United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-3548

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Frenchone One Horn, also known as Frenchone Kills In Water

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Western

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 Submitted: October 17, 2022

Filed: March 14, 2023

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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SMITH, Chief Judge.

Frenchone One Horn pleaded guilty to two counts of assault resulting in

serious bodily injury, one count of health care fraud, and one count of obtaining

controlled substances by fraud. One Horn caused multiple persons, including her

daughter and significant other, to inflict serious bodily injury on themselves. In some

instances, she inflicted the injuries herself by using a rock to smash their hands. One
Horn secured their injuries to enable them to obtain pain medication for her use. Their

injuries and the lack of prompt, proper treatment ultimately resulted in amputated

fingers.

The district court1

 sentenced One Horn to 144 months in prison, a 36-month

upward variance. She appeals, challenging the substantive reasonableness of her

sentence. She argues that it resulted from “an unreasonable weighing decision in that

it was unjustified by the record and explanation.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. One Horn

contends that the district court failed to explain the low weight it accorded her

mitigation points and supporting evidence. One Horn also argues that the district

court’s articulated reasons did not warrant an upward variance because the calculated

Guidelines range sufficiently accounted for them.

“We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Petersen, 22 F.4th 805, 807 (8th Cir. 2022). 

“[D]istrict court[s] should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly

calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d

455, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

49 (2007)). The court should then “afford[] both parties an opportunity to argue ‘for

whatever sentence they deem appropriate’”; thereafter, “it ‘should then consider all

of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence

requested by a party.’” Id. at 461 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50). 

A district court abuses its sentencing discretion when it (1) fails to

consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight;

(2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3)

1The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.

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considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors

commits a clear error of judgment. 

Petersen, 22 F.4th at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The district court need

not thoroughly discuss every § 3553(a) factor; rather, a district court must make it

clear on the record that it has considered the factors in making a decision as to the

appropriate sentence.” United States v. Leonard, 785 F.3d 303, 307 (8th Cir. 2015)

(per curiam). And the district court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate

court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Kay, 717 F.3d

659, 663 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).

Within-Guidelines-range sentences may be accorded a presumption of

reasonableness on appeal, but sentences outside the Guidelines range cannot. Gall,

552 U.S. at 51. “Where a sentence is outside the advisory guideline range, we ‘may

consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s

decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.’”

United States v. Lopez, 856 F. App’x 61, 63 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “[T]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have

concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal

of the district court.” United States v. Luleff, 574 F.3d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).

In addition, “[a] district court’s choice to assign relatively greater weight to the

nature and circumstances of the offense than to the mitigating personal characteristics

of the defendant is well within its wide latitude in weighing relevant factors.” United

States v. Farmer, 647 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 2011). But “[w]here the defendant

or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, . . . the

judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments.”

Kay, 717 F.3d at 663.

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The sentencing transcript belies One Horn’s argument that the district court

wrongly weighed the sentencing factors. On this record, we are satisfied that the court

considered her mitigation points and had a reasoned basis for its decision. One Horn’s

assertions that “anyone who would do these acts obviously would not have been in

her right mind” and that “the crimes were triggered by desperate instinct and

addiction, not by sober-minded deliberation,” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2, were

rejected. The district court found that injuring one’s own child is “not so uncommon

as to put [it] outside the bounds of human behavior if a person is functioning in a way

that they know exactly what they’re doing.” R. Doc. 60, at 77:12–14. The court also

noted that One Horn appreciated the nature of her actions because 

[t]he judgments made are too consistent over time, and the nature of the

conduct is too similar and extended temporally to be viewed as . . . the

result of a mental illness or an addiction so deep that the person couldn’t

appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or the seriousness of the

consequences to the victims here. 

Id. at 78:21–79:2.

Further, despite One Horn’s assertions to the contrary, the district court

expressly accounted for her upbringing, prior abuse, and addiction. It stated, “we

can’t overlook the reality that she’s had a very difficult journey in life herself, and

then struggling with the addiction issues,” id. at 80:3–5, but that “[i]t’s not offered

as an excuse for the behavior,” id. at 80:5–6. The district court also noted that the

seriousness of the crime warranted commensurate consequences, “especially when

there’s physical injury to five different victims in the setting of these facts.” Id. at

80:23–24.

One Horn also argues that the district court should have considered her need

for rehabilitation. But the district court addressed this need when imposing a term of

supervised release, stating, “I really do see the term of supervised release as being

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rehabilitative here. . . . [T]he best way to protect the community is to make sure that

you get the help that you need, Ms. One Horn, in terms of rehabilitation.” Id. at 81:7-

14.

Ultimately, the court “assign[ed] relatively greater weight to the nature and

circumstances of the offense,” rather than One Horn’s “mitigating personal

characteristics,” which was “within [the district court’s] wide latitude in weighing

relevant factors.” Farmer, 647 F.3d at 1180. The district court noted the

“extraordinary” nature of One Horn’s assaults and that they are the “real counts here

that are extreme and require punishment.” R. Doc. 60, at 81:18–20. The district court

commented on the “cruel” nature of the conduct and stated that it came “close to the

nature of being offenses which really constitute a form of torture.” Id. at 79:17–19.

The district court also acknowledged the conduct of the dismissed counts in the case. 

The defendant’s egregious acts warranted an above-Guidelines sentence. After

due consideration of the facts and the relevant factors, the resulting sentence was not

substantively unreasonable. In short, “[t]his is not the unusual case when we reverse

a district court’s sentence as substantively unreasonable.” Kay, 717 F.3d at 664

(cleaned up).

Accordingly, we affirm.

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