alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Anda B. Sloan, Respondent, v Samuel H. Sloan, Appellant.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Walter Schackman, J.), entered on or about January 14, 1986, judgment of said court, entered thereon on February 7, 1986, and order of said court, entered on December 4, 1985, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. Appeal from the order of said court (Alfred Ascione, J.), entered on November 22, 1982, unanimously dismissed as moot, without costs and without disbursements. No opinion. Concur — Rupferman, J. P., Sullivan, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.
<PAGE>
                                EXHIBIT 4.7

         SCHEDULE OF NON-EMPLOYEES RECEIVING STOCK OPTION GRANTS

     Date                                     Options    Strike    Exercised 
     Granted             Non-employee         Granted     Price   (Cancelled)
     -------             ------------         -------    ------   -----------

1    June 4, 1996        Bill Atherton         17,500    $9.00             - 
2    June 4, 1996        David Murfin          17,500    $9.90             - 

3    December 20, 1996   Bill Walsh            17,500    $6.125            - 
4    December 20, 1996   Stan Clark            17,500    $6.125            - 
                                               ------                    --- 
                                               70,000                      0 
                                               ------                    --- 
                                               ------                    ---
datetime,flow volume2015-05-20,3910.88154
#### IN THE MATTER OF FREDERICK E. BANNER, AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW.

Argued September 26, 1961

Decided October 9, 1961.

*Mr. Ilesion N. Poiis,*for the order.

Uo appearance for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered

Per Curiam.

Respondent was heretofore suspended for a period of one year. *In re*Banner, 31 *N. J. 24*(1959). Thereafter a complaint in another matter was processed by the ethics committee and it resulted in the presentment now before us.

*563Respondent appeared and participated in the hearing before the committee. Thereafter the committee was unable to serve our order to show cause upon him personally. We directed a mode of service which elicited a letter from respondent in which he stated he was in California for a substantial stay and requested a continuance of the argument date. His request was granted, with advice that the matter would be heard by us on September 26, 1961, on which date, however, he did not appear either personally or through counsel.

The complainant, Mrs. Eleanor M. Vincent, first retained respondent following her husband’s death, to settle his estate. Respondent continued to represent her in other matters. She informed him she had some moneys she wished to invest in mortgage loans. Respondent attempted to arrange a specific investment of that character, but the transaction failed. Thereupon respondent induced his client to lend him $3,200 on his personal note, without security, and later obtained a further loan of $2,600 from her on the same basis. Respondent was hardly a good credit risk, and that he had to know. Nonetheless, he solicited unsecured loans from a client who had come to him for mortgage investment, and did so without so much as suggesting she seek independent counsel. He testified that he prepared and delivered a mortgage to her upon his home. If that were a fact, the mortgage would have been subordinate to prior liens of some $30,000, but the committee found, and we agree, that no such instrument existed. We are thoroughly satisfied respondent overreached his client.

The matter is aggravated by two circumstances. The first is respondent’s palpable failure to appreciate, even in retrospect, the obligation of an attorney to his client. The second is that on June 8, 1959, respondent delivered his worthless check to Mrs. Vincent. At that very time, respondent was in the throes of the involvement which resulted in the suspension mentioned in the first paragraph of this opinion. The committee had already filed its presentment in that *564proceeding after hearings held between February 6, 1959 and March 13, 1959.

Respondent’s name will be stricken from the rolls.

*For disbarment*— Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Haneman — 7.

*Opposed*— None.
# L_2009197EN.01001701.xml

| 29.7.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 197/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.7.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 197/17

---

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 680/2009

of 27 July 2009

amending Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 60 and 301 thereof,

Having regard to Council Common Position 2008/652/CFSP of 7 August 2008 amending Common Position 2007/140/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (1),

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Council Regulation (EC) No 1110/2008 (2) amending Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (3) imposed additional restrictive measures pursuant to Common Position 2008/652/CFSP, and in particular a prior notification obligation in respect of certain shipments to and from Iran. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1110/2008 (2) amending Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (3) imposed additional restrictive measures pursuant to Common Position 2008/652/CFSP, and in particular a prior notification obligation in respect of certain shipments to and from Iran.

| (2) | For technical reasons, provision was made for derogations from the rules for the implementation of that prior notification obligation during a transitional period. As the complexity of the implementing rules for this measure has resulted in unforeseen delays in its implementation, the transitional period should be extended until 31 December 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

For technical reasons, provision was made for derogations from the rules for the implementation of that prior notification obligation during a transitional period. As the complexity of the implementing rules for this measure has resulted in unforeseen delays in its implementation, the transitional period should be extended until 31 December 2010.

| (3) | Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of Article 4a of Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 are hereby replaced by the following:

‘Until 31 December 2010, the entry and exit summary declarations and the required additional elements referred to in this Article may be submitted in written form using commercial, port or transport information, provided that they contain the necessary particulars.

As from 1 January 2011, the required additional elements referred to in this Article shall be submitted either in written form or using the entry and exit summary declarations as appropriate.’

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 July 2009.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 27 July 2009.

For the Council

The President

C. BILDT

---

(1)  
  OJ L 213, 8.8.2008, p. 58.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 1.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 103, 20.4.2007, p. 1.

3

---
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.

SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report of Intelligroup, Inc, (the Company) on Form
10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Vikram Gulati,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and
to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o (d);) and    
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) |  | The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the Company.
|   

|DATE: March 19,
      2009 | By: | /s/ Vikram
      Gulati      
|-------------------------- | --- | -----------------------------
|                           |     | Vikram
      Gulati          
|                           |     | Chief
      Executive Officer

---
[Cite as Ford v. Unknown , 2011-Ohio-4379.]



# Court of Claims of Ohio

The Ohio Judicial Center
65 South Front Street, Third Floor
Columbus, OH 43215

614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263

www.cco.state.oh.us

MARSHALL FORD

Plaintiff

v.

UNKNOWN

Defendant

Case No. 2011-05238-AD

Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL

{¶1} On April 11, 2011, this court issued an entry ordering plaintiff entity to

obtain counsel to proceed with this claim, to file a notice of appearance, and an

amended complaint naming an appropriate defendant with this court. Plaintiff entity has

failed to comply with the court order. Therefore, this claim is DISMISSED without

prejudice pursuant to Civ.R. 41. The court shall absorb the costs of this case.

________________________________ DANIEL R. BORCHERT Deputy Clerk

Entry cc:

Marshall Ford

c/o Eric Walker 6200 Mayfield RoadCase No. 2011-05238-AD - 2 - ENTRY

Case No. 2011-05238-AD - 2 - ENTRY

Mayfield Hts., Ohio 44124

DRB/laa Filed May 26, 2011 Sent to S.C. reporter 8/26/11
#### SIMONS, Appellant, v. CITY OF BROOKLYN, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

January 21, 1896.)

Action by Matilda A. Simons against the city of Brooklyn.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs, on the authority of Curry v. City of Buffalo, 135 N. Y. 366, 32 N. E. 80, and Mertz v. City of Brooklyn, 128 N. Y. 617, 28 N. E. 253. All concur, except BROWN, P. J., not sitting.
#### James V. Giancola, by Anthony Sorting, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v Gannett Co., Inc., Appellant.

Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: The court correctly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss this libel complaint. The court erred, however, in finding that the single instance rule does not apply to a complaint alleging libel per se *(Amelkin v Commercial Trading Co.,*23 AD2d 830, 831, *affd*17 NY2d 500; *see also,*comment, 2 NY PJI 101-102 [Supp]). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Boehm, J. — summary judgment.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-40871

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ALEJANDRO PEREZ-GONZALEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:13-CR-488-1

Before KING, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Alejandro PerezGonzalez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Perez-Gonzalez has not filed a response. We have 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 17, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-40871 Document: 00512666677 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/17/2014
No. 13-40871

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave 

to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities 

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

 Case: 13-40871 Document: 00512666677 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/17/2014
GRAND LAKE OUTLET BLW CHIPMUNK LN AT GRAND LK, COLatitude: 40.246Longitude: -105.829Elevation: 8365

GRAND LAKE OUTLET BLW CHIPMUNK LN AT GRAND LK, CO

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Never Summer Site Page...



Never Summer

Courtesy NRCS - Go to High Lonesome Site Page...



High Lonesome

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Sawtooth Site Page...



Sawtooth

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Bear Lake Site Page...



Bear Lake

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Lake Irene Site Page...



Lake Irene

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Phantom Valley

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Stillwater Creek
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RUSSELL D. FRANKLIN, )

DOC #517857, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Case No. 2D17-4576

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed September 28, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Ronald Ficarrotta, 

Judge.

Russell Dale Franklin, pro se.

Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado,

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for 

Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

MORRIS, SLEET, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
#### REYNOLDS et al., Appellants, v. ALBANY SAV. BANK et al., Respondents.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

December 8, 1896.)

Action by Sarah A. Reynolds and Clarence N. Reynolds against the Albany Savings Bank and others.

No opinion. Order affirmed, without costs. All concur.
#### In the Matter of Mieczystaw Rostkowski, Appellant, v Jan Baginski, Respondent.

[946 NYS2d 886]

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated September 12, 2011, which, after a hearing, dismissed the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner’s contention that the Family Court acted improperly by consolidating his petition with a petition in a related case is without merit. Although it is true that a court may not order consolidation sua sponte *(see*CPLR 602 [a]; *AIU Ins.*
      *1067
      *Co. v ELRAC, Inc.,*269 AD2d 412 [2000]; *Matter of Amy M.,*234 AD2d 854, 855 [1996]), here, there was no consolidation. The individual petitions were left intact. They were merely brought together to be heard on the same day. The captions of the individual petitions remained the same, and different determinations were rendered in separate orders.

Furthermore, contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Family Court did give him the opportunity to prove the allegations contained in his petition, but he failed to do so. Rivera, J.P., Eng, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          19,093
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               10,893,500
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (274,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    263,058
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            10,901,651
<PP&E>                                         137,060
<DEPRECIATION>                                  32,024
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,438,174
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,734,419
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           44,600
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,659,155
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,438,174
<SALES>                                        843,266
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               843,266
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               625,810
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               274,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              40,020
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (96,564)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (36,600)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (57,964)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (57,964)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)
        




</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gary Ervin, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jaspan, J.), rendered June 3, 1982, convicting him of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his right to claim that he was denied a speedy trial under CPL 30.30 *(see, People v O’Brien,*56 NY2d 1009; *People v Howe,*56 NY2d 622; *People v Suarez,*55 NY2d 940). Moreover, by failing to move to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, the defendant failed to preserve the issue for appellate review *(see, People v Pellegrino,*60 NY2d 636).

The defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim is likewise without merit *(see, People v Taranovich,*37 NY2d 442). Thompson, J. P., Niehoff, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.
FI RST DI VI SI ON BA RNES, P. J. , M C M I LLI A N and M ERCI ER, JJ.

N O T IC E : M otions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be ph y sic a l ly r e ce iv ed i n our c le r k ’s offic e w ithin te n da y s of the da te of de c is ion to be de e m ed tim e ly file d.

http://w w w .ga a ppe a l s .us /r ule s Septem ber 27, 2018



# I n th e Co u r t o f

A p p eals o f

G eo r g ia

A1 7 A1 09 8 . COATES v . THE STATE.

B A R N E S , Pres i d i n g J ud g e.

Hu b ert Co at es was co n v i ct ed o f o ne co u n t o f po s s es s i o n o f l es s t h an an o u nce

o f m ari ju an a an d fo u r co u n ts of p o s s es s i o n o f a fi rearm b y a co n v i ct ed fel o n

. Th e t ri al

co u rt s en t en ced Co at es s ep arat el y o n each co u n t , w i t h t h e s en ten ces t o ru n

co n secu ti v el y

. Co at es fi led a m o t i o n fo r n ew tri al an d t o am en d h i s sen t en ce, wh i ch

t h e t ri al co u rt d en i ed

. Co at es ap p eal ed , co n t en d i n g t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erred i n fai l i n g

t o m erg e h i s fo u r fi r e a r m c o n v i c t io n s

. In Co at es v. S t a t e , 3 4 2 Ga. Ap p

. 1 4 8 (8 0 2

S E 2d 65 ) (2 0 1 7 ), we affi rm ed Co at es ’ co n v i ct i o n s an d s en t en ces

. H o wev er, i n Co ate s

v. S t a t e , _

_ Ga.

_ _ (_

_ SE2 d

_ _ ) (Cas e No

. S1 7 G1 9 4 9, d eci d ed Au g

. 2 7 , 2 0 1 8 ), t h e

Su p rem e Co urt rev ers ed t h i s Co u rt ’ s d eci s i o n , v acat ed Co at es ’ co n v i ct i o n s an d

s e n t e n c e s fo r t h e fo u r co un t s of p o s ses s i o n o f a fi rearm by a co n v i ct ed fel o n , an drem an ded f

o r t h e t ri al co u rt t o co n v i ct an d s en ten ce Co at es o n o n l y on e o f t h o s e

co u nt s

. Th erefo re, we v acat e o u r ear l i er o p i n io n an d ad o p t t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e

Su p rem e Co u rt as o u r o wn

.
Ju d g men t va ca t ed i n p a r t a n d ca s e r ema n d ed wi th d i r ect i o n

. McMi l l i a n a n d

Mer ci er , JJ., co n cu r

.

2
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.01 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Arthur L. Swift, certify, to the best of my knowledge, that based upon a review of the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Transmeta Corporation, for the three months ended March 31, 2005,
(referred to as the Report), the Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of Transmeta Corporation for the period covered by the Report. Date: May 25, 2005 By:
    
    /s/ Arthur L. SwiftPresident and Chief Executive OfficerTransmeta Corporation
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Transmeta Corporation and will be retained by Transmeta Corporation and furnished to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 10/3/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JEFFREY LYN PIERCE,

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 96-7037

(E. Dist. of Oklahoma)

(D.C. No. CR-95-36-S)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

Having examined the briefs and the appellate record, this panel determines

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Mr. Pierce pleaded guilty to racketeering, conspiracy to defraud, and

forfeiture. As part of the sentence, the district court fined Mr. Pierce $15,000 and

ordered payment in $450 monthly installments beginning 90 days after release

from custody. Mr. Pierce appeals the fine. He argues that the district court failed

to consider various factors bearing upon ability to pay, as mandated by Section

5E1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

This court normally reviews appeals of fines under an abuse of discretion

standard. United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,

114 S. Ct. 2762 (1994). 

The Guidelines mandate only that the district court consider 5E1.2(d)

factors, not that it make any express findings. See United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d

1570, 1585 (10th Cir. 1993). Compliance with the Guidelines merely requires the

record to reflect that the district court considered the pertinent factors before it

imposed the fine. Id.

In this case, the district court made it amply clear that it had considered Mr.

Pierce’s circumstances. Addressing Mr. Pierce, the court said, “This fine is

imposed based on your current financial profile and your projected earning

ability.” Furthermore, the court adopted by reference “all relevant factual matters

set forth in the Presentence Investigation by reference.” The Presentence Report

included a detailed account of Mr. Pierce’s financial situation and a statement that
-3-

Mr. Pierce did not have the “funds or liquid assets to pay a substantial fine at this

time, without provisions made for a payment plan.” 

Accordingly, the district court imposed a fine at the low end of the $6,000

to $60,000 Guideline range, granted a 90-day grace period, and implemented a

reasonable monthly installment plan. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion. Mr. Pierce’s sentence is

therefore AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Michael R. Murphy

Circuit Judge