alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2005322EN.01001702.xml

| 17.12.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 322/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.12.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 322/17

---

Designation of the Judge replacing the President of the Tribunal as Judge hearing applications for interim measures

(2005/C 322/10)

On 30 November 2005, in accordance with Article 3(4) of Decision 2004/752 and Article 106 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the Tribunal decided that, for the period from the day of publication in the OJ of the decision of the President of the Court of Justice recording that the Civil Service Tribunal has been constituted in accordance with the law to 30 September 2006, Judge S. Van Raepenbusch, President of the Second Chamber, shall replace the President of the Tribunal as Judge hearing applications for interim measures in the event of the President's absence or his being prevented from attending.

---
*(17*Misc. Rep. 275)

#### LOSEE v. ALLEN.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

June 30, 1896.)

SUFFLEMENTAIIY PltOCEEDINGS—SECOND EXAMINATION—AFFIDAVIT.

An affidavit for a second examination in supplementary proceedings, which states that “certain outstanding contracts and subscriptions due to a certain publication, in which the judgment debtor was interested, were discovered; that deponent [plaintiff’s attorney] has reason to believe that money has come into the hands of the said judgment debtor since *350said examination on account of said contracts and subscriptions,” but which does not specify the publication, and the debtor’s interest therein, and the facts which induced affiant to believe that money had come into defendant’s hands,—is not sufficient.

Appeal from special term.

Action by Alanson F. Losee against Ralph O. Allen. From an order denying a motion to vacate a second order for defendant’s examination in supplementary proceedings, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before VAN WYCK, G. J., and CONRAN, J.

W. M. Thitchener, for appellant.

W. R. Bronk, for respondent.

VAN WYCK, C. J.

The record shows that, prior to the obtaining of the second order for judgment debtor’s examination, he had been fully examined in supplementary proceedings, and a receiver of his property duly appointed. The rule of practice is that, where a debtor has once been fully examined in supplementary proceedings, a second order for his examination will not be granted except upon proof that he has since acquired property, or that an alias execution has been issued or returned unsatisfied. The only proof shown by the record in this regard is that, on the previous examination, “certain outstanding contracts and subscriptions due to a certain publication in which the judgment debtor was interested were discovered; that deponent [plaintiff’s attorney] has reason to believe that moneys have come into the hands of said judgment debtor since said examination on account of said contracts and subscriptions.” The affiant should have stated what publication defendant was interested in, and what was his alleged interest, and the facts which induced affiant to believe that moneys had come into defendant’s hands; so that the judge, might find that such reason existed as to justify affiant in believing, etc., and whether defendant had any interest, and, if so, what interest. Whatever interest the defendant might have was certainly discovered on his first examination, and that interest, whatever it was, had then passed to his receiver. If the affiant had any reason to believe, etc., he should state it, and not hold it in his mind alone. If this averment of reason to believe is sufficient to justify the granting of a second order for a debtor’s examination, it can be repeated ad libitum; and, so often as repeated, orders for his examination will be granted.

The order denying motion to vacate reversed, with costs, and original motion granted;
<PAGE>


                              CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION

                     TO THE RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                               OF OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC.


                FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE DELAWARE SECRETARY OF STATE
                                    ON MAY 1, 1995


         OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Delaware (the "Corporation") hereby certifies that:

    1.   The Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation (the
"Restated Certificate") filed in the Office of the Secretary of State of the
State of Delaware (the "Office") on May 1, 1995 requires correction, as
permitted by Section 103(f) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

    2.   The inaccuracies or defects in the Restated Certificate exist in
Article FOURTH.  Due to an inadvertent error, the Restated Certificate failed to
accurately restate and integrate the provisions of the Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of the Corporation filed in the Office on December 28, 1994, as
amended and supplemented prior to May 1, 1995, in that a paragraph was omitted
from the end of Article FOURTH of the Restated Certificate.

    3.   Article FOURTH of the Restated Certificate is hereby corrected by
adding the following paragraph as the second and last paragraph of Article
FOURTH:

         The Board of Directors is authorized to determine, alter or
         eliminate any or all of the rights, preferences, privileges
         and restrictions granted or imposed upon any wholly unissued
         series of Preferred Shares, and to fix, increase or decrease
         the number of shares comprising any such series and the
         designation thereof, or any of them, and to provide for the
         rights and terms of redemption or conversion of the shares
         of any such series.


                [THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAGE LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY]


<PAGE>

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Oak Technology, Inc. has caused this Certificate
to be signed by its duly authorized officer on this ___ day of July, 1997.


                                       OAK TECHNOLOGY, INC.



                                       By:
                                            ------------------------
                                            Sidney Faulkner
                                            Vice President, Finance, Chief
                                            Financial Officer and Secretary
Exhibit 2 Page 1 of 1
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

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<CHANGES>                                            0
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</TABLE>
#### Hope F. Lennon, Appellant-Respondent, v Edward J. Lennon, Respondent-Appellant.

*789Although Special Term correctly recognized that the parties and the court were entitled to "a liberal and broad discovery process”, it erred in limiting the discovery sought by the wife up "to the year 1980”, i.e., when the instant actions for divorce were commenced. As this court stated in *Lee v Lee*(93 AD2d 221, 226): "The parties not only disagree over the commencement period for disclosure, but also argue over its termination point, with the plaintiff contending that she can inquire concerning the value of the defendant’s assets right up to the time of deposition, while he contends that the cutoff point is the commencement of this action. While it is true that the commencement of the action marks the termination of the time within which marital property can be acquired (see Domestic Relations Law, § 236, part B, subd 1, par c), the wife is not bound by her husband’s estimate of the worth of his assets on that date. An exchange of marital assets for other assets is relevant to the valuation of the exchanged marital assets, and arm’s length transactions after commencement of the action may help to establish the true worth of these assets (see *Aron v Aron,*NYLJ, Sept. 3, 1982, p 7, col 1). Postcommencement information relevant to the valuation of marital assets is thus a proper inquiry” *(see also, Kaye v Kaye,*102 AD2d 682).

*790The order appealed from dated June 10, 1985, as amended October 15, 1985, has therefore been modified to the extent indicated.

The wife also argues that Special Term erred when it noted that, despite the broad discovery granted to her, the husband "does not forfeit his right at trial to claim that any assets acquired between 1970 and 1980 should be categorized as separate property”. It appears that Special Term utilized the year 1970 as the cutoff date for determining whether any particular property was to be considered marital or separate property, based on the fact that the parties were separated pursuant "to a contested judgment of separation” in the wife’s favor entered May 13, 1970.

Insofar as is relevant herein, the Equitable Distribution Law (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]), provides as follows: "The term 'marital property’ shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage *and before the** * * *commencement of a matrimonial action”*(emphasis supplied).

In the case at bar, the separation action commenced by the wife was not only a "matrimonial action” *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2]), but one which clearly signalled the end of the "economic partnership” of the subject marriage. Accordingly, any assets acquired by the defendant after the date of commencement by the plaintiff of the action for a separation and not otherwise the product of a sale or exchange of any marital property should be categorized as separate, rather than marital property.

We have reviewed the remaining arguments raised by both parties and find them to be without merit *(see, Lee v Lee, supra,*at p 227; CPLR 3104 [a]; 5019 [a]). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Spatt, JJ., concur.
#### PEOPLE ex rel. MULLIGAN v. COLLIS.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July 31, 1896.)

Appeal—Record—Striking Out Papers.

The trial court has no power to strike from papers on appeal from order-granting a peremptory mandamus an affidavit recited as one of the papers on which the motion was decided, but the remedy, if the printed papers were not the papers read before the trial court, was to apply to the appellate court to correct the papers.

Appeal from special term, New York county.

Certiorari by Daniel Mulligan to review the determination of Charles H. T. Collis, commissioner of public works of the city of New-York, discharging the relator from the position, of inspector of street opening. A peremptory writ of mandamus was granted, and defendant appealed. Afterwards an order was entered striking out from the papers on appeal an affidavit made by defendant, and from said order he appeals. Reversed.

Argued before BARRETT, RUMSEY, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ.

Terence Farley, for appellant.

John W. Browne, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We do not think that the court below had any power to grant this order. The order appealed from recited, as one of the papers upon which the motion had been decided, the affidavit of Charles H. T. Collis on behalf of the commissioner of public works of the city of New York,—not a draft affidavit, a copy of which had been served upon the relator; and the general rules of practice require that the appeal should be heard, not upon the papers that had been served, but upon the papers that were before the court when the motion was granted. If the printed papers upon appeal were not the court papers that were recited in the order of the court, the proper remedy, of the relator was an application to the appellate court to correct the printed papers that had been filed and served under the provisions of the rule. So long as the order remained in the form in which it was entered, the court below had no right to require the appeal to be heard upon different or other papers than those upon which the motion was decided and the order entered.

The order should therefore be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion below denied, with $10 costs.
****Exhibit 10.4****

**OPTION CERTIFICATE**

This Option Certificate evidences an Option (“Option”) to purchase shares (“Option Shares”) of Common Stock, par value $0.0025, of PacificHealth Laboratories, Inc. (the “Company”) granted to **MICHAEL CAHR**(the “Optionee”) pursuant to the Company’s 1995 Incentive Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”), a copy of which has been furnished to the Optionee simultaneously with the delivery of this Option Certificate. The Option and Option Shares are subject to the terms, conditions, limitations and restrictions set forth in the Plan and the following terms and conditions:

a.        The effective date of the grant of the Option is February 10, 2006, and the number of Option Shares that may be purchased upon exercise of the Option is**THIRTY THOUSAN****D****(30,000) shares** (the “Option Shares”).

b.        The  Option Price shall be **$0.60** per  Option Share.

c.        The Option shall vest, subject to the provisions for early termination set forth herein and in the Plan, on February 10, 2007.

d.        The Option shall be exercisable to purchase Option Shares beginning on the date the Option vests as to such Shares, and shall terminate as to vested Option Shares on February 10, 2011, unless sooner terminated pursuant to the Plan.

e.        The Option may not be exercised as to any Option Share prior to the time that the Option becomes vested as to such Share. 

f.        The Option Price is payable at the time of exercise and shall be paid at the election of the Optionee (i) in cash; or (ii) in such other manner as may be approved by the Board of Directors or Committee of the Board then administering the Plan. 

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF,** this Option Certificate has been executed on behalf of the Company by a duly authorized officer effective this 23rd day of February 2006.

 

|   |   | **PACIFICHEALTH  LABORATORIES, INC.** |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------------|
|        |   | **By:**                          | /s/Robert Portman |
|   |   |                                  |  

 

 

**Robert Portman, President** |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
<CIK>                              0000833054     
<NAME>                             GEODYNE ENERGY INCOME LTD PARTNERSHIP II-C
                                    
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                      12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                     JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                    66,617
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                            157,275
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
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<CHANGES>                                      0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                              10.24
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with
the Amended Quarterly Report of Optical Cable Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended January 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of January 31, 2007, and for the period
then ended.



|                         |  |  |  |                                                                          
|------------------------ |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: September 14, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Neil D. Wilkin, Jr.                                                  
|                         |  |  |  | Neil D. Wilkin, Jr.                                                      
|                         |  |  |  | Chairman of the Board of Directors, President and
Chief Executive Officer
----

Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report ofmPhase Technologies, Inc., a New Jersey corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10Kfor the fiscal year ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Martin S Smiley, EVP, CFO and GeneralCounsel of the Company certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his knowledge:

1. 

TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2. 

Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

/s/ Martin S. Smiley                             Martin S. Smiley         EVP, CFO and General Counsel

October 7, 2009 

----
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Moriyah Lewis, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 206]

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carroll, J.), rendered September 14, 2010, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s specific contention regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence that the gun he was charged with having possessed was operable is not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to move for a trial order of dismissal on the basis of that specific claim *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Hawkins,*11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; *People v Edwards,*81 AD3d 848 [2011]; *People v Hutchinson,*57 AD3d 565, 566 [2008]; *People v Bailey,*19 AD3d 431, 431-432 [2005]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt *(see*Penal Law § 265.03 [1] [b]; *People v Cavines,*70 NY2d 882 [1987]; *People n Benjamin,*24 AD3d 565 [2005] ; *Matter of Shallany S.,*11 AD3d 414 [2004]; *People n Velez,*278 AD 2d 53 [2000]; *People n Blake,*172 AD2d 1027 [1991]; *People v Francis,*126 AD2d 740 [1987]; *cf. People v Brun,*58 AD3d 862, 864-865 [2009], *rend*15 NY3d 875 [2010]).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo, 2*NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006] ).

Finally, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme *879Court did not err in granting the People’s request to dismiss the lesser-included offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree since there was no reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense *(see People v Melendez,*71 AD3d 1166, 1167 [2010]; *People v Tillery,*60 AD3d 1203, 1205-1206 [2009]). Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of

Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, David M. Demshur, Chief Executive Officer of Core Laboratories N.V. (the "Company"), hereby certify that the accompanying report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
June 30, 2009, filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (the "Report").

I further certify that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date: July 23, 2009 | /s/ David M. Demshur          
|------------------- | ------------------------------
|                    | Name: David M. Demshur        
|                    | Title: Chief Executive Officer
|                    |