IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Dependency of 

W.W.S. and C.G.S.

 

 No. 79763-8-I

 (consolidated with 79764-6-I)

 ORDER WITHDRAWING 

 OPINION AND SUBSTITUTING

 OPINION

On November 21, 2019, the appellant-mother filed a motion requesting that this 

court remove her name and her children’s birthdates from the case caption and use her 

initials in the opinion. On March 30, 2020, we issued our opinion in this case and 

denied the mother’s motion. The mother filed a motion for discretionary review in the 

Washington State Supreme Court, seeking review on the merits and citing 

confidentiality concerns regarding the denial of her motion. 

On August 5, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the mother’s motion for 

discretionary review as to the confidentiality issue only and entered an order remanding 

to this court to remove the name of the parent from the case caption to comply with 

RAP 3.4 and to remove the birthdates of the children from both the case caption and the 

opinion. The court denied petitioner’s request to substitute initials for the mother’s 

name in the body of the opinion. In view of the Supreme Court order, the opinion 

should be withdrawn and a substitute opinion be filed. Now, therefore, it is hereby
No. 79763-8-I/2

2

ORDERED that the opinion filed on March 30, 2020, is withdrawn and a 

substitute opinion be filed.

 
 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Dependency of ) No. 79763-8-I 

W.W.S. and C.G.S., ) (consolidated with 79764-6-I)

)

) DIVISION ONE 

) 

) PUBLISHED OPINION

) 

SMITH, J. — Melodee Starvish appeals the order adjudging two of her 

sons, W.W.S. and C.G.S., dependent. She contends that the juvenile court 

(1) violated her due process rights by basing certain findings on allegations 

regarding educational neglect and C.G.S.’s mental health of which she did not 

receive fair notice, (2) erred by ordering an out-of-home placement, (3) erred by 

ordering her to submit to urinalysis, and (4) erred by concluding that it lacked 

authority to direct the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) 

to assign a new social worker to her case. 

Because the record reflects that Starvish received ample notice that 

educational neglect and C.G.S.’s mental health would be at issue during the 

dependency hearing, we hold that Starvish was not deprived of due process. We 

further hold that the juvenile court did not err by ordering an out-of-home 

placement or concluding that it lacked authority to direct the Department to 

assign a new social worker. But because there was no reliable evidence in the 

record that Starvish had a substance abuse issue that required remedying as a 
No. 79763-8-I/2

2

parental deficiency, the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Starvish 

to submit to urinalysis. Therefore, we reverse the juvenile court’s imposition of 

the urinalysis requirement, remand to strike that requirement, and affirm in all 

other respects. 

FACTS

Starvish is the mother of two boys, W.W.S. and C.G.S. The boys’ father is 

Brian Starvish (hereinafter, for clarity, Brian). 

W.W.S. has been diagnosed with ADHD1 and hospitalized several times to 

treat his mental health issues. He was the subject of an earlier dependency 

proceeding in 2017 (2017 Dependency), prior to which Child Protective Services 

(CPS) had been involved with the family five times. W.W.S. was adjudged 

dependent as to Brian in the 2017 Dependency. That dependency was later 

dismissed after Starvish completed services. 

Brian was abusive and, following an incident at C.G.S.’s fifth birthday in 

2017, Starvish left Brian. Starvish is in the process of divorcing Brian. At some 

point, Starvish moved with W.W.S. and C.G.S. into a confidential housing shelter. 

On August 3, 2018, the State, through the Department, filed the 

dependency petition in this case.2 It alleged that W.W.S. and C.G.S. were 

dependent as to both Brian and Starvish under RCW 13.34.030(6)(b) and (c). 

The former provides that a child is dependent if he “[i]s abused or neglected . . . 

 

1 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

2 The Department filed two petitions, one for W.W.S. and one for C.G.S. 

Because the allegations in the two petitions are the same, this memorandum 

refers to both petitions collectively as the “petition.”
No. 79763-8-I/3

3

by a person legally responsible for [his] care,” and the latter provides that a child 

is dependent if he “[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately 

caring for [him], such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger 

of substantial damage to the child’s psychological or physical development” (“c” 

dependency). RCW 13.34.030(6)(b), (c). 

The Department’s petition alleged that on July 22, 2018, CPS received an 

intake alleging that W.W.S. had been left alone at the housing shelter for about

five hours. According to the petition, the intake alleged that W.W.S. “was in 

emotional distress and wanted to call Ms. Starvish because they were supposed 

to meet at the complex to go to the beach together” and that W.W.S. “went into 

the housing complex office at 1:00 pm and reported that he believed Ms. Starvish 

had left without him.” According to the petition, the intake also alleged that “this 

was not the first time this had occurred at the complex.”

After describing CPS’s multiple unsuccessful attempts to speak with 

Starvish after that intake, the Department’s petition described another intake, on 

July 31, 2018, alleging that Starvish “had been seen regularly at a known drug 

house with [C.G.S.] and [W.W.S.].” According to the petition, the intake alleged 

that the two men in the house were Starvish’s brother and another man. The 

petition alleged that in the days following the July 31 intake, the Department and 

CPS made additional, unsuccessful attempts to contact Starvish and meet with 

W.W.S. 

The petition also described the family’s prior involvement with CPS, 

alleged facts regarding the 2017 Dependency, and described three additional 
No. 79763-8-I/4

4

CPS intakes involving Starvish that occurred after the 2017 Dependency was 

dismissed. According to the petition, all three of those intakes were closed as 

unfounded. One of the intakes, from April 2018, involved a report that W.W.S. 

had been falling asleep at school for long periods of time and missing up to 

seven days of school in a row. 

After the Department filed its petition, the juvenile court held a shelter care 

hearing and, on August 9, 2018, entered an order placing W.W.S. in shelter care 

but releasing C.G.S. to Starvish.

On October 26, 2018, the Department filed an emergency motion to place 

C.G.S. into shelter care as well. The Department argued, relying on a social 

worker’s declaration, that after shelter care was denied with respect to C.G.S. in 

August, “the mother ha[d] kept this child out of school for three weeks, alleging 

he [wa]s ill, but ha[d] not taken him to a doctor.” The Department’s motion also 

alleged that “[t]he mother appeared [at] the child’s school this week causing a 

scene with school officials around contact with [W.W.S.].” The social worker’s 

declaration also described a September 20 incident at school, where C.G.S. “was 

aggressive and said he was mad at his mother.” According to the declaration, 

when Starvish came to the classroom to talk with the teacher, C.G.S. “started to 

get angry with his mother and did not want to go with her” and “started to flip her 

off repeatedly (about 6 times) before the teacher got him to stop.” The social 

worker’s declaration described a second incident a week later, where C.G.S. 

“dr[e]w overlapping circles over and over again in an angry manner.” The 

declaration stated that when C.G.S. was asked about what he drew, he 
No. 79763-8-I/5

5

responded that “it was ‘the school getting sucked into a black hole’ and he ‘is in 

the school in the black hole’ because he ‘wants to be dead.’” Finally, the social 

worker’s declaration described a third incident during which C.G.S.’s teacher saw 

him “trying to cut himself in the wrist with children[’s] scissors.” The juvenile court 

ordered that C.G.S. be taken into custody and, on November 2, 2018, after a 

review hearing, ordered that C.G.S. be placed into shelter care.

The juvenile court subsequently entered an order of default and an order 

of dependency as to Brian. The court held a two-day fact-finding hearing as to 

Starvish on February 27 and 28, 2019. The court heard testimony from Christina 

Cartwright, the vice principal of Beacon Hill International School, where W.W.S. 

was in fourth grade and where C.G.S. had attended kindergarten from 

September to approximately October 2018; Alexandria Pearman-Gillman, 

C.G.S.’s kindergarten teacher at Beacon Hill; Kirsten Bolduan, the Department’s 

assigned social worker; Jennifer Moore, a visitation supervisor; Megan Notter, 

the guardian ad litem (GAL) for W.W.S. and C.G.S.; and Starvish. After the 

hearing, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that a “c” 

dependency had been established as to both W.W.S. and C.G.S. 

At a later disposition hearing, the court heard testimony from Bolduan and 

argument from Starvish, the Department, and the GAL. Starvish argued for an 

in-home dependency and asked the court to consider directing the Department to 

substitute Bolduan and assign a new social worker to her case. The GAL, too, 

asked the court “to encourage the Department to seriously consider 

reassignment to a different social worker” and stated her belief “that it’s going to 
No. 79763-8-I/6

6

be very difficult for both of them to work together.” The GAL further requested 

that the court “either . . . order a chemical dependency evaluation or . . . 

something like 90 days twice a week random UAs [urinalyses], and if there is a 

missed . . . or positive that [Starvish] then be required to take chemical 

dependency evaluation.” The GAL’s request echoed earlier testimony from 

Bolduan, who also requested random urinalysis.

The juvenile court ultimately ordered an out-of-home placement and 

concluded that it did not have the authority to direct the Department to assign a 

new social worker to Starvish’s case. Although the court did not order a chemical 

dependency evaluation,3it ordered Starvish to submit to random urinalysis once 

a week for 90 days and, additionally, up to 6 times per month upon the 

Department’s suspicion of use. Starvish appeals.4 

DISCUSSION

GAL’s Brief

As an initial matter, after Starvish filed her appeal, the GAL moved for an 

 

3 At oral argument, the Department suggested that the juvenile court did 

order a chemical dependency evaluation. Although the record does contain an 

order that includes a drug/alcohol evaluation requirement, that order was entered 

on March 19, 2019, before the disposition hearing had concluded. Later, on 

March 27, 2019, the court stated at the disposition hearing that it was “not 

ordering a drug and alcohol evaluation,” and on March 28, 2019, it entered a 

second order without that requirement. 

4

In her opening brief, Starvish assigned error to the juvenile court’s 

finding that Brian agreed to an order of dependency. Because Starvish did not 

provide argument in support of that assignment of error, we do not consider it. 

RAP 10.3(a)(6); see also Escude v. King County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 117 Wn. 

App. 183, 190 n.4, 69 P.3d 895 (2003) (“It is well settled that a party’s failure to 

assign error to or provide argument and citation to authority in support of an 

assignment of error, as required under RAP 10.3, precludes appellate 

consideration of an alleged error.”).
No. 79763-8-I/7

7

extension of time to file “the GAL’s brief.” A commissioner granted the GAL’s 

request for an extension of time but expressly declined to address whether the 

GAL was entitled to file a brief at all. Starvish then filed a motion to preclude the 

GAL from filing a brief.5 In her response to that motion, the GAL argued that she 

was a party to the case and, thus, entitled to file a brief. 

We disagree. The authorities primarily relied on by the GAL (and by the 

Department in support of the GAL) establish, at most, that the GAL has party-like

rights below, and that the GAL may seek review to enforce those rights.6 Cf. In 

re Dependency of D.L.B., 186 Wn.2d 103, 106 n.1, 376 P.3d 1099 (2016) 

(observing, citing GALR 2(j) and GALR 4(h), that “guardian ad litem is treated as 

a party, but only for certain purposes and only in superior court” (emphasis 

added)). They do not support the proposition that the GAL is a party entitled to 

file a merits brief in response to a parent’s appeal from a dependency order. 

Furthermore, and although we have discretion to consider briefs from 

 

5 Because the GAL proceeded to file a brief, we denied Starvish’s motion 

in a letter ruling. We hereby deny the GAL’s motion for reconsideration of that 

ruling. See RAP 12.4(a) (“A party may file a motion for reconsideration only of a 

decision by the judges (1) terminating review, or (2) granting or denying a 

personal restraint petition on the merits.”). We also deny Starvish’s motion to 

strike (1) the GAL’s motion for reconsideration and (2) the notice of appearance 

filed by attorney Jennie Cowan of the Dependency CASA Program.

6 See In re Dependency of M.H.P., 184 Wn.2d 741, 749-50, 364 P.3d 94 

(2015) (review of ex parte orders entered in a termination proceeding without 

notice to the court-appointed special advocate (CASA)); In re Dependency of

P.P.T., 155 Wn. App. 257, 263-64, 229 P.3d 818 (2010) (appeal taken by State 

and CASA from order in which court dismissed petition and denied CASA’s 

request to delay entry of written findings so that family could meet and discuss 

court’s earlier oral ruling); In re Welfare of B.D.F., 126 Wn. App. 562, 569, 572, 

109 P.3d 464 (2005) (discretionary review of GAL’s appeal from trial court order 

that misinterpreted GAL’s authority below).
No. 79763-8-I/8

8

nonparties under RAP 10.1(e) and (h), we do so on a case-by-case basis. To 

that end, although the GAL correctly points out that she “is charged with

representing the best interest of” W.W.S. and C.G.S., the best-interests 

determination is an inherently factual one to be made by the juvenile court. See

In re Welfare of Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980) (“This court 

has repeatedly said that the goal of a dependency hearing is to determine the 

welfare of the child and his best interests. While the criteria for establishing the 

best interests of the child are not capable of specification, each case being 

largely dependent upon its own facts and circumstances, the proof necessary in 

order to deprive a person of his or her parental rights must be clear, cogent and 

convincing.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). By contrast, whether 

Starvish is entitled to relief on appeal is based not on the best interests of her 

children but on whether the juvenile court committed legal error. Thus, the GAL’s 

input would not facilitate a decision on the merits in this appeal. We accordingly 

decline, as an exercise of our discretion, to consider the GAL’s brief. 

Due Process

Starvish asserts that reversal is required because a number of the juvenile

court’s findings (findings of fact 11-20 and 24) were based on allegations 

regarding educational neglect and C.G.S.’s mental health of which she did not

receive fair notice. Specifically, in finding of fact 24, the juvenile court cited to 

“the evidence of the number of days missed from school, the lack of attention to 

the children’s mental health, [W.W.S.]’s serious mental health needs, [and 

C.G.S.]’s expression of self-harm.” And, based on testimony from Cartwright, 
No. 79763-8-I/9

9

Pearman-Gillman, and the GAL, the juvenile court made findings of fact 11-20 

regarding the children’s educational deficiencies, C.G.S.’s lengthy absence from 

school in fall 2018, both children’s recent progress, and specific incidents that 

had occurred at Beacon Hill. These incidents included (1) a September 2018 

incident when Starvish showed up on the Beacon Hill campus asking for her 

children and, when she crossed paths with W.W.S., told him that he should not 

take his ADHD medication and did not need it, (2) a December 2018 incident 

where Starvish telephoned into an IEP7 meeting regarding W.W.S., became 

belligerent, and after she was disconnected, showed up on the Beacon Hill 

campus and became aggressive with school staff, and (3) the three incidents 

involving C.G.S. that were the basis of the Department’s earlier motion to place 

C.G.S. in shelter care. As further discussed below, we conclude that the juvenile 

court did not deprive Starvish of due process in entering these findings.

As an initial matter, the Department argues that we should decline to 

consider Starvish’s due process argument because it was raised for the first time 

on appeal. Meanwhile, Starvish argues that her due process argument is 

reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3) as an issue of constitutional magnitude. We 

agree with Starvish and reach the merits of her argument. Cf. In re Dependency 

of A.M.M., 182 Wn. App. 776, 790 & n.8, 332 P.3d 500 (2014) (reviewing, as 

issue of constitutional magnitude, parent’s contention that her due process rights 

were violated when the trial court terminated her parental rights based on a 

parental deficiency of which she was not notified).

 

7

Individualized education program.
No. 79763-8-I/10

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“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a 

parent’s right to the custody, care, and companionship of her children.” In re 

Welfare of Key, 119 Wn.2d 600, 609, 836 P.2d 200 (1992). “That right cannot be 

abridged without due process of law.” Key, 119 Wn.2d at 609. We review de 

novo an alleged deprivation of due process. In re Welfare of A.G., 160 Wn. App. 

841, 844, 248 P.3d 611 (2011). “In the context of a dependency proceeding, due 

process requires that parents have notice, an opportunity to be heard and 

defend, and the right to assistance of counsel.” In re Dependency of H.W., 70 

Wn. App. 552, 555-56, 854 P.2d 1100 (1993).

We conclude that Starvish received adequate notice that educational 

neglect and C.G.S.’s mental health issues would be at issue at the fact-finding 

hearing. Specifically, with regard to educational neglect, the petition itself 

referred to an April 2018 intake alleging that W.W.S. “had been falling asleep at 

school for long periods of time and missing up to 7 days of school in a row” and 

that he “was exhibiting symptoms of mental health issues that weren’t being 

addressed and Ms. Starvish was not engaging with the school on these 

concerns.” It also alleged that W.W.S. had exceptional needs and acted violently 

toward others when not medicated but that Starvish nonetheless allowed him to 

go without mental health treatment or medication in early 2017. 

Later in the dependency proceeding but still more than four months before 

the court’s fact-finding hearing, the Department moved for an order authorizing 

W.W.S. to take ADHD medication as prescribed by his treating physician. The 

Department alleged that it had approached Starvish to ask for her consent, and 
No. 79763-8-I/11

11

she did not consent. In support of its motion, the Department submitted letters 

from Cartwright and two teachers at Beacon Hill who described the noticeable 

improvement in W.W.S.’s behavior and ability to attend and participate in school 

after starting ADHD medication. After the juvenile court entered a temporary 

order authorizing medication, the GAL filed a declaration in support of a final 

order. In her declaration, the GAL stated that W.W.S. was held back a year in 

school and although he was then in the fourth grade, he was reading at a 

second-grade level. The GAL attributed W.W.S.’s struggles in school to his 

untreated ADHD. In short, the record reflects that Starvish received ample notice 

that W.W.S.’s performance in school would be at issue during the fact-finding 

hearing. 

As for C.G.S., Starvish does correctly point out that the Department’s 

petition did not make specific allegations as to C.G.S.’s performance in school or 

C.G.S.’s mental health. Nonetheless, Starvish received ample notice of these 

allegations as well. Specifically, and as discussed, allegations regarding 

C.G.S.’s absence from school and incidents that raised concerns regarding his 

mental health, including self-harm ideations, were the subjects of the 

Department’s October 2018 emergency motion to place him into shelter care. 

Because Starvish received notice of these allegations in connection with the 

shelter care motion and well before the fact-finding hearing, she had ample 

notice that C.G.S.’s educational neglect and his mental health would be at issue 

during the fact-finding hearing. Cf. In re Parental Rights to F.M.O., 194 Wn. App. 

226, 231, 374 P.3d 273 (2016) (looking, in termination context, to entire case 
No. 79763-8-I/12

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record to determine whether parent received adequate notice of an alleged 

deficiency).

In sum, Starvish received fair notice of the Department’s allegations of 

educational neglect with regard to both W.W.S. and C.G.S., and of the 

Department’s allegations regarding C.G.S.’s mental health. Thus, the juvenile 

court did not deprive her of due process by entering findings of fact 11-20 and 24 

based on testimony regarding these allegations. 

Starvish disagrees and points out that the Department’s petition contained 

only allegations regarding events that occurred before it was filed. She then

relies on In re Dependency of A.J., 189 Wn. App. 381, 357 P.3d 68 (2015), for 

the proposition that the fact-finding hearing is held “on the petition” and contends 

that she was deprived of due process because the Department never amended 

its petition to incorporate new allegations that arose later. But Starvish’s reliance 

on A.J. is misplaced. There, the Department’s petition alleged only a “c” 

dependency, and the court held a fact-finding hearing on that allegation alone. 

A.J., 189 Wn. App. at 403. More than six months later, the Department filed a 

“Motion to Establish Dependency” in which it for the first time alleged 

dependency under RCW 13.34.030(6)(a), i.e., for abandonment. A.J., 189 Wn. 

App. at 403. Without holding another fact-finding hearing, the trial court 

determined A.J. to be dependent under both prongs. A.J., 189 Wn. App. at 403. 

In concluding that the trial court denied the parent due process, we

observed that abandonment was never even pleaded in the dependency petition 

and that the parent “had no notice of the abandonment allegation at the fact-
No. 79763-8-I/13

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finding stage.” A.J., 189 Wn. App. at 403 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, 

the statutory basis for the Department’s dependency allegations was pleaded in 

the petition, and as discussed, Starvish did have notice at the fact-finding stage 

of the allegations on which the court’s challenged findings are based. Thus, A.J.

is not persuasive.

8

 

Starvish also relies on our decision in A.M.M. to support her contention 

that she was deprived of due process. But A.M.M. is unpersuasive for two 

reasons. First, “[d]ue process is a flexible concept that may vary with the 

interests that are at stake.” F.M.O., 194 Wn. App. at 230. To that end, A.M.M.

involved a termination proceeding, which can result in a permanent deprivation of 

a parent’s rights. By contrast, a dependency proceeding is “‘a preliminary, 

remedial, nonadversary proceeding’” and “does not inevitably lead to a 

termination of parental rights.” H.W., 70 Wn. App. at 556 (quoting Key, 119 

Wn.2d at 609). Second, in A.M.M., there was “no evidence in the record” that the 

mother could lose her parental rights based on the parental deficiency at issue in 

that case. A.M.M., 182 Wn. App. at 792. But here, as discussed, the record 

reflects that Starvish received ample notice of the allegations on which the 

juvenile court’s challenged findings were based. Accordingly, and even 

assuming that the same process is due in a dependency proceeding as in a 

termination proceeding, Starvish was not—like the mother in A.M.M.—rendered 

 

8 Although we conclude that Starvish was not deprived of due process, we 

note that the best practice would have been for the Department to amend its 

petition. See JuCR 3.5 (providing that a dependency petition “may be amended 

at any time” and “[t]he court shall grant additional time if necessary to insure a full 

and fair hearing on any new allegations in an amended petition”). 
No. 79763-8-I/14

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surprised, helpless, or disadvantaged when those allegations were tested at the 

hearing. See A.M.M., 182 Wn. App. at 791 (purpose of notice is “‘to prevent 

surprise, helplessness and disadvantage.’” (quoting In re Welfare of Martin, 3 

Wn. App. 405, 410, 476 P.2d 134 (1970))). A.M.M. does not require reversal.

Out-of-Home Placement

Starvish argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering an out-of-home 

placement. Specifically, Starvish contends that the juvenile court erred by finding 

that she was not “available” to care for W.W.S. and C.G.S. under former 

RCW 13.34.130(5)(a) (2018) (recodified as RCW 13.34.130(6)(a)). She 

contends, in the alternative, that remand is required because the juvenile court 

failed to make requisite findings. We reject both contentions.

“Available”

A juvenile court may order out-of-home placement only upon making 

certain findings:

An order for out-of-home placement may be made only if the court 

finds that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removal of the child from the child’s home 

and to make it possible for the child to return home, specifying the 

services . . . that have been provided . . . , and that preventive 

services have been offered or provided and have failed to prevent 

the need for out-of-home placement, unless the health, safety, and 

welfare of the child cannot be protected adequately in the home, 

and that:

(a) There is no parent or guardian available to care for such 

child;

(b) The parent, guardian, or legal custodian is not willing to 

take custody of the child; or

(c) The court finds, by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence, a manifest danger exists that the child will suffer serious 

abuse or neglect if the child is not removed from the home and an 

order under RCW 26.44.063 would not protect the child from 

danger.
No. 79763-8-I/15

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Former RCW 13.34.130(5) (emphasis added). Here, the juvenile court found, in 

accordance with this statute, that (1) the Department “made reasonable efforts to 

prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children,” (2) “[t]he health, safety, 

and welfare of the children cannot be adequately protected in the home,” and (3) 

“there is no parent or guardian available to care for the children.” (Emphasis 

added.) Starvish challenges this final finding. She contends that a parent is 

“available” under former RCW 13.34.130(5)(a) so long as she is physically 

available and because she was physically available, Starvish was available to 

care for W.W.S. and C.G.S. We disagree. 

Starvish’s argument raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we 

review de novo. Leishman v. Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC, 10 Wn. App. 2d 

826, 831, 451 P.3d 1101 (2019), review granted, 194 Wn.2d 1023 (2020). Our 

“fundamental objective in determining what a statute means is to ascertain and 

carry out the legislature’s intent.” Durant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 

Wn.2d 1, 8, 419 P.3d 400 (2018). “If the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, 

then courts must give effect to its plain meaning as an expression of what the

legislature intended.” Durant, 191 Wn.2d at 8. To discern a statute’s plain 

meaning, we consider the text of the provision in question, taking into account 

the statutory scheme as a whole. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC,

146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). “We may use a dictionary to discern the 

plain meaning of an undefined statutory term.” Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 

Wn.2d 863, 881, 357 P.3d 45 (2015). If, after conducting this inquiry, the statute 

is “susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous 
No. 79763-8-I/16

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and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 

Wn.2d at 12. 

Former RCW 13.34.130(5)(a) does not define “available.” The dictionary, 

however, defines “available” as “capable of use for the accomplishment of a 

purpose,” “immediately utilizable,” “that is accessible or may be obtained,” and 

“at disposal.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 150 (2002). In 

other words, the dictionary does not inform the plain meaning of “available” 

because, under the dictionary definitions, “available” may refer to a parent who is 

capable of taking on the responsibility of parenting, or one who is merely 

physically available. 

That said, “[p]lain language interpretation of a statute looks not only to the 

provision in question, but to other related provisions that illuminate legislative 

intent.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wn.2d 421, 438, 

395 P.3d 1031 (2017). To this end, the dependency statutes contain, at RCW 

13.34.020, an express declaration of that intent. Specifically, the legislature 

declared “that the family unit should remain intact unless a child’s right to 

conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized.” RCW 13.34.020 

(emphasis added). Additionally, “[w]hen the rights of basic nurture, physical and 

mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in 

conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail.” RCW 13.34.020 

(emphasis added). In other words, the best interests of the child are the juvenile 

court’s paramount concern in making placement decisions. In re Dependency of 

Ca.R., 191 Wn. App. 601, 610, 365 P.3d 186 (2015). 
No. 79763-8-I/17

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In light of this clear declaration of legislative intent, “available” must refer 

to something more than physical availability. Otherwise, and contrary to the 

legislature’s declared intent, a child could be placed with a parent even though 

that placement would jeopardize the child’s right to basic nurture, health, or 

safety. Cf. Columbia Riverkeeper, 188 Wn.2d at 439 (conducting plain language 

analysis and rejecting interpretation of statute that would have frustrated express 

declaration of legislative intent). For these reasons, we conclude that under the 

plain language of former RCW 13.34.130(5)(a), a parent is not “available” if she 

has deficiencies that jeopardize the child’s rights of basic nurture, physical and 

mental health, and safety.9 Indeed, this interpretation is supported by the text of 

that statute, which requires not just a finding that no parent is “available,” but that 

no parent is “available to care for such child.” Former RCW 13.34.130(5)(a) 

(emphasis added). 

Starvish contends that reading “available” to mean more than physical 

availability would “render[ ] meaningless [former RCW 13.34.130(5)(c)], which 

considers whether clear and convincing evidence shows a manifest danger of 

abuse or neglect in placing the child with the parent.” But there may be 

circumstances where a parent is “available” in that she has the ability to provide 

for a child’s basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety, but where an 

in-home placement would nonetheless pose a manifest danger to the child for 

 

9

In In re Dependency of A.Z.B., No. 49737-9-II, slip op. at 17-21 (Wash. 

Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), 

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2049737-9-

II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf, Division Two reached the same conclusion 

after determining that the term “available” was ambiguous. 
No. 79763-8-I/18

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other reasons, such as the presence of an abuser or environmental dangers in or 

around the parent’s home. Therefore, Starvish’s contention fails.

Starvish next argues that a broader reading of “available” violates the 

presumption that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different 

terms in the same statutory scheme. She points out that the legislature could 

have chosen to adopt the “no capable parent” standard for determining a “c” 

dependency as the standard for determining whether a parent is “available,” but it 

did not. Thus, she argues, “[r]eading the ‘no available’ parent standard to mean 

the same thing as the no capable parent standard would add words to the statute 

that are not there” and render the availability inquiry superfluous. But the canon 

of construction on which Starvish relies cannot trump the statute’s plain meaning, 

as informed by the legislature’s declared intent that the child’s best interests are 

of paramount importance. Cf. Heritage Grove v. Dep’t of Health, 11 Wn. App. 2d 

406, 411, 453 P.3d 1022 (2019) (court considers canons of construction only if 

ambiguity exists). And as discussed, accepting Starvish’s interpretation of 

“available” would allow in-home placement even when a child’s physical and 

mental health and safety are in jeopardy, contrary to the legislature’s declared 

intent. Therefore, Starvish’s argument fails. 

Starvish next contends that a broader reading of “available” would “turn 

the preference for in-home dependencies on its head.” But the inquiry required 

under former RCW 13.34.130(5) already recognizes this preference by 

authorizing out-of-home placement only when reasonable efforts have been 

made to prevent removal. Once that threshold has been met, placement 
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decisions are based on the child’s best interests. See In re Dependency of A.C., 

74 Wn. App. 271, 279, 873 P.2d 535 (1994) (holding that trial court erred by 

failing to give paramount consideration to child’s best interests in making 

placement decision). Indeed, and as discussed, the legislature expressly 

declared that “the family unit should remain intact unless a child’s right to 

conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized.” RCW 13.34.020. 

Therefore, Starvish’s contention fails. 

Findings

Starvish contends, in the alternative, that remand is required because the 

juvenile court did not make sufficient findings to support its conclusion that out-ofhome placement was warranted. Specifically, Starvish asserts that the court’s 

determinations that (1) the Department “made reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removal of the children,” (2) “[t]he health, safety, and 

welfare of the children cannot be adequately protected in the home,” and (3) 

“there is no parent or guardian available to care for the children” were 

conclusions of law for which more detailed findings were required. We disagree.

“‘If a determination concerns whether evidence shows that something 

occurred or existed, it is properly labeled a finding of fact.’” Inland Foundry Co. v. 

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 106 Wn. App. 333, 340, 24 P.3d 424 (2001) (quoting 

State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. 656, 658, 719 P.2d 576 (1986)). “However, ‘if 

the determination is made by a process of legal reasoning from facts in evidence, 

it is a conclusion of law.’” Inland Foundry, 106 Wn. App. at 340 (quoting 

Niedergang, 43 Wn. App. at 658-59). 
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Here, the juvenile court’s determinations are plainly findings of fact and 

not conclusions of law. Indeed, the governing statute, former RCW 13.34.130(5), 

expressly characterizes these determinations as findings:

An order for out-of-home placement may be made only if the court 

finds that reasonable efforts have been made . . . and that 

preventive services have been offered or provided . . . and that[ ]

. . . [t]here is no parent or guardian available to care for such 

child.

Former RCW 13.34.130(5)(a) (emphasis added). Furthermore, whether the 

Department has made reasonable efforts, whether services have been offered, 

and whether a parent is available involve determinations of whether something 

occurred or existed. Therefore, contrary to Starvish’s contentions, these 

determinations are findings of fact. And because Starvish does not argue that 

the evidence was insufficient to support these findings, neither remand nor 

reversal is required. See Perry v. Costco Wholesale, Inc., 123 Wn. App. 783, 

792, 98 P.3d 1264 (2004) (“Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, 

appellate review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports 

the findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of 

law.”).

Starvish contends that the juvenile court’s determinations are insufficient 

because they parrot the statutory language. But findings of fact that parrot 

statutory requirements are not invalid if they are specific enough to permit 

meaningful appellate review. See In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 

143, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995) (“Findings of fact which closely follow and which may 

to a certain extent parrot [statutory] requirements . . . are not rendered invalid if 
No. 79763-8-I/21

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they are sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review.”). Here, the juvenile 

court’s findings are specific enough to permit meaningful review even though 

they closely track the statutory language. Specifically, had Starvish challenged 

the court’s findings—which she did not—we could readily determine, with 

reference to the record, whether the findings were supported by substantial 

evidence. Therefore, Starvish’s contention fails. 

Urinalysis Requirement

Starvish argues that the juvenile court erred by directing her to submit to 

random urinalysis for 90 days and additional urinalysis upon the Department’s 

suspicion of use. We agree.

“The dependency statutes provide a broad framework from which the 

juvenile court may order services to facilitate parent-child reunification.” In re 

Dependency of D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. 149, 158, 253 P.3d 112 (2011). But as 

the Department itself acknowledges, “[o]nce intervention into the family’s life is 

authorized by the establishment of dependency, the court can require a parent to 

participate in a service when the circumstances in the record support the 

particular service.” (Emphasis added.) To that end, RCW 13.34.025, regarding 

coordination of services, expressly provides that “[t]his section . . . does not 

create judicial authority to order the provision of services except for the specific 

purpose of making reasonable efforts to remedy parental deficiencies identified in 

a dependency proceeding under this chapter.” RCW 13.34.025(2)(d) (emphasis 

added). That statute also mandates that the number of contacts a parent is 

required to make should be minimized to the extent possible. 
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RCW 13.34.025(1)(b). 

We review the juvenile court’s decision to order a particular service for 

abuse of discretion. D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. at 158. “The juvenile court abuses 

its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable 

grounds or reasons.” In re Dependency of B.F., 197 Wn. App. 579, 586, 389 

P.3d 748 (2017). Here, there was no reliable evidence in the record establishing 

that Starvish had a substance abuse issue that required remedying as a parental 

deficiency. Therefore, we conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

by ordering urinalysis.

D.C.-M. is instructive. There, Division Two considered whether the juvenile 

court erred by ordering the mother, K.M., to undergo a psychosexual evaluation. 

D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. at 157-58. The court concluded that the juvenile court did 

err. D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. at 162. Specifically, the court acknowledged that the 

juvenile court had broad discretion to order services aimed at reunification. D.C.-

M., 162 Wn. App. at 158. It nevertheless concluded that the juvenile court 

abused that discretion by ordering a psychosexual evaluation “because (1) the 

order relies solely on the children’s allegations, which [the Department] ruled 

were unfounded, and (2) there was no evidence before the court sufficient to 

show its usefulness as a service to reunify this family.” D.C.-M., 162 Wn. App. at

157. The court also observed that the juvenile court failed to consider an 

alternative approach recommended by the children’s therapist, i.e., “consult[ation

with] a sexual therapist who, after engaging with KM and DC-M for treatment, 

could then make recommendations about what testing, if any, would assist the 
No. 79763-8-I/23

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identification of particular services aimed at reunification.” D.C.-M., 162 Wn. 

App. at 162.

Here, as in D.C.-M., the evidence in the record is insufficient to support 

the urinalysis requirement imposed on Starvish. Specifically, the urinalysis 

requirement was based primarily on Bolduan’s testimony. But when asked at the 

fact-finding hearing why she suspected drug use, the only sign Bolduan 

mentioned was that she had observed pockmarks on Starvish on several 

occasions. Later, at the disposition hearing, Bolduan also referred to Starvish’s 

“unpredictable behavior, her outbursts, . . . [and] how she interacts with people, 

you know it’s very hostile, very demanding.” At no point, however, did Bolduan 

explain why she believed this behavior indicated that Starvish was using drugs. 

Indeed, in her earlier testimony, Bolduan twice attributed the same behavior to 

Starvish’s mental health issues, not to suspected drug use. Moreover, when 

asked at the disposition hearing why she was requesting urinalysis, Bolduan 

responded only that “the Department would hope that random UAs would 

motivate Ms. Starvish to lead a clean and sober life” and “[m]aybe to rule out 

drug use.” But this reasoning would justify subjecting any parent to urinalysis 

regardless whether there was evidence of drug use, and Bolduan provided no 

further testimony explaining how urinalysis would promote reunification for this

family.

In short, the evidence was not sufficient to show that Starvish had a 

substance abuse issue that required remedying as a parental deficiency. Indeed, 

the juvenile court itself acknowledged that the evidence was not sufficient even to 
No. 79763-8-I/24

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support a drug and alcohol evaluation to determine, as an initial step, whether 

there was a chemical dependency issue at all and to identify services aimed at 

reunification. By nonetheless ordering urinalysis under these circumstances, the 

juvenile court increased the number of contacts Starvish would need to make for 

a service whose usefulness to reunify the family was not supported by the 

record. This was an abuse of discretion. 

The Department disagrees and argues that the juvenile court “had a 

tenable basis for ordering random urinalysis testing.” The Department points out 

that Bolduan testified that C.G.S.’s caregivers had told her that their daughter 

and Starvish “used to do drugs together.” The Department also points out that 

there was a CPS intake alleging that Starvish had been seen regularly at a 

known drug house with W.W.S. and C.G.S. But not only is the caregivers’ 

statement hearsay, it is unreliable given that there is no additional testimony 

about how long ago the alleged use occurred or how it is relevant to Starvish’s 

current ability to parent. And although under ER 1101(c)(3) the rules of evidence 

do not apply at a disposition hearing in juvenile court, due process nonetheless 

requires that the disposition be based on reliable evidence. See State v. 

Strauss, 119 Wn.2d 401, 419, 832 P.2d 78 (1992) (sentence must be based on 

reliable evidence); State v. Kisor, 68 Wn. App. 610, 620, 844 P.2d 1038 (1993) 

(restitution must be based on reliable evidence). 

To this end, the “known drug house” evidence also is unreliable. Although 

the Department’s witness list included a fact witness who would have testified as 

to his observations and interactions that led to the “known drug house” intake, 
No. 79763-8-I/25

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the Department did not call that witness. And the Department points to no other 

testimony that substantiated that intake, much less how it was “known” that the 

house in question was a “drug house.” Moreover, the intake also alleged that 

Starvish’s brother was in the house, and the Department points to no evidence in 

the record that Starvish was not allowed to be there or to see her brother. In 

short, the additional evidence cited by the Department is not sufficient to justify 

urinalysis.10

Request To Replace Social Worker

Starvish contends that the juvenile court erred by concluding that it lacked 

authority to direct the Department to assign a new social worker to Starvish’s 

case. We disagree. 

The issue of a trial court’s legal authority is a question of law reviewed de 

novo. O’Neill v. City of Shoreline, 183 Wn. App. 15, 21, 332 P.3d 1099 (2014). 

Here, Starvish argues that the juvenile court had authority to direct the 

Department to assign a new social worker because of the communication 

breakdown between Starvish and Bolduan. Meanwhile, the Department argues 

that the juvenile court did not have that authority because granting the relief 

requested by Starvish would have violated separation of powers. We agree with 

the Department. 

 

10 Because we conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

directing Starvish to submit to urinalysis, we do not address Starvish’s argument 

that the urinalysis requirement violated her rights under article I, section 7 of the 

Washington Constitution. See State v. McEnroe, 179 Wn.2d 32, 35, 309 P.3d 

428 (2013) (appellate court will avoid deciding constitutional questions where 

case may be fairly resolved on other grounds).
No. 79763-8-I/26

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“Under the separation of powers doctrine, the fundamental function of 

each branch of government must remain inviolate, and one branch may not 

threaten the independence or integrity of another.” Afoa v. Dep’t of Labor & 

Indus., 3 Wn. App. 2d 794, 810, 418 P.3d 190 (2018). To this end, “[c]ourts will 

not interfere with the work and decisions of an agency of the state, so long as 

questions of law are not involved, and so long as the agency acts within the 

terms of the duties delegated to it by statute.” Wash. State Coal. for Homeless v. 

Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wn.2d 894, 913, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997).

Here, the Department’s decisions about how to manage internal 

resources, including decisions about what staff is to be assigned to what cases, 

fall squarely within the purview of the executive branch. See RCW 43.216.025(3)

(“The internal affairs of the [D]epartment are under the control of the secretary in 

order that the secretary may manage the department in a flexible and intelligent 

manner as dictated by changing contemporary circumstances. Unless 

specifically limited by law, the secretary has the complete charge and 

supervisory powers over the [D]epartment.”). And Starvish does not explain how 

maintaining Bolduan as the social worker in her case would be contrary to law or 

constitute agency action that falls outside the terms of the duties delegated to it 

by statute. Nor does she contend that interference is authorized because the 

Department’s decision to assign Bolduan is arbitrary, tyrannical, or predicated on 

a fundamentally wrong basis. See Wash. State Coal. for Homeless, 133 Wn.2d 

at 914 (“[W]here the acts of public officers are arbitrary, tyrannical, or predicated 

upon a fundamentally wrong basis, then the courts may interfere to protect the 
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rights of individuals.”). Therefore, the juvenile court did not err in concluding that 

it was without authority to direct the Department to assign a new social worker.

Starvish contends that “[t]he court may order the Department to take 

action consistent with chapter 13.34 RCW.” She cites, as an example, 

RCW 13.34.136(3), which expressly directs the court to require the Department 

to file a termination petition under certain circumstances. She then asserts that it 

follows that “when it is in furtherance of reunification or the best interests of the 

child, the court may order a new social worker substitute[d] in.” But the fact that 

the court is authorized by statute to direct the Department to act in certain 

circumstances does not mean that the court otherwise has the authority to 

interfere with the Department’s personnel assignments based on the goal of 

reunification or the child’s best interests. 

Starvish also points out that “if a social worker disregards a court order, 

the court has authority [to] take action through sanctions or other measures.” But 

as discussed, the court may of course interfere if the Department acts contrary to 

law. Starvish does not explain, however, how Bolduan’s continued assignment 

as the social worker on Starvish’s case would be contrary to law.

Finally, Starvish points to In re Dependency of T.L.G., where we reversed 

a termination order in part because the Department failed to demonstrate that it 

had offered the parents all services necessary to correct parental deficiencies. 

126 Wn. App. 181, 206, 108 P.3d 156 (2005). But the fact that the Department 

has a duty to offer a parent necessary services does not mean that the court may 

interfere with the Department’s internal personnel decisions made in the course 
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of carrying out that duty. Therefore, T.L.G. is not persuasive here.

We reverse the juvenile court’s imposition of the urinalysis requirement, 

remand to strike that requirement, and affirm in all other respects. 

WE CONCUR: