[Cite as Monroe v. Monroe, 2023-Ohio-3332.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

JOHN JAMES MONROE,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KIMBERLY ANN MONROE,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 CO 0035

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 2020 DR 393

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Matthew C. Giannini, 1040 South Commons Place, Suite 200, Youngstown, Ohio 

44514, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Kimberly Ann Monroe, Pro se, 180 Ohio Avenue, Unit #1, Salem, Ohio 44460, DefendantAppellant.

Dated: September 15, 2023
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Ann Monroe, appeals from a Columbiana 

County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, decision overruling her 

objections to the magistrate’s decision and granting a divorce to her and PlaintiffAppellee, John James Monroe.

{¶2} The parties were married on May 8, 2014. No children were born as issue 

of the marriage. They separated on May 1, 2019. Appellant moved into a condo owned 

by a friend and Appellee remained in the marital home for a brief time. By agreement, 

the parties then sold the marital home. Prior to selling the house, many issues with the 

house were remedied including replacing subflooring, repairing drywall, and fixing 

electrical and plumbing issues. After paying off the mortgage and fees associated with 

the sale, the parties received $60,862.97 from the sale.

{¶3} Appellee filed a complaint for divorce on September 24, 2020. The matter 

proceeded to a trial before a magistrate. 

{¶4} The magistrate found the parties were incompatible and granted a divorce. 

Relevant to this appeal, the magistrate found that Charlene Monroe, Appellee’s mother, 

had loaned the parties $19,500 for a down payment on the marital home. The magistrate 

ordered that from the proceeds of the sale of the house, the first $27,638 was to be paid 

to contractor John Smrek, who completed the repairs to house but had yet to be paid. 

The next $19,500 was to be paid to Charlene Monroe. The next $2,998 was to be paid 

to Appellant’s friend, Joe Armeni, as the parties agreed they owed him for various 

appliances and some medical bills he had paid for them. The magistrate ordered the 

remainder of the proceeds to be split equally between the parties. 

{¶5} The trial court entered judgment that same day entering a decree of divorce 

in accordance with the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶6} Appellant, however, filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Although 

represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, Appellant filed her objections pro se. 

Appellant objected to: (1) the award of $27,638 to Smrek (claiming it should have been 

less); (2) the award of $19,500 to Appellee’s mother (claiming the money had been a gift); 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

and (3) the award of $2,998 to Armeni (claiming it should have been more). Appellee 

filed a response in opposition to the objections. Appellant then filed a reply in support of 

her objections. To this reply, Appellant attached numerous documents and receipts, 

which she claimed supported her objections. 

{¶7} The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections. It noted that none of the 

documents Appellant attached to the reply were part of the record and, therefore, the 

court could not consider them. The court pointed out that the majority of the marital assets 

were the profits that resulted from the sale of the marital home. And it noted that after the 

marital debts were paid, the court divided the remainder equally between the parties. The 

court then adopted the magistrate’s decision.

{¶8} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 16, 2022. Still 

proceeding pro se, Appellant now raises four assignments of error for our review.

{¶9} Appellant’s assignments of error deal with various marital debts and weight 

of the evidence issues. 

{¶10} An appellate court reviews matters involving property division in domestic 

relations cases for abuse of discretion. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218, 

450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). An abuse of discretion implies a decision that is unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id. at 219.

{¶11} Marital debt is any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of 

the parties or for a valid marital purpose. Ketchum v. Ketchum, 7th Dist. Columbiana No.

01 CO 60, 2003-Ohio-2559, ¶ 47, citing Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (2 

Ed.1994, Supp.2002) 455, Section 6.29. Debts the parties incur during the marriage are 

presumed to be marital unless it is proved that they are not. Vergitz v. Vergitz, 7th Dist. 

Jefferson No. 05 JE 52, 2007-Ohio-1395, ¶ 12, citing Knox v. Knox, 7th Dist. Jefferson 

No. 04 JE 24, 2006-Ohio-1154, ¶ 25-26.

{¶12} Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all 

the material elements of the case must not be reversed as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 

N.E.2d 578, syllabus (1978). See, also, Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 

638 N.E.2d 533 (1994). Reviewing courts must oblige every reasonable presumption in 

favor of the lower court's judgment and finding of facts. Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

(citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 [1984]). In 

the event the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must construe 

it consistently with the lower court's judgment. Id. In addition, the weight to be given the 

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts. Kalain 

v. Smith, 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 162, 495 N.E.2d 572 (1986). “A finding of an error of law is 

a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and 

evidence is not.” Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 81.

{¶13} It is with these standards in mind that we now turn to Appellant’s 

assignments of error. 

{¶14} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT AWARDED 

JOHN SMREK, THE CONTRACTOR $27,638.00, ON THE BASIS OF A 

WRITTEN “PROPOSAL” ONLY AND WITH NO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 

OF TIME OR MATERIALS OR THE REASONABLENESS THEREOF. IN 

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINIDINGS OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT 

MAKES REFERENCE TO THE “PROPOSAL” EXHIBIT 5, AND THAT THE 

CONTRACTOR TESTIFIED THAT HE SPENT 25 TO 30 DAYS WORKING 

ON THE HOUSE? [sic]

{¶15} Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 is titled a “Proposal.” It states it was submitted to 

Appellee and it was signed by Smrek. It is an estimate for labor and materials for 

improvements to the marital home. It includes replacing, repairing/installing subfloors;

repairing the front door; installing a new window; replacing water-damaged drywall;

replacing a toilet; repairing the porch railing; rebuilding the back porch; repairing/replacing 

bathroom tile; and repairing wiring. It provides a cost of $27,638 to be paid 30 days after 

closing on the house. 

{¶16} Appellant argues the evidence does not support the trial court’s award of 

$27,638 to Smrek. She asserts the court should not have relied on Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 

because it is not dated, it does not include her name, it is not signed by Appellee, and it 

does not include a breakdown regarding labor and materials. Appellant also contends 

that Smrek’s testimony was inconsistent and unreliable. 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

{¶17} The parties in this case do not dispute that the improvements to the marital

house resulted in a marital debt. Appellant’s argument instead focuses on the amount of 

the debt. The testimony regarding the money owed to contractor John Smrek was as 

follows. 

{¶18} The parties purchased the house in 2014 for $67,000-$70,000. (Tr. 50, 

111). They sold the house in 2020 for $120,000. (Tr. 48). 

{¶19} Appellee testified that prior to listing the house for sale, the parties hired 

Smrek to complete renovations to the house. (Tr. 135). The work performed by Smrek 

included repairing/installing subfloors; repairing the front door; installing a new window;

replacing water-damaged drywall; replacing a toilet; repairing the porch railing; rebuilding 

the back porch; repairing/replacing bathroom tile; and repairing wiring. (Tr. 135; Plaintiff’s 

Ex. 5). Appellee stated that Smrek worked on the house for approximately 15-20 days 

and his bill totaled $27,638. (Tr. 136).

{¶20} Smrek agreed with Appellee on the work he performed on the parties’ 

house. (Tr.158; Plaintiff’s Ex. 5). He also agreed that the parties owed him a total of 

$27,683, which they were to pay him after they sold the house. (Tr. 159). The only 

discrepancy was that Smrek stated he spent 25 to 30 days on the project. (Tr. 159). 

{¶21} Appellant acknowledged that the house required renovations before the 

parties could list it for sale. (Tr. 49). She agreed that Smrek should be paid for the work 

on the house. (Tr. 77). And she agreed that the house increased in value by 

approximately $50,000 from 2014, when the parties purchased it, to 2020 after the 

renovations were complete and the parties sold it. (Tr. 48-50).

{¶22} This evidence supports the trial court’s decision. The parties agreed that 

Smrek had yet to be paid for the work that he completed and that he should be paid. Both 

Appellee and Smrek testified that Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 was accurate. Appellant did not 

dispute the facts that renovations had been completed, the value of the house had 

increased, and Smrek remained unpaid for his work. And while Appellant contends the 

amount the trial court found owing to Smrek is too high, she does not point to any 

evidence of what she asserts the correct amount owed should be. In sum, there is no 

indication that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in finding 

that the parties owed Smrek $27,638 for the renovations to the marital home. 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

{¶23} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled.

{¶24} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

FURTHER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION IN THE 

AWARD FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY TO 

JOHN MONROE’S MOTHER, CHARLENE MONROE, IN THE AMOUNT 

OF $19,500.00 FOR THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE PARTIES TO 

PURCHASE THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WITH NO DOCUMENTS TO 

SUPPORT THAT THE FUNDS GIVEN WERE A LOAN.

{¶25} Here, Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that Appellee’s mother 

loaned the parties $19,500 towards the purchase of the marital home. She claims she 

knew nothing of this loan and notes there are no documents to prove that the money was 

not a gift. 

{¶26} Appellee testified his parents sold a car for $19,500, the proceeds of which 

the parties used as a down payment on the marital home. (Tr. 111-113). Appellee stated 

that he and Appellant discussed the matter at the time. (Tr. 113, 177). In support, 

Appellee introduced Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, which was a copy of a check dated June 25, 2014 

in the amount of $19,500 made payable to him from his mother. (Tr. 112). Appellee 

testified it was his understanding that they would pay the money back either when they 

sold the house or when they otherwise had the money. (Tr. 178). He stated Appellant

was aware that the money was a loan. (Tr. 178). 

{¶27} Appellant acknowledged that Appellee’s parents had “helped” them 

financially. (Tr. 26). She believed that Appellee’s parents had “helped” them for a sum 

of $20,000 to $30,000. (Tr. 26). But she stated she did not specifically recall receiving 

$19,500 from Appellee’s parents. (Tr. 29). Appellant also testified that she did not 

remember how much money the parties borrowed to purchase the marital home. (Tr. 30-

31).

{¶28} Appellee’s mother, Charlene Monroe, testified that she sold a car and the 

parties used the proceeds of the sale for the down payment on their house. (Tr. 147). 

She identified the check she issued to Appellee in the amount of $19,500. (Tr. 147; 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

Plaintiff’s Ex. 3). Charlene testified that the money was a loan. (Tr. 149). But she 

admitted that she did not execute any loan documents. (Tr. 150). 

{¶29} This issue turns on credibility of the witnesses. The trier of fact occupies 

the best position to watch the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice 

inflections and to utilize these observations in weighing credibility. Seasons Coal Co., 

Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80. Here, the magistrate was in the best position to observe 

Appellant’s, Appellee’s, and Charlene’s testimony. The magistrate found Appellee’s and 

Charlene’s testimony that the $19,500 was a loan to be more credible than Appellant’s 

testimony that she was uncertain that Charlene had loaned the parties any money. And 

Appellee submitted a copy of the check from Charlene to him documenting the $19,500. 

Competent, credible evidence exists on the record to support the magistrate’s/trial court’s 

finding. As an appellate court, we are not in a position to second-guess the magistrate’s 

credibility determination. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that $19,500 from the proceeds of the house sale were owed to Charlene.

{¶30} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶31} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

FURTHER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT’S [sic] DISCRETION TO 

AWARD ONLY $2,998.00 TO JOE ARMENI FOR MONIES PAID BY HIM 

FOR THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL COURT IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS 

MAKES REFERENCE TO APPELLEE’S EXHIBIT 4 ONLY, WHEN 

APPELLANT’S EXHIBIT P SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO 

CONSIDERATION ALSO? [sic]

{¶32} In this assignment of error, Appellant argues the court should have awarded 

her friend, Joe Armeni, more than $2,998. She claims Armeni paid for various expenses 

for the parties including veterinary bills and legal fees. She asserts her claim is supported 

by Defendant’s Exhibit P. 

{¶33} Armeni is a close friend of Appellant. She testified that their relationship is 

platonic and that Armeni is like a father figure to her. (Tr. 18, 280). Since the time the 

parties separated, Appellant has given Armeni power of attorney to manage her finances. 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

(Tr. 281). Additionally, Armeni owns the condo where Appellant currently resides. (Tr. 

11).

{¶34} Exhibit P is a list Armeni compiled of all of the money he contended that the 

parties owe him. The items on the list total approximately $16,000. 

{¶35} The parties were married on May 8, 2014. They separated on May 1, 2019. 

Many of the items either pre-date the marriage, were incurred after the parties separated, 

or are not identified by date. Armeni admitted as much. And Armeni did not provide 

receipts for any items. 

{¶36} Armeni testified definitively that several of the items listed on Exhibit P predated the marriage: $300 for bail on February 22, 2013; $3,000 for Attorney Williams; 

$780 for court costs; $1,500 for Attorney Benvenuto. (Tr. 343-347). He testified that 

$1,250 for Attorney Macala dealt with Appellant’s child support in a case not involving 

Appellee. (Tr. 321, 346-347). He testified that $1,600 for rent was incurred after the 

parties separated. (Tr. 348). He could not say when the $297 for eyeglasses was 

incurred. (Tr. 348-349). He could not say when the $134 for water bills was incurred. 

(Tr. 327). Per Defendant’s Exhibit P, $221 for medical bills was incurred after the parties 

separated.

{¶37} Appellee admitted that the parties owed Armeni for certain items listed on 

Defendant’s Exhibit P. He stated that the parties owed Armeni: $1,000 for a refrigerator; 

$604 for fencing; $250 for a microwave; $250 for a washing machine; $673 for medical 

bills; and $221 for medical bills. (Tr. 128-129; Defendant’s Ex. P). He also included these 

items on a list he compiled of what he considered marital debt. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 4). These 

items totaled $2,998, which is the amount the court ordered paid to Armeni from the 

proceeds of the sale of the parties’ house.

{¶38} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Armeni was 

owed $2,998 by the parties. Both parties and Armeni agreed these debts were owed. 

The rest of the items on the list prepared by Armeni either predated the marriage, were 

incurred after the parties’ separation, or it could not be established with any certainty 

when the debts were incurred. 

{¶39} As was the case in the previous assignment of error, this is a matter of 

witness credibility. The magistrate listened to Armeni describe the items he believed the 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

parties owed him for. The magistrate also heard Appellant’s and Appellee’s testimony on 

these matters. And the magistrate and the trial court examined Defendant’s Exhibit P. 

Because there is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision and 

because we must defer to the magistrate/trial court on matters of witness credibility, we 

cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the parties owed 

Armeni the sum of $2,998.

{¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶41} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states:

FINALLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT’S [sic] DISCRETION WHEN 

IT DID NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDS THAT WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE 

IOLTA ACCOUNT EXHIBIT 10 TO PAY FOR UTILITY EXPENSES 

INCURRED BY JOHN MONROE AFTER KIMBERLY MONROE 

SEPARATED AND MOVED OUT OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. 

{¶42} On January 8, 2021, the magistrate issued temporary orders agreed to by

the parties. The orders instructed Appellee to pay $400/month in temporary spousal 

support to Appellant, instructed Appellee’s attorney to deposit the proceeds from the sale 

of the marital home into his IOLTA account, and instructed Appellee’s attorney to pay two 

utility bills from his IOLTA account upon receipt of proper documentation. The orders 

also instructed that the balance of the parties’ funds was to remain in the IOLTA account 

until the parties agreed on dispersal.

{¶43} Appellant contends here that the trial court erred in failing to address 

$1,375.13, which was taken out of the IOLTA account to pay for the utility debt she alleges 

was incurred by Appellee at the marital residence after she moved out. She asks this 

Court to address and resolve this issue. 

{¶44} This issue concerns the temporary orders in place prior to the divorce trial. 

As to temporary orders in divorce cases, this Court has stated: 

Temporary orders typically merge into the final order and become moot. It 

has been explained, “In a domestic relations action, interlocutory orders are 

merged within the final decree, and the right to enforce an interlocutory 
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Case No. 22 CO 0035

order does not extend beyond the decree, unless the interlocutory obligation 

has been reduced to a separate judgment or has been specifically referred 

to in the decree.” Cotter v. Cotter, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25656, 2011-Ohio5629, ¶ 10, citing Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245, 389 N.E.2d 856, 

syllabus (1979).

Dimmerling v. Dimmerling, 7th Dist. Noble No. 18 NO 0460, 2019-Ohio-2710, ¶ 140.

{¶45} In this case, the temporary order regarding the payment of the utility bills 

from the IOLTA account was not reduced to a separate judgment nor was it specifically 

referred to in the divorce decree. Thus, the order merged into the final judgment and 

became moot. 

{¶46} Moreover, Appellant did not raise this issue at trial. An appellant cannot 

raise an issue on appeal for the first time that could have been raised and resolved in the 

trial court. Quick v. Jenkins, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 13 CO 4, 2013-Ohio-4371, ¶ 27. 

Issues not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal. Id.

{¶47} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled.

{¶48} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as Monroe v. Monroe, 2023-Ohio-3332.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Columbiana County, Ohio, is 

affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the Appellant.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.