J u d g e A m u l T h a p ar , U n i t e d

S t a t e s D i s tr i c tJ u d g e f

o r th e E a s t e r

nD i s tr i c to f

K e n tu c ky, * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0543n.06 No. 08-1813 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MAURI CE L ASHON EMERY, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : CL AY and SUTTO N, Circuit J udg es; THAPAR, District J udg e. * SUTTON, Circuit Judge
. Maurice Emery appea ls his sente nce f or bank r obbery , challeng ing the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that he is a

c are e r o ff

e nd e r u nd e r t he se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s. B e c a us e
re sis tin g and ob str

uc tin g a po lic e of

fi c e r un de r Mic h. Com

p. L aws § 7 50 .8 1d (1 ) i s n ot c a te g or ic a lly
a cr ime of vi o l ence , as we rec ently conclude d in a sepa

rate case , see U

nited States v. Mosley , No. 08-1783, __F .3d__, 2009 WL 2176634, at *4 (6th Cir. J uly 23, 2009), we vacate his sentence and
re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g.
I.
I n 2008, Emery

pleade d g uilty

to bank robbe ry . See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
. After finding that Emery was a car eer offe nder, see U. S
. S
. G. § 4 B1
. 1 , th e d i s tri ct co urt ca l cu l at eda gu i d el i n es ra n geNo. 08-1813

Un ite d S tates v . E me ry

- 2 - of 151 to 188 months and sentenc ed him to 188 months in prison. In explaining its care er- offe nder deter mination, the district court found that Emer y ’s prior state -cour

t conviction for resisting and obstructing a police of

fice r wa s a cr ime of violence
. See Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.81d(1) . Emery objected to the c lassification bef ore th e sentenc ing judg e, and he objects to the cla ssification on appea l. (For

what it is worth, Emery

did not object then, and he does not object now, to the district court’s c lassification of a separ ate state -cour

t conviction as a c rime of violenc e.)
II.
We rec ently

considere d whether

resisting and obstructinga po li c e o f fice r under

Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.81d(1) is categ orica lly a cr ime of violence in Mosley , and we held that it wa s not. See 2009 WL 2176634, at *1. We follow the same path here
. An individual is a car eer

offe nder unde r the sente ncingg uidelines if (1) he was at least 18 when he committed the crime of conviction, (2) the crime of conviction is a fe lony crime of violence
or a felony controlled-substanc e offe nse, and (3) he has been convicted of at least two other c rimes of violence or controlled substance offe nses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. A “ crime of violence” is one that “[1] has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the person of anothe r . . . [2a] i s burg lary of a dw elling, a

rson, or e x tortion, involves use of explos ives, or [2b] otherwise involves c onduct that pre sent s a ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a ).No. 08-1813

Un ite d S tates v . E me ry

- 3 - I n deter mining whe ther a

prior convic tion is a crime of violenc e, we u s e a “c ateg orica l approa ch”—c onsideringthe cr ime as def ined by the statute, not as def

ined by the par ticulars of the individual’s underlying conduct. Taylor v. United States , 49 5 U. S. 57 5, 60 0– 02 (1 99 0) ; see M osley , 2009 WL 2176634, at *2. I f the statutory definition includ es an off ense that is not a crime of violence a

nd one that is, we ma

y look at “the indictment, the pl ea ag ree ment, the pl ea c olloquy or ‘c omp ara ble jud ic ia l r e c or d[s]’ ” to dis c ov e r wh e the r t he de fe nd ant “ ne c e ssa

ri ly” ple a de d guil ty

to a crime of vi olence
. Mosley , 2009 WL2176634, at *2 (q u o t i n g Shepard v. U nited States , 5 44 U. S. 13, 26 (2005))
. I n Mosley , we a ddresse d wh et h er resist ing a nd obstructing a police of fice r under

Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.81d(1) is a crime of violence. 2009 WL

2176634, at *4. The of

fense under Mic hig an la

w i s def ine d a s f oll ow s: “ [A]n i nd ivi du a l w ho a ssa ult s, batte rs , w ound s, re sis ts, ob str uc ts, op po se s, or

e nd ang e rs a

pe rs on wh o th e ind ivi du a l kn ow s or has reas on to k no w i s perf orming his or her d u t i es i s g uilty of a f elony punishable by

imprisonment for not more than 2 y ear s or a f

ine of not more tha

n $2,000.00, or both.” Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.81d(1) . The ter m “obstruct[ing]” is furthe r def ined as “ includ[i ng ] . .
. a k n o wi ng failure to comply with a lawf

ul command.” Id. § 750.81d(7)( a). Consistent with Chambers v. United States , _ _U .S.

__ , 1 29 S.Ct
. 687 (2009), we emphasized that, “bef ore we ex amine the ordinary behavior underly ing a conviction under the statute, we must de cide at the outset how to c lassify violations, a nd most significa

ntly we must decide whe ther the statute should be treated as involving more than one categ ory of off ense f or fede ral c rimes-of- violence pur poses.” Mosley , 2009 WL 2176634, at *4.No. 08-1813

Un ite d S tates v . E me ry

- 4 - I n holding that a

violation of the statute was not c ateg orica lly a cr ime of vi olence in Mosley , we s ai d t h e f o l l o wi n g: [W ]e know that Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.81d(1) contains at lea st two categ ories of crimes, a nd that at least one of those categ ories, “obstruct[i ng ]” based on a “know ing failure to comply with a lawf ul command,” is not a c rime of violenc e. We also know that Mosle y ’ s c o n v ic ti o n w a s f o r a v io lati o n o f th a t s tatute , b u t w e d o n o t know which categ ory

his offense falls into. Treating the of fense as “conta ining at least two separ ate c rimes” f

or purpose s of deter

mining the nature of a

prior con v i cti on, Cha mb e rs , 129 S.Ct . at 691, means that we ca nnot classify

Mosley ’s prior c onviction and, at lea st at the categ orica l step of the inquiry , it cannot qualify as a c rime of violence.
Id. The same conclusion applies he re. As in M o sley , the g overnme nt will have a c hance on rema nd to argue that the r eleva nt Sh e pa rd documents show that Em ery committed a cr ime of violence , by showing that “the indictment, the plea a g ree m en t , t h e plea colloquy or ‘c ompara

ble judicial re cord[s],’” id. at *2 (q u o t i n g Sh e

pa rd , 544 U.S. at 26), establish that Emery nece ssarily admitted to a crime of violence wh e n h e ple a de d guil ty

to r e sis tin g and

ob str uc tin g a po lic e of

fi c e r. B e caus e we mu st va c a te Em e ry ’s se nte nc e , it

is n ot n e c e ssa

ry to a dd re ss h is a rgume nt th at his se nte nc e wa s p ro c e dura lly
unrea sonable.
III
. Fo r t h es e r ea s o n s , we v ac at e E m ery ’s s en t en ce an d re m an d fo r r es en t en ci n g.