2024 IL App (1st) 211153-U 

No. 1-21-1153 

Order filed March 29, 2024

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.

 ) 

 v. ) No. 20 DV 41235 

 ) 

EMANUEL VIEYRA-MARTINEZ, ) Honorable 

 ) Terence MacCarthy, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Mikva and Navarro concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The defendant’s conviction is affirmed where his trial counsel did not offer 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 2 Defendant-Appellant, Emanuel Vieyra-Martinez, was charged with one misdemeanor 

count of domestic battery. The circuit court conducted a bench trial and found him guilty of the 

charge of domestic battery. On appeal, he argues that he was provided with ineffective assistance 

of counsel for (1) trial counsel’s failure to raise the issue of self-defense and (2) stipulating to live 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 2 -

witness testimony without his consent. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Mr. VieyraMartinez’s conviction. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On August 31, 2020, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez was charged with one misdemeanor count of 

domestic battery. Mr. Vieyra-Martinez elected to proceed with a bench trial. At the beginning of 

the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate that if called, Amelia Galvez would testify that she was 

present in the home and heard the incident. She would testify that she did not come out of the 

bedroom and that she didn’t call the police to the home. She would also testify that she did speak 

to the police when they arrived. 

¶ 5 The State then presented the complaining witness, Gloria Galvez. Gloria testified that she 

has one daughter, and that her daughter’s father is Mr. Vieyra-Martinez. On the night of the 

incident, she was in her bedroom with her mother, Amelia Galvez, and her baby in the apartment 

she shared with Mr. Vieyra-Martinez. At approximately 10:45 pm, she went to the kitchen to get 

formula for the baby.

¶ 6 Mr. Vieyra-Martinez was sitting on the couch in the living room when Gloria went into the 

kitchen. She testified that when she was on her way back to her bedroom, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez

began insulting her. She told him to “please respect me” and not offend her. According to Gloria, 

Mr. Vieyra-Martinez got up and started hitting her on her left cheek. She stated that she tried 

pushing him away, but he started pulling her hair. He then threw her against the wall with both of 

his hands on her chest. She testified that he left bruising on her chest and redness on her left cheek.

She then went into her bedroom and called the police. While on the scene, police took pictures of 

her injuries. 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 3 -

¶ 7 Gloria also testified that her mother, Amelia, was present at the home during the incident. 

She stated that Amelia heard the conversation between her and Mr. Vieyra and did not leave the 

bedroom because she was protecting Gloria’s baby. She also stated that Amelia did not call the 

police because she does not speak English and was carrying Gloria’s baby. 

¶ 8 Mr. Vieyra-Martinez then testified that on the night of the incident, he was home in the 

living room when he and Gloria started to have an argument. He stated that he raised his voice at 

her but that he did not hit her, push her against the wall, or pull her hair. He denied ever having hit

Gloria during their relationship. He also stated that he would notice that Gloria would get red in 

her face and chest when she gets mad. According to Mr. Vieyra-Martinez, the redness that he 

would notice on those occasions was similar to the redness he saw in the photographs of Gloria’s 

injuries.

¶ 9 On cross examination, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez stated that he was in the living room sleeping 

and did not see Gloria pass by the living room. He denied that he had insulted Gloria’s physical 

appearance while he was in the living room and denied that he had put his hands on her. On 

redirect-examination, he testified that as he awoke from sleeping, a verbal argument began 

between him and Gloria. 

¶ 10 At the close of the trial evidence, the trial court found Mr. Vieyra-Martinez guilty of 

domestic battery. The court stated that it made credibility determinations based “not only on the 

content of the parties’ testimony, but also their demeanor,” as well as the photographs admitted in 

the trial. The court stated that the stipulation regarding Amelia Galvez’s testimony did not disprove 

either of the parties’ version of events because she did not see the incident. The court believed that 

the police would not have been called if the incident had not occurred as testified to by Gloria
No. 1-21-1153 

- 4 -

Galvez. As to the photographs depicting Gloria’s injuries after the incident, the court found that 

she received injuries consistent with her testimony. The court also stated that it did not believe Mr. 

Vieyra-Martinez had never struck Gloria, believing that “he was somewhat waffling, unclear – or 

at best about whether or not there was even an argument in this matter.” Mr. Vieyra-Martinez was 

sentenced to 12 months conditional discharge with domestic violence classes to be started a month 

from the date of the sentencing hearing.

¶ 11 On April 22, 2021, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the State 

failed to prove him guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and that he was denied his right 

to effective assistance of counsel. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he 

contended that Amelia Galvez was listed in the discovery but was never interviewed; that counsel 

stipulated to Amelia’s testimony without his consent; and that counsel did not use the affirmative 

defense of self-defense. 

¶ 12 On July 2, 2021, the trial court heard evidence and arguments for Mr. Vieyra-Martinez’s 

motion for new trial. Grzegork Florek, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez’s trial counsel, testified that he spoke 

with Mr. Vieyra-Martinez multiple times over the phone and at least once in his office. Each time 

they spoke, an interpreter was present. When he met with Mr. Vieyra-Martinez at Mr. Florek’s 

office, he asked Mr. Vieyra-Martinez for his version of events. According to Mr. Florek, Mr. 

Vieyra-Martinez did not tell him that Gloria Galvez attacked him while he was sleeping, nor did 

he assert that he acted in self-defense. 

¶ 13 Regarding the stipulation, Mr. Florek stated that he never tried to contact Amelia Galvez. 

He testified that he did not interview Amelia and that did not know if his office attempted to contact 

her. He stated that Amelia had left the state or the country and that he had “fairly lengthy 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 5 -

discussions” about it with the State and the trial court. According to Mr. Florek, he explained the 

situation to Mr. Vieyra-Martinez who then agreed to proceed with the stipulation. He denied that 

Mr. Vieyra-Martinez told him that Amelia was “an actual witness” to what occurred between 

Gloria and Mr. Vieyra-Martinez.

¶ 14 Mr. Vieyra-Martinez then testified that he met with Mr. Florek one time before trial with 

the assistance of an interpreter. He testified that he told his attorney that Gloria Galvez attacked 

him while he was sleeping, but that he did not strike her. He also asserted that he never told his 

attorney that Amelia Galvez was out of the country, nor did he give his attorney consent to stipulate 

to her testimony.

¶ 15 After the parties concluded their arguments, the trial court denied Mr. Vieyra’s motion for 

new trial. The court found Mr. Florek’s testimony to be credible and found it “odd” that Mr. Vieyra 

would deny hitting Ms. Galvez but still claim self-defense. The court went on to find that Mr. 

Vieyra’s testimony was inconsistent with self-defense. Mr. Vieyra now appeals the trial court’s 

order. 

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Mr. Vieyra filed a timely notice 

of appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. July 1, 2017); see also People v. English, 2023 IL 

128077, ¶ 25. 

¶ 18 Mr. Vieyra argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on his 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Vieyra contends that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel where his attorney (1) did not raise the issue of self-defense and (2) stipulated 

to live witness testimony without his consent. 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 6 -

¶ 19 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show both 

that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 

2d 490, 496 (2010). To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show his attorney’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 

219 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Effective assistance of counsel refers to 

competent, not perfect representation.” Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 219 (quoting People v. Stewart, 104 

Ill. 2d 463, 491-92 (1984)). Mistakes in trial strategy or tactics do not necessarily render counsel’s 

representation defective. See People v. Hayes, 2021 IL App (1st) 172417, ¶ 78 (finding that the 

decision to not file a motion to suppress is typically a matter of trial strategy, in which courts of 

review give great deference to counsel’s decision). 

¶ 20 To establish the second prong of Strickland, prejudice, a defendant must show that “but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” People v. Houston, 229 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2008). “A defendant must satisfy 

both prongs of the Strickland test and a failure to satisfy any one of the prongs precludes a finding 

of ineffectiveness.” People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35. 

¶ 21 As to Mr. Vieyra-Martinez’s first claim, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise the theory of self-defense. Specifically, he argues that he was “entitled to a selfdefense theory, unless there was a specific, strategic reason to forgo the defense.” Generally, the 

decision of which theory of defense to present is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Little, 2021 

IL App (1st) 181984, ¶ 52. Matters of trial strategy do not support a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel unless counsel failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testimony. People v. 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 7 -

Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 441 (2005). Typically, we grant great deference to trial counsel on 

matters of trial strategy and evaluate counsel’s performance from his perspective at the time rather 

than through the lens of hindsight. People v. Perry, 224 Ill 2d. 312, 344 (2007).

¶ 22 The Illinois self-defense statute states that “[a] person is justified in the use of force against 

another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend 

himself or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 

2010). In order to assert a claim of self-defense, “the defendant must establish some evidence of 

each of the following elements: (1) force is threatened against a person; (2) the person threatened 

is not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the threatened force was unlawful; 

(5) he actually and subjectively believed a danger existed; and (6) his beliefs were objectively 

reasonable.” People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 127-28 (1995). If the State disproves any of these 

elements, the defendant’s claim of self-defense must be rejected. People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 

225 (2004). 

¶ 23 In the instant case, Ms. Gloria Galvez testified that Mr. Vieyra-Martinez attacked her 

without provocation. Further, his own testimony, both at trial and at his motion for new trial, does 

not support a theory of self-defense. Both times Mr. Vieyra-Martinez testified, he stated that he 

never touched Ms. Gloria Galvez during the incident. This is also consistent with Mr. Florek’s 

testimony that Mr. Vieyra-Martinez did not tell him that he acted in self-defense. As the evidence 

presented does not suggest Mr. Vieyra-Martinez acted in self-defense, we cannot conclude trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient for abandoning the affirmative defense. We need not address 

the prejudice prong as we have not found counsel’s performance deficient. 

¶ 24 Alternatively, Mr. Vieyra-Martinez argues ineffective assistance because his trial counsel 
No. 1-21-1153 

- 8 -

stipulated to Ms. Amelia Galvez’s testimony without his permission. Decision regarding which 

witnesses to call are also a matter of trial strategy. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999). 

“The mere use of a stipulation does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. 

Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512, ¶ 40. However, an incorrect or erroneous stipulation that 

satisfies both prongs of Strickland may establish that counsel was ineffective. Id. 

¶ 25 Here, the parties stipulated that if Ms. Amelia Galvez was called, she would testify that she 

did not see the incident between Mr. Vieyra-Martinez and Ms. Gloria Galvez and that she did not 

call the police. Mr. Vieyra-Martinez does not dispute the contents of the stipulated testimony. 

Rather, he suggests that the stipulation prevented him from advancing his argument that a physical 

altercation never occurred between him and Ms. Gloria Galvez because Ms. Amelia Galvez did 

not call the police. However, as the State points out, trial counsel used the stipulation to make this 

same argument in his closing. The trial court also addressed this argument, stating that the fact the 

police were called led the court to believe the events occurred as testified by Ms. Gloria Galvez. 

Further, the trial court noted that as Ms. Amelia Galvez did not witness the incident, her testimony 

would not disprove either parties’ version of events. Defense counsel cannot be deemed 

incompetent where a witness’ live testimony would not have added any more than the stipulation

already covered. People v. Eggleston, 363 Ill. App. 3d 220, 227-28 (3d Dist. 2006). Thus, we 

conclude that trial counsel’s assistance was not deficient, and therefore, we will not address the 

issue of prejudice. 

¶ 26 CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgement of the circuit court. 

¶ 28 Affirmed.