alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(May 17, 2012)

#### How Shim Yu, Appellant, v General Security Insurance Co., Respondent.

[948 NYS2d 1]—

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard F. Braun, J.), entered June 21, 2010, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion denied, the cross motion granted, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

This is an action pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) by an injured person (plaintiff) against the insurer (defendant) of a tortfeasor (nonparty Lep Keng Corp.), which has not satisfied a judgment against it in plaintiffs favor. It is undisputed that Lep Keng’s notice to defendant was late. However, “[a]n insurer’s failure to provide notice as soon as is reasonably possible precludes effective disclaimer, even [where] the policyholder’s own notice of the incident to its insurer is untimely” *(Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Aguirre,*7 NY3d 772, 774 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Defendant learned by August 27, 2004, at the latest, that plaintiff served the summons and complaint in the underlying personal injury action on the Secretary of State on December 31, 2001, that the Secretary of State had sent the documents to the address on file for Lep Keng, and that the documents had been returned unclaimed. Thus, defendant was aware by that date “of the grounds for disclaimer of liability or denial of coverage” *(id.*[internal quotation marks omitted]). Nevertheless, it did not disclaim until July 18, 2007, almost three years later, a delay that is unreasonable as a matter of law *(see e.g. First Fin. Ins. Co. v Jetco Contr. Corp.,*1 NY3d 64, 66 [2003]). Defendant’s contention that it had to wait until the motion court in the *628underlying action confirmed the Special Referee’s finding that Lep Keng had deliberately left mail unclaimed, is unavailing *(see Republic Franklin Ins. Co. v Pistilli,*16 AD3d 477, 479 [2005]).

Because neither the motion papers below nor the briefs on appeal addressed the amount of the judgment that should be entered and whether interest should be assessed, the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.

In light of the above disposition, we do not reach the parties’ remaining arguments.

The decision and order of this Court entered herein on February 23, 2012 (92 AD3d 568 [2012]) is hereby recalled and vacated *(see*2012 NY Slip Op 73495[U] [2012] [decided simultaneously herewith]). Concur — Tom, J.P., Saxe, Sweeny, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
EXHIBIT 32

                            CERTIFICATION OF OFFICERS
                          OF US GLOBAL NANOSPACE, INC.
                           PURSUANT TO 18 USC ss. 1350



Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) each of the
undersigned officers of US Global Nanospace, Inc. (the "Company") does hereby
certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

          (a)  The quarterly report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended
               September 30, 2003 of the Company fully complies with the
               requirements of section 13(a) or 15(b) of the Securities Exchange
               Act of 1934; and

          (b)  Information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.

Dated:  November 14, 2003


/s/ John Robinson
-------------------------------
John Robinson,
Chief Executive Officer


/s/ Julie Seaman
-------------------------------
Julie Seaman,
Chief Financial Officer
#### VILLAGE OF McGRAWVILLE, Respondent, v. SWEET, Appellant,

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

January 20, 1896.)

Action by the village of McGraWville against Francelia Sweet.

No opinion. Judgment of county court affirmed, with costs..
#### In the Matter of Robert F. Miner, Jr., Appellant, v New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent.

— Appeal by the petitioner from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, entered September 28, 1984.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, for reasons stated in the decision of Justice Buell at Special Term. Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Niehoff and Spatt, JJ., concur. *[See,*125 Misc 2d 594.]
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Internet America, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, William E. Ladin, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/    William E. Ladin, Jr.William E. Ladin, Jr. Chief Executive Officer Date: November 14, 2003
34.810(3). Appellant did not attempt to demonstrate good cause to excuse

the procedural default on the face of the petition. Further, his claim that he is actually innocent of his crimes lacks merit because that claim is grounded in legal rather than factual innocence. 

### See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998) (observing that actual innocence exception to excusing procedural default is grounded in factual rather than legal innocence); 

### Mitchell v. State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006) (observing that lajctual innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying appellant's petition as procedurally barred. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

, C.J.

Parraguirre J. Douglas

cc: Hon. Scott N. Freeman, District Judge Joe Tony Torres Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Oscar Frazier, Deceased.

—Order Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and application denied. Memorandum: The court lacked authority to direct payment of legal fees and disbursements to the attorneys for the purchasers of real property comprising the estate’s sole asset. That the attorneys brought a petition to remove the executor provides no basis for an award of such compensation. They did not perform any duty in administering the estate which the executor defaulted in doing or neglected, nor were the purchasers devisees, legatees, distributees or persons interested in the estate. Accordingly, the Surrogate erred in holding that payment by the estate was authorized under SCPA 2110. Moreover, the legal services rendered by the attorneys for the purchasers did not result in an enlargement of the share of the estate’s sole beneficiary *(see, Matter of Graves,*197 Misc 638; *see also, Matter of Lounsberry,*226 App Div 291; *Matter of Smith,*167 Misc 95; *Matter of Hirsch,*154 Misc 736).

"The mere fact that an outside attorney, while preserving the interests of his own client, suggests a course of action which produces a saving to the estate *(Matter of Kaufman,*169 Misc 714, affd 256 App Div 1070; *Matter of Wicks,*269 App Div 675), or forces the executor into action *(Matter of Trescott,*199 Misc 1087), or acts in conjunction with the executor’s attorney but without retainer *(Matter of Wadsworth,*250 App Div 11, affd 275 NY 590) is not sufficient. Volunteers may not be compensated from the general assets of the estate.” *(Matter of Bellinger,*55 AD2d 448, 452.)

Although the decision underlying the order on appeal ex*514presses the intention of the court to surcharge the executor an amount equal to the award of legal fees and disbursements made to purchasers’ attorneys, the order itself makes no reference to a surcharge. Instead, it directs that the sum be retained by the attorneys from estate proceeds held by them in escrow. Since the order awarding legal fees and reimbursement of expenses is reversed, the moneys so retained must be refunded to the estate. No issue is presented on this appeal as to the propriety of any surcharge. (Appeal from order of Niagara County Surrogate’s Court, DiFlorio, S. — remove executor.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Del R. POWELL, Private, U. S. Army, Appellant.

No. 29,516.

U. S. Court of Military Appeals.

Sept. 19, 1975.

*165*Colonel Victor A. DeFiori, Captain Pete M. Dalmut, and Captain Anthony J. Siano*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Hansen*was on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Prior to sentencing, the prosecution offered two official record entries to establish a previous summary court-martial conviction of the appellant for larceny. The DA Form 20B 1 and DD Form 4932 were both admitted into evidence without objection.

Pertinent Army regulations provide that the DD Form 493 extract will be prepared from the information provided on the DA Form 20B.3 Thus, the admissibility of the DD Form 493 must turn upon the admissibility of the DA Form 20B.

Because the DA Form 20B affirmatively established that the required supervisory review had not been accomplished, the prior summary court-martial conviction was not final and should not have been considered by the trial judge in sentencing the appellant. *United States v. Heflin,*23 U.S.C.M.A. 505, 50 C.M.R. 644, 1 M.J. 131 (1975). Although the DD Form 493 extract indicates on its face that the prior conviction was final,4 the presumption of regularity surrounding this entry was rebutted by the notation to the contrary on the DA Form 20B, the original source of information for the extract. Therefore, the trial judge erred in considering the DD Form 493 extract as evidence that the prior summary court-martial was final.

The decision of the US Army Court of Military Review is reversed. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for resubmission to the Court of Military Review. In its discretion, the court may cure the error by reassessment of the sentence, or it may return the case to the trial forum for a rehearing as to the sentence.

1

. Department of the Army Form 20B (Insert Sheet to DA Form 20), Record of Court-Martial Conviction.

2

. Department of Defense Form 493, Extract of Military Records of Previous Convictions.

3

. Paragraph 2-31, Army Regulation 27-10 (Dec. 12, 1973).

4

. The date of supervisory or appellate review is entered in the block labeled, “Date Sentence Finally Approved,” on the Form 493. Thus, a date entry in this block would indicate that the conviction was, in fact, final. *See*paragraph 2-31, AR 27-10 (Dec. 12, 1973).
PECOS RIVER ABOVE SANTA ROSA LAKE, NMLatitude: 35.059Longitude: -104.761Elevation: 4773

PECOS RIVER ABOVE SANTA ROSA LAKE, NM

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Wesner Springs Site Page...



Wesner Springs

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Elk Cabin Site Page...



Elk Cabin

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Santa Fe Site Page...



Santa Fe
OSO DIVERSION NEAR CHROMOLatitude: 37.03Longitude: -106.737Elevation: 9875

OSO DIVERSION NEAR CHROMO

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Chamita Site Page...



Chamita

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Cumbres Trestle Site Page...



Cumbres Trestle

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Lily Pond Site Page...



Lily Pond
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

JACOBUS RENTMEESTER, 

No. 3:15-cv-00113-MO

Plaintiff, 

JUDGMENT

v. 

NIKE, INC., an Oregon

corporation, 

 Defendant.

MOSMAN, J., 

Based upon my Opinion and Order, 

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant Nike, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED. Mr. Rentmeester’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. All pending motions are 

denied as moot. 

DATED this 17th day of June, 2015. 

/s/ Michael W. Mosman 

MICHAEL W. MOSMAN

United States District Judge

1 – JUDGMENT
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1975 Reported in House (RH)]

<DOC>

                                                 Union Calendar No. 385
114th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 1975

                          [Report No. 114-505]

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the Securities 
  Exchange Commission to refund or credit excess payments made to the 
                              Commission.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 22, 2015

 Mr. Meeks (for himself, Mr. Hultgren, Mr. Foster, and Mrs. Carolyn B. 
Maloney of New York) introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                 to the Committee on Financial Services

                             April 19, 2016

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
                       and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the Securities 
  Exchange Commission to refund or credit excess payments made to the 
                              Commission.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Securities and Exchange Commission 
Overpayment Credit Act''.

SEC. 2. REFUNDING OR CREDITING OVERPAYMENT OF SECTION 31 FEES.

    (a) In General.--Section 31 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78ee) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(n) Overpayment.--If a national securities exchange or national 
securities association pays to the Commission an amount in excess of 
fees and assessments due under this section and informs the Commission 
of such amount paid in excess within 10 years of the date of the 
payment, the Commission shall offset future fees and assessments due by 
such exchange or association in an amount equal to such excess 
amount.''.
    (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to any fees and assessments paid before, on, or after the date of 
enactment of this section.
                                                 Union Calendar No. 385

114th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 1975

                          [Report No. 114-505]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the Securities 
  Exchange Commission to refund or credit excess payments made to the 
                              Commission.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             April 19, 2016

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
                       and ordered to be printed
```
**EXHIBIT 23.2**

 

 

**[LOGO OF HASKELL & WHITE]**

 

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-41567 of Prolong International Corporation on Form S-8 of our report dated February 14, 2003, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K ofProlong International Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2002. 

 

/s/    HASKELL & WHITE LLP 

 

HASKELL & WHITE LLP 

 

Irvine, California 

March 28, 2003
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Guohua Sun, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



| | (a) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|By: /s/ Guohua Sun                                   | 
|---------------------------------------------------- | 
|Guohua Sun
Chief Executive Officer
November 15, 2016
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 2- 18 40

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ Ph il li p D. Will ia m s ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Pla in ti

ff - App el la nt

v. Arti s R ay Hob bs , Direc to r, Arka ns as Depa rtment o f Co rrec ti on ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll l Defe nd

an t - Ap pe ll ee

__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

Uni te d S ta te s Di st ric t Co ur t fo r th e Eas te rnDis tri ctof Ark an sa s - P in e Bl uf f

__ __ __ __ __ __ Subm it te d: Jan ua ry

17 , 20 13 Fil ed : J un e 7 , 20 13 [Unpubl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re BYE an d M ELLOY, Cir cu itJu dg es , and KOPF, Dis tri ctJu dg e. 1

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM. Ph il li p W il li am s ap pe al s th e di st ric t co ur t's di sm is sa l of hi s habe a s c o rpu s pe ti ti on as un ti m el y . The is su e be fo re th is Co ur t is whe th er th e di st ric t co ur t pr op erl y

The Hon or ab le Ri ch ard G. Kop f, Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Co ur t fo r th e Dis tri ct 1 of Nebr as ka , si tt in g b y

de si gn at io n.de te rm in edth atW il li am s i s n ot en ti tl edto equi tabl e to ll in g. Howev er, t hi s i ss ue is

no w m oo t aft er th e U

. S

. Supr em e Co ur t's de ci si on in McQu ig gi n v. Perk in s, No. 12 -1 26 , 56 9 U.S.

__

_, 20 13 W L 23 00 80 6 (Ma y 28 , 20 13 ), as W il li am s as se rte d ne wly di sc ov ered ev id en ce of actua l in no cen ce as th e pr im ary gr ou nd fo r hi s pe ti ti on . The refo re, we rem an d to th e di st ric t co ur t fo r a de te rm in at io n as to whe th er W il li am s's ne w evi de nc e m eet s t he "d em an di ng " actu al -in no cen ce sta nd ard

. Id. at 2 *1 2.

__

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _

W e reco gn iz e th at th e m ag is tra te jud ge in di cat ed in a fo ot no te th at he do ub te d 2 th at W il li am s m et th e actua l-i nn oc en ce st an da rd

. Howev er, th e di st ric t co ur t di d no t di sc us s t hi s fi nd in g a nddi d n ot rel y on th is fin di ng in it s d eci si on . -2

-
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2002 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend expensing of 

environmental remediation costs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 23, 2015 

Ms. ESTY (for herself, Mr. GIBSON, Mr. LARSON of Connecticut, and Ms. 

DELAURO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to extend 

expensing of environmental remediation costs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Brownfields Redevelop5 ment Tax Incentive Reauthorization Act of 2015’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF EXPENSING OF ENVIRONMENTAL 

7 REMEDIATION COSTS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 198(h) of the Internal 

9 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘December 

10 31, 2011’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2019’’. 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2002 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) shall apply to expenditures paid or incurred 

3 after December 31, 2011. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                  5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM PURCHASE
POINT  MEDIA  CORPORATION  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  AT MARCH 31, 2000 AND THE NINE
MONTHS  THEN  ENDED  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001001065
<NAME>                        PURCHASE POINT MEDIA CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER>                                             1
<CURRENCY>                                      US DOLLARS

<S>                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1.000
<CASH>                                                   0
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    16,525
<PP&E>                                               5,913
<DEPRECIATION>                                         948
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      47,239
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              880,582
<BONDS>                                                  0
<COMMON>                                           498,134
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                            170
<OTHER-SE>                                     (1,331,647)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        47,239
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      270,129
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  99,520
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (369,649)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (369,649)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (369,649)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (.03)


</TABLE>