### FILED 

# COURTOFAPPEALS. 2015 

### APR 28 

### AM 8: 36 STU OF V 

### SHINGTON By IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM BREMER, No. 45480 - 7 -I1 Respondent,

v. GLEN L. WALKER, an individual, Appellant. PART PUBLISHED OPINION

MAXA, P.J. — This appeal arises from supplemental proceedings to enforce ajudgment the estate ofWilliam Bremer obtained against Glen Walker. Walker appeals the trial court' s denial oftwo motions to revise orders entered bythe trial court commissioner as part ofthe 

### supplementary proceedings, and also appeals several attorney fee awards made bythe trial court commissioner and the trial court. We hold thatthe trial court commissioner had authority under RCW 6.32. 190 to compel Walkerto appear in Pierce County for supplemental proceedings examinations even though he resided in King County because Walker did not produce evidence that he did not do business in Pierce County. However, we further hold that the orders relating to the initial supplemental proceedings examination are invalid because Walker was not served with 

### a court order directing him to appear at a newtime that opposing counsel selected forthe examination. We,address Walker' s remaining arguments in the unpublished portion ofthis opinion.45480 - 7 -1I We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry offindings offact and conclusions of law regarding three attorney fee awards. FACTS In 2009, Bremer contracted with Walker to sell commercial property in Pierce County at which Walker operated an auto repair business. Walker defaulted on the contract and forfeited 

### his interest,but he refused to vacate the property. In 2012, Bremer's estate (hereinafter Bremer) initiated an unlawful detainer action against Walker in Pierce County Superior Court. The trial court ordered a writ ofrestitution, and entered ajudgment against Walker in favor of Bremer in the amount ofBremer' s attorney fees and costs. April / May 2013 Supplemental Proceedings On April 11, 2013, Bremer moved the trial court for an order directing Walkerto appear for an examination supplemental to execution ofthejudgment for fees and costs. The trial court 

### commissioner issued an orderfor supplemental proceedings, directing Walker to appearto be 

### examined at Pierce County Superior Court onApril 30 at 1: 30 PM. Bremer also filed anote for the commissioner's calendar stating thatthere would be ahearing atthat place and date. Bremer served Walker's attorney with copies ofthe motion, order, and the calendar note showing the April 30 hearing date. 

### A memorandum ofjournal entry dated April 30 states that Bremer's attorney appeared in

court but that nobody appeared for Walker. The memorandum states, " Counsel to renote the

matter. No service upon the respondent [Walker]." Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 10. On that same 

### date, Bremer filed a note for commissioner' scalendar stating that a hearing would take place on

245480 - 7 -II 

### May 17. However,the commissioner did not enter an order requiring Walkerto appear on May 17. Later that evening, a process server successfully served.Walker with the supplemental 

### proceedings documents at his residence in King County. Bremer alleges thatthe note for 

### commissioner' s calendar stating the May 17 date was one ofthe documents served. 

### On May 17, Bremer' s attorney appeared in court, but again neitherWalker norhis 

### attorney appeared. At Bremer' s request, the commissioner ordered issuance ofa bench warrant forWalker's arrestto bring him before the court to " show cause whyhe should not be convicted 

### ofContempt ofCourt" and awarded Bremer attorney fees and costs in the amount of $ 3, 116.50 for Walker' s failure to appear. CP at 13. 

### Walkerwas arrested and subsequently released on bail. The commissioner later quashed the warrant and ordered that Walker appearto show cause why he should not appear for supplemental proceedings. At the show cause hearing on August 12, Walker apparently argued 

### that the May 17 show cause order and attorney feesjudgment was invalid on various grounds. 

### The commissioner "reinstated" the May 17 order, and directed Walkerto appear for supplemental proceedings. CP at 104. Walker filed a motion for revision ofthe commissioner' s August 12 order. The trial

court denied the motion to revise following a hearing on September 13. The trial court reserved ruling on an award of attorney fees. Walker appealed this September 13 order.45480 - 7 -II January 2014 Supplemental Proceedings On December 3, 2013, Bremer moved the trial court for a new order directing Walker to 

### appear for a supplemental proceeding examination. On that date, the trial court commissioner 

### issued the orderdirecting Walkerto appear for examination on January2, 2014. Bremer also filed a note forthe commissioner' s calendar stating that a hearing would take place on that date. Bremer successfully served Walker with this order, the underlying affidavit, and the calendar 

### note listing the January 2 hearing date. Walker appeared at the January 2 hearing without his attorney. But he refused to be 

### sworn, stating that he couldn'ttestify because he was medicated. The commissioner ordered Walkerto appear in two weeks to showcause why a bench warrant should not be issued against 

### him for refusal to complywith the orderfora supplemental proceedings examination. The commissioner also awarded Bremer $315 for reasonable attorney fees.

Walker moved for revision ofthe December 3 supplemental proceedings examination 

### order andthe January2 showcause order. The trial court denied this motion on January 24. The trial court also awarded Bremer $500 for reasonable attorney fees. Walker could not appear atthe January 14 hearing because he was hospitalized, and the

commissioner continued the hearing until January 23. On January 23, Bremer' s attorney appeared in court but neither Walker nor his attorney appeared. The commissioner ordered the 

### issuance ofa bench warrant for Walker's arrestto bring him before the court to again show cause 

### whyhe should not be convicted ofcontempt, and also awarded Bremer attorney fees and costs in the amount of $

3, 475. 50 for Walker' s failure to appear.

445480 - 7 -II 

### Walkerappealed boththeJanuary 23 benchwarrant order and attorneyfees award and the January 24 denial ofhis motion to revise the December 3 and January 2 orders. Additional Motions 

### On February 27, 2014, Walkerfiled a motion for an order determining procedures for proceedings supplemental tojudgment. The trial court denied the motion and reserved the issue 

### ofan award ofattorney fees to Bremer. Bremer moved forpresentation offindings offact and

conclusions of law relating to his request for attorney fees. On April 11, the trial court entered findings offact and conclusions of law on Bremer' s request for attorney fees relating to Walker' s 

### February 27 motion, and approved Bremer' s request for $903 in attorney fees. The trial court then entered an order awarding attorney fees inthe amount of $ 1, 403, which included an additional $500 in attorneyfees incurred atthe attorneyfee hearing. 

### Laterthat same day,the parties appeared before the commissioner for a hearing on 

### Walker's motionto vacatethe outstanding January 23 bench warrant. The commissionervacated the warrant, but awarded Bremer attorney fees in the amount of $ 420. Walker appealed both the trial court' s April 11 attorney fee award and the commissioner' s April 11 attorney fee award. ANALYSIS A. VENUE OF SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS EXAMINATION Walker argues that all ofthe orders in this case are invalid because the trial court lacked thejurisdictional authority to compel him to appear at a supplemental proceedings examination 

### in Pierce County. We holdthatthe trial courthadjurisdiction overWalker,but thatunder RCW 6.32. 190 it could not exercise thatjurisdiction to compel Walkerto appear in Pierce County if

545480 - 7 -II Walker showed that he did not reside or do business in Pierce County. However, we further hold that the trial court did not err in compelling Walker's attendance in Pierce County for a supplemental proceedings examination because he did not produce any evidence that he did not do business in Pierce County. RCW 6.32. 190 states that ajudgment debtor can be compelled to attend a supplemental 

### proceedings examination only in the county in which he resides or does business. Butthis statute does not affect the trial court' sjurisdiction. Supplemental proceedings generally are 

### ancillaryto the underlying action, and thetrial court retains personaljurisdiction overthe parties to that action for purposes ofthose supplemental proceedings. Allen v.Am. Land Research, 95 Wn.2d 841, 850, 631 P.2d 930 ( 1981) ( Allen II); State ex rel. McDowell v. Super. Ct.for King County, 152 Wash. 323, 326 - 27, 277 P. 850 ( 1929). Therefore, ajudgment creditor is not . required to allege or prove the debtor' s residence or place ofbusiness in order to compel the 

### debtorto attend a supplemental proceeding examination inthejurisdiction where the underlying action was litigated. McDowell, 152 Wash. at 326. 

### However, even though the trial court may havejurisdiction, RCW 6.32. 190 acts as a 

### statutory restriction on supplemental proceedings examinations that prevents the trial courtfrom ordering them to occur outside the countywhere the debtor resides or does business. Allen v. Am. Land Research, 25 Wn.App. 914, 924, 611 P. 2d 420 ( 1980) (Allen I), rev' d on other grounds, 95 Wn.2d 841, 631 P. 2d 930 ( 1981). Therefore, if a debtor shows that he does not 

### reside or do business in a county where a supplemental proceedings examination has been ordered, he cannot be compelled to appear in that county. See McDowell, 152 Wash. at 326; Allen I, 25 Wn.App. at 924.
645480 - 7 -II Bremer argues that Allen II overruled Allen I. We disagree. The Supreme Court in Allen II did reverse our decision in Allen I. 95 Wn.2d at 852 - 53. But the court based its decision on a
provision in the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), ch. 19.86 RCW. RCW 19. 86. 080 permits a 

### trialjudge to make any necessary orders to enforce an order ofrestitution underthe CPA. Allen II at 850 -51. The court expressly stated that it was not addressing the type ofsupplemental
proceedings governed by chapter 6.32 RCW: " The ancillary proceedings in the subject case were notthe `normal supplemental proceedings [wherein] the prevailing party only seeks to discover the other party' s property in order to satisfy ajudgment.' " Id.at 850 (quoting State v. Ralph Williams' Nw. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 327, 334, 553 P. 2d 442 ( 1. 976)). The court in Allen II did not address RCW 6.32. 190. Under McDowell, it is thejudgment debtor' s burden to showthat he does not reside or do 

### business inthe county in which he is orderedto appearforsupplemental proceedings in orderto rely on RCW 6. 32. 190. 152 Wash. at 326 - 27. Here, Walker could have avoided any orders 

### requiring him to appear in Pierce Countyforasupplemental proceedings examination ifhe had submitted evidence to the trial court that he did not reside or do business in Pierce County. We 

### assume from the record that Walker resided in King County, because he was served at his residence in Kent. Walker also claims in his appellate briefing that he no longer operates a 

### business in Pierce County. However, the record does not showthatWalker submitted any evidence in the trial court that he did not do business in Pierce County, and nothing in the record shows that he did not do business in Pierce County.

745480 - 7 -II Walker did not meet his burden under McDowell ofshowing that he did not do business 

### in Pierce County. Therefore,we hold thatthe orders requiring Walkerto appear in Pierce 

### Countyfor supplemental proceedings examinations were not invalid under RCW 6.32. 190. B. ORDER DIRECTING A JUDGMENT DEBTOR TO APPEAR Walker argues thatwe must vacate the September 13, 2013 order denying his motion to revise the commissioner' s order relating to the May 17, 2013 supplemental proceedings examination because he was not served with an enforceable court order to appear on that date. We agree.

RCW 6.32.010 provides: 

### U]pon application bythejudgment creditor such court orjudge may, by ann order, require thejudgment debtorto appear at a specified time and place before thejudge granting the order ... to answer concerning [ajudgment]. Emphasis added). 

### Underthe plain statutory language, ajudgment debtor must appear at a 

### particulartime and place only ifrequired by acourt order. Further, RCW 6.32. 130 provides that copies ofsuch an order and the affidavit on which the order was made must be served on the judgment debtor. Here, the commissioner entered an orderthat complied with RCW 6.23. 010 directing Walker to appear on April 30, 2013 at 1: 30 PM. However, Walker was not served with the order before that date and time. As a result, when he was served with that order later that evening,the order no longer was enforceable. A person cannot be required to appear at a time in the past. Bremer argues that Walker was properly served with the commissioner' s order and note for the commissioner' s calendar showing a hearing date of May 17, 2013. However, even ifthis is true, the note forthe commissioner' s calendar was not a court order directing Walker to appear
845480 - 7 -II


### on May 17 as required under RCW 6.32.010. The note is addressed to Walker' s attorney and asks onlythat he " take notice that an issue oflaw in this case will be heard on the date and time

shown below." 

### CP at 9. Accordingly, Walkerwas not required to appear on May 17 for a supplemental proceedings examination.1 

### We holdthatthe commissioner erred by enteringthe May 17, 2013 order issuing abench warrant and awarding attorneyfees against Walker, and therefore thatthe trial court erred in denying Walker's motion to revise that order. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the September 13, 2013 order denying the motion for revision and remand with instructions to 

### vacate the May 17 order and the August 12 order relating to the May 17 order. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry offindings offact and conclusions oflaw regarding three attorney fee awards as discussed in the unpublished portion of this decision. 

### Amajority ofthe panel having determined that onlythe foregoing portion ofthis opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06.040, it is so ordered. Walker argues that the trial court commissioner erred by issuing an ex parte order that adjudicated Walker in contempt when he failed to appear for the January 23, 2014 supplemental 

### proceedings examination, and by entering attorney fee awards on January 2, January 23, and April 11, 2014. He further argues thatthe trial court erred by entering an attorney fee award on



### 1 Our holding does not applyto the situation where both parties agree to continue a supplemental proceedings examination to a future date or where the trial court continues the examination with both parties present.45480 - 7 -II 

### April 11, 2014 that was not fully supported by findings offact and conclusions oflaw. We hold that thetrial court commissioner did not err in entering the January 23 order ex parte or in 

### making the January 2 attorney fee award. However,we hold that the trial court commissioner erred in entering attorney fee awards on January 23 and April 11 in amounts that were not 

### supported by findings offact and conclusions oflaw, andthat the trial court erred in entering 500 ofthe April 11 attorney fee award because the trial court did not make a record to support that portion ofthe award. A. ORDER RELATING TO WALKER' S FAILURE TO APPEAR

1. Entering Order Ex Parte 

### Walker argues that the commissioner erred by issuing an ex parte orderwhen he failed to 

### appearon January 23, 2014.2 Walkerappears to claim thatthe commissioner could grant such reliefonly ifBremer provided proper notice to Walker. We disagree. We review the issuance of ex parte orders for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Hotrum, 120 Wn.App. 681, 683, 87 P. 3d 766 (2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when its 

### decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or made for untenable reasons. Cookv. Brateng, 180 Wn.App. 368, 375, 321 P.3d 1255 (2014). Walker argues that the commissioner made an adjudication ofcontempt ex parte on 

### January 23. But as discussed below,the commissioner did notfind Walker guilty ofcontempt. Instead, the commissioner ordered the issuance ofa bench warrant for Walker' s arrest to bring

2 Walker also argues that "[ t]he three fee awards, two bench warrant orders and two adjudications ofcontempt on May 17, 2013 and January2 and January 23, 2014 were all entered ex parte." Br. ofAppellant at 12 -13. But we have vacated the May 17 order on other grounds and Walkerwas present at the hearing on January 2. 1045480 - 7 -II 

### him before the courtto show cause why he should not be found in contempt. Walker provides 

### no authority suggesting that an order for issuance ofa bench warrant cannot be issued ex parte when ajudgment debtor fails to appear for a supplemental proceedings.examination. Walker also argues that the commissioner could not award attorney fees ex parte. 

### However, RCW 6.32.010 authorizes a courtto award attorney fees ifajudgment debtor fails to appear for a supplemental proceedings examination. And a court generally may hold remedial proceedings ex parte when the defendant has failed to appear. See Shepard Ambulance, Inc. v. Helsell, Fetterman, Martin, Todd & 

### Hokanson, 95 Wn.App. 231, 240, 974 P.2d. 1275 ( 1999) 

### noting that a defaulting defendant need not be given notice ofa damages hearing); RCW 4.28.210 ( "[W]hen a defendant has not appeared, service of notice or papers in the ordinary proceedings in an action need not be made upon him or her. "). Walker provides no authority 

### suggesting that a commissioner cannot award attorney fees exparte when ajudgment debtor fails to appear for a supplemental proceedings examination. 

### We hold that the commissioner did not err by ordering issuance ofa bench warrant and 

### awarding attorney fees ex partewhen Walkerfailed to appearforhis supplemental proceedings examination on January 23.

2. Contempt Order Walker argues that the commissioner' s January 23, 2014 order requesting the issuance of 

### a bench warrant and awarding attorneyfees violated the law ofcontempt because the commissioner summarily adjudicated his contempt charges. We disagree because the commissioner never entered afinding ofcontempt againstWalker.

1145480 - 7 -II RCW 6.32. 180 provides that a court presiding over supplemental proceedings has the 

### authorityto hold parties in contempt for failure to comply with examination orders or attend examination hearings. However, at supplementary proceedings, a court may not summarily 

### judge aparty guilty ofcontempt for acts occurring outside its presence. Dimmickv. Hume, 62 Wn.2d 407, 409, 382 P. 2d 642 ( 1963). A failure to appear is considered an act outside the

presence of the court. See State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 532, 269 P. 793 ( 1928); State v. Jordan, 146 Wn.App. 395, 403, 190 P. 3d 516 (2008). " One aspect ofthe contempt, the fact of absence, is, of course, obvious to the court, but the explanation ofthe absence is not known and the facts may be such as to excuse the apparent contempt." State v. Hatten, 70 Wn.2d 618, 621, 425 P.2d 7 ( 1967). 

### Due process requires that a partywho fails to appear be given notice and an 

### opportunity to respond before the court finds him in contempt. See id.;Jordan, 146 Wn. App. at 404. 

### Walker argues that the commissioner summarily adjudicated him guilty ofcontempt for failing to appear on January23 without giving him an opportunityto contestthe contempt charge. However, the commissioner did not adjudicate the contempt charge before issuing the 

### order or find Walker guilty ofcontempt in the order. Instead, it issued an order for a bench warrant for Walker' s arrest and ordered him brought before the courtfor a hearing to answer the contempt charge. In fact, Walker was never found guilty ofcontempt. 

### In the January 23 order,the commissioner also granted Bremer attorney fees, an appearance fee, and a service fee pursuant to the fee provisions of RCW 6.32.010. But those

1245480 - 7 -I1 fees were not imposed as sanctions for contempt, and the orders did not find Walker guilty of contempt of court.3 We hold that the commissioner' s January 23 order did not violate the law ofcontempt. B. ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS Walker challenges the amount ofattorney fees awarded by the trial court commissioner

on January 2, 2014 ($ 315), January 23, 2014 ($3, 360), and April 11, 2014 ($ 420), and by the trial court on April 11, 2014 ($ 

### 1403).4 We affirm the commissioner' s award ofattorney fees on January 2 and a portion of the trial court' s award of attorney fees on April 11. We hold that the 

### commissioner abused its discretion on January 23 and April 11 and the trial court abused its 

### discretion on April 11 by awarding attorneyfees without providing findings offact and 

### conclusions oflawthat supported the amount ofattorneyfees awarded.5 Trial courts must actively assess the reasonableness ofall attorney fee awards and may 

### not simply acceptthe amounts stated in fee affidavits. Berryman v. Metcalf,177 Wn.App. 644, 657, 312 P. 3d 745 ( 2013), review denied sub nom., Berryman v. Farmers Ins. Co., 179 Wn.2d 1026 ( 2014). The trial court generally considers the number ofhours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 660. We review the reasonableness of



### 3 Walkeralso argues thatthe January23 order improperly imposed remedial sanctions for contempt without including apurge clause. However, because the order did not find Walker guilty of contempt, no purge clause was necessary. 

### 4 The trial court also awarded attorney fees of $ 500 in its January 24, 2014 order denying Walker' s motion for revision. However, Walker does not challenge this award. 

### 5 Walker does not challenge the authority ofthe commissioner and the trial court to award attorney fees, so we do not address . that issue. 1345480 - 7 -1I

the attorney fees award for an abuse of discretion. Cook, 180 Wn.App. at 375. A trial court 

### abuses its discretion regarding the amount ofattorney fees when its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or made for untenable reasons. Id. Trial courts must exercise their discretion on articulable grounds, making a record sufficient to permit meaningful review. Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398, 435, 957 P.2d 632 1998); Just Dirt, Inc. v. Knight Excavating, Inc., 138 Wn.App. 409, 415, 157 P.3d 431 (2007). 

### This generally means thatthe trial court "must supply findings offact and conclusions oflaw sufficientto permit a reviewing court to determine whythe trial court awarded the amount in question." SentinalC3, Inc. v. Hunt, 181 Wn.2d 127, 144, 331 P. 3d 40 (2014); see also Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 435. Ifthe trial court does not make findings offact and conclusions of law 

### supporting the attorney fees award,the preferred remedy is to remand to the trial court for entry ofproper findings and conclusions. Berryman, 177 Wn. App. at 659. However, we do not read the cases as requiring written findings as long as the trial court has made an adequate record to supportthe amount ofthe attorneyfee award. See Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 435.

1. Oral Findings 

### On January 2, the commissioner did not enterformal findings offact or conclusions of 

### law supporting its award of $ 315 in reasonable attorneyfees. However,the commissioner did establish that Bremer' s attorney' s hourly rate was $210 and that his office was in Puyallup. The 

### award of $

315 reflects an hour and a halfofthe attorney' s time. Although the commissioner did not make written findings and conclusions regarding attorney fees, the record shows thatthe commissioner made an effortto calculate the award based on that amount oftime spent.

1445480 - 7 -II We believe that the record is sufficient to show that the commissioner found that the 

### attorney' s hourly rate was reasonable andthat an hour and ahalfwas a reasonable time to spend 

### on the hearing. Accordingly,we hold thatthe commissioner did not abuse its discretion in awarding this amount.

2. Written Findings On April 11, 2014, the trial court issued an order awarding Bremer $ 1403 in attorney fees 

### relating to his unsuccessful February 27 motion. The trial court entered findings offact and conclusions oflaw supporting the award of $ 903 in attorney fees. We hold thatthe trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding this amount.

However, the trial court also awarded Bremer an additional $500 in attorney fees based 

### on his attorney' s prehearing estimate ofthe time thatwould be spent preparing for the hearing. In general, courts should not accept a party' s estimate offees that it might incur in the future because such estimates are inherently.uncertain. N Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig, 136 Wn.App. 636, 646, 151 P. 3d 211 ( 2007). The trial court' s findings and conclusions here do not address the amount offees the attorney actually incurred and do not indicate that the trial court assessed whether the estimated amount was reasonable. Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the additional $500 in attorney fees without entering findings and conclusions supporting an award in that amount. We reverse this portion ofthe award and 

### remand for entry ofproper findings offact and conclusions of law supporting the amount ofthat portion ofthe award.

1545480 - 7 -II
3. No Findings or Conclusions The commissioner supplied no written findings offact and conclusions of law supporting 

### the reasonableness ofits attorney fee awards entered on January 23, 2014 and April 11, 2014. Because no record ofthese proceedings has been provided on appeal, we are unable to determine 

### whether orwhy the commissionerfound thatthe amount ofattorneyfees awarded was reasonable. Therefore,we vacate the amount ofthose attorney fee awards and remand for entry ofproper findings offact and conclusions oflaw supporting the amount ofthe awards. C. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

1. Walker' s Request 

### Walker requests reasonable attorney fees on appeal based on the attorney fees provisions ofthe Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act, ch. 61. 30 RCW; RCW 7.21. 030; and the provisions of 

### the underlying contract between the parties. We may award attorney fees on appeal ifapplicable law provides such a right. RAP 18. 1( a). But we hold that Walker is not entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees on appeal. Walker argues thatthe forfeiture statute supports an award ofattorney fees. He cites RCW 61. 30. 140( 5), which provides that 

### Ifthe purchaser or other person commencing the action [to set aside a forfeiture] establishes a right to set aside the forfeiture, the court shall award the purchaser or 

### other person commencing the action actual damages, if any, and may award the purchaser or other person its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs ofthe action. 

### By its own terms, this statute is inapplicable here because the supplementary proceedings were ancillary to Bremer' s successful unlawful detainer action, not a successful action to set aside the 

### resulting forfeiture. Therefore, we rejectthis basis foran attorneyfees award.

1645480 - 7 -II Walker also argues thatthe Coffin rule6 and RCW 7.21.030(3) should be reciprocally applied to allow him to collect attorney fees. Both the rule and the statute allow a court to award 

### a party attorney fees and other costs incurred as a result ofanother person' s contempt and the resulting proceedings. Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wn.2d 212, 246, 721 P. 2d 918 ( 1986); RCW 7.21. 030(3). These provisions allow a courtto award fees only to a party defending a contempt order on appeal, notto a party challenging a contempt order. See In re Marriage ofCurtis, 106 Wn.App. 191, 202, 23 P.3d 13 ( 2001). But according to Walker, "[

### p]ublic policy and equity demand reciprocity." Br. ofAppellant at 33. Here, we need not decide whether reciprocal application is warranted because the commissioner did not enter any contempt order. Therefore, we hold that Walker is not entitled to recover attorney fees on this basis. 

### Finally, in his reply briefWalker requests attorney fees based on the underlying contract. However, RAP 18. 1( b) requires that such arguments be made in the opening brief. Gardner v. First Heritage Bank, 175 Wn. App. 650, 677, 303 P. 3d 1065 ( 2013). Because Walker makes this 

### request only in his reply brief,and without argument or citation,we do not considerthis basis for Walker' s fee request.

6 This rule was based on former RCW 7.20. 100. State ex rel.Lemon v. Coffin, 52 Wn.2d 894, 896, 332 P.2d 1096 ( 1958). That statute has since been repealed and effectively replaced by RCW 7.21. 030(3). Walker argues that it should now be treated as an equitable rule.
1745480 - 7 -II

2. Bremer' s Request Bremer also requests reasonable attorney fees on appeal. He bases his request on the 

### attorney fees provisions ofthe contract. A contract awarding a party attorney fees attrial also

can support such an award on appeal. Atlas Supply, Inc. v. Realm, Inc., 170 Wn.App. 234, 241, 287 P. 3d 606 (2012). However, because both parties prevailed on major issues, Bremer is not the substantially prevailing party. Hertz v. Riebe, 86 Wn. App. 102, 105 -06, 936 ]?.2d 24 ( 1997). Therefore, we do not award Bremer attorney fees on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for entry offindings offact and 

### conclusions oflaw relating to the amounts ofthe commissioner' s attorney fee awards dated 

### January 23, 2014 and April 11, 2014, and the additional $500 awarded by thetrial court on April 11, 2014.

We concur:

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