97-278

 No. 97-278

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1998 MT 51

VICTOR A. JOHANSEN,

 

 Petitioner and Appellant, 

 v.

 

STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF 

NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, 

 Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

 The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 William G. Sternhagen, Sternhagen Law Firm, Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Tommy H. Butler, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana 

Department of Natural Resources & Conservation, Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: September 18, 1997

 Decided: March 10, 1998

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Victor A. Johansen (Johansen) and the Department of Natural Resources and

Conservation (Department) have filed cross-appeals from an order of the First 

Judicial

District Court, Lewis and Clark County. Johansen had filed a petition for judicial 

review in

the District Court of the Department's decision to cancel his lease of agricultural 

land for

failing to make timely lease payments. The District Court granted summary judgment 

in

favor of the Department and dismissed Johansen's petition for lack of jurisdiction. 

We

reverse and remand.

¶2 The sole issue we address on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 

holding that

it did not have jurisdiction to review Johansen's petition for judicial review of the

Department's decision to cancel his agricultural lease pursuant to § 77-6-506, MCA, 

for

failing to make timely lease payments.

 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 For decades, Johansen's family leased agricultural land from the State of 

Montana. 

Johansen continued leasing the same land that had originally been leased by his 

grandfather. 

The date when Johansen's rental payments were due are set by statute. Section 77-6-

506(2),

MCA. Pursuant to that statute, his latest lease payment was initially due on 

November 15,

1995. If he failed to make a payment by that date, then the full rental and a 

$25.00 penalty

were due on December 31, 1995. The statute also provides the Department with the

discretion to extend the deadline past that date. Specifically, that statute 

provides:

 For agricultural leases and the agricultural portion of leases containing

 both grazing and agricultural land, when the rental is paid on a crop share

 basis or on a crop share/cash basis, the rental is due in cash on or before

 November 15 of the year in which the crop is harvested. If the rental is not

 paid on or before November 15 of the year of crop harvest, a $25 penalty shall

 be imposed on the lessee. If the full rental and the $25 penalty are not paid 

on

 or before December 31 of the year in which the crop is harvested, the entire

 lease is canceled. The department may extend the deadline in writing. If the

 lessee does not make the rental payment by the date of extension, the entire

 lease is canceled. Any rental payment made after November 15 of the year in

 which the crop is harvested, including payment made after an extension of the

 deadline, must include the $25 penalty. 

Section 77-6-506, MCA.

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¶4 Because Johansen had not paid the rent by November 15, the full rental plus a 

$25

penalty was due on December 31. Johansen attempted to make this payment from his 

rural

postal box. Postal service for his route is provided by a contract carrier. 

Contractors,

including the contractor on Johansen's route, routinely accept letters for mailing 

that are

placed in the postal box without the stamps affixed when the customer has provided 

the

correct amount of money for postage. In such a case, the contractor accepts the 

mail, takes

it to the post office, and affixes the postage. 

¶5 Johansen testified that he and his father before him have mailed the lease 

payments

in this fashion from his rural postal box for the past 38 years. On Friday, 

December 29,

1995, Johansen again attempted to mail his lease payment in this fashion. He placed 

the

envelope containing his payment in his rural postal box with 32 cents. The postal 

carrier

did not take the letter, however, because snow had blown into the mailbox. The 

postal

carrier left Johansen a note stating that because the box was filled with snow, she 

was unable

to find all the money to pay the required postage. She requested that Johansen 

remove the

snow. 

¶6 On Saturday, December 30, 1995, when Johansen went to the mailbox, he discovered

the postal carrier's message. He removed the snow and again left the rental payment 

in the

mail box with money to pay the required postage. That day the postal carrier found 

the mail

and the money in the mailbox, which had been cleaned. Once again, she declined to 

accept

the letter. She left a note, stating that she did not have any stamps and would be 

unable to

get any more because it was a Saturday. 

¶7 The next two days, Sunday, December 31, 1995, and Monday, January 1, 1996 were

both legal holidays, so the post office was closed and mail was not delivered. 

See 1-1-216(a) and (b), MCA. On Tuesday, January 2, 1996, Johansen went to his 

mailbox and

discovered the note left by the postal carrier the previous Saturday and saw that 

the envelope

containing the rental payment was still in his postal box. That same afternoon, he 

drove to

East Helena and personally mailed the payment from the East Helena post office. 

However,

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the envelope did not receive a postmark until the next day, January 3, 1996. 

¶8 By letter dated January 24, 1996, and delivered February 9, 1996, the Department

notified Johansen that it was canceling his agricultural lease, for failure to 

timely pay his

rent. It notified him that he no longer had the right to use the leased land, and 

that any use

would be considered a trespass. The Department also informed him that it would be

advertising the land for lease. 

¶9 By letter dated April 1, 1996, Johansen requested that the Department reinstate 

his

lease. He argued that the Department had the authority to do so pursuant to § 77-6-

211(3),

MCA, which provides that a lease may be reinstated where "the violation is not 

serious

enough to warrant cancellation. . . ." Alternatively, Johansen requested that the 

Department

give him a contested case hearing pursuant to the Montana Administrative Procedure 

Act

(MAPA), § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA. 

¶10 The Department informally discussed the cancellation of the lease with 

Johansen. 

With regard to Johansen's claim that he mailed the letter from the East Helena post 

office

on January 2, 1996, the Department admitted that if had been postmarked that day 

rather than

January 3, it would not have canceled the lease. Subsequently, by letter dated May 

30, 1996,

the Department denied his request for a contested case hearing, stating that 

because no

person could verify (1) that he indeed placed the rental payment in the mail in a 

timely

fashion; and (2) that the post office routinely accepts letters for mailing without 

postage

stamps affixed to them, there were no issues of fact or law to be resolved by a 

contested case

hearing. It also denied his request for reinstatement of the lease, and stated that 

the letter

constituted a final agency decision pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-623, MCA, which pertains 

to

final agency decisions adverse to a party in a contested case. 

¶11 On June 11, 1996, Johansen requested a redetermination of the Department's 

decision

or alternatively an appeal to the State Board of Land Commissioners pursuant to 77-

6-211,

MCA. In direct response to the Department's statement that no person could verify 

whether

the postal carrier accepts letters for mailing without postage stamps affixed to 

them,

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Johansen submitted a letter from the postmaster in East Helena verifying that the 

postal

carrier accepts such mail so long as money is provided for the stamps. He 

additionally

submitted relevant excerpts from the USPS Handbook. Johansen also challenged the

Department's failure to address or make factual findings or legal conclusions that 

addressed

the issues raised by Johansen in his original request for reinstatement. 

¶12 At some point, the postal carrier servicing Johansen's route testified by 

affidavit that

she routinely accepts letters from the Johansen residence without the stamps affixed 

when

the correct amount of money is provided for postage. She also confirmed Johansen's

statements that she found mail in his mailbox on Friday, December 29, and again on

Saturday, December 30, but did not take the mail because snow had blown into the 

mailbox

on Friday, and she was unable to get stamps on Saturday. Although this affidavit 

was filed

with the District Court in connection with various motions below, the record is 

unclear as

to when she signed the affidavit or when Johansen provided it to the Department, if 

at all. 

¶13 By letter dated June 25, 1996, the Department again refused to reinstate his 

lease and

rejected his request for a hearing before the State Board of Land Commissioners. The

Department stated that the cancellation of the lease was "automatic." Although the

Department insisted that cancellation was "automatic," it did not address its 

statutory

authority to extend the rental due date past the December 31, 1995 deadline, nor did 

it

explain under what circumstances it has done so in the past. See § 76-6-506, MCA. 

It also

rejected Johansen's evidence that his rural postal carrier accepted letters without 

postage

affixed to it, even if there was money for the postage in the mailbox along with the 

letter. 

Additionally, although it had earlier stated in its April 1, 1996 letter that its 

decision was a

final decision under contested case proceedings pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-623, MCA, it 

now

stated for the first time that Johansen had no statutory right to a contested case 

hearing,

because termination for nonpayment of rent was automatic pursuant to § 77-6-506, 

MCA. 

The Department also stated that its purpose in meeting informally with Johansen was 

to

verify that his payment was not received by the statutory deadline. In its view, 

whether it

set out a formal division of facts and law was thus "irrelevant." Finally, it 

stated its view that

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§ 77-6-211, MCA, which allows for reinstatement when the lease violation is not 

serious,

only applies to cases where the lease is canceled "for cause," such as for 

overgrazing, and

not where the lease is canceled for failure to timely pay rent.

¶14 Consequently, Johansen filed a petition for judicial review with the District 

Court. 

The court ruled in favor of the Department on the parties' cross-motions for summary

judgment. It held that the Department's action in this case was not a contested case

proceeding, and that it therefore had no jurisdiction under MAPA to review the 

agency's

decision. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It is 

from this

decision that the parties have filed cross-appeals. 

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment rulings de novo. 

Seeley

v. Davis (Mont. 1997), 946 P.2d 119, 121, 54 St. Rep. 1006, 1007. It applies the 

same Rule

56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by the district court. Seeley, 946 P.2d at 121. In 

response to

a motion for summary judgment in this case, the court dismissed the case based upon 

lack

of jurisdiction. This Court reviews that legal determination to determine whether 

the court

erred. Seeley, 946 P.2d at 121. 

 DISCUSSION

¶16 The District Court held that the Department's action in this case was not a 

contested

case proceeding under MAPA, § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA. It held that judicial review 

pursuant

to MAPA was therefore not appropriate, and concluded that it had no jurisdiction to 

review

Johansen's claim. 

¶17 On appeal, Johansen argues that the Department unlawfully denied him his right 

to

a contested case proceeding pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA. He contends 

that

the District Court did have jurisdiction under MAPA, § 2-4-701, et seq., MCA, to 

review his

petition and that it should have ordered the Department to grant him a full 

contested case

hearing prior to canceling his lease.

¶18 The Department agrees with Johansen that the District Court had jurisdiction to

review his petition. However, it disputes Johansen's contention that he was 

entitled to a

contested case hearing or that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the 

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petition

pursuant to MAPA. Instead, it argues that the District Court had authority to 

review the

petition pursuant to the standard of review for informal agency decisions set forth 

in Langen

v. Badlands Co-op State Grazing District (1951), 125 Mont. 302, 234 P.2d 467; and 

North

Fork Pres. v. DSL (1989), 238 Mont. 451, 778 P.2d 862.

¶19 For the reasons elaborated below, this Court agrees with the District Court's

determination that Johansen was not entitled to a contested case hearing and that 

MAPA was

therefore inapplicable. But we do not agree with the court's conclusion that it 

therefore 

lacked jurisdiction to review Johansen's petition. We hold that the District Court 

did have

jurisdiction to review the Department's decision to determine whether the lease 

cancellation

was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or unsupported by substantial evidence.

 I.

¶20 Johansen is correct in asserting that pursuant to MAPA, an administrative 

agency must

afford all parties a trial-type hearing in a "contested case." Sections 2-4-601, 2-4-

612, MCA. 

He is equally correct in asserting that the District Court has jurisdiction to 

conduct a judicial

review of such contested cases. Section 2-4-701, et seq., MCA. But the statutory

requirement of a trial-type hearing does not apply to every situation where a 

person's interest

is adversely affected by agency action. Rather, such a hearing is required only in 

"contested

cases."

¶21 A "contested case" within the meaning of MAPA is:

 a proceeding before an agency in which a determination of legal rights, duties,

 or privileges of a party is required by law to be made after an opportunity for

 hearing. The term includes but is not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing,

 and licensing. 

Section 2-4-102(4), MCA. The lease of agriculture land does not constitute 

ratemaking or

price fixing, and Johansen does not contend that the lease constitutes a "license." 

We

therefore turn to the statutory provisions governing the lease of agricultural land 

to determine

whether the Department was "required by law" to afford Johansen a trial-type hearing 

prior

to canceling his lease.

¶22 The termination of a lease for failing to make a rental payment is provided for 

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in § 77-6-506(2), MCA. That section contains no provision requiring the Department 

to hold a

hearing prior to canceling the lease. In contrast, § 77-6-211, MCA, provides for an

administrative hearing when a lease is canceled pursuant to § 77-6-113, MCA (for 

failing to

properly manage agricultural lands), § 77-6-208, MCA (for violating rules regarding

subleasing of land), § 77-6-209, MCA (for failing to seek approval before changing a 

grazing

lease to an agricultural lease), and § 77-6-210, MCA (for various causes, such as 

fraud,

misrepresentation, or using the land for purposes other than those authorized by the 

lease). 

No provision requires the Department to hold a hearing when the lease is canceled for

nonpayment. 

§23 Although a contested case hearing is not required by statute, Johansen argues 

that

such a hearing is required by Montana's constitution. Specifically, he contends 

that such a

hearing is "required by law" pursuant to Article II, Section 17 of the Montana State

Constitution, which provides:

 Due process of law. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

 without due process of law.

However, Johansen cites no legal authority and sets forth no analysis to support his

argument. Johansen fails to provide analysis as to whether he had a property 

interest in the

continuation of the agricultural lease that was canceled for failure to timely pay 

rent. Even

were we to assume that it does constitute "property" within the meaning of Montana's

constitution, he provides no analysis as to what process was due in this case. For 

example,

he cites no case law that requires the Department to hold a formal, pre-termination 

hearing

as opposed to an informal post-termination hearing. Finally, Johansen provides no 

analysis

as to how the Department allegedly violated his constitutional rights.

¶24 Johansen must cite authority for the position he advances. Rule 23, M.R.App.

P. It

is not this Court's job to conduct legal research on his behalf, to guess as to his 

precise

position, or to develop legal analysis that may lend support to that position. 

State v. Carter

(Mont. 1997), ___ P.2d ___, ___, 54 St.Rep. 1235, 1240; State v. Fina (1995), 273 

Mont.

171, 181, 902 P.2d 30, 38. Johansen has failed to establish that the Montana State

Constitution required the Department hold a formal, trial-type hearing prior to 

canceling his

lease. We hold that such a hearing was not "required by law" prior to terminating 

his lease,

and the District Court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to MAPA to review his 

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petition.

 II.

¶25 Simply because an administrative decision is not a "contested case," however, 

does

not mean that Johansen has no avenue to seek review of the Department's decision. 

Indeed,

the Department itself admits that the courts have the inherent power to review its 

decisions,

whether or not they involve "contested cases." Citing Langen and North Fork Pres.,

the

Department contends that the District Court may review any informal administrative 

decision

to determine whether the Department used a fair procedure, whether questions of law 

were

properly decided, and whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

Johansen does not directly respond to the Department's argument, other than to argue 

that

the District Court has jurisdiction to review its decision pursuant to MAPA. He 

does not

challenge the Department's interpretation of the correct standard of review for nonMAPA

agency decisions.

¶26 In North Fork Pres., this Court addressed its power to review a non-MAPA

administrative decision. That case involved a challenge to the Department of State 

Lands'

approval of an operating plan on an oil and gas lease on school trust lands. North 

Fork

Preservation Association filed a complaint, alleging that the Department of State 

Lands had

failed to prepare an environmental impact statement as required by law. North Fork 

Pres.,

778 P.2d at 863. Upon reviewing the case, this Court noted that § 2-4-704, MCA, the

standard of review for judicial review of contested case hearings under MAPA was

inapplicable, because that section deals with review of "contested cases," and that 

case did

not involve a contested case. North Fork Pres, 778 P.2d at 865-66. We thus 

addressed the

standard of review the district court should use in that non-MAPA case and stated:

 The review by the district court is only for the purpose of determining

 the legal rights of the parties involved. This is so because of the division of

 governmental powers under the Constitution, neither the district court nor the

 Supreme Court may substitute their discretion for the discretion reposed in

 boards and commissions by the legislative acts. 

 The appeal from the commission to the district court is for the purpose

 merely of determining whether upon the evidence and the law of the action of

 the commission is based upon any error of law, or is wholly unsupported by

 the evidence or clearly arbitrary or capricious. On such review courts will

 only inquire insofar as to ascertain if the board or commission has stayed

 within the statutory bounds and has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or

 unlawfully. 

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North Fork Pres., 778 P.2d at 866 (citing Langen, 234 P.2d at 470). 

¶27 We further stated that in reaching its decision, the Department of State Lands 

was

carrying out a statutory duty assigned to it and not to the courts and that its 

decision involved

expertise within its province. Accordingly, we held that the standard of review to 

be applied

by the trial court and this Court was whether the record established that the agency 

acted

"arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully." North Fork Pres., 778 P.2d at 867.

¶28 In this case, the Department is charged by the legislature with managing state 

trust

lands, including the leasing of agricultural lands. Section 77-1-301(1), MCA, 

provides in

part:

 Under the direction of the board, the department has charge of the

 selecting, exchange, classification, appraisal, leasing, management, sale, or

 other disposition of the state lands. 

 The Department thus has jurisdiction in the first instance to determine whether to 

cancel

a lease. We agree with the Department that it is the courts' function to review 

its decision

to determine whether its decision is arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or unsupported 

by

substantial evidence. 

¶29 The Department additionally argues that when conducting its review, the District

Court should afford its decision great deference. The Department is correct in 

noting that

the courts defer to an agency's decision where its resolution implicates substantial 

agency

expertise. However, whether Johansen timely mailed his rental payment, whether the 

U.S.

postal service "accepts" letters for mailing without postage on rural routes 

serviced by a

contract carrier where a person has provided money for the postage, or whether 

mailing takes

place upon placing a letter in a mailbox or only upon the receipt of a postmark are 

not

disputes that invoke any particular expertise within the Department's province. 

They do not

involve the high level of technical expertise that is required, for example, when the

Department cancels a lease due to mismanagement of State land. Thus, although the

reviewing courts will conduct a limited review of the Department's decision, it is 

not

necessary that they accord any particularly special deference to the decision in 

this case.

¶30 We hold that the District Court did have jurisdiction to review the Department's

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decision to cancel Johansen's lease for failing to make timely lease payments. We 

reverse

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

¶31 Reversed and remanded.

 /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

 

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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