Filed 8/10/22 In re V.V. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re V.V. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B317159

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

18CCJP03513A-B)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.

Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Dan. V. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his daughter V.V. and son D.V. 

We are asked to decide whether the juvenile court erred in 

declining to rely on the parental benefit exception to forgo 

terminating parental rights. In particular, we consider whether 

substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that no 

beneficial relationship existed between Father and the children 

and whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

found terminating Father’s parental rights would not be 

detrimental to the children.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Investigation and Assumption of Dependency

Jurisdiction

V.V. was born in August 2008; D.V. was born in December 

2009. The events that led to the dependency orders challenged in 

this appeal began in May 2018.

1

A teacher at V.V.’s school reported to the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services (the 

Department) that V.V. disclosed an uncle had been sexually 

1 The children had been adjudicated dependents of the 

juvenile court on two previous occasions. In August 2012, the 

juvenile court sustained a dependency petition alleging the 

children were at risk based on their mother A.U.’s (Mother’s) 

history of mental and emotional problems and drug use, plus

Father’s failure to protect them. In October 2014, the juvenile 

court sustained allegations based on both parents’ alcohol abuse 

as well as Mother’s history of mental and emotional problems and 

drug use. The children were released to Father in both cases, 

and he was granted sole physical and legal custody.
3

abusing her for years.2 V.V. discussed the abuse in detail with a 

Department social worker. V.V. said she mentioned the abuse to 

D.V. about a year earlier, but D.V. could not recall what she told

him. V.V. did not believe anyone else in the home was aware of 

the abuse, and she had not reported it to any adults because her 

uncle threatened to “break the house down” and she was worried 

she would get in trouble.

The children told a Department social worker they lived

with Father, their maternal grandmother, and two uncles.3 The 

grandmother cared for the children, and V.V. said she is

“everything to [them]. She’s [their] mom, dad, gramma and 

grandpa. She does everything for [them].” D.V. reported Father 

“drinks a little bit” and “[s]ometimes he gets drunk. He always 

goes to his room and locks the door. . . . He’s mean sometimes. 

He argues with us and tries to take us somewhere . . . . He says 

mean stuff like [you’re] dumb and ugly . . . .” V.V. said Father 

left the home for days at a time, explaining: “He gets drunk 

sometimes and goes somewhere. He does that and he likes it 

because he won’t stop. He has red eyes and a grumpy voice. He 

acts a little scary.”

Father, who had red eyes and smelled of alcohol at the time

of an interview with a social worker, said it was “possibl[e]” V.V. 

had been abused by her uncle but the allegations were “difficult” 

to believe because he had not observed any concerning behavior 

and the uncle was someone he trusted. Father also suspected the 

2 A school psychologist also reported V.V. said the uncle 

abused D.V., but D.V. denied this and V.V. told a social worker 

she was not aware of anyone touching D.V.

3 Neither child had seen Mother for at least a year.
4

allegations were fabricated by Mother, who had accused the uncle 

of molesting D.V. a couple years earlier.4 Nonetheless, Father 

acknowledged the uncle “ha[d] to leave.” When a medical 

examination confirmed injuries to V.V. consistent with sexual 

abuse, Father “began crying and said he believe[d] his daughter.” 

Within a couple months, however, V.V. told her grandmother that 

Father said he would punish V.V. the next time she “speaks up or 

says anything.”

Father claimed he stopped drinking alcohol during the 

earlier dependency proceedings involving the children but 

relapsed a few months earlier when his mother died. He 

acknowledged leaving the home for days at a time, and he said 

the children’s grandmother took care of them. While the 

Department was investigating the sexual abuse allegations, 

Father tested positive for cocaine.

The children’s grandmother told a social worker she moved 

in to the family home to look after the children and she was their 

primary caregiver. As she put it, she had “played the role of the 

children’s ‘mother’ since they were born.” She had not witnessed 

any inappropriate behavior, but she did not spend time in the 

portion of the house occupied by Father and his brothers.

The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over 

the children in September 2018 based on the substantial risk of 

serious physical harm presented by the uncle’s sexual abuse of 

V.V., Father’s failure to protect her, and Father’s alcohol and 

drug abuse. Father was ordered to participate in a substance 

abuse program, to submit to alcohol and drug testing, and to 

4 The Department’s investigation of this claim in 2015 was 

“inconclusive.”
5

participate in individual counseling and sex abuse counseling. 

He was granted three monitored, two-hour visits per week.

B. Supplemental and Subsequent Petitions

The children were placed in foster care at the beginning of 

these proceedings, but they were later placed with their 

grandmother. Father smelled of alcohol during a visit with the 

children in October 2018, but he enrolled in Alcoholics 

Anonymous and had been “consistent and appropriate with 

visitation” as of March 2019. The Department exercised its 

discretion to permit Father unmonitored overnight visits, and 

these “went well.” The juvenile court ordered the children placed 

with Father on the condition that the family continue to reside 

with the children’s grandmother.

The following month, the Department received a report 

from V.V.’s school that she “said she wanted to hurt herself” 

because “[F]ather has been talking about seeing [the uncle who 

abused her] at family get togethers in the future . . . .” She told 

classmates she was worried about “her uncle moving back home, 

possibly within the next four days.” V.V. was briefly hospitalized.

The children’s grandmother told a social worker Father had 

been drinking and absent from the family home for days at a 

time. Father denied talking with V.V. about her uncle. He also 

denied—initially—he had begun drinking again and claimed he 

had been intermittently staying at his Alcoholics Anonymous 

provider site. (Residents at this facility told a social worker 

Father recently arrived drunk.) Within weeks, however, Father 

admitted to a social worker that he was drinking again and said 

he had not “been home lately because [he did not] want [his] 

children to see [him] like this.”
6

Father agreed to leave the home within a few days and 

signed an affidavit stating he needed the children’s grandmother 

to care for them while he sought mental health treatment. When 

asked about his role in the family home, Father said he would 

“come and see if everything is fine” but the children’s 

grandmother took care of the children, cooked for them, and took 

them to school. The children’s grandmother reported D.V. missed 

a recent mental health appointment because Father was away 

from home. V.V. said she only saw Father a few days each week 

and he would “sleep and sleep.”

In May 2019 (less than two months after the children were 

returned to Father’s care), the Department filed supplemental 

and subsequent dependency petitions. The children were 

removed from Father’s custody and placed with their 

grandmother, who monitored one two-hour visit with Father each 

week. The Department exercised its discretion to grant Father 

unmonitored daytime visits in September 2019, and these were 

“going well.”

In October 2019, the juvenile court sustained an allegation 

in the supplemental petition that Father failed to participate in 

court-ordered services and failed to ensure the children 

participated in wraparound services. The juvenile court also 

sustained an allegation in the subsequent petition that the 

children were at serious risk of physical harm because Father did 

not ensure V.V. received mental health services and left the 

children with their grandmother without making an appropriate 

plan for their care and supervision (including providing 

documentation needed to obtain medical treatment). Father was 

again ordered to participate in a substance abuse program, to 
7

submit to testing, and to participate in individual counseling. He 

was granted three unmonitored three-hour visits per week.

C. Second Supplemental Dependency Petition

Around the time the juvenile court ruled on the 

Department’s supplemental and subsequent petitions, the 

Department exercised its discretion to grant Father overnight 

weekend visits. Although Father missed some of these visits 

while in an inpatient program, they were generally “going well” 

as of February 2020. The juvenile court once again returned the 

children to Father’s care that month.

A few months later, however, the children’s grandmother 

told a social worker Father was drinking again. He was also “in 

and out of the home”—sometimes promising to bring the children 

food and not following through and other times coming home late 

after the children were in bed.

V.V. told a social worker she had seen Father drunk 

outside through her window. She also mentioned that when 

Father drank, he sometimes summoned D.V. to his room to 

discuss “adult stuff.” D.V. made it “very clear” to the social 

worker that he did not enjoy these conversations. He asked V.V.

to accompany him because he did not want to be alone with 

Father when Father had been drinking. D.V. said Father “talks 

to [him] about when he dies and says that [D.V.] will be the boss 

of the house.” Father told the children he was being deported 

and planned to move to Nicaragua with a new wife, but he

subsequently recanted these statements. V.V. said she felt safe 

at home when Father was sober, but not when he was drinking. 

D.V. said he did not feel safe “recently” with Father in the home.
8

When interviewed by the Department, Father denied he 

had begun abusing alcohol again and he said he was anxious 

because his group programs had been canceled due to the 

COVID-19 public health emergency. When a social worker told 

Father he had recently tested positive for cocaine, Father said he 

would move out of the family home so the children could remain 

there with their grandmother. Father had a phone visit with 

D.V. shortly after he moved out, but V.V. declined to speak with 

him because he missed her virtual graduation earlier that day.

The Department filed yet another supplemental petition 

alleging the previous disposition was not effective in protecting 

the children because Father tested positive for cocaine and was 

under the influence of alcohol on multiple occasions while the 

children were under his care. The juvenile court sustained this 

allegation in July 2020 and again removed the children from 

Father’s custody. The court also terminated family reunification 

services, but Father was allowed to continue monitored visitation

with the children.

D. Events After Termination of Family Reunification 

Services

The children’s grandmother expressed interest in adopting 

them, but, as of November 2020, the Department was still 

reviewing her eligibility as a permanent placement because she 

was going through a divorce and expected to move to a different 

home. The divorce was finalized in April 2021 and the 

Department found “no impediments to the placement or 

adoption” at that time.

The Department reported the children have a “wonderful 

bond” with their grandmother and called her “mami.” V.V. 
9

favored adoption, stating, “I do not want [Father] to take care of 

us because of how he treated us in the past. He would get drunk. 

I want to be adopted by my grandma because she knows us better 

than [Father]. I worry that he will begin to start drinking again.” 

V.V. reiterated in another conversation that she “worr[ied] about 

the case closing and [Father] going back to how he was.” She 

“[did] not trust” Father because of his drinking, because he 

“lie[d]” about being deported, and based on instances in which he 

promised outings and gifts without following through. V.V. knew 

Father “was trying,” but she felt their “connection [was] not 

there.” D.V. said he wanted Father to visit or “be home,” but he 

wanted his grandmother to adopt him and V.V. because she

“knows us well and knows how to take good care of us.” D.V. was 

also “worr[ied] about [Father] drinking again.”

Between July 2020 and August 2021, Father generally 

attended two of his three authorized weekly visits with the 

children.

5

 At times during this period, Father also brought the 

children lunch one day per week. (When in-person learning 

resumed, Father also drove the children to school.) The children 

told a social worker their visits with Father were short, “lasting 

30 minutes to an hour,” and he “sometimes only drop[ped] off food 

for the children, greet[ed] them and le[ft].” At other times, 

Father would greet the children, “inquire[ ] about school, bring[ ] 

them food and sometimes watch[ ] TV with them,” but there was 

“no other form of bonding.” The children said they enjoyed the 

visits, but V.V. asked Father to “stay a little longer” and D.V. 

5 Father missed at least a couple visits each month between 

January and August 2021.
10

wanted Father to “talk with [him and V.V.] more.” Both children 

said Father did not play with them.

In January 2021, Father filed a changed circumstances 

petition seeking reinstatement of family reunification services. 

He argued, among other things, that he was sober and had 

recently completed an outpatient substance abuse program. The 

Department recommended the juvenile court deny the petition.

The juvenile court held a hearing in June 2021 to consider 

Father’s changed circumstances petition and to address whether

the parental benefit exception to law that would otherwise 

require termination of Father’s parental rights might apply.

Both the Department and the children’s attorney asked the 

juvenile court to deny the changed circumstances petition based 

on Father’s long history of substance abuse, his pattern of 

recovery only to be followed by relapse, and the children’s desire 

for their grandmother to adopt them. Father’s attorney argued

he was currently sober, testing, and continuing to participate in 

treatment; he had completed sexual abuse awareness and other 

parenting classes; and he had enhanced his bond with the 

children, who, he asserted (in contrast to the position taken by 

their attorney), supported the changed circumstance petition.

The juvenile court found that circumstances were 

changing—but not changed—and that reinstating family 

reunification services was not in the children’s best interest. 

Among other things, the juvenile court emphasized Father’s 

inappropriate statements to the children, the anxiety those 

statements produced, and the children’s concern that Father 

might once again relapse. With respect to the parental benefit 

exception, the juvenile court continued the hearing on that issue 

because it believed a bonding study would be helpful. The court 
11

stated legal guardianship was an available option and remarked 

the children appeared to be “still . . . very attached” to Father.

E. The Bonding Study and the Juvenile Court’s 

Termination of Parental Rights

The bonding study was prepared by Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd, 

who met with Father, V.V., and D.V. in October 2021.

V.V. told Dr. Kaser-Boyd she did not want to return to 

Father’s care because he had done things that “affected [her] in a 

bad way.” Specifically, she was concerned that Father invited 

“[u]nsafe people” to their home. V.V. did not want to have 

overnight visits or go on any trips with Father, but she was “open 

to” continued visits with Father at her grandmother’s home. Dr. 

Kaser-Boyd noted V.V. has “lingering anxiety” and appeared to 

be “still working through the issues of molestation.” She is “quite 

needy” and “too fragile to be thrown into anxiety-provoking 

situations.”

D.V. told Dr. Kaser-Boyd he was concerned that Father 

might resume drinking when social workers were no longer 

present. D.V.’s principal concern with respect to Father’s 

drinking was that Father would have long, uncomfortable 

conversations with him. D.V. wanted to remain with his 

grandmother and, when asked whether he was interested in 

overnight visits or trips with Father, appeared anxious and said 

no. Nonetheless, D.V. was “very definite” that he wanted Father 

to continue to visit.

Dr. Kaser-Boyd observed Father “appears to have a 

commitment to the children” and believed the fact that he 

“maintain[ed] a cooperative relationship with the children’s 

[maternal grandmother] . . . demonstrates a good character . . . .” 
12

She opined, with respect to both children, that “they are attached 

to [Father], but have experienced him at his times of weakness 

and are lacking in security about whether his rehab is a stable 

condition.”

The juvenile court held a further hearing to consider the

bonding study and the applicability of the parental benefit 

exception in December 2021.6

Father’s attorney argued he maintained regular contact 

with the children, emphasized Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s view that the 

children were bonded with Father, and pointed out that Father 

provided financially for the children. Counsel for the children

and the Department’s attorney asked the juvenile court to 

terminate Father’s parental rights. The children’s attorney 

argued that Father visited the children frequently but the visits 

were so “brief” and “lacking in quality” that they did not “result[ ] 

in the cultivation . . . or preservation of a bond so beneficial to the 

children that its benefits, in conjunction with his history of 

relapse and removal, outweigh the benefits of permanency in the 

safe and stable home that the grandmother has been providing.” 

The children’s attorney further stated that V.V. asked them to 

inform the court that she did not “have an active bond” with 

Father and also highlighted a prior statement by D.V. that he 

wanted his grandmother to adopt him. The Department argued 

“inconsistent visits and short visits” by Father, “as well as his 

pattern of really just failing to live up to his promises,” 

6 Shortly before the hearing, in November 2021, V.V. was 

twice hospitalized based on concerns about her mental health. 

The appellate record does not include a detailed discussion of 

these episodes.
13

demonstrated the lack of a parental bond. Additionally, in the 

Department’s view, the stability offered by the children’s 

grandmother demonstrated that terminating Father’s parental 

rights would not harm the children.

The juvenile court found the first element of a parental 

benefit exception showing—regular visitation and contact—was 

satisfied. As to the second element—whether the children would 

benefit from continuing the relationship—the juvenile court was 

concerned the children did not “have the trust in Father that he 

will continue to go forward as he has not been able to gain their 

trust and keep their trust.” The juvenile court believed the 

children were mature enough “to assess how they feel about their 

relationship” and emphasized that, “[f]rom [their] statements, it 

appears very obvious . . . that it is the maternal grandmother 

who has provided that psychological importance and that 

important relationship to them.” With respect to the third 

element—whether terminating the relationship would be 

detrimental to the children—the juvenile court noted the 

grandmother would probably continue to allow the children to 

visit Father,7but concluded, even assuming the contrary, “life 

would be much better for these children in the adoptive home 

because they are secure” and “[t]hey are safe.” The juvenile court 

accordingly could not “find that the loss of the relationship [with 

Father] outweigh[ed] the benefit of the new adoptive home” and 

terminated Father’s (and Mother’s) parental rights.

Father appeals the parental rights termination order.

7 A status review report prepared a couple weeks after the 

juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights confirmed that 

Father continued to visit the children and drive them to school.
14

II. DISCUSSION

The juvenile court determined the parental benefit 

exception did not apply for two independent reasons: Father did 

not prove the requisite beneficial relationship and did not show 

terminating his parental rights would be detrimental to the 

children. Father’s challenge to the first of these findings focuses 

on statements by the children indicating they missed Father and 

wanted him to visit more. That, however, fails to account for 

evidence that the children no longer trusted Father. Moving to 

the second of these findings, the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in concluding that terminating the relationship would 

not be detrimental where the children’s grandmother had looked 

after them since before these proceedings began, shared a 

“wonderful” bond with them, and was the adoptive parent the

children wanted.

A. The Parental Benefit Exception

When a parent is unable to remedy the issues giving rise to 

dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court holds a hearing under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to determine 

“whether to terminate parental rights, making way for adoption, 

or to maintain parental rights and select another permanent 

plan.”

8

 (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 625 (Caden C.).) 

“To ease the court’s difficult task in making this important 

decision, the statute provides a carefully calibrated process. 

Even if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

child is likely to be adopted, the parent may avoid termination of 

8 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
15

parental rights by establishing at least one of a series of 

enumerated exceptions.” (Ibid.)

One of these exceptions, set forth at section 366.26, 

subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), is the parental benefit exception. The 

exception is “limited in scope” and applies where “‘[t]he court 

finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would 

be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following 

circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit 

from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 

From th[is] statute, [our Supreme Court] readily discern[ed]

three elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: 

(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the 

continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 631, third, fourth, and fifth 

alterations added.) Because we conclude the juvenile court 

correctly determined the second and third elements were not 

satisfied, we do not consider the Department’s contention—

contrary to the juvenile court’s finding—that Father also failed to 

establish the first element.

The second element—whether the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship—depends on “a slew of factors, such 

as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the 

parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction 

between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal5th at 632, citing In re Autumn H. (1994)

27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) As emphasized in 

Autumn H., which Caden C. cited as “the seminal decision 

interpreting the exception” (Caden C., supra, at 631), the 
16

parental benefit exception is not concerned with the “incidental 

benefit” that “[i]nteraction between natural parent and child will 

always confer.” (Autumn H., supra, at 575-576 [holding that a 

relationship comparable to that of a “‘friendly visitor’” or “‘family 

friend’” is insufficient to trigger the exception].) Nonetheless, 

juvenile courts “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arentchild relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern. 

[Citations.]” (Caden C., supra, at 632, second alteration added.)

The third element—whether terminating the relationship 

would be detrimental to the child—requires the juvenile court to 

determine “whether the harm of severing the relationship 

outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family 

would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child 

relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive 

emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of 

a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the 

court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.]” (Caden 

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633, citing Autumn H., supra, 27 

Cal.App.4th at 575.) Relevant factual determinations include 

“the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent 

and the harm that would come from losing those specific 

features,” “how harmful in total that loss would be,” and “for the 

particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset 

and even counterbalance those harms.” (Caden C., supra, at 

640.)

A reviewing court uses the substantial evidence standard to 

evaluate a juvenile court’s determination of the existence vel non 

of a beneficial relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 639.) 

“[T]he ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship 
17

with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse 

of discretion.” (Id. at 640.)

B. Analysis

1. Beneficial relationship

Our Supreme Court has made clear that the issues leading

to dependency are of limited relevance in determining whether 

the parental benefit exception applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at 638 [“The parent’s continuing difficulty with mental 

health or substance abuse may not be used as a basis for

determining the fate of the parental relationship by assigning 

blame, making moral judgments about the fitness of the parent, 

or rewarding or punishing a parent”].) Nonetheless, “[a] parent’s 

struggles may mean that interaction between parent and child at 

least sometimes has a ‘“negative” effect’ on the child,” and “are 

relevant to that extent.” (Id. at 637-638)

There is no question in this case that Father’s recurring 

substance abuse issues tainted his relationship with the children. 

He left the house for days at a time without notice, he was unable 

to follow through on promises to the children, he forced them into 

conversations that made them uncomfortable, and he made 

comments—e.g., about his plans to leave the country—that 

undermined their sense of stability. As Dr. Kaser-Boyd put it in 

the bonding study, the children “have experienced [Father] at his 

times of weakness and are lacking in security about whether his 

rehab is a stable condition.” As a result, neither V.V. nor D.V. 

trusted Father or wanted to have extended visits with him.

Moreover, even when Father was sober, there is little 

evidence that he was able to develop a beneficial relationship 

with the children. He drove the children to school and dropped 
18

off meals, but visits were short, both children said he did not play 

with them, and D.V. remarked that Father should talk with them 

more. Father also demonstrated insensitivity to V.V.’s 

“‘particular needs’”—indeed, he provoked her to threaten selfharm—by suggesting she would have to see her abuser again. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 632.) Under these circumstances, 

substantial evidence supports the finding that the children would 

not benefit from continuing their relationship with Father. (Ibid.

[“[C]ourts often consider how children feel about, interact with, 

look to, or talk about their parents” when assessing whether a 

child would benefit from continuing the relationship]; In re B.D.

(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [“A positive attachment 

between parent and child is necessarily one that is not 

detrimental to the child but is nurturing and provides the child 

with a sense of security and stability”].)

In arguing the contrary, Father primarily relies on the 

children’s statements that they missed him and enjoyed their 

visits. He cites no evidence, however, indicating these 

statements reflect anything more than the “incidental benefit” 

that “[i]nteraction between natural parent and child will always 

confer.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 575.) Father also 

argues the children lived with him most of their lives, but this

carries little weight in proving the existence of a beneficial 

relationship given the circumstances in which they lived 

together: Father was absent for extended periods—whether going 

to his room and locking the door or leaving the home altogether—

and it was generally acknowledged that Father delegated the 

physical and emotional care of the children to their grandmother. 

As V.V. put it, their grandmother did “everything” for them and 

assumed the roles of “mom, dad, gramma and grandpa.”
19

2. Detriment

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that any harm that may result from terminating 

Father’s parental rights would be outweighed by the security and 

stability they found living with their grandmother. The 

children’s grandmother had been “everything” to them (since 

even before this dependency proceeding began) and they called 

her “mami.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1157 [“[I]t 

was proper for the juvenile court to consider whether, and the 

extent to which, the caregivers and [the] father occupied parental 

roles with the minor”].) Both children wanted the grandmother

to adopt them. She was a constant presence when Father 

relapsed and left the home for extended periods of time. Father’s 

periodic reappearances—during which, among other things, he 

broached the prospect of further contact with V.V.’s abuser and 

engaged D.V. in inappropriate conversation—destabilized the 

children’s lives with their grandmother.

Father contends the juvenile court could not properly 

conclude the children would not be harmed by the termination of 

his parental rights without concrete evidence of the children’s 

feelings concerning the possibility that they would never see him 

again. While Father is correct that “courts must assume that 

terminating parental rights terminates the relationship” (Caden 

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633), there is no reason why the juvenile 

court could not infer the impact on the children from other 

evidence, including his sporadic disappearances.

Father’s further contention that terminating his parental 

rights is bound to be detrimental to the children because D.V. 

missed Mother (who had already been out of the children’s lives 

for a significant period) also misses the mark. Father’s burden 
20

was not merely to establish that terminating his parental rights 

may have negative consequences, but that these consequences

outweigh the benefits of adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 

at 640.) With only weak evidence that detriment would flow from 

severing any bond between Father and the children (including 

the children’s own stated preference for adoption) and strong 

evidence that the children’s grandmother was providing the 

safety and security they would otherwise lack, the juvenile court

was within its discretion in deciding that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would not be detrimental.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.