1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 09 /16/ 08. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-07-0201 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

________________________________________________________________________ LELA WI LLEF ORD, ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) S t. C lai r C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 03-L-134 ) TO YS "R " U S-D EL AW AR E, IN C., T OY S "R " U S, ) INC ., JANE T STUB BLEF IE LD, an d CAROL ) POST ME YERS, ) Honorable ) Lloy d A. Cueto, Defendan ts-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E C HA PM AN delive red the opin ion o f the c ourt: The plaintiff, Lela Will eford, wa s injure d w hen a n eas el fell from a shelf and str uck her at a Toys "R " Us store. T he de fend ants are Toy s "R" Us-Delaware, Inc., Toys "R" Us, Inc ., and two managers at the Toy s "R" Us stor e where t he plai nt iff was inj ured. The defe ndan ts file d a mo tion fo r a pro tective o rder, w hich a ddre ssed d ocum ents that were the subject of an or de r c om pe llin g d isc ov er y. Wh en they refused to comp ly with the discovery orderabsent a protect ive order , the co urt gr an ted the plaintiff' s motion for sancti ons and orderedthe defendant s to pay $1,000 and the plai ntiff 's r easonable attor

ney fee s for ser

vices rendered after February

13, 2007. The def

end ants appeal bot

h the sanctions orde r and the orderdenying their m otion for a protec tive ord er. Th ey argue that (1) th e cou rt erred in refusi ng to grant t

he protec tive order and (2) the sanctions shoul d be vacated because i t was
a "fri endly

contempt" order, s ought by the defend ants as a good-fai th way of t esti ng the
court ' s pr etri al di sc ove ry or der s. We af

fi rm. On December 15, 2001, t he plai ntiff

was injur ed when an easel fel l on her f ro m a2

shelf at one of t

he defendants ' stores. On M arch 12, 2003, she fil ed a peti tion al leging t hat the defendants neglige ntly fail ed to (1) safely

store , shelve, or r etri ev e the easel, (2) implementan adequate pol icy regarding the safe stora ge, shelvi ng, stacking, pla cement, and retrievalof merchandis e, and(3) provi de adequate t raining and supervi sionof em ployees in saf ely stor ing , she lvin g, an d re triev ing me rch and ise. The sam e day, the p lainti ff served eac h corporat e defendant wit h a set of inter rogatories and a request for the pr odu ction of do cume nts. At issue in this app eal are interrogatory No. 3 and producti on request s No. 6 and No. 25. Int errogat oryNo. 3 asked as follows: "Otherth an th e in sta nt ac tio n, h as th is D ef en da nt be en a p ar ty i n the la st t en (10) years to any type of litigation, or re ceived not ice of an al leged i njury or other cl ai m, in any

manner invol ving orotherwis e perta ining t o a box , con taine r, pro duc t[,]
or any ot

her merchandi se or i tem fall ing[] or being dropped or

pushed [] from overhead, from a shelf

or other rais ed platf

orm or surfa ces on the premi ses of any of Defen dant 's st ore s, and s tr iking a c ust omer , e mplo ye e[, ] or any oth er p ers on?" Th e plaintiff

furthe r requ ested th e nam e, add ress, an d telep hon e num ber o f any pa rty o r clai mant in any

such acti on; the name , addre ss, and tele phone number of any attor ney involved; and how each clai m was resolved. P roducti on request

No. 6 asked for t

he foll owing: "Any and all doc uments *** relating to any

invest igati on, st

udy, evaluat ion, testing, or other form of inquir y conduct ed byor on behalf

of this Defendant in any manner rel ating to the i nciden ce of fall ing merchandise in any

of its store s ***." Pr oduction reques t No. 25 as ked for the following: "T oys 'R ' U s' [ sic ] com pute r datab ase li sti ng all instances in which merchandi se is a llege d to have fall en ont o and/orstruc k a person i n any of Defendant 's s tores for the l ast t en (10) years."3

The defendan ts' response to these interr ogatori es and reques ts for producti on were du e
on M ay 13 , 200 3. The defe ndants did n ot respond until June 26 . In their interrogatory response, the d efenda nts objected to interrog atory No. 3 on the gro und s that it w as "ov erly broad and unduly

burdensome in i ts scope " and als o asked for "informati on that is i rrel evant and immateri al to t

he inst antacti on." The defendant s did, however, provi de the name of one
man who was involved in a fa lling-m ercha ndise incide nt in th e Fa ir vi ew Hei ght s To y s " R" Us store in 1997. The defendants stated that t here was " no indi cati on [that ] ther e was an injury or any clai m made." In their no tice of

com plianc e w ith the p laintiff's re ques t for pr odu ctio n, the de fend ants object ed to reques t No. 6 on the gro und s that it was "overly broad and not l imit ed in time and scope" an d inc luded "document s which are not related to the incide nt in ques tion. " They object ed to requestNo . 25 on the gro und s that it was "overly broad and not l imit ed in scope and irrelevant t o the case at issue. " On July 9, 2003, t

he plai ntiff

file d a motion t o compel disc overy . The de fend ants file d their

response to the mo tion to c om pel on Sep temb er 16 . In it, the defendant s rai sed the
sa me object ions they r aised in their responses to the initi al reque sts–t hey argued t h at interrogatory No . 3 and the tw o pro ductio n req uests w ere ov erly broa d, und uly bur den som e in sc ope , and not relev ant. On October 27, 2003, the court held a hearing in t

he matter . The reco rd does not conta in either a trans cript or a by stander 's r eport of t hat hear ing. The cour

t grant ed the pl ain tif f's motion andorde red the defe ndan ts to supplement t heir prior di scovery

responses byprovidi ng informat ion from "any da ta bases avai lable as to merchandise fal ling from shelves in its store s that stru ck an y person ." The cour t gave the de fend ants 3 0 days to comply wit

h its order, which meant that the y were to provide t he request ed informat ion by No vem ber 26, 2 003
.4

On December 23, 200 3, the c ourt h eld a status hearin g. By this tim e, the d efen dants had provided additional inform ation pursua nt to the Oc tober 27 o rder, but that informat ion
was limi ted to inci de nts i nvolving fa lling displ ay i tems (as opposed to over stock merchandise ) which had occur red between 1996 and 200 1. At th e hea ring, the defe ndan ts made an o ral moti on to reconsider a nd/or clarify the Octo ber 27 o rder. Aga in, the record does not co ntain e ither a tra nscrip t or a bystan der's rep ort of the Dece mber 2 3 hearing. In
a writt en orde r, the co urt den ied the defe ndan ts' motion and o rdered the de fend ants to f ully
com ply with the ear lier

order "a s draft ed." The orde r als o indicates t hat, during t

he heari ng, the defendants expresse d their intent to fil e a motion for

a protective ord er. Specifi call y, the orderstat es, "By

agreement, Plaintiff wil l not di ssemina te any info rmatio n or m aterials produced by Defend ant unti l Defendant has had an opportunity to fil e and obtai n a ruling upon a motionfora pr otec tive o rde r, provided, however, t hat Defendant

must fi le any such motion within 60 day

s ." (Em phas is add ed.) T he or der als o pro vided that the defe ndan ts had 60 additi on al day s to comply with the Oct ober 27 order . This gave them a deadl ine of Feb ruary 21 , 2004 , both to comply f ully with the discovery order an d to file a mo tion for a protective orde r. On March 19, 2004, nearly one month past t he court' s deadline, the defendants file d
a motion for a

protective ord er. They argue d, for the first time, that the orde r was "n ecessary t o prev ent the use a nd d isclosu re by partie s or en tities unre lated to this litigation of d ata , doc um ents [,] and in form ation p rodu ced b y defen dants ." The defe ndan ts did n ot ela bora te
on th is al le gatio n ei th erbyspe ci fy in g wha t h arm th ey bel ie vedwoul d co me t o them if th e orderwe re no t grante d or bym ak in g a ny s pe cific a lle ga tio ns w ith re sp ec t to th e p lai nt iff's inten tion s to u se th e inform ation imp rop erly. The motion r ema in ed pending for more than a y ear without a request

for a hearing,
as the parties engaged in fur ther disco very. On Ap ril 14, 20 05, the cour t held a hearin g in5

the matter (the reco rd is unclear rega rding how the motion came to a hearing a t this time). On May 27, 2005 , the court entere d an 11-page writ ten order

that revisi ted the discover y or der of October

2003 in addition to r

uling on t

he motion for a protective o rder. The court found t

hat it would be no m or e burdensome to t he defendants to pri nt allthe falling-merchandise incide nts i n thei r databa se than t o print a more li mited cat egory of incidents. The court r eject ed the ar guments the de fendants r aisedconcerni ng the rel evance of incidents involv ing emp loyees or incidents occ urring befo re 1996 or after 200 1. The co urt explai ned that e ven evidence t hatultima tely prove s inad missib le at a trial is discover able as long as th er e is so m e s im ila rity to the incide nt at i ssue. The court t hus concluded t

hat the discover y or der shoul d not be limited. The court t

hen discus sed the moti on fora protective ord er. The court not ed that the motion was "u nverified, unsu bstantiated[,] and c onclusory " and that it did not identi fy or even describe the documents it s ought to pr otect so that the court

could det ermine whether t heyare the ty

pes of mater ial in need of prot ecti on. The court further noted that the defendants' mo tio n did not ex plain h ow they wo uld b e harm ed or opp ressed abse nt a protective orde r. Finally, the c ourt co nclud ed tha t the de fend ants fa iled "to d emo nstrate 'goodcause' within the m eaning o f Illinois [Suprem e Cou rt] Rule 201 (c) [ ( 210 Il l. 2d R. 201(c)) ]." In reachi ng this conclusi on, the court cons idered f ederalcases t

hat had re

ject ed argu men ts similar to the de fend ants' "ap paren t conc ern tha t[,] abse nt a protective order , the informat ion and materials which they produce in thi s ca se m ay b e disse minated t o other present and future litigants bringing claims against them." We note that, a s the defendant s argue i n this appeal, Rule 201(c) doe s not conta in the phrase "good cause. " The parti es disa gree on whether Ill inois case l a w imposes that requir ement and, if

so , wh at t hat r equi r em en t me an s. We also not e that the court 's r eference to th e def

endants'"apparent

concern" t

hat inf ormation mi ght be dis seminate d to other6

litigants is the firs t time this i ssue appear s in t he record. The plaintiff poi nts out in her brief that this argument was rai sed for t he firs t time dur ing the A pri l 2005 hearing on the protective order; however, therecord does not conta in a transcript or r eport of t hat hear ing. On July 25, 2005, t

he defendants file d a mo tion to reconsider the Ma y 27 order. In this mo tion, the defe ndan ts arguedonly that ( 1) a prot ecti ve order was neces sary to prot ect the names of the peop le invo lved in other in ciden ts, appa rently to prot ect their privacy , (2) i nciden ts that oc curred subs eque nt to the plaintiff's injury are no t releva nt to sh ow that a dangerous conditi on exist ed in the store on th e d ay of the accid ent, an d (3) in ciden ts involving employees ( as oppo sed to cus tomers) are not r elevant due to the fact t

hat employe es spend more time in Toys " R" Us stores than cust omers, t hus exposing t

hem to a greate r ri sk of inj uryfrom fall ing merchandi se. On the sa m e d ay, the c our t, sua s pon te , ent ered an orde r stayi ng all f urther proceedi ngs in the case pending the parties'compliance wit h an orde r referr ing the case to mediati on. The co urt also ordered additional discov ery depositions. (We note that the reco rd does not indi cate pr ecisely whichis su es we re to be s ubmitt ed to mediation.) The parti es compliedwith the r eferralto mediation, but they fail ed to rea ch anyagr eeme nt . By November 200 5, th e p arti es resumed t rialpreparation. On December 13, 2005, the defendants provided the plaintiff with a report from their database conc erning incide nts of fall ing displ ay i tems that ha d o cc ur re d p rio r to th e p lai nt iff's accident –including those t

hat had occurred prior to 1996 . The defendan ts did not prov ide any inform ation re latin g to incide nts oc currin g afte r the pla intiff's inc ident. On Janu ary 12 , 2 006, the court hel d a stat us heari ng and enter ed an order s etting a hearing on the defendant s' J uly 25 motion t o reconsi der, al ong with al l pending discovery disputes, for F ebru ary 16. T he co urt a lso gav e the d efen dants a dea dline o f Jan uary 31 to subm itanyadditi onal bri efs and the plaintiff adeadli ne of February 11 to submit

any of her7

ow n br iefs

. On Januar y 31, the defendant s fil ed a supplement al bri ef in suppor t of the ir moti on to reconsider. In it, they reit erate d their

arguments t

hat the following types of incidents w ere not relevant: (1) incid ents occur ring aft er the pl ainti ff's injur y, (2) i ncident s invol ving employe es as opposed t o customers , and (3) incide nts i nvo lving overst ock or any ty pe of fall ing ob jec t o th er th an a d isp lay i t em. They argued that providi ng the reque sted info rmationwithout a protect ive order could be pre

judici al to t

hem because provi ding th e plaintiff with conta ct inf

ormation f

or every person i nvolved in a

f alling-merchan dise i ncident ata Toys " R" Us store "c ould res ult in plaintiff' s counsel*** contact ing these ind ivid uals ." They argued that "[t]his could potenti ally undermine settlement negotiati ons" in any pending litiga tion by cu stom ers o r w ork ers' co mp ens ation claim s by em plo yees. In support of

their supplementa l bri ef, the defendants provided t he affidavi t of

Karen McCann, a man ager in To ys "R" Us's risk ma nagem ent departm ent. In her affi dav it, McCann made essenti ally the same spec ulative all egati on a bou t th e possibi lit y of t he pl ain tif f's cou nse l con tactin g ot her litiga nts. She stat ed simply that providi ng the reque sted informat ion "presents a seri ous r isk that th e people i nvolved in t hose inci dents wil l be contact ed by Ms. Will eford' s counsel , orany ot her third part

y wit h whom Ms. Willefor d and hercoun sel choose to share the li st." I n addition, McCann d escribed the sy stem of "cause codes" used to cla ssify in cide nts o f fa lling me rch and ise. Cause code 21 is t he cause code for fall ing displ ay i tems, whil e cause codes 22 and 23 coverfalling overstock i tems, and cause code 26 is th e cod e for falling m ercha ndise that i s neither a d ispl ay i tem nor an over stock it em. Each cause code i s subdivi ded based on what caus ed the me rchandis e to fal l (for example, whether it was knocked from the shelf by an employee or by a customer or because it w as sta cke d im pro per ly to be gin wit h). On March 29, 2006, t

he court e ntered an order l imit ing the s cope of it s May 27, 2005,8

discovery order t o cause code 21 i ncident s and other inci den ts i nvolving fa lling displ ay items. On M ay 5, the defendant s fil ed a motion fo r a clarifi cati on of the court' s March 29 order because that

orderdi d n ot ad dr es s th e c ou rt's rulings on the d efenda nts' request for a protective order . We note that on May 3, the court did ente r an order gr anting a protective orderon workers' compensati on clai ms. On July 19, 2006, t

he court e ntered a

more formal protective order. That order pr ovided that any informat ion rel ating to workers'compensati on cl ai ms that t

he defendant s disclo sed pursuant to dis covery

orders was t o be confidential informat ion and could not be discl osed to anyone who was not a party or attorney of record in this case. On the same day, the ori ginal t rialjudge recused hi mself from pre sidi ng over future proceedings in the case . The case was subs equentl y r eassi gned. On No vem ber 2 , 2006 , the plain tiff fil ed a m otion t o strike pleadi ngs and for ot her sanctions. She alle ged that the defen dants still had not co mplied w ith the court's discovery orders, even as modifi ed by t he March 29, 2006, or der. On Decembe r 29 , 2 006, the defe ndan ts file d a response to the pl aint iff' s mot ion for s ancti ons, i n which they request ed that the court

enter a "fri endly

contempt or der" that would al low th em to ap pe al t he co ur t's di sc ov er y ru lin gs im m ed iat ely. The cour t heard argu men ts i n the m atter on Janu ary 18, 20 07. T he de fend ants repeat ed their

object ion to being requir ed to produce , without a protec tive order, informati on regarding fall ing-merchandise i ncident s that occu rred su bseq uent to the pla intiff's inc ident. The court s pecifi call y as ked the parties to addres s whetherRu le 201 requir es a part y se eking
a protective order

to d em ons trate "go od c aus e." The court det ermined that it would apply

the good-cause stand ard to e ach d ocum ent produ ced to det ermine whether the defendant s had good cause for s eeking a pr otect ive order on each. The court st atedthat it was not incl ined to grant either t

he defendants' requestfor a friendly cont empt order or the pla inti ff's motion to strike the defendant s' pl eadings but that it would not make a decisi on without s eeing the9

relevant database records. The court held another hearing on February 13, 2007, t o consider the records. By this poi nt, the parties had resol ved their discovery disputes on everyt

hing except the database informat ion invo lv in g incide nts that occur red aft er the pl ainti ff's accident . Earl y i n the hearing, the judge excused the plaintiff' s counselfrom the court ro om, ostensibly

to consi der the nature of e ach of the challenged re cords and documents to de termine whether it was sensitive enough to merit protection. However, very lit tle of the dis cussion c entere d on the nature of the i nformati on contai ne d in t he da tabase . Rath er, defense coun sel w as ab le to revisit unopposed their arguments conce rni ng th e plain tiff's attorn eys' alleged mo tives in seeking the material and the st andard to be applie d in dete rmining whethe r a prot ecti ve order is w arra nted

. First, counsel for

the defe ndan ts adm itted, "W e don 't dispute th at we need to sho w in
som e fashion tha t there is a re as on fo r p ro tec tio n h er e, w he th er th at's labeled as good cause
or it' s part

of an as[-]

just ice[- ]requi res el ement[,] but we think we mo re than meet that." He went on to argue that the datab ase rec ords– with the na mes and c ontac t inform ation for pe ople involved in fal ling- merchandise incide nts aft er 2001–"i s a blueprint for somebody t o go out and m ake pho ne ca lls an d s tar t re cr ui tin g p eo pl e a s p lai nt iff s." Th e d ef en da nt s' a tto rn eys twice admitt ed that

the pla inti ff's attor

neys ' st ated re ason for r equesting this informat ion was to determ in e whether there was a pattern. Both times , however, they contended–wit

hout providi ng any bas is–that whatthe pla inti ff real ly wanted was to fi nd potenti al class mem bers or strengthen her positi on in settlement negotiations. The court s tate d that, even accept ing their asses sment of the plain tiff 's r eal moti vation, the informat ion in t

he databas e was not the t ype of informati on that ordinari ly merite d protec tion. T he co urt exp lained as fo llow s:

"[N ]orm ally when a corporat ion comes befor e a co ur t and the y say t hey10

have–ther e's a propri etary interest and i t' s not [j ust] t hat[they ] don' t want[the other pa rty] to kn ow abou t all the oth er time s, let's say, a Cro wn Victo ria caught fi re when itwas rea r-ended o r something fell from a sh elf and hit som ebody[,] * ** w hich is differe nt than what y ou have here, isn' t it ? I mean, it 's more than jus t causing
econ om ic harm. I mean, *** I thi nk you' re ri ght why t he plai ntiff

s [ sic ] p roba bly want it. They proba

bly want it s o they

can go out and cont act peopl e to see i f they can drum up business and obviously that' s something adverse to To ys 'R' Us to do [ sic ][,] but that's d iffe ren t [fr om cas es w her e pr otec tive o rde rs are gen erall y used ]." Afterfurther discussi on along the same lines, the co urt told th e d ef en da nt s' a tto rn eys that it w as go in g t o e nt er a f rie nd ly co nt em pt or de r. T he n t he pl ain tif f's attorney s w ere allowedto ret

urn to the courtr oom, and the cour t announced t

hat it had reached a dec isi on and it w as "g oin g to do w hat's c om mo nly referre d to as a frie ndl y con tem pt." On M arch 12, 2 007 , t he court e ntered an order fi nding that the chal lenged material
was "not the kind deser

ving of prot ecti on against dissemi nation" and hold ing the defe ndan ts in co nt em pt of

co ur t fo r v io lat in g p re vi ou s d isc ov er y o rde rs . Th e court imposed as a sancti on an order for

the defendant s to pay

$1,00 0 and all the p laintiff's re ason able attor ney fees after February

13, 2007. The cour t denie d the p laintiff's m otion to strike t he defendants' pleadi ngs. The defendant s fil ed the i nstant appeal on Apri l 10, 2007. The parti es disa gree on the standard of review to be applie d on appeal. As the plaintiff correctly

contends, tri al courts enjoy a great deal of l atit

ude in det ermining whether
a pro tectiv e or der is ne ces sary. Skolnic k v. Alt heimer & Gray , 191 Il l. 2d 214, 22 3, 730 N.E.2d 4, 12 ( 200 0). Th us, on appe al, we ordinari ly review rul ings onprotective order s for
an abuse of discr etion. Skolnic k , 191 Ill. 2d at 224, 73 0 N.E .2d at 12. Th is case, how ever, turns, in part , on wh eth er the c ourt bel ow applied the correc t st andard. That is an i ssue of law that w e w ill decide de novo

. Milli gan v. Gorman , 348 Il l. App. 3d 411, 416, 810 N.E.2d11

537 , 541 (20 04)

. As prev iously noted, Rule 201(c) doe s not cont ain any language expr essly

requiring
a showing of good caus e befor e a pro tective o rder m ay be en tered. B y its terms, the rule provides that a court m ay enter a protective orde r, either at t he request of any par

ty or even
on it s ownmot io n, "a s j ustic e r equ ir es ." 210 Il l. 2d R. 201 (c)(1 ). Trialcourts have discr etionto determi ne whether j usti ce requi res a pr otect ive order–an d wh at the param eters of the o rde r sho uld be. Skolnic k , 191 Il l. 2d at 224, 730 N.E. 2d at 12. We emphasize that this gives t

rialcourts broad dis creti on to dete rmine that a protective order i s notwarranted just as it gives them b road discretion to d etermine that a p rotective order is warranted. The rule i tsel f does not define t he as -ju stice-requires standard . The sup reme co urt discuss ed this standar d in Statl and v. Freeman , 112 Ill . 2d 494, 493 N. E.2d 1075 (1986), and this court di scussed i t in May C enters, In c. v. S. G. Adams Printing & Stati onery Co. , 153 I ll. App
. 3d 101 8, 506 N.E .2d 69 1 (19 87). A lthoug h the tw o cas es use diffe rent lan guag e to des crib e the req uire me nts o f the rule , we do n ot fin d th em to b e inc ons isten t. In Statl and , the plaintiff was an attorney who sued eight

of his for

mer law partners for
an acco unting of the irpar tner ship 's pro fits. Statl and , 112 I ll. 2d at 496, 493 N.E.2d at 1076. The dispu te invo lved p artners hip inte rests in a busines s partnership that was a c lient of the law firm. The firm had recei ved partne rship interes ts i n the busi ness part nership as compensati on for lega l serv ices ren der ed. Statl and , 112 Il l. 2d at 496, 493 N.E. 2d at 1076. The record s sou ght to be protec ted inc ludedfinanci al rec ords and re cords of t he negoti ations relating to the p artners hip inte rests an d lega l fees p aid by the clien t. Statl and , 112 Ill . 2d at 497, 493 N.E.2d at 1076. After dis covery was com pleted–an d the doc umen ts were provided–t

he plaintiff

told his form er partn ers tha t, if nec essary, he wo uld u se the d ocum ents in an u nre lated Inte rna l Re ven ue S erv ice in ves tigat ion of th e pla intiff. Statl and , 112 Il l. 2d at497, 493 N.E.2d at

1076. The defendant s then filed a m otion for a p rotective order,12

arguing, amon g other thing s, t hat the parti es had agree d that t he informat ion would not be used outsi de of the litiga tion

. Statl and , 112 Ill. 2d at 497, 49 3 N.E .2d at 1076 -77. The court ultim ately g ran ted th e m otio n. Statl and , 112 Ill. 2d at 49 7, 49 3 N .E.2 d at 1 077
. On appeal, the pla inti ff

argued that the t

rialcourt abus ed its discr etionby ent ering t he protective order bec ause, und er Rule 2 01, "the defendan ts were requ ired to a llege a ny facts showing that the entering of a protective order was necessary. " Statl and , 112 Il l. 2d at 499, 493 N.E.2d at 1077. In rejecting this argument, the court explained as follows:

"Ru le 201(c)( 1) doe s not se t o ut an y spec ific requir ements for protect ive orders. There is only t he broad st andard ' as justice re quires .' The co mmittee
com men ts to Rule 201 note that subpar agraph (c) (1) provi des for'broad discre tion to make protective or de rs. ' Here, t he tri al court

was informed of

the nature of the discovered

material [] and that the plaintiff inte nded to use it in another

proceeding

. On this record it canno t be said that the ord er was im properly entere d ***. " (Emp hases add ed.) Statl and , 112 Ill. 2d at 49 9, 49 3 N .E.2 d at 1 077 -78
. We emphasize t

hat the lack of spec ific re q uirement s for prot ecti ve orders does not
mean that a party

seeking a protective order i s e ntitled to a protec tive order without demonstrating in som e fash ion tha t one is w arrante d. Th e defenda nts in th is case effe ctively conceded as much during t he heari ng from which the pl ainti ff's attor neys were exc lude d. The defendants in Statl and , unlike the defendant s here, sought t o protect fi nancialrecords and records of busines s negoti ations . These t ypes of documents have bee n reco gnized a s being inhere ntly sensitive. See May Centers, Inc

. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1022, 506 N.E.2d at 694-95 (citing Richards v. Superior Court , 86 Cal. App. 3d 265 , 150 C al. Rptr. 77 (19 78)). The plaintiff i n Statl

and , unlike the plaintiff here, expressly announced his intent t o use these inhere ntly sensitive materials in an unrel ated proc eeding. The plaintiff cont ended that something more was requir ed, and i t is that argument that the Statl and cour t re j ec t ed

. We13

do not read Statl

and to hold t hata trial cou rt must enter a protective order

anytime a li tigant alle ges that the materi al it provi des, regardless of the nature of tha t mate rial, cou ld poten tially be us ed by an other p arty in ano ther su it. In May Centers, Inc

. , thi s court used somewhat more narrow language in describing the requ ireme nts of Rule 201. That case involved a disput e over an al locabl e share l ease for store spac e in a sh opp ing m all. May Centers, Inc

. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1018-19, 506 N.E.2d at 692. The plaintiff l andlord was or deredto produce t he all ocable share lea ses with a ll of its tenant s in the Alton Square Mall , sub jectto a p rotective order keeping the lease s confidenti al. May Centers, Inc

. , 15 3 Il l. App. 3d at 1019- 20, 506 N. E.2d

at693. Th e defendanttenant

mo ved to vaca te the pro tective o rder, arg uing that the defe ndan t need ed to be able to discuss the leases with nonparties in order to investigat e the possibility of a cl ass acti on and to look f

or evidenc e that

could be used

for impeachment purposes. May C enters, Inc. , 153 Ill. App . 3d at 1 020 , 506 N .E.2d at 693 . In rulin g on this motion, the trial court notedthat t

he plaintiff had not

explai ned the nat

ure of an all ocable share lea se and that the only evidence of pr ejudic e that might fl ow from th e d isc lo su re of th e le as es w as co nc lu so ry. May Centers, Inc

. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1020, 506 N.E. 2d at 693. On app eal, th is co urt re ver sed

. We first e xplaine d that c ourts r ecognize t hat fi nancial data, such as that cont ained i n the al locabl e share l eases , is inheren tly sens itive

. May Centers, Inc. , 153 I ll. App . 3d at 1 022 , 506 N .E.2d at 694 -95. W e th en discuss ed the irr efutedtestimony of the plaintiff's chairm an. He testi fied that all ocable share lease agree men ts were, as a mat ter of bus iness practi ce, kept confident ial in order t o protec t th e interests of d evelo pers a nd co mm ercial lan dlord s. The reaso n fo r this w as to prevent a tenant negotiating a n ew or renewed lease from using i ts knowledge of t he terms of one of the lan dl or d's other allocable sh are leases in ord er to extr act m ore fav ora ble te rms . May C enters, Inc. , 153 Ill . App. 3d at

10 20 , 50 6 N .E .2d at 6 93 . W e f ou nd th at t hi s typ e o f b us in es s inju ry,14

which was likely t o flow from the fr ee dissemi nationof the i nherently se nsit ive inf ormation,
was "not a nec essary or e ven a des irable p rice fo r plaintiff to ha ve to p ay to vind icate its alle ged righ ts." May Centers, Inc. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1022, 506 N.E. 2d at 695. This was parti cularly so when the defendant' s abil ity to find e ither

impeaching evidence or potenti al class members by di scussi ng the informat ion with nonpar ties was speculative. May C enters, Inc. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1023, 506 N.E.2d at 695. We thus concluded t hat the plaintiff had sh own "good reasonfo r t he pr ot ec tive or de rs " i t s oug ht , w hi le th e d ef en da ntha d no t s how n good reason to vacate the orders. May Centers, Inc

. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1023, 506 N.E. 2d at 695. Ironic ally, the defenda nts contend that the circums tances of this ca se are analogous to those pr esent in May Centers, Inc

. , while t hey al so contend t hat the tri al court

erred by relying on our statement i n the May Centers, Inc

. opinion t hat, "by its own ter

ms, Rule 201(c ) requir es the part

y se eking a p ro te ct iv e o rd er to sh ow good cause ." (E mp has is ad ded .) May Centers, Inc. , 153 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 1 022 , 506 N.E.2d at 694 . We addr ess ea ch arg um ent in turn. We do not find t he circ umstances pr esen t in the i nstant case to be analogous t o the circumst ances of May Centers, Inc . The re, a s in Statl and , the materi al to be protect ed include d inherently

sensitive fi nancial documents, the ty pe of discove rymateri al that i s often subject to a prot ecti ve order. See May Centers, Inc

. , 153 Il l. App. 3d at 1022, 506 N.E.2d at694 -95 . Th is ca se, b y con trast, in vol ves reco rds o f ac cide nts s imila r to th e pla intiff's. May C enters, Inc. involved potentia l harm to t he business interest

s of the pl ainti ff, completel y sepa rate and dist inct f

rom the litigation. Here, by cont rast , the only

potenti al harm the defe ndan ts have point ed to is the possibili ty that t he plai ntiff

could put together a

class acti on or undermine its bar gaining pos iti on in li tigation
. Further, contrar

y t o the defendant s' c haract erization, we did not hold t ha t the May15

C enters, Inc. defendant' s stated inte nt to di scuss t he lease s with nonpar

ties in the hope o f finding impeachment evidence and /or putti ng together a possible class w as inh erently i mproperor abusi ve. Rather , we found that , on the record before us in t hat ca se, th e de fe nd an t's ability

to real ize that goalif al lowed to dis cuss the informat ion with nonpar ties
was speculative. In thi s case, the pla inti ff's stat ed purpose i n seeking the names and cont act informat ion f

or peop le involved in sim ilar incidents was to determine w hether a pa ttern exist ed–and we note that this was the plaintiff

's s tate d purpose no matt er how many times the defendants' attor

neys argued that her at

torney s real ly

had the ul teri or motive of looking for other clients. W hile it is no t c ertai n that t he plaintiff wil l find e vidence of a pat tern by contac tin g these peopl e, the discover y r equest i s reasona

bly calcul ated t o lead t o that evidence. We thus find this cas e dist inguis hable fr om both Statl and and May Centers, Inc
. As previous ly

noted, the "good cause" l anguage atthe heart of the parti es' disput e over the correct

standar d to be appl ied in r uling on a mot ion for a protect ive order com es fro m this
co ur t's May Centers, Inc

. deci si on. Th e opinion, read as a whole , st ands for no more t han the prop osition that a protective order should be entered i f a liti gant demonstrates there is a good reason t o conclude t hat jus tice requir es it . Neverthe less, to the e xtent t hat the language "good cause" i mplies a mor e onerous bur den on a party se eking the protective order t han the
as- ju sti ce-requires standar d expressly stated i n the rul e, we now clari fy t hat was not our intent. In other

words, as us ed in May C enters, Inc. , the good-cause r equirement mea ns on ly that a party seeking a p rotective order ne eds to show some v alid reason fo r the order. We are not persu aded, ho wev er, by the defenda nts' argumen t that the court applie d the wrong stan dar d in refu sing to en ter a b roa der pro tectiv e or der

. Although the court us ed the language "goo d cau se," it is cl earfrom the court' s discus sions at the cl osed sess ion with t he defendants' attor

neys that t

he court foc used its analy sis on t he nature of the dat abase rec ords and whetherthey

were the type of ma terial that should be the subject of a p rotective order.16

The cou rt c or re ctl y concluded t hat the y were not . In ot her words, t

he court f

ound that t

he defe ndan ts di d n ot sh ow th at j us tic e r eq ui re d t he en try o f a prote ctive order. It was not simp lya matter

of apply ing a more rigor ous stand ard tha n req uired; th ey did no t dem onstra te the need for a p rotectiv e ord er at all. W e there fore d ecline to direc t the co urt to en te r a broader p rotective order. We next consi der the de fendants'argument that the contemptordershould be vacated because itwa s a "frie ndly con temp t" orde r, entere d to allo w th e defenda nts to chall enge the discovery rulings with an immediate appeal. We reject t his ar gument. Fi rst, the writ ten order does no t st ate th at i t is a " fr ien dl y c onte mpt" order . The trial j udge announced from the bench that he was " goin g to do w h at's com mo nly referre d to as a frien dly conte mp t" (emp hasis added). Sec ond, even assuming t his st atement amount s to a r uling, we find that
a friendly cont empt order would have be en in error. The defendants di d not file a motion for
a protec tive ord er un til a year afte r the rele vant di sc ov er y r esponses were due . Even then they did not se ek im med iate review through friendly cont empt. Rathe r, t hey fi led a moti on to reconsi der–which attacked t he vali dity

of the under ly ing dis covery order y et agai n–and then waited eig ht more mo nths for the p laintiff to file a m otion for san ctions. It w as no t until they respo nded to the plaintiff's motion that they sou ght a friendly contem pt order. In total, the def enda nts' tactics led to five years of litigation o ver w hethe r they w ere req uired to provide the names and contact informat ion of peopl e who might have information re levant to the p laint iff's c ase . T his simp ly does n ot w arrant a findin g that th ey acted in goo d faith to challenge a discovery ruling. Th us, we d ecline to vaca te the contem pt order. For th e fore goin g reas ons, w e aff irm the rulings of the trial cou rt.

Affirm ed.17

STE WA RT , P.J., and WE XS TTE N, J., concur.NO. 5-07-0201 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ LELA WI LLEF ORD, ) Appeal from the ) Circui t Court of Plaintiff-Appell ee, ) S t. C lai r C ou nt y. ) v. ) No. 03-L-134 ) TO YS "R " U S-D EL AW AR E, IN C., T OY S "R " U S, ) INC ., JANE T STUB BLEF IE LD, an d CAROL ) POST ME YERS, ) Honorable ) Lloy d A. Cueto, Defendan ts-Appellants. ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : September 16, 2008

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Honorable M elissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Bruce D. St ewart, P. J., and Ho nor able Jam es M . W exs tten, J ., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Richard M . Ho ffm an, D avid M . Op pen heim , W ildm an, Harrol d, All en & Dixon, LLP, for 225 West Wacker Drive, Chi cago, IL 60606- 1229; Robert J . Basset t, Donovan, Rose, Ap pellants Nester & Joley , P.C. , 8 East Washington Str eet, Bellevi lle, IL 62220

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Daniel J. Cohen, Charles W. Armbruster, The Lakin Law Firm, P.C. , 300 Evans for Avenue, P.O. Box 229, Wood River, IL 62095 Appellee

___________________________________________________________________________________