T hi s opi ni on i s s ubj e ct t o r e vi s i on b e f or e f i nal p u bli ca tion i n th e P ac i

f i c R ep orter 2015 UT 42

I N T HE 

### S UPR EM E 

### C OU RT OF TH E 

### S TA TE O F 

### U TAH

S TA TE O F U T AH , Appe lle e,

v. R O GE R E DW AR D T A Y L OR , Appellant.

No. 20130556 Filed Mar ch 31, 2015

Third D is tric t, S al t La ke No. 111906891 The Honorable Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills

Att or neys: Sean D . Reyes, At t’y Gen., John J . Nielsen, As st. Att ’y Gen.,

S al t La ke C ity, fo r ap pe ll ee Joan C. Watt, M ichael D . Misner, Salt Lake Cit y, for appellant
J UST I CE P ARRIS H authore d the opinion of the Co urt, in which C H IEF J UST I CE D UR R ANT , A S S OC I ATE C H IEF J UST I CE L EE , J UST I CE D UR HAM , and J UDG E O R ME joined. Due to his retir ement, J UST I CE N EHR I NG did not part icipate herein;

C O U RT O F A PPEALS J UDG E G REG O RY K. O R ME s at. J UST I CE D E NO G. H I M ONAS be c am e ame mb er of the Cou rt on Februar y 13, 2015, after or al argument in this matter , and

ac c ordi ngl y di d n ot pa rtic ip ate

. J UST I CE P ARRIS H , op inion of the Cou rt: INTRODUCTION ¶1 Roge r Ta ylor w as c ha rged w ith mu lti pl e c ou nts of

s ec uri tie s fraud and theft on the basis of h is alleged o p e rat ion of a Ponzi

s c he me . Mr. Ta ylor a s ked the di s tric t c ou rt to dis mi s s ei ght of the ten charges based on the applic able statutes of limitations. The dis tr ict court concluded that secu rities fraud and theft are co nt i nu ing offe ns es an d e val ua ted the tim el in es s of the c ha rges ac c ordi ngl y. On interl oc ut ory revi ew , w e h old tha t s ec uri tie s fra ud an d the ft are notS TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

In a companion cas e issu ed today , we address the sam e 1 que st i o n with respect to t he commu nications fraud statute, U tah Code section 76-10-1801. State v. Kay, 2015 UT 43, __ P.3d __. Becaus e this cas e comes to us o n a n i nt erlo cutory appeal, the 2 fa c tsh a ve y et t o be deter mined. On interlocutor y r eview, we recount the facts as alleged and in a li ght most fav or able to t he ruling below. Cf

. P e ckv. State, 2008 UT 39, ¶ 2, 191 P.3d 4 (“On appeal fro m a motion t o dismis s, ‘we review the facts only as they ar e alle g e d in the complaint.’ We accept the factual allegations as true and draw all

rea s ona bl e i nferenc es fro m thos e f ac ts in a light m os t f avora bl e to the plaintiff.”).

2 continuing offenses and there fore remand the c ase to t he d i strict court t o r e-eva l ua t e t he timeliness of the charges in light o f our hol di ng. 1
BACKGROUND ¶2 Mr. Ta ylor an d Ric ha rd Sm ith are al le ged to h ave ope rate d a P onz i s c he me in

w hi c h mul tip le inves tors los t larg e sums. Th ey 2 initiated the alleged sch eme by founding an investment firm known

as As c en du s Ca pital Ma na gem ent. Onc e c li ents de pos ite d m one y with Asc endus , Mr . Taylor and Mr. Smith created false acc ount
s tate me nts refle c tin g inv est me nt g ai ns to lu re furthe r fu nd s fro m their clients. Later , Mr

. Taylor and M r. Smi th founded t he Frank lin Forb es Compos ite Fu nd . T he y as ked exis tin g c li ents to tran s fe r fund s to Fr anklin For bes, as suring them that t he investment was safe. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Smith fals ely r epresente d t ha t Fr anklin For bes w ould be investing in Lyxo r, a F rench ass et-management
c om pa ny, an d tha t the inves tm ent w ou ld be gu ara nte ed byS oc ié té Gé né ral e, a w el l- kno w n a nd pre s tigio us Frenc h b ank. In s tea d, Mr. Taylor and Mr

. Smi th p laced the fun ds in a l arg er Ponzi schem e in Ca li fo rni a, us ed s om e of the fu nd s to pa y oth er i nve s tors , a nd rai de d the rem ai ni ng fun ds to pay pe rs ona l e xpe ns es . Mr. Taylor a nd Mr. Smi th again creat ed false ac count statements showin g investment gains to lull investor s. Ev e ntually, however , the Ponzi sch eme
c oll ap s ed an d th e “ gu ara nte ed ” i nve s tm ents w ere l os t. ¶3 On August 13, 2010, the State filed an information charging Mr. T ayl or w ith

tw o c ou nts of

s ec uri tie s fra ud an d on e c ount of ab us e, ne gle ct , or expl oita tion of the el de rly. One yea r la ter, on August 30, 2011, the State amended t he information. Less than one

mo nt h l ater , when the S tate failed to appear at a sch eduling

c onferenc e, the di s tric t c ou rt di s mi s s ed the c as e w ith ou t pre j ud ic e.Cite as: 2015 UT 42 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

3 Th e S t a t e r e f i l e d a s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r i nf o r m a t i o n t h e s a m e da y, S ep tem be r 22 , 2 01 1, c ha rgin g Mr. T ayl or w ith fi v e counts of

secu rities fr a ud, four counts of theft, and one count of engaging in

a p a t ter n of unlaw ful ac tivit y, all second-degree felonies. It is this la s t info rma tion

tha t is at i s s ue he re. ¶4 M r

. Taylor f il ed a m otio n to di s mi s s , c la im in g th at f ou r of the five securities fraud charg es and the four theft charges were t ime ba rred . T he di s tric t c ou rt de ni ed the mo tion as to the fou r s ec uri tie s fraud charges and three of t he theft charges after rul i ng that

secu rities fraud and theft are both continuing offenses for which the limitations period did notbegin to r un until Mr. Taylor sent the last false ac count statement to investor s. ¶5 Th e f ou r s ec uri tie s fra ud cha r g es at is s ue in thi s c as e a re based u pon four separate investments in F ranklin Fo rbes. Counts 1 and 2 are based on two investments by A .D. She began investing thro ugh A s c en du s as ea rly a s Ju ne 20 03 an d, over the years , i nve s ted ab ou t $6 00 ,0 00 . On

the ba s is of

fa ls e i nf orm atio n from Mr. T ayl or, A.D. transferr ed her Ascendus inv e stment to F ranklin Fo rbes in Februar y 2006. And in July 2006, sh e invested an a d d i ti ona l$4 01,000. Mr . Taylor then sent A.D. fals e account statements sh owing investment gains thro ugh December 2007. ¶6 Cou nts 6 a nd 7 a ris e from s imila r tran s fe rs byoth er investor s. Th e factual predicate for count 6 is an $800,000 investment by W. M. and K.M. tha t the y mo ved fro m the ir Asc en du s ac c ou nt t o Fr anklin For bes in

Februar y 2006. W.M. and K .M. r eceived false

ac c ou nt s tate me nts thro ugh May 20 08 . T he fa c tu alpre di c ate fo r count 7 is an i nvestment by A.W., w ho tr ansferr ed almost $1.8 million from Ascen dus to Fr anklin For bes in Februar y 2 0 0 6

. A.W. received false account state ments through Apr il 2007. ¶7 Th e three theft charges at i s s ue are ba s ed on M r. T ayl or’s unauthorized use or withdraw a l of fund s from Frank lin For bes. Cou nt 5 ari s es fro m M r. T ay lo r ’s unau tho riz ed us e of fu nd s fro m E.K. In Mar ch 2007, E.K. invested approx imately $330,000 in Frankli n Fo rbe s w ith

exp res s di rec tion

th a ti tb e u s e d fo r inves tm ent. Bu t Mr. T ayl or w ith dre wthe fu nd s s oon the rea ft er a nd us ed the m for anot her purpo se

. M r

. Taylor then sent E.K. false acc ount statements showing investment gains through Apr il 2008. ¶8 Counts 9 and 10 arise fr om Mr . Taylor ’s mis use and

w ith draw alof

fund s belo ng ingt o unk no wn inv est o r s. C o unt9 a r ise s from misus e of ov er $1.5 million remov ed from Franklin For bes asS TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

Sta tev. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, ¶¶ 10–11, 37 P .3d 1103. 3 U T A H C ODE § 76-1-302( 1); see also id. § 61-1-21.1(1) (“No 4 indic tment or information may be ret urned

. . . [for securities fraud] more t han five years after the alleged v iolatio n.”). See id. § 76-1- 3 0 2 ; see also Russel l Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson , 5 20 05 UT14 , ¶ 2 0, 10 8 P .3 d 7 41 (“A s a g en era l ru le , as tatu te of (continued...)

4 la te a s Ja nu ary 2 00 8. An d C ou nt 1 0 i s ba s ed on a fi na l wi thd raw alof fund s from Frank lin For bes b y Mr . Taylor as late as August 2008. ¶9 Follo wing the district court’ s denial of his mot ion to dism iss , Mr. Ta ylor fi le d a pe titi on fo r interl oc ut ory revi ew, w hi c h th e c ou rt of appeals granted. I t then certified the inter locutor y appeal to this court. We hav e jurisdic tion pursuant to U tah Code section 78A-3- 102(3)(b). STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10 Th e is s ue of w he the r s ec uri tie s fra ud an d the ft are continuing offens es is one of statutor y construction. W e giv e no deference to t he district court’ s ruling on suc h an is sue and instead

rev iew it for cor rectness. 3
AN AL YSI S ¶11 The dis tr ict court concluded that secu rities fr a ud, in violat ion of Utah Code section 61-1-1, and theft, in vio lation of Ut ah Code section 76-6-404, are continui ng offenses. On the bas is of that

c onc lu s ion

, th e d is tric t c ou rt de term in ed tha t none of the s ec uri tie s fraud counts an d only one o f the four theft counts were t ime barred. Mr . Taylor contends that neither securities fr a ud nor theft is a

c ont inui ng o ffen s e a nd , th eref ore, t hat the c ha rges are nottim el y. We agre e w ith

Mr. T ayl or th at s ec ur it ie s frau d a nd the ftare not continuing offens es an d t he r efore r emand the cas e to the district court t o r e-evaluate t he timeliness of the charges.

I. THE TEST FOR CO NTINUING OFF ENSES ¶12 We are asked t o determine whether the criminal c harges in thi s c as e are tim e ba rred

. In gen era l, “a pros ec ut ion fo r ” a felony, mi s de me an or, or i nfrac tion “s ha ll be c om me nc ed w ith in ” fou r, tw o,
or on e year , r esp ecti vel y, “ after i t is c om mi tted .” If the S tate doe s 4 not c om me nc e pros ec ut ion w ith in thi s pe riod , a ny c rim in alli ab il ity wi l l e x pire. The limitations period begins to run when a c rime is “committed.” A c rime i s committed when ever y “elemen t o f t he 5Cite as: 2015 UT 42 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

(...continued) 5 limitations begins to r un up on the happening of the last ev ent
ne c es s ary to c ompl et e t he caus e o f act io n.” (in t er nal quo t at io n ma r ks omitte d)). See S tate v. Roth , 2001 UT 103 , ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 1099 (s urvey ing 6

cases a nd holding that t he crime of esc ape was c omplete when the defendant left offic ial cu stody withoutauthorizat ion). 22 C.J.S. Crimi nal Law § 2 56 (2 01 5) (“ Al tho ugh n orm al ly as tatu te 7 of limitation begins to r un fro m t he time the crime is complete, if the crime is a c ontinuing one the stat ute does not beg in to r un until the continuous c ommitment of the crime ceases.”) ; s e ea lsoW AYNE R. L A F AVE E T AL ., 5 C RI M I NAL P RO CE D URE § 18.5(a) ( 3d ed. 2007). 397 U.S. 112, 114– 15 (1970). 8 Id. at 115. 9 See, e.g. , People v. Thoro P rods. Co. , 70 P .3 d 1 18 8, 11 93

– 94 (C olo. 10 2003); Sta tev. Fra nco is , 577 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 1998); State v. Ga iner , 6 0 8 P

. 2 d 9 6 8 , 9 7 0 ( Ka n

. 1 9 8 0 ) ; S tatev. Mulli n , 886 P.2d 376, (continued...)

5 offe ns e” is me t. Bu t the Le gis la tu re has s tru c tu red the el em ents of 6 some offens es in s uch a way that a perpet rat or continues to commit the of fense so long as he continues to satisfy the elements. These offenses are considered continuing offenses . In the case of a

c ont inui ng o ffen s e, w hi le c rim in alli ab il ity a ttac he s w he n ev ery element is satisfied, t he statute of limitations does not begin t o r un
untilthe pe rpe trator c ea s es to s ati s fythe el em ents of the c rim e. At

7 tha t poi nt, the w hol e a rc o f crim in alc ond uc t is aggre gate d i nto a single crimin al violat ion. ¶13 In deter minin g whether a crime is a continuing offens e, the Un ite d S tate s S up rem e Co urtlook s to th e i nte nt o f C ongres s . In To uss ie v . Un it ed

Sta te s , i t rec ogn iz ed theinhe rent ten s ion be tw een the polic ies underpinnin g s tatut es of l i mit ations—prev enting pros ec ut ion of s tal e c la im s an d mo tiva tin g prompt i nve s tiga tion of crimes—and the imposition of c riminal liabi lity for proscribed acts. 8 Wi th tha t ten s ion

in mi nd , the Cou rt rea s one d th at c rim in als tatu tes should n ot be inter pret ed to cr eate a continuing offense “unless the explicit language of t he sub stantive criminal statute compels su ch a conclu sion, or t he nature of t he crime involved is suc h that Co ngress
mus t assuredly have intended thatit b e t r e ated as a continuing

one .” Oth er sta tes c ons id eri ng thi s qu es tion ha ve looked to To uss ie,

9 ei the r ad opti ng i ts la ngu age or c iti ng i ts rea s oni ng. 10S TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

(...continued) 10 378 (Mont. 1994); Sta tev. Nuss , 454 N.W.2d 482, 485– 86 (Neb. 1990) ; S ta te v

. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 116 ( Tenn. 1999) ; John v. State , 291 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Wis . 1980); seea lso22 C.J.S. Crimi nal Law § 256 (2015) ( “Whether o r nota crime is a c ontinuing offense depends upon the legislative int ent in definin g the crime . . . .”). LeBeau v. S tate, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 20, 337 P.3d 254. 11 See id. 12 See id. 13

6 ¶14 Th e To uss iean al ys is is gen era ll y c ons is tent with ou r lon gstanding approach to stat utor y construction

. O ur objective in construing statutes is to effectuate the inte nt o f the Legislature as exp res s ed in

the s tatu tory tex t. Thu s , to d ete rmi ne w he the r a 11 criminal s tatut e cr e a t e s a continuing offens e, we lookto t he plain

me an in g of

the en ac ted text, c ons id eri ng t hat t ext in the c ont ext of the w ho le s tatu te. An d w e h arm oni ze the s tatu te w ith rel ate d 12 provi s ion s of

the c ode , i nc lu di ng any ap pl ic ab les tatu tes of limitations. 13 ¶15 In sum, we respect the legislative policy choice reflected in

a c le ar s tatu te of

li mi tati ons an d w il l e ffec tu ate t hat protec tion
exc ep t in tho s e i ns tanc es w he re w e fin d c le ar, c ont rary l egi sla t ive intent in the terms of the s ubs tantiv e criminal statute atiss ue. In this case, w e are asked t o d e t ermine whether securities fraud and theft

are c ont inui ng offen s es . W e tu rn firs t to s ec uri tie s fra ud an d th en to the ft

. II . SE CU RI TI ES F RA UD I S NO T A CO NTI NU IN G O F F ENSE ¶16 The dis tr i ct court concluded that secu rities fraud, in violat ion of Utah Code section 61-1- 1, is a c ontinuing offense. On the basis o f t hat conclu sion, it deter mined that the securities fraud

c ha rges aga in s t Mr. Ta ylor w ere n ot ti me ba rred be c au s e Mr. Taylor continued the crimes b y sending false account s tate ments to lull the inves tors after th e s ec uri tie s tran s ac tion s w ere c om pl ete . Mr. Taylor arg ues that the district co ur t ’s determinatio n was in erro r because the s tatu tory l an gu age c rim in al iz in g s ec uri tie s fra ud doe s notgive rise t o a continuing offens e. Therefor e, the statut e of limitations be gan to ru n at t he tim e th at th e s ec uri tie s tran s ac tion s w ere
c om pl ete . W e a g ree w ith Mr. T ayl or th at s ec uri tie s fra ud is nota
c ont inui ng o ffen s e.Cite as: 2015 UT 42 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

U T A H C ODE § 61-1-1 ( emphas is added)

. 14 Id. § 6 1- 1- 21 .1 . In

the c as e of the gene ral ly- ap pl ic ab le s tatu tes of 15 li mi tati ons , the Le gis la tu re h as provi de d as afety va lve fo r
un di s c overe d frau d offe ns es tha t exte nd s the li mi tati ons pe riod fo r up to thr ee year s so long as the prosecution is c o mm enced w ithin one year of the fraud being repor ted to law enf or cement. Id. § 76-1- 30 3( 1) . B ut t hat extens ion is notava il ab le in

the c as e of

s ec uri tie s fraud, whic h is gov erned b y its own statute of limitations for which the Legislature has not pr ov ided a similar ext ension mec hanis m. Id. § 61-1-1. 16 Id. § 61-1-1( 2) (emp hasis added). 17

7 ¶17 The Utah Uniform Secu rities Act, pat ter ned after section 101 of the Unifor m Sec urities Act of 1956, pro vides that [i]t is u nlawful for any per son, in c onnection w i th the offer, sale, or purchase of any secu rity, d ire ct ly or in di rec tly t o: (1) emp loy any device, sch eme, or ar tifice to defraud; (2 ) m ake any untru e sta tem ent of a mat eri al fa c t or to
om it to s tate a ma teri al fa c t ne c es s ary in orde r to m ake the s tate me nts ma de , in the li ghtof

the c irc um s tanc es
un de r w hi c h th ey a re m ad e, notmi s le ad in g; or (3) engage in any act, practice, or co ur se of bus iness whic h operat es or would oper ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 14 The act contains a five y e a r stat ute of limitations that e xpre ssl y supercedes the gener al criminal s tatut e of limitations. 15 ¶18 The t ext of the Utah Uniform Secu rities Act do es not suggest tha t th e L egi s la tu re i nte nd ed s ec uri tie s fra ud t o co nstitu te a continuing offens e. To the contr ary , the o ff e nse is anchored in the disc ret e event s of an “o ffer, sale, o r purchas e of any security.” And 16 sub section (2) s imilarly iden tifies the disc ret e acts of “ mak[ ing] any untrue statement [or ] . . . omitt[ ing] to stat e a material fact.” 17 ¶19 In argu in g th at th e L egi s la tu re inte nd ed s ec uri tie s fra ud to constitute a continuing offense, the Stat e points to sub sections ( 1) and (3) , whic h speak of “employ[ing] any . . . sch eme . . . to defr aud” and “engag[ing] in any . . . practice[] or course of bus iness whic hS TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

Id. § 61-1-1( 1), (3)

. 18 Id. § 61-1-1 ( emphas is added)

. 19 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2014) ( emphas is added) (cons tr uing 20 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)( 1)(A))

. Id. 21 U T A H C ODE § 61-1-1. 22 Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. at 1066. 23

8 ope rate s

. . . a s a frau d. ” It argue s tha t th es e p hra s es give ris e to a 18

c ont inui ng o ffen s e. We di s agre e. Wh il e th ese p hra s es refer to
ac tivi tie s tha t m ay c ont inue fo r a p eri od of tim e, the ir p res enc e d oes
no t necess arily compel the conclusi on that securities fraud is a continuing offens e. Rath e r , t hey must be read in conc ertwith the

s tatu tor y r eq ui rem ent th at a ny a c tion ab le fra ud take pl ac e “ in
connec tion withthe offer, sale, or purchas e of any security.” 19 ¶20 The United States Su preme C o urt has construed simi lar language in a federal s tatut e to require t hat any scheme to defraud be material to a purchas e or sale of a covere d secu rity . In Cha db o urne & Pa rke LLP v . T

ro ice, the Cou rt c ons id ered the s c ope of the s tatu tory phras e “ ‘m is rep res entati on o r om is sion of a m ate ria l f ac t in
connec tion withthe purchase or sale of a cover ed secu rity .’” On the 20 basis of “a natural r ea d i ng of the Act’ s language,” the Cour t held that “[a] frau d ulentmisrepresentatio n or o miss ion is not made ‘in

c onn ec tion w ith’ s uc h a ‘p urc ha s e or s al e of a c overe d secur it y’

unle s s it is ma teri alto a d ec is ion byone or m ore i nd ivi du al s (o the r than the fraudster) to buy or t o sell a ‘cover ed secur i t y

. ’ ” The 21 simi lar language o f the Utah Unifor m Sec urities A ct co mpels a simi lar conclus ion. An activity listed in s ubs ecti o ns (1) through (3) cannot be “in c onnection wi t h [an] offer, sale, or purchas e of any

s ec uri ty” “u nl es s it i s ma terial t o a dec is ion byone or m ore 22 individuals (other than the fraudster).” 23 ¶21 By d efiniti on, an

ac t oc c urri ng s ub s eque nt t o a s ec uri tie s tr ansac tion c annot b e material to the decis ion to engage in that tran s ac tion . It the refor e cannots ati s fythe el em ents of s ec uri tie s fraud. Thus, the language o f the Utah Unifor m Sec urities Act dictates that the commis sion o f securities fraud t erminates and the statute o f limitat ions beg ins to run when the offer, sale, or purchase is c omplete, ev en if s ome of the activities listed in s ubs ections (1) an dCite as: 2015 UT 42 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

See Un ited States v. United Me d

. & S urgic al Supply C orp. , 24 98 9 F

. 2 d 1 3 9 0 , 1 3 9 8 (4 t h C i r

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( “ M a i l o r s e c u r i t i e s fr a u d i s not complete, and the s tatut e of limitations does not beg in to r un, until the sale of the s ecurity or the use of the m ail. Thus , a secu rities and mail fraud prosecu ti on falls w ithin the statute o f limi tatio ns if the

us e of the ma il s or the s al e of

the s ec uri ty oc c urre d w ith in fi ve ye ars of the indictment.” (ci tatio n omitted) (citing United State s v

. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1240 (7th Cir

. 1981); United Sta te s v . Du nn , 961 F

. 2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1992); United S tates v. Sc op , 846 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1988); United S tates v. Perholtz , 842 F.2d 343, 364–65 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per cu riam); United States v. Ashdo wn , 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975); United Sta te s v . B lo sse r

, 4 40 F.2 d 6 97

, 6 99 (1 0th

Ci r. 1971)))

. U T A H C ODE § 76-10-1801( 1). 25 Id. § 76-10-1801( 3). 26 See, e.g. , id. § 76-6-404 (Th eft); id. § 76-6-405 ( Theft by 27 deception); id. § 76-6-406 ( Theft by exto rt i o n); id. § 76-6-408 (Receiving stolen pro pert y). Id. § 76-10-1603. 28

9 (3 ) c ont inue the rea ft er. 24 ¶22 Related Ut ah sta t ut e s also supportour conclusi on that t he Uta h U ni fo rm S ec uri tie s Act d oes notc rea te ac ont inui ng o ffen s e. Th e d is c rete act s t hat often fo ll ows ec uri tie s fra ud in a b road er a rc of fraudulent conduct —like the false acc ount statements in this case—are more appr opriat ely c harged under r elated statut es, su ch as the commu nications fraud statute, U tah Code section 76-10-1801. Indeed, tha t p ro vision specifically crimin alizes c ommunic ations “c onc ea li ng [ a] s c he me or arti fi c e. ” An d w ith tha t offe ns e, 25 “[r]eliance on the part o f any person i s no t a necess ary element.” 26 Thus , th e s ep ara t e c rim e of c om mu ni c ati ons fra ud c ap tu res sub sequent communic ation designed to conceal s ecurit i e s fraud. Sim ilarly, o ne of the var ious theft statute s ma y apply if the pe rpe trator t ake s or d i s p os es of the inves ted fu nd s w ith the requi s ite intent. Fin al ly, in

c as es involvi ng thre e or m ore epis ode s of 27 unlawfu l activity , suc h as s ecurities fraud, communic ations fraud,

an d t he ft , th e S tate ma y b rin g c ha rges fo r en gagi ng i n apa ttern of

unla w fu l a c tivi ty. Th e Le gis la tu re’s en ac tm ent of c rim in aloffe ns es 28 that mor e precisely capture the disc ret e acts that the Stat e contends

c ons titu te c ont inua tion of s ec uri tie s fra ud c onfirm s ou r c onc lu s ion tha t th e L egi s la tu re d id notintend fo r s ec uri tie s fra ud to b e aS TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

Id. § 6 1- 1- 21 .1 . W e a re u na bl e to e nga ge i n th e d ete rmi na tion of 29 tim el in es s be c au s e th e rec ord on interl oc ut ory ap pe alis inc om pl ete and not all relev ant facts have been established at this early po int in the pro ceedings. Cou rts in

ou r s is ter st at es ha ve rea c he d th e s am e c onc lu s ion 30 with r egar d to simi larly wor ded statutes. See, e.g. , State v. Harrison , 561 N.W.2d 28, 29 (Iowa 1997) (p er curiam); Sta tev. Ga iner , 608 P.2d 968, 971 (Kan. 1980) ; Sta tev. Mulli n , 886 P.2d 376, 378 (Mont. 1994).

10 continuing offens e. Inst e a d, the Legislature has criminalized eac h di s c rete unit of

c rim in alac tivi ty an d, in exte nd ed c as es , th e p atte rn of unlaw ful ac tivit y itself. ¶23 In this case, the di strict c ourt evaluated the timelinessof the

secu rities fraud charges on the basis of its err oneous conclu sion that

s ec uri tie s fra ud is a c ont inuing offe ns e. In li ghtof ou r c ont rary h ol d i n g, w e re m a n d th i s c a s e to th e d i s tr i c t c ou rtto e n ga ge in a factual as se ssment to deter mine for each count of securities fraud

w he n th e offe r, s al e, or pu rc ha s e took p la c e a nd w he the r the c ha rge
w as fi le d n ot m ore th an fi ve ye ars la ter. 29 ¶24 In sum, we hold t ha t securities fraud, in violat ion of Utah Cod e sec tion 61 -1 -1 , i s nota c ont inui ng o ffen s e. In s tea d, the c rim e of

s ec uri tie s fra ud isc om pl ete an d th e s tatu te of li mi tati ons be gin s to run when an

“offer, sale, o r purchas e” is made “in connection with” an activity speci fied in s ubs ections (1) through (3).

II I. THE F T I S NO T A CO NTI NU IN G O F F ENSE ¶25 The dis tr ict court concluded that theft, in violat ion of Utah Code section 76 -6 -4 0 4 , is a c ontinuing offense. On the basis of that conclu sion, the district court det ermined that o nly one of t he theft counts are time barr ed becau se Mr. Taylo r continued to c ommi t theft bys en di ng fa ls e ac c ou nt s tate me nts to c onc ea l h is c rim e. Mr. T ayl or argu es tha t th e d is tric t c ou rt er r ed be c au s e th e s tatu tory l an gu age does not conv ey a clear legislative int ent thattheft is a continuing offe ns e. Rathe r, he c ont en ds tha t the s tatu te of li mi tati ons be gan to
run at th e ti me tha t he fi rs t obt ai ne d or exerc is ed un au tho riz ed

c ont rol ove r the fu nd s . W e a gree w ith Mr. Ta ylor tha t the ft is nota
c ont inui ng o ffen s e. 30 ¶26 Un de r the Uta h C rim in alCod e, [a] pe rs on c om mi ts the ftif he ob tai ns or exe rc is es
un au tho riz ed co ntrol ove r the prop erty of an oth erCite as: 2015 UT 42 Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

U T A H C ODE § 7 6- 6-40 4. Th e State m ake s s evera l a rgu me nts 31 ba s ed on o the r vari ants of the ft, s uc h a s the ftbyrec ei vin g s tole n proper ty. See id. § 76-6-408. That section inclu des an act us r e us element of “ret ain[in g]” st o l e n pr oper ty. This cas e would be di fferent if

tha t provi s ion w ere at i s s ue . B utMr. T ayl or w as c ha rged

un de r s ec tion

76 -6 -4 04 . W e th eref ore f oc us ou r an al ys is on the text of tha t s ec tion

, w hi c h d oes notc ont ai n s uc h l an gu age

. Id. § 76-1-302. 32 Id. § 76-6-404. 33 Sta tev. Ea

gle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980). 34 U T A H C ODE § 76-6-404. 35 See id. § 76-6-401( 3). 36

11 with a purpose to depr ive him thereo f. 31 Theft is s ubj ect to the gener al criminal s tatut e of limitations. 32 ¶27 We see nothing in the statut or y la ng uag e to suggest that t he ft i s a continui ng offense. Th e key actus reus elem ents of the offe ns e— “ob tai n[ in g] or exe rc is [in g ]”—a re d is c rete ac ts tha t are sati sf i e d instantaneously. And the commis sion of the crime is 33 complete when a person obtains or ex ercises th a t contro l with the req ui s ite intent. 34 ¶28 In argu in g th at theft is a c ont inui ng o ffen s e, the S tate fo c us es on the stat utor y language indicating thata person c ommits theft if he obtains proper ty with a “pu rpose t o depriv e.” The S tate reasons 35 tha t a p urp os e to d ep rive may c ont inue be yon d th e d is c rete act of ob tai ni ng o r exe rc is in g c ont rol. Bu t th e phras e “p urp os e to de pri ve”

s impl y de fi ne s the me ns reael em e nt

. A n d th at e le me nt e ith er ex is ts 36

or doe s not exi s t at the tim e tha t the pe rs on obt ai ns o r exerci s es
un au tho riz ed c ont rol of an o t he r ’s prope rty. T ha t phras e d oes not suggest that t he Legislature intended theft to constitute a continuing offe ns e. ¶29 Related prov isions of the c ode s upport the conclu sio n t hat theft is not a co nt i nuing o ffens e. The acts of “dis pos[ing],” “c onc ea l[ in g] , s el l[ in g] , [ or] w ithhol d[ in g] ” s tole n p r o p e r tya r e m ore ap prop ria tel y c ha rged un de r the rec ei vin g s tole n prop erty s tatu te, Utah Co de section 76-6-408. Thus , the Legislature has pro vided an ad di tion als tatu te th at c rim in al iz es s ub s eque nt a c tivi ty. ¶30 In rul in g th at th eft is a c ont inui ng o ffen s e, the di s tric t c ou rt analogized to the single larceny rule, whic h we recognized in StateS TATE v. T A Y L OR Opi ni on o f t he Cou rt

927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996). 37620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980). 38 See C rosby, 927 P.2d at 645– 46; Kimb el , 620 P.2d at 518. 39 Other states ha v e come to a similar conclu sion. See, e.g. , 40 Harrison , 561 N.W.2d at 29–30. U T A H C ODE § 76-1-302( 1)(a)

. 41

12 v. Crosby and Sta tev. Kimb el

. The si ngle larceny r ule, as app lied in

37 38 tho s e cas es , all ow s the aggre gati on o f mul tip le taki ngs over ape riod of tim e i nto a s ingl e cha rge of the ft

. Bu t th at ru le an d th os e c as es

39 are inapplicabl e to the charges in t his case, which eac h involve only a single taking. I ndeed, no thing in those cases s upports the propo sition that a single commiss ion of theft continues beyond the la s t taki ng. 40 ¶3 1 The d ist r ictco ur t ’s d et er min at io n t hat t he t he ftcha r gesw ere timely was premised u pon its err oneous conclu si o n t ha t theft is a continuing offens e. Becaus e we rev erse the distr ict court o n that iss ue, we remand t his case to the distr ict court t o r easses s the timeliness of the theft charg es in light of our holding . That court is be tter a bl e to d ete rmi ne fo r ea c h th eft c ount whe n Mr. T ayl or
o bt ai ne d or e xerc is ed un au tho riz ed c ont rol of an oth er’s prop erty
an d w he the r the c orres pon di ng c ha rge w as fi le d w ith in fo ur y ea rs of tha t da te. 41 ¶32 In s um, w e hol d tha t th eft, i n vi ola tion of Uta h C ode s ec tion 76 -6 -4 04 , i s nota c ont inui ng o ffen s e. Th e c rim e of the ftis c om pl ete and the statute o f limi tatio ns b egins to r un w hen a person “obtains

or exe rc is es un au tho riz edc o ntr o l ” o v e rthe prop erty of an oth er w ith the req ui s ite intent. CONC LUSION ¶33 The dis tr ict court conclu d e d that securities fraud, in violat ion of Utah Co de section 61-1-1, and theft, in violat ion of Utah code section 76-6-404, are continuin g offenses. This conclu sion was in erro r. We t herefor e rev erse the r uling of the dist r i ct co urt and remand the matte r for further pr oceedings consi stent with this opinion.