[J-19-2014] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFER Y, STEVENS, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v.

DUANE JEMISON, JR., Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : No. 17 WAP 2013 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered January 4, 2013 at No. 1588 WDA 2011, affirming the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered August 31, 2011 at No. CP-02-CR-0009708-2010. ARGUED: April 8, 2014

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: AUGUST 18, 2014 In this case, we consider the continued viability o f Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982), wherein we held that the prose cution is not required to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate to the fact of a pri or conviction when the conviction is an element of the offense charged. Concluding that St anley remains the law of this Commonwealth, despite the United States Supreme Cou rt's holding in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), we affirm the Superior Court's order affirming the judgment of sentence imposed on Duane Jemison, Jr. ("Appella nt"). In the early morning hours of May 16, 2010, a Pitts burgh police officer on foot patrol came upon Appellant's car which was parked i mproperly in a legally marked handicapped parking spot. Upon running the car's l icense plate number through his vehicle’s computer, the officer discovered that the car had been carjacked a few days[J-19-2014] - 2

before. As other officers arrived at the scene, Ap pellant entered the car and started to drive away, but was immediately stopped by a police vehicle in his path. The officers ordered Appellant to get out of the car. He did no t comply, but rather moved one of his hands downward toward the floorboard, where one of the officers then observed a gun. The officers apprehended Appellant from the vehicle , and recovered from the floorboard a gun with the hammer back, the safety off, and a r ound in the chamber. Appellant was charged with persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, resisting arrest, and two counts of receiving stolen property. 1 He was tried by jury for persons not to possess a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), after this charge had been severed from the others. To establ ish Appellant's guilt of this charge, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appella nt had been previously convicted of a statutorily enumerated offense that barred him from possessing a firearm, and that he had, indeed, possessed a firearm. 2 It was undisputed that, in 2008, Appellant had be en

1 Respectively, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106, 5104 , and 3925.

2 § 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms (a) Offense defined.-- (1) A person who has been convicted of an offense e numerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth , regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the crite ria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

* * * * *

(b) Enumerated offenses.-- The following offenses shall apply to subsection (a):

* * * * * (continuedF)[J-19-2014] - 3

convicted of robbery, one of the statutorily enumer ated offenses, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(b), and the Commonwealth sought to introduce a t trial the evidence of this robbery conviction. However, Appellant sought to stipulate only that he had been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses, without stating tha t the specific offense was robbery.

The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introdu ce into evidence Appellant's certified conviction of robbery. See Notes of Test imony, Trial ("N.T."), 6/29/11, at 50 (introducing Commonwealth's Exhibit 1). Immediatel y thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury "not to consider the defendant' s prior conviction as evidence of his propensity to commit crime but only as proof of the element of this specific offense." Id. at 50-51. After both sides had rested, the trial j udge repeated this instruction during her charge to the jury. Id. at 137. At the end of the one-day trial, on June 29, 2011, the jury found Appellant guilty of persons not to possess a firearm. On August 31, 20 11, Appellant pled guilty to two additional charges, to wit, carrying a firearm with out a license and resisting arrest. 3 The court sentenced Appellant as follows: for persons n ot to possess a firearm, not less than 5 nor more than 10 years of incarceration; for carryi ng a firearm without a license, not less than 3 nor more than 6 years of incarceration; and for resisting arrest, not less than 1 nor more than 2 years of incarceration, with all senten ces to be served concurrently. Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, contendin g that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior conviction for robbery when he

(Fcontinued) Section 3701 (relating to robbery).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 (emphasis in original).

3 The Commonwealth withdrew the two counts of receiv ing stolen property. Appellant also pled guilty to the summary offense of driving without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. 1501(a).[J-19-2014] - 4

had been willing to stipulate to a statutorily enum erated conviction. The Superior Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence, concludi ng that the trial court had properly applied this Court’s binding precedent of Stanley, supra. See Commonwealth v. Jemison, 64 A.3d 271 (Pa.Super., 2013) (Table). Ap pellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, which we granted. The sole issue before us, as stated by Appellant, i s the following:

Whether in a prosecution for possession of a firear m by a person not permitted to possess one, the prosecution should no longer be permitted to introduce the record of the disqualifying criminal conviction when the defendant is willing to stipulate that he is within the class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms.

Commonwealth v. Jemison, 71 A.3d 248 (Pa. 2013). We also directed the parties to address whether Pen nsylvania should henceforth follow the holding of the United States Supreme Cou rt in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), and overrule Commonwealth v. Stanl ey, 446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982). Jemison, supra. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause o f the United States Constitution art. VI, cl. 2, 4 this Court, like all state courts, is bound by dec isions of the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the federal Constitution and federal substantive law. See, e.g., Council 13, American Federation of State, County an d Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 986 A.2d 63, 77 (Pa. 2009). However, when resolving matters that involve no federal question, this Court is not bound by decisions of the U.S.

4 The U.S. Constitution art VI, cl.2 provides as fol lows:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United State s which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereb y, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to the Contrary no twithstanding.[J-19-2014] - 5

Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. McFeely, 502 A. 2d 167, 169 (Pa. 1985). As will be made clear infra, the issue presented here involves no federal question, and thus, we are not bound by the high Court’s resolution of the issue. As both parties acknowledge, this Court addressed the question pres ented here approximately 30 years ago in Stanley, supra, and the trial court was boun d by Stanley's precedent in the instant case. Appellant, however, urges us to overturn Sta nley. The issue presented is a pure question of law and thus our standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 959 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 200 8). In Stanley, the defendant-appellant, who had previo usly been convicted of murder, was on trial for, inter alia, persons not to posses s a firearm. At the time Stanley was decided, the statute barred an individual from poss essing a firearm if he or she had been convicted of a "crime of violence," which was defin ed to include murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, entering a building wit h intent to commit a crime therein, and kidnapping. Id. at 588. Stanley offered to stipul ate that he had a prior conviction for a “crime of violence,” but the prosecution refused to accept the stipulation. Instead, the prosecutor called a prison records custodian and an assistant district attorney to testify that Stanley had been convicted of first-degree mur der several months before; there was no reference at trial to the facts underlying the p rior murder conviction. On appeal, Stanley argued that the trial court erred in allowi ng this testimony because the mention of his murder conviction was unduly prejudicial in lig ht of his offer to stipulate to a “crime of violence.” Id. This Court disagreed, concluding a s follows:

[Stanley's prior] murder conviction was undisputedl y material and relevant to proving that he committed a "crime of violence." As such, it was "proper" evidence, squarely within Commonwealth v. Evans, 46 5 Pa. 12, 348 A.2d 92 (1975)[,] which held that the Commonwealth may u se any "proper" evidence to prove its case, and does not have to accept the accused's stipulations.[J-19-2014] - 6

Stanley, supra at 588 (emphasis in original). 5 Although Stanley's holding is clear and controlling in the instant case, Appellant insists that Stanley has been "undermined" by the U nited States Supreme Court ruling in Old Chief, supra. Appellant's Brief at 11. In Old Chief, the defendant-appellant (Old Chief) was charged with assault and with possession of a firearm by an individual who has been convicted of a crime punishable by impriso nment for a term exceeding one year, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 6 Before trial, Old Chief offered to stipulate that he had a prior conviction disqualifying him from firearms po ssession under § 922(g)(1), without identifying the specific offense of which he had pr eviously been convicted. Old Chief, supra at 174-75. The prosecution refused to accept this stipulation, and instead

5 In Stanley, the defendant-appellant was acquitted of persons not to possess a firearm, although he was convicted of other charges, to wit, escape offenses, possessing an instrument of crime, and possessing a prohibited of fensive weapon, respectively, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5121 and 5122, 907, and 908.

6 The federal firearms statute under which Old Chief was charged is as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person-- (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

* * * * * to ship or transport in interstate or foreign comme rce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or t o receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), a “crime punishable b y imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” does not include “antitrust violations, u nfair trade practices, restraints of trade, [and] similar offenses relating to the regulation o f business practices,” nor does it include “any State offense classified by the laws of the St ate as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.”[J-19-2014] - 7

introduced the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief’s prior conviction, which disclosed that he had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Id. at 177. After the jury found Old Chief guilty on all counts, he appealed, contending that he had been unfairly prej udiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow the stipulation. In its analysis of the case, the high Court first r ecognized that documentary evidence of Old Chief’s prior assault conviction wa s relevant to proving the § 922(g)(1) charge. Old Chief, supra at 179. However, citing Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 403, pursuant to which relevant evidence is properl y excluded when its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of [ inter alia ] unfair prejudice,” the high Court

concluded that “evidence of the name or nature of t he prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant,” the degree o f which will vary from case to case, “but

will be substantial whenever the official record of fered by the Government would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning.” Old Chief, supra at 180, 185. The high Court noted that one “ appropriate factor” for a court to consider when deciding whether to exclude evidence as unfairly prejudicial under F.R.E. 403 is the “availability of other means of proof.” Old Chief, supra at 184. As viewed by the high Court, “Old Chief’s proffered admission wo uld F have been not merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the [prior con viction] element.” Id. at 186. This was particularly true because “[t]he statutory lang uage F shows no concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad category of qualifying felonies.” Id. The high Court also determined that, in a case such as Old Chief, where the issue was the defendant’s legal status, the general rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice has no appli cation. Id. at 186-90. The purpose of[J-19-2014] - 8

the general rule is to allow the prosecutor to pres ent a whole story and complete picture, uninterrupted by gaps, of the events surrounding th e criminal offense for which the defendant is being tried. However, in the view of the high Court, the prosecution’s need for “evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story h as [ ] virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, depen dent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of late crimin al behavior charged against him.” Id. at

190. Based on the above analysis, the high Court held in Old Chief as follows:

In this case, as in any other in which the prior co nviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper groun d, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice di d substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of con viction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an adm ission was available. What we have said shows why this will be the genera l rule when proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor’ s choice will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offens e for which he is being tried.

Id. at 191-92. The high Court in Old Chief was sharply divided. 7 In a vigorous dissent joined by three other justices, Justice O’Connor expressed he r disagreement with the determination that “it was unfairly prejudicial for the Government to establish an essential element of its case against petitioner with direct proof of his prior conviction.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 193-94 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Jus tice O'Connor looked to the “structure

7 Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O’Connor filed a dis senting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.[J-19-2014] - 9

of § 922(g)(1) itself” to conclude that “Congress e nvisioned jurors' learning the name and basic nature of the defendant's prior offense.” Id . at 194. As Justice O'Connor recognized, “Section 922(g)(1) does not merely proh ibit the possession of firearms by ‘felons,’ nor does it apply to all prior felony con victions,” as certain crimes are statutorily excluded from coverage; therefore, “under § 922(g)( 1), a defendant's prior felony conviction connotes not only that he is a prior fel on, but also that he has engaged in specific past criminal conduct.” Old Chief, 519 U. S. at 194 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor then noted that F.R.E. 404(b) expr essly contemplates the admission of prior crimes evidence for purposes other than “to p rove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Among the purposes for which prior crimes evidence may be admissible, Justice O'Connor sugges ted, is that of proving a necessary

element of the firearms offense with which Old Chie f was charged. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 196 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Conno r’s criticism of the majority was sharp:

To say, as the Court does, that it ‘unfairly’ preju dices the defendant for the Government to establish its § 922(g)(1) case with e vidence showing that, in fact, the defendant did commit a prior offense misr eads the Rules of Evidence and defies common sense.

Id. In addition, Justice O'Connor emphasized that, even when the defendant stipulates to an element of the offense with which he or she is charged, the prosecution still bears the burden of proof on each and every e lement. Id. at 200. Because of the potential for juror confusion and speculation when the jury is not told the specific prior

offense of which the defendant had been convicted i n a § 922(g)(1) case, Justice O'Connor strongly disagreed with the majority's con clusion that the prosecution's need to tell a continuous story is not applicable when the issue is a defendant's legal status,[J-19-2014] - 10

determined by a judgment independent of the current criminal charges. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 198-99 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

Justice O'Connor summarized her dissent as follows:

The Court manufactures a new rule that, in a § 922( g)(1) case, a defendant can force the Government to accept his admission to the prior felony conviction element of the offense, thereby precludi ng the Government from offering evidence to directly prove a necessary ele ment of its case. I cannot agree that it ‘unfairly’ prejudices a defend ant for the Government to prove his prior conviction with evidence that revea ls the name or basic nature of his past crime. Like it or not, Congress chose to make a defendant's prior criminal conviction one of the tw o elements of the § 922(g)(1) offense. Moreover, crimes have names; a defendant is not convicted of some indeterminate, unspecified ‘crime .’ Nor do I think that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 can be read to obviate the well accepted principle, grounded in both the Constitution and in our precedent, that the Government may not be forced to accept a defendant' s concession to an element of a charged offense as proof of that eleme nt.

Id. at 201. In the case presently before us, Appellant urges us to adopt the high Court’s holding in Old Chief, based on the majority’s reaso ning, and thus to overturn our prior holding in Stanley. Appellant asserts that Stanley was an “overextension” of Commonwealth v. Evans, 348 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1975), see Appellant’s Brief at 17, a case in which this Court applied the general rule that a pa rty is not required to accept, in lieu of the presentation of specific evidence, a stipulation as to what that evidence would prove. Evans, supra at 94. In Evans, the defendant sought to stipulate to the testimony of a murder victim’s daughter, and this Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to compel the prosecutor to agree to this stipulation. In Stanle y, supra at 588, we cited Evans for the principle that “the Commonwealth may use any ‘prope r’ evidence to prove its case, and does not have to accept the accused’s stipulations.” (Emphasis in original ). Relying on Old Chief, Appellant contends that this principle d oes not apply “when the point at issue is[J-19-2014] - 11

a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgm ent rendered wholly independently

of the concrete events of later criminal behavior c harged against him.” Appellant’s Brief at 13 (quoting Old Chief, supra at 190). We cannot agree. We recognize first that the texts of the state and federal firearms statutes pursuant to which Appellant and Old Chief, respectively, wer e charged and convicted are not the same, but rather, differ in a highly relevant way. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, the offenses that bar an individual from possessing a firearm ar e set forth in a list that includes both the

names of the offenses as well as the sections of th e Criminal Code where they are defined. In contrast, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Congress chose not to include any listing of specific applicable offenses, but rather barred an individual from possessing a

firearm if he or she has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. While the U.S. Supreme Court m ajority concluded that the “statutory language [of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)] show s no congressional concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad category of qualifying felonies,” we are unab le to draw an analogous conclusion regarding the concern of our General Assembly in it s enactment of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. Our General Assembly took considerable care to deli neate the specific offenses that can support a conviction of the crime of perso ns not to possess firearms under § 6105, and there is no question that the relevant sp ecific enumerated offense is an

essential element of that crime. Given the text of the Pennsylvania statute, we cannot conclude, as the U.S. Supreme Court majority did in interpreting the federal statutory counterpart, that “the name of the prior offense F addressed no detail in the definition of the prior-conviction element that would not have be en covered by the stipulation” to an unspecified conviction. Old Chief, supra at 186. Thus, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, one element of persons not to possess firearms is a pri or conviction of a specific, enumerated[J-19-2014] - 12

offense, and this fact strongly supports the Common wealth’s view, as well as our precedent in Stanley, that the prosecution should n ot be required to accept a stipulation which acknowledges that a prior conviction satisfie s the element, but does not name or identify the specific prior offense. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has similarly distin guished Old Chief. See State v. Ball, 756 So.2d 275 (La. 1999). Like our Genera l Assembly, the Louisiana legislature has enacted a statute that bars a person from posse ssing a firearm if he or she has been convicted of any crime included in a long, specific ally enumerated list of felonies. In Ball, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with posse ssion of a firearm by a convicted felon, had offered to stipulate that he had a prior predicate conviction, without naming the offense, the date thereof, or the sentence imposed. The stipulation was not accepted, and at trial, the State introduced the bill of info rmation and guilty plea transcript from his prior conviction. After he was convicted of the fi rearm charge, the defendant-appellant sought appellate relief, arguing, based on Old Chie f, that he had been unfairly prejudiced because the name and nature of his previous felony conviction had been revealed to the jury. Id. at 275-77. Declining to grant relief, t he Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished

Old Chief as follows.

[B]ecause the Louisiana statute defines the crime b y specific enumerated prior offenses, contrary to the broad de finition in the federal statute, Old Chief is distinguishable.

* * * * *

[The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Old Chie f] reasoned that because Congress had made it plain that distinction s among generic felonies were irrelevant for purposes of the crime charged, the most the jury needed to know was that the admitted conviction fel l within the class of crimes that Congress felt should bar a convict from possessing a gun. To the contrary, under the Louisiana statute, “the sta tutory language in which the prior conviction requirement is couched” does show “concern with the[J-19-2014] - 13

specific name or nature of the prior offense” and t he name of the prior offense does address a “detail in the definition of the prior c onviction element that would not have been covered by the sti pulation.” Because proof of one of the enumerated felonies is an essen tial element of the crime under [the Louisiana statute], the probative value of the name and nature of the prior conviction is greater than the “generic” felony required by the federal statute.

Ball, supra at 278-79 (one citation omitted; quotin g Old Chief, supra at 186; emphases in original). We consider the Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis distinguishing Old Chief on the basis of the text of the state statute to be pe rsuasive, and we similarly distinguish Old

Chief on the basis of the text of our own state sta tute. 8 , 9

8 This analysis was augured by Justice O’Connor’s Ol d Chief dissent, wherein she concluded, based on the structure of § 922(g)(1), t hat Congress had envisioned that a jury hearing a § 922(g)(1) case would indeed learn the name and basic nature of the defendant’s prior offense. See discussion of Old C hief in text, supra.

9 We note that other states have adopted the holding in Old Chief, but many of these states were interpreting state statutes that, like the federal statute at issue in Old Chief, did not set forth a list of enumerated predicate pr ior offenses. See Anderson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 281 S.W.3d 761, 763, 765- 66 (Ky. 2009) (adopting the “limited holding” of Old Chief in the context of a state statute that bars the possession of firearms by persons who have been convicted of a fe lony, but does not specifically enumerate applicable felonies); People v. Walker, 8 12 N.E.2d 339, 350, 353 (Ill. 2004) (adopting the holding of Old Chief in the context o f a state statute that, “like the federal statute in Old Chief, does not require proof of a s pecific felony conviction,” and does not list predicate felonies, but requires only that the prosecutor establish the defendant’s status as a felon); Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123 ( Md. 2003) (adopting the holding of Old Chief in the context of a state statute that bars a n individual from possessing a firearm if he or she has been convicted of a crime of violence or any felony); Ross v. State, 614 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2005) (similar holding); Brown v. St ate, 719 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1998) (similar holding).

However, in State v. Lee, 977 P.2d 263 (Kan. 1999), the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the holding of Old Chief even though its analogous firearm possession statute did set forth a listing of specific enumerated predicate fe lonies.[J-19-2014] - 14

We recognize that, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 403, relevan t evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of F unfair prejudice.” In a Comment to Rule 403, unfair prejudice is defined as “a tendenc y to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from i ts duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” We are unable to conclude that, in a § 6105 persons not to possess firearms case, a defendant suffers unfair prejudice merely b y the admission into evidence of his or her certified conviction of a specific, identified, predicate offense, which has been offered by the Commonwealth to prove the prior conviction e lement of § 6105. Any possibility of unfair prejudice is greatly miti gated by the use of proper cautionary instructions to the jury, directing them to consider the defendant's prior offense only as evidence to establish the prior conviction element of the § 6105 charge, not as evidence of the defendant's bad character or propen sity to commit crime. Here, the trial judge appropriately instructed the jury twice regar ding the proper use of the prior offense evidence, once immediately after the Commonwealth i ntroduced the certified conviction, and again just before the jury began its deliberati ons. We reiterate that here, as in so many other contexts, the jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (recognizing that when evidence of

a defendant’s other crimes is admitted for a releva nt purpose under Rule 404(b), the defendant is entitled upon request to a limiting ju ry instruction, which the law presumes the jury will follow).

For all of the reasons that we have discussed above , we decline to overturn our precedential holding in Stanley, supra. Accordingl y, we affirm the Superior Court's order affirming Appellant's judgment of sentence.[J-19-2014] - 15

Mr. Chief Justice Castille, Mr. Justice Eakin, Mada me Justice Todd and Mr. Justice Stevens join the opinion.

Mr. Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in whic h Mr. Justice Saylor joins.