UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES D. GREEN, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v. FRANK DENNING; (FNU) POLSON; (FNU) KLOCK; (FNU) FARKES; (FNU) HOPKINS; S. JOHNSON, Correctional Officer; M. RAUNIG; (FNU) CORTRIGHT; (FNU) PIERYCCI; CORIZON HEALTH, INC., f/n/a Prison Health Services, Inc., Defendants–Appellees. No. 11-3270 (D.C. No. 5:06-CV-03298-SAC) (D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before LUCERO , EBEL , and GORSUCH , Circuit Judges.
Charles Green appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 suit. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.

* The case is unanimously ordered subm itted without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctri nes of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disf avors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 9, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court-2- I In May 2005, Green was committed to the Johnson County Adult Detention Center following a conviction in Kansas state court for a ggravated battery. His § 1983 complaint raises four claims. It names as defendants various prison officials along with Prison Health Services (“PHS”), the designate d health care provider for the Johnson County facility. First, Green alleges that a guard used excessive force against him. On May 10, 2005, Green was housed in a special manage ment module for observation due to bizarre behavior. That evening, Green was out side his cell and refused to return. Deputy Polson and Deputy Brownlee physically restrained Green. During the confrontation, Polson brought Green to the ground and Gr een’s head slamme d into the floor. Green suffered a cut to the bridge of his nose and complain ed of concussion-like symptoms some time later. Green also raises two deliberate indiffere nce claims. He alleges that PHS denied him a needed hormonal treatment, and that se veral officials denied him adequate dental floss. Lastly, Green claims that official s opened his legal mail outside his presence. The district court granted PHS’s motion to dismiss and granted the remaining defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Green timely appealed. 1

1 After Green filed his notice of appeal, this court noted a pot ential jurisdictional defect because one of the defendants was not listed in the order of dismissal. With our Continued . . .-3- II On appeal, Green contends the district court committed three procedural errors. He claims that the district court should have appointed him counsel. We review a district court’s order denying the appointment of counsel in a civil case for abuse of discretion. See Hill v. SmithKline Beecha m Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we will reverse a district court’s decision only if “the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness.” Id. Given the relatively straightforward factual and legal issue presented by Green’s claims, we conclude this was not one of the “extreme cases” warranting reversal based on the district cour t’s decision not to appoint counsel. Id. Green also asserts in conclu sory fashion that the district court erred by declining to order a Martinez report, see Martinez v. Aaro n, 570 F.2d 317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978), or other discovery. However, because Green make s no effort to explain these alleged errors, he has forfeited them. See Am. Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992) (“It is insufficient merely to state in one’s brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for the appeal.”).
III We review de novo the dismissal of the claims against PHS under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Ridge at Red Ha wk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In doing so, “we assume the trut h of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
leave, the district court entered a correct ed order including the remaining defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).-4- allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim against an entity, a plaintiff must allege that the entity had a policy or practice that lead to the claimed constitutional violation. See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2003 ). An entity “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a to rtfeasor—or, in other words, [it] cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat s uperior theory.” Id. at 1216 (quotation omitted). We agree with the district court that Gr een did not allege any facts suggesting PHS had a policy or practice that caused the allege d deprivation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, dismissal of the clai ms against PHS was appropriate.
IV We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2009). A party is entitled to summary judgment only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to judgmen t as a matter of law. Id. As to Green’s excessive force claim, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (quotation omitted). The extent of an in mate’s injury is one factor in that analysis. Id. “In determining whether the use of force was want on and unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of forc e, the relationship between that need and the-5- amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (quotations omitted). The undisputed facts in th e record show that Green had recently exhibited erratic behavior, was outside of his cell, and refused to return. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the decision to bring Gree n to the ground was appropriate despite the injuries he apparently suffered. Green’s claim regarding the denial of de ntal floss alleges inadequate medical care and thus falls under the rubric of “deliberat e indifference.” See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). To succeed on a de liberate indifference claim, an inmate must show that a prison official “kno ws of and disregards an excessi ve risk to inmate health or safety.” Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 2001) (q uotation omitted). The district court correctly granted summa ry judgment in favor of defendants on Green’s dental floss claim. Even if the ne ed for dental floss were sufficiently serious, 2 Green did not show that he was actually denied access to it. The reco rd shows that prison officials repeatedly allowed Gr een access to dental floss outside of his cell, but he refused it because he claimed the six-in ch strands that were offered were too short. These facts do not amount to cruel a nd unusual punishment.

2 We note that a claim based on the denial of dental floss was one of the examples of frivolous prisoner suits cited in the legi slative history of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 730 (8th Ci r. 2004) (Heabey, J., dissenting) (citing 141 Cong. Re c. S14,418 (1995)).-6- Lastly, Green claims that prison official s improperly opened his legal mail outside of his presence. However, Gr een did not name as defenda nts the only individuals he claimed were personally involve d in this violation. “Indi vidual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal in volvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). Without tying the named defendants to this alleged constitutional violatio n, Green cannot prevail. Defendants admit that a prison official inadvertently opened one item of Green’s privileged mail in front of a different inma te named Green. However, “an isolated incident, without any evidence of impr oper motive or resulting interference with [plaintiff’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation.” Smith v. Maschner, 89 9 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990).
V For the foregoing reasons, the ju dgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Green’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED

. Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge