1 NOTICE Decision fi led 03/ 03/11. The text of this decision may be changed or correct ed prior

to t he fi ling of a Peti tio n for

Rehearing o r th e disposit ion of

the same. NO. 5-09-0402 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT
WADE LES HER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit

Court of Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) Clinton C ounty. ) v. ) No. 08-MR-87 ) LARRY TR ENT, D irect or, I lli nois S tate Police; ) JOR GE MO NT ES, Ch airman, Illinois Prisoner ) Review Board ; and RO GE R E . W ALKE R, JR ., ) Director, Illinois Depa rtment of Co rrections, ) Honorable ) W illiam J. Becker, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.
PRES I DI NG JUSTICE CHAPM AN deliv ered the judgment of the co urt, with opin io n. Justi ces Spomer

and Wexstten concur

red in t he judg ment and opi nion. O P I N I O N The plaintiff, Wad e Lesher, app eals an orde r o f the trial co urt dism issing his complai nt for a writ of mandamus . Th e com plaint so ught to compel the defe ndants t o correct
an alle ged error in publi c records showing t hat the plaintiff

remained s ubject

to reg ist rati on under th e S ex Of

fender Regist

rati on Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq . (West 2008)) . The defe ndan ts file d a m otion to dismiss , arguing th at the p laintiff ha d no t alleged fa cts demonstr ating

that t hey had a clear

duty to t ake t

he request ed acti on. The tri al court agree d and dismi ssed the mandamus complai nt. On appeal, the pla inti ff ar gues t hat (1) the court erredin findin g he did not d emo nstrate a clear right to reli ef and (2) the trial j udge was not fair and impar tial. At issue is whether a 2008 amendment to the S ex Offender Reg ist rati on Act a ppli es t o the plainti ff. We affi rm. The Sex Offender

Regist rati on Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq . (W est 2008)) r e quires2

peop le convi cted of c ertain enumerate d sex o ffense s to register w ith local law enforce ment officials for a per iod of 10 years after beingreleased from prison. 730 I LCS 150/3, 7 (We st 2008). At issue in this case is whethera provi sion that tol ls t he 10-year r egi stration period during periods o f reincarceration is app licable. The plaintiff b ecam e sub ject to the reg ist rati on requir ement aft er he was convi cted of agg ravat ed criminal sexual ab use. The defendant s are t he direc tor of

the I llinois S tate Police, the chairm an of

the Illinois Pris oner Revie w B oard , and the dire ctor of the Illinois Dep artment of C orrections. The plaintiff

was convict ed of aggravat ed criminal sexualabuse in 1991 . H e was relea sed from pri son in December 1994, and the per iod of mandat ory superv isedrelea se on that charge ended in January 1997. He was subsequent ly incarcerat ed six mor e time s on vari ous unrelated ch arges. Two period s of inc arcera tion are relevan t for pu rpose s of this appe al. In 2002, the plaintiff was incarce rated f

or thr ee months and r elease d on November 22. The record does not reve al wh at cha rges led to this inca rceratio n. Alth ough a ppar ently the defendant s ini tial ly beli eved t hat thi s offens e was rel ated t o the plaintiff 's 1991 sex offense , they la ter dete rmi ned that there was no r eason to bel iev e that this period of incarc erati on was relat ed to the orig inal of fense or any other s ex offens e. From Jul y 2003 thro ugh January 2 009, the p laintiff wa s again incarcerated, this time on charges of robb ery and resi dentia l burg lary. At some point , short ly befor e his r elease , he lear ned that he was expectedto com ply w ith th e requi remen ts of the Sex O ffend er Re gistration A ct upo n his release. In December 2008, the plaintiff fil ed a pro se com plaint fo r a w rit of mandamus . He request ed that

the de fend ants b e ord ered to "corre ct the p ublic records " to re flect the fac t that his duty to com ply with the Sex Offen der Re gistration Act ended 10 years after his 1994 relea se from prison on the agg ravat ed-cri minal- sexual- abuse charg e.3

The defendants fil ed a motion t o dismi ss, ar guingthat t he plai ntif

f was notentitled to the rel ief r equested be cause he was required to r egi ster until Novem ber 201 2. This date
was based on a rel ease dat e of Novem ber 200 2. As p reviously noted , the d efend ants mistaken ly be li ev ed th at th e d ef en da nt 's three-m onth incarc eration in 20 02 w as relate d to h is orig inal sex o ffense . Th ey late r ackno wled ged tha t this was a mist ake. They argued, how ever, that a

2008 amendment t o the Se x Offender Regi stration Ac t was ret roact ively applic able. Prior to June 2008, the Sex Offender Regist rati on Act prov ided that a sex offender must re gis ter

for a period o f 10 years af te r afi naldi sc har ge orre le as e. 730 I LCS 150 /7 (W est 20 06). A noth er pro visio n requir ed offender s to re gis ter in person with law enforcement

ag en ci es , are quire me ntth at wou ld be impos sibl e t o c omp lywi th w hile incarc erate d. 730 I LCS 150/3 (West 2006). However, the s tatut e did not expressly address the effect

of peri ods of reincarcer ation until t he 2008 amendment spe cifi call y provi ded that those pe riods w ould toll the ru nnin g of the 1 0-ye ar registratio n per iod. 7 30 ILC S 150 /7 (West 2008); Pub. Ac t 95-513 ( eff. J une 1, 2008). The def

endants poi ntedout that the Se x OffenderRegi strati on Act and pr evi ous ame ndme nts to th e act hav e been held t o be retroac tively applic able. S ee People v. Malchow , 193 Il l. 2d 413, 418, 739 N.E.2d 433, 438 (2000); Miranda v. Madigan , 381 Ill. App. 3d 1 105, 11 09, 888 N.E .2d 158 , 162 (20 08). Thus, they argued that

the 2008 amendment

was applicable retroac tively as well. The co urt agree d with thi s argument and, t herefor e, dismi ssed the plaintiff 's complai nt for mandamus

. The plaintiff

fil ed a moti on to recons ider, which the court denie d. This appealfoll owed. On appeal, t

he plai ntif

f argues that

the trial c ourt er

red in di smiss ing hi s complai nt because he showed that t he defendant s had a cle ar duty t o act. Thi s is s o, he argues, for three
reasons. First, he argues th at the d efend ants d id not hav e the aut horit y to exte nd the peri od duringwhich he wa s requ ired to re gister as a s ex offend er. W e note that, in s ubsta nce, this is an argume nt that t

he provi sion i n the 2008 amendment does not apply to him. Second, t he4

plaintiff argues th at the re troactive a pplica tion of th e ame ndm ent co nsti tutes an imper missible ex po st facto punishment . Third, he c on tends that be caus e the d efend ants fail ed to notify him of the 2008 amendment, they cannot now "reap the rew ards" of applyi ng the amend ment to him. The plaintiff f urther contends that we must rever se because the trial judge was not fair and imparti al. We reject all four content ions. In order t o be enti tled

to mandamus relief, a plaintif f must show that a publ ic off icia l has a clear duty to p erform som e nond iscretionary official act. Rodriguez v. Illinois Pris oner Review Board , 376 I ll. App. 3d 4 29, 4 33-3 4, 87 6 N .E.2 d 65 9, 66 3-64 (200 7). In this case, wh eth er the defend ants have a clear d uty to act dep ends on whe ther the plaintiff is stil l requir ed to register under t he Sex Offend er Regi stration Ac t. This , in t urn, depends on whetherthe 10-year reg istrati on periodis t olled during pe riods of incarc erati on. To answer that question, we must det ermine w hether the pro vision contained in the 2008 statuto ry amendmentapplie s to the plaintiff. As we noted earl ier, the pla inti ff fr ames the ques tion as whetherthe defe ndants hav e the aut horit y to exte nd the peri od duringwhich he is r equired to register. We di sagree w ith this ch aracte rization beca use th e defe ndan ts' authority to require the pla inti ff t o regi ster is pre scri bed by stat

ute. The questi on is not whether the y can extendthe registra tion r equirement beyond the per iod impos ed by stat ute; c learly, they cannotdo so, and the y do not argue that they can. Ins tead, t

he questi on is whether

they have correctly determine d that the statute still requires the plaintiff to register. In response, the defe ndants argue that t he amendmentwas not a chang e in the law at all. Instead, the defend ants conten d, the 200 8 amen dment m erely clarifi ed ex isti ng law. They ackno wled ge that the y did not rais e this argu men t to the trial co urt, but they urge us to consider

it bec ause a n appe llate cou rt may affirm a trial cou rt's ruling on a ny b asis appeari ng in the record. See Rodriguez , 376 I ll. App. 3d at 433, 876 N.E.2d at 663. Alte rnati vel y, they a rgue tha t the co urt cor rectly d etermin ed th a t the amendment appl ies5

re tr oa ct iv el y. We find t ha t t he am en dme ntme re lycl ar if ie s e xi st in g l aw. Prior to the 2008 amendment, the statute pr ovided, in rel evant part, as follows: "Any *** person who is r eq uired to register *** shall be req uired to register for a periodof 10 ye ars aft er con victio n or adjudi cati on if not confined to a penal inst itution, hospital[,] or any other inst itution or f

acil ity, and if conf

ined, f or a peri od of 10 years af

ter par ole, di scharg e[,] or relea se from any s uch facility. * ** Lia bility forregi stration t erminat es at t he expiration of

10 years f

rom the dat e of convi ction or adjudic ationif not

confined t o a penal i nsti tuti on, hospit al[, ] or anyother i nsti tuti on
or faci lity and if confined , at the expiration of 1 0 years from the date of p arole , discharge[,] or release from any suc h facility ***." 73 0 ILCS 150/7 (W est 2006). The 2008 amendment added t he foll owing sent ence: "Reconfinement

due to a vi olati on of parol e or other circum stance s that do not rela te to the ori gina l conv icti on or adjudic ation s hall toll t he runningof the bal ance of the 10-yearperiod of

regi stration, which shallnot commence r unni ng unti l aft er fi nal parole, dischar ge, or rel ease." 730 ILCS 150/7 ( West 2008); Pub. Act 95-513 (eff. June 1, 2 008). Another provi sion of t

he Sex Offender Regi stration Ac t has always requir ed sex offenders to register in per sonwit h l oca l l aw en fo rc eme ntag enc ie s. 730 I LCS 150/3 (West 200 6). Ob vi ously, i t is not possible for an offender

who is incar cerat ed on an unrel ated cha rge to comply with this requirement. Thus, prior to the 20 08 am endm ent, the statute was ambiguous regarding whether it requir ed a sex offe nder to r egi ster for a t otal of

10 years or until 10 years had el apsed, re gardl ess of how much of t hat time the off

ender is actual ly out of prisonand able t o comply with t he regi strationre quire me nt s. For th e r ea so ns th at

fo ll ow, we find that

the 2008 amendment

clari fies this ambigui ty. W hen inter

preti ng a st atute , we must rea d the st atute as a whole and cons ider th e6

purpose for which i t was enacted. Peop le v. D avis , 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135, 766 N.E.2d 641, 644 (2002). The pur

pose of the Sex Offender Regist rati on Act i s to enhance pub lic safety by enabli ng law en forcemen t agencies to keep track of sex o ffenders. Malchow , 193 I ll. 2d at 420, 739 N.E.2d at 438. Const ruingthe pre- 2008 vers ion of se ction 7 in light of t his pur pos e, we find that it was alw ays intende d to require an offender to register for a totalof 10 years. I f a sex of

fender r emains at large fo r 10 ye ars wi thout reof fending, it

seems
reaso nable to concl ude that he is unl ike ly to r eoffend. Thus, all owing his duty to r egi ster to expire 10 y ears af

ter his relea se ful ly ser

ves t he purpose of

enhancingpublic s afety. On the other hand, if an offende r is in pris on fo r muc h of th e 10 y ears w ith no o ppo rtunity to reoffe nd, it is not as clear that he no lon ger poses a da nger to the comm unity. T hus, th e purpose of the r egi stration r e quirem ent is on ly served if such an offend er is req uired to regi ster as a sex offen der f

or a tota l of 10 years . We thus conclude t hat the stat

ute has always required sex offenders to register for a total of 10 years, and the 2008 amendment merely clarified this requirem ent. The plaintiff next contend s that the retroactive application of the amen dment inc reases the punishment

for hi s offens e in v iolation of the cons tit utionalprohibi tions on ex po st facto pun ishme nt. See U .S. Co nst. , art. I, §10 ; I ll. Const. 1970, ar t. I , §16. We have alr eady concludedthat t

he amendment cl arif

ied exi sti ng law. How ever, even ass uming t hat the amendmentis seen as a ch ange in the law, we would not find t his cont ention pe rsuasi ve. An

ex post fa cto law is a l aw that increa ses the punishment for a crime aft er it

has been committ ed. Garner v. Jones , 529 U .S. 244, 24 9 (2000 ). The key wo rd in this definitio n is "punishment ." The supreme c ourt has long he ld that the requir ement of

regi stration under the Sex Offender

Regist rati on Act does not

constitute punish ment. Peop le v. Ada ms , 144 Ill. 2d 381, 389, 581 N.E.2d 637, 64 1 (1991 ). The purpose of t he Sex Offender

Regist rati on Act is to enhance public safety, not to punish the offende rs required to register. Malchow , 1937

Ill. 2d at 42 0, 73 9 N .E.2 d at 43 8; Ada ms , 144 I ll. 2d at 388, 581 N.E.2d at 641 . Alth ough regi strationdoes impose a burden on those requir ed to reg ist er, t he burden is not subst antia l
eno ugh to c onstitute punishm ent. Ada ms , 144 I ll. 2d at 387-88, 581 N.E.2d at 640-41. Because r egi stration i s not puni shment, t he retroacti ve appl icat ion of t he Sex Offender Regist rati on Act and i ts amendment s does not v iolat e principles of ex postfacto

. Malchow , 193 Il l. 2d at

424, 739 N.E.2d at440 ; Rodimel v. Cook County Sheri ff' s Offi ce , 354 I ll. App. 3d 744 , 748, 82 2 N.E .2d 7, 11 (2004). The plaintiff

next arg

ues that he could not

be requir ed to reg ist er du e to the defendants' failure to notify hi m of the 2 008 amendment . W e disagree. All peop le are pr esumed to know the law. This bas ic premi se includes a pres umption t hat peopl e k no w what the collateral conseq uences o f any criminal ac tions might be. People v. Terneus , 239 Ill. App. 3d 669, 672, 607 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1992). Ev en assumingthat t he 2008 amendment modifi ed, rather th an cla rified, ex isting law , its app licability to the pla intiff did not depend on notice from the defendants. Finally, the pla inti f

f argues that

the trial j udge i n this matte r was not fa ir and impar tial. Trial judges are presumed t o be fair and impartial. A party al leg ing judici al bia s must overcome this p resumption. Eychanerv. Gross , 202 I ll. 2d 228, 280, 779 N.E.2d 1115, 1146 (2002). Advers e rulings a lone a re almo st never s ufficien t to sup port a clai m of judi cial bias, even if th ose ru lings are a lle ged t o be errone ous. Eychaner , 202 I ll. 2d at 280, 779 N.E.2d at 1146. The part y clai ming bi as must show eit her a pers onal bia s stemming from
some source ot

her than t

he litigation (

Eychaner , 202 Il l. 2d at 280, 779 N.E.2d at 1146) or
com men ts made in the course of the proce eding s that

" ' revea l such a hi gh deg ree of fa vorit ism or antagonism as to mak e fair judg ment impossible' " ( Eychaner , 202 Il l. 2d a t 281, 779 N.E.2d at 1147 (qu otin g Litekyv. United St ates , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))) . The plaintiff 's alle gat ions i n this case do not mee t thi s standard.8

The plaintiff a lleges that th e trial jud ge told h im that h is case could move s traight to
an appeal. He ar gues t

hat thi s stat ement demonst rates that t

he court was predis posed to rule against the plaintiff

without hearingall of

his ar guments . There are no trans cript s from t he hearing in this matter, and the pl ainti ff has not provi ded us with abysta nder 's report. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff

. Dec. 13, 2005) (pro vidin g pro ced ure s to in clud e a re por t of p roc eed ings in the record on appeal where no transcript exists). Thus, we cann ot con sider th e com men t. See People v. Salgado , 263 I ll. App. 3d 238, 245, 635 N.E.2d 1367, 1372 (1994) (explaining that it is th e a pp el la nt 's burden to pr ovide the rev iewing court wit h a complet e record and that any dou bts created by an incom plete record w ill be resolved against the appellant). Mo reover, even if

we could cons ider the alleged s tateme nt, the exact context of the comment is unclear. It is clear, how ever, tha t the co urt did in fact consider the pla inti ff' s clai ms. Aft er the hearing, t

he court allowed both parties the opportunit y to prese n t written argume nts before t he court r

uled. In denying the plaintiff 's motion t o reconsi der, the court not ed that the plaintiff p resen ted his argume nts "art iculately and forcef ully, " but i t found t

hat prec edent controlled the ca se. The plaintiff

also cont ends that

the court

refus ed e ven t o rule on t he issue he present ed. As pre viously noted, t he plai ntif

f has fr amed the i ssue in t his cas e as whether t

he defen dants have th e auth ority to e xtend the pe riod o f registration requ ir ed u nder the S ex OffenderRegist

rati on Act. For

the rea sons prev iousl y discuss ed, we do n ot b elieve that this is the is sue. The record shows t hat the court

careful ly consi dered whether the Se x Offender Regist rati on Act required the pl ainti ff t o continue to reg ist er. Thus, we rej ectth e p la in ti ff 's content ion that t

he court r efused t o consider any issue he present ed for i ts consi derati on. We find that he has not met his burden of demonstrating judi cial bias. For the foregoingreasons, we conclude t hat the tri al court

correctly dete rmined t

hat the plaintiff

was not enti tled to the mandamus reli ef he sought . We further c onclude that the9

pla i ntiff did not demons trat e that the court

was biased. Thus, we affir m the court 's order granti ng the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Affi rmed.NO. 5-09-0402 I N THE AP PE LLA TE C O U R T O F IL LIN O IS

FI FTH DI STRI CT

___________________________________________________________________________________ WADE LES HER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit

Court of Plaintiff-A ppella nt, ) Clinton C ounty. ) v. ) No. 08-MR-87 ) LARRY TR ENT, D irect or, I lli nois S tate Police; ) JOR GE MO NT ES, Ch airman, Illinois Prisoner ) Review Board ; and RO GE R E . W ALKE R, JR ., ) Director, Illinois Depa rtment of Co rrections, ) Honorable ) W illiam J. Becker, Defendants-Appellees. ) Jud ge, p resid ing.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opini on Fi led : March 3, 2011

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justi ces : Honorable M elissa A. Chapman, P.J.

Honorable St ephen L. S pomer, J. , and Hon orable Jame s M . W exstten, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn ey Wade Lesher, Regist rati on No.: N-51048, Big Muddy Correct ional Cent er, P.O. Box for 1000, I na, I L 62846-1000 Appe llant Pro se

___________________________________________________________________________________ Attorn eys LisaMadigan, Attorney Genera l, S tate of I llinois, MichaelA. Scodr o, Sol icitor for Ge neral, J an E . Hu ghes, A ssistant A ttorney Ge neral, 1 00 W . Ra ndo lph Stree t, 12th Appell ees Floor, Chi cago, IL 60601

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