1 – OPINION AND ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MARY C. BENAFEL,

Plaintiff, Civ. No. 6:16-cv-273-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., 

Defendant.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff Mary C. Benafel brings this action against Williams Northwest Pipeline

(“Williams”), the United States Department of Transportation (the “DOT”), the City of Eugene 

and members of the City Council (the “City”), William David and Shannon G. Tom (the 

“Toms”), and multiple affiliated individuals. Benafel brings claims under the Civil Rights Act of 

1871 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988) and the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the named 

Defendants conspired to violate her civil rights and took her property without just compensation.

Benafel seeks removal of the Williams Northwest Pipeline pigging station from her property, 

restoration of the property, and just compensation for the alleged taking and inverse 

condemnation.

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2 – OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants argue, among other things, that Benafel’s claims are barred by preclusion and

various statutes of limitations. Because those issues are dispositive, I do not address the other

arguments. Because Benafel’s claims have already been adjudicated in state court and are barred 

by multiple statutes of limitations, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 131, 23, 28, 37, 

are GRANTED. The requests for oral argument are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In 2007, Williams installed a pigging station on Benafel’s property, which is located in a 

subdivision in Eugene, Oregon. Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. Williams constructed a pig 

receiver, fence, road, and driveway, which Benafel claims violates local zoning laws, has caused 

loss of trees and vegetation, and was built over an aquifer. Id. Benafel reported the site to the 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) on October 8, 2009. Id. at ¶ 6. Benafel also 

brought suit in Lane County Circuit Court and appealed to the Court of Appeals of the State of 

Oregon, which affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants. Id. at ¶ 9; 

See Ex. J, ECF No. 30–10.

Benafel claims that the Toms, her neighbors, conspired with Williams to change the 

construction site from their property to Benafel’s in exchange for money. Id. at ¶ 10. Benafel 

also claims that the City gave Williams false permits allowing Williams to construct an apron, an 

eight-foot fence, and a road to the facility. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12, 13, 14. Benafel asserts that the City’s

and the Toms’ actions devalued her property and cost her time and money. Id. at ¶ 12. Lastly, 

Benafel claims that the DOT is guilty of gross negligence and willful misconduct. Id. at ¶ 17. 

Benafel seeks removal of the pigging facility, restoration of the property, $570,000 in 

compensatory damages, punitive damages, and court costs. Id. at ¶ 18. 

 

1 Because the Toms’ arguments are not materially different from the other Defendants’ arguments, I treat the Toms’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, as a Motion to Dismiss. 

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3 – OPINION AND ORDER

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may dismiss a claim at any time if it fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may 

generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the 

Complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Swartz v. KPMG, LLP, 476 F.3d 

756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a Complaint must contain more 

than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A Complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible when the factual 

allegations give rise to a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged 

misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). However, the factual allegations must 

allow the court to infer more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679.When 

considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a 

court should view all allegations made in the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Sun Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987). A court need not, 

however, accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss primarily on the basis of preclusion and multiple statutes of 

limitations. First, the Toms move for summary judgment, in part, because the Circuit Court ruled 

that Williams did not trespass on Benafel’s property as a matter of law. Defs.’ Mot., 4, 5, ECF 

No. 13. Similarly, Williams argues that this suit is barred by claim and issue preclusion. Defs.’

Mot., 9, ECF No. 28. Williams requests that this Court take judicial notice of the court filings 

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4 – OPINION AND ORDER

from Mary Benafel v. Williams Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline, LLC, et al, Lane County Circuit

Court Case No. 161305954 and Mary Benafel v. Williams Pacific Connector Gas Pipeline, LLC, 

et al, Oregon Court of Appeals Case No. A156288. See Req. for Jud. Not., ECF No. 30.

Second, the Toms argue that this action falls outside the six-year statute of limitations for 

trespass because the alleged wrongdoing occurred in 2007. Defs.’ Mot., 7, ECF No. 13. The City 

and Williams argue that Benafel’s § 1983 claim fails because it is subject to Oregon’s two-year 

statute of limitations. Defs.’ Mot., 4, ECF No. 23; Defs.’ Mot., 8, ECF No. 28. The DOT argues 

that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) carries a two-year statute of limitations and any other 

claim against the United States would be barred by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a)’s six-year “catch-all” 

statute of limitations. Defs.’ Mot., 4, ECF No. 37. I address each argument in turn. 

I. Preclusion

Defendants argue that this action is barred by claim and issue preclusion because Benafel

already brought this case in state court. “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an 

action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been 

raised in that action.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Similarly, collateral estoppel

prevents relitigation of an issue of fact or law under a new cause of action that has already been 

decided in a prior court proceeding involving a party from the first case. Id. The Full Faith and 

Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to give state court judgments the same 

preclusive effect that the law of the state where the judgment was rendered would give. Gonzales 

v. California Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Defendants argue that Benafel’s claims are barred by both claim prelusion (res judicata)

and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). In support of these arguments, Williams asks this 

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5 – OPINION AND ORDER

Court to take judicial notice of filings from the related Lane County and Oregon Court of 

Appeals cases. See Req. for Jud. Not., ECF No. 30.

In general, courts may not consider material outside of the in ruling on a motion to 

dismiss unless the motion is treated as one for summary judgment and the parties are “given 

reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.” 

Jacobson v. AEG Capital Corp., 50 F.3d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1995). However, courts may take 

judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. 

Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d, 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). It is “proper to take judicial notice of 

court filings in a state court case where the same plaintiff asserted similar and related claims.” In 

re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Burbank–

Glendale–Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir.1998)).

Benafel asserted similar and related claims against Williams in state court, which she reiterated 

on appeal. Therefore, this Court takes judicial notice of Exhibits 1–11 to Williams’ Request for 

Judicial Notice. 

A. Claim Preclusion

Defendants’ first argument under preclusion is that Benafel’s claims should be dismissed 

because she has already brought them in state court. A plaintiff may not bring an action against 

the same defendant twice where the second claim is based on the same factual transaction as the 

first, seeks an additional or alternative remedy, and could have been joined in the first action. 

Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or. 134, 140 (1990). Claim preclusion does not require actual 

litigation, nor does it require that the determination of the issue was essential to the outcome of 

the proceeding. Id. Claim preclusion only requires that the Plaintiff had the opportunity to litigate

and that there was a final judgment in the first action. Id. 

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6 – OPINION AND ORDER

Williams correctly argues that Benafel’s immediate action is based on the same factual 

transaction that was litigated to final judgment in state court and the Court of Appeals. Defs.’

Mot., 13, ECF No. 28. Benafel already sued Williams for trespass, ejectment, nuisance, 

negligence, and inverse condemnation/taking, Ex. A, 1, ECF No. 30–1, based on Williams’ 

construction of the same pigging facility, road, apron, and fence, Id. at 3. Benafel already alleged 

in her motion for summary judgment in state court that Williams and the Toms arranged for the 

pigging facility to be built on Benafel’s property, Defs.’ Mot., 10, ECF No. 28; Ex. D, 20, ECF 

No. 30–4, and that the City issued false permits to Williams, Defs.’ Mot., 1, ECF No. 28; Ex. D, 

17 n.4, ECF No. 30–4.

Benafel does not dispute this fact. Rather, she responds that the state court did not reach 

the merits of her claims because it granted Williams’ motion for summary judgment on the basis 

that she lacked standing to sue because she was not the owner of the property at the time the 

pigging facility was installed. Pl.’s Resp., ¶ 12, ECF No. 36. However, Williams’ motion for 

summary judgment, which the state court granted, also argued that its installation of the pigging

facility was within the express terms of the easement. Ex. B, 7, ECF No. 30–2. Furthermore, the 

Court of Appeals concluded that Williams’ actions were lawful under the easement. Ex. K, 1, 

ECF No. 30–11.

Benafel acknowledges that she already brought these claims in state court but seems to 

view this Court as yet another platform to seek redress. See Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 9, ECF No. 1. To the 

contrary, this Court is not a forum for plaintiffs to re-file unsuccessful state court actions, and the 

Full Faith and Credit Act requires this Court to give preclusive effect to state court judgments. 

Because Benafel has already brought these claims against Williams at the state and appellate 

court level, Benafel’s claims against Williams are DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

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7 – OPINION AND ORDER

B. Issue Preclusion 

Defendants’ second argument under preclusion is that Benafel’s claims should be 

dismissed because the issues have already been litigated in state court. “Issue preclusion arises in 

a subsequent proceeding when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final 

determination in a prior proceeding.” Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 318 Or. 99, 103 

(1993). Issue preclusion applies when the following five requirements are met: (1) the issue in 

the two proceedings is identical; (2) the issue was litigated and was essential to the outcome of 

the prior proceeding; (3) the party to be precluded has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard 

on the issue; (4) the party to be precluded was party to or in privity with a party to the prior 

proceeding; and (5) the prior proceeding was of the kind that this Court will give preclusive 

effect to. Id. at 104. 

Williams correctly argues that the state court’s decision, which was affirmed by the 

Oregon Court of Appeals, already determined that Williams’ actions were lawful under the 

express terms of its 1964 easement. Defs.’ Mot., 3, 14, ECF No. 28; Ex. K, 1, ECF No. 30–11. 

The Toms argue that because the state court found that Williams did not commit a trespass as a 

matter of law, the Toms cannot be liable for conspiracy to commit unlawful trespass. Defs.’

Mot., 5–6, ECF No. 13. I agree and find that the central issue of whether Williams acted within 

its rights when it constructed the pigging facility also determines whether the City may be liable 

for conspiracy and inverse condemnation. I find that this issue is identical in the two 

proceedings, has already been litigated, and was essential to the outcome of the state and 

appellate court proceedings. I also find that Benafel has had a full and fair opportunity to be 

heard on the issue and that she was a party to the prior proceedings. Furthermore, the state and 

appellate court proceedings were of the kind that this Court must give preclusive effect to. 

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8 – OPINION AND ORDER

Because each of these requirements are met, Benafel’s claims are barred by issue preclusion. 

Therefore, Benafel’s claims against Williams, the Toms, and the City are DISMISSED, with 

prejudice.

II. Statutes of Limitations 

Defendants move to dismiss due to several statutes of limitations that bar Benafel’s 

trespass, § 1983, and federal tort claims.

A. Trespass 

The Toms argue that Benafel’s action for trespass is barred by a six-year statute of 

limitations. Indeed, an action for taking, detaining, or injuring another’s personal property or for 

the recovery thereof must be brought within six years. ORS § 12.080(4). Benafel submitted a 

complaint to FERC on October 8, 2009. Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. That declaration includes 

claims that the Toms received money from Williams and that the original plan was to build the 

pigging facility on their property instead. Defs.’ Mot., 7, ECF 13. Therefore, Benafel knew of the

alleged conspiracy for nearly seven years before filing this complaint on February 16, 2016. See

Pl.’s Compl., ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiff vaguely responds that the Toms “raise issues of state law not yet ripe for 

adjudication.” Pl.’s Resp., ¶ 8, ECF No. 33. One may raise a statute of limitations defense in a 

motion for dismissal or summary judgment if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of 

the complaint, or if the trial court is willing to accept matters outside of the pleadings. Jablon v. 

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1980). Benafel’s complaint clearly centers 

around events that occurred in 2007, which she must have been aware of by the time she filed a 

complaint to FERC in 2009. Therefore, Benafel’s claim against the Toms is barred by Oregon’s

six-year statute of limitations for trespass and is DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

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9 – OPINION AND ORDER

B. Civil Rights Act § 1983

The City moves to dismiss Benafel’s § 1983 claim because it is barred by a two-year 

statute of limitations. Defs.’ Mot., 4, ECF No. 23. Williams also moves to dismiss Benafel’s § 

1983 claim and explains that, although § 1983 itself does not contain a statute of limitations, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that “Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions 

applies to actions under 42 USC § 1983.” Defs.’ Mot., 8, ECF No. 28 (quoting Cooper v. City of 

Ashland, 871 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Benafel responds that Cooper does not apply because Cooper had a previous claim in 

federal court prior to the state court action that led to the case cited. Pl.’s Resp., ¶ 11, ECF No. 

36. Benafel also argues that Cooper does not apply because Williams is a private corporation 

without the same immunities as the City of Ashland. Id. The City correctly replies that Cooper’s 

previous claim was not the basis for the holding in Cooper, and that the statute of limitations for 

§ 1983 actions in Oregon is two years regardless. Defs.’ Reply, 2, ECF No. 40. 

Benafel alleges that the City’s wrongdoings occurred May through June of 2007. Pl.’s 

Compl., ¶ 12, ECF No. 1. In her FERC complaint, Benafel described Williams’ alleged 

conspiracy with the Toms and construction of the pigging facility as having occurred in 2007. 

Pl.’s Resp., ¶ 12, ECF No. 33. Therefore, Benafel’s window of time to sue either Defendant

closed in 2009. But even if the statute of limitations period began from the time Benafel filed her

FERC complaint, it ran on October 8, 2011, years before Benafel filed this action. Therefore, 

Benafel’s § 1983 claims against Williams and the City are DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

C. Federal Tort Claims Act 

The DOT argues that Benafel cannot bring a tort claim against the government because 

she is barred by a two-year statute of limitations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 

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10 – OPINION AND ORDER

and a six-year “catch-all” statute of limitations for any claim against the United States. Defs.’

Mot., 4, ECF No. 37. 

A plaintiff must present a tort claim against the United States in writing within two years 

after the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Benafel claims that the DOT is guilty of gross 

negligence and willful misconduct, Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 17, ECF No. 1, although it is unclear what 

conduct she bases those claims on. Benafel simply cites communications between her appraiser 

and the DOT in April 2008, Id. at ¶ 15, and a July 2009 email from the president of Californians 

Against Renewable Energy to the DOT on Benafel’s behalf detailing the DOT’s allegedly flawed 

position that Williams had acted within its legal right, Id. at ¶ 16. Assuming that the DOT’s 

alleged misconduct occurred between those two dates, Benafel’s claim is barred by the two-year 

statute of limitations for tort claims against the federal government. 

Even if Benafel’s allegations of gross negligence and willful misconduct were not tort

claims, she would still be barred by a six-year statute of limitations for all claims against the 

federal government. Every civil action against the United States must be filed within six years 

after the claim accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). If the statute of limitations period began as late as 

July 2009, any claims brought after July 2015 are barred. Therefore, Benafel’s claims against the 

DOT are DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 13, 23, 28, 37, 

are GRANTED. Benafel’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.

____/s/ Michael McShane______

Michael J. McShane

United States District Judge

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