alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

November 7, 2012

s1031

Order 

November 7, 2012

144721

SCOTT and JEANNE WOODBURY, 

Plaintiffs, 

and

CENTER WOODS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 144721

COA: 297819

Saginaw CC: 09-006758-CH

RES-CARE PREMIER, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee, 

and

RUTH AVERILL,

Defendant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2012 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED. The parties shall 

include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the common law doctrines of de 

facto corporation, see, e.g., Bergy Bros, Inc v Zeeland Feeder Pig, Inc, 415 Mich 286 

(1982), and corporation by estoppel, see, e.g., Stott v Stott Realty Co, 288 Mich 35, 48 

(1939), survived enactment of the Nonprofit Corporation Act, MCL 450.2101 et seq.; (2) 

if so, whether plaintiff corporation, Center Woods, Inc., which was administratively

dissolved in 1993 under § 922 of the Nonprofit Corporation Act, but reinstated in 2009 

under § 925, continued to exist as a de facto corporation during the period of dissolution 

such that defendant Ruth Averill, a member and shareholder of the corporation, was 

required to provide notice to the corporation pursuant to its Articles of Agreement of the 

pending sale of her property; and (3) whether defendant Averill is estopped to deny the 

existence of the corporation, see Estey Mfg Co v Runnels, 55 Mich 130 (1884); Flueling v 

Goeringer, 240 Mich 372 (1927).
#### Ikechi Kallys ALBERT, Appellant, v. Sandy LARSON, Program Director (Shadyview) in her individual capacity and as an employee of Thomas Allen, Inc.; Fay Linscheid, Director, Human Resources, in her individual capacity and as an employee of Thomas Allen, Inc.; Sandy Quinn, Administrator, her individual capacity and as an employee of Thomas Allen, Inc.; Thomas Allen Incorporated, Appellees, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, Defendant.

No. 06-1148.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: July 6, 2007.

Filed: July 19, 2007.

Ikechi Kallys Albert, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.

Mary K. Martin, Martin Law Office, South St. Paul, MN, for Defendant.

Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Ikechi Albert, a Nigerian-born immigrant, appeals the district court’s1 dismissal of his employment-discrimination suit. Albert claimed numerous federal and state-law violations surrounding his dismissal from Thomas Allen, Inc. Having carefully reviewed the record and all of Albert’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that the district court committed no reversible error in dismissing Albert’s federal claims, *see Levy v. Ohl, 477*F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.2007) (de novo standard of review), and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his state-law claims without prejudice, *see Labickas v. Ark. State*
      *636
      *Univ.,*78 F.3d 333, 334-35 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (following dismissal of federal claims, district court has discretion to dismiss state-law claims, but dismissal should be without prejudice); and also did not abuse its discretion in denying his pending motions.

Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir. R. 47B.

. The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-2263

ELSWORTH M. MARSH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; JESSE BROWN,

Secretary,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 95-2482

ELSWORTH M. MARSH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,

Chief District Judge; Irene M. Keely, District Judge. (CA-95-2-3,

MISC-95-5)

Submitted: February 7, 1996 Decided: February 14, 1996
2
3

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

No. 95-2263 affirmed and No. 95-2482 dismissed by unpublished per

curiam opinion.

Elsworth M. Marsh, Appellant Pro Se. Helen Campbell Altmeyer,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
4

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's orders dismissing

his civil actions which claimed that he was improperly denied

veteran's benefits. We have reviewed the records and the district

court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, in No.

95-2263, we deny Appellant's motion to amend his petition and we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Marsh v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, No. CA-95-2-3 (N.D.W. Va. May 25, 1995). In

No. 95-2482, we deny in forma pauperis status and dismiss the

appeal of the reasoning of the district court. Marsh v. United

States, No. MISC-95-5 (N.D.W. Va. June 29, 1995). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

No. 95-2263 - AFFIRMED

No. 95-2482 - DISMISSED
# U ni te d S ta te s Co ur t of A pp ea ls For the Eig hth Circu it

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ _ No. 1 6- 17 41

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__ __ __ __ __ __ App eal fro m

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__ __ __ __ __ __ Subm it te d: Feb ru ary 2, 2 01 7 Fi le d: Feb ru ary 7, 2 01 7 [Unpubl is he d]

__ __ __ __ __ __ Befo re GRUENDER, BENTON, andSHEPHERD, Circ ui t J ud ge s.

__ __ __ __ __ __ PER CURI AM.Dr. Giri sh Sah u ap pe al s th e di st ric t co ur t’s or de r di sm is si ng hi s cl ai m s un de r 1 42 U.S.C. § 19 81 , Tit le VI, an d st at e la w. He al so ha s m ov ed fo r sa nc t io ns in th is co ur t. Hav in g ju ris di ct io n u nd er 2 8 U.S.C. § 12 91 , th is co ur t af firm s. A d e no vo rev ie w of th e reco rd rev eal s di sm is sa l was pr op er. Se e Ada m s v . Ameri ca n Fami ly Mut

. In s. Co

. , 81 3 F.3 d 11 51 , 11 54 (8 th Ci r. 20 16 ) (d e no vo rev ie w of gr an t of m ot io n to di sm is s)
. As to Sah u’s moti on fo r sa nc ti on s, th ere is no in di cat io n t ha t d efen da nt s ac te d i n b adfai th
. The jud gm en t i s af

firm edan d S ah u’s m ot io n i s d en ie d. Se e 8t h C ir. R . 47 B.

__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __

The Hon or ab le Pat ric k J. Sch il tz , Uni te d St at es Dis tri ct Ju dg e fo r th e Dis tri ct 1 of Mi nn es ot a, ad op ti ng th e rep or t an d reco m m en da ti on s of

th e Hon or ab le Fran kl in L. Noel , Uni te d S ta te s M ag is tra te Ju dg e fo r th e Dis tri ctof M in ne so ta
. -2

-
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRA AGRAZ, an individual, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

GOLDEN EMPIRE MORTGAGE, INC.; et 

al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-55037 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07088-PA-AS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 18, 2017**

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Sandra Agraz appeals from the district court’s order dismissing her federal 

claims alleging violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

(“RESPA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of the statute of 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 21 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-55037 

limitations and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Agraz’s RESPA claim and TILA 

damages claim because these claims are barred by the applicable statutes of 

limitation and Agraz failed to allege facts demonstrating that equitable tolling 

should apply. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (RESPA claims are subject to one- and threeyear statutes of limitation); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (TILA damages claims are subject 

to a one-year statute of limitations); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 

656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (federal standard for equitable tolling).

The district court properly dismissed Agraz’s TILA rescission claim because 

Agraz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she exercised the right to rescind 

within three years of the consummation of her loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) 

(borrower’s right to rescind “shall expire three years after the date of 

consummation of the transaction or upon the earlier sale of the property”); see also 

Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) 

(“[R]escission is effected when the borrower notifies the creditor of his intention to 

rescind.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agraz’s federal 

claims without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See 

Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a 
3 17-55037 

district court may dismiss without leave to amend where amendment would be 

futile).

AFFIRMED.
#### Kulvir SINGH, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-74481.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 2007 *.

Filed April 20, 2007.

Mohinder Singh, Esq., Walnut Creek, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Linda S. Wendtland, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*766Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kulvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination based on internal consistencies in Singh’s testimony and inconsistencies between his testimony and his identification documents, which go to the heart of his asylum claim. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003); *Pal v. INS,*204 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, Singh is not eligible for asylum.

Because Singh failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Farah*at 1156.

Because Singh did not raise the issue of CAT in his opening brief, he has waived this claim and we decline to review it. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1996).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 171 (Wednesday, September 8, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 50324]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19430]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[B-61-2021]


Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) 261--Alexandria, Louisiana, Notification 
of Proposed Production Activity, Avant Organics LLC (Specialty 
Chemicals), Alexandria, Louisiana

    Avant Organics LLC (Avant) submitted a notification of proposed 
production activity to the FTZ Board (the Board) for its facility in 
Alexandria, Louisiana, under FTZ 261. The notification conforming to 
the requirements of the regulations of the Board (15 CFR 400.22) was 
received on September 1, 2021.
    Pursuant to 15 CFR 400.14(b), FTZ production activity would be 
limited to the specific foreign-status material(s)/component(s) and 
specific finished product(s) described in the submitted notification 
(summarized below) and subsequently authorized by the Board. The 
benefits that may stem from conducting production activity under FTZ 
procedures are explained in the background section of the Board's 
website--accessible via www.trade.gov/ftz.
    The proposed finished products include: 4-methoxy-2,5-
dimethylfuran-3-one; 5-Methyl-2-phenyl-2-hexenal; Phenyl Acetaldehyde 
50% in Phenyl Ethyl Alcohol; and, Esiferane--2,5-dimethyl-4-ethoxy-
e(2H)-Furanone (duty rate ranges from free to 5.5%).
    The proposed foreign-status materials and components include: 4-
Hydroxy-2,5-dimethyl-3(2H)-Furanone; Methylcyclopentenolone; Phenethyl 
Alcohol; and, 2-Trans,4-Trans-decadienal (duty rate ranges from 4.8% to 
6.5%). The request indicates that certain materials/components are 
subject to duties under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 
301), depending on the country of origin. The applicable Section 301 
decisions require subject merchandise to be admitted to FTZs in 
privileged foreign status (19 CFR 146.41).
    Public comment is invited from interested parties. Submissions 
shall be addressed to the Board's Executive Secretary and sent to: 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#a1c7d5dbe1d5d3c0c5c48fc6ced7"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="7610020c36020417121358111900">[email protected]</span></a>. The closing period for their receipt is October 18, 
2021.
    A copy of the notification will be available for public inspection 
in the ``Online FTZ Information System'' section of the Board's 
website.
    For further information, contact Diane Finver at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#fbbf929a959ed5bd92958d9e89bb8f899a9f9ed59c948d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="72361b131c175c341b1c0417003206001316175c151d04">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: September 2, 2021.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-19430 Filed 9-7-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P


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# C_2010072EN.01000101.xml

| 20.3.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 72/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.3.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 72/1

---

COMMISSION OPINION

of 19 March 2010

relating to the plan to modify the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the Magnox Fuel Handling Plant, established at the Sellafield site in the United Kingdom, in accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty

(Only the English text is authentic)

2010/C 72/01

On 17 September 2009, the European Commission received from the British Government, in accordance with Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, General Data relating to the plan to modify the disposal of radioactive waste arising from the Magnox Fuel Handling Plant, established at the Sellafield site in the United Kingdom.

On the basis of these data and additional information requested by the Commission on 17 September 2009 and provided by the British authorities on 14 December 2009, and following consultation with the Group of Experts, the Commission has drawn up the following opinion:

| 1. | The distance between the Magnox Fuel Handling Plant and the nearest point of another Member State, in this case Ireland, amounts to 180 km. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The distance between the Magnox Fuel Handling Plant and the nearest point of another Member State, in this case Ireland, amounts to 180 km.

| 2. | The planned modification will involve an increase in the authorised discharge limit for airborne Antimony-125 only. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The planned modification will involve an increase in the authorised discharge limit for airborne Antimony-125 only.

| 3. | During normal operating conditions, the planned modification will not cause an exposure liable to affect the health of the population in another Member State. |
| --- | --- |

3.

During normal operating conditions, the planned modification will not cause an exposure liable to affect the health of the population in another Member State.

| 4. | In the event of unplanned releases of radioactive effluents which may follow an accident of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, the doses received in another Member State will not be liable to affect the health of the population. |
| --- | --- |

4.

In the event of unplanned releases of radioactive effluents which may follow an accident of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, the doses received in another Member State will not be liable to affect the health of the population.

In conclusion, the Commission is of the opinion that the implementation of the plan to modify the disposal of radioactive waste from the Magnox Fuel Handling Plant established on the Sellafield site in the United Kingdom, both in normal operation and in the event of an accident of the type and magnitude considered in the General Data, is not liable to result in radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State.

Done at Brussels, 19 March 2010.

For the Commission

Günther OETTINGER

Member of the Commission

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kelly Gordon, Appellant.

— Appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J., on the motion; Paul Bookson, J., at trial and sentence), rendered on July 19, 1985, convicting defendant, following a jury trial, of attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of from 2 to 6 years to run concurrently with three terms of from *IV2*to 4 Vi years, is held in abeyance and the matter remanded for a hearing pursuant to CPL 30.30.

In an indictment filed on December 28, 1984, defendant was charged with attempted murder, two counts of assault in the first degree, and one count each of criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees. After the People declared their readiness for trial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that more than six months had *258elapsed since the commencement of the criminal action against him, citing CPL 30.30. The motion, as well as a request for a hearing, was denied by the court, which held CPL 30.30 inapplicable to a proceeding in which the defendant is charged with attempted murder. We disagree. Section 30.30 expressly excludes from its operation those cases in which a defendant is accused of a homicide offense as defined in Penal Law §§ 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, and 125.27, all of which require that the conduct in question has resulted in the victim’s death. However, section 30.30 does not specify an attempt to commit a homicide as one of its exceptions. Attempted crimes are dealt with separately in Penal Law article 110, and, indeed, an attempt to commit a particular offense does not constitute the same crime as the actual commission of that offense and almost always subjects the perpetrator to a lesser penalty. *(People v Walker,*120 Misc 2d 235.) Since section 30.30 does not exclude the crime of attempted murder from its purview, the court should have granted defendant’s motion to the extent of directing a hearing on the issue of whether the People had satisfied their obligation to be ready for trial within the provisions of CPL 30.30. We have examined defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Ross, Lynch, Milonas and Rosenberger, JJ.
# L_2009283EN.01005601.xml

| 30.10.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 283/56 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.10.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 283/56

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 29 October 2009

appointing the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union for the period from 1 November 2009 until 31 December 2009

(2009/792/EC, Euratom)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 207(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and in particular Article 121(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | The term of office of Mr Pierre DE BOISSIEU, Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, will end on 31 October 2009 (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The term of office of Mr Pierre DE BOISSIEU, Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, will end on 31 October 2009 (1).

| (2) | That term of office should be renewed until 31 December 2009, or until the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, whichever is the earlier. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

That term of office should be renewed until 31 December 2009, or until the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, whichever is the earlier.

| (3) | It is recalled that Article 6 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, which the Treaty of Lisbon will annex to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, provides that the term of office of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council shall end on the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It is recalled that Article 6 of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, which the Treaty of Lisbon will annex to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, provides that the term of office of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council shall end on the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Article 1

Mr Pierre DE BOISSIEU is hereby appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union for the period from 1 November 2009 until 31 December 2009, or until the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, whichever is the earlier.

Article 2

This Decision shall be notified to Mr Pierre DE BOISSIEU by the President of the Council.

It shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 29 October 2009.

For the Council

The President

C. BILDT

---

(1)  
  OJ L 277, 22.10.2009, p. 20.

1

---