COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 26, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP1041 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV2154

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

GREGORY A. THOMPSON,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

MICHAEL D. FREDE, VENTURESPACE LLC,

VS CAPITOL DRIVE LLC AND MICHAEL D. FREDE,

 DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS,

ANDREA JOHNSON, ENCOMPASS REALTY LLC,

KONIGIN DEVELOPMENTS LLC, ALFRED C. WAGNER 

AND COMMERCIAL CONDOS LLC,

 DEFENDANTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County: 

MICHAEL O. BOHREN, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ.
No. 2022AP1041

2

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gregory A. Thompson, pro se, appeals the circuit 

court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Michael D. Frede, in his 

individual capacity and in his capacity as sole trustee of the Frede Trust, and

VentureSpace LLC and VS Capitol Drive LLC. He also appeals the circuit court’s 

denial of his partial summary judgment motion. Thompson argues the circuit 

court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying 

him partial summary judgment. We reject his arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Thompson created StorageShopUSA, which is an entity that 

develops condominium storage unit facilities and sells individual storage units. 

Each storage unit “is a commercially zoned big garage you can utilize for storage, 

business or personal needs.” There are twenty-one StorageShopUSA 

developments in Wisconsin, and Thompson has sold 280 individual storage units. 

¶3 Frede was interested in this area of real estate and contacted 

Thompson. Frede considered purchasing Thompson’s newest storage 

development in Delafield, and Thompson shared details about his business. 

No deal between the two for the purchase of the development came to fruition. 

Thompson, however, agreed to let Frede build and sell a storage building in the

Delafield development. Thompson created a manual setting forth his 

development, which he gave to Frede without any required written agreement. 

Thompson also gave Frede a set of development plans. 
No. 2022AP1041

3

¶4 During this time, and unbeknownst to Thompson, Frede created his 

own condominium storage development. Frede hired his own architect to design 

his development, purchased the land, obtained the permits from local governing 

bodies, oversaw the construction, and had a role in the marketing and sales. In 

marketing the units for his condominium storage development, Frede used pictures 

of Thompson’s storage condominiums and relied on his affiliation with Thompson 

through the Delafield development. We include some examples of the disputed 

photographs used by Frede below:

¶5 Ultimately, Thompson brought suit against Frede and others

(collectively, “Frede”).

1

 Thompson alleged Frede misappropriated his trade 

secrets, participated in unfair competition under the theories of trademark and 

trade dress infringement and misappropriation, and was unjustly enriched. 

 

1

 Thompson brought suit against eleven parties, who given their different interests, 

naturally divided into three defendant groups, each represented by a different attorney. Only the 

defendant group comprised of Michael Frede, VentureSpace LLC, and VS Capitol Drive LLC 

remains. During the course of litigation, each defendant group filed separate motions and 

responses relating to summary judgment; however, they collectively joined into each other’s 

motions and responses. 
No. 2022AP1041

4

¶6 Thompson then brought a motion for partial summary judgment on 

his unfair competition claims of trademark and trade dress infringement and 

misappropriation. Frede opposed the motion, but did not separately move for 

summary judgment. In support, Frede argued Thompson’s summary judgment 

materials did not establish that, as a matter of law, he had a protectable trademark 

or trade dress and the materials failed to establish the elements necessary to prove 

a common law misappropriation claim. 

¶7 The court denied Thompson’s motion, concluding first there was a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Thompson had a protectable 

trademark or trade dress—specifically, Thompson had not established that his 

purported trademark or trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. As for 

Thompson’s unfair competition claim based on misappropriation, the court 

concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the “unfair nature of the 

competition and how [Thompson’s] product was used to create unfair 

competition.” 

¶8 Three months later, Frede moved for summary judgment on all of 

Thompson’s claims, arguing that, as a matter of law, Thompson was unable to 

prove up his claims. Frede argued there was no trade secret misappropriation 

because the undisputed facts showed there was no contract and Thompson did not 

keep anything secret. Frede asserted there was no unfair competition based on 

common law trademark or trade dress infringement because Thompson’s storage 

units were not inherently distinctive, had not acquired secondary meaning, and the 

disputed photographs Frede used were merely illustrative of the same type of 

generic units he offered for sale. Frede contended there was no unfair competition 

based on common law misappropriation because the creation of an identical or 

similar product is not misappropriation as long as the second party puts forth its
No. 2022AP1041

5

own time, effort, and money. The undisputed facts showed Frede hired his own 

architect to design his development, purchased the land, obtained the permits from 

local governing bodies, oversaw the construction, and had a role in the marketing 

and sales. Finally, Frede argued there was no unjust enrichment because 

Thompson did not confer a benefit onto Frede. 

¶9 Thompson opposed the motion. He argued, in part, that the circuit 

court had already determined there existed a genuine issue of material fact on his 

unfair competition claims and the circuit court was bound by that determination. 

He also argued Frede failed to prove as a matter of law there was no trade secret 

misappropriation or unjust enrichment. 

¶10 The circuit court granted Frede’s motion for summary judgment. It 

first concluded there was no trade secret misappropriation because there were no 

restrictive agreements signed by Frede and no secrecy or efforts by Thompson to 

keep his condominium storage unit development technique secret. 

¶11 The circuit court then concluded that, as a matter of law, there was 

no trademark or trade dress infringement. The photographs Frede used in 

marketing his own development were neither inherently distinctive nor had they 

become distinctive over time by acquiring a secondary meaning. The court 

reasoned:

[T]he pictures that have been described, I’m satisfied, are 

not trademarks. I’m also satisfied that they don’t come into 

being as being protected by trade dress. I see the pictures 

as simply generic pictures of a duplex garage. It has 

nothing distinctive about it to make it stand out from any 

other type of building. 

 ....

There was nothing, however, in the evidence presented by 

the Plaintiff that backs up the use of the pictures had any 
No. 2022AP1041

6

distinctive meaning to them that would relate immediately 

to StorageShopUSA. 

 Now, the pictures were just pictures of a condo duplex 

garage unit. Perhaps there was more than one duplex 

building shown, but it was never inherently connected to 

that of the Plaintiff. 

The court also concluded Thompson’s unfair competition misappropriation claim 

was based on him having a protectable trademark and trade dress and, because the 

court determined there was no protectable trademark or trade dress, the court 

dismissed Thompson’s misappropriation claim. 

¶12 Finally, the court dismissed Thompson’s claim for unjust enrichment 

because it was also based on Frede’s use of Thompson’s purported trademark, 

trade dress, and trade secrets and the court had already determined those claims 

failed as a matter of law. Thompson appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶13 On appeal, Thompson objects to the circuit court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Frede on the claims of unfair competition and unjust 

enrichment. He “does not appeal the dismissal of the misappropriation of trade 

secrets claim.” Thompson also appeals the circuit court’s denial of his partial 

summary judgment motion on the unfair competition claims. 

¶14 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same 

methodology as the circuit court. Tews v. NHI, LLC, 2010 WI 137, ¶40, 330 

Wis. 2d 389, 793 N.W.2d 860. Summary judgment must be granted if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits 

establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
No. 2022AP1041

7

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2) (2021-

22).

2

 

¶15 Further, “once sufficient time for discovery has passed, it is the 

burden of the party asserting a claim on which it bears the burden of proof at trial 

‘to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 

that party’s case.’” Transportation Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 

Wis. 2d 281, 291-92, 507 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). “The 

party moving for summary judgment need only explain the basis for its motion 

and identify those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ that it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 292. 

“[T]he moving party need not support its motion with affidavits that specifically 

negate the opponent’s claim.” Id.

I. Unfair competition claims

¶16 We begin with Thompson’s arguments relating to his unfair 

competition claims. He argues the law of the case and judicial estoppel doctrines 

preclude the grant of summary judgment in favor of Frede on the unfair 

competition claims. Alternatively, and on the merits, Thompson emphasizes that 

he asserted two legal theories in support of his claim for unfair competition: 

(1) common law trademark and trade dress infringement and (2) misappropriation. 

He argues that he, not Frede, is entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 

We address each argument in turn.

 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2022AP1041

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A. Law of the Case Doctrine; Judicial Estoppel

¶17 Thompson first argues the law of the case and judicial estoppel 

doctrines preclude a grant of summary judgment in favor of Frede on the unfair 

competition claims. He explains that because the circuit court denied Thompson’s 

partial motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was a genuine issue 

of material fact, the circuit court was bound by that decision and could not later 

grant Frede’s later motion for summary judgment. We disagree. 

¶18 The law of the case doctrine does not apply to Frede’s summary 

judgment motion. “The law of the case doctrine is a ‘longstanding rule that a 

decision on a legal issue by an appellate court establishes the law of the case, 

which must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the trial court or on later 

appeal.’” State v. Stuart, 2003 WI 73, ¶23, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82

(emphasis added). It generally binds the circuit court and appellate courts to apply 

decisions of the court of appeals and supreme court in subsequent proceedings. 

Id. Here, the circuit court’s denial of Thompson’s partial motion for summary 

judgment is not a decision on a legal issue by an appellate court. As such, the law 

of the case doctrine is inapplicable.

¶19 Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that seeks to preserve the 

integrity of the judicial process by preventing litigants from “playing ‘fast and 

loose with the courts by asserting inconsistent positions’ in different legal 

proceedings.” State v. Ryan, 2012 WI 16, ¶32, 338 Wis. 2d 695, 809 N.W.2d 37 

(citation omitted). There are three elements that must be shown for judicial 

estoppel to apply: “(1) the later position must be clearly inconsistent with the 

earlier position; (2) the facts at issue should be the same in both cases; and (3) the 

party to be estopped must have convinced the first court to adopt its position.” Id., 
No. 2022AP1041

9

¶33. We review de novo whether the elements are present; however, the decision 

to invoke judicial estoppel is subject to the circuit court’s discretion. Id., ¶30.

¶20 Thompson did not ask the circuit court to invoke judicial estoppel. 

See Gibson v. Overnite Transp. Co., 2003 WI App 210, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 429, 671 

N.W.2d 388 (“[W]e will not consider on appeal arguments not made to the trial 

court.”). In any event, even if the circuit court implicitly decided not to invoke the 

doctrine, which is what Thompson argues, we conclude the elements of judicial 

estoppel are not present in this case. We disagree with Thompson that the 

positions taken by Frede were “clearly inconsistent.” Rather, in opposing 

Thompson’s partial summary judgment motion, Frede argued Thompson failed to 

put forth sufficient undisputed facts that established, as a matter of law, 

Thompson’s unfair competition claims. Then, in moving for summary judgment, 

Frede argued Thompson did not have sufficient facts to establish his claims at trial 

and therefore Frede was entitled to judgment. These positions are not “clearly 

inconsistent.” In fact, they are consistent.

B. Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement

¶21 Thompson next argues that he, not Frede, was entitled to summary 

judgment on his trademark and trade dress infringement claims. Wisconsin has 

adopted the trademark definitions and practices from the Restatement (Third) of 

Unfair Competition. Madison Reprographics, Inc. v. Cook’s Reprographics, 

Inc., 203 Wis. 2d 226, 234 n.2, 552 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1996). The 

Restatement defines trademark as “a word, name, symbol, device, or other 

designation, or a combination of designations, that is distinctive of a person’s 

goods or services and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or 

services and distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.” 
No. 2022AP1041

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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (AM. L. INST. 1995). A 

trademark is a mark used to identify the source of goods, generally used in the 

marketing of the goods. Id. cmt. f.

¶22 A trademark is valid if “it is recognized by the public as identifying 

and distinguishing plaintiff’s goods or services.” Echo Travel, Inc. v. Travel 

Associates, Inc., 870 F.2d 1264, 1266 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Ritter v. Farrow, 

2021 WI 14, ¶25, 395 Wis. 2d 787, 955 N.W.2d 122 (noting that because 

Wisconsin’s trademark jurisprudence is undeveloped, “we look to federal law for 

guidance and key principles”). A valid trademark is either inherently distinctive 

or has become distinctive over time by acquiring a secondary meaning. Echo 

Travel, 870 F.2d at 1266.

¶23 “Inherently distinctive designations are designations that are likely 

to be perceived by prospective purchasers as symbols of identification that 

indicate an association with a particular source.” Madison Reprographics, 203 

Wis. 2d at 235. 

Inherently distinctive designations include fanciful (a 

coined term having no meaning other than identifying the 

source, such as EXXON); arbitrary (an existing word 

whose dictionary meaning has no apparent application to 

the particular product or service, such as SHELL for 

petroleum products); and suggestive (suggestive of the 

nature or characteristics of the product or business without 

being clearly descriptive, such as HERCULES for girders). 

Id. at 235 n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 

cmt. c.).

¶24 “Designations that merely describe the nature or other characteristics 

of the business, called descriptive designations, are not inherently distinctive but 

can acquire distinctiveness through use.” Id. “Acquired distinctiveness, also 
No. 2022AP1041

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called secondary meaning, occurs when the relevant consuming public has come 

to recognize the designation as one that identifies the business.” Id. 

¶25 The elements of common law trademark infringement are (1) the 

validity of the mark and (2) infringement. Echo Travel, 870 F.2d at 1266. In 

order to survive summary judgment, or be entitled to summary judgment in his 

own right, Thompson, as the plaintiff, had the burden of proof on all of the 

elements. See Hunzinger, 179 Wis. 2d at 291-92. 

¶26 The circuit court determined that the disputed photographs used by 

Frede to market his own development were not, as a matter of law, a valid 

trademark or trade dress. We agree. 

¶27 First, the photographs are not inherently distinctive. The 

photographs depict neutral colored duplex garages with a gable roof, white trim, 

and white garage doors. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition provides:

Commonplace symbols and designs are not inherently 

distinctive since their appearance on numerous products 

makes it unlikely that consumers will view them as 

distinctive of the goods or services of a particular seller. 

Thus, unless the symbol or design is striking, unusual, or 

otherwise likely to differentiate the products of a particular 

producer, the designation is not inherently distinctive.

Id. § 13 cmt. d. There is nothing striking or unusual in the disputed photographs 

that would distinguish Thompson’s condominium buildings from another’s

buildings. 

¶28 Accordingly, to be protected as a valid trademark, Thompson needed 

to show the photographs had become distinctive over time by acquiring a 

secondary meaning. See Madison Reprographics, 203 Wis. 2d at 235. 

“Secondary meaning can be established through direct evidence, such as consumer 
No. 2022AP1041

12

surveys and customer testimony, or through circumstantial evidence, such as 

evidence of exclusivity of use, length and manner of the designation’s use, amount 

and manner of advertising, amount of sales, market share, and number of 

customers.” Id. at 235-36.

¶29 Thompson, however, did not put forth sufficient evidence that would 

establish the disputed photographs had become distinctive over time by acquiring 

a secondary meaning. He did not introduce any direct evidence of secondary 

meaning in the form of customer testimony or consumer surveys that established

any association between the disputed photographs and StorageShopUSA. See 

Madison Reprographics, 203 Wis. 2d at 235. Although Thompson introduced 

emails from potential customers who contacted him wanting to purchase a storage 

unit, none of the emails referenced a photograph and did not establish any 

association between the disputed photographs and StorageShopUSA. 

¶30 Similarly, Thompson’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to 

establish the disputed photographs acquired secondary meaning. With regard to 

exclusivity and advertising, although Thompson asserts that he consistently used

the disputed photographs in his own advertising for years, this sheds little 

probative light on the question of whether consumers associated the disputed 

photographs with StorageShopUSA. See Echo Travel, 870 F.2d at 1270 (“it is the 

effect or success of the advertising, not the mere fact of advertising, that is the test 

of secondary meaning”) (citation omitted). Thompson did not offer any evidence 

demonstrating how the disputed photographs were viewed, appreciated, and acted 

on by consumers. See id. (concluding evidence that 25,000 posters containing a 

disputed photograph that were distributed to 200 college campuses was, standing 

alone, insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of 

secondary meaning).
No. 2022AP1041

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¶31 As to the amount of sales and number of customers, Thompson 

argues that the fact that he sold 280 units in the past sixteen years while using 

photographs of his storage condominiums created a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether consumers associated the disputed photographs with 

StorageShopUSA. We disagree. Thompson’s sale volume figure, by itself, fails 

to raise a genuine issue as to whether the disputed photographs have acquired 

secondary meaning. See Echo Travel, 870 F.2d at 1271 (concluding that because

the plaintiff presented no evidence of how its sales were impacted by using the 

photograph, the sales volume figures failed to raise a genuine issue as to the 

photograph’s impact on sales and, thus, on the question of whether the photograph

acquired secondary meaning).

¶32 Finally, as to Thompson’s established place in the market, 

Thompson argues that StorageShopUSA is the dominant storage condominium 

development company. He asserts there are more StorageShopUSA locations than 

any other storage company. He also offers an affidavit from a CEO of a digital 

marketing firm who averred that when a consumer searches google.com 

with the terms, “storage condo wisconsin,” “storage condos wisconsin,” “storage 

condominiums wisconsin,” “office warehouse condo” or “garage condo 

wisconsin” that StorageShopUSA’s website is the first returned result. However, 

StorageShopUSA’s word search popularity and internet presence along with 

Thompson’s testimony that StorageShopUSA is dominant does not establish 

StorageShopUSA’s established place in the market such that the disputed 

photographs have acquired secondary meaning. See Echo Travel, 870 F.2d at 

1271 (concluding the company president’s testimony that his company was the 

dominant firm in the market was insufficient to show an established place in the 
No. 2022AP1041

14

market and failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether the disputed 

photographs acquired secondary meaning).

¶33 Based on the above, we agree with the circuit court and conclude 

that, as a matter of law, Thompson has failed to prove the disputed photographs 

acquired secondary meaning such that they are a protectable trademark. 

¶34 As for Thompson’s allegations regarding trade dress infringement, 

Trade dress is defined as a product’s total image and refers 

to the total image of a product, including features such as 

size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, 

or even particular sales techniques. Moreover, it includes 

not only the packaging or dressing of a product but can also 

encompass the design of a product. 

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Bradley Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶28, 261 

Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666 (internal citations omitted). Like trademark, the 

purpose of trade dress “is to enable a business to identify itself as the source of a 

given product through the adoption of some distinctive mark.” Id. Trade dress is 

protectable if the design is distinctive (either inherently distinctive or distinctive 

through secondary meaning) and if the design is not functional. 

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16.

¶35 Here, relying on the same analysis from above, the disputed 

photographs are neither inherently distinctive nor distinctive through secondary 

meaning. The disputed photographs are not protectable trade dress.3 

 

3

 Because we determine the disputed photographs are not distinctive, we need not 

determine whether the design is functional. See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 

N.W.2d 44, (1997) (“An appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible 

grounds.”).
No. 2022AP1041

15

¶36 Because Thompson does not have sufficient evidence to prove the 

disputed photographs constitute protectable trademark or trade dress, Thompson 

cannot prove his unfair competition claims for common law trademark or trade 

dress infringement. The circuit court properly granted summary judgment in 

Frede’s favor and denied Thompson’s motion for partial summary judgment on 

this issue.

C. Misappropriation

¶37 Thompson next argues that the circuit court erred by granting 

summary judgment in favor of Frede on Thompson’s unfair competition 

misappropriation claim. He concedes the circuit court properly denied 

Thompson’s motion for partial summary judgment on this issue, but argues the 

circuit court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Frede on this issue 

based on the law of the case doctrine. 

¶38 We, however, already determined the law of the case doctrine did 

not preclude the circuit court from granting Frede’s motion for summary 

judgment. That determination also applies to the circuit court’s grant of summary 

judgment on the misappropriation claim.

¶39 In any event, the elements of unfair competition misappropriation 

are “(1) time, labor, and money expended in the creation of the thing 

misappropriated’ (2) competition; and (3) commercial damage to the plaintiff.” 

Mercury Record Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 

163, 174, 218 N.W.2d 705 (1974). Thompson, as plaintiff, has the burden of 

proving misappropriation. See Hunzinger, 179 Wis. 2d at 291-92. 
No. 2022AP1041

16

¶40 The creation of an identical or similar product is not 

misappropriation. Mercury Record, 64 Wis. 2d at 184. “The wrong is not in the 

copying, but in the appropriation, of the plaintiff’s time, effort, and money.” Id. at 

175. Here, it is undisputed that Frede hired his own architect to design his own 

development, purchased the land, obtained all the necessary permitting from the 

local governing body, oversaw construction of his developments, and had a role in 

marketing and sales. This is not misappropriation.

II. Unjust Enrichment

¶41 Finally, Thompson argues the circuit court erred by granting Frede’s 

motion for summary judgment on Thompson’s unjust enrichment claim. Unjust 

enrichment is an equitable remedy where, if there is no express contract, it is 

nonetheless unjust or inequitable for one party to fail to pay for a benefit furnished 

by another. Gebhardt Bro., Inc. v. Brimmel, 31 Wis. 2d 581, 583, 143 N.W.2d 

479 (1966). The plaintiff must prove “(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant 

by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; 

and (3) the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such 

circumstances [that] make it inequitable” to retain without payment. Id. at 584.

¶42 Thompson devotes a single paragraph in his brief-in-chief in support 

of his argument that the circuit court erred by dismissing his unjust enrichment 

claim:

The court stated the unjust enrichment claim failed because 

it determined there were no trademarks, trade dress, or 

trade secrets. The court cited no authority that supports the 

position that if a claim doesn’t necessarily rise to protected 

intellectual property, an unjust enrichment claim would not 

be valid. Defendants did not raise the argument either. The 

court’s decision to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim was 

arbitrary and the decision to grant summary judgment on 

the unjust enrichment claim should be reversed.
No. 2022AP1041

17

¶43 Thompson’s argument, however, misses the mark. The circuit court 

did not conclude one must have protected trademark, trade dress, or trade secrets 

in order to pursue an unjust enrichment claim. Rather, the circuit court concluded 

that, in this case, Thompson’s claim for unjust enrichment was based on Frede’s

use of Thompson’s trademark, trade dress, and trade secrets under circumstances 

that would make it inequitable for Frede to retain these benefits without payment. 

However, because Thompson did not establish he had a valid trademark and trade 

dress or even maintained trade secrets, we agree with the circuit court that 

Thompson’s unjust enrichment claim likewise failed. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.