alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2009156EN.01002001.xml

| 19.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 156/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 156/20

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 532/2009

of 18 June 2009

on the issue of import licences for applications lodged during the first seven days of June 2009 under the tariff quota opened by Regulation (EC) No 1383/2007 for poultrymeat originating in Turkey

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1),

Having regard to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1383/2007 of 26 November 2007 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 779/98 as regards opening and providing for the administration of certain quotas for imports into the Community of poultrymeat products originating in Turkey (2), and in particular Article 5(5) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Regulation (EC) No 1383/2007 opened tariff quotas for imports of poultrymeat products. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulation (EC) No 1383/2007 opened tariff quotas for imports of poultrymeat products.

| (2) | The applications for import licences lodged during the first seven days of June 2009 for the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2009 do not cover the quantities available. The quantities for which applications have not been lodged should therefore be determined and these should be added to the quantity fixed for the following quota subperiod, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The applications for import licences lodged during the first seven days of June 2009 for the subperiod from 1 July to 30 September 2009 do not cover the quantities available. The quantities for which applications have not been lodged should therefore be determined and these should be added to the quantity fixed for the following quota subperiod,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The quantities for which import licence applications pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1383/2007 under the quota with order number 09.4103 have not been lodged, to be added to the subperiod from 1 October to 31 December 2009, shall be 750 000 kg.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 19 June 2009.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 18 June 2009.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 309, 27.11.2007, p. 34.

2

---
USGS 11517000 - SHASTA R NR MONTAGUE, CALatitude: 41.709Longitude: -122.537Elevation: 2458

USGS 11517000 - SHASTA R NR MONTAGUE, CA
Exhibit 13.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F/A of RADCOM Ltd. (the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Yaron Ravkaie, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: April 27, 2016


/s/ Yaron RavkaieYaron RavkaieChief Executive Officer
**BG** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20 - 0091 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MARY DARLEAN WRIGHT ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including May 18 , 2021 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 13 2021

04/13/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0091
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7465

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CECIL RAY, JR., a/k/a Esco,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

District Judge. (3:06-cr-00008-JPB-JES-1; 3:10-cv-00057-JPBJES)

Submitted: March 25, 2016 Decided: March 31, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cecil Ray, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Cecil Ray, Jr., filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion 

contending, in relevant part, that his attorneys were 

constitutionally ineffective in advising him to reject the 

Government’s second plea offer in favor of proceeding to trial, 

and in advising him as to his sentence exposure if he proceeded 

to trial. We granted a certificate of appealability on these 

claims and remanded his case to the district court for an 

evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Ray, 547 F. App’x 343 

(4th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-6471). On remand, after the magistrate 

judge held an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that 

counsel was not ineffective in advising Ray regarding the 

Government’s second plea offer or Ray’s sentencing exposure. 

Ray appeals for a second time. 

To succeed on his ineffective assistance claim, Ray must 

show that: (1) counsel’s failures fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient 

performance was prejudicial. In Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 

1376, 1384-85 (2012), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel applies to the plea bargaining 

process, and prejudice occurs when, absent deficient advice, the 

defendant would have accepted a plea that would have resulted in 

a less severe conviction, sentence, or both. In Missouri v. 

Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012), the Supreme Court held that 
3

a component of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the plea 

bargaining context is that counsel has a duty to communicate any 

offers from the Government to his client. We review the 

district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of 

fact for clear error. United States v. Nicholson, 611 F.3d 191, 

205 (4th Cir. 2010).

After reviewing the record and the transcript of the 

evidentiary hearing, we find no reversible error in the district 

court’s denial of relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment 

of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# L_2010058DE.01002302.xml

| 9.3.2010 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 58/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.3.2010

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 58/23

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1298/2009 der Kommission vom 18. Dezember 2009 zur Veröffentlichung der mit der Verordnung (EWG) Nr. 3846/87 festgelegten Nomenklatur der landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnisse für Ausfuhrerstattungen (2010)

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 353 vom 31. Dezember 2009
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 353 vom 31. Dezember 2009

Auf Seite 32, Anhang I, Sektor „9. Milch und Milcherzeugnisse“:

anstatt:

„0402 Milch und Rahm, eingedickt oder mit Zusatz von Zucker oder anderen Süßmitteln (11):

ex 0402 10 – in Pulverform, granuliert oder in anderer fester Form, mit einem Milchfettgehalt von 1,5 GHT oder weniger (14):“

muss es heißen:

„0402 Milch und Rahm, eingedickt oder mit Zusatz von Zucker oder anderen Süßmitteln (8):

ex 0402 10 – in Pulverform, granuliert oder in anderer fester Form, mit einem Milchfettgehalt von 1,5 GHT oder weniger (11):“.

---
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 1 A1 60 9

. D EREK LEE THOMAS v . BARNES LAND AND I N VESTMENTS, LLC et a l

.

On Oct o ber 9
, 2 0 2 0
, t he t ri al co u rt i ss u ed an o rd er g ran ti n g s u m m ary ju d g m en t

t o t h e d efen d an t s on t h e b as i s t h at al l o f t h e cl ai m s o f t h e p l a i n t i f f
, Derek Lee
Th o m as , were b arred b y res ju d i cat a an d co l l at eral es t o pp el

. Th o m as fi l ed t h i s ap p eal

o n M arch 7
, 2 0 2 1 . Th e d efen d an t s h av e fi l ed a m o t i on t o d i s m i ss , as s ert i ng t h at t h e
ap p eal i s u nt i m el y

. A n ot i ce o f ap p eal m

u s t b e f i l e d wi t h i n 3 0 d ay s o f en t ry o f t h e t ri al co u rt ju d g m en t o r o rd er s o u g h t t o b e ap p eal ed

. OCGA § 5 -6 -3 8 (a). Th e pro p er an d t i m el y fi li n g o f a n o t i ce o f ap peal i s an ab s o l u t e req u i rem en t t o co n fer ju ri s d i ct i o n o n t h i s Co u rt

. R o wl a n d v. S t a t e , 2 6 4 Ga. 8 7 2
, 8 7 2 (1 ) (4 5 2 SE2 d 7 5 6 ) (1 9 9 5 ). Here, Th o m as fi led h i s ap p eal 1 4 9 d ay s aft er t h e t ri al co urt en t ered i t s o rd er. Th erefo re, t he ap p eal
i s u n t i m el y

. Acco rd i n g ly
, th e m ot i o n t o d i s m i s s is h ereb y GRANTED, an d th i s ap p eal
i s h ereb y DISM ISSED fo r l ack o f ju ri s d i ct i o n

.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m
t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. July 08, 2021

07/08/2021
Page 1 – MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION UNDER SEAL

Thomas K. Coan, OSB #89173

tom@tomcoan.com

Attorney at Law

1001 SW Fifth Ave., Suite 1400

Portland, OR 97204

(503) 221-8736

Attorney for Defendant Santilli

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PETER SANTILLI,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 3:16-cr-00051-BR

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 

MOTION UNDER SEAL 

Defendant Peter Santilli, through his attorney, Thomas K. Coan, moves the court 

for an order allowing him to file the enclosed motion ex-parte and under seal because it 

contains confidential work product that should not be shared with the government or the 

other parties in this case.

Dated this 17th day of March 2016.

Thomas K. Coan

Thomas K. Coan, OSB 89173

Attorney for Defendant

Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 316 Filed 03/17/16 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bashan Rudolph, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 892]

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Forman, J), rendered August 31, 2010, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to *1081withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted (see *Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d 252 [2011]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]). Dillon, J.P., Balkin, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-50406

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TEODORO ROCHA-CERDA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-254-1

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Teodoro RochaCerda raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that a

prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
**CERTIFICATION**

**OF**

**CHIEF      EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

|                                   |                                                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date: August                  14, 2006 |                                                                                                       | /s/ Douglas                  Abel     |
|                                        |                                                                                                            |
|                                        | Douglas                    AbelPresident                    and                    Chief Executive Officer |
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

|                                 |                                                                               |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Date: August                14, 2006 |                                                                               | /s/ Michael                G. McGuinness |
|                                      |                                                                                    |
|                                      | Michael                    G. McGuinnessChief                    Financial Officer |
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James McDonald, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), rendered April 10, 1985, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree (two counts), sexual abuse in the first degree, assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered, that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must do on appeal *(see, People v Malizia,*62 *501NY2d 755, 757, *cert denied*469 US 932), any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the sex-related crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620). The defendant’s contention that there was insufficient evidence establishing his guilt is essentially based upon the complainant’s alleged lack of credibility, which we have repeatedly held to be a matter for the jury to resolve *(see, e.g., People v Cox,*114 AD2d 968; *People v Batts,*111 AD2d 761; *People v Cassidy,*109 AD2d 747). In any event, the complainant’s testimony was supported by that of a disinterested witness, as well as one of the police officers who responded to the scene.

The defendant also contends that a number of alleged prosecutorial improprieties occurred during the trial which deprived him of a fair trial. To the extent that these claimed errors have been preserved for our review by an appropriate objection, we find that the trial court, in sustaining the objections, minimized whatever prejudice may have resulted from the prosecutor’s improper questions or remarks. Significantly, the defense counsel never sought a curative instruction, nor did he move for a mistrial. As to those claimed errors which are unpreserved for review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]), we find, based upon the entire record, that a new trial is not warranted in the interest of justice.

Furthermore, there is no merit to the defendant’s argument that he did not receive a fair trial merely because the court, in its main charge to the jury, initially defined forcible compulsion by using the "earnest resistance” language which was no longer part of the law at the time the incident at bar occurred *(see,*Penal Law former § 130.00 [8], amended by L 1982, ch 560, § 1; L 1983, ch 449, §1). If anything, the defendant benefited by the fact that the jury heard a definition which imposed a higher burden of proof on the People. Moreover, it is not disputed that the court gave the correct definition in its supplemental charge, after the prosecutor advised the court of its error. The defendant’s claim that the jury was confused by the supplemental charge is sheer speculation, since there is nothing in the record to support his argument.

Finally, we find that the sentence imposed was appropriate under the circumstances. Thompson, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-41257 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LION SARMIENTO, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 9:00-CR-11-ALL

-------------------- June 14, 2001 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Lion Sarmiento appeals his sentence following a guilty-plea conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Sarmiento argues that the district court erred in increasing his base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides for a four-level sentencing increase “[if] the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense . . . .” The district court found that Sarmiento sold marijuana toNo. 00-41257 -2- undercover police officers in his home, and that law enforcement agents subsequently found two functional firearms, ammunition for those firearms, and a large quantity of marijuana in Sarmiento’s home. Although the firearms and the large quantity of marijuana were located in different rooms of the house, the firearms “were possessed” by Sarmiento and “could have been used to facilitate” his drug-related activities. United States v. Armstead , 114 F.3d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Condren , 18 F.3d 1190, 1194-98 (5th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, the district court did not err in increasing Sarmiento’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 22

- 00084

- CV

GARNER ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, INC. v. REFUGIO COUNTY, TEXAS

On Appeal from the 135th District Court of Refugio County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020

- 03

- 13092

JUDGMENT
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEA LS, having considered this cause on appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed . The Court orders the appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion . Costs of the appeal will be taxed against the

pa rty i ncu rring the same

. We further order this decisio n certified below f or observance. June 16, 2022
#### REINHART, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO., Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

October 16, 1896.)

Action by Bern-hart Beinhart against the New York Central & Hudson Biver Bailroad Company.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rodney Joseph, Appellant.

The hearing court properly declined to suppress the physical evidence recovered in the defendant’s apartment and the statement made to a police officer. We further conclude that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the conviction of robbery in the first degree. However, we find that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding that the complaining witness suffered either substantial pain or an impairment of physical condition (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). Accordingly, the conviction of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.10 [2] [a]) cannot stand *(see, Matter of Philip A.,*49 NY2d 198; *People v McDowell,*28 NY2d 373).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Brown, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### Lacy Jervay TATE, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Johnathon A. HART; Debrorah Crowder, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 06-7919.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 11, 2007.

Decided: May 25, 2007.

Lacy Jervay Tate, Appellant Pro Se.

Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lacy Jervay Tate, a North Carolina pretrial detainee, seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action without prejudice. The notice of appeal was received in the district court shortly after the expiration of the appeal period. Because Tate is incarcerated, the notice is considered filed as of the date it was properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c)(1); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). The record does not conclusively reveal when Tate gave the notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing. Accordingly, we remand the case for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to obtain this information from the parties and to determine whether the filing was timely under Fed. R.App. P. 4(c)(1) and *Houston v. Lack.*The record, as supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further consideration.

*REMANDED.*