In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 12-3588 & 12-3906

JACQUELINE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 3670—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

SUBMITTED MAY 30, 2013—DECIDED JUNE 10, 2013

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and

SYKES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Jacqueline Johnson filed this employmentdiscrimination suit against her former employer,

Chicago’s school system. The district court granted her

motion to appear in forma pauperis and set a status

hearing for October 18, 2012. The order setting the date

warned Johnson that failure to appear could result in

the suit’s immediate dismissal. Johnson did not appear,
2 Nos. 12-3588 & 12-3906

and the district judge dismissed the suit forthwith for

lack of prosecution. Johnson immediately filed a motion

to reinstate, contending that she had not been notified of the October 18 hearing. The judge denied this

motion, observing that Johnson had agreed to receive

electronic notice of orders and decisions, and that the

court had provided the same kind of notice about

the order dismissing the suit, an order Johnson admits

receiving.

On appeal, Johnson renews her contention that she

did not receive notice. Yet the district court’s contrary

finding is not clearly erroneous.

An order dismissing a suit as a sanction for not cooperating in its prosecution is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan

Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976). But legal issues

receive an independent appellate decision, and we

think that the district judge erred by dismissing the suit

for a litigant’s single misstep, without considering the

possibility of alternative sanctions. (The order entered

in this case reads, in full: “Status hearing held. Plaintiff

fails to appear. Case is dismissed for want of prosecution.”) We have held repeatedly that sanctions should

fit the misconduct, and in particular that dismissal is

not the appropriate response to a litigant’s errors (or

even misconduct) that do not appear to be serious or

repeated. See, e.g., Ball v. Chicago, 2 F.3d 752 (7th Cir.

1993); Kruger v. Apfel, 214 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2000);

Bolt v. Loy, 227 F.3d 854, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2000); FM Industries, Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 614 F.3d 335
Nos. 12-3588 & 12-3906 3

(7th Cir. 2010); Kasalo v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 656 F.3d

557, 561 (7th Cir. 2011). The district judge did not

explain why a single missed conference produced an

immediate dismissal.

The judge may have understood Ball and its successors

as holding no more than that a warning must precede

a dismissal for want of prosecution. The judge gave

such a warning. But Ball and our later decisions hold

more than that. They stand for the proposition that the

punishment must fit the crime. See, e.g., FM Industries,

614 F.3d at 338–39. A conclusion that dismissal is

necessary because other remedies have failed (or are

bound to fail) receives deferential appellate review. But

a district court that dismisses a suit immediately after

the first problem, without exploring other options or

saying why they would not be fruitful, commits a

legal error. This suit must be reinstated.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

6-10-13