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Filed 8/23/16 In re Jennifer R. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re JENNIFER R., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

C080381

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV136875)

In this Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 proceeding, the juvenile court 

made a finding that the minor, Jennifer R., was competent to proceed with delinquency 

proceedings within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 (unless 

otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions 
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Code). The minor contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s 

finding. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The minor, then 12 years old, punched her mother M.H. in the lip causing injury, 

threw a glass dinner plate at her eight-year-old sister, hitting her in the back, and 

punched, scratched, and bit her 11-year-old sister. The minor also threatened to kill her 

sisters (Y.G. and C.R.), kill the police when they arrived, and behead all Americans. 

A delinquency petition (§ 602, subd. (a)) filed February 3, 2015, alleged the minor 

threatened to commit a crime resulting in death and great bodily injury to M.H., Y.G., 

and C.R. (Pen. Code, § 422--count one), assault on Y.G. by means of force likely to 

produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)--count two), misdemeanor use 

of force and violence on M.H. (Pen. Code, § 242--count three), misdemeanor use of force 

and violence on C.R. and Y.G. (Pen. Code, § 242--count four), and misdemeanor 

vandalism of real and personal property belonging to M.H. in the amount of $400 or less 

(Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)--count five). 

Minor’s counsel declared a doubt as to the minor’s competency to stand trial. The 

juvenile court suspended proceedings, ordered an evaluation by a licensed psychologist 

or psychiatrist, and appointed Dr. Frank D. Weber, a psychologist, to complete the 

evaluation and submit a report. The minor was subsequently placed on home supervision 

and released to her mother’s care and custody. 

One month later, the probation department filed a motion to modify the minor’s 

custody status alleging the minor violated the terms of home supervision by getting 

suspended from school for fighting and leaving home for unauthorized reasons. 

Following a detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered the minor detained. 
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Dr. Weber conducted an evaluation of the minor and submitted his report 

concluding the minor was incompetent to stand trial. Minor’s counsel objected to the 

doctor’s conclusion and the matter was set for a contested hearing. 

June 26, 2015, Contested Competency Hearing

On June 26, 2015, the juvenile court conducted a contested competency hearing. 

Dr. Weber, whom the parties stipulated to be a qualified expert, testified regarding his 

testing and interviewing of the minor. Dr. Weber opined that the minor did not have an 

intellectual disability or learning disorder and had “a good factual understanding of the 

court proceedings [and] the participants.” He determined the minor’s functioning was 

significantly impacted by her Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), as evidenced by the 

minor’s school discipline records showing 45 disciplinary infractions in one year, the 

minor’s mother’s report of “significant behavior problems at school,” and minor’s 

counsel’s reports that the minor argues with counsel. 

Dr. Weber further opined that, based on the minor’s history and information 

provided by the minor’s mother, the minor also suffered from Disruptive Mood 

Dysregulation Disorder (DMDD), which is found in children who “have severe and 

frequent temper tantrums that interfere with their ability to function at home, in school or 

with their friends” and “are usually irritable or angry.” Dr. Weber opined that the 

combined effect of ODD and DMDD makes both conditions worse. 

Dr. Weber also diagnosed the minor with Cannabis Use Disorder, noting the 

minor’s frequent use of marijuana at 12 years old “with no plans to stop” factored into his 

evaluation. 

In concluding the minor was developmentally immature, Dr. Weber considered the 

minor’s “underestimation of risk,” as evidenced by her “marijuana use despite 

consequences,” the fact that she was arguing with her lawyer, her behavioral problems at 

school without caring about the consequences, and her statement that she “would never 
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plead guilty because sometimes they [district attorneys] lie to you.” He noted that, when 

he asked the minor, “what if the [plea] deal was really good,” she said, “Fuck it. I’m not 

pleading guilty.” He also noted the minor had a poor capacity for self-management, as 

evidenced by her behavioral problems, impulsivity, and “poor emotional regulation,” as 

well as her mother’s statements regarding bad behavior at home and her school discipline 

records. 

Dr. Weber concluded the minor was not competent to stand trial based, in large 

part, on her developmental immaturity, which hindered her ability to assist in her own 

defense, as well as her diagnoses of ODD and DMDD. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Weber acknowledged that he spent one and one-half 

hours with the minor, during which she was pleasant, not angry or violent, fully 

cooperative, and very talkative and engaging. The minor gave accurate answers to Dr. 

Weber’s tests, maintained good eye contact and a positive mood, was “nicely groomed,” 

and was articulate. She knew the exact date, could identify the President of the United 

States, the capitols of California and the United States. The minor’s affect was positive, 

and her short- and long-term memory appeared to be fully intact. She was able to count 

backwards from 20 to 1, say the alphabet without error, spell the word “world” 

backwards without problem, and sit down for the entire evaluation with only minimal 

fidgeting. Dr. Weber told the minor three words and periodically asked her to recall 

them, which she was able to do immediately and five minutes later. She was able to 

problem solve and correctly explain the meaning of the proverb, “Don’t judge a book by 

its cover,” demonstrating to Dr. Weber that she “had an understanding of at least simple 

abstract reasoning.” The minor was able to articulate information about her family, her 

family background, and her school background, although some of the information was 

inconsistent with other information provided to Dr. Weber. 

Dr. Weber testified that the minor was truthful in telling him that she attended 

continuation school and had engaged in “poor behavior,” was truant, and had been 
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expelled from school in the sixth grade. She was also truthful about the discord in her 

family relationships, stating that her relationship with her mother was “horrible.” She 

told Dr. Weber, “We’re the same so we fight a lot.” She also told Dr. Weber that her 

stepfather “pisses me off.” The minor was open with Dr. Weber about her use of 

marijuana and did not try to minimize or downplay it. 

Dr. Weber’s intellectual function tests revealed the minor had an average IQ, an 

adequate level of intellectual functioning, no intellectual disability, and no learning 

disabilities. Dr. Weber stated the minor did very well in her mental competence 

interview and was “probably above average” as compared to other similarly-aged 

children he has evaluated in the past. He felt the minor “did well and gave accurate 

answers on a vast majority of items.” 

With regard to the minor’s statements regarding plea bargains, Dr. Weber 

acknowledged the minor understood the concept of “getting potentially less penalty in 

return for a guilty plea after one teaching trial,” “appreciated the risk involved,” and 

“appreciate[d] the nature of a trade-off.” 

Dr. Weber admitted that it was “a close call” for him in finding the minor was not 

competent to stand trial. What ultimately swayed him to find the minor was 

developmentally immature was “the social/emotional piece and the extent of her behavior 

problems at home and school.” 

On redirect, Dr. Weber reiterated that his opinion was based on a number of 

factors in addition to the hour and a half spent with the minor. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, following closing argument by counsel, the 

juvenile court concluded the minor was competent to stand trial and reinstated 

delinquency proceedings. 
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Plea and Disposition

On August 21, 2015, the minor admitted counts three, four, and five, with a 

maximum confinement time of 16 months. Counts one and two were dismissed. The 

parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. The juvenile court found the minor came 

within the provisions of section 602 and ordered her to serve 175 days in juvenile hall 

with credit for 175 days, and 29 days of home supervision with credit for that time as 

well. The court further ordered the minor to serve 30 days of electronic monitoring. 

On September 30, 2015, the minor filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

The minor contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s 

finding she was competent to proceed with delinquency proceedings within the meaning 

of section 709. 

Juvenile competency proceedings are governed by section 709, which provides 

that “[a] minor is incompetent to proceed if he or she lacks sufficient present ability to 

consult with counsel and assist in preparing his or her defense with a reasonable degree 

of rational understanding, or lacks a rational as well as factual understanding, of the 

nature of the charges or proceedings against him or her.” (§ 709, subd. (a).) The statute 

further provides, “If the court finds substantial evidence raises a doubt as to the minor’s 

competency, the proceedings shall be suspended.” (Ibid.)

A minor is presumed competent to undergo a wardship proceeding. A party 

claiming otherwise bears the burden of proving incompetency by a preponderance of the 

evidence. (In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 196, 200 (R.V.).)

The question of the minor’s competency is determined at a hearing. “The court 

shall appoint an expert to evaluate whether the minor suffers from a mental disorder, 

developmental disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, 

whether the condition or conditions impair the minor’s competency. The expert shall 
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have expertise in child and adolescent development, and training in the forensic 

evaluation of juveniles, and shall be familiar with competency standards and accepted 

criteria used in evaluating competence.” (§ 709, subd. (b).)

“ ‘If the minor is found to be incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence,’ the 

proceedings remain suspended for a reasonable period of time until it can be determined 

whether there is a substantial probability that the minor will attain competency in the 

foreseeable future while the court still retains jurisdiction. (§ 709, subd. (c).) If, on the 

other hand, ‘the minor is found to be competent, the court may proceed commensurate 

with the court’s jurisdiction.’ (§ 709, subd. (d).)” (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 191-

192.)

An appellate court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the juvenile court’s determination in a competency proceeding under 

section 709 by applying the deferential substantial evidence test. (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th 

at pp. 198-199.) The appellate court “defers to the juvenile court and therefore views the 

record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination.” (Id. at p. 200.) 

In cases such as this, the evidence of incompetency generally consists of the 

opinion of a qualified expert and the materials on which that expert relied. (R.V., supra, 

61 Cal.4th at p. 201.) As the Supreme Court noted in R.V., “Even if the prosecution 

presents no evidence of competency, a juvenile court can properly determine that the 

minor is competent by reasonably rejecting the expert’s opinion. This court has long 

observed that ‘ “[t]he chief value of an expert’s testimony in this field, as in all other 

fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by 

which he progresses from his material to his conclusion.” ’ [Citation.] In a case such as 

this one, therefore, the inquiry on appeal is whether the weight and character of the 

evidence of incompetency was such that the juvenile court could not reasonably reject it. 

[Citation.]” (R.V., at pp. 200-201.)
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The minor claims her case is analogous to R.V. and urges us to follow the Supreme 

Court’s lead and reverse the juvenile court’s judgment. As we will explain, R.V. is 

distinguishable and we therefore decline to do so.

In R.V., the minor became angry and started throwing and kicking things after 

being awakened for school. The minor pulled a knife on several members of the 

household, threatening to kill one if the police were called. (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 186.) Once police arrived, the minor became compliant and told officers the knife was 

in his front pocket, explaining he “was upset and trying to scare his mother” and “had 

trouble with his parents.” One officer’s report noted the minor appeared to be having a 

difficult time understanding questions and “seemed confused about the incident.” (In re 

R.V., at p. 187.) Officers spoke with several witnesses, including landlord Javier 

Naranjo, who saw the minor stab a bed three times and was threatened with death when 

he attempted to calm the minor down. (Id. at pp. 186-187.) Each witness reported to 

police that the minor “had psychological problems” and had not taken his medication, 

Abilify, for the past four weeks. One witness told police the minor was “different every 

day” and “with each episode he gets worse.” (Id. at p. 187.) 

The minor’s counsel expressed doubts as to the minor’s competency and the 

juvenile court suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings, ordered an evaluation, 

appointed Haig J. Kojian, Ph.D., to conduct the evaluation, and released the minor to 

home supervision. Ten days later, the minor was returned to juvenile detention for 

violating the conditions of his release. (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 187.) 

Dr. Kojian’s evaluation of the minor included a clinical interview, telephone 

conversations with the minor’s mother, and review of the minor’s school records, and the 

detention reports prepared by the responding officers. (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 203.) 

According to Dr. Kojian’s report, the “minor’s presentation appeared impaired and there 

was evidence of an altered thought process,” his “speech and movements were slow and 

deliberate, and his gait was rigid,” his “affect appeared incongruent with thought 
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content,” he said several times that he “was confused” and “repeatedly changed his 

response to questions,” and he stated he was depressed. (Id. at p. 204.) The minor 

refused Dr. Kojian’s request to conduct psychological tests, but responded appropriately 

to an abbreviated version of a test to rule out malingering. (Ibid.) He gave 

“unconvincing” responses to self-history questions and contradicted information in his 

school records. He also told Dr. Kojian several times during the interview that he was 

“ ‘confused right now,’ ” and gave nonsensical responses when asked to elaborate. 

(Ibid.) 

The minor’s mother informed Dr. Kojian that the minor had been diagnosed with 

“ ‘mental problems’ ” despite having met developmental milestones on a timely basis. 

(R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 204.) Dr. Kojian noted the minor’s response to questions 

suggested the minor “ ‘was confused and didn’t know what was going on.’ ” (Ibid.) The 

minor was aware he had been detained, but seemed confused about the reasons for his 

detention. (Id. at pp. 204-205.) He was able to accurately describe certain aspects of the 

legal proceedings but was confused or ignorant about others. He was confused about 

whether or not he had an attorney; he did not know his attorney’s name; and he did not 

understand the function and duty of his attorney, the prosecutor, or the judge. He was 

under the impression that the question of guilt was dependent upon whether or not he 

attended school, and was confused about the charges against him. (Id. at p. 205.) 

Dr. Kojian concluded the minor was not competent to stand trial, finding the minor was 

“impaired” due to the fact that the minor was “ ‘clearly suffering from depression’ ” and 

his “thinking and cognitive functioning was ‘clearly disrupted.’ ” (Id. at p. 206.) 

Dr. Kojian believed the minor’s impairment was organic rather than developmental and 

that the minor could be in the early stages of schizophrenia or another psychotic disease 

or could be using more or different drugs than reported. (Ibid.) 

At a subsequent hearing to address the prosecution’s concern that Dr. Kojian had 

not administered any diagnostic tests, Dr. Kojian provided an explanation for the basis 
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for his conclusion of incompetence that was consistent with his written report. (R.V., 

supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 187, 206-207.) The juvenile court found the minor had not met 

his burden of proof and found the minor competent to stand trial. (Id. at pp. 187-188, 

210.) Thereafter, the minor entered a plea submitting the matter to the juvenile court 

based on the police report, and the court found the allegations in the wardship petition 

true. (Id. at p. 188.)

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 188.) 

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding the juvenile court could not reasonably have 

rejected Dr. Kojian’s opinion that the minor was incompetent to stand trial. (Id. at 

pp. 186, 211.) The court noted the materials upon which Dr. Kojian based his opinion 

could not reasonably be called into question, nor did the record suggest Dr. Kojian’s 

evaluation overlooked a significant indicator of competency or focused on an incorrect 

competency standard. (Id. at pp. 211-212.) The court further noted Dr. Kojian 

“expressed little reservation regarding his opinion that [the] minor was incompetent.” 

(Id. at p. 212.) The court rejected the People’s claim that Dr. Kojian’s inability to 

administer standardized tests for malingering somehow undermined his opinion, and 

pointed out that “most of [the] minor’s answers to Dr. Kojian’s questions reflected 

ignorance of, or confusion regarding, many of the significant features of a juvenile 

adjudication,” including the functions of the attorneys, the differences between a trial and 

a plea bargain, and the types of decisions made by the judge. The minor also 

misunderstood the meaning of a criminal charge and “exhibited no awareness of the most 

important facts underlying the charges, namely, that he allegedly had threatened family 

members with a knife.” (Id. at pp. 212-213.) The Supreme Court concluded the juvenile 

court could not reasonably have rejected Dr. Kojian’s opinion that the minor was not 

competent to stand trial. (Id. at p. 217.)

While the procedural posture and some of the facts in R.V. bear some resemblance 

to those before us, there are key differences which call for a different result here. That is, 
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that the juvenile court could reasonably reject Dr. Weber’s opinion that the minor was not 

competent to stand trial and instead find her competent.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination, the 

evidence showed that, unlike the minor in R.V. who appeared impaired, had an altered 

thought process, and was confused and repeatedly changed his responses to questions by 

the evaluating doctor (R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 204), the minor here was talkative and 

engaging, had good eye contact, and “was articulate for her age” during Dr. Weber’s hour 

and a half long clinical interview. She was able to pass simple tests, such as counting 

backwards from 20 to 1 and saying the alphabet without error, and was able to identify 

the date, the President of the United States, and the capitals of California and the United 

States, although not the Governor of California. When presented with a simple 

situational problem, she was able to understand an appropriate solution for the problem. 

She was also able to demonstrate an “adequate ability to engage in simple abstract 

thinking” when asked to explain the meaning of a simple proverb. She was not suffering 

from hallucinations or suicidal or homicidal ideation, was truthful and forthcoming about 

her behavioral problems, both in and out of school, and did not try to minimize or 

downplay her marijuana use. 

Whereas the minor in R.V. had been diagnosed with mental problems, was 

possibly in the early stages of schizophrenia or some other psychotic disease, and 

behaved in a manner that suggested impaired cognitive functioning (R.V., supra, 

61 Cal.4th at pp. 204-207), the minor here had an average IQ, an adequate level of 

intellectual functioning, no intellectual disability, and no learning disabilities. She tested 

average in word reading and below average in sentence comprehension and, according to 

Dr. Weber, did very well in her mental competence interview, giving accurate answers 

most of the time. 

While Dr. Weber based his incompetency finding in large part on the minor’s 

developmental immaturity and her diagnoses of ODD and DMDD which, in his opinion, 
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hindered her ability to assist in her own defense, both his report and testimony confirmed 

that, unlike R.V., the minor here understood the charges against her and appreciated the

degree of seriousness associated with those charges; she understood what happens in a 

juvenile court trial and appreciated the essential differences between a court trial and 

simply being told by the school principal that she did something wrong; she was able to 

understand and appreciate the meaning and consequence of entering a guilty plea, and the 

roles of the prosecutor, defense lawyer, probation officer, and juvenile court judge; and 

she understood and appreciated her defense attorney, his role in defending her, and her 

role in helping her lawyer defend her. Indeed, the minor told Dr. Weber she understood 

her attorney was “there to help her and . . . she would help her attorney because he is on 

her side.” 

Dr. Weber also noted he considered the minor’s “oppositional attitude,” evidenced 

by her statement that she would “never plead guilty” and responded, “Fuck it. I’m not 

pleading guilty,” when asked what she would do if “the deal was really good.” Although 

perhaps oppositional, the minor’s comments do not necessarily indicate her inability to 

assist in her own defense. As stated in Dr. Weber’s report, the minor did not initially 

understand plea bargains but, after just one teaching trial, quickly learned and understood 

the concept of “getting potentially less penalty in return for a guilty plea,” “appreciate[d]

the risk involved,” and “appreciate[d] the nature of a trade-off.” 

Further, as noted by the juvenile court, the minor got along well with Dr. Weber 

and gave him “her complete cooperation” and, while she “may [have elected] not to 

cooperate,” it was not “out of her control or impossible for her to do.” 

In sum, while the minor clearly had behavioral problems, impulsivity, and 

“oppositionality,” all of which formed the basis of Dr. Weber’s opinion that she suffered 

from ODD, DMDD, and Cannabis Use Disorder, there is substantial evidence that, unlike 

the minor in R.V., she was not hampered by any intellectual disability or learning 

disorder, had an average IQ and an “adequate level of intellectual functions,” understood 
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and appreciated the juvenile delinquency process, and was willing and able to and did 

cooperate in that process when she elected to do so. Based on that evidence, there was a 

reasonable basis for the juvenile court to reject Dr. Weber’s finding that the minor was 

incapable of assisting in her own defense and conclude the minor was competent to stand 

trial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 HULL , Acting P. J.

We concur:

 MAURO , J.

 MURRAY , J.