No. 87-170 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

DIXIE RAE HALVERSON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

LARRIE E. HALVERSON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Daniels, 

The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven; J. Daniel Hoven, 

Helena., Montana 

For Respondent: 

Wright, Tolliver & Guthals; Kenneth D. ~olliver, 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 13, 1987 

Decided: February 2, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Larrie E. Halverson appeals a judgment of the Fifteenth 

Judicial District Court, Daniels County, dividing marits.1 

property of Larrie and Dixie Halverson. 

We affirm. 

Appellant Larrie Halverson raises the following issues: 

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it. 

valued a portion of the Halversons' marital assets as of the 

date of the parties' separation and valued the remainder of 

the assets as of the date of dissolution? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance in 

accord with the parties' October 4, 1984, stipulation? 

Larrie and Dixie Halverson were married on June 19, 

1957. During their marriage of nearly thirty years, Larrie 

and Dixie accumulated marital property consisting of 1,200 

acres of deeded farm land, 1,035 acres of agricultural state 

leases, approximately 24,000 bushels of grain in storage, 

various farm machinery and miscellaneous personal property. 

Larrie and Dixie also owe $149,000 to the Federal Land Bank 

of Sidney and approximately $29,000 to the Citizens State 

Bank of Scobey. 

In February 1984, Dixie and Larrie separated. ~arrie 

moved from the couple's rented home in Scobey to the farm 

property. Larrie managed the farm property through the 

sununer of 1984. Dixie resided in Scobey and continued in her 

job as manager of the local radio station. Dixie did not 

participate in any farm management activities during 1984. 

On June 4, 1984, Dixie petitioned to dissolve the 

marriage. On September 17, 1984, Dixie filed a motion seeking temporary child support and maintenance. Subsequently, 

the District Court ordered Larrie to show cause why he shoulcl 
not be required to pay $1,000 per month in maintenance. The 

Court also restrained Larrie from disposing of real or personal property. Prior to hearing, the parties stipulated 

that Larrie would pay $600 per month in maintenance during 

the pendency of the action. On October 4, 1984, the District 

Court granted petitioner Dixie's motion for a decree of 

dissolution. The court reserved its ruling on property 

distribution and debt obligations. 

As stated earlier, Larrie managed the farm following 

the parties' separation in February 1984. However, Larrie's 

farming decisions for 1984 were much different than in earlier years. Larrie did not obtain crop insurance. Larrie 

elected to seed all land rather than leaving roughly half of 

it in summer fallow. His election disqualified the 

Halversons from any federal farm subsidy programs. Larrie 

then took an extended vacation to Alaska during the summer of 

1984. Larrie testified that he "was mistaken about the final 

date for signing up for [crop] insurance" and failed to do 

so. Dixie testified that, prior to the insurance deadline, 

she warned Larrie to purchase crop insurance. 

Larrie's 1984 farming decisions resulted in a poor 1984 

farm yield. The Halversons received no federal payments or 

crop insurance proceeds. As a result, on October 30, 1984, 

Larrie was forced to borrow $21,000 to pay the 1984 land 

mortgage payment. 

On April 6, 1985, Larrie and Dixie entered into a farm 

partnership agreement. The farm partnership agreement required that the parties evenly split all farm proceeds and 

debts. Subsequent to entering the agreement, Larrie, over 

Dixie's objection, applied $23,000 of the 1985 farming proceeds to Larrie's October 30, 1984, note. 
Issue 1 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

valued a portion of the Halversons' marital assets and debts 

as of the date of separation and valued the remainder of 

assets and debts as of the date of dissolution? 

The standard of review of division of marital property 

is found in In Re Marriage of Hall (Mont. 1987), 740 ~.2d 

684, 686, 44 St.Rep. 1321, 1323, which provides: 

As stated by this Court, our functions 

are as limited as the District Court's 

functions are broad. We have concluded 

that in a property distribution review 

in marriage dissolution, this Court will 

reverse a District Court only upon a 

showing that the District Court has 

acted arbitrarily or has committed a 

clear abuse of discretion, resulting in 

either instance in substantial 

injustice. 

In its findings of fact, the District Court found that 

Larrie "conducted the farm and ranch operation following the 

parties' separation without participation of [Dixie]." 

Accordingly, the court valued the farm operation as of the 

date of separation to avoid "unfairness to the parties which 

would have resulted from attributing the husband's post 

separation losses to the wife." 

The District Court also found that following separation, the parties' farm land continued to decline in value 

due to market conditions which were the fault of neither the 

husband nor the wife. As a result, the court valued the 

parties' land, farm equipment and personal property at the 

date of dissolution. 

Larrie cites the general rule that when valuing marital 

estates the District Court is required to determine the net 

worth of the parties at the time of dissolution. In Re 

Marriage of Kramer (1978) , 177 Mont. 61, 67, 580 P.2d 439, 
442; Downs v. Downs (1976), 170 Mont. 150, 551 P.2d 1025, 

appeal after remand 181 Mont. 163, 165, 592 P.2d 938, 939. 

Therefore, Larrie argues the District Court abused its discretion when it valued the farm operation at the date of 

separation in February 1984. 

A review of the record supports the District Court's 

finding that Larrie excluded Dixie from her normal role as 

co-manager of the Halverson farm. Larrie, contrary to the 

Halversons' traditional farm practices, seeded the land 

"fence to fence." Larrie's decision to seed fence to fence 

excluded the Halverson farm from any federal farm subsidy 

programs. Further, he refused, over Dixie's objection, to 

purchase crop insurance. The Halversons' low farm yield is 

directly attributable to Larrie's 1984 management decisions. 

Additionally, Larrie refused or was unable to testify 

to the amount of 1984 farm proceeds. He testified that he 

used the 1984 farm proceeds, including sales of an undisclosed amount of grain in storage, to make numerous unrecorded "cash" purchases. Larrie refused or was unable to testify 

to the amount of the above-mentioned purchases. The District 

Court was then faced with the unenviable task of dividing an 

unknown amount of farm assets. 

The District Court in its findings of fact stated: 

The Court finds the most equitable and 

clearest manner with which to deal with 

the parties' post-separation finances is 

to value these current assets and liabilities at time of separation for 

purposes of property division. 

The husband's 1984 farming operation is 

easily accounted for. The husband had 

complete control and, fairly, should be 

held responsible for the 1984 results. 

Equitably, it is fair to charge him with 

the December, 1984, Federal Land Bank 

payment for the use he made of the 
family farm in 1984. He, then, would 

also be entitled to the fruits of his 

1984 crop efforts which he, in fact, 

had. Therefore, the indebtedness of 

$23,600.00 incurred post-divorce and the 

1984 crop proceeds are attributed solely 

to the husband. 

To approach this matter otherwise would 

present a nearly insoluble problem. The 

husband had sole access to and control 

of the parties' grain and funds in 1984. 

He testified that he purchased numerous 

antique firearms, post-separation, for 

cash. He declined to have such items 

appraised deeming them "irrelevant" to 

this proceeding. On this state of the 

evidence, it is impossible for the Court 

to fairly allocate the 1984 crop year 

between the parties. The Court declines 

to attempt the impossible. 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 

valued the Halversons' farm operation at the date of separation. If the court had valued the farm operation as appellant Larrie suggests, Dixie would be forced to share 

responsibility of 1984 debts incurred solely by Larrie. 

We note the general rule that proper distribution of 

marital property requires a finding of net worth at or near 

the time of dissolution. Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 

Mont. 282, 283, 607 P.2d 102, 103. However, when the application of this rule would create an inequitable disposition, 

it is proper for the District Court to utilize a differing 

valuation date. In Re the Marriage of Wagner (~ont. 1984), 

679 P.2d 753, 757, 41 St.Rep. 409, 414; In re Marriage of 

Lippert (Mont. 1981), 627 P.2d 1206, 1208, 38 St.Rep. 625; In 

Re Marriage of Hunter (19821, 196 Mont. 235, 239, 639 P=2d 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 

valued the Halversons' marital assets. 
Issue 2 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance in 

accord with the parties' October 4, 1984, stipulation? 

Prior to the October 4, 1984, show cause hearing, Dixie 

and Larrie stipulated that Larrie would pay Dixie $600 per 

month until their property was divided and distributed. The 

stipulation provided in pertinent part: "That by October 8, 

1984, respondent Larrie E. Halverson would pay the petitioner 

$600 in temporary maintenance, and said payments - to continue 

during the pendency -- of this action and to be paid to the 

petitioner by respondent on the 1st of each month." [Emphasis added.] 

On April 9, 1985, Larrie and Dixie entered into a farm 

partnership agreement. Larrie and Dixie agreed to equally 

divide farm profits and losses. Additionally, Larrie was to 

receive wages of $500 per month. The farm partnership agreement did not make reference to the parties' October 4, 1984, 

stipulation. Nor did the agreement contain language addressing the maintenance issue. Subsequent to entering the farm 

partnership agreement, Larrie discontinued maintenance 

payments. 

In its May 12, 1986, findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the District Court found Larrie bound by the stipulation. The court noted that Larrie had failed to modify his 

maintenance obligation pursuant to S 40-4-208, MCA, and was 

therefore responsible for the stipulated maintenance. 

Larrie contends that his maintenance obligation was 

terminated when he and Dixie entered the farm partnership 

agreement. Larrie claims the parties intended the farm 

partnership would terminate maintenance. However, Larrie 

failed to produce evidence that the parties' intended to 
terminate maintenance. Further, the farm partnership 

agreement is silent to the maintenance issue. 

The District Court properly held that the farm partnership agreement did not terminate the maintenance stipulation: 

The husband contends that his obligation 

to make support was eliminated by the 

1985 farm partnership agreement between 

the parties. However, there is no 

reference to modification of the stipulated maintenance within the four corners of the agreement. The wife 

testified that there was no mention of 

modification of the maintenance prior to 

her signing the farm partnership agreement. The Court cannot find, on this 

evidence, a factual basis for terminating a maintenance stipulation which was 

part of the dissolution proceedings. 

Larrie next contends the District Court failed to make 

proper findings of need and duration required by § 40-4-121 

and § 40-4-203, MCA, prior to awarding temporary maintenance. 

However, the District Court is not required to make such 

findings when the parties voluntarily entered into the maintenance agreement. 

We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

when it held that Dixie was entitled to temporary maintenance 

in accord with the maintenance stipulation. 

Affirmed. 

Chief Justice 

We concur: