FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

OMNIGEN RESEARCH, LLC AND 

PRINCE AGRI PRODUCTS, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

YONGQIANG WANG, YAN ZHENG 

AND BIOSHEN,

Defendants.

Civil Case No. 6:16-cv-268-MC

FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MCSHANE, Judge:

After granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Terminating Spoliation Sanctions, finding and

ordering that a default judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants,

and affording the parties an opportunity to present live testimony, evidence, and argument at a 

hearing conducted on October 3, 2017, the Court enters the following findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and decision regarding damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees:

I. FINDINGS OF FACT1

A. Introduction

1. “From 2005 to 2013, Plaintiff OmniGen Research, LLC (‘OmniGen Research’) 

employed Defendant Yongqiang Wang as a scientist. Wang reported to Neil Forsberg, who is 

OmniGen Research’s co-founder, and at the time was its Vice President and Chief Scientific 

Officer. In 2013, Wang worked as a consultant for Plaintiff Prince Agri Products, Inc. (‘Prince 

 1 Although the Court lists its findings of facts here, these findings merely reflect the factual allegations contained in 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as is required upon an entry of default judgment. Geddes v. United Fin’l Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 

560 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 2

Agri’), which had become OmniGen Research’s parent company as of December 20, 2012, with 

the acquisition of OmniGen Research by Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.)

2. “At the same time Wang worked for OmniGen Research and Prince Agri in 

Oregon, he breached his contracts with them by secretly creating an OmniGen Research-clone 

Chinese business based on stolen OmniGen Research and Prince Agri information and the 

infringement of their rights. That imitation business consists of at least two entities, Defendant 

Bioshen and the Chinese company Jiangsu Mirigen Biotechnology Development Co., Ltd. 

(‘Mirigen’).” (Compl. ¶ 2.)

3. “While working at OmniGen Research, Wang applied for a Chinese patent that 

covers a knockoff of an OmniGen product. He tried to hide the application from OmniGen 

Research and Prince Agri, even though it rightfully belongs to OmniGen Research, by having 

Defendant Yan Zheng—who is Wang’s wife and . . . does not have a background in biological 

sciences—listed as an inventor in his place. He . . . tried to hide Bioshen by listing Zheng as its 

representative and ‘Registrant/Owner’ with the Oregon Secretary of State; and he . . . tried to 

hide Mirigen by having another associate, Wei Zeng, listed as the registrant, administrative 

contact, and technical contact for the Mirigen website.” (Compl. ¶ 3.)

4. “A little more than a year after quitting OmniGen Research and Prince Agri, 

Wang published and took credit for OmniGen Research’s product, product story and research 

approach as his own in a[n] ... article for a[n] ... overseas scientific journal. He continue[d] to 

use OmniGen Research information in marketing materials promoting Mirigen and Bioshen. 

And, in November 2015, he presented an OmniGen Research slide presentation as if it was his 

own at a large scientific conference in China. Many of the slides in that presentation were nearly 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 3

exact copies of the OmniGen Research slide presentation, altered only to add the Mirigen logo.”

(Compl. ¶ 4.)

5. “Mirigen and Bioshen market several lines of nutritional specialty products that 

are knockoffs of OmniGen Research’s products.” (Compl. ¶ 5.)

6. “Wang[] breach[ed] . . . two contracts with OmniGen Research and one contract 

with Prince Agri. Among other things, Wang has breached written agreements to return and not 

improperly use OmniGen Research’s and Prince Agri’s confidential information, to disclose and 

assign work-related inventions to OmniGen Research, to disclose work-related inventions to 

Prince Agri, and to not compete with Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 7.)

7. “Zheng and Bioshen intentionally interfered with OmniGen Research’s and 

Prince Agri’s economic relations with Wang because, among other things, they intentionally 

helped Wang breach his promises to assign his work-related patent applications and patents to 

OmniGen Research and to disclose them to both OmniGen Research and Prince Agri. Zheng and 

Bioshen intentionally interfered with Prince Agri’s economic relations with Wang because,

among other things, they intentionally helped Wang to breach his contract to not compete with 

Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 8.)

B. The Parties

1. Omnigen Research And Prince Agri

8. “OmniGen Research, LLC is an Oregon limited liability company . . . OmniGen 

Research is a subsidiary of Prince Agri Products, Inc.” (Compl. ¶ 13.) 

9. “Prince Agri Products, Inc. is a Delaware corporation . . . Prince Agri is a 

subsidiary of Phibro Animal Health Corporation (‘Phibro’).” (Compl. ¶ 14.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 4

10. “In 2002, Forsberg and Steve Puntenney co-founded OmniGen Research when 

Forsberg was a professor at Oregon State University (‘OSU’), and Puntenney was a graduate 

student in Forsberg’s department. It is now a successful agricultural research and development 

company, operating within larger corporate entities following the sale of OmniGen Research by 

Forsberg and Puntenney to Prince Agri in December 2012. OmniGen Research has a research 

laboratory in Corvallis, Oregon and a research farm south of Corvallis.” (Compl. ¶ 23.) 

11. “OmniGen Research’s business is based on technology originally developed by 

Puntenney. Puntenney had determined that the cause of a common disease, called Hemorrhagic 

Bowel Syndrome, in lactating cows was moldy feed. Puntenney developed feed additives that 

help counteract this cause, and that have a variety of other beneficial effects, including 

strengthening and helping to maintain dairy cows’ immune system, which in turn helps to 

prevent diseases, reducing the need for antibiotics, and increasing milk production. Forsberg 

advanced the technology by among other things identifying mechanisms of action and 

immunological markers for better understanding it.” (Compl. ¶ 24.)

12. “OmniGen Research holds numerous patents around the world, including in the 

U.S. and China. Prince Agri and Phibro have rights to use OmniGen Research’s technology. 

Puntenney’s and Forsberg’s inventions led to breakthrough and highly successful products for

dairy cattle, including OmniGen-AF, OmniGen-WYC and OmniGen-Green, which are 

developed, made and sold by Prince Agri, and also sold by Phibro. OmniGen Research has 

determined that its technology would benefit other species, including pigs and poultry.” (Compl. 

¶ 25.) 

13. “The OmniGen products have had strong sales in the U.S. and elsewhere. Phibro

has recently launched those products in China. Forsberg currently works as a consultant for 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5

Phibro, and is assisting with this product launch, including lecturing in China on scientific topics 

related to the OmniGen products.” (Compl. ¶ 26.)

2. Wang And Zheng

14. “Defendant Yongqiang Wang is a citizen of China, a legal permanent resident of 

the United States, and a resident of the State of Oregon, having his residence at 6255 SW 

Chestnut Drive, Corvallis, Oregon 97333.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) 

15. “Defendant Yan Zheng is a citizen of China, a legal permanent resident of the 

United States, and a resident of the State of Oregon, having her residence at 6255 SW Chestnut 

Drive, Corvallis, Oregon 97333. (Compl. ¶ 16.) 

16. “Wang first met Forsberg when Wang was a graduate student at OSU and 

Forsberg was a professor. Forsberg took Wang under his wing, hiring him to work in his 

academic research laboratory. When OmniGen Research grew, Forsberg hired Wang in 2005 to 

work at OmniGen Research. Wang worked at OmniGen Research as Forsberg’s right hand man 

for the next eight years.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) 

17. “Originally from China, Wang and his wife, Zheng, built lives in Corvallis, 

Oregon. With OmniGen Research as their sponsors, they became legal permanent residents of 

the U.S. They purchased their house and a rental property in Corvallis.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) 

18. “Wang apparently decided he owed no loyalty to OmniGen Research. So, while 

continuing to work at OmniGen Research, [Wang] . . . secretly form[ed] two businesses, Bioshen 

and Mirigen, to compete with OmniGen Research with the help of his wife and associates.”

(Compl. ¶ 29.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6

3. Bioshen And Mirigen

19. “[Defendat] Bioshen is . . . registered as an assumed business name for Zheng 

with a principal place of business at 6255 SW Chestnut Drive, Corvallis, Oregon 97333.” 

(Compl. ¶ 17.) 

20. “Mirigen is a Chinese corporation. Mirigen’s principal place of business is listed 

as Block 3, No. 28, Yanfeng Road, Yanqiao Supporting Area, Huisahn Economic Development 

Zone, Wuxi, China.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) 

21. “On or about February 6, 2012, while Wang still worked at OmniGen Research, 

Bioshen was registered as an assumed business name for a business with the Corporation 

Division of the Oregon Secretary of State using an electronic registration form bearing Zheng’s 

electronic signature. The registration form listed Zheng as the business’s ‘Registrant/Owner,’

and Wang’s and Zheng’s home address as its headquarters.” (Compl. ¶ 30.) 

22. “On or about April 28, 2012, the Bioshen website, www.bioshen.com, was 

registered, listing Zheng as the registrant but using Wang’s email address and cell phone number 

for contact information.” (Compl. ¶ 31.) 

23. “On or about September 11, 2012, while Wang still worked at OmniGen 

Research, Mirigen was formed.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) 

24. “On or about October 21, 2012, the Mirigen website, www.mirigen.com, was 

registered, listing Zeng as the registrant, administrative contact, and technical contact.” (Compl. 

¶ 33.) 

25. “Wang has been a co-owner of Mirigen from its inception, according to official 

Chinese documents.” (Compl. ¶ 34.) Defendants did not dispute this allegation in their 

responsive pleading. (SAA ¶ 34.) Wang has maintained an ownership interest and had 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7

involvement in Mirigen despite this Court’s Preliminary Injunction prohibiting it, Exs. 6-7. (See 

ECF No. 104 at 7; Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 50, ¶ 10 (“Wang and Zheng (including 

Bioshen) shall no longer have any involvement with or (direct or indirect) ownership interest in 

Mirigen.”).

26. “Mirigen’s website is mostly in Chinese; a computer translation described 

Mirigen as “a professional high-tech biological additives research and development, production, 

sales and service” business focusing on “feed additives.” The website listed four products, 

YQ004, YQ005, YQ006, and YQ007, for aquaculture, cows, pigs, and poultry, respectively . . . . 

‘YQ’ stands for Yongqiang, which is Wang’s first name.” (Compl. ¶ 36.) 

27. “In November 2015, Bioshen and Mirigen co-sponsored a scientific conference in 

China, attended by more than 1,000 people from academia, industry and government. Wang 

appeared on behalf of both companies, and Bioshen promoted itself as ‘BioShen USA 

Corporation.’” (Compl. ¶ 37.) 

28. “Marketing materials available at the November 2015 conference in China linked 

Mirigen and Bioshen to each other, and included information about Bioshen USA products 

called ‘Keligen’ for pigs and poultry that employ ‘the most advanced modern green agricultural 

technology from the United States.’” (Compl. ¶ 38.) The Plaintiffs’ Contracts, Confidential 

Information And Copyrights

4. The Contracts

29. “On or about September 23, 2009, Wang entered into the two contracts currently 

at issue with OmniGen Research and in 2013 he entered into a contract with Prince Agri.”

(Compl. ¶ 39.) Defendants did not dispute this allegation in their responsive pleading. (SAA ¶ 

39.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 8

30. “In the ‘Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement’ with OmniGen 

Research, Wang agreed . . . . to strict limitations on his use and disclosure of OmniGen Research 

trade secrets and proprietary information, and to return all material relating to OmniGen 

Research upon termination of his employment . . . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 40, 92.) 

31. “In the ‘Employee Invention Agreement’ with OmniGen Research, Wang agreed, 

among other things, to disclose and assign to OmniGen Research all inventions that result from 

his work at OmniGen Research, that relate to OmniGen Research’s business, or that result from 

using OmniGen Research resources.” (Compl. ¶ 41.) 

32. “Each of the two above contracts state ‘I EXPRESSLY CONSENT TO VENUE 

IN, AND THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF, THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 

LOCATED IN OREGON FOR ANY LAWSUIT ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO THIS 

AGREEMENT.’” (Compl. ¶ 42.)

33. “On or about February 1, 2013, following the sale of OmniGen Research to 

Prince Agri in December 2012, Wang abruptly quit OmniGen Research. A week later, Wang 

agreed to help OmniGen Research with the ensuing transition by becoming a consultant for 

Prince Agri. Wang executed a consulting agreement with Prince Agri on or about February 11, 

2013 to memorialize his agreement with Prince Agri. Wang subsequently changed his mind 

about continuing as a consultant and severed his ties permanently with Prince Agri and OmniGen 

Research.” (Compl. ¶ 43.) 

34. “The ‘Consulting Agreement’ between Wang and Prince Agri has, among things, 

sections in which Wang promises to maintain the confidentiality of Prince Agri’s information, 

and not make unauthorized use of it, to return all Prince Agri confidential information upon 

termination of the engagement, to disclose inventions to Prince Agri, and to not compete with 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 9

Prince Agri during the term of the agreement or for one year following termination or expiration

. . .” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 100.) 

5. The Confidential Information And Trade Secrets

35. “While at OmniGen Research for nearly eight years, Wang had access to its trade 

secrets and other confidential information. Wang also had access to the trade secrets and other 

confidential information of Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 45.) 

36. “As a research and development company, OmniGen Research has extensive 

trade secrets and other confidential information, including about OmniGen Research technology 

and OmniGen products.” (Compl. ¶ 46.)

37. “As a product development company, Prince Agri has extensive trade secrets and 

other confidential information, including about OmniGen Research technology and OmniGen 

products.” (Compl. ¶ 47.)

38. “The trade secrets and confidential information of OmniGen Research include 

OmniGen Research’s research and experimentation methods, including its confidential 

comprehensive approach to testing the effectiveness of feed additives on animal populations. 

This approach combines, among other things, dosage amounts, intervals for measuring temporal 

responses, procedures for blood sampling, procedures for isolating blood cells, and assessment 

targets.” (Compl. ¶ 48.)

39. “The trade secrets and confidential information of OmniGen Research and Prince 

Agri also include information about how to make OmniGen products. Since the original 

development of OmniGen products, OmniGen Research and Prince Agri have made numerous 

confidential improvements to OmniGen products, for example relating to processing aids, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 10

ingredient sourcing, ingredient mixing procedures, the scientific motivation behind the use of 

certain ingredients, and precise ratios of ingredients.” (Compl. ¶ 49.)

40. “The above information has independent economic value, and has gained in 

value, because it is not generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain 

economic value from its disclosure or use, thereby providing economic and competitive 

advantages to OmniGen Research and Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 50.)

41. “OmniGen Research and Prince Agri have made significant efforts to maintain 

the secrecy of the above information. For example, OmniGen Research and Prince Agri require 

employees with access to the above information to sign confidentiality agreements, such as the 

ones signed by Wang. OmniGen Research and Prince Agri keep the above information in secure 

electronic storage systems, and in locked, alarmed facilities not accessible by the public or 

people outside their organizations.” (Compl. ¶ 51.)

42. “Efforts by OmniGen Research and Prince Agri to maintain the secrecy of the 

above information are and have been reasonable under the circumstances.” (Compl. 

¶ 52.)

6. Copyright

43. “A former professor, Forsberg’s role at OmniGen Research included lecturing to 

veterinarians, scientists, customers and potential customers about some of the research and 

science behind the OmniGen products.” (Compl. ¶ 53.) 

44. “Forsberg developed a core lecture, based on slides. Over the years, he gave 

variations of it more than 100 times to audiences across the country and internationally.”

(Compl. ¶ 54.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 11

45. “OmniGen Research owns the copyright for these slides, and has recently 

obtained Copyright Registration TXu001977244 for one version of them.” (Compl. ¶ 55.) 

46. Copyright Registration TXu 1-977-244 was effective on February 11, 2016 for 

OmniGen Research’s slides “Nutritional regulation of immune function.” (Ex.2 14.)

47. “In his current role, in January of [2016], Forsberg lectured in China as part of the 

launch of OmniGen products in China.” (Compl. ¶ 56.)

48. A presentation dated March 16, 2016 on its face and found on Wang’s computer 

contains copies or at least substantial copies of slides in OmniGen Research’s copyrighted slides. 

(Compare Ex. 14 at 15, 28 and 31 with Ex. 15 at 3, 7 and 9.)

C. Wang’s, Zheng’s And Bioshen’s Illegal Acts

1. During Omnigen Research’s Employment Of Wang

49. “Following an extended January 2012 trip to China, Wang took concrete, secret 

steps that went well beyond initial preparatory measures to form his OmniGen-clone Chinese 

business while he was employed by OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 57.)

50. “On or about February 6, 2012, as set out above, Bioshen registered as a business 

with the State of Oregon . . . . Wang secretly participated in the registration of Bioshen.” (Compl. 

¶ 58.)

51. “That month, Wang also communicated extensively and secretly with Zeng, who 

is believed to have lived in New York State at the time. In one email Wang urged Zeng to look at 

OmniGen Research’s and Prince Agri’s websites to ‘find anyway to get your business to start’

and to ‘please let me know your ideas.’” (Compl. ¶ 59

 2

 Unless otherwise noted, “Ex.” references herein are to Plaintiffs’ Exhibits lodged with the 

Court in advance of the October 3, 2017 hearing and pursuant to the Case Management Order, 

ECF No. 189.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 12

52. “On or about March 3, 2012, Zeng sent Wang an email with his mailing address 

in Setauket, New York, along with the message ‘Look forward to your docs, and let’s roll ... 

rock later ...’” (Compl. ¶ 60.) 

53. “Wang sent Zeng documents and a CD, including . . . confidential OmniGen 

Research information.” (Compl. ¶ 61.) 

54. “On or about March 6, 2012, Zeng sent Wang another email stating ‘Got your 

documents and the CD.’” (Compl. ¶ 62.) 

55. “Over the next few weeks, Zeng, Wang and a third person, Liancheng Chen spent 

hours communicating with each other on video calls and Internet chats.” (Compl. ¶ 63.) 

56. “On or about April 28, 2012, the domain name for the Bioshen website, 

www.bioshen.com, was registered.” (Compl. ¶ 64.) 

57. “[I]n the spring of 2012 or earlier, Wang began planning and later helped conduct 

an experiment on the effect of a product very similar or identical to the OmniGen products on 

poultry, without the knowledge or permission of OmniGen Research or Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 

65.)

58. “On or about September 11, 2012, Mirigen was registered as a business with the 

Chinese government. Wang had an ownership stake in the Mirigen business, along with Zeng, 

Chen, among others.” (Compl. ¶ 66.) 

59. “On or about October 21, 2012, the domain name for the Mirigen website, 

www.mirigen.com, was registered.” (Compl. ¶ 67.) 

60. “On or about October 29, 2012, a Chinese patent application was filed for a 

‘Natural Animal Feed Additive’ with ingredients very similar to the OmniGen-WYC product. 

The application number was 201210420822 (‘the ’822 Chinese patent application’). The 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 13

application lists four inventors but Wang is not one of them. Instead, the listed inventors are 

Zheng (Wang’s wife), Zeng, Chen, and Yu Li.” (Compl. ¶ 68.) 

61. “Wang orchestrated the preparation and filing of the ’822 Chinese patent 

application.” (Compl. ¶ 69.)

62. “[L]isting Wang’s wife as an inventor on the ’822 Chinese patent application was 

a sham. She had no substantive involvement in the application or the claimed subject matter, but 

Wang listed her because he wanted to ensure that ownership of the application remained in his 

family while decreasing the possibility that OmniGen Research would learn of his role with 

respect to the patent application . . . . [H]e also wanted to create a (flawed) argument that 

OmniGen Research did not have rights to the application under the Employee Invention 

Agreement [which is attached to the Complaint].” (Compl. ¶ 70.)

63. “In November 2012, a few days after the filing of the ’822 Chinese patent 

application, Wang took an extended and unannounced absence from work at OmniGen 

Research.” (Compl. ¶ 71.) 

64. “In early January, 2013, Wang again took an unannounced trip of about three or 

four days. Soon after his return, he told Forsberg that he needed to immediately travel to China. 

Forsberg did not authorize that trip and Wang did not leave at that time, but about ten days later 

Wang again took an unannounced trip for about three days.” (Compl. ¶ 72.)

65. “On or about January 23, 2013, the ’822 Chinese patent application was published 

(unbeknownst to OmniGen Research).” (Compl. ¶ 73.) 

66. “On or about February 1, 2013, Wang quit OmniGen Research.” (Compl. 

¶ 74.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 14

67. “On or about February 7, 2013, Wang agreed to continue on as a consultant for 

Prince Agri to assist OmniGen Research transition due to his departure.” (Compl. ¶ 75.) 

68. “Then, on or about February 27, 2013, Wang stopped consulting and, it was later 

discovered, also attempted to erase the contents of his OmniGen Research-owned computer 

before returning it.” (Compl. ¶ 76.)

2. Activities After Wang Quit Working 

For OmniGen Research And Prince Agri

69. “On or about July 23, 2013, the Chinese government issued to Mirigen a 

production license for a feed additive.” (Compl. ¶ 77.) 

70. “On or about August 29, 2013, . . . Wang presented ‘Effect of dietary 

supplementation on improvement of growth and immune function of broilers’ at The 7th

International Medicinal Mushroom Conference in Beijing, China.” (Compl.¶ 78.) 

71. “On or about September 17, 2013, an article ‘Effect of dietary supplementation on 

improvement of growth and immune function of broilers’ was submitted for publication in . . .

Engineering Sciences. The article listed Chen, Zeng, Li and Wang as authors. The article 

described a research study of a dietary supplement product called Mirigen that has nearly 

identical ingredients to the product OmniGen-WYC. The article described a research approach 

that is a trade secret and confidential information of OmniGen Research, which includes among 

other things dosage amounts, intervals for measuring temporal responses, procedures for blood 

sampling, procedures for isolating blood cells, and assessment targets. [T]he Mirigen product 

described in the article was created using trade secrets and confidential information of OmniGen 

Research and Prince Agri, including processing aids, ingredient sourcing, ingredient mixing 

procedures, the scientific motivation behind the use of certain ingredients, and/or precise ratios 

of ingredients.” (Compl. ¶ 79.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 15

72. “On or about October 30, 2013, a Chinese patent issued from the ’822 Chinese 

patent application. That patent is Chinese patent no. ZL 2012 1 0420822.6 (‘the ’822.6 Chinese

patent’).” (Compl. ¶ 80.) 

73. “On or about July 10, 2014, the above-described article ‘Effect of dietary 

supplementation on improvement of growth and immune function of broilers’ was published in 

Engineering Sciences.” (Compl. ¶ 81.) 

74. “On or about July 14, 2015, outside counsel for OmniGen Research and Prince 

Agri sent Wang and Zheng a letter stating, among other things, that Wang had breached his 

contracts with OmniGen Research and Prince Agri, and that he had misappropriated their trade 

secrets. The letter also demanded, among things, that Wang and Zheng return all confidential 

documents of OmniGen Research and Prince Agri, that they assign the Chinese patent to 

OmniGen Research, and that Wang cease from all Mirigen-related activities.” (Compl. ¶ 82.) 

75. “OmniGen Research and Prince Agri did not receive a response to this letter. 

However, a few days after the letter was sent, the Mirigen website was no longer accessible.”

(Compl. ¶ 83.)

76. “But by November 2015, the Mirigen website was again accessible, although 

since then most of its content has again been removed.” (Compl. ¶ 84.)

77. “On or about November 13-15, 2015, Mirigen and Bioshen, along with others, 

sponsored a conference in China called ‘The First ‘International Animal and Intestinal Ecology 

and Health in China Summit Forum’ (IAIEH).’ The conference was held at Hunan Normal 

University, and attended by more than 1,000 people, including academics, government officials, 

and business leaders.” (Compl. ¶ 85.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 16

78. “At this conference, Wang gave a lecture titled ‘Effects of immunomodulatory 

feed additive on the intestinal gene expression and anti-bacteria.’ The lecture included the 

presentation of slides, the majority of which were copied from OmniGen Research’s copyrighted 

slide presentations, created by Forsberg, which Wang had access to while at OmniGen Research 

and which he illegally copied and retained following termination of his engagement with 

OmniGen Research and Prince Agri. These slides included data from OmniGen Research studies 

re-styled as data from studies conducted for Mirigen.” (Compl. ¶ 86.) 

79. “The slides Wang copied and retained included OmniGen Research confidential 

notes that are visible when the slide presentation is edited and are a part of the electronic slide 

document, but that are not visible when the slides are presented.” (Compl. ¶ 87.)

80. “Wang appeared at this conference as the president of Bioshen, and made 

numerous false statements in promoting Bioshen and Mirigen. For example, Wang represented 

the material copied from OmniGen Research’s copyrighted slides as Mirigen’s and Bioshen’s, as 

well the innovations described therein. Bioshen and Mirigen also promoted their affiliation with 

‘Dr. Kevin Marley,’ whom they touted as a ‘Professor of Veterinary College’ at Oregon State 

University. This also was false, as Marley [wa]s a research assistant and a laboratory manager at 

Oregon State University, but not a professor.” (Compl. ¶ 88.)

81. “Wang also provided an electronic version of the slides, which included OmniGen 

Research confidential notes, to the conference organizers, who then made electronic versions of 

the slides available to conference participants.” (Compl. ¶ 89.)

82. “Bioshen and Mirigen also submitted a paper, which falsely describes research, as 

part of their participation in the conference. The paper describes a study conducted with pigs by 

Bioshen and Mirigen, when in fact the studies were conducted by OmniGen Research with 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 17

regard to OmniGen products. The misrepresented studies were on sheep and dairy cattle. In other 

words, the paper falsely states the feed additive tested and the species involved, not to mention 

who actually conducted the studies.” (Compl. ¶ 90.)

3. Breach Of Contract – Wang

83. “In consideration of including but not limited to his continued employment by 

OmniGen Research, Wang promised among other things [in the Confidentiality and NonDisclosure Agreement] that he would not use OmniGen Research’s ‘Protected Matters,’ as that 

term is defined in the agreement, without authorization or approval, and that he would return and 

not retain all documents relating to OmniGen Research and/or Protected Matters that he obtained 

during the course of his employment.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) 

84. “In consideration of including but not limited to $500, Wang promised [in the 

Employee Invention Agreement (attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint)] among other things to 

disclose to OmniGen Research every ‘Invention,’ as that term is defined in the agreement, 

resulting from work performed on behalf of OmniGen Research, to assign all right, title and 

interest to such Inventions, and to assist OmniGen Research in securing such rights. In the 

agreement, he also promised to notify OmniGen Research of the details of his employment with 

any future or prospective employers.” (Compl. ¶ 95.)

85. “In consideration of including but not limited to his engagement as a consultant 

for Prince Agri, Wang promised among other things that he would not use or disclose Prince 

Agri’s ‘Confidential Information,’ as that term is defined in the agreement, without authorization 

or approval, and that he would return all material containing, embodying or reflecting any 

Confidential Information. Wang also promised that during the Agreement’s term, and for one 

year after, that he would not compete with Prince Agri’s business.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 100.) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 18

4. Intentional Interference With 

Economic Relations – Yan Zheng And Bioshen

86. “Both OmniGen Research and Prince Agri had a business and professional 

relationship with Wang, as a result of among other things the aforementioned contracts.”

(Compl. ¶ 106.) 

87. As set forth in the conclusions of law, Defendants Zheng and Bioshen interfered 

with Wang’s performance of the contracts described above.

5. Trade Secret Misappropriation – Yongqiang Wang

88. “OmniGen Research’s trade secrets include its comprehensive approach to testing 

the effectiveness of feed additives on animal populations, including among other things dosage 

amounts, intervals for measuring temporal responses, procedures for blood sampling, procedures 

for isolating blood cells, and assessment targets.” (Compl. ¶ 117.)

89. “OmniGen Research’s and Prince Agri’s trade secrets also include improvements 

about how to make OmniGen products, including processing aids, ingredient sourcing, ingredient 

mixing procedures, the scientific motivation behind the use of certain ingredients, and precise 

ratios of ingredients.” (Compl. ¶ 118.)

90. As set forth in the conclusions of law, Defendant Wang misappropriated 

Plaintiffs’ trade secrets.

6. False Advertising - Yongqiang Wang, Yan Zheng, And Bioshen

91. “Wang, Zheng (through Bioshen) and Bioshen have made false and misleading 

statements in the promotion of Bioshen and Mirigen, and their products. Those statements 

include for example Wang and Bioshen’s representation at a scientific conference that slides 

based on OmniGen Research’s copyrighted slides are the work of Wang, Bioshen and Mirigen, 

and reflect their own research and analysis; a paper about research for a scientific conference that 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 19

falsely states the feed additive tested, the target animal species, and who conducted the research; 

and that Mirigen and Bioshen are affiliated with a ‘professor’ at Oregon State University.”

(Compl. ¶ 129.)

92. Mirigen and Bioshen were created based on OmniGen Research’s business and 

trade secrets.

93. “These statements are material at least because they lend credibility to Wang, 

Bioshen, and Mirigen, giving them the appearance of relying on original scientific research and 

thinking. This additional credibility is material to the purchasing decision of a substantial 

segment of consumers.” (Compl. ¶ 130.)

94. “These false and misleading statements were intentionally and/or willfully 

designed to unfairly compete and make sales that otherwise would not have been made.”

(Compl. ¶ 131.)

95. The false and misleading statements are greatly comprised of research data and 

trade secrets misappropriated from OmniGen Research, and falsely attributed to Mirigen, 

Bioshen or Mirigen products. 

96. Defendants used OmniGen Research’s trade secrets, copyrighted slides, and 

confidential information to try to give Mirigen and Bioshen an appearance of credibility like 

OmniGen Research had already established for itself. 

97. “These statements were made in commercial advertising or promotion because for 

among other reasons they constitute commercial speech, were made by Wang, Zheng (through 

Bioshen) and Bioshen in an attempt to unfairly compete with OmniGen Research and Prince 

Agri, and were made for the purpose of influencing customers and potential customers to 

purchase Bioshen’s Keligen products and Mirigen’s YQ products.” (Compl. ¶ 132.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 20

98. “Plaintiffs compete with Bioshen and Mirigen. OmniGen Research’s related 

companies Prince Agri and Phibro have rights to use OmniGen Research’s technology and use it 

for OmniGen products, which are sold around the world, including an ongoing product launch in 

China.” (Compl. ¶ 133.)

99. “Bioshen claims to have Keligen products offered as ‘An honored product of the 

Bioshen USA Corporation.’ Promotion of these products rely on the same scientific concepts and 

boast the same benefits as OmniGen products. Bioshen claims to work closely with Mirigen, 

which offers YQ products that advertise nearly identical ingredients as in OmniGen-WYC, and 

promotion of these products rely on the same scientific concepts and boast the same benefits as 

OmniGen products.” (Compl. ¶ 134.)

100. “Mirigen and Bioshen market several lines of nutritional specialty products that 

are knockoffs of OmniGen Research’s products.” (Compl. ¶ 5.)

101. “Wang’s, Zheng’s (through Bioshen) and Bioshen’s false advertising affected 

interstate commerce because, among other things and on information and belief, Bioshen 

promotes itself as a U.S. company, attendees at the conference included people who do business 

in the U.S. and who represent companies that do business in the U.S., and people who review 

and comment on U.S. scientific research.” (Compl. ¶ 135.) 

102. Due to Defendants’ behavior and presentation of significant falsehoods, the award 

to Plaintiffs under the Lanham Act should serve as a deterrent against continued and future false 

advertising.

7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Yongqiang Wang

103. “While an OmniGen Research employee, Wang owed it fiduciary duties, 

including the fiduciary duty of loyalty. His fiduciary duty of loyalty included the duty to act 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 21

solely for the benefit of OmniGen Research in all matters connected with his employment.”

(Compl. ¶ 139.)

104. “Wang breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by, among 

other things, participating in filing and keeping the ’822 Chinese patent application secret from 

OmniGen Research and taking steps to try to ensure that OmniGen Research would not obtain 

ownership of the application or any resulting patent, which was for a product to be sold in direct 

competition with Plaintiffs.” (Compl. ¶ 140.)

105. “Wang further breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by, 

among other things, misappropriating its confidential information.” (Compl. ¶ 141.)

106. “Wang breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by, among 

other things, using its equipment, including a computer owned by OmniGen Research, to set up 

competing businesses.” (Compl. ¶ 142.)

107. “Wang breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by . . . using 

and representing as his own OmniGen Research’s research and slide presentation materials, 

including in the promotion of the competing businesses he helped establish, Mirigen and 

Bioshen.” (Compl. ¶ 143.)

108. Wang was disloyal and setting up his competing businesses throughout the year 

2012 up until he left OmniGen Research in early 2013.

109. Wang was paid over $92,000 (without accounting for benefits) in 2012. (Ex. 18)

110. Wang intentionally undermined his OmniGen Research work at the same time 

that he was working to set up Mirigen and Bioshen to knockoff OmniGen Research’s products 

for the Chinese market. (McLean Witness Statement at 2.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 22

111. When Wang was assigned the task of obtaining and processing samples from 

cattle in Ione, Oregon, he knew how to complete the task correctly, but he intentionally took 

shortcuts that sabotaged the study. (McLean Witness Statement at 2.)

112. Wang fabricated and falsified data, and instructed a junior scientist at OmniGen 

Research to do the same. (McLean Witness Statement at 3.)

113. Because a number of experiments assigned to Wang included falsified data or 

were performed improperly, OmniGen Research reasonably elected to repeat the March 2013 

through January 2014 period work for the following studies to confirm or correct the results:

a. University of New Hampshire OmniGen-AF rat project

b. University of Arizona OmniGen-AF Heat Stress Project I

c. OmniGen-AF Beef Free Choice Project

d. OmniGen-AF Goat Project I

e. OmniGen-AF Calf Titration study

f. OmniGen-AF Rat study 27

g. OmniGen-AF Rat study 27.2

h. OmniGen-AF Rat study 28

i. OmniGen-AF Rat study 29

j. OmniGen-AF Rat study 30

k. OmniGen-AF Rat study 31

l. OmniGen-AF Rat study 32

m. OmniGen-AF Rat study 33

n. OmniGen-AF Rat study 34

o. OmniGen-AF Rat study 35
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 23

p. Aspergillus fumigatus analysis

(See McLean Witness Statement at 3-4.)

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Jurisdiction

114. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties, which was not challenged by 

Defendants.

115. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a)-

(b) and 1367.

B. Damages

1. General Legal Standards

116. “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the 

complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. 

United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). 

117. Plaintiffs must prove their actual damages to a reasonable degree of certainty. 

Rubicon Global Ventures, Inc. v. Chongqing Zongshen Group Import/Export Corp., 226 F. Supp.

3d 1141, 1149 (D. Or. 2016). 

118. Where a defendant’s conduct makes damages difficult to determine, however, 

courts allow “broad latitude” in quantifying damages. See Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290, 

302-03 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding damages where district court acknowledged plaintiffs’ 

damages theory “was perhaps speculative,” but the result of defendants’ “obstructionist behavior 

that made business records hard to come by”); see also Digital Filing Systems, L.L.C. v. Aditya 

International, 323 Fed. Appx. 407, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (holding that where 

damages are difficult to ascertain because of failure to comply with relevant discovery, “doubts 

about the proof should be resolved against Defendants”). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 24

119. Although a plaintiff seeking full compensation for his injuries may plead and 

prove multiple causes of action, the plaintiff may not receive more than a single recovery and 

satisfaction for each distinct item of compensable damage supported by the evidence. See

E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).

2. Breach Of Contract

120. “The Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement (attached as Exhibit A [to 

the Complaint]) is a valid and enforceable contract.” (Compl. ¶ 92.) 

121. “The Employee Invention Agreement (attached as Exhibit B [to the Complaint]) 

is a valid and enforceable contract.” (Compl. ¶ 95.)

122. “The Consulting Agreement (attached as Exhibit C [to the Complaint]) is a valid 

and enforceable contract.” (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 100.)

123. “Wang breached paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure 

Agreement at least by using and disclosing OmniGen Research’s Protected Matters in manners 

that were not authorized and/or approved by OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 93.)

124. “Wang breached paragraph 3 of the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure 

Agreement at least by not returning all documents relating to OmniGen Research and/or 

Protected Matters, obtained by Wang during the course of his employment, and also by retaining 

copies of such documents.” (Compl. ¶ 94.)

125. “Wang breached paragraph 1 of the Employee Invention Agreement at least by 

not notifying OmniGen Research of work related to the ’822 Chinese patent application, the ’822 

Chinese patent application, and the resulting ’822.6 Chinese patent to OmniGen Research.”

(Compl. ¶ 96.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 25

126. “Wang breached paragraph 2 of the Employee Invention Agreement at least by 

not assigning the ’822 Chinese patent application and resulting ’822.6 Chinese patent to 

OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 97.)

127. “Wang breached paragraph 3 of the Employee Invention Agreement at least by 

not assisting OmniGen Research to secure its rights in the ’822 Chinese patent application and 

resulting ’822.6 Chinese patent.” (Compl. ¶ 98.)

128. “Wang breached paragraph 5 of the Employee Invention Agreement at least by 

not notifying OmniGen Research of the details of his employment with Bioshen and Mirigen.”

(Compl. ¶ 99.)

129. “Wang breached paragraph 4 of the Consulting Agreement at least by using and 

disclosing Prince Agri’s Confidential Information in manners that were not authorized or 

approved, and also by not returning to Prince Agri all material containing, embodying or 

reflecting any Confidential Information.” (Compl. ¶ 101.)

130. “Wang breached paragraph 5 of the Consulting Agreement at least by not 

informing Prince Agri of the ’822 Chinese patent application and resulting ‘822.6 Chinese 

patent.” (Compl. ¶ 102.)

131. “Wang breached paragraph 6 of the Consulting Agreement at least by competing 

with Prince Agri’s business both during the term of the agreement, and in the one-year period 

after termination or expiration.” (Compl. ¶ 103.)

132. “OmniGen Research and Prince Agri have been damaged by the above breaches 

and will continue to be injured by them unless Wang, and all those acting in privity with him, are 

ordered to return or destroy all materials in their possession, custody or control containing or 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 26

reflecting Plaintiffs’ confidential information, and are ordered to make no further use of them.”

(Compl. ¶ 104.)

133. In accordance with the entry of default judgment, Defendant Yongqiang Wang 

breached the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement he made with OmniGen Research.

134. In accordance with the entry of default judgment, Defendant Yongqiang Wang 

breached the Employee Invention Agreement he had with OmniGen Research.

135. In accordance with the entry of default judgment, Defendant Yongqiang Wang 

breached the Consulting Agreement he had with Prince Agri.

136. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages commensurate with the harms to their

expectation interests under the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement, Employee 

Invention Agreement, and Consulting Agreement.

137. Although Wang’s unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiffs’ confidential information 

caused quantifiable, compensable harms to Plaintiffs, see infra Parts E and G, as a measure of 

Plaintiffs’ expectation interests under the Confidentiality Agreement and paragraph 4 of the 

Consulting Agreement, any damages are too abstract and uncertain to quantify. Plaintiffs’ 

proposed measure of damages—the $821,000 initial investment in Mirigen—does not reflect its 

expectation interest. That is, the Court cannot fairly ascertain what Plaintiffs’ position would 

have been had Wang fully performed under the non-disclosure provisions.

138. The requested award could be described as consequential damages, since it was 

surely foreseeable to Wang that disclosing large volumes of confidential information might result 

in lost profits or investment opportunities for Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs specifically disclaim that 

they seek any consequential damages. (Pls.’ Reply Br. 8, ECF No. 223.) Similarly, Plaintiffs 

have not requested any quasi-contractual relief based on unjust enrichment.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 27

139. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ measure of damages reflects its expectation interest 

under the Employee Invention Agreement and paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Consulting Agreement. 

If Wang had fully performed under the Agreements, the Chinese patent would have been 

assigned to OmniGen and the investment garnered by that patent and other confidential 

information would have accrued to Plaintiffs rather than Wang’s competing business entity.

These are concrete, certain, and quantifiable injuries under a contractual theory of recovery.

140. On that basis, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested award of $821,000 is an 

appropriate measure of contractual damages.

3. Intentional Interference With Economic Relations

141. “Zheng intentionally interfered with Wang’s business and professional 

relationship with OmniGen Research by among other things assisting Wang with evading his 

obligation to disclose and assign the ’822 Chinese patent application and resulting ’822.6 

Chinese patent to OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 107.)

142. “Zheng provided this assistance through improper means and for an improper 

purpose by among other things agreeing to be listed as an inventor on the ’822 Chinese patent 

application in Wang’s place even though she was not an inventor of any alleged invention 

described or claimed therein.” (Compl. ¶ 108.)

143. “Zheng’s actions had the causal effect of damaging Wang’s and OmniGen 

Research’s business and professional relationship, and damage to OmniGen Research has 

resulted. OmniGen Research will continue to be injured by Zheng’s action unless she is ordered 

to assign her entire interest in the ’822 Chinese patent application and the ’822.6 Chinese patent 

to OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 109.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 28

144. “Zheng intentionally interfered with Wang’s business and professional 

relationship with Prince Agri by among other things assisting Wang in evading his obligation to 

not compete with Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 110.)

145. “Zheng provided this assistance through improper means and for an improper 

purpose by among other things agreeing to be listed and maintained as the registrant for the 

competing business Bioshen and as the registrant and contact for Bioshen’s website, and to be 

listed and maintained as an inventor on the ’822 Chinese patent application in Wang’s place even 

though she was not an inventor of any alleged invention described or claimed therein.” (Compl. ¶ 

111.)

146. “Zheng’s actions had the causal effect of damaging Wang’s business and 

professional relationship with Prince Agri and OmniGen Research, and damage to Prince Agri 

and OmniGen Research has resulted.” (Compl. ¶ 112.)

147. “Zheng (through Bioshen) and Bioshen intentionally interfered with Wang’s 

business and professional relationship with Prince Agri by among other things assisting Wang in 

evading his obligation to not compete with Prince Agri.” (Compl. ¶ 113.)

148. “Zheng (through Bioshen) and Bioshen provided this assistance through improper 

means and for an improper purpose by among other things associating with Wang even though 

Bioshen is a competing business with Prince Agri and OmniGen Research, and they knew or 

should have known of Wang’s obligations to Prince Agri and OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 

114.)

149. “Zheng’s (through Bioshen) and Bioshen’s actions had the causal effect of 

damaging Wang’s and Prince Agri’s business and professional relationship, and damage to 

Prince Agri has resulted.” (Compl. ¶ 115.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 29

150. In accordance with the entry of default judgment, Defendants Yan Zheng and 

Bioshen intentionally interfered with economic relations between Yongqiang Wang and 

OmniGen Research.

151. Plaintiffs do not seek any damages for this intentional interference with economic 

relations and the Court awards none.

4. Trade Secret Misappropriation

152. “OmniGen Research and Prince Agri employ reasonable measures to maintain the 

secrecy of the[ir] trade secrets.” (Compl. ¶ 119.)

153. “Wang used improper means to acquire the above information from OmniGen 

Research because among other things he had contractually agreed not to use OmniGen 

Research’s information unless authorized or approved by OmniGen Research, yet he used the 

information without OmniGen Research’s authorization or approval.” (Compl. ¶ 120.)

154. “Wang misappropriated OmniGen Research’s trade secrets by acquiring, using 

and disclosing those trade secrets without authorization and by improper means.” (Compl. ¶ 

121.)

155. “Wang’s misappropriation of OmniGen Research’s and Prince Agri’s trade 

secrets was willful and malicious, entitling OmniGen Research and Prince Agri to attorneys’ fees 

and punitive damages, and has damaged OmniGen Research and Prince Agri. Plaintiffs will 

continue to be injured by this misappropriation unless Wang, and all those acting in privity with 

him, are ordered to return or destroy all materials in their possession, custody or control 

embodying Plaintiff’s trade secrets, and are ordered to make no further use of them.” (Compl. ¶ 

122.)

156. In accordance with the entry of default judgment, Defendant Yongqiang Wang 

misappropriated trade secrets from OmniGen Research.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 30

157. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages that “may include both the actual loss caused by 

misappropriation, and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into 

account in computing actual loss, but shall not be less than a reasonable royalty for the 

unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.” O.R.S. § 646.465.

158. Whether deemed “actual loss,” “unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation,” 

or “a reasonable royalty for the unauthorized disclosure or use,” Plaintiffs’ estimate that the 

value of what Defendants misappropriated is no less than $821,000 is reasonably certain and a 

conservative valuation.

159. OmniGen Research and Prince Agri are entitled to punitive damages due to 

Wang’s willful and malicious misappropriation of OmniGen Research’s and Price Agri’s trade 

secrets. (Compl. ¶ 122.) O.R.S. § 646.465(2) (“Upon a finding of willful or malicious 

misappropriation, punitive damages may be awarded in an amount not exceeding twice any [nonpunitive] award.”).

160. Punitive damages in the amount of $1,642,000, or twice the award for the 

misappropriation of the trade secrets, are warranted.

161. Based on the forgoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested base award of 

$821,000 and punitive award of $1,642,000 is appropriate compensation and deterrent for

Wang’s misappropriation. A total award of $2,463,000 is therefore granted.

5. Copyright Infringement - Yongqiang Wang

162. “OmniGen Research owns the copyright and has a valid registration under United 

States copyright law, Copyright Registration TXu001977244, for original works of authorship in 

slides discussed above [and copied by Wang].” (Compl. ¶ 124.)

163. Defendant Yongqiang Wang infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrighted work with 

Copyright Registration TXu 1-977-244 effective on February 11, 2016, and Plaintiffs should be 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 31

awarded statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action since the work was 

registered. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).

164. “OmniGen Research has been injured as a result of Wang’s copying and will 

continue to be injured by it unless Wang, and all those acting in privity with him, are ordered to 

return or destroy all copies of OmniGen Research’s copyrighted materials and all copies of any 

documents that incorporate such materials, and are ordered to make no further use of any 

OmniGen Research copyrighted materials.” (Compl. ¶ 127.)

165. Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not request statutory damages for copyright 

infringement, containing only a general request for injunctive and economic relief, they are 

entitled to recover statutory damages for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he 

copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of 

actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the 

action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for 

which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 

or more than $30,000 as the court considers just”).

166. Plaintiffs ask the Court to award $30,000 in statutory damages for Wang’s alleged 

willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“In a case where the copyright owner sustains the 

burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its 

discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”).

167. The Court must accept as true that Wang infringed upon Plaintiffs’ copyright 

between February 11, 2016, the date on which the copyright was registered, and February 16, 

2016, the date on which the Complaint was filed. See Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. But it is not 

required to accept as true that such infringement, or the alleged infringement post-dating the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 32

Complaint, was committed willfully—that allegation is not contained in the Complaint. 

168. Plaintiffs do not show that they are entitled to more than the statutory minimum in 

damages for this brief period of infringement. 

169. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that $750 is an appropriate and just 

measure of damages for copyright infringement. 

6. Lanham Act And False Advertising

170. Plaintiffs are entitled to damages or equitable relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), 

including profits.

171. Defendants’ discovery abuse and spoliation of evidence related to damages 

prevents a precise calculation of Defendants’ profits.

172. Because Plaintiffs are unable to calculate Defendants’ profits due to Defendants’ 

discovery abuse and spoliation, it is equitable to award Plaintiffs the $821,000 as the value of 

Mirigen. Accord Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272, 1274-

75 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that, if only nominal damages are imposed under the Lanham Act,

then “enforcement would fail to serve as a convincing deterrent”).

173. After entering default for egregious litigation conduct, treble damages may be 

awarded under the Lanham Act if the allegations in the complaint support it. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)

(granting courts discretion to treble actual damages or “enter judgment for such sum as the court 

shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case”); see also Taser Int’l, Inc. v. 

Phazzer Elecs., Inc., No. 6:16-cv-366-Orl-40KRS, Slip Op. at 7 n.4 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2017) 

(awarding treble damages after entering default for litigation misconduct where the plaintiff 

alleged that the defendant “intentionally engaged in false advertising” because the plaintiff’s 

“allegations are accepted as true by virtue of the default judgment”).

174. Plaintiffs were harmed by Defendants making false efficacy claims for its own 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 33

product based (solely) on the research performed by Plaintiffs. In doing so, Defendants 

effectively usurped the nascent Chinese market, causing actual harm to Plaintiffs and undue 

profit for Defendants. 

175. Defendants—or, at least Wang—knew that he was passing off as his own the 

materials that underscored the very credibility of Defendants’ business. 

176. As is common in such false advertising cases, quantifying damages is difficult 

(especially where evidence has been systematically destroyed by the defendant). 

177. Here, Plaintiffs quantified such damages at $821,000, a reasonable estimation 

given the extensive spoliation of evidence. (See Spoliation Opinion and Order, ECF No. 182.)

178. Plaintiffs further request that any compensatory award include Defendants’ head 

start and avoided costs of conducting the scientific studies they used in false advertising. (Pls.’ 

Br. 14-18, ECF No. 195.) Those avoided costs are estimated at $80,000. (Id. Ex. 2, Voth Report 

¶ 33, Schedule 4 at 19.)

179. The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that counting avoided costs as actual damages

is appropriate under the circumstances.

180. The Court is already awarding Plaintiffs the initial $821,000 investment in 

Mirigen—the full known benefit gained by Defendants and the best available estimation of the 

actual competitive harm suffered by Plaintiffs. Requiring Defendants to pay damages which do 

not attempt to compensate Plaintiffs and which go beyond disgorging the wrongly-acquired 

investment is more punitive in nature. 

181. Although, as discussed infra, Plaintiffs may have suffered greater than $821,000

in economic harms, the Lanham Act does not allow for punitive damages and provides a 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 34

discretionary enhancement mechanism based on equitable considerations. The Court therefore 

declines to award Plaintiffs the estimated $80,000 in costs avoided by Defendants.

182. Nevertheless, the $821,000 actual damages award—which the Court agrees is a 

conservative proxy for ultimate profits from the venture, whether those lost by plaintiffs or 

gained by defendants—should be enhanced to $2,463,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

183. Enhancing damages is justified by Defendants’ conduct. Defendants’ “false and 

misleading statements were intentionally and/or willfully designed to unfairly compete and make 

sales that otherwise would not have been made.” (Compl. ¶ 131.) See Taco Cabana Int’l Inc. v. 

Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1127 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 

Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (“An enhancement of damages may be based on a finding of 

willful infringement, but cannot be punitive”).

184. Enhancing damages here would help fully compensate Plaintiffs for the harm 

caused by Defendants, not penalize Defendants. See Taco Cabana Int’l Inc., 932 F.2d at 1127

(“[E]nhancement could, consistent with the ‘principles of equity’ promoted in section 35 [of the 

Lanham Act], provide proper redress to an otherwise undercompensated plaintiff where 

imprecise damage calculations fail to do justice, particularly where the imprecision results from 

defendant’s conduct.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

185. The statute is designed to allow a court to provide just compensation for an 

injured plaintiff where the amount found as actual damages fails to do so. See, e.g., U-Haul Int’l, 

Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (D. Ariz. 1984) (awarding $20 Million of enhanced 

damages where plaintiff “sustained damages above and beyond those actually awarded”), aff’d in 

relevant part, modified in part and rev’d in part, 793 F.2d 1034, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1986). 

186. Here, the damages were conservatively calculated, based on very limited 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 35

evidence. The limitations of the evidence were largely due to the destruction of evidence by 

Defendants. An enhanced award of $2,463,000 would better align with Plaintiffs’ harm.

187. The statute does not proscribe limits on the type of uncompensated harm that a 

court can evaluate to exercise its discretion, or any level of precision that need be established to 

determine the amount of enhancement. Instead, it cites the “principles of equity” and caps 

awards at treble compensatory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (a).

188. Consistent with the principles of equity, courts have exercised broad discretion to 

address a variety of undercompensated harm, including where there is difficulty assessing 

damage, and where lost profits are insufficient to address the on-going harm. See, e.g., Binder v. 

Disability Grp., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[P]otential harm from 

lingering misimpressions that is unlikely to be fully captured by the lost profits”); Playboy 

Enterps., Inc. v. P. K. Sorren Exp. Co. Inc. of Fla., 546 F. Supp. 987, 998 (S.D. Fla. 1982) 

(“[T]here must have been some harm to PEI’s goodwill and reputation.”).

189. Moreover, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, it is proper to also consider 

that enhancing damages would advance the cause of deterring Defendants and others similarly 

situated from repeating the type of unfair and deceptive behavior. See Sands, Taylor & Wood v. 

Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1347 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts have required the final remedy 

imposed under Section 35(a) [of the Lanham Act] provide a sufficient deterrent to ensure that the 

guilty party will not return to its former ways and once again pollute the marketplace.”); 

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 

confers authority on the court to treble defendant’s profits in the event that compensatory 

damages are inadequate to deter future infringing conduct.”).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 36

190. As noted above, these Defendants—in both their underlying conduct and their 

litigation conduct—have shown repeated disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights, the law, and this Court’s 

orders. Enhancing damages to fully compensate Plaintiffs will have an important deterrent effect. 

191. The Court therefore finds it to be just under the circumstances of this case to 

award increased damages resulting from false advertising, passing off, and unfair competition 

under the Lanham Act. 

192. According to the circumstances of this case, increased damages are proper. The 

Court thus awards $821,000 in actual damages and concludes, based on the only available 

evidence, that this award should be tripled for deterrence (not a penalty) to a total award of

$2,463,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).

7. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

193. Wang owed a duty of loyalty while employed as a scientist at OmniGen Research 

from 2005 to 2013. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 139.) 

194. “At the same time Wang worked for OmniGen Research and Prince Agri in 

Oregon, he breached his contracts with them by secretly creating an OmniGen Research-clone 

Chinese business based on stolen OmniGen Research and Prince Agri information and the 

infringement of their rights.” (Compl. ¶ 2.)

195. Wang’s “imitation business consisted of at least two entities, Defendant Bioshen 

and the Chinese company Jiangsu Mirigen Biotechnology Development Co., Ltd. (‘Mirigen’).” 

(Compl. ¶ 2.) 

196. “Mirigen and Bioshen market several lines of nutritional specialty products that 

are knockoffs of OmniGen Research’s products.” (Compl. ¶ 5.)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 37

197. “Wang breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by, among 

other things, using its equipment, including a computer owned by OmniGen Research, to set up 

competing businesses.” (Compl. ¶ 142.)

198. Further, “Wang breached the fiduciary duty he owed to OmniGen Research by, 

among other things, using and representing as his own OmniGen Research’s research and slide 

presentation materials, including in the promotion of the competing businesses he helped 

establish, Mirigen and Bioshen.” (Compl. ¶ 143.)

199. “Wang’s breach of fiduciary duty has damaged and is continuing to damage 

OmniGen Research.” (Compl. ¶ 144.)

200. “Wang’s actions may have already created customer confusion in the marketplace 

about the origin and ownership of OmniGen Research technology, and [unless] Wang is stopped 

and his actions corrected, they pose a substantial risk of creating more confusion.” (Compl. ¶ 

144.)

201. OmniGen Research was directly harmed by Wang’s breaches of fiduciary duty by 

having to repeat or re-create certain research projects on which Wang had worked while Wang 

was plotting to start rival businesses, Mirigen and Bioshen. 

202. The reasonably certain cost to OmniGen Research to re-create or repeat research 

projects because of Wang’s breaches of fiduciary duty is $252,000. (See Voth Report Schedule 

3.) 

203. The “Restatement [of Agency] provides for the recovery of all compensation paid 

to an employee during a period of disloyalty as damages.” HTS, Inc. v. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d 

927, 955 (D. Ariz. 2013). Oregon law is consistent with this approach. Am. Timber & Trading 

Co. v. Niedermeyer, 558 P.2d 1211, 1123 (Or. 1976) “([A] corporate officer who engages in 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 38

activities which constitute either a breach of his duty of loyalty or a willful breach of his contract 

of employment is not entitled to any compensation for services rendered during that period of 

time even though part of those services may have been properly performed.”).

204. Wang was disloyal and setting up his competing businesses throughout the year 

2012 up until he left OmniGen Research in early 2013. 

205. Had Wang honored his duty of loyalty to OmniGen Research by disclosing his 

activities, it is reasonable to assume that OmniGen Research would not have continued to pay 

him, so an award of damages for Wang’s salary directly flows from the breach of his duty of 

loyalty. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 956.

206. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the $92,000

salary paid to Wang and the $252,000 cost of re-creating or repeating research projects. Total 

damages for Wang’s breach of fiduciary duty are therefore $344,000.

8. Summary of Findings on Damages

207. Wang breached his contractual obligations, misappropriated trade secrets, and 

violated the Lanham Act with the other named defendants. An award of $821,000 is 

independently supported by each of these three causes of action. Plaintiffs estimate that $821,000 

is equal to the approximate initial investment in Mirigen by its original shareholders. (See Voth 

Report ¶ 29.) Nothing was provided in discovery to offset or otherwise reduce that total 

investment as being the minimum valuation of what was misappropriated from Plaintiffs. (See

Voth Report ¶¶ 27-31.) Since Plaintiffs are limited to a single recovery, they are entitled to 

$821,000 for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and false advertising.

208. Wang breached his duty of loyalty while setting up his competing businesses 

throughout the year 2012 up until he left OmniGen Research in early 2013. Wang was paid over 

$92,000 in 2012 (without accounting for benefits) and the estimated cost to OmniGen Research 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 39

to re-create or repeat research projects mishandled by Wang is $252,000. (See Voth Report 

Schedule 3.) Plaintiffs are thus entitled to $344,000 for Wang’s breach of fiduciary duty.

209. Defendants infringed upon the copyright of OmniGen Research’s copyrighted 

slides, Copyright Registration TXu 1-977-244. Plaintiffs are entitled to $750 for these violations.

210. Due to the severity of Defendants’ intentional misappropriation, the Court further 

finds that Plaintiff qualifies for enhanced damages under the Lanham Act and punitive damages

under O.R.S. § 646.465(2). An additional award of $1,642,000 is independently supported by 

each of these two causes of action.

211. After enhancing damages, the Court finds it just that judgment for damages of 

$2,807,750 should be entered against Wang. The Court finds it just that Bioshen and Zheng 

should be held jointly and severally liable for $2,463,750 of the $2,807,750. This $2,463,750 

reflects the treble damages attributable to Bioshen and Zheng’s involvement with Mirigen and 

the misappropriation of studies and research performed by OmniGen.

C. Injunctive Relief

1. General Legal Standards

212. As stated previously, “[t]he general rule of law is that upon default the factual 

allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as 

true.” Geddes 559 F.2d at 560. 

213. A court may only grant a permanent injunction if a plaintiff demonstrates: “(1) 

that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 

damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 

hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the 

public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 

Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 40

214. A defendant’s voluntary cessation of cessation of activity is not a ground for the 

denial of a permanent injunction. See Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 793 F.2d 1132, 

1135-36 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to 

grant a permanent injunction based on plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence demonstrating that 

defendant planned to sell the objectionable items); see also Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix 

Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction even though the 

defendant voluntarily stopped use of the infringing mark). 

215. “An injunction should be tailored to eliminate only the specific harm alleged, but 

it should not be so narrow as to invite easy evasion.” Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 

F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

216. “A district court has considerable discretion in fashioning suitable relief and 

defining the terms of an injunction.” Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 

974 (9th Cir. 1991).

2. Analysis

217. This Court has the discretion to grant a permanent injunction pursuant to its 

equitable powers, see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006), and, with 

respect to false advertising, the Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).

218. In accordance with this authority, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried their 

burden and demonstrated all four prongs of the requisite test for permanent injunctive relief. 

a. Irreparable Injury

219. Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed by Defendants’ conduct and will be 

irreparably harmed if Defendants are not enjoined from disclosing Plaintiffs’ trade secrets and 

confidential information, as well as ordered to take steps to remedy any prior disclosure.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 41

220. As the Court previously noted in its Preliminary Injunction Revised Order, the 

disclosure or threatened disclosure of trade secrets or even non-trade secret confidential 

information is “sufficient to meet the irreparable injury requirement for a preliminary 

injunction.” Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing 

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 

F.3d 1069, 1071 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); and Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 

350 F.2d 134, 142 (9th Cir. 1965)).

221. The consumer confusion, loss of good will, and increased market place barriers 

which can result, and, in this case, have resulted, from false advertising are also sufficient to 

meet the irreparable injury requirement. See Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 

1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 1997).

222. As such, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating irreparable injury.

b. Inadequate Remedies Available at Law

223. Despite this Court’s award of monetary damages, remedies at law are inadequate 

to compensate for Plaintiffs’ injuries.

224. The disclosure of Plaintiffs’ confidential information and Defendants’ false 

representations have resulted in difficult to quantify injuries including consumer confusion, loss 

of good will, increased market place barriers, and unfair competition. These harms are ongoing 

and may continue or worsen if Defendants are not enjoined from engaging in related conduct.

225. Moreover, as a result of Defendants’ extensive spoliation, Plaintiffs more concrete 

injuries, such as lost profits, have been made difficult to calculate. 

226. An award of monetary damages is thus insufficient to remedy Plaintiffs’ injuries. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 42

c. Balance of Hardships

227. The balance of hardships also weighs in favor of Plaintiffs.

228. Defendants have no right to continue using Plaintiffs confidential information or 

engaging in false advertising. In general, “there is no harm to a defendant from an injunction 

with prevents continuing dissemination of false statements.” Homeland Housewares, LLC v. 

Euro-Pro Operating LLC, No. CV 14-03954 DDP MANX, 2014 WL 4187982, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

229. Similarly, Wang contracted with Plaintiffs to maintain confidentiality and assign

the Chinese patent in question—these are terms voluntarily agreed to by Wang and not terms 

crafted by the Court from whole cloth.

230. Defendants will therefore suffer minimal hardship in being enjoined from using 

and possessing Plaintiffs’ confidential information, engaging in further false advertising, and 

continuing to hold the wrongfully acquired patent rights.

231. Plaintiffs, by contrast, have and will continue to suffer hardship if their trade 

secrets and other confidential information are used by Defendants and Defendants maintain their 

pattern of disobeying the Court’s orders.

232. The balance of hardships therefore tips in favor of Plaintiffs.

d. Public Interest

233. Finally, an injunction will serve the public interest in fair competition, 

enforcement of contract rights, and truthful advertising.

234. There is “a public interest in upholding the law and contracts, and having parties 

abide by their legal duties.” Pac. Kidney & Hypertension, LLC v. Kassakian, 156 F. Supp. 3d 

1219, 1229 (D. Or. 2016); C & C Prop., Inc. v. Shell Co., No. 1:14-CV-01889-JAM, 2015 WL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 43

5604384, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015); Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning v. Tenke Corp., 

511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007). “There is [also] a strong public interest in preventing false 

advertising of products in the marketplace.” Homeland Housewares, 2014 WL 4187982 at *6.

235. An injunction will therefore serve the public interest.

3. Scope

236. As the record reflects, Defendants have repeatedly violated the Court’s orders and 

engaged in conduct harmful to Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Spoliation Opinion and Order 9 (noting that 

Wang’s conduct taking his laptop to China was a violation of the Preliminary Injunction order); 

id. at 11, 16 (noting that destruction of evidence was in violation of the Court’s orders); id. at 17 

(noting that Zheng’s donation of a desktop computer to Goodwill was admitted by Defendants to 

violate the Court’s preliminary injunction order).)

237. In turn, the Court finds that, in order to prevent further violations and bad faith 

conduct, any injunctive relief must be supported by sufficiently strong enforcement mechanisms 

and incentives for faithful compliance.

238. The following discussion summarizes and offers support for the specific 

provisions contained in the Court’s permanent injunction, provided infra.

a. Confidential Information and Trade Secrets

239. As a result of Wang’s breach of contract with regard to his misuse of confidential 

and trade secret information, his trade secret misappropriation, and Zheng and Bioshen’s 

interference with Wang’s contracts, Defendants are enjoined from possessing, using, or 

distributing Plaintiff’s confidential information or trade secrets, ordered to demand that their 

associates return Plaintiff’s information, and ordered not to have any involvement in Bioshen or 

Mirigen. See infra ¶¶ 269-72.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 44

240. The Court finds that merely prohibiting Defendants’ further use of Plaintiffs’ 

information would be insufficient given the willfulness of Defendants’ underlying conduct and 

behavior in the present litigation.

241. Defendants have raised no objections to these terms. (See Dfs.’ Resp. Br. ¶ 1, 

ECF No. 206.)

242. The Court, however, declines to grant Plaintiffs’ request for an expansive 

provision prohibiting Defendants from working for certain types of feed industry businesses. In 

general, courts are skeptical of restraints on trade when voluntarily entered into by private parties 

and a court-imposed restraint would require the highest order of justification. The proposed 

restraint would be burdensome, overbroad, and unfairly limit Defendants’ ability to satisfy the 

judgment in this case. Plaintiffs have ample enforcement mechanisms to ensure that Defendants 

comply with the terms of the injunction in their professional pursuits—targeting those 

professional pursuits directly is unfair and unwarranted.

b. False Advertising

243. Defendants are further enjoined from engaging in false, deceptive, or misleading

advertising as it relates to products in the feed additive industry. See infra ¶ 273.

244. “Courts routinely grant permanent injunctions prohibiting deceptive advertising.” 

TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011). “Nothing is clearer in 

the law of commercial speech than that false or misleading commercial speech is ‘clearly subject 

to restraint.’” ITEX Corp. v. Glob. Links Corp., 90 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1174 (D. Nev. 2015) 

(quoting U–Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

245. Furthermore, under the Lanham Act, “advertising may be enjoined if it ‘contain[s] 

misrepresentations or create[s] a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will be confused as to the 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 45

source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser’s product.’” Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v.

Grillhouse, Inc., No. 6:13-CV-02016-MC, 2015 WL 12880560, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 30, 2015) 

(quoting Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968)).

246. Defendants object to this term by alleging that the “Lanham Act has never been 

mentioned in this action.” (Defs.’ Resp. Br. ¶ 2.) That is simply not true. (See Compl. ¶ 11). As 

outlined supra, Wang’s advertising of his Mirigen and Bioshen companies was deceptive and 

contained misrepresentations in violation of the Lanham Act.

247. A provision enjoining further false advertising is therefore appropriate.

c. Patent Assignment

248. Defendants must assign to Plaintiffs all interest they have in the Chinese patent 

and application, as well as register the assignment with the Chinese government. See infra ¶ 274.

249. Precedent both within and outside the Ninth Circuit supports such assignment. 

See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 145 (9th Cir. 

1965) (affirming a district court’s order that patent applications be assigned to an employer 

where an agreement required their assignment); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Crescendo Techs., 

LLC, No. 1:07CV1016, 2009 WL 2707805, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2009) (“Where intellectual 

property has been found to be misappropriated through a patent application, it is appropriate 

equitable relief to reassign the application.”).

250. Defendants do not oppose assigning the patent and application to Plaintiffs. 

(Defs.’ Resp. Br. ¶ 3.)

251. The Court therefore finds assignment to be appropriate.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 46

d. Production of Electronic Media

252. Defendants are also ordered to produce their electronic media to Plaintiffs for 

review and to provide an affidavit and documentary evidence to verify their compliance with the 

terms of this injunction. See infra ¶¶ 275-76.

253. “[T]he existence of an injunction does not guarantee compliance with its terms, 

particularly if there is no means to verify compliance.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Liang, No. CV 13-

08670 DDP VBKX, 2014 WL 1089264, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014); see also United

States v. Viray, No. 12-CV-1016-GW, 2012 WL 759884, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) 

(allowing “post-judgment discovery to ensure compliance” with the terms of the injunction).

254. Defendants object that they have already provided all electronic data and media to 

Plaintiffs. (Dfs.’ Reply Br. ¶ 4.) 

255. The purpose of the production provision, however, is to ensure continued 

compliance with the Court’s orders—past production does not ensure future compliance. 

Moreover, prior production has shown possession of Plaintiffs’ confidential information. 

256. Defendants have demonstrated a willful failure to comply with the Court’s orders

regarding production of electronic data. These provisions will help to ensure compliance moving 

forward.

e. Security Interest

257. Defendants are also ordered to record a security interest in their property to ensure 

ongoing compliance with this injunction. Plaintiffs may foreclose on this interest only if the 

Court makes a finding that Defendants have engaged in a bad faith violation of paragraphs 274 to 

279 of the injunction. See infra ¶ 277.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 47

258. The Court finds that such a provision is necessary to ensure that Defendants 

Wang and Zheng, believed to be Chinese nationals and who have been building a business in 

China, do not dissipate assets or otherwise frustrate Plaintiffs’ ability to recover effective 

monetary or injunctive relief by liquidating their assets and returning to China. 

259. Defendants object on the grounds that this provision “appears to be unnecessary 

and constitutes overreach.” (Dfs.’ Reply Br. ¶ 5.)

260. As discussed above, Defendants’ lack of trustworthiness and prior failure to 

comply with Court orders indicate that such security is necessary to ensure their continued 

compliance with the terms of the injunction. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Satellite Broad. Corp., No. 

CIVSACV95336LHM(EEX), 1996 WL 87056, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1996) (ordering that a 

security interest in real property be recorded for the benefit of the plaintiff, to serve as security 

for defendants’ agreement to pay monetary damages).

261. The term, importantly, is limited only to bad faith violations and applies only to 

those provisions specifically enjoining the underlying conduct for which Defendants have been 

found liable. It does not apply to violations of the production and reporting requirements, 

discussed infra.

f. Violations and Production of Electronic Media

262. Defendants must produce their electronic devices to the Court within two days if 

Plaintiffs provide evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that Defendants have 

violated any provisions of the permanent injunction. See infra ¶ 278.

263. This provision is, like the other enforcement mechanisms, warranted due to 

Defendants’ conduct in this case and the need to verify ongoing compliance.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 48

264. Defendants object that this provision lacks procedural safeguards and requires

production based on mere allegations. (Defs.’ Reply Br. ¶ 6.)

265. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs proposed evidentiary standard—“reasonable 

possibility” of a violation—was too low. A preponderance of the evidence standard is more 

appropriate. The Court is satisfied that production of electronic media to the Court and not 

directly to Plaintiffs is an adequate safeguard.

g. Territorial Reach

266. The Court’s injunction applies worldwide. See infra ¶ 279.

267. Since Defendants’ wrongful actions have included conduct occurring in China—

including starting a competing Chinese business, filing a Chinese patent, and speaking at a 

conference in China using OmniGen’s copyrighted slides—a worldwide injunction is appropriate 

and necessary to accord Plaintiffs meaningful relief. See Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, 

Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a worldwide injunction appropriate in certain 

cases of trade secret misappropriation and always appropriate in impacted foreign markets).

4. Specific Terms

268. On the basis of the foregoing, and good cause otherwise appearing therefor, the 

Court issues a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants as follows:

a. Protecting Plaintiffs’ Confidential Information

269. Defendants and their agents, servants, employees and all persons and entities 

acting in privity, concert or participation with them, shall not possess, use, or distribute 

Plaintiffs’ nonpublic information or trade secrets. 

270. Wang shall send written demands to all former and current personnel, officers, 

owners, and customers of Jiangsu Mirigen Biotechnology Development Co., Ltd. (“Mirigen”) 

that they return all of Plaintiffs’ information (including any Mirigen or Bioshen documents that 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 49

contains such information). All references in this injunction to Mirigen will also include any 

business that is a successor entity to Mirigen.

271. Defendants shall not have any involvement with or ownership interest in Mirigen, 

either directly or indirectly. “Involvement” includes but is not limited to being employed by 

Mirigen, consulting with or advising Mirigen, or marketing for or promoting Mirigen. 

272. Wang and Zheng shall not have any involvement with or ownership interest in 

Bioshen, either directly or indirectly. For example, they may not be employed by Bioshen, 

consult with or advise Bioshen, or market for or promote Bioshen. Further, Wang and Zheng 

shall file a cancellation of Bioshen’s Assumed Business Name registration with the Oregon 

Secretary of State within 30 days of the entry of this order, and shall at no time take steps to form 

a new entity by that name or use that name.

b. Preventing Further False Advertising

273. Defendants and their agents, servants, employees and all persons and entities 

acting in privity, concert or participation with them, shall not: (1) falsify any of their credentials, 

or the credentials of any entity or person affiliated with them, when engaged in any activity 

related to feed additives; (2) falsely or deceptively represent that any feed additive product has 

benefits similar to OmniGen products, including that it supports or enhances immune function, 

reduces metabolic disorders, or improves milk quality, or (3) falsely or deceptively represent that 

research done on any OmniGen product reflects or predicts the performance of another product. 

c. Enforcing Employee Invention Agreement

274. Using the form attached hereto, Wang and Zheng shall assign any and all interest 

they have in Chinese patent no. ZL 2012 1 0420822.6 and Chinese application number 

201210420822 to Prince Agri Products, Inc., within 5 days of the entry of this order. Within 45 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 50

days of this order, Wang and Zheng shall file the executed assignment for registration at the 

patent administration department under the State Council in China, pursuant to Article 10 of 

Chapter 1 of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China.

d. Ensuring Compliance with Injunctive Relief 

275. Wang and Zheng shall file an affidavit with the Court within 60 days of the entry 

of this injunction, which describes and attaches all documents related to their efforts to comply 

with the injunction, including all efforts to retrieve Plaintiffs’ information and proof that the 

Mirigen interests have either been sold or have otherwise been terminated and that the Bioshen 

name has been cancelled. 

276. Defendants shall within 45 days of the entry of this order produce to Plaintiffs all 

electronic media in their custody, possession or control (including but not limited to all personal 

or household electronic devices and storage, including duplicates) for purposes of verifying that 

they do not contain Plaintiffs’ confidential and/or copyrighted material. Plaintiffs shall return the 

electronic media as soon as possible and not later than 10 business days of receipt.

277. In order to provide Plaintiffs with security that Defendants will comply with the 

other terms of this injunction, Wang and Zheng, within 30 days of the entry of this order, shall 

record with the Benton County Clerk a $500,000 security interest in favor of Plaintiffs in the 

residence at 6255 SW Chestnut Drive, Corvallis, Oregon 97333 that will expire in 5 years or at 

such earlier time as the Court orders. Until this security interest expires, Plaintiffs shall have the 

right to foreclose on this security interest if the Court determines that Wang or Zheng has in bad

faith violated any portion of Part A, B, or C of this permanent injunction. The parties may agree 

that this security interest may be transferred to another property of equal or greater value should 

Wang and Zheng desire to move.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 51

278. Wang and Zheng shall produce to the Court all of their electronic devices and 

storage within two days of Plaintiffs establishing to the satisfaction of the Court that it is more 

likely than not that either Wang or Zheng has violated any of the terms of this order.

279. This injunction applies worldwide and will last five years.

280. The Court retains non-exclusive jurisdiction to enter such orders as may be 

necessary to enforce the Court’s judgment in this matter.

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

1. Legal Bases for Awarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

281. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. 1117(a), Oregon Trade Secrets Act, ORS § 646.467, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

a. Lanham Act—Fees and Costs

282. Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorneys’ fees and costs under the Lanham Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1117(a).

283. Under § 1117(a), a court may “award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 

party” in “exceptional cases.” The Supreme Court has held that “an exceptional case is simply 

one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating 

position (considering both the governing law and facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner 

in which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

1749, 1756 (2014). 

284. The Court finds that both bases for awarding fees are easily satisfied in light of 

the default judgment and the conduct leading to its entry. 

285. The Complaint’s allegation that Defendants engaged in intentional and willful 

false advertising is, on its own, sufficient to establish the substantive weakness of Defendants’ 

litigation position. See Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 52

2008) (finding that because “[t]he district court entered default [and] all factual allegations in the 

complaint are deemed true, including the allegation of Poof’s willful infringement of Andrew’s 

trademarks,” the “default sufficiently establishes . . . entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the 

Lanham Act”); Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(holding that, after discovery sanction default judgment, case was “exceptional” under § 1117(a) 

because the complaint alleged that defendant’s acts were committed “knowingly, maliciously, 

and oppressively, and with an intent to . . . injure [plaintiff]”).

286. Defendants also litigated this case in an unreasonable manner. The record 

contains numerous instances of unreasonable conduct by Wang, including an attempt to evade 

service by lying to the process server, an initial default, discovery violations, and a destruction of 

evidence beyond anything previously witnessed by this Court. (See Spoliation Opinion and 

Order (describing Wang’s misconduct at length).)

287. Plaintiffs are also entitled to “the costs of the action” under the Lanham Act. 

288. Plaintiffs move for a total of $57,030.67 in costs for filing, service, hearing 

transcripts, depositions, forensic analysis and experts, a damages expert, translations, and 

lodging. (Pls.’ Motion for Fees and Costs 21, ECF No. 193.)

289. Under § 1117(a), Plaintiffs may recover costs including and in addition to those 

“taxable costs” permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See, e.g., World Triathalon Corp. v. Dunbar, 

539 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1290 (D. Haw. 2008) (“While none of these costs are expressly provided 

for in § 1920, the more general clause in § 1117(a) entitles Plaintiff to an award of the remaining 

costs.”); see also Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Const. Mach. Co., Ltd., 668 F.3d 677, 690 (9th Cir. 

2012) (holding that “attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act may also include reasonable costs 

that the party cannot recover as the ‘prevailing party’” as long as such costs are reasonably 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 53

incurred) abrogated on other grounds by SunEarth, Inc. v. Sun Earth Solar Power Co., Ltd., 839 

F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).

290. Defendants object that Plaintiffs cannot recover attorneys’ fees or costs under the 

§ 1117(a) because the Lanham Act is not contained in the Complaint and otherwise inapplicable. 

As stated supra, that is simply not true. (See Compl. ¶ 11). 

b. Oregon Trade Secrets Act—Fees

291. In the alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorneys’ fees under the Oregon 

Trade Secrets Act, ORS § 646.467.

292. Under ORS § 646.467, a court “may award reasonable attorney fees to the 

prevailing party if . . . [w]illful or malicious misappropriation is found by the court.” In 

determining the propriety of such an award, a court must weigh the factors set forth in ORS § 

20.075. See ORS § 20.075 (“A court shall consider the following factors in determining whether 

to award attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is authorized by statute and 

in which the court has discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees . . . .”); see also 

Precision Automation, Inc. v. Tech. Servs., Inc., No. CIV. 07-707-AC, 2010 WL 1051009, at *1 

(D. Or. Feb. 16, 2010) (considering the factors contained in ORS § 20.075).

293. Plaintiffs satisfy the facial requirements of ORS § 646.467. In particular, as a 

result of the default judgment, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in the present action and the 

Court credits as true that “Wang’s misappropriation . . . was willful and malicious.” (Compl. ¶

122.) See Wright v. Bloom, No. C 12-00746 WHA, 2013 WL 4517727, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 

2013) (awarding attorneys’ fees in a default judgment based on allegations in the complaint 

stating that the defendant’s “misappropriation was willful and malicious”).

294. The factors outlined in ORS § 20.075 also support an award of attorneys’ fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 54

295. The first factor, whether Defendants’ conduct was “willful or malicious,” ORS § 

20.075(1)(a), is already established. 

296. The second, third, fourth, and fifth factor all speak to the reasonableness of a 

defendant’s litigation conduct and the impact of an award on future litigants. See ORS § 

20.075(1)(b) (reasonableness of defenses); § 20.075(1)(c) (the extent to which award would deter 

others from asserting good faith defenses); § 20.075(1)(d) (the extent to which an award would 

deter others from asserting meritless defenses); § 20.075(1)(e) (the objective reasonableness of 

the parties and the diligence of the parties and the attorneys during the proceedings). 

297. Defendants’ conduct in this case was unjustifiable. In addition to asserting 

defenses which had no basis in fact, (Compare, e.g., Wang Declaration (ECF No. 148 ¶ 13) (“I 

have not had any connection with the company named Mirigen for approximately two years 

because it ceased operations in 2015.”) with 2017 People’s Republic of China State 

Administration for Industry and Capital report (ECF No. 162-4) (reflecting that Wang is Mirigen 

shareholder, legal representative, general manager and executive director) and Wang 

interrogatory response (ECF No. 136-20 at 5) (“I acted as technical consultant until June 

2016”)), Defendants repeatedly disobeyed the Courts orders and destroyed evidence. (See 

Spoliation Opinion and Order.) To the extent the conduct of future litigants could be impacted by 

an award of attorneys’ fees, it would be to deter bad faith claims and defenses, not discourage 

meritorious litigation. 

298. The sixth factor, the “objective reasonableness of the parties in pursuing 

settlement,” neither weighs in favor nor against awarding attorneys’ fees. Although Defendants 

resisted engaging in settlement negotiations prior to the entry of default judgment, there is no 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 55

requirement that parties engage in settlement discussions and Defendants’ conduct in this regard 

was stubborn but unremarkable. 

299. Taken together, the standard contained in ORS § 646.467 and the factors outlined

in ORS § 20.075 both support an award of attorneys’ fees. 

c. FRCP 37(b)(2)(C)—Fees and Costs

300. Finally, even absent the Lanham Act and Oregon Trade Secrets Act, Plaintiffs 

would be entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs related to Defendants’ discovery order violations.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

301. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C), upon a finding that a party disobeyed a 

discovery order, a court “must order the disobedient party . . . to pay the reasonable expenses,

including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or 

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 

302. As outlined in the Court’s Spoliation Opinion and Order, which documented and 

sanctioned Defendants’ extensive destruction of evidence in violation of this Court’s orders, 

Defendants’ disobedience was not substantially justified. The Court is aware of no other 

circumstances not already addressed in its previous Opinion and Order which would make such 

an award unjust.

303. Thus, even if Plaintiffs were not entitled to their attorneys’ fees and costs under 

the Lanham Act and Oregon Trades Secrets Act, they could still recover any fees and costs 

incurred as a result of Defendants’ discovery misconduct.

d. Scope of Attorneys’ Fees Recovery
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 56

304. The Court’s award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Oregon Trade Secrets Act 

and Lanham Act applies to the entire action and not just the individual claims under which the 

fees are authorized. 

305. In an action “where the plaintiff presents different claims for relief that ‘involve a 

common core of facts’ or are based on ‘related legal theories,’ the district court should not 

attempt to divide the request for attorney’s fees on a claim-by-claim basis.” McCown v. City of 

Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 

(1983)). Instead, the fee awards in such cases “[n]ormally . . . will encompass all hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.

306. As outlined supra, Plaintiffs’ claims are interrelated and involve a common core 

of facts. Plaintiffs are therefore awarded their reasonable fees for the entire case.

2. Reasonableness of Requested Attorneys’ Fees 

307. Having determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorneys’ fees for the entire 

matter, the Court now turns to whether the fees requested by Plaintiffs are reasonable.

308. Plaintiffs move for a total of $1,011,879.00 in attorneys’ fees. Defendants do not 

raise any objections to the number of hours or proposed hourly rates submitted by Plaintiffs. The 

Court nevertheless conducts a careful review of the record to determine the reasonableness of 

Plaintiffs’ claimed hours and rates.

a. General Legal Standards

309. In awarding a reasonable attorneys’ fee, courts apply the lodestar method to 

determine the reasonable hourly rate and then multiply that rate by the number of hours the 

attorney reasonably spent on the case. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th 

Cir. 2013). A “strong presumption” exists that the lodestar figure represents a “reasonable fee,” 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 57

and it should therefore only be enhanced or reduced in “rare and exceptional 

cases.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986).

310. A reasonable billing rate is determined based on the “prevailing market rate” in 

the relevant community. Camachco v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 

2008). “The burden is on the [fee applicant] to produce evidence that the requested rates are in 

line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 

comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1984).

311. Courts review the billing hours submitted to determine whether the prevailing 

attorney could have reasonably billed the claimed hours to a private client. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 

1202. Hours that could not reasonably be billed to a private client are not recoverable. Id. at 

1203. “[E]xcessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours are also not recoverable. Id.

(quoting McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008)). Non-clerical work 

performed by paralegals and law clerks, however, is recoverable as attorneys’ fees. Precision 

Seed Cleaners v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1247-49 (D. Or. 2013).

b. Reasonableness of Rates

312. Attorney Scott Davis seeks a rate of $425 per hour; Klaus Hamm a rate of $400 

per hour; and Carla Todenhagen Quisenberry a rate of $310 per hour. (Hamm Decl. Ex. 25.) 

After careful consideration, the Court finds these rates to be reasonable.

313. In general, the Court uses the Oregon State Bar’s 2012 Economic Survey as an 

initial benchmark for determining the reasonableness of a party’s requested rates. These survey

rates, however, are not compulsory and the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Survey is not the 

appropriate benchmark in the present case. (See Pls.’ Motion for Fees and Costs 19-20.) Most 

importantly, the Survey offers no data on the rates charged by attorneys specializing in 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 58

intellectual property law and there is no data on the most analogous specialty, labeled 

Business/Corporate – Litigation, in the region where this Court sits. (Hamm Decl. Ex. 22 at 3.)

314. The Plaintiffs instead propose that the Court look to the American Intellectual 

Property Law Association’s (“AIPLA”) 2015 Report of the Economic Survey. (Hamm Decl. Ex. 

21.) This survey reports on the billing rates for intellectual law attorneys and Plaintiffs point to a 

region labeled “Other West,” which includes Oregon, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New 

Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Washington, and parts of California, Alaska, and Hawaii. (Id. at 

25.) Although the geographic region is broad, it provides the best available estimation of the 

rates attorneys of comparable skill and experience would charge in the locality. 

315. In particular, all three attorneys are specialists in intellectual property law with 

extensive intellectual property experience. Mr. Davis, who also possesses an M.S. in Chemistry,

and Mr. Hamm are partners in their firm, each with more than fifteen years of experience, and 

Ms. Quisenberry was, at the time, an associate who possessed over ten years of relevant 

experience. The case required work on a range of intellectual property issues including 

copyright, trade secrets, and false advertising, as well as attention to the implications of conduct 

on multiple continents and under multiple legal regimes. These were not simple legal issues and 

a client in the locality would be required to compensate their attorneys in a manner 

commensurate with their level of specialized knowledge and relevant legal experience.

316. Turning to proposed rates, AILPA’s survey indicates that the median 2014 billing 

rate in the region for intellectual property attorneys working as partners at private firms was 

$400 and the 75th percentile rate was $478. (Hamm Decl. Ex. 21.) The median 2014 billing rate 

in the region for intellectual property attorneys working as associates at private firms was $300 

and the 75th percentile was $347. (Id.) Mr. Hamm’s rate sits precisely at the median and is 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 59

therefore reasonable. Mr. Davis’s rate is $25 above the median hourly rate, but he also possesses 

an additional technical degree and two more years’ experience than Mr. Hamm. The rate is also 

comfortably below the 75th percentile rate. As such, the Court finds Mr. Davis’s rate to be 

reasonable. Finally, Ms. Quisenberry’s rate is $10 above the median hourly rate, though still well 

below the 75th percentile hourly rate. Given Ms. Quisenberry’s ten years of experience, surely at 

the upper end of that possessed by a typical associate, the Court finds her rate to be reasonable.

317. By contrast, the Court finds the submitted paralegal rates to be out of step with the 

prevailing market rate in the community. 

318. Paralegal Jeanette Warner seeks a rate of $150 per hour; Mung Conway a rate of 

$160 per hour; and Xuan-Giang Tran a rate of $175 per hour. 

319. Plaintiffs provide no supporting declarations, survey data, or even description of 

specific qualifications to justify these rates. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11 (“To inform and 

assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce 

satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the 

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and 

reputation.”). The only supporting material is a citation to a previous case in the District where 

the court approved paralegal rates ranging from $90 to $175. (Pls.’ Motion for Fees and Costs 21

(citing Prison Legal News v. Columbia Cty., No. 3:12-cv-0071-SI, 2014 WL 1225100, at *7-9

(D. Or. Mar. 24, 2014).) The approved paralegal rates in Prison Legal News, however, were for 

work in a different locality, Portland, and were supported by descriptions of each paralegal’s 

level of experience. 2014 WL 1225100, at *7. Indeed, the only paralegal receiving $175 in that 

case was also an investigator—the highest rate for exclusively paralegal work was $125 and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 60

received by a “senior paralegal.” Id. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs have submitted no information 

about the experience, technical skills, or language skills possessed by any of the paralegals.

320. As such, the Court looks to the National Legal Assistant Association’s 2016 

National Utilization & Compensation Survey Report to identify the appropriate rate. In the 

region labeled “Far West,” which includes Oregon, Washington, California, Nevada, Hawaii, 

and Alaska, the mean billing rate for paralegal work in 2016 was $146 per hour. This is likely a 

generous benchmark given that, unlike the AIPLA survey, larger cities like Los Angeles and San 

Francisco are included in the relevant regional calculation. 

321. Other courts in the District have lowered applicants’ requested paralegal rates 

where applicants failed to provide evidence as to paralegals’ training and experience. See, e.g., 

Investors VII, LLC v. BBP One LLC, No. 3:16–cv–01595–SB, 2017 WL 706628, at *4 (D. Or. 

Jan. 30, 2017) (reducing paralegal rate from $195 and $135 to $125); Whitworth v. Nat'l Enter. 

Sys., No. CV 08–968–PK, 2010 WL 1924505, at *11 (D. Or. April 21, 2010) (reducing paralegal 

rate from $130 to $90); Van Dyke v. BTS Container Service, No. CV 08–561–KI, 2009 WL 

2997105, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2009) (reducing unopposed paralegal fee from $125 to $100);

Atl. Recording Corp. v. Andersen, No. CV 05–933–AC, 2008 WL 2536834, at *16 (D. Or. June 

24, 2008) (reducing paralegal rate from $150 to $120). 

322. On the other hand, courts in the District have awarded unopposed paralegal rates 

of $125 per hour. See, e.g., Salinas v. Beef Nw. Feeders, LLC, No. CV–08–1514–PK, 2010 WL 

1027529, at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 1, 2010); Megavail Inc. et al v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. CV 05–

1374–AS, 2007 WL 3232605, at *4 n. 2 (D. Or. Nov. 1, 2007). 

323. Here, because Plaintiffs provide no evidence of the paralegals’ training or 

experience, the Court lowers all of their rates to $125 per hour. This is a reasonable rate.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 61

c. Reasonableness of Hours

324. Attorney Scott Davis seeks fees for 770.40 hours of work; Klaus Hamm 1,210.70 

hours of work; and Carla Todenhagen Quisenberry 336.70 hours of work. (Hamm Decl. Ex. 24.)

Paralegal Jeanette Warner seeks fees for 116.40 hours of work; Mung Conway 37.70 hours of 

work; and Xuan-Giang Tran 413.20 hours of work. (Id.) The total number of hours expended on 

the matter is 2,885.10. (Id.)

325. The Court has carefully reviewed the submitted time sheets and finds that the 

requested hours are reasonable.

326. The entire action spanned over 18 months. (See Hamm Decl. Ex. 24.) This was a 

complicated matter and involved significant wrangling—legal, evidentiary, and tactical—

throughout the action. Plaintiffs were forced to reassess their strategy on multiple occasions 

based on the misconduct and frivolous counterclaims of Defendants. The case was further 

complicated by the transnational nature of Defendants’ actions and the legal issues giving rise to 

the suit and its resolution. Plaintiffs were, moreover, successful in virtually every aspect of the 

litigation, securing a default judgment, dismissal of counterclaims, and much of their requested 

relief. As the Court noted at oral arguments on the issues of damages and fees, Plaintiffs were, 

for the most part, extremely well organized and professional in their handling of the case. 

327. Defendants have raised no objections to the number of hours expended by 

Plaintiffs and, on the face of Plaintiffs’ time sheets, the Court finds these hours to be reasonable. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief outlined in

paragraphs 268 to 280, total damages in the amount of $2,807,750.00, attorneys’ fees in the 

amount of $986,989.50, and costs in the amount of $57,030.67.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 62

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _16th day of November, 2017.

s/ Michael J. McShane

Michael J. McShane

United States District Judge