alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NAPOLEON VILLACORTE GALANG;

et al.,

 Petitioners,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr. Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-74133

Agency Nos. A077-149-639

 A079-145-348

 A098-931-022

 A098-931-023

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 25, 2010** 

Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. 

Napoleon Villacorte Galang and his family, natives and citizens of the

Philippines, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

dismissal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for

withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

FILED

JUN 03 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 07-74133

for substantial evidence findings of fact, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039

(9th Cir. 2010) and de novo claims of due process violations, Colmenar v. INS, 210

F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for

review. 

Galang admitted that he entered into a fraudulent marriage in order to obtain

immigration benefits. In light of this fraud, and Galang’s failure to corroborate his

claim that he was a government informant in the United States, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d

at 1040-44 (adverse credibility determination was reasonable “[i]n the totality of

circumstances”); see also Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“[t]he highly deferential standard of review compels us to let stand the BIA’s

determination that petitioner’s corroboration was insufficient.”). Finally, we reject

Galang’s contention that the IJ’s actions during the merits hearing deprived him of

a full and fair hearing. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring

error and prejudice to prevail in due process claim). Accordingly Galang’s

withholding of removal claim fails.

We lack jurisdiction to review Galang’s contentions regarding the denial of

his asylum claim because he failed to exhaust them before the BIA. See Barron v.

Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
As noted o n o ri gi n al s u b m ission, the offense was a second- deg ree felony

when it was 1 committed. K

a h o o k e l e v . S tat e , 165 S.W .3d 440, 441 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin), vacate d and remande d , No. PD-0794-05, 2006 Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 757 (Tex. C rim. App. Apr. 12, 2006)

. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON REMAND

NO. 03-04-00493- CR

Edm und K aho oke le , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 94514 1, HO NORAB LE WILF ORD F LOW ERS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n M a y 19 95 , a pp e lla nt E dmu nd Ka ho ok e le ple a de d n o c on te st to en g a g ingin

or g a nize d c ri min a l ac tiv ity by c on sp ir ing duri ng the mon ths of Ma y thr ou g h J uly

19 93 to c omm it burg lary of a build i n g an d t h eft of more than $20,000. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 7 1. 02 (We st Supp. 2005). As called for in a plea barg ain ag ree ment, the district court de fer red a djudication of g uilty a n d p la c e d K a h o o k e le o n c o mm u n it y s u p e r v is io n f o r te n y e a r s . I n Ju ly 2 0 0 4 , the cour t adjudicate d Kahooke le g ui l t y and imposed a twe nty -y ear prison sentenc e. This appea l followed. 1 Se e Ha rg esh e im e r v . S

tat e , 182 S.W .3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).2 I n h is o n ly

p o in t o f e r r o r , K a h o o k e le c o n te n d s th a t t h e tw e n ty
- y e a r

sentenc e constitutes c ruel and unusual punishment be cause he had serve d over nine y ear s of t h e t en-y ear probationar

y period, he was inca

rce rate d for over seven y ear s during that time, a nd the leg islature ha s si nc e re du c e d th e ma ximumpunis hme nt f or his c ri me to t e n y e a rs . H e did no t e xpre ssl y

ra ise
t h i s issue in the trial court. Se e Rh oa de s v . S tat e , 9 3 4 S. W. 2 d 1 1 3 , 1 2 0 ( T e x. Cr im . App. 1996) (holding crue l a

nd unusual punishment c ontention w aived by failure to object at trial). I n any case , it is t he g ener al rule that if the punishment a ssessed is w ithin the rang e pre scribed by the leg islature, it i s n o t crue l and unusual. Sa mu e l v . S tat e , 477 S.W .2d 611614-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 1972). Ka ho ok e le ’s a rgume nts sh ou ld h a ve be e n a dd re sse d to the tr ia l c ourt , wh ich had the dis c re tio n to assess punishment within the statutory rang e. The punishment assesse d is not cruel and unusua l. The point of err or is overrule d and the judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: June 9, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh
**Exhibit 3.1**

AMENDMENT NO. 1 

TO 

OYO GEOSPACE CORPORATION 

AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS 

Adopted by the Board of Directors on May 8, 2007 

This Amendment amends the Section 4 of the OYO Geospace Corporation Amended and Restated Bylaws to read in its entirety as follows: 

"4. Except as requested by a holder with respect to such holder's shares of the Corporation or as provided by resolution of the Board of Directors, all shares of the Corporation shall be uncertificated sharesbeginning on July 1, 2007. Notwithstanding the foregoing, shares represented by a certificate issued prior to July 1, 2007, shall be certificated shares until such certificate is surrendered to this Corporation. Upon request, every holderof uncertificated shares shall be entitled to have a certificate signed by, or in the name of the Corporation by, the chairman or vice-chairman of the board of directors, or the president or vice-president, and by the treasurer or an assistanttreasurer, or the secretary or an assistant secretary of the Corporation representing the number of shares registered in certificate form. Any or all of the signatures on the certificate may be a facsimile. In case any officer, transfer agent orregistrar who has signed or whose facsimile signature has been placed upon a certificate shall have ceased to be such officer, transfer agent or registrar before such certificate is issued, it may be issued by the Corporation with the same effect asif he were such officer, transfer agent or registrar at the date of issue. The certificates shall otherwise be in such form as may be determined by the Board of Directors, shall be issued in numerical order, shall be entered in the books of theCorporation as they are issued and shall exhibit the holder's name and number of shares. At the election of the holder and without notice to the Corporation, any holder may participate in the Direct Registration System, or similar electronic recordsystem, in which the transfer agent of the Corporation participates, through which such holder may hold, own and transact registered shares in uncertificated or electronic form. The book-entry ownership of shares as reflected in the records (whetherelectronic or otherwise) of the transfer agent of the Corporation shall represent the official stock records of the Corporation."
#### LUDWIG et al. v. LAZARUS et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

December 18, 1896.)

Action by Bern-hard J. Ludwig and others against Sarah Lazarus and others.

No opinion. Motion denied. See 41 N. Y. Supp. 773.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-41567 on Form S-8, filed on December 5, 1997, Registration Statement No. 333-98051 on Form S-8, Filed on August 14, 2002, and AmendmentNo. 5 to Registration Statement No. 333-112299 on Form S-3, filed on September 20, 2004, of Prolong International Corporation (“the Company”) of our report dated April 13, 2005, which includes an explanatory paragraph regarding oursubstantial doubt of the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Prolong International Corporation for the year ended December 31, 2004. 

 

HASKEL & WHITE LLP 

 

Irvine, California 

April 13, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clinton L. WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-10305.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*789Submitted April 16, 2007.*

Filed April 20, 2007.

Matthew A. Lamberti, USSJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Clinton L. Watson, St. Louis, MO, pro se.

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Clinton L. Watson appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his request for recusal of the district judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Watson contends that the district court erred when it denied his third motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when, after ruling on the legal sufficiency of Watson’s motion in the first instance, it concluded that the motion should be denied. *See United States v. Studley,*783 F.2d 934, 939-40 (9th Cir.1986); *see also Clemens v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal.,*428 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that speculative allegations of bias are not sufficient to warrant recusal).

We deny appellee’s request that this court ban Watson from filing further motions in this case.

AFFIRM1ED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-40086

Summary Calendar

MARCUS DEON JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GAGE L. GUINN,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:16-CV-1169

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HO, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Marcus Deon Johnson, Texas prisoner # 1719334, appeals the district 

court’s order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw and denying Johnson’s 

motion to appoint substitute counsel in his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. “This [c]ourt must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own 

motion, if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). The 

denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in a § 1983 case is not 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 25, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-40086 Document: 00515465818 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/25/2020
No. 18-40086

2

immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Williams v. Catoe, 

946 F.3d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (overruling Robbins v. Maggio, 750 

F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1985)).

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

 Case: 18-40086 Document: 00515465818 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/25/2020
RIO PENASCO AT DAYTON NEAR ARTESIALatitude: 32.743Longitude: -104.414Elevation: 3403

RIO PENASCO AT DAYTON NEAR ARTESIA

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Sierra Blanca Site Page...



Sierra Blanca
#### PENOYAR et al. v. KELSEY et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

April, 1896.)

Action by William V. Penoyar and another against William E. Kelsey 'and another.

No opinion. Motion for reargument denied; and it is hereby certified that a question has arisen, under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that an attachment may issue, viz.: “Where, for .the purpose of procuring credit, or the extension of credit, the defendant has made a false_ statement in writing under his own hand or signature, or" under the hand or signature of a duly-authorized agent, made with his knowledge and acquiescence as to his financial responsibility or standing,”—whether an alleged false statement in writing by a debtor which does not come to the knowledge or notice of a creditor until after credit has been given to the debtor is sufficient to authorize the granting of a warrant of attachment under such provision. See 40 N. Y. Supp. 1147.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-41256

Summary Calendar

SUSAN BALDWIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH

AT GALVESTON; GARLAND D. ANDERSON,

Dr.; JOHN C. JENNINGS; ALVIN L. LEBLANC,

M.D.; CATHY VAN HOOK, M.D.; BEREL HELD,

M.D.; TURNER SHARP, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(G-95-CV-362)

July 21, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Susan Baldwin appeals an adverse summary judgment dismissing her claims2

of (1) intentional race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and

2000d and (2) defamation under the laws of Texas. Baldwin, who was a third-year

medical resident at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, claims

that she was not promoted to her fourth ye ar of residency solely because of her

race.

Baldwin’s case is totally devoi d of merit. The record does not contain a

single piece of evidence indicating that Baldwin was not promoted because of her

race. To show racial bias, counsel for Baldwin primarily relies on one of Baldwin’s

evaluations which contains the phr ase “innate inability to be taught.” The

purportedly racially offensive word is “innate.” The argument counsel advances

based thereon exceeds the limits of logical reasoning and sorely tests this court’s

patience as it obviously did the district court. The record is abundantly clear that

the decision not to promote Baldwin was based solely upon her poor surgical skills

as reflected in numerous performance evaluations. That the word “innate” was

used in a detailed discussion of Baldwin’s sho rtcomings as a surgeon does not

create a triable issue of fact regarding whether the hospital’s proffered reasons for

the failure to promote were pretextual. Baldwin’s other arguments regarding

pretext are equally meritless.

Baldwin also maintains that the district co u rt erred in granting summary3

judgment because it did not permit the conduct of adequate discovery on the merits

of the lawsuit. The record reflects neither abuse of discretion nor error on the part

of the district court.

Counsel is cautioned to be cognizant of the requirements of Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure in all future filings in this court and in the trial

courts in this circuit. A failure to comply therewith will be at counsel’s peril.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
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ORIGINALINTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANAPR22-0005SEP132022INRETHEMOTIONOFPETERN.KARVELISFORADMISSIONTOTHEBAROFTHESTATEOFMONTANABowenGreenwooaClerkofSuprerneCouStateofMonranaORDERPeterN.KarvelishasfiledamotionforadmissiontotheBaroftheStateofMontanapursuanttoRuleVoftheRulesforAdmission,AdmissiononMotion.TheBarAdmissionsAdministratoroftheStateBarofMontanahasinformedtheCourtthattheComrnissiononCharacterandFitnesshascertifiedthatKarvelishasprovidedthenecessarydocumentationandhassatisfiedtherequirementsprerequisitetoadmissiononmotionunderRuleV.Therefore,ITISHEREBYORDEREDthatuponpaymentofanyapplicationfeesandcompletionofanyotherprocessingrequirementsassetforthbytheBarAdmissionsAdministrator,PeterN.KarvelismaybeswornintothepracticeoflawintheStateofMontana.ArrangementsforswearinginmaybemadebycontactingtheofficeoftheClerkoftheMontanaSupremeCourt.TheClerkisdirectedtoprovidecopiesofthisordertoPetitionerandtotheStateBarofMontana.DATEDthis41-dayofSeptember,2022.Chiefrustice09/13/2022Case Number: PR 22-0005LA-m/2-#3d4M4.1...Justices
#### Abdul-Aziz Rashid MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-7718.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 9, 2007.

Decided: June 4, 2007.

Abdul-Aziz Rashid Muhammad, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Abdul-Aziz Rashid Muhammad appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing for failure to state a claim. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Muhammad,*No. l:04-cv00252-IMK-JSK (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 25, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be*266fore the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
•• I 

RECEIVED IN ~ 3 002S -Q3 

COURT OF CRIMINAl APPEAL~ . 

DEC 0 8 2m5 .. 
' ' 
\ ' 

--------~]I·~o ______________ __ 
~· . : 

P.O. Box 1707 *Quitman, TX 75783 *Phone: 903-763~~J61 *fax: 903-763-1511 

November 1ih, 2015 

Warren Keith Rodgers #1 0727 40 

Barry Telford Unit 3899 

State Hwy 98 

New Boston, Texas 75570 

·•'', ' 

Re: Cause No. 16,648-20018 (Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus) 

THE STATE OF TEXAS VS. WarrenKeith Rodgers 

Mr. !'Rodgers, 

This letter is to inform you regarding your Application for Writ pfHabeas Corpus, 

that no answer has been filed by the District Attorney and your case was 

appealed to the Crimina/Court of Appeals in Austin, Texas oti November_ 17th.._, 

2015. ' .. 
I ' 

/ 


~· 

JIM WHEELER, CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY 

WOOD COUNTY, TEXAS 

* P. 0. BOX 689 *QUITMAN, TX 75783 * 903-763-4515 *FAX: 903-763-5105 * 

Warren K. Rodgers # 1 072 7 40 

Barry Telford Unit 

3899 State Hwy 98 

New Boston, TX 75570 

Dear Mr. Rodgers, 

November 16, 2015 

In response to your letter dated November 2, 2015, you request this office to "conduct a DNA test..." 

which by statute is not a function of the District Attorney, rather by statute is the responsibility of the District 

Court. I further note that you have included a document entitled "Motion Requesting for Forensic DNA 

Testing of Evidence Containing Biological Material Pursuant to Art. 64.01 ",in the Writ package that you 

filed with the trial court. 

As the granting or denying of DNA testing pursuant to the provisions of Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 

64.01, et. s~q., is a judicial function, the State will await the Court's preliminary ruling to respond to your 

motion. Depending on that ruling, the State will file, if required, an appropriate re~ponse. · 

Cordially yours, 

hw/dm 

. ·'--------------------~~\
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MICHAEL MAKANEOLE, individually 3:14-CV-01528-PK

and on behalf of all similarly 

situated, ORDER

Plaintiff, 

v. 

 

SOLARWORLD INDUSTRIES AMERICA,

INC.; SOLARWORLD INDUSTRIES

AMERICA, LP; SOLARWORLD

INDUSTRIES SERVICES, LLC;

SOLARWORLD POWER PROJECTS,

INC., RANDSTAD PROFESSIONALS US,

LP, and KELLY SERVICES, INC.,

 Defendants.

BROWN, Judge.

Magistrate Judge Paul Papak issued Findings and

Recommendation (#160) on May 10, 2017, in which he recommends the

Court deny the Bill of Costs (#153) of Defendant Kelly Services,

Inc. 

1 - ORDER
Because no objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and

Recommendation were timely filed, this Court is relieved of its

obligation to review the record de novo. See Dawson v. Marshall,

561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). See also United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc). 

Having reviewed the legal principles de novo, the Court does not

find any error. 

CONCLUSION

The Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Papak’s Findings and

Recommendation (#160). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant

Kelly’s Bill of Costs (#153). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2017.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

2 - ORDER