alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PENDLETON DIVISION 

WAIBEL RANCHES, LLC, an Oregon 

Limited Liability Company, WAIBEL 

PROPERTIES, LLC, an Oregon Limited 

Liability Company, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant. 

MOSMAN,J., 

Case No. 2:15-cv-02071-HL 

OPINION AND ORDER 

On April 14, 2022, Magistrate Judge Andrew Hallman issued his Findings and 

Recommendation [ECF 149] ("F&R"), recommending that I grant the United States' Motion to 

Dismiss [ECF 1101 F&R at 20~21. Plaintiffs Waibel Ranches and Waibel Properties Gointly, 

"Waibel") filed timely objections [ECF 155], to which the United States responded [ECF 161]. 

Without leave to do so, Waibel filed a reply to the United States' response [ECF 162]. Upon 

review, I agree with Judge Hallman. 

DISCUSSION 

The magistrate judge makes only recommendations to the court, to which any party may 

file written objections. The court is not bound by the recommendations of the magistrate judge 

but retains responsibility for making the final determination. The court is generally required to 

make a de nova determination regarding those portions of the report or specified findings or 

1 - OPINION & ORDER 

Case 2:15-cv-02071-HL Document 163 Filed 07/14/22 Page 1 of 2
recommendation as to which an objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). However, the court 

is not required to review, de novo or under any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of 

the magistrate judge as to those portions of the F&R to which no objections are addressed. See 

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 

(9th Cir. 2003). While the level of scrutiny under which I am required to review the F&R 

depends on whether or not objections have been filed, in either case, I am free to accept, reject, 

or modify any part of the F&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). 

CONCLUSION 

Upon review, I agree with Judge Hallman's recommendation and I ADOPT the F&R 

[ECF 149] as my own opinion. Accordingly, I GRANT the United States' Motion to Dismiss 

[ECF 11 OJ. I dismiss Waibel' s first, fifth, and sixth claims with prejudice. I dismiss Waibel' s 

second, third, and fourth claims without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 1.i--day of July, 2022. 

es District Judge 

2 - OPINION & ORDER 

Case 2:15-cv-02071-HL Document 163 Filed 07/14/22 Page 2 of 2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

TOBY CARL McADAM, DBA Risingsun

Health,

 Defendant - Appellant,

 and

GRETA S. ARMSTRONG, DBA

Risingsun Health,

 Defendant.

No. 13-36201

D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00128-SEH

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 10, 2015** 

Before: FARRIS, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

FILED

MAR 20 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Toby Carl McAdam, dba Risingsun Health, appeals pro se from the district

court’s order holding him in civil contempt and awarding liquidated damages and

attorney’s fees to the United States. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We review for an abuse of discretion a civil contempt order, and review for clear

error underlying factual findings. FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228,

1239 (9th Cir. 1999). We affirm. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found McAdam in

contempt for failing to comply with the terms of a negotiated consent decree. See

Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (person subject to injunction

generally may not contest its lawfulness by disobeying it). 

The district court awarded liquidated damages to the United States under the

terms of the consent decree, which provided for liquidated damages not to exceed

$80,000 in any calendar year for failure to comply. The district court did not abuse

its discretion by using an amount negotiated by the parties as compensation for

McAdam’s continued contemptuous conduct. See SEC v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123,

1128 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review and noting that “[d]istrict

courts have broad equitable power to order appropriate relief in civil contempt

proceedings”). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees as

2 13-36201
part of its contempt order. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review).

We reject McAdam’s contentions concerning denial of due process,

violation of the Confrontation Clause, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

The district court afforded McAdam due process by providing notice and an

opportunity to be heard on the contempt claim. See United States v. Ayres, 166

F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ivil contempt may be imposed in an ordinary

civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard. Neither a jury trial

nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

McAdam’s opposed motion for a stay pending appeal, filed on November 3,

2014, is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

3 13-36201
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40745 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSEPH JAMES FALCETTA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:96-CR-59-1

- - - - - - - - - - December 23, 1998 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Joseph Falcetta has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Falcetta has filed a brief and a pleading entitled “Motion to Dismiss,” which are construed as his responses to the Anders motion. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file these pleadings into the record. Our independent review of counsel’s brief, the record, and Falcetta’s responses discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Falcetta’s motion for a bench warrant is DENIED. Accordingly, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein andNo. 97-40745 -2- Falcetta’s appeal is DISMISSED.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2143 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2143

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend chapter 45 of title 28, United States Code, to authorize the 
   Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice to accept voluntary 
                   services, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICES.

    Section 677 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding 
at the end the following:
    ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, the 
Administrative Assistant, with the approval of the Chief Justice, may 
accept voluntary personal services to assist with public and visitor 
programs.
    ``(2) No person may volunteer personal services under this 
subsection unless the person has first agreed, in writing, to waive any 
claim against the United States arising out of or in connection with 
such services, other than a claim under chapter 81 of title 5.
    ``(3) No person volunteering personal services under this 
subsection shall be considered an employee of the United States for any 
purpose other than for purposes of--
            ``(A) chapter 81 of title 5; or
            ``(B) chapter 171 of this title.
    ``(4) In the administration of this subsection, the Administrative 
Assistant shall ensure that the acceptance of personal services shall 
not result in the reduction of pay or displacement of any employee of 
the Supreme Court.''.

            Passed the Senate July 16, 1998.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
105th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                S. 2143

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend chapter 45 of title 28, United States Code, to authorize the 
   Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice to accept voluntary 
                   services, and for other purposes.
```
EXHIBIT 31.02



CERTIFICATION OF CFO  PURSUANT TO

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a  14(a)/15d  14(a),

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Ronald J. Domanico, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this amended annual report on Form 10-K/A of Caraustar;
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|3. | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of Caraustar as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ Ronald J. DomanicoVice President and Chief Financial Officer




Date: January 14, 2005
(25 Civ. Proc. R. 372.)

#### BARNES v. MEYER et al.

(Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County.

April, 1896.)

1. Costs—Extra Allowance—Foreclosure of Mortgage.

A leasehold is not real estate, within Code Civ. Proc. § 3253, subd. 1, providing for an extra allowance in an action to foreclose a mortgage on realty.

*211
      *2.*Same—Case where Defense is Interposed.

The fact that a defense has been interposed in an action, so as to authorize an extra allowance (Code Civ. Proc. § 3253, subd. 2), must appear as a condition precedent.

Action by Henry B. Barnes against George Meyer and others to foreclose a mortgage on a leasehold estate. Plaintiff moves for an extra allowance. Denied.

Jay & Candler, for the motion.

LAWRENCE, J.

This action was brought for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon leasehold property, and, upon the presentation of the judgment of foreclosure and sale, application was made for an allowance. The defendants raised no objection to the judgment of foreclosure, but opposed the allowance on the ground that it was held by the general term of this department in the case of Huntington v. Moore, 59 Hun, 351, 13 N. Y. Supp. 97, that in an action brought for foreclosure of a mortgage upon a leasehold estate for 21 years with conditions for renewal, reserving a rent certain, an additional allowance of costs in a proper case can be made to the extent of 5 per cent, upon the amount involved; but that the phrase “real property,” in section 3253 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not include leasehold estates so as to bring an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage thereon within subdivision 1 of that section. That subdivision limits the allowance in an action to foreclose a mortgage to a sum not exceeding 2-£ per centum upon the sum due or claimed to be due upon the mortgage, nor the aggregate sum of $200. I had granted in this case an allowance of $200 in the first instance, and the matter comes before me upon a motion for a reargument. I am satisfied, under the case cited, that an allowance cannot be granted under subdivision 1 of section 3253 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See, also, Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192. The question, therefore, remains whether an allowance of 5 per cent, can be granted under subdivision 2 of that section. The defendants’ counsel claims that it cannot, for the reason that no defense has been interposed herein, and that such fact must appear as a precedent condition to the right of the plaintiff to an allowance. This position seems to be well taken, and, as the leasehold property has been held not to be within subdivision 1 of the section in question, and not to be real property, I am reluctantly obliged to decline the application for an allowance.

Ordered accordingly.
#### Fahmi Aranki et al., Appellants, v Goldman & Associates, LLP, et al., Respondents.

[944 NYS2d 904]—

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sher, J.), dated March 22, 2010, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“Absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts, or other special circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity or near-privity for harm caused by professional negligence” *(Fredriksen v Fredriksen,*30 AD3d 370, 372 [2006]; *see*
      *1250
      *AG Capital Funding*Partners, *L.P. v State St. Bank & Trust Co.,*5 NY3d 582, 595 [2005]). Here, the defendants established that they did not collude with the majority members of Millennium Alliance Group, LLC (hereinafter MAG), inter alia, to freeze the plaintiffs out of MAG’s management and profit sharing and force them to surrender, at a reduced price, their minority membership interest in MAG. Thus, the defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging legal malpractice. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The defendants also established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty by showing that they did not knowingly induce the majority members of MAG to breach their fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs *(see Kaufman v Cohen,*307 AD2d 113, 125 [2003]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Mastro, A.EJ., Florio, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.1


                            CERTIFICATE OF TRUST OF
                          CAREMARK RX CAPITAL TRUST I


         THIS Certificate of Trust of Caremark Rx Capital Trust I (the "Trust")
is being duly executed and filed on behalf of the Trust by the undersigned, as
trustee, to form a business trust under the Delaware Business Trust Act (12
Del. C. ss. 3801 et seq.) (the "Act").


         1.       Name. The name of the business trust formed by this
Certificate of Trust is Caremark Rx Capital Trust I.


         2.       Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the
trustee of the Trust in the State of Delaware are Wilmington Trust Company,
Rodney Square North, 1100 North Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19890-0001,
Attn: Corporate Trust Administration.


         3.       Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective
upon filing.


         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate
of Trust in accordance with Section 3811(a)(1) of the Act.


                                 WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY, not in
                                 its individual capacity but solely as Trustee


                                 By: /s/ Patricia A. Evans
                                    -------------------------------------------
                                    Name:   Patricia A. Evans
                                    Title:  Financial Services Officer
<PAGE>   1
                                   Exhibit 21

                                  SUBSIDIARIES:


         Intelligroup New Zealand Limited, a corporation formed pursuant to the
laws of New Zealand and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intelligroup, Inc.

         Intelligroup Europe Limited, a corporation formed pursuant to the laws
of the United Kingdom and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Intelligroup, Inc.

         Intelligroup Singapore Private Ltd., a corporation formed pursuant to 
the laws of Singapore and 50% owned by each of Intelligroup, Inc., and Rajkumar
Koneru, an Executive Vice President and Director of Intelligroup, Inc.
From: Linda Whetton 

To: Balsom, Janet; Barger, Mary; Burke, Kelly; Burton, Gary; Christensen, Kerry; Damp, 

Jonathan; Davis, William E.; Dongoske, Kurt; English, Jeff; George, Roxane; Greiner, Lloyd; Harris, 

Christopher; Henderson, Norm; Jackson, Loretta; James, Leslie; Johnson, Rick; Kincaid, Chris; King, 

Robert; Knowles, Glen W.; Kubly, Dennis; Lehr, Phillip; McMullen, Ken; O'Brien, John; Persons, Bill; 

Peterson, Randy; Potochnik, Andre; Seaholm, Randolph; Shields, John; Steffen, Mark; Stevens, Larry; 

Werner, Bill; Yeatts, Michael 

Date: 6/25/2005 9:41:19 AM 

Subject: Fwd: Flow Recommendations from TWG Participants 

See attached message from Josh Korman. 

cc: Amy Heuslein (via fax @ 602-379-3833) 

From: Josh Korman <jkorman@ecometric.com 

To: Linda Whetton <LWHETTON@uc.usbr.gov 

Date: 6/21/2005 3:06:39 PM 

Subject: Flow Recommendations from TWG Participants 

Linda, 

Ted has asked me to forward the responses. re. flow treatments to be discussed for experimental 

planning exercise in early July at Flag. We received two comments which are appended below: 

RESPONSE FROM GLEN KNOWLES 

With respect to our discussions of experimental flow at the knowledge assessment workshop next month, 

we request that GCMRC please portray the Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flow as a legitimate alternative, 

that it be given equal weight to any other flow alternatives considered, and that it be portrayed as an 

alternative that has explicit requirements from BR per the 1995 biological opinion. 

We also request that the knowledge assessment include a thorough analysis of hydropower, including 

information on the "cost" of various experimental flow alternatives, both in terms of above-market cost of 

power resources and relative cost to ratepayers. 

 

RESPONSE FROM MARK STEFFEN

Hi Ted. I guess we were supposed to indicate to you flow alternatives to consider for the LTEP or 

knowledge assessment workshop by June 8th? I would suggest that we should consider the EIS 

alternative that was labeled "Moderate Fluctuating Flow Alternative". Some parts of this alternative are 

attractive to me and I think with some modifications it might be attractive to most stakeholders. Also, as I 

told Josh, I think it is very important to include the aquatic food base when considering impacts of 

different flow alternatives. 

CC: Ted Melis <tmelis@usgs.gov, Barbara Ralston <bralston@usgs.gov
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of CD&L, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Albert W. Van Ness, Jr., Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of
                  the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated
                  results of operations of the Company for the periods
                  presented.

Dated: November 21, 2005


                                                     \s\ Albert W. Van Ness, Jr.
                                                      --------------------------
                                                     Albert W. Van Ness, Jr.
                                                     Chief Executive Officer



     The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section
     906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsection (a) and (b) of Section
     1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and is not being filed as
     part of Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure statement.

     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
     been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
     furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
     request.