Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES T. KNIGHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

HILLIS, HILLIS, ROZZI & KNIGHT Attorney General of Indiana

Logansport, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

DAVID E. COREY

Deputies Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )

J.W.K, R.K., J.N.K., B.K., AND J.K. )

Minor Children, )

)

and )

)

S.K., Mother, )

)

Appellants-Respondents, )

)

vs. ) No. 75A05-1307-JT-368

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )

SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE STARKE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Kim Hall, Judge

Cause Nos. 75C01-1304-JT-4, 75C01-1304-JT-5, 75C01-1304-JT-6, 75C01-1304-JT-7, 

75C01-1304-JT-8

March 21, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

S.K. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.W.K., born October 

11, 2000; R.K., born March 6, 2002; J.N.K., born June 10, 2003; B.K., born July 30, 2004; 

and J.K., born April 25, 2006 (collectively, Children). She argues the Department of Child 

Services (DCS) did not present sufficient evidence the conditions under which Children were 

removed would not be remedied or that termination was in the best interests of Children. We 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mother and A.K. (Father)1 are the parents of Children. On October 3, 2011, DCS 

received a report that the family home was unsafe due to excessive clutter and drug use. 

Mother was uncooperative with DCS, so DCS obtained a court order to enter the residence. 

DCS and law enforcement discovered extreme clutter throughout the entire house, no 

working utilities, black mold on the back wall of the porch, an unstable back porch, falling 

ceiling, hanging wires, and a non-working refrigerator containing insects that were feeding

on the rotten food therein. At the time, Mother indicated she and Children were living with 

Mother’s adult child.

On October 21, Mother told DCS she and Children had to move back into the family 

home. DCS and the Health Department attempted to work with Mother for a month to 

remedy the conditions found in the family home on October 3. Mother made very little 

progress, and on November 22, the Fire Chief inspected the home and concluded it was 

unsafe for Mother and Children to live there. DCS removed Children from Mother’s care the 

 

1 Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to Children and does not participate in this appeal.
3

same day.

On December 14, the trial court adjudicated Children as Children in Need of Services 

(CHINS) upon admission of both parents. On January 10, 2012, the trial court entered a 

dispositional order placing Children outside of Mother’s care and ordered Mother to, among 

other things, attend all appointments and cooperate with the home-based therapist and home 

case manager; work with DCS and the treatment team to make the required improvements to 

the home and to eliminate unnecessary clutter in the home; work with service providers to 

clean the home and maintain that progress; work with a therapist to identify and avoid 

triggers that resulted in the unsatisfactory condition of the home; and obtain and maintain a 

means of financial support for Children. On April 15, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate

Mother’s parental rights to Children because she had not progressed in services and had 

ceased visiting Children in September 2012.

 The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the termination petition on June 25 and 

26, 2013. DCS presented evidence Mother had removed some of the clutter from the house 

and made some of the required repairs, but was resistant to making changes and the home 

was starting to get cluttered again; Mother did not follow through with mental health 

treatment recommendations, which were the root of her issues with the condition of the 

home; Mother did not have a stable income; and Mother failed to visit Children after 

September 2012 and missed several visits before that time. The trial court entered an order 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children on July 22.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S., & 

B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge 

credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the 

judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we 

will set aside a judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re 

L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 1161 (2002).

When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, 

we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 

839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first whether the evidence supports the 

findings and second whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by 

inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and 

inferences support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 

208.

“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 

N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court must subordinate the 

interests of the parents to those of the child, however, when evaluating the circumstances 
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surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 837. The right to raise one’s own child 

should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, id., but 

parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her 

parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six 

(6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are 

not required, including a description of the court’s finding, the 

date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was 

made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been 

under the supervision of a county office of family and children 

or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the 

most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the 

child is removed from the home as a result of the child being 

alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof of these 

allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. If the court 
6

finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. Mother argues DCS did not present sufficient evidence to prove the 

conditions under which Children were removed would not be remedied, pursuant to Ind. 

Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), or that termination was in the best interests of Children 

pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-35-2(b)(2)(C). We address each argument in turn.

a. Ind. Code § 31-35-2(b)(2)(B)(i)

A trial court may not terminate a parent’s rights unless the State demonstrates by clear 

and convincing evidence “there is a reasonable probability that: (i) the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents 

will not be remedied; or (ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to 

the well-being of the child.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); see also In re W.B., 772 

N.E.2d 522, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting State’s burden of proof). Because the statute 

was written in the disjunctive, the State needs to prove only one. In re J.W., 779 N.E.2d 

954, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied sub nom. Weldishofer v. Dearborn Cnty. Div. of 

Family & Children, 792 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 2003). Therefore, when the evidence supports one 

of the trial court’s conclusions, we need not determine whether the evidence supports the 

remaining portions of the statute. Id.

Mother challenges only whether the evidence supports the findings the court used to 

support its conclusion that the conditions resulting in removal of Children will not be 

remedied. However, the court also concluded the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children, and the court entered a number of 
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independent findings to support that conclusion. Mother has not challenged that conclusion 

or any of the findings that support that conclusion. Because the unchallenged findings 

support the unchallenged conclusion, which supports the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights, we need not review Mother’s allegations regarding the superfluous findings and 

conclusion\. See T.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012) (when unchallenged findings support termination, there is no error), trans. denied. 

b. Ind. Code § 31-35-2(b)(2)(C)

Pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(1)(C), DCS needed to provide sufficient 

evidence “that termination is in the best interests of the child.” In determining what is in the 

best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by 

DCS and to consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2009). In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those 

of the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly before 

terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Recommendations of the case manager and 

court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not 

be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in 

the child’s best interests. Id.

Regarding Children’s best interests, the trial court concluded:2

Termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Both the 

Family Case Manager and the CASA testified that the child has been adversely 

 

2 The trial court entered separate orders with identical language for each child, with the exception of the 

identifying information for the specific child. Therefore, we quote from the order regarding the oldest child, 

J.W.K.
8

impacted by the mother’s inability to provide a safe and stable home. Further, 

the child has been adversely affected by the lack of permanency. The child is 

in need of a permanent placement with the child’s siblings in a safe, stable, and 

loving environment. The Court finds there is clear and convincing evidence 

that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child to be required to 

continue to wait in a temporary, impermanent situation for the mother to 

overcome the problems that have kept her from providing the child with a safe, 

stable, and permanent home.

(App. at 17.) To support that conclusion, the trial court found Children had been removed 

from Mother’s care for almost two years, Mother refused treatment for mental illness, and 

Mother was resistant to outside intervention and help with cleaning and repairing her house, 

which was the reason Children were removed from her care. Mother’s arguments to the 

contrary are invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 

804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge credibility of 

witnesses).

CONCLUSION

As Mother does not challenge, and there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s determination that the continuance of the parent-children relationship posed a threat 

to the well-being of Children, we need not consider Mother’s argument regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence presented to prove the conditions under which Children were 

removed from Mother’s home would not be remedied. Additionally, DCS provided
9

sufficient evidence to prove termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of 

Children. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.