IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

TERESA A. GOODING, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

PAPAK, Magistrate Judge: 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

Civil No. 1 :15-cv-01921-PK 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Teresa A. Gooding filed this action on October 10, 2015, seeking judicial 

review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her application for 

disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. This court has jurisdiction 

over plaintiff's action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). 

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I have considered all of the parties' briefs and all of the evidence in the administrative 

record. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and this 

matter is remanded for the calculation and payment of benefits. 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 

To establish disability within the meaning of the Act, a claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step 

sequential process for determining whether a claimant has made the requisite demonstration. See 

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At the first 

four steps of the process, the burden of proof is on the claimant; only at the fifth and final step 

does the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 

(9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the Administrative Law Judge considers the claimant's work activity, if 

any. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I). If the ALJ finds that 

the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant will be found not disabled. 

See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(I), 416.920(b). Otherwise, the 

evaluation will proceed to the second step. 

At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairments. 

See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140-141; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416,920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is 

"severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities and is 

expected to persist for a period of twelve months or longer. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 

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20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). The ability to perform basic work activities is defined as "the abilities 

and aptitudes necessmy to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 416.92l(b); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 

141. If the ALJ finds that the claimant's impairments are not severe or do not meet the duration 

requirement, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c). Neve1iheless, it is well established that "the step-two 

inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen v. Chafer, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153-154. "An impairment or 

combination of impairments can be found 'not severe' only if the evidence establishes a slight 

abnormality that has 'no more than a minimal effect on an individual[']s ability to work." Id, 

quoting S.S.R. 85-28, 1985 SSR LEXIS 19 (1985). 

If the claimant's impairments are severe, the evaluation will proceed to the third step, at 

which the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal "one of a number of 

listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude 

substantial gainful activity." Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 

416.920(d). If the claimant's impairments are equivalent to one of the impairments enumerated 

in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1, the claimant will conclusively be found disabled. See 

Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416920(d). 

If the claimant's impairments are not equivalent to one of the enumerated impairments, 

between the third and the foutih steps the ALJ is required to assess the claimant's residual 

functional capacity ("RFC"), based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the 

claimant's case record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is an estimate of the claimant's 

capacity to perform sustained, work-related physical and/or mental activities on a regular and 

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continuing basis, 1 despite the limitations imposed by the claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.945(a); see also S.S.R. No. 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5 (July 2, 1996). 

At the fourth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the 

claimant's past relevant work. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

416.920(a)(4)(iv). If, in light of the claimant's RFC, the ALJ determines that the claimant can 

still perform his or her past relevant work, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 

482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). In the event the claimant is 

no longer capable of performing his or her past relevant work, the evaluation will proceed to the 

fifth and final step, at which the burden of proof shifts, for the first time, to the Commissioner. 

At the fifth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the 

claimant's age, education, and work experience to determine whether a person with those 

characteristics and RFC could perform any jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 

416.960(c), 416.966. If the Commissioner meets her burden to demonstrate the existence in 

significant numbers in the national economy of jobs capable of being performed by a person with 

the RFC assessed by the ALJ between the third and fourth steps of the five-step process, the 

claimant is found not to be disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 

416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c), 416.966. A claimant will be found entitled to benefits 

ifthe Commissioner fails to meet that burden at the fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see 

also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). 

1 "A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an 

equivalent work schedule." S.S.R. No. 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5 (July 2, 1996). 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

A reviewing court must affirm an Administrative Law Judge's decision ifthe ALJ applied 

proper legal standards and his or her findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 

(9th Cir. 2004). "'Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), citing 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The court must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that suppo11s 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Id., quoting Reddick v. 

Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The com1 may not substitute its judgment for that of 

the Commissioner. See id., citing Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882; see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 

F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the cout1 may not rely upon its own independent 

findings of fact in determining whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence 

ofrecord. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003), citing SEC v. Chene1y 

Co1p., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). If the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is rational, it is 

immaterial that the evidence may be "susceptible [of] more than one rational interpretation." 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989), citing Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 

1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). 

II/ 

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SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD2 

Gooding was 53 years old on Januaty 13, 2014, the date of the third hearing. Tr. 43.3 

She completed the ninth grade. Prior to her claimed disability onset date Gooding had 

substantial gainful employment as a customer service representative and dispatcher. Tr. 29. 

I. The Medical Record 

The medical record is extensive and the parties are familiar with it. Accordingly, it will 

be set out below only as relevant. 

II. The Hearing Testimony 

On April 13, 2011, a hearing was conducted before an ALJ in connection with Gooding's 

application. Tr. 78-119. A supplemental hearing occutl'ed on September 21, 2011. Tr. 55-77. 

Gooding, her non-attorney representative, and a vocational expett were present at both hearings. 

A. The April 2011 Hearing 

At the April 21011 hearing, Gooding was 50 years old and had completed the ninth grade. 

Tr. 82. She could read and write. She last worked part-time in retail sales for about a month the 

prior November-December. Gooding last worked full-time for Charter Communications in 2009, 

and was released from the job in October 2009 after several months of medical leave. Tr. 85. 

She earned $54,000 in 2008 because she was paid while on medical leave. She did door to door 

cable services sales and ca11'ied about 25 pounds of equipment. Tr. 86. 

2 The following recitation constitutes a summary of the evidence contained within the 

Administrative Record, and does not reflect any independent finding of fact by the court. 

3 Citations to "Tr." refer to the page(s) indicated in the official transcript of the 

administrative record filed herein as Docket No. 8. 

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In 2009 and 2010 Gooding received unemployment benefits and applied for many jobs. 

Tr. 87. She would have accepted full-time work if it were offered. She sought a sales job where 

she could alternate between sitting and standing. Tr. 88. Gooding sold eyeglass frames, which 

is ve1y stressful. Tr. 89. Sitting was ve1y difficult. 

Gooding took Ativan, Percocet, ibuprofen, and Prilosec without side effects. Tr. 91. She 

could sit for about 15 minutes before her legs go numb. Tr. 92. She could stand for about ten 

minutes before she needed to sit down. She could walk for ten to fifteen minutes. Her legs 

would swell and several times a week and she would lie down for about 30 minutes. Gooding 

had a crush injmy to her dominant right hand the previous December, as a result of which she 

had trouble grasping and twisting. Tr. 95. 

Plaintiff had pain in her neck, back arms, legs, knees, and feet. She has headaches 

almost eve1y day, and migraines two to three times a week. Tr. 96. She was not receiving any 

mental health care. Gooding rates her daily pain at six or seven out of ten, reduced by Percocet 

and ibuprofen to four or five. Tr. 97. She stretched two or three times a week but it was very 

painful. 

Gooding lost her health insurance when her job ended with Chatter Communications. 

She was able to prepare meals and dress and groom herself, but she had problems dealing with 

coworkers because of anxiety. Tr. 101. She takes Ativan to help her sleep. She could pick up a 

gallon of milk with difficulty but her fingers swell and get stiff. Tr. 104. Gooding attempted to 

work at a retail store but quit after two days of training because it was too stressful and she could 

not keep up with the typing. Tr. 105. While working pait-time Gooding sometimes left work 

early because of pain. Tr. 106. Her legs would swell and she had pain in her neck and back. 

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Her legs got cold. When she was in pain she woild quote the wrong price on an item. Tr. 108. 

When her legs are cold she had to stop and rub them, and this occmTed daily. Tr. 110. She had a 

limited range of motion in her neck, and could lift up to 25 pounds from waist height. 

B. The September 2011 Hearing 

Gooding testified that she did not have a mental impairment. Tr. 60. She "can't 

comprehend things so I tend to kind of fall apart." Tr. 61. She attended some counseling in 2011 

but did not complete it. Gooding said that "falling apati" meant she "can't comprehend it. 

Can't follow through, so I get work, you know, they want me to fulfill an assignment and I can't 

because I don't know what to do. I can't do the job." Id It would take her 30 minutes to deal 

with a customer when it was supposed to take seven minutes. 

Gooding's representative waived any claim of mental health impairment. Tr. 62. 

Gooding has had to leave lines at the grocery store because the pain in her legs made her need to 

sit down. Tr. 63. She can sit for ten to twenty minutes before her leg and back pain require her 

to change position. Fluid builds up in Gooding's knee and her doctors have told her to elevate 

her legs. Tr. 64. This has been a problem since the 1980s. A compression stocking was 

prescribed but Gooding found it did not help and she quit wearing it after three or four months. 

Tr. 65. She has carpal tunnel splints which she wears two or three nights a week. Tr. 66. She 

has tingling, numbness, and shooting pains in her right hand. She cannot pull the blankets up on 

the bed or hold a cup of coffee. Tr. 67. 

On December 9, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 125-

34. Gooding requested review of the ALJ's decision and the Appeals Council granted her request 

on August 8, 2013. The ALJ held a third hearing on Januaty 13, 2014. Tr. 40-54. 

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C. The January 2014 Hearing 

Gooding was 53 years old and represented by an attorney. She had not completed any 

education or worked since the September 2011 hearing. Tr. 43. In November 2011 Gooding had 

a psychological evaluation with Katherine Green, Ph.D. Thereafter she saw a counselor for about 

three months until her insurance expired. Gooding could not recall whether she had any 

medication for mental health conditions, although she tried several prescriptions for unknown 

reasons. Since the September 2011 hearing her right hand pain and numbness had become 

worse, and her left hand began hurting a few months before the third hearing. 

On March 6, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding Gooding not disabled. Tr. 9-39. In 

August 2015 the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision. Tr. 1-7. Accordingly, 

the ALJ's decision became the Administration's final order for purposes of judicial review. See 

20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a); see also, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000). This action 

followed. 

SUMMARY OF ALJ FINDINGS 

At the first step of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the Administrative Law 

Judge found Gooding did not engage in substantial gainful activity at any time following her 

claimed disability onset date of May 15, 2008 through her date last insured of December 31, 

2012. Tr. 16. 

At the second step, the ALJ found that Gooding's impairments offibromyalgia, 

trochanteric bursitis/iliotibial band syndrome, pes anserine bursitis, mild cervical and lumbar 

degenerative disc disease with no neurological deficits, mild to moderate degenerative joint 

disease of the knees bilaterally, mild to moderate bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, pain disorder 

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associated with general medical condition and psychological factors, anxiety disorder, and mild 

hip degenerative joint disease were "severe" for purposes of the Act. Id. Because an impairment 

was deemed severe, the ALJ proceeded to the third step of the analysis. 

At the third step, the ALJ found that none of Gooding's impairments were the equivalent 

of any of the impairments enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt P, app. 1. Tr. 18. The ALJ 

therefore conducted an assessment of Gooding's residual functional capacity. Specifically, the 

ALJ found between May 15, 2008 and December 31, 2012, Gooding had the capacity to perform 

a reduced range of light work, and to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently. She was able to stand up for one hour at a time for a total or two hours standing in an 

eight-hour workday. She could stand and walk in combination for a total of four hours in an 

eight-hour workday. Gooding was able to sit for four hours at a time up to a total of eight hours 

in an eight-hour workday. She was able to perform work that did not require climbing ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds. She could frequently balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, and kneel. She could 

occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and frequently reach, handle, finger, feel, push and pull with 

the upper extremities. The claimant was able to frequently operate foot controls, and was able to 

perform work that did not require exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights or large 

moving equipment. Gooding could have not more than occasional exposure to wetness, dust, 

odors, and fumes. She could have occasional exposure to vibration and temperature extremes. 

She was able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions in a setting with 

occasional public and coworker contact and no teamwork assignments. Tr. 19-20. 

At the foutih step of the five-step process, the ALJ found Gooding was unable to return to 

past relevant work as a customer service representative and dispatcher. Tr. 29. The ALJ relied 

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on the testimony of a Vocational Expert (VE) that an individual with the RFC set out above 

could perform other work, including assembler electrical accessories and electronics worker. Tr. 

29-30. On that basis, the ALJ concluded Gooding was not disabled as defined in the Act at any 

time between May 15, 2008, and December 31, 2012. Id. 

ANALYSIS 

Gooding contends the ALJ erred by (1) failing to find her limited to sedentary work and 

therefore disabled based on Medical Vocational Rule 201.1 O; (2) failing to find her impairments 

equaled Listing 14.09D; (3) improperly rejecting her testimony; and ( 4) improperly weighing lay 

witness testimony. Because the first issue is dispositive the court need not address the remaining 

assertions. 

Disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(l); 

416.927(e)(l). Ifno conflict arises between medical source opinions, the ALJ generally must 

accord greater weight to the opinion of a treating physician than that of an examining physician. 

Lester v. Chafer, 81F.3d821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). More weight is given to the opinion ofa 

treating physician because the person has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9'h Cir. 2007). In such circumstances the 

ALJ should also give greater weight to the opinion of an examining physician over that of a· 

reviewing physician. Id If a treating or examining physician's opinion is not contradicted by 

another physician, the ALJ may only reject it for clear and convincing reasons. Id (Treating 

physician); Widmarkv. Barnhart, 454F.3d1063, 1067 (9'h Cir. 2006) (examining physician). 

Even if one physician is contradicted by another physician, the ALJ may not reject the opinion 

without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1066. The opinion of an nonexamining physician, 

by itself, is insufficient to constitute substantial evidence to reject the opinion of a treating or 

examining physician. Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1066 n. 2. The ALJ may reject physician opinions 

that are "brief, conclusory, and inadequately suppo1ted by clinical findings." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 

427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 

III. The Medical Evidence 

A. Treating Physician Jean T. Bieraugel, M.D. 

Gooding began treatment for anxiety with Dr. Bieraugel in April 2006. Tr. 634-36. Dr. 

Bieraugel was Gooding' s treating physician until July 2008, when she reported neck pain 

radiating down both arms for the past six to eight months, as well as pain in the right leg. Tr. 

406. A June 2008 MRI revealed mild left foraminal stenosis at C3-4, moderate left stenosis at 

C4-5, and moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis C5-6. Tr. 411. Dr. Bieraugel diagnosed cervical 

stenosis, paresthesia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and insomnia. Tr. 406-07. 

Records indicate Gooding returned to Dr. Bieraugel in February 2011, when he noted 

diagnoses of fibromyalgia and aiihralgia for which she took ibuprofen and Percocet. Tr. 582. 

Gooding saw Dr. Bieraugel in April 2011 following a motor vehicle accident resulting in 

increased neck, back, and leg pain. Tr. 564. She appeared "mildly uncomfortable, holding neck 

stiffly." Id. Subsequent MRI of the thoracic spine was essentially normal. Tr. 562. An April 

2011 MRI of Gooding's cervical spine showed degenerative changes at C4-5 and C5-6 with 

borderline spinal canal stenosis at both levels. Neural foraminal natrnwing was present. Tr. 682-

83. MRI of Gooding's lumbar spine showed mild retrolisthesis ofL3-4 secondaty to 

ligamentous laxity allowing for mild central canal na1rnwing, with spondylitic changes. Tr. 563. 

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On April 20, 2011, Gooding saw Dr. Bieraugel to discuss her disability claim. Tr. 916. 

Dr. Bieraugel noted Gooding' s attorney suggested Gooding was disabled, and Dr. Bieraugel said 

he "did not disagree," but declined to be involved as he thought he would not be helpful at that 

point. Id. Gooding continued to see Dr. Bieraugel through 2011 and in September 2012 he 

wrote "I do feel that between dealing with chronic pain and her anxiety she is disabled." Tr. 835. 

In September 2012 Dr. Bieraugel wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" stating that he had 

treated Gooding regularly for the past two years for cervical disc disease and fibromyalgia with 

increased pain after two motor vehicle accidents. Tr. 716. Dr. Bieraugel said Gooding had 

"clll'onic daily pain that would make it difficult for her to be gainfully employed. She also 

suffers from anxiety and panic attacks that have worsened over the past year. This also makes it 

difficult for her to leave her home .... I do not think she is a malingerer, but has true, disabling 

pain and anxiety." Id. 

B. Treating Physician Suzan Hagar, M.D. 

Dr. Hagar began treating Gooding in Februaty 2013. Tr. 815. In September 2013 Dr. 

Hagar wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" in which she stated Gooding "is disabled by 

chronic neck and back pain as well as her peripheral neuropathy. These medical problems 

interfere with her ability to function on a day to day basis." Tr. 778. On Februmy 6, 2014, Dr. 

Hagar addressed a second letter "To Whom It May Concern" in which she wrote: 

My patient Theresa Gooding has been unable to work full time since 

2008. She suffers from chronic musculoskeletal pain and fatigue as 

well as poorly controlled depression. She is unable to lift weight 

greater than 8 lbs without difficulty. She has severe feet, leg, back 

and neck pain with prolonged sitting, standing, or walking. She is 

unable to concentrate and unable to complete tasks. She cries frequently 

and is often hTitable. She has been intermittently homeless since 2011 

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Tr. 970. 

after losing an apartment she was no longer able to afford. She does 

not tolerate loud environments or strong scents. She is easily overwhelmed by change or minor stressors. She has diagnoses of spinal 

stenosis, carpal tunnel syndrome, hypothyroidism, depression, and 

fibromyalgia. 

In my opinion she is unlikely to be able to return to work in the future 

and I consider her permanently disabled. 

C. Treating Physician Ruth Lowengart, M.D. 

In January 2012 Dr. Bieraugel referred Gooding to Dr. Lowengmt for evaluation and 

treatment of chronic pain. Tr. 703-09. Dr. Lowengart reviewed numerous imaging studies and 

examined Gooding. Dr. Lowengart advised Dr. Bieraugel that "In my opinion she is completely 

disabled due to the combination of her issues of multiple areas of pain, fatigue, and episodes and 

uncontrollable shaking and shivering." Tr. 709. Dr. Lowengart examined Gooding at least six 

times between January and late April 2012, and concluded Gooding was "permanently disabled 

even without the motor vehicle accident," and was "in my opinion ... completely disabled at this 

time." Tr. 735. In September 2012 Dr. Lowengart wrote a letter "To Whom It May Concern" in 

which she noted she had been treating Gooding since Januaty and "It's my opinion she is 

completely disabled from gainful employment." Tr. 714. 

D. Examining Provider Katherine Greene, Psy. D. 

Dr. Greene examined Gooding on two occasions in October 2011. Tr. 690-94. Dr. 

Greene conducted a clinical interview, interviewed Gooding's boyfriend by telephone, reviewed 

medical records, and administered the Symptom Assessment Checklist 45 (SA-45), Conner's 

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Adult ADHD, Repeatable Battery Assessment ofNeuropsychological Status (RBANS), and 

Trail Making A & B. 

On the SA-45 Gooding's total score was 82T indicating that her "overall emotional 

problems are at the High Risk range." Tr. 692. Gooding's scores in Somatization, Phobic 

Anxiety, Anxiety, and Depression were at the 98th percentile of the referent population. On the 

RBANS Gooding scored at the bottom of the low average range, with borderline scores in 

Attention and Visuospatial/Construtional and at the 16th percentile for Immediate Memory. Tr. 

693. Dr. Greene concluded Gooding's mem01y was mild to moderately impaired, her 

visuospatial/contructional skills were moderately impaired, and she had trouble finding words to 

express herself and frequently had trouble staying on topic and reaching her point. Id. 

Gooding's attention and concentration were severely impaired. On a self-rep01i profile of Adult 

Attention Deficit Gooding scored "Much Above Average" in Inattention/Memory Problems. 

Dr. Greene concluded that "[g]iven [Gooding's] current combination of severe physical, 

emotional and cognitive deficits, it is my opinion that she is not likely to engage in competitive 

employment." Tr. 694. Dr. Greene diagnosed Cognitive Disorder NOS, Panic Attacks with 

Agoraphobia, Depressive Disorder NOS, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, and assessed a GAF 

of45. 

As set out above, the ALJ found Gooding could stand and/or walk for up to four hours in 

an eight hour work day, and found her capable of a reduced range of light work. Tr. 19. The 

ALJ stated on the record that because of Plaintiff's age and limited education, if found limited to 

sedenta1y exertional level work the ALJ would be directed by application of the grids to find 

Gooding disabled. Tr. 52. 

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Social Security Ruling 83-10 provides that light work requires standing/walking for about 

six hours per day, while the ALJ found Gooding could stand/walk for four hours per day. SSR 

83-10*5, Tr. 19-20. Light work is defined as follows: 

(b) Light work. Light woi'k involves lifting no more than 20 pounds 

at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 

10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is 

in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, 

or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and 

pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing 

a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do 

substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we 

determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are 

additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to 

sit for long periods oftime. 

20 C.F.R. § 404. l 567(b ). 

The ALJ gave "significant weight" to the June 2011 opinion of reviewing physician Alan 

J. Coleman, M.D. Tr. 25. Dr. Coleman reviewed medical records and opined that Gooding 

retained the ability to stand for two hours a day and walk for two hours a day, for a total of four 

hours. Tr. 675. Dr. Coleman concluded that Gooding "can perform at a sedentary level of 

activity. I believe the RFC which I gave her reflects this." Tr. 673. 

The ALJ also gave "significant weight" to the opinions of state agency medical 

consultants. Tr. 25. Maty Ann Westfall, M.D., reviewed Gooding's medical record and opined 

in April 2009 that Gooding was able to stand or walk "at least 2 hours in an 8-hour workday." 

Tr. 490. Martin Kehrli, M.D. reviewed Gooding's records and in September 2009 he affirmed 

Dr. Westfall's opinion, stating "Initial RFC of sedentaty with postural limitations is hereby 

affirmed." Tr. 523. 

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The ALJ acknowledged that if limited to sedentary work, Gooding is disabled by the 

application of the medical vocational guidelines. Tr. 52. There is an enormous difference 

between the ability to stand or walk for four hours a day and the ability to stand or walk for six 

hours a day as required for light work. On this record, it is clear that Gooding is limited to, at 

most, sedentary work, and is therefore disabled. 

REMAND 

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for immediate payment of 

benefits is within the discretion of the coutt. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F .3d 172, 1178 (9'h Cir. 

2000), cert. denied, 53 I U.S. I 038 (2000). The issue turns on the utility of further proceedings. 

A remand for an award of benefits is appropriate when no useful purpose would be served by 

further administrative proceedings or when the record has been fully developed and the evidence 

is insufficient to support the Commissioner's decision. Strauss v. Comm '1~ 635 F.3d 1135, 1138-

39 (9'h Cir. 201 l)(quoting Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9'h Cir. 2004)). The coutt 

may not award benefits punitively, and must conduct a "credit-as-trne" analysis to determine if a 

claimant is disabled under the Act. Id at 1138. 

Under the "credit-as-true" doctrine, evidence should be credited and an immediate award 

of benefits directed where: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting such evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a 

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. Id. The "credit-as-true" 

doctrine is not a mandatory rule in the Ninth Circuit, but leaves the coutt flexibility in 

determining whether to enter an award of benefits upon reversing the Commissioner's decision. 

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Case 1:15-cv-01921-PK Document 15 Filed 09/14/16 Page 17 of 18
Connett, 340 F.3d at 876 (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 871 (91

h Cir. 2003)(en bane)). The 

reviewing court should decline to credit testimony when "outstanding issues" remain. Luna v. 

Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035 (91

h Cir. 2010). 

The ALJ' s determination that Gooding is capable of a reduced range of light work is 

erroneous for the reasons set out above. The ALJ acknowledged that if limited to sedentmy work 

Gooding is disabled. Tr. 52. Thus, the court concludes Plaintiff is disabled based on this 

medical record and no useful purpose would be served by a remand of this matter for further 

proceedings. See Harman, 211 F.3d at 117. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner and 

REMANDS this matter to the Commissioner pursuant to Sentence Four, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for 

the immediate calculation and payment of benefits to Plaintiff. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 14th day of September, 2) 

...••. ~ 

onorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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