#### Norris Michael THOMAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James MCDONOUGH, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Florida Parole Commission, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-14389

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 15, 2007.

Norris Michael Thomas, Raiford, FL, pro se. '

Connie Lynn Beach, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before ANDERSON, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Norris Michael Thomas, a Florida prisoner proceeding *pro se,*challenges the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Thomas’s petition included a claim that the Florida Parole Commission had committed an *ex post facto*violation by performing only biannual parole reviews, where annual parole reviews had been required at the time of Thomas’s conviction in 1969 for second-degree murder. The district court concluded that this claim was properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and denied it as not being cognizable under § 2254. The district court also denied all other claims in Thomas’s petition.

On October 23, 2006, we granted Thomas a certificate of appealability on one issue:

> Whether the district court erred in determining that appellant’s challenge that the retroactive application of the amended Florida parole guidelines allowing for a parole review every two years, instead of every year as provided in the guidelines in effect at the time appellant was convicted, constituted an *ex post facto*violation was not a cognizable claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Supreme Court has held that habeas remedies do not take the place of § 1983 actions when success in the suit would not necessarily result in a speedier release. *Wilkinson v. Dotson,*544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). In *Wilkinson,*two state prisoners challenged the constitutionality of state parole procedures under § 1983. The Court discussed its precedent, concluding that § 1983 remains available to a prisoner whose success in the action “would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” *Id.*at 81, 125 S.Ct. at 1247. Because the prisoners’ challenge in *Wilkinson*would only invalidate the parole eligibility procedures, success would not spell an earlier release. *Id.*at 82, 125 S.Ct. at 1248.

In *Hutcherson v. Riley,*468 F.3d 750 (11th Cir.2006), *cert denied,*— U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 467, 166 L.Ed.2d 333 (2006), we held that “[a]n inmate convicted and sentenced under state law may seek federal relief under two primary avenues: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” *Id.*at 754 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, *932“these avenues are mutually exclusive: if a claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that same claim cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights action.” *Id.*

We agree with the district court that Thomas’s challenge to the parole eligibility procedure is not properly brought under § 2254. The Court in *Wilkinson*held that claims like Thomas’s are cognizable under § 1983. Because § 1983 and § 2254 are mutually exclusive, Thomas’s claim cannot be brought under § 2254. *Hutcherson,*468 F.3d at 754. Therefore, the district court correctly denied Thomas’s § 2254 petition.

AFFIRMED.