IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

KIMBERLY A. HARRIS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYNW. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

MCSHANE, Judge: 

Civ. No. 6:14-cv-01821-MC 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Claimant Kimberly Harris brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for supplemental security income 

payments (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 

The issues before this Court are whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in (1) 

evaluating Harris's credibility; (2) rejecting the opinions of two of Harris's treating 

psychologists; and (3) failing to fully develop the mental health record. Because the ALJ 

provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for her determination that are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Harris applied for SSI on August 17, 20 I 0, alleging disability since January 20, 2006. Tr. 

14, 136.1 Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 14, 98, 102. Harris timely 

1 Tr. Refers to the transcript of the Social Security Administrative Record, ECF No. 12, provided by the 

Commissioner. 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 1 of 16
requested a hearing before an ALJ, and appeared before the Honorable Marilyn S. Mauer on 

January 4, 2013. Tr. 36-65. ALJ Mauer denied Harris's claim by written decision dated January 

17, 2013. Tr. 14-23. Harris sought review from the Appeals Council, which was subsequently 

denied, thus rendering the ALJ's decision final. Tr. 1-3. Harris now seeks judicial review. 

Harris, born on November 28, 1973, has a high school education and no relevant job 

experience. Tr. 22. Her only past employment was a short-term position in 1997 making pizza 

dough. Tr. 18. She attested that she discontinued that job because it aggravated her knee pain. Tr. 

22, 348; but see Tr. 273 ("She indicated that she has been fired in the past."). However, Harris 

testified that only her mental condition prevents her from working. Tr. 49. She suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression,2 and a history of substance abuse. Tr. 16. Harris's 

substance abuse issues have been in remission since she completed treatment in 2009. Tr. 19, 51, 

57. Harris was thirty-nine years old at the time of the administrative hearing. Tr. 22, 39. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner's decision ifthe decision is based on 

proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm 'r o/Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2004). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, this Court reviews the administrative 

record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the 

ALJ's conclusion. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

2 The record indicates that Harris has suffered an extensive history of emotional, physical, and sexual 

abuse, as well as grief related to the deaths of her brother and sister. See generally Tr. 230-48, 272-74, 

294. 

2 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 2 of 16
DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 

The Social Security Administration utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation to determine 

whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The initial burden of proof rests 

upon the claimant to meet the first four steps. If a claimant satisfies his or her burden with 

respect to those steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner for step five. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. 

At step five, the Commissioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the claimant is capable of 

making an adjustment to other work after considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and 

work experience. Id. "If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, then the claimant is 

disabled. If, however, the Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform work that 

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the claimant is not disabled." Carroll 

v. Colvin, No. 6:12-cv-02176-MC, 2014 WL 4722218, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 19, 2014). 

DISCUSSION 

Harris contends that the ALJ' s disability decision is not supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on an application of incorrect legal standards. In particular, Harris argues that the 

ALJ: (1) erred in evaluating Harris's credibility; (2) erred in rejecting the opinions of two 

treating psychologists; and (3) failed to fully develop the mental health record. 

I. Harris's Testimony 

Harris contends that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony because the ALJ failed to 

provide specific, clear and convincing reasons supporting her decision to do so. Pl.'s Br. 18, ECF 

No. 17. An ALJ must consider a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, including statements 

regarding workplace limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. However, an ALJ may 

discredit a claimant's testimony for clear and convincing reasons. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 

1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). This Court "must uphold the ALJ's decision where the evidence is 

3 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 3 of 16
susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Andrews v. Shala/a, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In this case, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons 

based on rational interpretations of the evidence to support her determination ofHarris's 

credibility. Although the ALJ devotes a full page of her opinion to outlining the reasons for 

rejecting Harris's testimony, those reasons can be summarized by three broad categories: overreporting, lack of motivation, and inconsistency with daily activities. Tr. 21-22. 

ALJ Mauer discredited Harris, in part, for over-reporting her symptoms. See Tr. 21. 

When evaluating a claimant's credibility, an ALJ may properly consider the claimant's tendency 

to exaggerate her symptoms, Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001), her 

positive response to treatment, Wells v. Colvin, No. 6:14-cv-0654-MC, 2015 WL 1492439, at *6 

(D. Or. Apr. 1, 2015), and any deliberate efforts to bolster her SSI application, see Berry v. 

Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's 

consideration of all three factors. First, Dr. Scott's report expresses concern about the validity of 

Harris's psychological test results based on her tendency to over-report or exaggerate the extent 

of her symptoms. Tr. 274, 278. Second, Harris testified that her anti-anxiety medication was 

working well, tr. 42, and, third, Harris admitted to her counselor that "she is primarily in 

counseling because ... it will help her obtain SSL" Tr. 372, 400 (lawyer encouraged her to seek 

counseling to bolster her SSI application); contra Tr. 48 (testifying during the hearing that she 

needed counseling). For these reasons, the ALJ's reliance on Harris's tendency to over-report her 

symptoms in assessing Harris's credibility was proper. 

The ALJ may also consider the claimant's lack of motivation when assessing the 

claimant's credibility. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002); Davies v. Colvin, 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 4 of 16
No. 6:14-cv-00491-MC, 2015 WL 4571107, slip op. at *3 (D. Or. July 28, 2015). ALJ Mauer 

found that: 

Harris further testified that she has not worked since 1997 because when she tried 

to work it aggravated her knees. She supported herself during that time on her 

husband's income and on supplemental security benefits received by her disabled 

children. Two of her children continue to receive supplemental security income 

benefits. Ms. Harris has had no need to work in the past and has no incentive to 

return to the workforce at this time. 

Tr. 22. Harris testified that only her mental condition prevented her from working.3 Tr. 49. Yet 

there is no evidence that she attempted to work but could not do so due to her mental condition. 

Instead, the record shows that Harris has never held a full time job, Tr. 40; that her "soon to be 

ex-husband" financially supported the family prior to the hearing, Tr. 40, 326; that in 2009, her 

partner was in trouble with the law for "trying to help [Harris's] kids via the money he was 

getting from selling drugs," Tr. 220, but by 2012, he was working in the logging business, Tr. 

346; and that her counselor was working with her on "the challenges of trying to 'get straight' .. 

. i.e., it takes extra motivation to take a regular job and earn less money .... "Tr. 220. Further, 

Harris stated childcare would be an issue if she worked outside of the home. Tr. 188. 

Harris argues that focusing on the facts listed above distracts us from the true issues in 

this case: "[her] cognitive problems and problems with anxiety." Pl.'s Reply Br. 2, ECF No. 19. 

As for cognitive problems, Harris testified that she would be unable to work because she has 

"difficulty concentrating," but testified that she could adequately pay attention when she drove, 

prepared meals, and provided care for her children. Tr. 48-49. She repeatedly alleged that she 

3 In a Pain & Fatigue Questionnaire that Harris completed in 2010, she also stated that it would be a 

challenge to fulfill both her current household duties and employment duties outside the home due to her 

knee pain. Tr. 188. Since Harris testified that her knee pain does not prevent her from working, Tr. 49, 

and the Vocational Expert provided three potential positions that Harris could perform--each of which 

had sitting options, Tr. 60-61-this Court limits its review to disability stemming from Harris's mental 

condition. 

5 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 5 of 16
has anxiety when she leaves the house and is around crowds or new people. E.g., Tr. 42, 47, 53, 

185, 188, 202, 272-73. However, when Harris was asked about her anxiety by the ALJ during 

the hearing she provided the following undetailed response: 

ALJ: Is there any way in which your anxiety affects your ability to function? 

Harris: Stress. 

ALJ: What does that mean? 

Harris: Just life is stressful for me. 

Tr. 49. Harris offered no more information relating to anxiety attacks which could assist the ALJ 

in her disability determination. This fails to demonstrate how Harris's anxiety affects her at a 

disabling level. 

With medication, Harris reported to her counselor that her anxiety is well-controlled, Tr. 

245, dropping from a level "8" to a level "3," compare Tr. 290 with Tr. 287. It is a rational 

interpretation of Harris's testimony and the record that her mental condition does not present 

limitations which would prevent her from attempting to work outside the home. It is also a 

rational interpretation of her work history and her statements to her counselors that Harris has no 

interest in attempting to work outside of the home. Therefore, in making her credibility 

determination, the ALJ's reliance on Harris's lack of motivation to seek employment was proper. 

An ALJ must make "'specific findings relating to the daily activities' and their 

transferability to conclude that a claimant's daily activities warrant an adverse credibility 

determination." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005)). However, when a claimant suffers from a mental condition, 

her ability to complete activities that do not directly contradict her diagnosis does not necessarily 

demonstrate transferability to the workplace. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 6 of 16
1989) (claimant suffering from psychosis who was able to complete short-term volunteer work 

did not demonstrate ability to maintain gainful employment). Harris's activities demonstrate an 

ability to fulfill the physical demands of employment consistent with the ALJ's RFC. However, 

none of her activities demonstrate that she will not suffer an anxiety attack from exposure to 

strangers. The only activity that Harris reports requires her to regularly interact with unfamiliar 

people is grocery shopping, which she does early in the morning to limit her interaction with 

others. Tr. 47. ALJ Mauer does not provide specific findings that Harris performs activities 

which demonstrate that she could successfully function in a workplace where she is surrounded 

by other people. Therefore, in making her credibility determination, ALJ Mauer's reliance of 

Harris's daily activities was improper. 

The ALJ' s overall credibility determination may be upheld even if not all of the ALJ' s 

reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are upheld. Batson v. Comm 'r, 359 F.3d 1190, 

1197 (9th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence supports that Harris is not entirely credible because 

she over-reported her symptoms and has shown a lack of motivation to seek employment. ALJ 

Mauer did not err in evaluating Harris's credibility. 

II. The Rejection of Medical Opinion Evidence from Two Treating Psychologists 

The record consists of multiple medical opinions addressing Harris's mental and physical 

health. Three of the opinions related to Harris's mental health were addressed directly by ALJ 

Mauer: treating psychologist Dr. Scott, tr. 20; treating psychologist Dr. Roman, tr. 20; and nonexamining, state-appointed medical advisor, Dr. Eder, tr. 22. Little weight was given to the 

opinions of Dr. Scott and Dr. Roman, tr. 20, while great weight was given to Dr. Eder's opinion, 

7 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 7 of 16
tr. 22. Dr. Scott and Dr. Roman both identified "marked limitations"4 in certain functioning 

areas, tr. 281, 353, and Dr. Eder found that Harris was not disabled, tr. 91, and only suffered 

"moderate limitations" in some functioning areas, tr. 89-90. 

ALJ Mauer found that Dr. Eder's assessment "is consistent with the medical record and 

evidence as a whole." Tr. 22. Meanwhile: 

[W]ithout explanation, a marked limitation in the ability to complete a workday 

was assessed. Dr. Scott's marked limitations in the ability to perform simple work 

and to accept instructions from supervisors [is] also given little weight as they are 

unsupported by objective evidence in the record, the claimant is far less than 

credible in her self-reporting, and further evidence supports the ability to perform 

at least simple work with occasional social contact. 

Tr. 20 (citations omitted). Additionally, ALJ Mauer found that the marked limitations identified 

by Dr. Roman were either outside of her area of expertise, based entirely on Harris's unreliable 

self-reporting, or inconsistent with Harris's reported activities. Tr. 20-21. 

In disability benefits cases, the ALJ must consider the nature of the relationship between 

the claimant and the physician, and must assign weight accordingly. See Holohan v. Massanari, 

246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001). A treating physician's opinion should be accorded more 

weight than an examining physician's opinion, and an examining physician's opinion should be 

accorded more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Id. at 1202. However, "an ALJ 

may rely on the medical opinion of a non-treating doctor instead of the contrary opinion of a 

treating doctor if she ... provides 'specific and legitimate' reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record." Id The opinion of a non-examining physician alone does not constitute 

substantial evidence sufficient to reject the opinion of a treating physician, but must be 

4 "Marked-There is a serious limitation in this area. There is a substantial loss in the ability to 

effectively function." Tr. 353 (definition provided in the Soc. Sec. Admin. Office of Disability 

Adjudication and Review, Medical Source Statement of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental), 

OMB No. 0960-0662). 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 8 of 16
additionally supported by "objective tests, reports from other physicians, testimony from the 

claimant, or other evidence [that] conflicts with the opinion." Robinson v. Colvin, No. 6:12-cv02175-HA, 2014 WL 1269674, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2014). Important to this analysis, "if the 

ALJ properly discounts the claimant's credibility, [s]he may reject a treating physician's 

opinions that are based upon the claimant's self-reports." Zamora v. Astrue, 853 F. Supp. 2d 

1048, 1059 (D. Or. 2011). 

A. Dr. Scott's Opinion 

Dr. Scott concluded that Harris has marked limitations in her ability to: (1) understand, 

remember, and carry out detailed instructions; (2) understand and remember simple instructions; 

(3) accept instructions and appropriately respond to supervisors; (4) maintain attention and 

concentration throughout a full workday; (5) complete a full workday without unreasonable 

breaks; and ( 6) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision. Tr. 2 80-81. The first 

marked limitation is reflected in the RFC, which states that Harris "can understand and carry out 

simple instructions," tr. 18, thus implying that Harris is limited in her ability to appropriately 

handle detailed instructions. However, this statement in the RFC directly contradicts the second 

marked limitation identified by Dr. Scott. 

The ALJ accorded the second and third marked limitations identified by Dr. Scott little 

weight because they are unsupported by objective evidence in the record, based on Harris's 

unreliable self-reports, and evidence that she can perform simple work with occasional social 

contact. Tr. 20. This is a sufficient "specific and legitimate" reason if supported by the record. 

Evidence supporting Dr. Scott's conclusion includes the WAIS-IV score coupled with 

Harris's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores. On the WAIS-IV, Harris scored 

lowest in her verbal reasoning abilities, which were assessed as "borderline" even though they 

9 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 9 of 16
I 

were above only 2% of her peers. Tr. 276. Dr. Scott interpreted this as "suggest[ing] that she 

would have significant difficulty understanding and following verbal instructions whether they 

be written or verbally given to her." Tr. 277. Harris's composite IQ was 78, tr. 275, which, while 

borderline, does not evince an intellectual disability, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P. app. 1, Listing 

12.05(B)-(C) (2015). Harris self-reported her cognitive abilities to a counselor as: "I'm like the 

dumb blonde in the dumb blonde jokes. Things are just hard for me to comprehend." Tr. 320. 

Finally, Harris's GAF scores ranged from 36 to 46 over a four year period. Tr. 217, 308, 312, 

322, 366, 406. GAF scores below 50 indicate that the claimant may have serious mental 

limitations. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter 

DSM-5]. 

Despite these factors, there is also significant evidence in the record to support the ALJ's 

decision to assign little weight to Dr. Scott's conclusion. Dr. Scott's report begins with a clear 

warning that "all information in this evaluation is based solely on comments during the 

interview." Tr. 271. Since ALJ Mauer determined that Harris was not credible, Tr. 20-21, she 

may properly discount medical opinions based on Harris's self-reporting, Zamora, 853 F. Supp. 

2d at 1059. On several of the psychological tests administered, Dr. Scott questioned the validity 

of the results based on an "elevated malingering index" and "significant concerns with over 

reporting." Tr. 274. Dr. Scott did not specifically note validity concerns for the WAIS-IV test, 

see Tr. 274-75, but made a general note that Harris's mental health was hard to assess based on 

her apparent "attempts to distort her psychological profile .... "Tr. 277. It is unclear from the 

record whether Dr. Scott's note expressing concern about the validity of Harris's test applied to 

all of the tests he conducted, or just to those he specifically deemed invalid. See Tr. 277. 

10 OPINION AND ORDER 

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Further, Dr. Roman, who reviewed Dr. Scott's opinion, found that "Harris was able to 

understand and remember simple instructions during the interview." Tr. 351. Dr. Roman even 

found that Harris could likely understand and remember slightly more complicated instructions. 

Tr. 351. Additionally, Harris's activities demonstrate at least a basic ability to follow simple 

instructions, and Dr. Scott noted that Harris ''appears to believe that she could do a full-time job 

if allowed to sit and focus on a single task with no counting of money." Tr. 277. He additionally 

made recommendations for restrictions on the types of employment Harris should pursue. Tr. 

278 ("limited cooperation with others" and "the ability to alternate sitting and standing"). It is a 

rational interpretation of these statements that Harris is capable of performing work with the 

limitations prescribed by Dr. Scott. 

Harris further argues that her consistently low GAF scores are determinative in assessing 

her longitudinal mental health, and the ALJ therefore erred in her consideration of the scores. 

PL's Br. 13, ECF No. 17. However, an ALJ's failure to address GAF scores does not constitute 

legal error where the RFC is consistent with the evidence in the record. McFarland v. Astrue, 

288 Fed. App'x 357, 359 (9th Cir. 2008). The use of GAF scores as substantial evidence to 

support the claimant's allegations of mental impairment is generally disfavored. See Hales v. 

Colvin, No. 6:14-cv-01050-MC, 2015 WL 5665383, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2015); but see Bonk 

v. Astrue, No. 3:11-cv-00637-BR, 2012 WL 5830392, at *11 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2012) (holding 

that consistently low GAF scores from multiple providers may constitute substantial evidence). 

The Social Security Administration has determined that a GAF score "does not have a direct 

correlation to the severity requirements in [the] mental disorders listing." Revised Medical 

Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders & Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-

65 (Aug. 21, 2000). Beyond that: "It has been recommended that the GAF be dropped from the 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 11 of 16
DSM-5 for several reasons including lack of clarity ... and questionable psychometrics in 

routine practice." DSM-5 at 16. 

The ALJ directly addressed one of the six GAF scores in the record, according it little 

weight because it was inconsistent with Harris's activities and overall functioning at that time. 

Tr. 19. The ALJ also highlighted some of the stressors in Harris's life at the time of the GAF 

assessment. Tr. 19. Upon review of the record, it appears each of the GAF assessments was 

performed when Harris had significant stress-creating factors in her life, including instability in 

her relationship with her significant other, financial concerns, or preparations for surgery. Tr. 

307, 315, 318-22, 364-65, 400. Because GAF scores are generally disfavored and the ALJ not 

only addressed them, but provided her reason for assigning them little weight, she did not err in 

her consideration of Harris's GAF scores. 

This Court "must uphold the ALJ's decision where the evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation." Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. Accordingly, I uphold the ALJ's 

determination that the evidence in the record does not support Dr. Scott's determination that 

Harris is unable to perform simple work and accept instructions from supervisors and that this 

opinion should be given little weight. 

The ALJ also assigned little weight to Dr. Scott's conclusion that Harris had a "marked 

limitation in the ability to complete a workday." Tr. 20. The ALJ rejected this conclusion based 

on the fact that Dr. Scott failed to provide any support for or explanation as to how he reached it, 

and I find none in the record. An ALJ is not required to "accept a [treating physician's] brief, 

conclusory, or inadequately supported opinion." Hales, 2015 WL 5665383, at *2. I therefore 

uphold the ALJ's decision to assign little weight to this conclusion. 

12 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 12 of 16
For all of these reasons, I find that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Scott's opinion for 

specific, legitimate, clear and convincing reasons. 

B. Dr. Roman's Opinion 

As to Dr. Roman's opinion, Dr. Roman based her opinion on an assessment ofHarris's 

counseling records, Dr. Scott's opinion, a clinical interview with Harris, and administered tests 

to evaluate Harris's mental status. Tr. 346. Dr. Roman found that Harris scored "adequate" in the 

WMS-R Information & Orientation and Mental Control tests, in the "low average range" on the 

WAIS-IV test, had a 19 year old age equivalent, a 5.3 grade equivalent, and scored in the 

"severe" range for both anxiety and depression. Tr. 350-51. Dr. Roman ultimately concluded 

that Harris is able to understand simple and slightly complicated instructions. Tr. 351. Despite 

scoring in the low average range for ability to pay attention and concentrate, Dr. Roman found 

that it would be difficult for Harris to "maintain attention and concentration throughout a normal 

work week and work day" due to her physical presentation. Tr. 351. Finally, Dr. Roman found a 

marked limitation in Harris's ability to interact with the public, supervisors, and coworkers.5 Tr. 

354. Dr. Roman based her conclusion on Harris's ability to interact with others solely on Harris's 

selfreports. See Tr. 354. That subjective symptom testimony, and the ALJ's attached credibility 

assignment, is consistent with the records ofHarris's self-reports made during previous 

counseling sessions. Tr. 351. 

The ALJ accorded little weight to two of Dr. Roman's conclusions. Tr. 20-21. First, the 

ALJ rejected that Harris's physical state would prevent her from maintaining attention and 

concentrating throughout a normal workday. Tr. 20. This rejection is supported by two specific 

5 Dr. Roman also found a marked limitation in Harris' s ability to understand and process complex 

information. Tr. 353. Since the ALJ's RFC limits Harris to simple instructions, Tr. 18, this part of Dr. 

Roman's conclusion need not be reached. 

13 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 13 of 16
and legitimate reasons: (1) the ALJ found that the effect ofHarris's physical state on her ability 

to concentrate is not Dr. Roman's area of expertise, Tr. 20; see also Pappe v. Colvin, No. 1: 13-

cv-0160-AA, 2014 WL 4850880, at *7 (D. Or. Sep. 26, 2014) (upholding an ALJ's rejection of a 

treating physician's statement because it was outside the realm of the physician's expertise); and 

(2) Dr. Roman's conclusion is based on Harris's self-reports, which were properly deemed not 

credible, Tr. 20; Zamora, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1059. Similarly, the ALJ rejected Dr. Roman's 

assessment of marked social limitations because that conclusion is based entirely on Harris's 

self-reports, Tr. 20-21, which, as discussed above, is a specific and legitimate reason to reject 

this opinion.6 

C. Dr. Eder's Opinion 

Dr. Eder reviewed the administrative record, Tr. 79-84, and found that Harris was 

partially credible in her allegation that she could not follow instructions. Tr. 86--87. Dr. Eder 

opined that Harris has moderate limitations in her ability to carry out detailed instructions; 

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of time; interact with the general 

public; and be aware of normal hazards. Tr. 89-90. Dr. Eder concluded that Harris was not 

disabled, Tr. 91, and that she is "capable of occ[asional] contact with other employees and the 

general public." Tr. 89. The ALJ accorded this opinion "great weight as it is consistent with the 

medical record and evidence as a whole," Tr. 22, and the ALJ subsequently reflected these 

limitations in her RFC calculation. Tr. 18. The record shows that Harris regularly completes 

simple, routine tasks that require simple instructions and sufficient attention, such as preparing 

meals and grocery shopping. Tr. 47, 49. Meanwhile, the only evidence in the record that Harris is 

6 The ALJ also rejected Dr. Roman's assessment of Harris's social capabilities based on her activity level. 

Tr. 21. As discussed above, neither ALJ Mauer nor the record provide examples of activities that Harris 

engages in which demonstrate an ability to interact with others. 

14 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 14 of 16
unable to interact with the public is her self-reports. Consistency with the record is a specific and 

legitimate reason to rely on a non-examining physician's opinion over a treating physician's 

opinion. See West v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-01764-SU, 2015 WL 4935491, at *9 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 

2015). Because the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons to rely on Dr. Eder's opinion 

rather than Dr. Roman's and Dr. Scott's opinions, she properly rejected the treating 

psychologists' opinions. 

III. Full Development of the Administrative Record 

Finally, Harris argues that the ALJ failed to fully develop the administrative record, as it 

lacks a full set ofIQ scores, and her IQ level may qualify as an "intellectual disability." PL's Br. 

20, ECF No. 17. 

The Plaintiff and Commissioner share a duty to fully develop the record. 20 C.F .R. § 

416.912(a); Heide v. Colvin, No. 6:13-cv-0522-MC, 2015 WL 1477905, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 

2015). The ALJ has a duty to develop the record by ensuring all medical records requested by the 

claimant are included in the record for the ALJ's consideration. See id. When the claimant 

alleges intellectual disability, a fully developed record includes a full set ofIQ scores. Garcia v. 

Comm'r o/Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir. 2014). 

As a preliminary matter, I note that Harris did not allege before or during the hearing that 

she suffered from an intellectual disability. Therefore, a duty to include a full set oflQ scores 

based on that claim did not arise. Even if such a duty had arisen, however, a full set ofIQ scores 

was provided by Dr. Scott.7 Tr. 275. While that fact renders Harris's argument meritless, I note 

7 Harris argues that a full set of scores is not provided because neither a "Verbal IQ" nor a "Performance 

IQ" score are listed in Dr. Scott's report. She then provides a citation to a source that lists the WAIS-III 

testing system components. In the record, however, Dr. Scott administered the WAIS-IV system-the 

standard since 2008-which analyzes the components of IQ listed in his report. A full set of scores is 

therefore present in the record. 

15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01821-MC Document 20 Filed 12/17/15 Page 15 of 16
also that her scores for each component of IQ exceeded the threshold of intellectual disability. 

Compare 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P. app. 1, Listing 12.05(B}-{C) (2015) with Tr. 275. The 

ALJ did not fail to properly develop the record. 

CONCLUSION 

Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported 

by substantial evidence in the record, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this ____G__ day of __ D_(·_ ... _· ____ , 2015. 

16 - OPINION AND ORDER 

"------ \. 

Michael J. McShane 

United States District Judge 

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