alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00324-CV

1995 Prowler Travel Trailer, et al., Appellants

v.

State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY, 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 34,180, HONORABLE ED MAGRE, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The clerk’s record in this appeal was due in this Court on May 1, 2011. On

June 27, 2011, Stephen Gardiner was notified that no clerk’s record had been filed due to his failure

to pay or make arrangements to pay the district clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record. The

notice requested that Gardiner make arrangements for the clerk’s record and submit a status report

regarding this appeal by July 7, 2011. Gardiner has not filed a status report or otherwise responded

to this Court’s notice.

If the trial court clerk fails to file the clerk’s record due to appellant’s failure to pay

or make arrangements to pay the clerk’s fee for preparing the record, the appellate court may dismiss

the appeal for want of prosecution unless the appellant was entitled to proceed without payment of

costs. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). Because Gardiner has failed to pay or make arrangements to pay the

clerk’s fee for preparing the clerk’s record, this appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution.
___________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Pemberton and Henson

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: August 9, 2011

2
December 16, ~010 

Denise Subramaniam 

1$865 SW Walker Rd 

Beaverton OR 97005~1015 

S~ CERTlFIED MAlL 

RE: NOTICE OF DEFAULT 

Loan Number: 1641 

Dear Mortgagor(s): 

MoJtaage Semcms 

1 Cot]lomte Drive, Suite 300 

Lake Zurich, lL (10047-8945 

www.mgcmortgage.com 

Cll.'ltomer Service 1-877-471-7888 

According to the terms of your loan documents, you agreed to make 

monthly payments on or before the due date. 

ln accordance with the specific terms of your loan documents, notice 

is hereby given that: 

l. You have breached the contractual obligation of the Deed of Trust/ 

Mortgage because you failed to make your monthly payments required by the note. ~our loan is now in default. 

2. To cure this default, you must contact us to obtain the 

amount necessary to cover the delinquent installments and 

any other fees and costs incurred. 

3. Payment of that amount must be received no later than 35 

days after the date of this letter. Payment of that amount 

will cure this breach. Payment must be made by certified funds, 

which may be :in the form of. either a money order or a cashie.r' s 

check. 

4. Failure to cure such breach on or before the date sp~cified in Paragraph 3 above may result in the immediate acceleration of the principal balance secured by the Deed of Trust/Mortgage and the sale of the 

mortgaged property. There is a possibility that a foreclosure de~iciency judgment might be pursued if foreclosure 

proceedings are undertaken. 

QL056/AGR 

Exhibit 5 

Page 1 of 2

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 54-5 Filed 06/08/15 Page 1 of 2
P<?.ge 2 of .2 

December 16, 2010 

Loan Number: 1641 

MorlJage Servicing 

1 Corporate Drive, Suite 360 

Lake Zurich, IL 60041·8945 

www.m$Cmortgage.com 

Customer Service 1-877-471·7888 

5. You have the right to reinstate your loan after acceleration and the 

right to assert in any foreclosure proceeding the non-existence of a 

default or any other defense of the borrower to acceleration and 

foreclosure. 

If you do not understand this letter, you are urged to seek the advice 

of your attorney, if you have one. Otherwise, you are urged to call us 

immediately. 

Sincerely, 

Collection Department 

CALL TOLL FREE: 1-877-471-7889 

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT, AND ANY INFORMATION 

OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE, IF YOU ARE IN BANKRUPTCY OR HAVE 

BEEN DISCHARC:IED IN BANKRUP'rCY, THIS LETTE:R IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES 

ONl..Y AND IS NOT INTENDED AS AN ATTEMI?T TO COLLECT A DEBT OR AS AN ACT 'I'O 

COLLECT, OR RECOVER ALL OR ANY PORTION OF TRE DEBT FROM YOU PERSONALLY. 

QL056/AGR 

Exhibit 5 

Page 2 of 2

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 54-5 Filed 06/08/15 Page 2 of 2
Overview of Reclamatio

FY 15-17 Budget

Glen KnowlesBureau of ReclamationGlen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program Technical Work GroupApril 21, 2015
GCDAMP Triennial Budget Proc

Fiscal Years 2015-2017

Sec. Designee Anne Castle May 7, 2014 memo

– Develop a three year budget and work plan for the 

for fiscal years 2015-2017

– Revise and update the biennial budget developme

timeline and process to a triennial process

– Organize the FY2015-17 TWP around:

• The four DFCs: Colorado River Ecosystem, Cultura

Resources, Recreation, and Hydropower

• TWG recommendations• A need to be responsive to the outcomes of the GC

EIS

2
Where are we in the TWP Proce

FY 14• Heavy lifting, the 

FY15-17 TWP - good news, its done!

FY 15• Easy times, revie

and approve FY year of the TWP

FY 16• Some work to do, do 

we need to change anything?

FY 17• Heavy lifting, dev

the FY 18-20 TW

3
GCDAMP Budget FY 15-17

GCDAMP Budget Power Revenues

FY 15 = $10,754,967 (1.7% CPI) (was 3%)

Reclamation = $2,116,578 (-$26,820GCMRC = $8,638,389 (-$110,65

FY 16 = $11,077,616 (3% CPI)

Reclamation = $2,180,075GCMRC = $8,897,541

FY 17 = $11,409,944 (3% CPI)

Reclamation = $2,245,477GCMRC = $9,164,467

4
5
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30138 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. HARRIS ROBERTSON Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:07-CR-108-1
Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Harris Robertson was arrested after he agreed to smuggle various contraband items, including a quantity o f cocaine base, into the Tangipahoa Parish Jail. Robertson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more ofcocaine base, a violation of21 U.S.C. § 841. He was sentenced to 51 months of imprisonment, which was within the applicable guidelines range. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 20, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 08-30138

2 The abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of
sentencing decisions. G all v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). A sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006); see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594. On appeal, Robertson argues that hissentencewas unreasonable because the district court failed to take into account the Government’s role in selecting cocaine base as the drug to be smuggled, which he argues constituted sentencing entrapment. We have not yet determined whether sentencing entrapment, or the related concept ofsentencing factor manipulation, is a cognizable defense to a sentence. However, even if we were to do so, Robertson has not shown that he was persuaded to commit a criminal offense greater than he was predisposed to commit, or that the Government’s conduct was outrageous. See United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1280 (5th Cir. 1995). Robertson does not contend that his sentence is otherwise procedurally or substantively unreasonable. SeeGall , 128 S. Ct. at 596-97. He likewise has not rebutted the presumption that his sentence, which falls within a properly calculated sentencing guidelines range, is reasonable. See Alonzo, 435 F.3d at 554. AFFIRMED.
#### Maria Echeverri et al., Respondents, v Irwin B. Cain et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant.

The appellants are the owners of a building in which the defendant Russo operated a laundromat. The plaintiff Maria Echeverri was injured while using an allegedly defective extractor in the laundromat. The appellants argue that as absentee landlords they did not control the premises and thus have no liability for Maria Echeverri’s injuries.

The plaintiffs’ assertion that a question of fact was presented as to the appellants’ control over the premises is without merit. Nothing in the record indicates that the appellants were ever present during the time the extractor was defective, and nothing in the lease gave the appellants control over Russo’s laundry machines. In fact, the lease provides the machines were to be maintained and repaired by the tenant and were to remain the property of the tenant.

The plaintiffs’ argument that the appellants’ liability is derived from the standard of care set forth in the Labor Law is also without merit. The statute imposes only limited responsibilities with respect to the leasehold property on an absentee landlord who does not operate a factory on the premises (Labor Law § 316 [2]).

The plaintiffs’ other contention is without merit *(see, Clarke v Unanue,*97 AD2d 888). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND MARCH 31, 1997 AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH
31, 1996 AND 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001001131
<NAME> ICG HOLDINGS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         459,288
<SECURITIES>                                    31,747
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,877
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,006
<INVENTORY>                                      2,595
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               541,362
<PP&E>                                         522,980
<DEPRECIATION>                                  66,255
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,089,681
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           76,114
<BONDS>                                        882,476
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          261,909
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,282
<OTHER-SE>                                   (137,030)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,089,681
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,050
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,572
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,268
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (61,028)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (66,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (66,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
JINA CHOI (NY Bar No. 2699718)

ERIN E. SCHNEIDER (Cal. Bar No. 216114)

SHEILA E. O’CALLAGHAN (Cal. Bar No. 131032)

 ocallaghans@sec.gov

WADE M. RHYNE (Cal. Bar No. 216799) rhynew@sec.gov

BERNARD B. SMYTH (Cal. Bar No. 217741) smythb@sec.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

44 Montgomery Street, Suite 2800

San Francisco, California 94104 

Telephone: (415) 705-2500

Facsimile: (415) 705-2501

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AEQUITAS MANAGEMENT, LLC; AEQUITAS 

HOLDINGS, LLC; AEQUITAS COMMERCIAL 

FINANCE, LLC.; AEQUITAS CAPITAL 

MANAGEMENT, INC.; AEQUITAS INVESTMENT 

MANAGEMENT, LLC; ROBERT J. JESENIK; 

BRIAN A. OLIVER; and N. SCOTT GILLIS,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:16-CV-00438-PK

PLAINTIFF SECURITIES AND 

EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S 

JOINDER OF RECEIVER’S 

OPPOSITION TO ENVISO CAPITAL’S 

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

Case 3:16-cv-00438-PK Document 335 Filed 01/04/17 Page 1 of 2
COMM.’S OPP. TO MOT. 

FOR RELIEF FROM STAY

1

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”) hereby joins 

the Receiver’s Opposition (Dkt. No. 334) to Enviso Capital’s (“Enviso”) Motion to Lift Stay 

(Dkt. No 327). For the reasons stated by the Receiver, the Court should deny Enviso’s motion to 

lift the stay and its alternative request that the Receiver post a bond.

Dated: January 4, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Wade M. Rhyne 

Bernard B. Smyth 

Sheila E. O’Callaghan 

Wade M. Rhyne 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Case 3:16-cv-00438-PK Document 335 Filed 01/04/17 Page 2 of 2
# C_2006159EN.01007501.xml

| 8.7.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 159/75 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.7.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 159/75

---

Notice inviting applications for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block Q10 of the Dutch continental shelf.

(2006/C 159/06)

The Minister for Economic Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands hereby gives notice that an application has been received for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block Q10 as indicated on the map appended as Annex 3 to the Mining Regulation (Mijnbouwregeling) (Government Gazette (Staatscourant) 2002, No 245).

Mijnbouwregeling

Staatscourant

With reference to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons and the publication required by Article 15 of the Mining Act (Mijnbouwwet) (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees (Staatsblad) 2002, No 542), the Minister for Economic Affairs hereby invites interested parties to submit an application for authorisation to prospect for hydrocarbons in block Q10.

Mijnbouwwet

Staatsblad

The Minister for Economic Affairs is the competent authority for the granting of authorisations. The criteria, conditions and requirements referred to in Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 6(2) of the Directive are set out in the Mining Act (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2002, No 542).

Applications may be submitted during the 13 weeks following the publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and should be sent to the Minister for Economic Affairs, for the attention of the Director for the Energy Market, Prinses Beatrixlaan 5, The Hague, Netherlands, and marked ‘personal’.

Official Journal of the European Union

Applications submitted after the expiry of this period will not be considered.

A decision on the applications will be taken not later than twelve months after the period has expired.

Further information can be obtained from the following telephone number: (31-70) 379 72 98.

---
BLD-178 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-1589

___________

IN RE: KIM RAGLAND,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-07294)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

April 23, 2015

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 1, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Kim Ragland presents a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that we direct 

the District Court to rule on a habeas petition that he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Ragland filed his habeas petition in the District Court in November 2014, see

D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-07294.

1

 On the same day that Ragland’s mandamus petition was 

docketed in this Court, the District Court entered an opinion and order dismissing that

petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies. In light of the District Court’s action, 

we will dismiss the mandamus petition as moot. See, e.g., Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 

F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 

698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the course of adjudication that 

eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from 

being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”)

 

1

In his mandamus petition, Ragland explains that he filed this petition because the 

District Court had not ruled on an earlier § 2254 petition that he had submitted, see

D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-02381. However, as is evident from a June 4, 2014 order that 

appears on the docket for D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-02381 and as an attachment to 

Ragland’s mandamus petition, the District Court entered an order administratively 

terminating that case because Ragland had not filed his habeas petition on the appropriate 

forms. We do not understand Ragland to be seeking mandamus relief in relation to that 

action. We note, nonetheless, that a motion remains pending in that matter. When it

administratively terminated the case, the District Court noted that it would reopen if 

Ragland re-filed his petition on the appropriate forms within 30 days of the Court’s order. 

Ragland did not do so; he instead sought an extension of time to re-file. Although 

Ragland ultimately re-filed his petition on the appropriate forms in the separate action 

that underlies this case, that motion for an extension of time remains pending in D.N.J. 

Civ. No. 2:14-cv-02381.
#### In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Proceeding In Rem Pursuant to Article 11 of Real Property Law by County of Herkimer, Respondent; Terry R. Jones, Appellant, et al., Respondent.

Submitted March 12, 2007;

decided May 1, 2007

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that *956the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Boris Teichman (Teishman), Appellant, v Brian Riordan, as Warden, Respondent.

Submitted April 9, 2007;

decided June 5, 2007

On the Court’s own motion, appeal dismissed, without costs, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. Motion for poor person relief dismissed as academic.
... 

RANDY PILANT 

V. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

Plaintiff, 

DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, and Does 1-50, 

Defendants. 

COFFIN, Magistrate Judge: 

6: 16-CV-00555-TC 

ORDER 

Defendant filed a motion (#20) to compel and for monetary sanctions. Pro se plaintiff 

responded with a motion to voluntarily dismiss the action with prejudice. The latter motion is 

allowed. The motion to compel is denied as moot and the motion for monetary sanctions is denied 

as an award of monetary sanctions in the circumstances of this case would be unjust, especially in 

light of the voluntary dismissal with prejudice .. 

Page 1 - ORDER 
.. 

Conclusion 

Plaintiffs motion (#22) to voluntarily dismiss is allowed and this action is dismissed with 

prejudice. Defendant's motion (#20) to compel and for monetary sanctions is denied. 

DATED this S day of October, 2017 . 

United States 

Page 2 - ORDER
#### Jordan *v.*Jordan.

*Divorce.*

(Decided November 21, 1913.

63 South. 1024.)

*Divorce; 'Bill for; Dismissal; Grounds.*— The fact that the wife had instituted previous suits for divorce on the same ground, but had failed to prosecute them to effect, dismissing her bills, is no ground for dismissing the subsequent bill filed for divorce by the wife.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. E. C. Crowe.

Bill by Annie Lou Jordan against J. J. Jordan for divorce and alimony. Decree for complainant, and respondent appeals.

Affirmed.

The motion to dismiss was based on the fact, as set up, that in December, 1907, this same complainant filed a bill against this respondent in the city court of Bessemer, based upon a similar charge to the charges made and preferred in this suit, had reference in said cause, took her testimony, and procured a report of the register in reference to alimony and solicitor’s fees, which the said city court declined in a proper decree in said cause to grant her, and that she then procured and had rendered a decree dismissing her said bill out of said court. A motion further alleges the filing of three other *409bills by complainant against respondent, none of which she prosecuted to effect.

Pinkney Scott, for appellant.

The court erred in refusing to dismiss the bill. — Rule 28, Ch. Pr.; *Lest-range v.*Moog, 72 Ala. 460; *Burgess v. A. M. Go.,*119 Ala. 669; *Hamilton v. Maxwell,*119 Ala. 25; *Ex parte Street,*106 Ala. 107; *Ex parte S'herer,*92 Ala. 596.

J. B. Aird, for appellee.

There is no merit in the motion to dismiss the *bill.*— Williams *v. Wood, 121*Ala. 539; *Moog’s Case;*72 Ala. 464; *Jordan v. Jordan,*57 South. 436.

McCLELLAN, J.

— Bill for divorce, by the wife, Annie Lou Jordan, against J. J. Jordan, appellant, upon the ground established by Code, § 3795. The motion to dismiss this cause was properly *overruled.*— Jordan *v. Jordan,*175 Ala. 640, 57 South. 436.

The evidence has been carefully considered, in the light of the argument submitted for appellant. Our conclusion accords with that prevailing with the court below. The averment of actual violence inflicted by appellant on appellee is supported by the preponderance of the evidence coupled with corroborating circumstances shown. The evidence shows appellant to have been an industrious, sober man, and appellee to have been a capable housewife, willing and industrious.

In accordance with the insistence of the solicitor for' the appellant, the letters, Avritten by appellee to appellant, have been given particular consideration. These letters evince the entertainment by appellee, at the time they were written, of a very ardent affection for appellant. When this fact is considered in connection with assertions in the letters that she would or should take *410the blame for the unhappy condition prevailing, it may well be attributed to the writer’s idea of the best way by which to promote her return to her husband — a hope and desire that was there given pathetic expression. There is no error affecting the decree.

Affirmed.

Dowdell, C. J., and Sayre and Somerville, JJ., concur.