No. 6:16-cv-00150-MC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

LORI DIANE BACZKOWSKI, 

Appellant,

v.

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, QUALITY LOAN SERVICE 

CORPORATION OF WASHINGTON, and SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, 

INC.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from an Order of Dismissal of the Honorable Frank R. Alley,

United States Bankruptcy Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon

Ch. 13 Bankruptcy Case No. 15-62839-fra13

Adversary Case No. 15-06085-fra

APPELLEES BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON AND SELECT 

PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.’S ANSWERING BRIEF

(Request for Oral Argument)

OREN B. HAKER (OSB #130162)

CRYSTAL S. CHASE (OSB #093104)

Stoel Rives LLP

760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000

Portland, OR 97205-2586

Telephone: (503) 224-3380

Facsimile: (503) 220-2480

Attorneys for Appellees Bank of New 

York Mellon and Select Portfolio 

Servicing, Inc.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii

I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1

II. STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION ...........1

III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE 

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW...........................2

A. Statement of the Issues Presented ........................................................2

B. Standard of Appellate Review..............................................................2

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................3

A. The Chapter 13 Case ............................................................................3

B. The Adversary Proceeding ...................................................................3

C. Dismissal of the Chapter 13 Case and the Adversary Proceeding.......4

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......................................................................5

VI. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS..................................................6

VII. ARGUMENT..................................................................................................7

A. The Bankruptcy Court Had Authority to Enter the Adversary 

Dismissal Order Because All Parties Consented to Entry of a 

Final Order by the Bankruptcy Court...................................................7

B. Debtor Has Not Demonstrated That Dismissal of the Adversary 

Proceeding Violated Debtor’s Due Process Rights............................11

C. Dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding Was Within the 

Bankruptcy Court’s Discretion and Was Not Inequitable .................12

VIII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................15

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

ii

Cases

Carraher v. Morgan Elec., Inc. (In re Carraher),

971 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1992) ..........................................................................2, 13

Daniels-Head & Assocs. v. William M. Mercer, Inc. (In re DanielsHead & Assocs.),

819 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1987) ................................................................................9

Etalco, Inc. v. AMK Indus., Inc. (In re Etalco, Inc.),

273 B.R. 211 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................3

Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Morris (In re Morris),

950 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) ..........................................................................14

Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Cahn (In re Cahn),

188 B.R. 627 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ....................................................................1

K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong,

789 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2015) ..............................................................................13

Linkway Inv. Co. v. Olsen (In re Casamont Inv’rs, Ltd.),

196 B.R. 517 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) ..................................................................14

Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re Mann),

907 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................9

Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976)............................................................................................11

Szanto v. Bistritz (In re Szanto),

No. NV-14-1528, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2198 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 

3, 2016) ...............................................................................................................13

TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc.,

653 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2011) ................................................................................2

United States v. Graf,

610 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................12

Case 6:16-cv-00150-MC Document 13 Filed 07/13/16 Page 3 of 20
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

iii

United States v. Hinkson,

585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)..............................................................2

Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp.,

678 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................11

Wilshire Courtyard v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Wilshire 

Courtyard),

729 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................2

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 157..............................................................................................8, 10, 11

28 U.S.C. § 157(c) .....................................................................................................7

28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)........................................................................................passim

28 U.S.C. § 158(a) .....................................................................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 1334..............................................................................................6, 8, 11

28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).............................................................................................13

Rules

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008...............................................................................................9

Oregon Local Bankr. R. 7008-1.........................................................................10, 13

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellees Bank of New York Mellon, f/k/a The Bank of New York, as 

Trustee, on Behalf of the Holders of the Alternative Loan Trust 2007-23cb, 

Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-23cb (“the Trust”) and Select 

Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”) hereby submit this Answering Brief in 

response to the Opening Brief submitted by pro se Appellant Lori Diane 

Baczkowski (“Debtor” or “Appellant”). 

II. STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

This is an appeal by Debtor from an order of dismissal dated January 12, 

2016 that dismissed the adversary proceeding (“Adversary Proceeding”) filed 

by Debtor (“Adversary Dismissal Order”). This Court has jurisdiction over this 

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), as the Adversary Dismissal Order was a 

final order. Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Cahn (In re Cahn), 188 B.R. 627 (B.A.P. 9th 

Cir. 1995) (setting forth what constitutes final, appealable order). 

Debtor did not timely file her opening brief within 30 days of January 28, 

2016. (ECF No. 5.) Following an Order to Show Cause why the appeal should 

not be dismissed for failure to timely file an opening brief (ECF No. 10), 

Debtor filed her opening brief on June 13, 2016 (“Opening Brief”). (ECF 

No. 11.) 

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III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE 

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

A. Statement of the Issues Presented. 

Although Debtor presents three issues on appeal, they essentially reduce 

to two issues: 

(1) Did the Bankruptcy Court have the authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 157(c)(2) to enter the Adversary Dismissal Order? 

(2) Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by dismissing the 

Adversary Proceeding after Debtor’s underlying bankruptcy case 

(“the Chapter 13 Case”) was dismissed on Debtor’s own motion? 

B. Standard of Appellate Review. 

Issues of judicial power are reviewed de novo. Wilshire Courtyard v. 

Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Wilshire Courtyard), 729 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 2013). 

A bankruptcy court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an 

adversary proceeding is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Carraher v. 

Morgan Elec., Inc. (In re Carraher), 971 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1992). A 

bankruptcy court abuses its discretion only if it applies the wrong legal 

standard, it misapplies the correct legal standard, or its factual findings are 

illogical, implausible, or without factual support. See TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. 

Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Hinkson, 

Case 6:16-cv-00150-MC Document 13 Filed 07/13/16 Page 6 of 20
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585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). A bankruptcy court’s decision 

may be affirmed on any ground clearly presented by the record. Etalco, Inc. v. 

AMK Indus., Inc. (In re Etalco, Inc.), 273 B.R. 211, 218 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001). 

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Chapter 13 Case. 

On August 20, 2015, Debtor filed her Chapter 13 Petition. (BK ECF No. 

2.)1

 Debtor scheduled as her residential home real property located at 6101 

Fish Hatchery Road, Grants Pass, Oregon 97527 (“Subject Property”) and 

identified that the Subject Property was subject to a first-position mortgage held 

by the Trust and serviced by SPS. (BK ECF No. 15.) 

B. The Adversary Proceeding. 

Less than two weeks after filing her Chapter 13 Petition, Debtor filed a 

complaint in the Adversary Proceeding. (ER 1-16 (“Adversary Compl.”).) In 

the Adversary Complaint, Debtor alleged that the Trust, SPS, and Quality Loan 

Service Corporation of Washington (“QLS”) (the foreclosure trustee) had 

“made adverse claims” against the Subject Property “without first proving those 

claims adequately under state and federal law.” (ER 1-3 (Adversary Compl. 

 1 References to “BK ECF” refer to the docket in the Chapter 13 Case, U.S. 

Bankr. D. Or. Case No. 15-62839. Those docket items have been designated as 

part of the record on appeal by SPS and the Trust. (ER 30-34 (Appellees’ 

Designation of Additional Items To Be Included In The Record On Appeal).) 

References to Adv. ECF refer to the docket in the Adversary Proceeding. 

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¶¶ 1-2).) Essentially, Debtor challenged a pending nonjudicial foreclosure 

proceeding against the Subject Property. Debtor sought a declaration of the 

validity, priority, or extent of the Trust’s lien on the Subject Property. (ER 3 

(Id. ¶ 4).) The Trust and SPS answered the Adversary Complaint, and QLS

filed a separate answer. (ER 17-21 (Answer of the Trust and SPS); ER 22-26 

(Answer of QLS).) In the answers, the Trust, SPS, and QLS (collectively, 

“Appellees”) admitted that the proceeding was non-core and consented to entry 

of a final order or judgment. (ER 19, 23.)

C. Dismissal of the Chapter 13 Case and the Adversary 

Proceeding. 

On November 16, 2015, Debtor filed a Motion to Dismiss the Chapter 13 

Case. (ER 27 (“Motion to Dismiss”).) At that point in time, no documents 

other than the pleadings had been filed in the Adversary Proceeding.

Three days later, on November 19, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court held a 

pre-trial hearing in the Adversary Proceeding. (ER 35-45 (11/19/15 Hearing 

Transcript (“11/19 Tr.”).) At that pre-trial hearing, the Bankruptcy Court raised 

the issue of Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss and explained to Debtor that if the 

Chapter 13 Case was dismissed, the Bankruptcy Court also intended to dismiss 

the Adversary Proceeding. (ER 38-39 (11/19 Tr. at 4:17-5:4).) The Bankruptcy 

Court instructed Debtor that if she wanted to continue the Chapter 13 Case (and 

therefore, the Adversary Proceeding), she would need to withdraw the Motion 

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to Dismiss and start making payments under the proposed plan in the Chapter 

13 Case. (ER 40 (11/19 Tr. at 6:4-19).) On November 19, 2015, the 

Bankruptcy Court entered a minute order that reflected its position on the status 

of the Adversary Proceeding in light of the Debtor’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Chapter 13 Case. (Adv. ECF No. 20.)

After Debtor failed to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss or make plan 

payments, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed and administratively closed the 

Chapter 13 Case on December 11, 2015 (“Chapter 13 Case Dismissal Order”). 

(ER 28.) The Bankruptcy Court subsequently entered the Adversary Dismissal 

Order in the Adversary Proceeding on January 12, 2016. (ER 19.) Debtor did 

not appeal the Chapter 13 Case Dismissal Order. 

V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Debtor’s appeal should be denied because the Bankruptcy Court 

exercised its discretion in dismissing the Adversary Proceeding after the 

Chapter 13 Case Dismissal Order (that dismissed and administratively closed 

the Chapter 13 Case) was entered. The law in the Ninth Circuit is clear that the 

Bankruptcy Court has discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction or dismiss 

a proceeding that is predicated on state law claims. 

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In her appeal, Debtor concedes that the Adversary Dismissal Order was a 

final order, but argues that the Bankruptcy Court had no authority to enter it. 

However, that argument ignores the fact that all of the parties consented to 

entry of a final order. With 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) satisfied, the Bankruptcy 

Court had the statutory authority to enter a final order. 

Equity does not argue for a different result here. Debtor filed her Chapter 

13 Petition on August 20, 2015, followed by a Chapter 13 Plan that she failed to 

implement in any way and an Adversary Proceeding that she failed to prosecute 

meaningfully. Then, she, on her own volition, filed the Motion to Dismiss, and 

after being warned by the Bankruptcy Court that the Chapter 13 Case would be 

dismissed and imperil her Adversary Proceeding if she did not withdraw the 

Motion to Dismiss, she did nothing. Having sat on her rights, she should not 

now be afforded relief that she could have easily sought before the Bankruptcy 

Court. For these reasons, the Bankruptcy Court’s Adversary Dismissal Order 

should be affirmed. 

VI. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(b) Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and 

notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers 

exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than 

the district courts, the district courts shall have 

original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 

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proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or 

related to cases under title 11.

(c)(1) Except with respect to a case under 

chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this section prevents 

a district court in the interest of justice, or in the 

interest of comity with State courts or respect for State 

law, from abstaining from hearing a particular 

proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or 

related to a case under title 11.

28 U.S.C. § 157(c) provides as follows: 

(c)(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a 

proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is 

otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such 

proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to 

the district court, and any final order or judgment 

shall be entered by the district judge after . . . 

reviewing de novo those matters to which any party 

has timely and specifically objected. 

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of 

paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district court, 

with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, 

may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 

to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to 

enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to 

review under section 158 of this title.

VII. ARGUMENT

A. The Bankruptcy Court Had Authority to Enter the Adversary 

Dismissal Order Because All Parties Consented to the Entry of 

a Final Order By The Bankruptcy Court. 

Debtor first argues that the Bankruptcy Court lacked authority to enter 

the Adversary Dismissal Order—which was a final order—in the Adversary 

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Proceeding because the proceeding was non-core and Debtor’s Adversary 

Complaint did not consent to entry of a final order by the Bankruptcy Court. 

Stated differently, Debtor argues that the Bankruptcy Court’s Adversary 

Dismissal Order violates 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) because the Bankruptcy Court 

did not have “the consent of all the parties to the proceeding” to enter a final 

order. 

Debtor’s argument fails because each of the Appellees expressly 

consented to the Bankruptcy Court entering a final order. While the Debtor did 

not expressly state in her Adversary Complaint that she consented to entry of a 

final order by the Bankruptcy Court, she did not object, nor did she assert a 

right to a jury trial before the U.S. District Court. Furthermore, she stated in her 

Adversary Complaint that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction, not only under 

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (which statutory provision confers subject matter jurisdiction) 

but also under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (which statutory provision allocates the work of 

the courts between the U.S. District Court and the Bankruptcy Court). (ER 3.) 

Thus, Debtor’s consent under section 157(c)(2) can be acknowledged by 

implication, including by the silence in her Adversary Complaint. 

The statute and case law support this reading of section 157(c)(2). First, 

nothing in section 157(c)(2) requires that consent be in writing or express; 

rather, the statute only speaks of simple consent. Second, case law in the Ninth 

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Circuit has recognized that express consent is not necessary for the Bankruptcy 

Court to exercise jurisdiction and enter a final order pursuant to section 

157(c)(2). See Mann v. Alexander Dawson Inc. (In re Mann), 907 F.2d 923, 

926 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[Debtor] chose to file this adversary proceeding in the 

bankruptcy court, and he never objected to the court’s jurisdiction prior to the 

time it rendered judgment against him. Through this conduct, he consented to 

the court’s jurisdiction.”); Daniels-Head & Assocs. v. William M. Mercer, Inc. 

(In re Daniels-Head & Assocs.), 819 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing cases 

for rule that consent in section 157(c)(2) can be both express and implied). 

Thus, consent can be implied from Debtor’s actions before the Bankruptcy 

Court. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court had statutory authority to enter the 

Adversary Dismissal Order.

In addition, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy 

Rules”) and Oregon’s Local Bankruptcy Rules (“Oregon LBRs”) support this 

conclusion. Rule 7008 of the Bankruptcy Rules states that the complaint must 

contain a statement that, if the proceeding is non-core, the pleader consents or 

does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the Bankruptcy Court. 

The Bankruptcy Rules do not address a pleader who fails to take a position on 

the issue—i.e., a pleader who fails to consent or object to entry of a final order 

by the Bankruptcy Court. 

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On the other hand, the Oregon LBRs do address the issue. In particular, 

Rule 7008-1 of the Oregon LBRs states as follows: “The pleader’s failure to 

timely make that statement [consenting or objecting to the Bankruptcy Court’s 

entry of a final order] waives any objection to the judge’s entry of final orders 

or judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Rules and 

Oregon LBRs, collectively, support the legal rule that failure by an adversary 

plaintiff to take a position in a complaint on the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a 

final order or judgment constitutes waiver to object. Consent by implication 

follows from this rule. 

Here, Debtor filed the Adversary Proceeding with the Bankruptcy Court, 

alleged that the proceeding was “a non-core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 

§ 157,” and did not object to the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a final order or 

judgment. (ER 3.) SPS, the Trust, and QLS each expressly consented to the 

Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a final order or judgment in their respective 

Answers. (ER 19, 23.) Debtor, however, never took a position on whether she 

consented to entry of a final order by the Bankruptcy Court, and thus she 

waived her right to object. On these facts alone, therefore, the Bankruptcy 

Court obtained “the consent of all the parties to the proceeding” under 

28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) to enter the Adversary Dismissal Order. 

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Nor is 28 U.S.C. § 1334 applicable. Debtor’s reference in her Opening 

Brief to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is inapposite to her argument that the Bankruptcy 

Court could not enter a final order in a non-core proceeding. Section 1334 

confers subject matter jurisdiction over certain proceedings including the 

Adversary Proceeding (which neither Appellant nor Appellees disputes), but 

section 1334 does not opine on or address the allocation of work between the 

Bankruptcy Courts and the U.S. District Courts regarding civil proceedings in 

which both courts have concurrent jurisdiction. That task is left to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 157, which, as explained above, was fulfilled here. 

B. Debtor Has Not Demonstrated That Dismissal of the 

Adversary Proceeding Violated Debtor’s Due Process Rights. 

Debtor next argues that entry of the Adversary Dismissal Order violated 

her due process rights. Debtor cites no legal authority in support of her 

position, save Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which merely 

holds that the specific dictates of due process procedures depend on a variety of 

factors. Nor does Debtor explain in any way the basis for her due process 

argument, or support it with citations to the record. For those reasons, Debtor 

has failed to sufficiently develop this argument and this Court should decline to 

develop it on Debtor’s behalf. E.g., Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 

678 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 2012) (appellate court will “not do an appellant’s 

work for it, either by manufacturing its legal arguments, or by combing the 

Case 6:16-cv-00150-MC Document 13 Filed 07/13/16 Page 15 of 20
12

record on its behalf for factual support”); United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 

1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not supported by 

citations to the record or to case authority are generally deemed waived.”).

In any event, it is unclear what further process could have been required 

here. The Bankruptcy Court expressly explained to Debtor at the November 19, 

2015 hearing the impact that failure to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss would 

have on the Adversary Proceeding and then gave Debtor an opportunity to 

withdraw the Motion to Dismiss. (ER 40 (11/19 Tr. at 6:10-19).) In fact, the 

Bankruptcy Court gave Debtor ample time and opportunity—more than six 

weeks—to withdraw the Motion to Dismiss before entering the Chapter 13 Case 

Dismissal Order. Debtor nonetheless declined to withdraw the Motion to 

Dismiss during this period. 

C. Dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding Was Within the 

Bankruptcy Court’s Discretion and Was Not Inequitable. 

Debtor next argues generally that “the bankruptcy court . . . acted 

inequitably and prejudicially against” her. (Opening Br. at 8.) Again, Debtor 

fails to develop this argument or cite to any applicable legal authority. In fact, 

Debtor should be estopped from arguing equity here, given that Debtor’s own 

actions precipitated the entry of the Adversary Dismissal Order by the 

Bankruptcy Court. This is true because the Adversary Dismissal Order was 

entered by the Bankruptcy Court as a direct result of the Bankruptcy Court’s 

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13

entry of the Chapter 13 Case Dismissal Order on December 11, 2015. And the 

Chapter 13 Case Dismissal Order granted the Motion to Dismiss, which was 

filed by Debtor on her own volition. In addition, Debtor waived her right to 

object to entry of a final order or judgment in the Oregon LBRs and thus should 

not be allowed to appeal an issue that she waived at the Bankruptcy Court. 

Oregon LBR 7008-1; e.g., K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 974 

(9th Cir. 2015) (a party that fails to raise an issue below waives consideration of 

that issue on appeal).

Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding 

was within the Bankruptcy Judge’s discretion. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (setting 

forth discretionary abstention rule). Although bankruptcy courts are not 

automatically divested of subject matter jurisdiction over “related to” adversary 

proceedings when the underlying bankruptcy case is dismissed, a bankruptcy 

court is certainly within its powers to exercise its discretion under section 

1334(c)(1) and abstain from hearing the case. 

Whether the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over the Adversary 

Proceeding after the underlying case has been dismissed depends on the 

weighing of factors of “economy, convenience, fairness and comity.” In re 

Carraher, 971 F.2d at 328; Szanto v. Bistritz (In re Szanto), No. NV-14-1528, 

2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2198 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 3, 2016); see also Fid. & 

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Deposit Co. of Md. v. Morris (In re Morris), 950 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1992). 

Retention of “related to” jurisdiction is not necessarily appropriate “when the 

initiation of the dispute was recent, no action had been taken prior to the 

dismissal and the dispute concerned issues . . . in which the state courts [have] 

more expertise.” Linkway Inv. Co. v. Olsen (In re Casamont Inv’rs, Ltd.), 196 

B.R. 517, 523 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (citing three Ninth Circuit cases). 

Here, retention of jurisdiction over the Adversary Proceeding would have 

been improper once the Chapter 13 Case was dismissed. At the time that the 

Adversary Dismissal Order was entered, the Adversary Proceeding had been 

pending for only five months, no actions had been taken in the case beyond 

filing of the pleadings, and the Adversary Complaint raised issues of real 

property law—specifically, the validity of the Trust’s lien on the Subject 

Property—over which state courts have significant expertise. See id. (on 

similar facts, bankruptcy court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction). 

Accordingly, dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding was entirely consistent 

with applicable case law and was not inequitable under the circumstances. 

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VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, SPS and the Trust respectfully request 

that this Court affirm the Adversary Dismissal Order of the Bankruptcy Court. 

DATED: July 13, 2016 Respectfully submitted, 

STOEL RIVES LLP

760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite 3000

Portland, OR 97205

By:/s/ Crystal S. Chase

OREN B. HAKER

OSB NO. 130162

CRYSTAL S. CHASE

OSB NO. 093104

Attorneys for Appellees Bank of New 

York Mellon and Select Portfolio 

Servicing, Inc.

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Page 1 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing APPELLEES BANK OF NEW YORK 

MELLON AND SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.’S ANSWERING BRIEF on 

the following named person(s) on the date indicated below by

 mailing with postage prepaid

 hand delivery

 facsimile transmission

 overnight delivery

 email

 notice of electronic filing using the Cm/ECF system

to said person(s) a true copy thereof, contained in a sealed envelope, addressed to said person(s) 

at his or her last-known address(es) indicated below.

Lori Diane Bacskowski

1025 Ne Fall Drive

Grants Pass, OR 97526

Appellant, Pro Se

DATED: July 13, 2016.

STOEL RIVES LLP

/s/ Crystal S. Chase

OREN B. HAKER, OSB No. 130162

CRYSTAL S. CHASE, OSB No. 

093104

Telephone: (503) 224-3380

Attorneys for Appellees Bank of New 

York Mellon and Select Portfolio 

Servicing, Inc.

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