alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 171 (Wednesday, September 8, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 50380]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19468]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION


Notice of Permits Issued Under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 
1978

AGENCY: National Science Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of permit issued.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Science Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Polly Penhale, ACA Permit Officer, 
Office of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower 
Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; 703-292-8030; email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#15545654657067787c6166557b66733b727a63"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="de9f9d9faebbacb3b7aaad9eb0adb8f0b9b1a8">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 27, 2021, the National Science 
Foundation published a notice in the Federal Register of a permit 
application received. The permit was issued on September 2, 2021, to:

Permit No. 2022-05

1. Leidos Innovations Group: Antarctic Support Contract

Erika N. Davis,
Program Specialist, Office of Polar Programs.
[FR Doc. 2021-19468 Filed 9-7-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555-01-P


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Exhibit 4(e)

 

PROTECTIVE   LIFE   INSURANCE   COMPANY           P.  O.  BOX   1928           BIRMINGHAM,   ALABAMA   35201-1928

 

— ENDORSEMENT —

WAIVER OF WITHDRAWAL CHARGE AND MARKET VALUE ADJUSTMENT

for Unemployment

 

We are amending your Contract to add a Waiver of Withdrawal Charge and Market Value Adjustment for Unemployment.  This endorsement remains in effect until the Annuity Date, or until the Contract to which it is attached is cancelled, surrendered or otherwise terminated.  Termination of this endorsement shall not prejudice any waiver while the endorsement was in force.  The terms and conditions in this endorsement supersede any conflicting provision in the Contract.  Contract provisions not expressly modified by this endorsement remain in full force and effect.

 

Waiver of Withdrawal Charge and Market Value Adjustment for Unemployment — We will waive any applicable withdrawal charge and market value adjustment if, after the Contract’s Issue Date, either you or your spouse met all of the following Qualifying Conditions:

 

1)             were employed full-time on the Issue Date; and,

2)             have been unemployed for at least 60 consecutive calendar days prior to claiming the waiver; and,

3)             remain unemployed on the date the withdrawal is requested.

 

For the purposes of this endorsement, the term ‘spouse’ includes bona fide domestic partners or civil union partners in jurisdictions that afford legal recognition to domestic partnerships or civil unions.

 

If any Owner is not an individual, unemployment of the Annuitant (or Annuitant’s spouse) will be used when endorsement provisions refer to unemployment of the Owner (or Owner’s spouse).

 

You must request the waiver and submit proof satisfactory to us that the Qualifying Conditions described above have been met.

 

Once the waiver is granted, it remains in effect as long as the three Qualifying Conditions continue unless you take either of the following actions (if permitted under your Contract in the absence of this endorsement):

 

1)             you submit and we accept Purchase Payment and we apply it to the Contract; or,

2)             you take an action that establishes a new withdrawal charge period.

 

If either event occurs, you may request a subsequent waiver provided the three Qualifying Conditions are again met.

 

If we deny the waiver, your withdrawal request will not be processed until you have been notified of the denial and we provide you the opportunity to re-apply for the waiver or cancel your request.

 

Signed for the Company and made a part of the Contract as of its Issue Date.

 

PROTECTIVE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

 



 

Steve M. Callaway, Secretary

 

SG-GFA-P-5031
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 99.4

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of CD&L, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Russell J. Reardon, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of
                  the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated
                  results of operations of the Company for the periods
                  presented.

Dated: August 13, 2003


                                           \s\ Russell J. Reardon
                                           -----------------------------------
                                           Russell J. Reardon
                                           Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Annual Report of The Majestic Star Casino, LLC
and The Majestic Star Casino Capital Corp. (collectively, the "Registrant") on
Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Don H. Barden,
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of The Majestic Star Casino, LLC
and The Majestic Star Casino Capital Corp., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.



By: /s/ Don H. Barden
   ------------------------------------------------
    Don H. Barden, Manager, Chairman, President
    and Chief Executive Officer of The
    Majestic Star Casino, LLC and The Majestic
    Star Casino Capital Corp.
    Date: March 31, 2003


         A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSE SANTIAGO RIVERA VALLE, AKA 

Jose Santiago Rivera, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50249 

D.C. No. 8:13-cr-00034-AG-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 8, 2020**

Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Jose Santiago Rivera Valle appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges the 13-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Valle contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 13 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-50249

consider his mitigating arguments and relying on a clearly erroneous fact regarding 

his criminal history. The district court did not plainly err. See United States v. 

Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). The record shows that 

the district court considered Valle’s arguments for a shorter sentence and expressly 

discussed some of them. The court was not required to address specifically each of 

Valle’s arguments. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358-59 (2007). The 

record does not show that the district court relied on a clearly erroneous fact when, 

in the course of explaining the basis for the sentence, it stated that past periods of 

incarceration had not fully deterred Valle and protected the community from his 

criminal activity. See United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 816 (9th Cir. 

2016) (stating standard).

Valle also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

51 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including 

Valle’s immigration and criminal history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 USC
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Medallion Financial Corp. (the Company) for the quarter ending September 30, 2017 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based on my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.



|                                                  |  |                  
|------------------------------------------------- |  | -----------------
|By:                                               |  | /s/ Larry D. Hall
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

Date: November 9, 2017
# L_2013234DE.01002701.xml

| 3.9.2013 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 234/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2013

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 234/27

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 443/2009 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 23. April 2009 zur Festsetzung von Emissionsnormen für neue Personenkraftwagen im Rahmen des Gesamtkonzepts der Gemeinschaft zur Verringerung der CO2-Emissionen von Personenkraftwagen und leichten Nutzfahrzeugen

2

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 140 vom 5. Juni 2009
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 140 vom 5. Juni 2009

Seite 8, Artikel 9 Absatz 2 Buchstabe a Ziffer ii:

anstatt:

„Formula;“

muss es heißen:

„Formula;“.

---
#### *In re*Pierce.

*(Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County.*

December, 1889.)

Vendor and Vendee—Rights of Vendee—Damages for Opening Street.

Where a deed of land, executed two years after the report of the commissioners awarding damages for opening a street through the same was confirmed, recites that it excepted “from said premises so much thereof as has been taken for the opening of Girard avenue, ” but did not refer to the award which had been made for the part taken, the vendee is not entitled to the damages awarded.

At chambers. Petition by Madeline Pierce for an order that the comptroller of the city of New York be directed to pay to her damages awarded by the board of commissioners of estimate and assessments for injuries caused by opening Girard avenue to property conveyed to her after the report of the commissioners had been confirmed.

*G. A. Moses,*for petitioner. *Varnum & Harrison,*for respondent Harrison.

Lawrence, J.

It was held in *King v. City of New York,*102 N. Y. 171, 6 N. E. Rep. 395, that where, under a statute closing a highway, damages were directed to be awarded and paid to the owners of premises injured by the closing, the right to such damages was personal, and belonged to one who was the owner at the time of the closing, although before the award he had conveyed his title; and in that case it was also held, the owner having conveyed the premises after the statutory closing of the highway bounding the lands conveyed by the highway, that the deed did not convey an easement in the highway which entitled the grantee to the damages subsequently awarded, and that the latter was chargeable with knowledge that the highway no longer existed, and was to be presumed to have purchased in view of that fact. The principles established by that case seem to me to be decisive of this motion. The report of the commissioners of estimates and assessment in the matter of Girard avenue was confirmed on the 23d of January, 1888. The deed to the petitioner from Mr. Harrison, who at the time was the owner of the premises for which the award now claimed was granted, was executed on the 26th of September, 1889, and recorded October 8, 1889. The description of the premises conveyed contains this clause: “Excepting, however, from said premises, so much thereof as has been taken for the opening of Girard avenue.” There is no allusion in the deed to the award which had been made for the portion of the premises taken for Girard avenue, and it is clear that the petitioner could not have supposed that she was purchasing either said premises, or the award made for the taking of the same, inasmuch as her deed bears date 22 months after the confirmation of the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment. If there is anything in the case of *Mayor*v. *Curran,*3 N. Y. Supp. 533, which is in conflict with these views, I must be controlled in disposing of this motion by the case of *King*v. *Mayor,*above referred to. The prayer of the petitioner must therefore be denied.
Administrative History A

(AHAHG)

April 21, 201

Administrative History Pilot P
 Effective an

provide his

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one year
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Quintrell Joe, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 522]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered August 31, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree. The judgment was affirmed by order of this Court entered September 30, 2011 (87 AD3d 1266 [2011]), and defendant on December 16, 2011 was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order of this Court (18 NY3d 859 [2011]), and the Court of Appeals on May 8, 2012 reversed the order and remitted the case to this Court for clarification of the basis of this Court’s decision (19 NY3d 842 [2012]).

Now, upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals,

It is hereby ordered that, upon remittitur from the Court of Appeals, the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On a prior appeal *(People v Joe,*87 AD3d 1266 [2011], *revd*19 NY3d 842 [2012]), we summarily affirmed the judgment convicting defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.18 [1]). Defendant’s sole contention was that his sentence was unduly harsh and severe. In reversing our order, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was impermissible for this Court to affirm the judgment summarily “without indicating whether [we] relied on the waiver [of the right to appeal] or determined that the sentencing claim lacked merit” *(Joe,*19 NY3d at 844). The Court remitted the matter to this Court “for clarification of the basis of [our] decision” *(id.).*

Upon remittitur, we conclude that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal is invalid inasmuch as the minimal perfunctory inquiry made by Supreme Court was “insufficient to establish that the court cengage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice’ ” *(People v Brown,*296 AD2d 860 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 767 [2002]; *see People v Hamilton,*49 AD3d 1163, 1164 [2008]). We further conclude, however, that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present — Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra and Fahey, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 5, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-60255 Summary Calendar

ARACELY ZAMORA-GARCIA, Petitioner,

versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

-------------------- Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A37 005 740

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Aracely Zamora-Garcia, a citizen of Mexico, has filed a petition seeking review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing her appeal of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision to deny her application for cancellation of removal as untimely. Because Zamora-Garcia’s petition for initial hearing en banc does not meet the requirements set forth in F ED . R. A PP . P. 35(b), that petition is DENIED. Respondent’s motion for summary disposition and Zamora-Garcia’s motion toNo. 04-60255 -2- strike respondent’s motion are DENIED. Further briefing, however, is not necessary. Zamora-Garcia argues that the BIA and IJ had a duty to protect her from the alleged ineffectiveness of her accredited representative (“AR”). We are unaware of and Zamora-Garcia does not cite any authority which supports or forms a basis for her argument. Zamora-Garcia also argues that the BIA erred byrejecting her ineffective-assistance claim. Because ZamoraGarcia’s claim did not implicate the violation of a due process right, the BIA did not err in denying her claim for lack of prejudice. See Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft , 349 F.3d 213, 214-15 (5th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Zamora-Garcia’s petition for review is denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED; PETITION FOR INITIAL HEARING EN BANC, MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, AND MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION DENIED.
#### David S. TAYLOR; Toby C. Taylor, Petitioners-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Bank of America, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 06-51642

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 17, 2007.

David S. Taylor, Pflugerville, TX, pro se.

Toby C. Taylor, Pflugerville, TX, pro se.

David I. Pincus, Francesca Ugolini Tamami, John Arthur Schumann, U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division Appellate Section, Washington, DC, Steven B. Bass, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Austin, TX, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

*483PER CURIAM: *

David and Toby Taylor challenge, *pro se,*the district court’s denial of their petition to quash two summonses issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to Bank of America requesting their bank records. They were issued in furtherance of the IRS’ investigating Appellants’ 2003-2005 tax liability. Appellants assert three claims, all of which lack merit.

First, Appellants contend the IRS lacks authority to issue summonses for their bank records because, *inter alia,*“the Internal Revenue Code is *not*the law”. (Emphasis added). Contrary to Appellants’ contentions, Title 26 of the United States Code grants the IRS expansive information-gathering authority, including the power to issue summonses to compel disclosure. *E.g.,*26 U.S.C. § 7602 (authorizing IRS to examine records, issue summonses, and take testimony to verify tax returns and determine tax liability) and 7609 (authorizing the IRS to “compel compliance with the summons”); *see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,*465 U.S. 805, 816, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 79 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984).

Second, Appellants contend they are *not*within any class of persons to whom the IRS may issue summonses, and the summonses lack a legitimate purpose. Section 7602(a) authorizes the IRS to issue summonses concerning *“any*person for *any*internal revenue tax”. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (emphasis added). Third-party summonses, like those issued here, are explicitly authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2). The burden on the Government to establish a *prima facie*case to enforce a summons is “slight” or “minimal”. *Mazurek v. United States,*271 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.2001) (internal citation omitted); *see also United States v. Powell,*379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) (identifying four factors the IRS must establish for summons enforcement). For the reasons stated by the district court, the IRS satisfied the *Powell*factors. Concomitantly, Appellants have *not*fulfilled their “heavy” burden of rebutting the Government’s *prima facie*case. *Mazurek,*271 F.3d at 230.

Finally, Appellants, United States citizens residing in Texas, claim the IRS lacks jurisdiction to investigate their tax liability or enforce tax laws. This contention is nonsensical. *See, e.g., Powell,*379 U.S. at 50-51, 85 S.Ct. 248; *Barquero v. United States,*18 F.3d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir.1994).

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### PEOPLE, Respondent, v. VAN HOUTEN, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

December 2, 1895.)

Edward C. Van Houten was convicted before a police justice of violating an ordinance of the village of Nyack. For decision of the court of sessions, see 35 N. Y. Supp. 186.

G. Z. Snider, for appellant.

Alonzo Wheeler and Richard S. Harvey, for the People.

PRATT, J.

In this case, that the defendant was guilty of violating a village ordinance; that he was tried for the same, and fined a sum authorized by law for such violation,—is not disputed. There is no material question raised upon this appeal that is not answered by the opinion of the county judge, and the cases quoted by him therein. Whether we call the decision of the police justice a fine or a penalty is not material, or whether we call the offense for which he was tried a crime or a violation of a city ordinance is equally immaterial, as a police justice simply imposed what he had power to impose under the law and the village charter. We need go back no further in point of time than the moment the defendant appeared for trial before the police court, as it is not material how he got there, as no objection was raised to the jurisdiction, but only that the offense with which lie was charged was not a crime. The defendant well knew the ordinance under which he was charged, and, upon the facts, made no substantial defense. It seems plain that the legislature intended that villages «should have the power to pass such an ordinance as now under consideration, and that the penalty might be imposed for its violation, and its collection enforced by imprisonment not exceeding 10 days in county jail, and the decision of the police court here under review was in accordance with such provisions. The request for a jury trial was properly overruled. No right of defendant was prejudiced, further than authorized by law. Judgment affirmed. All concur.