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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 34658

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ABIGAIL M. SWINDLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2009 Opinion No. 47

Filed: June 22, 2009

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Heather M. Carlson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

______________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Abigail M. Swindle appeals from her judgment of conviction entered upon her 

conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, Swindle challenges 

the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. 

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The following facts were found by the district court after conducting an evidentiary 

hearing on Swindle‟s motion to suppress:

On March 3, 2007, [Swindle] was a visitor at a mobile home owned by 

Kristine Bear in Post Falls, Idaho. That day Kootenai County Sheriff‟s Deputies 

Patrick Meehan and Charles Sciortino, acting on separate tips by two identified 

neighbors that drug activities were occurring in the mobile home, went to that 

home and were invited in by Kristine Bear. The deputies explained why they 

were there, and Ms. Bear gave her consent for the deputies to look around. 
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Deputy Sciortino asked if there were other people in the residence, and Bear said 

there was one other person in the back room.

Deputy Sciortino went to the back bedroom where he saw the defendant. 

He asked the defendant if there was anyone else in the residence, and she replied 

that there was not. Deputy Sciortino brought the defendant toward the living 

room, and in doing so discovered a woman hiding in another bedroom. This other 

woman gave Deputy Sciortino what turned out to be a false name and had a 

warrant out for her arrest. The deputy took both the defendant and the other 

woman to the living room where Deputy Meehan, Ms. Bear, and her minor son 

were located. Deputy Sciortino then received verbal consent from Ms. Bear to 

search the residence for drugs. While in the living room, the defendant asked to 

go into the bathroom to get a band-aid for her finger. Deputy Sciortino saw that 

she already had a bandage on the indicated finger. Deputy Sciortino denied this 

request and said to wait a few minutes as they would be done soon.

While Deputy Sciortino searched the residence, Deputy Meehan could not 

recall if he returned the defendant‟s identification. Deputy Sciortino found a 

bindle of what is alleged to be methamphetamine in the bathroom; this bindle 

appeared to have been recently used to ingest suspected drugs. Deputy Sciortino 

returned to the living room where he advised everyone present of their Miranda 1

rights. All of the individuals indicated they understood their rights.

Deputy Sciortino told all assembled about finding the bindle in the 

bathroom, and asked to whom it belonged. All answered to the effect, “Not me.” 

Deputy Sciortino then said that somebody was going to admit to the bindle or 

everybody was going to be going to jail. He also advised that somebody should 

be honest and admit the bindle belonged to that person. He further advised that at 

jail he would be performing drug tests on the arrested persons, but all that could 

be avoided if someone is honest; otherwise everyone will go (to jail).

At that point the defendant said, “I‟ll take it. It doesn‟t matter, I‟m not 

letting her (presumably Ms. Bear) with kids go to jail.” Deputy Sciortino 

admonished the defendant a few times not to make a false admission, but the 

defendant persisted that she would take responsibility for the bindle.

The defendant admitted last using methamphetamine about a week prior, 

and was then arrested. A search incident to arrest revealed methamphetamine and 

seven pipes in her pockets and in her bra.

Swindle was charged with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, Idaho 

Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to use, I.C. § 37-

2734A(1). She filed a motion to suppress her statements and the evidence seized from her 

person after her arrest, contending she was illegally seized and her statements and the evidence 

seized after her arrest were the “fruit” of her illegal detention. Following a hearing, the district 

court denied the motion, and Swindle entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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controlled substance, reserving her right to appeal the district court‟s denial of her motion to 

suppress. 

II.

ANALYSIS

Swindle argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the 

officers did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity 

when they detained her. 

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court‟s findings of fact which are supported 

by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the 

facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At 

a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees every citizen the 

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 888, 

187 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 347, 160 P.3d 1279, 1282 

(Ct. App. 2007); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 737, 117 P.3d 876, 877 (Ct. App. 2005). Its 

purpose is “to impose a standard of „reasonableness‟ upon the exercise of discretion by 

government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to „safeguard the privacy and 

security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.‟” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 

(1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). 

Under the Fourth Amendment, an investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon 

specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about 

to be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); State v. Sheldon, 139 

Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). The quantity and quality of information 

necessary to create reasonable suspicion for such a “Terry stop” is less than that necessary to 

establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); State v. Bishop, 146 

Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009), but must be more than a mere hunch or 

unparticularized suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Reasonable suspicion must be based on 
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specific, articulable facts considered with objective and reasonable inferences that form a basis 

for particularized suspicion. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983-84, 88 P.3d at 1223-24. Particularized 

suspicion consists of two elements: (1) the assessment must be based on a totality of the 

circumstances, and (2) the assessment must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular 

individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. See id. at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223. An officer 

may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may 

be drawn from the officer‟s experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 

Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). 

In denying Swindle‟s motion to dismiss, the district court ruled that while Swindle had 

been detained in the residence after she was located by the deputy in the back bedroom, the 

detention was reasonable. The court based its ruling on two grounds: (1) that the deputies had 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that Swindle was engaged in criminal activity since she was 

found in a residence suspected of being the scene of drug activity, she had lied about the 

presence of another woman in the residence, and she had “nervously” requested to retrieve a 

band-aid from the bathroom for a finger that was already bandaged, and (2) the officers‟ 

prerogative to detain persons found inside a residence that they are legally searching. 

Assuming, without deciding, that Swindle was detained immediately after the officer 

located her in the bedroom, we conclude the officer possessed reasonable articulable suspicion 

for the detention. Specifically, we conclude that the officers possessed the requisite suspicion 

that, at the least, Swindle was acting in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(d) which states that it is a 

misdemeanor offense “for any person to be present at or on premises of any place where he 

knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for 

distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away.” 

Deputy Meehan testified that he and Deputy Sciortino had initially gone to Bear‟s 

residence after Deputy Meehan was “stopped” by another resident of the trailer park who 

“informed [him] that he felt there was drug activity going on in [Bear‟s trailer] and he wanted 

law enforcement to „do something about it.‟” Specifically, Deputy Sciortino testified that the 

neighbor was 

very articulate in explaining why he thought people were using or selling drugs 

within the trailer. He said he was a recovering methamphetamine addict himself. 

He also pointed to an event that happened that prior morning at about 4 a.m. when 

persons mistakenly knocked on his door asking for drugs. And upon speaking 
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with him I found him to be very credible. And the way that he explained and 

articulated the happenings and goings on of the trailer next to him gave me 

reasonable suspicion to believe that the persons within that trailer were either 

using, selling, or possessing illegal drugs. 

When the officers first arrived at Bear‟s residence, Deputy Meehan testified that they were then 

approached by another neighbor “who told us the same thing that they felt there was drug 

activity going on there, but there was no one at home at the time.” The neighbor then agreed to 

call the officers as soon as he saw the residents come home, which he did, approximately one 

and one-half hours later, telling the officers that three individuals had arrived at the trailer in a 

vehicle. Neither neighbor provided a description matching that of Swindle as someone they 

believed to be involved in the drug activities in the residence. 

An informant‟s tip regarding suspected criminal activity may give rise to reasonable 

suspicion when it would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was 

appropriate.” White, 496 U.S. at 329; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Whether a tip 

amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the 

substance, source, and reliability of the information provided. See White, 496 U.S. at 328-29

(noting that “an informant‟s „veracity,‟ „reliability,‟ and „basis of knowledge‟” are highly 

relevant factors in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists). In other words, a tip must

possess adequate indicia of reliability in order to justify a Terry stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 

U.S. 143, 147 (1972); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-12, 203 P.3d at 1210-11. The more reliable the

tip, the less information is required to establish reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 330; 

Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. Factors indicative of reliability include whether the 

informant reveals his or her identity and the basis of his or her knowledge, whether the location 

of the informant is known, whether the information was based on first-hand observations of 

events as they were occurring, whether the information the informant provided was subject to 

immediate confirmation or corroboration by police, whether the informant has previously 

provided reliable information, whether the informant provides predictive information, and 

whether the informant could be held criminally liable if the report were discovered to be false. 

White, 496 U.S. at 331-32; Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 

1211; State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d 334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2000). If a tip lacks 

adequate indicia of reliability, police generally must engage in further investigation before 

conducting a Terry stop. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. 
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Whether a tip that merely provides a description of a suspect and alleges that he or she 

committed a crime amounts to reasonable suspicion depends on whether the tip was anonymous. 

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271-72 (2000); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. 

See also State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 965, 88 P.3d 780, 784 (Ct. App. 2004). When such 

a tip is received from an anonymous informant, the tip generally will not give rise to reasonable 

suspicion. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72 (concluding that a tip that a young man was carrying a 

gun did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because the anonymous informant merely alleged 

that the man committed a crime and provided a description of the suspect). On the other hand, 

when such a tip is received from a known citizen-informant, the tip is generally sufficient to 

establish reasonable suspicion. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho at 965, 88 P.3d at 784 (concluding that a 

known citizen-informant‟s tip indicating that the suspect was likely intoxicated and describing 

the suspect‟s vehicle provided police with reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop). Tips made by 

known citizen-informants are presumed reliable because the informant‟s reputation can be 

assessed and, if the informant is untruthful, he or she may be subject to criminal liability for 

making a false report. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211; Van Dorne, 139 Idaho at 965, 

88 P.3d at 784. Accordingly, independent police verification of such tips is generally not 

necessary. Id. See also Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47. Still, under the totality of the 

circumstances analysis, the content of the tip and the informant‟s basis of knowledge remain 

relevant in determining whether the tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 

812, 203 P.3d at 1211. Personal observation by an informant is one of the strongest possible 

indications of a basis of knowledge. State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 23, 56 P.3d 780, 785 (Ct.

App. 2002).

We conclude that the officers possessed reasonable articulable suspicion that Swindle 

was at least involved in frequenting the scene of drug activity given her presence in the house 

that two neighbors had told the police they suspected was the site of drug activities. Both

neighbors independently alerted authorities of their suspicions (arising from the neighbors‟

personal observations) regarding drug activity. Because the identities of both individuals who 

reported to the police their suspicions regarding drug activity at Bear‟s residence were known, 

and because their reports were based upon personal observation, the tips are presumably reliable. 

Additionally, each tip tended to corroborate the other. Because the officers had reasonable 

suspicion that persons within the trailer were involved in illegal drug activity, it was not 
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necessary that the neighbors‟ tips particularly implicated Swindle. It was enough to constitute 

reasonable suspicion to detain Swindle based on the neighbors‟ description to the officers of their 

suspicions of drug activity occurring at the residence (with one neighbor describing an incident 

that had occurred the prior morning) and that Swindle was found in the residence. 

Thus, because the detention was justified, it did not taint Swindle‟s statements made 

during the detention, nor did it taint the discovery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia 

following her arrest which was conducted with probable cause based on her statements admitting 

ownership of the methamphetamine. Therefore, we conclude the district court properly denied

the motion to suppress, and we affirm Swindle‟s judgment of conviction. 

 Chief Judge LANSING and Judge PERRY CONCUR.