### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ugus t 16 , 200 7 S es sio n

JE RRY BUNDY

v. F IR ST TE N N ES SE E B A N K N A TI ON A L A SS OC IA TI ON d /b /a

FIRST TENNESS EE EQ UIT Y LENDING
An Appeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-007084-03 K ay S. Robil io, Jud ge

No. W2006-02565-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 13, 2007

This is an ag e and se x discrimination case

. T h e fi ft y -ni ne-year old male plaintiff wor

ked for the defe ndant bank a s a loan off icer . I n April 2003, he attempted to proce ss a loan for a customer

and did not disclose t o the bank underwriting department documents he had rec eived from the customer. When t h i s was discove red, the plaintiff was pla ced unde r investig ation. His employ ment was ultimately

terminated f

or violating bank policy

. The plainti ff filed this lawsuit, alleg ing ag e and sex discrimination. The bank f iled a motion for summary judgme nt, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, or that the b a nk ’ s le g it im a

ten o n
- d isc riminatory

rea son for ter minating him was pretextual. The trial court gra nted s ummary

judgme nt in favor of

the bank. The plaintiff nowappea ls. W e af firm, conc luding that the pla intiff submitt ed insuffic ient evidenc e to e sta bli shthe fo ur

th e le me nt o f h is prima facie case , that he wa s either repla ced by an employ ee outside the protec ted class, or that he was treated less favor ably than a similarly

situated employ ee outside the protec ted class.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Aff irm ed

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co urt, in w h ic hW. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

D anM

. N o r

w o o d an d D av i d B

. S t e v e n s o n , M e m

p h i s , T e n n e s s e e , f

o r th e a p p e l l an t , J e r

r y B u n dy.

Fr eder ick J . L ewis and Whitney K. Fog erty , Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, F irst Tennesse e Ba n k Na t i o n al As s o ci at i o nd

/ b / a F i rs tT en n es s ee E qu i ty L en d i n g.

### -2

- OP IN ION

I n 1993, the Plaint i ff / Appellant Jerry

Bundy (“B undy ”) be g an wor king f or De fe nd ant/Ap pe lle e F ir st T e nn e sse e B ank Natio nal As soci a tio n d /b/ a F ir st T e nn e sse e Eq

uit y L e nd ing (“ the B ank ” ) as a loa n off ic e r. Ea rl y in 200 2, he vo luntari ly qu it to wor k els e wh e re

. In July 2002, the B ank re hired B u ndy , ag ain as a loan offic er. A t the time Bundy was re hired, he was approximately

fifty -nine (59) y ear s old.

As a loan o f f ic e r , B u n dy

w a s th e p r im ar

y c o n ta c t b e tw e e nth e B an k an d c u s to me r s who soug ht loans at the Ba

nk. He took the initial information from the customer, e lectronic ally rec orded that information, gathered the r equire d documentation fr om the customer, a nd forwa rded that i n fo rm at i o n to the Ba

nk Under writing Depa

rtment for a

n initial or prequalific ation deter mination as to whethe r the c ustomer qualified f or the loan.

Gene rally , the B ank offe rs three ty pes of loans to its customers: (1) a Stated Income loan, ( 2)

a No I nc ome Ve ri fi c a tio n loan, and (3 ) a F ull Do c ume ntatio n lo an. Th e Sta te d Inc ome loa

n is a “ fa st trac k” loan with minimal documentation. The bor rowe r is require d only to file a signe d Tax Form 45 06 , w hic h p e rm its the g ov e rnme nt t o p ull a c us tom e r’ s tax re tur

ns fo r a pe ri od of sixty da y s, if need be, and a

h o me o w n e r s ’ in s u r an c e a u th o r iz a ti o nf

o r m. I t i s a

p p r o v e d b a s e d o n ly o nthe borrowe r’s stated inc ome; the borrow er ne ed not file doc umen t at i o n t o substantiate his claimed income. In contra st, the Full Disclosure loa n require s documentation of income for a pproval. F or a No Income Ve rification loan, the loan offic er doe s not question the customer as to their income. Th e F ull Di sc los ur e and

No I nc ome Ve ri fi c a tio n lo ans c an ta ke fo ur to s ix we e ks fo r a

pp ro va l, whil e State d Inc ome loa

ns us ua lly take on ly tw o to thr e e we e ks to p ro c e ss.

Th e B ank ha d w ri tt e n guid e lin e s f

or the dif fe re nt t y pe s o f l oa ns , b ut t he y we re su bje c t to verba l chang es. In ear ly

2003, Bundy

asked B ank mana g ers Ne il Kane ( “Ka ne”) and Curt Gwa ltney (“G waltney”) f

or a copy of the B ank’s updated guidelines manual, but wa s told that they “hadn’ t g otten them y et.” To protec t themselves aga inst g uideline vi olations, some loan office rs, including Bundy , had borr ower s provide a sig ned wr itten statement reg ardingincome prior to final approva l of their loan. T he loan office rs wer e told by their super iors that this practice was unne cessa ry , and in fac t were told to st op requiringsuch a written statement.
On Saturday , April 19, 2003, Bundy was discussinga loan with a c ustomer and sug g ested that the customer a

pply for a S t at ed I n come loan. Bundy faxed the re quired a

pplication and

a u th o r iz a ti o nf

o r ms to th e c u s to me r

to f il l o u t. T h e a

p p li c a ti o nan d

f o r ms w e r e to b e r e tu

r n e d b y f a x. On Monday , April 21, 2003, Bundy came to work and pic ked up the doc uments that had bee n faxed to him by the customer. I

n addition to the items B undy had reque sted, the customer f axed some tax returns. The tax returns indicated that the c ustomer had less income than he had claimed. B undy

wa s a wa re tha t, u nd e r the Ba

nk ’s po lic ie s and

g uid e lin e s, if

the B ank

re c e ive d a

ny inc ome docume n tati o nf

r o m a c u s to me r s e e k in g a

St a te d In c o me lo an , h e w a s r e n d e r e d in e li g ib le f

o r the State d Inc ome loa

n p ro gr a m

. N e v e r the le ss, wh e n B un dy

re c e ive d th e c us tom e r’ s in c ome ta x re tur ns , he did not conver

t the loan to a Full Disclosure loan and submit the tax re turns with the application.D avi d Schaf f , a B ank empl oy ee l ocat ed i n D al l as , T exa s , al s o part i ci pat ed i n t he i nt er vi ew by t el ephone. 1



### -3

- I ns te a d, B un dy

se t a sid e the c us tom e r’ s ta x r e tur n do c ume nts a t his de sk

and c on tin ue d to pr oc e ss the loan as a

Stated I ncome loan.
Subsequently , the B ank’s Unde rwritingDepa rtment discover ed a disc repa ncy in the re ntal inc ome re po rt e d b y

the c us tom e r an d advis e d Bu nd y that the loa

n wou ld ne e d to be pr oc e sse d a s a Full Disclosure loan. At that point, Bundy took the t ax return documents he had rec eived f rom the customer, whic h he had kept in his desk, and g ave them to the Ba nk Under writing Depa

rtment for pr oc e ssi ng . B ank

pe rs onne l in

Un de rwri tin g no tic e d that the date on the faxed ta x re tur n d oc ume nts was Apr il 19, 2003, even thoug h the loan application was dated A pril 21, 2003.

When Sherrie Cana day

(“Cana day”), a

vice pr esident at the B ank in her late thirties, learne d th at Bund y ha d h e ld b a c k th e c us tom e r’ s tax re tur ns and c on tin ue d to pr oc e ss t

he loa n a s a State I ncome loan, she ref

erred t h e m at t er to the B ank’s Qua lity Control Depar

tment. There afte r, Clay Ba rnett (“ Ba rnett”) , a loss preve ntion office r wit h the Bank’s Corporate Secur ity Depa rtment, was tol d a bo ut B un dy ’s tr e a tme nt o f t he loa n, and he c on du c te d a

n inve sti g a tio n o f t

he inc ide nt. Th is was the se cond refer

ral that Ba

rnett had rec eived on a loan proc essed by Bundy within a one-w eek period.
As part of

his in vestig ation, Ba

rnett interview ed B undy . In the interview , Bundy

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t pr oc e ssi ngthe loa n a s a State d Inc ome loan was a mi sta ke and that he sh ou ld have pr oc e sse d it

a s a F ull Do c ume ntatio n lo an. Af te r t he int e rv ie w, B un dy

wr ote a state me nt, 1 dated Ma y 8, 2003, in which he acknow ledg ed his conduct and admitted that he had made a mistake, that his conduct was “wr ong ,” and that he shoul d have chang ed the loan from a Stated Income loan to a Full Doc umentation loan. He a pologized for

his er ro r and a sked that he be forg iven and permitted to kee p his job.

Af te r B arn e tt’ s inve sti g a tio n o f B un dy ’s ha nd lin g of the loa

n w a s c omp le te , B arn e tt m e t w ith

mana g e r G wa ltn e y

and Carr oll Mc Cor

mic k ( “ Mc Cor

mic k” ), a re pr e se ntativ e of

Em plo y e e Se rv ic e s, to dis c u s s th e matt e r

. O n M ay 9 , 2 0 0 3 , B un dy w a s te r mi n a te d f o r v io lati o n o f e s ta

b li s hed B ank policy

.
On Dec ember

13, 2003, Bundy

filed this lawsuit ag ainst the Ba nk, alleg ing that the Ba

nk had unlawfully

terminated him based on ag e and sex di scrimination in violation of the Tennesse e Human Rights Act, Te nnessee Code Annotated §§ 4- 21-101, et seq . (“the Human Rig hts Act” or “ the Act” ). Bundy asser ted t hat he and several other older male loan officers were single d out for investig ation of their proce ssing of

loans by the B ank’s two young er f emale vic e pre sidents, and he a lleg ed that this w a s d o n e b e c a

u s e th e y w e r e ma le an d

o v e r a g e f o rty

. H e c la im e d

th a t f e ma le lo ano f

f ic ers and/or young er loa

n office rs had pr ocesse d loans in a manne r not in compliance with Ba nk policy and we re not ter

min at ed , an d t hat in the y ear following his termination he was r eplac ed by ind ivi du als who were fe ma le and /or muc h young e r. B un dy

no te d h is e xce lle nt w or

k r e c or d a s a Ba nk loan offic er, a

nd asser ted that firinghim based on the one alleg ed incident of violating Ba nkIn oral argument on ap p eal , B und y a p p e a re d to c o nt end t hat he was as ser t i ng a cl ai m of “age pl us sex” 2
d i scr i m i nat i o n, rat her t han cl ai m s o f a ge d i scr i m i nat i o n a nd / o r sex d i scr i m i nat i o n. It is unc l ear how t hi s wo ul d change

our an al y s i s , but we f

i nd no ind i ca t i o n i n t he r ecor d t hat B un dy as s er t ed s uch a c l ai m i n t he t r i al cour t bel ow. I s s ues
c a n n o t b e ra ise d fo r th e fi rs t t im e o n a p p e a l. See Ci t y of Co ok evi ll e ex r el

. Co ok evi lle Regi ona l

M ed. Ct r . v. H um phrey , 1 2 6 S.W

. 3 d 89 7 , 90 5

- 0 6 (T enn. 20 0 4 ).


### -4

- policy was actually

a pre text for ter

minating his employ

ment based on his ag e and his sex. Bundy

so ug ht i nju

nc tiv e re lie f, dama g e s o f $ 1, 00 0, 00 0, and re a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Discover y ensued. The parties took the de positions of Bundy and seve ral o t h er Ba

nk employ ees involved in Bundy ’s t ermination. On J uly 31, 2006, the B ank filed a motion for summary judgme nt. The B ank ar g ued that it was e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt beca

use B undy

could not establish the required ele ments of a pr im a fa c ie case for a g e or se x discrimination. Specifica lly , the Ba nk contende d that Bundy could n o t s h ow that he wa s qualified for the position, or that he was

re pla c e d b y

an e mpl oy e e wh o wa s subs tanti a lly y oung e r an d/o r f e ma le , o r t

hat he wa s tr e a te d le ss favor ably than a similarly

situated employ ee who was substantially y oung er a

nd/or fema le. In the alternative, the B ank ar g ued that it had shown a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for ter

minating B undy ’s employ

ment, namely

his admitted violation of Bank policy , and that B undy had no evide nce that this reason wa s pretextual.

I n response to the Ba

nk’s motion, Bundy submitt ed evidenc e showing his qualifications as a B an k lo ano f f ic e r an d a s s e rte d th a t h e w a s r e p la c e d

b y a y o un g e r f e ma le lo ano f

f ic e r , Wil da Gr aham. B un dy a lso argue d that ano the r y oung e r fe ma le loa n of fi c e r, Kate B oyle , was s imilarl y situated t o him and was tre ated more favor ably , showing that the B ank’s state d rea son for terminating his employ

ment was pre text ual. Thus, B u n d y ar gued that suff icient evidenc e wa s submitt ed to cr eate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t for trial on both t h e establishment of a prima facie case and the issue of prete x t.

On Oc tob e r 23, 20 06 , the tr ia l c ourt e nte re d a n o rd e r f ind ingthat “ no re a so na

ble jur y c ou ld find in favor

of the Plaintiff base d on the undis p u t ed facts.” The tria l court held that B undy was unable to establish a prima facie case of either ag e or se x discrimination and that, eve n if a prima facie could be established, the Ba nk had demonstrated “legitimate, non-discriminatory rea sons for the employ

ment decision at issue, as to which P laintiff has no evidenc e to prove prete x t.” Ther efor e, the tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

avo r o f t he B ank

. F ro m thi s o rd e r, B un dy no w a pp e a ls.
On appe al, B undy

argues that the trial court e rre d in gr anting summary judgme nt to the Ba

nk. He maintains that he submitt ed suff icient evidenc e to establish a prima facie case o f ag e and se x discrimination by

showing that he wa s qualified for the position of loan office r, that he w as re place d by a su bs tanti a lly

y oung e r f e ma le , and that he wa s tr e a te d le ss f avo ra bly tha n a n e mpl oy e e no t in

his protec t ed cla ss who was similarly situated to him. I n addition, Bundy asser ts that he submitted sufficie nt e vidence to c reate a g enuine issue of fac t reg ardingwhether

the B anks’s prof

fer ed re ason fo r t e rm inatio n o f h is e mpl oy me nt w a s p re te xtua l. 2T o f al l i n t o t h e pr ot ec t ed cl as s on t h e bas i s of ag e, t h e pl ai n t i f f mu s t be at l ea s t f

or t y y ea r s ol d at t h e t i me of 3

t he d i scr i m i nat i o n. T

. C

. A

. § 4

- 2 1

- 1 0 1 (b) (20 0 5 ).

T h e a n a lyti c a l f

ra m e w o rk a n d b u rd e n o f p ro o f f o r a g e a n d se x d isc rim ina tio n c la im s b o u g h t un d e r th e A c t i s 4
the sa m e a s tha t use d fo r c la im s b ro u g h t u n d e r fe d e ra l l a w

. De n n i s v . W h i t e Wa y Cle a n e r s , L. P. , 119 S. W

. 3d 688, 693 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 3 ).


### -5

- We r e vie w the tr ia l c ou

rt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo with no presumption of

corr ectne ss. Wa rren v

. Esta te of Kir k , 9 54 S.W. 2d

72 2, 72 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . Summa ry jud g me nt i s not a substitut e for trial of disputed fa ctual issues. Gonzales v. Alm an Con str. Co. , 857 S.W .2d 42, 44 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 3) . It is app ro pr iate on ly wh e re “ the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue a s to a

ny materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. W e view the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving party , g iving that pa

rty the bene fit of all re asonable infere nces. Warren , 954 S.W .2d at 723. The moving pa

rty must demonstrate t h at no g enuine issues of material fa ct exist for tria l “by either aff irmatively

neg ating an esse n t i al element of the non-moving party ’s claim or by establishing a

n aff irmative defe nse that defe ats the non-moving party ’s claim.” Fry e v . St . T homas H e alt h Se rv s. , 227 S.W .3d 595, 601 (Tenn. Ct . App. 2007). Onc e the movingparty establishes that there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct, the non-movingpart y must demonstrate that a disputed issue of materia l fac t exi sts either “( 1) by pointing to evidenc e either ove rlooked or ig nored by the moving p art y t h a tc r e a t e s a

f a c tu a l d i s p u t e , ( 2 ) b y r e h a b i l i t a t i n g e v i d e n c e c h a l l e n g e d b y th e m o v i n g p arty, (3) by producingadditional evidenc e that cre ates a materia l fac tual dispute, or (4) by submitt ing a

n aff idavit in accor dance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 reque sting additional time for discove ry .” Id. at 6 0 2 (q u o t i n g Pe ndl

e ton v . M ill s , 73 S.W .3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001))

. Bundy asse rt s age and sex discrimination under the Te nnessee Human Rig hts Act, which prohibits discrimination in employ ment on the basis of “ rac e, cr eed , co lor, relig ion, sex , ag e or
natio na l or ig in. ” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 -2 1- 10 1( a ) ( 20 05 ). On e of the state d p ur po se s o f t he Ac t is 3 to “ [p]r ov id e fo r e xec uti on wi thi n T e nn e sse e of

the po lic ie s e mbo die d in the fe de ra l Civ il Ri g hts Acts of 1964, 1968 a

nd 1972 . . . and the Ag e Disc rimination in Employ ment Act of 1967, a s amende d ....” Id. Thus, beca use the Tenne ssee Human Rights Act and the f eder al statutes have a common purpose, we look to feder al ca selaw f or guidance

. Barnes v. Goodyear Tir e an d Rubber Co. , 48 S.W .3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000)

. The same g ener al ana ly tical fra mework a nd allocation of the burden of proof is use d for claims under both f eder al and state statutes, irr espec tive of whe ther the claim asse rts discrimination on the basis of ra ce, ag e, sex, or any other c lass protec ted under the Act. Dennis v. Whit

e Way Cleaners, L.P., 119 S.W .3d 688, 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
Ag e and se x discrimination can be proven by direc t or circ umstantial e vidence

. Se eKlin e 4

v . T e n n . V all e y Auth. , 12 8 F. 3d

33 7, 34 8 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 7) ; Wil

so n v . Rub in , 104 S.W .3d 39, 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). I n this case, ther e i s no direct e vidence of discrimination on the basis of either se x or ag e, and Bundy must re ly on circ umstantial e vidence to pr ove his claims. Where the re is no direct evide nce of

discrimination, the plaintiff’s claims must be analy zed under the f

rame workT h e “sim ilar ly sit u a te d yo u n g e r e m p lo ye e ” m a y b e w ithin th e p ro te c te d c la ss, i

. e. , at l ea st f o rty years o l d , so 5
lo n g a s the c o m p a re d e m p lo ye e is sub sta n tially yo u n g e r th a n the p la intiff

. Se e Fr am e v. D avi ds on Tr ans i t O r gani z at i on , 1 9 4 S.W

. 3 d 42 9 , 43 9 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 5 ).

T r adi t i onal l y , t he prot ect ed cl as s i n cas es o f sex d i s cr i mi nat i on are f emal e. H owever , t he T enn es s ee H uman 6
R igh ts A c t p ro h ib its d isc rim ina tio n in the w o rk p la c e w h e the r th e d isc rim ina tio n d isa d v a n ta g e s m e n o r w o m e n

. Wi l s on , 104 S. W

. 3d a t 52.


### -6

- se t f or th i nMcDonnell Douglas C orp. v. Green , 41 1 U. S. 79 2, 80 2 ( 19 73 ); V e rsa v . P olic y Stud ie s, Inc. , 4 5 S. W.3 d 5 75 , 5 80 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) . T his fr ame wo rk c an b e summa

ri zed a s f oll ow s: First, the plaintiff ha s the burden of proving by the prepondera nce of the evidenc e a prima fa cie c ase of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succe eds in pr oving the p ri m a facie c ase, the burden shifts to the def endant “ to articulate some leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for [i ts actions.]” [ McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.C t. 1817, 1824, 36 L .Ed.2d 668 (1973).] Third, should the defe ndant ca

rry this burden, the plaintiff must then have a n opportunity

to prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidence that the le g itimate rea sons offer ed by the def endant

wer e not its true reasons, but wer e a pr etext for discrimination. Id. , at 80 4, 93 S.Ct

. At 1825.

V e rsa , 45 S.W .3d at 580 (footnote omitted). This framework is e x plained in greater de tail below.

A pr im a fa c ie case of ag e discrimination unde r the Act may be esta blished by

showing that the plaintiff (1) was a

member of

the protec ted class , i

. e. t h at he f orty y ear s old or older, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) was terminated, and (4) was repla ced by a substantially y oung er pe rson. Sisk v. Com m ercial Furn itur e Group, Inc. , 1 74 F e d. Ap px. 2 83 , 2 86 (6 Cir . 2 00 6) ; Dennis , 119 th S.W. 3d a t 69 3- 94 . T he Court

of Ap pe a ls f

or the Sixth C ir c uit

ha s h e ld t

hat a plaint if f m ay a lso establish the fourth e lement of the pr im a fa c ie c a se by “ pr e se nti ng e vid e nc e that he wa s tr e a te d le ss favor ably than a simil arly situated y oung er employ ee.” Hagedorn v. V eritas Softwar e Corp. , 129 5 Fe d. Appx. 1000, 1002 (6 Cir. 2005). th

The e lements of a pr im a fa c ie case of s ex d i s crimination under the Act ar e similar. To establish a cla im for sex discrimination, t he Plaintiff must show that he ( 1 ) wa s a member of the protec ted class; (2) wa s qualified for the position, (3) was te rm i n at ed, and ( 4) either that he wa s 6 repla ced by

a per so n o u t s i d e the c lass or “a compar able non- protec ted per son was tre ated be tter.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. , 9 64 F .2 d 5 77 , 5 82 (6 Cir . 1 99 2) ; see Wilson , 104 S.W .3d at 52. th
Assuming the pla intiff can e stablish a prima facie case of employ ment discrimination, the burden of production sh if ts to the de fe nd ant to ar

tic ulate a le g iti mate , n on -d isc ri min a tor y bu sin e ss
rea son for ter

minating the pla intiff. I f the defenda nt can do so, the burde n shifts ag ain to the plaintiff to pr esent some e vidence that the def endant’ s rea sons were prete x tual. See McD onnell Dou glas , 41 1 U .S. a t 80 2; Dennis , 11 9 S. W.3 d at 69 4; V e rsa , 45 S.W .3d at, 580. “On a motion for summary jud g me nt, the pla int if

f need no t to ta lly

re fute the de fe nd ant’ s a sse rt ion s a s to its re a so ns fo r i ts

### -7

-

a c tio ns , b ut m

us t pr e se nt s ome e vid e nc e , w he the r dir e c t or c ir c ums tanti a l, that is su ff ic ie nt t o c re a te a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t as to the motivations of the defe ndant.” Dennis , 119 S.W .3d at 694. The burden of produc tion is sharply distinguished fr om the burden of proof, whic h never

shifts from the pla int if

f: “ Th e ult imate burd e n o f p e rs ua din gthe tr ie r o f f a c t th a t th e de fe nd ant i nte nti on a lly discriminated aga inst the plaintiff remains at all times with t he plaintiff.” T e x a s D e p ’t o f C o mm. Af fa irs v . Burdin e , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

I n th i s case , the trial cour t concluded that Bundy

had not established a prima facie case of either a g e or se x discrimination. I n its mot ion for summary judgme nt, the Ba

nk argued that B undy could not establish a pr im a fa c ie case of age or sex discrimination beca use he c ould not establish two

nece ssary elements: (1) that he wa s qualified for the position, or (2) that he was either repla ced by an employ ee who was substantially y oung er and/or female, or that he was treated less favorably than a similarly

situated person outside of his class, i.e. someone substantially y oung er a

nd/or fema le. Bundy contends on a

ppeal that he submitt ed suff icient evidenc e to c reate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t on both of these ele ments. We discuss each in turn.
First, B undy

argues that he submit ted s ufficie nt evidenc e to establish that he wa s qualified for the position of loan of fice r. B undy

points to hi s unblemished n i n e- y ear work re cord a s a loan office r, which is no t i n dispute. I n response , the B ank ar g ues that a pr imary qualification for the position of loan office r is integ rity , and that B undy ’s undisputed brea ch of Ba nk policy shows that he lacks this qua lity

. The Ba nk points out that B undy

ag ree d in his deposition t hat one of the primary qualifications for the position of loan offic er is integ rity . The B ank re lies on Bundy ’s M ay 8, 2003 letter a nd portions of his deposition testim ony as e v i d en ce that Bundy

knew that he violated the B ank ’s po lic y

by pr oc e ssi ngthe loa

n in qu e sti on a s a

Stand ard Inc ome loa

n. Th is e vid e nc e sh ow s, the B ank contends, that Bundy lacke d integ rity and wa s theref

ore unqua lified for the position of loan office r.

I n its argument, the Bank would have us ignor e Bundy ’s ni ne-year tenure at the B ank which, except for the inc ident that cost him his job, demonstrates B undy ’s ability to perfor m the essential fu nc tio ns of

the job to t

he satis fa c tio n o f h is s up e ri or s. W het her Bund y po sse sse s th e int e g ri ty
nece ssary for the position is an issue for the trier of fac t, c onsideringall of the e vidence . We decline to hold as a matter of

law that B undy

was not qualified f

or the position. There fore , the B ank wa s
no t e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt b a se d o n B un dy ’s fa ilure to e sta bli shthi s e lemen t of his prima facie case

.
We n e xt co ns ide r t

he la st e le me nt o f B un dy ’s pr im a fa c ie case , which ca n be esta blished by showing either that Bundy was repla ced by a person outside the protec ted class or that he was tre ated le ss f avo ra bly tha n a sim ila rl y -s itu a te d e mpl oy e e outsi de the pr ote c te d c la ss. Bundy argues first that he w as re place d by a fe male employ ee who was subs ta ntially y oung er, forty -eig ht-y ear -old Wil da Gr aham (“Graham”) . The re cord shows that Graha m was hired by

the Ba nk in J une 2000, and be g an wor king a s a loan off

icer in J un e 2 0 0 3 , o n e mont h afte r B undy ’s termination. Bundy

notes that the B ank norma lly completes c erta i n em ploy ment forms whe n an

### -8

-

employ ee is ter

minated, indicatingwho re place dthe terminate d employ ee. I n this case, howe ver, no such for

ms were produce d. Thus, beca use Gra ham beg an working as a loan of fice r shortly

afte r Bundy ’s employ

ment was ter

minated, and the Ba

nk could not show who re place d Bundy , he ar g ues that a rea sonable infere nce can be made that Gra ham re place d Bundy

in his posit ion as loan off icer

.
I n response , the Bank not es t hat, after Bundy was ter minated, his customers and pe nding loa n issues were transfe rre d to Tom Carry , a fift y -s i x -y ear-old male loan of fice r. The B ank also c ites Gra ham’s af fidavit, explaining how she came t o be reassig ned to the position of loan offic er in June 2003. I n her affidavit, Gra ham s tated that she had previously worke d at the B ank as a n underwriter. I n April 2003, on her own initiative, she applied for the position of loan of

fice r. Shortly

there afte r, she took a medic al leave of abse nce, which beg an on Apr il 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 and ende d on J une 1, 2003. Up on re tur nin g to w or

k, Gr aham w a s g ive n th e loa n o ff ic e r p os iti on

fo r whic h s he ha d a

pp lie d in April 2003. Whil e B undy had wor ked the da

y shift and had r eporte d to N ei l Ka ne and Curt Gwaltney , Gra

ham’s af fidavit stated that she w orked the night shift from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. and repor ted to L arr

y Thomas. In light of this e vidence , the Ba nk argues, there is not sufficient evidenc e to cre ate a

g enuine issue of fac t a s to whether Bundy was re place d by

Gra ham or a ny other pe rson outside his protected c lass.

We are mindful that “a person is repla ced only when another employ ee is hired or r eassig ned to perfor m the plaintiff’s duties.” Hag e do rn , 129 Fe d. Appx. at 1002, quoting Barnes v. GenCorp., Inc. , 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 ( 6 Cir. 1990)). He re, the only evidenc e in the re cord indicating that th Gra ham re place d Bundy

is the Ba nk rec ord showing that Gra ham’s first loan was proc essed on June 21, 2003, one month afte r the termination of B undy ’s employ ment. Gra

ham’s af fidavit, howeve r, shows that she wa s g iven t he posi tion of l oan officer pursuant to her April 2003 application for the job, and that she re ceive d it only afte r she r eturne d from medica l leave. It is undisput ed that Gr aham

was a ssigne d to a diffe rent shift than B undy , and that she ha d a diffe rent super visor. The undisputed evidenc e also shows that Bundy ’s exis ting business was assig ned to Tom Carry , a male e mploy ee not substantially

y oung er tha

n Bundy . Given these fac ts, we must co n cl u d e that ther e is not suffi c ie n t e v id e n c e f

r o m w h ic h a tr ie r o f f

a c t c o u ld r e a s o n a

b ly in f e r th a t B un dy w a s r eplac ed by Gra ham or a ny other pe rson outside of the pr otected c lass.

I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , B un dy

argue s th a t he c an e sta

bli shhis pr im a fa c ie case by showing that he wa s tr e a te d le ss fa

vo ra bly tha n a sim ila rl y sit uate d, su bs tanti a lly

y oung e r f e ma le e mpl oy e e , K a te Boy le (“ Boy le”) . I n deter

mining whe ther another employ ee is sim ilarly situated to the plaintiff, the compar ab le employ ee “ must be simil ar in a ll of the rele vant aspe cts” to the plaintiff. Id. at 1003 (q u o t i n g J

ohns on v. Kroger Co. , 319 F.3d 858, 867 ( 6 Cir. 2003)). The Six th Circuit Court of th Appea ls has explained:
. . . [T] o be dee med “similarly situate d ”, t h e i ndividuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compa

re his/her treatment must have dealt with the same supe rvisor, have bee ns u b je c t t o th e s ame s ta

n d ar d s an d

h av e e n g a g e d

in th e s ame c o n d

u c t w ithout such diffe rentiatingor mitigating c ircumstance s that would distinguish their conduc t
or the e mpl oy e r’ s tr e a tme nt o f t he m f or it.B und y s ub m i t t ed e vi d ence sugges t i ng t hat t he gui d el i ne he vi o l at ed i n pro cess i ng t he Stat e Incom e l o an went 7
i nt o ef f ect on M ay 2 7 , 20 0 3 , jus t af t er hi s em p l o y m ent was t erm i nat ed

. B und y a p p ears t o be argui ng ei t her t hat t here was no such gui d el i ne i n ef f ect at t he t i m e he p roce ss ed t he Stat e In c o m e lo a n , o r tha t he wa s unaware o f i t

. T he

u n d isp u te d e v id e n c e in the re c o rd , ho w e v e r, e sta b lishe s tha t t h e re w a s in fa c t a v e rb a l p o licy o n S ta te d In c o m e lo a n s to t he ef f ect t hat a loan co ul d no t b e p roce ss ed a s a Stat ed Inco m e l o an i f incom e d o cum ent at i o n ha d b een subm i t t ed , and t hat B und y was aware of t hi s p o l i cy. B ank em p l o y ee N ei l K ane t est i f i ed i n hi s d ep o si t i o n t hat i f t he l o an o f f i cer has any i ncome document at i on, he c an no t “ un der any ci r cums t anc es ” pr oces s t he l oan a s a St at ed I ncome l oan. T hi s was
corr ob orat ed by B un dy ’ s i mm edi at e su perv i s or, C ur t G wal t ney

. C l ay B ar net t , t he B ank l oss p r eve nt i on o f f i cer as s i gn ed t o i nv es t i gat e B un dy , s ai d t hat B un dy admi t t ed t hat he “ s houl d hav e s ubmi t t ed [ t he l oan] as a f ul l doc l oan, ” a nd t hat

s u bmi t t i n g i t as a St at ed I n come l oan “ wa s t h e wr on g t h i n g t o do. ” M or eov er , B u n dy a ck n owl edg ed i n h i s de pos i t i on tha t he a t l e a st ha d b e e n giv e n “v e rb a l ve rifica tio n ” tha t “if inc o m e [in fo rm a tio n ] c o m e s into the b u ild ing , w e a re no t t o use” t he Stat ed Incom e p rogram , and t hat he “ m ad e an err o r i n t he way [he] hand l ed the f i l e. ” F i nal l y , in B und y ’ s l et t er, d a te d M a y 8 , 2 0 0 3 , B u n d y a c k n o w le d g e d tha t his “m istak e w a s n o t ch a n g ing the lo a n fro m S ta te d [In c o m e ] to F u ll [ D ocument at i on] bef

ore s endi ng t he l oan t o proces s i ng

. I r eal i ze t hat t hi s was t he wr ong t hi ng t o do , t o i gn ore t he t ax
r et u r n

. ” I t a ppea r s t h at t h i s i s s u e i s pr i mar i l y r el ev an t t o B u n dy ’ s cl ai m t h at t h e B an k ’ s s t at ed r ea s on f or h i s t er mi n at i on i s pre t ext ual ; t hi s becomes an i s s ue onl y i f t he pl ai nt i f

f es t abl i s hes a pri m a f

aci e c a se o f d isc rim ina tio n

. S e e M c D o n n e ll D ougl as , 4 1 1 U .S . at 8 0 4 ; V ersa , 45 S. W

. 3d a t 580- 81.


### -9

- Mit c he ll , 964 F.2d at 583. One “r eleva nt aspec t” to be conside red is whe ther the plaintiff’s conduc t and the c onduct of the person to whom he compar es himself are of “c ompara ble seriousne ss.” Id. “I t is th e d is c r im in a ti o n p la inti f f ’ s b u r d e n to e s ta

b li s h th a t th e o th e r e mp lo y e e ’ s a c ts w ere of ‘compa rable seriousness’ to his or he r own infr action.” Id. at 583 n.5.
The only Ba nk employ ee B undy

alleg es is simil arly

situated to him is Boy

le, a f emale loa n
o f f ic e r w h o w a s in h e r tw e n ti e s a t th e ti me in qu e s ti o n

. T h e e v id e n c e s h o w s th a t, in J une 2003, Boy le attempted to pr ocess a No I ncome Ver ification loan for a retire e, althoug h reti re es ar e n ot elig ible for that ty

pe of loa n. To enable Boy

le to pr ocess the loan applica tion, Boyle was grante d a varia nce, that is, special per

mission t o proce ss a loan despite a n irregularity . I t is unclear whether Boy le re quested the va

rianc e, or whether

it was simply

g iven to he r. The va

rianc e wa s g rante d by Sherrie Ca

naday , a fe male B ank Vice President in her thirties. Cana day testified in he r deposition that the customer’ s high c redit scor e made it acce ptable to proc ess the loan a s a Stated Income loan, and that the va

rianc e was g rante d beca

use of an error committ ed by underwriter Ma ry Har ris. The

re c or d o f a

uth or izatio n a lso ind ic a te s th a t th e loa n invo lve d a

“ c us tom e r s e rv ic e iss ue .” At the tim e of Bo yle ’ s tr an s a c ti o n , th e b an k g u id e li n e f

r o m wh ic hs h e d e v iate d

w a s in c lu d e d

in th e B ank’s

wr itt e n lo an guid e lin e s. 7

As furthe r indication of the B ank’s a lleg ed discriminatory intent, Bundy

points to an incident inv olv ing B ank e mpl oy e e Da vid Gr avatt ( “ Gr avatt” ), a ma le loa n o ff ic e r i n h is f

if tie s at th e tim e in question. As with Boyle, Gra vatt submitt ed an application for a No Income Ve rification loan on behalf of a re t i re e, wh o was not elig ible for suc h a loan. F or re asons not appar ent in the re cord, Gravatt did not rece ive a va rianc e for the loan; th e Ba n k i n v es t iga ted him for fr aud, but he wa s ult imate ly

no t di sc ipl ine d o r te rm inate d. B un dy c onte nd s that a ll o f t his e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t B oyle was similarly

situated to Bundy , and t h at she wa s treate d more fa vorably than either

Bundy or Gr avatt, bo th m a le e mpl oy e e s in the ir fi ft ie s.T h e B an k c o nt end s t hat B oy l e’ s c i r cu ms t an ce s a r e n ot c ompar abl e t o B u n dy ’ s i n pa r t be ca u s e t h e l oan f or 8
whi ch B oy l e r ece i ved a va r i anc e wa s a N o i ncome V er i f i cat i on l oan, wh i l e B un dy ’ s was a St at ed I ncome l oan. W e s aw
n o e v id e n c e in the re c o rd ind ic a ting tha t t h is d iff e re n c e is m a te ria l.


### -1 0- I n r e sp on se , th e B ank

c on te nd s th a t B oyle is n ot s imi larl y sit uate d to B un dy , b e c a

us e the ir situations invol ved diffe rent ty pes of loans and dif

fer ent ty pes of policy

infrac tions. The Ba

nk notes that Bundy

was ter minated for submitting a Stated Income loan a

pplication wh i l e withhol ding inc ome do c ume ntatio n at hi s d e sk , w hil e B oyle sim ply su bmi tte d a n a pp li cat io n for

a No Inc ome Ver ification loan on be half of a retire e who wa s not eligible f or such a loan. B ank employ ee L inda Ba con testified in her

deposition that Bundy

“committed what we ref

er to a s an act of dishonesty or a bre ach of

his trust;” in compar ison, Boy le’s actions did not involve dece it. The B ank fur ther notes t h a tt h e d e c i s i o n

t o t e r m i n a t e B u n dy’ s e mp l o ym e n tw a s m a d e b y B un dy’ s s u p e r v i s o r , C urtG w a l tn e y, who was u n aw are of B oyle’s loan or the var iance g rante d to Boyle, and wa s not involved in any

e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on

re g ard ingB oyle . T he re fo re , th e B ank mai nt ains , B oyle is n ot “ sim ila rl y
s i tu a t e d ” t o B u n dy.

The re cord indicates “diff ere ntiating or m itigatingcirc umstances that would disting uish” B u n dy ’ s c o n d

u c t f r o m B o yle ’ s “ o r

th e e mp lo y e r ’ s tr e a tm e n t o f th e m f o r it

. ” V e rsa , 45 S.W .3d at 58 1. I n c on tr a st t o B oyle , B un dy a tte mpt e d to pr oc e ss a Sta te d Inc ome loa

n w hil e he wa s k

no wi ng ly wi thh old inginc ome do c ume ntatio n in his de sk dr awe r. Hi s re te nti on of the ta x doc ume nts c ame 8 to l ig ht o nly

a ft e r Und e rwri tin g ha d r e qu e ste d inco me doc ume ntatio n b e c a us e of dis c re pa nc ie s in the re nta l inc ome re po rt e d by B un dy ’s c us tom e r. Cana da y re po rt e d B un dy ’s c on du c t t o Qu ality Control, which in turn ref err ed the matter

to Corporate Security

. The Bank loss prevention office r who investigated the matter testified that this wa s the sec ond loan of B undy ’s that had be en re fer red to his de pa

rtme nt. I n our vie w, the fa c t that Bund y ’s c on du c t invo lve d a

la c k o f f ull dis c los ur e to the B ank is quite signif

icant. There is no evidenc e in t he re cord be fore us indicating that there was any lack of full disclosure b y Bo y l e in connection with the loan for which she wa s g rante d a

va ri anc e . Ind e e d, the un dis pute d e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t B oyle re c e ive d th e va ri anc e du e to s ome fa

ult on the part of underwriter Mary Har ris. Fur thermore , beyond mere conjec ture, B undy has submitted no meaning ful evidenc e to support his assertion that Cana day was involved in a “ cover up” of B oyle ’s c on du c t.

Un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, we mus t con clu de that B un dy and B oyle we re no t si mil arl y sit ua te d f or purp os e s o f e sta

bli sh ingB un dy ’s prima facie c a s e o f a g e an d / o r s e x d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

. In light of this conc lusion, the Bank’ s treatment of Gravatt become s irrele vant. C onsequently , Bundy has failed to submit sufficie nt evidence to establish a pr im a fa c ie case of ag e or se x discrimination. Thus, we f

ind no error

in the trial court’ s g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of

the B ank.

### -1 1-

The de cision of the trial c ourt is affir med. Costs on appeal a

re to be taxed to Appellant J err y B u n dy, an d

h i s s u r e ty, f

o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE