J-S62013-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDWARD RAMSEY

Appellant No. 2198 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 19, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004499-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016

Appellant Edward Ramsey appeals from the October 19, 2015 

judgment of sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common 

Pleas following his jury trial conviction for robbery (threat of immediate 

serious bodily injury).1 We affirm.

The trial court accurately sets forth the factual and procedural history 

in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion and we have no need to restate them here.2

1925(a) Opinion, 3/16/2016, at 1-8.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).

2 On page one of its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states the jury 

trial occurred in 2016, however, the jury trial actually occurred in 2015.
J-S62013-16

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I. Did not the court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to 

preclude the Commonwealth from introducing testimony 

from an expert in handwriting analysis when such 

testimony was improper expert testimony and was 

otherwise irrelevant?

II. Did not the [trial] court abuse its discretion by failing to 

grant [Appellant] a new trial on the basis that the guilty 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s first issue challenges the admission of expert testimony. 

This court applies the following standard of review in cases involving the 

admission of expert testimony: 

[T]he admission of expert testimony is a matter left largely 

to the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings thereon 

will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An 

expert’s testimony is admissible when it is based on facts 

of record and will not cause confusion or prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa.Super.2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Appellant’s second issue challenges the weight of the evidence. “One 

of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the 

[trial] court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa.2013) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa.2000)). A weight 

of the evidence claim concedes that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 

(Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 911 A.2d 933 (Pa.2006). A trial judge 

should not grant a new trial due to “a mere conflict in the testimony or 
J-S62013-16

- 3 -

because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different 

conclusion.” Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055. Instead, the trial court must examine 

whether “‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater 

weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is 

to deny justice.’” Id. (quoting Widmer, 744 A.2d at 752). Only where the 

jury verdict “is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of 

justice” should a trial court afford a defendant a new trial. Id. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Richard A. 

Lewis, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See 1925(a) Opinion, at 8-15) (finding: (1) opinion of 

handwriting expert properly admitted where: expert had specialized 

knowledge beyond that of layperson; expert’s analysis and conclusion were 

based on reasonable degree of scientific certainty; expert concluded 

Appellant probably wrote note; expert testified as to factors considered in 

her determination and her analysis; expert’s opinion fell at top of 9-point 

scale, which is more refined scale used and recommended by those in her 

profession; and expert’s work was peer-reviewed; (2) expert opinion: 

relevant where it evidenced Appellant’s intent when he entered bank and 

testimony made material fact, i.e., who wrote note, more or less likely, and 

not so prejudicial as to require exclusion; and (3) verdict not against weight 

of evidence where: bank employee testified that his identification of 
J-S62013-16

- 4 -

Appellant as person who robbed bank was based on “first hand” experience 

on date of incident and weight to be afforded to fact that employee had seen 

email from bank with Appellant’s picture was for jury to determine; although 

expert in fingerprint analysis could not determine age of fingerprint, bank 

employee’s testimony established Appellant exited from bank and touched 

door where print was retrieved; and, as discussed above, court properly 

admitted testimony of handwriting expert). Accordingly, we affirm on the 

basis of the trial court opinion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/30/2016
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §3701 (A)(1 )(ii). 

2 At docket nos. 3365 CR 2013 and 4497 CR 2013, Appellant pied guilty to the summary offense of 

criminal trespass and one count of escape. Appellant was sentenced on these dockets at the October 

19, 2015, hearing. On the same date his parole was revoked and he was resentenced at docket nos. 

1624 CR 2009, 5886 CR 2009, and 1170 CR 2010. None of these sentences are at issue in the instant 

appeal. 

response, this Court denied relief by order dated November 19, 2015. 

modification of sentence. Following review of the motions and the Commonwealth's 

Sentence Motions were filed requesting a new trial or arrest of judgment and 

Appellant was sentenced to a term of incarceration for sixty (60) to one-hundred twenty 

(120) months in a State Correctional lnstitution.2 He was also ordered to pay the costs 

of prosecution, a fine of $200 and restitution in the amount of $550. Timely PostA sentencing/revocation hearing was held on October 19, 2015, at which time 

conclusion of which Appellant was found guilty. 

Appellant, Edward Ramsey was charged with a single count of Robbery - Threat 

of Immediate Bodily lnjury.1 A jury trial was held on August 18-19, 2016, at the 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Pa.RAP. 1925(a). 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

EDWARD RAMSEY : CRIMINAL 

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Appellant, Edward Ramsey ("Appellant" or "Ramsey") is appealing this Co:i)rt's..::. 

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judgment of sentence entered October 19, 2015. This opinion is written pursuant to 

v. 

: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

: DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

: 4499 CR 2013 

: (2198 MDA 2015) 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Circulated 08/11/2016 09:40 AM
2 

3 Hereinafter "N.T." 

completed, the male approached Mr. DiCesare's window and placed a note on the 

and 2:00 p.m., a black male got on line behind a female who was conducting a 

transaction with him. (Notes of Testimony at 33-35; 50).3 When the transaction was 

DiCesare") was working as a teller at service counter number one when, between 1 :00 

Pennsylvania, was robbed in the early afternoon. Mr. Luciano DiCesare ("Mr. 

the Mid Penn Bank ("bank") located at 4509 Derry Street, Swatara Township, 

The jury trial held in this matter established the following facts: On June 3, 2013, 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

are without merit. 

1. The court erred in denying Defendant's motion to preclude the 

Commonwealth from introducing testimony from an expert in handwriting 

analysis. The expert testified that she could give "no conclusive opinion." 

Such testimony was improper expert testimony under Pa.RE. 702 and 

was otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible under Pa. R. E. 402 and 403. 

Any minimal relevance was outweighed by the tendency of such evidence 

to unduly prejudice Defendant. 

2. The court abused its discretion in finding that the jury's verdict was 

not against the weight of the evidence. The verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence so as to shock one's sense of justice. First, the 

identification testimony of the complaining witness was tainted by a 

photograph that was shown to the witness prior to trial. Second, the 

Commonwealth's expert in fingerprint analysis could not give a temporal 

nexus for his conclusion, i.e., he could not testify that Defendant's 

fingerprints were placed at the crime scene at the time of the robbery. 

Third, the Commonwealth's expert in handwriting analysis could not 

render a conclusive opinion that Defendant wrote the note that was 

handed to the complaining witness. 

For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that Appellant's claims on appeal 

December 14, 2015, and raises the following issues for review: 

The instant appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court was timely filed on 
Detective David Horner ("Det. Horner") was called to the crime scene to 

photograph and process the scene for physical evidence. (N.T. at 62). Det. Horner is 

the evidence custodian and crime scene technician for the Swatara Township Police 

Department. (N.T. at 62). He photographed the demand note on the teller counter 

before collecting it for processing. (N.T. at 63). Det. Horner viewed the security video to 

3 

While the event was occurring, Mr. Dicesare observed the robber from 

approximately 2 12 feet away in an attempt to remember as many details of his 

appearance as possible. (N.T. at 38; 41-42). When the police arrived a few minutes 

later, he provided a description to Swatara Township Police officers. (N.T. at 39; 45). 

The assailant was described as an African American male approximately 5' 1 O" tall and 

weighing around 230 pounds. (N.T. at 36; 54-56). He wore dark rimmed glasses, a 

white V-neck T-shirt, dark shorts, a dark hat and scruffy beard. (Id.) Mr. DiCesare 

observed the robber leave the bank through the front double doors and turn right on the 

street. (N.T. at 39; 43). At trial, Mr. DiCesare positively identified Appellant as the 

person who passed the note and took the money from him at the bank on June 3, 2013 

and as the person in the still photograph obtained from the security video that day. (N.T. 

at 45-46). 

counter which read, "Give me $100.00 and $50.00, no die [sic] pack or funny stuff. If 

anything happen [sic] before I get out the door I shoot you 15\" (N.T. at 38; 53; Commw. 

Exh. 1 ). As Mr. Dicesare was reading the note and mentally processing what was 

happening, the male was mumbling "give me all your hundreds and fifties." (N.T. at 43). 

Per his training, Mr. Dicesare handed over $550, retained the demand note and when 

the assailant left, sounded the silent alarm. (N.T. at 35-38). 
4 

4 The entrance to the bank consisted of two sets of double glass doors- one exterior set and one interior 

set - with a breezeway in between. (N.T. at 67). 

Commonwealth admitted into evidence at trial. (N.T. at 106; Commw. Exh. 4). Tpr. Petti 

(N.T. at 93-94). Tpr. Petti memorialized his analysis and findings in a report that the 

index number two finger, belonged to Appellant upon comparison with a known print. 

verification) methodology. (N.T. at 86-92). He concluded that one fingerprint, a right 

Department, Tpr. Petti utilized the ACE-V (analysis, comparison, evaluation and 

To analyze the fingerprints submitted by the Swatara Township Police 

admitted to testify as an expert witness. (N.T. at 76-81). 

related evidence. (N.T. at 76). Following questioning on his qualifications, he was 

Bureau of Forensic Services wherein he is responsible for the evaluation of fingerprint - 

Petti") was assigned to analyze them. Tpr. Petti is an AFIS examiner within the PSP 

With regard to the fingerprints submitted to the PSP, Trooper James Petti (''Tpr. 

from him for purposes of comparison. (/d.) 

Appellant became a suspect in the investigation, a handwriting sample was obtained 

demand note to the PSP Crime Lab for handwriting analysis. (N.T. at 69). Later, when 

Crime Lab for analysis and possible identification. (N.T. at 68). Horner also sent the 

processed the fingerprints and sent them to the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") 

were found in the teller area but, three were lifted from the interior part of the exterior 

door.4 As police did not have a suspect on the date of the incident, Det. Horner 

He checked the teller counter and the bank doors for fingerprints. (N.T. at 65-68). None 

determine where he should take photographs and dust for fingerprints. (N.T. at 63-64). 
5 

Lt. Miller examined the demand note that had been presented at the bank 

robbery. She followed a several step procedure to make an impressed writing 

specimen for the purpose of comparison to a known writing sample obtained from 

Appellant. (N.T. at 116-128). Upon comparison with the document written by Appellant, 

Lt. Miller concluded that the writer probably did write the handwriting found on the 

demand note. (N.T. at 124). This conclusion fell near the top of the lab's nine point 

opinion scale which ranges from one (1) "elimination of a writer" to nine (9) "did write." 

(N.T. at 128). Lt. Miller's opinion was rendered within a reasonable degree of scientific 

certainty and memorialized in two reports. (N.T. at 128-129; Commw. Exhs. 5, 6). 

Detective James Moyer ("Det. Moyer") responded to the bank robbery call on 

June 3, 2013, and assisted Det. Horner in the processing of the crime scene including 

the collection of fingerprints. (N.T. at 155-157). He also reviewed security video from 

The Swatara Township Police also submitted the demand note to the PSP for 

analysis. Lieutenant Sandra Miller ("Lt. Miller") is the Division Director of the Policy and 

Program Services Division of the PSP Bureau of Research and Development. (N.T. at 

108). At the time of the incident, Lt. Miller was a forensic/questioned documents 

examiner in the Questioned Documents Laboratory of the PSP Crime Lab and was 

called upon to examine the note. (N.T. at 108). Lt. Miller testified to her education, 

training experience and other professional credentials. (N.T. at 108-114). This Court 

admitted her to testify as a handwriting expert. (N.T. at 114). 

rendered his opinion based upon a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. (N.T. at 

95). 
6 

Personnel at UTS confirmed that those trailers were driven in tandem by 

Appellant and an individual named Ricky Walker ("Mr. Walker"). (N.T. at 161). Mr. 

Walker has known Appellant since they were children. (N.T. at 138). During June 2013, 

he had been working with Appellant as part of a truck driving team for UTS. (N.T. at 

138-140). The pair had a regular route starting in Carlisle, Pennsylvania with stops in 

Luray, Virginia, Menomonie, Wisconsin, Des Moines, Iowa and returning to Carlisle. 

(N.T. at 139). The pair would share the truck cab and alternate driving and sleeping. 

(N.T. at 139-140). 

The investigation was reopened upon receipt of the impressed writing from the 

PSP. Upon examination of the impressed writing, Det. Moyer observed the word 

"Anderson", a listing of several cities, and numbers that appeared to be telephone 

numbers and/or zip codes. (N.T. at 159-160). One of the numbers belonged to 

Ritescreen Corporation in Elizabethville, Pennsylvania. (N.T. at 160). Det. Moyer spoke 

to officials at Ritescreen and discovered that some of the numbers on the note 

corresponded with trailer numbers for tractor-trailer trucks. (N.T. at 160-161). Two 

trailers with the numbers 3005 and 3051 had travelled into Pennsylvania on May 23rd 

and were subcontracted to Anderson Logistics. (N.T. at 161). When Det. Moyer 

conducted further investigation at Anderson, he discovered that those particular trailers 

had been sublet to UTS. (N.T. at 161). 

neighboring businesses in furtherance of the investigation. (N.T. at 157-158). According 

to Det. Moyer, as of that date, police had no suspects so the investigation was "tabled" 

while they waited for lab results. (N.T. at 158-159). 
7 

Det. Moyer continued the investigation by speaking with Mr. Walker and with 

Appellant's wife. (N.T. at 163). He went to see Appellant's wife to request consent to 

search his clothing. She provided him with a black hat and black shorts. (N.T. at 162- 

163). Det. Moyer testified that the black hat and black cargo style shorts recovered 

from Appellant's wife matched the clothing worn by the suspect in the bank security 

video. (N.T. at 163-164). 

As Det. Moyer now had a suspect in mind, he obtained Appellant's driver's 

license photo from PennDOT. (N.T. at 162). A comparison was made with the bank's 

security video footage which revealed that the person on the video had physical 

characteristics which were very similar to Appellant's. (N.T. at 162). The driver's license 

information stated that Appellant's height is 5'11 ". (N.T. at 163). 

A few days prior to June 3, 2013, Walker and Appellant had finished delivering a 

load on their typical route. (N.T. at 141-142). The opportunity for a one-man trip to New 

Hampshire arose and, according to Walker, Appellant took it. (N.T. at 141-142). 

Sometime in the afternoon of June 3, 2013, Walker received a call and learned that the 

load had never made it to New Hampshire. (N.T. at 142). Later, he was contacted by 

his employer, UTS, about the discovery of the abandoned trailer on Division Street in 

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (N.T. at 143-144). Walker was instructed to rent a truck and 

make the trip to New Hampshire to complete the deliveries. (N.T. at 143-144). He made 

the deliveries and returned the next day. (N.T. at 144). Through his investigation, Det. 

Moyer verified with UTS that this story was accurate. (N.T. at 161-162). 

) 
8 

[A]dmissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and this Court will not reverse a trial court's decision concerning 

admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Flor, 606 Pa. 384, 998 A.2d 606, 623 (2010). An abuse 

of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but 

rather exists where the court has reached a conclusion which overrides or 

misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915A.2d 1122, 1140 (2007). 

Under our Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is permitted when the 

expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond that 

of the average layperson and will help the fact-finder to understand the 

evidence or determine a fact in issue. Pa.RE. 702(a) and (b); 

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 578 Pa. 545, 854 A.2d 465, 470 (2004). 

Commonwealth v. Alicia, 625 Pa. 429, 440-41, 92 A.3d 753, 760 

(2014)(footnote omitted). 

testimony: 

well-established principles regarding the admissibility of evidence as well as expert 

standard. The Supreme Court case of Commonwealth v. Alicia is instructive on the 

admissibility of evidence such claims are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

expert's testimony. Initially we note that when an appellant challenges to the 

Appellant first challenges this Court's ruling on the admission of the handwriting 

DISCUSSION 

(N.T. at 175-176). 

a search of its database he determined that Appellant was not a customer of the bank. 

Christopher Zampogna, the security officer for Mid Penn Bank testified that upon 

paper that could have come from the tablet he always kept in the truck. (N.T. at 141). 

Mr. Walker testified to keeping a stenographer's tablet in the cab on which he 

kept his notes. (N.T. at 140-141 ). He also identified the demand note as a sheet of 
9 

admitted as an expert under Rule 702. 

Viewing Lt. Miller's testimony as a whole, this Court finds that she was properly 

reasonable certainty has been established instead of a foundation of speculation. Id. 

courts must look to the substance of the testimony to determine whether the requisite 

728 (1998); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1160-61 (Pa. 2000). Rather, 

testify using "magic words." Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 101, 720 A.2d 711, 

The Pennsylvania Courts have held that it is not required that an expert witness 

testify as an expert. We disagree. 

that since a "conclusive opinion" was not rendered, the Court improperly permitted to 

he or she "may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise .... " Appellant is asserting 

says that if a witness is qualified as an expert by meeting the criteria set forth in the rule, 

because she stated that she could "give no conclusive opinion." Rule 702 explicitly 

(c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field. 

On appeal, the claim is that Lt. Miller's testimony should have been precluded 

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is 

beyond that possessed by the average layperson; 

(b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 

help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue; and 

expert witnesses. Rule 702 provides: 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of testimony by 

· .. 

j 
10 

ultimate conclusion were presented within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty 

With respect to Lt. Miller's examination of the demand note, her analysis and 

working with questioned documents that would qualify her as a hand writing expert. 

is quite clear that Lt. Miller is highly educated with many years of pertinent experience 

has also testified as a qualified expert in court cases 12-15 times. (N.T. at 111-112). It 

Scientists and the Mid-Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists. (N.T. at 111). She 

Lt. Miller also testified to being a member of the American Academy of Forensic 

Document Examiners who had a combined length of experience of 40 - 50 years. (Id.) 

(N.T. at 109-110). At the PSP, she was trained by working side by side with Questioned 

the Pennsylvania Lottery Commission, the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco. 

Institute of Technology, the FBI, the Canon photocopier headquarters, the BIC factory, 

time on the job training with the PSP, continuing training courses at the Rochester 

Lt. Miller testified to her education and training which included a Bachelor of Science 

Degree from Penn State University in the administration of justice field, two years of full 

possessed by her is well beyond that possessed by the average lay person on the jury. 

perpetrator of the bank robbery. It is beyond contention that the specialized knowledge 

... a witness must possess, at a minimum, "more expertise than is within 

the ordinary range of training, knowledge, intelligence, or experience." 

The test is "whether the witness has a reasonable pretension to 

specialized knowledge on the subject matter in question." 

Bennett v. Graham, 552 Pa. 205, 209-10, 714 A.2d 393, 395 

(1998)(internal citations omitted). 

Lt. Miller testified to the handwriting analysis of the demand note used by the 

held that: 

In order to qualify as an expert witness, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
11 

In determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court must 

weigh the relevant and probative value of the evidence against the 

stated by Pennsylvania courts for many years, as follows: 

The well-established rules of determining the admissibility of evidence have been 

disagrees. 

relevance is outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the evidence. Again, this Court 

because it is irrelevant and inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 402 and 403, and any minimal 

Appellant also argues that Lt. Miller's testimony should not have been admitted 

scientific certainty. 

layperson's knowledge and her conclusions rose to the level of a reasonable degree of 

as a whole, the evidence was properly admitted as her knowledge is well beyond a 

properly admitted under R. 702. See Baez; Spatz, supra. Viewing Lt. Miller's testimony 

reiterates that an expert is not required to provide "magic words" for the testimony to be 

Further, her work and conclusion is peer reviewed. (N.T. 129-130). This Court 

American Society for Testing Materials recommends the 9-point scale. (N.T. at 131). 

the opinion to her level of confidence. (N.T. at 128). Additionally, Lt. Miller said that the 

explained that it is her preference to use the 9-point scale because it allows her to form 

extensive than the 5-point scale used by other laboratories. (N.T. at 125-129). She 

at the top of a 9-point opinion scale used by the PSP which is more refined and 

consideration of many factors utilized in reaching her conclusion. Lt. Miller's opinion fell 

note. However, review of her testimony reveals the extensive analysis and 

takes issue with the fact that Lt. Miller stated Appellant probably did write the demand 

that Appellant was probably the writer of the demand note. (N.T. at 127-129). Appellant 
12 

defendant. Antidormi, supra. 

state above, evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the 

believes that this relevant evidence was so prejudicial it should have been excluded. As 

more or less probable. Appellant has not given this Court a single reason why he 

the bank. The testimony clearly made a material fact, namely who presented the note, 

jury's determination of who was the person that presented the note with the intent to rob 

approached Mr. DiCesare's teller station. Lt. Miller's testimony was relevant to the 

However, evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to 

the defendant. Exclusion is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would 

inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something other than the 

legal propositions relevant to the case. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 

2014 PA Super 10, 84 A.3d 736, 749-50 appeal denied, 626 Pa. 681, 95 

A.3d 275 (2014)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The demand note is evidence of the actor's intent when he entered the bank and 

***** 

The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the evidence 

is relevant. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material 

fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or 

supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence 

of a material fact. In addition, evidence is only admissible where the 

probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. 

Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

outweighed by its potential for prejudice. The probative value of the 

evidence might be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 

of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, pointlessness of 

presentation, or unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence. 

***** 

prejudicial impact of the evidence. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends 

to establish a material fact in the case or tends to support a reasonable 

inference regarding a material fact. Although a court may find that 

evidence is relevant, the court may nevertheless conclude that such 

evidence is inadmissible on account of its prejudicial impact. 
email circulated by bank security in August 2013 that attached a picture of the person 

13 

what photograph was shown and when, this Court surmises that the reference is to an 

that was shown to him prior to the trial. Without the benefit of any specifics regarding 

contends that the identification testimony of Mr. DiCesare was tainted by a photograph 

Appellant's first argument in support of his weight of the evidence challenge 

Rosette, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191-1192 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the jury's verdict. Commonwealth v. 

a defendant motions for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim, he 

Diggs, 597 Pa. 28, 949 A.2d 873, 879-80 (Pa. 2008) (internal citations omitted). When 

A motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. An appellate 

court, therefore, reviews the exercise of discretion, not the underlying 

question whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The 

fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court will award a new 

trial only when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock 

one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, 

appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's discretion was 

properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and 

inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion. Thus, the trial 

court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence 

claim is the least assailable of its rulings. 

Commonwealth v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908 (Pa. Super. 2014) citing Commonwealth v. 

of the evidence challenged, our Supreme Court has stated that: 

reasons which we will address in order. Initially, this Court notes that when the weight 

Appellant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence for three 

as follows: 

evidence. The offense for which Appellant was convicted is defined, in pertinent part, 

Appellant next challenges the jury's verdict as being against the weight of the 
14 

Next, Appellant argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence 

because the expert in fingerprint analysis could not give a "temporal nexus for his 

conclusion." This position is, again, without merit. Tpr. Petti testified extensively 

regarding his analysis methods and the "ten points of correspondence" between the 

latent print from the bank and the known print from Appellant that led him to conclude 

within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty it belonged to Appellant. (N.T. at 86- 

95). Although he did state that could not tell the age of the print, Mr. DiCesare's 

testimony clearly described Appellant's exit from the bank and what Appellant had 

touched including the doors where the print was found. (N.T. at 39; 43; 59-60). 

Additional corroboration for the areas touched by Appellant during the robbery was 

provided by the bank's security video which was reviewed by Detectives Horner and 

Moyer. (N.T. at 63-64; 66-69; 72-73; 156-157). Again, it is within the purview of the 

jury's responsibilities to consider all evidence presented, resolve any conflicts and afford 

appropriate weight to each fact adduced at trial. 

arrested for the robbery. (N.T. at 45-46). However, this argument has no merit as Mr. 

DiCesare unequivocally testified that his identification of Appellant as the person who 

robbed him on June 3, 2013, was based on his "[f]irsthand experience" on the date of 

the incident. (N.T. at 46). The weight and credibility to be afforded to the fact that Mr. 

DiCesare had seen the email from bank security prior to the preliminary hearing is a 

duty within the purview of the jury. This Court finds that it is entirely reasonable that the 

jury accepted Mr. DiCesare's testimony regarding the basis of his identification 

testimony. 
15 

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DISTRIBUTION: 

Brian Hokarnp, Esq., Dauphin Co. District Attorney's Office ~ 

James J. Karl, Esq., Dauphin Co. Public Defender's Office g.;() 

Clerk of Courts -;I:,() 

Prothonotary of the Superior Court . tl-M· /'Ml"" 

FILE - Judge Lewis vi/ 

MEMORANDUM oA rs: ;tf w 4-_ 1 ~ 0CJ r ~ 

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of sentence should 

stand. 

justice. 

After review of the evidence, the verdict does not shock this Court's sense of 

Court finds that is has no merit. 

note. This issue has already been addressed above and, for the same reasons, this 

because Lt. Miller did not render a "conclusive opinion" that Appellant wrote the demand 

Finally, the Appellant argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence