RENDERED: JULY 9, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0527-MR

ANTHONY TYLER FULTON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM ROBERTSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JAY B. DELANEY, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CR-00004 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND L. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Anthony Tyler Fulton appeals the final judgment of his 

conviction, entered on February 14, 2020, by the Robertson Circuit Court. After a 

careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jackie Burden approached Robertson County Sheriff Mark Sutton 

about making controlled drug buys. The sheriff and Burden—as a cooperating 
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witness—arranged for Burden to purchase $60.00 of methamphetamine from 

Anthony Tyler Fulton on June 2 and 3, 2018, for which Burden would be 

compensated $40.00 for each successfully completed transaction. As part of the 

arrangement, the sheriff placed a recording device in Burden’s vehicle. On June 2

and 3, 2018, Burden met Fulton and purchased white crystalline substances 

purported to be methamphetamine; said transactions were recorded.1 The 

purchased white crystalline substances were sent to a laboratory where they were 

weighed and tested to confirm their weight and chemical makeup. Both substances 

tested positive as methamphetamine. The first weighed approximately 0.389 

grams while the second weighed approximately 0.296 grams.

On December 10, 2018, an indictment was entered in which a grand 

jury charged Fulton with two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance 

(methamphetamine) in the first degree, first offense, less than two grams2and one 

count of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).

3

 A two-day 

trial was held during which Fulton, Burden, Sheriff Sutton, and a laboratory 

technician testified. The video recording of the first controlled buy was played for 

the jury. At trial, Fulton admitted to selling methamphetamine to Burden. During

 

1

 Fulton was not clearly visible in the recording of the second transaction. 

2

 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412, a Class C felony.

3

 KRS 532.080(3). 
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cross-examination, counsel was permitted to ask Burden if he was under the 

influence of drugs during the transactions and at trial; however, the 

Commonwealth objected to further questioning of Burden regarding his history of 

drug use. The trial court sustained the objection finding that line of questioning 

irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. Ultimately, the jury returned a guilty verdict on 

all charges4and recommended a total sentence of 13 years’ incarceration. The trial 

court adopted the jury’s recommendations and entered its final judgment on 

February 14, 2020. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review concerning a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is 

for abuse of discretion. Tumey v. Richardson, 437 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Ky. 1969). 

“The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was 

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound reasonable principles.” 

Penner v. Penner, 411 S.W.3d 775, 779-80 (Ky. App. 2013) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Fulton raises only one issue. He contends the trial court 

erred in disallowing questioning of Burden regarding his prior drug history on 

cross-examination. Fulton asserts he was prevented from exploring Burden’s 

knowledge of drugs, his experience in buying and selling drugs, and his history of 

 

4

 The PFO I charge was amended to the lesser charge of PFO II. 
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being a drug addict. 

KRE5 611(b) defines the scope of cross-examination. A “witness may 

be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including 

credibility. In the interests of justice, the trial court may limit cross-examination 

with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination.” Id. Even so:

the right to cross-examination is not absolute and the trial 

court retains the discretion to set limitations on the scope 

and subject. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an 

opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to 

whatever extent, the defense might wish. Instead, trial 

courts retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 

Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on 

such cross-examination based on concerns about, 

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion 

of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that 

is repetitive or only marginally relevant.

Therefore, a limitation placed on the crossexamination of an adverse witness does not automatically 

require reversal. Instead, a reviewing court must first 

determine if the Confrontation Clause has been violated.

The Sixth Amendment does not prevent[ ] a trial judge

from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry 

into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Rather, 

[s]o long as a reasonably complete picture of the 

witness’ veracity, bias and motivation is developed, 

the judge enjoys power and discretion to set 

appropriate boundaries.

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d 595, 602 (Ky. 2018) (emphasis added)

 

5

 Kentucky Rules of Evidence. 
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(footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the jury heard testimony that Burden’s motivation to conduct 

the controlled drug buy was to make money. The jury also heard Burden’s 

testimony that he would have passed a drug test on the days of the controlled drug 

buys and trial, which went to the issues of his veracity and credibility. The jury 

heard testimony about Burden’s potential bias against Fulton concerning another 

transaction in which Burden attempted to sell a car to Fulton’s father. 

Furthermore, the jury heard multiple admissions from Fulton that he 

sold Burden the methamphetamine, they saw a video recording depicting the first 

transaction, and heard testimony from Burden and the sheriff about the buys, as 

well as from the laboratory technician about the results of the tests conducted on 

the substances.6 Considering the overwhelming evidence of Fulton’s guilt, any 

curtailing of the cross-examination regarding Burden’s drug history by the trial 

court amounts to harmless error. 

The limiting of cross-examination—which may be perceived to 

violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment—can be subject to 

harmless error analysis. Barth v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Ky. 2001). 

It is well-established, a single error alone does not necessarily require reversal, and 

 

6

 None of these facts were mentioned by Fulton’s public advocate on appeal. We here note that 

while counsel has a duty to zealously represent the interests of his client, he still owes a duty of 

candor to the court.
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our court is bound to review the error for possible harmlessness. CR7 61.01 

provides: 

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 

evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or 

in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the 

parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting 

aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise 

disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 

such action appears to the court inconsistent with 

substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 

proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 

proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of 

the parties.

Kentucky courts recognize “[a]n error is harmless where, considering the entire 

case, the substantial rights of the defendant are not affected or there appears to be 

no likely possibility that the result would have been different had the error not 

occurred.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Ky. 2006). 

Even if Fulton had been allowed to fully cross-examine Burden in the 

manner from which he asserts he was prevented, such testimony from Burden 

would not have been sufficient to overcome Fulton’s admissions and the video 

recording depicting the transaction. Although Fulton claims he would not have 

needed to testify had he been permitted to more fully question Burden, Fulton still 

cannot overcome the evidence of the transaction depicted in the video recording. 

 

7

 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Accordingly, Fulton failed to show any likely possibility that the result would have 

been different had the error not occurred; thus, we must affirm. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 

Robertson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Robert C. Yang

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

E. Bedelle Lucas

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky