IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

DIANA MARIE ROBBINS, a.k.a. 

DIANA MARIE AUSTIN 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COLUMBIA COLLECTION SERVICE, 

INC., 

Defendant. 

Tim Eblen 

Michelle Freed 

James Tschudy 

Eblen Freed LLP 

1040 N.E. 44th Avenue, Suite 4 

Portland, Oregon 97213 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Jeffrey I. Hasson 

Davenport & Hasson, LLP 

12707 N.E. Halsey Street 

Portland, Oregon 79230 

Attorney for Defendant 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 6:15-cv-00821-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 1 of 14
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

BACKGROUND 

This dispute over attorney's fees arises out of plaintiff 

Diana Marie Robbins' s claim alleging that defendants Columbia 

Collection Service, Inc., ("Columbia") and Providence Health & 

Services-Oregon ("Providence") violated the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act ( "FDCPA") . 15 U.S. C. § 1692 et seq. ; Compl. 3-5. The 

parties reached a settlement including $15, 000 in damages and 

dismissal of defendant Providence. Doc. 21. The parties agreed 

attorney's fees would be determined after settlement. Id. 

STANDARD 

Under the FDCPA, a prevailing party is entitled to reasonable 

attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692k(a) (3). A determination of reasonable attorney's fees begins 

with the "lodestar, " which is the "number of hours reasonably 

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." 

Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 

U.S. 546, 563-64 (1986). Plaintiff carries the burden of proving 

the lodestar. Id. The factors to be considered in determining the 

lodestar figure include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the 

novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required; 

( 4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney; ( 5) the 

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; ( 8) the 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 2 of 14
amount involved and the results obtained; ( 9) the experience, 

reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the "undesirability" 

of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. 

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). Only 

those factors which are applicable need be addressed. Sapper v. 

Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1983). 

A court has discretion to reduce attorney's fees to ensure 

rates are "in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 

experience and reputation." Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 

F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted) . In addition, a court may exclude billed hours "for which 

it would be unreasonable to compensate the prevailing party." 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013) 

( citations and quotation marks omitted) . Finally, a court may 

reduce an attorney's fee award based on the level of success 

achieved by the plaintiff. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 

(1983). 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff requested a total of $14,817.50 in attorney's fees 

for 42.9 hours billed. Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 2. 

Columbia opposes plaintiff's request, arguing: (1) Columbia is not 

responsible for fees incurred pursuing claims against Providence; 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 3 of 14
(2) plaintiff's hourly rates are excessive; (3) it would be 

unreasonable to compensate plaintiff for some of the billed hours; 

and ( 4) attorney's fees should be reduced based on plaintiff's 

limited success. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Att'y Fees and Costs 6-

11. 

1. Attorney's Fees Incurred Against Providence 

Columbia asserts plaintiff cannot recover fees related to 

pursuit of claims against Providence because (1) plaintiff's claims 

against Columbia arose under a different statute than its claims 

against Providence and (2) Providence was dismissed from the case. 

Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 9-10; 

Doc. 21. 

Columbia's arguments fail. First, even though the claims arose 

under different statutes, plaintiff's claims against Columbia and 

Providence arose from the same operative facts. Columbia, on behalf 

of Providence, sought to collect a debt for unpaid medical services 

from plaintiff. Compl. ':!!':!! 7-10. To that end, in June of 2009 

Columbia filed a lawsuit against plaintiff and, after receiving a 

judgment, garnished plaintiff's wages in August of 2011 to recover 

the debt. Id. ':II 9. In March of 2014, plaintiff's wages were further 

garnished, and plaintiff made several inquiries regarding the 

payments received because plaintiff believed the debt to be paid 

off. Id. ':II 10. Plaintiff was in contact with and received 

contradictory information from both Columbia and Providence 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 4 of 14
throughout the process of determining her payments and the 

remaining balance. Id. at ~ 11-12, 15. Following several attempts 

by plaintiff to clarify the balance owed and a hearing regarding 

the garnishment of her wages, Columbia sent a letter to plaintiff 

stating her account had a zero balance and included a check 

refunding her excess payments. Id. at ~~ 10-20, 22. Thus, 

plaintiff's claims against Columbia and Providence are not 

analytically distinct enough to merit reduction of attorney's fees 

based on Providence's dismissal. 1 

Second, because Providence was dismissed from the case 

pursuant to the settlement agreement, neither judge nor jury 

addressed claims against Providence. Unlike dismissal after a 

motion for summary judgment, for example, dismissal of a defendant 

by settlement does not necessarily mean plaintiff's claims against 

that defendant were invalid. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Statement 

of Att'y Fees and Costs 9; Doc. 21. For these reasons, plaintiff's 

attorney's fees will not be reduced for any time spent pursuing 

claims against Providence. 

2. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates 

Columbia contends plaintiff's proposed hourly rates are 

1 Even if the claims against Providence were analytically 

distinct enough to be separated from claims against Columbia, the 

time necessary for plaintiff to prepare the complaint would not 

have been reduced by half without the claims against Providence: 

the bulk of plaintiff's counsel's work on this case was not 

claim-specific. 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 5 of 14
excessive because plaintiff's counsel's experience does not merit 

the billing rate. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Statement of Att'y 

Fees and Costs 8. Rather, Columbia asserts, plaintiff's counsel's 

rate should not exceed the median as determined by the Oregon State 

Bar Economic Survey ("Survey"). Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s 

Statement of Att' y Fees and Costs 8; OREGON STATE BAR 2 012 ECONOMIC 

SURVEY, available at https://www.osbar.org/_docs/resources/Econsur 

veys/12EconomicSurvey.pdf. Plaintiff uses the Survey and several 

declarations to support the requested rates. Pl.'s Statement of 

Att'y Fees and Costs 2; Baxter Deel. 2; Freed Deel. 2; Fuller Deel. 

2; Kuranz Deel. 3; Mutnick Deel. 2-3. 

In determining whether a fee is reasonable, a court may 

consider the rate range established by the Survey. Campi st a v. 

Creditors Fin. Grp. LLC, 2014 WL 127083, *3 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 2014). 

The Survey provides specific data on attorney's fees based on 

geography and years of experience. For attorneys in Portland with 

10-12 years of experience, the median hourly rate is $275 and the 

95th percentile hourly rate is $428. OREGON STATE BAR 2012 ECONOMIC 

SURVEY, 30 available at https://www.osbar.org/ docs/resources/Econ 

surveys/12EconomicSurvey.pdf. Mr. Eblen and Ms. Freed have 

practiced for 10 and 11 years, respectively, and their hourly rates 

are $340. Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 2. For attorneys 

in Portland with 4-6 years of experience, the median hourly rate is 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 6 of 14
$218, and the 95th percentile is $295. OREGON STATE BAR 2012 ECONOMIC 

SURVEY, 29 available at https://www.osbar.org/_docs/resources/Econ 

surveys/12EconomicSurvey.pdf. Mr. Tschudy has practiced for 5 years 

and his hourly rate is $250. Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and 

Costs 2. Therefore, the requested fees fall between the median and 

95th percentile for the attorneys' respective experience levels. 2 

In determining the reasonableness of an hourly rate, a court 

may consider counsel's specialized experience. Campista v. 

Creditors Fin. Grp. LLC, 2014 WL 127083, *3 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 2014). 

Ms. Freed and Mr. Eblen have a reputation for specializing on 

issues of debt collection. Baxter Deel. 2; Freed Deel. 2; Fuller 2; 

Kuranz Deel. 3. Mr. Tschudy's practice has focused on debtor and 

creditor issues. Tschudy Deel. 2. This specialized experience 

supports an hourly rate above the median for respective experience 

levels. Thus, the hourly rates of $340 for Mr. Eblen, $340 for Ms. 

Freed, and $250 for Mr. Tschudy are reasonable. 

3. Reasonableness of the Amount of Hours Billed 

Columbia next challenges the reasonableness of the number of 

hours billed by plaintiff's counsel. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s 

2 The requested rates move closer to the median if the 

Survey's rates are adjusted for inflation. The Survey was 

compiled in 2012, three years before this matter. Plaintiff 

applies a 2% annual increase to these figures to account for 

inflation, which results in the following rate adjustments: For 

attorneys in Portland with 10-12 years of experience, the median 

hourly rate is $291 and the 95th percentile hourly rate is $454. 

For attorneys in Portland with 4-6 years of experience, the 

median hourly rate is $231, and the 95th percentile is $313. Mem. 

in Supp. of Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 4-6. 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 7 of 14
Statement of Att' y Fees and Costs 9-10. Specifically, Columbia 

contends plaintiff ( 1) billed an excessive number of hours for 

preparing the complaint; (2) billed an excessive number of hours 

for opposing a discovery deadline extension; ( 3) should not be 

compensated for work done after Columbia extended an of fer of 

judgment; and (4) acted in bad faith. As explained below, the Court 

agrees the number of hours billed for complaint preparation should 

be reduced, but otherwise finds Columbia's arguments unpersuasive. 

Id. at 9-11. 

Columbia first takes issue with the time allegedly expended 

preparing the complaint: 9.4 hours by Mr. Tschudy and 5.1 hours by 

either Ms. Freed or Mr. Eblen. Id. at 9. Columbia does not contest 

the half-hour billed by plaintiff's paralegal. Hasson Deel. 8. 

Plaintiff asserts 5.1 hours were "spent in initial meetings with 

[p] laintiff, and assessing the viability of her case, and the 

damages she incurred," and acknowledges the Court "may reduce the 

remaining time spent in preparing the complaint." Pl.'s Reply to 

Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 5. 

Plaintiff's ten-page complaint includes three claims against 

Columbia pursuant to three different sections of the FDCPA, and one 

unlawful trade practices claim against Providence pursuant to 

Oregon statute. Compl. ~~ 24-27. Considering the relative brevity 

of the complaint and the straightforwardness of the claims, 

plaintiff's request for a total of 15 hours of fees in preparing 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 8 of 14
the complaint is excessive. See Campista v. Creditors Fin. Grp. 

LLC, 2014 WL 127083, *4 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 2014) (finding, in an 

FDCPA case, 11.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time billed for 

"opening the file, researching potential claims, and drafting the 

[c]omplaint"); Masood v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 

2006 WL 294795, *2 (reducing 30.2 hour complaint request to 12 

hours in Fair Credit Reporting Act case). Plaintiff's counsel's 

expertise in the area of consumer debt protection should streamline 

the complaint-drafting process. This Court limits the award of 

attorney's fees for the complaint to 10 hours, including the halfhour of paralegal fees. The 5 hour reduction is taken 

proportionally from each attorney's billing rate. Instead of the 

requested $4,141.50, plaintiff is awarded a total of $2,732.52 in 

fees for preparation of the complaint. 3 

Columbia next challenges the amount of time billed by 

plaintiff in opposing Columbia's motion for a discovery deadline 

extension. Objections to Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 9. 

Plaintiff billed 4.8 hours 4 regarding extension of the discovery 

3 Each attorney's hours billed are reduced to 65.5% of the 

requested amount, which represents the ratio of 9.5 (10 minus the 

0.5 hours of paralegal time) to 14.5. 65.5% of 9.4 hours billed 

at a rate of $250 per hour is $1,539.25. 65.5% of 5.1 hours 

billed at a rate of $340 per hour is $1,135.77. 0.5 hours of 

paralegal time billed at a rate of $115 per hour is $57.50. 

4 Columbia alleges plaintiff billed 5.5 hours, but it is not 

clear how this number was reached. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s 

Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 9. Plaintiff's counsel's 

billing records show 4.8 hours in connection with the discovery 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 9 of 14
deadline after Columbia filed its motion to extend, 2 hours of 

which were spent drafting an opposing motion and emailing with 

Columbia's counsel. Deel. of Tim Eblen in Supp. of Pl.'s Statement 

of Att'y Fees and Costs, Ex. 1 at 4-5. The other 2.8 hours were 

spent researching the motion and consulting with the client. 5 Id. 

Considering the variety and nature of the work done, 4.8 hours is 

a reasonable amount of time and plaintiff's attorney's fees related 

to the discovery deadline will not be reduced. 

Furthermore, Columbia challenges the time billed by plaintiff 

after Columbia made an offer of judgment. Def.' s Objections to 

Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 10. Following the offer of 

judgment, plaintiff's counsel reviewed the settlement offer, 

strategized about settlement, met with plaintiff, drafted a 

settlement counter offer, reviewed discovery, conferred with cocounsel, and emailed Columbia. Deel. of Tim Eblen in Supp. of Pl.'s 

Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs, Ex. 1 at 4-5. Plaintiff is not 

required to accept Columbia's offer of judgment and, if she elects 

not to accept, as is the case here, it is reasonable for her 

attorneys to continue pursuing her case. For this reason, 

plaintiff's attorney's fees billed after the offer of judgment will 

not be reduced. 

dispute. Deel. of Tim Eblen in Supp. of Pl.'s Statement of Att'y 

Fees and Costs, Ex. 1 at 4-5. 

5 Some of the time spent consulting the client included 

discussions of the offer of judgment. Deel. of Tim Eblen in Supp. 

of Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs, Ex. 1 at 4-5. 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 10 of 14
Columbia's final challenge to plaintiff's amount of hours 

billed asserts plaintiff acted in bad faith. Def.'s Objections to 

Pl.'s Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 10-11. Columbia alleges 

plaintiff acted in bad faith by refusing Columbia's settlement 

offers in an attempt to "extract a windfall" and by inflating 

attorney's fees. Id. First, rejection of a settlement offer, 

standing alone, is not evidence of bad faith. Second, Columbia's 

bad faith argument reiterates its previous justification for 

reducing attorney's fees: plaintiff billed too many hours after the 

offer of judgment. This argument is addressed above, and the court 

finds plaintiff exhibited no bad faith by billing time after the 

offers of judgment. For these reasons, attorney's fees will not be 

reduced for bad faith. 

Plaintiff's attorney's fees will only be reduced for hours 

billed on the complaint. Instead of the requested $ 4, 141. 5 0, 

plaintiff is awarded a total of $2,732.52 in fees for preparation 

of the complaint. 

4. Plaintiff's Level of Success 

Finally, Columbia contends plaintiff's fees should be reduced 

based on plaintiff's limited success. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s 

Statement of Att'y Fees and Costs 6-7. Plaintiff's complaint 

alleged damages "not to exceed $500,000." Compl. <JI 28. Plaintiff 

received a settlement of $15,000, exclusive of attorney's fees and 

costs. Doc. 21. Columbia alleges plaintiff's fees should be reduced 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 11 of 14
because the settlement award was a mere 3% of the damages alleged 

in the complaint. Def.'s Objections to Pl.'s Statement of Att'y 

Fees and Costs 7. 

When awarding attorney's fees, there is ~no precise formula or 

method for calculating the appropriate reduction based upon the 

size of recovery." Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 

Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1222 (D. Or. 2008). The court may 

adjust the lodestar amount: ( 1) downward if the plaintiff has 

achieved only partial or limited success, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 435 (1983); or (2) upward in "rare" and "exceptional" 

cases. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 

478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). However, there is a strong presumption 

the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee. Miller v. L.A. 

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1987) In 

determining whether the lodestar is reasonable, district courts 

generally consider whether a party prevailed on all claims and the 

relationship between the relief sought and relief obtained. 

McGinnis v. Ky. Fried Chicken, 51 F.3d 805, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In general, when courts reduce the lodestar for level of 

success, it is after a case has proceeded to trial. See, e.g., id. 

(attorney's fees calculated based on jury award inclusive of 

punitive damages must be proportionally reduced following 

determination that punitive damages are prohibited because the fee 

award must be related to the plaintiff's extent of success). This 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 12 of 14
makes sense because after the trier of fact rules on the issues the 

district court has specific information about a party's degree of 

success: which claims are won or lost, and how much was recovered 

compared to how much was requested for each claim. Where all claims 

are resolved in settlement, as in this case, the court does not 

have the same level of information. As a result, the court cannot 

gauge whether plaintiff prevailed on a particular claim or issue. 

Nor can plaintiff's level of success be determined by reference to 

the recovery amount listed in the complaint because the complaint 

states only the upper limit of recovery, and not the damages amount 

plaintiff would have sought at trial. Therefore, Columbia's 

argument that plaintiff's recovery rate was only 3% is misguided. 

The best way to measure level of success after a settlement is 

to compare the relief awarded to the fees sought. In general, a 

court will reduce attorney's fees based on level of success if no 

reasonable party would pay the fee amount to recover the award. 

McGinnis, 51 F.3d at 809-10 (no reasonable person would pay 

$148,000 in attorney's fees to recover $34,000). However, courts 

consider the reasonableness of a fee as compared to the amount of 

recovery differently when a statute contains an attorney's fees 

provision. The inclusion of such a provision in the FDCPA reflects 

Congress's intent to create "private attorney[s] general" who will 

enforce the law. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 

(9th Cir. 2008). Because the FDCPA mandates attorney's fees in an 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 13 of 14
effort to motivate enforcement, the court considers not only the 

benefit to the individual plaintiff but also the benefit to the 

public of an attorney taking on the case. 

Applying these standards, I find attorney's fees of 

$13,408.52, after the reduction for time spent preparing the 

complaint, are reasonable compared to the $15,000 settlement award. 

For these reasons, attorney's fees will not be reduced based on 

plaintiff's level of success. 

CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff's attorney's fees are reduced by $1,408.98 to 

$13,408.52, reflecting a 5 hour reduction in the time billed for 

complaint preparation. Plaintiff's request for oral argument is 

DENIED as unnecessary. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this I of December 2015. 

United District Judge 

Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00821-AA Document 43 Filed 12/19/15 Page 14 of 14