### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 11, 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE EX REL


### . SU Z Y WH ITLEY

v. SA M LE WIS

An Appeal f

rom the Juvenile Court for F ayett e County No. 2382 J. Mike Whitaker, Judge

No. W2006-02333-C OA-R3-JV- F iled Jul y 24, 2007

This appea l involves a claim in juve nile court to r ecove r child support pay ments. The mother of

the child at issue told the responde nt that he was the child’s father. I n relianc e on this, the responde nt signe d a v o lu n ta r y a c kn o w le d g me n t o f

p a te r n it y , an d th e juv e n il e c o u rt e n te r e d ana g r e e d

o r d er setting child support and establishing t he respondent’s child support ar rea rag e. Ove r two y ear s later, the re spondent lear

ned that the c hild might not be his, and he pe titioned the juven i l e court for a pater nity test. His petition wa s g rante d, and the test showed that he was not the biolog ical father of the child. The juve nile court set a side the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity based on f

raud,

re lie ve d th e re sp on de nt o f a ny futur e ob lig a tio n to pa

y c hil d s up po rt , a

nd fo rg a ve a ll p ast c hil d support arr ear ag es. Subsequently , the re spondent fi l ed a petition aga inst the mother, seeking damag es bec ause the mother had f raudule ntly

induced h i m i n t o signingthe voluntary ackn o wl edg ment of pate rnity . The juvenile c ourt g rante d the re spondent’s petition ag ainst the mot he r, awa rd inghim dama g e s c on sis tin g of

the c hil d s up po rt

e rr on e ou sly

pa id, the c os t of

pate rn ity testing, a nd attorney ’s fe es. The State, on be half of the m o t h er , now appe als. We reve rse, concludingthat the juvenile court er roneously forg ave the responde nt’s acc rued c hild support

arr ear ag es, and that the juvenile cour t did not have ju

r is d ic ti on to adjudicate the responde nt’s petition ag ainst the mother for

damag es.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nile Co ur t i s Reve rsed and Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Ge n er al & Reporter, a

nd L aure n S. L amber

th, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee e x rel. Suzy Whit ley

.
David L . Doug las, Somerville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Sam L ewis.B y o p e ra tio n o f l a w , M o the r a n d M .C .L

. a s s ig n e d the ir c h ild su p p o rt rig h ts to the S ta te o f T e n n e sse e in 1

e x c h a n g e fo r p u b lic a ssista n c e , p u rs u a n t t o the fed e ra l T itl e IV -D p ro g ra m

. See Ba ker v. St at e ex r el

. Ba ker , N o. 0 1 A 0 1 -9 5 0 9 -C V -0 0 4 2 8 , 1 9 9 7 W L 7 4 9 4 5 2 , a t *3 (T e n n

. C t. A p p

. D e c

. 5 , 1 9 9 7 ). T h e re fo re , the S ta te o f T e n n e sse e is
t he r eal par t y i n i nt er es t i n t hi s ca s e.

-2- OP IN ION

I n November

19 9 9 , P et i t i o n er

/ Ap p el l an tS u z y

W h i t l ey (“ M o t h er ”) an d

R espondent/Appe llee Sa m L e wi s (“ L e wi s” ) we re inv olv e d in an int imate re la tio ns hip

. At the tim e , Mo the r w a s li vin g wi th

a man named Yates (“Yates” ), and L ewis was eng ag ed to another woman. On J uly 11, 2000, Mother g a ve bir th t o a so n, M. C.L . ( “ the c hil d” or “ M. C.L .” ), the c hil d at is su e in t his a c tio n. At

the tim e the child was bor

n, Mother told Yates that he was the f ather of the c hild, and Yates de nied it, telling Mother that he c ould not father a child.

I n approximately 2002, when M.C.L

. was two y ear s old, Mothe r told L ewis that he w as the fathe r of M.C.L . Ba sed on Mother’ s statement, L ewis believe d that he wa s t he child’s biolog ical fathe r. Consequently , on September 10, 2002, L ewis sig ned a voluntar y acknow ledg ment of pater nity (“V AP”), a cknowledg ing that he was M.C.L .’s bi ologic al father. There afte r, M.C.L . was g ive n L e wi s’ s la st n a me . L e wi s e sta bli sh e d a fa t h e r

- c hil d r e la tio ns hip wi th M .C. L ., vis iti ngthe c hil d

on wee kends and ha

ving the child call him “Da ddy .”

On Dec ember

29, 2003, the State of Tenne ssee ( “State”) , on behalf of Mother, f

iled a petition ag ainst L ewis to set L ewis’s c hild support obligation in the J uvenile Court below. On J anuar y 16, 1 20 04 , the Ju v e n i l e C o u rte n t e r e d ana g r e e d

o r d e r r e qu i r i n g L e w i s t o p ay

$ 3 1 7 p e r m o n t h i nc h i ld

su pp or t. T he or de r a lso state d th a t L e wi s w as in arr e ars by $1 3, 31 4, and

or de re d h im t o p a y

thi s
arr ear ag e at a

rate of $50 per

month.

Some time later, one of Mother’s friends called L ewis and told him that he was not M.C.L .’s fathe r. L ewis conf

ronted Mother

and she a

ppare ntly admitted to L ewis that he w as not M.C.L .’s fathe r. On

Ap ri l 7, 20 05 , L e wi s f

ile d a pe tit ion in t he J uv eni le Court

se e kin g a

pate rn ity te st. L ewis’s pe tition s tated that he ha d signe d the VAP base d on Mother’s r epre sentation that he wa s M.C.L .’s biologic al father, but that he w as l ater informed that he was not the father of the c hild. He

a sse rt e d in

his pe ti tio n th a t Mo the r w ou ld n ot c on se nt t o a vo lun tary

pate rn ity te st. L e wi s a lso claimed that Mother had committed f raud upon him. The State was not ser ved with a c opy

of the petition or notified of an y hear ing on the petition. Despite the lac k of notice to the State, on June 1, 20 05 , th e Juve nil e Court or de re d th e pate rn ity

te st r e qu e ste d b y

L e wi s. Th e re su lts of

the te st

s h o w e d t h a tLe w i s w a s n o tt h e b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r o f M

. C

. L.

On J une 15, 2005, the Juvenile Court held a hea ring in the matter, Judge William S. R h ea presiding . The re cord doe s not c ontain a transcr ipt of the hear ing. On J uly 13, 2005, an orde r wa s enter ed, ac knowledg ing that the results of the paternity test excluded L ewis as M.C.L .’s biologic al fathe r. On that ba sis, the trial court ende d L ewis’s oblig ation to pay any future c hild support and-3-

absolved L ewis from being “re sponsible for any arr ear ag es or r etroa ctive child support that wa s set by an ea rlier or der of

this Court.” The State did not rec eive a copy of the Juvenile Court’s order.

On Aug ust 10, 2005, L ewis filed a “Petiti on for Damag es and Costs” in the J uvenile Court

a g a ins t Mo the r, a lle ging that he r f ra ud in f a lse ly te lli nghim

that he wa s th e on ly

man w ho c ou ld have f ather ed M.C.L . cause d him emotional dist ress a nd “fina ncial costs including but not limi ted to pay ment of child support, pay ment of ar

rea g es [si c], attorney ’s fee s, pater nity test fee s, and cour

t costs.” L ewis soug ht reimburseme nt from Mother f or all of the c hild support pay ments he had ma de, his pay ments toward the pa

ternity tests, and his rea sonable at t o rn ey ’s fee s and costs. As with the

ear lier proce eding s, the State was not se rved with a copy of L ewis’s petition an d wa s n o t given

no tic e of the he ari ngon

it.
On September

21, 2005, the J uvenile Court conduc ted a he aringon L ewis’s pe tition for d am age s , J u d g e R h eaaga i np re s i d i n g. T h e r ec o rdd o es n o ti n cl u d e at ra n s cr i p to f t h e h ea ri n g. There afte r, on Oc tober 21, 2005, a n order was e ntere d finding that M o t h er i n t entionally dece ived L ewis by telling him that he wa s the only possible father

of the c hild. Base d on this finding and the

re su lts of the e arl ie r pate rn ity te st, the Juve nil e Court awa rd e d L e wi s a

jud g me nt a g a ins t Mo the r i n the amount of $9,381.61, re prese nting c hild support and insurance err oneously paid, a tax refund, costs of paternity testing, and attorney ’s fees i ncurr ed as a result of he r fr aud. The J uvenile Court

re it e rate d th a t L e wi s’ s c hil d s up po rt pa y me nts wo uld

c e a se , a nd that L e wi s w a s n ot t o b e he ld responsible for

any arr ear ag e. The State was not ser ved with a notice of this order.

There afte r, the State filed a petition f or contempt ag ainst L ewis in the J uvenile Court. The Sta te ’s p eti ti on no ted th at M ot her w as r ecei vi ng Ti tl e I V-D s ervi ces, andth at, con seq uen tl y , the Sta te

wa s aut ho r i z e d

t o a c to nh e r

b e h a l f

. T h e p e t i t i o ns t a t e d

t h a tL e w i s w a s i nar

r e ar s o nh i s c h i ld

s u p p o rto b l i g a t i o nan d

t h a th e r e f

u s e d t o p ay.
Subsequently
, the S tate appa rently beca me awa re of the J uvenile Court’s disestablishment of L e wi s’ s p a te rn ity

and the or de rs fl ow ingfro m th at. As a re su lt, on F e br ua ry 6, 20 06 , th e State filed a motion in the J uvenile C ourt, asking the C ourt to set aside it s J une 1, J uly 13, and Oc tober 21, 2005 order s, order ing paternity tests, disestablishing L ewis’s paternity
, ending his child support ob lig a tio n, a

bs olv ing him of re sp on sib ili ty fo r pa st ar

re ara g e s, and

awa rd inghim dama g e s a g a ins t Mother. The motion was based on the f act that the State w as not serve d with copies of L ew i s ’s petitions or give n notice of the hear ings on them. On Fe bruar y 21, 2006, the J uvenile Court enter ed

an o rd e r s e tti nga sid e tho se thr e e or de rs

.
On Marc h 8, 2006, L ewis filed a motion to set aside the VAP based on Mother’s fraud. He

a sk e d th e Juve nil e Court

to d ise sta

bli shhis pate rn ity , s e t asi de the Janu ary 20 04 or de r s e tti nghis child support obligation, hold Mot her in c ontempt f or committing fra

ud, and aw ard him attorne y ’s fee s and costs. The State r ece ived prope r notice of this mot ion.

On J u n e 7 , 2006, J uvenile Court J udg e Rhea conducte d a de novo he ari nga t w hic h b oth Mo the r an d L e wi s tes tif

ie d. L e wi s tes tif

ie d tha t Moth e r ha d told him that he wa s th e on ly

po ssi bleFo r r easons t hat are not ap p arent i n t he reco rd, t hi s o rder was s i gned by Judge J. M i ke W hi t aker. 2

-4- fathe r of M.C.L ., and that he relied on her repre sentations in signing the VAP. He claimed that he did no t kn owthat Mo the r w a s li vin g wi th Yate s at th e tim e the c hil d w a s c on c e ive d. I n 2 00 5, L e wi s state d, a fr ie nd of Mo the r’ s c a lle d h im a

nd tol d him that he wa s n ot t he fathe r o f M .C. L . A ft e r t hat, L ewis aske d Mother to conse nt to paternity testing; she r efuse d, asser ting that the test was

un ne c e ssa

ry be c a us e L e wi s w a s th e on ly po ss ib le f a the r. Af te r t he re su lts of

the pate rn ity

te st indicated that L ewis wa s not the biologica l father , L ewis said that Mother responde d by saying, “ I told y ou Iwas see ing some one else .” L ewis testified that Mother would not tell hi m the name of M.C.L .’s biologic al father.

Mother also testified. She sa id that when she le arne d that she wa s preg nant, she told Yate s that he wa s th e fathe r o f t he un bo rn c hil d. Yate s res po nd e d b y te lli nghe r t

hat he wa s una

ble to fathe r childre n. Mother concede d that she suspec ted that Yate s’s asser tion was untrue be cause he had seve ral other

children. Mother

testified that L ewis assumed that he was the fathe r of the child,

and sh e did no t te ll him oth e rw ise

. She a lso c la ime d th a t, w he n M .C. L . w a s b or n, sh e tho ug ht L e wi s was the c hild’s father . Mother said that she and L ewis did not discuss whether she wa s having sexual relations with any one else at the time that the child was conce ived. She maintained, howe ver, tha t L e wi s w a s aw ar e t h a t s h e w a s l i v i n g w i t h Y a t e s , s o h e m u s t h a v e kn o w n t h a t t h e r e w a s a possibili ty that Yates was M.C.L .’s father. She indicated that L ewis instigated his execution of the VAP; he ca lled her to see whether she wanted the child to ha ve his la st na

me and drove her to the he a lth de pa

rtme nt wh e re the y bo th sig ne d the VA P. Mo the r sa id that, wh e n th e y sig ne d th e VA P, she believe d that L ewis wa s the fathe r. Mother did not want to explore whether Yates was M.C.L .’s biologica l father , beca

use she suspec ted that Yate s was in a r ela tionship wit h her sister a

nd broac hing the top ic wi th h im m ig ht c a us e fa mil y pr ob le ms.

At the c on c l u s i o no f

t h e h e ar i n g , t h e Ju v e n i l e C o u rtc r e d i t e d L e w i s ’ s t e s t i m o n y

o na ll disputed points and concluded that Mother had c ommitt ed an o n go i n g fr aud ag ainst L ewis. On S e p t e mb e r

3 0 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e J u v e n i l e C o u rte n t e r e d ano r d e r c o n s i s t e n tw i t h i t s o r a l f i n d i n g s

. It

2 reinstated the Oct o b er 21, 2005 order, in whic h the J uvenile Court (1) dise stablished L ewis’s pa te r n i t y o f t h e c h i l d ; ( 2 ) e n d e d a l l o f L e w i s ’ s f u tu r e c h i l d s u

p p o rt o b l i g a t i o n s ; ( 3 ) f

o r g a ve a ll

arr e ara g e s and

/or re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

du e fo r M.C .L .; an d (4) g ra nte d L e wi s a ju dg me nt a g a ins t Mother in the amount of $9,381.61. The order of t he Juvenile Court was made f inal on Fe bruar

y 7, 20 07 . F ro m th is o rd e r, the State no w a pp e a ls.

On appe al, the State does not c halleng e the J uvenile Court’s finding that Mother committed fra ud, nor does it c halleng e the J uvenile Court’s decision to se t a side the VAP or end L ewis’s futur e child support obligation. The State argues, howe ver, that the J uvenile Court e rre d in f org iving the child support arr ear ag e ac crue d befor e L ewis’s pe tition to set aside the VA P; it contends that the order was an impermissible retroa ctive modi fication of a valid child support orde r. In addition, the State a sse rt s th a t th e Juve nil e Court wa s w ith out su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n to g ra nt L e wi s a jud g me nt a g a ins t Mo the r f or c hil d s up po rt

that he ha d pa id an d othe r expe ns e s tha t he inc ur re d in this matter.-5-

Both iss ues raised by

the State on appe al ar e questions of law , which we revie w de novo , w ith no presumption of cor

rec tness in the J uvenile Court’s dec ision. Alexander v. Alexander , 34 S.W .3d 456, 459 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d).

We f ir st a dd re ss t he State ’s a rgume nt t

hat th e Juve nil e Co urt e rr e d in fo rg ivi ngthe c hil d support arr ear ag es. The State a rg ues that the Juvenile Court’ s forg iveness of L ewis’s c hild support

arr ear ag e was contra

ry to the plain lang uag e of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-5- 101(f) (1), whic h prohibits retroac tive modification of a c hild support order. I n response , L ewis conte nds that the J uvenile Court did not r etroa ctively modify the oper ative child support orde r; rathe r, it set aside the

or de r p ur su a nt t o Ru le 60 .0 2 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure

. L e wi s c on te nd s that Ru le 60.02 permits a Juvenile Court to set aside a judgm en t b as ed o n fra ud and other

fac tors. Setting aside the order, L ewis maintains, does not constitute an imper missibl e re troac tive modification of the orde r.
The ope rative c hild sup p o rt o rd er is the a g ree d order enter ed by

the J uvenile Court on J anuar y 16, 2004. This or der set L ewis’s monthly child support pay

ments at $317 and e stablished

an a rr e ara g e of

$1 3, 31 4. Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d § 36 -5 -1 01 (f

)( 1) pr ov ide s:
Any order for c hild support shall be a judgment entit led t o be enforce d as any other jud g me nt o f a

c ourt of thi s st a te and

sh a ll b e e nti tle d to fu ll f

a ithand c re dit in t his state and in a

ny other state. Such judgm ent shall not be subject to modification as to a n y t im e period or any am ount s due prior to t

he date that an action for modif ic ation i s f ile d a nd no ti ce of th e action ha s b e e n maile d to the las t kn own address of the opposing parti es. I f the full amount of child support is not paid by the date up on wh ic h th e or de re d s up po rt is d ue , th e un pa id a mou nt i s in arr e ars and

sh a ll become a judgment for the unpaid amounts and sha ll accr ue intere st from the date of the ar rea rag e at the r ate of

twelve pe rce nt (12%) pe r annum. . . .
T.C.A.§ 36-5-101( f)( 1) (2005) (empha sis added).

Prior to the 1987 amendment of Section 36-5-101, r etroa ctive modification of a child support order was pe rmitted where it was nec essar y “to meet the e nds of justice.” Rutl e dgev . Ba rre tt , 802 S.w.2d 604, 606 (Tenn. 1991) . As amende d, ho we v er, the statute makes no provision for such a modification. The Te nnessee Supreme Court ha s held, applying the plain lang uag e of this statute, that a valid child support orde r is not subject to retroa cti v e m o d i fi cation. “[P] rospec tive modifications can be made, but only afte r notice” has bee n provided. Id. There fore , the cour t has no authority

to forg ive an a cc ru ed ch i l d s upport arr ear ag e, but may only modify a child support obligation back to “the da te that an action for modification is filed and notice of the action has be en
ma ile d to t

he la st k no wn a dd re ss o f t he op po sin g pa

rt ie s. ” T. C.A . § 36 -5 -1 01 (f )( 1) ; see Alexander , 34 S.W .3d at 460.

Moreove r, ag ain re ly ing on the plain lang uag e of the statute, the T ennesse e Supreme Court held that a c hild support order is not subject to c halleng e based on equitable defe nses such a s fra ud,-6-

beca use to do so would “def

eat the ve ry

purpose of

the amendme nt.” Rut

ledge , 802 S.W .2d at 607. L e wi s c on te nd s tha t th e tr ia l c ourt did no t “ re tr oa c tiv e ly

mod if y ” the c hil d s up po rt

or de r; rathe r, it

mere ly “set it aside” under Rule 60.02. This argument, howeve r, is based more on semantics than

su bs tanc e ; the e ff

e c t of the Juve nil e Cou

rt ’s a c tio n in thi s c a se is t o a bs olv e L e wi s o f r e sp on sib ili ty fo r t h e a rr ea ra ge, co n t ra ry t o t h e e x p l i ci tl an gu a g e o f t h e s t at u t e. I n d ee d
, ap p l y i n g Rut ledge , th is Court has held that a c hild support obligor who i s later determined not to be the biologica l father of

a c hil d wh om he ha s be e n or de re d to su pp or t may no t ob ta in re tr oa c tiv e re lie f of the va li d ch ild support order by having the order s et aside under the provisions of Rule 60.02. Se eIn r eT. S.R. , No. W2003-01321-COA-R3-JV, 2004 WL 1361359, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 17, 2004); Sta te e x r e l. Phill ips v. Philli

ps , No. E2001-02081- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL31662544, *2 -* 3 (T en n . Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002). As the Rut ledge Court rec og nized, the e ffe ct of the statute may “see m harsh,” but it s p u r p o s e is to e n s u r e th a t c h il dr e n r e c e iv e a d e qu a te support. Rut ledge , 802 S.W .2d at 607. Consequently
, we must hold that the J uvenile Court in the instant case lacke d the authority to forg ive L ewis’s c hild support arre ara g e that ac crue d prior to the date on whic h he filed a motion for relief fr om t he su pp or t or de r a nd g a ve no tic e of

the mot ion

to t he State , th e re a l pa

rt y in i nte re st.

The State a lso arg ues that, for two rea s o n s , the J uvenile Court lacke d subject matter jur isd ic tio n to g ra

nt L e wi s a judg me nt ag a ins t Moth e r fo r dama g e s inc ur re d in c on ne c tio n w iththi s matter. First, the State claims that, beca use Mother was a rec ipient of Title I V-D be nefits and ha d assig ned all her

rig hts to child su p p o rt t o t h e S t at e, the State wa s the rea l party in interest and the action wa s in effe ct broug ht ag ainst the State. B eca use the State ha s sovere ign immunity from such actions, the Juvenile Court lacked subjec t matter j urisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Second, the State argues th at t he Juvenile Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and its j urisdiction does not include the a

uthority to order one party

to reimburse a

nother fo r ch i ld support paid and other

e xpe ns e s inc ur

re d in a c hil d su

pp or t e nf or c e me nt a c tio n. I n su

pp or t, the State c ite s Whit

ev . St ate

e x r e l. A rmstro ng , No. M1999-00713-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 134601, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 16, 2001).

I n r e sp on se , L e wi s argue s th a t so ve re ig n im mun ity is n ot i mpl ic a te d b e c a

us e L e wi s’ s c la im fo r d a ma g e s is a g a ins t Mo the r, no t th e State of Te nn e sse e . F ur

the rm or e , h e argue s, the Juve nil e Court had subject matter

jurisdiction based on its broad statutory authority to est abli sh a child’s pate rn ity and iss ue or de rs se tti ng , mo dif y ing , a nd termi nati ngsu

pp or t. L e wi s a lso c ite s Whit

e v. Armstr ong

in support of his p o s ition. He contends that implicit in the gr ant of a uthority to the J uvenile Court is the power to orde r re imbursement, re pay ment, or disg org ement of c hild support funds that wer e obtained by fra ud. There fore
, L ewis m aintains, the J uvenile Court had the subje ct matter jurisdiction to make the a war d of dama g es ag ainst Mother.

We consider f

irst t h e Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction t o order one par ty to reimburse a

nother for c hild support a n d o t h er such expenses wrong fully paid. “The conce pt of subject matter ju r is d ic ti o n im

p li c a te s a c o u rt’ s a

u th o r it y to h e a r an d d e c id e a p arti c u la

r ty p e o f ca se.” Id. at *2. Subject matter jurisdiction is derived f rom either the Constit ution or from l eg islation; unl ess the court ha s been g rante d j u ri s d iction directly or by nece ssary

implication to consider the ca use of-7-

action and g rant the r elief soug ht, the court is without authority to act. Id. A n o r d e r i s s u e d b y a court without subject matter jurisdiction is neither valid nor enf orce able. Id.
The juvenile c ourts did not ex ist at common law and a re not include d in o ur State’s Con s t i t u t i o n . They

are entirely

cre ature s of statute. SeeT.C.A. § 37-1-101, et seq . (2005). The juvenile court’s jurisdiction, then, i s define d by the s tatutes g ranting them power to act. Whit e , 2001 WL13 46 01 , at *2. “ We m us t take c are no t to e xten d th e su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o f t he juv e nil e courts beyond the jurisdiction confe rre d on them by the Gene ral Asse mbly .” Id.
The subjec t matter jurisdi ction of the juvenile c ourts to order r eimbursement of child support paid pursuant to a valid order of child support was a ddresse d direc tly by this Court i n Whit

e v . St ate

e x r e l. A rmstro ng , c it e d

b y b o th p arti e s

. I n White , a putative f ather had sig ned a V AP, believing the child at issue to be his. It later turne d out that he was not the c hild’s biologica l father . He wa s relieve d of his future child support obligation by the j uvenile court. There afte r, he f iled a “motion for judg ment of over

paid child su p p o rt” a g ainst the State and the mother of the c hild, seeking reimburse ment for the c hild support he had pa id on behalf of the child. The juve nile court de nied the putative father’s motion based on la ck of jurisdiction. The appellate court aff irmed, based in part

on “the inherent l imitations on the j urisdiction of juvenile cour ts. . . .” Whit

e , 2001 WL 134601, at *2. After revie wing the statutes re g ardingthe authority of the juvenile c ourts, the Whit ecourt stated:

Whil e the juvenile c o u rt s h ave broad statutory authority

to establish a child’s pater nity and to issue orde rs setting, modify ing or eve n terminating child support, we fi nd no statut e g ivi ngthe j uv e nil e c ourt s a uth or ity , e xpre ssl y

or by imp lic a tio n, to order the State to reimburse a per son who has v oluntarily paid child support base d on the mistaken belief

that he wa s the child’s biolog ical fa t h er. I n the abse nce of statutory authority , the juvenile cour ts d o n o t have subje ct matter jurisdiction over

re qu e sts of

thi s so rt

.
Id. Thus , fin din g no statut e g ra nti ng the juv e nil e c ourt

the a uth or ity to o rd e r t he State to r e imb ur se child support t h at h as been pa id, the Whit ecourt c oncluded that the juve nile court did not have subject matter jur isdiction to do so.

I n the ins tan tc a s e , L e w i s f i l e d a “ P e t i t i o nf

o r D a m a g e s an d

C o s t s ” a g a i n s tM o t h e r

. T his differ ed sl ightly

from the “ motion for judgme nt of overpa id child support” filed by the putative fathe r in Whit

ein two respec ts. F irst, L ewis did not name the State as a defe ndant, as did the father in Whit e . Second, in addition to reimburseme nt for the child support pay ments made, L ewis soug ht all damag es c a

u s e d a s a r e s u lt o f M o th e r ’ s f r a u d

. Ci ti n g n o a

u th o r it y , L e w is s im

p ly ma k e s the conclusory

asser tion that the J uvenile Court’s authority to order suc h relief

is “implicit.” He cites no statutory

basis for this a

rg ument, and we have found none. As did the Court in Whit e , w e mus tW e e x pr es s no opi n i on abou t an y ca u s e of ac t i on t h at Lew i s ma y a s s er t i n a n ot h er f or u m a g ai n s t M ot h er or 3

t h e bi ol og i ca l f

at h er of M

. C. L.

-8- conclude that the J uvenile Court did not ha ve subject matter jurisdiction over L ewis’s “ Petition for D a m a g e s an d

C o s t s ” a g a i n s tM o t h e r

. T h i s h o l d i n g p r e t e r m i t s t h e i s s u e o f

s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. 3

Th e de c isi on

of the Juve nil e Co urt is re ve rs e d. Cos ts o n a pp e a l are ta xed

to Respondent/Appellee Sam L ewis, for which execution may

issue, if nec essar

y

.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE