PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

RONALD MUKASA MAITEKI, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

MARTEN TRANSPORT LTD., 

 Defendant - Appellee, 

and 

VOYAGER EXPRESS, INC., 

 Defendant. 

No. 15-1429 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02021-WJM-CBS)

_________________________________ 

Submitted on the briefs:*

Andrew Nyombi, Emejuru & Nyombi, L.L.C., Silver Spring, Maryland, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Stephen A. DiTullio and John C. Gardner, DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C., Madison, 

Wisconsin, for Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

July 13, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Ronald Maiteki appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his 

former employer, Marten Transport Ltd., on his claim that Marten violated the 

reinvestigation provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681s-2(b)(1). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Marten is a transportation company that employed Mr. Maiteki as an 

over-the-road truck driver from March to December 2011. Marten has a duty under 

federal regulations to conduct background checks on drivers. It therefore receives 

information from and provides information to HireRight, a consumer reporting 

agency (CRA) that publishes “Drive-A-Check” (DAC) reports on truck drivers’ 

driving records. When describing Mr. Maiteki’s work record to HireRight after his 

employment ended, Marten used code 938, which stands for “Unsatisfactory Safety 

Record,” meaning that the driver did not meet the company’s safety standards. 

Aplee. Supp. App. at 176. 

 Mr. Maiteki alleges that other companies declined to employ him after 

Marten’s information appeared on his DAC report. He disputed the information, 

telling HireRight that “Unsatisfactory Safety Record” was incorrect because he “has 

no accidents/incidents listed on the report.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 84. HireRight 
3 

asked Marten to send support for its statement and to check its records to determine if 

it had made an error. 

Ann Konsela, an employee in Marten’s human resources department, 

conducted the investigation. She reviewed the information sent by HireRight, 

Mr. Maiteki’s personnel file, and the company’s computer data, including 

information in its Human Resources Image Screen (HRIS) records. 

 Ms. Konsela saw that Mr. Maiteki’s file contained a July 16, 2011 

Driver/Vehicle Examination Report by the Illinois State Police stating that 

Mr. Maiteki had traveled between six and ten miles per hour over the speed limit; 

accompanying the report was a contemporaneous written police warning indicating 

he had been speeding. In addition, the file included a “Written Warning” from 

Marten placing Mr. Maiteki on a six-month probation for this incident. 

 In HRIS, Ms. Konsela also saw comments dated October 5, 2011, regarding 

data gathered on Mr. Maiteki’s driving speeds. During the period it employed 

Mr. Maiteki, Marten contracted with a company called SpeedGauge to install 

speed-monitoring devices on Marten’s trucks. HRIS showed that SpeedGauge had 

recorded Mr. Maiteki’s truck traveling 12 miles per hour over the speed limit in 

Connecticut in October 2011 and had recorded him as having 13 incidents of driving 

at least four miles per hour over the speed limit in a seven-day period in 

September/October 2011. There was a notation that fleet manager Wendy Sobotta 

had issued Mr. Maiteki a “Serious Warning” based on this SpeedGauge data. 
4 

Ms. Konsela contacted Ms. Sobotta and confirmed that the October 5 HRIS 

entry was correct. Ms. Sobotta informed Ms. Konsela that she had seen the 

SpeedGauge records, told Mr. Maiteki that she was issuing him a Serious Warning, 

and entered the information into HRIS. At the time of Ms. Konsela’s investigation, 

however, Marten no longer had access to the underlying SpeedGauge records. 

 Marten considers speeds more than four miles per hour over a posted speed 

limit to be an unsafe driving practice. In light of the Illinois incident and the 

SpeedGauge data, Ms. Konsela concluded that the information submitted to 

HireRight was correct. Marten therefore informed HireRight that “Work Record 

(938) Unsatisfactory Safety Record is accurate.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 85. Although 

the response cited both the Written Warning for the Illinois incident and the Serious 

Warning based on the SpeedGauge data, Marten believed that the Illinois incident 

alone would support its report to HireRight. 

 Mr. Maiteki sued, alleging, among other claims, that Marten’s reinvestigation 

was inadequate and the response was false, in violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681s-2(b)(1). Marten moved for summary judgment on the FCRA claim, which 

the district court granted. Mr. Maiteki appeals.1

II. DISCUSSION 

 “We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standard as the district court.” Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans, 

 1

 This appeal concerns only the FCRA claim against Marten. Mr. Maiteki has 

not appealed from the judgment on any other claims. 
5 

Inc., 711 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Summary judgment is appropriate if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 

 Under § 1681s-2(b), when a CRA notifies an information furnisher of a 

dispute, the furnisher must take the following steps: 

(1) investigate the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information 

provided by the CRA; (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA; 

(4) report the results of the investigation to all other CRAs if the 

investigation reveals that the information is incomplete or inaccurate; and 

(5) modify, delete, or permanently block the reporting of the disputed 

information if it is determined to be inaccurate, incomplete, or unverifiable. 

Llewellyn, 711 F.3d at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he investigation 

an information furnisher undertakes must be a reasonable one.” Boggio v. USAA 

Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 

A “reasonable” investigation “is one that a reasonably prudent person would 

undertake under the circumstances.” Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 864 

(3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[H]ow thorough an investigation 

must be to be ‘reasonable’ turns on what relevant information was provided to a 

furnisher by the CRA giving notice of a dispute.” Boggio, 696 F.3d at 617; see 

Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[A] more 

limited investigation may be appropriate when CRAs provide the furnisher with 

vague or cursory information about a consumer’s dispute.”); Gorman v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Congress could not have 
6 

intended to place a burden on furnishers continually to reinvestigate a particular 

transaction, without any new information or other reason to doubt the result of the 

earlier investigation . . . .”). “[T]he reasonableness of the investigation is to be 

determined by an objective standard,” and “[t]he burden of showing the investigation 

was unreasonable is on the plaintiff.” Chiang, 595 F.3d at 37. 

 Mr. Maiteki first argues that summary judgment is improper because the 

reasonableness of an investigation is a question of fact that can be decided only by a 

factfinder. He is wrong. “Whether a defendant’s investigation is reasonable is a 

factual question normally reserved for trial; however, summary judgment is proper if 

the reasonableness of the defendant’s procedures is beyond question.” Westra v. 

Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, circuit 

courts have affirmed summary judgments on § 1681s-2(b) claims in appropriate 

circumstances. See Chiang, 595 F.3d at 38-39; Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1161; Westra, 

409 F.3d at 827. 

 Mr. Maiteki next argues that there is sufficient evidence for a factfinder to 

conclude that Marten’s investigation was unreasonable. For support, he relies on the 

same 20 points he raised in the district court. The district court ably explained why 

these points did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the 

reasonableness of Marten’s investigation. Rather than discussing each point, we 

address only a few and reject the remaining arguments for substantially the reasons 

discussed by the district court. 
7 

 Mr. Maiteki claims that Marten’s investigation was perfunctory and “cabined.” 

Aplt. Br. at 56. As stated above, however, the scope of a reasonable investigation 

turns on the information about the dispute that the furnisher has received. 

Mr. Maiteki’s notice of dispute said simply that the use of Code 938, Unsatisfactory 

Safety Record, was “incorrect due to [Maiteki] has no accidents/incidents listed on 

the report.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 84. Hence, it was not unreasonable for Marten to 

focus on whether there were incidents of record that supported its report to 

HireRight. Although Mr. Maiteki believes that Marten should have undertaken 

additional investigation and reviewed other sources of information (which 

purportedly would have more positively reflected his driving record), such additional 

investigation would not negate the Illinois warning and the SpeedGauge data that 

caused Ms. Konsela to conclude that Code 938 was accurate. 

 Mr. Maiteki asserts that he never received the Written Warning or the Serious 

Warning. But entries in HRIS are to the contrary; and given the terse nature of 

Mr. Maiteki’s notice of dispute, Ms. Konsela had no reason to know that Mr. Maiteki 

was challenging those entries. 

Mr. Maiteki also complains that Ms. Konsela failed to review the original 

SpeedGauge reports underlying Ms. Sobotta’s October 5, 2011 HRIS entry and failed 

to contact either the Illinois State Police or SpeedGauge to verify the information in 

Marten’s files. But as for the Illinois documents, there does not appear to be any 

reason to doubt their authenticity. Marten received them from the U.S. Department 

of Transportation. In district court Mr. Maiteki apparently did not dispute that 
8 

Marten’s file contained these documents, and before this court he concedes that he 

was issued the warning, see Aplt. Br. at 56 (“Aside from the Illinois State Police 

warning of July 16, 2011, Maiteki never had any speeding tickets or incidents nor 

accidents while working for Marten.”). Because she had no reason to question the 

documents, Ms. Konsela’s failure to contact the Illinois State Police does not cast 

doubt on the reasonableness of the investigation. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1160 

(information furnisher not required to perform additional procedures or inquiries 

when notice of dispute gave no reason to doubt the veracity of the initial 

investigation). 

Regarding the SpeedGauge data, it is undisputed that Marten no longer had 

access to the SpeedGauge reports underlying the HRIS entry by the time of 

Ms. Konsela’s investigation. Ms. Konsela would have had to contact SpeedGauge in 

an attempt to review that information.2

 But an investigation does not have to be 

exhaustive to be reasonable; an information furnisher may balance the costs and 

benefits of engaging in additional procedures. See Seamans, 744 F.3d at 865; 

Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 432-33 (4th Cir. 2004). If the 

circumstances warrant, a company may rely on its own records. See Gorman, 

584 F.3d at 1159-60; Westra, 409 F.3d at 827. We recognize that the Fourth Circuit 

has held that a jury could find unreasonable a procedure requiring agents to rely 

solely on computer data and “never consult underlying documents” for verification. 

 2

 Neither party submitted the underlying SpeedGauge records to the court. 

Thus, it is not clear which party such records might support or whether they even 

would be available. 
9 

Johnson, 357 F.3d at 431. In this case, however, instead of relying on the bare HRIS 

data, Ms. Konsela followed up with Ms. Sobotta, who confirmed that she had 

reviewed the underlying SpeedGauge reports and that the HRIS information was 

accurate. It was reasonable for Ms. Konsela to rely on Ms. Sobotta’s confirmation. 

Further, the record evidence shows that Marten believed Code 938 was appropriate 

even if the Illinois incident were the only incident. In these circumstances, 

Ms. Konsela could properly decide not to reach out to SpeedGauge. 

Mr. Maiteki raised certain additional arguments in his reply brief, but 

arguments not made in the opening brief are waived. See Reedy v. Werholtz,

660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). 

In short, Mr. Maiteki has not carried his burden to show that a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that Marten’s reinvestigation was unreasonable. The 

district court appropriately granted summary judgment to Marten on Mr. Maiteki’s 

FCRA claim. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Marten’s request that Mr. Maiteki pay fees and costs for filing a frivolous 

appeal, made in its response brief, is denied. Fed. R. App. P. 38 requires such a 

request to be made in a separate filing. The district court’s judgment is affirmed.