COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Felt on, Judges Haley and Beales Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

RICHARD A. GLEASON MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0420-09-4 CHIEF JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR. JUNE 29, 2010 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY Charles J. Maxfield, Judge Melinda L. VanLowe (Peter D. Greenspun; Greenspun, Shapiro, Davis & Leary, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Joshua M. Didlake, Assistan t Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney Genera l, on brief), for appellee.
Richard A. Gleason (“appellant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in vi olation of Code § 18.2-37 0 and one count of aggravated sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3. On appeal, appellant contends th e trial court erred in excluding evidence under the rape shield statut e, Code § 18.2-67.7, ru ling that he failed to file a timely notice pursuant to that statute. He also contends the trial court e rred in denying his motion for continuance. 1 For the following reason s, we disagree and affirm appellant’s convictions.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 The trial court denied appellant’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence at the end of its case-in-chief and his renewed motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence after all the evidence had been presented. The trial cour t also denied appellant’s motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. This Court previously denied appe llant’s petition for appeal on each of those questions presented.- 2 - I. “Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Bolden v. Commonwealth , 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). On July 21, 2008, appellant was indicted on two counts of ta king indecent liberties with a child in violation of Code § 18.2 -370 and one count of aggravated sexual battery in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3. 2 On October 20, 2008, at the beginn ing of appellant’s jury trial, the Commonwealth moved the tria l court to prohibit appellant from presenting evidence related to the young victim’s purported “prior sexual conduct.” 3 The Commonwealth asse rted that appellant failed to timely file the requi red notice and motion for an eviden tiary hearing pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.7 (the rape shield statute). 4 It further asserted the ev idence appellant proposed to

2 The evidence at trial proved that the crimes occurred between February 1 and November 30, 2007. Appellant lived in the baseme nt apartment of the house occupied by the victim, M.K., and her mother. M.K.’s mother a nd appellant were romanti cally involved. M.K., born March 11, 2000, was six or seven years old at the time the offenses occurred. Appellant did not attempt to cover himself or turn away wh en M.K. entered his room and saw him naked on several occasions. During one incident, appellant continued to expose his penis to M.K. while inviting her to touch it, which sh e did. During another incident, appellant allowed M.K. to hold his partially erect penis. Appellant also played “the pocket game” with M.K. where he had M.K. put her hand into the pocket of his pants and touch his penis th rough his pocket. Appellant did not tell M.K.’s mother of the incidents involving M.K. She first learned of those events from M.K.’s father.

3 Appellant intended to offer as evidence a deposition of a friend of M.K.’s mother, Rapeesak Kesasuwan, who would be unavailable for the Oct ober 20, 2008 trial. In that deposition, Kesasuwan described an incident where M.K. tried to pull down his pants in the summer of 2007. He also described other occasions where he witnessed M.K. touc h her aunt’s an d her mother’s breasts and buttocks.

4 Code § 18.2-67.7 provides, in part: A. In prosecutions under this article, or under § 18.2-370, 18.2-370.01, or 18.2-370.1, general reput ation or opinion evidence of the complaining witness’s unc haste character or prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted. Unless the complaining witness voluntarily agrees otherwise, evidence of specific instances of his- 3 - introduce was not relevant to the charges in the indictment. Responding to the Commonwealth’s arguments, appellant’s trial counsel stated, “Your Honor, we are required to have provided [the Commonwealth] with a wr itten notice.” He asserted that he “p rovided notice” to the Commonwealth three months earlie r in July 2008 when he noti fied the Commonw ealth of his deposing of a witness who observ ed M.K.’s purported “prior sexu al conduct,” bu t who would be unavailable on the trial date. Appe llant also asserted the Commonw ealth was put on notice by his September 22, 2008 motion for reco nsideration of the trial court’s denial of his discovery motion. 5 Prior to the trial court’s ruling on the Commonwealth’s motion to exclude, appellant (apparently assuming that the trial court deemed the deposition notice insufficient to se rve as the required rape

or her prior sexual conduct shall be admitted only if it is relevant and is: * * * * * * * 3. Evidence offered to rebut evidence of the complaining witness’s prior sexual conduct in troduced by the prosecution. B. Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from presenting evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate th e charge against the accused. If such evidence relates to the past sexual conduct of the complaining witness with a person other th an the accused, it shall not be admitted and may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial unless the party offering same files a written notice generally describing the evidence prior to the introduction of any evidence, or the opening statement of either counsel, whichever first occurs, at the preliminary hearing or tr ial at which the admission of the evidence may be sought. C. Evidence described in subsections A and B of this section shall not be admitted and may not be referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial until the court first determines the admissibility of that evidence at an evidentiary hearing to be held before the evidence is introduced at such prel iminary hearing or trial. . . .

5 The trial court previously denied appellant ’s discovery requests to obtain M.K.’s counseling session notes and for an in camera inspection of tapes or videos of M.K.’s interviews with child protective services.- 4 - shield statute notice) then asked fo r a continuance to permit him to f ile the rape shield statute notice and to have an evidentiary hearing on the prop osed prior sexual conduct evidence. Prior to the trial court’s ruling on his motion for continuance, appellant’s attorney stated, “I do have a ha ndwritten notice, al beit belatedly.” 6 The Commonwealth resp onded that it did not know the specific acts and conduct about which ap pellant sought to admit evidence and that, therefore, it was not prepared on the morning of trial to challenge the relevance and admissibility of such evidence. The trial court denied appellant’s rape shield motion because he failed to give notice to the Commonwealth. The tria l court also denied appellant ’s motion for a continuance.
II. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in excluding his ev idence under the rape shield statute that the six or seven year old victim was “sexua lly curious.” “A trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit or exclude evid ence will not be overturned on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.” Sprouse v. Commonwealth , 53 Va. App. 488, 491, 673 S.E.2d 481, 482 (2009).
A. Appellant initially argues the ra pe shield statute is inapplicable because the evidence he sought to introduce was not prior se xual conduct as contemplated by th at statute, and even if the evidence fell within the purview of the rape shield statute, he was not re quired to provide notice to the Commonwealth because the evidence was not offered to prove the victim had a motive to fabricate her allegations against appellant.

6 The joint appendix does not c ontain any handwritten notice pres ented to the trial court. On February 5, 2009, after the jury found appellant guilty of the indicted charges, appellant’s attorney filed a written notice “pursuant to [Code] § 18.2-67.7” indicating his intention to call witnesses at his sentencing hearing regarding “i nappropriate” conduct and actions by the victim. The trial court denied that motion. That ruling is not before us on appeal.- 5 - Appellant did not raise these arguments to the trial court, and we will not consider an alternative argument raised for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18. The laudatory purpose behind Rule 5A:18, and its equivalent Supreme Court Rule 5:25, fre quently referred to as the contemporaneous objection rules, is to require that objections be promptly brought to the attention of the trial court with sufficient specificity that the alleged error can be dealt with and timely addressed and corrected when necessary. The rules promote orderly and efficient justice and are to be strictly enforced except where the error has resulted in ma nifest injustice. Errors can usually be corrected in the trial court, particularly in a bench trial, without the necessity of appeal. Because our function is to review the rulings of the trial court, rather than superintend the proceedings, we will notice erro r for which there has been no timely objection only when necessary to satisfy the ends of justice. Brown v. Commonwealth , 8 Va. App. 126, 131, 380 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1989). Appellant does not argue that we should invoke eith er the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18.
See Redman v. Commonwealth , 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). The Court will not consider Rule 5A:18 exceptions sua sponte

. Edwards v. Commonwealth , 41 Va. App. 752, 761, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) ( en banc ).
B. In the alternative, appellant al so contends that he provided th e required rape shield statute notice to the Commonwealth in a ha ndwritten notice he gave to the trial court at trial before the jury was impaneled. He further asserts he provide d sufficient notice of his intent to offer that evidence to the Commonwealth at various points during pr etrial discovery. While the rape shield statute does not prescribe a more detailed time fr ame for filing notice other than “prior to the introduction of any evidence, or the opening stat ement of either counsel,” the record does not contain any written notice offered by appellant on or before the day of trial. Code § 18.2-67.7(B). The record on appeal is unclear whether the handwritten notice was ever filed- 6 - with the trial court. Moreover, the content of appellant’s handw ritten notice to which appellant referred is not discernable from the record. Appellant failed to present a re cord on appeal from which we can determine whether the trial court was plainly wrong in finding that appe llant did not meet the notice requirements as required by the rape shield statute. See Justis v. Young , 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (1961) (noting appellant bears burden of presenting a sufficient record upon which the Court of Appeals can determine that the trial cour t erred). From the record presented on appeal, we cannot conclude that the trial court er red in finding appellant failed to give the Commonwealth notice as required by the rape shield statute. Furthermore, appellant’s contention that th e trial court erred in denying his motion for continuance on the morning of the scheduled jury trial to give hi m time to provide the required notice to the Commonwealth is mo ot, as he asserts he did give the required notice albeit by a handwritten notice which he did not ma ke part of the record on appeal. From the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court a bused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance. See L.C.S. v. S.A.S. , 19 Va. App. 709, 726, 453 S.E.2d 580, 589 (1995) (no abuse of discretion in denying request for continuance on day of hearing). At trial, as well as on appeal, appellant took inconsistent positions, arguing first that he was not required to provide notice, then arguing that if he was re quired to provide notice, he had provided the required notice in a ha ndwritten note which is not contai ned in the record on appeal. Accordingly, from the record on appeal, we fi nd that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance.
C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.