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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CHAD STEVENS, Case No. 6:15-cv-01898-JR

 

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND

 RECOMMENDATION 

v.

GENESIS CREDIT MANAGEMENT, 

LLC, a foreign limited liability company;

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES,

LLC, a foreign limited liability company;

TRANS UNION, LLC, a foreign limited

liability company; and IPMG, Inc., an 

Oregon Corporation,

Defendants.

_________________________________

RUSSO, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Chad Stevens brings this action against defendants Genesis Credit Management, 

LLC (“Genesis”), Equifax Information Services, LLC (“Equifax”), IPMG, Inc. (“IPMG”), and 

Trans Union, LLC, asserting claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair 

Debt Collection Practices Act, and Oregon law.1 Equifax moves for summary judgment pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Oral argument was held on April 6, 2017. For the reasons set forth below, 

Equifax’s motion should be granted in part and denied in part. As a result, claims remain against 

all defendants. 

 1 The parties subsequently stipulated to the dismissal of Trans Union, LLC.
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff rented an apartment from IPMG in September 2006. Stevens Decl. ¶ 2 (doc. 45). 

He moved out of the apartment in March 2007 with no outstanding balance owed to IPMG. Id. at 

¶ 4. In July 2015, Genesis (a collections agency) attempted to extract payments from plaintiff 

based on a debt he allegedly owed to IPMG. Id. at ¶ 5. Credit reporting agency (“CRA”) Equifax 

disclosed Genesis’s collection attempts on plaintiff’s consumer credit report. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff 

contacted Genesis in early July 2015 disputing the alleged debt. Id. at ¶ 7. On July 16, 2015, 

Genesis responded to plaintiff by letter (“Genesis Letter”), stipulating he owed no debt to IPMG 

and that the account “was assigned in error.” Id. at Ex. A. Genesis then stated it would instruct 

CRAs to delete plaintiff’s collections account from his consumer credit report. Id.

Nevertheless, Equifax continued to report the alleged IPMG debt on plaintiff’s consumer

credit report. Id. at ¶ 9. Accordingly, on August 17, 2015, plaintiff contacted Equifax through its 

online investigation system, alerting Equifax that the collections account “was added in error.” 

Equifax’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 (“Munson Decl.”) ¶¶ 44, 46-47 (doc. 38-1). Plaintiff included the 

Genesis Letter with his online complaint to Equifax. Id. at ¶ 48; Stevens Decl. ¶ 8 (doc. 45). On

August 18, 2015, Equifax forwarded plaintiff’s dispute to Genesis through its Automated 

Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) system, which is used by CRAs to communicate with 

data furnishers regarding consumer disputes. Munson Decl. ¶¶ 22-23, 28-32, 49 (doc. 38-1). In 

its ACDV to Genesis, Equifax included the Genesis Letter. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. Genesis responded to 

Equifax one week later stating the account did belong to plaintiff and requesting Equifax update 

the account’s balance. Id. at ¶¶ 51-52. Equifax communicated the results of the reinvestigation to 

plaintiff that same day. Id. at ¶ 53.
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In October 2015, plaintiff commenced this lawsuit, alleging three FCRA claims against 

Equifax under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and 15 U.S.C. §1681i(a). Compl. ¶¶ 

32-39 (doc. 1). Plaintiff asserts Equifax both willfully and negligently failed to comply with 

these provisions in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Id. Plaintiff seeks

attorney fees, as well as punitive, statutory, and actual damages, from Equifax based on denied 

credit, lost business ventures, damage to reputation, and emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 38, 49-

50. Shortly after plaintiff initiated this action, Equifax deleted the collections account from 

plaintiff’s credit report pursuant to Genesis’s request. Munson Decl. ¶¶ 54-55 (doc. 38-1). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file, if any, show “that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Substantive law on an issue determines the materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Servs., 

Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Whether the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party determines the 

authenticity of the dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings 

and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

Special rules of construction apply when evaluating a summary judgment motion: (1) all 

reasonable doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of material fact should be resolved 
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against the moving party; and (2) all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. 

DISCUSSION

Initially, Equifax argues summary judgment should be granted as to all claims because 

plaintiff failed to file a timely response. Additionally, Equifax contends summary judgment is 

appropriate on plaintiff’s § 1681c(a) claim because his account was placed for collection fewer 

than seven years ago and, in any event, plaintiff waived this claim by failing to address it in his 

Response. Equifax also argues that summary judgment is warranted on plaintiff’s § 1681e(b) 

claim in light of its detailed procedures to assure accuracy on consumer credit reports. Finally, 

Equifax contends summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiff’s § 1681i(a) claim because its 

reinvestigation was reasonable and this lawsuit is actually a “collateral dispute” for which 

Equifax cannot be liable. 

A. Preliminary Matter

Before reaching the substantive merits of Equifax’s motion, the Court must resolve 

Equifax’s timeliness argument. Equifax is correct that plaintiff inadvertently filed an incorrect 

document, along with plaintiff’s declaration, one day after his Response was due. Plaintiff, 

however, filed a corrected Response two days later. Thus, as indicated at oral argument, 

Equifax’s timeliness argument is unpersuasive, as plaintiff corrected his mistake and filed his 

Response in a reasonable manner. Hearing (Apr. 6, 2017). 

B. Section 1681c(a) Claim

Plaintiff first alleges Equifax “include[ed] information on plaintiff’s consumer report that 

antedate[d] the report by more than seven years in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a).” Compl. ¶¶

33, 37 (doc. 1). 
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In relevant part, § 1681c(a) of the FCRA prohibits CRAs from making consumer reports 

containing “[a]ccounts placed for collection or . . . [a]ny other adverse item of information . . . 

which antedates the report by more than seven years.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a). The seven-year 

period begins running 180 days after the “commencement of the delinquency which immediately 

preceded the collection activity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(c)(1). Courts have construed these 

provisions as imposing a seven-and-one-half year statute of limitations that begins running on 

the date of the delinquency. Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 868 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014);

Gillespie v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 484 F.3d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s brief fails to address Equifax’s § 1681c(a) argument. See generally Pl.’s Resp.

to Mot. Summ. J. (doc. 46). Plaintiff also neglected to discuss his § 1681c(a) claim at oral 

argument, making the record devoid of any response to Equifax’s summary judgment motion.

Hearing (Apr. 6, 2017). Moreover, plaintiff specified in his Response that the collections account 

“was erroneously assigned to a collection agency . . . more than six years” – i.e., less than seven 

years – after he vacated the IPMG apartment. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. 4 (doc. 46) (emphasis 

added).

Due to plaintiff’s waiver, combined with his representation to the Court that the alleged 

debt was reported within the requisite timeframe, Equifax’s motion should be granted as to 

plaintiff’s 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) claim. See Bojorquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2013 WL 

6055258, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 7, 2013) (“[i]f a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing 

party makes in a motion, the court may treat that argument as conceded”) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (summary judgment should be entered 

against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden on proof at trial”). 
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C. Section 1681e(b) Claim

Plaintiff alleges Equifax failed to follow reasonable procedures in contravention of 15 

U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37 (doc. 1). 

Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA provides that when a CRA prepares a consumer credit

report, “it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 

information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To state a prima facie violation of § 1681e(b), “a consumer 

must present evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report 

containing inaccurate information.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 

1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). An item on a credit report is “incomplete or 

inaccurate” under the FCRA if “it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way 

and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Bradshaw v. 

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 816 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1071 (D. Or. 2011) (citing Gorman v. 

Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)). The FCRA, however, does 

not impose strict liability: “an agency can escape liability if it establishes that an inaccurate 

report was generated despite the agency’s following reasonable procedures.” Guimond, 45 F.3d 

at 1333. 

Section 1681e(b) reasonable procedure claims are distinct from § 1681i(a) reinvestigation 

claims. Saenz v. Trans Union, LLC, 621 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1081 (D. Or. 2007); Karmolinski v. 

Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 2007 WL 2492383, at *4-5 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2007). In particular, a 

CRA’s § 1681e(b) “obligations relate to the maintenance and operation of its own internal 

databases.” Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (citation omitted). Section 1681i(a), on the other hand, 

dictates a CRA’s duty to investigate the accuracy of information on a consumer’s credit report 

only after the consumer notifies the CRA of a potential error. Id.; see also Dennis v. BEH-1, 
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LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (CRA’s duty to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation

is triggered once a consumer lodges a dispute) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, “[e]vidence that an agency’s reinvestigation procedures were unreasonable is 

therefore not competent to support a [§] 1681e(b) claim.” Saenz, 621 F.Supp.2d at 1081. The

dispositive inquiry in a § 1681e(b) claim is whether the CRA’s “procedures for preparing” 

consumer credit reports are reasonable in that they attempt to “prevent inaccuracies.” Guimond,

45 F.3d at 1334. 

Because Equifax does not dispute that inaccurate information appeared on plaintiff’s 

consumer report, plaintiff meets his prima facie burden under § 1681e(b). Therefore, the Court 

turns to whether Equifax had sufficient procedures to prevent this inaccuracy. 

Equifax offers evidence demonstrating both its procedures for preparing consumer credit

reports and their reasonableness. Munson Decl. ¶¶ 8-20 (doc. 38-1). Specifically, when a 

company wishes to become a data furnisher for Equifax, it must complete a “detailed application 

and sign a subscriber agreement,” the latter of which requires compliance with the FCRA. Id. at 

¶ 13. Once the company completes these steps and acquires a business license, Equifax 

“conducts an investigation of the company, which may include an onsite visit, to determine the 

company’s legitimacy and reliability.” Id. at ¶ 15. After Equifax approves the company as a data 

furnisher, the company provides Equifax with consumer information in an electronic format, on 

which Equifax then “conducts a series of computerized quality checks before adding the data to 

its consumer database.” Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. 

Plaintiff failed to argue or submit evidence suggesting these procedures are unreasonable 

or that Equifax did not follow these procedures in preparing his consumer report. Rather, 

plaintiff focuses on Equifax’s handling of its reinvestigation after plaintiff submitted his online 
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dispute. See generally Compl. (doc. 1); Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. (doc. 46); see also Stevens 

Decl. ¶¶ 5-10 (doc. 45). Therefore, the Court treats plaintiff’s failure to rebut or otherwise 

address the reasonableness of Equifax’s procedures as a concession that summary judgment is 

appropriate as to his § 1681e(b) claim, especially because, as noted above, evidence that a 

CRA’s investigation was not reasonable is insufficient to establish a claim under § 1681e(b). 

Bojorquez, 2013 WL 6055258 at *5; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In sum, because plaintiff only 

expressly challenges Equifax’s alleged mishandling of his dispute over his consumer report, any 

claim is best addressed pursuant to the FCRA’s reasonable reinvestigation provision. 

Karmolinski, 2007 WL 2492383 at *4-5. Equifax’s motion should be granted as to plaintiff’s § 

1681e(b) claim. 

D. Section 1681i(a) Claim

Plaintiff next alleges Equifax failed to comply with the reinvestigation requirements of 15 

U.S.C. § 1681i(a). Compl. ¶¶ 33, 37 (doc. 1). Specifically, plaintiff argues Equifax violated § 

1681i(a) because its reinvestigation merely involved Equifax “parroting false data” back and 

forth with Genesis. Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. 10-12 (doc. 46). 

Section 1681i(a) of the FCRA requires that, when a CRA receives a dispute from a 

consumer, the CRA shall “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the 

disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or 

delete the item from the file” within 30 days. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). In conducting the

reinvestigation, § 1681i(a) requires the CRA “review and consider all relevant information 

submitted by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(4). If the CRA discovers through its 

reinvestigation that information on the consumer’s report is inaccurate, incomplete, or cannot be 

verified, the CRA must “promptly delete” or “modify” that information and notify the data 

furnisher of the change. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A). 
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To establish a claim under § 1681i(a), the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) his consumer

report contained inaccurate or incomplete information; (2) he notified the defendant of the 

inaccuracy; (3) the dispute is not frivolous or irrelevant; (4) the defendant failed to respond to 

plaintiff’s dispute; and (5) the defendant’s failure to reinvestigate the plaintiff’s dispute caused 

the plaintiff to suffer actual damages. Bradshaw, 816 F.Supp.2d at 1073 (citing Thomas v. Trans 

Union, LLC, 197 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1236 (D. Or. 2002)). 

There exists a genuine material dispute as to whether Equifax performed a reasonable 

reinvestigation. Specifically, a question of facts exists regarding whether Equifax’s decision to 

simply forward the information it received from plaintiff through the ACDV was reasonable, 

especially given that plaintiff’s complaint included the Genesis Letter, which indicated an error 

had occurred. Indeed, “[m]any courts, including this one, have concluded that where a CRA is 

affirmatively on notice that information received from a creditor may be suspect, it is 

unreasonable as a matter of law for the agency to simply verify the creditor’s information 

through the ACDV process without additional investigation.” Id. at 1073-74 (collecting cases).

Equifax nonetheless maintains that Bradshaw and the other cases cited by plaintiff are 

distinguishable because the CRAs in those cases did not transmit all of the relevant information 

via their ACDVs, whereas Equifax did so in the case at bar. Equifax’s Reply to Mot. Summ. J. 

13-14 (doc. 47); Equifax’s Suppl. Reply to Mot. Summ. J. 1-4 (doc. 50). Equifax also intimated 

at oral argument that the letter furnished by plaintiff was not clearly attributable to Genesis, such 

that it had no credible information evincing the alleged debt may be inaccurate.2 Hearing (Apr. 6, 

2017).

 2 Equifax also argues summary judgment is appropriate because “it is neither reckless nor 

negligent to have reinvestigated [p]laintiff’s dispute using the industry standard process that has 

been repeatedly approved by courts as reasonable.” Equifax’s Reply to Mot. Summ. J. 14 (doc. 
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Equifax’s arguments are unavailing. The heading of the Genesis Letter states, in plain 

font, “GENESIS CREDIT MANAGEMENT.”3 Stevens Decl. Ex. A (doc. 45). The Letter lists

the account number, balance owing, and contact information for any follow-up inquiries. Id.

Although Equifax places much import on the fact that “Genesis is an entity that Equifax has 

determined to be a reliable source of information,” this fact cuts both ways. See, e.g., Equifax’s 

Mot. Summ. J. 14-17 (doc. 38). In other words, where, as here, written documentation from a 

reliable source stipulates that no debt exists and an account was “assigned in error,” but that 

same reliable source then gives conflicting information via the ACDV regarding that very debt, a 

jury question exists concerning whether further investigative steps were reasonable. See

Bradshaw, 816 F.Supp.2d at 1073-75 (denying defendant’s summary judgment motion where it 

was unclear from the record whether a more thorough and detailed reinvestigation, beyond the 

use of the ACDV system, “could have discovered the inaccuracies in plaintiffs’ [credit] 

reports”).

Moreover, plaintiff does not challenge the legal validity of the underlying debt. Rather, 

he maintains the debt listed on Equifax’s credit report never existed and instead was assigned to 

him in error. Compl. ¶¶ 10-14, 20 (doc. 1). As such, the collateral dispute doctrine does not apply 

in the case at bar. Compare id., with Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 891-

92 (9th Cir. 2010) (the plaintiff acknowledged the existence of a debt but alleged her insurance 

 

47). As discussed herein, there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s §1681i(a) claim. As such, the Court declines to resolve whether Equifax 

acted willfully or negligently, as “whether a FCRA violation is willful is a matter for the jury.” 

Ashby v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Or., 565 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1206 (D. Or. 2008) (collecting cases).

3 The copy of the Genesis Letter submitted by Equifax in support of its motion for summary 

judgment omits this heading. Equifax’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1-A (doc. 38-1). The Court presumes 

this was an oversight.
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company was legally responsible for it, such that her claims against the CRA for reporting that 

debt to potential creditors represented a collateral dispute).

Because there is a disputed issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the

reinvestigation, Equifax’s motion should be denied on plaintiff’s § 1681i(a) claim.

E. Damages

Plaintiff seeks damages related to his “denial of credit, lost opportunity to receive credit,” 

and lost business opportunities. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 38 (doc. 1); Equifax’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2, at 2-4

(doc. 38-2). Equifax argues plaintiff cannot recover for these economic losses because the FCRA 

does not allow consumers to recover for business losses. Equifax’s Mot. Summ. J. 22-23 (doc 

38). Equifax also contends plaintiff’s evidence regarding denied credit (a letter from Chase 

Bank) is inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 23-24; Equifax’s Reply to Mot. Summ. J. 10-11 (doc. 47).

Because there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding plaintiff’s § 1681i(a) claim, 

the Court need not resolve these issues, as any determination concerning damages would be

premature at this stage in the proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court notes that a plaintiff cannot 

recover business losses under the FCRA. Boydstun v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 187 F.Supp.3d 

1213, 1217-18 (D. Or. 2016); see also Mone v. Dranow, 945 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1991)

(noting that Congress intended an earlier version of the FCRA to cover consumer reports, which 

determine credit, insurance, or employment, but not “business, commercial, or professional 

purposes”) (citations omitted). 

RECOMMENDATION

Equifax’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 38) should be granted as to plaintiff’s 15 

U.S.C. § 1681c(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) claims and denied in all other respects. 
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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment or appealable order. 

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the 

parties shall have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to 

timely file objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as 

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to this recommendation.

DATED this 2nd day of May 2017. 

s/Jolie A. Russo

JOLIE A. RUSSO

United States Magistrate Judge