IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

WILLIAM TARR, as Personal Representative 

of the ESTATE OF CONNOR WILLIAM 

TARR 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

USF REDDA WAY, INC., an Oregon 

corporation; YRC WORLDWIDE, INC., 

a Delaware corporation; GERALD THOMAS 

TRUELOVE, an individual, 

Defendants. 

PAPAK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:15-cv-02243-PK 

FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff William TatT, as personal representative of the Estate of Connor William TatT, 

brings this wrongful death action against defendants USF Reddaway, Inc. ("Reddaway"), YRC 

Worldwide, Inc. ("YRC"), and Gerald Thomas Truelove. Plaintiff alleges this cou1t has subjectmatter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Now before the 

court is Reddaway and YRC's Motion to Dismiss (#16). Reddaway and YRC move to(!) 

dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety for failure to allege the essential elements of diversity 

jurisdictional and (2) dismiss Plaintiff's claims against YRC for lack of personal jurisdiction. For 

the reasons provided below, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted in part and denied in pati. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship 

A party alleging subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship must 

plead the "essential elements of diversity jurisdiction, including the diverse residence of all 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-! 
parties." Bautista v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re lvfexico City Aircrash, 708 F.2d 400, 404 n. 4 (9th 

Cir.1983)). For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the legal representative of an estate is 

deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2). 

II. Personal Jurisdiction 

An action must be dismissed to the extent the court lacks personal jurisdiction. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). On a defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger v. Fred 

1Vfartin 1Vfotor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation 

Co., 792F.3d1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If the comt rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction without first holding a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff is only 

required to establish, through pleadings and affidavits, a prima facie showing of personal 

jurisdiction. E.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); accord Celgard, 792 F.3d at 1378. "Although the plaintiff cannot 

rest solely on the allegations of the complaint to establish that jurisdiction is proper, the 

complaint's uncontrove1ted factual allegations must be accepted as true and any factual conflicts 

in the parties' declarations must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor." Ukrvaktsina v. Olden Grp., 

LLC, No. CIV. 10-6297-AA, 2011WL5244697, at *l (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2011) (citingAmba 1'.Iktg. 

Sys., Inc. v. Johar Int'/, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977)); accord Harris Rutskv & Co. Ins. 

Serv., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003). 

There are two components to personal jurisdiction: first, the forum state's long-arm 

statute must pe1mit the asse1tion of jurisdiction, and second, the asse1tion of jurisdiction must 

comport with federal constitutional due process mandates. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-2 
Nat'! Bank of Cooperatives, 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996). Oregon's long-arm statute 

pe1mits assertions of personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowed under the federal 

constitution. See Or. R. Civ. P. 4L;1\Iillennium Enterprises, Inc. v. 1\Ii/lennium 1Vfusic, LP, 33 F. 

Supp. 2d 907, 909 (D. Or. 1999). "Thus, the analysis collapses into a single framework and the 

court proceeds under federal due process standards." };lillennium Enterprises, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 

909. Constitutional due process requires there to be sufficient "minimum contacts" between the 

party over whom jurisdiction is being exercised and the forum state such that "traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice" are not offended. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 1Vfilliken v. 1Vfeyer, 311U.S.457, 463 (1940)). "The strength of 

contacts required depends on which of the two categories of personal jurisdiction a litigant 

invokes: specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction." Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2015). In this case, Plaintiff invokes only specific jurisdiction. See Plf.'s Resp. 6 (#23). 

In the context of a tort claim, specific jurisdiction exists where (1) the defendant 

purposefully directs its activities at the form, (2) the claim "arises out of or relates to the 

defendant's forum-related activities," and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is fair and 

reasonable. See, e.g., Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). After the plaintiff establishes the first two prongs, "the burden 

shifts to the defendant to 'present a compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 

reasonable." Fred }vfartin }vfotor Co., 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)). 

BACKGROUND 

The parties' dispute arises out of a 2014 motor vehicle accident that occuned in 

California. Plaintiff alleges that a tractor-trailer owned by Reddaway and operated by Truelove 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-3 
collided with a vehicle in which Conner Tan ("Tarr") was a passenger, resulting in Tarr's death. 

See Comp!. iiii 14-18 (#1). 

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following jurisdictional facts. Plaintiff is a citizen of 

Washington. Id at ii 1. Truelove is a citizen of California. Id. at ii 4. Reddaway is an Oregon 

corporation with its principal place of business in Oregon. Id. at ii 3. Reddaway is a wholly 

owned subsidiary of YRC. Id. at iiii 2-3. YRC is a Delaware corporation with its principal place 

of business in Kansas. Id. at ii 2. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id at ii 5. 

Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege the citizenship of Tarr. 

DISCUSSION 

III. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship 

Plaintiff now concedes that he failed to properly allege essential jurisdictional facts by 

neglecting to allege the citizenship of Tarr. See Plf.'s Resp. 4 (#23); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(c)(2) ("[T]he legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen 

only of the same State as the decedent."). The parties agree that Plaintiff should be granted leave 

to amend his Complaint to add an allegation regarding Tarr's citizenship. Therefore, the Motion 

to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be denied as moot and Plaintiff should 

be granted leave to file an amended complaint. The remaining issue presented by the Motion to 

Dismiss is whether the comt may exercise personal jurisdiction over YRC. 

IV. Personal Jurisdiction 

The court lacks personal jurisdiction over YRC because Plaintiff has failed to make a 

prima facie showing of the first and second prongs of the specific jurisdiction test. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONPAGE-4 
A. The Parties' Arguments 

YRC argues that all of Plaintiffs claims against it should be dismissed for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. YRC notes that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege any contacts that YRC 

made with Oregon. YRC argues that Plaintiff cannot cure that defect because YRC does not 

have any contacts with Oregon. In suppmt, YRC offers a sworn statement from its Vice 

President and Treasurer, Mark Boehmer. Boehmer testified that YRC does not conduct any 

business in Oregon and has no offices, employees, or property in Oregon. Boehmer Deel. ~ 10 

(#18). Boehmer also testified that Truelove was not employed, managed, or controlled by YRC. 

Id at~ 7. Boehmer further testified that YRC did not own, maintain, or control the Reddaway 

tractor-trailer involved in the collision underlying this suit. See id. at~ 8. Reddaway's Director 

of Safety, David Yonemoto, provided an identical sworn statement. See Yonemoto Deel. (#19). 

In response, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not contend that this court has general 

jurisdiction over YRC under the Ninth Circuit's "alter ego" jurisprudence. Rather, Plaintiff 

contends that the court has specific jurisdiction over YRC because it obtained and is liable on an 

insurance policy covering Reddaway. 1 According to Plaintiff, because Reddaway's ability to 

conduct business in Oregon (i.e. operate vehicles on Oregon highways) depended on it having 

liability insurance, YRC is subject to this court's personal jurisdiction. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 

825.160(1) ("A person may not operate as a motor catTier on public highways of this state until 

the person has in effect a policy of public liability and prope1ty damage insurance."); Or. Admin. 

R. 740-040-0010(5) ("If for any reason the evidence of insurance becomes insufficient, the 

certificate or permit of the concerned carrier shall immediately, and by operation hereof, be 

suspended."). 

1 YRC allegedly insured Reddaway through a "fronting" anangement, whereby YRC, as the 

policyholder, retained the risk of loss. See Plf.'s Resp. 7 (#23). 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-5 
B. Analysis 

1. Prong I-Purposeful Direction 

Both pmties misstate the law governing the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test. 

The pmties frame the relevant inquiry as whether YRC purposefully availed itself of Oregon's 

laws. However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that purposeful direction-not purposeful 

availment-is the relevant inquiry in to11 cases. See, e.g., Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1128. 

This cou11 evaluates purposeful direction using the three-pait "Calder-effects" 

test, taken from the Supreme Cami's decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 

104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed.2d 804 (1984). Under this test, the defendant allegedly 

must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum 

state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 

forum state. 

Id (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Oil Pad Sols., LLC v. Parsons, 

No. 03:12-CV-01917-HZ, 2013 WL 1946743, at *3 (D. Or. May 8, 2013). 

The third pait of the Calder-effects test requires Plaintiff to show that "a jurisdictionally 

sufficient amount of harm [was] suffered in the fornm state." Yahoo/Inc. v. La Ligue Con/re Le 

Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff has failed to 

establish that any harm was suffered in Oregon. As stated above, Plaintiff alleges the accident 

occuned in California. Comp!. iii! 14-16 (# 1 ). Plaintiff fu1ther alleges that Tarr's estate is 

located in Washington. Id at ii 1; Plf.'s Resp. 5 (#23). Although the parties dispute where Tarr 

resided (with Reddaway and YRC alleging he resided in California and Plaintiff alleging he 

resided in Washington), neither party suggests that Tan ever resided in Oregon. Because 

Plaintiff has failed to show that "a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm [was] suffered in 

the forum state," he has failed to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over YRC. 

See Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1207. Consequently, Plaintiffs claims against YRC should be 

dismissed. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-6 
2. Prong 2-Arising Out of 

The second prong of the specific jurisdiction test requires Plaintiff to show that his claims 

arise out of or relate to YRC's fornm-related activities. See, e.g., Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 

1128 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit "refer[s] to the second prong of the specific 

jurisdiction test as a 'but for' test." In re W States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 

716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th 

Cir.1990)), ajf'd sub nom., Oneok, Inc. v. Lemjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 191 L. Ed. 2d 511 

(2015). "Under the 'but for' test, 'a lawsuit arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum 

state if a direct nexus exists between those contacts and the cause of action." Id (quoting 

Fireman's Fund Ins., 103 F .3d at 894 ). 

Here, there is no direct nexus between YRC's Oregon's contacts and Plaintiffs wrongful 

death action. Again, the only contact Plaintiff contends YRC made with Oregon was its 

obtaining an insurance policy for Reddaway. However, Plaintiff does not assert claims based on 

the insurance policy. Rather, Plaintiff claims that Truelove was negligent in operating the 

tractor-trailer and Reddaway and YRC were negligent in hiring and training Truelove. There is 

no direct nexus between YRC obtaining an insurance policy for Reddaway and the motor vehicle 

accident causing Tarr's death. At most, Plaintiff alleges an indirect nexus-that is, Reddaway 

was required to obtain insurance from some entity in order to do business in Oregon; Reddaway 

chose YRC as the insuring entity; Reddaway subsequently formed and headquartered its business 

in Oregon; and Reddaway then caused Tarr's death during the course of its business in 

California. That indirect nexus is insufficient to satisfy the "arising out of' prong of the specific 

jurisdiction test. See id. (requiring a direct nexus); accord Watters v. Kirk, No. 0:12-CV-338-

CMC, 2012 WL 831452, at *3 & n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2012) (holding that a parent company's 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-7 
procurement of liability insurance for its subsidiary, without more, is insufficient to subject the 

parent company to personal jurisdiction in locations where the subsidiary may be subject to suit 

for events covered by the insurance). 

Plaintiffs reliance on Nike, Inc. v. Spencer, 707 P.2d 589 (Or. App. 1985), is misplaced. 

1n that case, the Court of Appeal of Oregon affomed the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 

foreign corporate guarantor in a suit to enforce a guaranty the foreign corporation executed for 

the benefit of an Oregon business. See id. at 596-97. Nike is distinguishable because, in that 

case, the underlying claim to enforce the guaranty clearly arose out of the defendant's Oregon 

contacts-i.e. guaranteeing the underlying obligation. See id. Moreover, the Nike court's 

holding depended on its finding that the Oregon corporation relied on the foreign corporation's 

guaranty in extending credit on the underlying obligation. See id. at 596. In this case, there is 

obviously no suggestion that Tal1' relied on YRC's Oregon activities in becoming a tort victim. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to show that his claims arise out of or relate to YRC's forumrelated activities, he has failed to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over YRC. 

See Brayton Purcell, 606 F.3d at 1128 (citation omitted). Consequently, Plaintiffs claims 

against YRC should be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons provided above, the Motion to Dismiss (# 16) should be granted in part 

and denied in part. The Motion to Dismiss should be denied as moot to the extent it seeks 

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his 

Complaint to allege the residency ofTal1'. Plaintiff should be ordered to file his amended 

complaint within seven days after the final ruling on the present Motion to Dismiss. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION P AGE-8 
All claims against YRC should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The 

dismissal should be without prejudice. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Ci\!!! Corp., 765 F.2d 1369, 1372 

(9th Cir. 1985). 

Reddaway and YRC moved to strike much of the evidence Plaintiff submitted with his 

Response. See Reply 6-10 (#27). I did not consider the contested evidence to the extent it 

pertains to Tarr's domicile. Moreover, the evidence regarding YRC's Oregon contacts does not 

change my conclusion that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over YRC. Therefore, 

Reddaway and YRC's Motion to Strike (#27) should be denied as moot. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if 

any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no 

objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that 

date. If objections are filed, then a response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

Dated this 23rd day of February, 2016. 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION PAGE-----9