UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4687

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHADNEY DEVERICH STANBACK,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 17-4688

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHADNEY STANBACK,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, 

at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00269-NCT-1; 

1:16-cr-00423-NCT-1)

Submitted: May 31, 2018 Decided: June 15, 2018
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Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart 

Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Chadney Deverich Stanback pled guilty to one count of distribution of heroin. He 

was sentenced to a term of 210 months in prison. The district court also revoked his 

supervised release and imposed an 18-month consecutive sentence. On appeal, counsel 

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Stanback’s guilty plea was 

voluntary, whether the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea, whether the district court erred in finding him to be a career offender, whether his 

210-month sentence is reasonable, and whether his revocation sentence is plainly 

unreasonable. Stanback has filed a file a pro se supplemental brief challenging his career 

offender designation. The government has declined to file a brief.

We review the denial of a plea-withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012). To withdraw a guilty plea prior to 

sentencing, a defendant must “show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that 

withdrawal should be granted.” United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 

(4th Cir. 2009) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the district court 

fully complied with the Rule 11 requirements, the defendant must overcome a strong 

presumption that his guilty plea is final and binding. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 

1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 

We have developed a nonexclusive list of factors for district courts to consider 

when deciding whether a defendant has met this burden:
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(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was 

not knowing or not voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between the 

entering of the plea and the filing of the motion to withdraw the plea; 

(4) whether the defendant had the close assistance of competent counsel; 

(5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and 

(6) whether [withdrawal] will inconvenience the court and waste judicial 

resources.

United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). The first factor is perhaps the 

most important, as “the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding is the key factor in the review 

of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 

1300, 1306 (4th Cir. 1996).

With respect to the first Moore factor, we conclude based on our review of the 

record that the district court did not err in finding that Stanback entered a knowing and 

voluntary plea.1

 Further, upon consideration, we find that the remaining Moore factors 

likewise weighed against allowing Stanback to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we find 

that the district court’s denial of his motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Next, counsel and Stanback, in his pro se supplemental brief, challenge the district 

court’s finding that Stanback qualified as a career offender. This issue presents a 

question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Jenkins, 631 F.3d 680, 682 (4th 

 1 Counsel notes Stanback’s claim that his guilty plea was involuntary and 

unknowing due to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, unless an attorney’s 

ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record, ineffective assistance 

claims are not generally addressed on direct appeal. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 

424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Instead, such claims should be raised in a motion brought 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012), in order to permit sufficient development of the 

record. United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). To the extent 

this claim has been raised, we find that it is not cognizable on direct appeal.
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Cir. 2011). Counsel and Stanback assert that Stanback’s 2007 conviction in West 

Virginia for felony conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to deliver 

does not qualify as a career offender predicate because felony conspiracy under that 

statute is a “standalone” crime and is not a controlled substance offense. Upon review, 

we conclude that this claim is without merit.2

 See United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180, 

182-88 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that West Virginia statute prohibiting the manufacture, 

delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance qualifies as controlled 

substance offense under career offender Guidelines where punishable by more than a 

year, and concluding that attempt to violate same is a career offender predicate). 

Next, counsel challenges Stanback’s 210-month within Guidelines sentence. 

Upon review, we find the sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable. See

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 49-51 (2007). The record reflects that the court 

listened at length to the parties’ arguments, asked numerous questions, cited to the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors and engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Stanback.

Finally, we find that Stanback’s 18-month revocation sentence, at the low end of the 

policy statement range, is not plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Slappy, 872 

F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017).

We accordingly affirm the district court’s judgments. This court requires that 

counsel inform Stanback, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

 2 Likewise, we find that Stanback’s remaining challenges to his career offender 

status, under Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) and United States v. Booker, 

543 U.S. 220 (2005), are unavailing.
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United States for further review. If Stanback requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Stanback. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED