NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GIOVANNI RAMIREZ, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity; CHARLIE BECK, Individually and in his official capacity as Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Defendants - Appellees. No. 13-55028D.C. No. 2:12-cv-08138-GAFPLA
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 6, 2015 ** Pasadena, California 

# FILED
FEB 11 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).Before: MELLOY, *** BYBEE, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges. On March 31, 2011, Bryan Stow was seve rely beaten in the parking lot of Dodgers Stadium. About two months after the incident, the Los Angles Police Department (LAPD) identified Appellant Giovanni Ramirez as the prime suspect. They arrested Ramirez, who was then on parole, and searched his home for evidence connecting him with the beati ng. Over the course of the LAPD investigation, the Department Chief, Ch arlie Beck, issued several public statements indicating that Ramirez was their “prime suspect” and “the right guy.” The investigation concluded after three m onths and Ramirez was declared “factually innocent.” No charges were ever filed against Ramirez. This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, which Ramir ez filed against the City of Los Angeles, Chief Beck, and several Doe de fendants, asserts two claims: (1) that Chief Beck and LAPD officers violated Ramirez’s Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his home for evidence connecting him to the Stow beating; and (2) that Chief Beck’s public comments regarding Ramirez violated his right to due process. The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted the

*** The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 2motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim with leave to amend and the due process claim without. Ramirez voluntarily dismissed his action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a )(1), and this appeal followed. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Stone v. Travelers Corp. , 58 F.3d 434, 436–37 (9th Cir. 1995). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. First, Ramirez complains that LAPD offi cers, at the direction of Chief Beck, violated the Fourth Amendment when th e officers conducted a parole search for evidence related to the Stow beating, and th at this search was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. See Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 843, 856 (2006) (recognizing California’s prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing parole searches). Ramirez’s claim that the offi cers used a “subterfuge paro le search” to search for evidence connecting Ramirez to the Stow beating fails to state a cognizable claim. Even if the officers had not had a warra nt authorizing the search of Ramirez’s residence—which Ramirez’s own comp laint acknowledged they had—the Supreme Court has explained that poli ce officers may conduct warrantless parole searches to look for evidence of general criminal activity, even if they have no 3reasonable suspicion. Id . Moreover, searching for evidence of criminal activity constituted a legitimate law enforcement purpose, which forecloses the claim that the search was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. See In re Anthony S. , 4 Cal. App. 4th 1000, 1004 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that a search is arbitrary if “the motivation [for the search] is unrel ated to . . . legitimate law enforcement purposes”). Second, Ramirez argues that Chief Beck’s statements to the media violated Ramirez’s “well-established constitutional ri ght to the due process of law to not have evidence fabricated or false statemen ts [sic] against him in order to prejudice a criminal case against him.” There is no such right. While this Court has recognized a right not be criminally char ged on the basis of fabricated evidence, Devereaux v. Abbey , 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), the district court properly dismissed this claim because Ramirez was never criminally charged. We decline to address Ramirez’s cl aim for malicious prosecution because this claim was not alleged in the complaint. AFFIRMED

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