IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Burton, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 1152 C.D. 2020

: Submitted: May 21, 2021

RSVB Couriers (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

:

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: April 13, 2022

Christopher Burton (Claimant) petitions for review of the Orders of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the Decisions of a 

workers’ compensation judge (WCJ), which denied Claimant’s Claim Petitions for 

compensation benefits, and granted the Termination Petition of RSVB Couriers 

(Employer) to terminate his workers’ compensation benefits, pursuant to the 

provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).2 We affirm.

I.

1 This matter was assigned to the panel before January 3, 2022, when President Judge 

Emerita Leavitt became a senior judge on the Court.

2 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4; 2501-2710.
2

On December 1, 2017, Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle 

accident in the course and scope of his employment as a delivery driver for 

Employer. Claimant went to the hospital, but he did not receive any work 

restrictions. On January 11, 2018, Employer issued a Notice of Compensation 

Denial (NCD), which stated that Claimant “was in a company truck on I[-]76 on his 

way to the Fed [E]x Terminal when a vehicle shot out in front of him causing him 

to swerve and swipe a guardrail” resulting in a “low back strain.” Reproduced 

Record (R.R.) at 4a. The NCD also stated that benefits were denied at that time 

because the “insurance carrier is unable to determine compensability for the above 

alleged injury at this time” and that the “investigation is continuing.” Id. at 5a. 

However, on March 6, 2018, Employer issued a Medical-Only Notice of 

Compensation Payable (NCP) acknowledging Claimant’s work-related low back 

strain, but only providing “compensation for medical treatment (medical only, no 

loss of wages) will be paid subject to the [Act],” and that “[c]ompensation for 

medical treatment is payable from the date of injury.” Id. at 7a.3

On July 12, 2018, Claimant was terminated from his employment with 

Employer based on his purported misuse of a company fuel card for personal use. 

R.R. at 242a-45a. That same day, Claimant filed two Claim Petitions for 

compensation benefits in which he alleged, inter alia, that he sustained a workrelated injury on July 11, 2018, while lifting a heavy package on his work truck. See

C.R. Docket Entries 2 and 31. Claimant described the injury as a “lower back injury” 

in the nature of a “strain or tear, trauma to the muscle.” Id. Claimant also stated that 

3 On August 1, 2018, Employer filed an Amended Medical-Only NCP with respect to 

Claimant’s December 1, 2017 work-related injury. See R.R. at 8a-9a. However, as noted by the 

WCJ in her Decisions, “Claimant never filed a [Claim] Petition with respect to the December 1, 

2017 injury.” Certified Record (C.R.) Docket Entries 5 and 37 at 3 n.1.
3

he “called Rob[ Rangnow (Rangnow), Employer’s owner and his supervisor, at] 

1:30 p.m. [on] 7-11-18”; that Rangnow “came to [the] work area 2 [hours] later (after 

he took his son to work)”; that they “agreed to light duty and help after [Claimant’s] 

doctor visit starting on 7-12-18”; and that “[o]n 7-12-18 [at] 9:30[, Claimant] was 

told [that his] services [were] no longer needed.” Id. 

On August 7, 2018, Employer filed an NCD with respect to Claimant’s 

July 12, 2018 Claim Petition. R.R. at 10a-11a. On August 23, 2018, Employer filed 

an Answer to the Claim Petition denying all of the material allegations raised therein. 

Id. at 18a-20a. On December 27, 2018, Employer filed a Termination Petition 

alleging, inter alia, that “[i]t has been medically determined that Claimant [had] fully 

recovered from his work-related injury” as of December 3, 2018. Id. at 22a. All of 

the petitions were consolidated for disposition by the WCJ, see id. at 16a, 26a, and 

hearings before the WCJ ensued.

In her Decisions disposing of the petitions, the WCJ summarized the 

relevant evidence introduced in the proceedings as follows. At an October 30, 2018 

deposition, Claimant testified that on December 1, 2017, he worked for Employer as 

a delivery driver, which entailed arriving at the terminal each morning and loading 

the truck to make deliveries. R.R. at 45a. On that day, he was driving the truck to 

the terminal when a vehicle pulled out in front of him causing him to swerve and 

sideswipe a guardrail. Id. at 45a-46a. Claimant went to the emergency room of 

Presbyterian Hospital (Presbyterian) complaining of pain in his head from hitting his 

head on the windshield, pain in his lower back, and pain in his knee. Id. at 49a. He 

was released from the hospital with prescriptions for medication, and returned to 

light-duty work that day at Rangnow’s request. Id. at 46a, 47a. He continued to 

work and did not receive additional medical treatment until he sought medical care 
4

on July 12, 2018, for his alleged work-related injury of July 11, 2018. Id. at 52a, 

53a.

On July 11, 2018, Claimant allegedly sustained a work-related injury 

when he lifted a small, but heavy, box too quickly. R.R. at 54a. He heard something 

pop in his back and could not straighten out his back. Id. Claimant called Rangnow, 

who begged Claimant to finish his shift. Id. Claimant called his cousin who helped 

him finish the day. Id. at 55a.

On July 12, 2018, Claimant sought treatment at the University of 

Pennsylvania Hospital (Penn). R.R. at 55a-56a. He complained of worsening back 

pain across his beltline, but the pain did not extend into his legs. Id. at 56a. The 

hospital gave Claimant a paper containing work restrictions. Id. at 56a-57a. In 

August of 2018, Claimant started seeing Dr. Lombardo and treating with a 

chiropractor three times a week. Id. at 59a. Claimant has not worked for Employer 

since July 11, 2018, but, at the time of hearing, he was working as a driver for Lyft 

four days a week, earning $300.00 to $350.00 per week. Id. at 64a-65a, 66a-67a, 

68a.

At the WCJ’s June 24, 2019 hearing, Claimant testified that he lifted 

packages weighing up to 180 pounds in his position with Employer. R.R. at 286a. 

After the December 1, 2017 accident, Claimant wanted to see a company physician 

because his back was “killing” him, and he asked for light duty or to have a helper 

assist him. Id. at 287a-88a. After the accident, Claimant sent Rangnow a text saying 

that Erie Insurance had contacted him, and Claimant told Erie that he was “all 

better.” Id. at 288a. He explained that he sent the text because if he did not work, 

Rangnow would have to find someone else and Claimant would lose his job. Id. at 

288a-89a. After the accident, Claimant hired one of his cousins to help him out and 
5

Claimant paid his cousin half of his paycheck. Id. at 289a, 290a. Employer also 

removed heavy weight objects from Claimant’s truck to lighten his load. Id. at 289a.

Claimant disputed Rangnow’s testimony before the WCJ that he called 

Rangnow from the road on July 11, 2018, and asked Rangnow to bring out diesel 

exhaust fluid (DEF), stating that “[t]hat’s a lie.” R.R. at 290a. Claimant would buy 

DEF as needed and Rangnow reimbursed him. Id. His personal use of Employer’s 

fuel card was known by Rangnow and Rangnow would take the amount that 

Claimant owed out of his bonus. Id. at 291a-92a.

After Employer fired Claimant, he worked for Lyft from August 2018, 

to April 2019. R.R. at 293a. He had to pay increased insurance, gas, and tolls, which 

decreased his Lyft earning to $300.00 to $350.00 per week. Id. at 294a-95a.

Claimant does not suffer from any residual problems with his head or 

knee from the December 1, 2017 accident, but he has continuing back pain and his 

right leg “vibrates” once in a while. R.R. at 296a. He continues to treat with Maurice 

Singer, D.O. (Singer), and takes Tramadol for his injury. Id. at 296a-97a.

After Claimant’s work-related December 1, 2017 injury, he was seen 

in Presbyterian’s emergency room and discharged without any work restrictions. 

R.R. at 307a-08a. He did not seek any other medical treatment for this work-related 

injury between December 1, 2017 and August of 2018, when he started seeing 

Singer. Id. at 308a.

Claimant also presented the testimony of Saleem Wilson (Wilson), a 

former employee of Employer, at the WCJ’s June 24, 2019 hearing. Wilson testified 

that he worked for Employer between October of 2017 and July of 2018, as a 

delivery driver, and Rangnow was his supervisor and boss. R.R. at 315a, 316a. Each 

of Employer’s trucks was assigned a fuel card, but sometimes the fuel card was 
6

missing so Rangnow would allow him to call Claimant to meet him or Rangnow 

would give him a fuel card with the pin number on it. Id. at 316a. He would meet 

up with other drivers to fill up at gas stations at least three times per week. Id. at 

318a.

Claimant also presented Singer’s February 27, 2019 deposition 

testimony. Singer is a general practitioner with no board certifications. R.R. at 121a. 

On August 24, 2018, he began treating Claimant for his December 1, 2017 workrelated injury. Id. at 122a. He took a history of Claimant’s injury, with Claimant 

stating that he was “super dizzy” and had abdominal and back pain. Id. at 122a-23a. 

Upon examination, Claimant had severe pain of a 10 out-of-10 level in his 

dorsolumbar spine, with pain radiating into his extremities associated with 

numbness. Id. at 123a. Claimant also had severe pain of a 10 out-of-10 level in his 

cervical spine. Id. However, Claimant continued to work and did not seek additional 

medical treatment. Id.

Claimant also described the July 11, 2018 work-related injury in which 

he heard his back “pop” as he was lifting an item weighing 75 pounds. R.R. at 123a. 

Claimant told Singer that he was not able to return to work. Id. Claimant told Singer 

that he was terminated and began to work for Uber. Id.

Physical examination revealed that Claimant had a decreased range of 

motion in the cervical and the dorsolumbral spine, muscle spasm, and a positive 

straight leg test raising bilateral to 15 degrees. R.R. at 124a. Singer diagnosed 

Claimant as suffering from cervical strain and sprain; acute cervical myositis; dorsal 

strain and sprain; dorsal myositis; acute lumbosacral strain and sprain; lumbar 

myositis; lumbar radiculopathy; cerebral concussion; anxiety; and post-traumatic 

syndrome; however, Singer ruled out herniated nucleus pulposis. Id. Singer opined 
7

that the cerebral concussion is related to the December 2017 injury, but the other 

diagnoses appear to be a result of the second injury. Id. He recommended a course 

of treatment including physical therapy and medication, and the physical therapy 

was performed at Singer’s office. Id.

A February 8, 2019 magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) showed a 

bilateral intraforaminal disc bulge at L2-3 and L3-4, and a focal midline and left 

paramedian disc herniation with some impingement on the dural sac and the S1 nerve 

root. R.R. at 126a. These findings show an underlying pathology that was rendered 

symptomatic by the December 2017 and July 2018 work-related injuries. Id.

Singer last examined Claimant on February 8, 2019, which revealed 

that Claimant had continued reduced cervical and dorsolumbar range of motion, and 

tenderness to palpation in the paravertebral muscles with muscle spasm in straight 

leg raising. R.R. at 127a. Claimant also had pain in his right knee with a decreased 

range of motion. Id. Following 4 months of physical therapy, Claimant’s pain level 

was reduced to a level of 8- or 9-out-of-10 from a 10-out-of-10. Id. Singer opined 

that Claimant could not return to his pre-injury job because it would exacerbate his 

condition, and that Claimant was not fully recovered from his work-related injury. 

Id. at 127a-28a. Singer also opined that Claimant’s current employment with Uber 

or Lyft is appropriate because Claimant is only driving, and not delivering, lifting, 

carrying or moving. Id. at 128a.

Singer reviewed the records of Claimant’s August 7, 2018 treatment at 

Philadelphia Health Action (PHA) a few weeks before his first examination by 

Singer. R.R. at 128a. Singer acknowledged that the PHA August 7, 2018 record 

mentions low back pain, but does not mention any mid back or neck pain, and does 

not mention any work restrictions. Id. at 129a. Over two weeks later, on August 24, 
8

2018, Singer documented complaints of neck and mid back pain, and low back pain, 

all at a level of 10-out-of-10. Id.

Singer acknowledged that his opinion on causation is based on 

Claimant’s history of the December 1, 2017 and July 11, 2018 work incidents. R.R. 

at 130a. Singer conceded that he had no independent source of information 

regarding what happened on those two dates. Id. He also conceded that he did not 

review the July 12, 2018 emergency room records. Id. at 131a. He did not know 

how many hours per day or how many days per week that Claimant works for his 

current employer, Lyft. Id. at 130a. He was not aware of any records indicating that 

Claimant was placed on light-duty restrictions between the December 1, 2017 and 

July 11, 2018 work incidents. Id. Singer issued Claimant’s first work restrictions 

on September 21, 2018. Id. at 132a. He conceded that the December 1, 2017 

emergency room records do not show that Claimant was issued any work 

restrictions. Id.

Employer presented Rangnow’s testimony at the WCJ’s April 22, 2019 

hearing. Rangnow testified that he is Employer’s president and owner, which 

provides FedEx ground deliveries. R.R. at 225a-26a. He hired Claimant as a driver 

in October of 2017, and Claimant worked Tuesday through Saturday. Id. at 227a. 

Claimant worked alone and was not permitted to use a helper because the helper 

would need to be on the payroll and covered by Rangnow’s insurance. Id. at 229a230a. Rangnow provides the trucks to his drivers as well as a fuel card, which is to 

be used solely for fuel. Id. at 230a-31a. Each driver is assigned a PIN so that all of 

his or her purchases can be directly tracked for security, and the card is to remain in 

the truck at all times. Id. at 231a-32a. 
9

Rangnow stated that Claimant called him after his December 1, 2017 

injury, and he understood that Claimant was treated for a sore back. R.R. at 233a. 

Claimant did not miss any time from work following that injury. Id. at 233a-34a. In 

January of 2018, Claimant sent Rangnow a text message stating that Employer’s 

workers’ compensation carrier had contacted him about his claim, but he was not

interested in pursuing it because he was fully recovered from his injury. Id. at 234a35a.4

 Between December 1, 2017, and July 12, 2018, Claimant did not complain to 

Rangnow about any low back pain, right knee pain, or hip, mid back, or neck pain, 

and Claimant kept working full duty throughout that period without restrictions or a 

helper and did not ask for a lighter workload or a helper. Id. at 236a, 237a-38a.

Rangnow stated that he first became aware of Claimant’s alleged July 

11, 2018 work-related injury about one month after Claimant’s termination on July 

12, 2018. R.R. at 238a-39a. Claimant never called him about a work-related injury 

on July 11, 2018; however, Claimant did call him that day for DEF. Id. at 239a. 

Rangnow met Claimant on his route that day with the DEF, and Claimant did not 

say that he was injured and did not appear to be injured. Id. at 240a. Claimant 

finished his route that day, and there was no one else with Claimant on that day. Id.

at 240a-41a. Employer submitted Exhibit D-3, a copy of text messages between 

Claimant and Rangnow on July 11, 2018, and July 13, 2018, and there is no mention 

of any work-related injury. Id. at 241a-42a, 248a; see also C.R. Docket Entry 25.

4 Employer submitted Exhibit D-2, a copy of the text that Claimant sent, which reads, in 

relevant part:

Hey [R]ob[.] Erie [I]nsurance keep[s] calling and texting [a]bout

workers[’] comp. I’m not interested or injured[.] I’m just stating 

facts so we can be on the same page. I recovered[.] [I’]m fine!!!

R.R. at 386a. Exhibit D-2 was admitted into evidence without objection. Id. at 235a.
10

On the morning of July 12, 2018, Rangnow terminated Claimant’s 

employment because there was an issue with Claimant’s personal charges associated 

with his PIN on the fuel card. R.R. at 242a-44a. Claimant’s work truck used diesel 

fuel, but the charges associated with his PIN number were for unleaded gasoline, 

and were purchased about 20 to 25 miles away from Employer’s depot and in the 

opposite direction from Claimant’s delivery area. Id. When Rangnow terminated 

Claimant and explained that it was based on the fuel charges, Claimant did not 

dispute it and left without an issue. Id. at 245a. Claimant also did not tell Rangnow 

that he was injured the day before. Id.

On July 13, 2018, Claimant texted Rangnow asking for a letter of 

termination so Claimant could get medical insurance for his family. R.R. at 246a47a; see also C.R. Docket Entry 25. Claimant did not tell Rangnow that he was 

injured on July 11, 2018, in those text messages. R.R. at 246a-47a, 248a; see also 

C.R. Docket Entry 25.5

Employer also presented the April 16, 2019 deposition testimony of Ira 

Sachs, D.O. (Sachs). Sachs is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon who evaluated 

Claimant on December 3, 2018. R.R. at 146a-47a, 149a. Claimant presented with 

complaints of low back and right knee pain that he associated with a December 1, 

2017 vehicle accident. Id. at 149a-50a. Claimant also reported a July 11, 2018 

incident where he developed a sudden increase in low back pain while lifting a 

package at work. Id. at 150a-51a. Claimant did not complain of neck pain, mid back 

pain, pain extending into his lower legs stemming from his back, or post-concussion 

symptoms such as headaches. Id. at 154a.

5 Employer’s Exhibit D-3, a copy of the text messages between Claimant and Rangnow, 

was admitted into evidence without objection. R.R. at 248a.
11

Sachs testified that records of Claimant’s treatment at Presbyterian on 

December 1, 2017, discuss a diagnosis of “chest pain, abrasion of the head, low back 

strain and unspecified injury to the abdomen and thorax.” R.R. at 155a. The records 

do not mention any neck pain or right knee pain, and they do not provide any work 

restrictions. Id. at 156a-57a.

Sachs stated that records of Claimant’s treatment at Penn on July 12, 

2018, indicate that Claimant recounted a history of sharp left low back pain from 

lifting a box on July 11, 2018, and chronic back pain since a motor vehicle accident 

the preceding year. R.R. at 157a. On examination, there was mild left low back 

tenderness, but no other abnormalities were noted, and they do not provide any work 

restrictions. Id. at 157a-58a; C.R. Docket Entry 28 at 18.

Sachs testified that the February 8, 2019 lumbar spine MRI showed a 

midline left paramedian disc protrusion at L5-S1, with shallow bulging at L2-3 and 

L3-4. R.R. at 160a-61a. His review of the scans showed no evidence of cord or 

nerve root impingement, thereby ruling out a diagnosis of radiculopathy or disc 

syndrome, and no evidence of trauma-related changes. Id. at 161a-62a. The MRI 

showed multi-level degenerative changes. Id. at 162a.

On examination, Sachs noted that Claimant had excellent motor 

strength; no sciatic list or shift to suggest spasm; no sciatic notch tenderness to 

suggest radiculopathy; and no sacroiliac tenderness or spasm. R.R. at 163a. 

Neurological examination of the lower extremities was normal; there was no 

evidence of atrophy or wasting; and there was no evidence of sensory or reflex 

abnormality that would indicate neurologic post-traumatic injury. Id. at 163a-65a. 

Testing of Claimant’s right knee was normal. Id. He found no objective evidence 

of any ongoing injury. Id. at 166a.
12

Based on the examination, history, and review of Claimant’s records, 

Sachs opined that Claimant sustained a lumbosacral strain and sprain as a result of 

the December 1, 2017 and July 11, 2018 incidents, from which he had fully 

recovered as of December 3, 2018. R.R. at 167a-68a, 170a. There was no objective 

evidence upon examination and review of the MRI scan to substantiate Claimant’s 

ongoing complaints. Id. at 169a.

The WCJ made the following credibility determinations with respect to 

the foregoing evidence:

11. Having observed Claimant’s comportment and 

demeanor during testimony at the hearing, and having 

reviewed the evidence of record in its entirety, this [WCJ] 

finds Claimant’s testimony to be less than credible. 

Claimant submitted no evidence to support his testimony 

that after the December 1, 2017 injury, he had a lighter 

workload or had his cousin help him with his deliveries. 

Further, his testimony is not consistent with the credible 

testimony of []Rangnow and the text message that he sent 

to []Rangnow indicating that he was recovered from the 

December 1, 2017 injury and did not want to respond to 

the insurance company. His testimony regarding the 

alleged July 11, 2018 injury is not consistent with the 

medical records and []Rangnow’s testimony that Claimant 

never mentioned the injury.

12. Having observed []Rangnow’s comportment and 

demeanor during testimony, and having reviewed the 

evidence of record in its entirety, this [WCJ] finds 

[]Rangnow’s testimony to be credible. []Rangnow’s 

testimony is supported by the text messages he discussed 

and submitted.

13. Having observed []Wilson’s comportment and 

demeanor during testimony, and having reviewed the 

evidence of record in its entirety, this [WCJ] finds 

[]Wilson’s testimony to be less than credible where it is 

inconsistent with the credible testimony of []Rangnow.
13

14. This [WCJ] finds the testimony of []Sachs to be 

more credible and persuasive than []Singer for the 

following reasons:

a. []Sachs is a board-certified orthopedic 

surgeon whereas []Singer is a general practitioner 

with no board certifications.

b. []Singer’s opinions are based on the history 

provided by Claimant, who this [WCJ] has found 

not credible.

c. []Singer’s testimony regarding his initial 

examination findings of 10 [out-]of[-]10 pain in 

Claimant’s cervical and dorsolumbar spine is not 

consistent with contemporaneous medical records 

of PHA indicating no mention of mid to low back 

pain.

d. []Sachs’ testimony is consistent with the 

objective medical evidence of record. He reviewed 

the films of the lumbar MRI and reasonably 

explained bases for his opinions.

e. []Sachs’ opinion is consistent with 

Claimant’s admission that after treating at the 

emergency room on December 1, 2017, he did not 

seek treatment for the December 1, 2017 injury until 

he saw []Singer in August of 2018.

C.R. Docket Entries 5 and 37 at 9-10.

Based on the foregoing credible evidence, the WCJ found that 

“Claimant failed to meet his burden of proving by competent and credible medical 

evidence that he sustained a work injury on July 11, 2018,” and that “Claimant failed 

to meet his burden of proving that he sustained a disabling injury on December 1, 

2017.” C.R. Docket Entries 5 and 37 at 10. As a result, the WCJ concluded that 

Claimant did not sustain his burden of proving by competent and credible evidence 

that he sustained a disabling work-related injury on December 1, 2017, or that he 
14

sustained a work-related injury on July 18, 2018. Id. at 11. The WCJ also concluded 

that Employer sustained its burden of proving that Claimant was fully recovered 

from his work-related injury as of December 3, 2018. Id. Accordingly, the WCJ 

issued orders denying Claimant’s Claim Petitions and granting Employer’s 

Termination Petition. Id. at 12. Claimant appealed the WCJ’s Decisions to the 

Board, which affirmed the WCJ’s order by Opinions and Orders dated October 26, 

2020. See C.R. Docket Entries 8 and 40. Claimant then filed the instant petition for 

review of the Board’s Orders.6

II.

On appeal, Claimant argues that the Board’s Opinions and Orders 

affirming the WCJ’s Decisions are not “proper” because

[t]he [Board] improperly failed to exercise its appellate 

function, as the WCJ’s Decision[s] w[ere] not supported 

by substantial evidence, w[ere] arbitrary and capricious 

verging on bias, and w[ere] erroneous as a matter of law, 

as [they] ignored significant evidence establishing [the] 

occurrence of a traumatic motor vehicle accident during 

the course of [Claimant]’s work for [Employer] on 

December 1, 2017, subsequently aggravated by work[-

]related occupational trauma to [Claimant]’s back 

culminating on July 11, 2018. The [D]ecision[s] should 

also be remanded because the [Board] erroneously and 

inaccurately misstated the WCJ’s Decision[s].

6

‘“Generally, agency-level decisions–such as those of the WCJ and [the Board] here–are 

to be affirmed on appeal so long as the essential findings are supported by substantial evidence 

and there has been no constitutional violation, procedural irregularity, or error of law.’ We defer 

to the factual findings of the WCJ, who, in the workers’ compensation context, is the ‘ultimate 

finder of fact and the exclusive arbiter of credibility and evidentiary weight.’” Department of 

Labor and Industry v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Lin and Eastern Taste), 187 A.3d 

914, 922 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).
15

Brief for Petitioner at 5.7

III.

Preliminarily, we note that “[t]he Board is generally viewed as a ‘body 

of appellate review,’ evaluating the propriety of the WCJ’s adjudication.” Gregory 

v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Narvon Builders), 926 A.2d 564, 568 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted). On appeal from a WCJ’s decision, the Board may 

only disregard the WCJ’s findings of fact if: (1) there is not competent evidence to 

sustain the WCJ’s necessary findings of fact, Universal Cyclops Steel Corporation 

v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Krawczynski), 305 A.2d 757, 761 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1973); (2) the WCJ’s findings of fact are insufficient, or the WCJ failed to 

make a finding of fact on a crucial issue necessary for the proper application of the 

Act, L&S Tasta Pizza, Inc. v. Lundy, 366 A.2d 592, 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976); or (3) 

the WCJ’s findings of fact are insufficient to enable the Board to determine why a

claimant failed to sustain his burden of proof, Armco, Inc. v. Workmen’s 

7 Pa. R.A.P. 2111(a)(4) provides that “[t]he brief of the appellant . . . shall consist of the 

following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the following order: . . . Statement of 

the questions involved.” In turn, Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a) states, in relevant part:

The statement of the questions involved must state concisely the 

issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of 

the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be 

deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised 

therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the 

statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.

Accordingly, to the extent that Claimant raises issues in his appellate brief that are not “fairly 

suggested” by the quoted Statement of Questions Involved, they are waived for purposes of appeal. 

See, e.g., Mooney v. Greater New Castle Development Corp., 510 A.2d 344, 348 n.4 (Pa. 1986)

(“The Superior Court refused to decide this question because it was not set forth in the statement 

of questions involved as required by Pa. R.A.P. 2116; and therefore, it was not properly before 

that court. For this reason, we will not consider the question.”).
16

Compensation Appeal Board (Carrodus), 590 A.2d 827, 831 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). 

The Board exceeds its appellate authority by expanding the breadth of the WCJ’s 

findings where that expansion is not supported by the record. Department of Labor 

and Industry v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Lin), 155 A.3d 103, 107-08

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), aff’d, 187 A.3d 914 (Pa. 2018).

Additionally, to sustain an award of benefits, a claimant has the burden 

to establish that he “suffered a work-related injury and that this injury resulted in” 

disability. Ruhl v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Mac-It Parts, Inc.), 611 

A.2d 327, 329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). Where an employer has issued a medical-only 

NCP, the burden is on a claimant seeking wage loss benefits to prove that the injury 

has resolved into a “disability” causing a loss of earning power. Orenich v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center), 863 

A.2d 165, 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). During the pendency of the claim petition, the 

claimant must demonstrate “that the injury continues to cause disability.” Ohm v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Caloric Corporation), 663 A.2d 883, 886 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). An employer has no obligation to present any evidence during 

a claim petition proceeding. Coyne v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Villanova University), 942 A.2d 939, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

Moreover, “[t]o succeed in a termination petition, the employer bears 

the burden of proving that the claimant’s disability has ceased and/or that any current 

disability is unrelated to the claimant’s work injury.” Paul v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Integrated Health Services), 950 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008). An employer satisfies its burden of proof to show that a claimant is 

fully recovered when the employer provides unequivocal medical testimony “that it 

is [the medical expert’s] opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
17

that the claimant is fully recovered, can return to work without restrictions, and that 

there are no objective medical findings which either substantiate the claims of pain 

or connect them to the work injury.” Udvari v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal 

Board (USAir, Inc.), 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 1997).

As outlined above, in this matter, the WCJ specifically credited the 

testimony of Employer’s medical expert, Sachs, to support her Decisions denying 

Claimant’s Claim Petitions and granting Employer’s Termination Petition. Sachs 

testified, in relevant part, as follows:

Q. Doctor, after the history you obtained from 

[Claimant], your physical examination findings and your 

review of medical records, did you render an opinion as to 

the condition of [Claimant] as of when you examined him 

on December 3, 2018?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was your opinion?

A. Resolved lumbosacral strain and sprain.

And I qualify that by saying I didn’t find any 

clinical evidence of lumbar strain and sprain or a disc 

abnormality and/or injury to the knee from either dates of 

injury, December 1[, 20]17[,] or July 11[, 20]18.

Q. And that’s true as of the date of your exam on 

December 3, 2018?

A. Correct.

Q. So you found no objective evidence of any injury at 

that point?

A. I did not.

Q. In terms of either injury date, does [Claimant] 

require any further medical care?
18

A. No.

Q. Does he require any restrictions of any kind as it 

pertains to his pre-injury job as a FedEx delivery man?

A. No.

Q. Doctor, how would you classify any right knee 

injury that [Claimant] may have sustained on December 1, 

2017, as alleged?

A. Well, I don’t know the mechanism of injury. So the 

only thing I could testify to is, by the time I saw him, I 

found no evidence of any residual injury.

Q. There was nothing to substantiate his ongoing 

complaints of non-specific pain to the right knee?

A. Correct.

Q. Doctor, you did review []Singer’s narrative report. 

And he has a litany of what he claims are work-related 

diagnoses as they relate to both dates of injury.

Do you agree or disagree with those diagnoses?

A. Disagree.

Q. And what’s the basis for your opinion in that 

regard?

A. So, again, there are subjective complaints, but I 

found no objective clinical evidence of residuals. And the 

MRI scan that I reviewed was kind of essentially benign, 

no cord or nerve root compression.

And kind of the -- you know, you can’t be claiming 

post-traumatic disc abnormalities and then go into the 

emergency room with no physical findings. So for all 

those reasons, I drew my conclusions.

Q. Doctor, even assuming for the sake of argument that 

[Claimant] sustained some sort of an aggravation or 

exacerbation on July 11, 2018, of his lumbar spine injury 

of December 1, 2017, as of the date of your examination, 
19

did you find any ongoing injury or condition of the lumbar 

spine in that regard?

A. No.

Q. Is there anything in the MRI study that would 

correlate or substantiate [Claimant’s] subjective 

complaints in terms of when he presented to you on 

December 3, 2018?

A. I found no evidence of that at the time of my clinical 

evaluation.

Q. And, Doctor, you classified the December 1, 2017 

injury to the lumbar spine as a strain and sprain?

A. Yes.

Q. And he achieved full recovery as of the date of your 

exam?

A. In my view.

Q. Doctor, have all of your opinions been expressed 

here today within a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty?

A. Yes.

Q. One last question, Doctor. Did you find any 

evidence in the records that you reviewed of [Claimant 

being] placed under any formal work restrictions after 

either of these two incidents?

A. No.

R.R. at 167a-71a.

In reviewing the foregoing testimony, this Court has explained:

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion. Hoffmaster v. Workers’ Compensation 
20

Appeal Board (Senco Products, Inc.), 721 A.2d 1152 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998). In performing a substantial evidence 

analysis, this Court must view the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the party [that] prevailed before the factfinder.

Id. Moreover, we are to draw all reasonable inferences 

which are deducible from the evidence in support of the 

factfinder’s decision in favor of that prevailing party. Id.

Furthermore, in a substantial evidence analysis where both 

parties present evidence, it does not matter that there is 

evidence in the record which supports a factual finding 

contrary to that made by the WCJ; rather, the pertinent 

inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports 

the WCJ’s factual finding. Id. It is solely for the WCJ, as 

the factfinder, to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts 

in the evidence. In addition, it is solely for the WCJ, as 

the factfinder, to determine what weight to give to any 

evidence. Id. As such, the WCJ may reject the testimony 

of any witness in whole or in part, even if that testimony 

is uncontradicted. Id.

Sharkey v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Federal Express), 786 A.2d 

1035, 1038 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (emphasis added).

Sachs’ testimony, coupled with the corroborating testimony of 

Rangnow and the corroborating text messages between Claimant and Rangnow,

provides competent substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s Decisions in this 

matter. When viewed in a light most favorable to Employer, and drawing all 

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, this evidence supports the WCJ’s 

determination that Claimant failed to meet his burden of proving that he sustained 

an ongoing disabling work-related injury to support the award of workers’ 

compensation benefits, and that Employer was entitled to the termination of 

Claimant’s benefits as of December 3, 2018. It is of no moment that Claimant 

presented evidence that would support contrary conclusions, as it was solely for the 

WCJ to assess the credibility of the evidence that was presented and to accept it as 

credible, or reject it as not credible, even if it was uncontradicted. In short, we will 
21

not accede to Claimant’s request to review the WCJ’s credibility determinations in 

this regard, and the Board did not abdicate its appellate function by refusing to accept 

Claimant’s evidence over that offered by Employer as a basis to reverse the WCJ’s 

Decisions.

IV.

A review for capricious disregard of competent evidence is an 

appropriate component of appellate review in any case in which the question is 

properly raised before a court. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation

Appeal Board (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478, 487 (Pa. 2002). A capricious disregard of 

evidence occurs where the “findings reflect a deliberate disregard of competent 

evidence that logically could not have been avoided in reaching the decision . . . .” 

Pryor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Colin Service Systems), 923 A.2d 

1197, 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Where substantial evidence supports the findings, 

and those findings support the conclusions, it should remain a rare instance where 

an appellate court disturbs an adjudication based on capricious disregard. 

Wintermyer, 812 A.2d at 487. As a result, capricious disregard of evidence occurs 

when the fact finder ignores relevant, competent evidence. Williams v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2004). However, capricious disregard does not exist when a WCJ has 

considered and rejected evidence. Id.

Contrary to Claimant’s assertions, as outlined above, the WCJ 

considered and rejected Claimant’s evidence regarding the severity of the injury 

resulting from the December 1, 2017 accident and that he sustained a work-related 

injury on July 11, 2018. This rejection of Claimant’s evidence does not constitute a 
22

capricious disregard of such evidence. See, e.g., Williams, 862 A.2d at 145 (“[T]he 

WCJ did not deliberately ignore [the medical expert’s] testimony–as evidenced by 

the WCJ’s extensive summation thereof in [the f]inding [of fact], which includes a 

summation of [the expert’s] testimony on direct and cross-examinations–but merely 

considered, and then rejected as not credible, said evidence. Such an express 

consideration and rejection, by definition, is not capricious disregard.”).

As articulated above, the WCJ is the ultimate fact finder, and as such 

has complete authority over credibility determinations and the weighing of evidence. 

Department of Labor and Industry, 187 A.3d at 922. Where medical experts testify 

by deposition, a WCJ’s resolution of conflicting evidence must be supported by 

more than a statement that one expert is deemed more credible than another. Dorsey 

v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Crossing Construction Co.), 893 A.2d 

191, 194-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). “Some articulation of the actual objective basis 

for the credibility determination must be offered for the decision to be a ‘reasoned’

one which facilitates effective appellate review.” Id. at 194-95 (quoting Daniels v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Tristate Transport), 828 A.2d 1043, 1053

(Pa. 2003)). There are countless objective factors that may support a WCJ’s 

credibility determinations, and such factors must be identified in the WCJ’s decision. 

Dorsey, 893 A.2d 195. 

Nevertheless, we have repeatedly stressed that Section 422(a) of the 

Act8 does not permit a party to challenge or second-guess a WCJ’s reasons for 

8 Section 422(a) of the Act states that

[a]ll parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned 

decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based 

upon the evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and 

explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine why 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
23

credibility determinations. Id.; Kasper v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board 

(Perloff Brothers, Inc.), 769 A.2d 1243, 1244 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In Kasper, we 

declined the claimant’s “invitation to individually scrutinize each of the WCJ’s 

reasons for his credibility determination.” Id. We explained that 

[d]eciding credibility is the quintessential function of the 

fact-finder, particularly one who sees and hears the 

testimony. It is not an exact science, and the ultimate 

conclusion comprises far more than a tally sheet of its 

various components. We will not take the statutory 

mandate that a WCJ explain reasons for discrediting 

evidence as a license to undermine the exercise of this 

critical function by second guessing one or more of its 

constituent parts.

Id. (footnote omitted).

Moreover, where, as here, Claimant, Wilson, and Rangnow testified in 

person before the WCJ, the WCJ could base her credibility determinations upon her 

observation of these witnesses during the course of their testimony. As our Supreme 

Court has explained:

[W]hen the issue involves the credibility of contradictory 

witnesses who have actually testified before the WCJ, it is 

appropriate for the [WCJ] to base his or her determination 

upon the demeanor of the witnesses. In such an instance, 

there often is not much to say, nor is there a need to say 

and how a particular result was reached. The [WCJ] shall specify 

the evidence upon which the [WCJ] relies and state the reasons for 

accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced with 

conflicting evidence, the [WCJ] must adequately explain the reasons 

for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted 

evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an irrational 

reason; the [WCJ] must identify that evidence and explain 

adequately the reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall 

provide the basis for meaningful appellate review.

77 P.S. §834.
24

much, in order for a reviewing body to determine that the 

decision was reasoned. Such a credibility determination 

may involve nothing more than the fact[]finder’s on-thespot, and oftentimes instinctive, determination that one 

witness is more credible than another. The basis for the 

conclusion that certain testimony has the “ring of truth,” 

while other testimony does not, may be difficult or 

impossible to articulate-but that does not make such 

judgments invalid or unworthy of deference. To the 

contrary, people routinely undertake affairs of 

consequence based upon their judgment of the credibility 

and reliability of others, or their assessment of the mettle 

and character of the persons with whom they are dealing.

Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1052-53. In sum then, unless made arbitrarily or capriciously, 

a WCJ’s credibility determinations will not be disturbed when the basis for such is 

present in the record on appeal. Empire Steel Castings, Inc. v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Cruceta), 749 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

After careful review of the certified record in this matter, we conclude 

that the WCJ’s credibility determinations are supported by ample substantial record 

evidence. Moreover, as outlined above, the WCJ extensively and exhaustively 

outlined the reasons for her credibility determinations, and, as a result, these 

determinations are not subject to our appellate review. Thus, we find the Board did 

not abdicate its appellate function or err by affirming the WCJ’s Decisions in this 

regard.

V.

Finally, the Board did not erroneously and inaccurately misstate the 

WCJ’s Decisions. Claimant first asserts that the Board erred in determining that the 

WCJ did not commit error by failing to render credibility determinations regarding 

Claimant’s consistent testimony at his unemployment compensation hearing that 

corroborates the evidence submitted in support of his Claim Petitions herein. 
25

However, Claimant submitted the transcript of the unemployment compensation 

hearing solely for the limited purpose of rebutting Rangnow’s testimony during the 

instant proceedings. Specifically, Claimant’s counsel argued for the admission of 

the transcript as follows:

[Counsel]: I would submit, Your Honor, that [Rangnow] 

certainly had the opportunity to have counsel present. It 

actually states that in the transcript. He voluntarily waived 

his right to counsel at that hearing. It is testimony given 

under oath and, therefore, I submit that it is admissible.

[WCJ]: You are representing to me that there’s 

evidence in here --

[Counsel]: Discrepancies between the --

[WCJ]: So it’s rebuttal.

[Counsel]: Rebuttal, correct.

[WCJ]: I am going to admit it.

[Counsel]: Thank you, Judge.

R.R. at 303a-04a.

Accordingly, in her Decisions, the WCJ stated that the unemployment 

compensation hearing transcript “was admitted solely for purposes of rebutting 

[Rangnow’s] testimony.” C.R. Docket Entries 5 and 37 at 9. The WCJ further found 

that “Rangnow’s testimony at the unemployment compensation hearing was 

substantially similar to his testimony before this [WCJ].” Id. Thus, the Board did 

not improperly state that the WCJ did not err in failing to make credibility 

determinations with respect to Claimant’s testimony at the unemployment 

compensation hearing because the transcript at that hearing was not admitted to 
26

bolster Claimant’s testimony in this matter, but solely to impeach Rangnow’s 

testimony in these proceedings. 

Claimant next submits that the Board misstated the WCJ’s decision by 

indicating that the WCJ found Wilson’s testimony not credible because it conflicted 

with Rangnow’s testimony when, in fact, the WCJ found that Wilson’s testimony 

was not credible based solely on his comportment and demeanor. However, as 

outlined above, in her Decisions, the WCJ based her credibility determination on 

both Wilson’s comportment and demeanor and the inconsistency of Wilson’s 

testimony with Rangnow’s credible testimony. As the WCJ stated that, “[h]aving 

observed []Wilson’s comportment and demeanor during testimony and having 

reviewed the evidence of record in its entirety, this [WCJ] finds []Wilson’s 

testimony to be less than credible where it is inconsistent with the credible testimony 

of []Rangnow.” C.R. Docket Entries 5 and 37 at 9-10.

Claimant also asserts that the Board misstated the WCJ’s Decisions by 

excusing her failure to make necessary credibility determinations regarding non-live 

testimony, i.e., testimony that he gave at the October 30, 2018 deposition and at the 

unemployment compensation hearing. However, as noted above, the transcript of 

the unemployment compensation hearing was admitted solely to rebut Rangnow’s

testimony in these proceedings so no credibility determination with respect to 

Claimant’s testimony therein was required. Regarding Claimant’s deposition 

testimony, again, the WCJ based her credibility determination both on his 

comportment and demeanor at the in-person hearing and its inconsistency with 

Rangnow’s in-person testimony and the medical evidence. See C.R. Docket Entries 

5 and 37 at 9. As a result, the Board did not misstate the WCJ’s Decisions regarding

her credibility determination of Claimant’s in-person and deposition testimony.
27

Accordingly, the Board’s Orders are affirmed.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christopher Burton, :

:

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 1152 C.D. 2020

: 

RSVB Couriers (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

:

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of April, 2022, the Orders of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board dated October 26, 2020, are AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge