### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 18, 200 7
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE V 

### . LARRY DA NIEL

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 98-B-922 Cher yl A. Blackb urn, Jud ge

No. M2006- 01620-CCA -R3-C D 

### - F ile d A pr il 20, 200 7

Th e De fe nd ant, L arr

y Da nie l, a pp e a ls the se nte nc e imp os e d a ft e r h is p ro batio n w a s r e vo ke d d ue to an ar rest for driving under the influence

. Additionally , the Defenda nt asser ts that the s tatute which prohibits cre dit from being given for ti me s pent on probation i s unconstitutional. After revie wing the re cord a

nd applicable law, we find no err or in the judg ment of the trial c ourt and a ffirm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion o f the c ourt, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Natha n M oo re , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla

nt, L arr y Da nie l.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F inl e y , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; B enjamin Win t er s , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION I. F acts This appea l arises from a revoc ation of the Def endant’ s probation, and his se ntence to serve three y ear s at thirty

perc ent. The D efe ndant orig inally pled g uilty to a g g ravated assault in 1998, f or wh ic h h e wa s to se rv e thr e e y e ars a t th ir ty pe rcen t, f

oll ow e d b y

thr e e y e ars on

pr ob a tio n. Th is sentenc e wa s to be serve d consec utive to a nother sente nce f

rom a pre vious DUIconviction. I n 2001, the D e f e n d an t v io late d h is p r o b a ti o n an d w a s s e n te n c e d to s e r v e th e r e ma in d e r o f h is thr e e y ear s incar cer ated. I

n 2002, the Def

endant pe titioned the trial court to suspend his sentenc e, which wa s g rante d; he was the n place d on probation for a sec ond time. I n 2004, the Def endant wa s ag ain found to be in violation of his probation, and he w as plac ed under confine ment for two we eks, after whic h he wa s a g a in p la c e d o n p ro batio n. F ina lly , in 20 06 , th e De fe nd ant v iol a te d h is p ro batio n, and his sentenc e wa s place d into full effe ct. I t is from that judgme nt that he now appe als.-2-

T h i s l a t e s tr e v o c a t i o no f

t h e D e f e n d an t ’ s p r o b a t i o n ar o s e o u t o f h i s ar r e s t f o r h i s s e c o n d

D U I. At the re vocation hea

ring , Offic er D ustin Rus h testified as follows: Off icer Rush s t at ed he w as wo rk i n g for the G allatin Police Depa rtment in Dec ember

of 2005 whe n he wa s dispatched to a location in sear ch of a

truck. The dispatcher

advised Of

fice r Ru s h t h at an off- duty rese rve police of fi c e r c a lle d in to re po rt that a Ni ssa n Ti tan pic ku

p ha d ru n him of f the ro a d and

ha d r un a re d li g ht. Offic er Rush located the truc k in question an d stopped it. W hen Of fice r Rush approa ched the vehicle, the Def

endant rolled-down the window, and the office r smelled alcohol. Offic er Rush aske d the De fe nd ant t o e xit th e ve hic le , w hic h h e did . T he De fe nd ant perfor me d th e fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts poorly , but he re fused to submi t t o a test, and he would not sign the implied conse nt form. The De fe nd ant w a s arr e ste d fo r DU I

. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Of fi c e r Rus h a dmi tte d that he did no t pu ll over the Def

endant ba sed on any

persona l observation but solely based on the rese rve of

fice r’s observations.

Ba sed on this testimony , the trial cour t determined by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the Def endant did violate his probation. The trial cour t state d t h at it would revisit the issue if the DUI second w as dismissed based on a n illega l stop by

Offic er Rush, which w as y et to be dete rmined in another c ourt.
II. Ana lys is
The De fenda

nt presents two a

rg uments on appea l. First, he asser ts that the trial court e rre d in s e nte nc ingthe De fe nd ant t o s e rv e ja il t ime be c a us e of the re a l poss ibi lity that the sto p w a s il le g a l, and the DU Isecond c harg e wi l l b e d i s missed. Second, the De fenda nt argues the statute whic h pr ov ide s ja il- tim e c re dit fo r t ime se rv e d in

c omm un ity c or re c tio ns bu t no t pr ob a tio n is unconstitutional. This Court, in State v. Hay es, ex amined a case wher e the De fenda nt’s probation wa s revoke d
a f te r anil le g a l sear cho f

h is a u to mo b il e
. 1 9 0 S. W. 3 d

6 6 5 , 6 6 7

- 6 9 ( T e n n
. Cr im

. A p p
. 2 0 0 5 )

. We deter mined that “[i] n the abse nce of any ev i dence of police ha rassment or that the evidenc e wa s ob ta ine d in

a pa rt ic ula rl y of fe ns ive mann e r, we c on c lud e that th e e xclu sio na ry ru le is n ot a

pp lic a ble [i n probation re vocation hea ring s].” I d. at 671.

I n the ca se at ba

r, there is no alleg ation of, and w e can fi nd no evidenc e of, police ha ra ssm e nt. No r ca

n we fi nd that this ev ide nc e wa s “ob ta ine d in a par tic ula rl y of fe ns ive mann e r; ” Offic er Rush did not know the Def endant was on probation when he was stopped; the stop was not particula rly hara ssing or

otherwise e ventful. Thus, we conclude the exclusionary rule would not bar the consideration of this e vent, even if the stop w ere found to be unconstitutional in th e collateral proce e d in g
. B e c a

u s e th e tr ia l c o u rt r ig h tf

u ll y c o n s id e r e d th e ar

r e s t in d e te r

mi n in g w h e th e r

the Def endant violated the terms of his pr obation, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Def

endant’ s probation. See State v. Ha rkins, 11 S.W .2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). The Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.
The De fenda

nt next asser

ts that the distinction betwee n a sentence served on pr obation and-3-

on e se rv e d o n c omm

un ity c or re c tio ns is c on sti tut ion a lly ind ist inguis ha

ble , an d, thu s, the a

bil ity to rec eive c redit for one and not the other is a violation of the Equal Protec tion Cl ause of the United S t a t e s C o n s t i tu t i o n
. S e e U

. S

. C o n s t

. a m e n d X IV ; T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 6

- 1 0 6 ( e ) ( 3 ) ( B ) ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; O p
. A t t y. Ge n. No . 9 9- 11 1 ( May

13 , 1 99 9). Th e S tate argue s th e re is a dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n c omm un ity
corr ections and pr o b at i o n : one on community corr ections is serving his sentence while one on probation has his sentenc e suspende d. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303( c) ( 2006). We note the Te nnessee Supreme Court has f

ound a def

endant is not entitled to cre dit f o r t i m e s er v ed while on probation. State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999). Whil e the Def endant’ s particular

argument, that this viol ates the Equa l Protection Clause, is somewhat n o v el as shown by its lack of supporting authority , we a

re not pe rsuade d by it. The re is in fa ct a distinction betwee n community corr ections
an d p r o b a ti o n
. Se e St a te v
. Co r n e li u s D

. Pi e r c e , N o
. M 2 0 0 5 0 2 6 5 0

- CC A-R3

- CD , 2 0 0 6 WL 3071328, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 30, 2006), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed . The De fenda

nt is not entit led to relief

on this iss ue.
III

. Conclusion

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoningand author ities, we af firm t he judg ment of the trial court.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE