PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ RONALD MUKASA MAITEKI, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MARTEN TRANSPORT LTD., Defendant - Appellee, and VOYAGER EXPRESS, INC., Defendant. No. 15-1429

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:12-C V-02021-WJM-CBS)

________________ _________________ Submitted on the briefs: * Andrew Nyombi, Emejuru & Nyombi, L. L.C., Silver Spring, Maryland, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Stephen A. DiTullio and Jo hn C. Gardner, DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, Wisconsin, for Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _________________

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 13, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Before HARTZ , HOLMES , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ HARTZ , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Ronald Maiteki appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Marten Transport Ltd., on his claim that Marten violated the reinvestigation provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). Exercising jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Marten is a transportation compa ny that employed Mr. Maiteki as an over-the-road truck driver from March to December 2011. Mart en has a duty under federal regulations to cond uct background checks on driver s. It therefore receives information from and provides informati on to HireRight, a consumer reporting agency (CRA) that publishes “Drive-A-C heck” (DAC) reports on truck drivers’ driving records. When describing Mr. Mait eki’s work record to HireRight after his employment ended, Marten used code 938, which stands for “Unsatisfactory Safety Record,” meaning that the driver did not meet the company’s safety standards. Aplee. Supp. App. at 176. Mr. Maiteki alleges that other comp anies declined to employ him after Marten’s information appeared on his DAC report. He disputed the information, telling HireRight that “Unsatisfactory Safe ty Record” was incorr ect because he “has no accidents/incidents listed on the report.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 84. HireRight3 asked Marten to send support for its statemen t and to check its reco rds to determine if it had made an error. Ann Konsela, an employee in Mart en’s human resources department, conducted the investigation. She review ed the information sent by HireRight, Mr. Maiteki’s personnel file, and the company’s computer data, including information in its Human Resources Image Screen (HRIS) records. Ms. Konsela saw that Mr. Maiteki’s file contained a July 16, 2011 Driver/Vehicle Examination Report by th e Illinois State Po lice stating that Mr. Maiteki had traveled between six and ten miles per hour over the speed limit; accompanying the report was a contemporan eous written police warning indicating he had been speeding. In addition, th e file included a “Written Warning” from Marten placing Mr. Maiteki on a six- month probation for this incident. In HRIS, Ms. Konsela also saw commen ts dated October 5, 2011, regarding data gathered on Mr. Maite ki’s driving speeds. Du ring the period it employed Mr. Maiteki, Marten contracted with a company called SpeedGauge to install speed-monitoring devices on Marten’s trucks . HRIS showed that SpeedGauge had recorded Mr. Maiteki’s truck traveling 12 miles per hour over the speed limit in Connecticut in October 2011 and had recorded him as having 13 incidents of driving at least four miles per hour over the speed limit in a seven-day period in September/October 2011. There was a not ation that fleet manager Wendy Sobotta had issued Mr. Maiteki a “Serious Warn ing” based on this SpeedGauge data.4 Ms. Konsela contacted Ms. Sobotta and confirmed that the October 5 HRIS entry was correct. Ms. S obotta informed Ms. Konsel a that she had seen the SpeedGauge records, told Mr . Maiteki that she was issu ing him a Serious Warning, and entered the information into HRIS. At the time of Ms. Kons ela’s investigation, however, Marten no longer had access to the underlying SpeedGauge records. Marten considers speeds more than four miles per hour over a posted speed limit to be an unsafe driving practice. In light of th e Illinois incident and the SpeedGauge data, Ms. Konsela conclude d that the inform ation submitted to HireRight was correct. Marten therefor e informed HireRight that “Work Record (938) Unsatisfactory Safety Record is accura te.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 85. Although the response cited both the Written Warni ng for the Illinois incident and the Serious Warning based on the SpeedGauge data, Marten believed that the Illinois incident alone would support its report to HireRight. Mr. Maiteki sued, alleging, among other claims, that Marten ’s reinvestigation was inadequate and the response was false, in violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). Marten moved for summ ary judgment on the FCRA claim, which the district court grante d. Mr. Maiteki appeals. 1
II. DISCUSSION “We review a district court’s decisi on to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.” Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans,

1 This appeal concerns only the FCRA claim against Marten. Mr. Maiteki has not appealed from the judgm ent on any other claims.5 Inc. , 711 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10t h Cir. 2013) (internal quot ation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropria te if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Under § 1681s-2(b), when a CRA notif ies an informati on furnisher of a dispute, the furnisher must take the following steps: (1) investigate the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information provided by the CRA; (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA; (4) report the results of the inves tigation to all other CRAs if the investigation reveals that the informa tion is incomplete or inaccurate; and (5) modify, delete, or permanently block the reporting of the disputed information if it is determ ined to be inaccurate, in complete, or unverifiable. Llewellyn , 711 F.3d at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he investigation an information furnisher undertakes must be a reasonable one.” Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank , 696 F.3d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). A “reasonable” investigation “is one th at a reasonably pr udent person would undertake under the circumstances.” Seamans v. Temple Univ. , 744 F.3d 853, 864 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omit ted). “[H]ow thorou gh an investigation must be to be ‘reasonable’ turns on what relevant information was provided to a furnisher by the CRA giving notice of a dispute.” Boggio , 696 F.3d at 617; see Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc. , 595 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A] more limited investigation may be appropriate when CRAs pr ovide the furnisher with vague or cursory information a bout a consumer’s dispute.”); Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP , 584 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress could not have6 intended to place a burden on furnishers c ontinually to reinvestigate a particular transaction, without any new information or other reason to doubt the result of the earlier investigation . . . .”). “[T]he reasonabl eness of the investigation is to be determined by an objective standard,” and “[ t]he burden of showi ng the investigation was unreasonable is on the plaintiff.” Chiang , 595 F.3d at 37. Mr. Maiteki first argues that summ ary judgment is improper because the reasonableness of an investig ation is a question of fact that can be decided only by a factfinder. He is wrong. “Whether a de fendant’s investigati on is reasonable is a factual question normally reserved for trial; however, summary judgment is proper if the reasonableness of the defendant’s procedures is beyond question.” Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas , 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, circuit courts have affirmed summary judgments on § 1681s-2(b) claims in appropriate circumstances. See Chiang , 595 F.3d at 38-39; Gorman , 584 F.3d at 1161; Westra , 409 F.3d at 827. Mr. Maiteki next argues that there is sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that Marten’s inve stigation was unreasonable. Fo r support, he relies on the same 20 points he raised in th e district court. The distri ct court ably explained why these points did not demonstr ate a genuine issue of ma terial fact as to the reasonableness of Marten’s investigation. Rather than discussing each point, we address only a few and reject the remaini ng arguments for substantially the reasons discussed by the district court.7 Mr. Maiteki claims that Marten’s inve stigation was perfunctory and “cabined.” Aplt. Br. at 56. As stated above, however , the scope of a reas onable investigation turns on the information about the disput e that the furnishe r has received. Mr. Maiteki’s notice of dispute said simply that the use of Code 938, Unsatisfactory Safety Record, was “incorrect due to [M aiteki] has no accidents/incidents listed on the report.” Aplee. Supp. A pp. at 84. Hence, it was not unreasonable for Marten to focus on whether there were incidents of record that sup ported its report to HireRight. Although Mr. Ma iteki believes that Marten should have undertaken additional investigation and reviewed other sources of information (which purportedly would have more positively refl ected his driving reco rd), such additional investigation would not negate the Illinoi s warning and the SpeedGauge data that caused Ms. Konsela to conclude th at Code 938 was accurate. Mr. Maiteki asserts that he never rece ived the Written Warn ing or the Serious Warning. But entries in HR IS are to the contrary; and given the terse nature of Mr. Maiteki’s notice of dis pute, Ms. Konsela had no reas on to know that Mr. Maiteki was challenging those entries. Mr. Maiteki also complains that Ms. K onsela failed to re view the original SpeedGauge reports underlying Ms. Sobotta ’s October 5, 2011 HRIS entry and failed to contact either the Illinoi s State Police or SpeedGauge to verify the information in Marten’s files. But as fo r the Illinois documents, there does not appear to be any reason to doubt their authentic ity. Marten received them from the U.S. Department of Transportation. In dist rict court Mr. Maiteki appare ntly did not dispute that8 Marten’s file contained these documents, and before this court he concedes that he was issued the warning, see Aplt. Br. at 56 (“Aside fr om the Illinois State Police warning of July 16, 2011, Maiteki never had any speeding tickets or incidents nor accidents while working for Marten.”). Because she had no reason to question the documents, Ms. Konsela’s failure to contac t the Illinois State Police does not cast doubt on the reasonableness of the investigation. See Gorman , 584 F.3d at 1160 (information furnisher not required to perf orm additional procedures or inquiries when notice of dispute gave no reason to doubt the veracity of the initial investigation). Regarding the SpeedGauge data, it is undisputed that Marten no longer had access to the SpeedGauge reports underl ying the HRIS entry by the time of Ms. Konsela’s investigation. Ms. Konsela would have had to contact SpeedGauge in an attempt to review that information. 2 But an investigati on does not have to be exhaustive to be reasonable; an informat ion furnisher may balance the costs and benefits of engaging in additional procedures. See Seamans , 744 F.3d at 865; Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA , 357 F.3d 426, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2004). If the circumstances warrant, a company may rely on its own records. See Gorman , 584 F.3d at 1159-60; Westra , 409 F.3d at 827. We recognize that the Fourth Circuit has held that a jury could find unreasona ble a procedure requiring agents to rely solely on computer data and “never consu lt underlying documents” for verification.

2 Neither party submitted the underlyi ng SpeedGauge records to the court. Thus, it is not clear which party such reco rds might support or whether they even would be available.9 Johnson , 357 F.3d at 431. In this case, howev er, instead of relying on the bare HRIS data, Ms. Konsela followed up with Ms. Sobotta, who confirmed that she had reviewed the underlying SpeedGauge reports and that the HRIS information was accurate. It was reasonable fo r Ms. Konsela to rely on Ms . Sobotta’s confirmation. Further, the record evidence shows that Marten beli eved Code 938 was appropriate even if the Illinois incide nt were the only incident. In these circumstances, Ms. Konsela could properly decide not to reach out to SpeedGauge. Mr. Maiteki raised certain additional arguments in his reply brief, but arguments not made in the opening brief are waived. See Reedy v. Werholtz , 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). In short, Mr. Maiteki has not carried his burden to show that a reasonable factfinder could conclude th at Marten’s reinvestigati on was unreasonable. The district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Marten on Mr. Maiteki’s FCRA claim. III. CONCLUSION Marten’s request that Mr. Maiteki pa y fees and costs for filing a frivolous appeal, made in its response br ief, is denied. Fed. R. App. P. 38 requires such a request to be made in a sepa rate filing. The district co urt’s judgment is affirmed.