IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

C.M., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Police, : No. 47 M.D. 2021

Respondent : Submitted: April 11, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 15, 2024

Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, is an application for 

summary relief by Respondent, the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). Previously, 

Petitioner, C.M., filed a petition for review, and later an application for summary 

relief, seeking removal from Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry maintained by the 

PSP and exclusion from any future registration requirement under the Sexual 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA II).

1

In response to C.M.’s 

application for summary relief, the PSP denied that C.M. was entitled to relief and 

requested that this Court instead enter summary relief in favor of the PSP. However, 

that request was not properly before this Court, as the PSP had filed no application 

for relief. See Bradley v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 132 M.D. 

2019, filed June 23, 2021), slip op. at 19 n.20, 2021 WL 2580602, at *24 n.20 

(unreported) (despite petitioner’s failure to present any claim on which he could 

1 Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.75, as amended

by the Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29.
2

recover, “[i]n the absence of an application for summary relief filed by [respondent], 

the Court is without a procedural vehicle through which to dismiss the original 

jurisdiction . . . action”). After this Court denied C.M.’s application for summary 

relief, the PSP filed the application for summary relief that is presently before us. 

For the reasons discussed below, we grant the PSP’s application for summary relief.

I. Background

We reiterate here the pertinent background information concerning 

this case set forth in our previous opinion denying C.M.’s application for summary 

relief.

C.M. participated in a rape and murder in 1987. See Pet. for Rev., ¶ 

4; Com. v. [C.M.], 245 A.3d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2021) (C.M. I), appeal denied,

(Pa., No. 53 MAL 2021, filed Dec. 7, 2021), 2021 WL 5810455 (Table) (C.M. II). 

In 1995,2 he entered a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to rape, criminal 

conspiracy to commit rape, and third-degree murder. Pet. for Rev., ¶ 4. He received 

a sentence of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. Id. He was released from prison in late 

2020. See id., ¶ 10.

According to C.M., the PSP informed him upon his release that he was 

required to register for life as a convicted sex offender under Subchapter I of 

SORNA II, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52. He then commenced this action by a petition for 

2 C.M. was initially convicted in 1988, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later vacated 

that conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. Com. v. [C.M.], 245 A.3d 1121, 1124 n.4 

(Pa. Super. 2021) (C.M. I), appeal denied, (Pa., No. 53 MAL 2021, filed Dec. 7, 2021) (C.M. II), 

2021 WL 5810455 (Table) (citing Com. v. [C.M.], 602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992)).
3

review seeking removal from the sex offender registry and exclusion from any future 

registration requirement.3

C.M. filed an application for a preliminary injunction, seeking removal 

of his information from the sex offender registry pending this Court’s decision in the 

case. On May 6, 2021, this Court issued a single-judge opinion and order denying 

the injunction. C.M. v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 47 M.D. 2021, filed May 

6, 2021) (Ceisler, J., single-judge opinion) (C.M. III). This Court found C.M. failed 

to show either irreparable harm from the presence of his information on the registry 

or a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Id., slip op. at 5-6. C.M.

then filed his application for summary relief, which this Court denied. C.M. v. Pa. 

State Police, 269 A.3d 1280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (en banc) (C.M. IV). 

C.M. filed a petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, which that Court quashed on January 19, 2023, as seeking review 

3 C.M. has been attempting since at least 2014 to eliminate his lifetime registration 

obligation, which was first imposed under the statute known as Megan’s Law II, formerly 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.7. See Pet. for Rev., ¶ 6; C.M. I, 245 A.3d at 1124. After several years of 

appeals, in an opinion and order dated January 4, 2021, the Superior Court remanded that matter 

for the trial court to consider the very issue C.M. raises here, i.e., whether he is subject to the 

registration requirement of Subchapter I of SORNA II. C.M. I, 245 A.3d at 1126 (“[C.M.] argues 

that Subchapter I [of SORNA II] does not apply to him, as ‘his triggering offenses occurred in 

1987’ and, because he has been incarcerated since his conviction, he was never required to register 

under a former version of the sex offender registration laws.”) & 1133-34 (remanding to the trial 

court to “determine whether [C.M.] is obligated to register as a sex offender under Subchapter I”).

C.M. filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which held the remand in abeyance. See Pet. for 

Review, ¶ 15. Our Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal on December 7, 

2021. C.M. II. As of the filing date of this opinion, the last entries on the trial court docket are 

notice on January 3, 2022, of the denial of the petition for allowance of appeal, and receipt of the 

Superior Court’s remand decision on January 4, 2022. The trial court docket is available at 

https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-67-CR-0000798-1988&

dnh=zVlsmkSOd94WjCZzBh%2Fkqw%3D%3D (last visited May 14, 2024). See Court of 

Common Pleas of York County, No. CP-67-CR-0000798-1988.
4

of a non-final order. C.M. v. Pa. State Police, 291 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2023). Thereafter, 

the PSP filed the instant application for summary relief.

II. Issues

In his petition for review, C.M. challenges the application of 

Subchapter I of SORNA II to him. He committed his crimes in 1987 and was not 

released from prison until late 2020. He argues that he was first “required to 

register” under Megan’s Law II “upon release” from prison in 2020. Pet. for Rev., 

¶ 22. Subchapter I, however, applies only to offenders who were “required to 

register . . . on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.52. C.M. reasons that as he was incarcerated throughout that time period, he

was not “required to register” under Megan’s Law II because he had not been 

released. Pet. for Rev., ¶ 21. Therefore, he contends he is not subject to any 

registration requirement under the plain language of Subchapter I of SORNA II. 

C.M. argues that in Smolsky v. Blocker (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 254 M.D. 2018, filed May 

20, 2019), 2019 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 293 (unreported),4this Court construed 

the statutory language at issue in exactly the way C.M. seeks to have it construed in 

this case. In addition, C.M. asserts that the legislative findings and purpose behind 

the statutory framework creating the sex offender registry are inapplicable, as is any 

suggestion that C.M.’s reading of the statute yields an absurd result, because the 

4 Under Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported decisions 

of this Court issued after January 15, 2008 may be cited for their persuasive value, but not as 

binding precedents. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
5

language of the statute is clear and this Court should not ignore the letter of the law 

in favor of its spirit.

In its own application for summary relief, as in its opposition to C.M.’s 

application for summary relief,5the PSP observes that Megan’s Law II, which 

became effective in 2000, while C.M. was incarcerated, did not exclude incarcerated 

persons from the lifetime registration requirement. Br. of Resp’t at 5-6 (quoting 

former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1). The PSP asserts that the obligation of lifetime

registration arose on the effective date of Megan’s Law II, even though the duty to 

begin providing residence information to the registry began only upon release 

because until that time, an incarcerated person’s address – i.e., in prison – was 

known. Br. of Resp’t at 5-7 (citing former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2).

III. Discussion

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) permits filing of an 

application for summary relief at any time after a petition for review has been filed 

in an original jurisdiction matter. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Like summary judgment, 

summary relief is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Haveman v. Bureau of Prof. & 

Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Cosmetology, 238 A.3d 567, 570-71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2020). Here, as in the background and issues sections above, we reiterate our 

previous analysis from our en banc opinion denying C.M.’s application for summary 

relief, which is likewise dispositive of the PSP’s application for summary relief.

5 The parties filed joint applications, which this Court granted, for disposition of the PSP’s 

application for summary relief on the basis of the briefs already filed and without additional 

argument.
6

Subchapter I of SORNA II provides, in pertinent part: “This subchapter 

shall apply to individuals who were . . . required to register with the [PSP] under a 

former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of registration has not expired.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(2). Here, C.M. was convicted in 1995 of sex offenses 

committed in 1987, but he was incarcerated at the time Megan’s Law II was enacted 

and was, therefore, subject to its provisions. See former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1

(imposing registration requirement on individuals “convicted” of listed crimes and 

not excepting those already incarcerated for such crimes); Dunyan v. Pa. State Police

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 75 M.D. 2014, filed Dec. 17, 2014), slip op. at 4-5, 2014 Pa. 

Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 722, at *4-5 (unreported) (upholding application of

lifetime registration requirements first applied under Megan’s Law II to individual

convicted before its enactment but still incarcerated on its effective date); accord 

Com. v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) (upholding application of 

registration requirements of Section 9793 of Megan’s Law I,6formerly 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9793, to individual convicted of offense committed before its enactment).

Both C.M.’s petition for review and the PSP’s application for summary 

relief raise solely an issue of pure statutory construction.7 Subchapter I of SORNA

applies to offenders who were “required to register . . . on or after April 22, 1996, 

but before December 20, 2012.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(2). As explained above, C.M.

6 Formerly 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6. Megan’s Law II increased the registration period 

for some offenses from 10 years to lifetime registration.

7 Before this Court, C.M. does not assert any challenge to the retroactive application of 

Subchapter I as a constitutional violation. Notably, in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 

(Pa. 2020), our Supreme Court held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is non-punitive and does not 

violate constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. Id. at 626-27.
7

contends that he was not “required to register” under a former statute, i.e., Megan’s 

Law II, which was in effect in various forms from 2000 until 2012, because he was 

incarcerated throughout that period and was not released from prison, thus triggering 

his registration requirement, until 2020. In other words, because C.M. was not 

released until 2020, he insists he was not required to register before December 20, 

2012, and is, accordingly, not subject to registration under SORNA II. Pet. for Rev., 

¶¶ 20-21. We disagree.

Section 9795.1 of Megan’s Law II was titled “Registration.” Former

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1. Section 9795.1(b)(2) of Megan’s Law II imposed a lifetime 

registration requirement on individuals convicted of listed offenses, including rape, 

one of the crimes of which C.M. was convicted. Former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(2). 

As the PSP observes, nothing in that provision excepted already-incarcerated 

individuals from its application. See Br. of Resp’t at 5-6 (quoting former 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9795.1); Dunyan, slip op. at 4-5.

The point in time at which registration would begin was contained in a 

separate section of Megan’s Law II, Section 9795.2, titled “Registration Procedures 

and Applicability.” Former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2. Section 9795.2(a)(1) provided: 

“Offenders and sexually violent predators shall be required to register all current 

residences or intended residences with the [PSP] upon release from incarceration, 

upon parole from a state or county correctional institution, or upon the 

commencement of a sentence of intermediate punishment[8] or probation.” Former

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.2(a)(1) (2000). 

8

“Intermediate punishment” includes statutorily authorized sentencing alternatives such as 

home confinement and electronic monitoring. Com. v. Wegley, 829 A.2d 1148, 1148 n.1 (Pa. 

2003) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(16), (17); 37 Pa. Code § 451.51(a)(1)-(3)).
8

Reading Sections 9795.1 and 9795.2 together, it is apparent that the 

obligation to register arose under Section 9795.1 upon the enactment of Megan’s 

Law II with regard to individuals incarcerated for sex offenses on that date. 

Therefore, we agree with the PSP that C.M., who was incarcerated on the effective 

date of Megan’s Law II, became obligated for lifetime registration on that date. 

By contrast, Section 9795.2, which expressly related only to 

registration procedures, merely provided the timing and mechanism of when and 

how performance of the registration obligation would begin. Thus, only C.M.’s duty 

to begin performing that obligation, not the obligation itself, arose upon his 

subsequent release. The date of his release was irrelevant to his registration 

obligation.

As discussed above, Subchapter I of SORNA II applies to individuals 

who were “required to register with the [PSP] under a former sexual offender 

registration law . . . on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose 

period of registration has not expired.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52(2). C.M. incurred a 

lifetime registration requirement upon the effective date of Megan’s Law II in 2000, 

i.e., after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012. As a lifetime requirement, 

it has not expired. Accordingly, we agree with the PSP that, as a matter of law, C.M. 

must register with the PSP for his lifetime.

C.M.’s reliance on Smolsky is unavailing. In Smolsky, this Court issued

an unreported panel decision addressing the same issue in analogous circumstances. 

This Court found the petitioner was entitled to have his name removed from the sex 

offender registry and was not subject to future registration requirements. Smolsky, 

slip op. at 5-6. C.M. therefore relies heavily on Smolsky as persuasive. However, 

this Court expressly distinguished Smolsky in its en banc opinion in this case. See 
9

C.M. IV, 269 A.3d at 1285 (observing that Smolsky did not involve the same 

arguments raised here and noting that this Court had previously distinguished 

Smolsky in its single-judge opinion in C.M. III). Accordingly, as we reasoned in 

denying C.M.’s application for summary relief, we conclude that our decision in 

Smolsky is not persuasive here.

Moreover, as the PSP aptly points out in its brief, the result of C.M.’s 

construction of Subchapter I would have absurd results. Br. of Resp’t at 7-8. For 

example, if two persons committed sex offenses on the same day and were 

incarcerated at the same time, and one of them, who committed a less serious 

offense, was released before December 20, 2012, but the other, who committed the 

more serious crime, was not released until after December 20, 2012, C.M.’s reading 

of the statute would mean that the offender committing the less serious crime would 

have to register and the offender committing the more serious crime – and thus 

posing the more serious risk of harm to the public – would not. Id. Such a result 

would directly contravene the legislative policy underlying both Megan’s Law II and 

SORNA II to protect “the safety and general welfare” of Pennsylvania citizens. 

Former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791(b); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b)(1).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the PSP’s application for summary relief is 

granted.

___________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

C.M., :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania State Police, : No. 47 M.D. 2021 

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 15th day of May, 2024, the application for summary 

relief filed by Respondent, the Pennsylvania State Police, is GRANTED. The 

petition for review is DISMISSED.

___________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge