United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 24, 2020*

Decided February 25, 2020 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

No. 19-1428 

SIMEON WASHA AMEN RA, 

a/k/a SIMEON LEWIS 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 14-CV-07171 

John J. Tharp, Jr., 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Simeon Washa Amen Ra, who describes himself as an “indigent inhabitant 

traveler” and non-citizen “national” of the United States, believes that his employer, 

BNSF Railway Company, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 

discriminating against him based on his national origin, retaliating against him, and 

harassing him. The district court entered summary judgment for BNSF, concluding that 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-1428 Page 2 

Amen Ra did not timely file his claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (EEOC). We agree with the district court’s reasoning and affirm the 

judgment. 

Amen Ra, who had worked for BNSF for seventeen years, asked the human 

resources department in 2010 to make changes to his name (from Simeon Lewis to 

Simeon Washa Amen Ra), ethnicity (from African American to Indigenous Native 

American), and citizenship status (from U.S. citizen to “U.S. National”). The company 

updated Amen Ra’s name and ethnicity but not his citizenship. Amen Ra repeatedly 

renewed his request until he was informed by the director of human resources in late 

2012 that the department would not change his citizenship. The following month, BNSF 

rejected Amen Ra’s bid for a promotion from brakeman to conductor, and awarded the 

position to a less senior employee. Because Amen Ra was not certified as a conductor, 

BNSF prohibited him from applying for future conductor positions. To denote that 

restriction, it placed a “+” alongside his name on public employee rosters. 

 

In the summer of 2013, Amen Ra sent the Illinois Department of Human Rights 

an Employment Complainant Information Sheet, which is a pre-charge screening form 

that supplies basic information about his claim. (It is not a formal charge for Title VII 

purposes because it does not ask for relief. See Carlson v. Christian Bros. Servs., 840 F.3d 

466, 467 (7th Cir. 2016).) The Department of Human Rights promptly sent Amen Ra an 

intake letter (that he signed upon receiving), which explained that the official charge 

would include his claim of citizenship discrimination but not a claim of retaliation or 

harassment. In the months that followed, the Department of Human Rights provided 

Amen Ra with several drafts of a charge form that he refused to sign because each draft 

characterized him as a “Naturalized United States Citizen” rather than an “American 

National.” (“American National,” the Department informed him, is not a recognized 

citizenship status under the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS § 5/2-101(K).) 

Eventually, in November 2013, Amen Ra signed a formal administrative charge, 

alleging that BNSF discriminated against him when it refused to update his citizenship 

status in his employment files. The charge was cross-filed that day with the EEOC, 

which in turn issued a right-to-sue letter. 

Amen Ra then sued BNSF under Title VII for discrimination (by refusing to 

change his citizenship), retaliation (by rejecting his bid for promotion), and harassment 

(by putting the “+” symbol next to his name on public employee rosters). See 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Discovery ensued, and over the next fifteen months Amen Ra was 

allowed three extensions of time. BNSF then moved for summary judgment, arguing 
No. 19-1428 Page 3 

that Amen Ra’s claims were time-barred because he failed to file his charge with the 

EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful acts and, alternatively, because he 

failed to administratively exhaust his harassment and retaliation claims by not 

including them in the charge. Amen Ra countered that the defendants had generally 

withheld or tampered with key evidence, and he sought more time under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 56(d) to conduct discovery. 

The district court granted BNSF’s motion for summary judgment, agreeing that 

Amen Ra’s claims all were time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1). As for his 

Rule 56(d) motion, the court explained that it was denying Amen Ra’s request for 

additional discovery because he had not specified what new information he needed to 

obtain and, in any event, he already had been given fifteen months—and three 

extensions of time—to conduct discovery. 

On appeal, Amen Ra challenges the district court’s conclusion that his claims 

were untimely. He argues that, within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful acts, he filed 

with the Department of Human Rights two documents—a Complainant Information 

Sheet and an intake letter (signed two days later)—that each constitute a charge. For 

support, he points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,

552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008), which instructs that documents such as intake letters can count 

as a charge under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 if they contain the 

information required by implementing regulations and can be reasonably construed as 

a request for the EEOC to take remedial action. 

Amen Ra’s situation differs from the ADEA plaintiff’s in Holowecki because 

neither his Complainant Information Sheet nor his intake letter contained the requisite 

information to qualify as a charge. The Complainant Information Sheet, for instance, 

did not request remedial action or prompt the Illinois Department of Human Rights to 

activate its enforcement machinery, and it expressly warned Amen Ra that “THIS IS 

NOT A CHARGE.” See Carlson, 840 F.3d at 467–68 (upholding determination that 

Complainant Information Sheet filed with Illinois Department of Human Rights did not 

qualify as charge because the document—despite identifying the parties and describing 

the action complained of—did not request remedial action and stated that “THIS IS 

NOT A CHARGE”). The intake letter is not a charge for similar reasons: It also did not 

request relief or launch an investigation into BNSF. Accordingly, we agree with the 

district court that Amen Ra did not file his charge until November 2013, more than 300 

days after each of the challenged actions. 
No. 19-1428 Page 4 

 Amen Ra also argues that the district court should have granted his request 

under Rule 56(d) for additional time to take discovery. But the court acted well within 

its discretion in denying the request because Amen Ra did not identify any discoverable 

evidence that would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Here the court had 

before it all the evidence that it needed to conclude that Amen Ra’s charge was 

untimely, and it was not required to grant more time on “an obviously meritless claim 

or defense.” Smith v. OSF HealthCare Sys., 933 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2019). 

We have considered Amen Ra’s other arguments and none has merit. The 

judgment is AFFIRMED.