### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00043- CR

Ra du P aulLaur e nt iu, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 368TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 02-0 36- K3 68, H ONO RAB LE BURT CARNES, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
A ju r y f o u n d a p p e ll an t R a d

uPa u l L a u r e n ti ug u ilty of t wo co u n ts o f r o b b e r y . T e x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 29 .0 2 (We st 20 03 ). I n f our i ssu e s L a

ur e nti u c on te nd s th a t hi s c on vic tio n s ho uld be re ve rs e d be c a

us e the tr ia l court e rr e d by (1 ) ad mittin g e vid e nc e ob ta ine d in vi olatio n o f h is F ourt h Amendment rig hts; (2) admitting e vidence of extraneous offenses and other ba d acts without proper
no tic e un de r ar

tic le 37 .0 7, se c tio n 3 (g ) o f t he Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure ; ( 3) re fu sin g to g rant a new trial afte r the State violated a motion in limine; and (4) admitting evidenc e in violation of rules 401 a

nd 403 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. F or the re as o n s t h at follow, we a ffirm the conviction.To the north of the hotel was the pa rking lot and then a woode d are a. 1 2 BACK GR OUND On November

6, 2001, bank teller s Anna Reilly and Patricia

Grunba r we re c losing the C ompass Ba

nk branc h in Round Rock when a masked man overpow ere d Grunba r and e ntere d thr ou g h th e re ar d oo r. Th e man wa s we ari ng da rk c lot he s and wi e lde d a

stu n gun and an a ir pis tol
. He or dere d the tellers to open the main vault; how ever , the tellers led him to the drive- throug h are a and beg an to dispe rse money from the teller vault and draw ers. Reilly place d bait money , consisting of a pa cket of

bills with prer ecor ded serial numbers, and a trac king device , inside the bagwith the other money . The robbe r told the tellers to lie on the floor a nd wait for f

ive minutes and then he left the bank wi t h $ 3 2,663 in cash. Moments later , Reilly and Gr unbar pr essed va

rious panic buttons located in the ba

nk and ca lled 911. Austi n p o l i ce office r Richar d Muñoz receive d an ale rt about the robbe ry that descr ibed the suspect as a male carry ing a s ilver gun and we aringa g ray shirt, black pants, ski mask,
and g lov e s. Muño z tr a c ke d th e sig na l e manatin g fr om t he ba it m on e y

to a Wing a te I nn

Ho te l in Austin. Numerous police office rs and a helicopter, also trac king the signa l, alre ady had ar rived at the h o te l p ar

k in g lo t. Sh o rtl y

a f te r M u ñ o z ar

r iv e d , it w a s d e te r

mi n e d th a t t h e s ign a l w a s c oming from the nor

th side of the hotel. After observing L aure ntiu and his wife sitt ing motionl ess i n a truc k 1 in the parking lot, Muñoz and fellow Austin police office r Serg eant Earl Ha ll approac hed the truc k and orde red L aure ntiu a

nd his w ife to e x it the vehicle. Muñoz testified that except for the truck the pa rk inglot wa s e mpt

y and no oth e r p e op le we re pr e se nt
. L aure nt iu ’s c lot hin g wa s c ov e re d w ith leave s and twig s and he w as per spiring a nd breathing heavily
. Hall, who died befor e trial, prepa redThe State ne ver r efe rre d to the theft by chec k offe nse duringeither the g uilt/i nnocenc e or 2 punis hme nt p ha se of

the tr ia l. 3 a re po rt statin g tha

t he a sk e d L a

ur e nti u w hy

he wa s c ov e re d in

le a ve s. L a

ur e nti u’ s in iti a l r e sp on se
wa s th a t he wa s jo g g ing , b ut h e the n s a id he wa s do ing pu sh -u ps in the pa

rk ing lot to w a ke him se lf up. The re port then states that Hall asked for pe rmission to l ook inside the truck f or the re g istration, insurance , and any

wea pons; L aure ntiu replied that “the re wer e none but he could look for himself.” The re port st at es that Ha ll reac hed inside the truc k and seized a stun gun from the c enter console. After L aure ntiu and his wife we re a rre sted for ba

nk robber y , the truck w as impounded and a police evidenc e tec hnician located a g love and a roll of duct tape in the truck’s be d. Offic ers loca

ted a blac k bagcontainingover $30,000 in pa per c urre ncy , including the bait money , in a wooded are a adjac ent to the hotel parkinglot later that eve ning. T hey returne d the next m orning and re cover ed a g love, black jeans, and a silver air pistol. The bait pack matched the prer ecor ded ser ial numbers of the bills from Compass Bank. A pa per towe l with dr ops of blood later deter mined to be L aure ntiu’s was discover ed in t he back pocke t of the jea ns. Duringthe punishment phase, L aure ntiu a dmitted he robbed the Compass Ba nk and conc eded that the air pistol, stun gun, black ba g , black jea

ns, and g loves belong ed to him. Prior to trial, L aur en t i u ’s attorne y filed a r equest for

notice of e x trane ous offe nses under a rticle 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . The State filed a notic e t h at listed
rec kless conduct and driving with a suspended license, two of fense s that occur

red in I llinois , and a theft by chec k. Trial beg an on De cembe r 8, 2003, and on D ece mber 1 0 , t h e S t at e filed a written 2 supplemental notice of intent to introduce ex trane ous offe nses and ba d acts. The second notice listed4

an uncharg ed robbe ry , suspended lice nse, two uncha rg ed assa ults, and a history

of family violence ag ainst L aure ntiu’s w ife. The trial court g rante d L aure ntiu’s motion in limi ne to cove r re fer encing t h e o f f e n s e s l i s t e d

i nt h e s e c o n d

n o t i c e . L a

u r e n t i uw a s f

o u n d g u i l t y o f t w o c o u n t s o f

r o b b e r y. At se nte nc ing , th e Stat e refe rr e d to the pr ob a tio n L a ur e nti u r e c e ive d f

or re c kle ss conduct a

nd driving wit h a suspende d license be fore the pre -trial motion in lim ine cove ring L aure ntiu’s criminal rec ord wa s lifted. The trial court re fused L aure ntiu’s attorney ’s re quest for a new tria l and later admitted a certified copy of t he I llinois conviction i nto evidence . Over objections by L aure ntiu’s attorney , the t ri al co urt allowed the State to cross-e x amine his relatives about the unchar g ed robbe ry

and domestic violenc e listed in the supplemental notice. T he cour t permitted the State to introduce a

letter L aure ntiu wrote to his wife c oncer ning the conditions of his incarc eration. L aure ntiu rece ived a twe nty -y ear sentenc e. This appe al followed.
DI SCU SSIO N L aure ntiu brings f

orwa rd four issues on appea l. He first contends that the trial cour t
err ed in deny

ing his motion to suppress evidenc e of the stun gun at the guilt-innocence phase. H e then cha lleng es the a dmission of ex trane ous offe nses and other bad a ct s o n the basis of improper
no tic e , th e den ial of

a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l in

re sp on se to t

he State ’s vio latio n o f t

he mot ion

in limine, and the admission of the letter to his wife on g rounds of irr eleva nce a nd undue pre

judice.
Motion to Su

ppres s L aure nt i u fi l ed a m otion to suppress the stun gun obta ined from his truck on the theory that the sea

rch tha t p roduced the we apon wa s the product of an illeg al detention. The trial5

court ove rruled the motion. The a ppropriate standard f

or re viewinga trial c ourt’s rulingon a motion to suppress evidenc e is to g ive almost total defer ence to a trial court’s de termination of historical fac ts and to review de novo the court ’s ap p l i ca tion of the law of se arc h and seizure. Balentine v. Sta te , 71 S.W .3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Car mo uc hev . S

tate , 1 0 S. W. 3 d 3 2 3 , 3 2 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2000). We review the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the trial court’ s ruling a nd
assume that the trial cour

t made implicit findings of f act supporte d by

the re cord. Carmouche , 10 S.W .3d at 328. We revie w de novo the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f F ourt

h A me ndme nt s tand ard s. Id. An offic er ma y briefly detain an individual if the office r has re asonable suspicion that
a person is involved in criminal activity
. Da v is v . S tate , 989 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Austin, 1999, pet. re f’d)
. The officer must have specific articulable fac ts which, in l ight of his ex perie nce
and pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e , to g e the r w ithinf e re nc e s f ro m th os e fa c ts, wo uld

c re a te reas on a

ble suspicion and justif

y i n t ru d i n g on the fre edom of the c itiz en deta ined for inve stigation. Id. The
rea sonablene ss of an investig ative dete ntion turns on the totality of the c ircumstance s. Id. At the time Muñoz initially detained L aure ntiu, he knew that a bank robbe ry

had bee n
comm i t t ed ; t h at bait money had bee n place d in the robber ’s possession; that the bait money was trac ked and located on or

near the Wingate I nn’s north par king lot or the adjac ent wooded a rea ; that L aure ntiu wa s cover ed in le aves and sticks; that the truck wa s fac ing nor th towards the woode d are a; that L aure ntiu and his wife we re sitting motionless inside a truc k in the Wingate I nn parking lot; that de sp ite t he inc re a sin g po lic e pr e se nc e ne ith e r L a ur e nti u n or

his wi fe dis pla

y e d a ny no tic e a ble
c on c e rn ; th a t no oth e r p e op le we re ob se rv e d in the pa rk inglot ; th a t th e ro bb e r w a s d e sc ri bed as a6

thin, white male wearing a g rey sweater; and, that L aure ntiu was wea ring a g rey

sweatshirt. Muñoz had a r easona

ble suspicio n , based on the se fa cts and ra tional infere nces, that L aure ntiu was
connec ted to the bank r obbery . Thus, L aure ntiu’s detent i o n wa s j u s t ified, and the stun gun is not inadmissible on the gr ound that it is t he produc t of an illeg al detention.

L aure ntiu a

r g u e d f u r th e r th a t t h e r e w a s n o e xception to the wa rra nt require ment which would h av e ena

bled Hall to seize the stun g un. At the suppression hea ring , the State ar g ued that three exceptions applied: a Te rry f r i s k f o r o f f i ce r s af et y , p l ai nv i ew , an d

co n s en t
. T h e t ri al j u d ge admitted the evidenc e based on the plain view or the off icer safe ty exception. We ag ree with the trial court that the pla in view exception applied in this case.

F or theplai n v iew ex cept io n t o t he w arran t r equ ir eme ntto app ly , t wo c on di ti on s m ust be met: (1) the office r must be in a proper position to view the item or lawfully be on pre mises, and (2) the f act that the of

fice r has discove red e vidence must be immediately appar ent. J os e ph v . S tate , 807 S.W .2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). T h e i m m ed i at ely appar ent prongdoes not requir e actua l knowledg e of inc riminating e vidence
. Id
. (c i t i n g Te x as v . B ro wn , 460 U.S. 730, 742-44 (1983)) . Essentially , the offic er must believe that the evidenc e dis c o v e r e d is a ssociated with cr iminal activity
. Id
. The rec ord contains evidenc e that meets both r equire ments. Although Hall di ed befor e trial, his re port was a d m i t t ed i nto evidence during the suppression hea ring . Muñoz’s te sti mony and Ha ll’ s r e po rt

pr ov ide e vid e nc e that H a ll w a s in a pr op er po si ti on to v ie w t he ite m. The re port states that Hall rec eived L aure ntiu’s consent to look inside the truck for vehicle pa

pers and ac cessible we apons. Muñoz testified that L aure ntiu a nd his w ife ha d left the truc k doors open7

when they

exit ed and that he believe d the g un was in plain sig ht beca use Ha ll reac hed in “a s if y ou
rea ched in to g rab your ca

r key s out ty

pe mane uver.” Fur

thermore , the phot og raph taken of the tr uck at t he cr im e s c e n e r e v e a ls th a t t h e c e n te r c o n s o le li d

w a s n o t s h u t b e c a

u s e it w a s f il le d b e y ond capa city . L ikewise, Muñoz’s testimony indicates that at the time of seizure, it wa s appar ent that the stun gun w as evide nce. Muñoz testified that Hall informed him that the suspect de scription included a stun g un. Reviewing the evidence in a li g ht most favor able to the t rial cour t’s ruling and assuming implicit findi ng s of fa ct supported in the r ecord , we c onclude that both prong s of the plain view exception ha

ve been met and that the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was not in e rror . I n any event, if it were err or to admit the stun gun into evide nce, L aure ntiu was not ha rm e d. Ad mis sio n of e vid e nc e ob ta ine d fr om an imp ro pe r se arc h is su bje c t to the te st f

or ha rm le ss constitutional error. See J or da n v . S tate , 57 6 S.W. 2d 82 5, 82 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ). Th e te st i s not whether

the conviction could have b ee n h ad without the improperly admitted evidenc e but wh e the r t he re is a re a so na

ble po ssi bil ity that th e c omp la ine d o f e vid e nc e mig ht h a ve c on tr ibute d to the conviction or the punishment assessed. Se e Ca st il lo v. Stat e , 8 1 0 S. W. 2 d 1 8 0 , 1 8 4

- 8 5 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); se e als o Tex. R. App. P . 44.2(a)
.

After L aure ntiu was place d in custody , the police se arc hed the woode d are a adja cent to the hotel parkinglot a

nd discovere d: a

black ba g containingover $30,000 in c ash, including the bait money ; a g love; a pair of bla ck jea ns containing a pape r towel with L aure ntiu’s blood on it; and a silver a ir pistol. Furthermor e, whe n the indictment f or ag g ravated robber

y was announce d at the be g inn ingof

the g uil t- inn oc e nc e ph a se of th e tr ia l L a ur e nti u r e sp on de d, “ no t guil ty , guil ty to
ro bb e ry .” Ad dit ion a lly , d ur ingL a ur e nti u’ s o pe nin g stat eme nt his c ouns e l a sse rt e d th a t L a ur e nti u8

made a mistake, was e x tremely

ashame d of what he had done and that h e n ev er i n t ended to harm
anyon e . With re g ard to punis hme nt, L a ur e nti u a dmi tte d that he ro bb e d Co mpa ss B ank , th a t it e ms f o u n d in th e w o o d e d

ar e a w e r e h is , an d

th a t h e c ar

r ie d th e s tu ng u nd u r in g th e r o b b e r

y . We find be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e a dmi ssi on of th e st un g un int o e vid e nc e did

no t c on tr ibute to L aure ntiu’s punishment o r co n v iction beca use of the volume of

evidenc e that wa s located a nd elicited indepe ndent of the se arc h of the truc k. We overrule L aure ntiu’s first issue. Proper Notice I n his second issue, L aure ntiu challeng es the suff iciency of both of t he S tate’s notice s of extraneous off

enses and other bad acts, which wer e presented during the punishment phase of the trial. Tex. Crim. Proc. C ode Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(g ) (W est Supp. 2004-05). The trial c ourt ruled that notice wa s sufficient f

or all the off

enses introduc ed. We reviewt h e admi ssion of evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nses for a n abuse of discretion. Ro e the l v . S

tate , 80 S.W .3d 276, 280 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). We will affirm the trial cour

t’s decision if it is w i t h i n “t he zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Id. Article 37.07, section 3(g ) limits t he trial c ourt’s discre tion to admit evide n ce o f ex trane ous offe nses at the punishment ph as e a n d

p ro v i d es t h at n o t i ce fo r u n ad j u d i ca t edo ff

en s es i s re as o n ab l e o n l y

i f i ti n cl u d es the date on which and the county in which the alleg ed crime or bad act oc curr ed. Id. Be cause the statute does not provide guidance on deter mining whe ther the timeliness of notice is reasona ble, the
rea sonablene ss of the Sta te’s notice tur ns on the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h case
. Patton v. Sta te , 25 S.W .3d 387, 392 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d).9 L a ur e nti u a rgue s that the ini tia l no tic e did no t c omp ly wi th the re qu ir e me nts of art ic le 37.07, section 3(g ) beca

use it listed the date of conviction rathe r than commission of the offe nse and lis te d th e c ounty

a s “ Pa g e ” rathe r t

ha n “ Du pa g e .” Ho we ve r, the sta

tut e re qu ir e s inc lus ion of

the date and county

in which t h e cr i me or ba d act oc curr ed only if the extraneous c rime or ba d act ha s not resulted in a fi n al conviction. Unlike a lleg ed bad a cts, L aure ntiu should be awar e of his pre vious convictions. The f

irst n o t i ce included L aure ntiu’s I llinois conviction re cord. A s such, the notice complied with both article 37.07 a nd the cour

t-order ed filing deadline. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deter mining that the f

irst notice was r easona

ble. I t is unnecessa

ry for us to dec ide the re asonable ness of the supplemental notice beca use the State did not introduce a ny extraneous offense or bad act listed in it during its case- inc hie f i n th e punis hme nt p ha se . T he no tic e re qu ir e me nts of art ic le 37 .0 7, se c tio n 3 (g ) e nc omp a ss only case-i n -chie f evide nce. J au be rt v . S

tate , 74 S.W .3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When the State introduces ex trane ous offe nse evidence during cross-e x amination to miti g ate e vidence offe red by the def endant, a dvance notice of intent to off er the extraneous offe nse evidence is not possible. Id. at 4 (“ I n such a situation, the def endant, r at h er t h an t he State, dete rmines whethe r a c ontested i s s u e w i l l b e r a i s e d , an d

h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o nw i l l n o tb e m a d e kn o w nu n t i l h e p r e s e n t s h i s c a s e . It would be pra ctically

impossibl e for

the State to g ive notice until that time.”). I n th is c a se , th e State c ro ss- e xami ne d L a ur e nti u’ s c ha

ra c te r w itn e sse s r e g ard ingthe ir knowledg e of the unchar g ed robbe ry and incidents of dome stic violence listed in t he supplementa l notice rathe r than introducing extraneous offe nse evidenc e during its punishm ent ca se-in-c hief. The fac ts of this case f

all under Te x as Rule of Evidence 405 rathe r than article 37.07. Under Rule 405,10

a witness who testifies to a defe ndant’s g ood char acte r may be cross-e x amined to test the witness’s
awa rene ss of rele vant specific incidents of conduc t. W ils on v . S tate , 7 1 S. W.3 d 3 46 , 3 50 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e ri g ht o f a pa rt y to cr os s- e xami ne a c ha

ra c te r wit ne ss i s su bje c t to tw o li mit a tio ns . Id. at 350. Fir st, the incidents inquired about must be re levant to the cha rac ter issues at ha

nd. Second, the alleg ed bad act must have a basis i n fac t. Id. a t 35 1. Th e fo un datio n f or inq uir ingint o the spec ific instance s of conduc t should be laid outside the jury ’s pre sence so the judg e will have the opportunity

to rule on the propr iety

of askingthem. Id. The State re sted i t s case afte r opening arguments and then L aure ntiu’s attorney int ro du ced a ser ies of

wi tne sse s f

or the state d p ur

po se of sh ow ingho w L a

ur e nti u’ s f

a mil y wo uld contribute to his sug g ested re habilitation plan if he re ceive d probati o n . I n addition to testify ing about the super

vision the family

could provide, some of

the witnesses testified to L aure ntiu’s good char acte r. L aure ntiu’s mother gave examples of his ge nerous, loving nature and stated that “it’s not in his chara cter

to do stuff like that.” His brother t estified that this was the first time the family had dealt with a situation like this and that L aure ntiu had neve r lied to him. His sist er state d that there
was a disconnec t betwee n the bank robbery and what she knew of

her br other. The family

asser ted that had L aure ntiu been living ne ar the m, the bank robbe ry would not have oc curr ed. During a hear ing out of the prese nce of the jury , the State established that it wished to test L aure ntiu’s family reg ardingtheir knowledg e of his ac tivit i es when he lived at home. The State established a g ood-fa ith ba sis f or questioning the family beca use L aure ntiu’s w ife told them that he c on fe sse d to he r t hat he ro bb e d a

sto re a s a

te e na g e r a

nd a lso de sc ri be d d ome sti c a bu se incidents that occur

red throughout their relationship. Although the unchar g ed robbe ry descr ibed by11

L a ur e nti u’ s w if

e wa s sh ow n duri ngc ro ss- e xami natio n to be a sh op lif tin g inc ide nt, he r s tate me nts provided the State w ith a g ood-fa i t h b as i s fo r t he inquiries. The incidents wer e re levant to the char acte r issues at hand beca use L aure ntiu’s prior conduct rebutted the opinion that the bank r obbery was inconsistent wit h his char acte r, and dome stic abuse r ebuts L aure ntiu’s mother’s desc ription of his lov ingnatur e . B e c a

us e the fa mil y te sti fi e d a s to the ir

op ini on of L a ur e nti u’ s c ha

ra c te r, the State
wa s e nti tle d to te st the ir

kn ow le dg e re g ard ingsp e c if ic ins tanc e s o f r e le va

nt c on du c t. Even i f t h e State’s notice wa s deficie nt and, conse quently , the trial cour t erre d by
overr uling L aure ntiu’s objections, L aure ntiu suff ere d no harm. In Roethel, we he ld that a def endant is harmed by

defic ient notice re g ardingext ra n eo u s o ffenses if, af ter e x amining the rec ord, we conclude that the def

iciency either wa s t h e result of prosec utorial bad fa ith or impaired the defe ndant’s ability

to prepa re a dequate ly
. See R oethel , 80 S.W .3d at 282. Her e, the State did not le arn of the un c ha

rg e d r ob be ry

and the inc ide nts of do me sti c vio le nc e un til the y ha d a n o pp or tun ity to interview L aure ntiu’s wife on the da y befor e the guilt-innoc en ce p h ase of the trial beg an. The next day the State informed L aure ntiu’s attorney and the tr i al court that it intended to supplement its pr e vio us ly

fi le d n oti c e of

int e nt t o intr od

uc e e vid e nc e of

e xtra ne ou s o ff e ns e s a nd ba d a c ts. L aure ntiu contends that the State should have be en more diligent in it s sear ch for evidenc e of e x trane ous offe nses and ba d acts a nd th at t h i s ev i dence could have been disc overe d
e ar l i e r . H o w e v e r , L a

u r e n t i u ’ s w i f

e w a s i n i t i a l l y c h ar g e d

a s a c o - c o n s p i r a t o ri nt h e b an k r o b b e r y,
and , w hil e sh e wa s n ot i nd ic te d, sh e wa s re pr e se nte d by c ouns e l be fo re and duri ngL a

ur e nti u’ s tr ia l. Fur thermore , she re sided out of state in the time l eading up to trial. Additionally , all other potential
source s of this information, L aure ntiu’s f amily and friends, a lso lived out of state. Fina lly , the re cord12

reve als that L aure ntiu was awa re that the unchar g ed robber y listed in the notice re fer red to a shop lifting incident he was alleg edly involved in as a y outh. We conclude, ba sed on our r eview of the
re c or d, that th e State did

no t a c t in ba d f

a ithand that L a ur e nti u w a s a

ble to p re pa

re a de qu a te ly

to meet this evidenc e despite a ny defic iency

in the notice. We over

rule L aure ntiu’s second issue.
V iol ation o f M otion i n Li mine Th e State re fe rr e d at tr ia l to the pr ob a tio n L a ur e nti u r ece ive d f

or his I lli no is convictions for r eckle ss conduct and dr iving with a suspended license, both of which were cover ed by a pretri a l i nli mi n e o r d e r . L a u r e n ti uo b

je c te d an d r e qu e s te d

a mi s tr ia l. T h e tr ia l c o u rt i n stead direc ted th e ju

r y to d is r e g ar d th e St a te ’ s c o mm e n t an d th e n li f te d th e in li mi n e o r d e r

for the extraneous offe nses cove red in the f irst notice. L aure ntiu asserts on appe al that the trial c ourt err ed by re fu sin g to gra

nt a mis tr ia l. The de nial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed unde r an a b u s e o f di scre tion
s t andar d. Tre v ino v . S

tate , 9 9 1 S. W. 2 d

8 4 9 , 8 5 1 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p . 1 9 9 9 )
. O r d in ar il y , a p r ompt instruction to disreg ard w ill cure e rror as sociated w ith an improper que stion or argument. Ov alle
v . S tate , 13 S.W. 3d 77 4, 78 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion by ref

using to grant a mistrial. Following the objection, the trial cour t properly lifted the motion in l imine to admit evidence of extraneous offe nses for which prope r notice ha d been g iven. This circumstanc e, coupled with the t rial court’s instruction to disreg ard, r ender ed the State’ s failure to abide by

the motion in li mine harmless. We over rule L aure ntiu’s third issue.13

Relevance

of Evidence L a ur e nti u a sse rt s th a t th e State vio late d T e xas R ule s E viden ce 40 1 a

nd 40 3 in its closing argument at punishment by ref err ing to a letter he wrote to his wife while he w as inca rce rate d pr ior to t ri a l. T he tr ia l c ourt

ov e rr ule d L a ur e nti u’ s o bje c tio n th a t th e le tte r w a s ir re levan t to sentenc ing unde r Rule 401. The tria l court also over ruled L aure ntiu’s Rule 403 o b j ection, which state d th a t e ve n if

the le tter wa s r e le va

nt t o s e nte nc ing , th e pr ob a tiv e va lue wa s su bs tanti a lly outweig hed by

unfair pr ejudice. We reviewthe trial cour

t’s ruling s on the rele vance , materia lity , a n d p r e judic ial eff

ect of evide nce unde r an a

buse of discr etion standard. Se e Mo ntgom e ry v . S tate , 810 S.W .2d 372, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reve rse a trial ju d ge whos e rulingwas in the zone of
rea sonable disag ree ment. J on es v . S tate , 944 S.W .2d 642, 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Articl e 37.07 section 3(a) state s that “evide nce ma y be off ere d by the state a

nd the d ef en d an t as t o an y

m at t er t h e c o u rt d ee m s re l ev an tt o s en t en ci n g. ” L aure ntiu’s attorney prese nted to the jury

a re habilitation plan involving probation, and then state d, “He ’s alre ady been in c ustody for ove r two y ear s. Since the day of this off ense, he has been locked in a cag e. And so part of that punishment has alre ady

been a ccomplished, a

nd it’s continuing e very

single day .” In rebuttal, the State offe red e x cer

pts of a letter written by L aure ntiu to his wife stating that the prison was “ more lik e a do rm tha n a ja il, ” that he g ot to pla y so c c e r, that he ha d a

wi nd ow , a

nd he a po log ize d to his wife f or the pleasa

nt c onditions. He went on to say that he wr ote the letter

so that she could “f

eel
a t pe a c e ” wi th h im b e ingthe re . T he pu rpo se of intr od uc ingthe le tte r w a s to re but th e de fe ns e attorney ’s re fer ence to L au re n t iu’s being“locke d in a ca g e.” We hold that the tria l court’s14

determ i n at i on that the letter w as re levant to sentenc ing w as within the rea sonable zone of disag ree ment and wa s, theref ore, not a n abuse of

discretion. L aure ntiu’s final issue is overrule d.
CO NC LU SION I n s umm ary , w e c on c lud e the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in d e nyingL a

ur e nti u’ s mo tio n to suppress evide nce at the g uilt-innocence phase of trial and did not a buse its discretion by

admitting evidenc e of e x tran eo u s o ff en ses and other

bad ac ts, by

denying a

motion for a new

trial, or by admitting L aure ntiu’s letter. Thus, we aff irm the conviction.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Affir med Filed: January

21, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh