Filed 3/1/23 In re C.H. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re C.H., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

C.H.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Juv. No. B320051

(Super. Ct. No. PJ53380)

(Los Angeles County)

Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786,

1 a minor 

who satisfactorily completes probation is entitled to dismissal of a 

section 602 wardship petition and the automatic sealing of all 

records pertaining to the petition. C.H. appeals the juvenile 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2

court’s order finding his performance on probation unsatisfactory 

and declining to dismiss his two section 602 petitions and seal his 

records. The court based its decision on C.H.’s use of marijuana 

while on probation and his failure to enter a drug treatment 

program as directed by the court and probation. We affirm. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

In February 2020, a section 602 wardship petition was filed 

against C.H., alleging the felonious possession of metal knuckles

(Pen. Code, § 21810), misdemeanor trespass (id., § 602, subd. 

(m)), and misdemeanor public intoxication (id., § 647, subd. (f)). 

Three months later, a second section 602 petition was filed, 

alleging the felonious taking or driving of a vehicle without 

consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor hitand-run driving resulting in property damage (id., § 20002, subd. 

(a)). 

The juvenile court sustained the two felony allegations, i.e., 

possession of metal knuckles and the taking or driving a vehicle 

without consent. Initially, C.H. was placed at home on probation. 

At probation’s recommendation, C.H. was placed out of home for 

a period due to his drug and alcohol use and overall reckless 

behavior. In April 2021, C.H. was placed back home on 

probation. 

At a hearing on April 26, 2022, the juvenile court 

terminated its jurisdiction over C.H., who was no longer a minor, 

but denied C.H.’s request under section 786 to dismiss the 

petitions and seal his records. As detailed below, the court found 

C.H. had failed to satisfactorily complete probation, noting he 

2 We omit the facts underlying C.H.’s offenses because they 

are irrelevant to the issues on appeal.
3

“was given a lot of chances, and that would include he was told to 

stop using drugs, and he used drugs.” 

In addition, when C.H. turned 18 years old, he withdrew 

from his participation in drug court. The juvenile court noted 

that if C.H. had “stayed in drug court, . . . we would have 

withdrawn the petition and sealed it.” 

DISCUSSION

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 786, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “If 

a person who has been alleged or found to be a ward of the 

juvenile court satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for 

any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed. The 

court shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed 

petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of 

law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the 

Department of Justice.” 

“For purposes of [section 786], satisfactory completion of [a] 

. . . term of probation described in subdivision (a) shall be deemed 

to have occurred if the person has no new findings of wardship or 

conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral 

turpitude during the period of supervision or probation and if the 

person has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable 

orders of supervision or probation that are within their capacity to 

perform.” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) 

A juvenile court must determine, in its “discretionary 

estimation,” whether a minor has “‘substantially complied’ with 

the essential requirements of his probation, such that he ha[s] 

demonstrably achieved the rehabilitative goals of probation.” (In 

re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 701, 711.) A court does not 
4

abuse its discretion if its finding is “supported by substantial 

evidence” and is “not irrational or capricious.” (Id. at p. 711.)

The Juvenile Court Acted Within Its Discretion in 

Declining to Dismiss C.H.’s Petitions and Seal His Records

Between February 2022 and the April 26, 2022 termination 

hearing, C.H. failed two of five drug tests. At the outset of the 

hearing, the juvenile court stated its tentative was to “follow 

[probation’s] recommendation and terminate [jurisdiction], but 

that would be without sealing since his last tests were positive 

for marijuana.” 

Prior to that hearing, the juvenile court advised C.H. it 

would terminate jurisdiction if he attended substance abuse

classes and had negative drug tests. Neither requirement was 

met. In addition to the two positive drug tests, C.H. failed to 

enroll in substance abuse classes. When C.H. had difficulty 

finding an available substance abuse program, his “probation 

officer instructed [him] to enroll himself into a Narcotics 

Anonymous program or an acceptable adult program.” (All caps. 

omitted.) He did not do so. 

C.H. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

found he had failed to substantially comply with the probation 

requirements. He maintains his use of “very low dosage 

marijuana” near the end of his probationary period cannot be 

considered noncompliance because “[i]t might be that ceasing all 

use of marijuana under all circumstances, such as those involving 

the loss of a family member [i.e., C.H.’s grandmother], might 

have been beyond [his] capacity to perform.” (See § 786, subd. 

(c)(1).) 

Neither this argument nor the supporting “authoritative” 

internet sources were presented in the juvenile court. We decline 
5

to consider them for the first time on appeal. (In re M.S. (2009) 

174 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251, fn. 4 [information not presented in 

the juvenile court may not be considered on appeal]; People v. 

Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1183 [“[O]ur review on a direct 

appeal is limited to the appellate record”].) 

In C.H.’s estimation, his performance on probation was 

more than adequate. He had taken steps to obtain his high 

school diploma, was gainfully employed and generally stayed out 

of trouble. But “[t]he existence of evidence supporting [C.H.’s]

position does not demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion. Our role is not to substitute our judgment for that of 

the juvenile court or reweigh the evidence.” (In re J.P. (2019) 37 

Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of 

reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced 

from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute 

its decision for that of the trial court.”’ [Citation.]” (In re 

Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Emmanuel R.

(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) 

As the juvenile court concisely stated, C.H. “was told to 

stop using drugs, and he used drugs.” C.H. does not dispute that 

substantial evidence supports this finding. Whether the juvenile 

court could have focused on other factors and reached a different 

conclusion is immaterial. (See In re Emmanuel R., supra, 94 

Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) C.H.’s continued drug use alone supports 

the court’s decision to decline to dismiss the petitions and seal his 

records. 

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order denying C.H. relief under section 

786 is affirmed. 
6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J. 

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

YEGAN, J.
7

Fred J. Fujioka, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Peggy Z. Huang

and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.