* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 United States v. Gadison , 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1993).

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-41436

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

JOY A. SOAPE, also known as Joy A. Lovett,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 9:97-CR-10-2

November 10, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Joy Soape was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to commit credit card fraud,

and five counts of aiding and abetting credit card fraud. She now appeals that conviction. We affirm.

Soape’s first contention is that the district court erroneously admitte d evidence of “other

crimes, wrongs, or acts” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B). This court reviews such a ruling

for an abuse of discretion. 2 In the case at bar, the district judge admitted evidence that Soape knew

that her husband (an indicted coconspirator tried separately) had committed theft of several rental

cars. The district judge also admitted evidence that Soape had a fraudulent license tag on her vehicle.

The district court held that the evidence in question was not evidence of extrinsic offenses, and was

therefore not subject to Rule 404(B). We agree.3 United States v. Parziale , 947 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1991).

4 Id

.

5 United States v. Larbarera , 581 F.2d 107, 100 (5th Cir. 1978).

6 United States v. Iredia , 866 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1989).

7 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).

8 United States v. Duncan , 919 F.2d 981, 986 (5th Cir. 1990). The first issue concerns the appellant’s knowledge that her husband had committed theft of

the rental cars. Knowledge is not a “crime, wrong or act,” as provided for in Rule 404(B). Soape’s

knowledge of her husband’s activity is therefore not subject to 404(B) analysis.

The second issue is the appellant’s fraudulent license tag. The record reflects that the tag was

acquired by Soape and her husband through fraud. Soape and her husband were then indicted as

co defendants in a conspiracy to commit credit card fraud. The district judge did not abuse his

discretion in finding this to be “part and parcel” of the offense charged.

Soape further argues that the district court erred in not giving the jury a limiting instruction

with regard to this evidence. No limiting instruction was requested. In such a case, this court

reviews for plain erro r. 3 In t he case at bar, failure to give a limiting instruction, when no suich

instruction was requested, does not rise to the level of plain error. 4

Soape’s second contention is that the cumulative effect of several adverse evidentiary rulings

resulted in sufficient prejudice to require reversal. Erroneous rulings which could be considered

harmless if viewed alone may mandate reversal when considered cumulatively. 5 Reversal for such

cumulative error is a rarity. 6

The preliminary aspect of this assignment of err o r co ncerns evidence admitted under the

“regularly kept business record” exception to the hearsay rule. 7 Soape argues that documents created

at the jail were unreliable because the author of the documents was not identified. Rule 803(6) does

not require that the witness who lays the foundation be the a uthor of the record, or be abl e to

personally attest to its accuracy. 8

The bulk of Soape’s evidentiary objections concerns evidence which the court determined was9 Record, vol. 4, p.20.

10 United States v. McCord , 33 F.3d 1434, 1439 (5th Cir. 1994) c ert denied 115 S.Ct. 2558

(1995). not hearsay, in that it was not admitted to show the truth of the matter asserted. 9 These documents

were forged during the course of the conspiracy to defraud. In showing the fraudulent nature of the

documents, the government could not have been attempting to demonstrate the truth of the matter

asserted. The documents are therefore outside the scope of the hearsay rule.

As S o ape has not made a threshold showing of error, there is no need for this court to

evaluate the cumulative effect of any errors. The assignment of error is dismissed.

Soape’s final contention is that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to convict her

of the crimes charged. Specifically, Soape contends that the evidence was insufficient to show her

knowledge and criminal intent to commit the offenses with which she is charged. This court views

the evidence in the light most favor able t o t he verdict to determine if any rational jury could have

concluded the appellant was guilty. 10

The record reflects that Soape executed the paperwork ad ding her name to credit card

accounts wit h full knowledge that these accounts had been fraudulently obtained. As a result of

Soape’s and her husband’s criminal activity, NationsBank suffered financial losses in the amount of

$19,000. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could find

Soape guilty of the crimes charged.

AFFIRMED.