Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Compton, S.J. 

LAURA L. FOSTER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 050510 SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON

 January 13, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this criminal appeal, the sole question presented is 

whether the five-year statute of limitations for petit larceny 

applies when the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor badcheck violation. 

 The facts are undisputed. In an arrest warrant issued on 

April 24, 2003, it was charged that the defendant Laura L. 

Foster, on February 17, 2002 in violation of Code § 18.2-181, 

"did unlawfully . . . with the intent to defraud, make, draw, 

utter, or deliver a check . . . drawn on the Marathon Bank in 

the amount of $140.88, and made payable to Wal-Mart 

Supercenter . . . Winchester, Va. . . . knowing that there 

were insufficient funds in the account . . . for payment of 

the check . . . ." 

 There was no dispute that defendant committed the act 

alleged. She pled, however, that the one-year statute of 

limitations for misdemeanors applied to the prosecution. 

 Following conviction and sentence upon a plea of not 

guilty in the general district court, the defendant appealed 
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to the circuit court, where she also was found guilty and 

sentenced to 12 months in jail with all but 14 days suspended. 

 Upon review, the Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed 

the circuit court's judgment. Foster v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 

App. 574, 606 S.E.2d 518 (2004). We awarded defendant this 

appeal. 

 Several statutes are involved in this controversy. Code 

§ 18.2-181, a part of Virginia's Bad Check Law, as pertinent, 

provides: 

"Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make 

or draw or utter . . . any check, . . . for the 

payment of money, upon any bank, . . . knowing, at 

the time of such making, drawing, [or] uttering 

. . . , that the maker or drawer has not sufficient 

funds in, or credit with, such bank, . . . for the 

payment of such check, . . . although no express 

representation is made in reference thereto, shall 

be guilty of larceny; and, if this check . . . has a 

represented value of $200 or more, such person shall 

be guilty of a Class 6 felony. In cases in which 

such value is less than $200, the person shall be 

guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor." 

 Code § 18.2-96, not a part of the Bad Check Law, 

provides, as pertinent: 

"Any person who: 1. Commits larceny from the person 

of another of money or other thing of value of less 

than $5, or 2. Commits simple larceny not from the 

person of another of goods and chattels of the value 

of less than $200, . . . shall be deemed guilty of 

petit larceny, which shall be punishable as a 

Class 1 misdemeanor." 
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Code § 19.2-8, dealing with limitation of prosecutions 

generally, provides, as pertinent: "A prosecution for a 

misdemeanor . . . shall be commenced within one year next 

after there was cause therefor, except that a prosecution for 

petit larceny may be commenced within five years . . . ." 

 In this appeal, as below, the defendant contends it was 

error to permit the prosecution of a warrant for a misdemeanor 

bad-check charge that was issued more than one year after the 

date of the alleged offense. Conceding that she was charged 

with a "larceny" under Code § 18.2-181, she says the 

"dispositive issue" is whether she was charged with a "petit" 

larceny to fall within the exclusion of the one-year statute 

of limitations of Code § 19.2-8. 

 She argues there is no statutory authority that makes a 

misdemeanor bad-check charge a petit larceny. Dwelling on the 

headline as printed in the Code for § 18.2-96, which reads, 

"Petit larceny defined; how punished," and according 

substantive meaning to the headline, the defendant contends 

the legislature presumably offers a controlling definition of 

"petit larceny." She says: "The offense of misdemeanor bad 

check is clearly not encompassed in . . . Code § 18.2-96(1) 

because there is no element of a taking from the person." 

 She theorizes that the instant offense also is not 

encompassed in subsection (2) of § 18.2-96 because the 
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provision refers to "simple larceny." She argues that a badcheck charge is not a "simple" larceny because that crime must 

be without the victim's assent, citing Vaughan v. Lytton, 126 

Va. 671, 679, 101 S.E. 865, 867 (1920), (simple larceny is the 

wrongful or fraudulent taking, of personal goods of some 

intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and 

with the intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently). 

She maintains that in passing a bad check, the taking is with 

the victim's assent. 

 Concluding, defendant contends that because a bad-check 

charge is not a "simple" larceny, necessarily it is not a 

"petit" larceny. And, if it is not a petit larceny, the 

offense does not fall under the exclusion of the one-year 

statute of limitations. 

 We reject the defendant's theory. A plain reading of the 

controlling statute, Code § 18.2-181, which makes the instant 

offense a crime, furnishes the complete answer to the issue 

presented. 

 The statute, a part of the Bad Check Law, provides that 

passing a bad check is "larceny." If the value is $200, or 

more, the crime is punished as a Class 6 felony. If the value 

is less than $200, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor. Therefore, it 

follows logically that a larceny which is a misdemeanor is a 
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petit larceny. There are no other possibilities for other 

larcenies within the context of § 18.2-181. 

 Addressing defendant's reliance substantively upon the 

headline of Code § 18.2-96, and her argument in support, we 

are of opinion that the statute has no impact upon the 

foregoing analysis. In the first place, "The headlines of the 

sections printed in black-face type are intended as mere 

catchwords to indicate the contents of the sections and do not 

constitute part of the act of the General Assembly." Code 

§ 1-217. 

 Secondly, the statute does not define the term "petit 

larceny" as a universal term of art. It merely prescribes the 

penalty for two forms of misdemeanor taking, as the Court of 

Appeals noted. Foster, 44 Va. App. at 581, 606 S.E.2d at 521. 

Cf. McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 811, 814, 568 

S.E.2d 449, 450 (2002) ("Code § 18.2-96, which defines 'petit 

larceny' . . ."). 

 Accordingly, finding no error in the judgment of the 

Court of Appeals, we will affirm it. 

Affirmed.