United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 14, 2013*

Decided January 23, 2013

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 12‐3123

JAMES E. LUNDEEN, SR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

FRANCES L. KELLY, Director of Indiana

Professional License Agency

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐00696‐SEB‐DKL

Sarah Evans Barker,

Judge.

O R D E R

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the parties’ briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
Appeal no. 12‐3123 Page 2

Dr. James Lundeen appeals the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction filed

in connection with his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging provisions of the Indiana

Code used by the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana (“Indiana Board”) to suspend his

Indiana medical license. He had asked the district court to enjoin the Indiana Board from

enforcing its suspension order. We affirm.

Lundeen briefly held an unrestricted license to practice medicine in Indiana before it

was suspended by the Indiana Board in response to disciplinary action taken by the State

Medical Board of Ohio (“Ohio Board”). In May 2011, the Ohio Board had issued an

emergency order summarily suspending Lundeen’s Ohio medical license based on, among

other things, allegations that he was excessively and inappropriately prescribing narcotics

and failing to perform appropriate medical exams. The Ohio Board permanently revoked

his license seven months later. Upon learning of that ruling, the Attorney General of Indiana

asked the Indiana Board to suspend Lundeen’s license. The Indiana Board conducted a

hearing, and in May 2012 suspended Lundeen’s medical license indefinitely. See IND. CODE

§§  25‐1‐9‐4(a)(7), 25‐1‐9‐9(a)(2).

Lundeen then sued the Executive Director of the Indiana Professional Licensing

Agency (Frances Kelly) in her official capacity, generally challenging the constitutionality of

the Indiana statutes invoked to suspend his license. He soon requested a temporary

restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Indiana

Board’s suspension order. He argued (1) that he was likely to succeed on the merits because

the Indiana code provisions were overinclusive in that they authorized the Indiana Board to

discipline doctors like himself who have not engaged in any misconduct in the state; (2) that

he would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction because the suspension of his

license was tarnishing his reputation; (3) that he had no adequate remedy at law because

monetary damages would be difficult to assess; (4) and finally that the balance of harms

weighed in his favor because of the benefits that his reinstatement offered the public (in the

form of jobs and medical services).

The district court denied Lundeen’s requests for injunctive relief. The court first

found Lundeen’s suit unlikely to succeed because the Indiana Board’s ruling was supported

by the Ohio Board’s decision to revoke his license. See IND. CODE § 25‐1‐9‐4(a)(7). The Ohio

Board based its decision on detailed findings about the danger that Lundeen’s continued

practice posed of serious harm to the public. Second, the court found no evidence showing

that Lundeen would suffer irreparable harm if his Indiana license were not immediately

restored. Third, the court rejected as speculative any argument that Lundeen lacked an

adequate remedy at law through recovery of money damages. Finally, balancing the harms,

the court found that the potential danger to Indiana residents of
Appeal no. 12‐3123 Page 3

allowing Lundeen to practice far outweighed any harm he would suffer as a result of the

suspension.

Lundeen’s arguments on appeal are difficult to grasp, but he generally challenges

each of the district court’s conclusions regarding the threshold requirements for injunctive

relief. For example, he contests the court’s finding that he will not suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of an injunction, and asserts that the court wrongly assumed he would not be

able to find a job; to the contrary, he says, recruiters have offered him numerous positions

since February 2012.

We agree with the district court that Lundeen has not met his burden for obtaining

injunctive relief. He does not point to anything in the record to dispute the district court’s

finding that he failed to show he would suffer irreparable harm if his Indiana license were

not restored. See Bedrossian v. Northwestern Mem’l Hosp., 409 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 2005);

Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc., 274 F.3d 470, 478 (7th Cir. 2001). Our review is

deferential at this stage, see Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins.

Co., 582 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2009), and, as the district court observed, Lundeen has not

shown that restoration of his license would enable him to secure a job, given his

employment history and the expiration of his Drug Enforcement Administration

registration. For that matter, Lundeen’s position on this point is hard to pin down, because

he asserted in his district court filings that he could not secure employment because of the

stigma associated with the Indiana Board’s discipline.

Lundeen also argues that the district court erred in concluding that he was unlikely

to succeed on the merits because it misinterpreted § 25‐1‐9‐9, which, in his view, does not

allow the Indiana Board to discipline doctors for misconduct in another state if they did not

receive their Indiana medical license through reciprocity. The statute as interpreted by the

district court, Lundeen contends, is overinclusive and violates his constitutional right to

equal protection.

We are unpersuaded by Lundeen’s interpretation of the Indiana code. The district

court found that under Indiana law the Indiana Board was empowered to suspend

Lundeen’s license and he offers no support, either from the text of the code or rooted in

public policy, for his argument that the method one uses to obtain a medical license in

Indiana has any bearing on how the Indiana Board executes the state’s disciplinary

provisions. At most Lundeen asserts, without elaborating, that the district court’s

interpretation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

creating classes without a rational basis. But with nothing more than this conclusory
Appeal no. 12‐3123 Page 4

assertion, Lundeen has not met even the low threshold for showing that his chances of

succeeding on the merits are better than negligible. See Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 667 F.3d 765, 782 (7th Cir. 2011); AM General Corp. v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 311

F.3d 796, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2002).

Lundeen’s failure to meet two of the three threshold elements for obtaining

preliminary injunctive relief is sufficient to end our analysis here. See Kiel v. City of Kenosha,

236 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2000); Thornton v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 1380, 1390 (7th Cir. 1989); see

also González‐Droz v. González‐Colon, 573 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2009); Apotex, Inc. v. Food &

Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.