### IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 2 4 WY 16

OCTOBER TERM , A.D. 202 3

February 2 , 2024

RACHEL RODRIGUEZ

- WILLIAMS, House District Representative; CHIP NEIMAN, House District Representative; and RIGHT TO LIFE OF WYOMING, INC.

,
Appellant s (Proposed Intervenors),

v.

DANIELLE JOHNSON; KATHLEEN DOW; GIOVANNINA ANTHONY, M.D.; RENE R. HINKLE, M.D.; CHELSEA ’ S FUND; and CIRCLE OF HOPE HEALTHCARE d/b/a Wellspring Health Access,

Appellee s (Plaintiff s )

,

a

nd

STATE OF WYOMING; MARK GORDON, Governor of W yoming; BRIDGET HILL, Attorney General for the State of Wyoming; MATTHEW CARR, Sheriff Teton County; MICHELLE WEBER, Chief of Police, Town of Jackson, Wyoming,

Appellees (Defendants). S

- 2 3

- 0196Appeal from the District Court of Teton County The Honorable Melissa M. Owens, Judge

Representing Appellan t s (Proposed Intervenors) Rachel Rodriguez-Williams , House District Representative; Chip Neiman, House District Representative; and Right to Life of Wyoming, Inc.: Frederick J. Harriso n, Frederick J. Harriso n, PC, Che yenne, Wyoming ; Denise Harle and Timothy Garrison, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona. Argument by Mr . Garrison.

Repre senting App ellees (Plaintiffs) D anielle Johnson; Kathleen Dow; Giovannina Anthony, M.D.; R ene R. Hinkle, M.D.; C helsea ’ s Fun d ; and Circle of Hope Healthcare d/b/a Wellspring Health Access: John H. Robinson and Marci C. Bramlet, Robinson Bramlet, LLC, Casper, Wyoming; Peter S. Modlin , Gib son Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, San Francisco, California; Megan Cooney , Gib son Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Irvine , California. Argume nt by Mr. Modlin.

Repre senting App ellees (Defendants) S tate of Wyoming; Mark Gordon, Governor of Wyoming; and Bridget Hill, Attorney General for the State of Wyoming: Jay Jerde, Special Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee (Defendant) M atthew Carr , Sheriff Teton County: No appearance.

Repre senting App ellee (Defendant) M ichelle Weber , Chief of Police, Town of Jackson, Wyoming: No appearance.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opin ion is subject to for mal revi sion before pu blication in Paci fi c Reporter T hird. Rea ders are

re quested to notify th e Clerk of the Sup reme C ourt, Supre me C our t Building, Cheyenne, Wyomin g 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corre ction may be made b efo re f inal pub lication in th e permanent volum e.1 FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] State Representative s Rachel Rodriguez

- Williams and Chip Neiman, and Right to Life of Wyoming, Inc. (RTLW) (collectively the P roposed I ntervenors) appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of

two Wyoming laws restricting abortion. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2] This appeal presents two issues:

1. Did the district court err in denying the P roposed
I ntervenors’ motion to intervene as of right?

2. Did the district court abuse its discre tion in denying the
P roposed I ntervenors’ motion for permissive intervention?

FACTS

[¶3] In 2023, the Wyoming Legislature passed two laws restricting abortion. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35

- 6

- 120

- 138; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35

- 6

- 139 (2023). On March 17, 2023, four individuals and two organizations (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the State of Wyoming ; Governor Mark Gordon ; Attorney General Bridget Hill ; Teton County Sheriff Matthew Carr ; and Jackson Chief of Police Michel l e Weber

. Plaintiffs challeng ed the consti tutional ity of the two laws and sought a permanent injunction enjoining their enforcement. Plaintiffs c ontemporaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraini ng order to enjoin enforcement of the laws pending the litigation ’s outcome

.
[¶4] On March 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint

. T hat day, the Attorney General’s Office

, on behalf of the State, Governor Gordon, and Attorney General Hill (the State Defendants)

, submitted a nearly 100

- page opposition t o Plaintiffs ’ motio n for a temporary restrai ning order. On March 22, 2023, the district court entered the temporary restraining order. The challe nged laws are therefore not being enforced pending fin al de termination of this case.

[¶5] On April 4, 2023, the State Defendants answer ed Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. On April 6, 2023, the Proposed Intervenors filed a motion to intervene as of right ;

a lternatively, they sought permissive in tervention. Along with thei r motion to intervene, the Proposed Intervenors filed a proposed answer to the amended complain t , which in material respects mirrored the answer of th e State Defendants. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to intervene. The State Defendants did not oppose the P roposed Intervenors ’ intervention but objected to their expressed desire for an evidentiary hearing or trial

. The2 State Defendants maintained that the constitution al challenge to the abortion l a ws present ed purely legal questions that did not require taking evidence.

[¶6] The dis trict court denied the motion to intervene. It found the Proposed
Interveno rs timely fi led their motion but otherwise did not meet the r equirements for intervention as of right. The court denied permissive intervention on grounds that the State Defendants adequately represented the interests of the Proposed Intervenors and the intervent ion would unduly delay and prejudice adju di c ation of the case

. The Proposed Intervenors timely appealed to this Court. 1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] This Court review s a ruling on the timeliness of a motion to interve ne for an abuse of discretion. I nt

. of EHD

, 2017 WY 134, ¶ 14, 405 P.3d 222, 226 (Wyo. 2017) ( quoting Hirshber g v. Coon , 2012 WY 5, ¶ 9, 268 P.3d 258, 260 (Wyo. 2012) ). Aside from the question of its timeliness, intervention as of right p rese nts a question of law that we review de novo. Id

.
[¶8] We give deference to a district court’s denial of permissive intervention and review th at ruling for an abuse of discretion. Hirshberg , 2012 WY 5, ¶ 9, 268 P.3d at 261 (quot ing Concerned Citizens of Spring Creek Ranch v. Tips Up, L.L.C. , 2008 WY 64, ¶¶ 11

- 12, 185 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2008) ) ; see also Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Gunter , 2007 WY 151, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007) ( “ We review a denial of a

mo t io n for permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion, and our review is particul arly deferential .”) (citing Masinter v. Markstein , 2002 WY 64, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d 237, 242 (W yo. 2002) ) ; Tri

- State Generati on & Transmission Ass’n , Inc. v. N.M. Pub. Regul

. Comm’n , 787 F.3d 1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 2015) ( agreeing that “ d ecisions holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention are predictably

rare ”)

.

DISCUSSION

[¶9] We have summarized the W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) requirements fo r i nt ervention as of right as fol lows:

First, the applicant must claim an interest related to the property or tra nsaction which is the subject of the action.

1 On appeal

, the State Defendants have taken the same position they took below. They do not oppose intervention but object to the district court taking ev idence. The State Defendants therefore offer no argument regarding the district court’s order denying intervention and instead offer argument only on the question of whether a trial is required to resolve the legal challenges to the abortion laws. We need not address that question to resolve this appeal.3 Second, the applicant must be so situa ted that the disposition of the action may, as a pract ical ma tter, impai r or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest. Third, there must be a showing that the applicant’s interest will not be adequately represented by the exist ing parties. Fo urth, the application for intervention must be timely

.

In t

. of EHD , 2017 WY 134, ¶ 12, 405 P.3d at 225

- 26 (quoting State Farm Mut

. Auto

. Ins

. Co

. v. Colley , 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994) ). “An applicant who fails to meet any of the conditions of W.R.C. P. 24(a)(2) is not permitt e d to intervene as of right.” Hallibur ton , 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648 (cleaned up) (quoting State Farm , 871 P.2d at 1 94 )

. 2

I. Because the Proposed Intervenors do not have a sign ificant protectable interest in the litigation, the district cou rt did not err in denying their motion to intervene as of rig ht.

[¶10] To satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest requirement, a proposed intervenor must show

“ a significant protectable interest .” Tips Up , 20 08 WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40 (citing Platte Cnty. Sch

. Dist. No. 1 v. Basin Elec. Power Coop. , 638 P.2d 1276, 127 9 (Wyo. 1982) ). “ A significant protectable interest is distinguished from a merely conti ng e nt interest, an interest sh ared by members of the public at large, or a mere concern in the

outcome. ” Id

. ( c iting Halliburton

, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648 ) ; see also Allard v. Frizzell , 536 F.2d 1 3 32, 1334 (10th Cir. 1976) ( upholding denial on ground that movants had “ no requisite specific interest, and none other than that asserted by the public generally ”).

A. RTLW d oes not have a sign i ficant protectable interest in the l iti gat ion.

[¶11] RTLW c laims the following concerni ng its interest in the challenge to the abortion laws:

Right to Life of Wyoming’s core purpose is to educate the public on the value of human life

— including the harms of abortion

— and to advocate for laws that protect pregnant

wome n a nd th eir unborn children. A ll of the organi zation ’s resources are dedicated to this mission. Indeed, Right t o Life of Wyoming devoted substantial time, funds, and ot h er

resour ces in specific ally lobbying and advocating for the

2 Plaintiffs di d not appeal the district court’s fin ding that the Proposed Intervenor s ’ motion was timely, and we therefore do not address that requirement.4 statute s c hall enged in this case. Thus, its intere st is greatly distinguishable from m embers of the public. The fates of these statutes are mission

- critical to Right to Life of Wyoming’s efficacy.

[¶12] We do not question that RTLW has expended great effort an d resources in its campaign ag ainst abortion a nd in favor of the legislation at issue in this case. We disagree, however, that these advocacy efforts distinguish RTLW’s interests from the polic y co n cerns held by members of the public at large. The persuasive weigh t o f

au thority h olds that advocating for a policy an d lobbying for legisl ation to enact that policy does not give an individual or entity a protectable interest in a legal challenge to the s ubsequently enacted law.

[¶13] For example, i n Keith v. Daley

, th e Illinois Pro

- Life Coalitio n (IPC), a lobby ing organization, sought to intervene in a suit challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois statute regulating aborti o n . 764 F. 2d 1265, 1267 ( 7th C ir. 1985)

, cert. denied , 474 U.S. 980 (1985)

. Like RTLW, IPC claim ed an interest b ased on its advocacy for unborn chil dren and its lobbying efforts in support of the challenged la ws. Id

. It asserted “ that its

‘ very existence is intertwined with its ability to promote this type of legislation and to insure that su ch laws are adequately defende d if challenged. ’ ” Id

. at 1269. The district court denied intervention as of right, and the Seventh Circuit upheld that denial. Id

. at 127 0

. It note d that “[o] nly the d efendant Attorney Gener al and the defendant Cook County State’s At tor ney are requ i red to defend and enforce the law of the state of Illinoi s [.]” Id

. at 1269. It then held :

[I PC ’s ] purpose is essentially communicative and persuasive. IPC seeks to inform pe ople about abortion and about IPC’s preference for alterna ti ves to abortion. IPC also se eks to lobby leg islators so that its views on the protection of “the unborn” may become law. In an America whose freedom is secured by its ever vigi lant guard on the o p enness of its “marketpl ace of ideas,” IPC is encouraged to thrive, an d to speak, l obby, promote, and persuade, so that its principles may b ecome, if it is the will of the majority

, the law of the land. Such a priceless right to free expression, however, do es not also suggest that IPC has a right to intervene in e ve ry lawsuit involving abortio n rights, or to forever defend statutes it helped to enact. Rule 24(a) pr ecludes a conception of lawsuits, even “public law” suits, as necessary forum s for such public policy debates

.

Id. at 1270.5 [¶14] O ther courts have reached a s imilar conclusio n. In Northland Fam. Plan. Clinic, Inc. v. Cox

, a group called Standing Together to Oppose Partial

– Birth

– Abortion ( STTOP )

s ought to intervene in a s u it challenging a Michigan law that regulated abortion. 487 F.3d 323, 327

- 28 (6th Cir. 2007). S TTOP was a ballot

- question committee of Right to Life of Michigan, Inc., formed to promo te passage of the challenged law. Id

. at 328. It argue d that as a public interest group involved in the process leading to ad o ption o f the challenged law , it ha d a legal interes t in the subject matter of the lawsuit

. Id

. at 344. The district court found the interest insufficient, and the Sixth Circ u it agreed

. Id

. at 3 43

- 44

, 346

. The court held that once a statute is enacted, “ the public interest in its enfor ceability is entrusted for the most part to the government [

. ] ” Id

. at 345. It thus concluded:

Af ter the Act’s passage

. . . STTOP’s interest in the enforcement of the statut e is greatly diminished due to the state’s responsib i litie s in enforcing and defending i t as it is written. A s things now stand, STTOP’s interest in this case simply pertains to the enforceability of the statute in general, which w e do not b elieve to be co gniz able as a substantial legal interest sufficient to require interv e nti on as of right

.

Id

. a t 345

- 4 6; see also Leag ue of Women Voters Minn. v . Ritchie , 819 N.W. 2d 636, 640

, 6 42 (Min n. 2012) (per curiam) (nonprofit organization that expended resources to get proposed constitutional amendment passed in l eg i slature denied inter ven ti on in suit alleg ing error in preparation of ballo t for general election ); Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action v. Granholm , 501 F.3d 775 , 7 80

- 81 (6th Cir. 2007) ( groups that l o bbied for ballot initiative lacked substantial leg al interest in challenge t o l aw despite court’ s exp ansive view of interest sufficient to support int ervention ).

[¶15] As these cas e s illustrate, on ce the abort ion law s challe nged in this case were enacted, the responsibility for enforcing and defending the laws shifted to the government . At that p oin t, RTLW’s advocacy for the laws and its interest in the policy underlying them became no different from or great er than that of the public at large. It thus did not have a p r otectable interest in the li tigation challen ging the laws. Tips Up

, 200 8 WY 64, ¶ 17, 18 5 P.3 d at 40; Allard , 536 F.2d at 1334.

[¶16] The cases the Proposed Intervenors cit e are distinguish able and thu s do no t compel a different conclusion. They principally rely on Coal ition o f A riz

. /N

. M

. C ntys. f or Stable
Eco n . Growth v. Dep’t of the Inter ior

, 100 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1 996)

, which they argue

st ands for the proposition that advocacy for a cause provides the requisite interest for intervention as of right

. W e disagree.

[¶17] In C oalition , the proposed interveno r , Dr. Robin Silver, wa s “ a commercial wildl ife p hotographer, an amateur biologist, and a naturalist , specializing in

p hotographing creature s in the Ameri can Sou thwest

. ” 100 F.3d at 839. He petitioned the6 United States Fish and Wildlife Se rvice (F WS) to list the Mexican Spotted Owl as a threa ten ed or endangered species un der the Endangered Specie s Act (ESA) , and when FWS failed to timely act on the petition, he threatened suit under the ESA’s citizen lawsuit provision

. Id

. FW S eventually listed the owl as a threatened species but fai led to designate criti cal habitat for it

. Id

. Dr. Silver and other enviro nmental groups sue d FWS and obtained an order compelli ng it t o desi gnate habitat

. Id

.
[¶18] While Dr. Silver ’s suit was pending, the Coalition of Arizo na/New Mexico C o unties for Stable Economic Gro wth f iled a separate lawsuit c hallenging the owl’s list ing. Id. Dr. Silver moved to intervene as of right, or in the alternative, for permissive i ntervention, and the district court denied the mo tion

. Id

. The Tenth Cir cuit reversed. Id

. at 846.

[¶19] In addressing the int erest requirement for inter vention as of righ t , the court held that Dr. Silver wa s requi red to show an interest in the proceedings that was “ direct, substantial [,] and legally protectable. ” Id. at 840

. It c onc lu ded first “ that Dr. Silve r’s involvement with the Owl in the wild and his persistent record of advocacy for its protection amounts to a direct and substantial inter e st in the listing of the Owl for the purpose of intervention as of rig ht .” Id

. at 841. The court then went on to address whether the int erest was leg ally protectable , a s required for inte rvention as of r ight , a nd d etermined it was

. Id

. First, it found the ESA gave him a legal right to pr otect hi s interest in the owl. Id

. Next, t he court obs erv ed that “ t he desire to use or observe an animal

spec ies, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.” Id

. at 842 ( q uoting Lujan v. D ef s. of Wildlife

, 504 U.S. 555, 562

- 63, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). It concluded that since Dr. Silver had independent standing to participate in the s uit, he had the l egally p rotectable interest requir ed to intervene as of r ight

. Id

.
[¶20] Under the reasoning of Coalition , RTLW may claim a sign ificant i nterest in the liti g ation challenging Wyom ing’s abortion l aws based o n its advocacy

. That, however, is not sufficient to support intervent ion as of right. Under our precedent, and the holding in C

o a lition

, the claimed interest m ust also b e legally protectable. I d

. at 846 ; Tips Up , 2008 WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40. In Coalition , that requirement was satisfied by Dr. Silver ’ s legal rights un der the ESA and his in dependent standing base d on his recognized

a esthetic interest in observing the species he sought to protect

. R TLW has pointed to no law that provides it a protectable i nte rest in this litigation, and it has made no claim that it has independent standing to p articipate in the litigation. Coalition therefor e does not support its interven t ion as of right.

[¶21] T he Proposed I ntervenors’ reliance on W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv. Chief

, No. 20

- CV

- 67

- F, 2020 WL 13065066 (D. Wyo. July 29, 2 0 20) and Citizens for Bala nced Use v. Mo nt. Wilderness Ass’n , 6 47 F .3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) is equally

un persuasive

. Both agai n are environmental cases in which the intervenors show ed the ir7 members use d the r esources they sought to protect ; intervention as of right was not granted based solely on an intervenor’s advocacy e fforts

. W . Watersheds , 2020 W L 130 65066 at * 3; Mont . Wilderness Ass’n , 647 F.3d at 897

- 98; s ee also WildEarth Guardi ans v. Nat’l Park Serv. , 604 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10t h Cir. 2010) ( “ Wit h respec t to Rule 24(a)(2) , we have decla r e d it ‘ indisputable ’ that a pr o spective in te rvenor’ s environment al concern is a legally protectable interest. ”). RTLW cites no interest that is comparable to the pro t ectable interests recogni zed in these types of environmental cas es.

[¶22] RTLW’s reliance on Pla nned Parenthood o f Minn., Inc. v. Ci tizens for Cm ty. Actio n , 558 F.2d 861 (8t h Cir. 1977) is also misplaced. In t hat ca se, Planned Parenthoo d challenged an ordinance that would have barred its clinic in th e proposed location

. Id

. at 864. A n organization w h ose professed purpose was “ to preserve pr op erty va lues and insu re that abortion facilities do not affect the health, welfare and safety of citizens ” sought to inter v ene in defense of the ord inance. Id

. at 869. The application for intervention was joine d by two couples who lived in the vicini ty of the pro posed cli nic. Id

. The distri ct court denied the motion to interv ene , a nd the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id

. In concluding that the intervenors had a protect ab le interest in the litigation , the court found th a t the “ litigation, which will e stablish th e validit y or invalidi ty of the ordinance, necessarily bears directly on the property interests the applicants seek to pres e rve .” Id

. Again, the prot ectable interest in that case went well beyond advocacy for a part icular policy or law

.
[¶23] The same is t rue of Mich. State AFL

- CIO v. Miller , 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1997)

. In that cas e, t he Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to intervene in a challenge to an election f in ance law for which it lobbied. Id

. at 1243

- 44. Th e district court denied interve n tion, and t he Sixth Circuit rever sed. Id

. at 1243. In considering whether the Chamber had a legally protectable interest, the court no t ed the Chamber’s advocacy efforts, but it also relied on the fac t that the Chamber ha d thou sands of corporat e members who were subject to re gulation under the law. Id

. at 1243, 1247. In a later case, the Sixth Cir cui t clarified that advocacy for a challenged law is not in itself a protectable interest for purposes of intervention ; it observed that t h e pivotal consideration in Mil l er

wa s the fact that the Chamber’ s members were subject to regulation under the challenged law. Granholm , 501 F .3d at 782

. RTLW is not subject to regulation und er the abortion laws, and Miller there fore does not supp ort its position.

[¶24] The only cases RTLW c ites that hold inte rven tion should have been permi tted based on advocacy inte rests alo ne are three decisions by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Sagebrush Rebel lion, In c. v. Watt , 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (conserv a t ion gr oups should have been a llowed t o intervene b ased on advoc acy for bird conservation area and participation in process to have are a desi g nated) ; Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Counci l v. Spellman , 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (sponsor of radi oactive waste initiativ e should have been allowed to in terv ene b ased on its interest i n law) ; State of Idaho v. F reeman , 6 25 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (National Organization of8 Women should have been allo wed to i ntervene in suit challenging procedure for ratifi c a tion o f ERA based on its inte rest i n the continued viability of ERA)

. We find these cases unpersuasive because they contain no rea s oning to ex pla i n how such advocacy interests diff er from those of the public generally . This is important because court s are not political forums for these types of pu bli c policy debates. Keith , 764 F. 2d at 1270. As one court observe d:

In cases like this one, where a group of plaintiffs challenge state legislation, t he court should evaluate requests to intervene wi th speci al care, lest the case be swam ped by

ext ra ne ous parties who woul d do little more than reprise the political debate that produced the l e gislation in the first place

.

One Wis. Inst., In c. v. Nichol , 310 F.R.D. 394, 397 (W.D. Wis. 2015).

[¶25] We therefo re adher e to the authority that advocating f or a policy and l obbying for legislation to en act that policy does not give an individual or entity a protectable interest in a legal challenge to the subsequently ena cted law

. Because RTLW does not have a protect ab le int erest in this litigation, the district c ou rt did not err in deny ing its motion to intervene as of right. Halliburton , 2007 WY 15 1, ¶ 6

, 167 P.3d at 648 ( “An applicant who fails to meet any of the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is not permitt ed to in tervene as of right.” ) (quotin g State Fa rm , 871 P.2d at 194 ).

B

. Representatives Rodriguez

- Williams and Neiman do not have a signi ficant protectable interest in the litiga t ion.

[¶26] Repre sentatives Rod riguez

- Williams and Nei man claim a significant pr ote ctabl e interest in this litigation becaus e they “were the lead sponsor and the chief le gislative shepherd of the statutes, respectively.” They further cite their interest in protecting the legislature’s autho rity to enact laws governing abo rtion and to protect the healt h and

gen eral welfare of the p e o pl e. They add:

These particular Legislators have an especially strong interest in defending the s tatute s, be y ond their roles as lead

sp onsor and floor l eader. Both Representatives Ne iman and Rodriguez

- Will iam s hav e decades

- long pers onal histories of public pro

- life advocacy in their communities . Both ran on

pro

- life campaign platforms and committed their legislative effort to this crucial policy achievement. The Legislat ors should be allo wed to preserve these interest s by defe nding the law that th e y worke d so hard to en ac t.9 [¶27] Again, w e do not question the dedication of the R epr esenta ti ves to their campaign against abortion and thei r work on behal f of the challenged laws. However, w e als o again disagree that t hei r int erest , for purpos es of Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, is unique from that of the publ ic generally.

[¶28] First, we reject the argument that this litigation threatens the l egislature’s authorit y to regulate ab or tion or the health and welfare o f the p ublic. Regardless o f the outcome of this case, the legislature may still legislate in these areas. To t he ext en t i t must do so within constitutional paramete r s established by a court decision in the case, that is not a dim inution of its po wer , but is instead a p rod uct o f the separation of powers that unde rpins our government.

Determining whether a statute violates the constitution has been a matter for judicial consideration since the United States Supreme Court de cided Marbury v. Madison in 1803. Decla rin g the validity of statut es in relation to the constitution is a power vested in the cou rts as one of the checks and balances contemplated by the division of governme nt into three depa rtments, legislative, e xecutiv e and jud icial. It is emphatic a lly the p rovince and d ut y of the judicial department to say what the law is.

Conrad v. Uinta Cnty. Republ ican P ar ty
, 2023 WY 46, ¶ 13, 529 P.3d 482, 489 (Wyo.
2 023) (cleaned up)

.
[¶29] Interpreting the constitution is exclusively the province of the courts and does not im pinge on the legislature ’s authority to v ote on legislation. As the Pennsylvania Suprem e Court explained in upholding the denial of intervention to legislators seeki ng to defend a law their body enacted

,

t he legi sl ators’ interest implicates n e ither a d efense of the

p ower or authority of their offices nor a defense of the potency of their right to vote. Ra th e r , the legislators simply seek to offer the i r perspective on the correctness of governmental conduct, i.e., that the General Assembly did not violat e t he substantive and proce dural strictures of the Pennsylvania Constitution in enacting A ct 13

.
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth , 84 A.3d 1054, 1055 (P a. 2014) ; see al so Newdow v. U.S. Co ng

. , 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9 th Cir. 2 002) (senate’s own powers a nd respon sibiliti es not under attack when constitutionality of law challenged); Roe v. Casey , 464 F.S upp

. 4 83 , 4 8 6 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (legislator who co

- sponsored law had no protectable interest in litigation where issue did not concern whether law was duly and lawful ly enact ed)

.10 [¶30] The same is t rue here. The leg islature’s authority to vote on legislation is not at issue in this case. Consequently, Representatives Rodriguez

- Willi ams and Neima n can clai m n o protectable intere st i n this litigation based on their v oting aut hority

. Th eir reliance on Berger v. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP , 597 U.S. 179 , 142 S. Ct. 2 191, 2 13 L. E d.2d 517 (2022) to suggest otherwise is mispla ced.

[¶31] Berger is the sole case Representatives Rodriguez

- William s and Neiman cite in support of their asser ted inte rest in this litiga tion. In that ca se, the United States Supreme Court held that i f a state legislature authorizes a legislator to intervene in a case chal lenging the constitutio nality of a state sta tute
, even th ough the executive branch i s already defendi ng the law, the interest and impairment prong s of Rule 24(a)(2) are sat isfied

. Berge r , 597 U .S. at 190

- 9 4 , 142 S. Ct. at 2 201

- 02 . The Court r easoned that a state has a protectable interest in defending its laws and the authori ty to declar e who will

mos t eff ectively represent the state in any challenge to its laws. Id

.
[¶32] In this case, the Wyoming Legislature did not authorize Representatives Rodriguez

- Willliams an d Neiman, or any legislator, to represen t the St at e’s int erest s in defending the two abort ion statute s. Berger is therefore simply inapplicable. 3

[¶33] Finally, w e also reject the Represent atives ’ cla i m of a protect able interest based on thei r personal histories of advocacy against abortion. This claim fails for the same reas on RTLW’s claim failed. Be cause it is an interest shared with the general public

, a dvocating for a policy and wor king to enact legislation to implement that policy does not create a protect able interest in a legal challenge to th e subseq ue ntly en acted law

. Tips Up , 200 8
WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P. 3d at 40 (interest must differ from interest of public at large) ; see

a lso Daugh trey v. Ca rt er , 584 F. 2d 1050, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“ On ce a bill becomes law, a Congressman’s interest in its enforcement is shared by, and indistinguishable from, th at of any other member o f the public .”) ; Harri ngton v. Sc h lesing er , 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 197 5) ( “ Once a bill has become law . . . [the Senator’s] interest is indistinguishable from that of any other cit izen. ” ) ; United States v . Arizona

, No. C V 10

- 1413

- PHX

- SRB, 2010 WL 11470 582

, at * 3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2010) ( “ Senator Pe arce’s expressed interest is general, shared by many other citizens of the sta te of Arizona as well as some of his fellow legi sl ators .” )

.

3 Because the W yoming Legislature did not authorize int er vention by a legislator, we need not address whether we would adopt the Supreme Court’s holding that such authorization compels a conclusion that the interest and impairment requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) are met . While federal precedent is persuasive in interpreting our own court rules, it is not binding. Adams v. St ate , 2023 WY 85, ¶ 21, 534 P.3d 469, 476 (Wyo. 2023) ( “[W] e can loo k to federal precedent interpreting similar rules as persuasive authorit y .”) ( citing Pena v. S tate , 2013 WY 4

, ¶ 48, 294 P. 3 d 1 3, 22

- 23 (Wyo. 2013) )

.11 [¶34] As we noted in ou r disc ussi on of RTLW’s in terest, our concern with allowing intervention based on a policy inte rest shared b y the ge ner a l publ ic is the potential for interjection of political debate into a purely legal proceeding. Courts are not forums for

suc h deba tes. See One Wis. In st.
, 31 0 F.R.D. at 397.

[¶35] For these reasons, Representativ es Rodrigu ez

- Wil li ams and Neim an do not have a protectable legal interest in this litigation. The district court therefore did not err in denying their moti on to intervene as of right. H allibu rton , 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648 ( “An applicant who fails to meet any of the cond itions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is not permitted to intervene as of right.” ) (quoting State Farm , 871 P.2d at 1 94 )

.

II. The di str ict c ou rt did not abuse its discretion in de nying the Proposed Interv enors’ mo tion for permissive intervention.

[¶36] A court may allow permissive intervention “ when the i nter venor’s claim or defense has a question of fact or la w in common with the main acti on and the court in its dis cretion determines intervention will not und ul y delay or p rejudice the adjudications of the rights of the original par ties .” Mas inter

, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 6, 45 P.3d at 240 (citing W.R.C.P. 24(b)(2) )

.

A court abuses its discre t ion when it acts in a manner which exceeds t he bounds of reason under the circumstan ces. The party who is attackin g the trial co urt’s ru lin g has the burden to establish an abuse of discreti on, and the ultimate issue is whet her the c ourt could rea sonably c onc lude as it did

.

K

erbs v . Kerbs , 2020 WY 9 2, ¶ 14, 467 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Wyo. 2 020) (quo ting Three Way, Inc. v. Burton Enter s

. , Inc. , 2008 WY 18, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008) ).

[¶37] The district co urt d enied p ermiss ive in tervention on grou nds the State Defendants were adequa tely repr esenting the Proposed Intervenors’ interests and intervention would unduly dela y a nd prejudice the case’s adju dication. We find no abuse of dis cretion in its ruling.

A. The district court r ea sonably concluded the State Defendants were adequately representing the interests of the P r oposed Intervenors

.

[¶38] The Proposed Intervenors contend the district cou rt abused its di scretion in weighing the adequacy of the State Defend ant s’ repre sentati on aga inst i t s bid for permissive interven tion. They argue the adequacy of the representation is irrelevant to the question of per missive intervention and, e ven if it were relevant, t hey showed t he

rep resentation was n ot adequate. We disagree on both counts.12 [¶39] Ad eq uate representation of a proposed intervenor’s interests is a proper

con sideration for p er m issive intervention

. Tri

- State Generation , 787 F.3d at 1075; City of S

tilwell v. Ozark s Rural Elec. Co

- op Corp. , 79 F.3 d 1038, 1043 (10th C ir. 19 96)

. And

, “[ w] here the i ntervenor and an existing part y have the same objective, a pres umption of adequacy of representation arises.” Tips Up

, 2008 WY 64, ¶ 20, 185 P.3d at 41 (quoting Or

. Env ’ t. Coun cil v. Or

. Dep’t o f Env ’ t. Qua lity , 775 F.Supp. 353, 35 9 (D. Or. 1991) ). To overcome this pr esumption, a proposed intervenor “ must make ‘ a concrete showing of circumstances ’ that the

. . . representat ion is inade quate .” Tri

- State Generation , 787 F.3d at 107 3 (quoting Bottoms v. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 797 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1986) ).

[¶40] The State Defe ndants filed a nearly 100

- p age opposition to Plaintif fs’ motion f or a temporary restraining order so their interest in en forcing the challenged laws and having their constitutionality upheld is apparent. Given t hat t he State Defenda nts and the Proposed Intervenors share this same goal

, we presu me the State Def endants’ representat ion is adequa te

. Moreover

, the le gis lature c reate d the Of fice o f the Attorney General to repr esent the State’s interests and h as specifically recognized the Attorn ey General’s role in defending the constituti onal ity of state statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9

- 1

- 603(a)(i)

- (v) (2023) ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1

- 37

- 113 (2023) (requiring A ttorney G eneral to be copied and heard in any declaratory judgmen t action allegin g a sta tute to be unconstitutional) ; see also Tri

- State Generation , 78 7 F.3d at 1074 ( finding adequacy of representatio n based in part on f act th at de fenda nt was r eprese nted by state attorney

gen eral “ who is obligated by law to defe nd the constitutionality of the statute ”); Stuart v.
Hu ff , 706 F.3d 345, 351 (4th Cir. 2013) ( “[W] hen a statute comes un der attack, it is difficult to conceive of an entity bet ter situate d to defend it than the government .”)

.
[¶41] The Proposed Intervenors do not chall en ge the distric t court ’s finding that “ the Wyoming Attorney General is currently asse rting a vigorous defense [

. ] ” They instead point to the State Defendants ’ posi tio n tha t the issues in the case are que stio ns of law that do not require the court to take evidence

. Because Plaintiffs have offered evidence to support their challen ge , the Proposed Intervenors contend they should be permitte d to intervene to present opposing evidence they claim supports the challenge d laws. Notably, however, the Proposed Intervenors conceded d urin g oral ar gument t hat the S tate Defendants have made a colorabl e ar gument that they do not neces sarily disagree with

, a nd i n their briefing, they r efer to it as “principled.” 4

4 In su pport of their desire to intervene with evidence, the Proposed Intervenors point to our order declining to answer the constitutional questions the district court certified to the C ourt. In that order we stated, “This Court does not believe it can answer all twelve certified questions on the limited factual record provi d ed.” The Proposed Intervenors read too much into that statemen t. We did not specify that an evidentiary hearing was required. Our concern wa s with ruling on the questions in a vacuum without a fully developed record, what ever that record may ultimately look like

.13 [¶42] The Proposed In tervenors have not made a concrete showi ng that the State Defendants’ represe ntation of their interests was inadequa te. What they have show n is a dif ference in litigation strategy, which is insufficient to establish in ad equacy of representat ion. Kane Cnty., Utah v. United States , 928 F.3d 877, 892 (10th Cir. 2 019 ) ( “Of course, represen tation is not inadequate simply beca use the applican t and th e representative d isagree regard ing the facts or law of the ca se.” ) (quoting Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior

, 736 F.2d 1416, 14 1 9 (10th Cir. 1984) (burden of showing inadequate representation, while minimal, is on the applicant for intervention) ) ; Stuart

, 706 F.3d at 35 3 ( “[T] he releva nt and s ettled rule is that disagreement ove r how to

approac h the conduct of the litigation is not enough to rebut the pres umption o f adequa cy .” ) (citing circuit c ases) ; Saldano v. Roach , 363 F.3d 545

, 553

- 54 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying district att orney’s moti on to inter vene in post

- conviction proceedings where attorney general confessed error an d waived a procedural d efault and noting that “[t]he Attorney General is not an inadequate re presentat ive simply b ecause he ha s taken these actions, es peci ally when state l a w give s him the authority to do so.”) ; Bum garner v. U

te Indian Tribe of U i n tah & Ouray Rsvr. , 417 F .2d 1305, 1308 (1 0th Cir. 1969) (“ Ap pellants apparently would have handled the defense of the case differently than did the Administratrix. This however is n ot sufficie nt to challenge the adequacy of representation .”); 7C Charles A

. Wright et al.

, Feder al Pra ctice & Pro cedure : Civil § 19 09 , at 431

- 35 ( 3 d ed. Apr

. 2023 update ) ( “ A mere difference of opinion concerning the t actics with which the litigation should be handled doe s not make inadequate the representation of those whose interests are identic al with that of an exis ting party [.]”)

.
[¶43] The Fourth Circuit explained the importance of this li mitat io n on in tervention, particularly in case s where the go vernment is defe nding th e constitutionality of a statute.

F inally, to permit private persons and entities to in tervene in the governmen t’s defense of a statu te
upon only a nomin a l showing would greatly complicate the governme nt’s job. Faced with the prospect of a delu ge of poten tial intervenors, the government could be compelled to modify its litigation

st rategy to suit the se lf

- interested motivations of those who seek party status, or else suff er the co nsequen ces of a ge ometrically protracte d , costly, and complicated lit igation. In short, “the business of [ the ] gov e rnment could hardly be conducted if, in matters of litigat ion, ind ividual citizens could u sually o r alw ays intervene

a n d assert individual points of view.”

Stuart

, 706 F.3d at 351 (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal P ractice § 2 4.03[4][a][ v][A] (3d ed. 2011) ).14 [¶44] Adequacy of representation is a relevant c on sideration in ruling on permissive intervention , and the district court reasonably conclude d that th e State Defendant s adequately represen t ed the Propose d Intervenors’ i nterests

. It therefore did not abuse its dis cretion in weighing t his consideration against permissive i nterven tion.

B. The district co urt re as onabl y concluded the Proposed Intervenors’ intervention would undu ly delay the case and prejudice its adjudica tion.

[¶45] The district cou rt found that because the Proposed Intervenors and the State Defe nd ants seek the same ob jective in the litigation , intervention would risk duplicative and cum u lative a rgument , which wo uld delay the matter t o the detrimen t of the parties. The Proposed Interv enors contend that because their sole wish is to present evidence the State Defend ants a re not pre senting, the dis trict co urt ’ s concern was no t valid

. We disagree.

[¶46] Despite the differences in strate gy be t wee n the State Defendants and the Proposed
Intervenors , it was not beyond the boun ds of reason for the di strict court to conclude that their shared objective would result in a d uplicat ion of arguments and delay

.

Where the interests o f the applicant in ev e ry m anner match those of an existing par ty and the party’s representation is deemed adequate, the district court is well within its d iscretion in dec iding that the a pplica nt ’s co ntributions to the

proce edings would be superfluous and that any result ing d e lay w ould be undue.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Corbett , 296 F.R.D. 342, 3 50 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (cle aned up) (quoting Hoots v. Pennsylvania , 672 F.2d 1133, 1136 (3d Cir. 1982) ) ; see al so Bar nes v . Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co. , 945 F.3d 1112 , 1126

- 27 ( 10th Cir. 2019) (Hart z, J. , dissenting) ( “ Ad ding a party necessarily imposes additional burdens on the court and

o the r part ies. To do so when there is every reason to expect (a nd no r eason not to expe ct) that the interests of the party will be well represented in its absence hardly increases the efficiency of the j udicial process. ”) ; Stuart , 70 6 F.3d at 355 ( u pholdi ng deni al of permissiv e interve ntion where district court found inte rvention would caus e delay with out a corresponding benefit as existing defendants adequately repr es ented interests).

[¶47] T h e district court reasonably found intervention would cause delay and p rej udice

, and it did not abuse its d iscretion in weighing th is consid eration again st p ermissive intervention.15 CONCLUSION

[¶48] The P roposed I ntervenors do not have a protectable interest in this litigation, and thu s the district court d id not err in de nying th em in tervention as o f right. The district

court reasonably conclud ed the Stat e Defe nd ant s adequately represented the Proposed Intervenors’ interest and permissive in te rvention would cause undue delay and prejudice. It therefore did not abuse its discretion i n denying permissive intervention.