# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 9, 2022 *

Decided November 9, 2022

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

No. 22-1111

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

FREDDELL BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:07-cr-20043-SLD

Sara Darrow, Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

Freddell Bryant appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, arguing that th e district court failed to determine his eligibility or explain its reasoning. But the record adequately supports the district
court’s decision, so we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide the case wi thout oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP . P. 32.1No. 22-1111 Page 2

In 2010, Bryant pleaded guilty to three counts related to his role in a conspiracy to distribute large quantities of powder and crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In addition to his pl ea agreement, Bryant agreed— in exchange for immunity—to cooperate fu lly with law enforcement by providing information and testimony that was “complet e and truthful.” The criminal convictions carried a statutory sentence of life imprisonment, but the district court departed from that minimum based on Bryant’s substantial assistance, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and sentenced him to 300 months in prison and ten years of supervised release.

While providing information to law enforcement, Bryant revealed his participation in a 2007 triple murder related to drug trafficking. But after sentencing on his drug-crimes convictions, Bryant refused to testify about the murders when called before a grand jury. The government dete rmined that he was in breach of his cooperation agreement and later charged him with the murders. He was convicted and

sentenced to three consecutive life sentences. See generally United States v. Bryant

, 750 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2014).

In April 2020, Bryant moved to reduce hi s drug-crimes sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat . 5194, which gives discretion to district

courts to reduce defendants’ sentences for crack-cocaine convictions that would have been lowered after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. Noting that his guidelines range would now be 360 months to life in prison, Bryant requested a reduced sentence—240 months in prison and eight years of supervised release—to reflect the downward departure that he received in 2010.

The probation office filed a First Step Act Computations worksheet assessing sentencing options if the Fair Sentencing Act were applied. The office concurred with Bryant that he was eligible for a reductio n and that his amended sentence range would be 360 months to life in prison.

The government opposed Bryant’s motion. It conceded that Bryant was eligible for a reduction under circuit law but argued that the district court should deny Bryant’s motion as a matter of discretion. Opposing any further reduction, the government highlighted Bryant’s refusal to testify in a ccordance with his cooperation agreement, his
conviction for three murders, and his curre nt sentence, which was already below the newly calculated range.No. 22-1111 Page 3

In a text order, the district court denied the motion: “Pursuant to the framework in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) and § 404 of the Firs t Step Act, after full review of the record, careful consideration of all applicable senten cing factors, and exercising its discretion,

the Court declines to reduce the defendant’s sentence.”

Bryant argues that the district court procedurally erred by denying his motion without first determining his eligibility or app licable sentencing range. He relies on our

decision in United States v. Corner , 967 F.3d 662, 665–67 (7th Cir. 2020), in which we

directed district courts first to determin e an applicant’s eligibility and calculate the applicable sentencing range, an d only then decide whether to exercise their discretion to reduce the sentence. Bryant contends that the district court’s text order “disqualified [him] as ineligible.”

Bryant misapprehends the context behind the district court’s ruling. When the court denied his motion, his eligibility fo r a reduced sentence was undisputed. The probation office and the government both agr eed with Bryant that he was eligible for a reduction. (On its computational worksh eet, the probation office checked a box indicating that it “concur[red] with eligib ility,” and the government conceded as much in its response to Bryant’s motion.) The cour t justified its ruling by stating that it had considered the “applicable sentencing factors” but declined to reduce his sentence in an “exercis[e] [of] its discretion.” This, then, was not a case like Corner , in which the district court erred by declining to consider modifi ed statutory penalties before denying the

defendant’s motion. Id. at 664.

To the extent Bryant suggests that the co urt insufficiently explained its ruling, we

think that no more detailed explanation was needed. The record reflects that Bryant failed to provide information as required by his cooperation agreement, that he was convicted for three drug-related murders, and th at his current sentence is shorter than it would be if the Fair Sentencing Act were applied. See Chavez-Meza v. United States

, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018).

AFFIRMED