BLD-272 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-1710

___________

LARRY L. STULER,

Appellant

v.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-01342)

District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 6, 2013

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 14, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Larry L. Stuler, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 

his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). For the following 

reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
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I.

In 2010, Stuler requested copies of certain documents from the Internal Revenue 

Service (“IRS”) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). In his request, he 

promised to pay the fees associated with procuring those documents, but only if they 

were “expected to exceed $00.00.” (Dkt. No. 10-2, p. 2.) The IRS responded with a 

letter asking Stuler to agree to pay the fees associated with procuring the documents, a 

required prerequisite for processing his FOIA request, see 26 C.F.R. § 

601.702(c)(4)(i)(H). (Dkt. No. 10-3, p.2.) Stuler sent another letter that he claimed 

constituted his notice of appeal. (Dkt. No. 10-4, p. 2.) The IRS told him that “he was not 

entitled to administratively appeal” because his FOIA request had not been denied. (Dkt. 

No. 10-5, p. 3.)

Stuler then filed a complaint seeking release of the documents. The IRS processed 

his FOIA request, sent him copies of the documents, and then filed a motion to dismiss 

his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “because the issue [was] now moot.” 

(Dkt. No. 8, p. 4.) Stuler filed an amended complaint, alleging that the documents he 

received were incomplete because they were improperly redacted. The IRS again moved 

to dismiss the complaint and submitted declarations from its employees stating that the 

documents were not redacted. The IRS also argued that, if its motion were denied, it 
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would assert the affirmative defense that Stuler had not exhausted his administrative 

remedies prior to filing the amended complaint.1 

The District Court granted the IRS’s motion by order entered June 23, 2011, 

concluding that Stuler had not exhausted his administrative remedies because his FOIA

request did not comply with IRS regulations regarding the payment of fees, and that his 

allegations that the documents were improperly redacted required “interpretation and 

analysis” of IRS file and transaction codes. (Dkt. No. 23, pp. 3, 5.) Specifically, the 

District Court determined that, “in light of the fairly technical and agency-specific 

nature” of Stuler’s claims, it was “particularly appropriate” for him to “seek 

administrative review of the disclosure before pursuing judicial intervention.” (Id. p. 6.) 

The dismissal was made without prejudice to Stuler’s right to “reassert his claim 

following exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Id. p. 7.) 

On December 21, 2012, Stuler filed a motion to vacate the District Court’s 

judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), arguing that it lacked authority to render the order. 

The District Court denied the motion as untimely pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1), and Stuler 

appealed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of Stuler’s Rule 60(b)(4) 

motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm for any reason supported by the 

 

1

The District Court ordered the parties to submit briefs “regarding the impact on 

[Stuler’s] Amended Complaint of principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 
4

record, Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011), and may summarily 

affirm if no substantial question is presented on appeal, 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

The IRS argues that Stuler’s motion should be construed as a motion to alter or 

amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and that it was 

untimely because it was filed nearly a year and a half after the District Court dismissed 

the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Alternatively, the IRS argues that the

Rule 60(b)(4) motion, if considered timely, was properly denied because it was 

“groundless.” 

We will construe Stuler’s motion as a request for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), as did 

the District Court. Stuler argued that the District Court’s judgment was void because it 

“lack[ed] authority to render it.” (Dkt. No. 25, p. 2.) As the IRS points out, he is 

incorrect. Whether a requester has properly exhausted his administrative remedies under 

the FOIA is “a prudential consideration that the court takes into account in determining 

whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.” McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 

1227, 1240 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). In this case, it was well within the

purview of the District Court to dismiss Stuler’s complaint without prejudice for failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies. Even assuming that Stuler’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion 

was filed within a reasonable time, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), the District Court 

properly denied it because it was meritless. 

 

(Dkt. No. 19.) 
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III.

We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order, entered January 9, 2013, 

because no substantial question is presented on appeal.