IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 1:15-cr-00173-AA 

Plaintiff, 

ORDER 

v. 

ERNEST LUTHER TAYLOR, 

Defendant. 

AIKEN, J. 

Defendant Ernest Luther Taylor is charged with using a minor to produce visual 

depictions of sexually explicit conduct, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Defendant now moves to 

suppress photos and videos found during a search of his cell phone. I deny the motion to 

suppress. 

BACKGROUND 

Medford Police Officer Jennifer Newell investigated Defendant on suspicion that he was 

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manufacturing and delivering psilocybin mushrooms. An anonymous informant told Newell that 

Defendant was growing psilocybin mushrooms in a storage shed in Central Point, Oregon. The 

informant said Defendant had previously grown psilocybin mushrooms in the house where 

Defendant lived in Medford. Newell observed Defendant traveling between the storage shed in 

Central Point and the house in Medford. 

In October 2013, Newell drafted a search warrant and an affidavit describing her 

investigation of Defendant. A deputy district attorney for Jackson County reviewed the draft 

search warrant and affidavit, and suggested that Newell investigate Defendant further before 

seeking a judge's approval. 

From October 2013 to February 2014, Newell continued investigating Defendant. In 

January 2014, another officer arranged a controlled buy of marijuana from Defendant at 

Defendant's house. The buyer purchased marijuana from Defendant, and said that Defendant had 

a grocery bag of loose marijuana in his house. 

Newell learned that a fire marshal had attempted to inspect Defendant's storage shed. 

The fire marshal saw a wooden structure built by Defendant inside the shed that was completely 

shielded from view by sheets of black plastic. Defendant, who appeared to be very nervous, told 

the fire marshal that the wooden structure contained rooms used as "sex dungeons," and that the 

black plastic was for privacy. The fire marshal noticed several large freezers around the storage 

I shed, which Defendant said were used for sex toys. 

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Newell revised the affidavit to incorporate the results of her additional investigation. In 

the revised affidavit, Newell stated her conclusion that Defendant was growing psilocybin 

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mushrooms in the storage unit, transporting the psilocybin mushrooms to his house and 

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delivering them to customers. Newell stated that based on her experience and training, drug 

dealers often keep records of their transactions with customers. Newell sought a warrant to 

search for evidence of possession and manufacture of psilocybin mushrooms and marijuana. 

Included among the items to be seizure were "Recipes," "Drug Records," and "Cell Phones." 

The affidavit states, 

Conducting a search of digital devices such as phones, documenting the searches 

and making evidentiary and discovery copies can take over 5 business days. 

Complex systems or recovery tasks can require an excess of 45 business days. 

Due to the backlog of digital evidence pending examination and the limited 

number of trained forensic examiners, it is possible to take up to 12 months or 

more before the evidence will be fully processed. 

Gov't Resp., Ex. 1, at 19-20, ECF No. 24-1. 

In February 2014, Newell took the revised affidavit to a newly assigned deputy district 

attorney, who concluded that the affidavit was sufficient to submit to a magistrate. On February 

11, 2014, a Jackson County Circuit Court judge authorized the search warrant. 

On February 18, 2014, officers executed the search warrant at Defendant's residence. 

Among the items seized was a Samsung cell phone from Defendant's bedroom. 

In August 2014, a Medford police detective, Brandon Bloomfield, examined the contents 

of Defendant's cell phone. Bloomfield discovered eighteen images of a prepubescent girl (later 

identified as the seven-year-old victim) partially undressed. Several images showed an adult 

male touching the girl and pulling down her top. The phone also contained five videos of the girl 

with her mouth on Defendant's penis. 

Bloomfield obtained a warrant to search Defendant's residence for evidence of sexual 

abuse and use of a child in a display of sexually explicit conduct. Bloomfield also obtained an 

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arrest warrant for Defendant. In August 2014, Defendant was arrested in Crescent City, 

California, where he was traveling with the alleged victim and the alleged victim's mother. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 

persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To comply with the Fourth 

Amendment, a search warrant must describe the place to be searched and things to be seized with 

particularity, and there must be probable cause to seize the things specified in the warrant. See 

United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2009). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant contends that the search warrant did not show a sufficient connection between 

the cell phone and the crimes of drug manufacturing and dealing. Defendant also contends that 

the search of the contents of his cell phone was beyond the scope of the warrant. 

In resolving Defendant's motion to suppress evidence from the search of his cell phone, 

this court must strike a fair balance between the government's need to investigate criminal 

conduct and the protection of individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See United 

States v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Comprehensive 

Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT), 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (en bane) (per curiam)). As the Supreme Court 

has noted, "modem cell phones ... are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that 

the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 

anatomy." Riley v. California,_ U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). Because cell phones 

have become so common, and so powerful, able to record, store, and potentially reveal every 

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aspect of a person's life, courts must now confront Fourth Amendment issues that would have 

been difficult to imagine only ten years ago. 

I. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 

The exclusionary rule prohibits the government from using illegally seized evidence 

against the victim of the unlawful search. See United States v. Crews, 502 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2007 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). There is a good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule, however, for searches "conducted in good faith reliance upon 

an objectively reasonable search warrant." Id. at 1135-36 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 

897, 925 (1984)). This court may first determine whether the good faith exception applies before 

addressing "whether the affidavit supported probable cause." Id. at 1136 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. 

at 923-25). "[T]he government bears the burden of proving that officers relied on the search 

warrant 'in an objectively reasonable manner."' SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 706 (quoting 

Crews, 502 F.3d at 1136). 

Because I conclude that the good faith exception applies to the search and seizure here, I 

need not address whether the search warrant lacked probable cause. 

II. The Good Faith Exception Applies to the Seizure of Defendant's Cell Phone 

Defendant contends that the good faith exception does not apply here because Newell's 

affidavit "is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer could rely upon it 

in good faith." Crews at 1136. As Defendant acknowledges, "the threshold for establishing this 

exception is a high one" because "' [i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to 

question the magistrate's probable-cause determination."' Messerschmidt v. Millender,_ U.S. 

__ , 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). 

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Defendant argues that Newell's affidavit "provided no information at all regarding drug 

dealing activities and a cell phone." Def.'s Mem. 5. But the Ninth Circuit does not require such 

specificity. See SDI Future Health, 568 F.3d at 706. The affidavit here does establish probable 

cause that Defendant was manufacturing and distributing psilocybin mushrooms and marijuana. 

A reasonable officer could conclude there was at least a "fair probability" that a cell phone 

belonging to Defendant would contain evidence of his drug manufacturing or transactions. 

Many, if not most, people who use cell phones with storage capabilities keep important 

information on them, so it is reasonable to believe that a drug dealer might have records of 

transactions on his cell phone. I conclude that no "'reasonably well trained officer would have 

known that the search was illegal in light of all the circumstances."' United States v. Camou, 

773 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

III. The Good Faith Exception Also Applies to the Search of Defendant's Cell Phone 

Defendant argues that even if the officers had probable cause to seize his cell phone, they 

should have obtained an additional search warrant to search the cell phone. But the search 

warrant targeted the contents of the cell phone, not just the phone itself. The search warrant 

contemplated a search of the cell phone, explaining the process for searching the contents of 

"digital devices such as phones." Gov't Resp., Ex. 1, at 24. 

The problem with searching digital files, as opposed to paper files, is that "[t]here is no 

way to be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents -

- either by opening and looking, using specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some 

other such technique." CDT, 621 F.3d at 1176. For this reason, "over-seizing is an inherent part 

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of the electronic search process ... and this will be far more common than in the days of paper 

records." Id at 1177. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned courts to use "greater vigilance" because 

"[t]he process of segregating electronic data that is seizable from that which is not must not 

become a vehicle for the government to gain access to data which it has no probable cause to 

collect." Id 

Yet the Ninth Circuit has held that "the potential intermingling" of relevant evidence and 

personal information "does not justify an exception or heightened procedural protections for 

computers['] beyond the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement." United States v. 

Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2008). Evidence of a crime such as drug dealing could be 

located in emails, text messages, photos, videos, or social media accounts. A person seeking to 

conceal incriminating evidence on a cell phone or computer has many options, such as hiding 

images in text documents, or '"the simple expedient of changing the names and extensions of 

files to disguise their content from the casual observer."' Id (quoting United States v. Hill, 459 

F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (further quotation marks omitted)). As the Ninth Circuit has 

noted, "the nature of computers makes such searches so intrusive that the affidavits seeking 

warrants for the search of computers often include a limited search protocol, and judges issuing 

warrants may place conditions on the manner and extent of such searches, to protect privacy and 

other important constitutional interests." United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 

2009). But despite favoring search protocols, the Ninth Circuit has not seen fit to require them. 

See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2006) ("we look favorably upon 

1 A "smart" cell phone such as the one here is the equivalent of a computer for purposes of 

this analysis. 

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the inclusion of a search protocol; but its absence is not fatal"); Schesso, 730 F .3d at 1051 

(rejecting argument that a warrant to search a computer and other digital devices was defective 

for failing to use adequate search protocols); cf CDT at 1179-80 (proposing guidelines for 

limiting searches of digital storage devices) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). Given the state of the 

law governing searches of digital devices, the officers here acted in good faith in executing the 

search of Defendant's cell phone, despite the lack of protocols to limit the scope of the search. 

While searching Defendant's cell phone for evidence of drug dealing, the officer 

inadvertently encountered evidence of child abuse and child pornography. I agree with the 

government that the doctrine of plain view applies here. See United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 

831, 838 (9th Cir. 2003); cf CDT at 1180 (proposing that magistrate judges "insist that the 

government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases") (Kozinski, 

C.J., concurring). For the plain view doctrine to apply, "(1) the officer must be lawfully in the 

place where the seized item was in plain view; (2) the item's incriminating nature was 

'immediately apparent'; and (3) the officer had a 'lawful right of access to the object itself."' 

Wong, at 838 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (citations omitted)). 

Here, a reasonable officer could conclude that the plain view doctrine applied. The 

officer here did seek an additional search warrant after discovering the photos and videos of the 

child victim. Because the good faith exception applies to the search of Defendant's cell phone, 

the motion to suppress is denied. 

Ill 

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CONCLUSION 

Defendant's motion to suppress (#20) is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 4-~February, 2016. 

ANN AIKEN 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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