Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,1

 Lacy, Hassell, 

 Keenan, and Koontz, JJ. 

COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION 

COMMISSIONER OF VIRGINIA 

v. Record No. 962266 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 September 12, 1997 

A.B. CHADWELL, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY 

William C. Fugate, Judge 

 In this appeal of a judgment confirming an award in an 

eminent domain proceeding, the dispositive issue is whether the 

trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause a prospective 

commissioner based on his ownership of property directly across 

the highway from the condemnees' land. 

 In October 1994, the Commonwealth Transportation 

Commissioner (the Commonwealth) recorded a certificate condemning 

0.036 acre in fee and 0.006 acre owned by A.B. and Yvonne 

Chadwell for a permanent utility easement. The Commonwealth's 

certificate included a deposit of $69,125, its estimated value of 

the land taken, the easement, and the damage to the residue. 

 The condemned property was part of an 0.8 acre parcel owned 

by the Chadwells near the intersection of state Routes 58 and 693 

in Lee County. Two commercial structures are located on the 

property, a convenience store with a gasoline pump, leased to Lee 

Oil Company and subleased to Patty Fee Young, and a building 

 

 1Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and decision 

of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 

July 1, 1997. 
- 2 - 

leased to the Lee County Office on Youth for use as a "Teen 

Center." 

 In December 1994, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the 

trial court, requesting appointment of a commission to ascertain 

the value of the land taken and any damage which may accrue to 

the residue as a result of the taking. Lee Oil and Young 

intervened in the action. 

 Nine condemnation commissioners were summoned and seated in 

accordance with Code § 25-46.20. After the parties conducted 

their voir dire of the prospective commissioners, the 

Commonwealth moved to strike James C. Brown for cause on the 

ground that he was not impartial and disinterested. Brown had 

stated that he currently owned property directly across Route 58 

from the Chadwells' land, and that he had settled his case with 

the Commonwealth concerning property taken for the same highway 

project. 

 The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion, stating 

that a ruling automatically eliminating anyone who owned land on 

 Route 58 affected by the project would "seriously reduce the 

[number of] people that might be available" to serve as 

commissioners. Brown was removed from the panel by a peremptory 

strike. 

 After the commissioners were seated, they inspected the 

property and heard evidence concerning the value of the land 

taken and the damage to the residue caused by the take. The 
- 3 - 

chief issue in dispute was whether the taking, which eliminated 

vehicular access to the convenience store from Route 58, deprived 

the residue of its commercial value. After the taking, access to 

the convenience store was limited to entry from Route 693. 

 The commissioners returned an award of $162,275 for the land 

taken and $161,425 for the damage to the residue. The trial 

court overruled the Commonwealth’s exceptions and entered 

judgment confirming the award. 

 On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that Brown should have 

been struck from the panel for cause on the ground that he owned 

property directly across Route 58 from the condemned parcel. The 

Commonwealth argues that its right to a panel of five 

commissioners, chosen from a group of nine disinterested and 

impartial freeholders, was violated because Brown had a personal 

and financial interest in the outcome of this case. 

 In response, the Chadwells, Lee Oil, and Young 

(collectively, the Chadwells) assert that the trial court 

properly refused to strike Brown for cause. They contend that 

Brown did not have a personal or financial interest in this 

proceeding because he did not own property adjacent to the 

condemned property or property that was currently the subject of 

a present or anticipated condemnation proceeding. We disagree 

with the Chadwells. 

 The issue of just compensation in an eminent domain 

proceeding may be determined by a commission, which must be 
- 4 - 

comprised of disinterested freeholders. Code § 25-46.20. When 

nine commissioners are summoned, as occurred in this case, the 

condemnor and the landowners are each entitled to two peremptory 

strikes, after which the remaining five freeholders are appointed 

to fix the value of the property to be taken and the damage, if 

any, to the residue. Id.

 The commissioners must be "upright and capable,...without 

bias or prejudice." Chairman of the Highway Comm'n v. Fletcher, 

153 Va. 43, 46-47, 149 S.E. 456, 457 (1929). The commissioners, 

like a jury, hear the evidence, evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses, and make factual determinations in ascertaining the 

proper award due the landowner. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. 

Thompson, 249 Va. 292, 295, 455 S.E.2d 206, 207 (1995). 

 To maintain public confidence in the integrity of 

condemnation proceedings, the selection of condemnation 

commissioners is subject to the same rule applicable to the 

selection of jurors, namely, that any person who may be 

improperly influenced in the proceedings must be stricken for 

cause from the panel. See May v. Crockett, 202 Va. 438, 440-41, 

117 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (1961). The trial court is given 

discretionary authority to determine whether a prospective 

commissioner should be stricken for this reason. State Highway 

and Transp. Comm'r v. Dennison, 231 Va. 239, 243, 343 S.E.2d 324, 

327 (1986). Under its discretionary authority, the trial court 

must decide, among other things, whether any members of the 
- 5 - 

venire have a financial interest so intimately related to the 

issue at trial that they cannot sit indifferent in the cause. 

Id. 

 In May, we held that the trial court should have stricken 

for cause a commissioner who owned property adjoining the land to 

be condemned and held an equitable interest in other property in 

the same project on which condemnation proceedings were pending. 

 202 Va. at 441, 117 S.E.2d at 650. By comparison, in Dennison, 

we upheld the trial court's refusal to strike for cause two 

prospective commissioners, one who had sold the landowner some 

personal insurance policies before the taking, and the other who 

had done some construction work for the landowner three years 

before the taking. 231 Va. at 243, 343 S.E.2d at 327. The 

standard distinguishing these decisions was whether the panel 

member had a present financial interest that may have affected 

his ability to be disinterested in the cause. 

 Applying this standard to the present case, we conclude that 

the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Brown 

for cause. Like the commissioner challenged in May, Brown was 

not disinterested in the cause, because he owned property in very 

close proximity to the land taken. His ownership of that 

property could have affected his ability to render a 

disinterested valuation of the land taken, or a disinterested 

determination of the damage to the residue.2

 

 2Based on our holding, we need not address the remaining 
- 6 - 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment confirming 

the award and remand the case for a new trial. 

Reversed and remanded.

 

issues raised by the Commonwealth.