alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Opinion filed April 30, 2019

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-19-00134-CR

___________

EX PARTE JOSEPH WILLIAM WALLACE DECKER

Original Proceeding

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Joseph William Wallace Decker has filed in this court a pro se application for 

writ of habeas corpus. Decker contends that he is being illegally restrained; he

alleges that he has been in custody for 260 days without being indicted or tried. 

Decker requests that the charges against him be dismissed. We have no authority to 

grant Decker’s request. 

This court’s authority to exercise original jurisdiction is limited. See TEX.

CONST. art. V, §§ 5, 6 (providing that Court of Criminal Appeals has the power to 

issue writs of habeas corpus and that intermediate courts of appeals only have

original jurisdiction as prescribed by law); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221 (West 

Supp. 2018) (limited writ powers granted to the courts of appeals). An intermediate 
2

appellate court has no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal law matters. In 

re Spriggs, 528 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, orig. proceeding); Ex 

parte Hawkins, 885 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding). 

Because we have no jurisdiction in this original proceeding, we must dismiss it.

Accordingly, we dismiss this proceeding for want of jurisdiction. 

PER CURIAM

April 30, 2019

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating. 

 1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.
# L_2010072DE.01004602.xml

| 20.3.2010 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 72/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2010

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 72/46

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1024/2009 der Kommission vom 29. Oktober 2009 zur Zulassung bzw. Verweigerung der Zulassung bestimmter gesundheitsbezogener Angaben über Lebensmittel betreffend die Verringerung eines Krankheitsrisikos sowie die Entwicklung und die Gesundheit von Kindern

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 283 vom 30. Oktober 2009
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 283 vom 30. Oktober 2009

Auf Seite 27, in Anhang I Spalte 4 Reihe 3:

anstatt:

„Phosphor wird für ein gesundes Wachstum und eine gesunde Entwicklung der Knochen bei Kindern benötigt.“

muss es heißen:

„Phosphor wird für das normale Wachstum und die normale Entwicklung der Knochen bei Kindern benötigt.“

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<CASH>                                          22,784
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  237,213
<ALLOWANCES>                                    10,109
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          35,597
<DEPRECIATION>                                     303
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 319,314
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           178
<OTHER-SE>                                      35,548
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   319,314
<SALES>                                         58,010
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                91,690
<CGS>                                           53,547
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,335
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                22,718
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              22,006
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,976)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,976)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,976)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.74)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.74)
        

</TABLE>
# INNIDI110

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA PR23-0005

IN RE MOTION OF LISANNE MARCHESE BUTTERFIELD, FORADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE STATE OF MONTANA ORDER

Lisanne Marchese Butterfield has moved for admission to the Bar ofthe State of Montana pursuant to Rule V ofthe Rules for Admission, Admission on Motion. The Bar Admissions Administrator ofthe State Bar of Montana has informed the Court that the Commission on Character and Fitness has certified that Butterfield has provided the necessary documentation and has satisfied the requirements prerequisite to admission on motion underRule V. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that upon payment of any application fees and completion of any other processing requirements as set forth by the Bar Admissions Administrator, Lisanne Marchese Butterfield may be sworn in to the practice oflaw in the State ofMontana. Arrangements for swearing in may be made by contactingthe office of the Clerk ofthe Montana Supreme Court. The Clerk is directed to provide copies ofthis order to Petitioner and to the State Bar ofMontana. `r_1 :7 , DATED this t) day ofOctober, 2023. 

# FILED OCT 10 2023 Bowen Greenw000 Clerk of Supreme Court Stato of AAontane ChiefJustice 10/10/2023

Case Number: PR 23-0005‘94 1:4ajL
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Lee Smith, Appellant.

The sentences imposed were not excessive *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816). The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in denying youthful offender treatment *(see, People v Jordan,*115 AD2d 622). Thompson, J. P., Niehoff, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 6393** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. ZSA ZSA COUNCIL, a/k/a Toochie , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. James R. Spencer , District Judge. ( 3:09

- cr - 00378

- JRS

- 1; 3:11

- cv - 00377

- JRS )

Submitted : July 12, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, an d WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Zsa Zsa Council, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Mastandrea

- Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Zsa Zsa Council seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on h er 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (B) (200 6 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (200 6 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner sati sfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 ( 2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U .S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Council has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and lega l3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### COSGROVE et al., Respondents, v. BROOKLYN EL. R. CO. et al., Appellants.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 20, 1896.)

Action by Mary Cosgrove and others against the Brooklyn Elevated Railroad Company and the Union Elevated Railroad Company.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Cruz, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 881]

— Appeal by the de*873fendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowling, J.), rendered March 23, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence is granted, and a new trial is ordered.

For the reasons stated in our decision on the codefendant’s appeal (see *People v Vargas,*89 AD3d 771 [2011]), that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence should have been granted. Contrary to the People’s contention, the error in admitting the physical evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see *People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]). Rivera, J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 14.(a).4







CONSENT









I hereby consent to the inclusion of the summary
of my appraisal of Alon Holdings Blue Square's investment property under the captions “Summary of Significant Accounting
Policies” (note 2f) and “Investment Property” (note 8) in the consolidated financial statements of Alon Holdings
Blue Square-Israel Ltd. contained in the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Alon Holdings Blue Square-Israel Ltd. for the year ended
December 31, 2011, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.





|Tel Aviv, Israel | /s/ Barak,
        Friedman Cohen & Co.
|---------------- | ---------------------------------------
|April 29, 2012   | Barak, Friedman Cohen & Co.            
|                 | Economic & Real Estate Appraisal
# EUR-Lex - 52006AP0397 - EN

Important legal notice

*|*

# 52006AP0397

**European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on certain aspects of air services (COM(2005)0264 - C6-0224/2005 - 2005/0112(CNS)) **

*
Official Journal 308 E , 16/12/2006 P. 0082 - 0082 *

P6_TA(2006)0397

Agreement between the EC and Australia on certain aspects of air services *

European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Community and Australia on certain aspects of air services (COM(2005)0264 — C6-0224/2005 — 2005/0112(CNS))

(Consultation procedure)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the proposal for a Council decision (COM(2005)0264) [1],

- having regard to Articles 80(2) and 300(2), first subparagraph, of the EC Treaty,

- having regard to Article 300(3), first subparagraph, of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C6-0224/2005),

- having regard to Rules 51 and 83(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport and Tourism (A6-0293/2006),

1. Approves conclusion of the agreement;

2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and Australia.

[1] Not yet published in OJ.

--------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 14.(a).1







CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM







We hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-149175) of Alon Holdings Blue Square-Israel Ltd. (the "Company”),
of our report dated April 30, 2012, relating to the financial statements of the Company and the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting, which appears in this Form- 20F.







|Haifa, Israel  | /s/ Kesselman
        & Kesselman                               
|-------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------
|April 30, 2012 | Kesselman & Kesselman                                           
|               | Certified Public Accountants (Isr.)                             
|               | A member of PricewaterhouseCoopers
        International Limited
|               |
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

ALISHA L. PRICE
, Appellant,

v.

REZA TORKAMAN
, Appellee.

No. 4D 2 0 2 3

- 1872

[ April 24, 2024 ]

Appeal from the C ounty Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.

Lucie County; Edmond Alonzo

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2023CC002019

.

Alisha L. Price, Fort Pierce, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Tenant appeals the trial court’s final judgment of eviction. After Tenant failed to make a required monthly payment, Landlord issued a notice invoking the provisions of section 83.56(3), Florida Statutes (20 2 3), informing Tenant of the lease termination due to non

- payment. The notice provided a three

- day period for Tenant to settle the outstanding rent. After Tenant failed to settle the outstanding rent, Landlord filed a complaint seeking to evict Tenant.

Three days after service of the summons and complaint, Tenant composed a handwritten letter articul ating her reasons for withholding rent. The following day, Tenant deposited the total rent amount and court fees into the court registry. One hour later, the court entered a final judgment of eviction and order to disburse the funds held in the court

reg istry.

The controlling statute allows a tenant to assert defenses to an eviction action and, if defenses are asserted, requires the tenant to pay the amount of rent at issue into the registry of the court. § 83.60(2), Fla. Stat. (20 2 3). In this case, Te nant timely filed the defenses and deposited the funds into the registry of the court. Yet the court entered final judgment without2 affording Tenant an opportunity to present those defenses, and thus erred. On remand, the court must afford Tenant that op portunity.

Reversed and remanded

.

L EVINE
, K UNTZ and A RTAU

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Motions Granted and Order filed September 28, 2017 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-16-00113-CV

____________

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF CARRIE HOLLOMAN 

SLAGLE AND ALAN PAUL SLAGLE

On Appeal from the 300th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 76596-F

ORDER

After we struck his original and amended brief in early August, appellant Alan 

Paul Slagle timely filed a redrawn brief (which he calls his “Second AMENDED 

brief”) on August 22. 

On September 11, 2017, appellant filed a motion to amend the brief along 

with his proposed amended brief, which he calls his “Second AMENDED August 

22nd, 2017 Brief” brief. He offers this explanation in his motion for why he should 

be permitted to amend the brief:

The Court should allow appellant to amend his brief because his 
2

amendment does not present new points of error and only adds more 

case facts and more citations to the record that he did not have time to 

provide in the brief time window given for August 22nd brief. The 

amendment also adds citations to the supplemental clerk’s record that 

was not filed until after his August 22nd submission. The amendment 

also provides appendices to present the final decree of divorce and the 

statutes cited within the brief that appellant was not aware was required 

until after his August 22nd submission.

No response to that motion has been received.

On September 20, 2017, appellant filed a second motion to amend his brief as 

well as his proposed brief (which, like the September 11 brief, he calls his “Second 

AMENDED August 22nd, 2017 Brief”). He writes in his motion:

At the time of his submission, he did not have access to the text of Fam. 

Code §3.003 for inclusion in his Appendix B – Statutes and Local 

Rules.

. . . 

No prejudice will result to appellee if the Court permits this 

amendment. Appellant’s amendment only supplements Appendix B 

with a missing statute. No new points of error and no new arguments 

are presented. The word count of this amended brief is the same as his 

brief submitted on Sept. 10th.

Appellee’s was due on September 21, 2017. On that day, she filed a motion 

for a 60-day extension to file her brief, which this court granted. Appellee’s motion 

for extension did not mention appellant’s motions to amend.

“A brief may be amended or supplemented whenever justice requires, on 

whatever reasonable terms the court may prescribe.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.7. 

Accordingly, we order as follows:

1. Appellant’s September 11, 2017 motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

2. Appellant’s September 20, 2017 motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.
3

3. The brief filed September 20, 2017 will be considered the brief of 

appellant. 

4. No further amendments by appellant will be permitted. Any motion 

for leave to amend appellant’s brief will be denied. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Busby, and Donovan.
<PAGE>   1

                           NATIONAL PROCESSING, INC.
         Exhibit 11.1 -STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                              Year Ended December 31
                                             -----------------------
                                             1996      1995      1994
                                             ----      ----      ----
                                        (In Thousands, expect per share data)
<S>                                         <C>       <C>       <C>   
PRIMARY
-------
Average shares outstanding                  46,090    43,100    43,100

Net effect of dilutive stock options--
based on the treasury stock method
using average market price                      60         0         0
                                                --         -         -
Total                                       46,150    43,100    43,100
                                            ======    ======    ======
Net income                                 $31,353   $25,806   $19,256
                                           =======   =======   =======
Per share amount                           $  0.68   $  0.60   $  0.45
                                           =======   =======   =======


FULLY DILUTED
-------------
Average shares outstanding                  46,090    43,100    43,100

Net effect of dilutive stock options--
based on the treasury stock method using
the year-end market price,
if higher than average market price             60         0         0
                                                --         -         -
Total                                       46,150    43,100    43,100
                                           =======   =======   =======
Net income                                 $31,353   $25,806   $19,256
                                           =======   =======   =======
Per share amount                           $  0.68   $  0.60   $  0.45
                                           =======   =======   =======
</TABLE>
#### NEWMAN et al. v. WILSON et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

May 14, 1894.)

Appeal—Weight op Evidence.

A verdict rendered on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.

Appeal from circuit court, Bangs county.

Action by Simon Newman and others against John 0. Wilson and another. There was an affirmative judgment in favor of defendants on a counterclaim, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.

Benjamin Patterson and George Bell, for appellants.

Byram L. Winters, for respondents.

PRATT, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a new trial. There seems to have been no exception taken, however, to the denial of the motion for a new trial; but that is immaterial, as there was no merit in the motion, and we should affirm the order even if there had been an exception. The action was for the price of vinegar sold and delivered to the defendants, which they used in their business, and the jury allowed the plaintiffs the price of it in this verdict. The defendants set up a counterclaim for damages for a breach of warranty, Avhich was sustained by the jury, and judgment was thereafter rendered in favor of the defendants. The evidence was conflicting, and the charge was fair, clear, and unexceptionable, and, under such circumstances, the verdict is conclusive. There is nothing in the case to show that the verdict was not an intelligent and honest exercise of judgment upon all the facts and circumstances of the case.

The appellants complain of the amount of the verdict, in that defendants are given double damages. The answer to that is that such is not the fact'. With the plaintiffs’ consent the judge made a list of the items of the defendants’ claim for damages, and gave it to the jury as they went out to deliberate upon their verdict, and they returned a verdict for a sum less than that claimed by the defendants. If the list was incorrect, or if it contained any claim which ought not to have been submitted to the jury, the appellants should have had it corrected, or taken an exception.

As to the warranty and the ride of damages, the judge charged according to well-settled rules of law, to which no exception was taken. Judgment affirmed, with costs.