96-094

 No. 96-094

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

 1997

STATE OF MONTANA,

 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v.

 

 JACK 

MASON, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Fergus,

 The Honorable John Christensen, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Steven M. Hudspeth, Great Falls, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Thomas P. Meissner, Fergus County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana;

 Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Jennifer Anders, Assistant 

Attorney

General,Helena, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: April 24, 1997

 Decided: June 17, 1997

Filed:

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 _________________________________________ 

Clerk

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 Appellant Jack Mason (Mason) appeals convictions entered by the Tenth Judicial

District Court, Fergus County, after a jury found him guilty of two counts of sexual

intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault. We affirm.

 ISSUES

 Mason presents the following restated issues upon appeal:

 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Masonþs motion to

dismiss Count II and Count III of the information for lack of probable cause?

 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Masonþs motion to

dismiss the charges for violation of the applicable statute of limitations?

 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in allowing witnesses to 

testify that

the victim displayed psychological characteristics consistent with having been 

sexually

abused?

 FACTS

 On December 6, 1993, the Fergus County Attorney charged Mason with two

counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of felony sexual assault

against his grand-niece, R.K. R.K. contacted the County Attorney in April of 1992,

when she was nineteen years old. The incidents giving rise to the charges, however, 

took

place some six years before, when R.K. was about thirteen years old.

 Prior to trial, Mason moved to dismiss Count II, felony sexual assault and 

Count

III, sexual intercourse without consent. The District Court denied these motions. 

After

the evidence was submitted at trial, Mason moved the District Court to direct an 

acquittal

based on the Stateþs alleged failure to prove that the charges had been filed within 

the

applicable statute of limitations. The District Court denied this motion as well. 

In

addition, Mason objected at trial to the testimony of R.K.þs school and psychological

counselors. The District Court prohibited the counselors from testifying regarding 

R.K.þs

credibility, but otherwise allowed their testimony.

 Following a three-day jury trial, Mason was convicted of all the charged 

offenses. 

Mason appeals the denial of his motions to dismiss two of the charges, the denial of 

his

motion to direct an acquittal, and the allowance of the testimony of R.K.þs 

counselors. 

 

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Masonþs motion to 

dismiss

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Count II and Count III of the information for lack of probable cause?

 Mason argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion

to dismiss Counts II and III of the information. He contends that the information 

did not

contain allegations specific enough to meet the probable cause requirement of 46-

11-

201(2), MCA. 

 Leave to file an information will be granted if it appears from the 

application that

probable cause exists to indicate that the offenses have been committed by the 

defendant. 

State v. Ramstead (1990), 243 Mont. 162, 165-66, 793 P.2d 802, 804. In the 

supporting

affidavit, the State need only recite facts sufficient to indicate a probability 

that the named

defendant committed the charged offenses; the State need not demonstrate a prima 

facie

case. Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804. See also State v. Little (1993), 260 Mont. 460, 861

P.2d 154. In reviewing an affidavit for probable cause, the district court may use

common sense and draw permissible inferences. On appeal, this Court will not reverse

a district courtþs determination regarding probable cause absent an abuse of 

discretion. 

Little, 861 P.2d at 160; Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804.

 In this case, the affidavit underlying the information contained a long 

excerpt from

R.K.þs journal, detailing the abuse she suffered as a child. This excerpt vividly 

recounted

the progression of the abuse as well as the details of the particular incidents 

which gave

rise to the charges. However, as Mason notes, R.K. in the journal sometimes employed

euphemisms, such as recounting the initial events of one incident and then stating 

that

Mason "proceeded to do his thing." Mason contends that such phrases are vague and

insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to charge him with the challenged

crimes.

 The affidavit, however, is not limited to the excerpt from R.K.þs journal. 

It also

contains the testimony of the county attorney, who attested that the victim had told 

him

that sexual contact took place during the incident giving rise to the charge of 

sexual

assault, and that penetration took place during the incident giving rise to the 

charge of

sexual intercourse without consent. The affidavit in this case was both lengthy and

detailed, and the representations of the victim, together with the statements of the 

county

attorney, constituted more than sufficient probable cause to support the 

information. As

noted above, the prosecution need not prove its case before charging a defendant; it 

need

only recite facts indicating that it is probable that the defendant committed the 

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offenses. 

Ramstead, 793 P.2d at 804. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in finding sufficient probable cause to charge Mason with the crimes 

alleged. 

 

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err in denying Masonþs motion to dismiss the charges 

for

violation of the applicable statute of limitations?

 Mason next argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss

the charges for violation of the statute of limitations. Mason did not move to 

dismiss the

charges until the end of the case but, as he correctly notes, a claimed violation of 

the

applicable statute of limitations is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised at 

any time. 

State v. Larson (1989), 240 Mont. 203, 205, 783 P.2d 416, 417. Whether the District

Court correctly applied the statute of limitations is a question of law. Hollister 

v.

Forsythe (1995), 270 Mont. 91, 93, 889 P.2d 1205, 1206. See also Barthule v. Karman

(1994), 268 Mont. 477, 484, 886 P.2d 971, 976. This Court reviews questions of law

to ensure the trial courtþs application of the law was correct. Hollister, 889 P.2d 

at 1206;

Barthule, 886 P.2d at 976.

 A felony prosecution must be commenced within five years of the commission of

the offense. Section 45-1-205(2)(a), MCA. However, if the victim is under eighteen

years old, the statute of limitations is tolled for certain sex offenses (including 

both

felony sexual assault and sexual intercourse without consent) until he or she reaches

eighteen. Section 45-1-205(1)(b), MCA. This provision regarding victims under 

eighteen

was enacted in 1989 and applied retroactively to all offenses that were committed 

before

the effective date and for which the statute of limitations had not yet expired. 

Since the

statute of limitations for a felony prosecution is five years, the State was 

empowered to

prosecute any felony occurring after March 24, 1984, or five years prior to the 

relevant

amendment of 45-1-205(1)(b), MCA. 

 Mason contends that the State failed to prove that the incidents giving rise 

to the

offenses charged occurred after March 24, 1984. He notes that R.K. was unable to

pinpoint when the incidents took place, testifying only that they occurred when she 

was

in the seventh and eighth grades. Mason contends these vague references to time are 

not

sufficient to confirm that the statute of limitations on these offenses had not 

previously

expired.

 We disagree. The testimony at trial established that R.K. was born in 

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February

of 1973 and was a sophomore in high school in February of 1989. According to these

dates, R.K. progressed through school at the usual rate of one grade per year, 

starting

first grade at age six. In March of 1984, she would have been eleven years old and 

in

the fifth grade. Yet at trial R.K. testified that the abuse began during her 

twelfth year,

and that the incidents giving rise to the charges occurred when she was in the 

seventh and

eighth grades. While R.K. was unable to fix the dates of the offenses with 

particularity,

the record is devoid of any indication that they occurred prior to March of 1984, 

thereby

exceeding the statute of limitations. We have held that "because children are less 

likely

to distinguish dates and times with specificity, the fact that a victim cannot set a 

date for

the crime should not be fatal to the Stateþs case. To hold otherwise would leave the

defendant virtually immune from prosecution." Little, 861 P.2d at 161. We conclude

that the District Court did not err by refusing to dismiss the charges or by 

concluding that

the applicable statute of limitations had not expired. 

. ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in allowing witnesses to testify 

that the

victim displayed psychological characteristics consistent with having been sexually

abused?

 Lastly, Mason argues that the District Court abused its discretion in 

allowing the

testimony of R.K.þs high school and psychological counselors. He contends that these

individuals impermissibly commented on the victimþs credibility and that, therefore, 

their

testimony should have been excluded. This Court reviews evidentiary rulings to

determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in admitting or refusing 

the

evidence in question. State v. Stuit (1996), 277 Mont. 227, 230, 921 P.2d 866, 868

(citing State v. Riley (1995), 270 Mont. 436, 440, 893 P.2d 310, 313; State v. Santos

(1995), 273 Mont. 125, 137, 902 P.2d 510, 517). 

 Masonþs assertion of error is premised on his characterization of the 

counselorsþ

testimony as tending to "bolster or corroborate" R.K.þs testimony. He correctly 

notes

that evidence presented to corroborate a victimþs testimony is generally 

inadmissable,

absent an attack on the victimþs credibility by the defendant. Rule 801(d)(1)(B),

M.R.Evid. Since Mason did not attack the victimþs credibility, he argues that the

counselorsþ testimony was inadmissable and should have been excluded. In support of

this contention, Mason cites State v. Hensley (1991), 250 Mont. 478, 821 P.2d 1029, 

and

In re the Teaching Certificate of Thompson (1995), 270 Mont. 419, 893 P.2d 301. 

These cases are not on point. Hensley addressed the ability of a qualified expert 

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to

testify directly about the credibility of a victim who testifies in a child sexual 

abuse case. 

Thompson involved a lack of foundation for the use of expert testimony to address the

credibility of a victim over the age of seventeen. Thus, both Hensley and Thompson 

are

cases involving testimony commenting directly on the victimþs credibility. Masonþs

reliance on these cases is premised on the assumption that the counselorsþ remarks 

also

constituted direct commentary on R.K.þs credibility. This assumption misconstrues 

the

testimony. 

 The counselors in question worked with the victim during high school, prior 

to her

reporting the offenses to the authorities and before investigation of the charges. 

The

counselors described their counseling relationships with R.K. and testified that 

during

those relationships they observed certain behavioral characteristics, such as 

depression,

guilt and anger, which are symptomatic of sexual abuse victims. The counselors did 

not

testify regarding whether R.K. was telling the truth or give their opinions as to her

credibility. To the contrary, the District Court before trial specifically 

prohibited the

State from eliciting their testimony regarding R.K.þs credibility. The counselorsþ

testimony regarding counseling sessions which occurred long before trial did not 

serve

to corroborate R.K.þs testimony. Instead, it set forth the counselorsþ personal

observations regarding her behavior, which was relevant to the issue of whether the

offenses charged actually occurred. This in turn was relevant to the juryþs 

determination

of whether Mason had or had not committed the offenses charged. The District Court

did not abuse its discretion in allowing the challenged testimony.

 Affirmed. 

 /S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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