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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

TODD ERIC SCHUTZEUS, : No. 1895 WDA 2013 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, November 8, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0011106-1999 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2015 

 Todd Eric Schutzeus1 appeals from the order of November 8, 2013, 

dismissing his PCRA2 petition without a hearing. After careful review, we 

reverse. 

 The lengthy procedural history of this matter has been set forth in a 

previous Opinion of this court as follows: 

The record reflects that the Commonwealth charged 

Schutzues with one count of rape, two counts of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), and 

one count each of aggravated indecent assault, 

indecent assault, endangering the welfare of a child, 

and corruption of minors.[Footnote 1] These charges

arose from Schutzues’ sexual assault of a young girl 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 Appellant’s surname is alternatively spelled “Schutzeus” and “Schutzues.” 

2

 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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who was six years old when the assaults began. 

N.T., 10/9/01, at 8. The assaults persisted over a

four-year period. Id. at 8-9. The charges also arose 

from Schutzues’ repeated attempts to lure a 

12-year-old girl into his car, and an incident in which 

he exposed himself to an adult female. Id. at 9-10. 

[Footnote 1] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121, 

3123, 3125, 3126, 4304, 6301. 

Schutzues pled guilty to rape, one count of IDSI, 

endangering the welfare of children, and corruption

of minors. On October 9, 2001, the trial court 

sentenced Schutzues to an aggregate 3 1/2 to 

7 years of incarceration followed by seven years of

probation for the rape conviction. The trial court

imposed no further penalty on the remaining counts. 

Schutzues served the maximum seven-year term of 

incarceration and then commenced his probation 

sentence. Less than six months into his probation 

term, Schutzues violated his probation by having 

contact with his young nieces. 

After a May 1, 2007 hearing, the trial court found 

Schutzues in violation of his probation and sentenced 

him to 10 to 20 years of incarceration for rape, a 

consecutive 10 to 20 years of incarceration for IDSI, 

a consecutive 2 1/2 to 5 years of incarceration for

endangering the welfare of a child, and a consecutive 

2 1/2 to 5 years of incarceration for corrupting a 

minor. In an unpublished memorandum of July 29, 

2009, this Court vacated the judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Schutzeus, 1009 WDA 2007, 

981 A.2d 933 (Pa.Super. 2009) (Schutzeus I). 

Specifically, we concluded that the trial court failed 

to consider 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c) prior to imposing 

a sentence of incarceration. That section provides as 

follows: 

(c) Limitation on sentence of total 

confinement.--The court shall not 

impose a sentence of total confinement 

upon revocation unless it finds that: 
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(1) the defendant has been 

convicted of another crime; 

or 

(2) the conduct of the defendant 

indicates that it is likely that 

he will commit another crime 

if he is not imprisoned; or 

(3) such a sentence is essential 

to vindicate the authority of 

the court. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c). 

The trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing 

on February 9, 2010, at which the court sentenced 

Schutzues to 42 to 84 months of incarceration for 

rape, a consecutive 10 to 20 years for IDSI, and 

consecutive 2 1/2 to 5 year sentences for 

endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of 

minors. In an unpublished memorandum of 

March 31, 2011, this Court once again vacated the 

judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. 

Schutzues, 526 WDA 2010, 26 A.3d 1212 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (“Schutzues II”). In 

Schutzues II, we held that the sentences for IDSI, 

endangering the welfare of a child and corruption of 

a minor were illegal because “[a] probation 

revocation court does not have the authority to resentence an offender on a final guilt without further 

punishment sentence after the period for altering or 

modifying the sentence has expired.” Id. at 3 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 997 A.2d 

1205, 1210 (Pa.Super. 2010)). We remanded for resentencing on the rape conviction. Id. at 3-4. 

Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 88-89 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013) (“Schutzues III”). The trial court 

held another sentencing hearing on June 28, 2011, and imposed a sentence 

of 61⁄2 to 13 years’ incarceration. On the ensuing appeal, appellant argued 
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that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of incarceration without 

finding that any of the Section 9771(c) factors applied to his case. While 

this court expressed frustration with the trial court’s continuing failure to 

explicitly reference Section 9771(c) during sentencing, we ultimately found 

the matter waived for failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We rejected 

appellant’s argument that the trial court’s failure to adhere to 

Section 9771(c) resulted in an illegal sentence. See id. at 98 (“challenges 

under § 9771(c) are not among the narrow class of issues that implicate the 

legality of a sentence”). 

 Appellant also claimed that his sentence was excessive given the 

technical nature of his probation violation, which he described as 

de minimus, and his efforts at rehabilitation. Id. While we found that 

appellant raised a substantial question as to the legitimacy of his sentence, 

ultimately, this court found that appellant failed to establish an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 99-100. 

 On May 9, 2013, our supreme court denied appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal. A timely pro se PCRA petition was filed on August 6, 

2013, and counsel was appointed. On October 7, 2013, counsel filed a 

petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley “no merit” letter.3 On October 17, 

2013, the PCRA court granted counsel permission to withdraw and notified 

 

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 
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appellant of its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing within 

20 days pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On November 7, 2013, appellant 

filed a pro se response to Rule 907 notice; and on November 8, 2013, 

appellant’s petition was dismissed. A timely pro se notice of appeal was 

filed on November 27, 2013.4 On January 6, 2014, the PCRA court ordered 

appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 

21 days pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 14, 2014, prior to the 

Rule 1925(b) deadline, the PCRA court filed an opinion addressing the issues 

raised in appellant’s pro se PCRA petition. Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) 

statement on January 28, 2014. (Docket #98.)5 Appellant has retained new 

counsel on appeal. 

 Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review: 

I. DID THE COURT VIOLATE ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT SENTENCED THE APPELLANT TO THE 

MAXIMUM ON A PROBATION REVOCATION 

WITHOUT STATING VALID REASONS, BY 

ABDICATING ITS ROLE AS SENTENCER, AND 

BY NOT ALLOWING DEFENSE INPUT INTO THE 

REASONS FOR THE AGGRAVATED RANGE 

SENTENCE? 

 

4

 Appellant initially filed notice of appeal on October 28, 2013, from the 

October 17, 2013 Rule 907 notice. That appeal was dismissed on January 9, 

2014, as premature. (Docket #99.) 

5

 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was due on January 27, 2014. 

However, we note that appellant’s concise statement is dated January 23, 

2014. We are mindful of the so-called “prisoner mailbox rule,” pursuant to 

which a document is deemed filed on the date that a prisoner delivers it to 

prison authorities for mailing. Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 

426 (Pa. 1997). Furthermore, as noted above, the PCRA court issued its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion before the 21-day deadline expired. 
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II. WAS PRIOR APPELLATE COUNSEL 

INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT APPEALING ON THE 

DISCRETIONARY ASPECT OF THE SENTENCE? 

III. DID THE LOWER COURT NEGLECT TO IMPOSE 

CONDITIONS OF PROBATION ON THE 

APPELLANT SO THAT HE IS NOT IN 

VIOLATION? 

Appellant’s brief at 5. 

 Initially, we recite our standard of review: 

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order 

denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the 

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the

evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 

795, 799 n. 2 (2005). The PCRA court’s findings will 

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the

findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. 

Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa.Super.2001). 

Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 879 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007). 

[T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

post-conviction petition is not absolute. 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011, 1014 

(Pa.Super.2001). It is within the PCRA court’s 

discretion to decline to hold a hearing if the 

petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no

support either in the record or other evidence. Id. 

It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on 

appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA 

petition in light of the record certified before it in 

order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its 

determination that there were no genuine issues of 

material fact in controversy and in denying relief 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 454, 

701 A.2d 541, 542-543 (1997). 
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Id. at 882, quoting Commonwealth v. Khalifah, 852 A.2d 1238, 

1239-1240 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

 Appellant raises several discretionary sentencing challenges, including 

failing to comply with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c); failing to state adequate 

reasons on the record for the sentence imposed; failing to consider 

mitigating evidence; and improperly deferring to the prosecuting attorney to 

articulate reasons for the sentence.6 However, we find appellant’s third 

issue concerning the trial court’s failure to comply with 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

 

6 See Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 860 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Pa.Super. 

2004), reversed in part on other grounds, 912 A.2d 827 (Pa. 2006) (“a 

claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is cognizable under the PCRA”) (citations 

omitted); Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 801 (Pa.Super. 

2003) (“a claim regarding the discretionary aspects of [the defendant’s] 

sentence, raised in the context of an ineffectiveness claim, would be 

cognizable under the PCRA”), discussing Commonwealth ex rel. Dadario 

v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001) (footnote omitted). Appellant is 

correct that, despite this court’s promptings, the trial court has steadfastly 

refused to comply with Section 9771(c). Nowhere, during its three 

sentencing hearings following revocation of appellant’s probation, does the 

trial court make any explicit findings relative to Section 9771(c). See 

Schutzues III, 54 A.3d at 91 (“Despite our directive to the trial court in 

Schutzeus I to comply with § 9771(c), the trial court has continued to 

ignore that statute.”). Indeed, this court observed in Schutzues III, “The 

trial court’s attempts to give [appellant] the maximum amount of jail time 

possible have already resulted in two flagrantly illegal sentences and two 

remands from this Court, as set forth above.” Id. See also id. at 97 (“the 

trial court, as noted above, offered no analysis and simply bookended the 

sentencing hearing with statements of his desire to incarcerate [appellant] 

for as long as possible”). The trial court’s conduct in this matter has been 

regrettable, at best. 
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§ 9754(b) to be dispositive. Therefore, we need not reach the remaining 

issues. 

“To prevail on a claim alleging counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, Appellant must demonstrate (1) that 

the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that

counsel’s course of conduct was without a 

reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) that he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 555 

Pa. 397, 407, 724 A.2d 916, 921 (1999), citing 

Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 93, 645 

A.2d 1300, 1304 (1994) (other citation omitted). In 

order to meet the prejudice prong of the 

ineffectiveness standard, a defendant must show 

that there is a “‘reasonable probability that but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 308, 724 

A.2d 326, 331 (1999), quoting Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A “‘[r]easonable probability’ 

is defined as ‘a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.’” Id. at 309, 724 A.2d at 

331, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 

2052. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 811 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa.Super. 2002), 

appeal denied, 832 A.2d 435 (Pa. 2003). 

 When we consider an appeal from a sentence 

imposed following the revocation of probation, “[o]ur 

review is limited to determining the validity of the 

probation revocation proceedings and the authority 

of the sentencing court to consider the same 

sentencing alternatives that it had at the time of the 

initial sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b).” 

Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 

(Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 637, 771 

A.2d 1279 (2001) (citation omitted). Revocation of

a probation sentence is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and that court's 
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decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the 

absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa.Super. 502, 669 

A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa.Super.1996). The 

Commonwealth establishes a probation violation 

meriting revocation when it shows, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the 

probationer's conduct violated the terms and 

conditions of his probation, and that probation has

proven an ineffective rehabilitation tool incapable of 

deterring probationer from future antisocial conduct. 

Commonwealth v. Sims, 770 A.2d 346, 350 

(Pa.Super.2001). 

Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 557-558 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 945 A.2d 169 (Pa. 2008). See also Commonwealth v. 

Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 109 A.3d 

678 (Pa. 2015) (“In order to uphold a revocation of probation, the 

Commonwealth must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

defendant violated his probation.”) (citation omitted). 

 Appellant argues that prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise 

the trial court’s failure to comply with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b),7 which 

provides: 

 

7

 This issue was argued in appellant’s pro se PCRA petition. (Docket #82.) 

Appointed counsel, Robert S. Carey, Jr., Esq., did address the issue in his 

Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter but found it to be meritless for the same 

reason relied upon by the PCRA court and the Commonwealth, i.e., that the 

trial court signed off on a “special field report” from the probation office 

which contained a provision that appellant was not to have any contact with 

minors. (Docket #85.) We find this argument to be unpersuasive for the 

reasons discussed infra. 
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§ 9754. Order of probation 

(b) Conditions generally.--The court shall attach 

such of the reasonable conditions authorized 

by subsection (c) of this section as it deems 

necessary to insure or assist the defendant in 

leading a law-abiding life. 

 Appellant argues that the terms and conditions of his probation, 

including the no-contact order, were not actually imposed by the trial court 

as required by Section 9754(b), but rather by the Office of Probation and 

Parole. Appellant argues that this was an improper delegation of the court’s 

authority. At the original plea and sentencing hearing of October 9, 2001, 

the trial court stated: 

Then pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, at 

CC199911106, at Count One, it’s three and-a-half to

seven years, plus, seven years probation, terms and

conditions to be set by the Probation Office or Parole 

Office, whoever is going to do that. No further 

penalty at the remaining counts. 

Notes of testimony, 10/9/01 at 16-17. In addition, the trial court’s 

October 9, 2001 sentencing order did not impose any terms and conditions 

of probation whatsoever, except DNA registration. (Docket #7.) 

Regrettably, the trial court did not check the line next to the special 

probationary condition “No Contact w/Victim,” let alone order that appellant 

was not to have any contact with minor children generally. (Id.) 

 In Commonwealth v. MacGregor, 912 A.2d 315 (Pa.Super. 2006), 

the appellant was required to sign a “Special Conditions of Parole” form upon 

his release on probation, having served out the full four-year term of his 
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imprisonment. Id. at 316. One of the conditions was that he was not to 

have any contact with anyone under age 18. Id. Subsequently, on three 

different occasions, the appellant accompanied his girlfriend to gatherings of 

her family at which young children were present. Id. at 316-317. The trial 

court revoked his probation and imposed a prison sentence of 18 to 

60 months. Id. at 317. 

 On appeal, this court vacated the judgment of sentence on the basis 

that the condition appellant violated was never imposed by the trial court. 

We relied on Commonwealth v. Vilsaint, 893 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa.Super. 

2006), which held that, “the legislature [in the Sentencing Code] has 

specifically empowered the court, not the probation offices and not any 

individual probation officers, to impose the terms of probation.” Id.

(emphasis supplied in MacGregor). Since the condition the appellant was 

charged with violating, in addition to having been improperly drafted by a 

parole agent, was not imposed by the court as required by Section 9754(b), 

revocation of the appellant’s probation could not be sustained. Id. at 318. 

 Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Elliott, 50 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 

2012), our supreme court sought to reconcile Section 9754 with the Prisons 

and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6131(a)(5)(ii) & 6151, which mandates 

that the Board and its agents establish uniform standards for the supervision 

of probationers under its authority, and further to implement those 

standards and conditions. The court in Elliott distinguished between 
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“conditions of probation” and “conditions of supervision,” concluding that 

“the Board and its agents may impose conditions of supervision that are 

germane to, elaborate on, or interpret any conditions of probation that are 

imposed by the trial court.” Id. at 1292. 

 In Elliott, at the conclusion of the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the 

trial court imposed as a condition of his probation that he not have 

unsupervised contact with any minor child. Id. at 1285. After serving out 

his maximum sentence, the defendant was released and began serving his 

five-year probationary term. Id. at 1285-1286. The defendant was given a 

form created by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole entitled 

“Standard Special Conditions for Sex Offenders -- Minor Victims,” which 

included a condition that he not enter or loiter within 1,000 feet of areas 

where minors commonly congregate including playgrounds, youth recreation 

centers, elementary schools, etc. Id. at 1286. 

 The defendant’s probation officer observed him sitting near a large 

water fountain in a park in which young children were playing. Id. 

According to the probation officer, the defendant was closely observing a 

young girl in a red bathing suit. Id. The defendant subsequently admitted 

regularly going to the park to watch children and being sexually aroused by 

the girl in the red bathing suit. Id. at 1287. The defendant’s probation was 

revoked and he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 21⁄2 to 5 years’ 

incarceration. Id. The trial court opined, inter alia, that he had violated 
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Supervision Condition 19, that he avoid areas where persons under age 18 

commonly congregate, such as the park fountain. Id. On appeal, this court 

reversed, finding that Supervision Condition 19 (no loitering within 

1,000 feet) was not incorporated into the court’s general no-contact 

requirement of the defendant’s probation. Id. at 1288.8 Citing Vilsaint, 

supra, and MacGregor, supra, this court held that only the court, and not 

probation officers, can impose terms and conditions of probation. 

 The Commonwealth appealed, and our supreme court vacated this 

court’s order, holding that the Board merely expounded upon the trial court’s 

no-contact order: 

[W]e find that Supervision Condition 19, that 

Appellee should not ‘enter or loiter within 1,000 feet 

of areas where the primary activity at such locations 

involve persons under the age of 18,’ is a permissible 

condition of supervision imposed by the Board and is 

derivative of the trial court’s condition of probation 

that Appellee not have unsupervised contact with 

minors. 

Id. at 1292. The court in Elliott distinguished MacGregor where, in that 

case, the trial court had ordered a $25 probation administration fee as the 

sole condition of probation, without actually setting forth any terms and 

conditions of probation. Id., n.4. The matter was remanded to this court 

 

8

 This court also found there was insufficient evidence to support a violation 

of Supervision Condition 17, prohibiting the defendant from engaging in 

nonverbal communication with minor children while unsupervised such as 

waving, gesturing, or winking. That aspect of this court’s decision was not 

appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 1288. 
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for a determination as to whether the evidence was in fact sufficient to 

sustain the defendant’s probation revocation based upon Supervision 

Condition 19. Id. at 1293. 

 The Commonwealth and the PCRA court attempt to distinguish 

MacGregor based on the fact that in the matter sub judice, the trial court 

signed a “Special Field Report” from the Board specifically stating that 

appellant was being supervised as a sexually violent predator and was not to 

have any contact with children under the age of 18. (Appellant’s brief, 

Appendix B.) Therefore, they argue that the trial court concurred with the 

Board’s recommendations. 

 We find MacGregor to be controlling. As in MacGregor, in the 

instant case, the trial court did not impose any terms and conditions of 

probation whatsoever, remarking that they would be set by the Probation 

Office or “whoever is going to do that.” Nor did the trial court set out any 

terms and conditions of probation in its sentencing order. The fact that the 

trial court signed a field report some six years later, dated January 28, 2007, 

which contained the no-contact provision, is insufficient to comply with 

Section 9754(b). The court in Elliott did not overrule Vilsaint and 

MacGregor. MacGregor makes clear that only the court, not probation 

officers, can impose terms and conditions of probation. The field report was 

nothing more than a summary of appellant’s conditions of supervision, as 
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contrasted with conditions of probation, which are required to be imposed by 

the court. 

 While Elliott did hold that the Board may impose conditions of 

supervision that are “germane to” any conditions of probation imposed by 

the trial court, in the instant case, there were no conditions of probation for 

the Board to elaborate upon or interpret. In Elliott, at time of sentencing, 

the trial court had ordered as a condition of the defendant’s probation that 

he not have unsupervised contact with children. The Board does not have 

the statutory authority to implement standards and conditions of supervision 

out of whole cloth; it can only administer conditions of supervision within the 

parameters established by the trial court. Here, since the trial court never 

imposed a no-contact provision, the Board could not enforce one. As such, 

appellant’s contact with his two nieces was not a violation of his probation. 

The Commonwealth failed to establish, as a matter of law, that appellant’s 

conduct violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Clearly, then, 

prior counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this issue in the court below 

and on appeal. Appellant’s revocation sentence must be vacated and we will 

reverse the order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition.9 While it appears 

 

9

 As should be evident from this Memorandum, appellant’s claims are not 

patently frivolous or without any support in the record, so as to permit 

appointed counsel to withdraw. Even appellant’s previously waived 

Section 9771(c) claim cannot be characterized as patently meritless, where 

this court specifically expressed our displeasure at the trial court’s seemingly 

purposeful refusal to address the Section 9771(c) factors. Appointed 

counsel should have been required to file an amended petition on appellant’s 
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that appellant’s original sentence, including the seven-year probationary tail, 

has expired and he is entitled to immediate discharge without condition 

except for Megan’s Law registration requirements, we will remand for the 

trial court to make that determination and enter an appropriate order 

forthwith. 

 Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2015 

 

behalf, and an evidentiary hearing should have been conducted. That said, 

as appellant has retained counsel on the instant appeal and we have already 

determined that he is entitled to PCRA relief, remand for new counsel would 

be pointless.