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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

RAFAEL MARTINEZ-AYALA,

Petitioner,

v.

JERI TAYLOR, Superintendent, Eastern 

Oregon Correctional Institution,

Respondent.

Case No. 2:16-cv-00044-SB

ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

United States Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman issued Findings and 

Recommendation in this case on March 28, 2019. ECF 67. Magistrate Judge Beckerman

recommended that the Court should grant Petitioner’s Amended Habeas Petition (ECF 29) on the 

basis that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer mitigation evidence at sentencing.

Under the Federal Magistrates Act (“Act”), the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). If a party files objections to a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, 
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“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified 

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

For those portions of a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations to which neither 

party has objected, the Act does not prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (“There is no indication that Congress, in enacting [the Act], intended to 

require a district judge to review a magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); United 

States. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the court 

must review de novo magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations if objection is made, “but 

not otherwise”). Although in the absence of objections no review is required, the Act “does not 

preclude further review by the district judge[] sua sponte . . . under a de novo or any other 

standard.” Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b) recommend that “[w]hen no timely objection is filed,” the Court review the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations for “clear error on the face of the record.”

Respondent timely filed an objection (ECF 75), to which Petitioner responded (ECF 76), 

Respondent replied (ECF 79), and Petitioner sur-replied (ECF 81). Respondent objects to the 

portion of Magistrate Judge Beckerman’s recommendation finding that habeas relief is warranted 

on Petitioner’s claim 1C, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent raises three

primary claims of error. First, Respondent argues that the F&R erroneously fails to address the 

first prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669 (1984) under the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Second, Respondent argues that, even if the F&R did

consider both prongs of Strickland under AEDPA, it failed to accord the PCR court’s decision 

deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. And third, Respondent argues that the F&R failed to evaluate 

trial counsel’s performance under the deferential standard required by Strickland. 
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The Court turns first to the question of whether Judge Beckerman correctly applied the 

“doubly” deferential standard of review resulting from the combination of Strickland and 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). 

Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims subject to 

§ 2254(d) unless it is shown that the earlier state court's decision 

“was contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the 

holdings of this Court, . . . or that it “involved an unreasonable 

application of” such law, § 2254(d)(1); or that it “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record 

before the state court, § 2254(d)(2).

 Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted). 

“The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard 

was unreasonable.” Id. The PCR court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the motivation of Judge 

James, the sentencing judge, in imposing a 269-month sentence, referring repeatedly to the 

specific facts of Petitioner’s crime that the PCR court believed would have stood out to Judge 

James and motivated Judge James’s decision. Resp. Ex. 128 at 33-36. The Strickland analysis, 

however, is an objective one and “should not depend on the idiosyncrasies of the particular 

decisionmaker.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 670 (9th Cir. 2018). 

The PCR court’s decision was thus contrary to clearly established federal law because it applied 

the incorrect analysis under Strickland. 

After Judge Beckerman determined that the PCR court’s determination was contrary to 

Strickland, she analyzed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim “independently without 

AEDPA deference.” White, 895 F.3d at 671. “When a state court's adjudication of a claim is 

dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of federal law, the requirement set forth in 

§ 2254(d)(1) is satisfied. A federal court must then resolve the claim without the deference 

AEDPA otherwise requires.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). If a federal court 

“determine[s] that ‘the requirements of AEDPA have been met, [it] must also determine, 
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applying a de novo review standard, [that] there has been a constitutional violation’ before [it] 

may grant habeas corpus relief.” Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, Judge Beckerman’s analysis of Petitioner’s constitutional claim was appropriately 

conducted under a de novo standard of review, which still involved an application of the 

deferential standard of Strickland, but was stripped of the doubly deferential standard under 

AEDPA. 

The Court has reviewed the remainder of the F&R and concludes that Judge Beckerman 

properly analyzed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland. The 

failure to present any testimony, affidavits, letters of support, documentary evidence, or even a 

sentencing memorandum fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Trial counsel knew 

that Petitioner, then 49 years old, was facing a lengthy sentence—potentially up to 25 years—

and that Petitioner had a compelling personal history of law-abiding work, family support, and 

great personal loss. Yet, trial counsel undertook no steps, other than obtaining funding to prepare 

a three-page sentencing report that largely repeated Petitioner’s own statements, to pursue, 

investigate, or present mitigation evidence in the sentencing hearing. Despite affidavits from 

Petitioner’s family members that they were available and willing to testify, trial counsel failed to 

contact them. Petitioner’s daughter stated in her affidavit that she called Petitioner’s trial counsel 

“up to three times a week” offering her assistance, but trial counsel never asked her to testify or 

provide any information or documents. Trial counsel also never sought testimony from 

Petitioner’s cousin, who was present at sentencing and willing to testify. Although Respondent 

argues that trial counsel may have made a strategic choice in not pursuing a certain line of 

investigation, the decision not to pursue any investigation at all beyond the basic sentencing 
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reports falls below an acceptable standard of reasonableness. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 

524 (2003); White, 895 F.3d at 668-69; Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1995). 

At sentencing, the only evidence that, contrary to the State’s contention, Petitioner was 

not a long-time drug dealer was Petitioner’s own statements. Had Petitioner’s counsel presented 

evidence in the form of testimony, documents, letters of support, or a sentencing memorandum, 

there is a reasonable probability that a sentencing judge might have sentenced Petitioner, a firsttime, non-violent offender, to a sentence lower than the 269-month sentence that he is currently 

serving. 

For those portions of Magistrate Judge Beckerman’s Findings and Recommendation to 

which neither party has objected, this Court follows the recommendation of the Advisory 

Committee and reviews those matters for clear error on the face of the record. No such error is 

apparent.

The Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Beckerman’s Findings and Recommendation, 

ECF 67. Petitioner’s 269-month sentence is vacated and a new sentencing hearing must be held 

within 60 days from the date of entry of judgment in this case. The Court declines to issue a 

Certificate of Appealability on the claims that Judge Beckerman rejected on the basis that 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) with respect to those claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 19th day of July, 2019. 

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge