IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1938

Filed July 21, 2021

TAJH MALIK ROSS,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Sean McPartland, 

Judge.

Tajh Ross appeals the district court’s denial of his application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Fred Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., Ahlers, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2021).
2

MAHAN, Senior Judge.

Tajh Ross appeals the district court’s denial of his application for 

postconviction relief following his 2014 convictions for murder in the first degree, 

intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and going armed with intent. Upon our 

review, we affirm the court’s order denying Ross’s application for postconviction 

relief. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In its opinion affirming Ross’s convictions on direct appeal, this court set 

forth the following facts:

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on September 22, 2012, Haley 

McConnell, Neil Clark, and Latasha Roundtree were going to a party 

in Cedar Rapids. McConnell was driving, Roundtree was sitting in 

the passenger’s seat, and Clark was sitting in the back. The address 

of the house was 649 16th Avenue SW. The streets were not well 

lit, and being unable to locate the residence, they drove around the 

neighborhood slowly at approximately five to ten miles per hour.

After driving past the house at 649 16th Avenue SW, the 

passenger window shattered, and Roundtree fell over, having 

suffered a gunshot wound to the head. After Roundtree was shot, 

McConnell sped away and heard gunshots as she drove further 

down the street. Clark urged McConnell to drive to a local hospital,

and following emergency treatment there, Roundtree was 

transported to University Hospitals in Iowa City but died shortly 

thereafter.

The house located at 649 16th Avenue has two rental units, 

one upstairs and one downstairs. Amber Houston and her cousins, 

Jeremiah Ellis and Frederick Hanson, lived in the downstairs unit. 

Earlier in the day on September 22, Ellis’s girlfriend, Alleigha ChurchGreene, informed Ellis she had heard of plans that Davonte Safforld 

intended to “shoot up” Ellis’s residence. The district court noted, 

“There was bad blood between Ellis and Safforld for reasons 

unexplored in the testimony.” It was agreed the threat was not 

serious, and the party was not cancelled.

Those invited to the party were Liban Muhidin (Liban), Yasin 

Muhidin (Yasin), Adrian Kenney, Alexus Omar, Church-Greene, and 

Ross. All had arrived at the residence by approximately 9:00 p.m. 

Shortly thereafter, Ellis and Hanson began discussing the threat 
3

posed by Safforld, and everyone at the house became aware of it. 

Yasin and Kenney then left so Yasin could change clothes. The 

others were gathered outside the residence.

A green car passed by the house, which the parties believed 

could contain Safforld because Safforld’s girlfriend drove a green 

vehicle. Ellis went to the corner and watched it drive away.

Meanwhile, Liban called Yasin and told him to retrieve Liban’s guns 

from his residence. Yasin returned with an AK–47 and a .40 caliber 

handgun in the trunk of Liban’s car. Liban placed the AK–47 in an 

empty trashcan across the street, while Yasin and Ross argued over 

who should hold the handgun. Ross took the handgun, telling Yasin 

he was too little to operate it. Ellis was also armed with his own .22 

caliber handgun.

After the guns were distributed and most of the group had 

crossed the street to an abandoned house, the parties observed 

McConnell’s car (a white vehicle) drive slowly past. Ellis raised his 

handgun but was prevented by Yasin from firing. The second time 

the car approached the house, Liban ran across the street to the 649 

residence so the vehicle would decrease its speed. After Liban 

reached the property, Ross cycled the gun, told Liban to “look out,”

and fired the gun in the direction of the vehicle. Ellis ran into the 

street and fired five shots at the vehicle, and Ross ran down the alley, 

firing six more times at the car. The bullet that killed Roundtree was 

later matched to the .40 caliber handgun Ross had used.

State v. Ross, No. 14-1717, 2016 WL 1677181, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27,

2016) (footnote omitted).

The State charged Ross with various offenses, and following a bench trial, 

the district court found him guilty of all counts except for the charge of conspiracy 

to commit a forcible felony. This court affirmed Ross’s convictions on direct 

appeal, rejecting his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the district 

court’s denial of his counsel’s motions to withdraw and failure to allow Ross to 

proceed pro se. Id. at *3–7.

Ross filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR). Following trial, the 

court entered an order denying Ross’s application. Ross appealed. Facts specific 

to his claims on appeal will be set forth below.
4

II. Standard of Review

“Generally, an appeal from a denial of an application for postconviction relief 

is reviewed for correction of errors at law.” Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 750 

(Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). However, “ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 

are reviewed de novo.” Id. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Ross contends his trial counsel was ineffective in (A) failing to file “a motion 

to suppress evidence of Ross’s police interview” “after he said he was done 

answering questions,” and (B) failing to call “a firearm expert witness at trial on the 

issue of the gun accidentally firing as Ross explained to the police.” To prevail on 

his claims, Ross must show “(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and 

(2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). An ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim fails if either element is lacking. See State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 

488, 495 (Iowa 2012). 

A. Failure to File Motion to Suppress

Ross claims his counsel breached an essential duty by failing to seek 

suppression of his statements after he invoked his right to remain silent, which 

included his “statement that he shot the gun,” and that he was prejudiced by this 

omission because had his statements been suppressed, he “would not have had 

to testify at the criminal trial” and “[t]he only evidence that [he] fired a gun would 

have been the conflicting statements of the other people present at the party.”
5

Police are required to inform a suspect of the right to remain silent and the

right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, 

XIV (ensuring a criminal defendant, among other things, the right to remain silent 

during custodial interrogation); Iowa Const. art. 1, § 9 (affording similar protections 

under Iowa Constitution); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Absent 

Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of those rights, statements made during a 

custodial interrogation are inadmissible. 384 U.S. at 479; State v. Harris, 741 

N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2007). “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time 

prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation 

must cease.” State v. Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 473–74); State v. Prentiss, No. 02-0043, 2003 WL 21360908, at *5

(Iowa Ct. App. June 13, 2003) (“This right to cut off questioning must be 

scrupulously honored.”).

A suspect, having expressed a desire to remain silent, “is not subject to 

further interrogation . . . , unless the accused himself initiates further 

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Harris, 741 N.W.2d 

at 6 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)). “A valid waiver 

under these circumstances requires the individual to ‘evince[ ] a willingness and a 

desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.’” Id. (quoting Oregon 

v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983)).

In this case, Ross was subjected to two separate sessions of custodial 

interrogation, the first of which took place approximately one week after the 

incident, during which Ross denied any involvement in the shooting and denied 
6

having a gun. The second interview took place several months later, and Ross 

again denied having a gun or any involvement in the shooting. Ross then stated, 

“I want to go back home,” to which the police responded, “You can’t go anywhere 

today, so you’re going to stay with us.” Ross stated, “I want to call my mom” and 

that he did not understand why he had to stay there “all day” but no one else 

involved in the incident had. The police then left the room. They returned, and 

Ross stated, “I’m not talking.” An officer then said, “You’re going over to jail today.” 

Ross continued to deny involvement in the shooting and asked what the charges 

against him were. The police then left the room again; when they returned, they 

began reading Ross the charges against him. When Ross heard the murder 

charge, he became very upset and said, “[Is it] because I’m not telling you all 

exactly what happened? So if I tell you all exactly what happened, from my story, 

would you all know the difference—” An officer responded, “If you told us exactly 

what happened, we’d know the truth.” Ross then said, “Alright, I’ll tell you all the 

truth right now, come on, everybody sit down, close the door.”

Ross’s statement that he did not want to talk was sufficient to invoke his 

right to remain silent. But Ross arguably reinitiated communication with the 

officers when he asked if he was being charged with murder because he was “not 

telling . . . exactly what happened,” and he told the officers to “sit down” and “close 

the door” so he could tell them “the truth.” We could find Ross’s statements

demonstrated “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the 

investigation,” see Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045–46; accord State v. Johnson, 

No. 08-0320, 2009 WL 4842480, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009), and 
7

therefore the officers’ “decision to proceed with the interrogation was not 

improper,” Johnson, 2009 WL 4842480, at *5. The interview continued, and Ross

subsequently admitted he fired the gun in the direction of McConnell’s car, but that 

he shot “in the air” and hit Roundtree accidentally.

In any event, we concur with the PCR court’s finding that trial counsel did 

not fail to perform an essential duty given the circumstances in this case.1 As the 

court noted:

[I]n evaluating the objective reasonableness of trial counsel’s 

conduct in failing to file a motion to suppress, the Court examines all 

of the circumstances to consider whether acts or omissions were 

outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The circumstances here include the 

testimony of [defense counsel,] Mr. Weimer, which the Court found 

to be credible and which was unchallenged by Mr. Ross, that Mr. 

Ross was not always forthcoming in cooperation with his counsel. 

Mr. Weimer testified that Mr. Ross was not always helpful in assisting 

with his defense and at times was working at odds with his counsel 

to present a defense. Mr. Weimer’s testimony is also supported by 

other information in the record, including Mr. Ross’s earlier 

unsuccessful attempts at self-representation, including his failure “to

respond to the majority of the court’s questions,” his continual refusal 

“to give meaningful answers,” his “disjointed and rambling 

statements” and other pretrial actions of Mr. Ross reflecting conflicts 

with his counsel, detailed in the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Ross, No. 14-1717, 2016 WL 1677181, at *3, *4, *5. The conduct 

and “strategy” of Mr. Ross in preparation for and presentation of 

evidence at trial clearly complicated the ability of counsel to formulate 

 

1

In light of this conclusion, there is no need to address the State’s assertion the 

failure to file a motion to suppress was due to trial strategy of defense counsel. 

But we observe that defense counsel testified he did not believe a motion to 

suppress would have been meritorious because Ross initiated further 

communication. Specifically, defense counsel stated they “considered” filing a 

motion to suppress Ross’s statements but “because of the reengagement that he 

was involved in, we did not file that.” Defense counsel further explained, “After he 

was read the complaints, he asked if it was because he wasn’t telling them what 

had happened, and he asked them to sit down and said that he was telling them

the truth. He reengaged them. . . . He reengaged them before they reengaged 

him.” 
8

strategies and decisions related to defenses, including whether or 

not to present evidence that Mr. Ross fired the gun accidentally or 

without intent to shoot at the passing car. In the end, Mr. Ross chose 

to testify at trial and offered testimony that he intended to fire the gun 

above the car as a warning, but the gun accidentally discharged 

prematurely. Such testimony of Mr. Ross was generally consistent 

with statements to the police by Mr. Ross. The Court finds and 

concludes counsel properly made “[s]trategic choices . . . after a 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options,” 

and that counsel was not ineffective in not seeking to suppress such 

evidence and in presenting such evidence at trial. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690–91.

In summary, in evaluating the objective reasonableness of 

trial counsel’s conduct, it appears Mr. Ross’s actions and 

communications with his counsel may have, intentionally or not,

sabotaged his own defense. The Court finds and concludes that the 

conduct of Mr. Ross in failing to cooperate with his counsel in 

preparing for and presenting a defense at trial, which he now urges 

should have been presented, should not form the basis for a claim 

that counsel was ineffective, entitling Mr. Ross to a new trial. 

Otherwise, any defendant could sabotage its defense at a first trial, 

thereby getting a preview or rehearsal of the trial, and later obtain a 

second trial based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mr. Ross now apparently contends that ineffective assistance of his 

trial counsel resulted in his being required to testify at trial and

resulted in his failure to present credible testimony. Under the 

circumstances here, it is not surprising that Mr. Ross’s testimony at 

trial did not go well or that the fact finder found his testimony not to 

be credible. The failure to seek exclusion of his prior statements to 

police, however, did not require Mr. Ross either to testify or to 

present at trial testimony which was not credible and which was at 

odds with the other evidence in the case. Moreover, as noted below,

the lengthy and detailed findings and conclusions of the court in 

reaching verdicts against Mr. Ross did not rely heavily, if at all, on 

the statements made by Mr. Ross to the police.

Moreover, to meet the prejudice prong of his ineffective-assistance claim, 

Ross must prove a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s failure, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d at 196;

Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Iowa 2001) (“A reasonable probability is 

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (quoting 
9

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). Here, there was substantial evidence of Ross’s guilt 

without regard to his own statements during the interview. As this court previously 

found:

Ross and the others were aware of a potential threat, and when they 

saw the first car—a green vehicle—drive past, they armed 

themselves in response. Ross retained control over the .40 caliber 

handgun, following an argument between him and Yasin over who 

was going to use it. Then, when McConnell’s white car drove past 

the house, Ross proceeded to cycle his gun and fire at the car a 

number of times. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the State, and making all legitimate inferences in favor thereof, this 

did not amount to an accidental shooting. 

Ross, 2016 WL 1677181, at *5. And as the PCR court further noted:

The Court finds and concludes here that Mr. Ross has not met 

his burden of establishing prejudice by the actions of his counsel as 

required in the case law. Had Mr. Ross successfully urged a motion 

to suppress and declined to testify, the evidence offered by the State, 

including testimony by witnesses as to actions and statements by Mr. 

Ross surrounding the crime, would have gone largely unchallenged.

Moreover, the lengthy and detailed findings and conclusions of the 

court placed little or no significance on the statements made by Mr. 

Ross to the police. Rather, the court relied upon the eyewitness 

accounts of actions and statements by Mr. Ross, notwithstanding 

that the witnesses to such conduct themselves had credibility issues.

Such testimony included witnesses who saw Mr. Ross specifically 

pointing the gun toward the car and who heard Mr. Ross telling one 

of the witnesses to “look out” just before a shot is heard. . . . 

In summary, despite any errors of counsel alleged by Mr. 

Ross, the Court finds and concludes that Mr. Ross has failed to 

establish sufficient evidence to establish that, but for counsel’s 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Upon our review of the facts of this case, we conclude defense counsel did 

not breach an essential duty in failing to file a motion to suppress.2 And even if we 

 

2 Ross also contends the PCR court erred “in not considering the audio and visual 

recording of Ross’ police interview in making its ruling on whether a Motion to 

Suppress should have been filed.” We observe the court’s statement that “[n]either 

an audio recording nor transcript of the interrogation was offered at the time of trial 
10

assume there is merit to his claim, Ross has failed to show resulting prejudice. 

See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 (“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can be decided 

on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed 

deficiently.”). Ross’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on this basis is 

unpersuasive.

B. Failure to Call Firearms Expert

Ross next contends his trial counsel was ineffective “in not using an expert 

in firearms witness at the trial.” Ross acknowledges “the State’s firearms expert 

testified that the bullet that caused the death came from the gun that Ross fired,” 

but he alleges the State’s expert “did not testify about crime scene reconstruction 

or the human aspects of the use of a firearm.” According to Ross, because his 

defense “was that the gun accidentally fired, it was essential to that defense to 

have a witness explain how the gun potentially could have accidentally fired too 

soon (before Ross aimed over the car).” 

 

of this matter” indicates Ross failed to seek review of this specific piece of 

evidence, despite the fact it was included in the record. Cf. Iowa Code § 822.6A 

(“The underlying trial court record containing the conviction for which an applicant 

seeks postconviction relief . . . shall automatically become part of the record in a 

claim for postconviction relief under this chapter.”). Accordingly, there is nothing 

for us to review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002); see 

also Stammeyer v. Div. of Narcotics Enforcement, 721 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 

2006) (finding an argument not preserved for appeal when there was “nothing 

indicating the court ruled upon or even considered [it]”). The proper procedure to 

preserve error was to file a motion raising the court’s failure to consider the 

evidence prior to appealing. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 

2012). 

In any event, the PCR court quoted from Ross’s own recitation of the 

interview and the police report in addressing and rejecting his claim. And, under 

our de novo review, we have reviewed the evidence upon which Ross bases this 

challenge, and we reject this claim. 
11

Ross presented testimony from Wayne Hill, a firearms expert, at the PCR 

trial. Hill stated a shooter could fire a gun prematurely if “[h]e’s not paying attention 

to what he’s doing” or “to the pressure he’s putting on the trigger.” Hill further 

stated that “6 pounds is not that heavy,” meaning it does not take much pressure 

to pull the trigger to fire the gun. Hill opined that “an untrained person with a firearm 

can definitely have an unintentional discharge,” but “there’s no physical evidence 

for me to hang my hat on” to determine whether it was an accidental discharge in 

Ross’s case. Hill did not testify at Ross’s criminal trial, which according to Ross, 

prevented the court from learning “that only 6.25 pounds of pressure are required 

to fire the gun” and “that under stress and excitement an inexperienced person in 

the use of firearms is more likely to accidentally fire a gun.” 

With regard to the decision not to call a firearms expert, trial counsel 

testified:

In this case we didn’t feel an expert on those—those issues was 

necessary because we had the information, at least, that the State’s 

own witness would have conceded that an accidental discharge was 

a possibility. Wouldn’t necessarily agree that’s what happened in 

this case, but that they had conceded at some point that there was 

the possibility of an accidental discharge.

Trial counsel testified the defense strategy was to argue that Ross brought 

the gun up and it fired accidentally; i.e., “that he fired over the top of the vehicle.” 

Trial counsel furthered this strategy at Ross’s criminal trial in his questioning of 

Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations firearms expert, Victor Murillo. Trial 

counsel asked Murillo about whether the gun had “an external safety,” whether “a 

person of normal health or normal condition” would be able to fire the gun, and 

whether the “rate of the fall of the projectile” would vary if the gun was fired from 
12

certain distances away. Trial counsel also elicited testimony from Murillo that “[i]t 

takes six and a quarter pounds of pressure rearward on that trigger to cock and 

release the striker.” We do not find trial counsel breached a duty in failing to call 

a witness to testify to the same evidence already presented to the court. 

We conclude counsel’s trial strategy, tactical decisions, and accompanying 

investigation were reasonable under these circumstances. See Ledezma, 626 

N.W.2d at 143. We further note trial counsel’s testimony that various witnesses 

had different perspectives on what happened, and Ross was “not particularly 

forthcoming with a lot of information.” It appears trial counsel’s strategy was 

effective, as the district court noted it is “possible” that Ross’s alleged accidental 

discharge of the gun led to Roundtree’s death, but ultimately the court concluded, 

“Considering all of the evidence in this case, I do not find this explanation to be 

believable”; “the likelihood is so remote as to make the explanation unreasonable.” 

Ross’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on this basis fails.

IV. Consideration of Pro Se Filing

Ross argues this court “should consider the matters discussed in [his] pro 

se brief,” despite Iowa Code section 822.3A(1) (Supp. 2019), which provides: “An 

applicant seeking relief under section 822.2 who is currently represented by 

counsel shall not file any pro se document, including an application, brief, reply 

brief, or motion, in any Iowa court. The court shall not consider, and opposing 

counsel shall not respond to, such pro se filings.” (Emphasis added.) Section 

822.3A became effective on July 1, 2019, prior to the PCR court’s October 2019 

order denying Ross’s PCR application, and therefore precludes this court from
13

considering Ross’s pro se supplemental brief. See Hrbek v. State, 958 N.W.2d 

779, 782–89 (Iowa 2021) (rejecting various challenges to section 822.3A and 

directing the clerk of the supreme court “to strike [the applicant]’s pro se 

supplemental briefs”); Haywood v. State, No. 18-1476, 2020 WL 1551137, at *1 

n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020) (acknowledging that Iowa Code section 822.3A(1) 

precludes appellate court consideration of pro se materials filed after July 1, 2019).

We affirm the denial of Ross’s application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.