1

08- 525 0- cv Lynch v. The Ci ty of New York UN ITED STA

TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 009 (A rgue d N ov emb er

18, 200 9 De cid ed D ecem ber 11, 200 9) Do cket No . 08 -5 250 -c v P AT RI CK J. L

YN CH , as Pr es id ent

of th e P atr ol men ’s B ene vo len t A s s oci ati onof th e Cit y of New Yor k, I nc. , P AT R OLMEN ’ S B EN EV O LEN T A S S OCI AT I ON OF T HE C I TY O F N E W Y O RK , I NC .

Plainti ffs-Appella nts,
v. T HE C I TY O F N E W Y O RK , N E W Y O RK C I T Y P OLI CE D EP A R T MEN T , P OLI CE C OM MI S S I ONER R A YMON D W. K

ELLY , of the New York C ity Police De partment, Defenda nts-App ellees
. B ef or e K E AR SE , C AB R ANES , and S T R AU B , Circuit Jud ges . Appea l from a September 30, 2008 order of the United States Distr ict Court for the So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Geo rge B . D ani els , Judge ) denying pla intiffs ’ motion for a preliminary injunc tion. Plaintiffs , who are union representative s of police officers employed by the New Yor k Cit y P ol ice D epar tm ent

(“ NYP D” ), challen ge the c on s ti tu ti on ali ty of an N YP D p ol

icy that requires that a breathalyz er test be administered to every NYPD officer who causes injury or death as a r es ul t o f f

ir in g hi s or her gun . We hol d as follows: (1) the Dis trict Court did not make a “c learly e rroneous assess ment of the evide nce” w hen it found that the primary purpos e of the breathaly zer policy was not the NYPD’s “general interest in crime control” and thus fell under the “specia l needs” doctrine of our Fou rth Am en dm en t j uri spru de nc e; (2 ) th e f a cttha t c rim e c on tro l w a s o ne purpos e—but not the2

prima ry pu rpo se— of t he bre a tha ly ze r po li cy do es n ot b a r th e a pp li ca ti on of t he “sp ec ia l n ee ds” doctrine to the breathaly zer policy ; and (3) based on the record at this stage of the proceedings, the bre a tha ly ze r po li cy

is re a son a bl e u nd erthe thr ee -fa ct or b a la nc in g t estof t he “sp ec ia l n ee ds” doctrine. We conclude , therefore, that the Distr ict Court’s denial of plai ntiffs ’ motion for a preliminary injunc tion was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed. T H O M AS P. P U C C IO (M ich ael T . M ur r ay, on the brief ), New Yor k, N Y, for plainti

ffs-app ellants. J ANE L. G OR DON (M

ich ael A . Car do zo, Corpo r ati onCou ns el of the City of New Y ork, and Edw ard F.X. Hart and Ala n M. Sch les in ger , o f Co un s el, on the brief ), New Yor k, N Y, for defenda nts-ap

pellees
. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : Plaintiffs -appella nts are union repres entatives of police office rs employe d by the NewYork Cit y P ol ice D epar tm ent

(“ NYP D” or

“D epar tm ent ”) . T hey

br ought this act io n i n the U ni te d S tat es Di s tr ict Cou r t f or th e So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Geo rge B . D ani els , Judge ) challe nging the constitutionality of an NYPD policy that requires that a breathalyz er test—which measures the amount of alcohol in the bloodstr eam—be administered to an NYPD officer immediately after he
or s he c aus es in ju ry or

death as a r es ul t o f f

ir in g hi s or her gun . P lai nt

if fs mo vedinth e Di s tr

ict Court to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of the breathaly zer policy , and the District Court denied the motion. Pla intiffs now appe al the de nial of the prelimina ry injunction. W e affirm. BAC KGROUND I n N ov emb er

200 6, u nd er cov er

NYP D o ff

icer s inQu een s , N ew Yo r k, s ho t an d k ill ed a m an
nam ed S ean B ell , p r om pt

in g in te ns e andwid es pr ead c r it ici s m f r om th e pu bl

ic. In the wake of the B ell s ho ot in g, the Co mm is s io ner

of th e NYPD app oi nt ed a c om mi tt ee t o r evi ew the D epar tm ent ’s3

un der cov er

op er ati on s andto mak e r eco mm end ati on s fo r im pr ov eme nt s . T he c om mi tt ee was chaired by Chie f Charles V. C ampisi (“Ca mpisi”), the head of the Internal Affairs B ureau of the NYPD, which is cha rged with investigating police misconduc t. T he c om mi tt ee r eco mm end ed, amo ng o th er thin gs , that

a br eathalyzer

te s t b e adm inis te r ed
to any o ff icer who fi r es hi s or

her weap onandcaus es death o r in ju ry. T he P ol

ice Co mm is s io ner accep te d thi s s ugg es ti onand , inSep te mb er 200 7, p r om ulgat ed I nt er

im Or der 52, whi ch e s tab lis hed the breathaly zer policy

at issue in this action. The breathalyz er policy a pplies when a ny NYPD officer “on or off duty, is involved in a fi r ear ms di s char

ge wi thinNew

Yor k Cit y wh ichr es ul ts inin ju ry t o o r death o f aper s on .” J .A. 50 (I nt er im Or der 52) . T he p ol

icy f ir s t r equ ir es th at s eni or

NYP D o ff

ici als be n ot

if iedof a s ho ot in g, in clu di ng o ff

ici als fr om th e I nt er nal

Af fair s B ur eau. T he p ol

icy thenr equ

ir es th at a“po r tab le br eathalyzer

te s t” be ad mi ni s te r ed “ ina pr iva te s et ti ng” to th e “u ni fo r medmem ber (s ) o f the s er vic e who di s char

geda f ir ear m. ” Id

. at 51. If the portable breathaly zer test yields a readingof bloodalcohol level of 0.08 or greater—the lega l limit for dr iving a n automobile in Ne w York State—the officer in question mus t be transpor ted to an Internal Affairs B ureau testing facility w here he or she will b e gi vena s eco ndte s t o n a m or e accu r ate “I nt ox ily zer ” m achi ne. Id
. Pl ain ti ff s br ought this act io n ag ain s t the Ci ty

of New Yor k, the N YP D, andPo lic e Com mi s s io ner

Raym on d W. Kelly ( collect ive ly, “de fe nd ant s ”) , cl aim in g that th e br eathalyzer

po lic y vio lat es th e F ou r thAme nd men t t o the U ni te d S tat es Con s ti tu ti on . P lai nt if fs mo vedto pr eli mi nar

ily enj oi n the e nf

or cem ent of th e br eathalyzer

po lic y, an d the D is tr

ict Cou r t d eni ed the m ot

io n. Plaintiffs could not, the District Court concluded, demonstrate a like lihood of success on the merits bec aus e t he b r eathalyzer

po lic y withs to odFo ur thAme nd men t s cr ut in y un der th e s o- call ed “ s pec ialIn addition, defendants moved to dismiss the complai nt—or, alternatively, for s ummary 1 ju dgm ent —u nd er Fe der al Rule o f Ci

vil Pr oce du r e 12 (b )( 6) , an d the D is tr ict Cou r t d eni ed defendants’ motions in the s ame ruling in w hich it denie d plaintiffs’ motion f or a preliminary in ju nct io n. We do no t h ave j ur

is di ct io n t o r evi ew the d eni al o f d ef end ant s ’ m ot

io ns onthis in te rlo cut or

y app eal. See

28 U .S. C. § 1 291 (p r ov

id in g that th e co ur ts of

app eals hav e gen er al appell ate jurisdiction only ove r “final decisions of the district courts ”). 4 nee ds ” do ct r

in e. Se e P all adino v. Cit y o f N .Y. , No. 07 Ci v. 9246, 20 08 WL 45395 03 (S.D.N.Y. Se pt. 30, 2008). Plaintiffs brought this timely interlocutory appe al cha llenging the Distr ict Court’s denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction. See 28 U .S. C. § 1 292 (a) (“ [T ]h e co ur ts of

app eals s hall h ave 1 ju r is di ct io n o f a pp eals fr om . . . [i

]n te rlo cut or

y or der s of

th e di s tr ict cou r ts . . . r ef

us in g . . . injunctions.”). DISCUSSI ON On appea l, plaintiffs argue that the Distr ict Court erred in eval uating pla intiffs ’ motion for a preliminary injunc tion under a “like lihood-of-s ucce ss ” standard, rather than the less rigorous “fairgr ou nd -f or -l it igat io n” s tan dar d. Pl ain ti ff

s als o ar gue th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t ab us ed i ts di s cr et

io n i n denying the preliminary injunc tion beca use, in plaintiffs’ view, the breatha lyze r progr am is not
r eas on abl e un der

th e “s pec ial

nee ds ” do ct r

in e. I. The District Cour t Corr ectly Applied the Likelihood -of- Success Standard We ha ve recogni zed two sepa rate standards f or whether a district court m ay g rant a preliminary injunc tion:

In general, the district court may grant a prelimina ry injunction if the moving party establishes (1) ir reparable ha rm and (2) either (a) a likeli hood of success on the mer it s , o r (b ) s uf fi cien tly s er

io us qu es ti on s goi ng t o the m er it s of it s clai ms to mak e th em f air gr ou ndfo r

lit igat io n, pl us a bal ance of

th e har ds hi ps ti pp in g de cid edly in fa vo r of th e mo vin g pa r ty .5

Plaza Health La bs., Inc. v. Perales

, 8 78 F.2 d 5 77 , 5 80 (2 d C ir. 19 89 ) (c it a ti on om it te d). Ne ve rth el ess, we h ave h eldth at where the moving party see

ks to s tay governmenta l action taken i n the pu blic in terest pursuant to a st atut o ry o r r eg ulat o ry sc he me , the district court

should not apply the less rigorous fair-ground- for- litigation standard and should not grant the injunction unle ss the mo vin g pa r ty

es tab lis hes , al on g wi thir r epar abl e in ju ry, a l ike lih oo d that

he w ill succeed on the me rits of his claim. Id
. (e mp has is add ed) ; accord, e.g. , Al le y ne v. N .Y. St ate Educ . De p’t , 51 6 F .3d96, 101 (2 d Ci r . 20 08)
. Her e, p lai nt

if fs argue th at the “ les s r

igo r ou s fair -g

r ou nd -f or -l it igat io n s tan dar d” s ho ul d ap ply t o thei r motion for

a prelimina ry injunction, whe reas defendants argue that the more rigorous likelihood-ofsuccess s tandard should apply. The District Court applied the like lihood-of-s ucce ss standard, and we agr ee that

th at w as th e co r r ect

s tan dar d t o ap ply inth e cir cum s tan ces pr es ent ed h er e. Fi r s t, as di s cus s ed i n m or e de tail b elo w, the b r eathalyzer pr ogr am qual

if ies as “go ver nm ent al
act io n t akeninth e pu bl

ic i nt er es t, ” Plaza

Health , 878 F.2d at 580, beca use it was designed, among
other thin gs , t o dis cou r age o ff

icer s fr om us in g thei r

fi r ear ms while i nt ox icat ed— whi ch i s pl ain ly a
mat te r of pu bl ic co nce r n. Seco nd , the b r eathalyzer pr ogr am c on s ti tu te s “go ver nm ent act io n t aken

. . . pu r s uan t t o a s tatut or

y or r egulat or y s che me, ” id. , b ecau s e the N YP D Co mm is s io ner pr om ulgat ed I nt er

im Or der 52 u nd er hi s s tatut or

y autho r it y t o r egulat e the p ol

ice f or ce. See N. Y. Cit y Char te r § 43 4 ( pr ov id in g that th e Com mi s s io ner

is th e “chief

exec ut ive of fi cer of th e po lic e force” and “shall ha ve cog nizanc e and c ontrol of the gove rnment, administr ation, disposition and di s cip lin e of

th e de par tm ent , an d o f the p ol ice f or ce o f the d epar tm ent ” an d “s hall b e ch argeab le with and responsible for the exe cution of all laws and the rules and regulations of the department”); see also N. Y. Ci ty Adm in . Co de § 14- 115 (p r ov id in g that th e Com mi s s io ner

has br oaddi s cr et

io n o ver the di sci pl in e o f th e p ol ic e f orc e) . A cc ord in gl y, the Di stri ctC ou rt c orre ctly he ld tha t pl a in ti ffs mu st6

dem on s tr ate a “li kel

ih oo d o f s ucc es s onth e me r it s ” inor der

to s ecu r e a pr eli mi nar

y in ju nct io n i n this act io n. Plaza Health , 87 8 F .2dat 5 80. II. The District Cour t’s Denial of th e Prelim inary Injunct ion Was Not an Abuse of Discretion We r evi ew the d eni al o f apr eli mi nar y in ju nct io n f or abu s e of di s cr et io n. See, e.g. , Al

le y ne , 51 6 F.3d at 100. A di str

ict court has abused its dis cretion if it has (1) “based its ruling on an e rroneous view of the law,” (2) made a “c learly e rroneous assess ment of the evidenc e,” or (3) “rendered a dec is io n that

cann ot be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” Sims v. Blot , 53 4 F .3d 117 , 13 2 ( 2d Cir . 20 08) (i nt er nal

qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ; cf . Un it ed Stat es v. H asa n , No. 08-4921-cr, — F.3d —, 2009 WL 3737521, a t *4-5 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 200 9) (explaining “abuse of discretion”). The parties do not dis pute that, assuming the breathalyz er program violates the Fourth Ame nd men t, pl ain ti ff

s hav e de mo ns tr ate d “i r r epar abl e har m. ” See, e.g. , Covino v. Patrissi , 96 7 F .2d73, 77 ( 2d Cir . 19 92) (c on clu di ng that a po s s ib le d epr

iva ti onof con s ti tu ti on al r

igh ts s uf fi cien tly dem on s tr ate d a l

ike lih oo d o f i r r epar abl e har m) . I t i s als o u nco nt es te d that th e br eathalyzer

te s ts at iss ue here constitute “searches” and a re therefore s ubject to the strictur es of the Four th Ame nd men t. See, e.g. , Sk inne r v . Ry . Labo r E xe cut

iv es ’ A ss ’n , 489 U.S. 6 02, 616-17 (1989). The principal question, therefore, is whether plaintiffs have demonstr ated a “likel ihood of

s ucc es s onth e me r

it s .” Plaza

Health , 878 F.2d at 580. That question, in tur n, depends on whethe r,
onthis r eco r d, th e br eathalyzer pr ogr am i s no t “ r eas on abl e” u nd er th e F ou r thAme nd men t. “T he F ou r thAme nd men t r equ ir es th at s ear che s ands eizu r es be r eas on abl e,” anda “s ear ch
or s eizu r e is or di nar

ily un r eas on abl e inth e abs enc e of in di vid ual izeds us pi cio n o f wr on gdo in g.” City

o f I ndian apo lis v. Edmo nd

, 53 1 U. S. 3 2, 3 7 (

200 0) . N ever th eles s , the S up r eme Cou r t h as “up hel d

ce rta in re gi me s of su spi ci on le ss sea rc he s wh er e t he pro gra m w a s de sig ne d to serve spe ci a l n ee ds, bey on d the n or mal

nee d f or law e nf or cem ent .” Id

. (i nt er nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ; see also United7

States v. Amerson , 483 F.3d 73, 80-81 (2d C ir. 2007) (summ arizing the rec ent case law of the Supreme Court and this Circuit addressing the “special ne eds” doctrine). A “program” or “gene ral scheme” of searches qualifie s for treatment under the special ne eds do ct rin e o nl y i f th e p rog ra m’ s “p rim a ry pu rpo se” is not

a “ge ner al i nt er es t i n cr

im e co nt r ol .” Edmo nd , 53 1 U. S. a t 3 8, 4 6, 4 8; accord Ferg uson v. City of Charleston , 532 U.S. 6 7, 83-84 (2001) (holding that the special ne eds doctrine does not apply to searches whose “immedia te objective ” is “to gen er ate evi den ce for law enforcement purposes ”) ; Nicholas v. Goo rd

, 43 0 F .3d652 , 66 3 (

2d Cir . 20 05) (clarifying that the “ special ne eds” doctrine applie s only when the “sea rches ser ve as their immediate purpos e an obje ctive distinct from the or dinary evi dence gathering a ss ociate d with crime investigation”). T hu s , inor der

to det er mi ne whether

th e s pec ial

nee ds do ct r

in e app lie s , a co ur t m us t c on du ct “anin quir y in to pu r po s e at

th e pr ogr amm ati c lev el. ” Edmo nd , 53 1 U. S. a t 4 6. I n “‘ or di nar y, probable ca use Four th Amendment ana lysis,’” a court does not investigate the purpose behind a search, as an “indi vidual officer’s subjective intentions are irreleva nt to the [s earch’s] Fourth Ame nd men t v ali di ty .” Id

. at 4 5 ( qu ot

in g Whren v. Uni

ted States, 517 U.S. 8 06, 813 (1996)). But in the context of the “specia l needs” doctrine, a court mus t consider the “programmatic purpose” of the searches at issue, applying the “ special ne eds” doctrine only if the primary programmatic purpose of th e s ear che s is un r elat ed t o the g ov er nm ent ’s gen er al i nt er es t i n cr im e co nt r ol
. Id

. at 4 6. If the court makes such a finding—that is, if the court finds that the primary purpos e of a pro gra m o f se a rc he s is a “sp ec ia l n ee d” a nd no t a ge ne ra l i nte re st i n c rim e c on tro l— the co urtmu st then conduct a “context-specific inquiry” i nto the “reasonablene ss ” of the program, weighing “‘the

s pec ial nee d . . . a gain s t the p r

iva cy in te r es t ad

van ced .’” Amerson , 48 3 F .3dat 8 3 ( qu ot in g Ca ssidy v. Che rt o ff , 471 F.3d 67, 75 (2d C ir. 2006)). That task is acc omplished by means of a “ba lanci ng test”I nt er im Or der 52, th e or der

th at c r eat ed the b r eathalyzer pr ogr am, def

in es th e pr ogr am’ s 2 pu rpo se a s fol lo ws: To ensur e the highe st levels of integrity at the scene of police i nvolved firearms di s char ges whi ch r es ul t i n i nj ur

y t o o r death o f aper s on , o n o r

of f d ut y, wi thinNew Yor k Cit y. J .A. 50. Evi den ce inth e r eco r d cas ts lig ht onth e me ani ng o f that

lan gua ge an d p r ov

id es addit io nal pu r po s es fo r

th e br eathalyzer

pr ogr am. 8 th at i s “ba s ed o n anexam in ati onof th r ee f act or s : ‘( 1) th e natur e of

th e pr iva cy in te r es t i nv ol

ved ; ( 2) the charac ter and degree of the gov ernmental intrusion; and (3) the nature and immedia cy of the gov er nm ent ’s nee ds , an d the e ff icac y of it s po lic y inadd r es s in g tho s e ne eds .’” Id
. at 83-84 (quoting Cass idy , 47 1 F .3dat 7 5) ; see also I llinois v. Lidster

, 54 0 U. S. 4 19, 427 (2 004

). T he p r ogr am o f s ear che s pas s es con s ti tu ti on al m us te r if it is “r eas on abl e” u nd er

th at thr ee- fa ct or

bal anci ng t es t. Amerson , 48 3 F. 3d at 8 3. A. The District Cour t Pr operly Applied t he Special Needs Doctrine Pl ain ti ff s argue th at the s pec ial

nee ds do ct r

in e s ho ul d n ot

app ly t o the b r eathalyzer

po lic y at iss ue here bec ause the policy ’s primary purpose is f urthering the NYPD’s “general interest in crime
con tr ol .” Edmo nd

, 5 31 U. S. a t 4 8. De fe nd a nts d isp ute tha t c la im a nd a rgu e t ha t th e p rim a ry pu rpo se of th e br eathalyzer

po lic y is un r elat ed t o cr

im e co nt r ol
. T he r eco r d s ho ws th at the b r eathalyzer po lic y has mult

ip le p urpo s es . So me o f the p ol icy’ s purpos es are related to “specia l needs” apa rt f rom the NYPD’s general interest in crime control, but

on e o f it s pu rpo ses i s di re ct ly re la te d to the NY PD’ s rol e a s a n i nv estig a torof c rim es. 2 I n o pp os it

io n t o p lai nt

if fs ’ m ot io n f or a pr eli mi nar

y in ju nct io n, def end ant s s ub mi tt ed evidenc e—most notably an a ffidavit of Campisi, the cha ir of the committee that recommended the br eathalyzer

po lic y—s ho win g that

th e br eathalyzer

po lic y was des ign ed t o ad dr es s s ever al i s s ues
un r elat ed t o cr

im e co nt r ol
. Fi r s t, th e NYPD con du ct s a det ail ed ad mi ni s tr ati ve r evi ew ev ery t

im e an9

officer fir es his or

her gun, and th e br eathalyzer pr ogr am f

acil it ate s th at r evi ew. T o that end , it
ensures that an officer who fires his or her gun while intoxicate d—a cle ar violation of NYPD po lic y—c an b e qu

ick ly dis cip lin ed o r

r emo vedfr om du ty . T hat aim is no t r elat ed t o cr

im e co nt r ol ; it is r elate d to personnel manageme nt. The point is not to pros ecute the offending office rs but to
re mo ve the m fro m d uty

or t o i mp ose on the m i nte rna l, em pl oy me nt- re la te d sa nc ti on s. The breathalyz er program also operates as a deterrent to of ficers who may consider ca rrying their firearms while unde r the influence of alc ohol. The NYPD acknowledge s that s ome of its of fi cer s hav e alc oh ol

pr ob lem s , an d the N YP D r equ ir es it s of fi cer s to tak e pr ecau ti on s to avo id carrying their firearms into of f-duty s ituations in which they may be come intoxic ated. Thus, the br eathalyzer

po lic y is des ign ed t o co nv ey t o N YP D o ff icer s th e me s s age that

alco ho l- r elat ed firearms incidents are like ly to be discovered, providing an extra inc entive to the officers to follow th e NYPD ’s r egulat

io ns r egar di ng f

ir ear ms andalco ho l. H er e agai n, th e NYPD ’s in te r es t i s no t i n crime control but in personnel manage ment; the breathaly zer program, in this r espect, is more
conce rned with encourag

ing officers to f

ollow the NY PD’s int ernal safety polic ies than with pr os ecu ti ng N YP D o ff

icer s who vio lat e t he l aw. I n thi s s ens e, thi s cas e ver y mu ch r es emb les Skinner v. Rai

lway La bor Executives As

sociation , 48 9 U. S. 6 02 (

up ho ldin g drug t es ts of

r ail way emp lo yees im mediat ely f

ollo win g s er

io us tr ainacci den ts inor der to di s cip lin e tho s e em pl oye es involved in the acc ident who ha d tested posit ive for drug us e). Another purpos e of the breathaly zer program—apart from crime control—is promoting the NYP D’ s r epu tat

io n am on g N ew Yo r k Cit

y r es id ent s . T her e is no di s pu te th at the b r eathalyzer pr ogr am w as pu t i n p lace inr es po ns e t o the s ho ot in g of SeanB ell , a wi dely pu bl

ici zed in cid ent

th at gen er ate d cr

it ici s m o f the N YP D b y s om e me mb er s of th e pu bl ic. I n thi s con te xt , the b r eathalyzer program is an effor t to prom ote public c onfidence in the NYPD by showing the public that the10

NYP D t akes s er

io us ly i ts po lic ies r egar di ng alco ho l an d f ir ear ms . M or eov er , wh en anof fi cer fi r es hi s or her gunwhile not

under the influence of a lcohol, a breathaly zer test ass ures the public that the officer was fit for

duty when he or s he chose to fire. Here, the NYPD’s interest is in maintaini ng
s tr on g co mm unit

y r elat io ns , n ot incr im e co nt r ol
. Nev er th eles s , ev en tho ughth e r eco r d s ho ws th at s ever al o f the p urpo s es of th e br eathalyzer pr ogr am ar e un r elat ed t o cr im e co nt r ol , the r eco r d al s o s ho ws th at o ne o f the p r ogr am’ s pu r po s es is di r ect ly r elat ed t o cr

im e co nt r ol . T he N YP D ac kn owl edg es th at i t tr eat s ever y s ho ot in g in vo lvi ng a n of fi cer as a po te nt

ial cr im e andth at the b r eathalyzer r es ul ts could be u s ed as evi den ce ina cr im in al inves tigat io n o f the o ff

icer who was te s te d. I n o th er wor ds , t o the e xt ent

th at apo lic e of

fi cer commits a crime by firing his or her gun, the NYPD is charged with investigating that crime, a nd the br eathalyzer

pr ogr am i s mea nt

to be o ne i nv es tigat or

y t oo l at th e NYPD ’s di s po s al. There are, therefore, multiple purposes of the breathalyz er policy—some unrelate d to crime

con tr ol andon e di r ect

ly r elat ed t o cr

im e co nt r ol

—an d the c r

it ical qu es ti onindet er mi ni ng whether the special ne eds doctrine applies is whether the NYPD’s general inte rest in crime control is the po li cy ’s “ prima ry pu r po s e.” Edmo nd

, 53 1 U. S. a t 4 8 ( emp has is add ed)
. T he D is tr ict Cou r t c on clu dedth at p lai nt if fs hadfaile d t o s ho w a li kel ih oo d that

th ey co ul d pr ov e t hat th e NYPD ’s gen er al i nt er es t i n cr im e co nt r ol

is th e pr im ary pu r po s e of

th e br eathalyzer po lic y. I n the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s wor ds , “p lai nt

if fs hav e pr of

er r ed n o ev

id enc e that

[I nt er im Or der ] 5 2 is a regulation primarily c oncerned wi th law e nforcement,” nor have pla intiffs “shown that a primary pu r po s e of

th e r egulat

io n i s to gen er ate evi den ce f or pr os ecu ti on .” Pal

ladi no , 20 08 WL

453 950 3, a t *5. W e hold that the District Court did not err in reaching

that conclusion. We a lso hold that, having found that the primary purpose of the br eatha lyze r policy wa s not
cr im e co nt r ol , the D is tr

ict Cou r t c or r ect

ly ap pl iedth e s pec ial

nee ds do ct r

in e t o ev alu ate th e po lic y.11

Here we must clarify one a spect of law surr ounding the “specia l needs” doctrine: the speci al nee ds do ct r in e app lie s to any p r ogr am o f s ear che s who s e “p r im ary pu r po s e” i s a go ver nm ent in te r es t o th er th an cr im e co nt r ol , Edmo nd

, 5 31 U. S. a t 4 6-4 8, a nd the me re fa cttha t c rim e c on tro l i s o ne pu r po s e—b ut

no t the prima ry

purpos e—of a program of searches does not bar the appli cation of the

s pec ial nee ds do ct r

in e. That conclusion, we think, de rives naturally from pr ior case law . For example, in Mi chi ga n Departm ent of State Police v

. Sitz , 49 6 U. S. 4 44 ( 199 0) , the Supreme Court upheld hig hway sobr iety chec kpoints whose primary purpose was “reducing the i mmediate ha zard posed by the presence of dr un k d r ive r s onth e highw ays ,” Edmo nd , 531 U.S. a t 39. We have no doubt, how ever, that ai ding
crim in a l p rose cu ti on s of d run k d riv er s wa s another purpos e of the chec kpoints. It was simply not the che ckp oi nt s ’ prima ry

purpos e. Likewise, in United Sta tes v. M artinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. 5 43 (1976), the Su pr eme Cou r t u ph eldbo r der patr ol che ckp oi nt s who s e pr

im ary pu r po s e was “in te r cep t[ in g] ill egal ali ens ” an d p r om ot

in g “the G ov er nm ent ’s in te r es ts inpo lic in g the N ati on ’s bo r der s ,” Edmo nd , 53 1 U.S . at 37- 38. No nethel es s , ai di ng c r im in al p r os ecu ti on s of

s muggl er s of

ill egal im migr ant s was , we thin k, one pu r po s e of

th e bo ar der

patr ol che ckp oi nt s . I t w as s im ply no t the c hec kp oi nt s ’ prima ry purpos e. And in Cass

idy , t hi s C irc ui t up he ld ba gg a ge scr ee ni ng pro ce du re s wh ose pri ma ry pu rpo se was “to detec t and deter a potentia l ‘transpor tation security incident.’” 471 F.3d at 70. That is not to say, of course, that aiding inve stigations and pros ecutions of would-be terror ists was not o ne pu r po s e of

th e bag gage s cr eenin g pr oce du r es . I t w as s im ply no t the s cr eenin g pr oce du r es ’ prima ry pu r po s e. Thu s, e ve n i f c rim e c on tro l i s one pu r po s e of a pr ogr am o f s ear che s , the p r ogr am m ay nevertheless be reasonable unde r the special nee ds doctrine s o long as crime control is not the program’s pr

imary purpose. As a result, even though the Distr ict Court found that crime controlAn N YP D o ff icer is s ub ject to dr ug o r

alco ho l t es ts at m any dif

fe r ent ti mes inhi s or

her 3 car eer , in clu di ng whenan o ff icer fi r s t e nt er s s er

vic e inth e NYPD as a pr ob ati on ary po lic e of fi cer 12 was one purpose of the breathalyz er policy, the Court correctly applie d the special ne eds doctrine up on fin di ng

tha t c rim e c on tro l w a s no t th e p ol ic y’ s prima ry pu r po s e. B. The Breathalyzer Po licy Is R easonable Under th e “Special Needs” Balancing Tes t After determining that the special ne eds doctrine applies, the nex t st ep of the inquiry is to

assess the reasonablene ss of the breathalyz er policy by weig hing “‘the speci al nee d . . . ag ainst the pr iva cy in te r es t ad

van ced ’” u nd er

a th r ee- fa ct or

bal anci ng t es t. Amerson , 483 F.3d at 83 (quoting Cass idy , 471 F.3d at 75). The District Court declined to conduc t this s tep of the inquiry, expla ining th at i t w ould do s o o nly “[o] n the b as is of a f ully d evel op ed r eco r d at

th e app r op r

iat e t im e.” Pal ladi no , 2008 W L 4539503, a t *5 n.7. Neve rtheless , to determine whethe r the District Court properly denied the motion for a preliminary injunc tion, we c an and should conduc t this s tep of the in quir y. See, e.g. , Shum way v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 11 8 F .3d60, 63 ( 2d Cir . 19 97) (“ I t i s bey on d cav il that an appe llate c ourt may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground appea ring in the record.”). Fi r s t, as to th e “the n atu r e of th e pr iva cy in te r es t i nv ol

ved ,” Cass idy , 471 F.3d at 75, w e note th at N YP D o ff

icer s , li ke all la

w en fo r cem ent

of fi cial s , “h ave a dim inis hedexp ect ati onof pr iva cy” whe n i t c om es to car ryin g an d u s in g f ir ear ms . See Nat ’l T

reasu ry Emplo y ee s U nio n v. V o n Raab , 48 9 U.S. 656, 6 72 (1989) (upholding a drug testing program for employees of the United States Customs Service i n part because “C ustoms employe es . . . who are required to ca rry fir earms in the line of duty . . . hav e a dimini shed expecta tion of privacy in respect to the intrusions occa sioned by a [drug
te s t] ”) . I nd eed , N YP D o ff icer s ar e alr eady

s ub ject to dr ug s cr eenin g as par t o f thei r emp lo yme nt

in the NYPD, and al though breathaly zer testing may be i ntrus ive in some workplac es, the

3and ag ain a t the end of the officer’s pr obationary pe riod; when an office r applies for s pecia lty

as s ign men ts , s uchas an as s ign men t t o the N YP D’ s Or ganizedCr

im e Con tr ol

B ur eau; whe n ther e is a r eas on abl e s us pi cio n that an o ff icer has in ges te d a co nt r olleds ub s tan ce; a ndwhe n anof fi cer has bee n p lace d o n dis cip lin ary pr ob ati onbec aus e he or s he c aus ed i nj ur

y by dr ivi ng amo to r

vehicl e while i nt ox icat ed. NYP D o ff icer s ar e als o s ub ject

to r and om dr ug t es ts th r ougho ut th eir s er vic e in the NYPD. 13 “op er ati on al r eali ti es of

th e wo r kp lace ” f

or NYP D o ff

icer s “r end er

ent ir ely r eas on abl e cer tai n wo r kr elat ed i nt r us io ns by s up er vis or s andco- wor ker s th at m igh t b e vi ewedas un r eas on abl e inother
con te xt s .” Id

. at 6 71 ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d)
. Seco nd , as to “the c har act er anddegr ee o f the g ov er nm ent al i nt r us io n, ” Cass idy , 47 1 F .3dat 75, we note that NYPD officers who dis charge the ir weapons are, unde r s eparate, preexisting NYP D p ol

ici es , al r eady

s ub ject to clo s e s cr ut

in y inth e f

or m o f a n ad mi ni s tr ati

ve i nv es tigat

io n. T hu s , we d o n ot

thin k that

a br eathalyzer

te s t i s an “ un exp ect ed i nt r us io n[ ] o n p r iva cy.” Vo n Raab , 489 U.S . at

672 n. 2; see also Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. a t 559 (upholding highw ay c heckpoints in part beca use motor

ists “are not take n by surpr ise as they know, or may

obtain knowle dge of, the loca tion of the checkpoi nts”). I n addition, the brea thalyz er policy is appli ed uniformly in ever y s ituat io n i n whi ch anNYP D o ff

icer caus es in ju ry by

fi r in g hi s or her gun . As a r es ul t, th e br eathalyzer po lic y does not “carry the grave potentia l for ‘arbitr ary . . . interference with . . . privac y[’] . . . that the Fo ur thAme nd men t w as des ign ed t o p r even t. ” Vo n Raab , 48 9 U. S. a t 6 72 n .2 (qu ot in g Ma rt ine zFuerte , 428 U.S. a t 554). Third, as t o the “the nature a nd immediac y of the government’s needs” and “the efficacy of it s po lic y inadd r es s in g tho s e ne eds ,” Cass idy , 471 F.3d at 75, w e think that the gove rnment’s needs here are mani fest and that the breathalyz er policy straightforwardly addresses those needs. Like the Customs Service employe es in Vo n Raab , N YP D o ff icer s “wh o m ay us e de adly f or ce p lai nly ‘discharge duties fraught with such ris ks of injur y to others that eve n a momentary la pse of attention14

can h ave dis as tr ou s con s equ enc es .’” 489 U.S . at 670 (q uo ti ng Skinner

, 489 U.S. a t 628). Thus , the NY PD’ s re gu la ti on s in vo lv in g a lc oh ol a nd fir ea rms a re vi ta l t o p ub li c sa fe ty , a nd the NY PD h a s a sub sta nti a l i nte re st i n d et ec ti ng a nd di sci pl in in g o ffi ce rs w ho vi ol a te tho se p olic ie s. Th e N Y PD a lso has a s ub s tan ti al i nt er es t i n d et er r in g it s of fi cer s fr om us in g thei r

fi r ear ms while i nt ox icat ed. Cf. Cass idy , 471 F.3d at 70 (upholding bagga ge screening proce dures whose purpose was, in part, to “deter” terroris t attacks). Indeed, the breatha lyze r policy may actua lly promote the purpose of the Fo ur thAme nd men t. As th e Su pr eme Cou r t h as no te d, “en s ur in g agai ns t the c r eat

io n o f thi s dange rous risk will itself f

urther F ourth Amendment values, as the use of deadly force may viola te th e F ou r thAme nd men t i n ce r tai n ci r cum s tan ces .” Vo n Raab , 48 9 U. S. a t 6 71 ( cit in g Tennessee

v. Garner , 47 1 U. S. 1 , 7- 12 ( 198 5) ). B y qu ick ly an d u nequi

vo cally de te r mi ni ng whether alco ho l was involved in a n NYPD officer’s us e of his or her firearm, the breathalyz er policy will assist the NYP D i n dis cip linin g of

fi cer s who us e thei r

fi r ear ms while i nt ox icat ed an d will p r ov id e an i nce nt

ive
to of fi cer s to s to w t hei r

fi r ear ms bef

or e dr in king alc oh ol
. Finally, w e recogniz e that the NYPD’s reputation in the eye s of the public i s directly tied to it s ef fe ct ive nes s as a po lic e f

or ce. See, e.g. , Papp as v

. Gi uli ani , 29 0 F .3d143 , 14 9 (

2d Cir . 20 02) (explaini ng that nega tive “public perception . . . [c an] harm the mission of the Police Depa rtment”); see also Lidster

, 54 0 U. S. a t 4 25 (

no ti ng that

in fo r mat io n v ol un te er ed b y the p ub lic pl ays a “vi tal r ol e in police investigatory work”). Thus, to the extent that the brea thalyz er policy improves the NYPD’s public reputation, it furthers an important governmental interest. In light of each of these factors, we conclude that “‘the specia l need[s]’” asserted by the NYP D o ut

weig h the “ ‘p r iva cy in te r es t ad

van ced ’” b y pl ain ti ff

s . Amerson , 483 F.3d at 83 (quoting Cass idy , 471 F.3d at 75). A ccordingly , we hold tha t, on the record before us, plaintiffs have not dem on s tr ate d a “ lik eli ho odof s ucc es s onth e me r

it s ,” Plaza Health , 878 F.2d at 580, beca use the15

breathaly zer program is r easonable under the Fourth Amendment, ba sed on this r ecord. As a result, the Distr ict Court did not abuse its discr etion in deny ing plai ntiffs ’ motion for a preliminary injunction. CONCLUSI ON I n s um mar

y: (1 ) T he N YP D’ s br eathalyzer po lic y co ns ti tu te s “go ver nm ent al act io n t akeninth e pu bl

ic in te r es t p ur s uan t t o a s tatut or y or r egulat or y s che me, ” an d thu s th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c or r ect

ly ap pl ied the likeli hood-of- success s tandard in eva luating pla intiffs ’ motion for a preliminary injunction. (2) The Dis trict Court did not commit clear error in f inding that the primary purpose of the br eathalyzer

po lic y was no t the N YP D’ s gen er al i nt er es t i n cr im e co ntr ol
. (3 ) The fa cttha t c rim e c on tro l i s o ne pu r po s e—b ut

no t the prima ry

purpos e—of a program of

s ear che s do es no t b ar

th e app lic ati onof

th e s pec ial

nee ds do ct r

in e. T hu s , ev en tho ughth e Di s tr ict Cou r t f ou ndth at c r

im e co nt r ol

was on e pu r po s e of

th e NYPD br eathalyzer

po lic y, the D is tr

ict Court correctly applie d the special ne eds doctrine after finding that crime control was not the pr im ary pu r po s e of

th e po lic y. (4 ) A pp lyi ng the s pec ial

nee ds do ct r

in e’s th r ee- fa ct or

bal anci ng t es t, th e NYPD br eathalyzer program is r easonable under the Fourth Amendment ba sed on the record at this s tage of the pro ce ed in gs. Acc ordingly, the District Court did not err in denying

plaintiffs’ motion f

or a preliminary in ju nc ti on , a nd the Se pte mb er30 , 2 00 8 o rde r of t he Di stri ctC ou rt i s AF F IRME D
.