alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit and Witness List

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

United States of America

Case No. 3:16-cr-00051-BR-8

Plaintiff

EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LIST

v. 

Peter Santilli,

Defendant

Date(s) of

Hearing/Trial

2/2/2016 and 2/4/2016

Court

Reporter(s) Bonita Shumway

Deputy

Clerk(s) Dawn Stephens

Attorneys for Government Attorney for Defendant

Ethan D. Knight Thomas Coan

Geoffrey A. Barrow

Gov Def

 Date WITNESS / EXHIBIT DESCRIP Called 

 by Ex. No. ID Ev Ex. No. ID Ev

2/2 Deborah Rose Jordan Reynolds Def

A1-6 X R 2/2 Letters from various individuals in support of Peter

Santilli

Def

A X N 2/4 Exhibit A - Disc of Episodes of Peter Santilli’s Show

entire disc not received

Gov

R Exhibit - Redacted A containing A1-4, A6, A10-11,

A13 and A17 

A1 X R 2/4 Exhibit A1 - Episode 36; 12/21/15

A2 X R Exhibit A2 - Episode 994; 6/10/15

A3 X R Exhibit A3 - Episode 1015; 7/11/15

A4 X R Exhibit A4 - Episode 1015; 7/11/15

R=Received; N=Not Received; W=Withdrawn/Not Offered (Clerk's Exhibit List.wpd)

Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 145 Filed 02/11/16 Page 1 of 2
Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 145 Filed 02/11/16 Page 2 of 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001001188
<NAME> CARNEGIE GROUP, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      14,195,872
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,806,034
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            22,217,322
<PP&E>                                       2,054,367
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              25,686,804
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,314,154
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        64,893
<OTHER-SE>                                  21,307,757
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                25,686,804
<SALES>                                      1,061,112
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            21,495,970
<CGS>                                       13,346,764
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,636,479
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              13,683
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,971,474
<INCOME-TAX>                                   757,958
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,213,516
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,213,516
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### HANCHEY v. BRUNSON.

(Decided June 13, 1912.)

Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. H. A. Pearce.

A. G. Seay, for appellant. J. A. Carnley, for appellee.

Per curiam.

Dismissed for want of judgment to support appeal.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7467

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

FLOYD JUNIOR “DICK” POWELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (CR-99-12)

Submitted: November 6, 2003 Decided: November 20, 2003

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Floyd Junior “Dick” Powell, Appellant Pro Se. Gretchen C.F.

Shappert, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Floyd Junior “Dick” Powell appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion to stay the sale of forfeited real property. We

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See United

States v. Powell, No. CR-99-12 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2003). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42209

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCOTT BRADLEY MURIHUGH,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

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)

)

)

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2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 340

Filed: February 10, 2015

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 

Order relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM 

Scott Bradley Murihugh pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child. I.C. 

§ 18-1507(2)(a). In exchange for his guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The 

district court sentenced Marihugh to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of 

confinement of three years. The district court retained jurisdiction, and Marihugh was sent to 

participate in the rider program.

After Marihugh completed his rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. 

Marihugh appeals, claiming that the district court erred by refusing to grant probation. 
2

We note that the decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to 

relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district 

court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 

Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-

97 (Ct. App. 1990). The record in this case shows that the district court properly considered the 

information before it and determined that probation was not appropriate. We hold that Marihugh

has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.

Marihugh argues that all of the relevant goals of sentencing could have been 

accomplished with probation. As noted above, however, the district court found that probation 

was not an appropriate course of action in Marihugh’s case. The record does not indicate that the 

district court abused its discretion in sentencing. 

The order of the district court relinquishing jurisdiction is affirmed.
Grand Canyon National Park

Cultural Resources Program

Annual Budget Estimate for Support of 106 Treatment Program

6/LOl20Oe

ITORING: 106 Treatment Plan calls for

ng select sites to improve stability

nd conduct data recovery. Monitoring

uired to determine success of treatments

make follow up recommendations.

Field Work

. Logistics

o Boats

o Food

o Pers. Services (GSll Archeologist 3

PP/yearl

o Data collecting

o Data management

MAINTENANCE: lmplement other 106

recommendations (non-site stabilization)

ned efforts on a single field session

recommendations such as trail reTrails rehabilitation specialist

Vegetation Specialist

Backcountry Specialist

CRMP Coordinator

o Data collecting

o Data management

o Reporting

¡ Tribal Consultants

TA MANAGEMENT: a

a

GS-l1. Archeologist (4 PPlyear)

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT: NPS review of

permit applications, research proposals,

related activities to ensure compliance

Section 106, program oversight,

Contracting Officer Representative,

ments Technica I Representative,

work planning, internal compliance,

o GS-ll Archeologist (8 PPlyear)

. GSA Vehicle

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT: on-going

ntification of data saps and needs.

o GS-ll Archeologist (0.5 PPlyear)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

VICTOR CHARLES FOURSTAR, Jr.,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 30097

D.C. No. 4:02

- cr

- 00052

- DLC

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 7

, 2020 * *

Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Victor Charles Fourstar, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s order

denying his motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

APR 10 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 19

- 30097

early termination of supervised release. See United States v. Emmett , 749 F.3d

817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014). Assuming without deciding that Fourstar met the o ne

year requirement for early termination

, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), Fourstar failed

to show t hat he was entitled to early termination of supervis ion. See United States

v. Weber , 451 F.3d 552, 559 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) ( it is the def endant ’ s burden to

demonstrate that early termination is justified) . At the time Fourstar filed his

motion, he was still in custody for his third violation of supervised release, and the

record shows that he had never succeeded in complying with the conditions of his

supervision for more than a few months. Under these circumstances, the distr ict

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fourstar’s motion for early

termination.

Fourstar’s motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to consolidate and

to consolidate additional appeals is DENIED.

We do not consider Fourstar’s renewed m otion for appointment of counsel

because the court’s previous order denying his motion for appointment of counsel

stated that no motions for reconsideration, clarification, or modification of the

denial would be e ntertained.

Fourstar’s remaining argument s lack merit or are beyond the scope of this

appeal.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.1
 
 CEO Certification
 
 I, Brian Bonar , certify that:
 
 The undersigned certifies that:
 
 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of The Amanda Company, Inc. (the "Company");
 
 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report; and
 
 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.
 
 4. The Company's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Company and have:
 a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;
 
 b) evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 c) disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Company's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting;
 
 5. The Company's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based
 on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company's auditors and the audit committee of Company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);
 
 a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the Company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the Company's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and
 
 b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company's
 internal controls over financial reporting.
 
 Date: January 21, 2004
 
 /s/ Brian Bonar
 Brian Bonar , Chief Executive Officer,
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7977
JAMES P. PARKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CAPTAIN WHITLOW, Security; SERGEANT TAYLOR, Security; SERGEANT WILLIS, Security; SERGEANT WALTON, Security; SERGEANT WHITE, Security; MS. EPPERSON, R.N. Nurse; V. THOMPSON, Institutional Doctor; E. B. WALKER, Chief of Security, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Di strict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (CA-95-61-AM) Submitted: January 18, 1996 Decided: February 8, 1996 Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James P. Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Mark Ralph Davis, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Parker v. Whitlow , No. CA-95-61-AM (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 1995).We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                  The schedule contains summary financial  information extracted
                  from the Company's  consolidated  financial  statements and is
                  qualified  in its  entirety  by  reference  to such  financial
                  statements.
</LEGEND>                                                                                                            

       
<S>                                           <C>       
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           5,215,181
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   24,390,732
<ALLOWANCES>                                      (214,000)
<INVENTORY>                                        727,418
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,424,120
<PP&E>                                          80,385,318
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (18,519,015)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  99,757,734
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,859,336
<BONDS>                                          9,519,076
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            62,865
<OTHER-SE>                                      59,159,614
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    99,757,734
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                52,992,399
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   52,623,141
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 296,687
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     72,571
<INCOME-TAX>                                        27,431
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 45,140
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        45,140
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .01
        


</TABLE>
#### Century 21 Kaaterskill Realty, Respondent, v Savino Grasso et al., Appellants.

— Mikoll, J.

Plaintiff sued defendants seeking judgment in the sum of $2,200 claimed to be the balance due and owing for a real estate broker’s commission for the sale of real property belonging to defendant Michele Grasso (hereinafter Grasso). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of discharge and failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motion, giving rise to this appeal by defendants.

Plaintiff was retained to sell land owned by Grasso, who agreed pursuant to a written contract to pay brokerage fees of 10% of the purchase price. The property was sold for $82,000 and title was transferred on May 11, 1984. Plaintiff demanded payment of $8,200. Grasso’s attorney sent plaintiff a check for $6,000 which bore the legend: "In full accord and satisfaction *317for any real estate commission claimed by Centruy 21 against Michele Grasso.” The check was indorsed by Rubin J. Katz, an officer of plaintiff, and deposited in plaintiff’s account. Defendants contend that the $2,200 sought in plaintiffs complaint was discharged by plaintiff’s acceptance without protest of the check tendered on Grasso’s behalf in full satisfaction of the debt owed. Special Term held that defendants were not entitled to a dismissal of the complaint based on an accord and satisfaction in that the submissions failed to evidence the existence of a dispute which would make viable the accord and satisfaction defense.

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s failure to protest the partial payment as to conform to UCC 1-207 entitles defendants to a dismissal of the complaint. UCC 1-207 reads as follows: "A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as 'without prejudice’, 'under protest’ or the like are sufficient.” We concur with Special Term’s interpretation that UCC 1-207 is not implicated absent a pending dispute as to delivery, acceptance or payment. Defendants never disputed the amount owed before the check was sent to plaintiff. Accord and satisfaction pursuant to UCC 1-207 pertains only to a method of procedure where one party is claiming as of right something which the other feels is unwarranted *(see, Horn Waterproofing Corp. v Bushwick Iron & Steel Co.,*66 NY2d 321, 323).

Order affirmed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2212 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2212

To amend title V of the Trade Act of 1974 to include unwrought titanium 
 as an article that may not be designated as an eligible article under 
                 the Generalized System of Preferences.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 24, 1998

  Mr. Reid (for himself and Mr. Bryan) introduced the following bill; 
     which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title V of the Trade Act of 1974 to include unwrought titanium 
 as an article that may not be designated as an eligible article under 
                 the Generalized System of Preferences.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TREATMENT OF UNWROUGHT TITANIUM FOR GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
              PREFERENCES.

    (a) In General.--Section 503(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, (19 
U.S.C. 2463) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraph (G) as subparagraph (H); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (F) the following new 
        subparagraph:
                    ``(G) Unwrought titanium products described in 
                subheading 8108.10.50 of the Harmonized Tariff 
                Schedules of the United States as in effect on July 1, 
                1998.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, after the date of this Act.
                                 <all>
```