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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

JOANN ROSE RYAN STANLEY, 

Plaintiff, No. 6:15-cv-02403-MO

 v. OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

Defendant.

MOSMAN, J., 

Plaintiff Joann Ryan Stanley1 challenges the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim

for Disability Insurance Benefits. I have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ) decision. For the reasons stated below, I AFFIRM the 

ALJ’s decision. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Ms. Stanley filed her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits to the 

Commissioner on August 1, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of August 1, 2002. The claim 

was initially denied on January 31, 2013, and again upon reconsideration on May 29, 2013. Ms. 

 

1 Throughout Plaintiff’s brief, Plaintiff is referred to as “Ms. Standley.” While a “Ms. Standley” with a “d” almost 

certainly exists somewhere in the world, I am persuaded from the Complaint [1] and record of proceedings below, 

that the Plaintiff in this case is “Ms. Stanley,” and will refer to her as such.

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Stanley then filed a timely request on August 2, 2013, for a hearing to review the 

Commissioner’s decision. An ALJ held a hearing on February 10, 2014, after which Ms. Stanley 

amended her alleged onset date to May 4, 2012. The ALJ subsequently issued a decision on 

April 21, 2014, which denied Ms. Stanley’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits on the basis 

that she was not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, during the period of May 4, 

2012 to June 30, 2012. 

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made his decision based upon the five-step sequential evaluation process 

established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (establishing the five-step evaluative process for SSI 

claims). 

At Step One, the ALJ determined that Ms. Stanley did not engage in substantial gainful 

activity during the period from her amended alleged onset date of May 4, 2012, through her date 

last insured of June 30, 2012. 

At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Stanley had the following severe impairments: 

history of acute myocardial infarction, obesity, bradycardia/hypotension, and recurrent angina. 

At Step Three, the ALJ determined that, as of her date last insured, Ms. Stanley did not 

have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of 

a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. 

Next, the ALJ determined that Ms. Stanley had the residual functional capacity to 

perform medium work, with the restrictions that she could not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds 

more than occasionally and that she could not climb ramps, or stairs more than frequently. 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Ms. Stanley did not have past relevant work. 

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Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ determined that, given Ms. Stanley’s age, education, work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy that she could have performed as of her date last insured. Specifically, the Vocational 

Expert testified that Ms. Stanley could work as a cleaner, laundry worker, or hand packager. 

Therefore, she was not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, at any time through her 

date last insured.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I review the ALJ’s decision to ensure the ALJ applied proper legal standards and that the 

ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the ALJ’s 

decision must be supported by substantial evidence and not based on legal error). “‘Substantial 

evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter 

v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Commissioner’s decision must be upheld if it is a rational 

interpretation of the evidence, even if there are other possible rational interpretations. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The reviewing court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 

DISCUSSION

Ms. Stanley argues the ALJ erred as a matter of law in denying her claim for disability 

benefits because his decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, 

she alleges the ALJ failed to (1) give adequate weight to the opinion of her treating physician, (2)

adequately assess her credibility, (3) adequately determine her residual functional capacity based 

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on limitations from all of her impairments, and (4) meet his burden at Step Five of showing there 

are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform. Despite these 

arguments, I find that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

I. The ALJ’s Treatment of the Treating Physician’s Opinion

Ms. Stanley argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law by failing to give adequate 

weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Oelke, who completed a medical impairment 

questionnaire for this claim. Specifically, Ms. Stanley argues the ALJ erred by failing to give 

specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Oelke’s opinions as reflected in the 

questionnaire. 

There are three types of medical opinions in Social Security cases: those from treating, 

examining, and non-examining doctors. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The 

medical opinion of a claimant's treating physician is entitled to “special weight” because “he is 

employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual.” Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 

If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an 

ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by 

substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830-31). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary 

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 

findings.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (citation omitted). 

It is well-established that “the ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, 

including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by 

clinical findings.” Thomas v Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crane v. 

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Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may “permissibly reject[] . . . check-off reports 

that [do] not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions”). A “physician's opinion 

of disability ‘premised to a large extent upon the claimant's own accounts of [her] symptoms and 

limitations’ may be disregarded where those complaints have been ‘properly discounted.’” 

Morgan v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Fair v. Bowen, 

885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

The ALJ did not commit legal error in discounting Dr. Oelke’s opinions. The ALJ 

pointed to specific and legitimate evidence in the record for giving them “little weight.” 

Specifically, the ALJ stated that, when providing his opinion of Ms. Stanley’s limitations, Dr. 

Oelke “did not identify supportive objective signs or findings and the signs and findings noted in 

his medical records were not consistent with the limitations he identified.” Furthermore, the ALJ 

found the questionnaire to be conclusory and without adequate explanation for how Dr. Oelke’s 

opinions were supported by medical evidence. Inconsistency with the medical record is a 

specific and legitimate reason to limit the weight given to a medical opinion provided by a 

treating physician. Similarly, finding that an opinion is conclusory and unsupported by the 

medical evidence in the record is also a specific and legitimate reason to discount that opinion. 

Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Oelke’s 

opinions. Thus, he did not commit legal error. 

II. The ALJ’s Assessment of Ms. Stanley’s Credibility 

Ms. Stanley argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give adequate reasons for discrediting 

her credibility. In general, the ALJ assessed that her testimony related to the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms from her impairments was not entirely credible, 

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and he did not believe Ms. Stanley had been forthcoming in reporting her medical needs to 

providers or in testifying in support of her disability insurance claim. 

When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be 

expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no 

affirmative evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 

severity of . . . symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). A general assertion that the claimant is 

not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must “state which [] testimony is not credible and what 

evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th 

Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to 

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala, 

50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the ALJ may employ ordinary techniques of 

credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying and prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the alleged symptoms. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. And, if the “ALJ’s 

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage 

in second-guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. 

In assessing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider objective medical evidence 

and the claimant’s treatment history, as well as any unexplained failure to seek treatment or 

follow a prescribed course of treatment. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The ALJ may also consider 

the claimant’s daily activities, work record, and the observations of physicians and third parties 

with personal knowledge about the claimant’s functional limitations. Id. Specifically, when a 

claimant’s work history undercuts her assertions, the ALJ may rely on that contradiction to 

discredit the claimant. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (discrediting 

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a claimant’s pain testimony because he admitted to at least one doctor he was laid off rather than 

injured, and because he waited nine months after he was laid off before seeking any medical 

attention). 

The ALJ’s assessment of Ms. Stanley’s credibility is supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. The ALJ determined that Ms. Stanley’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause some of the symptoms she alleged. But he found that her 

testimony about the severity of the symptoms was not fully credible for several reasons. 

First, the ALJ believed that Ms. Stanley’s poor work history prior to the amended onset 

date suggested she had “little internal motivation to return to [the] workforce.” Second, he noted 

that Ms. Stanley’s testimony was inconsistent with the medical record. For example, she 

asserted that her cardiac symptoms began long before her myocardial infarction, but the 

longitudinal evidence did not show any continuous complaints of a cardiac nature. Third, her 

testimony about the extensive limitations that resulted from her asthma and allergies was not 

supported by her treating providers’ notes, which indicated that these conditions were stable. 

Fourth, a cardiac specialist who evaluated Ms. Stanley noted that she was “somatically focused, 

as having a non-diagnosed cardiac problem without significant objective findings, and as 

determined to have something physically wrong with her.” In fact, despite their advice to stop 

taking certain medications, Ms. Stanley refused to do so and asserted that she still needed the 

medication. Finally, the ALJ noted that Ms. Stanley had not required emergent care related to 

her alleged cardiac symptoms since 2012, which was inconsistent with the frequent cardiac 

episodes Ms. Stanley claimed she experienced since that time. 

The ALJ’s reasons for finding Ms. Stanley to be not fully credible are clear, convincing, 

and sufficiently specific for me to determine that his decision was not arbitrary. The 

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inconsistency between Ms. Stanley’s testimony about her respiratory problems and cardiac 

problems with the medical record supports the ALJ’s finding that she was not fully credible. 

Ultimately, even though variable interpretations of some of the evidence may exist, the ALJ’s 

analysis was nonetheless reasonable, such that it must be upheld. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 

III. The ALJ’s Formulation of Ms. Stanley’s Residual Functional Capacity 

Ms. Stanley argues that the ALJ erred in formulating her residual functional capacity 

because he (1) failed to consider the restrictions that resulted from her asthma, allergies, and 

other respiratory problems, (2) dismissed any limitations she had due to the deformity in her 

index finger and hearing loss in her right ear, and (3) failed to consider the fatigue and pain that 

she experienced. 

At Step Two of the sequential evaluation process, “the ALJ assesses whether the claimant 

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits his 

ability to do basic work activities.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). “An 

impairment is not severe if it is merely ‘a slight abnormality (or combination of slight 

abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities.’” 

Id. (citation omitted). Even if an impairment was at one time considered severe, improvement in 

the symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings associated with the impairment may suggest that it is 

no longer disabling. See Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 

2006). In addition, “[i]mpairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not 

disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility” for social security benefits. Id. (explaining 

that “the key question is . . . whether the severity of the problem ha[s] decreased sufficiently to 

enable [the claimant] to engage in gainful activity”).

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An individual’s residual functional capacity is the most “an individual can do despite his 

or her limitations or restrictions.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). Limitations 

from non-severe impairments are still considered in formulating an individual’s residual 

functional capacity. Id. (“[L]imitations due to [] a ‘not severe’ impairment may prevent an 

individual from performing past relevant work or may narrow the range of other work that the 

individual may still be able to do.”). Only limitations supported by substantial evidence must be 

incorporated into the residual functional capacity and, by extension, the dispositive hypothetical 

question posed to the vocational expert. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 

2001). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, 

we must defer to the ALJ's conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198. 

 A. Asthma

Ms. Stanley argues that ALJ erred in failing to include her asthma as a severe impairment 

at Step Two and in failing to include limitations that resulted from her respiratory problems in 

her residual functional capacity. 

The ALJ acknowledged that the medical evidence showed Ms. Stanley had a history of 

seasonal and environmental allergies, asthma, and recurrent infections of the upper respiratory 

system. Ms. Stanley was treated by specialists who worked to determine her allergic triggers and

develop an appropriate treatment regimen. But the ALJ noted that as of 2012, treatment records 

described Ms. Stanley’s asthma as stable and in remission, so long as she controlled the infection 

she had in her ear. Similarly, the ALJ noted that Dr. Oelke’s records did not mention asthma as a 

predominant concern during the period at issue. In addition, Ms. Stanley admitted at the hearing 

that her allergies and asthma had existed for many years before she was unable to work, and 

therefore, she had been able to work around whatever minimal accommodations she required to 

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avoid potential triggers. Finally, the ALJ was troubled by a lack of third-party statements 

supporting Ms. Stanley’s claims that she had difficulty dealing with environmental factors at 

work. 

The medical evidence in the record from around June 30, 2012, does not contradict the 

ALJ’s finding that Ms. Stanley’s asthma was under control and that her respiratory problems did 

not pose more than a minimal effect on her ability to work at that time. Indeed, a review of Ms. 

Stanley’s medical records suggests that she was not suffering from respiratory problems between 

May 4, 2012 and June 30, 2012. Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that her asthma and allergies 

were not a severe impairment at Step Two is rationally supported by the evidence in the record. 

Still, in formulating Ms. Stanley’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ had to consider 

whether her allergies, asthma, and other respiratory problems resulted in functional limitations

that, in combination with her other impairments, impeded her ability to work. Ms. Stanley 

argues that the ALJ committed error in failing to restrict the environments where she may work. 

Ms. Stanley testified that her asthma and allergies impacted her ability to work. She 

asserts that, even when her asthma is under control, she has significant environmental 

limitations. She believes the ALJ assumed environmental limitations were unnecessary if her 

asthma was under control, which she contends was an erroneous assumption, since she is still 

limited in where she may work. 

For example, while working as a massage therapist, she explained that she ran a scentfree office and used scent-free products. When her clients arrived smelling of cigarette smoke, 

she suffered asthma attacks and had to go home. Similarly, Dr. Oelke opined that Ms. Stanely’s 

history of asthma and other respiratory impairments required her to avoid exposure to gasoline or 

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other industrial fumes, perfumes, aftershaves and other scents, cigarette smoke, dust and dust 

mites, dog and cat hair, industrial cleaning fluids, pollen, grasses, and scented cleaning products. 

In declining to include further environmental restrictions in Ms. Stanley’s residual 

functional capacity, the ALJ noted that “the medical record showed her treating providers 

considered [Ms. Stanley’s respiratory condition] stable and under control.” As explained above, 

Ms. Stanley’s treatment records did not show that respiratory problems were a concern during 

the time period at issue in this case and the record suggests that her respiratory problems were 

well-controlled on medication. Similarly, Ms. Stanley did not testify that she was limited in her 

daily activities, specifically in terms of places she could go, as a result of her asthma and 

allergies. Further, as previously explained, the ALJ properly gave reduced weight to Dr. Oelke’s 

opinions and to Ms. Stanley’s testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to include 

environmental limitations in formulating Ms. Stanley’s residual functional capacity is rational 

based on the evidence in the record. 

B. Index Finger 

 Ms. Stanley argues the ALJ erred by failing to include limitations that resulted from her 

deformed index finger in her residual functional capacity. In November 2010, Ms. Stanley 

dislocated a joint on her left second finger while trying to break her fall. Three weeks after the 

injury, she had reduced flexion at the joint and her doctor prescribed home hand exercises. Ms. 

Stanley still experienced problems with her finger in March 2011, and sought treatment. That 

doctor recommended hand therapy and reconstructive surgery. In May 2011, Ms. Stanley sought 

an orthopedic evaluation because she believed the lack of motion in her finger was interfering 

with her ability to work as a massage therapist. Dr. Kenneth Butters, M.D., an orthopedic 

specialist, provided multiple surgical options for improving the functionality of the finger. Ms. 

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Stanley claims she did not have surgery because she lost her health insurance. She also claims 

the injury ultimately caused, or at least played a part in, her decision to stop performing selfemployed massage therapy work.

The ALJ determined that the finger deformity was not a severe impairment and that it 

would not interfere with work activity more than minimally. In making this determination, the 

ALJ noted a lack of objective findings to establish that the deformity caused any grip problems. 

In addition, he did not believe that Ms. Stanley performed hand therapy exercises regularly, as 

prescribed.

The ALJ’s finding that Ms. Stanley’s injured finger would not interfere with work 

activity more than minimally is supported by the record. On the questionnaire filled out by Dr. 

Oelke, when asked if Ms. Stanley was limited in her ability to complete repetitive bimanual 

actions or in doing fine detail work, he responded “no.” Additionally, he responded “no” to the 

question of whether he would expect her workplace to be impacted by her injured finger. At her

hearing, Ms. Stanley testified that she could not work as a massage therapist because of her 

injured finger. But she did not state that the injury otherwise limited the use of her hand for 

other purposes, including normal daily activities. Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that her 

finger injury would only minimally interfere with Ms. Stanley’s ability to work is supported by 

the record, and he did not err in failing to include additional limitations in her residual functional 

capacity.

C. Hearing Loss 

Ms. Stanley argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing limitations that result from her 

documented hearing loss in her right ear. Medical records show that Ms. Stanley has right-sided 

hearing loss, and Ms. Stanley testified that she lost all hearing if she blocked her left ear because 

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she had virtually no hearing in her right ear. The ALJ noted, however, that she was able to 

understand normal conversational tones and volumes during the hearing. Based on his 

observations and the evidence in the record, he determined that her hearing loss would not result 

in more than minimal work-related limitations. Accordingly, he did not find hearing loss to be a 

significant impairment and he did not include any limitations in Ms. Stanley’s residual functional 

capacity specifically related to her hearing loss. 

It is unclear exactly what limitations Ms. Stanley believes result from her hearing loss. 

While she argues the ALJ erred in not taking this impairment into consideration when 

formulating her residual functional capacity, she does not point to any evidence in the record to 

support a finding that she experienced any additional functional limitations as a result of her 

hearing loss. In fact, Dr. Oelke did not ascribe any limitations based on her hearing loss in the 

medical impairment questionnaire he completed, suggesting he was not concerned about any 

limitations. Thus, because there is no evidence that Ms. Stanley’s hearing loss significantly or 

even minimally impacts her ability to work, the ALJ did not err in failing to find it to be a 

significant impairment and in failing to include any hearing-related limitations in Ms. Stanley’s 

residual functional capacity.

D. Pain and Fatigue 

Finally, Ms. Stanley argues the ALJ erred in failing to properly assess the limitations she 

experiences as a result of pain and fatigue. Again, Ms. Stanley fails to articulate exactly what 

additional limitations should have been included in her residual functional capacity, and what 

objective evidence in the record supports such limitations. Presumably, Ms. Stanley believes

that her pain limits her to performing less than medium work, which was the residual functional 

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capacity determined by the ALJ. In addition, she likely believes that her fatigue further limits 

her ability to work because she will be absent too often to maintain employment. 

 The only evidence in the record supporting a more limited residual functional capacity as 

of her date last insured is Dr. Oelke’s medical impairment questionnaire and Ms. Stanley’s 

testimony. Ms. Stanley testified that her vascular spasms made her exhausted and required her to 

lay down. In terms of her non-exertional limitations, Dr. Oelke opined that her pain and fatigue 

was occasionally severe enough to impair her ability to maintain attention and pace for sustained 

periods of time, that she could have coronary spasms that would require her to rest for thirty to 

sixty minutes before returning to work, and that she could miss four or more days a month as a 

result of her work-related impairments. As to Ms. Stanley’s exertional limitations, Dr. Oelke

opined that she could stand and/or walk for up to two hours a day, that she could spend less than 

two hours a day in a sitting position, and that she could only carry up to tend pounds a day. 

During the hearing, the vocational expert testified that those additional exertional limits would 

preclude medium work and the non-exertional limits would preclude all work. 

As explained above, however, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Oelke’s opinion, and he 

properly found Ms. Stanley’s testimony not fully credible. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by 

failing to include any additional exertional and non-exertional limitations in Ms. Stanley’s 

residual functional capacity. 

IV. Whether the ALJ Conducted an Accurate Step Five Analysis 

At Step Five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs in the national economy that Ms. 

Stanley could perform, given her age, education, and residual functional capacity. Ms. Stanley

contends that the ALJ based his decision on the opinion of the vocational expert, which was 

based on an incomplete hypothetical that failed to accurately reflect her limitations. Specifically, 

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Ms. Stanley argues that the three jobs the vocational expert found she could perform were not 

accurate because the ALJ’s hypothetical questions were based on an inaccurate residual 

functional capacity. I disagree. 

Limitations supported by substantial evidence must be incorporated into the residual 

functional capacity and, by extension, the dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE. 

Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1163-65. 

As discussed above, the statements by Ms. Stanley and Dr. Oelke’s opinions were 

properly discredited by the ALJ. Accordingly, Ms. Stanley’s argument, which is contingent 

upon a finding of harmful error in regard to these issues, is without merit. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 

1217 (“The hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE contained all of the limitations that the 

ALJ found credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ's reliance on 

testimony the VE gave in response to the hypothetical therefore was proper.”). Accordingly, Ms. 

Stanley’s argument fails.

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated, I find the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, I AFFIRM the decision. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 23rd day of March, 2017. 

 /s/ Michael W. Mosman_________ 

MICHAEL W. MOSMAN

Chief United States District Judge

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