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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Cir c uit

No. 17-2792

R E B E C C A Z AND E R

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

S AMU E L O R

L I C H , J R ., et al ., Defendants-Appellees.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Indi a n a, Ha mmo nd Di v isi on. No . 2 :1 4 -cv -0 0 4 0 0 -PR C — Pa ul R. Che rry , Mag istrate Judge.

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 14, 2018

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 30, 2 018

Befor e B AU E R

, H AMI L T O N

, and S C UD D E R

, Circuit Judges

. B AU E R , Cir cuit Judge. Rebecca Z ander fi led negli gence clai m s agai nst John Bunci ch, in hi s offi ci al capacit y as S her i ff
o f Lake County

, Indi ana, as well as in tenti onal tor t a nd c i v i l

r i ghts c lai ms agai nst d e puty s her i ff S a muel Or li ch, Jr

. The Di str i ct Cour t had j ur i sdi ctio n ov er Zander ’s acti on for damages for Or li ch’s v i olati on of the Four teenth Amendment2 No. 17-2792

to the Uni ted States Consti tuti on pur suant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983, and s uppleme n t a l j ur i sdi c ti on ov er h er r elated state clai ms agai nst Or li ch and Bunci ch pur suant to 28 U.S .C. § 1367. Zander sued Bunci ch seeki ng to hold hi m vi car i ously li able f or an assault by Or li ch. The di str i ct cour t gr anted Bunc ic h
summar y j udgment on Zander ’s respondeat superior clai m, holdi ng that Or li ch w as not a c ti ng wi thi n the scope of hi s offi ci a l d uti es. The co u r t gr anted s ummar y j udgment to Bunci ch on Zander ’s negli gent hi ri ng, tr ai ning, and r e t e n t i on clai m, because Zander pr esented no ev i d ence t hat Bunci ch knew of the n ecessi ty of exer ti ng contr ol ov er Or li ch to pr ev ent hi s sexual mi sconduct. Zander a p p e a l s the or der gr anti ng summar y j udgment for Bunci ch. After s ummar y j udgment

w as gr anted for Bunci ch, Zander ’s clai ms agai nst Or li ch w er e tr i ed to a j ur y

. Zander pr ev ai led, a n d t he j ur y aw ar ded her $100,000 in com p e n s ator y damages, $275,000 in p uni ti v e damages, and attor neys fees and costs totalin g $97,267.80. For the r easons that follow , w e r e v er se the summar y j udgment f or Bunci ch as to Zander ’s respondeat superior clai m, and affi r mas to the negli gent hi r in g clai m
.

I. MA TERIAL FACTS On S eptember 19, 2013, Or li ch w as w or king as a deputy for the Lake County

, Indi ana, S her i ff's Depar tment (LCS D). He
w a s w e a r ing hi s LCS D uni for m, and ar med wi th a Glock .40 cali b er gun. That same day , Zander ’s hus b a n d c alled county di spatch to r epor t a domesti c di s turbance at h is r e s i dence on Geor gi a S tr eet. Or l i ch r esponded to the call.No. 17-2792 3
After ar r i v i ng at the scene, Or li ch or der ed Zander to leav e t h e G eor gi a S tr eet home and go to her other house on Whi te Oak A v enue. Zander told Or lic h t h a t s he could not go to the Whi te Oak A

v enue house becau s e t h e fur nace and electr i c panel had been di smantled. Offi cer Mi chael Mi ller w as also at the scene a s O r l ic h’s super v i sing offi cer
. Offi cer M il ler gav e Or li ch per mi ssi on to take Zander to the Whi te Oak A v enue house. Mi ller and Or li ch di s pu t e whether Mi ller gav e Or li ch per mi ssi on to enter the Whi te Oak A

v enue house to make r epai r s. After ar r i v i ng at the Whi te Oak A v enue house, Or li ch and Zander w ent to the basement, and Or li ch t u r ned on the electr i cit y and w ater heater

. Or li ch w a s unable to fi x the fur nace. Befor e l eav i ng, Or li ch told Zander that she could not
r etur n to the Geor gi a S tr eet addr ess fo r sev er al hour s. Or li ch left, and Zander closed the house door

. About ten or fi fteen m in utes after Or li ch l eft the house, Zander exi ted the bathr oom and found Or li ch standing ther e naked. He attacked Zander sexually , commi tti ng unspeakable acts, the detai ls of whi ch ar e unnece ssar y to r epeat in the

r ecor d her e. When Or li ch got up to p ut h i s clothes b a ck o n, Zander
c r a wled to the bathr oom and locked the door

. Or li ch bange d loudly on the b athr oom door and sai d that he cou l d make Zander ’s li fe v er y di ffi cult i f she s ai d anythi ng about what had happened. Or li ch also told Zander that she could not stay in the Wh i te Oak A

v enue house. Zanderenter ed Or li ch’s squad
car , and Or li ch dr ov e her to her fr i end's house.4 No. 17-2792
II. ANAL

YSIS Zander b r i ngs Indi ana state law tor t c lai ms agai nst Bunci ch i n hi s capac it y a s S her i ff. Zander asser ts that Bunci ch i s
v i c a r i o u s l y l i ab l e for Or l i ch's sexual batter y a nd false i mpr i sonment pu r suant to the doctr in e of respondeat superior and that Bunci ch negli g e n t l y hi r ed, tr ai ned, and r etai n ed Or li ch. Because resoluti on of Zander ’s clai ms depends on Indi ana law , the Cour t mu s t a pply Indi ana law as the Indi a na Supr eme Cour t w ould a pply i t. Home V a lu, Inc. v
. Pep Boys , 213 F .3d 960, 963 (7th Ci r
. 2000). W e r ev i ew the di str i ct cour t’s gr a nt of summar y j udgment de novo , dr awing all r easonable infer ences in fav or of the par ty opposi ng the moti on. Simmons v
. Chicago B d

. o f Educ. , 289 F .3d 488, 491–92 ( 7th Ci r
. 2002). S ummar y j udgment s h o u ld be gr anted “i f the mov ant shows that ther e i s no genui ne d i spute
as to a ny mater i al fact and the mov ant i s enti tled to j udgment
as a matter of law

. ” Fed

. R

. Ci v

. P

. 56(a). Rule 56 “mandates the entr y of sum m ar y j udgment, after a dequate ti me for di scov er y a nd upon moti on, agai nst a par ty who fai l s to make

a s h owi ng suffi ci ent to establi sh the exi stence of an elemen t essenti al to that par ty’s case, and on whi ch that par ty wi l l bear the bur den of pr oof at tr i al.” Celotex Corp. v
. Cat re t t, 477 U.S

. 317, 3 22 ( 1986). “S ummar y j udgment i s appr opr i ate when no mater i al fact i s di sputed and the mov in g par ti es ar e enti tled to j udgment as a matter of law , meaning that no r easonable j ur y could find for the other par ty base d o n t h e ev i dence in the

r ecor d.” Carman v . T

inkes , 762 F .3d 565, 566 (7th Ci r
. 2014).No. 17-2792 5
A. Respondeat Superior Under Indi ana law

, v i car i ous li abi l i ty wi ll gener ally be i mposed up o n a n employ er u nder the doctr ine of respondeat superior wher e the employ ee has infli cted har m “whi le acti ng wi thi n the scope of employment.” Barnett v. Clark , 889 N.E.2d 281, 2 83 (Ind. 2008). “[I]n or der for a n e m p l o y e e’s a c t to fall ‘wi thin the s cope of employment, ’ t h e inj u r i ous a ct m u st be i nci d ental to the conduct author i zed or i t must, to an appr eci a bl e extent, fur ther the employ er 's business.” I d

. at 283–84. Whether an a ct falls wi thi n t h e scope of employment i s gener ally a questi on of fact. See Knighten v
. E. Chi. Hous. A uth. , 45 N.E.3d 788, 794 (Ind. 2015). Wher e conduct inv olv es b o th “author i zed acts unquesti onably wi thi n the scope of employm e n t” and “unauthor i zed acts unquesti onably outsi d e th e scope of employment” i t should b e sent to a j ur y
. Stropes v
. Heritage House Children's Ctr

. , 547 N .E.2d 2 44, 249–50 (Ind. 1989). Li abi li ty c a n be i mposed upon employ er s u nder respondeat superior f or the tor ti ous or cr i min al acts of thei r employ ees. See, e.g., Stropes , 547 N .E.2d at 250 (Ind. 1989) (employ ee assaulted i ncapaci tated pati ent); Southport Li ttle League v
. V a ughan , 734 N.E.2d 261, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 20 0 0 ) (equi pment manager molested par ti ci pati ng y ouths). The Indi ana S upr eme Cour t
r ecently r ei ter ated “[c]r i m inal cond uc t t hat v i olates an employ ee's offi ci al duti es, an employ er 's expr ess or der s, or ev en
a most sacr ed pr ofessi onal duty may nev er theless b e w i th in th e scope of employment. The cr i ti cal inqui r y i s whether the tor ti ous act ar ose n atur ally or pr edi ctably fr om the employment context.” Cox v
. Evansville Police Dep't, 107 N.E.3d 453,6 No. 17-2792
463–64 (Ind. 2018) ( Summar y j udgment for poli c e d epar tment
on re spondeat superior clai m r ev er sed wher e poli ce offi cer sexually assaulted w oman inhi s custody). In Cox, d eci ded after the di str i c t cour t's deci si on in thi s c ase, the Indi ana S upr eme Cour t fi r st spoke di r ectly to the i ssue of

a poli ce offi c er ’s scope of employment when mi sus i n g employ er -confer r ed pow er and a utho r ity to commi t a sexual assault. Id

. Ther e, Offi cer Mar k Roger s of For t W ayne, Indi ana,
w as on an oper ati ng-whi le-int o x icated patr ol when fellow offi cer s placed a sev er ely intoxi cated w oman, Babi Bey er , into Roge r s ’ s q u ad car
. Id

. at 457. When Bey er began v omi ti ng, Roger s dr ov e her to a hospi tal. Id

. Bey er ’s blood alcohol l ev el

w as too hi gh f o r B e y e r to leav e by h er self and the hospi tal di schar ged h e r i nto poli ce custody

. Id

. Roger s handcuffed Bey er , d rov e her to a secluded l ocati on, and r aped her

. Id

. a t 4 5 8. Roger s pleaded gui lty to offi ci al mi s c onduct, se x u a l mi sconduct, and rape. Id

. Be y e r sued the Ci ty of For t W ayne
on a respondeat superior theor y
. I d

. The Indi ana S upr eme Cour t
r ev er sed the low er cour t’s or der of s ummar y judgment for For t W a y n e, fi n ding that a j ur y should d eter mine whether Roger s’ acti ons fell wi thi n the scope of employment. Id

. at 464. G e ner ally

, li abi l i ty under a theor y of respondeat super i o r attaches for sexual ass a u l t only wher e the assault occur s dur i ng physi cal, i n ti mate contact r equi r ed by a j ob. Doe v
. V igo Cty

. , No. 17-3155, 2018 U.S

. App. LEXIS 280 0 5 , at *7 (7th Ci r
. Oct. 3, 2018) (ci ti ng Barnett v
. Clark , 889 N.E.2d 2 81, 286 (Ind. 2008)). In Cox, how ev er , the Indi a na S u pr eme Cour t held that “poli ce offi cer s' duti es come wi th br oad author i ty and i nti mi

dati ng p o w e r t hat may affect v i car i ous li abi li ty” and becauseNo. 17-2792 7
of that br oad a uthor i ty “the r ange of acts for whi ch a ci ty may be vi car i ously l i able str etches far .” Cox, 1 07 N.E.3d at 460. Becau se “poli ce offi cer s' employ er -confer red pow er and author i ty car ry a n i nher ent r i sk of abuse” the inqui ry into
w h e t he r a p oli ce offi cer ’s acti on fall wi thi n the scope o f employment consi sts of tw o qu e s t ions: “Fi r st, di d the offi cer abuse employ er -confer r ed pow er and a uthor i ty in commi tti ng the sexual assau l t ? A n d second, d i d that abuse of p ow er and author i ty flow natur ally or p r e d ic tably fr om the poli ce-employment context i n whi ch i t ar ose?” Id

. at 464. Her e, th e facts show that Or li ch abused hi s employ er confer r ed pow er when he assaulted Zander

. Or li ch r esponded to the domesti c di sturbance call as a par t of hi s r egular duti es, cloaked i n the author i ty of h i s uni for m
. He or der ed Zander i nto hi s squad car and tr anspor ted her to the Whi te Oak addr ess. Or li ch d ir e c t ed her to r emain at the pr oper ty for
sev er a l hour s, knowi ng she w ould b e a lone when he r etur ned minutes later

. Addi ti on a l l y , O r l i ch ’ s uni for m and si d ear m w er e pr esent i n the r oom whi le he assaulted Zander

. Or li ch exploi ted “uni que insti tuti onal pr er ogati v es of hi s poli ce employment.” Id

. Because of thi s c onnecti on, Bunci ch i s not enti tled to summar y judgment. Whether Or li ch’s employment gav e r i se to the abuse of that pow er i s a questi on of fact for the j ur y

. The j ur y must deter m ine i f Or li ch’s “employment acti v i ti es natur ally or pr edi ctably led to ‘hi s taki ng adv a ntage of the oppor tuni ty’ to commi t sexual assault by abusing the ‘author i ty and pr oxi mi ty and pr i v acy’ of hi s employment.” Id

. (ci ti ng W est ex rel. Norris v
. W

aymire, 114 F .3d 646, 649 (7th Ci r
. 1997)).8 No. 17-2792
The gr a nti n g of summar y j udgment to Bunci ch i s r ev er sed and r emanded for fur ther pr oceedings. B. Negligent Hiring, T raining, and Retention India na law r ecogni zes a cause of a cti on agai nst an empl oy er for the negli gent hi r ing, tr ain ing, and r etenti on of an empl o y e e. See Hudgins v
. Bemish , 64 N.E.3d 923, 925–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Levinson v
. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville , 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). The standar d set for th i n Restatement (S econd) of T or ts § 3 17 gov er ns t h ese clai ms. Hudgins , 64 N.E.3d at 925–26. Thi s gen e r a l rule states that an employ er has a duty to
exer ci se r easonable car e to c ontr o l h i s employ ee to pr ev ent har m agai nst a per s on, but thi s duty exi sts only i f the employ er “(i ) kn o ws or has r eason to know that he has the abi l i ty to cont r o l hi s [employ ee], and ( i i ) knows or should know of the necessi ty and oppor tuni ty for exe r c i sing such contr ol.” Restatement (S econd) of T or ts § 317. Wher e a gener al duty has been ar ti culated, for es e eabi l i ty i s “ the cr i ti cal inqui r y” in d e ter minin g whether the gener al d u ty appli es to a par ti cular
scenar i o. Rogers v. Martin , 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016). T o pr ev ai l, Zander m u s t s how that Bunci ch knew or had

r eason to know that Or li ch w oul d a c t a s he d i d and fai led to take appr opr i ate acti on to pr ev ent i t. Se e G rza n v
. Charter Hosp. , 702 N

. E

. 2 d 786, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1 998) (S ummar y j udgment w as r ev er sed wher e questi on of fact r emained about super v i sor ’s knowledge of ongoi n g misconduct); see also Frye
v
. American P a inting Co. , 642 N .E.2d 995, 999 (Ind. C t

. App. 1994) (Holding i t w as for eseeable that a pain ti ng c ompany employ ee wi th a h i stor y of bur glar y and ar son w ould bur glar

-No. 17-2792 9
i ze a nd set fi r e to a house.); Sandage v
. Board of Commissioners of V anderbur gh County, 897 N.E.2d 507, 513–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (Holding i t w as not f or eseeable that a p ar king c ompany employ ee w i th robber y and dr ug use hi stor y w ould dr i v e to an apar tment and ki ll thr ee people). Her e, ther e w as no ev i dence that Bunci ch s ho u l d hav e known that Or li ch w as li kely to assault a m ember of the publi c
. The r ecor d i s absent of any suggesti on that Or li ch had a h i stor y of thi s type of mi s conduct. The di str i ct c our t cor r ectly gr anted Bunci ch’s moti on for summar y j udgment.

III. CONCLUSION For the for egoi ng r easons, the o r de r gr anti ng summar y j udgment f or Bun c ic h i s REVERS ED on Zander ’s respondeat superior clai m a nd REMANDED for fur ther pr oceedi ngs, and AFFIRMED on Zander ’s negli gent hi r in g, tr ai nin g and r etenti on clai m.