IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

MELISA D. BOYD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

JAMES W. MOLLER 

8655 SW Citizens Dr., Ste. I 04 

Portland, OR 97070 

Of Attorney for Plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

United States Attorney 

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

District of Oregon 

1000 SW Third Ave., Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204-1011 

MARTHA A. BODEN 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of the General Counsel 

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 MIS 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

Of Attorneys for Defendant 

I - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case No. 6: 15-cv-01399-AC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 1 of 14
Findings and Recommendation 

ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: 

Melisa Dawn Boyd ("Boyd") seeks judicial review of the final decision by the Social 

Security Commissioner ("Commissioner") denying her applications for Disability Insurance 

Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). This Court has jurisdiction 

to review the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on a careful 

review of the record, the Commissioner's decision should be affirmed and this case dismissed. 

Procedural Background 

Boyd filed for DIB on May 8, 2012, alleging disability as of June 29, 2008 due to 

rheumatoid arthritis; chronic kidney disease (stage 1 ); anxiety and depression; myalgia; irritable 

bowel syndrome; obesity; hypothyroid; hypertension; and vitamin D deficiency. Tr. 16, 18, 133. 

Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 94, I 00. A hearing was held 

on December 6, 2013 before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALI"); Boyd was represented by 

counsel and testified, as did a vocational expert ("VE"). Tr. 31. On January 2, 2014, ALJ 

MaryKay Rauenzahn issued a decision finding Boyd not disabled. Tr. 16-29. Boyd requested 

timely review of the ALI' s decision and, after the Appeals Council denied her request for 

review, filed a complaint in this Comi. Tr. 1-5. 

Factual Background 

Born in 1968, Boyd was 39 on the disability onset date and 43 years old on the date last 

insured ("DLI"). Tr. 24. She attended high school through the ninth grade. Tr. 580. She 

previously worked as a sales clerk, clerical support staff, and in the manufacturing industry. Tr. 

280. Additionally, she has held a nmnber of jobs for short periods of time through temporary 

employment agencies. Tr. 136-40. 

2- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 2 of 14
Standard of Review 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 

[Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is 

rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. 

Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must 

demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502 and 

404.920. First, the Commissioner considers whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial 

gainful activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. 

At step two, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520( c ). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 

3- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

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At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairments, either 

singly or in combination, meet or equal "one of a number of listed impairments that the 

[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Yuckert, 

482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the claimant is presumptively disabled; if 

not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant can still perform "past 

relevant work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 404.920(f). If the claimant can work, he is not 

disabled; if he cannot perfonn past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. 

At step five, the Commissioner must demonstrate that the claimant can perform other 

work existing in significant numbers in the national or local economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-

42; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. 

The ALJ's Findings 

At step one of the sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ found that Boyd 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date, June 29, 2008, 

throughherDLiofMarch31,2012. Tr.18. 

At step two, the ALJ determined Boyd had the following severe impairments: rheumatoid 

arthritis; chronic kidney disease (stage 1 ); anxiety and depression; myalgia; itTitable bowel 

syndrome; obesity; hypothyroid; hypertension; and vitamin D deficiency. Tr. 18. The ALJ 

identified a few conditions that did not rise to the level of severe impairment, such as Crohn's 

disease and fibromyalgia. Tr. 19. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Boyd's impairments, either singly or in combination, 

did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 20-21. Because Boyd did not 

establish disability at step three, the ALJ continued to evaluate how Boyd's impairments affected 

4- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 4 of 14
her ability to work during the relevant period. The ALJ found Boyd had the residual functional 

capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) except: 

she could sit for up to 4 hours, and stand/walk for up to 4 hours in an 8-hour 

workday (with n01mal breaks). Such tasks had to allow her to change positions as 

necessary to relieve discomfort while still remaining on-task. She had to avoid 

climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but she could occasionally climb stairs or 

ramps. She could also occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. She had to 

avoid overhead reaching bilaterally. She could understand, remember, and catTy 

out no more than simple instructions that could be learned within 30 days. She 

could engage in frequent, but not constant, bilateral handling and fingering. She 

had to avoid workplace hazards, such as unprotected heights or dangerous 

machinery. Such tasks had to avoid contact with the public. 

Tr. 20-21. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Boyd was unable to perform her past relevant work as a 

customer service representative and office clerk. Tr. 24. 

At step five, based on the testimony of the VE and other evidence, the ALJ determined 

Boyd could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national and local 

economy despite her impairments, including inspector of optical goods, addresser, and table 

worker. Tr. 25. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Boyd was not disabled under the Act. Id. 

Discussion 

Boyd alleges the ALJ erred by improperly assessing: (1) Boyd's symptom testimony; (2) 

lay witness testimony; (3) Boyd's Listing determination; and (4) Boyd's RFC and the VE's 

testimony. 

I. Boyd's Symptom Testimony. 

The ALJ must consider a claimant's symptom testimony, including statements regarding 

claimant's pain and workplace limitations. 20 CFR § 404.1529. The ALJ is responsible for 

determining the veracity of such statements. Andrews v. Shala/a, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

1995). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing the claimant is malingering, the 

5- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 5 of 14
Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony must be clear and 

convincing. Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not plausible and 

what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints. Id.; Reddick v. Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 722 

(9th Cir. 1998). The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial. See Reddick 157 

FJd at 724. The ALJ's overall symptom testimony evaluation may be upheld even if some of 

the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are ove1turned. Batson v. Comm 'r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). Boyd argues the ALJ failed to give clear 

and convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. 

The Commissioner argues that the clear and convincing standard should not apply, and 

urges the court to apply the deferential substantial evidence standard. This is a legally inconect 

interpretation oflaw in the Ninth Circuit. It is well settled that, absent malingering, comts m·e to 

apply the clear and convincing standard when evaluating subjective symptom testimony. Burrell 

v. Colvin, 775 FJd 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2014). Even applying the clear and convincing 

standard, however, the ALJ's reasons are supported by the record. 

The ALJ gave numerous reasons for rejecting Boyd's subjective testimony sufficient to 

satisfy the clear and convincing standard. First, the ALJ noted in a separate section of the 

opinion that Boyd's presentation at her psychological examination was normal, except her 

responses were "rambling and overly detailed" and she occasionally exhibited an "exaggerated" 

style in her responses. Tr. 19. When a plaintiff overdramatizes subjective symptoms, it can 

justify a finding of limited credibility. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 

1989). Here, the ALJ identified the psychologist's repmt as evidence that Boyd's subjective 

symptom testimony was inaccurate. While the ALJ mentioned the report in a separate section of 

her opinion, it was still used to evaluate the veracity of Boyd's testimony. The ALJ did not err in 

identifying the repmt as evidence to reject Boyd's testimony. 

6- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 6 of 14
Second, Boyd's medical records from the end of 2011 show that, contrary to her 

complaints of numbness, exhaustion, fatigue, and pain in her coccyx, lower spine, and hips, she 

exhibited normal gait, stance, and balance when examined. Tr. 290. Furthermore, Boyd denied 

abdominal tenderness and was noted to have normal mood, affect, concentration, and attention 

span. Tr. 276, 290. The ALJ noted that Boyd retained significant physical and mental 

functioning in spite of her complaints. Tr. 23. "While subjective pain testimony cannot be 

rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by the objective medical evidence, the 

medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and 

its disabling effects." Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ did not 

err when she contrasted Boyd's subjective complaints with medical records that tend to refute 

those complaints. 

Boyd argues the ALJ ened by referencing isolated examples of normal objective 

findings, citing Smolen v. Chafer. Smolen, however, is readily distinguishable. In Smolen, the 

ALJ cited contemporaneous medical records as evidence of a contradiction between the 

plaintiffs statements and her condition. Smolen v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The comi held the ALJ failed to identify the actual contradiction between the plaintiffs 

testimony and her medical records. Id Here, the ALJ specifically referenced Boyd's testimony 

about her condition, and the medical records that directly contradicted that testimony. 

Furthermore, the ALJ did not cite isolated references of normal objective findings, but instead 

referenced several different findings from the end of 2011. 

Third, the ALJ noted that Boyd's gastrointestinal problems, including IBS, coincided 

with a period where her earnings exceeded the level of substantial gainful activity. The ALJ may 

find against the plaintiffs symptom testimony when the plaintiff alleges a disabling condition 

that did not stop her from working. Tommaseffi v. Astrue, 533 F.3d I 035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). 

7- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 7 of 14
Boyd alleged IBS was a disabling condition but she was able to work for many years while 

suffering from its effects; IBS did not stop her from working. Boyd argues the ALJ must 

consider all her impairments in combination. While true for the overall disability analysis, that 

argument does not change that Boyd alleged IBS to be a disabling impairment despite her ability 

to work with it. 

F omih, the ALJ cited several occasions when Boyd's impairments dramatically improved 

with different treatments, including vitamin D supplements, reducing her sugar intake, increased 

movement, committing to a gluten-free diet, and taking probiotics. Impairments that can be 

controlled with medication are not disabling, and asse1iions that such conditions are disabling 

may be used to discredit subjective symptom testimony. Tommasetti 533 F.3d 1040. The ALJ 

noted that Boyd renewed her allegations of debilitating pain at the hearing. Tr. 21. Boyd stated 

that her various pains were "extremely painful" and "really bad" and that she has "never lived a 

day without pain since two thousand and- well, obviously, since 2006 or 2007; but there's times 

where things do get a little better, yes, absolutely." Tr. 41. The ALJ contrasted this testimony 

by citing one of Boyd's medical records, in which Boyd stated she felt "dramatically better" 

following her vitamin D injections. Tr. 264. The record also indicates that reducing Boyd's 

sugar intake "seemed to have helped" and movement sometimes helped her symptoms. Tr. 221. 

Furthermore, when Boyd began a gluten-free diet her symptoms significantly improved. Tr. 399. 

Finally, when Boyd took probiotics they "significantly improved her miluitis symptoms." Id. 

The ALJ did not err in using Boyd's medical records to contrast her testimony that she lived in 

constant pain which only got "a little better." 

8- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 8 of 14
Any other reasons stated by the ALJ, to the extent such reasons were not clear and 

convincing, were harmless error as the ALJ provided numerous clear and convincing reasons to 

reject Boyd's subjective symptom testimony. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195-97. 1 

II. Third Pmiy Testimony. 

Boyd argues the ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient reasons for giving only partial 

weight to the lay witness testimony of David Boyd, her husband, and failing to discuss the lay 

witness testimony of Lauren Stewart, her mother. Lay witness evidence is competent and cannot 

be disregm·ded without comment. Tobe/er v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2014). An 

ALJ may reject lay witness testimony by giving germane reasons for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 

236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ gave patiial weight to Mr. Boyd's testimony because it was written four months 

after Boyd's DLI and reflected her contemporary level of functioning. Tr. 23. At the hearing, 

Boyd stated her level of functioning declined shortly after her DLI. Id Additionally, the ALJ 

stated that Boyd's exertional capacity improved with medication and a cm·efully managed diet, 

contradicting Mr. Boyd's description of her condition. Id The ALJ gave Mr. Boyd's testimony 

partial weight to the extent it reflected a sedentary restriction involving unskilled work. Id The 

ALJ did not address the lay witness testimony of Lauren Stewart. 

The ALJ did not err in granting Mr. Boyd's testimony partial weight because it reflected 

Boyd's level of functioning after her DLI. Mr. Boyd stated "[Boyd] can't walk, stand, [or] sit 

because of pain in body." The statement is written in the present tense, and the ALJ did not err 

in identifying it as a reason to doubt Mr. Boyd was describing Boyd's pre DLI level of 

1 The court also notes the Commissioner offered numerous facts not asserted by the ALJ in 

suppmi of her analysis; the court is constrained to review the facts as written in the opinion, and 

did not affirm based on these extraneous reasons. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th 

Cir. 2003). 

9- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 9 of 14
functioning. See Cole v. Astrue, 395 Fed. Appx. 387, 389 (9th Cir. 2010) (the temporal nature of 

the third party evaluation was a germane reason to assign it little weight). 

\\ \ \ \ 

Boyd argues the ALJ failed to appropriately explain her reasoning and simply assumed 

Mr. Boyd was describing Boyd's post DLI level of functioning, citing Tobeler v. Colvin. 

However, Boyd apparently ignored the ALJ's quotation of Mr. Boyd's present tense 

characterization of her condition. Because the ALJ provided reasoning for her conclusion, she 

did not assume without explanation that Mr. Boyd's description was contemporary. Regardless, 

Tobeler is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Tobeler, the ALJ improperly 

disregarded lay witness testimony without comment. Tobeler, 749 F.3d at 832. There, the 

Commissioner argued that the lay witness evidence was irrelevant because it was completed 

seven years after the DLI. Id. at 833. However, the court found that there was no reason to 

assume the witness's testimony solely described the post-DLI period. Id. Rather, the description 

encompassed the entirety of the plaintiffs period of disability. Id. Additionally, there was no 

evidence that the plaintiffs condition worsened between his DLI and the time the witness 

testified. Id. Finally, the court noted that the SSA provided the fotm that failed to specify which 

time period the witness should have considered. Id. 

Here, the ALJ commented on Mr. Boyd's testimony and provided textual support for the 

conclusion that he was describing Boyd's current level of functioning, unlike Tobeler, where the 

Commissioner simply assumed the witness was speaking about the present. Additionally, while 

the SSA gave the same form to Mr. Boyd that it gave to the witness in Tobeler, here, the ALJ 

gave Mr. Boyd's testimony partial weight, unlike Tobeler, where the witness's opinion was 

given no weight. Finally, here, there is substantial evidence Boyd's condition worsened between 

the DLI and the time the witness testified, unlike Tobeler. 

10- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 10 of 14
Boyd further argues against the ALJ's conclusion that Boyd's condition worsened 

considerably following her DLI. However, Boyd is essentially arguing for a different 

interpretation of the record. The ALJ reasonably interpreted the evidence and used Boyd's own 

statements to determine she suffered a decline in functioning after her DLI, and the court must 

defer to the ALJ's decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193 (the Commissioner's findings are 

upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record; if evidence exists to suppmi 

more than one rational inte1pretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner's decision). 

Lauren Stewart's lay witness testimony described Boyd's varying pain levels, dog care 

habits, bathroom habits, cooking and general housework abilities, and hobbies and social 

activities. Tr. 201. 

The ALJ erred by disregarding Ms. Stewart's testimony without comment, but this error 

ultimately was harmless. An error is harmless when it is "inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination in the context of the record as a whole." Molina v. As true, 67 4 F .3d 

1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, while the ALJ failed to explain her reasons for disregarding 

Ms. Stewart's testimony, her testimony did not describe any limitations beyond those that Boyd 

herself described. Id. Because the ALJ validly rejected Boyd's symptom testimony, the court 

can confidently conclude Ms. Stewart's testimony would not have altered the ultimate 

nondisability determination. 

III. Listing Determination. 

The Listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 are "descriptions of various 

physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities" which are sorted by the body system each 

affects. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 529-30 (1990). The plaintiff has the burden of proving 

the Listing specifications by providing medical evidence establishing all the relevant medical 

criteria stated in the Listing. Burch, 400 F.3d at 683. A general assertion of functional problems 

11- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 11 of 14
does not reach the threshold of disability at step three. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 

(9th Cir. 1999). Listings 12.04 (affective disorders) and 12.06 (anxiety disorders) establish that a 

plaintiff must have marked limitations in at least two of the following categories to meet Listing 

level impairment: activities of daily living ('ADLs'), social functioning, or concentration, 

persistence, or pace. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, 12.04, 12.06. 

The ALJ found Boyd's mental impaitments, considered singly and in combination, did 

not meet the criteria for Listings 12.04 or 12.06. Tr. 19. The ALJ found that Boyd had mild 

restrictions in activities of daily living, and moderate restrictions in social functioning. Id. Boyd 

argues the ALJ erred by failing to find marked restrictions in her activities of daily living and 

social functioning. 

The ALJ did not etT in finding only mild restrictions in activities of daily living. Boyd 

could prepare simple meals, go outside independently, drive a car, and go shopping in stores. Tr. 

19. Boyd argues that she was unable to perform these activities on one of her "bad days," which 

allegedly occur a few days each month. Boyd's argument would have merit if the ALJ had 

found no restrictions in activities of daily living. However, because the ALJ found mild 

restrictions in activities of daily living, she did not err in her assessment. Additionally, the ALJ 

is not required to assess Boyd's activities of daily living based on Boyd's "bad days," when 

those days do not occur on a daily, or even weekly, basis. 

The ALJ did not err in finding only moderate restrictions in social functioning, citing 

Boyd's denial that she had ever been fired from a job for having problems getting along with 

other people. Additionally, Boyd's presentation during a November 2013 psychological 

evaluation was cooperative, and she spoke with a normal tone and volume. The ALJ also cited 

the examiner's notes that Boyd's responses were "rambling and overly detailed" and she 

"occasionally exhibited an exaggerated style in her responses." Tr. 19. 

12- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 12 of 14
Boyd argues her social interactions at her places of employment are "legally irrelevant" 

because the interactions took place before her disability onset date. However, in Robinson v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin., the court noted that the ALJ was permitted to consult an assessment made prior 

to the alleged onset date. Robinson v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 12 Fed. Appx. 451, 453 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Additionally, while Boyd's condition has allegedly grown worse over time, she testified that she 

suffered from pain for at least one year while working. Tr. 37. 

Boyd also offers contradicting evidence to support her interpretation of the record, 

including rarely leaving her apartment, her small social circle, and that she does not belong to 

any clubs or attend events on a regular basis.2 However, the ALJ's interpretation of the record is 

rational; she did not err in finding mild and moderate restrictions to activities of daily living and 

social functioning. See Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2000) (when 

evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one way, the court must uphold the 

Commissioner's decision). 

IV. RFC Assessment and VE Testimony. 

Boyd contends that when her testimony is found credible and the lay witness evidence 

accorded its proper weight, her RFC will change to such a degree that remand is required. 

However, the ALJ's credibility assessment and the weight accorded to the lay witness evidence 

were both proper; therefore, Boyd's step five argument is inapplicable. 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's decision denying Boyd's application for 

DIB should be affirmed. 

Scheduling Order 

2 The court notes that Boyd joined a Parovirus suppott group during the period under review. 

13- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

Case 6:15-cv-01399-AC Document 23 Filed 11/09/16 Page 13 of 14
The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if 

any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no 

objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that 

date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

9.IA_ DATED this day of November, 201 

' a 

14- FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

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