RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1820-18T2

 A-1821-18T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

L.J. and C.G.,

Defendants-Appellants.

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF J.R., 

a Minor.

Argued telephonically June 2, 2020 –

Decided July 2, 2020

Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, 

Docket No. FG-13-0061-18.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, Designated Counsel, argued 

the cause for appellant L.J. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel; Cecilia M.E. Lindenfelser, on the 

briefs).

Daniel Anthony DiLella, Designated Counsel, argued 

the cause for appellant C.G. (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel; Daniel Anthony DiLella, on the 

briefs).

Salima E. Burke, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Salima E. Burke, on the 

brief).

Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith Alexis 

Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa 

R. Vance, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this consolidated matter, defendants L.J. (Father) and C.G. (Mother) 

appeal a Family Part judgment terminating their parental rights to their 

biological son J.R. (John),1 born in May 2016. Mother argues the Division of 

Child Protection and Permanency failed to establish all four prongs of the best 

 

1

 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parties, see R.

1:38-3(d)(12), and for ease of reference.
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interests standard under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4). Father primarily focuses

on the requirements of the third prong, emphasizing the Division failed to 

consider alternatives to termination. John's law guardian joins the Division in 

urging us to affirm. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we 

are satisfied the evidence in favor of the guardianship petition supports the 

termination of defendants' parental rights. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.

The guardianship trial spanned six days, during which the Division 

presented the testimony of three caseworkers, and its expert psychologist, Lori 

Lessin, Ph.D., who performed the psychological evaluation of Mother and 

bonding evaluations of John with Mother and his resource parents. The law 

guardian presented the testimony of its expert psychologist Dr. Maureen 

Santina, Ph.D., who observed a visit between John and Father at the county jail. 

Defendants did not testify; Father presented the testimony of three relatives to 

challenge the merits of the Division's "rule outs." The parties also moved into 

evidence hundreds of documents, including the caseworkers' reports, bonding 

evaluations, and rule-out letters. 
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John has never lived with his parents. The Division became involved with 

Mother and John the day after the child was born, following a referral from the 

hospital that cited concerns for Mother's well-being, including her impending 

homelessness. Mother initially named her boyfriend, J.R. (Jim), as John's 

biological father, although she and Jim suspected another man – whom mother 

refused to identify – could be John's father. 

Mother acknowledged a history of mental illness, including psychiatric 

hospitalizations, but said she was not presently receiving treatment. Mother 

agreed to a safety protection plan, whereby she and John would be supervised 

by a family member or friend. The Division considered John's maternal 

grandmother, and several friends proposed by Mother and Jim, but none was a 

viable option. Mother agreed that, upon John's release from the hospital, he 

could stay with her friend, Co. L. (Colleen), without Mother. Unable to 

implement a safety protection plan to enable Mother and John to live together, 

the Division sought and received custody of John, and placed him with Colleen 

upon his release from the hospital. 

Six months later, John was placed with Colleen's parents (resource 

parents), with whom he has lived ever since. Although the resource parents 
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initially were open to kinship legal guardianship,2they have since expressed 

their unequivocal desire to adopt John. 

During the course of the litigation, the Division provided a multitude of 

services to Mother, including psychological evaluations, referrals for mental 

health services, parenting skills training, supervised parenting time, and 

financial assistance with transportation. But Mother was inconsistent with her 

mental health treatment and was psychiatrically hospitalized during the course 

of the litigation. Mother fluctuated between her desire to kidnap John and "not 

want[ing] the child." Mother's attendance at visits was inconsistent, missing 

some visits and arriving late for others. Mother's interactions with John varied: 

she was often disengaged and failed to respond to his needs. At one point, 

Mother absented herself from John's life for eight months, failing to notify the 

Division of her whereabouts. And during Dr. Lessin's psychological evaluation, 

Mother "abruptly announced that she needed a domestic violence counselor," 

marking the first time she claimed domestic violence existed in her relationship 

with Jim.

 

2

 See N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 512-13 (2004) (clarifying that kinship legal guardianship 

should only be considered when adoption is not possible). 
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Meanwhile, in mid-July 2016, Mother provided Father's name to the 

Division, and said he was incarcerated; two weeks later a paternity test 

confirmed Jim was not John's father. In mid-August, a Division worker met 

with Father at South Woods State Prison. Father claimed he could be released 

by March 2018, but he was later sentenced to a twelve-year prison term and was 

incarcerated at the time of the guardianship trial. Father offered his sister, J.J. 

(Jessie) as a possible placement for John, but Jessie could not be evaluated until 

DNA testing later confirmed Father's paternity. 

The Division provided Father visitation in prison; arranged for courtordered psychological and bonding evaluations; and offered counseling and 

parenting classes. Father's interaction with John during visits was inconsistent; 

John often became visibly upset on visitation day. Following Dr. Santina's 

observed visit, she opined the visits had "a harmful emotional impact on J[ohn]." 

Father refused court-ordered evaluations and claimed he had completed the 

programs offered by the Division. 

Several relative placements were considered by the Division, including 

Mother's sister, who later withdrew her application. Jessie and Father's niece, 

R.H., were ruled out following background checks. The Division also 

considered Father's niece, T.R. (Tara), who twice was ruled out by the Division; 
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appealed those decisions; and ultimately was ruled out because the Division 

found disruption of John's bond with his resource parents would not be in his 

best interests. Tara's brother, J.H., was considered and ruled out because he 

would not commit to the licensing process. In May 2018 – more than two years 

after John's birth – Father proposed two other relatives: G.D. and K.G., who 

were ruled out on a best interests basis, and K.G. did not pass the background 

check. 

Based on the evidence adduced at the guardianship trial, the judge 

considered each prong of the best interests test, and gave careful attention to the 

importance of permanency and stability for John. As one notable example, the 

judge credited the expert opinion of Dr. Lessin, noting the psychologist's "very 

serious concerns with [Mother's] mental health." The judge also recognized the 

"strong and secure bond" between John and his resource parents. Ultimately, 

the judge concluded the Division demonstrated by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of defendants' parental rights was in John's best 

interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 

347-48 (1999). These appeals followed.
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II.

Our review of a judgment terminating parental rights is limited. N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014). We are bound to 

accept the trial court's findings, as long as they are "supported by adequate, 

substantial, and credible evidence." Ibid. (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). Additionally, we accord a family court's 

decision particular deference in view of its "special jurisdiction and expertise in 

family matters," and because the court is uniquely in a position to evaluate the 

credibility of the witnesses. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998). We 

review the trial court's legal interpretations de novo. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552-53. 

Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children, and that right is 

constitutionally protected. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 

596, 605 (2007). "[T]erminations should be granted sparingly and with great 

caution because they irretrievably impair imperative constitutionally-protected 

liberty interests and scores of centuries of societal family constructs." R.G., 217 

N.J. at 553 (citation omitted). But, a parent's rights are not absolute. Ibid. 

"Because of its parens patriae responsibility, the State may terminate parental 

rights if the child is at risk of serious physical or emotional harm or when 

necessary to protect the child's best interests." Id. at 553-54 (citing N.J. Div. of 
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Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986)). At times, a parent's 

interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009).

To effectuate those concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining 

when a parent's rights must be terminated in a child's best interests, requiring 

the Division to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four 

prongs: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1)-(4).] 
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The four prongs are not independent of one another. Rather, they "are 

interrelated and overlapping[,] . . . designed to identify and assess what may be 

necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 88 (App. Div. 2006). 

Parental fitness is the crucial issue. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. Determinations of 

parental fitness are very fact sensitive and require specific evidence. Ibid. 

Ultimately, "the purpose of termination is always to effectuate the best interests 

of the child, not the punishment of the parent." Id. at 350. 

We first consider defendants' overlapping arguments that the trial judge's 

findings were insufficient to establish the first and second prongs of the best 

interests test. In particular, Mother contends she did not cause John harm, and 

the Division hastily ruled out her friend as an appropriate supervisor, thereby 

preventing her from parenting John. Father claims his imprisonment cannot be 

a basis for finding he caused harm to John especially where, as here, he proposed 

relative placements for the child's care. Defendants' arguments are unavailing.

Relevant here, "[w]hen the condition or behavior of a parent causes a risk 

of harm, such as impermanence of the child's home and living conditions, and 

the parent is unwilling or incapable of obtaining appropriate treatment for that 

condition, the first subpart of the statute has been proven." N.J. Div. of Youth 
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& Family Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 2013); see also

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.M., 430 N.J. Super. 428, 444 (App. 

Div. 2013) (holding that a parent's "continued drug use, lack of appropriate 

housing, and failure to attend treatment, clearly posed a risk to the children" and 

satisfied prong one of the best interests test). 

The second prong "relates to parental unfitness," K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352. 

"[T]he inquiry centers on whether the parent is able to remove the danger facing 

the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 451

(2012). This prong is satisfied "by demonstrating that the parent has not cured 

the problems that led to the removal of the child." H.R., 431 N.J. Super. at 224. 

"In other words, the issue becomes whether the parent can cease causing the 

child harm before any delay in permanent placement becomes a harm in and of 

itself." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 434 

(App. Div. 2001); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 

494, 512 (2004) (holding that prong two was proven by clear and convincing 

evidence where the parents repeatedly failed "to comply with [the Division's] 

recommendations and court orders for services," and "were not in a position to 

care for their children" at the time of trial). 
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As is often the case, the trial judge's findings regarding the first prong, 

informed and overlapped the second. See R.L., 388 N.J. Super. at 88. The 

judge's prong one and prong two findings not only focused on Mother's 

pervasive mental health issues and Father's incarceration, but also on defendants' 

inability to eliminate the harm, despite the Division's efforts to assist them. 

According to the judge, Mother "refused to comply with services and address 

[her mental health issues]," which were "still existing" at the time of trial. 3 The 

judge cited Father's lengthy prison term and refusal to cooperate with the 

Division. The record supports the judge's findings. 

Regarding Mother, we recognize "[m]ental illness, alone, does not 

disqualify a parent from raising a child." F.M., 211 N.J. at 450. But, the best 

interests test can be met by expert evidence demonstrating that a parent's mental 

illness prevents her from meeting a child's daily needs. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 

at 436. The Division is not required to "wait to act until a child is actually 

irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect." In re Guardianship of 

D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999). 

 

3

 As the trial judge observed, Mother had given birth to another child after John 

was born. That child was removed from Mother's care, but is not a party to the 

present guardianship complaint or this appeal. 
13 A-1820-18T2

One such need is a stable and safe home, the deprivation of which causes 

a child psychological harm. See K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353; D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 

379. When mental illness causes risk of harm, such as the inability to maintain 

a safe environment, and the parent is unwilling or incapable of obtaining 

appropriate treatment, the first prong has been proven. F.M., 211 N.J. at 450-

51. We are satisfied that the record, especially Dr. Lessin's expert testimony, 

fully supports the judge's finding that Mother's mental illness has prevented –

and will continue to prevent – her from providing John a safe home and the 

nurturing he requires. Moreover, as the judge observed, mother was living in a 

shelter at the time of trial. 

As to Father, our Supreme Court has recognized that although 

imprisonment alone is insufficient to establish parental unfitness, 

"particularized evidence of how a parent's incarceration affects each prong of 

the best-interests-of-the-child standard" can support termination of parental 

rights of an incarcerated parent. R.G., 217 N.J. at 556. In R.G., the Court found 

"the Division failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that [the 

defendant-father's] incarceration caused harm to [the child]" because the father 

"parented [the child] prior to his incarceration," and remained a part of the 
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child's life and communicated with the child while incarcerated. 217 N.J. at 

559-60. 

Father's reliance on R.G. to support his arguments as to the first and 

second prongs is misplaced. Unlike the defendant in R.G., Father never lived 

with John, and never cared for or supported the child. As the trial judge correctly 

noted, Father had not engaged in any services, despite the Division's efforts to 

assist him. And as Dr. Santina observed, Father's visits with John were harmful 

to the child. Contrary to Father's assertion, the trial judge's findings of harm 

and Father's inability to eliminate that harm were not based upon Father's 

incarceration alone. 

 Prong three requires the Division to establish it "made reasonable efforts 

. . . to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's 

placement outside the home" and considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Mother primarily challenges the 

first part of the prong; father primarily challenges the second.

In view of the services offered to both defendants, we find insufficient 

merit in their contentions that the Division failed to make reasonable efforts to 

assist them to warrant discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

We simply note the reasonableness of the Division's efforts is not measured by 
15 A-1820-18T2

whether those efforts were successful in bringing about reunification of parent 

and child. D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 393. 

We turn instead to Father's claim that the Division failed to properly 

evaluate his suggested relatives. The Division has a statutory obligation to 

"search for relatives who may be willing and able to provide the care and support 

required by the child." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12.1(a); N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and 

Permanency v. K.N., 435 N.J. Super. 16, 29 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd as modified, 

223 N.J. 530 (2015). There is, however, no presumption in favor of placement 

with relatives or friends. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. K.L.W., 419 

N.J. Super. 568, 580 (App. Div. 2011). The presumption of custodial placement 

only exists between a child and his biological parents, not a proposed placement 

with family or a friend. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. 

Super. 69, 82 (App. Div. 2013). The reasonableness of the Division's efforts to 

consider alternatives to termination is fact sensitive. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. at

435.

Here, the Division properly ruled out defendants' relatives because they 

either withdrew from consideration; were ruled out based on their background 

checks; were proposed after John had formed a bond with his resource parents; 

or a combination of those reasons. More importantly, the undisputed expert 
16 A-1820-18T2

evidence confirmed John had a strong attachment to his resource parents and 

would suffer severe and enduring harm if removed from them. And, John's 

resource parents are no strangers to Mother: they are the parents of Mother's 

friend, Colleen, with whom John was placed – at Mother's request – before 

Mother named Father as a potential biological parent. 

Moreover, the resource parents are committed to adopting John. In that 

regard, after briefing on this appeal, we granted the Division's motion for a 

limited remand for the trial court to clarify the resource parents' commitment to 

adoption or preference for kinship legal guardianship (KLG) pursuant to N.J. 

Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. 246 (App. 

Div. 2019). Another judge conducted the remand hearing, during which the 

Division presented the testimony of the resource parents and the adoption 

caseworker. 

In a cogent oral decision, the motion judge found the testimony of the 

Division's witnesses credible, remarking the resource parents were "extremely 

forthright." Citing our decision in M.M., the judge found the Division 

demonstrated "by clear and convincing evidence that the resource parents were 

fully informed regarding the benefits and burdens of KLG" and "the differences 

between KLG and adoption." The judge concluded the resource parents were 
17 A-1820-18T2

"fully committed to adoption," and their decision to adopt John was 

"unconditional, unambiguous and unqualified." Given our discretionary 

standard of review, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's decision, which 

is fully supported by the record. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552. 

"[T]o satisfy the fourth prong, the State should offer testimony of a wellqualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive, 

objective, and informed evaluation of the child's relationship with both the 

natural parents and the foster parents." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (citation omitted). 

An important consideration under this prong is "the child's need for 

permanency." Ibid. "Ultimately, a child has a right to live in a stable, nurturing 

environment and to have the psychological security that his most deeply formed 

attachments will not be shattered." F.M., 211 N.J. at 453.

The uncontroverted expert evidence in this case provides overwhelming 

support for the trial judge's finding that there is a deep bond between John and 

his resource parents and that he would suffer serious and enduring emotional or 

psychological harm if he were separated from them. John has lived with his 

foster parents continuously since he was six months old. Importantly, he has no 

bond with defendants. Moreover, John's resource parents have now made it 

unequivocally clear they want to adopt John. Accordingly, this is a case in 
18 A-1820-18T2

which "termination of . . . parental rights [will] secure for [John] a safe, loving 

home and the care of . . . stable adult[s] who [are] intent on assuring the child's 

psychological and physical well-being." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 

T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 248 (App. Div. 2010).

Affirmed.