IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

HOWARD L. YATES, 6:15-CV-00022-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

SARA L. GABIN

14523 Westlake Drive

Lake Oswego, OR 97035-8651

(503) 620-3171 

Attorney for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1003

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Case 6:15-cv-00022-BR Document 16 Filed 02/01/16 Page 1 of 21
DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

ALEXIS L. TOMA 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/A 221A

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 615-2950

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Howard L Yates seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's application

for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the

Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on November 22, 2010,

alleging a disability onset date of April 1, 2010. Tr. 60.1 The

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. An

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on April 1, 2013. 

Tr. 39-59. At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on June 11, 2015, are referred to as "Tr."

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attorney. Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified at

the hearing. 

The ALJ issued a decision on May 10, 2015, in which she

found Plaintiff was not disabled before his December 31, 2010,

date last insured and, therefore, is not entitled to benefits. 

Tr. 22-32. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d), that decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner on October 17,

2014, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for

review. Tr. 1-5. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07

(2000). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born July 20, 1960, and was 52 years old at

the time of the hearing. Tr. 60. Plaintiff completed high

school. Tr. 163. Plaintiff has past relevant work experience as

a firefighter-equipment repairer. Tr. 56, 146. 

Plaintiff alleges disability during the relevant period due

to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), degenerative

disc disease of the lumbar spine, cardiac condition, and knee

pain. Tr. 24-25. 

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the

medical evidence. See Tr. 24-29.

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STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate his

inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). "It is more than a mere scintilla [of

evidence] but less than a preponderance." Id. (citing Valentine,

574 F.3d at 690). 

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The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation

The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential

inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the

meaning of the Act. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.

2007). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Each step is potentially

dispositive. 

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser v.

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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509,

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed

Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. “A

'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885

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F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity from his April 1, 2010, alleged

onset date through his December 31, 2010, date last insured. 

Tr. 24.

At Step Two the ALJ found before Plaintiff's date last

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insured Plaintiff had the severe impairments of COPD and

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Tr. 24. The ALJ

found before Plaintiff’s date last insured Plaintiff’s

impairments of a cardiac condition and knee pain were nonsevere. 

Tr. 25. 

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically

determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal one of

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, 

appendix 1, before his December 31, 2010, date last insured. 

Tr. 26. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light

work through his date last insured. The ALJ also found before

Plaintiff's December 31, 2010, date last insured Plaintiff could

occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and

carry ten pounds; could stand and walk for six hours in an eighthour work day; could sit for six hours in an eight-hour work day;

and could not work “in environments where he was exposed to

temperature extremes or odors, fumes, dusts, or gases. Tr. 26. 

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff had past relevant work

as a firefighter-equipment repairer. Tr. 30. 

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform jobs that

exist in significant numbers in the national economy before his

date last insured. Tr. 30. Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff

was not disabled before his December 31, 2010, date last insured.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when she (1) improperly

found at Step Two that Plaintiff’s cardiac condition and knee

pain were nonsevere during the relevant period; (2) improperly

rejected Plaintiff’s testimony; (3) improperly gave limited

weight to the opinions of Teresa Tioran, D.O., treating

physician, Harold Budhram, M.D., treating physician, and Paul

Holmes, M.D., examining physician; (4) found at Step Three that

Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal the criteria for

any impairment in the Listing of Impairments; and (5) failed to

include all of Plaintiff’s functional limitations in his RFC.

I. The ALJ did not err at Step Two.

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred at Step Two when she found

Plaintiff's cardiac condition and knee pain were nonsevere during

the relevant period.

As noted, at Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments. Stout, 454 F.3d

at 1052. See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A

severe impairment "significantly limits" a claimant's "physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1521(a). See also Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1003. The ability

to do basic work activities is defined as "the abilities and

aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a),

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(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include walking, standing,

sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling,

seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions; using judgment; responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work

situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 

Id.

Here the ALJ found Plaintiff's cardiac condition and knee

pain were nonsevere during the relevant period. On March 8,

2010, Scott Anderson, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff and concluded his

cardiac condition resulted only in a 4% disability, that

Plaintiff’s cardiac condition was permanent and stationary, and

that Plaintiff’s cardiac condition was essentially normal. 

Tr. 315. In March 2010 cardiac testing of Plaintiff revealed

“mild ischemia, no infarct, and normal LV functioning.” Tr. 350. 

Similarly, in December 2010 Dr. Tioran indicated Plaintiff did

not have any “significant coronary heart disease” and prescribed

nitroglycerin to treat Plaintiff’s angina. Tr. 350.

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff underwent surgery on his right

knee after he injured it falling out of a truck. Tr. 494. The

record, however, does not reflect any ongoing treatment for

Plaintiff’s right knee after surgery during the relevant period.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when

she found Plaintiff's cardiac condition and knee pain were

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nonsevere during the relevant period because the ALJ provided

legally sufficient reasons supported by the record for doing so.

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held when the ALJ has

resolved Step Two in a claimant's favor, any error in designating

specific impairments as severe does not prejudice a claimant at

Step Two. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005)

(any error in omitting an impairment from the severe impairments

identified at Step Two was harmless when Step Two was resolved in

claimant's favor). As noted, at Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff

has the severe impairments of COPD and degenerative disc disease

of the lumbar spine.

Because the ALJ resolved Step Two in Plaintiff's favor, the

Court concludes any error by the ALJ in finding Plaintiff’s knee

pain and cardiac condition to be nonsevere is harmless. 

II. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for partially

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear

and convincing reasons for partially rejecting Plaintiff's

testimony.

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence

of an impairment or impairments, and he must show the impairment

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th

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Cir. 1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective

medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not

any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant's pain testimony only if he provides clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant's testimony is

not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must identify "what

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the

claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).

At the hearing Plaintiff testified he suffered lower-back

pain, radicular leg pain, right-knee pain, and shortness of

breath. Tr. 42-43. Plaintiff testified he was only able to lift

a gallon of milk occasionally, and he suffered pain when he bent

over. Tr. 44, 45. Plaintiff stated he could spend “close to an

hour” standing and could sit for forty-five minutes. Tr. 45, 46.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the

alleged symptoms,” but Plaintiff’s testimony “concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are

not entirely credible” as to the relevant period. Tr. 27.

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The ALJ noted the medical record during the relevant period

reflects Plaintiff’s pulmonary function test in March 2010 was

consistent with “mild to moderate mixed pattern with obstruction

and restriction.” Tr. 450. At a May 2010 examination

Plaintiff’s lungs were clear to ausculation in all lobes. 

Tr. 417. The ALJ noted in April 2010 Plaintiff denied radicular

symptoms of back and leg pain. Similarly in June 2010 Plaintiff

had a “negative straight leg-raising test . . . [and] a normal

sensory and motor exam . . . gain was also noted to be normal 

. . . [without any] evidence of lumbar radiculopathy.” Tr. 280. 

After undergoing medial branch blocks on the right side of his

back in March 2010, Plaintiff experienced a 75 percent

improvement in his pain symptoms. Tr. 278. After undergoing

radio-frequencing on the left side of his back in June 2010

Plaintiff reported decreased pain on his left side as well. 

Tr. 283. As noted, in March 2010 cardiac testing of Plaintiff

revealed “mild ischemia, no infarct, and normal LV functioning.” 

Tr. 350. Similarly, in December 2010 Dr. Tioran indicated

Plaintiff did not have any “significant coronary heart disease”

and prescribed nitroglycerin to treat Plaintiff’s angina. 

Tr. 350. 

On this record the Court finds the ALJ provided clear and

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record for finding Plaintiff's testimony was not entirely

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credible as to the limiting effects of impairments during the

relevant period. The Court, therefore, concludes the ALJ did not

err when she rejected Plaintiff's testimony in part.

III. The ALJ did not err when she gave limited weight to the

opinions of Drs. Tioran, Budhram, and Holmes.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when she gave limited

weight to the opinions of Drs. Tioran, Budhram, and Holmes.

An ALJ may reject a treating or examining physician's

opinion when it is inconsistent with the opinions of other

treating or examining physicians if the ALJ makes "findings

setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are

based on substantial evidence in the record." Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). When the medical

opinion of a treating physician is uncontroverted, however, the

ALJ must give "clear and convincing reasons" for rejecting it. 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,

830-32 (9th Cir. 1995).

A. Dr. Tioran

On December 29, 2009, Dr. Tioran, Plaintiff’s treating

cardiologist, filled out a Medical Treatment/Return to Work form

for Plaintiff’s employer, the California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection, in which she opined Plaintiff would not be

able to return to his work as a firefighter-equipment manager,

but he would be able to return to other work as long as it did

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not involve fumes or emissions. Tr. 513.

On December 15, 2010, Dr. Tioran provided an opinion

letter in which she stated Plaintiff suffered from Prinzmetal

angina, which limited his ability to engage in “high-stress”

activities that “precipitate his symptoms of angina.” Tr. 348. 

Dr. Tioran noted Plaintiff had also been diagnosed with

restrictive lung disease that “limits his ability to work in 

that he cannot work in areas with exhaust fumes.” Tr. 348. 

Dr. Tioran opined Plaintiff could “do a low stress job and he can

sit for six to eight hours a day. He can stand or walk for up to

four hours a day.” Tr. 348.

After a September 20, 2011, examination of Plaintiff,

Dr. Tioran filled out a Cardiac Impairment Questionnaire in which

she opined Plaintiff could sit for two hours in an eight-hour

work day and stand or walk for two hours in an eight-hour work

day. Tr. 441. Dr. Tioran opined Plaintiff would be absent more

than three times per month and he was “incapable of even low

[work] stress.” Tr. 443. Dr. Tioran noted the “earliest date

that the description of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms and limitations

[set out in] this questionnaire applies” was September 24, 2008. 

Tr. 443.

Finally, on August 15, 2013, Dr. Tioran provided a

medical opinion in which she stated Plaintiff could sit for two

hours in an eight-hour work day, stand or walk for two hours in

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an eight-hour work day, and could lift up to ten pounds

occasionally. Tr. 605. Dr. Tioran opined Plaintiff became

disabled on April 1, 2010. Tr. 605.

The ALJ gave Dr. Tioran’s September 2011 and August

2013 opinions little weight as to the issue of Plaintiff’s

limitations during the relevant period on the grounds that 

Dr. Tioran offered those opinions years after Plaintiff’s date

last insured and they are not consistent either with the medical

record for the relevant period or with Dr. Tioran’s own medical

opinions offered during the relevant period. For example, as

noted, in December 2010 (which is during the relevant period) 

Dr. Tioran opined Plaintiff could “do a low stress job and

[could] sit for six to eight hours a day [and] stand or walk for

up to four hours a day.” Tr. 348.

The ALJ gave limited weight to those portions of 

Dr. Tioran’s December 2010 opinion related to Plaintiff’s lung

issues on the ground that Dr. Tioran treated Plaintiff only for

his cardiac issues. The ALJ adopted those portions of 

Dr. Tioran’s December 2009 and December 2010 opinions related to

Plaintiff’s cardiac issues.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err

when she gave little weight to Dr. Tioran’s September 2011 and

August 2013 opinions and to the portions of Dr. Tioran’s December

2010 opinion related to Plaintiff’s lung issues because the ALJ

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provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for doing so.

B. Dr. Budhram

On February 8, 2013, Dr. Budhram, treating physician,

completed a Residual Functional Capacity Form and a Multiple

Impairment Questionnaire in which he noted Plaintiff suffers from

chronic daily back and knee pain due to arthritis and

degenerative disc disease. Tr. 594. Dr. Budhram noted Plaintiff

can sit four hours in an eight-hour work day and stand or walk

for one or two hours in an eight-hour work day. Tr. 600. 

Dr. Budhram opined Plaintiff would be absent from work two to

three times per month, Plaintiff is not able to “do a full time

competitive job,” and Plaintiff would “never” be able to return

to work. Tr. 594, 602-03.

The ALJ gave Dr. Budhram’s February 2013 opinion little

weight on the grounds that Dr. Budhram offered his opinion years

after Plaintiff’s December 31, 2010, date last insured, and his

opinion is inconsistent with the medical record for the relevant

period. For example, as noted, the record reflects Plaintiff

underwent surgery on his right knee after he injured it falling

out of a truck. Tr. 494. The record, however, does not reflect

any ongoing treatment for Plaintiff’s right knee after surgery

during the relevant period. Similarly, the record reflects in

April 2010 Plaintiff denied radicular symptoms of back and leg

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pain. In June 2010 Plaintiff had a “negative straight legraising test . . . [and] a normal sensory and motor exam . . .

gain was also noted to be normal . . . [without any] evidence of

lumbar radiculopathy.” Tr. 280. After undergoing medial branch

blocks on the right side of his back in March 2010, the record

reflects Plaintiff experienced a 75 percent improvement in his

pain symptoms. Tr. 278. After undergoing radio-frequencing on

the left side of his back in June 2010, Plaintiff reported

decreased pain on his left side as well. Tr. 283.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err

when she gave little weight to Dr. Budhram’s opinion because the

ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for doing so. 

C. Dr. Holmes

On January 12, 2010, Dr. Holmes filled out a Medical

Treatment/Return to Work form for the California Department of

Forestry and Fire Protection in which he opined Plaintiff could

not engage in any “prolonged” sitting, bending, or stopping and

could lift up to 25 pounds occasionally. Tr. 512. Dr. Holmes

opined Plaintiff would not be able to return to “full duty” as a

firefighter-equipment manager. Tr. 512.

The ALJ gave Dr. Holmes’s opinion little weight on the

grounds that it was offered before Plaintiff’s April 1, 2010,

alleged onset date and was inconsistent with the objective

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medical evidence during the relevant period. As noted, during

the relevant period several doctors opined Plaintiff was able to

work, that he did not suffer a severe cardiac condition, that his

knee and back conditions had improved, and that his lung

condition did not prevent him from performing any work. In

addition, the record does not contain any treatment records of

Plaintiff by Dr. Holmes, and in his one-page opinion Dr. Holmes

did not identify any medical records on which he relied.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err

when she gave little weight to Dr. Holmes’s opinion because the

ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for doing so. 

IV. The ALJ did not err at Step Three.

 At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have “an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically

equaled the severity” of a Listed impairment during the relevant

period. The ALJ considered respiratory listings, including

Listing 3.02 and back pain listings including Listing 1.04.

At Step Three the Commissioner must determine whether a

claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the listed

impairments and are so severe that they preclude substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

Plaintiff does not indicate the listing that his impairments

allegedly satisfied during the relevant period nor the manner in

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which he asserts his impairments met Listing 3.02 or Listing 1.04

during the relevant period. The Ninth Circuit has held a court

cannot conclude an ALJ’s analysis as to a listing is erroneous

when a claimant does not proffer any plausible theory as to how

his impairments satisfy the specific criteria of the listing. 

See, e.g., Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir.

2013).

In addition, as noted, the ALJ evaluated the medical record

during the relevant period and concluded Plaintiff’s impairments

during that period did not preclude substantial gainful activity.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err at Step

Three.

V. The ALJ did not err at Step Five.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Five when she found

Plaintiff could perform other jobs in the national economy

because the ALJ failed to consider the limitations indicated by

Plaintiff and Drs. Tioran, Badhram, and Holmes. 

Because the Court has found the ALJ properly rejected

Plaintiff's testimony in part and properly assigned limited

weight to the opinions of Drs. Tioran, Badhram, and Holmes, the

Court concludes the ALJ did not err at Step Five when she failed

to include all of the limitations indicated by Plaintiff and 

Drs. Tioran, Badhram, and Holmes in her assessment of Plaintiff's

ability to do other jobs existing in the national economy. 

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Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err at Step

Five when she concluded Plaintiff could perform other work in the

national economy because the ALJ provided legally sufficient

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing

so.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 1st day of February, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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