IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

TINA L. BANGHART-BROWN 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYNW. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

6:15-CV-01883-PK 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Tina L. Banghmt-Brown protectively filed this action on October 31, 2011, 

seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her 

application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act 

(the "Act"). This court has jurisdiction over Banghart-Brown's action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) and 1383( c )(3). 

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Banghart-Brown argues that: (1) the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") failed to provide 

a clear and convincing reason for rejecting her symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ failed to credit 

Dr. Anthony Glassman, an examining doctor; (3) the ALJ failed to credit the treating mental 

health providers; (4) the post-hearing opinion of Dr. Mia Schreiner, the treating neurologist, 

shows the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence; (5) the Commissioner failed 

to prove that Banghart-Brown retains the ability to perf01m "other work" in the national 

economy; and (6) the ALJ failed to develop the record by not ordering a comprehensive 

psychological examination, as recommended by Dr. Schreiner. I have considered the parties' 

briefs and all of the evidence in the administrative record. For the reasons set fmih below, the 

Conm1issioner's final decision should be affirmed. 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 

To establish disability within the meaning of the Act, a claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impaitment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(I)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step 

sequential process for dete1mining whether a claimant has made the requisite demonstration. See 

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At the first 

four steps of the process, the burden of proof is on the claimant; only at the fifth and final step 

does the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ considers the claimant's work activity, if any. See Bowen, 482 

U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged 

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in substantial gainful activity, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 

140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b). Otherwise, the evaluation will proceed 

to the second step. 

At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairments. 

See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140-141; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impaitment is 

"severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's ability to perfo1m basic work activities and is 

expected to persist for a period of twelve months or longer. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). The ability to perform basic work activities is defined as "the abilities 

and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 

141. If the ALJ finds that the claimant's impairments are not severe or do not meet the duration 

requirement, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). Nevertheless, it is well established that "the step-two 

inquity is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chafer, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153-154. "An impairment or 

combination of impaitments can be found 'not severe' only if the evidence establishes a slight 

abnormality that has 'no more than a minimal effect on an individual[']s ability to work." Id., 

quoting S.S.R. 85-28, 1985 SSR LEXIS 19 (1985). 

If the claimant's impairments are severe, the evaluation will proceed to the third step, at 

which the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal "one of a number of 

listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude 

substantial gainful activity." Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 

416.920(d). If the claimant's impaitments are equivalent to one of the impaitments enumerated 

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in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1, the claimant will conclusively be found disabled. See 

Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)( 4)(iii), 416.920( d). 

If the claimant's impairments are not equivalent to one of the enumerated impailments, 

between the third and the fourth steps the ALJ is required to assess the claimant's residual 

functional capacity ("RFC"), based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the 

claimant's case record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is an estimate of the claimant's 

capacity to perform sustained, work-related physical and/or mental activities on a regular and 

continuing basis, 1 despite the limitations imposed by the claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.945(a); see also S.S.R. No. 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5 (July 2, 1996). 

At the fourth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the 

claimant's past relevant work. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 

If, in light of the claimant's RFC, the ALJ determines that the claimant can still perform his or 

her past relevant work, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see 

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). In the event the claimant is no longer capable of 

performing his or her past relevant work, the evaluation will proceed to the fifth and final step, at 

which the burden of proof shifts, for the first time, to the Commissioner. 

At the fifth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the 

claimant's age, education, and work experience to determine whether a person with those 

characteristics and RFC could perform any jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 

1 "A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work 

schedule." S.S.R. No. 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5 (July 2, 1996). 

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416.960(c), 416.966. If the Commissioner meets her burden to demonstrate the existence in 

significant numbers in the national economy of jobs capable of being performed by a person with 

the RFC assessed by the ALJ between the third and fourth steps of the five-step process, the 

claimant is found not to be disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c), 416.966. A claimant will be found entitled to benefits 

if the Commissioner fails to meet that burden at the fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see 

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A reviewing court must affirm an ALJ's decision if the ALJ applied proper legal 

standards and his or her findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2004). "'Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it 

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Robbins v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The court must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that suppo1ts 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Id., quoting Reddick v. 

Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the Commissioner. See id., citing Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882; see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 

F .3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001 ). Moreover, the court may not rely upon its own independent 

findings of fact in detennining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence 

of record. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003), citing SEC v. Chene1y 

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Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). If the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is rational, it is 

immaterial that the evidence may be "susceptible [ ofJ more than one rational interpretation." 

1'vfagallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). 

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD2 

Banghart-Brown was born April 27, 1970. Tr. 44.3 She completed the 11th grade. Tr. 

243. According to the evidence ofrecord, prior to her claimed disability onset date of April 30, 

2011, Banghart-Brown worked as a fast food worker, an informal waitress, and an import clerk. 

Tr. 92, 226-27, 230-31, 258-70. 

The earliest medical evidence in the administrative record is a November 2009 Mental 

Health Assessment from the Douglas County Health and Social Services Department when 

Banghart-Brown came in with complaints of depression and a hist01y of marijuana use. Tr. 331-

51. Banghart-Brown rep01ted increased problems with depression and anger after she was 

attacked by a man with a knife in February 2008 while living in a homeless shelter with her 

children. Tr. 331. She also reported having panic attacks every few weeks. Id. The examiner 

diagnosed posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). Tr. 351. After her assessment, BanghartBrown began attending group therapy sessions, but in August 2010 was discharged for failing to 

keep appointments with Douglas County Mental Health. Tr. 363-65. 

2 The following recitation constitutes a summmy of the evidence contained within the 

Administrative Record, and does not reflect any independent finding of fact by the court. 

3 Citations to "Tr." refer to the page(s) indicated in the official transcript of the administrative 

record filed herein as Docket No. 11. 

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In January 2011, Banghart-Brown returned to the Douglas County Health and Social 

Services Department for panic attacks. Tr. 352-61. That month she also began treatment at 

Umpqua Community Health Center with Yancy Seamans, Family Nurse Practitioner ("FNP") for 

chronic low back pain, insomnia, migraine headaches, esophageal reflux, and seasonal allergic 

rhinitis. Tr. 398-400. She reported using marijuana to help her relax and lower anxiety, and had 

used Depakote, Zoloft, Paxil, and Prozac for her mental health. Tr. 399-400. FNP Seamans 

noted in February 2011 that Banghati-Brown complained of having migraines since the age of 

twelve and found they were triggered by "lights, pollens, perfume, sinus pressure." Tr. 395. He 

prescribed Phenergan to treat her headaches. Tr. 395. Over the next few months she repo1ied 

suffering from a migraine about once a week and that the Phenergan would help with nausea, but 

she would occasionally use alcohol and marijuana for treatment of her migraines. Tr. 393-97. 

In March 2011, Banghati-Brown had x-ray imaging of her left knee and back done which 

showed no acute abnormalities of her knee or spine. Tr. 405-15. She also continued to receive 

treatment from FNP Seamans for migraines during May 2011, which she complained were 

occurring two to tln·ee times a week. Tr. 386-97. She reported some relief with Phenergan, but 

still noted headaches. Tr. 389. In May, Banghart-Brown was also examined by neurologist Dr. 

Mia Schreiner, who diagnosed migraine headaches and "[p ]robable bilateral cmpal tunnel 

syndrome and possible left ulnar mononeuropathy." Tr. 584-87. Dr. Schreiner prescribed 

Topamax for migraine relief. Tr. 587. On June 15, 2011, Banghart-Brown presented at the 

emergency room complaining of a severe migraine that felt "different" than her normal 

headaches. Tr. 378-79, 424-25. She denied any vomiting, fever, chills, neck pain, rash or 

itching, but described photophobia and "thinking without a problem," but being unable "to find 

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the words." Tr. 424. A CT scan showed "no acute intracranial abnormality." Tr. 425. She was 

given normal saline 1 L wide open, Compazine, Benadryl, and Toradol, which improved her 

headache, and was sent home. Id. After this episode she continued to see FNP Seamans who 

opined in July 2011 that Topamax was helpful for migraines. Tr. 374. 

In May 2012, Banghart-Brown was seen by Dr. Anthony Glassman who opined that she 

suffered from migraine headaches, mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and an 

"oral history of PTSD." Tr. 450-55. In August 2012, Banghart-Brown repmied to FNP Seamans 

having more migraines and asked to restart medications after having been off them since 

November 2011 because of lack of medical coverage. Tr. 517-20. He noted that she was using 

marijuana with "some relief' and was previously using Topamax, which helped reduce her 

migraine incidence from "5-6 times per week to 2-3 times per week." Tr. 517-18. BanghartBrown continued to see FNP Seamans for complaints of migraines and low back pain for the rest 

of2012. Tr. 490-520. In November 2012 she repmied to FNP Seamans that she was having 

"different headaches" once a month that were accompanied with a "dull, tln·obbing, icing 

sensation spreading across her forehead." Tr. 491. She denied photophobia, phonophobia, 

nausea, and vomiting. Id. 

In November 2012, Banghati-Brown returned to Douglas County Mental Health and was 

examined by Lisa Corallo-Conner, medical assistant ("MA"), for increased panic attacks. Tr. 

465-76. She repo1ied that she "refus[ es] to leave her home due to fear of having a panic attack" 

and that after a panic attack she usually has a migraine. Tr. 466. MA Corallo-Conner 

recommended individual and group therapy, medication management, and case management 

services at the discretion of her primmy clinician. Tr. 476. 

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In January 2013, she began treatment with William Monis, psychiatric-mental health 

nurse practitioner ("PMHNP"), for complaints of PTSD and anxiety, and in March 2013, began 

individual therapy sessions with Jessica Hansen, licensed professional counselor ("LPC''). Tr. 

537-43, 545-79. PMHNP Monis prescribed Alprazolam for Banghmi-Brown's panic attacks and 

Wellbutrin to help her drive. Tr. 542, 569. Banghart-Brown repotied that Wellbutrin helped her 

focus, and continued to see PMHNP Monis and LPC Hansen throughout 2013. Tr. 545-72. 

In January 2014, Banghart-Brown began care with Skyler Meyer, nurse practitioner 

("NP"), who noted she was "[h]ere to establish care" because she was "[u]nhappy" with her 

previous provider. Tr. 605. NP Meyer assessed Banghart-Brown with severe depression, and 

reported she had no abnormalities except being poorly kept and obese, noted that she reported 

daily headaches, and that she appeared "anxious and irritable." Tr. 604-09. That smne month 

Banghmi-Brown began seeing Dr. Schreiner again and was prescribed an increased dose of 

Topamax and given a refenal for an MRI for her continuing migraine headaches. Tr. 580-82. 

On February 12, 2014, Banghmi-Brown had an MRI done on her brain which showed "no 

intracranial abnormality" and "mild maxillary sinus disease which may be chronic; however, 

sinusitis can trigger recutTent headaches," as repotied by Dr. Philip F. Benedetti. Tr. 588-89. 

Additionally, in February 2014, Banghart-Brown complained to PMHNP Morris that she was 

having more anxiety and panic attacks. Tr. 575-76. PMHNP Monis opined that it was not clear 

whether her current medications were helping and suggested changes to her medications, but also 

found her agoraphobic symptoms were "somewhat selective." Tr. 575-77. 

On March 5, 2014 Banghart-Brown had a hearing before the ALJ. Tr. 40-104. She 

testified to suffering from PTSD and migraines where she throws up at least eight or nine times a 

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month. Tr. 58- 61, 84. She also testified to taking Wellbutrin, Topamax, Hydroxyzine and 

Propranolol for her PTSD; Phenergan, Compazine, and Nutropin for migraines; and Flexril, 

Zantac, and Prilosec for "other things." Tr. 72. Additionally, Banghart-Brown testified to using 

marijuana to help relieve her migraines, but that she stopped a week before the hearing because 

of her daughter's substance abuse. Tr. 55-56. Without marijuana Banghart-Brown said she treats 

her migraines by watching TV until she "can't keep [her] eyes open" and "[a]s far as the migraine 

goes, praying that it will end." Tr. 68. 

The ALJ asked vocational expert ("VE") Mark A. McGowan to consider an individual of 

Banghart Brown's age, education, and work experience, whose 

maximum physical exertional capability is light; who's (sic) maximum mental capability 

is engaging in unskilled; repetitive; routine work; who will have no contact with the 

public; who will have occasional contact with supervisors; and coworkers; who will be 

off task at work seven percent of the time; but still meet minimum production 

requirements; and who will be absent from work one time per month 

and then asked the VE whether that person could "perform any of the previous work of 

[Banghart Brown]." Tr. 93. The VE stated such limitations would prevent such a person from 

any of the past work. Id. The VE testified that other jobs existed in the national economy for a 

person with those characteristics could perform including the positions of mail clerk and office 

helper. Id. 

On March 28, 2014, the ALJ denied Banghmt-Brown's application for SSL Tr. 16-34. 

Banghart-Brown timely requested review of the ALJ's decision on April 29, 2014, and the 

Appeals Council denied her request on August 3, 2015. Tr. 1-3, 11. In consequence, the ALJ's 

decision of March 28, 2014 became the Administration's final order for purposes of judicial 

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review. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a); see also, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000). This 

action followed. 

SUMMARY OF ALJ FINDINGS 

At the first step of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that 

Banghart-Brown has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 31, 2011, the 

application date of her SSI application. Tr. 18. He therefore proceeded appropriately to the 

second step of the analysis. 

At the second step, the ALJ found that Banghart-Brown's medical impairments of 

"degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder" 

were "severe" for purposes of the Act. Tr. 18-20. The ALJ also noted that Banghart-Brown had 

the nonsevere impairments of migraine headaches, left knee pain, panic disorder, and attention 

deficit-hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). Tr. 18-20. The ALJ found despite Banghart-Brown's 

complaints of migraine headaches she was able to alleviate her headaches with marijuana, and 

overall had not been compliant in following a treatment plan, suggesting her headaches are not as 

limiting as she has alleged. Tr. 19. With respect to her left knee pain, the ALJ noted that a 

March 2011 radiological image of Banghart-Brown's left knee showed" only 'very mild' 

degenerative changes" in the left knee joint, and between 2011 and 2014 Banghart-Brown 

"demonstrate[d] a normal gait." Id. For Banghart-Brown's panic disorder the ALJ noted that 

MA Corallo-Conner found Banghart-Brown's panic disorder was related to stimuli that trigger 

memories from her past trauma, and therefore should be attributed to PTSD. Tr. 20. With 

respect to her ADHD, the ALJ found that MA Corallo-Conner opined that Banghart-Brown 

denied involvement in special classes or problems in school. Id. Additionally, in July 2013, 

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PMHNP MmTis ruled out ADHD and overall the ALJ found no evidence that Banghmi-Brown 

received treatment for ADHD. Id. Because the impairments caused by Banghmi-Brown's 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder were 

deemed severe, the ALJ properly proceeded to the third step of the analysis. Tr. 18-20. 

At the third step, the ALJ found that none ofBanghmi-Brown's impaitments was the 

equivalent of any of the impairments enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Tr. 20-23. 

Specifically the ALJ found that Banghart-Brown's degenerative disc disease did not meet listing 

1.04 (disorders of the spine) because the evidence of record did not establish the requisite nerve 

root compression "accompanied by sensory or reflex loss." Tr. 20. The ALJ also found that 

Banghart-Brown's major depressive disorder and panic disorder did not meet listings 12.04 and 

12.06 (affective disorders and anxiety related disorders, respectively, both requiring either 

satisfaction of the listing's "paragraph A" and "paragraph B" criteria or satisfaction of the listing's 

"paragraph C" criteria) because the record did not establish, in connection with each listing's 

paragraph B criteria, more than moderate restrictions in Banghmi-Brown's activities of daily 

living, more than marked difficulties in Banghart-Brown's social functioning, more than 

moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, or any episodes of decompensation of 

extended duration. Tr. 20-22. Additionally, the record did not establish, in connection with the 

listing 12.04's "paragraph C" criteria that Banghart-Brown requires a highly supportive living 

atrnngement to satisfy the "C" criteria, and in connection with listing 12.06, that Banghmi-Brown 

is completely unable to function independently outside the area of her home. Tr. 22. The ALJ 

therefore properly conducted an assessment ofBanghmi-Brown's residual functional capacity. 

Regarding Banghmi-Brown's RFC, the ALJ found that at all material times: 

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[Banghart-Brown had] the residual fonctional capacity to perfonn light work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) except she is limited to work that requires her 

to perform routine and repetitive work in the unskilled category. She can have 

occasional contact with coworkers and no contact with general public. She is 

likely to be off task at work 7% of the time but still be able to meet minimum 

production requirements of the job. She is likely to miss one day of work per 

month. 

Tr. 23. In reaching these findings, the ALJ considered all of the material objective medical 

evidence in the record bearing directly upon Banghart-Brown's asserted impairments, as well as 

Banghart-Brown's own statements regarding her symptoms. Tr. 23-32. 

At the fourth step of the five-step process, the ALJ found that Banghmi-Brown was 

unable to perform her past relevant work. Tr. 32. 

At the fifth step, the ALJ found in light ofBanghmi-Brown's age, education, work 

experience, and RFC that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national and local 

economy that she could perform. Tr. 32-33. Specifically, the ALJ found that Banghart-Brown 

could perform the requirements ofrepresentative light, unskilled occupations such as mail clerk 

and office helper. Tr. 33. On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Banghart-Brown was not 

disabled as defined in the Act since October 31, 2011, the date the application was filed. Tr. 34. 

ANALYSIS 

Banghart-Brown challenges the Commissioner's conclusion of her ability to perform other 

work in the national economy on several grounds. Banghart-Brown argues:(!) the ALJ 

improperly rejected her symptom testimony; (2) the ALJ improperly discounted the medical 

opinion of Dr. Glassman; (3) the ALJ ened by failing to provide ge1mane reasons for rejecting 

"other source" opinions from two mental health providers; ( 4) the ALJ's decision was not 

suppo1ied by substantial evidence given the additional evidence submitted to the Appeals 

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Council; (5) the ALJ eJTed in finding she had the ability to perform "other work" in the national 

economy; and (6) the ALJ failed to develop the record by not ordering a comprehensive 

psychological examination. Although Banghart-Brown does not expressly challenge the 

Commissioner's assessment of her residual functional capacity, her argument concerning her 

ability to retain the ability to perform "other work" in the national economy can plausibly be 

construed as suggesting that the ALJ failed to consider medical evidence of her migraine 

headaches in making that assessment, and that in consequence the Commissioner failed to meet 

her burden at the fifth step of the five-step process. I address each of Banghmi-Brown's 

arguments, express and constructive, in turn. 

I. Banghart-Brown's Symptom Testimony 

Banghart-Brown contends the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason for 

discrediting her symptom testimony. Pl.'s Br. 14-17. 

If "there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, 'the ALJ can reject the claimant's 

testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing 

reasons for doing so."' Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen 

v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996)). A general assertion that the claimant is 

not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which ... testimony is not credible and what 

evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 

1993). The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to 

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shala/a, 50 

F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). 

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Examples of clear and convincing reasons include conflicting medical evidence, effective 

medical treatment, medical noncompliance, inconsistencies either in the claimant's testimony or 

between his testimony and his conduct, daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms, a 

sparse work history, testimony that is vague or less than candid, and testimony from physicians and 

third parties about the nature, severity and effect of the symptoms complained of. Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007); Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,792 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown's "medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms," yet her statements "concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully credible." Tr. 25. The ALJ 

provided numerous specific reasons to support this conclusion. 

First, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown's activities of daily living were inconsistent with her 

allegations of "severely limiting symptoms," noting that she could take care of her own hygiene, 

cook simple meals, feed her cats, fold laundry, watch TV, play video games, sew quilts, had the 

ability to shop with her husband, attend therapy sessions, pay bills, and help her children with 

homework. Tr. 25, 250-57, 272, 506, 518. The ALJ also found Banghart-Brown was "primarily 

responsible for upbringing of her teenage children" overall finding that "her claims that her children 

are self-sufficient are only pmiially credible." Tr. 25. 

Here, Banghati-Brown argues she has been found to have marginal hygiene on occasion, 

noting PMHNP Monis's notes from January 29, 2013, Februmy 22, 2013, and September 12, 2013. 

Pl.'s Br. 15, citing Tr. 541-42, 553, 569. Although the record reflects Banghmi-Brown occasionally 

had marginal hygiene, the ALJ's finding was reasonable given repo1is from Banghati-Brown and her 

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husband Danny Brown that she could care for her hygiene, and reports from her doctors finding that 

she was well dressed and "appropriately groomed." See e.g., Tr. 251, 273, 353, 488, 563, 566, 586. 

Additionally, although Banghmt-Brown argues that her children and husband do all of the 

housework, her testimony at the March 5, 2014 hearing was that although chores in the household 

were to be shared, she "end[s] up doing it all." Tr. 68, 251. Although variable interpretations ofa 

claimant's testimony may exist, the ALJ's interpretation of a claimant's testimony will be upheld if 

it is a reasonable interpretation supported by substantial evidence. See Rollins v. 1Vfassanari, 261 

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is reasonable such that 

this comt finds no error. 

Next, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown had a poor work history, finding that she held four 

different jobs since 1998, none of which lasted more than nine months, and her earning records 

between 2000 and the application filing date showed she had not earned above substantial gainfol 

activity ("SGA") level during seven of those ten years. Tr. 26, citing Tr. 224-29, 243, 258, 305. An 

ALJ may consider a claimant's poor work histmy when making a credibility determination. See 

Thomasv. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, the record reflects Banghart-Brown 

had a poor work history, which the ALJ reasonably relied upon to support his credibility 

determination. Therefore, there is no error. 

Third, the ALJ found the objective imaging and independent testing did not support 

Banghmt-Brown's allegations of disability. Tr. 26. With respect to Banghmt-Brown's complaints 

of back pain, the ALJ noted numerous medical repo1ts from Dr. Scln·einer, Dr. Glassman, FNP 

Seamans, PMHNP Morris, and Dr. Diwaker Agarwal who found she had mild degenerative disc 

disease, normal gait, coordination, and foll motor strength. First, the ALJ cited a March 2011 x-ray 

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image, which showed only mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Tr. 26, 437. 

Additionally, in May 2011, Dr. Sclu·einer reported that Banghatt-Brown had normal gait and 

coordination, and full motor strength. Tr. 26, 586-87. Later in May 2012, Dr. Glassman reported 

Banghait-Brown had a normal gait and other than decreased lumbar spine flexion, she had full range 

of motion in lumbar spine extension, bilateral rotation, and bilateral flexion. Tr. 26, 453. FNP 

Seamans found Banghart-Brown had a normal gait in August 2012, and Dr. Agarwal, when 

reviewing an October 2012 x-ray of Banghart-Brown's lumbar spine, reported her lumbar spine 

showed alignment was within normal limits. Tr. 26, 513, 530. Finally, PMHNP Morris's reports 

from February 2013 tlu·ough December 2013 opined that Banghart-Brown had n01mal gait and 

muscular strength, and motor examinations performed by Dr. Sclu·einer in May 20114 and Januaty 

2014 also found she had a normal gait, full motor strength, and normal tone in all four extremities. 

Tr.26,547,558,563,569,582,586-87. 

As for Banghart-Brown's mental symptoms, the ALJ found they were not as severe as she 

alleged, noting medical reports from FNP Seamans, Dr. Schreiner, Dr. Glassman, PMHNP Morris, 

Barbara Jacobson, FNP, and Skyler Meyer, FNP. Tr. 27. BetweenJanumy2011 andJuly2011, FNP 

Seamans reported that Banghart-Brown was talkative, tangential, and exhibited nonnal affect. Tr. 

26, 376, 384, 387, 396, 401. In May 2011, Dr. Sclu·einer reported that Banghart-Brown was "alett, 

cooperative, and oriented," and shows "notmal" and "articulate" speech, and in May 2012, Dr. 

Glassman found Banghait-Brown "appears well developed, well nourished, and in no apparent 

distress." Tr. 26-27, 453, 586. In August 2012 and December 2012, reports from FNP Seamans 

4 The court notes that the ALJ incorrectly lists the date of Dr. Sclu·einer's repott as March 2014, 

instead of May 2011. Despite this error, it does not change this coutt's findings regarding the 

ALJ's overall analysis of Banghart-Brown's symptom testimony. 

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opined that Banghmi-Brown appears "alert, oriented to person, place, date, and time, calm, and 

cooperative with normal mood and affect, intact judgment, intact insight, and intact memory." Tr. 

484, 492, 495, 504, 510, 513, 519. Additionally, in December 2012, FNP Jacobson, described 

Banghart-Brown as "pleasant, appropriately groomed, ale1i, oriented, calm, cooperative with normal 

mood and affect, intact judgment, intact insight, intact memory, and in no apparent distress." Tr. 

488. In February 2014, FNP Meyer rep01ied that Banghart-Brown was ale1i, oriented and history 

was "negative for depression, anxiety, or change in sleep habits," and in March 2014, Dr. Schreiner 

found Banghmi-Brown was "well dressed, alert, oriented, cooperative and in no acute distress" and 

"shows intact attention span, concentration, and judgment, and n01mal memory." Tr. 586, 601. 

"Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discrediting pain testimony, it is 

a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 

(9th Cir. 2005). Here, the ALJ considered the lack of medical evidence as one of numerous reasons 

to discredit Banghart-Brown's symptom testimony, and his findings are supp01ied by the record. 

Therefore, this court finds no e1mr. 

Fomih, the ALJ found Banghmi-Brown was not compliant with her treatment plan for a 

significant period after the filing date of her application for SSI, suggesting her symptoms were not 

as limiting as she alleged. Tr. 27. The ALJ noted that Banghart-Brown did not show up or cancelled 

appointments multiple times in August 2010, Janumy 2014, and March of2014. Tr. 27, citing Tr. 

363, 574, 578. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Banghmi-Brown had not seen a doctor since 

November 2011 and was not refilling prescribed medications, alleging a lack of money. Tr. 27. The 

ALJ found her lack of treatment "cannot be contributed to financial concerns, since [BanghartBrown] was able to find the money to suppo1i her marijuana, cigarette, and alcohol addiction." Tr. 

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27. In making this finding, the ALJ noted that in May 2012 Banghart-Brown stated that marijuana 

gave her 80% axial pain relief, and in August 2012 and December 2012 she admitted to using 

marijuana and drinking alcohol once or twice daily. Tr. 27, citing Tr. 450, 487, 509. The ALJ 

fmther found that Banghart-Brown admitted in January 2014 that she rarely takes Xanax and 

Buspirone, and in in Februmy 2014 felt that Buspar was not helpful, yet noted problems when she 

missed doses of Buspar. Tr. 27, citing Tr. 577, 580. Overall, the ALJ concluded that BanghmtBrown "would rather use illicit drugs and drink alcohol than comply with refilling her medications." 

Tr. 27. 

I find this reason for discrediting Banghmt-Brown's testimony is not suppo1ted by substantial 

evidence. Although Banghmt-Brown admits to using marijuana and alcohol to treat her migraine 

headaches, there is nothing in the record to suppo1t the ALJ's finding that she had a marijuana, 

cigarette, and alcohol addiction. Additionally, Banghart-Brown was approved for a medical 

marijuana card, which suggests her marijuana use might be compliant with her treatment plan. Tr. 

509. However, under Carmickle v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 

2008), the court need not uphold every reason the ALJ discredited the plaintiff, as long as substantial 

evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision. Here, the ALJ provided numerous other reasons for 

finding Banghart-Brown not entirely credible, reasons that are supported by the record. An ALJ's 

error is harmless where it is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination." Stout v. 

Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Adm in., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ's eITor is harmless 

because he has provided numerous other clear and convincing reasons for discrediting BanghartBrown' s symptom testimony. Therefore, this court finds no etTor. 

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With respect to her mental health treatment, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown's treatment plan 

had been relatively effective in controlling her symptoms when she is on medication. Tr. 28. See, 

e.g., Warre v. Comm 'r, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Impairments that can be controlled 

effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for SSI 

benefits.") Specifically, the ALJ noted that PMHNP Monis found Banghart-Brown's stress was 

situational and overall found she showed "only mild depressive symptoms" and "normal speech and 

intact thought process and memory. " Id., citing Tr. 568-69. In March 2013, Banghart-Brown 

reported somewhat improved sleep and denied feeling any side effects from her medications. Id. 

Over the course of2013 and 2014, the ALJ noted that although Bangha1t-Brown reported less focus 

and poorer attention when she missed her medications, she also reported improved memmy, 

attention span, and concentration with Wellbutrin. Id. Additionally, the ALJ noted that PMHNP 

Monis found Banghart-Brown had an "intact thought-process and memory, cooperative attitude, and 

appropriate and mood congruent affect" in July 2013, was "open and cooperative" and appeared 

calmer in December 2013, and at a Janua1y 2014 interview, she even repmted her anxiety was 

improved on Propranolol and denied depressed mood, suicidal thoughts, or c1ying spells. Id., citing 

Tr. 546, 558, 580-81. The ALJ's findings are supported by the record, such that this comt finds no 

error. 

Next, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown had "misrepresented facts relevant to the issue of 

disability," specifically, that she repmted that other than marijuana, she does not use any recreational 

drugs or drink alcohol, despite continuing to use alcohol. Tr. 28, citing Tr. 452. Additionally, the 

ALJ found Banghart-Brown exaggerated her back symptoms to "increase the chance of obtaining 

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benefits," finding that Dr. Agarwal stated that "the lumbar lordosis is moderately exaggerated and 

appears worse during extension view." Tr. 29, citing Tr. 530. 

This comt finds neither of these reasons persuasive. An independent review of the record 

shows Banghait-Brown did repott her occasional alcohol use to her physicians. See e.g., Tr. 399, 

452, 470, 487, 506, 509, 540, 606, 617. Additionally, the ALJ incorrectly interpreted Dr. Agarwal's 

repoti that "the lumbar lordosis is moderately exaggerated" to mean that Banghatt-Brown 

exaggerated her symptoms. Tr. 29, citing Tr. 530. Although this court finds these reasons not 

persuasive, the ALJ's overall credibility detetmination is upheld. See Batson v. Comm'r, 359 F.3d 

1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (The ALJ's overall credibility decision may be upheld even if not all of 

the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are upheld.) 

Finally, the ALJ found Banghart-Brown's pain was not as severe as she alleged because there 

were inconsistencies in the record with respect to her marijuana use and evidence that "she does not 

need to smoke marijuana if she chooses not to." Tr. 29. Specifically, the ALJ noted BanghartBrown repotted being approved for a medical marijuana card to FNP Seamans in August 2012, and 

repotted receiving the card in November 2012, yet in in January 2013 told PMHNP Morris that she 

was approved for the marijuana card but did not have the money to pay for it. Tr. 29, 475, 509. 

Additionally, the ALJ noted that Banghart-Brown testified at the March 5, 2014 hearing that she quit 

using marijuana because of her daughter's substance abuse problem, which the ALJ found suggested 

that Banghait-Brown's pain was not as severe as alleged. Tr. 56. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 681 (An ALJ can use a claimant's conservative course of treatment to discredit his or her 

symptom testimony.) These inconsistencies and Banghait-Brown's decision to stop using marijuana 

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are both supported by the record. Therefore, this co mt finds the ALJ's findings reasonable and there 

is no error. 

Here, the ALJ provided numerous clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence, for discrediting Banghart-Brown's symptom testimony. I find the ALJ reasonably cited 

inconsistencies in Banghart-Brown's testimony, conduct, and medical records, to support his reasons 

for discrediting her testimony. While variable interpretations of this evidence may exist, the ALJ's 

analysis was reasonable, such that it must be upheld. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Therefore, I find the ALJ reasonably discredited Banghart-Brown's symptom testimony. 

II. Medical Opinion of Examining Physician, Dr. Anthony Glassman 

Next, Banghart-Brown contends the ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinion of Dr. 

Glassman, who found Banghart-Brown would "need the ability to lay down in a dark quiet room 

from time to time" because of her migraines. Pl.'s Br. 13-14, citing Tr. 455. 

An ALJ may reject the uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating or examining physician 

only for "clear and convincing" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lester v. Chafer, 81F.3d821, 830-31 (9th 

Cir. 1995)). An ALJ may reject the contradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor by 

providing "specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Id. 

Here, the ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Glassman's opinion that Banghart-Brown had the 

severe condition of migraine headaches and would need the ability to lie down in a dark quiet room 

from time to time. Tr. 30, citing Tr. 455. The ALJ found Banghait-Brown's treatment notes with 

regard to migraine headaches were "non-descriptive" because they" contained no objective findings" 

and showed "a significant period of incompliance in taking the prescribed medications." Id., citing 

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Tr. 367-416, 424, 436, 480-82, 491, 511-12, 517. The ALJ also found Dr. Glassman's assessment 

was "based solely on the claimant's subjective repmt of symptoms and limitations" during a period 

when she "was not taking any medication." Id., citing Tr. 519. 

This court finds no error in the ALJ's finding. Numerous medical professionals found 

Banghart-Brown had a long histmy of headaches and migraines, so the ALJ was required to find 

clear and convincing reasons forrejecting the medical opinion ofDr. Glassman. See e.g. Tr. 331-66, 

374-80, 383-401, 424-32, 450-55, 490-93, 500, 511-20, 541-42, 566, 596, 580-87, 605. 

Here, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Glassman's opinion that Banghart-Brown had the severe 

condition of migraine headaches because treatment notes contained "no objective findings." Tr. 30. 

At step two, the ALJ reviewed Banghart-Brown's medical records and found her migraines were not 

severe, noting examinations conducted by Dr. Schreiner in May 2011 and January 2014 were 

"normal," that marijuana helped relieve Banghait-Brown's symptoms, and a CT scan and MRI of 

Banghait-Brown from 2011 and 2014 respectively showed "no intracranial abnormality." Tr. 436, 

582, 587-89, 605. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Although a 

treating physician's opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not 

binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an impairment or the ultimate determination of 

disability.") 

Additionally, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Glassman's opinion concerning BanghaitBrown's need to lay down in a quiet room from time to time, finding they were "based solely on 

[Banghart-Brown J's subjective repo1t of symptoms and limitations," which the ALJ reasonably 

discredited. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) ("If a treating provider's opinions are based to a large extent on an applicant's self-repmts 

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and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not credible, the ALJ may discount the 

treating provider's opinion.") This comt finds the ALJ's findings reasonable such that there is no 

eJTor. 

III. Credit Treating Mental Health Providers 

Next, Banghart-Brown argues the ALJ erred by failing to provide germane reasons for 

rejecting the "other source" opinions of PMHNP William Morris and MA Lisa M. CoralloConner. Pl.'s Br. 17-18. 

Evidence from "other sources," including "nurse practitioners, physician's assistants, 

chiropractors, therapists," "[e]ducational personnel (for example, school teachers, counselors, 

early intervention team members, developmental center workers, and daycare workers)," 

"[p]ublic and private social welfare agency personnel," and other non-medical sources, such as 

spouses, parents, caregivers, relatives, friends, neighbors, and clergy, may be used to show the 

severity of a claimant's impaimients and how they affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.913(d). In order to reject evidence from "other sources," the ALJ must give ge1mane reasons 

for doing so. J\Iolina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 

A. PMHNP William Morris 

The ALJ gave "little weight" to PMHNP Morris's' October 2013 and December 2013 

opinions with respect to Banghmt Brown's residual mental functional capacity assessment. Tr. 

30-31. During that time, PMHNP M01Tis assessed Global Assessment Functioning (GAF) scores 

' Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ mistakenly refeJTed to PMHNP Morris as a "therapist." 

Pl.'s Br. 17. Despite the ALJ's mistake it does not change the overall analysis which requires the 

ALJ to provide ge1mane reasons for discrediting the opinion of either a nurse practitioner or a 

therapist. See J\Iolina, 674 F.3d at 1111. 

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of 47 and 48, respectively. Tr. 548, 551. The ALJ noted these GAF scores suggest "at least 

serious symptoms or serious impaitment in social, occupational, or school functioning," but 

found this opinion was inconsistent with PMHNP Mo1Tis's observations of Banghart-Brown that 

she had "intact thought process and memo1y, full orientation, cooperative and calm attitude, and 

slightly limited concentration and attention span." Tr. 31, citing Tr. 547, 551. Additionally, the 

ALJ noted that PMHNP Mo1Tis opined that Banghart-Brown's stress was situational and his 

opinion "contrasts sharply with the rep01ted activities of daily living." Tr. 31. 

The ALJ also gave little weight to PMHNP MotTis's opinions made in February 2013, 

March 2013, and Februaty 2014 finding they "were made when [Banghart-Brown] just began to 

receive mental health treatment after a significant period of noncompliance." Tr. 31. With 

respect to the Februmy 2014 opinion, the ALJ found it was formed closely after Banghart-Brown 

had cancelled her appointment with her counselor and admitted to rarely taking Xanax and 

Buspirone. Tr. 31, citing Tr. 577, 580. Additionally, the ALJ found the 2014 opinion sharply 

contrasted with Banghart-Brown's repot1s of improved mood in January 2014, and PMHNP 

Mo1Tis's observations of "normal speech, goal-directed associations and thought process, intact 

memo1y, and only fair judgment, 'a bit low' energy level, and 'a bit limited' attention span and 

concentration." Tr. 31, citing Tr. 576. 

This cou11 finds the ALJ provided a germane reason for discounting PMHNP Morris's 

opinions. Indeed, the record suppot1s the ALJ's finding that despite PMHNP Morris's low GAF 

scores assigned to Banghart-Brown he still found that her "speech was normal," "thought process 

seem[ ed] to be grossly intact," "[ o ]rientation is full," and "[m]em01y is grossly intact with some 

problems with some retention." Tr. 566. Additionally, PMHNP Morris opined that some of 

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Banghart-Brown's agoraphobic symptoms "might be somewhat selective" given her complaints 

of difficulty getting outside for walks, yet having the ability to attend appointments. Tr. 576. 

See Britton v. Colvin, 787 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2015) (An ALJ may use inconsistencies 

between an other source's opinion and a claimant's activities as a gemmne reason for rejecting the 

other source's opinion.) Finally, although not directly cited by the ALJ, an independent review of 

the record shows Banghart-Brown spent a number of years doing h01ticulture work at Wildlife 

Safari despite her alleged limitations, further suppo1ting the ALJ's finding that PMHNP Monis's 

opinion was inconsistent with the GAF scores assigned. See, e.g., Tr. 396, 450, 515, 517. This 

comt finds the ALJ gave a germane reason for rejecting the opinion of PMHNP Monis. 

B. MA Lisa M. Corallo-Conner 

Next, the ALJ gave little weight to MA Corallo-Conner's November 2012 opinion with 

respect to Banghmt Brown's residual mental functional capacity assessment and GAF score of 42 

because it "contrast[ed] sharply with the other evidence of the record." Tr. 31. Specifically, the 

ALJ noted that a GAF score of 42 suggested "some impairment in reality testing or 

communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, 

judgment, thinking, or mood, or at least some serious symptoms or serious impahment in social 

occupational, or school functioning," yet the evidence showed "no more than moderate 

restrictions in [her] activities of daily living." Tr. 31-32, citing Tr. 475. The ALJ noted that 

other providers found Banghart-Brown had normal mood, and intact memory and judgment. Tr. 

32, citing Tr. 484, 488, 492, 495, 504, 510, 513, 519. Additionally, the ALJ found that BanghartBrown repo1ted "taking care of household chores, folding laundry, cooking dinner at times, 

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sewing quilts, shopping in stores, watching television, using computer (sic), and playing video 

games." Tr. 32, citing Tr. 68, 250-57, 272, 276-77, 451, 506, 518. 

The ALJ provided ge1mane reasons for discrediting the opinion of MA Corallo-Conner 

which are substantiated by the record. As noted by the ALJ, numerous medical providers found 

Banghart-Brown had a normal mood and intact memory. See e.g., Tr. 484, 488, 492, 495, 504, 

510, 513, 519. Additionally, as discussed above, Banghart-Brown both testified and reported 

that she was able to complete numerous activities of daily living. Tr. 68, 273. As such, this 

court finds that the ALJ gave a ge1mane reason for rejecting the opinion of therapist CoralloConner. 

IV. New Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council 

Next, Banghart-Brown argues the post-hearing opinion of Dr. Schreiner, the treating 

neurologist, shows that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Pl.'s Br. 12-

13. On August 3, 2015, Banghmi-Brown submitted additional, new evidence to the Appeals 

Council in connection with her request for review. Tr. 5. This evidence included a Medical 

Evaluation by Dr. Schreiner, conducted on April 4, 2014, and medical records from the Roseburg 

Neurology Clinic from March 24, 2014 through April 17, 2014. Tr. 5, 610-19. The Appeals 

Council denied Banghmi-Brown's request for review making the ALJ's decision the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Tr. 1-4. In doing so, the Appeals Council 

considered Dr. Schreiner's April 4, 2014 evaluation and the additional medical records from the 

Roseburg Neurology Clinic, finding that this evidence "does not provide a basis for changing the 

Administrative Law Judge's decision." Tr. 2. 

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Banghart-Brown notes that Dr. Schreiner found Banghart-Brown's medical conditions 

would "interfere with her capacity to concentrate, focus and persist on tasks, 11 that she would be 

unable to maintain a regular work schedule more than four days a month, and that BanghartBrown should undergo neurocognitive testing to determine "subtle mem01y problems." Pl.'s Br. 

12, citing Tr. 612-13. Therefore, Banghart-Brown argues, if properly credited, Dr. SclU'einer's 

opinion compels "either a finding of disability, or a remand for development of Plaintiffs 

psychological condition. 11 Pl. 's Br. 13. 

"When the Appeals Council considers new evidence in denying a claimant's request for 

review, the reviewing court considers both the ALJ's decision and the additional evidence 

submitted to the Council." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1030 n. 2 (9th Cir.2007). The 

comt then considers whether the post-decision evidence undeimines or further supports the ALJ's 

decision. Brewes v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Dr. Schreiner wrote in her April 4, 2014 Medical Evaluation that Banghart-Brown 

suffered from daily migraine headaches, would need to lay down periodically several times a day 

due to headaches, and more than four days per month would be unable to maintain a regular work 

schedule. Tr. 610-13. Additionally, she wrote that Banghmt-Brown's condition would interfere 

with her capacity to concentrate, focus, and persist on tasks, and it was her opinion that 

neurocognitive testing should be done to "help dete1mine if any subtle memory problems exist." 

Tr. 612. 

After reviewing Dr. Schreiner's April 4, 2014 medical opinion and the record as a whole, 

this court finds the ALJ's findings are still supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Schreiner 

reported Banghart-Brown suffered from daily headaches and experienced migraines since age 

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twelve requiring her to lie down several times a day, yet this report is almost identical to prior 

repmis from Dr. Schreiner describing Banghart-Brown's migraines. See e.g., Tr. 580-82, 584-87 

(medical reports from Dr. Schreiner from May 2011 and January 2014 that describing BanghaiiBrown's history of migraines since age twelve, yet overall finding her examinations to be 

normal.) Additionally, Banghati-Brown continued to do ho1iiculture work at Wildlife Safari in 

2011 and 2012, was able to complete numerous activities of daily living, and testified at the 

March 5, 2014 to doing all the chores around the house. Tr. 68, 396, 451, 515, 584. 

Additionally, this comi rejects Dr. Schreiner's subsequent repmi because she provides no 

additional medical evidence to suppo1i her findings, even noting that Banghart Brown's February 

2014 MRI showed no cause for headaches, and memory loss testing gave a mini-mental status 

score (MMSE) of28/30 which was within the no1mal range. Tr. 610-11. See Crane v. Shala/a, 

76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (ALJ properly rejected check-off forms that did not contain any 

explanation of bases for conclusions). See also, Chaudry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, ifthat opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

suppmied by clinical findings."). Overall, Dr. Schreiner's report provided no additional 

information such that the ALJ's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, 

this court finds that Dr. Scln·einer's opinion does not show that the ALJ's decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence, and there is no eil'or. 

V. Ability to Retain the Ability to Perform "Other Work" in the National Economy 

Next, Banghaii-Brown argues the Commissioner failed to meet her burden of proving that 

she retains the ability to perform "other work" in the national economy. Pl. 's Br. 18-19. 

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Essentially, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC finding and subsequent step five findings are not 

based on substantial evidence in the record because they did not include the opinions of Dr. 

Schreiner and Dr. Glassman, whose limitations, if credited, would require a finding that 

Banghart-Brown is disabled. Pl.'s Br. 18-19. 

A. Banghart-Brown's RFC 

The RFC is the maximum a claimant can do despite her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.945. In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all ofa 

claimant's impaim1ents, even those that are not severe, and evaluate "all of the relevant medical 

and other evidence," including the claimant's testimony. SSR 96-8p. The ALJ is responsible for 

resolving conflicts in the medical testimony and translating the claimant's impairments into 

concrete functional limitations in the RFC. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 

(9th Cir. 2008). Only limitations supported by substantial evidence must be incorporated into the 

RFC and, by extension, the dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE. Osenbrock v. 

Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2001). 

As discussed above, the ALJ reasonably discredited the opinions of Dr. Glassman, 

PMHNP Manis, and MA Corallo-Coffiler, and therefore was not required to include their more 

restrictive functional limitations in Banghart-Brown's RFC. Additionally, this court finds the 

new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council including a report from Dr. Schreiner do not 

support a finding of additional functional limitations for Banghart-Brown. The ALJ reasonably 

assessed Banghart-Brown's RFC assessment with respect to her limitations supported by the 

medical record and lay witness statements. Tr. 23-32. As Banghart-Brown raises no other issues 

with the ALJ's RFC assessment, I find no error in the ALJ's RFC assessment. 

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B. Step Five Findings 

At step five, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the 

claimant can engage in some type of substantial gainful activity that exists in "significant 

numbers" in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42. The step five analysis requires 

assessment of the medical evidence, the claimant's daily activities, prior work record, functional 

restrictions and limitations, medication and other treatment for relief of symptoms, and evidence 

from physicians and third parties. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. Typically, the ALJ propounds a 

hypothetical question to the VE that is based on medical assumptions supported by the record 

and reflects all of the claimant's limitations. Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1163. If the claimant fails 

to present evidence that she suffers from certain limitations, the ALJ need not include those 

alleged impaitments in the hypothetical question to the VE. Id. 

Here, the ALJ propounded a hypothetical to the VE based on the RFC finding. Tr. 93. 

Under the hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to consider a person with the same work 

experience, age, academic vocational profile as Banghart-Brown, and "who's (sic) maximum 

physical exertional capability is light; who's (sic) maximum mental capability is engaging in 

unskilled; repetitive; routine work; who will have no contact with the public; who will have 

occasional contact with supervisors; and coworkers; who will be off task at work 7 percent of the 

time; but still meet minimum production requirements; and who will be absent from work one 

time per month." Id. Under this hypothetical, the VE identified the positions of mail clerk and 

office helper. Id. As discussed above, the ALJ reasonably discredited the opinions of Dr. 

Glassman, PMHNP Morris, and MA Corallo-Conner when assessing Banghart-Brown's RFC. 

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Therefore, the hypotheticals propounded to the VE incorporated all of Banghart-Brown's 

limitations, and this court finds no etTor. 

VI. ALJ's Duty to Develop the Record 

Finally, Banghart-Brown argues the ALJ failed to develop the record after rejecting her 

request to order a comprehensive psychological examination. Pl.'s Br. 19-20. Banghart-Brown 

argues the ALJ relied on his own opinion after "rejecting the assessment of the treating therapists 

and nurse practitioner, despite the lack of any review by an acceptable medical source of Plaintiffs 

impaimients." PL 's Br. 20. 

An ALJ in social security cases has a duty to fully and fairly develop the record to assure that 

the claimant's interests are considered. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence or extent of an impairment, such 

that the ALJ' s limited "duty to further develop the record is triggered only when there is ambiguous 

evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." J.Jayes 

v. lvfassanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001 ). "No authority suggests that the regulations require 

the ALJ to continue developing the record until disability is established; the regulations require only 

that the ALJ assist the claimant in developing a complete record." Hampton v. Astrue, 2009 WL 

2351703 at *11 (D. Or. July27, 2009) (citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 (1987)). 

Here, the ALJ denied Banghart-Brown's request for a comprehensive psychological 

examination at the March 5, 2014 hearing finding that there was sufficient evidence in the file and 

testimony by the claimant to make a disability detennination. Tr. 94. When making this 

dete1mination the ALJ noted there was "a lot more ... psychologically oriented ... evidence in this 

case" noting Exhibit IOF, the Douglas County Mental Health records from February 19, 2013 

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through December 23, 2013, noting that it was "cmTent evidence." Tr. 75, citing Tr. 545-72. The 

ALJ found that a comprehensive psychological examination would only consist of"an interview and 

possibly looking at some records." Tr. 77. 

Banghart-Brown argues, with respect to her mental impairments, that she has only been seen 

by umecognized medical sources and this, in combination with GAF scores below 50, and her 

inability to pay for an additional psychological testing require a comprehensive psychological 

examination to be done. Pl.'s Br. 19-20, Tr. 75-77. I find this argument unpersuasive. As discussed 

above, although Banghart-Brown received GAF scores below 50 the ALJ reasonably discredited 

those opinions. Additionally, I find that the evidence of record is sufficient for the ALJ to determine 

whether Banghart-Brown suffers from a severe mental impairment. The record included years of 

medical evidence concerning Banghart-Brown's mental health and there is substantial evidence of 

numerous doctors describing normal mood and affect, and skepticism regarding the extent of her 

mental health limitations. Tr. 376, 384, 387, 396, 401, 453, 484, 492, 495, 504, 510, 513, 519, 586. 

Therefore, this court finds the ALJ did not err by not ordering a comprehensive psychological 

examination. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner's final decision denying BanghartBrown's application for disability insurance benefits should be affirmed. A final judgment 

should be prepared. 

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SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, 

are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno objections 

are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due fomteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

,__.-

!) '"'.)' 

Dated this:::;>'-._l_ day ofNovember, 2016. 

nited States Magistrate Judge 

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