UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SCOTT BRADSHAW, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NANCY BERRYHILL, 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

Portland Division 

Civil No. 3:14-CV-01829-JO 

ORDER A WARDING ATTORNEY FEE 

PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(B)(l) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Plaintiff Scott Bradshaw brought this action for judicial review of a decision by the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for disability benefits under the Social 

Security Act. Based on a stipulation of the parties, this comi reversed and remanded the 

Commissioner's decision for further proceedings. Bradshaw applied for attorney fees under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act and received an award in the amount of $6,582,35. 

In the administrative proceedings after remand, the Commissioner found Bradshaw 

disabled beginning in December 2010 and awarded past-due benefits for the period from 

December 2010 through March 2017. The matter is now before the co mi on Bradshaw's 

unopposed motion for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). [# 31] The motion is granted. 

Bradshaw's counsel seeks attorney fees in the amount of $23,502.25, to be paid from 

Bradshaw's retroactive benefits, which total approximately $94,000. Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), 

the comi may award a reasonable attorney fee, not to exceed 25 percent of the past-due benefits 

ORDER FOR ATTORNEY FEES Page 1 
awarded to the claimant. To the extent a contingency fee agreement does not provide for fees 

exceeding 25 percent of the claimant's past-due benefits, its te1ms are enforceable subject to the 

district comt's review to assure the fee is reasonable in a paiticular case. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 

535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The claimant's counsel bears the burden of showing the 

reasonableness of the requested fee. 

The Comt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the Gisbrecht reasonableness standard 

to resolve three consolidated appeals in Crawfordv. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9111 Cir. 2009). The 

comt found it significant that in each case, the claimant signed a contingency fee agreement 

providing that the attorney would receive 25 percent of the past-due benefits, there was no 

substandard performance to justify a reduction in the fee, there was no evidence of dilatory 

conduct on the part of the petitioning attorneys, and the requested amounts were not excessively 

large in relation to the benefits received by the claimant. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1150-1151. The 

court concluded that the requested fees were reasonable. 

In this case, Bradshaw entered into a contingency fee agreement providing that his 

attorney would receive 25 percent of any past-due benefits recovered. In the present motion, the 

fee requested is indeed 25 percent of Bradshaw's award for past-due benefits. I have considered 

the factors identified in Gisbrecht and Crm1ford and find no basis for a reduction for substandard 

perfo1mance or dilat01y conduct. The amount requested is not excessively large relative to the 

benefit achieved for Bradshaw. I conclude that the requested fee is reasonable. 

In the event that both an EAJA fee and a fee under section 406(b) are approved by the 

court, the claimant's attorney must refund the smaller amount to the claimant. See Gisbrecht, 

ORDER FOR ATTORNEY FEES Page 2 
535 U.S. at 796. Accordingly, the fee approved today must be reduced by the amount of the 

previous EAJA fee award, $6,582,35. The net fee due to Bradshaw's counsel is $16,919.90. 

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion for an award of attorney fees [ # 31] is 

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this JS~ day of June, 2017. 

0 RD ER FOR ATTORNEY FEES 

ROBERT E JO ES, SENIOR JUDGE 

UNITED S~~:r S DISTRICT COURT 

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