J-S36009-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

IFEANYI NWANI

Appellant No. 3542 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007130-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 25, 2017

Appellant, Ifeanyi Nwani, pled guilty to a charge of unlawful restraint 

arising from allegations that he had sexually assaulted an 18-year-old 

female. The court imposed a sentence of time served to 23 months’ 

imprisonment, to be followed by a two-year probationary period. Nwani was 

released on parole prior to serving his maximum term of imprisonment, but 

his parole was revoked on March 23, 2016. As a result, the court sentenced 

Nwani to serve the remainder of his sentence.

On April 19, 2016, he filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and counsel 

promptly filed a no-merit letter. The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent 

to dismiss Nwani’s petition and granted counsel leave to withdraw. Nwani 
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filed a response to the notice, but the court entered an order dismissing the 

petition on August 1, 2016.

On October 17, 2016, Nwani filed the instant notice of appeal. The 

appeal was facially untimely, as he did not file it by August 31, 2016. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). An untimely appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to 

entertain the appeal. See Sass v. AmTrust Bank, 74 A.3d 1054, 1063 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). As a result, we ordered Nwani to show cause why the appeal 

should not be quashed.

Nwani responded by arguing that he filed a timely notice of appeal on 

August 25, 2016. A review of the certified record reveals that a document 

was filed with the trial court on August 25, 2016, after it had been forwarded 

from this Court’s Prothonotary, where Nwani had originally attempted to file 

it. 

The document consists of a single hand-written page that lists 

challenges to Nwani’s conviction for unlawful restraint as well as challenges 

to the revocation of his parole. Attached are several photocopies of prior 

pleadings, an alleged affidavit signed by the victim, and a copy of the 

preliminary hearing in this matter. We are unable to locate the word 

“appeal” anywhere in these documents. 

Rule 904 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a template for

appellants to follow in drafting a notice of appeal. However, “[a] timely 

notice of appeal triggers the jurisdiction of the appellate court, 
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notwithstanding whether the notice of appeal is otherwise defective.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587 (Pa. 2014). The question 

raised here is what constitutes the bare minimum necessary for a document 

to qualify as a notice of appeal?

As noted above, the document filed by Nwani on August 25, 2016 is 

untitled. It does not contain the word “appeal,” nor does it contain any 

statement that the PCRA court committed error. Rather, Nwani raises 

challenges to prior final orders. For example, Nwani asserts that the 

“probation officer made a false report after she snatched petitioner’s cell 

phone without his consent when she read petitioner’s personal text 

messages and without [] prior approval from her supervisor for property 

search[.]” Furthermore, it does not reference, in any way, the order dated 

August 1, 2016, that dismissed his PCRA petition.

Arguably, the fact that Nwani filed these documents with this Court 

initially could support an inference that he intended them to constitute a 

notice of appeal of some order. However, we refuse to create a standard 

whereby prothonotaries are required to be mind readers. Such a standard is 

contrary to the intent of Pa.R.A.P. 902, which seeks to simplify the appeals 

process and remove discretionary power from prothonotaries in the process. 

See Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 A.3d 393, 396 (Pa. Super. 2011).

In order to qualify as a notice of appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 904, a 

document must, at a minimum, evince its face, a desire to appeal. We are 
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not requiring any specific combination of language or technical 

requirements—Rule 902 and our interpretive case law counsel against such a 

course. Rather, we merely conclude that Nwani’s August 25, 2016 filing does 

not meet this minimal standard.

While we will liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, such 

appellants are not entitled to any particular advantage due to their lack of 

legal training. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. 

Super. 1996). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in 

a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of 

expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Commonwealth v. 

Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Even given 

a liberal construction due to his pro se status, Nwani’s August 25, 2016 filing 

does not meet the minimal standards imposed by our Rules of Appellate 

Procedure.

As a result, Nwani’s October 17 notice of appeal does not qualify as an 

amendment to an earlier, timely notice of appeal. It is the first and only 

notice of appeal filed by Nwani. It is also indisputably untimely. We therefore 

have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

Appeal quashed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2017