UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM L. SINGLETARY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-1638

ENERSYS, INCORPORATED, formerly

known as Yuasa, Incorporated,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-00-527-3-10)

Argued: January 22, 2003

Decided: February 10, 2003

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and MOTZ,

Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: George Andrew Harper, JACKSON LEWIS, L.L.P.,

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. John Palmer Britton,

BRITTON LAW FIRM, Sumter, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Robert M. Sneed, JACKSON LEWIS, L.L.P., Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellant. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

William Singletary brought this action against his former

employer, Enersys, Inc., seeking compensatory and punitive damages

for alleged wrongful termination of employment in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-117,

12201-213 (West 1995 and West Supp. 2002), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 1999), and

South Carolina law. Enersys moved to dismiss the action and compel

arbitration of Singletary’s claims or, alternatively, to stay the action

pending the outcome of arbitration. 

Finding that the collective bargaining agreement did not contain

explicit provisions sufficient to waive Singletary’s right to litigate his

employment grievances in federal court, the district court denied

Enersys’s motions. Enersys then moved for interlocutory appeal on

the question of "[w]hether the collective bargaining agreement satisfies the Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998)

standard for permitting waivers of an employee-union member’s statutory right to a jury trial on his federal and statutory claims under the

ADA and the FMLA?" The district court certified the question, and

we granted Enersys’s petition for interlocutory appeal. See 28

U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 1993). We reverse. 

I.

Singletary began work for Enersys’s predecessor on June 12, 1988.

He contends that on February 26, 1999 his employment was unlawfully terminated because of a disability (paranoid schizophrenia),

which had been diagnosed in 1985. Singletary maintains that he successfully treated his schizophrenia with medication during the bulk of

his employment, requiring only four short hospitalizations over more

than ten years of employment with the company. After his last hospi2 SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC.
talization, Singletary apparently had trouble adjusting to his new medication and, rather than return to work, re-entered the hospital. During

this time, Enersys terminated his employment, ostensibly because of

"absenteeism." Singletary then brought this action for wrongful termination. 

There is no dispute that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)

entered into by the company and the I.U.E. International Union governed Singletary’s employment and his subsequent termination. The

only question is whether the arbitration provisions of the CBA were

sufficiently clear to meet the standards required to constitute a waiver

of Singletary’s right to litigate in a judicial forum his statutory claims

of employment discrimination. 

II.

We review the district court’s contract interpretation decision de

novo. See United States v. Bankers Insurance Co., 245 F.3d 315, 319

(4th Cir. 2001). In doing so, however, we do not simply apply common law principles of contract interpretation; nor do we impose the

general presumption of arbitrability that applies in other contexts.

Rather, the Supreme Court has directed that in situations like this,

involving a "a union-negotiated waiver of employees’ statutory right

to a judicial forum for claims of employment discrimination," such a

waiver must be "clear and unmistakable." See Universal Maritime,

525 U.S. at 80-81; see also Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325,

331 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[C]ollective bargaining agreements to arbitrate

these [statutory] claims, unlike contracts executed by individuals,

must be ‘clear and unmistakable’" (quoting Universal Maritime, 525

U.S. at 80)).1

In applying Universal Maritime, we have concluded that a collective bargaining agreement can achieve "the requisite degree of clarity

1

In Universal Maritime, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the

question whether a union-negotiated waiver of a statutory right to litigate

employment claims in federal court can ever be enforceable. See Universal Maritime, 525 U.S. at 82. This court, however, has "answered that

question — both before that decision and since — in the affirmative."

Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1999).

SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC. 3
. . . by two different approaches." Carson, 175 F.3d at 331. The first

approach "simply involves drafting an explicit arbitration clause," i.e.,

"a clear and unmistakable provision under which the employees agree

to submit to arbitration all federal causes of action arising out of their

employment." Id. The second approach applies "when the arbitration

clause is not so clear," and requires that such "[g]eneral arbitration

clauses" be supported by additional provisions mandating "explicit

incorporation of statutory anti-discrimination requirements," which

"make[ ] it unmistakably clear that the discrimination statutes at issue

are part of the agreement." Id., at 332; see also Brown v. ABF Freight

Systems, Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1999). In the case at

hand, we need only consider the first approach. 

Article V (Non-Discrimination) of the governing CBA provides in

pertinent part: 

The company and the union recognize the importance of

providing all employees with equal employment opportunities, as provided by applicable laws. Therefore, the Company and the Union agree that no employee will be

discriminated against based upon their race, color, creed,

religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or status as a

Vietnam era veteran. The Company and the Union will comply with all laws preventing discrimination and regarding

employment of individuals. . . . 

Any and all claims regarding equal employment opportunity or provided for under this Article of the Agreement or

under any federal or state employment law shall be exclusively addressed by an individual employee or the Union

under the grievance and arbitration provisions of this

Agreement.

The specific grievance and arbitration procedures are detailed separately in Articles XIII (Grievances) and XIV (Arbitration). 

The district court concluded that the language emphasized above

did not constitute the "clear and unmistakable" waiver described in

Universal Maritime because it was "general in nature," "somewhat

ambiguous," devoid of any "specific reference to arbitration of

4 SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC.
employee claims against Defendant under the ADA, FMLA, or state

law governing wrongful termination of employment," and lacking any

"explicit incorporation of statutory antidiscrimination requirements."

Singletary urges us to affirm the district court, arguing similarly that

the language of the CBA does not constitute an "explicit arbitration

agreement" because "the word ‘statute’ is not present, there is no reference to statutory discrimination disputes, there is no reference to the

FMLA, and there is no language that compels arbitration." Brief of

Appellee at 8.2

We disagree with the interpretation of the CBA advanced by the

district court and urged on us by Singletary. Article V of the CBA

does include an explicit arbitration provision: "Any and all claims . . .

under any federal or state employment law shall be exclusively

addressed by an individual employee or the Union under the grievance and arbitration provisions of this Agreement." This language

constitutes a "clear and unmistakable provision under which the

employees agree to submit to arbitration all federal causes of action

arising out of their employment." Carson, 175 F.3d at 331. Although

2Singletary also contends that the CBA arbitration provisions are permissive rather than mandatory because Article XIV (Arbitration) states

that "[a]ll disputes . . . may be referred to arbitration." Id. at 11-12. This

argument disregards the context of the "may." Article XIV provides in

pertinent part: "All disputes under this agreement which are not settled

or resolved may be referred to arbitration by a notice given to the other

party. Notice of appeal of a grievance must be given within ten (10) days

of the Company’s decision in the last step of the Grievance Procedure.

In the event that notice of arbitration is not given within the ten (10) day

period, the grievance shall be considered settled and/or waived." JA 50.

Thus, failure to give proper and timely notice of arbitration ordinarily

results in settlement or waiver of the grievance; this does not render arbitration permissive. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,

78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that purpose of the word "may"

in a CBA was "to give an aggrieved party the choice between arbitration

and abandonment of his claim"); see also Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d at

320-21 (same). We note, however, that at oral argument counsel for

Enersys stipulated that, in any event, this ten-day notice provision could

not be applied in a manner that would prevent an employee from exercising his procedural rights to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination

claims initiated within the time period set forth in the governing statute.

SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC. 5
the language is indeed quite broad, it could not be more clear. Nothing in Universal Maritime, Carson, or Brown requires that the provision be narrow in scope, just that it be clear and unmistakable in its

application to statutory claims. The arbitration provision here refers

explicitly to "any and all claims . . . under any federal or state

employment law," thus, its application to statutory claims arising in

the employment context is certainly clear. Simply put, it includes the

entire set of such claims, leaving no room for courts and litigants to

speculate on the margins about which claims are covered and which

are not. 

A quick review of the agreements at issue in the leading cases illustrates the point. In Universal Maritime, 525 U.S. at 80, the arbitration

clause merely provided for arbitration of "[m]atters under dispute"

without elaborating on whether those matters could arise under the

employment contract, or federal law, or both, and "contain[ed] no

explicit incorporation of statutory anti-discrimination requirements."

Similarly, in Carson, 175 F.3d at 332, the arbitration clauses stated

"that the parties agree to arbitrate all disputes over the meaning of the

agreement," without mentioning "disputes arising under federal law,"

and without any explicit incorporation of federal statutory law.

Finally, in Brown, 183 F.3d at 321-22, the arbitration provisions also

referred generally to "all grievances or questions of interpretation

arising under . . . this Agreement," without any mention of those that

might arise out of alleged statutory violations and without any explicit

provision incorporating the anti-discrimination statutes. Consequently, in all of these cases, the arbitration provisions were held

insufficient to constitute waivers of the employees’ rights to litigate

their statutory claims. By comparison, the arbitration clause in this

case was far more explicit — referring to "any and all claims . . .

under any federal or state employment law." 

Indeed, the provision at issue in this case is arguably even more

clear than that in Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306, 308 (4th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam), which we held sufficient to waive an

employee’s right to a judicial forum. In Safrit, the CBA stated only

that the parties agreed to "abide by all the requirements of Title VII"

and "that [u]nresolved grievances arising under this Section are the

proper subjects for arbitration." Id. The CBA in this case explicitly

mandates that "any and all claims . . . under any federal or state

6 SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC.
employment law shall be exclusively addressed" through the agreement’s grievance and arbitration procedures. 

III.

No matter how sympathetic his claims, William Singletary submitted to a union-negotiated agreement that contained an explicit arbitration clause, which clearly and unmistakably waives his rights to

litigate statutory employment discrimination claims in a judicial

forum. Such "[a]n agreement to arbitrate statutory claims is part of the

natural tradeoff that a union must make in exchange for other benefits." Safrit, 248 F.3d at 308. Had the union and the company struck

a different bargain, the result might indeed be different. But this is the

bargain they reached, and we hold that it is sufficient under Universal

Maritime and Carson to constitute a waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims in a judicial forum. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

SINGLETARY v. ENERSYS, INC. 7