alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 –ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DONALD STIDHEM,

2:15-cv-0379-TC

Plaintiff, ORDER

v. 

LORINDA SCHWARTC, Chaplain, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Coffin filed a Findings and Recommendation (ECF No. 

65), and the matter is now before me. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Plaintiff filed objections to the Findings and Recommendation. Accordingly, I have reviewed the 

file of this case de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore 

Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). I find no error and conclude the report is 

correct.

Case 2:15-cv-00379-TC Document 72 Filed 01/18/17 Page 1 of 2
2 –ORDER

Magistrate Judge Coffin’s Findings and Recommendation (ECF No. 65) is adopted. I 

assume, without deciding, that Stidhem asked the individual officers for grievance forms as 

stated in his declaration. I note defendants provided strong evidence that Stidhem’s declarations

could not be true because the particular officers did not work in Stidhem’s unit at the times in 

question. Even assuming Stidhem asked on those three occasions for a grievance form, his 

minimal attempts at grieving his disputes during times when, as his own declarations establish, 

the officers were busy, fail to establish the administrative remedies, which he clearly was aware 

of, were “effectively unavailable to him.” See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2014) (en banc). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED as to 

each of plaintiff’s claims except the “Quiznos” claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2017.

_______/s/ Michael J. McShane________

Michael McShane

United States District Judge

Case 2:15-cv-00379-TC Document 72 Filed 01/18/17 Page 2 of 2
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     (Replace this text with the legend)
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<NAME>                        ENEX INCOME AND RETIREMENT FUND - SERIES 2, L.P.

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<PERIOD-START>                                 jan-01-1996
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<CASH>                                         21658
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  35195
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TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00355-CR

Carlton Eugene Scott, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-DC-11-201948, HONORABLE BRENDA P. KENNEDY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant pled guilty to attempting to tamper with evidence and was sentenced to

sixty days in the county jail. The trial court has certified both that the cause is a plea-bargain case

and that appellant waived his right of appeal. Thus, the appeals are dismissed. See Tex. R. App.

P. 25.2(d).

__________________________________________

 David Puryear, Justice

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Rose

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: July 1, 2011

Do Not Publish
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








I,
Mitchell K. Dauerman, Chief Financial Officer of The Ultimate Software Group,
Inc., hereby certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that this Annual
Report on Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d))
and that the information contained in this Annual Report on Form 10-K fairly
represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of The Ultimate Software Group, Inc.




/s/ Mitchell K.
Dauerman


Mitchell
K. Dauerman


Chief
Financial Officer




(Principal
Financial and Accounting Officer)




Date: March
2, 2009
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-50771

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for the Use and Benefit of 

Consorcio ICA-CBI, a Foreign Corporation

Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant

VERSUS

U S CAPITAL, a New York Corporation, ET AL

Defendants,

U S CAPITAL, a New York Corporation 

 Defendant - Appellant-Cross-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Texas

(EP-91-CV-230)

July 14, 1997

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This matter is a controversy between the subcontractor and the

furnisher of a payment bond under the Miller Act arising out of the

construction of an office complex for the U.S. Embassy in La Paz,

Bolivia. The district court granted judgment in favor of the
2

subcontractor on most of its damage claims and both parties appeal.

The case presents the issues whether the district court erred:

in finding that the subcontractor’s claims against the bonding

company are not prescribed, and in the district court’s award of

damages to the subcontractor. We have carefully considered the

record, the briefs and arguments of counsel, and the district

court’s painstakingly detailed findings of fact and conclusions of

law. We are convinced that the district court correctly applied

the appropriate law and that none of its factual findings are

clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the

district court essentially for the reasons given by that court.

AFFIRMED.
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<CASH>                                           1,951
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   21,075
<ALLOWANCES>                                     7,860
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                31,397
<PP&E>                                          37,762
<DEPRECIATION>                                  19,138
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  82,868
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           39,436
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<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                           201
<OTHER-SE>                                      42,225
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    82,868
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                75,793
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   54,256
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                27,208
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,154
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (8,889)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (2,677)
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#### In the Matter of Kit Decious (Admitted as Kathryn Conelly Decious), an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

Second Department,

February 17, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Robert H. Straus*for petitioner.

*Kit Decious,*respondent *pro se.*

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

The respondent was admitted to practice by this court on October 1,1980, under the name of Kathryn Conelly Decious.

*26On August 28, 1986, the respondent was convicted after a jury trial in the Supreme Court, New York County, of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25, a class D felony), offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.35, a class E felony), tampering with physical evidence (Penal Law § 215.40, a class E felony), and conspiracy in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 105.05, a class A misdemeanor).

Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4), upon her conviction of a felony, the respondent ceased to be an attorney and counselor-at-law in this State.

Accordingly, the petitioner’s motion is granted. The respondent is disbarred and it is directed that the respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law forthwith.

Mangano, J. P., Thompson, Bracken, Niehoff and Weinstein, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Gerald A. Powell, a Suspended Attorney.

— Application by petitioner, a suspended attorney for reinstatement to the Bar of the State of New York, which was referred to the Committee on Character and Fitness to investigate and report on whether the petitioner complied with this court’s order of suspension and whether he presently possesses the character and fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.

This court has received satisfactory proof that the petitioner has taken and passed the Multi-State Professional Responsibility examination, therefore the clerk of this court is directed to restore the petitioner’s name to the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law forthwith and he is hereby reinstated as an *620attorney and counselor-at-law. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Mangano, Thompson and Bracken, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sammy DELEON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-10895

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 24, 2007.

*461Christy Lee Drake, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Amarillo, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bonita L. Gunden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Amarillo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Sammy Deleon appeals his 120 month sentence imposed for his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He argues that the district court erred in applying a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) because he did not commit the Texas felony offense of manslaughter. Deleon also contends that his non-guidelines sentence is unreasonable because the district court improperly considered a factor for which there was no evidentiary support. Specifically, Deleon argues that the record did not support a finding that he knew the firearm was defective.

Reviewing the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error, we find that the district court did not err in applying the § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement. *See United States v. Villegas,*404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir.2005); *United States v. Villanueva,*408 F.3d 193, 203, n. 9 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*546 U.S. 910, 126 S.Ct. 268, 163 L.Ed.2d 241 (2005). Deleon’s statement contained in the presentence report indicated that he knew the firearm was defective, that he had taken methamphetamine earlier in the day, that he was cleaning a loaded gun in close proximity to another person, and that he was illegally possessing the firearm. Considering these facts, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Deleon reckless*462ly caused the death of Audra Fuentes, thereby committing the Texas felony offense of manslaughter.

Deleon’s non-guidelines sentence is not unreasonable based on the district court’s consideration of the fact that Deleon knew the gun was defective. Deleon’s argument that the record does not contain evidence of Deleon’s knowledge as to the firearm’s defect is erroneous. His statement in the presentence report indicates that he was aware of the defect. The district court did not give significant weight to an improper factor. *See United States v. Smith,*440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.2006).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# C_2006246EN.01000301.xml

| 13.10.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 246/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.10.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 246/3

---

Amendment by France of public service obligations in respect of scheduled air services between Strasbourg and Copenhagen (Kastrup/Roskilde)

(2006/C 246/03)

(Text with EEA relevance)

| 1. | France has decided to amend, with effect from 25 March 2007, the public service obligation imposed on scheduled air services between Strasbourg and Copenhagen (Kastrup/Roskilde) published in the
  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 348 of 5 December 2000 pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes. |
| --- | --- |

1.

France has decided to amend, with effect from 25 March 2007, the public service obligation imposed on scheduled air services between Strasbourg and Copenhagen (Kastrup/Roskilde) published in the
  Official Journal of the European Communities No C 348 of 5 December 2000 pursuant to Article 4(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes.

Official Journal of the European Communities

2.   The public service obligation is as follows:

2.1.   Frequency

The minimum level of service provided between Copenhagen and Amsterdam must be two round trips per day from Monday to Friday, all year round except for the month of August, when there must be a minimum of one round trip per day, from Monday to Friday. The flights in question must be non-stop.

2.2.   Type of aircraft used and minimum capacity provided

The services must be operated by jet aircraft with at least 25 seats.

2.3.   Timetables

The first flight in the day departing from Copenhagen must leave at a time that enables flights from Scandinavia and other European countries to connect.

The timetable must coincide with parliamentary sessions, i.e. arriving at Strasbourg close to but no later than 14:00 for the session beginning at 15:00 and leaving Strasbourg close to but no earlier than 17:00, when the sessions end.

The two daily rotations must enable passengers to make a return trip in one day.

2.4.   Flight bookings

Seats on these flights must be marketed by a computerised booking system.

2.5.   Continuity of service

Except in cases of force majeure, the number of flights cancelled for reasons directly attributable to the carrier must not exceed 2 % of the number of flights scheduled in any IATA scheduling season. The carrier must give a minimum of six months' notice before discontinuing these services.

Community carriers are hereby informed that the operation of air services without regard to the abovementioned public service obligation may result in administrative and/or criminal penalties.

---
#### Simon-Equity Jefferson Valley Partnership, Appellant, v AJC Contractors, Inc., Respondent-Respondent, et al., Respondents.

It is settled that by participating in an arbitration one waives his right to move for a stay of the arbitration on the ground that no valid contract or agreement to arbitrate had been made *(see,*CPLR 7503 [b]; *Matter of National Cash Register Co. [Wilson],*8 NY2d 377; *Matter of Yonkers Public Lib. [Landolfe Elec. Corp.]*27 AD2d 575).

The record reveals that the respondents Rudolph’s Women’s *580Apparel of Mt. Kisco, Inc. (hereinafter Rudolph) and AJC Contractors, Inc. (hereinafter AJC) entered into a construction contract for improvements to be made on premises leased by Rudolph from the plaintiff Simon-Equity Jefferson Valley Partnership (hereinafter Simon-Equity). This contract provided that all disputes arising out of the contract would be arbitrated. When disputes over performance arose, AJC filed a mechanic’s lien against the premises. Rudolph then served a demand for arbitration upon AJC and Simon-Equity, seeking to resolve all disputes and obtain a declaration that the mechanic’s lien is invalid.

Although it was not a party to any agreement to arbitrate, Simon-Equity expressly and affirmatively agreed with Rudolph to be named as a respondent in the arbitration proceeding "in order to insure that full relief was accorded to the parties with respect to the mechanic’s lien”. By that act and because of its interest in having the mechanic’s lien dispute resolved in Rudolph’s favor, Simon-Equity has indicated an "affirmative acceptance” of arbitration *(De Sapio v Kohlmeyer, 35*NY2d 402, 405), or an "election] * * * to go forward” with the arbitration *(Matter of National Cash Register Co. [Wilson], supra,*p 383). In this manner, Simon-Equity has "participated” in the arbitration and cannot now move for a limited stay of arbitration to the extent of preventing arbitration of claims made against it by AJC in the pending arbitration proceeding. Once it was a participant in the arbitration by consent, Simon-Equity knew or should have known that the possibility of claims was present.

We finally note that it was unnecessary for the court to find that Simon-Equity did not make a timely objection to the underlying arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503, which requires a motion to stay arbitration to be made within 20 days of service of the demand for arbitration. It is Simon-Equity’s "participation” in the arbitration, through its failure to in any form object to the underlying arbitration and its active consent to being named a party in that underlying arbitration proceeding, which now bars it from obtaining a stay of arbitration. Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.
# C_2009136EN.01000101.xml

| 16.6.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 136/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.6.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.5377 — SNCF/VFE P/Bollore/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2009/C 136/01

On 5 June 2009, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in French and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition website (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32009M5377. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu). |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32009M5377. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law (http://eur-lex.europa.eu).

---
1 - ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

ROY J.,

1 No. 3:15-CV-00404-HZ

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Plaintiff brought this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision to deny 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). In an April 26, 2016 Opinion & Order, the Court

reversed the Commissioner’s decision, and ordered that the case be remanded for further 

proceedings. Judgment was entered on April 26, 2016. 

 

1

In the interest of privacy, this order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the nongovernmental party or parties in this case. 
2 - ORDER

Plaintiff now seeks an award of fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Defendant has no 

objection to the request. The Court has reviewed the record in the case, the motion, and the 

supporting materials including the award of benefits, the fee agreement with counsel, and the 

recitation of counsel’s hours and services. Applying the standards set by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 

535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002), the Court finds the requested fees reasonable.

The Court grants the motion [29] and awards Plaintiff's counsel $14,568 in attorney’s 

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Previously, the Court awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees in the 

amount of $3,250.66 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. When 

issuing the section 406(b) check for payment to Plaintiff’s attorney, the Commissioner is directed 

to subtract the amount previously awarded under EAJA and send Plaintiff’s attorney the balance 

of $11,317.34, less any applicable processing fees as allowed by statute. Any amount withheld 

after all administrative and court attorney’s fees are paid should be released to the claimant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this day of , 2019

 

Marco A. Hernández

United States District Judge