UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 99-368
W.T. S UM NER , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
. On Appellant' s Motion for Full Court Dec ision
(Argued Oc tober 3, 2001 De cided Nove mber 6, 2001 )
Clayte Binion, of

F or t Wor th, Te xas, wa s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt. Miche le R. Katina , w ithwh om Ti m S

. M cClain, Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Assistant Ge ne ra l Co un se l; Darryl A. Joe , Acting Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Al ly n L. E ng e lst e in , all of Washington, D.C., we re on the pleading s, for the a ppellee. Kenneth M. Carpenter , of Topeka , Kansa s, for the a ppellant and for the National Org anization of Veter ans' Advocates as amicus c uriae

. Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and FARL EY, HOL DAWAY, I VERS, STEI NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. KRAMER, Chief Judge : Presently befor e the Court is the appe llant's a pplication for attorney fee s and expens es u n d er the Equal Ac cess to Just ice Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (EAJA). For the

re a so ns that f

oll ow , th e Court

wi ll r e vo ke the sin g le -j ud g e or de r pr e vio us ly iss ue d in thi s c a se ; w ill issue this opini on in its st ead; a nd will deny

the appe llant's EA J A application.

I

. BACK GR OUND The a ppellant, throug h counsel, filed w ith this Court a ti mely Notice of Appea l (NOA) from

a Janu a ry 20 , 19 99 , B oa

rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls (B oa

rd or B VA ) de c isi on that ha d de nie d h is c la im for se rv i ce connec tion for spinal mening itis. S ubsequent to filing his NOA with the Court, the appellant f

iled an unopposed motion for a stay of proc eeding s in his appeal; he no t i fied the Court2

that he had f

iled with the Boa

rd a motion for r econside ration (premised upon the di scover y of new and mater ial evidenc e in the form of rele vant rec ords or repor ts of the servic e depa

rtment conc erne d) of the January

1999 BV A decision and requested that the C ourt stay proce eding s in his case until he

rec eived notification from the B oard Chair man whethe r the Chairma n was inclined to g rant

rec onsideration. In November 1999, the Court order ed, int er alia, that if the B oard Chair man was inc lin e d to g ra

nt r e c on sid e ratio n o f the Janu a ry 19 99 B oa

rd de c isi on , th e Se c re tary

wa s to fi le wi th the Court a motion for re mand. See Ce rullo v. Derwinski , 1 Vet.App. 195, 200 ( 1991). On Fe bruar

y 4, 2000, pursuant to the Court' s order , the S ecr etar y filed an unopposed motion to remand the J anuar

y 1999 Boa

rd decision pursuant to Ce ru llo , su pra . I n that motion, the Secreta ry indic at ed t h at t he B VA had notifie d the appe llant that the BV A Chairman wa s inclined to g rant

rec onsideration of the J anuar y 1999 Boa

rd decision and that the Boa rd would take no further

action with reg ard to re considera tion pending this Court' s transfe r of jurisdiction over the appe al from the Court to t he B oa rd . T he Se c re tary

thu s r e qu e ste d th a t th e Court " re mand

. . . to a llo w the B VAto

va c a te its de c isi on

a nd to r e a dju dic a te [the a ]ppe lla nt' s c la im. " Mo tio n at 1 . A c c or din g ly , th e Court , on Fe bruar

y 1 0 , 2 0 0 0 , g rante d the Secr etar y ' s unopposed motion for re mand pursuant to Ce ru llo , su pr a , and orde red the immediate issuance of mandate. The a ppellant, on Marc h 11, 2000, filed his application for an aw ard of

attorney fee s and expenses under the EAJA, seeking $6,444.66 in fee s and expenses. The appellant asserted that he

wa s a p re v ai l i n g p a r t y fo r p u rp o s es o f a n aw ar d o f E AJ A f

ee s , i n t er al i a, b ec au s e, b y

o b t ai n i n g a
rema nd of his claim, he ha d achie ved succ ess " on t h e m er i t s
. " Appl ication (Appl.) at 2. I n the alternative, the appe llant asserte d that he wa s a preva iling party under the cata ly st theory

. Id . The appellant f

urt h er as s erte d that: the position of the Secre tary at the administrative leve l was not substantially

justified; there we re no spe cial cir cumstance s that would make a n awa rd of EA J A fe es unjust; and his net worth di d not exceed $2,000,000. Appl. at 3-4. The Sec reta ry , on May

15, 2000, filed a r esponse in opposition to the appellant' s EAJ A application. I n that response , the Secr etar y
asser ted that the appe llant was not a preva iling par ty under the EAJA because the Ce ru llo rema nd that wa s g ra

nte d in his ap pe a l did not re fl e c t th at th e a pp e lla nt h a d s uc c e e de d in

" a ny de mon str a

ble

manner on the merits." Response (Resp.) at 5. I n addition, the Secre tary argued that the a

ppellant had fa iled to show that his appeal wa s the cataly st that ha d p ro m p t ed the B VA to g rant3

rec onsideration and that the appellant thus was not a prevailing party under the cata ly st theory . Resp.

a t 6- 7. Th e Se c re tary

fu rt he r a sse rt e d th a t hi s p os iti on a t th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e le ve l w a s su bs tanti a lly j u s t i fi ed

. R es p
. at 9 -1 0

. T h e S ec re t ary re qu es t ed , t h er ef

o re , t h a t t h e C o u rt d en y

t h e ap p el l an t 's EAJA application. Resp. at 10. The appellant subseque ntly filed a r eply

to the Secre tary ' s response; he in essenc e re iterate d the asser tions that he had made in his EAJ A application. I n a n A u g u s t9 , 2 0 0 0 , s i n g l e - j u d g e o r d e r , t h e C o u rtd i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s E A JA

a pp licatio n f

or la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n. I n th a t or de r, the Cou rt fo un d th a t th e a

pp e lla nt w a s n ot a pr e va ili ng p a rt y f

o r p u r p o s e s o f a n a w a r d o f E A JA f e e s b e c a u s e , u n d e r t h i s C o u rt ' s d e c i s i on in Le ma tta v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 504, 507 ( 1996), " a Ce ru llo rema nd for r econside ration by

the B oard, p ri o r t o t h e C o u rt 's re v i ew o f t h e r ec o rd o n ap p ea l o r t h e f i l i n g o f b ri ef

s , d o es n o tco n fe r p re v ai l i n gpart y st atu s upo n an app ell ant pu rsu ant to a me ri ts th eory ." Sumner v . Gober , U.S. Vet. App. No. 99 -3 68 (o rd . A ug . 9 , 2 00 0) . T he Court a lso state d th a t, e ve n a ssumin g that the a pp e lla nt w a s a preva iling par

ty , the position of the Secre tary at bot h the admini strative and the l itigation stag es wa s substantially

justified. Id. at 3. Subsequent to the Court's Aug ust 9, 2000, dismiss al of his EAJ A application, the appellant filed a timely motion for panel review and for panel re fer ral to the full Court for a

decision. In that motion, the a

ppellant argued, inter alia, that, pursua nt to Shalala v. Schaefe r , 509 U.S. 292 (1993), and Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. 2 9 1 (1 9 9 4 ), h e w as a p re v ai l i n g p ar t y b e ca u s e t h e C o u rt 's Fe bruar y 2000 rema

nd of his appea l qualified as suc cess on the m erits. Finally , the appe llant reque sted that the en ba

nc Court re consider a

nd overr ule Le ma tta be c a

us e it w a s in c on sis te nt w ith Sc ha e fe r and Sti llwe ll , both su

pra . I n a S ep t em b er 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 , o rd er , t h e C o u rt d en i edt h e ap p el l an t 's motion for a pane l de cision and denied as premature the appellant' s motion for a full Court decision. See U.S. V ET . A PP . R. 35(c) ( motion for full Court decision m ay b e fi l ed after pa nel has de nied motion for panel de cision or motion for pane l rec onsideration). On Octobe r 17, 2000, the a ppellant filed a m o tion for pane l rec onsideration or, in the alternative, for a

full Court decision. The appellant in e ssence reiter ated the a rg uments that he had

m ad e p re v i o u s l y

re gar d i n g Le ma tta a nd

fu rt he r s ta te d th a t Le ma tta wa s i n co n fl i ct wi t h t h i s C o u rt 's decision in Swiney v. G ober , 14 Vet.App. 65, 69 (2000) (stating that "a ll of the appe aled c laims were

rema nded, re solutions which mate rially chang ed the ' leg al re lationship' be tween the Secre tary and4

the appe llant, Texas State Teache rs Ass' n [ v . G ar lan d I

nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. , 4 8 9 U

. S. 7 8 2 , 792-93 (1989)], from one of claim denial to a continuing adjudicatory proce ss") . The Court, in an Apr il 3, 2001, order , denied the a ppell an t 's m o t ion for pane l rec onsideration. Sumner v . Principi , 14 Vet.App. 309, 310 ( 2001) (e n banc or der)

. I n i ts order, the Court stated that the re solution of Bu c k ha nn on Bd

. a nd Car e Ho me

, Inc . v. W est Vir gin ia De p't of He alt

h and Hu ma n R es. , 1 21 S. Ct

. 1835 (2001), may

aff ect the disposition of the appe llant's EA J A appli ca t i o n. The Court orde red, there fore , that the appe llant's motion for a full Court decision be held in abe y ance pending further order of the Court. Sumner , su

pra . The Court further ordered that the appe llant, within 30 day s after the U.S. Supreme Court' s disposit ion of Buck h a n non , su

pra , file and se rve a

leg al memora

ndum addre ssing the r esolution of that proce eding as it pertains to his EAJA application. Sumner , su pr a . Finally , the Court order ed that the Sec reta ry file and serve a leg al memorandum within 30 day s after service of the a

ppellant' s leg al memora

ndum. Id

. The U.S. Supreme Court, on Ma y 29, 2001, issued its opini on in Buck

hannon , 121 S. Ct . 1835. The National Org anization o f Ve t erans' Advocates (NOV A), on June 27, 2001, filed an unoppos e d mo ti o n f

o r le a v e to f

il e a n a mi c u s c u r ia e b r ie f

. O n th a t s a me d a te , th e Co u rt rec eived NOVA' s brief. NOVA asserts that, to attain preva iling-pa rty status, Buck

hannon , 121 S. Ct . at 1839- 40, require s that the appe llant r ece ive "a t le ast some relief

on the merits" from the Court. B rief ( Br .) at 5. NOVA argues that the appellant rec eived "r elief on the merits of his c laim" be cause the Court "va cate d" the J anuar

y 20, 1999, BV A dec ision and remande d the m at t er to the B oard f or
rea d j u d i ca t i o n
. Br . at 6. (The Court notes that, contrar y to NOVA' s argument, the Court did not

va c a te the B VAde c isi on , b ut that c ir c ums tanc e is n ot r e le va nt u nd e r o ur a na ly sis of

pr e va ili ng -p a rt

y status. See discussion, inf ra .) NOVA further argues that such a rema nd eff ects a "material a lteration of the leg al re lationship of the partie s " beca use, as state d in Swiney , the appe llant's c ase ha s g one from " [claim] denial to a c ontinuing adjudicator y proce ss." B r. at 6-7. F inally , NOVA a rg ues that Le ma tta is inconsistent with Buck hannon beca

use L e m a tta require s the appe llant to "win the litigation." Br . at 8. NOVAcontend s , t h er efor e, that the f ull Court shoul d overr

ule Le ma tta and

reve rse the Aug ust 9, 2000, single -judg e order that dismiss ed the a

ppellant' s EAJ A application. Id. On J une 28, 2001, the a

ppellant, pursuant to t h e C o u rt 's April 2001 order , filed his leg al

me mor a nd

um. Th e a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t Buck

hannon and Swineytoge ther e stablish that the5

Court ' s Ce ru llo re mand

in t he ins tant c a se is a

n e nf or c e a ble j ud g me nt o n th e me ri ts b e c a us e , in

re mand ing the ma tte r a nd re qu ir ing re a dju dic a tio n, the Court ' s or de r a lte re d the le g a l r ela tio ns hip betwee n the appe llant and the Secr etar y in that it allowed the appe llant to avoid an ad v er s e Court decision and to r easse rt his c laim be fore the BV A. Appellant' s Memorandum (Mem.) at 9-10. The appellant a sserts: "It is assumed that the Court revie wed the under ly ing ple ading s and the re cord a nd d etermined there w as no leg al impediment preve nting the Court f rom g ranting the Secr etar y 's [unopposed] motion [ for] remand." Appellant' s Mem. at 11. The a ppellant contends, the ref

ore, that the Court' s remand or der a ddresse d the merits of his c ase and that he thus is a preva iling par ty for purposes of a

n awa rd of attorney

fee s and expenses under

the EAJA. Id. Th e a pp e lla nt n e xt as se rt s th a t a ll that Buck hannon require s to attain preva iling-pa rty status

un de r t he su c c e ss- on -t

he -m e ri ts the or

y is a n e nf or c e a ble jud g me nt o n th e me ri ts an d tha t a Ce ru llo

rema nd meets t h i s require ment. Appellant' s Mem. at 12. The a ppellant contends in e ssence that Le ma tta predic ated success on the m erits upon the fil ing of pleading s or ot her documents afte r the appellant ha s filed his NOA with the C o u rt an d that, beca use " succe ss on the merits under B u ck hannon was not pre dicated on the filing of pleading s or other doc uments by the appe llant subsequent to the filing of the a ppeal, Buck

hannon e f f e c t i v e l y o v e r r ule s Le ma tta ." Ap pe lla

nt' s Me m.
a t 12 -1 3. I n a dd iti on , the a pp e lla nt a sse rt s that the c a ta ly st the or y is a moo t is su e be c a

us e he pr e va ils under the succe ss-on -t he-me rits theory

. Id . Finally , the appe llant reiterates his assertion that the Secre tary ' s position was not subst antially justified at the administrative leve l. Id . The a ppellant states that, on May

31, 2001, a VA re gi o nal offic e (RO) , subsequent to the B VA' s g ranting

re c on sid e ratio n a

nd re mand inghis c la im t o th e RO , g ra nte d ser vic e c on ne c tio n f

or po st- me nin g iti s he a da c he s and a ssi g ne d a 10 % ratin g , e ff e c tiv e Ap ri l 11 , 1 99 5. Ap pe lla nt' s Me m. at 14 (A

pp e nd ix I I ). The appellant reque sts that the Court overrule Le ma tta ; f ind that he is a preva iling party under the EAJA and that the S ecr etar y was not substantially justified at the administrative leve l; and g rant his application for a

n awa rd of attorney

fee s and expenses under

the EAJA. On J uly 27, 2001, pursuan t t o the Court' s April 2001 order , the Secr etar y filed his leg al

me mor a nd

um. Th e Se c re tary

ini tia lly a sserts th a t Buck

hannon e lim inate s th e c a ta ly st the or y a s a via ble ba sis fo r at ta ini ng pr e va ili ng -p a rt y status

. Se c re tary ' s Mem . at 4- 5. Th e Se c re tary the n a sse rt s that the S upreme Court's application of t he merits theory set forth in Buck hannon is not inconsist ent6

with this Court's application of the merits theo ry in Le ma tta , a

nd that Buck

hannon thus does not

overr ule Le ma tta

. Secre tary ' s Mem. at 5. The Secre tary argues that the appe llant's c ontention that under Buck

hannon an appellant is a prevailing party for purposes of t he EAJ A by mere ly obtaining

a Court re mand jud g me nt i n th e un de rl y ingc a se , th us a lte ri ngthe le g a l re la tio ns hip of the pa rt ie s, i gn o re s t h e key

element in Buck

hannon that th e re mus t be a jud ic ia l ju dg me nt on theme rit s . Secre tary ' s Mem. at 6. The Sec reta ry contends that the Ce ru llo re mand that wa s g ra nte d by this Court in the underly ing case was pure ly proce dural a

nd did not affor d the appe llant even " some relief on the merits of his claim." Secre tary ' s Mem. at 6-7. The Secre tary asser ts that this C ourt did not

make " ' so me [' ]sub sta

nti ve de te rm inatio n in

[the ] ap pe a l, b a se d u

po n th e re c or d, the pa

rt ie s' pl eadi ngs, and th e Co urt 's[ '] prec eden t, th at is favo rabl e to th e app ell ant .'" Id

. (q u o t i n g Swiney , 14 Ve t.A pp . at 69 ). Th e Se c re tary thu s c on te nd s that the a pp e lla nt d id n ot a c hie ve su c c e ss " a s a re su lt of the Court ' s c on sid e ratio n o f t he me ri ts o f h is a

rgume nts " a nd , the re fo re , is n ot a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y under the merits theory

for pur poses of the EA J A. Id . at 7. Oral argum ent befo re t he en ban c C ou rtwas hel d i n t he i ns tan t case on Oct ob er 3, 20 01 . By holding that or al ar g ument, t h e C o u rt in essence g rante d the appe llant's motion for a full Court decision and a lso gr anted NOVA' s motion to appea r as amicus curiae. NOVA' s brief w ill be filed as of the da

te that it was re ceive d.

II. AN AL YSI S Th is C ourt

may a ward reas on able a tto rn e y fe e s and e xpe ns e s p ur su a nt t o 2 8 U .S. C. § 2412(d)( 2)(F ). I n order for the Court to have jurisdiction over an EAJA application it must be filed within the 30-day p er i o d s et forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) (B ). I n order for the a ppellant to be

e lig ibl e fo r a

n E AJA a

wa rd , h is a pp lic a tio n mu st c on ta in: (1 ) a sh owi ng that th e a pp lic a nt i s a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y wi thi n th e me a nin g of the EA JA; (2) a n ass e rt ion that the a pp lic a nt i s a

pa rt y e lig ibl e for a n awa rd under the EAJA bec ause his or her ne t worth does not exceed $2,000,000 dollar s; (3) an alleg ation that the position of the Secre tary at the administrati v e l ev el or in litigation wa s not substantially

justified; and (4) a

n itemiz ed stateme nt of the fe es and expenses soug ht. See 28 U. S.C. § 2 41 2( d) ; Cullens v. Gober , 1 4 V e t.A pp . 2 34 , 2 37 (2 00 1) (e n b a nc ); Che sse r v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 49 7, 49 9 ( 19 98 ); Ba

za lo v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 304, 3 0 8 (1 9 96) (e n banc) , rev'd on other grounds7

sub nom

. Ba

za lo v . W est , 15 0 F .3 d 13 80 , 1 38 4 ( F e d. Cir . 1 99 8) . T he piv ota l is su e in t he ins tant c a se is whether the appellant has shown that he is a prevailing party for purposes of an a war d of attorne y fee s and expenses under

the EAJA. To the extent that the appellant still may be asser ting preva iling-pa

rty status ba sed upon the argument that his appea l of the January 1999 Boa

rd dec ision to t his Court served a s the cataly st for the B VA Chairman' s decision to g rant re consideration of his claim, as a re sult of Buck hannon that issue has bee n eliminated from the instant c ase. See Thayer v. Principi , __ Vet.App. __, __, 2001 WL10 02 74 3 at * 7, No . 9 8- 17 82 (S e pt. 4, 20 01 ) ( c on c lud ingthat Buck hannon pr e va ili ng -p a rt

y d ef i n i t i o n s h o u l d

b e ap p l i edt o E AJ A a n d

t h at ca t al y s tt h eo ry

i s n o t av ai l ab l e to ac h i ev e p re v ai l i n gparty status in this Court). Althoug h the holding of Buck hannon involved only

the elimination of the c a ta ly st the or

y a s a ba sis fo r a c hie vin g pr e va ili ng -p a rt y status , th e lang ua g e that th e Supreme Court us e d in re statin g its pr e c e de nts wi th re sp e c t to the de fi nit ion of pr e va ili ngpa

rt y pr omp ts this Court now to ree x amine our jurisprudenc e with reg ard to attaining preva iling-pa rty status pursuant to the succe ss-on-the- merits theory under the EAJA and to clarify our ca selaw. I n Buck hannon , the Supreme Court initially noted the def

inition of "pre vailing pa

rty " in feeshifting statutes a s being one "' in whose favor a judgme nt is rende red, reg ardle ss of the amount of dam ages awar ded .'" Buck hannon , 1 2 1 S

. C t

. at 1 8 3 9 (q u o t i n g B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY 11 45 (7 th ed. 1999)) . The Supreme Court then stated that the view that a preva iling party is "one who has be en award ed som e rel ief by th e cou rt can be dis ti ll ed from ou r pr io r cas es. " Id

. I n discussing suc h prior

case s, the Supreme Court re iterate d that, in order to attain preva iling-pa rty status, a par

ty is require d to "'receiv e atlea st so me r eli ef on th e me ri ts of h is cla im .'" Id

. at 1 8 4 0 (q u o t i n g Hewi t t v. Helms , 482 U.S. 755, 760 ( 1987) (holding that plaintiff was not preva iling par ty simply by virtue of c ourt of a pp e a ls f a vo ra ble state me nt o f l a w b e c a us e su c h s ta temen t, wh ic h amou nte d at mo st t o interlocutory

ruling that complaint should not have been dism issed for f ailure to state c onstitut ional claim but which af

forde d plaintiff no re lief on merits of that c laim, was " not the stuff of which leg al victories are made" )). The Supreme Court f ound that, when taken toge ther, its pr i o r d ecisions established that " enfor cea ble j udg ments on the merits and c ourt-orde red c onsent dec ree s cre ate the 'm at er i al al t er at i o n o f t h e l ega l re l at i o n s h i p o f t h e p ar t i es ' n ec es s ary t o p er m i t an aw ar d o f a t t o rn ey 's fees ." Id

. at 1 8 4 0 (q u o t i n g Te x a s S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n , 489 U.S. a

t 792 (holding that unions were8

preva iling par

ties beca use they ob t ai ned judg ment finding that school-district policy prohibiting te a c he rs fr om c omm

un ic a tin g wi th e a c h o the r r e gardi ngun ion a c tiv iti e s v iol a te d te a c he rs ' F ir st Am e ndme nt r ig hts )) ; see also Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U. S. 103 , 109 -1 2 ( 19 92 ) ( Sup re me Court he ld that p l ai ntiff who had be en aw arde d even nominal damag es obtained e nforc eable judgme nt that

re fl e c te d r e lie f o n mer its of c la im an d thus ma de him pr e va ili ng pa rt y fo r f e e purp os e s) ; Maher v

. Gagne , 4 48 U. S. 1 22 , 1 25 (1 98 0) (S up re me Court a ff ir me d lo we r c ourt ju dgmen t th a t A id t o Famili e s w it

h Depe ndent Children (AF DC) plaintiff wa s preva iling par ty wher e she ha d soug ht, inter alia, and obta ined conse nt decr ee a war ding substantial incr ease i n s t an d ard a llowance for workrelated expenses and r ight to prove actua l work-r elated e x penses e x cee ded standa rd allowa nce) . The Supreme Court stresse d that the " merit[s] " r equire ment contained in its prio r ca s es was not to be abrog ated be cause "' only

when a party has pre vailed on the mer its of at least some of his cla ims . . . has th ere been a det erm in ati on of th e 'sub st ant ial ri ghts of th e part ies '.'" Buck hannon , 121 S. Ct . at 1841-42 (quoting Hanrahan v. Ham pton , 4 4 6 U.S . 754, 758 (1980) ( per c uriam) ( holding that plaintiffs wer e not pre vailing pa rties bec ause r ever sal of dire cted ve rdict ag ainst plaintiffs did not involve any

finding on merits of their unde rlying c laims)). Th e Court ' s se min a l de c isi on on pr e vail in g-party

status is Sti llwe ll , su

pra . I n the appe al

u n d er l y i n g Sti llwe ll , this Court g rante d the parties' joint motion for remand pursua nt to Gregory v

. Br own , 5 Vet.App. 108 (1993) (re mand order ed for Boa rd to c orre ct err or made in ap p l y ing regulation, subsequently

found to be unlaw ful, reg ardingsurviving- spouse status; C o u r t a ls o order ed BV A to make specific fac tual finding s in c ourse of re adjudication). In rende ring a dec ision on the appellant' s EAJ A application in Sti llwe ll , the Court, relying upon Schaefe r , su pra , held that the appellant wa s a pre vailing pa rty beca use she h ad o btained just such a r emand, i.e., a rema nd predic ated upon the B VA' s application of a n invalid regulation, even thoug h the C ourt had not y et decla red ( in Gr e

go ry , su pra ) that invalidity at the time that the Boa rd had rende red its de cision on her c laim. Sti llwe ll , 6 Vet.App. at 300-01. The Court fur ther he ld, however , that the Secr etar y was substantially justified be cause his misinterpre tation of the regulation at issue was " no more than a

rea sonable mistake" and thus denied the appellant' s EAJ A application. Id . at 30 1- 03 . In th e c ours e of re achingits decision in Sti llwe ll , th e Court state d th a t Schaefe r

direc t ed that " a re mand alone" confe rre d preva iling-pa

rty status upon an appe llant beca use a remand repre sented " ' succe [ss ] on any9

s i gn i fi ca n ti s s u e i n l i t i gat i o n wh i ch ac h i ev e[ d ] s o m e o f t h e b en ef i t

. . . s o u gh ti n b ri n gi n g s u i t

. '" Sti llwe ll , 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 2 9 9 -3 0 0 (q u o t i n g Schaefe r , 509 U.S. at 302). I n the under ly ing c ase in Schaefe r , th e pla int if f h a d b e e n d e nie d So c ia l Se c ur ity disabi lity benef its at t he adminis trative level and subsequently had sought judicial revie w of that de nial. See Schaefe r , 5 09 U. S. at 29 4. I n th e c ours e of tha t ju dic ia l r e vie w, a

dis tr ic t c ourt , ho ld in g th a t, i n adjudicating the plaintiff' s claim at the a dmi n istrative level, the Sec reta ry of He alth and Human Service s (HHS) had committed three err ors that the Secr etar y had to cor

rec t , reve rsed the ne g ative administrative dec ision and remanded t h e plainti ff' s claim for disability benef its for corr ection of those err ors. Id . T hereaft e r, wh e n r e nd e ri nga de c isi on on the pla int if

f' s E AJA a

pp lic a tio n in Schaefe r , the S upreme Court held t hat t he plainti ff wa s a pre vailing pa rty for EA J A purposes ba sed upon this underly ing r esult. Id . at 3 01-02. Relying pr imarily upon the district court' s rec og nition of administrative err ors, the entry of judgme nt, a

nd the sequential obligation of the Secre tary of HHS t o c o r r e c ts u c h e r

r o r s , the S u

p r e m e C o u rth e l d

t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f

f w a s a p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y

f o r E A JA purposes be cause he " cer tainly [m et the] description [of a preva iling par ty as one w ho] 'has

su c c e e de d o n a

ny sig nif ic a nt i ssu e in l iti g a tio n w hic h a c hie ve [d] so me of the be ne fi t . . . so ug ht i n bri ngin g sui t. '" Id

. (q u o t i n g Te x a s S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n , 489 U.S. at 791-92). The Court notes in par

ticular that the r emands in both Schaefe r and Sti llwe ll

wer e pre dicated upon administrative error. Although the Court rec og nizes the breadth of the lang uag e in Sti llwe ll , su pr a , w hic h, in a

nd of its e lf , co uld be re a d to me a n th a t pr e va ili ng -p a rt y status is a c hie ve d a

ny tim e th a t t h is Co u rt r e ma

n d s a n a p p e ll a n t' s u n d e r ly

in g a p p e a l, th a t l a n g u a g e mu s t b e r e a d in th e c o n te xt of why the re mands wer e orde red in both Schaefe r and Sti llwe ll

. I n Le ma tta , whi ch th e ap pe lla nt a nd NO VAur g e thi s Co ur

t to fi nd inc on sis te nt w ith Buck hannon a nd thu s ove rr

ule , the Court a dd

re sse d for the fi rs t time wh e the r a re mand purs ua nt t o Ce rullo a u t o m a t i c a l l y m a k e s a n a

p p e l l a n t a p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y u n d e r t h e E A JA

. T h e C o u rt in iti a lly state d th a t " th is Cour

t ha s g e ne ra lly

he ld t hat th e pr e va ili ng [-]p a rt

y re qu ir e me nt o f t

he EA JA is sat is fi ed w hen a rem andis ord ered ." Le ma tta , 8 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 5 0 7 (c i t i n g Sti ll we ll , su pra ). I n the context of applying the succe ss-on-the- merits theory for attaining pr evailing -par ty status, the Court po sit e d th a t, at it s mo st f un dame nta l le ve l, t

hat th e or y wo ul d all ow an a

pp e lla nt t o q ua lif y a s a prev ail in g p art y if th e app ell ant "'w[o n] th e li ti gati on .'" Id

. at 5 0 8 (q u o t i n g Exe ter-W est Gree nwich10

Re g'l S ch. Di st . v . P on tar e lli , 7 88 F .2 d 4 7, 50 (1 st C ir . 1 98 6) ). Th e Cou rt state d, ho we ve r, that, pursuant to Sti llwe ll , an " outrig ht victory " i s not alway s nece ssary and that it is sufficient for the Court to m a ke so me " ' su

bs tanti ve de te rm inatio n in [the ] ap pe a l, b a se d u

po n the re c or d, the pa

rt ie s' pl eadi ngs, andth e C ou rt 's' preced ent , t hat is favo rabl e to th e app ell ant ." Id

. (q u o t i n g Sti llwe ll , 6 Vet.App. at 301). The Court found the rule quoted in Sti llwe ll to b e c on sis te nt w iththe Sup re me Court's holding in Schaefe r that a par ty to a lawsuit attains pre vailing- party status "' [i ]f the plaintiff has succ eede d on any

signific ant issue in litigation which a chieve d some of the be nefit . . . soug ht in bri ngin g the s ui t. '" Id

. (q u o t i n g Schaefe r , 509 U.S. at 302)

. Apply ing the se g uidelines, the Court in Le ma tta he ld that, b e c a

us e its Ce ru llo re mand

or de r w a s is su e d b e fo re it h a d c on sid e re d th e me ri ts

o f t h e ap p el l an t 's ca s e, i th adn o tm ad e an y s u b s t an t i v e de t er m i n at i o n s wi t h re gar d t o t h e ap p el l an t 's appea l and that thus the appellant ha d failed to de monstrate that he w as a pr evailing party under the merits theory

for pur poses of the EA J A. Id . at 509. Le ma tta also must be construed i n the contex t in which it occur red. In the appe al under ly ing Le ma tta , the Court, unlike the district court in Schaefe r and this Court in Sti llwe ll , did not order a

rema nd predic ated upon err or in the administrative adjudication proc ess. Rather, in that unde rly ing appea l in Le ma tta , t h e C o u rt h adb as edi t s re m an d o f t h e ap p el l an t 's cl ai m s o l el y u p o n t h e S ec re t ary 's

rema nd motio n , w h ic h r e qu e s te d th a t t h e Co u rt r e tu

r n ju r is d ic ti o n to th e B o a r d

b u t w h ic h d id

n ot acknow ledg e any

administrative er

ror. Le ma tta ' s ref

ere nce to the f

iling of a record on appea l or any pleading s by

the par ties was simply

a ca se-spe cific r efe renc e to demonstrate that the Court had made

no rema nd based upon a dminist rative e rror . Thus, gi ven this context, t he Le ma tta holding is not inconsistent with either the Schaefe r or Sti llwe ll

ho ldi ng s. Th e a pp e lla nt s imi larl y

a rgue s th a t Le ma tta is inc ons i s t en t with Swiney , su pra . I n the underlying a

ppeal in Swiney , the Court reve rsed a Boa rd dec ision as to one claim; vaca ted a B oard de c isi on a s tw o o the r c la ims on

the g ro un ds that th e B oa

rd " ha d fa ile d to a

pp ly a nd ha d in c or

re c tly applied, re spec t i v el y , pertinent re g ulations"; and r emande d the three matters for rea djudication. Swiney , 14 Vet.App. at 68. I n the cour se of r ender ing a decision on the a

ppellant' s EAJ A application in Swiney , the Court stated that pre vailing- party status is ge nera lly

att a in e d wh e n a n appellant obtains

a re mand of his claim bec ause the rema nd "' repr esents succ e[ss] on any signific ant issue in litigation whi ch ach iev e[ d] so me o f the b enef it

. . . s ou ght i n b ri ngin g sui t. '" Id

. at 6 9 (q u o t i n g Sti llwe ll and11

no tin g that Sti llwe ll

cited Schaefe r ). The Court fur ther stated that "' [t ]he touchstone of the pre vailing party inquiry must be the materia l alteration of the l eg al re lationship of the parties in a ma nner w hich C o n gr e s s s o u gh t t o p rom ot e in th e fee s tat ut e.'" Id . (empha sis in Swineyo m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Texas S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n , su pra ). I n finding that the appe llant in Swineyw a s a p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y

f o r E A JA purposes, the Court posited, inter a lia, th at t he re mands in the underly ing c ase w ere "r esolutions which mater ially

chang ed the ' leg al re la

ti o n s h ip' betwee n the Secr etar y and the a ppellant, Te

x as Sta te Te a c h e r s A s s 'n , su pra , from on e of cl aim den ial to a con ti nu in g adju di cat ory pro cess ." Swiney , 14 Vet.App. at 69. Swiney also must be construed w ithin it s context, i .e., a Court r emand pr edicated upon administrative err or. I t is a remand suc h as that orde red in Swineyand in Schaefe r , as we ll as the other r esolutions in the Supreme Court case s cited above, t hat re sult in a material alter ation of the leg al re lationship of the parties. Thus, c ontrary to the appellant' s argument, Le ma tta and Swiney

are not inconsistent because in Le ma tta , unlike in Swiney , there was not a r emand pr edicated upon administrative er

ror. The Court notes that in Buck h a nnon , su

pra , wher e pre vailing- party status was not found, the re wa s n o und e rl y ingc ourt de te rm inatio n o f a

ny e rr or . Furt

he r, a n an a ly sis of the c a se s c ite d in Buck hannon is instructive. Apply ing the standard summar ized in Buck hannon (" some relief on the merits") , 121 S. Ct . at 1840-42, pre vailing- party status was found by

the Supreme Cour t in the following situations: wher e the plaintiff had obtained an enforc eable judgme nt for dama g es, Farrar , su pr a ; a jud g me nt, ba se d upon a

c ourt fi nd ingof

a c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio n, that a lte re d a sc ho oldistrict pro h ib it io n

o n te a c h e r c o mm u n ic ation reg ardingunion activities, Te x a s S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n , su pr a ; and a c onsent dec ree that provided an AF DC rec ipient with a substantial increa se in the standard a llowance for wor k-re lated expenses and a rig ht to prove that ac tual work-r elated e x penses exceede d the standar d allowanc e, Maher , su pra . Conversely , preva iling-pa rty status w as not found, under the test reiter ated in Buck hannon , wher e the plaintiff me rely obtained a f avora ble statement of law, He witt , su

pra , o r a re ve rs a l of

a dir e c te d v e rd ic t a g a ins t hi m, Hanrahan , su pra . This analy sis revea ls that those Supreme C ourt case s awa rding preva iling-pa

rty status either require the ul timate rec eipt of a benef it that was sought i n bring ing the litigation, i .e., the a war d of

a benef it, or , at a minimum, a court re mand pre dicated upon a dminist rative e rror
. See B uckhannon and Schaefe r , both su

pra . Both of these alternatives entail resolutions that materially alter the leg al12

relationship of t he par

ties. S e e Te x a s S ta teTe a c h e r

s A s s 'n and Swiney , both su pra . Thus, a re mand does not constitute "some relief on the merits" unle ss that remand is pre dicated upon a dminist rative

err or. Buck

hannon , 121 S. Ct . at 1840. Sti llwe ll , Le ma tta , and Swiney , a ll su pra , co mpo rt wi th t

his construct. To the extent that any Court prec edent c ould be construe d as in conflict with our holding today , we disavowthat prec edent. That st andar d has not been me t in the instant case. The appellant' s claim was r emande d as reque sted in the Secr etar

y ' s unopposed motion for re mand. B eca use nowhe re in his motion did the Secre tary acknow ledg e er

ror, a nd beca use, alternatively , in rema nding the matter, the Court did not

rec og nize admi n i strative er ror, the r emand wa s not predicated upon administrative er ror. The

a p p e lla nt thu s i s n o ta

p r e v a i l i n g p a rt y
. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e C o u rtd e n i e s t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s E A JA application.

III . C ON CL USI ON Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo regoi ng a na ly sis , th e Au g us t 9, 20 00 , s ing le -j ud g e or de r i s
re vo ke d; t

his op ini on

is i ssu e d in

its ste a d; a

nd the a pp e lla nt' s EA JA a

pp lic a tio n is de nie d. I t is so order ed.