### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A pr il 13, 200 4 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DAVID SCOTT AKERS
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for DyerCounty

No. C02-270 LeeMoore , Judge

No. W2003-00010-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Jul y 26, 2004

The Appe llant, David Scott Akers, wa s indicted for the crimes of robbery and attempted r obbery

and, following a jury

t rial, wa s convicted of

theft under

$500 and attempted r obbery . The trial c ourt consolidated the se ntencing hearing f or these c onvictions with Akers’ two pending probation re vo c a tio n h e ari ng s. F oll ow ing thi s h e ari ng , A ke rs re c e ive d a n e ff e c tiv e te n- y e ar s e nte nc e fo r h is two jury convictions and two one- y ear sentenc es fr om the revoc ation of his sentenc es for violation of the Motor Ve hicle Ha

bitual Offe nder ( MVHO) A ct. On appe al, Aker s raises three issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the tria l court er red in a dmitti ng Ak ers’ three prior MVHO convictions for impeachme nt purposes; (2) w hether he was denied the eff

ective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentenc ing; and (3) whe ther the trial court erre d in conducting the re vocation hea ring without proper notice. F inding no e rror , the judg ments of the Dy er County Circuit Court are a ffirme d. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R
. and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
J ohn W. P almer and J as o n L . Hudson, Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, ( on appea l); and H. Tod Tay lor, As sis tant P ub lic Defend er, D y ers bu rg, Ten nes see, (attr ial ), A tt orn ey s fo r t he A pp ell ant , Da vi d S c ott Ak e rs
. P au l G

. S u m m e r s , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d R e p o rt e r ; M i c h a e l M o o r e , S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ; J e n n i f

e r L. Ble dsoe, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; C. Phill ip Bivens, District Attorne y G e n e r al; an d

Ch a rles Dy er, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.H ut chi nson’ s case was s evered , and no d i spo si t i o n of her case i s shown. 1
-2- OP IN ION
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On the nig ht of J uly 9, 2002, Amy Robinson and Nicole Fr ee were riding around in a rura l are a of D y er County , when they observe d a par

ked truc k on a side roa d that intersec ted the roa d they wer e tra veling

. As they slowed, they hear d “someone y elling for [t hem] to pull ove r.” Robinson, who was driving, stopped and asked if anything wa s wrong
. Although Fr ee lived in the are a, neither she nor Robinson rec og nized the person, later identified as the Appellant, or Sheila Hutc hinson, who was a lso present. Af

ter de termining that nothing wa s wrong , Robinson and Fr ee g ot out of their ca r, and the f our continued to e ng ag e in conver sation. The Appe llant and Hutchinson off ere d to sell Fre e and Robinson seve ral purses and other items loc ated in the Appellant’s truc k. After declining the offe r, Robinson returne d to he r car
. The Appellant followed her, leane d throug h the window of the passeng er- side of the c ar, and demande d Robinson’s and Fr ee ’s purses. He then g rabbe d Fr ee’ s pu rs e ; ho we ve r, F re e wa s a bleto r e trie ve it f

ro m th e Ap pe llant. At thi s po int , Fre e , w ho wa s st ill outside the ca

r, wa s attacke d by Hutchinson, who also attempted to ta ke the purse. The Appe llant then re a c h e d b a c k

in to th e c ar , g r ab b e d Ro b in s o n ’ s h a ir , a n d a g a ina tt e mp te d to ta k e h e r p u r s e. Robinson plac ed her car in r ever se and “slammed” the Appellant betwee n the open passe ng er- side doors of he r car and his truc k. She then put he r car in drive and made a quick turn, which thre w the Appellant out of the c ar. Robins on proce eded to drive to Fr ee’ s house, where she called the sheriff ’s department. Meanwhile, Free , in an ef fort to esca

pe, returned to the m ain rural road w ith the intent of fl e e ing to h e r h ou se . Fre e the n r e late s,
I ’m try ing to g et away

. . . then the truc k starts up and he re the y come down the road. [H]e pu lls up a ndhe sto ps , a nd that’ s wh e n h e jumps ou t, atta c ks me a ndwr e stl e s me to the g ro un d .

. . a nd

he lit e ra lly

re a c he s a ro un d me a nd ri ps theha nd le s o n my pu rs e out of my hand and thr ows it in the truck and shuts the door and takes off

. After the Appellant had taken her purse, Free , frantic at t his point, ran throug h a fie ld to the near by ho me of Ar c hieCr isw e ll f

or he lp. Cr isw e ll c a lle d F

re e ’s famil y

a nd thesh e ri ff ’s de pa

rt me nt.
After Hutchinson’s ar

rest, s h e t o l d i n vestig ators whe re Free ’s purse c ould be found. The burned rema ins of the purse wer e rec overe d, along with some identification ca rds belong ing to Free , near a par k. The Appe llant was later arr ested at a motel. On Aug ust 12, 2002, a Dy er County g rand jury

returne d a two-c ount indictment ag ainst the Appellantan d Hu t ch i n s o n , ch ar gi n g t h em wi t h t h e r o b b er y o f N i co l e F re e a n d t h e a t t em p t ed ro b bery 1 of Amy Robinson. After a jury

trial, the Appe llant was convic ted of thef t under $500 a nd attempted robbery . A sentenc ing he aring w as h el d on November 19, 2002, and the tria l court sentenc ed the-3-

Appellant to conc urre nt sentenc es of ten y ear s, as a Rang e I I I persistent off

ender , for the attempted robbery and ele ven months and twenty -nine day s for the the ft. As part of

the same se ntencing hearing, the tri al court a lso found that the Appellant ha d violated the terms of his probation in Case Nos. C01-03 and C01-139. The se ch ar ges ar o se fr om g uiltypleas to violations of the MVHO Act, which had been enter ed on J une 12, 2001. As part of the plea a g ree ment, the Appellant ha d rec eived an ef fe cti ve two-y ear

Depa rtment of Corre ction sentenc e, which was suspended with pr obation. After determining that the Appe llant had violated his probation, the trial court revoke d the Appellant’ s probationary sentenc es and or d er ed that the balanc e of the sentenc es be se rved c onsecutively with the curr ent sentenc es imposed.
Ana lys is On appe al, the Appe llant raises three issues for our review : (1) whe ther the tria l court er red in admitting for impea chment purpose s the Appellant’s thre e prior convictions for violation of the M VH O A ct ; (2 ) w h et h erh e wa s d en i ed t h e ef fe ct i v e as s i s t an ce o f co u n s el attri al an d s en t en ci n g; and (3) whether he rece ived prope r notice that the probation re vocation hea ring would be conduc ted at the sente ncing hearing f or the attempted robbery

and thef t convictions.
I. Adm iss ion of P r ior

Co nvi c ti ons During the trial proc eeding s, a Morgan he ari ng wa s c on du c te d to de te rm inethea dmi ssi bil ity of the Appel l an t ’s prior c onvictions for impeac hment purposes. The trial court r uled that a prior rec kless en d an ger m en t conviction was not admissible but held that the State could e x amine the Appellant re g arding a prior the ft co n v i ct ion and three prior violations of the MVHO Act. The Appellant asserts that allowing the three prior habitual of fende r off enses to be use d for impea chment pu rp os e s wa s e rr or be c aus e the of fe ns e s did no t inv olv e dis ho ne sty or fa lse state me nt a nd thei r prejudicia l effe ct outweig hed their pr obative value . A trial court’s determination under the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce w ill not be re v er s ed u nless it appear s from the re cord that the trial court a bused its discretion. State v. Mix on , 983 S.W .2d 661, 675 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n t h e p re s en t ca se, the State provide d the Appellant with notice of its int ent to use the challeng ed convic tions prior to tria l . Clearly , the three violations were not c rimes involving dishonesty

or fa lse statement. Howe ver, a ll three violations of t he MVHO Act were punishable by imprisonment in ex cess of one y ear and we re w ithin the ten-y ear time limi t. Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a) (2), ( b). Thus, the only question for our revie w is w hether the trial court pr operly balanc ed the probative value of

the convictions ag ainst their pre judicial eff

ect.
Two criteria a

re e specia lly

rele vant in determining whe ther the pr o b at i v e v alue of a conviction on the issue of c redibility outweig hs its unf

ai r p rejudicial effe ct upon the substantive issues: ( 1 ) t h e i m p eac hing c onviction’s rele vanceas to cre dibilit y ; and (2) the impeaching conviction’s similarity

to the char g ed off

ense. State v. W

aller , 118 S.W .3d 368, 371 (Tenn. 2003) (c i t i n g Mixon , 983 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 7 4 ). A trial c ourt should first analy ze whether the impeac hing-4-

conviction is r elevant to the issue of cre dibilit y
. Id

. Rule 609 sug g ests that the commi ssion of any felony is “g ener ally probative” of a c riminal defe ndant’s cr edibility

. Id

. (c i t i n g State v. W alker , 29 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)). Howeve r, our supreme court has previously reje cted a per se rule that pe rmits impeachment by any and all fe lony

convicti o n s
. Id . A prior f elony c on vic tio n s til l mu st b e a na ly zedto d e te rm inewh eth e r i t is su ff ic ie ntl y pr ob a tiv e of

c re dib ili ty

to outweig h any

unfair pr ejudicial ef

fec t it may

have on the substantive issue of the c ase. Id

. As arg ued by

the State, this court has previously held that a de fendant’s continued violation of themot or

ve hic le la ws , a ft e r b e ing de c lare d a ha bitua l mo tor

ve hic le of

fe nd e r, is pr ob a tiv e of

his cre dibilit y

“bec ause it may indicate a willingness to likewise disre g ard the laws of pe rjury .” Sta te v . R og e r D ale Hi ll , No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 20, 1996). Thus, the three prior convic tions were probative of the Appellant’s cre dibilit y
. Further, we can f ind littl e, if a n y , p r e

ju d ic ia l e f

f e c t o n th e s u b s tan ti v e is s u e o f th e c a s e
. T h e th r e e c o mp laine d of c on vic tio ns we rec le arl y

no t su bs ta nti a lly

sim ila r t o th e c ha

rg e d o ff e ns e . We c a n s e e no mate ri a l risk that the jury

would consider the m as evide nce of the Appellant’ s propensity to commit the present offe nses. Thus, having found that the convictions wer e rele vant to the Appellant’s cre dibilit y , not unduly prejudicia l, and not simil ar to the char g ed offe nse, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s de cision to admit them for impeac hment purposes. This issue is without merit.
II. Inef fective Assistanceof Cou nsel
Se c o n d , th e A p p e ll a n t a s s e rts th a t h e w a s d e n ie d h is c o n s ti tu ti o n a l rig h t t o th e e ffe ctive assistance of counsel. Specifica lly , he contends that appointed trial counsel was defic ient b y : (1) failing to subpoena a potential witness and instead using that witness’ statement, whic h was ha rmful to the Ap pe llant; (2 ) faili ng to ob je c t to he ars a y te sti mon y , wh ic h w a s p re jud ic ia l to theAp pe llant; and (3) disclosing plea

ag ree ment neg otiations to t he trial c ourt during the sentenc ing he aring

. We a refi rs t c on str a ine d to no te that th e Ap pe llant ha s cho se n to raise his ine ff e c tiv e c la im in the c on te xt of

a dir e c t app e a l. Th is p ra c tic e is “ fr aug ht w ithpe ri l” sin c e it “ is v irtua lly imp os sib le to demonstrate prej u d i ce as require d” without an evide ntiary hearing. Kirby George W allace v. Sta te , No. C01-9308- C C -00275 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 15, 1994). Instead, “inef fec tive assistanceof counse l claims should normally be raised by a petiti on for post-c onviction relief .” Sta te v . De re nz

y Tur ne r an d V e rn on W e st , No. 02C01-9512-CR-00390 (Te nn. Crim. App. a t Jac ks on , Jun e 11 , 1 99 7) ; see also State v. Bobby Vincent Black mon , 78 S.W .3d 322, 328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The insertion of an ineff ective a ssistance c laim w i t h i n a m otion for new trial essentially transforms the hearing on the m otion into a post-conviction proce eding

. State v. Kathy Jane G iles , No. W2001-01468-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, A pr. 2, 2002).
Nonethele ss, to suc ce ed o n a cha lleng e of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the Appe llant bear s the burden o f es t ab l i s h i ng the alleg ations set forth in his petition byclea r and c onvincing ev i d en ce
. T en n
. C o d e A n n
. § 4 0 -3 0 -1 1 0 (f ) (2 0 0 3 ). T h e A p p el l an tm u s td em o n s tra t e t h atco u n s el 's repr esentation f

ell below the rang e of compe tence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. Baxter v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687,-5-

104 S. C t

. 2 0 5 2 , 2 064 (1984), the Appellant must establish (1) def icient per formanc e and ( 2) prejudice resulting from the de ficienc y
. The petitioner is not entitl ed to the bene fit of hindsight, may no t se c on d- g ue ss a

re a so na bly ba se d tria l st

rate g y , a ndc a nn ot c ri tic ize a so un d, bu t un su c c e ssf

ul, tactica l decision made during the course of the proc eeding s. Ad k ins v . S tate , 911 S.W .2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . This defe renc e to the tactica l decisions of trial counse l is dependant upon a showing that the dec isions were ma de af ter a dequate prepa

ration. Coo

pe r v . S tate , 847 S.W .2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. It is unnecessa

ry for a court to ad d ress deficienc y and pre judice in any

particula r orde r or even to addre ss both, if the petitioner make s an insufficie nt showing on e ither. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. a t 69 7, 10 4 S. Ct. a t 2069

. I n o rd e r t o e sta bli sh pr e jud ic e , th e pe tit ion e r mus t e sta bli sh a " re a so na ble probability

that, but f or counsel' s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en differ ent. A re asonable probability is a probabilit y s u ff

i ci ent t o undermine c onfidenc e in the ou tco me. " State v. Burns , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 5 3 , 4 6 3 (T en n
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068).
The issues of d ef

i ci en t p er fo rm an ce by counsel and possible prejudice to the def ense a re mix ed questions of law and fa ct. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 461. " [A] trial court' s findings of fac t underlying a

claim of inef

fec tive as s i s t an ce of counsel a re r eviewe d on appea l under a de novo standard, a ccompanied with a presumption that those finding s are corr ect unless the pr eponder ance of t he ev id ence i s o th erwi se. " Fi e lds v . S tate , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 58 (Ten n. 20 01 ) ( c iti ng Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; He nle

y v . S tate , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ). Howeve r, conc lusions of law ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e r

a p u r e l y de novo s t an d ar d wi t h n o p re s u m p t i o n t h at t h e p o s t -c o n v i ct i o n co u rt 's finding s are corr ect. Id

. a. F ailure to Sub poena Witness/In troduction of S tate m ent The Appe llant complains that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for his failure to “ subpoena c odefe ndant S h ei l a Hu tchinson, so that he could examine her with reg ard to a n attempted drug transac tion with the alleg ed victims, Nicole Free and Amy Robinson.” Sheila Hutchinson was not c a lle d a s a

wi tne ss a t th e he ari ng on the mot ion fo r ne w tria l. Whe n a n app e llant c on te nd s th a t hi s trial counsel f

ailed to pre sent a witness in support of his de fense , he should prese nt that witness at the evidentiary

hearing. Bl ac k

v . S tate , 79 4 S.W. 2d 75 2, 75 7- 58 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ). Du e to thi s o mis sio n, we ha ve no way of kn ow ing wh e the r H utc hin so n w ou ld h a ve inv ok e d h e r F if th Amendment rig hts and ref used to testify , or i f she had testi fied, what her testimony would have be en. Thus, we a

re una ble to conclude that trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s deficie nt. Conversely , the Appellant a rg ues that trial counse l w as def icient for a llowing Hutc hinson’s statement to be re ad into evidenc e by a sherif f’ s investigator bec ause it conta ined re marks implicating the A ppellant in the cur rent c rimes. The recor d ref lects that trial counse l was succ essful in persuading the trial court to permit introduction of Hutchinson’s pre -trial stateme nt give n to aA l t ho ugh t he st at em ent was cl earl y hears ay, no o b ject i o n was ent ered by t he Stat e as t o i t s ad m i ss i o n. 2 M o re o v e r, the trial c o u rt c o n c lud e d , “I’m go ing to let yo u d o it this tim e , alth o u g h I thin k I’m in e rr o r in d o ing so .” -6- sheriff ’s in v e s ti g a to r
. I n H u tc h in s o n ’ s s tate me n t, w h ic h w a s r e a d to th e ju r y b y th e in v e s ti g ator, 2 Hutchinson stated that at the time of the robbery and attempted r obbery

of the two victims, she and the victims were try ing to wor k a “drug deal” for six to eig ht hy drocodone pills. After the drug deal went awry , Hutchinson acknow ledg ed that the Appellant assaulted Fre e and stole her pur se, which contained $30.00. T hus, by introducing Hutchinson’s statement befor e the jury , trial counsel wa s succe ssful in doing what the Appellant ar g ued that trial c oun s el failed to do by not subpoenaing Hutchinson to testify

at trial, i.e. , intr od uc ing e vid e nc e that th e fo ur we ree ng a g e d indr

ug de a lin g s.
Moreove r, althoug h the statement a dmitted the Appellant’s involv em ent in the robbe ry of Fr ee, c learly

the alleg ation of drug dealing play ed a ro l e i n t h e jury ’s ver dict by reduc ing the Ap pe llant’ s c ri me fr om a c la ss C fe lon y

to a mis de me a no r. Whil e we do no t ne c e ssa ri ly e nd or se such tr ia l t a c ti c s , th e p r o o f o f r o b b e r y w a s o v e r w h e lm in g a n d li tt lew a s to b e lo s t b y th is tactica l g amble at this stag e of the trial. I ndeed in this ca se, the Appe llant’s sentenc ing e x posure wa s reduc ed from a ten to fiftee n-y ear -sentenc e to a max imum eleven-month, twenty -nine day sentenc e. B e c aus e we fi ndno pr e

jud ic e , w e fi ndthi s c la im w ith ou t me ri t.
b. F ail ur e to Obj e c t t o He ar sa y St at e m e nt Second, the Appel lant asserts that trial counsel wa s deficie nt for failing “to objec t to the int ro du c tio n o f h e ars a y

te sti mon y

by Ar c hieCr isw e ll. ” Cr isw e ll t e sti fi e d at tria l: Well, my doorbell rang

. . . And when I opened the door, [Nicole Fr ee] was standing outside the door, scr eaming and holl ering and begg ing me to let her in the hous e . . . Sh e sa id s ome thi ng to the e ff e c t, “ Th e y ’r e try ing to kill me ,” or so me thi ng lik e that.
T h e A p p e l l a n tc h a l l e n g e s t h e t e s t i m o n y “ t h e y’ r e tr yi n g t o k i l l m e ” o n g r o u n d s o f h e ar s a y. The trial court found the statement was “proba bly admissible” as an excited utter anceunder Tenne ssee Rule of E v i d ence 803(2), thus, de ficient pe rformance was not established. Therec ord does not preponde rate ag ainst this finding. Ac cording ly , this iss ue is without merit.

c . D isc los ur e of P le a Offe rDur ing th e Se nt e nc ing He ar ing During the course of the Appellant’s sentenc ing hearing, trial counsel disclosed to the trial court that the State ha d made a plea offer , the terms of w hich wer e a se ntence of eig ht y ear s to run concur rently with his two-y ear probation revoc ation, and that the Appellant had reje cted the offe r. On the re cord, it wa s stated that this was done fo r p o s t -c o n v iction purposes. Afte r hea ring the evidenc e and arg uments, the t rial court subsequently sentenc ed the Appellant to terms of ten y ear s for th e a tt e mp te d r o b b e r y

a n d e le v e n mo n th s a n d tw e n ty

- n in e d a y s f o r th e th e f t c onviction. Additionally , he orde red that the terms be se rved c onsecutively to the Appel l ant’s probation revoc ation sentenc es.-7-

Th e Ap pe llant a

rg ue s th a t it

wa s e rr or to a llo w t ri a l c ou ns e l to dis c los e to the c ou rt thete rm s and re jection of the ple a off

er pur suant to Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Proce dure 11( e)( 6) and Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 410, which prohibit the disclosure of plea ne g otiations. He asserts that the disclosure c ould have pr ejudiced the trial court’ s sentencing decision. The Appe llant’s r e li an c eu p o nT e n n e s s e eRu le o f Cr imin al Proce dure 11( e)( 6) and Te nnessee Rule of Evidence 410, which are sim ilar i n eff ect, is misplaced. These rules ar e desig ned to pre clude thea dmi ssi on of

a g uil ty ple a fo r pu rp os e s of e sta

bli sh ing the de fe nd a nt’ s c ulp abil ity or lia bil ity in an existi ng or subseque nt civil or criminal proc eeding s. Obviously , the Appellant’s gu ilt was not at issue during the sentenc ing he aring
Al tho ug h the ha

rm a dd re sse d by Rul e 11 (e ) or Rul e 41 0 is no t impli c a te d inthi s c a se , c le arl y the better prac tice would be to r efr ain from discussing sentenc ing ne g otiations during an “open ple a” sentenc ing he aring to preserve sente ncing neutra lity . This issue is withoutmerit.
III. Notice for P robation Revocation
L a stl y , th e Ap pe llant a

rg ue s th a t hedidno t r ece ivepr op e r w ri tte n n oti c e re g ard ing his probation re vocation hea

ring and that, as a

result, his due process rig hts were violated. The r ecor d establishes that the re vocation hea ring was c onducted at the s ame tim e as the sentencing hearing f or the attempted r obbery

and thef t convictions. The trial c ourt’s order ref lects that the Appellant’s two probationary

sentenc es i n case numbers C01-03 and C01-139 w ere revoke d due to the Appe llant’s arr ests and convic tions for attempted robbe ry and thef t.
A re v o ca t i o n h ea ri n g i s d es cr i b ed as a f l ex i b l e, i n fo rm al p ro ce ed i n g. Black v . Romano , 471 U. S. 6 06 , 6 13 , 1 05 S. Ct . 2 25 4, 22 58 (1 98 5) ; State v. W ade , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 406, 408 (Tenn. 1993)

. Whil e th e a c c u s e d is n o t e n ti tl e d to " th e f u ll p a n o p ly o f p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u ar d s a s s o c iate d w ith a cri mi nal tr ial ," B l a ck v . Romano , 4 71 U. S. at 61 3, 10 5 S. Ct. a t 22 58 , th e Du e Pr oc e ss C laus e contained in the F ourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion and the L aw of the L and provision contained in Article I , Section 8 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution r equire that the ac cused be a ff o r d e d c e rt a i n b a s i c r i g h t s
. A m i n i m u mr e q u i r e m e n tm a n d a t e d b y t h e D u e P r o c e s s Cla us e includes, “w ritten notice of the claimed violations of [ probation or] parole .” Ga gn on v . S c ar pe lli , 4 1 1 U. S

. 7 7 8 , 7 8 6 , 9 3 S

. C t

. 1 7 5 6 , 1 7 6 1 -6 2 (1 9 7 3 ) ( ci t i n g Morrissey v. Brewe r , 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S. Ct . 2 59 3, 26 04 (1 97 2) ; see also W ade , 863 S.W .2d at 408. This court has he ld, however , that there qu ir e me nt i s me t wh e n the re is pr oo f that th e de fe nd a nt h a d a c tua l no tic e of thec ha rg e s a g a ins t him, State v. Christopher Lynch , No. E2001-00197-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, Apr. 16, 2002) ( citations omitt ed) ( "[t]hough written notice is pr efe rre d,

. . . actua l notice will suffice to meet the due process requirements in a r evocation of probation proc eeding ") , and whe n the trial court make s oral finding s of fac t at the probation revoc ation hearing sufficie nt to show the g rounds for the r evocation and the re asons for the court' s findings. See State v. Leiderman , 86 S.W .3d 584, 591 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)

.Indee d , t hi s st at em ent by t ri al co unsel was r ai sed as a gr o und fo r i nef fect i ve ass i st ance o f

co unsel by t he 3 A p p e llan t. -8- I n the c as e b efore us, it appea rs that the Appe llant did in fact have actua l notice that the revo ca t ion hearing w ould be conduc ted in conjunction with his other sentenc ing he aring . Trial co u n s el s t at ed , o n th e r ec o rd , t h att h e S t at e h a d o ff er ed t h e p l eaagr ee m en t“o f e i gh ty ea rs , R an ge I I I , c on c ur

re nt wit h his two-year probation revoc ation that w as also set to be heard at the same time .” (Empha sis added). Clearly , tr i al counsel was awa re that the revoc ation hearing w as 3 schedule d at the same time the sentenc ing he aring was to be heard, and t his supports a finding that the Appellant was also awa re of the proce eding

. See Christopher Lynch , No. E2001-00197- CCAR3- CD . N o o bje c tio n w a s ma de by tria l c ou ns e l no r w a s th e iss ue raise d in the mot ionfo r n e w t ri a l. The Appe l l an t was awarethat the hea ring had bee n schedule d and that his probation re vocation hearing w ould be hea

rd. Additionally , the State was also appar ently awa re that a re vocation hea

ring was sche duled as the A ppellant’s probation officer was pres ent with the Appellant’ s probation history

. The func tion of notice is to provide for ew ar n i n g to the person soug ht to be char g ed of the e xiste nc e of

thepa rt ic ula r f a c ts i n q ue sti on s o r t o e na blehim to a c qu ir e theme a ns of

kn ow ing it. 58 A M

. J UR . 2d Notice § 2, § 6 (1989). Although not pr ovided written notice, the rec ord indicate s that the Appellant wa s adequately informed of

the re vocation proc eeding . We conclude that the Appellant wa s not prejudiced, misled, or sur prised by the fa ilure to rec eive writ t en noti ce. Additionally , we note that the trial court de termined that the Appellant had violated his probation beca use of his arr ests and convic tions for attempted robbe ry and thef t, and we f

ind that the rec ord a de qu a te ly

e sta bli sh e s th e se vio latio ns . T hu s, theAp pe llant’ s c lai m of a pr oc e du ra l du e pr oc e ss violation is wit hout merit.
CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg oing, w e af firm the judg ments of the Dy er County Circuit Court.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE