RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-1254-MR

LEONARD MARTIN APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 03-CR-00110

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Leonard Martin filed a post-conviction motion under 

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 and 60.03 asking to be released 

from incarceration due to fear of contracting COVID-19. The Floyd Circuit Court 

denied the motion. We affirm.

In 2005, Martin was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and 

sodomy in the first degree in the Floyd Circuit Court, for which he was sentenced 
-2-

to a total of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Our Supreme Court affirmed his 

conviction on direct appeal and we later affirmed the trial court’s denial of 

Martin’s motion for post-conviction relief.1 

This appeal involves Martin’s May 2020 motion for post-conviction 

relief under CR 60.02 and 60.03. The crux of the motion is Martin’s assertion that 

he is “at increased risk of contracting SARS-CoV2 (COVID-19), a novel virus, 

which poses a large risk to public health that may be alleviated, in part, by release 

of persons from confinement in close quarters.” Record (“R.”) at 441. Martin

asserts in the motion that he is particularly susceptible to COVID-19 due to, for 

example, being a senior citizen and having had a heart attack while incarcerated.

2

Of course, as Martin notes, inmates are vulnerable to the virus since 

they are unable to practice some of the remediation measures scientists and 

physicians have urged the general public to undertake, such as social distancing. 

Martin briefly alleged that his continued incarceration during the pandemic 

violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

 

1 Martin v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 374 (Ky. 2005); and Martin v. Commonwealth, No. 

2010-CA-000671-MR, 2012 WL 752018 (Ky. App. Mar. 9, 2012). See also Martin v. 

Beckstrom, No. CIV.A. 12-83-KSF, 2013 WL 3192895 (E.D. Ky. Jun. 21, 2013).

2 Though not discussed in his motion, Martin’s appellate brief alleges he has tested positive for 

COVID-19. He does not cite to any medical notes in the record confirming that test result. 

Regardless, Martin is not entitled to post-conviction relief even if we assume, for the sake of 

argument, that he has tested positive for the virus. Martin does not argue that corrections 

officials failed to provide him necessary and appropriate medical care after his positive test. 
-3-

Martin asked the trial court to suspend further execution of his sentence or to 

impose an alternative sentence, such as home incarceration. The Floyd Circuit 

Court denied the motion without analysis and without the Commonwealth’s having 

filed a response. Martin then filed this appeal pro se.

3

As it pertains to this case, CR 60.02(f) permits a court to grant relief 

in circumstances of an “extraordinary nature justifying relief.” CR 60.03 similarly 

permits a court to grant relief upon “appropriate equitable grounds.”4 Our 

Supreme Court has held there is a “high standard for granting a CR 60.02 motion,” 

because relief under that rule is meant to be “special” and “extraordinary.” Barnett 

v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Ky. 1998). “[B]ecause of the 

desirability of according finality to judgments, CR 60.02(f) must be invoked only

with extreme caution, and only under most unusual circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Bustamonte, 140 S.W.3d 581, 584 (Ky. App. 2004). A trial 

court’s ruling on a CR 60.02 motion “receives great deference on appeal and will 

 

3 Martin’s brief is not in full compliance with the requirements of CR 76.12. For example, it 

does not contain statements regarding whether and how his arguments were preserved for 

appellate review, as is required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), or ample citations to the record, as is 

required by CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v). We have leniently elected to ignore the deficiencies. 

However, we caution Martin that we may strike any future noncompliant brief. See CR 76.12(8).

4 CR 60.03 provides in relevant part that: 

Rule 60.02 shall not limit the power of any court to entertain an independent 

action to relieve a person from a judgment . . . on appropriate equitable grounds. 

Relief shall not be granted in an independent action if the ground of relief sought 

has been denied in a proceeding by motion under Rule 60.02, or would be barred 

because not brought in time under the provisions of that rule.
-4-

not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion.” Barnett, 979 S.W.2d at 102. 

CR 60.02 “replaced the common law writ of coram nobis. That writ, 

however, was aimed at correcting factual errors, not legal errors.” Leonard v. 

Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 161 (Ky. 2009). Martin has not alleged, much 

less shown, any factual errors in his judgment of conviction. In fact, he has not 

argued, or shown, that there are any errors of any kind in the judgment. CR 60.02 

“specifically functions to address significant defects in the trial proceedings[,]” 

Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Ky. App. 2014), and Martin has 

not alleged any defects with his proceedings. 

Moreover, Martin’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, his 

motion runs contrary to precedent. Family hardships and emotional trauma are not 

a proper basis for CR 60.02 relief because such factors “have no relation to the trial 

proceedings . . . .” Wine v. Commonwealth, 699 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. App. 1985). 

Instead, such concerns “are more appropriately a consideration of the parole 

boards.” Id. Similarly, “physical ailments of a defendant are not tantamount to 

trial defects” and thus do not warrant CR 60.02 relief. Ramsey, 453 S.W.3d at 739. 

We do not intend to minimize Martin’s health concerns, but if a 

prisoner who actually suffers from “multiple life threatening medical issues which 

required medical treatment unavailable to him while incarcerated” is not entitled to 

CR 60.02 relief, id., Martin cannot be entitled to relief based on his subjective fears 
-5-

regarding COVID-19. In fact, we have rejected similar COVID-19-based

arguments made by prisoners at least six times. Morris v. Commonwealth, No. 

2020-CA-1195-MR, 2021 WL 1933656 (Ky. App. May 14, 2021); Williams v. 

Commonwealth, No. 2019-CA-0964-MR and No. 2020-CA-0638-MR, 2021 WL 

943753 (Ky. App. Mar. 12, 2021); Gribbins v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA0635-MR, 2021 WL 1164461 (Ky. App. Mar. 26, 2021); Thomas v. 

Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-1081-MR, 2021 WL 3117200 (Ky. App. Jul. 23, 

2021); Eaves v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-1276-MR, 2021 WL 3818113 (Ky. 

App. Aug. 27, 2021); Wade v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-1145-MR, 2021 WL 

3435530, at *2 (Ky. App. Aug. 6, 2021).

5

 Simply put, since Martin is not raising 

any claims of error stemming from his prosecution, including his guilty plea and 

sentence, he is not entitled to CR 60.02 relief.

Martin also is not entitled to relief under CR 60.03. Martin did not 

file a separate, independent action, as is envisioned by the plain language of that 

rule. See, e.g., Morris, 2021 WL 1933656, at *2. Moreover, CR 60.03 “is 

intended as an equitable form of relief when no other avenue exists.” Meece v. 

Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 295 (Ky. 2017). So, because his argument on 

 

5 Under CR 76.28(4)(c), unpublished opinions rendered after January 1, 2003 may be cited “if 

there is no published opinion that would adequately address the issue before the court.” The 

parties have not cited, nor have we independently located, any published Kentucky opinions 

addressing the relationship between CR 60.02, CR 60.03, the Eighth Amendment, and the 

COVID-19 pandemic.
-6-

the same core grounds fails to satisfy CR 60.02(f), Martin is not entitled to relief 

under CR 60.03. Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Ky. 2014) 

(“Appellant is not entitled to relief under CR 60.02. As such, in effect, the ‘relief 

sought [in his CR 60.03 action] has been denied in a proceeding by motion under 

Rule 60.02.’ It follows that Appellant is not entitled to relief under CR 60.03.”) 

(quoting CR 60.03). We have repeatedly rejected similar CR 60.03 arguments 

made by inmates during the pandemic. Morris, 2021 WL 1933656, at *2; 

Williams, 2021 WL 943753, at *2-3; Gribbins, 2021 WL 1164461, at *2; Thomas, 

2021 WL 3117200, at *2; Eaves, 2021 WL 3818113, at *2; Wade, 2021 WL 

3435530, at *2.

Next, Martin has not shown he is entitled to relief pursuant to the 

Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. The precise parameters of his claims are not 

clear. Regardless, we have rejected similar COVID-19-based claims and do so 

here again, for the same fundamental reasons. Gribbins, 2021 WL 1164461, at *2-

3 (holding that the Kentucky Department of Corrections was not indifferent to the 

health needs of prisoners);6 Williams, 2021 WL 943753, at *3 (holding that Eighth 

Amendment claims involve the conditions of the movant’s confinement and thus 

 

6

 Though Martin obviously believes them to be inadequate, the Kentucky Department of 

Corrections has outlined the steps it has taken to minimize the COVID-19 health risks to 

prisoners. See Key Initiatives, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

https://corrections.ky.gov/Facilities/Documents/COVID-19/DOC%20Key%20Initiatives%201-

26-21.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2021).
-7-

are civil claims which are not properly brought in the sentencing court); Morris, 

2021 WL 1933656, at *2 (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

conditions of confinement claims must be raised in civil actions by naming the 

warden of the movant’s institution as a named party and, in any event, success on 

those claims would not result in the claimant being released from incarceration).

In addition, Martin’s reliance upon federal authority by which inmates 

were granted early release due to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as United States 

v. Foster, No. 1:14-cr-324-02, 2020 WL 6882941, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2020) 

(unpublished), is misplaced. There is a federal statute specifically permitting 

convicted and incarcerated defendants to be granted compassionate (i.e., early) 

release by courts. See id. at *2.7 But Martin is a state prisoner and so, though he 

strenuously argues to the contrary, the federal compassionate relief program is not 

available to him. Instead, as we have previously noted in affirming the denial of 

post-conviction relief in the similar case of Eaves, supra, Martin “may only receive 

early, pre-parole eligibility release via executive clemency[,]” which Governor 

Beshear has granted to some inmates. Eaves, 2021 WL 3818113, at *3. 

 

7 The compassionate release program does not inherently entitle federal prisoners to early 

release, even if they have significant health concerns. For example, a prisoner was denied 

compassionate relief despite having increased COVID-19 risks stemming from serious health 

conditions, including having partial paralysis and a blood disorder that caused him to have four 

strokes. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020). 
-8-

In sum, denying an unmeritorious CR 60.02/60.03 motion–which 

Martin’s is–violates no federal or state constitutional provisions. 

 In conclusion, we are not unsympathetic to the COVID-19 concerns 

of prisoners, including Martin. Nonetheless, the pandemic does not entitle 

prisoners to post-conviction relief. As we recently held in Eaves:

The COVID-19 pandemic is a worldwide crisis and 

tragedy of epic proportions which has caused significant 

fear and has upended previously settled societal and 

governmental norms. Nonetheless, [Martin] has not 

shown the pandemic entitles him, despite his health 

concerns, to be released early from incarceration. Thus, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion, or otherwise 

err, in denying his motion.

Eaves, 2021 WL 3818113, at *3 (footnote omitted).8

For the foregoing reasons, the Floyd Circuit Court’s order denying 

Leonard Martin’s post-conviction motion is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Leonard Martin, pro se

West Liberty, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Perry T. Ryan

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky

 

8 We have considered all of Martin’s scattershot arguments not explicitly discussed herein but 

conclude none provides a basis for disturbing the trial court’s decision.