UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

WILLIAM F. HOLDNER dba HOLDNER Case No. 3:15-cv-2039-AC

FARMS,

 OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

KATY COBA, in her individual capacity;

ALEXIS TAYLOR, DIRECTOR OF

OREGON DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE, in her official capacity;

DICK PEDERSON, in his individual

capacity; and RICHARD WHITMAN,

DIRECTOR OF THE OREGON

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY, in his official capacity,

Defendants.1

___________________________________

1Alexis Taylor and Richard Whitman have been substituted as successors for KatyCoba and

Dick Pederson, respectively, under FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d), but only to the extent they were named

in their official capacities.

PAGE 1 - OPINION AND ORDER {sib}
ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge:

Introduction

Plaintiff William Holdner (“Holdner”), appearing pro se, filed a civil rights action against

Katy Coba, Director of Oregon’s Department of Agriculture, and Dick Peterson, Director of

Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality (collectively “Defendants”), challenging their

authority to regulate livestock operations on his land. The court granted Defendants’ motion to

dismiss findingHoldner lacked standing; the claims are barred byclaim preclusion, issue preclusion;

and Eleventh Amendment immunity; and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and

dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Holder appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the court’s

dismissal of the complaint but remanded with directions to dismiss the action without prejudice.

On March 27, 2018, Holdner filed a First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”)

in which he asserts the same claims but incorporates additional factual allegations. Defendants move

to dismiss the Amended Complaint asserting it does not remedy the defects found in the original

complaint. The court finds the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted and Defendants are entitled, once again, to the dismissal of this action. Consequently,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

This is the third action initiated in this court by Holdner asserting claims based on Oregon’s

enforcement of water quality standards against his livestock operation. In 2006, the Oregon

Department of Agriculture (the “Department”) became concerned Holdner was discharging animal

waste from his property in a manner likely to send it into a nearby creek. Holdner v. Coba, Civ. No.

09-979-AC, 2011 WL 2633165, at *3 (D. Or. July 5, 2011)(“Holdner I”). As a result, the

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Department issued a civil citation for pollution violations against Holdner on three separate

occasions – March 9, 2007, February 10, 2009, and June 15, 2009. Id. Additionally, in 2010, the

Oregon Department of Justice indicted Holdner on three felonyand twenty-five misdemeanor counts

of water pollution. Id. at *3. Holdner requested administrative review of the civil citations, arguing

his ranch was exempt from state and federal regulation, and moved to dismiss the criminal charges

on the ground the Department exceeded its authority in enforcing the federal statute. Id. at *3; see

also Holdner v. Kroger, No. 3:12-cv-01159-PK, 2012 WL 6131637, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 6,

2012)(“Holdner II”). The administrative hearing resulted in final orders in the agency’s favor and

the court denied Holdner’s motion in the criminal proceedings. Holdner I, 2011 WL 2633165, at

*3; Holdner II, 2012 WL 6131637, at *3.

On August 20, 2009, Holdner filed an action against the Department complaining about the

issuance of the civil citations. Holdner I, 2011 WL 2633165, at *1. Holdner again asserted the

Department exceeded its authority under federal statues and sought to enjoin it from taking further

enforcement actions against him. Id. at *4. After directing Holdner to amend his complaint twice,

the court determined Holdner was alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for

violation of his rights to procedural due process. Id. It then granted summary judgment to the

Department on the Section 1983 claim, finding Holdner failed to allege a violation of a fundamental

right or offer evidence of the Department’s involvement in the conduct comprising such violation.2

Id. at *7-*8. 

/ / / / / 

2The court also granted summary judgment on Holdner’s claim for injunctive relief finding

it barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Id. at *6. 

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Holdner filed a second action on June 28, 2012, once again alleging various Oregon agencies

lacked authority to regulate water quality and asserting a single claim for declaratory relief under a

slightly different theory than alleged in Holdner I. Holdner II, 2012 WL 6131637, at *2. 

Specifically, Holdner alleged the United States Environmental Protection Agency never granted

authority to the State of Oregon to administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System

and, absent such authority, Oregon’s regulatory and permitting scheme governing animal feeding

operations was ultra vires. Id. at *3. Judge Papak denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the

grounds of mootness and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but granted the motion finding Holdner’s

claims barred by the Younger abstention doctrine and claim preclusion. Id. at *3-*7.

Judge Papak set forth the elements of the claim preclusion doctrine – identity of claims, final

judgment on the merits, and identity or privity between the parties – and described the doctrine as

“[barring] litigation of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action”

where these elements are present. Id. at *7. He then reasoned:

Looking for the moment only at Holdner’s prior state administrative and criminal

proceedings, it is clear that Holdner could easily have raised his current theory that

the ODA lacks authority to enforce the Clean Water Act in either of those

proceedings, but only now attempts to pursue further litigation on that “theory of

relief.” Similarly, Holdner could have raised his ultra virestheoryin the prior federal

case, in which he contended that the ODA exceeded its regulatory authority for other

reasons. Moreover, there is no doubt that Holdner’s prior proceedings were litigated

to final judgment on the merits. Finally, the current defendants in this action are

surely in privity with the State of Oregon, a party to Holdner’s criminal proceeding,

since they are all departments or agents of the state.

Holdner’s single argument against the application of claim preclusion is that the legal

theory central to his case – that Oregon’s entire water pollution control scheme is

ultra vires – was not previously litigated in any other proceeding. But Holdner

misunderstands the nature of federal and Oregon claim preclusion doctrines, both of

which recognize preclusion where a claim or theory could have been raised in an

earlier proceeding, but nevertheless was not. Consequently, even though Holdner has

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now discovered a new legal theory explaining why he was not subject to the Oregon

NPDES permitting requirement for CAFO’s, he is precluded from advancing it here

because he could have raised it in any number of earlier proceedings.

Id. at *7 (internal quotations omitted).

Holdner filed the instant action, the third in this court, on October 29, 2015, once again

complaining about Defendants’ regulation of the livestock operations on Holdner’s property. 

(Compl. ECF No. 1.) The court interpreted the complaint filed on October 29, 2015 (the

“Complaint”) to allege three claims: 1) deprivation of Holdner’s constitutional due process rights

under Section 1983; 2) Defendants acted outside their enforcement authority under the Clean Water

Act; and 3) Holdner’s land patent bars the state from regulating water quality on his land. Holdner

v. Coba, Civ. No. 3:15-cv-2039-AC, 2016 WL 3102053 (D. Or. June 1, 2016) (“Holdner III”)3. 

However, the court later noted “the allegations of the Complaint universally support a single claim

under Section 1983.” Holdner v. Coba, Case No. 3:15-cv-2039-AC, 2016 WL 6662687, at *5 (D.

Or. Nov. 9, 2016).

The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on several grounds. First, the court found

Holdner lacked standing based on the absence of a injury-in-fact. Holdner III, 2016 WL 3102053,

at *3. The court reasoned “[b]ecause plaintiff cannot legally possess livestock until December 8,

2019, he has no legally protected interest in livestock as required for standing to bring his claims,

and can show no ‘actual or imminent’ injury sufficient to meet the standing requirement in federal

court.” Id.

/ / / / /

3Holdner’s motion for reconsideration of this Opinion was denied in Holdner v. Coba, Civ

No. 3:15-cv-2039-AC, 2016 WL 4210776 (D. Or. Aug. 8, 2016).

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Next, the court found Holdner’s claims barred by claim preclusion. Id. The court found

Holdner IIIto be substantially similar to Holdner I and Holdner II, and to allege “claims which were

raised or should have been raised in prior administrative and criminal proceedings.” Holdner III,

2016 WL 3102053, at *3. It then noted “Judge Papak clearly stated that plaintiff’s claims would be

barred by claim preclusion” and “[a]s plaintiff’s prior proceedings were litigated to final judgment

on the merits and the defendants in this action are in privity with the State of Oregon, a party to

plaintiff’s criminal proceeding, plaintiffs claims are barredbyclaimpreclusion.” Id. Similarly, issue

preclusion prevented Holdner from pursuing his claims “because issues raised in plaintiff’s

complaint were fully litigated to a final judgment on the merits in plaintiff’s first federal court

lawsuit, the criminal proceedings, and the prior state court administrative proceedings. Id. at *4. 

Additionally, the court found Holdner unable prosecute a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act. 

Id. at *5-*6.

AssumingHoldner had stated a viable claim, the court determined Defendants were protected

by Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. Id. at *5. Holdner sued Defendants in

their official capacities and Oregon did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

Consequently, Defendants were shielded by such immunity. Id. Additionally, Holdner failed to

allege a viable claim for violation of his constitutional rights, providing qualified immunity to

Defendants. Id. 

The court considered allowing Holdner leave to amend the Complaint. However, it

determined Holdner could not cure the defects in the Complaint in amended pleading. Specifically,

claim preclusion barred Holdner from pursuing any claim that was, or should have been, raised in

his prior federal lawsuits or state administrative and criminal proceedings. Id. at *6. Moreover,

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Holdner could not bring a private action under Clean Water Act or sue Defendants in their official

capacity. Id. Finally, Defendants would be afforded qualified immunity on any claims based on

constitutional violations alleged in his prior actions. Consequently, the court dismissed Holdner’s

action with prejudice.

Holdner appealed the opinion and the Ninth Circuit “affirm[ed] the district court’s dismissal

of Holdner’s action but vacate[d] the judgment in part and remand[ed] for the district court to

dismiss Holdner’s action without prejudice.” Holdner v. Coba, 693 Fed. Appx. 613, 613 (2017). 

The court based its ruling on Holdner’s failure to challenge this court’s grounds for dismissing the

complaint, resulting in the wavier of any such challenge. Id. The Ninth Circuit did not provide any

direction on whether Holdner could file an amended complaint in this case or what deficiencies

should be remedied in the new filing. 

Holder filed the Amended Complaint asserting the same claims with additional factual

allegations. The new allegations relate solely to his conviction for water pollution in the state court

under an allegedly unconstitutional statute. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 62, ¶¶ 22-29.) They describe

testimony and evidence offered at his criminal trial, and assert the penalty and fine issued against

him violated his due process rights. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-29.) Defendants move to dismiss the

Amend Complaint. 

Legal Standard

A well-pleaded complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (2018). A federal claimant is not

required to detail all factual allegations; however, the complaint must provide “more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. While the court must assume that

all facts alleged in a complaint are true and view them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party, it need not accept as true any legal conclusion set forth in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, a plaintiff must set forth a plausible claim for relief – a

possible claim for relief will not do. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the

non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly

suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); Sheppard v. David Evans and Assoc., No. 11-

35164, 2012 WL 3983909 at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2012)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679) (“The

Supreme Court has emphasized that analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint’s allegations is a

‘context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.’”).

Discussion

The Amended Complaint asserts the same claims as those asserted by Holdner in the

Complaint. The only difference in the Amended Complaint is the addition of allegations related to

Holdner’s state criminal proceedings. All of these allegations, and any new claims deriving

therefrom, could have been asserted in Holdner’s prior legal proceedings and are barred by claim

preclusion. Holdner has failed to successfully cure the deficiencies identified by this court, which

findings were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Consequently, the Amended Complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted and Defendants are entitled, once again, to the dismissal

of this action. 

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At oral argument, Holdner expressed, for the first time, his intent to rely on Rule 60 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60”) to set aside Oregon’s enforcement of water quality

standards against Holdner and his livestock operation. Rule 60 allows the court to “relieve a party

or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for various reasons. FED. R.

CIV. P. 60(b) (2018). However, a motion for relief under Rule 60 must be brought in the court which

rendered the original judgment. Veltze v. Bucyrus-Eire Co., 154 F.R.D. 214, 216 ( E.D. Wis. 1994). 

Rule 60 does not authorize this court to relieve Holdner from a judgment issued by the Oregon

courts. 

The failure of the Ninth Circuit to instruct Holdner, or the court, on the purpose of dismissing

this action without prejudice is problematic. As Defendants surmise, it is possible the Ninth Circuit

intended to allow Holdner to refile his action after the prohibition on his ability to legally possess 

livestock expired, thereby eliminating the obstacle to establishing standing. Additionally, the Ninth

Circuit could have opened the door to Holdner reasserting his claim in a court of competent

jurisdiction to resolve the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. While such filings would remain

subject to the prior conclusion by this court and the Ninth Circuit that any claim based on

Defendants’ regulation of Holdner’s livestock operation and resulting administrative proceedings

and criminal prosecution are barred by claim preclusion, the court must follow the direction of the

Ninth Circuit and dismiss this action without prejudice. However, Holdner may not refile this action

in this court prior to the expiration of the prohibition on his ability to legally possess livestock on

December 8, 2019, and may not assert claims related to Defendants’ previous regulation of

Holdner’s livestock operation, and resulting administrative proceedings and criminal prosecution.

/ / / / /

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Conclusion

Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 63) to dismiss is GRANTED and this action is dismissed

without prejudice.

DATED this 2nd

 day of July, 2018.

 /s/ John V. Acosta 

 JOHN V. ACOSTA

United States Magistrate Judge

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