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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 

January 2016 Term 

_______________ FILED 

March 15, 2016 

No. 15-0392 released at 3:00 p.m. 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

PATRICK RUSSELL and
 

SYLVIA SMITH,
 

Petitioners
 

v. 

TOWN OF GRANVILLE,
 

Respondent.
 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Monongalia County
 

The Honorable Susan B. Tucker, Judge
 

Civil Action No. 14-C-571
 

AFFIRMED
 

Submitted: March 8, 2016
 

Filed: March 15, 2016
 

Michael J. Sharley, Esq. Michael L. Solomon, Esq. 

Westover, West Virginia Solomon & Solomon 

Counsel for the Petitioners Morgantown, West Virginia 

Counsel for the Respondent 

CHIEF JUSTICE KETCHUM delivered the Opinion of the Court. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 

1. “The legislature did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in granting to 

municipalities the authority to regulate, with or without a comprehensive zoning plan, the 

placement of mobile homes within municipalities.” Syl. Pt. 2, Town of Stonewood v. 

Bell, 165 W.Va. 653, 270 S.E.2d 787 (1980). 

2. “Repeal of a statute by implication is not favored in law.” Syl. Pt. 1, 

State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick, 145 W.Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960). 

3. “To repeal a statute by implication there must be such positive 

repugnancy between the provisions of the new statute and the old statute that they can not 

stand together or be consistently reconciled.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. 

Renick, 145 W.Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960). 

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Chief Justice Ketchum: 

Petitioners, Mr. Patrick Russell and Ms. Sylvia Smith (collectively “Mr. 

Russell”), appeal a March 30, 2015, order by the Circuit Court of Monongalia County. In 

its order, the circuit court found that Respondent, the Town of Granville, had authority 

under West Virginia statutory law to adopt an ordinance regulating the placement of 

mobile homes and house trailers. Mr. Russell contends the circuit court misconstrued the 

relevant statutes, and he argues that local governments must permit mobile homes and 

house trailers wherever site-built homes are permitted. 

Upon review, we find no error. The circuit court correctly found Granville 

had authority under West Virginia statutory law to adopt an ordinance regulating the 

placement of mobile homes and house trailers. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.
 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 

In September 2013, Granville adopted an ordinance limiting new mobile 

homes and house trailers to existing mobile home parks. Granville has space available in 

existing mobile home parks for new mobile homes. 

Mr. Russell owns real property in Granville not located in a mobile home 

park. Still, he wished to place a mobile home on his property, so he requested a variance 

to the ordinance. Granville declined to grant the variance. 

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Mr. Russell sought relief in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, 

asserting Granville’s ordinance was contrary to the West Virginia Code. The circuit 

court found the ordinance did not conflict with West Virginia law, and thus, it was valid 

and enforceable. Accordingly, on March 30, 2015, it entered an order denying Mr. 

Russell relief. Mr. Russell now appeals the circuit court’s March 30, 2015, order to this 

Court. 

II.
 

STANDARD OF REVIEW
 

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a municipal ordinance 

comports with West Virginia statutory law. Because this matter involves a question of 

law, it is subject to a de novo review. Am. Tower Corp. v. Common Council of City of 

Beckley, 210 W.Va. 345, 348, 557 S.E.2d 752, 755 (2001). 

III.
 

ANALYSIS
 

This dispute arises out of an ordinance adopted by the Town of Granville, 

which states: 

1739.03 . . . No person shall . . . locate, situate, keep or 

maintain a mobile home or trailer1 for occupancy upon any 

1 Granville Town Ordinance Section 5-17-1739.02 defines “mobile home” 

and “house trailer,” as “(a) a movable or portable unit, designed and constructed to be 

towed on its own chassis, comprised of frame and wheels, and designed to be connected 

to utilities for occupancy.” This definition excludes recreational vehicles. Under 

subsection (b) of the same ordinance, a “mobile home park” is “any tract of land on 

(continued . . .) 

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lot or tract of land located within the Town other than such 

property which is currently designated to be a mobile home 

park. 

Town of Granville Ordinance § 5-17-1739.03 [2013] (footnote added). 

Granville adopted this ordinance pursuant to a West Virginia statute, which 

provides, in pertinent part: 

[E]very municipality and the governing body thereof 

shall have plenary power and authority therein by ordinance 

or resolution . . . and by appropriate action based thereon: . . . 

(30) To prohibit with or without zoning the location of 

occupied house trailers or mobile homes in certain 

residential areas[.]” 

W.VA. CODE § 8-12-5 [2012] (emphasis added). In Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 165 

W.Va. 653, 270 S.E.2d 787 (1980), we found this statute to be constitutional and held: 

“The legislature did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in granting to municipalities the 

authority to regulate, with or without a comprehensive zoning plan, the placement of 

mobile homes within municipalities.” Syl. Pt. 2, Id. at 658, 270 S.E.2d at 791.2 

Nevertheless, Mr. Russell contends West Virginia law prohibits Granville 

from regulating the placement of mobile homes and house trailers. He relies on another 

statute, amended in 2006, which provides: 

which more than five (5) mobile homes are situated, . . . and designated, conducted and 

maintained as a mobile home park.” 

2 In Bell, this Court noted, “we are not here dealing with an absolute 

exclusion of mobile homes. If we were, our analysis would necessitate a different 

approach.” 165 W.Va. at 661, 270 S.E.2d at 792. Granville’s ordinance regulates the 

location of mobile homes and trailers but does not absolutely exclude them. 

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A governing body of a municipality or a county, when 

enacting residential design standards . . . shall uniformly 

apply such design standards and associated review and 

permitting procedures for factory-built3 and other singlefamily constructed homes. 

W. VA. CODE § 8A-11-1(c) [2012] (emphasis and footnote added). 

Mr. Russell interprets this statute to mean mobile homes and house trailers 

are permitted everywhere site-built homes are permitted. According to this 

interpretation, West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 impliedly repealed West Virginia Code § 

8-12-5(30) because the two statutes are irreconcilable, and West Virginia Code § 8A-11­

1 was enacted after West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30). He further argues that because 

West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30) is no longer in effect, Granville is without authority to 

adopt an ordinance regulating the placement of mobile homes and house trailers. 

By contrast, Granville contends these two statutes are not irreconcilable. 

Thus, West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30) remains in effect and Granville has authority 

3 “Factory-built home” is a term that encompasses “mobile home.” Under 

West Virginia Code § 8A-1-2(i), “‘Factory-built homes’ means modular and 

manufactured homes.” A “Modular home” is any home built in a factory which meets 

state and local codes. W. VA. CODE § 8A-1-2(s) [2012]. By contrast, “Manufactured 

homes” are regulated by federal law, and are defined as “a structure, transportable in one 

or more sections, which . . . is built on a permanent chassis [a wheeled conveyance] and 

designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when 

connected to the required utilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6) [2000]. The primary 

difference between a “manufactured” and a “modular” home is whether the home is built 

on a permanent chassis. “Mobile home” is merely an antiquated term for a 

“manufactured home.” Basically, they are the same thing. Carr v. Michael Motors, Inc., 

210 W.Va. 240, 247, 557 S.E.2d 294, 301 (2001) (“The statutory definition for a ‘mobile 

home’ constructed after 1974 is incorporated into the definition of a ‘manufactured 

home[.]’ . . . The term ‘mobile home’ was replaced with the term ‘manufactured 

home.’”). 

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under it to regulate the placement of mobile homes and house trailers. Granville further 

asserts West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 does not apply to its ordinance because the statute 

is limited to “residential design standards.” 

Therefore, the issue is whether West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 impliedly 

repealed West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30)’s grant of authority to regulate the placement 

of mobile homes and house trailers. In assessing this issue, we note “[r]epeal by 

implication is not favored in law.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick, 

145 W.Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960). Indeed, the implication of repeal must be “clear, 

necessary, irresistible, and free from reasonable doubt.” State ex rel. Thompson v. 

Morton, 140 W.Va. 207, 212, 84 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1954) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). “To repeal a statute by implication there must be such positive 

repugnancy between the provisions of the new statute and the old statute that they can not 

stand together or be consistently reconciled.” Syl. Pt. 2, Renick, 145 W.Va. 640, 116 

S.E.2d 763. Accordingly, if there is any reasonable construction that renders the two 

statutes reconcilable, we will not find West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 impliedly repealed 

West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30). 

West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 is limited to “residential design standards.” 

While the statute provides no definition for “residential design standards” or any 

variation thereof, other provisions in the West Virginia Code guide us in assessing its 

meaning. As we have held: “In parsing the language of a statute for its meaning, we are 

mindful that a cardinal rule of statutory construction is that significance and effect must, 

if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of the statute.” Meadows v. 

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 214, 530 S.E.2d 676, 687 (1999) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “In the construction of a legislative enactment, the 

intention of the legislature is to be determined, not from any single part, provision, 

section, sentence, phrase, or word, but rather from a general construction of the act or 

statute in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, Parkins v. Londeree, 146 W.Va. 1051, 124 S.E.2d 471 

(1962). 

Chapter 8A of the West Virginia Code encompasses differing types of land 

use planning ordinances. It lists “prohibiting specific land uses” separately from 

“[e]stablishing design standards and site plan approval procedures.” W. VA. CODE § 8A7-2(b)(1) & (b)(5) [2012]. Thus, proscribing permitted uses of land is necessarily 

different from adopting design standards, because an interpretation of a statutory 

provision which renders it a “mere repetition” must be rejected. See Syl. Pt. 7, Ex Parte 

Watson, 82 W.Va. 201, 95 S.E.2d 648 (1918). Likewise, local governments may regulate 

“the height, area, bulk, use and architectural features of buildings, including reasonable 

exterior architectural features and reasonable aesthetic standards for factory-built 

homes[,]” so long as the “process and standards” for such regulations are no more strict 

than those for site-built homes. W. VA. CODE § 8A-7-2 (b)(8)-(9). 

Clearly, the term “residential design standard,” as used in West Virginia 

Code § 8A-11-1, pertains to the minimum standards in terms of architecture, aesthetics, 

size, etc., to which permitted uses must adhere. Where mobile homes and trailers are 

permitted, West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 prohibits local governments from applying one 

design standard to site-built homes and another, more stringent standard, to mobile homes 

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(e.g. in regard to base size, roof pitch, brick fronts, chimneys, etc.). However, this statute 

does not say, or even imply, mobile homes and house trailers must be a permitted use of 

land everywhere site-built homes are permitted. Mr. Russell’s argument otherwise 

contradicts the Legislature’s intent to provide municipalities and counties “flexibility 

when authorizing land development and use.” W. VA. CODE § 8A-1-1(a)(9) [2012]. 

By contrast, West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30)’s plain terms authorize 

municipalities to proscribe permitted uses of land, i.e., to regulate the placement of 

mobile homes and house trailers. Therefore, we conclude West Virginia Code § 8-12­

5(30) and West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 implicate two different types of land use 

planning ordinances. Thus, the two statutes are not irreconcilable, and West Virginia 

Code § 8-12-5(30) is not impliedly repealed. 

Turning to the facts of this case, West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30) remains 

in effect. It grants authority to municipalities to regulate the placement of mobile homes 

and house trailers. In Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 165 W.Va. 653, 270 S.E.2d 787 

(1980), we found a municipality acts within its authority when, pursuant to West Virginia 

Code § 8-12-5(30), it restricts new mobile homes and house trailers to existing mobile 

home parks. Therefore, Granville acted within its authority when it adopted an ordinance 

restricting new mobile homes and house trailers to existing mobile home parks. Because 

Granville did not enact “residential design standards,” West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 

does not apply to this case. 

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Accordingly, Town of Granville Ordinance Section 5-17-1739.03 [2013] is 

valid and enforceable.4 

IV.
 

CONCLUSION
 

Upon review, we find no error. The circuit court correctly found Granville 

had authority under West Virginia Code § 8-12-5(30) [2012] to adopt an ordinance 

regulating the placement of mobile homes and house trailers. The circuit court’s March 

30, 2015, order is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

4 While the circuit court correctly found Granville’s ordinance was valid 

and enforceable, part of its reasoning was incorrect. The circuit court allowed a witness 

who participated in drafting the 2006 amendment to West Virginia Code § 8A-11-1 to 

opine on the amendment’s intent and meaning. The circuit court based its holding, in 

part, on this witness’s testimony. 

We have held: “Ordinarily, a court cannot consider the individual views of 

members of the Legislature or city council which are offered to prove the intent and 

meaning of a statute or ordinance after its passage and after litigation has arisen over its 

meaning and intent.” Syl. Pt. 1, Cogan v. City of Wheeling, 166 W.Va. 393, 274 S.E.2d 

516 (1981). 

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