IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR NORTH 

AMERICA, INC., an Oregon corporation,

No. 3:15-cv-00064-HZ

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

v.

SEIRUS INNOVATIVE ACCESSORIES,

a Utah corporation,

Defendant.

Devon Zastrow Newman

David W. Axelrod

Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt, PC

1211 SW Fifth Avenue, Ste. 1800

Portland, OR 97204

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Eric M. Jaegers 

Troutman Sanders LLP 

11682 El Camino Real, Ste. 400 

San Diego, CA 92130 

Matthew D. Murphey 

Troutman Sanders LLP 

5 Park Plaza , Ste. 1400 

Irvine, CA 92614 

Paul E. McGowan

Troutman Sanders LLP 

600 Peachtree St. NE, Ste. 5200

Atlanta, GA 30308 

Lisa D. Hardie 

Troutman Sanders LLC 

805 SW Broadway, Ste. 1650 

Portland, OR 97205 

Attorneys for Defendant

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Plaintiff, Columbia Sportswear North America, Inc. (“Columbia”), alleges that Defendant 

Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc. (“Seirus”), a Utah corporation with a principal place of 

business in California, has infringed Columbia’s patents related to a heat reflective lining for 

outdoor sporting gear. Currently before the Court is Seirus’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, to transfer venue to the Southern District of California. 

The Court has personal jurisdiction over Seirus because it intentionally targeted the forum by 

selling allegedly infringing products directly to Oregon retailers. Also, since the multi-factor 

analysis which guides the Court’s decision to transfer venue is essentially balanced between the 

parties, the Court defers to Columbia’s choice of venue. Accordingly, Seirus’s motion is denied.

//

//

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BACKGROUND

Columbia is a Portland, Oregon based outdoor company with more than $2.1 billion in 

global annual sales. Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss/Transfer Venue (“Pl. Resp.”) at 3. 

Columbia owns and controls U.S. Patent Nos. D657,093 (“ ‘093 patent”), 8,424,119 (“ ‘119 

patent), and 8,453,270 (“ ‘270 patent”). Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 2. Collectively, those patents 

protect Columbia’s Omni-Heat technology, a heat reflective material that retains body heat but 

allows for breathability and moisture wicking. Compl. ¶ 2. The Omni-Heat material is used as a 

lining in a variety of outdoor gear such as jackets, shirts, gloves, and more. Compl. ¶ 2.

Seirus is a Utah corporation with a principal place of business in Poway, California. 

Compl. ¶ 5. Seirus sells its own brand of cold weather gear, including gloves and glove liners 

with a breathable, heat reflective material it calls HEATWAVE. Compl. ¶¶ 20–21. Columbia 

alleges that Seirus’s HEATWAVE product infringes its Omni-Heat patents, and that Columbia 

purchased gloves featuring Seirus’s HEATWAVE product at various stores in Oregon. Complat 

¶¶ 25, 26–47. 

Before it could substantiate Seirus’s products were available for purchase in Oregon, 

Columbia filed a patent infringement action against Seirus in December, 2013, in the Western 

District of Washington. Compl. ¶ 9. Seirus filed a similar motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction because, it argued, it lacked any meaningful contacts with the forum. Defendant’s 

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Memo.”), at 8. Columbia sought leave to 

conduct jurisdictional discovery, but the court denied the motion and ordered Columbia to 

respond to Seirus’s motion to dismiss or transfer venue. Compl. ¶ 13. In the interim, Columbia 

confirmed that Seirus’s HEATWAVE products were available in Oregon. Compl. ¶ 12. Since 

Seirus had yet to file an answer in the Washington case, Columbia promptly filed a notice of 

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dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(a), and subsequently filed the 

instant action in the District of Oregon. Compl. ¶ 15–16. 

Seirus now moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because it lacks the 

“minimum contacts” with Oregon required to support a constitutional exercise of this Court’s 

personal jurisdiction over it. Alternatively, Seirus seeks to transfer this case to the Southern 

District of California because it is a more convenient forum. 

STANDARDS

I. Personal Jurisdiction

Federal Circuit law, rather than regional circuit law, determines whether a district court 

has personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent infringement case. Avocent Huntsville 

Corp. v. Aten Intern. Co. Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). If the parties have not 

conducted discovery, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the defendant is 

subject to personal jurisdiction. Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201 

(Fed. Cir. 2003). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

without holding an evidentiary hearing, the court construes the pleadings and affidavits in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Graphics Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Products, 

Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1383 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in a patent-related dispute involves 

two questions: whether jurisdiction exists under the forum state’s long-arm statute, and if so, 

whether asserting personal jurisdiction is consistent with the limitations of the Due Process 

Clause of the federal Constitution. Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Products, Inc., 395 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2005). These inquiries essentially merge because Oregon’s long-arm 

statute extends jurisdiction to the outer limits of due process. Invellop, LLC v. Bovino, No. 3:14-

cv-00033-SI, 2014 WL 3478866, at *2 (D. Or. July 11, 2014); see also Trintec, 395 F.3d at 1279 

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(“collaps[ing]” the two-part inquiry where a state’s long arm statute is coextensive with the 

limits of due process).

The Due Process Clause “protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to 

the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or 

relations.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). To satisfy this due process protection, the plaintiff must show that 

the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of 

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). “The requirement for purposeful minimum contacts 

helps ensure that non-residents have fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to 

litigation in the forum.” Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 

(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 

“Under the ‘minimum contacts’ test, a defendant may be subject to either specific 

jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 

1375 (Fed.Cir. 2000). A court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that 

defendant has “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state. Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). A court has specific 

jurisdiction where “the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the 

forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those 

activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see 

also Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at 1563 n.10 (citation omitted). Thus, in “contrast to general, 

all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, 

or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

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Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

A district court can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant subject to a 

three-part test. First, the defendant must have purposefully directed its activities at residents of 

the forum. Second, the plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to those activities. And third, 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable and fair. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford 

Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. 

Metabolite Labs, Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Under this test, a court may 

properly assert specific jurisdiction “even if the contacts are isolated and sporadic,” so long as 

the cause of action arises out of or relates to those contacts. Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., 

Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73). The 

plaintiff bears the burden at step one and two, but the burden shifts to the defendant at step three 

to prove that personal jurisdiction is unreasonable. Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 

1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

II. Transfer Venue

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 

may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is proper, the Federal Circuit applies 

regional circuit law. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1222–23 (Fed. Cir. 

2011). For purposes of adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the court resolves factual conflicts 

and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Benchmade Knife Co. v. 

Benson, No. CIV. 08-967-HA, 2010 WL 988465, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 2010) (citing Murphy v. 

Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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DISCUSSION

I. Personal Jurisdiction

Columbia concedes that Seirus is not subject to general jurisdiction in this district.

Instead, Columbia relies on specific jurisdiction and argues that Seirus has “directed its 

commercial activities to Oregon,” through both direct sales of infringing and other products in 

the state and its sales to national vendors with outlets in Oregon. Pl. Resp. at 11–12.

Seirus admits it first sold an accused HEATWAVE product directly to an Oregon retailer 

in December of 2013. Def. Memo. at 4. Since that first sale, Seirus admits it sold a total of $798 

of the accused products directly to specialty stores such as ski shops and hunting stores in 

Oregon, a mere 0.0014% of its total sales in the same period. Id. Seirus contends that these direct 

sales amount to only an “attenuated affiliation” that cannot support personal jurisdiction in this 

District. Def. Reply at 3–4. 

The value of Seirus’s direct sales in Oregon may be small, but there is no dispute that 

Seirus has sold products directly into the forum, and that Columbia’s suit arises out of or relates 

to those sales. That is all that is required for Columbia to make a prima facie showing that the 

Court has personal jurisdiction over Seirus. See Patent Enforcement Group, LLC v. Chassis 

Tech, LLC, No. 3:11-cv-925-BR, 2012 WL 12678, at *5 (D. Or. Jan 3, 2012) (finding direct 

sales totaling less than $1,000 over twelve year span sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction 

because defendant “anticipat[ed] that the allegedly infringing products would be sold to 

customers in Oregon.”); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Belkin Intern., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 868, 883 (N.D. Cal. 

2011) (finding personal jurisdiction in a patent infringement case where defendant made direct 

sales into the forum five years prior to filing suit). Notably, Seirus admits to making its first 

direct sale of the allegedly infringing product to an Oregon retailer on or about December 20, 

2013, approximately three weeks after Columbia had filed its first patent infringement suit 

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against Seirus in the Western District of Washington. Seirus was, therefore, on notice that 

Columbia was the owner of the allegedly infringed patents, was a citizen and resident of Oregon, 

and was the party who would be injured by Seirus’s ongoing infringement. After Columbia had 

already sued it for patent infringement, Seirus sold and shipped its allegedly infringing products 

directly to retailers in Columbia’s home state. Given its conduct in the face of Columbia’s 

pending lawsuit, Seirus surely could have “reasonably anticipated being haled into court” here. 

Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1330 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). 

Finally, the third element of the test for specific personal jurisdictions requires the 

exercise of such jurisdiction be “reasonable and fair.” Autogenomics, Inc., 566 F.3d at 1018. 

“The Supreme Court advises that the third factor applies only sparingly,” and thus the defendant 

bears a substantial burden at this step to make a “compelling case that the presence of some other 

considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Nuance Commc'ns, Inc. v. Abbyy 

Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477); 

see also Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that “defeats of 

otherwise constitutional personal jurisdiction ‘are limited to the rare situation in which the 

plaintiff's interest and the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated 

that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to litigation within the 

forum.’ ”) (quoting Beverly Hills Fan Co., 21 F.3d at 1568). 

In examining “reasonableness,” courts “consider five factors: (1) the burden on the 

defendant, (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in 

obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining 

the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the states in 

furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. 

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Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 

477). 

Seirus asserts that it would be unfair and unreasonable to subject it to this Court’s 

jurisdiction. Its officers and documents are located in California approximately 1,000 miles from 

the District of Oregon, and Seirus argues it will be uniquely burdened by litigating this matter in 

Oregon, given the small revenues generated from sales here and that Seirus is a “small 

company.” Def. Reply at 12. But those reasons do not constitute the compelling showing 

required to override the exercise of otherwise constitutional jurisdiction in this case. Seirus 

admits to doing business in this forum, both directly and indirectly through sales to national 

retailers. Columbia has a strong interest in adjudicating in this forum, its home state, a harm felt 

here that was caused by Seirus’s intentional conduct directed at this forum. The State of Oregon 

has the same interest as other states in “ensuring that its citizens are not harmed by nonresidents 

though patent infringement.” Patent Enforcement Group, LLC, 2012 WL 12678 at *7. Seirus is 

located in a neighboring jurisdiction, and the parties can use electronic document production and 

take depositions of Seirus’s witnesses in more convenient locations. 

Because Columbia has established a prima facie case that Seirus has sufficient minimum 

contacts with Oregon that are related to Columbia’s claims, and because Seirus has failed to 

show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable or unfair, Seirus’s motion 

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied. 

II. Transfer of Venue

Courts employ a two-step analysis when determining whether transfer is proper. First, a 

court must ask “whether the transferee district was one in which the action might have been 

brought by the plaintiff.” Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960). Second, if the 

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moving party makes this threshold showing, the district court has “discretion to adjudicate 

motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience 

and fairness.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Stewart 

Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)) (quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has identified a number of public and private interest factors that a 

district court may consider, including: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum, (2) the parties contacts 

with the forum, (3) convenience to the parties, (4) convenience to the witnesses, (5) availability 

of compulsory process for non-party witnesses, (6) ease of access to evidence, (7) differences in 

the costs of litigation in the two forums, (8) familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, (9) 

local interest in the controversy, and (10) the relative court congestion and time of trial in each 

forum. Id. at 498–99 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29–31); Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth 

Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986); Robertson v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV01572-HZ, 2014 WL 7240682, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 16, 2014). 

First, the Court finds that this action could have been brought in Seirus’s proposed 

alternative forum, the Southern District of California, because Seirus has its principal place of 

business there and is subject to that court’s general personal jurisdiction. As for the weighing of 

factors, the Court finds that many are neutral. Both this Court and the Southern District of 

California are equally able to adjudicate patent infringement matters. Both parties and their 

witnesses would be inconvenienced if this case is heard in the other’s preferred forum. The 

relative docket congestion between the two courts is not so significant as to tip the scales in favor 

of one party or the other. See Murphy Declaration Exhibit 11, ECF No. 16-12, at 3. Both 

localities have an interest in this matter—each party is headquartered in its preferred forum, and

both contribute to their respective local economies as employers. Oregon’s interest based on the 

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availability of Serius’s products for sale in the forum is not given significant weight for the 

purposes of determining whether to transfer venue. In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument that a forum had a “substantial interest” in having 

the case tried locally because several vehicles with the allegedly infringing headrest element 

were sold there). 

As for the parties’ contacts with the forum, Seirus admits that it has directly sold and sent 

allegedly infringing products into Columbia’s home state, and this intentional targeting of the 

forum for commercial gain weighs in Columbia’s favor.

Seirus vigorously argues that this matter should be transferred because its evidence is 

located in Southern California. Def. Reply at 14. Seirus cites In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 

1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), for the proposition that “[i]n patent infringement cases, the bulk of 

the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused infringer,” and therefore the location of 

the defendant’s documents “weighs in favor of transfer to that location.” Id. The Federal Circuit 

has instructed that district courts should not minimize the weight of this factor in light of 

technological advances such as electronic document storage and transportation, or the 

availability of video conferencing for depositions or testimony. TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1321

(quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th Cir. 2008)) (explaining “that 

access to some sources of proof presents a lesser inconvenience now than it might have absent 

recent developments does not render this factor superfluous.”). This factor weighs in Seirus’s 

favor, though given the aforementioned conveniences of modern litigation, the Court does not 

give it the conclusive weight Seirus demands.

Finally, there is ordinarily a “strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of 

forum.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981); see also Decker Coal Co., 805 

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F.2d at 843 (“The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting 

the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”). Given that the preceding factor analysis essentially stalemates, 

the Court defers to Columbia’s choice to litigate this matter in its home forum, and Seirus’s 

motion to transfer venue to the Southern District of California is denied. 

ORDER

For the reasons stated, Defendant Seirus’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction or, alternatively, transfer venue to the Southern District of California [15] is denied. 

Dated this day of ________________, 2015. 

MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ

United States District Judge

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