23-6457-cr

United States v. Gorychka

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND 

IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR 

AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 28th day of August, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, 

 Circuit Judges. 

 ------------------------------------------------------------------

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 23-6457-cr

PATRICK EDWIN GORYCHKA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

------------------------------------------------------------------ 
2 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Darrell Fields, Federal 

Defenders of New York, New 

York, NY 

FOR APPELLEE: Marcia S. Cohen, Nathan 

Rehn, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Damian 

Williams, United States 

Attorney for the Southern

District of New York, New 

York, NY 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in part 

and the case is REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

Patrick Edwin Gorychka appeals from a January 20, 2023 judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, J.) 

convicting him, after a guilty plea, of one count of possessing child pornography, 

also known as child sexual abuse material (“CSAM”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Gorychka was sentenced principally to 42 months’ 

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, Gorychka 

challenges the District Court’s imposition of three special conditions of 
3 

supervised release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to 

explain our decision. 

We review Gorychka’s challenge for plain error because he did not object 

to these special conditions before the District Court. See United States v. Matta, 

777 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2015). We have cautioned that reversal for plain error 

“should be used sparingly.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 

2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

A sentencing court may impose special conditions that are reasonably 

related to the factors listed in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b), so long as, among other things, 

the conditions involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 

necessary. See United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123–25 (2d Cir. 2005). When 

determining whether to impose a special condition of supervised release, a 

district court must “make an individualized assessment” and “state on the 

record the reason for imposing it; the failure to do so is error.” United States v. 

Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). But even when a district court fails to state 

its reasons, as the District Court did here, “we may . . . affirm if the district 
4 

court’s reasoning is self-evident in the record.” United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 

748, 760 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). 

I. Adult Pornography 

Gorychka first challenges the special condition that he may “not view, 

access, possess and/or download any pornography involving adults unless 

approved by the sex-offender specific treatment provider.” App’x 98. He argues 

that “the record contains no evidence or finding that [the condition] is reasonably 

related to the goals of sentencing.” Appellant’s Br. 14. We are not persuaded. 

The “conditional liberty” to which offenders on supervised release are subject 

“may include, inter alia, a prohibition against possession of pornographic 

matter.” United States v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 810 (2d Cir. 2006). We have 

affirmed special conditions prohibiting defendants from accessing adult 

pornography where the record indicated that the restriction was reasonably 

related to the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Springer, 684 F. App’x 37, 40 (2d 

Cir. 2017); United States v. Lombardo, 546 F. App’x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2013). 

 In her psychosexual evaluation, Dr. Jennifer McCarthy discussed the links 

between Gorychka’s use of adult pornography and CSAM. Dr. McCarthy noted

that Gorychka disclosed a long history of viewing and trading adult 
5 

pornography. She also noted that Gorychka has “problems with sexual selfregulation” and “deviant sexual interests.” Report at 19. Further, Gorychka

admitted that he began viewing and trading CSAM and having fantasies about 

prepubescent and adolescent girls after he found CSAM in online chatrooms 

devoted to adult pornography. Dr. McCarthy, as well as the Presentence 

Investigation Report, recommended that Gorychka be prohibited from viewing, 

accessing, possessing, or downloading any pornographic material, including 

adult pornography, unless approved by his treatment provider. The District 

Court adopted this recommendation. 

 It is thus apparent from the record that the special condition restricting

Gorychka’s access to adult pornography was reasonably related to the 

circumstances of his offense, his history and characteristics, and his treatment, 

among other factors listed in § 5D1.3(b). We find no plain error. 

II. Contact with Minors 

We also reject Gorychka’s challenge to the condition prohibiting

“deliberate contact with any child [(other than his own)] under 18 years of age 

unless approved by the Probation Office.” App’x 100. Gorychka argues that the 
6 

basis for the imposition of this condition was not self-evident from the record

and that it is overbroad. We disagree. 

The record indicates that Gorychka revealed his desire to engage in sexual 

conduct with minors to two different undercover agents via an online platform. 

During these conversations, Gorychka made attempts to arrange a meeting with 

an undercover agent posing as a child trafficker. Given these and other facts on 

the record, it is apparent that this special condition was reasonably related to the 

nature and circumstances of Gorychka’s offense, and similar to conditions that 

we have previously upheld. See, e.g., United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 75 

(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 342, 344 (2d Cir. 2008); cf. 

United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that the district 

court plainly erred in imposing, without explanation, a prohibition on contact 

with minors because the offense conduct did not entail inappropriate contact 

with minors). In particular, the special condition excludes inadvertent contact 

with children. For these reasons, we conclude that the condition is not 
7 

overbroad. See United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 2006). The

District Court therefore did not plainly err in imposing this special condition. 

III. Monitoring 

 Lastly, Gorychka challenges the special condition that his “use of any 

devices in the course of employment will be subject to monitoring or restriction 

as permitted by [his] employer.” App’x 100. Gorychka argues that this 

condition “would effectively require him to notify prospective employers about 

his conviction.” Appellant’s Br. 23; see id. at 26. The Government acknowledges

that the condition may lead to a “conversation between the Probation Office and 

[Gorychka’s] employer” and “would presumably result in the disclosure of 

Gorychka’s supervision . . . .” Appellee’s Br. 30. We have treated similar 

employer notification conditions as “occupational restrictions.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5; 

see United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2001). A sentencing court 

may impose an occupational restriction only if it determines that there is a 

“reasonably direct relationship” between the defendant’s occupation and the 

defendant’s offense conduct, and that the restriction is “reasonably necessary to 

protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, 
8 

the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for 

which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a). 

It is not “obvious from the record” before us that the monitoring condition 

satisfies this standard. Bleau, 930 F.3d at 43. The District Court did not explain 

its basis for determining that a relationship exists between Gorychka’s offense 

conduct and his work, or that monitoring Gorychka’s use of internet-capable 

devices as part of his employment is reasonably necessary to protect the public. 

It may be possible, however, for the court to show that the monitoring condition 

is warranted because of such a nexus between Gorychka’s occupation and his 

criminal conduct. 

Accordingly, we remand pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 

21–22 (2d Cir. 1994), so that the District Court may expeditiously provide us with 

such an explanation, if it exists, or inform us that it is unable to find a specific 

nexus between Gorychka’s occupation and his criminal conduct. Upon the 

District Court’s provision of a written response, any party may restore the matter 

to the active docket of this Court by letter without filing a notice of appeal. If 

further action is sought from this Court, the matter will be referred to this panel. 
9 

CONCLUSION 

 We have considered Gorychka’s remaining arguments and conclude that 

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District 

Court is AFFIRMED in part and the case is REMANDED to the District Court 

pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994), for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. 

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court