COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

February 21, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2022AP2079

2023AP904

Cir. Ct. No. 2015ME122

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

No. 2022AP2079

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF B.M.T.:

MANITOWOC COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

B.M.T.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

No. 2023AP904

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF B.M.T.:

MANITOWOC COUNTY,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.
Nos. 2022AP2079

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2

B.M.T.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Manitowoc County: 

ROBERT P. DEWANE, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. 

¶1 GROGAN, J.1 B.M.T. appeals the twelve-month WIS. STAT. ch. 51

(hereinafter “ch. 51”) extension of his commitment2and involuntary medication 

orders from both 2022 and 2023.3 In the 2022 appeal, B.M.T. asserts the circuit 

court lost competency to enter the extension orders, which he asserts requires

reversal of both the 2022 and 2023 commitment and involuntary medication 

orders. In the 2023 appeal, B.M.T. makes two arguments: (1) the circuit court 

failed to make specific findings on the dangerousness element required by 

D.J.W.,

4 which warrants reversal; and (2) the County failed to establish that 

B.M.T. was provided with an explanation of the advantages, disadvantages, and 

alternative medications, which therefore warrants reversal of the medication order. 

This court affirms the orders in the 2022 appeal but reverses the orders in the 2023 

appeal.

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22). 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 “[E]xtension of a commitment” and “recommitment” are synonymous, and the terms 

will therefore be used interchangeably. Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶6 n.3, 402 

Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733.

3

 B.M.T. moved to consolidate his appeals from the 2022 and 2023 commitment orders. 

This court granted his motion by written order dated May 30, 2023. 

4

 Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277. 
Nos. 2022AP2079

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3

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 B.M.T. has been under a ch. 51 commitment since 2015 and has 

been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. In January 2022, the County filed a 

petition to extend commitment orders that were set to expire on February 27, 

2022. B.M.T. contested the petition, and a hearing was set for February 25, 2022. 

B.M.T., the County’s lawyer (Sarah Belair), and three individuals from the 

Manitowoc County Human Services Department were present in the courtroom on 

the February 25th hearing date, and B.M.T.’s lawyer, Luke Harrison, appeared via 

Zoom. The following exchange occurred:

 THE COURT: Matter had been on the calendar today 

for an extension hearing. Due to the level of snow we got 

last night, Attorney Harrison has not been able to make it in 

to the office. In anticipation of this, this possibility was 

apparently discussed with [B.M.T.] prior to this morning, 

and it’s my understanding that -- Attorney Harrison, that 

your client wishes to stipulate to an extension of the 

extension hearing so that we can have you here in person. 

Is that correct? 

 MR. HARRISON: That’s correct. 

 THE COURT: And, [B.M.T.], that is in fact your 

request? 

 [B.M.T.]: Yes, Your Honor. 

 THE COURT: Based on [B.M.T.’s] request and the fact 

that Attorney Harrison is not able to be with us today, the 

Court is going to find the necessary cause to extend the 

hearing until March 8th at 9:00 and that time is good for 

your office, Attorney Belair? 

 MS. BELAIR: Yes, Your Honor. 

 THE COURT: And Attorney Harrison? 

 MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor. 

 THE COURT: And, [B.M.T.], that’s good for you as 

well? 
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4

 [B.M.T.]: Yes. 

 THE COURT: Anything else? 

 MS. BELAIR: Just to clarify, the order and all 

conditions are being extended until that time? 

 THE COURT: Correct. 

 MS. BELAIR: Nothing further. 

 THE COURT: Attorney Harrison? 

 MR. HARRISON: I would apologize for my absence 

and thank you for your flexibility. 

 THE COURT: Then we are adjourned. 

¶3 On the same day, the circuit court entered a written order extending 

B.M.T.’s commitment order for eleven days. B.M.T. did not object to or appeal 

that eleven-day extension order, and the final hearing occurred as agreed on 

March 8, 2022. At that hearing, B.M.T. again did not object to the date of the 

hearing or assert that the circuit court lost competence to hear the matter due to the 

delay. Rather, he participated fully in the hearing, including testifying on his own 

behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found:

Grounds for the extension and commitment have been 

established. [B.M.T.] is mentally ill. He’s dangerous as 

defined by statute as he poses a substantial probability of 

physical harm to other individuals as manifested or shown 

by a substantial likelihood based on the subject’s individual 

treatment records that the individual would be a proper 

subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. 

 He is a proper subject for treatment. He’s a resident of 

Manitowoc County. His dangerousness is likely to be 

controlled with the appropriate medication administered on 

an outpatient basis. He has been adjudicated pursuant to 

U.S. Code as mental defective or committed to a mental 

institution previously. 

 Based on those findings, the Court is going to order that 

his commitment is extended for 12 months from the date of 

this hearing to the care and custody of the Manitowoc 
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County Human Services Department. Maximum level of 

treatment shall be outpatient with conditions. [B.M.T.], I 

need to advise you because of the commitment you are 

prohibited from possessing a firearm and the Court will 

sign that order at this time. 

The circuit court also found that medication would have therapeutic value, B.M.T. 

needed medication, and that:

[t]he advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to the 

medication have been explained to him, but due to his 

mental illness he’s not competent to refuse psychotropic 

medication or treatment because he’s substantially 

incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages, 

disadvantages and alternatives to his condition in order to 

make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse 

psychotropic medications.

The court entered an involuntary medication order based on its findings. 

¶4 B.M.T. filed a notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief the 

next day. Nothing was filed, however, due to issues with his appointed counsel. 

After obtaining extensions from this court, B.M.T. filed his notice of appeal from 

the March 8, 2022 commitment and involuntary medication orders in 

December 2022. 

¶5 In February 2023, the County filed a petition seeking to extend 

B.M.T.’s ch. 51 commitment orders. The circuit court appointed Dr. Marshall

Bales to examine B.M.T.; however, B.M.T. refused to meet with Dr. Bales. 

Dr. Bales filed a report that explained: “I made several phone calls to the subject 

individual that all but one went to voicemail. A man answered once and denied he 

was the subject individual. Later, the case manager informed me the subject 

individual declined to meet for an examination in any fashion.” The report 

indicated that B.M.T. was dangerous but did not identify by statute number the 
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specific subdivisions in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1) upon which he believed B.M.T. to 

be dangerous.5 The report further stated:

Although I could not perform a medication review with 

[B.M.T.], I, along with many other examiners, have in the 

past, and he has been unable to weigh the pros and cons of 

psychotropics or apply the information to himself. He has 

had ongoing lack of insight. He has also abused or 

self-medicated with street drugs and/or alcohol. Therefore, 

it is my opinion with a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty that he is not competent to refuse psychotropic 

medication, and an involuntary medication order is 

requested.

¶6 The circuit court held a hearing on the petition on March 1, 2023. 

Only Dr. Bales and Heidi Barnes, the County’s court liaison to the Manitowoc 

County Human Services Department, testified. As material,6 Dr. Bales testified as 

follows: 

 When asked whether he had the “opportunity to evaluate” 

B.M.T., Dr. Bales responded: “Only the records. I would add 

here I called his cell phone number and one time I got the voice 

machine with his name and another time I called the same 

number and somebody answered the phone and said that I have 

the wrong person and then hung up. Later I did contact the social 

worker and they contacted him and he completely declined to 

meet, so, therefore, I did this report by the record. I would add I 

did receive Circuit Court Access as well.” 

 

5

 The report does contain the language of all of the dangerousness standards in WIS.

STAT. § 51.20(1)(a), and Dr. Bales’s report placed an X next to the language found in 

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b and 2.c. His report also placed an X next to a box labeled “Additional standard 

available for recommitment hearings” that has some of the language from § 51.20(1)(am) listed. 

6

 B.M.T. does not contest the circuit court’s findings that he was mentally ill and a 

proper subject for treatment. He challenges only the dangerousness determination and the 

required medication discussion; therefore, this court sets forth only the testimony relevant to 

those issues.
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 When asked whether he could still offer an opinion as to 

B.M.T.’s dangerousness, he answered: “Definitely” because he 

had “done reports on him several different times including in 

2015, which was this case 15-ME, and I saw him at that original 

incident and -- but then several times since then.” 

 Dr. Bales testified that he looked at “[p]rior court examination[s], 

Wisconsin Circuit Court Access and then some Manitowoc 

County records[,]” and spoke to “the case manager[.]” 

 The doctor confirmed that he prepared a report, which was 

admitted into evidence, and that it was his opinion to a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty that B.M.T. is dangerous 

because if treatment is withdrawn, B.M.T. “becomes assaultive 

and threatening to people.” Further, Dr. Bales explained that 

even with treatment, B.M.T. has been charged with criminal acts, 

including battery, disorderly conduct, and drug possession.

 He explained that B.M.T.’s dangerousness is the result of his 

“mental health condition and/or antisocial behavior or it’s drug 

use, and, frankly, it’s probably some of all three.” Dr. Bales said 

B.M.T.’s use of illegal drugs while on the psychotropic 

medication also makes him dangerous. 

 When asked about whether B.M.T. would become dangerous to 

himself if treatment were withdrawn, Dr. Bales testified that he 

would be and indicated this is due to the way B.M.T. acts when 

he is off treatment: “people [like B.M.T.] with these manic, 

assaultive behaviors while paranoid and psychotic that they are 

very commonly assaultive themselves, and that’s a big concern 

here. Is somebody going to pull a gun and shoot him when he’s 

so psychotic and out of control and manic, but that’s my opinion 

and I really believe that.” 

 Dr. Bales testified that B.M.T. will not take his medication if not 

on commitment, and if that happens, there is a substantial 

probability that B.M.T. will harm someone or harm himself. 

 When asked if it is B.M.T.’s schizoaffective disorder that causes 

him to be dangerous, Dr. Bales answered: “It’s schizoaffective 

disorder, complicated by some antisocial traits and drug use. I 

just can’t say how much of each, but off street drugs and when 

he’s been in mental health facilities in the past, he’s been manic, 

aggressive and psychotic in the absence of drug use.” 
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¶7 With respect to the involuntary medication that Dr. Bales believes 

B.M.T. needs, the following exchange occurred:

 Q. You did not have an opportunity to explain the 

advantages, disadvantages or alternatives to medications to 

[B.M.T]; is that correct? 

 A. Not this year. 

 Q. Did [B.M.T.] decline to hear or have the opportunity 

for you to explain the advantages, disadvantages and 

alternatives to medication? 

 A. Yes. Again, I called him and somebody at his phone 

number said I have the wrong person so and then hung up 

quickly. And then later I called that number again and it 

was his name and voice machine. But later then I contacted 

the case manager and they said he was not going to talk to 

me in any fashion, not even briefly, so I took that as his 

choice to remain silent or not meet. That’s his right. 

 Q. And had you previously explained advantages, 

disadvantages and alternatives to medication to [B.M.T.]? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. Thank you. Doctor, do you have any opinion as to 

whether currently [B.M.T.] is capable of expressing an 

understanding of an explanation of the advantages, 

disadvantages and alternatives to accepting medication? 

 A. Incapable. 

 Q. You said incapable? 

 A. Yes. 

 Q. Is [B.M.T.] capable of applying the understanding of 

advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his mental 

health disorder in order to make an informed choice about 

whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medications? 

 A. He is not. 

 Q. And I guess I want to put it in layman’s terms. Is 

[B.M.T.] competent to consent to or refuse psychotropic 

medications? 

 A. Incompetent. 
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¶8 Ms. Barnes testified that she recommended another twelve-month 

commitment extension “after talking with [B.M.T.], his case manager and his 

psychiatrist.” She explained that B.M.T. has repeatedly said he does not need 

medication, he would be normal without it, and “he would not continue with 

services if he were not under the commitment.” When asked what would happen 

if B.M.T. stopped taking his medications, Barnes testified: “He would most likely 

become psychotic and need rehospitalization and potentially a commitment again” 

and that “there is a good likelihood that he could become dangerous, yes.” 

¶9 B.M.T. did not testify or call any witnesses. After the hearing 

concluded, the circuit court found: 

grounds for the extension of the commitment have been 

established. [B.M.T.] is mentally ill. He’s dangerous as 

defined by statute because he poses a substantial 

probability of physical harm to other individuals. Any 

substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to 

himself or herself or other individuals due to impaired 

judgment as manifested or shown by a substantial 

likelihood based on his individual treatment record that he 

would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment 

were withdrawn. He’s a proper subject for treatment.... 

His dangerousness is likely to be controlled with the 

appropriate medication administered on an outpatient basis. 

He has previously been adjudicated mentally defective or 

committed i[n] an institution. 

 Based on those findings, the Court is going to order that 

[B.M.T.’s] commitment is extended for 12 months[.] 

¶10 With respect to the involuntary medication and treatment request,

the circuit court found:

the issue of involuntary administration of medication or 

treatment was considered at a final hearing. Medication or 

treatment will have therapeutic value. [B.M.T.] appeared 

in person and with counsel. He does need medication or 

treatment. The advantages, disadvantages and alternatives 

to the medication were not explained to him on this current 

go-around but have been explained to him in the past and 
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due to his mental illness, he’s not competent to refuse 

psychotropic medication for treatment because he’s 

substantially incapable of applying the advantages, 

disadvantages and alternatives to his condition in order to 

make an informed choice as to whether or not to accept or 

refuse psychotropic medications. 

¶11 The circuit court entered orders extending B.M.T’s commitment and 

involuntary medication for twelve months. B.M.T. appealed the 2023 orders, and 

this court consolidated his two appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

¶12 B.M.T. raises three issues in this consolidated appeal: (1) whether 

the circuit court lacked competency to act with respect to his 2022 commitment 

orders by failing to hold the final hearing before the prior commitment order 

expired on February 27, 2022, and by failing to hold the final hearing within seven 

calendar days of the originally scheduled final hearing; (2) whether the circuit 

court failed to make specific findings that B.M.T. was dangerous as required by 

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277; 

and (3) whether the County failed to meet its burden with respect to the 2023 

involuntary medication order.

A. 2022 Commitment Order and Circuit Court Competency to Act

¶13 B.M.T. contends the circuit court lacked competency to act because 

his final 2022 recommitment hearing was not held until March 8, 2022. He says 

this date was too late because his prior commitment order expired on February 27, 

2022, and when his attorney could not make it to the scheduled final hearing on 

February 25, 2022, due to a snowstorm, any extension from that date was limited 

to seven calendar days pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(e). Thus, he says, 
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because March 8, 2022, was eleven days after February 25, 2022, the circuit court 

lacked competency to act.7

¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(10)(e) provides: “At the request of the 

subject individual or his or her counsel the final hearing under par. (c) may be 

postponed, but in no case may the postponement exceed 7 calendar days from the 

date established by the court under this subsection for the final hearing.” The 

statute is very clear, and when B.M.T.’s counsel asked for an extension because a 

snowstorm prevented him from getting to the courthouse for the February 25, 

2022 hearing, the circuit court should have known that the statute only permits a 

seven-calendar-day extension.

¶15 The County argues that WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(e)’s seven-calendarday extension does not control here, however, because the circuit court did not 

rely on that statute but instead entered an order extending B.M.T.’s recommitment 

for eleven days from February 25, 2022 (to March 8, 2022). The County points to 

its attorney’s clarification at the February 25th hearing that “the order and all 

conditions are being extended” and the fact that the Record contains a written 

eleven-day recommitment extension order from which B.M.T. did not appeal.

¶16 B.M.T. replies that the circuit court’s first words at the 

February 25th hearing were that it “extend[ed] the hearing” (emphasis added),

rather than B.M.T.’s commitment order. He further argues that an eleven-day 

 

7

 In his initial appellate brief, B.M.T. asserts that the hearing ultimately “took place on 

March 8, 2022, nine days after the originally scheduled February 25 date.” Although it ultimately 

is not pertinent to the resolution of this issue, March 8th is eleven days after February 25th (the 

date initially scheduled for the recommitment hearing); it is nine days after February 27th—the 

date the commitment order expired.
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extension order would require the County to comply with the ch. 51 statutory 

procedures for seeking an extension of the commitment orders and that the 

March 8th recommitment and medication orders were therefore invalid.

¶17 This court need not resolve the merits of this dispute because B.M.T. 

forfeited any right to challenge the circuit court’s competency by failing to object 

at the March 8, 2022 hearing. If B.M.T. wanted to challenge the court’s 

competence, he needed to object to it in the circuit court. See City of Cedarburg 

v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, ¶¶49, 55, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463, opinion 

modified on reconsideration, 2020 WI 45, 391 Wis. 2d 671, 943 N.W.2d 544

(“[A]n objection to a court’s competence can be forfeited if it is not raised in a 

timely manner.”). B.M.T. did not make a timely competence objection, and he

fully participated in the March 8th hearing that he now claims the court lacked 

competence to conduct. Moreover, it was B.M.T.’s counsel who prevented the 

final hearing from taking place as scheduled on February 25th and who requested 

the extension. B.M.T.’s counsel did not object to the March 8th hearing date and 
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did not object to the written order extending the recommitment order for eleven 

days. This court therefore concludes B.M.T. forfeited any competency challenge.8 

B. 2023 Commitment Dangerousness Determination

¶18 B.M.T.’s next challenge is to the circuit court’s determination in the 

2023 commitment order that he is dangerous. Specifically, he contends that the 

court failed to mention the specific WIS. STAT. § 51.20 subdivision upon which the 

dangerousness determination was made—it was not mentioned in the petition for 

recommitment, it was not mentioned by either witness at the hearing, and the 

circuit court failed to state which subdivision of the statute it based its ruling on. 

B.M.T. argues that D.J.W. required the circuit court to make this specific finding.

¶19 Before specifically addressing B.M.T.’s argument, it is necessary to 

first identify the general principles governing a WIS. STAT. ch. 51 recommitment 

governed by WIS. STAT. § 51.20. To involuntarily commit an individual, a county 

must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill, a 

proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. Sec. 51.20(1)(a)1-2, (13)(e), 

 

8

 B.M.T. relies on G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 636, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. 

App. 1989), but that case preceded our supreme court’s decision holding that a failure to timely 

challenge competence forfeits the right to raise it on appeal. See City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 

2020 WI 11, ¶¶49, 55, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463, opinion modified on reconsideration, 

2020 WI 45, 391 Wis. 2d 671, 943 N.W.2d 544 (“[A]n objection to a court’s competence can be 

forfeited if it is not raised in a timely manner.”). Further, in a more recent case decided after 

G.O.T., this court held judicial estoppel precluded dismissal of a ch. 51 commitment when the 

delay beyond the statutory timeline occurred at the request of the subject of the commitment. See 

County of Milwaukee v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, ¶7, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241

(applying judicial estoppel in a ch. 51 case because the subject of the commitment requested an 

adjournment beyond the statutory deadline in the circuit court and then on appeal objected to the 

circuit court granting the requested adjournment). This court is not persuaded by B.M.T.’s 

argument that Edward S. does not apply simply because the County agreed to the adjournment 

his counsel requested. The County’s attorney was present in the courtroom for the February 25th 

hearing ready to proceed despite the snowstorm. The delay is solely attributed to B.M.T. 
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(13)(g)3; Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶18, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 

N.W.2d 783. 

¶20 “To prevail in a recommitment proceeding, the petitioner must 

demonstrate the same three elements necessary for the initial commitment[,]” but 

“‘WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) provides a different avenue for proving 

dangerousness if the individual has been the subject of’” commitment immediately 

before the recommitment petition. Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, 

¶¶18-19, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733 (quoting Portage County v. J.W.K., 

2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509). Dangerousness “‘may be 

satisfied by a showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject 

individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn.’” M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 (quoting 

WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am)). This method of proving dangerousness is necessary 

because “‘an individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent 

overt acts or omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment 

ameliorated such behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may be a 

substantial likelihood such behavior would recur.’” M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶20 

(quoting J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶19). If a county relies on § 51.20(1)(am) to 

prove dangerousness, a link to one of the five dangerousness standards from 

§ 51.20(1)(a)2 is required. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶59. 

¶21 Our supreme court set forth the applicable standards for reviewing 

ch. 51 recommitment cases in D.J.W.:

In a recommitment proceeding, the burden is on the County 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence all required 

facts. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(e); Winnebago [County] v. 

J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶59, 381 Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41. 

Whether the County has met its burden is a mixed question 

of law and fact. Waukesha [County] v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 
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57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. First, we will 

uphold a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly 

erroneous if it is against the great weight and clear 

preponderance of the evidence. Metro[politan] Assocs. v. 

City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, ¶62, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 

N.W.2d 784. Second, we review whether the facts satisfy 

the statutory standard. J.W.J., 375 Wis. 2d 542, ¶15. In 

our review, we interpret and apply WIS. STAT. § 51.20. 

Statutory interpretation and application are questions of law 

that we review independently of the determinations 

rendered by the circuit court and court of appeals. 

Metro[politan] Assocs., 379 Wis. 2d 141, ¶24.

D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶23-25 (formatting altered).

¶22 Here, B.M.T. challenges only the dangerousness element, and 

therefore, this court need not address the other two elements. B.M.T. claims the 

absence of a specific reference to any statutory dangerousness standard requires 

reversal of the circuit court’s decision. As set forth above, B.M.T. is correct that 

neither Dr. Bales nor the circuit court specifically identified the statutory 

subdivision relied upon in concluding that he was dangerous. D.J.W., which 

requires such a finding, held: “[C]ircuit courts in recommitment proceedings are 

to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of 

[WIS. STAT.] § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” Id., ¶59

(emphasis added).

¶23 D.J.W. provided two reasons for requiring the “specific factual 

findings” and “reference to the specific subdivision paragraph”: (1) “it provides 

clarity and extra protection to patients regarding the underlying basis for a 

recommitment”; and (2) it “will clarify issues raised on appeal of recommitment 

orders and ensure the soundness of judicial decision making[.]” Id., ¶¶42, 44. 
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¶24 It is troubling that circuit courts are still failing to comply with

D.J.W.’s specific directive, which our supreme court announced almost four years 

ago in April 2020. D.J.W.’s directive is neither complicated nor difficult to 

understand. In no uncertain terms, it says that a circuit court should specifically 

identify the WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2 statutory subdivision it is relying on in 

making the dangerousness determination. The circuit court did not do that here.

¶25 The County argues that despite the circuit court’s failure to identify 

the specific WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2 subdivisions it relied on, the circuit court’s 

words nevertheless made it clear to B.M.T. that it found him dangerous under

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b and 2.c because the language the circuit court used in its oral 

ruling lines up “exactly” with the words of those subdivisions. This court 

disagrees.

¶26 The petition to extend B.M.T.’s commitment does not identify any 

specific WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2 subdivisions—it simply parrots some of 

§ 51.20(1)(am)’s language. The petition does not mention § 51.20(1)(a)2.b or 2.c

at all, and accordingly, the petition itself does not give B.M.T. notice that the 

underlying basis for his recommitment will be that he is dangerous under 

§ 51.20(1)2.b and 2.c. While Dr. Bales’s report suggests that the basis for 

dangerousness is § 51.20(1)(am), linked to both § 51.20(1)(a)2.b and 2.c by using 

the language from those statutes, his report does not actually identify any specific 

statutory subdivision. Moreover, no statutory subdivisions were mentioned at any

time during the hearing.

¶27 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b allows a subject to be found 

dangerous if he: 
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Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm to 

other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent 

homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that 

others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and 

serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent 

overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm. 

And, § 51.20(1)(a)2.c allows a subject to be found dangerous if he:

Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence 

of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a 

substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to 

himself or herself or other individuals. The probability of 

physical impairment or injury is not substantial under this 

subd. 2.c. if reasonable provision for the subject 

individual’s protection is available in the community and 

there is a reasonable probability that the individual will 

avail himself or herself of these services, if the individual 

may be provided protective placement or protective 

services under ch. 55[.]

Dr. Bales testified about past dangerous acts and his belief that B.M.T. may 

become dangerous again if treatment is withdrawn as well as that B.M.T. may be 

dangerous to others when treatment is withdrawn because B.M.T. “becomes 

assaultive and threatening to people” when not medicated. He also testified that 

B.M.T. is a danger to himself because he will act out if untreated, which could 

cause others to hurt him. The County contends that this testimony sufficiently 

identifies a link to the second (WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b) and the third 

(§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c) dangerousness standards. The circuit court, however, neither 

made specific factual findings based on Dr. Bales’s testimony nor made reference 

to the respective statutory standard, which D.J.W. explicitly requires of circuit 

courts in ch. 51 proceedings.

¶28 Despite having failed to make such findings and despite having 

failed to make any such references, at the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit 

court nevertheless found the County had established dangerousness by clear and 
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convincing evidence. The court’s entire statement on dangerousness was that 

B.M.T. is

dangerous as defined by statute because he poses a 

substantial probability of physical harm to other 

individuals. Any substantial probability of physical 

impairment or injury to himself or herself or other 

individuals due to impaired judgment as manifested or 

shown by a substantial likelihood based on his individual 

treatment record that he would be a proper subject for 

commitment if treatment were withdrawn.

The circuit court’s statement is simply a conclusory statement that does not 

address all parts of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b or 2.c. This is insufficient under 

D.J.W. as it does not satisfy either purpose our supreme court discussed in that 

case. First, the circuit court’s ruling does not provide B.M.T. clarity as to the basis 

upon which he is currently dangerous. Second, it fails to provide this court with 

clarity as to which WIS. STAT. § 51.20 dangerousness subdivision the circuit court 

relied on in making its decision. It is not clear to this court from the circuit court’s 

two sentences—which jumble together a few words from § 51.20(1)(a)2.b, 2.c,

and § 51.20(1)(am) and comprise the circuit court’s entire explanation on 

dangerousness—that the circuit court found B.M.T. dangerous under 

§ 51.20(1)(am) with a link to § 51.20(1)(a)2.b and 2.c. The circuit court’s 

decision does not contain specific factual findings on dangerousness or reference

to the subdivision paragraph.

¶29 D.J.W. directed that “circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are 

to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of 

§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, 

¶59. As our supreme court explained: 

With such an important liberty interest at stake, the 

accompanying protections should mirror the serious nature 

of the proceeding. Requiring circuit courts to provide 
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specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision 

paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the 

recommitment is based provides increased protection to 

patients to ensure that recommitments are based on 

sufficient evidence.

D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶43 (emphases added; footnote omitted). The circuit 

court here failed to do so. 

¶30 Because the circuit court failed to comply with D.J.W.’s directive to 

both make factual findings and to then tie those factual findings to the specific 

dangerousness subdivision, the 2023 commitment order must be reversed as does

the involuntary medication order because it is dependent upon the validity of the 

commitment order.9 

III. CONCLUSION

¶31 This court affirms the orders in B.M.T.’s 2022 commitment 

(Appeal No. 2022AP2079). This court reverses the orders in B.M.T.’s 2023

commitment (Appeal No. 2023AP904).

10

By the Court.—Orders affirmed in part; orders reversed in part. 

 

9

 It is not necessary for this court to specifically address B.M.T.’s involuntary 

medication issue because only dispositive issues need be addressed. See Maryland Arms Ltd. 

P’ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (“[A]ppellate court[s] 

should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.”).

10

 Although the 2023 orders do not expire until March 8, 2024, the circuit court no longer 

has competency to act as to the 2023 recommitment because the previous recommitment order—

the 2022 order—expired on March 8, 2023. See Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2023 WI 59, ¶24, 

408 Wis. 2d 316, 992 N.W.2d 809 (“[T]he failure to enter a lawful extension order before the 

preceding order expires results in a loss of competency.”). Accordingly, reversal—rather than 

remand—is the appropriate remedy. 
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This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.