COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Felton, Senior Judges Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

LUIS ARMANDO SOLORZANO 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2782-06-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JANUARY 22, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Lisa B. Kemler, Judge 

 Bryan Waldron (Nichole Dannielle Flippen; Butler Legal Group, 

P.L.L.P., on brief), for appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

Luis Armando Solorzano, appellant, contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of 

law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed assault and battery of a firefighter in 

violation of Code § 18.2-57(C), a Class 6 felony, and misdemeanor obstruction of justice of a 

police officer in violation of Code § 18.2-460(B). We find no error and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 

438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). So viewed, the evidence proved that on March 13, 2006, 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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Korrina Torres found appellant, her father, unconscious in his home.1

 Appellant only briefly 

regained consciousness. Torres called the paramedics for assistance. 

Approximately fifteen minutes later, paramedics and firefighters arrived at Solorzano’s 

home. Leddyanne Dell, a paramedic for the City of Alexandria Fire Department, discovered 

appellant unconscious and unresponsive. Dell and her co-worker attempted several procedures 

and protocols to revive appellant and determine his condition. They placed an oxygen mask over 

his mouth and nose, attached a portable heart monitor, and Dell administered two one-milligram 

doses of Narcan to appellant.2 When appellant did not respond, rescue personnel strapped 

appellant onto a stretcher and transported him to the elevator. Dell, her supervisor Kathleen 

Barrett, and firefighters Thompson and Lalhei accompanied the stretcher into the elevator. The 

paramedics wore T-shirts inscribed with the word “Medic,” and the firefighters wore T-shirts 

inscribed with “Firefighter.” 

As the elevator descended, appellant regained consciousness and became “very 

combative, coming out of a seatbelt” holding him onto the upright stretcher. The rescue 

personnel “tried to explain to him and reassure him what was going on.” They told him that they 

were fire and EMT personnel and that they were there to help him. They also used hand gestures 

to instruct appellant to calm down. Appellant then “made a purposeful movement for [Barrett], 

taking his hand and placing it around her neck.” When appellant began choking Barrett, 

firefighter Thompson helped Barrett remove appellant’s hands from her neck. When Barrett 

1

 Appellant is a fifty-two-year-old Venezuelan native. He is a permanent United States 

resident. 

2

 Narcan is a drug used to counteract an opiate, morphine, or heroin overdose. At trial, 

Dell testified that she administered Narcan in an attempt to bring Solorzano out of 

unconsciousness, which is standard protocol when there is no information regarding why a 

patient is unconscious. 
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raised her hand to protect herself, appellant grabbed her wrist, bending it backwards.3

 Appellant 

then struck Dell across the chest with his elbow and arm, knocking her to the back of the 

elevator. 

When they reached the lobby, appellant’s daughter, Torres, tried to speak with appellant, 

but rescue personnel asked her to move back because “it was making the situation worse.” 

Meanwhile, appellant continued to physically resist police officers who were waiting at the 

elevator door to assist in response to Dell’s call for help. A Spanish-speaking police officer 

explained the situation to appellant, but appellant remained combative and resistant. When 

officers tried to restrain appellant, “he pulled so hard away from [one officer] that he bent the 

handcuffs.” Appellant continued to “thrash about” and pull away even after he had been 

handcuffed. During Dell’s testimony, the Commonwealth played for the trial court a videotape 

depicting a portion of the events that took place.4

 Moreover, Dell wore in court the same 

uniform she wore the day of the incident. 

Officer Feltham received the paramedic’s emergency signal and approached the elevator 

when the doors opened on the ground floor. Feltham, who was in his police uniform at the time, 

testified that appellant “was violently thrashing about” and “trying to push the firefighters away.” 

At trial, a medical expert testified that Narcan would not produce violent behavior, and 

appellant stipulated that Narcan had nothing to do with his behavior. The parties also stipulated 

that, upon arrival at the hospital, appellant had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .22 and that 

3

 In the confrontation with Barrett, appellant “laterally crushed [Barrett’s] wrist and then 

snapped it backwards.” Barrett sustained several tears in her radial attachment, has permanent 

Stage II lymphodema, and has retired from the fire department because she can no longer 

perform her job. She also sustained strains, pulls, and nerve damage in her shoulder and the 

scapula behind her shoulder. 

4

The videotape was marked for identification as Commonwealth’s Exhibit Number 4, but 

it was not admitted at trial or sent with the record on appeal. 
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appellant was diagnosed with acute alcohol intoxication and chronic alcoholism.5

 At the 

hospital, the doctor spoke with appellant and communicated with him in English. 

Appellant testified that he remembered nothing up until the time he awoke in the elevator 

on the ground floor, and he had no recollection of struggling with the paramedics or police.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, convicted appellant of assault and battery of Barrett 

in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C) and obstruction of justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(B). 

The court found appellant not guilty with respect to the charged assault on Dell. 

ANALYSIS 

Summary of Arguments and Standard of Review

 Appellant contends the evidence failed to prove he knew the people surrounding him 

were firefighters, paramedics, and police officers. He argues he had no reason to know their 

identities because he did not know English well enough to understand the explanations provided 

to him by the emergency services personnel. He also argues the evidence did not exclude all 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence as is necessary to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He 

reasons that the evidence showed he believed he was defending himself from being kidnapped, 

that this hypothesis of innocence was inconsistent with guilt, and that the Commonwealth failed 

to rebut this evidence at trial. Finally, appellant contends the Commonwealth did not show that 

appellant’s mental and physical states at the time were such that he was able to accurately 

process the meaning of the events and information provided to him. In addition to the arguments 

appellant advances in defense of the assault charges, he contends the slight challenge he 

presented to firefighters and police officers was insufficient to sustain a conviction for 

 5

 Appellant testified that on March 13, 2006, he had seven whiskeys to drink before he 

returned to his home. The night before he consumed ten to twelve whiskeys. 
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obstruction of justice. Finally, appellant argues the “Commonwealth failed to prove” he “was 

not entitled to defend himself.” 

“Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to 

consider it in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom.” Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 

534, 537 (1975). ‘“[T]he relevant question is whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 

41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). ‘“The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same 

weight as a jury verdict and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it.’” Askew v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 104, 107, 578 S.E.2d 58, 60 

(2003) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 170, 172, 342 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1986)). 

We address each argument seriatim. 

Assault of a Firefighter

 Code § 18.2-57(C) provides, in pertinent part, “if any person commits an assault or an 

assault and battery against another knowing or having reason to know that such other person is 

. . . a firefighter as defined in § 65.2-102 . . . engaged in the performance of his public duties, 

such person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.” Appellant concedes Barrett was a firefighter as 

defined in the Code, but contests the conclusion that he knew or had reason to know Barrett was 

a firefighter or emergency medical technician. 

 “Actual knowledge is a fact that may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.” 

Tooke v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 759, 766, 627 S.E.2d 533, 536 (2006). “‘Guilty 

knowledge . . . [a]bsent proof of an admission against interest, . . . necessarily must be shown by 
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circumstantial evidence.’” Snow v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 766, 775, 537 S.E.2d 6, 11 

(2000) (quoting Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 497, 503, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983)). 

 Here, the evidence established appellant knew or had reason to know Barrett was a 

firefighter. When paramedics arrived at the scene, they were informed appellant understood 

English. As soon as appellant regained consciousness, he looked around the elevator. Each 

person in the elevator wore a uniform identifying that individual as a firefighter or medic. 

Additionally, after the elevator reached the ground floor, an officer fluent in Spanish explained 

the situation to appellant in Spanish, yet appellant remained uncooperative. When appellant 

received treatment at the hospital, the medical staff communicated with him in English, and 

when he testified at trial, he did not assert that his inability to understand English was the reason 

he responded violently upon awakening. 

Even accepting appellant’s contention that he did not understand the instructions 

provided to him or the words on the uniforms because his knowledge of the English language 

was poor, we conclude that he nevertheless knew or had reason to know Barrett was a member of 

an emergency rescue team because of the circumstances attending the incident. Appellant awoke 

on a stretcher, “[h]e was hooked up to [a] life pack. He had an IV established.” “He had a 

non-rebreather mask on his face for oxygen.” He was surrounded by people in uniform carrying 

gear one would expect emergency personnel to carry: a “drill box, oxygen bag, [] life pack, and 

[] jump bag.” As soon as appellant regained consciousness, the emergency personnel team was 

“making hand gestures so that he understood to be calm and [that everything was] okay.” The 

trial court as fact finder had an opportunity to view the uniforms worn by the emergency 

personnel both at trial and on the videotaped account of the incident. In light of this evidence, 

we find that appellant’s assertion he did not “knowingly” assault a firefighter is without merit. 
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Appellant also contends the trial court failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence that he thought he was being kidnapped and was acting in self-defense when he 

assaulted Barrett. We find this contention to be likewise without merit. 

In determining whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements of assault of a 

firefighter, “‘all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent 

with innocence and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Hamilton v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993) (quoting Boothe v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 484, 492, 358 S.E.2d 740, 745 (1987)) (emphasis added). “It is 

‘within the province of the jury to determine what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts, 

provided the inferences are reasonably related to those facts.’” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 

Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 

228 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1976)). We “must determine not whether there is some evidence to 

support [appellant’s] hypothesis of innocence but, rather, whether a reasonable fact finder, upon 

consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected appellant’s theories and found him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Corbin v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 196, 202, 604 S.E.2d 111, 

114 (2004). “Further, a fact-finder having rejected a defendant’s attempted explanation as 

untrue, may draw the reasonable inference that his explanation was made falsely in an effort to 

conceal his guilt.” Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004). 

Here, appellant claims that because he did not know the emergency rescue team was 

trying to help him, he was defending himself from being kidnapped. Appellant testified at trial, 

but did not testify to the issue. Instead, appellant’s daughter, Torres, testified that when 

appellant emerged from the elevator, appellant stated, “[p]lease somebody help me. They’re 

kidnapping me. Somebody please come and help me.” The court rejected appellant’s hypothesis 

of innocence, and instead, chose to believe the emergency services personnel, none of whom 
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testified appellant claimed he was being kidnapped during the encounter. The court was entitled 

to reject Torres’ testimony, and conclude she was lying to help conceal her father’s guilt. Id. 

Finally, appellant claims his mental state and intoxication rendered him unable “to accurately 

process the meaning of the events giving him reason to know the identities of his escorts and to 

act accordingly.” The evidence established appellant’s BAC was .22 at the time of the 

altercation. Appellant’s altered mental state was the product of his own excessive drinking. Any 

problem he had perceiving the identity of the fire and EMT personnel and understanding the 

nature of their actions in trying to revive him was due to his own voluntary action. Appellant’s 

voluntary intoxication does not excuse his behavior and does not constitute a basis for reversal as 

a matter of law. Arnold v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 781, 791, 560 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2002) 

(“[V]oluntary intoxication is not an excuse for any crime. At most, it may negate the 

deliberation and premeditation required for first degree murder.”). 

Obstruction of Justice

 Appellant contends in his brief that the “slight challenge to” the police officers did not 

constitute obstruction of justice. He contends he “merely squirmed” as he was being handcuffed, 

and his “struggles were purely and merely for the purpose of freeing himself from tethers and 

strangers he thought were kidnapping him.” He also contends he did not act “knowingly” and 

makes the same arguments for the obstruction conviction that he made for the assault conviction, 

namely, his mental state precluded him from being aware the uniformed police officers were 

“law enforcement officers engaged in the performance of their duties.” 

Criminal obstruction of justice occurs 

[i]f any person without just cause knowingly obstructs a judge, 

magistrate, justice, juror, attorney for the Commonwealth, witness 

or any law-enforcement officer in the performance of his duties as 

such or fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction 

when requested to do so by such judge, magistrate, justice, juror, 
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attorney for the Commonwealth, witness, or law-enforcement 

officer, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 

Code § 18.2-460. 

 The evidence established appellant was “violently thrashing about . . . [and] pushing his 

arms up, trying to push firefighters away.” Officer Feltham testified, 

I got a hold of his right hand. And as soon as I got a hold of his 

right hand, he grabbed my other hand with his hand. And me and 

another unknown person in the elevator literally had to pry his 

fingers off one by one in order to free my hand . . . to get the 

handcuff on his arm. 

Once we got the handcuff on, he was still thrashing about and 

pulling away. He had pulled the IV lines out of his arm. I was 

holding onto the one—the free bracelet, or the handcuff. And he 

pulled so hard away from me that he bent the handcuffs. 

From this record, it is clear that appellant presented more than a “slight challenge” to 

Feltham and that he obstructed justice in his attempt to escape from being handcuffed. 

Self-Defense

Appellant’s argument that he acted in self-defense in assaulting the paramedics and the 

police and that the “Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] was not 

entitled to defend himself against what he reasonably perceived to be an imminent danger to 

himself” was not presented to the trial court as required by Rule 5A:18 and, accordingly, was not 

preserved for appeal. Furthermore, appellant does not argue we should invoke the “good cause” 

or “ends of justice exception,” and this Court will not apply the exceptions to Rule 5A:18 sua 

sponte. Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en 

banc). Moreover, even if appellant had preserved this issue below, it was not a question 

presented in the petition for appeal as required by Rule 5A:12(c), nor in his opening brief, as 
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required by Rule 5A:20(c), Jordan v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 322, 326 n.2, 649 S.E.2d 709, 

711-12 n.2 (2007), nor was it included as an issue in the order in which we granted Issue I.6

 Accordingly, we are precluded from addressing this argument for the first time on appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Commonwealth presented competent, credible and sufficient evidence to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of assaulting a firefighter and obstructing 

justice, therefore, the trial court’s judgment was neither plainly wrong nor without evidence to 

support it. See Askew, 40 Va. App. at 107, 578 S.E.2d at 60. Accordingly, the decision of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

Affirmed.

 6

 The question on which we granted the appeal was: 

Whether the trial court erred in not setting aside the verdict, where 

the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that (i) appellant assaulted and battered a 

firefighter, and (ii) obstructed justice. 

Moreover, the law and standard of review relating to a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence differ from the law relating to self-defense. “Self-defense is an affirmative defense 

which the accused must prove by introducing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt 

about his guilt.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1993).