alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

Exhibit 10.41

                          AMENDMENT TO MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT


     This Amendment to Management Agreement (the "Amendment") is made
effective as of November 1, 1997, by and between Cross-Continent Auto
Retailers, Inc. ("C-CAR") and Tar-Car, Inc. (the "Company").

                                       RECITALS

     A.   By that certain Management Agreement (the "Management Agreement")
dated October 16, 1997, by and between C-CAR and the Company, C-CAR agreed to
manage the Dealership (as defined in the Management Agreement).

     B.   C-CAR and the Company desire to amend the Management Agreement.

                                      AGREEMENT

     In consideration of the mutual agreements set forth in this Amendment,
C-CAR and the Company agree as follows:

          1.   The second sentence of Paragraph 1 of the Management Agreement
is deleted in its entirety and the following is substituted therefor:

          C-CAR shall assume management responsibilities of the
          Dealership effective December 1, 1997 (the "Effective
          Date").

          2.   Subparagraph 3(b) of the Management Agreement is deleted in
its entirety.

          3.   Subparagraph 4(c) of the Management Agreement is deleted in
its entirety.

          4.   The following sentence is added to the end of paragraph 12 of
the Management Agreement:

          Randt may be employed in northern Nevada in a position that
          allows Randt to perform his obligations under this
          Agreement.

          5.   This Amendment shall be governed by and construed and enforced
in accordance with the laws of the State of California.

          6.    This Amendment shall be binding upon and shall inure to the
benefit of the

                                       1
<PAGE>

parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.

          7.   Except as specifically set forth herein, all other provisions
of the Management Agreement remain in full force and effect.

                              CROSS-CONTINENT AUTO RETAILERS, INC.,
                              a Delaware corporation


                              By:
                                 -------------------------------
                                   Robert W. Hall, Vice Chairman


                              TAR-CAR, INC., a California corporation


                              By:
                                 -------------------------------
                                   Thomas A. Randt, President


                              By:
                                 -------------------------------
                                   Ronald J. Blomquist, Vice President




                                       2
#### Martin D. Friedman, Appellant, v E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., et al., Respondents.

— In an action to recover damages under General Business Law § 340, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Balletta, J.), dated August 7, 1985, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, the chief officer, shareholder, and founder of United States Priority Transport Corporation, brought this action on his own behalf to recover for individual damages due to an alleged conspiracy by the defendants to cause the corporation to cease operations. The complaint was properly dismissed on the ground that shareholders, officers and employees of a corporation do not have standing under General Business Law § 340 (the "Donnelly Act”) to recover for wrongs committed against the corporation *(see, Lerner Stores Corp. v Parklane Hosiery Co.,*86 Misc 2d 215, *affd*54 AD2d 1072; *Teltronics Servs. v Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc.,*587 F Supp 724, *affd*762 F2d 185). Here, the business allegedly interfered with was conducted by the corporation. The plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he suffered direct personal damage as a result of the alleged conspiracy, as opposed to damages derived solely from injury to the corporate entity *(see, Greenfield v Denner,*6 NY2d 867). Thompson, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
_______________________________________ __ ___________________ ___________________ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

April 6, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 126121(64) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly NATIONAL WINE & SPIRITS, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. INC., NWS MICHIGAN, INC., and Stephen J. Markman, NATIONAL WINE & SPIRITS, L.L.C., Justices Plaintiffs-Appellants, SC: 126121 v CoA: 243524 Ingham CC: 02-000013-CZ STATE OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellee, and

MICHIGAN BEER & WINE WHOLESALERS AS SOCIATION, Intervening Defenda nt-Appellee.

On order of the Chief Jus tice, the motion by plaintiffs -appellants for extension of the time for filing their br ief and appendix is considered and it is GRANTED.

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 6, 2006

Clerk
#### PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FLAGG, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division. First Department.

December 18, 1896.)

Proceeding against Jared Flagg, Jr. 0. Haldane, for appellant. J. D. Lindsay, for respondent.

No opinion. Motion to dismiss appeal for failure to serve papers granted.
BIG THOMPSON RIVER AT LOVELAND, CO.Latitude: 40.379Longitude: -105.061Elevation: 4906

BIG THOMPSON RIVER AT LOVELAND, CO.

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Willow Park
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT STEVE Y. GAR

R ISON, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. EDM UND G. B R O W

N, Jr.; e t a l., De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 13-15189 D.C . No. 5:11-c v-01901-EJD M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Edwa rd J. Da vila , Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Subm itte d Ja

nua ry 21, 2014 ** B e fore : C ANB Y, SILVER M AN, a nd PAEZ, C irc uit Judge s. C a lifornia sta te prisone r Ste ve Y. Ga

rrison a ppe a l s pro se from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt dismi ssing his 42 U.S.C . § 1983 a c t ion a lle g ing va rious c onstitutiona

l viola t ions in c onne c tion with his inc arc e ration. W e have jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e re vie wde novo a distric t c ourt’ s dismissa l unde r 28



# FIL ED JAN 27 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).U.S.C . § 1915A. W e ilburg v . Shapiro , 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th C ir. 2007). W e a ffirm . The distric t c ourt prope rly dismisse d Ga

rrison’ s a c tion be c a

use Ga rrison fa ile d to a lle g e suffic ie nt fa c ts in his Se c ond Am e nde d C om pla int showing tha

t de fe nda nts viola te d his c onstitutiona

l rights. Se eAshc roft v . Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to sta

t e a c la im for re lie f that is pla

u sible on its fa c e , a pla intiff m ust a lle ge fa c ts tha

t “ a llow[ ] the c ourt to dra w the re a sona

ble infe re nc e tha

t the de fe nda nt is lia ble for the m isc o nduc t a lle g e d” ); s e ealso Mc He nry v . Re nne , 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (9th C ir. 1996) (a c om pla int m ust m ake c le a

r “ who is be ing sue d , for what re lie f, a

nd on wha

t the ory , with e nough de ta il to guide disc ove ry ” ). Garrison’ s c onte ntions c onc e rning a ny a lle ge d m isc onduc t by the distric t c ourt a re without me rit. W e do not c onside r argum e nts a n d a l le gations ra ise d for the first tim e on a ppe a l, inc luding those

c onc e rning forc e d m e d ic ation, a lle g e d m isc onduc t by San Jose polic e offic e rs, a

nd re c e nt de nia ls of m e nta l he a lth se rvic e s a nd le ga l supplie s. Se ePadge tt v . W

right , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th C ir. 2009) (pe r c uriam ). All pe nding m otions a

re de nie d. AFFIRM E D.

1 3 - 1 5 1 8 9 2
II

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1989

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the standard

deduction amount to reduce the marriage penalty, simplify the filing

of individual tax returns, and provide tax relief for lower and middle

income individuals, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 27, 1998

Mr. FORD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to

the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase

the standard deduction amount to reduce the marriage

penalty, simplify the filing of individual tax returns, and

provide tax relief for lower and middle income individuals, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Marriage Penalty Re5 duction Act’’.
2

•S 1989 IS

1 SEC. 2. INCREASE IN STANDARD DEDUCTION AMOUNT.

2 (a) STANDARD DEDUCTION AMOUNT.—Section

3 63(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating

4 to the basic standard deduction) is amended—

5 (1) by striking ‘‘$5,000’’ and inserting

6 ‘‘$12,000’’ in subparagraph (A),

7 (2) by striking ‘‘$4,400’’ and inserting

8 ‘‘$9,000’’ in subparagraph (B),

9 (3) by striking ‘‘$3,000’’ and inserting

10 ‘‘$6,000’’ in subparagraph (C), and

11 (4) by striking ‘‘$2,500’’ and inserting

12 ‘‘$6,000’’ in subparagraph (D).

13 (b) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.—Subparagraph (B) of

14 section 63(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (re15 lating to adjustments for inflation) is amended—

16 (1) in clause (i)—

17 (A) by striking ‘‘(2) or’’, and

18 (B) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end,

19 (2) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the

20 end and inserting ‘‘, and’’, and

21 (3) by adding at the end the following new

22 clause:

23 ‘‘(iii) ‘calendar year 1998’ in the case

24 of the dollar amounts contained in para25 graph (2).’’.
3

•S 1989 IS

1 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after

3 December 31, 1998.

Æ
Order entered February 22, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 13
- 00243
- CV
IN RE TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, Relator On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F94
- 01553
- ML 

### O RDER The Court has before it relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. The Court requests that real party in interest and respondent file any responses by March 4, 2013.

/s/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE
[868 NE2d 211, 836 NYS2d 531]

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Paul Person, Appellant.

Argued March 29, 2007;

decided May 8, 2007

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Office of the Appellate Defender,*New York City *(Sara Gurwitch*and *Richard M. Greenberg*of counsel), for appellant.

*974
      *Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney,*New York City *(Sheryl Feldman*and *Mark Dwyer*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Defendant orchestrated a robbery that was perpetrated by two accomplices whose actions resulted in the death of the victim. After being apprehended by the police, the accomplices gave videotaped statements incriminating themselves but exculpating defendant of involvement in the crime. The accomplices later entered into cooperation agreements with the People and gave testimony at trial detailing defendant’s role in planning the robbery.

During cross-examination of the accomplices, defense counsel used the transcripts of the videotaped interviews to impeach the credibility of the witnesses by questioning them about the prior inconsistent statements each had initially made to the police. Both accomplices acknowledged they made the prior inconsistent statements. Defense counsel then sought to introduce the videotaped interviews into evidence. Supreme Court denied the request because the accomplices admitted they made the statements on the videotapes. Defendant was subsequently convicted of multiple counts of robbery in the first and second degrees.

Before our Court, defendant asserts that preclusion of the videotaped statements was erroneous as a matter of law because Supreme Court failed to recognize that the jury could not reliably gauge the credibility of the witnesses without viewing their demeanor and hearing their voices during the police interviews. At trial, however, the crux of defendant’s argument was that he should be able to use the videotapes, rather than the transcripts, to prove the content of the prior inconsistent statements. Defendant at that time failed to explain how the videotapes would have conveyed information beyond that provided by the verbatim transcripts of the statements. As a result, he did not preserve his current contention that Supreme Court had discretion to admit the videotapes because they were relevant to the jury’s ability to reliably evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the preclusion of this evidence constituted an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. Defendant’s constitutional claims are similarly unpreserved.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.

*975Order affirmed in a memorandum.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alexander Freeman, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Qui*843nones, J.), rendered January 31, 1986, convicting him of burglary in the first degree (two counts), attempted rape-in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing concurrent terms of imprisonment of 2 to 6 years on the convictions of burglary in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree, and concurrent terms of imprisonment of one year on the convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reducing the sentences imposed on the convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree to concurrent terms of imprisonment of six months; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s summation was unduly prejudicial and that the charge improperly shifted the burden of proof to him are not preserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Nuccie,*57 NY2d 818; *People v Cadorette,*56 NY2d 1007; *People v Gonzalez,*102 AD2d 895). In any event, the defendant’s contentions are without merit. The People’s summation constituted fair comment and a proper response to the defense summation, and the jury charge as a whole was proper *(see, People v Baldo,*107 AD2d 751; *People v Reeves,*57 AD2d 1015, *affd*44 NY2d 761).

As the People concede in their brief, the sentences of concurrent terms of imprisonment of one year imposed upon the defendant on his convictions of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree were erroneous and have been modified to conform to the applicable statute *(see,*Penal Law § 70.15 [1] [a]-[e]). Lawrence, J. P., Weinstein, Kooper and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of CD&L, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Russell J. Reardon, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of
                  the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated
                  results of operations of the Company for the periods
                  presented.

Dated: November 21, 2005


                                                         \s\ Russell J. Reardon
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Russell J. Reardon
                                                         Chief Financial Officer


     The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section
     906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and (b) of Section
     1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as
     part of Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure statement.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
     been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
     furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
     request.
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#### Bobbie HOOD, Jr., Petitioner-Appellee, v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections, James McDONOUGH, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 06-15131.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 13, 2007.

Jill Kramer Traína, Office of the Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Respondent Appellant.

*927Federal Public Defender, Miami, FL, Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner-Appellee.

Before CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and WALTER,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable Donald E. Walter, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

For the reasons that we discussed with counsel at oral argument, we are convinced that no part of the petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim is unexhausted or proeedurally barred, and the district court did not err in finding that the state court’s determination regarding the prejudice prong was an unreasonable application of the principles set out in *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of IDX Systems Corporation
(the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned,
James H. Crook, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and John A. Kane,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: August 3, 2004             /S/    JAMES H. CROOK, JR.
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                  James H. Crook, Jr.
                                  Chief Executive Officer




Dated: August 3, 2004             /S/    JOHN A. KANE
                                  ----------------------------------------------
                                  John A. Kane
                                  Sr. Vice President,Finance and Administration,
                                  Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Lonon, Appellant.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court’s alibi charge was erroneous in certain respects. However, the defendant failed to object to the alibi charge and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Further, in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the fact that the trial court’s charge, as a whole, properly instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proof, there is no basis for reversing the conviction in the interest of justice *(see, People v Canty,*60 NY2d 830; *People v Colon,*122 AD2d 151; *People v Payne,*111 AD2d 938).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining claims and find that they are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hyperion Solutions Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended December 31, 2003 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Jeffrey R. Rodek, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

Dated: February 9, 2004

/s/ JEFFREY R. RODEK
Jeffrey R. Rodek
Chief Executive Officer