J-S52029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SCHWENKSVILLE FARM, LLC IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MENDELSON FAMILY TRUST AND

MARK MENDELSON

Appellants No. 3245 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered October 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No: 2015-13113

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2016

Appellants, Mendelson Family Trust and Mark Mendelson, appeal from 

the October 21, 2015 order granting Appellee, Schwenksville Farm, LLC’s, 

emergency motion for possession of property pending appeal. We quash. 

This appeal arises from a landlord/tenant dispute. On June, 2, 2015, a 

magisterial district judge (“MDJ”) entered an judgment granting possession 

of property located at 833 Camp Wawa Road, Schwenksville, Pennsylvania 

(the “Property”), to Appellee, the plaintiff and landlord. The June 2, 2015 

judgment did not require Appellant to pay any arrears to Appellee, but it 

required Appellant to pay $6,000.00 per month in rent in accordance with 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the parties’ lease agreement. On June 11, 2015, Appellants appealed from 

the MDJ’s decision and filed a praecipe for a rule to require Appellee to file a 

complaint in the court of common pleas. On June 26, 2015, Appellee filed a 

complaint for possession and eviction in the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas. On August 31, 2015, Appellee filed an emergency motion 

for possession, alleging Appellant failed to comply with the MDJ rules 

governing supersedeas. Appellee argued it was entitled to possession of the 

Property because Appellant never paid rent as specified in the MDJ’s June 2, 

2015 decision. Appellee relied on Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. No. 1008(b): 

When an appeal is from a judgment for the possession of real 

property, receipt by the magisterial district judge of the copy of 

the notice of appeal shall operate as a supersedeas only if the 

appellant at the time of filing the notice of appeal, deposits with 

the prothonotary a sum of money (or a bond, with surety 

approved by the prothonotary) equal to the lesser of three (3) 

months’ rent or the rent actually in arrears on the date of the 

filing of the notice of appeal, based upon the magisterial district 

judge’s order of judgment, and, thereafter, deposits cash or 

bond with the prothonotary in a sum equal to the monthly rent 

which becomes due during the period of time the proceedings 

upon appeal are pending in the court of common pleas, such 

additional deposits to be made within thirty (30) days following 

the date of the appeal, and each successive thirty (30) day 

period thereafter.

Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. No. 1008(B). 

Appellant never deposited any amount of money with the prothonotary 

after the June 2, 2015 judgment. Appellant’s appeal from the MDJ’ 

judgment therefore did not act as a supersedeas. Accordingly, the trial 

granted Appellee’s October 15, 2015 motion for possession and directed the 
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sheriff to remove Appellant from the Property. Appellant filed a timely 

appeal from that order.1 

Before we consider the merits, we sua sponte consider our jurisdiction 

over the trial court’s order. Roman v. McGuire Mem'l, 127 A.3d 26, 31 

(Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 134 A.3d 57 (Pa. 2016) (noting that this 

Court can raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte). Appellant argues 

the October 21 order is final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1),2

because it granted Appellee all the relief it sought in its complaint. 

Appellant’s Brief at 1. We disagree. To the contrary, the order on appeal 

did not dispose of any claim or party, it simply rendered the MDJ order 

immediately enforceable because Appellant failed to effect a supersedeas in 

accord with Rule 1008(B). The order on appeal does not resolve Appellee’s 

complaint for possession and eviction. That complaint is still pending, and it 

remains to be determined whether Appellee can prove the facts it alleges 

and whether those facts support eviction under the terms of the parties’ 

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1

 On November 4, 2015, Appellant applied to this Court for a stay of the 

order on appeal. On November 19, 2015, we granted Appellant’s application 

and stayed the trial court’s order conditioned upon Appellant’s filing of 

security in an amount to be determined by the trial court. The trial court 

ordered Appellant to file security of $42,000. That amount represented 

seven months’ rent—from June 2015 through January 2016, the latter date 

representing the end of the 60-day stay period. Appellant failed to post the 

required security. On January 15, 2015, this Court entered an order lifting 

the stay. 

2

 An order is final under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) if it “disposes of all claims and 

of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). 
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lease agreement. The order on appeal merely permits Appellee, rather than 

Appellant, to be in possession of the Property while the litigation is pending. 

Appellant also cites Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4), which permits an 

interlocutory appeal from “[a]n order that grants or denies, modifies or 

refuses to modify, continues or refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses 

to dissolve an injunction[.]: Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4). The order on appeal does 

not relate to the grant, denial, modification, continuation, of dissolution of an 

injunction. The order on appeal simply recognizes Appellee’s present right 

to possession of the Property based on the MDJ’s judgment and the absence 

of a supersedeas. 

In summary, Appellant has failed to establish any basis upon which 

this Court has jurisdiction over the trial court’s October 21, 2015 order. We 

therefore quash the appeal. 

Appeal quashed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2016