J-S22035-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

v.

CHARLES OWEN DANDRIDGE JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1952 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 25, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County 

Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0002291-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JULY 05, 2018

Appellant, Charles Owen Dandridge, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on May 25, 2017, following his jury conviction for fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer, and summary convictions of reckless 

driving, careless driving, failing to signal, failure to obey maximum speed 

limits, and driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked.1 

Appointed counsel has filed an application for leave to withdraw as counsel 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We grant counsel’s 

application to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a.2)(2)(iii), 3736(a), 3714(a), 3334(b), 

3362(a)(3), and 1543(b)(1), respectively.
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We take the following facts and procedural history from our independent 

review of the certified record. On June 16, 2016, Police Officer Joseph Waldron 

of the West Brandywine Township Police Department observed Appellant 

traveling at a high rate of speed through a speed enforcement area. Using a

VASCAR Plus speed-timing device, Officer Waldron calculated Appellant’s car 

to have been traveling fifty-three point four miles per hour, in a thirty-five 

mile per hour zone. (See N.T. Trial, 1/24/17, at 49-50). Officer Waldron then 

pursued the vehicle to conduct a traffic stop, turning on his lights and sirens 

only after the vehicle entered an area with a turning lane where it was safe to 

conduct the traffic stop. (See id. at 51). The vehicle did not stop and 

continued to travel between fifty-three and fifty-five miles per hour. (See id.

at 55-56). When the vehicle stopped at a red light, Officer Waldron shone his 

spotlight into the back of the vehicle. Appellant then looked into his rearview 

mirror and adjusted it. (See id. at 56). When the light turned green, 

Appellant continued to drive and passed several areas that would have been 

safe for a traffic stop.

When Officer Waldron followed the vehicle out of West Brandywine 

Township and into Wallace Township, it became clear to him that the vehicle

was not going to stop, and he called for back-up. Officer Waldron chased 

Appellant on dark, winding roads at speeds in excess of the posted speed limit, 

at times traveling in the opposing traffic lane to attempt to get Appellant to 

pull over; at one point, Appellant swerved at Officer Waldron’s patrol vehicle. 
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(See id. at 62-66, 70). Officer Waldron activated the motor vehicle recording 

device and his body camera after Appellant swerved at him. (See id. at 73).

After almost twenty-minutes of high-speed chase, Appellant and Officer 

Waldron reached a gas station where officers from Upper Uwchlan Township 

were waiting to attempt to help stop Appellant. (See id. at 75, 78). At that 

point, when officers had blocked the roadway, Appellant cut through the gas 

station and exited onto the side roadway. Upon seeing an officer there as 

well, Appellant cut sharply to the right then made a left onto another roadway. 

(See id. at 77-78). Appellant continued for a couple more miles whereupon 

Officer Waldron and other officers were able to block him and force him to 

stop his vehicle. (See id. at 83-84). 

Ultimately, Officer Waldron followed Appellant for thirty minutes 

traversing at least twenty-eight miles. He explained that the primary offense 

during the chase was speeding; however, he also observed Appellant fail to 

stop at a construction stop sign. (See id. at 85, 87). After Appellant was 

apprehended, a record search revealed that his license was suspended from a 

prior DUI conviction.

A jury trial was conducted on January 24 and 25, 2017, after which the 

jury convicted Appellant of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, 

finding that he endangered a law enforcement officer or member of the 

general public by engaging in a high speed chase. (See Verdict Slip, 1/25/17). 

In the summary portion of trial, the court convicted Appellant of driving while 

his license was suspended, and related summary offenses. The court imposed 
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a sentence of not less than eighteen nor more than thirty-six months of 

incarceration for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and imposed 

a concurrent sentence of sixty days of incarceration for driving under a 

suspended license. Appellant did not file post-trial motions. After privately 

retained trial counsel withdrew, he filed a timely pro se notice of appeal, after 

which the trial court appointed counsel. On February 9, 2018, counsel filed a 

petition to withdraw and Anders brief on the basis that the appeal is wholly 

frivolous.2 Appellant filed a pro se response to the Anders brief on March 14, 

2018.

The standard of review for an Anders brief is well-settled.

Court-appointed counsel who seek to withdraw from representing 

an appellant on direct appeal on the basis that the appeal is 

frivolous must:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw 

stating that, after making a conscientious examination 

of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal 

would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to anything 

that arguably might support the appeal but which 

does not resemble a “no-merit” letter or amicus curiae

brief; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the 

defendant and advise the defendant of his or her right 

to retain new counsel or raise any additional points 

that he or she deems worthy of the court’s attention.

[T]his Court may not review the merits of the underlying 

issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.

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2 Appellate counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief on 

September 18, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). The trial court entered its 

statement in lieu of an opinion on October 25, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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Commonwealth v. Lilley, 978 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). Further, our Supreme Court ruled in 

Santiago, supra, that Anders briefs must contain “a discussion of counsel’s 

reasons for believing that the client’s appeal is frivolous[.]” Santiago, supra

at 360.

Here, counsel’s Anders brief and application to withdraw substantially 

comply with the applicable technical requirements and demonstrate that she 

has made “a conscientious examination of the record [and] determined that 

the appeal[s] would be frivolous[.]” Lilley, supra at 997. The record 

establishes that counsel served Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief and 

application to withdraw, and a letter of notice, which advised Appellant of his 

right to retain new counsel or to proceed pro se and raise additional issues to 

this Court. Further, the application and brief cite “to anything that arguably 

might support the appeal[.]” Id. (citation omitted); (see also Anders Brief, 

at 22-28). As noted by our Supreme Court in Santiago, the fact that some 

of counsel’s statements arguably support the frivolity of the appeal does not 

violate the requirements of Anders. See Santiago, supra at 360-61. 

Accordingly, we conclude that counsel complied with Anders’ technical 

requirements. See Lilley, supra at 997.

Having concluded that counsel’s application and brief substantially 

comply with the technical Anders requirements, we must “conduct [our] own 

review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment 
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as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Id. at 998 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

In the Anders brief, Appellant’s counsel presents two issues that might 

arguably support an appeal: 

I. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction 

beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of fleeing or attempting 

to elude police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733? Specifically was there 

sufficient evidence to support the felony of the third degree 

grading pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii)?

II. Was sufficient evidence presented to support a conviction 

beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge of driving under 

suspension DUI related, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)?

(Anders Brief, at 5) (most capitalization omitted).

In his pro se reply to the Anders brief, Appellant raises three questions:

I. Whether the [trial court] erred in sentencing [Appellant] under 

fleeing or attempt to elude police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

3733(a.2)(2)(iii) based on it endangered law enforcement or 

member of the general public? [Appellant] believes the court had 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when being only charged with 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a)[?]

II. Whether the [trial court] erred in sentencing [Appellant] under 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1) based on [Appellant] was driving on a 

[DUI] suspension? [Appellant] believe (sic) that they violated his 

fifth admendant (sic) in light of the retroactively applicable 

Supreme Court decision Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579 (Va. 

1930)[?]

III. Whether Officer Waldron violated written policies required [by]

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6342(a) based on every police department has a 

policy to follow? [Appellant] believe (sic) Officer Waldron did 

violate 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6342(a) when his department policy states 

to limit and not to pursue high speed chase[?]

(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (some citation formatting provided; unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).
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Both questions raised in the Anders brief challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence, for which our standard of review is well settled.

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, 

support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every 

element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the 

province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden 

may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt 

about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter 

of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

The Anders brief claims that the evidence was insufficient to support 

Appellant’s convictions of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and 

driving under a suspended license, DUI related. (See Anders Brief, at 22-

28). We disagree.

The jury convicted Appellant of fleeing or attempting to elude a police 

officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733, which states inter alia:

(a) Offense defined.—Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully 

fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise 

flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer, when given a 

visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, commits 

an offense as graded in subsection (a.2).
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* * *

(a.2) Grading.—

* * *

(2) An offense under subsection (a) constitutes a felony of 

the third degree if the driver while fleeing or attempting to

elude a police officer does any of the following:

* * *

(iii) endangers a law enforcement officer or member of the 

general public due to the driver engaging in a high-speed 

chase.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a), (a.2)(2)(iii). 

The court convicted Appellant of the summary offense of driving while 

operating privilege is suspended—DUI related, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §

1543(b)(1), which states:

(1) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway 

of this Commonwealth at a time when the person’s operating 

privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of 

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 

3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled 

substance) or the former section 3731, because of a violation of 

section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3802 or 

former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 (relating 

to Driver's License Compact) for an offense substantially similar 

to a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon 

conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced 

to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of 

not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1).

Here, as discussed above, Officer Waldron testified that Appellant

refused to pull over after Officer Waldron attempted to initiate a traffic stop, 

activating the lights and siren on his patrol vehicle, and led the officer on a 

high-speed chase on dark, winding roads, traversing over twenty-eight miles 
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at speeds well in excess of the posted speed limit. He testified that Appellant 

swerved at his vehicle and came close to striking other police vehicles while 

cutting through a gas station to avoid police. (See N.T. Trial, 1/24/17, at 70, 

77-78). At the end of trial, the jury found that, based on this evidence, 

Appellant endangered a law enforcement officer or member of the general 

public by engaging in a high speed chase. (See Verdict Slip, 1/25/17). In 

addition, the Commonwealth introduced Appellant’s certified driving record, 

which demonstrated that, on the date of the chase, Appellant’s operating 

privilege was suspended for a DUI conviction that occurred on July 3, 2014. 

(See N.T. Trial, 1/25/17, at 67).

Upon review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that the evidence is clearly 

sufficient to show that Appellant willfully failed to bring his vehicle to a stop 

after being given a visual and audio signal to do so, and thereafter endangered 

either a law enforcement officer or members of the public by engaging in a 

high-speed chase. Additionally, we conclude that the evidence is clearly 

sufficient to establish that Appellant operated a vehicle while his driving 

privilege was suspended as a result of a DUI conviction. Accordingly, the 

issues raised in the Anders brief lack merit.

Appellant’s first question in his pro se response to the Anders brief also 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning his conviction of fleeing 

or attempting to elude a police officer. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 10). His 

argument, which is somewhat vague, appears to claim that the evidence was 
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insufficient because Officer Waldron did not testify about injury, death, or 

property damage that occurred during the chase. (See id.). Thus, he claims 

the Commonwealth failed to establish that he violated subsection 

3733(a.2)(2)(iii). We disagree.

As discussed above, to prove that a defendant is guilty of fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer as a felony of the third degree, the 

Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, that the defendant “endanger[ed] a 

law enforcement officer or member of the general public due to the driver 

engaging in a high-speed chase.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a.2)(2)(iii). This Court 

has held that “[t]he term ‘high-speed chase,’ far from being the primary focus 

of the subsection, was intended to merely require a different level of danger 

from the run-of-the-mill dangers posed by merely failing to stop when signaled 

to do so by a police officer.” In re R.C.Y., 27 A.3d 227, 230 (Pa. Super. 

2011).

In the instant case, there is no doubt that Appellant engaged in a highspeed chase. He traveled well in excess of the speed limit on dark winding 

roads, and took several actions including swerving toward Officer Waldron’s 

patrol vehicle and cutting through a gas station, endangering both officers and 

the general public. The statute has no requirement of actually causing either 

injury, death, or property damage. The information charged the offense as a 

felony of the third degree under section (a.2)(2)(iii). Accordingly, Appellant’s 

first issue lacks merit.
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In his second issue, Appellant appears to claim that the suspension of 

his driving privileges violated his Fifth Amendment rights. (See Appellant’s 

Brief, at 11). Specifically, he claims that his right to travel was 

unconstitutionally abrogated. (See id.). We disagree.

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s argument appears to challenge 

the constitutionality of the suspension of his license, and thus is not related 

to the instant appeal. Accordingly, because the question of the 

constitutionality of his license suspension is not before us, we decline to 

address it.

3

Finally, in his third issue, Appellant claims that Officer Waldron violated 

police department policy directing him to limit and not pursue high-speed 

chases and that if the officer had followed the policy, there would have been 

no chase. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 12). It appears that Appellant is arguing 

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3 Furthermore, we observe that this Court has concluded that “[t]he imposition 

of mandatory license suspensions for drunk driving reflects a proper legislative 

determination of the seriousness of the drunk driving problem, and § 1543(b) 

is rationally related to the legitimate goal of keeping those convicted drunk 

drivers off the roads during the period of their suspensions.” Commonwealth

v. Hoover, 494 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. 1985). The Court further 

“determined that the legislature had a proper rational basis for being 

especially concerned about drunk drivers violating the conditions of their 

license suspensions and for imposing special sanctions designed to deter such 

suspension violations[,]” and held that section 1543(b) did not deny the 

appellant due process. Id.; see id. at 1135. Accordingly, to the extent that 

Appellant claims that his conviction under § 1543(b) violated his due process 

rights, his argument would be meritless. Finally, we note that the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly held that “[o]perating a motor vehicle 

is a privilege, not a right[.]” Alexander v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., 880 

A.2d 552, 561 (Pa. 2005).
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that his arrest or conviction was somehow invalid because Officer Waldron 

pursued him during the high-speed chase. Appellant has cited no legal 

authority to support this argument, nor has our research revealed any. Thus, 

we conclude that Appellant’s third issue is meritless. 

Based on the foregoing, neither the claims raised in the Anders brief, 

nor those raised in Appellant’s pro se response, merit relief. Furthermore, this 

Court has conducted an independent review of the record and finds that no 

non-frivolous issues exist. We agree with counsel that this this appeal is 

“wholly frivolous.” Lilley, supra at 998. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition for leave to withdraw as 

counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/5/2018