UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH JUSTIN GATES, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-4106 

(D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00027-DB-1) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Joseph Justin Gates entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, reserving the right to challenge the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. We conclude that Mr. Gates was not 

seized until Officer Curtis Ricks exited his patrol car, ordered Mr. Gates to “come 

here,” and drew and deployed his taser. We further conclude that reasonable 

suspicion supported Mr. Gates’s seizure at that juncture. Therefore, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Mr. Gates’s motion to suppress and affirm Mr. Gates’s 

conviction. 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 

Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 20, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Mr. Gates’s Arrest 

On a cold March evening when some snow covered the ground, Officer Ricks, 

who had twenty-two years of experience as a police officer and six years of 

experience with the South Ogden City Police Department, conducted a vehicle patrol 

in the area of 37th Street and Riverdale Road in South Ogden City, Utah. Around 

11:00 p.m. Officer Ricks was driving west on 37th Street toward the intersection of 

Riverdale Road in a marked, black South Ogden City patrol car with the word 

“police” down the side and overhead emergency lights on the roof. As he approached 

a strip mall with a twenty-four-hour, self-service carwash, Officer Ricks spotted 

Mr. Gates. Mr. Gates was initially standing near a carwash bay that housed a coin 

machine and power box for the car wash. The bays of the carwash have three walls, a 

roof, and an opening in the front through which cars can enter. Officer Ricks did not 

see any vehicle or other items that might be washed in proximity of the carwash bay 

and Mr. Gates. As Officer Ricks approached in his vehicle, Mr. Gates moved behind 

and crouched below a four- to five-foot retaining wall. Officer Ricks found 

Mr. Gates’s location and conduct suspicious and intended to turn into the strip mall, 

by using an entrance near the intersection of 37th Street and Riverdale Road, to 

further observe Mr. Gates’s actions. But, before Officer Ricks could drive the short 

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distance to the intersection, he saw, through his rearview mirror, Mr. Gates climb the 

retaining wall and run across the middle of 37th Street. 

Officer Ricks made a U-turn, activated his “alley light” (a non-emergency 

spotlight), and pulled up alongside Mr. Gates as Mr. Gates walked on a sidewalk. 

When Officer Ricks reached Mr. Gates’s position, he lowered the window on his 

patrol car and called out to Mr. Gates, seeking an explanation for Mr. Gates’s 

presence at the carwash near the coin machine.1

 Mr. Gates responded by moving 

away from Officer Ricks’s car, behavior which Officer Ricks perceived as Mr. Gates 

starting to “conceal[] himself.” Id. at 31. Officer Ricks also observed a “bulge” on 

Mr. Gates’s “waistline” that was outside of his tucked in shirt. Id. at 30. But Officer 

Ricks was not able to identify the object causing the bulge. 

With Mr. Gates moving away from him and having observed the bulge, Officer 

Ricks exited his vehicle and instructed Mr. Gates to “come here.” Id. at 31. Mr. Gates 

did not obey this command and, instead, attempted to flee on foot. Officer Ricks 

pursued Mr. Gates and deployed his taser in an effort to halt Mr. Gates’s flight. The 

taser temporarily stopped Mr. Gates, but he removed one of the probes and continued 

running. In continued pursuit, Officer Ricks tackled, struggled with, and ultimately 

subdued Mr. Gates. Officer Ricks identified the bulge in Mr. Gates’s waistline as a 

1

 Although there is body camera video of Officer Ricks’s interaction with 

Mr. Gates, Officer Ricks did not activate the camera and the audio recording when 

making initial contact with Mr. Gates. Rather, the audio activated only when 

Mr. Gates fled a few moments after Officer Ricks made initial contact with him. 

Accordingly, we rely primarily on Officer Ricks’s suppression hearing testimony 

when describing his interaction with Mr. Gates prior to Mr. Gates’s flight. 

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loaded .44 caliber revolver. Mr. Gates was arrested on several state charges. At the 

time of his arrest, Mr. Gates had eight prior criminal convictions, including three 

felony convictions. 

B. Procedural History 

A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Gates on one count of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Mr. Gates filed a motion to suppress the firearm Officer Ricks recovered. The district 

court held a suppression hearing at which only Officer Ricks testified. Officer Ricks 

testified about his encounter with Mr. Gates and his basis for believing Mr. Gates 

was about to engage in criminal conduct when he spotted him at the carwash near the 

coin machine. Officer Ricks also testified that the area of 37th Street and Riverdale 

Road had been “deemed a high-crime area.” Id. at 21. In support of this 

categorization, Officer Ricks relied upon his personal experience patrolling the area, 

noting that he spent 80% of his twelve-hour patrol shifts in the area of 37th Street 

and Riverdale Road because of the crime rate in the area. Officer Ricks identified 

several types of crimes he had previously worked in the area, including “[r]etail 

thefts, thefts, burglaries, drug sales, drug distribution, drug use,” and “a couple of 

robberies.” Id.

Through post-hearing briefing, Mr. Gates argued Officer Ricks lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry2

 stop when Officer Ricks approached him. 

2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 

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Inherent in Mr. Gates’s argument was that Officer Ricks’s initial contact with him—

in which Officer Ricks, from the patrol car, asked Mr. Gates about his purpose for 

being at the carwash—qualified as a seizure. The Government argued (1) Mr. Gates 

was not seized until Officer Ricks exited his vehicle and ordered Mr. Gates to “come 

here” such that the bulge on Mr. Gates’s waistline was part of the reasonable 

suspicion calculus; and (2) even if Mr. Gates was seized when Officer Ricks first 

approached, Officer Ricks had reasonable suspicion at that point based on 

Mr. Gates’s presence in a high-crime area late at night, his presence at the carwash 

near the coin machine and without a vehicle, and his evasive behavior. Mr. Gates 

countered that the Government had not established that the area of 37th Street and 

Riverdale Road was a high-crime area. 

The district court denied Mr. Gates’s motion to suppress and announced two 

conclusions in reaching its ruling. First, the district court concluded Mr. Gates was 

not seized until Officer Ricks exited his vehicle and ordered him to “come here.” In 

support of this conclusion, the district court observed (1) Officer Ricks did not 

activate the emergency lights on his patrol car, (2) Officer Ricks remained in his 

patrol car when initially speaking to Mr. Gates, (3) Officer Ricks did not display a 

weapon, (4) Officer Ricks approached Mr. Gates in a non-aggressive manner, 

(5) Mr. Gates’s movement and course of travel was not blocked or restrained, and 

(6) Officer Ricks did not initially command Mr. Gates to stop. Second, the district 

court concluded Officer Ricks had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Gates at the 

outset based on Mr. Gates’s presence at the carwash near the coin machine and 

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without a car, the high-crime nature of the area, the time of day, and Mr. Gates’s 

attempt to conceal himself and then flee from the carwash. 

Following denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Gates entered a conditional 

guilty plea, preserving the suppression issue for appeal. The district court sentenced 

Mr. Gates to a term of 27 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a 36-month term 

of supervised release. Mr. Gates timely filed this appeal. On appeal, Mr. Gates 

renews his arguments that (1) he was seized when Officer Ricks initiated contact with 

him by pulling alongside him and asking about his presence at the carwash; and 

(2) Officer Ricks lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him at that point in time. 

Encompassed in this second proposition, Mr. Gates argues the Government failed to 

adequately support the conclusion that the area of 37th Street and Riverdale Road 

was a high-crime area. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We state the standard of review before analyzing the point at which Mr. Gates 

was seized and whether reasonable suspicion supported the seizure at that time. 

A. Standard of Review 

We apply an overarching de novo standard of review to a district court’s denial 

of a motion to suppress. United States v. Juszczyk, 844 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th 

Cir. 2017). The question of when a seizure occurred is a question of law subject to de 

novo review. United States v Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 2010). 

Likewise, whether a seizure is reasonable is a question of law that we review de 

novo. United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 2020). But, “[i]n 

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applying de novo review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

ruling and review the district court’s factual findings under the clear-error standard.”3

Juszczyk, 844 F.3d at 1214. “A district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous 

when it is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, 

we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

Morales, 961 F.3d at 1090 (quotation marks omitted). In conducting this clear-error 

review within the context of a suppression motion, an appellate court should “give 

due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

B. When was Mr. Gates Seized? 

The parties agree Mr. Gates was seized at the point when Officer Ricks 

ordered him to “come here” and drew and deployed his taser. But Mr. Gates contends 

he was seized moments earlier when Officer Ricks first pulled his patrol car 

alongside Mr. Gates. Before we undertake our de novo analysis, we discuss the legal 

framework used to determine whether an individual is seized. 

1. Governing Law 

“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an 

individual and asks a few questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). 

“[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may 

3

 In a footnote, Mr. Gates challenges the proposition that we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling; but he acknowledges his 

challenge is foreclosed by circuit precedent and that he raises the challenge only for 

the purpose of preserving the issue for further review. 

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generally ask questions of that individual . . . as long as the police do not convey a 

message that compliance with their requests is required.” Id. at 434–35. Thus, “[a] 

seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when ‘a reasonable person would 

have believed that he was not free to leave.’” Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1225 

(10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)). This 

assessment is based on “what a reasonable, law-abiding person would have thought 

had he been in the defendant’s shoes,” and not based on “what the defendant himself 

thought.” United States v. Tafuna, 5 F.4th 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2021). 

In assessing whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would 

have felt free to leave, a court takes a holistic “totality-of-the-circumstances” 

approach. United States v. Ringold, 335 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003). Factors to 

consider include: 

(1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the brandishing of a 

weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching by an officer; (4) aggressive 

language or tone of voice by an officer indicating compliance is 

compulsory; (5) prolonged retention of an individual’s personal effects; 

(6) a request to accompany an officer to the police station; 

(7) interaction in a small, enclosed, or non-public place; . . . (8) absence 

of other members of the public . . . [; and (9)] whether an officer 

indicated to the person that he is free to leave. 

United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1313 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). This list of factors “is not exhaustive,” and “no single factor is 

dispositive.” Id. But “the strong presence of two or three factors may be sufficient to 

support the conclusion a seizure occurred.” United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 

1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). 

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In assessing an officer’s verbal interaction with an individual, we have “made 

clear that the mere fact that [an officer] ask[s] incriminating questions is not relevant 

to the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry—what matters instead is the manner in 

which such questions were posed.” Ringold, 335 F.3d at 1173 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In this sense, “[a]ccusatory, persistent, and intrusive questioning can 

turn an otherwise voluntary encounter into a coercive one.” Id. at 1174 (quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he nature of a police-citizen encounter can change . . . and 

what may begin as a consensual encounter may change to an investigative detention 

if the police conduct changes.” Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1264 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 There are also specific considerations for assessing situations involving a 

police officer operating a vehicle when approaching an individual. The Supreme 

Court has recognized that “the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a [] 

pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating.” Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575. But, 

“standing alone,” this is not enough to constitute a seizure. See Hernandez, 847 F.3d 

at 1265 n.2 (quotation marks omitted) (observing that the Supreme Court in 

Chesternut held individual was not seized despite patrol car driving alongside 

individual before interaction). “[W]hen [a] police officer[] pursue[s] a citizen in their 

squad car while the citizen is on foot, courts will consider whether the officer[] 

activated their siren or flashers, operated their car in an aggressive manner to block 

the citizen’s course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement, 

displayed their weapons, or commanded the citizen to halt.” Id. at 1264. An officer 

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shining a bright, non-emergency light at an individual “is not inherently coercive.” 

Tafuna, 5 F.4th at 1201 (collecting authority on this point and noting that an 

opposing rule would place officer safety at risk when approaching a vehicle or 

individual at night).

2. Application 

The totality of the circumstances overwhelmingly favors the conclusion that 

Mr. Gates was not seized when Officer Ricks first approached and inquired about 

Mr. Gates’s presence at the carwash. Officer Ricks was the only officer present, he 

remained in his patrol car, and he spoke to Mr. Gates from a distance. Thus, when 

Officer Ricks initiated the interaction, he was not in a position to restrain Mr. Gates 

or to take possession of Mr. Gates’s personal effects.4

 Nor did Officer Ricks display a 

weapon when he initially attempted to converse with Mr. Gates. Similarly, at that 

point in the encounter, Officer Ricks neither gave Mr. Gates any commands nor 

ordered him to take or refrain from any action. Further, although the interaction 

occurred at night when few members of the public may have been out-and-about, it 

happened on a public street where the degree of coercion is generally diminished. 

Finally, Officer Ricks asked a single question in an effort to obtain information, 

4

 Mr. Gates’s initially unimpeded flight following Officer Ricks’s question 

supports the conclusion that Mr. Gates was neither objectively restrained nor felt 

subjectively restrained. 

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doing so without lobbing any direct accusations at Mr. Gates, no less a series of 

accusatory or intrusive questions. 

 Mr. Gates attempts to overcome the conclusion that he was not seized at the 

outset of the interaction by pointing to two considerations—Officer Ricks did not 

advise him he was free to leave and Officer Ricks approached him in a patrol car. 

While both considerations are certainly factors in our analysis, we find them to be of 

little weight when viewed as part of the totality of the circumstances. As to the first 

consideration, although it is true Officer Ricks did not advise Mr. Gates he was free 

to leave, Mr. Gates attempted to run away from Officer Ricks almost immediately 

after Officer Ricks commenced the interaction by asking a single question. Thus, 

Mr. Gates’s reaction and conduct did not permit Officer Ricks a reasonable 

opportunity to advise Mr. Gates he was free to leave. As to the second consideration, 

we acknowledge that a patrol car pulling up alongside an individual “could be 

somewhat intimidating.” Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575. But this alone is not sufficient 

to support the finding of a seizure. And, in this case, the district court found that 

Officer Ricks approached Mr. Gates in a non-aggressive manner, a finding that is not 

clearly erroneous. In fact, Officer Ricks’s decision not to activate his emergency 

lights when he approached Mr. Gates supports the district court’s factual conclusion.5

Further, Officer Ricks made contact with Mr. Gates shortly after he observed 

5

 Officer Ricks activated only his non-emergency spotlight, the activation of 

which enhances officer safety and does not transform an interaction into a seizure. 

United States v. Tafuna, 5 F.4th 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2021). 

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Mr. Gates run across 37th Street and, therefore, did not follow Mr. Gates for an 

extended period of time. The compressed timeframe of events in this case decreases 

the intimidating nature of Officer Ricks’s interaction with Mr. Gates. See United 

States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that officer followed 

suspect for “several blocks with his red lights on” when assessing whether a seizure 

occurred (emphasis added)). 

 Because a significant majority of the factors favor the conclusion that 

Mr. Gates was not seized at the inception of the interaction and the factors relied 

upon by Mr. Gates are of minimal value when considered in the context of the 

interaction, we conclude Mr. Gates was not seized at the outset of the interaction. 

Therefore, the starting point for our analysis regarding whether reasonable suspicion 

supported the seizure of Mr. Gates is that Mr. Gates was seized when Officer Ricks 

ordered him to “come here” and drew and deployed his taser.6

 

6

 Our case law holds that “[w]hen an officer does not apply physical force to 

restrain a suspect, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only if (a) the officer shows 

his authority; and (b) the citizen ‘submit[s] to the assertion of authority.’” United 

States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) 

(quoting California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 625–26 (1991)); cf. Torres v. Madrid, 

141 S. Ct. 989, 1001 (“Unlike a seizure by force, a seizure by acquisition of control 

involves either voluntary submission to a show of authority or the termination of 

freedom of movement.” (emphasis added)). Under this articulation of a seizure, 

Mr. Gates was not seized until Officer Ricks’s deployment of the taser impeded his 

movement. However, where no aspect of the reasonable suspicion calculus upon 

which we rely occurred between Officer Ricks ordering Mr. Gates to “come here” 

and Officer Ricks deploying his taser, we need not determine the exact second at 

which Officer Ricks seized Mr. Gates. 

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C. Whether Reasonable Suspicion Supported the Seizure of Mr. Gates? 

Similar to our analysis of when Mr. Gates was seized, we start our 

reasonable-suspicion analysis by outlining the law governing the issue. Then we 

apply the law to conclude that Officer Ricks had reasonable suspicion to stop 

Mr. Gates when he ordered Mr. Gates to “come here” and drew and deployed his 

taser. 

1. Governing Law 

In assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, this court “must look 

at the totality of the circumstances of [the] case.” United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 

1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 2011). “For reasonable suspicion to exist, an officer must 

‘articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

hunch.’” United States v. Moore, 795 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Stated as an affirmative standard, to 

conduct an investigatory stop, “an officer must have a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting an individual may be involved in criminal activity.” United 

States v. Martinez, 910 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “Although the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness 

of an officer’s suspicion, reasonable suspicion is not, and is not meant to be, an 

onerous standard.” Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “In deciding whether the government has met its burden of showing 

reasonable suspicion, we judge the officer’s conduct in light of common sense and 

ordinary human experience and we accord deference to an officer’s ability to 

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distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v. Simpson, 609 

F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 

see also United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (“We defer to 

all reasonable inferences made by law enforcement officers in light of their 

knowledge and professional experience distinguishing between innocent and 

suspicious actions.”).

The “particularized and objective basis” threshold does “not rise to the level 

required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 

preponderance of the evidence standard.” Kitchell, 653 F.3d at 1218–19. “To satisfy 

the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer need not rule out the possibility of 

innocent conduct, or even have evidence suggesting a fair probability of criminal 

activity.” Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1374, 1379 (quotation marks omitted). “As long as an 

officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual may be 

involved in criminal activity, he may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is 

more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Id. at 1379–

80 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Application

 We conclude Officer Ricks had reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Gates when 

he ordered him to “come here” and drew and deployed his taser. Most notably, 

Mr. Gates’s presence at the carwash near the coin machine, without any item in sight 

to wash, and at 11:00 p.m. on a cold March night with snow on the ground would 

draw the attention and suspicion of any reasonable officer. Officer Ricks’s suspicions 

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were justifiably heightened by Mr. Gates’s response to Officer Ricks driving down 

37th Street past the carwash.7

 From Officer Ricks’s perspective, Mr. Gates engaged 

in a series of evasive moves—first moving behind the retaining wall as Officer Ricks 

approached and then scaling the wall and running across the middle of 37th Street 

upon Officer Ricks passing the carwash. These evasive actions, coupled with the time 

of day and Mr. Gates’s seemingly out-of-place presence at the carwash, were likely 

sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion and permit Officer Ricks to seize 

Mr. Gates and inquire about his presence at the carwash. See United States v. De La 

Cruz, 703 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Flight can create reasonable suspicion 

that the person fleeing is involved in criminal activity.” (emphasis omitted)). 

Any doubt though regarding whether Officer Ricks held reasonable suspicion 

when he ordered Mr. Gates to “come here” is resolved by Officer Ricks’s observation 

of a bulge on Mr. Gates’s waistline. “[I]n the circumstances facing the officer[] in 

this case, the presence of a concealed weapon would heighten reasonable suspicion 

that criminal activity was afoot.” United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1288-89 

(10th Cir. 2013); cf. United States v. Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 2019) (“As 

the Supreme Court [has] observed . . . , a visible and suspicious ‘bulge’ [on a 

7

 Mr. Gates contends that it would have been difficult for him, at night, to 

observe that Officer Ricks was driving a marked patrol car. Although we watched the 

body camera video and were not able to clearly make out the word “police” on the 

side of the patrol car, the overhead lights on Officer Ricks’s patrol car were quite 

visible. Therefore, to the extent the district court concluded a person in Mr. Gates’s 

position would have recognized Officer Ricks’s vehicle as a police car, the court did 

not clearly err. 

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suspect] may alone ‘permit the officer to conclude that the suspect was armed and 

thus posed a serious and present danger to the safety of the officer.’” (quoting 

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977))). Therefore, based on the totality 

of the circumstances, we conclude Officer Ricks had reasonable suspicion to seize 

Mr. Gates when he ordered Mr. Gates to “come here” and drew and deployed his 

taser.8

III. CONCLUSION 

We conclude Mr. Gates was not seized until Officer Ricks ordered Mr. Gates 

to “come here” and drew and deployed his taser, and Officer Ricks had reasonable 

suspicion to seize Mr. Gates at that juncture. Therefore, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s denial of Mr. Gates’s motion to suppress and AFFIRM Mr. Gates’s 

conviction. 

Entered for the Court 

Carolyn B. McHugh 

Circuit Judge 

8

 Because of the time of day, Mr. Gates’s unexplained presence at the carwash 

near the coin machine, his flight from the carwash, and the bulge on his waistline are 

sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, we find it unnecessary to rely upon the 

purported high-crime nature of the area around 37th Street and Riverdale Road in 

reaching our conclusion. We likewise find it unnecessary to consider Mr. Gates’s 

attempt to run away from Officer Ricks after Officer Ricks asked his initial question. 

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