IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

ROBERT LOUIS DANNENHOFFER, 

M.D., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

ARCHITRAVE HEALTH, LLC; and 

MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 

Jennifer J. Middleton 

Meredith A. Holley 

Defendants. 

Johnson, Johnson & Schaller, PC 

975 Oak Street, Suite 1050 

Eugene, OR 97401 

Attorneys for plaintiff 

John A. Berg 

Littler Mendelson, PC 

121 SW Morrison, Suite 900 

Portland, OR 97204 

Linda M. Doyle 

Kaitlin P. Sheehan 

McDermott Will & Emery LLP 

227 West Monroe Street 

Chicago, IL 60606 

No. 6:16-cv-00135-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 1 of 14
Gregory R. Jones 

McDermott Will & Emery LLP 

2049 Century Park East, Suite 3 800 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

Attorneys for defendant 

Architrave Health, LLC 

David C. Campbell 

Eric J. Neiman 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP 

888 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204 

Attorneys for defendant 

Mercy Medical Center, Inc. 

AIKEN, Judge: 

Plaintiff Robert Louis Dannenhoffer, M.D., was the Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of 

defendant Architrave Health, LLC ("Architrave"). He was fired shortly after Architrave selfdisclosed to the federal government that an Architrave subsidiary had submitted about $10 million 

in potentially illegal Medicare claims. In this action, plaintiff asserts Architrave retaliated against 

him for whistleblowing in violation of the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), and 

Oregon's whistleblower protection statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.199. He further contends 

Architrave blacklisted him, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.805. Finally, plaintiff avers 

Architrave and defendant Mercy Medical Center ("Mercy") committed the state-law tmi of 

intentional interference with economic relations. 

Defendants filed separate Answers to the Complaint on March 30, 2016. That same day, 

Architrave filed a Motion to Strike or in the Alternative to Dismiss (doc. 25), asking the Court to 

excise substantial portions of the Complaint. When plaintiff filed his response in opposition 

Architrave's motion, he also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend (doc. 34). For the reasons set forth 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 2 of 14
below, Architrave's motion is denied and plaintiffs motion is granted. 1 

BACKGROUND 

The following facts are undisputed. Architrave, a limited liability corporation, was founded 

in 2013 in Roseberg, Oregon. Compl. if 5. Architrave is a joint venture of Mercy, the nonprofit 

corporation that runs Rose berg's community hospital, and the Douglas County Independent Practice 

Association, Inc. ("DCIP A"), a corporation with more than 100 doctor-owners. Id. ifif 5-7. Mercy 

and DCIP A agreed to form Architrave to "align their interests and promote access to high-quality, 

low-cost health care for the residents of Douglas County." Id. if 15. 

In order to form Architrave, Mercy put up $23 million in capital and DCIP A transferred to 

Architrave the majority of its assets, including the coordinated care organization2 for Douglas 

County; a medical billing company; an electronic health records management company; a primarycase health center; and a one-third interest in a Medicare Advantage plan. Id. if 16. A portion of 

1 Architrave filed a reply brief in support of its motion to strike. Doc. 36. In the District 

of Oregon, replies to motions to strike are permitted only with leave of the court. See L.R. 56-

1 (b ); Practice Tip to L.R. 7-l(e)(2). Even if a reply had been permitted, Architrave's reply would 

not have been timely, as it was filed more than fourteen days after plaintiff filed his response. See 

L.R. 7-l(e)(2). 

2 Coordinated care organizations ("CCOs") are "the umbrella organizations that govern 

and administer care for [Oregon Health Plan (Medicaid)] members in their local 

communities. . . . They ... have one budget that grows at a fixed rate for mental, physical and 

ultimately dental care. CCOs will bring forward new models of care that are patient-centered and 

team-focused." Oregon Health Authority, About Coordinated Care Organizations, 

https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Pages/AboutUs.aspx (last accessed May 11, 2016). After the 

Affordable Care Act was enacted in 2010, Oregon obtained "waiver" authorization from the 

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") to establish CCOs as the care and 

coverage delivery system for Medicaid. Oregon Health Policy Board, Oregon's Medicaid 

Demonstration, www.oregon.gov/oha/OHPB/Pages/health-reform/cms-waiver.aspx (last 

accessed May 11, 2016). 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 3 of 14
Mercy's $23 million capital investment was used in pay dividends to DCIPA's doctor-members in 

exchange for this transfer of assets. Id. if 16. Plaintiff was CEO of DCIP A when Architrave was 

formed, and he became the first CEO of Architrave when it began operations. Id. if 17. As CEO, 

plaintiff was accountable to Architrave's board of directors, which was composed of five DCIPA 

representatives and five Mercy representatives. Id. if 18. 

From its inception, Architrave contracted with DCIPA to provide certain services. For the 

first year of its operation, Architrave paid DCIPA a $30,000 monthly fee for consulting services 

("consulting services contract"). Id. if 25. Architrave also paid a subsidiary of DCIP A a flat permember monthly fee for "special services" - clinical services such as sterilization and family 

planning that Mercy, as a Catholic hospital, could not provide ("special services contract"). Id. ifif 

32-34. During plaintiff's tenure as CEO, Architrave attempted to negotiate a management services 

contract with a different DPICA subsidiary ("management services contract"). Id. ifif 42-43, 46. 

After legal review of one of the proposed management services contracts, Architrave, through 

plaintiff, self-disclosed $10 million in potentially illegal Medicare claims to CMS. Id. ifif 59, 61, 66. 

Architrave terminated plaintiff's employment about three weeks after that disclosure. Id. if 67. 

The parties' versions of the story diverge dramatically with respect to the reasons for 

plaintiff's termination and the sequence of events involving the contracts with DCIP A. It is 

undisputed that one of the goals of Architrave was to reduce "outmigration" of cases. Id. if 21; 

Answer if 21. "Outmigration" is the movement of a patient to a healthcare provider outside of 

Roseberg- for example, through a referral to a hospital in the larger nearby city of Eugene rather 

than to Mercy. Plaintiff asserts Architrave's board members considered it vital to develop "some 

kind of deal to fund the DCIP A," which had lost major revenue streams when it transferred its assets 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 4 of 14
to Architrave, so that DCIPA's doctor-members would keep their referrals in Roseberg. Compl. 

if 24, 42. He further alleges Architrave's contracts with DCIPA and its subsidiaries were all 

designed, at least in part, to "secure the cooperation" ofDCIP A in sending a steady stream of patient 

referrals to Mercy and other Architrave providers. Id. iii! 24, 30, 38. Plaintiff asserts Architrave 

achieved this goal by paying DCIP A for services it never delivered (in the case of the consulting 

services contract) and by paying significantly more than fair market value for services rendered (in 

the case of the special services contract.) Id. iii! 28, 36-37. 

Plaintiff contends that he insisted on a legal review of the management services contract, 

which "uncovered significant and long-standing violations of [federal] law" governing Medicare 

claims. Id. if 51. He alleges that, in the face of a "hailstorm of criticism" from Architrave board 

members, he continued to investigate these legal violations. Id. iii! 53, 54. Plaintiff contends he was 

the driving force behind self-reporting and that the board only "reluctantly" agreed to disclose the 

violations to CMS. Id. if 61. He alleges he was fired, and that defendants blocked him from 

obtaining employment elsewhere, because of his "strict compliance stance" and "unwillingness to 

go along with [defendants'] fraudulent schemes." Id. if 73. 

Unsurprisingly, Architrave's version of the facts is quite different. It denies the DCIP A 

contracts were motivated by a desire to boost referrals. Answer iii! 24, 30, 38. Instead, Architrave 

argues the DCIP A contracts were intended to further "multiple important and legitimate business 

purposes," including "to harness DCIP A[' s] substantial expertise, abilities, relationships, and other 

attributes useful to further development of the medical community and the provision of healthcare 

services." Id. iii! 24, 30 (quotation marks omitted). Architrave also denies it paid for services never 

rendered under the consulting contract, and contends the apparent overpayment under the special 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 5 of 14
services contract was due to coding problems, viz., the computer system did not permit providers to 

bill for the full amount of services rendered. Id. iii! 28, 36. Once the coding problems were 

adequately addressed, Architrave asserts the amount paid under the special services contract fairly 

approximated the value of the DCIPA subsidiary's services. Id. if 36. Architrave contends plaintiff 

was not fired because of any attempt to stop legal violations, but instead due to "significant issues 

related to his performance ... , his leadership style (including his inability to work collaboratively), 

his extreme negative response to any criticism or disagreement (including angry outbursts), his 

failure to respond to the board's directives, his constant misleading of the board, his alienating and 

angering of physicians, his mismanagement of personnel, and his management and selection of a 

new practice management system ... which ... ended up costing Architrave more than $4 million." 

Id. if 68. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to Strike 

The focus of Architrave's motion to strike is paragraphs 25 to 40 and portions of paragraph 

7 4 in the Complaint. These sections are devoted to factual allegations related to the consulting 

services contract and the special services contract. Architrave argues these allegations should be 

stricken as immaterial and impertinent. 

A court may "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 

impertinent, or scandalous matter" either "on its own" or "on motion made by either party ... before 

responding to the pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). An immaterial matter is "that which has no 

essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded." Fantasy, 

Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted), rev 'd 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 6 of 14
on other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). Impertinent material "consists of 

statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Id. at 1527. "One 

test that has been advanced for determining whether an allegation in a pleading is immaterial and 

impertinent within the meaning of 12(f) is whether proof concerning it could be received at trial; if 

it could not, then the matter is immaterial and impertinent." Pratt v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. 

Co., 285 B.R. 3, 6 (D. Or. 2001) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure§ 1382 (2d ed. 1990)). 

Citing Rule 12(f)'s directive that a motion to strike must be made "before responding to the 

pleading," plaintiff challenges Architrive's motion as untimely. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted 

Rule 12(f) to prohibit a district court from striking portions of a pleading in response to a motion 

filed after the moving party has already filed a responsive pleading. Culinary & Serv. Emps. Union, 

AFL-CIO Local 555 v. Haw. Emp. Benefits Admin., Inc., 688 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, 

however, the motion to strike was filed at the same time as Architrive's Answer. See Doc. 25, 26. 

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether a district court is time-barred from considering a 

motion to strike when the motion is filed together with the responsive pleading, and lower courts are 

split on the issue. Compare Winnemem Wintu Tribe v. US. Forest Serv., 2013 WL 1325423, *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (interpreting Culinary to mean a motion to strike is timely only if it 

"precede[s] the filing of a responsive pleading") with Nkemakolam v. St. John's Military Sch., 876 

F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (D. Kan. 2012) (motion to strike is timely when filed "simultaneous[ly]" 

with answer). However, it is unnecessary to resolve this question. Even if the motion is timely, it 

must be denied. The challenged allegations are neither immaterial nor impertinent, as evidence 

about the consulting services contract and the special services contract (collectively, "the DCIP A 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 7 of 14
contracts") would be relevant at trial. 

Before addressing Architrive' s arguments, it is necessary to explain the federal laws that form 

the backdrop of plaintiffs claims. Plaintiff alleges he was concerned about violations of three 

federal laws: the Stark Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; the Anti-Kickback Statute ("AKS"), 42 U.S.C. § 

1320a-7b(b); and the FCA, 31U.S.C.§3729. The Stark Act "generally prohibits a physician from 

referring Medicare patients to entities in which the physician has a prohibited 'financial interest."' 

Ebeid ex rel. US. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn). 

The AKS makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully exchange money for referral of Medicare 

patients. United States v. Ctr.for Diagnostic Imaging, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217-18 (W.D. 

Wash. 2011). 

The FCA broadly combats fraud on the government by "encourag[ing] insiders to disclose 

fraud." Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 995. It "contains a qui tam provision that permits private persons (known 

as 'relators') to bring civil actions on behalf of the United States" against individuals or entities who 

violate its terms. Id. As part of submitting Medicare claims to the federal government for payment, 

the submitting individual or entity must certify compliance with a variety of federal laws, including 

the Stark Law and the AKS. See US. ex rel. Brooks v. Trillium Onty. Health Plan, 2016 WL 

1725300, *6 (D. Or. Apr. 29, 2016). Accordingly, in the healthcare context, anFCA violation often 

takes the form of a false certification of compliance with the Stark Law and the AKS. Id. 

Plaintiffs first claim for relief is a claim under the FCA's whistleblower protection 

provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the 

employee engaged in activity protected under the statute; (2) that the employer knew that the 

employee engaged in protected activity; and (3) that the employer discriminated against the 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 8 of 14
employee because she engaged in protected activity." Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech. Jet Propulsion 

Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002). "Protected activity" includes any "lawful act ... done ... 

in furtherance of an action" under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(l). It also encompasses "efforts 

to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter." Id. As relevant here, that means "protected 

activity" encompasses efforts to stop false certifications to the government regarding compliance 

with the Stark Law and the AKS. 

Architrave argues the allegations about the DCIP A contracts are immaterial and impertinent 

to his FCA retaliation claim because plaintiff has failed to identify any "protected activity" in 

connection with those contracts. I disagree. 3 Plaintiff asserts he opposed the contracts with DCIP A, 

and eventually refused to renew those contracts, because of his concern the agreements violated the 

AKS.4 A CEO's internal opposition to and eventual decision not to renew contracts because of a 

sincere, reasonable belief those contracts violated the AKS plainly qualifies as an effort to stop an 

3 Even if the DCIP A allegations did not themselves contain allegations of protected 

activity, striking them would be improper. These allegations provide context and background for 

(1) Architrave's self-report to federal officials about Stark Law violations; and (2) plaintiffs 

purported internal efforts to restructure Architrave's compensation schemes and contractual 

relationships to eliminate violations of the Stark Law and the AKS. For example, the DCIP A 

allegations could be used to prove board member knowledge of the alleged pattern of legal 

violations and plaintiffs purported attempts to stop those violations. That knowledge, in turn, 

would be a relevant consideration in determining Architrave's motivation in firing plaintiff. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining 

the action.") 

4 I agree with Architrave the Complaint could be clearer regarding plaintiffs belief the 

agreements violated federal law. However, that argument goes to adequacy of the pleadings, not 

to materiality and pertinence on a motion to strike. As explained in Section II of this Opinion, 

Architrave has not made a proper challenge to the pleadings under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 

12(c) because it has not asked the Court to dismiss any of plaintiffs claims. 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 9 of 14
FCA violation.5 

Architrave argues plaintiffs opposition to the DCIP A contracts was not protected activity 

because he was simply carrying out his normal job duties as CEO. In support of this argument, 

Architrave cites a number of out-of-circuit authorities holding actions do not constitute "protected 

activity" if the employee was "required to undertake [them] in fulfillment of ... job duties." E.g. 

US. ex. rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1523 (10th Cir. 1996). This line 

of cases is inapplicable here because the decisions interpreted a predecessor version of section 

3730(h). Before 2009, FCA retaliation protection was confined to individuals who had done 

something "in furtherance of an action" under the FCA. Because of the statute required a "nexus" 

between the employee's activity and a claim under the FCA, many courts held employees had to 

show they had gone beyond the usual scope of their job duties in investigating or reporting the fraud. 

E.g. Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1994). Defendant 

contends these cases stand for the proposition that employees whose job descriptions encompass 

ensuring the company operates within the bounds of the law face a heightened burden to prove their 

investigation of fraudulent activity was connected to a potential FCA violation, and was not simply 

part of their normal job duties. E.g. Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 191 (3d 

5 In ruling on a motion to strike, a district court may not resolve "disputed and substantial 

factual or legal issues." Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973. Accordingly, it is premature to determine 

whether plaintiffs belief the contracts violated the Anti-Kickback Statute was objectively 

reasonable or subjectively genuine. It is similarly premature to determine whether his decision 

not to renew the contracts was based on such a belief, i.e., whether that decision was an effort to 

stop FCA violations rather than a pure attempt to improve Architrave's financial situation. 

Today, the Court decides only that if plaintiffs belief was reasonable and sincere, and if that 

belief motivated him to oppose the contracts, then plaintiff engaged in qualifying protected 

activity under section 3730(h). 

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Cir. 2001). 

In 2009, Congress amended section 3 730(h) to add whistle blower protections for employees 

who attempted to stop violations of the FCA, whether or not those efforts were connected to a 

potential FCA claim. Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 847-48 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Applying old case law rooted in the requirement there be a connection between an FCA claim and 

the employee's actions would contravene the plain text of the statute.6 See US. ex rel. McGinnis v. 

OSF Healthcare System, 2014 WL 378644, *9 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2014) (explaining there is no 

"nexus" requirement to prove "protected activity" in the form of "other efforts to stop violations of 

the FCA"). 

The factual allegations in paragraphs 25 to 40 and 7 4 are neither impertinent nor immaterial. 

Architrave's motion to strike is denied. 

6 The "scope of duties" cases also tended to collapse into a single inquiry whether an 

employee engaged in protected activity and whether the employer was aware of the protected 

activity. See Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 193 (stating there is a heightened burden for each prong when 

the protected activity and scope of employment duties overlap, but focusing on whether a 

memorandum "inform[ ed]" the employer "that [the employee] intended to use th[ e] information 

in fmiherance of a qui tam action"); Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1523 (discussing both prongs but 

failing to separate analysis of the two prongs); Robertson, 32 F.3d at 951-52 (same). In 

Ramseyer and Robertson, the ultimate holding dooming the employee's claim was not that the 

employee failed to show protected activity, but that the employer could not have been expected 

to know about the protected activity because that activity overlapped with the employee's usual 

duties. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1523 ("[W]e do not believe plaintiff has satisfied her burden of 

pleading facts which would put defendants on notice that she was taking any action in 

furtherance of an FCA action."); Robertson, 32 F.3d at 952 ("We therefore conclude that 

Robertson failed to present sufficient evidence to suppmi a finding that Bell was aware that his 

investigations were in furtherance of a qui tam action.") But see Hutchins, 253 F.3d at 195 ("By 

failing to prove that he engaged in 'protected conduct' and that he put his employer on notice of 

the 'distinct possibility' of False Claims Act litigation, Hutchins, as a matter of law, cannot prove 

a violation of§ 3730(h).") Arguably, this line of cases applies primarily to the employee's 

evidentiary burden regarding employer knowledge. 

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II. Motion to Dismiss 

In the alternative, Architrave argues paragraphs 25 to 40 and portions of paragraph 74 should 

be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )( 6).7 The relief Architrave requests is not available pursuant 

to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to challenge the 

sufficiency of a claim; it is not a vehicle for striking isolated factual allegations. Cf Whittlestone, 

618 F.3d at 974 (explaining the difference between Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f), and refusing to 

"creat[ e] redundancies within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" by dismissing a claim as legally 

insufficient in response to a 12(f) motion to strike). Because Architrave has not asked the Court to 

dismiss any of plaintiffs claims, its alternate request for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied 

without prejudice to renewal of the arguments therein in a future motion. 

III. Motion for Leave to Amend 

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the complaint. 8 Architrave opposes amendment on the ground 

7 Plaintiff asserts the 12(b)(6) motion is time-barred. Rule 12(b) provides that a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim "must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is 

allowed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). Again, this raises the question whether a 

motion filed together with the Answer qualifies as being filed "before" the responsive pleading. 

Id. Whatever the answer to that question, timeliness is not bar to this Court's consideration of 

Architrave's 12(b)(6) motion. Courts regularly construe motions to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim filed after a responsive pleading as motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 

12(c). Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). Rule 12(b)(6) 

and Rule 12(c) are "functionally identical" and "the same standard of review applies to motions 

brought under either rule." Cafasso, US. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 

1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). 

8 Plaintiff moved to amend "in an abundance of caution ... should this Court feel that 

additional allegations are necessary." Pl.'s Mot. Leave Amend 2. As explained, the Court will 

not address Architrave's arguments regarding dismissal of certain portions of the Complaint, as 

Rule 12(b)(6) is a vehicle for dismissal of claims, not factual allegations. Nonetheless, in the 

interest of efficiency, the Court addresses plaintiffs request for leave to amend. 

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Case 6:16-cv-00135-AA Document 39 Filed 05/25/16 Page 12 of 14
of futility. A party seeking to amend its pleading after the time to amend as a matter of course has 

expired must obtain leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend "should be freely 

given when justice so requires because the purpose of the rule is to facilitate decision on the merits, 

rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." Novakv. United States, 795F.3d1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 

2015) (alterations normalized and quotation marks omitted). However, a court need not grant leave 

to amend if amendment would be "an exercise in futility." Id. 

Plaintiff seeks to add three allegations to the complaint: that the ACIP A contracts likely 

violated the AKS; that plaintiff subjectively believed the contracts violated the AKS; and that 

Architrave knew when it discharged plaintiff that his opposition to and decisions not to renew the 

ACIP A contracts were efforts to stop potential violations of the FCA. Architrave argues such 

amendments would be futile on two grounds. First, Architrave asserts plaintiff has "already 

conceded" the allegations about the ACIP A contracts are immaterial to his retaliation claims. 

Architrave Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Leave Amend 3. The Court finds no such "concession" anywhere in 

plaintiffs filings. Moreover, as explained, the Court finds the ACIP A allegations both material and 

pertinent. Second, Architrave argues plaintiffs amendments amount to affirmative allegations that 

he committed a federal felony, and that his signature on the ACIPA contracts means he bears 

responsibility for any legal violations. That argument is well beyond the scope of a motion to amend 

and most likely cannot be resolved until summary judgment or trial. 

Plaintiffs proposed additions are directly responsive to the Architrave's arguments regarding 

purported pleading deficiencies. Amendment would not be futile. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion 

for leave to amend is granted. 

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CONCLUSION 

Architrave's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative to Dismiss (doc. 25) is DENIED. 

Architrave's request for oral argument is DENIED as unnecessary. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to 

Amend (doc. 34) is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/i\ 

Dated this __ day of May 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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