This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. 36,200 4
LANCIE REALIVASQUEZ, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY 7 Briana H. Zamora, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 The Law Office of Ramsey & Hoon, LLC 12 Twila A. Hoon 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 GARCIA, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant appeals from the district c ourt’s judgment in an on-record appeal, 1 affirming the metropolitan court’s sentencing order that convicted Defendant for his 2 first offense DWI pursuant to a conditi onal plea. Unpersuaded that Defendant 3 demonstrated error, we issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing 4 to affirm. Defendant file d a memorandum in opposition to our notice. We remain 5 unpersuaded and therefore affirm. 6
{2} On appeal, Defendant challenges the lawful ness of his arrest, as he did in both 7 the metropolitan and district courts, conte nding that the officer lacked probable cause 8 to support the seizure and de facto arrest. [RP 84-85; DS 10; MIO 3-4] This appeal has 9 been pursued under the demands of State v. Franklin , 1967-NMSC-151, ¶ 9, 78 N.M. 10 127, 428 P.2d 982; and State v. Boyer , 1985-NMCA-029, ¶ 24, 103 N.M. 655, 712 11 P.2d 1. [DS 10; MIO 4] To the extent Defendant maintains that the seizure should be 12 reviewed as a “felony stop,” Defendant doe s not explain how it would change the 13 analysis or result. Our notice proposed to hold that the officer had probable cause to 14 arrest Defendant based on hi s refusal to obey the officer’s lawful and reasonable 15 commands. [CN 3] Thus, there is no need to engage in a dispute over the precise 16 nature of the seizure. 17
{3} In response to our notice, Defendant contends that the officer’s testimony 18 amounted to a hunch and did not support the officer’s concern for his safety, which 193 lead to the more intrusive seizure. [MIO 6- 7] We are not persuaded. The record shows 1 that Defendant engaged in dangerous and erratic conduct: Defendant drove too fast 2 through a parking lot, peeled out during a U-turn taken too fast, ran two stop signs, 3 accelerated when the officer turned on his siren and lights, and then came to an abrupt 4 stop. [RP 109-10] After stopping, Defendant did not follow the officer’s repeated 5 instructions to drop the car keys on the ground and keep both hands outside the 6 driver’s window; and the officer could notsee inside the car, due to the tinted 7 windows at nighttime. [RP 110-11] After the twelfth command, the officer drew his 8 gun at the car. [Id.] A few minutes later, De fendant exited the car and walked to the 9 back of it, as instructed. [RP 111] The officer (with back-up officers) handcuffed 10 Defendant and placed him in th e back of the one of the patrol cars. [Id.] We are 11 persuaded that the officer’s actions amounted to reasonable, precautionary measures 12 in response to reasonable fears that simply permitted the officer to conduct a safer 13 investigatory detention. [RP 113-15] See, e.g. , State v. Lovato , 1991-NMCA-083, 14 ¶ 26, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (“Even in routine traffic stops, police may adopt 15 precautionary measures addressed to reasonable fears[,]”) We will not require 16 probable cause to justify those precautionary measures when “the level of intrusion” 17 is reasonable and appropriate for the level of danger pos ed, in conducting an 18 investigatory detention. see id. ¶ 27. 194 {4} As we further explained in our notice, we believe the officer not only acted 1 reasonably with respect to the heightened le vel of self-protection used, but that the 2 officer also had probable cause to arrest Defendant for refusing to obey the officer’s 3 lawful and reasonable commands. [RP 115-17] See State v. Maez , 2009-NMCA-108, 4 ¶ 24, 147 N.M. 91, 217 P.3d 104 (holding that o fficer had probable cause to arrest the 5 defendant based on his refusal obey or comply with the orders of a police officer in 6 violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1( B) (1981)). Defendant distinguishes Maez 7 on the basis that the officer in the currentcase did not conclude, and the facts do not 8 establish, that Defendant had committed the crime of failure to obey, and nor was he 9 charged with that offense. [MIO 9-10] We are not persuaded. In Maez , the defendant 10 spontaneously and without provocation ran aw ay from his vehicle during an attempted 11 traffic stop; the officer chased the defendant and repeatedly shouted, “Police, stop,” 12 and the defendant kept running. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 24. We held thatthe officer had probable 13 cause to arrest the defendantfor evading or resisting. Id. ¶ 25. Although the facts of 14 Maezmay support a violation of a different form of resisting an officer; namely, 15 fleeing, the facts are sufficiently an alogous. Further, as we observed in Maez , 16 “[p]robable cause does not require that an officer’s belief be correct or more likely 17 true than false.” Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Also, our 18 probable cause analysis is not affected by what an officer subjectively believed or 195 whether a defendant was charged with anoffense that justified the arrest. See, e.g. , 1 State v. Ochoa , 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 9, 135 N.M. 781, 93 P.3d 1286 (“[P]robable cause 2 must be evaluated in relation to the circum stances as they would have appeared to a 3 prudent, cautious and trained police officer .” (internal quotation marks and citation 4 omitted)). We remain persuaded that the officer had probable cause based on 5 Defendant’s refusal to comply with the officer’s lawful commands. 6
{5} Lastly, we address Defendant’s statements regarding his right to appellate 7 review. [MIO 3] Defendant’s comments seem to imply that he has not or will not be 8 afforded the appropriate scrutiny of our three-panel appellate review where we base 9 the disposition of appeals on reasons given in the district court’s memorandum 10 opinions. We remind Defendant that a singl e judge authors all calendar notices, and 11 then the appellants have an opportunity to respond. Thereafter a three-judge panel 12 reviews the appeals and participates in considering and drafting the opinions. This 13 Court dutifully reviews all appeals and issues before it and reaches its own 14 conclusions, regardless of the procedural mechanisms by which appeals come to this 15 Court. As we routinely explain in the cases that come befo re us from on-record 16 appeals, we avoid the duplication of effort s where there is no reason to expend judicial 17 resources to restate a thorough opinion of a court sitting as we do in an appellate 18 capacity that reaches a result with which we agree for the same reasons we would 196 state. This Court will deviate from district court opinions where we see fit. We 1 encourage counsel for future docketing statements to focus on pointing out errors in 2 both metropolitan court decisions and in the consistently thorough district court 3 memorandum opinions that come before us from on-record appeals, in order to take 4 full advantage of our responsive calendaring process. 5
{6} For the reasons stated in our notice and in this opinion, we affirm Defendant’s 6 conviction 7
{7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

__________________ ______________ 9 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

_______________________________ 12 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 13

_______________________________ 14 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 15