96-513

 No. 96-513

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

IN RE THE LICENSE REVOCATION OF

JEFFREY H. GILDERSLEEVE

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Missoula,

 The Honorable John W. Larson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Steve Fletcher, Bulman Law Associates,

 Missoula, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General;

 Brenda Nordlund, Assistant Attorney General;

 Helena, Montana

 Tom Orr, Assistant City Attorney, Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 19, 1997

 Decided: July 17, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 The appellant, Jeffrey H. Gildersleeve, petitioned the District Court for the 

Fourth

Judicial District in Missoula County for a hearing at which to consider 

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reinstatement of

his motor vehicle operator's license pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA. After hearings, 

the

District Court upheld the revocation. Gildersleeve appeals. We reverse the 

judgment of

the District Court and remand this case to the District Court for proceedings 

consistent

with this opinion.

 The following issues are presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it concluded that Gildersleeve refused to

submit to testing pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA?

 2. Did the District Court err when it concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to

consider the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On August 28, 1995, Officer Jeff Dobie of the Missoula Police Department

arrested Jeffrey H. Gildersleeve for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs 

after

Gildersleeve made an illegal left turn. Gildersleeve admitted that he had consumed 

one

shot of whiskey. He cooperated with Officer Dobie and performed the field sobriety 

tests

which were administered. Officer Dobie contended that because of Gildersleeve's 

slurred

speech, red eyes, and poor performance in the field sobriety tests, he arrested him 

and

transported him to the Missoula police station, where he asked Gildersleeve to take a

breath test. 

 The breath analysis results indicated a 0.00 blood alcohol content. Officer 

Dobie

then requested that Gildersleeve submit to a blood test. Gildersleeve objected to 

the

blood test for ethical reasons, a fear of needles, and a concern that he could 

thereby

contract the AIDS virus. The Missoula Police Department does not offer a urine test,

and neither Officer Dobie nor Gildersleeve raised it as an alternative. Pursuant 

to 61-8-

402, MCA, Officer Dobie seized Gildersleeve's license and Gildersleeve's driving

privileges were suspended for ninety days.

 On September 27, 1995, Gildersleeve filed a notice of appeal of the revocation 

of

his license in the District Court pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA. He maintained that he

was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that he did not refuse to 

submit to

the blood test. In addition, he informed the District Court of his intent to 

challenge the

constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA. After a hearing on November 1, 1995,

the District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gildersleeve's

constitutional challenges. After a second hearing on May 31, 1996, the District 

Court

concluded that Officer Dobie had reasonable grounds to arrest Gildersleeve and that

Gildersleeve had refused to submit to the blood test.

 ISSUE 1

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 Did the District Court err when it concluded that Gildersleeve refused to submit

to testing pursuant to 61-8-403, MCA?

 The District Court held that it was the burden of the petitioner to prove the

invalidity of his license revocation and that Gildersleeve had not met that burden. 

Specifically, with regard to the issue of whether Gildersleeve refused to submit to 

a blood

test, the District Court found that he had refused.

 The District Court's opinion and order was entered on June 18, 1996. On July 

11,

1996, we decided Wessell v. State (1996), 277 Mont. 234, 921 P.2d 264. In Wessell, 

the

petitioner was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He

cooperated with the investigating officer and submitted to a breath test, which was

unsuccessful because the testing instrument failed. He was then asked to submit to a

blood test, but declined on the basis that he had a great fear of needles. He 

volunteered

to submit to a urine test; however, none was available at the Glendive Police 

Department. 

Therefore, his license was revoked based on his refusal to submit to the blood 

test. The

District Court affirmed the revocation of his license; however, we reversed and held 

that:

 In the present case, it was not contested that Wessell had a valid fear

of needles which prevented him from being able to submit to a blood test

and therefore we accept this as stipulated. The record shows that he was

willing to consent to a test for alcohol but was prevented from doing so by

a psychological inability to perform resulting from his disabling fear of

needles, which he immediately disclosed to the officer. We determine that

under the facts of this case, this psychological inability to perform the test

is the equivalent of a physical disability which precludes an individual from

participating in or completing a valid test regardless of their willingness. 

Wessell, 277 Mont. at 240, 921 P.2d at 267-68.

 Although the facts of record in this case are similar to those in Wessell, they 

are

not identical. Neither did the parties have an opportunity to present or test 

evidence

based on the standard established in Wessell. Finally, the District Court did not 

have the

opportunity to consider whether, based on the record in this case, Gildersleeve was

prevented from submitting to a blood test based on a psychological inability to 

perform

resulting from a disabling fear of needles. 

 Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand to that court

for further consideration in light of our decision in Wessell. Either party may 

supplement

the record to the extent necessary to assist the court in its determination.

 The State contends that as a result of our decision in Wessell this Court has

unintentionally eliminated the petitioner's burden of proving an inability to 

perform a

blood test and placed the burden on the State to prove there was no such inability. 

The

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State, therefore, urges this Court to reconsider its decision in Wessell and more 

clearly

articulate the factors an officer should consider when deciding whether a suspect is

"unable" to perform or submit to a test. 

 The State's interpretation of Wessell, however, is unsupported by the plain

language in that decision. We clearly noted that in that case it was uncontested 

that

Wessell had a valid fear which prevented him from being able to submit to a blood 

test. 

We accepted that fact as stipulated. There was no reason to discuss the petitioner's

burden, or a shifting of the burden, because the facts were not disputed. The rule

remains, as it has been, that "[t]he burden of proof falls upon the appellant to 

prove the

invalidity of the State's action, rather than require the State to justify its act 

of revocation.

Jess v. State (1992), 255 Mont. 254, 259-60, 841 P.2d 1137, 1140.

 For these reasons, we decline the invitation to reconsider our decision in 

Wessell

v. State.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err when it concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to 

consider

the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA?

 The District Court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction over this matter 

is a

conclusion of law. We review conclusions of law to determine whether they are 

correct.

Bayleat Law v. Pettit (Mont. 1997), 931 P.2d 50, 52, 54 St. Rep 77, 78.

 Section 61-8-403, MCA, which sets forth the scope of review from a driver's

license revocation, states in relevant part:

 (4) (a) The court shall take testimony and examine the facts of the

case, except that the issues are limited to whether: 

 (i) a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person

had been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle upon ways

of this state open to the public while under the influence of alcohol, drugs,

or a combination of the two;

 (ii) the person was placed under arrest; and

 (iii) the person refused to submit to the test or tests.

Section 61-8-403(4)(a), MCA. We have strictly construed this language and held that 

the

Legislature clearly intended to limit the issues that a court may consider on appeal

pursuant to the statute. See Thompson v. Department of Justice (1994), 264 Mont. 

372,

871 P.2d 1333 (removing from consideration the issue of whether the initial report 

was

properly sworn); Blake v. State (1987), 226 Mont. 193, 735 P.2d 262 (denying 

authority

to consider the issue of hardship as a mitigating factor in granting a restricted or

probationary license).

 The District Court erred, however, when it equated limitation on its authority 

to

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consider factual issues other than those specified by statute with limitation on its 

authority

to consider the constitutionality of the statue itself. The two exercises of 

authority are

inherently different and emanate from distinct sources. The District Court's 

authority to

consider the constitutionality of a statute derives from the basic constitutional 

notion of

separation of powers, while its authority to review factual issues related to a 

driver's

license revocation comes from the Legislature. 

 "[T]he Constitution vests in the courts the exclusive power to construe and

interpret legislative Acts, as well as provisions of the Constitution." State v. 

Leslie

(1935), 100 Mont. 449, 455, 50 P.2d 959, 962. Inherent in this power is the

responsibility to determine whether a particular law conforms to the Constitution. 

Powell

v. McCormack (1969), 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491. "[I]t is the

province and duty of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly brought

before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even those of 

the

legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the

Constitution." Powell, 395 U.S. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 1956, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 508. Thus,

we hold that the District Court erred when it concluded that 61-8-403, MCA, limits 

its

jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges to that statute.

 The State's contention that a declaratory judgment pursuant to 27-8-101 to -

313,

MCA, should constitute Gildersleeve's sole opportunity to challenge the 

constitutionality

of the statute is unfounded. Declaratory relief is not meant to displace otherwise

available remedies. In In re Matter of Dewar (1976), 169 Mont. 437, 548 P.2d 149, we

stated:

 The purpose of declaratory relief is to liquidate uncertainties and

controversies which might result in future litigation and to adjudicate rights

of parties who have not otherwise been given an opportunity to have those

rights determined. However, it is not the true purpose of the declaratory

judgment to provide a substitute for other regular actions.

Dewar, 169 Mont. at 444, 548 P.2d at 153-54. Here, Gildersleeve has already been

affected by 61-8-402 and -403, MCA, and thus, his challenge to the statute is

appropriately made during the course of his regular appeal pursuant to 61-8-403, 

MCA.

 Although this Court has the ultimate authority and responsibility to interpret

Montana's Constitution, we are primarily a court of review. State v. Finley (1996), 

276

Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208. Furthermore, resolution of this case on a constitutional 

basis

should be avoided where it may be unnecessary. In State v. Still (1995), 273 Mont. 

261,

263, 902 P.2d 546, 548, we held that:

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 This Court has repeatedly recognized that "courts should avoid

constitutional issues whenever possible." Wolfe v. State, Dept. of Labor &

Ind. (1992), 255 Mont. 336, 339, 843 P.2d 338, 340 (citing Ingraham v.

Champion Intern. (1990), 243 Mont. 42, 46, 793 P.2d 769, 771). Certain

constraints govern the Court's power to determine the constitutionality of

statutes. Among those constraints is the principle that we will not rule on

the constitutionality of a legislative act if we are able to decide the case

without reaching constitutional considerations. Ingraham, 793 P.2d at 771;

Wolfe, 843 P.2d at 340 (citing Taylor v. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks

(1983), 205 Mont. 85, 90, 666 P.2d 1228, 1231); see also State ex rel.

Hammond v. Hager (1972), 160 Mont. 391, 400, 503 P.2d 52, 57.

 Because of our resolution of Issue 1, and the possibility that Gildersleeve's 

appeal

could be resolved without the necessity of addressing the constitutional issues 

which have

been raised; and because if it is necessary to address those constitutional issues 

which

relate to the constitutionality of 61-8-402 and -403, MCA, as applied, further

development of the factual record may be appropriate; we decline to address those 

issues

at this time, but remand to the District Court for the appropriate resolution of 

those

issues, if necessary.

 For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and this case 

is

remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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