6,; 

TlE?IE .c%-JITORNEY GENERAL 

OP TEXAS 

Honorable M. B. Morgan 

Commissioner 

Opinion No. WW-372 

Bureau of Labor Statistics 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Mr. Morgan: 

: 

Re : Maximum number of hours 

a female employee may 

work,under the provisions of Article 5172a 

in any one period of 

twenty-four consecutive 

hours. 

You have requested our opinion on the construction of 

Sections 1 and 13 of Article 5172a, Vernon's Civil Statutes 

and ask to be advised if the term "calendar day" as used 

Section 1 and the term '#day of twenty-four hoursA 

In 

Section 13, both mean a period.of time beginning ai ",;:%e&E 

night to 12:00 P.M. 

Section 1 Article 972a, Vernonls Civil Statutes, 

"reads in part as fo&Us: 

"No female shall be employed in a factory e 0 0 

for more'than nine (9) hours in any one calendar dav 

nor more than fifty-four (5%) hours in any one calendarweek." (Emphasis ours). 

Section 13 Article 5172a,-,.Vernon?s Civil Statutes, 

reads in part as follows: 

n . . 0 female to work in any place mentioned in 

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Act more thano;heti;zber 

of hours provided therein in any one dav Yin any one calendar week, 0 o ett (EmphaAre the terms synonymous, and does Section 13 prohibit 

a female employee working in designated places for more than the 

specified hours in any one period of twenty-four consecutive 

hours? 

This question seems to have been settled by the Supreme 

Court of Texas in Lorul v. City of Wichita Falls, 176 S.W.2d 936, 

142 Tex, 202, when the Court had before it a similar question 

construing the term "calendar day" and the undefined term "day", 
Honorable M. B. Morgan, page 2 (w-372) 

in Article 1583, Vernon's Annotated Penal Code, relating to 

the permissible hours of employment for firemen in municipalities of various categories, 

There the term "calendar day" was defined as being 

"the time elap&g from one midnight to the successive one". 

Such construction was said to be a rule ordinarily adopted and 

followed merely as a matter of convenience. The undefined term 

"dayc' was defined as "the period of time during which the earth 

makes one revolution on its axis, the interval of time which 

elapses between two consecutive returns of the same terrestrial 

meridian to the sun; the average length of this interval, twentyfour hours". 

It is our opinion 

two .terms are not necessari I y 

and you are so advised, that the 

synonymous and do not necessarily 

refer to the same period of time. 

.In.order to determine what construction should be 

placed on the term "day", as used by the Legislature in the statute here under construction, we must look to the purpose intended 

to be accomplished by the Act and the effect that it will have 

when so applied to the subject matter. Lona v. Citv of Wichita 

Falls. suura. Its obvious purpose is the protection of health 

and the prevention of hours of employment that may add to the 

hazards of employment. In our opinion, such purpose would not 

be served by a construction which allowed female employees to 

work maximum hours in two calandar days, but within one period 

of twenty-four consecutive hours. %y construing "day of twentyfour hoursl' to mean a calendar day from midnight to the successive midnight, a female employee could be required to begin work 

at 3:00 P.M. on one afternoon and continue working until 9:OO 

A.M. the following morning, without violation. Such construction 

would defeat the purpose of the Act, in our opinion. 

That the legislative use of the two different terms 

indicates a legislative intent to distinguish between a midnight 

to midnight calendar day and a period of twenty-four consecutive 

hOtIm, is made clear by Lona v. Citv of Wichita Falls, Suora. 

OOur position that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the rest period to be allowed firemen in cities of less than 75,000 population to a : : 

'calendar day' is evidenced, we think by the language of the statute as a whole. Seckon 1 of the 

Act, which regulates cities of more than 25,000 and 

less than 75,000 inhabitants, provides that the firemen shall not be required to be on duty more than 

'six (6) days in any one week,' and nothing is said 
Honorable M. B. Morgan, page 3 W-372) 

about calendar days or calendar weeks. On the 

contrary, the Legislature, when it attempted to 

deal with cities of over 75,000 population in 

Section 6 of the Act, expressly stipulated that 

firemen should not be required to work more than 

twelve hours per 'calendar day or more than 

seventy-two hours in any one calendar week.' 

This, to our minds evidences legislative intent 

that the calendar A ay and the calendar week 

should be applied in regulating the work periods 

of firemen in cities with a population in excess 

of 75,000, but that such limitation should not 

be required in cities with a less populat.ion,11 

(Emphasis by the Court). 

Court, 

Also see Citv of Amarillo,v, York; et al., Supreme 

142 Tex. 210, 176 S.W,2d 935 reversing &&Y of Amarillo 

v. York, 167 S.W.2d 787, where the Court of Civil Appeals held 

the term "daytl to mean the usual calendar day from midnight to 

midnight. 

The language of Section 13 specifically indicates~ 

which period it means by placement of the words "of twenty-four 

hours" after the word "day".. In our opinion, Section 13 clearly 

prohibits the working of female employees in excess of the maximum number of hours in any one period of twenty-four consecutive 

-hours, and you are so advised. 

SUMMARY 

As used in Article 5172a, the terms "calendar 

day" in Section 1, and "day of twenty-four hours" in 

Section 13 are not synonymous in constructional context,*but the limitations on female employees working 

in excess of designated hours within a "day of twentyfour hours" refers to a period of twenty-four consecutive hours, and not a period only from one midnight 

to the successive one. 

TIM:jl:wb 

Yours very truly, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

.,: 

I,.: "y 

c&, & ii ; /" '!;;I .;r.< q 

Tom I. McFarling : aAssistant 
Honorable M. B. Morgan, page 4 (ww-372) 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Geo. P. Blackburn 

Cecil C. Rotsch 

J. Mark McLaughlin 

J. Milton Richardson 

John H. Minton, Jr. 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: W. V. Geppert