NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CHRISTOPHER LEE WILLIAMS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7048

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-4192, Judge Alan G. Lance Sr.

______________________ 

Decided: June 8, 2015

______________________ 

 CHRISTOPHER LEE WILLIAMS, Fairview, TX, pro se.

GEOFFREY MARTIN LONG, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by MARTIN JAMES SENDEK, DAVID J. BARRANS, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 
2 WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD

Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Christopher Lee Williams appeals from an order of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) denying his petition for extraordinary 

relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus. Mr. Williams 

sought a writ that would direct the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to process his claims expeditiously. 

Because the issues raised by Mr. Williams on appeal are 

either not within the scope of our jurisdiction or not 

related to the denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus, we dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Williams notes that he is a seventy-two year old 

Vietnam War veteran rated 100% disabled who suffers 

from Parkinson’s disease. He also notes that he received 

the Purple Heart and the Combat Infantryman Badge for 

his service in the Army as an infantry platoon leader.

This case concerns Mr. Williams’s claims for benefits 

relating to his fibromyalgia and hearing loss.

In June 2014, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals

(“Board”) granted Mr. Williams service connection for 

fibromyalgia and denied a rating in excess of 10% for 

defective hearing on a schedular basis. The Board remanded the case to the VA’s local regional office for 

further factual development of Mr. Williams’s claim 

seeking an increased rating for his hearing disability on 

an extraschedular basis. The Board noted that all remanded claims must be handled expeditiously under 38 

U.S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112.

In September 2014, the VA’s Appeals Management 

Center (“AMC”) issued a Statement of the Case addressing Mr. Williams’s fibromyalgia. Mr. Williams filed a 

notice of disagreement, contesting the disability rating.
WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD 3

In December 2014, Mr. Williams filed a mandamus 

petition with the Veterans Court. Mr. Williams sought an 

order directing the VA to process his claims for fibromyalgia and hearing loss expeditiously. Mr. Williams recognized that the Board had made a favorable decision, but 

he argued that the VA had not processed his claims 

expeditiously as required by § 5109B. He cited to several 

other statutes and the First and Fifth Amendments in his 

briefing. In a footnote, he argued that the Veterans 

Court’s arbitrary refusal to act standard in Costanza v.

West, 12 Vet. App. 133, 134 (1999) (per curiam),1 created 

an almost irrebuttable presumption against him that 

violated due process under the Fifth Amendment because 

the standard denied him an opportunity to rebut it. 

In response, the Veterans Court denied the petition 

based on the standard in Cheney v. United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 

(2004). The court held that Mr. Williams had not demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the writ. The 

court found that Mr. Williams failed to demonstrate that 

the VA unreasonably delayed processing his claims. The 

court stated that “the evidence submitted by the petitioner demonstrates that the Secretary is acting on his

claims.” Williams v. McDonald, No. 14-4192, 2014 WL 

7336954, at *2 (Vet. App. Dec. 24, 2014). The court did 

not address any statutes or constitutional issues, though 

the court noted that Mr. Williams argued the AMC failed 

to process his claims expeditiously as required by 

1 In Costanza, the court determined that, to show a 

clear and indisputable right to a writ of mandamus, a 

petitioner must demonstrate that the delay is “so extraordinary, given the demands and resources of the Secretary, 

that the delay amounts to an arbitrary refusal to act and 

not the product of a burdened system.” 12 Vet. App. at 

134.

 
4 WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD

§ 5109B. The court also took note of its arbitrary refusal

to act standard articulated in Costanza. 

In January 2015, after the denial of the petition, the 

AMC issued a statement of the case regarding Mr. Williams’s hearing loss claim. Mr. Williams reports that a 

veterans law judge issued a fully favorable decision on his 

hearing loss claim in February 2015.

Despite the Veterans Court’s factual findings and the 

VA’s progress on his claims, Mr. Williams persists in his 

appeal from the Veterans Court’s order denying his 

petition for a writ of mandamus.

On appeal, he argues that: (1) the VA intentionally circumvented 38 U.S.C. § 5109B by creating the AMC, 

where § 5109B allegedly does not apply; (2) the VA unreasonably delayed processing Mr. Williams’s claims, raising 

constitutional issues; and (3) the Veterans Court created 

an unconstitutional presumption regarding delay by 

requiring a petitioner to show that the delay amounted to 

an arbitrary refusal by the VA to act.

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review Veterans Court decisions is 

limited by statute. We may review “the validity of a 

decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of any 

statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof 

(other than a determination as to a factual matter) that 

was relied on by the Court in making the decision.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7292(a). Unless the appeal presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a 

factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id.

§ 7292(d)(2).

We have stated that a party’s characterization of an 

issue as constitutional in nature does not confer jurisdiction that is otherwise lacking. Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 

1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Davis v. McDonald, 
WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD 5

593 F. App’x 992, 994 (2014) (“merely characterizing 

arguments as constitutional does not make them so”).

Our limited jurisdiction extends to the situation at 

hand—when the Veterans Court denies a petition for a 

writ of mandamus. As we stated in Beasley v. Shinseki, 

709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013):

This court has jurisdiction to review the [Veterans 

Court’s] decision whether to grant a mandamus 

petition that raises a non-frivolous legal question 

. . . . We may not review the factual merits of the 

veteran’s claim, but we may determine whether 

the petitioner has satisfied the legal standard for 

issuing the writ. In conducting such a review, we 

do not interfere with the [Veterans Court’s] role as 

the final appellate arbiter of the facts underlying 

a veteran’s claim or the application of veterans’ 

benefits law to the particular facts of a veteran’s

case. 

A court may issue a writ of mandamus only if: (1) the 

petitioner has a clear legal right to relief, (2) there are no 

adequate alternative legal channels through which the 

petitioner may obtain that relief, and (3) the grant of 

mandamus relief is appropriate under the circumstances. 

Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380–81. In this instance, Mr. Williams raises issues on appeal that are challenges to factual determinations or the application of law to facts, and 

thus not within our appellate jurisdiction; or not related 

to the denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus.

Mr. Williams’s first argument is that the VA intentionally circumvented 38 U.S.C. § 5109B by creating the 

AMC because § 5109B does not apply at the AMC. Mr. 

Williams argues that the creation and operation of the 

AMC denies Mr. Williams and other veterans due process 

under the Fifth Amendment. He also asks whether the 

VA can intentionally delay its processes and thereby 

violate 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 702, and 706(1). He contends 
6 WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD

that, after he appealed, the AMC sped up his claims to 

moot his appeal.

None of these concerns raise any issue or error regarding the decision of the Veterans Court—the only decision 

before us for review. These concerns are outside of our 

jurisdiction in this case. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Shinseki, 

403 F. App’x 514, 516 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that the 

petitioner’s constitutional arguments “do not relate to the

Veterans Court’s decision denying the petition for a writ 

of mandamus, the only decision before us for review, but 

rather to the procedures established by statute and regulation for adjudicating claims at the RO and the Board. 

Because [petitioner] has not raised any issues regarding 

the decision of the Veterans Court that are within our 

jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.”).

Mr. Williams’s second argument is that the VA unreasonably delayed processing his claims and that this raises 

a constitutional issue. Mr. Williams essentially contests 

the factual findings of the Veterans Court, which we 

cannot disturb unless a constitutional argument is raised. 

Although Mr. Williams contends that a constitutional 

issue is at play, we disagree. His characterization of this 

issue as constitutional in nature does not change its 

factual nature or confer jurisdiction that is lacking. See 

Helfer, 174 F.3d at 1335; see also Davis, 593 F. App’x at 

994.

Finally, Mr. Williams’s third argument is that the 

Veterans Court has created an unconstitutional presumption through its arbitrary refusal to act standard in 

Costanza. Mr. Williams argues that this alleged presumption deprives him and others of due process under 

the Fifth Amendment because there is no opportunity to 

rebut the presumption with disclosure, discovery, or 

additional argument as to the reason for the delay. 

Similarly, he argues the supposed presumption violates 
WILLIAMS v. MCDONALD 7

the First Amendment’s right to petition for redress of 

grievances.

Although Mr. Williams raised similar arguments before the Veterans Court, the court did not address Mr. 

Williams’s constitutional concerns. We similarly decline 

to address them here. The Veterans Court took note of 

the arbitrary refusal to act standard and held that Mr. 

Williams failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable 

right to the writ. Nevertheless, the court’s decision would 

not have been any different had it never mentioned the 

standard from Costanza. The court’s denial of the petition 

was dependent in no small part on its factual findings 

that the VA had not unreasonably delayed processing Mr. 

Williams’s claims. Any consideration of the constitutional 

issues raised by Mr. Williams would not have affected the 

court’s decision.

Mr. Williams contends that the VA system unfairly delays processing his claims and other veterans’ claims in 

general. While we are not unsympathetic to any delay in 

adjudicating veterans’ benefits claims, the issues that Mr. 

Williams attempts to raise are simply not within the 

scope of our jurisdiction in this particular context. 

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED

No costs.