NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0755n.06 No. 08-4214 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. STEVEN P. PUGH, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appeal from the United States District C o urt for the Southern Di str ic t of

Oh io

B e fo re : K EI TH , B OG GS, and Mc KE AG UE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. BO GGS, Circuit J udg e. Steven Pug h, a fo rm er war ehouse ma nag er at Be rkele y

Premium Nutrac euticals, I nc. (“B erke ley ”), was convicted of conspirac y to obstruc t a Fo o d an d Drug Ad m i n i s t ra t i o n(“ FD A” ) i n s p ec t i o n , i nv i o l at i o no f 1 8 U. S
. C
. § § 3 7 1 an d 1 5 0 5
. I n t h i s ap p ea l , P u gh argues that his conviction should be rev er s ed , claiming that the g overnme nt failed to introduce sufficie nt evidence that he knowing ly enter ed int o an ag ree ment to impede the F DA’s e ffor ts. He also argues that the e vidence was insuffic ient beca use the F DA ins p ec t i o n was not an ag ency “proc eeding ” for

purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. I n addition, he claims that the district court’s jury ins tr uc tio ns we re ina de qu a te in l ig ht o f t he ir fa ilure to de fi ne the te rm “ pr oc e e din g .” Pug h a lso claims that the district court made a number of err oneous evidentiar y ruling s. Finally , Pugh c ontends that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr e d in re fu sin g to g ra

nt him a ne w tri a l bas e d on p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t. For the re asons that follow, we aff irm Pugh’s c onviction.Nos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

Rovicid was orig inally

formulated to pr omote prostate he alth. Howeve r, lag g ing sa les 1 pr omp te d th e c omp any

to r e fo rm ulate it— i.e. , c ha

ng e its ing re die nts —a

nd mark e t it a s a h e a r t
- he a lth product. When the c hang e wa s m ad e, h o we v er , my riad boxes of the old Rovicid remaine d. To avoid simply

throwing the old Rovicid away , the company repa ckag ed it as newRovicid. - 2 - I On May 12, 2004, Roy

Stephens, an F DA ins p ec t o r, ap pear ed unannounc ed at B erke ley ’s of fi c e s in B lue As h, Oh io. B e rk e le y wa s a dis tr ibutor

of he rb a l su pp le me nts , a

nd Ste ph e ns ha d c ome to gather infor

mation on the company ’s pra ctices a nd take samples of i ts products. Upon entering the company ’s hea dquarte rs, Stephens aske d to speak with “the most responsible person” and
e v e n tu a l l y m e t w i t h S t e v e n W ar s h a k an d P a u l K e l l o g g , t h e o w n e r an d g e n e r a l c o u n s e l o f

B e r k e l e y, respe ctively . Stephens prese nted Warshak with a notice of inspection and explained that the F DA would need to take a look ar ound. After g ather ing cer tain “administrative data,” Stephens indicated that FDAag ents would also nee d to inspect the are as in which Be rkele y stored its products. He wa s tol d tha tt h e p r o d

u c t s w e r e k e p ti nt w o w ar e h o u s e s , o n e o nD u f f R o a d , an d

t h e o t h e r o nC orne ll R o a d
. It w a s a g r e e d

t h a tt h e F D A w o u l d

i n s p e c tt h e f

a c i l i t i e s o nt h e f

o l l o w i n g d ay. After Stephens left, Ke llogg gat here d a number of B erke ley

executives to discuss the impending inspe ction of the wa rehouse s. Acc ordi n g t o J ames Te eg arde n, one of the executives prese nt at the m eeting , Kellog g indicated that “the FD A ag ent was g oing to g o to the war ehouse a nd revie w all of the products and chec k labeling and the like.” This cause d a mea sure of alar m among the executives, who thoug ht that one of th e wa rehouse s contained mislabele d box es of Rovicid, a
su pp le me nt t

hat w a s a dv e rt ise d to pr omo te he art he a lth
. To e ns ur e that th e F DAdid no t st umb le 1Nos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 3 - acr oss any

of the mislabeled Rovic i d , t h e ex ecutives de cided “ to move [t he] Rovicid out of the
war ehouse a

nd basica lly

hide it somewhere as quickly as possible.” Once the g roup disbanded, G re g Cossman, Ber keley ’s President, we nt to the Duff Road
war eho u s e to s p e a k

w it h Pu g h , w h o w a s in

c h ar g e o f

th e f a c il it y . A c c o r d in g to Co s s ma n , he “informe d [P ug h] t hat there was a n FDAinspection coming and [t hat they ] nee ded to g et rid of the Rovicid.” Pugh r eplied, “O kay , I ’ll take c are of it.” F oll ow inghis c on ve rs a tio n with Cos sma n, Pug h inst

ru c te d s e ve ra l w are ho us e e mpl oy e e s to load the mislabeled Rovicid onto a Penske renta l truck before the end of t he night. J ames Seiter,
one of the employ ees, later testified that Pugh “told [hi m]
. . . the FDA inspectors wer e c oming.” The ne x t morning, a

round 7 o’c lock, Pugh or dere d another employ ee, James Kin m o n , t o “ge t the truck out of t here and int o—and drive it over to [another Berke ley site] and park it in the overf low lot.” Pu g h in s tr

u c te d h im to d o it “ im me d iate ly
. ” A f te r th e tr u c k h a d b e e n mo v e d , Pu g h met Kinmon in the overflow lot and dr ove him back to the w are house. That same mor

ning, the FDAarr ived, collecte d samples, and subsequently moved on to the
rema ining f

acilities. The inspec tion concluded within the next seve ral day s, and the Rovicid-laden
re nta l tr uc k w a s dr ive n b a c k to the Du ff Roa d w are ho us e . Co ssm an, wh o h a d to ld P ug h to dis po se of the Rovicid, later

visited the ware house and sa w that “the Rovicid that w as to be g otten rid of wa s [back].” Accor ding to Cossman, Pug h explained that “he ha d hidden [the Rovicid] on a re ntal truck and re turned it bac k to the war ehouse.” On September

27, 2005, more than a y ear afte r the F DA inspec tion, Pugh was a rre sted in the wake of a ma ssive criminal investig ation into Ber keley ’s business prac tices. On Septembe r 20,Nos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 4 - 20 06 , a g ra nd jur y sittin g in t

he Southe rn

Di str ic t of Ohi o r e tur

ne d a 11 2- c ount i nd ic tme nt a g a ins t P u gh an d s ev er al o t h er s . P u gh wa s ch ar gedwi t h o n e c o u n to f c o n s p i ra cy t o co m m i tm i s b ra n d i n g, one count of misbranding , and one count of c onspiracy to obstruct an F DA proc eeding . I n Fe bruar y 2008, following a seven- wee k trial, a jury acquitted Pug h of the misbrandingchar g es but convicte d him of c onsp ira c y

to i mpe de the F DAins pe c tio n. Af te r t ri a l, P ug h mo ve d f

or a c qu itt a l, b ut h is motion was denied. He was later sentenc ed to one y ear and one da

y of imprisonment, to be followed by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. This timely appea l followed. II Pugh a rg ues that the e vidence at trial wa s insufficient to supp o r t h is conviction for c onspiracy to obstruct an ag ency

proce eding . “Ge nera lly , when the suf ficienc y o f the evidenc e is cha lleng ed
on a pp e a l, t he sta nd ard of re vie w is ‘ wh e the r, a ft e r v ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the prosec ution, anyratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e essen tia l e le me nts of the c ri me bey ond a re asonable doubt.’” United States v. Swidan , 888 F.2d 1076, 1080 ( 6th Cir. 1989) (quoting J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ). “ Cir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e a lon e is s uf fi c ient to sustain a conviction and such evidenc e need not remove ever y rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” United States v. Vanne rson , 7 8 6 F. 2 d 2 2 1 , 2 2 5 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 6 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Stone , 748 F.2d 361 ( 6th Cir. 1984)). To establish that a defe ndant is guilty of conspirac y under 18 U .S.C. § 371, t he g overnme nt must prove three elements: “(1) the ex istence of an agree ment to violate the law; (2) knowledg e and intent to join t he conspira cy ; and (3) a n overt act constituting ac tual participation in the conspiracy .” Un ite d Sta te

s v . B lac k we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 760 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “[P] roof of a for mal ag ree ment . . .Nos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

On cr oss-examination, Cos sman was a sked whe ther he told Pugh to “hide” the Rovicid, and 2 Cos sma n s a id n o. Ho we ve r, Cos sma n’ s a ns we r do e s no thi ng to un de rm ine his te sti mony that he tol d Pugh to get rid of

the Rovicid. I t does appe ar that there was some c onfusion among the conspirators a s to wh e the r t

he Rov ic id s ho uld

be hid de n o r d e str oy e d, bu t th a t in c on sis te ncy is ulti mate ly immaterial. The point is that they agreed to pre vent the F DA fr om sniffing out the mislabeled su pp le me nts
. - 5 - is unnece ssary ; a tacit or mutual understanding among the parties is sufficient to show a c onspiracy .” United States v. Lee , 99 1 F. 2 d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1993). I ndeed, “ [a] conspirac y may be infe rre d from cir cumstantial evidenc e [that] may rea sonably

be interpr eted a s participation in a c ommon plan.” Un ite d Sta te

s v . W all s , 2 9 3 F. 3 d 9 5 9 , 9 6 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Blake ney , 942 F.2d 1001, 1010 ( 6th Cir. 1991)). A Pug h a rgue s th a t th e g ov e rnme nt f a ile d to pr ov e that he kn owi ngly joi ne d a c on sp ir a c y

to obstruct the F DA inspec tion. He ar g ues that he w as mere ly “an unw itting pawn” in the hands of Be rkele y executives. Reply Br
. at 9. He also claims that “ther e [was] no evidenc e that [he] had any involvement in conver sations, m eetings or tra nsactions re lating to the illeg al cr iminal activity .” Appellant’s B r. at 21. In sum, he argues that there is nothing in the rec ord to sug g est that he kne w the Rovicid neede d to be moved bec ause of the looming inspec tion. Howeve r, that is simply

not the case . Cossman testified that he told Pugh to g et rid of the Rovicid so that the FDA w ould not find it. T hus, there is c ompetent evidenc e in the re cord that 2 Pugh discusse d the aims of the c onspiracy with Cossm an bef ore movingthe Rovicid out of the DuffNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

Pugh a rg ues that Cossman’s t es t i mony was inconsistent with respe ct to what exactly was 3 said during the conve rsation prior to the FDA ’s arr ival. Pugh c ontends that, on cross- examination, Cossman indicated that he “could not be cer tain that Pugh was e ven told that the FD A was c oming.” A p p e l l an t ’ s B r . a t 2 1
. H o w e v e r , t h a ti s ano v e rtm i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o no f t h e t r i a l t r an s c r i p t
. In r e a l i t y, C o s s m an s t at edt h at h e c o u l d n o tre m em b er

t el l i n g inv esti

ga tor s th at he had told Pugh about the FDAinspection. - 6 - Road war ehouse. Pugh’ s statement t hat he would “take car e of it” permits the conclusion that he 3 knowing ly

ag ree d to advanc e the c riminal aims of the Be rkele y executives. Thus, a re asonable juror
c o u l d f a i r l y c o n c l u d e t h a tP u g h h a d t h e r e qu i s i t e i n t e n tt o c o m m i tc o n s p i r a c y. But that is har dly

the extent of the evidenc e ag ainst Pugh. There i s al s o t h e testimony of J ames Seiter, w ho stated that Pug h told him “the FDA ins p ec t ors wer e comingand to g et the
rema ining [ Rovicid] that hadn’t be en switche d from the old box to t he new box out of sight.” Seiter also testified that he put Rovicid “in [a] rental truck.” Additionally , J ames Kinmon testified that Pugh instructe d h i m to drive the re ntal truck to an of f-site pa rking lot. A rea sonable juror , when confr onted with this testim ony , could rationally conclude that Pugh wa s a knowing participa nt in the plot to concea l the Rovicid from the F DA. Consequently , Pugh’ s conviction must stand. B Pugh’ s next argument is that the evidenc e wa s insufficient bec ause, if a ny thing, it showed only tha t h e a tt e mp te d

to im p e d e a r o u ti n e F D A in s p e c ti o n . T h e in s p e c ti o n , h e ar g u e s , d o e s not qualify as an a g ency “proc eeding ” withi n the meaningof 18 U.S.C. § 1505. There fore , acc ordingNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

Pug h als o ar g ue s tha t a pr e jud ic ia l va

ri anc e oc c ur

re d b e c a us e the ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d h im 4 with conspirac y

to obstruct an ag ency

proce eding and the g overnme nt introduced e vidence of a conspirac y

to obstruct the FD A inspection. This argument i s s i m p l y another manifestation of the contention that the F DA inspec tion was not an ag ency proce eding
. As such, i t merits no independe nt discussion. Pugh c ontends that this court’s re ading of the term “proc eeding ” should be informed by the 5 lang uag e of 21 U .S.C. § 331(f), which spe cifica lly prohibits refusa l to permit an FD A in s p ec tion. He is incorr ect. The term “pr ocee ding” appea rs in 18 U.S.C. § 1505, an entirely dif ferent statute. See U nited States v. Simpson , 520 F.3d 531, 537 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (“Dif fer ing statutory

contexts j ustify differ ing inter

pretations.”). - 7 - to Pugh, evide nce that he conspire d to obstruc t the inspection was ne cessa rily insufficient to prove t h at h e c o n s p i re d

t o o b s t ru ct an age n cy

p ro ce ed i n g. 4 I t is clea r, howe ver, that the FDAinspection was a n ag ency proce eding for pur

poses of the rele vant statute. As we obse rved in United States v. Fruc htman , in the contex t of § 1505, the term 5

“ p r o c e eding ” is one “ of broa d scope, e ncompassing both the investigative and adjudicative functions of a de pa rtme nt o r a g e nc y .” 42 1 F .2 d 1 01 9, 10 21 (6 th C ir . 1 97 0) ; see U nited States v. Senffner , 280 F.3d 755, 761 ( 7th Cir. 2002) (noting th at t h e t erm “proce eding ” is “de fined rather broa dly ”). I ndeed, nume rous cour

ts of appea ls have he ld that a var iety of ag ency

investigative acti v i t i es constitute “proc eeding s.” See, e .g. , United States v. Sutton , 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that failure to c omply with a Depa rtment of Ener g y

subpoena c onstitut ed obstruction of a n
a g e nc y pr oc e e din g ); United States v. Browning , 572 F.2d 720, 723- 24 (10th Cir. 1978) (findingthat a Bureau o f

Cu s to ms in qu ir

y in to th e im

p o rtati o np r a c ti c e s o f

th e d e f e n d an ts w a s ana g ency pr oc e e din g ); Un ite d S

tates v . V ix ie , 532 F.2d 1277, 1278 (9th Cir. 1976) (findingthat the def endant impeded an a g ency

proce edingby

submitt ing f

alse d ocuments in response to an Interna l RevenueNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

Pugh make s much of t he judicially noticed fa ct that the F DA “visit[s] some 16,000 fac iliti es 6 a y ear to monitor the manufa cture of products that fall[] under its jurisdiction.” Howe ver, the sheer nume ro sity

of the ins pe c tio ns ha s n oth ingto d o w ithwh e the r t he y c on sti tut e a g e nc y

pr oc e e din g s. - 8 - Se rv ic e su bp oe n a )
. A c c o r d i n g ly , b e c a us e the F DAins pe c tio n in thi s c a se is l arg e ly

ind ist inguis ha

ble fr om o the r i nv e sti g a tiv e a c tio ns fo un d to qu a lif y a s p ro c e e din g s, Pug h’ s a rgume nt f a ils
. Of c ours e , w e a c kn ow le dg e that, in ca se s whe re a g e nc y inv e sti g a tio ns have be e n d e e me d to constitute proce eding s, “the investig ations ty pically have involved ag encie s with some adjudicative power , or with the powe r to enha nce the ir investigations through t h e i s s u ance of subpoena s or
war rants.” United States v. Kelley , 36 F.3d 1118, 1127 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Howeve r, that does not alter the conclusion in this case, a s the FD A clea rly possesses “e nhance d” investig ative powe rs. See 21 U.S.C. § 374(a) (a

uthoriz i n g t h e FD A to conduct inspec tions of “any fac tory , war ehouse, or establishment in w hich food, drug s, device s, tobacc o products, or cosmetics are m anufa cture d, proce ssed, pac ked, or he ld, for introduction into interstate c ommerce or afte r such introduc tion”); United States v. Roux

Labs., Inc. , 4 56 F . Su

pp . 9 73 , 9 75 (M .D . F la . 197 8) (n oti ngthat “ 21 U. S.C. § 374(a) , (c) , and (d) authorizes FDA ag ents to conduct reasona ble s ear ches a

nd inspections of the premises of busine sses and e stablishments reg ulated by the ac t, and to collect samples for testing and examination”). Fur thermore , the fa ct that the F DA inspec tion was not a “for mal administrative action” ha s
no bear ing on the conclusion that it was an a g ency proce eding
. See Appellant’s Br
. at 17. As the 6 Eig hth Circuit ex plained in Rice v. United States , “it would be absurd to hold that Congr ess meant to pr oscribe interfe renc e with the administrative proc ess only afte r [it] had re ache d a ce rtain for malNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 9 - stag e and le t go unpunishe d individuals who obstruct earlier preliminary proce eding s . . . .” 356 F.2d 70 9, 712 (8 th Ci r. 1966 ); see Browning , 5 72 F .2 d at 72 3- 24 . Ind e e d, pe rm itt ingde fe nd ants to obstruct routine inspec tions that lead to more for malized ag ency

actions would fr

ustrate the g oal of the statute. The e arly

bird may g et the wor

m, but he should not ge t impunity from prose cution under § 1505. III Pugh’ s next argument is that the district court er red in fa iling to instruct the jury on the definition of the ter

m “proc eeding ” as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 1505. “ ‘The standard on a ppeal f or
a c ourt ’s c ha

rg e to t he jur y is w he the r t

he c ha rg e , taken as a

wh ole , f a ir ly and a de qu a te ly

su bmi ts the issues and a

pplicable law

to the jury .’” United St ates v. Buc kley , 934 F.2d 84, 87 ( 6th Cir. 1991) (q u o t i n g Un ite d S

tates v . M ar tin , 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 ( 6th Cir. 1984)). I n this case, our

revie w of the jury instructions is brief, f or the que stion of whether an ag ency action constit utes a “proce eding ” is a question for the judge , not the jury
. See F ruchtman , 421 F.2d at 1021 (“The definition of ‘proc eeding ’ as use d in the statute was a question of law to be de termined by the c ourt

ra the r t ha n th e jur y .” ); Un ite d S

tates v . No rth , 9 10 F .2 d 8 43 , 8 94 n. 29 (“ I t is ind isp uta ble that the question of whe ther a proce eding constitutes a n inquiry under § 1505 is a matter of law for the cour t.”), as amende d by920 F. 2 d 8 4 3 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Consequently , the district court wa s under no oblig ation to inform the jury as to the mea

ning of the t erm “proce eding ,” and Pug h’s contention fa ils. IVNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 10 - P u gh al s o at t ac k s s ev er al o f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s ev i d en t i ary ru l i n gs . W e r ev i ew s u ch ru l i n gs for abuse of discretion. See McCombs v. M eijer, Inc

. , 3 95 F .3 d 3 46 , 3 58 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . I f a n a bu se of discre tion is found, reve rsal is w arr anted only “whe n ‘such a buse of discr etion has ca

used more than har mless error .’” Ibid. (q u o t i n g Cooley v. CarmikeCinemas, Inc. , 25 F.3d 1325, 1330 (6th Cir. 19 94 )) . A n e vid e nti ary

e rr or is h arm le ss “ un le ss it i s mo re pr ob a ble tha n n ot t hat th e e rr or

mate ri a lly aff ecte d the ver dict.” Un ite d S tates v . M ar tin , 897 F.2d 1368, 1372 ( 6th Cir. 1990). A Pugh’ s first evidenc e-r elated a rg ument is t h at t h e dis trict court imprope rly permitted the g ov ernme nt t o e lic it t e sti mony duri ngre dir e c t e xami natio n th a t w a s o uts ide the sc op e of c ro sse xami na tio n. Mo re sp e c if

ic a lly , Pug h co nte nd s tha t the g ov e rnme nt sho uld no t hav e be e n a ble to
a sk Cos sma n a bo ut P ug h’ s st a te men t th a t he ha d “ hid de n” the Rov ic id. I n e va luatin g thi s contention, we a

re mindful that a “ trial judg e h as b ro ad discre tion in determining the scope of redire ct examination . . . .” U n ite d S ta te s v . S e g ines , 1 7 F. 3 d 8 4 7 , 856 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Un ite d S tat es v . To ulo um is , 771 F.2d 235, 241 ( 7th Cir. 1985)). Her e, the testimony

at issue was squa

rely within the boundaries of the cr oss-examination. When questioning Cossman, Pugh’ s attorney asked him about the c onversation that had take n place
o nt h e e v e o f t h e F DA ’s i n s p ec t i o no f t h e D u ff R o adwa re h o u s e. Du ri n g t h at l i n e o f q u es t i o n i n g, Pugh’ s attorney

asked Cossman whe ther he told “Steve Pugh to hide product fr om the FDA [.] ” That inquiry plainly “opene d the door” to redire ct t estimony about whether P ug h had squi rre led awa y any Rovicid. Un ite d S

tates v . B ro wn , 276 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, it cannot be sa id that the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

pe rm itt ingCos sma

n’ s te sti mony

on re dir e c t.Nos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 11 - B Pug h’ s n e xt ar g ume nt i s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng c e rt a in he ars ay state me nts
. At trial, a number

of wa rehouse employ ees wer e permitted to te stify that they had hea rd fr om other employ ees that the Rovicid was moved to pre vent the F DA fr om discoveringit. The district court
a dmi tte d th e te sti mony ov e r re pe a te d he ars ay ob je c tio ns , r uli ngthat th e state me nts we re a dmi ssi ble
u n d e r F e d e r a l R

u le o f E v id e n c e 8 0 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( D )
. I ns o ruling , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt s tate d , “ [m ]y p h i l o s o p h y i s . . . t h a t i ti s [ an ] e x c e p t i o nt o t h e h e ar s ay r u l e . T h e y’ r e a l l e mp l o ye e s o f t h e c o mp an y. They ’re all admissions ag ainst interest her e.” Assuming, arguendo , that the di strict court’s r uling wa s improper, ther e is still no cause for
reve rsal. The rec ord conta ins unequivocal—a nd plainly

admi ssible—testimony

from seve ral individuals who stated that Pugh kne w t he F DA wa s coming . Thus, the hea rsay statements at issue
wer e cumulative, r ender ing any mistake on the par t of the district court ha

rmless. See H

amblin v. Mi tc he ll , 354 F.3d 482, 496 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that an evide ntiary err or wa s harmless whe re “[m] uch of the [i mproperly admitted] i nformation .
. . was c umulative of information that was proper ly admitted, and the [other] evidence pointing to def endant’ s g uilt was very

strong ”). C Pugh’ s final evidentiar

y argument is that the district court improperly permitted the g overnme nt to elicit testim ony throug h leadingquestions. Under F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 611(c ), “[l] eadingquestions should not be used on the direc t examination of a witness excep t as may be
ne c e ssa ry to d e ve lop the wi tne ss’ tes ti mo ny .” Gi ve n th e langua g e of Rul e 61 1( c ), “ [i]t is we llNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

One of the obj ections t o which Pug h ref ers did not eve n deal with lea ding que stions. R ather , 7 Pugh’ s attorney

objected on the g rounds that the witness’s a nswer w as non-r esponsive. “Whether state ments made by a prose cutor amount to mi sconduct a nd whether

such 8 statements re nder a trial fundame ntally unfair are mix ed questions of lawand fa ct, which we revie w de novo .” United States v. Carson , 5 6 0 F
. 3 d 5 6 6 , 5 7 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Fran c is , 170 F.3d 546, 549 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). - 12 - re c og nize d th a t th e us e of le a din g qu e sti on s d

ur ingthe dir e c t e xami natio n o f a wi tne ss f a lls wi thi n the sound discre tion of the trial cour t.” United States v. Shoupe , 548 F.2d 636, 641 ( 6th Cir. 1977). He re , Pu g h o bje c ts to a numbe r o f i ns tanc e s in wh ic h th e g ov e rnme nt’ s atto rn e y wa s si mpl y
a tte mpt ingto f

oc us the wi tne ss o r to oth e rw ise c lari fy te sti mony . I n th e wo rd s o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt , 7 all the gover

nment’s attorney did was “focus[] on a particular area of i nquiry on cross-e x amination,
so we [did

no t] have to g o a

ro un d th e mul be rr

y bu sh .” L eading is p e rm iss ibl e un de r t ho se circ umstance s. See U

nited States v. Kuehne , 547 F.3d 667, 692 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “lea ding que stions [ may

be] util ized to direc t a witness’ attention to a particular individual or da te, or to clar ify

testimony ”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discre tion. V Pugh’ s final arg

ument is that a new trial is neede d beca use the prose cutor’s r ebuttal ar g ument
wa s la c e d w ith imp ro pe r re mark s. To de c ide wh e the r a pr os e c uto r’ s r e mark s and c on du c t me ri t a new tria l, we e mploy

a two-pa rt test. Crist ini v. McKee , 526 F.3d 888, 899 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing 8 Girts v. Y

anai , 501 F.3d 743, 758- 59 (6th Cir. 2007)). F i rs t, we must examine “whethe r the prosec utor’s conduct and rema rks wer e improper .” United States v. Carter , 236 F .3 d 777 , 783 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d Sta tes v. C arrol l , 26 F.3d 1380, 1387 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). Second, if theNos. 08-3997, 08-4214

United States v. Stev en Pugh

- 13 - c on du c t an d r e m ar

k s w e r e i mp r o p e r , “ t h e c o u rt m u s t
. . . c o n s i d e r an d w e i g h f o u r f a c tor s in deter mining whe ther the impropr iety was fla g rant and thus warra nts rever sal.” Ibid. The four fac tors
are : “(1) w hether

the conduc t and re marks of the prosec utor tended to mislead the jur y or pre judice the def endant; (2 ) wh ether

the conduc t or rema

rks wer e isolated or e x tensive; (3) w hether the
rema rks wer e deliberately

or ac cidentally

made; and ( 4) whe ther the e vidence ag ainst the defe ndant was strong .” Ibid. Ad dit ion a lly , “ [w]he n c on sid e ri ngc ha lle ng e s to a pr os e c uto r’ s st a te me nts a t tr ia l,
we e x amine those statements within the context of the [entire] trial to de termine whether they wer e prejudicia l error .” Crist ini , 5 2 6 F. 3 d at 8 9 9 (c i t i n g Gi rts , 501 F.3d at 759). We hold that the prosecutor ’s conduc t in this case does not merit re versa l. A t bottom, t he
rema rks at is sue we re not suff iciently prejudicia l in light of the fa ct that the district cour t issued a forc eful c urative instruc tion. See U nited States v. Carson , 560 F.3d 566, 576 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (holding that prejudice cause d by a prosecu t o r’ s i m proper rema rks may be cur ed or minimiz ed throug h curative instructions). A more c omplete expl anation of our holding is set for

th in United States v. W

arshak , No. 08-3997, at *44-55 (6th Cir. 2010), which a ddresse s the same pr osecutoria l misconduct claims–ar ising out of the sa me trial–that Pug h separ ately raises he re. VI F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , Pu g h’ s c on vic tio n is AF F IRM ED
.