IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 2, 2016

IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF SOPHIA ELAINE TAYLOR

Appeal from the Probate Court for Davidson County

No. 14P1510 Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M2016-01288-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from the removal of a conservator. The Tennessee Department of 

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (“the Department”) filed a petition in the 

Probate Court for Davidson County (“the Probate Court”) seeking removal of Cheryl R. 

Russell (“Russell”) as conservator for Sophia Elaine Taylor (“Taylor”). Russell, Taylor’s 

mother, was alleged to have interfered repeatedly with Taylor’s medical treatment. After 

a hearing, the Probate Court removed Russell as Taylor’s conservator and named 

ComCare, Inc. (“ComCare”) as temporary conservator. Russell appeals to this Court. 

Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the 

Probate Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Probate Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL 

MCBRAYER and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Cheryl R. Russell, pro se appellant.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and, Brian A. Pierce, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the appellee, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and 

Substance Abuse Services.

Barbara E. Futter, Nashville, Tennessee, Attorney Ad Litem for Sophia Elaine Taylor.

03/10/2017
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OPINION

Background

Taylor, born in 1968, suffers from a variety of health problems both mental and 

physical. In the interest of her privacy and as it is unnecessary to the resolution of this 

appeal, we will avoid disclosing the precise details of her illness where possible. Suffice 

it to say, Taylor’s illnesses have required hospitalization and frequent medication. In 

September 2014, Russell, Taylor’s mother, petitioned to be appointed Taylor’s 

conservator. In October 2014, the Probate Court entered an order appointing Russell as 

Taylor’s conservator. In February 2016, the Department filed its own petition, this one 

seeking to remove Russell as Taylor’s conservator. At this time, Taylor resided at the 

Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”). The Department’s petition 

alleged that Russell had interfered with Taylor’s medical treatment by many means, 

including making excessive phone calls to MTMHI, behaving abusively toward MTMHI 

staff, and, most critically, refusing to consent to the medical regimen recommended by 

Taylor’s doctors. Both a Guardian Ad Litem and Attorney Ad Litem were appointed in 

this case. This matter was tried over three days in April and May of 2016.

Dr. Don Elazar (“Dr. Elazar”), Taylor’s treating psychiatrist, testified. Dr. Elazar 

stated that Taylor’s condition could be treated with anti-psychotic medications. 

According to Dr. Elazar, Russell refused to allow doctors to give anti-psychotic 

medications to Taylor. Dr. Elazar testified that Russell was concerned that adopting the 

recommended treatment would negatively impact Taylor’s white blood cell count. Dr. 

Elazar stated that this was not a well-founded medical concern. Dr. Elazar testified:

Q. Dr. Elazar, while Sophia Taylor’s been here under your care, has she 

made any progress toward being discharged from this hospital?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. She’s still psychotic, violent. She was in . . . 4 point restraints a few days 

ago.

Q. And why is it that she’s not making any progress?

A. I feel it’s because we don’t have her on antipsychotics.

Q. Why isn’t she on antipsychotics?

A. Because her mother refuses to let us put her on antipsychotics. And she 

refuses to let us communicate to other doctors to address our concerns.

Dr. Barbara Snell (“Dr. Snell”), Taylor’s medical doctor, testified. Dr. Snell 

testified that while Taylor’s white blood cell count was low at times, this was being 
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monitored and was not necessarily significant. Dr. Snell stated that Russell cancelled an 

appointment the hospital had set up for Taylor. Dr. Snell testified:

Q. You testified earlier that you thought ComCare would be a better 

conservator than Ms. Russell. What are you basing that on?

A. I’m basing it on the fact that Ms. Russell has obstructed her psychiatric 

care for the year plus that she’s been hospitalized here.

Q. By refusing antipsychotics?

A. Refusing to even attempt them. And, in the one attempt, stopping it 

while it was still within the parameters given by the hematologist that 

would be fine to continue.

Mary Corbitt (“Corbitt”), a social worker at MTMHI, testified. Corbitt testified as 

follows regarding certain of Russell’s behavior:

Q. Okay. I believe there was a time period where you were the designated 

contact for Ms. Russell with regard to Sophia Taylor; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you know how that came about where you were the designated 

contact?

A. I’m not for sure how. They said that the treatment team -- Ms. Russell 

was making too many phone calls and that they wanted one particular 

person to handle all of her calls.

Q. Okay. And once you became the designated contact, do you know 

approximately what month that took place?

A. Maybe July of last year. I’m not for sure.

Q. Okay. And so approximately how many phone calls would you get a 

day from Ms. Russell?

A. Average?

Q. Average.

A. About five to six.

Q. Five to six. And that’s just to you; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that just the ones that you were there in the office and able to answer?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And whenever you -- would you return phone calls to Ms. Russell 

as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right. And as a member of the treatment team, if you would, 

just go through and tell me a little bit about how a typical treatment team 

would go with Ms. Russell as part of the treatment team meeting.
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A. We would all meet as a team. Ms. Russell would be present. She would 

request that Sophia not be present at the treatment team meeting because 

Sophia was often disruptive, but she is allowed to because she is a member 

of the team. And then --

Q. Sophia is?

A. She is. She is a member of the team. The doctors would discuss 

medications and what they wanted to put Sophia on, and Ms. Russell would 

decline, stating that she needed certain tests. When the test results came 

out, she would say she needed more tests. So nothing really was resolved 

in the treatment team meetings.

Q. Was she -- was there ever a time where she would be indecisive about 

her decision whether or not to allow something and just not give “yes” or 

“no” answers?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And do you believe that Ms. Russell has blocked the treatment 

team from being able to treat Ms. Taylor?

A. Yes.

***

Q. Okay. One more question. With regard to health insurance, what type 

of health insurance does Ms. Taylor have?

A. TennCare.

Q. And do you remember a time, during this treatment period especially, 

where Ms. Russell has threatened to cancel Ms. Taylor’s health insurance 

through TennCare so that MTMHI would be left without a payer source?

A. Yes.

Q. And approximately how many times has she done that?

A. Three or four times.

Q. Okay. And what are the reasons that she gives for threatening to cancel?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Does she use it as a tactic in order to get her -- her -- whatever she is 

wanting across, that she uses it as a control method?

A. Yes, she uses it as a control.

Russell testified. When questioned about her concerns over Taylor’s white blood 

cell count, Russell stated as follows:

Q. So let’s move on to the medication issue. What’s the basis for your 

concern about her white blood count?
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A. Out of all the times Sophia has been on antipsychotics from Vanderbilt 

to MTMHI to Tennessee Christian, she’s always had a white count 

problem. She’s had two bone marrow -- those things are painful -- two 

bone marrow tests to rule out a bone marrow problem with the WBC. They 

always come back normal, and she’s been to two, maybe three 

hematologists that always come back and say it’s medication-induced.

Okay. Now, Dr. Rogers had set guidelines for it not to drop below 2.5. 

Okay. And I admit the last time it dropped was following a hospitalization 

where she had drank from – ate soap, drank lotions, and ended up in the 

back of an ambulance with anaphylactic shock. Okay. When she came out, 

her white count was 10.1. I allowed them at that time to put her on the 

tube. Two weeks later, her white count was 2.6. And, granted, 2.6 is not 

2.5, but I don’t err on the side of caution. And seeing that they only do her 

white blood count once a week, which was precipitated Dr. Snell – I said, 

well, they’re only going to – they’re going to check her white count again 

next week. But you only got one point between 2.6 and 2.5. So I said stop. 

She’s been on the Latuda, she’s been on Prolixin, all of which I approved, 

she’s been on Zyprexa since she -- all since she’s been there. So to say I 

won’t let him treat her or I won’t let them use antipsychotics is not true.

Even down to the end when she said, “Can we try again,” I said, “Only if I 

have adequate information to be able to determine whether or not her white 

count is high enough to have a cushion between 2.5 and give room to bring 

it down. Okay. Now, I’m not a doctor, but as conservator, it’s my job -- if 

I go to a doctor and he asks me if I want to take a medicine, I’m going to 

make my decision, okay, so that’s all I’m doing is exercising my

responsibility to make sure any decision I make to give medication is to the 

best of my ability, best of my knowledge and what’s best for her. We all 

need to do what’s best for the patient, not just me.

***

Q. Okay. And are you opposed -- even now as you sit here today, are you 

opposed to agreeing to antipsychotics?

A. I am not opposed to her taking antipsychotics, but I still maintain that 

the only way I will approve antipsychotics is if I have enough information

to make a decision -- which by the way, MTMHI handbook, patient rights 

handbook, stipulates that I have the right to request and receive information 

necessary to make a sound decision, okay, and that -- I maintained that. 

The only way I will approve it is that I get the information I need. 
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I asked for labs. Even Ms. Corbitt couldn’t find labs. When they -- I finally 

talked to the director of medical records, and when they were found, they 

were being kept in Teresa -- I don’t know what Teresa’s last name is –

Teresa’s office, under her protection. So when I paid for medical records 

thinking I’m getting labs and test results, I’m paying for them, but I’m not 

getting these things. I asked the social worker. She don’t know where they 

are. We can’t find them. I asked Dr. Elazar – that’s a whole different story. 

But at any rate, you know, I get no respect. I’m compared with other 

conservators that just rubber stamp things and just do what you want to do. 

And they’ve already told me -- you know, we called a conservator and 

asked them to do this, and they just said, “Do what you need to do.” That’s

not me, and if that’s what you are looking for, you know, that’s not me. 

That’s not protecting my daughter and doing what’s best for her.

In May 2016, the Probate Court entered its final order in which it removed Russell 

as Taylor’s conservator. We quote the Probate Court’s findings, in relevant part, as 

follows:

6. As conservator of the person of the Respondent, Ms. Russell has 

exercised strict control over the medications administered to the 

Respondent, and has consistently refused to consent to the medication 

regimen recommended by the doctors at MTMHI. 

7. Ms. Russell has refused to allow MTMHI to administer 

antipsychotic medications, individual therapy or counseling, or 

psychological testing to the Respondent, stating that she considers these 

forms of treatment and testing to be harmful to the Respondent or 

unnecessary. 

8. The Respondent is not receiving proper treatment for her mental 

illness and her prognosis for rehabilitation and future hospital discharge is 

very poor as long as Ms. Russell continues to serve as the Respondent’s 

conservator. 

9. Ms. Russell’s behavior toward MTMHI staff has been accusatory 

and threatening. Ms. Russell has regularly threatened to report clinical staff 

to professional boards without any reasonable basis to do so. In addition, 

Ms. Russell has threatened to cancel the Respondent’s Medicare and 

TennCare benefits on several occasions, based on her perception that 

MTMHI staff failed to meet her demands, claiming that she will arrange it 

so MTMHI will have to assume payment of treatment-related expenses for 

the Respondent.
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10. Ms. Russell has requested unnecessary lab work and other 

medical tests for the Respondent. In addition, she has consistently 

attempted to withhold medical information from MTMHI doctors regarding 

Ms. Taylor’s medical treatment by outside providers. Moreover, she has 

demanded that the Respondent not be treated by certain staff or 

practitioners at MTMHI, which has been disruptive to the Respondent’s 

care and treatment.

11. On multiple occasions, Ms. Russell has accused staff, including 

Respondent’s treating psychiatrist, of falsifying the Respondent’s medical 

records in an attempt to undermine her as conservator. Such accusations 

were without merit and only caused further disruption to the Respondent’s 

care and treatment.

12. MTMHI staff has spent hundreds of hours on the phone with Ms. 

Russell. Ms. Russell calls MTMHI by phone with inordinate frequency. 

From February 16, 2015 through February 15, 2016, Ms. Russell placed a 

total of 4,600 phone calls to MTMHI, with an average of more than 350 

calls to MTMHI per month. Records demonstrate that Ms. Russell’s calls 

often exceed 30 times per day, and at times have exceeded 50 times per 

day. In addition to the inbound calls from Ms. Russell to MTMHI, records 

indicate that there were 2,101 calls from MTMHI to Ms. Russell from 

February 16, 2015 through February 15, 2016.

13. Ms. Russell’s behavior in constantly calling and demanding to 

speak to clinical staff is harassing and disruptive to the hospital, and further 

demonstrates that she is unfit to continue serving as conservator of Ms. 

Taylor.

14. As a licensee of the Department, the Conflict Resolution Rules 

of the TDMHSAS, Chapter 0940-1-7 apply to MTMHI with regard to 

resolution of conflict(s) between a service recipient and a service provider. 

Under the Rule, a service recipient who has capacity or the legal 

representative, if the service recipient lacks capacity, may request conflict 

resolution procedures if he/she has been unable to resolve a conflict. A 

request for conflict resolution must be submitted to the licensee not more 

than thirty (30) calendar days after the occurrence of the matter which is the 

basis for the request. Conflict resolution must not exceed two (2) steps to 

finality: an informal meeting under 0940-1-7-.06(10) and an appeal under 

0940-1-7-.06(11). The decision of the chief officer or designee is final and 

may not be appealed.

15. Although Ms. Russell never requested formal Conflict 

Resolution, MTMHI worked extensively with Ms. Russell to resolve her 

complaints and concerns in accordance with established Conflict 

Resolution Rules and procedures. In addition, Ms. Russell took advantage 
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of many resources available to her to get complaints heard or demands met, 

and MTMHI has cooperated and responded appropriately and in a timely 

manner.

16. Ms. Russell has also filed formal complaints with the following 

entities: the MTMHI Grievance Committee; the Office of Licensure for 

TDMHSAS; the Office of Consumer Affairs for TDMHSAS; Adult 

Protective Services at the Tennessee Department of Human Services 

(TDHS); the Tennessee Governor’s Office; Disability Rights of Tennessee; 

Blue Care (TennCare); and The Joint Commission (Private Accreditation 

Organization). All of the complaints filed by Ms. Russell against MTMHI 

were found by these entities to be unsubstantiated, and most of the demands 

could not be met or were not required to be met by MTMHI in the 

treatment of Ms. Taylor.

17. Most attempts to resolve conflicts between Ms. Russell and 

MTMHI proved to be unsuccessful. Over the last year, it became apparent 

to MTMHI that Ms. Russell was not going to be satisfied with the 

hospital’s attempts to resolve conflicts, even though MTMHI continued to 

make reasonable efforts to resolve complaints received from Ms. Russell.

18. The efforts by the TDMHSAS and MTMHI staff to work with 

Ms. Russell went well beyond the framework of the Conflict Resolution 

Rules and certainly exceeded their intended purpose. In essence, MTMHI 

has been engaged in conflict resolution with Ms. Russell the entire time the 

Respondent has been hospitalized at MTMHI. All attempts by MTMHI to 

resolve such conflicts with Ms. Russell have proven to be futile in this case. 

19. In addition, the requirement for MTMHI to convene a Treatment 

Review Committee is inapplicable in this matter because the Respondent 

had a conservator appointed by this Court to make medical and psychiatric 

decisions. Specifically, Chapter 0940-1-2 of the TDMHSAS’ Rules 

(Procedures for Prescription and Administration of Psychotropic 

Medications at Mental Health Institutes) does not apply in the treatment of 

service recipients who have an active conservator appointed by the Court to 

make medical decisions.

20. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by the treatment team to 

obtain Ms. Russell’s consent for the administration of necessary 

antipsychotic medications, it would be futile to require MTMHI to convene 

a Treatment Review Committee for the same purpose prior to seeking the 

removal of Ms. Russell as conservator.

21. The Court finds that MTMHI complied with the conflict 

resolution rules and grievance procedures. In addition, the Court finds that 

a Treatment Review Committee was inapplicable as a matter of law and not 

required by statute, the Committee being expressly prevented from 
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overriding the wishes of Ms. Russell as conservator. See Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 33-6-107(c).

22. Based on the facts stated above, the Court finds that Ms. Russell 

has, and is, actively obstructing, harassing, and intimidating medical and 

psychiatric personnel at MTMHI and that she should be removed as 

conservator of Respondent Sophia Elaine Taylor, effective immediately.

23. In addition, the Court finds by clear and convincing proof that 

the best interests of the Respondent would be served by appointing 

ComCare, Inc. to serve as the successor conservator over Sophia Elaine 

Taylor for the purpose of making medical and psychiatric decisions, 

including the decision as to the proper medications for Respondent Sophia 

Elaine Taylor.

***

4. Upon the official discharge of the Respondent to the community 

from a Regional Mental Health Institute operated by the TDMHSAS, Ms. 

Russell may seek to be reappointed as the Respondent’s limited medical 

conservator by filing an appropriate petition with this Court.

Russell timely filed an appeal to this Court.

Discussion

We restate and consolidate the issues Russell raises on appeal into the following 

two dispositive issues: 1) whether Russell’s due process rights were violated; and, 2) 

whether the Probate Court abused its discretion in removing Russell as conservator for 

Taylor.

Our review is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of 

correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the 

evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 

(Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no 

presumption of correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 

S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

This Court previously has discussed the standard of review we are to apply when 

reviewing the decision by a trial court to appoint or remove a conservator, as follows:

A conservator occupies a fiduciary position of trust of the highest 

and most sacred character. Grahl v. Davis, 971 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tenn. 
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1998) (citing Meloy v. Nashville Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 340, 149 S.W.2d 73 

(1941)). Although the conservator plays a most important fiduciary role, it 

is significant to note that “the court itself is ultimately responsible for the 

disabled persons who come under its care and protection.” In re 

Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) 

(citing Hinds v. Buck, 177 Tenn. 444, 150 S.W.2d 1071, 1072 (1941); In re 

Ellis, 822 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). (footnote omitted).

The authority, rights and responsibilities of a conservator are not 

independent of the court. “Conservators act as the court’s agent and are 

under the court’s supervision.” Clayton, 914 S.W.2d at 90. The courts 

appointing conservators “retain continuing control over guardians and 

conservators because the persons who accept these appointments become 

‘quasi-officials’ of the court appointing them.” Clayton, 914 S.W.2d at 92 

(citing Logan v. Graper, 155 Tenn. 565, 4 S.W.2d 955, 956 (1927)).

Following a conservator’s appointment, the court may discharge a 

conservator or modify the duties and authority of the conservator if the 

court determines the conservator has failed to perform its duties and 

obligations, or if the court determines the conservator has failed to act in 

the ward’s best interest so as to warrant modification. Tenn. Code Ann. § 

34-3-108(a). Because a conservator is in a sense the agent through whom 

the probate court manages the affairs of a ward, the right to choose its 

representatives is important to the tribunal. Monteverde v. Christie, 23 

Tenn. App. 514, 134 S.W.2d 905, 910 (1939). An appellate court, far 

removed from the scene will be slow, indeed, to substitute its judgment for 

that of the probate court. Id. “The removal of a guardian is largely a matter 

in the discretion of the Probate Judge and the court’s action in this respect 

is not to be disturbed except upon a clear case of abuse of that discretion.” 

Id.

AmSouth Bank v. Cunningham, 253 S.W.3d 636, 642-43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (footnote 

omitted).

Our Supreme Court discussed the abuse of discretion standard in Eldridge v. 

Eldridge, stating:

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s ruling “will be upheld 

so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to [the] propriety of the 

decision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “applie[s] 

an incorrect legal standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or 
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reasoning that cause[s] an injustice to the party complaining.” The abuse of 

discretion standard does not permit the appellate court to substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court.

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).

We first address whether Russell’s due process rights were violated. In her brief 

on appeal, Russell states: “[T]he objection to disallow as evidence Susan Swaner’s 

affidavit asserting the accuracy and authenticity of a call log and the call log itself due to 

the inability to cross-examine the witness was denied by the court.” Russell stated 

further: “[T]he Court did only allowed [sic] cross-examination to address Conflict 

Resolution for Affidavits from John Arrendondo and Joyce Kovacs although both 

addressed issues beyond Conflict Resolution.” Russell cites to the Sixth Amendment of 

the United States Constitution and specifically to the Confrontation Clause. 

We note initially that Russell is not a criminal defendant in this matter and thus 

her reliance upon the Sixth Amendment is inapt. As to Russell’s argument generally that 

she was denied her right to present her case, we disagree. The record on appeal reflects 

that Russell, through her counsel, vigorously pursued her case at trial. Russell testified 

voluminously. The Probate Court heard ample testimony about efforts toward conflict 

resolution, medical regimens, Russell’s conduct, and more. In the end, the Probate Court 

credited the Department’s witnesses’ testimony and did not credit Russell’s testimony, as 

was its prerogative. It is not at all clear what additional evidence Russell believes likely 

would have altered the outcome of the trial and was excluded wrongly. Finding no 

violations of Russell’s right to due process, we find this issue to be without merit.

The next and final issue we address is whether the Probate Court abused its 

discretion in removing Russell as conservator for Taylor. Russell argues that she is best 

suited to serve as conservator for her daughter. In support of her argument that she 

should have priority, Russell cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-103 (2015) which provides:

Subject to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the 

person with a disability, the court shall consider the following persons in 

the order listed for appointment of the conservator:

(1) The person or persons designated in a writing signed by the alleged 

person with a disability;

(2) The spouse of the person with a disability;

(3) Any child of the person with a disability;
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(4) Closest relative or relatives of the person with a disability;

(5) A district public guardian as described by § 34-7-104; and

(6) Other person or persons.

The problem with Russell’s argument is that the list of statutory preferences is 

subject to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the person with a 

disability. The Probate Court heard the evidence and concluded that, despite their close 

family ties, Russell continuing as Taylor’s conservator is contrary to Taylor’s best 

interests.

1

 The Probate Court found further that, conversely, ComCare’s appointment as 

Taylor’s conservator was in Taylor’s best interest. 

We have reviewed the record carefully. The evidence does not preponderate 

against the factual findings made by the Probate Court. Russell has spent many years 

coping with her daughter’s illness and has acquired a great deal of knowledge about her 

condition. However, Russell is not a doctor. The evidence is that Taylor’s condition is 

not improving at least in part due to Russell’s objections to recommended treatment. 

Perhaps the most cogent and concise summation of the Probate Court’s reasoning is 

found in this withering statement from the final judgment: “[T]he Court finds that Ms. 

Russell has, and is, actively obstructing, harassing, and intimidating medical and 

psychiatric personnel at MTMHI and that she should be removed as conservator of 

Respondent Sophia Elaine Taylor.” Based on this record, we find nothing factually 

inaccurate, illogical, or unjust about this statement made by the Probate Court. We, 

therefore, conclude that the Probate Court did not abuse its discretion in removing 

Russell as Taylor’s conservator. We affirm the judgment of the Probate Court in its 

entirety. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the Probate Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the 

Probate Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against 

the Appellant, Cheryl R. Russell, and her surety, if any. 

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

 

1

Taylor did not testify at trial. Taylor’s Guardian Ad Litem testified that in one meeting with Taylor, she 

expressed a desire to keep Russell as her conservator. However, at a subsequent meeting one month later, 

Taylor stated indirectly that she wanted Russell removed.