Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A03-1701-CR-108 | May 31, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mary P. Lake

LaPorte, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jt.

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. MacKenzie

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Martell J. Anderson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 31, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

46A03-1701-CR-108

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior

Court

The Hon. Michael S. Bergerson, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

46D01-1211-MR-545

Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] In November of 2012, Appellant-Defendant Martell Anderson and three others 

participated in the robbery of Gerald Peters. During the robbery, Anderson 

struck Peters several times with a baseball bat, causing serious bodily injuries 

which proved fatal. The State initially charged Anderson with murder, felony 

murder, and Class A felony robbery that resulted in serious bodily injury. 

Ultimately, Anderson pled guilty to Class A felony robbery and agreed to 

cooperate in the prosecution of his codefendants in exchange for the dismissal 

of the murder and felony murder counts. In August of 2016, the trial court 

sentenced Anderson to fifty years of incarceration. In so doing, the trial court 

found that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating. 

Anderson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him 

and that his sentence is inappropriately harsh. Because we disagree with both 

contentions, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 8, 2012, Anderson, along with Mjoseph Basford, Ryan Phelps, 

and Trevon Walker, went to the Michigan City home of sixty-nine-year-old 

Peters with the intent to rob him. Phelps planned to go inside and leave the 

backdoor open for the others to enter and take gold and televisions from Peters. 

Once the quartet was inside, Phelps lured Peters downstairs, where Basford 

struck him with a bottle, knocking him down. While others went upstairs to 

look for items to steal, Anderson stole one of Peters’s credit cards. When Peters 
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appeared to be attempting to get up, Anderson struck him multiple times with a 

baseball bat, causing serious bodily injury to which Peters eventually 

succumbed. Phelps turned on the gas stove in the kitchen in an attempt to blow 

up the house, and the quartet left in Peters’s car. 

[3] On November 8, 2012, the State charged Anderson with murder, felony 

murder, and Class A felony robbery that resulted in serious bodily injury. On 

November 14, 2013, Anderson pled guilty to Class A felony robbery pursuant 

to a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided that, in exchange for 

Anderson cooperating in the prosecution of his three codefendants and pleading 

guilty to Class A felony robbery, the State would dismiss the murder and felony 

murder charges. On December 31, 2015, following a sentencing hearing, the 

trial court rejected the plea agreement. 

[4] On January 20, 2016, the parties submitted a new plea agreement, which the 

trial court accepted. Once the terms of the new agreement were satisfied, the 

trial court held another sentencing hearing on August 17, 2016. The trial court 

found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Anderson was in need of 

correctional and or rehabilitative treatment best provided by commitment to a 

penal facility; (2) Anderson was most responsible for the death of Peters; (3) a 

reduced or suspended sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime 

given Anderson’s responsibility; (4) the victim of the crime was at least sixtyfive years of age; (5) Anderson used more force than necessary to commit Class 

A felony robbery; and (6) the brutality of the injuries, pain, and suffering 

endured by Peters before he died reflect a callous disregard for human life. 
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[5] The court found mitigating factors in Anderson’s age of sixteen at the time of 

the commission of the crime, lack of significant criminal history, guilty plea, 

and cooperation and assistance in the prosecution of his codefendants. The 

trial court additionally found that Anderson received a substantial benefit from 

his plea agreement which dismissed charges of murder and felony murder and 

that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating 

circumstances. The trial court sentenced Anderson to fifty years of 

incarceration, stating in its sentencing order that 

[t]he court finds that the Aggravating circumstances far outweigh 

the Mitigating circumstances and hereby sentences the Defendant 

within the parameters of the Plea Agreement to the Indiana 

Department of Correction for a period of Fifty (50) years; fully 

executed and with none suspended. The Court is not imposing 

the maximum sentence because it disagrees with the decision of 

the Prosecuting Attorney to dismiss the Murder and Felony 

Murder charges; nor does the Court believe that the imposition of 

anything less than the maximum sentence would provide the 

rationale to justify the plea agreement. 

In its simplest terms, the maximum sentence within the

parameters of the Plea Agreement is warranted under the 

circumstances.

Conf. App. Vol. II p. 93. Anderson contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in sentencing him and that his sentence is inappropriately harsh. 

Discussion and Decision
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I. Abuse of Discretion

[6] Under our current sentencing scheme, “the trial court must enter a statement 

including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a 

particular sentence.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), 

modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2008). We review the 

sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if “the 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” 

Id. 

[7] A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at 

all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a 

sentence–including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any–but 

the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that 

“omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 490-91. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for 

resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have 

imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy 

support in the record.” Id. at 491. However, the relative weight or value 

assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been 

found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. There is no 

requirement that a trial court generate a list of aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, only that it state reasonably detailed reasons. Id. at 490. A 

single aggravating factor can support upper-level sentences. See Willey v. State, 
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712, N.E.2d 434, 446 (Ind. 1999) (stating that a single aggravating circumstance 

may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence). Although material 

elements of the crime may not be considered as aggravating factors at 

sentencing, the particularized circumstances of the elements properly may be 

considered as such. See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 598-99 (Ind. 

2007); Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d 376, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

A. Aggravating Circumstances

[8] As previously mentioned, the trial court found the following aggravating 

circumstances: (1) Anderson was in need of correctional and or rehabilitative 

treatment best provided by commitment to a penal facility; (2) Anderson was 

most responsible for the death of Peters; (3) a reduced or suspended sentence 

would depreciate the seriousness of the crime given Anderson’s responsibility; 

(4) the victim of the crime was at least sixty-five years of age; (5) Anderson used 

more force than necessary to commit Class A felony robbery; and (6) the 

brutality of the injuries, pain, and suffering endured by Peters before he died 

reflect a callous disregard for human life. 

[9] Anderson argues that we should “merge” aggravating circumstances (2), (5), 

and (6) because they are all encompassed by Indiana Code section 35-38-1-

7.1(a)(1), which states: “The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the 

victim of an offense was: (A) significant; and (B) greater than the elements 

necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” We find no abuse of 

discretion here. The question of whether Anderson used more force than 

necessary to establish Class A felony robbery is separate from the questions of 
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whether he was primarily responsible for Peters’s death and his callous 

disregard for human life. Put another way, Anderson could easily have 

satisfied the statutory aggravating circumstance of greater force than necessary 

without being the only one who beat Peters with a baseball bat and without the 

beating being so brutal and unnecessary. In any event, even if we were to 

accept Anderson’s invitation to “merge” three of the six aggravating 

circumstances found by the trial court into one, Anderson has not shaken our 

confidence that the trial court’s sentence would be the same, given that “a single 

aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” 

Willey, 712 N.E.2d at 446. 

[10] Anderson also argues that there was no evidence that he was in need of 

correctional or rehabilitative treatment that could best be provided by 

commitment to a penal facility. Anderson himself does not dispute the need for 

commitment to a penal facility, as he himself argued in favor of a thirty-year 

sentence, as opposed to the fifty-year sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Moreover, Anderson’s witness Dr. James Garbarino, Ph.D., testified that he 

had interviewed many men who had committed heinous crimes as teenagers 

who were rehabilitated following lengthy prison sentences. If anything, this 

evidence supports the conclusion that Anderson would likely benefit from a 

lengthy prison sentence. 

B. Mitigating Circumstances

[11] Anderson does not argue that the trial court overlooked any significant 

mitigating circumstances, asserting only the trial court failed to give sufficient 
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weight to his lack of significant criminal history, youth, and guilty plea. 

However, “trial courts no longer have any obligation to weigh aggravating and 

mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence.” Richardson v. 

State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The amount of weight given 

to mitigating factors is thus no longer a cognizable issue on appeal and cannot 

support an abuse of discretion claim. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. 

Anderson has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing him. 

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[12] We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 

the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. 

Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due 

consideration to the trial court’s sentence because of the special expertise of the 

trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an 

authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” 

Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “[W]hether we regard a sentence as appropriate 

at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the 

severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that 

come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 

2008). In addition to the “due consideration” we are required to give to the 

trial court’s sentencing decision, “we understand and recognize the unique 
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perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions.” Rutherford v. State, 

866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). As mentioned, the trial court 

sentenced Anderson to a maximum sentence of fifty years of incarceration for 

Class A felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. 

[13] The nature of Anderson’s offense easily justifies his maximum sentence. 

Anderson was involved in a plan to rob the sixty-nine-year-old Peters, which 

involved luring him down into the basement and repeatedly beating him with a 

baseball bat. When Peters began to get up off the floor following a series of 

beatings, Anderson beat him to death with a baseball bat. In short, the nature 

of Anderson’s offense is that of appallingly senseless violence. Anderson’s 

Class A felony robbery conviction is based on facts that go way beyond the 

typical scenario in which a victim is punched or knocked down and has his or 

her wallet stolen. Anderson and his accomplices had many options for carrying

out the robbery, but instead of breaking in while Peters was not at home, or, 

perhaps, tying him up to prevent his interference, Anderson chose to beat him 

to death. The nature of Anderson’s offense reasonably justifies his enhanced 

sentence. 

[14] Anderson’s character also justifies his enhanced sentence, being that of a highly 

dangerous person who, despite a stable upbringing and virtually no prior history 

of violence, went directly to bludgeoning an elderly man to death with a 

baseball bat during a robbery. Anderson argues that his guilty plea and 

cooperation with authorities are evidence of good character. Considering the 

very substantial benefit Anderson received in exchange for his plea and 
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cooperation, we disagree. The State dismissed murder and felony murder 

charges against Anderson; had Anderson been convicted of either charge, he 

was facing a maximum sentence of sixty-five years of incarceration. See Ind. 

Code §§ 35-50-2-3; 35-42-1-1. At the very least, Anderson lessened his potential 

exposure by the fifteen additional years of incarceration he could have received 

for murder or felony murder. Anderson’s character reasonably justifies his 

enhanced sentence. Anderson has failed to establish that his fifty-year sentence 

for Class A felony robbery is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense 

and his character. 

[15] We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.