J-S13041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KYONTIA LAMONT BLANKS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 377 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0001794-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: May 16, 2024

Kyontia Blanks appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a 

jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault,

possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), firearms not to be carried without a 

license, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), and flight to avoid 

apprehension, trial, or punishment.

1

 Blanks challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain his PIC conviction and claims two of his sentences should 

have merged. We affirm Blanks’ convictions but vacate and remand for 

resentencing.

On October 21, 2020, Blanks was standing with friends outside of a 

convenience store. Blanks had recently purchased a gun, which he kept in 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2503(a)(1), 2702(a)(1), 907(a), 6106(a)(1), 2705, and 

5126(a), respectively.
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the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Frederick 

Perry drove up to the store. Within seconds, Blanks drew his gun and shot 

Perry twice. Perry, who was unarmed, was taken to a hospital and pronounced 

dead. Blanks fled and was apprehended in New York eight months later.

The Commonwealth charged Blanks with criminal homicide and other 

offenses. The case proceeded to trial in January of 2023. Blanks testified that 

he had purchased the gun because Perry had threatened to kill him. He 

claimed that he shot Perry in self-defense.

The jury convicted Blanks of voluntary manslaughter and the other 

charged crimes. On February 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced Blanks to an 

aggregate term of 9 to 18 years of confinement and 1 year of reentry 

supervision, as well as costs and restitution. Blanks filed a post-sentence 

motion, which the trial court denied. Blanks timely appealed. Blanks and the 

trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 

Blanks then sought leave and filed an amended concise statement nunc pro 

tunc. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2)(i). The trial court issued a supplemental 

opinion on February 20, 2024.

Blanks presents two issues for review: (1) whether the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for PIC, and (2) whether 

his convictions of voluntary manslaughter and REAP merge for sentencing. 

We address them in turn.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence – PIC

Blanks first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his 

conviction for PIC. Specifically, he contends that the Commonwealth failed to 

prove his intent to employ the gun (the alleged instrument of crime) 

“criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a). Blanks argues that the jury’s verdict, 

finding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, precludes a finding that his 

intent was criminal. Further, Blanks submits that there was no other evidence 

that he intended to employ the gun criminally.

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to 

conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 

489–90 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). A defendant’s intent, such as the intent 

to use a gun for a criminal purpose, “may be inferred from the circumstances 

surrounding the possession.” Commonwealth v. Brockington, 230 A.3d 

1209, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 

A.2d 309, 318 (Pa. 2001)).

Generally, analysis of a sufficiency challenge for one conviction is 

independent from the jury’s verdict at a different count. Commonwealth v. 

Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1242 n.3 (Pa. 2014) (citing United States v. Powell, 
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469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)). A challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is thereby 

distinct from a challenge to the inconsistency of a verdict. Id.

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has considered and 

rejected sufficiency claims for PIC based on verdicts in related charges of 

criminal homicide. A verdict of voluntary manslaughter, by means of 

imperfect self-defense, does not render evidence insufficient for the crime of 

PIC. Commonwealth v. Weston, 749 A.2d 458, 462 (Pa. 2000) (abrogating 

a contrary holding in Commonwealth v. Correa, 648 A.2d 1199, 1203 (Pa. 

Super. 1994)). Even an acquittal of all homicide charges is not a basis to 

reverse a conviction for PIC. Moore, 103 A.3d at 1250. We therefore reject 

Blanks’ argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of PIC

simply because the jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Weston, 

supra.

Further, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find 

that Blanks intended to employ the gun criminally. As the trial court 

recounted, the surveillance video “depicted [Blanks] gazing at [Perry] while 

adopting the aggressive stance of holding a gun, pointing the gun toward 

[Perry] with his hand extended, and lunging forward toward [Perry] with the 

gun pointed towards him.” Supplemental Opinion, 4/20/24, at 3. Blanks 

shooting an unarmed Perry mere seconds after Perry’s arrival is ample 

evidence of Blanks’ intent. Blanks’ sufficiency challenge fails.
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Merger for Sentencing – Voluntary Manslaughter and REAP

Blanks next argues that his sentence for REAP should have merged with 

his sentence for voluntary manslaughter. This issue implicates the legality of 

Blanks’ sentence. Commonwealth v. Quintua, 56 A.3d 399, 400 (Pa. Super. 

2012). Accordingly, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of 

review is plenary.” Id.

Crimes merge for sentencing if two requirements are satisfied: first, “the 

crimes arise from a single criminal act,” and second, “all of the statutory 

elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other 

offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765. Analysis of the second requirement “begins 

and ends with the statutory elements of each offense.” Commonwealth v. 

Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130, 1137 (Pa. 2021).

Voluntary manslaughter is defined in relevant part as:

A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual 

commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he 

believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would 

justify the killing under [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505], but his belief is 

unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b). The elements are that the defendant intentionally or 

knowingly killed an individual and the defendant’s belief about the need for 

deadly force was unreasonable, i.e., the killing was not justified. Weston, 

749 A.2d at 462.

Likewise, a person commits REAP “if he recklessly engages in conduct 

which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. The elements are that the defendant recklessly 
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engaged in conduct that placed another person in actual danger of death or 

serious bodily injury. Edwards, 256 A.3d at 1138.

The Commonwealth argues that the crimes do not merge because they

require proof of different mental states. However, proof that a defendant 

acted intentionally or knowingly satisfies the requirement that he acted 

recklessly. See Commonwealth v. James, 268 A.3d 461, 469 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (sustaining a conviction for REAP where the evidence was sufficient to 

prove the defendant shot a gun intentionally). “The elements required to be 

proved [for REAP] are all necessary, though not sufficient, to establish the 

elements of murder.” Commonwealth v. Musselman, 396 A.2d 625, 625 

n.1 (Pa. 1979)

Alternatively, the crimes would not merge if the victims were different. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/24, at 6; see Commonwealth v. Burdge, 562 A.2d 

864, 867 (Pa. Super. 1989). A useful comparison is Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480 (Pa. Super. 2020). There, Martin Hernandez shot 

Christian Aguilar, who was near other people. Id. at 483. A jury found 

Hernandez guilty of third-degree murder and REAP, among other crimes. Id. 

This Court ruled that merger was not required because Hernandez “was not

charged with and convicted of REAP with respect to any danger in which he 

may have placed his murder victim. Rather, [Hernandez’s] charge and 

conviction was a result of the danger in which he placed other individuals near 

the scene of the shooting.” Id. at 488. In our analysis, we considered the 
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Commonwealth’s claim at trial and the jury instructions, both of which made 

clear that the charge of REAP was not directed at Aguiar. Id.

Here, the criminal information accused Blanks of recklessly endangering 

another person because he “did use a firearm to shoot the victim, Frederick 

Perry, in the chest, causing his death while there were other individuals 

present in the immediate vicinity.” Information, 9/30/21, at 1 (capitalization 

omitted). However, by the time of trial, there were no references to victims 

other than Perry.2 Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that the 

alleged victim for the charge of REAP was Perry:

The Defendant is charged at Count 5 with reckless 

endangerment, [REAP]. To find him guilty of this offense, you 

must find that the Defendant recklessly did something that may 

have placed Mr. Perry in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Now, once again, a person acts recklessly as I defined 

before with respect to serious bodily injury when he consciously 

ignores a great and unjustifiable risk that what he is doing will 

cause another person to be seriously injured. The risk must be so 

high that considering what a Defendant did and what his 

intentions were, he acted in a way that would amount to a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 

in this situation would have followed.

Now, if after considering all the evidence you find that the 

Commonwealth has established beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the Defendant’s reckless action placed Mr. Perry in danger of 

death or serious injury, you should find the Defendant guilty of 

reckless[] endangerment. Otherwise, you must find the Defendant 

not guilty.

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2 The Commonwealth emphasized that Blanks was with a group only to refute 

Blanks’ claim of self-defense; Blanks had testified that Perry threatened, “I’m 

going to kill you when I catch you by yourself.” N.T., 1/12/23, at 25. As the 

Assistant District Attorney argued to the jury, the only question in this case 

was self-defense. Id. at 104.
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N.T., 1/12/23, at 160–61. Based on the Commonwealth’s claims and the jury 

instructions, it is readily apparent that Perry was the only alleged victim for 

this count at trial. See also Trial Court Opinion, 8/1/24, at 1 (“Appellant 

Kyontia Lamont Blanks was convicted of . . . Recklessly Endangering Another 

Person (Frederick Perry) . . . .”).

In conclusion, Blanks’ convictions for voluntary manslaughter and for 

REAP arose from a single criminal act. The statutory elements of REAP are 

included in the statutory elements of voluntary manslaughter. And both

crimes were against the same victim, Perry. Therefore, Blanks’ conviction for 

REAP should have merged for sentencing purposes with his conviction for 

voluntary manslaughter. We vacate Blanks’ sentence at Count 5, recklessly 

endangering another person. Mindful that vacating this 6-to-12-month 

consecutive sentence may upset the overall sentencing scheme, we vacate 

the remainder of Blanks’ sentence and remand for resentencing. 

Commonwealth v. Sutton, 583 A.2d 500, 502 (Pa. Super. 1990).

Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded 

for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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5/16/2024