THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

SUSAN SZABO; ZOLTAN SZABO 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 

et al. 

Defendants. 

PANNER, J. 

No. 1:15-cv-0347-PA 

ORDER 

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiffs' 

Complaint (#1) and Application to Proceed in forma pauperis 

(IFP) (#2). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' 

Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

Background 

Plaintiffs in this action borrowed $230,000 on August 12, 

2004, to finance the purchase of property in Josephine County, 

Oregon. The loan was secured by a Note and Deed of Trust. In 

2012, Plaintiffs began to experience financial difficulties and 

fell behind on their mortgage payments. At some point, 

Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings. 

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Legal Standard 

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in 

United States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity 

for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their 

inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that 

access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must 

make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether 

the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the 

action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1). Second, it must assess 

whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2) (B). 

In regard to the second of these determinations, district 

courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) to screen 

complaints even before the service of the complaint on the 

defendants, and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a 

claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915 (e) (2) (B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the 

federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a short 

and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief 

that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonabl~ inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard . asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully." Id. The court is not required to accept legal 

conclusions, unsupported' by alleged facts, as true. Id. 

Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than 

pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se 

plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefits of 

any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is 

entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the 

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies 

cannot be cured by amendment. Id. 

Discussion 

Plaintiffs bring this action alleging breach of contract, 

"failure to prove lawful position as a Note Holder," demands 

for records, and human rights violations. 

I. Standing 

"[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the 

case-or-controversy requirement of Article III [of the United 

States Constitution]." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560 (1992). "Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is 

the proper party to bring the matter to the court for 

adjudication." Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 

F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). At an "irreducible minimum," 

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Article III "standing requires the party asserting the 

existence of federal court jurisdiction to establish three 

elements: ( 1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent; (2) causation); and 

(3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the 

injury." Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citation omitted). 

In addition to these constitutional limitations on federal 

court jurisdiction, there are also prudential limitations on 

its exercise. Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 

F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2006). The doctrine of prudential 

standing "restrict[s] the grounds a plaintiff may put forward 

in .seeking to vindicate his personal stake." Id. at 1104. 

Courts must consider, among other things, "whether the alleged 

injury is more than a mere generalized grievance, whether the 

plaintiff is asserting her own rights or the rights of third 

parties, ·and whether the claim falls within the zone of 

interests to be protected or regulated by the constitutional 

guarantee ln question." Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1056 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]s a prudential 

matter, even when a plaintiff has Article III standing, we 

ordinarily do not allow third parties to litigate on the basis 

of the rights of others." Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc., 

Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In this case,· Plaintiffs appear allege that Defendants 

failed to comply with the requirements of its pooling and 

servicing agreement (PS~). Plaintiffs allege that this failure 

somehow constituted a breach of contract with Plaintiffs. 

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Plaintiffs do not allege that they are parties to the PSA or 

investors in the REMIC trust. It is well settled that a 

plaintiff lacks standing to enforce the terms of a PSA when he 

is neither a party to, nor a third party beneficiary of, that 

agreement. See, ~ Oliver v. Delta Fin. Liquidating Trust 

6:12-cv-00869-AA, 2012 WL 3704954, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 27, 

2012). Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to challenge 

Defendants' compliance with the terms of the PSA. 

II. Factual Issues 

Plaintiffs appear to allege that the involvement of 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) in their 

loan potentially constitutes a violation of the Oregon Trust 

Deed Act (OTDA). The Complaint, however, alleges only that 

Defendants have initiated a foreclosure proceeding. It is 

possible for a lender to foreclose on a Note and Deed of Trust 

without recourse to non-judicial foreclosure under the OTDA. 

See Memmott v. OneWest Bank, Civil No. 10-3042-CL, 2011 WL 

1560985 at *11 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2011) (describing the three 

mechanisms for enforcing a security interest under Oregon law). 

It is not clear from the Complaint whether the foreclosure 

action was brought subject to the OTDA, nor is it clear if that 

action is ongoing or completed. 

Plaintiffs also allege that they demanded to see the "wet 

inku copies of their Note. Plaintiffs appear to allege that 

Defendants' failure to do produce the original Note constitutes 

either a breach of contract or a separate cause of action. The 

Complaint does not allege that Defendants had a contractual 

obligation to produce the original Note upon demand. 

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Plaintiffs also allege that if Defendants present them with 

copies of the Note, such an act would be "considered 

counterfeiting." Plaintiffs provide no support for this 

conclusory allegation. 

III. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants and their 

attorneys have used their membership in state bar associations 

to commit human rights violations in contravention of the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty 

of the United States, but rather a non-binding resolution of 

the General Assembly of the United Nations "which creates legal 

obligations only insofar as it represents evidence of customary 

international law." Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 

Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1992). The 

Declaration does not, of its own force, impose obligations as a 

matter of international law. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 

692, 734-35 (2004). Nor does the Declaration serve as a source 

of justiciable rights. Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2010). 

To the extent that Plaintiffs base their claims on the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Complaint fails to 

state a claim. 

Conclusion 

Plaintiffs' Complaint (#1) is DISMISSED. Because I cannot 

say with certainty that Plaintiffs could not amend their 

complaint to state a claim, dismissal with without prejudice 

and with leave to amend. If Plaintiffs wish to file an amended 

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complaint, they must do so within 30 days of the date of this 

Order. I defer ruling on Plaintiffs' Application to Proceed 

IFP (#2) pending timely submission of an amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this /( day of March, 2015. 

OWEN ~~ M. PANNE 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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