COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MICHAEL D. LABRANCHE 

v. Record No. 2383-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

RENE JOY LABRANCHE JUNE 4, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Jack B. Stevens, Judge 

 Chanda L. Kinsey (Kinsey, Lynch & Filipour, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Paula Winchester Rank (Lawrence H. Bowen; 

Byrd, Mische, Bevis, Bowen, Joseph & 

O'Connor, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 Michael D. Labranche (husband) challenges the decree of the 

trial court ordering him to pay Rene J. Labranche (wife) spousal 

support of $500 per month and certain "marital" debts. Finding 

no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we 

recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this 

appeal. "Upon familiar principles, we review the evidence on 

appeal in the light most favorable to wife, the party prevailing 

below." Cook v. Cook, 18 Va. App. 726, 731, 446 S.E.2d 894, 896 

(1994). 

 The parties married on July 6, 1987, separated June 17, 

1993, and were divorced, in a bifurcated proceeding, by decree 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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dated July 1, 1994. The disputed orders resulted from the 

court's subsequent adjudication of equitable distribution and 

spousal support and attendant factual findings. 

 Spousal Support

 "[W]hether a spouse is entitled to support, and if so how 

much, is a matter within the discretion of the court . . . ." 

Dukelow v. Dukelow, 2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 

(1986). An award "'based upon due consideration of the factors 

enumerated in Code § 20-107.1, as shown by the evidence, . . . 

"will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion."'" 

Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 679, 406 S.E.2d 401, 403 

(1991) (citations omitted); Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 

574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992). In addressing the relevant 

statutory factors, the trial court is not required "to quantify 

or elaborate exactly what weight or consideration it has given to 

each . . . ." Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 

S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986). However, the "award must be based upon 

the circumstances in existence at the time of the award. An 

award 'premised upon the occurrence of an uncertain future 

circumstance . . . ignores the design and defeats the purpose of 

the statutory scheme.'" Payne v. Payne, 5 Va. App. 359, 363, 363 

S.E.2d 428, 430 (1987) (citation omitted). 

 Here, in a letter opinion to counsel and attendant order, 

the trial court noted its consideration of the statutory factors, 

and detailed those factual findings deemed pertinent to the 
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decision, all of which were well supported by the evidence. 

Although the court acknowledged that wife anticipated a move to 

California, her evidence included an "Income and Expense 

Statement" that reflected existing economic circumstances, and 

the record does not establish that the trial court improperly 

fashioned an award based upon "speculative" future expenses. See

Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 

(1977). Similarly, the record also does not indicate that the 

court required husband to pay wife's post-marital debt. Under 

such circumstances, we decline to disturb the award. 

Marital Debt 

 "[I]n reviewing an equitable distribution award, we rely 

heavily on the trial judge's discretion in weighing the 

particular circumstances of each case." Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. 

App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1988). Accordingly, we defer to 

the chancellor's resolution of the conflicting equities and will 

upset an award only if unsupported by the evidence or the result 

of an abuse of discretion or failure to follow statutory mandate. 

Banagan v. Banagan, 17 Va. App. 321, 326, 437 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 

(1993) (citations omitted). Like Code § 20-107.1, Code 

§ 20-107.3 requires the court to consider numerous factors in 

adjudicating the equities between the parties, but, likewise, 

"[t]he court need not quantify or elaborate exactly what weight 

was given to each of the factors," provided its findings are 

based upon credible evidence. Taylor v. Taylor, 5 Va. App. 436, 
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444, 364 S.E.2d 244, 249 (1988). Here, the court's findings and 

conclusions clearly reflect appropriate consideration of the 

requisite statutory factors and our review of the record 

discloses no abuse of discretion in the allocation of the marital 

debt in issue. See Code § 20-107.3(C),(E). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.