Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1710-JT-2492| April 30, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Danielle L. Gregory

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Matter of the 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of M.A., N.A., 

W.A., W.A., (Minor Children),

 and,

R.F. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

 and,

April 30, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1710-JT-2492

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn Moores, 

Judge

The Honorable Scott Stowers, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1607-JT-765

49D09-1607-JT-766

49D09-1607-JT-767

49D09-1607-JT-768
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Child Advocates, Inc.,

Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem.

Barnes, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] R.F. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to M.A., N.A., 

Wh.A., and We.A. (“Children”). We affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient 

to support the termination of her parental rights.

Facts

[3] On July 12, 2011, Mother had her parental rights terminated for six of her 

children. Department of Child Services (“DCS”) had initiated a child in need 

of services (“CHINS”) case after one child who, being only six weeks old, 

suffered non-accidental, life-threatening injuries while in Mother’s care. 

Mother was provided services for two-and-a-half years, but she failed to make 

significant progress.
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[4] Since the termination of Mother’s parental rights for those six children, Mother 

has given birth to four more children, M.A., N.A., Wh.A., and We.A. Around

June 16, 2015, Mother and Children were at a Meijer in Marion County. 

Mother was panhandling for money at the store with the children. Mother 

reported to police that she was being evicted from her home, and she had no 

plan as to what she was going to do. DCS received a report about Mother and 

Children stating that two of the children did not have on shoes and one did not 

have on a shirt. On June 17, 2015, Children were removed from Mother’s care 

due to concerns that Mother was unable to provide for Children’s needs and 

lacked stable housing. On June 18, 2015, DCS filed its CHINS petition 

alleging:

1. [Mother] has failed to provide the children with a safe, stable, and 

appropriate living environment.

2. [Mother] is currently homeless.

3. She lacks the financial means necessary to provide the children with 

basic care and necessities.

4. [Mother] was begging for money outside of a store with the children 

present, and she reported to the police that she had nowhere to go.

5. [Mother] does not have a support system in place, and she has not 

developed a plan to obtain and maintain stable housing.
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6. [Mother] has a history with DCS and was previously offered services 

through a CHINS action.

7. She failed to successfully complete the services to remedy the reasons for 

DCS’s involvement, and her parental rights were terminated as to six of 

her children.

8. I.A. (“Father”) has not demonstrated the ability and willingness to 

appropriately parent the children, and he is unable to ensure their safety 

and well-being while in the care and custody of [Mother].

9. Due to the foregoing reasons, the coercive intervention of the Court is 

necessary to ensure the children’s safety and well-being.

Petitioner’s Ex. 4 at p. 77.

[5] In July 2015, Mother was referred to Alliance for Life for supervised visitation. 

On October 7, 2015, the court held a fact-finding hearing and adjudicated 

Children as CHINS. During a visit on October 10, 2015, Mother was irate and 

acting irrationally. The police had to be called because Mother did not want to 

leave the building. Children were crying and stated that they were afraid. Due 

to Mother’s behavior, Alliance for Life discontinued Mother’s visits. DCS 

requested that Mother’s parenting time be suspended. On November 4, 2015, 

Mother’s parenting time was suspended, and the court entered its dispositional 

decree and parental participation order ordering Mother to participate in 

services including home-based case management; a parenting assessment; 
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random drug screens; a psychological evaluation; a medication management 

evaluation; individual therapy; and follow all recommendations. The court 

authorized Mother’s parenting time to resume upon her participation in 

services.

[6] Mother completed a psychological evaluation which diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and schizophrenia. Based on her 

psychological evaluation, Mother was referred to Cummins Behavioral Health. 

On November 5, 2015, Mother completed an intake assessment at Cummins 

Behavioral Health. Based on the assessment, Mother was recommended to 

participate in medication management, case management, life skills, and homebased therapy. Mother attended about three sessions before her services at 

Cummins Behavioral Health were closed, on January 14, 2016, in order to 

transfer Mother to a community mental health agency. Mother began mental 

health services at Gallahue.

[7] In April 2016, Mother’s supervised visits with Children resumed because she 

had started participating in mental health services at Gallahue. In June 2016, 

Mother’s visitation was suspended again due to behaviors that she displayed 

during a visit. In order for Mother’s visits to resume, Mother had to 

demonstrate she was participating in ongoing mental health treatment and 

obtain recommendations from her providers that visits should resume. On June 

15, 2016, the court changed Children’s permanency plan from reunification to 

adoption due to Mother repeatedly indicating that she would not follow 

recommendations regarding medication to assist her in managing her mental 
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health; exhibiting erratic behaviors around the children and providers; lacking 

stable housing; lacking stable employment income; and Father’s 

noninvolvement with the children since the CHINS action was filed. In fact, 

Father’s parental rights were previously terminated.

[8] During the first year of treatment at Gallahue, Mother did not make any 

improvements. In March 2017, Mother began taking her medication 

consistently and making improvements. However, Mother continued to 

demonstrate “ongoing paranoid thoughts.” Tr. p. 189. In May 2017, Mother 

was referred to home-based therapy. The therapist had been meeting with 

Mother twice a week and helping her with decreasing anxiety and processing 

trauma. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother’s home-based therapist 

was not recommending that Mother resume visitation with Children because 

Mother seamed unstable. The therapist testified that she would have concerns 

if Children were placed back into Mother’s care at that point in time because 

Mother was not mentally stable and she was unsure about whether Mother 

would be able to effectively and safely parent Children. Mother’s visits never 

resumed. 

[9] In June 2015, Wh.A. and We.A. were placed in their current foster home. 

N.A. and M.A. were placed together in a different foster home, but they were 

later moved to their current home where Wh.A. and We.A. are placed. 

Children appear to have bonded with their foster parents and do not ask about 

Mother. The foster parents ensure that Children’s medical, educational, 

emotional, and mental health needs are being met, and they are willing to adopt 
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Children. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had recently moved 

out of a cluster apartment with Gallahue staff and was living with her sister. 

Mother was unemployed, and it was unclear whether the living arrangement 

with her sister was temporary or permanent. On October 5, 2017, the court 

entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Analysis

[10] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to Children. The 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re 

I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010). “A parent’s interest in the care, 

custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the 

fundamental liberty interests.’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 

120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). “Indeed the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the 

most valued relationships in our culture.’” Id. (quoting Neal v. DeKalb County 

Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)). We recognize, of 

course, that parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the 

child’s interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to 

terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when 

the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.’” Id. 

(quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). 

[11] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and 
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reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We must 

also give “due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses. Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Here, the trial 

court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS’s 

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, as required by Indiana Code 

Section 31-35-2-8. When reviewing findings of fact and conclusions thereon 

entered in a case involving a termination of parental rights, we apply a twotiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports 

the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the 

judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly 

erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support 

the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id. 

[12] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the 

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, 

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section 

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship 

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true: 

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal 

or the reasons for placement outside the 

home of the parents will not be remedied. 
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to the well-being of the child. 

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, 

been adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; 

and 

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and 

treatment of the child. 

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Egly v. 

Blackford County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992).

I. Trial Court’s Findings

[13] Mother argues that several of the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. 

She first challenges Finding No. 24, which states: “Home-Based Case 

Management has been referred at least three times. Mother has not successfully 

completed it.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46. Mother is correct that the

evidence indicates that home-based case management has been referred to her 

twice, not at least three times. However, the evidence does support the trial 

court’s conclusion that Mother failed to successfully complete it. We conclude 

that the trial court’s minor error is harmless and does not impact its ultimate 

decision here. 
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[14] Next, Mother challenges Finding No. 26, which provides: “The DCS [Family 

Case Manager] (“FCM”) referred Mother to individual counseling. However, 

she did not complete this service and it was closed unsuccessfully.” Id. The

evidence indicates that the FCM referred Mother to individual counseling once 

and that the referral was not successfully completed. The record supports the 

trial court’s finding, and it is not clearly erroneous.

[15] Mother also challenges Finding No. 28, which states: “Robin Robinson has 

been providing Home Based Therapy to Mother since March 2017. Ms. 

Robinson has noted some progress. However, Ms. Robinson is concerned that 

Mother continues to deny that she has issues. As of two weeks before this 

Termination Trial began, Ms. Robinson was not in agreement with Mother 

receiving parenting time.” Id. The record indicates that Ms. Robinson initially 

believed that she had been providing home-based therapy to Mother since 

March 2017 but later corrected herself by stating that she had been providing 

home-based therapy to Mother since May 2017. The evidence also indicates 

that, as of two weeks before the termination trial, Ms. Robinson was not in 

agreement with Mother receiving parenting time. We conclude that the trial 

court’s minor error is harmless and does not impact its ultimate decision here.

[16] Finally, Mother challenges Finding No. 41, which provides: “Since the 

beginning of the CHINS case, over two years ago, Mother has not 

demonstrated that she is capable of providing the children of a safe and stable 

home, as demonstrated by her behavior during visits with the children.” Id. at 

47. The record indicates that throughout the pendency of this case, Mother has 
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made very little progress with addressing her issues and continues to harbor 

paranoid thoughts. Mother also has had her supervised visits with Children 

terminated (twice) due to her erratic and irrational behavior during visits. 

Mother’s therapist testified that she was unsure about whether Mother would be 

able to effectively and safely parent Children. Furthermore, the record indicates 

that, at the time that Children were placed in foster care, Mother reported that 

she was being evicted from her home and that she had no plan as to what she 

was going to do. Within a few months, Mother was living in a cluster 

apartment with Gallahue staff. A little over one year later, Mother began living 

with her sister. It was unclear whether Mother’s living arrangement with her 

sister was temporary or permanent. This evidence does not demonstrate that 

Mother is capable of providing the children with a safe and stable home. The 

record supports the trial court’s finding, and it is not clearly erroneous.

II. Changed Conditions

[17] Mother challenges the trial court’s finding of a reasonable probability that the 

conditions resulting in Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside 

their home will not be remedied.1 In order to prove this element, DCS must 

 

1 Mother also argues that the trial court’s conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

poses a threat to the well-being of Children is clearly erroneous. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is 

written in the disjunctive. Subsection (b)(2)(B)(iii), which concerns repeated CHINS adjudications, is 

inapplicable here. Consequently, DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a 

reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children. The trial court found a reasonable probability that 

the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal and continued placement outside parents’ home would not 

be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Thus, we 
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establish (1) what conditions led to DCS placing and retaining the children in 

foster care; and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied. In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134. When 

analyzing this issue, courts may consider not only the basis for the initial 

removal of the children, but also reasons for the continued placement of the 

children outside the home thereafter. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. Courts must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or 

her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed circumstances. A.D.S. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The parent’s habitual 

patterns of conduct should be evaluated to determine the probability of future 

neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. Factors to consider include a parent’s 

prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to 

provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Courts 

also may consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s 

responses to those services. Id. DCS is not required to prove a parent has no 

possibility of changing; it need only establish a reasonable probability that no 

change will occur. Id.

[18] On this issue, the trial court concluded:

 

need not determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to Children’s well-being. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake County Office of Family & Children, 

839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
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There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the children’s removal and continued placement outside of the 

home will not be remedied by their mother. Mother has had 

nearly two years to complete services and has not done so. She 

has not demonstrated that she has the appropriate skills to parent 

her children. She has not demonstrated that she has the requisite 

skills to cope with domestic violence. Based on the observations 

of multiple service providers, Mother is unable to safely parent her 

children. As recently as May 19, 2017, during a session with 

Recovery Clinical Leanne Bennett from Gallahue, Mother still 

demonstrated overall paranoid thoughts. Ms. Bennett noted that 

Mother “continues to believe others are trying to trick her or hurt 

her. Believes her latest 4 children were taken by the police for no 

reason, that it was some sort of plot against her.” In a number of 

reports, and as recently as June 19, 2017, Ms. Bennett concludes 

that Mother’s “insight and judgment is poor to fair[.]” On May 

26, 2017, Ms. Bennett noted that Mother’s “. . . judgment is poor 

when understanding her years of involvement with DCS. As 

recently as July 7, 2017, Nurse Practitioner Beth Delambo 

reported that Mother had “ongoing paranoid thoughts, though 

with decreased severity.”

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 47.

[19] On appeal, Mother argues that she has made a significant amount of progress 

and the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal and continued placement 

outside of the home will be remedied by her. DCS presented evidence of the

conditions that led to DCS placing and retaining the children in foster care. On 

June 17, 2015, Children were removed from Mother’s care due to concerns that 

she was unable to provide for their needs and lacked stable housing. Children 

were adjudicated as CHINS and the trial court ordered Mother to complete 

home-based case management, a parenting assessment, random drug screens, a 

psychological evaluation, individual therapy, and a medical management 

evaluation. Children remained in foster care because Mother was making very 
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little progress with addressing her issues, despite the services offered and 

continued to demonstrate ongoing paranoid thoughts. Mother’s behavior also 

continued to be erratic around the children.

[20] DCS also presented evidence that there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied. At the time of the termination hearing, 

Mother was unemployed, and it was unclear whether her living arrangement 

with her sister was temporary or permanent. Mother was also mentally 

unstable and thus unable to continue visitation with Children. In fact, at the 

time of the termination hearing, Mother’s therapist testified that she would have 

concerns if Children were placed back into Mother’s care at that time because 

Mother was not mentally stable and that she was unsure about whether Mother 

would be able to effectively and safely parent Children. 

[21] Mother contends that DCS failed to comply with the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because DCS failed to consider Mother’s mental 

health record prior to refusing requests for parenting and terminating her 

parental rights, and that DCS failed to provide Mother with the services 

necessary to assist with her disability. In accordance with the ADA, no 

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 

program, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any 

such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. When Children were placed in foster care, 

Mother was provided with a psychological evaluation which diagnosed her 

with PTSD and schizophrenia. Mother was then referred to Cummins 
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Behavioral Health to receive help with her PTSD and schizophrenia. Mother 

attended about three sessions before her services were closed in order to transfer 

her to a community mental health agency. While at the community mental 

health agency, Mother failed to make very much progress and continued to act 

erratic during visits with Children, resulting in her loss of visitation with 

Children and part of the reason for the termination of her parental rights. DCS 

did not fail to consider Mother’s mental health record or fail to provide Mother 

with the services that were necessary to assist with her disability and the 

opportunity to get her children back, and thus did comply with the ADA. 

[22] It is well-settled that a parent’s mental illness or disability cannot, standing 

alone, support the termination of parental rights. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 

1140, 1147 (Ind. 2016). However, if such illness or disability causes a parent to 

be unable and unwilling to develop the skills necessary to fulfill his or her legal 

obligations as a parent, parental rights may be terminated. Id. at 1148 (citing 

R.G. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 647 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1995), trans. denied). Here, Mother’s instability still existed at the time of 

the termination hearing and it would have posed a danger to the welfare of the 

children if they were to be returned to her care.

[23] Given Mother’s lack of progress, unemployment, and unstable housing at the 

time of the termination hearing, despite services offered, the trial court’s finding 

of a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s removal 

or the reasons for placement outside their home will not be remedied is not 

clearly erroneous.
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III. Best Interests

[24] Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental 

rights is in Children’s best interest. In determining what is in the best interests 

of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. D.D., 

804 N.E.2d at 267. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of 

the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

[25] Mother concedes that Children need permanency in a stable environment 

where their needs would be met and argues that she has demonstrated that she 

can provide permanency and a stable environment. Throughout the pendency 

of this case, Mother has made very little progress with addressing her issues and 

continues to harbor ongoing paranoid thoughts. Mother has had her supervised 

visits with Children terminated twice due to her erratic and irrational behavior

during visits. At the termination hearing, Mother’s home-based therapist 

testified that she would have concerns if Children were placed back into 

Mother’s care because Mother was not mentally stable and that she was unsure 

about whether Mother would be able to effectively and safely parent Children.

[26] At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was unemployed, and it was 

unclear whether her living arrangement with her sister was temporary or 

permanent. For approximately two years, Children have been living together in 

a foster home with foster parents they appear to have bonded with and do not 

ask about Mother. The foster parents ensure that Children’s medical, 

educational, emotional, and mental health needs are being met, and they are 
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willing to adopt Children. The FCM recommended the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights. The court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) 

opined that it was in Children’s best interests for Mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated and for Children to remain in their current foster home and to be 

adopted by that family. 

[27] Mother has failed to demonstrate that she can provide permanency and a stable 

environment for Children. Termination of Mother’s parental rights will allow 

Children to be adopted into a stable and permanent home where their needs 

will be safely met. We cannot say that the trial court’s finding is clearly 

erroneous.

Conclusion

[28] The evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

to Children. We affirm.

[29] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.