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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-BG-1491

IN RE GILBERT BABER, RESPONDENT.

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

(Bar Registration No. 428285)

On Report and Recommendation of the 

Board on Professional Responsibility

(BDN-518-09)

(Submitted November 13, 2014 Decided January 15, 2015)

Wallace E. Shipp, Jr., Bar Counsel, Jennifer P. Lyman, Senior Assistant Bar 

Counsel, and Jelani C. Lowery, Senior Staff Attorney, were on the brief for the 

Office of Bar Counsel.

Before THOMPSON and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEWMAN, Senior 

Judge.

PER CURIAM: The Board on Professional Responsibility has concluded that 

respondent Gilbert Baber violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct during 

his representation of a client in a probate matter. The Board recommends that Mr. 

Baber be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years and be 

required to prove fitness and to pay restitution as conditions of reinstatement. The 
2

Office of Bar Counsel contends that Mr. Baber‟s conduct constituted flagrant 

dishonesty requiring disbarment. We conclude that Mr. Baber should be disbarred.

I.

The Board‟s report and recommendation rests on the following findings, 

which are undisputed in this court. 

In April 2007, Darlene Gripper retained Mr. Baber to represent her in the 

probate of her mother‟s estate. Ms. Gripper and Mr. Baber signed a retainer letter 

providing that Mr. Baber was to charge Ms. Gripper $125 per hour, plus expenses. 

On June 14, 2007, Mr. Baber filed a petition for unsupervised probate, naming Ms. 

Gripper as the personal representative of her mother‟s estate. On June 19, 2007, 

the probate court appointed Ms. Gripper as the personal representative of her 

mother‟s estate. 

As personal representative, Ms. Gripper was required to give notice of the 

opening of the estate to her two brothers, as “interested persons,” within twenty 

days of her appointment, i.e., by July 9, 2007. Ms. Gripper‟s brothers did not 

receive notice until July 30, 2007, approximately three weeks after the required 
3

date. Ms. Gripper was also required to publish notice of the opening of the estate 

within three months of her appointment and to verify to the court that she had done 

so. On September 10, 2007, the probate court sent a notice to Mr. Baber and Ms. 

Gripper, reminding them that they needed to file a verification with the court by 

September 24, 2007. Despite receiving the reminder, Mr. Baber did not send the 

verification form to Ms. Gripper to sign until September 27, 2007. Ms. Gripper 

sent the signed forms back to Mr. Baber the next day, but Mr. Baber did not file 

them until October 2, 2007.

Additionally, as personal representative, Ms. Gripper was required to 

complete an inventory of the estate within three months of her June 19, 2007, 

appointment. Mr. Baber did not provide Ms. Gripper with the necessary forms 

until October 9, 2007, well after the deadline. He also erroneously advised Ms. 

Gripper on how to properly value the estate and refused to correct the valuation 

despite Ms. Gripper‟s request that he do so. 

The probate court set a hearing for October 30, 2007, to determine whether it 

should remove Ms. Gripper as personal representative. At the hearing, Mr. Baber 

told the court that Ms. Gripper had missed deadlines because the estate had limited 

funds, which was not true. Mr. Baber billed Ms. Gripper for the time he spent 
4

preparing for and participating in the hearing, even though his neglect had led the 

probate court to schedule the hearing in the first place. 

In July 2008, Mr. Baber learned that the estate‟s share of proceeds from the 

anticipated sale of property in Alabama was estimated at around $196,000. Mr. 

Baber subsequently wrote a letter to Ms. Gripper memorializing an oral

modification of the terms of the retainer agreement, to provide that Mr. Baber 

would receive five percent of the estate‟s interest in the property if the property 

was sold. His explanation for the modification was that it was “too burdensome” 

for him to document the time he spent on work relating to the property. Despite 

this explanation, the modified agreement stated that, if the property was not sold, 

Mr. Baber would be paid hourly for his time. Although the property was not sold,

Mr. Baber nevertheless demanded one-third of five percent of the estimated value 

of the property. Ms. Gripper refused to pay and requested an accounting of Mr. 

Baber‟s time on the matter so that she could pay him the agreed-upon hourly fees. 

Rather than comply with Ms. Gripper‟s request, Mr. Baber sent a notice to 

Ms. Gripper informing her that he was withdrawing from the representation. In the 

notice, Mr. Baber stated that he was withdrawing because, among other things, (1) 

Ms. Gripper had failed to pay her monthly bills in a timely manner; (2) Ms. 
5

Gripper had failed to cooperate with Mr. Baber and to furnish information and 

documentation in a timely manner; and (3) Ms. Gripper had refused to comply 

with Mr. Baber‟s demand for one-third of the five-percent fee for the unsold 

property. Mr. Baber also accused Ms. Gripper of attempting to “perpetrate a fraud 

on the Court,” and he demanded that she pay him $10,360.48, representing onethird of the five-percent fee, the balance owed for work relating to the unsold 

property, and the balance owed for work in April. He threatened to sue Ms. 

Gripper for the total amount if she failed to pay $3,265.99 by April 15, 2009. In 

response, Ms. Gripper stated that she disagreed with Mr. Baber‟s assertions and 

requested a full accounting of services and all documents that Mr. Baber had 

received or sent to third parties in connection with the representation.

Mr. Baber subsequently filed a motion in the probate court, seeking to 

withdraw from the representation. The motion contained false accusations and 

misrepresentations similar to those he made in his earlier letter to Ms. Gripper. 

When Ms. Gripper renewed her request for her case file, Mr. Baber refused to turn 

it over or account for his time, stating that he did not document every hour he spent 

working on the unsold property. Mr. Baber thereafter sent Ms. Gripper a letter

estimating that he spent thirty-three hours working on the property, but Ms. 

Gripper refused to pay Mr. Baber because he had only provided an estimate. The 
6

probate court ultimately granted Mr. Baber‟s motion to withdraw, without 

endorsing any of the allegations in the motion. 

Mr. Baber‟s actions caused prejudice to Ms. Gripper. One of Ms. Gripper‟s 

brothers charged her with malfeasance in the administration of the estate, expressly 

relying on the allegations in Mr. Baber‟s motion to withdraw. Furthermore, 

because Mr. Baber withdrew, Ms. Gripper had to restart the probate process with a 

new attorney and post a $61,000 probate bond. 

Mr. Baber also sued Ms. Gripper in Superior Court, accusing her of 

fraudulently using his legal services to “conceal and misrepresent [her mother‟s]

assets” and to deny her brothers their lawful share of the estate‟s assets. After Ms. 

Gripper filed a pro se answer to the lawsuit, Mr. Baber filed a motion to dismiss 

the answer and a motion for judgment against Ms. Gripper, claiming that Ms. 

Gripper had fraudulently represented herself as a lawyer. In fact, Ms. Gripper had 

not represented herself as a lawyer. The court denied Mr. Baber‟s motions. 

Ultimately, Mr. Baber filed a consent motion to dismiss his lawsuit with prejudice, 

stating that “[t]he filing of this lawsuit against [Ms. Gripper] should not be 

construed as indicating anything negative about her character or honesty.” The 

trial court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. The court subsequently amended 
7

the dismissal order, to add language stating that the filing of the lawsuit “should 

not be construed as indicating anything negative about [Ms. Gripper‟s] character or 

honesty.” 

Ms. Gripper filed a disciplinary complaint against Mr. Baber. In response, 

Mr. Baber stated that the complaint he had filed in Superior Court accurately stated 

his defense to Ms. Gripper‟s allegations. 

After an evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Committee of the Board on 

Professional Responsibility concluded that Mr. Baber violated numerous Rules of 

Professional Conduct. Specifically, the Hearing Committee found that Mr. Baber 

had exhibited a lack of knowledge about probate law and practice and failed to 

competently represent Ms. Gripper, in violation of Rules 1.1 (a) and (b); failed to 

act zealously and diligently and misused information he had obtained in 

representing Ms. Gripper to formulate baseless attacks against her, in violation of 

Rules 1.3 (a) and (c); failed to keep Ms. Gripper reasonably informed, in violation 

of Rules 1.4 (a) and (b); charged unreasonable fees, in violation of Rule 1.5 (a);

betrayed client confidences to Ms. Gripper‟s detriment, in violation of Rules 1.6 

(a)(1), (2), and (3); failed to timely return Ms. Gripper‟s file after the 

representation ended, in violation of Rule 1.16 (d); knowingly made false 
8

statements to the court, in violation of Rules 3.3 (a) and 8.4 (c); and engaged in 

conduct that seriously interfered with the administration of justice, in violation of 

Rule 8.4 (d). The Hearing Committee recommended that Mr. Baber be disbarred,

because his conduct amounted to “flagrant dishonesty.” The Hearing Committee 

also recommended that Mr. Baber be required to pay restitution of $8,093.75 plus 

interest. 

The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee‟s findings of fact and 

conclusions that Mr. Baber committed the foregoing violations of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct. The Board concluded, however, that Mr. Baber‟s conduct 

did not constitute flagrant dishonesty. In reaching that conclusion, the Board 

considered that Mr. Baber had no prior disciplinary record, that his 

misrepresentations were limited to Ms. Gripper‟s case, and that he withdrew his 

civil complaint and did not resist Ms. Gripper‟s request that the Superior Court 

clarify its dismissal order to protect her reputation. The Board recommended that 

Mr. Baber be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for 

three years and that Mr. Baber be required to demonstrate his fitness to practice 

and to make restitution in the amount of $8,093.75, plus interest, before being

permitted to resume the practice of law. 
9

II.

Mr. Baber has not challenged before this court the report and 

recommendation of the Board. Moreover, the record provides ample support for 

the Board‟s findings of fact and conclusions that Mr. Baber violated numerous 

Rules of Professional Conduct. We therefore accept those findings and 

conclusions. See generally, e.g., In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 766, 769 (D.C. 2013) 

(accepting Board‟s uncontested findings of facts and conclusions that attorney 

violated Rules of Professional Conduct).

Bar Counsel does challenge the Board‟s recommended sanction, arguing that 

Mr. Baber instead should be disbarred. On the question of what sanction to 

impose, “[o]ur Rules provide that this Court „shall adopt the recommended 

disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward 

inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be 

unwarranted.‟” Vohra, 68 A.3d at 771 (quoting D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9 (h)(1)). Thus, 

“[a] sanction recommendation from the Board comes to us with a strong 

presumption in favor of its imposition.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

general, “if the Board‟s recommended sanction falls within a wide range of 

acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” Id. (internal quotation 
10

marks omitted). “Ultimately, however, the system of attorney discipline, including 

the imposition of sanctions, is the responsibility and duty of this court.” In re 

Kanu, 5 A.3d 1, 14 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where this 

court takes a significantly different view of the seriousness of an attorney‟s 

conduct, the court thus has not hesitated to reach its own conclusion as to the 

appropriate sanction. See, e.g., In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 464 (D.C. 1994) (per 

curiam).1

In determining what sanction to impose upon an attorney for violations of 

the Rules of Professional Conduct, we consider a number of factors, including, “(1) 

the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) prior discipline; (3) prejudice to 

the client; (4) the [attorney‟s] attitude; (5) circumstances in mitigation and 

aggravation; and (6) the mandate to achieve consistency.” Vohra, 68 A.3d at 771. 

We also consider “the moral fitness of the attorney” and “the need to protect the 

public, the courts, and the legal profession . . . .” In re Howes, 52 A.3d 1, 15 (D.C. 

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of imposing discipline is 

to serve the public and professional interests identified and to deter future and 

 

 

1

 Bar Counsel appears to interpret our cases as requiring that any attorney who 

engages in “flagrant dishonesty” must be disbarred as a matter of law. We need 

not decide whether that interpretation is correct, because we conclude that 

disbarment is the appropriate sanction in the particular circumstances of this case.
11

similar conduct, rather than to punish the attorney.” Kanu, 5 A.3d at 16 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Boiled down to essentials, the Board‟s findings are that Mr. Baber failed to 

competently represent his client; lied to the court; pressured his client to pay an 

excessive fee that she had not agreed to pay; improperly used confidential 

information from his client to make knowingly false accusations of fraud against 

his client in several pleadings; reiterated those false accusations during the 

disciplinary process; and failed to show remorse during the disciplinary process. 

Assessing that conduct in light of the pertinent factors, we are convinced that Mr. 

Baber should be disbarred.

First, Mr. Baber‟s dishonesty was very serious. We have repeatedly stated 

that “honesty is basic to the practice of law, and that lawyers have a greater duty 

than ordinary citizens to be scrupulously honest at all times.” In re Guberman, 978 

A.2d 200, 209 n.10 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Howes, 52 

A.3d at 16 (“[T]here is nothing more antithetical to the practice of law than 

dishonesty . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an isolated 

incident of dishonesty will not ordinarily by itself warrant disbarment, see, e.g., In 

re Silva, 29 A.3d 924, 945-46 (D.C. 2011), this case involves a series of knowingly 
12

false statements, not only to Ms. Gripper but also orally to the court, in written 

pleadings filed in court, and in a written submission to Bar Counsel. Mr. Baber‟s 

dishonesty was also protracted, starting in October 2007 and continuing through to 

his December 2009 submission to Bar Counsel. The repeated and protracted 

nature of Mr. Baber‟s dishonesty weighs significantly in favor of disbarment. See, 

e.g., In re Omwenga, 49 A.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 2012) (per curiam) (“Particularly 

where dishonesty is aggravated and prolonged, disbarment is the appropriate 

sanction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Second, Mr. Baber‟s repeated dishonesty is particularly disturbing because it 

came at the expense of his client‟s interests and was in large part driven by a desire 

for personal gain. When he lied to the court about why Ms. Gripper had not met 

certain deadlines, Mr. Baber “basically threw his client under the bus.” Mr. Baber 

also made false statements to Ms. Gripper in an effort to obtain an unreasonable 

fee that Ms. Gripper had never agreed to pay. Mr. Baber subsequently betrayed 

client confidences and made knowingly false accusations that Ms. Gripper had 

engaged in fraudulent conduct. Moreover, as we have noted, Mr. Baber‟s 

dishonest conduct caused prejudice to Ms. Gripper. These considerations weigh 

significantly in favor of disbarment. See, e.g., Omwenga, 49 A.3d at 1239 

(describing attorney‟s conduct as “egregious” because, among other things, it 
13

reflected “a blatant disregard for his clients”); Silva, 29 A.3d at 946 (cases in 

which attorneys have been disbarred have involved, among other things, “actions 

that abused the attorney-client relationship”); Kanu, 5 A.3d at 15 (attorney‟s lies to 

clients “compounded her misconduct,” and court “must view the injury to 

[attorney‟s] clients as an aggravating factor”); Goffe, 641 A.2d at 465 (treating as 

aggravating factor that attorney acted “in order to obtain an economic benefit”).

Third, the record supports the Board‟s determination that Mr. Baber showed 

no remorse during the disciplinary process, but instead repeated his false 

accusations against Ms. Gripper and continued to falsely blame Ms. Gripper. Such 

circumstances also weigh significantly in favor of disbarment. See, e.g., Howes, 

52 A.3d at 20 (attorney‟s “failure to accept responsibility [is] an aggravating factor 

in our determination of the appropriate sanction”).

Fourth, we do not see countervailing considerations weighing significantly 

against disbarment. It is true that Mr. Baber has no prior disciplinary record. The 

aggravated nature of Mr. Baber‟s conduct, however, in our view “overwhelm[s] 

any absence of prior or subsequent disciplinary actions.” Howes, 52 A.2d at 20. It 

is also true that Mr. Baber‟s dishonesty was limited to a single matter and did not 

“permeate” Mr. Baber‟s practice of law. See, e.g., Vohra, 68 A.3d at 787 (in 
14

accepting Board‟s recommendation that attorney be suspended for three years, 

court notes that attorney‟s conduct was not as pervasive as conduct involved in 

prior case that resulted in disbarment). But given the prolonged and repeated 

nature of Mr. Baber‟s conduct, and the other aggravating circumstances, we do not 

view it as dispositive that Mr. Baber‟s dishonesty involved one related set of 

circumstances. Cf. In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d at 1191, 1199-1201 (D.C. 

2010) (per curiam) (disbarring attorney for falsifying single voucher seeking

compensation from court and then lying about voucher). The Board also relied on 

Mr. Baber‟s eventual withdrawal of his suit against Ms. Gripper, but we do not 

view that circumstance as weighing significantly against disbarment, particularly 

given that Mr. Baber has at no point during the disciplinary proceedings showed 

remorse or accepted responsibility for his misconduct. 

Considering the circumstances of this case as a whole, we conclude that Mr. 

Baber demonstrated repeated “indifference to the obligations of honesty in the 

judicial system and to the duty of loyalty he owed” to Ms. Gripper. Howes, 52 

A.3d at 16. We further conclude that Mr. Baber has shown himself to lack the 

“moral rectitude needed to be a member of the legal profession.” Id. Disbarment 

of Mr. Baber is therefore warranted, in order “to protect the public, the courts, and 

the legal profession . . . .” Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15

Finally, we consider the “mandate to achieve consistency.” Vohra, 68 A.3d 

at 771. We recognize that “[p]erfect consistency is not achievable in this area,” 

Silva, 29 A.3d at 927, because the “imposition of sanctions in bar discipline . . . is 

not an exact science but may depend on the facts and circumstances of each 

particular proceeding,” Goffe, 641 A.2d at 463. Nevertheless, we conclude that 

disbarment rather than suspension is more consistent with our prior cases. We 

have disbarred a number of attorneys in circumstances comparable to those of the 

present case. See, e.g., Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d at 1198-1200 (rejecting 

Board‟s recommendation of suspension and instead disbarring attorney who 

submitted single false voucher for compensation from court and then lied under 

oath about voucher; attorney had no prior disciplinary record and did not obtain 

payment for voucher; court notes that effort to steal public funds is not 

meaningfully different from effort to steal client funds); In re Pelkey, 962 A.2d 

268, 280-82 (D.C. 2008) (accepting Board‟s recommendation of disbarment of 

attorney who acted dishonestly in business dispute by engaging in conduct that 

“amount[ed] to theft,” lied about his conduct, and filed frivolous pleadings; 

although attorney had no prior disciplinary record, attorney showed no remorse 

and had committed “persistent, protracted, and extremely serious and flagrant acts 

of dishonesty” over several years); In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d 438, 441-43 (D.C. 
16

2002) (accepting Board‟s recommendation of disbarment of attorney who suborned 

perjury from clients in two separate matters and lied to Board about conduct; even 

if attorney was not acting for personal gain, attorney‟s conduct was “egregious” 

and “reprehensible,” attorney showed no remorse, attorney was also found to have 

committed other serious ethical violations, and there were no mitigating 

circumstances); Goffe, 641 A.2d at 463-68 (rejecting Board‟s recommendation of 

suspension and instead disbarring attorney who submitted fabricated documents in 

two separate matters, once to benefit fiancee and once to benefit himself; although 

attorney had no prior disciplinary record, attorney‟s conduct was blatant and 

egregious, conduct extended over several years, attorney testified falsely about 

conduct and showed no contrition, and there were no other mitigating 

circumstances).

Conversely, the cases in which we have imposed suspension generally 

involve circumstances significantly less aggravated than those of the present case. 

Most significantly, none of them involve an attorney baselessly and maliciously

attacking the client whose interests the attorney was charged with protecting. See, 

e.g., Vohra, 68 A.3d at 771-73 (accepting Board‟s recommendation of three-year 

suspension, where attorney failed to properly file immigration documents on behalf 

of clients, never informed clients that visa applications had been rejected, forged 
17

clients‟ signatures on renewed applications, and lied to clients about status of 

applications; attorney refunded clients‟ fee and showed some remorse, and 

attorney‟s conduct was not pervasive and was not “grounded in malice”); Silva, 29 

A.3d at 941-47 (accepting Board‟s recommendation of three-year suspension, 

where attorney lied about filing easement on behalf of client, forged signatures on 

document, and lied under oath during disciplinary process; attorney‟s conduct was 

not prolonged, related to single matter, and did not involve “abuse[ of] the 

attorney-client relationship”); In re Daniel, 11 A.3d 291, 299-301 (D.C. 2011)

(imposing three-year suspension instead of one-year suspension recommended by 

Board, where attorney hid assets and lied to the Internal Revenue Service to avoid 

paying taxes, showed lack of remorse during disciplinary process, lied to Hearing 

Committee, and had previously been informally admonished; no indication that 

attorney‟s conduct harmed client); In re Kline, 11 A.3d 261, 265-67 (D.C. 2011)

(imposing three-year suspension instead of eighteen-month suspension 

recommended by Board, where attorney‟s negligence led to default judgment and 

attorney negotiated settlement without informing client of default judgment, forged 

client‟s signature on settlement agreement, and used own funds to pay settlement; 

attorney‟s conduct was not protracted, attorney demonstrated remorse and 

cooperated with disciplinary investigation, and attorney had no prior disciplinary 

history); In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433, 446-48 (D.C. 2007) (accepting Board‟s 
18

recommendation of three-year suspension, where attorney fabricated documents 

over a period of years to mislead attorney‟s law firm about attorney‟s relationship 

with client; although attorney had not expressed remorse or sought to reimburse 

firm for loss firm suffered, attorney had no prior disciplinary violations, attorney 

did not defraud client for personal gain, no indication that client was prejudiced, 

and no indication that attorney lied to court or submitted false documents to court).

We recognize that we ordinarily owe deference to the Board‟s 

recommendation as to the proper sanction to be imposed. The Board viewed it as a 

close question whether Mr. Baber should be disbarred. We take a significantly 

different view of the seriousness of Mr. Baber‟s conduct, however, and we are 

convinced that disbarment is the proper sanction. In such circumstances, this court 

has not hesitated to reach its own conclusion. See, e.g., Howes, 52 A.3d at 14-25 

(disbarring attorney, despite Board‟s recommendation that attorney be suspended); 

Cleaver-Bascombe, 986 A.2d at 1198-1200 (same); Goffe, 641 A.2d at 464 (same).

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Baber is disbarred from the practice of law in 

the District of Columbia. For purposes of reinstatement, the period of disbarment 
19

shall run from the date that Mr. Baber files an affidavit in accordance with District 

of Columbia Bar Rule XI, § 14 (g). Reinstatement shall be conditioned on Mr. 

Baber paying restitution to Ms. Gripper in the amount of $8,093.75, plus interest.

So ordered.