1 – OPINION AND ORDER 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

JEREMIAH THOMASSON, 

No. 6:14-cv-01788-MO 

 Plaintiff, 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 v. 

JEFF PREMO, et al., 

 Defendants. 

MOSMAN, J., 

Mr. Thomasson brings two claims against Defendants, both related to alleged violations 

of his constitutional rights. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [82], arguing that 

they are entitled to judgment in their favor on both of Mr. Thomasson’s claims. Mr. Thomasson 

responded in opposition [87], and Defendants replied [90]. For the reasons stated below, I 

GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [82]. 

BACKGROUND 

 Mr. Thomasson is an inmate serving a sentence with the Oregon Department of 

Corrections (ODOC). He is currently housed in a “supermax” facility in Florida under an 

agreement between Oregon and Florida pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact. Mr. 
2 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Thomasson is on “Close Management” status in Florida, and as a result, he claims he is held in 

solitary isolation for 23 hours a day. 

Prior to Mr. Thomasson’s transfer to Florida, he was housed in administrative segregation 

at a prison in Oregon. He claims he was housed there for 26 days before he received a notice of 

hearing on February 13, 2014. While Mr. Thomasson does not dispute that he received the 

notice, he believes it was deficient because it was addressed to another inmate. A few days after 

his hearing, Mr. Thomasson was transferred to Florida. 

 The reasons behind Mr. Thomasson’s stay in administrative segregation or transfer to a 

state penitentiary in Florida are not at issue in this case. Regardless of the reasons, Mr. 

Thomasson claims that Defendants have violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due 

process rights by (1) putting him in solitary confinement without explanation, (2) failing to 

provide him with adequate notice of a hearing, and (3) transferring him to Florida without a 

hearing. In addition, Mr. Thomasson claims that the transfer has impeded his access to the 

courts because he does not have access to Oregon law materials in Florida, which violates his 

constitutional rights. 

Mr. Thomasson seeks to hold several individuals connected to the Oregon Department of 

Corrections liable for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Specifically, he brings 

claims against (1) Jeff Premo, the Superintendent of an Oregon State Prison, (2) Collete S. 

Peters, the Director of Corrections as the Oregon Department of Corrections, (3) Doug Yancey, a 

member of the Security Threat Management Unit at an Oregon State Prison, and (4) Michael F. 

Gower, the Assistant Director of Corrections at the Oregon Department of Corrections. Both 

claims are brought against all four individuals in their personal and official capacity. 
3 – OPINION AND ORDER 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The initial burden for a motion for summary judgment is on the moving party to identify 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). Once that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, 

through the production of evidence listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), that there remains a 

“genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party may not rely upon the 

pleading allegations, Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)), or “unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements,” Hernandez 

v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). All reasonable doubts and 

inferences to be drawn from the facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

DISCUSSION 

 Mr. Thomasson brings two claims against Defendants. In Claim I, Mr. Thomasson 

alleges that Defendants violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. In Claim II, Mr. Thomasson alleges that Defendants violated his First, Fourth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with access to a library with materials on 

Oregon law, thereby obstructing his access to the courts. Defendants argue they are entitled to 

summary judgment on both claims because Mr. Thomasson has failed to show that they violated 

his constitutional rights. Even if there is a factual dispute as to whether they violated Mr. 

Thomasson’s constitutional rights, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. For 

the reasons explained below, I find that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both 
4 – OPINION AND ORDER 

claims. Because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the claims, I do 

not consider whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

I. Procedural Due Process Violations 

Mr. Thomasson argues Defendants violated his procedural due process rights by (1) 

putting him in solitary confinement for 26 days without explanation or adequate notice of a 

hearing, and (2) sending him to a prison in Florida, where he remains in solitary isolation. 

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim under both theories 

because Mr. Thomasson has failed to show they violated a protected liberty interest, either under 

the Due Process Clause itself or under state law. See LaFleur v. Nooth, 2:12-CV-00637-SI, 2014 

WL 1236138, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2014) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment protects liberty interests that arise either under the clause itself or under state law.” 

(citing Chappell v. Manderville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2013)). For the following 

reasons, Mr. Thomasson has failed to show that Defendants violated a liberty interest created 

under the Due Process Clause itself or under state law. As such, I GRANT summary judgment 

in Defendants’ favor on Claim I. 

 A. Due Process Violation Arising From the Clause Itself 

The Due Process Clause in itself “does not protect every change in the conditions of 

confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 

472, 478 (1995) (citation omitted); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) 

(“[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more 

adverse conditions of confinement.”(citation omitted)). Standing alone, it “does not confer a 

liberty interest in freedom from the conditions or degree of confinement ordinarily contemplated 

by a prison sentence.” LaFleur, 2014 WL 1236138, at *3; see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480 
5 – OPINION AND ORDER 

(explaining that the Due Process Clause “confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action 

taken within the [criminal] sentence imposed.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). “[A]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is 

subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him . . . the Due Process Clause does not in itself 

subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.” Chappell, 706 F.3d at 

1063 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 

A prisoner’s transfer to a maximum security facility or a prison with more burdensome 

conditions is “within the normal limits or range of custody” that a state may impose and not itself 

a due process violation. Sandin, at 478 (citation omitted). This is so because even if “life in one 

prison is much more disagreeable than in another,” such circumstances do not themselves 

implicate a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) 

(“Transfers between institutions . . . are made for a variety of reasons and often involve no more 

than informed predictions as to what would [] best serve institutional security or the safety and 

welfare of the inmate.”); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983) (adopting 

Meachum for interstate transfers and explaining that “an inmate has no justifiable expectation . . . 

that he will be incarcerated in any particular State”). Similarly, temporary placement in 

administrative segregation does not itself constitute a due process violation. May v. Baldwin, 

109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, under Meachum, Sandin, Olim, and May, it is clear that Mr. Thomasson’s claims 

grounded in his placement in administrative segregation and transfer to Florida do not, standing 

alone, rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation. Accordingly, Defendants are 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Claim I on the theory that they violated Mr. 
6 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Thomasson’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights simply by placing him in 

administrative segregation and then transferring him to Florida. 

 B. State-Created Liberty Interests 

Under certain circumstances, states may create liberty interests that are entitled to 

protection by the Due Process Clause. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. State-created liberty interests 

arise when the state “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. In such cases, the Due Process Clause requires 

“minimum procedures . . . to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” 

Meachum, 472 U.S. at 226 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 “[T]here is no single standard for determining whether a prison hardship is atypical and 

significant and that analysis . . . requires case by case, fact by fact consideration.” Chappell, 706 

F.3d at 1064 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test focuses on “an 

examination of the hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action relative to the basic 

conditions of life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has identified three markers, based on Sandin, for determining whether 

a hardship is atypical and significant in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 

Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1064. First, courts consider “whether the conditions of confinement 

mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in analogous discretionary confinement 

settings.” Id. at 1064-65 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is typically a fact-intensive 

inquiry that requires a body of evidence to perform the comparative analysis. See Sandlin, 515 

U.S. at 485-86 (conducting a fact-intensive analysis comparing the inmates inside and outside 

the challenged conditions). Second, courts look at the “duration and intensity of the conditions 
7 – OPINION AND ORDER 

of confinement.” Chappell, 706 F.3d at 1065. Third, they look at whether the change in 

confinement would “inevitably affect the duration of [the prisoner’s] sentence.” Id. 

Mr. Thomasson argues that the circumstances surrounding his placement in 

administrative segregation, hearing, and transfer to Florida were atypical and caused a significant 

hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. As a result, because he was not 

afforded some due process, he argues Defendants’ actions hindered his state-created liberty 

interests and violated of his Due Process Rights. As explained below, I find that Mr. Thomasson 

has failed to show his stay in administrative segregation and transfer to Florida invoked a statecreated liberty interest requiring some due process. As such, he was not entitled to some due 

process before those actions occurred. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on Claim I under the theory that they violated Defendant’s due process rights based on 

a state-created liberty interest. 

1. Administrative Segregation 

In general, “administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected 

liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). For example, a 

relatively brief stay in disciplinary segregation does not, in itself, invoke a liberty interest. 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (explaining that a 30-day stay did not invoke a liberty interest); see also 

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that fifteen days of 

segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life). But an indefinite duration in isolation or abnormally harsh conditions 

may cause an atypical and significant hardship. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. Indeed, 
8 – OPINION AND ORDER 

conditions that would otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment would impose an atypical and 

significant hardship. Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). 

In LaFleur, for example, this Court held that an inmate who was housed in administrative 

segregation for 86 days without a hearing, which violated an Oregon regulation, did not 

experience an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of his life in 

prison. 2014 WL 1236138, at *5. Judge Simon based his holding on the facts that Mr. LaFleur’s 

segregation was not indefinite and the conditions of his stay in administrative segregation were 

relatively normal. Id. 

Similarly, here, Mr. Thomasson has not alleged facts from which one could conclude his 

placement in administrative segregation constituted an atypical and significant hardship, such 

that it invoked a state-created liberty interest. Under the first Chappell factor, Mr. Thomasson 

has not stated facts to suggest the actual conditions in administrative segregation were intolerable 

compared to the ordinary conditions of prison life. Under the second Chappell factor, the 

duration was relatively short. He was in solitary confinement for 28 days, which is relatively 

short and not long enough by itself to invoke a liberty interest. Finally, under the third factor, 

there is no evidence to show that Mr. Thomasson’s placement in administrative segregation 

extended the length of his incarceration. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary 

 I am sensitive to research suggesting that the conditions to which inmates in solitary confinement are subjected 

often lead to profound psychological peril for the inmate, and as such, the use of solitary confinement itself may 

implicate an Eighth Amendment violation. See Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1246 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Davis 

v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing “[t]he human toll wrought by extended terms 

of isolation”); Alex Kozinski, Worse Than Death, 125 Yale L.J. Forum 230, 231-33 (2016) (recounting research 

regarding the impacts solitary confinement has on prisoners and noting “it should come as no surprise that 

‘incarceration in solitary cause[s] severe exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance of an 

acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness’” (citation omitted)). But this is 

not the law of the land. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. at 224-25 (noting that long-term solitary confinement 

itself is not unconstitutional); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (explaining that solitary 

confinement, while a “form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards,” is not itself 

unconstitutional). 
9 – OPINION AND ORDER 

judgment on the claim that putting Mr. Thomasson in administrative segregation for 28 days 

without a hearing violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

 2. Hearing 

Mr. Thomasson argues that the hearing he received while in administrative segregation 

was inadequate. But, because Mr. Thomasson was not entitled to due process for his brief stay in 

administrative segregation, as explained above, he was not entitled to a hearing at all. Thus, 

administrative or procedural errors that he alleges occurred at the hearing cannot serve as the 

basis for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

Even if Mr. Thomasson had shown that his conditions in administrative segregation 

constituted an atypical and significant hardship, and thus implicated a protected liberty interest, 

he has failed to show he was not afforded the minimal due process required during his 

administrative segregation hearing. “[D]ue process requires procedural protections before a 

prison inmate can be deprived of a protected liberty interest.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., 

Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985). But officials must only “provide the inmate with 

some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison 

official charged.” Bruce v. Yist, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). In addition, officials must have “some evidence” to support their 

underlying decision to move an inmate into administrative segregation. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 

(“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the 

conclusion.”). 

Mr. Thomasson argues he was not provided with minimal due process because another 

inmate’s name was written on his notice of hearing. As a result, he argues he was unable to 

present facts or material witnesses to prove his innocence. Defendants concede this mistake 
10 – OPINION AND ORDER 

occurred, but they state the error was fixed on the record at the hearing. Mr. Thomasson argues 

that is not true. Regardless, a typographical error by itself is not a sufficient allegation for a due 

process violation. Mr. Thomasson does not allege he did not attend the hearing or that he did not 

receive any notice of the reasons for his segregation. More fundamentally, he does not allege 

that he thought the hearing notice was not intended for him at all, and he does not explain why he 

was unable to present hearing officials with facts or witnesses at the hearing. 

Defendants have also provided some evidence to support their decision to place Mr. 

Thomasson into administrative segregation—he was the subject of an investigation into a prison 

gang’s conspiracy to have a staff member at the prison assaulted. Regardless of whether his 

participation in plan to assault a staff member was true, his alleged involvement in a conspiracy 

is “some evidence” to support the placement. Thus, Mr. Thomasson has failed to show facts 

from which a jury could find he was not afforded minimal due process at his administrative 

segregation hearing, should he have been entitled to due process at all. Accordingly, Defendants 

are entitled to summary judgment on the theory that they failed to afford Mr. Thomasson due 

process when they gave him a notice of a hearing that named another inmate. 

 3. Transfer to Florida 

Finally, Mr. Thomasson alleges his involuntary transfer to Florida constituted a 

deprivation of his procedural due process rights. Specifically, Mr. Thomasson argues he was 

entitled to a pre-transfer hearing before he was sent to Florida. 

Because Mr. Thomasson was not entitled to a pre-transfer hearing under the Due Process 

Clause itself, as explained above, this claim can only proceed if he was entitled to due process 

based on a state-created liberty interest. See Sandin 515 U.S. at 483-84; see also Wilkinson, 545 

U.S. at 221-22. Indeed, although unclear, Mr. Thomasson appears to allege that his conditions of 
11 – OPINION AND ORDER 

confinement in Florida constitute an atypical and significant hardship in comparison to ordinary 

incidents of prison life, and thus, they implicate a protected liberty interest. Specifically, Mr. 

Thomasson argues that he was housed in general population in Oregon, but in Florida he has 

been assigned to an alleged “supermax” prison, where he spends 23 hours a day in solitary 

isolation. Mr. Thomasson alleges this condition of incarceration has been imposed for an 

indefinite period of time, and he argues it is harsher and more restrictive than what an Oregon 

inmate could be expected to endure. Furthermore, he alleges his period of confinement was 

extended upon his transfer to Florida. 

The specific theory under which Mr. Thomasson bases his claim is unclear. For example, 

he may be arguing that his conditions of confinement in Florida are harsher in comparison to the 

conditions of confinement that other inmates in Florida experience. That claim, in itself, could 

not be made against prison officials in Oregon, however, because they are not responsible for 

Mr. Thomasson’s conditions of confinement in Florida under the Interstate Corrections Compact. 

See Rev. Stat. § 421.245 (2014). In other words, should his conditions of confinement in Florida 

violate his constitutional rights, he must bring a claim against the proper officials in Florida. 

Still, Mr. Thomasson could plausibly claim that he was entitled to some due process 

before his transfer to Florida under the theory that Defendants knew he would experience 

conditions of confinement there that constitute an atypical and significant hardship in 

comparison to his conditions of confinement in Oregon. Indeed, this is the claim Mr. Thomasson 

seems to make in his Amended Complaint and opposition to summary judgment. 

In order to determine whether Mr. Thomasson’s transfer imposed an atypical and 

significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life that he experienced 

in Oregon, I must apply the three factors adopted in Chappell. The first factor requires me to 
12 – OPINION AND ORDER 

determine whether the conditions of solitary isolation in Florida mirror the conditions imposed 

upon inmates in analogous settings. To be sure, it is unclear how “analogous settings” are 

defined under this test. Specifically, it is not clear whether I should look at similar settings of 

solitary confinement in Florida or similar settings in Oregon. I do not need to answer this 

question, however, because Mr. Thomasson has failed to allege facts showing that his conditions 

of confinement are atypical and pose a significant hardship under either scenario. 

Mr. Thomasson makes conclusory assertions that no prisoner in Oregon would be 

subjected to the extremely harsh and restrictive conditions that he experiences in Florida and that 

confinement under Close Management status is not a classification in Oregon. But those 

conclusory assertions are not supported with facts. For example, Mr. Thomasson did not cite to 

Oregon statutes, regulations, or policies governing the use or non-use of solitary isolation in 

Oregon. While he may believe solitary isolation is not used in Oregon, there are simply no facts 

to substantiate that belief. To the extent that he believes the conditions of confinement in 

solitary isolation in Oregon are less restrictive or severe than the conditions in Florida, he again 

failed to allege any facts to support that belief. To the extent I should compare Mr. Thomasson’s 

conditions of confinement in solitary isolation to other prisoners in Florida, he has failed to 

allege any facts to support an argument that he is subjected to atypical conditions in comparison 

to other Florida inmates. Accordingly, there are no facts to show that Mr. Thomasson’s 

conditions of confinement are atypical or harsh in comparison to the conditions in analogous 

settings. 

Under the second Chappell factor, I look at the duration and intensity of Mr. 

Thomasson’s confinement in solitary isolation to determine whether they are atypical or harsh. 

Mr. Thomasson argues his stay in solitary isolation is perhaps indefinite. I presume this means 
13 – OPINION AND ORDER 

he is unaware of a date in which he will be returned to general population. Mr. Thomasson also 

states that he is isolated for 23 hours a day. I agree with Mr. Thomasson that Oregon prison 

officials may have owed him some due process before transferring him to Florida if they knew 

that he was going to be indefinitely subjected to solitary isolation without any due process in 

Florida. But there is no evidence to support a claim that officials in Oregon knew or should have 

known that Mr. Thomasson’s Close Management classification would be indefinite or without 

some due process afforded to Mr. Thomasson. 

Indeed an exhibit provided by Mr. Thomasson shows at least one periodic review of his 

classification in Close Management has occurred since he arrived in Florida. The periodic 

review, where he was allowed to present evidence on his behalf, occurred about six months after 

he arrived in Florida. This evidence contradicts his assertion that his stay in solitary isolation is 

indefinite because it shows that his stay is actually under periodic review. 

Finally, as to the third Chappell factor, Mr. Thomasson claims his release date has been 

extended since his transfer to Florida, and thus, the transfer affected the duration of his sentence. 

To support his claim, Mr. Thomasson points to a document from the prison in Florida that states 

his release date is February 28, 2039. Defendants argue that his release date has not changed and 

they attached a declaration from the Policy Manager of the Office of Offender Information and 

Sentence Computation, who states that Mr. Thomasson’s release date remains June 28, 2036. 

Oregon Revised Statute § 421.245, which governs Oregon’s participation in the Interstate 

Corrections Compact, states that Oregon will maintain jurisdiction over Mr. Thomasson for the 

purposes of effectuating his release on probation or parole, or his discharge from custody. Or. 

Rev. Stat. § 421.245 Art. IV subsec. 3 (2014). As such, Oregon is responsible for determining 

Mr. Thomasson’s release date, not Florida. To the extent Florida has miscalculated this date, it is 
14 – OPINION AND ORDER 

not controlling, and thus, a jury could not conclude based solely on a document from Florida that 

Mr. Thomasson’s release date has been extended as a result of his transfer. 

After reviewing the Chappell factors, I find that Mr. Thomasson’s transfer to Florida 

without a pre-transfer hearing did not violate his procedural due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment because he has not shown that the transfer invoked a state-created liberty 

interest. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this theory of liability 

for Claim I. 

II. Access to the Courts 

Mr. Thomasson’s second claim is grounded in his assertion that his incarceration in 

Florida is impeding his constitutional right of access to the courts in Oregon. Specifically, he 

argues he was unable to file two civil claims, including a claim related to a late-2013 stay in 

disciplinary segregation for twenty-two days and a claim related to property that was missing 

after he was released from disciplinary segregation. In addition, Mr. Thomasson claims he was 

unable to object to a motion for extension of time on a habeas case that was pending in this 

Court. He argues Defendants are responsible for this violation because they either recommended 

his transfer to Florida or because they did not enforce alleged provisions of the Interstate 

Corrections Compact that he claims requires the sending institution to ensure he maintains access 

to needed legal materials in the receiving institution. 

Defendants move for summary judgment on Mr. Thomasson’s access-to-courts claim on 

several grounds. First, Defendants argue that he has access to Oregon legal materials. By 

regulation, Mr. Thomasson can seek legal materials and assistance from inmate legal assistants 

through correspondence directed to a library coordinator at any Oregon Department of 
15 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Corrections facility. Accordingly, they state that he cannot show, as a matter of law, that he was 

denied access to the courts. Second, Defendants argue that a fact-finder could not conclude that 

he suffered the type of prejudice necessary to state an access-to-courts claim. Specifically, his 

property claim is not the type of claim to which his right to access courts attaches, and his 

inability to object to an adversary’s request for extension of time is not sufficiently prejudicial. 

Finally, Defendants argue Mr. Thomasson cannot show that they caused his injury because there 

are no facts showing they had any involvement with his access to library materials. In other 

words, he has sued the wrong defendants. 

Mr. Thomasson claims he has attempted to utilize law library resources in Oregon to no 

avail. Specifically, he states he has “written the Oregon state penitentiary law library many 

times and has either got no response, a delayed response of a long period of time, partial 

documents or just the face sheet of a document.” Further, he states that he cannot complete 

complaints for his claims without the help of a legal assistant who is knowledgeable in Oregon 

law. Finally, he asserts that he cannot “shepardize meaningful legal material without access to 

the books provided in Oregon [sic] law library.” For the following reasons, I find these 

allegations to be insufficient to prove Defendants violated Mr. Thomasson’s constitutional right 

to access the courts, and thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Claim II. 

Incarcerated individuals have a fundamental constitutional right to access the courts in 

order to litigate the legality of their detention or challenge the conditions of their confinement, 

and prison officials cannot actively interfere with their attempts to prepare legal documents. See 

 The relevant regulation states: 

Oregon inmates from out-of-state facilities (state and federal) may access Oregon legal research 

materials and assistance from assigned inmate legal assistants through correspondence directed to 

a library coordinator of an Oregon correctional facility. Requests for law library services from 

Oregon inmates in out-of-state facilities will be processed with reasonable diligence. 

Or. Admin. R. 291-139-0035(6) (2017). 
16 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350, 355 (1996). But “a prison system need not provide 

maximum or even optimal level of access.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 

1999). Inmates must only be afforded the tools “to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, 

and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55. In 

fact, courts recognize that “[i]mpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the 

incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. 

An inmate challenging his access to the courts in a particular facility must prove he 

suffered an “actual injury,” which requires him to “demonstrate that [his] nonfrivolous legal 

claim ha[s] been frustrated or was being impeded” by the prison. Id. at 353; see also Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (concerning the inability to file a complaint or defend 

against a charge). A failure to show that a “nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated” is fatal 

to the access to court claim. Lewis, at 353 & n. 4. 

Further, the inmate must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or 

legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. at 351. He may, for 

example, show that a complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy a technical requirement that 

he could not have known about, given the deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities. 

Id. Similarly, he may show that he was “stymied by inadequacies of the law library” to even file 

a complaint on an “arguably actionable harm” that he suffered.” Id. Ultimately, “access to court 

claims brought against prison officials must be judged within the deferential rubric of Turner v. 

Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), where ‘a prison regulation impinging on inmates’ constitutional 

rights is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.’” Harper v. Premo, 

No. 6:13-cv-00097-MO, 2014 WL 1309370, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 28, 2014), on reconsideration in 

part, No. 6:13-CV-00097-MO, 2014 WL 3818681 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 2014). Accordingly, a policy 
17 – OPINION AND ORDER 

that causes inmates to experience a relatively short delay in receiving their legal materials is 

constitutionally acceptable when it is rationally related to legitimate penological interest. See id. 

Here, Mr. Thomasson’s difficulty accessing Oregon law legal materials does not rise to 

the level of a constitutional violation. The case related to his missing property is not one related 

to challenging his sentencing or otherwise challenging his conditions of confinement. Such a 

case, quite simply, amounts to one of those incidental consequences of conviction and 

incarceration. Similarly, his complaint about being unable to object to a request for extension of 

time in his habeas case does not constitute an injury that rises to the level of a constitutional 

violation. Mr. Thomasson could still pursue his habeas petition, so there is no evidence that his 

claim was impeded. 

The only remaining allegation centers on Mr. Thomasson’s allegation that he was unable 

to file a claim for what he alleges was an illegal confinement in disciplinary segregation. Such a 

claim sounds in a “conditions of confinement” challenge, for which Mr. Thomasson would have 

a constitutional right to access the courts for redress. But Mr. Thomasson has not shown that his 

access to courts to pursue this claim was actually impeded. 

Oregon regulations provide for a mechanism for out-of-state inmates to receive legal 

assistance on Oregon law. See Or. Admin. R. 291-139-0035(6) (2017). While Mr. Thomasson 

alleges he contacted penitentiaries in Oregon, he does not provide any evidence of who he 

contacted and when. His exhibits include requests that he appears to have sent to the law library 

in Florida, to which he received responses indicating the requested materials were not available 

or that he could only request materials related to Florida law. He provides no evidence to show 

he followed Oregon’s procures for out-of-state inmates to receive Oregon law materials. 

Accordingly, because Defendants have shown Mr. Thomasson had a method for receiving the 
18 – OPINION AND ORDER 

constitutionally-required assistance, and because Mr. Thomasson has not shown those 

procedures were not available to him, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 

those issues. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, I GRANT Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [82] 

and DISMISS Mr. Thomasson’s claims with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017. 

/s/ Michael W. Mosman_________ 

MICHAEL W. MOSMAN 

Chief United States District Judge