1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

JOHN DOE, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE 

OF GREENSBURG, et al., 

 Defendants.

Civ. Action No. 20-1750 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Doe”) brings this 

case against Defendants Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg; 

Edward C. Malesic, Bishop of the Diocese of Greensburg; St. John 

the Baptist and St. Joseph parish, successor entity to St. 

Joseph’s Roman Catholic Church in Everson, Pennsylvania 

(collectively, hereinafter “Greensburg Defendants”); and Donald 

Wuerl (“Mr. Wuerl”), the former Bishop of the Diocese of 

Pittsburgh and former Archbishop of the Roman Catholic 

Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., based on alleged sexual abuse 

Mr. Doe suffered as a minor.1 See Ex. A Notice of Removal 

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1; Mot. Proceed via Pseudonym, ECF No. 5-

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 
2

1. The Greensburg Defendants and Mr. Wuerl both seek to have 

this case dismissed. See Motion to Dismiss (“Greensburg Defs.’ 

Mot.”), ECF No. 36; Defendant Donald W. Wuerl’s Motion to 

Dismiss (“Def. Wuerl’s Mot.”), ECF No. 37. Mr. Doe opposes both 

motions. See Mem. in Opp’n to Greensburg Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs.”), ECF No. 39; Mem. in 

Opp’n to Donald Wuerl’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. 

Wuerl”), ECF No. 40. 

Upon consideration of the motions, responses, and the 

replies thereto, the applicable law and regulations, the entire 

record and the materials cited therein, the Court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART the Greensburg Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 

ECF No. 36; and DENIES Mr. Wuerl’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 

37. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background 

On June 5, 2020, Mr. Doe brought suit in the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia (“Superior Court”) against 

Defendants alleging the following causes of action: (1) Count I—

Negligence, see Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 52-60; (2) Count II—

Negligent Supervision, Monitoring, Training, and Retention, see 

id. ¶¶ 61-70; (3) Count III—Breach of Special Duty, see id. ¶¶ 

71-78; (4) Count IV—Constructive Fraud, see id. ¶¶ 79- 85; and 

(5) Count V—Civil Conspiracy to Commit Fraud, see id. ¶¶ 86-93. 

The Diocese and Parish are named as defendants on all counts. 
3

Bishop Malesic and Cardinal Wuerl are named only in Count V of 

the Complaint.2 

Mr. Doe seeks compensatory and punitive damages on his 

claims, each of which arise from the alleged sexual abuse he 

suffered as a minor from approximately 1991 to 1997—or from when 

he was between 11 and 17 years old—largely at the hands of 

Joseph L. Sredzinski, the now-deceased priest of Saint Joseph’s 

Roman Catholic Church (“the Parish”). Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 3, 

34. At the time, Mr. Doe resided in Westmoreland County, 

Pennsylvania, and attended the Parish, located within the 

Diocese of Greensburg (the “Greensburg Diocese”). Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 

8, 29. During this time, Mr. Sredzinski served as priest of the 

Parish, and Mr. Wuerl served as bishop of the Diocese of 

Pittsburgh, before beginning his service as Archbishop of 

Washington in 2006. Id. ¶ 9. 

Mr. Doe asserts that he was groomed by Mr. Sredzinski 

starting at the age of 9. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 29–30. 

Mr. Doe details an escalating pattern of alleged sexual abuse 

over the course of his childhood. In the second half of 1991, 

when he was 11 years old, he alleges that Mr. Sredzinski took 

him to the Parish’s rectory, stripped him naked, and kissed him 

2 Bishop Malesic is no longer the Bishop of the Diocese of 

Greensburg and was installed as the new Bishop of the Diocese of 

Cleveland on September 14, 2020. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 36 at 12-13. 
4

all over his body, including on Mr. Doe’s anal area. Id. ¶ 31. 

Mr. Doe contends that on an occasion soon thereafter, Mr. 

Sredzinski anally penetrated him. Id. ¶ 32. Mr. Doe alleges that 

this continued for several years, with Mr. Sredinzki repeatedly 

raping him violently and forcing him to perform fellatio, 

“claiming Plaintiff was Sredzinski’s servant through God and 

needed to internalize Sredzinski’s seed.” Id. ¶¶ 32–34, 40. Mr. 

Doe alleges that on multiple occasions, Mr. Sredinzski invited 

other priests to the Rectory, who then purportedly took turns 

raping him. Id. ¶ 35. 

As per the Complaint, the sexual abuse allegedly occurred 

at the Parish rectory in Pennsylvania and on approximately 

thirty trips to Washington, D.C., during which Mr. Sredzinski 

shared a hotel room with Mr. Doe and raped him on every 

occasion. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39-40. On a few of these trips, Mr. Doe 

alleges that Defendant Cardinal Wuerl was present in the hotel 

room and witnessed Mr. Doe being abused by Mr. Sredzinski; 

rather than stopping the abuse, Mr. Wuerl allegedly proceeded to 

masturbate. See id. ¶ 42. Mr. Doe asserts that many of these 

trips were church-sponsored, and coordinated by the Greensburg 

Diocese, Bishops of that Diocese, and the Parish, including an 

annual trip to a pro-life rally, sports competitions, and other 

political or religious events. Id. ¶¶ 31, 35–38. Others trips to 

D.C. were vacations. Id. ¶ 36. 
5

Mr. Doe asserts that he reported the sexual abuse, to no 

avail, at several points. Id. ¶¶ 44-46. At age 13, Mr. Doe 

states that he reported the abuse to the Diocese in the form of 

two messages left with the office of the Bishop of the Diocese, 

but his messages were never returned. Id. ¶ 44. He states that 

he also reported the abuse to two different officials at his 

Catholic high school, which is under the Diocese’s control. Id. 

¶ 46. He adds that at age 15, he allegedly confronted Mr. Wuerl, 

who denied ever witnessing the abuse and stated that Mr. Doe 

must be lying or hallucinating. Id. ¶ 45. 

In addition to his own purported reports of the alleged 

sexual abuse, Mr. Doe points to evidence that the Diocese and 

Parish had actual or constructive knowledge that Mr. Sredzinski 

had inappropriate relationships with minor boys since at least 

as early as 1991. See generally Office of the Pennsylvania 

Attorney General, Pennsylvania Diocese Victims Report (“Grand 

Jury Report”), available at

https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/report/ (last accessed January 

5, 2022). The Court takes judicial notice of the evidence to 

which Mr. Doe refers, a multi-year Pennsylvania Grand Jury 

Investigative Report on child sexual abuse in the Catholic 

Church in Pennsylvania, published in 2018. See Pharm. Rsch. & 

Manufacturers of Am. v. United States Dep't of Health & Hum. 

Servs., 43 F. Supp. 3d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2014) (stating that 
6

“[c]ourts in this jurisdiction have frequently taken judicial 

notice of information posted on official public websites of 

government agencies,” and collecting cases). According to the 

Grand Jury Report, Tim Shoemaker, then the Mayor of Everson, 

contacted Father Roger Statnick, then a priest of the Diocese, 

as far back as 1991, to inform him of his concerns about Mr. 

Sredizski’s inappropriate relationships with multiple local 

boys, including an incident where he was found in a parked car 

with a young boy in a cemetery late at night. See Office of the 

Pennsylvania Attorney General, Grand Jury Report at 506, 

available at https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/report/. As per the 

Grand Jury Report, on January 14, 1994, the Bishop of the 

Diocese himself wrote a letter to Mr. Sredzinski’s sister 

acknowledging the Mayor’s outreach and the dangers posed by Mr. 

Sredzinski’s actions in terms of criminal and civil liability. 

Id. at 509. The Grand Jury Report concluded that the 

Pennsylvania dioceses (including the Diocese of Greensburg) were 

far more complicit in covering up abuse by priests than was 

previously known by the public. The Report stated as follows: 

While each church district had its 

idiosyncrasies, the pattern was pretty much 

the same. The main thing was not to help 

children, but to avoid ‘scandal.’ That is not 

our word, but theirs; it appears over and over 

again in the documents we recovered. Abuse 

complaints were kept locked up in a ‘secret 

archive.’ That is not our word, but theirs; 

the church’s Code of Canon Law specifically 
7

requires the diocese to maintain such an 

archive. Only the bishop can have the key. 

Id. at 2. The Grand Jury Report also made findings of 

circumstantial evidence that were suggestive of a conspiracy to 

conceal abuse amongst different dioceses and leaders. Id. at 297 

(noting that the dioceses had such commonalities in their plans 

to fraudulently conceal sexual abuse from law enforcement, the 

public, and potential victims that “[i]t seemed as if there was 

a script”). 

Mr. Doe contends that none of the information as to Mr. 

Sredinzki’s alleged child abuse was ever communicated to him, 

his family, or anyone else who could have protected him from the 

ensuing events. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 

at 11. Instead, he states that he and his family “reasonably 

relied on the Diocese and Parish’s omission of these facts, 

and/or statements in sermons, catechism classes, and other 

teachings that Catholic priests were trustworthy authority 

figures.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 20, 73. Mr. Doe alleges that the 

abuse left him with serious and permanent physical and emotional 

injuries, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, 

hypertension, panic attacks, difficulties with trust and human 

interactions, and a loss of faith, educational and employment 

opportunities. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 10-11. 
8

Mr. Doe brought suit against the Defendants on June 5, 

2020.3 See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Mr. Wuerl then removed the action 

from Superior Court to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 

1441, and 1446 on June 27, 2020. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 

1. The Greensburg defendants and Mr. Wuerl both subsequently 

moved to have the case dismissed. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 36; Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37. Mr. Doe, who has been 

granted leave by the Court to proceed under a pseudonym, see 

Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 43; opposes both motions. See Pl.’s 

Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. 

Wuerl, ECF No. 40. The motions are ripe and ready for 

adjudication. 

3 The Greensburg Defendants mention a “nearly identical” action 

commenced by Mr. Doe on August 7, 2020. See Greensburg Defs. 

Mot., ECF No. 36. at 6, 39. Mr. Doe explains that the action 

“was apparently the result of a misunderstanding between 

Plaintiff and a different law firm that is not involved in the 

instant action.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39. 

Since the action was voluntarily discontinued, the Court finds 

that it has no relevance to the present proceedings. See 

generally Docket for MR v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Greensburg, 

et. al., No. 2783 of 2020 (Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland 

County, Pennsylvania). 
9

III. Standards of Review 

A. Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss 

Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss an 

action when the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(2). On such a motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over each defendant. Crane v. N.Y. Zoological 

Soc’y., 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet this burden, 

the plaintiff must allege specific facts that connect each 

defendant with the forum. Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. 

Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The 

plaintiff cannot rely merely on conclusory allegations. 

Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 34, 42 

(D.D.C. 2003). The court may consider, receive, and weigh 

affidavits and other relevant materials outside of the pleadings 

to assist it in determining the pertinent jurisdictional facts. 

U.S. v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 n.4 (D.D.C. 

2000). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give 
10

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). While 

detailed factual allegations are not required, a complaint must 

contain “sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may 

consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents 

either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters 

of which we may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis 

Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F. 3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In 

so doing, the court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all 

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. 

MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements” are not sufficient to 

state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plaintiff must “give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 
11

C. Fraud Claims 

“In alleging fraud,” “a party must state with particularity 

the circumstances constituting fraud[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 

see also FTC v. Cantkier, 767 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(“Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard for fraud 

claims.”). To meet this “enhanced pleading standard,” a 

plaintiff must “provide a defendant with notice of the ‘who, 

what, when, where, and how’ with respect to the circumstances of 

the fraud.” Id. (quoting Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 

2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2009)). In other words, “[t]he plaintiff 

must ‘state the time, place, and content of the false 

representations, the fact misrepresented . . . and identify 

individuals allegedly involved in the fraud.’” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). 

Rule 9(b) also governs constructive fraud claims, which 

apply to innocent or negligent (rather than intentional) 

misrepresentation. See Jacobson v. Hofgard, 168 F. Supp. 3d 187, 

206 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Like claims for fraudulent 

misrepresentation, Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements apply 

to claims for negligent misrepresentation.”). Rule 9(b) further 

governs claims of conspiracy to commit fraud. See, e.g., Geier 

v. Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C., 983 F. Supp. 2d 22, 42 

(D.D.C. 2013) (“The Geiers’ civil conspiracy allegations are 

threadbare accusations that fail to state a claim, let alone 
12

meet the heightened pleading standard required by Rule 9(b).”) 

(internal citation omitted); Silvercreek Mgmt., Inc. v. 

Citigroup, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 428, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“A 

claim for conspiracy to commit fraud is also subject to Rule 

9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.”). 

D. Rule 12(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss 

Under Rule 12(b)(7), a defendant may seek dismissal of a 

complaint for failure to join a required party under Rule 19. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). The burden is on the defendant seeking 

dismissal for failure to name an absent party to show the nature 

of the interest possessed by an absent party and that the 

protection of that interest will be impaired by the absence. 

Citadel Inv. Grp., L.L.C. v. Citadel Capital Co., 699 F. Supp. 

2d 303, 317 (D.D.C. 2010). In evaluating the need for the absent 

person under Rule 12(b)(7), the court must accept as true the 

allegations in the complaint but may also consider affidavits 

and other extrinsic evidence outside of the pleadings submitted 

by the parties. 16th & K Hotel, LP v. Commonwealth Land Title 

Ins. Co., 276 F.R.D. 8, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2011). 

IV. Analysis 

The Greensburg Defendants present nine legal arguments in 

their Motion to Dismiss. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 37 

at 9. They argue that the first two arguments, lack of personal 

jurisdiction and a failure to join required parties, warrant a 
13

dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. See id. at 10. The 

Greensburg Defendants allege that the seven remaining arguments 

“warrant, at a minimum, the dismissal of some or most of the 

parties named and the claims asserted.” Id. Mr. Wuerl argues 

that Mr. Doe’s “conspiracy claim fails to meet the Rule 12(b)(6) 

and 9(b) pleading standards on multiple levels.” Def. Wuerl’s 

Mot., ECF No. 37 at 9. Since several arguments presented by the 

Greensburg Defendants and Mr. Wuerl are overlapping, the Court 

considers all the arguments together. 

A. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the 

Greensburg Defendants 

1. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over the 

Diocese and Parish Under D.C. 

Code § 13-423(a)(3) 

First, the Greensburg Defendants argue that the Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction, because the Complaint “alleges no 

cognizable connection between the Greensburg Defendants and the 

District of Columbia sufficient to confer either general or 

specific personal jurisdiction over them in this Court.” 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 37 at 9. Mr. Doe does not 

dispute the lack of general jurisdiction but argues instead that 

this Court has specific jurisdiction.4 Specifically, he responds 

that many of the trips to the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) were 

“church-sponsored events: an annual Catholic pro-life rally, 

4 The Court therefore does not reach the Greensburg Defendants’ 

arguments as to a lack of general jurisdiction. 
14

basketball and bowling competitions in D.C., and other events in 

Washington” that the Greensburg defendants have been 

coordinating “for decades.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 39 at 7, 15. He contends that specific 

jurisdiction attaches to the Diocese and Parish because the 

Parish officials supervising these trips were acting as agents 

under D.C.’s long arm statute. See id.; D.C. Code § 13-

423(a)(3). Drawing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, the 

Court agrees with Mr. Doe as to the allegations pertaining to 

Church-sponsored trips. 

D.C.’s long arm statute provides that this Court has 

personal jurisdiction over a party “who acts directly or by an 

agent” as to claims arising from the party’s “causing tortious 

injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the 

District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3). Where one acts 

as an official of a defendant and on such defendant’s behalf, an 

agency relationship can exist for the purposes of specific 

personal jurisdiction. See Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va., 

490 F. Supp. 307, 313 (D.D.C. 1980). To establish personal 

jurisdiction, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” with 

D.C. IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 3d 95, 113 

(D.D.C. 2018). “It is essential that there be some act by which 

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the 
15

benefit and protection of its laws.” Heller v. Nicholas 

Applegate Capital Mgmt., LLC, 498 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109 (D.D.C. 

2007). 

When responding to a motion to dismiss based on personal 

jurisdiction, without an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need 

only make a prima facie showing that the court has personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant. Edmond v. U.S. Postal Service 

General Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991). To meet 

this burden, the plaintiff must allege specific facts that 

connect each defendant with the forum. Second Amendment Found., 

274 F.3d at 524. Any “factual discrepancies appearing in the 

record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Crane, 894 

F.2d at 456 (citing Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1052 

(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 

Here, Mr. Doe alleges that he “was abused many times on 

approximately thirty trips to Washington D.C., both churchsponsored trips and otherwise, including vacations.” Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶ 36. He alleges that these trips to D.C. included “an 

annual Catholic pro-life rally as well as other political 

events,” and “basketball and bowling competitions with other 

churches.” Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Mr. Doe alleges that these trips were 

coordinated by Mr. Sredzinski "in conjunction with the DIOCESE, 

bishops of the DIOCESE, and/or the PARISH.” Id. On every trip to 

D.C., Mr. Doe alleges that he “shared a hotel room and slept in 
16

the same bed” as Mr. Sredzinski, and on every trip, “[Mr.] 

Sredzinski violently raped [Mr. Doe] and forced him to perform 

fellatio.” Id. ¶¶ 39-40. Mr. Doe also refers to evidence 

indicating that the Diocese and Parish were organizing an 

overnight March for Life trip as recently as 2020. See January 

12, 2020 Parish Newsletter, Exhibit 1, ECF No. 39-1 at 6 

(stating that “[y]oung people in grades 8-12 and their adult 

chaperones are invited to journey to the March for Life in 

Washington, D.C., Jan. 23-24.”). 

The Greensburg Defendants respond that “even assuming that 

these overnight trips and vacations occurred, none of the 

Greensburg Defendants would have sanctioned, coordinated, or 

approved of them during the relevant time period, especially not 

Bishop Malesic.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 19; see 

also Exhibit C, Affidavit of Monsignor Larry J. Kulick (“Kulick 

Affidavit”), ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 9-14 (stating that during the time 

period of 1991-1997, neither the Diocese, nor its Parishes, 

would have “sanctioned, coordinated, sponsored, or approved” of 

“personal vacations,” “basketball and bowling competitions,” or 

“overnight trips” to the District of Columbia “involving 

parishioners and clerics staying together in the same private 

hotel room,” and adding that the Diocese and its Parishes 

organized at most once a year day trips for the annual Catholic 

pro-life rally). The Greensburg Defendants add that they had no 
17

duty to oversee these “alleged unsanctioned overnight trips and 

personal vacations” to the District of Columbia and therefore 

did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of the 

District of Columbia. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 19. 

The Court finds that Mr. Doe has made a prima facie showing 

that the court has personal jurisdiction over the Diocese and 

Parish. See Edmond, 949 F.2d at 424. Mr. Doe has alleged that 

several trips to D.C. were Church sponsored and organized in 

conjunction with the Diocese and Parish, such that Mr. 

Sredzinski was acting as an agent of the Diocese and Parish. See

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 36-38. Although the Greensburg Defendants 

respond that the Diocese and its Parishes would not have 

organized any such trips, see Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 

at 19; Mr. Doe provides evidence that the Church has organized 

overnight trips as recently as 2020. See January 12, 2020 Parish 

Newsletter, Exhibit 1, ECF No. 39-1 at 6. There is a discrepancy 

between the Greensburg Defendants’ insistence that none of the 

trips during 1991-1997 would have been overnight trips, and Mr. 

Doe’s allegations, supported by the later Parish Newsletter that 

invites “Young people in grades 8-12 and their adult chaperones” 

to the March for Life Rally from “Jan 23-24,” a period of two

days, with events spread across both days. Compare Kulick Aff., 

Exhibit C, ECF No. 36-2 ¶ 11 with January 12, 2020 Parish 

Newsletter, Exhibit 1, ECF No. 39-1 at 6. The Greensburg 
18

Defendants do not explain why they organize such trips now, but 

allegedly only had day trips previously. There is also a 

discrepancy between the assertion that the Greensburg Defendants 

have no specific acts directed toward D.C., and the March for 

Life trips advertised by the Diocese to D.C., as well as the 

other trips Mr. Doe asserts that the Church organized.5 Compare 

Kulick Aff., Exhibit C, ECF No. 36-2 ¶ 11; January 12, 2020 

Parish Newsletter, Exhibit 1, ECF No. 39-1 at 6 with Greensburg 

Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 22. 

At this juncture, the Court must draw all factual 

discrepancies in favor of the Plaintiff. See Crane, 894 F.2d at 

456. Doing so here, the Court concludes that it can exercise 

personal jurisdiction over the Diocese and Parish since Mr. 

Doe’s allegations adequately establish their “minimum contacts” 

5 The Kulick affidavit falls far short of stating that the church 

trips Mr. Doe alleges took place, including sporting 

competitions, did not happen. See generally Kulick Aff., Exhibit 

C, ECF No. 36-2. The affidavit merely states that the Greensburg 

Defendants “would” not have approved any “overnight trips to the 

District of Columbia involving parishioners and clerics staying 

together in the same private hotel rooms” whether for “personal 

vacations” or “basketball and bowling competitions.” Id. at 45-

46. However, Mr. Doe is not alleging the church approved of Mr. 

Sredzinski staying in the same room as him; he is alleging that 

negligence by the Greensburg Defendants allowed him to be abused 

at church-sponsored trips. To that end, the affidavit does not 

establish that the Church “did not” organize any overnight trips 

of the sort Mr. Doe alleges. It does not even state the Church 

“would” not have organized any basketball or bowling trips to 

D.C. 
19

to D.C. as a party “who acts directly or by an agent” as to 

claims arising from the party’s “causing tortious injury in the 

District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of 

Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3). Mr. Doe’s allegations are 

sufficient at this juncture to show that the Greensburg 

Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of 

D.C. and created a “substantial connection with the forum.” 

Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115. 

In addition, this case, to the extent it involves churchsponsored and organized events, is easily distinguished from Doe 

v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, No. CV 19-20934(FLW), 2020 WL 

3410917, at *4 (D.N.J. June 22, 2020), which held that a 

priest’s conduct in transporting plaintiff to another state for 

purposes of sexual abuse did not subject the Archdiocese of 

Philadelphia to the personal jurisdiction of the New Jersey 

courts. By virtue of the alleged abuse occurring at churchsponsored or organized events, there is no conflict here with 

the legal standard that “unilateral activity of a third party 

cannot satisfy the requirement that Defendant have minimum 

contacts with the forum state.”6 Id. The exception is for trips 

6 For similar reasons, the Court need not address at this stage 

whether the Greensburg Defendants had any duty as a matter of 

law to oversee “unsanctioned” trips. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot.,

ECF No. 36 at 21. 
20

that were not church-sponsored or were vacations. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 36. Where Mr. Sredzinski was acting on his own 

behalf, rather than as an agent of the church, his behavior was 

the “unilateral activity of a third party” that cannot be held 

to provide specific jurisdiction over the Greensburg Defendants. 

Finally, even if the Diocese and Parish would never have 

approved trips to D.C. that involved “parishioners and clerics 

staying together in the same private hotel rooms,” Kulick Aff., 

Exhibit C, ECF No. 36-2 ¶ 13; that does not preclude the 

possibility that their agent deviated from the expected standard 

and was not adequately supervised. Moreover, the Greensburg 

Defendants emphasis on the fact that most of the alleged 

negligence took place in Pennsylvania, see Greensburg Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 36 at 21; is a question unrelated to specific 

jurisdiction, which asks simply whether the Greensburg 

Defendants had minimum contacts with D.C. For these reasons, the 

Court concludes that it has specific personal jurisdiction over 

the Diocese and Parish under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3) with 

regard to Mr. Doe’s claims arising out of the church-sponsored 

trips to D.C. 
21

2. The Court Also Has Personal Jurisdiction Over 

the Greensburg Defendants Under D.C. Code § 13-

423(a)(4) 

The Greensburg defendants argue that even if the 

“unsanctioned” trips to the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) and 

“personal vacations taken by Plaintiff and Father Sredzinski” 

are enough to confer specific jurisdiction, the Court must limit 

its exercise of jurisdiction “only to those alleged acts or 

omissions that occurred in the District of Columbia, and not 

Pennsylvania.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 9-10. Mr. 

Doe responds that the Court does have jurisdiction over the 

Greensburg Defendants’ conduct outside D.C., because they had a 

“persistent course of conduct” in D.C. that caused tortious 

injury [the alleged repeated rape of a minor] by an act [the 

Diocese and Parish’s failure to supervise, monitor, and train 

Mr. Sredzinski] that occurred both within and outside D.C. The 

Court agrees with Mr. Doe, insofar that it has personal 

jurisdiction over acts and omissions leading to injury in D.C. 

The District of Columbia’s long-arm statute provides, in 

relevant part: 

“A District of Columbia court may exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts 

directly or by an agent, as to a claim for 

relief arising from the person's . . . causing 

tortious injury in the District of Columbia by 

an act or omission outside the District of 

Columbia if he . . . engages in any other 
22

persistent course of conduct . . . in the 

District of Columbia. 

D.C. Code § 13-423(a). The “persistent course of conduct” 

provision “is satisfied by connections considerably less 

substantial than those it takes to establish general . . . 

jurisdiction,” and the connections can “be unrelated to the 

claim in suit.” Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (Ginsburg, J.) (citing cases). Furthermore, such 

persistent course of conduct establishes the “minimum contacts” 

between the defendant and D.C. “such that the maintenance of the 

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 316 (1945). In addition, § 13-423(b) provides that when 

jurisdiction over a person is based on the long arm-statute, 

“only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this 

section may be asserted against him.” D.C. Code § 13-423(b). 

Because of § 13-423(b), the Greensburg Defendants interpret 

the long-arm statute to mean that this Court’s jurisdiction is 

limited to “to those acts or omissions that occurred in the 

District of Columbia.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 24. 

However, this interpretation confuses §13-423(a) and (b). 

Section 13-423(a) plainly covers “an act or omission outside the 

District of Columbia,” so long as it leads to “tortious injury 

in the District of Columbia.” The question is not whether the 
23

act or omission occurred in D.C., but whether it led to injury 

in D.C. The limitation in §13-423(b) to “a claim for relief 

arising from acts enumerated in this section” includes acts 

outside D.C. that cause tortious injury in D.C., so long as the 

person “(i)regularly does or solicits business, (ii) engages in 

any other persistent course of conduct, or (iii) derives 

substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services 

rendered, in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-

423(a)(4). 

Nor is Mr. Doe’s interpretation of § 13-423(a) entirely 

correct. Mr. Doe maintains that “[i]f Greensburg Defendants 

engaged in a persistent course of conduct in the District, then, 

this rule would thus provide a basis for jurisdiction not just 

for the Diocese and Parish’s misconduct with respect to churchsponsored trips, but also for any of the Greensburg Defendants’ 

wrongdoing anywhere that caused injury in the District of 

Columbia, even on vacations.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., 

ECF No. 39 at 18. However, §13-423(a) provides for personal 

jurisdiction only over a person “who acts directly or by an 

agent.” Although the Church may have organized trips to D.C. at 

which its direct actions (alleged negligence) caused tortious 

injury to Mr. Doe, and Mr. Sredinzki may have been acting as an 

agent of the church on church-sanctioned trips, it does not 

follow that Mr. Sredzinski was acting as an agent of the 
24

Greensburg Defendants when he was on vacation. Personal 

jurisdiction over acts or omissions outside D.C. is limited to 

those that caused injury, directly or when Mr. Sredzinski was 

acting as an agent on church-sponsored trips, so long as there 

was a “persistent course of conduct.” 

Here, all the Greensburg Defendants engage in a consistent 

course of conduct in D.C. One example is the March for Life. As 

Mr. Doe points out, the Diocese’s Office of Faith, Family, and 

Discipleship sponsors an annual “March for Life Youth 

Pilgrimage,” where the Diocese organizes and coordinates an 

overnight “pilgrimage” trip to Washington, D.C. for their youth. 

See March for Life Youth Pilgrimage, Roman Catholic Diocese of 

Greensburg, 

https://www.dioceseofgreensburg.org/youth/Pages/marchforlifeya.a

spx; see also Energy Automation Systems, Inc. v. Saxton, 618 F. 

Supp. 2d 807, 810 n. 1 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (“A court may take 

judicial notice of the contents of an Internet 

website.”) (Citing City of Monroe Emples. Ret. Sys. v. 

Bridgestone Corp., 387 F.3d 468, 472, n. 1 (6th 

Cir.2004), amended and superseded on other grounds, 399 F.3d 651 

(6th Cir.2005)). The Parish has also coordinated bus trips for 

these events in the past. See Nature Programs Continue at 

Library, Trib Live, https://archive.triblive.com/news/natureprograms-continue-at-library-2/ (advertising, in 2009, that “St. 
25

Joseph’s parish and youth group will take a charter bus to 

Washington, D.C., Jan. 22 for the 36th annual ‘March for 

Life’”); see also January 12, 2020 Parish Newsletter at 6, 

Exhibit 1, ECF No. 39. Mr. Malesic too engages in a persistent 

course of conduct in D.C., stating in a press release letter 

that one “of the most important things [he] does every year is 

show [his] support for the March for Life in Washington, D.C.” 

Edward C. Malesic, Bishop Pro-Life Letter 2019, 

https://www.dioceseofgreensburg.org/about/Documents/Bishop%20Mal

esic%20Media/Bishop% 20Pro-Life%20Letter%202019.pdf. Although 

the Greensburg Defendants allege the letter “does not mention 

the coordinating of trips or overnight stays in the District of 

Columbia,” it mentions that Bishop Malesic shows his support 

“every year” and will do so again by being present at the March, 

suggesting he attends on an annual basis. See id. 

In addition, Mr. Doe points out several other trips the 

Greensburg Defendants organize to D.C. for parishioners both old 

and young. See June 11, 2017, Parish Newsletter at 6, Exhibit 2, 

ECF No. 39-2 at 6; June 25, 2017 Parish Newsletter, Exhibit 3, 

ECF No. 39-3 at 6. The organization of these trips demonstrates 

a “persistent course of conduct,” D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(4); and 

creates the minimum contacts necessary. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 

316. 
26

Accordingly, the Court has personal jurisdiction over all 

three Greensburg Defendants under D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4), for 

acts or omissions outside of the District of Columbia that 

caused tortious injury within the District. 

B. The Vatican and the Diocese of Pittsburgh are Not 

Required Parties 

The Greensburg Defendants contend that, in light of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 19 and the absence of the Vatican and the Diocese of 

Pittsburgh as parties, “the court cannot accord complete relief 

among existing parties” and thus the Complaint must be 

dismissed. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 25. Mr. Doe 

responds that “the Vatican and the Diocese of Pittsburgh are not 

required to be joined under Rule 19 and that equity and good 

conscience does not [sic] warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

complaint.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 22. 

The Court agrees that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of 

the Diocese of Pittsburgh or the Vatican. 

Rule 19(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person who 

is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not 

deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined 

as a party if: (A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot 

accord complete relief among existing parties[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 19(a)(1)(A). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(7) is “warranted only 

when the defect is serious and cannot be cured.” Direct Supply, 

Inc. v. Specialty Hospitals of America, LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 13, 
27

23 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal citations omitted). For the purposes 

of a Rule 12(b)(7) motion, the court must accept the complaint's 

allegations as true, and may also consider matters outside the 

pleadings when determining whether Rule 19 requires that 

a party be joined. Id. Defendant, as the moving party, bears 

the burden to demonstrate an absent party is required. Ilan–Gat 

Engineers, Ltd. v. Antigua Int'l Bank, 659 F.2d 234, 242 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981). 

However, “[i]t has long been the rule that it is not

necessary [under Rule 19(a)] for all joint tortfeasors to be 

named as defendants in a single lawsuit.” Temple v. Synthes 

Corp., Ltd., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990). Co-conspirator joint 

tortfeasors are “not indispensable parties.” Lawlor v. Nat’l 

Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955); see also Cronin v. 

Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 

2012) (“Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint 

tortfeasors” because “joint and several liability permits the 

plaintiff to recover full relief from any one of the responsible 

parties, which party then has the option of suing for 

contribution or indemnity”); Krieger v. Trane Co., 765 F. Supp. 

756, 763 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting that “it is . . . well-settled 

that joint tortfeasors are not indispensable parties” (citing C. 

Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 

1623, at 342 & n. 2 (2d ed. 1986)). 
28

Mr. Doe’s claims here are based in tort, rather than 

contract. Even if, as the Greensburg Defendants suggest, “the 

Vatican and the Diocese of Pittsburgh would be liable for 

contribution and/or indemnification to the Greensburg Defendants 

and Cardinal Wuerl for any judgment entered in this case,” 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 29; this does not mean 

they are required parties. “[J]oint and several liability 

permits the plaintiff to recover full relief from any one of the 

responsible parties, which party then has the option of suing 

for contribution or indemnity.” Cronin, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 

Therefore, the Greensburg Defendants “potential right to 

contribution or indemnity” from the Vatican or the Diocese of 

Pittsburgh does not make the latter two a required party under 

Rule 19. Id. 

The Court’s analysis is unchanged by the Greensburg 

Defendants entirely unsupported assertion that “Rule 19 does 

require the joinder of a primary tortfeasor.” Greensburg Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 36 at 29. It is unclear who the Greensburg 

Defendants consider a “primary tortfeasor,” in view of the daily 

supervision of Mr. Sredzinski by the Greensburg Defendants 

rather than the Vatican. Finally, the Court is unpersuaded by 

the Greensburg Defendants’ extensive discussion of the role of 

the Vatican in Mr. Doe’s Complaint, or the hypothesized reasons 

for the exclusion of the two named parties, without any 
29

reference to the legal standard for the joinder of tortfeasors. 

See id. at 25-27. Since the Court concludes that neither the 

Vatican nor the Diocese of Pittsburgh is a required party, it 

need not reach the second half of the joinder test, namely 

“determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action 

should proceed among the existing parties or should be 

dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). 

C. St. John The Baptist Parish Is a Proper Party to This 

Action 

The Greensburg Defendants contend that St. John the Baptist 

Parish is not a proper party to this case because it is an 

independent entity rather than a “successor entity” to St. 

Joseph Parish as Mr. Doe alleges. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 36 at 31. Mr. Doe responds that he “has not yet received 

any discovery from the Greensburg Defendants in this matter and 

does not believe this argument is appropriate for a motion to 

dismiss.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 26. The 

Court agrees with Mr. Doe that it is unable to say at this stage 

that the only relevant Parish to this lawsuit is St. Joseph 

Parish, where the alleged abuse occurred. 

As per Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, “[o]n motion or on its own, the 

court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” The 

Greensburg Defendants challenge the relevance of St. John the 

Baptist Church, stating that although the two parishes are 

partnership parishes that share a pastor and some pastoral 
30

resources, they are independent entities. See Greensburg Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 36 at 31. In response, Mr. Doe directs the 

Church’s attention to the website for the two parishes, which is 

a shared one, but proves only that they are partner parishes of 

the Diocese of Greensburg. See St. John the Baptist and St. 

Joseph, https://www.stjohnsandstjosephs.org/pages/default.aspx. 

At this juncture, however, it is premature to dismiss St. John 

the Baptist Church prior to discovery on the extent to which its 

resources have merged with St. Joseph’s. 

In Friendship Edison Pub. Charter Sch. Collegiate Campus v. 

Murphy, 448 F. Supp. 2d 166, 170 (D.D.C. 2006), a Court in this 

District held that the District of Columbia was not a proper 

party defendant in an action brought by a public charter 

school, because it was not involved in processes giving rise to 

the administrative decision at issue, it had no control over the 

hearing officer’s decisions, it could not provide any relief 

should the charter school prevail in litigation, and it had no 

stake in litigation’s outcome. Here, however, depending on the 

degree to which the parishes have merged, St. John could provide 

relief were Mr. Doe to prevail, and given the shared resources, 

may have a stake in the litigation’s outcome. The Court 

concludes that St. John shall remain a named party, until 

discovery provides more certainty that it is not relevant. 
31

D. Mr. Doe Has Sufficiently Pled All Five Claims 

1. Mr. Doe Has Stated a Claim of Negligence 

The Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe’s negligence 

claim fails as a matter of law because he has not established 

the existence of a legal duty owed by the Diocese or Parish with 

regard to the “unsanctioned overnight trips in private hotel 

rooms and personal vacations that he allegedly took with Father 

Sredzinski.” Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 18. Mr. Doe 

counters that “[a] church and a diocese have a duty to members 

of their congregation to protect them from an unreasonable risk 

of harm during a church-sponsored activity.” Pl.’s Opp’n to 

Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 33. Applying the foreseeability 

of harm test, the Court agrees with Mr. Doe. 

A claim alleging the tort of negligence must show: (1) that 

the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that 

duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff that was proximately 

caused by the breach. Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 289 

(D.C. 2016). The foundation of any negligence claim is the 

existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. 

Gilbert v. Miodovnik, 990 A.2d 983, 988 (D.C. 2010). Whether the 

facts in the record give rise to a legal duty is an issue of law 

to be determined by the court as a necessary precondition to the 

viability of a cause of action for negligence. Newmyer v. 

Sidwell Friends Sch., 128 A.3d 1023, 1034-35 (D.C. 2015). 
32

The existence of a duty depends on the “foreseeability of 

harm” test. Roe v. Doe, 401 F. Supp. 3d 159, 165 (D.D.C. 2019). 

“If the injury that befell the plaintiff was ‘reasonably 

foreseeable’ to the defendant, then courts will usually conclude 

that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to avoid causing 

that injury . . . .” Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 

789, 793 (D.C. 2011). The “test of foreseeability does not 

require that the negligent [party] should have been able to 

foresee the injury in the precise form in which it in fact 

occurred. Rather, it is sufficient if the negligent [party] 

might reasonably have foreseen that injury might occur.” Keranen 

v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 743 A.2d 703, 715 (D.C. 2000). 

The “relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant” is 

also a large part in making a determination as to 

foreseeability. Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 794. 

As a threshold matter, Mr. Doe has alleged that the trips 

to D.C. included Church-sponsored events, which are the extent 

of this Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Greensburg 

Defendants. Negligence does not turn on the fact that the injury 

“occurred at a private hotel in the District of Columbia, not 

any property or premises owned or operated by the Diocese or 

Parish.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 36. Nor does 

negligence turn on the fact that “the alleged trips occurred 

while the Plaintiff was in the care and supervision of Father 
33

Sredzinski alone.” Id. The relevant question for the purposes of 

negligence is that of the foreseeability of harm, taking into 

account the relationship between the plaintiff and the 

defendant. 

Here, Mr. Doe has sufficiently pled that “the Diocese and 

Parish knew or should have known of [Mr.] Sredzinski’s sexual 

interest in children and his capability of committing sexual 

abuse on children entrusted to the care of the Diocese and 

Parish on church-sponsored trips.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg 

Defs., ECF No. 39 at 33. Mr. Doe alleges that priests in the 

Diocese had actual knowledge of Mr. Srednzinski’s abusive 

behavior by at least as early as 1991. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 47. 

He further alleges that the Bishop of the Diocese referred to 

his actual knowledge in a letter to Mr. Sredzinski’s sister by 

at least as early as 1994. Id. ¶ 49. Furthermore, Mr. Doe 

notified the Bishop’s office of his own abuse during the 1993 to 

1994 timeframe and notified teachers at a diocesan institution 

by 1995 to 1996. Id. ¶¶ 44, 46. Drawing inferences in Mr. Doe’s 

favor at this stage, given the repeated rape of a minor on 

Parish premises by a priest, and the information in the Parish 

and Diocese’s possession, the risk during trips to D.C. was 

something the Diocese and Parish “might reasonably have 

foreseen.” Keranen, 743 A.2d at 715. 
34

The relationship between the Greensburg Defendants and Mr. 

Doe serves only to strengthen the legal duty owed by the 

Greensburg Defendants. Mr. Doe was a parishioner of the 

Greensburg Defendants, which cannot be called an “arms-length” 

relationship of the sort in Roe, where the plaintiff and 

defendant had met for the first time on the night at issue. 401 

F. Supp. 3d at 166. Contrary to the Greensburg Defendants 

assertion, see Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 18; Mr. 

Doe has pleaded a close relationship between himself and the 

Greensburg Defendants. Mr. Doe alleges that the “Plaintiff’s 

care, welfare, and/or physical custody were entrusted to the 

DIOCESE and PARISH at all times he was under their care and 

supervision, was on properties and premises operated by them, 

and/or was on trips to Washington, D.C. coordinated by them.” 

Compl, ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 54. He further alleges that the “DIOCESE 

and PARISH voluntarily accepted the entrusted care of 

Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 55. The Court takes judicial notice of the 

Parish’s website, which repeatedly describes itself as a “parish 

family,” and “an active parish faith community,” which 

“encourage parishioner involvement.” St. John the Baptist and 

St. Joseph, https://www.stjohnsandstjosephs.org/parishlife/Pages/Organizations.aspx (last accessed Jan 7, 2022). See 

also Energy Automation Systems at 810 n. 1 (“A court may take 

judicial notice of the contents of an Internet website.”) 
35

(Internal citation omitted). The Court concludes that the Parish 

and Diocese had a legal duty to Mr. Doe based on the 

foreseeability of harm, which is strengthened by the 

relationship between the two parties. For these reasons, the 

Court concludes that Mr. Doe has stated a negligence claim 

against the Greenburg Defendants. 

2. Mr. Doe Has Stated a Claim of Negligent 

Supervision 

The Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe’s negligent 

supervision claim fails “for the same reason as his negligence 

claim – the absence of a legal duty owed by the Diocese or 

Parish to supervise Father Sredzinski with regard to 

unsanctioned overnight trips.” Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 

41 at 19. They further argue that the claim also fails because 

“Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that 

the Diocese or Parish failed to adequately supervise Father 

Sredzinski.” Id. Mr. Doe responds that “[f]or similar reasons as 

those described above [with regard to negligence], the Diocese 

and Parish were bound to valid duties as to Count II.”, Pl.’s 

Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 35. The Court agrees. 

In the District of Columbia, the tort of negligent 

supervision is recognized as formulated in the Second 

Restatement of Agency, such that: 

“A person conducting an activity through 

servants or other agents is subject to 
36

liability for harm resulting from his conduct 

if he is negligent or reckless: 

(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or 

in failing to make proper regulations; or 

(b) in the employment of improper persons or 

instrumentalities in work involving risk or 

harm to others; 

(c) in the supervision of the activity; or 

(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, 

negligent or other tortious conduct by 

persons, whether or not his servants or 

agents, upon premises or with 

instrumentalities under his control.” 

Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

Relevant here, the Restatement provides that the supervised 

person need not be an employee or agent to establish liability 

under a theory of negligent supervision if the defendant was 

“negligent or reckless ... in permitting, or failing to 

prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, ... 

upon premises or with instrumentalities under [the defendant's] 

control.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213(d). 

The Greensburg Defendants first argue that Mr. Doe’s 

negligent supervision claim is devoid of any alleged duty owed 

by the Diocese or Parish to Mr. Doe on unsanctioned trip. See 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 37. However, the Court has 

already concluded that its personal jurisdiction over the 

Greensburg Defendants extends to the church-sponsored trips See 
37

supra § IV(A).7 The Court has also concluded that the Parish and 

Diocese had a duty towards Mr. Doe. See supra § IV(D)(1). 

Second, the Greensburg Defendants contend that the 

“Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to establish that 

the Diocese or Parish failed to adequately supervise Father 

Sredzinski.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 37. However, 

and as discussed previously, see supra, Mr. Doe has sufficiently 

pled that the Diocese and Parish “knew or should have known of 

Sredzinski’s predilection to sexually abuse young boys for the 

entire six-year period Sredzinski was continually raping and 

sexually abusing Plaintiff.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., 

ECF No. 39 at 36. 

Third, the Greensburg Defendants contend that Mr. Doe “has 

not alleged, and cannot allege, that Father Sredzinski was an 

employee of the Parish, which is a requirement of a negligent 

supervision claim.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 38. 

This argument is flawed because it misunderstands the scope of 

the negligent supervision tort. As the District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals established in Brown, a case the Greensburg 

Defendants themselves cite, although several cases “. . . 

7 For this reason, the Greensburg Defendants’ argument that “the 

Diocese and Parish could not be responsible as a matter of law 

to supervise Father Sredzinski while on personal excursions with 

Plaintiff to another state,” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 

at 38; fails. 
38

discuss negligent supervision in the context of an employeremployee relationship and frequently use the term “employee,” it 

is clear from the Restatement and other authorities that a claim 

of negligent supervision does not require proof that the 

supervised person was also an employee or agent.” Brown v. 

Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d 752, 760 (D.C. 2001). Mr. Doe 

correctly points out that the question for the Court is “whether 

the Parish had the ‘power to control’ Sredzinski’s conduct ‘or 

the opportunity to alert someone who did have that power in time 

to prevent the harm.’” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 

39 at 36 (citing Brown, 782 A.2d at 760). Mr. Doe has 

sufficiently pled that the Parish and Dioecese had both power 

and opportunity. Accordingly, Mr. Doe has sufficiently pled his 

negligent supervision claim. 

3. Mr. Doe Has Not Pled Breach of a Special Duty or 

Breach of a Confidential Relationship 

The Greensburg Defendants argue that D.C. does not 

recognize a breach of special duty claim as an independent cause 

of action, and alternately, if the claim is one of breach of 

fiduciary or confidential duty, it is subsumed by Mr. Doe’s 

constructive fraud claim. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 

at 38. Mr. Doe responds that these duties are “essentially 

interchangeable,” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 

27; and the distinction between them is an “unhelpful, pedantic 

exercise in hair-splitting.” Id. at 30. Nonetheless, Mr. Doe 
39

argues that even if they are considered separate claims, he has 

sufficiently pled any of these three alternatives. Pl.’s Opp’n 

to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 27. He also asserts that 

there is no requirement that he cannot separately bring a claim, 

here, breach of special duty, if it is an essential requirement 

of another claim, here, constructive fraud. See Pl.’s Opp’n to 

Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 28. The Greensburg Defendants 

reply that Mr. Doe has not established the existence of a 

generic tort of “breach of special duty,” nor has he established 

the existence of a confidential or fiduciary duty owed by the 

Diocese and Parish. Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 20-

22. The Court addresses each of the arguments in turn. 

As a threshold matter, the Court recognizes that the 

Complaint does plead breach of special duty, as well as the 

alternatives of confidential or fiduciary duty. See Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶ 74-77. The Court is also cognizant, as the Greensburg 

Defendants should have been per the Federal Rules, that “[a] 

party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense 

alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or 

defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative 

statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is 

sufficient.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). Further, “[a] party may 

state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless 

of consistency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3). Consequently, contrary 
40

to the Greensburg Defendants’ assertion, Mr. Doe is free to 

plead both breach of special duty and constructive fraud, as 

well as alternatives to breach of special duty. As Mr. Doe 

points out, the very case the Greensburg Defendants cite in 

support of their proposition that a breach of special duty claim 

is subsumed by constructive fraud allows both causes of action 

to proceed. See Cordoba Initiative Corp. v. Deak, 900 F. Supp. 

2d 42, 51 (D.D.C. 2012). Having established that Mr. Doe is free 

to plead claims in the alternative and to bring claims with 

overlapping requirements, the Court turns to the three theories 

of breach of duty Mr. Doe puts forward. As the movant for the 

motion to dismiss, the Greensburg Defendants have the burden to 

show the non-existence of legal relief. 

First, as to the alleged breach of special duty, the Court 

is unaware of a generic tort for breach of special duty. Mr. Doe 

argues that The Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323, 324A 

(1965) states the elements of a breach of special duty. See 

Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 27. However, and 

as the Greensburg Defendants point out, the Restatement sets 

forth the requirements for the torts of negligent and

intentional breach of a special duty. See Greensburg Defs.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 41 at 21. The case Mr. Doe cites in support of 

his argument does not describe a general tort of breach of 

special duty, but rather discusses “Plaintiffs' claims for 
41

negligent and intentional breach of special duty.” Serv. Emps. 

Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 83 F. 

Supp. 2d 70, 92 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 249 

F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Court concludes that the 

Greensburg Defendants have met their burden of showing the nonavailability of legal relief on Mr. Doe’s claim for breach of 

special duty and that claim is DISMISSED.

Second, as to breach of a confidential relationship, the 

tort comprises the “unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a 

third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has 

learned within a confidential relationship.” Vassiliades v. 

Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. App. 1985). 

Although the complaint alleges breach of a confidential 

relationship, as the Greensburg Defendants point out, it does 

not allege the disclosures of confidential, nonpublic 

information that comprise the tort. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 

17-18. The Court concludes that the Greensburg Defendants have 

met their burden of showing that Mr. Doe has not sufficiently 

pled breach of a confidential relationship and that claim is 

DISMISSED. 

Third, as to the alleged breach of a fiduciary duty, to 

state a valid claim, a complaint “must allege facts sufficient 

to show: (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (2) a 

breach of the duties associated with the fiduciary relationship; 
42

and (3) injuries that were proximately caused by the breach of 

fiduciary duties.” Friends Christian High Sch. v. Geneva Fin. 

Consultants, 39 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2014). The Greensburg 

Defendants argue that Mr. Doe’s “alleged relationship as a 

Church parishioner, altar boy and Catholic school attendee is 

insufficient as a matter of law to establish a fiduciary 

relationship” because D.C. “does [not] [sic] recognize any type 

of diocese/parish- parishioner relationship as triggering 

fiduciary duties.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 39. Mr. 

Doe responds that there can be a confidential relationship 

between parishioners and religious institutions, and that “the 

distinction between a fiduciary relationship and a confidential 

relationship in this context is an unhelpful, pedantic exercise 

in hair-splitting.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 

at 29-30. Mr. Doe also asserts that although under District of 

Columbia law, courts may not have considered the issue of a 

fiduciary relationship between parishioner and religious 

institution, other courts have found that such a relationship 

can exist. Id. The Court agrees that it is legally possible for 

such a relationship to exist. 

As a threshold matter, examining the difference, or lack 

thereof, between a confidential relationship and a fiduciary one 

is critical to evaluating the claims here. District of Columbia 

courts have “deliberately left the definition of a ‘fiduciary 
43

relationship’ open-ended, allowing the concept to fit a wide 

array of factual circumstances.” Council on American-Islamic 

Relations v. Gaubatz (“CAIR 2011”), 793 F. Supp. 2d 311, 341 

(D.D.C. 2011); Millennium Square Residential Ass'n v. 2200 M 

Street LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d 234, 248 (D.D.C. 2013) (“District of 

Columbia law has deliberately left the definition of ‘fiduciary 

relationship’ flexible, so that the relationship may change to 

fit new circumstances in which a special relationship of trust 

may properly be implied.”). Generally, “[a] fiduciary 

relationship is founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one 

person in the integrity and fidelity of another.” Xereas v. 

Heiss, 987 F.3d 1124, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Gov't of 

Rwanda v. Rwanda Working Group, 227 F. Supp. 2d 45, 64 (D.D.C. 

2002)). This definition is extremely similar to that of a 

confidential relationship, which “arises when one party, having 

gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises 

extraordinary influence over the other party.” Goldman v. 

Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

The similarity in these two definitions does not mean, 

however, that they are strictly interchangeable. It is true that 

a court in this District has previously held that a claim for a 

breach of the duty of confidentiality is equivalent to a claim 

for a breach of a fiduciary duty. See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 

365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2019), on reconsideration in 
44

part, 518 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2021). However, the Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has treated 

fiduciary duties as arising from a “special confidential 

relationship.” Xereas, 987 F.3d at 1130; see also Democracy 

Partners v. Project Veritas Action Fund, 453 F. Supp. 3d 261, 

279 (D.D.C. 2020), reconsideration denied, No. CV 17-1047 (ESH), 

2020 WL 5095484 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2020) (quoting Ying Qing Lu v. 

Lezell, 919 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2013)). This interpretation 

suggests that all fiduciary duties are confidential but that not 

all confidential duties are fiduciary. Moreover, treating a 

breach of confidential duty as equivalent to a breach of 

fiduciary duty would render redundant the D.C. Court of Appeals’ 

recognition of a distinct tort for the breach of confidential 

relationship. This Court therefore considers these two 

relationships, and breaches thereof, to be distinct. 

Mr. Doe correctly points out that D.C. has recognized a 

confidential relationship between parishioners and religious 

institutions. See Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 

(D.C. Ct. App. 1992)(internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted) (noting that a “person who stands in a relation of 

spiritual confidence to another” can create “a relation which 

naturally creates influence over the mind,” fostering an 

influential relationship even stronger than that of attorneyclient, guardian-ward, or parent-child relationships. “The 
45

principal factor leading to a finding of a confidential 

relationship . . . was the existence of continuous influential 

contacts, generally on a one-to-one basis, between an 

unscrupulous spiritual leader and a trusting or otherwise 

deferential parishioner.”) 

The Greensburg Defendants respond that Meares is not 

determinative in this case however because District of Columbia 

courts have not yet contemplated whether a religious institution 

can owe a fiduciary duty to their parishioners. The Greensburg 

Defendants correctly point out that a federal court when 

applying D.C. law to a situation not previously addressed by the 

D.C. Court of Appeals should be loath to extend the common law 

“without some indication that the D.C. Court of Appeals would be 

inclined to do the same were it presented with an appropriate 

situation.” Tripp v. U.S., 257 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2003).

That is not the case here, though, since the Court in Meares

held that the term “confidential relationship,” as used in 

context of relationship between parishioners and church leaders, 

“embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those informal 

relations which exist when one man trusts and relies upon 

another.”8 Meares, 624 A.2d at 420 (emphasis added). The Court 

8 As Mr. Doe points out, persuasive authority has embraced the 

“parishioner-plus rule” which holds that “a fiduciary 

relationship does not arise between the church and all 
46

concludes that District of Columbia law could support a 

conclusion that the Diocese and Parish owed a fiduciary duty to 

Mr. Doe, and that the Greensburg Defendants challenge fails 

insofar as it argues that no fiduciary duty is possible. 

However, “[w]hether a fiduciary relationship exists is a 

fact-intensive question,” Millennium Square, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 

248–49; so “a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is generally 

parishioners generally” but that “a parishioner plaintiff must 

submit facts demonstrating that his relationship with the church 

differed from other general parishioners’ relationship with the 

church.” Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ 

of Latter-Day Saints, No. 1:09-CV-00351-BLW, 2012 WL 3782454, at 

*9 (D. Idaho Aug. 31, 2012); see also Martinelli v. Bridgeport 

Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 429 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(holding that there was a fiduciary relationship between the 

plaintiff and a Catholic diocese because the plaintiff had a 

“special and privileged relationship” with a particular priest, 

because the plaintiff’s mother “entrusted his education, care, 

supervision, and safety” to the diocese by having the plaintiff 

attend Catholic school from 1st through 12th grade, because the 

plaintiff was instructed in catechism classes that the bishop 

and diocesan priests were “moral authorities whom he was obliged 

to trust and respect,” because plaintiff also engaged in 

Catholic youth groups and extracurricular activities established 

by the diocese, etc.); Fortin v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of 

Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1220 (Me. 2005) (noting that the 

plaintiff had “prolonged and extensive involvement with the 

church as a student and altar boy,” which distinguished him from 

a plaintiff “who asserts nothing more than general membership in 

a religious organization”); Rice v. Diocese of AltoonaJohnstown, 212 A.3d 1055, 1071 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (embracing 

the parishioner-plus rule and noting that “the trend is 

increasingly in favor of allowing plaintiffs to assert 

individualized, confidential relationships between themselves 

and their religious institutions”), appeal granted, 226 A.3d 560 

(Pa. 2020). 
47

not amenable to dismissal for failure to state a claim when the 

claimed ground for dismissal is absence of a fiduciary 

relationship.” CAIR 2011, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 341. Accordingly, 

the Court concludes that Mr. Doe may proceed on his claim for 

breach of fiduciary duty. 

4. Mr. Doe Has Pled His Fraud-Based Claims With The 

Requisite Particularity 

The Greensburg Defendants next argument regards Counts IV 

and V of Mr. Doe’s Complaint, in which he alleges constructive 

fraud against the Diocese and Parish, and civil conspiracy by 

all the Greensburg Defendants, including Bishop Malesic. The 

Greensburg Defendants argue that these two fraud-based counts 

must be dismissed as a matter of law because they fail to meet 

the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), which governs 

fraud claims. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 31. 

Specifically, the Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe has 

failed to meet any of the particularity requirements of Rule 

9(b), including the “who, what, when, where, and how” regarding 

his alleged constructive fraud and civil conspiracy to commit 

fraud claims. Id. at 32. Mr. Wuerl reiterates the Greensburg 

Defendants argument on particularity. See Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF 

No. 37 at 22-24; Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 6-7. 

Mr. Doe responds that given that his fraud counts are based 

in part on silence in the face of a duty to disclose, it would 

be “illogical to require [him] to allege specific times and 
48

places where the Diocese or Parish failed to inform him or his 

family of what it knew or should have known about Mr. 

Sredzinski’s sexual proclivities and abusive behavior.” Pl.’s 

Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 38-39. In addition, 

Mr. Doe argues that he should not be required to plead matters 

which are “entirely within the exclusive knowledge of the 

Diocese and Parish (and their agents) and have been withheld 

from [him] and the public.” Id. at 40. The Greensburg Defendants 

reply that absent a fiduciary, confidential, or special duty, 

the Diocese and Parish had no duty to speak. Greensburg Defs.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 41 at 24. Mr. Wuerl also asserts that he had no 

duty to speak. Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 27. The Court 

finds that Mr. Doe has pled his fraud claims with the requisite 

particularity. 

“In the District of Columbia, the elements of fraud are: 

(1) a false representation or willful omission in reference to a 

material fact, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity, and (3) 

with intent to induce the party to rely on the representation or 

omission, where (4) the party relies upon the representation or 

omission (5) to its detriment.” Cadet v. Draper & Goldberg, 

PLLC, No. CIV.A. 05-2105 (JDB), 2007 WL 2893418, at *6 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 28, 2007) (citing Schiff v. AARP, 697 A.2d 1193, 1198 

(D.C. 1997)). The elements of constructive fraud differ only in 

that (1) Plaintiff must allege an innocent or negligent 
49

misrepresentation rather than an intent to deceive, see Attias, 

365 F. Supp. 3d at 10; and (2) Plaintiff must allege the 

existence of a confidential relationship between himself and a 

defendant, see Cordoba Initiative Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d at 50. 

The first element of fraud, a false representation, “may be 

either an affirmative misrepresentation or a failure to disclose 

a material fact when a duty to disclose that fact has arisen.” 

Rothenberg v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 495 F. Supp. 399, 406 

(D.D.C. 1980); see also McWilliams Ballard, Inc. v. Broadway 

Mgmt. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) (“A claim for 

fraud may be founded on a false representation or a willful 

omission.”). “There is, of course, no question that mere silence 

does not constitute fraud unless there is a duty to speak.” 

Kapiloff v. Abington Plaza Corp., 59 A.2d 516, 517 (D.C. 1948). 

Such a duty can arise from a confidential, fiduciary, or special 

relationship between a plaintiff and defendant that justifies 

the imposition of the duty. See Jefferson v. Collins, 905 F. 

Supp. 2d 269, 287 (D.D.C. 2012). Alternatively, it can arise 

from a situation where a material fact is unobservable or 

undiscoverable by “an ordinarily prudent person upon reasonable 

inspection.” Cadet, No. CIV.A. 05-2105, 2007 WL 2893418, at *6 

(quoting Loughlin v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 26, 50 

(D.D.C. 2002)). 
50

To satisfy Fed. R. Civ P. 9(b), which governs fraud claims, 

a plaintiff must “set forth an adequate factual basis for his 

allegations,” including a “detailed description of the specific 

falsehoods that are the basis for his suit.” United States ex 

rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 552 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). Fraud claims must state “the time, place, and content of 

the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented, and what 

was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud, as well 

as the individuals allegedly involved in the fraud.” See 

Intelsat USA Sales Corp. v. Juch-Tech, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 

101, 107 (D.D.C. 2013). This includes “notice of the who, what, 

when, where, and how with respect to the circumstances of the 

fraud[.]” Stevens, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 114. 

However, courts outside this district have noted that 

“while there is a good deal of caselaw that speaks of a 

journalistic-type approach to [Rule 9(b)’s] requirement of 

pleading ‘with particularity,’ that locution really does not fit 

well in dealing with extended fraudulent schemes involving a 

large volume of transactions” and thus “a plaintiff is required 

to provide only a ‘general outline’ of the alleged scheme 

sufficient to put defendants on notice about their roles in the 

fraudulent or false activity.” U.S. ex rel. Salmeron v. Enter. 

Recovery Sys., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 766, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 

(quoting Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1020 (7th 
51

Cir. 1992)). Courts have also observed that “[i]n applying the 

first sentence of Rule 9(b) courts must be sensitive to the fact 

that its application, prior to discovery, may permit 

sophisticated defrauders to successfully conceal the details of 

their fraud. Moreover, in applying the rule, focusing 

exclusively on its ‘particularity’ language ‘is too narrow an 

approach and fails to take account of the general simplicity and 

flexibility contemplated by the rules.’” Christidis v. First 

Pennsylvania Mortg. Tr., 717 F.2d 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1983) 

(internal citation omitted); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita 

Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Specificity 

requirements may be relaxed, of course, when the details are 

within the defendant’s exclusive knowledge.”); U.S. ex rel. 

Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 385 

(5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) may 

be to some extent relaxed where, as is arguably the case here, 

the facts relating to the alleged fraud are peculiarly within 

the perpetrator’s knowledge.”). 

The Court has already found that the Diocese and Parish had 

a legal duty with regard to Mr. Doe, see supra §IV(D); which 

would by itself be sufficient to give rise to a duty to speak, 

at least as to constructive fraud, see Jefferson, 905 F. Supp. 
52

2d at 287.9 For the purposes of the conspiracy to commit fraud 

claim, the Court also finds that a duty to speak arises as to 

all defendants because a material fact, Mr. Sredzinski’s 

behavior, was unobservable or undiscoverable by “an ordinarily 

prudent person upon reasonable inspection.” Cadet, No. CIV.A. 

05-2105 (JDB), 2007 WL 2893418, at *6 (internal quotation 

omitted). Mr. Doe and his family could not have discovered the 

alleged dangers Mr. Sredzinski posed upon reasonable inspection, 

of which all the defendants were allegedly aware. See Cadet, No. 

CIV.A. 05-2105 (JDB), 2007 WL 2893418, at *6 (internal quotation 

omitted). The Complaint specifically alleges when and how the 

defendants ignored Mr. Doe’s own attempts to report sexual abuse 

and covered up other incidents of abuse. Id. ¶¶ 43-49. Mr. Doe 

also specifically alleges Mr. Malesic and Mr. Wuerl’s knowledge 

as to the material fact of Mr. Sredzinski’s behavior. See id. ¶ 

42, 45, 97-99. Notably, even if Mr. Malesic or Mr. Wuerl did not 

have a duty to speak themselves, they could be liable for a 

conspiracy to commit fraud based on other defendants’ duty to 

speak. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 

1983). 

9 The Court has not addressed whether a confidential or fiduciary 

duty existed between the Diocese / Parish and Mr. Doe, but they 

could also give rise to a duty to speak. See Jefferson, 905 F. 

Supp. 2d at 28. 
53

The Greensburg Defendants’ argument suggesting that Mr. 

Sredzinski’s behavior was observable is an astounding one. The 

Greensburg Defendants assert that because Mr. Doe was 

“personally aware of Father Sredzisnki’s alleged ‘predatory 

behaviour’ as early as 1993, when he allegedly ‘first reported 

the abuse,’” the “Diocese and Parish could not have been bound 

by an alleged duty to disclose any alleged ‘predatory behavior’ 

on the part of Father Sredzinski that Plaintiff already knew 

himself and even allegedly reported to others.” Greensburg 

Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 24-25. Mr. Wuerl makes a similar 

argument that because Mr. Doe was aware of the alleged false 

misrepresentations, he cannot now state he has no need to plead 

knowledge that was exclusively held by the perpetrators. See

Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 8. In essence, the defendants 

suggest that having been sexually abused as a child, Mr. Doe can 

claim neither that Mr. Sredzinski’s behavior was unobservable 

and that they had a duty to disclose, nor that his pleading 

burden is lessened by exclusive knowledge. 

This argument fails for several reasons. First and most 

obviously, Mr. Doe alleges that he would not have been raped if 

he and his family had known not to trust Mr. Sredzinski. See 

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 107. Accordingly, the duty to speak–at 

least as to the Diocese and Parish–predated the injury. Second, 

the Court is unaware, and nor do the Greensburg Defendants nor 
54

Mr. Wuerl point to, any legal authority for the proposition that 

the duty to speak about the material fact of Mr. Sredzinski’s 

child sexual abuse is dissipated because Mr. Doe–then a minor–

was himself being abused. Third, the duty to speak is arguably 

strengthened by Mr. Doe’s own attempts to report the abuse. 

Instead, Mr. Doe was allegedly ignored, told he was “lying or 

hallucinating,” or that he must be “mentally disturbed,” Compl., 

ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 9; thereby calling into question his knowledge and 

mental capacity and undermining the Greenburg Defendants and Mr. 

Wuerl’s own argument that Mr. Doe was “well aware” of the abuse 

Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 12. Fourth, the alleged 

conspiracy is not just fraudulent omission of Mr. Sredzinski’s 

behavior targeted at Mr. Doe, but of Mr. Sredzinski’s child 

abuse of others as well, which was kept from Mr. Doe and his 

family and could have prevented Mr. Doe being entrusted to Mr. 

Sredzinski’s care and being raped. Fifth, the inescapable fact 

is that Mr. Doe was a minor; even if Mr. Doe was aware after 

being raped, defendants allegedly then concealed Mr. Doe’s abuse 

from his family and parishioners, which Mr. Doe alleges was a 

proximate cause of his repeated rape. This Court cannot sustain 

the conclusion that Mr. Doe’s – then a minor – alleged repeated 
55

rape absolved the defendants of any responsibility to speak to 

either Mr. Doe or his family thereafter.10 

Having established that there was a duty to speak, the 

Court turns to the question of whether the fraud claims have 

been pled with particularity. The Greensburg Defendants argue 

that in regard to the “who” for his fraud- based claims, Mr. Doe 

only vaguely identifies the “Diocese” and the “Parish” without 

identifying specific individuals, and also refers to 

“Defendants” collectively, without specifying or distinguishing 

to which of the four named “Defendants” he may be referring. 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 32. As for the “who, what, 

when, where, and how” of his fraud-based claims, see InPhonic, 

662 F. Supp. 2d at 114; the Greensburg Defendants argue that 

“Plaintiff has failed to provide any specifics for these vague 

allegations, such as “what” specific allegations of child sexual 

abuse were allegedly concealed, “when” they were allegedly 

concealed, and “by whom” they were allegedly concealed. 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 32-33. Mr. Wuerl makes 

similar arguments. See Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 23-24; 

Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 13. Mr. Doe responds–and the 

Court agrees–that he has pled both fraud counts with 

10 Mr. Doe’s theory of fraud is based not just on a duty to speak 

but also on false representations. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg 

Defs., ECF No. 39 at 34. 
56

sufficiently particularly, based on a duty to disclose as well 

as false representations. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., 

ECF No. 39 at 37, 41. The Court addresses each of the 

considerations–who, what, when, where, and how–in turn. 

To the extent the Complaint is based on Mr. Doe’s theory of 

a failure to speak, the logical conclusion is that “[t]he 

Complaint does not identify a precise statement that contained 

any alleged misrepresentation.” Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 

23. The Complaint does, however, specifically allege what 

information was allegedly concealed, when, and by whom, see 

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 47 (alleging Father Roger Statnick knew 

that Mr. Sredzinski had sexually abused minors by 1991); id. ¶ 

49 (alleging that Bishop Bosco (then the leader of the Diocese) 

knew of Mr. Sredzinski’s behavior by 1994); id. ¶ 44 (alleging 

that Mr. Doe had left messages informing Bishop Bosco of his own 

abuse at age 13); and id. ¶ 44-46 (alleging that Mr. Doe 

informed a nun and a guidance counselor at his Catholic high 

school (as well as Mr. Wuerl) about his own abuse at age 15). 

Mr. Doe also alleges “how” the abuse was concealed. See, 

e.g., id. ¶ 45 (“[Mr.] Wuerl denied that anything had happened 

and told Plaintiff that he must be either lying or 

hallucinating”); id. ¶ 46 (“Plaintiff was not taken seriously 

and told he must be mentally disturbed and /or hallucinating”); 

¶¶ 49, 82-84, 88-95 (alleging all three Greensburg Defendants’ 
57

policies of covering up and staying silent despite knowledge of 

widespread abuse).11 It would be illogical to ask where and to 

whom the alleged misrepresentations were made, since the 

underlying argument is the lack of representation. See Def. 

Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 24. Nonetheless, Mr. Doe asserts 

that the Diocese and Parish in Greensburg kept critical 

information from “Plaintiff, his parents, and the public.” 

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 83. For all these reasons, the Court 

concludes that Mr. Doe has pled fraud based on silence in the 

face of a duty to speak with sufficient particularity. 

To the extent that Mr. Doe’s Complaint is also based on 

false representation, he has pled that too with sufficient 

particularity. Mr. Doe points out that the statements were made 

“in various iterations by the Diocese and Parish 25 to 30 years 

ago to a young child.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 

39 at 41. He states that “[h]e was instructed in catechism 

classes and otherwise that the bishop of the DIOCESE and priests 

11 The Greensburg Defendants point to four allegations in the 

Complaint that they allege do not meet the “who, what, when, 

where, and how” standard. See Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 

41 at 26. However, the sentences they highlight are part of the 

larger fraud claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that “a party 

must state with particularity the circumstances constituting 

fraud or mistake.” The sentences referred to are simply 

describing the circumstances. They are not required individually 

to satisfy “who, what, when, where, and how” (which would lead 

to absurd outcomes) but considered a part of the fraud 

pleadings, which together must satisfy Rule 9(b). 
58

employed by the DIOCESE were moral authorities whom he was 

obliged to trust and respect.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 73. He 

alleges that it was represented by the Diocese and Parish in 

school and church services that their priests were “worthy of 

being entrusted with children.” Id. ¶ 20. These allegations 

establish the specific misrepresentations, i.e., the “what.” 

They also establish “when” and “where” – in catechism classes, 

school, and church services in Greensburg when Mr. Doe was a 

minor.12 The “how” is satisfied by the allegations that the 

Diocese and Church priests were held out as trustworthy and 

moral authorities. The “who” is not explicitly stated but can 

reasonably be inferred to mean Parish and Diocese instructors 

and agents. Given the passage of time, and Mr. Doe’s age when 

the representations were made, the Court does not find it 

necessary that the “who” be more specific, especially since the 

names of employees from over two decades ago are “peculiarly 

within the perpetrator’s knowledge.” U.S. ex rel. Willard., 336 

F.3d at 385. Mr. Doe’s allegations have been pled with 

12 This case is therefore distinguishable from those Mr. Wuerl 

mentions in his Notice of Supplemental Authority, see ECF No. 

48; where the allegations fall short of Rule 9(b)’s pleading 

standard. See, e.g., Fay v. Humane Soc'y of United States, No. 

20-CV-1893 (RCL), 2021 WL 184396, at *11 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2021) 

(stating that “at most, plaintiff alleges that the Humane 

Society has “consistently engaged in the use of electronic 

radio, television, and print media to fraudulently obtain 

charitable donations of money and goods from the public.”). 
59

sufficient particularity to put “defendants on notice about 

their roles in the fraudulent or false activity.” U.S. ex rel. 

Salmeron, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 768. 

The Court concludes that Mr. Doe has satisfied the 

heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), particularly when 

considering the duty to speak, the large volume of alleged 

interactions, and the extent of the information known only to 

the defendants, rather than him. The Court need not, given the 

requisite specificity in the Complaint, demand that Mr. Doe 

allege precise dates, names or locations. Nor does he need to 

identify with even greater precision the times at which the 

Defendants withheld information, given their alleged exclusive 

knowledge. See Jepson, 34 F.3d at 1328 (7th Cir. 1994). To 

demand more detail than what Mr. Doe has already provided on the 

“who, what, when, where, and how” would potentially permit 

“sophisticated defrauders to successfully conceal the details of 

their fraud.” Christidis, 717 F.2d at 99–100. 

5. Mr. Doe Has Stated a Claim of Constructive Fraud 

The essential elements of a common law fraud claim are: (1) 

a false representation; (2) in reference to a material fact; (3) 

made with knowledge of its falsity; (4) with the intent to 

deceive; and (5) action taken in reliance upon the 

representation. Frese v. City Segway Tours of Washington, D.C., 

LLC, 249 F. Supp. 3d 230, 236 (D.D.C. 2017). Constructive fraud 
60

includes all the same elements as common law fraud except the 

intent to deceive, and, in place of requiring a showing of 

actual dishonesty, it requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the 

existence of a confidential relationship between the plaintiff 

and defendant by which the defendant was able to exercise 

extraordinary influence over plaintiff. Dentons US LLP v. 

Republic of Guinea, 208 F. Supp. 3d 330, 341 (D.D.C. 2016). 

Separate from their particularity argument against both 

fraud-based claims, the Greensburg Defendants present several 

arguments as to why Mr. Doe has failed to state a claim of 

constructive fraud against the Diocese or Parish. The Court 

addresses each of these arguments in turn. 

First, the Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe’s 

alleged diocese/parish-parishioner relationship is not a legally 

recognized fiduciary relationship, which is fatal to Mr. Doe’s 

constructive fraud claim. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 

41. Mr. Doe responds that “D.C. does not require that 

constructive fraud be based on a fiduciary, as opposed to 

confidential, relationship, to the extent that those two are 

distinguishable.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 

42 (citing Witherspoon v. Philip Morris Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 

461 (D.D.C. 1997). 

At the outset of its analysis, the Court notes that it has 

already distinguished between a confidential relationship, and a 
61

fiduciary relationship, which is a “special confidential 

relationship.” Xereas, 987 F.3d at 1130. As Mr. Doe asserts, 

constructive fraud requires only the former. Whether two parties 

are in a confidential relation is a fact-specific inquiry. 

Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1994). That 

factual question cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. 

Dentons, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 340. Therefore, Mr. Doe’s claim 

cannot fail at this stage because of the absence of a 

confidential relationship. The Court finds it unnecessary to 

address both parties’ arguments as to whether such a 

relationship exists. 

Second, the Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe uses 

only generalized statements to assert the “false representation” 

element of a fraud claim and provides no “particular answers to 

material questions.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 42. 

This argument is essentially the same as the Greensburg 

Defendants particularity argument, which this Court has already 

addressed. See supra §IV(D)(4). 

Third, and relatedly, the Greensburg Defendants argue that 

Mr. Doe does not plead with particularity how any of the 

representations were false, or what information the Diocese or 

Parish had when the representations were made. Id. at 42-43. The 

Complaint clearly states that the representations as to Mr. 

Sredzinski were false because the Diocese and Parish were aware 
62

of Mr. Sredzinski’s abuse as far back as 1991. See Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶¶ 44-49. The Complaint also alleges what information 

they had. Id. 

Fourth, the Greensburg Defendants assert that Mr. Doe “has 

not alleged that the Diocese or Parish made any particular false 

representation about Father Sredzinski,” nor has he alleged any 

action he took in reliance thereof. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 36 at 43. The Court agrees that Mr. Doe does not single out 

a false representation made only as to Mr. Sredzinski. However, 

the Greensburg Defendants do not point to caselaw that requires 

the false representation to be about just one person. Moreoverand decisive here-as the Court has already discussed, Mr. Doe’s 

claim is not just based on false representation, but also on 

misrepresentation through failure to disclose a material fact as 

to Mr. Sredzinski of which the Greensburg Defendants were aware. 

See supra IV(D)(4). Mr. Doe also specifically alleges reliance. 

See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 84. 

Fifth, the Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe has not 

pleaded a cognizable injury he suffered because of the 

Greensburg Defendants’ misrepresentation, as opposed to the 

alleged abuse by Father Sredzinski. Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 36 at 43. The Greensburg Defendants further assert that 

“economic harm is an essential element of a fraud claim; 

emotional harm is not recoverable.” Id. at 44 (citing Bond v. 
63

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 828 F. Supp. 2d 60, 81 (D.D.C. 2011)). 

Mr. Doe responds that his damages are the proximate result of 

fraud because he and his family relied on the Greensburg 

Defendants’ misrepresentations. Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., 

ECF No. 39 at 44. Mr. Doe also adds that the rule in D.C. is 

that “a plaintiff may recover emotional damages that are the 

natural and proximate result’ of the defendant’s conduct.” Id. 

(citing Osbourne v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 667 A.2d 1321, 

1328 (D.C. 1995)). 

Before turning to the question of whether Mr. Doe has pled 

a cognizable injury for which this Court could provide relief, 

the Court considers the relevant legal standard. The Greensburg 

Defendants refer incorrectly to a standard that applies to 

claims in contract instead of claims in tort. See Bond, 828 F. 

Supp. 2d at 81. Mr. Doe, meanwhile, ignores conflicting 

authority stating that “the economic torts of fraud and 

constructive fraud require some showing of economic harm in 

order for the plaintiff to recover emotional damages as well.” 

Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 

2019), on reconsideration in part, 518 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 

2021). Since local law is being applied, the Court defers to the 

standard articulated by the D.C. Court of Appeals, which 

discusses the division of courts on the issue of whether 

economic harm must be alleged, before unambiguously deciding 
64

that emotional damages are recoverable so long as intentional

misrepresentation can be proven. Osbourne, 667 A.2d at 1328. 

Since constructive fraud is based on negligent

misrepresentation, see Attias, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 10; emotional 

damages are not recoverable. Mr. Doe, however, also asserts 

economic damages, specifically “a loss of earnings and earnings 

capacity.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 59. 

Turning to Mr. Doe’s alleged injury, the Court is not 

persuaded that Mr. Doe “has not established any alleged damages 

to support his constructive fraud claim.” Greensburg Defs.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 41 at 26-27. The legal standard demands that 

“[t]o prevail on [a fraud] claim, the plaintiff must also have 

suffered some injury as a consequence of his reliance on the 

misrepresentation.” Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d 

268, 275 (D.D.C. 2011). Liability for constructive fraud extends 

to damages that are “the natural and proximate consequences, or 

the direct consequences of the fraud, and to such damages as can 

be clearly defined and ascertained.” Naartex Consulting Corp. v. 

Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Mr. Doe’s alleged 

repeated rape as a child can be attributed to Mr. Sredzinski, 

but Mr. Doe has also alleged that it was a proximate result of 

the fraud because he and his family relied on the Greensburg 

Defendants misrepresentations. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 84–85. 

There can be more than one cause of an injury, and the 
65

Greensburg Defendants do not provide any authority in support of 

their assertion that the injury from fraud must be “separate and 

distinct” from the injuries from Mr. Sredzinski’s abuse. See 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 44. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that Mr. Doe has pled a claim for constructive fraud. 

6. Mr. Doe Has Stated A Claim Of Civil Conspiracy 

To Commit Fraud 

The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) an agreement 

between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful 

act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused 

by an unlawful overt act performed by one to the parties to the 

agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in 

furtherance of the common scheme. Mensah-Yawson v. Raden, 170 F. 

Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D.D.C. 2016). There is no independent action 

in the District of Columbia for civil conspiracy; it is a means 

for establishing vicarious liability for an underlying tort. See 

Geier v. Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C., 983 F. Supp. 2d 22, 

42 (D.D.C. 2013). Under District of Columbia law, “one who 

alleges a conspiracy must allege an event, conversation, or 

document showing that there was an agreement among the alleged 

conspirators.” Id. 

As a threshold matter, Mr. Wuerl argues that conspiracy to 

commit constructive fraud is a legal impossibility, because a 

civil-conspiracy claim requires specific intent, whereas 

constructive fraud deploys an innocent or negligent 
66

misrepresentation standard. See Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 

16. Mr. Doe responds that Count V is not concerned with 

constructive fraud, but with “Civil Conspiracy to Commit Fraud.” 

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 20. Mr. Wuerl replies that because the 

standalone tort in Mr. Doe’s Complaint is the lesser claim of 

constructive fraud, the inference is that the parties against 

whom constructive fraud is alleged did not commit the common law 

fraud necessary to sustain his conspiracy allegations. See Def. 

Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 10. The Court disagrees.

The Court is not aware why Mr. Doe chose to bring a 

constructive fraud claim against the Diocese and Parish, and a 

conspiracy to commit fraud claim against a larger group of 

defendants. But the Court cannot agree that “the inescapable 

conclusion is that Plaintiff was alleging a conspiracy to commit 

constructive, rather than common law, fraud.” Def. Wuerl’s 

Reply, ECF No. 42 at 10. It is possible, for instance, that Mr. 

Doe thought he could prove a conspiracy to commit fraud but not 

common law fraud. It is also misleading for Mr. Wuerl to attach 

any standalone relevance to Mr. Doe’s reference to his 

constructive fraud pleadings in his opposition to the Greensburg 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Set in context, Mr. Doe states 

that given the underlying tort for the conspiracy is fraud, the 

Court can “ignore Wuerl’s laborious arguments . . . that 

constructive fraud was not adequately pled as to Wuerl.” Pl.’s 
67

Opp’n to Def. Wuerl, ECF No. 40 at 8-9. Mr. Doe subsequently 

refers to where he addresses the question of whether 

constructive fraud has been pled as to the Parish and Diocese. 

Id. It cannot reasonably be inferred that this reference amounts 

to a negation of Mr. Doe’s entire argument on the point, nor is 

it appropriate for the Court to draw such an inference. The 

Court concludes that Mr. Doe is alleging a conspiracy to commit 

fraud, not constructive fraud.13 

Turning to claims challenging conspiracy to commit fraud, 

the Greensburg Defendants and Mr. Wuerl both present several 

arguments as to why Mr. Doe’s claim is legally insufficient. 

First, the Greensburg Defendants and Mr. Wuerl both argue that 

Mr. Doe has failed to plead any specific facts establishing an 

agreement between persons in the furtherance of a common scheme. 

13 Consequently, the Court need not address Mr. Wuerl’s arguments 

as to constructive fraud, a claim which does not apply to him. 

This includes Mr. Wuerl’s argument that he is not legally 

capable of committing constructive fraud as well as his 

assertion that Mr. Doe has failed to adequately plead 

constructive fraud. See Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 19, 2. 

The Court also does not reach the Greensburg Defendants argument 

that Mr. Doe has failed to state a claim for civil conspiracy 

because he “has not established a legally cognizable claim for 

constructive fraud.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 45 

(emphasis added). Finally, the Court does not reach the 

supplemental authority provided by Mr. Wuerl, because it is not 

the case that Mr. Doe pled only constructive fraud. See Notice 

of Supplemental Authority, ECF No. 49 at 2 (referencing Rice v. 

Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, No. 3 WAP 2020, 2021 WL 3073157 

(Pa. July 21, 2021)). 
68

See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 45; Def. Wuerl’s Mot., 

ECF No. 37 at 28; Geier, 983 F. Supp. at 42. The Greensburg 

Defendants add that Mr. Doe bears the burden to plead with 

particularity but has relied only on general averment. See 

Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 27. Mr. Doe responds that 

he is not required to point to events, conversations, or 

documents showing an agreement among the co-conspirators. Pl.’s 

Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 44-45. The Court 

concludes that Mr. Doe has pled enough circumstantial 

allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. 

“Because the typical conspiracy is rarely evinced by 

explicit agreements,” this Court has found that that a 

“plaintiff’s allegations of circumstantial evidence” can survive 

a motion to dismiss. City of Moundridge, KS v. Exxon Mobil 

Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 20, 40 (D.D.C. 2007); see also 

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“The element of agreement is a key 

distinguishing factor for a civil conspiracy action. Proof of a 

tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is sufficient to 

show agreement.”); Weishapl v. Sowers, 771 A.2d 1014, 1024 (D.C. 

2001) (“Where there is no direct evidence of an agreement 

between the alleged co-conspirators, there must be 

circumstantial evidence from which a common intent can be 

inferred.”). Mr. Doe sufficiently pleads circumstantial evidence 
69

suggesting that there was a common intent to fraudulently 

conceal child abuse. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 88–99. 

Mr. Wuerl argues that Mr. Doe’s allegations are comparable 

to those that have failed in other courts. See Def. Wuerl’s 

Mot., ECF No. 37 at 29. However, the present case is 

distinguishable for several reasons. First, the Complaint here 

does not simply allege “failure to take action.” Doe v. Hartford 

Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV105015963, 2014 WL 

2581049, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 9, 2014). It pleads that 

the defendants were aware of Mr. Sredzinski’s behavior as far 

back as 1991 and sought to cover it up. See, e.g., Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶ 49. Second, two of the three opinions Mr. Wuerl 

references are on motions for summary judgment, which employed a 

different standard than that applicable to a motion to dismiss. 

See Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. 

X10UWYCV105015963, 2014 WL 2581049, at *4; Nelligan v. Norwich 

Roman Catholic Diocese, No. X07CV020084287S, 2006 WL 1828532, at 

*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 15, 2006). That leaves a case from 

Rhode Island, where the court held that a claim for conspiracy 

could not be stated where “the complaint is devoid of any 

specific allegations regarding the existence of such an 

agreement.” Smith v. O’Connell, 997 F. Supp. 226, 241 (D.R.I. 

1998). 
70

This Court, however, is bound by authority holding that 

“[p]roof of a tacit, as opposed to explicit, understanding is 

sufficient to show agreement.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. 

Moreover, persuasive precedent within this District holds that a 

“plaintiff’s allegations of circumstantial evidence” can survive 

a motion to dismiss. City of Moundridge, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 40. 

The Court accordingly concludes that Mr. Doe has sufficiently 

pled circumstantial evidence suggesting that there was a common 

intent to fraudulently conceal child abuse. See Compl., ECF No. 

1-1 ¶¶ 88–99; see also Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 49. The Court is 

also cognizant that other courts have allowed conspiracy claims 

on similar pleadings, including against Mr. Wuerl. See Perfetto 

v. Diocese of Pittsburgh, et al., Case No. GD-20-5140 (Ct. 

Common Pleas, Allegheny Cty., Pa.).14 

14 Mr. Wuerl contends that “the most striking omission in 

Plaintiff’s Opposition is its failure to address the numerous 

cases that Wuerl cited where district courts have dismissed 

virtually identical fraud claims because of virtually identical 

deficiencies.” Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 16. However, 

these cases were cited as part of Mr. Wuerl’s argument that Mr. 

Doe has failed to adequately plead constructive fraud. Since 

this is a claim that Mr. Wuerl is not a party to, Mr. Doe did 

not address Mr. Wuerl’s arguments. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. 

Wuerl, ECF No. 40 at 9. Mr. Wuerl’s reply then extends these 

cases to his arguments against a claim of fraud. Def. Wuerl’s 

Reply, ECF No. 42 at 16. 

The Court is mindful that none of the three cases Mr. Wuerl 

puts forth are based on a theory of a duty to disclose. 

Moreover, in Doe, the Court dismissed the fraud claim not 

because of the misrepresentation allegations, but because there 

was no evidence that “the defendant knew that such a 

representation was false or was reckless as to whether it was 
71

Second, Mr. Wuerl asserts that Mr. Doe has failed to 

“sufficiently allege that a speaker made any [] 

misrepresentation with knowledge of its falsity.” Def. Wuerl’s 

Mot., ECF No. 37 at 26. However, the complaint specifically 

alleges when and how the Greensburg Defendants ignored Mr. Doe’s 

own attempts to report sexual abuse and also covered up other 

incidents of abuse, of which they had knowledge as early as 

1991. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 43-49. This allegation dispenses 

with Mr. Wuerl’s contention that that there was no knowledge of 

falsity, see Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 25-26; and allows 

the Court to “reasonably infer knowledge or another mental 

true or false.”. Doe v. Catholic Soc’y of Religious & Literary 

Educ., No. H-09-1059, 2010 WL 345926, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 

2010). In Boy Scouts, the allegations brought by Plaintiff 

generally concerned “adult scout leaders” rather than specific 

individuals. See Boy 7 v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. CV-10-449-RHW, 

2011 WL 2415768, at *4 (E.D. Wash. June 13, 2011). Doe I 

provides similar allegations, but less specific ones than 

presented herein; unlike Doe I, the present case does not just 

allege the impression created by the defendant, but also the 

instructions given by the Defendants that the Parish’s priests 

were moral authorities. Compare Doe I v. Roman Catholic Diocese 

of Galveston-Houston, No. H-05-1047, 2006 WL 8446968, at *11 

(S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2006) (“Archdiocese Defendants ‘fraudulently 

misrepresented material facts’ and provided ‘partial disclosure 

that created a false impression’ that [the alleged abuser] ‘was 

a celibate, sexually safe, moral cleric who would not be 

sexually dangerous to minors”) with Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 73 (Mr. 

Doe was “instructed in catechism classes and otherwise that the 

bishop of the DIOCESE and priests employed by the DIOCESE were 

moral authorities whom he was obliged to trust and respect.”) 
72

state.” Elemary v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., 533 F. Supp. 2d 116, 

132 (D.D.C. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) permits 

knowledge to “be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 

Third, Mr. Wuerl states that Mr. Doe does not specify “how 

he took an action in reliance on an alleged misrepresentation 

and thereby suffered an injury.” Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 

at 24-26. The Court agrees with Mr. Wuerl that “[t]he question 

is whether Plaintiff did detrimentally rely on any alleged 

misrepresentations, not whether he could have relied on them.” 

Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 15. The Complaint alleges such 

reliance, asserting that in trusting Mr. Doe to Mr. Sredzinski’s 

care, he and his family “reasonably relied on the Diocese and 

Parish’s omission of these facts [as to Mr. Sredzinski’s 

behavior], and/or statements in sermons, catechism classes, and 

other teachings that Catholic priests were trustworthy authority 

figures.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 11; see 

also Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 20, 73, 84. 

Mr. Doe also alleges that his repeated rape as a child was 

a proximate result of the fraud because he and his family relied 

on the Greensburg Defendants misrepresentations. See Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶ 84–85. Mr. Doe has therefore specified “how he took an 

action in reliance on an alleged misrepresentation and thereby 

suffered an injury.” Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37at 22-26. See 

also McManemy v. Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of Worcester, 
73

2 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1197 (D.N.M. 2013) (“A major component of 

fraud requires the inducer to make a misrepresentation to the 

plaintiff on which the plaintiff detrimentally relies. Without 

such targeted misrepresentation, there can be no proximate cause 

between the inducer’s act (the misrepresentation) and the injury 

to plaintiff.”). 

Fourth, the Greensburg Defendants and Mr. Wuerl both argue 

that as with constructive fraud, Mr. Doe has not pleaded a 

cognizable injury suffered as a direct and proximate result of 

conspiracy to commit fraud. See Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 

36 at 46; Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 31. The Court has 

already concluded that Mr. Doe has sufficiently alleged 

constructive fraud was a proximate cause of his alleged abuse. 

See supra §IV(D)(5). The same holds true for fraud here. Mr. Doe 

is not required to separate the damages from the abuse from the 

damages from the conspiracy which led to the abuse, and neither 

Mr. Wuerl nor the Greensburg Defendants cite any authority 

suggesting otherwise. 

Fifth, the Greensburg Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is entirely devoid of any allegations establishing 

that Bishop Malesic was engaged in a conspiracy to conceal 

Plaintiff’s allegations specifically, or alleged abuse by Father 

Sredzinski generally.” Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 46. 

Mr. Doe “agrees that Bishop Malesic never concealed abuse from 
74

Plaintiff or his family while Plaintiff’s abuse by Sredzinski 

was ongoing.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 46. 

Rather, Mr. Doe asserts that he “pleads circumstantial evidence 

that [Bishop] Malesic joined the conspiracy via overt acts that 

started well before his tenure but continue to the present day, 

including by utilizing various practices to conceal sexual abuse 

from the public and deny responsibility for it.” Id. The 

Greensburg Defendants respond that Mr. Doe’s position is 

untenable because the conspiracy as alleged was “entirely 

complete in 1997- some 18 years before Bishop Malesic allegedly 

joined the purported conspiracy.” Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 41 at 28. The Court disagrees. 

The question for the Court is whether Mr. Doe has pled that 

Mr. Malesic joined the conspiracy to conceal Mr. Sredzinski’s 

alleged child abuse, not just of Mr. Doe but of other children 

as well. In relevant part, the Court notes at the outset that 

contrary to the Greensburg Defendants assertion, the alleged 

conspiracy to cover up Mr. Sredzinski’s behavior was not over in 

1997, see Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 28; rather, Mr. 

Doe asserts that the conspiracy started “before [he] was abused 

and continues to this day.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 87. In other 

words, Mr. Doe’s argument is that his abuse at the hands of Mr. 

Sredzinski may have ended in 1997, but the cover up of Mr. 

Sredzinski’s behavior is allegedly still ongoing. Therefore, it 
75

is not the case that “Bishop Malesic could not have joined the 

conspiracy actually alleged.” Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 

41 at 28. Given the alleged continued nature of the conspiracy, 

it is also not significant that Mr. Doe accepts that Bishop 

Malesic did not conceal Mr. Sredzinski’s abuse of Mr. Doe while 

it was ongoing. See id. The fact that Bishop Malesic agreed to 

conceal Mr. Sredzinski’s child sexual abuse at any time after 

would suffice. See United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 

1108 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“An individual who joins an already 

formed conspiracy knowing of its unlawful purpose may be held 

responsible for acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy both 

prior to and subsequent to his joinder.”) (Internal citation 

omitted).15

In the Complaint, Mr. Doe alleges circumstantial evidence 

that Mr. Malesic is withholding information about child abuse, 

including abuse by Mr. Sredzinski, who is one of the twenty-one 

priests that Bishop Malesic admitted were “credibly” accused of 

15 Contrary to the Greensburg Defendants’ assertion, the 

Complaint also does not suggest that Bishop Malesic “committed 

an overt act that caused Plaintiff’s sexual abuse in 1991-1997.” 

Greensburg Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 41 at 27. Nor does the relevant 

legal standard require an overt act by Bishop Malesic that 

caused the alleged damage; it requires only an agreement between 

co-conspirators, and an overt act by one of them. See Raden, 170 

F. Supp. 3d at 230.
76

sexual misconduct. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 98–99 (listing 

pertinent information that Mr. Malesic has but is allegedly 

fraudulently concealing). Mr. Doe also alleges that “[e]ach 

defendant undertook overt acts in furtherance of the common 

scheme.” Id. ¶ 92. The Court concludes that Mr. Doe has 

sufficiently pled his claim of conspiracy, including against 

Bishop Malesic. 

Sixth, Mr. Wuerl argues that “Plaintiff never articulates 

how the conspirators entered into the agreement with the 

specific intent to participate in an unlawful act, which as 

alleged here is constructive fraud.” Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 

37 at 30. Since the conspiracy does not concern constructive 

fraud, the Court does not reach this argument. As for Mr. 

Wuerl’s related assertion that Mr. Doe has offered only “brief 

allegations regarding the purported object of the agreement,” 

the Court is cognizant that the Complaint repeatedly states the 

object of the conspiracy is a desire to preserve the reputation 

of the Catholic Church. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 26, 49, 63–

64. 

Seventh, Mr. Wuerl argues that even if Mr. Doe has 

adequately pled a conspiracy to commit fraud, he has failed to 

adequately plead that Mr. Wuerl joined such a conspiracy. Def. 

Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 31. Mr. Doe responds that the 

Complaint alleges through circumstantial evidence that Mr. Wuerl 
77

joined other institutions and church leaders in an agreement to 

cover up child sexual abuse by priests in the Catholic Church. 

See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def. Wuerl, ECF No. 40 at 13. The Court 

agrees. 

The circumstantial evidence includes allegations that: (1) 

when Mr. Wuerl personally witnessed a minor being raped by a 

priest multiple times in D.C., he did absolutely nothing to stop 

it, Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 42; (2) when Mr. Wuerl was confronted 

by Mr. Doe later on, Mr. Wuerl’s position was that Mr. Doe was 

“lying or hallucinating,” id. ¶ 45; (3) Mr. Wuerl, through 

counsel, used the threat of a defamation suit many years later 

in the hopes of silencing Mr. Doe, id. ¶ 97; (4) a Pennsylvania 

grand jury found that Mr. Wuerl “allowed numerous priests whom 

he knew to be abusive to continue in active ministry or to 

remain in good standing when they were transferred to other 

dioceses,” id. ¶ 95; and (5) Mr. Wuerl has made statements about 

his actions with respect to the abuse scandal that the 

Pennsylvania Attorney General has referred to as “not telling 

the truth”, id. 

Mr. Wuerl responds that: (1) even if the first allegation 

were true, it is no plausible basis for inferring agreement to 

enter into a conspiracy to commit fraud; (2) Mr. Wuerl’s 

response was the “natural” response one would expect from 

someone wrongly accused; (3) his “preservation and enforcement 
78

of his legal rights do not show that he joined a conspiracy to 

defraud Plaintiff”; (4) the Grand Jury Report was fundamentally 

deficient and never claims that Mr. Wuerl had anything to do 

with Mr. Sredzinski, the Parish or the Greensburg Diocese; and 

(5) the Pennsylvania Attorney General disagreeing with Wuerl 

does not show that Mr. Wuerl entered into a conspiracy to commit 

fraud. Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 23-25. 

At this juncture, all factual discrepancies must be drawn 

in favor of Mr. Doe. See Crane, 894 F.2d at 456. Applying this 

standard, the allegation that Mr. Wuerl stood by and watched 

while Mr. Doe was allegedly raped certainly circumstantially 

indicates agreement to commit fraud. The Court agrees with Mr. 

Wuerl that Mr. Wuerl’s “alleged failure does not establish a 

conspiracy to commit fraud,” Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 

23; but Mr. Doe need only provide circumstantial evidence at 

this stage, see City of Moundridge, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 40. 

Similarly, Mr. Wuerl’s alleged response to Mr. Doe, stating that 

he was lying or hallucinating, could have been in response to 

being wrongly accused, but drawing inferences in Mr. Doe’s 

favor, it provides further circumstantial evidence, as does the 

Grand Jury Report.16 Mr. Wuerl is right that “nothing in the 

16 Mr. Wuerl lays out several reasons the Grand Jury Report is 

flawed. However, since this is a motion to dismiss, all 

inferences are drawn in favor of the Plaintiff, and the Court 
79

Report suggests [Mr.] Wuerl ever agreed to commit fraud against 

Plaintiff” specifically, Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF No. 42 at 24; 

but that is why the Report, along with the Attorney General’s 

statement, provide circumstantial evidence of the alleged 

conspiracy. The Court’s role at this stage is not to consider 

the “obvious alternative explanation,” Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF 

No. 42 at 25; but to draw inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, 

Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. 

Mr. Wuerl also argues even if he had joined the conspiracy, 

the Complaint does not establish that Mr. Doe suffered an injury 

thereafter from an overt act in furtherance of that agreement. 

See Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 37 at 32. This is easily 

addressed – Mr. Doe’s alleged injury is his repeated rape, and 

Mr. Wuerl, as alleged in the Complaint, joined the conspiracy at 

least as early as 1995, when Mr. Doe confronted him about the 

abuse. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 45. The abuse continued until 

1997, id. ¶ 3; hence, the Complaint does establish an injury 

thereafter. Moreover, as discussed earlier with regard to Bishop 

Malesic, the Complaint alleges the conspiracy is ongoing, and 

Mr. Wuerl cites no legal authority requiring the injury to Mr. 

Doe to have occurred before a new conspirator joined. The 

allegation that Cardinal Wuerl allegedly agreed to conceal Mr. 

does not address such issues here. See Def. Wuerl’s Reply, ECF 

No. 42 at 20-21. 
80

Sredzinski’s child sexual abuse while the conspiracy was ongoing 

is sufficient. See Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1108. 

The Court also deems it irrelevant that the “negligence, 

breach of special duty, and constructive fraud counts do not 

name [Mr.] Wuerl,” or that Mr. Wuerl was not a party to a 

similar lawsuit in a different state. Def. Wuerl’s Mot., ECF No. 

37at 32. It is Mr. Doe’s prerogative as Plaintiff whom he brings 

claims against and for what. The relevant question for this 

Court is simply the sufficiency of the pleadings, which are 

sufficient here to establish a claim for conspiracy to commit 

fraud. 

E. Mr. Doe Is Not Required To File A More Definite 

Statement Pursuant To Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(E) 

Finally, the Greensburg Defendants argue that Mr. Doe 

should be required to file a more definite statement because the 

Complaint “wholly fails to provide any additional details on 

these alleged trips [to D.C.] and, specifically, the Greensburg 

Defendants’ alleged role or involvement in these trips, if any.” 

Greensburg Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 36 at 47. Mr. Doe responds that 

the trips have already been explained, and that he “has no idea 

at this point what individuals at the Diocese or Parish 

coordinated any of these trips and would not be able to include 

this information in any more definite pleadings.” Pl.’s Opp’n to 

Greensburg Defs., ECF No. 39 at 48. The Court agrees that Mr. 

Doe is not required to file a more definite statement. 
81

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) provides that: “[i]f a pleading to 

which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague and 

ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 

responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 

statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” Here, the 

Complaint does not state precisely, or even approximately, how 

many of the alleged trips to D.C. were church sanctioned. 

However, the Complaint is not vague or ambiguous, and it is not 

the case that defendants cannot “reasonably be required to frame 

a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Mr. Doe alleges 

that there were several church-sponsored trips to D.C. on which 

he was raped. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 37–38 (“Sredzinski 

would take Plaintiff to an annual Catholic pro-life rally as 

well as other political events in Washington, D.C., trips that 

Sredzinski coordinated in conjunction with the DIOCESE, bishops 

of the DIOCESE, and/or the PARISH. Sredzinski also took 

Plaintiff and other boys to Washington, D.C. for basketball and 

bowling competitions with other churches, which Sredzinski 

coordinated in conjunction with the DIOCESE, bishops of the 

DIOCESE, and/or the PARISH.”). 

The Greensburg Defendants argue that their connection to 

these overnight trips is “tenuous at best,” but the Court is 

unpersuaded. As Mr. Doe emphasizes, “[t]he Diocese of Greensburg 

describes its ‘annual pilgrimage’ to the Washington, D.C. March 
82

for Life event on its own website, and is actively selling 

tickets to it right now.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Greensburg Defs., ECF 

No. 39 at 48. See March for Life Youth Pilgrimage, Roman 

Catholic Diocese of Greensburg, 

https://www.dioceseofgreensburg.org/youth/Pages/marchforlifeya.a

spx (“The Office of Faith, Family, and Discipleship sponsors a 

youth pilgrimage to the March for Life in Washington, D.C., each 

January.”); March for Life, Roman Catholic Diocese of 

Greensburg, 

https://www.dioceseofgreensburg.org/ministries/Pages/advocacyfor

life.aspx (noting that “[t]he March for Life began as a small 

demonstration [in 1974] and rapidly grew to be the largest prolife event in the world”). The Parish has also coordinated bus 

trips for these events in the past. Nature Programs Continue at 

Library, Trib Live, https://archive.triblive.com/news/natureprograms- continue-at-library-2/ (“St. Joseph’s parish and youth 

group will take a charter bus to Washington, D.C., Jan. 22 for 

the 36th annual ‘March for Life.’”). 

The issues of exactly how many trips took place, for what 

purposes, and coordinated by whom, are more appropriate for 

discovery. The Diocese and Parish are better suited to answer 

these questions than Mr. Doe is through additional statements. 
83

V. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Greensburg Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36; is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART; and Mr. Wuerl’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, is DENIED. 

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

 United States District Judge 

 January 24, 2022