alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

Calendar No. 261 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1884 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2015 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Reported by Mr. JOHNSON, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 206 West Commercial Street in East Rochester, New York, as the ‘‘Officer Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. OFFICER DARYL R. PIERSON MEMORIAL POST 

4 OFFICE BUILDING. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 206 West Commercial Street in 

7 East Rochester, New York, shall be known and designated 


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2 

•HR 1884 RS

1 as the ‘‘Officer Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office 

2 Building’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Officer Daryl R. Pier7 son Memorial Post Office Building’’. 


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asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 261 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1884 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostBuilding’’. ficer Daryl R. Pierson Memorial Post Office Street in East Rochester, New York, as the ‘‘Of- al Service located at 206 West Commercial 

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Reported without amendment 


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<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.1

                       Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the inclusion of our report dated April 18, 1997 with respect to
the audited combined financial statements of Educational Management, Inc. and
Wikert and Rhude, general partnership, as of December 31, 1996 and 1995 and for
each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1996 and our reports
dated May 16, 1997 with respect to the balance sheet of Nebraska College of
Business (a division of Nebraska Acquisition Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Educational Medical, Inc.) as of March 31, 1997 and the balance sheet of
Lincoln School of Commerce (a division of Nebraska Acquisition Corp., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Educational Medical, Inc.) as of March 31, 1997 in
the Annual Report on Form 10-K for Educational Medical, Inc. for the year ended
March 31, 1997.


                                              /s/ Winther, Stave & Co., LLP

Spencer, Iowa
June 26, 1997
#### Harrington *et al.,*Appellants, *v.*Brown *et al.,*Respondents.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.*

May 2, 1890.)

No opinion. Decree of the surrogate’s court of Chenango county affirmed, with costs.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1863 

To amend the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 

to expand the Veterans Choice Program to veterans who would otherwise 

receive medical care from a deficient medical facility of the Department 

of Veterans Affairs. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 16, 2015 

Mr. BOUSTANY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability 

Act of 2014 to expand the Veterans Choice Program 

to veterans who would otherwise receive medical care 

from a deficient medical facility of the Department of 

Veterans Affairs. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Local Care for Vet5 erans Act’’. 


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2 

•HR 1863 IH

1 SEC. 2. PROVISION OF CARE UNDER VETERANS CHOICE 

2 PROGRAM FOR VETERANS RESIDING NEAR 

3 DEFICIENT MEDICAL FACILITY OF THE DE4 PARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS. 

5 Section 101(b)(2) of the Veterans Access, Choice, 

6 and Accountability Act of 2014 (38 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 

7 amended— 

8 (1) in subparagraph (C)(ii), by striking ‘‘or’’; 

9 (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period 

10 at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

11 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub12 paragraph: 

13 ‘‘(E) notwithstanding paragraph (1)(A), 

14 resides not more than 50 miles from the med15 ical facility of the Department, including a com16 munity-based outpatient clinic, that is closest to 

17 the residence of the veteran if— 

18 ‘‘(i) the Secretary has identified such 

19 medical facility— 

20 ‘‘(I) in a prospectus level lease 

21 request, regardless of the date of such 

22 request, as being deficient with re23 spect to providing certain treatment 

24 or services; or 

25 ‘‘(II) as needing expansion; and 


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3 

•HR 1863 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) the Secretary determines that 

2 such a deficiency has not been resolved or 

3 such an expansion has not occurred, in4 cluding pursuant to leases entered into 

5 under an Act authorizing major medical 

6 facility leases.’’. 

Æ 


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#### DEVEREAUX et al. v. CLIFFORD.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

December 18, 1896.)

1. Contempt—What Constitutes.

A judgment defendant who does not appear for examination, as required by an order in supplementary proceedings, is in contempt.

-2. Same—Punishment.

Where a judgment defendant is in contempt by failing to appear for examination pursuant to an order in supplementary proceedings, a fine of $371.-15, the amount of the judgment, is unauthorized, in the absence of evidence that his disobedience caused actual loss or injury to plaintiff beyond the costs and expenses of the proceeding to punish him. Code Civ. Proc. § 2284.

*688Appeal from special term, Saratoga county.

Action by Charles J. Devereaux and others against Timothy A. Clifford, in which there was a judgment for plaintiffs. From an order convicting defendant of contempt, and fining him $371.15, the amount of the judgment, for his failure to appear for examination under an order in supplementary proceedings, he appeals.

Modified.

Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LARDON, HERRICK, PUTNAM, and MERWIN, JJ.

James F. Swanick, for appellant.

Nash Rockwood, for respondents.

LANDON, J.

The conviction for contempt was proper, but, in the absence of evidence that the defendant’s disobedience occasioned any actual loss or injury to the plaintiffs beyond the costs and expenses of this proceeding to punish him, the fine to the amount of the judgment was not authorized. Code Civ. Proc. § 2284; Coal Co. v. Hecksher, 42 Hun, 534.

Order affirmed as to the conviction, reversed as to the fine, and proceeding remitted to the special term, as in the case cited, for further order in respect to the fine, with $10 costs and disbursements to appellant. All concur.
LISA WYSS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

NANCY BERRYHILL, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

3: 16-CV-00023-BR 

ORDER 

Based upon the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED that attorney fees in the 

amount of$6,645.06 shall be awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 

U.S.C. § 2412. The parties agree that attorney fees will be paid to Plaintiffs attorney, dependent 

upon verification that Plaintiff has no debt which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, 

pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (20 I 0). 

If Plaintiff has no such debt, then the check shall be made out to Plaintiffs attorney and 

mailed to Plaintiffs attorney's office as follows: Merrill Schneider, P.O. Box 14490, Portland, 

OR 97293. If Plaintiff has a debt, then the check for any remaining funds after offset of the debt 

shall be made to Plaintiff and mailed to Plaintiffs attorney's office at the address stated above. 

DATED this ( t)~ay of f\;\{V1/t:tv , 2017. 

a/J/L,111l-f11?7,z~ Anna Brown 

United States District Court Judge 

Case 3:16-cv-00023-BR Document 24 Filed 03/15/17 Page 1 of 1
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 18-BG-215

IN RE DAVID E. FURRER

2018 DDN 29

A Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Reg. No. 446343

BEFORE: Glickman and Easterly, Associate Judges, and Nebeker, Senior Judge. 

ORDER

(FILED –May 24, 2018)

On consideration of the certified order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland 

indefinitely suspending respondent from the practice of law in that jurisdiction by 

consent; this court’s March 9, 2018, order directing respondent to show cause why 

the functionally-equivalent discipline of an indefinite suspension with a fitness

requirement, with the right to file for reinstatement after five years or after 

reinstatement by the state of Maryland, whichever occurs first, should not be 

imposed; the motion of Disciplinary Counsel for leave to file his lodged late 

response; and it appearing that respondent failed to file either a response to the 

court’s show cause order or his D.C. Bar R. XI, §14 (g) affidavit, it is

ORDERED that the motion of Disciplinary Counsel is granted and the 

lodged response is filed. It is 

ORDERED that David E. Furrer is hereby indefinitely suspended with a 

fitness requirement. He may file for reinstatement after five years or after 

reinstatement by the state of Maryland, whichever occurs first. See In re Sibley, 

990 A.2d 483 (D.C. 2010), and In re Fuller, 930 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 2007) 
2

(No. 18-BG-215)

(rebuttable presumption of identical reciprocal discipline applies to all cases in 

which the respondent does not participate). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that for purposes of reinstatement respondent’s 

suspension will not begin to run until such time as he files a D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14 

(g) affidavit. 

PER CURIAM
#### In the Matter of Frank Miraglia, Appellant, v Essex Insurance Company, Respondent.

[947 NYS2d 138]

In a turnover proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5225 (b), the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated October 28, 2010, which denied the petition to direct the respondent to pay over funds received pursuant to an indemnification agreement between the judgment debtor and a third party.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A judgment creditor’s ability to satisfy a judgment in his or her favor from assets that are not in the possession of the judgment debtor is governed by CPLR 5225. That statute “provides for an expedited special proceeding by a judgment creditor to recover ‘money or other personal property’ belonging to a judgment debtor ‘against a person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest’ in order to satisfy a judgment” *(Matter of Signature Bank v HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,*67 AD3d 917, 918 [2009] [citation omitted], quoting CPLR 5225 [b]). According to the express language of CPLR 5225 (b), a judgment creditor must first establish that the judgment debtor has an interest in the property held by the third party, and then must demonstrate either that the judgment debtor is entitled to possess the property or that the judgment creditor has a right to the property superior to that of the party who possesses it *(see Beauvais v Allegiance Sec., Inc.,*942 F2d 838, 840-841 [1991]).

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Supreme Court *946properly denied the instant turnover petition. Pursuant to the terms of an insurance agreement between the judgment debtor, H&L Holding Corp. (hereinafter H&L), and the respondent, Essex Insurance Company (hereinafter Essex), any right of indemnification that H&L possessed was “transferred” to Essex once Essex paid out the policy limits on behalf of H&L to the petitioner, and H&L no longer possessed an interest in that right. The obligation of Essex ran only to H&L as its insured, and only to the extent of the policy limits *(see Winkelmann v Excelsior Ins. Co.,*85 NY2d 577, 583 [1995]). Accordingly, the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of CPLR 5225 (b) and, under the circumstances presented, he cannot recover additional funds from Essex or compel Essex to seek additional funds from other third parties. Rather, his recourse is to proceed against the remaining judgment debtor. Mastro, A.P.J., Chambers, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
#### Francis Matamoro et al., Respondents, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

[941 NYS2d 684]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated August 10, 2011, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

A driver is bound to see what is there to be seen through the proper use of his or her senses *(see Wilson v Rosedom,*82 AD3d 970 [2011]; *Topalis v Zwolski,*76 AD3d 524, 525 [2010]; *Gonzalez v County of Suffolk,*277 AD2d 350 [2000]), and a driver with the right-of-way has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid a collision *(see Tapia v Royal Tours Serv., Inc.,*67 AD3d 894, 895 [2009]). Moreover, there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, and the question of comparative negligence is generally a question for the jury *(see Jahangir v Logan Bus Co., Inc.,*89 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2011]; *Wilson v Rosedom,*82 AD3d at 970).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted, inter alia, the deposition testimony of the defendant driver Celestin Jean, and the deposition testimony of the infant plaintiff. Although this evidence demonstrated that Jean had the right-of-way when the school bus he was driving came into contact with the infant plaintiff, it was insufficient to establish, prima facie, that Jean was not negligent and that the *723infant plaintiffs alleged negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident *(see Topalis v Zwolski,*76 AD3d at 525; *Tapia v Royal Tours Serv., Inc.,*67 AD3d at 895-896; *Spicola v Piracci,*2 AD3d 1368, 1369 [2003]; *Levy v Town Bus Corp.,*293 AD2d 452 [2002]). Since the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was properly denied, and we need not examine the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ opposition papers *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; *Topalis v Zwolski,*76 AD3d at 525). Skelos, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
      32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF
    EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.

SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
    OF 2002

In connection with
      the Annual Report of Intelligroup, Inc, (the Company) on Form
      10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
      Vikram Gulati, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 and to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:


|(1) | The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
        of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (16 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d); and      
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                               |     |                        
|------------------------------ | --- | -----------------------
|DATE: October 21,
        2005 | By: | /s/ Vikram
    Gulati  
|                               |     |                        
|                               |     | Vikram Gulati          
|                               |     | Chief Executive Officer





---
Exhibit 13











CONSENT OF INTERNATIONAL METALLURGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL INC.





Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the Annual Report) of Cumberland Resources Ltd. (the Company), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.



We hereby consent to the references to our name under the heading Narrative Description of Business -- Meadowbank Gold Project, Nunavut Territory, Canada in the Companys Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2005 which is included as part of the Annual Report, and to all other references to our name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report.







International Metallurgical and Environmental Inc.





By:

/s/ Jeff Austin



Name:

Jeffrey B. Austin, P.Eng.

Title:

President





March 22, 2006
#### BAKER et al. v. BROWN et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

April, 1896.)

Action by Jane A. Baker and another against Thomas Brown and others.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with costs.
---

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report of mPhase Technologies, Inc., a New Jersey corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10K/A
(Amendment No.3) for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Ronald A. Durando, Chief Executive Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his knowledge:

|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                    
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

/s/ Ronald A. Durando 
Ronald A. Durando 
Chief Executive Officer

December 3, 2010

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF IMV LEASE/CAPITAL, INC. FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH
30, 1996,  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY BY  REFERENCE  TO SUCH  FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

        
<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                      MAR-31-1996
<CASH>                                  4,489
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                               0
<ALLOWANCES>                                0
<INVENTORY>                                 0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        8,489
<PP&E>                                      0
<DEPRECIATION>                              0 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          8,489
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   5,880
<BONDS>                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<COMMON>                                9,900
<OTHER-SE>                             (7,291)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            8,489
<SALES>                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           33
<CGS>                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        7,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        (6,967)
<INCOME-TAX>                                0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    (6,967)
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                           (6,967)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               0
<EPS-DILUTED>                               0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2009196EN.01000301.xml

| 20.8.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 196/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 196/3

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5528 — Mubadala/UTC/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 196/02

On 13 August 2009, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5528. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32009M5528. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

---