- 462 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Issa Abu-Serieh, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed January 16, 2018. No. A-17-151.

1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: 

Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment or 

the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), an 

appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear 

error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment or 

Fifth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court 

reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.

2. Standing: Warrantless Searches. Before a party may challenge a 

search without a warrant, he or she must have standing in a legal 

controversy.

3. Standing: Words and Phrases. “Standing” means that a person has 

a sufficient legally protectable interest which may be affected in a 

justiciable controversy, entitling that person to judicial resolution of 

the controversy.

4. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Standing. A “standing” 

analysis in the context of search and seizure is nothing more than an 

inquiry into whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an 

interest of the defendant in violation of the protection afforded by the 

Fourth Amendment.

5. Standing: Courts: Jurisdiction: Parties. Because the requirement of 

standing is fundamental to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, a litigant or 

a court before which a case is pending may raise the question of standing at any time during the proceeding.

6. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. Ordinarily, two inquiries 

are required to determine whether an individual may make a challenge 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

01/16/2018 08:12 AM CST
- 463 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

under the Fourth Amendment. First, an individual must have exhibited 

an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

7. Standing: Motor Vehicles: Search and Seizure: Contracts. The driver 

of a rental vehicle may have standing to challenge the search or seizure 

of such vehicle if he or she can demonstrate that he or she received 

permission to drive the vehicle from the individual authorized on the 

rental agreement.

8. Standing: Warrantless Searches. Mere possession of a key granting 

access to a house does not necessarily create standing to raise an objection to a warrantless search.

9. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. A traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of 

a vehicle.

10. Investigative Stops: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. If 

an officer has probable cause to stop a violator, the stop is objectively 

reasonable and any ulterior motivation is irrelevant.

11. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: 

Probable Cause. Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement 

officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the 

circumstances that justified the traffic stop.

12. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs. A 

law enforcement officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during an 

otherwise lawful traffic stop, so long as doing so does not measurably 

extend the duration of the stop.

13. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: 

Probable Cause. In order to expand the scope of a traffic stop and 

continue to detain the motorist, a law enforcement officer must have a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person in the vehicle is involved 

in criminal activity beyond that which justified the initial stop.

14. Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Reasonable suspicion entails 

some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something 

more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, but less than the level 

of suspicion required for probable cause.

15. Miranda Rights: Self-Incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prohibits the use of statements stemming from the custodial interrogation of a defendant unless 

the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective 

to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

16. Miranda Rights. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a 

person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
- 464 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

17. Miranda Rights: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles. Persons temporarily detained pursuant to an investigatory traffic stop are not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 

16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

18. Miranda Rights: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers 

and Sheriffs. Neither detention pursuant to a traffic stop nor continued 

voluntary contact with law enforcement constitutes a formal arrest 

or restraint on an individual’s freedom sufficient to require Miranda

warnings.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: 

Andrew R. Jacobsen, Judge. Affirmed.

Steven B. Muslin, of Muslin & Sandberg, and Thomas J. 

Olsen, of Olsen Law Offices, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss 

for appellee.

Pirtle, Riedmann, and Arterburn, Judges.

Riedmann, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Following a stipulated bench trial, Issa Abu-Serieh was 

found guilty of one count of delivery or possession with 

intent to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana. The district court for Lancaster County sentenced him to 18 to 36 

months’ imprisonment. Abu-Serieh now appeals his conviction. 

Following our review of the record, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The events giving rise to this case, and the issues raised on 

appeal, are substantially intermingled with those in a companion case filed today in State v. Khalil, ante p. 449, ___ N.W.2d 

___ (2018).

On January 25, 2015, Lancaster County Deputy Sheriff 

Jason Henkel observed two vehicles traveling eastbound on 

Interstate 80. The first was a Nissan Altima; immediately 

behind the Nissan was a Ford Edge. Henkel observed that both 
- 465 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

vehicles had out-of-state license plates and that both appeared 

to be following the vehicle in front of them too closely. Henkel 

believed that the two vehicles were traveling together based 

on “their driving habits” and the fact that they appeared to be 

staying close to one another. Henkel used a stopwatch to time 

both vehicles’ speed and distance traveled and determined 

that both vehicles were following at a closer distance than is 

considered safe. Henkel contacted Deputy Sheriff Jason Mayo 

and requested that he initiate a traffic stop of the Ford for 

following too closely while Henkel initiated a traffic stop of 

the Nissan.

Mayo initiated a traffic stop of the Ford and made contact 

with the driver and sole occupant, who was later identified as 

Abu-Serieh. Abu-Serieh provided Mayo with a copy of the 

rental agreement for the vehicle, which was not rented in his 

name. Abu-Serieh stated that he was coming from California 

and that a cousin had rented the vehicle for him there. When 

Mayo asked Abu-Serieh if he was traveling with anyone, AbuSerieh responded that he was not.

Mayo informed Abu-Serieh that he would be issuing a warning citation for following too closely and requested that AbuSerieh accompany him to his cruiser while he completed the 

paperwork. Abu-Serieh complied and sat in the front passenger 

seat of Mayo’s cruiser.

During this time, Mayo maintained contact with Henkel 

via the mobile data terminal in each of their cruisers. The 

deputies exchanged details regarding the information that 

Abu-Serieh and the other driver, who was identified as Ali 

E. Khalil, gave them. Henkel informed Mayo that Khalil had 

stated that he and Abu-Serieh were traveling together and 

that he had rented the vehicle Abu-Serieh was driving. Mayo 

was ultimately able to confirm that the vehicle driven by 

Abu-Serieh was rented in Khalil’s name. Furthermore, Khalil 

reported that he was coming from a trucking convention in 

Salt Lake City, Utah, while Abu-Serieh stated that he was 

coming from California.
- 466 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

After Mayo completed the paperwork and gave the warning 

citation to Abu-Serieh, he asked Abu-Serieh if he could ask a 

few additional questions. Abu-Serieh consented. Mayo then 

asked Abu-Serieh if he had any illegal items in his vehicle 

such as marijuana. Mayo also informed Abu-Serieh that he 

had smelled the odor of raw marijuana when he initially made 

contact at the vehicle’s window. Abu-Serieh responded that 

he did not have marijuana in his vehicle. Mayo then asked 

Abu-Serieh if he could search the vehicle, and Abu-Serieh 

consented.

During his search, Mayo found two marijuana joints in a 

plastic container along with a piece of drug paraphernalia and 

two driver’s licenses for Abu-Serieh. In the back cargo area, 

Mayo found a spare tire for another vehicle, as well as its component parts, and the contents of another vehicle’s trunk.

While Mayo was searching Abu-Serieh’s vehicle, Henkel 

was simultaneously searching Khalil’s vehicle. During Mayo’s 

search, Henkel contacted Mayo and asked if he had found 

a “trunk lock key” for the Nissan. Mayo found a key that 

appeared to match this description in a backpack on the front 

passenger seat of the Ford.

Both deputies testified that in order to open the trunk, the 

trunk lock located inside the glovebox had to be turned off. 

The key found in Abu-Serieh’s backpack turned off the trunk 

lock which allowed the deputies to open the trunk. After the 

Nissan’s trunk was opened, the deputies found 128 pounds 

of marijuana inside. Abu-Serieh and Khalil were both subsequently placed under arrest. Mayo testified that he placed 

both parties in the back seat of his cruiser and read them their 

Miranda warnings. After being booked at the jail, Abu-Serieh 

admitted to Mayo that he was to receive $6,000 to be another 

driver for the transportation of the load of marijuana from 

California to Chicago, Illinois.

Abu-Serieh was charged with delivery or possession with 

intent to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1) and (2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 
- 467 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

2014). He filed a motion to suppress, claiming that his rights 

under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments had been violated. 

The district court held a hearing on the motion and overruled 

it, finding that there was probable cause to stop Abu-Serieh’s 

vehicle, that the statements he made in Mayo’s cruiser were not 

custodial and not subject to Miranda warnings, that Abu-Serieh 

freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle, 

and that there was probable cause based on the totality of the 

circumstances for Abu-Serieh’s arrest. The district court additionally found that Abu-Serieh waived his Miranda rights and 

that his postarrest statements were admissible.

The district court subsequently held a stipulated bench trial 

and found Abu-Serieh guilty. The court sentenced Abu-Serieh 

to 18 to 36 months’ imprisonment. Abu-Serieh now appeals.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Abu-Serieh assigns, restated, that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment 

or the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 

2d 694 (1966), we apply a two-part standard of review. See, 

State v. Bauldwin, 283 Neb. 678, 811 N.W.2d 267 (2012); State 

v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 807 N.W.2d 769 (2011). Regarding 

historical facts, we review the trial court’s findings for clear 

error. State v. Bauldwin, supra; State v. Nelson, supra. But 

whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment or 

Fifth Amendment protections is a question of law that we 

review independently of the trial court’s determination. State v. 

Bauldwin, supra; State v. Nelson, supra.

ANALYSIS

Abu-Serieh argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress. Specifically, he claims that the district 
- 468 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

court erred in finding that the deputies did not violate his 

rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

Fourth Amendment.

Abu-Serieh claims that the deputies violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by stopping his vehicle on a pretextual 

basis and improperly extending the scope of the traffic stop. 

He also argues that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy 

in the trunk of Khalil’s vehicle due to his possession of the key 

that opened the trunk. He argues that due to this expectation 

of privacy, the violation of Khalil’s Fourth Amendment rights 

in the search and seizure of Khalil’s rental vehicle violated his 

Fourth Amendment rights as well.

[2-6] Before a party may challenge a search without a warrant, he or she must have standing in a legal controversy. See 

State v. Baltimore, 242 Neb. 562, 495 N.W.2d 921 (1993). 

“Standing” means that a person has a sufficient legally protectable interest which may be affected in a justiciable controversy, entitling that person to judicial resolution of the 

controversy. Id. A “standing” analysis in the context of search 

and seizure is nothing more than an inquiry into whether the 

disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the 

defendant in violation of the protection afforded by the Fourth 

Amendment. State v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 807 N.W.2d 769 

(2011). Because the requirement of standing is fundamental to 

a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, a litigant or a court before 

which a case is pending can raise the question of standing 

at any time during the proceeding. State v. Baltimore, supra. 

To determine whether an individual may make a challenge 

under the Fourth Amendment, we must determine whether an 

individual has a legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy. See State v. Nelson, supra. Ordinarily, two inquiries are 

required for such a determination. First, an individual must 

have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, 

and second, the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id.
- 469 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

[7] Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme 

Court have held that individuals have a lesser expectation of 

privacy in a motor vehicle than in a home or office because a 

motor vehicle’s “function is for transportation purposes and it 

seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.” See State v. Konfrst, 251 Neb. 214, 224, 556 

N.W.2d 250, 259 (1996), citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 

U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). The expectation of privacy in one’s vehicle extends to rental vehicles. See 

State v. Nelson, supra. Nebraska law has held that the driver 

of a rental vehicle may have standing to challenge the search 

or seizure of such vehicle if he or she can demonstrate that he 

or she received permission to drive the vehicle from the individual authorized on the rental agreement. See id.

Here, Abu-Serieh contends that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of Khalil’s vehicle because he 

was in possession of the key that opened the trunk. However, 

nowhere in his brief does he explain why he believes possession of the key gives rise to a reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy. Instead, his argument on this issue consists of 

only conclusory statements that such a legitimate expectation 

of privacy exists.

The State argues that Abu-Serieh lacks standing to challenge 

the search and seizure of Khalil’s vehicle. The State claims 

that there is no evidence that Abu-Serieh ever drove or traveled in Khalil’s vehicle, that he had any belongings in Khalil’s 

vehicle, or that he ever had dominion or control over Khalil’s 

vehicle or any of its contents. Although Abu-Serieh was in 

possession of the key to the vehicle’s trunk, the State argues 

that there is a difference between a party having access to the 

trunk and a party having a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the trunk.

In State v. Baltimore, 242 Neb. 562, 495 N.W.2d 921 (1993), 

the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether a party had 

standing to challenge the search of the house where he was 

arrested when he did not reside in the house. There, Steave 
- 470 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

Baltimore had permission and “‘sometimes’” had a key to his 

neighbor’s home for the limited purpose of using the neighbor’s garden hose. Id. at 572, 495 N.W.2d at 928. On the night 

that Baltimore was arrested, he had asked for and received his 

neighbor’s house key and permission for the purpose of using 

the neighbor’s bathroom. Law enforcement officers made contact with Baltimore at the door to the house and subsequently 

entered the home and found prescription drugs.

[8] On appeal, Baltimore argued that the search of the 

house was unlawful. The Supreme Court found that Baltimore 

had a key to his neighbor’s house for a very limited purpose, 

never exercised control over the house or its contents, did 

not keep his personal belongings there, and did not have an 

unlimited right to enter the house. State v. Baltimore, supra. 

The court held that “[a]lthough Baltimore places much stock 

in his having a key for access to [his neighbor’s] house, more 

than possession of a house key is necessary for access to the 

Constitution for an objection against the police search of [his 

neighbor’s] house without a warrant.” Id. at 573, 495 N.W.2d at 

928. Finding that Baltimore’s limited access to his neighbor’s 

house was insufficient to demonstrate a legitimate expectation 

of privacy in the home, the Supreme Court held that Baltimore 

lacked standing to challenge the search. Thus, mere possession 

of a key granting access to a house does not necessarily create 

standing to raise an objection to a warrantless search. See State 

v. Baltimore, supra.

While we find no Nebraska case law directly on point for 

the issue of whether possession of a key to the trunk of a 

vehicle rented in another individual’s name is sufficient to give 

rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy, we believe that the 

factors outlined in State v. Baltimore, supra, can be applied in 

this case.

Here, Abu-Serieh claims to have a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the trunk of Khalil’s vehicle due to his possession of 

the key that opened the trunk. However, there is no evidence 

in the record to indicate that Abu-Serieh ever exercised any 
- 471 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

type of control over the trunk or any other part of Khalil’s 

vehicle. The law enforcement officers found no evidence that 

Abu-Serieh kept any personal belongings anywhere in Khalil’s 

vehicle. Furthermore, the vehicle was rented in Khalil’s name, 

not Abu-Serieh’s.

While Abu-Serieh did possess the key that opened the 

locked glovebox, thereby giving access to the trunk lock, that 

was the key’s only purpose; it was not a key to the vehicle 

itself. Additionally, Henkel and Mayo testified that in order to 

use the key to open the trunk, it must be inserted into a lock 

in the glovebox that would then allow the trunk lock to be 

turned either on or off. Based on this testimony, it appears that 

a person must first have access to the passenger compartment 

of the vehicle in order to use the trunk key. This indicates that 

Abu-Serieh did not have an unlimited right to access the trunk, 

as use of the key required Khalil to grant him access to the 

vehicle’s passenger compartment.

Based on these factors, as well as the lesser expectation of 

privacy an individual has in a vehicle, we find that Abu-Serieh 

did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk 

of Khalil’s rental vehicle and therefore does not have standing 

to challenge the search and seizure of the vehicle. Other jurisdictions addressing the issue of whether possession of a key 

creates a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item which 

the key unlocks have similarly found a lack of standing. See, 

e.g., U.S. v. Stokes, 829 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2016) (no standing to 

maintain Fourth Amendment challenge to search of post office 

box to which defendant held key); U.S. v. Reyes, 908 F.2d 281 

(8th Cir. 1990) (possession of key to rental locker does not create reasonable expectation of privacy in locker); United States 

v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (possession of keys 

insufficient to give defendant constitutionally protected interest 

in privacy of car).

Because Abu-Serieh lacks standing to challenge the search 

of the Nissan, our analysis will focus solely on the stop of the 

Ford driven by Abu-Serieh.
- 472 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

Abu-Serieh argues that Mayo improperly expanded the 

scope of the traffic stop by asking him questions unrelated to 

the offense of following too closely and by extending the scope 

past the time at which Mayo issued him a warning citation. 

We disagree.

[9,10] Before addressing the merits of his argument, we note 

that Abu-Serieh spends a significant portion of his brief arguing that the stop of his vehicle was pretextual. However, he 

also concedes that “[t]he evidence is unrebutted that the traffic 

stop was properly initiated . . . ,” brief for appellant at 27, and 

that Henkel had “both reasonable suspicion . . . and probable 

cause” to stop Abu-Serieh’s vehicle for the offense of following too close, id. at 31. It is well established that a traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the 

driver of a vehicle. State v. Jasa, 297 Neb. 822, 901 N.W.2d 

315 (2017). If an officer has probable cause to stop a violator, 

the stop is objectively reasonable and any ulterior motivation is 

irrelevant. State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448, 755 N.W.2d 57 

(2008). It is clear from the record that the stop of Abu-Serieh’s 

vehicle was lawful.

[11,12] Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related 

in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop. 

State v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 807 N.W.2d 769 (2011). This 

investigation may include asking the driver for an operator’s 

license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the 

patrol car, and asking the driver about the purpose and destination of his or her travel. Id. Also, the officer may run a 

computer check to determine whether the vehicle involved in 

the stop has been stolen and whether there are any outstanding warrants for any of its occupants. Id. The U.S. Supreme 

Court has held that an officer may conduct certain unrelated 

checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, so long as 

doing so does not measurably extend the duration of the stop. 

Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 

2d 694 (2009).
- 473 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

[13,14] In order to expand the scope of a traffic stop and 

continue to detain the motorist, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person in the vehicle is 

involved in criminal activity beyond that which initially justified the stop. See State v. Nelson, supra. Reasonable suspicion 

entails some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. Id.

Here, Mayo testified that during the course of the traffic 

stop, he asked Abu-Serieh where he was from, what he did for 

a living, as well as his general itinerary and travel plans. AbuSerieh stated that he was coming from California, where his 

cousin had rented the vehicle for him, and that he was not traveling with anyone else. After completing the paperwork for the 

warning citation and handing it to Abu-Serieh, Mayo sought 

permission to ask a few additional questions and Abu-Serieh 

consented. At that point, Mayo asked Abu-Serieh if he had any 

illegal items such as marijuana in his vehicle and informed 

Abu-Serieh that he had smelled the odor of raw marijuana 

upon making initial contact at the vehicle’s window. AbuSerieh denied having marijuana in the vehicle and consented to 

Mayo’s request to search the vehicle.

Although Mayo conceded that some of the questions he 

asked Abu-Serieh during the traffic stop were unrelated to 

issuing a warning citation, there is nothing in the record to 

suggest that such questions extended the duration of the stop. 

Furthermore, after Mayo completed the warning citation and 

handed it to Abu-Serieh, thereby completing the traffic stop, 

Abu-Serieh consented to additional questioning. At that time, 

we find that Abu-Serieh was no longer detained and was 

instead engaged in a voluntary contact with Mayo. Such voluntary contact does not require reasonable suspicion because 

Abu-Serieh was no longer detained and was free to terminate the encounter. Abu-Serieh also consented to a search of 

his vehicle thereby agreeing to an extension of the scope of 
- 474 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

the stop. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment 

of error.

Fifth Amendment.

Abu-Serieh argues that Mayo’s question to him of whether 

he had any drugs “created a hazard of incrimination” and that 

he was compelled to answer the question or be penalized for 

asserting his right to refuse to answer. Brief for appellant at 

39. He therefore concludes that Mayo was required to read 

him his Miranda rights prior to posing the question. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Abu-Serieh was not in custody. Second, Mayo posed the question only after Abu-Serieh 

consented to additional questioning.

[15-17] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 

16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), prohibits the use of statements stemming from the custodial interrogation of a defendant unless 

the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 

State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995). The 

Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 

equivalent. State v. DeJong, 287 Neb. 864, 845 N.W.2d 858 

(2014). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda when 

there is a formal arrest or a restraint on his or her freedom 

of movement to the degree associated with such an arrest. 

See State v. Landis, 281 Neb. 139, 794 N.W.2d 151 (2011). 

Persons temporarily detained pursuant to an investigatory traffic stop are not in custody for purposes of Miranda. State v. 

Landis, supra.

Because Abu-Serieh was only temporarily detained pursuant to an investigatory traffic stop when he was seated in 

the cruiser, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 

Furthermore, Abu-Serieh consented to additional questioning. 

See State v. Landis, supra (determining defendant voluntarily 

stayed in cruiser for additional questioning at officer’s request 

and therefore was not in custody).
- 475 -

Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

25 Nebraska Appellate Reports

STATE v. ABU-SERIEH

Cite as 25 Neb. App. 462

[18] Neither detention pursuant to a traffic stop nor continued voluntary contact with law enforcement constitutes a formal arrest or restraint on an individual’s freedom sufficient to 

require Miranda warnings. Therefore, we find no merit to this 

assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

Following our review of the record, we find Abu-Serieh’s 

assignment of error to be without merit and therefore affirm.

Affirmed.