J-S66028-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CURTIS R. GOVAN

Appellant No. 148 MDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000735-1996

 CP-22-CR-0000905-1996 

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA J. FILED OCTOBER 13, 2016

Appellant, Curtis R. Govan, appeals pro se from the order dismissing 

as untimely his fifth petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the relevant procedural and factual 

history as follows. 

Following a jury trial from August 5-9, 1996, [Govan] was 

found guilty of first degree murder for the shooting of Robert 

Vasquez. [Govan] was also found guilty of [a]ggravated 

[a]ssault, two counts of [r]obbery, and three counts of 

[c]onspiracy. On August 27, 1996, [Govan] was sentenced to a 

life term imprisonment, plus a term of thirty-one to sixty-two 

years, to run concurrently with the life sentence. The Superior 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 13, 1999. On 

July 29, 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a Petition 

for Allowance of Appeal. 

[Govan] filed a first counseled PCRA petition on June 22, 

2000, which the court dismissed on July 12, 2002. The Superior 
J-S66028-16

- 2 -

Court affirmed the court’s dismissal of the first PCRA on 

September 26, 2003, and on March 16, 2004, the [Pennsylvania] 

Supreme Court denied a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 

[Govan] filed a second PCRA on May 24, 2004, seeking 

relief based upon recantation testimony of a Commonwealth 

witness at trial. The court appointed counsel. The court deemed 

the second PCRA untimely, and dismissed the [p]etition on 

February 16, 2005. The Superior Court vacated the trial court 

[o]rder, and remanded the matter to the PCRA court for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine the timeliness of the [p]etition 

based upon the [p]risoner [m]ailbox [r]ule. An evidentiary 

hearing was held on November 10, 2005. Based upon the 

evidence presented therein, the court found the [p]etition to 

have been timely filed. The court considered and denied the 

second PCRA by [m]emorandum [o]pinion and [o]rder filed 

August 18, 2006. The [c]ourt dismissed the [p]etition by [f]inal 

[o]rder filed February 7, 2007. [Govan] appealed, and the 

Superior Court affirmed by memorandum [o]pinion dated 

November 16, 2007. 

[Govan] filed a third PCRA petition on July 15, 2008 which 

the court denied by [f]inal [c]ourt [o]rder on March 3, 2010. 

[Govan] took no appeal. Thereafter, on March 12, 2010, [Govan] 

filed a “Petition to Review Evidence Dismissed[,]” which the 

court denied by [o]rder of March 18, 2012. 

[Govan] filed a fourth PCRA on August 28, 2012, then an 

[a]mended PCRA on September 20, 2012. [Govan] filed a 

[m]otion for [d]iscovery on November 13, 2012, which the court 

denied by [c]ourt [o]rder on November 19, 2012. On January 

23, 2013 the court dismissed [Govan’s] fourth PCRA. [Govan] 

appealed to the Superior Court and by [o]rder filed October 10, 

2013, the Superior Court affirmed. 

Subsequently, on August 15, 2015, [Govan] filed a fifth 

PCRA. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/24/15, at 1-2. On December 30, 2015, the PCRA 

court dismissed Govan’s fifth PCRA petition as untimely. This pro se appeal 

follows. 
J-S66028-16

- 3 -

Prior to addressing Govan’s substantive claims, we must first 

determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that Govan’s latest 

pro se PCRA petition was untimely filed. 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or 

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

is final, unless the petition alleges and proves an exception to the time for 

filing the petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A PCRA petition 

invoking one of these statutory exceptions must “be filed within sixty days of 

the date the claims could have been presented.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 

651-652 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2)). Exceptions to the time bar must 

be pled in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see 

also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower 

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

Govan’s judgment of sentence became final on October 27, 1999, 

when the filing period for a writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Therefore, Govan needed to file the petition 

at issue by October 26, 2000 in order for it to be timely.1 Govan filed the 

____________________________________________

1 The year 2000 was a leap year, therefore October 26, 2000 constitutes one 

year from the date Govan’s judgment of sentence was finalized.
J-S66028-16

- 4 -

instant petition almost sixteen years later; it is blatantly untimely unless he 

has satisfied the burden of pleading and proving one of the enumerated 

exceptions applies. 

Govan acknowledges that his petition was untimely, but claims that 

the PCRA court should have granted an evidentiary hearing because he pled 

the newly-discovered evidence exception in his PCRA petition. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); see also Appellant’s Brief, at 15. Govan 

contends that the PCRA court had jurisdiction over his petition because he 

presented his newly discovered evidence within sixty days of discovery. See 

id. We disagree. 

In order for the newly-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA time 

requirement to apply, a petitioner must prove that “the facts upon which the 

claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

Therefore, for the exception to apply, Govan must prove that the new 

evidence, in this case Govan’s childhood mental health records, was 

unknown to Govan and could not have been ascertained earlier by the 

exercise of due diligence. Govan fails to plead ignorance of his childhood 

mental health records. Further, Govan offers no explanation in his petition or 

brief as to why he could not have obtained his medical records earlier than 

June 3, 2015. Rather, Govan asserts that he meets the due diligence 

requirement because he filed his fifth PCRA petition within sixty days of 

receiving the medical reports. Govan’s reasoning is flawed. Govan incorrectly 
J-S66028-16

- 5 -

relies upon the fact that the statute requires a petitioner plead an exception 

within sixty days of the date they learn of the exception to establish that he 

acted with due diligence in discovering the new evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(2). However, complying with this provision only shows that a 

petitioner acted with due diligence in presenting the claim to the court; it 

does nothing to establish that a petitioner acted diligently in working to 

discover new evidence. Therefore, these allegations do not satisfy the 

requirement to plead, and establish, that the evidence could not have been 

obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

In sum, Govan’s latest PCRA petition is untimely, and he failed to 

successfully plead any exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 

Therefore, the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and 

correctly denied Govan post-conviction relief without a hearing. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/13/2016