010594-11 950560 V1

Keith A. Ketterling, OSB No. 913368

Email: kketterling@stollberne.com

Timothy S. DeJong, OSB No. 940662

Email: tdejong@stollberne.com

Jacob S. Gill, OSB No. 033238

Email: jgill@stollberne.com

Nadia H. Dahab, OSB No. 125630

Email:ndahab@stollberne.com

STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & SHLACHTER P.C.

209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500

Portland, Oregon 97204

Telephone: (503) 227-1600

Facsimile: (503) 227-6840

Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice)

Email: steve@hbsslaw.com

Jeniphr A. E. Breckenridge (pro hac vice)

Email: jeniphr@hbsslaw.com

Karl P. Barth (pro hac vice)

Email: karlb@hbsslaw.com

HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP

1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300

Seattle, Washington 98101

Telephone: (206) 623-7292

Facsimile: (206) 623-0594

Attorneys For Plaintiffs

[Additional Counsel of Record Listed on Signature Page]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

LAWRENCE P. CIUFFITELLI, for himself 

and as Trustee of CIUFFITELLI 

REVOCABLE TRUST; GREG and ANGELA 

JULIEN; JAMES and SUSAN 

MACDONALD, as Co-Trustees of the 

MACDONALD FAMILY TRUST; R.F. 

MACDONALD CO.; ANDREW NOWAK, 

for himself and as Trustee of the ANDREW 

NOWAK REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST 

U/A 2/20/2002; WILLIAM RAMSTEIN; and

Case No. 3:16-cv-00580-AC

CLASS REPRESENTATIVES’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 

PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AND 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

Case 3:16-cv-00580-AC Document 333 Filed 07/16/18 Page 1 of 41
010594-11 950560 V1

GREG WARRICK, for himself and, with 

SUSAN WARRICK, as Co-Trustees of the 

WARRICK FAMILY TRUST, individually 

and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP; 

EISNERAMPER LLP; SIDLEY AUSTIN 

LLP; TONKON TORP LLP; TD 

AMERITRADE, INC.; INTEGRITY BANK & 

TRUST; and DUFF & PHELPS, LLC,

Defendants.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 7-1 ..................................................................1

MOTION..........................................................................................................................................1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT....................................................................................................2

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................2

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................4

A. Allegations of the Action.........................................................................................4

B. Procedural Background............................................................................................5

C. The Mediation/Settlement Process ..........................................................................6

III. SUMMARY OF KEY SETTLEMENT TERMS ................................................................7

A. The Class Definition ................................................................................................7

B. The Settlement Consideration..................................................................................7

C. Release of Claims ....................................................................................................8

D. Contribution Claims Bar..........................................................................................8

IV. NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT .....................................................................................8

V. ARGUMENT.......................................................................................................................9

A. The Proposed Settlement Warrants Preliminary Approval......................................9

1. The Settlement is Entitled to the Presumption of Fairness as 

Being the Result of Non-Collusive, Informed, Arm’s-Length 

Negotiations. ..............................................................................................10

2. The Settlement Does Not Suffer from Any Obvious 

Deficiencies................................................................................................12

3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential 

Treatment to Class Representatives or Segments of the Class. .................13

4. The Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible Approval ..................14

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B. The Court Should Make a Preliminary Determination that the 

Proposed Class Satisfies the Standard for Certification Under Rule 23................15

1. The Rule 23(a) Requirements are Met.......................................................16

a. The Class Is So Numerous that Joinder Is Impracticable ..............16

b. Numerous Common Issues Exist...................................................17

c. The Class Representative’s Claims Are Typical of 

Those of Other Class Members......................................................17

d. The Class Representatives and Their Counsel 

Adequately Represent the Interests of the Class............................19

2. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met. .............................................19

a. Common Questions of Fact or Law Predominate..........................19

b. The Class Action Mechanism is Superior to Any Other 

Method of Adjudication.................................................................21

C. The Proposed Plan of Allocation is Fair and Reasonable......................................22

D. The Proposed Claims Administrator Should be Approved....................................23

E. The Form and Method of Notice Should be Approved. ........................................24

F. The Court Should Appoint Class Counsel.............................................................26

VI. PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF EVENTS...........................................................................26

VII. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................28

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TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Description

A [Proposed] Preliminary Approval Order

A-1 Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class Action

A-2 Summary Notice

A-3 Proof of Claim and Release

B [Proposed] Limited Judgment 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,

521 U.S. 591 (1997).....................................................................................................20, 21, 22

Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,

568 U.S. 455 (2013)...........................................................................................................20, 21

In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & Emp. Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) 

Litig.,

281 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) .............................................................................................18

Bell v. Consumer Cellular, Inc.,

2017 WL 2672073 (D. Or. June 21, 2017) ........................................................................11, 12

Bickley v. Schneider Nat’l Inc.,

2016 WL 4157355 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016).........................................................................10

In re Blech Sec. Litig.,

187 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ...............................................................................................21

In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.,

654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................12

Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. GE,

361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................24, 25

Ciuffitelli for Tr. of Ciuffitelli Revocable Tr. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP,

2017 WL 2927481 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2017), report and recommendation 

adopted sub nom. Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2017 WL 2927150 (D. 

Or. July 5, 2017) ......................................................................................................................21

Collins v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp.,

274 F.R.D. 294 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ...............................................................................................9

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,

569 U.S. 27 (2013)...................................................................................................................16

In re Comput. Memories Sec. Litig.,

111 F.R.D. 675 (N.D. Cal. 1986).............................................................................................16

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Costelo v. Chertoff,

258 F.R.D. 600 (C.D. Cal. 2009).............................................................................................18

Couser v. Comenity Bank,

125 F. Supp. 3d 1034 (S.D. Cal. 2015)....................................................................................12

Dubeau v. Sterling Sav. Bank,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123337 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013)..........................................................22

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) .......................................................................................17, 18, 19

Fidel v. Farley,

534 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................25

Fosbre v. Las Vegas Sands Corp.,

2015 WL 3722496 (D. Nev. June 15, 2015)............................................................................21

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.,

2012 WL 5838198 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012) ........................................................................10

Fraser v. ASUS Comput. Int’l,

2012 WL 6680142 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012).........................................................................13

Freedman v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,

922 F. Supp. 377 (D. Or. 1996) ...............................................................................................18

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,

150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ...............................................................................18, 19, 21, 22

Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp.,

976 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................18

Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.,

329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964) ...................................................................................................16

Hurst v. First Student, Inc.,

2015 WL 6437196 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 2015)...................................................................17, 18, 19

In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig.,

881 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................20

In re Immune Response Sec. Litig.,

497 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2007)....................................................................................25

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In re Intelcom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

169 F.R.D. 142 (D. Colo. 1996) ..............................................................................................22

Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

765 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................17

Lane v. Brown,

166 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (D. Or. 2016) ..........................................................................................9

In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig.,

247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. Cal. 2007)...............................................................................................16

Medearis v. Or. Teamster Emplrs. Tr.,

2009 WL 1788183 (D. Or. June 19, 2009) ..............................................................................10

In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig.,

213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................................11, 14

In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig.,

249 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) .............................................................................................23

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,

2015 WL 5705126 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2015) .................................................................16, 17, 20

Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,

221 F.R.D. 523 (C.D. Cal. 2004).............................................................................................10

Nobles v. MBNA Corp.,

2009 WL 1854965 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2009).........................................................................11

Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,

688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) .....................................................................................................9

In re Omnivision Techs.,

559 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2007).............................................................................22, 23

Ontiveros v. Zamora,

303 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Cal. 2014) .............................................................................................24

In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,

1994 WL 502054 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1994)...........................................................................23

In re Pac. Enterprises Sec. Litig.,

47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................10

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Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc.,

2010 WL 8742757 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010).........................................................................17

In re Portal Software, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

2007 WL 1991529 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2007).........................................................................25

Rieckborn v. Velti PLC,

2015 WL 468329 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) .............................................................................25

Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp.,

563 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................10

Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc.,

835 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................20

Schueneman v. Arena Pharms., Inc.,

2018 WL 1757512 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018)..........................................................................23

Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc.,

2013 WL 12126744 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2013).........................................................................22

Seymour v. Summa Vista Cinema,

809 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir.), 

amended, 817 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1987)...................................................................................15

Silber v. Mabon,

18 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................26

Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp.,

2015 WL 4498571 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015)..........................................................................10

Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp.,

211 F. Supp. 3d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2016) ...................................................................................14

Staton v. Boeing Co.,

327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................9

Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp.,

655 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2011) ...........................................................................................19, 20

Sullivan v. Kelly Servs.,

268 F.R.D. 356 (N.D. Cal. 2010).............................................................................................18

In re Tableware Antitrust Litig.,

484 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2007).........................................................................9, 10, 14

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Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co.,

8 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................14

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,

___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016)......................................................................................20

Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc.,

2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis 140759 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016)........................................................14

Villanueva v. Liberty Acquisitions Servicing, LLC,

319 F.R.D. 307 (D. Or. 2017)............................................................................................16, 17

Villanueva v. Morpho Detection, Inc.,

2015 WL 4760464 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) ........................................................................12

Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166704 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012).....................................................14

Walsh v. CorePower Yoga LLC,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20974 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) .......................................................12

Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc.,

2011 WL 2650711 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011)............................................................................13

West v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,

2006 WL 1652598 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006) .........................................................................13

Zepeda v. Paypal, Inc.,

2015 WL 6746913 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015) ..........................................................................10

In re Zynga Sec. Litig.,

2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 145738 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015)........................................................14

Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115...................................................................................................5, 13, 21, 23

Other Authorities

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23................................................................................................................... passim

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 13:10 (4th ed. 2004) .....................................................9, 15

4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:10 (5th ed.)...........................................................................9

4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:14 (5th ed.)...................................................................10, 12

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4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:15 (5th ed.).........................................................................13

7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:82 (5th ed.).........................................................................22

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CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH LR 7-1

Defendants Tonkon Torp LLP and Integrity Bank & Trust do not oppose this motion. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel conferred with counsel for each of the other Defendants, except TD 

Ameritrade, Inc., by telephone and the parties made a good faith effort to resolve this dispute but 

were unable to do so. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s efforts to confer with counsel for TD Ameritrade, Inc. 

were unsuccessful. In light of the oppositions of several other Defendants, further attempts to 

confer with TD Ameritrade, Inc. would have been futile and only delayed this motion.

MOTION

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), Plaintiffs Lawrence P. Ciuffitelli (on behalf of himself 

and as Trustee of the Ciuffitelli Revocable Trust); Greg and Angela Julien (as Trustees of the 

Gregory and Angela Julien Revocable Trust U/A 7/2/2012); R. F. MacDonald Co.; James and 

Susan MacDonald (as co-Trustees of the MacDonald Family Trust U/A 12/05/2000; Andrew 

Nowak (on behalf of himself and in his capacity as trustee of the Andrew Nowak Revocable 

Living Trust U/A 2/20/2002); William Ramstein; Greg Warrick (on behalf of himself and as coTrustee of the Warrick Family Trust); and Susan Warrick (as co-Trustee of the Warrick Family 

Trust) (collectively, the “Class Representatives”), through their legal counsel, move the Court for 

the following relief:

1. Preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement (the “Settlement”) with 

Defendant Tonkon Torp LLP (“Tonkon”) (the Class Representatives and Tonkon collectively 

“the Parties”) on the terms set forth in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated May 

31, 2018 (the “Stipulation”);

2. Provisionally certifying a settlement class consisting of all members of the 

proposed class as defined in the Second Amended Complaint, except named plaintiffs in various 

identified “Individual Actions” (the “Settlement Class”);

3. Preliminarily approving the Plan of Allocation;

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4. Approving the retention of the proposed Claims Administrator, Garden City 

Group LLC;

5. Approving the form and method for providing notice of the Settlement to the 

Class;

6. Preliminarily approving counsel for the Class Representatives as Settlement Class 

Counsel; and

7. Scheduling a hearing at which the Court will consider (a) final approval of the 

Settlement, (b) certification of the Settlement Class, (c) approval of the Plain of Allocation, (d) 

Class Counsel’s request for fees and expenses, (e) entry of a Limited Judgment, and (f) rule upon 

such other matters as the Court may deem appropriate.

This motion is supported by the Declarations of the Hon. Michael H. Simon, Steve W. 

Berman, and Timothy S. DeJong, filed herewith.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

The Class Representatives have reached a settlement in this action with Tonkon that 

represents a significant recovery for the proposed Class and avoids the costs and risks associated 

with continued litigation, including the danger of a smaller recovery, or no recovery, at trial. In a 

comprehensive settlement with the Class and several groups of Aequitas investors whom filed 

similar actions against Tonkon (the “Individual Actions,” described below), Tonkon and its 

insurers have agreed to pay all remaining insurance policy limits, totaling $18.5 million or more. 

The Settlement provides an immediate and substantial benefit to the Class of at least

$12,913,000.00, or 69.8% of the total, comprehensive settlement. In return, the Class will grant 

Tonkon a release of all claims against it. Additionally, the Settlement is explicitly conditioned 

upon the entry by the Court of a contribution claims bar, with a pro tanto credit for non-settling 

Defendants. See Section III(D), infra. 

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This Settlement represents a maximum recovery for the Class. Based upon Class 

Counsel’s review of Tonkon’s confidential financial information, the Settlement equals or 

exceeds any recovery the Class might have obtained if no settlement were reached and Plaintiffs 

prevailed at trial and on appeal. DeJong Decl. ¶ 5. The Settlement reflects the reality that 

Tonkon faces hundreds of millions of dollars of potential liability and defense costs from this 

and related investor lawsuits and has limited assets beyond its remaining insurance policy 

limits—which would be depleted by attorney fees incurred to defend further litigation—to satisfy 

any judgment. Simply put, there will never be more money potentially available to the Class 

than what Tonkon has voluntarily agreed to pay to settle these claims.

The Class Representatives and proposed Class Counsel recommend this Settlement, 

which meets the standard for preliminary approval because it was the product of arm’s-length 

negotiation between experienced counsel, has no obvious deficiencies, does not grant 

preferential treatment to the Class Representatives or any other portion of the Class, and falls 

within the range of possible approval. See Section V(A), infra. U.S. District Court Judge 

Michael H. Simon, who served as settlement judge by appointment of this Court, has submitted a 

declaration in support of the Settlement. The court-appointed Receiver for Aequitas also 

supports the Settlement.1 Plaintiffs in the Individual Actions, representing 30.2% of the total net 

losses of all Aequitas investors, agreed after highly-contentious negotiations spanning the course 

of a full year to the allocation of 69.8% of the total base settlement payment of $18.5 million to 

the Class.

 

1 As part of the comprehensive settlement of all actual and potential claims asserted against 

Tonkon related to Aequitas securities, the Receiver has agreed to apply to the District of Oregon 

for permission to enter into a release of potential claims against Tonkon (in exchange for 

Tonkon’s release of potential contribution claims against Aequitas entities). The Receiver’s 

motion will be filed in the case captioned SEC v. Aequitas Management, LLC, et. al, No. 3:16-

cv-00438-PK (D. Or.).

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Further, because all the requirements for class certification approval are met, the Court 

should certify the Class for settlement purposes only. See Section V(B), infra. The Court should 

also grant preliminary approval of the proposed Plan of Allocation because it seeks to disburse 

the settlement amount to Class members based on their proportionate loss, and thus has a 

“reasonable, rational basis.” See Section V(C), infra.

The Court should also approve the proposed Notice and method of notice to Class 

members because the Notice complies with the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B), and the 

proposed method of notice satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 and due process. See Section 

V(D), infra. The Court should also approve the Garden City Group, LLC as Claims 

Administrator to administer the method of notice and administration of the Settlement proceeds. 

See Section V(E), infra. Additionally, the Court should appoint counsel for the Class 

Representatives as Class Counsel. See Section V(F), infra. 

Lastly, the Court should schedule a final fairness hearing for approximately four months 

after the preliminary approval order is entered, to allow sufficient time for providing the Notice 

to Class Members, and allowing them to object or exclude themselves from the Class, as well as 

sufficient time for the Class Representatives to review any objections and to file a motion for 

Final Approval. See Section VI, infra.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations of the Action

Having considered multiple motions over the course of more than two years, the Court is 

familiar with the allegations of this lawsuit. The Aequitas companies sold hundreds of millions 

of dollars of unregistered securities to Class Members in violation of the Oregon Securities Law. 

Tonkon, a law firm with offices in Portland, Oregon, was one of Aequitas’ law firms for an 

ongoing securities offering conducted through at least seven Aequitas subsidiaries over the 

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relevant time period. Plaintiffs allege that Tonkon is liable pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115(3) 

for participating and materially aiding in Aequitas’ unlawful sales of securities. 

B. Procedural Background

On April 4, 2016, the Class Representatives filed their initial Complaint in this Action

[Dkt. No. 1], alleging violations of the Oregon Securities Law by Tonkon and other Defendants 

in connection with their roles in participating in and materially aiding the sales of Aequitas 

Securities. On May 19, 2016, the Class Representatives filed an Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 

57].

On June 10, 2016, Tonkon, along with the other defendants, filed a joint motion to 

dismiss the Complaint [Dkt. No. 74]. On the same date, Tonkon also filed a separate motion to 

dismiss the Complaint [Dkt. No. 80]. On August 1, 2016, the Class Representatives filed an 

opposition to each of Tonkon’s motions to dismiss. [Dkt. Nos. 119, 120]; and, on August 7, 

2016, Tonkon filed a reply to the opposition to its motion [Dkt. No. 129] and to the joint motion 

to dismiss [Dkt. No. 131].

On September 21, 2016, the Class Representatives served requests for production of 

documents on Tonkon. In response, Tonkon has produced more than 455,000 pages of 

documents.2 Class Counsel have reviewed many hundreds of thousands of documents produced 

by Tonkon, by other parties to this Action, and by Aequitas.

On April 24, 2017, the Court issued Amended Findings and Recommendations largely 

denying Tonkon’s motion to dismiss the Complaint and granting the Class Representatives an 

opportunity to amend their complaint to address certain issues identified by the Court. [Dkt. No. 

242]. Tonkon did not object to the Amended Findings and Recommendations, but other 

Defendants did object. Judge Mosman adopted the Amended Findings and Recommendations 

on July 5, 2017 [Dkt. No. 250].

 

2 See Declaration of Steve W. Berman (“Berman Decl.”) ¶ 7.

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On September 8, 2017, the Class Representatives filed their Second Amended Complaint 

(the “SAC”) with the Court. [Dkt. # 257]. On October 23, 2017, Tonkon participated in a joint 

motion to dismiss filed collectively by all defendants in this action. [Dkt. #278]. On November 

22, 2017, the Class Representatives filed their opposition to the joint motion to dismiss. [Dkt. # 

287]. On December 20, 2017, Tonkon and the other defendants filed a reply memorandum in 

support of their motion to dismiss. [Dkt. # 300]. The Court held a hearing on this motion on 

June 1, 2018, and it is under advisement.

C. The Mediation/Settlement Process

On March 17, 2017, Class Counsel and Tonkon’s Counsel and insurer met with U.S. 

District Court Judge Michael H. Simon, who acted as settlement judge for a confidential 

mediation process. After difficult negotiations, the Class Representatives and Tonkon reached 

agreement as to the financial component of a potential settlement. DeJong Decl. ¶ 2. Following 

the initial mediation session, there were extensive negotiations between Plaintiffs and Tonkon to 

finalize the terms of a settlement. Id. On March 27, 2017, the Class Representatives and 

Tonkon executed a “Term Sheet” memorializing the basic terms of the Settlement. Id. and Ex. 

A. As set forth in his declaration, Judge Simon believes the settlement was the product of 

serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations. 

However, the settlement could not be completed on the terms contemplated by the March 

27, 2017 Term Sheet, which specified a settlement class that included all named plaintiffs in 

related, non-class cases filed by groups of individual Aequitas investors (the “Individual 

Actions”). 3 DeJong Decl. ¶ 3. The Individual Plaintiffs declined to participate in a class 

 

3 The “Individual Actions” consists of the following court cases: 1) Wurster v. Deloitte & 

Touche, LLP, Case No. 16CV25920 (Multnomah Cty. Cir. Ct.); 2) Pommier v. Deloitte & 

Touche, Case No. 16CV36439 (Multnomah Cty. Cir. Ct.); 3) Ramsdell v. Deloitte & Touche, 

Case No. 16CV40659 (Multnomah Cty. Cir. Ct.); 4) Albers v. Deloitte & Touche, Case No. 

2:16CV02239 (D. Or.); 5) Layton v. Deloitte & Touche, Case No. 16CV36439 (Multnomah Cty.

Cir. Ct.); and 6) Cavanagh v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, Case No. 18CV09052 (Multnomah Cty.

Cir. Ct.).

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settlement. Id. Furthermore, the various interested investor groups disagreed about how to 

allocate the negotiated total settlement payment among them. Id. Extensive negotiations 

followed over the course of a year, including an unsuccessful mediation session with Judge 

Simon. Id. ¶ 4. Ultimately, the investors agreed to an allocation formula proposed by the courtappointed Receiver for Aequitas. Id. The Receiver calculated the net losses of all investors and 

determined that the Individual Actions represent 30.2% of the total net loss. Id. The Receiver 

further proposed that all investors pay attorneys’ fees equal to 20% of the recovery. Id. 

Plaintiffs in this action and the plaintiffs in the Individual Actions thereafter negotiated separate 

settlement agreements with Tonkon, based upon the negotiated allocation of 69.2% of the 

proceeds to the Class and 30.2% to the Individual Actions. 

III. SUMMARY OF KEY SETTLEMENT TERMS

A. The Class Definition

The proposed settlement class (the “Class”) includes all persons who purchased Aequitas 

securities on or after June 9, 2010. Stipulation, ¶ 1(d)4; SAC ¶ 203. The Class excludes: (a) 

Defendants; (b) the past and present officers and directors of Aequitas-affiliated companies; (c) 

the past and present members of the Aequitas Advisory Board; (d) registered investment advisors 

and investment advisor representatives; and (e) any investor who received finder’s fees or other 

consideration from Aequitas in connection with referring investors to Aequitas. Id. The Class 

also excludes all plaintiffs in any of the Individual Actions.

B. The Settlement Consideration

The Total Settlement Amount to be paid by Tonkon to the Class is a minimum of 

$12,913,000.00. 5 Stipulation, ¶¶ 1(aa), 2. This amount may be increased by any remaining 

 

4 A true and correct copy of the Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and 

Release, dated May 31, 2018 (the “Stipulation”), is attached as Exhibit A to the Berman Decl.

5

In separate settlements, Tonkon has agreed to pay a total of $5,587,000 to the plaintiffs in 

the Individual Actions.

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policy limits at the time the Settlement becomes final, in an amount equal to $1,850,000 less the 

total fees and costs Tonkon and/or its insurers have incurred (whether invoiced or accrued but 

unbilled) for all the legal work performed by K&L Gates (or by another firm, if applicable) in 

connection with this Action, the Individual Actions, and the SEC Civil Action. Stipulation 

¶¶ 1(y), 5.

C. Release of Claims

Once the Settlement is effective, the Class Representatives and Class Members who have 

not opted out will release all claims for damages against Tonkon arising out of or relating in any 

way to any act or omission of the Defendants or their member institutions that is alleged or could 

have been alleged in this litigation. Stipulation ¶¶ 17-21.

D. Contribution Claims Bar

The Settlement is conditioned upon: 1) the entry of an injunction barring contribution 

claims by the other defendants in this action against Tonkon (Stipulation ¶ 31); and 2) approval 

of a pro tanto credit in favor of the remaining defendants in this action against any judgment that 

may be entered against them in this action. Stipulation ¶ 32. 

IV. NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT

The [Proposed] Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice 

(“Preliminary Approval Order”), which is attached as Exhibit A to this motion, mandates that 

within twenty-eight (28) calendar days of the Court’s order preliminarily approving the 

Settlement, Class Counsel shall provide notice to Class Members through mailing to all 

identifiable Class Members as identified by the Receiver: i) the proposed Notice of Pendency 

and Settlement of Class Action (the “Notice”) (substantially in the form annexed as Exhibit A-1 

to the Preliminary Approval Order); and ii) the Proof of Claim and Release (substantially in the 

form annexed as Exhibit A-3 to the Preliminary Approval Order).

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Additionally, within thirty-five (35) calendar days after entry of the Preliminary Approval 

Order, Class Counsel shall cause a Summary Notice, substantially in the form annexed as Exhibit 

A-2 to the Preliminary Approval Order, to be published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL and THE

OREGONIAN and to be distributed over a national newswire service.

V. ARGUMENT

A. The Proposed Settlement Warrants Preliminary Approval

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) requires judicial approval of any compromise or 

settlement of class action claims. “[T]here is a strong judicial policy that favors settlements, 

particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned.” Lane v. Brown, 166 F. Supp. 3d 

1180, 1188 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2008)); see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)

(“voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute resolution ... 

especially ... in complex class action litigation”). Approval of a settlement is a multi-step 

process, beginning with (i) preliminary approval, which then allows (ii) notice to be given to the 

class and objections to be filed, after which there is (iii) a motion for final approval and fairness 

hearing. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 

LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.632, 320-21 (2004). Preliminary approval is thus not a dispositive 

assessment of the fairness of the proposed settlement, but rather determines whether it falls 

within the “range of possible approval.” Id.; see also Collins v. Cargill Meat Sols. Corp., 274 

F.R.D. 294, 301-302 (E.D. Cal. 2011). The Court’s primary objective is to establish whether to 

direct notice of the proposed settlement to the class, invite the class’s reaction, and schedule a 

final fairness hearing. 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:10 (5th ed.). Preliminary approval 

establishes an “initial presumption” of fairness such that notice may be given to the class. In re 

Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotation 

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marks and citation omitted); see also Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp., 2015 WL 4498571, at *6 

(N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (same). 

Preliminary approval of a settlement and notice to the proposed class is appropriate if the 

proposed settlement: (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive 

negotiations; (2) has no obvious deficiencies; (3) does not improperly grant preferential 

treatment to class representatives or segments of the class; and (4) falls with the range of possible 

approval. Bickley v. Schneider Nat’l Inc., 2016 WL 4157355, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016); 

Zepeda v. Paypal, Inc., 2015 WL 6746913, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015); Fraley v. Facebook, 

Inc., 2012 WL 5838198, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2012); Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 

1079; see also 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:14 (5th ed.). All factors weigh in favor of 

preliminary approval here.

1. The Settlement is Entitled to the Presumption of Fairness as Being the Result 

of Non-Collusive, Informed, Arm’s-Length Negotiations.

As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[w]e put a good deal of stock in the product of an arm’slength, non-collusive, negotiated resolution.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 

965 (9th Cir. 2009); Medearis v. Or. Teamster Emplrs. Tr., 2009 WL 1788183, at *3 (D. Or. 

June 19, 2009). “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to 

produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in the litigation.” In re 

Pac. Enterprises Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995); Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Thus, “the trial judge, absent fraud, 

collusion, or the like, should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of counsel.” Id. 

(quoting Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir.1977)) (other citations omitted). 

Accordingly, as is the case here, when proposed counsel are experienced and support the 

settlement, which was the result of arm’s-length negotiations and relevant discovery has been 

conducted, there is an initial “presumption that the agreement is fair.” Am. Greetings Corp., 

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2015 WL 4498571, at *6; Nobles v. MBNA Corp., 2009 WL 1854965, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 

2009). 

The proposed Settlement arises out of extended, informed, arm’s-length negotiations 

between experienced counsel for the Parties. Here, the Parties have engaged in more than two 

years of litigation and Tonkon had produced more than 455,000 pages of document discovery. 

This “significant investigation, discovery and research” weighs in favor of finding the settlement 

was adequately informed. See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (holding “significant investigation, discovery and research” supported the district 

court’s conclusion “that the Plaintiffs had sufficient information to make an informed decision 

about the Settlement”). Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced and recognized nationally 

for competently handling large-scale, financial fraud and class action litigation. Berman Decl., 

Ex. D; DeJong Decl., Ex. B.

There is no evidence of conflicts of interest or collusion among the Parties in crafting the 

Settlement. Courts considering a pre-class certification settlement must examine whether the 

settlement was the result of good faith, arm's-length negotiations or the result of fraud and 

collusion. Bell v. Consumer Cellular, Inc., 2017 WL 2672073, at *7 (D. Or. June 21, 2017). 

The Ninth Circuit has identified three signs of collusion: (1) class counsel receives a 

disproportionate distribution of the settlement, or the class receives no monetary distribution but 

counsel is amply awarded; (2) the parties negotiate a “clear sailing” arrangement providing for 

the payment of attorneys' fees separate and apart from class funds without objection by a 

defendant; or (3) the parties arrange for payments not awarded to revert to a defendant rather 

than to be added to the class fund. Id. (citing In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 

F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011)). None of those things is present here.

First, the proposed settlement does not bear any of the characteristics of collusion, the 

Plan of Allocation provides that the Class Representatives will recover the same pro rata share as 

all other Class Members, and Class Counsel’s fees must be approved by this Court. Berman 

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Decl., Ex. B. Second, there is no ‘clear sailing’ provision, and any fees awarded by this Court 

will be paid from the Settlement Fund. Third, there is no reversion of any of the Settlement 

Amount to Tonkon. In addition, the Parties were assisted by the Honorable Michael H. Simon, 

United States District Court Judge, in their settlement negotiations, which is a strong “factor 

weighing in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness.” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948; see also

4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:14 (5th ed.). The presence of counsel for plaintiffs in the 

various Individual Actions in the negotiations further underscores the lack of collusion between 

the Class Representatives and Tonkon.

The Settlement is the result of informed, non-collusive and hard-fought negotiations 

between the Class Representatives, Tonkon and the plaintiffs in the Individual Actions. 

Plaintiffs and their counsel recommend the Settlement as being fair, reasonable, adequate and in 

the best interests of the Class members. Berman Decl. ¶ 6; DeJong Decl. ¶ 7. “Great weight” 

should be accorded to this recommendation of Class Counsel. Bell, 2017 WL 2672073, at *6 

(citations omitted); Couser v. Comenity Bank, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1044 (S.D. Cal. 2015). 

Accordingly, the Court should give an initial “presumption of fairness” to the Settlement. 

Villanueva v. Morpho Detection, Inc., 2015 WL 4760464, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2015) 

(citation omitted); see also Walsh v. CorePower Yoga LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20974, at 

*29 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (“[S]ettlements are entitled to ‘an initial presumption of fairness’

because they are the result of arm’s-length negotiations among experienced counsel.”) (citation 

omitted).

2. The Settlement Does Not Suffer from Any Obvious Deficiencies.

The Settlement is the product of a thorough assessment and evaluation of the strengths 

and weaknesses of plaintiffs’ case, including the collectability of any potential judgment 

obtained against Tonkon. The Parties have litigated this case for more than two years, during 

which time the Class Representatives conducted extensive document discovery. The Aequitas 

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Receiver waived applicable attorney-client privileges, allowing an unfettered look into the 

relevant documents. The Receiver produced a massive database containing Aequitas’ 

documents, and Tonkon has produced more than 455,000 documents. Accordingly, the 

Settlement reflects the Class Representatives’ informed assessment of the risks generally 

inherent in litigation, and the specific litigation risks present in this action in particular. Had 

there not been a settlement, Tonkon would have vigorously defended Plaintiffs’ claims, 

including by asserting the statutory “due diligence” defense to a claim for secondary liability 

under Or. Rev. St. § 59.115(3). Furthermore, the massive cost to defend this action, and the 

related Individual Actions, would have depleted Tonkon’s insurance substantially, if not entirely, 

leaving little if anything for any plaintiffs to collect post-judgment. Weighing the benefits of the 

Settlement with the risks that the Class Representatives faced in this Action, there are no obvious 

deficiencies in the Settlement. 

Further, the Settlement contains no obvious defects of the types that courts have found to 

preclude preliminary approval such as: unreasonably high attorneys’ fees; preferential treatment 

of class representatives; deficient notice plan; burdensome claims procedure; plainly unfair 

allocation scheme or overly broad releases of liability. See, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS

§ 13:15 (5th ed.) (citing, inter alia, Pokorny v. Quixtar Inc., 2011 WL 2912864, *1 (N.D. Cal. 

July 20, 2011) (fee concerns); West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 1652598, *12 (E.D. Cal. 

June 13, 2006) (preferential treatment of class representatives); Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, 

Inc., 2011 WL 2650711, *15–16 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (deficient notice); Fraser v. ASUS

Comput. Int’l, 2012 WL 6680142, *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2012) (overly broad releases). The 

lack of any obvious deficiencies in the Settlement weighs in favor of preliminary approval.

3. The Settlement Does Not Improperly Grant Preferential Treatment to Class 

Representatives or Segments of the Class.

The third factor to consider is whether the Settlement grants preferential treatment to 

class representatives or segments of the Class. The Settlement does not. The Plan of Allocation 

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is designed to compensate all Class Members equally based on their losses. Berman Decl., Ex. B. 

Therefore, there is no preferential treatment where the Class Representatives will receive the 

same pro rata distribution based on their losses that is applicable to all class members. In re 

Zynga Sec. Litig., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 145738, at *38-39 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015). The lack 

of preferential treatment for the Class Representatives also weighs in favor of preliminary 

approval.

4. The Settlement Falls Within the Range of Possible Approval

To determine whether a settlement “falls within the range of possible approval,” courts 

consider “substantive fairness and adequacy” and “plaintiffs’ expected recovery balanced against 

the value of the settlement.” Tableware, 484 F.Supp.2d at 1080. “It is well-settled law that a 

cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the potential recovery does not per se render the 

settlement inadequate or unfair.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 459 (quoting 

Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 628). The adequacy of the amount offered in settlement “cannot 

be assessed in a vacuum. Rather, it must be considered in light of ‘the strength of the plaintiff’s 

case’ and the risks in pursuing further litigation.” Viceral v. Mistras Grp., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. 

Lexis 140759, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016); see also Villegas v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166704, at *16-17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (“the fairness and the 

adequacy of the settlement should be assessed relative to risks of pursuing the litigation to 

judgment”) (citing In re Mego Fin. Corp., 213 F.3d at 459). Tonkon’s inability to pay a 

significantly larger amount is also an important consideration. Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power 

Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993) (the financial condition of defendant predominated in 

assessing the reasonableness of settlement); Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 

1256 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (uncertainty concerning defendant’s financial stability “strongly supports 

the reasonableness of the settlement”). Here, the substantial relief that will be received by the 

Class in this Settlement is quite favorable in light of the litigation risks and the risks of collection 

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of any judgment that might have been obtained against Tonkon. Further, the entry of a 

contribution claims bar, including a pro tanto credit for the non-settling Defendants, is 

appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., Seymour v. Summa Vista Cinema, 809 F.2d 1385, 

1389 (9th Cir.), amended, 817 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1987) (pro tanto credit preferable where 

financial condition of settling defendant limits settlement amount). 

The Settlement provides the substantial benefit of $12,913,000.00, without further risk to 

the Class. Due to the complexities inherent in this case, the certainty of this substantial 

settlement amount has to be judged in the context of the legal and practical obstacles to obtaining 

a large judgment against Tonkon at trial, and the likelihood of collecting any such judgment. 

Had the case continued, the Class faced significant legal challenges at class certification, 

summary judgment, and trial that could have resulted in no recovery at all for the Class. In 

addition, this Settlement (together with the related settlements of the Individual Actions) 

represents a recovery of the entire value of Tonkon’s insurance policy. Moreover, even if the 

Class Representatives had tried the case and prevailed, Tonkon would likely have appealed the 

verdict, thus adding years of further delay and expense to the litigation. These events would 

further diminish the insurance monies available for the Class.

Given the litigation risks that the Class faced here, along with risks inherent in any 

litigation, the Class Representatives believe that the $12,913,000.00 Settlement that will be 

available promptly for the Class is reasonable and adequate. For these reasons, the amount of the 

Settlement is very much within the “range of possible approval.”

B. The Court Should Make a Preliminary Determination that the Proposed Class 

Satisfies the Standard for Certification Under Rule 23.

The Federal Judicial Center instructs courts undertaking preliminary settlement review in 

uncertified cases to “make a preliminary determination that the proposed class satisfies the 

criteria set out in Rule 23(a) and at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b).” MANUAL FOR 

COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.632 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court should make 

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that preliminary determination that the proposed Class satisfies the standards for certification 

under Rule 23. Courts within the Ninth Circuit have taken a liberal view of class certification in 

cases such as this, recognizing that “securities litigation is particularly well suited for class action 

treatment.” In re Comput. Memories Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 675, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (citing

Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902-04 (9th Cir. 1975)). To certify the proposed Class, the 

Class Representatives must satisfy all four of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the relevant 

portions of Rule 23(b)(3). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). As described 

below, each of these requirements is met in this case.

1. The Rule 23(a) Requirements are Met

a. The Class Is So Numerous that Joinder Is Impracticable

The first requirement for maintaining a class action is that its members are so numerous 

that joinder would be “impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “Impracticable” does not mean 

impossible, but only that joinder would be difficult or inconvenient. Harris v. Palm Springs 

Alpine Estates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964). Numerosity depends on the facts and 

circumstances of each case and does not require any specific minimum number of class 

members. In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 116 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting 

General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). This District follows the rule of thumb 

that “approximately forty members is sufficient to satisfy the numerosity requirement.” 

Villanueva v. Liberty Acquisitions Servicing, LLC, 319 F.R.D. 307, 314 (D. Or. 2017) (citations 

omitted). “Plaintiffs need not provide an exact number of class members, so long as there are 

enough to make joinder impracticable.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 2015 WL 5705126, at *3 (D. 

Or. Sept. 28, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Class exceeds 1,500 members. SAC ¶ 204. 

This estimate is more than sufficient to establish the numerosity of the Class. Id. (“estimate of 

200 to 300 people is well above the number required in this district.”) 

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b. Numerous Common Issues Exist

Under Rule 23(a)(2), Plaintiffs must establish that there are “questions of law or fact 

common to the class.” Villanueva v. Liberty, 319 F.R.D. at 315. The requirements of Rule 

23(a)(2) have “been construed permissively.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 

981 (9th Cir. 2011); Moss, 2015 WL 5705126, at *3. Accordingly, commonality is “a low hurdle 

easily surmounted.” Pecover v. Elec. Arts Inc., 2010 WL 8742757, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 

2010). “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule.” Id. Rather, 

commonality requires the existence of even a single common contention that is capable of 

classwide resolution. Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011)). However, the common contention or 

contentions necessary to establish commonality must be “apt to drive the resolution of the 

litigation.” Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165. Here, the SAC identifies numerous common issues of 

fact and law, each of which are amenable to class-wide proof, including, without limitation, the 

following (SAC ¶ 206):

 whether the Aequitas Securities were sold to Class Members in violation of the 

registration requirements of the Oregon Securities Law; 

 whether the Aequitas Securities were sold by means of false statements of fact or 

omissions of material fact; 

 whether Defendant Tonkon participated or materially aided in the unlawful sales 

of Aequitas Securities. 

The determination of these common issues would resolve the allegations for the entire 

Class “in one stroke.” Hurst v. First Student, Inc., 2015 WL 6437196, at *3 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 

2015) (quoting Jimenez, 765 F.3d at 1165). As such, the commonality requirement is satisfied.

c. The Class Representative’s Claims Are Typical of Those of Other 

Class Members.

The third requirement is that the “claims ... of the representative parties are typical of the 

claims ... of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The test of typicality ‘is whether other 

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not 

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unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same 

course of conduct.’” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984 (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 

497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992)); Hurst, 2015 WL 6437196, at *3; Freedman v. Louisiana-Pacific 

Corp., 922 F. Supp. 377, 399 (D. Or. 1996). “Typicality refers to the nature of the claim or 

defense of the class representative, and not to the specific facts from which it arose or the relief 

sought.” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984. Like commonality, typicality is to be construed permissively: 

“[u]nder the rule’s permissive standards, representative claims are ‘typical’ if they are reasonably 

co-extensive with those of absent class members; they need not be substantially identical.” 

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Sullivan v. Kelly Servs., 

268 F.R.D. 356, 363 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The “focus should be on the defendants’ conduct and 

plaintiff’s legal theory, not the injury caused to the plaintiff.” Costelo v. Chertoff, 258 F.R.D. 

600, 608 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Simpson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 391, 396 

(N.D. Cal. 2005)). This requirement is “to assure that the interest of the named representative 

align with the interests of the class.” Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. In a securities class action, the 

claims and nature of evidence “are generally considered sufficient to satisfy the typicality 

requirement.” In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & Emp. Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) 

Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Plaintiffs’ claims here arise from the same events or course of conduct that give rise to 

claims of other Class Members, and the claims asserted are based on the same legal theories. All 

Class Members purchased Aequitas securities which, Plaintiffs allege, were sold in violation of 

Oregon securities laws and that Tonkon participated and aided in the unlawful sales of the 

Aequitas Securities. And Plaintiffs are not subject to any unique defenses that could make them 

atypical of Class Members. Therefore, the Class Representatives’ claims are typical.

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d. The Class Representatives and Their Counsel Adequately Represent 

the Interests of the Class.

The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the representative plaintiffs will fairly and 

adequately represent the interests of the Class. The relevant inquiries are: “(1) do the named 

plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will 

the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” 

Ellis, 657 F.3d at 985 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). 

The first inquiry requires only that a class representative does not have interests that are 

antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the Class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020; Hurst, 

2015 WL 6437196, at *4. As described herein, named plaintiffs have no interests that are 

antagonistic to other Class members, but do have claims that are typical of and coextensive with 

those of the Class. The proposed Class Representatives are committed to pursuing the claim that 

they and all Class Members have suffered injury from their purchase of Aequitas securities. 

As to the second inquiry, as discussed in Section V(F), infra, the Class Representatives

have retained counsel highly experienced in securities class action litigation who have 

successfully prosecuted securities and other complex class actions throughout the United States. 

The Class Representatives and their chosen counsel have prosecuted this action vigorously on 

behalf of the Class and will continue to do so, thus satisfying the adequacy requirement.

2. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are met.

A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) when: a) “questions of law or fact common 

to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;” and b) 

the class action mechanism is “superior” to other methods of adjudicating the controversy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Both of these requirements are satisfied in this case.

a. Common Questions of Fact or Law Predominate.

“The predominance inquiry ... asks whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to 

warrant adjudication by representation.” Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1019 

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(9th Cir. 2011). “The focus is on the relationship between the common and individual issues.” 

Id. To ensure that the class action is more efficient than individual actions, Rule 23(b)(3) 

requires that common issues predominate over issues that are particular to individual class 

members. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“predominance is a test 

readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud”). “An individual question is 

one ‘where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member 

to member,’ while a common question is one where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each 

member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide 

proof.’” Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016)). “Predominance 

exists ‘when common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved 

for all members of the class in a single adjudication.’” Moss, 2015 WL 5705126, at *4 (quoting 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022). Rule 23(b)(3) requires only a showing that questions common to the 

class predominate, and a plaintiff seeking class certification is not required to prove the answers 

to such questions. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013) (“[i]n 

other words, they need not, at that threshold, prove that the predominating question will be 

answered in their favor.”) Predominance does not require a plaintiff to show a complete absence 

of individual issues. Rather, the predominance inquiry “asks whether the common, aggregationenabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregationdefeating, individual issues.” Tyson Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1045. Predominance is not a 

matter of “nose-counting,” but “more important questions apt to drive the resolution of the 

litigation are given more weight in the predominance analysis over individualized questions 

which are of considerably less significance to the claims of the class.” Ruiz Torres, 835 F.3d at 

1134. Thus, predominance may be established on the basis of a single common issue, if that 

issue is central to the claim. In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 881 F.3d 679, 708 (9th Cir. 

2018). 

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To prevail on their claim under Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115(3) against Tonkon at trial, the 

Class Representatives need to prove that: 1) Aequitas committed a “primary violation” of the 

Oregon Securities Laws by selling unregistered securities or selling securities by making untrue 

statements of material facts or omitting to state material facts;6and 2) Tonkon committed a 

“secondary violation” by participating in or materially aiding in the sale of these securities. The 

Class Representatives will likely rely on the same evidence when establishing each of the 

foregoing at trial, and thus, common issues predominate over individual issues. As in Amgen, 

the proposed Class is “entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison. In no event will the 

individual circumstances of particular Class Members bear on the inquiry.” Amgen, 568 U.S. at 

460. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that predominance is a test “readily met” in 

cases alleging securities fraud. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 625. For these reasons, common 

issues predominate in this Action.

b. The Class Action Mechanism is Superior to Any Other Method of 

Adjudication.

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that the Court determine whether a class action is superior to 

other methods of adjudication. “When common questions present a significant aspect of the case 

and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication, there is clear 

justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis.” 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022; see also Fosbre v. Las Vegas Sands Corp., 2015 WL 3722496, at *5 

(D. Nev. June 15, 2015) (“It is preferable to determine these common questions once, rather than 

a multitude of times (or not at all if the small value of individual recoveries would deter any 

single plaintiff from bringing suit).” Securities fraud class actions are generally found to be 

superior to individual actions. In re Blech Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 97, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[i]n 

 

6 Reliance on the misrepresentation or omission is not an element of the primary violation 

under Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115(1). Ciuffitelli for Tr. of Ciuffitelli Revocable Tr. v. Deloitte & 

Touche LLP, 2017 WL 2927481, at *20 (D. Or. Apr. 10, 2017), report and recommendation 

adopted sub nom. Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2017 WL 2927150 (D. Or. July 5, 2017).

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general, securities suits such as this easily satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule 23”); In re 

Intelcom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 142, 149 (D. Colo. 1996) (“[T]he superiority of 

class actions in large securities fraud is well recognized.”); 7 Newberg on Class Actions § 22:82 

(5th ed.) (“Securities class actions rarely fail the superiority test.”)

A class action is the superior method for resolving the claims at issue in this Action. 

But for a class action, investors would be forced to file 1,500 individual claims that “would not 

only unnecessarily burden the judiciary, but would prove uneconomic for potential plaintiffs[,]” 

thereby demonstrating the superiority of a class action. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. Further, 

because the claims are being certified for purposes of settlement, the Court need not consider any 

purported issues with respect to the manageability of this case as a class action. Amchem, 521 

U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only certification, a district 

court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems 

... for the proposal is that there be no trial.”); Dubeau v. Sterling Sav. Bank, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 123337, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013) (quoting Amchem). 

For these reasons, the proposed Class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) 

and the Court should grant provisional certification for purposes of effecting the proposed 

Settlement.

C. The Proposed Plan of Allocation is Fair and Reasonable.

Approval of a plan of allocation of settlement proceeds in a class action is governed by 

the same standards as the settlement as a whole – the plan of allocation must be fair, reasonable 

and adequate. In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2007). “When 

formulated by competent and experienced class counsel, an allocation plan need have only a 

‘reasonable, rational basis.’” Scott v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., 2013 WL 12126744, at *7 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2013) (quoting In re Global Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 

462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

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The proposed Plan of Allocation is described in the Notice, and seeks to disburse the 

monies in the Net Settlement Account on a pro rata basis according to the proportionate losses 

(as calculated pursuant to Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.115(2)) that were suffered by each Class Member. 

The Class Representatives will receive no special treatment or different allocation than any other 

Class member under the Plan. 

“A plan of allocation that reimburses class members based on the extent of their injuries 

is generally reasonable.” In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 1994 WL 502054, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 

1994); see also In re Omnivision Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (“It is reasonable to allocate the 

settlement funds to class members based on the extent of their injuries or the strength of their 

claims on the merits.”); In re Merrill Lynch Tyco Research Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 124, 135 

(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A plan of allocation that calls for the pro rata distribution of settlement 

proceeds on the basis of investment loss is presumptively reasonable.”) Because it has a 

reasonable and rational basis (and treats all Class Members fairly and equally), the proposed Plan 

of Allocation should be granted preliminary approval. Schueneman v. Arena Pharms., Inc., 2018 

WL 1757512, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018). 

D. The Proposed Claims Administrator Should be Approved

The Class Representatives also respectfully request the appointment of the Garden City 

Group, LLC (“GCG”), an experienced and diligent administrator, as Claims Administrator. As 

Claims Administrator, GCG will be responsible for, among other things, mailing the notices to 

the Class, reviewing claims from Class Members, claims administration, and compiling a 

distribution schedule to Class Members. GCG is the leading global administrator of securities 

class actions, having handled 43% of the Top 100 securities settlements of all times, more than 

any other administrator. Garr Decl. ¶¶ 4–6.7 GCG has handled some of the largest securities 

 

7 Declaration of Shandarese Garr (“Garr Decl.”) ¶¶ 4–6. A true and correct copy of the Garr 

Decl. is attached as Exhibit C to the accompanying Berman Decl.

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matters ever, including the $6.15 billion WorldCom Securities Litigation Settlement, the $3.2 

billion Tyco Securities Litigation Settlement, two separate $1.1 billion settlements of the Nortel 

Securities Litigations, and the $2.4 billion Bank of America Securities Litigation Settlement. Id. 

During its 30-year history, GCG has also administered more than 3,200 cases, mailed hundreds 

of millions of notices, handled over 33 million phone calls, processed tens of millions of claims, 

designed and launched over 1,000 case websites, distributed over $63 billion in compensation, 

and issued approximately 30 million checks. Id. Additional detail regarding GCG is available in 

the Garr Decl. Additionally, a comprehensive list of the cases GCG has administered can be 

found at www.choosegcg.com/case-list.

E. The Form and Method of Notice Should be Approved.

For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the 

best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 

members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Rule 23(c)(2)(B). Similarly, Rule 

23(e)(1) requires that a court approving a class action settlement “direct notice in a reasonable 

manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). 

“Although that notice must be ‘reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 

class,’ actual notice is not required.” Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 367 (E.D. Cal. 2014) 

(quoting Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994)). The form and method of notice 

proposed by the Class Representatives in Section IV, supra, are appropriate because the form of 

the Notice complies with the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vii); and the method of notice 

complies with Rule 23(c)(2)(B) and due process requirements by providing the “best notice that 

is practicable under the circumstances.”

A class action settlement notice “is satisfactory if it generally describes the terms of the 

settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come 

forward and be heard.” Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. GE, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (describing specific information to be included in the notice). Here, 

the content of the proposed Notice complies with the specific requirements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B) 

because it clearly and concisely states in plain, easily understood language: (i) the nature of the 

action (Notice at 4); (ii) the class definition (Notice at 1); (iii) the claims, issues, and defenses 

(Notice at 4-5), (iv) that a Class Member may enter an appearance through an attorney (Notice at 

8); (v) Class Members’ right to exclude themselves from the class (Notice at 8); (vi) the time and 

manner for requesting exclusion (Notice at 8); and (vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on 

all Class Members who do not request exclusion (Notice at 8, 10). Churchill Vill., 361 F.3d at

575 (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient 

detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’”).

Likewise, plaintiffs’ proposed method for providing notice to Class Members constitutes 

the best practicable notice under the circumstances. Plaintiffs propose to mail, by first class 

mail, individual copies of the Notice of Proposed Settlement (the “Notice”), together with a copy 

of the Proof of Claim and Release form (the “Proof of Claim”) to all potential Class Members at 

the address of each such person as set forth in the records of Aequitas or who otherwise may be 

identified through further reasonable effort. Garr Decl. ¶ 11. In addition, a summary notice (the 

“Summary Notice”) will be published in the WALL STREET JOURNAL and THE OREGONIAN and 

disseminated over a national newswire service. Garr Decl. ¶ 12. GCG will also maintain a 

settlement website, a toll-free number and email address dedicated to this Settlement. Id. ¶¶ 13-

14. Courts regularly approve similar notice plans in securities class actions. See, e.g., Fidel v. 

Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (adequate notice provided by publication of notice in 

INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY and mailing notice to potential class members); Rieckborn v. Velti 

PLC, 2015 WL 468329, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (similar); In re Immune Response Sec. 

Litig., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (similar); In re Portal Software, Inc. Sec. 

Litig., 2007 WL 1991529, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2007) (mailed and published notices satisfy 

Rule 23(c)(3)).

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The Court should approve both the proposed form and method of Notice because they 

both comply with the requirements of Rule 23 and due process, and represent the best practicable 

notice under the circumstances. Silber, 18 F.3d at 1454.

F. The Court Should Appoint Class Counsel

Rule 23 requires a court to appoint class counsel that will fairly and adequately represent 

the class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B). In making this determination, the Court must 

consider, inter alia, counsel’s (i) work in identifying or investigating potential claims; (ii) 

experience in handling class actions or other complex litigation and the types of claims asserted 

in the case; (iii) knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) resources committed to representing 

the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i-iv).

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C. seek 

to be appointed Class Co-Lead Counsel. Both Hagens Berman and Stoll Berne have extensive 

experience in handling complex class actions, including securities class actions. Berman Decl., 

Ex. D and DeJong Decl., Ex. B. Moreover, both firms have vigorously investigated and 

prosecuted this case, and have negotiated an early partial settlement that provides considerable 

monetary relief to each of the Class members. Thus, the Court should appoint Hagens Berman 

Sobol Shapiro LLP and Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C as Class Co-Lead Counsel.

VI. PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

The Court’s entry of the proposed Preliminary Approval Order would, among other 

things, (i) certify, for settlement purposes, this action as a class action; and (ii) direct notice of 

the Settlement to all members of the Class. As such, the Preliminary Approval Order sets a 

proposed schedule for mailing and publication of the Notice and Summary Notice, and deadlines 

for submitting claims and/or objecting to the Settlement or opting out of the Class.

Plaintiffs recommend the schedule set forth below. Tonkon agrees to the proposed 

schedule setting the Settlement Hearing. The Parties also agree to the schedule for the other 

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dates, as provided for in the proposed Preliminary Approval Order, which was negotiated among 

the Parties.

The Parties propose the following schedule for notice, final approval hearing and related 

dates:

Date Event

Not later than twentyeight (28) days after entry 

of Preliminary Approval 

Order

Settlement website established and basic Settlement 

documents posted

Not later than twentyeight (28) days after entry 

of Preliminary Approval 

Order

Mailing of Notice and Proof of Claim to be mailed by first 

class mail to all record owners of Aequitas securities who can 

be identified with reasonable effort (the “Notice Date.”)

Not later than thirty-five 

(35) days after entry of 

Preliminary Approval 

Order

Summary Notice to be published in the WALL STREET 

JOURNAL and THE OREGONIAN

Not later than forty-two

(42) days prior to the 

Fairness Hearing

Class Counsel to file with the Court Proof of Mailing and 

Publishing by Declaration of Claims Administrator

Not later than forty-two 

(42) days prior to the 

Fairness Hearing

Due date for Plaintiffs’ Class Counsel’s papers in support of 

final approval of the Settlement and papers in support of the 

request for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses

At least twenty-eight (28) 

days prior to the Fairness 

Hearing

Due date for postmark or delivery of requests for exclusion

Due date for delivery and filing of objections and intents to 

appear at the Fairness Hearing

No later than fourteen 

(14) days prior to the 

Fairness Hearing

Due date to file reply papers, if any, in support of final 

approval of the Settlement and request for an award of 

attorneys’ fees and expenses

To be set by the Court 

approximately four

months following entry of 

the Preliminary Approval 

Order

Fairness Hearing

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This schedule is similar to those used in numerous class action settlements and provides 

due process to the putative Class Members with respect to their rights concerning the Settlement. 

The Class Representatives respectfully request that the Court schedule the Settlement Hearing at 

least one hundred twenty (120) calendar days after entering the Preliminary Approval Order in 

order to allow sufficient time for mailing the Notice and Proof of Claim and Release, publishing 

the Summary Notice, filing the motions in support of final approval of the Settlement, and any 

objections or requests for exclusion that may be made by Class Members.

VII. CONCLUSION

Counsel for the Parties reached this Settlement following extensive discussions and 

arm’s-length negotiations, and after significant discovery and motions practice. At this juncture, 

the Court need not answer the ultimate question: whether the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate. The Court is being asked only to grant preliminary approval of the proposed 

Settlement so that notice of the terms of the Settlement may to be sent to the Class, and to 

schedule a Settlement hearing to consider: i) final approval of the Settlement; ii) Certification of 

the settlement Class; iii) approval of the Plan of Allocation; iv) Class Counsel’s request for fees 

and expenses; v) entry of the Final Judgment and Order; and vi) other matters as the Court may 

deem appropriate.

Dated: July 16, 2018. HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP

By: s/ Steve W. Berman

Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice)

Jeniphr A. E. Breckenridge (pro hac vice)

Karl P. Barth (pro hac vice)

1918 Eighth Avenue, Suite 3300

Seattle, WA 98101

Telephone: (206) 623-7292

Facsimile: (206) 623-0594

steve@hbsslaw.com

jeniphr@hbsslaw.com 

karlb@hbsslaw.com

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Page 29 - CLASS REPRESENTATIVES’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PARTIAL 

SETTLEMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP

1918 EIGHTH AVENUE, SUITE 3300

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101

TEL. (206) 623-7292 FAX (206) 623-0594

- and -

Keith A. Ketterling, OSB No. 913368

Timothy S. DeJong, OSB No. 940662

Jacob S. Gill, OSB No. 033238

Nadia H. Dahab, OSB No. 125630

STOLL STOLL BERNE LOKTING & 

SHLACHTER P.C.

209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500

Portland, OR 97204

Telephone: (503) 227-1600

Facsimile: (503) 227-6840

kketterling@stollberne.com

tdejong@stollberne.com

jgill@stollberne.com

ndahab@stollberne.com

- and -

Robert S. Banks, Jr., OSB No. 821862

Darlene D. Pasieczny, OSB No. 124172

SAMUELS YOELIN KANTOR LLP

111 SW 5th Ave., Suite 3800

Portland, OR 97204-3642

Telephone: (503) 226-2966

Facsimile: (503) 222-2937

bbanks@SamuelsLaw.com

darlenep@SamuelsLaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 3:16-cv-00580-AC Document 333 Filed 07/16/18 Page 40 of 41
Page 30 - CLASS REPRESENTATIVES’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PARTIAL 

SETTLEMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO, LLP

1918 EIGHTH AVENUE, SUITE 3300

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101

TEL. (206) 623-7292 FAX (206) 623-0594

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on July 16, 2018, this document was filed through the Court’s ECF 

system and will be sent electronically to the registered participants as identified on the docket, 

and that paper copies will be sent by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to anyone indicated as nonregistered participants. 

s/ Steve W. Berman

Steve W. Berman

Case 3:16-cv-00580-AC Document 333 Filed 07/16/18 Page 41 of 41