Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-450 | July 30, 2020 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ryan D. Bower

Bower Law Office, LLC

Salem, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine A. Cornelius

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Matter of V.R. (Minor 

Child),

R.C. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JC-450

Appeal from the Orange Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Steven L. Owen, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

59C01-1911-JC-246

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-450 | July 30, 2020 Page 2 of 11

[1] R.C. (“Mother”) appeals the Orange Circuit Court’s order adjudicating her 

minor child a Child In Need of Services (“CHINS”). Mother raises three issues, 

which we restate as the following two:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed a 

toxicologist’s telephonic testimony; and,

II. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) proved that V.R. was 

a CHINS by a preponderance of the evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother has one child, V.R., who was born on August 10, 2008.1 V.R. suffers 

from a heart condition. V.R.’s maternal grandmother provides medical care to 

her.

[4] On November 25, 2019, the DCS received a report that Mother was using 

illegal substances and not maintaining her mental health. Two family case 

managers went to Mother’s home to investigate. They spoke to Mother and her 

roommate. V.R. was at her grandmother's house.

[5] Mother initially agreed to submit to a drug screen and admitted that the screen 

would be positive for methamphetamine. Tr. p. 64. Mother told family case 

manager (“FCM”) Rebecca Nail (“Nail”) that she sprayed hairspray on 

methamphetamine “to oxidize it or to remove the chemicals so she could sleep 

1 The child’s father, H.R., is incarcerated, and his release date is May 24, 2023. Tr. p. 48.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-450 | July 30, 2020 Page 3 of 11

at night.” Tr. p. 17; see also Tr. p. 62. Mother admitted that she heard voices in 

her head. Tr. pp. 18, 65. She was agitated and could not speak in clear and 

concise sentences. 

[6] Dalton Nigg (“Nigg”), the second family case manager, learned that V.R. was 

safe at her grandmother’s home but was expected to return to Mother’s home 

the next day. Nigg returned to Mother’s home on November 26, 2019. When 

he arrived at approximately 11:40 a.m., Mother was still in bed. Mother was 

agitated and “somewhat scattered.” Tr. p. 12. Mother’s roommate reported that 

Mother was hearing voices and made statements about “sacrificing” V.R. or her 

roommate. Tr. p. 13. Mother denied making the statements. V.R. was removed 

from Mother’s home and placed in relative care. 

[7] The same day, DCS filed a petition alleging that V.R. was a CHINS pursuant to 

Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. DCS alleged that V.R. was a victim of neglect 

due to Mother’s methamphetamine use and her untreated mental illness. 

Mother was no longer taking her prescribed medications for her mental illness 

and was not participating in therapy. In 2016, V.R. had previously been 

adjudicated a CHINS because of Mother’s methamphetamine use and mental 

instability.

[8] After an initial hearing held on November 27, 2019, the trial court ordered V.R. 

to be placed with relatives. At a family team meeting on December 17, 2019, 

Mother admitted to using methamphetamine. Tr. p. 102. FCM Nigg 

recommended a substance abuse evaluation. He recommended that V.R. 
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should not be returned to Mother’s care until she completed substance abuse 

treatment. Tr. p. 103. Mother was also hospitalized for her mental illness for 

approximately two weeks in December 2019, after V.R. was removed from her 

care. After her release from the hospital, she continued to participate in 

treatment once a month with a psychiatrist and a counselor. Tr. p. 54. Mother 

is also taking prescribed medications to treat her mental health issues.

[9] On January 15, 2020, the trial court held the CHINS fact-finding hearing. 

Mother testified that she suffers from schizophrenia. Tr. p. 53. When DCS 

began to question Mother about her substance abuse issues, Mother responded, 

“if we are going to focus on mental illness we can focus on that. Substance use 

is not an issue with me, nor has it been and if we need to, to not talk about that 

then I’m not going to answer.” Tr. p. 56.

[10] FCM Nail testified that DCS received a report concerning Mother’s substance 

abuse, and that Mother had stood over her roommate and V.R. while holding a 

knife stating “the voices were telling her to do bad things.” Tr. p. 61. Nail 

testified that Mother appeared to be “[m]entally unstable” during Nail’s 

November 25, 2019, visit to Mother’s home. Tr. p. 62. Mother told Nail that 

people thought she “was crazy because she dressed up and carried a butcher 

knife around the house[.]” Tr. p. 63. Nail did not believe that V.R. should be 

returned to Mother’s care. Nail felt that Mother’s mental health was unstable, 

and that she needed to address her substance abuse issues. Tr. p. 66. 
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[11] The trial court allowed toxicologist, Dr. Donna Coy, to testify telephonically 

over Mother’s objection. Dr. Coy testified that Mother’s drug screens submitted 

on November 26, 2019, and December 11, 2019, were both positive for 

amphetamine and methamphetamine. Tr. p. 93.

[12] After considering Mother’s mental health issues and substance abuse, the trial 

court concluded that V.R. was CHINS. Tr. pp. 127–29. Two weeks later, the 

trial court held the disposition hearing and issued its dispositional order. 

Mother was ordered to participate in visitation with V.R., maintain contact 

with DCS, participate in services recommended by DCS, complete a parenting 

assessment and a psychological evaluation, take all prescribed medications, 

submit to random drug screens, and complete a substance abuse assessment. 

Mother now appeals the CHINS adjudication.

I. Telephonic Testimony

[13] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed a 

toxicology witness, Dr. Coy, to testify telephonically at the fact-finding hearing. 

DCS contends that, if the testimony was admitted in error, the error was 

harmless.

[14] The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

In re B.H., 989 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will find an abuse of 

discretion only where the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. But not all error is reversible. 

Id. The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the judgment is 
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supported by substantial independent evidence to satisfy the reviewing court 

that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed 

to the judgment. Id.

[15] Administrative Rule 14(B) provides guidelines for the admission of telephonic 

testimony in a CHINS fact-finding hearing. A motion for telephonic testimony 

must be served not less than thirty days before the date specified for the factfinding hearing. Admin. R. 14(B). DCS admits that its motion was filed only 

twenty-six days before the scheduled fact-finding hearing. Appellee’s Br. at 22. 

The trial court’s order granting DCS’s motion to present telephonic testimony 

also did not include specific findings as required by Administrative Rule 14(B).

[16] Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Dr. Coy’s 

telephonic testimony without meeting the requirements of Administrative Rule 

14(B). DCS argues that the error is harmless because Dr. Coy’s testimony 

concerning the test results of Mother’s drug screens was cumulative of other 

properly admitted testimony.

[17] Dr. Coy testified that Mother’s November 26 and December 11, 2019, drug 

screens were positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Tr. p. 93. FCM 

Nail testified Mother admitted to methamphetamine use during the initial 

investigation in November 2019. Tr. pp. 62, 68. Mother told the case manager 

that she would test positive for methamphetamine. She also told Nail that she 

sprayed hairspray on methamphetamine before ingesting it. Tr. p. 62. She 

indicated that her methamphetamine use did affect her ability to parent V.R. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-450 | July 30, 2020 Page 7 of 11

Tr. p. 62. At a team meeting on December 17, 2019, Mother told FCM Nigg 

that she had used methamphetamine recently. Tr. p. 102.

[18] Error in the admission of evidence is harmless “if the erroneously admitted 

evidence was cumulative of other evidence appropriately admitted.” In re S.W., 

920 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Dr. Coy’s testimony concerning 

Mother’s drug screen results was cumulative of Mother’s admissions to the 

family case managers that she used methamphetamine in November and 

December 2019. For this reason, the trial court did not commit reversible error 

when it allowed Dr. Coy’s telephonic testimony.

II. Sufficient Evidence

[19] Mother argues that DCS failed to prove that V.R. was endangered or that the 

coercive intervention of the court was necessary. It is well-settled that

[i]n all CHINS proceedings, the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined 

by the juvenile code. When reviewing a CHINS adjudication, we 

do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility and will 

reverse a determination only if the decision was clearly 

erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do 

not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard 

to properly found facts.

V.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).
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[20] DCS alleged that V.R. was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-

1, which provides that a child under the age of eighteen is a CHINS under the 

following circumstances:

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply 

the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 

education, or supervision;

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able 

to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal or inability of the parent, 

guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other 

reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 

intervention of the court.

[21] “That final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, 

reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for 

their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s 

needs.’” J.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)

(quoting Lake Cty. Div. of Fam. & Child. Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). When considering this requirement, “courts should 

consider the family’s condition not just when the case was filed, but also when 

it is heard.” Gr.J. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017)
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(quotations omitted). “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes 

when they have already corrected them.” Id. at 581.

[22] Mother argues that V.R. was never endangered because she “was not present 

during the [M]other’s mental situations or substance abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 

6. Mother claims that case manager Nail “made a number of uncorroborated 

fantastical statements about her initial interview with” Mother.2Id. at 7. Mother 

admits her struggles with mental illness but notes that she participated in mental 

health treatment in December 2019 after V.R. was removed from her care.

[23] After reviewing the testimony of the family case managers and Mother’s 

testimony, the trial court was not convinced that Mother’s mental health 

condition was stable. The trial court acknowledged that V.R. was with her 

grandmother on November 25, 2019, when DCS investigated the initial report 

concerning Mother’s mental health and drug use. But the court was concerned 

that returning V.R. to Mother’s home would endanger V.R. because Mother 

required hospitalization for her mental illness in December 2019, and Mother 

refused to address her substance abuse issues. The trial court stated, “I do not 

feel comfortable in [] letting somebody who is using methamphetamine and 

2 Contrary to Mother’s claim, family case manager Nail’s testimony related Mother’s statements to her 

during DCS’s initial November 25, 2019, investigation. With her own testimony, Mother attempted to argue

that her statements to Nail concerning dressing up like a clown and carrying a butcher knife were 

misconstrued. It was within the trial court’s discretion to weigh Nail’s recollection of their initial 

conversation against Mother’s explanation. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). 
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suffering from mental illness making decisions” about when it is safe for V.R. to 

be in Mother’s home. Tr. p. 128. 

[24] The trial court also found that Mother was resistant to services, and therefore, it 

“is necessary for the department to intervene and to get services to the family 

unit so that we can reunite the family[.]” Id. Given the evidence that Mother 

hears voices and made statements about sacrificing V.R. or her roommate, see

Tr. p. 13, the court was concerned for V.R.’s safety if she was returned to 

Mother’s home. Tr. p. 129 (“The Court’s not going to wait around for 

something bad to happen when I get something like this[.]”); see also, In re R.P., 

949 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the CHINS statute does 

not require the juvenile court and DCS to wait until a child is physically or 

emotionally harmed to intervene; rather, a child may be determined to be a 

CHINS if his or her physical or mental condition is endangered).

[25] It was also reasonable for the trial court to infer that Mother used 

methamphetamine more than once.3 Mother admitted to using 

methamphetamine to case manger Nail on November 25, 2019. On December 

17, 2019, at a family team meeting, Mother again admitted that she used 

3

For this reason, we are not persuaded by Mother’s citation to Perrine v. Marion County Office of Child Services, 

866 N.E.2d 269, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In Perrine, our court held that a “single admitted use of 

methamphetamine, outside the presence of the child and without more, is insufficient to support a CHINS 

determination.” Id.
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methamphetamine. But at the fact-finding hearing, Mother denied 

methamphetamine use and refused to discuss her substance abuse issues. 

[26] Mother cites to her own her testimony to support her argument that V.R. is not 

a CHINS. But it is not our role to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of 

the witnesses. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012); see also SteeleGiri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that appellate courts 

grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters). The trial 

court was understandably concerned that Mother’s refusal to acknowledge and 

receive treatment for her substance abuse issues, combined with Mother’s 

failure to consistently treat her mental illness, seriously endangers V.R.’s wellbeing.

[27] For all of these reasons, we conclude that DCS proved by a preponderance of 

the evidence that V.R. is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. 

Conclusion

[28] The trial court’s error in admitting Dr. Coy’s telephonic testimony was 

harmless. And DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that V.R. is a 

CHINS. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order adjudicating V.R. a CHINS.

[29] Affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J, concur.