[Cite as State v. Cabrera, 2024-Ohio-885.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

LOGAN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 8-23-12

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

JOSE R. PUJOL CABRERA, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from The Bellefontaine Municipal Court

Trial Court No. 22TRD03206

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: March 11, 2024

APPEARANCES:

William T. Cramer for Appellant

Jim R. Gudgel for Appellee
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MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jose R. Pujol Cabrera (“Cabrera”), appeals the 

May 15, 2023 judgment issued by the Bellefontaine Municipal Court after a jury 

found him guilty of vehicular manslaughter. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} At approximately 12:30 p.m. on April 29, 2022, Cabrera was driving a 

53-foot-long commercial semi-tractor with an attached trailer westbound on State 

Route 47. Cabrera’s girlfriend, Lianet Trujillo (“Trujillo”), was a passenger in the 

semi-truck, along with their dog that rode in the back of the cabin. 

{¶3} Cabrera approached the intersection with State Route 235 in Logan 

County. Vehicles traveling westbound on State Route 47 (like Cabrera’s semitruck) are required to stop at that intersection; there is a flashing red stop light 

overhead, stop signs on both sides of the road, a stop line on the roadway prior to 

entering the intersection, signs that say “CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP,” 

and yellow triangular signs about 800 feet away when approaching the intersection 

that indicate there is a stop sign ahead. 

{¶4} Vehicles traveling northbound or southbound on State Route 235 are 

only faced with a flashing yellow caution light at that intersection. At the time 

Cabrera approached the intersection, Mary Elizabeth Pasquale-Berenics (“PasqualeBerenics”) was driving a four-door Alfa Romero sport-utility-vehicle northbound 
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on State Route 235. Her SUV collided with Cabrera’s semi-truck. PasqualeBerenics was taken to a hospital, where she succumbed to her injuries and died. 

Separate complaints charged Cabrera with (1) vehicular manslaughter, in violation 

of R.C. 2903.06(A)(4), a second-degree misdemeanor; and (2) failure to yield the 

right of way at a stop sign, in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A), a minor misdemeanor.

{¶5} On May 11 and 12, 2023, the case went to trial before a jury.

1

 There 

were no eyewitnesses to the crash other than the occupants of the semi-truck, 

Cabrera and Trujillo. Photos of the crash scene admitted into evidence during the 

trial showed the vehicles had come to a rest almost directly west of the intersection 

and a considerable distance away—approximately fifty feet, based on the length of 

Cabrera’s vehicle. The tractor portion of Cabrera’s vehicle had disconnected from 

the trailer portion, with both parts rolled onto their side and having sustained 

considerable damage. The entire front half of Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle was 

crushed and completely mangled. Additionally, the photos showed skid marks 

starting just after the stop bar on State Route 47 that continue through and beyond 

the intersection and follow in the direction of the overturned semi-truck. And, there 

were gouge marks in what would have been Pasquale-Berenics’ lane of travel. The 

photos also showed the speedometer in Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle was pegged at 

1 The minor misdemeanor offense was tried to the court.
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approximately 60 miles-per-hour and the speedometer in Cabrera’s vehicle was 

pegged at approximately 40 miles-per-hour.

{¶6} Coleton Piatt, a Logan County deputy sheriff, was dispatched to the 

scene and testified at trial. He is a certified traffic accident reconstructionist. The 

trial court allowed Deputy Piatt to describe what he saw during his investigation. 

However, he had not been disclosed as an expert and was not allowed to provide 

expert testimony or expert opinions. 

{¶7} Deputy Piatt saw gouging, yaw marks, and skidding through the 

intersection, and a utility pole and a metal pole had been knocked down. According 

to Deputy Piatt, Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle struck the “front driver portion” of the 

semi-truck.2 (May 11, 2023 Tr. at 108). Deputy Piatt testified that PasqualeBerenics had been in her lane of travel when the crash occurred, Cabrera’s semitruck proceeded into Pasquale-Berenics’ lane of travel, Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle 

hit the semi-truck (and became stuck to it) and, after contact was made, the vehicles 

proceeded further westbound through the intersection. 

{¶8} Upon questioning about the pegged speedometers, Deputy Piatt 

testified: “when a vehicle encounters an immediate power failure, on an analog 

gauge the gauge will not have the power to cycle back down to zero, so it is an 

indication that at the point of impact -- time of the impact [Pasquale-Berenics’ 

2 Cabrera testified Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle struck his vehicle at the front part of the trailer on the driver’s 

side. (May 11, 2023 Tr. at 158-59).
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vehicle] was traveling approximately 60 miles per hour.” (Id. at 74). Additionally, 

Cabrera’s semi-truck’s “speedometer pegged, which occurs with immediate power 

failure,” and Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle hit the semi-truck where its battery boxes 

were located. (Id. at 76-77). 

{¶9} The event data recorder recovered from Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle 

indicated the brakes had not been engaged before the crash and it was traveling at 

approximately 60 miles-per-hour (thus matching the pegged speedometer). (See

Defendant’s Exhibit B-1). For various reasons, Deputy Piatt was unsuccessful in 

his attempts to obtain information from the semi-truck’s data recorder and camera 

systems. 

{¶10} Deputy Piatt testified the speed limit was 55 miles-per-hour on both 

State Route 235 and State Route 47. He explained State Route 235 approaching this 

intersection is “completely flat” and “[y]ou can see in every direction.” (May 11, 

2023 Tr. at 52). At the time of the crash, it was a clear, warm, sunny day, with no 

precipitation or fog. When asked if he would have cited Pasquale-Berenics for 

traveling five miles-per-hour over the speed limit, Deputy Piatt said “[a]bsolutely 

not.” (Id. at 116).

{¶11} Miriam Reames, a Logan County Sheriff’s Office patrol deputy, had 

also been dispatched to the scene. Both Deputy Reames and Deputy Piatt testified

they had traveled through the intersection at issue many times over the course of 

their lives (sometimes several times in a single day as a deputy), and they never had 
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issues seeing vehicles from cross traffic while traveling through the intersection. 

Both deputies described it is as flat intersection, visible from all sides with a grassy 

surrounding area. Importantly, Deputy Piatt explained: “When you come to a 

complete stop, you can look to the south for several miles.” (Id. at 53) 

{¶12} Trujillo also testified at the trial. She said she loves Cabrera, they had 

lived together for seven years, they shared expenses, and they had taken a training 

course together in Florida to obtain their commercial driver’s licenses in order to 

become truck drivers. They traveled together and divided their duties while driving. 

According to Trujillo, Cabrera had stopped at the intersection. She then quickly 

went to the back of the trailer to check on their dog and, when she went to go back 

up front, Cabrera had already started driving and then she felt herself falling and 

spinning.

{¶13} Cabrera testified through an interpreter at the trial. According to 

Cabrera, he came to a complete stop at the intersection. He looked to the left as far 

as he could see, did not see anything, looked to the right and saw nothing, looked 

again to the left, “and that’s when I continue to pass through the intersection.” (Id.

at 156). He did not see Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle before it struck his vehicle. 

Cabrera testified Trujillo was on her way to sitting back down at the time of the 

collision. On cross-examination, he testified that the signs that actually say 

“CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP” say, “vehicles are passing.” (Id. at 169-

70). 
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{¶14} At both the conclusion of the State’s evidence and again at the 

conclusion of his own case, Cabrera moved for an acquittal, pursuant to Crim.R. 29. 

The trial court denied those motions and allowed the case to go to the jury. Among 

other things, the trial court’s jury instructions defined right-of-way and included the 

following:

A driver with the right-of-way has the right to operate her vehicle 

uninterrupted in a lawful manner and other drivers must yield to her; 

however, a driver can forfeit the right-of-way if she unlawfully 

operates her vehicle at an unreasonable speed or at a greater speed 

than will permit her to stop within the assured clear distance ahead. 

Operation of a vehicle in excess of posted speed limit is presumptively 

but not conclusively unreasonable. For purposes of determining 

whether a driver has forfeited her preferential right-of-way, you must 

consider whether her speed was reasonable given all of the 

surrounding circumstances, including the posted speed limit, the 

permanent physical features of the intersection, the hour of day or 

night, the extent of other traffic, the width and nature of the roadway, 

and any other circumstances existing at that time.

(May 12, 2023 Tr. at 227-28). No party objected to the jury instructions.

{¶15} The jury found Cabrera guilty of vehicular manslaughter, and the trial 

court found Cabrera guilty of failure to yield the right of way at a stop sign. (See 

May 15, 2023 Journal Entry). The trial court sentenced Cabrera to a $750 fine, 

suspension of his driver’s license for two years, and 90 days in jail for the vehicular 

manslaughter count. The trial court imposed no fine, but assessed costs, for the 

failure to yield the right of way at a stop sign count. This appeal followed.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶16} Cabrera raises two assignments of error for our review:
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First Assignment of Error

Appellant’s due process rights were violated by a conviction that was not 

supported by sufficient evidence.

Second Assignment of Error

The weight of the evidence does not support the findings of guilt.

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Assignment of Error

{¶17} Both parties indicate the main issue in this appeal is whether the 

evidence supports a finding that Cabrera failed to stop his vehicle before entering 

the intersection. In the first assignment of error, Cabrera contends the evidence to 

convict him of a stop-sign violation was insufficient because the State did not 

present expert testimony explaining “the import of the evidence collected at the 

scene of the accident.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). Additionally, according to Cabrera, 

“[a]bsent expert testimony, or indeed any evidence whatsoever, relating to the 

acceleration capability of Cabrera’s vehicle, the jury could not possibly have found 

that Cabrera failed to stop.” (Id. at 10). However, as discussed below, we need not 

address whether Cabrera failed to stop his vehicle before entering the intersection 

to resolve this appeal.

1. Standard of Review

{¶18} “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same 

standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient 
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evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37, citing State

v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995) and State v. Thompkins, 

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A sufficiency challenge disputes 

whether a party met its burden of production at trial. State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio 

St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “In reviewing a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he 

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Tenace at ¶ 37, quoting State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Thus, “[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not resolve evidentiary 

conflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Jackson, 3d Dist. Allen No. 

1-22-27, 2023-Ohio-2193, ¶ 26; see also Jenks at 279.

2. Applicable Law

{¶19} The vehicular manslaughter statute states, in relevant part: “No 

person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, * * * 

shall cause the death of another * * * in any of the following ways: * * * [a]s the 

proximate result of committing a violation of any provision of any section contained 

in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor * * *.” R.C. 

2903.06(A)(4). Thus, violating a provision of any section contained in Title XLV 

of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor is a predicate offense to, and an 
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element of, vehicular manslaughter. State v. Six, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-23-14, 

2023-Ohio-4361, ¶ 8.

{¶20} Here, the charged minor misdemeanor traffic offense was failure to 

yield the right of way at a stop sign, in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A). See Six at ¶ 9 

(generally, violating R.C. 4511.43(A) is a minor misdemeanor); R.C. 4511.43(C). 

That statute provides, in part:

“[E]very driver of a vehicle or trackless trolley approaching a stop 

sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line * * *. After having 

stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the 

intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to 

constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving 

across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.

R.C. 4511.43(A). In this context, “right-of-way” means the right of a vehicle “to 

proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it” is moving, 

in preference to another vehicle approaching its path from a different direction. R.C. 

4511.01(UU)(1); see also Six at ¶ 9. The duty to stop and yield the right-of-way “is 

not abrogated by the presence of a flashing yellow light directed towards oncoming 

traffic.” Espenschied v. Dougherty, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 88AP020014, 1988 

WL 83509, * 1 (Aug. 2, 1988). “Drivers approaching the yellow light may presume 

that the driver stopped at the stop sign will yield the right-of-way.” Id. 

{¶21} “Accordingly, a driver with the right of way has an absolute right to 

proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner, and other drivers must yield to him.” 

In re Neill, 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-04-08 and 8-04-09, 2005-Ohio-1696, ¶ 10. 
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“Conversely, the driver with the right of way forfeits this preferential status over 

other drivers if he or she fails to proceed in a lawful manner.” Id. “A driver 

proceeds in a lawful manner by complying with Ohio traffic laws.” Six, at ¶ 10. 

However, “evidence of speed in excess of a posted speed limit alone is not

conclusive that a vehicle is proceeding unlawfully and has forfeited its right of way.” 

(Emphasis sic.) In re Neill at ¶ 13. When a defendant has “initially rebutted the 

presumption that an opposing vehicle was proceeding lawfully because it was 

traveling in excess of a posted speed limit, the trial court must further determine 

whether the speed of the opposing vehicle was ‘reasonable given the surrounding 

conditions.’” Id., quoting City of Fremont v. Tilson, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-92-

95, 1993 WL 306564, *3 (June 30, 1993). One reason for this further determination 

was explained during a vehicular homicide case: “a driver stopped at a stop sign 

who sees a car approaching” should not “deliberately drive into imminent danger of 

a collision, upon an assumption that the driver who initially has the right-of-way has 

lost the right-of-way because of his excessive speed.” State v. Dailey, 5th Dist. 

Morrow No. 2006-CA-0012, 2007-Ohio-2544, ¶ 11 (affirming jury’s verdict finding 

appellant guilty of vehicular homicide despite evidence decedent had been traveling 

above the speed limit).

3. Analysis

{¶22} Even assuming Cabrera properly stopped at the intersection, he 

violated the second requirement in R.C. 4511.43(A): “After having stopped, the 
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driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle * * * approaching on another 

roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time the driver 

is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.” R.C. 

4511.43(A). As the State argues, evidence presented at trial supports finding that 

Cabrera drove into the intersection while Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle had the rightof-way and constituted an “immediate hazard” during the time his semi-truck moved 

across the intersection. Despite Cabrera’s testimony that he stopped, looked both 

ways, and then continued to pass through the intersection, other evidence (including 

the testimony of both deputies and the photographs) shows he then should have seen 

Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle and not entered the intersection, in accordance with R.C. 

4511.43(A). 

{¶23} In his brief, Cabrera points out the speed limit on both roads is 55 

miles-per-hour and “[t]he speedometer of the Alfa Romeo was stuck at 60 mph, 

indicating that it was travelling at that speed when it struck the truck.” (Appellant’s 

Brief at 3). Yet, other evidence presented by the State demonstrated PasqualeBerenics was properly traveling in her lane. Further, there was testimony the driving 

conditions were very good—it was a clear, warm, sunny day, with no precipitation 

or fog; the road was completely flat and with an unobstructed view allowing drivers 

to see in every direction; and Deputy Piatt would not have cited Pasquale-Berenics 

for traveling five miles-per-hour over the speed limit.
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{¶24} Thus, even if Cabrera stopped at the stop sign and Pasquale-Berenics 

was operating her vehicle above the posted speed limit, the finder of fact was free 

to determine she was not proceeding unlawfully so as to forfeit her right-of-way. 

This was an issue on which the jury was specifically instructed. In other words, the 

evidence supports the jury’s implicit finding that the speed of Pasquale-Berenics’ 

vehicle was “reasonable given the surrounding conditions.” In re Neill, 2005-Ohio1696, at ¶ 13.

{¶25} This same conclusion was reached by the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals, which affirmed a conviction for violating R.C. 4511.43 even though 

appellant had stopped at the stop sign and the victim admitted he was speeding. 

State v. Cline, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-610, 2015-Ohio-4036, ¶ 1-2. The court 

disagreed with appellant that the victim had forfeited the right-of-way by traveling 

10 miles-per-hour over the speed limit in the dark through an unlit intersection. Id.

at ¶ 6. A police officer who had been at the scene testified “she did not believe that 

[victim’s] traveling about 70 m.p.h. in a 60 m.p.h. zone at 5 o’clock in the morning 

with very little traffic was unsafe for the conditions.” Id. at ¶ 20. Thus, the victim’s 

speed was reasonable given the surrounding circumstances and the verdict was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at ¶ 23; see also City of Upper 

Arlington v. Streets, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 94APC04-534, 1994 WL 714609, *3

(Dec. 20, 1994) (finding appellant guilty of failure to yield the right-of-way at a stop 

sign was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; the trial court could find 
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victim’s speed was reasonable under the conditions, even though victim was 

exceeding the speed limit by five miles per hour, faced a yellow flashing light at the 

intersection, and was potentially driving on wet pavement). Therefore, we need not, 

and do not, decide whether the evidence adequately supported that Cabrera failed to 

stop his vehicle before entering the intersection. 

{¶26} In support of his argument, Cabrera relies on our prior decision in State 

v. Jordan, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-01-25, 13-01-26, and 13-01-27, 2002 WL 

479160 (Mar. 29, 2002), to support his claim that the State failed to present evidence 

that he failed to stop. In Jordan, we determined the jury would have to 

impermissibly infer that Jordan’s vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and 

then stack the additional inference that his speed prevented him from stopping

before proceeding into the intersection. See id. at *2. The instant case differs from 

Jordan because, here, there was evidence of the relative speed of the vehicles based 

on where the speedometers were stuck after the accident. Thus, there is not the same 

issue of the jury impermissibly stacking inferences. 

{¶27} Additionally, evidence at Cabrera’s trial showed the collision took 

place only a few feet away from the stop line where Cabrera was required to stop. 

R.C. 4511.43(A). It seemingly would defy common sense and the knowledge of 

any experienced driver to believe a 53-foot-long semi-truck with a trailer could 

accelerate to 40 miles-per-hour within a few feet from a dead stop. We find this to 

be within the understanding of jurors, who may rely on their common sense and 
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experience in making their findings. See State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 636, 653 

N.E.2d 675 (1995) (“[t]he jurors were free to rely on their common sense and 

experience,” thus making expert testimony on a particular issue unnecessary); 

Standard Oil Co. v. Van Etten, 107 U.S. 325, 334, 1 S.Ct. 178, 27 L.Ed. 319 (1882) 

(“[t]he very spirit of trial by jury is that the experience, practical knowledge of 

affairs, and common sense of jurors, may be appealed to, to mediate the 

inconsistencies of the evidence, and reconcile the extravagances of opposing 

theories of the parties”); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 

L.Ed.2d 234 (1978) (the purpose of a jury trial is attained “by the participation of 

the community in determinations of guilt and by the application of the common 

sense of laymen who, as jurors, consider the case”).

{¶28} Regardless, the evidence supported a finding that Cabrera did not yield 

the right-of-way to Pasquale-Berenics’ vehicle, in violation of R.C. 4511.43(A). 

After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of vehicular manslaughter in 

violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(4), including the predicate offense of failure to yield 

the right of way at a stop sign in violation of 4511.43(A), proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Cabrera’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Second Assignment of Error

{¶29} In the second assignment of error, Cabrera argues the jury clearly lost 

its way in finding him guilty of vehicular manslaughter, and weight of the evidence 
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did not support a such a finding, based on the evidence presented at trial. We 

disagree.

1. Standard of Review

{¶30} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to 

the state’s burden of persuasion.” Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 26. “To 

evaluate a claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new trial.” State v. Wilks, 

154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 

387. Yet, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against 

the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State 

v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 

131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

2. Analysis

{¶31} Cabrera’s convictions for vehicular manslaughter and failure to yield 

the right of way at a stop sign were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Again, Cabrera’s argument focuses on the first part of R.C. 4511.43(A) regarding a 

failure to stop. Yet, in line with our analysis in the first assignment of error, the 

evidence supports that Cabrera violated R.C. 4511.43(A)—even assuming he 
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properly stopped at the intersection. The fact finder “could have found appellant’s 

testimony surrounding the facts of the collision not credible,” including “that [he] 

looked and saw no oncoming traffic.” Cline, 2015-Ohio-4036, at ¶ 16. Plus, in 

weighing credibility, the fact finder could consider how both Cabrera and Trujillo 

had a clear interest in Cabrera being found not guilty. Moreover, Cabrera’s 

testimony indicated he believed the intersection was a four-way stop and he could 

not see what traffic signal Pasquale-Berenics would have faced while she drove 

northbound on State Route 235. (May 11, 2023 Tr. at 156-57). And, his testimony 

on cross-examination showed he misunderstood or could not read the sign that said 

“CROSS TRAFFIC DOES NOT STOP.” (Id. at 169-70).

{¶32} Having reviewed the record as a whole, we do not find that the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way or that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Cline, 

2015-Ohio-4036, at ¶ 23 (it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence to 

find the speed of the victim’s vehicle was reasonable given the surrounding 

circumstances); City of Upper Arlington, 1994 WL 714609, at *1 (judgment finding 

appellant guilty of failure to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence). Cabrera’s second assignment of error is 

overruled.
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IV. CONCLUSION

{¶33} For the foregoing reasons, Cabrera’s assignments of error are 

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Bellefontaine Municipal Court.

Judgment Affirmed.

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls