COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

LINDA C. EISSLER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1879-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 MARCH 4, 1997 

F. CHARLES STANGE, JR. 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

John K. Moore, Judge 

 Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. Martin-Gayle; 

Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (Barry Randolph Koch; McCardell & Inman, P.L.C., 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Linda C. Eissler (Eissler) appeals the ruling of the trial 

court relieving F. Charles Stange, Jr. (Stange), her former 

husband and father of the parties' daughter, Kimberly, of 

responsibility for Kimberly's college related expenses pursuant 

to the terms of a stipulation agreement. Finding no error, we 

affirm the decree. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 It is well established that a settlement agreement 

incidental to divorce is a contract subject to general principles 

of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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App. 173, 180, 355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987). If the agreement is 

unambiguous and "all the evidence which is necessary to construe 

[it] was presented to the trial court . . ., the meaning and 

effect of the contract is a question of law which can readily be 

ascertained by this court." Id. Although parties may advance 

different interpretations of like provisions in an agreement, 

this "does not necessarily imply the existence of ambiguity where 

there otherwise is none." See Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 

513-14, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). "'An ambiguity exists when 

language admits of being understood in more than one way or 

refers to two or more things at the same time.'" Id. at 513, 351 

S.E.2d at 595 (quoting Renner Plumbing v. Renner, 225 Va. 508, 

515, 303 S.E.2d 894, 898 (1983)). Here, the trial court 

correctly determined that those provisions of the subject 

agreement in issue are unambiguous. 

 "Where [a separation] agreement is plain and unambiguous in 

its terms, the rights of the parties are to be determined from 

the terms of the agreement and the court may not impose an 

obligation not found in the agreement itself." Jones v. Jones, 

19 Va. App. 265, 268-69, 450 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1994). 

 The court must give effect to all of the 

language of a contract if its parts can be 

read together without conflict. Where 

possible, meaning must be given to every 

clause. The contract must be read as a 

single document. Its meaning is to be 

gathered from all its associated parts 

assembled as the unitary expression of the 

agreement of the parties. However inartfully 

it may have been drawn, the court cannot make 

a new contract for the parties, but must 
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construe its language as written. 

Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 16, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985) 

(quoting Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 

(1983)). 

 We concur in Eissler's contention that the plain meaning of 

paragraphs 21, 23 and 25 of the agreement does not vest Stange 

with authority to veto Kimberly's college selection as a 

condition of his obligation to pay attendant expenses, despite 

provisions that Eissler and Stange "will in good faith negotiate 

mutual decisions as to the . . . college . . . to be attended by 

the child." See id. at 17, 332 S.E.2d at 800. However, 

paragraph 26 provides that, "if it is deemed appropriate and 

necessary for the child to attend a private school with consent

of both Husband and Wife," Stange must "pay the tuition and book 

costs, if an appropriate school, suitable to both Husband and

Wife can be secured." (Emphasis added). Considered together 

with the entire agreement, paragraph 26 clearly limits Stange's 

responsibilities for Kimberly's education at a private

institution, including college,1 to those enumerated costs of an 

institution deemed suitable and approved by both parties. 

 Nevertheless, Eissler contends that Stange must pay for 

Kimberly's private education because he agreed that Rice was an 

"appropriate school." However, appropriateness and necessity are 

 

 1"School" defined in paragraph 21 includes "grade school, 

high school, college, technical, professional or other." 
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simply considerations in the assessment of suitability and 

consent by each party. If the parties had intended that a 

decision under paragraph 26 must be neither unreasonable nor 

capricious, they should have included such limitation in the 

agreement. Compare Jones, 19 Va. App. at 269-70, 450 S.E.2d at 

764-65 (party vested with veto where agreement conditioned duty 

on "agree[ment] on the college of attendance"), with Harris v. 

Woodrum, 3 Va. App. 428, 429, 432-34, 350 S.E.2d 667, 668, 669-70 

(1986) (refusal reviewable where agreement premised duty on 

husband's "approval of the particular school . . ., which 

approval [he] agrees not to unreasonably withhold"). Clearly, 

the language in issue requires that the parties must jointly 

assent to any private school selected by Kimberly before husband 

is responsible for the costs. 

 We also reject Eissler's argument that Stange waived 

objection to Kimberly's selection when he failed to negotiate her 

choice in the "good faith" required by paragraph 21, declining 

responsibility only after Kimberly decided to attend Rice. 

However, considerations of good faith are not appropriate to 

paragraph 26, the provisions of which imposed no duty on Stange 

to address the issue until confronted with the payment request. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decree of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.