UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5088

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ZARQUROUS LEQUIS SANDERS, a/k/a Carwright,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:08-cr-00332-HEH-3)

Submitted: January 25, 2011 Decided: February 11, 2011

Before KING, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael R. Gill, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Zarqurous Lequis Sanders appeals his 137-month prison 

sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to obstruct, delay, 

and affect commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(a) (2006), and bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2, 2113(a) (2006). On appeal, Sanders contends that his 

sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to 

achieve the purposes of sentencing. We affirm.

We review a sentence imposed by the district court

under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this 

review requires us to ensure that the district court committed 

no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating 

the guideline range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). We 

then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence

imposed taking into account the totality of the circumstances, 

including the extent of any variance, but giving due deference 

to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors

justify the extent of the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When 

we review a sentence outside the advisory guideline range —

whether as a product of a departure or a variance — we consider 

whether the district court acted reasonably both with respect to 
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its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the 

extent of the divergence from the range. United States v. 

Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007). 

Sanders agreed to a stipulated statement of facts in 

which he admitted that he committed eight bank robberies. Based 

on the stipulated robberies, the probation officer determined 

the combined offense level was twenty-eight by adding five 

levels for more than five units pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3D1.4 (2008). With a three-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Sanders’s total 

offense level was twenty-five; and with his criminal history 

category IV, his advisory guideline range was 84 to 105 months 

in prison. Neither party objected to the presentence report, 

and the district court adopted its findings and calculations.

The Government moved for an upward departure or 

variance, contending that the advisory guideline range did not 

adequately address Sanders’s conduct or criminal history, and 

his criminal history category should be raised two levels from 

IV to VI resulting in a sentencing range of 110 to 137 months. 

Specifically, the Government asked for a one-level increase to 

account for the uncounted robberies pursuant to USSG § 3D1.4 

cmt. background, and another one-level increase under USSG 

§ 4A1.3(a)(2) because three of Sanders’s six prior felonies were 

not assigned criminal history points and his criminal history 
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category substantially underrepresented the seriousness of his 

criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit other 

crimes. Sanders argued the Government was asking the district 

court to second-guess the Sentencing Commission and the judge 

who gave him a suspended sentence on four of his felonies.

The district court granted the Government’s motion and 

sentenced Sanders at the top of the new range to 137 months in 

prison. The court found that Sanders’s bank robbery spree 

involved eight banks and $151,342, took place in five separate 

states over a thirty-seven day period, and Sanders committed the 

first robbery only six months after being released from prison. 

The court noted commentary accompanying USSG § 3D1.4 provided 

that a departure would be warranted in the unusual case where 

additional offenses resulted in a total of significantly more 

than five units, and the court found that the facts and 

circumstances of this bank robbery spree were atypical.

Moreover, the district court found that the guidelines 

as calculated did significantly underrepresent Sanders’s 

criminal history and likelihood that he would commit other 

crimes. He had six other prior felony convictions, five of 

which were for offenses committed as recently as 2006, but he 

received no criminal history points for three of them. When he 

committed the bank robberies, he was on a suspended sentence, 

and the court found his prior sentences had failed to promote 
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respect for the law, provide for deterrence, or protect the 

community. The court furthermore found the advisory guideline 

range failed to serve the sentencing factors under § 3553(a). 

Based on Sanders’s sustained history of criminal 

activity, the number of convictions for which no criminal points 

were assessed, his likelihood of continuing criminal activity, 

failure of prior periods of incarceration, and the seriousness 

and scope of the series of offenses before the court, the court 

found the advisory guideline range failed to promote respect for 

the law, provide for deterrence, and account for the nature and 

circumstances of the underlying offense. In determining an 

appropriate range and sentence, the court separately reviewed 

the ranges for an offense level twenty-five and criminal history 

category IV and V, and found each to be inadequate. The court 

determined that a range of 110 to 137 months, and a sentence of 

137 months, were each adequate but not longer than necessary to 

achieve the sentencing objectives under § 3553(a).

After reviewing the record and giving due deference to 

the district court’s decision, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion, and Sanders’s sentence is 

both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district 

court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to 

sentence Sanders outside his advisory guideline range, and with 

respect to the extent of its divergence from that range.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED