CASE NO 3:15-cv-01666-SI

Individuals For Justice

Joseph Walsh, representative

E-mail: lonevet2008@comcast.net

Phone: 503-946-8428

IS IT EVEN POSSIBLE AT THIS POINT?

vioncEssaerke..

RESPONSE TO THE CITY'S BRIEF CONCERNING THEIR MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-01666-SI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

JOSEPH WALSH

PLAINTIFF,

BRYANT ENGE, CHARLIE HALES,

CITY OF PORTLAND, et all

Defendants.

Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 1 of 13
Motion by the city for Summary Judgment:

The motion offered by the city of Portland is without merit because the

entire document never answers or offers any authority who would grant the

city to arbitrarily stop a citizen/activists from exercising one of our basic

rights; "...petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The city spends a great deal of their brief on making me out to be a terrible

person who acts up and causes such confusion that I must be kept out of

future public meetings of the city council. The escalation of punishment is

most distressing and has a chilling effect on those who wish to speak at

meetings but fear if they get into an argument with this mayor they too will

be banned for a time to be decided by the mayor. There are no instructions

that we can point to limiting the powers of the mayor.

Legal Argument By The City:

There are major disputes concerning every•aspect of this case and can only

be brought out if the case proceeds. The attack on my activism will be

responded to by witnesses who will testify of my long and dedicated work

concerning the issues that come before this council. Because the city says I

acted in such a way does not make it so, the witnesses they offer are all paid

city employees or contractors as in the case of G4S security. We would

offer counter witnesses who are not paid, to testify to the selective

enforcement of the "Code of Conduct." We would also offer some rational

reason for the presentation to the mayor that he has some obligation to

conduct the meetings as outlined by the City Charter. If there is no way

but to interrupt illegal proceedings a jury might want to know that.

The First Amendment does not say one must petition our government only

during times that the government dictates, that is left up to courts to decide

if the interruption of the process is wanted or expected. In this case the

catalyst for my 60 day exclusion was both wanted and expected. There was

no way of redoing the item pulled by me if the session was completed, the

Exhibit 1

Page 2 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 2 of 13
money was going to be spent and once that happened it was over. Even if

one decides that my action was out of order, and/or impolite, is that enough

to ban me from all services offered in the City Hall Building? Again we are

not arguing that the mayor may be justified when he had me removed from

the Chambers, we are only challenging the 60 day exclusion or banning.

We also take issue with the concept of "Mootness." The city does not use

this concept anymore and we suggest it is partly based on my first exclusion

dated September 17, 2014 and appealed to the City's Hearing Officer. This

had to do with an Appeal Hearing during a city council meeting on

September 10, 2014 concerning a Hemp Festival permit rejection by the

bureau known as Parks and Recreation. I objected that the permit was

refused and thought the festival was being treated unfairly. I was thrown

out, not arrested, and one week later told I was banned from the city hall

chambers for 30 days. I appealed, and the decision of the Hearing Officer

was based on mootness. Attached (aft. 1) is an e-mail from the Auditor's

Office that says they will not use mootness as an end result of hearings.

My appeal was never heard because the city ran the clock out and then

said in effect "You are moot." (See hearing officer decision, Aft. 2) So, there

was never any possibility of me getting a hearing on the first 30 day

exclusion. The Hearing Officer is paid by the city, seems like the deck was

loaded at the time of my appeal of my first exclusion. There was no real

appeal; one was at the mercy of the city. There are some cases that speak to

this issue: one must have a fair hearing to obtain whether the mayor has

over reached his authority, and if he has what limits are there on his powers

to punish what he/she considers bad behavior. We do not have dictators yet

in this country and all elected officials must have limits on their powers; we

believe in due process.

DUE PROCESS:

We take the position that when a liberty is taken away by the government

there must be a fair hearing and appeal process. The City of Portland

cannot show that they had a compelling reason to ban me for 30 or 60 days.

There were no arrests, I was ordered out of the council chambers and

complied. So where is the compelling need to keep me from exercising one

of our basic rights? The interruptions of council business was not just me

objecting vigorously, there were others who actually led the demonstrations

Exhibit 1

Page 3 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 3 of 13
yet only I was pointed out for exclusion. This to us is a planned punishment

for our organization where others were either visibly warned or received no

warning at all. The city of Portland is well aware that I do represent

Individuals For Justice at every city council meeting I attend because I

declare that at the beginning of my testimony. The fact that the city's

security force, called G4S, documents every action that I take during

council meetings is disturbing on its face and should stop.

In HAGUE v. COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,

(1939) The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in stating the

government cannot just decide to ban an organization from using

government property to gather and hand out information about joining a

union. The city in that case did what this city is trying to do by saying they

have the power to stop citizens from gathering. Individuals For Justice was

stopped for a total of 120 days, missing about 17 meetings. This is a very

serious action by the city and they offer no authority except listing every

minor disturbance, hoping the total is greater than the parts, they are not.

The city exercised a tool to deal with disturbances when they removed me

from the meetings in question but exceeded any authority they have when,

a week later, they added extended exclusions as in this instance of 60 days,

not just banished from the meetings but from using any facility inside city

hall. The Mayor has no authority over the Auditor's functions yet barred

me from using that office.

This case is a clear picture of the abuse of authority and we submit it is

based on the council, including the mayor's intended exclusion of opposing

opinions when it comes to actions taken by the city.

In their motion, the city states "...there is no justifiable case or controversy

before the court." We beg to differ, depriving a citizen of a constitutional

right is surely controversial and justifiable by countless court decisions

concerning protective rights. The First Amendment is not without

restrictions, we acknowlege the privledge of speech is surely limited by the

courts and the government has a duty to conduct business in an organized

way, we accept that principle; but how far the mayor can go is the question

we present to the court. Removal from a meeting should be enough and

future exclusions should not be part of the tools for the mayor to use at will.

This is not riding a Trimet train, being caught without a ticket and being

excluded for a time, this is loss of a basic right to petition local government

Exhibit 1

Page 4 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 4 of 13
as covered under "Oregon Public Records Law." The brief offered by the

city is only one side and the videos are lacking in evidence in that we would

call witnesses to dispute what the videos shows and offer some context to

what is on just selected sections offered by the city. There is no reason

given for my actions and that we challenge, just because the city says

something does not make it so. We take the position that my actions did not

happen in a vacuum and to document all my actions including obvious legal

and protected rights outside of city hall just adds to the attempt by the city

to make me the issue and not the city abusing their power.

Grounds For Summary Judgment:

The city contends that "...disruptive conduct at city council meetings is not

conduct protected by the First Amendment." We see this conduct not as

disruptive but necessary. We are reminded of the well known example or

exception to freedom of speech when a person yells "Fire" in a crowded

theater, we as reasonable people say one cannot do that because of the

danger of people getting killed or hurt trying to get out of the theater. But

suppose there is a fire; what does the same person do?

The fire on July 8th of 2015 was caused by the mayor calling up an agenda

item that I had requested be pulled when I was out of the room. This

matter had to do with transferring funds from the Transportation Bureau

to the Police Department. We were opposed to that transfer and wanted to

go on record to list our opposition. The City Charter lays out that an item

pulled out of Consent Agenda will be heard after a vote on the rest of the

Consent Agenda. (see att. 3)

The mayor decided not to do that and we waited over 2 hrs for him to

bring up the item. I had to use the restroom due to an illness called

ulcerative colitis and left all my belongings, including an oxygen backpack,

at my disabled chair which is in the first row in front of the mayor. I had

notified the mayor of this medical condition on a number of occasions. I

was told when I returned that the item was voted on and there was nothing

I could do. I yelled out because there was no way that they could have a

report from staff on this issue and vote. I was later told that the mayor

decided that since I was not in the room there was no need for a staff report

to the council and called for a vote. If the mayor followed the city charter

Exhibit 1

Page 5 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 5 of 13
and brought up the item after the Consent Agenda was voted on I would

have been present, but he decided to bring it up 2 hrs later when I was out

of the room; there was a "Fire."

Material Facts:

The material facts in this case are that the city is arguing that because they

can remove me from a meeting, where I may be out of order, they have the

power to do anything else they please.

Conclusion:

We take the position that the mayor, Mr. Bryant Enge, and the City of

Portland acted as dictators and have offered no defense concerning my 60

day exclusion. We ask that the case proceed to a hearing scheduled for

December 17, 2015 without delay.

Respecylly submitted,

Joseph Walsh,

Individuals For Justice,

Vietnam Veterans Against the War,

Activist

Exhibit 1

Page 6 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 6 of 13
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RE: "Mootness" in cases before the hearing officer

Sent By: City Auditor, Mary Hull Caballero On: Nov 11/03/15 1:04 PM

To: joe walsh

Mr. Walsh,

I checked in with Greg Frank to discuss your question and learned the following:

In July, the Oregon Supreme Court issued a decision in Couey v. Atkins (357 Or 460

exclusion cases.

For many years courts deferred to an Oregon Supreme Court case originating from

Shatzer, 337 Or 345 [2004]). The Oregon Supreme Court, in Yancy, held that a case

courts persisted in following Yancy even though the Oregon legislature later passed

person had standing if the person's case involved an act that was "capable of repeti

The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in the Couey case overruled Yancy.

Regards,

Mary Hull Caballero

From: outlook_025a23a1fc539a45@outlook.com [ma ilto:outlook_025a23a lfc539az

Sent: Sunday, November 01, 2015 1:45 PM

To: City Auditor, Mary Hull Caballero <AuditorHullCaballero@portlandoregon.gov>

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Exhibit 1

1 of 1 Patjtig3f142:57 PM

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 7 of 13
CITY AUDITOR

1111=11111 oral Am accoutninscairommair

CITY OF PORTLAND

Office of City Auditor Mary Hull Caballero

Hearings Office

1900 SW 4th Avenue, Room 3100

Portland, OR 97201

phone: (503) 823-7307 - fax: (503) 823-4347

web: vv-ww.portlandoregon.oviauditorlhearings

HEARINGS OFFICER'S SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

APPEAL OF JOE WALSH

HEARINGS OFFICE CASE NO. 3140345

HEARINGS OFFICER: Mr. Gregory J. Frank

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Background:

Walsh received a written letter of exclusion (the "Walsh Exclusion"), on September 17, 2014, excluding

him from the City of Portland Council Chambers for a period of 30 days. 'For reasons set forth in the

Order, an evidentiary hearing was not held until November 3, 2014 ("11/3 Hearing"). Prior to the 11/3

Hearing the City filed a Motion (Exhibit 32) which included a request that the Hearings Officer dismiss

the case as being moot The Hearings Officer provided Walsh and the City Attorney an opportunity to

submit written arguments and provide oral arguments at a December 3, 2014 Hearing ("12/3 Hearing").

The Hearings Officer issued an Order (the "Order") on December 8, 2014 dismissing the Walsh

Exclusion appeal as being moot.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Order, the City of Portland City Attorney's Office ("City Attorney")

submitted information to the Hearings Office alerting the Hearings Officer of the 'image of HB 2324

(codified as ORS 14.175). Upon receipt of the communication of the information from the City

Attorney, the Hearings Officer sent a letter to Walsh and Assistant Deputy City Attorney Daniel Simon

("Attorney Simon") (Exhibit 36) requesting written arguments/comments related to the applicability of

HB 2324 to this case. Walsh and Attorney Simon each provided a written response to the Hearings

Officer (Exhibits 34 and 35). The Hearings Officer admitted Exhibit 34 and 35 into the evidentiary

record.

Walsh, in Exhibit 34, stated the following:

"I ask that you recognize that my case is not moot, and reconvene

to decide on the outstanding subpoenas, and schedule a hearing on

the merits of my appeal of being excluded from attending and

monitoring meetings of the city council for a period of thirty

days, (30)."

Exhibit 1

Page 8 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 8 of 13
CASE NO. 3140345 Page 2

Scope:

This Supplemental Order re-considers all documents in the file (Exhibits 1 through and including 36)

but is focused upon the arguments made by Walsh (Exhibit 34) and Attorney Simon (Exhibit 35), ORS

14.175 and relevant case law.

Legal Analysis:

The Hearings Officer interprets Exhibit 34 as a request forreconsideration/rehearingas allowed under

Portland City Code ("PCC") 22.03.115.

HB2324passedtheOregonlegislatureandwassignedintolawin2007.HB2324wascodifiedas

ORS 14.175. The 74tOregon Legislative Assembly — 2007 Regular Session issued a "Staff Measure

SummaryforHouseBill2324B"whichstatedthefollowing:

"HB 2324 B concerns the power of a court to hear lawsuits that

challenge an act, policy or practice of a public body or public

official, but have become `moot' because of an intervening event

that occurred after the lawsuit began. Generally, courts only

hear cases that are `justiciable.' This means a plaintiff must

have 'standing' to bring the action - i.e., the plaintiff must

have suffered an injury from the challenged action or must

otherwise be qualified to'seek judicial review of particular

cOnduct - and the lawsuit must present a controversy that is

`ripe' and not `moot.' Ripeness' and 'mootness' refer to the

timing of a lawsuit. A laWsuit is not 'ripe' if it is brought to

soon and is `moot' if it brought too late. For example, if a

plaintiff seeks to challenge an agency's failure to issue a

permit, the action might not be ripe if the party files the

action before the agency has isfjued a final decipion on the

matter. If a plaintiff challenges a governmental act precluding

him and her from participating in a political event, the action

would be moot if the event took place before the court decided

the controversy.

The federal_courts, as-well as state in the-union, -

recognize an exceptiOn to the mootness. doctrine:for controversies

that come up repeatedly, but cannot be reviewed by appellate

courts if a strict mootness standard were to apply. Courts call

this the 'capable of repetition but evading, review' doctrine. In

Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or 345 (2004), however, the Oregon Supreme

Court ruled that the judicial power granted by Article VII, sec.

1 of the Oregon Constitution does not include the power to hear

cases that are capable of repetition but might &trade review. Two

years later, the Court decided Kellas v. Department of

Corrections, 341 Or 471 (2006), in which it ruled that the

legislature has the power to grant standing to a party to

initiate litigation even if that person might not have a personal

interest in the litigation. KB 2324 B is a response to the Yancy

and Kellas opinions. It would provide that, if a party already

had standing to initiate a lawsuit, and the action became moot

Exhibit 1

Page 9 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 9 of 13
CASE NO. 3140345 Page 3

while the lawsuit was pending, the party still has an interest in

the litigation and the court can issue a judgment if the

controversy is capable of repetition but might evade judicial

review."

Walsh argued, in Exhibit 34, that ORS 14.175 should be applied to the "mootness" analysis of this case.

Walsh argued that this case is one "capable of repetition but evading review" and as such the Hearings

Officer's Order should be reversed and the Walsh Exclusion hearing process should proceed to a final

decision on the merits.

Attorney Simon argued, in Exhibit 35, that the Hearings Officer should continue to apply the Yancy

decision to this case and find the case is "moot" In the alternative, Attorney Simon argued that the

underlying facts of the Walsh Exclusion appeal do not satisfy the requirements of ORS 14.175.

The Hearings Officer, in the Order, found that Walsh was orally excluded from the City of Portland

Council Chambers ("Council Chambers") on September 10, 2014 and subsequently, on or about

September 17, 2014, received the written Walsh Exclusion. On or about October 31, 2014, the City

submitted a motion to dismiss the Walsh Exclusion appeal case because the case became moot on

October 17, 2014. The Hearings Officer, in the Order, dismissed the Walsh Exclusion appeal case based

upon his understanding of the relevant dates associated with the Walsh Exclusion and the Yancy

decision. The Hearings Officer was not apprised of HB 2324 (ORS 14.175) during final written or oral

arguments by Walsh or Attorney Simon.

The question before the Hearings Officer, at first blush, appears to be rather straightforward: Should the

Hearings Officer apply the three prong test set forth in ORS 14.175 to this case? The Hearings Officer's

initial reaction was that the legislature passed HB 2324 (ORS 14.175) and the Hearings Officer is

obligated to follow that law. However, in reviewing cases decided by Oregon Courts following the

passage of ORS 14.175, the Hearings Officer is less comfortable with his initial reaction.

The Oregon Supreme Court, in Yancy, engaged in an extensive historical review of Article VII of the

Oregon Constitution and concluded that "the judicial power under the Oregon Constitution does not

extend to moot cases that are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Yancy v. Shatzer @ 363 In

2008, after the passage of ORS 14.175, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that Yancy remains good

law, and mootness remains an aspect of justiciability. Pendleton School Dist. V. State of Oregon, 220 Or

App 56, 65 (2008)

In 2013, the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the "capable of repetition, yet likely to evade judicial

review" concept. Couey v. Brown, 257 Or App 434, 443-444 (2012). The Court of Appeals stated, in a

footnote, the following:

"We are also reluctant to conclude that this challenge, in the

Absence of a request for expedited review under ORS 14.175,

qualifies for review because we prefer to avoid constitutional

questions when possible. If we were to hold that a particular

case qualifies for review under ORS 14.175, we would have to

confront the obvious question of whether that statute violates

the Oregon Constitution under Yancy, 337 Or. At 363, 97 P.3d

1161, where the Supreme Court held in no uncertain terms, 'The

judicial power under the Oregon Constitution does not extend to

Exhibit 1

Page 10 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 10 of 13
CASE NO. 3140345 Page 4

moot cases that are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'"

Couey v. Brown, @ 444

In 2014, the Oregon Court of Appeals once again addressed the "capable of repetition, yet likely to

evade judicial review" concept. Krisor v. Henry, 256 Or App 56 (2013). The Court of Appeals included

another footnote which stated the following:

"In Yancy v. Shatzer, 37 Or. 345, 363, 97 P.3d 1161 (2004), the

Supreme Court held that the judicial power under the Oregon

Constitution does not encompass adjudicating cases that are moot

but 'capable of repetition yet evading review.' The legislative

assembly enacted ORS 14.175 apparently in response to Yancy. Or.

Laws 2007, ch. 770, Section 1. This case does not require us to

decide whether ORS 14.175, by purporting to create a justiciable

controversy where the Supreme Court has held that no such

controversy exists, is constitutional . " Krisor v. Henry, (4)60

It is clear to the Hearings Officer that in the absence of the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Yancy,

the Hearings Officer would be obligated to apply the three prong test set forth in ORS 14.175 to the facts

in this case. However, the Oregon Supreme Court reaffirmed Yancy by stating that "When a court is

asked to decide 'a matter that no longer is a controversy between the parties[0 Article VII (Amended)

section 1, of the Oregon Constitution constrains us from doing so." State v Hemenway, 353 Or 498, 500

(2013) See also Homestyle Direct v. Dep't of Human Services, 354 Or 253, 260 (2013)

The Hearings Officer finds the Yancy decision, as it respects the concept of "capable of repetition, yet

evading review," is based upon Article VII (Amended) section 1 of the Oregon Constitution. The

Hearings Officer also finds the "Oregon Constitution does not extend to moot cases that are 'capable of

repetition, yet evading review.'" Yancy v. Shatzer, ®363 The Hearings Officer finds the Yancy decision

remains the controlling law in Oregon when determining if a case is moot.

The Hearings Officer finds no good and sufficient reason has been raised by Walsh to grant his request

for reconsideration/rehearing. The Hearings Officer finds that the Walsh motion to reopen this case for

hearing (Exhibit 34) should be denied.

The Hearings Officer, based upon the findings above, shall not addrms the ORS 14.174 three prong test

referenced by Walsh (Exhibit 34) and Attorney Simon (Exhibit 35).

ORDER AND DEIE,RIVIINATION:

1. Walsh's request for reconsideration/rehearing (Exhibit 34) is denied.

2. This Supplemental Order has been mailed to the parties on January 6, 2015.

3. This Supplemental Order is subject to the right to filing a Writ of Review as set forth in ORS

34.010 et. seq.

Dated: January 6, 2015

Gregory J. Frank, Hearings Officer

Exhibit 1

Page 11 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 11 of 13
Chapter 3.02 Council Organization and Procedure http://www.portlan don line. conilauditor/?c=28201#c id_13380

5. Matters not appearing on the Agenda may be considered by the Council under suspension of rules at any

session. Aeoeals

Chapter 3.130 Adminstratrve

6. The Auditor shall prepare a supplementary Agenda which shalt be designated and known as the Four Fifths

Agenda, which shall contain a summary of matters filed in his or her office not later than 5:00 p.m. on the

preceding Tuesday for consideration at either the following Wednesday or Thursday session. All documents

filed with the Auditor intended for the Four Fifths Agenda shall be initialed by four members of the Council or

their representatives, as designated in Subsection 3.02.040 D.2.

7. Matters ordered by the Council to be considered at a special time other than the listed sessions shall be

considered at the special time as directed by the Council. Council members may direct that special items be

listed for meetings other than those specified above.

3.02.035 Ordinance Wording.

A. Ordinance exhibits.

1. If the directive portion of an ordinance refers to an exhibit, unless the ordinance directs otherwise, the

following language is understood to follow; to wit "said exhibit is by this reference incorporated as if set out

verbatim."

2. Unless the ordinance directs otherwise, the Auditor shall determine when a copy of an exhibit is to be

provided with a copy of the ordinance.

B. Appropriation designation. The budget ordinance makes the annual appropriation and defines the level of

accounting control. When the directive section of an ordinance includes a reference to an appropriation, the

ordinance shall control the appropriation at the same accounting level in the original budget ordinances. These

appropriations are subject to the limitations on specific appropriations or types of expenditure stated in the budget

ordinance. The designation of an appropriation in an ordinance by subaccount below the level of control may be

adjusted administratively without an amending ordinance provided there is no change in the appropriation at the

level of control, unless the ordinance directs otherwise.

3.02.036 Consent Agenda.

(Amended by Ordinance Nos. 166314 and 17787, effective August 13, 2003.)

A. Those who file documents for indusion on the Council Agenda shall clearly designate such items as "Consent" or

"Regular" Agenda. The Council Agenda shall clearly distinguish Consent from Regular Agenda items. The Auditor

shall make an appropriate designation if none is assigned.

B. The Consent Agenda may include any matter for Council consideration except:

1. Appeals of land use decisions or other land use matters requiring a hearing under City Charter or State

law;

2. Any matter which will increase an appropriation unit's budget; or

3. Any matter requested to be placed on the regular agenda at the time of filing with the Auditor.

C. The Consent Agenda shall be positioned in the Council Agenda in accordance with Section 3.02,030.

D. An item designated for the Consent Agenda may be removed from the Consent Agenda by a Council member or

any individual prior to Council vote on the Consent Agenda. The request may be in either written or verbal form.

When removed, items shall be considered individually at the end of the Consent Agenda at the same Council

meeting. A request to pull an item from Consent shall be made to the City Auditor prior to the beginning of the

Council meeting, or presented verbally at the Council meeting.

E. At any meeting at which there is a Consent Agenda, the ayes and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all

items on the Consent Agenda by a single Council vote. It shall not be necessary that there be a reading of the titles

or the effect of the items on a Consent Agenda. Items on a Consent Agenda shall not be subject to amendment or

debate, Consideration of the Consent Agenda requires at least four Council members to be present and voting.

Action on the Consent Agenda shall require a unanimous vote of all Council members present.

3.02.037 lime Certain Agenda.

(Amended by Ordinance Nos. 177787 and 184046, effective September 10, 2010.)

A. Any Council member, the City Auditor, City Attorney, City Purchasing Agent, Hearings Officer, City Planning and

Sustainability Commission, and any other City appointed board or commission filing an item with the City Auditor

for City Council consideration may designate the item as "time certain."

B. A request for time certain designation shall be made In writing to the City Auditor at least 4 days prior to the

filing deadline for the regular Council agenda items; or by verbal request by the City Council or member thereof at

any time prior to City Council action on a particular Item. The request shall include an estimate of time to be

devoted to the particular item.

C. The City Auditor shall schedule the item for hearing before the City Council and inform the office requesting the

time certain designation.

D. The Council Agenda shall clearly distinguish time certain items from all other items.

3.02.040 Rules of the Council.

(Amended by Ordinance Nos. 162784, 165402, 166075, 166314, 170834, 177787, 178617, 180371 and 182515,

effective February 4, 2009.)

A. Suspension and Repeal of Rules - Robert's Rules of Order.

wirr

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3 of 8

Exhibit 1

Page 12 of 12

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 12 of 13
District of Oregon CM/ECF LIVE Release Version 6.1-History/Documents Query

Query Reports Utilities Logout

3:15-cv-01666-SI Walsh v. Enge et al

Michael H. Simon, presiding

Date filed: 09/03/2015

Date of last filing: 11/20/2015

History

Doc.

No.

Dates Description

1 Filed & Entered: 09/03/2015

Terminated.• 09/08/2015

_3 Application for leave to proceed ifp

2 Filed & Entered.• 09/03/2015 _a Complaint

2 Filed & Entered: 09/03/20154 Case Assignment Notice

4 Filed & Entered: 09/03/20153 Clerks Notice of Mailing

¢ Filed & Entered: 09/03/20153 Case Reassignment Notice

¢ Filed & Entered: 09/08/2015 _a Order on motion/application for leave to proceed

ifp

7 Filed & Entered: 09/08/2015 _a Clerks Notice of Mailing

IQ Filed: 09/08/2015

Entered: 09/10/2015

_a' Discovery order

8 Filed & Entered: 09/10/2015 _a Scheduling

9 Filed & Entered: 09/10/2015 _a Clerks Notice of Mailing

11 Filed & Entered: 09/10/2015 _3 Clerks Notice of Mailing

12 Filed & Entered: 09/10/2015 i3 Rule 16 Conference

13 Filed & Entered: 09/10/2015 _a Clerks Notice of Mailing

14 Filed & Entered: 10/06/2015 _a Scheduling

15 Filed & Entered: 10/06/20154 Clerks Notice of Mailing

LE Filed & Entered: 10/16/20154 Answer to Complaint

12 Filed & Entered.• 10/30/2015 _3 Motion for Summary Judgment

la Filed & Entered: 10/30/2015 _a Declaration

.1.2 Filed & Entered: 10/30/20154 Declaration

211 Filed & Entered: 10/30/2015 _a Declaration

21 Filed & Entered: 10/30/20153 Declaration

22 Filed & Entered: 10/30/20154 Declaration

22 Filed: 11/02/2015

Entered: 11/03/2015

4 Response to Motion

24 Filed: 11/02/2015

Entered: 11/03/2015

3 Exhibits

25 Filed & Entered: 11/20/2015 _a Response to Motion

https://ecford.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/HistDocQry.pl?68078770720594-L_1_0-1[12/4/2015 11:01:13 AM]

Exhibit 2

Page 1 of 1

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 27-1 Filed 12/04/15 Page 13 of 13