IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

AMANDA R. CULVER, 6:16-cv-00074-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1

Acting Commissioner, Social

Security Administration,

Defendant.

KATHERINE EITENMILLER

MARK A. MANNING

Harder Wells Baron & Manning, PC

474 Willamette Street

Eugene, OR 97401

(541) 686-1969

Attorneys for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1011

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Nancy

A. Berryhill, who became Acting Commissioner of the Social

Security Administration on January 23, 2017, is automatically

substituted in place of Carolyn W. Colvin.

1 - OPINION AND ORDER
DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

MICHAEL S. HOWARD 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104-7075

(206) 615-2539

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Amanda R. Culver seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff’s applications for

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance

Benefits (DIB) under Titles XVI and II of the Social Security

Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s

final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff filed applications for DIB on January 31, 2012,

and for SSI on January 9, 2012, and alleged a disability onset

date of March 19, 1980. Tr. 37, 312, 314.2 Her applications

were denied initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative

2

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on June 21, 2016, are referred to as “Tr.”

2 - OPINION AND ORDER
Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on June 10, 2014. Tr. 60-123. At

the hearing Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified. 

Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. 

On August 20, 2014, the ALJ issued an opinion in which she 

found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled

to benefits. Tr. 37-52. On November 20, 2015, that decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. 1-4. See

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on March 19, 1980. Tr. 312, 314. 

Plaintiff was 34 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 60,

312, 314. Plaintiff has a high-school diploma. Tr. 346. 

Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as a bus person,

stock clerk, hand-packager, and nurse assistant. Tr. 50, 107. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to “learning and mental

disabilities” and back pain. Tr. 345. 

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the

medical evidence. See Tr. 40-50.

3 - OPINION AND ORDER
STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her

inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690). 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairments or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

5 - OPINION AND ORDER
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed

Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. “A

‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or an equivalent schedule.” SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff engaged in substantial

gainful activity from January 2000 through December 2004 and from

January 2007 through December 2007. Tr. 39-40. The ALJ,

however, continued the sequential disability evaluation because

the ALJ also found there had been “continuous 12-months period(s)

during which [Plaintiff] did not engage in substantial gainful

activity.” Tr. 40.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe

impairments of post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder,

dysthymic disorder, borderline intellectual functioning,

7 - OPINION AND ORDER
attention-deficit disorder, left-knee patellofemoral syndrome,

and obesity. Tr. 40-41. 

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s medically

determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix

1. Tr. 41-44. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff is able to lift 50 pounds occasionally

and 25 pounds frequently; to follow “short and simple

instructions”; and to perform work that is limited to “basic

routine work tasks,” that has “no close interaction with the

public and only casual and superficial interaction with coworkers,” and that is “stress low to prevent [Plaintiff] from

becoming overwhelmed.” Tr. 44. The ALJ defined “stress low”

work as “no fast-paced production or pace work and a workplace

with minimal changes in routine and setting.” Tr. 44.

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is unable to

perform any of her past relevant work. Tr. 50. 

At Step Five, however, the ALJ found Plaintiff is capable of

performing other jobs existing in the national economy as a

“sweeper cleaner, industrial”; a “warehouse worker”; and a

“laborer, salvage.” Tr. 51-52. Accordingly, the ALJ found

Plaintiff is not disabled.

8 - OPINION AND ORDER
DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) discredited

Plaintiff’s testimony; (2) improperly considered the medical,

record including Plaintiff’s Global Assessment of Functioning

(GAF) scores, the opinion of Elizabeth Perrine, QMHP, and Ruth

Ann Duncan, LMFT, and the opinion of David Truhn, Psy.D.; and 

(3) discredited the lay testimony of Roy Culver, Plaintiff’s

father.

I. Plaintiff’s Testimony

As noted, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he

discredited Plaintiff’s testimony.

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence

of an impairment or impairments, and she must show the impairment

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th

Cir. 1986). See also Spelatz v. Astrue, 321 F. App’x 689, 692

(9th Cir. 2009). The claimant, however, need not produce

objective medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their

severity. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). 

See also Delgado v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 500 F.

App’x 570, 570 (9th Cir. 2012).

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not

9 - OPINION AND ORDER
any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant’s pain testimony only if she provides clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834

(9th Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant’s

testimony is not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must

identify “what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester, 81

F.3d at 834).

At the June 10, 2014, hearing Plaintiff testified she has

difficulty reading although she obtained her high-school diploma

with the help of special-education services. Tr. 69-70. 

Plaintiff stated she has difficulty understanding and filling out

forms and that each of her previous employers told her they were

preparing to fire her because she was too “slow.” Tr. 91. 

Plaintiff testified she suffers from anxiety and that she

suffered from depression in the past, but the depression had

improved since she regained custody of her children. Tr. 78-79. 

At the time of the hearing Plaintiff stated she was neither

taking medication nor undergoing therapy for her anxiety. Tr.

79. Plaintiff testified she has difficulty maintaining her house

because she struggles to concentrate long enough to complete

tasks. Tr. 99. 

Plaintiff also stated she had knee problems in the past, but

10 - OPINION AND ORDER
at the time of the hearing it was “doing a lot better.” Tr. 83. 

Plaintiff also testified since a car accident in 1999 she has

suffered low-back problems that cause her “constant pain” when

she sits and walks. Tr. 84-85.

The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony on the basis that

(1) Plaintiff did not consistently seek treatment for her

depression and anxiety (including at the time of the hearing),

and, thus, Plaintiff’s testimony that her depression and anxiety

rendered her unable to work was not credible; (2) the treatment

record does not fully corroborate Plaintiff’s testimony; 

(3) Plaintiff’s testimony was not consistent with contemporaneous

reports of her ability to function; (4) Plaintiff did not follow

through on recommended mental-health treatment, and the timing of

Plaintiff’s engagement in mental-health treatment suggests

secondary-gain motives for seeking treatment; and (5) Plaintiff

has demonstrated the ability to perform work at substantial

gainful activity levels since her alleged onset date.

 The Court notes, however, that the ALJ did not entirely

discredit Plaintiff’s testimony, but instead incorporated into

his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC many of the limitations to

which Plaintiff testified.

The ALJ correctly noted Plaintiff’s mental-health treatment

history was sufficiently sporadic that it did not support

Plaintiff’s statements about her alleged disabling anxiety.

11 - OPINION AND ORDER
Although Plaintiff sought extended mental-health treatment in

2010 and 2011 after her children were removed from her custody,

Plaintiff discontinued that treatment after her children were

returned to her custody. Tr. 523, 612-20. Plaintiff briefly

began treatment again in February 2013, but she discontinued

treatment in May of that year when she stated she moved out of

town. Tr. 595-611. Plaintiff had not re-established care

anywhere by the June 2014 hearing. Tr. 79.

Moreover, the ALJ also correctly noted that the medical

record did not support Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling

conditions in numerous instances, including times when Plaintiff

told her treatment providers that her conditions were wellcontrolled with medication or other conservative treatment. 

Tr. 470, 493, 523, 556, 597, 615. 

Similarly, the ALJ reasonably concluded Plaintiff’s

testimony regarding her functionality was not consistent with

portions of the record that demonstrated she functions at a

higher level than Plaintiff indicated. For example, although

Plaintiff reported in her disability application that she stopped

working because of her conditions, Plaintiff told Dr. Truhn and

Alison Prescott, Ph.D., that she left her last job because she

became pregnant. Tr. 382, 461, 493-94. Plaintiff acknowledged

at the hearing that she left her previous job due to her

pregnancy, but she also stated her past employers were preparing

12 - OPINION AND ORDER
to fire her because she was “too slow” and that she “really never

knew” why she could not work as fast as others. Tr. 91-93. 

Plaintiff, however, told Dr. Prescott that “she would return to

caregiving if she could do the physical work of the job,” but she

did not indicate she lacked the mental functionality to perform

that work. Tr. 493.

The ALJ also correctly noted Plaintiff failed to follow up

on recommended mental-health treatment, and the ALJ reasonably

inferred the timing of Plaintiff’s pursuit of mental-health

recourse suggests she was motivated to seek treatment in order to

strengthen her applications for disability benefits rather then

for the purpose of improving her mental health. Although

Plaintiff’s therapist referred Plaintiff to a “coping class” on

March 19, 2013, the ALJ correctly noted there is not any evidence

in the record that Plaintiff followed up on that referral. 

Tr. 602. Moreover, the ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff reinitiated mental-health treatment on February 26, 2013, only five

days after she filed her Request for Hearing by Administrative

Law Judge following the denial of reconsideration of her

disability application. Tr. 268-70, 605. Thus, the ALJ

reasonably inferred from the timing of Plaintiff’s return to

mental-health treatment that such treatment was intended to

buttress her disability claim rather than to improve her mental

health.

13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Finally, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s ability to work at a

level of substantial gainful activity during the alleged period

of disability undermines Plaintiff’s allegations that her

disabilities (which Plaintiff contends rendered her unable to

work since March 19, 1980) are not, in fact, so severe that

Plaintiff is unable to work.

On this record the Court finds the ALJ provided legally

sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record for partially discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

II. ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Record

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in his consideration of the

medical record as to her mental-health conditions and, in

particular, Plaintiff’s GAF scores; the opinion of Perrine and

Duncan; and the opinion of Dr. Truhn.

A. Plaintiff’s GAF Scores

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he did not find

Plaintiff is disabled based on her mental-health issues as

reflected in her GAF scores of 51 assessed on March 31, 2010; 41

assessed on May 19, 2010; and 45 assessed on February 27, 2013. 

Tr. 433, 467, 610-11.

The Ninth Circuit, however, “has recognized that ‘the

Commissioner has determined the GAF scale does not have a direct

correlation to the severity requirements in [the Social Security

Administration’s] mental disorders listings.’” Doney v. Astrue,

14 - OPINION AND ORDER
485 F. App’x 163, 165 (9th Cir. 2012)(quoting McFarland v.

Astrue, 288 F. App’x 357, 359 (9th Cir. 2008)). See also Cote v.

Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-00103-SI, 2015 WL 7871169, at *6 (D. Or. 

Dec. 4, 2015). The Ninth Circuit, therefore, has not required

ALJs to provide any rationale for disregarding or discrediting a

GAF score when evaluating a claimant’s mental-health limitations. 

See Doney, 485 F. App’x at 165 (“We therefore hold that it was

not error for the ALJ to disregard [the claimant’s] GAF score.”).

The ALJ in this case, nonetheless, explained his reasons for

finding Plaintiff is not disabled notwithstanding her GAF scores. 

When discussing GAF scores issued on March 31, 2010; May 19,

2010; and May 17, 2011, the ALJ reasoned the GAF scores were

offered during the period in which Plaintiff’s children had been

removed from her custody, and, therefore, those scores were

affected by social factors unrelated to Plaintiff’s claim for

disability. Tr. 48-49. More broadly, the ALJ noted GAF scores

are “highly subjective” and “intertwine psychological symptoms,

physical impairments, socioeconomic factors, and socioeconomic

factors that are not considered under the Regulations.” Tr. 49.

The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s GAF scores are

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Three of the

four GAF scores were issued during the time that Plaintiff was

attempting to regain custody of her children, and it is clear

from the record that the stress of not having custody was the

15 - OPINION AND ORDER
primary driver of her mental-health symptoms during that period. 

Moreover, the only GAF score Plaintiff identifies outside of that

period was determined at Plaintiff’s appointment five days after

filing her Request for Hearing by Administrative Law Judge.

On this record, therefore, the Court finds the ALJ did not

err when he discredited Plaintiff’s GAF scores.

B. Opinion of Perrine and Duncan

Plaintiff next contends the ALJ erred when he discredited

the opinion of Perrine, a qualified mental-health professional,

and Duncan, a licensed marriage and family therapist.

Under the regulations in place at the time that Plaintiff

filed her disability applications and at the time when the

Commissioner rendered her final decision, the Commissioner’s

regulations separated medial opinions into two types: those from

“acceptable medical sources” and those from “other sources.” See

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Only “licensed physicians and certain

other qualified specialists” such as licensed or certified

psychologists, licensed podiatrists, and qualified speechlanguage pathologists are considered “acceptable medical

sources.” Id. In general, “[i]n order to reject the testimony

of a medically acceptable treating source, the ALJ must provide

specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the

record.” Id. On the other hand, the ALJ may “discount testimony

from these ‘other sources’ if the ALJ ‘gives reasons germane to

16 - OPINION AND ORDER
each witness for doing so.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010)). The parties agree

Perrine and Duncan qualify as “other sources,” and, therefore, to

discredit their testimony the ALJ was required to provide reasons

germane to their opinion.

Perrine and Duncan conducted a “Mental Health/Psychological

Assessment” of Plaintiff on March 31, 2010, after Plaintiff’s

children were removed from her custody. Perrine and Duncan found

Plaintiff to be “somewhat developmentally delayed,” and she

“lack[ed] insight and understanding regarding the situation and

may have some poor judgment.” Tr. 434. Perrine and Duncan found

Plaintiff’s “symptoms meet the criteria for Adjustment Disorder

and Learning Disorder, NOS” and found Plaintiff’s prognosis to be

“moderate to poor for responding affirmatively to treatment.” 

Tr. 434. Perrine and Duncan concluded “[w]ithout treatment

[Plaintiff] is at risk for deterioration in functioning, which

would negatively impact her family, social and occupational

life.” Tr. 434.

The ALJ discredited the opinion of Perrine and Duncan

because the opinion was not consistent with evidence in the

record, including Plaintiff’s statements that she functions

adequately even during periods in which she does not have mentalhealth treatment and because the opinion was offered for the

purpose of a parenting evaluation and did not address the issue

17 - OPINION AND ORDER
whether Plaintiff is disabled. The ALJ is correct that the

opinion of Perrine and Duncan was focused on Plaintiff’s ability

to care for her children and did not expressly address whether

Plaintiff was capable of employment. Although some portions of

the assessment and findings may be relevant to the disability

determination, much of the assessment is not relevant to the

issues that were under consideration by the ALJ. 

Moreover, the ALJ reasonably found the opinion or Perrine

and Duncan to be inconsistent with other parts of the medical

record. Although Perrine and Duncan opined Plaintiff would be at

risk of “deterioration in functioning” without mental-health

treatment, the record reflects Plaintiff went without treatment

for extended periods without a marked loss in everyday function. 

See Tr. 523 (Plaintiff reported to her primary-care provider that

she “did not think she had depression” and “feels fine off the

medication.”).

On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ did

not err when she discredited the opinion of Perrine and Duncan

because the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record for doing so.

C. Dr. Truhn’s Opinion

As noted, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he

discredited the opinion of Dr. Truhn, an examining psychologist

who conducted a “Comprehensive Psychological Evaluation” of

18 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff on May 19, 2010. Tr. 458-69.

An ALJ may reject an examining or treating physician’s

opinion when it is inconsistent with the opinions of other

treating or examining physicians if the ALJ makes findings

setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are

based on substantial evidence in the record. Taylor v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 659 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011). When the medical

opinion of an examining or treating physician is uncontroverted,

however, the ALJ must give “clear and convincing reasons” for

rejecting it. Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 821, 830-

31 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31

(9th Cir. 1995)). The opinion of a treating physician is “given

greater weight than the opinions of other physicians.” Kelly v.

Astrue, 471 F. App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2012)(quoting Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996)).

A nonexamining physician is one who neither examines nor

treats the claimant. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. See also Garrison

v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). “The opinion of a

nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an

examining physician or a treating physician.” Taylor, 659 F.3d

at 1233 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 831). When a nonexamining

physician’s opinion contradicts an examining physician’s opinion

and the ALJ gives greater weight to the nonexamining physician’s

19 - OPINION AND ORDER
opinion, the ALJ must articulate her reasons for doing so with

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence. See, e.g., Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194,

1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Dr. Truhn found Plaintiff exhibited symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of abuse as a child

and as an adult and that Plaintiff described symptoms of

depression that had “been occurring for at least four and a half

years” and were “exacerbated” by the loss of custody of her

children. Tr. 467. Dr. Truhn also found Plaintiff’s “scores on

the neuropsychological screening test are indicative of a

cognitive disorder” and Plaintiff’s “scores on the intellectual

testing fell in the borderline range” with specific deficits in

abstract thinking, knowledge and use of vocabulary words, and

knowledge of common-sense reasoning and ability to solve day-today problems. Tr. 467. Dr. Truhn noted, however, that “[i]f the

depression, anxiety, and symptoms of [PTSD] are treated and

become less severe, that can affect her intellectual and

cognitive functioning.” Tr. 468.

The ALJ gave “some weight” to Dr. Truhn’s opinion because it

was “consistent with the evidence of record” and “his opinions

adequately consider [Plaintiff’s] subjective mental health

complaints.” Tr. 49. The ALJ, however, partially discredited

Dr. Truhn’s opinion on the basis that “Dr. Truhn did not evaluate

20 - OPINION AND ORDER
[Plaintiff] for disability purposes, rather for suitability as a

parent.” Tr. 49.

The ALJ is correct that Dr. Truhn’s opinion addressed

Plaintiff’s ability to provide for her children as a parent and

did not extensively discuss Plaintiff’s ability to work. For

example, Dr. Truhn’s recommendations and conclusions were

specifically framed as answers to questions that related to

Plaintiff’s ability to serve as a parent. Tr. 467-69. The ALJ

is also correct that many of the broader conclusions that 

Dr. Truhn reached were accounted for in the ALJ’s assessment of

Plaintiff’s RFC, including in the ALJ’s limitation of Plaintiff

to “following short and simple instructions,” performing work

that is limited to “basic routine tasks,” not having “close

interaction with the public” and only being required to have

“casual and superficial interaction with co-workers,” and being

limited to “stress low” work to “prevent [Plaintiff] from

becoming overwhelmed.” Tr. 44. Thus, to the extent that 

Dr. Truhn’s conclusions applied to the ALJ’s disability

determination, the ALJ sufficiently accounted for Dr. Truhn’s

assessment in the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC.

On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ did

not err when he partially discredited Dr. Truhn’s opinion because

the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by

substantial evidence for doing so.

21 - OPINION AND ORDER
III. Lay Testimony

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he discredited the lay

testimony of Plaintiff’s father, Roy R. Culver.

When determining whether a claimant is disabled the ALJ must

consider lay-witness testimony concerning a claimant’s

limitations and ability to work. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d

1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). If the ALJ wishes to discount the

testimony of lay witnesses, he “must give reasons that are

germane to each witness.” Id. (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d

1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)). See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)(improperly rejected lay-witness

testimony is credited as a matter of law). 

Although the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting lay-witness

testimony must be “specific,” Stout v. Comm’r, Social Sec.,

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006), the ALJ need not

discuss every witness’s testimony on an individualized basis. 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. “[I]f the ALJ gives germane reasons

for rejecting testimony by one witness, the ALJ need only point

to those reasons when rejecting similar testimony by a different

witness.” Id. See also Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,

674 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Roy Culver submitted a Third Party Adult Function Report

dated March 26, 2012, in which he stated Plaintiff “does not

understand simple things and she is very slow about doing

22 - OPINION AND ORDER
things.” Tr. 391. Roy Culver stated Plaintiff does not spend

time with others, is “alone all the time,” and does not go

anywhere on a regular basis. Tr. 395. Roy Culver reported

Plaintiff’s conditions affect her abilities to lift, bend, stand,

squat, walk, talk, climb stairs, remember, complete tasks,

understand, and follow instructions. Tr. 396. Roy Culver stated

Plaintiff’s back pain limits her physically, and she can only

walk four or five blocks before requiring rest. Tr. 396. Roy

Culver reported Plaintiff does not follow written instructions

well because she “[cannot] read very well,” does not follow

spoken instructions well because “she will start something and

then she stops,” and does not handle stress or changes in routine

well. Tr. 396-97. Roy Culver also stated Plaintiff has had

these limitations “all her life.” Tr. 395.

The ALJ discredited Roy Culver’s testimony on the basis that

it was inconsistent both internally and with Plaintiff’s report

of functioning. Tr. 50. The ALJ reasonably found Roy Culver’s

report to be particularly inconsistent with respect to

Plaintiff’s social functioning. Although Roy Culver stated

Plaintiff does not spend time with others and “stays alone all

the time,” he also stated Plaintiff does not have a problem

getting along with family, friends, and neighbors and, in fact,

needs somebody to accompany her when she goes out. Tr. 395. In

addition, the ALJ found Roy Culver’s testimony was contradicted

23 - OPINION AND ORDER
by Plaintiff’s reports. As the ALJ noted, Roy Culver stated

Plaintiff does not go anywhere on a regular basis, but Plaintiff

reported to Dr. Prescott that she “drives to run errands about

twice a week,” including trips to the grocery store and to

appointments. Tr. 395, 494.

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ did

not err when he discredited the testimony of Roy Culver because

the ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by

substantial evidence for doing so.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2017.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

24 - OPINION AND ORDER