alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 214 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify that tar sands 

are crude oil for purposes of the Federal excise tax on petroleum. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 8, 2015 

Mr. BLUMENAUER (for himself, Mrs. CAPPS, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. PASCRELL, 

Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. NADLER, Mr. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. SHERMAN, 

Mr. GRAYSON, Mr. QUIGLEY, Mr. CARTWRIGHT, Ms. LEE, and Mr. CONNOLLY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify 

that tar sands are crude oil for purposes of the Federal 

excise tax on petroleum. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tar Sands Tax Loop5 hole Elimination Act’’. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 214 IH

1 SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF TAR SANDS AS CRUDE OIL FOR 

2 EXCISE TAX PURPOSES. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 4612(a)(1) of the Internal 

4 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows: 

5 ‘‘(1) CRUDE OIL.—The term ‘crude oil’ includes 

6 crude oil condensates, natural gasoline, any bitumen 

7 or bituminous mixture, any oil derived from a bitu8 men or bituminous mixture, and any oil derived 

9 from kerogen-bearing sources.’’. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 this section shall apply to oil and petroleum products re12 ceived or entered during calendar quarters beginning more 

13 than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of State of New York, Respondent, v John Hall, Appellant.

[947 NYS2d 856]

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Genesee County (Robert C. Noonan, A.J.), dated June 7, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The order determined that respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement and committed respondent to a secure treatment facility.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order determining that he is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 and committing him to a secure treatment facility. We reject respondent’s contention that petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence at the dispositional hearing that “respondent is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to a secure treatment facility” (§ 10.07 [f]). Indeed, the experts for both petitioner and respondent recommended inpatient treatment. Thus, Supreme Court’s determination that respondent should be committed to a secure treatment facility is supported by the requisite clear and convincing evidence *(see generally id.).*

Contrary to the further contention of respondent, the court did not err in permitting petitioner’s expert to testify concerning statements in the various records he reviewed in forming his opinion. “The professional reliability exception to the hearsay rule ‘enables an expert witness to provide opinion evidence based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, provided it is *1461demonstrated to be the type of material commonly relied on in the profession’ ” *(Matter of State of New York v Motzer,*79 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2010], quoting *Hinlicky v Dreyfuss,*6 NY3d 636, 648 [2006]). We reject respondent’s contention that the court abused its discretion in permitting petitioner to call respondent’s expert as a rebuttal witness *(see generally Matter of Roth v S & H Grossinger,*284 AD2d 746, 748-749 [2001]), and the record belies the further contention of respondent that the court limited his cross-examination of petitioner’s expert concerning recidivism statistics related to the Static 99 assessment.

Finally, there is no merit to the contention of respondent that the court’s delay in rendering a decision denied him due process. The dispositional hearing concluded on April 26, 2011, and the court’s decision was issued 42 days later, on June 7, 2011, well within the 60-day limitation *(see*Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [b]; CPLR 4213 [c]). Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Carni and Lindley, JJ.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Jason Castanon, Defendant-Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Tara A. Collins, J.), rendered August 1, 2018, convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of driving while impaired, and imposing sentence.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Judgment of conviction (Tara A. Collins, J.), rendered August 1, 2018, affirmed. </p><p>Our review of the record indicates that defendant's guilty plea to driving while impaired (Vehicle and Traffic Law ยง 1192[1]) was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently (<i>see People v Conceicao</i>, 26 NY3d 375 [2015]). At the plea proceeding held eight months after arraignment, counsel indicated that defendant would plead guilty to the lesser charged offense of driving while impaired in exchange for a negotiated sentence consisting of enrollment in the Impaired Driver's Program. In response to questioning from the court, defendant stated that he had ample time to discuss his case with counsel, waived specific constitutional rights, including the right to trial, admitted his guilt to operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, and acknowledged that he was being sentenced to a conditional discharge requiring him to lead a law-abiding life for one year and to enroll in and complete the Impaired Driver's Program. Defendant also executed a form acknowledging receipt of a written copy of the terms of the conditional discharge and its expiration date (<i>see</i> CPL 410.10[1]).</p><p>In any event, the only relief defendant requests is dismissal of the accusatory instrument, rather than vacatur of the plea, and he expressly requests that this court affirm his conviction if it does not grant dismissal. Since we do not find that dismissal would be appropriate, we affirm on this basis as well (<i>see People v Conceicao</i>, 26 NY3d at 385 n 1; <a href="../2016/2016_03598.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v Teron</i>, 139 AD3d 450</a> [2016]).</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur <br>Decision Date: November 13, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
Exhibit






                                                                                                                                          
EXHIBIT 10.29


January 27, 2019
Mr. Scott Offer
8170 Doug Hill
San Diego, CA 92127


Dear Scott:
The offer letter dated June 14, 2016 between Scott Offer and Flex (the “Scott Offer Letter”) is hereby amended effective January 28, 2019 as follows:
Changes to Scott Offer Letter:
Work Location


Your new work location will be Flex San Diego Office 10805 Rancho Bernardo Rd, Suite 100, San Diego, CA 92127. If such an office will not exist in the future, you will be working from any future Flex San Diego office or in absence of that, from your home office. You agree that this change is agreeable to you and will not constitute a mandatory relocation under the terms of the Flex Ltd. Executive Severance Plan.
Additions to Scott Offer Letter:


Flex will reimburse you for business travel, including travel to and from our office in San Jose. Flex may provide you corporate housing or, if no corporate housing is provided, you may book reasonable accommodations in line with Flex corporate travel  policies.
All reasonable expenses associated with travel or housing will be reimbursed through Workday expense processing, per policy. You will be responsible for, and agree to, indemnify and hold Flex harmless from and against any cost, damage, claim, liability or expense incurred by or claimed against Flex as a result of your use or occupancy of such leased housing and/or transportation in any manner inconsistent with or in violation of the terms of the applicable lease or agreement, including, without limitation, any damage to the leased housing, property or furnishings or failure to maintain or surrender the same in the condition required by the applicable lease or agreement.
If you agree with all the terms and conditions set forth in this letter, please sign below and return it to me.
Sincerely,
/s/ Paul Baldassari 

Paul Baldassari 
CHRO of Flex
OFFER ACCEPTANCE
I, Scott Offer, understand all the terms and conditions in this amendment letter. I agree by signing below that the Company has made no other promises other than what was in the Scott Offer Letter and the changes and additions outlined in this amendment letter and I accept this amendment.
	
					
	/s/ Scott Offer
	 
	Jan 28th, 2019
	 
	N/A

	Signature
	 
	Today’s Date
	 
	Start Date
731 A.2d 128

#### Wade PLAIR, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Central Office Review Committee, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 9, 1999.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM:

AND NOW, this 9th day of June, 1999, the order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Rayner, Appellant.

The hearing court credited the testimony of the arresting officer. This testimony was not so inherently incredible or improbable as to lead this court to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing court *(see, e.g., People v Owens,*111 AD2d *755273; *People v Africk,*107 AD2d 700; *People v Wright,*71 AD2d 585). Nor do we find that a reduction in sentence is warranted. The sentence imposed was part of a negotiated plea and is within the legally permissible range for a second felony offender convicted of a class E felony offense *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816; *see also,*Penal Law § 70.06 [3] [e]; [4] [b]). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report on Form 40-F of Cumberland Resources Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.  The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2.  The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.





Date:  March 28, 2007





/s/ Michael L. Carroll



Senior Vice-President, Chief Financial Officer and Corporate Secretary









A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
## St at e of Ne w York Supre me Court , Appe llat e D i vi s i on T h i rd J udi ci al D e

part me n t Decided and Entered: September 15, 2016 D-55-16

In the Matter of ATTORNEYS IN VIOLATION OF JUDICIARY LAW § 468-a.
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER STANDARDS, ON MOTION Petitioner; HANA IRFANI, Respondent. (Attorney Registration No. 2872216)
Calendar Date: April 25, 2016 Before: McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch, Rose and Mulvey, JJ.

Monica A. Duffy, Committee on Professional Standards, Albany, for petitioner. Hana Irfani, North Salem, respondent pro se.

Per Curiam. Respondent, who was admitted to practice by this Court in 1998, was suspended by this Court's order dated January 30, 2014 for failure to comply with the attorney registration requirements of Judiciary Law § 468-a (113 AD3d 1020 [2014]). Respondent now requests reinstatement on the ground that she has complied with the attorney registration requirements of Judiciary Law § 468-a and the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) part 118. Petitioner does not object to

### - 2- D-55-16

respondent's application. Respondent's application is granted and she is ordered reinstated, effective immediately. McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch, Rose and Mulvey, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that respondent's application is granted; and it is further ORDERED that respondent is reinstated as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York, effective immediately.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 22 - 0165

_________________ ST ATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BRUCE SCHRODER,

Defendant and Appellant. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant t o the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five - justice panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of r ecord and to the Honorable Peter B. Ohman , District Judge . For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 10 2024

01/10/2024
Case Number: DA 22-0165
Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-17-0000226

15-JUN-2018

08:15 AM
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 29, 2014

h0721

Order 

Clerk

July 29, 2014

149012-3

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149012-3

COA: 310439; 310440

Macomb CC: 2011-001982-FH

JORDEN ANTHONY POWELL, 2011-002176-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 4, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
# C_2010073EN.01001101.xml

| 23.3.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 73/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.3.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 73/11

---

COMMISSION DECISION

of 19 March 2010

appointing the member of the European Consumer Consultative Group for Malta and its alternate

2010/C 73/04

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Commission Decision 2009/705/EC of 14 September 2009 setting up a European Consumer Consultative Group (1), and in particular Article 4 thereof,

1

Whereas:

| (1) | The mandate of the members of the European Consumer Consultative Group expired on 14 November 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The mandate of the members of the European Consumer Consultative Group expired on 14 November 2009.

| (2) | New members and alternates were appointed by Commission Decision of 17 February 2010 for a three-year period. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

New members and alternates were appointed by Commission Decision of 17 February 2010 for a three-year period.

| (3) | It is necessary to appoint a full and an alternate member representing consumer organisations from Malta for the remainder of the three-year term of office, on the basis of the proposals put forward by national authorities from Malta, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

It is necessary to appoint a full and an alternate member representing consumer organisations from Malta for the remainder of the three-year term of office, on the basis of the proposals put forward by national authorities from Malta,

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

Sole Article

The following persons are appointed member or alternate of the European Consumer Consultative Group for the remainder of its term of office:

| Member | Alternate |
| --- | --- |
| Renald BLUNDELL (MT) | Stefan XUEREB (MT) |

Member

Alternate

Renald BLUNDELL (MT)

Stefan XUEREB (MT)

Done at Brussels, 19 March 2010.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Robert MADELIN

Director-General for Health and Consumers

---

(1)  OJ L 244, 16.9.2009, p. 21.

1

---
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1765 

To require the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

to submit a report regarding certain plans regarding assistance to applicants and grantees during the response to an emergency or disaster. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 14, 2015 

Mrs. HARTZLER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To require the Administrator of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency to submit a report regarding certain 

plans regarding assistance to applicants and grantees 

during the response to an emergency or disaster. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ACTION PLAN TO IMPROVE FIELD TRANSITION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

5 date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the 

6 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall 

7 report to the Committee on Transportation and Infra8 structure of the House of Representatives and the ComVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:07 Apr 15, 2015 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1765.IH H1765

emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1765 IH

1 mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

2 of the Senate regarding the plans the agency will under3 take to provide the following: 

4 (1) Consistent guidance to applicants on FEMA 

5 disaster funding procedures during the response to 

6 an emergency or disaster. 

7 (2) Appropriate record maintenance and trans8 fer of documents to new teams during staff transi9 tions. 

10 (3) Accurate assistance to applicants and grant11 ees to ease the administrative burden throughout the 

12 process of obtaining and monitoring assistance. 

13 (b) MAINTAINING RECORDS.—The report shall also 

14 include a plan for implementing operating procedures and 

15 document retention requirements to ensure the mainte16 nance of appropriate records throughout the lifecycle of 

17 the disaster an emergency or disaster. 

18 (c) NEW TECHNOLOGIES.—Finally, the report shall 

19 identify new technologies that further aid the disaster 

20 workforce in partnering with State, local, and tribal gov21 ernments and private nonprofits in the wake of a disaster 

22 or emergency to educate, assist, and inform applicants on 

23 the status of their emergency or disaster assistance appli24 cations and projects. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                      15,870,659
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            12,277,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                123,044,183
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                    694,573,251
<ALLOWANCE>                                  7,394,383
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             866,859,253
<DEPOSITS>                                 442,314,334
<SHORT-TERM>                               246,800,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                         14,717,476
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       171,925
<OTHER-SE>                                 162,855,518
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             866,859,253
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             13,877,882
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            3,034,062
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            16,911,944
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           5,965,898
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           9,886,072
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        7,025,872
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                 (62,970)
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                           3,341,155
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,011,188
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,692,285
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   4,074,263
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 4,074,263
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .26
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .26
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.85
<LOANS-NON>                                  6,252,535
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               634,310
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             7,611,675
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  160,747
<RECOVERIES>                                     6,425
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            7,394,383
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         7,394,383
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

KIRSTEN BOWMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN COLVIN, Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration 

Defendant. 

) Case No.: 3: 16-CV-00267-HZ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY 

FEES PER 28 USC 2412(d) 

It is hereby ORDERED that, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2412, an attorney fee in the amount of $5,462.48 is awarded to Plaintiff. It is 

ordered that the attorney fee will be paid to Plaintiff's attorney, dependent upon 

verification that Plaintiff has no debt which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, 

pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 

2521 (2010). If Plaintiff has no such debt, then the check shall be made payable to 

Plaintiff's attorney, George J. Wall, and mailed to Plaintiff's attorney's mailing address 

at: 1336 E. Burnside St., Suite 130, Portland OR 97132. If Plaintiff has such debt, then 

the check for any remaining funds after offset of the debt shall be made payable to 

Plaintiff and mailed to Plaintiff's attorney's mailing address stated above. 

Case 3:16-cv-00267-HZ Document 21 Filed 03/17/17 Page 1 of 2 
IT IS SO ORDERED this __ day of ______ , 2017. 

Proposed Order submitted: 

George J all, OSB #934515 

gwall@ stpdxlaw.com 

Phone No.: 503-236-0068 

Fax No.: 503-236-0028 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Date: March 16, 2017 

Attorney for Plaintiff, Kirsten Bowman 

Case 3:16-cv-00267-HZ Document 21 Filed 03/17/17 Page 2 of 2
ACCEPTED03-14-00390-CV4052244THIRD COURT OF APPEALSAUSTIN, TEXAS2/6/2015 11:41:06 AMJEFFREY D. KYLECLERK
Legend      
**Site Types****  Confluence    **  Stream Gage    **  Reservoir    **  Reach    **  Climate Site (Rain)    **  Canal    **  Climate Site (Snow)    **  Diversion    **Data Sources****  BOR      **  USGS      **  NRCS      **  CDEC      **  CASS      **  COOP      **  ACIS              Updated: June 04, 2024