Filed 11/13/23 In re K.C. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re K.C. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

Los Angeles County Department 

of Children and Family Services,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B324134

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02699A-C)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Tara L. Newman, Judge. Dismissed as moot.

Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

Father, R.M., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

and disposition orders finding his children, K.C. (born July 2005), 

Ra.M. (born May 2013), and Be.M. (born February 2015) 

(collectively, the children) to be persons described by Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300.1 Father argues that the evidence 

did not support the jurisdictional findings. His appeal, however,

has been rendered moot by a subsequent petition independently 

establishing jurisdiction over the children, which father did not 

appeal. We decline to exercise our inherent discretion to reach 

the merits. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Original Section 300 Petition

In May 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral

indicating father arrived at the family home intoxicated from 

alcohol. As the family was preparing to leave the house that 

morning, Father and K.C. had an argument. Father punched

K.C.’s face with a closed fist, causing her glasses to fall off,

because he thought she disrespected him. Ra.M. and Be.M. were 

in a car about 20 feet away when the incident occurred. After 

nonparty mother intervened, father left the home. Mother then 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

went to the police station and obtained an emergency-protective 

order against him. 

Mother reported to law enforcement personnel that father 

was an alcoholic and she had multiple prior altercations with 

him. Mother later told a social worker that “father’s behavior[ ] 

changes when he drinks, such as th[at] father can be very 

irritable, but he ha[d] never physically assaulted any of the 

children.” Mother described his alcohol consumption as 

“excessive” and said he was “unable to control his intake.” 

Father admitted to drinking alcohol the night before the 

incident. He said he was hungover but not drunk that morning

and had partaken in “five days of partying and drinking.” He

claimed he became defensive with K.C. because he thought, albeit 

mistakenly, she called him a “dead ass.” 

The Department found that while the family was 

cooperative, the incident and father’s drinking issues were 

serious. The Department also noted mother believed an open 

case and court order would ensure her family got the help they 

needed. The Department filed a section 300 petition on the 

children’s behalf. 

At the adjudication hearing in September 2022, the 

juvenile court sustained an amended petition pursuant to 

section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court found true allegations

that father physically abused K.C. and that father’s alcohol abuse 

rendered him incapable of providing Ra.M. and Be.M. with 

regular care and supervision, placing the children at risk of 

serious physical harm. The court ordered, “Pursuant to §360(b) 

of the Welfare and Institutions Code, minor[s are] person[s]

described under §300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and 

minor[s] and or parent(s) or guardian(s) are placed under [the 
4

Department’s] supervision for a period consistent with §301 of 

the Welfare and Institutions Code.” The children were released 

to the parents, with the parents being ordered to participate in 

services. Father timely appealed. 

B. Post-Appeal Proceedings and Subsequent Petition

In February 2023, the Department filed a section 342 

subsequent petition based on new facts alleging the children were 

at substantial risk of suffering serious harm under section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). The Department concurrently 

filed a section 360, subdivision (c) petition alleging the parents 

failed to participate in court-ordered services. 

In May 2023, the juvenile court sustained the subsequent 

petition, amended by interlineation, based upon events that 

happened since the original petition was filed. The subsequent 

petition not only included new allegations of the parents 

engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence, but 

also allegations concerning more recent incidents where father 

repeatedly hit K.C.’s face and was under the influence of alcohol 

while the children were under his supervision and care. The 

court also sustained the section 360 petition. The children were 

removed from father and ordered placed in mother’s home.

Additionally, in July 2023, the court terminated its jurisdiction 

over K.C. after the Department recommended the court do so

because she turned 18 years old.

2

2 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the 

section 342 subsequent petition, the section 360 petition, the lastminute information report filed with the juvenile court, and the court’s 

orders following father’s notice of appeal. (Evid. Code., §§ 452, 

subd. (d), 459.)
5

DISCUSSION

A. Father’s Appeal is Moot

The Department requests that we dismiss father’s appeal. 

It contends the appeal was rendered moot by the juvenile court 

finding the children are persons described by section 300 based 

on new and independent facts pursuant to the section 342 

subsequent petition. Father argues that his appeal is not moot 

because if the original jurisdictional findings are reversed, the 

order sustaining the subsequent petition necessarily fails. We 

disagree.

“A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, 

or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 266, 276.) “A reviewing court must ‘“decide on a case-bycase basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency 

matter make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect 

the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” (Ibid.) “A case 

becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if 

it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any 

effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two 

requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of 

an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or 

capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) In a dependency case, “relief is effective when 

it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or 

legal status.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 277.)

“In dependency proceedings, the basic pleading device to 

assert a child falls within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is a 
6

petition. [Citation.] ‘It may be an original petition (§ 332), a 

subsequent petition for children who are already dependents 

when there are “new facts or circumstances” that bring them

within a category of section 300 “other than those under which 

the original petition was sustained” (§ 342), or a supplemental 

petition when there are facts which indicate that a previous 

disposition is not appropriate. (§ 387.)’” (In re A.B. (2014) 225 

Cal.App.4th 1358, 1364.)

“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for 

its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s 

jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s 

finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory 

bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is 

supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing 

court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged 

statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’” 

(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; see also In re Ashley B.

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [“[a]s long as there is one 

unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another 

might be inappropriate”].)

In In re A.B., a parent appealed from orders finding 

jurisdiction under an original and subsequent petition. (225 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1363–1364.) No effective relief could be 

provided by reversing jurisdiction under the original petition

“because jurisdiction was established independently under the 

subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.” (Id.

at p. 1364.) The Court of Appeal held, “[a]ll procedures and 

hearings required for an original petition are required for a 

subsequent petition and are conducted under the same rules.” 

(Ibid.) “[S]o long as the jurisdictional finding under the
7

subsequent petition is supported by substantial evidence, 

reversal of the jurisdictional finding under the original petition 

would be futile.” (Ibid.)

Here, father challenges only the findings made on the 

original petition; however, the allegations against father in the 

section 342 subsequent petition provide an independent basis for 

finding jurisdiction over the children. Father did not appeal from

the subsequent petition, and he does not dispute his time to do so 

has expired. Moreover, the findings made under the subsequent 

petition were not dependent on the original jurisdiction findings 

and orders. Consequently, reversal of the original jurisdictional 

findings would not affect whether any of the children are 

dependents of the court, and thus, reversal would be futile. (In re 

A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364; see also In re Ashley B., 

supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)

The cases that father relies on in arguing that the findings 

made under the subsequent petition must fail are inapposite. In 

each case, an initial section 300 petition was found insufficient to 

establish juvenile court jurisdiction, but none involved a 

section 342 subsequent petition providing an independent basis 

for jurisdiction. (See e.g., In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986; 

In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 999; In re Janet T. (2001) 

93 Cal.App.4th 377.) They did not affect the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction. (Cf. In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 

1548 [“As the jurisdictional findings are the basis for the 

restrictive visitation and custody orders, error in the former 

undermines the foundation for the latter”]; In re Travis C. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225 [“Section 342 requires the trial court 

to determine whether newly[-]alleged facts or circumstances 
8

establish jurisdiction independent of facts alleged in the 

section 300 petition”].)

Accordingly, father’s challenge as to the jurisdictional

findings under the original petition was rendered moot by the 

court’s findings under the section 342 subsequent petition, as 

“jurisdiction was established independently under the 

subsequent petition on entirely new and independent facts.”

3 (In 

re A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1364.)

B. Discretionary Review of Father’s Moot Appeal is Not

Warranted

Father asserts we should exercise our discretion to reach

the merits of the moot appeal. We conclude exercise of our

discretion is not warranted.

“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their

‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute. 

[Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) “As a rule,

courts will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot

case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest

that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the

controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question

remains for the court’s determination.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

3 Regarding K.C., she is now 18 years old, and the juvenile court 

has terminated its jurisdiction over her. The termination of 

dependency jurisdiction generally renders an appeal of previous orders 

moot. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) While mootness 

for this reason should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, father has 

not identified any relief we could grant him as to K.C. now that she

has reached the age of majority. (See In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 

Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316.)
9

The Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive list of

factors to be considered when deciding “whether a court should

exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (In re D.P.,

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) First, a court deciding whether to

exercise discretionary review may consider “whether the

challenged jurisdiction finding ‘could be prejudicial to the

appellant or could potentially impact the current or future

dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences for

[the appellant] beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 285.) Second, the

exercise of discretionary review “may also be informed by

whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly

pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Third,

a court may consider whether the case became moot due to

prompt compliance by parents with their case plan. (Id. at

p. 286.) “[N]o single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a

court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.” 

(Ibid.)

Although father generally contends the adverse jurisdiction

findings may affect future family law or dependency proceedings,

or that they could impact the children’s placement and his

finances, father does not identify specific consequences or

prejudice he could suffer. Further, the challenged findings were

based on father’s alcohol abuse and physical abuse of K.C. While

these issues are serious, the juvenile court made new

jurisdictional findings as to the children, and regardless of our

ruling, these findings again involving father’s alcohol abuse and

his physical abuse of K.C. will remain. This is also not a case

that became moot due to prompt compliance with a case plan.

No other factor supports reaching the merits. While In re

D.P. stated it may serve the interest of justice to review a moot
10

appeal “[w]here a case is moot because one parent appealed and

not the other,” this is not an appeal that became moot because

only one parent appealed. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at

p. 286.) Although father asserts this case involves issues of broad

public interest, as the question of what constitutes “substance

abuse” for purposes of dependency jurisdiction is pending before

the Supreme Court (In re N.R. (April 29, 2022, B312001)

[nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 24, 2022, S274943), father

does not assert it is necessary to clarify the law to resolve his

appeal. Father’s appeal is fact-specific as to the findings against

him, and he does not show that a material question remains

between the parties. On balance, the factors identified in In re

D.P. do not warrant discretionary review of the moot appeal. 

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot. 

MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J.