[Cite as New Beginnings Residential Treatment Ctr., L.L.C. v. Steel Town, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-4814.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

NEW BEGINNINGS RESIDENTIAL 

TREATMENT CENTER, LLC., et al. 

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 

VS. 

STEEL TOWN, LLC., et al. 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

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CASE NO. 15 MA 0185 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2013 CV 3422 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellants Attorney Thomas Leopp 

1865 Arndale Road, Suite B 

Stow, Ohio 44224 

For Defendants-Appellees Attorney Percy Squire 

341 South Third Street, Suite 10 

Columbus, Ohio 43206 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: June 30, 2016 
[Cite as New Beginnings Residential Treatment Ctr., L.L.C. v. Steel Town, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-4814.]

DeGENARO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants, New Beginnings Residential Treatment Center, et 

al., appeal the October 20, 2015 judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common 

Pleas. New Beginnings’ arguments are meritorious as the trial court improperly used 

Civ.R. 60 to make substantive, as opposed to clerical, changes to a previous order. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Plaintiffs-Appellants, New Beginnings Residential Treatment Center, 

LLC and Dr. Vanessa Jones (New Beginnings) filed a complaint for accounting 

malpractice, retaliation, negligence, fraud, and breach of lease on December 4, 2013, 

against Defendants-Appellees, Steel Town, LLC, Sterling A. Williams, and Tax 

Master Accounting and Tax Service (Steel Town). 

{¶3} After receiving leave of court, Steel Town filed a motion to dismiss, 

answer, and counterclaim. In their answer Steel Town generally denied the 

allegations of the complaint and asserted various defenses. For its counterclaim, 

Steel Town asserted that New Beginnings breached the lease agreement. 

{¶4} On September 23, 2014, New Beginnings filed a motion for summary 

judgment on their claims contained in the complaint as well as Steel Town’s 

counterclaim. Steel Town opposed the summary judgment motion and also filed a 

motion to dismiss counts two and three of the complaint based upon a mandatory 

arbitration provision. In the alternative Steel Town requested summary judgment on 

counts two and three based upon an attached affidavit of defendant, Sterling 

Williams. 

{¶5} On October 20, 2014, New Beginnings filed a notice requesting the trial 

court to grant its previously filed motion for summary judgment on the basis that Steel 

Town failed to reply pursuant to the local rules within 14 days. Further, they asked 

that their previously filed requests for admissions be deemed admitted because Steel 

Town did not respond in a timely manner. 

{¶6} On November 3, 2014, New Beginnings filed a brief in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss arguing that Steel Town had consented and invoked the jurisdiction 

of the trial court by filing a counterclaim and that they waived any argument regarding 
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arbitration. 

{¶7} On January 14, 2015, the magistrate ruled that Steel Town had failed to 

exercise and avail themselves of any rights they had to arbitrate any portion of the 

proceedings in a timely manner and waived their right to do so. As such, the trial 

court denied Steel Town’s motion to dismiss or otherwise stay the proceedings for 

arbitration. 

{¶8} On January 26, 2015, Steel Town filed a motion to set aside the 

magistrate’s decision and objections to the magistrate’s decision again requesting 

dismissal of counts two and three or a referral of the counts to arbitration arguing that 

the magistrate disregarded strong public policy favoring arbitration and failed to 

address waiver language contained within the lease. 

{¶9} On January 28, 2015, the magistrate denied New Beginnings summary 

judgment on counts one, two, and three; he sustained the motion on counts four and 

five reserving the issues of proximate cause and damages for further adjudication 

upon the merits by the trier of fact. 

{¶10} On the same date the magistrate ordered that the requests for 

admission served upon Steel Town be deemed admitted and also granted New 

Beginnings motion for summary judgment on Steel Town’s counterclaim (breach of 

commercial lease). In doing so, the magistrate held that Steel Town failed to explain 

how the lease was breached, failed to address the counterclaim in its response to the 

motion for summary judgment, and provided no evidentiary materials to support that 

New Beginnings had breached the lease. 

{¶11} On February 4, 2015, the trial judge sustained Steel Town’s motion to 

allow arbitration of counts two and three of the complaint. 

{¶12} On February 9, 2015, Steel Town filed a motion to withdraw the 

admissions deemed admitted by the magistrate on January 28, 2015, and a 

combined motion to set aside magistrate’s decision and objections to the magistrate’s 

decision on the grant of summary judgment. New Beginnings promptly responded in 

opposition noting the untimeliness of the motions, the unfairness of granting of same, 
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and the prejudice to New Beginnings if the motions were granted. 

{¶13} On February 25, 2015, the trial judge overruled the objections, 

upholding the magistrate’s decision to grant summary judgment. With respect to the 

counterclaim, the trial judge agreed with the magistrate that Steel Town had not 

responded in any manner to the motion, and sustained the motion. 

{¶14} On March 25, 2015, the magistrate denied Steel Town’s motion to 

withdraw admissions. Once again Steel Town filed a combined motion to set aside 

magistrate’s decision and objections to the magistrate’s decision. Again, New 

Beginnings promptly responded in opposition. 

{¶15} On April 20, 2015, the trial court sustained Steel Town’s objections to 

the March 25, 2015 magistrate’s decision regarding the requests for admissions. 

Consequently, the admissions filed by Steel Town on July 10, 2014, were to be 

considered by the magistrate when deciding the case. 

{¶16} On May 21, 2015, the trial court, recognizing that an inconsistency 

existed in two prior judgment entries, overruled its earlier grant of summary judgment 

on counts four and five of the complaint. The trial court cited the fact that the 

magistrate had used the admissions that were previously deemed admitted when 

reaching its decision to grant the summary judgment. As the trial court had stated 

that a different set of admissions was to be used (i.e. July 10, 2014 admissions), the 

grant of summary judgment was vacated and counts four and five remained pending 

for further adjudication. The judgment entry states that this was a sua sponte act by 

the trial judge based upon Civ.R. 60(A). 

{¶17} On October 20, 2015, the trial judge, pursuant to Civ.R 60(A), vacated 

the grant of summary judgment to New Beginnings on Steel Town’s counterclaim and 

ordered the counterclaim into arbitration based upon the same contractual language 

that was cited to submit counts two and three of the complaint to arbitration. 

Civil Rule 60 

{¶18} As the first two assignments of error share a basis in law and fact, they 

will be addressed together for clarity analysis. New Beginnings asserts: 
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The trial court erred and abused its discretion in using Civil Rule 60(A) 

to “correct” its judgments regarding summary judgment and referring 

the Counterclaim to arbitration. 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion in referring to arbitration 

the Counterclaim. 

{¶19} "[I]t is within the trial court's discretion to correct mistakes pursuant to 

Civ.R. 60(A) and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion." 

Bobb Forest Products, Inc. v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 151 Ohio App.3d 63, 2002–

Ohio–5370, 783 N.E.2d 560, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.). Abuse of discretion means the trial 

court's decision is unreasonable based upon the record; that the appellate court may 

have reached a different result is not enough to warrant reversal. Downie v. 

Montgomery, 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 43, 2013–Ohio–5552, ¶ 50. 

{¶20} "Civ.R. 60(A) permits a trial court, in its discretion, to correct clerical 

mistakes which are apparent on the record but does not authorize a trial court to 

make substantive changes in judgments." State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 

Ohio St.3d 97, 100, 1996-Ohio-340, 671 N.E.2d 236. "A clerical mistake 

contemplated by Civ.R. 60(A) is mechanical in nature, apparent on the record, and 

does not involve a legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Bobb, supra, at ¶ 28. 

{¶21} Here, the trial judge stated that Civ.R. 60(A) enabled him to "correct 

errors in Judgments, Orders or other parts of the record arising from the oversight or 

omission at any time on its own initiative" and that he was taking action to correct an 

error and "prevent manifest injustice." Specifically, it vacated a portion of a February 

25, 2015 judgment entry that granted summary judgment in favor of New Beginnings 

on Steel Town's counterclaim. The trial judge then ordered the counterclaim to 

binding arbitration with counts two and three of the complaint that had previously 

been ordered to arbitration on February 4, 2015. 

{¶22} This action by the trial court clearly constitutes a substantive change as 

opposed to a clerical correction. Indeed, by its own account, the trial court was asked 
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twice earlier in the proceedings by Steel Town to refer the counterclaim to arbitration. 

That had not occurred. Ultimately the magistrate granted summary judgment on the 

counterclaim to New Beginnings. 

{¶23} Accordingly, the changes associated with the October 20, 2015 

judgment entry were substantive in nature. As such, the trial court improperly used 

Civ.R. 60(A) to vacate the grant of summary judgment on the counterclaim and to 

send it to binding arbitration. Accordingly, New Beginnings' first and second 

assignments of error are meritorious. 

{¶24} In the final of three assignments of error, New Beginnings asserts: 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion in permitting the 

withdrawal of the deemed admissions. 

{¶25} On appeal, New Beginnings contends that Steel Town should not have 

been permitted to withdraw admissions that the magistrate had previously deemed 

admitted. However, New Beginnings is appealing the judgment of October 20, 2015. 

This entry does not address the withdrawal of admissions. That was done in the May 

21, 2015 order. The notice of appeal says nothing about appealing the May order, 

and the time to appeal has long since passed. See App.R. 3(A); App.R. 4(A). 

Accordingly, this assignment of error is meritless. 

{¶26} In sum, New Beginnings’ arguments are meritorious as the trial court 

improperly used Civ.R. 60 to make substantive, as opposed to clerical, changes to a 

previous order of the court. As such, the October 20, 2015 decision of the trial court 

reversed and remanded, the February 25, 2015 judgment is reinstated, and the 
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matter remanded for further proceedings. 

Donforio, P. J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs.