IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

STEPHEN GLENN RAMSEY, 

Case No. 2:16-cv-00686-SI 

Petitioner, 

OPINION AND ORDER 

v. 

JERI TAYLOR, 

Respondent. 

Anthony D. Bornstein 

Assistant Federal Public Defender 

101 S.W. Main Street, Suite 1700 

Portland, Oregon 97204 

Attorney for Petitioner 

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General 

Samuel A. Kubernick, Assistant Attorney General 

Department of Justice 

1162 Court Street NE 

Salem, Oregon 97310 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 
SIMON, District Judge. 

Petitioner brings this 

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging 

habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 

the legality of his state-court 

convictions for Sexual Abuse. For the reasons that follow, the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is denied. 

BACKGROUND 

Petitioner and his girlfriend, Lynne Schreiber, lived 

together for approximately eight years. The couple lived with 

their natural son, Alec, as well as Schreiber' s two daughters 

from a previous relationship, ES and KS. The couple separated in 

July 2006, with Petitioner living in an apartment a half mile 

from Schreiber and the children. Petitioner retained visitation 

rights with his son, and Alec would frequently visit Petitioner 

at his new apartment. 

Alec developed a friendship with a 12-year-old girl in 

Schreiber's apartment complex, KW. On several occasions, KW 

visited with Alec at Petitioner's apartment where the trio would 

eat dinner and watch a movie. On the last such visit, Petitioner 

hugged KW, kissed her ear, licked her earlobes, and kissed her 

neck and shoulders. 

touched her genital 

inner thighs. 

He touched her breasts over her clothing, 

area under her clothing, and touched her 

When KW returned home from Petitioner's apartment, her 

wrong and questioned her 

Petitioner had touched her 

mother could tell something was 

daughter. KW told her mother that 

inappropriately, but asked her not to call the police. KW's 

mother did not contact the police, and instead left Petitioner a 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 
message instructing Petitioner to leave KW alone. Ultimately, 

however, law enforcement personnel were alerted to the abuse. 

When a police detective and a Department of Human Services 

caseworker notified Schreiber of KW's allegations, Schreiber was 

dismissive. Schreiber' s reluctance to believe KW' s allegations 

angered ES because she, herself, had been a victim of 

Petitioner's sexual abuse in the past (but had not yet disclosed 

the abuse). This prompted ES to leave her mother a note telling 

her that KW was likely being truthful because Petitioner had 

abused ES when she was younger. The investigation expanded, and 

when authorities questioned KS, she revealed that Petitioner had 

sexually abused her as well. 

The Washington County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on 

three counts of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree as to KW (Counts 

1-3 occurring in 2008), one count of Sexual Abuse in the First 

Degree as to ES (Count 4 occurring between 1996 and 1998), and 

one count of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree as to KS (Count 5 

occurring between 1999 and 2000). Respondent's Exhibit 102. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial where the defense 

reasoned that ES and KS harbored animosity against Petitioner 

because he had been a harsh disciplinarian during the years they 

lived together. Petitioner testified that he also angered KW when 

he became upset with her for refusing to allow Alec to sit in the 

front seat of his car for the trip back to Schreiber's apartment 

complex. He therefore theorized that all three girls held grudges 

against him that would cause them to fabricate their stories of 

abuse. 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 
During the trial, a question arose as to whether KS had made 

a prior out-of-court statement denying that Petitioner had 

sexually abused her. Kristin Griffey, a childhood friend of 

Schreiber's, had taken Schreiber and her children into her home 

for about two months during a particularly volatile time in 

Petitioner's and Schreiber' s relationship . 1 While KS lived in 

Griffey' s home, Griffey became concerned about KS because she 

witnessed changes that led her to believe KS might have been 

sexually abused. She observed that KS "became very just 

sexualized" and "just became a completely different person. Her 

persona was completely changed." Trial Transcript, p. 519. KS 

went from someone who "would wear cute appropriate, age 

appropriate clothing, to somebody who absolutely changed looking 

like what I would consider a street person or a streetwalker type 

of person." Id. 

In an offer of proof, Griffey testified that she asked KS if 

she had ever been abused, careful to avoid asking a leading 

question as to "sexual" abuse so as not to lead to a false 

accusation. KS simply responded, "No." The trial court refused to 

allow the testimony because: ( 1) the question Griffey asked was 

"very vague" and pertained to generic abuse, not sexual abuse, 

and KS could have interpreted it in the context of domestic 

violence; and (2) KS's statement amounted to inadmissible hearsay 

because it was not inconsistent with her prior testimony. Id at 

533-34. 

1 During that time, Petitioner and Schreiber had been living together, but 

experienced issues with domestic violence stemming from drug and alcohol 

abuse. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 
The jury convicted Petitioner on all Counts, and the trial 

court sentenced him to 150 months in prison. Respondent's Exhibit 

101. Petitioner took a direct appeal raising state-law issues not 

relevant to this habeas corpus case. The Oregon Court of Appeals 

affirmed the trial court's decision without opinion, and the 

Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Ramsey, 245 Or. App. 

165, 259 P.3d 115, rev. denied, 351 Or. 403, 271 P.3d 115 (2011). 

Petitioner next filed for post-conviction relief 

Umatilla County. Among his claims, he alleged that 

( "PCR") in 

his trial 

attorney had been ineffective for failing to argue that KS' s 

denial of abuse was, in fact, admissible because it amounted to a 

prior inconsistent· statement with respect to her testimony that 

Petitioner abused her. The PCR court agreed and remanded the case 

for a new trial only as to Count 5 (Sex Abuse I as to KS) . 

Respondent's Exhibit 137, pp. 2-3. The PCR court otherwise denied 

relief on Petitioner's claims. 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that trial counsel's deficient 

performance infected his entire trial with prejudice such that 

the PCR court should have vacated all of his convictions. 

Respondent's Exhibit 142, p. 8. The State argued that such an 

argument was unpreserved where Petitioner failed to raise it to 

the PCR court, and also argued that the claim lacked merit. The 

Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the PCR court's decision without 

issuing a written opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied 

review. Ramsey v. Taylor, 275 Or. App. 577, 366 P.3d 847 (2015), 

rev. denied, 359 Or. 523, 379 P.3d 516 (2016). 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Pe ti ti oner filed this federal habeas corpus case on April 

20, 2016. In his supporting memorandum, Petitioner argues that: 

(1) trial counsel's error with respect to KS's prior inconsistent 

statement infected his entire trial with prejudice such that the 

PCR court erred when it limited its relief only as to Count 5 of 

the Indictment; and (2) counsel did not adequately question KW as 

to the incidents alleged in the Indictment pertaining to 

Petitioner's contact with her. Respondent asks the Court to deny 

relief on the Petition because: (1) Petitioner has not sustained 

his burden of proof as to his unargued claims; ( 2) Petitioner 

failed to fairly present either of his argued claims to Oregon's 

state courts, and he cannot excuse the resulting procedural 

default; and (3) Petitioner's claims lack merit. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be 

granted unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted 

in a decision that was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or ( 2) 

"based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). A state court's findings of fact are presumed correct, 

and Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of 

correctness by 

§ 2254 (e) (1). 

clear and 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

convincing evidence. 28 u.s.c. 
A state court decision is "contrary to 

established precedent if the state court applies 

clearly 

a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] 

cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are 

materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] 

precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). 

Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas 

court may grant relief "if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions 

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner's case." Id at 413. The "unreasonable application" 

clause requires the state court decision to be more than 

incorrect or erroneous. Id at 410. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

"preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no 

possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state 

court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court's precedents. 

It goes no farther." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 

(2011). 

When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but 

provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, the federal 

habeas court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court clearly erred in its 

application of Supreme Court law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 

982 (9th Cir. 2000). In such an instance, although the court 

independently reviews the record, it still lends deference to the 

state court's ultimate decision. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98-99. 770, 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 
784-85 (2011); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 

2002) . 

II. Unargued Claims 

Petitioner raises several claims in his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. As noted above, Petitioner elects to pursue only 

two specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Where 

Petitioner does not argue the merits of his remaining claims, he 

has not carried his burden of proof with respect to these 

unargued claims. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (Petitioner bears the burden of proving his claims) . 

Even if Petitioner had briefed the merits of these claims, the 

court has examined them based upon the existing record and 

determined that they do not entitle him to relief. 

III. Prejudicial Impact of Impeachment Evidence 

the 

According to 

admissibility 

Petitioner, trial counsel's failure to argue 

of KS's statement to Griffey as a prior 

inconsistent statement was prejudicial to his entire case. 

Respondent asserts that Petitioner never raised this issue to the 

PCR court, and instead couched the issue only in terms of KS's 

credibility. Where Pe ti ti oner's claim fails on its merits, the 

court declines to decide the exhaustion issue. See 2 8 U.S. C. 

§ 2254 (b) (2) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the 

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the 

state."). 

Because no Supreme Court precedent is directly on point that 

corresponds to the facts of this case, the court uses the general 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 
two-part test established by the Supreme Court to determine 

whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122-23 (2009). First, 

Petitioner must show that his counsel's performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). Due to the difficulties in 

evaluating counsel's performance, courts must indulge a strong 

presumption that the conduct falls within the "wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance." Id at 689. 

Second, Petitioner must show that his counsel's performance 

prejudiced the defense. The appropriate test for prejudice is 

whether Petitioner can show "that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694. 

A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id at 696. When 

Strickland's general standard is combined with the standard of 

review governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus cases, the result 

is a "doubly deferential judicial review." Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 

at 122. 

Petitioner maintains that his case did not call for a 

compartmentalized credibility determination for each of the 

victims, but instead involved an assessment as to whether the 

girls, viewed collectively, fabricated the charges against him. 

He believes that KS' s "no" response to Griffey' s generic abuse 

inquiry was not only damaging to his case in terms of the single 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 
charge involving KS, but bore directly on the credibility of all 

of the victims in his case. 

Petitioner's trial attorney argued in favor of the 

admissibility of KS's out-of-court statement, and initially 

claimed that KS's "no" response to Griffey's question was 

"relevant on its own, because it's a statement of one of the 

complaining witnesses that contradicts the statements that she's 

made in court." Trial Transcript, pp. 531-32. The trial judge 

appeared disinclined to share this view, and asked, "How does 

that contradict her statements in court?" Id at 532. Counsel 

responded that he "misspoke about that" and abandoned that 

particular argument. Id at 532. 

The trial court ultimately refused to allow KS' s out-ofcourt statement to Griffey. It reasoned as follows: 

[Griffey's] question was a very general 

question. It was a very vague question in 

context of why the girl was there, why [KS] 

was there, and what had been happening over 

at the house before she moved in or 

temporarily stayed with Ms. Griffey. I think 

[the prosecutor] does a good job of pointing 

that out. 

Here these girls are there because of the 

alcohol abuse and the abuse with regard to 

drugs. And when she asked them, "Have you 

been abused?" there is some domestic violence 

also that was testified to, and is an issue. 

And for all of those reasons, the girls are 

over at Ms. Griffey's house. And so when they 

ask if she's been abused, I mean, we don't 

know if she was asking about domestic 

violence or what. So it would lead the jury 

to make an improper reference to speculative 

or something along those natures. 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 
The second issue is, it is hearsay. I mean it 

is - it is an out-of-court statement used for 

the truth of the matter asserted. She said, 

"No." And so it is hearsay and it's not an 

inconsistent statement, and so it's 

inadmissible in that sense. 

Id at 533-34. 

The PCR court disagreed with this conclusion, and found that 

KW's "no" statement to Griffey "denied the abuse" and amounted to 

a prior inconsistent statement sufficient to overcome the hearsay 

obstacle. Respondent's Exhibit 137, p. 2. The PCR court concluded 

that counsel's failure to argue the admissibility was 

"inadequacy," and that the omission was of the kind that "has a 

tendency to affect the outcome and is prejudicial." Id at 3. It 

therefore granted relief as to the conviction on Count 5 

(involving KW) . 

Although Petitioner now asserts that the prejudicial impact 

of counsel's error impacted all of his charges, during his PCR 

hearing, he acknowledged that it "may not have bore on the 

credibility of all the victims. " Respondent's Exhibit 136. 

In addition, as Respondent points out, not only did the 

children's allegations pertain to very different periods of 

time, 2 but nothing in the record shows that the three victims 

conspired together as to their allegations. It is therefore 

difficult for this Court to conclude that had counsel made the 

argument Petitioner advocates, there was a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of Counts 1-4 would have been different. 

2 The conduct as to KW allegedly occurred in 2008, whereas the conduct 

involving ES occurred between 1996 and 1998, and that involving KS occurred 

between 1999 and 2000. Respondent's Exhibit 102, pp. 6-13. 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Consequently, upon an independent review of the record, the Court 

cannot conclude that the state-court decision denying relief on 

this claim was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law. 

II. Failure to Adequately Question KW 

Petitioner next alleges that his trial attorney was 

ineffective for failing to adequately question KW as to the 

incidents alleged in the Indictment pertaining to Petitioner's 

contact with her. Pe ti ti oner concedes that he failed to raise 

this issue in Oregon's state courts, but asks the Court to 

nevertheless review the claim because his appointed PCR attorney 

should have raised it. 

Traditionally, the performance of PCR counsel could not be 

used to establish cause and prejudice to excuse a procedural 

default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) (only 

the constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

constitutes cause); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 

(1987) (there is no constitutional right to counsel in a PCR 

proceeding). However, in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the 

Supreme Court found "it . . . necessary to modify the unqualified 

statement in Coleman that an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence 

in a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to 

excuse a procedural default." Id at 8. It concluded, "Inadequate 

assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings 

may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a 

claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Id. 

12 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Id at 17. 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel must be raised in 

an initial-review collateral proceeding, a 

procedural default will not bar a federal 

habeas court from hearing a substantial claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

if, in the initial review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel 

in that proceeding was ineffective. 

In order to show that the omitted claim is substantial, a 

petitioner must "demonstrate that the underlying ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim . has some merit." Id at 

14. A claim is considered "insubstantial" if "it does not have 

any merit or . is wholly without factual support." Id at 15. 

In order to make the second required showing that appointed PCR 

counsel was "ineffective," a petitioner "need only show that his 

PCR counsel performed in a deficient manner. A prisoner need not 

show actual prejudice resulting from his PCR counsel's deficient 

performance, over and above his required showing that the trialcounsel IAC claim be 'substantial' under the first Martinez 

requirement." Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 

2013). 

In his pro se Petition, 3 Petitioner claims that KW "was 

asked if the petitioner had touched her butt," and she replied, 

"no." Petition (#2), p. 20. He argues that counsel should have 

taken that opportunity to further inquire into the other claims 

she made against him. 

3 Petitioner's appointed attorney refers this Court to the prose Petition 

for argument on this claim. 

13 - OPINION AND ORDER 
KW testified that Pe ti ti oner "touched me in places that I 

find to be private areas." Trial Transcript, p. 384. She 

specified that Petitioner touched her breasts over her clothing 

and ran his fingers along the inside of her waistband, but did 

that "[j]ust in the front." Id at 391. She stated that although 

he touched her in her genital area under her clothes, he did not 

touch her "back private area." Id at 3 92. The Court does not 

believe counsel could have made significant headway with this 

testimony, and therefore finds the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim to be insubstantial. Accordingly, PCR counsel 

was under no obligation to raise it, thus Petitioner is not able 

to excuse his procedural default. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons identified above, the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (#2) is denied. The Court issues a Certificate of 

Appealabili ty limited only to Petitioner's claim that the his 

trial attorney's failure to introduce KS' s prior inconsistent 

statement infected his entire trial with prejudice and warranted 

a new trial on all charges. 

IT IS SO ORDERE~ 

/ & 

DATED this day of 

~ 

February, 2018~ 

United States District Judge 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER