J-A06025-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CURTIS MAURICE HARPER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 410 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0000988-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: May 10, 2024

Curtis Maurice Harper appeals from the order entered in the Cambria 

County Court of Common Pleas on March 13, 2023, denying his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. For the reasons discussed below, we find the PCRA court properly 

denied Harper relief and affirm.

On April 18, 2016, Harper was charged by criminal information with over 

fifty offenses related to drug trafficking. The charges stemmed from a 

statewide grand jury investigation. 

On June 27, 2017, Harper entered a negotiated guilty plea to all charges. 

On July 31, 2017, the trial court sentenced Harper in accordance with the plea 

agreement to twenty-two to forty-four years’ incarceration. Harper did not file 

any post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. 
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On January 19, 2018, Harper filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Counsel 

was appointed and subsequently filed two amended PCRA petitions. The PCRA 

court held seven evidentiary hearings between July 2021 and September 

2022. At the direction of the PCRA court, both parties submitted legal briefs 

for the court’s consideration. 

Before the court could rule on the petition, it learned that Harper’s PCRA 

counsel had passed away in January 2023. New counsel was appointed to 

represent Harper and a status conference was held in March 2023. The PCRA 

court subsequently issued an opinion and order denying Harper’s PCRA 

petition. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Harper argues the PCRA court erred in ruling that plea 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue pretrial motions filed on 

Harper’s behalf. Harper claims that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently 

entered as a result of ineffectiveness of counsel. 

Our review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is limited to examining 

whether the PCRA court’s determinations are supported by the record and the 

court’s decision is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Shaw, 217 

A.3d 265, 269 (Pa. Super. 2019). Although we give great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless 

they have no support in the record, we apply a de novo standard of review to 

the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. See Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 

A.3d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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“A plea of guilty effectively waives all nonjurisdictional defects and 

defenses.” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 561 A.2d 1240, 1242 (Pa. Super. 

1989) (citation omitted). Here, Harper failed to raise a challenge to his guilty 

plea at any time before the trial court. Harper did not move to withdraw his 

plea either. He also failed to pursue a direct appeal. Therefore, any challenge 

to his guilty plea is undoubtedly waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).

Seemingly recognizing this, Harper phrases his current challenge as a 

claim counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty instead of 

pursuing pretrial motions. 

“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea 

process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 

369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). However, “[a]llegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a 

basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 

141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Also, “[w]here the defendant enters 

his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends upon 

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

We presume counsel is effective, and an appellant bears the burden to 

prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 
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2012). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both 

the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 

330-32 (Pa. 1999). An appellant must demonstrate: (1) his underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel 

did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and 

(3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Commonwealth 

v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-63 (Pa. 2015). A failure to satisfy any prong 

of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. See id. at 

1163. Where, as here, the appellant entered a plea of guilty, in order to satisfy 

the prejudice requirement, he must show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial.” Rathfon, 899 A.2d at 370 (citation 

omitted). 

Extensive PCRA evidentiary hearings were held on Harper’s claims in the 

instant PCRA petition. In its opinion, the PCRA court summarized its findings 

of fact from the seven PCRA evidentiary hearings as follows: 

1. On June 27, 2017, [Harper], being represented by counsel, 

negotiated and accepted a plea agreement in which [Harper] pled 

guilty to all 58 counts included in the Information; Commonwealth 

also agreed to nolle prosequi charges stemming from three other 

dockets. 

2. [Harper] completed both a written and oral colloquy in 

connection with the guilty plea. 
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3. [Harper] was sentenced on July 31, 2017, with Attorney Lovette 

present as counsel. The sentence was the same as the sentence 

anticipated in the plea agreement (22 – 44 years[’] incarceration). 

4. [Harper] did not file a direct appeal. 

5. [Harper]’s instant allegations of ineffective assistance of 

counsel pertain only to Attorney Kevin Sanders and Attorney John 

Lovette [Attorneys Sanders and Lovette collectively, “Counsel”]. 

Counsel represented [Harper] at the time he entered his guilty 

plea. Attorney Patricia Moore had previously represented 

[Harper].

6. During her representation, Attorney Moore filed an omnibus 

pre-trial motion; Counsel subsequently filed a second omnibus 

pre-trial motion. 

7. The second omnibus pre-trial motion was scheduled for 

argument for June 27, 2017. 

8. Commonwealth had offered [Harper] a plea bargain; 

Commonwealth indicated June 27, 2017, would be the last day 

the offer would be available. 

9. Operating pursuant to [Harper]’s direction, Attorney Sanders 

spent the majority of the courthouse’s ordinary business hours on 

June 27, 2017, negotiating the plea agreement on [Harper]’s 

behalf and discussing the plea agreement (and [Harper]’s case) 

with [Harper]. 

10. Among the chief considerations [Harper] contemplated in 

electing to enter a guilty plea was the opportunity to eventually 

be released from prison and the substantial number of charges he 

was facing. In other words, [Harper] wanted to avoid the 

possibility of a de facto life sentence. 

11. In the event a plea agreement was not reached, Attorney 

Sanders was willing, able, and prepared to litigate the second 

omnibus pretrial motion. 

12. At all relevant times, [Harper] understood the nature, status, 

and happenings of his case, including but not limited to the 

matters contained within the second omnibus pretrial motion. 
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13. The second omnibus pretrial motion was not litigated solely 

because [Harper] pled guilty. 

14. All of the information that [Harper] alleges (in the Second 

Amended Petition) he needed to possess to enter a voluntary and 

knowing plea relate to matters that would have been litigated in 

the second omnibus pretrial motion but for [Harper]’s decision to 

plead guilty. 

15. [Harper] never requested for Counsel to withdraw his guilty 

plea during their representation. 

16. Before the [c]ourt, [Harper] did not request to withdraw his 

guilty plea at sentencing nor beforehand. 

17. [Harper] has not alleged (in the Second Amended Petition) 

any defect of any kind or ineffectiveness of counsel relative to the 

written and oral plea colloquies. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/2023, at 2-3 (footnote omitted). After careful 

review of the record, we find the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported 

by the record. As such, we will not disturb them. See Benner, 147 A.3d at 

919. 

Based on the above findings, the PCRA court concluded that the only 

reason the Second Omnibus Pretrial Motion was not litigated was because 

Harper agreed to enter a guilty plea. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/2023, at 

5. Harper therefore waived the opportunity to litigate the motion by pleading 

guilty. See id. 

Harper completed a written and oral plea colloquy. We agree with the 

PCRA court that Harper has not alleged any defect or ineffectiveness with the 

colloquies themselves. See id. 
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This Court has held where the record clearly shows the court conducted 

a thorough plea colloquy and the defendant understood his rights and the 

nature of the charges against him, the plea is voluntary. See Commonwealth 

v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001). In examining whether 

the defendant understood the nature and consequences of his plea, we look 

to the totality of the circumstances. See id.

On June 27, 2017, at around 10:00 a.m., Harper appeared before the 

trial court for a scheduled hearing on pre-trial motions. At the start of the 

hearing, the Commonwealth put forth a plea offer on the record. See N.T., 

Plea Hearing, 6/27/17, at 2. The Commonwealth clarified that it was the last 

day for Harper to accept the plea offer. See id. Harper requested more time 

to speak with his counsel. See id. at 4-5. Harper spoke to Attorney Sanders

for most of the day. See id. at 6. 

At about 3:35 p.m., the trial court reconvened the proceedings and 

Harper indicated that he had an opportunity to speak with his counsel and that 

it was his wish to enter a guilty plea. See id. Prior to reconvening the 

proceedings, Harper had completed and signed a written guilty plea colloquy. 

Harper acknowledged that he assisted Attorney Sanders in filling out the 

colloquy, and that he signed the colloquy. See id. at 9. Relevantly, in the 

written colloquy, Harper affirmed that by pleading guilty he was giving up the 

right to pre-trial motions, including motions for suppression. See Written 

Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/27/17, at 5. 
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During the oral guilty plea colloquy, Harper affirmed he was not under 

the influence of any drugs or alcohol. See N.T., Plea Hearing, 6/27/17, at 8. 

Harper acknowledged his understanding of the written plea colloquy, that he 

had reviewed the whole document with counsel, and that he did not have any 

questions about the form. See id. at 9. The court thoroughly set forth the 

elements of the offenses Harper was pleading to and the maximum sentence 

he could receive for each charge. See id. at 10-17. Harper acknowledged that 

he understood everything that was explained by the court and still wished to 

plead guilty. See id. at 17. The Commonwealth then set forth the factual basis 

for the plea on the record. See id. at 17-20. Harper affirmed those facts to 

be true. See id. at 20. 

Harper affirmed that no one had forced or threatened him into pleading 

guilty, and that no promises had been made to him other than the proposed 

agreement with the Commonwealth. See id. at 22. Finally, Harper 

acknowledged he was satisfied with his counsels’ representation. See id. In 

accepting the plea, the court concluded the plea was knowingly and voluntarily 

entered. See id. at 23. 

The statements made during a plea colloquy bind a criminal defendant. 

See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

As a result, a defendant cannot assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that 

contradict statements made at that time. See Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 

A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999). Further, “[t]he law does not require that 
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appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: 

All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently made.” Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 

1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Harper has not shown that his decision to enter his plea was 

involuntary. 

Harper did not challenge his guilty plea at either the guilty plea hearing 

or two months later at sentencing. Further, Harper did not file a motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea at any point or a direct appeal challenging his guilty 

plea. While he briefly states he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea 

in the summary of the argument and conclusion sections of his brief, see 

Appellant’s Brief, at 10, 16, this simply is not enough to preserve the issue. 

Finally, at no point, including during the instant PCRA proceedings, has Harper 

claimed he was actually innocent of the charges or, but for Counsels’

inadequate representation, he would have elected to proceed to trial. Rather, 

he argues that had he had more information related to the omnibus pre-trial 

motions, he would have chosen to litigate the motions rather than plead guilty. 

At the first hearing, Attorney Lovette testified that he did not recall 

Harper wanting to withdraw his plea between the plea hearing and sentencing. 

See N.T., PCRA Hearing, 7/8/21, at 21. Attorney Lovette stated it was his 

practice to file a motion to withdraw a plea if a client asked him to do so. See 

id. Accordingly, if Harper had asked him to file a motion to withdraw the plea, 
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he would have. See id. Attorney Lovette further testified that Harper did not 

say anything about wanting to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing. 

See id. at 50. 

Attorney Lovette testified that all pretrial motions that were filed on 

Harper’s behalf were set to be litigated at the omnibus motion hearing which 

was scheduled for June 27, 2017. See id. at 23. Attorney Lovette stated the 

hearing was not held because Harper accepted a plea offer. See id. Attorney 

Lovette testified that Counsel was prepared to litigate the pretrial motions at 

the motions hearing scheduled for June 27, 2017, if Harper had decided not 

to enter his guilty plea. See id. at 38-48. 

Attorney Sanders testified at the evidentiary hearings held on August 

24, 2021 and November 9, 2021. Attorney Sanders testified that Counsel had 

discussed possible defenses with Harper “at length.” See N.T., PCRA Hearing, 

11/9/21, at 14. Attorney Sanders clarified that defenses were not discussed 

at length specifically on the day of the plea however, because a majority of 

the day was spent going back and forth discussing the offer and trying to 

negotiate a plea that was acceptable to Harper. See id. at 14-15. While parts 

of the conversation that day dealt with defenses, a majority of the 

conversation pertained to negotiations, by Harper’s own choosing. See id. at 

16-17. 

After speaking with Harper for multiple hours prior to the plea, Attorney 

Sanders believed Harper was able to make a knowing, voluntary, and 
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intelligent choice to enter a plea. See id. at 56. Attorney Sanders affirmed 

that Harper did not have any difficulty understanding anything when they 

completed the written colloquy form together, and that if Harper did not 

understand something, Attorney Sanders would have informed the court. See 

id. at 56-57. Attorney Sanders stated that “[t]here was never an indication 

any time between the plea and whenever the sentencing occurred that 

[Harper] wanted to withdraw that plea or that he did not understand the plea 

bargain itself and voluntarily, knowingly pled it.” Id. at 57-58. Attorney 

Sanders affirmed the same was true for after sentencing. See id. at 58. 

Attorney Sanders was adamant that Harper understood the status of the 

case, in that if Harper did not accept a plea that day, counsel would be 

litigating the pretrial motions that same day. See id. at 59. Attorney Sanders 

was confident that Harper understood that there was a possibility that he could 

prevail on one or more of the omnibus pretrial motions if he chose to pursue 

them. See id. It was a fair back and forth between Harper and Attorney 

Sanders during the numerous hours they spent discussing the plea. See id. 

Attorney Sanders clarified that Harper did not have any questions about the 

provision in the written plea colloquy providing that he understood he was 

giving up his ability to file pretrial motions. See id. at 62. Finally, Attorney 

Sanders affirmed that to the best of his ability he tried to inform Harper of the 

evidence against him, possible defenses, what status the case was at, up to 

and including what counsel knew on June 27, 2017. See id. at 75. 
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Harper testified on his own behalf at the next two evidentiary hearings, 

held on November 23, 2021 and January 4, 2022. Harper admitted that prior 

to sentencing, Attorney Lovette notified Harper that if there was anything he 

wanted to change, that at that time Harper had the opportunity to withdraw 

his plea. See N.T., PCRA Hearing, 11/23/21, at 35. Harper stated he believed 

doing that “would have been ridiculous” and “wouldn’t have went nowhere.” 

Id. Harper stated that Attorney Lovette asked “me was this – is this what I 

wanted them to do” and he responded “yeah.” Id. at 36-37. 

Harper testified that prior to his plea, Attorney Sanders discussed the 

motion to suppress with him. See id. at 37-38. Harper stated that Attorney 

Sanders told him he didn’t believe the motion would be successful, and Harper 

believed him. See id. at 38. 

On cross-examination, Harper affirmed that he spoke with Attorney 

Sanders for approximately five hours before entering his guilty plea. See id. 

at 52. Harper agreed that he had plenty of time during those five hours to ask 

Attorney Sanders any questions he had about the case. See id. at 52-53. 

While Harper had claimed Attorney Sanders never gave any reason or 

explanation as to why he thought the suppression motion would not be 

successful, Harper affirmed that he never asked for an explanation during the 

five hours that they talked about the plea offer. See id. at 56. 

The PCRA court specifically credited the testimony of Attorneys Lovette 

and Sanders. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/13/23, at 5. Along with the court’s 
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factual determinations, these credibility determinations are binding on us. See 

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super.

2015). 

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Harper is entitled to 

no relief. The record supports the PCRA court's determination. Moreover, 

having conducted an independent review of the record in light of the PCRA 

petition, we agree that the PCRA petition is meritless. 

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

dismissal of Harper’s PCRA petition. 

 Order affirmed.

DATE: 05/10/2024