IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

AMY ROBERTSON 0/B/O 

C.C., A MINOR 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

Civ. No. 6:15-cv-903-CL 

OPINION AND 

ORDER 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

CLARKE, Magistrate Judge. 

Plaintiff Amy Robertson seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's 

final decision denying the application of her minor son, C.C., for Supplemental Security Income 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g), and reviews to determine that the Commissioner's decision was based upon substantial 

evidence. Treichler v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (91

h Cir. 2014). All 

parties have consented to entry of final judgment by a Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. The Commissioner's decision should be REVERSED 

and REMANDED for the immediate calculation and award of benefits. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

C.C. was born in 2001, and alleges disability since age seven. His 2009 application for SSI 

is based upon a combination of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), adjustment 

disorder with depressed mood, oppositional defiant disorder, enuresis (bedwetting), and 

associated behavioral issues. The Commissioner denied his initial application. An 

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing and again found him not disabled on July 29, 

2010. Admin. R. 17-30; 344-57. C.C. appealed to this Court. On August 14, 2013, this Court 

remanded the matter for further proceedings, directing the Commissioner to develop the record. 

Id. 367-99. A different ALJ held a second hearing on July 14, 2014 (id. at 319), and again 

found C.C. not disabled on January 23, 2015. Id. at 298-314. C.C. is now approximately fifteen 

years old, and his application for childhood disability benefits has been pending for at least seven 

years. 

II. Disability Analysis for Children 

The Commissioner evaluates childhood disability under a three-step regulatory process. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.924. The Commissioner determines if the child (1) has a "severe" impairment or 

combination of impairments; (2) that meets or medically equal a "listed" impairment; or (3) 

"functionally equals" a "listed" impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). Childhood disability 

determinations utilize a variety of evidential sources, including medical records, test scores, and 

information from parents, caregivers, teachers, and school personnel. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). 

Though limitations must result from a medically determinable impairment, the Commissioner 

looks to a child's functioning in comparison to his peers. 20 C.F.R. § 924(b)(l-3). Here, 

analysis is directed to six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and 

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completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating to others; ( 4) moving about and manipulating 

objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l). 

III. The ALJ's Findings 

The ALJ found C.C.' s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, adjustment disorder with 

depressed mood, oppositional defiant disorder, and nocturnal enuresis (bedwetting) to be 

"severe" impairments pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). Admin. R. 301. She found C.C.'s 

alleged depressive mood disorder and intellectual disability nonsevere. Id. at 302. The ALJ 

subsequently found that C.C. 's impairments did not meet or medically equal a listing. Id. 

Finally, she found that his impairments did not functionally equal the severity of any listed 

disorder, and therefore found him not disabled. Id. at 303-04. 

IV. Analysis 

Ms. Robertson, on behalf of C.C., challenges the ALJ's finding that C.C. did not meet, equal, 

or functionally equal the regulatory listings. She specifically argues that the ALJ failed to give 

appropriate weight to her own testimony and the opinions of C.C. 's treating psychiatrist, treating 

physician and an evaluating psychologist, and failed to properly weigh the testimony of his first 

grade teacher in the context of the record as a whole. Throughout, she argues that the ALJ failed 

to comply with this Court's August 14, 2013 remand order, and asserts that C.C. is disabled 

because his impairments and their effects functionally equal childhood disability listings. 

A. Ms. Robertson's Testimony 

C.C. 'smother, Amy Robertson, testified at length at both his July 20, 2010 hearing and 

his July 18, 2014 hearing. She also submitted numerous reports and questionnaires to the record. 

Ill 

Ill 

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1. 2010 Hearing Testimony 

Ms. Robertson's July 2010 testimony stated that C.C. had twice been suspended from 

school, and was "kicked off' the school bus. Admin. R. 415. She stated that C.C. has a 

"different way of thinking," that he does not have a lot of friends, and cannot keep friends. Id. at 

417. Here she explained that C.C. hits and yells at other children, says "really mean things to 

them," and, in one instance, had a playmate for "like two days" whom he then punched in the 

stomach, resulting in a police call. Id. at 421, 424. Because of this behavior C.C. "doesn't have 

anybody." Id. at 424. C.C. also grabs his younger brother's ears "really tight" and has "choked 

him before." Id. at 424-25. Ms. Robertson, therefore, remains in the room when C.C. is with his 

brother. Id. at 425. 

Ms. Robertson also stated that C.C. set a bed on fire and, despite the fire, continued to 

play with Legos on the bed. Id. at 423. She reported that C.C. ripped the shell and eyes off of a 

snail, id. at 417, squeezed a gerbil and threw it against a wall, id. at 420, and rips wings off flies. 

Id. at 421. Ms. Robertson stated that this "really worries me." Id. at 525. Ms. Robertson 

explained that she cannot allow C.C. unsupervised time with family pets, and that he breaks toys 

and scraped drywall off the house. Id. at 417-18. 

Ms. Robertson also testified that C.C. has problems with focus and attention "all the 

time," and that his teacher makes him sit outside the door at school because he is disruptive in 

class. Id. at 419. C.C. cannot stay on task in performing simple household chores without 

correction and re-guidance because "everything distracts [C.C.]." Id. at 419-20. When he 

cannot "figure something out" he throws objects, walks away, and becomes angry "at everybody 

in general." Id. at 420. In response to questioning, she affirmed that C.C. has a problem 

understanding right from wrong. Id. at 422. 

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2. 2014 Hearing Testimony 

At C.C.'s 2014 hearing, Ms. Robertson testified that C.C. was now in middle school, and 

that his difficulties in staying on task in school were "harder" for the middle school to handle. 

Admin. R. 328. In response to questioning, she affirmed that she was scared that C.C.'s 

"horseplay" behavior would "cross the line" into pushing someone down stairs or injuring 

someone. Id. at 328. Ms. Robertson testified that, earlier in the day, C.C. was "stomping" on his 

sleeping younger brother following a dispute regarding a ring. Id. C.C. refused to go to school 

for some time, which required a home visit from school personnel. Id. at 329. Ms. Robertson 

stated she was discussing initiation of an IEP (Individualized Education Plan) 1 with the school 

because of C.C.'s behavior, but that the issue could not be addressed until C.C.'s attendance 

normalized. Id. at 330. Finally, Ms. Robertson testified that it appeared to her that C.C.'s 

medication was "either wearing off or it's just not working," id. at 333, and that the community 

counseling program treating C.C. felt that he was not progressing. Id. at 334. 

3. Disability Function Reports 

Finally, Ms. Robertson submitted various forms describing C.C.'s impairments and 

behavior in conjunction with his disability application and appeals. Here she stated that 

"students['] parents at school are threatening to take [their] kids out of school because of his 

behavior" (id. at 156), and "he's everywhere .... He can pay attention for maybe 5 minutes at a 

time." Id. at 143. An undated report in association with C.C.'s appeal states that, beginning on 

approximately April 1, 2009, "now he has real bad night terrors and stomach aches." Id. at 180. 

Ms. Robertson finally wrote that it is "hard to cope at school." Id. at 182. 

1 "IEP" refers to an "Individualized Education Program" pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities in Education 

Act ("IDEA"). The IEP is a "written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and 

revised in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)." 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (14). The fact that a child claimant receives 

special education services is irrelevant to determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b )(7)(iv). 

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4. Analysis 

The ALJ described Ms. Robertson's testimony: 

At the hearing, Ms. Robertson called ADHD as the big issue for 

her son. She reported the claimant could not be kept on task. Her 

testimony further indicated that the school wanted the claimant to 

have an independent2 education plan (IEP). By her report, the 

claimant's math skills were quite low and he was not doing well at 

school. Although he had a couple of friends, he had trouble 

interacting with other children, as evidenced by hurting younger 

children such as his brother. Ms. Robertson also provided the 

information that her son was kicked out of the pool indefinitely at 

Coquille while visiting his grandmother. At that time, he was also 

involved in trouble with the police for damaging a park fence. 

Admin. R. 304. This does not fully surmise Ms. Robertson's testimony, described above. 

Furthermore, the ALJ gave no reasons for rejecting this testimony, or failing to give it full 

weight. Id. Instead, the ALJ issued a boilerplate finding that these statements were "not entirely 

credible for the reasons explained below." Id. The ALJ then stated that the "evidentiary record 

fails to support the degree of limitation alleged by claimant's mother," and proceeded without 

further reference to Ms. Robertson's testimony. Id. at 304-05. 

The regulations direct that the ALJ consider lay testimony addressing the severity of a 

claimant's limitations, "or, if you are a child, how you typically function compared to children 

your age who do not have impairments." 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d). This direction is emphasized 

in determination of childhood disability claims; here, evidence from parents is a "basic 

consideration." 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(l). This is because "every child is unique, so the effects 

of ... impairment(s)" on a child's functioning "may be very different from the effects the same 

impairment(s) might have on another child." Id. at § (2). Further, "parents and other caregivers 

2 See note 1. 

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can be important sources of information because they usually see [the claimant] every day." Id. 

at§ (2)(i). 

The ALJ must give reasons "germane" to the witness in rejecting lay testimony, and such 

testimony "cannot be disregarded without comment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996)) (emphasis 

original). Here, the ALJ made no effort to either assess Ms. Robertson's testimony in its entirety 

or clearly set out the manner in which other evidence of record contradicts her testimony 

regarding C.C.'s behavior and associated limitations. The evidence the ALJ purported to rely 

upon, discussed below, supports - rather than undermines - Ms. Robertson's testimony. The 

ALJ' s truncated and boilerplate evaluation cannot now constitute a "germane" reason for 

rejecting Ms. Robertson's testimony, and therefore is not sustained. 

B. Physician Opinions 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between treating, examining, and reviewing physicians in 

its review of the Commissioner's disability determinations. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). A treating physician's opinion "must be given controlling weight if that opinion 

is well supported and not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record." 

Edlund v. Massinari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ is tasked with resolving 

"conflicting medical evidence" on the matter, but "must present clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting the uncontroverted opinion of a claimant's physician." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 

947, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002). An examining physician's opinion is, in tum, accorded greater 

weight than that of a reviewing physician, and the ALJ must set out "specific, legitimate" 

reasons for rejecting the opinion of an examining physician for that of a reviewing physician. 

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 831). 

Page 7 - OPINION & ORDER 

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1. Treating Psychiatrist Franc Strgar, M.D. 

Child psychiatrist Dr. Strgar met with C.C. and his family members in 2012 and 2013. 

Admin. R. 544-49. The record indicates that Dr. Strgar treated C.C. on at least one additional 

interval during this period. Id. at 547. In 2014, Ms. Robertson testified that C.C. had been 

seeing Dr. Strgar for "I'd say a year and a half." Id. at 326. 

Dr. Strgar diagnosed ADHD and oppositional defiant disorder, and noted a rule-out mood 

disorder impression on August 24, 2012. Id. at 545. Dr. Strgar assessed a Global Assessment of 

Functioning ("GAF")3 score of 60. Id. at 546. 

On September 23, 2013, Dr. Strgar made the same diagnoses, and additionally noted 

"problems with primary support group, social problems, academic problems." Id. at 548. Here 

Dr. Strgar discussed C.C.'s evident distress, and history of worsening behavior difficulties, 

where C.C. was noted to be "defiant, irritable, and even aggressive." Id. at 547. Dr. Strgar 

assessed a GAF score of 50-55. Id. at 548. 

Finally, on July 16, 2014, C.C.'s attorney submitted a questionnaire to Dr. Strgar, asking 

"Do you agree with Dr. Greneir that [C.C.] is "markedly" limited in his ability to Attend and 

Complete Tasks, and Interact and Relate with Others?" Id. at 554. Dr. Strgar checked "yes" and 

provided a narrative explanation citing C.C.'s diagnosis, longitudinal history, and stating "C.C. 

has not realized significant improvement" regarding his attentional issues, and that C.C. does not 

relate appropriately to others in multiple settings. Id. at 554-555. 

The ALJ gave "partial" weight to Dr. Strgar's opinion, stating that evidence did not 

support a marked limitation in C.C.'s ability to attend and complete tasks. Id. at 305. This 

3 The Global Assessment of Functioning is a standardized measure of a clinician's judgment of a claimant's overall 

level of functioning. It is included in standardized psychological reports. Am. Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual, Fourth Ed., Text Rev. (2000), p. 32. 

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analysis does not sufficiently discredit Dr. Strgar's opinion. The ALJ must give clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting a treating physician's opinion, Thomas, 278 F.3d at 956-57, and 

must generally give more weight to the opinion of a medical specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(d)(5). Here, the ALJ did not specify contemporary and probative evidence 

contradicting Dr. Strgar's opinions rendered during the period during which he treated C.C. The 

ALJ therefore failed to properly reject this opinion. 

The ALJ separately addressed Dr. Strgar's global assessment of functioning findings. 

Admin. R. 305. She cited Dr. Strgar's GAF analysis, but did not acknowledge that it was 

embedded in Dr. Strgar's opinion, instead stating "GAF scores are highly subjective, 

intertwining psychological symptoms, physical impairments, and socioeconomic factors." Id. 

She concluded, "Therefore, I cannot place a high degree of reliance on these scores or on the 

opinions associated with them." Id. This cursory assessment fails to acknowledge that Dr. 

Strgar made a customary GAF analysis in the context of standardized clinical exam. Further, it 

provides no analysis regarding the extent to which the GAF assessment is supported by Dr. 

Strgar's opinion as C.C. treating specialist. 

In summary, the ALJ's determination that Dr. Strgar's opinion merited "partial" weight 

only is not sustained. 

2. Treating Physician Catherine Grenier, M.D. 

Pediatrician Dr. Grenier and her colleagues have provided C.C.'s primary care for most 

of his childhood and throughout the period under review. See id. at 286-94; 488-413, 514-541. 

The Ninth Circuit allows consideration of continuity of care and clinic staffing in assessment of a 

treating physician's opinion, Benton v. Barnhart, 331F.3d1030, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2003), and a 

general physician is competent to assess psychiatric diagnoses pertaining to disability 

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determinations. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirmed by Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d at 833). 

Ms. Robertson testified at C.C.'s 2010 hearing that C.C. sees Dr. Grenier "once every 

five months" for management of his mental health issues. Admin. R. 416. She stated at the 

second hearing, in 2014, that Dr. Grenier referred C.C. to Dr. Strgar for mental health treatment, 

but continued to provide generalized pediatric care. Id at 326. 

This Court's August 14, 2013 remand order extensively discussed Dr. Grenier's earlier 

treatment records and her associated July 28, 2010 disability opinion. Id at 373-76, 385-86. 

The Court noted that Dr. Grenier's 2010 disability opinion was limited, but stated that it and 

other evidence triggered the ALJ's duty to develop the record. Id at 396. It specifically ordered 

the Commissioner to: 

[O]btain and evaluate: (1) an explanation from Dr. Grenier for her 

check-box answers on the form supplied by C.C.'s attorney 

indicating C.C. has a marked limitation in the ability to attend and 

complete tasks, and to interact and relate with others; and that 

C.C.'s marked impairment continues despite medication ... ; (2) an 

explanation for the reason Dr. Grenier stopped treating C.C.; (3) a 

more recent evaluation report and/or testimony by Dr. Grenier, or 

another acceptable medical source with appropriate training and 

experience, regarding C.C.'s functional limitations .... 

Admin. R. 398. The record shows that the matter was subsequently discussed at C.C.'s July 18, 

2014 hearing. The ALJ addressed C.C.'s mother, Ms. Robertson: 

And when I looked at this, I saw Dr. [Grenier], one of her 

statements is something that the District Court really honed in on, 

and they said, try to get more information from Dr. Grenier. And I 

know because she was our pediatrician at the time too, that she's 

retired. Is that right? Is she retired? 

Id. at 325. Ms. Robertson replied, "I don't think so because they just [sic] seen her a couple 

months ago for a checkup." The ALJ replied, "Really?" and reported that her own husband had 

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stated Dr. Grenier was retired. Id This conversation continued, and the ALJ concluded, "I'm 

thinking what we may need to do, after the hearing, is ask her for some more information" in 

light of this Court's remand order. Id. at 326. Ms. Robertson affirmed that C.C. is still under Dr. 

Grenier's care. Id. She also stated that Dr. Grenier referred C.C. to Dr. Strgar approximately a 

year and a half ago as well, but had recently seen C.C. for an annual checkup. Id. at 327. C.C.'s 

attorney later submitted the updated medical records. Admin. R. 463-543. 

On July 28, 2010, Dr. Grenier completed a form, which stated that, in reference to the 

Commissioner's regulatory definitions, she found C.C. "markedly" limited in his ability to 

"attend and complete tasks" and "interact and relate with others." Id. at 207. Dr. Grenier also 

affirmed that medication improves these symptoms, but that C.C. "still demonstrates marked 

levels of impairment despite medication." Id. at 208. 

On July 16, 2014, Dr. Grenier submitted a letter of clarification to the record regarding 

her July 28, 2010 statement, which addresses C.C.'s ability to attend and complete tasks: 

[C.C.] has had difficulty with school performance this year. 

Mother reported at 4/14 visit that he had 2 D's and 2 F's. He is 

currently being treated for ADHD by psychiatrist Dr. Strgar who 

may be able to produce more detailed information regarding these 

[illegible]. 

Admin. R. 543. 

The ALJ gave only "some" weight to Dr. Grenier's opinion because she "failed to 

provide any evidence to establish her contentions of marked limitations .... " Id. at 305. Dr. 

Grenier's longitudinal record cited above contradicts this finding. Dr. Grenier's opinions are 

supported by voluminous treatment notes and, by her own reference, also supported by Dr. 

Strgar's concurrent opinions. The ALJ's evaluation of treating physician Dr. Grenier's opinion 

therefore is not based upon clear and convincing evidence, and is not sustained. 

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3. Examining Psychologist Pamela Roman, Ph.D. 

Dr. Roman evaluated C.C. on or about February 6, 2014,4 when C.C. was 11 years old. 

Admin. R. 456-61. She performed the evaluation at the request of the Oregon Department of 

Health and Human Services, and indicted that she reviewed a variety of C.C.'s medical records 

from numerous medical sources which she clearly identified. Id at 456. Dr. Roman also 

administered clinical tests and performed her own clinical evaluation, id at 457-59, and stated 

that "information presented during the interview was consistent with the medical evidence 

reviewed from 2008." Id. at 459. 

Dr. Roman assessed ADHD, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, "enuresis 

[bedwetting] nocturnal only," and a rule-out diagnosis of "intellectual disability." Id. Regarding 

C. C. 's interpersonal issues, Dr. Roman stated that he has "set two fires and pinches his mother's 

dog's ears," and mocked a classmate in a school program and was asked not to return. Id. She 

also stated that C.C.'s mother reported that he has been depressed since his brother's death three 

years prior, and described him as "being worried, fearful and irritable at times." Id. 

The ALJ briefly noted this report, emphasizing that it was based in part upon statements 

made by C.C.'s mother, without "testing and further analysis," and stated that it "provides a 

'snapshot' of the claimant's condition at a particular time, rather than a longitudinal view of his 

functional level." Id. at 305. 

This summation does not reflect the record. Dr. Roman clearly stated that she based her 

report in part upon a longitudinal review of C.C.'s 2008 medical records. Id. at 459. The ALJ's 

analysis therefore does not reflect Dr. Roman's opinion. The ALJ also failed to properly 

4 Dr. Roman's report left the evaluation date blank, but the associated invoice indicates February 6, 2014. Admin. 

R. at 456, 461. 

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discount Ms. Robertson's testimony, discussed above. Contrary to the ALJ's findings, Dr. 

Roman's opinion pertaining to C.C.'s functioning and behavioral issues is supported. For these 

reasons, the ALJ's conclusion regarding Dr. Roman's opinion is not sustained. 

D. School Personnel 

The Commissioner's regulations specifically instruct that "other" sources relevant to 

childhood disability determinations include educational personnel, "for example, school teachers, 

counselors" and other educational staff. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(2). 

This Court's August 2013 remand order discussed an April 2009 report produced by 

C.C.'s first grade teacher, Ms. Ellenbecker (Admin. R. 380), and directed that the ALJ obtain "a 

more recent report from C.C.'s teachers, especially after first grade." Id. at 398. Attempts to 

obtain further teacher reports were unsuccessful because the requests were directed to schools in 

which C.C. was not enrolled, and staff was unavailable to answer requests. See id. at 164, 306. 

The second ALJ's 2015 opinion now under review is again limited to Ms. Ellenbecker's 

2009 report. Id. at 307, 308. The ALJ gave "great weight to the information provided" by Ms. 

Ellenbecker because she "answered the questions on the form and then provided additional 

information in support of her conclusions." Id. at 306. While the ALJ correctly noted that 

further educator questionnaire responses were unavailable, id., this absence of evidence does not 

point to a finding that the first-grade teacher's report is the most probative evidence of record. 

Ms. Ellenbecker's report is the only evidence of record to which the ALJ gave "great" rather 

than "partial" or "some" weight. 

The result is nonsensical; here, the ALJ gave more evidentiary weight to a report 

produced by now-fifteen year old claimant's first grade teacher than to medical and other 

evidence addressing C.C.'s functioning in the intervening period. This is contrary to controlling 

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law, which direct that greater weight be given to treating medical source opinions, see Thomas, 

278 F.3d at 956-57 (instructing that an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting a treating source opinion), and contrary to any common sense analysis of C.C. 's 

developmental changes throughout the period under review. This reasoning is not sustained. 

E. Childhood Disability Functional Analysis 

The regulations clearly instruct that the Commissioner must consider a medical source 

"opinion about your functional limitations compared to children your age who do not have 

impairments" in the six specified domains pertaining to childhood disability. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.913(c)(3). If a child is determined to have "marked" impairment in two of the six indicated 

domains, or "extreme" limitation in one of the six, the child is deemed to have impairment that is 

functionally equivalent to regulatory disability listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l)(d). The 

relevant domains are "attending and completing tasks" and "interacting and relating to others." 

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(l). 

While the ALJ found C.C. "markedly" impaired in "interacting and relating with others," 

Admin. R. 310-11, she concluded that C.C. had "less than marked" limitation in "attending and 

completing tasks." Id. at 308-09. The ALJ noted Ms. Robertson's September 2009 statement 

that C.C. was "everywhere" and that he could not pay attention even with ADHD medication. 

Id. at 308. The ALJ then found that C.C.'s first grade teacher, Ms. Ellenbecker, reported that 

C.C.'s attention was "age-appropriate," and that Disability Determination Services reviewing 

psychologists Drs. Lahr and Henry found C.C.'s difficulties "lowered to 'very few problems' 

when he was on mediations. They cited teacher description of the claimant as calm and 

attentive." Id. at 309. 

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This determination does not properly account for the evidence discussed under the legal 

standards above. Treating physician Dr. Strgar found C.C. "markedly" limited in attention and 

interacting with others. Id. at 555. Longtime treating physician Dr. Grenier also stated that he 

had "marked" limitation in the same areas. Id. at 207. Therefore, the ALJ's finding that C.C. 

had "less than marked" limitation in "attending and completing tasks" is not sustained. 

V. Remand 

The Court has discretion in determining remand parameters. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099-

1100; Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1038 (2000). 

The "ordinary remand" rule instructs that the proper course is, generally, to remand to the agency 

for additional proceedings. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four, 

instructs that the reviewing court may "affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's decision 

"with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 

A remand for award of benefits is appropriate where further administrative proceedings 

would serve no useful purpose and the record has been fully developed. Treichler, 775 F.3d. at 

1100; Strauss v. Comm 'r, 635 F.3d 1135, 1138-139 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Benecke v. Barnhart, 

379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, the Court must conduct a "credit-as-true" analysis. 

Strauss, 635 F.3d at 1138. 

The "credit-as-true" doctrine directs that evidence be credited and an immediate award of 

benefits where: (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; 

(2) there are no outstanding issues requiring resolution before a disability determination can be 

made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant 

disabled should the evidence be credited. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101-02. The doctrine is not 

mandatory; it allows the Court discretion in determining whether to enter an award of benefits 

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upon reversing the Commissioner's decision. Id. at 1102; see also Connett v. Barnhartt, 340 

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 871, 348 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

bane)). The Court declines to credit testimony when "outstanding issues" remain. Luna v. 

Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The ALJ's analysis of the opinions of Drs. Strgar, Grenier, and Roman, as well as testimony 

proffered by Ms. Robertson and Ms. Ellenbecker, is erroneous for the reasons established above. 

The ALJ's subsequent finding that C.C. did not functionally equal a listed disorder at step three 

in the proceedings is consequently flawed. 

In determining whether to award benefits or remand the matter for further proceedings, the 

Court must finally determine whether "outstanding issues remain in the record" under the third 

prong of the credit-as-true analysis. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101; see also Strauss, 635 F.3d at 

1138. While the Commissioner requests remand for proceedings rather than benefits, she does 

not articulate any theory that the record requires further development. She states only that Ms. 

Robertson has failed to show that C.C. has "marked limitation in two domains, or "extreme" 

limitation in one. Def.'s Br. 10. 

The record discussed above shows that the opinions of Drs. Strgar, Grenier, and Romans, as 

well as Ms. Robertson's testimony, point to a finding of "marked" limitation in the domains of 

attention and relating to others. The Commissioner's regulations direct a finding of childhood 

disability if the evidence shows "marked" limitation in two or more functional domains. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(l). The Court is additionally mindful of the administrative delays now 

encompassing much of C.C.'s childhood. 

Page 16- OPINION & ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00903-CL Document 22 Filed 08/19/16 Page 16 of 17
The indicated opm1ons are therefore credited as true, and a finding of disability is 

consequently entered. For all of these reasons, the matter is remanded for the immediate 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Page 17 - OPINION & ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00903-CL Document 22 Filed 08/19/16 Page 17 of 17