UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DAVID BETTS, 

 Plaintiff Counterclaim Defendant - 

 Appellant, 

v. 

WORK ZONE TRAFFIC CONTROL, 

INC., a Colorado corporation, 

 Defendant Counterclaimant - 

 Appellee.

No. 18-1199 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-01890-CMA-MJW)

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

David Betts, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to his former employer, Work Zone Traffic Control, Inc., in his suit for 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Although Betts is proceeding pro se in this appeal, he was represented by 

counsel below. So we construe his appellate filings liberally, but do not afford the 

same liberal construction to counsel’s filings in the underlying case. See Celli v. 

Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir. 1994). 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 6, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2 

retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 

§ 215(a)(3). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse. 

I. Background

Work Zone employed Betts as a full-time Traffic Control Supervisor for more 

than eight years. His job duties included loading signage and equipment on to 

company trucks, driving to job sites, and unloading and placing equipment at job 

sites according to written traffic control plans. For most of those years, Betts worked 

as a nonexempt employee under the FLSA and received time-and-one-half for hours 

worked over 40 hours in a single work week. 

In April 2015, Work Zone reclassified Betts as a salaried employee, which 

meant he received no overtime pay. Betts objected to this classification. When

Work Zone refused to pay him overtime, he hired an attorney who, in September 

2015, sent Work Zone a demand letter. In December 2015, the parties reached a 

settlement under which Work Zone reclassified Betts as a nonexempt hourly 

employee and paid him overtime amounts he claimed.

In May and June 2016, Work Zone assigned Betts to the Marksheffel Road job 

site in Colorado Springs, Colorado. During the week of May 22-28, 2016, the 

company assigned him to work a double shift, for which he claimed 92 hours of pay, 

including 52 hours of overtime. This prompted Work Zone to review Betts’

timesheet and the GPS for the company truck he was driving and determine Betts was 

claiming hourly pay for drive time between his home in Pueblo, Colorado and the 
3 

Marksheffel Road job site. Work Zone paid Betts in full for the week ending 

May 28, 2016. 

According to Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy and its official rules for 

claiming mileage, employees do not receive hourly pay for the drive from their 

homes to job sites. Instead, Work Zone pays them 10 cents per mile. But the 

company pays employees hourly for drive time at the beginning of a project when 

they haul equipment to set up a new job and at the end of a project when they pick up 

a completed job. Work Zone also pays by the hour when workers return to an 

existing job site if they are hauling additional equipment—more than a few cones or 

a sign—needed for the project.

During the week of May 29-June 4, 2016, Betts claimed 59 hours of pay, 

including 19 hours of overtime. Work Zone did not pay Betts for 15 hours of 

overtime. On June 10, 2016, Betts called Work Zone owner, John Volk, to complain 

about the 15 hours missing from his paycheck. 

During the week of June 5-11, 2016, Betts claimed 75.5 hours of pay, 

including 35.5 hours of overtime. On June 15, 2016, Volk sent Betts the following 

text: 

Hey Betts, no more weekend time for paperwork and shop stuff make sure 

and get that done daily when your working! Also make sure if you are 

scheduled to work Sat you check with [Work Zone Managers] Mike and 

David as to whom is available and who had the least amount of hours will 

work. 

Then on the message Boards make sure if you have several to move 

around you get assistance working overtime for 7 hrs to move message 

boards at night buy yourself is not acceptable. If it was down for 5 weeks 
4 

we should be getting it done during normal working hours. That time like 

discussed is not billable time to our customers so it comes out of Wz 

pocket which in turn cost us to much money. Please try and maintain 

better time management and make sure we are keeping the hours down as 

much as possible. 

Thanks

Jv

 

R. Vol. 3 at 528-29. 

Betts claimed 72.25 hours of pay per week for each of the next two weeks—

June 12-18, 2016 and June 19-25, 2016—which included drive time between his 

home and job site and replacing a headlight on his company truck at the shop on a 

Sunday. 

The morning of June 29, 2016, Betts said the following in a text to Bob 

Andrews, a Work Zone safety manager:

I hate to tell you Bob. But life short I’m getting ready to go round two 

with JV he arbitrary three weeks ago took 15 hours off my weeks time 

sheet I can’t find where this 15 hrs are extra He’s going to have to prove 

it. I hope he’s wright. Pray for me. 

Thanks. 

R. Vol. 4 at 193. That same afternoon, Work Zone terminated Betts’ employment. 

The “Explanation of Violation” on the Employee Termination Form given to Betts

contains a single word: “Insubordination.” R. Vol. 3 at 536. Work Zone eventually 

paid Betts for all the disputed hours he claimed for the week ending June 4, 2016.

Betts sued under the FLSA alleging that Work Zone terminated his 

employment in retaliation for complaining that Work Zone failed to pay him for all 

the hours he worked during the week ending June 4, 2016. He also claimed the 
5 

company fired him because he hired a lawyer and demanded payment for unpaid 

overtime in September 2015. Work Zone counterclaimed for civil theft, conversion, 

and unjust enrichment, based on Betts’ claiming drive time between his home and job

site. 

The district court granted summary judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA 

claim. Betts sought to appeal this summary judgment ruling in 2017, but we 

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Work Zone’s counterclaims 

remained pending. See Betts v. Work Zone Traffic Control, Inc., No. 17-1463 

(10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2018). 

Work Zone dismissed its counterclaims without prejudice, and Betts filed this

appeal. But a dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims in a multi-claim 

action does not render a judgment final. Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 

(10th Cir. 1998). After we notified Betts of the still existing jurisdictional defect, 

Betts moved the district court to enter final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 54(b). The district court certified its summary judgment ruling under 

Rule 54(b), which gave us jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA claim. See Lewis 

v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988). 

II. Discussion

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same legal standard as the district court. Pacheco v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 

365 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 
6 

moving party shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We 

construe the record and all reasonable inferences from it, in a light most favorable to 

the party opposing summary judgment. See Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 

121 F.3d 1390, 1392 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997). 

Under the FLSA, it is unlawful for any person “to discharge or in any other 

manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any 

complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to 

[the FLSA].” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). When a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence 

of retaliation, we apply the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Conner, 121 F.3d at 1394. Under this 

framework, 

a plaintiff must first establish a prima facia case of retaliation. The burden

then shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate [nonretaliatory] reason 

for the plaintiff’s termination. Once the employer offers such a reason, 

the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for 

the challenged action is pretextual.

Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under the FLSA, a plaintiff 

must show (1) he engaged in activity protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered adverse 

action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with that activity; and 

(3) a causal connection exists between the employee’s activity and the employer’s 

adverse action. Id.
7 

The district court concluded that Betts established a prima facie claim for

retaliation. First, the court found Betts engaged in protected activity when he called 

Volk on June 10 to complain about the 15 hours missing from his June 4 paycheck.2

 

Second, the court noted the parties did not dispute that Betts suffered an adverse 

employment action when Work Zone terminated him on June 29. Finally, the court 

concluded that the temporal proximity between Betts’ June 10 complaint and June 29 

termination sufficiently established a causal connection between Betts’ protected 

activity and his termination. Thus, the burden shifted to Work Zone to offer a 

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the termination.

The district court concluded that Work Zone proffered a legitimate, 

nonretaliatory reason for terminating Betts—“insubordination because [Betts] 

disregarded company drive time policies and defied Mr. Volk’s June 15 text 

instructing [Betts] not to perform overtime shop work during weekends.” R. Vol. 4 

at 369. The court then determined that Betts failed to provide sufficient evidence 

from which a rational jury could conclude Work Zone’s stated reason was pretextual. 

We discuss each of these determinations in turn.3

 2 The court also suggested that Betts’ text expressing his intent to “go round 

two” with Volk could also constitute protected activity under the FLSA.

3 We do not review the district court’s determination that Betts established a 

prima facie case because Work Zone has not argued, as an alternative basis for 

affirming the summary judgment in its favor, that the district court erred in this 

determination, and we will not craft arguments for a party. See Perry v. Woodward, 

199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider whether there was 

an alternative basis to affirm where the appellee failed to develop an argument for 

affirming on an alternative basis).
8 

A. Work Zone’s Proffered Reason for Terminating Betts. 

The Supreme Court has described the defendant’s burden under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework as follows:

The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the 

presumption of [retaliation] by producing evidence that the plaintiff was 

[terminated] . . . for a legitimate, non[retaliatory] reason. The defendant 

need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered 

reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue 

of fact as to whether it [retaliated] against the plaintiff. To accomplish 

this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of

admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s [termination]. The 

explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for 

the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the 

presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual 

inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of 

production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the 

plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the 

action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the 

plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The 

sufficiency of the defendant’s evidence should be evaluated by the extent 

to which it fulfills these functions. 

 

Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981) (emphasis 

added and internal citation and footnotes omitted) (modified to reflect the retaliation 

terminology applicable to this suit).

The district court accepted Work Zone’s contention that it terminated Betts for 

“insubordination because [Betts] disregarded company drive time policies and defied 

Mr. Volk’s June 15 text instructing [Betts] not to perform overtime shop work during 

weekends.” R. Vol. 4 at 369 (emphasis added). But Work Zone offered no evidence 
9 

on the nature of Betts’ insubordination.4

 For example, Work Zone did not offer an 

affidavit or deposition testimony from John Volk, or anyone else involved in the 

decision to terminate Betts, identifying how Betts was insubordinate. Work Zone 

articulated the nature of Betts’ insubordination in its answer to Betts’ complaint and 

its motion for summary judgment. But, “[a]n articulation not admitted into evidence 

will not suffice. . . . [T]he defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an 

answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9. 

The only evidence cited by the district court was the Employee Termination Form

containing only the single word “insubordination.” See R. Vol. 4 at 369 (citing 

Doc. No. 16, Work Zone’s Answer, Doc. No. 48-4, which does not exist, and 

Doc. No. 48-3, the Employee Termination Form).

Insubordination can serve as a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for discharge to 

rebut a prima facie case. See Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 746 F.2d 1407, 1411 

(10th Cir. 1984). Even so, the generic term “insubordination,” without evidence 

identifying the act of insubordination, is inadequate to satisfy Work Zone’s burden. 

See Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.4 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that 

Burdine requires the defendant’s evidence regarding its reason for the plaintiff’s 

dismissal to be reasonably specific); accord, e.g., DePaula v. Easter Seals 

 4 Work Zone’s reliance on Betts’ deposition testimony is misplaced. At his 

deposition, Betts repeatedly denied Work Zone told him it was terminating him for 

violating the Drive Time Policy, and he repeatedly stated that Work Zone did not 

explain his termination beyond giving him the Employee Termination Form

containing the word “insubordination.”
10

El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957, 972-73 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting the termination letter 

recounted performance issues); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1201 

(10th Cir. 2016) (considering decisionmaker’s deposition testimony about plaintiff’s 

insubordination); Brown, 746 F.2d at 1411 n.5 (considering affidavit evidence about

the plaintiff’s insubordination). 

To support its articulated reason for the discharge, Work Zone must rely on an 

inference: because Volk sent Betts a text two weeks earlier directing him to practice 

better time management and not to perform shop work on weekends, 

“insubordination” must refer to defiance of that directive. But we do not draw 

inferences in favor of the moving party on summary judgment. Betts sent Work Zone 

safety manager Bob Andrews a text the morning Work Zone terminated him, saying 

he was getting ready to “go round two with JV” in a second FLSA complaint for 

unpaid overtime. One could also infer that “insubordination” referred to Betts’ threat 

to “go round two” with Volk by challenging the refusal to pay overtime.

5

The defendant’s burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework at summary 

judgment is “exceedingly light.” DePaula, 859 F.3d at 970 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It need not persuade the court that its articulated reason for the termination 

is true. Id. But it must produce admissible evidence of the articulated reason 

 5 Work Zone argued to the district court that Betts offered no evidence that 

John Volk knew Betts sent the text to Andrews. We mention Betts’ text to highlight 

the problem with Work Zone’s inference: the word “insubordination,” alone, does not 

necessarily reflect a nonretaliatory reason. And Work Zone, not Betts, had the 

burden of producing evidence at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. 
11

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it retaliated against 

the plaintiff. Id. As the moving party, Work Zone cannot rely on inferences to meet 

its burden. Because Betts presented a prima facie case sufficient to survive summary 

judgment, and Work Zone did not produce sufficient evidence to rebut Betts’ prima 

facie case and shift the burden back to Betts, the district court should have denied 

Work Zone’s motion for summary judgment at this point.

B. Betts’ Evidence of Pretext. 

Even assuming Work Zone produced sufficient evidence of a legitimate 

nonretaliatory reason to shift the burden to Betts, we conclude Betts produced 

sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. 

A plaintiff can withstand a motion for summary judgment by demonstrating “a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for the 

challenged action is pretextual—i.e. unworthy of belief.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 

69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff can make this showing with a variety 

of evidence, including evidence: (1) “that the defendant’s stated reason for the 

adverse employment action was false,” (2) “that the defendant acted contrary to a 

written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the 

circumstances,” or (3) “that the defendant acted contrary to an unwritten policy or 

contrary to company practice when making the adverse employment decision.” 

Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000). “A 

plaintiff who wishes to show that the company acted contrary to an unwritten policy 

or to company practice often does so by providing evidence that he was treated 
12

differently from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of 

comparable seriousness.” Id. 

In response to Work Zone’s motion for summary judgment, Betts argued that 

Work Zone’s reason for terminating him (1) was false because he had not defied 

Volk’s directive not to perform shop work on weekends and he had not violated 

Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy and (2) contradicted Work Zone’s established drive 

time practices and Work Zone had not terminated other employees who claimed drive 

time like Betts.

The district court determined that Betts failed to respond adequately to Work 

Zone’s stated reason for his termination indicating, “it is undisputed that Mr. Volk 

sent [Betts] a text on June 15 instructing [him] not to perform shop work during 

weekends,” R. Vol. 4 at 369, and “[i]t is also undisputed that [Betts] defied 

Mr. Volk’s instruction by, among other things, performing work at the Pueblo shop 

on a Sunday four days after receiving the text,” id. at 370.

6

 This is not an accurate 

statement of the evidence before the district court. 

1. Volk’s Directive Not to Perform Shop Work on Weekends

Betts offered evidence that he did not defy Volk’s directive not to perform 

shop work on weekends. The only specific instance of shop work on a weekend 

identified by either Work Zone or the district court was one hour on Sunday, June 19, 

2016. Betts testified at his deposition that he went to the shop in Pueblo on Sunday, 

 6 The district court did not specifically address Work Zone’s Drive Time 

Policy.
13

June 19, 2016, to change a headlight on his company truck. He testified this was not 

shop work; it was vehicle maintenance. He offered Work Zone’s policy on the use of 

its trucks, which provides, “All scheduled maintenance and repairs shall be 

performed as soon as possible. Any failures, concerns, questions or problems with 

the truck or any of the truck’s equipment should be reported to the employee’s 

superior IMMEDIATELY.” R. Vol. 4 at 194 (emphasis in original). Betts testified 

that he told his general manager, David Ranney, about the headlight, and Ranney told 

him to get it fixed. Betts’ timesheet for June 19, 2016, reflects that Betts went to the 

Pueblo shop to “replace [a] head lite.” R. Vol. 3 at 504. Betts offered sufficient 

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Work Zone’s 

claim that it terminated him for performing shop work on a weekend was pretextual. 

2. Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy

As noted, Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy allows employees to claim an 

hourly rate for drive time when they are hauling equipment to set up a job site and 

after picking up a site. In addition, its mileage rules allow employees to claim an 

hourly rate (rather than mileage) for drive time when they are hauling additional

equipment needed for a job “and it’s more than a few cones or a sign.” Id. at 458. 

Betts testified at his deposition that he charged hourly for his drive to and from the 

Marksheffel Road job site when he was hauling equipment needed for the job and it 

was more than a few signs and cones. He also testified that, sometimes, he would 

haul cones and signs from the Marksheffel Road job site, south to his home in Pueblo 

so he could set them back up the next morning on his way north. He testified that the 
14

crew set up cones and signs starting at the southern end of the project, and this was 

more efficient than driving to the Marksheffel Road equipment yard at the end of the 

day, unloading the cones and signs, driving home to Pueblo, then driving back to the 

equipment yard the next morning to pick up the necessary equipment before heading 

to the southern end of the project again to set up. Betts understood this to comply

with Work Zone’s Drive Time Policy. 

In considering whether the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual, “we 

examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision; we do not look to 

the plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of the situation.” EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 

644 F.3d 1028, 1044 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis and citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, Betts’ subjective view about whether his timekeeping violated 

Work Zone’s policy does not demonstrate a genuine dispute regarding pretext. That 

said, Betts also offered evidence that his timekeeping followed Work Zone’s 

established practices for claiming drive time. For example, Betts offered evidence 

that he had been claiming drive time the same way for years, including the months in 

2015 that were the subject of his September 2015 FLSA complaint, for which Work 

Zone eventually paid all the overtime he claimed. He offered evidence that Work 

Zone paid other Traffic Control Supervisors drive time who claimed it on their 

timesheets, even when their timesheets did not reflect that they were hauling 

equipment. Finally, Betts argued that the fact that Work Zone imposed different 

drive time rules on him after he complained about the 15 hours deducted from his 
15

June 4 paycheck is evidence that he was treated differently than other Traffic Control 

Supervisors after he complained. 

Betts’ evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Work 

Zone’s reason for terminating him was worthy of belief. The district court erred in 

concluding that he had not offered sufficient evidence of pretext.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to Work Zone on Betts’ FLSA claim, and REMAND this matter to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Entered for the Court 

Joel M. Carson III 

Circuit Judge