J-A02041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRANDON OBRYAN BOWERS 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 744 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 29, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-43-CR-0001023-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MAY 3, 2023

Appellant, Brandon Obryan Bowers, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on December 29, 2021, as made final by the denial of his 

post-sentence motion on June 10, 2022, following his jury trial convictions for 

simple possession of narcotics, possession with intent to deliver narcotics,

recklessly endangering another person, and criminal use of a communication 

facility.1 We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On July 15, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint 

alleging that, on July 12, 2019, Appellant delivered fentanyl to Michael 

____________________________________________

1

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, 

and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), respectively.
J-A02041-23

- 2 -

Herndon (the decedent) who ultimately overdosed and died.2 Following a 

three-day trial, on November 18, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of the 

aforementioned crimes. On December 29, 2021, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years of imprisonment, consecutive 

to any sentence Appellant was already serving. On January 3, 2022, the trial 

court filed an amended sentencing order merging the sentences imposed for 

simple possession of narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to 

deliver. This timely appeal resulted.3

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court err in permitting Officer Jesse DiPietro to 

testify in the capacity as an expert witness and render an 

expert opinion when he had not been so qualified?

II. Did the trial court err in depriving Appellant of the right to 

cross-examine Officer Jesse DiPietro related to his training 

and experience in the field of narcotics when he testified in 

the capacity as an expert witness and rendered an expert 

opinion?

____________________________________________

2

 In addition to the crimes for which Appellant was convicted, the 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with third-degree murder, involuntary 

manslaughter, and drug delivery resulting in death. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2502(c), 2504(a), and 2506(a), respectively. The jury, however, 

ultimately acquitted Appellant of these homicide-related offenses.

3

 On January 7, 2022, the trial court granted Appellant’s extension request to 

permit the filing of a post-sentence motion after the receipt of the trial 

transcripts. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on March 21, 2022. 

The trial court denied relief by order entered on June 10, 2022. Thereafter, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 2022. On June 23, 2022, 

the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied 

timely on July 7, 2022. On August 15, 2022, the trial court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
J-A02041-23

- 3 -

III. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

introduce evidence related to the possession and 

distribution of marijuana to an unknown party as the same 

was irrelevant, overly prejudicial and the Commonwealth 

failed to file proper notice under [Pa.R.E.] 404(b)?

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (complete capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s first two issues pertain to the admission of testimony by 

Commonwealth trial witness, Officer Jesse DiPietro and, thus, we will examine 

them together. First, Appellant argues that Officer DiPietro testified in the 

capacity as both an expert and lay witness when the Commonwealth elicited 

him “to render an expert opinion even though he had not been identified as 

such or qualified in that capacity.” Id. at 20. Appellant claims that 

Pennsylvania courts have routinely held that expert testimony is required to 

decipher for a jury “coded and encrypted language utilized by drug 

traffickers.” Id. at 19 (citation omitted). Appellant cites an exchange at trial, 

wherein the Commonwealth questioned Officer DiPietro about his training and 

experience with drug investigations and observations regarding the use of 

code or slang narcotics terms and the average length of drug sale 

conversations. Id. at 20-23. Although Officer DiPietro was not offered as an 

expert, Appellant argues that the officer “gave an opinion based upon his 

training that he believed that the communications between Appellant and [the 

victim] were consistent with the sale and delivery of narcotics.” Id. at 33. 

In his second issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court 

compounded its initial error by denying Appellant the opportunity to 
J-A02041-23

- 4 -

cross-examine Officer DiPietro “as to his training, experience, qualifications, 

and/or expert opinion.” Id. at 41. Appellant claims, therefore, that his right 

to confront and cross-examine Officer DiPietro regarding his qualifications as 

an expert was also violated. Id. at 41-45.

Our Supreme Court has previously determined:

An appellate court generally reviews a trial court's decisions 

regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1027 (Pa. 2012) 

(“An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an 

appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but 

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such a lack of support so as to be 

clearly erroneous.”) (citations and quotations omitted). [When

the examination or interpretation of our evidentiary rules involves 

a question of law our] standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 

1176 (Pa. 2012). When interpreting our rules of evidence, we 

must ascribe to the words of these rules their plain and ordinary 

meaning. Id. (citation omitted).

[Pennsylvania] Rule [of Evidence] 701 permits lay witnesses to 

provide opinion testimony only if such testimony meets three 

limiting criteria:

Pa.R.E. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the 

form of an opinion is limited to one that is:

(a) rationally based on the witness's perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony 

or determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701. The first and second criteria outlined in the rule are 

self-explanatory, in that they simply require that a [lay] witness's 

opinion testimony be based upon personal knowledge and be 

helpful to the jury in understanding the witness's testimony or a 
J-A02041-23

- 5 -

fact at issue. The final limiting criteria precludes lay witness 

opinion testimony based upon scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge that falls within the realm of expert opinion 

testimony as outlined by Rule 702, which provides as follows:

Pa.R.E. 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of 

an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average 

layperson;

(b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

(c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the 

relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702. [Our Supreme Court has] explained that “expert 

testimony is permitted only as an aid to the jury when the subject 

matter is distinctly related to a science, skill, or occupation beyond 

the knowledge or experience of the average layman.” 

Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa. 1988) 

(citation omitted). [Our Supreme Court has] also recognized that 

the standard for qualifying as an expert is a liberal one and the 

witness need only have “‘any reasonable pretension to specialized 

knowledge on the subject matter under investigation’” and the 

weight to be given to the expert's testimony is for the factfinder. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 546 A.2d 26, 31 (Pa. 1988), 

quoting Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 

914, 924 (Pa. 1974) (additional citation omitted); see also

Comment, Pa.R.E. 702. [Moreover,] “expertise, whether acquired 

as a result of formal education or by experience, is expertise.”

Commonwealth v. Auker, 681 A.2d 1305, 1317 (Pa. 1996).

* * *

In [Commonwealth v.] Huggins, [68 A.3d 962 (Pa. Super. 

2013),] the Superior Court considered whether Rules 701 and 702 

precluded a police officer from testifying as both a lay and expert 

witness. Huggins, 68 A.3d at 966, 974. The [Huggins] court 

ultimately held that the plain language of these rules “do not 
J-A02041-23

- 6 -

preclude a single witness from testifying, or offering opinions, in 

the capacity as both a lay and expert witness on matters that may 

embrace the ultimate issues to be decided by the fact-finder,” so 

long as the jury is properly instructed to avoid confusion. Id. at 

967, 974. In reaching this conclusion, the panel referenced 

federal case law highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing 

between an officer's lay and expert testimony:

We have explained that a law enforcement officer's 

testimony is lay opinion if it is limited to what he observed 

... or to other facts derived exclusively from a particular 

investigation .... On the other hand, an officer testifies as 

an expert when he brings the wealth of his experience as an 

officer to bear on those observations and makes connections 

for the jury based on that specialized knowledge.

Id. at 969, quoting United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 

709 (7th Cir. 2012) (additional quotations and citations omitted). 

The panel also acknowledged that distinguishing between an 

officer's expert and lay testimony “is often far from clear” when 

that officer possesses specialized knowledge and was also 

personally involved in [investigating] the facts underlying the 

case. Id. It explained that “‘the inferences officers draw when 

observing and responding to situations cannot always be 

separated from the expertise they bring to evaluate those 

situations. Their observations are guided by experience and 

training and thus, at least some of their fact testimony will be 

influenced by specialized knowledge.’” Id. quoting Christian, 673 

F.3d at 708.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 889–891 (Pa. 2020) (original 

brackets omitted).

In Commonwealth v. Rose, 172 A.3d 1121 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing

United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2015), this Court 

further recognized that law enforcement officers should be qualified as experts 

when interpreting intercepted conversations that use “slang, street language, 

and the jargon of the illegal drug trade.” Rose, 172 A.3d at 1130 (citation 

omitted). Whereas, an ”officer's lay opinion is admissible only when the law 
J-A02041-23

- 7 -

enforcement officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal 

knowledge of the facts being related in the conversation, or observed the 

conversations as they occurred.” Id. (citation omitted). When a witness 

testifies in dual capacities, the trial court must exercise “its gatekeeping 

function” to “minimize any juror confusion” by directing the Commonwealth 

“to delineate between” the witness’ “expert and fact-based opinions[,]”

permit “rigorous cross-examination” of the proffered witness “regarding his 

expertise and the substance of his testimony” and issue “cautionary 

instructions throughout trial.” Huggins, 68 A.3d at 974.

Finally, we note:

It is well settled that the test to be applied when qualifying an 

expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable 

pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under 

investigation. Such knowledge need not be obtained through 

formal education but may have been acquired by other training or 

experience. Moreover, a defendant's right of confrontation 

includes the right to cross-examine witnesses about possible 

motives to testify. 

* * *

The scope of cross-examination is a matter within the discretion 

of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that 

discretion.

Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 785–786 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(cleaned up); see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 727 (Pa. 

1998) (“The qualification of an expert witness is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for a clear abuse of 

discretion.”).
J-A02041-23

- 8 -

Here, applying the foregoing legal precepts, we agree with Appellant 

that the trial court erred in concluding that the challenged portion of Officer 

DiPietro’s testimony was offered and admitted solely as lay opinion. The 

Commonwealth questioned Officer DiPietro at length about his expertise in 

“drug interdiction,” his work with the Attorney General Mercer County Drug 

Task Force, and his special training in narcotics investigation including drug 

identification, lingo, and packaging. N.T., 11/16/2021, at 240-245. 

Moreover, while Officer DiPietro was called upon primarily as a fact witness to 

testify regarding his investigation of the charged crimes, we have little doubt 

that Officer DiPietro summoned the wealth of his experience in law

enforcement when he explained for the jury the nature of the drug trafficking 

exchanges that occurred in this case as well as the meaning of certain coded 

words used in exchanges between Appellant and the decedent. As to those 

aspects of Officer DiPiero’s testimony, there is no dispute that he was not a 

participant in the text messages, had no personal knowledge of the facts being 

related in the conversation, and/or did not observe the conversations as they 

occurred. Instead, Officer DiPietro was asked to provide his insights gained 

through his occupational training and experience, not within the average 

layperson’s knowledge as required under Rule 702(a), to describe encrypted

jargon used in narcotics’ sales. See Rose, 172 A.3d at 1131 (Witness “should 

have been qualified as an expert in order to testify to the meaning of any of 

the particular words within the conversations.”). As such, the trial court 

should not have permitted Officer DiPietro to testify as an expert, or as a 
J-A02041-23

- 9 -

witness testifying in dual capacities.

4

 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 

court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in permitting Officer 

DiPietro to testify as an expert witness regarding the content of Appellant’s 

text messages with the decedent without first securing the proper formalities 

from the Commonwealth, allowing Appellant to fully cross-examine the 

witness regarding his training and experience, and then properly guiding and 

instructing the jury.

Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion, we next 

turn to whether the error was harmless. See id., citing Commonwealth v. 

McClure, 144 A.3d 970, 975–976 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“In the event of an 

erroneous admission of evidence, a verdict can still be sustained if the error 

was harmless.”). “Harmless error exists if the [Commonwealth] proves either: 

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; 

or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other 

untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously 

admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence 

of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so 

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the 

____________________________________________

4

 The Commonwealth is required to disclose expert opinions during pretrial 

discovery and inspection. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(e). The trial court may 

order “an expert whom the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to call in 

any proceeding” to prepare a report. Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(b). The trial 

court is also required to properly instruct the jury to avoid confusion when a 

witness testifies in a dual capacity as a fact and expert witness. Huggins, 68 

A.3d at 974. Here, there is no dispute that these requirements were not met.
J-A02041-23

- 10 -

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 787 (Pa. 2017) (citation 

omitted).

In this case, in addition to the text messages between Appellant and the 

decedent, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of two individuals, 

Michelle Jordan (Jordan) and Travis Pratt (Pratt), who were living with 

Appellant at the time of the alleged narcotics delivery. Jordan testified that 

Appellant appeared agitated when he learned that the decedent suffered a 

fatal overdose the night before. N.T., 11/17/2021, at 21. Appellant admitted

to Jordan that the text message he sent to the decedent referred to fentanyl

and that he was nervous that the message was incriminating. Id. at 24. 

Appellant asked Jordan to help him manufacture an alibi and an excuse for 

the text messages. Id. at 28-34. Jordan testified that Appellant asked her 

to “help him figure out how to erase” the text messages, because he was 

“concerned he would get in trouble ... for providing [the decedent] the drugs.” 

Id. at 39-40. Appellant “wanted [Jordan] to tell the police that when he saw 

[the decedent] that night, the night that [he] passed away, [] that [Appellant] 

was dropping off headphones.” Id. at 44. Jordan further testified that 

Appellant stated that “he’d given [the decedent] more [fentanyl] in the past 

and nothing like this ha[d] ever happened.” Id. at 39. Jordan confirmed that 

Appellant had fentanyl on the night the decedent died, because she and 

Appellant used it. Id. at 58-59. Likewise, Pratt testified Appellant told him 

that the police confiscated his cellular telephone, Appellant gave the decedent 
J-A02041-23

- 11 -

“stuff” the day before he died, Pratt believed the term “stuff” referred to 

narcotics, and Appellant exclaimed to Pratt, “I’m fucked.” Id. at 106-107. 

The Commonwealth additionally presented the testimony of Matthew 

Thompson (Thompson). In 2020, Thompson “frequented the same hotel” as 

Appellant and testified that Appellant admitted that he killed the decedent. 

N.T., 11/18/2021, at 39-41. Thompson further testified that Appellant asked 

him to kill Jordan and Pratt for $10,000.00 for “giving the police information.” 

Id. at 41-42. 

Finally, we note that the Commonwealth also presented the testimony 

of Detective Michael Songer (Detective Songer), in his capacity as a narcotics 

expert.5 Id. at 57-68. Detective Songer testified that the text messages at 

issue contained “drug lingo communication[s]” wherein Appellant “texts [the 

decedent] and tells him that he had some fire gray that he wanted him to try.” 

Id. at 65. Detective Songer explained that “[g]ray is what is commonly 

referred to as fentanyl ... just based upon the color.” Id. “[I]f it’s higher 

potency or better quality, then it’s referred to as fire.” Id.

Based on this overwhelming evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s 

error in permitting Officer DiPietro to testify as a lay witness regarding the 

meaning of the text messages was harmless. The error was de minimus, 

cumulative of other untainted evidence, and the prejudicial effect of the error 

was insignificant by comparison to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 

____________________________________________

5 The trial court accepted Detective Songer as an expert and Appellant did not 

object. N.T., 1/18/2022, at 62.
J-A02041-23

- 12 -

Furthermore, we note that the trial court instructed the jury to weigh the 

evidence and make its own credibility determinations. See N.T. 11/18/2021, 

at 139-145. We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. See 

Rose, 172 A.3d at 1131 (citation omitted). As such, we discern that Appellant 

is not entitled to relief on his first two issues as presented. 

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Detective 

Songer to testify regarding the distribution of marijuana to an unknown 

individual. Appellant’s Brief at 45-58; see also id. at 53 (“Detective Songer 

was permitted to give an expert opinion that the day prior [to decedent’s 

death], that [Appellant] had picked up a ‘zip’ i.e. ounce of marijuana to give 

to an unknown individual.”). Appellant first contends that the testimony

pertaining to the distribution of marijuana to an unknown individual 

constituted a prior bad act under Pa.R.E. 404(b). Id. Appellant next posits 

that the Commonwealth was required, but failed to, give proper notice that it 

was presenting Rule 404(b) testimony. Id. at 47-50.

The text message at issue stated:

I stopped yesterday. Nobody home. I had some fire gray I 

wanted you to try. I went over tonight for a zip for someone. But 

not getting any more until tomorrow after work. I barely have 

any. I have maybe a 30 for the next 24 hours, and I need a g for 

24 hours, so it’s gonna be a rough one until after work, brother. 

I’m sorry.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/2022, at 6. 
J-A02041-23

- 13 -

As previously stated, we review the admission of evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to 

prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 

person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). We have 

previously determined:

Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose of 

demonstrating a criminal defendant's propensity to commit 

crimes. Nevertheless, evidence may be admissible in certain 

circumstances, where it is relevant for some other legitimate 

purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant's 

character. Specifically, other crimes evidence is admissible if 

offered for a non-propensity purpose, such as proof of an actor's 

knowledge, plan, motive, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident.[6] When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of 

prior crimes is admissible if its probative value outweighs its 

potential for unfair prejudice. 

Unfair prejudice means a tendency to suggest decision on an 

improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty 

of weigh[]ing the evidence impartially.

Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful 

to the defendant. This Court has stated that it is not 

required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts 

from the jury's consideration where those facts are relevant 

to the issues at hand and form part of the history and 

natural development of the events and offenses for which 

the defendant is charged. Moreover, we have upheld the 

admission of other crimes evidence, when relevant, even 

where the details of the other crime were extremely 

grotesque or highly prejudicial.

____________________________________________

6 “Additionally, evidence of prior crimes and bad acts may be admitted where 

the acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of 

the case and were part of its natural development.” Commonwealth v. 

Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing Commonwealth v. 

Powell, 956 A.2d 406 (Pa. 2008).
J-A02041-23

- 14 -

Commonwealth v. Green, 271 A.3d 393, 402 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 329 (Pa. 2022).

Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3), before presenting prior bad act evidence, 

“[i]n criminal cases, the prosecution must provide reasonable written notice 

in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or 

if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, 

permitted use, and use of any such evidence[.]” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). The 

purpose of this rule “is to prevent unfair surprise, and to give the defendant 

reasonable time to prepare an objection to, or ready a rebuttal for, such 

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 404, Comment. Where the Commonwealth has provided 

the defendant with discovery containing evidence of the prior bad acts, the 

defendant has sufficient notice of the proffered evidence prior to trial. See 

Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 126 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing

Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 118, n.2 (Pa. 2001).

On this issue, the trial court determined:

The full text message was shown to the jury to enable the jury to 

fully understand the context of the communication between 

Appellant and the deceased. Any reference to Appellant’s 

providing drugs to a third party was stated in passing as it was 

neither the focus of the message nor the Commonwealth’s 

purpose for introducing this particular message. The 

Commonwealth did not introduce the evidence to prove 

Appellant’s criminal propensity as prohibited by Pa.R.E. 404(b), 

but to establish Appellant communicated about and supplied the 

deceased with drugs. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/2022, at 7. 
J-A02041-23

- 15 -

Upon review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern there 

was no abuse of discretion. Initially, we note that the text message at issue 

was provided during discovery, so we reject Appellant’s contention that he did 

not have proper notice. Next, we observe that the text message at issue 

showed a close relationship between Appellant and the decedent wherein 

Appellant brought a sample of fentanyl to the decedent and did so without 

solicitation. The text message revealed an established association, a motive 

for Appellant to obtain an additional supply of fentanyl to deliver to the 

decedent, and a plan to meet for an exchange. Moreover, Detective Songer 

testified that the subsequent responses to the above cited text message 

revealed that the decedent “was confused about what [drugs] he thought 

[Appellant] had” for sale. N.T., 11/18/2021, at 67. In one response, 

Appellant asked the decedent if he wanted marijuana. See id. at 66 

(“[Appellant] replied back, bud with a question mark. ‘Bud’ would be slang 

for marijuana, for marijuana buds, and he asks [the decedent], you want to, 

with a question mark.”). The decedent responded that he could not smoke 

marijuana. Id. at 66-67. Detective Songer, therefore, interpreted the text 

message at issue to mean that Appellant possessed marijuana available for 

delivery, but did not have enough fentanyl for the decedent and that he would 

not be able to get any more for 24 hours. Id. at 72. Thus, the portion of the 

text relating to the sale of marijuana to an unknown person was part of a 

chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case and was part 

of its natural development. Furthermore, this evidence was not introduced to 
J-A02041-23

- 16 -

show Appellant had a general propensity to sell narcotics. Rather, the 

Commonwealth sought to clarify that the decedent requested, and ultimately 

received fentanyl but not marijuana, from Appellant. The admitted evidence 

was relevant to the question of whether Appellant delivered drugs to the 

decedent which resulted in his death.7 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing 

reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claim on appeal. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2023 

____________________________________________

7

 We note, however, that the jury acquitted Appellant on all charges related 

to the decedent’s death. Thus, it appears that the jurors believed that 

Appellant delivered drugs to the decedent, but were unable to conclude that 

the fatal overdose resulted from that delivery.