PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser and Lemons, 

JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 

DAVID ALAN STEVENS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 051890 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

 September 15, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

I 

 Upon a jury verdict in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, 

David Alan Stevens was convicted of aggravated involuntary 

manslaughter, in violation of Code § 18.2-36.1. Stevens was 

sentenced to 15 years in prison, and his conviction was affirmed 

by a panel of the Court of Appeals. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 44 

Va.App. 122, 603 S.E.2d 642 (2004). Thereafter, the Court of 

Appeals, sitting en banc, also affirmed the conviction. Stevens 

v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 234, 616 S.E.2d 754 (2005). We 

awarded Stevens this appeal. 

II 

 Stevens contends that the trial court committed reversible 

error in allowing into evidence the results of a blood alcohol 

content test performed on a blood sample taken from him in 

violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Stevens also contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss the charge of aggravated involuntary 

manslaughter because he had not been provided the opportunity 
2

for an independent testing of the blood taken from him pursuant 

to the implied consent law, Code § 18.2-268.2. Finally, Stevens 

claims that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 

support his conviction. 

III 

 On appeal, we must view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. 

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 

(2003). 

 Approximately 2:00 a.m., on June 29, 2002, Stevens was 

driving his motor vehicle north on Sterling Boulevard, a fourlane divided highway in Loudoun County. Barry Childers was 

driving his vehicle south on the same highway, and Heather 

Watson was a passenger in his car. 

 As Childers approached the intersection of Sterling 

Boulevard and East Frederick Drive, he entered the left-turn 

lane with the intention of turning left onto East Frederick 

Drive. Childers paused in the left-turn lane until the 

controlling traffic light changed from red to a green arrow and 

then proceeded to turn left. When he was "halfway through the 

intersection," the car operated by Stevens struck the passenger 
3

side of Childers' car.1 Heather Watson died as a result of 

injuries she sustained in the collision. There were no skid 

marks at the scene. 

 Shortly after the collision, Childers approached Stevens' 

car to check on the driver. According to Childers, Stevens "was 

talking[,] but [Childers] couldn't understand what [Stevens] was 

saying." Stevens "was just mumbling." 

 The first police officer to arrive at the accident scene 

detected a strong odor of alcohol about Stevens' car. A rescue 

worker at the scene detected a very strong odor of alcohol on 

Stevens' breath, and she described Stevens as very disoriented. 

Stevens told the rescue worker that he had consumed both beer 

and "shots of alcohol." When asked how much he had consumed, 

Stevens said, "Lots, and lots, and lots." Stevens also told the 

rescue worker that he did not remember the accident, and he 

asked her, "What did I hit?" 

 Stevens was taken to a nearby hospital for examination. At 

the hospital, Stevens reported that he had consumed 12 to 24 

beers prior to the accident. Hospital personnel took a sample 

of Stevens' blood for testing, and the test performed on the 

 1

 John Olivo of the Virginia Department of Transportation 

explained the operation of the traffic lights at the accident 

scene and stated that the traffic light controlling the 

northbound lanes of Sterling Boulevard will always be red when 

the southbound left-turn lane of Sterling Boulevard shows a 

green arrow. 
4

sample indicated a blood alcohol content of .24 or .25 (the 

Hospital Test). 

 A deputy sheriff approached Stevens at the hospital and 

clearly smelled the odor of alcohol in the room where Stevens 

was located. The deputy arrested Stevens for driving under the 

influence of alcohol and advised Stevens about the implied 

consent law. Stevens agreed to a blood test (the Implied 

Consent Law Test). After two vials of blood had been drawn from 

Stevens, the deputy explained to Stevens that he was entitled to 

have one vial independently analyzed. The deputy further 

explained that, if Stevens desired an independent analysis, he 

needed to sign a certain form. Stevens responded, "I'm too 

f_____ up. I can't sign s___." The Implied Consent Law Test 

indicated a blood alcohol content of .21. 

 At trial, Dr. Carol O'Neal of the Department of Forensic 

Sciences testified as an expert witness for the Commonwealth. 

Dr. O'Neal stated that a blood alcohol content reading above .20 

would cause a motor vehicle operator to have tunnel vision, 

increased reaction time, decreased steering accuracy, and a 

tendency to be inattentive. Such an operator would have trouble 

adapting vision between light and dark and reduced ability to 

adjust vision from far to near and vice-versa. The operator 

also would have a loss of coordination and reduced ability to 
5

estimate a vehicle's speed and to observe traffic signals, 

traffic signs, other vehicles, and pedestrians. 

IV 

A 

 Prior to trial, Stevens contended that the seizure of his 

blood by the police had violated his rights contained in the 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal 

Constitution. He asserted that there had been no probable cause 

to support his arrest; that he had not, in fact, been arrested; 

and that exigent circumstances had not supported the taking of 

his blood sample without a warrant. 

 Following a pretrial hearing, the trial court suppressed 

the certificate of analysis regarding the Implied Consent Law 

Test and precluded the Commonwealth from using the presumptions 

established by Code § 18.2-269. At trial, however, Dr. O'Neal 

was allowed to report that the Implied Consent Law Test revealed 

a blood alcohol content of .21. Stevens contends that, in doing 

so, the trial court committed reversible error. We do not 

agree. 

 In Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 523 S.E.2d 208, 

209 (1999), we quoted from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 

24 (1967), as follows: " '[B]efore a federal constitutional 

error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a 
6

belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' " We 

further stated the following: 

In making that determination, the reviewing court is 

to consider a host of factors, including the 

importance of the tainted evidence in the 

prosecution's case, whether that evidence was 

cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 

corroborating or contradicting the tainted evidence on 

material points, and the overall strength of the 

prosecution's case. 

Lilly, 258 Va. at 551, 523 S.E.2d at 209. 

 The Hospital Test had been independently performed by 

hospital personnel and the written report thereof was admissible 

under Code § 19.2-187.02(A).2

 It is unreasonable to believe that 

the jury would have rejected the Hospital Test and accepted, 

instead, the Implied Consent Law Test. Moreover, Stevens' 

conduct and statements showed that he was highly intoxicated at 

the time of the collision. Therefore, we conclude that any 

error in permitting Dr. O'Neal to testify as to the result of 

the Implied Consent Law Test was harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and we so hold. 

 2

 At the time of the offense, Code § 19.2-187.02(A) 

provided, in pertinent part, the following: 

 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 

written results of blood alcohol tests conducted upon 

persons receiving medical treatment in a hospital 

emergency room are admissible in evidence as a 

business records exception to the hearsay rule in 

prosecutions for any violation of § 18.2-266 (driving 

while intoxicated) or a substantially similar local 

ordinance [and] § 18.2—36.1 (involuntary manslaughter 

resulting from driving while intoxicated). 
7

B 

 Stevens also contends that the trial court erred in 

refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated involuntary 

manslaughter because he had not been provided the opportunity 

for an independent testing of the blood taken from him pursuant 

to the implied consent law. See former Code § 18.2-268.6 (1996 

& Supp. 2002). 

 Again, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and we so hold.3

 As previously noted, the 

Hospital Test revealed a higher blood alcohol content than the 

result reported from the Implied Consent Law Test. The Hospital 

Test was an independent examination performed by hospital 

personnel who had no interest in the charge against Stevens. 

Both of the tests performed on Stevens' blood showed an alcohol 

content in excess of .20, and it is unreasonable to believe that 

a third test would have differed substantially. 

V 

 Finally, we consider Stevens' contention that the evidence 

is insufficient, as a matter of law, to support his conviction. 

Code § 18.2-36.1 provides, in pertinent part, the following: 

 3

 In its brief, the Commonwealth presents argument to 

counter what it characterizes as Stevens' federal constitutional 

claim. It is unclear from Stevens' brief whether he makes such 

a claim, but, to the extent that he does, we have held the 

Commonwealth to this more stringent harmless-error standard. 
8

 A. Any person who, as a result of driving under 

the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or 

(iv) of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance 

substantially similar thereto unintentionally causes 

the death of another person, shall be guilty of 

involuntary manslaughter. 

 B. If, in addition, the conduct of the defendant 

was so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a 

reckless disregard for human life, he shall be guilty 

of aggravated involuntary manslaughter. 

 When a person challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth and give the Commonwealth all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom. Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 

459, 461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000). Further, a jury's verdict 

should not be disturbed on appeal unless the verdict was plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it. Stockton v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145-46, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1984). 

 Stevens first asserts that the evidence was insufficient, 

as a matter of law, to prove that he was intoxicated at the time 

of the accident. We disagree. 

 There is ample evidence that Stevens was extremely 

intoxicated. The Hospital Test showed that Stevens' blood 

alcohol content was .24 or .25, approximately three times the 

legal limit. As previously related, an expert testified about 

the effect that this amount of alcohol would have on an operator 

of a motor vehicle. There was also evidence that Stevens did 

not remember what he had hit. Stevens admitted he had consumed 
9

between 12 and 24 beers before the accident, and witnesses who 

observed Stevens after the accident testified that Stevens was 

mumbling, confused, and had a strong odor of alcohol about him. 

Clearly, there was substantial evidence from which the jury 

could find that Stevens was intoxicated at the time of the 

accident. 

 Next, Stevens asserts that the evidence was insufficient, 

as a matter of law, to prove that he caused Watson's death. The 

evidence, as previously related, established that Childers had 

received a green arrow before undertaking his left-hand turn and 

that, when the arrow was green, Stevens would have faced a red 

light. No skid marks were found at the scene, indicating that 

Stevens never applied his brakes prior to striking Childers' 

car. As discussed above, Stevens was highly intoxicated. From 

all the evidence presented, the jury properly could have 

concluded that Stevens caused Watson's death. 

 Finally, Stevens asserts that the evidence is insufficient, 

as a matter of law, to prove that his conduct was gross, wanton, 

and culpable. Again, we focus upon Stevens' high level of 

intoxication, approximately three times the legal limit. This 

alone justifies a finding that Stevens' conduct was gross, 

wanton, and culpable. In addition to the high degree of 

intoxication, other facts support the jury's finding. Stevens 
10

ran a red light, failed to apply his brakes before the 

collision, and did not know what he had struck. 

VI 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Stevens' 

conviction for aggravated involuntary manslaughter. 

Affirmed.