1 –ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JOHN DOE, an individual proceeding under

a pseudonym,

Case No. 6:16-cv-00517-MC

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

v. 

JO ANN SARGEANT, an individual,

DEBRA EVANS, an individual, RICHARD

HILL, an individual,

Defendants.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff brings this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Jo Ann Sargeant, 

Debra Evans, and Richard Hill in their individual capacities for alleged sexual abuse while 

plaintiff was housed at MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility in 1992. Plaintiff brought a state 

court action, based on the same allegations of abuse, against Jo Ann Sargeant and the facility. 

Defendants here, all of whom worked at MacLaren, moved for summary judgment on statute of 

limitations grounds. 
2 –ORDER

While the parties briefed the motions here, the state court granted summary judgment 

against plaintiff on statute of limitations grounds. See Jan. 13, 2017 Order, Case No. 

16CV02710. Specifically, the state court concluded, “Plaintiff knew or should have known of the 

harm, causation, and tortious conduct allegedly caused by Defendants while housed at MacLaren 

in 1992. Plaintiff’s discovery of his injuries thus occurred well beyond ten years ago. As such, 

Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.” Id. At a telephone conference following the state court 

judgment, plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, admitted he did not challenge the state court’s 

preclusive effect on this action and stated he would dismiss this action. 

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, district courts adopt 

the closest analogous statute of limitations from state law. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 

1136 (9th Cir. 2002). In Oregon, as § 1983 claims are most closely analogous to personal injury 

actions, the relevant statute of limitations is two years. Id.; O.R.S. § 12.110. Oregon and the 

Ninth Circuit generally espouse that the Discovery Rule governs the start of the tolling period for 

a statute of limitations. T.R. v. Boy Scouts of Am., 344 Or. 282, 292 (2008); Golden Gate Hotel 

Ass’n v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1994). This rule states that as 

soon as the plaintiff is aware, or should reasonably be aware, that an injury occurred, and knew 

or should have known that the defendant caused the injury, the statute of limitations period 

begins to run. T.R., 344 Or. at 291 – 92. 

As noted, the state court concluded plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the harm 

stemming from the abuse back in 1992. Therefore, collateral estoppel bars plaintiff’s claim here.

Collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation of an issue of fact or law under a new cause of 

action that has already been decided in a prior court proceeding involving a party from the first 

case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “Issue preclusion arises in a subsequent 
3 –ORDER

proceeding when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final determination 

in a prior proceeding.” Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 318 Or. 99, 103 (1993). Issue 

preclusion applies when the following five requirements are met: (1) the issue in the two 

proceedings is identical; (2) the issue was litigated and was essential to the outcome of the prior 

proceeding; (3) the party to be precluded has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the 

issue; (4) the party to be precluded was party to or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; 

and (5) the prior proceeding was of the kind that this Court will give preclusive effect to. Id. at 

104. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to give state court 

judgments the same preclusive effect that the law of the state where the judgment was rendered 

would give. Gonzales v. California Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014).

The issue of when plaintiff knew or should have known of the harm from the alleged 

sexual abuse is identical in both cases. Plaintiff had a fair opportunity to be heard on that issue in 

state court and the issue was in fact essential to the outcome there. The state court entered 

judgment and the time to appeal has passed. Therefore, I conclude plaintiff’s claims here are 

barred by collateral estoppel. Plaintiff’s brought this 1983 claim well past the two year limitation 

from the date he knew or should have known of the harm. Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, ECF No. 28, is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of August, 2017.

 

/s/ Michael McShane

Michael McShane

United States District Judge