[Cite as State v. Blazo, 2020-Ohio-4636.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2019-L-094

 - vs - : 

STEPHEN E. BLAZO, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018 CR 

000051. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Lisa A. Neroda, Jenny B. Azouri and 

Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main 

Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Edward M. Heindel, 2200 Terminal Tower, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 

(For Defendant-Appellant). 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Stephen E. Blazo, appeals from the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of complicity to burglary and attempted 

burglary with a repeat violent offender specification. Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence upon which his convictions were based as well 

as the trial court’s sentencing order. We affirm. 
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{¶2} During the afternoon of October 2, 2017, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office 

received a report of an attempted residential break-in and a separate report of a 

successful residential break-in both on Ravenna Road, in Concord, Ohio. The first 

homeowner, Bill Kostelnik, contacted police after he returned to his residence and 

observed pry marks and damage on the side and back doors to the home. The damage 

was apparent, but the would-be intruder was unable to gain entry. A short distance 

away, the second home, owned by the Alemagno family, had similar damage to Mr. 

Kostelnik’s home. In this case, however, the intruder was able to enter the residence 

where the master bedroom was ransacked, and various items taken. Evidence was 

collected from both residences, which included video evidence from the Alemagno’s 

security camera. 

{¶3} Based upon the security-camera videos, one M.K. became a suspect; 

ultimately, investigators determined M.K. was the individual who entered the Alemagno 

home. In light of surrounding circumstances, police determined a second suspect was 

driving M.K.’s vehicle to assist in the “get-aways.” 

{¶4} M.K. was ultimately arrested and his phone and vehicles seized and 

searched. Officers found a tire iron in the vehicle. The pry marks at the Alemagno 

residence were consistent with toolmarks made by the iron found in the vehicle. 

Further, paint found on the tire iron was consistent with paint from Mr. Kostelnik’s home. 

In effect, the tool could not be eliminated as the instrument used at both locations. 

{¶5} Investigators were able to obtain information from M.K.’s phone which 

allowed them to develop appellant as a second suspect. Appellant’s phone records 

revealed the device was in close proximity to the incidents at the time they took place. 
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The records further demonstrated that appellant’s phone was in contact with M.K.’s 

phone near the time of the burglaries. 

{¶6} In October 2018, appellant was indicted on Count One, burglary, a felony 

of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), with a repeat violent offender 

specification; Count Two, complicity to burglary, a felony of the second degree, in 

violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), with a repeat violent offender specification; Count 

Three, attempted burglary, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2923.02; and 

Count Four, complicity to attempted burglary, a felony of the third degree, in violation of 

R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). Appellant waived his right to be present at the arraignment and 

thus pleas of “not guilty” were entered on his behalf. 

{¶7} Prior to trial, the state dismissed Counts One and Three. Count Two was 

renumbered Count One and Count Four was renumbered Count Two. After hearing the 

evidence, the jury entered verdicts of guilty on the renumbered counts and the repeat 

violent offender specification. Appellant was sentenced to a term of eight years on 

renumbered Count One and a term of 60 months on renumbered Count Two. The court 

ordered the terms to be served consecutively to one another. He now appeals, 

assigning three errors. As they are related, we shall address assignments of error one 

and two together. They provide: 

{¶8} “[1.] The convictions for complicity to burglary and attempted complicity to 

burglary were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶9} “[2.] The convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.” 

{¶10} When a defendant moves the trial court pursuant to Crim.R. 29, he or she 

is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. A “sufficiency” argument raises a 
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question of law as to whether the prosecution offered some evidence concerning each 

element of the charged offense. State v. Windle, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-0033, 

2011-Ohio-4171, ¶25. “[T]he proper inquiry is, after viewing the evidence most favorably 

to the prosecution, whether the jury could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Troisi, 179 Ohio App.3d 326, 2008-

Ohio-6062, ¶9 (11th Dist.) A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction requires an appellate court to determine whether the state met its burden of 

production. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997) (Cook, J., concurring). 

{¶11} In contrast, a court reviewing the manifest weight observes the entire 

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of 

the witnesses and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Schlee, 11th Dist. Lake 

No. 93-L-082, 1994 WL 738452, *5 (Dec. 23, 1994). The role of the reviewing court is 

to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence in determining whether the state 

properly carried its burden of persuasion. Thompkins, supra. If the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one interpretation, an appellate court must interpret it in a 

manner consistent with the verdict. State v. Banks, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2003-A0118, 2005-Ohio-5286, ¶33. 

{¶12} It is well-settled that “[c]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence 

inherently possess the same probative value * * *.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 

272 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus. Circumstantial evidence involves testimony 

not grounded on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, 
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but of other facts from which inferences are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought 

to be established. State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 150 (1988). An inference is “a 

conclusion which, by means of data founded upon common experience, natural reason 

draws from facts which are proven.” State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263 (1947). It 

consequently follows that “when circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, 

that evidence must prove collateral facts and circumstances, from which the existence 

of a primary fact may be rationally inferred according to common experience.” State v. 

Windle, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-033, 2011-Ohio-4171, ¶34. 

{¶13} Appellant contends there was little to no evidence that he was the driver of 

M.K.’s vehicle when the burglary and attempted burglary occurred. He emphasizes his 

face did not appear on the security camera videos; there was no DNA or fingerprint 

evidence connecting him to either residence or the vehicle. Appellant asserts the state 

merely adduced evidence that he and M.K. were friends who enjoyed speaking with one 

another on their cell phones. As a result, he maintains there was insufficient evidence 

to support the convictions or, at the least, the convictions were unsupported by the 

weight of the evidence. 

{¶14} R.C. 2911.12(A)(2) defines burglary and provides: 

{¶15} No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the

following: * * * Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately 

secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure

that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when 

any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or 

likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any 

criminal offense. 

{¶16} Attempt to commit an offense is defined by R.C. 2923.02, which provides: 

“No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient 
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culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, 

would constitute or result in the offense.” And R.C. 2929.03, Ohio’s complicity statute, 

provides: “(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission 

of an offense, shall do any of the following: * * * (2) Aid or abet another in committing 

the offense[.]” 

{¶17} Here, the state produced evidence that an attempted burglary and a 

successful burglary occurred within approximately 0.3 miles of one another. In the first, 

attempted burglary, the principal offender used an apparent tire iron to break into a 

residence. He was unsuccessful. In the second, the principal also used an apparent 

tire iron to break into a residence and was successful. The principal left the residence 

with various items and was caught on video surveillance both inside and outside the 

residence. While in the backyard area, the surveillance caught the principal stating 

“Where are you at? Talk to me Stevie.” Appellant’s name is Steve and, in an interview 

with investigators, he admitted he is frequently called “Stevie.” In the principal’s phone, 

one of appellant’s two phone numbers (234.228.4477) lists the name “Stevie” and the 

other phone number (234.600.0347), the phone that was placing and receiving calls 

from the principal on the date of the incidents, was listed under the name “Steve.” 

{¶18} On the day of the incidents, appellant and the principal were on the phone 

with one another frequently. And, during the times the incidents occurred, i.e., between 

11:00 a.m. and 11:14 a.m., phone records indicate the principal called appellant once 

and appellant called the principal once; the first call, from the principal, occurred at 

11:02 a.m., and was about 20-30 seconds; the second call, from appellant, occurred at 

11:08 and was about six minutes in length. 
 7

{¶19} Police were able to determine, from automatic notifications sent to Mr. 

Alemagno by his security-video system, that the principal entered the Alemagno 

residence at 11:07 a.m. and left the residence at 11:14 a.m. The phone call which 

commenced at 11:08 and was received by the principal from appellant’s phone occurred 

squarely within the timeframe officers placed the principal in the residence. 

{¶20} The state also introduced evidence of the “pinging” from cell phone towers 

which placed both phones in the vicinity of the burglaries. Although the cell-phonetower evidence could not place either party in the exact location of the incidents, it 

provided some visual evidence that, at specific times calls were placed, the phones 

were traveling in a similar direction, i.e., from Trumbull County to Lake County. 

{¶21} Finally, during his police interview, appellant stated he neither “hung out” 

nor was he friends with M.K. and portrayed him as crazy and violent. He additionally 

stated he would not enter M.K.’s vehicle because, inter alia, he carries a firearm. 

However, video evidence obtained from a Walmart in Austintown, Ohio, from 

September 29, 2017, depicted appellant and M.K. entering the store with a large jar of 

change and leaving in M.K.’s vehicle. These points demonstrate the two men did 

associate more than appellant initially admitted and that appellant was not entirely 

averse to traveling in M.K.’s vehicle. 

{¶22} The state’s evidence that M.K. entered the Alemagno residence at 11:07 

a.m. and left at 11:14 a.m. provide a basic timeframe in which the incidents were 

committed; and the timing of the 11:02 a.m., as well as the 11:08 a.m. call, each 

between appellant’s phone and M.K.’s phone, support the state’s theory that the former 

call occurred during or immediately after the attempted burglary of Mr. Kostelnik’s 
 8

residence. Given these points, as well as the close proximity of the incidents and M.K.’s 

specific reference to “Stevie” while committing the second burglary and while connected 

to appellant’s phone, provide sufficient, credible evidence that appellant was complicit, 

as the driver of the “get away” vehicle, in both the attempted burglary and the 

successful burglary. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error lack merit. 

{¶23} Appellant’s third assignment of error provides: 

{¶24} “The trial court erred at sentencing when it imposed maximum and 

consecutive sentences.” 

{¶25} Appellant first takes issue with the court’s imposition of maximum terms of 

imprisonment for each crime. Recently, in State v. Gwynne, 156 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-

Ohio-4761, the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified that R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12 apply to the review of the duration of individual sentences. Gwynne, supra, at 

¶17-18. R.C. 2929.11 addresses the purposes and principles of felony sentencing 

and R.C. 2929.12 sets forth “seriousness” and “recidivism” factors. A sentencing court is 

not required to use specific language and render precise findings to satisfactorily 

“consider” the relevant seriousness and recidivism factors. State v. Long, 11th Dist. 

Lake No. 2013-L-102, 2014-Ohio-4416, ¶79. Instead, the defendant has the burden to 

affirmatively show that the court did not consider the applicable sentencing criteria or 

that the sentence imposed is “strikingly inconsistent” with applicable sentencing 

factors. Id. Thus, we presume a trial court considered the statutory purposes, principles, 

and factors from a silent record. State v. Morefield, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-71, 

2014-Ohio-5170, ¶41. 
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{¶26} In State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, the Supreme 

Court stated: 

{¶27} We note that some sentences do not require the findings that R.C. 

2953.08(G) specifically addresses. Nevertheless, it is fully 

consistent for appellate courts to review those sentences that are 

imposed solely after consideration of the factors in R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12 under a standard that is equally deferential to the

sentencing court. That is, an appellate court may vacate or modify 

any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law 

only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the record does not support the sentence. Marcum, supra, at 

¶23. 

{¶28} Here, the trial court expressly considered the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing as well as the seriousness and recidivism factors it found relevant to 

appellant’s case. Specifically, the court stated at the sentencing hearing: 

{¶29} I’ve reviewed the presentence report, obviously sat here during the 

course of the trial. I considered the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing, the overriding purposes being to punish the 

offender and protect the public from future crime by the offender 

and others using the appropriate sanctions. And I’ve also 

considered the need for incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation 

and restitution. The sentence will be commensurate with and not 

demeaning to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and its

impact on the victim will be consistent with similar crimes by similar 

offenders. I considered the seriousness and the recidivism factors 

under 2929.12. 

{¶30} I find that the victims suffered at the very least psychological and 

economic harm. That the defendant acted as part of an organized 

criminal activity with [M.K.]. The factors that indicate it’s less 

serious, I don’t find any applicable. And under the factors that 

indicate recidivism is more likely, in speaking with the probation 

officer you are on some federal parole as I understand it. 

{¶31} * * * 

{¶32} Under the factors that indicate less likely. I don’t find anything 

applicable. * * * I’m going to find that you were previously 

convicted of burglary in Mahoning County in case number 2000-

CR-605 in May of 2001; you have a burglary, a felony of the second 
 10 

degree in Mahoning County case number 2005-CR-059, April 10, 

2007; burglary, a felony of the second degree in Mahoning County; 

2005-CR-119 burglary, August 10, 2010 [sic]; burglary, a felony of 

the second degree in Mahoning County case number 2006-CR-178 

April 10, 2007; aggravated burglary, a felony of the first degree in 

Cuyahoga County CR-88-233773-A July 26th, 1989. 

{¶33} In the presentence report, it indicates that you’ve been to prison 

five separate times * * * [T]hat’s state prison five times, it does not 

include the federal incarceration. So among those convictions that 

are part of the specification that you stipulated to and that I

repeated a few minutes ago those are among fourteen felony 

convictions, this is now fifteen so you’ve kind of set forth how you 

want to live your life and you keep doing it. 

{¶34} The foregoing findings are supported by the record and therefore we hold 

the trial court did not err in imposing the maximum duration of imprisonment for each 

conviction. 

{¶35} Next, appellant challenges the trial court’s order that his terms of 

imprisonment be served consecutively. We review consecutive sentences imposed 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which states: 

{¶36} The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this 

section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the 

sentence or modification given by the sentencing court. 

{¶37} The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a

sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the 

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 

resentencing. The appellate court’s standard for review is not 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate 

court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and 

convincingly finds either of the following: 

{¶38} (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings 

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or 

(C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the 

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

{¶39} (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
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{¶40} Appellate courts “‘may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly 

and convincingly contrary to law’” only when the appellate court clearly and convincingly 

finds that the record does not support the sentence. State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 

2017-L-028, 2017-Ohio-7127, ¶8, quoting Marcum, supra, at ¶23. 

{¶41} Further, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides, in relevant part, as follows 

regarding consecutive felony sentences: 

{¶42} If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions 

of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the 

prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive 

service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to 

punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to 

the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also 

finds any of the following: 

{¶43} (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a 

sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 

of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior 

offense. 

{¶44} (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of 

one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or 

more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual 

that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part 

of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the 

seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

{¶45} (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶46} At the sentencing hearing, the court articulated the following findings: 

{¶47} I’m going to find that consecutive sentences are necessary to 

protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender. And 

that consecutive sentences are proportionate to the seriousness of 

your conduct and the danger, the obvious danger that you pose to 

the public. I’m also going to find that history of criminal conduct 

demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect 
 12 

the public from future crime by you. In that regard, there is a 

number of times amongst your fourteen convictions that you were

given concurrent time on some other cases so there is no question 

that consecutive sentences, that a consecutive sentence is 

necessary in this case. 

{¶48} The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. Further, they 

comport with statute and, as a result, the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is 

not contrary to law. 

{¶49} Appellant’s third assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶50} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

MARY JANE TRAPP, J., 

concur.