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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JEROME H. WALDHER, JR. No. 6:15-cv-02012-HZ

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant.

Kathryn Tassinari

Brent Wells

Harder Wells Baron & Manning, PC

474 Willamette Street, Suite 200

Eugene, OR 97401

Attorney for Plaintiff

Billy J. Williams

United States Attorney, District of Oregon 

Janice E. Hebert

Assistant United States Attorney

U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Oregon

1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204

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Richard Morris

Social Security Administration 

Office of the General Counsel

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 901

Seattle, WA 98104

Attorneys for Defendant

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Plaintiff Jerome Waldher brings this action for judicial review of the Commissioner’s 

final decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI 

of the Social Security Act and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social 

Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 

1382(c) (3)). The Commissioner’s decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB on March 6, 2009. Tr. 150, 157.1 His application was 

denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 81-84. On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff appeared, with 

counsel, for a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John J. Madden, Jr. Tr. 309. On 

May 26, 2011, ALJ Madden found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 372-89. The Appeals Council 

denied review. Tr. 390.

Plaintiff appealed his case to this Court and, on December 29, 2013, the Honorable 

Robert E. Jones reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for further 

proceedings. Judge Jones found:

[T]he ALJ did not adequately account for the evidence of Waldher’s limitations 

interacting with coworkers and supervisors and failed to fully develop the record 

regarding Waldher’s intellectual deficits by obtaining historical records. As a result, the 

ALJ’s RFC assessment was flawed and the ultimate conclusion that Waldher can perform 

 

1 Citations to “Tr.” refer to the page(s) indicated in the official transcript of the administrative record, 

filed herein as Docket No. 13.

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work within the limitations of the RFC assessment was not supported by substantial 

evidence. 

Tr. 399. Despite this finding, Judge Jones concluded that the record did not establish that 

Plaintiff was disabled. Instead, he stated that “enhancement of the record with additional 

evidence of Waldher’s intellectual deficits, proper evaluation of the evidence of his limitations

interacting with coworkers and supervisors, and additional vocational expert testimony is 

necessary before a disability determination can be made.” Tr. 399-400. Thus, the case was 

remanded for further proceedings. 

On March 2, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Ted W. Neiswanger. Tr. 330. On June 

29, 2015, ALJ Neiswanger found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 305-324. The Appeals Council did 

not review the case on its own motion; therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of 

the agency from which Plaintiff seeks judicial review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.984.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges disability based on an intellectual disability. Plaintiff was 38 years old at 

the time of his alleged onset date. Tr. 150. Plaintiff completed high school. Tr. 338. All of 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work was unskilled. Tr. 316. 

SEQUENTIAL DISABILITY ANALYSIS

A claimant is disabled if unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be 

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. See, e.g., Valentine v. 

Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving 

disability. Id.

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In the first step, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity.” If so, the claimant is not disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). In step two, the Commissioner 

determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment or combination of 

impairments.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If not, 

the claimant is not disabled.

In step three, the Commissioner determines whether the impairment meets or equals “one 

of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to 

preclude substantial gainful activity.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 

416.920(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Commissioner 

proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.

In step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant, despite any 

impairment(s), has the residual functional capacity to perform “past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can, the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot 

perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. In step five, the 

Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 

141-42; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f). If the Commissioner meets his burden 

and proves that the claimant is able to perform other work which exists in the national economy, 

the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

At step one, ALJ Neiswanger determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since October 11, 2005, the alleged onset date. Tr. 310. Next, at steps two and 

three, ALJ Neiswanger determined that Plaintiff has the severe impairment of “mild intellectual 

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disability.” Id. However, ALJ Neiswanger determined that Plaintiff’s impairment did not meet or 

medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 311. At step four, ALJ Neiswanger 

concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: 

He is able to perform simple routine work tasks. He can have no interaction with the 

public. He is capable of structured superficial interaction with coworkers. He is limited to 

low stress work, defined as work with no persuasive communication tasks; no teamwork 

tasks; no fast-paced production pace work; and few changes in the work setting.

Tr. 313. ALJ Neiswanger concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

However, at step five, ALJ Neiswanger found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 

in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as “cleaner commercial/institutional,” 

“warehouse worker,” and “sweeper/cleaner industrial.” Tr. 317. Thus, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 318.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the Commissioner 

applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla, but less than 

preponderance.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). It is “such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

The court must weigh the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 

715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998)). The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

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Commissioner. Id. (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)); see 

also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). Variable interpretations of the 

evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner’s interpretation is a rational reading. Id.; see also

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. However, the court cannot not rely upon reasoning the ALJ did not 

assert in affirming the ALJ’s findings. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1225-26 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 

332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that ALJ Neiswanger’s decision is not supported by substantial 

evidence. The parties agree that ALJ Neiswanger erred by (1) failing to craft an RFC that 

incorporates Plaintiff’s limitations regarding his ability to respond appropriately to supervision

or stay on task; (2) failing to address the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother; and (3) failing to give 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. The parties disagree on whether 

the Court should remand the case for an award of benefits or for further proceedings. The Court 

agrees that ALJ Neiswanger’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. However, 

because the record has not been fully developed and doubts remain as to whether Plaintiff is, in 

fact, disabled, the Court remands for further proceedings.

I. Plaintiff’s Response to Supervision and Ability to Stay on Task

The parties agree that ALJ Neiswanger’s residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment 

failed to address Plaintiff’s limitations in interacting with supervisors, as reflected in the medical 

evidence and the testimony of Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s mother. In addition, Plaintiff argues that 

ALJ Neiswanger failed to address how Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in concentration, 

persistence, and pace affect his ability to perform simple, routine tasks. 

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Joshua Boyd, Psy.D., conducted a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff on September 7, 

2007. Tr. 235. Dr. Boyd observed that Plaintiff’s behavior was odd and “[h]is presentation and 

demeanor seemed more consistent with a 13 to 14 year old child.” Tr. 237. Dr. Boyd noted that, 

based on Plaintiff’s self-report, it appeared that Plaintiff lacked social judgment regarding 

appropriate behavior at work. Id. Plaintiff reported getting in trouble at work due to talking and 

praying in a disruptive way. Id. Dr. Boyd concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others 

was “moderately impaired.” Tr. 238. 

On April 18, 2009, Plaintiff was examined by Douglas Smyth, Ph.D., who concurred 

with Dr. Boyd’s assessment that Plaintiff’s social functioning was at an adolescent level. Tr. 264. 

Dr. Smyth opined that Plaintiff’s social skills were “less than age appropriate,” Tr. 264, and his 

interpersonal skills were “modest and immaturely developed,” Tr. 266. Dr. Smyth provided a 

rule-out diagnosis of “intermittent explosive disorder” and “borderline intellectual functioning.” 

Tr. 266. He provided a provisional diagnosis of mild mental retardation “inasmuch as there is no 

accompanying documentation supporting this diagnosis and test scores fall into a range where a 

case could also be made for borderline intellectual functioning.” Id.

Agency psychologist Sandra Lundblad reviewed Plaintiff’s case record on April 27, 

2009. Tr. 274. She opined that a diagnosis of borderline intellectual function was “appropriate” 

because there was no evidence to support a diagnosis of mental retardation prior to age 22. Tr. 

286. Based on her review of Plaintiff’s records, she indicated that he was not significantly 

limited in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from 

supervisors. Tr. 289. 

Plaintiff’s mother, Ms. Waldher, testified at the administrative hearing before ALJ 

Madden in 2011. Tr. 43. According to Ms. Waldher, Plaintiff was “fine” with authority figures or 

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supervisors as long as they were nearby, giving him instructions. Tr. 51. However, she said if 

they moved away then Plaintiff had trouble remembering what he was supposed to do or how he 

was supposed to do it. Id. She also testified that he had been fired from jobs because he was 

preaching during work. Tr. 52. In addition, Ms. Waldher testified that Plaintiff does not handle 

stress well and that he loses his temper, gets “real loud,” and “blows his top.” Tr. 53. 

Judge Jones found that the medical opinions in the record suggested “significant deficits 

in social functioning that would make appropriate interactions with coworkers and supervisors 

difficult.” Tr. 398. Judge Jones directed the ALJ on remand to conduct a proper evaluation of the 

evidence of Plaintiff’s limitations interacting with coworkers and supervisors. Tr. 400.

In between the time of Judge Jones’ decision and the administrative hearing on remand, 

Plaintiff obtained a second consultative psychological report from Dr. Smyth. Tr. 517. On 

October 7, 2014, Dr. Smyth conducted another evaluation of Plaintiff and reviewed test results, 

his earlier report, and Dr. Boyd’s report. Tr. 517. Dr. Smyth noted that, while Plaintiff’s attention 

span during the testing and interview was within normal limits, “he appeared easily sidetracked 

in conversation.” Tr. 521. Dr. Smyth wrote that Plaintiff’s “[p]ersistence and pace appeared 

modestly compromised secondary to distractibility and tangentiality.” Tr. 522.

According to Dr. Smyth, Plaintiff’s interpersonal skills “appeared underdeveloped.” Tr. 

522. The results of Dr. Smyth’s evaluation were consistent with diagnoses of “intellectual 

disability, mild severity across conceptual, social, and practical domains, provisional diagnosis” 

and “attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, predominantly inattentive presentation, mild 

severity.” Tr. 522. However, Dr. Smyth clarified that the diagnoses were only provisional 

because there was a lack of historical documentation. Tr. 523. In addition, Dr. Smyth found 

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insufficient evidence in the 2014 evaluation to support a diagnosis of intermittent explosive 

disorder or impulse-control disorder.

ALJ Neiswanger assigned “substantial weight” to the assessments of Drs. Smyth, Boyd, 

and Lundblad. Tr. 316. He concluded that the doctors’ assessments showed that Plaintiff 

“functions intellectually/cognitively in the mild intellectual disability range.” Id. ALJ 

Neiswanger acknowledged the doctors’ assessed limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to interact with 

others. Id. ALJ Neiswanger also limited Plaintiff to simple, routine work tasks and noted that 

Plaintiff needs a low-stress work environment. Id.

In crafting the RFC on remand, ALJ Neiswanger found that Plaintiff was limited to 

“simple routine work tasks,” “structured superficial interaction with coworkers” and “no 

teamwork tasks.” Tr. 313. However, ALJ Neiswanger failed to address the impact of Plaintiff’s 

social functioning deficits on his ability to interact with supervisors. He also failed to incorporate 

Plaintiff’s limitations in concentration, persistence and pace. See Brink v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 343 F. App'x 211, 212 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (restriction to “simple, repetitive 

work” did not encompass difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace); see also Lubin v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 507 Fed. Appx. 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (finding the ALJ 

erred by accepting the claimant had limitations as to concentration, persistence, or pace and then 

failing to include such limitations in the RFC and the hypothetical questions to the vocational 

expert).2In sum, the ALJ erred by creating an incomplete RFC. 

 

2 Although Brink and Lubin are unpublished decisions by the Ninth Circuit, and therefore do not establish 

precedent, they are indicative of how the court would rule in a published opinion. Lee v. Colvin, 80 F. 

Supp. 3d 1137, 1150 (D. Or. 2015) (citing Saucedo v. Colvin, No. 6:12–CV–02289–AC, 2014 WL 

4631225, slip op. at *17 (D.Or. Sept. 15, 2014)).

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II. Ms. Waldher’s Testimony

In addition to the portions of Ms. Waldher’s testimony described above, Ms. Waldher 

noted serious limitations in Plaintiff’s social functioning and in concentration, persistence, and 

pace. Ms. Waldher testified that Plaintiff attended special education classes in high school due to 

his temper and lack of control. Tr. 44. Plaintiff had been in trouble with the police due to praying 

too loudly in his apartment. Tr. 50. He also had gotten into trouble due his desire to proselytize

in public and his sense that strangers bully and persecute him. Tr. 50-51. 

ALJ Madden accepted Ms. Waldher’s testimony “as descriptive of [her] perceptions,” 

however, ALJ Madden found that it did not alter his RFC. Tr. 380. ALJ Madden also stated that 

“[t]he behavior observed and/or alleged by [Ms. Waldher] is not fully consistent with the 

medical and other evidence of record.” Id. Judge Jones, on the other hand, acknowledged Ms. 

Waldher’s testimony and opined that it strongly suggested that Plaintiff’s intellectual deficits 

were “life long.” Tr. 399. However, on remand, ALJ Neiswanger did not address Ms. Waldher’s 

testimony at all. 

ALJ Neiswanger should have credited Ms. Waldher’s testimony or given germane 

reasons to discount her opinion. Stout v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053–54 

(9th Cir. 2006) (to discount lay witness opinion evidence, an ALJ must “give reasons germane to 

each witness”). Because he did neither, the Commissioner concedes that ALJ Neiswanger erred.

III. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

The parties, and this Court, also agree that ALJ Neiswanger erred in his consideration of 

Plaintiff’s credibility. 

At the hearing in front of ALJ Neiswanger, Plaintiff testified that he has lost jobs as a 

result of conflict with coworkers. E.g., Tr. 353. Plaintiff also testified that he has yelled at and 

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threatened coworkers. Tr. 354. In addition, Plaintiff testified that he has gotten in trouble at work 

for preaching about his religion. Tr. 357. He also stated that he has gotten in trouble at work due 

to an inability to keep up with the pace of the work. Tr. 361.

Plaintiff testified that he has bad judgment regarding appropriate ways of reacting to 

other people. Tr. 356. Plaintiff testified regarding conflict with his brother and noted that his 

parents have called the police on Plaintiff. Tr. 357. 

ALJ Neiswanger stated that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence 

and limiting effects of these symptoms [alleged by Plaintiff] are not entirely credible for the 

reasons explained in this decision.” Tr. 313. However, ALJ Neiswanger failed to provide any 

specific reasons in the decision. 

The Ninth Circuit recently explained that an ALJ errs by stating only a general, 

nonspecific finding regarding credibility after simply reciting the medical evidence. BrownHunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (“General findings are insufficient; rather, 

the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant's complaints.”). Here, the ALJ simply provided a summary of the medical evidence and 

a general, unexplained conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ failed to identify 

which of Plaintiff’s complaints were at issue, leaving this court unable to meaningfully review 

the decision. Thus, the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s credibility is not supported by 

substantial evidence. See Carmickle v. Comm'r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (absent 

affirmative evidence that the plaintiff is malingering, “where the record includes objective 

medical evidence establishing that the claimant suffers from an impairment that could reasonably 

produce the symptoms of which he complains, an adverse credibility finding must be based on 

‘clear and convincing reasons’”). 

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IV. Remand for Further Proceedings

The Court finds that the ALJ failed to craft an RFC that incorporates Plaintiff’s 

limitations regarding his ability to respond appropriately to supervision or stay on task; failed to 

address the testimony of Plaintiff’s mother; and failed to give clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Therefore, the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s disability is 

not supported by substantial evidence. The Court vacates the ALJ’s decision.

The question remains, however, whether to remand the case for further proceedings or for 

an award of benefits. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 728 (decision is within the discretion of the 

Court). The Ninth Circuit has “devised a three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of which 

must be satisfied in order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and 

award benefits: (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings 

would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled on remand.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even if the “credit-as-true” criteria are met, the 

court retains the “flexibility” to remand for further proceedings where “an evaluation of the 

record as a whole creates serious doubt that a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Id. at 1021.

The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the record is not fully developed and 

doubts remain as to whether Plaintiff is, in fact, disabled. First, the extent and effect of Plaintiff’s 

ability to interact with supervisors is not fully developed in the record. Plaintiff argues that the 

VE already addressed the issue of Plaintiff’s limitations. ALJ Neiswanger asked the VE about a 

hypothetical person with a tendency to react inappropriately to criticism or supervision such that 

he would have episodes of yelling or making threats. Tr. 366. While the VE testified that such 

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behavior would not be tolerated, the record is not conclusive that Plaintiff would, in fact, have 

such behavior with supervisors. Dr. Boyd noted moderate impairments in Plaintiff’s ability to

interact with others and stated that he lacked social judgment regarding appropriate behavior at 

work. Tr. 237. However, any notations by Dr. Boyd of Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior at work 

were based on Plaintiff’s own reports. Dr. Smyth opined that Plaintiff had underdeveloped social 

skills, yet he did not make findings regarding the extent of Plaintiff’s ability to interact with 

supervisors. Tr. 264-66. And Dr. Lundblad concluded that Plaintiff was not significantly limited 

in his ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. Tr. 

289. Plaintiff does not challenge either ALJ’s decision to award substantial weight to these three 

medical opinions. He also does not address the opinion of non-examining psychologist Paul 

Rethinger, Ph.D., who concluded that Plaintiff would be “responsive to supportive lay 

supervision (not overly harsh, critical style).” Tr. 256. 

In addition, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates doubt that Plaintiff is disabled. 

Questions remain about the credibility of Plaintiff and Ms. Waldher due to inconsistent 

statements throughout the record. Plaintiff repeatedly alleged that his vision is limited; however, 

Ms. Waldher testified that Plaintiff would use a library computer to send email. Tr. 56, 349. 

Plaintiff told Dr. Boyd that he had a driver’s license, Tr. 236, yet two years later he denied ever 

having a license, although he stated he once had a permit, Tr. 264. See also Tr. 51 (Plaintiff 

testifying that he had been a dangerous driver because of his vision). In addition, Plaintiff and 

Ms. Waldher provided inconsistent statements regarding whether and when he had been in 

special education classes, why he was placed in those classes, and whether he graduated high 

school with a regular diploma. Tr. 44, 236, 263, 338-39. 

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The inconsistencies in the statements of Plaintiff and Ms. Waldher raise doubts as to the 

credibility of their testimony. And because their testimony is central to a potential finding of 

disability in this case, the Court thus has doubts as to whether Plaintiff is disabled.

In Burrell v. Colvin, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided guidance on how to 

decide whether to remand a case for an award of benefits or further proceedings. 775 F.3d 1133, 

114-42. In Burrell, the Court reviewed the facts of the case and concluded that “[v]iewing the 

record as a whole . . . Claimant may be disabled.” Id. However, the record also contained cause 

for serious doubt. Id. at 1142. When faced with the existence of both of those circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. See also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021 

(“Thus, when we conclude that a claimant is otherwise entitled to an immediate award of 

benefits under the credit-as-true analysis, Connett allows flexibility to remand for further 

proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in 

fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.”).

As in Burrell, Plaintiff here may be disabled. However, the record also contains cause for 

serious doubt and, thus, this Court must remand the case for further proceedings. The ALJ on 

remand must conduct a thorough evaluation of Ms. Waldher’s and Plaintiff’s credibility and 

assess whether to credit the allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects 

of Plaintiff’s symptoms. In addition, the ALJ must develop the record regarding whether a 

limitation on interaction with supervisors and ability to stay on task should be incorporated into 

the RFC and, if so, whether there are still jobs that Plaintiff could perform.

///

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CONCLUSION

The Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded for further administrative 

proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this ________ day of __________________________, 2016

________________________________________________

MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ

United States District Judge

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