The Honorable Russell G. Clark, United States District Judge 1

for the Western District of Missouri.

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No. 95-1229

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Western District of Missouri.

Johnny Boyce, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: July 5, 1996

 Filed: July 19, 1996

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Before BOWMAN, LOKEN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Johnny Boyce challenges the fifty-seven-month sentence imposed

by the District Court following his guilty plea to conspiring to provide 1

a prohibited object (heroin) to an inmate, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 371, 1791(a)(1) (1994). Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Boyce has filed a pro se

supplemental brief raising additional issues. We affirm.

In his Anders brief, counsel suggests he rendered ineffective

assistance in advising Boyce to waive a reduction for accepting

responsibility, and Boyce joins in this argument. Because the record is

undeveloped as to such a claim, it is more properly the subject of a 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) motion where Boyce can first
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present it to the District Court. See United States v. Taylor, 82 F.3d

200, 201 (8th Cir. 1996).

In his supplemental pro se brief, Boyce contends the District Court

wrongly assessed a four-level aggravating-role enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.1(a) (1995). This contention is baseless because Boyce stipulated

in his plea agreement that he should receive the enhancement and admitted

at the change-of-plea hearing that he had read the plea agreement and had

consulted with counsel before signing it. See United States v. Nguyen, 46

F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant who voluntarily and

explicitly acknowledges that specific guidelines provision applies may not

challenge punishment on appeal). For the same reason, any challenge Boyce

makes to the District Court's decision not to grant him an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction also fails. We also reject as vague and

conclusory Boyce's contentions that the District Court failed to comply

with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(f) and 32(c)(3)(D). See Fed.

R. App. P. 28(a)(6) (1996); see also Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 750

(8th Cir.) (holding that habeas petitioner waived argument by failing to

specify why grounds asserted entitled him to evidentiary hearing) (citing

predecessor to Rule 28(a)(6)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 144 (1995).

For the first time, Boyce also argues that he was entitled to a

three-level decrease under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2). After conducting plainerror review, see United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir.

1993) (en banc), we reject the claim, as the undisputed facts reveal that

one of Boyce's co-conspirators was about to receive heroin from another coconspirator--for subsequent delivery to Boyce--when the individual

delivering the heroin suspected she had been discovered by authorities and

quickly disposed of the drugs. See U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2) (1995)

(providing that three-level decrease in conspiracy cases unavailable if coconspirators were about to complete all acts
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believed necessary for successful completion of substantive offense "but

for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond their

control").

Finally, Boyce lodges a general ineffective-assistance claim, arguing

that he was prejudiced by counsel's advice to stipulate to "untrue" facts,

and by counsel's failure "to properly mitigate factors that [were] clearly

in [Boyce's] best interest[s]." Boyce's Supplemental Brief at 6. These

shortcomings, Boyce maintains, resulted in his receiving the aggravatingrole enhancement and not receiving a § 2X1.1(b)(2) decrease. Again, such

claims are more properly the subject of a § 2255 motion. See Taylor, 82

F.3d at 201.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we have found no other

nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988).

Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.