[Cite as State v. Hughley, 2010-Ohio-6010.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, ) 

 ) CASE NO. 09 MA 200 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ) 

 ) 

 - VS - ) O P I N I O N 

 ) 

MATRICE HUGHLEY, ) 

 ) 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

 Court, Case No. 09CR682. 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Attorney Paul Gains 

 Prosecuting Attorney 

 Attorney Ralph Rivera 

 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor 

 Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Attorney James Gentile 

 42 North Phelps Street 

 Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1130 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 
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 Dated: November 24, 2010 

VUKOVICH, P.J. 

¶{1} Defendant-appellant Matrice Hughley appeals the decision of the 

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court, which denied his motion to suppress a 

handgun found on his person during a pat-down. Appellant contends that the officer 

did not possess reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed and dangerous 

and thus the frisk was unwarranted. Under the totality of the circumstances, however, 

reasonable suspicion existed to validate the frisk. For the following reasons, the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶{2} On June 1, 2009 at 5:15 a.m., ambulance personnel noticed a vehicle 

sitting on Himrod Avenue on Youngstown’s east side. They called the police 

department reporting that the driver appeared to be passed out behind the wheel and 

that they could not awaken him after several attempts. (Tr. 7-8). When an officer 

arrived, appellant was awake and arguing with a medic. The officer noticed that 

appellant’s speech was slurred and that he appeared to be under the influence of 

drugs or alcohol. (Tr. 8). As the car was in drive, the officer asked appellant to put it 

in park. Appellant was not compliant until the officer made several requests and 

appellant kept moving his hands about within the car. (Tr. 8-9). 

¶{3} The officer then asked appellant to step out of the vehicle. It took 

several requests before appellant complied. (Tr. 9, 16). When he finally alighted from 

the vehicle, the officer conducted a brief pat-down for officer safety. (Tr. 9, 11, 17). 

The officer discovered a .38 caliber handgun on appellant’s person. (Tr. 15). Appellant 

was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, a fourth degree felony in violation of 

R.C. 2923.12(A)(2). 

¶{4} Appellant filed a motion to suppress the handgun, alleging in pertinent 

part that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him. After the officer related 

the above facts, appellant testified that he had been working as a cook in a pub in 

Warren and that he had been on his way to his girlfriend’s house. (Tr. 21, 34). He 
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stated that she lived in a dangerous area just down the road from where he stopped 

his vehicle. (Tr. 21). He explained that he stopped in order to text her so that she 

would be ready to let him into the building. (Tr. 20). He denied that he had been 

drinking or that he had been passed out. (Tr. 23). He also believed that it was 

approximately 2:30 a.m. when he stopped his vehicle. (Tr. 21, 28). 

¶{5} The trial court denied the motion in an August 25, 2009 judgment entry, 

finding that there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the frisk. Thereafter, appellant 

pled no contest to carrying a concealed weapon. On October 28, 2009, the trial court 

found appellant guilty and sentenced him to two years of community control and 

required the completion of an outpatient program. Appellant filed a timely appeal. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

¶{6} Appellant’s sole assignment of error provides: 

¶{7} “THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SINCE THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT WAS 

AGAINST APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.” 

¶{8} Suppression decisions present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. 

Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶100. Any legal issues are decided de 

novo. Id. Any factual findings are upheld as long as they are supported by competent, 

credible evidence. Id. The weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses at 

the suppression hearing are issues primarily for the province of the trial court. State v. 

Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366; State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 277; 

State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20. 

¶{9} Appellant does not take issue with the fact that he was ordered to exit 

the vehicle. Rather, he contests only whether the frisk was warranted. 

¶{10} A police officer may make a brief, warrantless, investigatory stop without 

probable cause when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is or 

has been involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1. During such 

an encounter, an officer is authorized to perform a limited pat-down search for 

weapons as a safety precaution if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person 

stopped may be armed and dangerous. Id. at 24. 
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¶{11} Reasonable suspicion means that the investigating officer must be able 

to point to specific, articulable facts that, when coupled with any rational inferences 

that may be drawn from those facts, warrant the investigation. Id. The 

reasonableness of a stop and frisk is based upon the totality of the circumstances. 

State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87. These circumstances are to be viewed 

through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must 

react to events as they unfold. Id. at 87-88. An officer need not artfully articulate his 

justification for the frisk as long as there is evidence in the record that the officer had 

specific facts before him suggesting the subject may be armed or dangerous. State v. 

Whitfield (Nov. 1, 2000), 7th Dist. No. 99CA111, ¶30. 

¶{12} Here, the officer had information from dispatch that medics from Rural 

Metro Ambulance were reporting that appellant was passed out behind the wheel of 

his vehicle. The officer then confirmed this with the medic and was specifically 

advised that appellant was not easily awakened. Notably, the informants here were 

expressly identified. See State v. Otte (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 559. They were not 

anonymous tipsters or criminal informants. See Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio 

St.3d 295, 300 (noting the three main types of informants and explaining their varying 

levels of trustworthiness). There was no reason for the officers to disbelieve these 

witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Neeley, 2d Dist. No. 20842, 2006-Ohio-418, ¶22 (an 

eyewitness identification will constitute probable cause unless at the time of the arrest 

there is some apparent reason for the officer to disbelieve the eyewitness). As such, 

the officer could properly act under the belief that appellant was passed out behind the 

wheel of a vehicle. 

¶{13} Moreover, it was 5:15 a.m. on Youngstown’s east side approaching an 

area that appellant suggested was dangerous. From appellant’s testimony, it appears 

that he was stopped in the roadway. (Tr. 22). When the officer arrived, he noticed 

that the vehicle was in drive. The officer heard appellant arguing with the medic. He 

noticed that appellant’s speech was slurred and that he generally appeared to be 

under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Appellant was hesitant and moved his hands 

oddly. He was noncompliant with requests to put the car in park and to step out of the 
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vehicle, which appellant admits were proper requests. The officer expressed that he 

conducted a brief frisk out of concern for his safety. (Tr. 9, 11, 17). 

¶{14} In conclusion, the officer sufficiently articulated particular facts showing 

his justification for the frisk. There were various reasons to believe that appellant had 

been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Besides 

being passed out behind the wheel of the vehicle which was sitting in the roadway, it 

appears he was passed out with the vehicle in drive. As he had just been passed out, 

his condition could be considered unstable, especially since he appeared to be 

intoxicated and since he was not compliant with important safety requests. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, the officer possessed reasonable suspicion that appellant 

may have posed a danger to his safety. As such, the brief pat-down on appellant’s 

outer clothing was warranted before the officer permitted appellant to enter his pocket 

for identification. 

¶{15} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is hereby 

affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., dissents; see dissenting opinion.