IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

GOLD MEDAL LLC d/b/a RUN GUM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

USA TRACK & FIELD and UNITED 

STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, 

Defendants. 

MCSHANE, Judge: 

Civ. No. 6:16-cv-00092-MC 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Gold Medal LLC, doing business as Run Gum ("Run Gum"), brings this 

antitrust action against Defendants USA Track & Field ("USA TF") and the United States 

Olympic Committee ("USOC"). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' policy forbidding athletes 

from competing at the 2016 Olympic Trials in apparel bearing individual sponsorship is an 

illegal restraint on trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Defendants move to 

dismiss Run Gum's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Defendants argue four distinct theories supporting dismissal: (1) that Run Gum failed to allege a 

plausible agreement in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act; (2) that Run Gum has not 

adequately pled a plausible relevant market; (3) that Run Gum's allegations do not support aper 

se violation of the antitrust laws; and (4) that the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act 

(the "ASA" or the "Act") provides Defendants with implied antitrust immunity. 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 1 of 18
Because congress charged Defendants with financing the United States' participation in 

the Olympics, in part by preserving the value of the Olympic brand, Run Gum's challenge fails 

under an implied grant of immunity. USA TF and USOC may exercise control over the apparel 

worn by competitors on the field of competition at the Olympic Trials, particularly as it relates to 

individual advertisements and sponsorships that would undercut USOC's fundraising mission. 

For this reason, USATF's motion, ECF No. 43, and USOC's motion, ECF No. 41, are 

GRANTED and Run Gum's complaint is DISMISSED. 

BACKGROUND 

Run Gum manufactures and sells chewing gum that contains caffeine, taurine, and b 

vitamins. Compl. if 15, ECF No. 1. Run Gum markets its product to athletes, particularly runners, 

as a performance-optimizing alternative to coffee and energy drinks. Comp. if 15. As part of its 

marketing scheme, Run Gum sponsors a team of professional runners who promote its product 

by wearing Run Gum branded apparel in competition. Compl. if 16. Run Gum seeks to have its 

sponsored athletes compete in branded apparel at the 2016 Olympic Trials, compl. if 16, which 

will be held July 1-10, 2016, in Eugene, Oregon, compl. if 8. 

USOC is a federally chartered corporation with exclusive jurisdiction over the United 

States' participation in the Olympic Games. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3). As part of that authority, 

USOC is charged with organizing, financing, and controlling the representation of the United 

States in the Olympics. 36 U.S.C. 220505(c)(3). USOC may delegate that authority to various 

national governing bodies (NGBs) such as USATF, the NGB for track and field. Id; compl. if 4. 

Through such a delegation, USA TF hosts and organizes the Olympic Trials every four years, an 

event which determines the membership of the U.S. Olympic Team. See compl. if 4. Although 

USATF hosts and organizes the Trials, USOC governs, supervises, and funds USATF, and also 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 2 of 18
approves USATF's procedures for selecting members of the United States Olympic Team 

("Olympic Team" or "Team USA"). Compl. ,-r,-r 4, 25. 

As required by the USOC, athletes are restricted in the kinds of advertising and logos 

they can display on their apparel while competing in the Olympic Trials. 1 Compl. ,-i 35. These 

restrictions are set out in a four-page document entitled "2016 Olympic Trials Uniform 

Advertising and Logo Regulations" ("the Regulations"), located on the USATF website. Compl. 

i133; see also compl., ECF No. 1-1. In these Regulations, USOC2 forbids athletes from wearing 

"any commercial identification or promotional material" while competing at the Trials, with two 

exceptions. Compl. i135. First, athletes may wear apparel that features the name or logo of the 

apparel's manufacturer, subject to specific size and quantity restrictions. Compl. ,-i,-r 10, 35. For 

example, an athlete wearing a competition top made by Nike may display Nike's name and logo 

on the front of the top. See compl. i-!i-110-11, 35. Second, athletes may wear uniforms bearing the 

name of a track club that is registered with USATF and approved by the USOC, again subject to 

size restrictions. Compl. ,-i 35; compl., ECF No. 1-1. Run Gum alleges that these exceptions 

demonstrate the existence of a horizontal and vertical agreement between USOC, USATF, and 

unnamed co-conspirators3 to restrain trade. Compl. ,-r,-r 26--27, 38. 

Athletes who violate the advertising and logo rules may be disqualified from the Olympic 

Trials. Compl. i135. The Regulations note that athlete uniforms will be inspected for compliance 

during packet pick up and also during the final clerking process before competition. Compl. i-!i-19, 

1 Although Defendants also restrict advertising and logos on track and field equipment-such as vaulting polesRun Gum only contests the advertising ban as applied to apparel. Accordingly, for simplicity, I will refer solely to 

apparel. 

2 The Regulations note that "[a]s a U.S. Olympic Committee event, the U.S. Olympic Team Trials ... are subject to 

[International Olympic Committee] and USOC advertising regulations for athletes' apparel and uniforms." Comp!., 

ECF No. 1-1. 3 While Run Gum does not specifically identify these unnamed co-conspirators, it includes apparel and equipment 

manufacturers who sponsor individual athletes as part of the conspiracy. Comp!. if 26. Historically, such 

manufacturers have included companies such as adidas, ASICS, Mizuno, Nike, Puma, and Reebok. Comp!. if 11. 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 3 of 18
38; compl., ECF No. 1-1. The Regulations direct any questions to a USATF email address and 

grant USATF the discretion to determine whether a manufacturer's logo dominates or unduly 

distracts from a piece of apparel. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. 

Run Gum alleges that USATF's and USOC's agreement to restrict individual 

sponsorships at the Olympic Trials is longstanding. Compl. iJ 39. For instance, in March 2012, 

the USOC's Director ofNGB Marketing Programs and Business Development asked USATF's 

interim CEO "to send an important reminder to athletes, agents, coaches and staff regarding 

apparel and equipment identification" during the 2012 Olympic Trials. Compl. iJ 39. Run Gum 

alleges that USATF-issued guidelines from the 2008, 2012, and 2016 Trials confirm the 

agreement to ban nearly all commercial advertising on competition apparel. Compl. iJ 38. 

Although USOC and USATF broadly restrict companies from advertising on athletes' 

apparel during the Trials, they provide alternative marketing forums for would-be advertisers. 

Compl. iJ 7. The products of "official sponsors," for example, are featured in conjunction with 

the competition in exchange for a fee. These sponsors are not limited to a particular kind of 

business or industry, but range from an automobile manufacturer to a credit card company to an 

online university, amongst others. Com pl. iJ 6. USA TF also offers "a wide range of sponsors for 

itself' at the Trials which, while distinct from individual athlete sponsorships, provide marketing 

opportunities to companies like Run Gum. Com pl. iJ 7. Additionally, USA TF independently 

hosts numerous other track and field competitions, such as the Indoor Championship Series and 

Outdoor Championship Series. Compl. iJ 44. At these events, which do not involve USOC or the 

accompanying "Olympic" designation, athletes may wear apparel bearing individual 

sponsorships. Compl. iii! 43-45. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 4 of 18
STANDARDS 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter that "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual 

allegations allow the court to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than "the 

mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 678. 

While considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material 

fact as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burgert v. 

Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir.2000). However, the court is 

"not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. Specifically under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, "claimants must plead not just 

ultimate facts (such as a conspiracy), but evidentiary facts"-bare allegations alone are 

insufficient to survive dismissal. Kendall v. Visa US.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 

2008). Although Rule 12(b)(6) generally does not permit the court to look beyond the pleadings, 

the court may consider material attached to the complaint when evaluating a motion to dismiss. 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Run Gum's Allegations under the Antitrust Laws 

A. Agreement in Restraint of Trade 

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[ e ]very contract, combination in the form of trust 

or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 

U.S.C. § 1. Mere independent action is insufficient to trigger a Section 1 violation; rather, a party 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 5 of 18
must plead that multiple entities had a "conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 

achieve an unlawful objective." Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 

(1984) (citations omitted). In the contract setting, this concerted action requirement is met when 

multiple entities are involved in either the establishment or enforcement of the contract's 

allegedly anticompetitive provisions. Toscano v. Prof'! Golfers Ass 'n, 258 F .3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

In Toscano, a golfer sued the Senior PGA Tour, as well as local sponsors who contracted 

with the PGA to organize individual golf tournaments. Id. at 980-81. As part of the contract, 

local sponsors agreed to adopt the PGA's rules, which laid out specific player eligibility 

requirements and forbid golfers from playing in conflicting tournaments without PGA preapproval. Id. at 981-82. However, the PGA Tour Commissioner retained the discretion to waive 

or enforce the conflicting tournaments rule. Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 

1111 (E.D. Cal. 1999), ajf'd sub nom. Toscano, 258 F.3d at 978. The golfer alleged that, by 

implementing these regulations across all Senior PGA events, the PGA and its local sponsors had 

restricted competition between professional golfers and golf tournaments. Toscano, 258 F.3d at 

983. The Ninth Circuit held there was no evidence that the local sponsors had agreed to restrain 

trade because they merely accepted the PGA's rules and played no role in creating or enforcing 

the regulations. Id. Because the various local sponsors "acted independently of the PGA Tour 

and of one another" when they entered into a tournament contract, and because the local 

sponsors themselves did not enforce the allegedly anticompetitive contract provisions, the Ninth 

Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. Id. at 984. 

Toscano raises two issues: first, whether USATF played a role in creating USOC's 

advertising rules; and second, whether USA TF will play a role in enforcing the Regulations. As 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 6 of 18
an initial matter, the complaint fails to plausibly allege USATF involvement in the establishment 

ofUSOC's apparel advertising policy. Like the local sponsors in Toscano, the agreement 

between USATF and USOC shows that USA TF merely accepted that the Trials would be 

operated under USOC rules. Two uncontested aspects of the complaint make it implausible that 

USATF conspired to craft the Regulations. First, the apparel policy's plain language states that 

the logo restrictions are solely a creature of the USOC. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ("As a U.S. 

Olympic Committee event, the U.S. Olympic Team Trials ... are subject to ... USOC 

advertising regulations for athletes' apparel and uniforms. As required by the USOC: ... 

uniforms ... of the competitors ... at the Trials may not bear any commercial identification or 

promotional material"). Second, at track and field events where USA TF retains full discretion 

over uniform advertising, USA TF declines to prohibit individual apparel sponsorships. Compl. 

ifil 43, 45. Together, these facts make it implausible that USATF has done anything more than 

passively accept the Regulations as a condition of organizing the Trials. Not only does the 

complaint deny any role for USA TF in establishing the Regulations, but it also demonstrates that 

the Regulations are inconsistent with USATF's past practice when operating independent of 

USOC. 

Nevertheless, under these allegations, I assume that USATF will enforce USOC's 

advertising rules. Unlike Toscano, where the local sponsors had no enforcement role, several of 

Run Gum's allegations suggest USATF will implement the logo restrictions. First, the 

Regulations state that athlete apparel "will be inspected during packet pick up at the Athlete 

Hospitality Lounge and during the final clerking process before competition to ensure 

compliance." Compl., ECF No. 1-1. The Regulations, which are posted on USATF's website, 

direct any questions to a USATF email address. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. USA TF is both the 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 7 of 18
organizer and host of the Trials, as well as the entity responsible for clarifying the advertising 

and logo rules. USATF also retains the discretion to determine whether a manufacturer's logo 

violates the Regulations. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. On these allegations, it is plausible that USATF 

will inspect athlete uniforms, flag apparel with improper logos, and disqualify violating athletes. 

Moreover, a 2012 letter from USOC to USATF confirms USATF's role in apparel advertising 

enforcement. In it, USOC "ask[ s ]" USA TF to remind athletes of both the apparel advertising 

rules in place at the 2012 Trials and the potential punishment that may result from a rules 

violation.4 Compl. if 39. Based on this past practice, it is plausible that USATF has played or will 

play a role in enforcing the Regulations at the Trials. Thus, I assume that Run Gum adequately 

alleges an agreement to restrain trade under Toscano's enforcement prong. 

B. Relevant Market 

"In order to state a valid claim under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must allege that the 

defendant has market power within a relevant market." Newcal Indus., Inc. Ikon Office Sol., 513 

F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). A properly defined relevant market 

"includes the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and crosselasticity of demand." Tanaka v. Univ. of So. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001). In other 

words, the relevant market must contain not only the product at issue, but also any economic 

substitutes for that product. Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1045. "Failure to identify a relevant market is a 

proper ground for dismissing a Sherman Act claim." Id. ("a complaint may be dismissed under 

Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint's 'relevant market' definition is facially unsustainable."); Right 

Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chi. Baseball Holdings, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 874, 886-87 (denying 

4 USATF contends that, like the Regulations themselves, the USATF's enforcement role was offered on a take-it-orleave-it basis. While this is a persuasive argument, it is perhaps more suitable at summary judgment than a motion to 

dismiss. 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 8 of 18
motion for preliminary injunction because the "proposed relevant market cannot stand because it 

is comprises [sic] a single brand product" oflive Cubs games.). 

Run Gum describes its claim as one challenging a conspiracy of USOC, USA TF, and 

unnamed co-conspirators "agreeing and conspiring to prevent certain businesses-while 

permitting others-from sponsoring individual athletes at the upcoming July 1-10, 2016 U.S. 

Olympic Track & Field Team Trials ... in exchange for sponsor identification on the athletes' 

competition apparel." Compl. iJ 1. In describing the relevant market, Run Gum alleges 

40. The challenged conduct affects the market for sponsorship of individual 

athletes at the upcoming 2016 Olympic Trails in exchange for the display of the 

sponsors' name and/or logo on the competition [apparel] of those athletes at the 

Olympic Trials (the individual-sponsorship market"). The individual-sponsorship 

market concerns the highest level of track & field competition in the United 

States, the apex of the sport in this country, which occurs only every four years. 

This market is distinct in that it offers a unique commercial opportunity for 

individual sponsors for which there is no reasonable substitute or alternative. 

41. The relevant geographic market consists of the entire United States and its 

territories. 

Compl. iii! 40-41. 

Defendants make strong arguments challenging the alleged relevant market. See USOC 

Mot. to Dismiss, 2 (The "impossibly narrow, single-event alleged 'relevant market' in the 

complaint-a particular type of advertising (a third-party logo on an athlete's attire) at one 

particular location (the field of competition) during one particular event (the 2016 Track & Field 

Olympic Trials}-is at odds both with common sense and with Run Gum's own descriptions of 

the other advertising opportunities that it enjoys."). Additionally, a recent opinion from the 

Northern District of California indicates Run Gum's alleged market is impermissibly narrow. 

Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 15-cv-00489-VC, 2016 WL 928728 (N. D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016). In Hicks, 

golf caddies brought antitrust claims against the PGA Tour, alleging the "bibs" worn by caddies 

violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The caddies alleged two relevant markets: the "live 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 9 of 18
action advertising market" and the "endorsement market". The court concluded other 

advertisements calculated to reach golf fans, such as magazine and television ads, or even 

advertisements on a wall or bridge at the golf course, were reasonably interchangeable with the 

alleged relevant markets. The alleged markets were "artificial, contorted to meet [plaintiffs'] 

litigation needs." Id at *7. 

Run Gum's alleged market too appears unnatural. Run Gum seems to have started out 

with what it wanted to accomplish-the ability to advertise on individual athlete apparel during 

in-play competition at the Trials-and drawn up a relevant market to accomplish those ends. Of 

course Run Gum has the ability to purchase myriad media advertisements involving sponsorship 

of individual athletes during the Trials. Many other advertisements, such as chryon graphics over 

an on-screen event timer, provide Run Gum with in-play competition eyeballs. Moving outside 

of the Trials themselves, Run Gum ignores other potential substitute markets such as individual 

athlete sponsorships during other "hallowed" running competitions, such as the Boston 

marathon. And, even as acknowledged in the complaint, individual athletes are generally free to 

advertise as they see fit during countless other USATF competitions. While I recognize the 

rather unique value of individual athlete sponsorships during any event associated with the 

"Olympics," it is precisely due to that linkage with the "Olympics" that advertisements during 

the Trials are so valuable. While that may cut in Run Gum's favor as to the alleged relevant 

market, it certainly cuts the other way, as explained below, in the implied immunity analysis. 

C. Per Se Violation 

Run Gum further alleges that USA TF and USOC, together with unnamed coconspirators, have engaged in a horizontal conspiracy which is a per se violation of the antitrust 

laws. Although the vast majority of antitrust claims are reviewed under a rule of reason analysis, 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 10 of 18
restraints that have immediately obvious anticompetitive effects may be deemed inherently 

illegal. Leegin. Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 557 U.S. 877, 886 (2007); Texaco 

Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006). In particular, these per se prohibitions are only appropriate 

where the restraint has "manifestly anticompetitive" implications and lacks "any redeeming 

value." Leegin, 557 U.S. at 886 (quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has 

identified a highly limited number of trade restraints as per se antitrust violations, id. at 886, 

such as horizontal agreements among competitors to either fix pricing, see Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5, 

or divide markets, see Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990). 

Without deciding whether Run Gum's allegations are sufficient to establish aper se 

violation, I note that Run Gum's relevant pleading appears to lack the requisite evidentiary facts 

to survive Rule 12(b )( 6). See Kendall, 518 F .3d at 104 7. Run Gum's per se allegations are as 

follows: 

26. Various other persons, firms, corporations, and entities (including, but not 

limited to, apparel and equipment manufacturers who are sponsoring individual 

athletes at the upcoming Olympic Trials) have actively participated as unnamed 

co-conspirators with the defendants in the violations and conspiracy alleged in 

this complaint-and continue to do so. In engaging in the offenses charged and 

violations alleged in this complaint, these co-coconspirators have performed overt 

acts and made statements in furtherance of the antitrust violations alleged here. 

27. At all relevant times, the defendants and each co-conspirator ratified and/or 

authorized the wrongful acts of the defendants and each of the other coconspirators. The defendants and their co-conspirators, including each 

individually, are participants as aiders and abettors in the improper acts and 

transactions that are the subject of this action. 

38. This anticompetitive agreement has horizontal and vertical aspects. Insofar as 

it is an agreement between and among USOC, USA TF, apparel manufacturers, 

and equipment manufacturers, it is a vertical restraint. Insofar as it is an 

agreement between and among apparel manufacturers and equipment 

manufacturers, it is also a horizontal restraint. 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 11 of 18
Compl., iii! 26-27, 38. 

While the complaint contains plenty of boilerplate antitrust language, it lacks any specific 

factual allegations as to any potential horizontal co-conspirator. Run Gum does not allege any 

facts to support its theory that unnamed apparel and equipment manufacturers conspired with 

each other or with the USOC and USATF to restrain trade. Although Run Gum volleys these 

assertions at the unnamed apparel manufacturers and labels them co-conspirators, its boilerplate 

accusations fail to implicate the nameless manufacturers in any wrongdoing. Run Gum's 

conclusory statements do not meet the high threshold of a per se violation. Under today's 

heightened pleading standards, Run Gum's bare allegations come up short. See Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 558-60; see also Kendall, 518 F.3d at 1047 (remarking that a "bare allegation of a 

conspiracy is almost impossible to defend against, particularly where the defendants are large 

institutions with hundreds of employees entering into contract and agreements daily"). 

II. Implied Immunity under the ASA 

The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (later amended as the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act) 

grants the USOC the "exclusive jurisdiction ... over ... all matters pertaining to United States 

participation in the Olympic Games ... including representation of the United States in the 

Games." 36 U.S.C. § 220503(3) (2012). At its core, Congress passed the ASA in order to secure 

financing for the U.S. Olympic Team, particularly through the fundraising capabilities of a new 

organization established by the Act: the USOC. Eleven Line v. North Texas State Soccer Ass 'n, 

213 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2000); US. Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., S.A., 737 F.2d 263, 

263 (2d Cir. 1984). As the only nation that does not provide its Olympic team with federal 

funding or subsidies, the United States instead relies on the USOC to raise the financial resources 

necessary to organize Team USA and to compete in the Olympic Games. Id For this reason, the 

12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 12 of 18
ASA also authorizes the USOC to "organize, finance, and control the representation of the 

United States in the competitions and events of the Olympic Games."§ 220505(c)(3). 

Concomitant with the USOC's mission, which it historically achieves in large part by soliciting 

corporate sponsorships, Intelicense, 737 F.3d at 266 n. 3, the Act grants the USOC "unfettered 

control over the commercial use of Olympic-related designations," such as the Olympic rings. Id. 

at 266. By investing the USOC with this exclusive authority over the Olympic brand, Congress 

intended to enable the USOC to raise money with which to finance the U.S. Olympic Team. San 

Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. US. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 538-39 (1987). 

Underneath the USOC, the ASA recognizes national governing bodies, such as USATF, 

for each Olympic sport. See 36 U.S.C. § 220521. These NGBs are fundamental to coordinating 

amateur athletics in the United States; they exercise "monolithic control" over particular sports 

by, for example, establishing governance structures, setting national goals, and recommending 

the membership of Team USA. Eleven Line, 213 F.3d at 203; Rehagen v. Amateur Basketball 

Ass'n of US., 884 F.2d 524, 529 (10th Cir. 1989); see also 36 U.S.C. §§ 220522-220524. Out of 

these sweeping grants of authority, courts have conferred the USOC and its partner NGBs with 

limited implied immunity from antitrust liability on issues stretching from the scheduling of 

individual competitions to athlete eligibility. See, e.g. JES Properties, Inc. v. USA Equestrian, 

Inc., 458 F.3d 1224, 1232 (I Ith Cir. 2006) (United States Equestrian Foundation immune from 

antitrust liability where it set up scheduling rules to minimize competition conflicts); Rehagen v. 

Amateur Basketball Ass 'n of US., 884 F.2d 524, 529 (10th Cir. 1989) (antitrust exemption 

inferred from ASA where basketball NGB established player eligibility rules). 

As a matter of statutory construction, implied exemptions from the antitrust laws are 

disfavored. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (courts may not grant 

13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 13 of 18
implied immunity unless an exemption is "necessary to make [a statutory scheme] work, and 

even then only to the minimum extent necessary"). Congressional intent is the bellwether of 

implied immunity-such an exemption is only permissible when "necessary to implement the 

clear intent of Congress." Rehagen, 884 F.2d at 529. Consequently, this court's inquiry hinges on 

whether "the application of the antitrust laws to the facts of this case would 'unduly interfere' 

with the 'operation' of the ASA." JES Properties, 458 F.3d at 1231 (quoting Gordon v. New 

York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 686 (1975)). Rather than narrowly focus on the merits of a 

particular regulation, courts instead have granted implied immunity where a broader category of 

rules are necessary to carry out the mission of an NGB. See id. at 1232 (citing Rehagen, 884 F.2d 

at 524-30). 

In JES Properties, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit held that the NGB for equestrian 

competitions (United States Equestrian Foundation or "USEF") was entitled to antitrust 

immunity under the ASA. Id. at 1228. There, horse promoters brought antitrust claims against 

USEF, arguing that mileage restrictions on non-NGB affiliated horse shows unreasonably 

restrained trade. Id. at 1226-27. USEF promulgated rules restricting non-affiliated horse 

competitions from operating on the same day as USEF events within certain distances. Id. 

Plaintiffs challenged the mileage restrictions, arguing that the rules gave USEF and its affiliated 

shows a monopoly over specific horse competitions and prevented competitors from entering the 

market. Id. at 1227-28. Plaintiffs also contended that, because the mileage rule was not essential 

to any core USEF function, the NGB was not entitled to implied immunity under the ASA. Id. 

Relying on the text and purpose of the Act, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and extended 

implied immunity to USEF. The ASA directs NGBs to "minimize, through coordination with 

other amateur sports organizations, conflicts in the scheduling of all practices and competitions 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 14 of 18
.... " 36 U.S.C. § 220524(2). Noting that the ASA allows an NGB to exert "monolithic control," 

the court held that USEF was immune because the mileage rule minimized scheduling conflicts 

and thus implemented the clear intent of Congress; any potential antitrust liability for 

promulgating the mileage rule would have been "plainly repugnant to the ASA." JES Properties, 

458 F.3d at 1231-32. Even though a less restrictive mileage rule may have been able to reduce 

scheduling conflicts, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the broader purpose of the ASA and found 

that the specific regulations fell within USEF's authority. Id. at 1232. 

Similarly, in Behagen, the 10th Circuit considered whether amateur eligibility rules 

promulgated by the Amateur Basketball Association of the United States (ABA) violated the 

Sherman Act. 884 F.2d at 525. In that case, the ABA-the NGB for basketball-determined that 

its eligibility regulations precluded the plaintiff from competing in amateur events because he 

had previously played professional basketball several times. Id. at 525-26. Although the plaintiff 

contended that these eligibility requirements violated the antitrust laws, the ASA granted NGBs 

the authority to establish amateur eligibility regulations. Id. at 528. As a result, drawing on the 

ABA's "monolithic control" over basketball, the 10th Circuit found that the eligibility rules 

"were clearly within the scope of activity directed by Congress, and were necessary to 

implement Congress's intent." Id. at 527- 28. For this reason, the court held that the 

promulgation of player eligibility rules by an NGB were exempt from federal antitrust laws. Id. 

at 527. 

Here, the text and purpose of the ASA likewise confirm that, when the USATF and 

USOC promulgate logo regulations which restrict commercial advertising on athlete apparel, 

they are entitled to antitrust immunity. First, the ASA allows the USOC, through its partner 

NGBs, to "organize, finance, and control" the representation of the United States in the Olympic 

15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 15 of 18
Games. 36 U.S.C. § 220505. Second, the Act further grants the USOC exclusive rights to not 

only the Olympic rings, but to the very word "Olympic."§ 220506. Read together with 

Congress's clear intent in passing the ASA-to financially support Team USA through USOC 

fundraising, see San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 538-39; Jntelicense, 737 F.2d at 264----these 

provisions enable the USOC and USATF to issue regulations that restrict apparel advertising in 

order to protect the value of the Olympic brand. 

The logo restrictions in this case directly implicate USOC's ability to generate revenue 

for the United States Olympic Team; allowing any company to advertise on competitor apparel 

would unduly interfere with USOC's fundraising mission. First, the Regulations prevent a 

dilution of the Olympic brand. The Regulations permit the USOC and USATF to play a 

gatekeeping function which preserves the exclusivity-and thus value-of the Olympic symbols 

and name. By strictly limiting the advertisements that can appear on the field of competition 

itself, the Defendants can control the use of the Olympic brand and preserve the integrity of their 

primary fundraising mechanism. Second, the Regulations bolster the value of USOC's and 

USATF's corporate sponsorships. If, instead of purchasing an official sponsorship through 

USATF, would-be advertisers could instead place their logos directly on high-profile athletes, 

the value of these corporate sponsorships would necessarily decrease. Accordingly, the 

Regulations are necessary to implement the clear intent of Congress and to make the ASA's 

statutory scheme work. Without them, USOC's revenue-generating capabilities would be 

compromised in a way that is plainly repugnant to the text and purpose of the Act. 

Run Gum contends that its proposed advertising is not an attack on the Olympic brand 

and would not undermine USOC's fundraising abilities, particularly in light of the 

manufacturers' and running club exceptions embedded within the Regulations. Pl.'s Resp. Br., 

16 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 16 of 18
ECF. No. 45, at 9. I disagree. First, Run Gum clearly seeks to capitalize on the unique nature of 

the Olympic brand generally, and the Olympic Trials in particular, in order to promote its 

product. See compl. iii! 4-5 (describing the Trials as a "singular" and "infrequent[t]" event that 

serves as the "zenith of track [and] field"); compl. if 40 (noting the "unique commercial 

opportunity" that the Trials present, which has "no reasonable substitute or alternative" for 

advertising purposes"); compl. if 45 (depicting the Olympic Trials as offering "unique marketing 

possibilities and aura" due to its "hallowed opportunity to witness ... who will go on to the 

Olympic Games"). To the extent that Run Gum attempts to associate with the Trials' public 

profile and alleged sanctity, it treads on ground that Congress reserved for USOC and USATF. 

Second, the relief that Run Gum seeks-an injunction preventing Defendants from enforcing the 

Regulations at the 2016 Olympic Trials-would open the floodgates to a myriad of potential 

apparel advertisements, not just Run Gum's.5 Third, although Run Gum's frustration with the 

manufacturer and club exceptions may be well-taken, my review of the Regulations focuses on 

the USOC's broad authority to restrict advertising, not the specific merits of particular rules. See 

JES Properties, 458 F.2d at 1232 (citing Rehagen, 884 F.2d at 524--30). 

Finally, Run Gum characterizes any extension of implied immunity to the facts of this 

case as "breathtaking" and allowing the USOC to "fix prices with abandon." Pl.'s Resp. Br., ECF 

No. 45, at 10. Here, however, we are not dealing with "limitless antitrust immunity." Instead, the 

question is whether the USOC's decision to limit competition apparel-based advertising to 

equipment and apparel manufacturers goes too far. It does not. The Regulations center on the 

5 In its prayer for relief, Run Gum only seeks to enjoin USA TF and USOC from enforcing the Regulations against 

Run Gum. Although overly broad injunctions are an abuse of discretion, injunctive relief"must be tailored to 

remedy the specific harm alleged." Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941F.2d970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, Run Gum's alleged harm-an illegal restraint of trade-affects not just Run Gum, but any would-be apparel 

advertiser. Due to the wide-ranging nature of the alleged harm, I have serious doubts that an injunction limited to 

potential Run Gum advertisements would be appropriately tailored. 

17 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 17 of 18
USOC' s and USATF' s ability to control what athletes wear on the field of competition at the 

Olympic Trials. Given the exclusive and unfettered power that Congress delegated to Defendants 

in the ASA, I find that the Regulations are a proper exercise of their statutory authority. Despite 

Run Gum's contentions to the contrary, immunizing the Regulations from antitrust liability does 

not unmoor the USOC from all responsibility under the Sherman Act. Rather, it allows USOC 

and USATF to preclude athletes from becoming human billboards at the Trials-a ban which is 

necessary to finance Team USA. Accordingly, I conclude that USATF and USOC are not subject 

to antitrust liability for the apparel advertising restrictions at issue in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

Under the Amateur Sports Act, USOC and USATF are impliedly immune from Run 

Gum's challenge to their regulations. USATF's motion, ECF No. 43, and USOC's motion, ECF 

No. 41, are GRANTED and Run Gum's complaint is DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this _I_/_ day of May 2016. 

18 - OPINION AND ORDER 

t~ l'L--

Michael J. Mc Shane 

United States District Judge 

Case 6:16-cv-00092-MC Document 52 Filed 05/11/16 Page 18 of 18