United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2347

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Riley Johannessohn; Daniel C. Badilla; James Kelley; Kevin R. Wonders; William 

Bates; James Pinion, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Polaris Industries Inc.

 Defendant - Appellee

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State of Minnesota

 Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: April 13, 2021

Filed: August 20, 2021

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Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
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Appellants filed this putative class action alleging that Polaris Industries, Inc.

failed to disclose heat defects and that this artificially inflated the price of their allterrain vehicles. The district court1 denied class certification because individualized 

questions predominated, a class action was not a superior method for litigating, and 

the putative classes included members who lacked standing. We affirm. 

I. 

Polaris makes ATVs. About 15 years ago, it began receiving consumer 

complaints about excessive heat in its ATVs. In 2014, the U.S. Consumer Product 

Safety Commission started investigating reports of several ATV fires. The CPSC 

preliminarily found that one model presented a “substantial product hazard” under 

15 U.S.C. § 2064(a) because “the right hand side heat shield is in close proximity to, 

and in some cases makes contact with [the] exhaust manifold, posing a burn and fire 

hazard.” D. Ct. Dkt. 336-23 at 2. The CPSC requested that Polaris voluntarily recall 

or correct the problem. In March 2017, Polaris recalled two models. CPSC also 

reviewed two other models, and Polaris issued a service advisory in July 2017 

offering owners a close off kit to fix the problem. 

Appellants bought Polaris ATVs. They sued, alleging that Polaris failed to 

disclose the heat defect, which “artificially inflated the market price for ATVs.” D.

Ct. Dkt. 66 at 2. Six plaintiffs in six states sought to certify a nationwide class under 

Minnesota consumer protection laws for consumers who purchased new (1) MY 

(Model Year) 2016–17 Sportsman 450s; (2) MY2014–17 Sportsman 570s; 

(3) MY2009–16 Sportsman 850s; and (4) MY2015–2016 Sportsman 1000s. 

Alternatively, they asked the district court to certify six statewide classes for ATV 

owners in California, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and North Carolina, 

under the laws of each state. 

1

The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District 

of Minnesota.
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The district court denied the motion for class certification for three reasons. 

First, the putative classes included plaintiffs who did not suffer an injury. Second, 

questions involving individual members predominated over questions of law or fact 

common to class members. Finally, the district court found that a class action was 

not superior to individualized methods of adjudication. The plaintiffs appealed.

II. 

To certify a class, a district court must find that the plaintiffs satisfy all the 

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and one of the subsections of 

Rule 23(b). Hale v. Emerson Elec. Co., 942 F.3d 401, 403 (8th Cir. 2019). “The 

district court has broad discretion to decide whether certification is appropriate.” 

Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation 

omitted). We review a district court’s denial of class certification for abuse of 

discretion. Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1004 (8th 

Cir. 2004). 

A.

Appellants tried to certify the classes under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3)’s

predominance requirement requires courts to ask “whether the common, 

aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the 

non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 

Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (citation omitted). “An individual question 

is one where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies 

from member to member, while a common question is one where the same evidence 

will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing or the issue is 

susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” Id. (citation omitted) (cleaned up). 

“The predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive 

to warrant adjudication by representation, and goes to the efficiency of a class action 

as an alternative to individual suits.” Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 479 

(8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (cleaned up). 
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 In In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., we held that a district court abused its 

discretion by certifying a class of plaintiffs that alleged material misrepresentations 

concerning heart valve replacements in violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud 

Act. 522 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2008). We noted that fraud cases are ill-suited for 

class actions because they require individualized findings on whether the plaintiffs

actually relied on the alleged misrepresentation. Id. at 838. The defendants there 

put on evidence showing that the plaintiffs did not remember whether their doctors 

mentioned the unique qualities of the valve. Id. at 839. Considering this rebuttal 

evidence, we held that individual issues predominated over common questions. Id.

at 841. 

 

The same is true here. Plaintiffs’ nationwide class action complaint alleges 

violations of the MCFA, so rebuttal evidence is permitted. See St. Jude, 522 F.3d at

840. Polaris has evidence challenging how much each consumer-plaintiff relied on 

the alleged omissions. It showed that some of the named plaintiffs are previous 

Polaris owners who bought new ATVs despite earlier experiences with the alleged 

defect. A couple of these owners tried to sell their ATVs to third parties and said 

they were in excellent condition—without mentioning a heat defect. While a jury is 

free to reject this evidence, Polaris may present it. This will require individualized 

findings on reliance and is likely to make for multiple mini-trials within the class 

action. Because these fact issues will predominate, the district court was within its 

discretion to deny the motion for class certification on this basis. 

B. 

Appellants also argue that the district court should have certified six statewide classes for the states of California, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, 

and North Carolina. But at least two2 of these proposed classes—Minnesota and 

2

Appellants take issue with the district court’s ruling that individualized fact 

issues would predominate in the California class. Whether the California Unfair 

Competition Law requires a showing of reliance is “uncertain.” Avritt v. Reliastar

Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010); compare Cohen v. DIRECTV, 
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North Carolina—require individualized fact findings on the issue of reliance. See

St. Jude, 522 F.3d at 838–39 (MCFA requires a showing of reliance); see also 

Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 781 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 2015) 

(affirming dismissal of claim under North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act because “plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege justifiable reliance 

on any omission”). Consistent with our holding above, we agree with the district 

court that those two statewide classes have individual questions that predominate. 

C. 

The Appellants say that even if classes could not be certified as Minnesota 

and North Carolina classes, the district court could have certified class actions for 

the remaining four states. Under Rule 23(b)(3), even if common questions 

predominate, a class can only be certified if the district court finds “that a class action 

is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 

controversy.” 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification for 

superiority reasons. The district court found that class action was not superior 

because the underlying issues in the case “would present a significant risk of jury 

confusion and would create enormous challenges to trial management.” D. Ct. Dkt.

453 at 83. This was based on the observation that the proposed classes will require 

application of the laws of four different states to forty-three different vehicle 

configurations, including at least four different engines, with changing exhaust 

standards through the years, and various attempts by Polaris to remedy the problems. 

Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (affirming denial of class 

certification because of individualized showings of reliance), with Mass. Mut. Life 

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting 

that the fact that “a defendant may be able to defeat the showing of causation as to a 

few individual class members does not transform the common question into a 

multitude of individual ones”). Today, we conclude simply that fact issues might 

present themselves in the California cases. 
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But those are not the only concerns here. If the lead plaintiffs are any indication, a 

sizable portion of Polaris owners have resold their ATVs, and these sales “may have 

reflected different discounts that could require vehicle-specific litigation.” In re 

Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Appellants argue that they have solved some of these problems by producing 

expert testimony on the price premium paid by purchasers, and so no individualized 

findings are needed. But cases are not tried on the evidence of one party. Polaris 

would be entitled to present contrary evidence suggesting the price premium theory 

does not appropriately provide proper damages figures for each specific class 

member. The district judge would then need to weigh how to instruct the jury to 

take these differing theories into account, especially as they relate to different state 

laws applying to different model years, different vehicle configurations, and 

different recall efforts. The district court was uniquely positioned to assess these

management concerns and it was within its discretion to deny class certification on 

this basis. 

Appellants also say that the district court focused too much on manageability, 

ignoring the other factors in Rule 23(b)(3). They argue that concentrating the 

litigation would be valuable to the individual class members because of the relatively 

small amount of individual damages and that Minnesota is the ideal venue for 

litigation because it is where Polaris is at home. We do not discount either of these 

interests. We assume Polaris would prefer to litigate (whether individually or on a 

class-wide basis) in Minnesota. But these interests do not outweigh the monumental 

manageability concerns. The putative classes simply seek to consolidate too many 

claims with too many variables. The district court was well positioned to weigh this, 

and the record supports its superseding concern that the litigation would be 

unmanageable. See Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 70–72 (4th Cir. 

1977) (extreme manageability concerns precluded certification); see also Vega v. TMobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (suggesting manageability 

issues alone “likely” show superiority was not met); Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. 

LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir. 2015) (“While Rule 23(b)(3) sets out four individual 
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factors for courts to consider, manageability is, by the far, the most critical concern 

in determining whether a class action is a superior means of adjudication.”) (citation 

omitted).

III. 

There is a more fundamental problem here. “Although federal courts do not 

require that each member of a class submit evidence of personal standing, a class 

cannot be certified if it contains members who lack standing.” Avritt, 615 F.3d at

1034 (citation omitted). “A class must therefore be defined in such a way that 

anyone within it would have standing.” Id. (citation omitted). “If members who 

lack the ability to bring a suit themselves are included in a class, the court lacks 

jurisdiction over their claims.” In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prod. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 

604, 616 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional understanding of a case 

or controversy.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised 

(May 24, 2016). “The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to 

maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Id. To satisfy 

Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal 

connection between the injury and conduct complained of; and (3) the likelihood 

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citation omitted). “To establish injury in 

fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected 

interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (citation omitted). “It is well established 

that purchasers of an allegedly defective product have no legally recognizable claim 

where the alleged defect has not manifested itself in the product they own.” Briehl 

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

Appellants did not define their class to make sure all proposed members have 

standing. While Appellants seek to certify classes for everyone who bought the 
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models in question, evidence at the class certification stage shows that not all of the 

ATVs manifested the alleged heat defect. For example, Polaris employee Robin 

Stroot said that the panels on his own Sportsman 850 did not melt—the key defect

manifestation alleged in the model—because his ATV had a larger gap between the 

exhaust and the engine than others. And Appellants’ own briefing before the district 

court acknowledges only that the “the high [exhaust gas temperatures] and low 

clearance create melt risks to the ATV and burn risks to the rider.” D. Ct. Dkt. 335 

at 30 (emphasis added). But “[i]t is not enough to allege that a product line contains 

a defect or that a product is at risk for manifesting this defect; rather, the plaintiffs 

must allege that their product actually exhibited the alleged defect.” O’Neil v. 

Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 

Appellants try to reframe the issue by saying that there is an inherent heat 

defect common to all Polaris ATVs. This misses the mark. That ATVs run “hot” is 

not the subject of our inquiry; what matters is whether the heat caused injury. Zurn

helps demonstrate. There, we found homeowners who had brass fittings installed in 

their pipes had standing. 644 F.3d at 617. But the fact that the pipe fittings were 

made of brass was inconsequential. Id. What mattered was that the fittings 

developed cracks “as soon as they [were] exposed to domestic water.” Id. In the 

same way, we care little about the temperatures in the ATVs—whether five or five 

hundred degrees hotter. Of course, increased temperatures lead to greater risks of 

injury. But even if the ATVs run “hot,” Article III standing will only rest on the 

actual injury Polaris owners suffer when they use their vehicles at high temperatures. 

Appellants’ attempt to sidestep the manifest defect rule fails. They say that 

the manifest defect line of cases is inapposite because they can show economic injury 

by the mere fact that they paid an inflated purchase price. They also claim the 

average ATV buyer would not pay the sticker price if they knew how hot the engine 

ran. In other words, because some buyers did not receive the benefit of the bargain, 

all buyers should have paid less for their ATVs. And because all class members paid 

sticker price, all class members suffered an economic injury. At its core, Appellants’ 

argument is that purchasers without manifest defects should be able to piggyback on
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the injury caused to those with manifest defects. That theory is in direct conflict 

with the manifest defect rule and does not create an Article III injury-in-fact. See, 

e.g., O’Neil, 574 F.3d at 504 (“[B]ecause the O’Neils’ crib has not exhibited the 

alleged defect, they have necessarily received the benefit of their bargain.”). 

In this circuit, plaintiffs claiming economic injury do not have Article III 

standing in product defect cases unless they show a manifest defect. Some class 

members cannot. Because the class has not been “defined in such a way that anyone 

within it would have standing,” the class cannot be certified. Avritt, 615 F.3d at

1034 (citation omitted).

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IV. 

The district court’s denial of the motion for class certification is affirmed. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 

I concur in the judgment because I agree the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying class certification. Yet I write separately to express my view 

that the plaintiffs nevertheless had standing to pursue their claims on behalf of the 

proposed class. 

 

3

The separate opinion says that we have required every plaintiff to submit 

evidence of their individual standing. Not so. Instead, we merely conclude that a 

class cannot be certified where it is defined in such a way to include individuals who 

lack standing. The class here included all Polaris purchasers. Admissible evidence 

showed that the increased temperatures do not produce manifest defects in all Polaris

vehicles. To comply with the rule in our circuit, a properly drawn class could only 

include those members that have suffered a manifest defect. See Forrest v. Polaris 

Ind., ___ F.4th ___ (8th Cir. August 16, 2021). We recognize this may present other 

challenges. See Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1277 (11th Cir. 2019)

(remanding to district court to consider whether individual fact questions over 

standing would predominate under Rule 23(b)(3)). We need not address those today. 
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The Supreme Court has said that whether a suit is a class action “adds nothing 

to the question of standing.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 n.6 

(2016) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)). 

“The requirements for standing do not change in the class action context,” and a 

class action “can proceed as long as one named plaintiff has standing.” In re 

SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017); see 1 William B. Rubenstein, 

Newberg on Class Actions § 2:1 (5th ed. 2012) (“Once threshold individual standing 

by the class representative is met . . . there is no further, separate ‘class action 

standing’ requirement.”). Accordingly, whether “the named plaintiff who meets 

individual standing requirements may assert the rights of absent class members is 

neither a standing issue nor an Article III case or controversy issue.” Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 395–96 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 

concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg 

on Class Actions § 2.07 (3d ed. 1992)). Rather, it “depends . . . on meeting the 

prerequisites of Rule 23 governing class actions.” Id. (cleaned up).

In my view, to conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing simply because there 

is no evidence that all potential class members experienced the alleged heat defect 

is to conflate the requirements for standing with those for class certification. We 

previously held in Avritt v. Reliastar Life Insurance Company, 615 F.3d 1023 (8th 

Cir. 2010) that “a class cannot be certified if it contains members who lack standing.” 

Id. at 1034 (citing Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 

2006)). But to my knowledge we have never required potential class members to 

submit evidence of their standing “so long as every class member contemplated by 

the class definition can allege standing.” In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 

804 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up); see Denney, 443 F.3d at 263 (“We do not require 

that each member of a class submit evidence of personal standing.”). 

Here, the plaintiffs allege that the ATVs “have a common design defect that 

makes them dangerous to ride.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2. They further assert that the ATVs’ 

exhaust pipes heat up and cause vehicle components to melt, exposing riders “to 

temperatures up to nearly 250 °F” and potential burns. Id. The named plaintiffs 
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claim to have experienced this defect in the ATVs they purchased. See id. ¶ ¶ 44–

70. This is sufficient to establish their standing to pursue claims on behalf of the 

class. See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 768. Further, because the plaintiffs allege 

that all of the ATVs at issue suffered from this common defect, they have, in my 

view, defined the proposed class “in such a way that anyone within it would have 

standing.” Avritt, 615 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Denney, 443 F.3d at 264); see Stuart 

v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 910 F.3d 371, 377 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Whether some 

plaintiffs [or class members] are unable to prove damages . . . is a merits question, 

and the district court has the power to amend the class definition at any time before 

judgment.”). 

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