Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1707-CR-1733 | November 29, 2017 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas P. Keller

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Jackson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1707-CR-1733

Appeal from the St. Joseph

Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1604-F1-9

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Michael Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony battery 

resulting in serious bodily injury;1 Level 1 felony rape;2 and Level 3 felony 

criminal confinement.3 He argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 5 felony 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 3 felony criminal 

confinement violated the continuous crime doctrine; and (2) there was 

insufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Because we conclude 

that Jackson’s convictions did not violate the continuous crime doctrine and 

because there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim of self-defense, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether Jackson’s convictions for Level 5 felony battery 

resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 3 felony criminal 

confinement violated the continuous crime doctrine. 

2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim

of self-defense.

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1. 

2

I.C. § 35-42-4-1.

3

I.C. § 35-42-3-3.
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Facts

[3] As of April 2016, Jackson had dated L.W. “off and on” for eight years, 

although L.W. had also begun seeing another man. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12). On the 

night of April 26, 2016, L.W. went to Jackson’s house so that they could talk. 

At Jackson’s house, L.W. sat on the toilet in Jackson’s bathroom while he was 

taking a bath so that she could keep him company. While they were talking, 

Jackson brought up the topic of the other man L.W. was seeing. L.W. did not 

want to discuss the other man with him, so she stood up to leave. 

[4] At that point, Jackson got out of the tub and blocked the bathroom doorway so 

that L.W. could not leave. L.W. asked Jackson to move, and he told her that 

she “[was not] going anywhere until [she] answered all of [his] questions. . . .” 

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). L.W. asked again if she could leave, and he said “no,” so she 

“got scared” and “started to cry and hyperventilate.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). L.W. 

tried to push past Jackson, but he pushed her into the sink. 

[5] At that point, L.W. saw that Jackson looked angry and “like he wanted to 

fight,” so she drew her gun from its holster in her pants leg and pointed it at 

him. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). She asked Jackson again to move so that she could 

leave, but he did not do so. Instead, he “rushed [her]” and grabbed her hands 

so that they were both struggling over the gun. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). During this 

struggle, the gun fell out of L.W.’s hands. She retrieved the gun and told 

Jackson that she did not want any problems. She just wanted to go. Still, 

Jackson “rushed [her]” again, and they got into another struggle over the gun. 
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(Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). The gun again fell onto the ground, but L.W. retrieved it and 

pointed it at Jackson. 

[6] Jackson began to retreat slowly out of the bathroom, and L.W. reiterated that 

she “[did not] want any trouble;” she “just want[ed] to go.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). 

However, as Jackson backed up, the clip fell out of L.W.’s gun. She “[dove]” 

to the floor to pick it up. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). When she stood up, Jackson was 

“coming for [her].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 22). L.W. tried to fire the gun, but it did not 

fire. Jackson attacked her, and they began to struggle over the gun again. L.W. 

dropped the gun onto the floor. She ran to the living room and attempted to 

leave out the front door, but Jackson pulled her back by her hair as she was 

unlocking the door. He threw L.W. onto the couch, jumped on top of her, and 

choked her with both hands until she lost consciousness. 

[7] L.W. then awoke to a “fiery sensation . . . like a fire [] burning through [her] 

body.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). She jumped up, pushed Jackson off her, and again 

tried to escape through the living room door. However, Jackson pulled her 

back by her hair and started to drag her through the house. L.W. tried to stop 

him by hanging onto a doorway, but he pulled her into a chokehold. L.W. 

broke free, but Jackson rushed towards her and grabbed her hair again. L.W. 

fell onto the floor and grabbed his testicles. In response, Jackson twisted L.W.’s 

hand until it “snapped.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32). 

[8] L.W. started to scream loudly for help, and Jackson dragged her by her hair to 

the window so that he could shut the window. He then slammed L.W. against 
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the floor, causing her to hit her head and become dizzy. He took her clothes off 

and shoved his whole hand “forcefully” into her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). He 

used so much force that he pushed L.W.’s body across the floor, causing L.W. 

to lose consciousness again. When she regained consciousness, Jackson was 

moving her gun in and out of her vagina, saying “[n]ow I’m fucking you with 

your gun.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 36). After that, L.W. passed out again. 

[9] L.W. awoke when Jackson poured water onto her face. The water caused her 

to cough, choke, and throw up. Jackson got mad at her, saying “You already 

peed on my floor and now you’re throwing up on my floor.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 35-

36). He then dragged her by her hair to the bathroom and the toilet, where she 

passed out again. 

[10] Subsequently, Jackson took L.W. to the hospital. When L.W. awoke at the 

hospital, she was not sure how she had arrived there. South Bend police officer 

Mollie O’Blenis (“Officer O’Blenis”) spoke with L.W. and observed that she 

had red marks around her neck, upper thigh, and back, was missing hair, and 

had blood in her underwear. She also had a red stain on her right leg above her 

knee, which Officer O’Blenis believed was blood. The hospital staff also 

determined that she had a fractured hand and a small cut or tear in her labia 

minora, which would have likely been caused by “fairly significant trauma.” 

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 84). 

[11] When L.W. returned home from the hospital, she had a voicemail message 

from Jackson’s roommate letting her know that her gun had been left in her 
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backyard. She also received messages from Jackson on Facebook in the 

following days. In the messages, Jackson admitted that “[t]hings went to[o] 

far” and said, “MY SINCERE APOLOGIES!!!” (State’s Ex. 27) (emphasis in 

original). He also offered multiple times to pay L.W.’s rent and said, “we don’t 

need the police involved.” (State’s Ex. 27). At one point, he asked for her 

lawyer’s number so that he could “know exactly what got to be said and done.” 

(State’s Ex. 27). 

[12] Detective Casey Hof with the South Bend Police Department investigated 

L.W.’s sexual assault and found several red stains throughout Jackson’s home, 

which she believed were blood. She tested a red stain on the carpet in the 

hallway, and the sample tested presumptively positive for blood. She then sent 

a piece of the carpet for DNA testing, and the State Police Laboratory 

concluded that the DNA from the carpet was consistent with L.W.’s DNA. 

Investigators also found L.W.’s DNA on the inside of the barrel of her gun. 

[13] On April 28, 2016, the State charged Jackson with Count 1, Level 1 felony 

rape; Count 2, Level 1 felony rape; Count 3, Level 3 felony criminal 

confinement; and Count 4, Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily 

injury. The trial court held a bench trial on March 20-21, 2017. At trial,

Jackson’s defense was that he had acted out of self-defense towards L.W. He 

testified that she had pointed her gun at him after they had started to argue and 

that they had then struggled over the gun. Jackson said that he had wrestled the 

gun from L.W. through the struggle and had removed the gun’s clip and tossed 

it backwards. However, at that point, according to Jackson, L.W. had run up 
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to him and grabbed his testicles. Jackson admitted that he had then grabbed 

L.W.’s hair, punched her in the face five or six times, choked her, banged her 

head on the floor, and “punched her” in the vagina several times, but he 

claimed that he had done so in order to make L.W. release his testicles. (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 53). He denied that he had ever placed his hand or L.W.’s gun inside 

of her vagina. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court took the matter 

under advisement.

[14] Thereafter, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon 

determining that Jackson was guilty of Level 5 felony battery resulting in 

serious bodily injury as a lesser-included offense of the charged Level 1 felony 

rape in Count 1; Level 1 felony rape in Count 2; and Level 3 felony criminal 

confinement in Count 3. The trial court found Jackson not guilty of Level 5 

felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury in Count 4; it concluded that the 

continuous crime doctrine applied and that, therefore, Jackson could not be 

convicted of two counts of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. The 

serious bodily injury underlying Jackson’s Count 1 conviction was L.W.’s 

unconsciousness after Jackson punched her in the vagina. The serious bodily 

injury used to enhance Jackson’s criminal confinement conviction to a Level 3 

felony was L.W.’s broken wrist.

[15] The trial court concluded that the State had produced sufficient evidence to 

rebut Jackson’s claim that he had acted in self-defense. It reasoned that, even if 

Jackson had initially had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury when 

L.W. pointed her gun at him, he had “stopped defending himself and actively 
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engaged in combat” once the gun was “not in the picture” anymore. (App. Vol. 

2 at 36). The trial court sentenced Jackson to three (3) years on Count 1, 

twenty (20) years on Count 2, and nine (9) years on Count 3 and ordered the 

sentences to run concurrently for an aggregate sentence of twenty (20) years. 

Jackson now appeals. 

Decision

[16] On appeal, Jackson argues that: (1) his convictions for Level 5 felony battery 

resulting in serious bodily injury and criminal confinement as a Level 3 felony 

violated the continuous crime doctrine; and (2) there was insufficient evidence 

to rebut his claim of self-defense. We will address each of these arguments in 

turn.

1. Continuous Crime Doctrine

[17] Jackson’s first argument is convoluted. He notes that the trial court found that 

the continuous crime doctrine applied to his offenses, meaning that the offenses 

were “compressed in terms of time and singleness of purpose and continuity of 

action as to constitute a single transaction.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36) (citing Chavez v. 

State, 988 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). The continuous 

crime doctrine provides that, under such circumstances, a defendant cannot be 

charged multiple times for the same offense. See Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 

1220 (Ind. 2015). As Jackson notes, the trial court found him not guilty of 

Count 4, battery resulting in serious bodily injury, based on the continuous 
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crime doctrine, noting that it had found him guilty of battery resulting in serious 

bodily injury as a lesser-included offense of his felony rape charge, in Count 1. 

[18] Jackson now argues that the continuous crime doctrine also prohibited the trial 

court from convicting him of two offenses based on L.W.’s serious bodily 

injuries. Specifically, serious bodily injury was an element of Count 1, battery 

resulting in serious bodily injury, and also an element used to enhance 

Jackson’s criminal confinement conviction from a Level 5 felony to a Level 3 

felony.4 Jackson argues that the criminal confinement enhancement was

prohibited under the continuous crime doctrine and that he should have been 

convicted of Level 5 felony criminal confinement, instead. 

[19] However, Jackson’s argument is based on a misinterpretation of the continuous

crime doctrine. In Hines, our supreme court clarified that the continuous crime 

doctrine applies only where “a defendant has been charged multiple times with 

the same offense.” 30 N.E.3d at 1220 (emphasis added). There, like here, the 

defendant challenged his convictions for battery and criminal confinement. Id. 

The supreme court noted that battery and criminal confinement were “two 

distinct chargeable crimes to which the continuous crime doctrine [did] not 

apply.” Id. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the defendant “was not 

convicted of multiple charges of criminal confinement, nor multiple charges of 

 

4

Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-42-3-3(b)(1), criminal confinement is a Level 5 felony if “it results in bodily 

injury to a person other than the confining person.” The offense is a Level 3 felony if it “is committed while 

armed with a deadly weapon” or “results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining 

person.” I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(2).
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battery. Nor is battery a crime for which all of the elements necessary to 

impose criminal liability are also elements found in Criminal Confinement, or 

vice versa.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the continuous crime doctrine 

did not apply. See id. Likewise, we find that the doctrine does not apply here. 

Even though Jackson’s offenses had one element, serious bodily injury, in 

common, they were distinct offenses.5 

2. Sufficiency

[20] Next, Jackson argues that there was not sufficient evidence to rebut his claim 

that he acted out of self-defense. A valid claim of self-defense is a legal 

justification for an otherwise criminal act. Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c) (providing that a person is 

“justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the 

person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the 

imminent use of unlawful force”). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a 

defendant must have: “(1) acted without fault; (2) been in a place where he or 

she had a right to be; and (3) been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily 

 

[1] 5 Alternatively, the State interprets Jackson’s argument as a double jeopardy argument challenging the use of 

the same injury—L.W.’s fractured wrist—to enhance two separate convictions. To the extent Jackson 

intended to raise a double jeopardy argument, we find it waived for failure to state a cogent argument 

because Jackson did not cite any legal authority to support such an argument. See Anderson v. State, 64 

N.E.3d 903, 905 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue 

on appeal.”). Waiver notwithstanding, a double jeopardy argument is equally unavailing. Serious bodily 

injury was an element of Jackson’s convictions for both Count 1 and Count 3. However, the serious bodily 

injury underlying Jackson’s Count 1 conviction was L.W.’s unconsciousness following his act of punching 

her vagina. The serious bodily injury underlying his Count 3 conviction was her broken wrist bone. 

Therefore, Jackson’s two convictions were not enhanced by the same serious bodily injury.
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harm.” King v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1275, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. 

“‘Where a person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack[,] the 

right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim 

then becomes the perpetrator.’” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014) (quoting Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999)), trans. denied.

[21] When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the evidence, the 

State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. King, 61 

N.E.3d at 1283. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense 

directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or 

by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id. Whether the 

State has met its burden is a question of fact for the fact-finder to determine. 

Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1137.

[22] Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

rebutting a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency 

of the evidence claim. Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1136-37. We do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 1137. We consider only the 

probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that 

support the verdict. King, 61 N.E.3d at 1283. If the defendant is convicted 

despite a claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable 

person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. 
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[23] Here, the trial court found that, even if Jackson had initially had a reasonable 

fear of death or bodily injury, he “could no longer argue that he had a 

reasonable fear of death or of great bodily injury once the gun was not in the 

picture.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36). Instead, “Jackson stopped defending himself and 

actively engaged in combat.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36). For that reason, the trial 

court concluded that Jackson’s self-defense claim had been rebutted. 

[24] On appeal, Jackson disputes the trial court’s conclusion, arguing that he had a 

reasonable fear of bodily injury after the gun disappeared because L.W. was 

grabbing his testicles. He also argues that he did not use more force than 

necessary because he did not use a deadly weapon to defend himself. We find 

that these arguments are a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not 

do. See Cole, 28 N.E.3d at 1136-37 (stating that we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). L.W. testified that, after she 

tried to fire the gun, she dropped the gun during a struggle with Jackson and 

attempted to run out the living room door. At that point, Jackson pulled her 

back by her hair and choked her. She passed out and, after she woke up, 

attempted to escape again. Jackson stopped her, grabbed her by her hair, 

dragged her throughout the house by her hair, and put her into a chokehold. 

These acts happened before L.W. tried to grab his testicles. Then, according to 

L.W.’s testimony, Jackson “snapped” her hand so that it fractured, dragged her 

by her hair again, shoved his whole hand into her vagina, and pushed her gun 

in and out of her vagina. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32). This evidence more than supported 

the trial court’s conclusion that after the gun disappeared, Jackson stopped 
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defending himself and actively engaged in combat. Accordingly, we conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to rebut Jackson’s claim of self-defense.

Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.