IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CARRIE MEDINA, 3:15-cv-00232-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CITY OF PORTLAND, a municipal 

corporation; CITY OF GRESHAM, a 

municipal corporation; TRI-COUNTY

METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION 

DISTRICT OF OREGON, a municipal

corporation; OFFICER TAYLOR 

LETSIS, both individually and in

his official capacity as an officer

of the Gresham Police Department; 

UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS NUMBERS 1,

2, AND 3, both individually and in

their official capacities as 

officers of the Portland Police 

Bureau,

Defendants.

ALAN J. GALLOWAY

TIMOTHY M. CUNNINGHAM

Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP

1300 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 2400

Portland, OR 97201-5630

(503) 778-5219

 - OPINION AND ORDER 1

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 1 of 19
CHARLES J. PATERNOSTER

Parsons Farnell & Grein, LLP

1030 S.W. Morrison Street

Portland, OR 97205

(503) 222-1812

Attorneys for Plaintiff

ROBERT S. WAGNER

DAVID C. LEWIS

Miller & Wagner, LLP

2210 N.W. Flanders Street

Portland, OR 97210

(503) 299-6116

Attorneys for Defendants City of Portland, City of

Gresham, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation

District of Oregon, and Officer Taylor Letsis

BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion (#23) to

Dismiss filed by Defendant Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation

District of Oregon (TriMet). The Court heard oral argument on

the Motion on June 19, 2015, and took the matter under advisement

at the conclusion of that hearing. For the reasons that follow,

the Court DENIES TriMet’s Motion.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint

(#1) and documents referenced therein and are assumed to be true

for purposes of this Motion only:

Plaintiff describes herself as a “camera of accountability”

who has reported on the internet about various topics ranging

 - OPINION AND ORDER 2

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 2 of 19
from a bicycle accident to an incident in which a Portland highschool student was pepper-sprayed to the Occupy Portland

protests. 

I. February 12, 2013, Incident

While riding on a bus in downtown Portland on February 12,

2013, Plaintiff observed police arresting an individual “rather

roughly” on a sidewalk. Plaintiff left the bus and began

broadcasting the arrest live over the internet using her

smartphone and Ustream, an online, real-time, video-streaming

application.

When Plaintiff began to broadcast video of the arrest, 

there were police officers on scene and the suspect was already

in custody. One of the officers, Defendant Officer Taylor

Letsis, is an employee of the Gresham Police Department who was

working that day as a member of TriMet’s Transit Police. 

Throughout the time that Plaintiff broadcasted the arrest,

Plaintiff did not interfere with any police activities or cross

any police line. Officer Letsis approached Plaintiff after she

had been broadcasting for nearly four minutes. He asked to see

the video that she had been broadcasting to determine whether it

recorded any evidence of a crime. After Plaintiff initially

declined to show the video to Officer Letsis and explained she

only began broadcasting after the suspect was in custody, Officer

Letsis informed her that permitting him to watch the video was

 - OPINION AND ORDER 3

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 3 of 19
“not a choice” and that Plaintiff could either show the video to

him or he would seize her smartphone. After Plaintiff insisted

she would not show the video to Officer Letsis without a

subpoena, Officer Letsis grabbed the smartphone from Plaintiff’s

hands, which resulted in termination of the live video broadcast. 

After seizing the smartphone, Officer Letsis grabbed

Plaintiff’s wrist and jacket cuff, twisted Plaintiff’s arm, and

instructed Plaintiff to “stop resisting.” Another officer

(Defendant Unknown Officer No. 1) approached Plaintiff and

Officer Letsis. Officer Letsis continued to grip Plaintiff’s arm

for approximately 20 seconds before he released her. 

Because the broadcast had been terminated, the Ustream

application prompted the smartphone user to determine whether to

“archive” the video. Officer Letsis appeared poised to press the

“No” button (which would have resulted in the broadcast being

deleted), but Plaintiff protested. Officer Letsis then archived

the video and followed Plaintiff’s instructions to have it posted

on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube websites.

After the video had been archived on Ustream, Office Letsis

handed the smartphone to Plaintiff and ordered her to show him

the video. Plaintiff located the video on Ustream’s public

website and pressed “play.” Officer Letsis then grabbed the

smartphone again from Plaintiff’s hands. 

 - OPINION AND ORDER 4

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 4 of 19
After Officer Letsis viewed the video for approximately ten

seconds, Plaintiff asked if she was free to leave. Officer

Letsis responded she was not. While still holding Plaintiff’s

smartphone, Officer Letsis told Plaintiff that he could take her

smartphone at any time and warned Plaintiff that her phone could

be seized if she did not comply with future demands by police to

view video.

Officer Letsis then returned the smartphone to Plaintiff and

informed her that she was free to go. Plaintiff recorded a

follow-up segment that spanned approximately four minutes and 48

seconds.

Approximately three days later on February 15, 2013, a local

television station published a report on the incident in which

Gresham police spokesman Claudio Grandjean stated: “[Officer

Letsis] wasn't doing something illegal. Now, was he

inappropriate, or . . . a little rough, or officious or

whatever? We can look at that, but that's not nearly as

important as was he doing something illegal."

On March 5, 2013, Gresham Police Chief Craig Junginger

issued a memorandum to all Gresham police officers at least in

part in response to the February 12, 2013, incident. In the

memorandum he stated he “support[s] the reasonable actions of

officers to seize cell phones when there is probable cause to

believe the recording contains evidence of a crime and there are

 - OPINION AND ORDER 5

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 5 of 19
exigent circumstances to seize the cell phone to prevent the

destruction or loss of the evidence,” but he advised he “highly

discourage[d] the seizing of property, or the arresting of

persons, for simply recording your official actions without your

knowledge.”

II. Organization of the Transit Police

TriMet is a municipal corporation of the State of Oregon

that provides public-transit services in Multnomah, Washington,

and Clackamas Counties. The Transit Police Division is a service

that TriMet provides pursuant to intergovernmental agreements

(IGAs) among TriMet, and the Cities of Portland and Gresham, and

other municipalities.

Pursuant to such IGAs, Transit Police patrols are

administered, coordinated, and directed by the Portland Police

Bureau and staffed by officers from the Portland Police Bureau,

Gresham Police Department, and the other jurisdictions, but the

Transit Police Division Commander is selected jointly by the

Portland Police Bureau and TriMet. Selection and assignment of

officers to the Transit Police is determined jointly by the

participating jurisdictions, TriMet, and the Transit Police

command personnel. 

Officers assigned to the Transit Police are subject to both

the Transit Division’s Standard Operating Procedures and the

General Orders of each officer’s respective jurisdiction. To the

 - OPINION AND ORDER 6

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 6 of 19
extent that a conflict exists between an officer’s General Orders

and the Transit Division Standard Operating Procedures, the

General Orders control.

When TriMet enters into an IGA with a jurisdiction, that

jurisdiction is said to be “an independent contractor for all

purposes under this Agreement,” the officers are said to remain

employees of their respective jurisdictions and are not to be

considered employees or agents of TriMet, and the various

jurisdictions are to be responsible for paying the salaries and

benefits of their officers who are assigned to the Transit

Division. In addition, the officers assigned to the Transit

Division remain subject to the collective-bargaining agreements

of their respective jurisdictions, and the various jurisdictions

remain responsible for disciplining or discharging their

officers.

STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. “The plausibility standard

 - OPINION AND ORDER 7

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 7 of 19
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 546). When a complaint is based on facts that are

“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short

of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement

to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557). See also Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56. The court must

accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe them

in favor of the plaintiff. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 859 (9th

Cir. 2013).

The pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). See also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint also does not

suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further

factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits

attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to

 - OPINION AND ORDER 8

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 8 of 19
judicial notice." Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th

Cir. 2007)(citing Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d

1198, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). A court, however, "may consider a

writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly incorporated

therein if the complaint relies on the document and its

authenticity is unquestioned." Id. (quoting Parrino v. FHP,

Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated in Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676

(9th Cir. 2006)).

DISCUSSION

In her Complaint Plaintiff brings six claims, three of which

name TriMet as a Defendant: Claims Four, Five, and Six. 

Plaintiff brings Claim Four under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

Gresham, Portland, and TriMet maintained official policies

allowing Transit Police officers to seize recording devices

unconstitutionally, failed to train Transit Police officers

regarding the rights guaranteed to the public and media under the

First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

and failed to supervise and to discipline Transit Police officers

for unlawfully interfering with the First Amendment rights of the

public and media, all of which Plaintiff alleges were the “moving

forces” behind Officer Letsis’s alleged violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights during the February 12, 2013, incident.

 - OPINION AND ORDER 9

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 9 of 19
Plaintiff alleges in Claim Five that Portland, Gresham, and

TriMet are liable under the Privacy Protection Act (PPA), 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000aa(b) and 2000aa-6(a)(1) because Officer Letsis, an

employee of Gresham, Portland, and TriMet within the meaning of

the PPA, unlawfully seized and searched materials possessed by a

person for the purpose of dissemination to the public.

In Claim Six Plaintiff brought three counts in which

Plaintiff sought declarations that the actions of Officer Letsis:

(1) violated Article I, Section 9, of the Oregon Constitution; 

(2) violated Article I, Section 8, of the Oregon Constitution;

and (3) constituted a common-law false arrest. Although TriMet

initially moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim Six, counsel for

TriMet withdrew that challenge to Claim Six at oral argument

after Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to dismiss Claim Six, Count

Three (false arrest), and clarified that Counts One and Two of

Claim Six are brought only with respect to the specific conduct

of Officer Letsis and not as a broader challenge to TriMet

policies. Accordingly, on this record the Court denies as moot

Trimet’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s Claim Six and directs Plaintiff

to file an amended complaint no later than August 7, 2015, that

clarifies Counts One and Two consistent with Plaintiff’s

representation at oral argument and that omits her common-law

false-arrest claim.

Accordingly, the Court limits its consideration of TriMet’s

 - OPINION AND ORDER 10

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 10 of 19
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim to Claims Four and

Five.

As to Claim Four, TriMet contends Plaintiff has failed to

show that TriMet was sufficiently involved in Officer Letsis’s

allegedly unlawful actions to give rise to § 1983 liability under

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978). 

As to Claim Five, TriMet contends Plaintiff has not

sufficiently shown that Officer Letsis was an “employee” of

TriMet within the meaning of the PPA. 

I. Claim Four

As noted, in Claim Four Plaintiff brings a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Gresham, Portland, and TriMet are

liable for Officer Letsis’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct

under a Monell theory.

A. Standard

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

“[I]n Monell the Court held that ‘a municipality cannot be

held liable’ solely for the acts of others, e.g., ‘solely because

 - OPINION AND ORDER 11

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 11 of 19
it employs a tortfeasor.’ But the municipality may be held

liable ‘when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . .

inflicts the injury.’” Los Angeles Cnty., California v.

Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010)(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at

691, 694)(emphasis and omissions in original). “Official

municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s

lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices

so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of

law.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). When a

plaintiff alleges a municipality’s policy or custom provides the

basis for § 1983 liability, the municipality will only be liable

when “its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the

constitutional violation.’” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 388 (1989)(quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

326 (1981)). See also Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892,

900 (9th Cir. 2011).

“In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not

to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid

violating citizens' rights may rise to the level of an official

government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at

1359. For a failure-to-train claim to be actionable against a

municipality under § 1983, however, the municipality's failure to

train its employees must constitute “‘deliberate indifference to

the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come

 - OPINION AND ORDER 12

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 12 of 19
into contact.’” Id. (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 389). 

Deliberate indifference is a “‘stringent standard of fault,’”

which, in the context of Monell liability, requires the plaintiff

to demonstrate “city policymakers are on actual or constructive

notice that a particular omission in their training program

causes city employees to violate citizens' constitutional

rights.” Id. at 1360 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan

Cnty., Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). “A pattern

of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is

‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train.” Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520

U.S. at 409). In the absence of “a pattern of similar

constitutional violations,” a municipality is not liable under

Monell for a failure to train unless “the unconstitutional

consequences of failing to train” the employee are “patently

obvious.” Id. at 1361.

B. Analysis

In Claim Four Plaintiff alleges TriMet’s policies and

customs and its failure to train Officer Letsis led to the

alleged constitutional violations. 

TriMet, in turn, contends Plaintiff’s allegations are

insufficient at this early stage of the proceedings to establish

that TriMet’s policies or customs were the moving force behind

Officer Letsis’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct or that

 - OPINION AND ORDER 13

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 13 of 19
TriMet was the organization responsible for training Officer

Letsis with respect to the conduct that involves the

constitutional rights of Plaintiff that were allegedly violated. 

TriMet specifically contends the IGAs on which Plaintiff relied

in her Complaint demonstrate the officers’ jurisdictions retained

control over the training and discipline of their officers who

were assigned to the Transit Division; those officers remained

subject to their respective jurisdictions’ General Orders; and,

therefore, the policies of TriMet could not be the “moving force”

behind Officer Letsis’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct.

Although TriMet is correct that portions of the IGAs suggest

the various jurisdictions are responsible for the training and

discipline of officers assigned to the Transit Division with

respect to the kind of conduct that allegedly violated the

constitutional rights of Plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges and the

IGAs make clear that Transit Division officers are also subject

to the Transit Division Standard Operating Procedures. Thus, for

purposes of assessing the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint

under Rule 12, the Court concludes it is plausible that TriMet

policies and training could have been the moving force behind

Officer Letsis’s alleged constitutional violations. Although

Plaintiff’s ultimate burden to prove a Monell claim is rigorous,

the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations in her Complaint as

true, and, therefore, concludes Plaintiff has sufficiently pled

 - OPINION AND ORDER 14

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 14 of 19
her Claim Four against TriMet under § 1983.

Accordingly, on this record the Court denies TriMet’s Motion

to Dismiss Claim Four.

II. Claim Five

As noted, Plaintiff brings Claim Five against TriMet,

Portland, and Gresham under the PPA contending those entities are

liable for Officer Letsis’s alleged violations of the PPA because

Officer Letsis is an “employee” of TriMet, Portland, and Gresham.

A. Standard

Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, the PPA

provides:

Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for

a government officer or employee, in connection with

the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense,

to search for or seize any work product materials

possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a

purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book,

broadcast, or other similar form of public

communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce.

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a). The PPA provides a civil cause of action

for damages may be brought

against the United States, against a State which has

waived its sovereign immunity under the Constitution to

a claim for damages resulting from a violation of this

chapter, or against any other governmental unit, all of

which shall be liable for violations of this chapter by

their officers or employees while acting within the

scope or under color of their office or employment.

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(1). If a state has not waived its

sovereign immunity, the PPA provides a cause of action may be

 - OPINION AND ORDER 15

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 15 of 19
brought “against an officer or employee of a State who has

violated this chapter while acting within the scope under color

of his office or employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-6(a)(2).

The PPA does not define who qualifies as an “employee” under

the Act. When “a statute does not otherwise define the term

‘employee,’ ‘the term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of

the general common law of agency.’” In re Crystal Cathedral

Ministries, 584 F. App’x 307, 308 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Cmty.

for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741 (1989)). 

The Supreme Court has instructed:

In determining whether a hired party is an employee

under the general common law of agency, we consider the

hiring party's right to control the manner and means by

which the product is accomplished. Among the other

factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill

required; the source of the instrumentalities and

tools; the location of the work; the duration of the

relationship between the parties; whether the hiring

party has the right to assign additional projects to

the hired party; the extent of the hired party's

discretion over when and how long to work; the method

of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying

assistants; whether the work is part of the regular

business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party

is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and

the tax treatment of the hired party. No one of these

factors is determinative.

Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52 (citations omitted). See also JustMed,

Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010). “Because ‘the

common-law test contains no shorthand formula or magic phrase

that can be applied to find the answer, all of the incidents of

the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor

 - OPINION AND ORDER 16

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 16 of 19
being decisive.’” JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1125-26 (quoting

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992)).

B. Analysis

TriMet contends Plaintiff’s Claim Five should be dismissed

because Plaintiff cannot show Officer Letsis was an “employee” of

TriMet within the meaning of the PPA. In support of its

contention TriMet points to several provisions of the IGAs,

including those that state the officer-supplying jurisdictions

are to be treated as “independent contractor[s],” the

jurisdictions remain responsible for payment of wages and

benefits to officers assigned to the Transit Division, the

jurisdictions remain responsible for the discipline of officers

assigned to the Transit Division, and officers assigned to the

Transit Division “remain employees of the City of Gresham and

will not be considered employees or agents of TriMet.” In

addition, TriMet contends the fact that the General Orders of the

officers’ respective jurisdictions prevail over the Transit

Division Standard Operating Procedures establishes that the

various jurisdictions retain the right to control the manner and

means by which the officers conduct their policing duties. Reid,

490 U.S. at 751.

Although TriMet identifies relevant evidence that may

satisfy the Reid test and ultimately lead to a finding that

Officer Letsis was, within the meaning of the PPA, an “employee”

 - OPINION AND ORDER 17

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 17 of 19
of the City of Gresham and not TriMet while he was assigned to

the Transit Division, the Court cannot conclusively make that

finding at this early stage of the proceedings. Although TriMet

also correctly points out that the jurisdictions’ General Orders

prevail over the Transit Division Standard Operating Procedures

in the event of a conflict, there is not any evidence in this

record that shows the degree to which the Transit Division

Standard Operating Procedures govern the means and manner by

which the officers assigned to the Transit Division are to

perform their work, including the policies and practices under

which Officer Letsis was acting at the time he seized Plaintiff’s

smartphone. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation that Officer Letsis was

an “employee” of TriMet within the meaning of the PPA is

sufficiently plausible to entitle Plaintiff to proceed against

TriMet on Claim Five.

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes Plaintiff

has adequately pled a claim against TriMet under the PPA. The

Court, therefore, denies TriMet’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Claim Five.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES TriMet’s Motion (#23) to

Dismiss. The Court directs Plaintiff to file an amended

complaint that omits the false-arrest count in Claim Six and

 - OPINION AND ORDER 18

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 18 of 19
further sets out Counts One and Two in a manner that is

consistent with Plaintiff’s representations at oral argument no

later than August 7, 2015.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 17th day of July, 2015.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

 - OPINION AND ORDER 19

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 32 Filed 07/17/15 Page 19 of 19