Filed 4/26/23 In re S.B. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This 

opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re S.B. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B321633

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELODY R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

19CCJP01011A–B

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed.

Melody R., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy 

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Melody R. (mother) appeals from an order continuing her 

children’s selection and implementation hearing. Mother argues 

the continuance lacked good cause and contravenes the best 

interests of her children. Mother also raises a litany of unrelated 

arguments in her reply brief. As we explain, mother forfeited any 

challenge to the order continuing the selection and 

implementation hearing by not objecting to the continuance 

below. In any event, the court didn’t abuse its discretion in 

continuing the hearing. As for the arguments mother raises for 

the first time on reply, we do not address them because they are 

untimely. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

In February 2019, the Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) filed a dependency petition under Welfare 

and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), on 

behalf of mother’s children, S.B. (born 2017) and P.B. (born 2018), 

alleging they were in danger of suffering physical harm based on 

domestic violence between mother and their father (counts a-1 

and b-1) and mother’s mental and emotional problems (count b2). The Department filed the operative first amended petition in 

August 2019, adding allegations that the children were at 

substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm and sexual 

abuse based upon father’s sexual abuse of the children’s niece 

and their adult siblings (counts b-3, d-1, and j-1).

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

As of October 2019, the children were living with Nekeya C.

(Nekeya), a foster parent with whom they have remained 

throughout these proceedings. 

In February 2020, the court sustained the b-1, b-2, b-3, d-1, 

and j-1 allegations, declared S.B. and P.B. dependents of the 

court, and removed them from mother’s and father’s custody, 

with both parents receiving monitored visitation. The court 

ordered no reunification services for either parent and scheduled 

a selection and implementation hearing for June 2020.

We later granted mother’s petition for extraordinary relief 

from the court’s dispositional orders, concluding the court 

violated mother’s due process rights by denying her the 

opportunity to cross-examine the dependency investigator and 

social worker at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The 

court vacated its jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. 

The court held a new jurisdiction hearing in May 2021. 

Prior to the hearing, mother’s counsel moved to be relieved and 

attached to her motion an email from mother threatening to sue 

the attorney if she continued to contact or represent mother. 

Mother had apparently “stopped all communication” with her 

attorney. The court denied the motion, explaining that counsel

could not be relieved unless mother filed a motion to discharge 

the attorney under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118

(Marsden motion). The court then sustained the b-1, b-2, b-3, d-1, 

and j-1 allegations, and dismissed the a-1 allegation.

In June 2021, the court held the disposition hearing, at 

which mother did not appear. By that time, mother wasn’t 

communicating with her attorney or the Department, and the 

court noted that mother was engaging in dilatory tactics to delay 

the children’s proceedings. The court declared S.B. and P.B. 
4

dependents of the court, removed them from their parents’ 

custody, and denied mother and father reunification services. The 

court scheduled a selection and implementation hearing for 

October 2021. Mother did not appeal the new disposition orders.

In October 2021, the court granted the Department’s 

request to continue the proceedings to February 2022 for the 

Department to assess placing the children with their out-of-state 

relatives.

In November 2021, mother, acting in pro per, filed a 

“demurrer and motion to terminate court jurisdiction with 

prejudice” (demurrer). In late January 2022, the court held a 

hearing on mother’s demurrer, at which mother failed to appear.

The court declined to rule on mother’s demurrer because mother 

was represented by counsel. The court noted that the children’s 

proceedings had been substantially delayed “because of the 

mother’s obstreperous and recalcitrant conduct.”

In February 2022, the court continued the children’s 

selection and implementation hearing to allow the Department 

more time to assess the children’s out-of-state relatives.

In late May 2022, the Department reported that S.B. and 

P.B. could not be placed with their relatives, but the current 

caregiver, Nekeya, was committed to adopting the children. By 

that time, S.B. and P.B. had been living with Nekeya for over 

three years, and they were closely bonded to her. Accordingly, the 

Department was evaluating Nekeya for “adoption readiness.” 

On June 9, 2022, the court continued the selection and 

implementation hearing to August 2022. Mother did not appear, 

but the court substituted mother’s appointed counsel for counsel 

mother had recently retained. The court explained that it needed 

to continue the selection and implementation hearing to allow the 
5

Department to complete its permanency planning report. 

Mother’s counsel did not object to the continuance. Instead, 

counsel asked the court to order the Department to provide 

mother information about a medical procedure P.B. was expected 

to undergo and to assess whether the children could be placed 

with their maternal grandmother. The court ordered the 

Department to notify mother “of any medical services of the 

children that are required” and to “provide an update [on] 

whether the maternal grandmother has been assessed before and 

reasons why or why not the children were not be placed with 

her.”

Mother appeals from the court’s June 9, 2022 order.

DISCUSSION

1. Appellate Jurisdiction 

As a preliminary matter, the Department contends we lack 

jurisdiction to hear mother’s appeal because mother did not 

identify in her notice of appeal the order that she challenges in 

her opening brief—i.e., the order continuing the selection and 

implementation hearing. We disagree.

While an appellate court’s jurisdiction is limited in scope to 

the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from (In 

re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75), we must liberally construe 

the notice in favor of its sufficiency. (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 261, 272 (Joshua S.); Cal. Rules of Court,2 rules 

8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3).) Thus, a notice of appeal should be 

construed to encompass the challenged order if “ ‘it is reasonably 

clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where 

2 All undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
6

the respondent could not possibly have been misled or 

prejudiced.’ ” (Joshua S., at p. 272.) A notice of appeal “is 

sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being 

appealed [from].” (Rule 8.100(a)(2).)

Here, mother’s notice of appeal states that she is appealing 

from the following order: “On June 9th, 2022[,] the court ordered 

mother to be notified of any medical services of the children that 

are required.” In her opening brief, mother challenges the order

continuing the selection and implementation hearing, which the 

court also issued at the June 9, 2022 hearing. Although the notice 

of appeal does not reference the continuance, it clearly identifies 

the hearing at which the continuance was issued. Moreover, the 

continuance and the order requiring the Department to notify 

mother of any required medical services for the children are

reflected in the same minute order. 

Under a liberal construction of the notice of appeal, it is 

reasonably clear that mother appeals from the orders issued at 

the June 9, 2022 hearing, including the order continuing the 

selection and implementation hearing. (See In re Daniel Z. (1992) 

10 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017 [construing notice of appeal to include 

disposition order, even though notice identified only the 

jurisdiction finding, because the jurisdiction finding and 

disposition order were rendered at the same hearing and 

included in the same minute order].) In any event, even assuming 

the notice of appeal is ambiguous as to the order continuing the 

selection and implementation hearing, the Department makes no 

showing that it was misled or prejudiced by the ambiguity. 

(Joshua S., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 272.) We will therefore 

address the merits of mother’s challenge to that order.
7

2. Mother hasn’t shown the court erred when it 

continued the selection and implementation hearing.

In her opening brief, mother argues the court abused its 

discretion when it continued the June 9, 2022 selection and 

implementation hearing to allow the Department to submit a 

complete permanency planning report. As we explain, mother 

forfeited any challenge to the continuance by failing to object to 

that order. In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion.

Under section 352, a juvenile court may continue “any 

hearing ... beyond the time limit within which the hearing is 

otherwise required to be held, provided that a continuance shall 

not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In 

considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial 

weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her 

custody status, the need to provide children with stable 

environments, and the damage of prolonged temporary 

placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).) A continuance “shall be granted 

only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of 

time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the 

hearing on the motion for the continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(2).) 

We review an order granting a continuance for abuse of 

discretion. (In re F.A. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 107, 117.)

As we noted above, mother did not object to the court’s 

order continuing the selection and implementation hearing to

August 2022. In fact, mother’s counsel asked the court to, as part 

of its order continuing the selection and implementation hearing, 

require the Department to assess the children’s maternal 

grandmother for possible placement. Mother, therefore, cannot 

complain on appeal that the court erred in continuing the 

selection and implementation hearing. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 
8

Cal.4th 1287 [generally, a reviewing court will not consider a 

challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not 

raised below]; see also In re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 

1351, 1362 [“Since appellant acquiesced in the multiple 

continuations, he cannot complain about any ‘foot dragging’ as a 

ground to reverse the court’s decision.”].)

In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion when it 

continued the selection and implementation hearing. As for good 

cause, the court explained that it had yet to receive a full 

permanency planning report for the children. Indeed, shortly

before the June 9, 2022 hearing, the Department learned that the 

children could not be placed with their out-state-relatives. Thus, 

the Department needed to complete an adoption assessment for 

the children’s caregiver, Nekeya, before the court could select a 

permanent plan for the children. The court, therefore, had good 

cause to continue the selection and implementation hearing. (See 

§ 352, subd. (a)(2) [court must give substantial weight to 

children’s need for stable home environments].) 

Likewise, continuing the selection and implementation 

hearing did not contravene the children’s best interests. By the 

June 9, 2022 hearing, the children had lived with Nekeya for 

nearly the entirety of their dependency proceedings—or more 

than three years. Nekeya was committed to adopting the 

children, and the Department was finishing its assessment of her 

as a prospective adoptive parent. Since S.B. and P.B. were closely 

bonded to Nekeya, continuing the selection and implementation 

hearing to allow the Department to assess whether the children 

could permanently reside with her was in the children’s best 

interests. Indeed, the children’s counsel didn’t object to the 
9

continuance, and the children do not challenge the continuance 

on appeal.

Finally, mother fails to explain how she was prejudiced by 

the order continuing the selection and implementation hearing. 

(See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [an appellate court will not reverse 

a lower court’s ruling without a showing that the ruling resulted 

in a miscarriage of justice]; In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 

606 [“ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of 

discretion, it must clearly appear the resulting injury is 

sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of justice’ ”].)

For all these reasons, we reject mother’s claim that the 

court abused its discretion when it continued the selection and 

implementation hearing to August 2022. 

3. Mother has forfeited the issues raised for the first time 

in her reply brief.

In her reply brief, mother raises several new arguments. 

Specifically, mother argues: (1) the Department violated her 

First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights; (2) she was 

denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at an 

unspecified hearing; (3) the Department engaged in abusive 

discovery tactics; (4) the Department filed false reports; (5) the 

court improperly shifted the burden of proof at the jurisdiction 

hearing; (6) insufficient evidence supports the court’s removal 

orders; and (7) mother is bonded to the children, and the children 

are not adoptable.

We decline to address these arguments because they were 

not raised in mother’s opening brief. (In re Karla C. (2010) 186 

Cal.App.4th 1236, 1269–1270; see also REO Broadcasting 

Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 500 [“This 

court will not consider points raised for the first time in a reply 
10

brief for the obvious reason that opposing counsel has not been 

given the opportunity to address those points”].) Further, to the 

extent mother challenges the court’s jurisdiction findings or 

disposition orders, those issues are not properly before us because 

mother never appealed the court’s June 2021 disposition orders,

which were appealable. (In re B.P. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 886, 889 

[“the dispositional order on a section 300 petition is [an] 

appealable judgment”].) Since those orders are now final, they 

are no longer subject to appellate review. (In re A.A. (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 1292, 1318 [appeal from most recent dependency 

order may not challenge prior orders for which statutory time for 

filing appeal has passed]; rule 8.406(a)(1) [a notice of appeal in a 

dependency proceeding must be filed within 60 days after the 

rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being 

appealed].)
11

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s June 9, 2022 order continuing the 

selection and implementation hearing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

BENKE, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 

of the California Constitution.