IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

HEATHER M. ROWE, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

MCSHANE, Judge: 

Civ. No. 6:15-cv-00027-MC 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Heather Rowe brings this action for judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying her application for disability 

insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income payments (SSI) under Titles II and 

XVI of the Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c)(3). 

The issues before this Court are: (1) whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred 

in evaluating Plaintiffs credibility; and (2) whether the ALJ erred in evaluating lay witnesses' 

credibility. Because the ALJ properly considered the relevant testimony, the Commissioner's 

decision is AFFIRMED. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff previously applied for DIB and SSI on June 5, 2008, alleging disability since 

January 1, 2004. Those applications resulted in a closed period of disability between January 6, 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00027-MC Document 16 Filed 11/04/15 Page 1 of 8
2009, and August 30, 2010, with stipulation of medical improvement rendering plaintiff not 

disabled on August 30, 2010. On November 21, 2011, plaintiff protectively filed applications for 

DIB and SSI, again alleging disability since January 1, 2004. These claims were denied initially 

and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an ALJ, and appeared 

before the Honorable John Michaelsen on September 11, 2013. ALJ Michaelsen denied 

plaintiffs claims by written decision dated September 20, 2013. Plaintiff sought review from the 

Appeals Council, which was subsequently denied, thus rendering the ALJ's decision final. 

Plaintiff now seeks judicial review. 

Plaintiff was born on May 16, 1973. Tr. 21. Plaintiff was 30 years old as of her alleged 

onset date of disability, and was 40 years old as of her administrative hearing date. Tr. 21, 33. 

Plaintiff has a GED and earned her Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) Certification in 1992. Tr. 

21, 47. Plaintiffs last relevant work was as a CNA, which ended in 2003. Tr. 35. Plaintiff alleges 

disability due to: bipolar disorder; personality disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; lack of 

focus; anxiety; and poor memory. Tr. 222, 241. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner's decision if the decision is based on 

proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2004). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, this Court reviews the administrative 

record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the 

ALJ's conclusion. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

DISCUSSION 

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The Social Security Administration utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation to determine 

if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The initial burden ofproofrests upon 

the claimant to meet the first four steps. If a claimant satisfies his or her burden with respect to 

the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner for step five. 20 C.F .R. § 404.1520. At 

step five, the Commissioner's burden is to demonstrate that the claimant is capable of making an 

adjustment to other work after considering the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC), 

age, education, and work experience. Id. 

Plaintiff contends that: ( 1) the ALJ erred in evaluating plaintiffs credibility; and (2) the 

ALJ erred in evaluating the lay witnesses' credibility. 

I. Plaintiff's Credibility 

An ALJ must consider a claimant's symptom testimony, including statements regarding 

pain and workplace limitations. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1529, 416.929. "In deciding whether to 

accept [this testimony], an ALJ must perform two stages of analysis: the Cotton analysis and an 

analysis of the credibility of the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms." 

Smolen v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). If a claimant meets the Cotton analysis 1 

and there is no evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." 

Id. (citing Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993)). This Court "may not engage in 

second-guessing," Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted), 

and "must uphold the ALJ' s decision where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation," Andrews v. Shala/a, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 

1 "The Cotton test imposes only two requirements on the claimant: (1) she must produce objective medical evidence 

of an impairment or impairments; and (2) she must show that the impairment or combination of impairments could 

reasonably be expected to (not that it did in fact) produce some degree of symptom." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (citing 

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

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The ALJ determined that plaintiffs statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of her impairment were not credible. Tr. 17. In making this determination, the 

ALJ relied on three reasons: (1) inconsistencies within plaintiffs own statements; (2) plaintiffs 

prior stipulation of non-disability; and (3) inconsistencies between the objective medical 

evidence and plaintiffs allegations. See tr. 17-19. These reasons are legally sufficient and 

supported by substantial evidence. 

First, the ALJ found that there were inconsistencies between plaintiffs disability 

allegations and her various statements made to the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff 

alleged an inability to work because of problems with communication, concentration, task 

completion, comprehension, and interacting with others. See tr. 17, 209, 213, 215, 241, 246. 

Plaintiff also alleged that she was unable to complete household chores and prepare herself 

meals. See tr. 17, 38, 41, 242-44. These allegations are inconsistent with statements made to the 

Social Security Administration. For example, plaintiff reported that she uses public 

transportation, shops at Walmart, spends time with her family, goes out to breakfast, lives with 

others, reads, watches television, prepares herself meals, and complete household chores. Tr. 33, 

38-40, 242, 244, 245. Also, when interviewed by an official from the Social Security 

Administration, plaintiff was described as "direct and to the point"; she answered "all of [the 

interviewer's] questions without hesitation"; and she did not exhibit issues with understanding, 

concentration, or speech. Tr. 219. 

Plaintiffs allegations are also inconsistent with statements that she made to medical 

providers. For example, plaintiff alleged that her medications did not improve her mental state 

and resulted in adverse side effects. Tr. 44, 245. Nonetheless, plaintiff repeatedly reported 

improvement to her treatment providers. See tr. 305, 370, 374, 540, 551, 556, 562. Plaintiff also 

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Case 6:15-cv-00027-MC Document 16 Filed 11/04/15 Page 4 of 8
alleged that she was unable to interact with others, but reported to medical providers that she had 

good relationships with people and enjoyed spending time with others. Tr. 305, 362, 371, 372, 

467. 

Second, the ALJ noted that plaintiff previously stipulated to the termination of her 

disability benefits in August 2010 because of medical improvement. Tr. 11. Yet, at her hearing, 

plaintiff testified that she did not understand her previous stipulation and that she remained 

disabled. Tr. 34-35. The ALJ determined that plaintiffs subsequent hearing statements were not 

credible because: she had previously stipulated to medical improvement upon advice of counsel; 

her treatment providers did not document cognitive impairments; and she continued to report 

medical improvement following stipulation. See tr. 18, 463, 466, 540-68, 576-604. This 

reasoning is supported by substantial evidence. See id. 

Third, the objective medical evidence is inconsistent with plaintiffs allegations relating 

to communication, concentration, and task completion. For example, as noted by the ALJ, 

plaintiffs treatment notes repeatedly reflected clear speech, appropriate orientation, appropriate 

thought content, and intact memory. See, e.g., tr. 306, 310-13, 315, 317-21, 373, 376, 465, 546-

47, 552, 557, 558, 580. These treatment notes are consistent with a psychodiagnostic assessment 

performed in 2012, in which plaintiff appropriately understood, remembered, and followed 

instructions. See tr. 465, 467. Thus, the ALJ properly relied upon the objective medical evidence. 

In sum, the ALJ properly considered plaintiffs inconsistent statements, her prior 

stipulation, and the objective medical evidence in evaluating her credibility. 

II. Lay Witnesses' Credibility 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Heidi Tafjord's, Stormy 

Rowe's, and Aaron Rowe's credibility. See Pl.'s Br. 14-19, ECF No. 12. In response, Defendant 

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argues that the ALJ reasonably evaluated each respective witness's credibility. See Def.'s Br. 9-

12, ECF No. 14. 

Ms. Tafjord, who is a Psychiatric-Mental Health Nurse Practitioner (PMHNP), is an 

"other source" pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913. See Brown v. Colvin, Civ. No. 

3:13-cv-02248-MC, 2015 WL 1059068, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 2015) (citation omitted). Stormy 

Rowe, who is plaintiffs father, and Aaron Rowe, who is plaintiffs son, are also "other sources." 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). An opinion offered by an "other source" requires 

consideration. See SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, *4-5 (Aug. 9, 2006). To reject such an 

"other source" opinion, an ALJ must give reasons germane to that source for doing so. See 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2012). 

As to Ms. Tafjord's opinion, the ALJ assigned it "some weight." Tr. 20. The ALJ 

explained: 

To the extent that [Ms. Tafjord's] opinion is inconsistent with the [RFC], 

the undersigned gave it less weight because she did not provide any 

explanations and merely checked off boxes .... [I]t is unclear what the 

provider based her opinion on and what explains the difference between 

her opinion regarding maintaining concentration and the claimant's 

activities of daily living that demonstrate her ability to do so as found in 

the treatment notes. 

Id (citations omitted). These reasons are germane. 

Ms. Tafjord's treatment notes routinely described plaintiff as having intact concentration 

with logical thought processes. Tr. 552, 558, 580, 584, 589, 593, 596, 600. Ms. Tafjord's 

treatment notes also indicated that plaintiff appropriately rescheduled appointments if necessary. 

See Tr. 561. These treatment notes are inconsistent with a check-box mental RFC form submitted 

by Ms. Tafjord in 2012. In that form, for example, Ms. Tafjord opined that that plaintiff had 

"moderately severe" limitations in her ability to: maintain attention and concentration for 

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Case 6:15-cv-00027-MC Document 16 Filed 11/04/15 Page 6 of 8
extended periods; perform activities within a schedule; and maintain regular attendance and 

appropriate punctuality. Tr. 573. Nonetheless, Ms. Tafjord failed to explain the basis for her 

opined restrictions. Because Ms. Tafjord's treatment notes differ significantly from the 

unexplained check-box answers, the ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Tafjord's credibility. 

As to plaintiffs father's and son's opinions, the ALJ found both not credible. See tr. 17, 

20. The ALJ explained: 

For the same reasons that the undersigned finds the claimant less credible, 

the undersigned also finds these statements less credible as they rely 

heavily on the claimant's report of her symptoms. Additionally, their 

opinions that the claimant cannot function at a job are inconsistent with 

the testimony of the vocational expert who has a greater degree of 

knowledge about the demands of work. 

Tr. 20. These reasons are germane. 

Both lay witnesses reported that plaintiff had difficulties with communication, 

concentration, and understanding, and as a result, would be unemployable. See tr. 270-71. In 

contrast, as discussed above, plaintiffs treatment notes repeatedly reflected clear speech, 

appropriate thought content, and understanding. See, e.g., tr. 306. Moreover, as noted by the 

ALJ, the VE testified that there were jobs available in the national economy that plaintiff could 

perform based upon her RFC. See tr. 47-49. Thus, the ALJ properly evaluated Stormy Rowe's 

and Aaron Rowe's credibility. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Dated this_:!_ day of November, 2015. 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

\ 

Michael J. McShane 

United States District Judge 

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