Page 1 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

Robert B. Miller, OSB No. 960068

bobmiller@kilmerlaw.com

Candice R. Broock, OSB No. 025200

cbroock@kilmerlaw.com

KILMER, VOORHEES & LAURICK, P.C.

732 N.W. 19th Avenue

Portland, Oregon 97209-1302

Telephone: (503) 224-0055

Fax: (503) 222-5290

Attorneys for Defendants

Daimler North American Corporation,

Daimler Trucks North America LLC, Gable Hofman and Karla Steffenson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

RONALD MALCOMSON, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN 

CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; 

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA 

LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; 

CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC., 

a Texas corporation; GABLE HOFMAN, 

an individual; KARLA STEFFENSON, an individual; and JOHN DOES (#1-10), 

individuals,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-02407-SB

DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH 

AMERICAN CORPORATION, DAIMLER 

TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, 

GABLE HOFMAN AND KARLA 

STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS 

AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Oral Argument Requested

LR 7-1(a) CERTIFICATION

Counsel for Defendants Daimler North American Corporation ("Daimler Corp."), 

Daimler Trucks North America LLC ("Daimler Trucks"), Gable Hofman ("Hofman") and Karla 

Steffenson ("Steffenson") (collectively the "Daimler Defendants") certifies that he conferred 

with counsel for Plaintiff regarding the substance of these Motions, but the parties could not 

reach an agreement. 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 1 of 10
Page 2 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

SUMMARY OF MOTIONS

Motion 1: The Daimler Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s statutory claims pursuant 

to ORS Chapter 659A (Counts 1, 2 and 4) with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff cannot allege the 

Daimler Defendants were his employer.

Motion 2: The Daimler Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim

(Count 3) with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the statute provides Plaintiff with an adequate remedy at law, 

which precludes his common law wrongful discharge claim. 

Motion 3: The Daimler Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional interference

claims (Count 5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the Daimler Defendants 

interfered with Plaintiff’s relationship through improper means or for improper motive.

Motion 4: If the Court (1) finds Plaintiff can maintain claims against the Daimler 

Defendants as Plaintiff’s employer and (2) fails to dismiss Plaintiff's intentional interference 

claim pursuant to Motion 3, the Daimler Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional 

interference claims (Count 5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the Daimler 

Defendants were third parties who interfered with Plaintiff’s economic relationship.

In support of this Motion, the Daimler Defendants rely upon the First Amended 

Complaint ("Complaint") and the supporting memorandum of law filed concurrently herewith. 

SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges that he was hired by Defendant Concentra to provide health care services 

to employees of Daimler Corp. and Daimler Trucks (collectively "Daimler") under a contract for 

medical care between Daimler and Concentra. Complaint, ¶¶ 9-10. Plaintiff does not allege he 

was an employee of Daimler. Plaintiff alleges “Daimler’s workers’ medical treatment and 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 2 of 10
Page 3 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

referrals were being interfered with by agents of Daimler, namely Ms. Steffenson, in violation of 

HIPAA and safety regulations and in a discriminatory nature....” Complaint, ¶¶ 12-14. Plaintiff 

alleges he reported such issues to Daimler and Concentra, but received no “meaningful 

response.” Plaintiff alleges he made a report to the Daimler ethics hotline and the Federal Office 

of Civil Rights Department of Health regarding these same issues. Complaint, ¶¶ 15-17. 

Plaintiff alleges “[a]s expressly commanded by Daimler Trucks, Steffenson, Hofman and/or John 

Doe, Concentra terminated Plaintiff on or about November 21, 2014.” Complaint, ¶ 16. 

In addition to claims for common law wrongful termination (Third Claim) and intentional 

interference (Fifth Claim), Plaintiff brought three claims against the Daimler Defendants1 under 

the following statutes:

• ORS 659.199 (First Claim): “It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 

discharge, demote, suspend or in any manner discriminate or retaliate against an 

employee with regard to promotion, compensation or other terms, conditions or 

privileges of employment for the reason that the employee has in good faith reported 

information that the employee believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, 

rule or regulation.” 

• ORS 659A.030(1)(f) (Second Claim): It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or any 

person to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any other person because 

that other person has opposed any unlawful practice, or because that other person has 

filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter or has 

attempted to do so.”

• ORS 659A.030(1)(g) (Fourth Claim): It is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or any 

person, whether an employer or an employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the 

doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.”

 1 It is unclear from Plaintiff’s Complaint against whom Plaintiff is making his various claims. 

For the purpose of these Motions, the Daimler Defendants will assume that Plaintiff intended for 

Daimler Corp., Daimler Trucks, Hofman and Steffenson to be included in all claims. 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 3 of 10
Page 4 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations of material fact as true, and must construe those 

allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington,

51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the court need not accept any legal conclusions set 

forth in a plaintiff's pleading. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege sufficient 

facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court must determine whether the plaintiff has made 

factual allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where there is no 

cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when there is an absence of sufficient factual 

allegations to support a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless 

Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). 

ARGUMENTS

Motion 1: Plaintiff’s statutory claims pursuant to ORS Chapter 659A against the Daimler 

Defendants should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted because Plaintiff cannot allege the Daimler Defendants were his employer.

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to ORS Chapter 659A require a claim against Plaintiff’s 

employer or his employer’s employee. Plaintiff cannot allege that any of the Daimler 

Defendants is his employer or an employee of his employer and, therefore, his statutory claims 

brought pursuant to ORS Chapter 659A should be dismissed with prejudice. In order to make a 

claim under ORS 659A.199, Plaintiff must allege an action by his employer. ORS 659A.199. 

To make a claim under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and ORS 659A.030(1)(g) Plaintiff must allege 

wrongdoing by either his employer or employee of his employer. See Larmanger v. Kaiser 

Found. Health Plan of Nw., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Or. 2011) (court dismissed claims under 

ORS 659A.030(1)(g) against third-parties because, as a matter of law, that statute applies only to 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 4 of 10
Page 5 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

employers and employees); see also Demont v. Starbucks Corp., 2010 WL 5173314, at *8 

(D. Or. Aug. 26, 2010) report and recommendation rejected in part on other grounds, 2010 

WL 5173304 (D. Or. Dec. 15, 2010) (ORS 659.030(1)(f) applies to both employers and 

employees). 

Plaintiff cannot allege the Daimler Defendants were his employers because he has alleged 

Concentra was his employer and Oregon does not recognize “joint employer” or “indirect”

liability under ORS Chapter 659A. Ford-Torres v. Cascade Valley Telecom, Inc., 374 F. App'x 

698, 700 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co., 184 Or. App. 138, 143-44, 

55 P.3d 1113 (2002) (indirect employer) and Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. McDonald, 187 Or. App. 

40, 66 P.3d 528 (2003) (joint employer)). Recently, a Multnomah County judge concurred with 

the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that neither “joint employer” nor “indirect employer” applies to 

the statutory claims asserted in this case. See Radhika Breaden, M.D., M.P.H. v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan of the Northwest, 2015 WL 9254617 (Or. Cir. Sept. 14, 2015). 

In Breaden, Judge You stated:

However, plaintiff cites only federal cases in support of each of [the indirect 

employer and joint employer] discrimination theories. A search of Oregon case 

law reveals that the indirect employer theory exists only in the context of 

Employer Liability Law claims. See, e.g., Boothby v. D.R. Johnson Lumber Co., 

184 Or App 138 (2002); Brown v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 150 Or App 391 (1997). 

The joint employer theory appears to exist only in the context of workers 

compensation claims, see Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. McDonald, 187 Or App 

40 (2003), and tort immunity. See Senger v. Risberg's Truck Line, 54 Or App 752 

(1981).... In sum, plaintiff's alternative theories are unsupported by Oregon law. 

Id. at * 2.

Plaintiff has not and cannot allege the Daimler Defendants were his employer because 

that would make them a joint or indirect employer with Concentra, a theory that is not supported 

by Oregon law. Action by an employer is necessary for each of Plaintiff’s statutory claims and 

without such allegations Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Fourth Claims against the Daimler 

Defendants should be dismissed. 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 5 of 10
Page 6 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

All three claims should be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend because the 

Daimler Defendants’ non-employer status cannot be cured by amendment. See Balsam v. 

Tucows, Inc., 627 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Motion 2: Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed with prejudice for 

failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted because the statute provides Plaintiff 

with an adequate remedy at law, which precludes his common law wrongful discharge 

claim.

Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge should be dismissed because he has an adequate 

remedy under ORS Chapter 659A. The tort of wrongful discharge is not a tort of general 

application and is intended only to provide a remedy when the conduct in question is 

unacceptable and no other remedy is available. See Reid v. Evergreen Aviation Ground Logistics 

Enterprises Inc., 2009 WL 136019, at *21 (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2009); see also Shaw v. Action Fin. 

Servs., LLC, 2014 WL 4404961, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 5, 2014).

2 Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim 

for common law wrongful discharge if “(1) an existing remedy adequately protects the public 

interest in question, or (2) the legislature has intentionally abrogated the common law remedies 

by establishing an exclusive remedy regardless whether the courts perceive that remedy to be 

adequate.” Shaw, 2014 WL 4404961, * 3 (citing Draper v. Astoria Sch. Dist. No. 1C, 

995 F. Supp. 1122, 1131 (D. Or. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Rabkin v. Oregon Health 

Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2003) and Walsh v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 

353, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977)). 

Plaintiff’s claim under ORS 659A.199 for retaliation precludes a common law wrongful 

discharge claim based on the same conduct. Shaw, 2014 WL 4404961, * 3. Similarly, 

ORS 659A.030 provides Plaintiff with an adequate remedy for discrimination. Id., (citing

Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, Plaintiff's claims under 

 2 While Reid and Shaw are unpublished opinions, these cases thoroughly review the history of 

state common law for claims, explain the relationship of the conflicting opinions between the 

Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and summarize the District Court’s application of 

Oregon law for wrongful discharge.

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 6 of 10
Page 7 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

ORS 659A.030 precludes a common law wrongful discharge claim based on the same conduct. 

Id. 

For actions alleging violations of ORS 659A.030 and ORS 659A.199, the court may 

award equitable relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Stensland v. City of 

Wilsonville, 2011 WL 6257090, at *14 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2011) (citing ORS 659A.885(1) and

3(a)). These are the same remedies available for the tort of wrongful discharge. Id. (citing Ryan 

v. HSC Real Estate, 2010 WL 3222443, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2010)). The standard of proof 

(preponderance of the evidence) also is the same under both the statutory and the common-law 

claim. Id. 

Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and his wrongful discharge claim should be 

dismissed. The claims should be dismissed with prejudice without leave to amend because the 

adequacy of the remedy under the statute cannot be cured by amendment. See Balsam, 627 F.3d 

at 1163 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Motion 3: Plaintiff’s intentional interference claims should be dismissed for failure to state 

claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the 

Daimler Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s relationship through improper means or for 

improper motive. 

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the Daimler Defendants interfered with his 

relationship with Concentra through improper means or for an improper purpose. Plaintiff 

alleges the following:

The means through which Defendants interfered were improper as they 

unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff and the actions were taken solely for the 

improper motive and purpose of harming Plaintiff’s employment relationship

with Defendant Concentra with the intent to specifically inflict injury upon 

Plaintiff.

Complaint, ¶ 51 (emphasis added). This is Plaintiff’s sole allegation in support of both his claim 

for Intentional Interference with Contractual and Economic Relations (Fifth Claim, Count I) and 

Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations (Fifth Claim, Count II). 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 7 of 10
Page 8 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

In order to state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff 

must plead: 1) the existence of a present or prospective business or professional relationship; 

2) a third party's intentional interference with that relationship; 3) which is accomplished through 

improper means or for an improper purpose; 4) a causal relationship between the interference 

and the damage to the relationship, and 5) resulting damages. McIntire v. Sage Software, Inc.,

2015 WL 9274301, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2015) report and recommendation adopted, 2015 

WL 9272884 (D. Or. Dec. 17, 2015) (citing McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 535, 901 P.2d 

841 (1995)). If a defendant's liability allegedly arises from improper means, “then the means 

must violate some objective, identifiable standard, such as a statute or other regulation, or a 

recognized rule of common law, or, perhaps, an established standard of a trade or profession.” 

Id. (citing NW Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 328 Or. 487, 498, 982 P.2d 1117 

(1999)). 

Plaintiff’s allegation of improper means (i.e., unlawful retaliation) is prefaced on the 

argument that Defendants’ liability stems from violations of ORS Chapter 659A. As discussed 

in Motion 1, the statute only applies to employers or employees of those employers. Because the 

improper means allegation in support of the intentional interference claim is premised on a 

non-viable statutory claim, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts to support a finding of 

improper means. Id. (citing Witt Co., v. RISO, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Or. June 7, 2013)

(Hernandez, J.) (dismissing an intentional interference claim where alleged antitrust violations 

furnished the improper means and the antitrust claim had been dismissed); citing also Noel v. 

Hall, 2012 WL 3241858 (D. Or. April 27, 2012) (Acosta, J.) (concluding that improper means 

necessary for an intentional interference claim could not be furnished by statutory claims that 

failed as a matter of law)). Adopted by 2012 WL 3241814 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2012). 

Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege an improper purpose to support his 

intentional interference claim against the Daimler Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that the Daimler 

Defendants interfered with his relationship “for the improper motive and purpose of harming 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 8 of 10
Page 9 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant Concentra with the intent to specifically 

inflict injury upon Plaintiff.” Complaint, ¶ 51. This allegation is “conclusory, devoid of factual 

support, and not entitled to the presumption of truth.” See A & B Asphalt, Inc. v. Humbert 

Asphalt, Inc., 2014 WL 3695480, *7–8 (D. Or. May 8, 2014), adopted by 2014 WL 3695474 

(D. Or. July 24, 2014) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-82) (regarding plaintiff’s allegation that 

defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiff’s business expectancy); see also Walchli v. 

ACMTY. Bank, 2010 WL 2164874, at *10 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2010) (Plaintiff’s allegation that 

defendant acted with “deliberate indifference’ to plaintiff’s interests was conclusory allegation 

insufficient to support element of improper purpose).

This case is very similar to Eusterman v. Nw. Permanente, P.C., 204 Or. App. 224, 

129 P.3d 213 (2006), where a plaintiff doctor’s claim for intentional interference was dismissed. 

Id. at 238. In that case, plaintiff was a doctor employed by Northwest and Northwest had a 

contract to provide medical services to Kaiser. Id. at 226. Plaintiff alleged Kaiser interfered 

with his employment with Northwest because of his exercise of “independent medical judgment 

regarding diagnoses and treatment and his advocacy of the position that other doctors should be 

allowed to exercise their medical judgment.” Id. at 238. Plaintiff argued Kaiser's motives were 

wrongful because Kaiser's interference was motivated by plaintiff's “protected activity” and 

“Kaiser wished to increase its profits in ways that were unlawful.” Id. The court found that 

plaintiff had not adequately shown improper means, even if Kaiser had urged or insisted plaintiff 

be fired for his allegedly protected activities, and he failed to show improper motive because the 

maximization of profits is not improper. Id. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege either an improper means or improper purpose sufficiently to 

satisfy Iqbal and his claim for intentional interference against the Daimler Defendants should be 

dismissed. 

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 9 of 10
Page 10 – DEFENDANTS DAIMLER NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATION,

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA LLC, GABLE HOFMAN AND

KARLA STEFFENSON'S FRCP 21 MOTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK,P.C. A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

732 N.W. 19TH AVENUE

PORTLAND, OREGON 97209-1302

(503) 224-0055 · FAX (503) 222-5290

Motion 4: If the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the Daimler Defendants were 

Plaintiff’s employer and fails to dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional interference claims pursuant 

to Motion 3, Plaintiff’s intentional interference claim should be dismissed for failure to 

state claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently 

allege the Daimler Defendants were a third party who interfered with Plaintiff’s economic 

relationship. 

To bring a claim for intentional interference with an economic relationship, Plaintiff must 

allege a third party's intentional interference with that relationship. McGanty, 321 Or. at 535. 

If the Court finds Plaintiff may bring claims against the Daimler Defendants as Plaintiff’s 

employer, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional interference claim against the Daimler 

Defendants because Plaintiff can no longer allege the Daimler Defendants were third parties who 

interfered with an economic relationship. As Plaintiff’s employer, the Daimler Defendants could 

not be third parties to Plaintiff’s employment relationship. 

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for all of the reasons set forth above, the Daimler Defendants 

respectfully request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Daimler Defendants. 

DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016.

KILMER VOORHEES & LAURICK, P.C.

/s/ Robert B. Miller

Robert B. Miller, OSB No. 960068

bobmiller@kilmerlaw.com

Candice R. Broock, OSB No. 025200

cbroock@kilmerlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Daimler North American 

Corporation, Daimler Trucks North America LLC,

Gable Hofman and Karla Steffenson

I:\10161\0004\Pleadings\MTD.docx

Case 3:15-cv-02407-SB Document 8 Filed 02/03/16 Page 10 of 10