Opinion issued January 27, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00869-CV

———————————

TOWN & COUNTRY SUITES, L.C., Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2012-55900

O P I N I O N

On July 1, 2014, we issued an opinion in this case. Appellee HCAD filed a 

motion for rehearing. We deny the motion but withdraw our opinion and judgment 

of July 1 and issue this opinion and accompanying judgment in their stead. Our 

disposition of the case remains unchanged. 
2

This is an appeal from a property valuation dispute between the Harris 

County Appraisal District and Town & Country Suites, L.C., the owner of the 

property being appraised for tax purposes. In two issues, Town & Country 

contends that the trial court erred by granting HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction

because (1) a newly enacted Tax Code provision permits Town & Country to 

amend the pleadings appealing an appraisal determination to correct a 

misidentification1 of the property owner and, alternatively, (2) the naming error in 

this case should be considered misnomer instead of misidentification.

Because recent amendments to the Tax Code compel the conclusion that the 

trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse and remand.

Background

John Sheehan, Robert Gowan, and Barden Patterson formerly owned the 

property that is the subject of this tax valuation dispute. On November 12, 1997, 

the three conveyed their property to Town & Country. 

When HCAD issued its annual notice of the property’s appraisal value in 

2012, a notice of protest was filed, not by Town & Country (the current owner of 

the property), but by “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson” (a grouping of the individual, 

prior owners’ last names, though with a spelling error). The Harris County 

 1 Misidentification occurs when a pleading lists as a party to the litigation the wrong 

individual or entity; on the other hand, misnomer occurs when the proper party is 

included in the suit but listed with an incorrect name. See Reddy P’ship/5900 N. 

Fwy. L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373, 376–77 (Tex. 2012).
3

Appraisal Review Board responded with an Order Determining Protest, addressed 

to “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson,” notifying “[t]he above property owner” of the 

property’s assigned valuation. “Sheenan Gowan and Patterson Gowan”—another 

variation of the prior owners’ last names, again with a spelling error—filed an

appeal of that decision in district court.

The parties agree that “Sheenan Gowan and Patterson Gowan” is a 

misnomer for “Gowan Sheenan & Patterson” and that the filing by one has the 

same legal effect as a filing in the name of the other. Thus, for the purpose of this 

appeal, the party that filed the protest also appealed the Board decision. But that 

party was not the current owner, Town & Country. There is no dispute that the 

property was correctly identified in the appeal. 

HCAD answered the Gowan suit. Seven months later, HCAD filed a plea to 

the jurisdiction and attached a copy of the 1997 warranty deed listing Town & 

Country as the property owner. HCAD contended that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the suit because the true property 

owner—Town & Country—had not filed an appeal within the 60-day limitations 

period, as required by section 42.21(a) of the Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 42.21(a) (West Supp. 2014). Town & Country responded that “Gowan Sheenan 

and Patterson” had been listed on the HCAD appraisal rolls as the property owner 

“for at least 15 years” and that it mistakenly filed suit under the Gowan name due 
4

to HCAD’s record error. Town & Country attempted to correct the error by filing 

an amended petition naming Town & Country as the property owner. 

HCAD filed a second plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that an amendment to 

identify a different entity as the property owner is not permitted. According to 

HCAD, the trial court never “acquire[d] subject-matter jurisdiction and the 

[Board]’s determination became final” because the property owner was not the 

party that pursued the appeal within the statutory deadline. HCAD again requested 

dismissal of the suit. 

Town & Country responded by alerting the trial court to an amendment to 

section 42.21 of the Tax Code, which Town & Country argued changed the law to 

allow the trial court to retain jurisdiction despite the naming error. See TEX. TAX 

CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (West Supp. 2014) (effective June 14, 2013). Alternatively, 

Town & Country argued that the error should be viewed as a misnomer, which 

may be corrected by amendment and does not require dismissal. TEX. TAX CODE 

ANN. § 42.21(e).

The trial court granted HCAD’s plea to the jurisdiction. Town & Country 

timely appealed.
5

Standards of Review

A. Pleas to the jurisdiction and standing 

A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 

(Tex. 2000); Pineda v. City of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Standing is a component of subject matter 

jurisdiction and is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit under 

Texas law. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–45 

(Tex. 1993). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to 

decide a case and is never presumed. Id. at 443–44.

The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that 

the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446; Richardson v. First Nat’l 

Life Ins. Co., 419 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. 1967). The existence of subject matter 

jurisdiction is a question of law. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. 

Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 

S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Therefore, we review de novo the trial court’s ruling 

on a plea to the jurisdiction. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928.

Town & Country argues that the 2013 amendment to section 42.21 of the 

Tax Code has changed the law on subject matter jurisdiction concerning the 
6

standing of misidentified property owners. We, therefore, consider the standard of 

review for statutory construction as well.

B. Statutory construction

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 

S.W.3d 248, 254–55 (Tex. 2012). The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held 

that when courts construe statutes, they should start with the text because it is the 

best indication of the Legislature’s intent. See Fresh Coat, Inc. v. K–2, Inc., 318 

S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. 2010); Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 

433, 437 (Tex. 2009). “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this 

first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. 

United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981)). A court should 

interpret a statute by reference to its language alone when it can do so. Fresh Coat,

318 S.W.3d at 901. Courts, however, are not confined to isolated statutory words 

or phrases; instead they review the entire act to determine legislative intent. 

Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex. 2001); City of 

Houston v. Hildebrandt, 265 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, 

pet. denied).
7

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Neither party disputes that the property that is the subject of the HCAD 

valuation was correctly identified. Instead, the dispute is whether the correct entity 

pursued the appeal of the HCAD valuation and, if not, whether a procedural 

mechanism exists under the Tax Code to correct the misidentification and avoid 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Chapter 41 of the Tax Code permits property owners to protest the appraised 

value of their property to their local Board. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.41–.47 

(West 2008 & Supp. 2014). Chapter 42 grants the right to seek judicial review of 

an adverse decision by the Board on a protest. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01–

.031 (West 2008 & Supp. 2014). Section 42.01 provides that a “property owner is 

entitled to appeal . . . an order of the appraisal review board determining . . . a 

protest by the property owner . . . .” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(1)(A) (West 

Supp. 2014). “Rights under the Code are premised upon ownership of the property 

at issue.” KM–Timbercreek, L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 312 S.W.3d 

722, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). With a few specifically 

enumerated exceptions not applicable here, the property owner is the only entity 

with standing to appeal a Board decision to the district court. Id. at 726–27;

Tourneau Hous., Inc. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
8

A. Pre-2011 law concerning misidentified property owners and subject 

matter jurisdiction over their appeals

Before 2011, both this Court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

consistently held that misidentification of a property owner in an appeal of a Board 

decision required dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the statutory 

limitations period had expired and the true property owner was not yet a party to 

the appeal. See, e.g., Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d at 729; GSL Welcome BP 32 L.L.C.

v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 01-10-00189-CV, 2010 WL 4484361, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The Tax 

Code procedures for adjudicating a property-tax valuation protest are the exclusive 

remedies available to property owners. . . . If no proper party seeks judicial review 

of the board’s decision . . . within the statutory time period, the trial court does not 

acquire subject-matter jurisdiction over the protest, and the [Board’s] valuation 

becomes final when the statutory time period expires.”); Woodway Drive L.L.C. v. 

Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 311 S.W.3d 649, 652–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (same).

Thus, misidentification required dismissal. Misnomer, on the other hand, did 

not. See Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 

S.W.3d 373, 376–77 (Tex. 2012). 
9

B. 2011 amendments to Tax Code analyzed

In 2011, the Legislature amended the Tax Code to add section 42.016, which 

allows a person who owned the property during the applicable tax year to intervene 

in an on-going appeal and have standing. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.016 (West 

Supp. 2014); Storguard Invs., L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 369 S.W.3d 

605, 613 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

In Storguard, this Court held that a property owner could “rely upon another 

person’s completion of the administrative protest process instead of requiring that 

the party seeking intervention personally exhaust its administrative remedies,” as 

had been required under pre-2011 law. Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 613. The 

intervention was allowed only if the person who initially protested and appealed 

the decision had standing independent of the intervening property owner’s 

standing. See id. at 613–15. 

The property owner in Storguard argued that another Tax Code amendment, 

found in section 41.44, could provide that standing. See id. at 614. Section 41.44(e) 

states as follows:

[A] notice of protest may not be found to be untimely or insufficient 

based on a finding of incorrect ownership if the notice: (1) identifies 

as the property owner a person who is, for the tax year at issue: . . . 

(B) the person shown on the appraisal records as the owner of the 

property, if that person filed the protest; . . . or (2) uses a misnomer of 

a person described by Subdivision (1).

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.44(e) (effective September 1, 2011).
10

This Court explained the new provision as follows:

This statute allows a . . . previous owner of the property who is still 

listed as the record owner in the appraisal records to administratively 

protest the property’s initial appraised value, which then provides the 

basis for a person in [the current property owner]’s position to take 

advantage of this protest process and intervene in the judicial review 

proceeding at a later date.

Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 613. Nonetheless, this Court held that the Storguard 

property owner was unable to take advantage of section 41.44(e) because that 

provision’s effective date (September 1, 2011) was after the date on which the 

challenged protest had been filed. Id. at 614. As a result, the previous property 

owner did not have standing to protest the appraisal or seek judicial review of that 

decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over its appeal, and the 

true property owner did not have a suit in which to properly intervene. Id. at 614–

15.

Using a similar rationale, this Court also rejected the Storguard property 

owner’s alternative argument that it had standing because section 42.21(e) allows

amendment of a petition for review to “correct or change the name of a party.” Id. 

at 614. That provision applies only to petitions for review that have been timely 

filed under Chapter 42. See id. The protest and petition for review in Storguard 

could not be considered “timely filed” because they were submitted by a party 

without standing due to the inapplicability of the new section 41.44(e) provision.
11

Id. Thus, this Court concluded that the property owner could not rely on section 

42.21(e) to establish standing.

As Storguard demonstrates, the 2011 amendments to the Tax Code provided 

property owners new avenues for avoiding dismissal based on a lack of standing, 

though the property owner in that particular case was unable to avail itself of both 

amendments due to their effective dates.

C. 2013 amendment to section 42.21

The Tax Code was amended again in 2013 to add subsection (h) to section 

42.21. It states as follows:

(h) The court has jurisdiction over an appeal under this chapter 

brought on behalf of a property owner or lessee . . . regardless of 

whether the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as the owner or 

lessee of the property or correctly describes the property so long as 

[1] the property was the subject of an appraisal review board order, 

[2] the petition was filed within the period required by Subsection (a), 

and [3] the petition provides sufficient information to identify the 

property that is the subject of the petition. Whether the plaintiff is the 

proper party to bring the petition . . . must be addressed by means of a 

special exception and correction of the petition by amendment as 

authorized by Subsection (e) and may not be the subject of a plea to 

the jurisdiction . . . . If the petition is amended to add a plaintiff, the 

court on motion shall enter a docket control order to provide proper 

deadlines in response to the addition of the plaintiff.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (effective June 14, 2013) (emphasis added).

Town & Country argues that section 42.21(h) was added to allow judicial 

review of tax appraisals when a protest and appeal have been filed that correctly 
12

identify the property but misidentify the property owner. Town & Country also 

argues that the legislative history for the 2013 amendment supports its contention.

HCAD argues that this section does not apply to cases of misidentification 

but is, instead, strictly limited to cases of misnomer, meaning that the actual 

property owner has appealed but is listed under the wrong name. HCAD argues 

that any other reading would create constitutional standing issues and that there is 

no indication the Legislature “meant to overturn the many judicial opinions 

requiring a property owner to bring suit,” such as Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d 722.

Town & Country replies that HCAD’s interpretation of the statute—limiting 

it to cases of misnomer—would “strip 42.21(h) of all utility, essentially 

eviscerating any remedial promise held by the rule.”

The 2013 amendment to section 42.21 has not been subject to judicial 

review. Whether the 2013 amendment allows subject matter jurisdiction over tax 

suits involving misidentification is a question of first impression. We construe the 

statute in accordance with established rules of statutory construction.

D. Section 42.21 is not limited to cases misnomer

1. The statute’s plain language indicates that something other than 

the misnaming of a single party is being addressed

Section 42.21(h) concerns appeals that have been “brought on behalf of” a 

property owner. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h). Two other subsections of 

Section 42.21, by comparison, refer to petitions “filed by an owner.” TEX. TAX 
13

CODE ANN. § 42.21(f), (g). We presume that every word of a statute has been 

included or excluded for a reason. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 

S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2) (West 2013). 

Thus, the use of the phrase “brought on behalf of a property owner” signifies that 

the Legislature was contemplating jurisdiction over suits that were not brought by 

the property owner directly. This is contrary to HCAD’s interpretation of the 

amendment, seeking to limit subject matter jurisdiction to cases in which the 

correct entity sued but was merely misnamed. 

Additionally, section 42.21(h) provides that there is subject matter 

jurisdiction “regardless of whether the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as 

the owner or lessee of the property.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (emphasis 

added). When construing a statute, we will honor its plain language unless its 

meaning is ambiguous or such an interpretation would lead to absurd results. 

Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tex. 2013). In doing so, 

“[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules 

of grammar and common usage.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (West 

2013). Further, we assume the Legislature purposefully selected one word over the 

other. See Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex.

2004) (“[W]e presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded 

for a reason . . . .”). 
14

The Legislature chose to include the term “identifies” instead of “names.” 

The term “names” is generally associated with misnomer, while “identifies” is 

linked with the concept of misidentification. Compare In re Greater Hous.

Orthopaedic Specialists, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. 2009) (“A misnomer 

occurs when a party misnames itself or another party, but the correct parties are 

involved.”) with Hernandez v. ISE, Inc., No. 04-06-00888-CV, 2008 WL 80005, at 

*4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing claim of 

misidentification in which trial court mistakenly “identifies” the defendant). We 

agree with Town & Country that the choice of the term “identifies” indicates that 

this provision is meant to deal with misidentification, not misnomer.

Furthermore, section 42.21(h) sets forth the mechanism that applies when 

the plaintiff is not “the proper party to bring the petition.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 42.21(h) (emphasis added). This language, likewise, speaks in terms of multiple, 

alternative parties instead of the typical misnomer scenario that involves only one 

party.

Lastly, section 42.21(h) specifically contemplates that a petition may be 

amended to “add a plaintiff” if the plaintiff that brought the petition is not the 

proper party. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h). If misnomer were the only 

application of this section, no new plaintiffs would need to be added. This 

language, like the language previously discussed, supports the conclusion that 
15

section 42.21(h) applies to misidentification. See Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las 

Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue, 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (stating that construction 

should be avoided that would “render[] any part of the statute meaningless or 

superfluous.”).

2. Reference to section 42.21(e) does not limit application to 

misnomer cases

Next we consider HCAD’s argument that reference to subsection 

(e) indicates that subsection (h) applies only to misnomer. 

Subsection (h) mandates that the issue of a plaintiff not being the proper 

“party” to bring a petition “must be addressed by means of a special exception and 

correction of the petition by amendment as authorized by subsection (e) and may 

not be the subject of a plea to the jurisdiction . . . .” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 42.21(h). HCAD argues that the Legislature’s reference to subjection (e) within 

subsection (h) indicates its intent that subsection (h) apply only to misnomer cases.

While it is correct that subsection (e) has been applied to misnomer cases

(see, e.g., Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. L.P., 370 S.W.3d at 373), it is not limited to 

that context. As this Court discussed in Storguard, subsection (e) could also be 

implicated when a previous property owner loses a protest, files a petition for 

review, then seeks to amend its petition to add the current property owner as a 

party. Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 612. In that situation, a petition could be amended

under section 42.21(e) to name the current (correct) property owner after the 
16

previous property owner (who has no current interest in the property) filed the 

protest and appealed that decision. The parties then could argue that the previous

property owner has standing under section 41.44(e). Id. at 614–15 (concluding that, 

given timing of that particular appeal, newly added section 41.44(e) could not be 

relied on to satisfy standing requirement).

Thus, contrary to HCAD’s assertion, section 42.21(e) does not apply only to 

cases of misnomer. Likewise, reference to subsection (e) within subsection 

(h) does not indicate legislative intent that subsection (h) be limited to misnomer 

cases. Furthermore, subsection (e)’s allowance of an amendment to correct 

misnomer raises the issue of why the Legislature would have further amended the 

statute to include subsection (h) if it accomplishes nothing more than what was 

already permissible under subsection (e)—amendment to correct misnomer. We 

must construe a statute to give effect to all of the statute’s provisions, leaving none 

of its parts without meaning or import. See City of San Antonio, 111 S.W.3d at 29; 

Harris Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 99 v. Duke, 59 S.W.3d 333, 

336 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Hogue, 271 S.W.3d at 256. 

3. Subsection (h) has a broader application

Before the 2013 amendment, a party had to meet three jurisdictional 

requirements: 1) it had to be the property owner (or designated agent), 2) it had to 

exhaust its administrative remedies, and 3) it had to file an appeal within 60 days. 
17

Storguard, 369 S.W.3d at 612. In the case of misnomer, the mislabeled party met 

all three of these requirements, and thus the plaintiff had standing and could 

replead under (e). Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy. LP, 370 S.W.3d at 377. But in a 

misidentification case, no one had standing. The appealing protester was not the 

property owner, and the true property owner—who never actually filed a protest—

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; therefore, both lacked standing. 

Because no one had standing, HCAD’s decision on the protest would become 

unchallengeable. See KM-Timbercreek, 312 S.W.3d at 728; see also Storguard, 

369 S.W.3d at 612.

Section (h) is designed to solve this problem. So long as the appeal is 

“brought on behalf of a property owner,” the court has jurisdiction. TEX. TAX CODE 

ANN. § 42.21(h). Even if the original petition misidentifies the plaintiff as the 

property owner, the true property owner has standing because he “is considered to 

have exhausted . . . administrative remedies.” Id. Therefore, (h) fills in the gaps 

that otherwise would prevent the court from obtaining subject-matter jurisdiction.

Based on the text of section 42.21(h), other relevant Tax Code amendments, 

and the implications of the various asserted interpretations when reading these 

provisions as a whole, we conclude that 42.21(h) is not limited to cases of 

misnomer and can be relied on by property owners in cases of misidentification.
18

E. HCAD’s argument that this interpretation will lead to advisory opinions 

HCAD argues that this interpretation is unreasonable because it would result 

in a violation of established constitutional standing requirements. See Combs, 401 

S.W.3d at 630 (stating that statute should not be interpreted using plain meaning of 

words if doing so would lead to absurd results). We, therefore, consider this 

constitutional challenge to our interpretation of the statute.

The Legislature dictates the scope of subject matter jurisdiction for trial 

courts to hear appeals of administrative tax decisions. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 42.01 (providing that property owner is entitled to appeal Board’s order). In 

addition to granting subject matter jurisdiction, the Legislature has authority to 

revise its statutes to alter jurisdictional requirements. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.

Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, 244 S.W.3d 455, 

459 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007), aff’d, 324 S.W.3d 544, 547–49 (noting that 

Legislature amended Government Code to make statutory prerequisites to suit 

jurisdictional requirements, thereby altering subject matter jurisdiction), overruled 

on other grounds, Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 & n.3 (Tex. 2012). 

HCAD argues that interpreting the amendment to section 42.21 to expand 

subject matter jurisdiction to include cases in which property owners have been 

misidentified would be “unreasonable” in that it would raise constitutional 

standing concerns. Specifically, HCAD argues that it would lead to advisory 
19

opinions being issued because misidentified property owners do not have standing 

to challenge tax valuations in the trial courts. Instead, only the actual property 

owner may appeal the tax valuation. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01. As the 

party challenging the constitutionality of the amended statute, as we have 

interpreted it, HCAD “bears the burden of demonstrating that the enactment fails to 

meet constitutional requirements.” Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 

S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1996). HCAD’s argument fails for two reasons. 

First, there is a statutory provision that provides a defendant aware of a 

misidentification with a procedure to rectify the error and allow the correct party to 

be brought into the suit. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h) (permitting HCAD to 

raise issue of misidentification through special exception and plaintiff to amend 

petition to correctly identify property owner). Use of this procedure allows the 

parties to correct a misidentification error, bring the proper parties before the trial 

court, and avoid the issuance of an advisory opinion. That subsection 

(h) contemplates that the original plaintiff might not be “the proper party to bring 

the petition” and that another plaintiff might be “add[ed]” indicates that a proper 

party—the true owner, lessor, or designated agent—is ultimately still required.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.21(h).

Second, it is only if HCAD fails to raise the issue of misidentification that a 

final judgment could be entered in a suit brought by a person who, potentially, is 
20

not the actual property owner. But that same possibility existed before the statute 

was amended. There always is a possibility that a party will be misidentified and, if 

uncorrected, that a judgment will result that does not affect the true parties in 

interest. Cf. Sanchez v. Braden, No. 05-97-00811-CV, 1999 WL 378426, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (refusing to modify trial court’s order to grant appellant judgment on 

merits because judgment on merits in appellant’s favor would be “a purely 

advisory opinion”). In this case, HCAD raised the issue by referring to the 

warranty deed for the property.

The possibility that an uncorrected misidentification might result in an

“advisory opinion” is not a valid basis for rejecting the clear wording of the 

amendment or refusing to give it effect. See Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 630 (requiring 

reviewing courts to honor plain language of statute unless that interpretation would 

lead to absurd results); see also Enron Corp., 922 S.W.2d at 934 (“In determining 

the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with a presumption that it is 

constitutional.”).

We reject HCAD’s argument that this interpretation of section 42.21(h) will 

impermissibly lead to advisory opinions.
21

F. HCAD’s argument that the appeal was not brought “on behalf of” 

Town & Country

HCAD’s final argument is that subsection (h) applies only to appeals 

brought “on behalf of” the property owner and Gowan never claimed to be acting 

on behalf of the property owner but, rather, to be the true property owner. While 

the statute does not elaborate on what would constitutes an appeal “brought on 

behalf of the property owner,” the full text of subsection (h) contemplates the 

scenario of owner misidentification, as occurred with Gowan and Town 

& Country. For example, subsection (h) grants jurisdiction “regardless of whether 

the petition correctly identifies the plaintiff as the owner.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 42.21(h). And the newly added provisions, when read together, extend standing 

to a party who is not the true owner but is listed on the appraisal rolls and is added 

to the lawsuit. Further, newly added subsection (h) provides that the identity of the 

property owner is no longer a basis for a plea to the jurisdiction but should, instead, 

be dealt with by another motion.

Thus, the language selected by the Legislature and included in the statutory 

amendment supports the conclusion that an appeal qualifies as being “brought on 

behalf of a property owner” if an entity is mistakenly listed as a property owner 

due to misidentification. It would be inconsistent with the language of the statute 

and the legislative intent, as expressed through that language, to require that the 

party mistakenly listed as the property owner have declared that he was acting “on 
22

behalf of” a different property owner—a declaration that, by its terms, would 

require him to realize the concurrent misidentification error. Accordingly, we

reject HCAD’s argument that Gowan, Sheehan, and Patterson must produce 

evidence that they intended to act on behalf of a separate entity when they initially 

pursued the appeal.

Thus, we conclude that the newly enacted subsection 42.21(h) grants a trial 

court subject matter jurisdiction over a suit appealing a Board decision as long as 

the suit meets the property identification and filing requirements contained in 

section 42.21(h), even if the petition misidentifies the property owner and must be 

corrected through amendment. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred by 

holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and by granting HCAD’s plea to 

the jurisdiction. We sustain Town & Country’s first issue. We, therefore, do not 

reach the second issue.

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s order granting HCAD’s second plea to the 

jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings between Town & Country and 

HCAD.

Harvey Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.