In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2908

Delbert Heard,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Michael F. Sheahan, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 3512--Wayne R. Andersen, Judge.

Submitted May 3, 2001--Decided June 13, 2001

 Before Fairchild, Bauer, and Posner,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. This prisoner’s

civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. sec.

1983 charges the defendant prison

officials with inflicting cruel and

unusual punishment on the plaintiff by

denying him medical care for his hernia.

The district court held the suit barred

by the two-year statute of limitations

applicable to such suits.

 The plaintiff had been held in the Cook

County jail, awaiting trial, from January

1994 until sometime after June 6, 1996,

and he filed the suit on June 5, 1998. It

was during his confinement in the jail,

months before his release, that he

developed a prominent bulge in his groin

that he suspected was a hernia. The

hernia caused him significant pain,

especially after eating, and caused

numbness in the upper part of his thigh.

After months of unsuccessfully demanding

medical attention, he was finally

examined by a doctor who diagnosed a

ruptured hernia and recommended surgery.

But the jail refused to act on the recom

mendation. All this is according to the

complaint, and may not be true; but in

the posture the case is in we must treat

it as true.

 The district court thought that the
statute of limitations began to run as

soon as the plaintiff discovered that he

had a medical problem that required

attention, and this was more than two

years before he sued. We should consider

first whether this is an issue of state

or federal law. The statute of

limitations for suits under section 1983

is supplied by state law--not only the

limitations period but also the tolling

rules. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,

275 (1985); Johnson v. Railway Express

Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975).

Tolling interrupts the statute of

limitations after it has begun to run,

but does not determine when it begins to

run; that question is the question of

accrual, Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,

920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1991), and in

section 1983 suits as in other suits

under federal law the answer is furnished

by federal common law rather than by

state law. E.g., Sellars v. Perry, 80

F.3d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1996); Wilson v.

Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir.

1992).

 The district court, as we said, thought

the date of accrual was when the

plaintiff discovered he had a medical

problem that required attention. This

would be correct if the suit were for

medical malpractice. See, e.g., United

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118-24

(1979); Hinkle v. Henderson, 85 F.3d 298,

301 (7th Cir. 1996); Goodhand v. United

States, 40 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994);

Joyner v. Forney, 78 F.3d 1339, 1341 (8th

Cir. 1996). But it is not; malpractice

does not violate the Eighth Amendment;

instead the suit charges that the

defendants inflicted cruel and unusual

punishment on the plaintiff by refusing

to treat his condition. This refusal

continued for as long as the defendants

had the power to do something about his

condition, which is to say until he left

the jail. Every day that they prolonged

his agony by not treating his painful

condition marked a fresh infliction of

punishment that caused the statute of

limitations to start running anew. A

series of wrongful acts creates a series

of claims. Palmer v. Board of Education,

46 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 1995); Webb v.

Indiana National Bank, 931 F.2d 434, 438

(7th Cir. 1991); Morton’s Market, Inc. v.

Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823,

828 (11th Cir. 1999); Kuhnle Bros., Inc.

v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 522-23
(6th Cir. 1997).

 A more difficult question is precisely

how far the plaintiff can reach back in

seeking to prove liability and estimate

damages. He cannot reach back to the

first time he noticed the bulge and began

to experience pain from it, for remember

that his suit is for redress of the

deliberate indifference of the

defendants, and that could not be thought

to begin until the defendants learned

that he had a condition warranting

medical attention yet unreasonably

refused to provide that attention. Until

then, the defendants had not violated his

rights, and so his claim had not accrued.

See, e.g., Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v.

Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591-92

(7th Cir. 1999); White v. Napoleon, 897

F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990); Todaro v.

Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1977); cf.

Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565, 570 (7th

Cir. 1999); Galloway v. General Motors

Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164,

1166 (7th Cir. 1996); Saxton v. AT&T, 10

F.3d 526, 532 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1993).

 But all the pain after the date of

onset, as it were, of deliberate

indifference was fair game for the

plaintiff’s suit, by virtue of the

doctrine of "continuing violation" (also

referred to as "continuing wrong,"

"continuing harm," or "continuing tort").

For the general principle see, e.g.,

Filipovic v. K & R Express Systems, Inc.,

176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999); Taylor

v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir.

1983); Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231

F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2000); Tiberi

v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423, 1430-31

(10th Cir. 1996), and for its application

to improper withholding of medical

attention see Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d

1129, 1132 (5th Cir. 1980), and Neel v.

Rehberg, 577 F.2d 262, 263-64 (5th Cir.

1978) (per curiam). This is a general

principle of federal common law; it is

not anything special to section 1983.

See, e.g., Freeman v. Madison

Metropolitan School District, 231 F.3d

374, 381 (7th Cir. 2000); Provencher v.

CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir.

1998); Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases,

Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 1997).

 Some cases say that the doctrine of

continuing violation is a tolling

doctrine, Davis v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 204 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir.

2000) (per curiam); Herman v. National

Broadcasting Co., 744 F.2d 604, 607 (7th

Cir. 1984); Matson v. Burlington Northern

Santa Fe R.R., 240 F.3d 1233, 1236-37

(10th Cir. 2001); Fletcher v. Union

Pacific R.R., 621 F.2d 902, 908 (8th Cir.

1980), and if this is right it would,

because this is a section 1983 suit,

bring Illinois law into play. Illinois

has a doctrine of continuing violation,

see, e.g., Jones v. Dettro, 720 N.E.2d

343, 346 (Ill. App. 1999); Bank of

Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 717 N.E.2d

478, 484 (Ill. App. 1999), but it is of

uncertain scope, see, e.g., River Park,

Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 692 N.E.2d

369, 374 (Ill. App.), aff’d in part and

rev’d in part, on other grounds, 703

N.E.2d 883 (Ill. 1998); Hertel v.

Sullivan, 633 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ill. App.

1994), which might spell trouble for our

plaintiff. But the usual and it seems to

us the correct characterization of the

doctrine of continuing violation is that

it is a doctrine governing accrual, e.g.,

Wilson v. Giesen, supra, 956 F.2d at 743;

Taylor v. Meirick, supra, 712 F.2d at

1118-19; Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231

F.3d 204, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2000);

Pisciotta v. Teledyne Industries, Inc.,

91 F.3d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d

818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984), not a tolling

doctrine, because we don’t want the

plaintiff to sue before the violation is

complete. Tolling rules create defenses;

they are optional with the plaintiff; he

can sue as soon as his claim accrues. We

therefore push back the accrual date

when, quite independently of the

plaintiff’s wishes, we want to delay the

right to bring suit.

 It is doubtful that there is any real

disagreement, rather than a merely

terminological difference, over the

proper characterization of the doctrine

of continuing violation. For example,

Matson v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe

R.R., supra, 240 F.3d at 1237, after

stating that the doctrine of continuing

violation tolls the limitations period,

explains that where the doctrine is

applicable "the cause of action accrues

at . . . the date of the last injury." 

 But what exactly is a "continuing

violation"? A violation is called

"continuing," signifying that a plaintiff
can reach back to its beginning even if

that beginning lies outside the statutory

limitations period, when it would be

unreasonable to require or even permit

him to sue separately over every incident

of the defendant’s unlawful conduct. The

injuries about which the plaintiff is

complaining in this case are the

consequence of a numerous and continuous

series of events. See, e.g., M.H.D. v.

Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d 797, 804-05

(11th Cir. 1999); Interamericas

Investments, Ltd. v. Board of Governors,

111 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 1997); Sable

v. General Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 176

(6th Cir. 1996); Rapf v. Suffolk County,

755 F.2d 282, 292 (2d Cir. 1985); Page v.

United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821-22 (D.C.

Cir. 1984). When a single event gives

rise to continuing injuries, as in

Sandutch v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254

(3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam), the

plaintiff can bring a single suit based

on an estimation of his total injuries,

and that mode of proceeding is much to be

preferred to piecemeal litigation despite

the possible loss in accuracy. But in

this case every day that the defendants

ignored the plaintiff’s request for

treatment increased his pain. Not only

would it be unreasonable to require him,

as a condition of preserving his right to

have a full two years to sue in respect

of the last day on which his request was

ignored, to bring separate suits two

years after each of the earlier days of

deliberate indifference; but it would

impose an unreasonable burden on the

courts to entertain an indefinite number

of suits and apportion damages among

them.

 In between the case in which a single

event gives rise to continuing injuries

and the case in which a continuous series

of events gives rise to a cumulative

injury is the case in which repeated

events give rise to discrete injuries, as

in suits for lost wages. If our plaintiff

were seeking backpay for repeated acts of

wage discrimination (suppose that every

pay day for five years he had received

$100 less than he was entitled to), he

would not be permitted to reach back to

the first by suing within the limitations

period for the last. E.g., Knight v. City

of Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 581-82 (11th

Cir. 1994); Pollis v. New School for

Social Research, 132 F.3d 115, 119 (2d

Cir. 1997); see also Thomas v. Denny’s
Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1513 (10th Cir.

1997); Ashley v. Boyle’s Famous Corned

Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168 (8th Cir.

1995) (en banc). As emphasized in Pollis,

the damages from each discrete act of

discrimination would be readily

calculable without waiting for the entire

series of acts to end. There would be no

excuse for the delay. And so the

violation would not be deemed

"continuing." The present case is

different. It would have been impractical

to allocate the plaintiff’s pain day by

day across the period during which

medical treatment was delayed by the

deliberate indifference of the defendants

to his plight. 

 Numerous cases assume that a federal

doctrine of continuing wrongs is indeed

applicable to suits under 42 U.S.C. sec.

1983. E.g., Perry v. Sullivan, 207 F.3d

379, 383 (7th Cir. 2000); 287 Corporate

Center Associates v. Township of

Bridgewater, 101 F.3d 320, 324 (3d Cir.

1996); Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129,

1132 (5th Cir. 1980); Neel v. Rehberg,

577 F.2d 262, 263-64 (5th Cir. 1978). We

agree. We have enough prisoners’ suits

without having to create incentives to

bring multiple suits arising out of the

same course of events.

Reversed and Remanded.