1

Filed 6/29/21 In re T.V. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re T.V., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

F.O. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

T.V.,

 Appellant.

 A160796

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP-6024)

The minor, almost two-year-old T.V., appeals from a juvenile court 

order granting reunification services to her parents, F.O. (mother) and A.V. 

(father). The court found that services could be bypassed under Welfare and 

Institutions Code1 section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), based on the parents’ 

history of drug abuse, but that reunification was nevertheless in T.V.’s best 

interest under subdivision (c)(2) of that statute. On appeal, T.V. contends 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
2

that insufficient evidence supports the best-interest finding.

2 We disagree 

and affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

Mother and father, who are married, have longstanding substance 

abuse problems. Mother, who is in her late 30’s, has abused primarily opioids 

but also methamphetamine and prescription drugs. Father, a disabled 

veteran in his mid-50’s, has numerous convictions for drug-related offenses

dating back to the late 1980’s. He indicated that his drugs of choice are

heroin and methamphetamine. In addition, both parents have traumatic 

brain injuries, mother’s due to a vicious 2014 assault. 

A. July to December 2019: The Original Petition Is Dismissed.

T.V., who was born in July 2019, is the second of mother’s children to 

be the subject of dependency proceedings. In 2011, one of T.V.’s half sisters,

B.C., was removed from mother’s care because “mother was abusing 

methadone and klonopin, which resulted in seizures. The infant was 

admitted to the hospital with signs of substance exposure through breast 

milk.” Mother failed to comply with her case plan because she “continued to 

seek out prescription drugs,” and B.C.’s father received full custody. 

In July 2013, mother relapsed while caring for then five-month-old

W.O., T.V.’s other half sister. Mother “followed a safety plan and left the 

infant with the maternal grandmother,” and the grandmother obtained legal 

guardianship of W.O. in probate court. Mother stated that she subsequently 

2 The Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) also 

appealed from the order. It did not file its own briefing, but it informed this 

court that it does not oppose T.V.’s appeal and adheres to its position below 

“that services should not have been given to the parents as ordered.” 
3

“had chunks of sobriety here and there” but “did not fully achieve sobriety” 

until learning she was pregnant with T.V. 

To treat her opioid addiction, mother began taking methadone through 

the Redwood Empire Addictions Program (REAP) a few years before the 

events at issue. Although otherwise sober, Mother took methadone

throughout her pregnancy with T.V. Thus, T.V. was born with high levels of

the drug in her system. In addition, and unrelated to the methadone 

exposure, T.V. had a difficult birth during which her skull fractured, 

requiring emergency neurosurgery. She then spent over two months in the 

hospital during which she “required round the clock, high levels of 

intervention,” particularly to manage her “extreme symptoms of withdrawal” 

from methadone.

While T.V. was still in the hospital, staff members expressed concern 

“that the parents [were] not able to meet the needs of this medically fragile 

child.” The parents seemed unable to retain information about how to care 

for T.V. Father reportedly “declined to participate in much of the training . . .

provided to the parents” and appeared to be in “denial that [T.V.] require[d] 

care beyond that of a typical infant.” Mother visited T.V. regularly, but 

“while at times [mother] appear[ed] appropriate, at other times she 

appear[ed] groggy and unable to handle [the] baby.” Mother also struggled to 

respond to T.V.’s needs, “consistently becom[ing] overwhelmed by the child’s 

fussiness and crying and request[ing] the child be medicated rather than 

attempt[ing] to hold and soothe her.” On October 9, mother “ ‘nearly passed 

out’ ” in front of staff, “was speaking ‘gibberish[,]’ and didn’t know the day or 

the year.” The Department suspected from mother’s behavior that she might 

be abusing prescription drugs. 
4

Two days later, on October 11, a protective custody warrant was issued 

for T.V. Soon after, the Department filed a petition alleging that she came 

within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) 

of section 300. The allegations under subdivision (b)(1) were based on both 

parents’ failure to adequately protect T.V. and on mother’s “chronic substance 

abuse problem” inhibiting her capacity to care for the baby. The allegation 

under subdivision (j), as to mother only, was based on mother’s neglect of 

B.C.

The juvenile court ordered T.V. detained, and she was discharged from 

the hospital on October 18 and placed in an emergency foster home. The 

following week, T.V. was placed with her maternal grandfather and stepgrandmother in Sacramento due to a wildfire in Sonoma County. T.V. 

reportedly did well in both homes. 

In the November 2019 jurisdiction report, the Department 

recommended that the dependency petition be dismissed and a voluntary 

family maintenance case be initiated. The social worker who prepared the 

report, Penelope Salzgeber, took a significantly different view of the parents 

than that previously reported. While acknowledging the parents’ “colorful 

histories” and history of addiction, Salzgeber opined that “the allegations of 

the original petition rel[ied] upon false or misleading assumptions that 

unfairly paint[ed] the parents in a truly unfavorable light.” Although the 

allegations involving B.C. were undisputed, Salzgeber believed the remaining 

allegations lacked sufficient evidence, and a dependency case was not 

justified. 

To begin with, Salzgeber concluded there was insufficient evidence that 

mother’s methadone use was problematic. Mother disputed “having a 

substance abuse problem because she is prescribed methadone, a ‘harm 
5

reduction medication,’ ” and reported she had “been sober for over a year.” 

Salzgeber confirmed that mother was “prescribed methadone to manage 

chronic pain and . . . to prevent relapse of misusing opioids” and opined that 

“[m]ethadone maintenance in and of itself is not a substance abuse disorder.”

Much of mother’s concerning behavior could be explained by her own ongoing 

medical problems as a result of T.V.’s birth, which involved a “ ‘hysterectomy 

and botched C-Section’ ” and required mother’s subsequent hospitalization as 

well. Mother needed “multiple blood transfusions, and the side effects 

include hypotension, infections, dizziness, and sweatiness, all symptoms that 

could be mistaken for misuse of prescription medication.” 

In addition, Salzgeber opined that there was no way to know whether

T.V.’s severe withdrawal symptoms were due to the amount of methadone 

mother used during the pregnancy or other factors, including “the barrage of 

medications and interventions [the baby] experienced during and after birth.” 

After being discharged from the hospital, T.V. “appear[ed] to thrive in the 

calmer environments of her substitute caregivers,” and “[t]he parents 

appear[ed] more at ease outside the chaotic and overstimulating NICU, and 

ha[d] demonstrated their ability to meet [T.V.’s] needs for care.” Both 

parents interacted appropriately with T.V. during an observed visit “and 

appeared to delight in their daughter.” 

Father reported feeling distressed by “nearly losing his wife and 

daughter during delivery and never receiving an acknowledgment or apology 

from the hospital, and then the hospital staff’s apparent judg[]ment of the 

family led to the additional trauma of the Department’s intervention and 

separation of [T.V.] from him and [mother].” Although father had been 

“criticized for not being present at the hospital frequently enough, he needed 

to work to maintain housing for his injured, traumatized wife and child.” 
6

Salzgeber concluded the report by stating that she could “appreciate 

how some of the misunderstandings [that led to the dependency case] came to 

be,” but the parents’ “reality [was] drastically different than the story told on 

paper.” Thus, while cautioning that her recommendation should not be 

“mistake[n] . . . for a complete absence of concern,” she opined that both 

parents were ready to care for T.V. and entitled to heal after “this period of 

unbelievable suffering and strain.” At the December 2019 jurisdiction 

hearing, the juvenile court followed the report’s recommendations and 

dismissed the petition in favor of a voluntary family maintenance case. Thus, 

T.V. was returned to her parents’ care.

B. January to August 2020: The Parents Relapse, Resulting in a 

New Dependency Case. 

Mother tested negative for all drugs other than methadone throughout 

January and early February 2020. In mid-February, mother broke her wrist,

which required surgery on February 26, and she was prescribed oxycodone. 

Mother reported that she asked father “to hold [her] pain meds and [her] 

methadone box,” but he began taking her oxycodone. According to a 

subsequent Department report, in late February mother discovered that 

father, who had injured his knee, was also using her methadone.

Meanwhile, the COVID-19 lockdown in the Bay Area occurred in midMarch, at which point mother felt she “lost [her] entire support network.”

Before the lockdown, the family was paying G.P., a friend otherwise 

employed as an in-home support worker for people with disabilities, to help 

mother because her wrist injury made it more challenging to care for T.V.

Once the lockdown happened, mother asked G.P. to move in to continue 

helping. 

Mother reportedly ran out of her methadone because father took it, and 

she became sick from withdrawal. About a week after the lockdown began, 
7

father obtained methamphetamine, telling mother it would “take the edge 

off,” and they both used it. In later testimony, mother admitted that she took 

methamphetamine at this time, even though she knew it caused her to have 

seizures, but she denied that father used her methadone. Father, however, 

admitted that he used mother’s oxycodone and methadone, as well as the 

methamphetamine. He testified that he had been sober for about three years 

before this relapse. 

In addition, mother reportedly tested positive for fentanyl on 

February 28, March 3, 6, and 10, and April 21 and 28. At a doctor’s visit on 

March 6, mother stated that she received fentanyl in connection with her 

wrist surgery. On March 24, mother’s doctor called mother to review an

“unexpected” positive test for fentanyl, the date of which is unclear from the 

record. Mother denied using fentanyl, and the doctor indicated she believed 

mother and “want[ed] to repeat these tests to get more information and 

appropriately guide her care.” Mother later reaffirmed in her testimony that 

she never used fentanyl and speculated that the methamphetamine she took

may have contained it. 

On April 19, father overdosed “on benzodiazepines, amphetamine[,] and 

methadone.” Mother reported that leading up to this time father’s “behavior 

ha[d] gotten way out of control,” and she asked her father and stepmother to 

take T.V. but they refused. Mother decided “to get high together one last 

time” with father before leaving, and he obtained methamphetamine for 

them. A friend of father’s, who was also mother’s ex-boyfriend, arrived to 

help mother convince father to go to the hospital. Father refused, however, 

and later that morning he fell asleep. 

Meanwhile, T.V. had a fever that day. Mother testified that T.V. was 

with G.P. outside of the home for most of the day and was not present when 
8

mother used methamphetamine. At some point, G.P. left for work and left 

T.V. with mother. Mother, who described herself as “loaded,” called her 

brother to meet her, and they left the home with the baby around 7:00 p.m. to 

get Tylenol for her fever. When mother, her brother, and T.V. returned 

home, father was still sleeping. 

Several hours later, mother discovered father lying down “in his own 

vomit [and] blood.” He had “soiled himself” and “looked like he’d been hit in 

the face.” She called 911 and father was taken to the hospital, where he 

tested positive for methamphetamine. Father also had what appeared to be 

blisters or burns and “healing slashes” on his right arm, and he could not 

explain what happened to him.3 Father soon left the hospital “against 

medical advice.” He was readmitted on April 26 after having a grand mal 

seizure and again tested positive for methamphetamine.

Meanwhile, on April 21, mother told a social worker that she was

“worried that she [was] using too many substances (though she claimed only 

to be using prescribed medications at that time), and [she] stated that [she 

knew] she should go into drug treatment.” Mother later explained she did 

not want to tell the social worker she was using but felt the home was unsafe 

for T.V. The social worker praised mother for doing “a good job of reaching to 

her supports to get help during this crisis,” and at this point the Department 

was not worried that T.V. was in danger. 

On April 28, however, the Department learned that mother had tested 

positive for methamphetamine six days beforehand. In addition, father’s 

3 According to mother, father had been “picking at his arm for seven 

hours a day with a box cutter and paper clip,” and these injuries became 

infected when he was lying “in his own piss and vomit and shit on that arm.” 

Father speculated that mother’s ex-boyfriend may have assaulted him, but 

the issue of how father injured his head was never clearly resolved. 
9

Veterans Affairs (VA) social worker reported that the family’s home was in 

disorder, which was unusual, and she was “concerned for the baby’s safety at 

this point.” The VA social worker also reported that the hospital told her 

that after his overdose “father was [lying] on the ground for ‘at least 10 hours’ 

before anyone called 9-1-1 for help,” and she felt “the baby ‘had to be there’ at 

the home for ‘whatever took place’ or ‘for at least part of it,’ ” contrary to what 

mother had said. 

The following day, on April 29, T.V. was removed from the parents’ 

home. Around the same time, the voluntary family maintenance case was 

closed because the parents were “not attending services or working with the 

social worker” and, despite relapsing, had not sought help from the 

Department. 

Once T.V. was removed, “mother admitted that she ha[d] relapsed with 

illicit substances.” Mother “stated she was glad her daughter would be safe 

in a foster home” while she pursued drug treatment. Despite mother’s 

relapse, a probation search during the removal did not uncover any drugs or 

drug paraphernalia, and “[t]he home had been cleaned from the week prior 

and did not appear as cluttered as it had.” Father, who was present during 

the removal, refused to admit to the Department that he was using drugs, 

but he also stated that he was “glad [T.V.] was being put in foster care 

because she would be safe.” 

Shortly after T.V.’s removal, the Department filed another petition 

alleging that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over T.V. under section 300, 

subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The subdivision (b)(1) allegations were based on 

both parents’ substance abuse, focusing primarily on father’s overdose and 

mother’s relapse. The same subdivision (j) allegation was again made based 
10

on mother’s neglect of B.C. The court ordered T.V. detained, and she 

remained in a foster home. 

According to the Department, mother failed to enter a residential drug 

treatment program on May 11 as scheduled. Father’s VA social worker 

reported that mother was “ ‘loaded’ ” on May 11, and both parents were “ ‘in 

full[-]on relapse.’ ” Mother, however, later testified that she was on the wait 

list for the program and did not miss an intake. She reported that the 

program informed her she could not enter treatment because she was taking 

a benzodiazepine she was prescribed for seizures after methamphetamine 

withdrawal. A program counselor told the Department this was not the case 

and mother could enter. As discussed further below, mother ultimately

entered a different residential treatment program, Women’s Recovery 

Services (WRS), on May 21. 

The Department’s May 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report, written by 

Salzgeber, recommended that both parents’ reunification services be 

bypassed under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), based on their drug use.

4

T.V. had some developmental delays, including not being able to sit 

independently or crawl, gagging on food, and not “babbling.” Overall, 

however, T.V. appeared to be a “cheerful, smiling, engaging baby,” and she 

was doing well in her foster home. The parents had seven scheduled virtual 

visits with the baby in May, attending five and missing two. They expressed 

their desire to get drug treatment and be better parents to T.V. 

The Department filed an addendum report by Salzgeber in mid-July. 

T.V. had grown almost two inches in a month, and the doctor who saw her 

4 The report also recommended that mother’s services be bypassed 

under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), based on termination of her services 

as to B.C. The juvenile court did not rule on this basis for bypassing services.
11

opined that “the jump in height, in which [T.V.] moved from the .44th 

percentile . . . to the 10th percentile, was due to eliminating ‘chronic stress’ 

from her environment by entering foster care.”5 Her motor skills had also 

“improved significantly,” and she was thriving in the foster home. 

Mother entered WRS on May 21. She was required to leave the 

program when she developed a contagious skin condition, and she returned to 

the program on June 9 after the condition resolved. Mother later testified 

that she was able to stay sober throughout this time outside WRS, and she 

tested negative for all substances except methadone. Mother had difficulty 

with other people in the program due to her communication style, and WRS, 

believing it would be “better for [her] mental health,” referred her to an 

outpatient program, DAAC Perinatal. Mother was discharged from WRS’s

aftercare when she failed to attend her scheduled intake at DAAC Perinatal

on June 24, but she later explained that she missed the intake due to a 

misunderstanding about whether it was required. 

On June 26, mother completed intake at DAAC Perinatal and tested 

negative for drugs except methadone. Mother’s doctor was concerned that 

mother was abusing gabapentin, a medication prescribed for seizures, and 

trying to “ ‘self-adjust meds’ ” by “picking and choosing what she disclosed” to 

her medical and mental-health providers respectively. The doctor prescribed

another medication to help mother wean herself from the gabapentin. 

Mother later denied that she had any problem with gabapentin. Mother was 

“drowsy, argumentative, and distracted” during a video visit with T.V. on 

July 9, and she failed to respond when asked to drug test on that date. 

5 There was never any evidence presented that T.V. was malnourished

or not fed appropriately by the parents. 
12

Meanwhile, father entered a residential treatment program called 

Duffy’s on June 25, and he “sounded clearer and healthier.” On July 8, he 

reported to the Department that he was “in treatment and enjoying the 

programming,” although he missed the July 9 visit with T.V. The 

Department characterized visitation as “poor” overall, given both the 

difficulty of video visits with a baby and the parents’ possible intoxication 

during them. 

The parents submitted on jurisdiction, and in July 2020 the juvenile 

court found the petition’s allegations true. The following month, a contested 

dispositional hearing was held at which the parents were the only two 

witnesses to testify. Mother testified that she was currently attending DAAC 

Perinatal, was in good standing there, and intended to complete the program. 

In addition, she regularly attended informal backyard meetings that had 

replaced more formal groups like Narcotics Anonymous during the pandemic. 

Finally, she was still receiving methadone through REAP. 

When mother was asked why she should receive reunification services, 

she testified that she was in a different place than she had been when she 

lost her other two daughters and thought she could truly “benefit from the 

therapy and the outpatient [treatment] and whatever else there is beyond.” 

She testified about her shame in failing her children, stating, “There is no 

pain like a mother’s pain of missing her child, except for when you get used to 

it, and I will not allow myself to get used to missing my daughter. I will not 

push this shame down. I will feel it every day. And that is what will 

motivate me forward.” Although acknowledging that T.V.’s foster mother 

was giving T.V. “a wonderful experience,” mother testified that it would be 

“best for [T.V.] to be with her mother” because of the bond they shared. 
13

Father testified at the hearing that he used mother’s prescription drugs 

and methadone, although he disagreed that this constituted a “relapse”

because he was using them for pain relief. He admitted to relapsing on 

methamphetamine around February 2020. Father testified that he 

completed the Duffy’s treatment program and had been sober ever since 

entering the program in late June. 

The juvenile court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), 

applied to mother and father but nevertheless ordered reunification services 

because it found clear and convincing evidence that reunification was in 

T.V.’s best interest. The court reasoned that although both parents had a 

“significant relapse” by April 2020, they sought assistance and treatment, 

and both were in programs at the time of the dispositional hearing. A sixmonth review hearing was set for January 2021. 

C. Proceedings in This Court

T.V. and the Department appealed from the dispositional order. In 

December 2020, T.V. also filed a petition for a writ of mandate in this court, 

arguing that the appeal was an inadequate remedy because “the juvenile 

[court] could very well grant additional services to the parents” at the 

upcoming six-month review hearing, which would “only serve[] to delay [her] 

permanency and stability.” (Boldface omitted.) The following month, this 

court denied the petition. 

In late March 2021, father, joined by mother, filed a motion to dismiss 

the appeal as moot. This court granted father’s accompanying unopposed

request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s orders and findings from the 

six-month review hearing, which actually occurred on March 17, as well as 

the Department’s six-month status review report. Father argued that T.V. 

could no longer obtain effective relief through the appeal because the juvenile 
14

court had extended reunification services based on the parents’ “significant 

progress.” This court denied the motion, indicating that reversal of the 

dispositional order could still provide T.V. with effective relief by terminating 

reunification services. (See In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1140, fn. 6 

(A.E.).) In now holding that substantial evidence supports the finding that 

reunification was in T.V.’s best interest, we do not rely on the judicially 

noticed documents reflecting events after that ruling.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. General Legal Standards

“Generally, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification 

services to a child and the child’s parents when a child is removed from 

parental custody under the dependency laws.” (In re I.A. (2019) 

40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23.) Services may be bypassed under certain 

circumstances when “ ‘reunification efforts are likely to be “fruitless.” ’ ” 

(Ibid.) One such circumstance is “when the [juvenile] court finds, by clear 

and convincing evidence,” that “the parent or guardian of the child has a 

history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has 

resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year 

period immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child 

to the court’s attention, or has failed or refused to comply with a program of 

drug or alcohol treatment described in [a dependency] case plan . . . on at 

least two prior occasions, even though the programs identified were available 

and accessible.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).) The parents do not contest the 

juvenile court’s finding that this bypass provision applies to them.

If section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), applies, services cannot be ordered 

“unless the [juvenile] court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) Thus, 
15

if a court finds that this bypass provision applies, “ ‘ “the general rule 

favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering 

services would be an unwise use of governmental resources,” ’ ” and “[t]he 

burden is on the parent to change that assumption and show that 

reunification would serve the best interests of the child.” (In re William B.

(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227 (William B.).)

“The concept of a child’s best interest ‘is an elusive guideline that belies 

rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child’s opportunity to develop 

into a stable, well-adjusted adult.’ ” (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 

55, 66 (Ethan N.).) In addressing whether reunification is in the child’s best 

interest, “[t]he juvenile court should consider ‘a parent’s current efforts and 

fitness as well as the parent’s history’; ‘[t]he gravity of the problem that led to 

the dependency’; the strength of the bonds between the child and the parent 

and between the child and the caretaker; and ‘the child’s need for stability 

and continuity.’ ” (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228, quoting 

Ethan N., at pp. 66–67.) In addition, “at least part of the best interest 

analysis must be a finding that further reunification services have a 

likelihood of success. In other words, there must be some ‘reasonable basis to 

conclude’ that reunification is possible before services are offered to a parent 

who need not be provided them.” (William B., at pp. 1228–1229.)

“ ‘ “A juvenile court has broad discretion when determining whether . . .

reunification services would be in the best interests of the child under 

section 361.5, subdivision (c). [Citation.] An appellate court will reverse that 

determination only if the juvenile court abuses its discretion.” ’ [Citations.] 

If the juvenile court’s finding that further services would be in the [child’s] 

best interest is not supported by substantial evidence, then the order for such 
16

services constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1140–1141.) 

“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence, the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole 

contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have 

found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012; In re S.B. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 612, 623.) 

We make all presumptions “ ‘in favor of the order, considering the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party 

the benefit of every reasonable inference[,] and resolving all conflicts in 

support of the order.’ ” (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164.)

B. Reversal Is Not Required Merely Because the Juvenile Court Did 

Not Expressly Address Every Relevant Factor.

Initially, we address T.V.’s contention that the order granting 

reunification services must be reversed because “the juvenile court did not 

properly focus on the mandated best interests factors as outlined in . . .

William B.” T.V. argues that a court is “required to consider” each of those 

factors and the court here failed to do so. (Italics added.) Specifically, T.V. 

contends that the court erred by (1) not fully considering the parents’ history, 

particularly mother’s history with T.V.’s half sisters; (2) failing to “fully 

address” the seriousness of the problems leading to dependency; (3) not 

addressing the bond between T.V. and the parents “at all”; (4) insufficiently

“consider[ing] [T.V.’s] need for stability and continuity”; and (5) making 

“absolutely no finding” of a likelihood that services would be successful. 

(Boldface omitted.) 

Mother argues that this case should not be analyzed in light of the 

factors enumerated in William B., which were originally set forth in Ethan N. 

She points out that Ethan N. involved the bypass provision for a parent who 
17

“has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect” (§ 361.5, 

subd. (b)(4)), and the decision emphasized “the enormous hurdle faced by 

[such] a parent seeking reunification” compared to parents whose conduct

falls under other bypass provisions. (Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 68.) To be sure, the applicable bypass provision will affect analysis of the 

best-interest issue, and mother and father were clearly in a better position to 

establish that reunification was in the child’s best interest than were the 

Ethan N. parents. But none of the factors that decision discussed are specific

to the child-death bypass provision. Indeed, as mother recognizes, William B.

involved the bypass provision at issue here yet analyzed the best-interest 

issue in light of the same factors as Ethan N. did. (William B., supra, 

163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228–1230.) We conclude it is likewise appropriate to 

do so here.

A separate issue is whether a juvenile court must consider all these 

factors, which Ethan N. characterized as “relevant” to the best-interest issue. 

(Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.) Although Ethan N. held 

that the juvenile court there “did not apply the correct standards in 

examining [the child’s] best interest and . . . thus abused its discretion,” this 

was primarily because “[t]he lower court’s conclusion . . . that reunification 

would be in [the child’s] best interest evidently was based on the court’s 

concomitant finding that [the mother] had ‘made significant progress towards 

alleviating or mitigating the causes of [her] children’s placement in out-ofhome care.’ ” (Id. at pp. 65, 68.) Certainly, the case law recognizes that a 

child’s need for stability is key, and there must be reason to think that 

reunification is possible. (In re S.B., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 623;

William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228–1229; Ethan N., at p. 67.) 

But we do not read Ethan N. or William B. to hold that a juvenile court must 
18

expressly address these factors or make particular findings in addition to its 

best-interest finding. Rather, our obligation to presume the juvenile court’s

order was correct means we also presume the court used the correct legal 

analysis, absent any indication otherwise.6 (In re Heather A. (1996) 

52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193; see In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 456 

[affirming juvenile court’s “implied finding” that reunification services were 

not in child’s best interest].) Therefore, although we will analyze the bestinterest finding in light of the so-called William B. factors, we reject T.V.’s 

arguments that reversal is required to the extent the court did not expressly 

address each of those factors.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Reunification 

With The Parents Was in T.V.’s Best Interest.

T.V. claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering 

reunification services because insufficient evidence supported the finding 

that reunification was in her best interest. According to her, although the 

parents “made some efforts to come to terms with their addiction, their lastminute efforts and love for their child was not enough to prove to the court, 

by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be in [her] best interests” to 

provide them with reunification services. 

In analyzing this claim, we structure our discussion around the 

William B. factors as follows. First, as to mother, we address three factors

that revolve around her substance abuse: a parent’s history and current 

efforts and fitness, the gravity of the problem that led to the dependency, and 

6 T.V. argues in passing that the juvenile court improperly relied on In 

re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932. Although B.E. involved whether the same 

drug-history bypass provision applied, not whether reunification was in the 

minors’ best interest (see B.E., at pp. 934–935), we disagree with T.V. to the 

extent she suggests the juvenile court’s reference to that decision establishes 

an abuse of discretion. 
19

the likelihood that services will succeed. Second, as to father, we address the 

same three factors, which also revolve around his substance abuse. And 

finally, as to both parents, we address the factors of the child’s bond with the 

parent and caretakers and the child’s need for stability and continuity.

1. Mother

a. Mother’s history

There is no dispute that mother has a serious drug addiction and that 

it prevented her from parenting her two other daughters. T.V. is incorrect, 

however, when she states that the juvenile court did “not consider[] 

[m]other’s prior CPS history.” As the court observed, mother lost custody of 

B.C. nearly a decade before this proceeding was initiated, reducing its 

relevance to mother’s current circumstances. In addition, mother voluntarily 

agreed to let her mother take W.O., which the court said “sounds like a safety 

plan. That sounds like something that [mother was] doing for her daughter 

and should not be used against [mother] in this proceeding because she made 

that step.” Thus, the court clearly considered mother’s history with her other 

children but declined to hold it against her when deciding whether 

reunification was in T.V.’s best interest. And the court was entitled to do so, 

given that history’s remoteness, the relative lack of information about the 

circumstances involving either half sister, and mother’s subsequent 

substantial periods of sobriety.

T.V. also highlights that “[m]other herself indicated that she continued 

to struggle with sobriety since these cases [involving B.C. and W.O.] and over 

the years.” (Boldface omitted.) Again, while it is true that mother was not 

consistently sober after the events involving her other children, her 

testimony provided substantial evidence that she was able to maintain 

significant periods of sobriety. Notably, she attained sobriety upon learning 
20

she was pregnant with T.V., and she consistently managed her opioid

addiction with methadone throughout the proceedings below. Thus, while 

the juvenile court found that mother “has a history of extensive, abusive, and 

chronic use of drugs” and “resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this 

problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the 

petition that brought that child to the court’s attention” in determining the 

bypass provision applied (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13)), mother’s overall addiction 

history also had mitigating aspects supporting the conclusion that

reunification with T.V. was still possible and desirable.

T.V. also faults the juvenile court for “factor[ing] in the fact that the . . .

previous petition [filed in October 2019] had been dismissed as clear and 

convincing evidence that it was in [her] best interest to offer the parents . . .

services.” In fact, what the court stated was that Salzgeber’s description of 

the parents in the November 2019 report, which ultimately led to the 

petition’s dismissal, was clear and convincing evidence that reunification was 

in T.V.’s best interest. Thus, it was not the prior petition’s dismissal per se

but the information about the parents that Salzgeber provided that 

supported granting reunification services. 

In turn, that report, from which the juvenile court quoted at length,

reflected that the parents were extremely motivated to have a family with 

T.V. and had been misunderstood and unfairly treated by various 

professionals involved in the case. As to mother specifically, the report 

constituted substantial evidence that T.V.’s medical difficulties, as well as 

questionable behavior on mother’s part, were attributable to the birth’s 

traumatic effects on both mother and the baby, not any substance abuse by 

mother. The report supports the conclusion that mother was doing her best 

to parent T.V. under difficult circumstances.
21

b. Mother’s relapse

It is uncontested that both parents eventually relapsed, which led to 

the filing of the petition at issue. In this regard, the juvenile court found it 

notable that mother asked for help after father relapsed, even though she had 

not yet admitted that she relapsed as well. In addition, the court observed 

that “mother took protective actions by calling 911” after father overdosed 

and “later reaching out to family and friends” for help. The court also noted 

circumstances suggesting the baby’s safety was not threatened during this 

period. It found that although father’s overdose was “concerning,” T.V. “was 

not home during . . . most of that time.” In the period immediately after 

father’s overdose, T.V. was observed to be doing well, and even when she was 

removed mother remained “calm” and the probation search did not uncover

drugs or drug paraphernalia. This discussion suggests the court’s 

conclusions, as to the first and second William B. factors, that mother was 

able to seek help when needed and that the problems leading to T.V.’s 

dependency were not especially grave.

T.V. attempts to discount many of these findings, but in doing so she 

fails to recognize our obligation to view the record in the light most favorable 

to the juvenile court’s ruling. For example, T.V. notes that while “[m]other 

initially asked for help from the Department on April 21, 2020, it must be 

remembered that this was during a time when she was still actively in the 

throes of her addiction unbeknownst to the Department [or anyone else].” 

T.V. also argues that “the court appears to be mistaken that [m]other reached 

out to family and friends appropriately,” because mother raised “only . . . her 

concerns about [f]ather using” without “report[ing] that she herself was 

experiencing issues with drug use.” (Boldface omitted.) And T.V. accuses

mother of “minimiz[ing]” or even “outright den[ying]” father’s inappropriate 
22

conduct, primarily based on mother’s testimony that father did not use her 

methadone. But even if mother could have been more open with others, the 

court was still entitled to give her credit for her efforts to seek help and try to 

protect T.V. Any failure by mother to be perfectly transparent in doing so

hardly negated the substantial other evidence of her positive efforts.

T.V. also contends that mother’s actions on April 19, the day father 

overdosed, “placed [T.V.] in grave danger, contrary to [mother’s] testimony, 

which demonstrated a total denial of this fact.” Mother testified that T.V.

“was with [G.P.] for the duration of the day, and then when he went to work, 

he called [mother’s] brother. . . . [¶] First, [T.V.] was with [G.P.] alone, and 

then she was with [mother’s brother], who was . . . dropping [mother] off at 

the house and taking the baby while [mother] sobered up.” T.V. contends 

that this testimony “gave the [juvenile] court the impression that [T.V.] was 

never left alone in [mother’s] care” on April 19, even though, according to the 

May 2020 report, mother said there was a period of time after G.P. went to 

work when she and father’s friend, who had also been using drugs, were 

alone with the baby.

To the extent there were any discrepancies in the information mother 

provided, the juvenile court was entitled to credit her testimony at the 

hearing. Indeed, mother testified that statements attributed to her in 

Department reports did “not reflect” what she actually said. T.V.’s briefing

reads as if the Department’s reports contain the objective truth and any 

statements by mother to the contrary must be rejected. But mother’s 

testimony is also legitimate, substantial evidence of what she described, and 

we must presume the court resolved conflicts in the evidence in her favor. 

Viewed in this light, the record shows that mother did not take care of T.V.

alone for any significant amount of time on April 19.
23

T.V. next argues that mother’s testimony about her own drug use more 

generally paints “a picture of a woman in total denial about the seriousness 

of her drug addiction and sustained pattern of drug use when she was [T.V.’s] 

caretaker.” T.V. points to discrepancies in mother’s testimony about her use 

of methamphetamine, but mother ultimately admitted that she used the drug 

twice, once in late March and once on April 19. This appears to be consistent 

with her positive tests for methamphetamine on March 24 and April 21.7 The 

juvenile court was not required to conclude that mother was “in denial” just

because it took time for her to clarify when she used methamphetamine,

particularly given the evidence that mother had difficulty remembering 

things because of her traumatic brain injury.

T.V. also points out that mother denied that she abused fentanyl, 

despite having six positive tests for the drug. But the juvenile court was 

entitled to credit mother’s explanations that she received fentanyl in 

connection with her wrist surgery and that it was possible the 

methamphetamine she took was tainted. T.V. may be correct that mother’s 

testimony does not explain all the positive test results, but it is notable that 

mother was being drug tested by both by her doctor and REAP, and the 

results were not always consistent. For example, although mother’s doctor 

was concerned that mother tested positive for fentanyl around March 24, on 

7 T.V. claims that mother also tested positive for methamphetamine on 

April 22, implying mother used the drug three times, based on the following 

statement in the May 2020 report: “Redwood Toxicology Report dated 

April 22, 2020[,] positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.” It 

appears this was a typographical error, as the summary of mother’s REAP 

test results attached to the July 2020 addendum report shows that mother 

did not test at all on April 22. Moreover, even if mother had tested positive 

for methamphetamine on April 22 as well, we have no basis on which to 

conclude this necessarily meant that mother used the drug after April 19.
24

the same date she tested negative for that drug at REAP. And although she 

tested positive for fentanyl at her doctor’s visit on April 28, a REAP test on 

the same date was negative for the drug. Thus, the court could have 

reasonably determined that mother never knowingly took fentanyl to get 

high during the relevant time period. 

Similarly, we reject T.V.’s argument that mother’s refusal to admit she 

abused gabapentin was additional evidence that mother was “in total denial 

about her serious addiction and substance abuse.” T.V. claims “this 

testimony was wholly inconsistent and in contradiction to what [mother’s 

doctor] told the social worker as documented in the . . . [July 2020 report].” 

But the juvenile court was entitled to credit mother’s testimony over her 

doctor’s suspicion, a credibility determination we cannot second guess on 

appeal. While there was no question that mother relapsed and used 

methamphetamine twice, the court was not required to conclude that she also 

abused fentanyl and gabapentin or, more generally, that she was “in denial” 

about her drug problem.

c. Mother’s current efforts and the likelihood that 

services will be successful

The juvenile court also considered mother’s current efforts to address 

her drug addiction in concluding that reunification was in T.V.’s best interest. 

As the court observed, mother “submitted evidence that . . . she is [an] active 

and regular participant in the DAAC [P]erinatal program, and she is now 

actively participating in REAP.” The evidence also showed that mother 

successfully participated in residential drug treatment through WRS for a 

month, at which point she followed that program’s advice to enter an 

outpatient program. 

T.V. maintains that mother’s efforts in this regard “were eclipsed by 

her delay in seeking treatment, the multitude of problems she displayed 
25

during her treatment, as well as the paucity of information about her ongoing 

treatment.” T.V. faults mother for not admitting that she relapsed or “taking 

steps to look into programs until after [T.V.] was removed on April 30.” 

(Boldface omitted.) T.V. also points to evidence that mother did not follow 

through with other programs to which she was referred before entering WRS, 

that mother’s behavior required her to leave WRS early, and that she did not 

complete WRS’s aftercare. Again, however, this evidence does not negate the 

substantial other evidence that at the time of the dispositional hearing 

mother was obtaining drug treatment and on track to successfully complete

it. Even if there may have been delays and road bumps along the way, this 

did not prevent the juvenile court from relying on evidence of mother’s overall 

sincere and significant efforts to address her substance abuse problem.

Mother’s efforts in drug treatment also provide substantial evidence of 

a likelihood that services would be successful and reunification is possible. 

Again, by the time of the dispositional hearing, mother had completed a 

month of residential drug treatment and was participating in an outpatient 

program she anticipated she would successfully complete. She was also still 

participating in REAP, a commitment she had maintained since before T.V.’s 

birth. Since mother’s primary problem is opioids, the juvenile court could 

properly rely on her consistency with REAP as a key indicator that 

reunification was possible. Indeed, as suggested by our discussion above of 

mother’s positive tests for fentanyl, it is not clear that her relapse even 

involved opioids. And while we do not minimize the seriousness of mother’s

use of methamphetamine, the court could have reasonably determined there 

was a likelihood mother would successfully avoid that drug, which she 

testified she had rarely taken, and continue to avoid opioids. In short, we 

reject T.V.’s claim that “[t]here is no evidence in the record that would 
26

remotely suggest that there is a likelihood that services would be successful 

and that reunification is possible.” (Boldface omitted.) To the contrary, if 

mother’s testimony was believed, as the court was entitled to do, there was 

plenty of evidence to establish a likelihood that services would successfully 

address her drug addiction and she could reunify with T.V.

2. Father

It is undisputed that father also has a history of substance abuse. 

Although there is significantly less evidence in the record about father than 

about mother, including on this point, T.V. correctly points out that father’s 

criminal history suggested he has a longtime drug problem. But father’s 

most recent drug-related conviction was for possession of a controlled 

substance in late 2016, and he testified that he completed a drug treatment 

program and was then sober for about three years before the relapse at issue. 

Thus, there was evidence that father had successfully addressed his drug 

problem before and was capable of maintaining long periods of sobriety.

Father’s relapse in early 2020 was undoubtedly serious, culminating in 

his hospitalization on April 19. The juvenile court noted, however, that on 

that date T.V. “was not home during most of that time,” mother sought help, 

and the Department “at this point [was] not seeing any safety threat.” 

Contrary to T.V.’s claim otherwise, there is no evidence that on April 19

“she was exposed to the same type of chaos and dysfunction that presumably 

stunted her growth while she resided with her parents prior to removal.” 

Rather, the record suggests father passed out relatively early in the day, 

permitting the conclusion that T.V. was not directly exposed to his negative 

behavior even if she was present at some point after he overdosed.

T.V. also argues that because father knew mother was using drugs at 

the same time, his relapse was “the very epitome of a failure to protect and 
27

. . . placing [one’s] child at risk of . . . harm.” It is true that if both parents 

had not relapsed, T.V. would not have become a dependent at the time she 

did. As discussed above, however, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude 

that the problem leading to dependency was not especially grave, given

mother’s protective actions and the lack of evidence that T.V. was ever in real 

danger on April 19 or immediately afterward. 

As for father’s current efforts to address his drug problem, T.V. claims

they “were minimal and unknown at best.” T.V. points to the May 2020

report’s statement that “father has refused to enter residential treatment and 

has not commenced intensive outpatient treatment.” Yet in the same report,

father was quoted as saying, “I’m gonna do this outpatient thing and 

counseling, and if it doesn’t work in a couple weeks, we agree I’ll do the 

inpatient thing.” The record does not reflect whether father did in fact attend 

outpatient treatment, but the following month he entered an inpatient 

program at Duffy’s. Father indicated that the delay in entering Duffy’s was 

because the VA paid for it, and “it took some time to get that all worked out 

for [him] to go.” He also testified that he successfully completed this program 

and was still sober. His testimony was substantial evidence that he was 

actively addressing his drug problem.

This evidence of father’s efforts also supported a finding of a likelihood 

that services would be successful and reunification was possible. Although 

father arguably was in more denial than mother was and took longer to seek 

help for his problems, we agree with him that his “participation in a 

residential drug treatment program and sobriety cannot be ignored.” It 

appears self-evident that successfully completing a drug treatment program 

and continuing to maintain sobriety is substantial evidence of a likelihood 

that services, which in both parents’ cases would presumably focus on their 
28

substance-abuse issues, will be successful. We reject T.V.’s argument 

otherwise. 

3. The strength of T.V.’s bonds with her parents and her

caretakers and her need for stability and continuity

Finally, we address the two William B. factors that focus on a child’s 

relationships and needs. Although T.V. does not dispute that her parents 

love her, she argues that her bonds with them were not strong enough to 

weigh in favor of determining that reunification was in her best interest. In 

particular, she focuses on the “poor” quality of visitation during the three 

months between her removal and the dispositional hearing. Viewing the 

record in the light most favorable to the parents, however, we conclude that 

the visits were unsatisfying primarily because they had to be held by video

due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As another court recently observed, “We can 

all appreciate now . . . that video meetings are not an adequate substitute for 

meeting in person, even for adults. That’s even more true for children, 

especially small children, who aren’t cognitively developed enough to engage 

in that setting.” (In re S.S. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 355, 377.) The 

Department’s visitation logs also reflect that the parents, particularly 

mother, tried to engage T.V., and the parents consistently expressed affection 

toward their daughter. The juvenile court was entitled give little weight to 

the fact the parents may have had difficulty holding T.V.’s attention during 

visits. 

Of more concern was a report that both parents appeared to be “under 

the influence” during a June 25 visit. But according to the social worker who 

had been supervising visits, mother “stated [father] had used the night prior 

and was not high but was coming down.” Mother also “denied using 

substances herself” on this occasion, a claim she repeated at the dispositional 
29

hearing. Thus, there was substantial evidence that neither parent was 

actually intoxicated during this visit. 

T.V. also points to the evidence that she began to thrive physically once 

she was removed as suggesting that her bond with her foster family was 

strong and her bond with her parents was weak. She points to both her jump 

in height and her improved developmental markers between May and 

June 2020. Even though this evidence led T.V.’s doctor to opine that “there 

was ‘clearly dysfunction and chaos’ in [T.V.’s] home environment with [the 

parents] that impacted [T.V.’s] growth and development,” it is speculative to 

infer much of anything about T.V.’s bonds with the parents or the foster 

family from this information. Substantial other evidence in the record, 

including visitation logs and the parents’ own statements about their 

daughter, supports the conclusion that the parents and T.V. were bonded. As 

for the foster family, T.V. recognizes that “[t]here is little information in the 

record about [her] relationship with” them, and it is reasonable to infer she 

did not have a strong bond with them since she had been living there for only 

two months by the time of the dispositional hearing. In sum, the juvenile 

court was not required to weigh this factor against the parents.

T.V. also claims that the juvenile court “failed to properly consider [her] 

need for stability and continuity” in ruling. She argues that she “is in a 

stable placement where all of her needs are being met,” and it will take too 

long for the parents to address their drug addiction in light of each one’s 

“lengthy history, very recent efforts in this case, and continued denial and 

minimization.” As discussed above, however, the evidence hardly compels

this myopic view of the parents, and the court was entitled to credit their 

successful efforts to get treatment in determining that preserving the 
30

possibility of reunification did not outweigh T.V.’s need for stability and 

continuity. 

We agree with T.V. that because of her very young age, “ ‘ “moving to 

permanency more quickly is critical.” ’ ” (Quoting Daria D. v. Superior Court

(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 612.) But this interest is protected by the shorter 

amount of time that mother and father will have to try to reunify with their 

daughter (see id. at p. 610), and they have little room for error. As the 

juvenile court cautioned them, “A relapse at this point during reunification

services would be devastating to your ability to retain those services.” Since 

the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding that

reunification is in T.V.’s best interest, we conclude that the court did not err 

by giving mother and father another chance.

III.

DISPOSITION

The August 7, 2020 order granting reunification services to mother and 

father is affirmed.
31

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

In re T.V. A160796