PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT LEE BROCK, a/k/a Two Souls

Walker,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 96-6116

v.

RONALD ANGELONE,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge.

(CA-95-1194-2)

Submitted: May 16, 1996

Decided: February 4, 1997

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Sanctions imposed by published per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Robert Lee Brock, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Robert Lee Brock, a.k.a. Two Souls Walker, a Virginia

inmate, lodged twenty-nine appeals before this court in 1995-96
alone, making him one of, if not the most frequent litigants in this circuit. Virtually all of Brock's actions originate as complaints under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, in which Brock complains about some aspect of prison

conditions. None of Brock's allegations have ever been found by any

court to have any merit. Because Brock's repeated, frivolous claims

have placed a significant burden on this court, as well as on the district court, we ordered Brock on May 16, 1996, to show cause why

he should not be sanctioned for filing this most recent appeal. Having

reviewed his response, we hereby impose sanctions upon Brock pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

Brock has a history of filing frivolous appeals in an apparent effort

to undermine the legal system that incarcerated him. Over the course

of his litigious history, Brock has complained about all aspects of his

legal treatment and prison conditions including, inter alia, food,

clothing, access to and the poor condition of the prison's law library,

mail delivery, hot water, improper placement of a mirror for the handicapped, phones, canteen needs, art supplies, mental stress, and the

price of coffee. One of Brock's earlier appeals, filed when Brock only

had 30 section 1983 claims pending in various courts, requested "$1

million dollars for mental cruelty and cruel and unusual punishment"

because the prison nurses said "no" when Brock requested that his

meals contain "extra meat" or "vitamins in place of vegetables."

Brock v. Harrison, No. 2:95 Civ. 507 (E.D. Va. May 16, 1995). The

district court dismissed this case as frivolous. Brock responded by

bringing numerous additional suits, including a section 1983 claim

against the victim of the crime for which Brock had been incarcerated. See Brock v. Speck, No. 2:95 Civ. 800 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 1995).

The district court again dismissed the case. Id . On the same day, the

district court dismissed yet another section 1983 case filed by Brock

based upon Brock's dissatisfaction with the manner in which the

prison officials responded to Brock's grievances. See Brock v. Smith,

No. 2:95 Civ. 465 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 1995).

In response to Brock's salvo of petitions, the district court ordered

Brock on September 15, 1995, to show cause why a system of prefiling review should not be instituted by any action filed by Brock.

Brock responded only by asserting that "he is incarcerated for a crime

he did not commit and that someone should pay for this." Brock v.

Robertson, No. 2:95 Civ. 891 (E.D. Va. September 29, 1995). The

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district court found Brock's objection meritless and ordered Brock to

submit his future complaints for pre-filing review, allowing to be filed

only those claims found to be made in good faith and not frivolous.

Id. The pre-filing review system apparently failed to deter Brock, who

responded by trying to bring yet another section 1983 claim, requesting inter alia reconsideration of all his previous cases and

$72,000,000.00 in damages, against the district court judge that had

presided over many of Brock's claims. See Brock v. Smith, No.

2:95mc40 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 1995). The district court reviewed the

complaint and returned it to Brock unfiled. Id .

Brock later filed another section 1983 petition because he had been

"housed with black men," and was "incarcerated two hundred miles

from his family." Brock v. Virginia Dept. of Correct., No. 2.95mc45

(E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 1995). Brock also complained that a prison counselor "recommended that he take job training and AA classes" and

"that the prison [would] not give him extra meat," along with numerous other similar alleged rights violations. Id . The district court

ordered this complaint to be returned to Brock unfiled, as well.

In addition to these cases, Brock has filed numerous other section

1983 claims, motions for reconsideration, and appeals to this circuit.

Virtually all of Brock's filings include a litany of claims, each of

which requires a response. For example, one of plaintiff's section

1983 actions complained of a laundry list of prison wrongs and

requested "a change of Department policy, intervention by the [federal] courts, establishment of new state and federal laws and

$82,000.27." Id. (emphasis added). In his motion for reconsideration

of the district court's dismissal of that case, Brock explained that he

did not want to bring his claim under section 1983 and requested that

the court "file it under `any applicable court title and code of law,'"

thus requiring the court to examine his laundry list of grievances for

any possible claim under any federal or state law. Id.

Brock's instant section 1983 claim is typical of the claims with

which he has burdened the courts of this circuit over the past several

years. Here, Brock alleges that he is "either being poisoned or experimented on" because one of the ingredients listed on the side of the

bottle of pancake syrup served at his prison is propylene glycol,

which petitioner notes is also used in deodorant and antifreeze. Brock

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attempted to evade the pre-filing judicial review imposed on him by

the District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia by filing his

action in the Western District of Virginia. This, even though Brock

stated in his complaint that he was aware the Western District did not

have jurisdiction, and even though he was aware that all events giving

rise to the claim occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia where

petitioner has filed each of his numerous previous petitions. His

action was transferred to the Eastern district.

Even though Brock's claim on its face is at best fanciful or delusional, and more likely simply a deliberate affront to the judicial system, the district court thoroughly researched Brock's claim and found

it to be frivolous. As the district court noted:

Propylene glycol is a common extract used in cough syrup,

pancake syrup and coffee flavoring. See Coffee, Perking Up

a Workaholic City, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 19,

1994, at C1. It is a sweet viscous substance used to hold

ingredients together. The fact that this substance is used in

antifreeze does not make it poisonous. In fact, cat owners,

whose cats like to hide under the car, have been advised to

use antifreezes containing propylene glycol because they are

not toxic. Protecting Your Pets from Yard-Pest Poisons,

Plain Dealer, July 13, 1995, at 10E. Plaintiff is clearly not

being poisoned or experimented on.

Brock v. Angelone, No. 2:95cv1194 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 1995). Petitioner's claim is obviously frivolous for numerous additional reasons,

not the least of which is that Brock nowhere alleges that anyone at the

prison forced or in any way coerced him to consume the "poisonous"

syrup. Brock's litigation over pancake syrup in the face of the court's

pre-filing review system and threat of sanctions has shown that neither can serve as an effective deterrent.

Under F.R.A.P. 38, we are authorized to impose sanctions upon

appellants for the filing of frivolous appeals. Bast v. Cohen, Dunn &

Sinclair, PC, 59 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 1995). F.R.A.P. 38 provides:

If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous,

it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the

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court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just

damages and single or double costs to the appellee.

Such "just damages" and "costs," include"damages, attorney's fees

and other expenses incurred by an appellee if the appeal is frivolous,"

regardless of whether "the appeal resulted in delay." F.R.A.P. 38,

Advisory Committee Notes. We are authorized to award such damages and costs "in [our] discretion in the case of a frivolous appeal

as a matter of justice to the appellee and as a penalty against the

appellant." Id.

Here, we ordered appellant to show cause as to why he should not

be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal, thereby providing him

with "notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond."

F.R.A.P. 38. Having reviewed the appellant's response to our order,

we now conclude that the appeal was indeed "frivolous," and therefore impose the following sanctions upon the appellant. In lieu of particularized fees and costs, we award the amount of $500 to the

appellees, as we have frequently done in similar circumstances. See,

e.g., Peeples v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 87-1053 (4th

Cir. Sept. 23, 1987) (unpublished); Leining v. Commissioner, No. 86-

1253 (4th Cir. July 21, 1987) (unpublished); United States v. Bowser,

No. 86-1241 (4th Cir. April 22, 1987) (unpublished); United States v.

Wissig, No. 86-1188 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1986) (unpublished);

Chapman v. Egger, No. 86-2151 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1986) (unpublished); Jensen v. United States, No. 86-1504 (4th Cir. June 25, 1986)

(unpublished), motion for accounting and cert . denied, 479 U.S. 924

(Oct. 20, 1986). This money shall be payable to the Warden of the

Haynesville Correctional Center in his official capacity. Additionally,

following a practice adopted in one of our sister circuits, we enjoin

appellant from filing any further civil appeals in this court until these

monetary sanctions are paid, and unless a district court judge certifies

that his claim is not frivolous. See Smith v. McCleod, 946 F.2d 417,

418 (5th Cir. 1991) (ordering that petitioner "be barred from filing

any further appeals in this court until (1) the sanctions awarded by

this court and the district court are fully paid; and (2) a district court

certifies his appeal as having some arguable merit"); cf. Shief v.

Kakita, 116 S. Ct. 1311 (1996) (directing "the Clerk not to accept any

further petitions for certiorari from [appellant] in noncriminal matters

unless he pays the docketing fee required by [Supreme Court] Rule

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38 and submits his petition in compliance with [Supreme Court] Rule

33.1"); Jones v. ABC-TV, 116 S. Ct. 870 (1996) (same); Attwood v.

Singletary, 116 S. Ct. 769 (1996) (same); Whitaker v. Superior Court

of California, San Francisco County, 115 S. Ct. 1446 (1995) (same).

It is so ordered

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