J-S37002-18

____________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.D.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.A.P., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 448 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order January 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): 51-FN-000971-2015, CP-51-AP-0001193-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 09, 2018

T.A.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the January 9, 2018 order involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her now two-year-old daughter N.D.P. 

(“Child”). We affirm.

The factual background and procedural history of this case are as 

follows. On July 13, 2016, Mother gave birth to Child. At that time, Mother

tested positive for opioids. She also tested positive for drugs on three 

occasions in the ten weeks prior to Child’s birth. 

On July 18, 2016, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) obtained an order of protective custody for Child. The following day, 

DHS placed Child in the care of Mother’s great-cousin. On August 2, 2016, 

the trial court adjudicated Child dependent and referred Mother to several 

agencies to assist in reunification efforts.
J-S37002-18

- 2 -

When reunification efforts failed, DHS petitioned to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights as to Child. At the conclusion of a 

termination hearing on January 9, 2018, the trial court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights as to Child.1,2 This timely appeal followed.3

Mother presents three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) . . . ?

2. [Whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)]?

3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that termination 

of [Mother’s] parental rights would best serve [Child’s] needs and 

welfare . . . ?

Mother’s Brief at 5 (certain capitalization omitted).

We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an 

abuse of discretion. In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d 699, 704 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citations omitted). “The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

____________________________________________

1 We note that Yolanda Houston, Esquire was appointed guardian ad litem for 

Child and Daniel Silver, Esquire was appointed as Child’s legal counsel. Both 

Attorneys Houston and Silver attended the termination hearing on behalf of 

Child.

2 On January 9, 2018, the trial court also entered orders terminating the 

parental rights of unknown putative father and of K.P. (“Father”). Father did 

not appeal the order terminating his parental rights and he is not a party to 

this appeal.

3 Mother’s three appellate issues were included in her concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal she filed contemporaneously with her notice 

of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), (b).
J-S37002-18

- 3 -

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination[.]” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 942 (Pa. Super.

2018), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

“In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree with any one subsection under [s]ection 2511(a).” In re Interest 

of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 991 

(Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). The trial court found that the requirements of 

subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) were satisfied. We focus our 

attention on subsection 2511(a)(8), which provides that a parent’s rights to a 

child may be involuntarily terminated if 

[t]he child has been removed from the care of the parent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months 

or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist[,] and termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

In this case, there is no dispute that Child was removed from Mother’s 

care for at least 12 months at the time of the termination hearing. Hence, we 

initially focus our inquiry on whether the conditions which led to Child’s 

removal from Mother’s care continued to exist at the time the trial court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that Mother was 

still addicted to illegal drugs, was mentally unstable, and was failing to pursue 

meaningful employment opportunities. These factual findings are supported 

by the record. See N.T., 1/9/18, at 7-16. As these circumstances prompted 
J-S37002-18

- 4 -

DHS to remove Child from Mother’s care, DHS proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination was appropriate under subsection 2511(a)(8).

Having determined that DHS proved by clear and convincing evidence 

the requisite factors under subsection 2511(a)(8), we next consider section 

2511(b)’s requirements. The focus in terminating parental rights under 

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but the focus under section 2511(b) is on 

the child. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted). 

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term bond is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child

is a major aspect of the []section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, “[c]ommon sense dictates 

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children 

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

The trial court found that no bond existed between Mother and Child. 

This factual finding is supported by the record. See N.T., 1/9/18, at 10. 

Mother relies on a line of cases holding that the lack of a bond does not ipso 
J-S37002-18

- 5 -

facto prove that termination is in a child’s best interest. See Mother’s Brief 

at 14. This is a correct statement of the law but is inapposite in our analysis

of section 2511(b). The trial court considered other best interest factors and 

found that they weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

The trial court found that Child and Mother’s great-cousin, i.e., her foster 

parent, had a bond. This finding is supported by the record. See N.T., 1/9/18, 

at 9-10. The trial court also found Mother’s great-cousin provided a caring, 

nurturing, and loving environment. This finding is supported by the record. 

See id. at 9-10, 13-14. On the other hand, the trial court found that if Child 

lived with Mother she would be exposed to drugs and lack basic necessities. 

Again, this finding is supported by the record. See id. at 6-8. Hence, the 

trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights would help 

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Based on the factual 

findings supported by the record, this legal conclusion was correct. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights as to Child.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/9/18