T EX . PE NAL C ODE §19. 03 (a ); T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art . 3 7. 07 1. Un le ss o the rw ise 1 indicated, a ll future re fer ence s to articles re fer to the Code of Criminal Procedur e. Art. 37.071, §2(h)

. 2 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

NO. AP -75,010 TR AC Y B EA TTY , A ppe lla nt

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS

ON DI RE CT AP P EA L F RO M CAUSE NO. 241-0978-04 IN THE 241ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SM ITH CO UN TY

P E R C UR I AM . J OHNS ON , J. , f i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o pi ni on i n w hi c h P RI CE and H OL C OM B , J J ., jo in e d . K EASLE R , J. , not part i ci pat i ng. Appellant wa s convicted of ca pital murder a

nd sentenc ed to death f

o r ki lling his mother, Caro ly n Cl ic k, in t

he c ours e of

c omm itt ing burg lary

of a ha bit a tio n. Di re c t a

pp e a l to thi s Co ur

t is 1 automatic. Appellant raises twenty -four points of error. Finding no reve rsible er ror, we aff

irm the 2BEATT Y — 2

conviction and se ntence

.

I. SUF F IC IEN CYOF THE E VI DE NC E - UN DE RL YI NG OF F EN SE I n point of err or t wo, appellant claims that the evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to show that he committed the underly ing offe nse of burg lary

of a ha bitation. He ar g ues that the e vidence does

no t sh owthat he e nte re d Cl ic k’ s h ome wi tho ut he r c on se nt or that he ha d re qu isi te int e nt to c omm it burg lary at the time he enter ed her home. I n point of err or four , appellant c laims that the evidenc e is f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt f or the same re a so ns .

A. Evidence at Trial Appellant and Click ha d

a v o la tile and combative r elationship. Appellant moved into Click’s ho us e in e arl y Oct ob er 200 3. Al tho ug h Cl ic k to ld h e r n e xt-d oo r n e ig hb or and c los e fr ie nd , B e tty McCarty , that appellant ha d assaulted he r seve ral times in the past, Click said that she was e x cited about appe llant’s arr ival. Click’s excitement, how ever , vanished shortly afte r appe llant moved in. M cC arty testified that Click told her that she a sked appe llant to leave sometime in Oc tober a nd a second time on November 25, 2003—two day s befor e Tha nksg iving a

nd the last day

Click was see n alive. Ar ound 4:00 p.m. on November 25th, Click went to Mc Carty ’s house. Click was “stre ssed

ou t and cry in g. ” Clic k to ld M c Cart y that sh e wa s unh a

pp y a bo ut t he wa y thi ng s w e re g oin g wi th

a pp e lla nt a nd that sh e ha d a sk e d a

pp e lla nt t o le ave : [P rosec utor:] W hat did [C lick] t ell y ou? [McCarty :] That she had asked him to leave that day , and that – she sa id, “I put up with all I ’m g oing to put up with, and I had asked him to leave ,” and she was upset about it. And that’s the last time Isaw he r. [P rosec utor:] Did s he tell y ou what time that da y she had told [appellant] to l eave ?BEATT Y — 3

[McCarty :] No, sir. Although Mc Carty

initially testified that Click said that she “a sked” a ppellant to lea v e, she later clar ified that Click said, “I told [ appellant] to leave toda y .” McCar

ty did not know exactly

when the

conver sation with appellant had oc curr ed that day or whe n appellant wa s supposed to leave : [Defense counsel:] Did [ Click] say specific ally

when . . . she had that conve rsation w i t h [ a p p e l l an t ] o r

w h e nh e w a s s u

p p o s e d t o l e a v e b y? [McCarty :] No, sir. I

saw he r at 4:00, and I didn’t know any thing a bout it unti l that tim e . So I

do n’ t kn owwh a t ti me sh e tol d h im. Appellant’s c ousin, St ace y Killough, testified that appellant ar rived at her house la

te r th a t da y be tw e e n 5 :00 and

5:3 0 p .m. dr ivi ng Clic k’ s car. Ki llo ugh tes tif ie d tha t the dr ive fr om C lic k’ s h ou se to h e r h o u s e ta

k e s a p p r o xim a te ly f

o rty

- f iv e mi n u te s . A p p e ll an t s me ll e d o f a lc o h o l b u t w as not intox icated. N oting Click’s a b s en ce, K illough bec ame suspicious bec ause Click wa s “ver y protec tive” of he r ca

r and ne ver le t any one else drive it

. I n fac t, Killough ha d previously seen Click

re fu se to l e t a

pp e lla nt d ri ve the c ar. Whe n K ill ou g h a sk e d a pp e lla nt wh e re Clic k wa s, a

pp e lla nt t old he r t hat Clic k w a s o ut o f t ow n w itha fr ie nd and wo uld no t be ba c k f

or a fe w w e e ks . B e c a

us e Killough wa s busy , appellant stay ed at Killoug h’s house for only five to ten minutes. L ieanna Wil kerson testified that she l i v ed ac ross the roa d from Click and that they had become close fr iends. Click told W ilkerson that appe llant had assaulted h er on sever al occ asions i n t h e p as t . Once appellant ha d “beaten her so sever ely

that he had le ft her f

or dea d.” Click was

never theless excited th at ap p el l an t was c oming to live with her and hoped that she and a ppellant could mend their relationship. After appellant moved in w ith Click, Wil kerson hired him to do odd jobs around her house beca use he was unemploy ed. The two beca me frie nds, and Wilkerson ref err edBEATT Y — 4

to appellant as “ Trey .” Appe llant went to her hous e wh en he and Click would a rg ue, which w as daily . Towar d the end of October and the first part of N ovember , appellant house -sat for Wil kerson while she wa s out of town for se vera l day s. Wi lkerson extended the of fer to appellant bec ause she

wa s c on c e rn e d a

bo ut a pp e lla nt a nd Clic k f ig hti ng , a nd sh e tho ug ht it wou ld g ive the m an o pp or tun ity to separate from e ach othe r. When Wil kerson r eturne d home, appellant’ s suitcase was sitti ng in the living room. Appe llant told W ilkerson that Click had pac ked his things a nd broug ht t h em over. Wilk e rs on

un de rs too d th is t o me an th a t Cli c k ha d pa c ke d a pp e lla nt’ s su itc a se in a

n e ff or t to kic k h im

ou t. A pp e lla nt, ho we ve r, re tur

ne d to Clic k’ s h ou se and

c on tin ue d to liv e wi th h e r. Ac c or din g to Wil kerson, a

ppellant and Click foug ht daily in November

. Wil kerson de scribed a conver sation that she had with appellant in the middle of Nove mber in which he e x presse d his ang er w ith Click. Appellant told W ilkerson about missing a job interview wit h an el ec t ri c company that he had be en ver

y excited about. Click refuse d to drive him to the interview, saying that “she just didn’t fee l like it.” Wil kerson knew that appellant could not drive himself beca

use Click ref

used to let appellant, who did not have a driver’ s license, bor

row he r ca

r. Around the same time, appellant told Wilkerson that he thoug ht about harming Click: [W ilkerson:] I know [appellant] had said they wer e underpinning he r house, a nd he had g otten upset

. . . . And they had g otten into a hug e fig ht, and she wa s y elling at him, and h e just made a

n offha nd comment, “I

can’ t believe she handed me that hamme r. ” He sa id, “ B e c a us e a ll I c ou ld thi nk a

bo ut wa s hittin g he r in the he a d w ith it.” And I said, “Tre y ,” and he goes, “Well, I couldn’t do it.” He sa id, “I f I shoved her unde r there , she would have just started stinking.” [P rosec utor:] S he hande d it – she being Caroly n Click, handed him a hammer. He thought a bout hitti ng her with it, rolling her underne ath the house, but she would start to stink? [ W i l k er s o n : ] R i gh t

. An d Ij u s tt h o u gh th e w as j o k i n g.BEATT Y — 5

[Pro se c uto r: ] Did

he e ve r m a ke any

re fe re nc e s to hurt inghe r, to c ho kin g he r, to hitting her ? [Wilk e r s o n : ] S e v e r a l t i m e s h e h a d s a i d h e j u s t w an t e d t o s h u t h e r u p , t h a the jus t wa nte d to c ho ke he r a

nd shut h e r u

p, that – t he y g ot i nto ho rr ibl e fi g hts

. Wil kerson testified that, on November 25th, appellant ate spag hetti at her house around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. and st ay ed at her house until 10:00 p.m., when he we nt home. The ne x t day , appellant g ave Wilkerson a tur

key . He told Wilkerson that he had boug ht it for Thanksg iving, but that Cli ck ha d d e c ide d to g o o ut o f t ow n w itha man n a me d “ Junio r, ” so the y wo uld no t ne e d it

. Ap pe lla nt t old va ri ou s p e op le mul tip le sto ri es abo ut ho w h is m oth e r d ie d. Ap pe lla nt f ir st claimed to law e nforc ement off icials that he c ame home one day and discove red t h at J unior had killed his mot her. In response to this di scover y , he stabbe d J unior, disposed of his body in a lake, and burie d his mother in the backyard. A ppellant eve n took office rs t o a couple of diffe rent locations wher e he c laimed to ha

ve submerg ed J unior’s body . Appellant told them that he sliced Junior’s body open so that it would fill with lake water and s i n k. I n a stateme nt three da y s later, a

ppellant

re ite rate d the sto ry inv olv ing Junio r. B ut fo ur da y s af te r that, a pp e lla nt t old de te c tiv e s th a t he “ re a lly didn’t mean to” kill his mother: he “came in drunk,” she “starte d bitching” at him, he choke d her, she fe ll to the floor, and he did not re alize that she was de ad until the next day

. Appellant also told his cousin, J ohn Clary , that he had “killed the bitch.” He told Clary that he “ ha d g on e int o th e ho us e , a nd the re ha d b e e n a

n a rgume nt, and

[Clic k] ha d pull e d a g un on him , so he we nt to choke her .” When Clary told appellant that he ne eded to turn himself in or g o back ho me , a pp e lla nt i ne xplic a

bly tol d Cl ary

that he c ou ld n ot g o b a c k th e re be c a us e his mot

he r “ wo uld have the cops looking for him.”BEATT Y — 6

Appellant also told diffe ring stories about his mother ’s death to a cquaintanc es with whom h e s p en tt i m e d o i n g dru gs , u s i n g C l i ck ’s cr ed i t an d d eb i tca rd s , an d d i s p o s i n g o f C l i ck ’s b el o n gi n gs in the wee ks after

her de ath. He initially

told these acqua intances that his “aunt” had died a nd left him he r p ro pe rt

y . H e la te r t old

the m “ a fr ie nd ” kil le d h is m ot her and that he kil le d th e fr ie nd

to

cover it up. He also said that he had killed “his mother’s boy friend” afte r discover ing that he had kil le d Cl ic k a

nd that he buri e d b oth

bo die s in the wo od s. Ap pe lla nt g a ve dif

fe ri ng sto ri e s to W ilk e rs on a s w e ll. F ir st, he tol d h e r t hat he c a me ho me to find Click dead. Juni or killed Click and attac k ed appellant, so a ppellant killed him. He then descr ibed in g reat detail how he disposed of J unior’s body

by submerg ing it in the lake . He sa id that he burie d his mother. L ater , appellant told Wil kerson that he hired a fr iend to kill C lick and that he then killed the frie nd. Finally , appellant sa id that he killed Click on the night of N ovember 25th, when he returne d home from ha ving dinne r at Wilkerson’s house. Wilkerson testified: Th e ve ry la st thin g tha

t – i nc ide nt t

hat [a pp e lla nt] t old me wh a t ha

pp e ne d is he sa id when he left my

house, he w ent direc tly

acr oss the street to her

house and that she wa s w a iti ngfo r h im, and that w he n h e came thr ou g h th e do or , th e y ha d a ho rr ibl e fig ht . . . . Appellant told Wil kerson that he ended up c hoking Click until she fe ll to the floor. He said that he did no t r e a lize that sh e wa s d e a d unti l he wo ke up the ne xt m or nin g and sa

w he r l y ingin t

he same place on the floor. B. Stand ards of Review The lega l sufficie ncy of t he evide nce to support a conviction is review ed under the familiarBEATT Y — 7

44 3 U .S. 30 7 ( 19 79 ); se e als o G rif fin v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). 3 Id. at 319 (e mphasis in origina l). 4 Id. 5 Ho op e r v . S

tat e , 214 S.W .3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Car do v a v . S tat e , 698 6 S.W .2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Id. (c i t i n g Gu e v ara v . S

tat e , 152 S.W .3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). 7 Id. (c i t i n g J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 871 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). 8 De wbe rry

v . S tat e , 4 S.W. 3d

73 5, 74 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ap pe lla nt c la ims that so me 9 of the e vidence supporting his c onviction was hea rsay , to which his attorney should have objec ted. We also note that the rules of evidenc e provide , “Inadmissible hear say admitted without objection shall not be denied pr obative value mere ly beca use it is hearsa

y .” T EX . R. E V ID . 802. standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in J ac k so n v. Vi rg ini a . Under

the standar d 3

announce d in Jack

son , w e a sk “ wh e the r, a ft e r r e vie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond

a re asonable doubt.” This assessment af fords a ppr o p r ia te defe renc e “to the r esponsibility of the trier 4 of fact fai rl y

to r e so lve c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony , to we ig h th e e vid e nc e , a nd to d ra w r e a so na

ble infere nces f

rom basic to ultimate fa cts.” The e vidence is sufficient if the ac tions of the defe ndant 5 b ef o re , d u ri n g, an d af t er t h e c o m m i s s i o no f t h e o ff en s e “ s h o w a nu n d er s t an d i n g an d co m m o nd es i gn to do the prohib i t ed ac t

. ” “Circumstantial evide nce is a s probative a s direct e vidence ,” and the 6 7 cumulative for ce of

the incriminating evidenc e may be suff icient t o s u p p o rt a c onviction. I n a 8 sufficie ncy

revie w, we c onsider both admissible and inadmissible evidenc e. 9 When assessing a cla im of fac tu al i nsufficie ncy on direc t appea l, we conside r all of the

ev i d en ce i na n eu t ra l l i gh tan d as k wh et h er t h e ev i d en ce i n t ro d u ce d t o s u

p p o rt t h e v er d i ct , t h o u gh leg ally s u f

f ic ie n t, is n e v e rth e le s s s o w e a k o r s o a g a in s t th e g r e a t w e ig h t an d p r e p o n d e r an c e ofBEATT Y — 8

W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 10 Lan c on v . S

tat e , 253 S.W .3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 11 T EX . P EN A L C ODE §30.02(a) (1). 12 co n fl i ct i n g ev i d en ce as t o re n d er t h e j u ry ’s v er d i ct cl ea rl y

wr o n g an d

m an i fe s t l y

u n j u s t

. Al t h o u gh 10

we r eview the evidenc e in a n eu t ral lig ht, we still “aff ord almost complete de fer ence to a jury ’s decision whe n that decision is based upon a n evaluation of cre dibilit y .” 11 C. Ana lys is The indictment cha

rg ed appe llant with two alternative the ories of ca pital murder— committing murder

in the course of robber

y and committing murder in the c ourse of burg lary of a habitation. The jury

was g iven a specia l ve rdict form that require d it to specify which theor

y it based its conviction on. The jury found appe llant guilty

of committing c apital murder i n t h e co u rse of committing a bur g lary

of a ha bitation. The jury

was instructe d under the foll o wi n g theory of burg lary : A person c ommits the offe nse of bur g lary of a ha bitation if, without t he ef

fec tive consent of the ow ne r, he e nte rs a

ha bit a tio n w ithint e nt t o c omm it a fe lony , th e ft , o r a ssa

ult

. 12 1. Cons e nt Appellant ar g ues that the only evidenc e that he e ntere d the house without Click’s eff ective consent wa s Click’s statement to McCarty at 4:00 p.m. on the 25th that she told appellant to leave

. He points out that this was not the first time that Click asked him to leave a nd that their patter

n was that they would fig ht a

nd then make up. He also points out that the State pre sented no e vidence of

a fo rc e d e ntr

y . Spe c if ic a lly , he c on te nd s that the re wa s n o e vid e nc e that he e ve r s top pe d li vin g wi th Click or that she did not consent to his entry the day that she wa s murdere d. The State c ontends thatBEATT Y — 9

the evidenc e that Click told appellant to leave was suff icient to establish that appellant enter ed the ho us e wi tho ut h e r c on se nt. Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht m o s t fa v orable to the verdic t, we ca n infer f rom Click’s statements to McCarty

at 4:00 p.m., Cli ck’s pa st phy sical alter cations with appe lla n t , an d her appar ent state of mind at that time, that Click did not want appellant to live in her house any

more,

an d t h a ts h e w i t h dr e w h e r c o n s e n tf o r a p p e l l an tt o r e m a i ni nt h e h o u s e

— e f f e c t i v e i m m e d i a t e l y. Even thoug h McCarty

testified that Click told appellant to leave “that day” and “ today ,” viewingthe evidenc e in a lig ht m o s t favora ble to the ver dict, a rational jury could infer

that she expected appellant to lea

ve immediately

. To prove bur g lary , appellant must have enter ed Click’s house a fter Click withdrew her

consent. The ref

ore, the re must be some e videnc e to convince a rational fac tfinder be y ond a re asonable doubt that appellant lef t the house af

ter Click told him to l eave , and then re turned late r, entering with the i ntent to commit a felony , theft, or a ssault. Appellant’s own statements supply

such evide nce. Although a

ppellant offe red many conflicting acc ounts about his mother’s demise to frie nds and author ities, appellant’s self -incriminating acc ounts a

re consistent about one particula r fa ct—he

e n t e r e d t h e h o u s e b e f

o r e k i l l i n g C l i c k , an d

C l i c k w a s p r e s e n ti nt h e h o m e a tt h e t i m e o f h i s e n t r y. Fr om this evidence, a

rational trier

of fa ct could have concluded that Click told appellant to leave, that afte rwa

rds she we nt over to McCar ty ’s house, that she later re t u rn ed h o me at a time whe n appellant wa s no longe r pre sent, and that a ppellant subsequently

enter ed the house and killed her

. Moreove r, appe llant’s own words support the conc lusion that Cl ick did not chang e her mind at some point after

her 4:00 p.m. conve rsation with M cC arty and conse nt to appellant’s re turn.BEATT Y — 10

Ma nr iqu e v . S

tat e , 9 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d

6 4 0 , 6 4 9 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 9 ) (“ I n t en tan d k n o wl ed ge 13 are fac t questions for the jury , and ar e almost alway s proven throug h evidenc e of the circ umstances surrounding the cr ime.”). Appellant drove Click’s car on Thanksg iving and when he returne d, Wil kerson said, “Yo u k now how upset she’s g oing to be that y ou’re driving her car.” I n response , appellant state d, “Since she ’s kicking me out a

ny way , I rea lly don’t car e.” Also when further ing the char ade abo u t Click’s depar ture with Junior, a

ppellant told McCarty

that he expected Click to re turn home on De cembe r 17th and that Click expected him to vacate her house bef

ore she arr ived. Ba sed on the for eg oin g, the evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding that appellant e ntere d Click’s house without her c onsent. Additionally , when l o o k i n g at all of the

e vid e nc e in a

ne utr a l li g ht, it i s a lso fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w a

pp e lla nt’ s unl awfu l ent ry

int o Click’s house. 2. Inte nt W e c o n s tr

u e a p p e l l an t ’ s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t s h o w t h a t h e h a d “ the int e nt t o

c omm it a burg lary a t th e tim e of

e ntr y ” to be an a tta c k on the State ’s pr oo f t hat a pp e lla nt’ s e ntr y int o t h e home was “with the intent to commit a felony , theft, or a n assault.” The evidenc e shows that appellant did not have a job, a dr iver’s lice nse, or much mone y . Appellant wa s ang ry and fr ustrated wi th C lic k f

or no t a llo wi nghim

to u se he r c ar a

nd fo r r e fu sin g to t a ke him

pla c e s li ke job int e rv ie ws . Appellant told Wil kerson a bout having thoughts of killing or assa ulting Cli ck

. Fur

ther, a ppellant assaulted Click in the past, once so badly she wa s “lef

t fo r dead.” A rational jury could infer

that

a pp e lla nt w a s ang ry

a ft e r C lic k to ld h im t o g e t ou t and that he e nte re d Cl ic k’ s h ou se wi th i nte nt t o assault her

ag ain or kill her, or

at least take some of her

money or her posses s ions. Viewing the

13BEATT Y — 11

Lancon , 253 S.W .3d at 705. 14 Te al v . S

tat e , 230 S.W .3d 172, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 15 evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, we conc l u d e that a rational jury could have fo un d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t a

pp e lla nt p os se sse d the re qu isi te int e nt at th e tim e of e ntr y to est ab l i s h a burg lary . Fur ther, g iving due defe renc e to the jury ’s cr edibility deter minations, we

14 conclude that the evidenc e is also fa ctually sufficie nt in that reg ard. Points of error two and four are

overr uled. II. G UI LT- P HA SE ISS UE S A. Inadequ ate N otice I n point of err or three , appellant c ontends that the trial judg e er red by failing to su a s

po nte qu a shthe ind ic tme nt. He c la ims that the ind ic tme nt d id n ot p ro vid e him a de qu a te no tic e be c a

us e it failed to descr ibe the par ticular a ct or a cts reg ardingthe burg lary alleg ations. He a lso complains about the re -indictment, which a dded the theory that appellant killed Click in the course of committing robbe ry

and an “ almost unlim ited number of me ans.” So long as the indictment’s alleg ations are sufficie nt to identify the ac cused pe rson and the pe na l st a tut e c on ta ini ngthe of fe ns e a lle g e d, the n an y de fe c ts i n th e ind ic tme nt a re fo rf e ite d unle ss

ra ise d b e fo re tr ia l. Ap pe lla nt do e s no t c on te nd that he wa s un a ble to d e te rm ine the pe na l st a tut e 15 descr ibing the of

fense of which he was a ccuse d; there fore , he forfeited a ny complaint about lack of notice in the indictment by failing to raise the issue be fore trial. Point of error three is overrule d. B. Trial Ju dge’s Answ er t o the Jury Question I n point of err or five, a

ppellant claims that by g iving an incorre ct response to a critica l juryBEATT Y — 12

W oo le yv . S tat e , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 762, *21 (J une 25). 16 T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)( 1)(A)

. 17 question, the judg e hig hlighted and ex acerbated the fa ctual insuffic iency of the State’s c ase. Appellant spec ifically

complains about the j u d ge’ s answer to the following inquiry

from the jury reg ardingappellant’ s where abouts on Novembe r 25th: Be tty [McCarty ’s] testim ony

on the day

of the murde r Nov. 25, 2003. W e have [a] c o n f l i c tt o w h e t h e r

M r . B e a t t y w a s a th o m e t h a tw h o l e d ay. T h e p ar t i es an d t h e j u d ge d i s cu s s ed t h i s i n qu i ry an d re v i ew edt h e t ra n s cr i p t

. Ul t i m at el y , t h e j u d ge g ave the following response , to which both parties a ffirmatively stated they

had no objec tion: The Court w ould be unable to r esolve y our conflict as to whethe r [appellant] was at home the whole da

y by having any portion of the testimony of Be tty McCarty rea d ba c k to y ou

in C ourt

. Appellant now c ontends that the trial judg e’s ins t ru cti on was a misrepre sentation of the e vidence beca use a por tion of the court r eporte r’s re cord sho ws t h at M cC arty testified that she did not see appellant at any

time on November

25, 2003. F ir st, we ob se rv e that a tria l judg e ’s re sp on se to a j ur y inq uir y duri ngde lib e ratio ns , e ve n if

err oneous, has no be aringon a re viewing court’s suf ficienc y analy sis, le gal o r fa ctual, because a sufficie ncy

analy sis is based upon the elements of the offe nse as define d by the hy pothetically

corr ect jury char g e for

the ca se, and not upon a

ny instructions the jury

actua lly rec eived. Next, we observe 16 that the har

m appellant cla ims to have suffe red f lows not f rom the trial judg e’s instruction but from the fa ilure to rea d back te stimony that appellant view ed as important. B eca use appe llant did not object to the fa ilure to rea d back te stimony , his complaint w as fo rf ei t ed

. Fur

ther, to the e x tent 17 appellant c an be said to be complaining about the t rial j udg e’s actual instruction, and a ssuming thatBEATT Y — 13

W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 2008 Tex. Crim . App. L EXI S 692, *54 & *55 n.86 ( J une 11)( g ener al 18 statement of “no objection” to the jury char g e insufficient to e ffe ctuate waiver of jury char g e er ror, but waiver

of a spe cific a spect of the char g e is possible). Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 19 such an instruc tion were viewed as p ar t of the jury char g e, def

ense c ounsel’s statement of “no

o b j e c t i o n ” w i t h r e s p e c tt o t h a tp art i c u l ar i n s t r u c t i o nar g u a

b l y waived any

rig ht to complain on appea l. And eve n if defe nse counse l’s statement of “ no objection” did not amount to a wa iver,

18 the fa ilure to object mea

ns that a showing of “eg reg ious harm” would be required be fore appellant could obtai n a re medy

for the suppose d jury

char g e er ror on a ppeal. We see no e g reg ious harm

19 flowing from the trial judge ’s i nstruction, apar t from the forf

eited non-jury -cha

rg e error of failing to rea d back te stimony

. Witha ll that sa id, we ne ve rt he le ss c on c lud e that the tr ia l jud g e ’s re sp on se wa s n ot e rr on e ou s. Appellant’s supplied re cord r efe renc e to a p o rt ion of McCarty ’s testimony does not resolve any

c on fl ic t a bo ut w he the r h e wa s at ho me . Sh e sim ply did no t se e him

g o in or ou t: [P rosec utor:] Now, let me ask y ou, y ou indicated that a fter the 25th when y ou had thi s c on ve rs a tio n w ithMs. Clic k at a bo ut 4 :00 p. m. –

is that r ig ht, ma ’a

m? [McCarty :] Yes, sir. Q. That that’s the last time y ou saw or ta lked to her. A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay . Did y ou know wher e [appellant] was at that time? A. No, sir. Q

. H a d yo us e e nh i mo v e r

a tt h e h o u s e e ar l i e r

t h a td ay? A

. N o , s i r . I h a d

b e e ng o n e m o s to f

t h e d ay.BEATT Y — 14

Q

. D i d yo us e e h i m o v e r

a tt h a th o u s e an ym o r e t h a td ay? A. No, sir. The judg e made no misrepre sentations with respec t to the complained of te stimony . Point of error five is over

ruled. C. Handw riting Exem plars I n points of error

six , seven, and eig ht, appellant ra ises three issues relate d to handwriting exemplars that the trial judg e orde red him to provide. B e fo re tr ia l, t

he State fi le d a

mot ion to c omp e l a

pp e lla nt t o p ro vid e ha

nd wr iti nge xemp lars . Appellant objected, citing the Four th a nd Fifth Amendments to the United State s C o nstitut ion. When th e St a te ’ s h an dw r it in g e xp e rt, D e n is e Ja r r e tt , a tt e mp te d

to g e t t h e e xe mp la

r s , a p p ellant

re fu se d to g ive the m to he r. Th e State a sk e d th e tr ia l ju dg e a se c on d ti me to orde r a

pp e lla nt t o

su b m i ts a mp l e s . A p p e l l an to b j e c t e d , c i t i n g t h e F o u rt h , F i f t h , S i xth , E i g h t h , an d

F o u rte e nth Amendments to the United States Constituti on and Ar t i cl e I , Sections Ten, Thirtee n, Fifte en, and Ninetee n of the Te x as Constitut ion, as well as a ny other a pplicable c onstitut ional provision. The jud g e ov e rr

ule d a pp e lla nt’ s o bje c tio ns and

or de re d h im t o c omp ly wi th the or de r. Ap pe lla nt t old the judg e that he w ould not comply with the order. The St ate then a sked the judg e to hold appellant in contempt and to orde r appe llant to return to cour t to give the exemp lars. The judge then schedule d a conte mpt hearing

. Th e ne xt we e k, a t th e c on te mpt pr oc e e din g , a

pp e lla nt w a s g ive n a

no the r o pp or

tun ity to

co mp l y wi t h t h e o rd er , b u t h e re fu s ed

. Af t er fi n d i n g ap p el l an t gu i l t y o f v i o l at i n g t h e o rd er , t h e j u d ge imposed a $500 fine and si x months’ confine ment. The judge then informed appellant t hat he ha dBEATT Y — 15

the ri g ht t o c ouns e l to c ha lle ng e the or de r of c on te mpt and sanc tio ns via

ha be a s o r a pp e a l. T he Sta te then g ave notice of its intention to use appellant’s failure to comply with the orde r and the contempt finding at appe llant’s trial. Approxima te ly

tw o w e e k s late r , a f

te r a p p e ll an t s ti ll r e f

u s e d to c o mp ly

w it h th e o r d e r , the State urg ed the judg e to hold a sec ond contempt hea ring . The jud ge h eld t he conte mpt hearing immediately

and found B eatty in criminal contempt of court for a second time. The judge imposed a $500 fine and six months’ confineme nt in jail, which was orde red to ru n consecutively with the pr ior se nte nc e . Th e jud g e the n a pp oin te d c ouns e l f

or a pp e lla nt a g a in t o p ur su e an a

pp e a l or to f ile an application for a wr it of habea s corpus. At trial, over a

ppellant’s objec tion s , including his objec tions under the F ifth Amendment and Texas Constitution, Ar

ticle I , §10, the State was allowed to que stion Jarrett about a ppellant’s re fusal to provide exemplars in the fa ce of the judg e’s or der: Q. Ms. Jar

re tt, y ou ’r e awa

re that the re wa s a

c ourt or de r o rd e ri ngthe de fe nd ant t o g ive y ou a handw riting e x emplar? A. Ye s, Ia m. * * * Q. Did y ou, prior to today , have a n oppo rt u nity

to meet with, sit down with Tracy B e a t t y i no r d e r

f o r yo ut o o b t a i na

h an dw r i t i n g e x e mp l ar

f r o m T r a c y B e a t t y? A. I ’ve trie d twice. Q. Wer e y ou

su c c e ssf ul? A. No , I wa s n ot. Q. Why no t?BEATT Y — 16

Ex parte Thompson , 2 00 8 T e x. Cr im. Ap p. L EX I S 32 8, *1 0 ( Ma r. 5) ; Ex pa rteEu re

ste , 20 725 S.W .2d 214, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A. B eca use the de fenda

nt refuse d. Q. B oth tim e s? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was the re a

c ourt or de r i n p la c e bo th t ime s? A. I believe so. I n point of err or six , appellant contends that the judge twice violated his rig hts ag ainst selfinc ri min a tio n b y

ho ldi nghim

in c ri min a l c on te mpt

be c a us e of his re fu sa l to pr ov ide the e xemp lars . We c on c lud e that a

pp e lla nt’ s c ha lle ng e to t

he c ri min a l c on te mpt

or de rs is n ot p ro perly

be fo re us . The prope r ave nue for

challeng ing a

contempt orde r is throug h an orig inal application for a wr it of habea s corpus fr om the contempt proc eeding s. Point of error six is overruled. 20 I n point of error seven, appe llant claims that the trial judg e er red in a llowing the c ontempt

c on vic tio ns to b e us e d a s e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s d ur ingthe g uil t ph a se . App e lla nt d oe s n ot c ite any wher e in the record w here his contempt convictions wer e admitted into evidenc e as e x trane ous offe nses during the g uilt phase, and our ow n revie w of the re cord indicates that this evidence was

no t a dmi tte d a t the g uil t ph a se . I nd e e d, the jud g e inf or me d the pa

rt ie s that he wo uld n ot permit evidenc e of the contempt orde rs to be admitted. Point of err or seve n is overrule d. F ina lly , in

po int of e rr or e ig ht, a pp e lla nt c omp la ins that th e tr ia l judge com mit te d a F if th Amendment violation when he allowed the State to prese nt, throug h J arr ett’s testimony , evidenc e that appellant r efuse d to provide the e x emplars a nd that su ch re fu s al was in viol ation of a c ourt

or de r. At the ou tse t, w e ob se rv e that th e tr ia l ju dg e did no t e rr in o rd e ri ngthe e xemp lars . I t is we llBEATT Y — 17

Gi lbe rt v . Ca lif

or nia , 3 88 U. S. 2 63 , 2 66 -6 7 ( 19 67 ); Ol so n v . S tat e , 484 S.W .2d 756, 772 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

Se e Po rtu on do v . A ga rd , 529 U.S. 61, 74-75 (2000)( prosec utor could comment upon the 22 def en dant’s pre sence at trial); So uth Da k ota v . Ne v ill e , 459 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1983)( prosec utor c ou ld c omm e nt up on the de fe nd ant’ s r e fu sa l to take a blo od -a lc oh ol t e st) ; see also Pe nnsylvania v. Mu niz , 496 U.S. 582, 604 n.19 (1990)(“ since submission to a blood test could itself be compe lled . . ., a State’s d ecision to permit a suspec t to refuse to take the test but then to comment upon that r e f u s a l a t tr ia l d id n o t ‘ c o mp e l’ th e s u s p e c t to in c r im in a te h im s e lf an d h e n c e d id n o t v iolate the p ri v i l ege ”) (c i t i n g Ne v ill e ). established that handw riting e x emplars a re non- testimonial and th er ef o re do not warr ant constitutional protection under the fede ral or state constitutions. As a re sult, the prosecutor’ s 21 comment upon appe llant’s ref usal to c omply with the trial judge ’s order did not violate appellant’s Fifth Ame ndment rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination. 22 D. Evi de nc e of C lic k’ s Sui c ide At te m pt I n p oin t of

e rr or e le ve n, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e e rr e d in re fu sin g to a llo w h is de fe ns e a tto rn e y

to q ue sti on Mc Cart y a bo ut C lic k’ s su ic ide a tte mpt

. During trial, the State made an ora l motion in limi ne to prohibit appellant fr om questioning McCarty about Click’s suici d e at t em p t , claiming that it was not releva nt to any issue. Appellant

ar g u e d th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s r e le v an t b e c a u s e th e a u to p s y r e p o rt s h o w e d th a t a b u ll e t h a d been

re mov e d fr om Clic k’ s bo dy , and he wa nte d to make sure that the jur y wo uld no t get th e fa lse impression that appellant shot Click. The judg e conc lud ed that the evidence was not re levant but state d that , if evi dence a

bo ut t he bu lle t w a s late r a dmi tte d, the n th e de fe ns e wo uld be e nti tle d to

rec all McCarty

to clear up any confusion. Appellant also argued that the s uicide attempt was re levant to his and Click’s re lationship. I n a he ari ng ou tsi de the pr e se nc e of the jur y , a pp e lla nt qu e sti on e d Mc Cart

y on the ma tte r. Mc Cart

yBEATT Y — 18

T EX . R. E V ID . 402. 23 T EX . R. E V ID . 401. 24 Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ). 25 said that, five or

six y ear s ear lier, Click told her that she trie d to k i l l h er s el f by shooting he rself. Clic k s a id t

hat sh e wa s “ y oung ” at th e tim e and did no t expla in w hy sh e a tte mpt e d s uic ide . M c Cart y testified that she did not know if the attempt had any thing to do with appellant. The State objec ted, statin g that th e in for mat ion w a s ir re le va nt. Th e tr ia l ju dg e su sta ine d th e State ’s ob je c tio n. With Clary ’s testimony conce rning what appe llant told him about killing Click appa rently in the fore front of his mind, defense counsel c ontinued to push the issue. Counsel claimed that the suicide attempt

wa s r e le va

nt t o Cl ic k’ s p ro pe ns ity

to u se a g un a g a ins t he rs e lf

or oth e rs : I f C a ro ly n Cl ic k wa s wi lli ng a t on e po int in tim e to p ro du c e a g un and sh oo t he rs e lf in t he sp ine , I wo uld

say that a t so me su

bs e qu e nt p oin t in

tim e it m ay

a dd c re dib ili ty to th e d e f

e n d an t’ s v e r s io nth a t h e h a d to ta k e th e g u naw ay

f r o m h e r to d e fend himself in self-de fense to strang le her

. The judg e adhe red to his prior r ulings, stating that the evidenc e wa s not releva nt. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Under Rule 401 of the Te x as Rules of 23 Evidence , “Releva nt Evidence ” mea

ns evidenc e having any tendenc y to make the exist ence of any fac t that is of consequence to the determination of t he ac tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e. 24 When review ing a

trial judge ’s ruli ng to admit or ex clude evidence , we give g reat defe renc e to the j u d ge’ s d ec i s i o n ; t h er ef

o re , we wi l l re v er s e t h e r u l i n g o n l y w h en t h e r ec o rds h o ws t h at t h e j u d ge abused his or her dis cre tion. Moreove r, we will uphold a trial judge ’s ruli ng if it was c orre ct under 25BEATT Y — 19

Ma rti n v . S

tat e , 1 7 3 S

. W

. 3 d

4 6 3 , 4 6 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Sa uc e da v . S tat e , 129 26 S.W .3d 116, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 391. 27 Se e Cro c k

e tt v. Sta te , 803 S.W .2d 308, 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (observingthat “the 28 rec ord is de void of any

evidenc e re motely

tending to sugg est, as an e mpirical matter, that persons t ra v eli ng to Chicag o are more likely to be transpor

ting illeg al drug s than are persons traveling elsewhe re” ).

See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 38.36. 29 any theory of law a pplicable to the c ase. 26 Considering the evid en ce b efore the tria l judge , we c onclude that his dete rmination that

e vid e nc e of Clic k’ s su ic ide atte mpt wa s no t re le va nt wa s no t “ outsi de the zon e of r e a so na ble disag ree ment.” Contrary to appellant’s a ssertion, evidenc e that Click had attempted suicide in the 27 past by sh o o t i n g h erse lf with a g un did not have any tendenc y to make it more likely

that Click pulled a g un and wielde d it at appellant and that appellant ther efor e h ad to defe nd himself. That Click was willing to use a g un on herse lf does not ha ve any tendenc y to show that she was willing to use a g un ag ainst others. F urther, a ppellant made no e ffor

t to demonstrate that such a n infere nce, while intuitively

illogica l, is supported by

some ty pe of e mpirical data , nor did he make any eff ort 28 to show that the attempted suicide ha d any rele vance to his relationship with her. 29 Even if the e vidence wer e relevant, by appellant’ s own admission, such rele vance depends solely upon an infe renc e that she a cted in conf ormity with her prior behavior. A lthough a defe ndant may offe r evide nce r eleva

nt solely to show the victim’s violent chara cter throug h opinion orBEATT Y — 20

T EX . R. E V ID . 404(a) (2), 405( a). 30 Id. , 404(b). 31 Sh e an e ttev . S

tat e , 1 44 S.W. 3d

50 3, 51 0 ( Te x. Cr im . App . 2 00 4) ; Ex parte Torres , 943 32 S.W. 2d 46 9, 47 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); J ac k so n v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Sh e an e tte , 144 S.W .3d at 510.

33 reputation testim ony , he may not do so by

introducing specific instances of conduct. Point of 30 31

err or ele ven is overr

uled. II. INEFF ECTIVE ASS ISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS In p o i n t s o f

e r r o r t w e l v e , t h i rt e e n , an d

f o u rt e e n , a p p e l l an tc o n t e n d s t h a th i s t r i a l a t t o r n e ys rende red ine ffe ctive assist an ce . I n p o int of err or twelve , appellant a sserts that his counsel wa s ineffe ctive for

conce ding that appellant had c ommitt ed the c rime of murder w hen counse l knew that

a pp e lla nt h a d a via

ble se lf -d e fe ns e c la im. Ap pe lla

nt c on te nd s that he ha d a

via ble se lf -d e fe ns e c la im beca use he told Clary that he killed Click a fter she pulled a g un on him. I n point of err or thirteen, appellant f

aults cou n s el for f

ailing to r equest a

char g e on self- defe nse or sudde n passion at either stag e of the trial. And in point of err or four teen, appellant c laims that counsel was ine ffe ctive at the punishment phase for

failing to retain a

risk-asse ssment witness with prison ex pertise. We have c onsistently

observe d that usually

“the r ecor d on direc t appea l will not be suffic ient to show that counsel’s r epre sentation was so deficient and so lackingtactica l or strateg ic dec isionmaking as to overc ome the strongpresumption that counse l ’s co nduct was r easona ble and pr of e ssi on a l.” He re , w e c an o nly sp e c ulate wh y c ouns e l ac te d o r f a ile d to a c t; thu s, we pr e su me 32 th a t c o u n s e l’ s a c ti o n s w e r e w it h in th e w id e r an g e o f

r e a s o n a b le an d p r o f

e s s io n a l a s s is ta

n c e . We 33BEATT Y — 21

541 U.S. 36 (2004). 34 171 S.W .3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 35 overr ule appe llant’s ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel points of err or.

III . P UN ISHM EN T P HA SE ISS UE S A. Co nfro nt at ion Cl aus e I n point of error one, appellant claims that State’s Ex hibit 150 was inadmiss ible under the Sixth A me ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s C on st it ut ion , a s in te rp re te d b y the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court in Crawf

ord v. W ashington and this Court in Ru sse au v . S tat e , and under Article I , §10 of 34 35 the Texas Constit ution. St ate’ s Ex hibit 150 contained two judgments of f elony conviction and ove r eig hty pag es of pr ison disciplinary repor ts documenting appellant’ s failure to com p l y with prison rules. The material contained in these docume nts included admissions made by appellant that we re witnessed by

the re cordingoffice r as we ll as statements made by other pe rsons. Be fore the par

ties prese nted evidenc e and outside of the jury ’s pre sence , appellant objec ted to S ta te ’s Exhi bit

15 0 o n h e ars ay

g ro un ds : My objectio ns are , is that while the documents themselve s may be self- authenticating in the stack of r ecor ds, they themselves conta in statements which ar e a se cond leve l of he ars ay and no t adm iss ibl e . I t’ s g oin g to r e qu ir e the Cou rt to l oo k thro ug h it

jus t to take a look a

nd see w hat I ’m dis cussing . But we have to make that hear say objection. * * * Th e c on c ept of busi ne ss r e c or ds c omi ngin, we un de rs tand that a s an e xce pti on

to hear say , but we believe that there are substantially —there are a subst antial amount o f s t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n e d

i nt h o s e r e c o r d s w h i c h ar e a s e c o n d l e v e l o f h e ar s ay. After a response from the State, the judge asked appellant to c larify what he meant by secondha nd hear say . Appellant explained:BEATT Y — 22

I t’s the conc ept of if a

specific employ ee of

the Texas Depa

rtment of Corre ctions makes a statement and notes that statement t hat t hey themselves have knowledg e of and that’s made part of the ir rec ord, we understand. B ut w he n y ou loo ke d thr ou g h so me of tho se do c ume nts – a

nd I ’l l ju st s ay

tha t a lmo st ever y sheet ha s a statement like that. I t is an employ ee that is writing down something that s o m eb o d y else may have sa id to that person. . . . And so if they ’re g oing to be offe ring those secondha nd hear say

rema rks for the truth, and there ’s not cer tification of anyone in there , other than the person making the re cord, howdo the bu sin e ss r e c or ds e xce pti on pe rt a in t o th e m? The judg e then state d that he would rule when the State actually offe red the exhibi t and, in the meantime, that he would look throug h the documents. After a re cess, the judg e stated that he had revie wed the doc uments and wa s prepa red to he ar a

ny objections and issu e a ru l i n g when the documents we re of

fer ed. The State off

ere d State’s Exhi bit 150 during the di re ct ex amination of its first witness, a Smit h County

Sheriff’ s Deputy . Appellant lodg ed the f ollowing objec tion: Judg e , w e ob

je c t to the a dmi ssi on of that. We o bje c t th a t th e re ’s he ars ay in t he re to w h ic h n o e xc e p ti o n a

p p li e s . We o b

je c t to r e le v an c e , 4 0 1 , 4 0 2 , 4 0 3 b a la n c in g . We object to the constit u t i onality under A rticle 1 of the Texas Consti tution and the Four th, Fifth, Six teenth Amendme n t of the United States Constitution for a dmi ssi bil ity

a t th is s ta g e of

tr ia l. The judg e over

ruled the obje ctions and admitted the doc uments. We conclude that appellant has not prese rved his confr ontation claims for r eview. When the admissibili ty

of State’s Exhibit 150 was discussed outside the jury ’s presence , the discussion inv olv e d on ly wh e the r the do c ume nts c on ta ine d do ub le or se c on dh and

he ars ay a nd the a pp lic a bil ity of the business re cords e x ception. A he arsa y o b j ec t i o n does not prese rve e rror on ConfrontationBEATT Y — 23

Re y na v . S tat e , 168 S.W .3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 36 T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a) (1)( A)(“ with sufficie nt specific ity to make the tria l court aw are of 37 the c omp la int ” ); see T EX . C O N ST ., Art. 1. T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)( 1)(A) (“unle ss specific g rounds wer e appa rent fr om the context”). 38 W e n o t e t h a tt h e r i g h tt o c o n f r o n t a t i o ni s o n e o f

s e v e r a l r i g h t s p r o t e c t e d

b y t h e S i xth 39 Amendment. See U. S. C O N ST ., Amend. 6. Clause g rounds. Neither the judg e nor the parties mentioned the Confrontation Clause or 36 Cra wfo rd , which wa s handed dow n five months befor e the punishment phase . Appellant’s r efe renc e to Article 1 of the Texas Consti tution, which contains many indivi d u al ri gh t s provisions, was too g lobal to a

pprise the trial judge of the nature of his c laim. And though appellant’ s o b j ec t ions 37 b e f o r e th e ju

r y in c lu d e d r e f e r e n c e s to th e F o u rth , F if th , an d Si xte e n th

A me n d me n ts , h e n e v er actua lly cited the Sixth Amendment, which c ontains the Confrontation Clause. Even if we assumed that the trial judg e interpr eted a ppellant’s re fer ence to the Six teenth Amendme nt to be intended as

a re fer ence to the S ix th Amendment, we neverthe less find that such a brief a nd g ener ic re fer ence 38 to t he Sixth A me nd

me nt, c on ta ine d w ith in a

str ingc i t a t i on to v ari ou s o the r c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s, was not spec ific enoug h to make the trial court awa re of his complaint. Finally , appellant f ailed 39 to draw the trial court’ s attention to the specific portions of this eighty -pag e exhibit t hat he be lieved

we re i na dmi ssi ble . T he tr ia l ju dg e ha s n o d uty to w a de thr ou g h a

vo lum ino us e xhibi t to se pa rate

a dmi ssi ble fr om i na dmi ssi ble po rt ion s: The trial c ourt nee d never sort throug h challeng ed evide nce in or der to seg reg ate the admissible from t h e excludable, nor is the trial c ourt requir ed to admit only the former part or exclude only the latter part. I f evidenc e is of fer ed an d ch al l eng ed wh ic h c on ta ins so me of

e a c h, the tr ia l cou

rt may sa fe ly a dmi t it a ll o r e xclu de it a ll, and the losing party , no matter who he is, will be made to suffe r on appe al theBEATT Y — 24

Re y na v . S tat e , 1 6 8 S

. W

. 3 d

1 7 3 , 1 7 8 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 5 )( qu o t i n g J on es v . S tat e , 843 40 S.W .2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). conseque nces of

his insufficiently

specific offe r or objec tion. 40 Point of error one is overrule d. B. Han dcuf f Key I n p oin t of e rr or nin e , a

pp e lla nt argue s that the jud g e e rr e d by a dmi tti nga

ha nd c uf f k e y int o evidenc e. Pursuant to a c ourt order , the prosec ution obtaine d a set of key s that was c ollected f rom appellant whe n he wa s booked into the Smith C ounty jail. The State off

ere d a handc uff ke y , found on appellant’ s key

ring , into evidence at the g uilt phase for r ecor d purposes o n l y . Bu t during the punishment phase, the State r e-of fer ed the ke y into e vidence “for all purposes.” Appellant objec ted to the State’s offe r, esse ntially arguing that the key

was not re levant. Countering , the State ar g ued: J udg e, the f

act that a

person ha s a handc uff ke y on them who’s bee n to the pe nit e nti ary

on mul tip le oc c a sio ns , ha s be e n in v ari ou s ja ils on mul tip le oc c a sio ns , who’s been arr ested on various occa sions, who has esca ped on at lea st one occ asion that’ s b e e n in

e vid e nc e in t

his c a se , th e fa c t th a t th e y have a han dcuff

ke y wo uld c e rt a inl y be re le va

nt t o w he the r t

he y wo uld int e nd to u se it, if

arr e ste d, to tr

y to e sc a pe , tr y to o pe n u p th e ha nd c uf fs and e sc a pe . A g a in, Ic e rt a inl y

thi nk that w ou ld be something rele vant. And additionally , this defenda nt – the re’ s alre ady been evidenc e that this defe ndant ha s p os se sse d c on tr a

ba nd wh ile inc arc e ra

te d in pri so ns , a

nd Ibe lie ve be ingin po sse ssi on

of a ha nd c uf f k e y wo uld be re le va nt o n a ll tho se iss ue s. Th e jud g e ov e rr

ule d ap pe lla

nt’ s obje c tio n, statin g that it wa s re le va nt t o p un ish me nt, sp e c if

ic a lly to the future dang erousne ss special issue. Article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal Proc edure , decla res that, in ca

pital case s, “evide nce may be pre sented by

the state a

nd the def endant or the defe ndant’s counsel as to a ny matter that theBEATT Y — 25

T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art 37.071 §2(a ). 41 Fo rd v . S tat e , 919 S.W. 2d 10 7, 11 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Lan e v . S tat e , 822 S.W .2d 42 35, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Mo re no v . S

tat e , 858 S.W .2d 453, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 43 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art

. 37 .0 71 §§ 2( b) (1 ), 2( c ); Lad d v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 547, 557-58 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Dr ue ry v . S tat e , 2 2 5 S

. W

. 3 d

4 9 1 , 5 0 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g W ar dr ip v . S tat e , 45 56 S.W .3d 588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). court deems rele vant to se ntence

. . . .” At the penalty phase of a capital murder t ri al , t h e t ri al 41 judge has wide discr etion to admit or ex clude evidence

. Relevanc y questions “ar e g ener ally left 42 larg ely to the trial judg e, and w ill not be rever sed abse nt an abuse of discre tion.” 43 At the punishment phase of a ca pital murder tria l, the State has the burden of proving , bey ond

a re asonable doubt, the punishment issue of future da ng erousne ss—that there is a pr obability t h at the def endant will commit criminal ac ts of violence in the f uture, so as to c ons t i t u t e a continuing thr e a t, wh e the r in or ou t of pr iso n. Whe n de c idi ng wh e the r a de fe nd ant pos e s a con tin uin g thr e a t, 44 the jur y may c on sid e r, a mon g oth e r t

hin g s, the fo llo wi ngfa c tor s: the def endant’ s state of mind an d whether he wa s working alone or with other parties; the c alculate d nature of the de fendan t ’s acts; t he for ethoug ht and deliberateness ex hibited by the cr ime’s execution; the exis tence and seve rity of prior crimes; the defe ndant’s ag e and persona l c ircumstance s at the time of the offe nse; wh et h er the def

endant wa s acting under dur ess or the domination of a nother at the time of the commission of the offe nse; psy chiatric ev idence ; and cha rac ter evidenc e. 45

The e vidence at puni shment showed, in par t, that appellant: (1) killed Click only a fe w months after he was re lease d on parole ; (2) had a lengthy criminal re cord, w hich included e scape ,BEATT Y — 26

evadingarr est, as sault for striking Click, and injury to a child for shoc king, striking , biting, and pu lli ngthe ha ir

of a n e ig hte e n- mon th- old c hil d; (3 ) ha d ph y sic a lly inj ur e d a pr iso n gua

rd , v e rb a lly threatened a

nd spit on numerous other g uards a n d f o ug ht with inmates when pre viously incar cer ated; (4) ha d vio l at ed t h e co nditions of his si x -y ear probation term f

or injury to a child, and ( 5) had possessed a “ shank” in jail while a waiting trial in this case . Evidence that appellant ke pt a handc uff k ey o nh i s k ey

ri n g, es p ec i al l y

wh en co mb i n edwi t h e v i d en ce o f h i s p ri o r e s cap e a n d ev ad i n gde te nti on of

fe ns e s, ma de it mor e pr ob a ble that a pp e lla nt wo uld a tte mpt to e sc a pe fr om c us tod

y in the futu re. Hi s p ri or

c ri min a l a c ts o f v iol e nc e tow ard a uth or iti e s and

oth e r i nma

te s w hil e incar cer ated make s it more probable that appellant would not hes i tate to commit criminal ac ts of vio le nc e in e ff

e c tuatin g an e sc a

pe . F ina lly , a

pp e lla nt’ s h ist or

y of c omm itt ing vio le nt c ri min a l a c ts

as a me mber of the g ener al public, including when he was re lease d on probation and pa role, make s it more probable that appellant would commit additional acts of violence in the “free world” if he

e sc a pe d. So a

pp e lla nt’ s p os se ssi on

of the ha ndcuff ke y

make s it mor e pr ob a

ble that he wo uld

c o n s t i tu t e a c o n t i n u i n g t h r e a t t o b o t h p r i s o n an d f r e e s o c i e t y . T h e t r i a l j u d g e d i d n o t a b u se his discretion in admitting the e vidence . Point of error nine is overrule d. C . C o m m e nto n R ig htN o t t o Te s t if y I n point of err or ten, c iting the United States and Texas Constitutions and Article 38.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, appe llant complains that the foll owing portion of t he State’s

c l o s i n g ar g u m e n tc o n s t i tu t e d ani mp r o p e r

c o m m e n to nh i s f

a i l u r e t o t e s t i f

y: I t ju st – it a ma zes me that he wi ll do the thi ng s he ’s do ne , hurt the pe op le he ’s hurt , and then c ome i n here and say do [si c] some kind of – “Oh, w ell, y eah, but you know what? I t’s y our fa

ult. I t’s y our fa

ult. I t’s y our fa

ult. You’ re trying to kill me. I t’s y our fa ult.”BEATT Y — 27

W e ad v . S tat e , 129 S.W. 3d

12 6, 12 8- 29 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Bu sta ma ntev . S tat e , 48 46 S.W .3d 761, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

Bu sta ma nte , 48 S.W .3d at 765. 47 Id. 48 Over ruling appellant’ s objection, the trial judg e conc luded that the complaine d-of a rg ument did not

c on sti tut e a

c omm e nt o n appel lan t’ s f a ilure to t e sti fy

bu t w a s in ste a d a

re sp on se to t

he argume nts made by the def ense. A comment on a defe ndant’s failure to t estify violates the fe dera l and state c onstitut ions and Article 30.08, Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e. We view the complaine d-of languag e fr om the 46 jury ’s per spective, a

nd “[t] he test is whether the l ang uag e used was manifestly intended or w as of such a c hara cter that the jury would nece ssarily and natur ally

take it as a

comment on the def

endant’ s fa ilure to t e sti fy .” Th e c omp la in ed-of langua g e mus t c le arl y

re fe r t o th e de fe nd ant’ s f a ilure to 47 testify ; “[i] t is not suffi ci en t t h at the languag e mig ht be construe d as an implied or indire ct allusion.” 48 Whatever e lse this p ortion of the prose cutor’s a rg ument may

be, it was not a c omment on appellant’ s failure to testify . The pa ssag e in question does not comment on any failure of appe llant to do any thing; instead, it purpor

ts to comment on something appe llan t s ai d o r d i d

. The broa der context shows that it was a comment on what de fense counsel said. I n argu m en t , d efense counse l took the prosecutor to task for de humanizing appe llant and

ur g e d th e jur

y no t to sin k to a

pp e lla nt’ s le ve l in

a sse ssi ngpunis hme nt: And M s . Si k e s is v e r

y g o o d a t w h a t s h e d o e s . I t’ s e a s ie r to k il l s o me b o dy if y ou dehumanize them fi rst ; make them 100 per cent e vil; make them a monster; makeBEATT Y — 28

them worthless. And y ou know what? I t’s easy to do w hen y ou have the se kinds of fac ts, right? All y ou’ve g ot to do is just c ross that last bridg e and sa y there ’s nothing about him worth saving . He’ s worthless, 100 perc ent evil. He’ s all those things that the State say s. I want to ta lk to y ou a minute a bout the cons – well, I probably should sit down and le t K e n ta lk a

bo ut thi s, be c a

us e he ’s a lot be tte r tha

n I a m – the c on c e pt o f r e sp e c t, re sp e c t f or oth e r p e op le ’s op ini on s, re sp e c t f or the law, re sp e c t for lif

e . Tr a c y B e a tty d o e s n ’ t r e s p e c t a

n y o f th o s e . D o e s th a t m e any o us h o u ld n ’ t? D o e s that mean I s h o u l dn ’ t ? De fe ns e c ouns e l th e n e xpla ine d to the jur or s that he re sp e c te d the ir g uil ty ve rd ic t but di sa g re e d w ith it. Several times, def

ense c o u n s el ca l l ed himself an “idiot” f or missing obvious evidenc e that

a pp e lla nt w a s n ot guil ty

of burg lary , th e un de rl y ingc ri me that wa s u se d to ra ise a pp e lla nt’ s o ff e ns e from murde r to ca

pital murder. De fens e co u n sel found “a mazing” tha

t a Texas Depa

rtment of Cr imi na l Just ic e of

fi c ia l w ou ld s ay

that c on vic te d c a

pit a l murd e re rs “ do n’t au tom a tic a lly g o to administrative seg reg ation.” Reg ardingthis “amazing” fac t, defe nse counse l further stated: They want y o u t o k i l l him because there ’s no safe place for him. And what’s a ma zing– I ’m g e tti ng ba c k to it – wh a t’ s a ma zing to me is that th e y wo n’ t put hi m straig ht in administ rative se g reg ation, but they can, a nd it has happene d. Def ense c ounsel also told the j ury that appellant was “not 100 percent e vil” but “a c hild of God who has made terrible, hor

rible cr iminal decisions his whole miserable life .” I t is to t hese ty

pes of c o m ments made duringdefe nse counse l’s summation that the pr os e c uto r r e sp on de d w iththe c omp la ine d- of c omm e nt t

hat w e no w s e t f

or th i n it s c on te xt: Under stand something. I ’m not killing the def endant. You, by

y our ver dict, if it was y es or no, a

re not k i l l i n g h i m . You’re answe ring specia l issues based on the e vid e nc e . I t ju st –

it a ma zes me that he wi ll d o th e thi ng s h e ’s do ne , hur t th e pe op le he’s hur t, and then come in here and say do some kind of – “Oh, w ell, y eah, but you know what? I t’s y our fa

ult. I t’s y our fa

ult. I t’s y our fault. You’re trying to kill me. I t’s y our fa

ult.”BEATT Y — 29

Cam ac ho v . S

tat e , 864 S.W .2d 524, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Go ss v . S tat e , 826 49 S.W .2d 162, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Ton g v . S tat e , 25 S.W .3d 707, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (c iting Mc Fa rla nd v . S tat e , 928 50 S.W. 2d 48 2, 49 8- 99 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Lawton v . S tat e , 91 3 S.W. 2d

54 2, 55 6- 58 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1995)).

Va llev . S tate , 109 S.W .3d 500, 502-03 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003). 51 Th is c omm e nt w a s n ot o ne tha t a jur y wo uld “ natur a lly

and ne c e ssa rily ” vi ew as pe rt a ini ngto appellant’ s failure to testify . Point of error te n is overrule d. D. Ch a l l en g es to th e D ea th Pen a l ty S ch eme I n a number of points of error , appellant r aises attac ks on the Texas death pe nalty scheme that we have alr eady

reje cted. For eac h, we f

ind it sufficient to set out appellant’s c laim and footnote the

case or ca ses in which the c laim was rej ec t ed . I n point of err or fifte en, appe llant complains that article 37. 0 7 1 , § 2(b)( 1), violates the Eig hth and Four teenth Amendme nts to the United States Constit ution because the ag g ravating f actor s are vag u e and do not pr operly challeng e the jury ’s discretion. In doi n g so, appellant spec ifically claims that the statute is unconstitutionally vag ue beca use it fails to de fine the terms “proba bility ,” “cr iminal a cts of violence ,” and “ continuing thr eat to s oc ie ty .” I n po int

of e rr or sixte e n, a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e Te xas d e a th p e na lty sc he me 49 vio la te s th e fe de ra l c on sti tut ion be c a us e it d oe s n ot a llo w f

or me anin g fu l a

pp e llate re vie w o f a

de a th sentenc e. In doing so, he complains that Tex as l aw d oes not allow for appellate revie w of the mitigation spec ial issue set out in article 37. 0 7 1 , §2(e) , that there is no longe r any meaning ful 50

r e v i e w o f t h e f u tu r e d an g e r o u s n e s s i s s u e b e c a u s e e v e r yo n e c o n v i c t e d

o f c a p i t a l m u r d e r

w i l l a l w a ys be fo un d to be a futur e da ng e r, tha

t T e xas l aw d oe s n ot p ro vid e fo r a c omp ara tiv e pr op or

tio na lity 51BEATT Y — 30

An de rso n v . S

tat e , 932 S.W .2d 502, 508-09 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996). 52 Lawt on , 9 13 S.W. 2d

a t 55 6- 57 ; McFarland , 928 S.W .2d at 499. 53 Lawt on , 9 13 S.W. 2d

a t 55 8; Bl ue v . S

tat e , 125 S.W .3d 491, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

. 54 Cru tsi ng e r v . S

tat e , 2 0 6 S

. W

. 3 d 6 0 7 , 6 1 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Escamilla v. 55 Sta te , 1 43 S.W. 3d

81 4, 82 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 )) ; Ma ste rso n v . S tat e , 1 5 5 S. W. 3 d

1 6 7 , 1 7 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2005).

Sh an no n v . S

tat e , 942 S.W .2d 591, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 56 Ra by v . S tat e , 9 7 0 S

. W

. 2 d 1 , 7 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Lawt on , 913 S.W .2d at 560; 57 McFarland , 928 S.W .2d 499).

Id. at 9. 58 revie w, and that, bec ause the mitigation spec ial issue is open-ende d and unstructur ed, ther e is no

52

wa y to k no w w hic h a g g ra

vatin g or mit ig a tin g fa c tor s the jur

y c on sid e re d, the re by

makin g a pp e llate revie w impossible. I n point of error se ventee n, appellant c laims that the failure to assign a burden 53 of proof on the mitigation issue renders the death penalty provision unconstitutional. I n point of 54

err or eig hteen, a

ppellant claims that the “ 10-12 rule,” and the t ri al judg e’s c onforming jury instruction, violates the fede ral constitut ion. I n point of err or ninetee n, appellant c omplains that 55 the ca pital senten ci n g s ch eme’s failure to infor m the jury

that a sing le hold-out juror re sults in an automatic life se ntence violates the fe dera l constituti on. I n point of err or twenty , appellant a lleg es 56 that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional beca use i t give s the jury

open-e nded discre tion. 57 I n point of err or t we nty -one, a ppellant maintains that the ca pital sentencingstatute’s def inition of “mitigating e vidence ” is fac ially unconstitutional beca use i t limit s the Eig hth Amendment conc ept of mitigation to factors that re nder a defe ndant l ess m orally “blamew orthy ” for commission of the

c a pit a l murd e r. Ha

vin g de c ide d the iss ue s adv e rs e ly to ap pe lla nt’ s posi tio n, we re

je c t hi s c la ims

. 58BEATT Y — 31

Ra y for d v . S tat e , 1 2 5 S

. W

. 3 d

5 2 1 , 5 3 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Ladd , 3 S.W .3d at 59 57 4; McFarland , 928 S.W .2d at 510-11).

Y ou ng v . S tat e , 552 S.W .2d 441, 443 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)(ne wspape r article s attache d 60 to a brief are no t pr op e rl y

be fo re the a

pp e llate c ourt

a s e vid e nc e ); se e als o Ra mi re z v . S tat e , 104 S.W .3d 549, 550-51 (Te x . Crim. App. 2003)(document attached to not ice of appea l “could not be considere d as substantive evide nce in support of a point of er

ror” ). Points of er

ror f ifteen throug h twenty -one a re ove rruled. E. Smith County P rosec ution I n point of err or twenty -four , appellant c la ims that the a dmi nis tr a tio n o f t he de a th p e na lty

in Smith Co un ty

is i nc on sis te nt a

nd un fa ir and the re fo re vio la te s th e fe de ra l and state c on sti tut ion s. He c laims that the administration of the de ath pena lty is arbitrar y and ca pricious bec ause pr osecutors

are g iven unfe ttered discr etion on whether or not to seek the de ath pena l t y

– re s u lting in a lac k of consistency

among prosec utorial authorities in diffe rent jurisdictions. We have de cided this issue adver sely to appellant’s position. 59 Appe l l an t al so claims that the Smith C ounty prosec uting a

uthorities, in particular, ha ve

e xer c ise d th e ir

dis c re tio n in

an unc on sti tut ion a l ma

nn e r. Citi nga

July 2005 “ As so c ia te d Pr e ss” article , appellant c ontends that the prosec utor in his case a llowed another person who c ommitt ed a capital murde r to rec eive c onsecutive life sentenc es under a p l ea ag ree ment at the re quest of the victim’s family

. He claims that a c ousin of his (who was a lso the victim’s niece) wanted to testify that she did not want to see him re ceive the death penalty but was stopped fr om doing so. Appellant’s claim relies larg ely on events that occur red afte r his tria l in 200 4

. E v i dence relating to those subseque nt events ar e not a pa rt of the a ppellate r ecor d, and the State ha s not been 60 g ive n a n o pp or tun ity to p ro du c e its ow n e vid e nc e on the ma tte r, wh ic h c ann ot o c c ur in a n a pp e llateBEATT Y — 32

Am ad or v . S tat e , 221 S.W .3d 666, 676-77 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007)(supplementation rules 61 cannot be used to cre ate a new r ecor d in the appellate court). Ga llo v . S

tat e , 239 S.W .3d 757, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 62 forum. And appe llant’s claim that his cousin was “ stopped” fr om testify ing is m i s l ea d i n g. The

61 trial court wa s attempting to rule upon a pa rt icular que stion defense counsel ha d asked, a nd the witness’s wishes re g ardingappellant’ s execution were not responsive to that question. That matter

wa s su bs e qu e ntl y c le are d up , bu t de fe ns e c ouns e l did no t th e re a ft e r atte mpt

to q ue sti on the wi tne ss about her wishes re g ardingappellant’ s execution Poi nt of err or twenty -four is overrule d. IV. Adm inis trat ion of

the De ath P enalty I n p oin t of e rr or tw e nty -t

wo , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s that the mann e r in wh ic h the de a th p e na lty is administered is crue l and unusual and the ref ore violate s the fede ral a

nd state co n s t i t u t i o n s . He

a pp e ars to c omb ine tw o s e pa rate c la ims in his br ie fi ng . F ir st, he argue s tha t the se nte nc ingsc he me is unconstituti onally

open-e nded. That argument has alre ady been a ddresse d in the previous sec tion of this opinion. S econd, he claims that th e l et h al injection protocol may inflict intense and

unnece ssary

pain on the executed pe rson. This latter claim is not ripe for revie w. Point of error 62 twenty -two is overr

uled. I n point of err or twenty -three , appellant c laims that the state constitutional provision prohibiting “ cru el o r u n u s u al p u n i s h m en t s ” c o n fe rs b ro ad er p ro t ec t i o nt h an t h e E i gh t h Amendment’s pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t “ c ru e l and unusual punishments.” Thoug h appellant does not ex pressly say so, i ta p p e ar s t h a tt h i s c l a i m i s m e an t t o r e l a t e t o t h e s u b j e c tm a t t e r

d i s c u s s e d

i np o i n to f

e r r o r t w e n t ytwo. To the extent this claim relates to sentenc ing, w e have held t hat t he Tex as ca pital sentencingBEATT Y — 33

Anderson , 932 S.W .2d at 509. 63 scheme does not violate the state c onstitut ion’s “cr uel or unusu al punishments” prohibition. To 63 the e xten t th e c la im r e la te s to the le tha l inj e c tio n pr oto c ol, the n, lik e his fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l c la im, it is not ripe for

revie w. Point of error

twenty -three is overrule d. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

Date D elivere d: March 11, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh