IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

FRANCIS DAVIS STOVALL, IV,

Plaintiff,

v.

GABRIEL GALLEGOS,

Defendant.

3:15-CV-01328-BR

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

BRADLEY C. LECHMAN-SU

Lechman-Su & Quach PC

1 S.W. Columbia Street

Suite 1800

Portland, OR 97258

(503) 224-1640 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

KELLY M. EVANS

Gevurtz, Menashe, Larson & Howe, P.C.

115 N.W. First Avenue

Suite 400

Portland, OR 97209

(503) 227-1515 

Attorneys for Defendant

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-01328-BR Document 38 Filed 04/26/16 Page 1 of 23
BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion (#30) of

Petitioner Francis Davis Stovall, IV, for Attorneys Fees and Cost

Bill. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s

Motion and awards Petitioner attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$12,010.00 and costs in the amount of $3,051.24.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Verified Petition for

Return of Child to Her Habitual Residence of Francis Davis

Stovall, IV, and attachments thereto.

Petitioner and Respondent Gabriel Gallegos “have been

together since 2000.” The child at issue in this matter, DGS,

was born in 2001 in Portland, Oregon, and Respondent was listed

as her biological parent on her birth certificate at that time.

At some point Petitioner and Respondent formed a limited

liability company. The terms of the formation of the parties’

LLC are unclear on this record. Respondent alleges in his

Objections to Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys Fees that

“Respondent understands that Petitioner believes Respondent only

has a one percent interest in the LLC.”

In October 2006 the LLC purchased real property in Izamel,

Yucatan, Mexico.

From 2001 through 2009 DGS resided with Petitioner and

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Respondent in Portland, Oregon. Petitioner retired from his job

as a Portland public schoolteacher in 2009. At some point in

2009 Petitioner and DGS relocated to the property purchased by

the LLC in Izamel, Mexico, with the consent of Respondent. 

Respondent continued to reside in Portland and to work as a

TriMet bus driver.

In May 2010 Petitioner adopted DGS. In June 2010

Petitioner’s name was added to DGS’s birth certificate as a

parent of DGS.

On December 25, 2013, Petitioner and Respondent married in

the State of Washington.

In November 2014 Respondent retired and moved to Izamal,

Mexico, where he resided with Petitioner and DGS.

In April 20151 Petitioner and Respondent decided to

separate. At some point thereafter a dispute arose between them

“over division of property.” Respondent alleges a dispute also

arose at some point regarding whether Respondent would travel

with Petitioner and DGS to Houston, Texas, in June 2015 for the

birthday of Petitioner’s mother. 

Between approximately April 2015 and June 2015 the parties

attempted to resolve the terms of their separation. Respondent

1

 Petitioner states in his Verified Petition for Return of

Child that the parties decided to separate in April 2014. Based

on the record before the Court, however, it appears 2014 was a

clerical error and the parties actually decided to separate in

April 2015.

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

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alleges in his Objections to Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys

Fees that “the terms became unacceptable . . . when Petitioner

demanded Respondent move from the joint real property in Izamel,

Mexico[, and] relinquish all interest in the property,” which

Respondent believes to be worth more than $200,000. At that

point the parties’ negotiations reached an impasse.

On June 11 or 12, 2015, Petitioner traveled to Portland,

Oregon, “to close a sale on” the parties’ residence in the 

St. John’s neighborhood. When Petitioner returned to Mexico on

June 20, 2015, Respondent and DGS were gone. Ultimately it came

to light that Respondent had removed DGS from Mexico to the

United States on June 17, 2015, without the consent of

Petitioner.

On June 19, 2015, Respondent sent an email to Petitioner in

which he stated in pertinent part:

I have thought about are [sic] situation here[,

DGS] needs to have access to both her parents. 

Your decision for me to find somewhere else to

live is not going to work. You have been spending

more time with your friends and leaving her alone

here with her boyfriend. Not Acceptable [sic]. 

She is only 14. I know you trust her but she is

still too young.

Everyone here says that you leave her alone for

hours with Henry.

I have taken her back to the states.

So now what I want is my half of what we

originally agreed on.

* * *

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

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[DGS] love [sic] it [in Mexico] and I do not want

to do this to her.

But I have no choice you brought this on.

Solution

You give me my half of the corporation.

You put [DGS’s] name as beneficial [sic] if either

one of us die. As it stands her name is nowhere

on the corporation or the property.

So if something were to happen to you[,] your

family gets the property, that’s not how we

planned it. Neither of us can ever sell.

It’s very simple.

We all remain on the property for the sake of

[DGS] and only then will [DGS] and I . . . come

back home.

Change & Sign it.

* * *

Second choice

I sign off on this property [and] I get all the

profit of the St. John’s [property] minus your

13,000 and [DGS] will remain in the states.

Petition, Ex. 1 at 1-2.

Respondent states in his Objections to Petitioner’s Motion

for Attorneys Fees that he left Mexico with DGS on June 18, 2015,

with the intent to visit Respondent’s family in Illinois and then

to finalize the sale of the parties’ property in Oregon. 

Respondent asserts Petitioner was aware of Respondent’s intent to

visit family and to close on the Oregon property sale. 

Nevertheless, Respondent concedes he authored the June 19, 2015,

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-01328-BR Document 38 Filed 04/26/16 Page 5 of 23
email and “intended by the letter to ‘force’ Petitioner to resume

negotiations related to the resolution of their dissolution of

marriage.” Respondent asserts he “only sought to encourage

Petitioner to negotiate a resolution of the real property issue

in good faith.”

After the close and sale of the parties’ property in Oregon

in mid-June, Respondent remained in the United States with DGS. 

Petitioner and Respondent divided the sale proceeds from the sale

of the Oregon property, and each received $52,000.

On July 17, 2015, Petitioner received an email from DGS

stating:

Papa

Can we skype please

Papa it’s important

Papa awnser [sic] please!!!

Papa it’s important please.

Pet.’s Decl. in Support of Reply, Ex. 3 at 1.

On July 17, 2015, Petitioner filed in this Court a Verified

Petition for Return of Child to Her Habitual Residence in which

Petitioner alleged Respondent had wrongfully removed DGS from her

habitual residence in Mexico in violation of the Hague Convention

and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 22

U.S.C. § 9001, et seq. Petitioner sought, among other things, an

order directing DGS to be returned to her habitual residence in

Mexico and for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Article 26

of the Hague Convention and 22 U.S.C. § 9007.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

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On July 21, 2015, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause

directing Respondent to appear and to show cause why Respondent

should not turn DGS over to Petitioner or, in the alternative, to

return DGS to Mexico.

On July 23, 2015, Respondent retained counsel.

On July 29, 2015, the Court held a show-cause hearing at

which Respondent’s counsel advised the Court that Respondent

denied receiving actual or other notice of the July 29, 2015,

hearing. Accordingly, the Court issued a second Order to Show

Cause directing Respondent to appear on August 5, 2015, and to

show cause why Respondent should not turn DGS over to Petitioner

or, in the alternative, return DGS to Mexico.

In his Objections to Petitioner’s Motion for Attorneys Fees

Respondent states Petitioner’s counsel advised Respondent’s

counsel in a July 29, 2015, telephone conversation about “the

mandatory nature of attorney fees in contested Hague Convention

cases.” Respondent’s counsel verified that assertion, and the

parties then “immediately began negotiating a return of DGS to

Mexico.” 

On August 5, 2015, the Court struck the show-cause hearing

based on a stipulated agreement between the parties to maintain

the status quo while negotiations proceeded.

On August 13, 2015, Petitioner sent a letter to Respondent

outlining Petitioner’s position regarding settlement.

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

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On August 19, 2015, the parties filed a Joint Alternative

Dispute Resolution (ADR) Report in which they noted, among other

things, that “[t]here is agreement to return DGS to Mexico, with

ongoing discussions about the procedure and conditions for return

of DGS”; the parties had undertaken settlement negotiations

regarding the dissolution of their marriage; and “[s]ignificant

progress has been made in resolving the Hague case.” 

On August 19, 2015, Respondent filed a Petition for

Unlimited Separation in Multnomah County Circuit Court in which

Respondent asserted, among other things, that Oregon was DGS’s

home state and Respondent should be awarded custody of DGS. 

Respondent served Petitioner in the state-court action on 

August 20, 2015.

On August 21, 2015, as a result of Respondent’s filing of

the state-court matter, Petitioner filed an ADR Report in this

Court in which he asserted there was “no agreement to return

DGS”; Petitioner had sent a written settlement offer to

Respondent on August 20, 2015, before being served with the

state-court action; and Respondent had not responded to the

settlement offer.

On August 21, 2015, Respondent replied to Petitioner’s

August 20, 2015, settlement offer via email. Notwithstanding the

assertion about DGS’s Oregon residence and the statement that

Respondent sought custody of DGS in the state-court matter,

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Respondent noted in the August 21, 2015, email that

[Respondent] does not object to [DGS] returning to

Mexico. The filing in Circuit Court was simply

intended to ensure that the parties resolved the

other divorce issues in Oregon. If the matter was

not filed in Oregon I do not believe there is

currently a jurisdiction that could divorce the

parties. . . . [T]his filing has NOTHING to do

with [DGS]. . . . [M]y client is in agreement

that [DGS] should return to Mexico immediately. 

The only issue to be resolved was who takes her

back to Mexico.

Objs. to Pet.’s Mot. for Attorneys Fees, Ex. 102 at 1. The

parties continued to negotiate.

On August 25, 2015, the parties filed an Amended Joint ADR

Report in which they advised the Court that they had reached a

negotiated agreement regarding the return of DGS to Mexico. 

On August 26, 2015, the Court entered an Order approving the

terms of the agreement described in the August 25, 2015, Amended

ADR Report and directed the parties to submit an agreed form of

order consistent with the ADR Report.

On August 27, 2015, the Court entered an Order for Return of

Child to Her Habitual Residence in which the Court ordered, among

other things, DGS to be returned to Mexico on August 28, 2015,

accompanied by Petitioner; Respondent to remove certain personal

items from the parties’ property in Mexico and then leave the

real property; and the parties to submit a judgment of dismissal

to the Court after DGS arrived in Mexico.

On October 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Dismissal

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

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of Child Custody Claim in the Multnomah County Circuit Court on

the ground that the state court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to decide child-custody issues because Mexico is

DGS’s home state.

On December 15, 2015, the parties submitted a Joint ADR

Report in which they advised the Court that DGS had been returned

to Mexico; Multnomah County Circuit Court had granted

Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the child-custody claim and

entered a judgment on November 16, 2015; and Petitioner had filed

a custody action in Izamel Family Court in Mexico.

On December 16, 2015, the Court entered a Judgment

dismissing this matter.

On December 30, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for

Attorneys Fees and Cost Bill in which he seeks $12,720 in

attorneys’ fees and $3,051.24 in costs. The Court took

Petitioner’s Motion under advisement on February 5, 2016.

STANDARDS

Article 26 of the 1980 Hague Convention provides in

pertinent part:

Upon ordering the return of a child or issuing an

order concerning rights of access under this

Convention, the judicial or administrative

authorities may, where appropriate, direct the

person who removed or retained the child, or who

prevented the exercise of rights of access, to pay

necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the

applicant, including . . . the costs of legal

10 - OPINION AND ORDER

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representation of the applicant.

The ICARA, which implements the obligations of the United

States under the 1980 Hague Convention, provides:

Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant

to an action brought under section 11603 of this

title shall order the respondent to pay necessary

expenses incurred by or on behalf of the

petitioner, including court costs [and] legal fees

. . . related to the return of the child, unless

the respondent establishes that such order would

be clearly inappropriate.

42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3)(emphasis added). The ICARA “contemplates

the use of such awards to restore a petitioner to the financial

position he or she would have been in had there been no removal

or retention, as well as to deter violations of the Hague

Convention.” Aguilera v. DeLara, No. CV–14–01209–PHX–DGC, 2014

WL 4204947, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2014)(citing Hague

International Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494–01,

10511 (Mar. 26, 1986)). 

An award of attorneys’ fees and costs is “appropriate” when

the case is not a “difficult” one and “‘falls squarely within the

heartland of the Hague Convention.’” Cuellar v. Joyce, 603 F.3d

1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d

505, 511 (9th Cir. 2010)). “The respondent bears the burden of

establishing that an award of fees and costs would be clearly

inappropriate under the circumstances.” Aguilera, 2014 WL

4204947, at *1 (citing Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st

Cir. 2004)).

11 - OPINION AND ORDER

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DISCUSSION

Respondent does not dispute the Court entered an Order for

Return of DGS on August 27, 2015, and, therefore, Article 26 of

the Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) apply. 

Respondent, however, asserts the Court should conclude an award

of attorneys’ fees and costs to Petitioner is “clearly

inappropriate” because (1) a state-law action under the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), adopted

by the State of Oregon at Oregon Revised Statute § 109.701, et

seq., would have led to the same resolution without invoking the

Hague Convention; (2) Respondent has limited financial means to

pay an award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and (3) Petitioner

agreed to DGS’s removal to the United States.

I. A UCCJEA action would not have led to the same resolution.

As noted, Respondent asserts an award of attorneys’ fees and

costs would be clearly inappropriate because an action in Oregon

state court pursuant to the UCCJEA would have had the same

outcome and would not have resulted in attorneys’ fees and costs.

As Petitioner points out, however, Oregon courts did not have

jurisdiction over the child-custody matter in this case because

Oregon was not the home state of DGS within the meaning of Oregon

Revised Statutes §§ 109.704 and 109.741. In addition, even if

Oregon state courts had jurisdiction, the attorneys’ fee

provision for enforcement actions under the UCCJEA found in

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Oregon Revised Statute § 109.811 states:

The court shall award the prevailing party,

including a state, necessary and reasonable

expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party,

including costs, communication expenses, attorney

fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses,

travel expenses and child care expenses during the

course of the proceedings, unless the party from

whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that

the award would be clearly inappropriate.

This provision is similar to the one regarding attorneys’ fees

and costs found in the ICARA. Thus, even if Oregon state courts

had jurisdiction to decide the parties’ child-custody issue

(which they do not), Petitioner still could have received an

award of attorneys’ fees and costs using virtually the same

standard as this Court applies when evaluating an award under the

ICARA.

II. Respondent’s ability to pay attorneys’ fees and costs.

Respondent asserts an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is

“clearly inappropriate” because he does not have the ability to

pay such an award. Specifically, Respondent states he is retired

and living on his pension of $1,700 per month. Respondent also

notes he “is spending more on his HIV medication than he would

otherwise be spending in Mexico” (although Respondent does not

specify how much he spends on medication). Petitioner, however,

points to a letter from Respondent’s counsel produced in

discovery that indicates Respondent owns three cars and a

Winnebago as well as other assets.

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Courts have reduced attorneys’ fee awards under the ICARA

based on respondents’ financial circumstances. For example, in

Rydder v. Rydder the court noted the respondent had stock valued

at $18,683, but she had “worked only sporadically as a substitute

teacher.” 49 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1995). The court reduced

the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees of $18,487 to

$10,000 due to the respondent's “strained financial

circumstances.” Id. at 373-74. The court, however, “le[ft]

undisturbed” the award of expenses in the amount of $9,667. 

Thus, the court found a total award of attorneys’ fees and costs

of $19,667 was not “clearly inappropriate.” Similarly, in

Willing v. Purtill the petitioner sought $33,729 in attorneys’

fees and $10,052 in costs. No. 07–CV-1618–AA, 2008 WL 299073, 

at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 31, 2008). The court awarded the petitioner

all of her costs. The court, however, noted the respondent was

unemployed and, therefore, concluded a full award of attorneys’

fees would be “clearly inappropriate.” Accordingly, the court

awarded attorneys’ fees of $28,669. Id., at *1. See also

Berendsen v. Nichols, 938 F. Supp. 737, 739 (D. Kan. 1996)

(reducing attorneys’ fees and costs award by 15% in light of the

respondent's financial condition and because awarding full fee

would “unduly limit” the respondent's ability to support his

children).

Here Respondent is retired, but he is receiving a pension. 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER

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In addition, Respondent chooses to remain in Oregon to litigate

his divorce rather than in Mexico. Finally, the Court recognizes

attorneys’ fees of approximately $12,000 can be steep for a

retired individual, but the Court concludes the amount is

reasonable in light of the purpose of attorneys’ fees under the

Hague Convention to “deter violations of the Hague Convention.” 

Aguilera, 2014 WL 4204947, at *1 (citing Hague International

Child Abduction Convention, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494–01, 10511 

(Mar. 26, 1986)). 

III. Removal of DGS from Mexico.

Respondent asserts an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is

clearly inappropriate because “Respondent’s position is that

Petitioner not only acquiesced to the removal [of DGS from

Mexico], but further agreed to her removal and facilitated the

removal by providing DGS’s passport to Respondent.” 

“The determination of the reasonableness of attorney fees

and whether an award would be ‘clearly inappropriate’ is not the

place to ‘rehash’ the merits of the parties’ dispute.” Sullivan

v. Sullivan, No. CV–09–545–S–BLW, 2010 WL 1651994, at *2 

(Apr. 21, 2010). In addition, the record establishes Respondent

sent Petitioner the June 19, 2015, letter, in which Respondent

made clear that he removed DGS from Mexico and did not intend to

return her unless Petitioner gave Respondent half of the LLC or

gave Respondent “all the profit of the St. John’s [property]

15 - OPINION AND ORDER

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minus your 13,000 and [DGS] will remain in the states.” The

letter strongly indicates Petitioner did not consent to DGS

remaining in the United States. Respondent concedes he “intended

by the letter to ‘force’ Petitioner to resume negotiations

related to the resolution of their dissolution of marriage.” 

Thus, Respondent intended to keep DGS in the United States as

long as necessary and against the wishes of Petitioner as a

bargaining chip for the property in dispute. 

On this record the Court is unpersuaded by Respondent’s

assertion that Petitioner acquiesced in DGS’s removal and,

accordingly, concludes an award of attorneys’ fees and costsis

not “clearly inappropriate.”

IV. Amount of Attorneys’ Fees.

As noted, in his Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs

Petitioner seeks $12,720 in attorneys' fees. Respondent does not

object to the hourly rate sought by Petitioner’s counsel. 

Respondent asserts only that the parties’ negotiations in this

matter were “[f]or all intents and purposes . . . resolved on

August 19, 2015,” and, therefore, the Court should not award

attorneys’ fees incurred after that date.

The Supreme Court has made clear "the lodestar approach" is

"the guiding light" in determining a reasonable fee under federal

fee-shifting statutes such as the ICARA. Perdue v. Kenny A., 130

S. Ct. 1662, 1671-73 (2010)(internal quotation omitted). Under

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

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the lodestar method the court first determines the appropriate

hourly rate for the work performed and then multiplies that

amount by the number of hours properly spent doing the work. Id.

 Although "in extraordinary circumstances" the amount produced by

the lodestar calculation may be increased, "there is a strong

presumption that the lodestar is sufficient." Id. at 1669. The

party seeking an award of fees bears "the burden of documenting

the appropriate hours expended in the litigation, and [is]

required to submit evidence in support of those hours worked." 

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan For Hourly-rated

Emp. Of Asarco, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 565 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quotations omitted). When "determining the appropriate number

of hours to be included in a lodestar calculation, the district

court should exclude hours 'that are excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.'" McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d

1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

To determine the lodestar amount the court may consider the

following factors: 

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty

and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the

skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 

(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is

fixed or contingent; (7) any time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances;(8) the

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

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attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case;

(11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in

similar cases.

Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997,

1007 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002)(quotation omitted). A rote recitation

of the relevant factors is unnecessary as long as the court

adequately explains the basis for the award of attorneys' fees. 

McGinnis v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., 51 F.3d 805, 809 (9th

Cir. 1995).

The lodestar amount is presumed to be the reasonable fee,

and, therefore, "'a multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar

amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional cases,

supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed

findings by the lower courts.'" Summers v. Carvist Corp., 323 F.

App'x 581, 582 (9th Cir. 2009)(quoting Van Gerwen v. Guarantee

Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000)).

 "Adjustments [to the lodestar amount] must be carefully tailored

. . . and [made] only to the extent a factor has not been

subsumed within the lodestar calculation." Rouse v. Law Offices

of Rory Clark, 603 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2009)(citing Camacho

v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008)).

A. Hourly Rates for Plaintiff's Counsel

Petitioner’s counsel Bradley Lechman-Su requests

attorneys’ fees at an hourly rate of $300. As noted, Respondent

does not object to Lechman-Su’s requested hourly rate.

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To determine the reasonable hourly rate this Court uses

the most recent Oregon State Bar Economic Survey published in

2012 as its initial benchmark. Attorneys may argue for higher

rates based on inflation, specialty, or any number of other

factors. 

Lechman-Su had 25 years of experience during the course

of this matter. According to the 2012 Oregon Bar Economic

Survey, the median rate for attorneys in the Portland area with

this level of experience was $326. The Court, therefore,

concludes Lechman-Su’s requested rate of $300 per hour is

reasonable.

B. Legal-Assistant Rate.

Petitioner requests 10.9 hours of time for legal

assistant Debbie Best at $125 per hour and .7 hours of time for

legal assistant Tamera Meisner at $175 per hour. Petitioner,

however, did not provide any information regarding the reasonable

hourly rates for legal assistants in the Portland area where

these individuals worked. In addition, Petitioner did not

provide any information as to the experience of the legal

assistants. Accordingly, the Court reduces to $100 per hour (a

minimal rate the Court can support on this scant record), the

rate at which fees may be awarded for paralegal time.

C. Time Expended

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Respondent asserts this matter was resolved “for all

intents and purposes” as of August 19, 2015, and, therefore, the

Court should decline to award any attorneys’ fees after that

date. The Court disagrees. As noted, on August 19, 2015,

Respondent filed a Petition for Unlimited Separation in Multnomah

County Circuit Court in which Respondent asserted, among other

things, that Oregon was DGS’s home state and Respondent should be

awarded custody of DGS. Respondent served Petitioner in the

state-court action on August 20, 2015. The filing of the statecourt action necessitated further negotiations between the

parties and additional filings with this Court. In addition, the

parties had to engage in further negotiations and discussions

related to the return of DGS and termination of this matter. The

Court, therefore, awards Petitioner attorneys’ fees incurred by

Petitioner’s counsel after August 19, 2015. 

After a review of counsel’s billing record, however,

the Court notes several entries for hours that Lechman-Su and

Best dedicated to the state-court matter. For example, several

entries indicate time spent to research and to draft the motion

for dismissal of the child custody claims in the state-court

matter. The Court declines to award attorneys’ fees for time

expended in the state-court action and, therefore, reduces the

time requested by Lechman-Su by 5.5 hours and the time spent by

20 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Best by 2.2 hours.2

Accordingly, the Court awards Petitioner attorneys’

fees in the amount of $12,010.

V. Costs

Petitioner requests costs in the amount of $3,051.24, which

include the fee to file this action, postage/delivery and service

fees, expert testimony fee, printing, and photocopies.

Respondent does not object to Petitioner’s requested costs.

A. Standards.

Absent a showing of circumstances not relevant here, an

award of costs is governed by federal law. See Champion Produce,

Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.

2003).

28 U.S.C. § 1920 allows a federal court to tax specific

items as costs against a losing party pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Section 1920 provides:

A judge or clerk of any court of the United States

may tax as costs the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; 

(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part

of the stenographic transcript necessarily

obtained for use in the case; 

(3)Fees and disbursements for printing and

witnesses; 

(4)Fees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case; 

2

 See Exhibit 1 for the Court’s calculation of attorneys’

fees and costs.

21 - OPINION AND ORDER

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(5)Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 

(6)Compensation for court-appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees,

expenses, and costs of special interpretation

services under § 1828 of this title.

 

A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and,

upon allowance, included in the judgment or

decree.

B. Analysis

As noted, costs generally are awarded to the prevailing

party in a civil action as a matter of course unless the court

directs otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). The court must limit

an award of costs to those defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 unless

otherwise provided for by statute. Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin.

Ca., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 579-80 (9th Cir. 2010). See also

Haagen-Dazs Co., Inc. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc.,

920 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1990)(citing Crawford Fitting Co. v.

J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987)). 

The costs sought by Petitioner are specifically allowed

under § 1920. Accordingly, the Court awards costs to Petitioner

in the amount of $3,051.24.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Motion

(#30) for Attorneys Fees and Cost Bill and AWARDS attorneys' fees

to Petitioner in the amount of $12,010 and costs in the amount of

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Case 3:15-cv-01328-BR Document 38 Filed 04/26/16 Page 22 of 23
$3,051.24.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

23 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-01328-BR Document 38 Filed 04/26/16 Page 23 of 23