IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CHARLES PETTUS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MARION FEATHER, 

Respondent. 

Charles Pettus, #18642-111 

FCI-Sheridan 

P.O. Box 5000 

Sheridan, Oregon 97378 

Attorney for Petitioner 

Billy J. Williams 

United States Attorney 

Jared Hager 

Case No. 3:15-cv-02438-JO 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204-2902 

Attorneys for Respondent 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-02438-JO Document 14 Filed 07/19/16 Page 1 of 6
JONES, District Judge. 

Petitioner brings this habeas corpus case pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP' s") 

decision not to place him in a Residential Reentry Center 

("RRC"). For the reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (#2) is denied. 

BACKGROUND 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at FCI-Sheridan 

pursuant to a 51-month sentence from the Northern District of 

California for being a felon in possession of a firearm in 2013. 

As petitioner neared the end of his sentence, BOP officials 

considered him for placement in an RRC. On February 29, 2016, 

they reviewed his record and determined that petitioner is the 

lead suspect in an open murder investigation by the San 

Francisco Police Department. Declaration of Autumn Norris 

(#11), Att. 3. As a result, they refused to place him in a RRC. 

Petitioner contends he has a protected liberty interest in 

RRC placement, and he seeks a court order requiring respondent 

to change his housing assignment. Respondent asks the court to 

deny relief on the Petition because: ( 1) petitioner failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies; ( 2) the court lacks 

jurisdiction to review individualized determinations of prisoner 

placements such as the one at issue in this case; and 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-02438-JO Document 14 Filed 07/19/16 Page 2 of 6
(3) petitioner 

placement. 

has no protected 

DISCUSSION 

liberty interest in RRC 

"In order to seek habeas relief under section 2241 . . a 

petitioner must first, 'as a prudential matter,' exhaust his or 

her available administrative remedies." Singh v. Napolitano, 

649 F.3d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Requiring a 

petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies aids "judicial 

review by allowing the appropriate development of a factual 

record in an expert forum." Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 

(9th Cir. 1983). Use of available administrative remedies 

conserves "the court's time because of the possibility that the 

relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level." 

Id. Moreover, it allows "the administrative agency an 

opportunity to correct errors occurring in the course of 

administrative proceedings." Id; United Farm Workers v. Arizona 

Agric. Employ. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 

1982). 

"Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required 

where the remedies are inadequate, inefficacious, or futile, 

where pursuit of them would irreparably injure the plaintiff, or 

where the administrative proceedings themselves are void." 

United Farm Workers, 669 F.2d at 1253 (citation omitted); see 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

• 

Case 3:15-cv-02438-JO Document 14 Filed 07/19/16 Page 3 of 6
also Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 

(9th Cir. 1993) (exhaustion waived where request for 

administrative remedy initially denied by Community Corrections 

Office based upon official B.O.P. policy and further appeal 

would almost certainly have been denied based upon the same 

policy) . Courts should not, however, relax the exhaustion 

requirement where it "would encourage the deliberate bypass of 

the administrative scheme." Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 

1 0 0 0 ( 9th Cir . 2 0 0 4 ) . 

The BOP provides four levels of review: (1) informal 

resolution; ( 2) formal complaint with the Warden; ( 3) appeal to 

the Regional Director; and (4) appeal to the General Counsel in 

Washington, D.C. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13-542.15. Petitioner 

concedes that he did not file an appeal with the General 

Counsel, but argues that pursuit of such an appeal would have 

been futile. He does not, however, specifically describe why 

such an appeal would have been futile, nor does he identify the 

existence of any BOP policy that precludes him from challenging 

the BOP's RRC determination in his appeal to the General 

Counsel. Moreover, petitioner does not assert that a BOP policy 

is, itself, unlawful. Instead, he claims that the BOP has 

mistakenly concluded that he is a suspect in murder 

investigation in San Francisco. This is the kind of 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-02438-JO Document 14 Filed 07/19/16 Page 4 of 6
individualized determination that the administrative appeals 

process is intended to address. Petitioner's mere assertion 

that it is futile for him to continue his administrative appeal 

based upon his lack of success during the preliminary stages of 

the administrative review process is insufficient to excuse him 

from the exhaustion requirement. To conclude otherwise would 

render all but the first level of the administrative appeal 

process meaningless. 

Even if petitioner were to exhaust his administrative 

remedies as to this claim, he would not be entitled to habeas 

corpus relief. 

individualized 

Federal courts may not review the BOP's 

determinations pertaining to RRC placement 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 

1227-28 (9th Cir. 2011) (no habeas jurisdiction in the context 

of BOP discretionary decisions made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3621-24). Moreover, even assuming the court had jurisdiction 

to address the BOP's discretionary decision on petitioner's RRC 

placement, while such placement is highly desired among 

prisoners, it is simply another form of custodial housing. 

Inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in their 

security classification or place of incarceration. Olim v. 

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 

U.S. 215, 224 (1976); United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-02438-JO Document 14 Filed 07/19/16 Page 5 of 6
789 (9th Cir. 1991); see also 28 U.S.C. § 3624 (c) (1) (the BOP 

"may" (not "must") place an inmate in a RRC during the last year 

of his sentence). Accordingly, relief on the Petition is 

denied. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons identified above, the Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus ( #2) is denied. The court declines to issue a 

Certificate of Appealability on the basis that petitioner has 

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) (2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this l

,ASJ- day _-. of July, 2016. 

. Jones 

States District Judge 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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