alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6393

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ZSA ZSA COUNCIL, a/k/a Toochie,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District 

Judge. (3:09-cr-00378-JRS-1; 3:11-cv-00377-JRS)

Submitted: July 12, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Zsa Zsa Council, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Mastandrea-Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Zsa Zsa Council seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on her 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Council has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
(8 App. Div. 192)

#### McELROY et al. v. NATIONAL SAV. BANK OF ALBANY et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

July 7, 1896.)

•Gift—Deposit of Money in Bank.

A deposit of money in bank to the credit- of depositor’s wife and himself, with a provision that either of them, or tlie survivor, is to draw it, imports a gift to the wife, in case she survives him, and a delivery of the pass book to the wife is not necessary to perfect the gift.

Controversy between John E. McElroy and Alice Bell, as executors of James C. Bell, deceased, plaintiffs, and the National Savings Bank of Albany and Montgomery H. Rochester, as administrator, defendants, submitted without action, - pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 1279.

*341Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, MERWIN, and PUTNAM, JJ.

I. & J. M. Lawson, for plaintiffs.

Rosendale & Hessberg, for the Savings Bank.

Albert Rathbone, for M. H. Rochester, Administrator,

PARKER, P. J.

I am of the opinion that the deposit by James C. Bell of the money in bank to the credit of his wife, Alida P. Bell, and himself, with the provision that either of them, or the survivor of them, was to draw it, imports a gift to the wife in case she survives him, and that delivery of the pass book to her by the husband was not necessary to perfect such gift. The principle decided in Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723, and again in 58 N. Y. 69, seems to be applicable to the facts before us, and to so hold. See, also, Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 68, 72; Scott v. Simes, 10 Bosw. 314.

The intent of the husband to that effect is véry plain, and it seems that the wife had been informed of his purpose, and expected to receive the benefit of it. The only question is whether he had fully perfected the gift by the delivery which the law requires. None of the cases cited by the plaintiffs’ counsel are necessarily in conflict with the principle decided in the cases above cited, and I consider them authority for the conclusion which I reach.

A judgment should be entered directing that, upon the death of James C. Bell, the balance in the bank to the credit of himself and Alida P. Bell became the property of Alida P. Bell, and that, upon her death, the defendant Rochester became entitled to the same as assets of her estate.„ All concur.
Bruce W. Brewer, OSB No. 925581 

brucebrewerusdccases@gmail.com 

PO Box 421 

West Linn, OR 97068 

503-621-6633 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

MARYALICE INSKEEP, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

COMMISSIONER, 

of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

Case No. 3:15-cv-00759-BR 

ORDER (EAJA FEES) 

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that, pursuant to the 

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an attorney fee in the amount of$5,289.78 is 

awarded to Plaintiff. It is ordered that the aforementioned attorney fee will be paid to Plaintiff's 

attorney, dependent upon verification that Plaintiff has no debt which qualifies for offset against 

the awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 

S.Ct. 2521 (2010). If Plaintiff has no such debt, then the check shall be made payable to 

Plaintiff's attorney, Bruce Brewer, and mailed to Plaintiff's attorney's mailing address at 

1 - ORDER FOR EAJA FEES 

Case 3:15-cv-00759-BR Document 19 Filed 09/26/16 Page 1 of 2
PO Box 421, West Linn, OR 97068. If Plaintiff has such debt, then the check for any remaining 

funds after offset of the debt shall be made payable to Plaintiff and mailed to Plaintiffs attorney's 

mailing address stated above. There are no costs or expenses to be paid herein. 

DATEDthis/).fe/JI. dayof ~ '2016. 

Submitted by: 

Bruce W. Brewer, OSB No. 925581 

503-621-6633, Attorney for Plaintiff 

2 - ORDER FOR EAJA FEES 

The Honorable Anna J. Brown 

United States District Court Judge 

Case 3:15-cv-00759-BR Document 19 Filed 09/26/16 Page 2 of 2
PAGE 1 – ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRANDON CHE LEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD IVES,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:16-cv-786-SI

ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

United States Magistrate Judge Patricia Sullivan issued Findings and Recommendation in 

this case on September 19, 2016. ECF 6. Judge Sullivan recommended that the Court should 

dismiss this action without prejudice. No party has filed objections.

Under the Federal Magistrates Act (“Act”), the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). If a party files objections to a magistrate’s findings and recommendations, “the court 

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings 

or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

If no party objects, the Act does not prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 

474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (“There is no indication that Congress, in enacting [the Act], intended 

Case 3:16-cv-00786-SU Document 8 Filed 10/13/16 Page 1 of 2
PAGE 2 – ORDER

to require a district judge to review a magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); 

United States. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the 

court must review de novo magistrate’s findings and recommendations if objection is made, “but 

not otherwise”). 

Although review is not required in the absence of objections, the Act “does not preclude 

further review by the district judge[] sua sponte . . . under a de novo or any other standard.” 

Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 

recommend that “[w]hen no timely objection is filed,” the court review the magistrate’s findings 

and recommendations for “clear error on the face of the record.”

No party having made objections, this Court follows the recommendation of the Advisory 

Committee and reviews Judge Sullivan’s Findings and Recommendation for clear error on the 

face of the record. No such error is apparent. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Judge Sullivan’s 

Findings and Recommendation, ECF 6, and dismisses this action without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2016.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge

Case 3:16-cv-00786-SU Document 8 Filed 10/13/16 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6638

SAM FREDERICK,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Beaufort. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. 

(9:15-cv-02699-MGL)

Submitted: September 13, 2016 Decided: September 15, 2016

Before TRAXLER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sam Frederick, Appellant Pro Se. Marshall Prince, II, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sam Frederick appeals the district court’s order accepting 

the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant the United States 

summary judgment on Frederick’s malpractice action, brought 

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 

2671–2680 (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). We have reviewed the record 

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s judgment. Frederick v. United States, No. 

9:15-cv-02699-MGL (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2016). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 31.2

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

I, Adam Wasserman, Chief Financial Officer of Colmena Corp. certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Colmena Corp.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
         a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
         b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report, based on such evaluation; and
         c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

         a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
         b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.

Date: August 14, 2003
                                  /s/ Adam Wasserman
                                  -----------------------------------------
                                  Adam Wasserman, Chief Financial Officer

<PAGE>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

CHARLES W. DOWELL
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 15

- 1330

[ November 2, 2017 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Martin County ; Elizabeth Ann Metzger , Judge; L.T. Case No.

432012CF000828A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Narine N. Austin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allen R. Geesey,

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

W ARNER
, G ROSS and T AYLOR

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE AUDITED
THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND THE AUDITED STATEMENT
OF OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD FROM INCEPTION (APRIL 3, 1996) TO DECEMBER 31, 1996
IN THE REPROT ON FORM 10-KSB FOR THE PERIOD FROM INCEPTION (APRIL 3, 1996) TO
DECEMBER 31, 1996 OF BRISTOL TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS, INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS:
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-03-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       5,475,674
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,336,046
<ALLOWANCES>                                    39,090
<INVENTORY>                                  2,169,531
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               155,656
<PP&E>                                         280,378
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,552
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,169,699
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,933,327
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,746
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,170,247
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,169,699
<SALES>                                      4,196,230
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,239,510
<CGS>                                        2,845,995
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,298,210
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              46,125
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (104,825)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (106,625)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (106,625)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)


</TABLE>
#### Daniel Joseph STAKEM, III, and wife, Carol Stakem, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kimber Lee RANDOLPH, Defendant, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-5821.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 19, 2007.

BEFORE: KEITH, BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Daniel and Carol Stakem were driving a motorcycle southbound on a Tennessee highway, while Kimber Lee Randolph was driving a car northbound on the same highway. Ms. Randolph turned left in front of the Stakems, causing a collision in which the Stakems were thrown from the motorcycle and severely injured. The Stakems sued, and Ms. Randolph’s insurer paid the policy limit of $25,000 to each of the Stakems. State Farm, which insured the Stakems, paid the policy limit of $100,000 for each of their two policies ($200,000 total) towards the medical costs incurred by Mrs. Stakem for her physical injuries.

Mr. Stakem claimed additional injuries, however, including the emotional distress of witnessing the carnage of the accident and his wife’s severe injuries. Therefore, even after the Stakems had settled their lawsuit with Ms. Randolph, they still had an under-insured motorist claim against State Farm, and the case proceeded to arbitration pursuant to TenmCode Ann. § 56-7-1201. The arbitrator awarded Mr. Stakem $70,438 on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which (less the $25,000 paid by Ms. Randolph’s insurer) left State Farm owing $45,438.

Both sides moved for summary judgment on the arbitrator’s award. State Farm sought to vacate the award on the theory that the plain terms of the insurance policy limit coverage to only those intangible damages (i.e., “pain, suffering, mental anguish, or inconvenience”) that arise out of a “serious injury,” as defined by Florida Statute § 627.737(2) (the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law). Mr. Stakem sought to enforce the award, arguing that the Florida No-Fault Statute was inapposite because it does not apply to motorcycles. The district court held that under Tennessee law, “the liability of an insurance company under a policy of insurance is determined by the law of the state where the contract for insurance was made,” and that, because the contract in this case was made in Florida, Florida law governed the interpretation of the policy’s provisions. The court explained “that the plaintiffs argument misses the point,” because the issue was not the application of Florida’s no-fault statute, but the application of the policy’s language under Florida law. Based on the plain language of the policy, the district court granted summary judgment to State Farm.

After carefully reviewing the record, the law, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude *601that the district court’s opinion correctly sets out the applicable law and correctly applies that law to the facts contained in the record. The issuance of a full written opinion by this court would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion, we AFFIRM.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 23

            CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

To Intelligroup, Inc.


         We consent to the incorporation by reference in Intelligroup, Inc.'s
(the "Company") Registration Statements (File Nos. 333-11486, 333-31809,
333-56143, 333-67583, 333-73051, 333-94285 and 333-70244) of our reports dated
February 24, 2006, except for Note 15 as to which the date is March 31, 2006,
appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended
December 31, 2005.


/s/ J.H. Cohn LLP

Roseland, New Jersey
March 31, 2006
#### Thomas Popp, Respondent, v Kathleen Kremer, Appellant.

*721In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted, *inter alia,*the plaintiff’s hospital record and physician’s report, as well as his bill of particulars and portions of his examination before trial. The medical evidence indicated that the plaintiff suffered a "possible cerebral concussion” and a "cervical sprain”. After a two-day hospital stay, the plaintiff was discharged with a direction for office follow-up and normal activities. A follow-up medical report by the plaintiff’s physician indicated that the plaintiff’s prognosis was good and that he might experience "mild neck pain on and off for approximately 3-4 months”. The plaintiff’s examination before trial indicated that he returned to work approximately five weeks after the accident and thereafter played a full season of recreational league softball and returned to play in a bowling league. Moreover, he subsequently engaged in deck hockey, exercise classes and Nautilus training. In response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff offered only his counsel’s affirmation, his physician’s follow-up report, and his own affidavit claiming pain in his neck, headaches and blurred vision, a limited ability to drive "due to neck pain and limitation of movement”, and a bill from a chiropractor.

The defendant’s motion should have been granted. Insurance Law § 5102 (d) defines serious injury, in relevant part, as: "permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person’s usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment.” The medical reports submitted by the plaintiff clearly demonstrated that the plaintiff did not suffer either permanent loss, permanent consequential limitation or a significant limitation of a body organ, member, function, or system *(see, Caiazzo v Crespi,*124 AD2d 623). By his own admission, the plaintiff was not disabled for a period of 90 days. The plaintifF s affidavit of subjective pain was insufficient to raise a triable issue *(see, Zoldas v Louise Cab Corp.,*108 AD2d 378; *Dwyer v Tracey,*105 AD2d 476; *De Filippo v White,*101 AD2d 801). We decline to follow the Third Department rule in *La Frenire v Capital Dist. Transp. Auth.*(96 AD2d 664), which would require a *722defendant to submit a physician’s *affidavit*in order to prevail on a summary judgment motion in a case such as this, where the lack of merit to the plaintiffs serious injury claim is patent *(see, D’Iorio v Brancoccio,*115 AD2d 634; *De Filippo v White, supra; Mulhauser v Wood,*107 AD2d 1019; *see also,*CPLR 4518; Richardson, Evidence § 251 [Prince 10th ed]). Thompson, J. P., Weinstein, Rubin and Spatt, JJ., concur.