Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1863 | May 13, 2020 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth A. Bellin

Elkhart, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Byron D. Harris, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

May 13, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1863 

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Michael A. 

Christofeno, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1808-F1-10 

Tavitas, Judge. 

Case Summary

[1] Byron Harris, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for attempted murder, a

Level 1 felony. We reverse and remand.
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Issue 

[2] Harris raises one dispositive issue, which we restate as whether Harris’ due

process rights were violated when his mother was excluded from his trial as part

of a witness separation order.1

Facts

[3] Harris was born in January 2003. On June 10, 2018, Trestepfone Pryor was

visiting friends at the River Run Apartments in Elkhart. Fifteen-year-old Harris

and another man approached Pryor. Harris thought Pryor was a man named

“Hershey,” and Harris told his friend, “Yeah, I’m gonna shoot him and all that

because he robbed me.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 180-81. Pryor denied being Hershey

and denied robbing Harris. Pryor saw that Harris had a gun “tucked” into his

pants. Id. at 182.

[4] The next evening, on June 11, 2018, Pryor was standing in the playground of

River Run Apartments talking to some people when Harris and several of his

friends walked past. Harris was “mugging” Pryor, which means Harris was

staring at Pryor or “[l]ooking hard” at Pryor. Id. at 185. One of the women

Pryor was talking with said to Harris, “Why are you mugging? What’s going

on?” Id. at 214. Harris responded, “Shut the f*** up. This has nothing to do

1 Harris also argues that his thirty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender and that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to sentence 

Harris under the Alternative Sentencing Statute. Given our resolution of Harris’ remaining issue, we need 

not address his sentence.
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with you.” Id. Harris then “fell on [a] car,” drew his gun, and “fired shots” at

Pryor. Id. at 178, 186. According to Pryor, Harris was wearing a “red hat.” Id.

at 187.

[5] Surveillance video in the apartment complex’s parking lot shows four men 

entering the parking lot from the direction of the playground. One of the men, 

later identified as Harris, wore what appears to be a black sweatshirt with a red 

hood. He walked backwards, facing the playground. The man pulled a 

handgun from his waistband, hid behind a parked vehicle, and fired toward the 

playground. One of the other men, who was wearing black, also drew a 

weapon and fired toward the playground. The four men then ran away. Pryor 

suffered two gunshot wounds to his lower right leg. 

[6] The State filed a petition alleging that Harris, a juvenile, committed acts that 

would be attempted murder if committed by an adult, a Level 1 Felony, and

aggravated battery if committed by an adult, a Level 3 felony. In August 2018, 

after a hearing, the juvenile court waived juvenile jurisdiction over the case to 

the Elkhart Circuit Court. In its order, the juvenile court noted that: (1) Harris 

was fifteen years old at the time of the offense; (2) Harris had been involved in 

the juvenile justice system for six years; (3) Harris had several juvenile 

delinquency adjudications, including acts that would be armed robbery, 

dangerous possession of a firearm, theft, pointing a firearm, and possession of 

marijuana if committed by an adult; (4) Harris had pending charges for acts that 

would be possession of methamphetamine, resisting law enforcement, and 

escape if committed by an adult; (5) Harris was “beyond rehabilitation under 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1863 | May 13, 2020 Page 4 of 18

the juvenile justice system”; and (6) Harris had received “a plethora of services”

from the juvenile justice system, but he had not been placed at the Indiana 

Department of Correction (“DOC”). Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. 

[7] The juvenile court noted that Harris’ offenses had escalated in violence; he 

committed the instant offense after running from residential placement; and it 

was “in the best interest of the safety and welfare of the community” that Harris 

“stand trial as an adult.” Id. The State then charged Harris with attempted 

murder, a Level 1 felony. 

[8] At the June 2019 jury trial, Harris was sixteen years old. Before voir dire, the 

State requested a separation of witnesses order. Harris’ mother, Twanna 

Warren, was listed as a witness in the State’s fourth amended witness list. 

Harris objected and noted that Warren would like to be present at the trial as 

much as possible because Harris is a juvenile.2 The trial court overruled Harris’

objection. The State, however, never called Warren to testify during the trial. 

The jury found Harris guilty of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony.

[9] Harris filed a motion for alternative sentencing under Indiana Code Chapter 31-

30-4, which the trial court denied. The trial court then sentenced Harris to 

thirty-seven years in the DOC with five years suspended to probation. Harris 

now appeals.

2 The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicates that Harris’ parents never married, and Harris was 

raised by his mother. Harris’ father resided in Gary.
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Analysis

[10] Harris argues that the trial court denied him due process when it barred Harris’

mother from being present during the trial due to the separation of witnesses 

order.3

 “‘The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and the 

Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action 

which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without the ‘process’ or 

‘course of law’ that is due, that is, a fair proceeding.’” Gingerich v. State, 979 

N.E.2d 694, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 

803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied), trans. denied. “Once it is determined 

that the Due Process Clause applies, ‘the question remains what process is 

due.’” Id. “Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that 

we review de novo.” Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2015); R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1040 (Ind. 2018) (“Both the existence of 

constitutional rights and the requirements for waiving them are legal questions 

we review de novo.”). 

[11] Harris raises an issue of first impression—whether the parent of a juvenile 

waived to adult court is subject to a separation of witnesses order. “When 

determining whether a juvenile has a constitutional right that the Supreme 

3 The State argues that Harris’ due process claim is waived for failure to raise it at the trial court level. We 

acknowledge that Harris did not use the words “due process” during his objection at the trial. Harris did, 

however, specifically object to the exclusion of his parent from the trial as a result of the separation of 

witnesses order, citing that Harris is a juvenile, which is the basis of the issue he raises on appeal. 

Accordingly, we will address the issue.
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Court of the United States has not expressly recognized, we will decide the 

question based on ‘our own judicial examination of the various cases, statutes, 

and constitutional principles pertinent thereto.’” R.R., 106 N.E.3d at 1040

(quoting Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 378, 254 N.E.2d 319, 320 (1970)).

[12] In general, a separation of witnesses order is governed by Indiana Evidence 

Rule 615. “The basic premise of Rule 615 is that, upon request of any party, 

witnesses should be insulated from the testimony of other witnesses.” Long v. 

State, 743 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ind. 2001). Evidence Rule 615 provides:

At a party’s request, the court must order witnesses excluded so 

that they cannot hear other witnesses’ testimony. Or the court 

may do so on its own. But this rule does not authorize 

excluding:

(a) a party who is a natural person;

(b) an officer or employee of a party that is not a natural person, 

after being designated as the party’s representative by its attorney; 

or

(c) a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to 

presenting the party’s claim or defense.

[13] Under Evidence Rule 615, a trial court is required to grant a motion for 

separation of witnesses. Hernandez v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1999)

(emphasis added). The determination of whether a witness qualifies for a Rule 

615 exemption, however, is “within the trial court’s discretion and is subject to 

review for an abuse of that discretion.” Osborne v. State, 754 N.E.2d 916, 924 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1863 | May 13, 2020 Page 7 of 18

(Ind. 2001) (quoting Long, 743 N.E.2d at 256). “Rule 615’s exemptions should 

be ‘narrowly construed and cautiously granted.’” Id.

[14] Under the juvenile code, however, a juvenile’s parent is a “part[y] to the 

proceedings described in the juvenile law and ha[s] all rights of parties provided 

under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” Ind. Code § 31-37-10-7; see K.S. v. 

State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006). As such, the juvenile’s parent falls 

under the Evidence Rule 615(a) exception for a party and cannot be excluded 

from juvenile proceedings. Accordingly, a juvenile’s parent is “a party not 

covered by the order for a separation of witnesses.” K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 542-43. 

Here, however, because Harris was waived to adult criminal court, the juvenile 

code granting his parents party status in the juvenile proceeding no longer 

applied.

[15] Harris’ parent did not fall under the exception in Rule 615 for a “party who is a 

natural person” or the exception for “an officer or employee of a party that is 

not a natural person, after being designated as the party’s representative by its 

attorney.” Evid. R. 615(a), (b). The only remaining exception is for “a person 

whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party’s claim or 

defense.” Evid. R. 615(c). 

[16] In general, “[a] party seeking to exempt a witness from exclusion as ‘essential to 

the presentation of the party’s cause’ under clause (3) must convince the trial 

court that the ‘witness has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge of 

the facts of the case that a party’s attorney would not effectively function 
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without the presence and aid of the witness.’” Long, 743 N.E.2d at 256

(quoting Hernandez, 716 N.E.2d at 950). See Long, 743 N.E.2d at 257 (holding 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing an FBI agent to

remain in the courtroom as an “essential” person in a complex investigation); 

Hernandez, 716 N.E.2d at 951 (holding that a prison guard, who was the only 

person that could assist in the cross-examination of inmates, was an “essential 

witness” under Rule 615); R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. N. Texas Steel Co., 752 

N.E.2d 112, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“This exemption most frequently is 

employed for expert witnesses, who are believed to be less susceptible to the 

temptation to shape their testimony.”), trans. denied. We must determine here 

whether the parent of a juvenile defendant waived to adult court is “essential”

to the juvenile defendant’s presentation of his defense.

[17] Harris argues that a juvenile lacks “maturity to adequately assess the gravity of 

the proceedings” despite the waiver to adult court. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. 

According to Harris, the waiver to adult court “does not change the 

Defendant’s age or his ability to fully understand the proceedings against him. 

Nor should it change the requirement or ability to have a parent present during 

each stage of a proceeding to allow for meaningful consultation when liberty 

interests are at stake.” Id.

[18] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a juvenile 

defendant’s special status. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S. Ct. 

2455, 2455 (2012) (holding that “mandatory life without parole for those under 

the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
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prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’”); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 

U.S. 261, 277, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2406 (2011) (holding “that so long as the child’s 

age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have 

been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the [Miranda] 

custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test”); Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Eighth 

Amendment prohibits the imposition of life without parole sentence on juvenile 

offenders for non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 

1183, (2005) (holding that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid 

the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 

when their crimes were committed).

[19] “The law has historically reflected the same assumption that children 

characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess 

only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.” J.D.B., 564 

U.S. at 273, 131 S. Ct. at 2403. The Court has recognized that “[a] lack of 

maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth 

more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. 

These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 

decisions.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct. at 1195. “[T]he legal 

disqualifications placed on children as a class—e.g., limitations on their ability 

to alienate property, enter a binding contract enforceable against them, and 

marry without parental consent—exhibit the settled understanding that the 

differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.” J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273, 
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131 S. Ct. at 2403-04. “‘[O]ur history is replete with laws and judicial 

recognition’ that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.” Id. at 

274, 131 S. Ct. at 2404 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 

S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982)). “[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’

youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473-74, 

132 S. Ct. at 2466. 

[20] Indiana courts have held that “[t]he special status accorded juveniles in other

areas of the law is fully applicable in the area of criminal procedure.” S.D. v.

State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Hall v. State, 264 Ind.

448, 451, 346 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1976)), trans. denied. Indiana has recognized

that juveniles are entitled to meaningful consultation with their parents.

Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-14 provides:

Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the 

United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any 

other law may be waived only:

(1) by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child if the

child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver;

(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or 

guardian ad litem if:

4

 In a matter of first impression, our Supreme Court recently held that, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, 

the juvenile court violated Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 by holding a fact-finding hearing in the juvenile’s 

absence where neither the juvenile’s counsel nor his parent waived the juvenile’s right to be present. R.R., 

106 N.E.3d at 1042. 
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(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the 

right;

(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;

(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that 

person and the child; and

(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the 

waiver; or

(3) by the child, without the presence of a custodial parent, 

guardian, or guardian ad litem, if:

(A) the child knowingly and voluntarily consents to the 

waiver; and

(B) the child has been emancipated under IC 31-34-20-6 or 

IC 31-37-19-27, by virtue of having married, or in 

accordance with the laws of another state or jurisdiction.

[21] “The meaningful consultation requirement of the juvenile waiver of rights 

statute is a safeguard additional to the requirement of adult waivers that they be 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” S.D., 937 N.E.2d at 431

(citing Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 254 (Ind. 2000)). “The purpose of the 

meaningful consultation requirement is to ‘afford the juvenile a stabilizing and 

comparatively relaxed atmosphere in which to make a serious decision that 

could affect the rest of his life.’” Id. (quoting Patton v. State, 588 N.E.2d 494, 

496 (Ind. 1992)). 
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[22] For example, we held in D.D.B. v. State, 691 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1998), that, in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, “no meaningful consultation 

occurred between D.D.B. and the guardian ad litem with regard to the decision 

to testify. In fact, no conversation occurred at all.” Accordingly, we reversed

the delinquency determination and remanded for further proceedings. 

[23] Once a juvenile is waived to adult court, Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 and its 

requirement for meaningful consultation no longer apply. Despite the waiver to 

adult court, however, the juvenile is still a minor child; the juvenile’s lack of 

maturity and need for meaningful consultation with a parent regarding the 

juvenile’s rights remain. Regardless of the waiver to adult court, our criminal 

procedures should take into account the juvenile’s youth and need for such 

meaningful consultation with a parent, especially during a trial. As such, we 

conclude that the parent of a juvenile waived to adult court is “a person whose 

presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party’s claim or 

defense.” Evid. R. 615(c). Accordingly, the trial court erred by excluding 

Harris’ mother from Harris’ trial.

[24] Although we have concluded that the trial court erred by excluding Harris’

mother, we must also determine whether that error impacted Harris’ substantial 

rights. Stated differently, and within the context of Harris’ alleged due process 

violation, we are tasked here with determining whether the exclusion of Harris’

mother rendered the proceedings unfair. See Ind. Trial Rule 61 (“No error in 

either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any 

ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties 
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is ground for granting relief under a motion to correct errors or for setting aside 

a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order 

or for reversal on appeal, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 

inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding 

must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 

substantial rights of the parties.”); Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error or 

defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or 

by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its 

probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so 

as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). 

[25] In Osborne v. State, 754 N.E.2d 916, 927 (Ind. 2001), Justice Boehm—in a

concurrence in which two other justices joined—held that, in reviewing the 

Evidence Rule 615 exceptions, “the party supporting the erroneous decision 

[was required] to show that the error was harmless” and the defendant was

“entitled to a presumption of prejudice that the State must overcome to 

prevail.” Moreover, we have held: “It is reversible error to extend the 

separation of witnesses to those who have a substantial interest in the subject 

matter.” In re Change of Name of Fetkavich, 855 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006). Accordingly, the State had the burden of overcoming the presumption 

of prejudice here. 

[26] The State makes no harmless error argument. Although the evidence presented 

at the trial was persuasive, the impact of denying Harris, who was sixteen years 

old at the time, any opportunity for meaningful consultation with a parent 
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cannot readily be quantified. We also note that, although the State listed 

Harris’ mother as a witness, she was never called to testify. Under these 

circumstances, we cannot say that the exclusion of Harris’ mother was harmless 

error. 

Conclusion

[27] In this case of first impression, we conclude that Harris’ due process rights were

violated when the trial court excluded Harris’ mother from the courtroom

during the jury trial. We conclude that Harris’ mother is “a person whose

presence [was] essential to presenting the party’s claim or defense” under

Indiana Evidence Rule 615(c). The trial court abused its discretion by

excluding her pursuant to the separation of witnesses order. Accordingly, we

reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[28] Reversed and remanded.

Najam, J., concurs.

Vaidik, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1863 | May 13, 2020 Page 15 of 18

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Byron D. Harris, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1863 

Vaidik, Judge, dissents. 

[29] I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the trial court should have

exempted Harris’s mother from the separation-of-witnesses order for two

overlapping reasons: (1) because the parent of a juvenile waived to adult court is

“a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to presenting the party’s

claim or defense” under Evidence Rule 615(c) and (2) because Harris had a

due-process right to have his mother present throughout the trial. I see several

problems with these conclusions.
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[30] First, Harris does not argue on appeal that his mother should have been

allowed to stay in the courtroom because of Evidence Rule 615(c). Instead, he

argues that he had a right to have his mother in the courtroom in spite of

Evidence Rule 615. Therefore, the State had no reason to address—and did not

address—Rule 615(c) in its brief. We should not reverse a judgment based on

an issue that was not raised by the appellant, especially when the appellant’s

silence leads to the appellee’s silence.5

[31] Second, Harris did not raise either the due-process issue or the Evidence Rule

615(c) issue in the trial court. In objecting to the separation-of-witnesses order,

he did not mention “due process,” the United States Constitution, or the

Indiana Constitution, and he did not say anything about Rule 615(c) or argue

that his mother’s presence was “essential.” In fact, he never even said that he

wanted his mother to be present. He said only that his mother “would like to

be -- to be in the trial as much as possible.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27. By failing to raise

5 As the majority acknowledges, to date Evidence Rule 615(c) has been held to apply only where the witness 

in question “has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge of the facts of the case that a party’s 

attorney would not effectively function without the presence and aid of the witness.” Long, 743 N.E.2d at 

256. It may be that the language of Rule 615(c)—“a person whose presence a party shows to be essential to

presenting the party’s claim or defense”—is broad enough to include a parent of a waived juvenile who is illequipped, for one reason or another, to participate meaningfully in their own defense. But if we are going to

extend the provision to that scenario, we should do so only in a case where the issue has been properly raised

and fully litigated. Here it has not been. With no argument from either party as to the meaning of the

provision, this is not a case where we should decide the issue.
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either issue in the trial court, Harris waived both issues for purposes of appeal. 

See Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).6

[32] Third, notwithstanding the fact that Harris waived both issues (and doesn’t 

even raise the Evidence Rule 615(c) issue on appeal), I disagree with the 

majority’s blanket conclusions that every waived juvenile has an absolute dueprocess right to have a parent who is also a witness present throughout trial and 

that the presence of such a parent is per se “essential” for purposes of Rule 

615(c). As the majority notes, a juvenile waived to adult court loses many of

the benefits of the juvenile code and becomes subject to adult-court procedures, 

and in my view, a waived juvenile claiming a due-process right to the presence 

of a parent or claiming that the presence of the parent is essential under Rule 

615(c) should be required to make some showing of need. For example, the 

presence of a parent may be necessary if the waived juvenile, perhaps by reason 

of immaturity or a developmental disability, is having significant trouble 

understanding the proceedings or communicating with their attorney and is 

therefore at risk of an unfair trial. Harris did not even attempt to make such a 

showing here. Again, he merely pointed out that he is a juvenile (sixteen at the 

time of trial) and that his mother wanted to be present. To me, those facts are 

not sufficient to establish a constitutional right to have his mother exempted 

6 The majority holds that Harris preserved the due-process issue simply by pointing out that he “is a 

juvenile.” Slip op. ¶10 n.3. I disagree. 
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from the separation-of-witnesses order or to show that the presence of his 

mother was “essential” under Rule 615(c).7

[33] For these reasons, I would affirm Harris’s conviction.8

7 I understand the majority’s holding to be limited to situations in which a separation-of-witnesses order 

would leave a waived juvenile with no parent in the courtroom. The transcript in this case suggests that 

Harris’s father might have been in the courtroom. See Tr. Vol. II p. 28 (Harris’s attorney saying that 

“[Harris’s] parents would like to be present” (emphasis added)). However, Harris’s argument implies that 

the exclusion of his mother meant that he did not have any parent present, and the State and the majority 

seem to accept that premise. As such, I read the majority opinion to mean that a separation-of-witnesses 

order cannot be enforced to the extent that it would leave a waived juvenile without any parent present in the 

courtroom.

8 I would also reject Harris’s arguments that his sentence is inappropriate and that the trial court should have 

sentenced him under the alternative juvenile sentencing statute, Indiana Code section 31-30-4-2. Harris’s 

actions in this case—firing multiple shots at Pryor with other potential victims nearby—were highly 

dangerous, and they were preceded by a troubling history of delinquent behavior, including robbery in 2012, 

theft in 2014, and pointing a firearm and battery in 2017. These facts establish both that Harris’s sentence is 

not inappropriate and that he is not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile-justice system.