Page 1 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

DAVID LANDRUM, Oregon State Bar ID Number 955425

Senior Deputy City Attorney

Email: david.landrum@portlandoregon.gov

DANIEL SIMON, OSB No. 124544

Assistant Deputy City Attorney

Email: dan.simon@portlandoregon.gov

Office of City Attorney

1221 SW 4th Avenue, Suite 430

Portland, OR 97204

Telephone: (503) 823-4047

Facsimile: (503) 823-3089

Attorney for Defendants

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

JOSEPH WALSH,

PLAINTIFF,

v.

BRYANT ENGE, CHARLIE HALES, 

CITY OF PORTLAND,

DEFENDANTS.

3:15-cv-01666 SI

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO 

PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE 

CITY’S BRIEF CONCERNING THEIR 

ABILITY/POWER TO EXCLUDE 

CITIZENS FROM PUBLIC BUILDINGS”

Defendants Bryant Enge, Charlie Hales, and the City of Portland respond to plaintiff’s 

“Response to the City’s Brief Concerning Their Ability/Power to Exclude Citizens From Public 

Buildings” (see docket #23) (hereinafter “Response”) as follows:

I. Plaintiff Cannot Show a Justiciable Controversy Because His Complaint Relies on

Contingent or Hypothetical Events

Plaintiff acknowledges that he cannot make a reasonable showing that he will be 

subjected to exclusion in the future. On the third page of the Response, plaintiff states “Will 

there be future confrontations with the city council, not sure—I am not a person who can tell the 

future.” That statement illustrates the fact that plaintiff’s case is premised on unknown future 

events that may or may not occur. To be justiciable, a controversy must involve a dispute based 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 1 of 12
Page 2 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

on present facts rather than on contingent or hypothetical events. Plaintiff must have some 

concrete injury beyond an abstract interest in the correct application of the validity of a law. 

Bricker v. TriMet, 2013 WL 2037123, at *10 (D. Or. May 14, 2013), citing Morgan v. Sisters 

Co. Dist. No. 6, 353 Or. 189, 2013 WL 179480, at *5 (Or. Jan. 17, 2013). A speculative 

contingency is also insufficient to create an existing controversy for purposes of overcoming 

mootness. Bricker v. TriMet, 2013 WL 2037123, at *7 (D. Or. May 14, 2013), citing O’Shea v. 

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). 

The fact that the City uses plaintiff’s prior disruptive acts as the basis for issuing 

exclusions of increasing length has no bearing on whether or not plaintiff’s claim presents a 

justiciable case or controversy before the court. To show that he has standing or that this case 

overcomes mootness under the “cases capable of repetition yet evading review” exception, 

plaintiff must make a reasonable showing that he will be subject to an exclusion in the future. 

Bricker, 2013 WL 2037123, at *5-*6, citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 

(1983). Plaintiff will only be subjected to exclusions if he commits a future violation of the 

City’s Rules of Conduct, i.e., if plaintiff engages in disruptive behavior or fails to obey the 

reasonable directives of a City employee. In other words, plaintiff alone controls whether or not 

he will be excluded from City properties in the future. 

Plaintiff has not been excluded from City Council meetings based on a subjective belief 

that he is “disruptive all the time” (see Response, at p. 3). Indeed, by his own admission plaintiff 

has attended numerous City Council meetings without incident. Id. Plaintiff has only been 

excluded when his communications rose to the level of disruptive behavior, as evidenced by the 

documented incidents where City Council meetings were delayed for lengths of time due to 

plaintiff’s actions. (See docket #19, Enge Declaration, Exhibit J; see also docket #22, Le 

Declaration, Exhibit A). Removing disruptive individuals is within a government official’s 

discretion under the First Amendment. See Kindt v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 67 F.3d 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 2 of 12
Page 3 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

266, 272-73 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Nothing indicates that Kindt was prevented from speaking his 

mind on his chosen topics. Indeed, the Board's members regularly endured Kindt's philippics 

and, essentially, restrained him only when he abandoned all sense of decorum. That is not the 

stuff that First Amendment violations are made of.”). Plaintiff does not dispute that he was 

disruptive during the documented City Council meetings previously submitted as evidence in 

support of the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, nor does plaintiff dispute that he was 

properly excluded from those meetings.

Plaintiff’s pattern of disruptive behavior justifies the length of his exclusion, but plaintiff 

initiated every disruption that required a response from the City defendants. So long as plaintiff 

does not engage in future disruptions, he will not be subjected to future exclusions. Plaintiff 

therefore has not shown a concrete injury that is based on present facts, and his claim is 

nonjusticiable. 

Plaintiff also asserts that the City’s use of exclusions creates a chilling effect on people 

attending a City Council meeting, but offers no support for that assertion. “Allegations of a 

subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a 

threat of specific future harm; the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the 

Constitution do not render advisory opinions.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972), citing 

United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947). Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that his speech has been chilled due to the City’s use of exclusions. 

Finally, plaintiff’s assertion that “the mootness question now offered by the city is also 

complicated due to a recent announcement by a hearing officer for the city that mootness will no 

longer be offered by the city and any case brought to the city’s hearing officer will continue until 

a decision is rendered” carries no weight. Plaintiff’s interpretation of a hearsay statement by a 

City employee is not equivalent to a policy declaration by the City government.

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 3 of 12
Page 4 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

II. The Rights of Freedom of Speech and Freedom to Petition the Government for 

 Redress of Grievances are not Absolute 

Plaintiff’s Response argues that there is no distinction between the First Amendment

right of freedom of speech and the First Amendment right of freedom to petition the government 

for redress of grievances. The two do not guarantee the same rights, though the constitutional 

analysis for both is the same. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S 598, 610 n. 11 (1985) 

(“Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are 

related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis”) (internal citation omitted). 

The right to petition in general guarantees only that individuals have a right to communicate 

directly to government officials, and that individuals have the right of access to the courts to 

redress constitutional violations. Kittay v. Giulani, 112 F.Supp.2d 342, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 

aff’d, 252 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2001), citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). 

Although the right guarantees that plaintiff may speak to government officials, it does not mean 

that plaintiff may unilaterally dictate the terms on which he speaks to government officials, nor 

does it guarantee that plaintiff will be granted a receptive audience. Plaintiff does not have an 

absolute right to attend City Council meetings in person.

The First Amendment’s bar on governmental conduct that would chill an individual does 

not mean that the government has an affirmative obligation to listen or respond to plaintiff’s 

comments at a prescribed time during City Council meetings. Erum v. County of Kauai, 2008 

WL 763231, *5 (D. Haw. 2008), aff’d, 369 F.Appx. 843 (9th Cir., 2010), citing Minn. State Bd. 

For Comm. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). (“Nothing in the First Amendment or in 

this Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition 

require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public 

issues.”). 

In Erum v. County of Kauai, plaintiff Ted Erum sought a temporary restraining order to 

prevent the County of Kauai from removing certain trees after the County’s Arborist Committee 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 4 of 12
Page 5 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

denied Erum’s petition to classify the trees as “exceptional.” 2008 WL 763231, at *1-*2. Erum 

alleged that he was deprived of his First Amendment right to petition the County to address his 

grievances when the Arborist Committee denied his petition, allegedly without considering its 

merits. Id. at *5. The District Court dismissed Erum’s complaint, finding that an individual’s 

First Amendment right to petition the government was not mirrored in a governmental obligation 

to respond to the exercise of that right. Id. The court couched its analysis by stating that “In 

evaluating Erum’s First Amendment claim, this court is only concerned with whether Erum 

exercised his right to petition the County and whether any County official or entity took any 

action that might have chilled Erum’s speech.” Id. Because Erum was allowed to file his 

petition and address the merits of his grievance at a hearing, and because the County had no 

governmental duty to respond to Erum’s petition, the court found that there was no First 

Amendment violation. Id. at *6.

In the current case, plaintiff believes that the First Amendment right to petition the 

government for redress of grievances gives him an absolute right to attend each City Council 

meeting and speak on items on the Communications Agenda or Consent Agenda, and that he 

cannot be barred in any way from speaking at future meetings based on his disruptive conduct at 

past meetings. Although the First Amendment guarantees the rights to free speech and to 

petition the government for redress of grievances, such rights are not absolute, Cornelius v. 

NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985); Heffron v. 

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981).

The Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by 

public bodies making decisions of policy. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 

271, 283 (1984); see also Smith v. Ark. State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979); 

DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because her exclusion from 

the closed meetings did not interfere with DeGrassi's ability to speak out in public or to represent 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 5 of 12
Page 6 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

her constituents, it did not offend the First Amendment”). Plaintiff thus has no constitutional 

right to force the government to listen to his testimony at City Council meetings. Per City Code 

and the Rules of Conduct for City Properties, the City granted citizens a limited privilege to 

testify at City Council meetings so long as their behavior meets the rules of decorum. Plaintiff 

has repeatedly failed to abide by those rules of decorum, leading to plaintiff’s exclusions.

Plaintiff’s exclusion from City Hall means that he cannot be physically present to 

comment on agenda items that the City Council debates during its weekly meetings, but that is a 

permissible exclusion under the First Amendment because it does not bar plaintiff from 

communicating with public officials. Plaintiff’s Response makes no mention of the alternative 

means plaintiff may use to inform himself of City issues and communicate with City Council, 

including:

• Observing live City Council meetings online;

• Providing written testimony to the City Council Clerk prior to the City Council’s meeting

dates;

• Conducting business at City Hall by appointment; or

• Conducting business with City officials at alternative meeting locations.

(See docket #2, Complaint, Attachment #1, p. 2-3, Items 7-8; See also docket #17, Defendants’ 

Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 32-33). Plaintiff is therefore incorrect in asserting that not 

being allowed to be present at City Council meetings is a complete ban on his ability to 

communicate with the government.

III. It is not an Impermissible First Amendment Burden to Restrict Plaintiff’s Ability to 

Appear Before the City Council

Plaintiff asserts a facial challenge against the City’s exclusion policies. For a party to 

succeed in facially challenging a statute, “the challenger must establish that no set of 

circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.

739, 745 (1987). Plaintiff has not made such a showing in this case.

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 6 of 12
Page 7 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

Plaintiff’s argument against the City’s use of exclusions from future City Council 

meetings is summarized on page 3 of his Response: “[T]here must be some disruptive behavior 

during a meeting to even have the authority to throw me out of the meeting. One cannot have a 

disruptive behavior if one is not there.” (See docket #23, Response, at p. 3). Plaintiff thus argues 

that the City has no constitutional authority to exclude him from future meetings despite his past 

history of disruptive behavior and subsequent exclusions. He cites to White v. City of Norwalk, 

900 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1990) and Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 979 (9th Cir. 

2010) to support his theory that the City may only issue exclusions from the disrupted meeting 

and not future meetings. (See docket #23, Response, at pp. 3-4). That generalization is not 

supported by First Amendment jurisprudence. 

To reiterate, City Hall is not a traditional public forum; rather, it is properly classified as 

a limited public forum or designated public forum. (See Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, pp. 18-19). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the government may regulate 

the time, place, and manner of speech in a limited public forum. Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 

629 F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2010). The government does not violate First Amendment speech 

rights when it bars citizens from exchanging views with legislators in formal settings when 

opportunities for informal communications also exist. Minn. State Bd. For Cmty. Colls., 465 

U.S. at 277 n. 4. Hence, exclusion from City Council meetings after the one Plaintiff actually 

disrupts does not run afoul of First Amendment rights because it only bars plaintiff from 

exchanging views with legislators in the formal setting of a City Council meeting. Plaintiff is 

free to provide written testimony, conduct business at City Hall by appointment, or conduct 

business with City officials at alternative meeting locations. Because plaintiff does not have an 

absolute right to speak to the City Council during City Council meetings, it is not 

constitutionally impermissible to restrict his ability to appear at those meetings. (See Sec. I, 

infra.) 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 7 of 12
Page 8 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

Furthermore, there is precedent and authority for excluding plaintiff from future City 

Council meetings. The government has the ability to proactively manage disruptions of 

government business. See Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 810, citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry

Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 52 n. 2. (1983) (“[T]he Government need not wait until 

havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum).” As the City has previously argued, 

exclusion from discrete areas for discrete periods of time is a commonly used security technique

to manage forums. See Bricker v. Tri-Met, 2013 WL 2037123, at *2 (D.Or. 2013); see also City 

of Norwalk, 900 F2d at 1423-24; Mead v. Gordon, 583 F.Supp.2d 1231, 1236-37 (D.Or. 2008); 

Reza v. Pearce, 798 F3d 881, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Exclusions from discrete areas for discrete periods of time reasonably serve the City’s 

demonstrated need to preserve decorum and prevent disruptions to City business. There is no 

requirement that the City use the least restrictive means to further its legitimate interests. See, 

e.g., Mead, 583 F.Supp.2d, at 1239-40 (“Although one might question the necessity of a yearlong exclusion when Mead's actions were not violent and her previous courthouse arrest took 

place two years before and charges were later dropped, the defendants did not have to choose the 

least restrictive means to achieve their ends.”); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 

781, 798 (1989) (holding that the government is not required to use the least restrictive or least 

intrusive means of furthering legitimate interests when establishing time, place and manner 

restrictions). Just as in Mead, the strong possibility of future disruptions based on past behavior 

justifies a lengthy exclusion to prevent an individual from consistently disrupting the ordinary 

flow of government business. 

In this case, the City is faced with an ongoing pattern of apparently intentional 

disruptions that have stalled at least five recorded City Council meetings. Plaintiff does not and 

cannot argue that he is unaware of the Rules of Conduct or the possibility that disruptive 

behavior can lead to an exclusion; by his own admission, he has been excluded three times for 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 8 of 12
Page 9 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

past incidents of disruptive behavior dating back to January 2014. Plaintiff’s 60-day exclusion 

was not issued in a vacuum, but is a response to plaintiff’s repeated disruptions of City Council 

meetings (see docket #19, Enge Declaration, Exhibit E). Plaintiff also has a history of being 

disruptive and combative with the City Council during City Council meetings irrespective of 

whether he was excluded (see docket #20, Wood Declaration, ¶9; docket #21, Chandler 

Declaration, ¶8, docket #18, Moore-Love Declaration ¶5). The City’s use of exclusions is 

designed to prevent these disruptions and preserve a safe and healthy environment for visitors 

and employees of City Properties. (See docket #19, Engle Declaration, Exhibit E). For plaintiff 

to successfully raise a facial challenge to the City’s exclusion policy, he must show that there is 

no circumstance under which the City could legally exclude a person from City Hall. He has not 

made that showing in this case. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Cited Case, Sanchez v. City of Austin, is Distinguishable 

Plaintiff cites to Sanchez v. City of Austin, 774 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 2014), as an example of 

an exclusion policy that a federal appellate court found facially unconstitutional. In Sanchez, 

plaintiffs Rodolfo Sanchez and Kristopher Sleeman participated in the Occupy Wall Street 

protests that took place in a plaza in front of Austin City Hall. Police officers arrested Sanchez 

and Sleeman, and issued both of them a verbal criminal trespass notice excluding Sleeman from 

City Hall for one year and Sanchez for two years. Sanchez, 774 F.3d, at 875. Two days after 

Austin police issued these notices, the City formalized its exclusion policy by committing it to 

writing. Id. at 876. Sanchez and Sleeman filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the City and 

several City officials, alleging that the policy, both facially and as applied, violated the First 

Amendment and due-process rights of Appellants and citizens of Austin who used the plaza as a 

forum for free expression. Id. 

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas found that the policy was a 

content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on protected speech and a traditional public 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 9 of 12
Page 10 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

forum and that the policy failed intermediate scrutiny because it did not leave open adequate 

alternative avenues for communication. Id. at 877. The district court entered judgment for the 

plaintiffs, declaring the policy facially unconstitutional and ordering a permanent injunction 

against its enforcement. Id. The City of Austin did not appeal the district court’s merits ruling, 

and at the appellate level the only issue left for review was whether plaintiffs were entitled to 

attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988. Id. 

The current case is distinguishable because the interior of Portland’s City Hall is not a 

traditional public forum. Sanchez involved the public plaza in front of City Hall, and plaintiff’s 

right to traverse the exterior of City Hall has not been encumbered in this case. In addition, the 

City’s exclusion policy gives plaintiff alternative means of communicating with City officials, as 

well as the right to appeal his exclusion and receive a hearing from the City Auditor’s Hearings 

Office (see docket #19, Enge Declaration, Exhibit E). The exclusion policy had also been 

formalized and in effect prior to the time that it was used to exclude plaintiff from City Hall, 

unlike the policy in Sanchez where the policy was formalized after the plaintiffs had already 

been excluded. The City of Portland established the Rules of Conduct in early 2013, and the 

Rules of Conduct were applied to plaintiff Walsh in 2014 (see docket #19, Enge Declaration, ¶¶ 

6-11). Sanchez is distinguishable because it was decided in a different context and because it 

concerns a public as opposed to limited public forum. 

V. The Court Should Grant the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Deny 

 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff’s claims are not justiciable due mootness and lack of standing, thus the court 

should grant the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s Response acknowledges that 

his claim is based on hypothetical future events that are insufficient to overcome mootness or 

grant plaintiff standing. 

In the alternative, the court should grant the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

because the City’s use of exclusions is permissible under First Amendment jurisprudence. 

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 10 of 12
Page 11 – DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF”

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

Plaintiff does not have an absolute right to testify before the City Council at City Council 

meetings. The City’s exclusion of disruptive individuals from City Council meetings and City 

Hall is a content-neutral, reasonable restriction on speech that is justified by the City’s legitimate 

need to maintain order, decorum and safety in the place where it performs its ordinary business. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he has disrupted past City Council meetings or that the City has the 

authority to remove him from meetings he disrupts. The City’s use of such exclusions is 

designed to prevent future disruptions. The exclusions advise plaintiff of alternative methods of 

communicating with government officials. 

The court should grant the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Dated: November 20, 2015.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Dan Simon

DAVID LANDRUM, OSB # 955425

Senior Deputy City Attorney

DANIEL SIMON, OSB #124544

Assistant Deputy City Attorney 

Telephone: (503) 823-4047

Attorney for Defendants

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 11 of 12
Page 1 – CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

1221 SW 4TH AVENUE, RM 430

PORTLAND, OREGON 97204

(503) 823-4047

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO 

PLAINTIFF’S “RESPONSE TO THE CITY’S BRIEF CONCERNING THEIR 

ABILITY/POWER TO EXCLUDE CITIZENS FROM PUBLIC BUILDINGS” on:

Joseph F. Walsh

7348 SE Division Street

Portland, OR 97206

Plaintiff-Pro Se

on November 20, 2015, by causing a full, true and correct copy thereof, addressed to the lastknown address (or fax number) of said attorney, to be sent by the following method(s):

by mail in a sealed envelope, with postage paid, and deposited with the U.S. Postal 

Service in Portland, Oregon.

by hand delivery.

by email pursuant to LR 5-2(b).

by facsimile transmission.

by email.

/s/ Dan Simon

DAVID LANDRUM, OSB #955425

Senior Deputy City Attorney

DANIEL SIMON, OSB #124544

Assistant Deputy City Attorney 

Telephone: (503) 823-4047

Attorney for Defendants

Case 3:15-cv-01666-SI Document 25 Filed 11/20/15 Page 12 of 12