### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 13, 200 4

ALB ERT YA RBR OUG H v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -26800 Ar thur T. Benn ett , Judge

No. W2004-00867-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Augu st 13, 2004

The pe titioner, Albert Ya rbroug h, was c onvicted by a jury in the S helby County Criminal Court of rape , a Class B f

elony . The trial c ourt sentenc ed the petitioner a s a violent offe nder to fourteen y ear s in the Tenne ssee De partment of Correc tion. F ollowing a n unsucce ssful appea l of his conviction, the petitioner filed a

petition for post-conviction re lief, alleg ing, a mong othe r g rounds, ineff ective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding the pe tition t o be bar red by the statute of limit ations and the pe titioner’s alleg ations to be without merit. The petitioner now bring s this appeal cha lleng ing the denial of his petition for r elief. U pon revie w of the r ecor d and the parties’ b ri ef s , we c onclude that the pe titioner timelyfiled his petition for post-conviction re lief. Howeve r, we aff

irm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition on the merits.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

J uni S. Gang uli, Memphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Albert Yarbr oug h.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndL e e Cof

fe e , Ass ist a nt Dis tr ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The pe titioner was convic ted by a jury of rape and se ntence d as a violent off ender to fourtee n y ear s incarc eration. The petitioner subsequently filed a direc t appea l challeng ing the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e. On April 12, 2002, this court aff irmed the c onviction. State v. Albert Ya rbroug h, No. W2001-01150-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL1732337 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Apr. 12, 2002). On Se pte mbe r 3 0, 20 02 , th e pe tit ion e r f ile d a pr o s e pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n re lie f. Th e po st--2-

conviction court appoi n t ed counsel, and an ame nded petition was filed, a lleg ing ine ffe ctive assistance of counse l at tr ial. On September 18, 2003, the post-conviction court held an evide ntiary hearing at which the petitioner, his trial c ounsel, and a fellow inmate te stified.

At the evidentiary

hearing, trial counsel testified tha t she was lice nsed t o prac tice law in 1987 and wa s employ ed by

the pu b l i c d efender’ s office for f ifteen y ear s. She relate d that she had previously tried approximately fifty criminal case s. Trial counsel testified tha t upon being appointed to repre sent the petitioner, she filed t he appr opriate motions, including a motion for discovery

and a motion to suppress the victim’s out of court identific ation. Additionally , she fi l ed the prope r response s to the State’s motions and challeng ed the chain of custody of the petitioner’s D NA sample. Tria l co u n s el testified that she spe nt twenty to thirtyhours pre paring for the pe titioner’s trial, not including thr ee day s of trial and se vera l hearings on se ntencing . Moreove r, trial wa s rese t numerous tim e s w hil e the pa

rt ie s a wa ite d th e re su lts of DN A a na ly sis

.

Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s in c us tod y wh e n s he w as fi rst app oin te d to

re pr e se nt h im; ho we ve r, he wa s subs e qu e ntl y re le a se d on bon d. Tria l cou ns e l re la te d th a t sh e did not learn that the petitioner ha d been r elea sed on bond until a subsequent c ourt date. Trial counsel visited the petitioner in ja il on three occa sions a nd also talked with him at court appea ranc es. She explained that once the pe titioner was re lease d on bond, it was his responsibilityto contact he r for appointments. Acc ording to trial counsel, the pe titioner never came to the public defe nder’ s office and telephone d only

twice. Nevertheless, t rial counsel rela ted t hat her visits wit h the petitioner we re productive. Trial counsel stated, “ We talked about the DN A at leng th .

. . [and] I g ave him copies of the DN A re port and [other discovery materia ls] .”

Trial counse l conce ded that neither she nor the inve stiga tor from the public de fende r’s off ice interviewe d the victim in the i n s t an t case . Howeve r, trial counse l stated that she lea rned of the victim’s alleg ations throug h the af fidavit of compla i n t , d iscovery materia ls, and testimony at the suppression hearing. Mor eover , prior to trial, the State a llowed trial counse l to review a nd take notes from the victim’s stateme nt. Trial coun sel maintained that she w as not surprised by any of the victim’s testimonyand she que stioned the victim reg arding the “number of inconsistencie s” in her
t e s t i m o n y.

Re g ard ing the the ory

of de fe ns e , tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r m a int a ine d h is innocenc e throug hout the trial proce ss, claiming tha t he had ne ver se en the victim. The pe titioner provided trial c ounsel with t h e name s of alibi witnesses, and tria l counsel and the investigator contac ted these w itnesses. Trial counsel subsequently learned that the r esults of DNA a naly sis of semen found on the vi ctim matched the petitioner’s DN A. Trial c ounsel explained to the petitioner that based upon the DNA results, an alibi defe nse would not likely be succ essful. Ne verthe less, the petitioner insisted on g oing to tria l. Howeve r, prior to trial, the pe titioner decide d not to present the testimonyof the a libi witnesses. At trial, counsel vig orously challeng ed the c hain of c ustody of the petitioner’s blood samples in an attempt to attack the re liabilityof the DN A ana ly sis. Trial counsel
te sti fi e d th a t bec a us e the pe tit ion e r d e nie d h a vin g se x withthe vic tim , s he didno t pu rs ue the de fe ns e of conse nt. She furt h er ex p lained that the de fense of conse nt would not have bee n succe ssful-3-

beca use the victim had been beate n during the rape , resulting in the loss of teeth and br uising a bout the fa ce.

When asked if she had questioned the victim on cross-e x amination about being a prostitute, trial counsel replied t hat s he asked the victim about her e mploy ment. The victim responde d that she

wa s u ne mpl oy e d. Tria l c ou ns e l th e n a sk e d th e vic tim wh y sh e wa s out l a te a t ni g ht, a ndthe vic tim responde d that she had be en to a party

. Trial counsel testified that unless the victim had admitted sh e wa s a pr os titute , th e re wa s n o w a y to p ro ve it.

Trial counse l testified that in N ovember of 2000, the State off

ere d the petitioner a

sentenc e of eig ht y ear s. I n light of the DNA r esults and th e v i ct i m ’s identification of the pe titioner, trial counsel believed eig ht y ear s was “a g reat offer .” Tria l counsel informe d the petitioner of the State’s offe r two we eks l ater , at which time she a lso provided him with copies of the DN A re sults and discovery materia ls a nd discussed the contents of the victim’s statement. Trial c ounsel advised the petitioner of the State’ s evidenc e, including the DNA results and the victim’s identification of the pe tit ion e r. She fu rthe r e xpla ine d th a t r ape wa s a vio le nt off

ens e fo r w hic h th e pe tit ion e r c ou ld

re c e ive a se nte nc e of tw e lve to tw e nty y e ars wi th no po ssi bil ity of pa ro le

. Th e pe tit ion e r r e fu se d to

acc ept the State’s of

fer

.

Trial counsel testified t hat t he S tate’s offer of eight y ear s was ava ilable until jury selec tion. Once the jury was selec ted, the trial c ourt voir dired the petitioner about his re fusal to ac cept the ple a offe r. Tria l c ounsel stated that the pe titioner knowing ly , intelligently , and voluntarily reje cted the State’s offe r, explaining that s h e an d t h e petitioner had discusse d the offe r seve ral times and the petitioner wa s well-advise d of the fac ts of the case

. Moreove r, the petitioner had prior convictions and wa s fami l i ar with the criminal justice sy stem. Acc ording to trial counsel, the pe titioner was confide nt that a jury

would not believe the victim. “[The petit ioner] was ada mant from day one that he did not do this and he wa nted a tria l.”

Donald Watkins testified that he wa s an inm ate in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection,

se rv ing se nte nc e s f

or dr ug c on vic tio ns a ndvio la tin g the Mo tor Veh ic le Ha bitua l O ff e nd e r’ s A c t. Prior to incarc eration, Watkins had lived in Me mphis whe re he sold drug s. Watkins related that he ha d k no wn the pe tit ion e r f or app ro xima te ly

fi ve y e ars a ndhe a nd th e pet it io ner we re c ur re ntl y incar cer ated at the same fac ility

. Watkins testified that prior to the petitioner’s trial, the pe titioner informed him that he had been char g ed with r aping the victim. Watkins told the petitioner that he ha d pr e vio us ly so ld c oc a ine to the vic tim a nd the vic tim ha d of fe re d se x in e xch a nge for dru g s. Watkins t estified that he would have te stified to these fa cts at the pe titioner’s trial, but he wa s never contac ted by any one from the public defe nder’ s office

. On cross-e x amination, Watkins concede d that he ha d n e ve r s e e n a

pic tur e of

the vic tim

.

At the e vid e nti ary he ari ng , the pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d tha t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to pr ov ide a de qu a te

re pr e se ntatio n. Ac c or din g to the pe tit ion e r, tr ia l c ou ns e l f a ile d to c on su lt w ith him a nd fa ile d to fi le the prope r mo ti o n s

. T h e p e ti ti o n e r c la im e d th a t tria l c o u n s e l s h o u ld h a v e f il e d a mo ti o n to hire a DNA e x pert to re fute the te stimonyof the State’s D NA expert. The pe titioner further claimed that-4-

he did not rec eive the r esults of the DNA analy sis until the day of trial. The petitioner conc eded that he neve r informe d any one about the ineffe ctiveness of trial counsel, but cla imed that he did not know wh o to c on ta c t.

The pe titioner testified that trial counse l advised him that rape was a Class B felony for whic h he could rec eive a sentenc e of twenty to thirty y ear s incarc eration without t he possibilityof par ole. He fu rthe r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t tria l c ou ns e l adv ise d him tha t hi s p ri or c on vic tio ns c ou ld b e us e d to enhanc e his sentenc e. The petiti oner stated that on the day of t rial, counse l provided him with the results of the DN A ana ly sis. The petitioner claimed that at that time he believe d that the State’s off er was twe nty

y ear s. He de nied that counse l informed him prior to trial of the Stat e’ s o ff er o f eight
y ear s incarc eration. Accor ding to the pe titioner, “ [h ]alfway throug h trial she aske d me why wouldn’t I take the eig ht. And I asked her what eig ht? ” The pe titioner stated that he mig ht have a cce pted the State’s offe r of e ight y ear s, but he did not have a dequate time to consider the offe r. The pe titioner

c la ime d th a t he didno t kn ow that he c ou ld h a ve ple d g uil ty in the mid dle of

tr ia l.

The pe titio n e r f

u r th e r te s ti f

ie d th a t tria l c o u n s e l d id n o t p r e s e n t a n a d e q u a te d e f e n s e

. The petitioner ac knowledg ed that he told trial c ounsel that he did not rape the vi ctim. Neve rtheless, the petitioner cla imed that upon rec eiving the DNA r esults, trial counsel shoul d have insisted upon pursuing a def

ense of consent. How ever , the petitioner c oncede d that he never informed he r that he h a d c o n s e n s u a l s e x w i t h t h e v i c t i m

. H e c l a i m e d t h a tb e c a u s e t r i a l c o u n s e l b e l i e v e d h e w a s g u i l t y, it would not have made a differ ence . Moreove r, he did n o t wa n t h i s famil y to learn of

the extramarital af

fair. T he petitioner ex plained that he had known t he victim prior to the alleg ed ra pe

a ndsh e ha d p re vio us ly

pe rf or me d o ra l se x on h im.

The pe titioner testified that trial counse l visit ed him sever al times in jail and they met once in the c ou rt

ro om. He a c kn ow le dg e d that he pr ov ide d tr ia l c ou ns e l wi th the na me s o f a lib i w itn e sse s, bu t su bs e qu e ntl y

de c ide d n ot t o c a ll the m to tes ti fy . H e e xpla ine d th a t he didno t w a nt the m to provide fa lse testimony . On cr oss-examination, the petitioner conce ded that he ha d previously been

c on vic te d o f t wo mis de me a no rs a ndse ve n f e lon ie s, inc lud ing bu rg lary , s e xua l of fe ns e s, a ssa

ult wi th i n t en tt o co m m i tm u rd er , ro b b er y , an d aggr av at ed k i d n ap p i n g.

At the c on c lus ion of

the te sti mon y , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de nie d th e pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief. Specific all y , th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n court found tha t the petitioner had be en untruthful in his petiti on and in his te stimony

. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel was e ffe ctive

a ndvig or ou sly re pr e se nte d the pe tit ion e r at tr ia l, sta tin g , “[sh e ] pu t forth the be st d e fe ns e sh e c ou ld based on the fac tual situation that she had to deal with. She did eve rything that a lawy er c ould have done under the facts of y our case.” There afte r, the post-c onviction court ente red w ritten finding s of fac ts and conc lusions of law, finding the petition to be barr ed by the statute of limitations and the petitioner’s a lleg ations to be without merit. The petitioner now brings this appeal c halleng ing the denial of his petition for post-c onviction relief.-5- II. Ana lys is

A. Statute of Limitations

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-102(a ) (2003) provides in pertinent part that

a pe rs on in c us tod y

un der a sen tenc e of

a c ou rt of thi s st a te mus t petition f or post-conviction relief under this part within one (1) y ear

o f t h e d a t e o f

t h e f i n a l a c t i o n o f

t h e h i g h e s ts t a t e ap p e l l a t e c o u r tto which an a

ppeal is taken or, if no appea l is taken, within one (1) y ear of the da te on which the judgme nt be came final, or consideration of such petition shall be bar

red.

As the State conce des, the post-conviction court err ed by finding that the instant pe tition was time-barr ed. I n its findings of f act, the post-c onviction court stated that the pe titioner was convic ted on Marc h 21, 2001, but did not file hi s petition for post-conviction re lief until September 30, 2002, more than one y ear

afte r the judg ment beca me final. Howeve r, the petitioner filed a dire ct appe al to this court. Thus, the judgme nt did not become fina l until t his co u rt affirmed the pe titioner’s conviction on April 12, 2002. Ac cording ly , the petitioner timely filed for post-conviction re lief.

B. Ineff ective A ssistance of Counsel

I n a post -convic tion proce eding , the petitioner be ars the bur den of pr oving the g rounds ra ised in the petition by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2003).

“ Ev ide nc e is c le ar a nd c on vin c ing wh e n the re is no se ri ou s or su bs ta nti a l do ub t abo ut the c or re c tne ss of the c on c lus ion s d ra wn fr om the e vid e nc e .” Hi c ks v. Sta te , 9 83 S.W. 2d24 0, 24 5 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1998) (c iting Hodge s v. S.C. Toof & C o., 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992) ). Que stions reg arding the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be ac corde d their testimony , and the fac tual issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e to be r esolv ed b ythe post-conviction court as the trier of fac t. Henley

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). There fore , we a ffor d the post-conviction court’s f indings of fac t the weig ht of a jury verdic t, w ith suc h finding s being conclusive on a ppeal absent a showing that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. I d. at 578.

On appe al, a c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel prese nts a mix ed question of law and fa c t su bje c t to de no vo re vie w. Sta te v. B ur ns , 6 S.W. 3d45 3, 46 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . A s su c h, the po stconviction court’s finding s of fact are entit led to a pre sumption of corre ctness unless the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). How ever , a post-convic tion court’s conc lusions of law, such as w hether counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt or whe ther that de fi cienc y was pre judicial, are subject to a pure ly de novo re view with no presumption of cor

rec tness. I d.

When a petitioner see ks post-conviction relief on the basis of i n eff

ective a ssistance of counsel, “ the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient-6-

and that the de ficienc y

prejudice d the def

ense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

Be cause a petitioner must establish both prong s of the test, a f ailure to p ro ve e ith e r d e fi c ie nc y or pr e jud ic e pr ov ide s a

su ff ic ie nt b a sis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim. I ndeed, a court ne ed

no t a dd re ss the c omp on e nts in any partic ula r o rd e r o r e ve n a dd re ss both if the [petiti oner] makes a n ins u ff i cient showing of one

c omp on e nt.

I d. at 370.

To establish constitutionallydefic ient p er fo rm ance , the petitioner must demonstrate that

c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll b e low a n o bje c tiv e sta nd ardof re a so na ble ne ss. Str ic klan d, 46 6 U .S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Spec ifically
, the petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was not within “the rang e of competenc e demanded of attorney s in criminal

case s.” B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice , the petitioner

m ust show that “there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the

re su lt o f the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve b een di ffe re nt. A r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickla nd, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068;

see a lso Dean v. State, 59 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tenn. 2001).

On app e a l, the pe tit ion e r a lle g e s n ume ro us ins ta nc e s o f i n e f f e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

tr ia l c ou ns e l. The pe titioner contends that trial counsel failed to inter view the victim or other witnesses, made no eff ort to suppress the victi m ’s o u t of court identification of the pe titioner, failed to pre pare the petitioner for

trial, failed to inform the petit ioner of the futi lity of an a libi defense, f ailed to pre sent the testimony

of Dona ld Watkins who would have testified that the victim was a c ocaine -addic ted pr os titute , a nd fa ile d to a de qu a te ly pr e pa re fo r t ri a l. T he pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t c umu la tiv e ly

the se defic iencies g ave rise to a re asonable probability that, but f or trial counsel’s err ors, the re sult of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. We f

indthe pe tit ion e r’ s a lle g a tio ns to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

As previously

noted, the post-convic tion court found that t ri al counsel wa s eff ective a nd vig or ou sly re pr e se nte d the pe tit ion e r a t tr ia l, statin g that tr ia l c ou ns e l ha d “ pu t f orth the be st d e fe ns e sh e c ou ld b a se d on the fa c tua l si tuatio n s he ha d to de a l w ith .” Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ob vio us ly

a c c re dit e d the te sti mon y of tr ia l c ou ns e l. T he re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s.

III. Conclusi on

Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt

.-7- ___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE