Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A04-1607-CR-1716 | May 23, 2019 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Russell W. Brown, Jr.

King, Brown & Murdaugh, LLC

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Caroline G. Templeton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carl L. Dahlin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 23, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A04-1607-CR-1716

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable Mary R. Harper, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D05-1512-F5-11081

Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Carl L. Dahlin appeals his conviction for level 5 felony 

carrying a handgun without a license with a prior felony conviction within the 

last fifteen years. Dahlin argues that a police officer’s removal of a handgun 

case from his car without a warrant violated his constitutional right against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, and therefore the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence regarding the case and the handgun found inside it. Dahlin 

also argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his 

conviction. We conclude that any error in the admission of evidence regarding 

the case and the handgun was harmless and that the evidence is sufficient to 

support Dahlin’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] The facts most favorable to the jury’s verdict are as follows. On December 3, 

2015, Dahlin was convicted of two counts of class D felony theft. On 

December 20, 2015, he was released from jail and went to live with his father in 

Valparaiso in Porter County.

[3] At approximately 4:20 p.m. on December 25, 2015, Officer Charles Gambrel 

from the Westville Police Department in LaPorte County stopped at a gas 

station in Valparaiso on his way home from work. The sky was dark, and the 

 

1 We heard oral argument on April 19, 2019, at John Adams High School in South Bend. We thank the 

faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality and thoughtful questions, and we thank counsel for their 

excellent advocacy.
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temperature was approximately fifty degrees. Officer Gambrel went inside the 

station, and the clerk told him that there was a person “parked outside” who 

was “slumped over” his steering wheel and had been there “a long time.” Trial 

Tr. Vol. 1 at 100. The officer asked the clerk if she had called 911, and she said 

yes. He told her to call 911 again and let them know that he was “out there” 

and “needed assistance”; as a law enforcement officer from LaPorte County, he 

had “no way of contacting the Porter County dispatch system.” Id.

[4] Officer Gambrel went outside and approached a white Nissan Altima with 

black interior that was parked diagonally in a parallel parking space with its 

engine running. Id. at 167. The driver’s side window was down; the 

windshield wipers were on, although it wasn’t raining; and “[t]he radio was 

going.” Id. at 101. The officer noticed Dahlin “slumped over the front of the 

[steering] wheel.” Id. Officer Gambrel asked Dahlin if he was “okay” and “got 

no response.” Id. The officer “knocked on the side of the door, still with no 

response.” Id. Then the officer “poked” Dahlin in the shoulder with his index 

finger. Id. “At that time, [Dahlin] jumped up, got in a boxing stance as he was 

still [sitting] in the car, like [the officer] scared him.” Id. at 102.

[5] Officer Gambrel asked Dahlin “what was going on.” Id. Dahlin replied that he 

was “going through the car wash and doing scratch offs.” Id. The officer did 

not see any scratch-off lottery tickets in Dahlin’s lap. Officer Gambrel stated 

that “the clerk was concerned for [Dahlin’s] safety” and that he “was there to 

make sure [Dahlin] was okay.” Id. at 103. Officer Gambrel asked Dahlin “if 

he was on any kind of medications[,]” and Dahlin said that “he was not.” Id. 
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The officer asked Dahlin “if he would provide some kind of ID[,]” and Dahlin 

began to “fumble around looking for his ID.” Id. Dahlin gave Officer Gambrel 

his insurance card and said that “he could not find his [driver’s] license[.]” Id. 

At that moment, the gas station clerk handed the officer the phone that she had 

used to call 911. Officer Gambrel “walked to the back of the car,” got the 

license plate information, and had the 911 dispatch operator “run the plates.” 

Id. at 104. The Nissan was registered to Dahlin’s mother, who had been killed 

in a traffic accident exactly two years earlier; Dahlin’s father had renewed the 

license plates in her name.

[6] From his vantage point, Officer Gambrel saw Dahlin do “a lot of fumbling 

around” with the center console and a backpack that was located on the front 

passenger seat. Id. The officer “positioned [himself] a little closer to the front” 

of the car so he could “see exactly what [Dahlin] was doing.” Id. He “noticed 

the corner part of” what he recognized to be a black Glock handgun case that 

was “[p]artially underneath” the backpack. Id. at 105. The officer asked 

Dahlin if he had a handgun license. Dahlin said that he did.2

 Officer Gambrel 

asked if Dahlin “had a gun in the car. He said yes” and that the gun belonged 

to his father. Id. at 106. The officer asked “if [Dahlin] would be willing to step 

out of the car and talk to [him].” Id. Dahlin opened the driver’s side door 

(which stayed open), exited the car, and leaned against the rear driver’s side 

 

2 See Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 124 (Officer Gambrel acknowledging that it was not “the first time [he] ever 

encountered someone that had a gun in a car with a handgun permit”).
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quarter panel. Officer Gambrel asked where the gun was, and Dahlin replied 

that “it was on the passenger floor.” Id. at 107. Dahlin’s speech was “kind of 

slurred[,]” and “[h]is balance was unsteady” as he leaned against the car. Id. at 

108.

[7] Several Valparaiso Police Department officers responded to the clerk’s 911 call 

and arrived at the gas station almost simultaneously at 4:30 p.m. Officer 

Michael Trueblood parked behind Dahlin’s car to “box it in[.]” Id. at 131. 

Officer Trueblood approached Officer Gambrel, who told him that “there was a 

firearm in the vehicle[.]” Id. at 132. Officer Trueblood “looked inside the 

vehicle” and saw what he recognized to be a “standard Glock box.” Id. The 

officer “walked over to the passenger side of the vehicle and opened the door 

and grabbed the box.” Id. at 133.3

 He

opened the box, saw that there was a firearm inside the box. 

[He] ejected the magazine from the firearm. Pulled the slide back 

on top of the firearm. Locked it in place. Put the firearm on top

on top of the car. Put the magazine in [his] pocket. And then 

[he] put the firearm inside [his] police vehicle and locked [his] 

police vehicle.

 

3 When asked why he did so, Officer Trueblood replied,

Because when we’re on a scene and there’s a firearm that’s unattended for [sic] it’s in our best 

interest for our safety and everyone else’s safety on the scene, including the person we’re talking 

with, any patrons of the gas station, gas station employees to make sure all deadly weapons are 

accounted for and secured.

Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 133.
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Id.

4

 Officer Trueblood did not pat Dahlin down for weapons because he “just 

assumed” that Officer Gambrel had done so, which he had not. Id. at 134.

[8] Officers Patrick Yokovich and John Watson arrived at the gas station as Officer 

Trueblood was placing the handgun on the roof of the Nissan. Id. at 166. At 

that point, the officers were informed that Dahlin had a valid handgun license. 

Officer Jason Hamilton was talking with Dahlin and Officer Gambrel. Officer 

Yokovich, who was the lead officer at the scene, “asked Officer Hamilton what 

was going on, and he [replied] that it was just a possible OWI [operating while 

intoxicated] investigation at this point. And they had just removed the gun for 

safekeeping.” Id. at 167.

[9] Officer Yokovich “walked Mr. Dahlin over to a flat well-lit area of the parking 

lot” and “attempted to administer field sobriety tests to him.” Id. at 168. The 

officer did not make Dahlin perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test because 

Dahlin claimed to be “legally blind without his glasses on[,]” and he did not 

make Dahlin perform the “walk and turn or one leg stand test[s]” because 

Dahlin “advised [the officer] that he had a torn meniscus” in “his right knee.” 

Id. The officer directed Dahlin to recite the alphabet forward from C to R and 

count backward from 62 to 31, and Dahlin “was able to do both of those.” Id. 

at 169. Officer Yokovich did not “smell any alcohol” on Dahlin and did not 

 

4 Officer Trueblood testified that the handgun wasn’t ready to fire when he opened the case. He confirmed 

that “there was one bullet in the magazine” and that “[i]n order to fire that gun someone would have had to 

take it, pull the slide back, and then that one bullet would have been in a fireable position[.]” Trial Tr. Vol. 1

at 145, 146.
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administer a portable breath test. Id. at 176. Dahlin admitted that he had taken 

medication for which he had a prescription, and that the bottle was in the 

backpack. According to Officer Yokovich, “given the circumstances, the 

vehicle was parked, and nobody really saw [Dahlin] drive, [he] just didn’t feel 

comfortable proceeding for the OWI investigation even though [he] probably 

could have.” Id. at 169.

[10] As Dahlin was talking with Officer Yokovich, he admitted “that he had just 

gotten out of jail a couple days ago.” Id. at 170. The officers’ attention was 

“drawn to that because [Dahlin] had had a firearm in his vehicle[,]” and they 

“asked him what he had gotten out of jail for.” Id. Dahlin “advised that it had 

been a felony Theft.” Id. “[K]nowing that [a person is] not allowed to possess 

a firearm if [he has] a felony conviction,” the officers needed to “gather more 

information on that.” Id.

5

 “Officer Hamilton called dispatch, and they advised 

that” Dahlin had been convicted of class D felony theft on December 3. Id. 

“And because of that conviction he was no longer eligible to possess a firearm.” 

Id. The handgun’s serial number was “provided to dispatch. And the only 

thing that dispatch came back with was that the gun was a Signal 80, which 

means that it’s not stolen. It didn’t have any information about the registered 

 

5 See Ind. Code §§ 35-47-2-3(e) (providing that a lifetime license to carry a handgun, which Dahlin had, “is 

automatically revoked if the license holder does not remain a proper person” to be licensed) and 35-47-1-7 

(defining “proper person” as “a person who ... does not have a conviction for a crime for which the person 

could have been sentenced for more than one (1) year[,]” i.e., a felony).
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owner.” Id. at 173. The officers contacted a prosecutor, who told them to “go 

ahead and take [Dahlin] for Felon in Possession of a Firearm.” Id. at 172.

[11] On December 28, 2015, the State charged Dahlin with level 5 felony carrying a 

handgun without a license with a prior felony conviction within the last fifteen 

years. See Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (providing that “[a] person shall not carry a 

handgun in any vehicle or on or about the person’s body without being licensed 

under this chapter to carry a handgun” and that “[a] person who knowingly or 

intentionally violates this section” commits a level 5 felony if the person “has 

been convicted of a felony within fifteen (15) years before the date of the 

offense.”). In March 2016, Dahlin filed a motion to suppress evidence 

regarding the handgun and the case, which he argued were obtained in 

violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 

After a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the motion.

[12] A jury trial was held in May 2016. At the beginning of trial, Dahlin raised what 

we perceive to be a continuing objection to “the introduction of the firearm” 

and “testimony regarding the handgun” based on the arguments he had made 

at the suppression hearing, and the trial court overruled his objection. Trial Tr. 

Vol. 1 at 87-88. Officers Gambrel, Trueblood, and Yokovich testified for the 

State. Dahlin’s elderly father (“Dahlin Senior”) and Dahlin testified on 

Dahlin’s behalf. According to Dahlin Senior, Dahlin was going to take Dahlin 

Senior’s truck to a Christmas party on December 25, but Dahlin Senior told 

him to take the Nissan “because the truck [wasn’t] running good[.]” Id. at 234. 

Dahlin Senior claimed that the handgun and the case belonged to him, that he 
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had forgotten that he had left them on the front seat of the Nissan on December 

23 or 24, and that he had not told Dahlin that he had left them there.

[13] Dahlin testified that he was going to take his father’s truck to a party on 

December 25, but his father told him to take the Nissan instead because the 

truck had “not been running that well[.]” Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 4. Dahlin got out 

of the truck, “threw” his backpack onto the Nissan’s front passenger seat, and 

drove to the gas station to buy a beverage, lottery tickets, and cigarettes. Id. at 

6. The drive took about five minutes. He parked, went inside, bought the 

items, and returned to the car. He was “scratching off tickets” when Officer 

Gambrel approached and asked for his driver’s license and registration. Id. at 8. 

He retrieved his license from his wallet and was looking for the registration 

when he moved the backpack and “saw the Glock case sitting on the passenger 

side.” Id. at 10.6

 According to Dahlin, he had not seen the case before then 

because “it was dark out. It [the case] was black. [His] backpack was on top of 

it. The car seats were black.” Id. Dahlin stated, “[W]hen I saw the gun case I 

notified the officers. I mean, not only for their safety, but for my safety. I 

mean, officers if think [sic] you’re carrying a gun I don’t know what may 

happen.” Id. at 15.

 

6 Officer Yokovich testified that Dahlin told him that the handgun case had originally been in the backpack 

and that the backpack belonged to his father. The officer asked Dahlin why the case was out of the backpack, 

and he replied that “he had to remove it from the backpack to get his wallet.” Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 171. The 

officer obtained Dahlin’s consent to search the backpack, in which he found a bottle of Dahlin’s medication. 

The officer testified, “And then I said well, if this is your dad’s backpack why is -- why was your wallet in it 

and why was your medication in it. And [Dahlin] advised that they share the backpack.” Id.
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[14] The jury found Dahlin guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to four 

years, with 182 days executed and the rest suspended to probation. Dahlin filed 

a timely notice of appeal, but the appeal was dismissed with prejudice in 

December 2016 because he had failed to file an appellant’s brief. In July 2018, 

Dahlin sought permission to pursue a belated appeal, which was granted.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – Any error in the admission of evidence regarding 

the handgun case and the handgun was harmless.

[15] “The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects persons from 

unreasonable search and seizure by prohibiting, as a general rule, searches and 

seizures conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause.” Clark v. 

State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).7

 “This provision applies to the states 

through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Schlechty v. State, 926 N.E.32d 1, 3 n.1 

(Ind. 2010). The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to protect 

the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their 

homes, and their belongings.” Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). 

 

7 The Fourth Amendment states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 

and the persons or things to be seized.” Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution has nearly identical 

wording, but “Indiana courts ‘interpret and apply Section 11 independently from federal Fourth Amendment 

jurisprudence.’” Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 745 

N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001)). Dahlin asserts that the seizure of the handgun case violated both the Fourth 

Amendment and Section 11, but he offers no analysis under the Indiana Constitution beyond reciting the 

three-part test from Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005). The State argues, and we agree, that he has 

therefore “waived any claim of error” under Section 11. Id. at 647.
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“A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the Fourth Amendment by 

entering an automobile.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986). “While 

the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy 

that exist with respect to one’s home, a car’s interior as a whole is nonetheless 

subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the 

police.” Id. at 114-15.

[16] Under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] warrantless search or seizure is per se 

unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the welldelineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.” Erickson v. State, 72 

N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 

935 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. “[W]hen evidence is obtained in violation of the 

constitution, such evidence may not be used against a defendant at trial.” 

Osborne v. State, 805 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The 

exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the right 

of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by deterring police 

misconduct.” Hendricks v. State, 897 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[17] Dahlin contends that the warrantless seizure of the handgun case was 

unconstitutional, and therefore any evidence regarding the case and the 

handgun found inside it should have been excluded at trial. “In general, rulings 

on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and 

reversed when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances.” Stickrod v. State, 108 N.E.3d 385, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), 

trans. denied. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve any conflicts 
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in the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 

924, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “When a challenge to such a ruling 

is based on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a 

question of law that we review de novo.” Id.

8

[18] We note that “there are three levels of police investigation, two of which 

implicate the Fourth Amendment and one of which does not.” Negash v. State, 

113 N.E.3d 1281, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

First, the Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest or detention 

that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by 

probable cause. Second, the police may, without a warrant or 

probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory 

purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer 

has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has or is about 

to occur. The third level of investigation occurs when a police 

officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which 

involves neither an arrest nor a stop. This third level is a 

consensual encounter in which the Fourth Amendment is not 

implicated.

Id. (citations omitted).

 

8 Dahlin’s first argument on appeal is that his status as a probationer did not justify the warrantless search. 

This argument appears to be a response to the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress that “[t]he 

Conditions of Probation imposed upon [Dahlin] require him to submit to reasonable searches of his person or 

property to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 49. The State 

made no such argument at the suppression hearing and has made no such argument on appeal, perhaps 

because, as Dahlin points out, his conditions of probation state, “I shall waive my fourth amendment right 

and allow reasonable search of my home, vehicle and/or person by my Probation Officer and/or law 

enforcement with my Officer present.” Id. at 110 (emphasis added). Obviously, Dahlin’s probation officer was 

not present at the gas station when Officer Trueblood seized the handgun case from Dahlin’s vehicle.
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[19] The State does not argue that the officers had probable cause to arrest or detain 

Dahlin for more than a short period of time when Officer Trueblood removed 

the handgun case from Dahlin’s vehicle, and Dahlin does not argue that the 

officers did not have reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him for investigatory 

purposes. Cf. State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (Ind. 2008) (holding 

that officer’s “brief questioning” during traffic stop “as to whether the 

defendant had any weapons, drugs, or anything else that could harm the officer 

... was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 

U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not prohibit officer 

from asking driver to exit vehicle during traffic stop).

9

 We therefore proceed 

from the premise that Dahlin was subjected to an investigative stop, which 

implicates the Fourth Amendment.

[20] Dahlin asserts that Officer Trueblood violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

removing the handgun case from his car without a warrant and without a 

reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous. Dahlin cites Michigan v. 

Long, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 

permits an officer to conduct a warrantless search of the passenger 

compartment of a vehicle during a traffic stop, “limited to those areas in which 

a weapon may be placed or hidden,” but only if the officer “possesses a 

reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

 

9 “A traffic stop is more akin to an investigative stop ... than a custodial arrest.” Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 

539, 541 (Ind. 2001).
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with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer[] in 

believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate 

control of weapons.” 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). See also State v. Dodson, 733 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000) (“When a vehicle has been properly stopped for investigative purposes, if 

the officer reasonably believes that he or others may be in danger, he may 

conduct a limited search of the automobile’s interior for weapons without first 

obtaining a search warrant.”) (citing, inter alia, Long).

[21] But in this case, Officer Trueblood did not actually conduct a search of Dahlin’s 

car; he saw the handgun case in open view on the front passenger’s seat and 

seized it from the car. The open view doctrine, not to be confused with the 

plain view doctrine, “is used in situations in which a law enforcement officer 

sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, but rather is 

in a place where the officer is lawfully entitled to be.” Justice v. State, 765 

N.E.2d 161, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), clarified on reh’g, 767 N.E.2d 995.10 “In 

such situations, anything that is within ‘open view’ may be observed without 

having to obtain a search warrant because making such ‘open view’ 

 

10 “The plain view doctrine is recognized as an exception to the search warrant requirement.” Justice, 765 

N.E.2d at 164. “The concept of ‘plain view’ is used when an officer is making a lawful search in a 

constitutionally protected area and discovers an item in plain view.” Id. “Generally, items observed in plain 

view are not considered the product of the search.” Id. at 165. “To justify a warrantless seizure under the 

plain view doctrine, a law enforcement officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at 

the place where items are in plain view, the ‘incriminating character’ of the items must be ‘immediately 

apparent,’ and the officer must have ‘a lawful right of access’ to the items in plain view.” Id. (quoting Horton 

v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990)). “If such requirements are met, the items discovered in ‘plain view’

may be seized without a warrant.” Id.
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observations do not constitute a search in the constitutional sense.” Id. 

“Nonetheless, in order to lawfully seize items in ‘open view,’ it may be 

necessary to obtain a search warrant or be able to justify a warrantless seizure 

under an exception to the warrant requirement.” Id.

[22] Citing Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 2001), and Delatorre v. State, 903

N.E.2d 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, the State claims that “[t]he safety 

of police officers is a legitimate and weighty justification for an intrusion.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 13. But those cases hold only that the Fourth Amendment 

does not prohibit an officer from asking whether a motorist has any weapons. 

Also, citing Billingsley v. State, 980 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied

(2013), the State asserts that “[i]n order to conduct a further investigation to 

determine whether Dahlin was intoxicated and whether he legally possessed the 

firearm, officers were permitted to freeze the situation by securing the firearm 

until it could be confirmed that Dahlin was entitled to possess it.” Appellee’s 

Br. at 12-13. But Billingsley holds only that the officer in that case did not 

convert an investigative stop into a custodial arrest by using his firearm to 

detain a suspect sitting in the passenger seat of an SUV in a parking lot, where 

the officer had a “specific and reasonable belief” that the suspect “may have 

been armed.” 980 N.E.2d at 407.

[23] The State offers no other justification for the warrantless seizure of the handgun 

case. Nevertheless, the State correctly observes that “[a]ny error in the 

admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other properly admitted 

evidence is harmless.” Appellee’s Br. at 15. See Fuller v. State, 674 N.E.2d 576, 
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578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“It is well recognized that any error in admitting 

evidence will be found harmless where the evidence is merely cumulative. This 

proposition also applies where the alleged error is of a constitutional nature.”) 

(citation omitted). The State argues that any error in the admission of evidence 

regarding the handgun case and the handgun was harmless because “Dahlin did 

not object to the testimony of the officers that established there was a gun box 

in the car” and did not “object to the testimony of the officer that he admitted 

to having the gun in the car[.]” Appellee’s Br. at 15.

[24] Although Dahlin did in fact raise a continuing objection to such testimony, he 

cites no authority for the proposition that the testimony was inadmissible. The 

officers’ personal observations regarding the publicly viewable contents of 

Dahlin’s vehicle prior to the warrantless seizure of the handgun case could not 

be considered “fruit of the poisonous tree” for purposes of the exclusionary rule. 

Cf. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 267 (Ind. 2013) (“Generally speaking, 

evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure must be excluded under the 

fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. This extension of the exclusionary rule bars 

evidence directly obtained by the illegal search or seizure as well as evidence 

derivatively gained as a result of information learned or leads obtained during 

that same search or seizure.”). And Officer Gambrel’s testimony that Dahlin 

told him there was a gun in the vehicle would not be excluded by the fruit of the 

poisonous tree doctrine or by the rule against hearsay. See Ind. Evidence Rules

802 (providing that hearsay is generally inadmissible) and 801(d)(2) (providing 
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that statement made by opposing party in an individual capacity and offered 

against that party is not hearsay).

[25] Moreover, a handgun need not be introduced into evidence to sustain a 

conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. E.g., Williams v. State, 983 

N.E.2d 661, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Here, Officers Gambrel and Trueblood 

saw a handgun case on the front passenger seat of Dahlin’s car, and Dahlin told 

Officer Gambrel that there was a gun in the car. The jury obviously disbelieved 

Dahlin’s claims that he did not know there was a gun in the car until he began 

searching for his vehicle registration and that the gun belonged to his father, 

and this credibility determination did not hinge on the admission of the actual 

gun and gun case. The assessment of witness credibility “is the sole province of 

the jury.” Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind. 1998). Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that any error in the admission of evidence 

regarding the handgun case and the handgun was harmless.

11

Section 2 – Dahlin’s conviction is supported by sufficient 

evidence.

[26] Dahlin also argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support 

his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. “When reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither 

 

11 Dahlin does not argue that the officers’ post-seizure activities unduly extended the length of the 

investigative stop, nor does he argue that evidence regarding his prior felony convictions should have been 

excluded for any reason.
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reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 

1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict and will affirm the 

conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ferrell v. State, 

746 N.E.2d 48, 50 (Ind. 2001). The evidence need not overcome every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Negash, 113 N.E.3d at 1291. If the 

testimony believed by the trier of fact is sufficient to support the verdict, then 

we will not disturb it. Ferrell, 746 N.E.2d at 51.

[27] Dahlin challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to whether he 

“carried” a handgun for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-47-2-1; he 

concedes that he did not have a valid license to carry the handgun and that he 

had been convicted of a felony within fifteen years before the date of the 

offense. To convict a defendant of carrying a handgun in a vehicle, the State 

must prove that he had control over the vehicle, the unlicensed handgun was 

found in the vehicle, and the defendant had knowledge of the handgun’s 

presence. Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835 n.2 (Ind. 1999).12 Knowledge

 

12 Several cases state that, “[i]n addition, it must be established that there was an intention to convey or 

transport the weapon.” Cole v. State, 69 N.E.3d 552, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Thurman v. State, 793 

N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Klopfenstein v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1982)), trans. denied. In our view, evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the handgun’s presence in the 

vehicle would be sufficient to establish that intent.
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of a handgun’s presence may be inferred where the defendant has exclusive 

possession of the premises on which it is found. Negash, 113 N.E.3d at 1291.

[28] Here, Dahlin had exclusive possession of the vehicle in which the handgun was 

found, and the handgun was in a case that was “[p]artially underneath” his

backpack on the front passenger seat. Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 105. This evidence is 

sufficient to support an inference that Dahlin had knowledge of the handgun’s 

presence. Dahlin argues that his father had accidentally left the handgun in the 

vehicle, that he had borrowed the vehicle from his father, and that he did not 

know that the handgun was in the vehicle until he started looking for the 

vehicle registration. The State argues, and we agree, that this is “a clear request 

for this Court to reassess the credibility of the witnesses.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. 

This we may not do. Consequently, we affirm Dahlin’s conviction.

[29] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.