### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 6, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. R ICKY GR OVE R A AR ON
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 99-D- 2360 WalterKurt z, Judge

No. M2002- 02288-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 13, 2004

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., concur ring

. I c on c ur wi th Judg e Smith’ s le a d o pin ion ; ho we ve r, I a m w ri tin g se pa

rate ly fo r t wo re a so ns

. First, I have r econside red, a nd upon further ref lection, retre at from my

ear lier position that sentence s found to be in violation of Bl ake ly should be rema nded for a new sentenc ing he ar i n g in the trial court. Until suc h time a s there is c lear authority for our courts to dea l with Bl ake ly issues, whether by case law or by

statute, judicial ec onomy and sentencing considerations, including unif ormity of application of se ntencing fac tors, di ct at es t hat most sentence s found to be in violation of Bl ak e ly should be modified, if at a ll, by the appe llate courts. Clearly , the appe llate courts have be en g iven the authority

to do so by

the leg islature. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(c)

. Second, I want to express my conce rn and rese rvations of the waiver assertions arg ued by the State and adopte d by

my estee med collea g ue, Judge H ay es. Pre- Bl ake ly , th e status of th e la w i n Tenne ssee as established by our supre me court’s opinion in Gr ah am v . S tat e , 90 S.W .3d, 687 (Tenn. 2002), is clea

rly set forth in Judge Smith’s opinion.

I n the ca se sub judice (and in virtually every other c ase on direct ap p ea l d ea ling with the

“ Bl ake ly issue”) the State asserts that “this issue is now waived for consideration in this case sinc e the def endant could have pr eviously raised the issue under Apprendi , just as Mr. Blakely did, in the tr ia l c ou rt a ndon app e a l to thi s Court in his app e llate br ie fs .” As su min g that Mr . A aro n in thi s c a se had arg ued in the trial c ourt, under Apprendi , that no enhanc ement fa ctor other than prior c onvictions
c ou ld b e app liedabs e nt a jury fi nd ing , th e tr ia l c ou rt , a ndthi s Co urt ( pr ior to the U. S. Su pr e me Court’s opinion in Bl ake ly ) would have been oblig ated to re ject that is sue under Graham . I n Holder v. Tennesse e Judic ial Selection , 937 S.W .2d 877 (Tenn. 1996) , our supre me court stated:

We ob se rv e , ho we ve r, that tr ia l c ou rt s mus t f oll ow the dir e c tiv e s o f s up e ri or c ou rt s, particula rly when the su p er i o r court has g iven def inite expression to i ts views in a
case afte r caref

ul consideration. [citations omitted] . Acc ording ly , inf eriorcourts
are no t f re e to d isr e g ard , o n th e ba sis that th e state me nt i s o b it e r dictum , the pr on ou nc e me nt o f a

su pe ri or c ourt wh e n it

sp e a ks dir e c tly

on the ma tte r b e fo re it, particula rly when the superior court see ks to give g uidance to the bench a nd bar. To do otherwise invites c haos into the sy stem of justice.
Holder , 937 S.W .2d at 881-82. (E mphasis in bold ty pe adde d).-2-

Furthermore , it is nece ssary to note that the foc al point of Bl ake ly is the constitutional right to j ury tr ia l, a nd no t the str e ng th of e vid e nc e of e nh a nc e me nt fa c tor s, oth e r tha n that th e pr oo f m us t be esta blished bey ond a re asonable doubt. There is no clear statutory authority in Tennesse e for

a jury to determine the applicability of any enhanc ement factor. There fore , if Mr. Aaron had pre vailed in raising the Apprendi issue in the trial court a nd/or on appe al, surely the re medy

would not have been t o s t ill have the trial c ourt determine the exist ence of an e nhance ment fac tor, subject to the hy po the tic a l de te rm inatio n o f w he the r a no n- e xiste nt j ury

wo uldha ve als o f

ou ndthe sa me enhanc ement fa ctor be y ond a re asonable doubt. The maj o ri t yopinion in Bl ake ly closed with the fo llo wi ng state me nt:

The Frame rs would not have thoug ht it too m uch to demand that, before depriving
a ma n of th re e mor e y e ars of his lib e rt y , th e Sta te sh ou ld s uf fe r the mod e st inconvenienc e of submitting its acc usation to “the unanimous suffrag e of twe lve of his equals and ne ighbor s,” 4 B lackstone, Commentari es , at 343, ra ther than a lone employ ee of

the State.

Bl ake ly , 124 S.Ct . at 2543.

Th e c on c lus ion that Bl ake ly err ors in Tenne ssee a re r are ly , if eve r, harmless error bey ond a
rea sonable doubt, is supported by case law.

I n Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct

. 2078, 124 L

. Ed. 2d 182 (1993), the issue was whe ther a “constitutionally defic ient rea sonable-doubt instruction may be harmless error .” The State conc ed ed t hat the “r easona ble doubt” instruction g iven by the trial court in this first deg ree mu r d e r c a s e w a s e s s e n ti a ll y

id e n ti c a l t o th e s a me in s tr u c ti o n h e ldu n c o n s ti tu ti o n a l in C a g e v. Louisi ana , 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.C t. 328, 112 L

. Ed. 2d. 339 (1990) (per curiam). The Supreme Court of L ouisiana held that the er roneous instruction in Sullivan wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t, and upheld the con v i ct i on. The United States Supre me Court there afte r g rante d certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the c onstitut ionally defic ient instruction c ould not be harmless error . The fo llo wi ng qu ote fr om Sullivan is particula rly pertinent to the situation in the case sub judice , wher e no jury in Tennesse e has e ver ma de (a nd u n d er p re s en t statutory proce dure a

rg uably could neve r make ) the fa c tua l de te rm inatio n th a t a n e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (s ) e xists :
Consist ent with the jury -t ri al g uara ntee, the que stion [ Cha pm an v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U. S. 1 8, 87 S .C t. 82 4, 17 L . E d. 2d70 5 ( 19 67 )] i ns truc ts the re vie wi ng c ou rt to
c on sid e r i s n ot w ha t e ff

e c t th e c on sti tut ion a l e rr or mig ht g e ne ra lly

be e xpe c te d to ha ve up on a

re a so na ble jury , b ut r a the r w ha t e ff e c t it ha d u po n th e g uil ty

ve rd ic t in the case at hand. See Cha pm an , s up ra , 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct ., at 828 (a naly zing
e ff e c t of e rr or on “ ve rd ic t ob ta ine d” ). Ha rm le ss- e rr or

re vie w l oo ks , w e ha ve sa id, to t h e b a s i s o n w h i c h “ t h e j u r y actually rested its verdict.” Y

ate s v . E v att , 500 U.S. 391, 4 0 4 , 1 1 1 S

. C t

. 1 8 8 4 , 1 8 9 3 , 1 1 4 L

. E d

. 2 d 4 3 2 ( 1 9 9 1 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. T h e i n q u i r y, in o the r w or ds , is no t w he the r, in a tr ia l th a t occu rred wi tho ut the e rr or , a g uil ty
ve rd ic t wo uld su re ly ha ve be e n re nd e re d, bu t wh e the r the g uil ty ve rd ic t ac tu ally-3-

rende red in thi s tr ia l w a s su re ly un a ttribu ta bleto the e rr or . T ha t mu st b e so , b e c a us e to hy poth e s iz e a g u il ty v e r d ic t th a t w a s n e v e r in f a c t r e n d e r e d

- - n o matt e r

how inesca pable the f

indings to support that verdic t mig ht be --would violate the jury -trial g uara ntee. See Ro se v . Cl ar k , 478 U.S. 570, 578, 106 S.C t. 3101, 3105, 92 L .Ed.2d 46 0 ( 19 86 ); id ., at 59 3, 10 6 S. Ct. , a t 31 14 (B L AC KM UN , J., dis se nti ng ); Pope v

. Il lin ois , 481 U.S. 497, 509- 5 1 0 , 1 0 7 S

. Ct. 1918, 1926, 95 L .Ed.2d 439 (1987) (STEVENS, J ., dissenting)

. Once the proper role of an appellate court e ng ag ed in the Chapman inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-err or re view i n the pre sent ca se bec omes evident. Sin ce, f

or the reasons d escr ibed above, there has b een no jury ver dict wi t hi n t he m e a ni ng of th e Si x t h A m e nd m e nt , t he e nt ir e pr e m is e o f Chapm an revie w i s sim ply ab sent. There being no jury verdic t of g uilty -bey ond-a- rea sonabledoubt, the qu es tion whether the same verdic t of g uilty -bey ond-a- rea sonable-doubt
wo uldha ve be e n r e nd e re d a bs e nt the c on sti tut ion a l er ror is utte rl y me a nin g le ss. There is no object , so to speak, upon which harmless-er ror scrutiny

can ope rate

. The
m ost an app ellate c ourt can conclude is t h a t a jury woul d s ure ly hav e fo und pe ti ti one r gui lt y be yo nd a r e as ona ble doubt

-- not th at th e ju r y’ s a c tu al fi nding of gu ilty beyond a reasonable doub t woul d s ure ly not

hav e be e n di

ff e re nt abs e nt the constitutional err or

. That is not enoug h. See Y ate s, su pr a , 500 U.S., at 413- 414, 111 S.Ct ., at 1898 (SCAL I A, J ., concur ring in part and concur

ring in judgment)

. The S i x th Am endm ent re qui res m ore t han ap pellate speculation abou t a hypo th e ti c al j ur y’ s acti on, ore lse dir e c te d ve r dic ts for th e St at e would be sustain able on ap peal ; it require s an actua l jury finding of g uilty . See Bollenback v. United States , 326 U.S. 607, 614, 66 S.C t. 402, 405, 90 L .Ed. 350 (1946).

Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. at 279-80, 113 S.Ct. at 2081-82. (Emphasis in bold type adde d).

I n s umm ary , w e are ob lig a te d to fo llo w pr e c e de nt c le arl y se t fo rth by the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court, Holder , except wher e the holding of the Tennessee Supre me Court is in direct contra vention of a holding by

the United States Supreme Court c oncerning a rig ht under the Un i ted States Constit ution. Se e Te rry v . S tat e , 4 6 S. W.3 d 1 47 , 1 60 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Sta te v . Ca rru the rs , 35 S.W .3d 516, 561 n. 45 (Tenn. 2000) (the Te nnessee S u p re m e Court is not bound byany fede ral c ourt decisions other tha n those of the United States Supre me Court.)

The a ppellant in the ca se sub judice raised the Apprendi issue in a very timely manner afte r the Bl ake ly decision was filed. The issue, ther efor e, should not be consider ed wa ived. To conc lude that, if err or, it wa s harmless err or bey ond a rea sonable doubt, r equire s acc epting that a hy pothetical jury , w h ic h w o u ld h a v e n o c le ar s tatu to r y a u th o r it y to d e te r mi n e a n y th in g mo r e th a n g uilt or inn oc e nc e , w ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s b e y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t. I n o the r w or ds , t h e S t at e a rgu es t h at ev en i f D ef en d an th ad n o t“w ai v ed ” t h e i s s u e a n d h ad b ee n cl ai rv o y an ten o u gh to see how the Bl ake ly decision would be decide d befor e it was filed, he would be denie d any reme dy-4-

beca use the State of T ennesse e had not pr ovided the re medy : a proc edure for jury determination of the e xiste nc e of

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s. Respectf ully , in light of Sullivan v. Louisiana , I am unable to a cce pt this l og ic.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE