. RFAAX 6, at 1. The 

DI Declaration states that Respondent 

‘‘previously had been convicted of a 

felony involving forgery and that her 

nursing license had been placed on 

probation.’’ Id. According to the DI 

Declaration, the DI’s investigation 

included obtaining certified copies of 

records of the Superior Court of Douglas 

County and of the GBN. Id. at 2; see also 

infra section II.C. 

C. The Government’s Case 

The Government’s case includes five 

exhibits, one of which is the Written 

Statement. 

The first exhibit is the Certification of 

Registration History. RFAAX 1. 

According to that Certification, 

Respondent submitted to the Agency 

registration renewal applications on 

December 31, 2011, February 25, 2015, 

and January 5, 2018. Id. at 1. On each 

of the three submissions, the 

Certification of Registration History 

states, Respondent answered ‘‘No’’ to 

whether she ‘‘has . . . ever been 

convicted of a crime in connection with 

controlled substance(s) under state or 

federal law, . . . or any such action 

pending.’’ Id. at 1–2, 4, 7, 10. Further, 

on each of the three submissions, 

according to the Certification of 

Registration History, Respondent 

answered ‘‘No’’ to whether she ‘‘has 


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50174 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 170 / Tuesday, September 7, 2021 / Notices 

2Although the certification for RFAAX 4 

references ‘‘Linda U. Sakor,’’ five of the documents 

in RFAAX 4 refer to ‘‘Uvienome Linda Sakor,’’ three 

of the documents refer to ‘‘Linda Sakor,’’ one 

document refers to ‘‘Linda U. Sakor,’’ and one 

document does not refer to anyone by name. 

RFAAX 4, at 2 (Linda U. Sakor); id. at 3–26 

(Uvienome Linda Sakor); id. at 27–30 (Linda Sakor); 

id. at 31 (no name). I find substantial record 

evidence that all of the documents in RFAAX 4 

pertain to Respondent. 3The day in April is not legible. RFAAX 4, at 31. 

. . . ever surrendered (for cause) or had 

a state professional license or controlled 

substance registration revoked, 

suspended, denied, restricted, or placed 

on probation, or is any such action 

pending.’’ Id. at 2, 4, 7, 10. 

The next exhibit is the OSC, RFAAX 

2, and the third exhibit is the Written 

Statement, RFAAX 3. 

The next exhibit consists of ten 

documents certified by the ‘‘Clerk 

Superior/State Court’’ as true and 

correct copies from case ‘‘10CR00980 

State of Georgia vs. Linda U. Sakor.’’ 2

RFAAX 4, at 1; see also RFAAX 6, at 2. 

The first document is one page 

consisting of the ‘‘Petition for Discharge 

of Defendant (First Offender Act)’’ and 

the signed ‘‘Order of Discharge,’’ dated 

March 20, 2012. RFAAX 4, at 2. In this 

document, a probation officer states that 

Respondent is ‘‘eligible for discharge as 

shown by having fulfilled the term of 

. . . probation and upon review of . . . 

[her] criminal record.’’ Id. Below the 

probation officer’s statement, the Court’s 

signed Order of Discharge states that (1) 

Respondent is ‘‘discharged without 

Court adjudication of guilt,’’ (2) the 

‘‘discharge shall completely exonerate 

. . . [Respondent] of any criminal 

purpose,’’ (3) the ‘‘discharge shall not 

affect any of . . . [Respondent’s] civil 

rights or liberties,’’ (4) Respondent 

‘‘shall not be considered to have a 

criminal conviction,’’ and (5) the 

‘‘discharge may not be used to 

disqualify a person in any application 

for employment or appointment to 

office in either the public or private 

sector by reason of criminal conviction 

. . . unless otherwise provided by law.’’ 

Id. 

The second document, consisting of 

fifteen pages, is the ‘‘Transcript of 

Proceedings’’ of the criminal hearing on 

November 18, 2010. Id. at 3–17. The 

Transcript states that Respondent was 

present with her attorney ‘‘to enter a 

negotiated guilty plea.’’ Id. at 4. 

According to the Assistant District 

Attorney (hereinafter, ADA), 

Respondent changed employers in July 

of 2008. Early in 2009, the ADA stated, 

Respondent presented a prescription for 

hydrocodone, purportedly issued by her 

previous employer, to be filled at a 

pharmacy. Id. at 9. The ADA indicated 

that Respondent had forged the 

prescription in the name of her previous 

employer. Id. at 10. He also stated that 

‘‘[t]here’s no evidence that there were 

any other forged prescriptions 

presented’’ by Respondent. Id.; see infra 

section II.E. Respondent’s Public 

Defender added that Respondent had 

‘‘retained the [prescription] pad after 

she had left their employ and basically 

she wrote prescriptions out for herself 

which basically she would have to have 

gone back to the doctor to get that 

authorized prior to the time this was 

done and that’s not the way it was 

done.’’ RFAAX 4, at 13 [emphasis 

added]; see infra section II.E. 

When the Court invited her to speak, 

Respondent stated that ‘‘nurse 

practitioners actually do have the 

authority and . . . [she has] the 

authority, . . . [has] the license to write 

prescriptions for people in the State of 

Georgia as in many other states, and that 

is part of . . . [her] job.’’ RFAAX 4, at 

14–15. She did not mention the 

controlled substance schedule 

parameters, schedules III through V, of 

her federal authority to issue controlled 

substance prescriptions. She finished by 

stating that she ‘‘did the wrong thing in 

writing it for . . . [her]self.’’ Id. at 15. 

When the Court asked her why she 

forged the prescription, she stated that 

she ‘‘was having severe pain and could 

not make it to . . . [her] doctor’s office.’’ 

Id. When the Court asked her, she 

denied having ‘‘any sort of drug abuse 

problem.’’ Id. The Transcript ends with 

the Court imposing the recommended 

sentence and treating Respondent as a 

first offender. Id. at 15–16. 

The third document is the one-page 

Plea Sheet filed on November 18, 2010. 

Id. at 18. The Plea Sheet shows that 

Respondent pled guilty to one count, 

that she was to undergo substance abuse 

counseling, that she was fined $1,000, 

and that she received a sentence of five 

years’ probation with the possibility of 

four years being suspended ‘‘after 

completion of 1st year of probation 

successfully.’’ Id. 

The fourth document is the one-page 

Waiver of Rights, dated November 18, 

2010. Id. at 19. This document, signed 

by Respondent and her attorney, lists 

the rights that Respondent waived by 

pleading guilty. Id. Over the Court’s 

signature, the document states that 

‘‘inquiry has been made of the . . . 

[Respondent] concerning the rights 

listed,’’ that the Court is ‘‘satisfied there 

is an adequate factual basis to support 

the guilty plea,’’ and that the Court is 

satisfied that Respondent ‘‘is acting 

knowingly, freely and voluntarily and 

no promise, threat or force has been 

used to induce the . . . [Respondent] to 

enter this plea.’’ Id. 

The document comprising the next 

three pages is the ‘‘First Offender 

Treatment Order,’’ the ‘‘General 

Conditions of Probation,’’ and the 

‘‘Special Conditions of Probation 

Imposed Pursuant to Code 42–8–34.1,’’ 

dated November 18, 2010. Id. at 20–22. 

This document shows that Respondent 

‘‘negotiated’’ a guilty plea to one count 

and was sentenced to five years, which 

may be served on probation, and the 

payment of a $1,000 fine. Id. at 20–21. 

The sixth set of documents concerns 

the ‘‘Felony Accusation’’ about 

Respondent. Id. at 23–26. The 

documents indicate that Respondent 

pled guilty to one count of ‘‘Forgery in 

the First Degree (O.C.G.A. 16–9–1)’’ on 

November 18, 2010. Id. at 23, 24, and 

26. Her attorney and the ADA signed the 

fully completed document along with 

Respondent. Id. at 26. 

The next two documents, ‘‘Entry of 

Appearance; and Notice of Intent to 

Engage in Reciprocal Discovery’’ and 

‘‘Rule 5.2(2) Certificate of Service of 

Discovery,’’ dated April 24, 2010, show 

that Respondent was represented by 

counsel at the proceedings. Id. at 27–28. 

These documents also show two 

‘‘unindicted’’ case numbers. Id. 

The ninth document is the two-page 

‘‘Affidavit for Arrest’’ concerning 

Respondent, signed by a Douglas 

County Magistrate Judge on March 30, 

2010. Id. at 29–30. The first page shows 

a warrant in the matter of ‘‘The State of 

GA vs. [Respondent]’’ charging four 

counts of Forgery, a Felony in the First 

Degree, with bail set at $16,000. Id. at 

29. The second page of the ‘‘Affidavit 

for Arrest’’ shows a warrant in the 

matter of ‘‘The State of GA vs. 

[Respondent]’’ charging one count, 

Theft by Taking, a misdemeanor, with 

bail set at $1,000. Id. at 30. 

The tenth and final document is 

entitled ‘‘Arrest Warrant, County of 

Douglas, State of Georgia, Exhibit: A 

page 1 of 1’’ to the Forgery in the First 

Degree ‘‘Affidavit for Arrest,’’ filed on 

April 2010.3 Id. at 31. The ‘‘Arrest 

Warrant’’ describes four counts of 

Forgery in the First Degree. The first 

count concerns the ‘‘knowing,’’ ‘‘with 

intent to defraud’’ making of a ‘‘certain 

writing in such a manner that the 

writing as made purports to have been 

made by authority of one . . . who did 

not give such authority at another time 

and did deliver said writing being a 

prescription for Hydrocodon [sic] and 

Phenergan.’’ Id. The other three counts 

specifically concern the delivery to a 

pharmacy of forged prescriptions for 

Vicodin and Phenergan on September 8, 

2009, Tussionex Pennkinetic on 


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4Respondent explicitly ‘‘request[ed] a waiver of 

a hearing.’’ RFAAX 3, at 1. 

5Respondent may have meant to refer to Liability 

question ‘‘3,’’ not ‘‘2.’’ 

November 6, 2009, and Vicodin, 

Ibuprofin, and Phenergan on November 

11, 2009. Id. 

The first page of the next exhibit is 

the Certification of the GBN, dated July 

23, 2019, concerning its Consent Order 

with Respondent and the statement that 

‘‘Respondent has met the terms and 

conditions outlined in this order.’’ 

RFAAX 5, at 1. The second page is the 

GBN letter to Respondent, dated July 20, 

2015, advising Respondent that her 

‘‘license is unencumbered and free of 

the conditions imposed by’’ the Consent 

Order. Id. at 2. 

The remaining ten pages of RFAAX 5 

is the June 25, 2013 Consent Order 

between Respondent and the GBN. Id. at 

3–11. The first page of the Consent 

Order states that Respondent pled 

guilty, ‘‘[o]n or about November 18, 

2010,’’ to the ‘‘felony criminal offense of 

Forgery, First Degree in the Superior 

Court of Douglas County.’’ Id. at 3. It 

also states that ‘‘Respondent failed to 

report her felony conviction to the 

Board within ten (10) days of such 

conviction as required’’ by Georgia 

statute. Id. Page three of the Consent 

Order states that, ‘‘[u]pon the effective 

date of this Consent Order, the 

Respondent’s license to practice as a 

registered professional nurse and 

authorization to practice as an advanced 

practice nurse in the State of Georgia 

shall be placed on probation for a period 

of two (2) years, or until lifted by the 

Board.’’ Id. at 5. The Consent Order 

specifies that ‘‘this Consent Order, once 

approved and docketed, shall constitute 

a public record, evidencing disciplinary 

action by the Board.’’ Id. at 10. The 

Consent order was approved on June 20, 

2013, and docketed on June 25, 2013. Id. 

at 10, 3. 

The last exhibit of the RFAA is the DI 

Declaration. RFAAX 6. In addition to 

certifying some of the Government’s 

other exhibits and providing the origins 

of the investigation leading to the OSC, 

as already discussed, the DI Declaration 

affirms that Respondent pled guilty to 

one felony count ‘‘for attempting to fill 

a forged controlled substance 

prescription’’ and ‘‘agreed [with the 

GBN], among other things, to be placed 

on probation for a period of two (2) 

years.’’ Id. at 2. 

D. Respondent’s Case 

As already discussed, Respondent 

submitted a timely Written Statement. 

Supra section I. In her Written 

Statement, Respondent stated that she 

was responding to the ‘‘material 

falsification of renewal applications for 

. . . [her] DEA license’’ by ‘‘writ[ing] a 

statement of explanation.’’ 4 RFAAX 3, 

at 1. Respondent began the explanation 

by stating that ‘‘[i]n the year 2008, . . . 

[she] made a very grave mistake which 

. . . [she] will forever regret.’’ Id. She 

elaborated, stating that she ‘‘wrote a 

prescription for . . . [her]self in 2008 on 

a prescription pad which belonged to 

. . . [her] collaborating physician.’’ Id. 

The prescription, according to her 

Written Statement, ‘‘was for Vicodin 

which is also known as Hydrocodone 5/ 

500 mg.’’ Id. She ‘‘did this,’’ she stated, 

‘‘because . . . [she] was in severe 

menstrual pain and could not make it to 

see . . . [her] personal physician to 

prescribe this medication for . . . 

[her].’’ Id. Respondent wrote that she 

‘‘presented this prescription to a local 

pharmacy who notified the physician 

. . . [she] worked with, and then 

proceeded to notify the local 

authorities.’’ Id. She stated that ‘‘[s]ince 

then . . . [she has] undergone a lot of 

emotional stress regarding the risk . . . 

[she] placed . . . [her] career in.’’ Id. 

According to her Written Statement, 

she pleaded nolo contendere and ‘‘was 

sentenced under the first offender act 

[sic] and upon completion of . . . [her] 

one-year probation was noted not to 

have a felony conviction.’’ Id. ‘‘It was 

based on this understanding,’’ 

Respondent wrote, ‘‘that . . . [she] 

responded to the questions in . . . [her] 

subsequent DEA renewal applications.’’ 

Id. Specifically, she admitted that ‘‘[i]n 

December of 2011 on . . . [her] DEA 

renewal application, . . . [she] 

responded ‘No’ to liability question 1 

with the understanding that . . . [she] 

was not guilty of a felony substance 

control conviction.’’ Id. 

Regarding her nursing license, 

Respondent stated that she ‘‘answered 

‘Yes’ on the renewal of . . . [her GBN] 

license to the questions regarding a 

pleading Nolo Contedere [sic] and was 

then placed on a two-year probationary 

period in 2013 which after careful 

monitoring was lifted in 2013.’’ Id. 

According to her Written Statement, she 

‘‘underwent psychological evaluation 

and testing requested by the . . . [GBN] 

which concluded that . . . [she] did not 

have substance abuse problems and was 

able to practice safely as a nurse.’’ Id. 

Regarding the registration renewal 

applications she submitted, she 

admitted that, in 2015 and 2018, she 

‘‘answered ‘‘no’’ to liability question 2 

[sic] with the understanding because at 

that time . . . [her] nursing license was 

no longer under probation.’’ 5 Id. 

Respondent addressed her three false 

answers to the first Liability question on 

the registration renewal applications she 

submitted in December, 2011, February, 

2015, and January, 2018, and her two 

false answers to the third Liability 

question on the registration renewal 

applications she submitted in 2015 and 

in 2018. Id. She stated that she ‘‘did not 

intentionally answer these questions to 

misrepresent or give false information 

for . . . [her] DEA application.’’ Id. 

Respondent wrote that she ‘‘also 

renewed . . . [her] Georgia nursing 

license and when faced with similar 

questioning ha[s] answered yes to . . . 

[her] Nolo Contendere plea with an 

explanation of the situation.’’ Id. She 

did not attach documentary evidence to 

support this assertion. 

Respondent’s Written Statement states 

that she ‘‘prescribe[s] medications to 

patients in . . . [her] role as a nurse 

practitioner’’ and that she has practiced 

as a nurse, and then a nurse 

practitioner, ‘‘for the past 25 years.’’ Id. 

Respondent stated that she ‘‘cannot 

emphasize how sorry . . . [she] is that 

. . . [she has] placed [her]self in such a 

position.’’ Id. at 2. She stated that she 

is a mother of two and a wife, that she 

has ‘‘worked hard throughout . . . [her] 

life to have a successful career which 

. . . [she] placed in jeopardy,’’ and that 

she is ‘‘an upstanding member of . . . 

[her] community and church and [has] 

never abused any medications.’’ Id. The 

Written Statement characterizes the 

‘‘circumstances’’ as her ‘‘unwittingly 

submit[ting] the wrong responses on 

. . . [her] renewal applications,’’ and, 

‘‘instead of a complete revocation’’ of 

her registration, ‘‘appeal[s]’’ for ‘‘a 

period of either probation or suspension 

with monitoring and the ability to 

reapply or renew’’ her registration. Id. 

I find substantial record evidence that 

Respondent admitted, in her Written 

Statement, to writing a prescription for 

herself in 2008 on a prescription pad 

belonging to her collaborating 

physician. Id. at 1. This wrongdoing by 

Respondent is not set out in the 

Government’s case. While the 

Government’s case presents evidence of 

one negotiated guilty plea by 

Respondent arising from events in 2009, 

I find substantial record evidence that 

the Written Statement references ‘‘a very 

grave mistake’’ of forgery by Respondent 

in 2008. Compare RFAAX 4, 3–16 and 

id. at 29–31 with RFAAX 3, at 1; see 

also RFAAX 5, at 1 (referring to 

Respondent’s ‘‘plea of guilty to the 

felony criminal offense of Forgery, First 

Degree in the Superior Court of Douglas 

County . . . pertain[ing] to her forging 

prescriptions in 2009 for pain 

medication for her own use’’). I further 


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6Although I find this fact relevant to my 

determination of a sanction, there is more than 

enough record evidence without it to support 

revocation as a sanction based on the Government’s 

prima facie case. 

find, based on substantial record 

evidence, that the ‘‘Affidavit for Arrest’’ 

and the ‘‘Arrest Warrant’’ state that 

Respondent presented four forged 

prescriptions for filling in 2009, the year 

after Respondent’s 2008 ‘‘very grave 

mistake’’ forgery admission described in 

her Written Statement. RFAAX 4, at 29– 

31. I find substantial record evidence 

that one of the instances described in 

the Arrest Warrant corresponds to the 

facts underlying Respondent’s 

negotiated guilty plea according to the 

Transcript of that plea. Id. at 9. 

There is substantial fact congruity 

between the evidence submitted by the 

Government and Respondent’s Written 

Statement. The glaring exceptions to 

this substantial fact congruity are the 

number of controlled substance 

prescription forgeries the evidence 

indicates and the number of times 

Respondent pled to forging a controlled 

substance prescription. 

Regarding the number of controlled 

substance prescription forgeries the 

evidence indicates, there are significant 

differences between the Written 

Statement’s description of the forgery 

Respondent states took place in 2008, 

and the forgery underlying her 2009 

guilty plea documented in the 

Government’s evidence along with the 

alleged forgeries described in the Arrest 

Warrant. These significant differences 

lead me to conclude that they describe 

two different forgeries. For example, in 

its description of the four purported 

self-prescribed controlled substance 

prescriptions, the Arrest Warrant 

differentiates between brand names and 

generic names for controlled substances. 

See, e.g., RFAAX 4, at 31 (Arrest 

Warrant description of four purported 

self-prescribed controlled substance 

prescriptions for ‘‘hydrocodone,’’ 

‘‘Vicodin,’’ ‘‘Tussionex Pennkinetic,’’ 

and ‘‘Vicodin’’). The Written Statement 

states that the forged prescription she 

wrote for herself in 2008 ‘‘was for 

Vicodin which is also known as 

Hydrocodone 5/500 mg.’’ RFAAX 3, at 

1. The Transcript of Respondent’s guilty 

plea, on the other hand, describes the 

forged prescription of 2009 to have been 

for ‘‘hydrocodone.’’ RFAAX 4, at 7. 

While the Written Statement explains 

that ‘‘Vicodin is also known as 

Hydrocodone,’’ this is in direct contrast 

to the record evidence in the Arrest 

Warrant that provides the precise name 

of the controlled substance entered on 

the purportedly forged prescriptions. 

Accordingly, in this context, I find that 

‘‘Vicodin,’’ not ‘‘hydrocodone,’’ is a 

noteworthy departure and points to two 

different forgeries. 

By way of further example, according 

to the Written Statement, Respondent 

wrote the Vicodin prescription for 

herself in 2008 ‘‘on a prescription pad 

which belonged to . . . [her] 

collaborating physician’’ and she 

‘‘presented this prescription to a local 

pharmacy who notified the physician 

. . . [she] worked with and then 

proceeded to notify the local 

authorities.’’ RFAAX 3, at 1. According 

to the Transcript of her 2009 guilty plea, 

by contrast, the prosecutor stated that 

Respondent left the employ of a medical 

practice in 2008 to work for another 

medical practice. RFAAX 4, at 9. 

Several months after that job change, he 

stated, Respondent presented a forged 

hydrocodone prescription written on a 

pad that belonged to the previous 

employer. Id. at 9–10. The pharmacy 

contacted Respondent’s new employer 

and then the previous employer who 

‘‘informed them that he did not write or 

authorize this prescription.’’ Id. at 10. 

The previous medical practice notified 

law enforcement. Id. Neither 

Respondent nor her Public Defender 

corrected any part of these prosecutor 

statements. Instead, the Public Defender 

added that Respondent had retained the 

prescription pad from the former 

employer and forged the prescription 

while at the subsequent employment. 

Id. at 11. I find that the differences 

between the Written Statement and the 

guilty plea Transcript on these critical 

points are too significant to result from 

faulty memory. I further find that the 

absence of any correction of those 

differences by Respondent or her Public 

Defender during the guilty plea 

proceeding means that the 2008 forgery 

described in the Written Statement and 

the forgery to which Respondent pled 

guilty in 2009 are not the same. 

Consequently, I find that the Written 

Statement describes a different forgery 

than the forgery to which Respondent 

pled guilty and the forgeries alleged in 

the Arrest Warrant. RFAAX 4, at 31. I 

consider the fact that the 2009 guilty 

plea for forging a controlled substance 

in the Government’s evidence was not 

an isolated incident in determining the 

appropriate sanction.6 Infra section IV. 

Regarding the number of forgery 

pleas, the Written Statement describes a 

2008 nolo contendere plea for forging a 

controlled substance prescription. 

RFAAX 3, at 1. The conviction 

described in the Government’s evidence 

is a 2009 guilty plea for forging a 

controlled substance prescription on 

February 5, 2009. RFAAX 4, at 3–16; see 

also RFAAX 5, at 1 (referring to 

Respondent’s ‘‘plea of guilty to the 

felony criminal offense of Forgery, First 

Degree in the Superior Court of Douglas 

County . . . pertain[ing] to her forging 

prescriptions in 2009 for pain 

medication for her own use’’). I need not 

sort out whether there were two pleas or 

one plea because the OSC alleges one 

felony conviction and because I am 

carrying out the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 

824 regarding that felony conviction 

alleged in the OSC. 28 CFR 0.100(b). 

Whether Respondent pled nolo 

contendere to a violation in 2008 is not 

an issue presented by the OSC, is not 

before me for adjudication, and, 

therefore, I shall not resolve it. 

E. Allegation That Respondent Has Been 

Convicted of a Felony Related to a 

Controlled Substance (21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2)) 

I find that there is substantial record 

evidence that Respondent, after leaving 

employment at a medical practice, 

retained a prescription pad of a doctor 

in that medical practice. Id. at 13 

(statement of Respondent’s attorney). I 

find that there is substantial record 

evidence that Respondent used the 

prescription pad after leaving that 

employment to ‘‘wr[i]te prescriptions 

out for herself’’ without authorization of 

the doctor to whom the prescription pad 

belonged. Id. (statement of Respondent’s 

attorney). I find that there is substantial 

record evidence that Respondent 

‘‘would have to have gone back to the 

doctor to get that [prescription] 

authorized prior to the time this was 

done and that’s not the way it was 

done.’’ Id. (statement of Respondent’s 

attorney). 

I find that there is substantial record 

evidence that Respondent presented for 

filling a controlled substance 

(hydrocodone) prescription on February 

5, 2009, that this prescription purported 

to be issued by a doctor at her former 

employment, and that this prescription 

was one of the unauthorized 

prescriptions Respondent wrote for 

herself on the prescription pad of a 

doctor at her former employment. Id. at 

9. 

I find that there is substantial record 

evidence that the pharmacist 

investigated this prescription. Id. at 10. 

I find that there is substantial record 

evidence that the doctor for whom 

Respondent had previously worked 

stated that he neither wrote nor 

authorized the prescription, that this 

doctor notified his practice, and that the 

practice notified law enforcement. Id. I 

find that there is substantial record 

evidence that the prosecutor at 

Respondent’s sentencing stated that 


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7 ‘‘Any licensed individual who is convicted 

under the laws of this state, the United States, or 

any other state, territory, or country of a felony as 

defined in paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Code 

Section 43–1–19 shall be required to notify the 

appropriate licensing authority of the conviction 

within ten days of the conviction. The failure of a 

licensed individual to notify the appropriate 

licensing authority of a conviction shall be 

considered grounds for revocation of his or her 

license, permit, registration, certification, or other 

authorization to conduct a licensed profession.’’ 

‘‘[t]here’s no evidence that there were 

any other forged prescriptions presented 

by . . . [Respondent].’’ Id. I find that 

there is substantial record evidence that 

Respondent’s attorney stated that 

Respondent ‘‘retained the [prescription] 

pad after she had left . . . [her prior 

medical office employer’s] employ and 

basically she wrote prescriptions out for 

herself.’’ Id. at 13. I further find that the 

‘‘Arrest Warrant’’ for Respondent 

describes four allegations of Forgery in 

the First Degree, including presenting 

those forged prescriptions to a 

pharmacy for filling, spanning February 

5, 2009, through November 11, 2009. Id. 

at 31. I credit the statement of 

Respondent’s attorney and the items 

addressed in the ‘‘Arrest Warrant’’ for 

Respondent. I conclude that the 

statement of Respondent’s attorney, that 

Respondent ‘‘wrote prescriptions for 

herself,’’ was made to ensure that all of 

Respondent’s alleged criminality was 

subsumed in her guilty plea. Id. at 13. 

Given, among other reasons, that the 

statement of Respondent’s attorney 

implicated Respondent in criminality in 

addition to the one instance to which 

she pled guilty through a ‘‘negotiated 

plea,’’ I credit the statement of 

Respondent’s attorney, which I consider 

in my determination of Respondent’s 

appropriate sanction. Id. at 10; supra 

section II.C. 

Based on substantial record evidence, 

I find that Respondent entered a 

negotiated guilty plea to Forgery in the 

First Degree, Ga. Code Ann. 16–9–1, a 

Georgia felony, and that the Court 

accepted her guilty plea on November 

18, 2010. RFAAX 4, at 3–5, 9, 20, 26 

(hydrocodone prescription); see also 

RFAAX 5, at 3 (‘‘forging prescriptions’’). 

I find that there is substantial record 

evidence that the facts underlying 

Respondent’s First-Degree Felony 

conviction include her having forged 

and presented for filling a controlled 

substance, hydrocodone, prescription 

for herself, and that the Court ordered 

Respondent discharged under the 

Georgia Probation for First-Offenders 

Act. RFAAX 4, at 9–10; id. at 2. 

F. Allegation That Respondent 

Materially Falsified Registration 

Renewal Applications (21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(1)) 

I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing evidence that, on November 

18, 2010, the Honorable William H. 

McClain, Superior Court Judge of 

Douglas County, Georgia, found that 

Respondent pled guilty to one count of 

Forgery in the First Degree under 

Georgia law, ‘‘freely and voluntarily, 

with a full knowledge, understanding in 

waiver of her rights, there’s a factual 

basis, and no promises, threats or force 

has been used to induce’’ her plea. Id. 

at 13; see also id. at 4–9. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that the facts underlying the 

Georgia felony to which Respondent 

pled guilty are that she forged and 

presented for filling a controlled 

substance (hydrocodone) prescription 

made out to herself on prescription 

paper belonging to a former physician 

employer. Id. at 9–10, 13. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that Judge McClain accepted 

her guilty plea, imposed sentence, and 

treated Respondent as a first offender on 

November 18, 2010. Id. at 15–16; see 

also id. at 20–22. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that, on November 18, 2010, 

when Judge McClain asked her before 

imposing sentence if ‘‘there [is] 

anything that . . . [she] would like to 

say,’’ Respondent replied that she 

would ‘‘[j]ust . . . enlighten people that 

nurse practitioners actually do have the 

authority and . . . [she] do[es] have the 

authority, . . . the license to write 

prescriptions for people in the State of 

Georgia as in many other states, and that 

is part of . . . [her] job.’’ Id. at 14–15. 

I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that 

Respondent also stated that she ‘‘did the 

wrong thing in writing it for [her]self.’’ 

Id. at 15. I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that, when 

Judge McClain asked her whether she 

had ‘‘any sort of drug abuse problem,’’ 

Respondent answered, ‘‘No, I do not.’’ 

Id. 

I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that, after 

her felony guilty plea and sentencing on 

November 18, 2010, Respondent 

submitted registration renewal 

applications to the Agency on December 

31, 2011, on February 25, 2015, and on 

January 5, 2018. RFAAX 1, at 1–10; see 

also RFAAX 3, at 1–2. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that, on those three 

registration renewal applications, 

Respondent answered ‘‘no’’ to the first 

Liability question that asked whether 

she had ‘‘ever been convicted of a crime 

in connection with controlled 

substance(s) under state or federal law 

. . . or any such action pending?’’ 

RFAAX 1, at 1–2, 4, 7, 10. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that Respondent admitted in 

her Written Statement that she 

answered ‘‘no’’ to this liability question 

‘‘in . . . [her] subsequent DEA renewal 

applications.’’ RFAAX 3, at 1. I find 

clear, unequivocal, and convincing 

record evidence that Respondent stated 

that she provided this negative answer 

in ‘‘December of 2011 . . . with the 

understanding that . . . [she] was not 

guilty of a felony substance control 

conviction.’’ Id. 

I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that, on 

June 25, 2013, the GBN placed 

Respondent’s Georgia Nurse Practitioner 

license on probation for two years due 

to her ‘‘fail[ure] to report her felony 

conviction to the . . . [GBN] within ten 

(10) days of such conviction.’’ RFAAX 

5, at 3–11, citing Ga. Code Ann. 43–1– 

27.7 I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that, after 

the GBN placed her nurse practitioner 

license on probation on June 25, 2013, 

Respondent submitted registration 

renewal applications to the Agency on 

February 25, 2015 and on January 5, 

2018. RFAAX 1, at 1–10; see also 

RFAAX 3, at 1–2. I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that, on those two registration 

renewal applications, Respondent 

answered ‘‘no’’ to the third Liability 

question that asked whether she had 

‘‘ever surrendered (for cause) or had a 

state professional license or controlled 

substance registration revoked, 

suspended, denied, restricted, or placed 

on probation, or is any such action 

pending.’’ RFAAX 1, at 1–2, 4, 7, 10. I 

find clear, unequivocal, and convincing 

record evidence that Respondent 

admitted in her Written Statement that 

she answered ‘‘no’’ to this liability 

question in 2015 and in 2018. RFAAX 

3, at 1. I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that 

Respondent stated that she provided 

these two negative answers ‘‘with the 

understanding because at that time . . . 

[her] nursing license was no longer 

under probation.’’ Id. 

III. Discussion 

A. The Controlled Substances Act 

Under the Controlled Substances Act 

(hereinafter, CSA), ‘‘[a] registration . . . 

to . . . distribute[ ] or dispense a 

controlled substance . . . may be 

suspended or revoked by the Attorney 

General upon a finding that the 

registrant—(1) has materially falsified 

any application filed pursuant to or 

required by this subchapter or 


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8 If Respondent intended to argue that her 

negotiated guilty plea in 2010 and her treatment as 

a first offender mean that she was not convicted of 

a First-Degree Felony, I reject her argument. The 

Agency established over thirty years ago, and 

recently reiterated, that a deferred adjudication is 

‘‘still a ‘conviction’ within the meaning of the . . . 

[CSA] even if the proceedings are later dismissed.’’ 

Kimberly Maloney, N.P., 76 FR 60,922, 60,922 

(2011). In reaching this conclusion, the Agency 

explained that, ‘‘[a]ny other interpretation would 

mean that the conviction could only be considered 

between its date and the date of its subsequent 

dismissal.’’ Id. (citing Edson W. Redard, M.D., 65 

FR 30,616, 30,618 (2000)). The same reasoning 

applies to treatment as a first offender. I also note 

that the GBN Consent Order exists because 

Respondent ‘‘failed to report her felony conviction 

to the Board within ten (10) days of such conviction 

as required by O.C.G.A. § 43–1–27.’’ RFAAX 5, at 

3. 

9 ‘‘A person commits the offense of forgery in the 

first degree when with intent to defraud he 

knowingly makes, alters, or possesses any writing 

in a fictitious name or in such manner that the 

writing as made or altered purports to have been 

made by another person, at another time, with 

different provisions, or by authority of one who did 

not give such authority and utters or delivers such 

writing.’’ Ga. Code Ann. § 16–9–1 (West, Westlaw 

effective to June 30, 2012). 

subchapter II; [or] (2) has been 

convicted of a felony under . . . any 

. . . law of the United States, or of any 

State, relating to any substance defined 

in this subchapter as a controlled 

substance,’’ among other reasons. 21 

U.S.C. 824(a). The OSC alleged material 

falsification and felony conviction as 

the proposed bases for revocation of 

Respondent’s registration. 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(1) and (2). 

B. Allegation That Respondent 

Materially Falsified an Application (21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(1)) 

As already discussed, I find clear, 

unequivocal, and convincing record 

evidence that Respondent submitted to 

the Agency three registration renewal 

applications containing a false answer 

to the first Liability question. Supra 

section II.F. Also, as already discussed, 

I find clear, unequivocal, and 

convincing record evidence that 

Respondent submitted to the Agency 

two registration renewal applications 

containing a false answer to the third 

Liability question. Id. My findings that 

Respondent submitted these false 

answers to the Agency stem from 

Respondent’s conviction for violating a 

Georgia First-Degree Felony when she 

forged and presented for filling a 

controlled substance prescription for 

herself. Id.; infra section III.C. Further, 

my fact findings directly implicate three 

of the factors I am statutorily mandated 

to consider as I act on applications for 

registration: The applicant’s experience 

in dispensing controlled substances, the 

applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

dispensing of controlled substances, and 

other conduct which may threaten the 

public health and safety. 21 U.S.C. 

823(f)(2), (3), and (5). Thus, 

Respondent’s false responses on three 

registration renewal applications 

directly implicated my statutorilymandated analyses and decisions by 

depriving me of legally relevant facts 

when I evaluated those three 

registration renewal applications of 

Respondent. RFAAX 1, at 1–11; see also 

Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 

45,229, 45,235 (2020). Accordingly, I 

find, based on the CSA and the analyses 

underlying multiple Supreme Court 

decisions explaining ‘‘materiality,’’ that 

the five false Liability question 

responses Respondent submitted to the 

Agency in the three registration renewal 

applications at issue were material, and 

that the five false responses are grounds 

for the suspension or revocation of her 

registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); see 

Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D., 85 FR 

45,235. 

According to the Written Statement, 

Respondent ‘‘responded ‘No’ to liability 

question 1 with the understanding that 

. . . [she] was not guilty of a felony 

substance control conviction.’’ RFAAX 

3, at 1. Due to the clear, unequivocal, 

and convincing record evidence, I do 

not credit this portion of Respondent’s 

Written Statement.8 See, e.g., RFAAX 4, 

at 9 and RFAAX 5, at 3; see also infra 

section III.C. 

Respondent’s Written Statement also 

states that she ‘‘answered ‘No’ ’’ to the 

third Liability question ‘‘with the 

understanding because at that time . . . 

[her] nursing license was no longer 

under probation.’’ RFAAX 3, at 1. I do 

not credit this portion of Respondent’s 

Written Statement because the third 

Liability question asks whether the 

applicant ‘‘ever . . . had a state 

professional license . . . placed on 

probation.’’ RFAAX 1, at 4; id. at 10 

[emphasis added]. 

C. Allegation That Respondent Has 

Been Convicted of a Felony Related to 

Any Controlled Substance (21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2)) 

As already discussed, I find 

substantial record evidence that 

Respondent entered a negotiated guilty 

plea to Forgery in the First Degree, Ga. 

Code Ann. 16–9–1, a Georgia felony, on 

November 18, 2010.9 Supra section II.E. 

I also find substantial record evidence 

that the facts underlying Respondent’s 

First-Degree Felony conviction include 

her having forged a controlled substance 

prescription for herself. Id. 

Based on the facts I found in this 

matter, I conclude that Respondent has 

been convicted of a felony under a State 

law relating to a controlled substance. 

21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). First, to state the 

obvious, the state of Georgia used its 

First-Degree Felony Forgery statute to 

prosecute and convict Respondent of 

forging a controlled substance 

prescription even though that Georgia 

statute does not include the phrase 

‘‘controlled substance’’ in its text. See 

n.9. Georgia’s choice of this forgery 

statute shows that Respondent was 

convicted of a felony under a state law 

relating to any controlled substance. 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(2). 

Second, according to the Supreme 

Court, the phrase ‘‘in relation to’’ is 

interpreted expansively, and means 

‘‘with reference to’’ or ‘‘as regards.’’ 

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 

237 (1993). The Smith decision 

involved an offer to trade an automatic 

weapon for cocaine. 508 U.S. at 225. 

The decision addressed the question of 

whether the exchange of a firearm for 

cocaine constitutes using a firearm 

‘‘during and in relation to . . . [a] drug 

trafficking crime’’ within the meaning of 

18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). Id. The Supreme 

Court’s analysis cited prior Supreme 

Court and appellate court decisions 

interpreting the phrase ‘‘in relation to’’ 

and concluding that the phrase should 

be interpreted expansively. Id. at 237; 

see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater 

Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 

125, 129 (1992) (‘‘We have repeatedly 

stated that a law ‘relate[s] to’ a covered 

employee benefit plan . . . ‘if it has a 

connection with or reference to such a 

plan.’ . . . This reading is true to the 

ordinary meaning of ‘relate to’ . . . and 

thus gives effect to the ‘deliberately 

expansive’ language chosen by 

Congress.’’); United States v. Harris, 959 

F.2d 246, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per 

curiam) (‘‘The only limitation is that the 

guns be used ‘‘in relation’’ to the drug 

trafficking crime involved, which we 

think requires no more than the guns 

facilitate the predicate offense in some 

way.’’); United States v. Phelps, 877 

F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that 

the situation was ‘‘unusual’’ and not 

covered, the court stated that ‘‘the 

phrase ‘in relation to’ is broad’’). 

The Supreme Court also cited a 

dictionary definition in its analysis. 508 

U.S. at 237–38. It stated that 

‘‘[a]ccording to Webster’s, ‘in relation to’ 

means ‘with reference to’ or ‘as 

regards.’ ’’ Id. at 237. It concluded, thus, 

that the phrase ‘‘in relation to,’’ at a 

minimum, ‘‘clarifies that the firearm 

must have some purpose or effect with 

respect to the drug trafficking crime; its 

presence or involvement cannot be the 

result of accident or coincidence.’’ Id. at 

238. The Court also stated that ‘‘the gun 

at least must ‘facilitate[e], or ha[ve] the 


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potential of facilitating,’ the drug 

trafficking offense.’’ Id. Applying its 

analysis to the facts before it, the Court 

concluded that the use of the firearm 

‘‘meets any reasonable construction’’ of 

‘‘in relation to’’ because the gun was ‘‘an 

integral part of the transaction.’’ Id. I 

apply these conclusions of the Supreme 

Court as I analyze the record evidence 

before me. 

According to the facts I already found, 

Respondent used the prescription pad of 

a doctor at her former place of 

employment to write a schedule II 

controlled substance prescription for 

herself. RFAAX 4, at 9–10 and 13. My 

found facts also include that 

Respondent’s registration did not have 

schedule II authority. RFAAX 1, at 1. As 

such, for Respondent to have any 

chance of obtaining a schedule II 

controlled substance from a pharmacy 

by her efforts alone, she had to present 

a prescription written on the 

prescription pad of, and purportedly 

signed by, a registrant with schedule II 

authority. As my found facts show, 

Respondent had already absconded with 

the prescription pad of a doctor at her 

former place of employment and used 

that prescription pad to prescribe a 

schedule II controlled substance for 

herself, including forging the name of 

the registrant to whom the prescription 

pad belonged. RFAAX 4, at 9–10 and 13. 

Under my found facts, therefore, the use 

of the forged prescription was ‘‘an 

integral part of the transaction.’’ Smith 

v. United States, 508 U.S. at 238. Based 

on the Supreme Court’s explanation of 

‘‘in relation to,’’ I conclude that 

Respondent’s Georgia felony forgery 

conviction was ‘‘with reference to’’ and 

‘‘as regards’’ a controlled substance and, 

accordingly, I also conclude that 

Respondent’s felony forgery conviction 

satisfies the terms of 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). 

Third, prior Agency decisions have 

applied the felony conviction provision 

of 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2) to circumstances 

similar to those in this matter. See, e.g., 

Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR 

23,848, 23,852 (2007) (conspiracy to be 

an accessory after the fact); Clark G. 

Triftshauser, M.D., 67 FR 71,202, 71,203 

(2002) (criminal possession of a forged 

instrument); Charles A. Buscema, M.D., 

59 FR 42,857, 42,858 (1994) (FirstDegree Felony conviction for falsifying 

business records about the dispensing of 

controlled substances, but ultimately 

not finding for revocation); Lambert N. 

DePompei, M.D., 49 FR 37,862, 37,863 

(1984) (possession of false or forged 

prescriptions are ‘‘all felony convictions 

relating to controlled substances’’); 

Ontario Drugs, Inc., Fullerton-Kedzie 

Pharmacy, Inc., 46 FR 16,004, 16,005 

(1981) (theft and forgery of controlled 

substance prescriptions). Consequently, 

my finding that Respondent’s Georgia 

forgery felony guilty plea satisfies the 

terms of 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2) is consistent 

with Agency decisions issued in the last 

forty years. 

For all of the above reasons, I 

conclude that the found facts in this 

matter meet the requirements of 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(2). Accordingly, I find that 

Respondent has been convicted of a 

felony related to any controlled 

substance. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). 

In sum, I find that the record evidence 

supports two independent legal bases 

for the suspension or revocation of 

Respondent’s registration—(1) five 

material falsifications in three 

registration renewal applications and (2) 

Respondent’s conviction of a felony 

related to any controlled substance. 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(1) and (2). 

IV. Sanction 

Where, as here, the Government 

presented two, independent bases for 

the suspension or revocation of 

Respondent’s registration, and 

Respondent did not present evidence 

rebutting either of the two bases, it is 

then up to Respondent ‘‘to assure the 

Administrator’’ that she ‘‘can be 

entrusted with the responsibilit[ies] that 

accompany registration.’’ White v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 626 F. App’x 493, 496 (5th 

Cir. 2015); see also Jones Total Health 

Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 

2018) (quoting Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 841 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 

2016)); MacKay v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 

664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Volkman v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 

567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009) 

quoting Hoxie v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 419 

F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005)). As the 

Fifth Circuit also stated, ‘‘[s]uch 

evidence includes acceptance of 

responsibility and a demonstration that 

the . . . [Respondent] ‘will not engage 

in future misconduct.’ ’’ White v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 626 F. App’x at 496; see 

also Pharmacy Doctors Enterprises, Inc. 

v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 789 F. App’x, 724, 

733 (2019) (citing Jones Total Health 

Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf’t 

Admin., 881 F.3d at 831 (citing MacKay 

v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 664 F.3d at 820 

(noting that past performance is the best 

predictor of future performance and, 

when a registrant has ‘‘failed to comply 

with . . . [her] responsibilities in the 

past, it makes sense for the agency to 

consider whether . . . [she] will change 

. . . [her] behavior in the future’’) and 

Alra Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 54 

F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995) (‘‘An 

agency rationally may conclude that 

past performance is the best predictor of 

future performance.’’))). 

The Agency has decided that the 

egregiousness and extent of misconduct 

are significant factors in determining the 

appropriate sanction. Garrett Howard 

Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18,882, 18,910 

(2018) (collecting cases); Samuel 

Mintlow, M.D., 80 FR 3630, 3652 (2015) 

(‘‘Obviously, the egregiousness and 

extent of a registrant’s misconduct are 

significant factors in determining the 

appropriate sanction.’’). The Agency has 

also considered the need to deter similar 

acts in the future by Respondent and by 

the community of registrants. Garrett 

Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18,910; 

Samuel Mintlow, M.D., 80 FR 3652. 

In terms of egregiousness, the five 

instances of material falsification and 

the felony conviction go to the heart of 

the CSA: Non-compliance with the 

closed regulatory system devised to 

‘‘prevent the diversion of drugs from 

legitimate to illicit channels’’ and not 

prescribing controlled substances in 

compliance with the applicable 

standard of care and in the usual course 

of professional practice. Gonzales v. 

Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13–14, 27 (2005). 

These material falsifications and felony 

conviction alone support revocation. 

Further, the uncontroverted record 

evidence, including Respondent’s 

admissions, shows that Respondent’s 

forgery of controlled substance 

prescriptions for herself spanned 2008 

and 2009. Supra sections II.C., II.D., 

II.E., and II.F. The record evidence 

includes five instances of Respondent’s 

founded (including negotiated and 

admitted) or alleged forgery of a 

controlled substance prescription. Id. 

The admittedly and allegedly forged, 

self-prescribed controlled substance 

prescriptions, Vicodin/hydrocodone (4) 

and Tussionex Pennkinetic (1), all 

include hydrocodone, a highly abused 

schedule II controlled substance. Supra 

sections II.C., II.D., and II.E. In this 

regard, I note Respondent’s sworn 

denials of ‘‘any sort of drug abuse 

problem.’’ Supra sections II.C. and II.F. 

I also note, though, that Respondent’s 

current registration does not authorize 

her to issue schedule II controlled 

substance prescriptions, and that 

Respondent allegedly forged two, selfprescribed schedule II controlled 

substance prescriptions in one month. 

Supra sections II.A., II.C., and II.E. 

Respondent’s submission does not 

address acceptance of responsibility. 

See supra section II.D. Indeed, 

Respondent does not even acknowledge 

the entirety of the OSC’s charges against 

her. Her Written Statement begins by 

stating that she is writing it about 

‘‘material falsification of renewal 


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10 I do not consider remedial measures when a 

Respondent does not unequivocally accept 

responsibility. As discussed, the scope of 

Respondent’s discussion of remedial efforts was 

limited and, therefore, unpersuasive and not 

reassuring. 

1The Government’s Exhibit demonstrates that the 

Florida Board of Medicine approved the settlement 

agreement on April 5, 2021. See Government’s 

Motion for Summary Disposition, Exhibit D, at 1– 

2. 

2According to the Declaration of the lead 

Diversion Investor (hereinafter, DI) assigned to this 

case, the DI mailed two copies of the OSC to 

Respondent on March 31, 2021. Government 

Motion Exhibit 1, at 1–2. By email dated April 2, 

2021, Respondent’s counsel indicated that 

Respondent had received the OSC on April 2, 2021, 

and would be filing a request for hearing within 30 

days, as well as a proposed corrective action plan. 

Request for Hearing (Emailed). Because 

Respondent’s hearing request, was filed within 

thirty days of the DI’s mailing the OSC on April 29, 

2021, I find that the Government’s service of the 

OSC was adequate and that the hearing request was 

timely filed. 

applications for . . . [her] DEA license.’’ 

RFAAX 3, at 1. At the end of her 

Written Statement, Respondent asks for 

‘‘a period of either probation or 

suspension with monitoring’’ ‘‘based on 

the circumstances in which . . . [she] 

unwittingly submitted the wrong 

responses on . . . [her] renewal 

applications.’’ Id. at 2. In other words, 

Respondent does not even acknowledge 

that the OSC also proposed the 

revocation of her registration based on 

21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2). 

Further, the focus of her Written 

Statement is that she ‘‘made a very grave 

mistake which . . . [she] will forever 

regret.’’ Id. at 1. It points out that she 

has ‘‘undergone a lot of emotional stress 

regarding the risk . . . [she] placed . . . 

[her] career in.’’ Id. The Written 

Statement, however, does not move 

beyond the impact her wrongdoing has 

on herself and her career. Id. at 1–2. It 

characterizes her wrongdoing as 

‘‘unwittingly submitting the wrong 

responses,’’ not as violating the law and 

betraying the trust of her employer and 

the Agency. Id. at 2. 

Respondent’s choice to submit a 

Written Statement, instead of taking 

advantage of her right to a hearing, 

means that she cannot answer questions 

about her admittedly and allegedly 

forged controlled substance 

prescriptions and whether she accepts 

responsibility for her wrongdoing. The 

areas of concern I have about her 

admitted and alleged violations include 

how many times she forged controlled 

substance prescriptions for herself, what 

controlled substances were involved, 

why she forged the prescriptions, and 

what she did with the controlled 

substances. The areas of concern I have 

about acceptance of responsibility 

include whether, and for what, 

Respondent unequivocally accepts 

responsibility. In other words, 

Respondent’s recognition of having 

made a ‘‘grave mistake’’ that placed her 

career in risk, the resulting experience 

of ‘‘a lot of emotional stress,’’ and being 

‘‘sorry’’ that she placed herself ‘‘in such 

a position’’ do not constitute 

unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility for her wrongdoing. All of 

the areas of concern to me remain 

unresolved. 

In sum, the record evidence raises, 

but does not answer, the extent and 

degree of Respondent’s wrongdoing and 

whether Respondent unequivocally 

accepts responsibility for it as the 

Agency requires. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 

FR 46,968, 46,972–73 (2019) 

(unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility); Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 

M.D., 74 FR 459, 463 (2009) (collecting 

cases). These deficiencies are 

concerning. For example, they may 

mean that Respondent does not 

appreciate (1) the full extent of her 

wrongdoing and the (2) breadth of the 

harm her wrongdoing caused. I am also 

left wondering what Respondent 

learned from her wrongdoing, and 

whether Respondent has the resources 

to avoid future wrongdoing. 

For all of the above reasons, it is not 

reasonable for me, at this time, to trust 

that Respondent will comply with all 

controlled substance legal requirements 

in the future.10 Alra Labs., Inc. v. Drug 

Enf’t Admin., 54 F.3d at 452 (‘‘An 

agency rationally may conclude that 

past performance is the best predictor of 

future performance.’’). Accordingly, I 

shall order that Respondent’s 

registration be revoked, and that all 

pending applications to renew or 

modify Respondent’s registration and 

any pending application for a new 

registration in Georgia, be denied. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate 

of Registration No. MS1972101 issued to 

Uvienome Linda Sakor, N.P. Pursuant to 

28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority 

vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and by 

21 U.S.C. 823(f), I further hereby deny 

any pending application of Uvienome 

Linda Sakor, N.P., to renew or modify 

this registration, as well as any other 

pending application of Uvienome Linda 

Sakor, N.P. for registration in Georgia. 

This Order is effective October 7, 2021. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2021–19194 Filed 9–3–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 21–13] 

Lora L. Thaxton, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On March 24, 2021, the Assistant 

Administrator, Diversion Control 

Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Lora L. 

Thaxton, M.D. (hereinafter, Respondent) 

of Naples, Florida. OSC, at 1. The OSC 

proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s Certificate of Registration 

No. FT3429227. It alleged that 

Respondent is without ‘‘authority to 

handle controlled substances in Florida, 

the state in which [Respondent is] 

registered with DEA.’’ Id. at 2 (citing 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(3)). 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that the 

Florida Department of Health issued an 

Order of Emergency Restriction of 

License on April 14, 2020. Id. at 1. This 

Order, according to the OSC, suspended 

Respondent’s Florida medical license 

following its findings, inter alia, that a 

medical evaluator from the impaired 

practitioner program for the Florida 

Board of Medicine had determined that 

Respondent was ‘‘unable to practice 

medicine with reasonable skill and 

safety to patients due to alcohol use 

disorder.’’ Id. at 2. According to the 

OSC, Respondent subsequently entered 

into a settlement agreement with the 

Florida Board of Medicine on February 

5, 2021,1 under which Respondent’s 

medical license would remain 

suspended until she demonstrated her 

ability to practice medicine with 

reasonable skill and safety, submitted to 

an evaluation by the impaired 

practitioner program, and petitioned the 

Florida Board of Medicine for 

reinstatement of her medical license. Id. 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 2–3 (citing 

21 CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Respondent of the opportunity to 

submit a corrective action plan. Id. at 3 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated April 29, 2021, 

Respondent timely requested a hearing.2

Request for Hearing (Official 

Notification). The Office of 

Administrative Law Judges put the 

matter on the docket and assigned it to 


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