- 1 - STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

} Town of Hartford, } Plaintiff, } } v. } Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec } Marc and Susan Wood, } Defendants. } }
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++ } In re: Appeal of Marc and Susan Wood } Docket No. 121-7-03 Vtec }
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++ } In re: Appeal of Wood } Docket No. 185-10-04 Vte c }
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++ } In re: Appeal of Wood } Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec }
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ ++++++++++++ } In re: Wood Certificate of Occupancy } Docket No. 176-8-07 Vtec }
Decision on Pending Motions All five of the above-captioned Dockets relate to Mr. Marc Wood’s plans to renovate and develop a diner, private club, and ret ail shop at his property on Maple Street, also known as Vermont Route 14, in the Town of Hartford. 1 Mr. Wood, Defendant in Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec and Appellant in all remaining above-captioned Dockets, has moved for the Court to reconsider a nu mber of its recent decisions, stay whatever time may be remaining on his zoning permit , take new evidence in a closed case, and hold the Town in contempt. The Town oppo ses Mr. Wood’s motions in all Dockets, requests that Mr. Wood be held in contempt , and requested preliminary and

1 Curiously, though the property at issue in these c ases has been the subject of litigation for many ye ars, the correct street address has yet to be established, e ven after this Court requested clarification. Beca use of the confusion, reference to the property will be made u sing generic descriptive terms rather than its addr ess.- 2 -

permanent injunctive relief. Mr. Wood appears pro se and has represented himself in all proceedings to this point. The Town of Hartford (“ Town”) is represented by William F. Ellis, Esq. Background There have been many motions and cross-motions file d in the above-captioned Dockets. The following facts regarding the motions ’ context are undisputed unless
otherwise noted. 1. On September 21, 2007, we heard testimony and to ok evidence regarding the Town’s motion for contempt and its associated motio n for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec. As Mr. Wood has noted in his clarification motion, Mr. Wood had some difficultie s at that hearing which he later
attributed to an illness. 2 2. The Court was of the opinion that Mr. Wood shoul d have a full and fair opportunity to present his arguments and evidence i n response to the Town’s motion for contempt and gave Mr. Wood the opportunity after th e hearing to present his arguments and objections to the Court in writing. Mr. Wood h ad until October 22, 2007 to file his objections, and the Town was given until November 5 to file its response. An Entry Order to this effect was issued on September 28, 20 07. 3. On October 10, 2007, Mr. Wood filed a motion in Docket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec and 176-8-07 Vtec to withdraw his pro se appearance and to continue the proceedings 60 days so that he could find an attorney to enter an appearance. The Town opposed these
motions. 4. Also on October 10, Mr. Wood filed a motion to m odify the September 28 Entry Order that directed Mr. Wood to file his objections in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec by
October 22.
5. Mr. Wood also on October 10 filed a motion for c ontempt and request for relief in Docket No. 121-7-03. Mr. Wood argued in this motio n that the Town had disobeyed an
order from the Court to consider amendments to Mr. Wood’s zoning application at a public hearing.

2 The Court does not recall Mr. Wood disclosing at the time of the hearing that he was ill.- 3 -

6. On October 10, the Court sent notice to the part ies that a motions hearing would be held via telephone on October 22 in Docket No. 1 76-8-07 Vtec. Notice was sent to the parties again on October 18 that motions in Doc ket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec and 81-4-07
Vtec would also be discussed at the October 22 tele phonic motions hearing. 7. On October 19, Mr. Wood filed a motion to stay p roceedings in Docket No. 176- 8-07 Vtec until the motions for contempt and for pr eliminary and permanent injunction
were resolved in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec. 8. On October 19, Mr. Wood filed a motion requestin g that the Court take new evidence and reconsider a ruling it made May 19, 20 01 in Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec, a closed case. On October 22, Mr. Wood filed a motio n requesting that the Court take new evidence and reconsider a ruling it made on Septemb er 21, 2001, also in Docket No. 72- 3-00 Vtec. Mr. Wood also explained that this secon d motion in Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec was meant to replace the motion made on October 19, as the first motion incorrectly identified the decision Mr. Wood sought to change. 9. A motions hearing was held on October 22 via con ference call in Docket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec, 81-4-07 Vtec, and 176-8-07 Vtec, as was noticed to the parties. Mr. Wood, William Ellis, Esq., and Judge Thomas Durkin participated. At the outset, Judge Durkin noted several motions had been filed, includ ing motions in two additional Docket
Nos. 72-3-00 Vtec and 121-7-03 Vtec.
10. The Court did not rule on Mr. Wood’s motions in Docket Nos. 72-3-00 Vtec or
121-7-03 Vtec. The Court noted that it was not awa re of any legal authority that would allow the Court to re-open closed cases or to other wise examine the issues Mr. Wood had
raised. The Court directed Mr. Wood to file memora nda explaining the Court’s authority to examine the issues raised by his motions in thos e Dockets by November 21, 2007. The Town would then have until December 21, 2007 to fil e its response. Thereafter, the
Court would take the matter under advisement. Mr. Wood acknowledged orally during
the teleconference that he understood the Court’s r equest. 11. In Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec, Mr. Wood’s motion to modify the September 28 Entry Order was granted, and Mr. Wood was allowed t ime (i.e., until December 17, 2007) to respond to the Town’s reply. An entry ord er to this effect was issued on October 31, 2007.- 4 -

12. The Court also considered Mr. Wood’s motion to withdraw his pro se appearance and continue the proceedings in Docket Nos. 185-10- 04 Vtec and 176-8-07 Vtec for 60 days. The Town objected to Mr. Wood’s motion, argu ing that Mr. Wood did not meet the substantive, legal requirements for withdrawal and that a continuance would harm the Town’s “right to have [its] case heard and decided in a reasonable fashion.” Leiter v.
Pfundston , 150 Vt. 593, 596 (1988). 13. Mr. Wood explained that he had already spoken w ith several attorneys and that he was actively seeking representation. Concerned bot h with the possibility of further prolonged delays, and also with Mr. Wood’s ability to secure adequate representation, the Court granted Mr. Wood’s motion to continue, with c onditions. 14. The Court directed that first, if Mr. Wood were to secure an attorney, that attorney was to enter an appearance by November 16, 2007. A n entry order to this effect was issued on October 31, 2007 in Docket Nos. 185-10-07 Vtec and 176-8-07 Vtec. Second, regardless of whether Mr. Wood could secure an atto rney, Mr. Wood or his attorney was to file legal memoranda by December 17, 2007 in Doc ket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec and 176- 8-07 Vtec. An entry order to this effect was issue d on October 31, 2007 in Docket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec, 81-4-07 Vtec, and 176-8-07 Vtec. 15. The Court also denied Mr. Wood’s motion to stay resolution of the Town’s contempt motion in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec until Mr. Wood’s appeal in Docket No.
176-8-07 Vtec was concluded. Mr. Wood filed a moti on to reconsider that specific ruling on December 11, 2007. The Town filed its reply on December 26, 2007. Mr. Wood’s reconsideration request remains pending and is addr essed below. 16. The Court also decided that the most appropriat e manner in which to decide all remaining pending motions was to address the motion s filed in the earliest docketed cases first and then proceed to the latest, beginning wit h Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec and finishing
with Docket No. 176-8-07 Vtec. The Court also deci ded to delay the initial conference in
Docket No. 176-8-07 Vtec until the cross-motions fo r contempt were resolved. The parties offered their oral agreement at the October 22 telephonic motions hearing. This is the general approach that the Court takes in this D ecision.
17. The Court also addressed Mr. Wood’s concern tha t his inability to enter the Hartford property was causing damage to the tools h e had left there. Mr. Wood was also- 5 -

concerned that structures on his property would be damaged if he was not allowed to prepare the property for the coming winter. The To wn expressed its concern that Mr. Wood would conduct work on the property during the pendency of these appeals for which he currently held no municipal permit. 18. The Court arrived at a procedure to resolve win ter preparation issues as they arose. In order to address both parties’ concerns, the Court ordered that if Mr. Wood wished to prepare his property for the winter, he m ust file with the Court an explanation of his plans, with photographs, and provide copies to the Town’s counsel. The Town would then have ten business days to file a respons e, to which Mr. Wood would have time to reply. The Court would then take the matte r under advisement and issue an order. 19. At the October 22 motions hearing, the Town req uested that if Mr. Wood wished to contact the Town in regards to Mr. Wood’s cases before this Court, Mr. Wood should communicate solely through the Town’s attorney. Th e Court granted this request. 20. Lastly, the Court explained that for the purpos e of clarity, all the decisions made during the motions hearing would be reduced to the form of entry orders, but invited the parties to inform the Court, should they believe th at a ruling was omitted from the entry orders issued after the hearing. Revised and compl ete entry orders were thereafter issued; no party has advised that the Court omitted from su ch entry orders decisions announced during the October 22 telephonic motions hearing. 21. To date, the Court has received some materials from Mr. Wood in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec. However, Mr. Wood has not filed le gal memoranda in Docket Nos. 72- 3-00 Vtec, 121-7-03 Vtec, 81-4-07 Vtec, or 176-8-07 Vtec. No attorney has entered an appearance on Mr. Wood’s behalf.
Discussion A number of motions are now ripe for our considera tion in all five abovecaptioned Dockets. Many of these motions have been filed by Mr. Wood. In some, he has expressed confusion and even frustration regard ing this Court’s past decisions. We are sympathetic to Mr. Wood’s predicament. But we also recognize that Mr. Wood is a veteran of many Court appeals from the Hartford Zon ing Board of Adjustment and from this Court to our Supreme Court, all over a period of time beginning as much as ten years ago. He has much experience with the process invol ved in these appeals, yet a number of- 6 -

the issues he has most recently presented raise bas ic process questions; some of Mr. Wood’s current motions appear to represent a lack o f understanding of the basic concept of finality of court decisions.
As discussed below, the Court has given Mr. Wood ev ery opportunity to present his arguments, and will continue to do so. But the Court is also mindful of its important obligation to render decisions and to otherwise see that Court proceedings reach some conclusion. With those continuing obligations in m ind, we turn our attention to all the remaining pending motions in all Dockets, which we understand to be the following: 1. Mr. Wood’s motion to reconsider our September 2 8, 2007 Entry Order in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec; 2. Mr. Wood’s motion to reconsider and clarify our October 22, 2007 Decisions as they relate to all five above-captione d Dockets; 3. Mr. Wood’s motion to take new evidence and reco nsider our September 21, 2001 Decision in Docket No. 72-3-00 V tec; 4. Mr. Wood’s motion to reconsider our August 27, 2007 Entry Order in Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec; 5. Mr. Wood’s motions to stay the time remaining o n his Permit #99-1180 in Docket Nos. 81-4-07 Vtec and 176-8-07 Vtec; 6. Mr. Wood’s motion for contempt and other relief in Docket No. 121-7- 03 Vtec; and 7. The Town’s motion for contempt and injunctive r elief in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec;
1. Motion to Reconsider September 28 Entry Order i n Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec Mr. Wood has requested that we modify our Septembe r 28, 2007 entry order regarding the time Mr. Wood has to respond to the T own’s objections to Mr. Wood’s weatherproofing requests. Mr. Wood asserted in his December 11, 2007 motion that we included no language allowing him to respond to the Town. This is incorrect. In our October 31, 2007 entry order on this topic, we dire cted “[a]fter any submission made by the Town, Mr. Wood may have ten (10) business days to respond.” Thus, we have already addressed Mr. Wood’s request. Because ther e is no live controversy on this issue between the parties, we DISMISS this motion as moot. O’Brien v. Brown , 153 Vt. 652, 652-53 (1990).- 7 -

2. Motion to Reconsider and Clarify October 22 Rul ings in all Dockets Mr. Wood has asked us to reconsider and clarify th e rulings made during the October 22, 2007 motions hearing as they apply to a ll five above-captioned Dockets. In his motion for reconsideration, filed with the Cour t on December 14, 2007, Mr. Wood explains that he phoned the Environmental Court on December 11, 2007 to determine
whether the Town had filed an answer his motion for contempt and request for relief in
Docket No. 121-7-03 Vtec. Mr. Wood claims he was surprised to learn that he h ad missed some filing deadlines. See Wood Mot. to Clarify, Reconsider at ¶ 11 (“The appellant feels that [the Court’s rulings were] unfair, unreasonable, and des picable....”). He likely refers to one of the following deadlines: the November 16 deadlin e for an attorney to enter an appearance; the November 21 deadline for filing an explanation of the legal authority for this Court to re-open Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec and t ake new evidence; the November 21 deadline for filing an explanation of the legal aut hority for the Court to consider Mr. Wood’s contempt motion in Docket No. 121-7-03 Vtec, and possibly the thenapproaching deadline to file defense materials in c onnection with the Town’s motion for contempt and injunctive relief in Docket No. 185-10 -04 Vtec. Mr. Wood now claims that he was unable to hear Judge Durkin during the Octob er 22 motions teleconference, and he also asserts that the entry orders issued on Oct ober 31 were unclear, making it difficult
for him to discern what the Court ordered on Octobe r 22. Lastly, Mr. Woods asserts that he is, in his words, “a fish out of the water and n ot in his realm of expertise when it comes to legal matters.” Regarding the part of Mr. Wood’s motion requesting a clarification of our October 22 rulings, we pause in our analysis here t o explain our role when a pro se litigant appears before the Court. We appreciate t he difficulties a non-lawyer encounters when he decides to represent himself. It is someti mes difficult even for experienced lawyers to satisfy all the obligations litigation i mposes. However, the Court must remain a neutral and independent tribunal, and it does not have the responsibility, nor the right, to offer Mr. Wood “affirmative help” during the cou rse of litigation. Nevitt v. Nevitt
, 155 Vt. 391, 401 (1990). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Wood’s motion asks the Court for legal advice, we must decline. His motion is t herefore DENIED in this context. To- 8 -

the extent that Mr. Wood asks for an explanation or restatement of the rulings made on October 22, we refer him to the Background section of this Decision and our previous entry orders. To the extent that we have restated the rulings made at the October 22 motions hearing in the factual background above, we conclude that we have offered Mr. Wood as much assistance as is permissible. His mot ion is therefore otherwise DENIED

. Mr. Wood’s request for clarification also asks that we explicitly state our decisions in the form of entry orders so that he ma y know exactly what has been ordered, specifically requesting that we check boxes on the entry order forms labeling motions as either “Granted,” “Denied,” or “Other.” 3 Wood Mot. to Clarify, Reconsider at ¶ 13. We understand and appreciate the clarity that a one-pa ge entry order provides the parties. However, from time to time, we must elaborate upon the factual background and procedural posture of a case and explain our legal analysis thoroughly, something that is not always easily accomplished in a one-page entry order. We encourage the parties to thoroughly read and consider our written decisions if they wish to have an opportunity to reach a complete understanding of our decisions. Regarding his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wood seems to suggest that the Court has ruled arbitrarily between his motion for contempt in Docket No. 121-7-03 Vtec and the Town’s contempt motion in Docket No. 185-10 -04 Vtec. In addressing such reconsideration requests, we are directed to review our earlier decisions for the presence of legal error or the absence of factual support. See Garrow v Garrow , 150 Vt. 426, 428 (1988) (citing Romano v. Romano , 133 Vt. 314, 316 (1975)). In his motion, Mr. Woo d asserts that the Court, among other things, ruled a rbitrarily regarding his motion for contempt, set scheduling deadlines that unfairly be nefit the Town, was unclear about scheduling deadlines Mr. Wood was to meet, and “che at[ed] the appellant” out of time he was allotted to reply to the Town’s response to Mr. Wood’s request to weatherproof his
structure. We take Mr. Wood’s assertions in turn. First, we note that at the October 22 telephonic mo tion hearing, the Court did not issue any final order or judgment regarding either party’s contempt motion. The Court

3 Mr. Wood explains his confusion thusly: “...[U]pon r eceiving the entry order regarding the request to amend the court failed to check one of the three op tions on the order. The appellant now does not kno w whether it was granted or not.” Wood Mot. to Clari fy, Reconsider at ¶ 13. Mr Wood is correct that th e Court neglected to check one of the entry boxes. B ut the text of this Entry Order provides the clear direction Mr. Wood requests.- 9 -

responded to Mr. Wood’s request for additional time to find an attorney and prepare defense materials. Although we will allow pro se litigants, like Mr. Wood, some flexibility, we must also hold them to the same sta ndards to which we must hold an attorney and the party they represent. Vahlteich v . Knott , 139 Vt. 588, 590-91 (1981). In the above-cited cases, we have allowed Mr. Wood muc h flexibility, particularly with regard to affording many months in additional time to prepare and organize his arguments. It is not apparent to this Court that M r. Wood has suffered from any “unfair advantage” from which this Court could protect him in accordance with Nevitt v. Nevitt
, 155 Vt. at 401.
There has been no final determination of the contem pt motions at this point. We have merely accommodated Mr. Wood’s scheduling requ ests. All the Court has accomplished thus far is to adjust the schedule for the parties’ filing deadlines so as to give Mr. Wood a fair opportunity to present his arg uments. Such decisions fall within the inherent power of th e Court to conduct the business before it and to take actions necessary to administ er justice “efficiently, fairly, and economically,” which is necessary to the Court’s “e xistence, dignity, and functions.” 20 Am.Jur. Courts § 39 (2007); see also Vt. Const. ch. II, § 28 (regarding Vermont courts, “justice shall be therein impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay”). Mr. Wood argues that these deadlines were not clear and appears to suggest that the Court should reconsider its past determinations of filing deadlines due to his apparent
confusion. We conclude that no such clarification is warranted here. Given the set of entry orders issued on October 31, along with Mr. W ood’s oral acknowledgement of the orders the Court issued during the October 22 heari ng, we cannot say that the Court did not provide Mr. Wood with fair notice of its filing deadlines. Moreover, if Mr. Wood was confused regarding the filing extensions made a t his request, the Court offered him the opportunity eliminate any confusion by timely r equesting clarification. He did not request clarification until some deadlines had pass ed and others were near. However, this provides us with neither a factual basis to change those rulings, nor does it demonstrate legal error. Lastly, Mr. Wood complains that the Court did not g ive him ten days to reply to the Town’s response to Mr. Wood’s request to weathe rproof his structure. Mr. Wood- 10 -

filed his request on November 27, 2007. The Town f iled its response on December 6, 2007, within the Court-ordered ten business day win dow. The Town did not oppose Mr. Wood’s request. Mr. Wood replied to the Town’s res ponse (complete with a reference to the Town’s December 6 response) on December 11, and the Court issued an entry order regarding weatherproofing on December 13. Mr. Wood filed his reply within ten days of the Town’s response to Mr. Wood’s request, taking a dvantage of his response period. The Court considered Mr. Wood’s reply when it delib erated on his request. We find no factual support for Mr. Wood’s assertion that he wa s denied the opportunity to respond to
the Town. Because we find neither legal error nor a lack of f actual support for the rulings made at and after the October 22, 2007 motions hear ing, Mr. Wood’s motion for reconsideration of those rulings is DENIED

. 3. Motion to Take New Evidence and Reconsider in D ocket No. 72-3-00 Vtec
Mr. Wood has moved that we take new evidence and re consider the Court’s September 21, 2001 Decision in Docket No. 72-3-00 V tec. The Town, by a letter filed with the Court on January 15, 2008, has moved that Mr. Wood’s motion be dismissed for failing to submit legal memoranda explaining this C ourt’s authority to reopen and
reexamine the issues in Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec. W e decline to grant Mr. Wood’s request here, as he has offered no legal support fo r granting it. As we explained at the October 22, 2007 motions hearing, the consequences of Mr. Wood’s failure to submit the requested legal memoranda would be immediate consid eration of his motion. While we
have received no assistance from Mr. Wood in determ ining how this Court could grant such a motion, we have conducted our own legal anal ysis of the issue and find no precedent to support it. In Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec, Mr. Wood appealed a dec ision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Town of Hartford that upheld a Notice of Violation against Mr. Wood for failing to comply with the terms of a perm it to build a retaining wall on Mr. Wood’s property during “Phase II” of his project. Town of Hartford v. Wood , Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec slip op. at 1-3 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Se pt. 21, 2001) (J. Wright), aff’d, Docket No. 2001-473 (Vt. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2002). The term s of the permit required Mr. Wood to obtain easements from the Town for “ingress and egress over and the stockpiling of- 11 -

snow on the [Town of Hartford] Fire Department prop erty.” Town of Hartford v. Wood
, Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec slip op. at 3 (Vt. Envtl. C t. Sept. 21, 2001). Mr. Wood secured this easement, but he appealed our determination th at the easement did not allow him to place the foot of his retaining wall on Fire Depart ment property. Town of Hartford v.
Wood , Docket No. 2001-473 (Vt. Sup. Ct. May 29, 2002) ( unpub. mem.). Our Decision was affirmed by our Supreme Court on appeal. Id

. The site plan approvals also called for a retaining wall to support the upper level
of the site. Town of Hartford v. Wood , Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Sept. 21, 2001) (J. Wright). The wall was to be a dry-laid, sloping concrete slab wall, and the wall was to meet several specifications. Id . First, the slabs were to be at least ten inches thick.
Id . Second, only slabs that had been sawn and that h ad maintained their integrity were to be used, with hammered slabs unacceptable. Id . Third, any steel was to have been
removed from a slab if another slab was to bear on it. Id . Also, only certain types of
soils were to be used as backfill. Id

. The Court, Judge Merideth Wright presiding, found t hat Mr. Wood’s concrete slabs “range[d] from seven (7) to ten (10) inches i n thickness...[t]he ends of some slabs [had] been hammered rather than sawn [and that]...[s] teel reinforcing bars (rebar) protrude[d] from the ends of the slabs.” Id . For these reasons, the Court held that Mr. Wood had failed to comply with the terms of the per mit approving his reinforcing wall in Phase II, and the Court entered judgment in the Tow n’s favor. Id . at 3-5. Mr. Wood now asks that we reconsider that September 21, 2001 Dec ision. In support of his motion, Mr. Wood now argues, more than six years after the fact, that the Town deliberately misled the Court i n order to obtain a favorable ruling. Mr. Wood contends that new evidence has recently be come available, and he asks us to
take this new evidence under consideration and resc ind our September 21, 2001 Decision, which he styles as an “infectious sore” that will c ontinue to give rise to vexatious litigation. Even if new evidence is now available, the long del ay between our decision and Mr. Wood’s presentation of new evidence – more than six years – prevents us from now considering new evidence or reconsidering the Septe mber 21, 2001 Decision.- 12 - The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure apply to munic ipal ordinance enforcement cases under our jurisdiction. V.R.E.C.P. 3(3). Be cause the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable here, we consider Mr. Wood’s motion to b e a Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order under V.R.C.P. 60(b). Under that Rule, the Court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding if new evidence is discovered which could not have been discovered by due diligence in time t o request a new trial under Rule 59(b). V.R.C.P. 60(b)(2). The Court may also gran t the requested relief if there has been fraud, misrepresentation, or “other misconduct of a n adverse party.” V.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). The decision to grant such a motion is a matter of discretion for this Court. Bidgood v.
Town of Cavendish , 2005 VT 64, ¶ 9, 179 Vt. 530, 531 (2005) (mem.). A request for relief based upon the discovery of ne w evidence or upon fraud or misrepresentation must be made within one year afte r the judgment or order. V.R.C.P. 60(b); see also Brown v. Tatro , 136 Vt. 409, 411 (1978) (holding that the one-yea r time limit is an absolute bar where it applies). Indeed , six-year delays have been held to be fatal to Rule 60(b)(2) motions. In Godin v. Godin , 168 Vt. 514, 517-18 (1998), an exhusband’s motion for relief from a child support ju dgment made six years after judgment was entered was denied, even where it was deemed th at he had presented “newly discovered evidence” regarding the custodial parent ’s ten-month pregnancy and a second sexual partner. The one-year limitation of Rule 60 (b) was deemed to be absolute by the
Godin Court; we are compelled to follow its precedent he re. A separate provision of our Civil Rules, Rule 60(b) (6), represents an equitable catch-all provision that allows relief for “any oth er reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” We do not interpret Ru le 60(b)(6) in a manner that would help Mr. Wood. Our Supreme Court has held that thi s provision is “available only when a ground justifying relief is not encompassed withi n any of the first five classes of the
rule.” Alexander v. Davis , 140 Vt. 122, 124 (1981) (citing U.S. v. Cirami , 563 F.3d 26, 32 (2nd Cir. 1977)). Mr. Wood has offered no speci fic factual or legal basis for this Court to grant his motion under Rule 60(b)(6). In this regard, we note that general allegations as to injustice or unfairness are insuf ficient to justify the extraordinary relief of reopening a final judgment now six years old; th ere must be some substantive and- 13 -

specific facts, deemed credible by this Court, to w arrant such relief. We conclude that Mr. Wood has provided no such foundation. Accordingly, because Mr. Wood’s motion was filed to o late to qualify for relief under V.R.C.P. 60(b), his motion to take new eviden ce, reopen and reconsider our September 21, 2001 Decision is DENIED

. 4. Motions to Reconsider and to Stay in Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec On August 27, 2007, we granted the Town’s motion t o dismiss Mr. Wood’s appeal in Docket Number 81-4-07 Vtec. In response, Mr. Wood has filed two motions. First, Mr. Wood filed a motion to reconsider our Au gust 27 Decision dismissing his appeal. Second, Mr. Wood filed a motion to stay (o r toll) the running of the time, if any, remaining on Permit # 99-1180. We will take each o f these motions in turn. First, the August 27, 2007 Decision, written in th e form of an entry order, dismissed Mr. Wood’s appeal in Docket Number 81-4-0 7 Vtec. Mr. Wood’s Statement of Questions in that Docket broadly asked whether h is newest zoning permit application, dated November 20, 2006, should be exempted from si te plan approval requirements under the Hartford Zoning Regulations, specifically from the requirement that his site plan be completed by a licensed engineer. The issue of whether Mr. Wood’s applications requir ed the assistance and approval of a licensed engineer has already been ad dressed and resolved by this Court on two previous occasions. With respect to an earlier application, we have held that the Town has the discretionary authority to require Mr. Wood to submit site plans completed by a licensed engineer. Appeal of Wood , Docket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec and 174-8-05 Vtec slip op. at 13, 16 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Apr. 13, 20 06) (J. Durkin). Our August 27, 2007 Decision dismissing Mr. Wood’s appeal in 81-4-07 Vt ec considered this issue resolved after Mr. Wood’s unsuccessful appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court. In re: Wood Zoning Permit Amendment , Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec Entry Regarding Motion (V t. Envtl. Ct. Aug. 27, 2007) (J. Durkin). Mr. Wood no w seeks a third review of whether his development plans require site plan approval. We d ecline to authorize this third bite at the proverbial apple. The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents Mr. Wood from re-litigating this same issue. The doctrine prevents relitigation of an is sue and applies when:- 14 - (1) it is asserted against one who was a party in t he prior action; (2) the same issue was raised in the prior action; (3) the issue was resolved by a final judgment on the merits; (4) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action; and (5) its application is fair.

In re Stormwater NPDES Petition , 2006 VT 91, ¶ 23, 180 Vt. 261, 275 (2006). The issue of whether the Hartford Zoning Regulation s may require a professionally completed site plan has been raised and decided by final judgment. Appeal of Wood , Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec slip op. at 16 (Vt. Env tl. Ct. Apr. 13, 2006) (J. Durkin). Mr. Wood was a party to that action a nd had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue. Holding Mr. Wood to the final decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court is fair in light of these long and pr otracted litigations. Therefore, Mr. Wood’s motion for reconsideration of our August 27, 2007 Decision must be DENIED

. Second, Mr. Wood has requested that the time remai ning, if any, on Permit # 99- 1180 be tolled during the pendency of his appeals. As we have explained, Permit # 99- 1180 remained valid for 331 days, and the permit ti me began to run on April 13, 2006. Appeal of Wood , Docket Nos. 185-10-04 Vtec and 174-8-05 Vtec slip op. at 14-15 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Apr. 13, 2006) (J. Durkin). A permit’s effective time may be tolled “where a valid permit is issued for a specified period, and where actual construction is delayed by litigation , involving parties who...oppose construction, past t hat time, a permittee otherwise proceeding in good faith is entitled to r eissuance of that permit....” Preseault
v. Wheel , 132 Vt. 247, 253 (1974) (emphasis added). We hav e twice explained to Mr. Wood what time remained on his permit: see In re: A ppeal of Wood , Docket No. 121-7- 03 Vtec slip op. at 4 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. May 19, 2004) (J. Wright) and In re: Appeal of
Wood , Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec slip op. at 14-15 (Vt. Envtl. Ct. Apr. 13, 2006) (J. Durkin). For the time remaining on Mr. Wood’s perm it to be stayed, there must be a credible showing that litigation actually caused a construction delay during the 331 day window beginning April 13, 2006 and ending March 10 , 2007.
Our review of the record in all five of the above- captioned Dockets reveals that between April 13, 2006 and March 10, 2007 there was a single action taken that might toll the running of the time remaining on Permit # 99-1180: Mr. Wood’s filing of his Notice of Appeal in Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec. Mr. W ood filed his Notice of Appeal on- 15 -

March 9, 2007, the eve of the expiration of his per mit. He has since also sought to toll the time remaining on this permit in Docket No. 176 -8-07 Vtec. 4 Mr. Wood’s appeal in Docket Number 81-4-07 Vtec do es not satisfy the permit tolling framework described in Preseault . Unlike the litigation in Preseault , this litigation did not prevent Mr. Wood from completing constructi on under Permit # 99-1180.
Preseault , 132 Vt. at 253. In Preseault , challenges to the legality of a developer’s building permit outlasted the building permit itsel f and delayed the developer’s completion of his project. Id . In contrast, as the Hartford ZBA noted in its Ma rch 9, 2007 Decision on Mr. Wood’s latest application, Mr. Wood was free to continue to work under Permit # 99-1180 until it expired, irrespecti ve of his newest application. Put more simply, no one has filed an appeal to challenge Mr. Wood’s authority to work under
Permit # 99-1180. 5 Mr. Wood merely sought in his latest appeal to ex pand his building authority under the permit. There was nothing that prevented him from fulfilling the work that Permit # 99-1180 allowed during its term. His most recent application merely sought to amend Permit # 99-1180. That application was denied because Mr. Wood did not submit proper site plans. However, Permit # 99 -1180 continued to be a valid authorization for construction until it expired on March 10, 2007. 6 Because there is no time remaining on Permit # 99-1 180; there is nothing left for this Court to toll. Mr. Wood’s motions to stay in Docket Nos 81-4-07 Vtec and 176-8-07
Vtec must therefore be DENIED because the relief he requests cannot be granted.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that: 1. Mr. Wood’s Motion to Reconsider our September 2 8, 2007 Entry Order in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec is DISMISSED AS MOOT

. 2. Mr. Wood’s Motion to Reconsider and Clarify our October 22, 2007 Decisions as they relate to all five above-captioned Dockets is DENIED AS MOOT
,

4 This appeal, and the request for a stay, was filed after March 10, 2007. Therefore, the question of whether any time remains to be tolled will be resolved sole ly based upon Mr. Wood’s motion in Docket No. 81-4- 07 Vtec.
5 The Town only sought to challenge Mr. Wood’s cons truction authority under Permit #99-1180 after that Permit had expired.
6 Mr. Wood makes reference to a request for stay co ntained in a letter he submitted to the Hartford ZB A. It does not appear that the ZBA recognized or acted upon this stay request. We do not view this filin g as offering further support for Mr. Wood’s current sta y request.- 16 - particularly as it relates to the explanation suppl ied in the Background section of this Decision, and is otherwise DENIED to the extent it requests legal advice or reconsideration of our October 22, 2007 D ecisions. 3. Mr. Wood’s Motion to Take New Evidence and Reco nsider our September 21, 2001 Decision in Docket No. 72-3-00 Vtec is DENIED

. 4. Mr. Wood’s Motion to Reconsider our August 27, 2007 Entry Order in Docket No. 81-4-07 Vtec is DENIED

. 5. Mr. Wood’s Motions to Stay Permit Time in Docke t Nos 81-4-07 Vtec and 176-8-07 Vtec are DENIED

. This resolves most of the motions pending before th e Court. At present, the following two motions remain under advisement and w ill be addressed in a forthcoming opinion: Mr. Wood’s Motion for Contempt and Relief in Docket No. 121-7-03 Vtec and the Town’s Motions for Contempt and Injunctive Reli ef in Docket No. 185-10-04 Vtec. Thereafter, we must take up the substance of Mr. Wo od’s appeal in Docket No. 176-8-07 Vtec. If the parties believe that there are other issues that remain outstanding, we ask that they notify the Court immediately.

Done at Berlin, Vermont this 6 th day of March, 2008.

___________________________________ Thomas S. Durkin, Environmental Judge