alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Simone Cidnee-Allison Phillips, Respondent, v Mark Garvin Giddings, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 496]

*951In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the father appeals (1), as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Palos, S.M.), dated June 13, 2011, made after a hearing, as determined that he willfully violated a child support order dated March 31, 2009, and recommended that he be incarcerated for a period of six months unless he purged the contempt as directed by the Family Court at the confirmation proceeding, and (2) from an order of commitment of the same court (McElrath, J.), dated June 30, 2011, which, upon confirming the finding of willfulness, committed him to the New York City Department of Corrections for a term of incarceration of six months unless he paid the sum of $5,000 towards his child support arrears.

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated June 13, 2011, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that order was superseded by the order dated June 30, 2011 *(see Matter of Ceballos v Castillo,*85 AD3d 1161, 1162 [2011]); and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of commitment dated June 30, 2011, as committed the father to the New York City Department of Corrections for a period of six months is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the period of incarceration has expired *(see Matter of Rodriguez v Suarez,*93 AD3d 730 [2012]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order of commitment dated June 30, 2011, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.

Proof of failure to pay child support as ordered constitutes prima facie evidence of a willful violation of an order of support *(see*Family Ct Act § 454 [3] [a]; *Matter of Powers v Powers,*86 NY2d 63, 68-69 [1995]). Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party that owes the support to offer some competent, credible evidence of his or her inability to make the required payments *(see Matter of Powers v Powers,*86 NY2d at 69-70). Here, upon the petitioner’s prima facie showing of the father’s failure to pay child support as ordered, the father failed to meet his burden of offering competent, credible evidence of his inability to make the required payments *(see Matter of Gorsky v Kessler,*79 AD3d 746 [2010]; *Matter of Seleznov v Pankratova,*57 AD3d 679, 681 [2008]; *Matter of Catton v Catton,*41 AD3d 845 [2007]). Accordingly, the Family Court properly determined that the father willfully violated an order of child support.

The father’s claim that he was deprived of the effective assis*952tance of counsel is without merit. Contrary to the father’s contention, the record does not reveal that he received less than meaningful representation *(see Matter of Rodriguez v Suarez,*93 AD3d 730 [2012]; *Matter of Larrier v Williams,*84 AD3d 805, 806 [2011]; *Matter of Wright v Lyons,*288 AD2d 481, 482 [2001]). Skelos, J.P., Florio, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.
CHANGE IN TERMS AGREEMENT



Borrower:         US Global Nanospace, Inc.       Lender:  USDR Aerospace, Ltd.
                  f/k/a US Global Aerospace, Inc.
                  2533 N. Carson St., Suite 5107
                  Carson City, NV  89706

Principal:        Amounts up to $100,000.00       Interest Rate:    10.000%

Loan Date:        April 18, 2003

Maturity:         December 31, 2004

Date of Agreement:         December 30, 2004



                      DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS

A Revolving Promissory Note dated April 18, 2003 in original principal amounts
up to $100,000.00, amended on June 30, 2004 to include amounts up to
$200,000.00.

                         DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN TERMS

The maturity date of this Note is being extended to February 28, 2005. All other
terms and conditions remain unchanged.

                                 PROMISE TO PAY

US Global Nanospace, Inc. f/k/a US Global Aerospace, Inc., ("Borrower") promises
to pay to USDR Aerospace, Ltd. ("Lender"), the principal balance then
outstanding, together with interest at the rate of 10.000% per annum on the
unpaid principal balance from April 18, 2003, until paid in full.

                                     PAYMENT

Borrower will pay these loans in one principal payment of the balance then
outstanding, plus interest on or before February 28, 2005. This payment due on
February 28, 2005 will be for all principal and all accrued interest not yet
paid. Unless otherwise agreed or required by applicable law, payments will be
applied first to any accrued unpaid interest, than to principal. Borrower may
pay without penalty all or a portion of the amount owed earlier than it is due.

                             SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS

This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties,
their successors and assigns.




BORROWER:                            LENDER:

US Global Nanospace, Inc.,           USDR Aerospace, Ltd.
f/k/a US Global Aerospace, Inc.      by: United States Defense Research, LC,
                                           General Partner

By: /s/ John Robinson                By: /s/ Julie Seaman
    -----------------                    -----------------------
    John Robinson, Chairman              Julie Seaman, Secretary
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Rivera, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (C. Beauchamp Ciparick, J.), rendered on November 30, 1983, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders, 52*AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Carro, Asch and Milonas, JJ.
NO. 07-01-0249 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L A AUGUST 14 , 2002

______________________________ GREENBELT ELECTRIC COOPER ATIVE, APPELLANT V. LYNN MILLS AND BARRY SANDERS, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 31 ST DISTRICT COURT OF W HEELER COUNTY; NO. 10,372-A; H ONORAB LE GRAIN GER W. McILHANY , JUDGE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. ON AGREED MOTION T O DISMISS
On original submission, we aff irmed a j udgme ntin favor of appellees Lynn Mills and Barry Sa nde rs. Ap pella nt G ree nbe ltElectric Cooperative then filed a motion for rehearing. W hile that motion w

as pending, the parties reached a settlem ent and have now filed an2

agreed motion to dismiss w ith prejudice. W e withdraw our original opini on and judgm ent of M arc h 20 , 20 02 a nd, in lie u th ere of, gra nt t he m otio n todism isstheapp eal.
W ithout passi ng on the m erits of the case, the appe al is hereby dismissed w ith prejudice. Tex. R. App. P. 4 2.1(a). Having dism issed the appeal at the request of bot h parties, no further m oti on fo r rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith. Pursuant to th e m otion, all costs are to be assessed against the pa rty incurring them . Our dism issal of the case renders the pending m otion for rehearing moot.

Don H. Reavis Justice Do not publish.
(18 Misc. Rep. 599.)

#### WELTMAN v. POSENECKER.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

December 12, 1896.)

Costs—Right to Costs.

Code Civ. Proc. § 461, provides *that*a person permitted to sue in forma pauperis may prosecute his action without paying fees to any officer, and, if judgment is rendered against him, or his complaint is dismissed, costs shall not be awarded against him. *Beld*that, where plaintiff in such ease is wholly or partially successful, costs will follow as in an action by an ordinary litigant, and hence defendant is entitled to costs in an action by a poor person for personal injuries caused by defendant’s negligence, in which plaintiff recovers less than §50.

Appeal from special term.

Action by Rosa Weltman against Adolph Posenecker for personal injuries caused by defendant’s negligence, in which there was a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $25. From an order denying her motion to vacate and set aside the taxation of costs in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, she appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before FITZSIMONS and O’DWYER, JJ.

M. Strassman, for appellant.

O’DWYER, J.

The plaintiff was permitted to sue in forma pauperis in an action to recover damages for personal injury sustained through negligence of the defendant, and on the trial recovered a verdict for $25.

Section 461 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a person so admitted to sue may prosecute his action without paying fees to any officer, and, if judgment is rendered against him, or "his complaint is dismissed, costs shall not be awarded against him. In this instance the complaint was not dismissed, nor was judgment rendered against plaintiff. On the contrary, she recovered a verdict. The action having been brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained through defendant’s negligence, the defendant is entitled to costs where the recovery is for less than $50. Rieger v. Watch-Case Co. (City Ct. Brook.) 13 N. Y. Supp. 788.

Does the fact that the plaintiff has been permitted to sue in forma pauperis protect her from the imposition of costs in this case? We think not. The justices’ courts have jurisdiction in actions of this character, and, where the damages are less than $50, are the proper tribunals in which to maintain them. Section 461 simply provides for the prosecution of the action without payment of fees to any officer, and, where the complaint is dismissed, or judgment rendered against plaintiff, costs shall not be awarded. The section makes no provision regarding costs where the plaintiff is wholly or partially successful, and we are of opinion that section 3228 applies, and that, where a poor person is wholly or partially successful, costs will follow as in an action by an ordinary litigant.

The order should be affirmed, with costs.
|Exhibit |  | 99.2 - Certification of Principal Financial Officer
|------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------



CERTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Internet America, Inc. (the Company) for
the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mark Novy, Controller and Chief Accounting Officer of the Company, certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:



| | (1) |  | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Mark NovyMark Novy Controller and Chief Accounting Officer February 14, 2003
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-6356

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARNOLDO AVITA GAMBOA, a/k/a Angel Martinez, a/k/a Tony,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, 

at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (2:08-cr-00151-2)

Submitted: June 22, 2017 Decided: June 27, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arnoldo Avita Gamboa, Appellant Pro Se. Gary L. Call, Joshua Clarke Hanks, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Arnoldo Avita Gamboa appeals the district court’s order denying his Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 52(b) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. Gamboa, No. 2:08-

cr-00151-2 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 2, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 4.3


 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We have issued our
report dated May 28, 2020, with respect to the financial statement of SmartTrust 477 contained in Amendment No. 1 to the Registration
Statement on Form S-6 (File No. 333-236434) and related Prospectus. We consent to the use of the aforementioned report in the Registration
Statement and Prospectus, and to the use of our name as it appears under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting
Firm”.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


 


Chicago, Illinois


May 28, 2020
#### William E. Griffiths et al., Respondents, v Donald W. Jefferds et al., Appellants.

— Order unanimously modified, on the law, and, as modified, affirmed, without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiffs purchased a trailer park from defendants and executed a purchase-money mortgage. Defendants thereafter exercised what they contend was a right of assignment of rents granted them in the mortgage, and plaintiffs responded by commencing an action for tortious interference with contract. During the pendency of that action, defendants began foreclosure of the mortgage by advertisement pursuant to RPAPL article 14. In a motion in the pending tort action, plaintiffs sought relief from the foreclosure, characterized in the notice of motion as a preliminary injunction and in the supporting affidavit as a stay. *950Without specifying whether it was acting pursuant to CPLR 2201 or CPLR article 63, the court ordered a stay of the foreclosure. This was error. Since foreclosure by advertisement is not a judicial proceeding (15 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 93:1), CPLR 2201 is inapplicable. Since no undertaking was ordered, the requirements of CPLR article 63 were not met. Thus, that portion of the order directing a stay is vacated.

We note that although defendants have argued that the court erred in failing to disqualify plaintiffs’ attorney, who represented all parties when the mortgage was drawn and executed, the order appealed from does not address this issue and thus the issue is not before us.

We have examined defendants’ other contentions and find them without merit. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Allegany County, Sprague, J. — dismiss complaint.) Present— Callahan, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Pine and Balio, JJ.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-2881

___________________________ Angela Shana Walker lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Missouri Department of Corrections; Missouri Vocational Enterprises; Missouri Office of Administration lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

____________ Submitted: April 3, 2023 Filed: April 7, 2023 [Unpublished]

____________ Before COLLOTON, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. In this employment discrimination action, Angela Walker appeals following the district court’s 1 denial of her motion for summary judgment and grant of summary

1 The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.judgment in favor of her former employer. After careful review of the record and the

parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was proper. See Said v. Mayo Clinic, 44 F.4th 1142, 1147 (8th Cir. 2022) (grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to alter or amend its summary judgment order. See Akpovi v. Douglas, 43 F.4th 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2022) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

-2-
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-1196

___________________________

 

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Troyce Allen Lewis

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Waterloo

____________

Submitted: August 17, 2020

Filed: August 20, 2020 

[Unpublished]

____________

 

Before ERICKSON, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

____________

 

PER CURIAM.

After considering a number of factors, the district court1 decided not to reduce

Troyce Lewis’s 240-month prison sentence under the First Step Act. See Pub. L. 

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Iowa.
-2- 

No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Though he challenges the decision on a host of 

grounds, we affirm.

On the merits, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

See United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2019) (discussing 

the standard of review and outlining the two-step analysis for motions under the First 

Step Act). The First Step Act did not require the court to reduce Lewis’s sentence, 

even if he was eligible. § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“Nothing in this section shall be 

construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”). And

the court did its job by considering the statutory sentencing factors before making 

its decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

We also conclude that Lewis’s remaining arguments lack merit. District 

courts are not required to hold a hearing on sentence-reduction motions, see United 

States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2019), and there has been no 

violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Nor was the new 

statutory-minimum sentence authorized by the First Step Act retroactively 

applicable to him. See § 401(c), 132 Stat. at 5221. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and deny his pending 

motion as moot. 

______________________________
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

for the 

District of Oregon 

NAMU, INC., an Oregon Corporation, dba NAMU 

KOREAN AND HAWAIIAN, and NAMU KILLER 

KOREAN BBQ 

Plaintiff(s) 

v. 

NAMU HAIGHT, LLC., a California Limited 

Liability Company; DAVID LEE, an 

Individual 

Defendard(s) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00453-PK 

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION 

To: (Defendant's name and address) David Lee 

499 Dolores Street 

San Francisco, CA 94110 

A lawsuit has been filed against you. 

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it)- or 60 days if you 

are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) -you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney, 

whose name and address are: Darian A. Stanford, OSB No. 994491 

Scott T. Rennie, OSB No. 144154 

J. Curtis Edmondson WSB 43795 (pro hac vice pending) 

SUNDE NELSON STANFORD 

111 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1940 

Portland, OR 97204 

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. 

You also must file your answer or motion with the court. 

CLERK OF COURT 

Date: 

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk 

03/16/2016 By: s/D. St. Germain, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:16-cv-00453-PK Document 6 Filed 03/16/16 Page 1 of 2
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2) 

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-00453-PK 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (I)) 

This summons for (name of individual and title, if any) 

was received by me on (date) 

O I personally served the summons on the individual at (place) 

on (date) ; or ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- -~~~~~~~~ 

O I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with (name) 

, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or 

O I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is 

Date: 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization) 

on (date) 

O I returned the summons unexecuted because 

; or 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

O Other (specify): 

My fees are$ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true. 

Server's signature 

Printed name and title 

Server's address 

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: 

; or 

Case 3:16-cv-00453-PK Document 6 Filed 03/16/16 Page 2 of 2
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roger Bordaux, Appellant.

The hearing court properly declined to suppress any in-court identification testimony. Although it found that a corporeal identification of the defendant by the complainant Hyacinthe at a pretrial hearing was improperly suggestive and thus suppressed any testimony regarding this identification, it correctly held that Hyacinthe’s opportunity to view the defendant during the commission of the crime provided him with an independent basis allowing him to make an in-court identification of the defendant at trial. Specifically, it was revealed at the hearing that Hyacinthe viewed the defendant on at least two occasions, in satisfactory lighting conditions, on one occasion viewing his face for 10 to 15 seconds at a distance of about five feet while the defendant pointed a shotgun at him and asked for his radio. Promptly thereafter, Hyacinthe gave the police a detailed description of the defendant, which included facial characteristics, and, in a completely proper photographic identification procedure, picked out the defendant’s photo with great assurance from several hundred other photographs. Upon these facts, it cannot be said that the hearing court’s determination was clearly erroneous *(see, People v Armstead,*98 AD2d 726). An impermissibly suggestive *811identification procedure, such as occurred at the pretrial hearing in the instant case, will not prevent a witness from identifying a defendant at trial if the witness had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the commission of the crime *(see, e.g., People v Adams,*53 NY2d 241, 251-252; *People v Malphurs,*111 AD2d 266, 268).

We have reviewed the defendant’s other claims and find them to be without merit. Mollen, P. J., Brown, Niehoff and Kooper, JJ., concur.
# L_2009139EN.01003501.xml

| 5.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 139/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 139/35

---

Corrigendum to Commission Regulation (EC) No 407/2009 of 14 May 2009 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 123 of 19 May 2009
  )

On page 26, Annex, headed column ‘Annex B’, the species ‘Ortalis vetula (III Guatemala/Honduras)’ and ‘Pauxi pauxi (III Columbia)’ should be moved to headed column ‘Annex C’.

Ortalis vetula

Pauxi pauxi

---