United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 9, 2022*

Decided November 9, 2022 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1111 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

 

FREDDELL BRYANT, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:07-cr-20043-SLD 

Sara Darrow, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Freddell Bryant appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 

the First Step Act of 2018, arguing that the district court failed to determine his 

eligibility or explain its reasoning. But the record adequately supports the district 

court’s decision, so we affirm. 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 22-1111 Page 2 

In 2010, Bryant pleaded guilty to three counts related to his role in a conspiracy 

to distribute large quantities of powder and crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In addition to his plea agreement, Bryant agreed—

in exchange for immunity—to cooperate fully with law enforcement by providing 

information and testimony that was “complete and truthful.” The criminal convictions 

carried a statutory sentence of life imprisonment, but the district court departed from 

that minimum based on Bryant’s substantial assistance, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and 

sentenced him to 300 months in prison and ten years of supervised release. 

While providing information to law enforcement, Bryant revealed his 

participation in a 2007 triple murder related to drug trafficking. But after sentencing on 

his drug-crimes convictions, Bryant refused to testify about the murders when called 

before a grand jury. The government determined that he was in breach of his 

cooperation agreement and later charged him with the murders. He was convicted and 

sentenced to three consecutive life sentences. See generally United States v. Bryant, 

750 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2014). 

In April 2020, Bryant moved to reduce his drug-crimes sentence under the First 

Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, which gives discretion to district 

courts to reduce defendants’ sentences for crack-cocaine convictions that would have 

been lowered after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. 

Noting that his guidelines range would now be 360 months to life in prison, Bryant 

requested a reduced sentence—240 months in prison and eight years of supervised 

release—to reflect the downward departure that he received in 2010. 

The probation office filed a First Step Act Computations worksheet assessing 

sentencing options if the Fair Sentencing Act were applied. The office concurred with 

Bryant that he was eligible for a reduction and that his amended sentence range would 

be 360 months to life in prison. 

The government opposed Bryant’s motion. It conceded that Bryant was eligible 

for a reduction under circuit law but argued that the district court should deny Bryant’s 

motion as a matter of discretion. Opposing any further reduction, the government 

highlighted Bryant’s refusal to testify in accordance with his cooperation agreement, his 

conviction for three murders, and his current sentence, which was already below the 

newly calculated range. 
No. 22-1111 Page 3 

In a text order, the district court denied the motion: “Pursuant to the framework 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404 of the First Step Act, after full review of the record, 

careful consideration of all applicable sentencing factors, and exercising its discretion, 

the Court declines to reduce the defendant’s sentence.” 

Bryant argues that the district court procedurally erred by denying his motion 

without first determining his eligibility or applicable sentencing range. He relies on our 

decision in United States v. Corner, 967 F.3d 662, 665–67 (7th Cir. 2020), in which we 

directed district courts first to determine an applicant’s eligibility and calculate the 

applicable sentencing range, and only then decide whether to exercise their discretion 

to reduce the sentence. Bryant contends that the district court’s text order “disqualified 

[him] as ineligible.” 

Bryant misapprehends the context behind the district court’s ruling. When the 

court denied his motion, his eligibility for a reduced sentence was undisputed. The 

probation office and the government both agreed with Bryant that he was eligible for a 

reduction. (On its computational worksheet, the probation office checked a box 

indicating that it “concur[red] with eligibility,” and the government conceded as much 

in its response to Bryant’s motion.) The court justified its ruling by stating that it had 

considered the “applicable sentencing factors” but declined to reduce his sentence in an 

“exercis[e] [of] its discretion.” This, then, was not a case like Corner, in which the district 

court erred by declining to consider modified statutory penalties before denying the 

defendant’s motion. Id. at 664. 

To the extent Bryant suggests that the court insufficiently explained its ruling, we 

think that no more detailed explanation was needed. The record reflects that Bryant 

failed to provide information as required by his cooperation agreement, that he was 

convicted for three drug-related murders, and that his current sentence is shorter than it 

would be if the Fair Sentencing Act were applied. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 

138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018). 

AFFIRMED