COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 2, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2021AP1231

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2021AP1233

Cir. Ct. Nos. 2020TP44

2020TP45

2020TP46

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO P.G., A PERSON UNDER THE 

AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

P.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.G., A PERSON UNDER 

THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

P.G.,
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RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.G., A PERSON UNDER 

THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

P.G.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

MARSHALL B. MURRAY, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 BRASH, C.J.1 P.G. appeals the orders of the trial court terminating 

his parental rights to P.G., Jr., and twins J.G. and J.G. He argues that the petitions 

filed by the State seeking to terminate his parental rights to the children were 

insufficiently specific to meet the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 48.42(1)(c)2. He 

also argues that the COVID-19 pandemic interfered with his ability to complete 

the conditions required for reunification with the children, and therefore his right 

to due process was violated. Upon review, we affirm.

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2019-20). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
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BACKGROUND

¶2 P.G. is the adjudicated father of P.G., Jr., born in May 2017, and the 

biological father of twins J.G. and J.G., who were born in April 2018. P.G. and 

the children’s mother, S.T., have lived together since 2017. S.T.’s parental rights 

were also terminated under the orders that underlie this appeal.2 

¶3 The children were detained by the Division of Milwaukee Child 

Protective Services (DMCPS) in September 2018 after S.T. brought one of the 

twins to the emergency room at Children’s Hospital with severe burns over “a 

significant portion” of his body. S.T. explained to hospital staff that she was 

giving the twin a bath and did not realize the water was too hot. She did not 

immediately take the twin to the hospital because she did not think that the burn 

was significant; however, the skin that was burned was described as “blackened, 

blistered, and peeling,” and required surgery. 

¶4 S.T. is “cognitively delayed.” She was charged with felony child 

neglect causing great bodily harm after the incident with the burn but was found 

not guilty of that crime due to mental disease or defect and placed in community 

supervision for five years. Furthermore, S.T. has an extensive history with 

DMCPS. About ten years prior to this case, S.T. had another child who was 

removed from her custody after suffering first and second-degree burns for which 

S.T. did not seek medical care; as a result, S.T.’s parental rights to that child and 

another child were terminated in 2008. S.T. also had two children die of 

 

2

 S.T. also appealed the orders terminating her parental rights in a separate case.
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suffocation from co-sleeping, at different times, with one of those deaths 

considered “suspicious[].” 

¶5 There were also current contacts with the family by DMCPS prior to 

the twin being burned. Because the twins were born prematurely, they have 

medical conditions, including gastrointestinal issues, which were being monitored 

by DMCPS, and all three children have chromosomal abnormalities that could 

result in problems with their vision, which also require regular clinical

appointments. DMCPS was contacted in June 2018 after the twins missed two 

medical appointments and healthcare providers were not able to get in contact with 

the parents. Then in July 2018 it was reported that the twins were not being fed 

properly and they were “failing to thrive” as they have problems swallowing. 

¶6 After the burn incident, the three children involved in this matter 

were removed from their parents’ custody based on the potential for further 

“dangerous incidents” that could cause them harm, and petitions for protection or 

services (CHIPS) were filed.3 The children were placed in foster care as opposed 

to remaining with P.G., because it was suspected that P.G. also has cognitive 

delays, and because at the time, P.G. had an open case in Milwaukee County for 

disorderly conduct related to a domestic abuse incident occurring in August 2018.4 

 

3

 Another child of P.G. and S.T.—S., who was born in 2010—was also removed from 

the home at that time. S. was not included in the orders for the termination of parental rights 

which underlie this appeal; rather, a transfer of guardianship of S. was pending at the time of 

these proceedings. 

4

 P.G. was charged with disorderly conduct after it was reported that he became 

“aggressive” with S.T. while he was intoxicated. The case was eventually dismissed. 
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¶7 Dispositional orders relating to the CHIPS petitions were entered in 

June 2019, and listed a number of requirements that had to be met by S.T. and 

P.G. before the children could be returned to their care. Those requirements for 

P.G. included completing a psychological evaluation, as well as taking parenting 

classes to assist him in being able to meet the requirements of demonstrating that 

he and S.T. could provide a safe home for the children and properly care for them. 

Additionally, there was a requirement for regular visitation with the children. 

¶8 P.G. failed to meet those conditions, and petitions for the 

Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) of S.T. and P.G. with regard to P.G., Jr., 

J.G., and J.G. were filed in February 2020. In the TPR petitions, the State’s 

alleged grounds for termination included the continuing need of protection or 

services for the children, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2), and the failure of 

S.T. and P.G. to assume parental responsibility, pursuant to § 48.415(6).

¶9 Specifically, the petitions alleged that P.G. and S.T. had never been 

able to progress beyond fully supervised visits with the children. Furthermore, 

neither parent regularly attended the children’s medical appointments that are 

necessary to monitor their health issues. 

¶10 Additionally, the State noted that P.G. “continues to have a 

relationship and live with” S.T., whose “significant cognitive delays” prevent her 

from being “trusted to provide safe care for the children if left alone for any period 

of time.” It alleged that P.G. “does not seem to understand that [S.T.]’s deficits 

and history of maltreatment/neglect impair her ability to understand and safely 

provide for the children’s needs.” Moreover, it was “suspected that [P.G.] may 

have some delays or cognitive limitations as well,” but that it was not clear 
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whether he had completed a psychological evaluation, as required under the 

CHIPS orders, at the time the TPR petitions were filed. 

¶11 At a preliminary hearing on the TPR petitions held in May 2020, 

counsel for S.T. challenged the sufficiency of the petitions, and P.G. joined that 

challenge. The trial court denied the motion. The court noted that many of the 

allegations against P.G. were incorporated from the allegations against S.T., but 

observed that because P.G. had been living with S.T. since 2017, he “has 

essentially allowed these children to be exposed to that hazardous living 

environment.” The court further stated that the allegations in the petitions inferred 

that P.G. “doesn’t fully understand the danger the children are subjected to if in 

fact they were returned to the care of [S.T.].” Therefore, the court found that the 

petitions provided sufficiently specific allegations as to the claims against both 

P.G. and S.T. 

¶12 P.G. then filed a separate motion to dismiss the petitions on the 

ground that the COVID-19 pandemic had “adversely affected” his ability to satisfy 

the requirements of the CHIPS orders and, as a result, a finding of unfitness would 

violate his due process rights. Specifically, P.G. claimed that the visitation 

condition was interrupted between March and June 2020 when the visits were 

switched to virtual; that he lost his job due to the pandemic and was unable to pay 

his rent, resulting in an eviction action being filed against him; and that his 

subsequent work schedule through a temporary employment agency kept him from 

timely completing his psychological evaluation. 

¶13 At a pretrial conference hearing in January 2021, the trial court 

denied P.G.’s motion. The court stated that it was a matter for the fact-finder to 

determine whether the conditions of the CHIPS orders had been met, and P.G. 
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conceded that point. P.G. further acknowledged that the TPR petitions, which 

listed his failure to meet the CHIPS conditions as one ground for his parental 

rights being terminated, had been filed in February 2020—before the stay-at-home 

mandates due to the pandemic were imposed—and it was noted that the State’s 

burden for proving that ground would be based on the facts and circumstances at 

the time the petitions were filed. 

¶14 A court trial regarding the grounds phase of the TPR proceedings 

was set for February 2021. However, just prior to the start of the trial, P.G. opted 

to enter a no-contest plea to the continuing CHIPS ground, with the State agreeing 

to dismiss the ground of failure to assume parental responsibility. At the 

subsequent dispositional phase of the proceedings, the trial court determined that it 

was in the best interests of the children that both P.G.’s and S.T.’s parental rights 

be terminated. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶15 The sufficiency of a TPR petition is a question of law that we review 

de novo. See Sheboygan Cnty. v. D.T., 167 Wis. 2d 276, 282-83, 481 N.W.2d 493

(Ct. App. 1992). Our review of whether a TPR petition is sufficient is dictated by 

the requirements set forth in WIS. STAT. § 48.42(1). That statute requires that such 

petitions “set forth with specificity” the name, birth date, and address of the child; 

the names and addresses of the child’s parents; information relating to the current 

custody of the child, as set forth in WIS. STAT. § 822.29; information regarding 

whether the child may be subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act; and, if 

the parents are not consenting to the termination of their parental rights, a 

statement “of the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights under 
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[WIS. STAT. §] 48.415 and a statement of the facts and circumstances which the 

petitioner alleges establish these grounds.” See WIS. STAT. § 48.42(1). 

¶16 Citing State v. Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d 592, 516 N.W.2d 422

(1994), P.G. asserts that a TPR petition must meet the same requirements as a 

criminal complaint; that is, it “must contain facts ‘which are themselves sufficient 

or give rise to reasonable inferences which are sufficient to establish probable 

cause.’” Id. at 601 (citation omitted). However, in Courtney E., our supreme 

court was reviewing the sufficiency of a CHIPS petition, the requirements for 

which are governed by WIS. STAT. § 48.255. See Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d at 

601. In its analysis of that issue, the court stated that in order for a CHIPS petition 

to be sufficient, it must satisfy the requirements of § 48.255, and that “[i]n 

particular, the [CHIPS] petition must provide ‘reliable and credible information 

which forms the basis of the allegations necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the 

court ....” Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d at 600 (quoting § 48.255(1)(e)). 

¶17 Thus, the court’s analysis in Courtney E. focused on the statutory 

requirement for a CHIPS petition to state with specificity the basis for the court to 

invoke jurisdiction over a child, similar to the requirement of a criminal complaint 

to specifically state the reasons a court may invoke jurisdiction over a defendant. 

That requirement is not included in the statutory requirements for a TPR petition, 

see WIS. STAT. § 48.42(1), presumably because at the time a TPR petition is filed, 

the court has already invoked jurisdiction over the child through a CHIPS petition 

and resulting dispositional order. 

¶18 P.G. argues that because both CHIPS petitions and TPR petitions 

“arise under Chapter 48, there is no reason to believe that the principles which 

apply to the sufficiency of one type of Chapter 48 petition would not apply with 
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equal force to the sufficiency of another type.” We disagree. The statutes 

outlining the requirements for each type of petition, while similar, are different 

with respect to the addition of the requirement relating to the invocation of 

jurisdiction over the child for CHIPS petitions. According to the tenets of 

statutory interpretation, “[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give 

reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.” State ex rel. 

Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 

N.W.2d 110. Adopting P.G.’s interpretation would render the additional 

requirement for CHIPS petitions regarding the invocation of jurisdiction mere 

surplusage. We cannot do that and still give WIS. STAT. § 48.255(1)(e) its “full, 

proper, and intended effect.” See State ex rel. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44. 

Therefore, we reject P.G.’s contention that a TPR petition must rise to the level of 

a criminal complaint and establish probable cause for the alleged claims. 

¶19 We thus review the TPR petitions for compliance with the 

requirements set forth in WIS. STAT. § 48.42(1); specifically, whether the State set 

forth with specificity “a statement of the facts and circumstances which the 

petitioner alleges establish [the] grounds” for the termination of P.G.’s parental 

rights. See § 48.42(1)(c)2. Furthermore, “in reviewing the sufficiency of a 

pleading in a juvenile court proceeding, we may draw reasonable inferences from 

the allegations in the petition.” Monroe Cnty. v. Jennifer V., 200 Wis. 2d 678, 

684, 548 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996). 

¶20 As the trial court did in its analysis of this issue, we reviewed the 

factors relating to the grounds alleged by the State to determine whether the 

petitions provided sufficient notice relative those factors. We conclude that the 

allegations in the TPR petitions as discussed in this opinion, and the reasonable 
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inferences that can be drawn from those allegations, were sufficiently specific to 

provide P.G. with proper notice as to the grounds for the petitions. 

¶21 We next turn to P.G.’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic 

interfered with his ability to meet the conditions of the CHIPS orders, and thus the 

finding that he was an unfit parent violated his right to due process. “Substantive 

due process has been traditionally afforded to fundamental liberty interests, such 

as marriage, family, procreation, and bodily integrity,” and an analysis of this 

issue seeks to “balance[] the [S]tate’s compelling interests with its chosen method 

of protecting those interests.” Monroe Cnty. DHS v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶19, 

271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831. We independently review challenges to 

constitutional principles. State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶36, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 

N.W.2d 207.

¶22 As the State points out, the current statute relating to the continuing 

CHIPS ground for TPRs no longer includes a provision relating to whether parents 

would be able to meet the required conditions in the nine month time period 

following a fact-finding hearing. Thus, the fact-finder is to consider the facts and 

circumstances of the case as they existed on the date the TPR petitions were filed. 

See WIS JI—CHILDREN 324. In this case, that was February 27, 2020—before the 

stay-at-home mandates were imposed due to COVID-19. 

¶23 Nevertheless, P.G. had the opportunity to present evidence relating 

to the hardships he endured as a result of the pandemic at the disposition hearing. 

See WIS. STAT. § 48.427(1). Based on that evidence, he requested an alternative 

disposition—that instead of granting the TPR petitions, the CHIPS orders could 

instead remain in effect, such that that he and S.T. could continue working on 

meeting those conditions. See id. However, after weighing all the evidence in 
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terms of the relevant factors for determining whether the parental rights should be 

terminated, the trial court found that granting the TPR petitions was in the 

children’s best interests. 

¶24 Therefore, we conclude that P.G.’s due process rights were not 

violated during this process. See Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶19. Furthermore, the 

“ultimate determination of whether to terminate parental rights” is a discretionary 

decision that lies with the trial court. State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 

Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The trial court erroneously exercises its discretion 

“if it does not examine the relevant facts, applies the wrong legal standard, or fails 

to use a demonstrated rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion.” Brown 

Cnty. v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, ¶37, 286 Wis. 2d 278, 706 N.W.2d 269. That 

did not occur here.

¶25 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating the 

parental rights of P.G. to P.G., Jr., J.G., and J.G.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.