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*********************************************** 
MARINA P. WALKER v. ARTHUR L. WALKER

(AC 45308)

Cradle, Suarez and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and making certain financial

orders. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

failed to consider each factor set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b81 (c)) when distributing the marital property: because the trial court

expressly stated that it had considered all of the statutory criteria for

marital property distributions in § 46b-81, it is presumed to have performed its duty unless the contrary appears from the record, and, in

this case, the court provided a well reasoned analysis for the disparity

in awards, which was based on the facts, including the origin of the

assets, the parties’ respective contributions, and their respective needs;

moreover, it is well established that, in a case in which the court has

considered all statutory criteria, the court need not make express findings as to each individual statutory criterion.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court applied

an unreasonable amount of weight to his fault in the breakdown of the

marriage in fashioning its orders distributing the marital property and

awarding alimony: the court stated that it had considered all of the

statutory factors for distributing marital property in § 46b-81 and for

awarding alimony pursuant to statute (§ 46b-82), and this court determined that the trial court properly considered fault in fashioning its

financial orders and, in fact, was required to do so because the cause

for the dissolution of the marriage is a statutory factor that the court

must consider in distributing marital property and awarding alimony in a

contested dissolution proceeding; moreover, contrary to the defendant’s

claim, a finding by the trial court of irretrievable breakdown, rather

than intolerable cruelty, a ground also alleged by the plaintiff, does not

preclude it from considering fault in fashioning its financial awards;

furthermore, although it was not entirely clear from the memorandum

of decision the precise amount of weight the trial court gave to fault,

it was not necessary for this court to be able to discern this, as when

it is evident from the decision that the trial court considered all of the

relevant statutory criteria, the trial court is given broad discretion in

determining the weight to be given to each individual factor, no single

criterion is preferred over others, and the trial court is accorded wide

latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar

circumstances of each case, and the trial court’s careful reasoning for

its financial orders, which had a reasonable basis in the facts, reflected

no abuse of the court’s broad discretion in assigning the weight to be

given to each statutory factor.

Argued September 20—officially released October 31, 2023

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a

cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the

court, Moukawsher, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief, from which the

defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kevin F. Collins, for the appellant (defendant).

John H. Harrington, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

FLYNN, J. The defendant, Arthur L. Walker, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Marina P. Walker, awarding alimony to the plaintiff and dividing the marital property

between the parties. On appeal, the defendant claims

that the court improperly (1) failed to consider all of

the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b81 (c) in its division of the marital property and (2)

applied an unreasonable amount of weight to the defendant’s fault in the breakdown of the marriage in fashioning its orders distributing the marital property and

awarding alimony.1 We disagree and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court, and

procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant married in 1993 and had three

children together.2 The parties resided in a house in

Old Greenwich, which the plaintiff’s father had purchased for her. The plaintiff owned 74.5 percent of the

marital home and the defendant owned 25.5 percent.

The defendant and his sister inherited a building in

Eastchester, New York, that housed the family business,

a custom frame shop. The parties remortgaged the marital home and with the proceeds purchased the interest

of the defendant’s sister in the Eastchester building and

the custom frame shop, and thus the defendant became

the owner of the custom frame shop. A major cause of

the breakdown of the marriage was the defendant’s

extramarital affairs. The defendant was also repeatedly

violent toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no job

skills outside of her work at the custom frame shop

and her limited work in retail. The defendant’s annual

business income is approximately $100,000.

The court awarded the marital home to the plaintiff,

which was worth $800,000 and was burdened with a

mortgage of approximately $440,000, and awarded to

the defendant the custom frame shop and the Eastchester building, which was worth approximately $600,000,

had no mortgage, and had significant rental income

with potential for more. The court also ordered that the

defendant pay the plaintiff $235,000, which represented

the amount for which the parties had mortgaged the

marital home to purchase the interest of the defendant’s

sister in the Eastchester building and the custom frame

shop. The court determined that the defendant would

receive nothing for his interest in the marital home and

the plaintiff would receive nothing for her claim against

the custom frame shop, her share of claimed back rent,

or any interest on the $235,000 mortgage on the marital

home. The court ordered that the defendant pay the

plaintiff $1000 per month in modifiable alimony for ten

years. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set

forth as necessary.
We begin by noting our general standard of review

in family matters. A court must fashion its division

of marital property in accordance with the statutory

factors in § 46b-81 (c) and its alimony orders in accordance with the statutory factors in General Statutes

§ 46b-82 (a). See Riccio v. Riccio, 183 Conn. App. 823,

826, 194 A.3d 337 (2018). We will not disturb a trial

court’s financial orders in domestic relations cases

unless the court has abused its discretion or could not

reasonably conclude as it did based on the facts presented. See Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn.

358, 366–67, 999 A.2d 721 (2010).

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

failed to consider each statutory factor set forth in

§ 46b-81 (c) when distributing the marital property. We

disagree.

Section 46b-81 (c) provides that the factors that the

court shall consider in assigning property in a dissolution case are ‘‘the length of the marriage, the causes

for the . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age,

health, station, occupation, amount and sources of

income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,

employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of

the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also

consider the contribution of each of the parties in the

acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of

their respective estates.’’

The court expressly stated in its memorandum of

decision that it ‘‘considered all’’ of the statutory criteria

for marital property distributions in § 46b-81. Because

the court stated that it had considered all the relevant

statutory factors, it is presumed to have performed its

duty unless the contrary appears from the record. See

Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113, 130–31,

300 A.3d 1175 (2023). Nothing contrary to that presumption appears in the record. The court found that the

parties were married for twenty-nine years, that the

plaintiff was fifty years of age with limited job skills

and that the defendant was ten years older with an

approximate annual income of $100,000. The court further found that the plaintiff’s father purchased the marital home for her and that the defendant inherited a part

of the Eastchester building and custom frame shop.

The court detailed the amount of interest each party

had in the marital home and the Eastchester building

housing the custom frame shop and the value of the

respective properties, including any outstanding mortgages, and noted that the parties took out a $235,000

mortgage on the marital home to purchase the interest

the defendant’s sister had in the Eastchester building

and custom frame shop. The court also made findings

as to the causes of the breakdown of the marriage. It
is well established that in a case in which the court has

considered all statutory criteria, the court need not

make express findings as to each individual statutory

criterion. See, e.g., Riccio v. Riccio, supra, 183 Conn.

App. 826. ‘‘It is sufficient that the memorandum of decision at least reflect a proper consideration and weighing

of the factors set forth in the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Miller, 22 Conn. App.

310, 314, 577 A.2d 297 (1990). The court provided a well

reasoned analysis for the disparity in awards, which

was based on the facts, including the origin of the assets,

the parties’ respective contributions and their respective needs. We conclude that the memorandum of decision reflects a consideration of the relevant statutory

criteria for the distribution of marital property, and,

accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in

that regard.

II

The defendant next claims that the court applied an

unreasonable amount of weight to the defendant’s fault

in the breakdown of the marriage in fashioning its

orders distributing the marital property and awarding

alimony. Specifically, the defendant argues that the fact

that the court dissolved the marriage on the ground of

irretrievable breakdown3

rather than intolerable cruelty, which ground was also alleged in the amended

complaint, ‘‘leaves open the question as to whether

the proportional ‘fault’ assignment to the defendant/

husband was given unreasonable weight . . . .’’ He

also argues that, because the court did not state that

it had considered all of the statutory criteria set forth

in § 46b-81 (c) for distributing marital property, it is

‘‘impossible to assess whether the court assigned an

unreasonable amount of weight to ‘fault.’ ’’ We disagree.

We begin our analysis by noting that the court did,

in fact, state that it had considered all the statutory

factors for distributing marital property in § 46b-81 and

awarding alimony in § 46b-82.4

In distributing the marital property, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had

a strong claim to the marital home her father purchased

for her and the defendant had a strong claim to the

building and business his father left him. The court

stated that the disparity between the monetary value

of the properties distributed reflected: the plaintiff’s

interest in and contributions to the success of the custom frame shop; the origin of the marital assets; that

the defendant was awarded the Eastchester building

and custom frame shop with which he can support

himself; that the plaintiff has little chance to acquire

property in the future and is in need of money on which

to live; and the court’s findings of fault.

In fashioning the alimony award of $1000 per month

from the defendant to the plaintiff for ten years, the

court noted that the financial circumstances of the parties were ‘‘critical.’’ The court reasoned that, because
the defendant received the custom frame shop, the

plaintiff ‘‘will be left with no skills and no job. She

sacrificed them to maintain a home and raise three

children during a marriage that lasted nearly thirty

years. She will need time to get a decent job and money

to survive until she can recover from her economic

dependence on family and family enterprise. Given that

[the defendant] will likely struggle to keep his business

together and find a new home after paying [the plaintiff]

the property settlement, [the plaintiff] will have to

accept a sum calculated as best [as] the court can to

keep both parties’ heads above water.’’ The court further stated that, given that the plaintiff reports no current income, the defendant, who received the custom

frame shop, would be left with almost all of the parties’

joint income. The court additionally reasoned that,

although the plaintiff was unfaithful and there was evidence that she was also violent, the defendant ‘‘was

both repeatedly unfaithful to her and—especially

[because] he admits it—violent. The degree to which

he was unfaithful and the degree to which he was violent

outstrips any claims he makes on these same subjects

against [the plaintiff].’’5

The court properly considered fault in fashioning its

financial orders. In fact, it was required to do so because

the causes for the dissolution of the marriage is a statutory factor that the court must consider in distributing

marital property and awarding alimony in a contested

dissolution proceeding. See Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn.

657, 660, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983); see also General Statutes

§§ 46b-81 (c) and 46b-82 (a). Additionally, a finding by

the trial court of irretrievable breakdown does not preclude it from considering fault in fashioning its financial

awards. Sweet v. Sweet, supra, 660.

Although it is not entirely clear from the memorandum of decision the precise amount of weight the court

gave to fault—other than that fault was one factor

among many that it considered in distributing the marital property and that the critical consideration in awarding alimony was the parties’ respective financial circumstances—it is not necessary for us to be able to discern

this. Because it is evident from the decision that the

court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria

in §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, it is given broad discretion in

determining the weight to be given to each individual

factor. See, e.g., Coleman v. Coleman, 151 Conn. App.

613, 617, 95 A.3d 569 (2014); McMellon v. McMellon, 116

Conn. App. 393, 395–96, 976 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 293

Conn. 926, 980 A.2d 911 (2009). Although a trial court

must consider the statutorily delineated criteria, no single criterion is preferred over others and ‘‘the court is

accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed

upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of

each case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse, supra, 221 Conn. App. 130. The

court’s careful reasoning for its financial orders, which
has a reasonable basis in the facts, reflects no abuse

of the court’s broad discretion in assigning the weight

to be given to each statutory factor.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In the body of his main appellate brief, the defendant expressly declined

to pursue on appeal the following three additional claims, which had been

included in his statement of issues: the court erred in providing for an

inequitable double-dipping in the plaintiff’s favor; the court erred in its

weighing of the testimony of a third-party witness in assigning the marital

estate; and the court unreasonably limited the amount of time allocated for

trial, resulting in the defendant not having an adequate opportunity to present

his case. Accordingly, we do not review these expressly abandoned claims.

See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 165, 75 A.3d 651 (2013).

2

It is undisputed that the parties’ three children were adults by the time

of the dissolution proceedings.

3 See General Statutes § 46b-40.

4

‘‘The statutory factors for determining alimony in . . . § 46b-82 are

almost identical to the factors used to distribute property in . . . § 46b81(c). . . . They include: the length of the marriage, the causes for the . . .

dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount

and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs

of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make

pursuant to section 46b-81 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 137,

869 A.2d 164 (2005). In 2013, the legislature added as additional factors

‘‘education’’ and ‘‘earning capacity.’’ See Public Acts 2013, No. 13-213; see

also General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).

5 To the extent that the defendant also contends that it was clearly erroneous for the court to find that the degree to which the defendant was unfaithful

and violent outstrips any claims he made on those subjects against the

plaintiff, we disagree. The court found that both parties were unfaithful and

violent but determined that the defendant had admitted his violence and

further concluded that it found the plaintiff to be a more credible witness

than the defendant. It was within the province of the court to assess credibility, and we will not disturb such determinations on appeal. See Zilkha v.

Zilkha, 167 Conn. App. 480, 487–88, 144 A.3d 447 (2016).