IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

SPENCER DEAN BLACKKETTER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JERI TAYLOR, 

Respondent. 

NELL BROWN 

Assistant Federal Public Def ender 

101 SW Main Street 

Suite 1700 

Portland, OR 97204 

Attorney for Petitioner 

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM 

Attorney General 

NICK M. KALLSTROM 

Assistant Attorney General 

Department of Justice 

1162 Court Street NE 

Salem, OR 97301 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER -

Civil No. 2:15-cv-02406-BR 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 2:15-cv-02406-BR Document 20 Filed 03/03/17 Page 1 of 6
BROWN, Judge. 

Petitioner, an inmate at the Eastern Oregon Correctional 

Institution, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 2). 

BACKGROUND 

On November 5, 2010, a Douglas County grand jury indicted 

Petitioner on four charges of Sodomy in the First Degree and four 

charges of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. Resp. Exh. 102. 

Petitioner entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead 

guilty to one count of Sodomy in the First Degree and two counts of 

Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. Resp. Exh. 103. The plea 

petition signed by Petitioner specified that the sentence for one 

of the Sexual Abuse convictions would run concurrently with the 

sentence imposed for the Sodomy conviction, but that the parties 

were free to argue whether the sentence imposed for the second 

Sexual Abuse conviction would run concurrently or consecutively. 

Resp. Exh. 103. 

At the change of plea hearing, the trial judge engaged in a 

colloquy with Petitioner during which Petitioner stated he 

understood everything contained in the plea petition, the maximum 

sentences that could be imposed upon him, and the trial rights he 

was giving up. Resp. Exh. 104, pp. 10-14. He also stated he was 

pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty of the charged 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER -

Case 2:15-cv-02406-BR Document 20 Filed 03/03/17 Page 2 of 6
crimes. Resp. Exh. 104, pp. 10-14. The trial court found 

Petitioner's guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. Resp. Exh. 104, p. 14. 

At sentencing, the trial judge imposed the mandatory-minimum 

sentence of 100 months of imprisonment on the Sodomy conviction and 

75 months of imprisonment on each of the two Sexual Abuse 

convictions. Resp. Exh. 101. Consistent with the plea agreement, 

the trial court imposed one of the Sexual Abuse sentences to run 

concurrently with the Sodomy sentence and the other to run 

consecutively, for a total sentence of 175 months of imprisonment. 

Resp. Exh. 101. 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, but later moved to dismiss 

the appeal. Resp. Exh. 105. Petitioner then filed a petition for 

state post conviction relief ( 11 PCR11 ) alleging several claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Resp. Exh. 107. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCR trial court denied 

relief. Resp. Exh. 121. Petitioner appealed, asserting one claim 

for relief, that the PCR trial court's judgment failed to comply 

with Oregon law. Resp. Exh. 122. The Oregon Court of Appeals 

affirmed with out opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied 

review. Blackketter v. Amsberry, 272 Or. App. 181, 356 P.3d 1171, 

rev. denied, 358 Or. 145, 363 P.3d 1287 (2015). 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER -

Case 2:15-cv-02406-BR Document 20 Filed 03/03/17 Page 3 of 6
On December 28, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus with this Court. Petitioner alleges four grounds 

for relief: 

Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. 

Counsel threatened me with 120 years if I refused plea 

Deal. 

Supporting Facts: Counsel met with me and advised me to 

accept the plea offer or would likely receive 120 years 

if I took it to trial. 

Ground Two: Trial Counsel refused to meet with me for 

more than 10 minutes this pressured me to make decision 

to take the plea deal. 

Supporting Facts: Trial counsel met with me for 10 

minutes or less to discuss the plea agreement I did not 

have sufficient time to make a conscious and knowing 

decision. 

Ground Three: The plea agreement had more charges than 

what I admitted to when interviewed by the police. 

Supporting Facts: I made some admissions when speaking 

to police. The charges contained in the plea agreement 

were not previously disclosed. I was pressured to sign 

it. 

Ground Four: Trial Counsel was not prepared for trial 

and insisted that the best option was to accept the plea 

offer. 

Supporting Facts: Trial Counsel met with me briefly and 

informed me that he was not prepared for trial. He said 

we would likely lose and I would be sentenced to 120 

years. 

Respondent contends Pe ti ti oner procedurally defaulted all four 

claims for relief because he failed to fairly present them on 

appeal in his state PCR proceeding and the time to do so has now 

elapsed. Petitioner acknowledges Respondent's argument that the 

claims are procedurally defaulted, and asks this court to review 

his claims anyway in the interests of justice. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER -

Case 2:15-cv-02406-BR Document 20 Filed 03/03/17 Page 4 of 6
DISCUSSION 

Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state 

remedies either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings 

before a federal court may consider granting habeas corpus relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1). A state prisoner satisfies the exhaustion 

requirement by "fairly presenting" his claim to the appropriate 

state courts at all appellate stages afforded under state law. 

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 

541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). If the petitioner's federal claim is not 

exhausted, and he can no longer do so because of a state procedural 

bar, his claim is procedurally defaulted. Cooper v. Neven, 641 

F.3d 322, 327-28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 558 (2011). 

Once a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, federal 

habeas corpus review is barred unless the petitioner can 

demonstrate: (1) cause for the procedural default, and (2) actual 

prejudice from the failure. Edwards v. 

451 (2000), Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 

U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 

Procedural default of available state remedies may also be excused 

where the failure to consider the claims will result in a 

miscarriage of justice on a colorable showing of actual innocence. 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); House v. Bell, 

547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 

(1995). 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER -

Case 2:15-cv-02406-BR Document 20 Filed 03/03/17 Page 5 of 6
Petitioner did not present any of the claims alleged in his 

Petition on appeal in the state PCR proceeding, and is procedurally 

barred from now doing so. As such, his claims are procedurally 

defaulted. While Petitioner asks this Court nevertheless to review 

his claims "in the interests of justice," he presents no evidence 

establishing cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice to excuse his procedural default. Accordingly, this Court 

cannot review Petitioner's claims on the merits and habeas corpus 

relief cannot be granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 2) and DISMISSES this action. 

The Court DENIES a certificate of appealability as Petitioner 

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) (2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this day of March, 2017. 

ANNA J. BROWN 

United States District Judge 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER -

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