[Cite as Pike v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-814.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

KENNETH PIKE, ET AL., :

Plaintiffs-Appellees, :

No. 111688

v. :

PETER W. WILSON, ET AL., :

Defendants-Appellants. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 16, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV-21-957143

Appearances:

Weltman, Weinberg & Reis, Co., L.P.A., and Roy J. 

Schechter, for appellees. 

Herman Law, LLC, and Edward F. Herman, for appellant. 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

Defendant-appellant Peter Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals the trial court’s 

decision granting plaintiffs-appellees’ Kenneth Pike, Donna Anderson, and Kay Pike 

Easton (“the victims”) motion for judgment on the pleadings, which entitled the 
victims to recover a total of $99,978.78 plus any postjudgment interest from Wilson. 

After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm. 

In 2015, Wilson entered a guilty plea to securities fraud in violation of 

R.C. 1707.44(G), a third-degree felony, and aggravated theft in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3), a fourth-degree felony. Wilson was sentenced to community -

control sanctions for a term of five years and ordered to pay restitution to the 

victims. Specifically, Wilson was ordered to pay $20,000 to Kenneth Pike; $30,000 

to Donna Anderson; $30,000 to Kay Pike Easton. In 2018, the court held a status 

hearing to obtain the status of restitution. This transcript is not in the record before 

us, but the docket indicates that community control was continued after this 

hearing. Exactly five years after Wilson’s initial sentencing hearing, a single docket 

entry in July 2020 provided that community control was terminated. 

In August 2020, the victims obtained a certificate of judgment from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Clerk of Courts demonstrating the 

restitution owed to the victims.

In December 2021, the victims filed a creditor’s bill against Wilson and 

the entities PayPal, Upwork Inc., Upwork Escrow, Inc., and Upwork Global Inc.,

1

seeking the full restitution with interests and costs, for a total of $99,978.78 plus any 

interest accrued thereafter. 

1 The victims alleged in the creditor’s bill that Wilson was a registered user, client, 

or freelancer for the Upwork entities, and received payment for his services via the other 

named defendant, PayPal. 
Wilson timely answered, disputing the validity and enforceability of the 

creditor’s bill, and asserting several affirmative defenses. Wilson later amended his 

answer and counterclaimed seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the 

victims, setting forth various arguments alleging that the victims improperly and 

unlawfully obtained the certificate of judgment, and that the certificate of judgment

was improperly executed. 

The victims moved the court for judgment on the pleadings and 

dismissal of Wilson’s counterclaim, arguing that the court’s sentencing order in 

Wilson’s criminal case entitled them to collect the restitution. Wilson responded 

with his own combined motion for judgment on the pleadings and opposition to the 

victims’ motion, arguing that his obligation to pay restitution extinguished when he 

was released from community control.

The trial court denied Wilson’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

and granted the victims’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court ordered 

Wilson to pay the judgment, and enjoined Wilson from receiving any “money, 

properties, goods and effects” from the other defendants until the judgment was 

paid in full, including postjudgment interest. 

It is from this order that Wilson appeals, assigning two errors for our 

review. 

1. The trial court erred in concluding that criminal restitution orders 

are enforceable after the expiration of community control. 

2. The trial court erred in concluding at the close of pleadings that the 

purported judgment creditors did not act under color of state law to 
deprive the previously convicted citizen of his protections under the 

Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. 

Both of Wilson’s assignments of error allege that the trial court erred in 

granting the victims’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. A trial court’s decision 

on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is reviewed

de novo. Pincus v. Dubyak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110135, 2021-Ohio-3034, ¶ 17.

In his first assignment of error, Wilson contends that the trial court 

erred in determining that Wilson was still required to pay restitution because when 

his community-control sanctions expired, so did his requirement to pay restitution. 

Wilson directs us to R.C. 2929.15, which empowers a court to impose 

community-control sanctions in lieu of a prison sentence. Wilson points out that 

each subsequent code section pertains to different types of community-control 

sanctions, including R.C. 2929.16, pertaining to residential sanctions; R.C. 2929.17,

pertaining to nonresidential sanctions; and R.C. 2929.18, pertaining to financial 

sanctions. Restitution was imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.18. Wilson argues that 

R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) mandates that “[t]he duration of all community control sanctions 

imposed on an offender under this division shall not exceed five years” and that 

when read in pari materia with the other sections, this includes financial sanctions. 

Wilson notes that “[i]t is clear from the statutory scheme that financial sanctions, 

e.g. restitution, are part of a criminal sentence” and that criminal sentences “are not 

eternal.” Wilson invites us to consider that this natural reading of the statute 

suggests that when community-control sanctions are terminated, any financial 
sanctions imposed as part of community control must also be terminated and barred 

from pursuit in a civil action once the community-control sanctions are terminated.

Wilson does not point us to any caselaw that supports this contention. 

The victims rely on State v. Aguirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio4603, 41 N.E.3d 1178, in rebutting Wilson’s argument. In Aguirre, defendant 

Aguirre applied to have the record of her felony conviction sealed pursuant to R.C. 

2953.32(A)(1). As in the instant matter, Aguirre was sentenced to communitycontrol sanctions for a term of five years and ordered to pay restitution. In 2007,

her community-control sanctions were terminated after five years even though the 

restitution was still outstanding; in 2012, she applied to have her record sealed. The

state objected to Aguirre’s request to seal her record because the restitution was still 

outstanding. The Ohio Supreme Court held that “an offender does not attain a final 

discharge, and is thus ineligible to have his or her felony conviction records sealed 

under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1), until all court-ordered restitution has been paid.” Id. at 

¶ 29. The Aguirre majority reasoned that “[b]ecause Aguirre still owes restitution 

in this case, she has not received a final discharge of her conviction and cannot have 

her records sealed.”

We recognize that the Aguirre holding appears limited to cases where 

an offender seeks sealing of their record under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). Wilson strongly 

encourages us to apply this narrow interpretation, noting that the cases are easily 

distinguished because sealing a record is a privilege, and continuing punishment 
implicates various rights that an offender has. Wilson points to no caselaw 

supporting this contention. 

We find, however, that the Aguirre court’s reasoning is instructive in 

the instant matter. The court acknowledges that “[w]hile community-control 

sanctions end after five years, R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), the obligation to pay restitution 

does not expire due to the passage of time.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 28, citing 

R.C. 2929.18. Recently, in State v. P.J.F., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4152, the 

Supreme Court determined the meaning of “final discharge” under the record 

sealing statutes as applied to R.C. 2929.17 for nonresidential sanctions, noting that 

when considering the context of the different types of sanctions in R.C. 

2929.17 and 2929.18, the meaning of “final discharge” or completion of 

a community-control sanction is clear. A defendant completes a 

financial community-control sanction by paying it, and a defendant 

completes a nonresidential community-control sanction at the end of 

its duration.

Id. at ¶ 18. 

The P.J.F. Court continued to clarify that its holding in Aguirre 

“indicated that the only way the defendant could have received a final discharge 

from her financial community-control sanction under R.C. 2929.18 was by 

satisfaction of her payment obligation[.]” Id. at ¶ 19. While we note that P.J.F. also 

dealt with sealing a record, we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning instructive in the 

instant matter.

We are further persuaded by the language in R.C. 2929.18(D). This 

section provides that “[a] financial sanction of restitution imposed * * * is an order 
in favor of the victim of the offender’s criminal act that can be collected through [the 

processes described in R.C. 2929.18(D)(1)-(3)].” This section further authorizes a 

victim to “[o]btain execution of the judgment or order through any available 

procedure” once the financial sanction is imposed as a judgment or order. R.C. 

2929.18(D)(2). The availability of these remedies made available to victims to 

collect restitution from the offender exemplify the General Assembly’s intent to 

allow for actions such as the one that the victims in this matter initiated. We further 

note that there is no temporal restriction in this code section, so we are unpersuaded 

by Wilson’s contention that the victims were foreclosed from bringing a civil action 

since they did not bring it before the expiration of Wilson’s community-control 

sanctions. 

Finally, we acknowledge Wilson’s argument that R.C. 2929.15(A)(1)

mandates that community-control sanctions shall not exceed five years and that

financial sanctions, including restitution, are included under the umbrella of 

“community-control sanctions.” The absurd result principle is an exception to the 

rule that statutes should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. State ex 

rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office, 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶ 22. “If strict construction of a statute would result in 

‘unreasonable or absurd consequences,’ a construing court may reject the strict 

construction doctrine, because courts must presume that the legislature enacted a 

statute for a ‘just and reasonable result.’” Yoby v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-3366, 155 

N.E.3d 258, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting Clay at ¶ 23. If we were to hold that financial 
sanctions expire after five years, offenders may be incentivized to simply hold out 

on paying restitution for as long as possible until the natural termination of their 

community-control sanctions. This is consistent with the Aguirre holding that 

found exception to the statutory five years when the financial sanctions were 

imposed in the context of defendants seeking sealing of their records. We therefore 

find that financial sanctions imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.18 are not fully satisfied

and a defendant is not discharged from this obligation until the financial sanctions 

are satisfied or paid. 

Wilson’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

In his second assignment of error, Wilson alleges that the trial court 

erred in finding that his protections under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. 

Constitution were not violated. 

“It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects 

against successive prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Martin, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 87618, 2007-Ohio-1833, ¶ 15, citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 

688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 

445-446, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Double-jeopardy protections 

“protect against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after 

acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) 

‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 

2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 15, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds,

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989).

We note that none of the three abuses are implicated here. Plainly, 

Wilson was ordered to pay the restitution in his sole criminal prosecution and 

sentence for the crimes. The restitution was never paid, so the victims utilized their 

statutorily granted right to obtain execution of the judgment via a creditor’s bill. 

Wilson also argues that “[a] reasonable person could therefore conclude that [the 

victims] thereby impersonated the State of Ohio to enforce a criminal penalty 

against Wilson which was no longer enforceable.” We are unpersuaded by this 

argument. At no point does the record indicate that the victims attempted to collect 

the restitution that they are entitled to by impersonating the state. 

We further note that the victims’ action was explicitly authorized by 

the General Assembly. “No financial sanction imposed under this section or section 

2929.32 of the Revised Code shall preclude a victim from bringing a civil action 

against the offender.” R.C. 2929.18(H). 

The trial court did not err in granting the victims’ motion for judgment 

on the pleadings, nor were Wilson’s double-jeopardy protections violated as a result 

of the victims initiating a civil action to recover the restitution to which they were 

entitled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR