J-S14039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LYDELL COBBS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 559 WDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0013095-2002, 

CP-02-CR-0013096-2002

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JUNE 12, 2023

Lydell Cobbs (Cobbs) appeals1from the PCRA order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (PCRA court) denying his motion filed 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Cobbs filed one notice of appeal with this Court listing both docket numbers 

despite the holding of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 

2018), that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one 

docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case.” However, 

Cobbs filed the notice of appeal at both dockets in the trial court. Therefore, 

Cobbs complied with Walker’s mandate. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (declining to quash appeal where the 

notice of appeal contained multiple docket numbers that appellant filed at each 

trial court docket).
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pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-9546.

2

 Cobbs 

argues that the court erred in denying his motion because the sentence 

imposed after the revocation of his probation was illegal where it did not credit 

him with time served. We affirm.

This case has a protracted procedural history and we include only those 

pertinent facts we glean from our review of the record.

I.

A.

On October 30, 2002, Cobbs was charged at docket number 2002-13095 

with two counts of first-degree felony involuntary deviate sexual intercourse 

(IDSI) and related charges for criminal conduct involving his six-year-old 

daughter.

3

 He was charged at docket number 2002-13096 with one count 

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2 Cobbs did not title his requests for relief as PCRA petitions. However, 

“regardless of how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after 

a judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief 

contemplated by the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 

995 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted). “[A] petition challenging the 

legality of a sentence on the grounds that the sentence exceeded the statutory 

limit [is] ‘undoubtedly cognizable under the PCRA’ and, therefore, any such 

petition, regardless of its title [is] to be treated as a PCRA petition.” Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d at 467); see also Commonwealth v. 

Perry, 563 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa. Super. 1989) (“[W]hen a petitioner challenges 

the legality of a trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for time served as 

required by law in imposing sentence, that challenge to the sentence [is] 

deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.”).

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(6), 3126(a)(7), 3127, 4302, 4304 and 6301, 

respectively.
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each of IDSI and related charges for the same criminal action against his tenyear-old sister.

4

Cobbs pleaded guilty on April 6, 2004, at both docket numbers with the 

assistance of counsel. Sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a 

presentence investigation report (PSI) and a Megan’s Law evaluation. At the 

August 5, 2004 sentencing and Megan’s Law hearing, the court determined 

Cobbs was a sexually violent predator (SVP) and sentenced him in case 

number 2002-13095 on Count One IDSI to a term of not less than five nor 

more than ten years’ imprisonment

5 and a consecutive term of five years of 

probation, with credit for time served from August 15, 2002, through 

November 23, 2002. At case number 2002-13096, the court sentenced Cobbs 

to a concurrent sentence that was identical to the one imposed at case number 

2002-13095, i.e., not less than five nor more than ten years’ incarceration on 

Count One IDSI with the same credit for time served, and a consecutive period 

of five years’ probation.

On August 27, 2004, Cobbs filed an appeal challenging his SVP 

designation and on July 5, 2005, the Superior Court affirmed his judgment of 

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4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(6), 901(a), 3126(a)(7), 4302 and 6301, respectively.

5 At that time the statutory maximum for the first-degree felony conviction 

was 20 years. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103. The statutory 

maximum sentence for IDSI with a child under 13 years of age was later 

increased to 40 years. See 2002, Dec. 16, P.L. 1953, No. 226, § 1.1 (eff. 

Feb. 14, 2003).
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sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance 

of appeal on December 21, 2005. (See Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 883 A.2d 

685 (Pa. Super. filed July 5, 2005) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 891 A.2d 729 (Pa. 2005).

B.

After serving the ten-year maximum sentence, Cobbs was released on 

probation to a halfway house. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/17/2022, at 1). 

Thereafter, several violation of probation (VOP) hearings were held between 

May 6, 2013, and December 7, 2015, for violations ranging from engaging in 

assaultive behavior, failing to cooperate with Justice Related Services and 

producing an approved housing plan and having a cell phone, contact with

minors and smartphone pictures of minors despite his SVP designation.6

At the March 7, 2016 VOP hearing, after detailing all Cobbs’s violations

while he was on probation, the court revoked his probation and sentenced him 

to a term of incarceration of not less than five nor more than ten years on 

Count One IDSI at docket number 2002-3095 and a consecutive term of not 

less than five nor more than ten years on IDSI at Count One of case number 

2002-3096. At the hearing, Probation Officer Lynne stated incorrectly that 

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6 Cobbs had been ordered “to have no contact with minors, follow lifestyle 

restrictions as they pertain to avoid risk situations, no alcohol and is not to 

own or possess any device that has access to the Internet per his chargespecific conditions.” (N.T. VOP Hearing, 12/07/15, at 3).
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Cobbs had reached the statutory maximum on Count 1 IDSI at docket number 

2002-3095, and that it should be imposed at Count Two, to which the court 

responded in the affirmative. (See id. at 14-15). However, the VOP 

sentencing orders reflect that the five-to-ten-year sentences were properly

imposed for Count One IDSI at both docket numbers. (See VOP Order of 

Sentence 2002-3095, at 1-2); (VOP Order of Sentence 2002-3096, at 1-2).

On March 23, 2016, Cobbs filed a pro se motion to reconsider his VOP 

sentence in which he challenged its discretionary aspects. (See Pro se Motion 

to Reconsider Sentence, 3/23/16, at ¶¶ 1-8). On June 21, 2016, Cobbs filed 

a pro se PCRA petition. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition on 

February 2, 2017, requesting reinstatement of Cobbs’s appellate rights and 

credit for time served. The Commonwealth agreed that Cobb was entitled to 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights on his VOP sentence and to time 

credit from September 15, 2015, to October 2, 2015. On May 8, 2017, the 

court reinstated Cobbs’s direct appeal rights of his VOP sentence and granted 

him time credit from September 15, 2015, to October 2, 2015.

C.

On May 17, 2017, Cobbs filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 

7, 2016 VOP sentence that the court denied on June 7, 2017. Cobb filed a 

notice of appeal, arguing that the court erred in finding that he violated the 

terms of his probation. This Court affirmed the VOP sentence on June 25, 

2018, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Cobbs’s petition for 
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allowance of appeal. (See Commonwealth v. Cobbs, 193 A.3d 1104 (Pa. 

Super. filed June 25, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 198 

A.3d 328 (Pa. 2018).

D.

On September 9, 2019, Cobbs filed a timely pro se PCRA petition arguing 

that he should have received ten years’ credit for time served on the original 

sentence for Count One IDSI in case number 2002-3095. He maintained that 

at the VOP hearing, the court stated it was imposing a sentence on Count Two

IDSI, but the sentencing sheet reflected the sentence was imposed at Count 

One. (See Pro se PCRA Petition, 9/09/19, at 4 ¶ 6(A)). Court-appointed 

counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a Turner/Finley7 no-merit letter. On 

January 13, 2020, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the 

petition and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(1). 

The court granted two requests for an extension of time for Cobbs to respond 

to the Rule 907 notice, ultimately giving him until September24, 2020, to file 

a response, which he did on June 21, 2020.

On August 21, 2020, the court dismissed Cobb’s PCRA petition and 

Cobbs timely appealed to this Court. In his court-ordered Rule 1925(b) 

statement, Cobbs raised ten issues challenging the VOP sentence, including 

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7 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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that the court erred in failing to grant him 3,650 days’ time credit for time 

served in custody. (Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/30/20, at 1 ¶ 2(a)).8 The 

appeal was docketed at 936 WDA 2020.

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8

In his other nine issues, Cobbs claimed:

* * *

b. the trial court erred when it abused its authority when it 

sentenced Appellant to the aggregate 20-year maximum sentence 

after the Appellant had already served the maximum on the 

mitigated sentence on March 7, 2016.

c. the trial court erred when it illegally sentenced Appellant on 

Count Two of the first CC No: 200213095 on March 7, 2016, which 

is a Count that said no further penalty was originally imposed. A 

defendant cannot legally be resentenced on a GWP (without 

further penalty) upon a resentencing.

d. the trial court erred when it resentenced Appellant to 10 years 

and 18 days over the 20-year maximum sentence when it 

resentenced him on March 7, 2016.

e. the trial court erred when it violated Appellant’s due process 

rights at sentencing on March 7, 2016.

f. the trial court erred when it resentenced Appellant for having 5 

female friends on March 7, 2016.

g. the trial court erred when it didn’t resentence Appellant on the 

5 year probation on March 7, 2016.

h. the trial court erred when it resentenced Appellant unjustly and 

was being biased towards Appellant on March 7, 2016.

i. the trial court erred when it resentenced Appellant on expired 

Count One at docket number 200213095.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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E.

In the meantime, on June 17, 2020, Cobbs filed a pro se motion for time 

credit, again requesting that the court credit the ten years he served from 

December 22, 2002, until December 22, 2012. (See Motion for Time Credit, 

6/17/20, at 1). On July 22, 2020, the trial court issued an order that granted 

credit for time served in both cases from February 2, 2013, to March 16, 2015, 

from June 26, 2015, to October 2, 2015, and from November 19, 2015, to 

March 7, 2016 (979 days). The order specified that “no credit is given which 

was previously used in a prior sentence.” (Order, 7/22/20).

Cobbs timely appealed from the July 22, 2020 order. In his courtordered Rule 1925(b) statement, Cobbs raised one claim: “The trial court 

erred when it failed to credit [him] with 3,650 days time credit for time served 

in custody when it resentenced [Cobbs] on March 7, 2016.” (Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 9/08/20, at 1 ¶ 2(a)). The appeal was docketed at 869 WDA 2020.

F.

On November 2, 2020, a panel of this Court addressed Cobbs’s related 

appeals at 869 WDA 2002 and 936 WDA 2002 in one memorandum opinion. 

It quashed the appeal at 869 WDA 2002 for technical reasons, although it 

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j. the trial court erred when it resentenced Appellant without 

allowing Appellant to call on his witness on March 7, 2016.

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/30/20, at 1-2 ¶¶ 2(b)-(j)).
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noted that the PCRA appeal did raise “one cognizable challenge to the legality 

of the VOP sentence concerning the application of time credit” that it

addressed in its consideration of appeal 938 WDA 2002. (Commonwealth 

v. Cobbs, 268 A.3d 395, at *4 n.9 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 2, 2021) 

(unpublished memorandum)). In considering Cobbs’s claim that the trial court 

erred in failing to grant him time credit for the ten years he already served on 

IDSI, the Court observed:

[Cobbs] first claims that his VOP sentence is illegal because 

the 3,650 days he served on his original sentence should count 

toward the VOP sentence. ...

We note that a criminal defendant is entitled to credit for 

time served against the maximum term and any minimum term 

for all “time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending 

sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9760(1). Section 9760 bars a defendant from receiving credit 

against more than one sentence for time served. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 188 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citing Commonwealth v. Merigris, 681 A.2d 194, 195 (Pa.

Super. 1996)).

We conclude that [Cobbs]’s entire argument on this issue is 

misplaced. Cobbs did receive credit for the ten years he served 

on the original sentence, because ... Cobbs “maxed out,” or served 

the entire maximum term of ten years on that sentence for IDSI. 

At the time of [Cobbs]’s criminal acts, IDSI had a statutory 

maximum term of twenty years, Appellant received credit for the 

ten years that he served on the original sentence, the trial court 

ordered [Cobbs] to serve the remaining available ten years under 

the statute, and the trial court awarded [him] with credit for time 

served.[a] [Cobbs]’s VOP sentence of five to ten years, combined 

with the time to which he was previously sentenced, which was 

also five to ten years, does not exceed the twenty-year maximum 

amount of time to which he can be sentenced for each conviction 

for IDSI. [Cobbs]’s VOP sentence is a legal sentence.
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[a] As stated, on July 22, 2020, the trial court also clarified 

its award of time credit. Order, 7/22/20.

(Id. at *5) (record citation and two footnotes omitted).

G.

Cobbs again filed a motion for time credit and corrected commitment on 

March 20, 2022, in which he averred that “he was not given credit for the time 

served in the SCI-Albion 3,650 days ... from 2002 to 12-22-2012.” (Motion 

for Time Credit and Corrected Sentence Commitment, 3/30/22). The court 

denied the motion on April 21, 2022. (Order, 4/21/22). Cobbs timely 

appealed and on August 18, 2022, the court ordered Cobbs to file a Rule 

1925(b) statement within 21 days.

This Court’s docket reflects that on September 8, 2022, Cobbs filed pro 

se correspondence with this Court requesting an extension of time to file his 

Rule 1925(b) statement, which this Court denied without prejudice for Cobbs 

to seek relief in the trial court. (See Order, 9/15/22). On September 26, 

2022, Cobbs filed a Rule 1925(b) statement in this Court, claiming:

a. The lower courts refused to send a new DC 300 court 

commitment (sic) form here to SCI-Forest with the ten years of 

time credit on it so that the D.O.C. and SCI-Forest can fix my 

sentence as it is stated in your superior court November 2nd 2021 

decision.

b. The Da who is Stephen A. Zappala stated in his brief to the 

[S]uperior [C]ourt in (Brief 936 WDA 2020) that I was sentenced 

to just ten years more but I don't have no paper work stating that.

c. The [S]uperior [C]ourt also stated in there (sic) November 2nd 

2021 decision that I was court ordered to serve the remaining ten 

years under the statute in which is a 5 to 10 years sentence.
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d. The department of corrections central office specialist of records 

department Mr. Tony Stair stated that they have not received the 

sentencing order that mentioned anything that states I am to 

receive ten years of credit from the lower courts.

e. On 6/21/2022 I received another letter from the department of 

corrections specialist by the name of Mr. Williams BennageGregory and he stated in his letter to me that in the [S]uperior 

[C]ourt[’]s order dated November 2nd 2021 it does not mention 

anything about my sentence being a 5 to 10 year sentence and 

until they receive an amended order correcting the sentence they 

will not fix my sentence.

f. By not sending an amended order to the department of 

correction will make my sentence illegal still also by not correcting 

this error of giving my ten years credit will put me ten years over 

the 20 year maximum.

g. My maximum date should be June 30th of 2023 not June 30th 

2033 and for the above reasons this motion should be granted.

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/08/22, at 1 ¶ 2 (a)-(g)).

On September 29, 2022, we directed the Prothonotary of this Court to 

provide a copy of the document to the trial court for its convenience. (See

Order, 9/29/22). The trial court docket does not reflect the Rule 1925(b) 

statement, and on November 17, 2022, the court issued a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion finding that Cobbs waived any claims.9

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9

It is well-settled that “in order to preserve their claims for appellate review, 

Appellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925. Any 

issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii). “[T]he purpose of Rule 1925 is to facilitate appellate review 

and to provide the parties and the public with the legal basis for a judicial 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In his brief to this Court, Cobbs raises one issue for our review: “Did 

the trial court err as a matter of law by failing to credit [him] with all time 

served on his original sentence and apply it to his VOP sentence?” (Cobbs’s 

Brief, at 4).

II.

A.

Cobbs argues that his “VOP sentence violates 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) & 

(2), and exceeds the maximum allowable sentence governed by 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1103(1) by ten years making it illegal.” (See id. at 8). The Commonwealth 

treats Cobbs’s request for relief as an untimely PCRA petition that was properly 

dismissed. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 14-21).

As previously noted, regardless of how Cobbs titled his requests for 

relief, “courts are to treat a petition filed after a judgment of sentence 

becomes final as a PCRA petition if it requests relief contemplated by the 

PCRA.” Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 995 (citations omitted). Although Cobbs 

buttresses his argument by adding that the trial court failed to provide a new 

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decision.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1224 (Pa. 2021)

(citation omitted). Instantly, when Cobbs incorrectly filed his Rule 1925(b) 

statement in this Court, the Prothonotary was directed to provide a copy to 

the trial court, which appears not to have happened, so there is no trial court 

opinion addressing his issues or explaining the reasons for its decision. 

However, we may affirm a trial court decision on any legal basis. See 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d 512, 520 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(citation omitted). This Court, the trial and PCRA courts have addressed the 

legality of the VOP sentence before; therefore, we will address Cobbs’s claim.
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commitment order so all his time credit has not been awarded,

10 his claim is 

that his VOP sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum 

where he was not given credit for time served, which is “undoubtedly 

cognizable under the PCRA” and, therefore, it is to be treated as a PCRA 

petition.11 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d at 467); see 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii) (stating that to be eligible for relief under the PCRA, 

the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the sentence resulted from the “imposition of a sentence greater than the 

lawful maximum”); (see also Commonwealth’s Brief, at 15-23).

12

Before considering the merits of Cobb’s claim, we must first determine 

whether it is timely, thus vesting us with jurisdiction. A PCRA petition, 

“including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “Where a 

new sentence is imposed at a probation revocation hearing, the revocation 

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10 (See Cobbs’ Brief, at 11, 14).

11 Cobbs acknowledged this fact where he raised this same claim in his first 

PCRA petition. (See Pro se PCRA Petition, 9/09/19, at ¶ 6(A)). Furthermore, 

unlike in his first motion for time-credit in which he sought clarification of the 

computation of the time-served, which the trial court provided, the only claim 

in the motion for time-credit for our review is that the court erred in not giving

him credit for the ten years’ time served.

12 “Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
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hearing date must be employed when assessing finality under § 9545(b)(3) 

to any issues directly appealable from that hearing.” Commonwealth v. 

Anderson, 788 A.2d 1019, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 798 A.2d 

1286 (Pa. 2002). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

“including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Because the timeliness requirements 

of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature, courts cannot address the merits of 

an untimely petition. See Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 998

(Pa. 2021).

In this matter, Cobbs’s VOP sentence was imposed on March 7, 2016. 

On June 25, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on November 27, 2018. 

Therefore, the VOP sentence became final on February 25, 2019, when Cobb’s 

time to appeal to the United States Supreme Court expired and he had until 

February 25, 2020, to file a timely PCRA petition. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 11. 

His petition filed on March 30, 2022, is untimely on its face and we lack 

jurisdiction to consider any claims raised therein unless Cobbs pleads and 

proves one of the three limited exceptions to the time-bar,

13 which he failed 

to do since he did not acknowledge that his filing was a PCRA petition.

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13 The three limited exceptions to the time-bar are:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Further, in order to be eligible for relief, a PCRA petitioner must 

demonstrate that his allegation of error “has not been previously litigated or 

waived.” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Previous litigation is defined in relevant 

part as follows: “For purposes of this subchapter, an issue has been previously 

litigated if: ... the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have 

had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue [.]”. 42 

Pa. C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2); Commonwealth v. Derk, 913 A.2d 875, 881 (Pa. 

Super. 2006).

Previously, this Court addressed Cobbs’s following claim: “Whether the 

trial court erred when it failed to credit Appellant with 3,650 days of credit for 

time served in custody when it resentenced [him] on March 7, 2016[,]” which 

in practical effect is the same issue he now raises. (Cobbs, 268 A.3d at *5);

(see Cobbs’s Brief, at 10). Therefore, the issue was previously litigated and 

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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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this Court affirmed the VOP sentence specifically addressing the time-served 

argument.

Cobbs appears to be confused about the Court’s memorandum opinion 

because this Court affirmed the VOP sentence so it is unclear why he believes 

the trial court was directed to change it or provide a new commitment order. 

We remind Cobbs that, “upon sentencing following a revocation of probation, 

the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have 

imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Bowser, 783 A.2d 348, 349 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation 

omitted). This Court concluded that Cobbs’s issue had no merit where the 

maximum sentence he originally could have received for Count One IDSI at 

13095-2002 was 20 years, he served his maximum ten on the original 

sentence, and upon revocation, in consideration of the fact that Cobbs had 

served ten years of the 20-year maximum, the court sentenced him to only 

five to ten more years on that count. The fact that he was sentenced to a

consecutive term of five to ten years at case number 13096-2002 is of no 

moment because, at the time of the original sentence, Cobbs could have 

received a maximum 20-year term on both counts, not just on either one, as

they involved criminal behavior against a different victim.

In sum, even if timely filed, this issue was previously litigated, found to 

have no merit, and Cobbs is due no relief where the sentence is not illegal and 

considers time served.
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B.

We also note that Cobbs argues that his juvenile adjudication for 

robbery was assigned an incorrect record score and this resulted in an illegal 

sentence. (See Cobbs’s Brief, at 14-15). The Commonwealth responds that 

this issue is waived for Cobbs’s failure to include it in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement or to provide any support for the claim. (See Commonwealth’s 

Brief, at 22).

We agree with the Commonwealth that Cobbs did not include this 

challenge as one of the seven issues he raised in the filed Rule 1925(b) 

statement, resulting in waiver. (See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/23/22); 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 273 A.3d 1228, 1239 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(finding claim waived where appellant failed to raise specific issue in in his 

Rule 1925(b) statement); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).

Further, this claim is neither included in Cobbs’s statement of questions 

involved nor is it fairly suggested thereby in violation of Rule 2116(a). See

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the 

statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”);

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 342 (Pa. Super. 2013) (waiving 

issue not raised in statement of questions involved).

Finally, his brief argument on this issue is inadequate where it only cites 

boilerplate law about prior record scores and provides no citations to the 

record or any specifics about how that law was allegedly misapplied in his 
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case. (See Cobbs’s Brief, at 14-15); see Pa.R.A.P. 2101(a), (c). Therefore, 

the claim is waived on this basis as well.

For all these reasons, Cobbs is due no relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/12/2023