Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions 

Elisa J. Dozono, OSB No. 063150 

elisa.dozono@millernash.com 

Vanessa L. Triplett, OSB No. 154387 

vanessa.triplett@millernash.com 

MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP 

3400 U.S. Bancorp Tower 

111 S.W. Fifth Avenue 

Portland, Oregon 97204 

Telephone: 503.224.5858 

Facsimile: 503.224.0155 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CONSTANCE GEORGE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HOUSE OF HOPE RECOVERY; 

BRIDGES TO CHANGE, INC.; 

WASHINGTON COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING 

SERVICES, and PATRICIA BARCROFT, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 3:15-cv-01277-SB 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY 

INSTRUCTIONS 

Plaintiff Constance George submits the following proposed jury instructions in 

accordance with the court’s Civil Trial Management Order (ECF No. 90). In addition to these 

instructions and the general instructions, the parties respectfully request that the court use the 
 

Page 2 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions 

parties’ names in lieu of referring to the parties as “plaintiff” and “defendants.” 

No. Title: Source: Plaintiff’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Defendant’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Agreed 

Instructions

1 Duty of Jury Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.4 

(Modified) 

X 

2 Claims and Defenses Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.5 

(Modified) 

X 

3 Burden of Proof—

Preponderance of the 

Evidence 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.6 

X 

4 What Is Evidence Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.9 

X 

5 What Is Not Evidence Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.10

X 

6 Direct and 

Circumstantial 

Evidence 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.12 

X 

7 Ruling on Objections Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.13 

X 

8 Credibility of 

Witnesses 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.14 

X 
 

Page 3 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions 

No. Title: Source: Plaintiff’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Defendant’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Agreed 

Instructions

9 Taking Notes Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.18 

X 

10 Bench Conferences 

and Recesses 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 1.20 

X 

11 Charts and Summaries 

Not Received in 

Evidence 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 2.14 

X 

12 Fair Housing Act—

Vicarious Liability 

Meyer v. Holley, 

537 U.S. 280, 

285 (2003) 

X 

13 Fair Housing Act—

”Sole Reason” or 

“Motivating Factor” 

Ninth Circuit 

Model 

Instructions 10.1, 

10.2, 10.3 

(Modified)

X 

14 Fair Housing Act 

Claim—

Discriminatory 

Statement 

42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(c) 

X 

15 Section 1981 Claim—

Mixed Motive 

Third Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 6.1.1 

(Modified) 

X 

16 Section 1981 Claim—

Disparate Treatment—

Pretext 

Third Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 6.1.2 

(Modified) 

X 
 

Page 4 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions 

No. Title: Source: Plaintiff’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Defendant’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Agreed 

Instructions

17 Section 1981 Claim—

Retaliation 

Third Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 6.1.6 

(Modified) 

X 

18 Compensatory 

Damages 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instructions 5.1, 

5.2 (Modified) 

X 

19 Damages—Economic 

Damages 

Final Jury 

Instruction 

No. 14, ECF 

No. 64 

X 

20 Damages—

Noneconomic 

Damages 

Final Jury 

Instruction 

No. 13, ECF 

No. 64 

X 

21 Damages—Nominal 

Damages 

Final Jury 

Instruction 

No. 15, ECF 

No. 64 

X 

22 Damages—Punitive 

Damages 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 5.5 

(Modified) 

X 

23 Duty to Deliberate Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 3.1 

X 

24 Consideration of 

Evidence—Conduct of 

the Jury 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 3.2 

X 
 

Page 5 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions 

No. Title: Source: Plaintiff’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Defendant’s 

Proposed 

Instruction 

Agreed 

Instructions

25 Communication With 

Court 

Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 3.3 

X 

26 Return of Verdict Ninth Circuit 

Model Jury 

Instruction 3.5 

X 

 

Respectfully submitted: February 28, 2018. 

MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP 

s/ Elisa J. Dozono 

Elisa J. Dozono, OSB No. 063150 

elisa.dozono@millernash.com 

Vanessa L. Triplett, OSB No. 154387 

vanessa.triplett@millernash.com 

Phone: 503.224.5858 

Fax: 503.224.0155 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 
 

Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 1 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1

Duty of Jury 

(Court Reads and Provides Written Instructions at End of Case) 

Members of the Jury: Now that you have heard all the evidence and the 

arguments of the attorneys, it is my duty to instruct you on the law that applies to this case. 

A copy of these instructions will be sent to the jury room for you to consult during 

your deliberations. 

It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts 

you will apply the law as I give it to you. You must follow the law as I give it to you whether 

you agree with it or not. And you must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, 

opinions, prejudices, or sympathy. You should also not be influenced by any person’s race, 

color, religion, national ancestry, or gender, sexual orientation, profession, occupation, celebrity, 

economic circumstances, or position in life or in the community. That means that you must 

decide the case solely on the evidence before you. You will recall that you took an oath to do so. 

Please do not read into these instructions or anything that I may say or do or have 

said or done that I have an opinion regarding the evidence or what your verdict should be.

 

Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 1.4 (Modified). See also Ninth Circuit Model 

Criminal Jury Instruction 1.1 cmt. (citing Jury Instructions Committee of the Ninth Circuit, A

Manual on Jury Trial Procedures § 3.3 (2013); and Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 

871 (2017)).
 

Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 2 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2

Claims and Defenses 

The plaintiff in this case is Constance George. Ms. George is suing defendants 

House of Hope Recovery and Patricia Barcroft for discrimination. Ms. George is an AfricanAmerican woman. She previously was a resident at a residential recovery house operated by 

House of Hope. This residential recovery house provides transitional housing for women. 

Ms. Barcroft is the executive director of House of Hope. 

Ms. George alleges that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft violated the federal law 

known as the “Fair Housing Act.” The Fair Housing Act prohibits landlords from imposing 

different terms and conditions on the rental of a dwelling to a tenant because of the tenant’s race. 

The law also prohibits landlords from making any statements with respect to the rental of a 

dwelling that indicate any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race. 

In order to prove her claim under the Fair Housing Act, Ms. George must prove 

two things. First, she must prove that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft imposed different terms 

or conditions on her tenancy or made a statement with respect to the rental of a dwelling that 

indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race. Second, Ms. George must 

prove that her race was a motivating factor in House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to 

impose different terms or conditions on her tenancy or to make a statement with respect to the 

rental of a dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race. 

A statement indicates a preference based on race in violation of the Fair Housing 

Act if an ordinary listener would find that the statement indicates that tenants of a particular race 

are either preferred or disfavored for the housing in question. A landlord may advise prospective 

tenants that the landlord has a policy of nondiscrimination, as long as the landlord does not 

communicate its policy in a manner that in any way indicates that tenants of a particular race are 

either preferred or disfavored. 

Finally, Ms. George alleges that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft violated the 

federal civil-rights law referred to as “42 U.S.C. § 1981,” also known as “Section 1981.” 

Section 1981 guarantees that all persons have the same rights to make, perform, modify, and 

terminate contracts and to enjoy all the benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of any 

contractual relationship as are enjoyed by white citizens. In order to prove a claim under 

Section 1981, Ms. George must prove two things. First, she must prove that House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft terminated her lease. Second, she must prove that her race was a motivating factor 

in House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her lease. 

 

Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 1.5 (Modified).
 

Page 2 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 2 

Section 1981 protections also cover claims of retaliation by those pursuing race 

and color claims under the statute. In order to prove a retaliation claim under Section 1981, Ms. 

George must show that defendants imposed different terms and conditions on the rental of her 

dwelling because of her race, that she was subjected to materially adverse action at the time, or 

after, the complaint took place, and that there was a causal connection between the adverse 

action and Ms. George's complaint. 

Ms. George seeks an award of money for damages for the harm that she alleges 

was caused by House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s wrongful actions. House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft deny that they have violated the law, and they deny that Ms. George is entitled to 

any money damages.
 

Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 12 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12 

Fair Housing Act—Vicarious Liability 

The Fair Housing Act makes a principal legally responsible for the acts, conduct, 

and statements of its agent or employee if those acts are done within the scope of the agent’s or 

employee’s authority. For example, if a property manager violates the Fair Housing Act, the 

company that he or she works for will also be liable for the violation. 

Ms. George alleges that both House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft are liable for 

violations of the Fair Housing Act. Ms. George alleges that House of Hope is legally responsible 

for the statements and actions of Ms. Barcroft because Ms. Barcroft’s statements and actions 

were made within the scope of her employment.

House of Hope does not deny that Ms. Barcroft was acting within the scope of her 

authority at the times involved in this case. 

 

Source: Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (noting that “it is well established that the 

[Fair Housing] Act provides for vicarious liability”). 

See also Houck v. Feller Living Trust, 191 Or. App. 39, 43, 79 P.3d 1140 (2003); Kaiser Found. 

Health Plan of the Nw. v. Doe, 136 Or. App. 566, 573, 903 P.2d 375 (1995), modified on recons.

138 Or App 428, rev. denied, 324 Or. 394 (1996).
 

Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 13 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13

Fair Housing Act—”Sole Reason” or “Motivating Factor” 

The Fair Housing Act prohibits landlords from imposing different terms and 

conditions on the rental of a dwelling to a tenant because of the tenant’s race. Ms. George 

alleges that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft violated the Fair Housing Act by terminating her 

tenancy or imposing different terms and conditions on the rental of a room at House of Hope 

because of her race. 

Ms. George alleges that her race was the “sole reason” or “motivating factor” for 

House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her tenancy or subject her to different 

terms and conditions. House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft deny that Ms. George’s race was the 

“sole reason” or “motivating factor” for their decision to terminate Ms. George’s tenancy or 

subject her to different terms and conditions. 

In order to prevail on this claim, Ms. George has the burden of proving both of the 

following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 

1. That House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft terminated her tenancy at House of 

Hope or subjected her tenancy to different terms or conditions; and 

2. That Ms. George’s race was the sole reason or a motivating factor in the 

decision to terminate her tenancy or to subject her tenancy to different 

terms or conditions. 

A “motivating factor” is a factor that played a part in the decision to terminate 

Ms. George’s tenancy or to subject her tenancy to different terms or conditions. 

 

Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction Nos. 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3 (Modified).
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 14 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14

Fair Housing Act Claim—Discriminatory Statement 

In addition to prohibiting landlords from imposing different terms and conditions 

on the rental of a dwelling because of the tenant’s race, the Fair Housing Act also prohibits 

landlords from making any statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicates any 

preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race. 

Ms. George alleges that Ms. Barcroft made a statement with respect to 

Ms. George’s rental of a room at House of Hope that indicated a preference, limitation, or 

discrimination based on race. Ms. George alleges and House of Hope stipulates that House of 

Hope is vicariously liable for the statement made by Ms. Barcroft. House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft otherwise deny these allegations. 

 

Source: 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful “[t]o make, print, or 

publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with 

respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or 

an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”).
Page 1 - Joint Proposed Jury Instruction No. 15 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 15

Section 1981 Claim—Mixed Motive 

Ms. George also alleges a claim against House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft under 

42 U.S.C. § 1981, also known as “Section 1981.” This law guarantees that all persons have the 

same rights to make, perform, modify, and terminate contracts and to enjoy all the benefits, 

privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship as are enjoyed by white citizens. 

Ms. George alleges that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft violated her right to enjoy 

all the benefits and privileges of her lease contract by terminating her lease on the basis of her race. 

House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft deny that they discriminated against Ms. George in any way. 

To prevail on this claim, Ms. George must prove both of the following by a 

preponderance of the evidence: 

1. That House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft terminated Ms. George’s tenancy; and 

2. That Ms. George’s race was a motivating factor in House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her tenancy. 

In showing that her race was a motivating factor for House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s action, Ms. George is not required to prove that her race was the sole motivation or 

even the primary motivation for House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision. Ms. George need only 

prove that her race played a motivating part in House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision even 

though other factors may also have motivated House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft. 

As used in this instruction, Ms. George’s race was a “motivating factor” if her race 

played a role in House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her tenancy. 

 

Source: Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 6.1.1 (Modified). 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 16 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 16 

Section 1981 Claim—Disparate Treatment—Pretext 

Ms. George also alleges that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft terminated her 

tenancy because of her race. In order for Ms. George to recover on this discrimination claim, 

Ms. George must prove that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft intentionally discriminated against 

her. This means that Ms. George must prove that her race was a determinative factor in House of 

Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her tenancy. 

To prevail on this claim, Ms. George must prove both of the following by a 

preponderance of the evidence: 

1. That House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft terminated Ms. George’s tenancy; and 

2. That Ms. George’s race was a determinative factor in House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s decision. 

For Ms. George’s race to be a “determinative factor,” you must find that, if not for 

her race, her tenancy would not have been terminated. 

Although Ms. George must prove that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft acted with 

the intent to discriminate, Ms. George is not required to prove that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft 

acted with the particular intent to violate her federal civil rights. Moreover, Ms. George is not 

required to produce direct evidence of intent, such as statements admitting discrimination. 

Intentional discrimination may be inferred from the existence of other facts. 

House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft has offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its 

decision to terminate Ms. George’s tenancy. If you disbelieve House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s 

explanations for its conduct, then you may, but need not, find that Ms. George has proved 

intentional discrimination. 

You must decide whether Ms. George has proved that her race was a determinative 

factor in House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft’s decision to terminate her tenancy. 

 

Source: Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 6.1.2 (Modified). 



A plaintiff is required to show discriminatory intent to support this claim under Section 1981. 

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (holding that Section 1981 requires 

discriminatory intent and that the burden-shifting framework set by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Section 1981 claims).
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 17 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17

Section 1981 Claim—Retaliation 

Ms. George also claims that Ms. Barcroft and House of Hope terminated her 

tenancy in retaliation for complaining about Ms. Barcroft’s disparate treatment of Ms. George, 

based on her race. 

To prevail on this claim, Ms. George must prove all of the following by a 

preponderance of the evidence: 

1. That Ms. George complained that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft 

imposed different terms and conditions on the rental of her dwelling 

because of her race. 

2. That Ms. George was subjected to a materially adverse action at the time, 

or after, the complaint took place. 

3. That there was a causal connection between Ms. Barcroft and House of 

Hope’s termination of Ms. George’s tenancy and Ms. George’s complaint 

about her disparate treatment. 

Concerning the first element, Ms. George need not prove the merits of her 

complaint, but only that she was acting under a reasonable, good-faith belief that her right to be 

free from racial discrimination was violated. 

Concerning the second element for the action to be “materially adverse,” 

Ms. George must show that Ms. Barcroft and House of Hope’s termination of her tenancy was 

serious enough that it well might have discouraged a reasonable person from complaining about 

disparate treatment based on race. 

Concerning the third element, that of causal connection, that connection may be 

shown in many ways. For example, you may or may not find that there is a sufficient connection 

through timing—that is, Ms. Barcroft's and House of Hope’s action followed shortly after Ms. 

Barcroft and House of Hope became aware of Ms. George’s complaint about race discrimination. 

Causation is, however, not necessarily ruled out by a more extended passage of time. Causation 

may or may not be proved by antagonism shown toward Ms. George or a change in demeanor 

toward her. Ultimately, you must decide whether Ms. George’s complaint about her disparate 

treatment had a determinative effect on the termination of her tenancy. For Ms. George’s 

 

Source: Third Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 6.1.6 (Modified). 
Page 2 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 17 

complaint to have had a “determinative effect,” you must find that, if not for her complaint, Ms. 

Barcroft's and House of Hope’s termination of Ms. George's tenancy would not have occurred. 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 18 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 18

Compensatory Damages 

It is the court’s duty to instruct you about the measure of damages. By instructing 

you on damages, the court does not mean to suggest the party for which your verdict should be 

rendered. 

If you find for Ms. George on any of her claims, you must determine her 

damages. Ms. George has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Damages are the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Ms. George for 

any injury that you find was caused by defendants. 

In determining the measure of damages, you should consider: 

 The nature and extent of the injuries; 

 The mental and emotional pain and suffering experienced and that with 

reasonable probability will be experienced in the future; 

 The reasonable value of necessary medical care, treatment, and services 

received to the present time; 

 The reasonable value of necessary medical care, treatment, and services 

that with reasonable probability will be required in the future; 

 The reasonable value of wages, earnings, earning capacity, salaries, 

employment, and employment opportunities lost up to the present time; 

and 

 The reasonable value of wages, earnings, earning capacity, salaries, 

employment, and employment opportunities that with reasonable 

probability will be lost in the future. 

It is for you to determine what damages, if any, have been proved. Your award 

must be based on evidence and not on speculation, guesswork, or conjecture. 

 

Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction Nos. 5.1 and 5.2 (Modified). 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 19 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 19 

Damages—Economic Damages 

If you find for Ms. George on any of her claims, you must determine her 

economic damages, if any. 

Economic damages are the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 

compensate Ms. George for any increased housing costs, lost wages, and other expenses you find 

were caused by the unlawful acts of House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft. Ms. George has the 

burden of proving both the existence and the amount of her damages by a preponderance of the 

evidence. 

 

Source: Final Jury Instruction No. 14, ECF No. 64. 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 20 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20 

Damages—Noneconomic Damages 

If you find for Ms. George on any of her claims, you must determine her 

noneconomic damages, if any. Noneconomic damages are the subjective, nonmonetary losses 

that a plaintiff has sustained or probably will sustain in the future. The law does not furnish you 

with any fixed standard by which to measure the exact amount of noneconomic damages. The 

law requires, however, that all damages awarded be reasonable. So, you must apply your own 

considered judgment to determine the amount of noneconomic damages. 

In determining the amount of noneconomic damages, if any, you should consider 

the mental, physical, and emotional pain and suffering experienced and that with reasonable 

probability will be experienced in the future. 

 

Source: Final Jury Instruction No. 13, ECF No. 64. 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 21 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21 

Damages—Nominal Damages 

The law that applies to this case authorizes an award of nominal damages. If you 

find for Ms. George, but also find that Ms. George has failed to prove damages as defined in 

these instructions, you must award nominal damages. Nominal damages may not exceed one 

dollar. 

 

Source: Final Jury Instruction No. 15, ECF No. 64. 
Page 1 - Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 22 

PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 22 

Damages—Punitive Damages 

In addition to compensatory damages, the fair housing laws involved in this case 

allow a jury to award punitive damages against a defendant. Punitive damages may be awarded 

by the jury for two reasons: (1) to punish House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft for their misconduct; 

and (2) to deter House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft, and other persons, from acting in the same way 

in the future. Punitive damages may be awarded even if you award Ms. George only nominal, 

and not compensatory, damages. But punitive damages may not be awarded to compensate 

Ms. George. 

In a case such as this one, punitive damages may be awarded against House of 

Hope and Ms. Barcroft if, by a preponderance of the evidence, either House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s conduct was motivated by an intent to discriminate, or that House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s conduct involved reckless disregard for or callous indifference to the legal rights 

of Ms. George that are protected by the laws involved in this case. It is not necessary for 

Ms. George to show that House of Hope and Ms. Barcroft acted with actual malice or evil 

toward her. 

Conduct is malicious if it is accompanied by ill will, or spite, or if it is for the 

purpose of injuring the plaintiff. Conduct is in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights if, 

under the circumstances, it reflects complete indifference to the plaintiff’s safety or rights, or if 

the defendant acts in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate the plaintiff’s rights 

under federal law. An act or omission is oppressive if the defendant injures or damages or 

otherwise violates the plaintiff’s rights with unnecessary harshness or severity, such as by 

misusing or abusing authority or power or by taking advantage of some weakness, disability, or 

misfortune of the plaintiff. 

If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, you must use reason in setting 

the amount. Punitive damages, if any, should be in an amount sufficient to fulfill their purposes 

but should not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party. In considering the amount 

of any punitive damages, consider the degree of reprehensibility of House of Hope and 

Ms. Barcroft’s conduct. 

 

Source: Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction No. 5.5 (Modified); Sample Jury Instructions and 

Verdict Forms, 4 Housing Discrim. Pr. Man. App. 4BB; Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 

1985). 
 

Page 1 - Certificate of Service 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing on: 

Ms. Rebecca Cambreleng 

Cambreleng Law, LLC 

806 S.W. Broadway, Suite 1200 

Portland, Oregon 97205 

Attorney for Defendants House 

of Hope Recovery and Patricia 

Barcroft

by the following indicated method or methods on the date set forth below: 

 CM/ECF system transmission. 

 E-mail. (Courtesy copy.) 

 E-mail. As required by Local Rule 5-11, any interrogatories, requests for 

production, or requests for admission were e-mailed in Word or WordPerfect 

format, not in PDF, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. 

 First-class mail, postage prepaid.

 Hand-delivery.

 Overnight courier, delivery prepaid.

DATED: February 28, 2018. 

 

 s/ Elisa J. Dozono 

Elisa J. Dozono, OSB No. 063150 

elisa.dozono@millernash.com 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff