The Honor able Rober t Holmes Be ll, Chi ef Judge of the United States District Court for the * Western District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation. 1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0078n.06 F iled: Janu ary 24, 2008 No. 07-5295 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. TERESAJON ES, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE U NI TED STA TES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE M ID DL E D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

Before: BOGG S, Chief

Judge; GIBBONS, Circuit Judge; and B ELL , District Judge. * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge. Tere sa Jones ap p ea l s h er conviction and sentenc e for

conspiringto commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666; ac ceptingbribes of $5,000 or more in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1)( B) ; and makinga fa lse s t at em ent to a g overnme nt ag ent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) . J ones asse rts t h at t h e d i s trict court e rre d by : (1) sentenc ing he r pursua

nt to U. S
. S
. G. § 2C 1.1 beca use the money

paid to her w as not a bribe ; (2)
c on vic tin g and

se nte nc inghe r a s a

“ pu bli c off ici al” ; ( 3) a g g re g a tin g the br ibe s Jone s r e c e ive d inUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

Although Jones’s brief

includes five “ issues,” the four th issue appea

rs to us to restate 1 arguments she makes in e arlier sections of he r brief

. 2 deter mining Jones’s sentence ; and (4) imposing a disproportionate sentenc e. For the fol l owing 1

rea sons, we AF FI RM J ones’s c onviction and sentenc e. I. This case arises f

rom a bribe ry

scheme conducte d by

cer tain worke rs at the Te nnessee Depa rtment of S afe ty (“TD OS”) and the W inchester Driving School (“Winchester ”). F rom J anuar y 2004 to Aug ust 2004, J ones was employ ed by Adec co, a staffing place ment company that provides worke rs to the State of Tenne ssee. Fr om Aug ust 2004 to Ma rch 2005, J ones was an of fi cial employ ee of

TDOS. Duringboth time periods, J ones worke d as a lice nsing cler k at the Rutherfor d County Driver ’s L icense Center for t he S tate of Tennessee (“D L C”). He r re sponsibili ties included administering written and c omputerized driver’ s l i ce nse tests, taking pictures of applicants, a

nd
re c or din g a

pp lic ants ’ e y e te st r e su lts
. At J ones’s trial, Shelia Robertson (a Wincheste r employ ee) testified that while wor king at the DL C, J ones ac cepte d pay ments of $20 from B ry an Gue ss, the owner of Winchester, f or ea ch license a pplicant broug ht to J ones’s c ounter by Winchester employ ees. I n ex change for the $20 pay ments, J ones saw to it that Winchester students would obtain thei r l i ce n s es
–for e x ample by overlookingweak paper

work or e y e tests, providing easie r vers i o n s of written tests, and he lping applicants pa ss the tests. Robertson testified that these pa y ments beg an in April or Ma y of 2004. Robert s o n al s o t estified that beg inning in January 2005, she maintained r ecor ds on behalf of Winchester, and that Jones was paid $20 per student for 368 students fr om J anuar y throug h Marc h 2005 – over $7,000 f

or that per iod alone. This testimony was c orrobor ated by

Guess.United States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

3 J ones and her codef

endants Guess, Robertson, Shun Ga o, and Br uce Conklin ( a TDOS employ ee) wer e orig inally indicted for va

rious bribery

and conspira cy

offe nses. Guess, Rober

tson, Gao, a nd Conklin all pl ed guilty
. Jone s w a s e ve ntu a lly

ind ic te d f

or : ( 1) c on sp ir ingto c omm it b ri be ry c on c e rn ingpr og ra

ms
re c e ivi ngfe de ra l f

un ds in vio latio n of 18 U. S.C. § 6 66 ; ( 2) a c c e pti ngbr ibe s o f m or e tha n $ 5, 00 0 in vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 66 6( a )( 1) (B ); and (3 ) kn ow ing ly and

wi llf ull y makin g a fa lse state me nt t o
an F B Ia g e nt in vio latio n of 18 U. S.C. § 1 00 1( a )( 2) . Ajur y fo un d Jon e s guil ty

on a ll thr e e c ounts
. J ones’s Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”) r ecommende d a base level of 14 base d on J ones’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 and the corre sponding Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)( 1), for
a “ pu bli c of fi c ia l.” Th e PSR a lso a dd e d tw o le ve ls pu rs ua nt to § 2C1 .1 (b )( 1) be c a

us e th e off

e ns e involved more than one bribe; adde d 14 levels pursua nt to § 2B1.1 beca

use J ones wa s awa

re that the
c on sp ir a c y

inv olv e d b ri bes i n e xce ss o f $ 40 0, 00 0; a dd e d tw o le ve ls p ur su ant t o § 2C1 .1 (b )( 4) (C ) beca use Jones was a publi c officia l who fac ilitated the obtaining of a g overnme nt identification document; and a dded two leve ls pursuant to § 3C1.1(A) bec ause Jones o b s t ru cted justice. Jones
e ff e c tiv e ly ob je c te d to e a c h of the se PSR d e te rm inatio ns , w iththe e xce pti on of the e nh anc e me nts for multiple bribes and f

or obstruction of justice. At the sentenc ing he aring , the district court found that J ones wa s a “public officia l” pursuant to § 2C1.1. According ly , it be g an with a ba se off ense le vel of 14. The district court found that ther e
wa s n o t s u fficie nt evidence to conclude that J ones wa s awa re that the conspirac y

involved bribes
e x c e e d i n g $ 4 0 0 , 0 0 0
. H o w e v e r , b a s e d o nF B I A g e n tB r i anF a z e nb a k e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y, i tf o u n d b y a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that Jone s h a d p e rs on a lly a c c e pte d b ri be s to ta lin g a pp ro xima te lyUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

4 $2 0, 00 0. Th e re fo re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a dd e d f our l e ve ls pu rsu ant t o § 2B 1. 1. Ad din g tw o le ve ls be c a us e the of fe ns e inv olv e d mo re tha

n o ne br ibe , tw o le ve ls be c a us e the of fe ns e inv olv e d a

pu bli c officia l fac ilitating the o b t ai n i n g of identification documents, and two leve ls for obstruction of justice, the district co u rt re ached an a djusted offe nse leve l of 24. Given Jones’s criminal history
c a te g or y I , th is r e su lte d in

a Gu ide lin e s r ang e of

51 - 6 3 mo nth s. The dis tr ic t c o u rt a ls o a d dr e s s e d Jo n e s ’ s ar g u me n t r e g ar d in g th e p r o p o rti o n a li ty o f her sentenc e compa

red to he r code fenda

nts’ sentenc es. The c ourt explained that Gues s h ad re ceive d
a 14-leve l e nhance ment pursuant to § 2B1.1 (for acc epting over $400,000 in bribe s), which c aused him to have a hig her Guidelines ran ge (133-168 months) than Jones. Howeve r, due to Gue ss’s
s u b s t an t i al as s i s t an ce , h e wa s s en t en ce d t o o n l y 7 2 m o n t h s . Ga o , l i k e J o n es , h ad a G u i d el i n es ra n ge of 51-63 months , but rec eived only 18 months because of his assistance . Conklin had a rang e of 37- 46 months, but because of his assistance r ece ived 18 months. Robertson’s Guidelines rang e wa s 24- 30 months, but she was sentenc ed to three y ear s probation. Althoug h t h e d i s t ri ct court did not exp l i ci t l y p ro v i d e t h e r ea s o nfo r R o b er t s o n ’s re d u ce d s en t en ce at J o n es ’s s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, it noted that “all of the se par

ticular de fenda

nts got substantial assistance motions for various re asons.” The district cour

t sentence d J ones to 60 months imprisonment. I t explained that a Guidelines
ra ng e se nte nc e wa s a

pp ro pr iate be c a

us e Jone s’ s o ff

e ns e s “ thr e a te ne d th e pu

bli c sa fe ty

wi th p e op le
on the ro a d w ho we re un qu a lif ie d an d not pr op e rl y lic e ns e d. ” I t als o note d that “ pr ob a tio n . . . wo uld not be suffic ient, and it wouldn’t ref lect the se riousness of t h e o ffe nse or de ter other s from doing such a thing .” F inally , the district co u rt explained that a sentenc e at the bottom of the GuidelinesUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

5 rang e wa s “not appropr iate bec ause of these re peate d acts of public corruption and be cause of the
overa ll conduct in the ca se.” I I
. Th is co ur t re vie ws a dis tr ic t court ' s inte rp re tatio n of the Gu ide lin e s de novo , and the district court' s findings of

fac t for cle ar e rror . United States v. Kozinski , 480 F.3d 769, 774 ( 6th Cir. 2007). The c ourt defe rs to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the fa cts. Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Charles , 138 F.3d 257, 266 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). I I I
. J ones first ar g ues that the district cour t erre d by deter

mining her base offense level pursua nt to U .S. S.G . § 2C1 .1 , w hic h p e rt a ins to a c c e pti ng “bri bes ,” rathe r t ha n § 2C1 .2 , w hic h p e rt a ins to
acc epting “g ratuities.” We disag ree . U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 applies “to a per son who offers or g ives a bribe for a c or ru pt p ur po se , such as i nducing a publi c official .
. . to influence such individual’s of ficial actions, or to a public officia l who solicits or acc epts such a bribe.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 c mt. ba ckg round (2006) (empha ses adde d). Whil e a bribery offe nse sentenced pursuant to § 2C1.1 requires this ty pe of quid pro quo , a

g ratui ty offe nse sentenc ed pursua

nt to § 2C1.2 does not. Un ite d S tates v . Ca ne

strar o , 2 82 F .3 d 4 27 , 4 31 (6 th Cir . 200 2) . T his quid pro quo intent, rather than the timing of

the pay ment, distinguishes bribes f rom g ratuities. United States v. J ennings , 1 60 F .3 d 1 00 6, 10 14 (4 th C ir . 1 99 8) ; Un ite d S tates v . G rif

fin , 154 F.3d 762, 764 ( 8th Cir. 1998). J ones wa s indicted fo r and found guilty of cor ruptly acc epting bribes “intendingto be infl u en ce d [ b y ]” and “in re turn for pr oviding be nefits to Guess, Robertson, a nd students of theUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

Se c tio n 666 on ly re qu ir e s that the State or a g e nc y wh os e a g e nt a c c e pts br ibe s r e c e ive s “ in 2 any one y ear period, benef its in excess of $10,000, under a Fe dera l pr og ram.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). He re the pa

rt ie s st ipu late d to thi s f

a c t. Section 666 does not include the te rm “public off icial.” Thus, Jones may

rea lly be ar g uing 3 that sh e is n ot “ an a g e nt o f .
. . a State
. . . o r a

ny a g e nc y the re of ,” purs ua nt t o § 666(a) (1). An “ag ent” is fur

ther de fi n ed as “a person author ized to act on behalf of . . . a g overnme nt and . . . includes a se rvant or e mploy ee, a nd a part n er , direc tor, offic er, ma nag er, a nd repr esentative.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). The Third Circuit has noted that the § 666(d)( 1) list is not exhaustive, however , and that an “a gen t ” i n cl udes an inde pendent c ontrac tor who ac ts as a re prese ntative of the state
. United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 323 ( 3d Cir. 2007). 6 Winchester Dr iving School.” T hus, the jury clea rly found that a quid pro quo arr ang ement existed. Al tho ug h Jon e s a sse rt s th a t she wa s pai d “f or a c tio ns a lr e a dy

take n, ” a s Jennings and Gr iff in make
c le ar, he r i nte nt t o be inf

lue nc e d – re g ard le ss of the tim ing of pa y me nts – ma de the pa

y me nts br ibe s. Acc ording ly , the district court prope rly interpre ted and a

pplied § 2C1.1. I V. J ones next arg ues that the district cour t erre d in de termining that she was a “public off icial.” Although Jones’s ar g ument is less than clea r, we might g lean f

rom it three se parate contentions: (1) that 18 U.S.C. § 666, as applied in this case , is constitutionally overbr oad to the extent that no link 2 betwee n th e s tate c o r

r u p ti o nan d th e u s e o f

f e d e r a l f u n d s w a s d e mo n s tr a te d ; ( 2 ) th a t Jo n es’s conviction was imprope r bec ause she was not a “public officia l” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 666 ; and 3 (3) that the d i s trict court e rre d in sentencingJ ones as a “public off

icial” pur suant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1. Al tho ug h th e fi rs t tw o is su e s p e rt a in t o Jon e s’ s convic tio n, sh e did no t r a ise e ith e r o f t

he se issues befor e the district cour t. “In g ener al, issues not pr esente d to the district court but raise d for the first time on appe al are not properly befor e the c ourt.” W

einberge r v. United States , 268 F.3dUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

7 34 6, 35 2 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 1) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n a nd c itatio n omitte d)
. Th e re fo re , J on e s c an o nly pr e va il
on the se argume nts by

sh ow ingtha

t th e re ha s bee n “ a

manif e st m isc arr ia g e of

jus tic e ,” wh ic h o nly exis ts “ if the rec ord is de void of evidenc e pointing to g uilt.” United States v. He rnandez , 227 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2000) (interna l citations and quotations omitted). Given the substantial evide nce reg ardingher c orrupt ac tions while serving a public role as a TDOS empl oy ee a nd independe nt contra ct o r , Jo n e s c anma k e n o s u c hs h o w in g . T h e r e f o r e , w e d e c li n e to a d dr e s s th e tw o issue s perta ining to Jones’s conviction. As to J ones’s thi rd contention, the di strict court commit ted no err or i n sentenc ing J ones as
a “p ub l ic offic ial.” I t concluded that J ones qualified a s a “public of ficial” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a), which establishes a base offense level of 14, a nd § 2C1.1(b)(4) (C), which pr ovides a twolevel enha

nceme nt for a “ public officia l who fac ilitated . . . the obtaining of a g overnme nt identification docume nt.” The co mm e n ta

r y to § 2 C1
. 1 p r o v id e s th a t t h e te r m “ p u b li c o f f ic ia l” s h o u ld

b e “ c o n strued broadly” and inc ludes, inte r a lia , a person (1) “actingfor or on behalf of a state g overnme nt, or any de pa rtme nt, a g e nc y , or br anc h of g ov e rnme nt the re of ,” or (2 ) oc c up ying “ a

po sit ion of pu bli c tr us t with offic i al re s p o n s ibilit y for c arr ying out a g overnme nt prog ram or policy .” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, application note 1. As an o fficia l TDOS employ ee a nd as an inde pendent c ontrac tor workingfor TDOS, J ones ac ted “on be half of a state ag ency ,” and ha d the “of ficial re sponsibili ty ” to issue Tenne ssee dr iver’s lice nses pursuant to a “ g overnme nt prog ram. ” J o n es clea rly falls within the definition of “public of

ficial” provided by

the Guidelines a

nd provides no author ity

to sugg est thatUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

8 the Gu ide lin e s d o n ot m e an w hat th e y say . T hu s, we c on c lud e tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y interpre ted and a

pplied § 2C1.1. V. J ones next arg ues that the district cour t erre d in determining her Guid el ines rang e by ag g reg ating the bribes she rec eived “ over a two-y ear period.” Evidently

J ones conte nds that the district c ourt should not have ag g reg ated bribes that J ones rec eived during the 2004 and 2005 cale ndar year s. J ones appe ars to c onfuse the deter mination of whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666 has occ urre d with the determination of a de fenda nt’s corr esponding Guidelines ra ng e pursua

nt to § 2C1.1. Rega

rdless, the district cour

t committed no error

in either re g ard. A § 666 violation require s a def endant to have rec eived $5,000 in bribe s in a ny “one- y ear period.” See 18 U. S.C. § 6 66 (a ) a nd (b ); United States v. Valentine , 63 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 1995) (interpr eting statute as allowingb ri bes to be a g g reg ated dur ing “ one-y ear period” ). A “ one-year period” is defined a s “a c ontinuous period that commence s no ear lier than twe lve months before the commission of the offe nse or that e nds no later than twe lve months aft er the commission of the offe nse.” 18 U .S.C. § 666(d)(5). Thus, the “one- y ear time period” ne ed not coincide with a ca lendar y ear . See V

alentine , 63 F.3d at 463. I n this case, a ll of the bribes at issue occur red during “a one

y ear period” – betwee n April or May 2004 and March 2005. Eve n if there wer e a c alende r y ear
r e qu i r e m e n t , t h e e v i d e n c e s h o w e d t h a tJo n e s a c c e p t e d

o v e r $ 7 , 0 0 0 i nt o t a l b r i b e s d

u r i n g t h e fi rs t three months of 2005. I n deter minin g t h e Gu i d el i nes rang e for a § 666 offe nse involving more than one bribe, a sentenc ing c o u rt i s in s tr

u c te d to a g g r e g a te th e amo u n ts o f s e p ar a te b r ib e s , an d

th e r e is n o s imilarUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

J ones also complains that other s (Randy Wil son, Kelly Robertson, Alex Robertson, Gene 4 Jenn ing s, Wal ly

Ste rn , a nd Jame s Ma so n) we re no t pr os e c ute d f or fr a ud ule ntl y iss uin g thi rd

pa rt y cer tificates – the “ most eg reg ious conduct in this case,” acc ording to J ones. B u t J o n es does not expla i n h o w t he g overnme nt’s failure to prosecute others make s her se ntence unrea sonable or disproportionate. See United States v. Re ed , 264 F.3d 640, 649 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] dis trict court may not depar

t downwar d to adjust a defe ndant' s sentence to ac h i ev e proportionality with an unindicted co- conspirator who coope rate d with the g overnme nt.”)

9 one-year limit ation. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 (b)(2) & application note 2. After ag g reg ating the bribes, the court is instructed to incr ease the base offe nse l ev el ac co rd i ng to the table in § 2B 1.1(b)( 1). Id. H e r e , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt f

o u n d , b a s e d o n th e te s ti mo n y o f A g e n t F a ze nb a k e r , th a t Jo n es re ceive d approximately $20,000 in total bribes. This f inding was not c lear ly err oneous. The § 2B 1.1(b)( 1) table pr o v i d es fo r a f

our-leve l enhanc ement if the total amount of bribes is g reater than $10,000. Thus, in applying this enha nceme nt, the district court prope rly applied § 2C1.1. VI
. Finally , J ones ar g ues t hat her sentenc e is disproportionate to the se ntence s assig ned to other members of the conspiracy
. J ones not es t hat her sentenc e (60 months) is l ong er tha n that of three (Conklin, Robertson, and Gao) out of four of the other members of the c onspiracy , but argues that 4 she is “less culpa

ble.” Jones does not dispute, however , that her Guidelines rang e wa s in creased be c a us e sh e ob str

uc te d ju sti c e , o r t

hat he r c od e fe nd ants we re g ive n le sse r se nte nc e s b a se d o n th e ir substantial assistance. I n essenc e, J ones seems to argue that her sentenc e is unrea sonable. B ut we find nothing unr easona

ble about her

within-Guidelines sentenc e. Fo l l o wi n g Booke r v. United States , we r eview se ntence s for re asonable ness. 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005). This reviewhas both proce dural a nd substantive components. Gall v. United StatesUnited States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

10 522 U.S. ___, No. 06-7949, 2007 WL 4292116 at *7 (De c. 10, 2007). Jones contests only the ac tual leng th, or substance of her

sentenc e. See U

nited States v. Jone

s, 489 F.3d 243, 252 ( 6th Cir. 2007). This court has e x plained that “a sentenc e may

[be] substantively u n re as o n ab l e whe re the district
c ourt se le c t[s] th e se nte nc e arb itr ari ly , [2] b a s[e s] th e se nte nc e on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, [3] f a il[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) fac tors or [4] g iv[ es] an unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.” Id. (citation and inter nal quotation omitted). Be cause the di strict court im posed a within-Guidelines s entenc e, a rebuttable pr esumption of reasonable ness attaches to it. See U nited States v. W

illiams , 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct . 2456, 2467 (2007) (appr oving of this pre sumption). J ones has not rebutted this pre sumption. She does not argue, for example, that the district court selec ted he r s e nte nc e arb itr ari ly , o n th e ba sis of imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, or by g ivi ng unre a so na ble we ig ht t o permissible fac tors. See J ones, 489 F.3d at 252. I n fac t, Jones does not dispute the cour t’s approa ch to her sentenc e at a ll. I nstead, she c riticizes the Guidelines for r ewa rding other de fen d ants that provided substantial assistance
. Whil e a “district court may consider disparity in the sentenc ing of codef endants . . . a

depar ture intende d to achieve uniformity
. . . is not appropr iate when a basis for the di sparity

exis ts.” United States v. W alls, 293 F.3d 959, 969 (6th Cir. 2002). Her e, the district court e x plained the ba sis: that other defe ndants provided substantial assistanc e. More over, “ a sentenc ing c ourt may

not depar t downwar d to rec oncile one defe ndant' s sentenc e with another if the latter off ere d substantial assistance to the g overnme nt while the forme r obstructe d justice.” United States v. Ree d , 264 F.3d 640, 649 (6th Cir. 2001). Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the district c ourt’s sentenc e wa s not unreasona ble.United States v. J ones , No. 07-5295

11 V II. For the fore g oing rea sons, we affirm Teresa J ones’s c onviction and the sente nce imposed by the district court.