II

Calendar No. 345

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1873

[Report No. 105–175]

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a

missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United

States against limited ballistic missile attack.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 27, 1998

Mr. COCHRAN (for himself, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. LOTT, Mr.

THURMOND, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. HELMS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. LUGAR, Mr.

NICKLES, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. BURNS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. KEMPTHORNE,

Mr. ALLARD, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr.

SHELBY, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. BOND, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. FRIST, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. KYL, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. MCCAIN, Ms.

SNOWE, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. ENZI, Ms. COLLINS, Mr.

GRAMM, Mr. HATCH, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SPECTER, Mr.

HUTCHINSON, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. SANTORUM, and Mr. AKAKA) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

APRIL 24, 1998

Reported by Mr. THURMOND, without amendment

A BILL

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending
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the territory of the United States against limited ballistic

missile attack.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘American Missile Pro5 tection Act of 1998’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction

9 delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among

10 the most serious security issues facing the United

11 States.

12 (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President

13 Clinton certified, that ‘‘I . . . find that the pro14 liferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical

15 weapons (‘weapons of mass destruction’) and

16 the means of delivering such weapons, con17 stitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to

18 the national security, foreign policy, and econ19 omy of the United States, and hereby declare a

20 national emergency to deal with that threat.’’

21 This state of emergency was reaffirmed in

22 1995, 1996, and 1997.

23 (B) In 1994 the President stated, that

24 ‘‘there is nothing more important to our secu-
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1 rity and the world’s stability than preventing

2 the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic mis3 siles’’.

4 (C) Several countries hostile to the United

5 States have been particularly determined to ac6 quire missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

7 President Clinton observed in January of 1998,

8 for example, that ‘‘Saddam Hussein has spent

9 the better part of this decade, and much of his

10 nation’s wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi

11 people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and

12 biological weapons and the missiles to deliver

13 them’’.

14 (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ‘‘it

15 is in the supreme interest of the United States

16 to defend itself from the threat of limited ballis17 tic missile attack, whatever the source.’’

18 (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the

19 United States is increasing.

20 (A) Several adversaries of the United

21 States have stated their intention to acquire

22 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of at23 tacking the United States.

24 (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi

25 has stated, ‘‘If they know that you have a
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1 deterrent force capable of hitting the

2 United States, they would not be able to

3 hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent—

4 missiles that could reach New York—we

5 would have hit it at the same moment.

6 Consequently, we should build this force so

7 that they and others will no longer think

8 about an attack.’’

9 (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Pal10 estine Liberation Front, has stated, ‘‘I

11 would love to be able to reach the Amer12 ican shore, but this is very difficult. Some13 day an Arab country will have ballistic

14 missiles. Someday an Arab country will

15 have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the

16 United States and for Israel to reach peace

17 with the Palestinians before that day.’’

18 (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated,

19 ‘‘Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If

20 we could reach Washington, we would

21 strike if the need arose.’’

22 (iv) Iranian actions speak for them23 selves. Iran’s aggressive pursuit of me24 dium-range ballistic missiles capable of

25 striking Central Europe—aided by the con-
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1 tinuing collaboration of outside agents—

2 demonstrates Tehran’s intent to acquire

3 ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.

4 (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess

5 ballistic missiles, with at least 10 of those coun6 tries developing over 20 new types of ballistic

7 missiles.

8 (C) From the end of World War II until

9 1980, ballistic missiles were used in one con10 flict. Since 1980, thousands of ballistic missiles

11 have been fired in at least six different con12 flicts.

13 (D) The clear trend among countries hos14 tile to the United States is toward having ballis15 tic missiles of greater range.

16 (i) North Korea first acquired 300-kil17 ometer range Scud Bs, then developed and

18 deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is

19 currently deploying the 1000-kilometer

20 range No-Dong, and is developing the

21 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and

22 6000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2,

23 which would be capable of striking Alaska

24 and Hawaii.
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1 (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range

2 CSS-8s, progressed through the Scud B

3 and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-

4 kilometer range Shahab-3 and 2000-kilo5 meter range Shahab-4, which would allow

6 Iran to strike Central Europe.

7 (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash pro8 gram, produced a new missile, the Al-Hus9 sein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.

10 (iv) Experience gained from extending

11 the range of short- and medium-range bal12 listic missiles facilitates the development of

13 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

14 (E) The technical information, hardware,

15 and other resources necessary to build ballistic

16 missiles are increasingly available and accessible

17 worldwide.

18 (i) Due to advances in information

19 technology, a vast amount of technical in20 formation relating to ballistic missile de21 sign, much of it formerly classified, has be22 come widely available and is increasingly

23 accessible through the Internet and other

24 distribution avenues.
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1 (ii) Components, tools, and materials

2 to support ballistic missile development are

3 increasingly available in the commercial

4 aerospace industry.

5 (iii) Increasing demand for satellite6 based telecommunications is adding to the

7 demand for commercial Space Launch Ve8 hicles, which employ technology that is es9 sentially identical to that of interconti10 nental ballistic missiles. As this increasing

11 demand is met, the technology and exper12 tise associated with space launch vehicles

13 also proliferate.

14 (F) Russia and China have provided sig15 nificant technical assistance to rogue nation

16 ballistic missile programs, accelerating the pace

17 of those efforts. In June of 1997, the Director

18 of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress

19 on weapons of mass destruction-related equip20 ment, materials, and technology, stated that

21 ‘‘China and Russia continued to be the primary

22 suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to

23 stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern

24 weapons to countries of concern.’’
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1 (G) Russia and China continue to engage

2 in missile proliferation.

3 (i) Despite numerous Russian assur4 ances not to assist Iran with its ballistic

5 missile program, the Deputy Assistant Sec6 retary of State for Nonproliferation testi7 fied to the Senate, that ‘‘the problem is

8 this: there is a disconnect between those

9 reassurances, which we welcome, and what

10 we believe is actually occurring.’’

11 (ii) Regarding China’s actions to dem12 onstrate the sincerity of its commitment to

13 nonproliferation, the Director of Central

14 Intelligence testified to the Senate on Jan15 uary 28, 1998, that, ‘‘the jury is still out

16 on whether the recent changes are broad

17 enough in scope and whether they will hold

18 over the longer term. As such, Chinese ac19 tivities in this area will require continued

20 close watching.’’

21 (H) The inability of the United States to

22 defend itself against weapons of mass destruc23 tion delivered by long-range ballistic missile

24 provides additional incentive for hostile nations

25 to develop long-range ballistic missiles with
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1 which to threaten the United States. Missiles

2 are widely viewed as valuable tools for deterring

3 and coercing a vulnerable United States.

4 (3) The ability of the United States to antici5 pate future ballistic missile threats is questionable.

6 (A) The Intelligence Community has failed

7 to anticipate many past technical innovations

8 (for example, Iraq’s extended-range Al-Hussein

9 missiles and its development of a space launch

10 vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue

11 states to surmount traditional technological ob12 stacles to obtaining or developing ballistic mis13 siles of increasing range.

14 (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen15 tral Intelligence reported to Congress that

16 ‘‘many Third World countries—with Iran being

17 the most prominent example—are responding to

18 Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying

19 more on legitimate commercial firms as pro20 curement fronts and by developing more con21 voluted procurement networks.’’

22 (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen23 tral Intelligence stated to Congress that ‘‘gaps

24 and uncertainties preclude a good projection of
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1 exactly when ‘rest of the world’ countries will

2 deploy ICBMs.’’

3 (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intel4 ligence testified that Iran would have a me5 dium-range missile by 2007. One year later the

6 Director stated, ‘‘since I testified, Iran’s suc7 cess in getting technology and materials from

8 Russian companies, combined with recent indig9 enous Iranian advances, means that it could

10 have a medium-range missile much sooner than

11 I assessed last year.’’ Department of State offi12 cials have testified that Iran could be prepared

13 to deploy such a missile as early as late 1998,

14 nine years earlier than had been predicted one

15 year before by the Director of Central Intel16 ligence.

17 (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long18 range ballistic missile threats could have severe na19 tional security and foreign policy consequences for

20 the United States.

21 (A) An attack on the United States by a

22 ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass

23 destruction could inflict catastrophic death or

24 injury to citizens of the United States and se25 vere damage to their property.
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1 (B) A rogue state’s ability to threaten the

2 United States with an intercontinental ballistic

3 missile may constrain the United States’ op4 tions in dealing with regional threats to its in5 terests, deter the United States from taking ap6 propriate action, or prompt allies to question

7 United States security guarantees, thereby

8 weakening alliances of the United States and

9 the United States’ world leadership position.

10 (5) The United States must be prepared for

11 rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles

12 armed with weapons of mass destruction.

13 (A) In its resolution of ratification for the

14 START II Treaty, the United States Senate

15 declared that ‘‘because deterrence may be inad16 equate to protect the United States against

17 long-range ballistic missile threats, missile de18 fenses are a necessary part of new deterrent

19 strategies.’’

20 (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of

21 Defense Perry stated that in the post-Cold War

22 era, ‘‘we now have opportunity to create a new

23 relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual

24 Assured Destruction, but rather on another ac25 ronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.’’
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1 (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Sec2 retary of Defense for Policy testified to the

3 Senate that ‘‘I and the administration are quite

4 willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue

5 state, a potential proliferant, beginning to de6 velop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching

7 the United States, we would have to give very,

8 very serious attention to deploying a limited na9 tional missile defense.’’

10 (6) The United States has no defense deployed

11 against weapons of mass destruction delivered by

12 long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy

13 such a national missile defense system.

14 SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

15 It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon

16 as is technologically possible an effective National Missile

17 Defense system capable of defending the territory of the

18 United States against limited ballistic missile attack

19 (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).
Calendar No. 345

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1873

[Report No. 105–175]

A BILL

To state the policy of the United States regarding

States against limited ballistic missile attack.ble of defending the territory of the Unitedthe deployment of a missile defense system capaAPRIL 24, 1998

Reported without amendment