### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 19

- 00815

- CV

TJFA, L.P.; Environmental Protection in the Interest of Caldwell County; James Abshier; and Bryon Friedrich, Appellant s

v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and 130 Envir o n m ental Park, LLC, Appellee s

FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D

- 1

- GN

- 17

- 006632, THE HONORABLE DUSTIN M. HOWELL, JUDGE PRESIDING

O P I N I O N
This dispute con cerns 130 Environm ental Park, LLC ’ s (130 EP) applica t i on for a permit to con struct and operate a new municipal solid waste facility (Facility) in Caldwell County

. Following a contested

- case hearing, t he T exas Commi s s ion on Environm e ntal Quali ty ( Commission ) issued a f inal order granting 130 EP ’ s applicati on
. T JFA, LP; E nvironmen tal Protection in the Interest of Caldwell County; James Abshier; and Bryon Frie dri ch (collectivel y,
TJ FA) filed suit for judi cial review of the Commi s s ion ’ s order

. T h e district court rendered judgment upholding the permit. We wi ll affirm.

BACKG ROUND
We begin with an overview of the relevant statutory fram ework , t he Solid Waste Disposa l Act (the Act)

. The Act directs the Co mmission to “ safeguard t he health, welfare, and2 physical propert y of the people and to protect the environme nt by cont rolling the man a gement of
solid waste

. ” Tex. Heal th & Sa fety Co de § 36 1 .0 02 ( a )

. To accomplish this purpose, the
C o mmission may “ require and is sue permits authorizi n g and governi ng the c onstruction, operation , and maintenance o f the sol id waste f a c ilities used to store, process, or dispose of solid
waste under this chapter

. ” Id. § 361.061

. The Act also grants the Commission authority to prescribe the form and requ irements of the permit application and the procedure for processing
it. Id. § 36 1. 06 4 (a ).
T h e Commissio n h as exercised this authority and p rom ulgated rules prohibiting

anyone from storing, processing, remov ing , or disposing of solid waste without a permit o r other
authorization f rom the Commission. Se e 30 Te x . Admin. Code § 330.7 ( 20 2 1 ) ( Te x. Com m ’n on
Env ’ t Quality , Permits Required )

. The Commission ’ s rules divide the application into f our pa rts and specify the conte nts of each. See i d. § § 330.5 7 (a) (2021) ( Tex. Com m ’n on Env ’ t Quality , Permit and Registration Applications for Mu ni ci p al S olid Wa ste Facil i ti es) ( “ The application for a municipal solid waste facility is divided into Parts I

- IV. ”) , .5 9 ( “Content s of Part I of the Application ”), .61 ( “ Contents of Part II of the Application ”), .6 3 ( “ Content s of Part I II of the Applicati on ” ) , . 65 ( “ Content s of P a rt I V of the Application ”)

. Generally, an application will not
be declared administr atively complete

— meaning that it is ready for review and decision by the
Commission

— until the applica nt has submitted all the required materials

. Id

. § 330.57(a) ; se e
Te x
. He alth & Safety Code § 361.068 ( “ Administratively C o mplete Application ” ). H owever, t he
Act gives the Commission discr etion to process an application through a differe nt, two

- step procedure. The Commission “ in its discretion may, i n processing a pe rm it a p pl ication, make a separate determination on the question o f land

- use co mpatibility, and, if the site locatio n is acceptable, may at another time consider other te chnical matters concerning the application. ”3 Tex. Heal th & Sa fety Co d e § 361.069

. If t h e C o m mi ssion de cides to employ this procedure, the applicant “ shall submit a partial application consisting of Par ts I and II of the a p plication , ” which
the executive director will “ process
. . . to the extent necessary to determine land

- use compatib ili ty al o n e
. ” 30 T e x . Admin. Code § 330 .57 (a). If the Commission determines the land is suitable for use as a landfill, the applicant then submit s the remainder of the application

. I n September 201 3, 1 30 EP applied for a permit to c onstruc t the Fa cility a nd

re q u e st ed a lan d

- use - only determination. T h e Commission declared the application

— consisting
of Parts I and II

— administratively complete on September 23, 2013

. Three months later, the
Cal dwell County co mmissioner s adopted an or d inan ce p rohibiting t he process or dis p o sal of

so lid wast e in m o s t of the County, including the proposed site of the Facility ( Disposal
Ord i nance )

. The Com mission subsequently determined that the site was accep table for use as a
lan dfill , and 1 30 EP filed a compl e t e a pplication i n Febr uary 2 0 14

. T he executive di re c t o r
declared Parts II I and I V administratively complete on February 28, 2014. After technical review, the executive director recommend that the Commission grant the application and prepared a draft perm it. At 1 30 EP ’ s r eque st , t he Commis sion referred the application to the
State Off ice of A dm inistrative Hearings for a conte s te d

- ca se h ea ring

. The c as e w a s assigned to two adminis trative law judges ( AL Js) , who admitted
TJFA in opposition to the applicati on. The ALJ s conducte d a fi na l hearing on the case from August 1 5

– 26 , 2016. TJFA argued t hat Section 363.112 o f the Act bar red 13 0 EP ’ s a pp li c a t i on because the Disposal Ordinance prohibit s processing or disposal of solid waste in th e proposed
location. See Tex. Health & Safe t y Cod e § 363. 112 ( c)

– ( d)

. A s alternat e grounds, TJFA argued
that 130 EP ’ s geology expert had d estroye d ev ide nce , moved to st ri ke h i s conclusions from
130 EP ’ s application, and argued that the application f a iled to meet the Commiss ion ’ s standards4 concernin g surf ac e water drainage , land

- use compatibi lity , and flo od protection

. Whether 1 30 EP adequately addressed t he e ffect the Facility would have on the Si te 21 Dam and Reservoir

— located approximately 3,000 feet downstream

— was an especi al point of contention

. T he A LJ s subsequently issued a 211

- p age proposa l for de ci s i o n ( PFD) recommending that the Commission grant the permit as proposed in the draft perm it with three suggested change s :

• T he Pe rm it Bounda ry sh ould be exp anded t o include t he en tire le ngth of th e acce ss road from the en trance at U S 1 83 t o th e e ntranc e of t he f a c i lity at the curren t Pe rmit Boundary.

• The Permit Boundary sho uld be expanded to i nclu de t he entire
scre ening berm.

• The operating h ou rs for the Fac ility s h o uld be se t at the sta ndard hour s provid ed in 30 TAC § 330 .135.

The Co mmis sion vot ed to accep t th e PFD but rejected the first tw o changes. In September 2017,
the Commi ssion issued a final order that adopt ed almost all the ALJ s ’ findings a nd conclusion s of law, ex p lain ed why it rejected others, and gr ant ed the permit. T JFA sought judicial r ev i e w of
the order i n Tr avis C ounty d istr i ct court

. See id. § 361.321 (a) ( “ A person affected by a ruling, order, decision , or oth er act of the commiss i on ma y a ppeal the act i o n b y filing a petition in a
distr i ct court of Travis County. ” )

. T h e district c ou rt a f firm ed the Com m i ssion’s order, and th is appeal followed

.

ANALYSIS
TJF A challenges the district court ’ s judgment affirm ing the Commission ’ s grant
of a pe rmit to 1 30 EP i n fi v e issues

. Specificall y, TJFA a rgues that the Commission e rre d by granting t he p e r m it because the Commission cannot grant a permit for land covered by the Disposal Ordi nance ; the application ’ s geological repor t is unreliable ; the Commission unlawfully5 reje ct ed the ALJs ’ finding s and co n clusions ; the appli cation omit ted crucial inf or

ma t i o n regarding changes in surface water drainage patterns and flood protection ; and the Co mmission ’ s
dete rmination that the F acili ty is compatible with the Site 2 1 Reservoir an d Dam is unsupported
b y substa n t ial evid ence.

Standard o f Rev iew
I n a suit for j u di cial review of a final order under t he Act , “ the issue is whet h er
the action is inval id, arbitrary, or unreasonab le. ” Id. § 36 1.321 (e)

. T h e “ invalid, arbitr ar y , or

unreaso nable ” standard incorp orate s t h e entire scope of review allow ed by the “ sub sta nt i al
evidence ” stan dar d codified in the A dmini s trative Procedure Act. See Tex as Comm ’ n on
Env ’ t Quality v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 504 S.W .3d 5 32, 535 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Aus tin 2016,

no pet.) ; Citizens Again st the L a ndfill i n Hem pst ead v . Tex as C omm ’ n on Env ’ t Q u al i ty , No. 0 3

- 14

- 0 071 8

- CV, 2016 WL 1566759 , a t *1 (Tex. App.

— Aust in Apr. 13, 201 6, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under that standard, w e w ill rever se or remand a case fo r further proceed ings “ if
substantial r ights of the app ellan t hav e been prejud iced because t he ad m in istra tive f indings, inferences, conclu sio ns, or decisions ” are:
(A) in viola tio n of a constitutional or statutory provision; (B) in ex cess of the agency ’ s statut or y authority; (C) mad e through unlawful pro cedure; (D) aff ecte d by o ther error of law ; (E) not reasona bl y s u pp orted by su bstantial evidence consider ing the reliable and p robative eviden ce in the record as a who le; or (F) arbitra ry or capr ic ious or characterized by ab us e of discretion o r clearly unwarranted exercise of di sc retio n
.6 T ex. Gov ’ t Cod e § 2001.174 ( 2 ). W e a pply t his anal ysis witho ut defe r e nce to t he district c ourt ’ s judgment

. See Tex as Dep ’ t of Pub. Safe ty v. Alfor d , 209 S.W. 3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006) (pe r
curi am); Jenkins v. Cr osby Indep. Sch. Dist. , 537 S. W.3d 14 2 , 149 (Tex . App.

— Austin 2017,

no pet. )

.

Ef f

ec t of the Disposal Ordinance
We begin with whether the Disposal Ordinance bars 130 EP ’ s application as a
matter of law. The Act p rohibits the Commission from granting a n app lication for a per mit in any l ocation w here pro c essi ng or dis po sing of muni ci p al so lid waste is prohibited by ordina nce
unless the application is pending before the C ommi ssion when the ordinance is passed

. See Tex.
Health & S afe ty Code § 36 3.112 (c)

– (d)

. 1 The Commission conclud ed that the Di sposal
Ordinance did not prohibit granting the permit because 130 EP ’ s application for a land

- use - only determination was pending be fore the Commission at the time Caldwe ll Co u nt y e nacted the Disposal Or dinance. TJFA arg u es that the Commissio n erred becaus e Section 363.112 appl ies only to a complete application, i.e. , one that includes Parts I

- I V

.

“ Statutory interpr et ation i nvolves questio n s of la w that we consider d e n ov o , even when reviewing agen cy decisions. ” Ale ma n v. Tex as Med

. Bd. , 573 S.W .3d 796, 802 (T ex. 2019)

. O u r goal i n construing a statute is to a sc ertain and giv e effect to the l e gis lature’s intent , loo ki ng fir st to the “plai n and com mo n meaning of the sta tu t e’ s words.” Bush v. Lone Oak Club,
LLC , 601 S.W .3d 639, 647 (T ex. 2020) (c itin g MCI Sales & Serv., Inc . v. Hint on , 329 S.W.3d 475 , 500 (Tex. 20 10))

. In disc erning that meanin g, we “consider the con te xt and framewor k of t h e

1 Section 3 64.012 of the Act i s materially identical to Section 363.112 except th at it applies only to counti es
. Se e Te x . Hea lth & S afe t y Cod e § 36 4

. 012 (f) . We cite to Section 363.112 for convenien ce
.7 entire s tatute and constr ue it as a whole.” Aleman , 573 S.W.3d at 802

. “ W h ere statutory te xt is clear, t hat text is det erminative of legislat ive intent unless the plain me an ing of the

sta tute ’ s words would pr oduce an absurd resu lt

. ” T e

x as Workf orce C o mm ’ n v. Wi chita County , 548 S. W. 3 d 489, 492 (Tex. 2018)

. Section 363.112 pro hibits the Commis s ion from gra nt ing an ap plication for a

p e rmit to process or dispose of solid was te in an area where those activi ties are proh ibited

“ unless the governing body of t he municipality or county v iol at e d Subsecti on (c) in passin g the
ordinance or order. ” Tex. Healt h & S afe ty Code § 3 63 .112 ( d ) . Subse ct ion (c) provides:

(c) The gove rn ing body of a municipality or county may not prohibit the pr ocessing o r d isposal of mun icipal or industri a l so l id waste in an a rea of th at mu ni c ip ali ty or county fo r which: (1) an applic at i on fo r a permit or other auth oriz at ion under Chapter 361 has been filed with and is pending befor e the commission; or (2) a per mit or oth er authorization under Chapter 361 h as b e en issue d by th e commissi on
.

I

d. § 363.112 ( c)

. The A ct does not define “ap plicatio n , ” “f iled w ith, ” or “pend i ng. ” S ee id

.

“ W e typicall y ‘ lo o k first to dictionary definitions ’ to ‘ determi ne a te rm ’ s com mon, ordinary

mea ning. ’ ” Tex as Dep ’ t of Crim

. J ust

. v. Rangel , 595 S.W.3d 198, 208 (Tex. 2020 ) (quoting
Fort Wo rth Tran sp. Aut h. v. R o drigue z , 54 7 S .W.3d 8 30, 83 8 (Tex. 2018) )

. B lack ’s La w
D ictionary defines an application as “ a reque st or p etiti on , ” Applicat ion , Bl ack ’ s Law Dictionary ( 11th e d., 20 19) , and “ p ending ” as “r em aining u ndecided; awaiti ng decisi on , ” Pending , B lack ’ s
Law Dic t ionary ( 11t h e d. 2019 )

. To “ file ” means , as rele van t h er e, “ [t] o deliver a le gal
document to the co urt cler k or record custodian for placemen t into the offi cial recor d

. ” File , Black ’ s Law Dictionary (11th ed . 2019 )

. Reading these definiti ons tog ether , T JFA reasons th a t a8 pending a pplication i s one t hat i n cl udes all required materials and is “ready for review and
decision. ” Under this interpretation , a n application for a l and

- use - only determ inatio n cannot

sa tisfy Subsection 363 .112 (c) because a f avora b le determinat ion “ doe s not equate ” to granting a permit “ to construct a nd operate a landfill. ”
A l though TJFA is correct that a favorable la nd

- use determination does not equate to granting a permit, that does not necessarily mean an application for a land

- u se - only
deter mination does not satisfy the stat ute ’ s requirement of an application “ pending before ” the
Commission

. See Tex . Health & Safety Code § 363.112(c). Subs ection 363.112 (c) req uires than an application be awaiting dec ision, but it does not spec i fy whether an application must be pending a fin al de cision . To answer that question, we turn to the statutory context

. See Aleman , 573 S.W.3d at 802

. T JFA a r g u es that the Act refers to an application as “ something that may be granted or denied , ” b ut t h e A ct act ually contemplates that the Commission will act on

“ administratively complete ” ap plications

. See id. § 361.066 (b ) (requiring s ubmission of an administratively complete application). An application is administratively co mplet e w hen “ a complet e perm it applicatio n for m and the report and fees required to be submitted wi th a permit applicatio n have been s ubmitted ” and the “ ap plication is ready for technical r eview in

ac c orda nce with t he rules of the commission. ” Id. § 36 1.0 68. Importantly, “ [i ] f an a pp licant
does not subm it an a dm i nistratively complete application , ” then “ the application is considere d
withdrawn [.] ” I d

. § 361.066 (b )

. Thus, an applicat ion that is not administratively c omplete is not

“ filed with ” the Commissi on
. See id. § 363.112 (c). Re adi n g these provisions together , an application

— for a land

- use only determination or otherwise

— is “ filed with ” and “ pending
before ” the Commission when it is administratively complete and a waiting action by the
Commission

. Se e id

.9 Ne verthele ss, TJ FA maintains that d ecidin g l a n d

- use compa tibility is no t the same as deciding whe ther to gr ant a p er mit. H o wever, de termining land

- use compatibility is
necessaril y part of the Commission ’s decision on a permit applicati o n. S ee 30 Tex. Admin . Code § 330.6 1 (h) ( “ A primary co ncern is t h at the use of any land for a municipal solid waste facil ity

n ot a dve rs ely im pact human healt h or the environment.”)

. The Act authori zes the Commission

to address that matter separately from other technical issue s , but i t is p art of the same dec isiona l

p r o cess. Se e Tex. Health & S afety Code § 361.069 ( pro v iding tha t C om mission “ in i ts d iscretion

may, i n processing a permit applicat ion , make a separate determination on the question of land

us e c ompatibil ity, and, if the s ite lo c ation is acceptabl e, may a t a nother time consider othe r
technical matters concer n ing t he a ppl ic ation ” (emphasis added) ) ; se e al so N orth east Neighbors
Coal. v . Tex as Comm ’ n on Env ’ t Quality , No. 03

- 11

- 00277

- CV, 2013 WL 1 31 5078, at *9 (Tex. Ap p.

— Austi n Mar. 28, 2013, pet. den ied) ( mem
. op.) (chara cterizing S ec tion 361.069 as
authoriz ati o n to d eci de l a nd

- use compatibility “ s eparately from the oth er aspects of th e permitting process ” )

. TJFA stresses that 130 EP ’ s applicatio n contained only Parts I and I I, but
TJFA does not cite to an y p r o vi sion requ iring applicants to submit all required m ateri als be fo r e
the Commissi on m ay begin process ing a permit application. To the contrary, t he Act gives the
C ommission authority to pres cribe t he requisite ma terials and th e pr o cedure for pro cessin g t h e applicatio n. See Tex. Health & S afe ty Code § § 361.064 , .068

. TJF A main tai ns t hat t reat ing an application for a land

- use - only determination as a

pe nding application will have con sequences t h at t h e legislature co uld not have i ntended. Se e Bush , 601 S .W. 3 d at 64 7 ( “W e may als o consider . .

. ‘ t he consequenc es of a parti cular

constr uct io n
. ’ ” ( c itin g Atmos Energy Corp. v. Cities of Allen , 35 3 S.W.3d 1 56 , 160 (Tex. 2011) ) )

. Specificall y, TJFA a r gues that this interp retation will u nde rmine the au tho rity o f “ l oca l10 governm ents to p r ohibit landfills where their judgment deemed them u nsuita bl e
. ” TJFA impl ies
this would occur because local governme nts woul d have less n otice and opportunity to partic i pate

. We disagree. A s stated earli er, before acting o n an a ppli cation for a lan d

- use - only determination, the Commission ’ s executive dire ctor declares it to be administratively complete.
See 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 330.57 (a) (authorizing executive director to process land

- use - o nly appl icatio n )

. 2 That declar at ion tr igge r s the Commi ssion ’s o bligation to mail a copy of an
adm inistratively comp lete application to “ the mayor a nd health authority of a municipality in
who se territorial limits or extraterritorial jurisdicti o n th e soli d w as te f acilit y is located ” and “ the

co unty judge and t he health authority of the county in which the facility is lo cated. ” Tex. Health & Safety Co de § 361.0 67 (a) . Each of those entities has a statutory right “ to present comments

an d recommen dat io ns on t he permi t appl ication before the commis sion acts on the applica tion. ”
Id. § 361.067( b). Moreove r, when making a la nd

- use - only determination , the Co mmission is
under the same obligation to p rovi de a public hearing for affe cted person s as when it dec ides a l l

matte rs reg arding the applicat ion at onc e
. See id

. §§ 361. 069 ( “ A publi c hearing may be held for
each determinat ion in accordance with Section 3 61.088. ” ), .08 8 (providing that , with exc e ptions

n ot relevant he r e, Commission “s h all provide a n o pp or tu ni t y for a h earing to the applicant a nd

per sons affected ”) ; 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 330.57(a) (providing that “ an opportun ity for a public hearing will be offered ” before Commission makes land

- use - only determination ). 3

2 The executive director of the Commission declared 13 0 EP ’ s application for a land

- use only determination t o be administrati vely complete o n Septe mber 27, 2013

.
3 TJ FA is also concer ned that a pp lica nts w ill be less likely to w ork with local governmen ts a nd other stak eholders to resolve concerns
. Se e Te x. Health & Saf ety Co de § 361 .06 3 (p roviding f or volu ntary process to res olve disputes with aff ected pe r sons a t outse t of permitting p rocess ). Even i f that is true, it does not alter our conclusion. In constructing statutes, court s “ must take the Legislature at its word, respect its policy choices, and resist11 TJFA also argues th at re j ecting it s inter pre tatio n of S ection 361.112 elimi n at es the
distinction between an application and notice of intent to fi le a permit applicat ion. Citing provisions of the Act attaching legal consequences t o filing a notice , e .g. , Tex. Health & Safet y Code § 361 .102 (e) ( p rohi biti ng pe r mits for l andfill wit hin cert ai n dista n ce of residences and
other structures , measured on t he d ate of notice) , TJFA arg ues th at “ the Leg islature knew how to

use a not ice as a t riggering event if it wanted to ” but did not do so h ere. See , e.g

. , In re
Panch akarla , 602 S.W.3d 53 6, 5 40 ( Tex. 2020) (per curiam) ( orig. proceeding) ( “ We presume the Legislature included each word in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were purposefully omitted.” ). Rather, we have held that an application for a l and

- use - only
determin ation constitutes a p er mit applic ation for purposes of Subsection 363.112 (c)

. C o nstruing S ection 363.112 in the context of the entire Act , we conclude that an
app lic at io n i s “ f iled with ” and “ pendin g befor e ” the C ommission when the a p plicati on is
administr atively complete and awaiting ac tion by the Commission. See Tex. Health & Safet y Code § 363.112(c). There is no dispute that the executive director declared 130 EP’s partial application to be administratively complete before the Co u nty enacted the Dispo s al Ordi nance, and TJFA does not allege that the execut ive director acted outside his authority. Cf. i d

. § 361.064(a) (granting Commission authority to “prescribe “the form of and reasonable requirements for the permit application” a n d “the procedures for process ing” it). We therefore
conclude that t he Commi ssion did not er r by concluding 1 30 EP ’ s a p plication w as “ pending ”
before it prior to the C oun ty ’ s adop t ion of the Disposal Ordinance. Se e id

. § 363.112(c). We
overrule TJFA ’ s f i rst issue.
revising a statu te under the guise of interpre ting it

. ” Chr istus Health Gulf Coast v. Aetna, Inc. , 397 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2013) ; see Ritchie v. Rupe , 443 S.W.3d 856, 866 (Tex. 2014) (stating that courts must not “ second

- guess the policy choices that inform our statute s ” ).12 Admission o f the Geolo gy Report
Nex t, TJ FA ar gu es tha t t he ALJs erred b y deny ing their motion to stri ke the
G eology R epo rt from 13 0 EP ’ s app lication a nd their alternative r equest fo r a spoliation
instruc tion. W e review administrative rulings o n the admission or ex cl usion of ev idence under
the sam e abu se - of

- d is cretion standar d applied to trial courts. Sw a te v. Tex as Me d. B d. , No. 03

- 15

- 00815

- CV, 2017 W L 3902621, at * 2 (Tex. App.

— A us t in Aug. 31, 2017, pet . den ied) ( mem. op.) (citing Scally v. T e

x as State Bd. of Med. E xam ’ rs , 3 51 S.W.3d 434 , 450 ( T ex. Ap p.

— A u st in 2011, p et. d enied) )

. The same standard ap plies to a ruli ng on a request for a sp oliation

r emedy. See Bro okshire B ros., Ltd . v. Aldrid ge , 438 S.W .3d 9, 2 7 (Tex. 2014)

. A co urt “ a buses
i ts d iscretion if it a ct s with out reference to guidin g rules an d pri nciples s uch t h a t th e ruli n g
is arbitrary or unre asonable. ” Brew er v. Len nox Hearth Prod s

. , LLC , 601 S.W.3d 70 4, 717 (Te x. 20 20)

. The Commis sion requires that the application include a g eology report , prepar ed
b y a qual ified expert , that d escrib es, among other t h ings, “ t he re s ul t s o f investigat ions of
subsurface cond itions ” at the si te

. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 330. 63 (e) (4)

. In 2013 , 130 EP ’s
expert s entered the site and d ri lled bore h oles, collecte d soil samp les, and installed piezomete rs

to mon itor the gro un d wa ter. Dur in g th i s process, a d riller collected so il s a mples and prepar ed a

“ field l og ” for each bori ng th at includ ed , among other things, the locati on of the bore hole and
desc r iptions of the so il e xtra cted at v arious dept hs

. The driller then packaged the logs and

ac c ompa ny ing s am ples tog ethe r and shipp ed t he m to 130 EP ’ s experts, Michael Snyder, P.E. , and G rego r y Ad ams, P.E. Snyder an d A d ams analyzed the se sam ples and then cr e ated the

“ borin g logs ” re quir ed by the Commission ’ s rules. See id

. ( “ Each b ori n g m u st be p re sented in

t h e f o rm of a log t hat co ntai ns, at a minimum, the boring nu mber; surface e l evati on and l o cation13 coordinates; and a columnar section with text showing t h e elevation of al l c o ntac ts b etween soil
and rock l ayers, description of eac h l a yer us ing t he unified so i l c l assification, co lor , de gree of compaction, and moistur e content. ” ). Snyder then pre pared the geology report for 130 E P. At some point after pre p aring the report , Sny der ’ s co mpany discarded the fiel d logs and soil s amp les

. I n No ve mber 20 1 5, T JFA f i l ed a motion asserting t hat disc arding th e se
material s co n stituted spol iat ion of evidence

. As a remedy, TJFA re quested an order compelling
1 30 EP to a l low TJFA to enter the site an d conduct its o wn ge ology investigation

. I n th e

a l tern at ive, TJ FA ask ed the ALJs to apply a spolia tion pres umption wh ereby they woul d presume that th e des troyed in formation would be harmf ul to 130 E P ’ s c ase. See Bro okshire
B r os., Ltd. , 438 S. W .3d at 22 (discussing presump tio n tha t des tr oyed ev idence favor s opposing

pa rty)

. T he ALJ s iss ued an ord er granting TJFA access to the s i te. After be ginning its investigation, TJFA wit hdrew its request for a spo l i ation presumption , a nd th e A LJs accor d ingly
issued an order determining tha t t he r e ques t was m oo t. Five months l a ter , TJFA fil ed a renewed
motion for a s poliation presump tion. Th is motion wa s base d on the same facts and asserte d

es sentially the same le g al argu ments as did t he pri or m otion. TJFA al s o mo ved to st rik e the

r eport and any tes ti mo n y base d o n it as u nreliable

. The AL J s o verruled both motion s and
admitte d the report and al l owed Sny der to testify. First, we consider whether it was an abuse o f discretion to deny T JFA ’ s mo tion t o
stri ke the Geolo gy Report a s unreliable

. S ee S cal l y , 3 51 S.W

. 3d at 450 ( “ An ALJ, like a tr ia l court, has broad discretion when dec i ding whether to ad mit ex pert testimony in a cont este d

- case
hear ing [.] ” )

. A qualified e xpert may offer opini on testi mony if the testimony “ i s both relevant
and bas ed on a rel ia bl e found a ti on. ” Gha rda USA, Inc. v. C on tr ol Sols., I nc. , 464 S.W.3d 338,
348 (Tex. 2015)

. W h e n asse ss ing an expert ’s reliability , c ourts must “ rigorous ly examine t h e14 validity of facts a nd assum ptions on wh ich the test im ony is based, as well as the pri nc ip l es,

re s ea rch, and methodology underl yi ng the expert ’ s conclusions and the ma nner in which th e
p rinc ip les and metho dologies are a p pl ied by the expert to reach the c o nclusions

. ” Whirlpoo l Corp. v. Camacho , 298 S.W.3d 6 31 , 637 (Tex. 2009)

. “ If an ex per t ‘ b r [ings] to court li ttle more
than his c re dentials an d a subjective opinion, ’ his testimony wi l l not su pport a judgm ent. ”
Nat ural Ga s Pipeline Co. of Am

. v. Justiss , 397 S.W.3d 150, 156 (T ex. 20 12) (quoting Merrell
Dow P h arm., Inc. v. Havner , 953 S. W.2 d 70 6 , 712 ( Te x. 1997) )

. TJFA argues th at S nyder ’ s rep ort is esse ntially unsubs t antiated becaus e i t is b ased
on data

— the soil s amp le s, field notes, and field logs

— tha t are unavailable . Wi th o ut th is data , TJFA explain s , it cannot verify the re liabili ty of S n y der ’s co n clusions. M o re specific all y , T JFA

a r gues it can not verify th a t Snyder accurate ly c har acteri zed the s amples or the dr i lling logs. Snyder d id not rely ent i re ly on his observati ons of t he sa mples to prepare the geology report ; h e
al so revi ewe d re c ords o f t w o prelim inary drillin gs on the site, geo logica l literature regard ing the

area, and laborator y analy se s of the samples

. TJ FA does not dispute that this da t a supports Snyder ’s c onclusio ns but contend s that the t rue data “ underlying ” Snyder ’ s co nc l usions ar e the
soil samples , field no tes, and field logs . Assuming that is true, we neve rthe less disa gree that observing the orig inal soi l samples and reviewing th e field logs is the on ly way t o determine if Snyder ’s co nclus ions are rel iabl e. TJF A a sk ed for pe r mi s sion to take soil samples s o th at it
could “ obtain the type of data n ecessary to te st ” Snyde r ’ s opinio ns
. TJFA ’ s exp e rt examined the samples and prepared a report, which the A LJs obse rv ed “ lends cr edence to an d gener ally
supports the bas ic fi n d i ngs an d co nclusions set forth i n t he Geol ogy Report

. ” Based on the
record befo re us, w e conc lude that the ALJs did not abuse th eir discretion by overru ling TJFA ’ s

m otion to strike the r eport.15 N ex t, TJFA ar gu es that t hey were e ntitled to a s poliati on pr e s u mption

. T he AL Js
indicated that th ey den ied TJFA ’s renew ed request for a spoliation presumpt ion be cau se allowing T JFA to perfor m its own geological examin ation of t he site was s ufficien t to rem ed y the prejud ic e resultin g from the spol iation . TJFA ar gu e s that a c ces s to the site “was not a

re medy ” because TJFA h ad a right to access the s it e under the d i sco very rules

. Althoug h TJFA sought and ob tained p ermissi on to c o nduct its own subs urf ace inve st iga tion duri ng d iscovery ,

s ee Tex. R. Civ. P. 19 6.7 (R equ es t o r Mo ti o n f or Entry U p o n Property) 4 , the purpose of a spol iation remedy is “ to r estore the p ar tie s t o a rough approx imation of their positions if all
evidence were available , ” s ee Br ook shire Br os

. , 43 8 S.W.3 d at 21

. TJ FA originally sought

access to th e s i t e so that it could mount the same c hall enge s to Snyder ’ s conclusions it would
have do ne if the origi nal samples were available

. U nder these circumstances, t h e A L J s could
ha ve reasonab ly concl ud ed that thei r al lowing T JFA access to the sit e to conduct its own subsurface investigation restor e d t he p a rties to a ro ugh a pproximation of the ir posi tio ns if the

sam ples, log s, and notes had been re tained. We c o nclude the A LJs di d not abuse t h e ir discr et ion by den yi ng TJFA ’ s re q uest for a spoliatio n presumption. See id. a t 27

.

Fi n di ng s and C o ncl usi on s Next, TJFA challenges the C ommissio n ’ s r ejection of several o f the ALJs ’ proposed findi ngs an d conclusions . In its final o r de r, t he Commissi on d eleted t hr ee proposed
find ings of fact and one proposed conclusion of law that we r e in clu de d i n the PFD

. T JFA argues

4 Discovery in co ntes t ed cas e s involvi n g th e C o mmission is “ conduct ed ac cording to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e, unle ss commission rules provid e or th e j udge orders other wise. ” S

ee 30 Tex. A dmi n. C ode § 80.151 (a) ( Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, Di sco ve ry Genera l ly ).16 that in doing so the C o mmission violat ed stat utory res trictions on its authority to a lte r
administra t ive findings an d co nclusions

. S ee Te x. Healt h & Safe t y Cod e § 361.0832 (c)

– (d).
The disput ed findings her e r eg a r d the a c ces s road that 130 EP pl ans t o build from the highway to the Facility ’ s entra n ce and the sc reening berm it plans for the Facility ’ s norther n
border. 5 T he permit require s 13 0 EP to co nstru ct and maintain the road and the berm b u t d oes

not in clu de e i ther i m pro vem ent wit hin the per mit b oundary, defined in the Commis sion ’ s order

as “ [t] h e land on which the Facility wi ll be constructe d and operat ed

. ” 6 I n se v eral findi ngs of
fact and con cl usions of la w, t h e ALJ s conc luded that the pe rmi t bounda r y sh ou ld be exp a nde d to
include the acce ss r oad a nd the screening berm t o p reserve the C o mmissio n ’ s abili ty to enforce all the perm it ’ s requirement s
. Relevant f indings of f act include :

69. 1 30EP ha s not ju stifie d w hy the en tire lengt h of the ac cess ro ad is not i nc l ud ed w i thi n the Permit Bound ary , ev en though it is a facilit y autho rized by the per mit.
7 0. The entire length of the access road from US 18 3 s hould be incl ude d within the Permit Bo undary.
3 9 4. The entir e s creening berm 130EP will co nst ruct on t he nort he rn bo unda r y o f the Facility should be included within the Permi t B ound ary.
Proposed c onclu sion of l aw 21 states: “ The entire length of the access road should be i ncluded
with in the Pe rmi t Bou n dary to ensu re c onsiste n cy with and enforceabi lity of the p er mi t ’ s

re quir emen ts. ” T he Commission dele ted these proposed findings and conclu sions in its f inal

5 130 EP ’ s a p plicati on st ates it plan s to construc t a “ ve getated screening berm ” to l imit the vi sibility of the Facility

.
6 N o par ty has cited us to a uniform definition of “ permit boun dary ” in a statute or the Commission ’ s rules.17 orde r, e xplai n ing tha t including the screening berm and ac cess roa d in the permit is un n ecessar y

to ensure t h e Commissio n ’ s authority to enfor c e the pe rmit ’ s re qu ir ement s per t ain ing to
those stru ctu r e s
. A ppellees arg ue that the three deleted finding s of fact a re substantive ly
conclusion s of law. See Montgomery Indep. Sc h . Dist. v. Dav is , 34 S.W.3 d 5 5 9, 566 (Tex. 2 000) (noti ng t hat “ t he label att ached, ‘ fin ding o f fa ct ’ or ‘ co n clusion of law, ’ is not determinative ” and
courts may t reat ruling as fi ndin g of fact or co nclusion of law accor d ing to its substance ); AEP
Tex. Co m

. & Indu s. Reta il Lt d . P ’ sh ip v. Public Ut il. Comm ’ n o f Tex. , 4 36 S.W.3d 890 , 915 n
. 10 3 (T ex. Ap p
. — A ustin 2 014, no pet.) (same)

. A conclusion of law is “ [a] statement that

expresses a legal d uty or result [.] ” Legal Conclusion , Black ’ s Law Dicti onary (11 t h ed. 2019)

. Propose d f in din g 69 states t he ALJs ’ det ermination that 130 EP fa il ed to meet a le gal s tandard , and findings 70 an d 39 4 state the legal consequences of that d etermination

. We the refore agree
that the three om itt ed f indings are substantively conclusions of law. S ee S mit h v. H ouston Chem.
Servs. , Inc. , 872 S.W. 2d 252 , 2 71 (Tex . App

. — Aus tin 1 994, writ dism’d) ( concludi ng , in case
under Act, that challenged finding was “ pate ntly a co nclusion of law for it de cl ares a legal effect

or cons equence ” )

. The Commission “ m ay overt urn a conclus io n of law in a conteste d case on l y on the gr ounds tha t the conclusion was clearly err oneo us in lig ht of precedent and applicable rules. ”
Tex . H ealth & Safety Code § 361.083 2 (d)

. A conclusion of law “ is c onsider e d clearly erroneous

w hen the r ev i ewing body ‘ is left wit h the definite and f i rm con vi c t ion that a mist ake h as been
committed. ’ ” Hun ter Indus. F aciliti es, Inc. v. Tex as Nat. Res. Conse rvat ion C omm ’ n , 910 S.W.2d 96, 104 (Tex. Ap p.

— A ustin 199 5, writ d enied) (quoting United State s v. Uni te d
S

tates Gyps um Co. , 3 33 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) )

. This rule “ is gene r ally considered to give the18 r evie wing body broade r authority than is allowed under a ‘ subs t anti al evidence ’ review b ecause

a dec ision may be overt urned desp i te its theoretical re asonab le n es s. ” Id. (ci ting Watson v. Gulf
Stevedore Co rp. , 4 0 0 F.2d 649 , 653 (5th Cir. 1968) ( expl aining t hat “findin gs m ay be c learly erroneous without being unr eason able so as to be upset under the sub sta ntial

- evid ence rule ”) )

. We review the Commission ’ s decis ion that a conc lusion of la w is clearly erroneo us under
S ection 2001.1 74 ( 2) o f th e Governm e nt C o de

. Se e id. at 105 ; see also Tex. Gov ’ t Co de § 20 01.174 ( 2) (pro viding that reviewing cou rt will rev erse and remand a gency fi ndi ng s or

con clusions that are “ in vio la tion of a constitut ion a l or statutory prov ision ” or “ in ex cess of t he

ag en cy ’ s statut o ry a u tho r i ty ” )

. In the final order, t h e Commissi on expl ained tha t:

T exas W ater Co de § 7.002 gives the Commission the authority to enfo r ce provisions of the Tex as Wa ter C ode, Texas Health and Safety Code, and any rul es a dopted under th ose pro vi si ons. Texa s Wat e r C o de § 7.0 02 also a uthorizes t he Commission to compel com plian ce wit h the r ules, orders, permits, and other decisions of the Com m ission. That statutor y a uthor ity i s not limi ted to the
c onfines of a permit boun dary

. TJFA argues tha t t h e C ommission ’s ex p lan a tio n doe s not per mit a “def i nite and firm conclusion ”

t hat “ a mistake h a [d] been committed. ” S e e Hunter Indus. , 910 S.W.2d at 104

. While
acknowled ging tha t the Commis sion has statutor y au thorit y to enf orce pe rmi t s, T JFA argu e s
that th e Commissi on may no t en force the permit ’ s r equirements outside the permit b ou nda ry.
We disagre e.
TJFA finds t h is limitation in the rules statin g th at a permit become s bindin g

— and
i ts term subj ect to enfor cement

— by vir tue of the permitt ee ’s acc e pt ance
. S ee 3 0 Tex . Admin.
C od e § § 305. 12 4 (2021) (Tex. Com m ’n on Env ’t Quality , Ac cepta n ce of Permit, Effe ct) ( “ Acceptance o f the permit by the person to whom it is iss ued con stitut es an acknowl e dgment19 and agreemen t that suc h pers on will comply with all th e terms and condi tions emb o di e d in the

pe rmit, and the rule s and other orde rs of t he co m mission. ”) , .125 (1 ) (Tex. Com m ’n on Env ’t Quality , Standard Permi t Conditions ) ( “T he pe rmitte e has a d uty to compl y with all p ermit
conditions

. Failure to c omply wi t h any per m it condit ion is a v i ol ation of the permit and statutes
under which it was issue d and is grounds for enforcement actio n, for per mit a mendment,

rev o cation or suspe nsion, or for denial of a permit renewal appl ication or an ap plication for a permit f o r anothe r facility

. ”). W e i nte rpret administr ative rules “ in the same manner a s st atute s , ” Rodriguez v. Serv ice Lloyds Ins. , 997 S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. 19 9 9) , m eaning t hat we s eek t o g ive
eff ect to the a gency ’s inte nt by “ fol lowing the plain l a ngua ge of th e r ule , ” O n cor Elec. Delive ry
C

o. v. Pub lic Util. Comm ’ n of Tex. , 406 S. W.3d 253, 2 70 (T ex. App.

— Austin 2013, no pet.)

. The plain lang uage of these rules ref lect s th a t permit conditio ns are enforceable against the permitte e , but t he rules do not lim it the ge ographic sc ope of t he C o mmis sion ’ s e nf orcement authority

. 7 Such a limitation mu st ar ise, i f at all, from the terms of a permit. W e see n othing in
130 EP ’s p ermit st ating t hat its require ment s apply only within the permit bound ary. To the

contra ry, the p er mit sta t es on th e firs t pa g e that it is “ granted subject to th e r ules and o rde rs of
th e Commission and laws of the State of Texas

. ” Prec ed ent also f a vors th e Comm ission ’ s
decisio n : the rec ord incl udes evidenc e th at the Commis sion has granted pe rmits to se veral o t her
facil ities w it h access r oads or ancillary st ructures , incl udi ng sc reeni ng berm s , outside t h e permit
bou ndaries

. B ased on the Commission ’ s rules and p r evious p recedent , we c onclude the
Commission d id not err by com ing to a “ definite and firm co nvictio n ” that th e ALJ s we r e
mistaken. Se e Hunter Indu s. , 910 S. W.2d at 10 4

. We o verrule TJFA ’ s thir d issue.

7 As T JF A puts it elsew here in i t s openi ng brie f, “ a permit is issued in perso nam , that is, to a specific pe rson or ent ity ” and is enforceable against that person or entity

.20 Dr ai nage R e port a nd Flood Protection
N e xt, TJFA arg u es that the Comm ission acted arbit rarily and c apriciously by

gr ant ing the permit e ven thou g h 13 0 EP ’ s applicat ion o mi tt e d crucial infor mation requir ed by the
Commi ssion ’ s rules

. See Rodriguez , 997 S.W.2d at 255 ( “ If the Commission does not f o llow
the cle a r, unamb iguous l anguag e of its own regulation, we reverse it s a ction as arbitrary
and capr i ci ous. ” ). First, TJ FA ar gu es that the su rface

- wate r - drainage analysis in 130 EP ’ s

a

pp lication is insufficient to show that “ existing drainage patterns w ill not be adverse l y alte red ” by co nstructing t he F ac ility

. See 3 0 Tex. Adm in. Code § 330.63 (c) (1)(C)

. The a n al ysis mu s t analy ze c hang es i n peak flow, v elocities , an d volum es to show that construction of the Facility
will not “ adv ersely alter[] ” drainag e patterns in the ev e n t of a 2 5

- year storm

. T he Commission
has issued guidan ce provid ing that the an al y si s shoul d address condit io ns at the “ pe rmit boundary. ” See TCEQ W a ste Permits D ivisio n, Surface Water Drainage and Erosional Stability
Guidelines for a Municipal Solid Wast e Landfi ll , at 3 (RG

- 417, May 2018 ) , a vailable at
h ttps ://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/comm_exec/pubs/r g/rg

- 417.pdf , (last visited July 20 , 2021 ). TJFA argues that 1 30 E P ’ s analysis improperly consid ered land outside th e permit
bo undary w ith resp e ct to cha n ges at c o mparison p o ints 7 and 8

. 130 EP ’ s analys is states that
while “ the 25

- year storm runoff volum e wi ll increase at CP7 and decrease at CP 8 (a net increa s e
of 12.8 acre feet , appro ximately 12.5%), th ese changes will be insig nificant compa red to t h e
recei vi n g body, S CS Re ser vo ir Site 21. ” A lthough th is reservoir is outside th e permit boundary
in norma l co nditions, t he record includes undisput e d evidence th at the reservoir expa nds into the permit bounda ry in the event of a 25

- year s torm , and, as su ch, 1 3 0 EP ’ s an a lysis pro perly

co ns id ered the rese rvoir when determ ining changes in drai nage patterns at th e pe rmit boundary.21 Se cond , TJFA argues that 130 EP ’ s a pplication omits cru cial information

regar ding flood pr otection. I f a propo sed landfill s i te is w i th in the 100

- y ear flo od plain, th e applicant mus t “ provi de informati on detailing the specific floodin g le vels and other events ( e.g. , design hurricane projec t ed by Corps of Engi neers) that impact the flo od protection of the
faci li ty. ” 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 3 3 0. 63 ( c) (2 ) (C)

. T J F A argues t hat the Commiss i on fail ed to
consid e r the possibi lity of flooding fr o m h urricanes and cites evi dence that Governor Abb ot t
in c luded Caldwell Coun ty i n his d isaster declara tion regardin g Hurricane Ha rvey. However,
130 E P ’ s flo o d r epo rt i n cluded ex tensive in formation regar d in g the i mpact of s torms , including hurricanes, and T JFA does not explain what additional information is mis sing. 8 See Heritage on San Gabriel Homeowners Ass ’ n v. Tex as Comm ’ n on Env ’ t Quality , 393 S. W. 3d 41 7 , 4 24 ( Tex. App.

— Au st in 2012, p et. denied) (exp laining that agency orders are presumptively valid a nd t hat

contestant “ bear [s] the burden of proving o ther w ise ” ). Having decide d that the surface water drainage analysis and floo d protection
informati on in 13 0 E P ’ s ap plicat ion co mpli ed wit h ap plicable rul es, we c onclude that th e
Commission did no t act arbi trar y or capriciously by granting the permit.

Land

- Use D etermin ati on Finally , TJFA challenges the Commission ’ s determ ination th at the Facility is

com patible w it h su r rou ndi ng la n d

- use , par t icularly the Sit e 21 Rese rvo ir and D a m
. See 30 Tex.

8 TJ FA also argues t hat 1 30 EP w as r equired to include information re garding th e ma ximum flo od the S ite 2 1 Dam co ul d with st an d a nd w hether t he changes in draina ge patterns re sult ing f rom the Facility would adv ersely affect the dam. See 30 Tex. Admi n. Cod e § § 2 99. 2 (47) (defini ng prob able max imum flood) , . 15 (a) (1 )(A) ( setting minimum s tan dards for percent a ge o f prob ab le maxim um fl oo d dam s must m e et )

. 130 EP was n ot required to include this information because R ule 299 concerns the design of dams rath er t ha n la ndfills. See id. § 299.1 5 (a) (1)( A)

.22 Admin. Code § 3 30.6 1 (h) ( providing that Commission will determine wheth er “ use of any land
f or a municipal solid waste facility [will] no t adv ersely im pact human h e alth or
the env ir onment ”).
Rule 3 30 “ pr ovid es a fram e work for [ the Comm ission ’ s] a na lysis of l and

- use

com pati bility ” but “ ne ither the [A] ct nor the regulation [] define [s] compatibil ity or prov ide [s]

a sp ecific standar d by which to d e termine compatibility [.] ” N o rtheast N e ighbor s C oa l

. , 201 3 WL 1315 078, at *9

. The Commission balances all relevant fac tors , and its determinatio n is
review ed for substantia l eviden ce. See Tex . Gov ’ t Cod e § 2001.174 (2) ( e) ; see also N ortheast Neighbors Co al. , 2013 WL 1315078, at *9

. “Substant ial e vide nce ” review wit hin the m eaning
of S ubsection 2001.174(2) (e) , is essentiall y “ a rational

- basi s test to determine, as a matter of law,
whether an agency ’s order find s rea sonable support in the record. ” Jen kins , 537 S

. W.3d at 149

. Under t his defe re ntial s tanda rd, we pres u me that t he Commiss io n ’ s order is supported by
substantial e vidence, and the burden is on TJFA to sh ow otherwise

. S ee id. “ Alth ough

s ubstantial ev i dence is more than a mere scintilla, the evidence i n the record actually may
prep on derate again st t he deci s ion of th e agency a nd nonetheless amount to substantial evi d ence
. ”
Pers o nal Care Prod s

. , Inc. v. Smith , 578 S .W.3d 262, 266 (Tex . Ap p.

— Austin 201 9, no pet.) ( citing Tex as Health Faciliti es Comm ’ n v. Charter Med

. - Dal l

. , In c. , 665 S. W.2d 44 6, 45 2 (T ex. 1 984 ) ).
Rul e 330 prov i d es that to assist the Commission in determining land

- use compatibility , t he applicant must “ provide informat ion regarding the li kely impacts of the fac ility on cities, communities , groups o f property o wners, o r in divid ua l s by a nal yzing t he comp atibility
of land use, zoning i n the vicinity, c ommunity growth p att erns, and other f actors associ ated with the public i nterest. ” 30 Tex . A dmin. Code § 330.61 (h)

. TJFA argues that t he Commi ssion erre d23 by ign orin g 130 EP ’ s f ailur e to pr ov ide info rm ation r egarding t he F acility ’ s effec t on the S ite 21
Dam

. TJFA mad e es sent ially the sam e argu ment before the ALJ s
. In rejecti ng that argument,
th e A LJs explained :

130 EP thoroughly addressed poten tial adver se impacts o f the Fa cili ty on t h e Si t e 21 Re serv oi r and Dam in the con text of its compliance wit h othe r TC EQ rules pert a ini ng to surface water d rain age and floodplains. As pr eviously s t ated in t his PFD, the ALJs conclude that the Application met the requir ements in t he TCEQ' s ru les reg ar din g surf ace wa t er drainage and fl oodp lains, and that the prepon deranc e of the evidenc e in dicates that developme nt a nd operation of the Fac ili ty will no t adversel y impact or impair the District ’ s easement rights o r its opera tion of the Site 21 Dam and Re se rvo i r
.

T he Comm is sion invit es us to uphold that approach her e , but TJFA argues that 1 30 E P cannot satisfy Rule 330.61(h) “by proxy

. ” In oth e r words, TJF A argues that information submitted to satisfy other requir ements cannot also sat isfy Rul e 330 .61(h ). N ot hi ng in that rul e prevents the
Commission from conside ring information submit ted i n ot her parts of an applic ation if it i s
relevan t to det ermin ing la nd

- use compatibility

. TJF A ’ s main complaint is that the rec or d does

not support t he C o mmi ss ion ’ s dete rmina ti on th at th e changes in drain age patte rn s caused by the Facility will not adverse ly i mpac t the Site 21 R eservoir and D am
. H o wever, o ne o f 13 0 EP ’ s experts, Steven Odil, P.E., testified that he consulted the Com mission ’ s Dam Safet y Pr ogra m to
d etermi ne if t he in cre as e in volume would adversely impact the structure

. The Program
informe d hi m tha t the increase in volu me represents 1 % of the r eservoi r ’ s capacity du ring a
25

- year - storm event, an “ insignificant ” in crease. The appli cati on (w hic h the AL J s a dmi tt e d i nto
evi d ence) also suppor t s this conclusion :
[ T ] he peak storage volume of the SCS Rese rvoir Site 2 1 and pe ak inflow to the reservoir from Dry C re ek exceed 2,3 00 ac

- ft and 3,800 CFS, respectively, during t he 25

- year storm e vent

. Con si dering th e pr opo se d ne t chang e s w ithin the wate r body of less than 4% dec rease in peak disch a rge ra te s and le ss than 1% increase24 in volume, the changes at CP7 and CP 8 w ill not resul t in adverse alterations of existing drainage patterns.

TJ FA doe s n ot add re ss Odi l ’s tes tim on y or contes t th e statements i n 1 30 EP ’s applicati on but argues that further infor ma ti on is necessary becaus e the Site 21 Dam is “high haz ard , ” m ean ing
that significant loss of li fe and property would result f rom a breach

. See 30 Tex. A dm in. Co de § 29 9. 1 4 ( 3 ) ( 2021) ( T ex. Com m ’n on Env ’t Qua lity , H azard C lassification Crite ria )

. T h e
Co mmis sion f ound that the Site 21 Dam currently does not m eet th e de sign crit eria applicable to high

- hazard dams and that a rehab ilitati on plan h as bee n pr op os ed

. A nd , n ot hi ng in the recor d
reflects th a t t he Dam Safety Program ’ s representation is not credib le

. W e conclude that the
Commissi on ’ s finding that the Facility is compatible with the Site 21 Da m and Reservoir is reasonably supported by the reco rd

. We overru le TJFA ’ s fi nal is sue.

C O NCL U SION
W e aff i rm the district court ’ s jud gment.

___ __ ____________ _

___ _____________________ E d ward Sm it h , Justic e
B ef o r e Jus tices Goodwi n, T r iana, and S m ith
Affirmed
Fi led: July 23, 2021