PAGE 1 – PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JANE ROE’S MOTION TO 

 DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM 

DAVID H. ANGELI, OSB No. 020244 

 david@angelilaw.com 

KRISTEN L. TRANETZKI, OSB. No. 115730 

 kristen@angelilaw.com 

Angeli Ungar Law Group LLC 

121 SW Morrison Street, Suite 400 

Portland, OR 97204 

Telephone: (503) 954-2232 

Facsimile: (503) 227-0880 

COURTNEY W. ANGELI, OSB No. 941765 

 courtney@baaslaw.com 

ROBIN BOWERFIND, OSB No. 035949 

 robin@baaslaw.com 

Buchanan Angeli Altschul & Sullivan LLP 

321 SW 4th Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204 

Telephone: (503) 974-5015 

Facsimile: (971) 230-0337 

Attorneys for Plaintiff John Doe 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

JOHN DOE, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE REED INSTITUTE 

(aka, Reed College) and JANE ROE, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 3:15-cv-00617-MO 

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT JANE ROE’S 

FRCP 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM 

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Plaintiff John Doe respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to 

defendant Jane Roe’s FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Abuse of Process Claim 

(“Partial Motion to Dismiss” or “Motion”) (ECF No. 13). Because Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) adequately alleges an abuse of process claim against Jane Roe, Roe’s Partial 

Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff’s claim for abuse process is properly pled. This action involves false rape 

allegations against plaintiff John Doe (“John”) by his ex-girlfriend and fellow Reed College 

student, defendant Jane Roe (“Jane”), and her successful attempt to misuse their school’s 

disciplinary process to further her own goals. By his pleading, plaintiff has satisfied the 

requirements of Oregon law: (1) he has alleged an ulterior purpose unrelated to the process of 

Reed’s enforcing its honor principle; (2) he has alleged a “definite act or threat” by Jane in 

perverting that process; (3) he has alleged a “legal process” that was abused, because Oregon law 

does not preclude an abuse of process claim in connection with a private college’s disciplinary 

proceeding; and (4) (to the extent he even needs to) he has alleged a “seizure of property.” 

As set forth in the FAC, on July 25, 2013, after they had been dating for approximately 

ten months, John and Jane engaged in fully consensual group sexual activity with A.M., a recent 

Reed graduate. (FAC ¶ 2.) Months later, in late October 2013, John and Jane ended their 

relationship. (Id. ¶ 6.) John later began secretly dating one of Jane’s friends, which Jane 

eventually discovered. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 82.) Jealous and angry at her ex-boyfriend’s relationship with 

her friend, Jane decided to take matters into her own hands and suddenly declared for the first 

time, in March 2014, that the July 25th group sex eight months earlier was unwanted by her and 

amounted to an “assault”, and initiated disciplinary proceedings against John. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 82, 84.) 

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Contrary to what Jane claims in her Motion, this is not a case where a defendant pursued 

a proper process to its natural conclusion, just with bad intentions. Although Jane filed a formal 

complaint against John with Reed with a bad motive (anger, jealousy), plaintiff has also alleged 

improper ulterior purposes for Jane’s conduct: “to disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s education, to 

destroy his reputation, and to undermine his new relationship.” (Id. ¶ 292.) Presumably, the 

purpose of Reed’s disciplinary process is to assess accurately whether misconduct occurred and 

properly to impose discipline that is commensurate with the offense. Jane’s alleged motivations 

are clearly at odds with purposes for which Reed’s disciplinary proceeding was designed. (See, 

e.g., FAC ¶¶ 139, 140 (alleging that the disciplinary process is intended to investigate and 

recommend actions appropriate to the circumstances of the case and the ethos of the educational 

institution.)) As a result of Jane’s deliberate conduct in making a false report and false 

accusations (see, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 7-8, 88-89), John was deprived of his “property right in education, 

his right to be physically present on Reed’s campus and to reside in Reed’s residences, as well as 

his other privileges enjoyed under his contract with Reed.” (FAC ¶ 293.) The First Amended 

Complaint thus alleges Jane’s perversion of a legal process to accomplish ulterior purposes 

collateral to the process at issue, and which resulted in seizure of John’s property. 

ARGUMENT 

A. The Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss Cautions the Court to Evaluate 

the Complaint Liberally. 

A complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 

entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). On motions to dismiss 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), courts are required to accept the plaintiffs’ allegations as 

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true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 

1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005), and accept as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. 

Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be construed liberally 

and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 

2009), cert. granted in part on other issues, 131 S. Ct. 415 (2010). 

The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide 

the merits. In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1015 (S.D. Cal. 2005). As 

the Supreme Court has cautioned, “when a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be 

dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary 

support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the fact finder.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). 

B. John Doe Has Sufficiently Pled a Claim for Abuse of Process. 

“Abuse of process is ‘the perversion of legal procedure to accomplish an ulterior purpose 

when the procedure is commenced in proper form and with probable cause.’” Larsen v. Credit 

Bureau, Inc., 279 Or. 405, 408 (1977) (citing Kelly v. McBarron, 258 Or. 149 (1971)). “A 

defendant is liable for abuse of process if it perverts a process which is regular on its face to a 

purpose for which the process is not intended.” Clausen v. Carstens, 83 Or. App. 112, 118 

(1986). That is exactly what the FAC alleges. Jane deliberately misused Reed’s disciplinary 

process, which is designed to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations of school policy, to 

disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s academic career, destroy his reputation, and undermine his personal 

relationship with his new girlfriend. All the elements of the tort have been sufficiently pled. 

1. John Doe has sufficiently pled Jane’s ulterior purpose. 

 Jane properly notes that “to plead a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must allege 

some ulterior purpose, unrelated to the process, and a willful act in the use of the process that is 

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not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” Pfaendler v. Bruce, 195 Or. App. 561, 572 

(2004) (citing Larsen, 279 Or. at 408). The FAC on its face satisfies this element: John 

specifically pled that, “In March 2014, eight months after the July 25 group sex, and only after 

John started dating Jane’s friend, Jane claimed—for the first time—to Reed’s Community Safety 

Division (“Community Safety”) that (among other things) she had not consented to the group sex 

on July 25, 2013. Jane’s accusations were . . . intended to retaliate against John for dating her 

friend . . .” (FAC ¶ 7-8.) It further alleges that “Jane perverted the SMB [Sexual Misconduct 

Board] process to a process for which the SMB was not intended to accomplish the ulterior 

purpose of retaliating against John for ending his relationship with Jane and for dating Jane’s 

friend.” (FAC ¶ 292.) Her goal was to “disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s education, to destroy his 

reputation, and to undermine his new relationship.” (FAC ¶ 292.) John accordingly has 

adequately pled Jane’s ulterior purpose. 

The Clausen case makes clear that plaintiff is reading the requirement of “ulterior 

purpose” too narrowly. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that an abuse of process occurred in a 

legal proceeding in which a receiver was procured in connection with a divorce proceeding. The 

plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorneys “procured the receiver for the ulterior purpose of 

coercing a settlement and unauthorized discovery in the dissolution case.” 83 Or. App. at 118. 

The Court stated: 

That is a sufficient pleading. Although the receiver was appointed in the very case in 

which defendants actually sought collateral advantage, [plaintiff] still has stated a claim. 

The receivership proceeding was collateral to the main case. Its only proper purpose was 

to protect the property at issue pending the outcome of the case. * * * Its use to coerce a 

settlement or other concessions in the main case would be beyond the purpose for which 

it was created. Although the complaint does not explicitly allege that defendants procured 

the receiver primarily for the ulterior purpose, * * * that allegation is implicit in the 

pleadings. 

Id. (internal citations omitted).

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In this case, Jane’s main criticism with the pleading is that supposedly “John identifies no 

ulterior purpose of Jane’s, nor any action or threat taken by her, that was unrelated to the 

process” because “John’s claim is premised on the notion that Jane sought to obtain the very end 

(John’s discipline from Reed) that Reed’s disciplinary process was designed to bring about.” 

(Motion at 2.) Clausen makes clear that the fact that Jane may have had a legitimate purpose 

and an ulterior motive does not defeat the claim; those purposes do not have to be wholly 

unrelated to one another. In making her objection, Jane overlooks the factual assertions in the 

pleading that demonstrate that Jane “pervert[ed] a process which is regular on its face to a 

purpose for which the process is not intended,” Clausen, 83 Or. App. at 118, namely that Jane 

intended to “disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s education, to destroy his reputation, and to undermine his 

new relationship.” (FAC ¶ 292.) These goals are not the “very end” that Reed’s disciplinary 

process was designed to bring about. They are goals other than that for which Reed’s 

disciplinary process was intended. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 139, 140 (disciplinary process intended to 

investigate and recommend actions appropriate to the circumstances of the case and the ethos of 

the educational institution).) 

Jane also complains that there is no allegation that “Jane ever sought to obtain any sort of 

‘collateral advantage,’ such as the surrender of property or the payment of money” (Motion at 5), 

but that misstates the crux of the tort, which is a perversion of the process. As stated earlier, the 

cases, relying on Dean William L. Prosser’s treatise Law of Torts, suggest, as an example, that 

“the improper purpose usually take the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not 

properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of 

money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.” Larsen, 279 Or. at 408 (quoting Prosser, 

Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), 857, § 121) (emphasis added). But this is just an illustration set 

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forth in a treatise, not a hard and fast requirement. Not every case is going to involve the 

surrender of property or the payment of money, nor is every case going to look like a typical 

extortion scheme. Again, Clausen makes that clear. 

Put simply, the test is to determine whether a legitimate process was used to accomplish 

an end which is not the regular purpose of that process. Jane’s end was, as alleged, to “disrupt 

her ex-boyfriend’s education, to destroy his reputation, and to undermine his new relationship.” 

(FAC ¶ 292.) Even assuming that the disruption to John’s education was the “regular” end of the 

disciplinary process, which we disagree was proper here, the other two ulterior purposes alleged 

certainly are not: a school disciplinary process is not supposed to be abused by a student to 

cause a rift between her ex-boyfriend and his new girlfriend. 

Guidance from other cases is also helpful here in understanding what type of ulterior 

purpose is sufficient to state a claim for the tort. For instance, in Carranza v. United States, Case 

No. 3:12-cv-2255-AC, 2013 WL 3333104 (D. Or. July 1, 2013), plaintiff (Carranza) lodged an 

abuse of process claim against defendants (the United States and John Doe Federal Law 

Enforcement Agents), alleging that defendants willfully used the immigration detention process 

against her for the illegitimate purpose of attempting to coerce information from her about her 

brother who was wanted in connection with a criminal investigation. Defendants moved to 

dismiss, arguing that, regardless of any alleged ulterior motive, there was probable cause to 

arrest and detain Carranza, and that she did not plead sufficient facts to show the immigration 

detention process was initiated for any purpose other than to secure her presence at immigration 

and removal proceedings. 

In denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Carranza court reasoned that “the 

legitimate purpose of the immigration detention process is securing the presence of parties for 

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immigration and removal proceedings.” Id. at *11. Accepting the allegations of the complaint 

as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Carranza, the court found that she 

sufficiently pled an illegitimate purpose of the proceedings, namely that “Defendants used the 

immigration detention process not to detain Carranza pursuant to an outstanding removal order, 

but to compel her to divulge the whereabouts of her brother.” Id. at *12. In other words, the 

court “reasonably inferred that Defendants detained Carranza for the purpose of coercing her 

cooperation and that of her family in their search for [Carranza’s brother].” Id. This is despite 

defendants’ arguments that they only had in mind the legitimate purpose of the detention 

process. 

Just as plaintiff did in Carranza, John has sufficiently pled an ulterior purpose by Jane: to 

disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s education, to destroy his reputation, and to undermine his new 

relationship. Whether she succeeded in those goals is beside the point, nor does it matter at this 

stage if she disagrees factually with the allegations about her goals—presumably she does. Just 

as the court rejected the defendants’ attempt in Carranza to offer legitimate reasons for the 

proceeding (securing presence for removal order), so too here should Jane’s attempts to offer 

legitimate reasons for the proceeding (school discipline against John) be rejected for purposes of 

this motion. See also Clausen, 83 Or. App. at 118 (accepting as true for purposes of abuse of 

process claim plaintiff’s allegation that the ex parte order appointed a receiver of plaintiff’s 

business interests in bitter divorce proceedings was done for ulterior purpose of forcing 

settlement and gaining unauthorized discovery, even though defendants asserted the legitimate 

statutory purpose of receivership to protect property during pending proceedings). 

Jane also suggests that her allegedly malicious intent in pursuing the disciplinary 

proceeding somehow undermines the validity of John’s abuse of process claim; that is, that 

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because she had a bad motive, the tort cannot lie. Jane is wrong as a matter of law. A bad 

motive and an ulterior purpose are not mutually exclusive—indeed, they may often co-exist—

and courts have thus allowed plaintiffs to simultaneously pursue tort claims of both malicious 

prosecution and abuse of process. See, e.g., Singh v. McLaughlin, 255 Or. App. 340, 353-55 

(2013) (allowing claims for malicious prosecution and for abuse of process). 

2. John Doe has sufficiently alleged a “definite act” by Jane in perverting the 

process.

The abuse of process tort also requires “some definite act or threat not authorized by the 

process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process.” Larsen, 279 Or. at 

408 (cited favorably in Motion at 6). John has patently satisfied this element as well. Jane’s 

only objection here is that “John’s claim is insufficient, for it fails to identify or allege any act 

taken by Jane—or threat made by Jane—that was either not authorized by the process or was 

aimed at an illegitimate objective.” (Motion at 6.) Jane’s argument ignores the allegations in the 

First Amended Complaint detailing the very concrete actions taken by Jane to pervert the 

process. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 7-8 (Jane’s false accusations to Reed), ¶¶ 88-89, 291 (Jane’s false 

report on the sexual assault), ¶293 (Jane “perverted” and “hijacked” the proceeding.) 

Not only is it clear from the pleading that Jane willfully undertook these actions, it is also 

clear that these specific actions undertaken by Jane were aimed at an illegitimate objective, 

namely to “disrupt her ex-boyfriend’s education, to destroy his reputation, and to undermine his 

new relationship.” (FAC ¶ 292.) As alleged, Jane’s false report, false accusations and false 

testimony, were all made in furtherance of her ulterior purpose. 

3. John Doe has sufficiently alleged the “legal process.” 

 Jane also mistakenly asserts that a private college’s internal disciplinary process is “not 

the sort of ‘legal process’ for which an abuse of process claim may lie.” (Motion at 7.) Contrary 

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to Jane’s assertion, the Oregon Supreme Court in Donovan v. Barnes, 274 Or. 701 (1976), 

previously established that the related tort of malicious prosecution can be based on a 

university’s internal disciplinary proceeding.1

 There, the court was presented with the issue of 

whether an action for malicious prosecution should be allowed in connection with student 

disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 703-04. The court rejected the protests of the defendant who had 

instigated the disciplinary proceedings: “We do not agree with defendant’s contention that 

malicious prosecution actions should never be allowed to be based upon the malicious 

prosecution of a student disciplinary proceeding.” Id. at 704. The Donovan court could find “no 

basis for applying any different standards to this action merely because it is based on an 

adjudicatory proceeding before an administrative body2 rather than a proceeding before a judicial 

tribunal.” Id. The Donovan court instead opined that “[t]he administrative process is also a legal 

process, and its abuse in the same way with the same injury should receive the same penalty.” 

Id. at 705 (emphasis added). Thus, the Donovan court definitively and affirmatively answered 

the question at hand, i.e., can a student disciplinary process be the sort of “legal process” for 

which an abuse of process claim may lie? (Motion at 7.) 

                                                            

1 As noted above, claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process can and often are 

brought in the same legal proceeding based on the same underlying facts. See, e.g., Singh, 255 

Or. App. at 353-55 (recognizing that abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims can arise 

from the same legal process). These tort claims both require, as a necessary element, a “legal 

process” or a “judicial proceeding.” See, e.g., Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass’n, 234 Or. 255, 259-

260 (1963) (“Under Oregon law, the elements of a claim for wrongful initiation of a civil 

proceeding are: (1) The commencement and prosecution by the defendant of a judicial 

proceeding against the plaintiff....”). The malicious prosecution claim is arguably narrower than 

an abuse of process claim in requiring a “judicial proceeding” as opposed to the broader “legal 

process.” By allowing a malicious prosecution claim in the context of a malicious prosecution 

claim in Donovan, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of the law that must 

apply with at least equal force to abuse of process claims. 2 The administrative proceeding in Donovan was the University of Oregon Student Court. 

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In reaching its holding, the Donovan court did not distinguish between private or public 

universities. Rather, the court concluded that “an action for malicious prosecution may be based 

upon the initiation or instigation of an administrative proceeding of a judicial nature and that the 

rules and standards that govern actions based upon civil proceedings should also apply to actions 

based upon administrative proceedings.” Id. at 705-06 (emphasis added). Relevant to its 

determination were the specific quasi-judicial “procedural aspects” of the student disciplinary 

proceedings. Id. at 707-09 (e.g., written notice of the charges, a hearing before the Student 

Court, right to present evidence and make opening and closing statements). 

Other courts, likewise, have recognized that administrative proceedings, such as the 

student disciplinary actions here and in Donovan, are “legal processes” that can appropriately be 

the basis for an abuse of process or malicious prosecution claim. The need for redress against 

malicious or abusive proceedings conducted outside of a traditional courtroom setting was 

recognized because “[t]he same harmful consequences may flow from the groundless and 

malicious institution of proceedings in them as does from judicial proceedings similarly begun.”

Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 425-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (allowing tort of malicious prosecution 

for administrative proceedings) (cited favorably in Donavan). The Rhode Island Supreme Court, 

for instance, held that “contested administrative determinations or proceedings that establish the 

legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party after a hearing and that embody sufficient attributes of 

judicial proceedings” can give rise to an abuse of process claim. Hillside Associates v. Stravato, 

642 A.2d 664, 669 (R.I. 1994).3

 Contrary to Jane’s assertions (Motion at 8), John’s complaint 

                                                            

3 The list of courts that have similarly recognized that the torts of malicious prosecution 

and abuse of process can arise outside the context of a court proceeding is extensive. See, e.g., 

National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1932) (allowing tort of malicious 

prosecution for administrative proceedings); Lindenman v. Umscheid, 255 Kan. 610, 633, 875 

P.2d 964, 979 (1994) (allowing abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims in connection 

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does not stretch the definitional boundaries of “legal process” in any sort of way that should 

cause it to lack tort protection. 

Applying Donavan, it is clear that the FAC satisfactorily pleads “an administrative 

proceeding of a judicial nature,” Donovan, 274 Or. at 705-06, at Reed to survive the motion to 

dismiss. It alleges, for instance, that: “The Guidebook provides that formal complaints of sexual 

misconduct made by students against current or former students are heard and decided by the 

SMB.” (FAC ¶ 139.) Moreover, “[a]ccording to the Guidebook, the SMB has ‘the responsibility 

to investigate complaints, determine facts, and recommend action appropriate to the 

circumstances of the case and the ethos of an educational institution.’” (FAC ¶ 140.) It further 

alleges the specific procedural aspects of the Reed disciplinary process, factors which were 

relevant to the Donovan court’s holding. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 126-127 (alleging complaint); 143 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

with administrative licensing proceedings); American Credit Card Tel. Co. v. National Pay Tel. 

Corp., 504 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“agency proceeding may at some point 

become sufficiently quasi-judicial to support a claim for malicious prosecution”); Groat v. Town 

Bd. of Glenville, 73 A.D.2d 426, 428-30, 426 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340-41 (1980) (“administrative 

proceedings which require a hearing and trial of the issues on evidence and testimony under oath, 

with the right of cross-examination, have sufficient attributes of judicial proceedings to be 

considered judicial proceedings for the purposes of a cause of action for malicious prosecution”); 

McGuire v. Armitage, 184 Mont. 407, 410-11, 603 P.2d 253, 255 (1979) (malicious prosecution 

tort can be based on proceeding before administrative agency); Cassidy v. Cain, 145 Ind. App. 

581, 588-89, 251 N.E.2d 852, 856-57 (1969) (allowing abuse of process and malicious 

prosecution claims for administrative proceeding); Kauffman v. A.H. Robins Co., 223 Tenn. 515, 

520-27, 448 S.W.2d 400, 402-05 (1969) (same); Carver v. Lykes, 262 N.C. 345, 352-54, 137 

S.E.2d 139, 145-46 (1964) (“an action for malicious prosecution may be predicated upon the 

prosecution, institution, or instigation of an administrative proceeding where such proceeding is 

adjudicatory in nature and may adversely affect a legally protected interest”); Hardy v. Vial, 48 

Cal. 2d 577, 580-81, 311 P.2d 494, 495-96 (1957) (an action for malicious prosecution may be 

based on a proceeding before an administrative agency); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley 

Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 564-66, 117 A.2d 889, 895-96 (1955) (“under certain circumstances a 

malicious prosecution may be predicated upon the institution of other than a judicial action, at 

least where such proceedings are adjudicatory in nature and may adversely affect legally 

protected interests”); and Dixie Broad. Corp. v. Rivers, 209 Ga. 98, 105-06, 70 S.E.2d 734, 740-

41 (1952) (“a cause of action for malicious prosecution or the malicious use of legal proceedings 

may be predicated upon the prosecution of an administrative proceeding”). 

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(alleging adversarial hearing with evidence, including direct examination and witness testimony, 

and determinations of fact and recommendation); 175-176 (alleging appeal process)). See 274 

Or. at 707-09. 

4. John Doe has sufficiently pled seizure of his property. 

Jane also asserts that the FAC fails properly to allege “an actual arrest or a seizure of 

property” sufficient to establish the abuse of process claim. (Motion at 8.) Here, too, Jane is 

mistaken.4

 John has sufficiently pled “a seizure of property” sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss, namely that he was deprived of his “property right in education, his right to be 

physically present on Reed’s campus and to reside in Reed’s residences, as well as his other 

privileges enjoyed under his contract with Reed.” (FAC ¶ 293.) 

Courts are not as rigid in their interpretation of “seizure” as Jane insists. There does not 

need to be some tangible transfer of physical property to another person or body. For instance, 

in Roberts v. Jefferson County, the court, applying Reynolds, recognized that a “‘seizure’ could 

be defined as not being allowed to build on your property due to the placement of a stop work 

                                                            

4 There is a split in the courts as to whether “an actual arrest or seizure of property” is 

even a required element of the tort claim. Jane relies on Reynolds v. Givens, 72 Or. App. 248, 

255 (1984), for this proposition, although other cases have called this requirement into question.

Clausen, for instance, was decided by the same court a year later and cited favorably to 

Reynolds, but did not identify the “actual arrest or seizure of property” as a required element of 

the tort. 83 Or. App. at 118. This Court, in Spartalian v. Citibank, Case No. 3:12-cv-888-MO, 

2012 WL 3314164 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2012), likewise made no reference of the requirement in its 

instructions to the plaintiff on how to replead the claim. Id. at *3. There, the Court dismissed 

the abuse of process claim, but without prejudice, because plaintiff “fails to allege what 

Citibank’s ulterior purpose was when it conspired with the other defendants to do so.” Id. The 

Court’s specific instructions were: “If plaintiff wishes to do so, I instruct that he include in his 

amended complaint facts suggesting that Citibank filed suit in Nevada in order to extort 

something from him unrelated to the debt collection proceedings.” Id. The Court did not 

instruct him to allege a seizure of property or actual arrest in an amended complaint, nor were 

there any facts suggesting he could have pleaded an actual arrest or a seizure of property. But 

see Lee v. Mitchell, 152 Or. App. 159, 179 (1998) (recognizing a “split of authority” on whether 

it is necessary to allege either an actual arrest or seizure of property in order to state a claim, but 

declining to “change our opinion at this time” (citing Reynolds)).

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order.” Roberts, Case No. 98-cv-524, 1999 WL 1442334 (D. Or. Oct. 5, 1999), at *6; see also 

Clausen, 83 Or. App. at 118 (although not explicitly discussing what property was “seized,” it 

can be inferred that the court appointed receiver interfered with plaintiff’s rights in managing his 

businesses). That is, a mere interference with property rights would be sufficient to allege the 

tort. Thus, interference with the property right in education or other contractual rights can and 

does constitute a “seizure” for purposes of Jane’s Motion. 

Although Jane argues that the property seized, as alleged by John, “appears to be 

radically beyond that which previously has been recognized by any court in this context” 

(Motion at 8), courts have consistently acknowledged there is a property right in one’s education. 

In the seminal case of Goss v. Lopez, the United States Supreme Court determined that a high 

school student, who had been suspended for ten days based on charges of misconduct, had a 

legitimate entitlement to public secondary education as a property interest 419 U.S. 565, 572–73 

(1975); see also Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84 

(1978) (assuming student had protected interest in medical education); Regents of the University 

of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985) (assuming property right in continued 

enrollment in six-year undergraduate and medical degree program); Dixon v. Alabama State 

Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.) (recognizing property right in continuing 

education at an institute of higher learning), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Gorman v. 

University of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing liberty and property interest in 

“student’s interest in pursuing an education”); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 

1975) (relying on Goss and finding property right in college education where one paid for 

enrollment and attendance); Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Rds., 910 F. Supp. 1161, 

1164 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding “protectable property interest in continued enrollment”), aff’d, 

Case 3:15-cv-00617-MO Document 18 Filed 06/01/15 Page 14 of 16
PAGE 15 – PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JANE ROE’S MOTION TO 

 DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM 

131 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 1997); Stoller v. College of Med., 562 F. Supp. 403, 412 (M.D. Pa. 1983) 

(“a graduate student has a ‘property’ interest in continuing his studies”), aff’d without opinion, 

727 F.2d 1101 (3d Cir. 1984). 

A property right in higher education may also be created by contract. See, e.g., Ewing, 

474 U.S. at 222 n.7 (“‘agreements implied from the promisor’s words and conduct in the light of 

the surrounding circumstances’ could be independent sources of property interests.”); Galdikas 

v. Fagan, 342 F.3d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing property right in post-secondary 

education when “payment of tuition to an educational institution ordinarily gives rise to an 

implied contract that the school will award a degree upon the student’s satisfaction of the degree 

requirements established by the school.”) John’s FAC alleges at numerous times that he had a 

contract with Reed. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 43, 251.) The “property seized” as alleged in the FAC is 

thus sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and certainly does not represent a novel or 

“radical” (Motion at 8) concept of law. 

Jane also wrongly asserts that the “the use of the process must result in the seizure of 

property that is then used as leverage to obtain ‘a collateral advantage’ unrelated to the seizure of 

the property.” (Motion at 8.) This requirement has never been articulated by the courts, nor do 

court decisions support it. Rather, Clausen, cited by Jane, holds that “the tort involves the use of 

the process as a club to extort something unrelated to the process from the other party.” 

Clausen, 83 Or. App. at 118 (emphasis added). Larsen, also cited by Jane, notes only that “the 

improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not 

properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of 

money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.” Larsen, 279 Or. at 408 (emphasis added). 

Jane provides no citation to support her contention that, to state a claim for abuse of process, the 

Case 3:15-cv-00617-MO Document 18 Filed 06/01/15 Page 15 of 16
PAGE 16 – PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JANE ROE’S MOTION TO 

 DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM 

property seized must then be used as the leverage to obtain a different, collateral advantage. 

(Motion at 8.) This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the tort’s requirements that has no 

basis in Oregon law. 

Even if Jane’s analysis were accurate, John’s pleading is still sufficient. He alleges that 

Jane used the threat of seizing his property right in his education and other rights enjoyed by his 

contract with Reed to undermine his relationship and destroy his reputation. These were not 

undesirable fallout or unpleasant consequences from the disciplinary proceedings; rather, they 

were Jane’s ulterior purposes for misusing a disciplinary proceeding that is supposed to 

confidentially investigate and adjudicate violations of school policy and confidentially make 

findings and recommendations for sanctions. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 139-140, 143.) 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff John Doe respectfully requests that this Court deny 

Jane Roe’s Partial Motion to Dismiss. 

DATED this 1st day of June, 2015. 

ANGELI UNGAR LAW GROUP LLC 

 By: s/ David H. Angeli 

 David H. Angeli, OSB #020244 

 Kristen L. Tranetzki, OSB #115730 

 Telephone: (503) 954-2232 

 

BUCHANAN ANGELI ALTSCHUL & 

SULLIVAN LLP 

 Courtney W. Angeli, OSB #941765 

 Robin Bowerfind, OSB #035949 

 Telephone: (503) 974-5015 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff John Doe 

Case 3:15-cv-00617-MO Document 18 Filed 06/01/15 Page 16 of 16