IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

KERRY M. SKELTON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

AIKEN, Judge: 

EUGENE DIVISION 

Case No. 6:16-cv-00115-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Ke1Ty M. Skelton brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiffs application for Supplemental 

Security Income ("SSI"). For the reasons set fotth below, the Commissioner's decision is 

affirmed. 

BACKGROUND 

On December 22, 2008, plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging disability beginning December 

1, 2008. Tr. 149. She later amended her alleged onset date to December 22, 2008, the date of 

her application. Tr. 746. Bom June 4, 1971, plaintiff was thirty-seven years old when she 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 
submitted her SSI application. Tr. 149. She alleged disability due to back pain, neck pain, hip 

pain, anxiety, and depression. Tr. 157. 

Plaintiffs application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 95-98, 103-05. 

On June 15, 2011, she appeared at a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 49-89. The ALJ found her not 

disabled in a written decision issued October 14, 2011, Tr. 13-23, and the Appeals Council 

denied review, Tr. 1. On appeal, this Court remanded for fmther proceedings, finding that the 

ALJ committed harmful error by (1) failing to explain how much weight he had afforded to a 

series of Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") scores assessed by a treating physician and 

(2) failing to acknowledge a potential conflict between plaintiffs' physical capacities and the 

amount of overhead reaching required by some of the jobs identified by the vocational expe1t. 

Skelton v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 4162536, at *11, *13 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2014). 

On remand, plaintiff submitted additional medical evidence and appeared at an August 

28, 2015, hearing before a different ALJ. Tr. 735-72. The ALJ found plaintiff not disabled on 

September 25, 2015. Tr. 713-27. Plaintiff appealed that decision to this Comt. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district cou1t must affom the Commissioner's decision if it is based upon proper 

legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g); Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). "Substantial evidence is more than 

a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Gutierrez v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 

519, 522 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court must weigh "both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion." Mayes v. 

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence is subject to more than one 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 
interpretation but the Commissioner's decision is rational, the Commissioner must be affirmed, 

because "the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner." Edlund v. 

lviassanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 

COMMISSIONER'S DECISION 

The initial burden ofproofrests upon plaintiff to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impaitment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At 

step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since the 

alleged disability onset date. Tr. 715; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ 

found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "obesity; fibromyalgia; status-post 

cervical spine fusion at C6-7; status-post right rotator cuff repair; right brachia! plexis; recent 

onset of left shoulder pain, secondary to probable impingement syndrome; bipolar disorder; and 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)[.]" Tr. 715; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step 

three, the ALJ determined plaintiffs impaitments, whether considered singly or in combination, 

did not meet or equal "one of the listed impairments" that the Commissioner acknowledges are 

so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. Tr. 715; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). 

The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to 

Perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 416.967(b) except that she is 

futiher limited to no more than frequent stooping, crouching, kneeling, balancing 

or climbing of ramps and stairs. The claimant is limited to no more than 

occasional crawling, bilateral overhead reaching or climbing of ropes, ladders or 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 
scaffolds. The claimant is futiher limited to simple, repetitive routine tasks 

requiring no more than occasional interaction with the general public. 

Tr. 716; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). At step four, the ALJ concluded plaintiff had no past relevant 

work. Tr. 726; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step five, the ALJ found plaintiff could 

perfo1m several jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy: mail clerk, 

information router, and electronics worker. Tr. 727; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). 

Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and denied his application for benefits. Tr. 

727. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ committed harmful enor in evaluating the credibility of 

plaintiffs subjective symptom statements, weighing the medical opinion evidence, and assessing 

which jobs plaintiff would be able to perfo1m. I address each argument in turn. 

I. Plaintiff's Subjective Symptom Testimony 

When a claimant's medically documented impairments reasonably could be expected to 

produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no affinnative 

evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of ... 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." Smolen v. 

Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). A general assertion that the claimant is not credible 

is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which . . . testimony is not credible and what evidence 

suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing comi to conclude 

that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Sha/ala, 50 F.3d 

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995). If the "ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 
the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

959 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff testified that she is unable to work because of left shoulder pain, a frayed right 

bicep, chronic neck pain, anxiety, and depression. Tr. 746-47. With respect to her physical 

limitations, she cannot concentrate when in pain and cannot lift anything due to her neck and 

shoulder problems. Tr. 173. She has aches, muscle spasms, and burning sensations in her lower 

back. Tr. 75. Due to pain, it takes several hours to do chores such as dishes or laundry. Tr. 

170-71. She is unable to lift anything over her head or reach into cupboards, "[i]t doesn't matter 

if it's a can of corn or a plate." Tr. 755. She cannot hold a gallon of milk and even pouring a 

cup of coffee is a struggle. Tr. 756. Numbness in her finge1tips is triggered by writing, washing 

dishes, and lifting anything heavy. Tr. 70. Her 2006 shoulder surgery did not resolve her pain; 

instead, it now "hurts different." Tr. 72. Driving and doing chores such as cooking or dishes 

makes her neck pain worse. Tr. 73. She is unable to vacuum because she cannot pull with her 

right shoulder and her left mm is too weak. Tr. 73. She cannot mow the grass at all, and can 

only sweep for a few minutes before her arm and low back begin to hurt. Tr. 74. Although she 

can stmt a load of laundry, she needs her children's help to move the wet clothes from the 

washing machine to the dryer. Tr. 74. Her fibromyalgia affects "everything" from sitting down 

to lying in bed, with "every muscle and joint" aching and burning. Tr. 173. She takes pain 

medication but it does not help her pain at all. Tr. 747. She estimates she can stand for a 

maximum of ten to fifteen minutes at a time and sit for a maximum of forty minutes at a time. 

Tr. 76. 

Regarding mental limitations, plaintiff stated that she does not associate with people 

because they irritate her or make her angry. Tr. 173. She has panic attacks when she is around a 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 
large group of people. Tr. 173. She sometimes abandons a cart full of groceries at the store due 

to these attacks. Tr. 79. Medication helps with the panic attacks but does not make them go 

away. Tr. 81. She also suffers from depression and has a history of past trauma. Tr. 175, 747. 

She is not in counseling because she does not "like to divulge personal information to strangers." 

Tr. 81. She has "no girlfriends" and "no people [she] can trust." Tr. 175. 

The ALJ gave little weight to plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony for three reasons. 

First, the ALJ found the purported severity of the symptoms inconsistent with plaintiffs daily 

activity level. Second, the ALJ noted inconsistencies between plaintiffs testimony and the 

medical evidence. And third, the ALJ noted plaintiffs poor work hist01y and concluded that 

history suggested plaintiff decided not to work for reasons other than disability. 

The inconsistency between plaintiffs symptom testimony and her daily activity level is a 

clear and convincing reason to question her statements about her physical symptoms. See Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff described very severe limitations, including 

that she has to spend most of the day sitting down or lying down and cannot lift a gallon of milk 

or pour a cup of coffee. The ALJ reasonably found those limitations inconsistent with plaintiffs 

statements that she is able to care for two children (including giving them daily baths), Tr. 168; 

do a variety of household chores, including sweeping, vacuuming, wiping counters, doing the 

dishes, driving, and shopping, Tr. 170-71; care for household pets, Tr. 169; walk her children to 

school every morning, Tr. 78; and work in her garden, Tr. 68-69. To be sure, plaintiff 

consistently testified that she experienced moderate to severe limitations in her ability to do those 

activities. But the ALJ permissibly concluded that, even accounting for those limitations, 

plaintiff would not have been able to sustain her reported activity level if her symptoms were as 

extreme as she alleged. See Tr. 724 ("Despite the claimant's allegations of acute pain, 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 
depression, or anxiety, her actual level of functioning is much more consistent with an individual 

who would be able to sustain work with some accommodation of her physical and mental 

symptoms."). 

Plaintiff relies heavily on the ALJ' s statement that her symptom testimony is 

"particularly" inconsistent with a few examples of more vigorous activity, such as kicking a 

soccer ball and pushing a lawnmower. Tr. 724. I agree with plaintiff that there is no indication 

she engaged in such activities on a regular basis. But the ALJ did not suggest plaintiff played 

soccer or mowed the lawn often; he cited those incidents as more extreme examples of 

inconsistencies between the purpmied severity of plaintiffs symptoms and her activity level. 

The ALJ found plaintiffs alleged symptom severity inconsistent with her everyday activities. 

As explained above, that finding is suppo1ied by substantial evidence. 

The conflicts between plaintiffs symptom testimony and the medical evidence are also a 

clear, convincing reason to give her symptom testimony less weight. See Connett v. Barnhart, 

340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). For example, at the June 2011 hearing, plaintiff testified that 

her 2006 shoulder surgery did not resolve her pain problems. Tr. 72. The ALJ permissibly 

found that testimony inconsistent with a 2009 medical record in which plaintiffs treating 

physician stated, with respect to recovery after the surgery, "I think this patient is doing great. 

She will continue to increase her range of motion and strength. . . . I have no restrictions for her 

at this time. She can go back to all activities of daily living. She is maxillary medically 

improved." Tr. 577. 

Finally, the ALJ pe1missibly considered plaintiffs work history in evaluating her 

symptom testimony. Plaintiff has a sparse history of part-time work and has never worked at the 

substantial gainful activity level. Tr. 158. The ALJ permissibly considered those facts in 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 
evaluating plaintiffs symptom statements. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. Moreover, in her written 

disability repo1t, plaintiff stated that she left her last part-time job due to domestic violence 

issues and did not tie the decision to stop working to her limitations. Tr. 157. Standing alone, 

this would not be a sufficient reason to discredit plaintiffs testimony. However, the ALJ 

reasonably considered plaintiffs explanation of why she left her job evidence that her decision 

not to work was tied to reasons other than disabling impaitments. See Bruton v. lvfassanari, 268 

F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff correctly points out that the record is ambiguous and her 

poor work history could be attributable to her mental limitations. Nonetheless, I am bound to 

uphold the Commissioner's interpretation of the evidence because it is rational. Thomas, 278 

F.3d at 959. 

The ALJ provided clear, convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence to afford 

little weight to plaintiffs testimony about the severity of her symptoms. 

II. lvfedical Opinion Evidence 

There are three types of medical opinions in Social Security disability cases: those of 

treating, examining, and reviewing physicians. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 

(9th Cir. 2001). "Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an 

examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion canies more weight than a 

reviewing physician's." Id. at 1202; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Where there is a conflict between 

two medical opinions, the ALJ may rely on the medical opinion of a non-treating doctor instead 

of the contrary opinion of a treating doctor only if the ALJ provides "specific and legitimate" 

reasons suppo1ted by substantial evidence in the record. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202. Medical 

opinions may address both the nature of the plaintiffs limitations and the ultimate issue of 

disability, i.e., whether the plaintiff is capable of any work, given her limitations. Id. Although 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 
the ultimate decision regarding disability is reserved to the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(e)(l), the rnles governing consideration of medical opinions apply with equal force to 

opinions on the ultimate issue of disability. Reddick v. Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ e!1'ed by improperly rejecting the opinions of treating physician 

Dr. Phillips and examining physician Dr. Alvord, and by failing to assign weight to a series of 

low GAF scores. 

A. Dr. Phillips 's Opinions 

Dr. Phillips has been plaintiffs treating physician since 2005. Tr. 579. In February 

2011, Dr. Phillips provided a written opinion about plaintiffs functional limitations ("2011 

letter"). Tr. 579-80. Dr. Phillips explained that plaintiff "had a multitude of medical and 

psychiatric diagnoses, including chronic pain from a variety of objective diseases and injuries, 

and the mental health problem of bipolar disorder." Tr. 579. Dr. Phillips stated that plaintiffs 

"most debilitating" limitation is the decreased motion, pain, and numbness in her right mm and 

hands. Tr. 579. Dr. Phillips opined that plaintiff "would likely not be capable of light work or 

even sedentary work on a full time basis." Tr. 579. Dr. Phillips expressly relied on plaintiffs 

report of her own symptoms in formulating his opinion, though he noted that plaintiffs 

symptoms are "typical of what I have seen in many other patients with her diagnoses" and stated 

that he believed plaintiff reported her symptoms "earnestly." Tr. 579. 

In 2012, Dr. Phillips completed a two-page functional limitations questiormaire ("2012 

questionnaire"). He opined that plaintiff would be able to lift or cmTy a maximum of five to ten 

pounds, stand for a maximum of two hours, and sit for a maximum of two hours. Tr. 708. He 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 
also assessed a limited ability to push and pull with her arms and stated that plaintiff could never 

reach and could only occasionally handle, climb, balance, bend, or kneel. Tr. 708. 

Finally, in 2014, Dr. Phillips completed a form for the state Department of Human 

Services ("2014 form"). Tr. 1020. On that form, Dr. Phillips declined to recommend plaintiff 

for job search/employment, work experience, or vocational rehabilitation, and opined that 

plaintiff was a candidate for Social Security disability. Tr. 1020. 

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Phillips's opinions. Tr. 725. Because Dr. Phillips's 

opinions about plaintiffs limitations conflict with the opinion of reviewing physician Dr. Alley, 

the ALJ was required to supp01t his decision with specific, legitimate reasons. After a careful 

review of the record, I conclude the ALJ's reasoning meets that standard. 

The ALJ rejected the 2011 letter because it expressly relied on plaintiffs report of her 

symptoms, which the ALJ had already discredited. That is a legitimate reason to give less 

weight to Dr. Phillips's opinion. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014); see 

also Skelton, 2014 WL 4162536 at *6 (in the previous appeal, affirming the ALJ's decision to 

give little weight to Dr. Phillips' s 2011 letter on this same ground). The ALJ also found the 

limitations assessed by Dr. Phillips were not suppo1ted by the medical evidence and not based on 

diagnostic findings. That reason, too, is legitimate and supp01ted by substantial evidence. See 

Skelton, 2014 WL 4162536 at *7, *9 (citing normal EMO and nerve conduction studies and 

evidence that plaintiff "obtained good relief from her neck and shoulder surgeries" in affitming 

the ALJ' s determination that the limitations expressed in the 2011 letter were inconsistent with 

the medical record). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ' s reasons do not support rejection of the 2011 letter because 

her pain is caused, in part, by fibromyalgia, which eludes objective measurement and is 

Page 10- OPINION AND ORDER 
diagnosed based solely on a patient's subjective complaints. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 

594 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff's fibromyalgia diagnosis does not change the analysis. Because of 

the nature of the condition, subjective symptom testimony is pmiicularly important in cases 

involving fibromyalgia. As noted in the previous section, the ALJ provided three clear, 

convincing reasons to discredit plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. The fact that plaintiff 

has a fibromyalgia diagnosis does not override the ALJ's evaluation of plaintiff's symptom 

testimony. 

The ALJ discredited the 2012 questionnaire because it did not address negative clinical 

findings regarding a cervical condition, did not explain how the assessed limitations were 

consistent with plaintiff's daily activity level, and was inconsistent with the overall record. Tr. 

725. The ALJ rejected the 2014 fonn for similar reasons, finding that there were no clinical 

findings to support the assessed limitations and that the form did not address plaintiff's 

demonstrated level of functioning. Id. Those are specific, legitimate reasons to disregard Dr. 

Phillips's opinion. Read in isolation, the statements regarding inconsistency with the medical 

record and plaintiff's activity level lack the specificity required to reject a treating physician's 

opinion. But read in the context of the whole opinion, it is clear the ALJ made the requisite 

specific findings. Just as in plaintiff's previous appeal, the ALJ's general statements about 

inconsistencies follow several pages of in-depth discussion of the medical evidence and the 

evidence of plaintiff's daily activities. Tr. 717-24; Skelton, 2014 WL 4162536 at *9. The ALJ 

reasonably found inconsistencies between the limitations assessed by Dr. Phillips and much of 

that evidence. For example, Dr. Phillips's opinion that plaintiff cannot do any reaching or lifting 

is irreconcilable with the fact that plaintiff does several activities that require reaching and 

lifting, including cooking, cleaning, shopping, and bathing for her children. Similarly, Dr. 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Phillips' s opinion that plaintiff has severe limitations standing and walking is undermined by the 

absence of medical findings anywhere in the record documenting problems in those areas. 

The RFC provides limitations consistent with some of Dr. Phillips's opinion. For 

example, the ALJ limited plaintiff to light work, with additional limitations on stooping, 

crouching, kneeling, balancing, climbing, crawling, and bilateral overhead reaching. Tr. 716. 

To the extent Dr. Phillips's opinion would require restrictions beyond those included in the RFC, 

the ALJ discredited it based on specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

B. Dr. Alvord's Opinion 

Dr. Alvord evaluated plaintiff on August 10, 2015. Tr. 1005. Dr. Alvord based his 

evaluation on a clinical interview, mental status examination, and review of available records. 

Tr. 1005. Dr. Alvord opined that plaintiff would not have difficulty performing simple and 

repetitive tasks, but that she would have difficulty performing detailed and complex tasks, 

accepting instructions from supervisors, interacting with coworkers and the public, performing 

work activities on a regular basis without special instructions, maintaining regular attendance, 

and dealing with the usual stress encountered in the workplace. Tr. 1009. 

The ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Alvord's opinion. Tr. 726. Because Dr. Alvord's 

opinion conflicts with the opinion of reviewing physician Dr. Anderson, the ALJ was required to 

support his decision with specific, legitimate reasons. Once again, the ALJ met that standard. 

The ALJ found there was no support in the nanative body of Dr. Alvord' s opinion for the 

severity of the assessed limitations, and that nothing in the mental status examination suggested 

plaintiff was suffering from significant symptoms. Tr. 726. That finding is supported by 

substantial evidence and is a legitimate reason to give Dr. Alvord's opinion less weight. Dr. 

Alford deemed plaintiffs thought processes, memory, attention/concentration, abstract thinking, 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 
and insight/judgment "intact," "adequate," or "within no1mal limits." Tr. 1008. Although Dr. 

Alvord reviewed other records, he did not explain how those records provided support for 

limitations so out of step with the findings in his own mental status evaluation. The only 

po1iions of Dr. Alvord's repo1i that could suppo1i limitations as severe as those he assessed 

appear to relate to plaintiffs subjective description of her symptoms. As noted, the ALJ 

pe1missibly discredited those statements. 

The ALJ further found the extremity of the limitations Dr. Alvord assessed inconsistent 

with the record as a whole and with plaintiffs daily activity level. Tr. 726. Those are specific, 

legitimate reasons to discredit Dr. Alvord's opinion. As with Dr. Phillips's opinion, these 

seemingly general reasons gain the requisite specificity when read in the context of the opinion 

as a whole. The ALJ carefully summarized the medical record and the evidence regarding 

plaintiffs activity level, and pe1missibly found that evidence inconsistent with limitations at the 

level assessed by Dr. Alvord. 

Once again, the RFC accounts for several of the limitations assessed by Dr. Alvord. For 

example, plaintiff is limited to simple, repetitive, routine tasks and can interact with the public 

only occasionally. Tr. 716. To the extent Dr. Alvord's opinion would require additional 

restrictions, the ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons to discredit it. 

C. GAF Scores 

Finally, plaintiff contends the ALJ e!Ted in failing to give weight to a series of GAF 

scores assessed by treating physician Dr. Smolen. In the previous appeal, this CoUli found the 

ALJ erred by failing to discuss the GAF scores and directed the Commissioner to address those 

scores on remand. Skelton, 2014 WL 4162536 at *11. 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 
GAF scores are "a rough estimate of an individual's psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning used to reflect the individual's need for treatment." Garrison v. Colvin, 

759 F.3d 995, 1002 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 

(9th Cir. 1998)). "Although GAF scores, standing alone, do not control detenninations of 

whether a person's mental impairments rise to the level of a disability ... , they may be a useful 

measurement." Id 

Providers at Linn County Mental Health Services, primarily Dr. Smolen, consistently 

gave plaintiff GAF scores of 45 or 48 between 2008 and 2015. Tr. 264, 269, 488, 516, 629, 703, 

935, 1022, 1024, 1030, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1041. A GAF score between 41 and 50 

describes "serious symptoms" or "any serious impahment in social, occupational, or school 

functioning." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1002 n.4. The medical records do not contain specific 

functional limitations or explain the rationale behind the GAF scores. 

The ALJ gave "little to no weight" to the scores, finding them inconsistent with "the fact 

that the claimant showed some level of social functioning and cognitive ability throughout the 

period at issue" and with plaintiffs daily activity level. Tr. 725-26. The ALJ's treatment of the 

GAF scores is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ pennissibly considered plaintiffs 

demonstrated level of functioning, specifically her ability to care for her children, perform most 

chores, drive, shop, and pmticipate in other activities, inconsistent with symptoms so severe they 

would preclude all full-time work. 

III. Step Five Analysis 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at step five when he found that she could 

perform the jobs of mail clerk, information router, and electronics worker. Plaintiff contends 

Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER 
there is an inconsistency between the reasoning level required by those jobs and the RFC's 

limitation to simple, repetitive, routine tasks. 

The ALJ incorrectly stated that mail clerk has a reasoning level of two; in fact, it has a 

reasoning level of three. Dictionary of Occupational Titles § 209.687-026 (4th ed. 1991), 

available at 1991 WL 671813. The Ninth Circuit has held that there is a potential inconsistency 

between reasoning level three and a limitation to simple, routine tasks. Rounds v. Comm 'r, 807 

F.3d 996, 1002-04 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ therefore erred in concluding that plaintiff could 

perform the job of mail clerk. But that etTor was harmless. The ALJ correctly stated that 

infomiation router and electronics worker are reasoning level two jobs. This Court has 

repeatedly held that there is no inconsistency between reasoning level two and a limitation to 

simple, routine tasks. See Reaves v. Colvin, 2016 WL 775754, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2016) 

(collecting cases). The ALJ carried his burden at step five by identifying information router and 

electronics worker as jobs plaintiff could perf01m consistent with her RFC. 

CONCLUSION 

The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. ~ 

. Y\ f) {Vlo.»V' 

Dated this 0 day of Apr:H-2oi7. 

a;( A A A 0c1l ti_/ 

AnllAiken 

United States District Judge 

Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER