IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

DULCICH INC., an Oregon corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COORDINATED CARE PROGRAMS, LLC, a 

foreign corporation, 

Defendant. 

BECKERMAN, Magistrate Judge. 

Case No. 3:15-cv-01522-SB 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Dulcich Inc. ("Dulcich") filed a Complaint in the Clackamas County Circuit Court for the 

State of Oregon against Coordinated Care Programs LLC ("CCP"), asserting a single claim for 

Declaratory Judgment. Dulcich seeks a declaration that it is not required to pay a termination fee 

under the terms ofa Coordinated Health/Care Services Agreement. (Comp!.~~ 19-20, Ex. A.) 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 1 of 15
CCP removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting diversity 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Dukich filed a Motion to Remand Case to State Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, arguing that the amount in controversy does not satisfy the $75,000 

threshold required for diversity jurisdiction under§ 1332(a). CCP filed a Motion to Transfer Venue 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), arguing that the relevant factors weigh in favor of transferring this 

case to the Southern District of Ohio. 

Oral argument was heard on November 3, 2015. For the reasons that follow, the district judge 

should deny Dukich's motion to remand, and deny CCP's motion to transfer venue. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Dukich is a seafood company that does business under the assumed business name "Pacific 

Seafood Group." (Comp!. iJ 1.) At all material times, Dukich offered a self-funded health insurance 

program for its employees. (Comp!. iJl.) CCP provides health insurance programs for companies that 

have self-funded plans, such as Dukich. (Comp!. iJ2.) Dukich and CCP entered into an agreement 

titled "Coordinated Health/Care Services Agreement" ("Agreement"), that was effective as of 

November 1, 2009. (Comp!. Ex. A.) Pursuant to the Agreement, CCP provided services to Dulcich 

to administer and manage Dukich's employee health benefit plans. (Comp!. iJ3.) The parties 

performed under this Agreement for several years. However, in 2014, Dukich notified CCP that it 

was terminating the Agreement as of November 1, 2014. (Comp!. iJ4.) 

Following termination of the Agreement, a dispute arose between the parties concerning 

whether CCP was entitled to a termination fee under the terms of the Agreement. (Comp!. iii! 15-24.) 

Dukich contends that it does not owe a termination fee under the Agreement because the termination 

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fee provision was rendered inapplicable once Dulcich changed the manner in which it paid its 

monthly fee to CCP, from a monthly "Performance Fee" to a monthly "Fixed Fee." (Comp!. iii! 4-

16.) CCP contends that the full termination fee is owed, and that the termination fee is not dependent 

upon whether Dulcich paid its monthly fee as a "Performance Fee" or a "Fixed Fee." (Notice of 

Removal ii 8.) 

Section 6.6(a)(2) of the Agreement provides: 

Non-Renewal. In the event of a non-renewal pursuant to Section 6.2, if the Total 

Claims for the ending Plan Year are below the Total Claim Target for such ending 

Plan Year, a termination fee in an amount equal to 50% of the annualized maximum 

for the ending Plan Year shall be paid to the Company. Such termination fee shall be 

due on the effective date of tennination and shall be in addition to any amounts due 

for the ending Plan Year based on the final reconciliation or for insufficient notice 

pursuant to Section 6.6(b ). 

(Comp!. Ex. A at 10.) CCP alleges that approximately $103,000 is owed by Dulcich under the terms 

of this provision. (Notice of Removal ii 8.) 

On November 26, 2014, CCP sent Dulcich an invoice, which provided in relevant part: 

"Coordinated Care Programs LLC is entitled to compensation in the amount of $103, 103. 00, or 50% 

of the annualized maximum fee of$206,206. Reflecting the value we place on this relationship, we 

are reducing the termination fee to 33% of the maximum, or $68,048.00." (Comp!. Ex. C; Pl. 's Mot. 

Remand 3.) Dulcich elected not to pay the invoice amount and, instead, filed an action for 

declaratory relief in state court. (Comp!. iii! 15, 19, 23.) Dulcich seeks a declaration "that the 

Termination Fee is invalid and unenforceable under the applicable law." (Comp!. ii 24.) 

Ill!! 

11111 

11111 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Motion to Remand 

1. Legal Standard 

A civil action may be removed to federal court ifthe district coutt would have had original 

jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). Federal jurisdiction exists over all civil actions 

between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a). An action is removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as 

a defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 144l(b)(2) ("forum 

defendant rule"). In this case, defendant is not a citizen of Oregon, and there is complete diversity 

among the patties. Thus, the only question is whether the amount in controversy requirement has 

been satisfied. 

Courts decide whether the amount in controversy requirement has been met by first 

considering whether it is "facially apparent" from the complaint. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow 

Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006). If the amount in controversy is not apparent on the 

face of the complaint, "the court may consider facts in the removal petition, and may require parties 

to submit summmy-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of 

removal." Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also Lewis v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 627 

F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010) (district court may consider post-removal evidence in determining 

whether the requisite amount is in controversy); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 

1992) (if allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged in an appropriate manner, a party "must 

support them by competent proof''). In a diversity case, a removing party relying upon 

summary-judgment-type evidence "has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 4 of 15
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000." Cohn v. Pe/smart, 281 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 

2002). 

2. Analysis 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(l), CCP removed this case from Clackamas County Circuit 

Comt and represented that the amount in controversy is a $103,000 termination fee. (Notice of 

Removal 3.) In this litigation, Dukich seeks a declaration that the termination fee is "invalid and 

unenforceable under the applicable law." (Comp!. ii 24.) Alternatively, Dukich contends that its 

obligation is capped at $68,048, based on the invoice issued by CCP. Specifically, Dukich maintains 

that CCP unilaterally reduced the termination fee owed under the Agreement, and CCP did not 

condition that reduction on a timely payment. (Bree Palmer Deel. iiil 6-7, Sept. 25, 2015.) In addition, 

Dukich asse1ts that CCP never demanded "any sum in excess of $75,000." (Palmer Deel. ii 7.) 

Accordingly, Dukich seeks an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), remanding the case to state 

court on the ground that CCP's removal was improper and, as a result, this Comt lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction. 

In response, CCP argues that the amount in controversy is the value of its "earned nonrenewal fee, which even Dukich acknowledges ... amounts to $103,103." (Def.'s Resp. 2.) CCP 

contends that Dulcich's request for declaratory relief does not define the amount in dispute. Rather, 

the Court must consider the full extent ofDulcich' s potential liability under the Agreement. (Def.' s 

Resp. 4.) To meet its burden in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000, CCP relies upon the terms of the Agreement. (Comp!. Ex. A.) As 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 5 of 15
discussed above, the Agreement provides for a termination fee in the event of a "non-renewal." The 

parties do not dispute that the amount owed under that provision, as calculated by CCP, is $103, 103. 1 

The Couti agrees with CCP. The sole purpose of this litigation is for Dukich to obtain a 

declaratory judgment that it is not liable to CCP for a termination fee under the terms of the 

Agreement. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether the termination fee in the Agreement is 

enforceable against Dukich. If that provision is enforceable, the object or value of the litigation is 

the face value of the termination fee. In other words, under section 6.6(a)(2) of the Agreement, 

Dulcich has potentialliability to CCP of$103,000. See Hunt v. Wash. Stale Apple Adver. Comm 'n, 

432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977) ("In actions seeking declaratmy or injunctive relief, it is well established 

that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation."); JYlatsuda 

v. Wada, 128 F. Supp. 2d 659, 663-64 (D. Haw. 2000) ("[T]he value of the relief should be measured 

by the liability that will follow ifthe contract is valid and enforceable."); see also Biotronik, Inc. v. 

J\;Jedtronic USA, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (D. Or. 2012) ("Thus, to determine the amount 

in controversy, this court must measure Biotronik's potential liability to Medtronic .... "); l 4AA 

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3708 

(4th ed. 2015) ("[I]t is well-settled that the amount in controversy is said to be measured for subject 

matter jurisdiction purposes by the value of the right that the plaintiff seeks to enforce or to protect 

against the defendant or the value of the object that is the subject matter of the action."). This amount 

is the value Dukich may owe in the event that the Court accepts CCP's interpretation of the 

1 The Court expresses no opinion on the application or enforceability of section 6.6(a)(2) of 

the Agreement. 

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Agreement. Thus, as of the date of removal, the amount in controversy was satisfied based upon the 

termination fee of $103, 103, calculated in accordance with section 6.6(a)(2) of the Agreement. 

The evidence before the Court is that Dulci ch is potentially liable for $103 ,103, which 

exceeds the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S. C. § 1332(a). Accordingly, 

the district judge should deny Dulcich's motion to remand. 

B. Motion to Transfer Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 

1. Legal Standard 

On a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a court may transfer any civil 

action "[fjor the convenience of the patties and witnesses, in the interests of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a). The forum to which transfer of venue is sought must be a district court where the case 

"might have been brought." Id. Under§ 1404(a), the district court has discretion "to adjudicate 

motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and 

fairness." Steward Org., Inc. v .. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quotations and citation 

omitted). In determining whether to grant the party's request for permissive transfer of venue, the 

court uses a multi-factor test which balances the convenience of the parties and location of the 

evidence, among other things, against a plaintiffs preferred venue. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 

211 F.3d 495, 498-499 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The burden is on the defendant to establish that the balance of the factors supports 

transferring venue, as there is a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiffs chosen forum. See, e.g., 

Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[G]reat weight is generally accorded plaintiffs 

choice of forum .... "); Edwards v. Depuy Synthes Sales, Inc., No. C 13-6006 CW, 2014 WL 

2194798, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May22, 2014) ("As a general rule, the plaintiffs choice of forum is given 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 7 of 15
significant weight and will not be disturbed unless other factors weigh substantially in favor of 

transfer."). The district comthas discretion in deciding whether the relevant factors warrant transfer 

of the action to another forum. See Sparling v. Hoffinan Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 

1988) ("Weighing of factors for and against transfer involves subtle considerations and is best left 

to the discretion of the trial judge.") (quotations and citation omitted). 

2. Analysis 

CCP moves to transfer venue to the Southern District of Ohio. While CCP acknowledges 

Oregon is a proper venue, it seeks a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), on the grounds that 

CCP performed under the Agreement in Columbus, Ohio, and all ofCCP's witnesses and documents 

related to Dulcich and the Agreement are located in Ohio. (Kara Trott Deel. if 4, Aug. 17, 2015.) 

Additionally, section 8.4 of the Agreement states that the Agreement shall be governed by "the laws 

of the State of Ohio" to the extent Ohio law is not inconsistent with or otherwise governed by the 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("BRISA"). (Comp!. Ex. A.) 

In response, Dulcich acknowledges that venue is proper in Ohio, but urges the Court to deny 

CCP' s motion to transfer venue on the grounds that Dulcich' s forum selection is entitled to deference 

and its witnesses and evidence are located in Oregon. (Pl.'s Resp. 5.) 

It is undisputed that this case could have been brought in the Southern District of Ohio,' and 

therefore the remaining issues to consider are the convenience of the parties, the convenience of the 

2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in: (!) a district where a 

defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a 

district in which a substantial pati of the events giving rising to the claim occurred, or a substantial 

part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district where the 

action may be brought, any district where a defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 8 of 15
witnesses, and the interests of justice. To determine whether transfer of venue to another forum is 

appropriate, the Comi weighs several factors: 

(!)the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the 

state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiffs choice of forum, 

( 4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the 

plaintiffs cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of 

litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel 

attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of 

proof. 

Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99. The Court may also consider "the local interest in the controversy and 

the relative court congestion and time to trial in each forum." Safe Drain Inc. v. Kate Vito, et al., No. 

C-14-01867-DMR, 2014 WL 4088147, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014). 

After considering all of the relevant factors, including the presumption in favor ofDulcich's 

chosen forum, the respective parties' contacts with Oregon, where the claims arose, the convenience 

of witnesses and ease of access to sources of proof, the law governing the action, the relation of the 

community to the action, and the relative court congestion, the Comi finds this case should remain 

in the District of Oregon. 

(a) Location where the Agreement was Negotiated and Executed 

Neither Dukich nor CCP argue that this factor weighs in its favor. The Agreement was 

negotiated and executed in both Ohio and Oregon. Similarly, each party performed under the 

Agreement in its respective state. This factor is neutral. 

(b) State Most Familiar with the Governing Law 

CCP argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because of "the interest in having the 

trial ofa diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action." Decker 

Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). CCP maintains that the 

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issue before the Court is "a pure issue of law." (Def.' s Mem. Transfer Venue 7.) In addition to the 

fact that Ohio law will govern pursuant to the choice of law provision in the Agreement, at oral 

argument CCP noted that similar contracts containing termination fee provisions it has negotiated 

with other clients may be relevant here, and that those contracts are also governed by Ohio law. CCP 

argues that this factor weighs heavily in favor of allowing the federal court in Ohio to interpret the 

termination fee provision. 

The parties agree that disputes arising under the Agreement (excluding BRISA) are governed 

by Ohio law. (Comp!. Ex. A at§ 8.4.) Both federal district courts (Oregon and Ohio) are familiar 

with, and capable of applying, the legal principles necessary to adjudicate this dispute under Ohio 

law. See Foster v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., No. C07-04928 SI, 2007 WL 4410408 at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) ("[O]ther federal courts are fully capable of applying California law."). 

Nevertheless, on balance, the parties' decision to select Ohio law to govern the Agreement slightly 

favors venue in Ohio, and therefore this factor weighs in favor of transfer to Ohio. 

(c) PlaintifPs Choice of Forum 

The law is well established that courts must give the plaintiffs choice of forum great 

deference, unless defendant can show that other factors of convenience clearly outweigh the 

plaintiffs choice. See, e.g., Decker Coal, 805 F.2d at 843 ("The defendant must make a strong 

showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum."). 

CCP argues that this factor does not weigh as heavily as usual in favor of plaintiff's choice 

of forum, because this is a breach of contract action between two corporations. CCP does not cite 

any legal authority in support of its position. The Court notes that CCP is a national company, 

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operating in all states. In contrast, Oregon is Dukich's home state and Dukich does not do business 

in Ohio. This factor weighs against transfer to Ohio. 

( d) Respective Parties' Contacts with the Forum 

CCP argues that this factor is neutral because its only contact with Oregon is through its 

Agreement with Dukich. CCP's principal place of business is in Ohio, and Dukich's principal place 

of business is in Oregon. CCP is a national corporation that does business in Oregon. CCP created 

an ongoing relationship and obligations with Dukich, an Oregon entity. The majority ofDukich's 

employees covered by CCP' s health plan are Oregon residents. In contrast, Dulci ch' sonly affiliation 

to Ohio is its Agreement with CCP. Thus, CCP has more substantial contacts in Oregon than Dukich 

has in Ohio. This factor weights against transfer to Ohio. 

(e) Contacts Related to Plaintiffs Cause of Action in the Forum 

CCP argues that this a breach of contract action involving nonpayment for services rendered 

in Ohio. (Def.'s Mem. Transfer Venue 6; Def. 's Reply2-3.) On the other hand, Dukich is an Oregon 

resident seeking clarification of its obligation to CCP under the Agreement. The breach alleged by 

CCP, nonpayment for services, arose in Oregon. The parties each performed their duties under the 

Agreement in their respective forums. This factor is neutral. 

(f) Difference in Cost of Litigation 

CCP argues that the extrinsic evidence and CCP's witnesses are located in Ohio. In response, 

Dukich maintains that its witnesses and third patty witnesses and evidence are located in Oregon. 

Neither party demonstrates that the time and expense incurred by travel to the other's forum 

weighs more heavily on one entity than the other. Absent a showing by CCP that it will suffer 

inconvenience and expense that is distinctly different from what Dukich will endure, the Court 

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declines to shift the costs and inconvenience from CCP to Dulcich. See Decker Coal, 805 F.3d at 843 

(factor weighs against transfer if inconvenience is merely shifted); see also Jensen v. Simon & 

Schuster, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00759-PK, 2012 WL 6839713, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2012) (comparing 

the financial resources of an individual plaintiff and a large corporation in evaluating a motion to 

transfer venue); Peterson v. Nat'! Sec. Techs., LLC, No. 12-CV-5025-TOR, 2012 WL 3264952, at 

*5 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2012) ("The court agrees that the parties' respective abilities to absorb the 

costs oflitigation in either district is a relevant consideration. Indeed, the interests of justice require 

that the court consider whether financial constraints on either party could unfairly impact the 

outcome of the case.") (quotations and citations omitted). This factor weighs against transfer to Ohio. 

(g) Availability of Compulsory Process of Non-Party Witnesses 

CCP and Dulcich agree that this factor is neutral. 

(h) Ease of Access to Sources of Proof 

CCP argues that this factor supports a transfer because "all of the relevant witnesses that 

performed this work are located in Ohio and all of the relevant documents are maintained in Ohio." 

(Trott Deel. ~ 4; Def.'s Mem. Transfer Venue 3.) Specifically, CCP contends that most of the 

relevant witness testimony will be provided by its employees who were involved in negotiating and 

drafting the Agreement. In addition, CCP contends that its dealings with other clients on the 

termination fee provision may become relevant, and that evidence is located in Ohio. 

Dulcich responds that "there are three groups of people knowledgeable about the facts of this 

dispute - Plaintiffs employees, Defendant's employees, and the Wells Fargo broker/consultants -

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two of the three are here in Oregon."3 (Pl.'s Resp. 7.) Dukich also contends that it has documents 

in its possession in Oregon related to the Agreement, as does the Portland-based Wells Fargo 

consultants who participated in the Agreement negotiations. (Pl. 's Resp. 7.) Dukich argues that the 

documents relevant to this dispute are those related to the negotiation, rather than the performance, 

of the Agreement. (Pl. 's Resp. 8 ("majority of evidence concerning the negotiation of the 

[Agreement] is here in Oregon").) 

Neither Dukich nor CCP provide the Comt with specific information (name, substance of 

the testimony, and relevance to the claim) regarding necessary witnesses. Rather, both parties allude 

generally to a need for witnesses residing in their respective forum states. In addition, neither 

Dukich nor CCP identify a particular person whose convenience will or will not be impacted by a 

transfer. In addition, the location of other sources of proof, i.e., documents, is not particularly 

significant in this case given the ease with which the parties can transfer documents to various 

locations. See, e.g., Welenco, Inc. v. Corbell, Civ. No. S-13-0287 KJM CKD, 2014 WL 130526, at 

* 8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (finding that the location of documentary evidence is generally accorded 

little weight "given that advances in technology have made it easy for documents to be transferred 

to different locations") (quotations and citation omitted). There are witnesses located in both forums, 

and the documentary evidence is easily accessed in either forum. Based on the evidence before the 

Court, this factor is neutral. 

I/Ill 

3 In 2009, Dukich hired consultants from the Portland office of Wells Fargo to assist with 

the evaluation and negotiation of CCP 's proposal to manage Dukich' s employee benefit plan. (Brees 

Deel. ii 4.) The Wells Fargo consultants "were involved in reviewing and negotiating both the 

Original Agreement and the Amended Agreement, together with all the renewals." (Brees Deel. ~ 

6.) 

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Case 3:15-cv-01522-SB Document 18 Filed 12/23/15 Page 13 of 15
(i) Public Policy 

Both Oregon and Ohio have an interest in adjudicating disputes involving their corporate 

residents. This factor is neutral. 

(j) Court/Congestions and Time to Trial 

Neither party presented any argument or evidence in support of this factor. This factor is 

neutral. 

(k) Summary 

After weighing the relevant considerations, the Court finds that this case should remain in 

the District of Oregon. All but one of the relevant factors are neutral or weigh against transfer. The 

sole factor favoring transfer is that Ohio state law governs this dispute. The Agreement between the 

parties does not, however, include a forum selection clause. Both parties are sophisticated, and the 

Court must assume that the absence of a forum selection clause in the Agreement was intentional. 

See, e.g., rVi/liams v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 7588 (GEL), 2005 WL 1414435, 

at *5 (S.D. N.Y. June 13, 2005) ("The choice of law provision is considerably narrower than, and 

at any rate clearly different from, the forum selection clause. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 

the parties, in utilizing different standards for the choice of law and choice of forum, had different 

intentions with respect to the reach of the two provisions.") The Ohio choice oflaw provision in the 

Agreement does not substitute for a forum selection clause. The fact that Ohio law governs the 

dispute, standing alone, is insufficient to disturb Dulcich's choice of forum. Accordingly, the district 

judge should deny CCP's request to transfer this case to the Southern District of Ohio. 

Ill// 

Ill/I 

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III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the district judge should DENY Dukich' s Motion to Remand 

Case to State Court Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (ECF No. 11), and DENY CCP's Motion to 

Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (ECF No. 7). 

IV. SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are 

due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno objections are filed, 

the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a 

response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the 

response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under 

advisement. 

Dated this 23rd day of December 2015. 

c1'~m~ STAcrEF. ECiERiTN 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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