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GLD-201 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-1921

___________

BRIAN A. CAMPBELL,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN RONNIE HOLT; DHO RENDA; CAPTAIN BRECKON; SIS

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No.10-cv-01529)

District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 3, 2011

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES AND COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 8, 2011)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Brian A. Campbell appeals from the order of the United States District Court 

forthe Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. We will affirm.

At all times relevant to this matter, Campbell was an inmate of the Canaan United 
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States Penitentiary, Waymart, Pennsylvania (USP Canaan). He was charged with the 

prison violations of Assaulting Any Person and Possession of a Weapon. According to 

the officer who wrote the incident report, Campbell and other inmates were observed 

assaulting another inmate, with Campbell striking that inmate in the head and face with a 

padlock attached to the end of a belt. Campbell disputed the charges by maintaining that 

he did not strike anyone with a lock, though he admitted that he had grabbed a garbage 

can during the incident. After a hearing, the Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”) found 

that Campbell had committed the acts as charged and imposed various sanctions, 

including disallowance of forty days of good conduct time. In July 2010, Campbell filed 

his section 2241 habeas petition challenging the loss of good conduct time and privileges, 

alleging the violation of his due process rights at the disciplinary hearing. The 

respondent responded to the petition, arguing that the petition should be dismissed 

because Campbell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The respondent also 

argued that Campbell’s disciplinary hearing complied with all that due process requires. 

Campbell filed a traverse to the response. The Magistrate Judge issued a report and 

recommendation that the habeas petition be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, or alternatively, be denied on the merits. Campbell filed his 

objections to the report and recommendation, notifying the District Court that he had 

filed an administrative appeal in September 2010 (two months after the filing of the 

habeas petition), that he receive no response within the allotted time for reply, and that 

under section 542.18 of the administrative remedy process, the response constitutes a 

denial of his final appeal. The District Court proceeded to deny the section 2241 habeas 
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petition on the merits, stating that Campbell’s failure to exhaust was excused for purposes 

of the decision.

Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). Challenges to the loss of good time credits are properly 

brought under section 2241, see Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008), 

and a certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a section 2241 

petition, see Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). We review the 

District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de novo, but we review factual findings for 

clear error. See Vega v. United States

As an initial matter, we note that federal prisoners are generally required to 

exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a section 2241 habeas petition. 

, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).

See

Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Although we 

have consistently applied an exhaustion requirement to section 2241 claims, see 

Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000), here, the respondent did not raise 

the argument that Campbell’s September 2010 attempt to complete the administrative 

process constituted a procedural default barring judicial review, see Moscato

Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits. 

, 98 F.3d at 

760-61, although the respondent did raise the lack of exhaustion before that 

administrative appeal came into existence. In any event, we conclude, as the District 

Court did, that the section 2241 habeas petition is without merit.

See Vega, 

493 F.3d at 317 n.4 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974), and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3624(b)(1)). Thus, “[w]here a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good 
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time credits, . . . an inmate must receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 

charges; (2) an opportunity . . . to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his 

defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the 

reasons for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) 

(citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). In addition, the disciplinary decision must be 

supported by “some evidence,” that is, “any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” See id.

Campbell’s due process arguments are based in part on the DHO’s failure to 

consider videotape surveillance footage that Campbell believes would exonerate him.

at 455-46. In this case, there 

appears to be no dispute that Campbell was afforded the due process requirements 

described above. The record reflects that Campbell received written notice of the charges

and incident report in advance of the disciplinary hearing. He had the opportunity to 

present witness testimony, present documentary evidence, and have a staff 

representative’s assistance at the hearing. The DHO prepared a written record, 

documented his findings and the evidence upon which he relied, explained the sanctions 

imposed, and notified Campbell of his appeal rights.

1

 

Campbell also argued that the DHO incorrectly assessed witness credibility and 

incorrectly weighed the evidence. Among other things, Campbell referred to reasons 

why he and the witness he presented were credible, to medical reports that he suffered 

injury during the incident, and to a post-hearing affidavit submitted by the other inmate, 
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stating that the lock belonged to him and that Campbell was wrongly charged in the 

assault. However, we need not examine the entire record, re-weigh the evidence, or 

independently assess witness credibility in assessing whether the “some evidence”

standard is met. See id.

Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 

appeal. 

at 455-46. Here, the DHO relied on a correctional officer’s 

incident report and on additional eyewitness reports by a prison recreation specialist and 

a case manager, noting that the memoranda identified Campbell as a perpetrator in the 

assault and that the other inmate had been struck with a padlock attached to belts. The 

DHO also relied on photographs taken on the date of the incident depicting a lock affixed 

to a belt and two locks affixed to a sock, as well as prison health services reports and 

photographs documenting Campbell’s and the other inmate’s injuries. Thus, the DHO’s

decision clearly was based on “some evidence” in the record. Moreover, the existence of 

alleged videotape surveillance footage that might have been helpful to Campbell’s 

defense does not nullify the conclusion that the DHO decision was supported by “some 

evidence” and that the requirements of due process were satisfied.

See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. We will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

order. See Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.6.

 1 The hearing officer’s report contains Campbell’s staff representative’s statement that he 

had “called SIS and they have no video.” (Exhibits to Response to Habeas Petition, 

Attachment C.)