### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON MAY 21, 2002 Session
PIONEE R SUBD IVISION HOMEOW NERS A SSOCIA TION, I NC. v. PROFESSIONAL COUNSELING SERVI CES, INC.
Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Dyer County No. 00C438; The Honorable Ron E. Harmon, Chancellor

No. W2001-03053-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 31, 2002

This appeal arises from the Appellant’s purchase of a home in the Appellee’s subdivision which the Appellant intended to use as a group home for mentally handicapped persons. The Appellee filed
a petition against the Appellant in the Chancery Courtof Dyer

County seeking injunctive r elief. The petition alleged

that the subdivisio n’s restr ictive co venant pr

ohibited a ny business us e or othe

r use of property in the subdivision other than a priva te residence or single family dwelling. The Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim. Following a trial, the trial court denied the Appellee’s request for an injunction. The trial court ordered that the Appellant

include at least two residents of the subdivisi on on the selection committee used to select residents for the gr oup home. The trial court stated that it retained jurisdiction of the case for enforcement of the judgment as needed upon petition of either party. The Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision, including placing at least two residents of the subdivision on the selection committee. For the reasonsstated he rein, we affirm i n part, r

everse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded

A LAN E. H IGHERS , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D AVID R. F ARMER , J., joined and H OLLY K IRB Y L ILLARD , J. , c on cu rr ed se pa ra te ly. John W. Palmer, Jason L. Hudson, Dyersburg , TN, for Appellant David A. Riddick, Jackson, TN, for Appellee

Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General and Repor ter, Pamela A. Hay den-Wood, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for Amicus Curiae, State of Te nnessee-2- OPINION I. Facts and Procedural History

The Appellee, Pioneer Subdivision Homeown ers A ssociation, Inc. (“Homeowne rs Association”), is a non-profit corporation which consists of owners of lots within P ionee r Subdi vision in Dyersburg , Tennessee. The Appellant, Professional Counseling Service s, Inc. (“Professional Counseling”) purchased a home located on lot twenty -three in the Pioneer Subdivision. On August 18, 2000, Homeowners Association filed a petition ag ainst Profe ssional Counseling in the Chancery Court of Dyer County

to e nforce a res trictive covenant. The petition sought injunctive relief to prevent Professional Counseling from using the homeas a gr

oup home for mentally handicapped persons and guardians. The petition relied on a Pioneer Subdivision
re strictive covenant which prohibits any business use or other use of property in the subdi visio n ot her than a private residence or single f amily dwelling. The

petition also relied on a Dyer sbur g zoning ordinance which prohibits group homes and nursing homes in residential areas.

On September 5, 2000, Professional Counseling filed an answer and counterclaim alleging violations of the Fa

ir Housing

Act and s ection 13 -24-101, et seq. of the Tenness ee Code. The counter claim sought damages and an injunction restraining Homeo wners A ssociation from interfering with the group home. On September 14, 2000, Homeowners Association filed an answer to the counterclaim. On Oc tobe r 31, 2000 , Profess ional Coun seling s ubmitted in terrog atories, request s for admission, and requests for producti o n of documents to Homeowners Association. Professional Counseling

also submit

ted their answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents. On December 18, 2000, Homeowners Associa tion file d a motion to compel discovery alleging that Professional Counseling’s answers to interrogator ies were inadequate. Also on December

18, 2000, Professional Counseling filed a motion for a protective order limiting the scope of discovery a

rguing that the

additional discovery

information sought by Home owners Association
was irrelevant. On December 19, 2000, the trial court held a hea ring on the two motions. On January 16, 2001, the trial court entered an order limiting the scope of

interrog atories a

nd reque sts for production of documents as to the financial status and recor ds of Professional Counseling.
On March 20, 2001, the trial was held. On April 20, 2001, the trial court entered an order denying Homeowners Association’s request for an injunction. The trial court ordered Professional Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee used to select residents for the group home. The tria l court stated that it retained jurisdict ion of the case for enforcement of the j udgm ent as needed upon petition of either party . On May 18, 2001, Professional Counseling filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. On July 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order deny

ing the motion to alter

or amend judgment. On August 23, 2001, Homeowners Association filed a moti on req uesti ng the t rial c ourt f or an o rder di recti ng h ow members of the selection committee were to be chosen. On November 8, 2001, the trial court ordered that the two members of the selection committee would be selected by Homeowners Association. This appeal followed.-3- II. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a non -jury case is de novo upon the record. See Wright v. City of Knoxville , 898 S.W.2d 1 77, 181 (T enn. 1995 ). There is a presumpt ion of cor rectne ss as to the trial court’s factual findings, unless the preponder ance of the evidence is otherwise. See T ENN

. R. A PP

. P. 13(d). F

or issues of law, th

e standa rd of review is de novo , with no presumption of correctness. See Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co. , 914 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn. 1996).

III. Law and Analysis The following issues are presented for our review:

1. Wh et he r t he tr ia l c ou rt er re d b y limiting the s cope of discovery as to the financial status and record s of P rofess ional Coun selin g; 2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule that the proposed use of the home violated Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive co venant and t hat the proposed use of the home fell under a zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq.; 3. Whether

the trial court er

red by orderin g Profe ssional Cou nseling to include

at least t wo reside nts of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee used to select residents for the group home; and 4. Whether the trial court erred by retaining jurisdict

ion of the case to a llow the pa

rties to su bmit futur e disp utes t o the t rial c ourt f or hear ing. We will examine each issue in turn.

The first issue presented for our review is whether

the trial court erred by

limiting the scope of discovery a s to the financial status and records of Professional Counseling. The decision to limit the scope of discovery

“lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discre tion.” Loveall v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 694 S.W.2d 937, 939 (T enn. 1 985) ( citi ng Centurion Indus., I nc. v. WarrenSteurer & Assoc. , 665 F.2d 323, 326 (10 th Cir. 1981)). From our review o f the re cord, we

find no abuse of the

trial cou rt’s disc retion to limit the scope of discovery r

egarding Professional Counseling’ s finances. Accordingly , we affirm the trial cou

rt’s dec ision to limit the scope of discovery a s to the financial status and records of Professional Counseling. The second issue presented for our review is whether

the trial court er red by failing to rule that the proposed use of the home violated Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and that the proposeduse of the hom

e fell under a zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq. The trial court stated that the group home violated Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and the D yersburg

zoning or

dinance . The tria

l court fo und, howe

ver, tha t the gr oup home f

ell within th e zoning exe mptio n statute, section 13-24-101, et seq. The trial court stated that Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and the Dyersburg zoning ordinance say “you ca nnot operate anenterprise such
as this in your development. No

question a

bout that. In the

infinite wisdom of ou

r elected officia

ls, that ha s b ee n c ha ng ed by a law that says y ou can if you

do certain things. And that statute overrides-4-

the zo ni ng. It

overrides the subdivision restrictions.” We must decide whether the trial court erred by finding that

the group home fell within the zoning exemption statute, section 13-24-101, et seq.

The purpose o f section

13-24-10 1, et seq. is “to remove any zoning obstacles which prevent mentally retarded, mentally

handicapped or

physically

handicapped

persons from living in normal residential surroundings.” T ENN

. C ODE A NN

. § 13-24- 101(a) (Supp. 2001). Section 13-24-102 classif ies a group h ome of ei ght or f ewer me ntally retard ed, menta lly h andicap

ped or ph ysi cally handicapped

persons a nd two gu ardiansas a

“single family

residence” for

zoning purposes. T ENN

. C ODE A NN

. § 13-24-102 (1999). Section 13-24-103 states that “[t]his part takes precedence over any provision in any zoning law or or dinance in Tennessee to the contrary .” T ENN

. C ODE A NN

. § 13-24- 103 (1999). Professional Coun seling int ends to use the home in Pioneer Subdivision as a group home for eig

ht or few er menta

lly h andicap

ped indivi duals and

two gua rdians. T he statute clearly states that a use of a home in this manner is classified as a “single family

residence” which is exempt from “any zoning obstac les.” We find that Professional Counseling ’s propos ed use of the home f

alls within section 13-24-101, et seq. which overrides the Pioneer Subdivision restrictive covenant and the Dyersburg

zoning ordinance. Accordingly , we affirm the trial court’s finding that the proposed use of the home falls within section 13-24-101, et seq.

The third issue pr esented fo r our review is whether the trial court err ed by order

ing Professional Counseling

to include

at least two residen ts of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection
com mittee used to select residents for the group home. We ag ree that the trial co urt erred b y ordering Professi onal Couns e lin g to include at least two residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee when that issue was not submitted to the trial court in the pleadings.

It is a funda

mental ru le of law tha

t in order to receive relief, a party

must plead, request, and prove the relie

f with the opposing party having the oppor tunity to offer proof opposing the requested relief. Rule 54.03 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civ

il Proced ure state s: A judgment by de

fault shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Ex ce pt as to a p ar ty a ga in st wh om a j ud gm en t i s e nt er ed by default, every

final judgment shall grant the relief to which the pa rt y in wh os e f av or it is re nd er ed is en ti tl ed , e ve n i f t he pa rt y has not demanded such relief in the party ’s pleadings; but the
co ur t s ha ll no t g iv e t he su cc es sf ul pa rt y re li ef , t ho ug h s uc h p ar ty may be entitled to it, whe

re the pr opriety of such r elief wa s not litigate d and the o

pposing party had no opp ortunity

to asser t defenses to such relief.

T ENN

. R. C IV

. P. 54.03.

In a ddressin g the ne cessity

for matte

rs to be a lleged in th e pleadi ngs and supported by evidenc e befor

e they can be a djudicat ed by the chancery

court, G ibson’s Suits in Chanc ery states:-5- A Court of Chancery

has no jurisdiction of any matter not submitted to it in a pleading for adjudication; nor can the defe ndant be called on to respond to anything

not alleged against him. Neither ca n a Court consider any evidenc e which does not dir ectly , or indir

ectly , tend to prove or disprove the allegations contained in the plea dings. A decree can neither be based on allega tions without corresponding proof, nor on proof without corresponding allegations. All dec rees must be the concurring result of allega tions justified by proof, and proof justified by allegations. A decree based on ple adings without proof, will be reversed on appeal, but will be good against collatera l attack. A decree based on proof, w ithout plea

dings, w ill not only

be reve rsed on a ppeal, bu t will also yie ld to a collateral

attack b ecause

such a de cree is coram non judice , and absolutely void. The jurisdiction of the Court is circumscr ibed by the pleadings, and the pleadings are circumscribed by

the Law. Gibson’s Suits in Chancery § 218 (7th ed. 1988).

This fundame

ntal rule of law ha s been upheld

by the cour

ts of Tennessee. In the c ase of Cardwe ll v. Hacke

tt , 579 S.W.2d 1 86 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1 978), the plaintiff sued the d

efenda nt f o r implied warranty

of a mobile home purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant. The trial court rendered a judgment for the return of the purchase price of the mobile home to the plaintiff and a return of the mob ile home to the defe ndant. I n rever sing the

judgmen t on appea

l, this Courtstated, “Thus, his judgment

is a rescission of the contract and an effort to restore the parties to status quo. It seems to us that this is error . . . because the pleadings do not encompass a suit for r escission.” Id. at 191.

In the case of Fidelity-Phenix Fire I ns. Co. of New York

v. Jackson, etal. , 181 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1944), our supreme court stated, “No rule is better settled than that both allegations and proof
are essential to a

decree or judgment and that there can be no valid decree unless the matter on whic h the decree is rested is plainly within the scope of the pleadings.” Id. at 629. The cour t also note d with app

roval: In order to give

a judgment the merit and finality of an adjudication between the parties, it must be responsive not only to the proof but to the issues tendered by

the pleadings, because pleading s are the very foundati on of judgments and decree s. A judg ment will be void which is a departure from the pleadings, a nd based upon a case not averred therein, since if allowed to stand it would be altog ether arbitrary and unjust and conclude a point upon which the parties had not been heard . . . . Therefore, the r ule is firmly established that irrespective of what may

be proved a court cannot decree to any plaintiff more tha n he claims in his bill o

r other p leading s.-6-

Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

The relief requested by

Homeowners Association in thei r p leadings was based upon a violation of Pioneer Subdivision’s restrictive covenant and Dy ersburg’s zoning ordinance. Homeowners Association requested the trial court to order an injunction en join ing Professional Counseling from using the property as a group home. Homeowners Association did not request or offer evidence in support of

placing residents of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee for the group h ome. The

trial cou rt order ed Profe ssional Cou

nseli ng to include

at least t wo reside nts of Pioneer Subdivision on the selection committee. This relief granted was not within the scope of the pleading s. Under

the state of the record bef

ore us, the relief granted should have bee n confined to the relief

sought in

the plea dings. Accordin gly , we rev erse the trial cou rt’s dec ision orde

rin g Professional Counseling to include at least two residents of Pioneer S ubdivision on the selection committee.

The fourth issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred by retai ning jurisdiction of the ca se to allow the part ies to submi

t future d isputes to t

h e trial court fo r heari ng. The recitation by the tria

l court that it was retaining jurisdiction of the case w as mere surpl usage because the parties have the right to submit future disputes related to the orig inal judgment to the trial court. Accordingly , we affirm the trial court’s order re taining jurisdiction of the case to allow the pa rties to su bmit futur e disp utes t o the t rial c ourt f or hear ing.
IV. Conclusion

For the fore going

reasons , the decision of the trial court is a ffirmed in part, r everse d in part, and remand ed for further proceedings c onsistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed equally against the Appellant, Professional Counseling Services, I nc., and its surety, and the Appellee, Pioneer Subdivision Homeowne rs Asso ciation, Inc ., for wh ich execu tion may issue if
ne ce ss ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI

GHERS, JUDGE