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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHAZANTINE GRIFFIN

(AC 45019)

Prescott, Elgo and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of assault of an elderly person in the second degree, the defendant

appealed to this court. The defendant regularly sold illegal drugs to the

victim, who was sixty-four years old. After the victim failed to pay off

an outstanding debt, the defendant went to her residence and struck

her multiple times on the head with a handgun. The victim reported the

incident to the police, and, a few weeks later, in an attempt to apprehend

the defendant, the police arranged for a confidential informant to conduct a controlled purchase of illegal drugs from him. When the defendant

arrived at the agreed upon location, the informant identified him to

the police officers who were observing the transaction from unmarked

vehicles. The officers arrested the defendant, handcuffed him, and

placed him into a police car. At the time of his arrest, the defendant

had a key fob to a vehicle in his pocket, and the police used it to find

the vehicle the defendant had arrived in, which was parked in a visitor’s

spot of the parking lot of a nearby apartment building. One of the

vehicle’s windows was down, and the smell of marijuana emanated from

it. The police officers determined that the vehicle was registered to the

defendant’s foster mother and then conducted a warrantless search of

it, seizing illegal drugs, a scale, and a handgun. After finding clothing

consistent with that worn by a suspect in an unrelated shooting that

had occurred earlier that month, the police officers stopped their search,

towed the vehicle to the police department, and subsequently obtained

a warrant to seize the clothing and the handgun. The defendant filed a

motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle, claiming

that the police had lacked probable cause to search it. The trial court

denied the motion, and the state introduced into evidence the handgun

and a photograph of it. On the defendant’s appeal to this court, held

that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial

court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress was not improper,

as the court properly relied on the automobile exception to the fourth

amendment’s warrant requirement to determine that the police were

not obligated to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle: the

defendant’s claim that the state was required to prove that he was in

or near the vehicle at the time he was detained by the police in order

for the automobile exception to apply was unavailing, as the defendant

did not cite to any cases in his brief that were decided under the fourth

amendment that imposed such a proximity requirement and, even though

most Connecticut cases that arose under the exception typically involved

factual scenarios in which the warrantless search of a vehicle was

conducted immediately after observing the defendant in or near the

vehicle, the policy justifications that underlie the exception, namely,

the reduced expectation of privacy in the contents of a vehicle and

the inherent mobility of a vehicle, applied regardless of whether the

defendant was near the vehicle at the time of the search or otherwise

lacked access to it because he was in the custody of law enforcement,

and, in the present case, any expectation of privacy the defendant may

have had in the contents of the vehicle was further reduced by the fact

that the vehicle was left in a public place with the window of the vehicle

open; moreover, the defendant’s reliance on State v. Miller (227 Conn.

363) was misplaced because he raised a claim pursuant only to the

federal constitution, whereas Miller specifically addressed a claim under

our state constitution and, by its own terms, was limited to situations

in which a vehicle was searched at a police station and, therefore, did

not govern situations in which a vehicle remained in public and was

potentially mobile; furthermore, the totality of the facts supported the

conclusion that probable cause existed to search the defendant’s vehicle,

as the police had ample evidence to infer that the vehicle was the one

that the defendant had driven to the scene to complete a narcotics

transaction, including that the defendant had agreed to meet the confi-
dential informant to engage in a narcotics transaction, the defendant

was in possession of cocaine and marijuana at the time of his arrest,

other individuals to whom the defendant had previously sold drugs told

the police that he typically would park his vehicle near the agreed upon

location and then walk the remainder of the way, the key fob found on

the defendant operated the vehicle’s lights, the vehicle was located less

than 500 yards from where the defendant was arrested, and the vehicle

was registered to his foster mother, and, although the police did not

observe the defendant in or near the vehicle, that did not undermine

the factual nexus between the defendant and the vehicle; additionally,

the police had a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a fair

probability of finding contraband or evidence of a crime in the defendant’s vehicle, as it was found by the police within minutes of the

defendant’s arrest, the police knew that the defendant had arrived in

the vehicle with the intent to sell illegal drugs, the defendant had illegal

drugs on his person when he was taken into custody, and the police

could smell marijuana emanating from the vehicle.

Argued September 12, 2022—officially released January 24, 2023

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of robbery in the first degree and assault of

an elderly person in the second degree, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,

geographical area number seven, where the court,

Alander, J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress

certain evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to the

jury before Alander, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty

of assault of an elderly person in the second degree,

from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, chief

state’s attorney, and Andrew Reed Durham, former

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Chazantine Griffin,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after

a jury trial, of assault of an elderly person in the second

degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b (a)

(1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress a firearm and

narcotics that were seized by the police following a

warrantless search of a motor vehicle that was connected to the defendant and located near the scene of

the defendant’s arrest.1 We conclude that, under the

circumstances of this case, the court properly relied on

the automobile exception in determining that the police

were not obligated to obtain a warrant before searching

the vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. The defendant regularly sold crack cocaine to

the victim, who was sixty-four years old and resided in

Meriden. In August, 2018, the victim owed the defendant

$80, which she intended to pay after receiving her next

pension check. On August 2, 2018, the defendant went

to the victim’s residence and threatened to shoot her

if she did not have the money by the following day.

The defendant returned the next day to collect his

money. A friend of the victim was present, and the

victim began taking pictures of the defendant with her

friend’s cell phone. This enraged the defendant. The

defendant took out a small black and silver handgun,

struck the victim in the head with it several times, and

said to her, ‘‘bitch, I should end you.’’ The assault caused

her to suffer physical pain and lumps on her head. After

the defendant left the residence, the victim’s friend

called 911 and reported the assault to the police.

The following day, the victim gave a statement to the

police regarding the incident and identified the defendant in a photographic array as the individual who had

struck her with a handgun. The friend of the victim also

gave a statement to the police, corroborated the victim’s

account of the incident, and described the firearm used

to strike the victim.

Approximately three weeks after the assault, police

officers arrested the defendant in Meriden on an outstanding warrant. At the time of his arrest, the defendant

tossed a yellow baggy containing crack cocaine onto

the ground. In a search incident to his arrest, the police

seized from one of his pockets marijuana and a car key

with a key fob that opened a motor vehicle parked

nearby. From the vehicle, the police ultimately seized

a small black and silver handgun and other contraband.

Comparisons of DNA taken from swabs of the handgun

and the defendant’s DNA yielded a statistical probability

of one in one hundred billion that the defendant was

not a contributor to the DNA found on the firearm.
The firearm and a photograph of it were admitted into

evidence at the defendant’s subsequent trial.

The jury returned a split verdict of not guilty of robbery in the first degree and guilty of assault of an elderly

person in the second degree. The court subsequently

sentenced the defendant to fifty-four months of incarceration. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that he is entitled

to a new trial on the assault charge because the trial

court improperly denied his motion to suppress the

evidence seized from the vehicle. Specifically, he contends that the search of the vehicle by the police without

a warrant violated the fourth amendment’s prohibition

on unreasonable searches and seizures2 because the

automobile exception did not excuse the police officer’s

failure to obtain a search warrant authorizing a search

of the vehicle.3 We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to the defendant’s claim. In late August,

2018, the police attempted to find the defendant to serve

on him two arrest warrants. On August 29, 2018, the

police, with the cooperation of a reliable, confidential

informant, arranged a controlled purchase of illegal

drugs from the defendant. The police had the confidential informant set up the purchase to take place on

Crown Street in Meriden because the defendant lived

nearby. The police officers awaited in several unmarked

vehicles nearby to observe.

As the defendant approached the area, the confidential informant identified the defendant for the officers,

who then converged on him near the intersection of

Roy and Crown Streets. During the process of taking

him into custody, the defendant threw a cellophane

wrapped package into the tall grass just off the street.

The substance contained in the package field tested

positive for cocaine.

The police searched the defendant incident to his

arrest, and, in his pocket, the police found a bag of

marijuana and a car key to a Mercury automobile. The

defendant was handcuffed and put into a police car.

Prior to the defendant’s arrest, the police had

obtained information from individuals who previously

had purchased drugs from the defendant that it was his

practice when selling drugs to park on a side street or

around the corner from the location where the sale was

to take place and then to walk to that location. On

the basis of this information, and after considering the

direction from which the defendant had walked to the

scene, two officers began to search for the defendant’s

vehicle. Within five minutes, the officers located the

defendant’s automobile, a 2004 Mercury Sable LS. They

were successful in doing so by pressing the key fob

taken from the defendant, which illuminated the vehicle’s lights. The hood and front grill of the vehicle were
warm to the touch, suggesting that it recently had

been driven.

The vehicle was parked in a visitor’s parking spot at

an apartment building located at 27 Harrison Place, less

than one-quarter mile away from where the defendant

was taken into custody. One of its windows was down

and the officers could smell the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. The officers quickly determined

that the vehicle was registered to the defendant’s foster

mother.

The police officers then conducted a warrantless

search of the Mercury and seized from the vehicle crack

cocaine, marijuana, and a digital scale. The officers

also found a handgun in the center console and, in

the backseat area, clothing that was consistent with

clothing worn by a suspect who had been involved in

a shooting incident at a Sam’s Food Store in Meriden

earlier that August. The officers then stopped the search

and towed the vehicle to the police department. The

police subsequently obtained a warrant to seize the

clothing and the gun found in the Mercury.

Following the evidentiary portion of the hearing on

the defendant’s motion to suppress, the state argued to

the court that the officers had probable cause to search

the vehicle and that their warrantless search of the

vehicle was permitted by the well established automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The state

argued that, having found that the defendant possessed

marijuana and cocaine at the time he was taken into

custody, they had probable cause to suspect that additional contraband would be found in his vehicle because

(1) the officers possessed information that the defendant typically engaged in the sale of narcotics and that

he would park in an area near to where the sale was

to occur and then walk to that location, (2) the officers

knew, through the confidential informant, that the

defendant had come to the location to sell drugs that

day, (3) the Mercury was found in close proximity to

where the defendant was arrested, (4) the car key found

on the defendant connected him directly to the vehicle,

and (5) the smell of marijuana was emanating from a

window of the vehicle.

In response, defense counsel claimed that the motion

to suppress should be granted because the police lacked

probable cause, under the totality of the circumstances,

to search the vehicle. Specifically, defense counsel contended that the degree of attenuation between the Mercury and the defendant was too great because (1) no

one saw him operating the vehicle or in close proximity

to it, (2) the vehicle was not in eyesight when he was

arrested, (3) the Mercury was not registered to him,

and (4) the officers had to search for the vehicle in

order to locate it.

At the conclusion of the parties’ legal arguments, the
court, Alander, J., denied the defendant’s motion to

suppress in an oral ruling. The trial court found, in

addition to much of the evidence discussed by the state

in its argument, that, on the basis of the evidence that

had been presented, including the search warrant, the

vehicle was registered to someone directly connected

to the defendant and the vehicle was warm to the touch,

thereby suggesting that the defendant had just driven

the vehicle to the location where it was found. As a

result, the state was permitted to introduce into evidence during the defendant’s subsequent trial the handgun seized from the defendant’s vehicle and a photograph taken by the police of the handgun. The victim

and her friend who was present during the assault testified at trial that the handgun depicted in the photograph

was the weapon used to strike the victim in the head

or was at least consistent in appearance thereto.

We now address the standard of appellate review

applicable to the defendant’s claim on appeal and the

substantive law governing the warrantless search of an

automobile. ‘‘The standard of review for a motion to

suppress is well settled. A finding of fact will not be

disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the

evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [If]

a question of fact is essential to the outcome of a particular legal determination that implicates a defendant’s

constitutional rights, [however] and the credibility of

witnesses is not the primary issue, our customary deference to the trial court’s factual findings is tempered by

a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain

that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by

substantial evidence. . . . [If] the legal conclusions of

the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we

must determine whether they are legally and logically

correct and whether they find support in the facts set

out in the memorandum of decision . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pompei, 338 Conn.

749, 756, 259 A.3d 644 (2021). In the present case, the

defendant on appeal does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the court in adjudicating his

motion to suppress. Accordingly, our review of the trial

court’s legal conclusion that the search of the defendant’s vehicle was permitted by the automobile exception is plenary.

‘‘We next consider the scope of the warrant requirement as applied to motor vehicle searches. The police

ordinarily may not conduct a search and make a seizure

unless a neutral and detached magistrate first issues a

warrant based on probable cause. . . . [A] warrantless

search and seizure is per se unreasonable, subject to a

few well defined exceptions. . . . These exceptions

have been jealously and carefully drawn . . . . Specifically, a warrantless search of an automobile may be

deemed reasonable if it was: (1) made incident to a

lawful arrest; (2) conducted when there was probable

cause to believe that the car contained contraband or
evidence pertaining to a crime; (3) based upon consent;

or (4) conducted pursuant to an inventory of the car’s

contents incident to impounding the car.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Winfrey, 302 Conn. 195, 201, 24 A.3d 1218 (2011). The

burden is on the state to establish the applicability of

the automobile exception. State v. Badgett, 200 Conn.

412, 424, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107

S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986).

Under our federal constitution, ‘‘[t]he justification

for . . . [the] automobile exception is twofold: (1) the

inherent mobility of an automobile creates exigent circumstances; and (2) the expectation of privacy with

respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than

that relating to one’s home or office. . . . In recent

years, the United States Supreme Court has placed an

increasing emphasis on the reduced expectation of privacy justification . . . [such] that [e]ven in cases

where an automobile [is] not immediately mobile, the

lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as

a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the

vehicular exception. Thus, under the fourth amendment, a warrantless vehicle search does not require a

showing of exigent circumstances.’’4

(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Brito, 170 Conn. App. 269, 293,

154 A.3d 535, cert. denied, 324 Conn. 925, 155 A.3d

755 (2017).

‘‘Probable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to

be seized are connected with criminal activity or will

assist in a particular apprehension or conviction . . .

and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items

sought to be seized will be found in the place to be

searched. . . . The determination of whether probable

cause exists under the fourth amendment to the federal

constitution . . . is made pursuant to a totality of circumstances test. . . . Under [this] test, a court must

examine all of the evidence relating to the issue of

probable cause and, on the basis of that evidence, make

a commonsense, practical determination of whether

probable cause existed. . . . We have said that the

question is whether there was a fair probability that

the contraband was within the place to be searched.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Smith, 257 Conn. 216, 223, 777 A.2d 182 (2001).

We now turn to the merits of the defendant’s claim.

The defendant first argues that the ‘‘automobile exception cannot apply where the defendant was neither seen

inside the vehicle nor anywhere near the vehicle.’’ We

construe the defendant’s assertion to mean that, even

if law enforcement has probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband or evidence of a crime, the automobile exception categorically does not apply unless the

state also proves that the defendant was inside or near

the vehicle at the time he was arrested or that the police
stopped the vehicle with the defendant in it. We disagree

that the fourth amendment imposes such a requirement.

In the two pages that the defendant devotes to this

argument in his principal brief, he has not cited to a

single case decided under the fourth amendment that

specifically has imposed such a proximity requirement.

Although Connecticut cases arising under the automobile exception to the fourth amendment’s warrant

requirement typically have involved factual scenarios in

which the warrantless search of a vehicle is conducted

immediately after observing the defendant near or in

the vehicle; see, e.g., State v. Longo, 243 Conn. 732, 735,

708 A.2d 1354 (1998) (defendant was in rear seat of

vehicle when it was stopped by police); State v. Dukes,

209 Conn. 98, 100–101, 547 A.2d 10 (1988) (defendant

was stopped by police while he was driving vehicle);

State v. Badgett, supra, 200 Conn. 414 (defendant was

driving vehicle when stopped by police); State v. Patterson, 31 Conn. App. 278, 309, 624 A.2d 1146 (1993)

(police observed defendant as he exited vehicle to

approach them), rev’d on other grounds, 230 Conn. 385,

645 A.2d 535 (1994);5

the policy justifications that underlie the automobile exception to the fourth amendment’s

warrant requirement apply just as vigorously even if

the defendant is not found in or observed near the

vehicle at the time of the search. Indeed, the defendant

has a reduced expectation of privacy in the contents

of the vehicle regardless of whether he is viewed by

law enforcement in or near his vehicle at the time of

the search because it is the inherent nature of an automobile and its presence in a public place that creates

a reduced expectation of privacy in it. See California

v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–93, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L.

Ed. 2d 406 (1985).6 Moreover, any expectation of privacy

the defendant may have in the contents of the vehicle

may be further reduced if he has left the vehicle in a

public location where he lacks the ability to monitor

the vehicle and others’ access to it. This is especially

true if a person leaves a window of the vehicle open,

as did the defendant here.

Additionally, fourth amendment case law makes clear

that the inherent mobility of the vehicle exists regardless of whether the defendant is near the vehicle; see

United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 492–94 (2d Cir.)

(concluding that vehicles parked on side of highway

were inherently mobile despite defendant’s voluntary

presence at police barracks located some distance from

highway), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1005, 128 S. Ct. 525,

169 L. Ed. 2d 365 (2007); State v. Smith, supra, 257

Conn. 227, 230 (despite defendant’s flight from his vehicle, there was ‘‘continuing possibility that the defendant’s car, which was located in a parking lot accessible

to a public housing building, would be moved’’); or

otherwise lacks access to the vehicle because he or she

is in the custody of, or detained by, law enforcement.

See State v. Winfrey, supra, 302 Conn. 206; State v.
Smith, supra, 229–30.

The defendant principally relies on our Supreme

Court’s decision in State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 384–

85, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993), to assert that the automobile

exception does not apply unless the defendant, at the

time the vehicle was searched, had just been seen by

law enforcement in or near the vehicle. In Miller, the

court specifically addressed a claim that our state constitution prohibited the warrantless search of a vehicle

after it had been impounded and towed to the police

station. Id., 377. Although the federal constitution does

not prohibit the warrantless search of a vehicle that

has been impounded at a police station, provided the

police have probable cause to search the car; see id.;

see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52, 90

S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970); our Supreme Court

concluded that article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution prohibits such a warrantless search.7 State v.

Miller, supra, 386–87.

The defendant’s reliance on Miller is misplaced for

two reasons. First, as we previously discussed, the

defendant in the present case has raised a claim pursuant to only our federal constitution. See footnotes 3

and 4 of this opinion. Second, ‘‘Miller, by its own terms,

was limited to situations in which a vehicle is searched

at the police station . . . [and] does not govern cases

[in which] an automobile remains in public and is therefore potentially mobile, even [if] the driver has been

taken into police custody and the police have effective

control of the vehicle.’’ State v. Winfrey, supra, 302

Conn. 206. Accordingly, Miller does not support the

defendant’s fourth amendment challenge to the warrantless search in the present case.

We recognize, as the defendant argues, that our

Supreme Court sometimes has referred to the automobile exception as applying to ‘‘ ‘warrantless on-thescene automobile searches’ . . . .’’ See, e.g., State v.

Williams, 311 Conn. 626, 641, 88 A.3d 534 (2014); State

v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. 384. The defendant attempts

to rely on this language, in isolation, to argue that the

automobile exception applies only to cases in which a

defendant’s vehicle is searched immediately after his

arrest or detention after he had been driving the vehicle

or standing near it. This assertion is devoid of merit.

Read in context, our Supreme Court has occasionally

used such shorthand terminology simply to distinguish

a warrantless search of a vehicle conducted while the

vehicle is impounded at the police station from a warrantless search of a vehicle conducted while that vehicle

is still located in a public place. None of the cases cited

by the defendant that employs such language purports

to define what is meant by the term ‘‘on-the-scene’’ or,

with the exception of Miller, involved a claim in which

the vehicle is searched when the defendant is not immediately next to or taken out of the vehicle.
By rejecting the defendant’s claim, we do not mean

to suggest that a defendant’s physical proximity to, and

factual connection with, the vehicle to be searched is

irrelevant to the question of whether the automobile

exception applies in a particular case. Such facts often

will bear directly on the question of whether probable

cause exists to search the vehicle under the totality of

the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards,

632 F.3d 633, 644–45 (10th Cir. 2001) (analyzing defendant’s lack of proximity to vehicle as part of totality of

circumstances bearing on existence of probable cause).

Indeed, if a vehicle is located hundreds of miles from

the location of the defendant’s arrest or the site of the

criminal activity, it may be more factually difficult to

prove that there is probable cause to believe that the

vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. On

the other hand, in such circumstances, there may be

other facts in existence that support a finding of probable cause despite a lack of physical proximity to the

vehicle. In sum, the location of the vehicle, including

its proximity to the defendant, is just one fact to be

considered, under the totality of the circumstances, in

determining whether there is probable cause to search

the vehicle under the automobile exception to the

fourth amendment’s warrant requirement.

Having disposed of the defendant’s assertion that the

automobile exception categorically does not apply

unless the state also proves that the defendant was seen

inside or near the vehicle at the time he is arrested or

that the police stopped the vehicle, we next address the

defendant’s assertion that the police lacked probable

cause under the totality of the circumstances to search

his vehicle. Although the defendant does not challenge

any of the underlying facts found by the trial court in

support of its conclusion that the police had probable

cause to search his vehicle in this case, he argues that

those facts, alone or in combination, do not demonstrate probable cause to search his vehicle. We are not

persuaded.

We agree with the court that the totality of the following facts supported a reasonable belief by law enforcement that there was a fair probability that evidence

of a crime or contraband was within the defendant’s

vehicle. First, the defendant had agreed to meet the

confidential informant on Crown Street to engage in a

narcotics transaction. That fact was confirmed when

the police officers took the defendant into custody at

the location and found him to be in possession of marijuana and cocaine. The police officers also knew from

other individuals to whom the defendant had sold drugs

in the past that he typically would drive his vehicle to

a place near the location at which the sale was to occur,

park his vehicle, and then walk to the agreed upon

location.

Moreover, the police officers had substantial evi-
dence tying the defendant to the particular vehicle they

searched because the key fob found on the defendant

operated the vehicle’s lights, the vehicle was located

less than 500 yards from where the defendant was

arrested, and it was registered to someone directly connected to the defendant, his foster mother.8 Accordingly, the police officers had ample evidence to infer

that this was the vehicle that the defendant had driven to

the scene so that he could complete a nearby narcotics

transaction. The fact that no police officer observed

the defendant in or near the vehicle at that precise

moment does not undermine in any way the strong

factual nexus between the defendant and this vehicle.

The police officers had a reasonable basis to conclude

that there was a fair probability of finding contraband

or evidence of a crime in the defendant’s vehicle. The

defendant’s vehicle was found by the police within five

minutes of his arrest. They knew that the defendant

had arrived in his vehicle to sell drugs, and he had

cocaine and marijuana on his person when he was taken

into custody. From these facts, it was reasonable to

infer that his vehicle may contain additional contraband

or other evidence regarding the sale of illegal drugs.

Moreover, the police could smell the odor of marijuana

emanating from the vehicle.9 See State v. Brito, supra,

170 Conn. App. 313–15. All of these facts, considered in

their totality, amply support a conclusion that probable

cause existed to search the defendant’s vehicle.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant also claims that the state cannot demonstrate that the

admission of evidence unlawfully obtained from the search of the motor

vehicle was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because we conclude

that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we need not

address this claim.

2 The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘‘The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.’’ U.S. Const., amend. IV.

3 Although the defendant, in his written motion to suppress, referred to

our state constitution, he did not brief or otherwise argue to the court that

the warrantless search of his automobile violated the state constitution. On

appeal, the defendant also does not appear to claim that the warrantless

search of his vehicle violated article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.

Although in his principal brief on appeal he relies on one case addressing

the scope of the automobile exception under our state constitution, we

construe his brief, as does the state, as raising only a federal constitutional

claim. The defendant in his reply brief does not challenge the state’s assertion

that he properly briefed only a federal claim. Moreover, to the extent that

the defendant has attempted to advance such a state constitutional claim

on appeal, he has not adequately briefed it pursuant to the strictures of

State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992). Accordingly,

even if raised, we deem it abandoned.

4 We recognize that, under article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,

the policies that justify the automobile exception are narrower than those

that underlie the fourth amendment’s automobile exception. See State v.

Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 384–85, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) (state constitution

‘‘tolerate[s] the warrantless on-the-scene automobile search only because

obtaining a warrant would be impracticable in light of the inherent mobility

of automobiles and the latent exigency that mobility creates’’ (emphasis in
original)). Because the defendant has not asserted a claim under our state

constitution, however, we may properly rely on the defendant’s reduced

privacy interests in the contents of his vehicle under federal law. See footnote

3 of this opinion.

5 This is not always the case, at least not with respect to other jurisdictions.

In United States v. Williams, 878 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206–207 (D.D.C. 2012),

aff’d, 773 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 1019, 135 S. Ct.

2336, 191 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2015), the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia upheld the warrantless search of a defendant’s vehicle

that the police located by using a key fob seized from the defendant during

his arrest at the police station on unrelated drug charges. There was no

evidence in Williams that the police had ever seen the defendant driving,

occupying, or standing near this vehicle prior to conducting the warrantless

search. See id., 196, 206–207; see also United States v. Wider, 951 F.2d 1283,

1285–86 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (warrantless vehicle search was upheld even though

police did not observe defendant in vehicle or standing next to it).

6 Specifically, the United States Supreme Court in Carney stated: ‘‘[T]he

expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less

than that relating to one’s home or office. . . .

‘‘Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the

lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile

vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception. . . . In some cases,

the configuration of the vehicle contributed to the lower expectations of

privacy . . . because the passenger compartment of a standard automobile

is relatively open to plain view . . . . But even when enclosed repository

areas have been involved, we have concluded that the lesser expectations

of privacy warrant application of the exception. . . .

‘‘These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the

area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of

vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways. . . . As we [have]

explained . . . [a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and

continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and

examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired,

or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or

if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order. . . .

‘‘The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles

because of this compelling governmental need for regulation. Historically,

individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be

stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle

contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior

evaluation of those facts. . . . In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation,

which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to

the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable

cause is met.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) California v. Carney, supra, 471 U.S. 391–92.

7 Article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘The people

shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to

seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly

as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.’’

8 The fact that the vehicle’s hood was warm to the touch also supports

a finding of probable cause because it reasonably suggests that it had just

been driven to the location in which it was found. Although the defendant

attempts to minimize this fact by asserting that the hood could have been

warm because it was August, the court was free to infer from the officer’s

testimony that the warmth was caused by the vehicle’s operation rather

than the August sun. Even if this fact did not support a determination of

probable cause and we were to disregard it, the totality of the remaining

factual circumstances amply supports the court’s ultimate determination of

probable cause.

9

In his reply brief, the defendant asserts that General Statutes § 54-33p

undermines the probable cause determination to the extent that it is premised on the odor of marijuana coming from his vehicle. This statute, first

enacted in 2021; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2021, No. 21-1, § 18;

provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . [T]he existence of any of the following

circumstances shall not constitute in part or in whole probable cause or

reasonable suspicion and shall not be used as a basis to support any stop

or search of a person or motor vehicle: (1) [t]he odor of cannabis or burnt
cannabis . . . .

‘‘(b) Any evidence discovered as a result of any stop or search conducted

in violation of this section shall not be admissible in evidence in any trial,

hearing or other proceeding in a court of this state. . . .’’ General Statutes

§ 54-33p.

The defendant’s reliance on this statutory provision is misplaced for at

least two reasons. First, it is well established that we do not entertain

arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See State v. Myers, 178

Conn. App. 102, 103, 174 A.3d 197 (2017). Second, this provision became

effective on July 1, 2021, almost three years after the defendant’s arrest

and search of his motor vehicle. The defendant has not adequately briefed

whether this statute must be applied retroactively to the present case.

Finally, even if the police officer had not been able to smell the odor of

marijuana emanating from the vehicle, the other facts we have recited are

sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle.