United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 18, 2020

Decided July 21, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐2738

BARBARA ANDERSEN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

VILLAGE OF GLENVIEW, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 1:17‐cv‐5761

John J. Tharp, Jr.,

Judge.

O R D E R

This case is one stop in a long and lamentable ordeal stemming from the

acrimonious divorce of Barbara Andersen and her former husband. Andersen brought

this lawsuit after her ex‐husband’s complaints of harassment resulted in criminal

charges, a night in jail, and the temporary loss of her children. The case proceeded in

the district court and first was narrowed by motions to dismiss before the court

eventually entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all remaining

claims. Andersen appeals several of the district court’s orders. Finding no error in any

of them, we affirm.   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19‐2738    Page 2

I

Barbara Andersen was married to Rick Gimbel, an emergency room physician,

and they have two children. When the union came to an end in 2009, the couple entered

into a joint custody agreement. The separation was not amicable and ignited hostilities

that would continue for years, including accusations of harassment from both sides.

Tensions escalated in 2015 when a complaint that Gimbel submitted to the

Glenview Police Department landed Andersen in jail. Gimbel reported that his former

spouse had been harassing him, including by leaving angry voicemails. Detective Jacob

Popkov was assigned to the case, and he was the one to make the arrest. Andersen

spent the night in jail before being released on bond with the condition that she submit

to a psychological evaluation. The court also ordered that the children remain with their

father, though Andersen’s custody was later restored.   

A grand jury charged Andersen with three felonies—two counts of stalking and

another of telephone harassment with the intent to kill. But she was never convicted.

The state later chose to drop the stalking counts and reduce the harassment charge to a

misdemeanor, of which she was acquitted after a bench trial. Andersen then brought a

lawsuit of her own.

Andersen sued Gimbel, the Village of Glenview, and Detective Popkov. The

factual allegations painted the disturbing picture of an ex‐spouse who worked with a

biased police officer to trump up charges against his children’s mother that would put

her behind bars so that he could whisk the kids away to a football game.   

The complaint was based on many different legal theories related to Andersen’s

arrest and prosecution. She claimed that, among other things, Detective Popkov

violated her First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and

committed the Illinois common law tort of malicious prosecution; Popkov and Gimbel

conspired in the deprivation of her rights and in malicious prosecution; and all the

defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. Andersen also

contended that Glenview was liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658 (1978).

The parties proceeded to vigorously litigate the case. Andersen unsuccessfully

sought to disqualify attorneys from the Sotos Law Firm from serving as counsel to

Glenview and Detective Popkov. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,

resulting in all claims against Glenview being dismissed and a narrowing of the claims

against Detective Popkov and Gimbel. In discovery, Andersen requested that Glenview

be compelled to disclose emails between the Village and its counsel, but the district
No. 19‐2738    Page 3

court denied the request, finding the documents to be privileged. Andersen’s case never

made its way to a jury—the last remaining defendants received summary judgment in

their favor. Andersen now appeals, raising issues from all these orders.

II

A

We begin with the motions to dismiss, of which our review is de novo. See Hughes

v. Sw. Airlines Co., 961 F.3d 986, 987–88 (7th Cir. 2020). In doing so, we accept the

complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Andersen’s

favor. See id.   

Andersen contends that the district court was wrong to dismiss her claim that

Detective Popkov falsely arrested her in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That claim

required her to plead that he did not have probable cause for the arrest. See Neita v. City

of Chi., 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016). The district court granted dismissal because it

concluded that Andersen’s allegations did not demonstrate a lack of probable cause. We

agree.   

For Detective Popkov to have had probable cause for the arrest, he must have

known facts and circumstances that would be enough for a reasonable person to believe

that she had committed an offense. See id. He justified the arrest as one for telephone

harassment, defined under Illinois law as “[m]aking a telephone call, whether or not

conversation ensues, with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called

number.” 720 ILCS 5/26.5‐2. Probable cause for that offense will bar the false arrest

claim, even though Andersen was later charged with other crimes. See Holmes v. Vill. of

Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[P]robable cause to believe that a

person has committed any crime will preclude a false arrest claim, even if the person

was arrested on additional or different charges for which there was no probable

cause.”).   

Andersen contends that the district court erred in considering the recordings of

her voicemails and interrogation, which the Glenview defendants attached to their

motion to dismiss. Ordinarily, district courts are confined to the pleadings on such a

motion, but courts may consider outside exhibits that are central to the plaintiff’s claim

and referred to in the complaint, even if supplied by the defendants. See Venture Assocs.

Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). Those were the grounds

that the court found to apply here, having concluded that the recordings were central to

Andersen’s claims and there was no dispute about their authenticity. But the court took

care to point out that even without taking into account the content of the recordings, the

complaint’s allegations failed to show a lack of probable cause.   
No. 19‐2738    Page 4

Andersen’s complaint alleged that Gimbel filed a police report stating that he

was being harassed through voicemail messages, submitted recordings of them (though

the complaint does not specifically describe what they contained), and forwarded a log

of his incoming calls. See Woods v. City of Chi., 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e

have consistently held that an identification or a report from a single, credible victim or

eyewitness can provide the basis for probable cause.”). It also alleged that Andersen

called Gimbel’s boss (which he reported to the police) and “several” other people in an

angered attempt to stop what she perceived as Gimbel harassing her, which would

have been reflected on the logs and recordings that Detective Popkov received. Taken

altogether, these alleged facts positioned Popkov (or, more generally, any reasonable

police officer) to believe that Andersen had engaged in telephone harassment. In short,

Andersen’s allegations could not support a claim that Detective Popkov lacked

probable cause to arrest her.   

The district court was right to dismiss the other claims that it did too. No

allegations plausibly linked any statements by Detective Popkov to the bond court’s

decision to remove Andersen’s children from her care. The state law malicious

prosecution claim failed because “the chain of causation [was] broken by [the]

indictment,” and the complaint did not sufficiently allege any post‐arrest actions by

Detective Popkov that influenced the prosecutor’s decision to indict. Colbert v. City of

Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis omitted). And our decision in Bridewell

v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) holds that Andersen’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim against Detective Popkov began to accrue on the date she was

arrested, rendering it time barred.   

Nor could Andersen’s Monell claim against the Village of Glenview survive a

motion to dismiss. A municipality may be sued only for constitutional violations that it

caused through one of its policies or by someone with final policymaking authority. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Andersen sought to

hold Glenview responsible for obstructing her access to exculpatory evidence, an effort

she alleges was accomplished by a Village attorney and outside counsel. The district

court correctly concluded that these allegations do not plausibly establish that either

party had final policymaking authority for Glenview or that anyone who did was

involved. That defeats the claim.   

B

We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on the claims that survived the motions to dismiss. Summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
No. 19‐2738    Page 5

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We review the decision de

novo and draw all justifiable inferences in Andersen’s favor. See Flexible Steel Lacing Co.

v. Conveyor Accessories, Inc., 955 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2020).   

First was Andersen’s claim that Detective Popkov unconstitutionally prolonged

her detention. When the delay between arrest and presentment to a judge is less than 48

hours, we presume it to be reasonable. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,

56–57 (1991). Andersen was burdened with the task of rebutting that presumption

because she was detained for just over 24 hours. See Portis v. City of Chi., 613 F.3d 702,

703–04 (7th Cir. 2010). The district court concluded that Andersen had come up short on

evidence that Detective Popkov unreasonably delayed her detention.   

In challenging that determination, Andersen points to issues with Detective

Popkov’s credibility, including that he changed his justification for holding her

overnight. But the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis is objective. See Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996); United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th

Cir. 2011). Properly placing credibility aside, we agree with the district court that

Andersen’s evidence did not rebut the presumption that her detention was reasonable.

And with no underlying constitutional violation, there could be no conspiracy between

Gimbel and Popkov to violate her Fourth Amendment rights. See Green v. Howser, 942

F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2019).

Last was Andersen’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against

Gimbel. The bar is high—the conduct must be “truly extreme and outrageous.” Feltmeier

v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003). The district court reasoned that although

pursuing baseless criminal charges against someone could meet that demanding

standard, Gimbel’s allegations were not unfounded. Indeed, Illinois courts have

previously found the act of filing criminal charges to fall below the required level of

outrageousness. See, e.g., Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005);

Adams v. Sussman & Hertzberg, Ltd., 684 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). We cannot

say that the district court committed any error in concluding that no reasonable jury

could find Gimbel’s decision to lodge a report with the police after feeling threatened to

be “intolerable in a civilized community.” Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d at 83.   

C

Our final stop is Andersen’s motion to disqualify attorneys from the Sotos Law

Firm from serving as counsel to Glenview and Detective Popkov in this civil lawsuit

because they had been involved in her criminal prosecution. The district court denied

the motion, and we review that decision only for an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Bender, 539 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2008).
No. 19‐2738    Page 6

Disqualification is a “drastic measure” that should not be imposed lightly. Owen

v. Wangerin, 985 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1993). The district court rightfully found that the

attorneys’ acts in the criminal case—attending the bench trial, speaking with Glenview

employees, and representing Glenview in a motion to quash subpoenas—had no

relevance to the merits of the civil case. And by no means were the attorneys necessary

witnesses. There was no need for disqualification.   

III

Andersen had many claims below and raises numerous arguments on appeal,

and we have carefully considered them all. But after thoroughly reviewing the district

court’s orders, we are confident that there was no error. For that reason, we AFFIRM.