LIFE	BEFORE	AMWG	

For	the	Adaptive	Management	Transition	Work	Group,	April	19,	2016	

By	Gaylord	Staveley	

I’d	like	to	talk	about	“life	before	AMWG”,	and	offer	some	perspective	on	Grand	Canyon	

river‐running	as	an	element	of	the	LTEMP	matrix.	

By	way	of	background,	I	had	my	first	river	trips	on	the	Colorado	in	1956,	and	have	been	a

professional	guide	and	outfitter	since	1957.

For	7	years	before	the	construction	of	Glen	Canyon	Dam.	I	organized	and	led	commercial	

river	trips	in	Glen	and	Grand	Canyons.	

In	1969	I	organized	and	led	a	centennial	retracing	of	Major	Powell's	1869	descent	of	the	

Green	and	Colorado	Rivers	in	wooden	rowboats.		

From	1978	to	1990,	I	was	chairman	of	the	Professional	River	Outfitters	Association,	the	

predecessor	of	present‐day	Grand	Canyon	River	Outfitters	Association.			ሺWhose	Executive	

Director	is	here	today?ሻ		

I've	written three	books	of	river‐running	history,	most	recently:	Taking Big	Red:	The	

Colorado	River‐Grand	Canyon	Water	War,	1970	to 2016.	

I	don’t	presume	to	educate	this	Group	on	scientific	or	technical	matters—This	is more	in	

the	nature of	story	telling.	If	I	get	too	elementary,	please know	it’s	because	I’m	drawing	

from	my	book,	in	which	I’ve	tried	to	explain	and	document	the	evolution	of	river	and	dam	

management	for	general	readers.	

The	first	year	I	went	down	the	river	through	Grand	Canyon,	there	were	only	four	

companies	conducting	organized	and	scheduled	river	trips.	By	1970,	there	were	21.	Today,	

as	a	result	of a	few	mergers	and	acquisitions,	there	are	16.			

By	now,	those	companies	have	taken	almost	1,000,000	Park	visitors	through	Grand	

Canyon	by	boat.	Grand Canyon	River	trip	fares are	presently	$43 million	dollars	per	year	

and	those	dollars	recirculate	through	the	economy	from	7	to	17	times, depending on	whose	

computations	are	being	used.	The sixteen	river	companies	employ	several	hundred	highly	

trained	pilots	and	guides,	who	are	required	to	be	skilled	boat	handlers,	cooks,	back‐country	

guides,	wilderness	first‐responders,	interpreters,	and	psychiatrists.	According	to	Grand	

Canyon	National	Park,	we	pay	$5	million dollars per	year	in	franchise	fees	to	the	federal	

treasury	through	the	National	Park	Service,	as	well	as	lot	of	other	taxes	and	fees.

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Besides	about	18,500	commercial	passengers	per	year,	about	6,700	self‐guided	

boaters	run	the	Grand.	There	are	also	several	livery	companies	that	rent	equipment	and	

services	to	self‐guided	boaters.	The	exact	annual	value	of	those	activities	hasn’t	been	

compiled,	but	enough	grab	figures	are	available	to	also	put	it	in	the	millions	of	dollars.		

According	to	a	2012	study	for	Protect	the	Flows	ሺa	non‐profit	coalition	of	businesses	

that	depend	on	the	Colorado	Riverሻ,	the	businesses	and	employees	who	benefit	directly	or	

indirectly	from	“Colorado	River	recreation”	earn	$10.4	billion	dollars	annually	in	salaries	

and	wages.

In	addition	to	those	dollar	values,	there	are	also	substantial	non‐dollar	values,	and	

non‐use	values,	attributed	to,	and	computed	for,	Grand	Canyon	river‐	running.	

Despite	those	values,	river	runners are	heavily overmatched	in	the	competition	for	

use	of	the	river	below	Glen	Canyon	Dam.	Unlike	the	basins,	or	the	states,	or	the	water	

companies,	we	have	no	water	treaties,	water	rights,	or	water	allocations.		

I	trace	the	beginning	of	this	situation	back	more	than	60	years, to	the following

actions	and	events:		

The	purpose	of 	Glen	Canyon	Dam	was 	changed,	and	its	generating	 capacity	was	increased

The	stated	primary	purpose	of	Glen	Canyon	Dam	was	flood	control,	but	that	soon	

became	subordinated	to	generation	and	sale	of	electricity.

Early	proposals	were	for	an	800	megawatt	powerplant.	

•	The	authorizing	legislation	was	for	a	900	megawatt	plant.		

•	When	the	dam	was	completed,	it	was	name‐plated	at	950	megawatts	

•	When	tested,	it	was	found	to	produce	1,035	megawatts.	

•	In1980,	with	4	of	8	generators	rewound,	it	produced	1,150	megawatts.

•Rewinding	of	the	other	4	generators	gave	it	a	capacity	of	1,336	megawatts.

Those	modifications	changed	the	peak	release through	the	turbines	from	20,900	cfs	

to	31,500	cfs.	In	a	minute,	I’ll	mention	other	modifications that	have	been	proposed.	

The	generating	cycle	depends	on	lower	lows	to	save	water	for	higher	highs.	Low	

flows	strand	boats	on	shore,	or	ground	them	in	shallow	water	for	extended	periods	of	time.

In	one	instance	a	boatload	of	passengers	was	grounded	in	mid‐river	at	Crystal	Rapid	for	40	

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hours	–	from	Sunday	afternoon	until	Tuesday	morning.	I’m	sure	you	can	imagine	the	

restroom,	meal‐making,	and	sleeping	situations	that	created.		

Daily	flow	ranges	and	averages	are	often	cited	as	measures,	but	those	are	irrelevant	

to	river	running:	The	daily	range	of 8,000	cfs	is	damaging	if	the	low	end	of	the	range	is	

6,000cfs.	And	just	as	a	person	can	drown	in	water	that	averages one	inch	deep,	boats	can	be	

grounded	or	stranded	by	a	release	that	averages	11,000	cfs,	or	even	more,	on	a	given	day.

Changing	the	natural	flow		 

When	the	generators	first	went	online	in	1966,	the	daily	peaking	power	cycles—one	

boatman	called	it	YoYo	water—created	chaos.	In	narrow	sections	of the	canyon,	the	daily	

cycle	changed	the	depth	of	the	river	by	some	fifteen	feet,	leaving	boats	high	and	dry	at	

attraction	sites	or	overnight	camps.	Strandings	and	groundings	disrupt	trip	and	turnaround	

schedules;	they	disrupt	travel	schedules	for	our	passengers—and	they	damage	boats	and	

other	equipment.	

Organizational	restructuring		

For	the	first	10	years	of	hydropower	generation	ሺ1966‐1976ሻ,	daily	and	seasonal	

discharges	through	the	dam	had	at	least	resembled—in	a	broken	way—the	pre‐dam	

pattern	of	higher	flows	in	spring	and	summer	and	lower	flows	in fall	and	winter.		

Partway	through	that	ten‐year	period,	the	situation	began	changing.	In	response	to	

the	1973	OPEC	oil	embargo,	President	Nixon	called	for	a	comprehensive	National	Energy	

Independence	Plan.	What	most	people	probably	remember	about	that	period	is	its	national	

highway	speed	limit	of	55	miles	an	hour.	In	1974,	Congress	passed	the	Federal	Energy

Administration	Act.	Between	1974 and	1978,	propositions	were	developed	for	increasing	

the	peaking power	capacities	of	selected	existing	hydropower	facilities.		

In	1977,	the	spring	releases	from	the	dam	were	sharply	curtailed—an	abrupt	

alteration	of	the	seasonal‐release	mimic.	In	mid‐April,	when	the	release	was	suddenly	cut	

to	1700	cfs,	90	people	who	started	downriver	for	“Easter”	trips had	to	be	rescued.	

Depending	on	where	they	were	stranded,	an	emergency	gush	from	the	dam	enabled	some	

to	get	on	down	to	Bright	Angel	beach,	but	others	had	to	be	lifted	out	by	helicopter.	

Navigable	flows	weren’t	released	until	the	third week	in	June,	so	the	first	seven	weeks	of	

the	river	outfitters’	season	had	to	be	cancelled—about	a	$2	million	dollar	revenue	loss.	The	

scuttlebutt	was	that	the	Bureau	of	Reclamation	had	used	the	water	the	previous	winter	to	

generate	power	they	could	sell	in	Wyoming	instead	of	buying	replacement	power	from	

fuel‐fed	generating	plants.

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During	that	year,	the	Western	Energy	Expansion	Studies	were	released.	Most	of	the	

propositions	were	for	increasing	the	peaking	power	of	existing	plants	by	modifying	their	

outlet	works,	rewinding	existing	generators	and	quickening	their	responses	to	demands.	

Glen	Canyon	Dam	was	one	of	the	candidates.	

On	October	1,	1977,	the	Department	of	Energy	was	established.	Two	months	later,	

WAPA	ሺthe	Western	Area	Power	Administrationሻ	was	established	within	the	Department	

as	the	Bureau’s	marketing	and	distribution	arm	for	Glen	Canyon hydropower.		

In	1978,	a	customer	organization,	CREDA	ሺColorado	River	Energy	Distribution

Associationሻ	was	formed.		

In	1979,	WAPA	put	forth	its	initial	ten‐year	marketing	plan.	

The	Erosion of 	Commitments	

In	July	1979,	the	Bureau	held	a	public	meeting	at	the	dam’s	visitor	center	to	

announce	the	beginning	of	a	Glen Canyon	Dam	powerplant	expansion	study,	and	their	

intention	to	have	their	own	study	team	supplemented	by	advisory sub‐teams	on	power,	

biology,	sociology,	and	recreation.	About	25	people	attended,	and	a	number	of	us

volunteered	for	each	of the	sub‐teams.		

During	the	remainder	of	1979,	and	through	1980,	the	other	sub‐teams	were	

convened	and	consulted	several	times,	but	the	Recreation	sub‐team	wasn’t—until	almost	

two	years	later.	We	formed	an	unofficial	group	and	tried	to	get information	and	provide	

input,	but	without	much	success.	Recreation’s	relative	unimportance	in	the	Bureau’s	

process	seemed	to	be	reflected	in	the	fact	that,	when	the	“recreation”	member	of	their	own	

study	team	left	them	in	1980,	he	wasn’t	replaced.		

In	February 1981,	our	unofficial	group	learned	from	one	of	the	other	sub‐teams	that	

the	Bureau	had	obtained	a	draft	report	by	Robert	Dolan	titled	Analysis	of Potential	

Recreation	Impacts	due	to	High	Water	Releases	from	Glen	Canyon	Dam	We	also	learned	

they	were	convening	the	sub‐teams	on	March	17‐18	to	present	information	from	the	Dolan	

Report—and	that	April	1	—two	weeks	hence—was	the	deadline	for	sub‐team	

recommendations.	

About	75	people	showed	up	for	the	2‐day	meeting.	The	Dolan	study	was	based	on	

release	patterns	the Bureau	said would	result	from	uprating	the dam,	plus	their	claim	that	

they	and	the	boaters	had	“a	gentlemen’s	agreement”	that the	minimum	release	would	not	

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go	below	3,000	cfs	during	the	183‐day	river	running	season.		There	was	no	such	

agreement—and	in	earlier	discussions,	their	volumes	had	been	much	higher.		

On	the	second	day	of	the	meeting,	the	recreation	sub‐team	was	constituted.	Because	

we	had	been	sidelined	for	two	years,	we	asked	for	a	one‐year	extension	of	the	deadline,	and

were	given	two	months.		

A	few	days	later,	the	Bureau	asked	me,	as	chairman	of	the	outfitters’	association,	

whether	there	was	a	minimum	flow	level	or	pattern	that	would	make the	peaking	power	

proposal	acceptable.		

I	polled	the	outfitters. Their	consensus	was	that	most	of	the	canyon	could	be	run	on	

8,000	cfs,	but	a	12,000	cfs	minimum	was	needed	for	the	granite	gorge.		

They	were	upset	with	the	Bureau’s	3,000	cfs	minimum	because,	in its	early	presentations,

the	Bureau	had	deemed	18,000	cfs	the	minimum	for	rigid motorboats,	and	7,000	to	10,000	

the	minimum	for	pontoons	and	hard‐hulled	rowboats.	But	in	some	sections	of	the	river,	

lows	of	even	8,000	cfs	were	leaving	boats	stranded	or	grounded,	waiting	for higher	water.	

Moreover	they	were	angry	that,	during	the	five	river	seasons	1975‐1979,	the	Bureau	had	

dropped	the	minimum	flow	lower	than	3,000	cfs	on	the	average of	one	day	in	every	three.	

In	four	of	those	years,	the	low	was	lower	than	3,000	on	70	or	more	days	of	the	183‐day	

season.

The	peaking	power	expansion	propositions	were	eventually	dropped—but	by 1981,	

the	summer	/	winter	release	pattern	had	been	substantially	reversed, producing	higher	

monthly	releases	in	the	colder	months	and	lower	releases	during the	boating	season.		

.		

Proving a minimum	 flow

In	the	spring	of	1982,	the	Park	superintendent	and	I	arranged	to	take	a	group	of	

officials	down	river	from	Hance	Rapid	to	Dubendorff	Rapid	to	demonstrate	that	8,000	cfs	

was	the	bare	minimum	for	smooth	and	safe	river	navigation.	The	participants	included	the	

Deputy	Director	of	the	National	Park	Service,	the	Park	superintendent,	the	Commissioner	

of	Reclamation,	his	Regional	Director	and	environmental	officer,	representatives	of	WAPA,	

CREDA,	the	Arizona	Game	and	Fish	Department,	and	the	Arizona	governor’s	office.	About	

twenty	in	all—enough	to	simulate	a	normal	passenger	load.	During	the	experiment,	the	

flows	would	be	measured	and	timed	at	the	dam	and	confirmed	by	USGS	gagers	at	Lees	

Ferry	and	Bright	Angel.		

5
 
On	weekend	water,	I	took	a	36‐foot	motorized	pontoon	from	Lees	Ferry	to	a	beach	

just	above	Unkar	Rapid.	On	Monday	afternoon,	three	Park	Service	rowing	rigs	arrived,	and	

the	officials were	brought	in	by	helicopter.	Overnight,	the	water	level	continued	to	drop,	

and	the	rangers	and	I	had	to	get	up several	times	to	push	the	boats	off	the	beach.	By	10:00	

a.m.	it	had	bottomed,	and	we	started	downstream	on	3,500	cfs,	with	the	Park’s	rowing	rigs	

in	the	lead.		

Running	over	the	ledges	below	Unkar	on	about	15	inches	of	water,	the	rowing	rigs	

floated	through,	but	the	big	boat	scuffed	the	bedrock	river	bottom,	paused,	and	nearly	hung	

up—which	noticeably	startled	the	officials.	When	we	reached	Hance	Rapid	at	noon,	we	

found	several	small	boats	and	about	a	dozen	private	boaters	on	the	beach	waiting for	more	

water.		

After	bottoming	for	a	while,	the	flow	had	begun	increasing	slowly.	At	4:00	o’clock,	

the	rangers	decided	to	try	running	their	rowing	rigs	through.	We	saw	them	take	pretty

hard	hits	in	the	bottom	hole,	so	our	motorized	boat	waited	two	more	hours.	Then,	with	just	

enough	daylight	to	get	to	Bright	Angel	Beach,	we	ran	through,	also	getting	a	jolt.	

The	next	morning,	the	Bright	Angel	gager	told	us	the	previous	day’s	average flow	

was	6,000	cfs	and	that	we	had,	in	fact,	run	Hance	the	previous	evening	on	8,000, with	the	

Park	rowing	rigs	having	made	it	on 7,500.	

Three	weeks	later	ሺTuesday	June	15,	1982ሻ	thirteen	motorized	boats	were	stalled	at	

the	head	of	Hance	Rapid	by	a	flow	of	7,000	cfs. During	June	and	July,	the	Park	recorded	

eleven	boating	incidents	attributed	to	peaking	power	water,	both	high	and	low.	They	were	

about	equally	divided	between	commercial	trips	and	private	trips,	and	were	composed	of	

inundations,	strandings,	and	injuries	involving ankle,	knee,	back,	shoulder,	nose,	eye,	hand,	

and	head.	One	very	grim	Incident Report	mentioned	a	boatman’s	“broken	face.”

Those	events	did	produce	some	important	changes,	but	not	soon.	A	few	days	after	

the	demonstration	trip, the	Park	Service	and	Bureau	officials	had	a	meeting.	In	July,	

Regional	Director	Barrett	informed	all	the	trip	participants	by letter	that	.	.	.	“BOR	is	

actively	pursuing,	at	Secretary	of	the	Interior	Level,	consideration	to	initiate	detailed	

studies	to	determine	impacts	to	Grand	Canyon	under	present	operations	and	proposed	

changes.”		

A	year	later,	the	midsummer	1983	emergency	release	resulted	in	many	capsizes	and	

one death	at	Crystal	Rapid.	Two	months	after	that,	the	House	Interior Committee	

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conducted	field	hearings	at	Needles California	During	the	hearings	it	was	argued	that	the	

1983	emergency	release	occurred because	water	held	back	in	Lake Powell	to	generate	

winter	electricity	occupied	space	needed	to	catch	the	April	through	July	runoff.	

In	December	ሺ1983ሻ,	the	first	Glen	Canyon	Environmental	Studies	project	was	

established,	and	specifically	instructed	to	focus	on	ecological	and	recreational	issues	

related	to	Glen	Canyon	Dam	operation,	and	not on	economic	or	social	issues. Commissioner	

Broadbent	ordered	the	maximum	release	from	Glen	Canyon	Dam	limited	to	31,500	cfs	until	

long‐term	operating	criteria	for	the	powerplant	were	determined through	the	appropriate	

NEPA	compliance	process.	At	year‐end,	Interior	Secretary	James	Watt	terminated	the	Glen	

Canyon uprating	campaign.	

Redrawing	boundaries	

In	late	1983,	with	its	ten‐year	power	marketing	plan	scheduled	to	expire	in	1988,	

WAPA	announced	its	intent	to	revise	the	plan.	Among	the	revisions	was	alteration	of	their	

marketing‐area	boundaries	and	the	shifting	of	energy	sales	to	what	they	called	“northern	

region	customers.”	But	by	then	had	already	made	those	changes—and	they	subsequently	

implemented	their1989	Plan	without	going	through	the	NEPA	process.	Those	actions	

resulted	in	their	being	sued	on	the	basis	that—because	Glen	Canyon	Dam	was	not	

constructed either	solely	or	principally	for	the	generation	of	hydroelectric	power—any	

plan	to	market	Glen	Canyon	power	must	consider	non‐power	values,	meaning	

environmental	and	recreational	values.	

The	result	of those	factors	was	an	increased	emphasis	on	Scienc e	and	Research	

The	hydropower	interests	complained	about	the	1983—1988	Glen	Canyon	

Environmental	Studies	concerning	itself	only	with	environmental	and	recreational	

consequences	of	dam	management.	In	1989	Secretary	Manuel	Lujan	established what	

became	known	as	GCES II.	

GCES	II	posed	six	scenarios	for	dam	operations,	each	to	address	one	or	more	critical	

resource.	River	runners were	elated	that	river	recreation	was	again	identified	as a	critical	

resource.	At	the	same	time,	some	were	upset	because	so	many	researchers	were	on	the	

river	that	all	the	good	campsites	were	being	taken.	In	1991,	research	trips	took	18,500	user	

days,	half‐again	larger	than	the	largest	outfitter’s	concessioner	allocation.	Shortly	after	

mandating	GCES	II	as	a	5‐year	program Secretary	Lujan	shortened	it	by	three	years,	and	

ordered	Interim	Flows	until	an	Environmental	Impact	Statement	on	Glen	Canyon	Dam	

could	be	completed.	The	Glen	Canyon	Environmental	Studies became the	progenitor	of the	

not‐yet‐foreseen	AMWG.	

7
		

Because	Glen	Canyon	dam	was	built	and	generating	hydropower	before	enactment	

of	the	1970	National	Environmental	Policy	Act. 1970,	those	phases	were	not	subject	to	the	

NEPA	process.	After	1970,	application	of	the	NEPA	process	to	dam	management	was	

repeatedly	dodged.

In	1992,	as	a	result	of	years	of	conflict	and	lawsuits,	Congress	passed	the	Grand	

Canyon	Protection	Act.	Although	it	required	completion	of	a	Final	EIS	on	long‐term	

operation	of	the	dam,	and	protection	of	Glen	Canyon	and	Grand	Canyon,	the	Act	also	

incorporated	an	Exemption	Criteria	MOU,	drawn	up	by	WAPA	and	Reclamation,	which	

allowed	the	dam	to	be	operated	outside	the	Act	in	certain	circumstances.	WAPA	also	asked	

for,	and	subsequently	received,	a	revision	of	the	Draft	EIS that	would	increase	the	

maximum	allowable	flow	from	20,000	cfs	to	25,000	cfs	and	the	ramping	rate	from	2,500	cfs	

per	hour	to	4,000.	

Adopting	Adaptive		Management		

In	February 1995,	the	Bureau	formed	a	19‐member	Monitoring	Group	to	oversee	

conversion	of	dam	operations	from	Interim	to	Long‐Term	and	from	the	Grand	Canyon	

Environmental	Studies	group	to	another	entity.	Shortly	after	that,	an	external	meeting	was	

called	to	select	stakeholder	representation	for a	Transition	Work	Group.	More	than	60	

signed	the	attendance	register,	and	many	in	the	monitoring	group	became	the	Transition	

Group.	Two	years	later	ሺ1997ሻ	AMWG—the	Adaptive	Management	Work Group—was	

established,	followed	by	formation	of	this	Technical	Work	Group—and	a	Science	Center	

that	was	initally	called	the	Grand	Canyon	Observatory	and	later	named	the	Grand	Canyon	

Monitoring	and	Research	Center.	

LTEP	and 	LTEMP 	and	30	Desired	Future	Conditions			 

During	the	most	recent	twenty	years,	long‐term	experimentation	was the	focus	of	

Adaptive	Management.	Now	that	has	been	modified	to	combine	experimentation	and	

management,	and	the	challenge	is	to	fairly	address	30	Desired	Future	Conditions.		

As	mentioned	at	the	beginning,	a	series	of	events	and	actions	have	both	eclipsed	

Grand	Canyon	river	running,	and	repeatedly	reiterated	its	economic	and	social	values.	I	

hope	adaptive	management,	and	the	increased	emphasis	on	research‐based	river	and	dam	

management,	will	lead to	a	fair	balancing	of	hydropower	interests	and	recreational	

interests.	

8
 
We	river	runners	don’t	presume	to	claim	that	floating	down	the	river	is	more	

important	than	having	the	lights	go	on,	but	we	do	claim	that	both	are	important	in	different	

ways.		

I	know	all	river	boaters	highly	appreciate	the	work	this	group, and	their	parent	

group,	has	done,	and	will	be	doing.	I	personally	would	like	the see	a	Preferred	Alternative	

that	would	identify	ways	at	least	some	of	the	summer	releases	could	be	returned to	

summer,	and	the	low	flows	during	the	river	season	could	be	a	solid	8,000	cfs	or	more,	

rather	than	an	average	of	8,000.	

Thank	you.	

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