17-2181 Beltran-De Roque v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A202 075 721/722/723 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of** 3 **New York, on the 8 th**  **day of August, two thousand nineteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **ROBERT A. KATZMANN,** 7 Chief Judge, 8 **RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,** 9 **CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,** 10 Circuit Judges. 11

**_____________________________________** 12 13 **MAYRA BELTRAN-DE ROQUE,** 14 **RAQUEL SUHEY ROQUE-BELTRAN,** 15 **JOSE ARIEL ROQUE-BELTRAN,** 16 17 Petitioners **,** 18 **v. 17-2181** 19 **NAC** 20 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES** 21 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 22 23 Respondent **.** 24

**_____________________________________** 25 26 **FOR PETITIONERS:** Mayra Beltran-De Roque, Pro Se, 27 Brooklyn, NY. 28 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 29 Attorney General; Emily Anne 30 Radford, Assistant Director; David 312 Kim, Trial Attorney, Office of 1 Immigration Litigation, Civil 2 Division, United States Department 3 of Justice, Washington, DC. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DENIED. 9 Petitioners Mayra Beltran-De Roque, and her minor 10 children, Raquel Suhey Roque-Beltran and Jose Ariel Roque11 Beltran, natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of 12 a June 15, 2017 decision of the BIA affirming a November 14, 13 2016 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Beltran14 De Roque’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, 15 and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In 16

re Mayra Beltran-De Roque, Raquel Suhey Roque-Beltran, Jose 17 Ariel Roque-Beltran , Nos. A 202 075 721/722/723 (B.I.A. June 18 15, 2017), aff’g Nos. A 202 075 721/722/723 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 19 City Nov. 14, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 20 the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 21 Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered 22 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of 23 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 448 F.3d 24 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review 253 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin 1 Weng v. Holder , 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Gjolaj v. 2 Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 468 F.3d 140, 143 3 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing nexus determination for substantial 4 evidence). 5 Nexus to a Protected Ground 6 To demonstrate eligibility for asylum and withholding of 7 removal, Beltran-De Roque had to “establish that race, 8 religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 9 group, or political opinion was or will be at least one 10 central reason for” her persecution. 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); In re C-T-L- , 25 12 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010) (applying “one central 13 reason” standard to withholding). The BIA has explained that 14 “the protected ground cannot play a minor role in the alien’s 15 past mistreatment or fears of future mistreatment. That is, 16 it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or 17 subordinate to another reason for harm.” In re J-B-N- & S18

M- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007). However, “asylum 19 may be granted where there is more than one motive for 20 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the 21 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya 22 v. Holder , 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks 234 omitted). An applicant “must provide some evidence of [a 1 persecutor’s motives], direct or circumstantial .” INS v. 2 Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); see also Manzur v. 3 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 494 F.3d 281, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). 4 Beltran-De Roque claimed asylum based on her membership 5 in two particular social groups: (1) her nuclear family; and 6 (2) the related group of Salvadorans who have family ties to 7 the United States. Assuming these social groups are 8 cognizable, the agency reasonably determined that Beltran-De 9 Roque failed to demonstrate that she suffered past 10 persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution 11 on account of her membership in the groups.* 12 Beltran-De Roque’s membership in her family-based social 13 groups was not “a central reason” for her harm. In re J-B14

N- & S-M- , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 214. Beltran-De Roque’s 15 familial status played an incidental role to the gang’s 16 purpose of maintaining its larger criminal enterprise, which 17 affects Salvadoran society at large. See id. ; see also In 18

re L-E-A- , 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 45 (B.I.A. 2017) (“[T]he fact 19

* Although she now argues that the gangs targeted her on account of a gender-based social group, she did not exhaust that argument before the agency and it is not properly before us. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 480 F.3d 104, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining requirement that petitioners exhaust all issues before the BIA).5 that a persecutor has threatened an applicant and members of 1 his family does not necessarily mean that the threats were 2 motivated by family ties. . . . Further, the fact that a 3 persecutor targets a family member simply as a means to an 4 end is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, 5 especially if the end is not connected to another protected 6 ground.”). Additionally, the fact that Beltran-De Roque’s 7 daughter in El Salvador has not been directly threatened by 8 the gangs weighs against a finding of a well-founded fear on 9 account of familial status. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno , 10 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that fear of 11 persecution is undermined when similarly situated family 12 members remain unharmed in the native country). 13 Beltran-De Roque’s statements instead reflect that she 14 was a victim of and feared general crime rather than violence 15 perpetrated by the gangs on account of a particular social 16

group. See id. at 314 (noting that “general crime 17 conditions” are not a protected ground for asylum and 18 withholding of removal). In her asylum application, she 19 conceded that “[n]o one is really safe over there,” and she 20 expressed the same sentiment at her hearing, stating that 21 gangs “seek[] any opportunity to gain money the way they want, 22 or how they want to.” She testified that the gangs targeted 236 other people, including business owners, her daughter’s 1 friend, and rival gang members, and the country conditions 2 evidence reveals that gang violence and extortion affect all 3 sectors of society. Beltran-De Roque was “not in a 4 substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed 5 the gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s 6 interests.” In re S-E-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 587 (B.I.A. 7 2008); see id. (finding no nexus to a protected ground when 8 “gangs have directed harm against anyone and everyone 9 perceived to have interfered with, or who might present a 10 threat to, their criminal enterprises and territorial 11 power”). 12 Absent evidence of her familial status as one central 13 reason for her harm and fear, the criminal activity that 14 Beltran-De Roque suffered and feared is not a basis for asylum 15 or withholding of removal: “When the harm visited upon members 16 of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to 17 ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are 18 tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular 19 social group.’” Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d 20 Cir. 2007). This nexus determination is dispositive of both 21 asylum and withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. 22 §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A). 237 As this determination is dispositive, we do not reach 1 the agency’s alternative finding that the harm Beltran-De 2 Roque experienced did not rise to the level of persecution. 3 See INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general 4 rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on 5 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results 6 they reach.”). 7 Convention Against Torture 8 To receive protection under the CAT, an applicant must 9 “establish that it is more likely t han not that . . . she 10 would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 11 removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as 12 any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 13 or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . at 14 the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 15 public official or other person acting in an official 16 capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see Khouzam v. 17 Ashcroft , 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). 18 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT 19 relief. There is no evidence that the gang members remain 20 interested in Beltran-De Roque or are more likely than not to 21 torture her in the future. She was not tortured in the past. 22
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i) (no ting that “[e]vidence of 238 past torture inflicted upon the applicant” is a factor in CAT 1 analysis). Although she prese nted country conditions 2 evidence of pervasive gang violence, there is no 3 particularized evidence that she would more likely than not 4 be targeted for harm constituting torture. See Mu-Xing Wang 5 v. Ashcroft , 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile Wang’s 6 testimony as well as some of his ‘country conditions’ 7 documents . . . indicate that some prisoners in China have 8 been tortured, Wang has in no way established that someone in 9 his particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not 10 to be tortured if imprisoned in China.”); see also Mu Xiang 11 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) 12 (requiring “particularized evidence” beyond general country 13 conditions to support a CAT claim). And she has not argued 14 or presented evidence that Salvadoran officials would 15 acquiesce in her torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). 16 Given the lack of particularized evidence that Beltran-De 17 Roque would be targeted, subjected to harm amounting to 18 torture, or that the authorities would acquiesce in such 19 torture, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of 20 CAT relief. See Savchuck v. Mukasey , 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d 21 Cir. 2008) (“[A]n alien will never be able to show that [s]he 22 faces a more likely than not chance of torture if one link in 239 the chain cannot be shown to be more likely than not to 1 occur.” (quoting In re J-F-F- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 2 (AG 2006))). 3 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 4 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 5 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 6 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 7 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 8 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 9 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 10 34.1(b). 11
FOR THE COURT: 12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 13 Clerk of Court 14 15