RULE 10. MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have

no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated

“MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any

reason in any unrelated case.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned On Brief May 25, 2004 

DAVID SHARP v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Direct Appeal from the Claims Commission of the State of Tennessee

No. 20-300-947 Nancy C. Miller-Herron, Commissioner

No. W2004-00044-COA-R3-CV - June 16, 2004

An inmate filed a claim with the Claims Commission contending negligence on the part of the

Tennessee Department of Correction in miscalculating his sentence credits. The Commission

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the inmate appealed, and we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed

DAVID R.FARMER,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W.FRANK CRAWFORD,P.J.,W.S.,

and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

David H. Sharp, Pro se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore Solicitor General and John H.

Sinclair, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

David Sharp, an inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC), filed

a claim with the Division of Claims Administration. The claim was transferred to the Claims

Commission on April 22, 2003. The basis of the claim was that the TDOC negligently, willfully and

maliciously miscalculated Mr. Sharp’s sentence credits. Claimant sought damages in the amount

of $500,000 for loss of wages and loss of freedom. 
-2-

The State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure on the basis that the Claims Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim and the

motion was granted. Mr. Sharp appeals, contending that the granting of the motion to dismiss was

in error. 

Generally, an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission is reviewed de novo with a

presumption of correctness in its findings of fact. See Dobson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 324, 328-29

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). However, in reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12.02, we assume all

the Plaintiff’s allegations to be true and review the lower court’s conclusions de novo with no

presumption of correctness. See King v. Danek Medical, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 453-54 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2000). Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law. Therefore, our standard

of review is de novo without a presumption of correctness. See Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33

S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). 

Mr. Sharp asserts on appeal that “[t]his is a negligence action under T.C.A. § 9-8-

307(a)(1)(E).” 

In addressing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, our supreme court, speaking through Chief

Justice Drowota, recently stated as follows:

Article I, section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that “[s]uits may

be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may

by law direct.” This constitutional provision reflects sovereign immunity, the notion

that a sovereign governmental entity cannot be sued in its own courts without its

consent. See State v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605, 609, 106 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1937); Tenn.

Code Ann. § 20-13-102 (“No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction, or

authority to entertain any suit against the state . . . with a view to reach the state, its

treasury, funds, or property . . .”). As a general interpretive matter this Court has held

that the principle of sovereign immunity requires that legislation authorizing suits

against the state must provide for the state’s consent in “plain, clear, and

unmistakable” terms. Cook, 171 Tenn. at 611, 106 S.W.2d at 861; see also Beare

Company v. Olsen, 711 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tenn. 1986). We must therefore carefully

analyze the statute granting jurisdiction to the Tennessee Claims Commission, which

this Court has previously held creates a “sweeping procedure for filing monetary

claims against the state.” Hembree v. State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Tenn. 1996).

Northland Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d at 729.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307 states that the Commission has “exclusive jurisdiction

to determine all monetary claims against the state based on the acts or omissions of “state

employees” . . . falling within one (1) or more of the following categories [.]” Tenn. Code Ann. §

9-8-307(a)(1). Mr. Sharp relies upon section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E)(Negligent care, custody, and control

of persons). It is provided in section 9-8-307(a)(3) that “[i]t is the intent of the general assembly that
-3-

the jurisdiction of the claims commission be liberally construed to implement the remedial purposes

of this legislation.” We are inclined to agree with the Claims Commission that Mr. Sharp’s claim

of negligent miscalculation of his sentence credits does not fall within the jurisdictional statute. Mr.

Sharp has cited no authority to convince us otherwise.

Mr. Sharp next argues that “Appellee had a duty of care to appellant. This duty was

established by the Tennessee Legislature as a matter of right through T.C.A. 4-1-103 Oath of Office

of Officers’ and employees which mandated that appellee followed Appellee’s administrative

policies including 505.01, Sentence Credits.” Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) states

that the Claims Commission has jurisdiction to decide monetary claims against the state for the

[n]egligent deprivation of statutory rights created under Tennessee law, except for

actions arising out of claims over which the civil service commission has jurisdiction.

The claimant must prove under this subdivision that the general assembly expressly

conferred a private right of action in favor of the claimant against the state for the

state’s violation of the particular statute’s provisions[.]

Therefore, the above statute conferring jurisdiction on the Claims Commission specifies that Mr.

Sharp must show that this statute allegedly violated by the state expressly grants individuals a private

right of action to enforce those rights. For every statutory right allegedly violated by the state, Mr.

Sharp must reference explicit statutory language that would grant him the private right of action to

enforce the statute. Mr. Sharp’s claim states, in pertinent part, that the TDOC negligently

miscalculated his sentence credits “in violation of T.C.A. §§ 41-332 and 41-334. In July 1, 1981,

TCA §§ 41-332 and 41-334 was [sic] abrogated and a new sentencing statute enacted, T.C.A. §§ 41-

21-229 and 41-21-230 which sets out how prisoners such as myself are to obtain good conduct

sentence credits . . . .” Mr. Sharp has not cited express language in the statutes relied upon that

granted a private right of action in his favor. We have further reviewed Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-

236. Sentence reduction credits. We likewise failed to find such express language in that statute.

Accordingly, we hold that the Tennessee Claims Commission lacked the subject matter jurisdiction

to hear Mr. Sharp’s claim and that dismissal under Rule 12.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil

Procedure was proper in this case.

An inmate who contends that he has not been given proper sentence reduction credits is not

without recourse but may avail himself of the Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §

4-5-101, et seq. See James A. Vaughn v. State, No. 01 CO1-9308-CR-00258 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

Nashville, Feb. 24, 1994); see also Russell Kirby v. State, No. 03 CO1-9309-CR-00303 (Tenn. Crim.

App., Knoxville, Aug. 22, 1994).
-4-

The decision of the Claims Commission is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are taxed to

the Appellant, David Sharp, for which execution may issue if necessary.

___________________________________ 

DAVID R. FARMER, JUDGE