alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 3(i)


                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
            SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                       OF
                     CONSOLIDATED DELIVERY & LOGISTICS, INC.



         Consolidated Delivery & Logistics, Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the
"Corporation"), does hereby certify that:

         1. The name of Corporation is Consolidated Delivery & Logistics, Inc.

         2. The Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the
Corporation is hereby amended to effect the following amendment, which was
adopted by the Board of Directors and by the holders of a majority of the
outstanding shares of common stock of the Corporation entitled to vote thereon,
in accordance with the provisions of Section 242 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law. To change the name of the Corporation from Consolidated
Delivery & Logistics, Inc. to "CD&L, Inc.", the first paragraph of Article First
of the Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation is deleted and
the following is substituted in lieu thereof:

         FIRST: The name of the Corporation is "CD&L, Inc."

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being the duly elected officer of
the Corporation, has executed this Certificate of Amendment and affirms the
statements contained therein on this 14th day of June, 2000.

                                      CONSOLIDATED DELIVERY & LOGISTICS, INC.



                                      By: _____________________________
                                            Albert W. Van Ness, Jr.
                                            Chief Executive Officer
#### Constance D. Lenge *v.*Alexander A. Goldfarb et al.

*Wesley W. Horton,*in support of the motion.

Submitted March 25

decided April *1,*1975

The plaintiff’s motion to strike from the brief of the defendant Florence DiPietro the appendix; thereto in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is denied.
#### In the Matter of Louella Palmer, Petitioner, v New York State Department of Social Services et al., Respondents.

— Determination unanimously annulled, on the law, with costs, petition granted and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Petitioner was denied medical assistance by respondent Oswego County Department of Social Services. That agency found petitioner ineligible because, within 24 months of application, she had owned a homestead which was no longer exempt (18 NYCRR 360.8 [a]) and it determined that petitioner "will not be able to return to the home” (18 *978NYCRR 360.6 [b]). Petitioner appealed that decision and, after a fair hearing, respondent New York State Department of Social Services confirmed the decision. Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding alleging that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree.

At the hearing, witnesses for the Oswego County Department of Social Services attempted to justify their decision based on three documents: two DMS-1 forms and one hospital discharge summary. The hospital discharge summary states no facts pertaining to petitioner’s likelihood of returning to her home, and the witnesses so testified. The "DMS-1” forms, whose origin and purpose were not well described, indicate that at the current time petitioner was eligible for skilled nursing care. With respect to continued confinement, they say very little. The second form, however, does note that discharge from the nursing facility is "possible” "if and when decubitus heals” and there is "participation in ADL to HRF”. These documents, which are at best ambiguous, cannot provide substantial evidence that the agency has "medical verification that the client will be unable to return” (18 NYCRR 360.6 [b] [2] [ii]) to her home. The “speculative inferences” to be gleaned from those documents "do not constitute a substitute for affirmative evidence” *(Matter of Dauer v Perales,*116 AD2d 573, 575).

We also find that petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees *(Maine v Thiboutot,*448 US 1; *Matter of Johnson v Blum,*58 NY2d 454; *Matter of Holley v Blum,*75 AD2d 998; *Matter of Ashley v Curtis,*67 AD2d 828; *see also, Matter of Martin v Blum,*87 AD2d 688, *revd on other grounds*61 NY2d 506; *Calkins v Blum,*511 F Supp 1073, 1102).

The matter is remitted to Supreme Court for a determination of the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. (Article 78 proceeding transferred by order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Lynch, J.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Joseph J. Casale et al., Respondents, v City of New York, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 92]—

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Larry S. Schachner, J.), entered April 5, 2011, which granted petitioners’ motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.

The IAS court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the motion *(see*General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]). Petitioners failed to offer a reasonable excuse for not serving a timely notice of claim. Indeed, petitioners failed to submit any medical evidence supporting their assertion that the injured petitioner’s physical condition prevented them from timely serving a notice of claim *(see Matter of Dominguez v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,*178 AD2d 186, 188 [1991]; *Matter of Mandia v County of*Westchester, 162 AD2d 217, 218 [1990]). Petitioners’ *745excuse is especially unreasonable, given that they were able to file claims for Workers’ Compensation and Social Security disability benefits. Moreover, petitioners’ alleged ignorance of the law is no excuse *(see Bullard v City of New York,*118 AD2d 447, 450 [1986]; *Figueroa v City of New York,*92 AD2d 908, 909 [1983]).

Further, the accident report prepared by the purported general contractor or construction manager, Turner Construction Company (Turner), did not give the City actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, as there is no evidence that Turner was an agent of the City *(see Matter of Grant v Nassau County Indus. Dev. Agency,*60 AD3d 946, 948 [2009]; *Williams v City of Niagara Falls,*244 AD2d 1006, 1007 [1997]). Moreover, even if Turner were found to be an agent of the City, its report was insufficient to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim. Indeed, although the report provided facts regarding the incident, it failed to connect the incident to any claim against the City *(see Bullard,*118 AD2d at 450-451; *Matter of Carpenter v City of New York,*30 AD3d 594, 595 [2006]).

Lastly, petitioners have offered nothing to rebut the inference of prejudice that arises from their eight-month delay in serving the notice of claim *(see Matter of Polanco v New York City Hous. Auth.,*39 AD3d 320, 321 [2007]). Concur — Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Freedman and Abdus-Salaam, JJ.
#### Julia B. Budney *v.*Bruno Zalot

House, C. J., Loiselle, MacDonald, Bogdanski and Longo, Js.

Argued April 3

decision released April 22, 1975

*Waldemar J. Lach,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*David T. Ryan,*for the appellee (defendant).

Per Curiam.

The sole question on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing the plaintiff’s offer into evidence of a series of bills for medical examination, treatment and drugs in the absence of any medical expert testimony which would support a finding that there was any causal connection between the accident for which the plaintiff’s suit was brought and the services and drugs for which the bills were rendered. “To be entitled to damages a plaintiff must establish a causal relation between the injury and the physical condition which he claims resulted from it. *Bates*v. *Carroll,*99 Conn. 677, 679, 122 A. 562. This causal connection must rest upon more than surmise or conjecture. *Witkowski*v. *Goldberg,*115 Conn. 693, 696, 163 A. 413; *Green*v. *Stone,*119 Conn. 300, 306, 176 A. 123. A trier is not concerned with possibilities but with reasonable probabilities. *Richardson*v. *Pratt & Whit*
      *389
      *ney Mfg. Co.,*129 Conn. 669, 672, 30 A.2d 919. The cansal relation between an injury and its later physical effects may be established by the direct opinion of a physician, by his deduction by the process of eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or by his opinion based upon a hypothetical question.” *Boland*v. *Vanderbilt,*140 Conn. 520, 525, 102 A.2d 362.

In the absence of any medical evidence whatsoever which would support a finding that the bills offered into evidence by the plaintiff were causally connected with the alleged negligence of the defendant, the court properly excluded the offered exhibits.

There is no error.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-50771

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for the Use and Benefit of Consorcio ICA-CBI, a Foreign Corporation

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

VERSUS

U S CAPITAL, a New York Corporation, ET AL

Defendants,

U S CAPITAL, a New York Corporation

Defendant - Appellant-Cross-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Texas

(EP-91-CV-230)

July 14, 1997

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This matter is a controversy between the subcontractor and the

furnisher of a payment bond under the Miller Act arising out of the

construction of an office complex for the U.S. Embassy in La Paz,

Bolivia. The district court granted judgment in favor of the2

subcontractor on most of its damage claims and both parties appeal.

The case presents the issues whether the district court erred:

in finding that the subcontractor’s claims ag ainst the bonding

company are not prescribed, and in the district court’s award of

damages to the subcontractor. We have carefully considered the

record, th e briefs and arguments of counsel, and the district

court’s painstakingly detailed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. We are convinced that the district court correctly applied

the appropriate law and that none of its factual findings are

clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the

district court essentially for the reasons given by that court.

AFFIRMED.
Order entered June 18, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00178-CR

JEFFREY KING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 10-13223

ORDER

Appellant’s brief was originally due April 13, 2013. The Court has twice granted 

appellant thirty-day extensions of time to file his brief. The Court now has before it appellant’s 

third extension request, seeking another thirty days to file appellant’s brief. We DENY

appellant’s June 13, 2013 third motion to extend time to file his brief.

We ORDER the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why appellant’s brief has 

not been filed. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate findings and 

recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, whether 

appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the appeal. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the hearing, the 

trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 S.W.2d 708 
(Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the trial court is 

ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to assure effective representation, which 

may include appointment of new counsel.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

This appeal is ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeal shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
# L_2009328EN.01006901.xml

| 15.12.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 328/69 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.12.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 328/69

---

EUROPEAN COUNCIL DECISION,

taken with the agreement of the President of the Commission,

of 4 December 2009

appointing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

(2009/950/EU)

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 18(1) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 1 December 2009 Catherine ASHTON was appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from 1 December 2009 until the end of the current term of office of the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 1 December 2009 Catherine ASHTON was appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from 1 December 2009 until the end of the current term of office of the Commission.

| (2) | In accordance with Article 17(7), third subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union, the President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other Members of the Commission will be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In accordance with Article 17(7), third subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union, the President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other Members of the Commission will be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament.

| (3) | The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should be appointed for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2014, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy should be appointed for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2014,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Catherine ASHTON is hereby appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2014.

Article 2

This Decision shall be notified to Catherine ASHTON by the President of the European Council.

It shall take effect on the day of its notification.

Article 3

This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 4 December 2009.

For the European Council

The President

H. VAN ROMPUY

---
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 170 (Tuesday, September 7, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 50102]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19198]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. EF21-7-000]


Western Area Power Administration; Notice of Filing

    Take notice that on August 27, 2021, Western Area Power 
Administration submitted tariff filing: Formula Rates for Western Area 
Power Administration--Rate Order No. WAPA-195, to be effective 10/1/
2021.
    Any person desiring to intervene or to protest this filing must 
file in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211, 385.214). Protests will be 
considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must file a notice of 
intervention or motion to intervene, as appropriate. Such notices, 
motions, or protests must be filed on or before the comment date. On or 
before the comment date, it is not necessary to serve motions to 
intervene or protests on persons other than the Applicant
    The Commission strongly encourages electronic filings of comments, 
protests and interventions in lieu of paper using the ``eFiling'' link 
at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons unable to file electronically may mail 
similar pleadings to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 
First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. Hand delivered submissions in 
docketed proceedings should be delivered to Health and Human Services, 
12225 Wilkins Avenue, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
    In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the 
Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an 
opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the 
internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://ferc.gov) using the 
``eLibrary'' link. Enter the docket number excluding the last three 
digits in the docket number field to access the document. At this time, 
the Commission has suspended access to the Commission's Public 
Reference Room, due to the proclamation declaring a National Emergency 
concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), issued by the 
President on March 13, 2020. For assistance, contact the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#f5b3b0a7b6ba9b999c9b90a68085859a8781b593908796db929a83"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="1d5b584f5e5273717473784e686d6d726f695d7b786f7e337a726b">[email protected]</span></a> or call toll-free, 
(886) 208-3676 or TYY, (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time on September 27, 2021.

    Dated: August 31, 2021.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2021-19198 Filed 9-3-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

RICHARD B. BURKE, Individually, ) d/b/a RICHARD B. BURKE, ) ATTORNEY, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-1976 ) WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ) ASSOCIATION, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed January 30, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Andrea McHugh, Judge. Martin E. Leach of Feiler & Leach, P.L., for Coral Gables, Appellant. Ronald M. Emanuel of Emanuel & Zwiebel, PLLC, Plantation, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
NORTHCUTT, SILBERMAN, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
# L_2009125EN.01006401.xml

| 21.5.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 125/64 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.5.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 125/64

---

COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 421/2009

of 20 May 2009

fixing the maximum export refund for skimmed milk powder in the framework of the standing invitation to tender provided for in Regulation (EC) No 619/2008

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1), and in particular Article 164(2), in conjunction with Article 4, thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Commission Regulation (EC) No 619/2008 of 27 June 2008 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain milk products (2) provides for a standing invitation to tender procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Commission Regulation (EC) No 619/2008 of 27 June 2008 opening a standing invitation to tender for export refunds concerning certain milk products (2) provides for a standing invitation to tender procedure.

| (2) | Pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1454/2007 of 10 December 2007 laying down common rules for establishing a tender procedure for fixing export refunds for certain agricultural products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for the tendering period ending on 19 May 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Pursuant to Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1454/2007 of 10 December 2007 laying down common rules for establishing a tender procedure for fixing export refunds for certain agricultural products (3) and following an examination of the tenders submitted in response to the invitation to tender, it is appropriate to fix a maximum export refund for the tendering period ending on 19 May 2009.

| (3) | The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for the Common Organisation of Agricultural Markets,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

For the standing invitation to tender opened by Regulation (EC) No 619/2008, for the tendering period ending on 19 May 2009, the maximum amount of refund for the product and destinations referred to in Article 1(c) and in Article 2 of that Regulation shall be EUR 22,00/100 kg.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on 21 May 2009.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 20 May 2009.

For the Commission

Jean-Luc DEMARTY

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 168, 28.6.2008, p. 20.

2

(3)  
  OJ L 325, 11.12.2007, p. 69.

3

---