The Honorable Steven N. Limbaugh, United States Distric t 1 Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. ____________ No. 95-1255

____________ Michael Aucutt, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Six Flags Over Mid-America, * Inc., a Missouri corporation * in good standing, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Appellee. * Eastern District of Missouri *

---------------- * * Equal Employment Advisory * Council, * * Amicus Curiae. *

____________ Submitted: November 16, 1995 Filed: June 5, 1996

____________ Before McMILLIAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

____________ McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Michael Aucutt appeals from a final judgment entered in the United States D istrict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri grantin g 1 summary judgment in favor of Six Flags over Mid- America, Inc. (Six Flags). Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc. , 869 F. Supp. 736, 744 (E.D. Mo
. 1994). For reversal, plaintiff argues the distr ict court erred in holding that (1) plaintiff had failed-2-

to establish a prima facie case on his Age Discrimination in Employment Ac t (ADEA) claim or, in the alternative, had failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination proffered by defendant and (2 ) plaintif f had failed to establish a prima facie case of disabilit y discrimination in vio lation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the distric t court.
I. Background

After a c areer in the United States Army, Aucutt was hired by Si x Flags in April 1990 a s a seasonal security guard at its amusement park in Eureka, Missouri. At the time he was hired, Aucutt was 41 years old. In May 1990, Six Flags made Aucutt a full-time secu rity guard. His duties in this position include d patrolling the amusement park and its parking lot. Aucutt held this position until October 1992, when he was discharged, at the age of 44.
During his employment at Six Flags, Aucutt was diagnosed with high blood p ressure, angina, and coronary artery disease. He informed hi s supervisors at Six Flags of these medical conditions. In July 1991, Aucut t became ill while at work. He was transported to a hospital, treated for high blood pressure a nd released after several days. He returned to work approximately three weeks later with a doctor’s statement releasing him fo r work and stating that he should not lift more than twenty-five pounds

. Aucut t alleges that when he returned to work, Tom Robertson, the vice

president of Six Flags, initially told him that he would be discharged but later informed him that he would not be discharg ed after all. Aucutt also alleges that on the s ame day, Keith Hendricks, the Admissions Supervisor, told him that the “insurance people did not want him back [at]. . . work.” Joint App. 45-46. Si x Flags denies these allegations. It is undisputed, however, that Six Flags refused Aucutt’s repeated requests to be allowed to drive air-conditioned-3-

vehicles on warm days. Six Flags was also aware that Aucutt could no t perform a “streams co urse,” a mandatory employee obstacle course, without experiencing severe pain.

At the end of the 19 92 season, William Haviluk, the General Manager of t he Six Flags in Eureka reviewed the park’s operating results an d decided to engage in a reduction-in-force (RIF) at the park. Havilu k implemented layoffs which affected several of the park’s departments. He direct ed Mike Chilovich, the Manager of Security, to reorganize th e Sec urityDepartment. It was decided that three security positions (tw o sergeant s and one officer) would be eliminated as part of the RIF. I n Octobe r 1992, after evaluating the officers and sergeants under hi s superv ision, Chilovich concluded that Aucutt would be terminated

. Chilovich Aff. ¶ 12. According to Chilovich, Aucutt was selected because of his low productivity and abrasive, “militaris tic” attitude towards park patro ns. For example, on one occasion Aucutt had made patrons perfor m pus h-ups in the parking lot; he had also conducted several unauthorize d searches of patrons’ vehicles for liquor. Chilo vich Aff. ¶ 7-8. Although Chilov ichhad not personally observed these incidents, he did counse l Aucutt about his negative attitude at work. In February 1992, Chilovich specificallyinformed Aucutt that a failure to improve his work attitude would result in termi nation. Chilovich Aff. ¶ 11. However, according to Six Flags, Aucutt continued to demonstrate an abrasive demeanor while on duty.
When Chilovich recommended Aucutt for layoff inOctober 1992 as part of the RIF, Haviluk concurred. At the time of his layoff, Aucutt was 44 years old and the oldest uniformed security officer at the park. Eigh t months later, following the termination of another uniformed securit y officer, a long-term Six Flags employee below the age of 40 was transferre d into the Security Department as a uniformed security officer.-4- After exhausting his administrative remedies, Aucutt instituted the present action on Sep tember 24, 1993, in the United States District Court for th e Eastern District of Missouri, alleging his layoff wa s discri minatorilybased upon his age and his medical conditions, i n violation of the ADEA and ADA, respectively. On December 6, 1994, upo n motion by Six Flags, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of Six Fl ags, holding that Aucutt had failed to establish a prima faci e
case of discrimination under either the ADEA or the ADA. Further, th e district court found that even if Aucutt had established a prima facie cas e of age discrimination, he had failed to rebut the legitimate , nondiscriminatoryreasons for his layoff articulated by Six Flags. Slip op. at 12-13, 19. This timely appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before the district court, a nd this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewe d in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows tha t there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part y is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see, e.g., Celotex Corp. V. Catrett , 477 U.S. 31 7, 322-23 (1986); Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Get Away Club, Inc.
v. Colema n , 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992); St. Paul Fire & Marin e Insurance Co. v. FDIC , 968 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 1992). Where th e unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgmen t is particularly appropriate. Crain v. Board of Police Comm’rs , 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir. 1990).-5- B. ADEA Claim
On appeal, Aucutt contends that the district co urt erred in granting summary jud gment in favor of Six Flags on his ADEA claim for thre e reasons. First, he argues the district court failed to apply the proper standard for determining whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted. According to Aucutt, the district cour t neither viewed the facts in the light most favorable to him as the non-movant, nor resolve d evi dentiaryconflicts in his favor. Second, Aucutt argues the distric t court erroneously con cluded that he had failed to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA or, alternatively, tha t he had failed to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hi s layoff articulated by Six Flags. Finally, Aucutt maintains tha t statements in Chilovich’s affidavit describing Six Flags ’ nondiscriminatory reason for i ts selection of Aucutt for discharge
were improperly credited by the district court, because thes e stat ements were not based on Chilovich’s personal knowledge, a s requir ed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). We consider each argument i n turn.

1. Standard of Review Employed by District Court

Au cutt first argues that the district court, in considerin g Six Flags’ motion for summary judgment, failed to review the facts in a lig ht most favorable to him, the party opposing the motion , and give him the benefit of al l reasonable inferences supported by the facts. See Didier v. J.C. Penney Co. , 868 F.2d 276, 279-8 0 (8t hCir. 1989). More particularly, Aucutt contends that th e di strict court, in considering his performance evaluations, gav e undue weight to the portions describing his “negative , militaristic” attitude but fai led to give sufficient weight to the portions stating that he had “made progress as a security of ficer.” Appel lant’s Add. 11; Joint App. 65. He also maintains that th e district court improperly disregarded the statements alleged ly made-6-

byRobertson and Hendricks in July 1991 as evidence of age-base d discriminatory animus.

Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. Although th e district court was required to consider all facts in the lig ht most fav orable to Aucutt, it was not required to ignore undispute d eviden ce in the record indicating that Aucutt had repeatedl y demonstrated a hostile attitude towards park patrons.
Similarly, the district court properly disregarded th e statements allegedly made by Robertson and Hendricks, in light of the principles set forth in Beshears v. Asbill , 930 F.2d 134 8, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991) ( Beshears ). I n Beshears , we distinguished between “[c]omments which demonstrate a ‘discriminatory animus in th e dec isional process’” from “‘stray remarks in the workplace, ’ ‘statements by nondecisionmakers,’ or ‘statements by decisio nmakers
un related to the decisional process.’” Id. (quoting Pric e Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J. , concurring)); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc. , 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8thCir. 1993) ( Radabaugh ) (documents authored by compan y presid ent emphasizing young age of managers as one of company’ s strengths constituted evidence of age-based discriminatory a nimus). In the present case, the alleged remarks of Robertson and He ndricks were made fourteen months befo re Aucutt’s termination, and neither Robertson nor Hendricks was involved in the decision to terminate Aucutt in October 1992. Moreover, these statements do not evince any discriminatory animus with respect to age. Thus, even i f made, these statements constitute “stray remarks in the workplace [or ] statements by nondecisionmakers” and were therefore properl y disregarded by the district court. Beshears , 930 F.2d at 13 54. We therefore hold that the district court properly applied the summary judgment standard in the present case.The ADEA provides, inter alia , that “[i]t shall be unlawful 2 for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discha rge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, beca use of such individual’s age. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 623(1).
-7- 2. Merits of ADEA Claim

Aucutt next contends that the district court erred i n determining that he had failed to present a prima facie case of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA or, al ternatively, that he 2 had failed to show that the legitimate reason for his discharg e articulated by Six Flags was a pretext for age discriminatio n. See slip op. at 12-13. We disagree.

The burden- shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), for Title VI I discrimination cases also governs age discrimination claims under the ADEA. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc. , 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8t h Cir. 1984) ( Holley ). The plaintiff must first establish a prim a facie ca se of age discrimination. In order to establish a prim a facie case, an age-discrimination plaintiff such as Aucutt, who was dismissed pursuant to a RIF, must show that: (1) he or she was at least 40 years old at the time of discharge; (2) he or sh e satisfied the applicable job qualifications; (3) he or she wa s discharged; and (4) “provide some additional showing that age was a factor in the termination.” Nitschke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 68 F.3d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1995) ( Nitschke ) (quoting Holley , 77 1 F.2d at 1165). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case , the employer has the burden of producing evidence that th e plaintiff was discharged “for a legitimate, nondiscriminator y reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks , 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (19 93) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 45 0-8-

U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). The bu rden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the employer was a pret ext forThis argument is considered separately below. 3 -9- age-based discrimination. Nitschke , 68 F.3d at 251; Hutson v
. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995).

We will assume for purposes of this appeal that Aucutt ha s established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Eve n granting him this assumption, the district court properly entered
summa ryjudgment in favor of Six Flags on the issue of pretext

. SixFlags submits that it discharged Aucutt pursuant to a RI F caused by a decline in business in the 1992 season. According to Chilovich, the Manager of Security at the Six Flags in Eureka , Auc utt was selected for termination because of his failure t o
correc t his negative work attitude after repeated admonitions , inclu ding a corrective counseling session in February 1992

. Chilovich Aff. ¶ 12. Noting that Aucutt had conducted unaut horized searches of patrons’ cars in t he parking lot, had made park guests per form“push-ups” on at least one occasion, and had ofte n
cr iticized Six Flags’ procedures, Chilovich stated that he ha d
reco mmended Aucutt for termination, and the General Manager ha d agree d, because Aucutt’s behavior was inconsistent with th e comp any’s public relations and safety policies. Chilovich Aff

. ¶¶ 7, 12.

Because Six Flags presented a legitimate, nondiscriminator y
rea son for Aucutt’s termination, the burden shifted to Aucutt t o demonstrate the existence of a factual issue as to whether thi s explanation was a pretext for age-based discrimination. Although Aucutt questions Chilovich’s personal knowledge of the “push up ” in cident, he does not deny having engaged in any of th e

3 “m ilitaristic” conduct described by Chilovich. Rather, he merel y alleges pretext on the basis that Six Flags retained two younge r security officers who had inferior job performance evaluatio ns. Yet-10-

we note that these officers were only ranked below Aucutt in on e category; nor did they demonstrate the negative work attitude for-11-

which Aucutt had often been admonished. More importantly, h owever, Aucutt has not presented any e vidence that Six Flags harbored agebas ed discriminatory animus. This court may not second-guess a n empl oyer’s personnel decisions, unless such decisions are base d upon unlawful discrimination. See Walker v. AT & T Technologies , 995 F.2d 846, 850 (8th Cir. 1993). Upon careful de novo rev iew, we hold that the district court correctly determined that Aucutt has not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue o f material fact that Six Flags’ articulated reason for his discharge was a pretext for age-based discrimination.

3. The Chilovich Affidavit

Aucutt contends that the district court erred in crediting th e
rea sons for his termination given by Chilovich in his affidavit

. Not ing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that affidavit s supp orting motions for summary judgment be made on persona l knowledge, Aucutt argues that Chilovich’s affidavit does not meet this requirement because Chilovich lacked personal knowledge of the “push-up” incident described i n his affidavit. Chilovich made the following statement in paragraph eight of his affidavit:

It came to my attention that whil e patrolling the parking lot, Michae l Aucutt encounte red four young guests in military uniforms. It also came to my att ention that after concluding tha t the yhad violated a rule, he informe d them that he was a former Army Sergeant , he had the auth ority to discipline them as their military superior, and the n com menced giving orders to perfor m calisthenic “push-ups”, (which th e gue sts then did), in the Six Flag s parking lot.-12-

Chilovich Aff. ¶ 8. Chilovich recounted the “push-up” incident as one of several examples of Auc utt’s failure to improve his hostile demeanor towards park patrons, which was the primary reason why he was selected for layoff in the October 1992 RIF. Aucutt contends-13-

that because Chilovich did not personally observe the “push-up ” incident described in the affi davit, the district court improperly considered the affidavit in deciding to grant summary judgment in favor of Six Flags.

Six Flags responds that Chilovich’s affidavit comports wit h Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), because it was based on Chilovich’s p ersonal knowle dge of the reasons for the decision to lay off Aucutt. W e agree. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires that affidavits supporting
or opposing a motion for summary judgment “shall be made o n per sonal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would b e admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that th e affian t is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In eva luating evidence related to possible summary judgment, a court may not consider affidavits that do not satisfy the requirements of Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See El Deeb v. Uni versityof Minnesota , 60 F.3d 423, 428-29 (8th Cir. 1995) ; Cu mmings v. Roberts , 628 F.2d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 1980). Th e district court in the present case properly considered Chilovich’s affidavit, because it was based on Chilovich’s personal knowledge of the reasons underlying the challenged employment decision. As the Manager of the Security Department, Chilovich was directed to select two sergeants and one o fficer to be laid off as part of the October 1992 RIF. He evaluate d the personnel file and performance of each employee under his supervision and decided to lay of f Auc utt. In his affidavit, Chilovich indicated that he ha d repeatedly admonished Aucutt to improve his demeanor towards park guests while performing his se curity duties, yet Aucutt had failed to do so . For example, Chilovich stated, “Even after I reminde d Aucutt several times not to conduct vehicle searches, I stil l found himin t he parking lot searching vehicles.” Chilovich Aff. ¶ 7

. He further stated that he chose Aucutt for termination becaus e Aucutt had “continued to demonstrate a negative attitude and a n-14-

unwill ingness to cooperate with Six Flags’ policies an d goals. . . .” Chilovich Aff. ¶ 12. Thus, Chilovich had firsthandThe ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualifie d 4 individual with a disability because of the disability of suc h indi vidual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring , advancement, or discharge of e mployees, employee compensation, job trai ning, and other terms, conditions, and privileges o f employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). -15- knowle dge of the reasons why Aucutt was selected for discharge

. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) does not require Chilovich to have witnessed every incident supporting the termination decision, so long as he had personal knowledge that th e decision was for reasons unrelated to age-based discrimination. Cf. Gill v. Reorganized School Dist. , 32 F.3d 376, 379 (8th Cir. 1994) (school superintendent wh o di scharged plaintiff teacher after receiving report that studen t had a ccused plaintiff of making racially derogatory remark s satis factorilyrebutted plaintiff’s prima facie case with a legitimate reason for plaintiff’s discharge; superintendent nee d not have observed incident in question, because crucial issue was “whether [the reported incident] was the real reason for [Gill’s] termination and not a pretext for [race] discrimination”).

Inlight of the foregoing, we hold that the district court di d not err in considering Chilovich’s affidavit in support of Si x Flags’s motion for summary judgment. We further hold that th e dis trict court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Si x Flags on Aucutt’s ADEA claim.

C. ADA Claim
Finally, Aucutt challenges the district court’s grantin g
summar yjudgment in favor of Six Flags on his ADA claim. Th e 4 dis trict court concluded that Aucutt had not established a prim a facie case of disability discrimination, because he had failed to show that he suffered from a “disability” within the meaningof the-16-

ADA. Slip op. at 19. A plaintiff may use the McDonnell Dougla s Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework described above to prove-17-

a claim of intentional disability discrimination. See Price v. S-B Power Tool , 75 F.3d 362, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1996), petition fo r cert. filed , 64 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-1782). T o establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she is a “disabled” person within the meaning o f the ADA ; (2) he or she is qualified to perform the essentia l func tions of the job (either with or without reasonabl e
accomm odation); and (3) he or she has suffered an advers e employ ment action under circumstances from which an inference o f
un lawful discrimination arises. See id . (citing Benson v
. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 62 F .3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995)). In order to e stablish a prima facie case in a RIF situation, th e plaintiff must also show that his or her disability was a determining factor in his or her termination. See Johnson v

. Minnesota Historical Soc’y , 931 F.2d 1239, 1243 (8th Cir. 1991).

The ADA defines a “disability” as “(A) a physical or menta l impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1 2102(2)(A)-(C). It is undisputed that Aucutt suffers fro m angina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease. Th e dis trict court held that Aucutt was not “disabled” within th e meaning of the ADA, because he had presented no evidence sug gesting that his medical problems “sub stantially limit[ed]” one or more of his “major life activities.” Slip op. at 19. Emphasizing that he could not complete the “streams course” without experiencingsevere pain , Aucutt argues that his medical problems constitut e “disab ilit[ies]” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)

. Alternatively, he contends tha t because Six Flags was aware of his medical problems, his difficulty performing the streams cour se, and his requests for an air-conditioned vehicle, he was “regarded” as-18-

having an impairment which substantially limited one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). We think Aucutt’s arguments are without merit.-19-

Bec ause the ADA does not define the term “major lif e activities,” we are guided by the definition provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1 630.2, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC ) regulations issued to implemen t Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (requiring EEOC to iss ue regulations implementing ADA). As defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), the phrase “major lif e activities” means “functions such as caring for oneself, per forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathin g learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The regulation s fu rther provide that “[t]he inability to perform a single , particular job does not consti tute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)

. Rather , a person claiming a disability must show that th e impairment “significantly restrict[s] [his or her] ability t o perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various clas ses as compared to the average person having comparabl e training, skills and abilities .” Id ; see also Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc. , 36 F.3d 939, 942-44 (10th Cir. 1994) ( Bolton ) (work-related inju rypreventing employee from performing his job as orde r sele ctor in grocery warehouse was not substantial limitation i n major life activity of working , as required for unlawful discharge claim under ADA, absent eviden ce showing restriction in ability to perform class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1104 (1995). Finally, the EEO C regulations state that the following factors should be considered in determining whether an indi vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) the nature and severity of the impa irment, (ii) its duration or expected duration, and (iii) its actual o r expected long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).

Aucutt has not presented any evidence indicating that hi s ang ina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease place a significant restriction on his ability to perform any of the basic-20-

functions enumerated in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). His difficult y completing the “streams course” hardly constitutes the requisite-21-

sho wing that his medical condition substantially limited hi s overall employment opportuniti es. See Bolton , 36 F.3d at 943. We note, for example, that a 25-pound lifting restriction was t he only med ical limitation placed upon Aucutt’s activities after hi s hospitalization in July 1991. Nor has Aucutt attempted to sho w that his angina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease pose a significant restriction on his ability to carry out othe r
ma jor life activities, such as walking, seeing, speaking , br eathing, or learning. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). In short , Aucutt has failed to present s ufficient evidence to establish that the nature, duration, and long -term impact of his medical problems caused him to be substantially limited in a major life activity

. Therefore, we hold that he is not “disabled” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Also without merit is Aucutt’s claim that he is disabled unde r 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) because Six Flags regarded him as ha ving an impair ment which substantially limited one or more of his majo r life activities. In support of this argument, Aucutt notes tha t SixFlags was aware of his medical problems, his inability t o per formthe “streams course,” and his requests for an air

conditioned vehicle during the summer months. The mere fact that Six Flags had such knowledge, however, does not show that Si x Flags regarded Aucutt as having a disabling impairment. We are agai n guid ed by the applicable EEOC regulations, which provide a s follows:

(l) Is regarded as having such a n

impairment means: (1) Has a physical or menta l imp airment that does not substantiall y limit major life activities but i s treated by a covered entity a s constituting such limitation;-22- (2) Has a physical or menta l impairment that substantially limit s major life-23- act ivities only as a result of th e attitudes of others toward suc h impairment; or (3) Has none of the impairment s defined . . . [ above] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3). Aucutt has not brought forth an y evidence suggesting that Six Flags perceived or treated him a s having a substantially limiting impairment. In the absence of such evidence, the fact that Six Flags was aware of his medical p roblems is insufficient to establish that Six Flags “regarded” him a s disab led under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Thus, we hold that Aucut t failed to make a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

III. Conclusion

After carefully reviewing the record, we hold that th e district court did not err in granting summary judgment in f avor of SixFlags on Aucutt’s ADEA and ADA claims. Accordingly, th e judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.