IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–0875 

Submitted March 23, 2021—Filed June 4, 2021 

Amended August 16, 2021 

AL POLLER and DEB POLLER,

Appellants, 

vs. 

OKOBOJI CLASSIC CARS, LLC,

Appellee. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, Don E. 

Courtney, Judge. 

Automobile owners seek further review of court of appeals decision 

affirming the district court decision that found the owners failed to make 

a valid claim under Iowa’s Motor Vehicle Service Trade Practices Act and 

were not entitled to relief against their car restoration service for breach of 

contract and, instead, awarded the automobile restoration service 

damages in a counterclaim against the owners for breach of contract. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

Appel, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined. 
2 

Matthew G. Sease (argued) and Kylie E. Crawford (until withdrawal) 

of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellants. 

Jordan M. Talsma (argued) and John R. Walker Jr. (until 

withdrawal) of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson, P.C., 

Waterloo, for appellee. 
3 

APPEL, Justice. 

In this case, the owners of a 1931 Chevy claim that a company in 

the business of restoration of antique vehicles violated various provisions 

of the Motor Vehicle Service Trade Practices Act (MVSTPA), Iowa Code 

chapter 537B, and breached its contract with the owner. The company 

denied the claims, asserted affirmative defenses, and filed a counterclaim 

alleging breach of contract arising from the failure of its customer to pay 

an outstanding balance for restoration work on the vehicle. 

After a two-day trial, the district court concluded that there were no 

violations of the MVSTPA and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief 

on their contract claim. The district court further held that the company 

was entitled to a verdict on its counterclaim and awarded damages of 

$67,396.15. 

Plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. According to the 

court of appeals, the plaintiff failed to prove “ascertainable” damages 

under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, which provides the remedies for 

violations of the MVSTPA. The court of appeals further upheld the district 

court’s verdict on the breach of contract counterclaim. 

We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below, we 

affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand the case to the district 

court for the entry of judgment consistent with our opinion. 

I. Background Facts and Procedural History. 

A. Introduction. Al and Deb Poller are residents of New Jersey 

who own a 1931 Chevy. Okoboji Classic Cars, LLC (OCC) is a company 

located in Spencer, Iowa, that is in the business of restoring antique cars. 

After some preliminary communications, the Pollers shipped their 

disassembled 1931 Chevy from New Jersey to OCC for restoration in 
4 

November of 2013. In late December, the Pollers visited OCC in Iowa and 

made a $10,000 down payment on costs of the restoration project. 

OCC commenced work on the vehicle in late 2013. Although the 

Pollers were told by OCC staff that they would receive monthly invoices, 

no invoices were sent to them during the first seven months of the project. 

In August of 2014, when OCC asked for additional payment for their work, 

the Pollers requested the unsent invoices. OCC promptly sent six invoices 

to the Pollers, which showed that after a credit for the $10,000 down 

payment, the Pollers owed OCC a balance of $39,560.27. 

In the ensuing months, invoices accumulated as work continued on 

the restoration of the Pollers’ vehicle. The Pollers paid an additional 

$35,000 to OCC in three separate payments after August of 2014 but did 

not satisfy the entire amount ultimately invoiced by OCC. According to 

OCC, the total cost of the restoration of the ’31 Chevy came to 

$112,396.15. The balance OCC claimed the Pollers owed was $67,396.15. 

In December 2014, Al Poller and his son arrived at OCC to see the 

car. OCC, however, refused to permit them to view the vehicle until bills 

were paid. OCC placed the car in storage and refused to allow the Pollers 

to inspect it, apparently asserting an artisan’s lien under Iowa Code 

section 577.1. 

Ultimately, OCC permitted an expert to view the vehicle for appraisal 

purposes. The expert concluded that the quality of the restoration work 

on the vehicle was excellent and that the cost to restore a vehicle to the 

quality observed would be in excess of $100,000. Yet, the expert opined 

that the current fair market value of the restored vehicle itself was 

$37,900. 

B. Overview of Petition and Counterclaim. The Pollers filed a 

petition with three counts relevant to this appeal. In count I, the Pollers 
5 

sought a declaratory judgment regarding the nature of the contractual 

relationship of the parties. According to the Pollers, the parties “agreed (at 

least implicitly), that the costs of restoration would not greatly exceed the 

overall value of the final finished product.” The Pollers sought a 

declaration that with their total remittance of $45,000, they had “paid the 

proper amount for the restoration of the ’31 Chevy.” 

In count II of the amended petition, the Pollers alleged breach of 

contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. They alleged 

that there existed a valid and enforceable contract between the Pollers and 

OCC and that the Pollers had met the necessary terms of the contract by 

“paying a reasonable and fair amount for the work performed on the ’31 

Chevy.” The Pollers claimed OCC breached the contract by making 

demands for payment outside the scope of any contractual agreement and 

by failing to return the vehicle to the Pollers after receiving payment for 

services. 

In count IV of their amended petition, the Pollers alleged violations 

of the MVSTPA. The Pollers claimed that OCC violated section 3 of the 

MVSTPA by failing to disclose that the Pollers had a right to an estimate, 

failing to provide an estimate, and failing to have proper forms 

documenting the transaction. See Iowa Code § 537B.3. In the alternative, 

the Pollers pled that if the ballpark figure was, in fact, an estimate, OCC 

violated section 6 of the MVSTPA by not obtaining oral or written 

authorization from the consumer when the costs of the repairs or service 

amounted to more than ten percent above the original estimate. See id.

§ 537B.6(3). 

Further, the Pollers charged that OCC violated section 6 of the 

MVSTPA in other ways. They claimed that OCC improperly charged them 

for disassembly and reassembly or partially completed work without 
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obtaining authorization in advance. See id. § 537B.6(5). The Pollers 

alleged that they incurred charges that they had not authorized, including 

storage fees for their vehicle. See id. § 537B.6(6). Further, the Pollers 

asserted that OCC “materially and intentionally understate[d] or 

misstate[d] the estimated cost of the repairs or service.” See id.

§ 537B.6(12). 

Because of the above violations, the Pollers sought damages, 

including damages for loss of use of the ’31 Chevy and money previously 

paid. The Pollers also sought injunctive relief seeking to enjoin OCC in 

order to protect the public from further violations. See id. § 714H.5(1). 

The Pollers further sought an award of attorney fees under Iowa Code 

section 714H.5(2). Finally, the Pollers sought statutory damages up to 

three times the actual damages because the actions of OCC were alleged 

to be in willful and wanton disregard for the rights of consumers. See id.

§ 714H.5(4). 

OCC generally denied many of the Pollers’ allegations in their claims. 

Notably, however, OCC admitted that in approximately November of 2013, 

the parties entered into an oral contract in which OCC was to restore the 

Pollers’ ’31 Chevy. OCC further pled affirmative defenses of estoppel, 

waiver, laches, and acquiescence. 

In addition, OCC brought a counterclaim for breach of contract. In 

the counterclaim, OCC alleged that an oral contract between the parties 

was reached. Under the oral agreement, OCC made it clear that the 

charges were on a time and materials basis, with labor being charged at 

the rate of $65 per hour. OCC alleged that the Pollers were provided with 

periodic billings and encouraged OCC to continue work on the vehicle. 

OCC asserted that it continued work until the car was completed without 

any indication from the Pollers that they should cease working on the 
7 

vehicle. OCC asserted that the Pollers were in breach of contract for failure 

to make payments for work on the completed car and sought damages plus 

interest. Further, OCC asked the court to permit it to maintain possessory 

control of the vehicle pursuant to its lien until the judgment of the court, 

including interest and costs, was satisfied. 

In response to OCC’s counterclaim, the Pollers admitted that OCC 

refused to provide an estimate but otherwise denied the allegations. As 

affirmative defenses, the Pollers claim that OCC breached the contract by 

failing to deliver the vehicle in a timely manner and demanding an amount 

beyond that agreed to by the parties. The Pollers further asserted that 

there was no mutual assent to the terms of the contract. The Pollers also 

claimed that OCC breached the contract first, thus excusing performance. 

Finally, the Pollers charged that any alleged contract is illegal under the 

MVSTPA and is therefore void. Finally, in light of the statutory violations, 

the Pollers claimed that OCC was precluded from receiving any payment 

from them. 

C. Trial Before the District Court. The district court held a twoday trial in January 2018. Witnesses at trial included Deb Poller, Al Poller, 

a former OCC employee Robert Kirschbaum, and current OCC employees 

Denny Linn, April Torrence, and Ken Potter. Exhibits were admitted into 

evidence that included OCC invoices and backup documents, a number of 

email communications between the Pollers and OCC, photographs of the 

car during the work in progress and upon completion, and the report of 

the expert on the value of the restored vehicle and the work done by OCC. 

Many of the facts were undisputed and well documented in the 

record. But there were two key factual disputes at trial. 

First, the Pollers claimed that early in December 2013, an employee 

of OCC provided them with what the Pollers claim either was a nonbinding 
8 

ballpark statement or, in the alternative, an initial estimate of $45,000 for 

the restoration project. The OCC employees who testified at trial denied 

that such a representation was made. 

Second, OCC offered testimony that all of the work on the vehicle 

was approved by the Pollers. OCC notes that it maintained close contact 

with the Pollers as the project progressed, and when the invoices were sent 

to the Pollers in August of 2014 and in later months, the Pollers did not 

voice any objection to the invoices. The Pollers testified that they never 

authorized any expenditures above $45,000 nor did they authorize certain 

categories of expenses reflected in the invoices. 

D. Overview of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the 

District Court. 

1. Findings of fact. The district court found the facts as follows. Al 

and Deb Poller are residents of New Jersey. The Pollers have owned a 1931 

Chevrolet four-door Sedan since the late 1990s. The Pollers began 

restoring their Chevy in the 1990s but put it on hold to raise their family. 

In July 2013, Deb Poller, while visiting her family near Spencer, 

Iowa, visited the OCC museum. OCC’s museum also contained a body 

shop where OCC employed restoration specialists to restore vehicles for 

the museum as well as work on automobile restoration projects for private 

owners. Visiting the museum prompted Deb to inquire into completing 

the restoration project on her Chevy. Deb discussed the potential 

restoration of her Chevy with OCC’s officer manager, April Torrence. After 

Deb asked about the potential cost of the project, April told Deb that OCC 

has a policy to not provide estimates of quotes for restoration projects 

because of the variability and unknown conditions related to each 

individual project. 
9 

By November 2013, the Pollers decided that they wanted OCC to 

restore their Chevy. Deb sent April an email stating that the Pollers would 

ship their Chevy to OCC to be restored but conditioned the project on OCC 

providing a quote. OCC’s shop manager, Denny Linn, responded to Deb’s 

email saying that OCC does not provide estimates for the total cost of 

restoration projects and that he could not give Deb an estimate on her car 

specifically because he did not know the condition of the Chevy. In his 

reply, Denny told Deb that OCC would work on the Chevy based on “time 

and materials,” meaning that OCC would do restoration work for $65 per 

hour plus the materials for the project. Denny’s reply to Deb consisted of 

the following: 

Thank you for sending the pictures of the 31 Chevy, I 

just saw them today for the first time. It looks like a pretty 

nice car. Is it complete? It is very hard for us to give you a 

quote or estimate. In fact we don’t give estimates. Our 

experience has been that you can never see what problems 

may arise as we work on the car. What I can tell you is that 

we charge $65.00 an hour for work done in the shop. We do 

the mechanical work, the body work and the upholstery work 

for $65.00 an hour plus materials. We would restore or alter 

the car, what-ever your interests maybe, while keeping you 

involved in the decision making along the way. Right now we 

are booked up over a year in advance. In our shop we have 

area experts in the mechanics, body, and upholstery fields 

and with your input into what you want, I am sure that we 

could build you a very nice car. 

Soon after receiving the email, Deb shipped the Chevy to OCC, and 

all of the parts, consisting of four boxes, a motor, and a chassis, arrived 

on November 26. At the time of arrival, an OCC employee unpacked all of 

the boxes and determined that the Chevy appeared to be in excellent 

condition and contained all of the major parts. The exception to the 

excellent condition was surface rust and a dent near the roof that likely 

occurred during transport. 
10 

Denny sent an email to Deb notifying her that the shipment arrived 

and that they took pictures of all of the parts. The email stated, “You have 

a really nice car here. It looks like it made the trip pretty well” aside from 

the rust and small dents. He also indicated that OCC was one and a half 

to two years away from restoring the Chevy because of the number of 

projects ahead of the Pollers’ Chevy. Deb replied saying “NO WAY!!! Talk 

to April, I have been on the schedule since summer.” Denny responded 

that OCC had a number of cars they committed to restore ahead of the 

Pollers’ Chevy but that OCC would do some preliminary work and get to 

the more major work as soon as possible. Denny indicated that if the 

Pollers were not satisfied with that arrangement, they should let OCC 

know so OCC could discontinue work on the Chevy. Denny also said that 

OCC would be in touch so that OCC and the Pollers could discuss more 

detailed plans about the project. 

Deb responded by email that she would be visiting Okoboji around 

Christmas and that they could discuss specifics at that time. The Pollers 

visited OCC on December 27. The Pollers wanted the restoration work 

completed by August 15, 2014, to participate in a car cruise event. Denny 

took notes during the meeting, and the notes indicated that the Chevy 

would be restored to its original condition, with a modified paint job, and 

installation of a stereo. 

Deb discussed putting a $10,000 down payment on the project, and 

despite April saying OCC had never taken a down payment, OCC accepted 

the money. April also told Deb that OCC would be providing monthly 

invoices, which was a new policy of OCC’s, beginning in 2014. Al also said 

that during the meeting, an OCC employee said the restoration would 

probably cost between $35,000 and $40,000, with an additional $5,000 to 

$10,000 cost depending on choices the Pollers made. 
11 

Over the next several months, OCC worked on various parts of the 

Chevy. OCC communicated with the Pollers regarding updates on the 

work as well as asking the Pollers for their input on various decisions. 

There were over forty email exchanges between OCC and the Pollers. The 

first emails consisted of updates on engine parts and issues that thirdparty contractors discovered with the engine. Denny discussed the 

problems and the price to fix the problems, and the Pollers approved of the 

costs as long as the repairs were what the third-party recommended. 

Subsequent emails discussed the top speed of the engine and how 

the engine could be “geared up” to be more comfortably driven on the 

highway or in the alternative to replacing the gears, the use of larger tires. 

Deb said that they did not want the larger tires because they would be 

using the Chevy as a parade car. 

A set of emails by Denny in May first indicated that there was a lot 

of work left to do on the Chevy. Additional emails discussed the color to 

be painted. Denny also discussed upgrading the electrical system so that 

more safety features could be added to the Chevy, including a second tail 

light, turn signals, and four-way flashers, and that the upgraded system 

would allow for electric wipers, a stereo system, and a cigarette lighter. 

Deb replied that they would like the upgraded electrical system and 

wanted a specific metallic purple color for the Chevy. 

In June, Denny told the Pollers that the fuel tank needed to be 

replaced due to rusting. He provided two options, one for $1000 and 

another for $1155. Deb replied that they would like the $1155 option. 

Denny replied that they were putting many hours into the project and 

sending out lots of parts for rebuilding. In another email, Denny discussed 

parts needed for the rear gearing, including a ring and pinion set which 

would cost $1320, and updated Deb that chromed items were sent to be 
12 

rechromed and would be back in five weeks. Deb replied, “[W]hy were the 

chrome items not sent out until now? Also regarding the gear out, we 

discussed this almost 2 months ago and gave our approval. How is this 

car ever going to be completed by Aug 15th?” Denny’s reply consisted of 

a continued discussion of the color, ring and pinion gears, and rear 

luggage rack. He also said, “[W]e may not have the car ready for the midAugust pick up.” 

In July, Denny sent emails regarding the radiator, stating that for 

the radiator to look like original, it would cost around $3000 but a modern 

style radiator would be $1050 and said that it may take some time before 

the radiator is completed. Deb responded: 

We are very concerned about the time frame on our car. 

You have had the car since Nov. 2013 with the agreement that 

it would be done this summer. We met with you over 

Christmas, went over details, set a date for Aug 16, now within 

the last 2 weeks we are looking for gears on rear end, sending 

out chrome and now addressing radiator, all issues according 

to you will take a while some time, at least 5–6 weeks on just 

the chrome. We have asked before, why wasn’t this done 

before now? What has been done since Dec. 2013? 

Denny did not address Deb’s questions, instead continuing to discuss the 

paint and radiator. 

In July, Deb was in Iowa and checked in on the progress at OCC. 

Deb met with an upholstery person to discuss details. After the visit, 

Denny sent Deb an email with pictures of the new radiator and asked the 

Pollers for an additional payment. In response, Al replied saying that they 

never received any monthly invoices from OCC and asked OCC to send the 

invoices. 

On August 6, OCC sent six invoices that demonstrated OCC had 

used the $10,000 initial down payment and that the Pollers owed an 

additional $39,560.27. The Pollers asked for an itemization of work. While 
13 

the itemization was being sent, the Pollers were sent an additional invoice 

showing another $25,000 of work since August 6. 

Denny sent more progress pictures at the end of August and also 

stated that they were putting in many hours and paying for a lot of parts 

for the Chevy. He again asked for a check from the Pollers. The Pollers 

made a payment of $15,000 on September 11. Denny asked for additional 

payment on October 7 if they wanted OCC to continue work on the Chevy 

and told the Pollers that if they wanted OCC to discontinue work, they 

would move the Chevy to a secured warehouse. He indicated that the 

Pollers had paid $25,000 up to that point but that OCC had $21,219.19 

of parts for the Chevy in OCC’s warehouse. He also said OCC would send 

the itemization that the Pollers requested. 

The Pollers had sent a check to OCC on October 6 for $10,000. On 

October 31, Denny sent an email informing the Pollers of various work 

being performed and wondered whether the Pollers had sent an additional 

check. The Pollers sent a check for $10,000 on November 13. The Pollers 

made no further payments. On November 14, the outstanding balance 

was $50,694.93, and after completion of the project on December 31, the 

balance was $66,705.70. 

In January 2015, the Pollers hired an automobile appraiser to 

appraise the Chevy. OCC initially refused to allow the appraiser access to 

the Chevy but eventually the appraiser was given access. The appraiser 

determined that the car was in excellent condition and said that the type 

of restoration he saw would cost in excess of $100,000. The Chevy is still 

in OCC’s possession and OCC continues to send the Pollers invoices. 

2. Conclusions of law. The district court first addressed the Pollers’ 

claims under the MVSTPA. The district court held that “Deb’s action of 

shipping the ’31 Chevy was an acceptance of OCC’s offer, authorizing OCC 
14 

to restore her ’31 Chevy based upon their $65.00 per hour time plus the 

cost of materials.” The district court stated that Iowa Code section 

537B.3(2)(b) gives a supplier “the choice to write the written estimate on 

the authorization form, or state an hourly labor charge.” Since OCC 

provided an hourly rate, the district court determined that OCC complied 

with the provision. The district court further determined that because Deb 

shipped the parts, rather than requesting repairs in writing or orally, the 

disclosure requirements of subsections 1 and 3 of Iowa Code section 

537B.3 and were not triggered. 

The district court also concluded that OCC did not engage in other 

deceptive activity under section 537B.6. The district court rejected the 

claim that OCC violated the MVSTPA by not obtaining authorization when 

the amounts exceeded the initial estimate by ten percent. See Iowa Code 

§ 537B.6(3). The district court concluded that there was no estimate; 

therefore, no violation of the ten percent rule. 

The district court did not directly address other potential violations 

of the MVSTPA regarding unauthorized work. But the court noted that all 

modifications were authorized by the Pollers through email and that 

detailed invoices demonstrating that the charges OCC imposed were all 

directly related to restoration. As a result, the district court ruled that the 

plaintiffs failed to prove any violations of the MVSTPA. 

On the breach of contract claims, the district court determined that 

the Pollers breached the contract. The district court found the Al Poller’s 

testimony that he received an oral estimate of $45,000 was against the 

weight of the evidence. So, any claim that costs above the “agreed upon 

amount” lacked mutual assent was without merit. 

The district court also determined that the Pollers’ claim that OCC 

charged a thirty percent markup on parts in violation of the agreed-upon 
15 

contract was without merit. The district court found that OCC sold parts 

below fair market value, even after the thirty percent markup. 

Finally, the district court determined that OCC’s failure to send 

monthly invoices at the beginning of the project was not a material breach. 

The district court found that the Pollers did not dispute any of the invoices 

or request work be cancelled. OCC continued with the project and 

continued to request payments from the Pollers. 

The district court found that OCC provided general billing 

statements and detailed itemization of the bill. The district court found 

“[t]he evidence is clear, and without dispute, that every stage of the 

restoration process was a work in progress that involved the Plaintiffs in 

the decision matrix that led to the ultimate cost of the time and materials 

billed.” The district court said that if the plaintiffs believed they were only 

required to pay $45,000, then “they had a duty to terminate their 

relationship and not authorize further expense.” The district court noted 

that the Pollers did not mitigate their damages despite having the 

opportunity to have OCC set aside the Chevy. The district court concluded 

that the Pollers materially breached the contract by only paying $45,000 

when the total cost of the project amounted to $112,396.15. Thus, the 

Pollers were in breach for failure to pay the unpaid balance of $67,396.15. 

The district court entered a judgment in favor of OCC in that amount. 

E. Decision of the Court of Appeals. The court of appeals, in a 

per curiam opinion, affirmed the district court ruling. The court of appeals 

assumed, without deciding, that the MVSTPA applied to the transaction. 

In discussing the Pollers’ claim that OCC violated the MVSTPA, the court 

of appeals majority emphasized the findings of fact of the district court 

that all the work performed by OCC was authorized. Because the work 

was “authorized,” the court of appeals majority held that that the Pollers 
16 

could not prove “actual damages” under Iowa Code section 714H.5. In 

support of its holding, the court of appeals majority cited a footnote in 

Kaskin v. John Lynch Chevrolet-Pontiac Sales, Inc. stating that “a customer 

finding a violation of the written estimate requirement has not suffered a 

pecuniary loss if the customer admits to authorizing to the repairs.” 767 

N.W.2d 394, 402 n.6. (Wis. Ct. App. 2009). 

The court of appeals majority also held that the Pollers did not 

establish that OCC committed a willful or wanton breach of Iowa Code 

chapter 537B that would entitle them to exemplary damages. The court 

of appeals majority reasoned that the district court finding in favor of OCC 

on its breach of contract counterclaim made it clear that the standard for 

exemplary damages was not met. In support of its holding, the court of 

appeals majority cited Scibek v. Longette, 770 A.2d 1242 (N.J. Super. Ct. 

App. Div. 2001). In Scibek, the court found that there was no 

“ascertainable loss” arising from the failure of a repair shop “to provide a 

written estimate and obtain a written authorization.” Id. at 1249–51. 

The court of appeals majority next turned to OCC’s breach of 

contract claim. The court of appeals majority recognized the argument 

advanced by the Pollers that it would be illogical and against public policy 

to permit collection of monies earned in violation of a consumer protection 

statute. But, the court of appeals majority noted that Iowa Code section 

714H.5 limits damages to “ ‘actual damages’ incurred ‘as the result of a 

prohibited practice.’ ” Based on its conclusion that the Pollers are not 

entitled to damages based upon alleged violations of the MVSTPA, the 

court of appeals majority concluded that OCC “is not foreclosed from 

recovering damages on its breach-of-contract counterclaim based on its 

violation of chapter 537B.” 
17 

The court of appeals majority finally considered whether OCC 

breached the parties’ agreement by failing to provide timely billing. The 

court of appeals majority noted that the district court found that OCC did 

not provide timely billing, but the court put the onus on the Pollers for 

failing to insist on adherence to timely billing while OCC continued to work 

on the car. As a result, the court of appeals majority found that the Pollers 

acquiesced in the delayed billing. 

A special concurrence determined that the antique auto restoration 

business of OCC was subject to the terms of the MVSTPA. See Schuster v. 

Dragone Classic Motor Cars, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 441, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 

Montgomery v. Nostalgia Lane, Inc., 891 N.E.2d 994, 999, 1001 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2008). Further, the special concurrence reasoned that a dissembled 

vehicle was within the scope of the statute. In re Baily, 326 B.R. 750, 757 

(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2004). Further, the special concurrence concluded that 

the OCC violated the MVSTPA by failing to provide the Pollers an estimate 

as required by subsections 2(b) and 3 of Iowa Code section 537B.3. 

The special concurrence also considered the impact of the Pollers 

sending the car to OCC for repairs without having obtained an estimate. 

According to the special concurrence, the conduct of the Pollers does not 

provide a waiver, noting, in part, that under Iowa Code section 537B.6(2), 

a supplier cannot condition services on waiver. Further, the special 

concurrence found that while the Pollers could have taken action to 

mitigate their expenses, mitigation has no bearing on whether OCC 

violated chapter 537B. 

Yet, like the majority, the special concurrence determined that the 

Pollers did not prove actual damages from the violation of the MVSTPA. 

The special concurrence further agreed with the majority’s disposition of 

OCC’s breach of contract claim. 
18 

II. Standard of Review. 

“In a law action tried to the court, our review is for the correction of 

errors at law, and the district court’s findings of fact are binding on us if 

they are supported by substantial evidence.” Wolf v. Wolf, 690 N.W.2d 887, 

892 (Iowa 2005). 

III. Overview of the Iowa Motor Vehicle Service Trade Practices 

Act and Private Right of Action Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. 

We begin with a brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions 

in this case. Iowa Code chapter 537B is entitled the “Motor Vehicle Service 

Trade Practices Act.” Iowa Code § 537B.1. The MVSTPA covers 

transactions between consumers and suppliers “for, repairs or service 

upon a motor vehicle used primarily for farm or personal use.” Id.

§ 537B.2(1). After providing a series of definitions in Iowa Code section 

537B.2, the MVSTPA contains provisions related to estimates and 

documentation required before services are provided, provisions related to 

various trade practices, aftermarket parts, and deceptive acts or practices. 

Id. §§ 537B.3, .4, .6. 

Importantly, a violation of the MVSTPA is an unfair practice under 

the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. Id. § 714.16(2)(k); State ex rel. Miller v. 

Vertrue, Inc., 834 N.W.2d 12, 31 n.8 (Iowa 2013). Under the Iowa 

Consumer Fraud Act, a private party may seek “actual damages.” Iowa 

Code § 714H.5(1). Actual damages are “all compensatory damages 

proximately caused by the prohibited practice or act that are reasonably 

ascertainable in amount.” Id. § 714H.2(1). In addition, section 714H.5(4) 

provides exemplary damages for “willful and wanton disregard for the 

rights or safety of another.” Finally, attorney fees are recoverable where 

statutory violations are proven and actual damages are awarded. Id.

§ 714H.5(2). As a consumer protection statute, the terms of the MVSTPA 
19 

should be interpreted liberally in favor of the consumer. State ex rel. Miller 

v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 528 (Iowa 

2005); State ex rel. Turner v. Koscot Intrerplanetary, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 624, 

630 (Iowa 1971); Levin v. Lewis, 431 A.2d 157, 161 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div. 1981).

IV. Coverage Under the MVSTPA. 

A. Positions of the Parties. 

1. The Pollers. The Pollers assert that the restoration services 

provided by OCC were within the scope of the MVSTPA. The Pollers claim 

that they are “consumers” and OCC is a “supplier” under the Act. Under 

the Act, a consumer is defined as “a person contracting for, or intending 

to contract for, repairs or service upon a motor vehicle used primarily for 

farm or personal use.” Iowa Code § 537B.2(1). A motor vehicle under Iowa 

Code section 537B.2(2) is “a motor vehicle as defined in section 321.1 

which is subject to registration.” In turn, Iowa Code section 321.1(42)(a) 

defines motor vehicle as “a vehicle which is self-propelled and not operated 

upon rails.” A “supplier” is “a person offering to contract for repairs or 

service upon a motor vehicle.” Id. § 537B.2(3). 

At the outset, the Pollers address a generalized concern that the 

MVSTPA was not intended to cover transactions for the restoration of 

antique cars. They note that such restoration work has been held to be 

within the scope of similar statutes in a number of jurisdictions. Schuster, 

98 F. Supp. 2d at 448–49; Schreiber v. Kelsey, 133 Cal. Rptr. 508, 510 

(App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1976); Morris v. Gregory, 661 A.2d 712, 716 (Md. 

1995); Levin, 431 A.2d at 160; Jagodzinski v. Jessup, 572 N.W.2d 515, 

517 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); Webb v. Ray, 688 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 

1984). 
20 

In order to be a “consumer” under the MVSTPA, the repair work 

must be done on a “motor vehicle” within the terms of the statutory 

provisions. Although their ’31 Chevy was disassembled when sent to OCC, 

the Pollers assert that does not matter. The Pollers claim that when 

delivered to OCC, the ’31 Chevy was complete with all major necessary 

components provided. 

In support of their position, the Pollers cite In re Baily, 326 B.R. 750. 

In In re Baily, the court held that “the ordinary and common meaning of 

the term ‘motor vehicle’ includes an inoperable vehicle that can be made 

operable by reassembling one [or] more of its parts or by repairing one or 

more of its parts.” Id. at 757–58. 

The Pollers recognize that in order to be a “motor vehicle,” the vehicle 

must be “subject to registration.” The Pollers assert that upon completion 

of the work, the vehicle will be subject to registration under the laws of 

New Jersey. They claim as a matter of statutory interpretation that the 

word “is” includes the future because under Iowa Code section 4.1(33), 

“[w]ords in the present tense include the future.” Therefore, according to 

the Pollers, the fact that the vehicle upon completion of the restoration 

would be subject to registration is sufficient to bring the restoration work 

within the scope of the MVSTPA. 

2. OCC. OCC denies MVSTPA coverage. OCC makes the general 

claim that restoration of antique cars is simply not the type of activity that 

the legislature intended to regulate under the MVSTPA. They cite two 

cases from Massachusetts for the proposition that the repair work on 

classic cars “customarily require[s] several months, if not years, to 

complete and routinely cost twenty to thirty thousand dollars.” Devito Auto 

Restoration v. Card, No. 9657, 2000 WL 1426124, *3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 
21 

Sept. 15, 2000); see also Gulbankian v. Harabedian, No. 01WAD014, 2002 

WL 480952, *3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Mar. 25, 2002). 

OCC notes that the cases cited by the Pollers for the general 

proposition that classic auto restoration is subject to similar acts are not 

persuasive because of differences in statutory language. OCC claims that 

the Iowa statute was designed to protect consumers who use their vehicles 

for daily transportation, not for owners of antique cars. In support of its 

argument, OCC cites an affidavit from a distinguished former state 

legislator who declared that chapter 537B was not intended to apply to 

restoration of dismantled vehicles incapable of operating on the roadway 

“because there are too many unknowns in the car restoration industry and 

restoring vehicles is not an exact science.” Because OCC had a policy of 

not providing estimates, OCC argues that the Pollers cannot use the 

MVSTPA as a sword against them for authorized work. 

OCC then turns to the question of whether the Pollers ’31 Chevy is 

a “motor vehicle.” OCC directs our attention to Nelson v. Merchants 

Bonding Co., 425 N.W.2d 433 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). In Nelson, the court 

of appeals held that a collection of automotive parts did not constitute a 

“motor vehicle” under Iowa Code section 321.1. Id. at 436. OCC urges us 

to follow a similar approach here. 

OCC also addressed the case In re Baily cited by the plaintiffs. 

According to OCC, while OCC recognizes that the court in In re Baily, 326 

B.R. at 757, stated that the term ‘motor vehicle’ includes “an inoperable 

vehicle that can be made operable by reassembling one [or] more of its 

parts or by repairing one or more of its parts,” OCC argues, however, that 

the case does not mean that a “completely assembled, inoperable vehicle” 

which can only be made operable by replacing and rebuilding numerous 

essential parts, is included within the term. 
22 

Finally, according to OCC, the disassembled vehicle was not “subject 

to registration” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 321.18. OCC 

argues that the Pollers have never held a certificate of title to the ’31 Chevy 

and have never registered the vehicle. But, according to OCC, the reading 

of the statute is unreasonable or absurd because the ’31 Chevy would have 

been subject to registration for the thirteen years it was held in storage. 

Instead, OCC points to Iowa Code section 321.18 to assist in the 

interpretation of the term “subject to regulation” in the MVSTPA. Under 

this provision, “[e]very motor vehicle, trailer, and semitrailer when driven 

or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the registration provisions of 

this chapter.” Id. § 321.18. OCC claims that motor vehicles are subject 

to registration only when “driven or moved” on the highway, and not one 

minute before. 

B. Discussion. 

1. Restoration of antique cars. We begin our discussion of the 

applicability of the MVSTPA by considering whether restoration of antique 

cars is within the scope of the statute. We recognize that there is some 

authority from Massachusetts standing for the proposition that antique 

restoration is not subject to a similar statute because of its unique 

characteristics. In Devito Auto Restoration, the court held that a business 

that restores antique cars is not a repair shop because the work 

“customarily require[s] several months, if not years, to complete and 

routinely cost twenty to thirty thousand dollars.” Devito Auto Restoration, 

2000 WL 1426124 at *3; see also Gulbankian, 2002 WL 480952 at *3. 

And, we recognize that OCC offered an affidavit from a prominent state 

legislator stating that the legislature did not intend to include antique 

restoration such as that engaged in by OCC within the scope of the statute. 
23 

Yet, the overwhelming majority of authority in other states points in 

the opposite direction. See Schuster, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 448–49 (holding 

that restoration is subject to Connecticut’s consumer fraud act); Schreiber, 

133 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (“Restoration is not a stated exception to the 

statute.”); Morris, 661 A.2d at 716 (Md. 1995) (“[W]e see no reason to draw 

a distinction . . . between repair and restoration.”); Levin, 431 A.2d at 160; 

Jagodzinski, 572 N.W.2d at 517 (“[T]here is nothing within the code to 

suggest that the repairs were meant to be excluded simply because they 

amounted to a ‘restoration.’ ”); Webb, 688 P.2d at 537. 

We conclude that the restoration of antique automobiles is within 

the scope of the MVSTPA if the relevant statutory criteria are met. There 

is nothing in the statute that suggests that the age of the motor vehicle is 

relevant to coverage, nor is there an exception for restoration of “classic” 

or “antique” motor vehicles. Schreiber, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 510; Morris, 661 

A.2d at 716; Jagodzinski, 572 N.W.2d at 517–18. Instead, the legislation 

broadly applies to “a motor vehicle used primarily for farm or personal 

use.” Iowa Code § 537B.2(1). While OCC has offered an affidavit from a 

legislator to the contrary, we have held that statements by individual 

legislators in litigation are inadmissible on the question of legislative 

intent. Roades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 447 (Iowa 2016). We do not 

depart from that precedent today. We hold that if there is to be a carve 

out from the statute for the restoration of antique automobiles, it is up to 

the legislature to provide one. 

2. Definition of “motor vehicle.” We now turn to the question of 

whether the ’31 Chevy was a “motor vehicle” under the statute. We 

conclude that the fact that the vehicle was disassembled and inoperable 

at the time of delivery is of no moment. Autos that need repair are often 
24 

inoperable, of course, and the separation of an auto into component parts 

does not change the nature of the repair activity. 

The question was considered in an insurance context in Robertson 

v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, 569 A.2d 565 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990). 

There, a disassembled antique car that was not currently operable was 

stored in the insured’s garage. Id. at 565. The policy in that case had an 

exclusion for “motorized land vehicles . . . designed for travel on public 

roads as subject to motor vehicle registration.” Id. at 566 (omission in 

original). The court found that the vehicle qualified as a motor vehicle as 

it “was designed for highway travel” and “would be subject to vehicle 

registration when that use was made.” Id. 

Of course, a mere miscellaneous assembly of parts is not a “motor 

vehicle.” Nelson, 425 N.W.2d at 436. In Nelson, many essential parts were 

missing, such as the engine, radiators, and wheels. Id. But here, OCC’s 

manager testified that the car was “a really nice car” and a former employee 

characterized the vehicle as “very complete.” Unlike in Nelson, the former 

employee testified that “the major components were there, the motor, 

transmission, frame, running gear, wheels.” The testimony of Al Poller 

that the vehicle was “[a]lmost drivable” was unrebutted. 

Based on the facts developed at trial, we conclude that the approach 

of the bankruptcy court in In re Baily applies here. In In re Baily, the 

bankruptcy court found that the term “motor vehicle” includes an 

inoperable vehicle that can be made operable through repair. 326 B.R. at 

757–58; see also Sprenger v. Trout, 866 A.2d 1035, 1046 (N.J. Super. Ct. 

App. Div. 2005) (rejecting “roadworthiness” limitation and noting that 

“[c]ourts have consistently rejected creative attempts to narrow the scope 

of the [statute] by technical definitions and artificial distinctions”). We 

think the teaching of In re Baily, rather than Nelson, controls here. 
25 

3. “Subject to registration.” The final question is whether the ’31 

Chevy meets the “is subject to registration” requirement. We think it does. 

We regard the “is subject to registration” requirement as designed to 

separate automobiles from other motor vehicles such as ATVs, golf carts, 

and riding lawn mowers. See N. Sec. Ins. v. Rossitto, 762 A.2d 861, 863 

(Vt. 2000) (stating that ATVs used on easements are not subject to 

registration under Vermont statute); Progressive N. Ins. v. Pippin, 725 

F. App’x 717, 720 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating that a golf cart is not a motor 

vehicle under Oklahoma statute); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Kurtenbach 

ex rel. Kurtenbach, 961 P.2d 53, 58–59 (Kan. 1998) (holding that a “street 

legal” motorcycle was the type of motor vehicle subject to registration 

despite its part-time use as an agriculture implement); Argonaut Ins. v. 

Colonial Ins., 138 Cal. Rptr. 855, 857 (Ct. App. 1977) (stating that a 

backhoe loader is not type of equipment subject to registration). 

In other words, we find the statute is categorical, namely, that the 

phrase “motor vehicles subject to registration” is designed to ensure that 

vehicles that are commonly known as automobiles and cars that travel on 

the state’s roads are within the scope of the act. Kimball v. New England 

Guar. Ins., 642 A.2d 1347, 1348–49 (Me. 1994) (holding that for the 

purposes of what type of vehicle is subject to registration, what matters is 

whether the type of vehicle is subject to registration, not whether the owner 

actually intends to register the vehicle). 

As a result, the restoration of a disassembled vehicle for the purpose 

of providing an operable motor vehicle falls within the scope of the 

MVSTPA. In this case, there was undisputed testimony that the 

completely restored automobile would be subject to registration in New 

Jersey, the residence of the Pollers. We conclude that the “subject to 
26 

registration” requirement does not take the restoration project in this case 

outside the scope of the MVSTPA. 

V. Alleged Violations Under the MVSTPA. 

A. Overview. Having determined that the MVSTPA covers the 

transaction between the Pollers and OCC, we now turn to whether the 

Pollers established any violations. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff 

to prove each element of a statutory violation. 

B. Violation of Iowa Code Section 537B.3 (Required 

Disclosures).

1. The Pollers. The Pollers claim that OCC violated the 

requirements of Iowa Code section 537B.3. This section of the statute 

mandates that suppliers notify a consumer of several rights. Specifically, 

the statute requires the supplier must maintain authorization forms which 

contain “a conspicuous disclosure in substantially the following language”: 

ESTIMATE 

You have the right to a written or oral estimate if the 

expected cost of repairs or service will be more than fifty 

dollars. Your bill will not be higher than the estimate by more 

than ten percent unless you approve a higher amount before 

repairs are finished. Initial your choice: 

................................ Written estimate. 

................................ Oral estimate. 

................................ No estimate. 

................................ Call me if repairs and service will be more 

than $................................ 

Iowa Code § 537B.3(1). 

In addition, the MVSTPA requires the form to provide the date, the 

supplier’s name, the customer’s name and phone number, and the 

reasonably anticipated completion date. Id. § 537B.3(2)(a). 
27 

The MVSPTA contains provisions about the manner of execution of 

the authorization forms. Under Iowa Code section 537B.3(2)(b), if the 

consumer requests a written estimate, the supplier may use the written 

authorization form or another form. If, however, “the nature of repairs or 

service is unknown at the time that the estimate is given, the supplier may 

state an hourly labor charge for the work.” Id.

According to the Pollers, OCC failed to comply with Iowa Code 

section 537B.3 in several ways. Prior to shipping the car, Deb asked for 

an estimate. In response, OCC did not provide an estimate but instead 

declared that they “work for $65 an hour plus materials.” But the statute, 

according to the Pollers, requires that the customer be notified of their 

right to seek an estimate. Id. § 537B.3(3). 

In addition, the Pollers assert that under the statute, a supplier is 

required to provide to the consumer an estimated completion date. Id. 

§ 537B.3(2)(a)(4). The Pollers assert that completion date was a significant 

factor to them and that they were never provided an estimated finish date 

as required by the statute. 

Further, under Iowa Code section 537B.3(1), the Pollers claim they 

were entitled to be informed of their right to impose a budget cap on project 

expenses without express authorization. The Pollers claim that they were 

interested in disciplining the cost of the project as reflected in the requests 

for invoices as the project advanced. They claim OCC violated the statute 

by not expressly offering them the option of capping expenses without 

further authorization. 

2. Position of OCC. OCC asserts that the language required by 

section 537B.3(1) is only required “[i]f a consumer authorizes, in writing, 

repairs or service upon a motor vehicle prior to the commencement of the 

repairs or service.” Here, OCC points out, the Pollers did not authorize the 
28 

restoration service in writing but instead authorized the restoration service 

by conduct. 

Further, OCC asserts that the statute does not require an estimate 

in all instances. They note that under Iowa Code section 537B.3(2)(b), “[i]f 

the nature of repairs or service is unknown at the time that the estimate 

is given, the supplier may state an hourly labor charge for the work.” OCC 

cites the plaintiff’s case of Levin v. Lewis in support of its claim. In Levin, 

the court specifically noted that the supplier did not tell the consumer that 

he worked only on a time and materials basis. 431 A.2d at 157–58. 

3. Discussion. We first consider the assertion of OCC that because 

the request was not in writing, OCC was not required to provide an 

estimate form. Iowa Code section 537B.3 establishes a two-tiered 

framework for documentation. If a customer authorizes repairs in writing, 

the supplier is required to use a form in substantial compliance with Iowa 

Code section 537B.3(1). 

But, if the customer authorizes repairs orally, the supplier is 

required to inform the customer of “the right to receive a written or oral 

estimate.” Id. § 537B.3(3). Then, the supplier is required to “note the 

consumer’s response on the form described in subsections 1 and 2.” Id. 

“If the consumer requests an estimate, the supplier shall provide the 

estimate to the consumer prior to” the commencement of any work. Id.

Here, the Pollers do not claim there was a written acceptance under 

Iowa Code section 537B.3(1) but instead seek to bring the case within the 

“oral acceptance” provision by asserting that where there is no written 

authorization, the provisions related to oral acceptance should apply. Id.

§ 537B.3(3). 

We think the Pollers provide the best approach to the statute. The 

statute divides authorizations into two categories: written and oral. They 
29 

are designed to create a binary world of authorization and not to permit 

an exception for a third category of authorization, namely, authorization 

by conduct.1 Further, we note that OCC in its pleadings admitted the 

existence of an oral contract between the parties for the restoration of the 

vehicle. 

In any event, we think that subsection 3 has been violated under 

either interpretation. If the requirements of subsections 1 and 2 related 

to written authorizations apply to oral authorizations as well, it is clear 

that the Pollers were not presented with two material disclosures. First, 

they were entitled to have the opportunity to cap costs without further 

authorization. Second, they were entitled to an estimated completion date. 

It is undisputed that these requirements were not met by OCC. 

And, even if we interpret subsection 3 as having its own distinct 

requirements for oral authorizations, OCC still has not complied with the 

statute. Based on the district court’s finding of fact, we conclude that the 

Pollers were not given an estimate for the work. In fact, the opposite 

 

1There is a question of whether there is a substantive difference in the terms of 

subsections 1 and 3 under Iowa Code section 537B.3. For example, under subsection 3, 

if the consumer requests an estimate, “the supplier shall provide the estimate to the 

consumer prior to commencing the repairs or service.” Iowa Code § 537B.3(3). There is 

no express provision in subsection 3 for an hourly rate and cost of materials type 

response. Id. And, while subsection 3 provides that a supplier shall note the response 

of the consumer on a form described in subsections 1 and 2 of the statute, the “response” 

seems to refer to the prior sentence in the subsection, which requires only that the 

supplier notify a consumer of the right to an estimate. Id. Thus, subsection 3 does not 

expressly require that a supplier give the consumer the option of “Call me if repairs and 

service will be more than $.........................” Compare id. § 537B.3(3), with id.

§ 537B.3(1). Nor does subsection 3 expressly require that the consumer be provided with 

“[t]he reasonably anticipated completion date.” Compare id. § 537B.3(3), with id.

§ 537B.3(2)(a)(4). Yet, the requirement that the consumer’s response be recorded on a 

form similar to that used for written authorizations may imply that these are additional 

requirements. While OCC does contend that authorizations by conduct are excluded 

from the statute, it does not argue that the authorization here is oral in nature and that 

the substantive disclosure rights under the statute differ between oral and written 

contracts. For the purpose of this case, we assume that the disclosure requirements for 

oral and written authorizations are the same. 
30 

occurred. But, if an estimate is requested, as it was here, subsection 3 

imposes on the supplier an unqualified obligation to “provide the estimate 

to the consumer prior to commencing the repairs or service.” Iowa Code 

§ 537B.3(3). In this case, Deb Poller clearly requested an estimate, but 

OCC did not provide it. 

We do not regard the failure to comply with the disclosure 

requirements of subsection 3 as an inconsequential violation. As noted in 

Sprenger v. Trout, “The significance of the automotive repair regulations is 

to prevent a situation where the consumer is presented with a final bill 

that far exceeds the anticipated cost of repairs.” 866 A.2d at 1042. That 

is exactly what occurred here. A violation of the provision related to 

estimates “goes to the very essence of what the regulations are designed to 

accomplish.” Id. Or, as stated by another court, failure to comply with 

the statute “created the climate for the dispute that ultimately developed.” 

Scibek, 770 A.2d at 1249. Indeed, in this case, if OCC had complied with 

the requirements of subsection 3, the parties would likely have mutually 

come to grips with the overall cost issues prior to the provision of over 

$100,000 in restoration services. 

For the above reasons, we find that OCC violated Iowa Code section 

537B.3 under all interpretive alternatives. We recognize that in light of 

the nature of its business, OCC may find it difficult to provide prerepair 

estimates. But OCC has a path to statutory compliance that 

accommodates practicalities by insisting that all authorizations for 

restoration be made in writing. Under the statute, when repair 

authorizations are made in writing, OCC may decline to provide an 

estimate, but it must specifically provide in writing an opportunity for the 

customer to set a limit on expenditures that may be incurred without prior 
31 

approval and provide the information provided in subsection 2, including 

an estimated completion date. See Iowa Code § 537B.3(1), (2). 

C. Violation of Iowa Code Section 537B.6(3) (Cost Exceeding 

Estimates). 

1. Positions of the parties. The Pollers claim that OCC violated Iowa 

Code section 537B.3 by not informing them of their right to an estimate 

and not providing an estimate when requested by Deb. In the alternative 

to their claim that they were not provided with an estimate as required by 

chapter 537B.3, they claim they were provided with an estimate of $45,000 

but that OCC exceeded the estimate by more than ten percent without 

obtaining further authorization from them. Such conduct would amount 

to an unfair practice under Iowa Code section 537B.6(3). OCC responds 

that the district court determined that OCC did not, as a matter of fact, 

provide a $45,000 cost estimate and that this factual determination is fatal 

to the Pollers’ claim here. 

2. Discussion. We see no reason to disturb the district court’s 

factual finding that the Pollers were not given an estimate. The district 

court found that the Pollers claim was against the weight of the evidence. 

Such findings are left undisturbed if there is substantial evidence, as there 

is here, to support it. Grinnell Mut. Reins. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783, 785 

(Iowa 1988). If there was no estimate, the Pollers were not improperly 

charged for repairs that exceeded the estimate by ten percent. As a result, 

we find no violation of Iowa Code section 537B.6(3). 

D. Violation of Iowa Code Section 537B.6(5) (Disassembly and 

Reassembly).

1. Position of the Pollers. Iowa Code section 537B.6(5) provides that 

a supplier shall not fail to disclose to the customer “prior to the 

commencement of any repairs or service” charges for “disassembly, 
32 

reassembly, partially completed work, or any other work not directly 

related to the actual performance of the repairs or service.” On appeal, the 

Pollers present to us a matrix of charges from invoices with descriptions 

of work that they claim are within the scope of subsection 5. The total 

amount of charges that the Pollers claim required advance authorization 

is $6516.25. 

2. Position of OCC. OCC responds by noting that the district court 

found that “each and every task” performed by OCC was authorized. If 

this factual finding is correct, OCC argues, then there is no basis for the 

Pollers’ claim under Iowa Code section 537B.6(5). 

3. Discussion. Based on the record at trial, we conclude that OCC 

did not get preapproval for charges for “disassembly, reassembly, . . . or 

any other work not directly related to the actual performance of the 

repairs.” Id. Further, there is no question that the record shows that there 

was considerable correspondence between the Pollers and OCC about the 

restoration, including specific approval of engine parts, gas tanks, the 

radiator, and paint. But the question here is a narrow one: Did OCC get 

permission in advance for reassembly, disassembly, and other work not 

related to the restoration of the car? The answer to this narrow question 

is no and, as a result, a violation of the statute occurred. 

E. Violation of Iowa Code Section 537B.6(6) (Unauthorized 

Repairs). 

1. Position of the Pollers. Iowa Code section 537B.6(6) provides that 

it is a deceptive act or practice for a supplier to “[c]harge for any repair or 

service which has not been authorized by the consumer.” The Pollers 

claim that OCC engaged in unauthorized repairs by marking up the cost 

of materials they obtained for the restoration project by thirty percent 

before billing the Pollers. They further claim that OCC charged for shop 
33 

supplies and disposal of hazardous material. The Pollers also claim that 

OCC performed a “show quality” restoration and that such services 

involved extra work and charges. Finally, the Pollers assert that they never 

agreed to storage charges assessed by OCC after the billing dispute arose. 

2. Position of OCC. OCC generally asserts that the record shows the 

Pollers approved “numerous modifications and change orders to the 

original scope defined in December [of] 2013.” Therefore, OCC generally 

claims that all of the charges on its invoices were “authorized.” 

On the specific claim that the thirty percent markup of materials 

violated the MVSTPA, OCC notes that it told the Pollers that it would 

charge “$65.00 per hour plus materials” for the restoration work. This 

statement, according to OCC, did not bind it to charge for materials at 

wholesale cost. Further, OCC points out, both Linn and Torrence testified 

that such markups were customary in the automobile industry for sellers 

who purchase parts at wholesale. OCC also notes that it did not hide the 

practice of marking up supplies and parts. Specifically, in an email sent 

to the Pollers on August 1, 2014, OCC noted it had found a new core and 

rebuilt radiator for “$2080 and we will not be marking it up for you.” 

On the issue of “show quality,” OCC notes that Denny Linn testified 

that show quality is the only kind of service performed by OCC. Further, 

OCC points to an August 21, 2014 email from Linn to the Pollers noting 

that the “[f]ront fenders have been color sanded and buffed. Again, it takes 

a lot of time, but show quality when finished.” Further, OCC notes that 

whenever OCC presented the Pollers with a choice between a cheaper or 

higher quality item, the Pollers always chose the more expensive item. In 

any event, OCC argues that Iowa Code section 537B.6(6) requires only that 

“repairs or service” be authorized and that whether or not a restoration is 

“show quality” is simply not relevant. 
34 

3. Discussion. We begin with consideration of the lawfulness of the 

thirty percent markup by OCC. Here, OCC made it clear to the Pollers 

that it would be billing them based on labor charges and “materials.” 

There is nothing in the record to suggest that OCC said anything about 

the method that OCC would use to price the materials. An automobile 

repair service is ordinarily in the business of selling parts to consumers, 

as well as providing services. The notion that a supplier would markup 

materials provided to the consumer is not a surprising notion and appears 

to be a standard practice in the automobile restoration industry. If the 

Pollers were concerned about the pricing of materials, they could have 

simply asked how charges for materials would be calculated. Under the 

facts and circumstances presented here, we decline to find a violation of 

Iowa Code section 537B.6(6) based on the thirty percent markup.2

On the question of charges for shop supplies and disposal of 

hazardous materials, we also do not find a violation of the statute. The 

Pollers failed to show at trial that the shop supplies and disposal of 

hazardous waste charges were not tied to the actual performance of 

repairs. As a result, since the general restoration was authorized and the 

Pollers have not shown that the charges for shop supplies and disposition 

of hazardous materials was not directly related to the authorized 

restoration project, we decline to find a deceptive act or practice under the 

MVSTPA. 

The Pollers finally claim that they did not realize that the services 

would produce a “show quality” vehicle. We think that the Pollers’ claim 

fails on the record presented. The evidence shows that OCC only 

 

2Our ruling here demonstrates the importance of the requirements of Iowa Code 

section 537B.3 at the beginning of the transaction which help ensure that the consumer 

and the supplier understand the nature of the costs and the limits of the transaction. 
35 

performed “show quality” restorations and the Pollers, who were in the 

shop itself in December 2013, had an opportunity to view the work being 

performed there. The expenses that the Pollers point to as being 

unauthorized show quality relate largely to the painting of the vehicle. But 

when Linn in the August 21, 2014 email relating to the painting of a fender 

specifically mentioned “show quality,” there was no objection from the 

Pollers. We decline to find a deceptive practice related to the restoration 

of the car based on “show quality” under the record developed in this case. 

Finally, there is the issue of storage costs. These arise not from the 

restoration project itself but arise out of an artisan lien apparently 

asserted by OCC under Iowa Code section 577.1. We do not regard these 

charges as arising from the restoration itself but rather from a subsequent 

payment dispute. We do not find a violation of the MVSTPA as the charge 

is not related to the repair or restoration but to the subsequent legal battle 

between OCC and the Pollers over the payment of bills. In any event, the 

Pollers have not been damaged, as they have not paid the storage charges. 

As will be seen below, because we conclude that the Pollers do not owe any 

further amounts to OCC, OCC is not entitled to its lien and is not entitled 

to receive storage charges arising from it. 

F. Violation of Iowa Code Section 537B.6(12) (Materially and 

Intentionally Mislead as to the Cost of Repairs). Iowa Code section 

537B.6(12) prohibits a supplier from “[m]aterially and intentionally 

understat[ing] or misstat[ing] the estimated cost of the repairs.” Because 

the district court’s finding that OCC did not provide the Pollers with a 

$45,000 estimate is supported by substantial evidence, we decline on 

appeal to find a violation of this provision of the MVSTPA. 

G. Summary. We find that OCC violated Iowa Code section 537B.3 

by failing to inform the Pollers of the right to an estimate and section 
36 

537B.6 by failing to obtain preapproval of charges related to disassembly 

and reassembly. We reject the balance of the Pollers’ MVSTPA claims. 

VI. Impact of MVSTPA Violations on Enforceability of OCC’s 

Breach of Contract Counterclaim. 

A. Overview. We now turn to the question of whether the MVSTPA 

violations affect the enforceability of OCC’s contract with the Pollers. The 

district court found a contract existed based on the terms of the 

November 6, 2013 email stating that charges for the project would be $65 

an hour plus materials. The Pollers raise a number of issues related to 

formation of the alleged contract.3 In addition, the Pollers claim that 

because the contract was formed in violation of the provisions of the 

MVSTPA, OCC may not enforce the illegal contract. Because it is 

dispositive, we focus on the enforceability of the contract in light of the 

violations of the MVSTPA.

B. Positions of the Parties. 

1. Position of the Pollers. The Pollers claim that OCC cannot 

succeed on a breach of contract claim because “[i]t is illogical and against 

clear public policy to allow OCC to collect for monies it attempted to earn 

in violation of a consumer protection statute.” The Pollers note that under 

Iowa law, contracts made in contravention of a statute are void and 

unenforceable. Bank of the W. v. Kline, 782 N.W.2d 453, 462–63 (Iowa 

 

3The Pollers claim that OCC breached the contract with the Pollers when it failed 

to provide monthly invoices. Further, the Pollers claim there was no meeting of the minds 

regarding the work to be done as the Pollers did not agree to “show quality” of the 

restoration effort and to other aspects of OCC’s billings. Finally, the Pollers claim OCC 

represented that the cost of completion should be no more than $45,000 and, in any 

event, they certainly were not notified that their bill would be in excess of $100,000. 

Based on our review of the record, and our deference to the findings and credibility 

determinations of the district court, we conclude that the Pollers at trial failed to show 

that the monthly invoices were part of a bargained-for contract, that the parties failed to 

agree on the issue of “show quality,” and that OCC promised that the cost of the project 

would not exceed $45,000. As a result, the Pollers’ breach of contract claim fails. 
37 

2010) (holding that violations of Equal Credit Opportunity Act render void 

any obligations made in contravention of the act); Milholin v. Vorhies, 320 

N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1982) (en banc) (holding that a violation of rules of 

the Iowa Real Estate Commission render oral listing agreement invalid). 

The Pollers draw support from the Florida case Osteen v. Morris, 481 

So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). In Osteen, the court 

considered a violation of the right to an estimate under a statute similar 

to Iowa’s MVSTPA. Id. at 1288. The Osteen court concluded that the 

purpose of the statute was “to protect consumers against 

misunderstandings arising from oral estimates of motor vehicle repairs 

and the legal disputes and litigation that result from the ‘fait accompli’ 

nature of claims for repair work already done.” Id. at 1290. The Pollers 

also cite a Wisconsin court of appeals case holding that when a repair shop 

takes money from a consumer after violating the law, in that case repairing 

without authorization from the consumer, then the repair shop is not 

entitled to payment for the repairs. Kaskin, 767 N.W.2d at 403. 

2. Position of OCC. OCC argues that even if it violated chapter 

537B, there was still a valid underlying contract. OCC contends that an 

agreement to perform services on a time and materials basis is a valid 

agreement. Welter v. Heer, 181 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Iowa 1970). OCC argues 

that it provided quality restoration work under the contract and that 

expert testimony from the Pollers’ own witness indicated that the final 

product was in excellent condition and the restoration work would have 

cost in excess of $100,000. OCC also argues that unlike some state 

legislatures, Iowa has not created a “strict liability” statute within Iowa 

Code chapter 537B that would prohibit charges for services rendered in 

violation of chapter 537B. OCC argues that the legislative intent, 
38 

evidenced by not creating a strict liability rule, indicates that the Pollers’ 

public policy argument is not valid. 

OCC notes that one of the Pollers’ main arguments under chapter 

537B is that they were not provided with an estimate, which would have 

given them an option to put a cap on the project’s expenses. But, OCC 

argues that the Pollers had the chance to opt out of the contract after the 

$45,000 expended that they alleged was their cap because in August 2014, 

the Pollers received invoices totaling $49,560.27 and at the time of 

receiving the invoices, also received an email from Denny offering the 

Pollers to set aside their Chevy in a warehouse if the Pollers were not happy 

with the arrangement. 

3. Discussion. There are a number of cases from other jurisdictions 

that provide that where a supplier does not provide a written estimate, the 

underlying contract is not enforceable. Many of the cases, however, 

involve statutes that directly answer the difficult question of what to do 

when a supplier provides quality work but did not provide an estimate 

required by law. 

For instance in Webb v. Ray, a state of Washington appellate court 

considered a case where the statute provided that “[t]he repairman may 

not charge for work done or parts supplied which are not a part of the 

written price estimate.” 688 P.2d at 536. The Webb court concluded that 

because there was no written estimate, the repairer was not entitled to 

enforce the underlying contract. Id. at 537. Similarly, in I-5 Truck Sales 

& Serv. Co. v. Underwood, the court held that where no written estimate 

was given, the contract could not be enforced. 645 P.2d 716, 720 (Wash. 

Ct. App. 1982). 

A California appellate court took a similar path in Schreiber v. 

Kelsey, 133 Cal. Rptr. 508. In Schreiber, the statute provided that “The 
39 

automotive repair dealer shall give to the customer a written estimated 

price for labor and parts necessary for a specific job and shall not charge 

for work done or parts supplied in excess of the estimated price.” Id. at 

509 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 9884.9 (1973)). The Schreiber court 

concluded that the “section bars recovery . . . done in the absence of a 

written estimated price for labor and parts.” Id. Further, the court in 

Schreiber held that subsequent oral authorizations were not enforceable 

in light of the lack of the written estimate required by statute. Id. The 

Schreiber court noted that if subsequent oral authorization were 

permitted, the statute could be easily avoided in every case. Id. 

A third case of interest is Brooks v. R.A. Clark’s Garage, Inc., 378 

A.2d 1144 (N.H. 1977). In Brooks, the statute declared: 

Every repairman who agrees to perform any repair on a 

customer’s motor vehicle shall give to such customer a written 

estimated price for labor and parts necessary for such repair. 

No work shall be done and no charges shall accrue before 

authorization to proceed is obtained from the customer. 

Id. at 771 (omission in original) (quoting N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 269:8 

(Supp. 1975)). The Brooks court held that where a repairer entered into 

an illegal contract by not providing a written estimate, the party could not 

recover on principles of contract or quasi-contract. Id. at 771–72. 

The Iowa version of the MVSPTA does not provide express 

instruction of whether a contract entered in violation of section 3 may be 

enforced. To that extent, our situation is somewhat different from the 

situations in Webb, I-5 Truck Sales, Schreiber, and Brooks. But there is 

authority for the proposition that express statutory language of the 

unenforceability of an illegally formed contract is not required. 

In Huffmaster v. Robinson, the court considered a case where a 

written estimate of price was not provided. 534 A.2d 435, 437 (N.J. Super. 
40 

Ct. Law Div. 1986). Although the New Jersey statute was silent on the 

effect of the omission on the underlying contract, the New Jersey court 

concluded that the act “must be read as depriving a technically violating 

repairman of any enforcement capacity.” Id. at 439. Otherwise, declared 

the New Jersey court, “the act would make no sense.” Id. 

The same type of reasoning was employed in Osteen v. Morris, 481 

So. 2d 1287. In Osteen, a customer orally authorized a repair but the 

statute required a written estimate or a written notice of the right to a 

written repair estimate. Id. at 1288. The Osteen court held the contract 

was not enforceable. Id. at 1290. According to the Osteen court, “if the 

customer is held legally liable when the shop has disregarded the 

provisions of the statute, the shop could effectively disregard the intention 

of the legislature as evidenced by the provisions of this act.” Id. at 1289. 

The result in the above cases has not been without controversy. For 

instance, in the state of Washington, the legislature amended the statute 

after the Webb and I-5 Interstate cases to permit the supplier to recover 

the reasonable value for work performed and parts supplied. Clark v. 

Luepke, 809 P.2d 752, 754–55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). In another case, a 

Maryland appellate court held that a failure to give notice of customer 

rights did not excuse the customer from paying for services rendered which 

were necessary and furnished at a reasonable cost. Rogers Refrigeration 

Co. v. Pulliam’s Garage, Inc., 505 A.2d 878, 884 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 

The precise question here on the breach of contract claim, then, is 

not whether the Pollers suffered an ascertainable loss under the MVSTPA, 

but is whether a contract which is illegally formed may be enforced by 

OCC. While the court of appeals conflated these two issues, they are 

separate and distinct. 
41 

On the separate and distinct issue of whether OCC may enforce the 

illegally formed contract in violation of Iowa Code section 537B.3, we think 

the better view is that the illegal contract cannot be enforced. Otherwise, 

as suggested by Huffmaster and Osteen, the salutary terms of the statute 

would not be enforceable and could easily be evaded. The salutary 

purpose of the statute, namely, to clearly establish and document likely 

expenses in the auto repair business, would be severely undermined by a 

contrary rule. Our approach in this case is consistent with other 

commercial cases where we have held that illegal contracts are not 

enforceable. See, e.g., Kline, 782 N.W.2d at 461 (holding the violation of 

the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was an affirmative defense in an action 

to collect on debt). 

We recognize that our conclusion may yield a degree of unfairness 

to OCC. By all accounts, the work performed on the Pollers’ vehicle was 

excellent. But as noted by the Osteen court, “We do not suggest that the 

result in this case is fair to the shop. We only agree with the trial court 

that this result appears to be mandated in this case by the statute.” 481 

So. 2d at 1290. 

We too agree that in order to give section 3 teeth, a contract formed 

in violation of the provision is not enforceable. As a result, the district 

court erred in awarding OCC damages based on its breach of contract 

claim in this case. 

VII. Remedies Available in Light of Rulings on MVSTPA and 

Breach of Contract Claims. 

A. Overview. In light of our ruling on the contract issue, we now 

consider whether the Pollers are entitled to damages under the MVSTPA. 

The MVSTPA does not have a section on remedies. Instead, violations of 

the MVSTPA are unfair practices under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act. 
42 

See Iowa Code § 714.16(2)(k). Thus, in order to recover damages for 

violations of the MVSTPA, a plaintiff must meet the requirements of the 

Iowa Consumer Fraud Act for damages. 

Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, “ ‘[a]ctual damages’ means all 

compensatory damages proximately caused by the prohibited practice or 

act that are reasonably ascertainable in amount.” Id. § 714H.2(1) (second 

emphasis added). A consumer who suffers actual damages may bring a 

claim under Iowa Code section 714H.5(1). Even if the Pollers have proven 

violations of the MVSTPA, the question arises whether the Pollers have 

made the required damage showing in this case, particularly in light of our 

holding that OCC may not enforce the contract to collect the balance it 

claims the Pollers owe. 

B. Damages: The Issue of Ascertainable Loss. The Pollers claim 

that they have established the requirements for a private cause of action 

under Iowa Code section 714H.5. The Pollers argue that they have 

demonstrated an ascertainable loss in both money and property because 

of OCC’s violations of Iowa Code chapter 537B. 

On the question of ascertainable loss, the Pollers cite the 

Washington cases. In these cases, the Washington courts held that 

contracts formed in violation of MVSTPA-type statutes are unenforceable. 

I-5 Truck Sales & Serv. Co., 645 P.2d at 720; Webb, 688 P.2d at 537. 

Because the Pollers have paid $45,000 under a contract that is invalid, 

the Pollers are seeking a full refund of the amounts they have paid as part 

of the restoration effort. In the alternative, the Pollers seek a credit against 

the balance owed by the Pollers to OCC for unauthorized charges.4

 

4OCC does not directly address the damage issue in its appellate brief. 
43 

We briefly addressed the term “ascertainable loss” in McKee v. Isle 

of Capri Casinos, Inc., 864 N.W.2d 518, 532 (Iowa 2015). In McKee, we 

considered a case where a patron of a casino believed she had won in 

excess of what the rules of the game, which provided contractual rights, 

allowed for. Id. at 520. The claim was based on an alleged breach of 

contract. Id. at 526–32. We determined that the consumer fraud claim 

failed because “[i]f McKee had no contractual right to the bonus, and we 

have already determined she did not, then she could not have suffered an 

ascertainable loss of money or property when she was denied that bonus.” 

Id. at 532. 

Several other jurisdictions provide additional guidance for 

understanding the term “ascertainable loss” in the context of violation of 

a consumer protection statute. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has 

determined that something is ascertainable when it is “capable of being 

discovered, observed or established” and that loss is “synonymous with 

deprivation, detriment and injury.” Hinchliffe v. Am. Motors Corp., 440 

A.2d 810, 814 (Conn. 1981). Therefore, the court determined that 

“[w]henever a consumer has received something other than what he 

bargained for, he has suffered a loss of money or property. That loss is 

ascertainable if it is measurable even though the precise amount of the 

loss is not known.” Id. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has determined 

that an “ascertainable loss” must be “measurable,” Discover Bank v. 

Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 496 (Tenn. 2012), and “have tangible economic 

value.” Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 509–10 

(Tenn. 2012). Another court has stated that “ascertainable loss” is getting 

something less than you bargained for and encompasses more than 

economic harm. Simonsen v. Sandy River Auto, LLC, 413 P.3d 982, 985 

(Or. Ct. App. 2018). 
44 

The Pollers claim that OCC’s violations of section 3 of the MVSTPA 

meant the Pollers did not receive a document indicating the reasonably 

anticipated completion date or allow them to set a budgetary cap on the 

project under subsections 1 and 2 or, in the alternative, they did not 

receive a written estimate, under subsection 3. We have also found that 

certain charges for assembly and disassembly were subject to prior 

approval, which did not occur, in violation of section 6 of the statute. 

While OCC has undoubtedly failed to comply with the provisions of 

the MVSTPA, the Pollers have not demonstrated a reasonably 

ascertainable loss caused by OCC’s failings, particularly in light of our 

holding that OCC cannot seek to enforce the contract to collect the balance 

of the amount it claims the Pollers owe them. The Pollers have paid OCC 

a total of $45,000. The testimony makes it clear that the Pollers in fact 

expected to pay up to $45,000 for the restoration services. In light of our 

holding on the lack of enforceability of the underlying contract, there is no 

showing that they would have paid less than this amount had OCC 

complied with all of the provisions of the MVSTPA. 

We also conclude that the Pollers have no ascertainable loss for the 

violation of Iowa Code section 537B.6(5). While OCC did not obtain 

preapproval for covered charges, the Pollers made no persuasive showing 

that they would not have approved the charges in advance if given the 

opportunity to do so. 

We now address the question of whether the Pollers are entitled to a 

refund of the $45,000 paid to OCC. Although we have found the contract 

illegal and unenforceable, we do not find that the Pollers are entitled to a 

return of their payments to OCC. Such payments were voluntarily made 

and show acquiescence in the underlying violations at least to the extent 

of payments made. Further, the course of conduct in paying three 
45 

additional payments after they received the invoices on August 6 and 

thereafter were clearly relied upon by OCC when it continued to work on 

the car. Under the circumstances, permitting the Pollers to, in effect, 

disown the payments would be inequitable. See Scibek, 770 A.2d at 1250 

(discussing application of estoppel to prevent unjust results in auto repair 

context). Further, while we have concluded that the MVSTPA may be a 

shield to protect a customer from enforcement of an illegal contract, we 

are not prepared under the circumstances here to permit the Pollers to use 

the MVSTPA as a sword when they have no ascertainable loss. Id. at 1249. 

OCC has retained possession of the Pollers’ auto. There might be 

some economic value in being deprived of the use of the auto. The Pollers, 

however, made no showing of such damage at trial. Further, on appeal, 

the Pollers do not argue damages based on the retention of the car. Under 

the circumstances, we see no basis for an award of damages based on the 

lost possession of the vehicle. 

While we decline to award damages to the Pollers for the car, we do 

conclude they are entitled to full possession and ownership of the vehicle. 

While OCC held possession of the car by claiming a lien for unpaid 

charges, we have determined that the charges cannot be enforced. As a 

result, there is no basis for the lien. Therefore, the Pollers are entitled to 

their vehicle. 

C. Exemplary Damages. The Pollers seek exemplary damages 

under Iowa Code section 714H.5(4). They claim that OCC has been in 

business for many years and has a policy of not providing estimates to 

consumers seeking work performed. Such conduct, according to the 

Pollers, demonstrates “willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety 

of another.” OCC did not directly address the issue in its appellate brief. 
46 

We have found that there is no ascertainable loss arising from the 

violations of the MVSTPA in this case. As a result, there are no exemplary 

damages. In any event, the questions of coverage decided in this case are 

questions of first impression in Iowa. We cannot conclude that the actions 

of OCC amount to willful and wanton disregard of the rights of their 

customers sufficient to support an award of exemplary damages. 

D. Injunctive Relief. Under Iowa Code section 714H.5(1), a party 

may seek equitable relief as the court deems necessary to protect the 

public from further violations, including temporary and permanent 

injunctive relief. We see no basis for injunctive relief in this case. The 

restoration project is now complete. We have decided issues of first 

impression in this case. There is no basis to believe that OCC will continue 

the practices that we have found unlawful in this case. 

E. Entitlement to Attorney Fees. Under Iowa Code section 

714H.5(2), attorney fees may be awarded if a person has violated the 

chapter and the consumer “is awarded actual damages.” Here, although 

we have found a violation of the Iowa Code chapter 537B, we have awarded 

no damages. As a result, the Pollers are not entitled to attorney fees in 

this action.

VIII. Conclusion.

For the forgoing reasons, we determine that OCC violated several 

provisions of Iowa Code chapter 537B. As a result, OCC may not seek to 

enforce the terms of a contract that was formed in violation of Iowa law. 

The Pollers, however, did not establish actual damages arising from the 

alleged violations and, as a result, are not entitled to affirmative relief. 

Therefore, the decision of the district court is affirmed in part and 

reversed in part. To the extent the district court held that the Pollers are 

not entitled to recover under their claims, the result is affirmed. The 
47 

judgment in favor of OCC on the counterclaim is reversed. As a result of 

our holdings, OCC has no basis for a possessory lien on the vehicle and 

the Pollers are entitled to possession of it. The matter is remanded to the 

district court with instructions to enter judgment dismissing OCC’s breach 

of contract claim and to enter any such other orders as necessary to 

implement the holdings in this opinion. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.