United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30205

Karen Abraugh, individually and on behalf of M.A. and as 

Administrator, on behalf of Randall Abraugh Estate; Kelsey 

Rice Abraugh; Reashelle Morrow, on behalf of M.A., 

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Bill Altimus, individually and in his official capacity; James 

Cochran, individually and in his official capacity; Julian C. 

Whittington, individually and in his official capacity; Rodney 

Boyer, individually and in his official capacity; Susan C. Tucker, 

individually and in her official capacity; Cynthia Holley, individually

and in her official capacity; Anita Flye, individually and in her official 

capacity; Russell W. Roberts, individually and in his official capacity; 

Jessica Farrington, individually and in her official capacity; 

Bradley Vassar, individually and in his official capacity; State of 

Louisiana Office of Risk Management; John Doe #1, 

Correctional Employee; John Doe #2, M.D.; John Doe #3, Mental 

Health Professional; Louisiana State University 

Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of 

Supervisors; Police Jury Bossier Parish; Parish of 

Bossier, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:20-CV-252

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 14, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before Wiener, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:*

Some words have multiple meanings. The right meaning may vary 

dramatically depending on context. And determining which usage applies to 

a given situation can have significant consequences under our legal system.

A few examples will suffice to show how things can go awry if you get 

the usage wrong. “Sanction” can mean official approval—or official penalty. 

“Natural born” often refers to an attribute possessed at birth (as in “natural 

born citizen” or “natural born athlete”)—but it could also refer to the 

method of one’s delivery into the world. “Discrimination” might mean 

disfavoring one group of individuals over another—or it might just mean 

differentiating among people based on a group trait. See also Charles P. 

Pierce, Goat vs. G.O.A.T.: The History Behind Sports’s Antithetical Animal 

Analogy, Sports Illustrated, July 23, 2018 (depending on context, 

“goat” can mean “an athlete who failed, garishly, hilariously, and at the 

worst possible time”—or the “greatest of all time”).

Judges and lawyers are only human. At times we may be imprecise in 

our use of terminology. And that imprecision can lead to legal error. In 

particular, courts and judges are sometimes “less than meticulous” when it 

comes to the term “jurisdiction.” That’s what the Supreme Court observed 

in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006)—not to be 

confused with the lead plaintiff here, Karen Abraugh.

It’s also what happened here. In this case, the district court was “less 

than meticulous” about one particular aspect of jurisdiction—the concept of 

“standing.” The following two principles, stated independently, are both 

legally correct as far as they go: (1) A plaintiff like Abraugh lacks “standing”

* Judges Wiener and Graves concur in all but Section II.C of this opinion.

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to bring suits like this. (2) If a plaintiff lacks “standing,” then the district 

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s claims.

But combining these statements here, as the district court did, creates 

legal error. That’s because they involve different conceptions of standing.

The first statement concerns prudential standing, not Article III 

standing: Abraugh lacks prudential standing because Louisiana law does not 

authorize her to bring this particular cause of action. The second statement,

by contrast, concerns Article III standing: If Abraugh lacks Article III 

standing, then the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her 

claims.

In this case, Abraugh lacks prudential standing. But she has Article 

III standing. She has a constitutionally cognizable interest in the life of her 

son. And that determination does not turn on whether Louisiana law allows

her to sue.

So the district court erred when it held that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider any of Abraugh’s amended complaints. Accordingly, 

we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Karen Abraugh brought this suit over the wrongful death of her son 

Randall. Authorities booked Randall into the Bossier Maximum Security 

Facility as a pretrial detainee. He was both medicated and intoxicated at the 

time, and he had a history of mental health treatment. Though Randall was 

identified as “a detainee who should be followed for alcohol withdrawal 

syndrome and possible delirium tremens,” prison officials allegedly placed 

him in a cell without an operable source of water and failed to monitor him or 

provide any medication or liquids. The next day, officials found him hanging 

from his bedsheets. After emergency medical services personnel restored his 

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cardiac function, he was transported to the hospital for treatment, but he 

eventually died there from his injuries. 

So Karen filed this action. She filed the complaint both individually 

and on behalf of Randall’s estate. The complaint asserted civil rights 

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death and survival claims under 

Louisiana law, and other state-law claims against various defendants whom 

she alleges were responsible for her son’s death. It alleged that Randall was 

survived by his wife, Kelsey Rice Abraugh, along with his biological parents 

and siblings. 

Karen later amended her complaint to “substitute Plaintiff with 

individual heirs” by “adding Kelsey Rice Abraugh (Randall Abraugh’s 

surviving spouse), and [M.A.] (Randall Abraugh’s minor child).” She 

subsequently amended the complaint again to allow M.A. to appear through 

Reashelle Morrow, her mother and natural tutor. 

The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. It held 

that Karen lacked Article III standing to bring this suit, on the ground that 

Louisiana law does not provide her with a right of action to pursue these 

claims. The district court also found that the later amendments adding 

Kelsey and M.A. to this action could not cure the initial jurisdictional defect, 

because Karen was the only plaintiff in the original complaint. Karen timely 

appealed.

We review a dismissal for lack of Article III standing de novo. See,e.g., 

Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2021).

II.

There are three elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish 

Article III standing: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. See Lujan 

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

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In addition, courts have occasionally articulated other “standing” 

requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy under certain conditions, beyond 

those imposed by Article III. As relevant here, “[s]tanding under the Civil 

Rights Statutes is guided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d 381, 

383 (5th Cir. 2004). And § 1988 “provides that state common law is used to 

fill the gaps in administration of civil rights suits.” Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 

1988(a).

So “a party must have standing under the state wrongful death or 

survival statutes to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988.” 

Pluet, 355 F.3d at 383. 

Under Louisiana law, the right to pursue a survival or wrongful death 

action is available to four exclusive categories of survivors. Those four 

classes are as follows:

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or 

either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them 

if he left no spouse or child surviving.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, 

if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or 

any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving. 

LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.1(A) & 2315.2(A).

These provisions make clear that the existence of a higher class of 

survivors prevents a person in a lower class from filing suit. Id. And that is 

precisely the problem here: Karen would be allowed to sue under Louisiana 

law, but for the fact that there are other individuals who enjoy superior status 

under the governing provisions. Indeed, she concedes as much. She 

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concedes, as she must, that Randall was survived by his wife, Kelsey, and his 

daughter, M.A. As the “surviving spouse and child . . . of the deceased,” 

they are the only ones who may bring these survival and wrongful death 

claims in accordance with Louisiana law. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.1(A)(1)

& 2315.2(A)(1). And because they are available to sue, Karen is disabled from 

suing as a matter of Louisiana law as the “surviving . . . mother of the 

deceased.” Id. arts. 2315.1(A)(2) & 2315.2(A)(2).

That much is undisputed. But it led the district court to (incorrectly) 

conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Karen lacked 

Article III standing to bring this suit. To be sure, the district court did not 

err in describing her inability to sue under Louisiana law as a defect of 

“standing.” But it is a defect of prudential standing, not Article III standing. 

And the difference matters here, because Article III standing is the only kind 

of standing required before a federal district court can exercise subject matter 

jurisdiction.

A.

Before we explain why there is subject matter jurisdiction in this case, 

we should first address why we decline to embrace the jurisdictional theory 

set forth by Karen.

As Karen points out, at least four paragraphs in both the original and 

amended complaints mention Kelsey. So Karen theorizes that Kelsey was a 

plaintiff at the outset of this litigation—and as explained, Kelsey is 

indisputably entitled to sue under Louisiana law.

But Kelsey was not listed in the caption of the original complaint. Rule 

10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he title of the 

complaint must name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). And even if 

we were to accept that omission as a named party in the caption of the 

complaint is not necessarily “determinative as to the identity of the parties 

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to the action,” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5A FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1321 (4th ed. 2018), courts at least give the 

caption “considerable weight when determining who the plaintiffs to a suit 

are since plaintiffs draft complaints.” Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846, 

849 (8th Cir. 2006). We see no basis for looking past the caption here.

B.

The better jurisdictional argument for Karen is that the district court 

wrongly conflated two distinct concepts of standing—and that what really 

matters here is that she has standing under Article III, even if she cannot sue 

as a matter of Louisiana law.

The term “standing” is often misused in our legal system. “The 

‘standing’ label is . . . sometimes placed on the real-party-in-interest

challenge.” Norris v. Causey, 869 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2017). And this has 

unfortunately led to confusion for attorneys and judges. See id.

In fact, our unpublished opinions are divided over the very question

presented in this appeal: Does lack of “standing” to bring a § 1983 claim 

under a state’s wrongful death or survival statute implicate subject matter 

jurisdiction? Compare King ex rel. Chaney v. Texas Med. Bd., 576 F. App’x. 

353, 354 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (yes), with Prudhomme on behalf of Reed 

v. Russell, 802 F. App’x 817, 821 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (no).

Our decisions should not be so divided, however. Because our court 

has repeatedly affirmed the legal principle that should decide this question: 

“[S]tanding in federal court is determined entirely by Article III and depends 

in no degree on whether standing exists under state law.” Int’l Primate Prot. 

League v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 895 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1990)

(emphasis added), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 72, 74, 76–77 (1991). See 

Duarte ex rel. Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 759 F.3d 514, 519 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014)

(same). So the fact that Karen was not the proper plaintiff to bring this action 

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under Louisiana law does not mean that she lacked Article III standing. See 

Norris, 869 F.3d at 367.

Karen does indeed have Article III standing to bring this suit. She 

seeks money damages to address the death of her son, which was allegedly 

caused by Defendants’ conduct. So she has sufficiently alleged all three 

elements required to establish Article III standing at this stage. See Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 560–61 (Article III standing exists at the pleading stage when a 

plaintiff plausibly alleges (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly traceable 

to the challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) that is “likely . . .

redress[able] by a favorable decision”) (cleaned up).

Our sister circuits have held that a child has Article III standing to file 

suit over the wrongful death of a parent. See, e.g., Jones v. Prince George’s 

Cty., 348 F.3d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We presume that similar logic 

would govern a suit filed by a parent over the wrongful death of a child. And 

in any event, Karen has also sufficiently alleged Article III standing in her 

capacity as the administrator of her son’s estate. The estate has suffered an 

injury that the defendants are allegedly responsible for, and it seeks redress 

in the form of money damages. 

So we do not doubt the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. 

Karen has established “[s]tanding of the constitutional variety—the wellknown injury, causation, and redressability trifecta.” Norris, 869 F.3d at 366. 

And it is that kind of standing that determines subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

The defect here, by contrast, is one of prudential standing. And 

prudential standing does not present a jurisdictional question, but “a merits 

question: who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to 

enforce the right?” Id. at 367 (quotations omitted). As the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure make clear, “an action must be prosecuted in the name of 

the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1). And a violation of 

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this rule is a failure of “prudential” standing. Ensley v. Cody Res., Inc., 171 

F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)). “[N]ot one 

[of our precedents] holds that the inquiry is jurisdictional.” Id. It goes only 

to the validity of the cause of action. And “the absence of a valid . . . cause 

of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 

v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014) (quotations 

omitted).

Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction just because Karen was not the proper party to 

bring this case under Louisiana law.

C.

There is one final issue that we must address. The district court erred 

because it improperly conflated Article III standing with prudential standing.

But Karen has never made this argument. So that raises the question of 

forfeiture. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).

It is our constitutional duty, of course, to decline subject matter 

jurisdiction where it does not exist—and that is so whether the parties 

challenge Article III standing or not. See, e.g., Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 

1046 (2019) (noting courts’ “obligation to assure ourselves of litigants’

standing under Article III”) (quotations omitted).

But the opposite is not true. We do not have a constitutional duty to 

accept subject matter jurisdiction based on theories not actually presented by 

the parties. Rather, “[a]rguments in favor of [Article III] standing, like all 

arguments in favor of jurisdiction, can be forfeited or waived.” Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir. 2019). And Plaintiffs 

like Karen bear the burden of establishing Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560–61. So we must address the issue of forfeiture.

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We find no forfeiture here. Karen has repeatedly asserted that the 

district court erred in dismissing this action for lack of standing. To support 

her standing argument, she invoked our decision in Nobre v. Louisiana 

Department of Public Safety, 935 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2019). 

In Nobre, the decedent’s mother (like Karen) filed § 1983 claims as 

well as wrongful death and survival claims under Louisiana law. See id. at 

438. After filing the action (and after the limitations period had run), she 

discovered that her son had two children—which meant that she (like Karen) 

was “not the proper party” to bring the action under Louisiana law. See id. 

at 439. In response, she substituted the children’s natural tutors as plaintiffs 

in an amended complaint. Our court allowed the amendment and concluded 

that the amendment “would be allowed to relate back under Louisiana law, 

and is also allowed to relate back under Rule 15(c)(1).” Id. at 444.

So under Nobre, Plaintiffs like Karen may indeed amend their 

complaints to include the proper plaintiffs under state wrongful death and 

survival statutes. 

But here’s the problem: Nobre did not address standing at all—let 

alone distinguish between Article III standing and prudential standing. At 

first blush, then, it might seem odd for Karen to invoke a precedent to 

support Article III standing that nowhere even mentions, let alone analyzes, 

Article III standing.

That said, it seems obvious that Karen’s argument is that this case 

presents no Article III standing defect for the same reason that no Article III 

standing defect was identified in Nobre. To be sure, a precedent that does 

not discuss standing or jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a precedent on 

standing or jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 

563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011) (“When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither 

noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the 

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proposition that no defect existed.”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (“drive-by jurisdictional rulings . . . have no 

precedential effect”). But the argument here is not that Nobre is binding 

precedent on standing—but that citing our decision in Nobre is sufficient to 

avoid forfeiture. Karen has sufficiently preserved her standing argument by 

arguing that there is standing here for the same reason there’s standing in 

Nobre.

III.

Two issues remain, both of which the district court should address in 

the first instance.

First is the matter of timeliness. Various Defendants contend that 

Kelsey and M.A.’s claims are time-barred and do not relate back to the 

original complaint in this action pursuant to either Rule 15 or Rule 17. See 

Nobre, 935 F.3d at 441–42 (relation back under Rule 15); Ratner v. Sioux Nat. 

Gas Corp., 770 F.2d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 1985) (relation back under Rule 17(a)); 

Magallon v. Livingston, 453 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 2006) (addressing 

standard for “ratification, joinder, or substitution” under Rule 17(a)); 

Wieburg v. GTE Sw., Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 308–09 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).

Second is the matter of sovereign immunity. Two Defendants—the 

Louisiana Office of Risk Management and the Board of Supervisors of 

Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College—contend 

that they are entitled to sovereign immunity.

The district court did not have an opportunity to address these issues

in the first instance due to its jurisdictional holding. We decline to address 

these issues for the first time on appeal, and instead leave them for the district 

court to resolve on remand.

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* * *

We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

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