Filed 4/1/20 Certified for Publication 4/24/20 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LORIK MIKHAEILPOOR,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B293987

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC611197)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.

_________________

Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner and Arlyn L. 

Escalante for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson and Mark W. 

Allen for Defendants and Respondents.

__________________
2

Lorik Mikhaeilpoor (Mikhaeilpoor) appeals from the trial

court’s order awarding her attorney fees following the trial of

her action against BMW of North America LLC and Finchey

Corporation of California (collectively, BMW) under the 

Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Song-Beverly Act). 

(Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.)1 Mikhaeilpoor sued BMW after she 

purchased a defective 2013 BMW 328i that BMW was unable to 

repair. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Mikhaeilpoor’s Complaint

On February 22, 2016, Mikhaeilpoor sued BMW and

Finchey Corporation of California (erroneously named in 

the complaint as Pacific BMW), an auto dealership, asserting 

causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act stemming from 

her September 13, 2014 lease of the 2013 BMW 328i for 

which BMW had issued a warranty. Mikhaeilpoor alleged 

that defendants: (1) failed to promptly replace her car or make 

restitution, in violation of section 1793.2, subdivisions (a)(2) 

and (d)(1); (2) failed to commence repairs aimed at conforming the 

car to its warranty, in violation of section 1793.2, subdivision (b); 

(3) failed to make available service and repair facilities (including 

parts and literature) sufficient to effectuate repairs, in violation 

of section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3); (4) breached the express 

warranty, as defined in section 1791.2, subdivision (a); and 

(5) breached the implied warranty of merchantability, as defined 

in section 1791.1. Plaintiff ’s complaint sought restitution, an

award of actual damages, a civil penalty of two times actual 

damages and attorney fees and costs.

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references 

are to the Civil Code.
3

B. The Trial

The trial commenced on February 21, 2018, and spanned 

six days. On February 28, 2018, the jury returned a special verdict

in favor of Mikhaeilpoor. The jury awarded $35,805.08, comprised 

of $17,902.54 in compensatory damages and $17,902.54 in civil 

penalties.

C. Mikhaeilpoor’s Motion for Attorney Fees

On June 8, 2018, Mikhaeilpoor filed a motion for 

attorney fees pursuant to section 1794, subdivision (d), seeking 

$344,639. This figure consisted of $226,426, plus a 0.5 multiplier 

enhancement (totaling $113,213), and $5,000 for addressing the 

attorney fee resolution process.

The fee motion was accompanied by declarations from 

Payam Shahian, the managing attorney for Mikhaeilpoor’s 

trial counsel, and Christine Haw, lead trial counsel. Shahian’s 

declaration contained a bevy of information about his credentials 

and experience in unrelated Song-Beverly Act cases where his 

clients were awarded fees. Shahian’s declaration also included 

18 exhibits comprised of minute orders and notices of rulings on 

fee motions in unrelated cases; this despite the fact that no fees 

were billed for services by Shahian. Shahian’s declaration also

identified 10 attorneys who worked on this case along with their 

proffered billing information: Gregory Yu ($495 per hour), Jacob 

Cutler ($385 per hour in 2016, $395 per hour in 2017, and $410

per hour in 2018), Benjamin Beck ($400 per hour), Christine Haw 

($365 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in 2018), Eleazar Kim 

($350 per hour in 2017 and $370 hour in 2018), Yoon Kim (former

attorney) ($365 per hour), Michael Robinson (former attorney) 

($595 per hour), Heather Rodriguez (former attorney) ($325 per 

hour), Carey Wood ($370 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in 
4

2018), Armig Khodanian (former attorney) ($325 per hour). 

Shahian’s declaration also attached a copy of the billing records 

for Mikhaeilpoor’s trial counsel.

The fee motion was opposed because: the billing records 

vastly overstated the work performed; the hourly rates were

excessive; and an 0.5 multiplier adjustment was unwarranted. 

The defense argued that fees should be reduced by at least 

$83,206.05, and the proffered hourly billing rates of $325 to $595

were not based on market value.

Mikhaeilpoor replied, defending the amounts claimed. 

Before hearing the motion, the trial court issued a tentative ruling 

awarding $94,864 in attorney fees: $95,900 less an offsetting 

amount owed to defendants.

The court heard the motion on July 31, 2018. During 

argument, Judge Hammock explained that he “went through all

the bills” and was “aghast” that counsel sought $343,000 in fees. 

He “saw the motions, the discovery motion,” and “the motion for 

terminating sanctions, which was much ado about nothing.” He 

found before him “a very simple case, straightforward trial,” and 

“not a complicated case.”

In assessing fees, the court “looked at all the bills” 

and then “calculated what [it] thought was reasonable.” The

court understood that it had the “ability to exercise [its] sound

discretion,” but could not “do it arbitrarily.” The court emphasized 

that its analysis was not based on limiting plaintiff ’s fees to a 

proportion of the trial recovery; the court “recognize[d] that even 

though [the recovery] was [$]17,000, doubled to 34, this could 

justify a large attorney fee award.” Also, the court did not take

into account whether plaintiff should have accepted a Code of Civil 

Procedure section 998 offer.

The court found the requested fee amount “was just not 

reasonable.” The court “went through the bill and [it] decided what 
5

[it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably 

experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks 

that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . . [I]t added up 

to 225 hours.” The court decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly 

rate for the services that were done.”

During argument, plaintiff ’s counsel made two main 

arguments. First, counsel argued the court could not reduce 

plaintiff ’s requested fee amount by more than the $83,206.05 

reduction because that would constitute entertaining “objections 

not raised by [defendants].” Second, counsel argued that 

defendants had the burden to prove grounds for a fee reduction. 

The court took the matter under submission in order to review 

the billing records again. Ultimately, the court found that $95,900

was the reasonable amount of attorney fees for work performed on 

behalf of Mikhaeilpoor. After offsetting certain fees and costs that 

had been awarded to defendants, the net amount of awarded fees 

totaled $94,864.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An award of attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Act

is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Goglin v. BMW of North

America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470 (Goglin).) The 

reviewing court presumes that the trial court’s award is correct 

and infers that a request for fees is inflated when the trial court 

substantially reduces the requested amount. (Etcheson v. FCA

US LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 840.) These rules apply 

because the experienced trial judge is best positioned to evaluate 

the professional services rendered in his or her courtroom. (Ibid., 

citing Goglin, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 470–471.) The trial 

court’s decision must not be disturbed “ ‘unless [the Court of 

Appeal is] convinced that it is clearly wrong, meaning that it is 

an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. 
6

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 148 (Graciano), citing In re Vitamin 

Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052.) Accordingly, this 

court’s review of an order awarding attorney fees “must be highly 

deferential to the views of the trial court.” (Nichols v. City of Taft 

(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239.) “ ‘The only proper basis of 

reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount 

awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and 

suggests that passion or prejudice influenced the determination.’ ” 

(In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587.)

In particular, “the lodestar method vests the trial court 

with the discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the

attorneys were ‘reasonably spent’ on the litigation” (Meister v.

Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437,

449 (Meister)), and to determine the hourly rates that should 

be used in the lodestar calculus. (569 E. County Boulevard LLC

v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 

426, 436-437.) The methodology embodied in this language 

is consistent with California’s lodestar adjustment method of 

calculating attorney fees. (See Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel 

Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818

(Robertson).) As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d) 

makes clear, the trial court is “to base the fee award upon actual 

time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably 

incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount

charged.” (Robertson, supra, at p. 817.) In the case of contingency 

fee arrangements, “a prevailing buyer . . . is entitled to an award 

of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his 

or her attorneys.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 

31 Cal.App.4th 99, 105, fn. 6 (Nightingale), italics added.)

Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court

must initially determine the actual time expended and then

“ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the
7

amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being

made for the time expended are reasonable.” (Nightingale, supra,

31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.) Factors to be considered include, but are 

not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, 

the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. (Ibid.) The 

prevailing party and fee applicant bears “the burden of showing 

that the fees incurred were . . . ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct 

of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’ ” (Levy v. Toyota 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816; see Corbett 

v. Hayward Dodge, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 915, 926 [“[c]ourts 

have uniformly held that the party moving for statutory attorney 

fees or sanctions has the burden of proof”].) It follows that if the

prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the

time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the

circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and

award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Nightingale, supra,

31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.)

The amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to the 

lodestar adjustment method may be increased or decreased. Such

an adjustment is commonly referred to as a “fee enhancement” 

or “multiplier.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132

(Ketchum).) The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required 

to, award a multiplier. (See Montgomery v. Bio-Med Specialties, 

Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1292, 1297 [“That figure may then be

increased or reduced by the application of a multiplier after the

court has taken into consideration other factors concerning the

lawsuit”], citing Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311,

321–324 (Press); see also Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012)

203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242 [“the trial court is not required to 

include a fee enhancement for exceptional skill, novelty of the 

questions involved, or other factors. Rather, applying a multiplier 

is discretionary.”].) The Supreme Court has “set forth a number of 
8

factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure. 

These include: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent 

to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment 

by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, 

both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and 

the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.’ ” (Press, 

supra, at p. 322, fn. 12, italics omitted.)

Mikhaeilpoor argues that the trial court’s ruling must be 

reversed because the court acted arbitrarily and failed to utilize the 

lodestar adjustment method to calculate reasonable attorney fees.

The record belies this assertion.

In finding that $95,900 was the reasonable amount of

attorney fees in this case, the trial court expressly invoked the

lodestar method. Despite the trial court’s clarity, Mikhaeilpoor 

mischaracterizes the analysis the court employed in order to create 

the illusion of error where there is none.

Mikhaeilpoor claims that the trial court improperly applied 

“across-the-board” percentage reductions in the fees claimed 

because it found that only 274 of plaintiff ’s claimed 595 hours 

of work were reasonably incurred and that a reasonable hourly 

rate for these reduced hours was $350 per hour. But the record, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, 

does not show that the court made any “across-the-board”

percentage reductions. Thus, plaintiff ’s reliance on the decision 

in Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88 (Kerkeles) 

and Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 

266 (Mountjoy) is misplaced.

Kerkeles concerned an appeal from an order awarding a 

plaintiff a fraction of the fees he requested following the settlement 

of his civil rights case. (See Kerkeles, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at

p. 92.) The plaintiff filed a motion seeking $1,448,397 in fees and 
9

$75,255 in costs under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States 

Code and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (Kerkeles, supra, 

at p. 94.) This figure was based on 2,419.9 in attorney hours, with 

billable rates ranging from $425 to $650 per hour. (Ibid.) Plaintiff

also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount. (Ibid.) 

The total amount requested was $2,350,848. (Ibid.) In response, 

defense counsel urged “a 50 percent reduction of the total lodestar 

amount.” (Id. at pp. 95–96.) The trial court calculated the lodestar 

amount by multiplying the hourly rates by the full number of hours 

claimed, reaching a total of $873,615. The court then reduced the 

total lodestar by 50 percent, yielding $436,807.50 in attorney fees. 

(Id. at p. 97.)

In reversing, the appellate court deemed inadequate the 

trial court’s explanation for its fee reduction. (Kerkeles, supra, 

243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101–102.) The Court of Appeal noted that 

while trial courts may make “ ‘across-the-board percentage cuts 

either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar 

figure,’ ” they must set forth a “ ‘concise but clear’ explanation of

reasons for choosing a given percentage reduction.” (Id. at p. 102.) 

In lieu of that, the trial court in Kerkeles had simply explained that

the plaintiff ’s attorneys “expended far more time than a reasonable

attorney could ever bill a paying client for.” (Id. at p. 101.) Such

reasoning did “not meet the federal criterion of a clear and specific 

explanation sufficient for meaningful appellate review.” (Id. at 

p. 104.)

Similarly, in Mountjoy, the trial court awarded $59,334.60 in

fees after the moving party sought $308,425, based on 760.70 hours 

of work billed at hourly rates ranging from $200 to $450. (Mountjoy,

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) In reducing the fees sought, 

the trial court explained: “ ‘Approximately half of [the Mountjoys’]

pleading[s] amounted to unnecessary general legal argument 

warranting a reduction in the time it took to prepare that filing.
10

Approximately half of [the] “facts” [the Mountjoys] crafted in

[o]pposition to the summary judgment motion . . . were improper. 

Perhaps most critically, well over 70% of the billing entries fall 

into one or more of the following categories: prohibitively vague

“block billing,” excessive time spent on the stated task (including 

but not limited to drafting the complaint and opposition to 

summary judgment motion and document review tasks discussed

above), double billing where two attorneys completed the same 

task, attorney fees for non-attorney work, fees for filings that did

not actually occur in this case, and fees for otherwise unreasonable 

tasks. [¶] In light of the foregoing and the other various reasons 

stated in [d]efendants’ [o]pposition, the [c]ourt in its discretion 

reduces [the Mountjoys’] requested “hours worked” by 70% . . . 

to a more reasonable total of 228.21.’ ” (Id. at pp. 270–271.)

The Court of Appeal reversed, explaining that the trial 

court “determined that because well over 70 percent of the billing 

entries suffered from one or more flaws, it was appropriate to 

simply reduce the total hours claimed by 70 percent.” (Mountjoy, 

supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) This approach was flawed 

because there did not appear to be any “reasonable basis for the 

conclusion that the total hours included in the 70 percent-plus time 

entries that were flawed in one or more ways was even reasonably 

close to 70 percent of the total time claimed.” (Ibid.) For example, 

the flawed time entries may have only amounted to 50 percent 

of the total hours claimed; it was unclear whether the number 

of flawed billing entries were equivalent to the number of flawed 

hours. (Ibid.)

In contrast to Kerkeles and Mountjoy, the court here did not

make an “across-the-board” percentage reduction of the attorney 

fees claimed. Rather, the court explained that its reduction 

resulted because the fees claimed “include[ed] dual billing of 

attorneys when the work of only one (at times) was reasonably 
11

required” and trial counsel spent time on tasks that “should 

not have required anything more than [a] slight factual 

modification to [an] existing boilerplate.” Plaintiff ’s counsel 

spent an unreasonably excessive amount of time dealing with

this non-complex case. Thus, the trial court did not apply an

arbitrary percentage (as in Kerkeles) or use flawed logic (as

in Mountjoy). To the contrary, the court “went through the 

bill” multiple times and “decided what [it] felt was a reasonable 

amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar 

circumstances, to do the tasks that they claim to have done. . . .

[I]t added up to 225 hours.”

Dissatisfied with this explanation, Mikhaeilpoor 

questions how the trial court decided on the billing entries 

subject to reduction. Plaintiff would impose on the trial court 

the requirement of detailed explanatory orders. But this very 

same argument was rejected in Mountjoy, where the plaintiff 

faulted the court’s explanation of its fee reduction because it 

“ ‘did not break out how many hours it thought were devoted 

to double billing the same tasks, work on non-attorney tasks, 

excessive billing for working on the complaint or summary 

judgment opposition, or work on documents that were not filed.’ ” 

(Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 280.)

Mikhaeilpoor also relies on Moreno v. City of Sacramento 

(9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106 (Moreno) to support her claim that

the trial court inadequately explained “which tasks were cut

or reduced and why.” Moreno, however, is not binding on this

court and it is distinguishable. (Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship

Management Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451 [indicating 

that federal decisions are persuasive rather than binding 

authority].) In Moreno, the plaintiff prevailed in a federal

civil rights action and the district court imposed percentage 

reductions on plaintiff ’s requested fees. (Moreno, supra, 534 F.3d
12

at pp. 1112-1116.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 

The federal district court did not identify those fees it thought 

duplicative or why it cut the costs claimed for trial preparation. 

(Ibid.) But Moreno is not based on principles applied in California, 

where trial courts are not required to state “each charge they find 

to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessary or unnecessary. . . .

A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation 

that an attorney over[-]litigated a case.” (Gorman v. Tassajara 

Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101; see also 

Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [“The superior court was 

not required to issue a statement of decision with regard to the fee 

award.”].) This view was recently reaffirmed in Morris v. Hyundai 

Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 37, footnote 6 (Morris), 

where the court explained that such a heightened standard of 

requiring courts to explain fee determinations is not appropriate 

“for appellate review of fee awards under the Song-Beverly Act.” 

(Ibid.)

Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court improperly tied the fee 

award to plaintiff ’s modest amount of recovered damages. But the

trial court disclaimed tying the amount of fees to the damages and 

the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, does

not show that the court tied “the fee award to some proportion” of 

the damages award. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 

30 Cal.App.5th 24, 37 (Warren).) 

“[I]t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion

to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing 

[buyer’s] damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action, or 

pursuant to another consumer protection statute with a mandatory

fee-shifting provision.” (Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) If

the reasons for the reduction “include tying the fee award to some

proportion of the buyer’s damages recovery, the court abuses its 

discretion.” (Ibid.) But the two cases plaintiff invokes, Graciano,
13

supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at page 140 and Warren, supra, 

30 Cal.App.5th at page 37, help demonstrate that the court 

here committed no error.

Graciano concerned a plaintiff ’s appeal from an order 

awarding her attorney fees following her post-verdict settlement 

with the defendant. (Graciano, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.) 

The trial court awarded $27,570; $235,000 in fees had been 

requested. (Ibid.) The trial court set the reasonable hourly rate 

at $250 per hour, which was based on a local rule setting hourly 

rates for expert witnesses, and applied that rate to the 367.6 hours 

of legal services expended by the plaintiff ’s attorneys. (Id. at 

p. 148.) After calculating the lodestar at $91,900, the court applied

several multipliers, including a .3 negative multiplier “ ‘ “to ensure 

the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in 

the legal market place.” ’ ” (Ibid.) As relevant here, the trial court

explicitly tied its fee award to the plaintiff ’s damages recovery, 

reasoning: “ ‘[T]he settlement amount for the [p]laintiff was 

$45,000 plus whatever fees, if any, the court might award. It is

not uncommon for contingent fee agreements to require [p]laintiff 

to pay forty percent (more or less) of the recovery through trial 

to his/her counsel. If $45,000 represents [p]laintiff ’s sixty percent 

portion of the total settlement, then the forty percent fee portion,

would be $30,000 ($75,000 x .40). In order to adjust the lodestar 

amount of $91,900 “to ensure the fee awarded is within the range

of fees freely negotiated in the legal market place[,”] a “.30” factor 

should be applied. $91,900 times 3 yields $27,570, which amount

is within the market place range of fees.’ ” (Id. at p. 162.) Under

this rationale, the Court of Appeal perceived an improper 

downward adjustment based on the trial court’s notion of an 

appropriate contingent fee percentage. (Id. at p. 164.)

In Warren, the trial court applied a 33 percent negative 

multiplier to plaintiff ’s requested lodestar fees. (Warren, supra,
14

30 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) The court noted “ ‘a disconnect’ between 

the verdict amount of ‘$17,000’ and the over $500,000 in requested 

attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 33.) The appellate court concluded that 

the negative multiplier was applied “with at least the partial goal 

of arriving at an attorney fee award that was roughly proportional 

to or more in line with [the plaintiff ’s] modest $17,455.57 damages 

award.” (Id. at p. 39.)

Here by contrast, the trial court did not expressly or implicitly 

base any portion of its fee calculation on plaintiff ’s damage 

recovery. Unlike the situation in Graciano, the trial court here did 

not calculate the amount of fees using a methodology that ensured 

the fee and damages awards were proportional; accorded with a 

market-rate contingency agreement, or created a relationship to the 

damages awarded. Instead, the trial court “went through the bill 

and [it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for 

a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do 

the tasks that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . . [I]t

added up to 225 hours.”

Warren is similarly distinguishable. Here, unlike in Warren, 

the trial court was concerned because the $344,639 was shockingly 

unreasonable, irrespective of the damages awarded. And, of course,

the court here unequivocally disclaimed tying the fee award to 

the verdict amount because it “recognize[d] that even though [the

recovery] was [$]17,000 doubled to 34, this could justify a large 

attorney fee award.”

Also, instructive here is Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 

page 24, where the court affirmed an order reducing requested 

fees by more than 40 percent in a Song-Beverly Act case. In 

Morris, the trial court reduced plaintiff ’s requested fees by 

42 percent—from $191,688.75 to $73,864. On appeal, plaintiff 

argued—as Mikhaeilpoor does here—that the “trial court engaged 

in a prohibited proportionality analysis in setting the attorney fee
15

award.” (Id. at p. 35.) To support that claim, the plaintiff relied 

on selective portions of the hearing transcript where the trial 

judge stated, “ ‘So this is [a request for] $192,000 for a case that 

you settled for $85,000 and didn’t go to trial. Don’t you think 

that just on its face, that’s a little much.’ ” (Ibid.) According to 

the plaintiff, the trial court “slashed the requested award by more 

than 42 percent, to $73,864, to render the award ‘more in proportion 

to the $85,000 damages.’ ” (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that the trial 

court “did not suggest in any respect that the court reduced the 

attorney fee award based on the size of the settlement award.” 

(Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) To the contrary, the 

court “indicated a fee reduction was warranted because it was 

unreasonable to have so many lawyers staffing a [Song-Beverly 

Act] case that did not present complex or unique issues, did not 

involve discovery motions, and did not go to trial.” (Ibid.) 

Here, as in Morris, there is no indication that the trial 

court reduced fees based on the amount of damages awarded to 

plaintiff. Rather, the court said a reduction of the requested fees 

was warranted because: Plaintiff sought fees that “include[d]

dual billing of attorneys when the work of only one (at times) 

was reasonably required”; her trial counsel spent time working on 

tasks that “should not have required anything more than [a] slight 

factual modification to [an] existing boilerplate”; and—overall—an 

unreasonably excessive amount of time was spent on a noncomplex 

matter. Additionally, the trial court “went through the bill and

[it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a 

reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do 

the tasks that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done. . . .

[I]t added up to 225 hours.” The court did not engage in any 

proportionality analysis when it determined that $95,900 was 

the reasonable amount of attorney fees for the work performed. 
16

Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court based its fee award on an

improper impressionistic basis.

In Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at page 37, the trial court 

stated during a fee motion hearing that the total proposed fee 

sought by the plaintiff was “ ‘a little much’ considering the case 

settled for $85,000 and did not go to trial.” (Ibid.) On appeal, 

plaintiff argued the court’s statement “betrayed that at least one 

of the court’s intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it 

more in line with the settlement amount.” (Ibid.) Morris rejected 

the plaintiff ’s argument that such trial court statements disclosed 

an alternate, prohibited motive for reducing plaintiff ’s proposed 

attorney fees.

Morris contends that, as in Warren, the trial court’s 

comments during the hearing—suggesting that the total proposed 

fee was “a little much” considering the case settled for $85,000 

and did not go to trial—betrayed that at least one of the court’s 

intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it more in line 

with the settlement amount. Given the court’s clear expression 

in its final order of its reasons for the reductions, we will not 

speculate, based on a stray remark the court made at the hearing, 

that it had other, prohibited reasons that would require reversal. 

(See Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 539, fn. 16 [holding 

the court’s “oral comments were not final findings and cannot 

impeach the court’s subsequent written ruling”]; Jespersen v. 

Zubiate-Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 633 [“a judge’s 

comments in oral argument may never be used to impeach the final 

order, however valuable to illustrate the court’s theory they might 

be under some circumstances”].)

Mikhaeilpoor contends that the trial court impermissibly 

reduced fees below the level defendants proposed. Plaintiff argues 

“[a]ny objections to the fees and rates requested not made by BMW 
17

should have been deemed waived by the trial court.” This argument 

is meritless.

At the outset, defense counsel did not limit its request 

to reduce plaintiff ’s requested fees by only $83,206.05 as 

Mikhaeilpoor erroneously represents. Rather, defendants argued 

that plaintiff ’s fees should be reduced by at least $83,206.05. As 

such, Mikhaeilpoor’s argument that the trial court reduced her fees 

below the level defendants proposed is based on a false premise.

To support its position that the trial court cannot reduce fees

absent—or below the non-moving party’s specific objection, plaintiff 

cites Blum v. Stenson (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 892, fn. 5, a federal 

case concerning fees in a federal civil rights action. In Blum, the

defendant waived its challenge to a district court determination 

of reasonable hours billed by failing to submit any evidence 

challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged. 

(Ibid.) In contrast to Blum, defendants here are not challenging the 

trial court’s decision but showing it was not an abuse of discretion. 

And defendants did not waive any challenge to the fee award. 

Rather, defendants challenged fees in the trial court on grounds the 

trial court found applicable.

The extent of a court’s discretion to unilaterally reduce 

fees is also apparent in Morris. There, appellant argued that fees 

were arbitrarily reduced in those circumstances where particular 

fee amounts claimed were not the subject of defense objections. 

(Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38–39.) Notwithstanding 

this argument, Morris was “satisfied that the trial court did not 

abuse its broad discretion to determine the reasonable value of 

the professional services performed by the [appellant’s] attorneys.” 

(Id. at p. 40.) 

Mikhaeilpoor also claims that the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to award a multiplier. The argument rests 

on some of the same unmeritorious arguments advanced with 
18

regard to the trial court’s reduced lodestar award. There was no 

abuse of discretion.

While the court’s rationale for the lodestar reduction also 

influenced the denial of a multiplier, the court went further as to

the multiplier issue, emphasizing that this was “not a complicated

case,” and the “request for a multiplier was specious.” These 

findings weigh on the issue of the “ ‘novelty and difficulty of the

questions involved,’ ” which is a factor that trial courts may 

consider when a multiplier is requested. (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d 

at p. 322, fn. 12.) This factor is separate from the trial court’s 

finding that plaintiff ’s counsel litigated the case inefficiently. 

Moreover, even though the trial court did not specifically mention 

other factors open to consideration when a multiplier is under 

consideration, this court must presume that the trial court 

considered all factors in reaching its decision, “even though the 

court may not have mentioned or discussed them in its written 

ruling.” (Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.)

Mikhaeilpoor argues that the attorney fee award is not 

supported by the evidence. This claim has no merit. The court has

no authority to disturb the trial court’s factual findings if they are 

supported by substantial evidence. (Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 453.) Here, substantial evidence amply supports the trial 

court’s fee award because the record demonstrates the relative 

simplicity of plaintiff ’s lawsuit and the inefficiency of her counsel’s 

litigation activities.

The case concerned the simple issue of a purported engine 

defect in plaintiff ’s vehicle that was—in plaintiff ’s view—not fixed 

after multiple attempts. To prevail, plaintiff ’s attorneys were only 

required to establish that their client purchased the vehicle, that 

it had a written warranty, that the vehicle had a defect, and that 

the vehicle was not repaired or replaced after the manufacturer 

had a reasonable opportunity to do so. (CACI No. 3201.) Plaintiff 
19

was under no obligation to establish the cause of the purported 

defect. (Ibid.; see Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 

90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102, fn. 8 [rejecting manufacturer’s claim 

that plaintiff buyer was required to prove cause of leak to establish 

remedy under the Song-Beverly Act].) What follows is the trial 

court’s altogether warranted conclusion that this was a noncomplex 

case. The record shows that Mikhaeilpoor filed one discovery 

motion, propounded a single set of discovery, took three depositions 

(Jose Conde, defendants’ person most qualified; and Luis Holguin, 

defendants’ expert), and retained the services of a single expert, 

Dan Calef. These were modest litigation efforts.

Additionally, the record demonstrates the highly inefficient 

manner in which plaintiff litigated her case. Plaintiff ’s trial 

counsel claims “extensive experience with claims brought under the

Song-Beverly [Act].” Payam Shahian, the senior attorney among 

plaintiff ’s trial counsel, supervises the other attorneys in his firm,

but does not “materially” get involved “unless they involve complex 

legal issues, reach significant stages of litigation, or require [his]

assistance.” (Italics added.) Shahian did not bill time to this case,

confirming the case did not involve complex legal issues. Yet,

despite counsel’s experience litigating “hundreds of automotive 

defect cases involving California’s consumer protection statutes, 

including Song-Beverly,” an astonishing array of 10 different 

attorneys litigated this case, with multiple attorneys staffed at 

different times. Further, counsel’s billing entries demonstrate a 

lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks 

performed. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

plaintiff ’s counsel failed to act efficiently.

Similarly, plaintiff ’s lead counsel, Christine Haw, had 

experience with Song-Beverly Act claims. Plaintiff sought hourly 

rates of $365 and $375 for Haw, but acknowledged that similar or 

more experienced attorneys had previously been awarded hourly 
20

billable rates of $345 and $350. As such, the trial court’s award 

of a $350 hourly billable rate is supported by substantial evidence. 

Additionally, at the time of the hearing on the fee motion, Haw 

had been an attorney for approximately five years and had litigated 

“hundreds of automotive defect cases involving [the] Song-Beverly 

[Act].” Notwithstanding, the court reasonably found that Haw did

not leverage her experience to produce efficient litigation. Haw

personally billed more than 240 hours, and required the help of 

nine other attorneys at various points in the litigation.

Ultimately, the trial court was in the best position to 

evaluate the professional services rendered before it. (Ketchum,

supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) The court’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence. There was no abuse of discretion. 
21

DISPOSITION

The order awarding fees is affirmed. Respondents are 

awarded their costs on appeal.

WHITE, J.*

We concur.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

 

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 4/24/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LORIK MIKHAEILPOOR,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B293987

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC611197)

 CERTIFICATION AND

 ORDER FOR PUBLICATION 

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on April 1, 

2020, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For 

good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published 

in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. WHITE, J.*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.