FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

August 28, 2002

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 01-16211

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 01-14026-CV-DLG

In Re: 

JANE MCLEAN BROWN,

Debtor.

DEBORAH MENOTTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JANE MCLEAN BROWN,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(August 28, 2002)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BLACK and COX, Circuit Judges.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:
2

This case involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor seeking to exclude her

interest in a trust from the bankruptcy estate. The trust, which was created by the

debtor prior to insolvency, was established to provide income to the debtor for her

lifetime with the remainder ultimately being given to several charities. Based on

the presence of a spendthrift clause prohibiting assignment or alienation, the debtor

contends her interest in the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy estate. 

Alternatively, the debtor contends her interest is exempt because the trust qualifies

as a support trust. Having created the trust for her own benefit, however, the

debtor cannot shield her interest in the trust from her creditors. This interest,

consisting of a yearly income stream from the trust assets, is not exempt from the

debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The corpus of the trust, however, is not likewise

subject to the claims of the debtor’s creditors. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Establishment of the Trust

Appellee Jane McLean Brown (Appellee), the debtor in the bankruptcy case

giving rise to this appeal, suffers from chronic alcoholism. In 1993, her mother

died, leaving her an inheritance of approximately $250,000. In order to protect the

inheritance from her own improvidence, Appellee decided to place the money into

an irrevocable trust which would pay her a monthly income for life. On
3

August 11, 1993, Appellee executed the trust agreement, entitled Irrevocable

Charitable Remainder Unitrust Agreement (ICRUA).

Under the ICRUA, Appellee is entitled to receive an annual amount equal to

7% of the net worth of the trust, valued as of the first day of each taxable year. 

The payments are due in monthly installments. Appellee, who is unemployed,

lives off of the monthly payments flowing from the ICRUA. Appellee is the only

beneficiary currently entitled to receive income payments under the trust.

As a trust beneficiary, Appellee’s only rights are to receive the 7% income

payments. Although Appellee also serves as trustee, her powers are generally

limited to directing investment decisions. She does not have the discretion to

invade the trust corpus or to alter the amount of payments made to the trust

beneficiaries. Furthermore, Appellee is prohibited from assigning or otherwise

alienating her interest in the trust by virtue of a “spendthrift” clause contained into

the ICRUA: 

To the extent permitted by law, no beneficiary shall have any

power to dispose of or to charge by way of anticipation any interest

given to her, and all sums payable to any beneficiary shall be free and

clear of her debts, contracts, dispositions and anticipations, and shall

not be taken or reached by any legal or equitable process in

satisfaction thereof.

See Article IV of the ICRUA.
1

The income payments to Appellee’s daughter will be due under the ICRUA

as long as the daughter survives Appellee, unless Appellee revokes and terminates

the interest of the daughter through testamentary instruction. If the daughter’s

interest is revoked and terminated, the ICRUA will treat the daughter as having

predeceased Appellee.

2

The ICRUA states any charity serving as a beneficiary under the trust must

qualify as an organization described in 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c), 2055(a),

2522(a) (1994).

3

Appellee’s interest in the ICRUA was assigned a value of “0.00.”

4

Upon Appellee’s death, the 7% yearly trust income payments will be made

to her daughter for life.1

 At the daughter’s death, the corpus of the trust will pass

to four charities listed in the ICRUA. Although the ICRUA expressly reserves

Appellee’s right to designate substitute or additional charitable beneficiaries by

testamentary instruction, the right of redesignation is limited to substituting or

adding other charities meeting certain Internal Revenue Code qualifications.2

B. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

On February 4, 1999, Appellee filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7

bankruptcy. Appellant Deborah Menotte (Appellant) was appointed as the Chapter

7 trustee. In her bankruptcy petition, Appellee listed secured and unsecured claims

totaling $110,023.53. Although Appellee acknowledged her interest in the

ICRUA, no value for the interest was included as part of her asset calculation.3

Rather, Appellee claimed her interest in the trust was exempt from the bankruptcy
5

estate. Appellant objected, arguing self-funded trusts are not insulated from the

claims of creditors.

On July 26, 2000, the bankruptcy court overruled Appellant’s objection to

the claimed exemption. Based on the presence of the spendthrift clause, the

bankruptcy court concluded Appellee’s interest in the trust could not be attached

by her creditors. As an additional ground for exemption, the bankruptcy court

indicated the trust also qualified as a support trust, which is a type of trust

established to provide for a beneficiary’s needs. The bankruptcy court rejected

Appellee’s alternative argument that her interest in the trust constituted an exempt

annuity.

On November 8, 2001, Appellant filed an appeal to the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida. On appeal, Appellant argued the

bankruptcy court erred in finding the ICRUA was exempt from the bankruptcy

estate as either a spendthrift trust or a support trust. The district court affirmed in

part, finding the ICRUA was exempt from the bankruptcy estate based on its

spendthrift provision. Although it did not need to reach the bankruptcy court’s

other ground for exemption, the district court indicated the trust likely would not

qualify as a support trust because the ICRUA provided for payment of a fixed sum

to Appellee each year regardless of the amount needed for her support. Having not
4

On appeal to this Court, Appellee argues the ICRUA is exempt from her

bankruptcy estate as an annuity. This issue, however, was not raised before the

district court; nor was it raised by Appellant as an issue on appeal to this Court. 

Whether the ICRUA qualifies as an exempt annuity, therefore, is not properly

before the Court. See generally Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir.

1991) (“We have long held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised

for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.”). 

6

been raised on appeal, the issue of whether the trust qualified as an exempt annuity

was not addressed by the district court.4

 This appeal followed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In bankruptcy appeals, legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and the

district court are subject to de novo review. Bush v. JLJ, Inc. (In re JLJ, Inc.), 988

F.2d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION

An estate in bankruptcy consists of all interests in property possessed by the

debtor at the time of her bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1994). Where

there is a restriction on transfer of the debtor’s interests under applicable nonbankruptcy law, however, such restriction remains effective even in bankruptcy. 

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). As a result, spendthrift and support trusts are excluded

from a debtor’s bankruptcy estate to the extent they are protected from creditors
5

See Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490

(11th Cir. 1985) (stating the term “applicable nonbankruptcy law” in 11 U.S.C. §

541(c)(2) refers to state spendthrift trust law), abrogated on other grounds by

Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); see also Rep. of the

Comm’n on the Bankr. Laws of the U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 193 (1973)

(discussing recommendations to change the bankruptcy laws to include spendthrift

trusts within a debtor’s bankruptcy estate).

7

under applicable state law.5 The state law applicable in this case is the law of the

State of Florida. We will examine in turn whether the ICRUA qualifies as either a

spendthrift trust or a support trust under Florida law. 

A. The ICRUA as a Spendthrift Trust

In Florida, trusts containing valid spendthrift provisions are protected from

the reach of creditors, so long as the beneficiaries cannot exercise dominion over

the trust assets. See generally Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603, 605 (Fla. 1947)

(en banc) (recognizing the validity of spendthrift trusts); Croom v. Ocala Plumbing

& Elec. Co., 57 So. 243, 244-45 (Fla. 1911) (holding creditors could reach trust

property, despite presence of spendthrift clause, where the beneficiaries possessed

absolute control over the property). Where a trust is self-funded by a beneficiary,

however, there is an issue as to whether the trust’s spendthrift provision is valid as

against creditors of the settlor-beneficiary. We conclude it is not, and the

beneficiary’s interest is subject to alienation by her creditors.
6

This principle is not unique to Florida law. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut.

Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1990)

(stating Oregon and Massachusetts laws hold a “settlor cannot create a spendthrift

trust for his own benefit”); Herrin v. Jordan (In re Jordan), 914 F.2d 197, 199-200

(9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law and holding trust funded by

beneficiary’s personal injury settlement was not excludable from his bankruptcy

estate as a valid spendthrift trust); Dzikowski v. Edmonds (In re Cameron), 223

B.R. 20, 24 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (“It is axiomatic that under New York Law,

self-settled trusts are void against both present and future creditors and a debtor

may not avoid his creditors, or future creditors, by placing his property in trust for

his own benefit.”); In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361, 364-65 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995)

(applying Maine law and holding settlor-beneficiary’s interest in trust was not

8

1. Validity of the ICRUA’s Spendthrift Provision as Against

Appellee’s Creditors 

 

Spendthrift trusts are defined under Florida law as “those trusts that are

created with a view of providing a fund for the maintenance of another, and at the

same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapacity for selfprotection.” Croom, 57 So. at 244 (emphasis added); see also Waterbury, 32

So. 2d at 605 (“A spendthrift trust is one that is created with the view of providing

a fund for the maintenance of another, and at the same time securing it against his

own improvidence or incapacity for self protection.”). 

As impliedly recognized by the definition of spendthrift trusts set forth in

Croom, Florida law will not protect assets contained within a spendthrift trust to

the extent the settlor creates the trust for her own benefit, rather than for the benefit

of another.6

 See In re Witlin, 640 F.2d 661, 663 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (holding,
protected from creditors), aff’d, 101 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 1996); Jensen v. Hall (In re

Hall), 22 B.R. 942, 944 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (applying Ohio law and holding

creditors could reach settlor-beneficiary’s interest in spendthrift trust); Speed v.

Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348, 349 (Ga. 1993) (applying Georgia law, and holding

spendthrift provision in trust created by quadriplegic husband from his insurance

benefits was not enforceable where the husband was both settlor and beneficiary);

Bank of Dallas v. Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 540 S.W.2d 499, 501-02 (Tex.

App. 1976) (applying Texas law, and holding settlor who created spendthrift trust

and made herself a beneficiary thereof could not protect her interest in the trust

from her creditors). 

7

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en

banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth

Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981).

9

under Florida law on spendthrift trusts, debtor’s interest in his Keogh plan was not

exempt from his bankruptcy estate where the debtor was both the beneficiary and

the settlor of the plan);7 In re Wheat, 149 B.R. 1003, 1004-05 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.

1992) (holding, under Florida law on spendthrift trusts, debtor’s deferred

compensation plan was not exempt from his bankruptcy estate where it was selffunded); In re Williams, 118 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (holding,

under Florida law on spendthrift trusts, debtor’s interests in his employer’s thrift

plan was not exempt from his bankruptcy estate where it was self-settled); JOHN G.

GRIMSLEY, FLORIDA LAW OF TRUSTS § 15-5(b) (4th ed. 1993) (“A settlor cannot

create for himself a spendthrift trust to avoid creditors.”); 55A FLA. JUR. 2D Trusts

§ 78 (2000) (“The trustee and the sole beneficiary cannot be one in the same under
8

Sources setting forth the common law of trusts frequently are cited by

Florida courts for guidance regarding construction of spendthrift and other trusts. 

See, e.g., Bacardi v. White, 463 So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS regarding spendthrift trusts); Waterbury, 32 So. 2d at 605

(citing Bogert’s TRUSTS & TRUSTEES and Griswold’s SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

regarding spendthrift trusts); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 447 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. App.

1984) (citing Scott’s THE LAW OF TRUSTS regarding spendthrift trusts).

10

spendthrift trust law. A settlor cannot create a spendthrift trust for his or her own

benefit.”). 

This limitation comports with the common law of trusts.8

 See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959) (“Where a person creates for

his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary

transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his interest.”); GEORGE

GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 223 (rev.

2d ed. 1992) (“If a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and inserts a

spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing or future creditors are

concerned, and they can reach his interest under the trust.”); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,

SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §474 (1936) (“A spendthrift trust created by a person for his

own benefit is invalid against creditors.”); II AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW

OF TRUSTS § 114 (3d ed. 1967) (“It is to be noticed that the beneficial interest

reserved to the settlor is for some purposes treated differently from a beneficial

interest created in a third person. Thus, although a beneficial interest created in a
11

third person may be inalienable by him and not subject to the claims of his

creditors, a beneficial interest reserved to the settlor himself can be alienated by

him or reached by his creditors even though it is otherwise provided by the terms

of the trust.”). Self-settled trusts may be reached by creditors, even if the settlor

was solvent at the time of the trust’s creation and no fraud was intended. See Id.

§ 156 (“It is immaterial that in creating the trust the settlor did not intend to

defraud his creditors. It is immaterial that he was solvent at the time of the creation

of the trust. It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his own property in

such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his creditors from reaching

it.”).

In this case, Appellee is a beneficiary of a self-settled spendthrift trust. In

1993, Appellee inherited $250,000 from her mother. To protect the inheritance

from her own squandering, Appellee established a charitable trust under which she

retained the right to receive a 7% income for life. Appellee purportedly was not

insolvent at the time the trust was established; nor is there evidence Appellee

intended to defraud her creditors. Nevertheless, Appellee is both the settlor and a
9

The fact that Appellee cannot exercise dominion over the trust assets is

irrelevant to this analysis. The issue of self-settlement is separate from the issue of control,

and either can serve as an independent ground for invalidating a spendthrift provision. See, e.g.,

In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. at 363 (declining to address beneficiaries’ control over trust where

the trust was self-settled and, therefore, the spendthrift provision was ineffective on that basis

alone); In re Wheat, 149 B.R. at 1004 (“However, the Debtor’s degree of control is irrelevant in

this case since one cannot create a spendthrift trust for oneself in Florida.”); Walro v. Striegel (In

re Walro), 131 B.R. 697, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1991) (holding self-settlement prevented

agreement from qualifying as a spendthrift trust, although beneficiary did not have any control

over assets). 

Although some cases appear to intertwine the issues of self-settlement and

control, those cases are distinguishable because their facts supported invalidity of

the spendthrift trusts at issue under both grounds. See, e.g., Fehlhaber v.

Fehlhaber, 850 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing In re Witlin and other

cases for the proposition that a settlor who creates a trust for his own benefit

cannot protect his interest under the trust from his creditors, but also stating a

settlor who exercises dominion over the trust cannot protect the trust from

creditors); Lawrence v. Chapter 7 Trustee (In re Lawrence), 251 B.R. 630, 641-42

(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000) (invalidating spendthrift provision where trust was selfsettled and the beneficiary exercised control over the trust), aff’d, 279 F.3d 1294

(11th Cir. 2002); In re Cattafi, 237 B.R. 853, 855-56 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999)

(same). In those cases, there was no need to address the issues as separate grounds

for invalidation. 

12

beneficiary of the trust. Consequently, the spendthrift clause contained in the trust

is ineffective as against Appellee’s creditors.9

 

2. Interest Reachable by Appellee’s Creditors

When a settlor creates a trust for her own benefit and inserts a spendthrift

clause, the entire spendthrift clause is void as to her creditors. See BOGERT § 223

(“The entire spendthrift clause, both as to voluntary and involuntary alienation, is

void. The creditors can reach the settlor-beneficiary’s interest.”). In the absence of
13

a valid spendthrift provision, a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is a property right

which is liable for the beneficiary’s debts to the same extent as her legal interests. 

See generally GRIMSLEY § 8-3 (“Where the beneficiary’s equitable interest is

vested in him without restraint on alienation, the interest is transferable by him and

subject to claims of his creditors.”); BOGERT § 193 (“If the trust is active the

creditor of the beneficiary can subject the latter’s interest in the trust to the

satisfaction of the debt, either in law or equity, unless a statute or a valid

spendthrift provision prevents this result.”). 

As with any other property right, a trust beneficiary’s right to receive income

for life is an interest which may be alienated or subject to attachment by her

creditors. See generally Blair v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 5, 13-14,

57 S. Ct. 330, 333-34 (1937) (holding that in absence of a valid restraint on

alienation, the interest of a trust beneficiary to income for life was present property

which could be assigned to others); Bradshaw v. Am. Advent Christian Home &

Orphanage, 199 So. 329, 332-33 (Fla. 1940) (holding that in absence of a restraint

on alienation, income stream granted to orphanage as trust beneficiary was subject

to the claims of the orphanages’ creditors).
10Some limited exceptions to this general rule exist which do not apply in

this case. For example, creditors of a settlor-beneficiary who has reserved only a

right to income may reach both the income and the corpus of a trust if the trustee

has discretion to invade the corpus for the benefit of the settlor. See, e.g., Miller v.

Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 664 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ohio App. 1995) (holding

entire amount of trust was available to Medicaid even though settlor was given

only income for life, where the trustee in his discretion could expend the principal

on her behalf). Likewise, creditors may reach the corpus of a trust where the

beneficiary is given not only an income stream for life, but also the ability to

designate remaindermen. See, e.g., Bank of Dallas, 540 S.W.2d at 502 (holding

income as well as corpus of an irrevocable spendthrift trust created by the settlor

for her and her children’s benefit was subject to garnishment by creditors where

the settlor received all the income from the corpus and held a general power of

appointment exercisable at death); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt.

c (“If the settlor reserves for his own benefit not only a life interest but also a

general power to appoint the remainder by deed or will or by deed alone or by will

alone, his creditors can reach the principal of the trust as well as the income.”). In

this case, the trustee of the ICRUA does not have discretion to invade the corpus of

the trust for Appellee’s benefit. Additionally, Appellee does not have a general

power of appointment regarding remaindermen; rather, her right to redesignation is

strictly limited to substituting other Internal Revenue Code qualified charities.

14

Where the only interest a settlor has retained for herself under a trust is the

right to income for life, it is solely this interest which her creditors can reach.10 See

II SCOTT § 156 (“Where the only interest which the settlor has created for himself

under the trust is a right to the income for life or for some other period, it is this

interest alone which his creditors can reach, unless the creation of the trust was a

disposition in fraud of his creditors.”); see also In re Goff, 812 F.2d 931, 933 (5th

Cir. 1987) (indicating creditors of settlors-beneficiaries were limited to attaching

whatever interest the settlors retained under the trust and, therefore, could not
11See also Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 27 A.2d 166, 173-74 (Conn. 1942)

(“While we have found few cases dealing with a situation where the settlor of the

trust, after reserving to himself the income for life, creates vested indefeasible

interests, to take effect at his death, we have found none which subjects such

interests to the demands of the settlor’s creditors, and on principle there is no

question that the creditors cannot reach those interests. Over them the settlor has

no dominion, and his creditors have no more right to reach them than they would

any interests in property formerly owned by him which has passed into the

ownership of another.”); Henderson v. Sunseri, 174 So. 767, 770 (Ala. 1937)

(holding settlor’s creditors could only reach the income stream reserved to the

settlor, and not the remainder which was vested in the settlor’s children); Dillon v.

Spilo, 9 N.E.2d 864, 866 (N.Y. App. 1937) (holding settlor’s reserved life estate

was subject to reach by her creditors, but not the remainder of the trust); Egbert v.

De Solms, 67 A. 212, 212-13 (Pa. 1907) (holding settlors’ creditors could reach

income from trust which was reserved for settlors’ benefit, but could not reach the

remainder of the trust which was vested in the settlors’ children). 

15

obtain a lien on real property conveyed into the trust because settlors’ interest was

equitable rather than legal); BOGERT § 223 (“If the settlor creates a trust for the

settlor for life, with a restraint on voluntary or involuntary alienation of his interest,

and with a remainder interest in others at his death, his creditors can reach his life

interest but not the remainder, unless he has also reserved a general power of

appointment.”); GRISWOLD § 475 (indicating creditors could reach a settlor’s life

interest, but not the remainder if vested in another).11 As illustrated in the

Restatement (Second) of Trusts:

A transfers property to B in trust to pay the income to A for life and to

pay the principal on A’s death to C. By the terms of the trust it is

provided that A’s interest under the trust cannot be transferred or
16

reached by his creditors. A can transfer his interest; his creditors can

reach his interest.

 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt. a, illus. 1.

This result makes sense. Although the spendthrift provision of a trust is void

as against a settlor-beneficiary’s creditors, the trust itself remains valid. See, e.g.,

In re Goff, 812 F.2d at 933 (holding spendthrift provision was void as against

creditors based on self-settlement, but trust itself was valid); Liberty Nat. Bank v.

Hicks, 173 F.2d 631, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (holding settlor-beneficiary was

bound by terms of trust, even though its spendthrift provision was ineffective as

against his creditors); see also 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 128 (1992) (“[W]here there

is a provision in the terms of the trust imposing restraint on the transfer by a

beneficiary of his interest and the provision is illegal, the provision fails, but the

whole trust does not fail, since provisions like this can ordinarily be separated from

other provisions without defeating the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust.”). 

Thus, although a settlor-beneficiary’s creditors are not bound by a trust’s

spendthrift clause, the assets subject to attachment are circumscribed by the trust

agreement. 

By establishing an irrevocable trust in favor of another, a settlor, in effect,

gives her assets to the third-party as a gift. Once conveyed, the assets no longer

belong to the settlor and are no more subject to the claims of her creditors than if
17

the settlor had directly transferred title to the third-party. Where the settlor retains

a right to income payments, however, there is a limited interest created in favor of

the settlor. It is this limited interest, and not the entire trust assets, which may be

attached by the settlor’s creditors:

Life interest in settlor with remainder over to a named or

designated person. The settlor may reserve to himself only the

income from the property transferred during his life and may by the

transfer give a vested remainder after his death to some named person

or persons. This situation arises in the following typical case: A

conveys property to T on trust to pay the income to A during A’s life,

with restraints against anticipation, assignment, and the rights of

creditors, and with a further provision that on the death of A the

property shall be conveyed to B. Such a conveyance creates in B a

present vested remainder, and if the transfer is not a fraudulent

conveyance, the interest of B can not, of course, be reached for A’s

debts. The remainder may be to a class, as to the children of the

settlor. It may likewise be contingent until the death of the settlor. In

any of these cases, if the settlor has reserved no power over the

remainder, and the transfer is not fraudulent, the conveyance of the

remainder constitutes a present gift and is just as much beyond the

reach of creditors as any other completed gift.

GRISWOLD § 475. 

In this case, Appellee transferred assets of $250,000 into a charitable trust. 

The transfer was irrevocable, and the charities listed in the trust became vested in

the corpus of the trust, subject only to divestment through redesignation of other

charitable remaindermen. Appellee retained no rights to the trust principle. In

establishing the ICRUA, however, Appellee granted herself an interest in the trust
12Likewise, her interest vests in her bankruptcy trustee. See II SCOTT §

147.1 (“Where a beneficiary of a trust becomes bankrupt, his interest under the

trust vests in the trustee in bankruptcy, unless either by the terms of the trust or by

statute there is a restraint on the alienation of his interest. If his interest is

assignable by him or if his creditors can reach it, it vests in the trustee in

bankruptcy.”).

18

in the form of a right to receive 7% income from the trust for life. As a result,

Appellee’s income stream is subject to the reach of her creditors.12 The corpus of

the trust, having irrevocably been conveyed to the trust for the benefit of others, is

not likewise subject to the claims of her creditors.

B. The ICRUA as a Support Trust 

In addition to claiming the ICRUA’s spendthrift provision is effective

against her creditors, Appellee asserts the trust is exempt from her bankruptcy

estate as a support trust. “A support trust is one where the trustee is directed to pay

to the beneficiary only so much income or principal, or both, as is necessary for the

beneficiary’s support and education.” In re McLoughlin, 507 F.2d 177, 185 (5th

Cir. 1975). Support trusts, by their nature, are non-transferrable. Id.; see

also BOGERT § 229 (“If a trustee is directed to pay or apply trust income or

principal for the benefit of a named person, but only to the extent necessary to

support him, and only when the disbursements will accomplish support, the nature
19

of the interest of the beneficiary makes it not transferable and not subject to the

claims of creditors.”).

As an initial matter, the structure of the ICRUA is not in the form of a

support trust. Nowhere in the ICRUA is there a mention of payments by the

trustee for the support of Appellee. Although the monthly income payments are

used by Appellee for her own support, the ICRUA does not limit disbursements to

that effect. Rather, the trustee is merely obligated to pay 7% of the value of the

trust to Appellee each year. The trustee may not pay Appellee more than the 7%

income if her needs exceed that amount; likewise, the trustee may not limit

payments to less than the 7% income. Appellee is entitled to the income payments

regardless of need and may dispose of the funds as she chooses. The ICRUA,

therefore, does not constitute a support trust.

Even if the ICRUA qualified as a support trust, Appellee’s interest in the

trust would not be shielded from her creditors. As with the ICRUA’s spendthrift

provision, a support trust created by a settlor for her own benefit is ineffective as

against her creditors. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2) (“Where a

person creates for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary trust, his

transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the

terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit.”); II SCOTT § 156.1
20

(“The policy which prevents a person from creating a spendthrift trust for his own

benefit also prevents his creating a trust under which his creditors are precluded

from reaching the income or principal which is to be applied for his support.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

When establishing the ICRUA, Appellee made an irrevocable charitable gift

of the trust corpus. By including the right to receive income payments for life,

Appellee retained a portion of the assets for herself. Whatever interest Appellee

retained is her own property, subject to the claims of her creditors. Accordingly,

Appellee’s right to an income stream is not exempt from her bankruptcy estate and

may be reached by her creditors. The corpus of the trust, however, may not be

reached by Appellee’s creditors.

AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.