UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4333

ALAN BERNARD BOSTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4779

ALAN BERNARD BOSTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(CR-98-733)

Submitted: April 25, 2000

Decided: August 7, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,

South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Alan B. Boston appeals his sentence

imposed pursuant to a guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute crack

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a), 846 (West 1999). Boston's attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the district court failed

to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

during the plea colloquy and whether it erred when calculating Boston's criminal history points for sentencing. Boston filed a supplemental pro se brief contending that the district court erred in finding

that the 10.27 grams of drugs he sold in December 1996 were crack

cocaine. Also in his supplemental brief, Boston lists several issues

which he desires to "preserve" for a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2255 (West Supp. 1999). In accordance with the requirements of

Anders, we have examined the entire record and find no meritorious

issues for appeal.

We initially find that the district court properly complied with the

requirements of Rule 11 by informing Boston of the applicable factors

outlined in Rule 11(c), by ensuring the voluntariness of Boston's

guilty plea, and by inquiring into the factual basis of the plea. See

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)-(d), (f). We also find no error in the computation of Boston's criminal history points, as the record demonstrates

that the district court correctly calculated them to be eleven and then

properly sentenced Boston according to Criminal History Category V.

We next find that the district court did not err when finding the

10.27 grams to be crack cocaine. Contrary to Boston's contention, the

Government need not provide expert chemical analysis to prove the

identity of a narcotic by a preponderance of the evidence. See United

States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976). Moreover, two

DEA agents testified (one in his affidavit attached to the original

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complaint and the other during the plea hearing) that chemical analysis of the 10.27 grams revealed the substance to be crack cocaine.

Boston also admitted in his objections to the presentence report his

responsibility for at least thirty-five grams of crack cocaine. The district court was free to adopt the finding in Boston's presentence report

that the 10.27 grams were crack cocaine because Boston failed to

object to this finding. See United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162

(4th Cir. 1990).

After reviewing the record as Anders requires, we also find that

Boston's "preserved" issues questioning whether he knowingly or

intelligently pled guilty and whether the Government violated the plea

agreement are both without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967). Boston develops neither issue and both his plea

agreement and statements he made during his plea colloquy refute

these claims. Finally, we find that Boston's ineffective assistance of

counsel claim is more properly raised on collateral review because the

record does not conclusively demonstrate that his counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. See United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582,

590 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.

This Court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that such a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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