IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ROBERT EV ANS MAHLER, 

Defendant. 

AIKEN, District Judge: 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

Case No. 3:16-cr-00105-AA-1 

OPINION AND ORDER 

In February 2016, defendant Robert Evans Mahler was indicted on one count of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l). On December 7, 2017, 

defendant filed a set of four pretrial motions: a motion in limine (doc. 88), a motion for recusal 

(doc. 90), a motion to suppress (doc. 93), and a motion to dismiss for outrageous government 

conduct (doc. 95). The parties appeared for oral argument on those motions on January 16, 

2018; at that hearing, I denied the motion for recusal and continued the hearing on the remaining 

motions to March 12, 2018. Following an evidentiary hearing and additional oral argument, I 

orally denied defendants' motions to suppress and dismiss. I will elaborate on the reasons for 

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that denial in a subsequent opinion and order. This opinion and order addresses only defendant's 

motion in limine. 

The parties reached the following agreements with respect to the issues raised in the 

motion in limine. With respect to "Intemet Search-Article that Defendant Went to Prison" 

(Section II.A.1 of defendant's memo in support of the motion), defendant stipulates to the 

admission of this witness statement so long as the Court offers a limiting instruction that it is not 

offered for the truth of the content of the articles but instead for its effect on the listener, Connie 

Daggett. With respect to "Defendant Wanted To Retrieve Firearms Stored at Mrs. Daggett's 

Residence" (Section II.A.2), defendant withdrew his objection. With respect to evidence that 

defendant is a veteran or has anti-govemment beliefs (Section II.A.3), the govemment stated that 

it does not intend to introduce any evidence regarding military service or defendant's political 

beliefs. With respect to "Witness Speculation" (Section II.A.4), defendant stipulates to 

admission of the evidence so long as it is offered for the purpose of explaining Mrs. Daggett's 

motivation. With respect to "Mrs. Daggett's Further Hearsay" (Section II.A.7), defendant 

withdrew his objection based on the government's promise not to introduce evidence of the 

content of Mrs. Daggett's conversations with her sister-in-law or Special Agent Adam Sully 

through Mrs. Daggett's testimony. With respect to "Mrs. Daggett's Impression of Defendant's 

Jokes And Unrelated Activities" (Section II.A. I 0), defendant withdrew his objection after the 

govemment stated that it would not introduce the challenged evidence. With respect to the 

po1iions of the testimony of Curtis Allen, Jr., regarding arguments or tlu·eats between defendant 

and Mr. Allen (Section II.A.15), the govemment stated that it does not intend to rely on that 

evidence unless defendant introduces it in order to impeach Mr. Allen's credibility. 

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The parties fmiher agreed to reserve a number of evidentiary disputes for trial; whether 

defendant renews those objections will depend on whether the government is able to lay a proper 

foundation. That agreement applies to the following objections: "Speculation As To Type of 

Firearm" (Section II.A.6), "Speculation by Mr. Daggett" (Section II.A.8), "Shooting 

Competitively" (Section II.A.9), "Chase's Cashier's Check and J&G Sales Receipt" (Section 

II.A.11, discussing Defendant's Exhibits 101 and 102), "Defendant's Alleged Handwritten 

Notes" (Section II.A.12, discussing Defendant's Exhibit 103), "Shooting with Kyle" (Section 

II.A. 13), "Statement of Special Agent Adam Sully" (Section II.A.14), and Mr. Allen's testimony 

about gun transactions with defendant (Section II.A.15). 

The parties were unable to resolve two of defendant's objections and requested a ruling 

on each. First, defendant objected to the government's plan to introduce evidence that he owned 

a gun shop and was a member of the NRA (Section II.A.3). The motion in limine is denied as to 

those pieces of evidence. I will allow their introduction as it goes to defendant's knowledge. 

However, I instructed the government to keep evidence on those points limited. 

Second, defendant objected to Connie and William Daggett's testimony that defendant 

agreed to pay a rental fee to store guns and ammunition on their property, but never made 

payment (Section II.A.5). Defendant objected to admission of that testimony, citing Oregon's 

statute of frauds. The statute provides: 

(1) In the following cases the agreement is void unless it, or some note or 

memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed 

by the party to be charged, or by the lawfully authorized agent of the party; 

evidence, therefore, of the agreement shall not be received other than the writing, 

or secondary evidence of its contents in cases prescribed by law: 

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year 

from the making. 

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( e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for 

the sale of real property, or of any interest therein. 

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.580(1 ). Defendant contended that permitting the jury to hear testimony 

about the existence of the oral argument violates the statute's directive that "evidence ... of the 

agreement shall not be received other than the writing[.]" Id. 

That is a creative argument, but I am not persuaded. When deciding the meaning of an 

Oregon statute, courts begin with text and context. Brunnozi v. Cable Comm 'cns, Inc., 851 F.3d 

990, 998 (9th Cir. 2017). A statute's context "includes other provisions of the same statute and 

other related statutes." Portland Gen. Elec. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 

(Or. 1993), superseded on in part other grounds by Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020. Although Oregon's 

statute of frauds is located in the chapter of Oregon law devoted to evidence, it is not grouped 

with the provisions on judicial evidence generally; instead, it is located with laws addressing 

proof of contracts specifically. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 41.560 (making a grant or assignment of any 

existing trust void unless it is in writing); id § 41.570 (providing that a contract by telegraph is a 

contract in writing). That suggests that the rule relates to evidence in lawsuits to enforce 

agreements rather than to legal actions generally. The text of the statute fmiher supports this 

reading: the use of the word "therefore" ties the evidentiary rule to the principle that the oral 

agreement is unenforceable. Finally, it seems plain that the Oregon legislature did not intend the 

statute of frauds to hamstring prosecutors by making evidence of any "off the books" agreement 

inadmissible in a criminal case if the agreement had a duration of longer than a year. 

Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the storage agreement is denied. That 

evidence goes to defendant's knowledge. The government is to keep evidence on the agreement 

limited and targeted to proof of defendant's knowledge. 

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Defendant's Motion in Limine (doc. 88) is DENIED IN PART and RESERVED IN 

PART as set forth in more detail above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this \(J+hday of March 2018. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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