UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HAROLD RAY DUCKWORTH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00161-WO-5)

Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: December 27, 2010

Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael 

Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Harold R. Duckworth appeals his convictions and the 

180-month sentence of imprisonment imposed by the district court 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 

(2006), following a guilty plea to felon in possession of a 

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and 

possession of stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) 

(2006). Duckworth’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting, in his 

opinion, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court erred in finding that 

Duckworth’s four previous drug convictions were committed on 

occasions different from one another for purposes of imposing 

the enhanced sentence. Duckworth has filed a pro se 

supplemental brief claiming that his trial counsel was 

ineffective and he received an unconstitutional sentence. We 

affirm. 

We review Duckworth’s sentence for reasonableness, 

using an abuse of discretion standard of review. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review 

requires us to ensure that the district court committed no 

significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the 

advisory sentencing guidelines range. United States v. Evans, 

526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). We then consider the 
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substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account 

the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

Although our determination of whether the ACCA enhancement 

applies involves review for procedural error, Duckworth’s 

assertion that his four previous convictions were not committed 

on occasions different from one another is a question of 

statutory interpretation that we consider de novo. United 

States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 636, 639 n.4 (4th Cir. 2010).

Under the ACCA, a defendant is an armed career 

criminal and subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum 

punishment if he violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and has three 

prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, 

“committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(1); USSG § 4B1.4(a). “Convictions occur on occasions 

different from one another if each of the prior convictions 

arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes.” United 

States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, the 

predicate ACCA offenses must be those that can be isolated with 

a beginning and an end.” United States v. Hobbs, 136 F.3d 384, 

388 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To determine whether previous convictions arose out of 

separate and distinct criminal episodes, we consider: “(1) 
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whether the offenses arose in different geographic locations; 

(2) whether the nature of each offense was substantively 

different; (3) whether each offense involved different victims; 

(4) whether each offense involved different criminal objectives; 

and (5) after the defendant committed the first-in-time offense, 

did the defendant have the opportunity to make a conscious and 

knowing decision to engage in the next-in-time offense.” United 

States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 640 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 

Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 335-37). We may apply these factors 

independently or in conjunction, and “if any one of the factors 

has a strong presence, it can dispositively segregate an 

extended criminal enterprise into a series of separate and 

distinct episodes.” United States v. Williams, 187 F.3d 429, 

431 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Letterlough, 63 F.3d at 336).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court properly found that Duckworth’s four previous 

1989 North Carolina drug convictions were committed on occasions 

different from one another, and properly counted them as 

separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA. We also conclude 

that the district court was correct in finding that each one of 

Duckworth’s drug convictions qualified as a predicate offense, 

subjecting him to a 180-month mandatory minimum sentence of 

imprisonment. 
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Further, the district court properly calculated 

Duckworth’s guidelines range, considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, made an individualized assessment 

based on the facts presented, and adequately explained the 

reasons for the chosen sentence in open court sufficient to 

satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a 

reasoned basis for its decision. Thus, we find that the 

district court did not procedurally err in imposing the 180-

month sentence of imprisonment. Nor was the sentence imposed 

substantively unreasonable. “A statutorily required sentence, 

which is what [Duckworth] received, is per se reasonable.” 

United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Therefore, Duckworth’s sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal.*

 * We decline to consider on direct appeal Duckworth’s claim 

that his trial counsel provided ineffective representation. To 

allow for adequate development of the record, ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims must ordinarily be pursued in 

appropriate post-conviction proceedings. See United States v. 

Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Because ineffective 

assistance is not conclusively established by the present 

record, Duckworth must pursue this claim on collateral review.

 We therefore affirm Duckworth’s convictions and 

sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Duckworth in 
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writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further 

review. If Duckworth requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Duckworth. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED