Denise Subramaniam 

Self-represented 

13865 SW Walker Rd 

Beaverton OR 97005 

503-764-5300 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

LNV CORPORATION Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-01836 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DENISE SUBRAMANIAM 

pro per 

Defendant 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION 

FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 

ADJUDICATIVE FACTS 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF RICK SLORP V. LERNER, 

SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS, ET AL 

Comes now Defendant Denise Subramaniam, representing herself, pursuant to Federal Rule 201 

Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts and hereby requests this Court take judicial notice of the 

documents described herein in and in support states as follows: 

1. THE DEFENDANT moves this Court to take judicial notice of: 

Rick Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al. Case No. 13-3402, United States 

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Originating Case No.: 2:12-cv-00498. (Attached 

as Exhibit A) 

2. This case is similar to the present case in that it originated through a series of foreclosure 

actions where the foreclosing party lacked standing to foreclose due to a forged 

assignment of deed of trust. Quoting the Appellate justices: 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 1 of 36
The law firm of Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (LSR) filed that foreclosure action 

against Rick Slorp on behalf of its client, Bank of America. Because Countrywide had 

originated Slorp 's mortgage, LSR attached to the complaint an assignment 

purporting to assign an interest in Slorp 's mortgage to Bank of America. The state 

court awarded judgment to Bank of America. Slorp subsequently retained counsel 

who questioned the assignment's validity, and he sought to depose Shellie Hill, the 

LSR employee who had executed the assignment on behalf of Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Bank of America promptly dismissed the 

foreclosure action, and the state court vacated its judgment. 

3. Slorp then filed an action against LSR, Hill, MERS, and Bank of America to recover the 

attorney's fees he expended in the foreclosure action. The Appellate justices found: 

The gravamen of the complaint was that the defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive, 

and fraudulent debt-collection practices when they filed an illegitimate foreclosure 

action against Slorp. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and as that 

motion was pending, Slorp sought leave to amend his complaint to add a civil claim 

under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), I8 USC.§§ 

1961-68. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for 

leave to amend the complaint. We now affirm the dismissal of the original complaint 

but reverse the district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint. 

We remand the case to the district court with instructions to permit Slorp to amend 

his complaint to add a RICO claim. 

4. Slorp originally alleged that "filing and maintaining the foreclosure action with the use of 

false statements and evidence constitute[d] a false, deceptive, and/or misleading practice 

in an attempt to collect a debt." Slorp filed a motion for leave to file a second amended 

complaint, together with his proposed second amended complaint. The proposed 

complaint expanded the factual allegations and added a fifth count alleging a violation of 

RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The defendants opposed Slorp's request for leave to amend. 

The district court denied Slorp' s motion for leave and dismissed the complaint. 

5. The district court also concluded that Slorp had not suffered damages attributable to the 

allegedly fraudulent assignment because his exposure to the foreclosure action resulted 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 2 of 36
from his default on the promissory note rather than any of the defendants' conduct. The 

court then rejected each of Slorp's claims on the merits. 

6. Ultimately the Appellate justices determined: 

The district court held that Slorp lacked standing because he sustained no injury as a 

result of the assignment. In its view the foreclosure action "was filed because of his 

default under the terms of the Note and Mortgage; not because of the creation of the 

allegedly 'false 'Assignment. " Although the foreclosure action caused Slorp to incur 

legal fees, the court stated, he incurred those fees because he defaulted, "not because 

of the Assignment. " Thus the district court held that Slorp sustained no injury 

attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment. 

This analysis suffers from one key error: It mistakes the source of the injury alleged 

in Slorp 's complaint. Slorp does not attribute his injuries to the false assignment of 

his mortgage; rather, he attributes his injuries to the improper foreclosure litigation. 

According to the complaint, Bank of America (through LSR) filed a foreclosure action 

against Slorp despite its lack of interest in the mortgage; the defendants misled the 

trial court by fraudulently misrepresenting Bank of America's interest in the suit; and 

Slorp incurred damages when he was compelled to defend his interests. If Bank of 

America had no right to file the foreclosure action, it makes no difference whether 

Slorp previously had defaulted on his mortgage. Slorp 's suit to recover damages 

caused by Bank of America 's lawsuit satisfies each of the three components of Article 

Ill standing. That is all that is required for count one, which alleged a violation of the 

FDCPA-afederal statute. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) 

(stating that "standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law''); 

see also Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Slorp has 

established standing to seek relief under the FDCP A, and the district court erred 

when it held otherwise. 

7. Federal Rule of Evidence 20l(c)(2) - Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts states: 

"The court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied 

with the necessary information." 

The necessary information is supplied herein as attached Exhibit A. 

8. Defendant also filed a Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Fact in the Criminal 

Indictment and Conviction of Lorraine Brown for Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire 

Fraud in support of her Motion to Dismiss filed with this court on Friday March 6, 2015. 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 3 of 36
Collectively the Beal victims, specifically Beal victims as parties identified in her Notice 

of Related Cases, have experienced as pro-se litigants that in spite of the language of the 

law requiring courts to take judicial notice of adjudicative fact courts have routinely 

ignored and even denied their motions for judicial notice. This violates federal rules of 

evidence and constitutes a deprivation of our constitutional rights to due process and 

equal protection of law. 

9. Federal Rule 301 Presumptions in Civil Cases states: 

" ... unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against 

whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut 

the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which 

remains on the party who had it originally." 

10. LNV as the plaintiff had the burden of proof or persuasion in the present case. LNV 

submitted to the court various mortgage related documents including an assignment of 

deed of trust and allonges to the note as evidence of its standing to foreclose on 

Defendant's property. Defendant challenges the authenticity of these documents. 

11. Deed assignments, since they are filed with the property recorders' office carry a 

presumptive burden. Presumptions governed by Rule 301 are given the effect of placing 

upon the opposing party (Defendant in the present case) the burden of establishing the 

nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party invoking the presumption establishes 

the basic facts giving rise to it. 

12. Adjudicative fact in the criminal indictment and conviction of Lorraine Brown for 

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud def eats the presumption that deed assignments 

and other documents filed with a property recorders' office must be genuine. 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 4 of 36
Adjudicative fact in this criminal conviction it is that over 1 million fraudulently signed 

and notarized mortgage-related documents were produced through the crimes of Lorraine 

Brown and her co-conspirators and filed with property recorders' offices across the 

country. This adjudicative fact defeats the presumption invoked by LNV. 

13. Likewise judges in many federal and state courts seem to have a presumption that since 

the homeowner "defaulted" on their mortgage they are not entitled to protection of the 

law or to damages as a result of a continued onslaught of foreclosure attempts by parties 

that lack standing to foreclose on their properties. Adjudicative fact in Rick Slorp v. 

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss. et al defeats this biased and unconstitutional presumption. 

14. Defendant has consistently claimed, and the evidence supports her claim, that she 

NEVER DEF AUL TED ON HER MORTGAGE! Defendant has also consistently 

claimed LNV is not a party of interest to either her note or her deed of trust and therefore 

has no standing to foreclose on her property. 

15. Furthermore, Defendant has consistently claimed she is a victim of a crime and the 

adjudicative facts in United States ofAmerica v. Lorraine Brown, Case No. 3:12-cr-198-

J-25 MCR, (M.D. Fla.) support this claim; and that she is entitled to restitution for the 

damages she has suffered. This claim is supported by adjudicative fact in Rick S/orp v. 

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Denise Subramaniam 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 5 of 36
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT A 

Adjudicative Fact in Rick Slorp v. Lerner. Sampson & Rothfuss. et al 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 6 of 36
Case: 13-3402 Document: 61-1 Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 1 

Deborah S. Hunt 

Clerk 

Mr. Troy John Doucet 

Doucet & Associates · 

700 Stonehenge Parkway 

Suite 2-B 

Dublin, OH 43017 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 

POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE 

CINCINNA Tl, OHIO 45202-3988 

Filed: September 29, 2014 

Tel. (513) 564-7000 

www.ca6.uscourts.gov 

Re: Case No. 13-3402, Rick Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, et al 

Originating Case No.: 2:12-cv-00498 

Dear Counsel: 

The Court issued the enclosed Opinion today in this case. 

cc: Mr. Rick D. DeBlasis 

Mr. John P. Hehman 

Ms. Kimberlee Shay Rohr 

Mr. James W. Sandy 

Brad Jonathon Terman 

Mr. James S. Wertheim 

Enclosure 

Mandate to issue 

Sincerely yours, 

s/Bryant L. Crutcher 

Case Manager 

Direct Dial No. 513-564-7013 

(1of29) Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 7 of 36
Case: 13-3402 Document: 61-2 Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 1 

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 14a0745n.06 

No.13-3402 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

RICK A. SLORP, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

LERNER, SAMPSON & ROTHFUSS; BANK OF ) 

AMERICA, N.A.; SHELLIE HILL; ) 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION ) 

SYSTEMS, INC., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

BEFORE: MOORE, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges. 

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. This case relates to alleged misconduct in a 

separate state-court foreclosure action. The law firm of Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (LSR) filed 

that foreclosure action against Rick Slorp on behalf of its client, Bank of America. Because 

Countrywide had originated Slorp's mortgage, LSR attached to the complaint an assignment 

purporting to assign an interest in Slorp's mortgage to Bank of America. The state court 

awarded judgment to Bank of America. Slorp subsequently retained counsel who questioned the 

assignment's validity, and he sought to depose Shellie Hill, the LSR employee who had executed 

the assignment on behalf of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). Bank of 

America promptly dismissed the foreclosure action, and the state court vacated its judgment. 

Slorp then filed this action against LSR, Hill, MERS, and Bank of America to recover the 

attorney's fees he expended in the foreclosure action. The gravamen of the complaint was that 

the defendants engaged in unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent debt-collection practices when they 

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No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss 

filed an illegitimate foreclosure action against Slorp. The defendants moved to dismiss the 

complaint, and as that motion was pending, Slorp sought leave to amend his complaint to add a 

civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1961-68. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion for leave to 

amend the complaint. We now affirm the dismissal of the original complaint but reverse the 

district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint. We remand the case to the 

district court with instructions to permit Slorp to amend his complaint to add a RICO claim. 

I. 

LSR filed a separate foreclosure action on behalf of Bank of America in the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas in July 2010. Bank of America attached to its complaint a 

promissory note dated December 14, 2007. The note named Countrywide Bank, FSB as the 

lender and Slorp as the borrower. Bank of America also attached a mortgage that secured the 

promissory note with Slorp's home. The poor printing quality renders the mortgage difficult to 

read, but it lists Countrywide Bank, FSB as the lender and MERS as the lender's nominee. 

Bank of America also attached a document, captioned "Assignment of Mortgage," which 

states that MERS "does hereby assign to BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. 1 fka Countrywide 

Home Loans Servicing, L.P .... all of its interest in that certain mortgage from Rick A. 

Slorp ... to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Countrywide Bank, 

FSB." The assignment was executed on behalf of MERS, "as nominee for Countrywide Bank, 

FSB, its successors and assigns," by Shellie Hill, who purported to be an assistant secretary and 

vice president of MERS. The assignment was dated July 9, 2010, and was prepared by LSR. 

1

Slorp alleges that BAC Home Loans Servicing was formerly known as Countrywide 

Home Loans Servicing and is currently an arm of Bank of America, N.A. 

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After Slorp answered the foreclosure complaint, Bank of America moved for summary 

judgment. The court of common pleas granted that motion. Slorp moved for relief from the 

judgment in July 2011, and in February 2012 Slorp served Hill with a subpoena duces tecum, 

demanding that she "appear at an evidentiary hearing and bring documents demonstrating her 

relationship with [Bank of America] and its predecessors, documents demonstrating her 

appointment as Assistant Secretary and Vice president of Defendant MERS, and other 

documents related to the Assignment." One month later--on the day before Hill was scheduled 

to testify at the evidentiary hearing-Bank of America voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure 

action, and the state court vacated the judgment. 

On June 7, 2012, Slorp filed this action in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Ohio against LSR, Bank of America, Hill, and MERS. The four-count 

complaint alleged a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e; a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Ohio Rev. Code 

§§ 1345.02 and 1345.03; falsification in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.13; and civil 

conspiracy to commit falsification. 

According to the complaint, Hill "falsely executed" the assignment because Countrywide 

Bank did not exist on July 9, 2010, and Hill was not an employee of MERS on that date. Hill 

acted at the behest of LSR and with Bank of America's knowledge, said Slorp, and her "false 

statement was made with the purpose to mislead the judge in the performance of her official 

function within the foreclosure action." Slorp alleged that "filing and maintaining the 

foreclosure action with the use of false statements and evidence constitute[ d] a false, deceptive, 

and/or misleading practice in an attempt to collect a debt." Slorp sought actual damages of 

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$8,934.44, treble damages of $26,803.32, statutory damages of $1,000, non-economic damages 

of $5,000, and fees and costs. 

Bank of America and MERS moved to dismiss Slorp's complaint, and LSR and Hill filed 

a separate motion to dismiss on the same day. After the parties finished briefing those motions, 

Slorp filed an amended complaint without first seeking the defendants' consent or the court's 

leave. The parties held a pretrial conference two days later, and Slorp pledged to file a motion 

for leave to amend within five days of that conference. Slorp then filed a motion for leave to file 

a second amended complaint, together with his proposed second amended complaint. The 

proposed complaint expanded the factual allegations and added a fifth count alleging a violation 

of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The defendants opposed Slorp's request for leave to amend. 

The district court denied Slorp's motion for leave and dismissed the complaint. The 

court held that Slorp lacked standing to challenge the validity of the assignment because he was 

not a party to the assignment. The district court also concluded that Slorp had not suffered 

damages attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment because his exposure to the 

foreclosure action resulted from his default on the promissory note rather than any of the 

defendants' conduct. The court then rejected each of Slorp's claims on the merits. 

Turning to Slorp's motion for leave to amend the complaint, the district court first noted 

that the proposed amended complaint "provides no new factual allegations that would alter the 

Court's analysis" of the merits of Slorp's claims. The court then denied the request for leave to 

amend because it held that the RICO claim in the proposed amended complaint was not viable. 

Slorp had not identified any injury caused by the assignment, the court stated, and he therefore 

would not be able to obtain relief under RICO. Slorp timely appealed. 

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No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss 

II. 

We begin with standing. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power of 

the federal judiciary to the adjudication of certain "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. 

III, § 2, cl. 1. From this textual limitation and "the separation-of-powers principles underlying 

that limitation," the federal courts have "deduced a set of requirements that together make up the 

'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."' Lexmark Int 'l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-88 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Three components comprise this "irreducible constitutional minimum": 

(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," (2) that injury must be "fairly traceable" 

to the defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) it must be likely that the plaintiffs injury would 

be redressed by the requested relief. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. At its essence, Article III 

standing requires the plaintiff to have some personal and particularized stake in the dispute. See 

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19 (1997). 

To determine whether Slorp had Article III standing, we focus on whether Slorp 

sustained an injury that was traceable to the defendants' conduct-the first two of the three "core 

components." This "inquiry often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted." Raines, 

521 U.S. at 818-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). And so it does here. 

The district court held that Slorp lacked standing because he sustained no injury as a 

result of the assignment. In its view the foreclosure action "was filed because of his default 

under the terms of the Note and Mortgage; not because of the creation of the allegedly 'false' 

Assignment." Although the foreclosure action caused Slorp to incur legal fees, the court stated, 

he incurred those fees because he defaulted, "not because of the Assignment." Thus the district 

court held that Slorp sustained no injury attributable to the allegedly fraudulent assignment. 

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This analysis suffers from one key error: It mistakes the source of the injury alleged in 

Slorp's complaint. Slorp does not attribute his injuries to the false assignment of his mortgage; 

rather, he attributes his injuries to the improper foreclosure litigation. According to the 

complaint, Bank of America (through LSR) filed a foreclosure action against Slorp despite its 

lack of interest in the mortgage; the defendants misled the trial court by fraudulently 

misrepresenting Bank of America's interest in the suit; and Slorp incurred damages when he was 

compelled to defend his interests. If Bank of America had no right to file the foreclosure action, 

it makes no difference whether Slorp previously had defaulted on his mortgage. 2 Slorp's suit to 

recover damages caused by Bank of America's lawsuit satisfies each of the three components of 

Article III standing. That is all that is required for count one, which alleged a violation of the 

FDCPA-a federal statute. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013) (stating 

that "standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law"); see also Coyne v. Am. 

Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999). Slorp has established standing to seek relief 

under the FDCP A, and the district court erred when it held otherwise. 

III. 

Whether Ohio law countenances Slorp's state-law claims requires that we clarify the 

circumstances under which a mortgagor can challenge the validity of an assignment that 

purportsto assign the mortgagee's interest in the mortgage to another entity. 

Much of the district court's analysis was taken from Livonia Properties Holdings, LLC v. 

12840-12976 Farmington Road Holdings, LLC, where we held that a homeowner did not have 

standing to challenge the validity of a home-loan assignment in an action contesting a 

2 Although whether Slorp had defaulted is not pertinent to the actual legal issue, whether 

Slorp had defaulted remains an issue in the case. Slorp did not concede default in his complaint, 

and the defendants' assertions that he did default may not be considered by the district court in 

connection with a motion to dismiss testing Slorp's allegations. 

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foreclosure. 399 F. App'x 97, 102 (6th Cir. 2010). The type of standing we discussed in Livonia 

Properties is a common-law analogue of statutory standing, wholly unrelated to Article III 

standing. It is entirely a creature of state contract law and is assessed in conjunction with the 

merits of the claim, not as a threshold issue. Assignments are contracts and, as a general matter, 

are regulated by the common law of contracts. See 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 123 (2014). A 

person who is neither a party to the contract nor in privity with the parties, and who is not a 

third-party beneficiary of the contract, is said to lack "standing" to enforce the contract's terms 

and to challenge its validity. See Kaplan v. Shure Bros., Inc., 266 F.3d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir. 

2001) (analyzing contractual privity as an issue of state-law standing); City of Akron v. Castle 

Aviation, Inc., No. 16057, 1993 WL 191966, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 1993) ("As a general 

rule a non-party may not assert contract rights unless it is a third-party beneficiary under the 

contract or such standing is conferred by statute."). Livonia Properties was one of innumerable 

cases recognizing that this general contract principle extends to assignments, subject to various 

caveats and exceptions. See also, e.g., Druso v. Bank One of Columbus, 705 N.E.2d 717, 721-22 

(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 

We analyze the district court's holding in more detail than might ordinarily be necessary 

because our Livonia Properties opinion has confounded some courts and litigants, see, e.g., Etts 

v. Deutsche Bank Nat'/ Trust Co., No. 13-11588, 2014 WL 645358, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 

2014) (noting that the inexact use of the term "standing" to denote a homeowner's eligibility to 

challenge certain aspects of a foreclosure made it "unclear whether Defendants are challenging 

Plaintiffs' standing under Article III of the Constitution, under the Michigan statutory scheme, or 

both"), and has generally received more attention than an unpublished opinion might warrant. 

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No. 13-3402, Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss 

A. 

The district court held, and the defendants now maintain, that Slorp lacked standing to 

assert his claims because an individual who is not a party to an assignment may not attack the 

assignment's validity. We differ with this interpretation of Livonia Properties. The sweeping 

rule that the district court extrapolated from Livonia Properties dwarfs our actual holding in that 

case. The district court in Livonia Properties stated that an individual "who is not a party to an 

assignment lacks standing to challenge that assignment," and our Livonia Properties opinion 

quoted and endorsed that general statement, perhaps inartfully. 399 F. App'x at 102. But we 

quickly limited the scope of that rule, clarifying that a non-party homeowner may challenge the 

validity of an assignment to establish the assignee's lack of title, among other defects. Id (citing 

6A C.J.S. Assignments§ 132); see also Carmack v. Banko/NY. Mellon, 534 F. App'x 508, 511-

12 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Livonia's statement on standing should not be read broadly to preclude all 

borrowers from challenging the validity of mortgage assignments under Michigan law."). Thus a 

non-party homeowner may challenge a putative assignment's validity on the basis that it was not 

effective to pass legal title to the putative assignee. See Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 

714 F.3d 355, 361 (6th Cir. 2013); Livonia Props., 399 F. App'x at 102; see also Woods v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, NA., 733 F.3d 349, 353-54 (1st Cir. 2013); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 132 ("The 

debtor may also question a plaintiffs lack of title or the right to sue."). 

There was no dispute in Livonia Properties that the assignor had assigned title to the 

assignee; rather, the homeowner lacked "standing" to assert that the assignment was not properly 

recorded and suffered from technical defects that prevented the assignee from establishing record 

chain of title under Michigan law. In this case, by contrast, Slorp alleges that Bank of America, 

the putative assignee, held neither his mortgage nor the attendant promissory note when it filed 

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the foreclosure action because the parties lacked the authority to assign his mortgage to Bank of 

America when they purported to do so. That distinction makes all the difference. See Conlin, 

714 F.3d at 361 (stating that a third party may challenge an assignment if that challenge would 

render the assignment void). Because Slorp alleges that the assignment was fraudulent and that 

Bank of America therefore did not hold title at the time of the foreclosure, 3 Livonia Properties 

does not bar his suit-in fact, it supports it. 

B. 

Livonia Properties also does not govern Slorp's standing to assert the statutory claims 

that he alleged in his complaint. Livonia Pr.operties discusses the defenses that are available to 

homeowners who face foreclosure-i. e., the circumstances in which a homeowner may impede 

foreclosure by attacking the assignment of the mortgage. See 399 F. App'x at 102-03 (relying in 

large part on 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 132, which is captioned "Defenses"). That opinion says 

nothing about when a homeowner may bring suit to seek redress for fraudulent or deceptive acts 

in connection with a foreclosure. 

Insofar as Ohio law affects Slorp' s standing to bring the CSP A, falsification, and 

conspiracy claims, the relevant law is the statutes that create those causes of action. Like the 

federal courts, Ohio courts distinguish between constitutional and statutory standing. Ohio's 

constitutional standing doctrine resembles its federal counterpart. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. 

3

In Slorp's memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, he stated 

that he "has not attacked the validity of the assignment." The district court's opinion quoted this 

statement, which could be interpreted as an admission that the assignment was valid and 

effective. But this interpretation would belie the allegations of fraud in Slorp's complaint, and 

when that language is read in context, it is clear that he does dispute the validity of the 

assignment. The statement relates to his requested relief rather than his allegations: He states 

that he does not presently seek a declaration of the invalidity of the assignment; he only seeks 

damages for the defendants' prior fraudulent conduct. This interpretation comports with the 

allegations in the complaint and the arguments in his briefs, all of which maintain that the 

assignment was invalid. 

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Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1218-20 (Ohio 2012). By contrast, the Ohio state 

courts repeatedly have held that statutory standing is a question to be resolved with reference to 

the specific language of the applicable statute rather than to abstract standing principles. See, 

e.g., Ohio Valley Assocd. Builders & Contractors v. DeBra-Kuempel, 949 N.E.2d 582, 585-87 

(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (discussing statutory standing and stating that the "only issue" is whether 

the plaintiff was an "interested party" as defined in the relevant statute, "common-law standing 

notwithstanding"); Rose-Gulley v. Spitzer Akron, Inc., No.21778, 2004 WL 1736982, at *3 (Ohio 

Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2004) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert CSPA claim because she 

was not a "consumer" within the meaning of that statute). "To incorporate common-law 

standing principles when the legislature has specifically authorized a party to bring suit is simply 

inappropriate." Ohio Valley Associated Builders & Contractors v. Indus. Power Sys., Inc., 

941 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 

Accordingly, to determine whether Slorp had standing to bring CSPA, falsification, and 

conspiracy claims against the defendants, we look only to the language of those statutes. See 

Kuempel, 949 N.E.2d at 586-87 ("[C]ommon-law standing requirements, such as establishing a 

'personal stake' in a case, do not apply when the issue is statutory standing under [a statute]."). 

The principles outlined in Livonia Properties are irrelevant here. 

IV. 

Because Slorp has Article III standing and Livonia Properties does not bar his claim, we 

tum to the merits. Slorp alleged four causes of action in his initial complaint: a violation of the 

FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; a violation of the CSPA, Ohio Rev. Code§§ 1345.02 and 1345.03; 

falsification in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.13; and civil conspiracy to commit 

falsification. We take each claim in turn. 

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A. 

The district court held that Slorp's FDCPA claim was time-barred because he failed to 

file suit within the one-year statute of limitations. Slorp acknowledges that an FDCP A action 

generally must be brought "within one year from the date on which the violation occurs," 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), but asks us to apply the continuing-violation doctrine to rescue his claim. 

Slorp also maintains that Bank of America, LSR, and Hill committed a second, unprecluded 

violation of the FDCP A when Hill submitted an affidavit to the district court affirming that she 

was authorized to execute the assignment. We agree with the district court. 

1. 

The continuing-violation doctrine provides that violations "which occur beyond the 

limitations period are actionable where a plaintiff challenges not just one incident of unlawful 

conduct but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period." Haithcock v. Frank, 

958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This court 

historically recognized two distinct categories of continuing violations, serial and systemic, each 

of which constituted a narrowly limited exception to the general rule that the limitations clock 

begins to run at the time of the act that gives rise to the claim. See LRL Props. v. Portage Metro 

Haus. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995). In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, however, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the serial continuing-violation 

doctrine when it held that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even 

when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). We 

have since held that "plaintiffs are now precluded from establishing a continuing violation 

exception by proof that the alleged acts of discrimination occurring prior to the limitations period 

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are sufficiently related to those occurring within the limitations period." Sharpe v. Cureton, 

319 FJd 259, 268 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Although we continue to recognize systemic continuing violations, Slorp's invocation of 

the continuing-violation doctrine in the FDCPA context is problematic. Courts have been 

"extremely reluctant" to extend the continuing-violation doctrine beyond the context of Title VII, 

Nat'! Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks omitted), and we have never applied the continuing-violation doctrine 

to an FDCP A claim. 

At least one court of appeals has stated in dicta that a defendant's collection activities 

might amount to a continuing violation of the FDCP A. See Solomon v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 

395 F. App'x 494, 497 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). But that case included FDCPA claims related to an 

allegedly baseless foreclosure action, and the court concluded that the deceptive acts alleged in 

the complaint, including the foreclosure action, were discrete acts rather than continuing 

violations. Id. at 497. No court of appeals has held that debt-collection litigation (or a 

misleading statement made in connection with that litigation) is a continuing violation of the 

FDCPA. See Schaffhauser v. Citibank (S.D.) NA., 340 F. App'x 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009) (per 

curiam) (holding that ongoing debt-collection litigation does not constitute a continuing violation 

of the FDCPA); Naas v. Stolman, 130 FJd 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the FDCPA's 

statute of limitations begins to run when the debt-collection suit is filed rather than when the trial 

court issues its judgment).4 

4

Most district court decisions have held that the continued prosecution of a collection suit 

is not a continuing violation under the FDCPA. See, e.g., McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer 

& Brooks, P.C., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46-47 (D. Mass. 2012); Ball v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 

No. 1: 12-CV-0604, 2012 WL 1745479, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2012); Wilhelm v. Credico, 

Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009 (D.N.D. 2006); Egbarin v. Lewis, Lewis & Ferraro LLC, No. 

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Application of the continuing-violation doctrine to FDCP A claims would be inconsistent 

with the principles underlying the Supreme Court's limited endorsement of that doctrine in 

Morgan. In Morgan the Court differentiated between discrete acts and continuing violations. 

"Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are 

easy to identify," and each of those discrete acts "constitutes a separate actionable unlawful 

employment practice." 536 U.S. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only those discrete 

acts that occurred within the limitations period are actionable; "[a]ll prior discrete discriminatory 

acts are untimely filed and no longer actionable." Id at 114-15. Claims of hostile work 

environment, by contrast, "are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves 

repeated conduct." Id at 115. "It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct 

contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own." Id. 

Liability attaches to a discrete act as soon as that act occurs, whereas liability for a hostile work 

environment depends upon "proof of repeated conduct extending over a period of time." Id. at 

120 n.12. A plaintiff therefore may assert a claim for hostile work environment based on a series 

of component acts provided that just one of those acts occurred within the filing period. Id. at 

117. All of the acts that comprise a claim for hostile work environment, "including those that 

would otherwise fall outside of the filing period," are deemed timely if one of those acts 

occurred within the limitations window. Sasse v. US. Dep 't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 782 (6th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117). 

The institution and maintenance of the debt-collection suit in this case is much more akin 

to a discrete act of discrimination than a hostile work environment. As a general matter, when a 

debt collector initiates a deceptive, abusive, or otherwise unfair lawsuit, there is no doubt that the 

3:00-CV-1043, 2006 WL 236846, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2006) (collecting cases); Calka v. 

Kueker, Kraus & Bruh, LLP, No. 98-CV-0990, 1998 WL 437151, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 1998). 

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FDCPA claim-insofar as it is viable-accrues on that date. Although the subsequent 

prosecution of that suit may exacerbate the damages, the continued accrual of damages does not 

diminish the fact that the initiation of the suit was a discrete, immediately actionable event. 5 

To be sure, an individual will not always recognize that the debt-collection suit is 

deceptive or unfair on the date it is filed. Here, for example, Slorp may have learned that the 

assignment was fraudulent-and that the foreclosure action was illegitimate-after the 

limitations period expired. But tolling doctrines such as fraudulent concealment and the 

discovery rule exist to address such situations. The continuing-violation doctrine is concerned 

with whether the initial act gives rise to an actionable claim rather than whether the tortfeasor 

concealed that claim. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120 n. 12. 

Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the continuing-violation doctrine cannot 

rescue Slorp's FDCPA claim from the limitations clock. 

2. 

In Slorp's proposed amended complaint he alleged that the defendants again violated the 

FDCPA when they opposed Slorp's motion for relief from the judgment. We disagree. 

A plaintiff who alleges several FDCP A violations, some of which occurred within the 

limitations period and some of which occurred outside that window, will be barred from seeking 

relief for the untimely violations, but that plaintiff may continue to seek relief for those 

violations that occurred within the limitations period. See Purnell v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

303 F. App'x 297, 301 (6th Cir. 2008). But the violations that occur within the limitations 

5

Courts are divided on whether the relevant date for purposes of the accrual of an FDCPA 

claim is the date on which the suit is filed or the date on which the defendant is served. See Ruth 

v. Unifund CCR Partners, 604 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2010). Because Bank of America's 

foreclosure action was filed and served more than one year before Slorp filed suit, we need not 

resolve that dilemma. 

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window must be discrete violations; they cannot be the later effects of an earlier time-barred 

violation. Id. at 302 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628 (2007), 

superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5). 

Even if the defendants misrepresented their interests in Slorp's mortgage when they 

opposed his motion for relief, their opposition to Slorp's motion is not independently actionable 

because it merely gave "present effect" to deceptive conduct that had occurred outside the 

limitations window. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628. The defendants' deceptive conduct, as 

alleged in the complaint, consisted of their initiation of unfair, misleading, and abusive legal 

process against Slorp and their concurrent docketing of a fraudulent assignment. The defendants 

did not commit a fresh violation of the FDCP A each time they filed pleadings or memoranda 

reaffirming the legitimacy of their state-court suit; rather, those were the continuing effects of 

their initial violation. "[S]uch effects in themselves have no present legal consequences." See 

id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ledbetter held that the plaintiff was not denied equal pay 

each time she received a paycheck reflecting a discriminatory pay disparity. 6 Id. It follows that 

Slorp was not deceived or abused anew each time the defendants reaffirmed their deceptive 

statements throughout the litigation. Amendment of the complaint to allege a second violation of 

the FDCP A therefore would have been futile. 

B. 

The district court dismissed the CSP A claim against LSR-the only defendant named in 

count two--because there was no "consumer transaction." The CSPA prohibits an unfair, 

deceptive, or unconscionable act or practice by a supplier "in connection with a consumer 

6 Although Congress subsequently enacted a statute superseding Ledbetter and resetting 

the statute of limitations each time an employee receives a paycheck reflecting a discriminatory 

pay disparity, that statute does not disturb Ledbetter's interpretation of the continuing-violation 

doctrine more generally. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 214-15 (2010). 

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transaction." Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A). The statute defines a consumer 

transaction as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, 

a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, 

family, or household, or solicitation to supply any of these things." § 1345.0l(A). The statute 

expressly excludes from this definition transactions between financial institutions, as defined in 

section 5725.01, and their customers. § 1345.0l(A). The district court applied this exception to 

preclude Slorp's CSPA claim against LSR. 

In his reply brief Slorp concedes that Anderson v. Barclay's Capital Real Estate, 

989 N.E.2d 997 (Ohio 2013), bars CSPA claims related to the servicing of residential mortgag~ 

loans. He also concedes that Bank of America is a mortgage servicer. His sole argument on 

appeal is that neither Anderson nor any other case or statute bars CSP A claims against the law 

firms that represent mortgage servicers in foreclosure litigation. 

We need not determine whether the CSP A countenances claims against law firms 

engaged in mortgage litigation because the state-court foreclosure action was not a "consumer 

transaction." The CSPA defines a consumer transaction as "a sale, lease, assignment, award by 

chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an 

individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to supply 

any of these things." § 1345.0l(A). This definition does not encompass a lawsuit: Lawsuits do 

not involve the transfer of goods or services for personal purposes. Slorp therefore cannot bring 

a CSP A claim arising from the state-court foreclosure litigation. 

When a debt collection agency files a lawsuit to enforce a debt stemming from a 

consumer transaction, the consumer may bring suit against the debt collection agency under the 

CSPA. Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). This 

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is because "[s]ince the Act provides consumer protection through all phases of the transaction, 

the seller cannot relieve itself of its duty to act fairly by assigning its claim to an agent or 

assignee and having that assignee conduct practices prohibited by the Act. Such a narrow 

construction of [Ohio Rev. Code §] 1345.0l(C) would defeat the purpose of the Act." Id. Here, 

LSR brought an allegedly deceptive lawsuit on behalf of Bank of America, a mortgage servicer. 

The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the servicing of residential mortgages is not a 

consumer transaction under the CSP A "because there is no 'transfer of an item of goods, a 

service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual."' Anderson, 989 N.E.2d at 1001 (quoting 

Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.0l(A)). Because the lawsuit was in furtherance of the servicing of a 

residential mortgage, which is not a consumer transaction, the lawsuit is not an act in furtherance 

of a consumer transaction as in Celebrezze and the lawsuit may not be regulated under the 

CSPA. 

Slorp also contends that LSR is liable under the CSP A because "violating the FDCPA has 

been determined by an Ohio district court to violate the CSP A, and that decision was made 

available for public inspection under Ohio Revised Code§ 1345.05(A)(3)." For that proposition 

he cites Becker v. Montgomery, Lynch, No. 02-874, 2003 WL 23335929 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 

2003 ). Becker stated that "any violation of any one of the enumerated sections of the FDCP A is 

necessarily an unfair and deceptive act or practice" in violation of the CSP A. Id. at *2. That 

interpretation of the CSP A overlooks substantial disparities in the language of the two statutes, 

and Becker thus paints with too broad a brush. Although conduct that violates the FDCP A often 

will violate the CSP A as well, neither the courts nor the parties should simply assume that the 

two statutes are coterminous without examining whether the alleged conduct is expressly 

prohibited under each statute. 

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Thus the district court properly dismissed Slorp's CSPA claim. 

c. 

Slorp alleged that Hill and LSR violated the Ohio falsification statute, Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 2921.13, when Hill falsely represented that she was authorized to execute the assignment on 

behalf of MERS. The district court dismissed Slorp's falsification claim because neither Hill nor 

LSR had been charged with criminal falsification. Section 2921.13 is a criminal statute. It 

provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person knowingly makes a false 

statement, or knowingly affirms the truth of a prior false statement, in various circumstances, 

including when the statement is made in an official proceeding, the statement is made to mislead 

a public official in performing his or her official function, or the statement is sworn before a 

notary public. Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.13(A). But the statute also establishes a civil remedy: 

"A person who violates this section is liable in a civil action to any person harmed by the 

violation for injury, death, or loss to person or property incurred as a result of the commission of 

the offense." Id. § 2921.13(G). 

Ohio courts have held that criminal charges are a condition precedent to the institution of 

a civil cause of action under section 2921.13(G). In Hershey v. Edelman, for example, the court 

refused to recognize civil liability under section 2921.13(G) absent criminal charges or criminal 

proceedings under section 2921.13. 932 N.E.2d 386, 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). That holding is 

consistent with the statutory language, which provides a civil remedy for losses that result from 

"the commission of the offense." Ohio Rev. Code§ 2921.13(G) (emphasis added). Use of the 

word "offense" makes clear that civil liability is predicated on criminal guilt. The effect of the 

statute is to provide restitution to victims of the criminal offense; it does not create civil liability 

absent criminal conviction. Dismissal of Slorp' s falsification claim therefore was appropriate. 

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D. 

Slorp also alleged that the defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy when they agreed to 

execute the fraudulent assignment and to falsify court documents. Yet Slorp's appellate brief 

does not directly address his conspiracy claim and implicitly acknowledges that the claim is 

derivative of his falsification claim-that is, Slorp concedes that the conspiracy count must be 

dismissed if the falsification count is dismissed. Because we affirm the dismissal of the 

falsification count, we also affirm the dismissal of this count as a matter of course. 

v. 

We turn to count five, which Slorp unsucc~ssfully sought to add to his complaint. Slorp 

requested leave to amend his complaint to allege a civil violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 

1964. The district court denied the motion for leave to amend upon concluding that amendment 

of the complaint would be futile. In the district court's view, Slorp "failed to adequately allege 

an injury resulting from the Assignment at issue here," and "[c]onsequently, Plaintiff has failed 

to state a RICO claim upon which relief can be granted." 

The denial of a motion for leave to amend the complaint ordinarily is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. Dubuc v. Green Oak Twp., 312 F.3d 736, 743 (6th Cir. 2002). When denial is on 

the basis of futility, however, the decision is reviewed de nova. Id. 

The germane provision of RICO makes it unlawful for a person employed by or 

associated with an enterprise that affects interstate commerce to conduct or participate in the 

conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 

1962( c ). The statute provides a civil remedy that allows an individual to recover treble damages 

for injuries to that person's business or property sustained by reason of the RICO violation. 18 

U.S.C. § 1964(c). 

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The defendants argue that amendment of the complaint would be futile for three 

independent reasons: (1) Slorp cannot recover RICO damages because his injuries are 

attributable to his own default rather than to the defendants' initiation of foreclosure 

proceedings; (2) Slorp's proposed amended complaint does not identify a pattern of racketeering 

activity because he does not allege a plausible scheme or artifice to defraud; and (3) Slorp does 

not allege sufficient facts to support the existence of an enterprise. We take one at a time. 

A. 

In Slorp's proposed amended complaint he alleges numerous injuries sustained as a result 

of the defendants' RICO violations: Slorp had to defend himself against the improper foreclosure 

action, faces "potential multiple liability from others who may claim an interest in the mortgage 

or note," possesses a "cloud[ ed]" title to his home because the fraudulent assignment continues 

to be recorded with the Franklin County Recorder, and had to deal with a wrongful foreclosure 

action. Most of these damages are speculative, uncertain, and undefined. Cf Berg v. First State 

Ins. Co., 915 F .2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that loss of security and peace of mind are 

not recoverable injuries under RICO). Slorp faces no imminent threat of potential double 

liability because Bank of America voluntarily dismissed its state-court foreclosure action and has 

shown no intent to revisit that decision. Slorp also identifies no monetary costs associated with 

the clouded title. But the attorney's fees he paid in connection with the foreclosure action are 

real and quantifiable damages, and our analysis therefore focuses on whether those fees were 

injuries to Slorp's business or property incurred by reason of the defendants' alleged RICO 

violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 

The first component of this inquiry concentrates on the term "business or property." In 

Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., the en bane court held that a RICO 

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victim cannot recover damages for personal injuries flowing from a RICO violation. 731 F.3d 

556, 564-70 (6th Cir. 2013) (en bane). Whether damages caused by the victim's specific injury 

are recoverable under § 1964(c) depends on "the origin of the underlying injury." Id at 565. 

While "personal injuries and pecuniary losses flowing from those personal injuries fail to confer 

relief under § 1964(c)," id at 565-66, injuries to property and at least some pecuniary losses 

flowing from those property injuries do confer relief under§ 1964(c). 

The question, then, is whether Slorp's complaint alleges personal injuries or injuries to 

property. According to the proposed RICO count, the defendants used various schemes to 

mislead both Slorp ~d the state court and thus attempted fraudulently to deprive Slorp of his 

home through an illegitimate foreclosure sale. Those schemes revolved around a fraudulent 

mortgage assignment and a related foreclosure action. Thus, if we look to "the origin of the 

underlying injury" to determine whether it relates to property, Slorp has alleged quintessential 

property injuries: The object of the alleged scheme to defraud was to obtain title to Slorp's home 

(i.e., real property) through foreclosure. 

Of course, the specific injury for which Slorp seeks to recover is not an injury to his 

home-he did not lose title as a result of the foreclosure action and therefore cannot obtain 

damages on that claim. Rather, his alleged injury was the attorney's fees he incurred in 

connection with that foreclosure action. Under Jackson, however, that is beside the point. 

Jackson held that the pecuniary losses flowing from those personal injuries were not recoverable 

because "an award of benefits under a workers' compensation system and any dispute over those 

benefits are inextricably intertwined with a personal injury giving rise to the benefits." 731 F.3d 

at 566. Thus it is the source of the injury that matters, and accordingly pecuniary losses flowing 

from a property injury are recoverable under § 1964( c) if they are similarly intertwined with that 

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property injury. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (stating that a 

RICO plaintiff can recover only if "he has been injured in his business or property by the 

conduct constituting the violation"); Isaak v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 169 F.3d 390, 397 (6th 

Cir. 1999) (permitting RICO plaintiff to recover damages resulting from plaintiffs purchase of 

an interest in a campground). Slorp suffered an injury to his home as a result of the defendants' 

alleged scheme: The defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings and obtained a judgment 

awarding them the right to take possession of Slorp's house. That direct property injury is not 

quantifiable because the state court ultimately vacated the judgment and permitted Slorp to retain 

his house, and unquantifiable injuries are not recoverable. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 

370 F.3d 602, 614 (6th Cir. 2004). But the attorney's fees he incurred were pecuniary losses 

intertwined with the property injury and therefore are recoverable under § 1964( c ). 

This inquiry flows into the second component of§ 1964(c) damages analysis, which asks 

whether the injuries were sustained "by reason of' the alleged RICO violation. The phrase "by 

reason of' incorporates a statutory-standing requirement into § 1964( c ), prohibiting a private 

RICO plaintiff from recovering for derivative or passed-on injuries. See Id. at 613-14. This 

statutory-standing requirement is not at issue here because there is no dispute about whether 

Slorp is the proper party to assert these claims. But in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 

Corp., the Supreme Court held that the phrase "by reason of' also incorporates a proximatecause requirement into § 1964(c). 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). "[W]hile a RICO plaintiff and 

defendant may have a direct and not a derivative relationship, the causal link between the injury 

and the conduct may still be too weak to constitute proximate cause-because it is insubstantial, 

unforeseeable, speculative, or illogical, or because of intervening causes." Trollinger, 370 F.3d 

at 614. 

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The defendants argue that "it was his mortgage default ... which caused Slorp to have to 

defend the foreclosure action, not anything contained within the Assignment." But the factual 

premise of this argument contradicts the factual allegations in Slorp's complaint and overlooks 

our obligation to assume the veracity of those allegations. Slorp alleges that the assignment was 

fraudulent and that the defendants had no right to foreclose on his house. If the defendants were 

not authorized to initiate the foreclosure proceedings, Slorp's injuries were caused by their fraud 

rather than his own alleged default. 

According to the complaint, Hill was an authorized agent of neither MERS nor 

Countrywide, and she therefore lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to Bank of America. 

Assuming that to be true, as we must, Bank of America wrongfully initiated foreclosure 

proceedings against Slorp, and his damages were proximately caused by the defendants' 

institution of fraudulent foreclosure proceedings that led Slorp to incur attorney's fees. The 

allegedly fraudulent assignment allowed the defendants to perpetrate and conceal the fraud by 

precluding the state court from ascertaining whether the defendants were the proper parties to 

initiate the foreclosure proceedings. On those facts it was the defendants' alleged 

misrepresentations rather than Slorp's default that led to his injuries. Had the proper mortgagee, 

whoever that is, elected to initiate its own foreclosure proceedings against Slorp, he would have 

faced double liability, and the defendants' fraudulent assignment would have led to the 

anomalous and unlawful result of two separate mortgagees-{)ne real and one fraudulentforeclosing on Slorp's house. The fact that the legitimate mortgagee has not initiated foreclosure 

proceedings only reinforces the conclusion that the defendants' allegedly fraudulent foreclosure 

led to Slorp's injuries. 

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To be sure, Slorp's injuries will vanish if the defendants prove that Bank of America was 

the legitimate mortgagee. But this case came to the district court on a motion to dismiss, and in 

that posture the court was required to accept the veracity of Slorp's factual allegations. Slorp 

alleges injuries to his property that were proximately caused by the defendants' allegedly 

baseless initiation of foreclosure proceedings and the fraudulent assignment of his mortgage. He 

is thus entitled to recover damages for those injuries unless he fails to satisfy his evidentiary 

burden, either on summary judgment or at trial. 

B. 

A successful RICO plaintiff must establish that the defendants engaged in a "pattern of 

racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); see also In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 

727 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2013). LSR and Hill contend that Slorp has not identified a pattern 

of racketeering activity because he has not alleged a plausible scheme or artifice to defraud. 

To establish a pattern ofracketeering activity, the plaintiff must allege at least two related 

acts of racketeering activity that amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. 

Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2008). The RICO statute enumerates 

dozens of crimes that constitute racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Among these 

crimes are mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343-the two predicate 

crimes that Slorp alleged in his proposed amended complaint. Mail and wire fraud consist of 

(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of the mails or interstate wire communications in 

furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property. United States 

v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 680 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 

2003). "A scheme to defraud is any plan or course of action by which someone intends to 

deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 

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or promises." United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

LSR first argues that Slorp's allegations are insufficient because he cannot show that he 

relied on the defendants' alleged misrepresentations. But "a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim 

predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to 

establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant's alleged misrepresentations." 

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 661 (2008). LSR's first argument stumbles 

right out of the gate. 

LSR also contends that "Slorp must allege sufficient plausible facts to indicate that LSR 

and Ms. Hill made a material misrepresentation of fact to Slorp that was calculated or intended to 

deceive Slorp." Slorp has done just that. Slorp's complaint alleges that LSR and Hill filed a 

state-court complaint against him misrepresenting that his mortgage had been assigned to Bank 

of America. He further alleges that LSR executed a fraudulent assignment and served it on Slorp 

in connection with the foreclosure action. According to Slorp, these material misrepresentations 

were intended to deceive both Slorp and the state court. Slorp therefore has alleged precisely 

what LSR demands of him. 

c. 

LSR also argues that Slorp has not alleged sufficient facts to support the existence of an 

enterprise. "The RICO statute makes it unlawful for 'any person ... associated with any 

enterprise ... to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity."' In re ClassicStar, 727 F.3d at 490 (quoting 

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)) (alterations in original). An enterprise "includes any individual, 

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partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 

associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 

An "association-in-fact enterprise" is "a group of persons associated together for a 

common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 

583 (1981). The association-in-fact enterprise must be separate and distinct from the pattern of 

racketeering activity in which it engages, but the enterprise could have been formed solely for 

the purpose of engaging in the racketeering activity. Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 

694 F.3d 783, 793-94 (6th Cir. 2012). The enterprise "must have at least three structural 

features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity 

sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose." Boyle v. United States, 

556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). The enterprise need not have a hierarchical structure or chain of 

command, members of the group need not have fixed roles, the group need not have a name, and 

the enterprise may engage in "spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence." Id at 948. 

Slorp has adequately alleged the existence of an enterprise that satisfies these basic 

criteria. He alleged that the defendants conspired to draft and execute a false assignment and to 

use the assignment in foreclosure proceedings to seize Slorp's property. He further alleged that 

the defendants used the mails and wires several times in furtherance of this scheme, and he 

alleged that the same defendants have engaged in similar malfeasance in other foreclosure 

proceedings, all with the aim of obtaining title to several properties that are not rightfully theirs. 

The alleged association-in-fact enterprise thus had a purpose and sufficient longevity, and its 

members had lasting relationships with one another. The defendants may introduce evidence to 

rebut any of these allegations, including the existence of an enterprise that was separate and 

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distinct from the racketeering activity, but the allegations in Slorp's complaint are sufficient to 

survive a motion to dismiss. 7 

Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined that amendment of Slorp's 

complaint to include a RICO count would be futile. 

VI. 

We affirm the dismissal of Slorp's FDCPA, CSPA, falsification, and civil conspiracy 

claims. But we reverse the district court's denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint 

and remand this action to the district court to permit Slorp to pursue the RICO claim. 

7

LSR's brief relies in large part on VanDenBroeck v. CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 210 

F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000), but that case has been abrogated by both Bridge and Boyle. 

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SUTTON, J., concurring. I join all of the majority opinion but part V. As to that, I agree 

with the majority that the district court's decision denying Slorp leave to add a civil RICO claim 

should be reversed. As the majority explains, the district court erred by concluding that Slorp 

suffered no cognizable injury, and that mistaken conclusion was the reason it denied leave to 

amend as futile. Rather than proceed to address the potential viability of other RICO claims in 

this setting, I would leave it at that, and let the district court address those claims in the first 

instance. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 

served upon all counsel of record, pro-se parties and the United States Attorney General and the 

Attorney General of the State of Oregon via the Court's CM/ECF system, email, and/or regular 

mail, and/or certified mail with return receipt requested. 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Loretta Lynch, 

U.S. Attorney General 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20530-0001 

202-514-2000 

Gabrielle D. Richards I Perkins Coie LLP 

1120 NW Couch Street 

10th Floor 

Portland, Oregon 97209-4128 

D. +1.503.727.2255 

F. + 1.503 .346.225 5 

grichards(u;perkinscoie.com 

Respectfully Submitted, 

Denise Subramaniam 

Case 3:14-cv-01836-MO Document 60 Filed 06/18/15 Page 36 of 36