Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ANDREW B. ARNETT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

AARON J. SPOLARICH

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CHRISTOPHER S. EDWARDS, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 73A01-1210-CR-446

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Charles D. O’Connor, Judge

Cause No. 73C01-1103-FA-4

May 15, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Christopher S. Edwards appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. He presents a single issue for review, namely, whether the trial court 

abused its discretion when it denied his motion. 

We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2011, the State charged Edwards with one count of child molesting, as a 

Class A felony; one count of child molesting, as a Class C felony; and one count of 

performing sexual conduct in the presence of a minor, as a Class D felony. Edwards then 

requested to continue the pretrial conference at least five times, requests that the trial 

court granted. Finally, on April 2, 2012, Edwards and the State filed a joint motion to 

enter a plea of guilty (“Plea Agreement”), executed by counsel for the parties, and an 

advisement of rights and waiver (“Waiver”), executed by Edwards. In the Plea 

Agreement, Edwards agreed to plead guilty to child molesting, as a Class A felony, and 

agreed to a sentence of thirty-three years, with twenty-eight years executed and five years 

suspended to probation. Edwards executed the Waiver, which provides in part that the 

entry of a guilty plea “constitutes an admission of the truth of all the facts alleged in the 

Information to which a plea of guilty has been entered and that the guilty plea amounts to 

a conviction.” Appellant’s App. at 49. The Waiver further provides: “You have been 

given an opportunity to read the information to which you are pleading guilty, and you 

admit the alleged facts contained therein are true and constitute a factual basis for your 

plea.” Id. Finally, immediately above Edwards signature, the Waiver provides: “By 
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signing this advisement, you are agreeing that the foregoing has been read and 

understood, and by pleading guilty, you understand that you are waiving each and every 

right enumerated.” Id. 

On May 3, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Plea Agreement. At that 

hearing, Edwards answered affirmatively when asked whether he: (1) had read the Plea 

Agreement and Waiver; (2) had discussed its contents with his attorney before he signed 

it; and (3) intended to enter a plea of guilty. The trial court then read aloud the charge of 

child molesting, as a Class A felony, and asked whether Edwards understood that by 

pleading guilty he would be admitting that he had committed the crime charged. 

Edwards again answered affirmatively. Finally, the State described the facts underlying 

the charge to which Edwards had agreed to plead guilty, and Edwards admitted to the 

factual basis for the plea and that he had acted as described. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court took the plea under 

advisement.

The sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 21. At that hearing, before being 

sentenced, Edwards informed the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. The 

State subsequently filed its objection to the withdrawal of the guilty plea, and, on June 

27, Edwards filed a written motion to withdraw his plea. In the motion, Edwards stated 

that he had “had time to reflect on the plea of guilty” and wished to go to trial on all three 

charges because he had “alerted Counsel that he did not actually engage in the facts 

alleged in the factual basis.” Id. at 32. On August 1, the trial court denied Edwards’ 

motion with a detailed written order.
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At the sentencing hearing on September 6, the trial court accepted the Plea 

Agreement and sentenced Edwards accordingly. Edwards now appeals the denial of his 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Edwards contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. As discussed by our Supreme Court:

Indiana Code § 35-35-1-4(b) governs motions to withdraw guilty 

pleas. After a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a 

defendant may motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. Id. The court must 

allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if “necessary to correct a 

manifest injustice.” Id.

By contrast, the court must deny the motion if withdrawal of the plea 

would “substantially prejudice[ ]” the State. Id. In all other cases, the court 

may grant the defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea “for any fair 

and just reason.” Id.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea “arrives 

in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling.” Coomer v. State, 

652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). We will reverse the trial court only for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused its 

discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we examine the 

statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide 

whether his plea was offered “freely and knowingly.” Id. 

Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001) (footnotes omitted; alteration original). 

Further, we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling where it was based on conflicting 

evidence, and we will not reweigh the evidence. Weatherford v. State, 697 N.E.2d 32, 34

(Ind. 1998) (citation and quotation omitted). 

Here, Edwards contends that it “is manifestly unjust that a man, who believes in 

his innocence, is not allowed to withdraw a plea prior to it being accepted by the court.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. He is correct that the trial court must allow the withdrawal of a 
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guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice. But Indiana Code Section 35-35-1-4 lists 

examples of manifest injustice that would require a trial court to allow withdrawal of a 

guilty plea:

(1) The convicted person was denied the effective assistance of counsel;

(2) The plea was not entered or ratified by the convicted person;

(3) The plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made;

(4) The prosecuting attorney failed to abide by the terms of a plea 

agreement; or

(5) The plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable for any other 

reason.

Edwards has not alleged or demonstrated any of these circumstances. Rather, he merely 

asserts his innocence. But Edwards signed the Waiver, and he stated under oath at the 

guilty plea hearing that he wished to plead guilty to Class A felony child molesting, both 

times admitting the factual basis for that charge. He did so after consultation with 

counsel, and he does not allege that his counsel was ineffective. He made no 

protestations of innocence at the guilty plea hearing, but first asserted his innocence and 

requested to change his plea at the sentencing hearing. We cannot say that these facts 

demonstrate manifest injustice so as to require the trial court to allow Edwards to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 

Edwards has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

withdrawal motion. Again, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 

arrives in this Court with a presumption in favor of the ruling. Brightman, 758 N.E.2d at

44 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court noted that the only basis 

Edwards provided for his request to withdraw his plea was a “change of heart.” 

Appellant’s App. at 29. The court also noted that Edwards had been granted several 
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continuances prior to his guilty plea, the court had advised him that no further 

continuances would be granted, the State had ceased trial preparation and efforts to 

secure witnesses, and the child victim had been told that he would not be required to 

testify and that Edwards had admitted his guilt. On these facts, we cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion when it denied Edwards’ motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea.

Affirmed. 

BAILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.