Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CLINTON DAVIS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CLINTON DAVIS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A05-1110-CR-547

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Rudolph R. Pyle, III, Judge

Cause No. 48D01-9502-CF-67 

May 9, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge
2

Case Summary

Clinton Davis, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his fourth motion to 

correct erroneous sentence. Because Davis’s argument requires consideration of matters 

beyond the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence was 

not the appropriate vehicle for Davis to use. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 

properly denied his fourth motion. 

Facts and Procedural History1

In 1996, Davis was convicted of three counts of Class A felony attempted murder, 

Class D felony criminal recklessness, and two counts of Class D felony resisting law 

enforcement. The only sentences at issue on appeal are Davis’s attempted-murder 

sentences. The trial court sentenced Davis to forty years for each attempted murder 

conviction and ran two of them consecutively and the third concurrently. Thus, the trial 

court sentenced Davis to eighty years for these three convictions. The record indicates 

that the trial court found the following aggravators: “the location of the first attempted 

murder was a church, some of the intended victims were police officers, and defendant’s 

post-conviction attitude – lack of remorse, implied threats to the Probation Department, 

and blaming the victim.” Appellant’s App. p. 9 (CCS); see also id. at 17 (sentencing 

order). 

 

1 Although this case has a lengthy and complicated procedural history, the only documents Davis 

includes in his appendix are the CCS from the trial court and his original 1996 sentencing order. Davis 

includes neither any of this Court’s previous opinions or orders nor any of the motions or orders from the 

courts below. Notably, Davis fails to include the very motion to correct erroneous sentence from which 

he now appeals. This failure has made it extremely difficult for us to construct the facts and procedural 

history of this case. 
3

Davis belatedly appealed, and we affirmed the trial court in a memorandum 

decision. Davis v. State, No. 48A02-9703-CR-179 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1998). Our 

Supreme Court denied transfer.

Davis then sought post-conviction review, which the court denied. Davis 

appealed, and we affirmed the post-conviction court in a memorandum decision. Davis v. 

State, 48A02-0402-PC-191 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2004). Our Supreme Court again 

denied transfer.

Davis, pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence in September 2007

which, according to the short CCS entry, challenged his consecutive sentencing. 

Appellant’s App. p. 13 (CCS). The trial court denied the motion. Id. (CCS). Davis 

appealed, but we dismissed it because Davis failed to show cause why the appeal should 

not be dismissed. Davis v. State, 48A02-0712-PC-1155 (Ind. Ct. App. July 7, 2008). 

Davis, pro se, filed a second motion to correct erroneous sentence in September 

2008. The CCS does not reveal the nature of Davis’s challenge this time. The trial court 

denied this motion. Appellant’s App. p. 14 (CCS). Davis appealed, but we dismissed the 

appeal with prejudice because Davis failed to show cause why the appeal should not be 

dismissed. Davis v. State, No. 48A02-0807-PC-648 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2009). 

Davis, pro se, filed a third motion to correct erroneous sentence in July 2009. 

Appellant’s App. p. 15 (CCS). Again, the CCS does not reveal the nature of Davis’s 

challenge. The trial court denied the motion, and we dismissed the appeal with prejudice. 

Davis v. State, 48A02-0905-CR-382 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009). 
4

In September 2011, Davis, pro se, filed a fourth motion to correct erroneous 

sentence. Appellant’s App. p. 16 (CCS). As explained above, Davis did not include this 

motion in his appendix. The trial court denied the motion. Id. (CCS). 

Davis now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Davis appeals the trial court’s denial of his fourth motion to correct erroneous 

sentence. The State responds that because the alleged sentencing errors are not clear 

from the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence was the 

wrong vehicle in which to bring this claim.

An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to 

correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not 

render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written 

notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his 

counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion 

to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of 

law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15; see also Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008). The 

purpose of this statute “is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal 

process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State,

805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a motion to correct 

sentence may only be filed to address a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Neff, 888 

N.E.2d at 1251 (citing Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786). Claims that require consideration 

of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion 

to correct sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Sentencing errors that are not facially 
5

apparent must be addressed via direct appeal or post-conviction relief. Neff, 888 N.E.2d 

at 1251. In addition, a motion to correct erroneous sentence may only arise out of 

information contained on the formal judgment of conviction, not from the abstract of 

judgment. Id.

The gist of Davis’s argument on appeal is that the “enhancements and consecutive 

sentences [for his attempted murder convictions] are not based on principles of 

rehabilitation or the nonviolent nature of the defendant as required by Article 1 Sections 

16 and 18 of the Constitution of Indiana, and they are not authorized by statute.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 3. This argument, however, falls plainly outside the parameters of 

Section 35-38-1-15. Resolution of this issue requires us to go beyond the face of the 

formal judgment of conviction. See, e.g., Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786-87 (noting that a 

claim that the trial court imposed the maximum sentence in partial reliance upon 

improper aggravators was not appropriate for a motion to correct sentence). Because the 

motion to correct erroneous sentence was not the appropriate vehicle for Davis to use,2

the trial court properly denied his fourth motion to correct erroneous sentence.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.

 

2 As detailed above, Davis has already unsuccessfully sought a direct appeal and post-conviction 

relief. And he has unsuccessfully tried, for four times now, to challenge his sentence. It appears that his 

only avenue of relief at this point is a successive petition for post-conviction relief.