NO. 12-22-00164-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

NEIL AARON CARVER, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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§

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APPEAL FROM THE 8TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

RAINS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Neil Aaron Carver appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. In two 

issues, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court 

committed structural error by refusing to allow him “his absolute right to represent himself at 

trial[.]” We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

Jessica Cassett, an investigator with the Texas Department of Family and Protective 

Services (the Department), testified that she performed an investigation into Appellant’s home

after Appellant’s daughter, S.C., was in an automobile accident with her mother, C.C., who was 

accused of neglectful supervision by driving while intoxicated. Cassett explained that S.C.’s 

mother was subsequently incarcerated, and S.C. was sent out of town to stay with Appellant’s 

sister while Appellant was working in another state. Cassett learned that C.C. was previously 

charged with driving while intoxicated and suffered from a drinking problem, and she conducted 

a forensic interview with S.C. According to Cassett, during the interview, S.C. made an outcry of 

sexual abuse. Cassett testified that Appellant was “[r]eluctant for the child to have a forensic 

interview without him present.”
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Courtney Ma, a forensic interviewer with The Bridge Children’s Advocacy Center,

testified that it is common for children not to disclose as much to her as they might disclose to 

their counselors later on, since children often only make partial disclosures when beginning to 

speak about their experiences. Ma explained that during her interview with S.C.,1 S.C. was 

consistent, used age-appropriate language, provided sensory details, and corrected Ma if Ma said 

something wrong. According to Ma, there was an incident when S.C. saw Appellant’s “bad spot” 

and called it a “little peach worm.” Ma testified that S.C. told her that when Appellant would grab 

her hand, she would “take her hand away and tuck it in the couch because she would know what 

he was going to be doing[.]” Additionally, Ma explained that S.C. “described that [Appellant] 

would always wake her up at night, and she would wake up to him grabbing her wrist, and he 

would be guiding it over to touch his bad spot[,]” and S.C. stated that this occurred “a lot of times.”

Ma testified that S.C. described these incidents as occurring both in Emory, Texas and out of town.

According to Ma, S.C. described “cannonballs” as her diving her hand off the table, and Appellant 

taking her hand and moving it up and down. Furthermore, Ma testified that S.C. described putting 

toys in front of her door to create an obstacle course. 

Licensed professional counselor Sylvia Hill testified that she counseled S.C. Hill testified 

that when she began counseling S.C., she “was told that [S.C.] had been molested by her father.” 

According to Hill, S.C. was fourteen years of age or younger when she was in counseling. S.C.

made statements to Hill about being abused, and Hill stated that S.C. “was very reluctant to talk 

about it[]” and “expressed extreme concern that it be understood that when it all started she was 

too little to know better.” Hill testified that S.C. appeared to be embarrassed and ashamed. When 

asked whether S.C. described penetration by Appellant, Hill testified that S.C. told her that 

Appellant “put his fingers and hands into me.” Hill explained that S.C. also described an incident 

when Appellant “put his fingers into her” while she was mowing the lawn with him during the 

summer. According to Hill, S.C. locked her bedroom door and put her toys on her bedroom floor 

to serve as an obstacle course. Hill further testified that S.C. described an incident when she was 

bitten by a dog and received stitches around Thanksgiving, and Appellant asked if he could kiss 

her where her stitches were and “again used his fingers to penetrate her[,]” and Hill inferred that 

S.C. was referring to her anus. Hill testified that S.C. told her these incidents occurred in Emory.

1 Ma testified that S.C. was nine years old when the interview took place.
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S.C., who was eleven years old at trial, testified via closed circuit television. S.C. testified 

that when she was bitten by a dog around Thanksgiving, she received stitches on her leg, arm, and 

buttocks. According to S.C., Appellant asked if she wanted him to kiss her stitches, and he “pulled 

[her] butt cheeks apart[]” and “kissed up [her] butt.” S.C. explained that Appellant then “started 

using his fingers” on her “bad spot.” S.C. testified that she locked her bedroom door until 

Appellant made her stop doing so, and she “put up an obstacle course” in her bedroom to block 

Appellant. S.C. explained that she believed Appellant made her stop locking her door so he could 

“do the thing.” S.C. testified that the dog bite incident occurred in Emory. S.C. also testified that 

when she was riding the lawn mower with Appellant in Emory during the summer, Appellant 

slipped his hand underneath her panties and touched her “butt.” In addition, S.C. testified that on 

one occasion, she tried to stop Appellant from “doing the thingy” by tucking her hands into the 

couch. S.C. explained that she would use her hand to “jump off [Appellant’s] bad spot[,]” which 

she called “doing cannonballs,” and Appellant grabbed her hand and tried to make her touch “his 

bad spot[,]” or “private,” which she described as “a giant peach worm.” S.C. testified that the 

cannonball incident did not occur in Emory. According to S.C., Appellant put his hand under her 

Pull-Up when they lived in Emory. 

Appellant’s sister, D.C., testified that S.C. sometimes stayed at her home. D.C. testified 

that S.C. denied being touched inappropriately. D.C. explained that she is close to her brother, 

and she does not believe he is capable of committing the crime. D.C. testified that she sometimes 

tracked Appellant’s progress when he was traveling, and he was away on the December 2020 date 

set forth in the indictment. D.C. testified that her daughter was abused by her former husband, and 

S.C.’s allegations against Appellant are worded similarly to those made by D.C.’s daughter. 

After all the witnesses testified, the trial judge stated on the second day of trial that 

Appellant’s counsel indicated to the trial court that Appellant wanted to fire him. The trial judge 

stated, “there may be a disagreement as to trial strategy or whatever, but I’m not going to grant a 

request for you to be able to fire your attorney here on day two in your case in chief[.]” The 

following colloquy then took place:

THE DEFENDANT: I’m sorry, I’m not allowed to fire my attorney?

THE COURT: That’s correct. Not at this stage.

THE DEFENDANT: Even if I was to continue pro se?

THE COURT: Especially if you were to continue pro se.

. . .
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THE DEFENDANT: I’d like . . . to fire him and move on, sir.

THE COURT: No, that’s denied. . . .

The trial judge asked Appellant why he wanted to fire his attorney and advised Appellant that he 

could call additional witnesses if he wished to do so, and Appellant indicated that he wanted to 

recall witnesses, but his counsel refused. The trial judge then asked Appellant about his level of 

education. The trial judge also asked Appellant if he is familiar with the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure, the Texas Penal Code, and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and advised him 

that he would be “bound by all of those.” The trial judge warned Appellant that “it is a land mine, 

which is why you have attorneys[.]” 

Ultimately, the jury convicted Appellant of continuous sexual abuse of a child and assessed 

his sentence at life in prison. This appeal followed.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In issue one, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction. Specifically, Appellant argues that the State failed to produce evidence that (1) he 

penetrated S.C.’s sexual organ, (2) he caused S.C. to contact his sexual organ “with intent to arouse 

or gratify anyone’s sexual desire,” and (3) he caused S.C. to contact his sexual organ in Rains 

County, as alleged in the indictment.

Applicable Law

To establish the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State must prove that 

the defendant, during a period of time thirty or more days in duration, committed at least two acts 

of sexual abuse. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (West Supp. 2022). The statute defines an 

“act of sexual abuse” as indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault, among other things. 

Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4); see id. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2019) (defining acts that constitute indecency 

with a child by contact, including causing the child to engage in sexual contact); see id. 

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B) (West 2019) (enumerating acts that constitute aggravated sexual 

assault of a child, including causing penetration of the child’s sexual organ by any means if the 

child is under fourteen years of age). The State need not prove the exact dates of the abuse; rather, 

the State need only prove that “there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a 

period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Brown v. State, 381 S.W.3d 565, 574 (Tex. 
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App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see Lane v. State, 357 S.W.3d 770, 773-74 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d).

When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found 

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 

902 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 

2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Legal 

sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; 

see also Escobedo v. State, 65 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The jury 

is the ultimate authority on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). A 

reviewing court must give full deference to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in 

the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to 

ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record contains conflicting inferences, we must 

presume that the jury resolved such facts in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. 

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 n.13; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

In addition, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the 

combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdict. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The testimony of a child victim, standing alone and without 

corroboration, is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b) (West Supp. 2022); Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 

266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).

Analysis

To prove Appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child as charged in the 

indictment, the State was required to prove that during a period that was thirty or more days in 

duration, when Appellant was seventeen years of age or older and S.C. was younger than fourteen 

years of age, Appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against S.C. in Rains County 

by (1) committing indecency with a child on or about January 1, 2018, by causing S.C. to touch 

his genitals, (2) committing aggravated sexual assault of a child by penetrating S.C.’s sexual organ 

with his finger, and (3) indecency with a child on or about December 1, 2020, by causing S.C. to 
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touch his genitals. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), 21.02(c)(2), (4), 21.11(a)(1),

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B).

The jury heard S.C. testify that Appellant used his fingers on her “bad spot” after she was 

bitten by a dog around Thanksgiving, that he touched her while she was riding a lawn mower with 

him in the summer, and that both incidents occurred in Emory. The jury also heard Ma testify that 

“a lot of times[,]” Appellant woke S.C. up, grabbed her wrist, and made her touch his genitals. 

Moreover, the jury heard Hill testify that S.C. revealed that Appellant put his fingers inside her 

while she was mowing the lawn with him and after she was bitten by a dog, both of which occurred 

in Emory. Ma testified that S.C. described the incidents as occurring both in Emory and elsewhere.

S.C. also testified that Appellant penetrated her when she received stitches around Thanksgiving. 

In addition, S.C. described setting up an obstacle course after Appellant stopped allowing her to 

lock her bedroom door. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and 

giving full deference to the jury’s responsibility to weigh evidence and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have 

found Appellant “guilty” beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 

2789; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Escobedo, 65 S.W.3d at 6; Penagraph, 623 S.W.2d at 343; see 

also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), 21.02(c)(2), (4), 21.11(a)(1), § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), 

(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, we overrule issue one.

SELF-REPRESENTATION

In issue two, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to 

represent himself at trial.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to have the assistance of counsel for 

his defense. U.S. CONST. amend VI. If a criminal defendant elects to proceed without counsel, he 

has a constitutional right to do so. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 

2383, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533, 

45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). While a criminal defendant’s right to counsel remains in effect until the 

defendant waives it, the defendant’s right to self-representation is not triggered until it is asserted.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; see also Lathem v. State, 514 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d). An accused must assert his right to self-representation in a 
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timely manner, namely, before a jury is impaneled. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 619 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1997); Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Birdwell 

v. State, 10 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d)). We review the 

denial of a defendant’s request to represent himself for abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Lathem, 514 S.W.3d at 802.

Analysis

As discussed above, the record shows that Appellant did not express a desire to represent 

himself until after both the State and his counsel called witnesses for their cases in chief, long after 

the jury was impaneled. Therefore, Appellant’s assertion of his right to self-representation was 

untimely. See McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 619; Blankenship, 573 S.W.2d at 585; Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d 

at 77; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541. Because Appellant did not timely assert 

his right to represent himself, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request. 

See McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 619; Blankenship, 673 S.W.2d at 585; Lathem, 514 S.W.3d at 802-

03; Birdwell, 10 S.W.3d at 77. Accordingly, we overrule issue two.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered January 19, 2023

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JANUARY 19, 2023

NO. 12-22-00164-CR

NEIL AARON CARVER,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 8th District Court

of Rains County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 6172)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, 

and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.

It is Therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of 

the court below be in all things affirmed, and that the decision be certified to the court below for 

observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.