### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 22, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CH AR LES R . T UR NER
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-C- 1790 Carol Solom an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 02064-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 1, 2004

The Appellant, Ch ar le s R. T u r n e r , w a s c o n v ic te d b y a D a v id s o n Co u n ty

ju r y o f tw o c o u n ts of ide nti fy th eft and sen te nc e d to c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e s o f thr e e y e ars , w ithse rv ic e of on e y e ar i n confine ment. I n addition, Turner was ordere d to pay restitution. On appeal, Turner raises four issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the trial court erre d by failing to suppress an in-c ourt identification by a witness; (2) w hether

the evidenc e was sufficie nt to support his convictions; (3) whethe r the trial court imposed excessive se ntence s; and (4) w hether the trial court erre d in determining the amount of re sti tut ion . Af

te r re vie w of there c or d, we c on c lud e that th e ide nti fi c a tio n is su e is w ith ou t me ri t and the e vidence is leg ally sufficient to support the convictions. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the judgme nts of conviction. However, after revie w, we conclude that the t rial court failed to sentenc e the Appellant in acc ordanc e with t he 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and to prope rly determine the Appellant’ s ability to pay the ordered restitution. Acc ording ly , we r emand the c ase f or a pr oper de termination of these se ntencing issues.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t and Rem anded

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Em ma Ra e Te nn e nt ( on app e a l) a ndRe be c c a Warfi e ld ( at tr ial ), Assi stant P ub lic De fe nd e rs , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f

or the Appe llant, Charles R. Turner

.
Paul G. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l Mo or e , Sol ic ito r Ge neral; Mi chell e Chapman McIntire, Assistant Attorn e y G e n e r al; V ic to r

S. Johnson I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Ry an D. B rown, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.T he A p p el l ant was emp l o y ed a t M u sic L a n d M o t o rs f rom M arch 20 0 2 unt i l June 2 0 0 2

. I n M ay 2 0 0 1 , t he 1
A p p el l ant , whi l e em p l o y ed at C row n Fo rd, sol d a car t o P i l l o w. G ri m es had previ o usl y purchased s everal cars f rom t he A p p ell an t wh i l e e m p l o yed at vario us N ash vil l e d ea l ersh i p s.
-2- OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On the date s the crimes wer e committed, the Appellant was employ ed by Music L and Motors
as a c ar sa lesman. While employ ed at other car deale rships in the Nashvill e area , the Appellant ha d
come into c ontact with both victims, L awr encePill ow and Da rre ll Grimes, when they

purcha sed ca

rs from him. During the purc hase o f t h e v ehicles, e ach vic tim gavethe Appellant the inf ormation 1

ne c e ssa ry fo r h im t o c he c k th e ir cred it r a tin g , in c lud ing so c ia l se c urity nu mbe r, drive r l ic e ns e number, e mploy ment history , date of birth, and a ddress. Ne ither victim did business with the Ap pe llant at Mu sic L a ndMo tor s.

I n May 2002, a man pur porting to be L awr encePill ow ca lled the 1-800-L oan-by -Phone prog ram at South Trust Bank and initiated a loan application. After be ing approve d for a $4,100.00 loan, the pape rwork w as sent to the lo cal bank branc h in order to c lose the loan. A ma n claiming to be Pillow and presenting a driver license identification came to the bank late in the a fternoon on May 28, 2002. Br enda Hess, a loan spe cialist with the bank, spoke with the man fo r a pp ro xima te ly fiftee n minutes but did not f eel comforta

ble issuing the c heck de spite the identification. She testified t h at t h e man could not remember his social security

number, did not rese mble the picture on the driver lice nse, kept his hea d down whil e talking, and ref used to take his hat of

f the fir st tim e she asked. Additionally , Hess noted that the driver license presente d to her wa s a duplicate license and was only a month old. She further

noted that the Metro School B oard chec k stub presente d to verify employ ment was not a form which she re cog nized. Hess testified that she did not believe that the
ma n wa s L a wr e nc e Pill ow a nd , as a re su lt, a sk e d him to com e ba c k th e ne xt mornin g to c omp le te the loan whe n her ma nag er w ould be in. The man left the bank and did not return. He ss identified the Appellant at trial as the man she spoke with.

Pill ow wa s c on ta c te d b y

Sou th T rust Bank andinf orme d th a t so me on e wa s atte mpt ing to borrow mone y

in his name. The bank prese nted Pill ow with se curity photos of the per son, but he was initially

unab l e t o re co gn ize the Appellant. Pillow ran his cre dit hist ory and lea rned that
someone at Music L and Motors had c hecke d his credit in April 2002. He t hen spoke w ith the g e ne ra l mana g e r o f M us ic L a ndMo tor s, wh o id e nti fi e d th e Ap pe llant a s th e pe rs on in the se c urity ph oto s. Pill ow late r d isc ov e re d th a t a du pli c a te drive r l ic e ns e ha d b e e n is su e d inhis na me on Ap ri l 23, 2002.

I n J une 2002, a man using the name Dar rell Grimes orig inated a $4,500.00 loan throug h the 1-800-L oan-by -Phone prog ram at AmSouth Bank. T h e paperwor k was then se nt to the local Nashville office , wher e loan office r David Hay es attempted unsucc essfully to contact the a

pplicant at the ph on e nu mbe r l ist e d o n th e app lic a tio n. A s ho rt tim e late r, a

ma n p ur po rt ing to b e Da

rr e ll-3-

Grime s c a me int o the ba nk a ndsp ok e wi th H a y e s. He pr e se nte d a drive r l ic e ns e be ari ng thena me Dar rell Grimes and s i gn ed the nec essary loan pape rwork. H ay es spent appr ox imately forty -five minutes with the person and even c onvinced him to open a c hecking acc ount, which he did in the name of Dar rell Grimes. Part of the loan funds w ere place d in the ch ec k i n g ac co u n t, with the
rema inder be ing distributed in cash. Hay es not ed that there was some discrepanc y in the appea

ranc e of the pe rson pre sent and the driver li cense photo. Howeve r, af ter c hecking with another e mploy ee, the two ag ree d that there was e noug h of a r esemblanc e that it could be the same per son. Hay es saw the person a

few day s later when he returne d to the bank attempting to withdra w funds from the ne w che cking acc ount. The per son had no identification with him but, because Hay es rec og nized him as “Darr ell Grimes,” hewas a llowed to cash the chec k. Hay es identified the pe rson who purporte d to be Dar

rell Grimes a s the Appellant.

Grimes lea

rned a bout the incident when hecontac ted AmSouth Bank a fter r ece iving a letter informing him that a li ne of credit had be en issued in his name. Upon f urther inve stigation, Grimes le arn e d that a dupl ic a te c op y of his drive r l ic e ns e ha d b e e n is su e d o n Jun e 11 , 2 00 2. He a lso ran h is
cre dit hist ory

and lea rned that his cre dit had been checked at Music L and Mot ors. Upon speaking with the g ener al manag er there , Grimes was informed that it was the Appe llant who had conduc ted the cr edit chec k.

I n September 2002, a

Davidson County

g rand jury returne d an indictment ag ainst the Ap pe llant c ha

rg ing him wi th t wo c ou nts of

ide nti ty the ft , cla ss D fe lon ie s. F oll ow ing a jury tria l, the Appellan t was c onvicted as c harg ed. At an A pril 30, 2003 sentencing hearing, the trial court
se nte nc e d th e Ap pe llant t o tw o concu rren t se nte nc e s o f thr e e y e ars , w ithon e y e ar t o b e se rv e d in
c on fi ne me nt. Ad dit ion a lly , the c ou rt or de re d the Ap pe llant to pay re sti tut ion of $4 ,5 00 .0 0 to AmSouth Bank, $1,100.00 to L awr ence Pill ow, and $3,000.00 to Darre ll Grimes for their pecunia ry losses. The Appe llant’s motion for a new trial was de nied, with this appeal following

. Ana lys is
On appe al, the Appe llant has raise d four issues for o u r re v i ew : (1) whe ther the tria l court
err ed by failing to suppress an in-c ourt identificatio n by a witness; (2) w hether

the evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to support his convictions; (3) whether the trial court imposed ex cessive se ntence s; and (4) whe ther the tria l court er red in de termining the re spective a war ds of re stitut ion.

I. Su ppression of

In-Court Identifi cation First, the Appe llant contends that the trial court err ed in de ny ing his motion to suppress based upon what he r efe rs to as an “ unconstitutional pre-trial identification by the witness B renda Hess.” I n revie wing suppression issues, we w ill affirm the trial c ourt’s finding s of fact unl ess t he evide nce preponde rate s otherwise. State v. Odom , 9 28 S.W. 2d 18, 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . Furthe rm or e , in revie wing a trial c ourt’s ruling on a motion to suppres s , t h i s co u rt may consider pr oof adduc ed at both the suppression hea

ring and at tria l. State v. He nning , 975 S.W .2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

.-4-

I n compliance with a s u b p o en a, Hess appe are d in the courtroom on the f irst day of the Appellant’s sc heduled tria l. Hess was prese nt in the courtroom while pre-trial m otions were be ing hear d in this case, and the Ap p el l an t, who was the only Afric an American in the c ourtroom, was seate d at counse l’s table with his attorney s. The Appe llant a rg ues that this pre-trial confr ontation was unduly

sug g estive and, a s a re sult, that Hess’ subsequent in-c ourt identification wa s tainted and should have be en suppre ssed. I n support of this arg ument, the Appellant r elies u p o n t h e United States S u p re m e C ourt dec ision in Ne il v . B igg e rs , 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S. C t. 375, 382 (1972).

We find no State action in arr ang ing the courtroom “ confr ontatio n ” betwee n Hess and the Ap pe llant. We r e

je c t th e arg ument th at th e issuanc e of a su bp oe na

wh ic h c omp e ls a

wi tne ss t o appea r, thus permitting the witness to view the ac cused at trial, is the fu n cti onal equivale nt of an improper show- up.

“It is we l l settled in Tennesse e law that in the absenc e of state action in the identification proce ss, constituti onal due pr ocess rights a re not implicated; there fore , the ana ly sis adopted by the United State Supreme Court in Ne il v . B igg e rs is not approp ri at e.” Sta te v . R e id , 91 S.W .3d 247, 27 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Sta te v . D rin k ar d , 9 09 S.W. 2d13 , 1 5- 16 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ) ( re fu sin g to fin d t h e i d en t ification unduly sug g estive and violative of due proc ess bec ause the police did not
arra n ge t h e c o n fr o n t at i o n b et we en t h e de fe n d an t an d t h e w i t n es s ) ( ci t i n g State v. Dixon , 656 S.W .2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App

. 1 9 8 3 ))

. An inadvertent or ac cidental mee ting involves no a buse of the identification proc ess. State v. Burns , 777 S.W .2d 355, 358 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)

.
I n a re lated issue, the Appe llant also arg ues that “a substantial likelihood e x i s t ed t hat the wi tne ss m isi de nti fi e d th e [Ap pe llant]. ” We a lso fi ndthi s c on c lus ory arg ume nt w ith ou t me ri t. H e ss testified that she spent a

pproxi mately

fiftee n minute s i n cl ose proximi ty with the Appellant whe n he came into the bank to obtain the loan. She also testified that in the course of her j o b s h e had
rec eived training to observe people in situations such as these and that she had c are fully observe d the Appellant. Additionally , Hess testi fied that she was positive that the Appellant wa s the person who impersonate d L awr encePill ow. She a l s o n o ted that, when she first saw the A ppellant in the courtroom on t h e day

of trial, he w as sitting in a g roup with more than thirty people and that she immediately

picked him out.

Th e Ap pe llant w a s pe rm itt e d to c ro ss- e xam H e ss w ithre g ardto h e r m e mory a ndthele ng th of time since she had seen the Appellant commit the crime. The issue became one of cre dibilit y

for the jury , who we must pre sume was pr operly i n s t ru ct ed with reg ard to e y ewitness identification testimony . We conclude that the identification testimony was prope rly

admitted.

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Next, the Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insuffic ient to support his two convictions for identity theft. S pecif

ically , the Appellant c ontends the evide nce w ith reg ard to the identity

of the pe rpetrator was insuff icient to establish that he committed the crimes.-5-

I n c on sid e ri ng thi s is su e , w e app ly th e rul e that w he rethesu ff ic ie nc y of thee vid e nc e is
c ha lle ng e d, there le va nt qu e sti on fo r the re vie wi ng c ou rt is “ wh e the r, a ft e r v ie wi ng thee vid e nc e in the light most favor able to the [State], any rational trier o f fa ct co u l d h ave f

ound the essential elements of the cr i m e bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9 ( 19 79 ); se e als o Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e)

. M o re o v er , t h e State is entitled to the str o n g e s t le g it im a te v ie w o f th e e v id e n c e a n d a ll r e a s o n ab le in f e r e n c e s w h ic h may b e draw n there from. Sta te v . H

ar ris , 8 39 S.W. 2d54 , 7 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) . A ll q ue sti on s in vo lvi ng thec re dib ili ty of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven t he evidence, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of fac t. State v. Pappas , 754 S.W .2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). This court will not
rew eig h or ree valuate the evidenc e pre sented. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978)

.
“A g u il ty v e r d ic t b y th e ju r y , ap p r o v e d b y th e tria l ju d g e , a c c r e d it s th e testimonyof the witnesses for

the State and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the t heory of the State.” State v. Grac e , 49 3 S. W.2 d 4 74 , 4 76 (T e nn . 1 97 3) . A jury c on vic tio n re mov e s the pr e su mpt ionof inn oc e nc e wi th which a de fendant is ini tially cloake d and re place s it with one of g uilt, so that on appea l, a convicte d defe ndant has the bur den of d em o nstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . These r ules areapplicable to finding s of guilt predic ated upon dire ct evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a combination of both. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

.

“ A p e r s o n c o m m i t s i d e n t i f y t h e f t w h o k n o w i n g l y tr a n s f

e r s o r u s e s , w i t h o u tl a w f

u l au t h o r i t y, a means of identification of another pe rson with the intent to commit, or otherwise pr omote, car

ry on, or fa cilitate any

unlawful a ctivi t y

. ” T en n. Code Ann. § 39-14- 150(a) (2003). A “ means of ide nti fi c a tio n” inc lud e s “ a ny na me or nu mbe r that may

be us e d to ide nti fy

a sp e c if ic ind ivi du a l, including” their name , social sec urity number, date of birth, off

icial s ta te o r g o v e rnment issued driver license or identification number. T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 14-150(b) (1).

Th e Ap pe llant d oe s n ot d isp utethat so me on e acqu ir e d d up lic a te drive r l ic e ns e s f or bo th L awr encePill ow and Da

rre ll Grimes and then pr esente d themself to the banks in or der to acquire , or attempt to acquir e, loan proce eds wit hout the knowledge or consent of t he victims. The Appe llant
mere ly arg ues that the proof

is insufficient to show bey ond a re asonable doubt that h e was that pers o n

. Specifica lly , the Appellant a rg ues that the only

testimonydirec tly

identify ing him as the pe rp e tr a tor c a me fr om B re nd a He ss a nd Da vid Hay e s, the tw o loan of fi c e rs

. Th e Ap pe llant a sse rt s that H e s s ’ te s ti mo n y

s h o u ldn o t h a v e b e e n a d mi tt e d b e c au s e it w a s tain te d b y

a p r e

- tr ial identification o f t h e Appellant and w as, there fore , unreliable . Additionally , he asse rts that the testimony of David Hay es wa s unduly bolstered by

Hess’ te stimony . He c ontends that had the tria l court prope rly

suppressed Hess’ identification, Hay es’ identification would have be en insuffic ient to sustain the verdict. We disag ree

. As prev i o u s l y

d et er m i n ed , t h e i d en t i fi ca t i o n t es t i m o n y o f B re n d a H es s wa s proper ly admitted into evidence . The evidence befor e the jury established that He ss positi vely identified the Appe llant as the pe rson who pre sented himself to her as L awr encePill ow, g ave he r a copy of Pillow’s driver license, his socia l security number, and date of birth in an attempt to obtain a $4,100.00 loan. Hay es-6-

a lso po sit ive ly

ide nti fi e d th e Ap pel lan t a s th e pe rs on wh o p re se nte d h ims e lf a s D arr e ll G ri me s in order to obtain a $4,500.00 l oan from AmSouth Bank. He testified that the Appe llant presente d a cop y o f G r im e s ’ d r iv e r

li c e n s e , a s w e ll a s v e r if

y in g G r im e s ’ a d d r e s s a n d s o c ia l s e c u r ity n umber. Mo re ov e r, str on g c ir c ums ta nti a l e vi den ce again st the Ap pe llant w a s p re se nte d to thejury . B oth victims had purcha sed car s from the Appellant and had g iven him pe rsonal information necessa ry to chec k their cr edit, including soc ial security and drive r license numbers. Eac h victim’s c redit wa s chec ked, without authorization, at Music L and Motors, the de aler ship wh er e t h e Appellant wa s e mpl oy e d, jus t prior

to the iss ua nc e of

dupl ica te driv e r l ic e ns e s f or bo th v ic tim s. Th e rewa s a lso testimonyfrom Hay es, Grimes, and a co- worke r of the Ap p el l an t reg arding a distinctive way that the Appellant he ld a pen. This evidenc e, when considere d in the light most favor able to the State, is more than suff

icient to support the Appellant’ s convictions. This issue is withoutmerit.

III . Ex c e ssi ve Se nt e nc ing Third, the Appe llant asserts that the tria l court imposed excessive s en t en ces in his case. When there is a c halleng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of

a sente nce, it is the duty

of this court to conduct a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the trial court are corr ect. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). This pr esumption is “conditioned upon thea ff irmativ e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tria l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 16 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) ; se e als o S tate v. Jone s , 883 S.W .2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1994) . “I f the trial c ourt ap p l i es inappropriate fa ctors or otherwise fai l s t o fo l l o w the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, the pre sumption of corre ctness fa lls.” State v. Shelton , 8 54 S.W. 2d11 6, 12 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ). Th e Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts provide that the bur den is on the Appe llant to show the impropriety of th e s en t en ce. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments. The Appe llant was convic ted of two c ounts of identity theft, cla ss D felonies, f

or which the appropriate sentence rang e is two to four y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 4) (2003). The presumptive sente nce to be imposed by the trial court f

or a class D felony is the minimum sentenc e within the applicable rang e unless there are enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors prese nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003). I f there are enhanc ement fa ctors pre sent but no miti g ating fac tors, the court may

set the sentenc e abovethe minimum. Id . at (d). If bot h enhancement and mitigating fac tors are prese nt, the court must start at the minimum sentence , enhanc e the se ntence as approp ri at e for

the enhanceme nt fac tors, then re duce the sentenc e for all applicable mitigating fac tors. Id . at (e ). The w eig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discretion of the trial judg e. Shelton , 85 4 S.W. 2d a t 12 3. Ho we ve r, the se nte nc e mus t be a de qu a te ly su pp orte d by the re c or d a ndc omp ly wi t h t h e p urposes a nd principles of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Ac t. Sta te v . M os s , 7 2 7 S. W.2d 229, 237 (Tenn. 1986)

. The Appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed in imposing a sentenc e g reater than the min imu m of

tw o y e ars fo r e a c h c on vic tio n a nd , f urthe r, that th e tria l cou rt ’s se nte nc ing de c isi on is not entitled to the presumption of corr ectne ss becaus e t h e co u rt enha nced the sentenc es without sp e c if y ing a ny statut ory e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s a ndfaile d to app ly thr e e app lic ablemit ig a tin g fa c tor s.T h e A p p e llan t also a lleg e s tha t t h e tria l co u rt e rr e d b y failing to a p p ly m iti g a ting fac to rs . F irst, he a sse rts 2

t hat t he t r i al co ur t sh oul d hav e app l i ed f act or (1) , t hat t he Ap pel l ant ’ s cri mi nal co nduct nei t her caus ed nor t hr eat ene d

se rio u s b o d ily inj u ry. See T enn

. Co de Ann. § 40

- 35

- 11 3(1) ( 20 03 )

. T he St at e c oncedes t hat t hi s f act or s houl d hav e been ap p l i ed , and t hi s co urt has p revio u sly c o n c l ud ed t hat m i t i gat i ng f act o r ( 1 ) may be co nsi d ered i n s ent enci ng d e te rm ina tio n s fo r p ro p e rty o ff e n se s. St at e v
. D an i el Jam es Co s grove , No. M 20 01

- 02 12 7- CCA- R3- CD ( T e n n

. Cr i m. A p p . at N a sh v ill e , N o v . 1 5 , 2 0 0 2 ), per m
. t o appe al de ni ed, (T e n n . 2 0 0 3 ). A d d iti o n a lly, the A p p e llan t as se rts th a t t h e trial co u rt sh o u ld h a v e a p p lied m iti g a ting fac to r (1 3 ), the c a tc h a ll

m iti g a to r, b a se d up o n b o th h is lo n g r e c o rd o f sta b le e m p lo ym e n t a n d h is s tro n g s u p p o rtive fa m ily ties in the c o m m u n ity. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 3 (13 ). W e no t e t hat t hi s co urt has s t at ed t hat wo rk et hi c and f am i l y co nt ri b ut i o n are
e n tit le d to fav o ra b le c o n sid e ra tio n un d e r T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 3 (1 3 ). St at e v. M cK n i ght , 900 S .W .2 d 3 6 , 5 5 (T e n n . C r im . A p p . 1 9 9 4 ). M o re o v e r, this c o u rt h a s h e ld tha t em p lo ym e n t sho u ld b e c o n sid e re d in

se n te n c in g a d e fen d a n t. St at e v
. Kel l ey , 3 4 S .W .3 d 4 7 1 , 4 8 2 -8 3 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ). T h e trial c o u rt sh o u ld

cons i der t he evi dence pre s ent ed an d m ake a det er mi nat i on as t o t he appl i cat i on an d wei gh t of t hes e f act ors , as wel l as
a n y o the rs w h ic h m a y b e a p p lied o n the fac ts o f t h e c a se

. -7- The trial c ourt made the following pronounce ments on the rec ord prior to sente n ci n g the Ap pe llant:

THE C OURT:

. . . H e s h o w s n o r e mo r s e , a n d a c c o r d in g to 4 0 [- ]3 5

- 1 02 De fe nd a nt s ho uldbe imp os e d to pr e ve nt c ri me of re mot e re sp e c t of the la w. Wel l, with this gentlema n’s beha vior pre and post trial it’s undermined re spect for the law beca use h e h as t old his sis ter, at least, and I assume his other six si blings that he did n’ t do thi s a c t.

There fore , what re spect for the law can the children, and his f amily have f

or a judicial sy stem that they now per ceive to be unfa ir. Not only has he undermined Mr . G ri me s, a ndMr . Pi llo w, he ’s un de rm ine d the le g a l sy ste m, o r the jus tic e sy ste m, and that is almost as distracting as the pe rsonal proble ms that Mr. Pil low, and Mr. Grimes havesuffe red. . . .

It say s it is a lso to e nc ou ra g e a

fe de ra l r e ha

bil itatio n f

or theDe fe nd a nt. Wel l, sin c e theDe fe nd a nt do es no t a dmi t to his of fe ns e , a ndsh ow s a

bs olu te ly no t a smithereens of remorse , the reha bilitation proc ess is g oing to ha ve to be alter ed. I am g oing t o sentenc e him to pay the re stitut ion of the victims. The potential for reha bilitation pursuant to 40[ -]35-13 section 45 without a long sentenc e, I don’t think [the De fe nd a nt] w ou ld be re ha bil itate d. Th e re fo re , I

wi sh I c ou ld s e nte nc e him

to more, but I ’m g oing to sentenc e him to two three y ear terms to run conc urre nt, which I reg ret, but I

have no othe r choic e.
After revie w, it is appare nt that the Appellant is corr ect that the t rial court failed to spec ify
on there c or d it s applic a tio n o f any e nh a nc e me nt o r m iti g a tin g fa c tor s o r e ve n th e app ro priate sentenc ing r ang e. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-210(f) mandates, “ Whenever the court 2 imposes a sentenc e, it shall place on the re cord e ither ora lly or i n wr i ting what enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors it f

ound, if any , as well as finding s of fa ct as re quired by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-209.” To f

acilitate a ppellate r eview, the trial court “ must p l ac e o n t h e record its re asons forW e no t e t hat t he t ri al co urt ’ s reco nsi d erat i o n o f t he A p p el l ant ’ s sent ence s ho ul d b e co nd uct ed i n vi ew o f t he 3

recent de ci si o n of t he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt i n Bl ake ly v. Was hi ngt on , 54 2 U

. S.__

_ _ _ , 12 4 S. C t

. 25 3 1 (20 0 4 ).
-8- arrivi ng a t the fi na l sen te nc ing de c isi on , ide nti fy themit ig a tin g a nde nh a nc e me nt f a c tor fo un d, state the spec ific fa cts supporting eac h enhanc ement factor found, and articulate how the mitig ating and enhanc ement fa ctors have been evaluate d and balanced in de termining the sentenc e.” Sta te v . P oo le , 94 5 S. W.2 d 9 3, 96 (T e nn . 1 99 7) ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(f ).

T h e r e c o r d r e f

le c ts th a t, ina d d it io n to f a il in g to s p e c if

y a n y s tatu to r il y

e n umera ted enhanc ement fac tors, the trial court in e nhancing the Appellant’ s sentencefrom two to three y ear s app e ars to hav e c on sid e re d th e Ap pe llant’ s la c k o f r e mor se , la c k o f r e sp e c t f or thela w, a ndhis
amena bilityto reha

bilitation, none of which are proper considerations in determining the leng th of a sente nce. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2003) . As the trial court is the primary court for sentenc ing, and beca

use her e the c ourt failed to impose a sentenc e in ac cord an ce w ith sentencing gu i d el i n es , we re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g. 3

IV. Restitution Am ounts

L astly , the Appellant a sserts that the t ri al co u rt err ed in orde ring the Appellant to pay restitution in the f

ollowing amounts: $4,500.00 t o AmSouth Bank, $1,100.00 to L awr encePill ow, and $3,000.00 to Dar

rell Grimes.

A s e nte nc ing c ou rt

ma y dir e c t a de fe nd a nt to mak e re sti tut ion to the vic tim fo r p e c un iary

los s a s a c o n d it io n o f p r o b a ti o n

. See Ten n. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 04 (a ) ( 20 03 ); Sta te v . A lfo rd , 970 S.W .2d 944, 945 (Tenn. 1998)

. Whenever the t rial court believes restitution may be proper or if the victim or the district attorney g ener al re quests restitution the court shall order the pre sentenc e off icer to include documentation reg arding the nature and amount of th e v i ct i m ’s pecunia ry loss in the prese ntence report. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-304(b) . The statute de fines " pecunia ry loss" to be:
(1) All spec ial damag es, but not g ener al damag es, as substantiated by evidenc e in the
rec ord or a s ag ree d by

the def endant; and
(2) Rea sonable out-of

-pocke t expenses incurre d by the vi ct i m re sulting fr om the filing of char g es or c ooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the off ense; provided, that pay ment of spec ial prosec utors shall n o t b e co n sidered an out-ofpocket e x pense.
Id . at (e ). Specia l damag es are those which are "the actual, but not the nece ssary , result of the injury
com pl ain ed o f, and whi ch i n fac t f ol lo w i t as a nat ural and pro x im ate con seq uen ce." Sta te v . Le wis , 917 S.W .2d 251, 255 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Gene ral da mag es ar e those whic h are "the nece ssary and im med iat e con seq uen ce of th e wro ng." Id

.-9-

It is unnecessa

ry for the sentenc ing court to determine restitution in accor dancewith the strict rules of damag es applied in c ivil cases. State v. Johnson , 968 S.W .2d 883, 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Howe ver, thoug h the rules of damag es ar e relaxed, they are not completely

discarde d. Sta te
v
. D a v id D

. B o ttoms , No . M2000-02080-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 31, 2001). The sum of restitution ordere d must be rea sonable but does not haveto mirror or e qual the prec ise pec uniary

loss. Sta te v . S

mi th , 898 S.W .2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). There is no set formula or method for determining the amount. Johnson , 968 S.W .2d at 886. The se ntencing court must consider not only the vi ctim's loss, but also the financ ial resour ces and future a bilityof the Appellant to pay

or perform i n d et er m i n ing the amount and method of pay ment. Tenn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 04 (d ); S ta te v
. B ottoms , 8 7 S

. W

. 3d 95,108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) . An orde r of
re sti tut ionwh ic h o bv iou sly c a nn ot b e fu lf

ill e d s e rv e s n o p ur

po se fo r the Ap pe llant o r the vic tim

. Johnson , 968 S.W .2d at 886.
A victim seeking restitution mustprese nt sufficient e vidence to a llow the trial court to make a reasonable , reliable determination as t o the amount of the vic tim’s loss. David D. Bottoms , No. M2 00 0- 02 08 0- CCA -R 3- CD . G e ne ra l st a te me nts by a vic tim re g ard ing thea mou nt o f his or he r l os s containing no explanation as to how the victim ar ri ved at the amount are insuff icient. Sm ith , 898 S.W .2d at 747. While a victim’s test i m o n y s t anding alone may be suff icient to establish specia l dam a g e s f

o r th e p u r p o s e s o f r e s ti tu ti o n , th e v ic ti m s h o u lde xp lainh o w h e o r s h e arr iv e d a t the
a mou nt o f d a ma g e s r e qu e ste d. F urthe r, do c ume ntatio n sup po rt ing thevic tim ’s te sti mon y is h e lpf ul.
When ordering restitution, the trial court shall specify the amount of time and pay ment and may permit payment or performanc e of r estitution i n installments. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304( c). Howeve r, the c ourt may not establish a payment or performanc e sche dule which e x tends bey ond the maxi mum statutory

term of pr obation supervision that could have been imposed f or the off ense. Id

. (a ) A m South Ban k

With re g ard to AmS ou th B a nk , the Ap pe llant co nc e de s tha t the mon e tary los se s r e su lti ng to the bank f rom the fr audulent loan we re spe cial dama g es and, thus, prope rly rec overa ble. Howeve r, he ar g ues that the e vidence prese nted failed to suf ficiently establish that the bank suff ere d an ac tual pecunia ry loss of $4,500.00. He a sserts that the proo f shows t hat while the origina l loan was for $ 4 , 5 0 0

. 0 0 , th e p r o o f a ls o e s ta b li s h e d th a t th e A p p e ll a n t d id n o t ta k e th e e n ti r e a mo u n t of the proce eds with him in cash but rathe r deposited pa rt of it in a che cking acc ount. We disag ree with the Appellant’s assertion and find the proof suf ficient to establish that the Appellant re ceive d proce eds in the amount of $4,500.00 from a fraudulent loan. The State submitted loan documentation in the amount of $ 4 , 5 0 0

. 0 0. The loan of fice r, Da vid Hay es, testified that the Appellant opene d a che cking acc ount with part of the procee ds and took the remainder in cash. The
rec ord also establishes that the Appellant later w ithdrew $450.00 by chec k from the a ccount. The re is nothing in the re cord to indicate that the bank r ecove red any of their loss from the loan. The orde r of re stitut ion is corre ct.-10-

(b) Law renceP illow /Darre ll Grim es
Wit h reg ard to the amounts awa rded Pillow and Grimes f

or lost wag es during the prosec ution
an d i n vestig ation of the c ase, a s well as the wa g es they lost to procure ne w driver licenses, the Appellant asse rts that the awa rded amounts were not r easona ble under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-35- 304(e) (2). That statute defines “pec uniary loss” to be “[r]easonable out- of-poc ket expenses incurre d by

th e v i ct i m re sulting fr om the filing of char g es or c ooperating in the investigation and prosec ution of the offe nse[.] ” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 304(e) (2).

Th e reis no dis pu te that los t wa g e s are pe c un iary los se s un de r there sti tutionstatut e , a s th is court has rec og nized lost wag es as part of a restituti on order

. See Sta te v . V an de rfo rd , No. 01-C-01- 91 01 -C C- 00 00 4 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. a t Na sh vil le , Au g. 22 , 1 99 1) ; Sta te v . Co wart , No. 01-C-01- 9508-CC-00251 (Tenn. Cri m

. App. at Na shville, Nov. 22, 1996). I ndeed, the Appellant
a c kn ow le dg e s th a t lo st w a g e s a rere c ov e ra

ble , b ut h e a sse rt s th a t pa rt of thepe c un iary

los s inthi s c a se wa s f

or ou t- of -p oc ke t e xpe ns e s o r l os t w a g e s th e me n in c ur re d for matte rs oth e r tha n th os e direc tly related to the prosec ution of the ca se. See T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 0 4 ( e ) ( 2 )

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Ap p e ll a n t d is p u te s th e mo n e y a w ar d e d f

o r lo s t w a g e s w h e n th e v ic ti ms w e r e p r o c u r in g new driver lice nses.
Whil e it m a y

be true that th e tim e thevic tim s sp e nt i n h a vin g ne w dri ve r l ic e ns e s is su e d d id not result “fr om the filing of char g es or c ooperating in the invest i gat i o n and prose cution of the offe nse,” the Appellant’s a rg ument ap p ea rs to ignor e sub-se ction (e) (1) of Tenne ssee Code An n o t at ed s ec t i o n 4 0 -3 5 -3 0 4 , wh i ch s t a t e s t h atre s t i t u t i o n m ayb e o rd er ed fo r acr i m e v i ct i m 's "pe cuniary

loss," def ined as a ll special dama g es substantiated by evidenc e in the re cord or

as ag ree d to by the Appellant but not to include g ener al damag es. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-304(b) , (e) (1) (2003).
Clearly , the lost wag es disputed by the Appellant we re spe cial dama g es. The w ag es the victims lost while proc uring new driver lice nses wer e an actua l r esult of the injury complained of , which followe d as a natural and pr ox imate conse quence . The Appe ll an t h a d duplicate driver lice nses issued in the victim’s names. I f this had not occur red, no rene wal of the licenses would have be en required

. I ndeed, w ith reg ard to Mr. Grimes, the Appe llant had his driver lice nse cla ssification chang ed, re sulting in additional loss of wag es.
The statute a lso require s that restitution be made only wher e spec ial damag es ar e "substantiate d by

evidenc e in the re cord." I n this c ase, Pill ow testified that he ha d missed a total of fi ve day s o f w or

k d ue to the Ap pe llant’ s a c tio ns a ndthat hema de $2 25 per day

. He sp e c if ic a lly testified that he suff

ere d approximately

$1,100.00 in lost wag es. Grimes te s t i fi ed that he missed twelve day s of work due to the Appellant’s c onduct and that he earned appr ox imately $1,400.00 per
we e k. He te sti fi e d th a t hee a sil y los t $3 ,0 00 .0 0 inwa g e s. Th us , a ft e r r e vie wi ng there c or d, th is
c ou rt fi nd s th a t th e vic tim s’ te sti mon y abo ut the ir wa g e s, wh ic h w a s u nc ha lle ng e d b y theAp pe llant, was suff icient to war

rant re stitut ion f

or lost wa g es in the amounts order ed. The Appe llant’s issue is without m erit.-11-

Notwithstanding the proper awa rds, the re cord is s i l en t with reg ard to a ny finding of the Appe l l an t ’s ability

to pay the orde red r estitution during his period of probation. The r ecor d
e sta bli sh e s that the Ap pe llant is e mpl oy e d a s a c a r sa le sman bu t no me nti onis m a de of his e arn ing s. As this is a require d finding presc ribed by the statute, we must remand for a dete rm ination of the Appellant’s a

bilityto pay

the orde red r estitution wit hin the schedule d period.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g , we a ff irm the Ap pe llant’ s judg me nts of c on vic tio n. Th e c a se is
rema nded to the Da vidson County Criminal Court for de terminations of the a ppropriate sentenc es and the Appe llant’s ability to pay the orde red r estitution consist ent with this opini on.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE