Filed 7/5/24 In re G.W. CA2/4

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re G.W., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B331618

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP01228A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ZACHARY W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Charles Q. Clay III, Judge. Affirmed.

Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________

Alleged father, Zachary W. (Zachary), appeals from the 

juvenile court’s orders denying his petition under Welfare and 

Institution Code section 3881 and terminating parental rights 

over G.W. (born September 2017). He contends the court erred in 

denying his petition and failed to comply with the inquiry 

requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 

U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et 

seq.). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition

On March 16, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition 

on behalf of G.W. following various domestic violence incidents 

between mother (Myrna P.) and her former companion. In an 

attached form ICWA-010, DCFS reported mother “refused to 

cooperate with DCFS and refused to answer any questions” about 

the child’s possible Indian ancestry. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Our summary of the facts is limited to those needed to resolve 

the issues raised on appeal and to provide relevant context.
3

Mother attended the detention hearing on March 19, 2021. 

The court noted the completed parentage questionnaire in which 

mother identified Zachary as G.W.’s father. Mother submitted 

Zachary’s approximate birth date and stated he was incarcerated 

in federal prison. Mother also submitted a form ICWA-020 

indicating she had no known Indian ancestry. Mother did not 

know if Zachary had Indian heritage. The court found no reason 

to know G.W. was an Indian child. It held paternity findings in 

abeyance pending (1) receipt of the child’s birth certificate to 

confirm Zachary was identified as his father;

3 and (2) notice to 

Zachary, which would permit him to seek presumed father 

status. The court ordered DCFS to conduct a due diligence 

search for Zachary. 

On April 12, 2021, mother informed a DCFS investigator 

Zachary “never had a relationship” with G.W. and was 

incarcerated around the time the child was nine months old. 

According to mother, Zachary would remain in federal prison for 

20 more years. Zachary had recently talked with mother over the 

phone, directing her to “do what is needed to get [G.W.] back”

from DCFS. 

On April 16, 2021, DCFS filed, and the court signed, a form 

order for prisoner’s appearance (JV-450), allowing Zachary to 

appear at the detention hearing from United States Penitentiary 

Victorville (USP Victorville).

4 One week later, a DCFS 

investigator spoke with a counselor at USP Victorville. The 

3 No name appeared on G.W.’s birth certificate identifying a 

father. 

4 Zachary W. contends DCFS listed the wrong inmate register 

number on the JV-450 form. 
4

counselor informed the investigator Zachary was refusing to talk 

about matters “regarding the case.” The counselor also reported 

Zachary’s expected release date was in May 2037. 

On April 22, 2021, DCFS filed a proof of service of the 

notice of detention hearing. The proof of service indicated notice 

was sent to Zachary at a USP Victorville address via certified or 

registered mail,

5 and verified the petition and social worker’s 

report was attached to the notice. The notice also listed 

Zachary’s inmate register number.

6

Zachary did not personally appear at the May 2021 

detention hearing. An attorney with the Los Angeles 

Dependency Lawyers (LADL), appearing as a friend of the court,

stated he “was tasked to reach out to [Zachary], and as of this 

morning had not been able to get in contact with him.” The court 

found notice proper and sustained the petition under section 300, 

subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). The court continued the disposition 

hearing to locate Zachary. 

On June 4, 2021, DCFS filed another proof of service at 

USP Victorville of the disposition hearing. The notice listed 

5 In his appellate briefs, Zachary contends the notices were sent to 

the “general” address to another penitentiary in Victorville called the 

Federal Correctional Institution Victorville Medium II (FCI 

Victorville). (Citing FCI Victorville Medium II 

<https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/vvm> (last accessed 

June 5, 2024).) The general address listed on the website matches the 

address to both USP Victorville and FCI Victorville. The website for 

both facilities identified different P.O. Box addresses “to send 

correspondence and parcels to inmates” in custody. 

6 The inmate register number listed on the notice matches the 

number listed in Zachary’s 388 petition. 
5

Zachary’s inmate register number and indicated service was 

made by first-class mail. 

At the disposition hearing, the court summarized the 

unsuccessful attempts by the LADL attorney and social workers

to reach Zachary in custody. It further noted a statewide inmate 

search failed to reveal Zachary’s whereabouts. The court found 

Zachary to be G.W.’s alleged father and held off ruling on 

disposition as to him individually. Regarding mother, the court 

declared G.W. a dependent, removed the child from her custody, 

and ordered mother visitation and reunification services. 

On July 8, 2021, DCFS filed and the court signed another 

order for prisoner appearance for Zachary. The order listed 

Zachary’s name, place of incarceration (USP Victorville), and 

inmate register number.

7 

In a last minute information for the court filed July 20, 

2021, DCFS reported its efforts to mail Zachary notice of the 

continued disposition hearing. On July 7, 2021, an employee 

with USP Victorville told a DCFS investigator Zachary was no 

longer housed at the facility. The investigator inquired where 

Zachary was located, was told “the information remain[ed] 

confidential at this time,” and was directed to the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons website for updates. As of July 19, 2021, Zachary’s 

location was not updated. 

On July 20, 2021, DCFS filed another proof of service for 

the continued disposition hearing. Notice was sent to the same 

7 The inmate register number did not match the number listed in 

Zachary’s 388 petition. 
6

USP Victorville address and inmate register number via certified 

mail with certified receipt requested.

8 

Zachary did not personally attend the continued disposition 

hearing on July 22, 2021. With a LADL attorney “standing by” 

for Zachary, counsel for DCFS expressed doubt Zachary would be 

released from federal custody. The court agreed, stating, “I 

haven’t known the feds to ever turn their custodies over to the 

local sheriffs.” The court continued Zachary’s disposition 

hearing. 

In a last minute information for the court filed on 

August 10, 2021, DCFS reported it was again “unable to locate 

[Zachary’s] current incarceration status at this time. On 

[August 9, 2021, an investigator] searched the Bureau of Federal 

Prison and the results remain[ed] the same stating ‘no longer in 

BOP custody, release date 05/26/37.’ [The] Los Angeles County 

Inmate Locator and California Inmate Locator did not yield any 

results.” 

The court held the continued disposition hearing for 

Zachary on August 12, 2021. The court began by noting “the 

prison systems, whether it be federal or state, has [sic] been 

unable to tell us where [Zachary] is for us to bring him in or to 

give him notice to have an attorney contact him.” Counsel for 

DCFS requested the court rule on disposition, noting minor 

counsel’s (and her law clerk’s) attempts to contact the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons and DCFS’s own efforts to do the same. 

Despite efforts by all parties involved, the court continued the 

disposition hearing again. 

8 The inmate register number matched the number in the 388 

petition. 
7

The court proceeded to disposition at a continued hearing 

on September 10, 2021, out of Zachary’s presence. As before, the 

court discussed the steps taken to identify Zachary’s 

whereabouts. The court discussed DCFS’s recent discussion with 

“a supervisor of records, a federal office named Gomez, who 

confirmed that [Zachary] remains in custody. But due to a 

confidential matter [he] cannot be available for any type of 

outside contact, even with the dependency court orders.”9 The 

court also noted the prison’s inability to release Zachary “for 

telephonic or in-person hearings to our court, and he will be 

unavailable for an unknown period of time.” The court found

notice to Zachary proper and found DCFS and LADL had done 

everything they could to make him available. Proceeding to 

disposition, the court bypassed Zachary’s reunification services 

under section 361.5, subdivision (e).

10

At the six-month review hearing in December 2021, the 

court found mother’s compliance not substantial and continued 

her reunification services. Notice of the review hearing was sent 

to Zachary at the same USP Victorville mailing address and 

inmate register number.

11

9 In a last information for the court filed September 7, 2021, 

DCFS reported an investigator had contacted USP Victorville and 

spoke with a supervisor of records, who confirmed a “confidential 

matter” rendered Zachary unavailable for an unknown period “for any 

type of outside contact, even with the dependency court orders.” 

10 Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) provides, inter alia, that if “the 

parent or guardian is incarcerated, . . . the court shall order reasonable 

services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, 

those services would be detrimental to the child.” 

11 The inmate register number matched the number listed in 

Zachary’s 388 petition. 
8

B. Permanency Planning

Mother’s reunification services were terminated in 

September 2022. On December 5, 2022, DCFS filed a declaration 

of due diligence to locate Zachary. The declaration summarized 

its inquiry of 23 different sources to locate Zachary, including the 

Los Angeles County jail inmate locator and California State 

Prison and Parole Index. DCFS asked maternal aunt (R.R.) and 

mother where Zachary was located, each claiming ignorance

despite admitting they had spoken with him on the phone.12 

Throughout the proceedings, mother refused to provide DCFS 

Zachary’s whereabouts. 

The court found DCFS’s due diligence complete at a 

permanency planning hearing on January 23, 2023. 

Nevertheless, the court ordered another statewide search and 

ordered mother and maternal aunt to provide any information on 

Zachary’s whereabouts. 

In a February 2023 status review report, DCFS reported it 

had engaged in ICWA inquiries of mother, maternal 

grandparents (A.R. and M.R.), and maternal aunt. Every person 

interviewed denied having Indian ancestry. 

On March 10, 2023, DCFS located Zachary at the Santa 

Ana Jail. Prior to discovering this location, DCFS’s attempts at 

obtaining information from the Bureau of Prisons were 

unsuccessful. Two days after DCFS discovered Zachary’s status 

at the Santa Ana Jail, a Bureau of Prisons agent informed DCFS 

12 In a January 2023 status review report, DCFS noted that 

“almost every time” mother and maternal aunt visited with G.W., they 

contacted Zachary telephonically and allowed him to speak with the 

child. Despite these actions, mother reported “on multiple occasions 

that she does not know where [Zachary] is presently located.” 
9

Zachary was “in transit per the records and that one should 

continue to check the website for updates.” 

DCFS also provided the court with Zachary’s statewide 

criminal record. Zachary served prior prison sentences for 

carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)) in 1996, attempted 

burglary (id., §§ 664, 459) in 2010, and felon in possession of a 

firearm (id., former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)) in 2002 and 2010. 

Zachary made his initial appearance from custody at a 

progress report hearing on April 7, 2023. Counsel specially 

appeared for Zachary “to investigate prior notice.” The court 

granted Zachary weekly telephonic or video visits with G.W. 

C. Termination of Parental Rights

The same day the court held a continued section 366.26 

hearing on May 30, 2023, Zachary filed a section 388 petition to 

vacate all disposition findings and orders. Citing Ansley v. 

Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477 (Ansley), Zachary 

argued his due process rights were violated by DCFS sending 

noncompliant notices of hearings.13 Zachary argued the notices 

and proofs of service provided “no indication” he received notice of 

the hearings or was made aware of the proceedings, “thus 

violating his due process rights.” The court appointed Zachary 

counsel and continued the matter for additional briefing. 

In its written opposition, DCFS argued Zachary’s sole 

reliance on Ansley was misplaced, as the facts of that case were 

13 Zachary’s request attached 15 supporting exhibits in support. 

One exhibit contained a website printout of USP Victorville. The 

website provided a link of “[o]ther facilities at the Victorville Federal 

Correctional Complex,” including FCI Victorville, which shares the 

same general address as USP Victorville.
10

readily distinguishable. In so arguing, DCFS discussed its 

various efforts to reach Zachary by telephone and send him 

notices of hearings at his place of incarceration. Assuming 

Zachary’s due process rights were violated, DCFS argued he 

failed to establish prejudice by showing how the outcome in the 

proceedings would be different.

In August 2023, DCFS reported it was unsuccessful in 

reaching Zachary to make relevant ICWA inquiries. 

At a hearing on September 11, 2023, the court denied 

Zachary’s 388 petition and terminated parental rights. In so 

ruling, the court found DCFS engaged in diligent and reasonable 

efforts to reach Zachary in custody “beyond what the court 

required.” Zachary filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

A. Section 388 Petition

Zachary contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

denying his 388 petition because (1) DCFS did not exercise

reasonable diligence in attempting to locate him; and (2) DCFS 

violated his rights to due process by mailing noncompliant 

notices of hearings. We disagree.

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review

“‘Notice is both a constitutional and statutory imperative. 

In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires parents 

be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise them an 

action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend.’ (In

re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.) ‘The child 

welfare agency must act with diligence to locate a missing parent. 

[Citation.] Reasonable diligence denotes a thorough, systematic 
11

investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith. [Citation.] 

[¶] However, there is no due process violation when there has 

been a good faith attempt to provide notice to a parent who is 

transient and whose whereabouts are unknown for the majority 

of the proceedings. [Citations.]’ (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 

Cal.App.4th 181, 188 (Justice P.).) Thus, where a parent cannot 

be located notwithstanding a reasonable search effort, the failure 

to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid. (In

re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247.)” (In re J.H.

(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 182.)

“‘[A]n alleged father’s rights (and/or corresponding duties

on the part of the state), fall into essentially four categories:

(1) the right to notice of the proceedings and of certain hearings

(see [ ] §§ 290.1, 290.2, 291, 294, subd. (a)(2)); (2) the right to

notice of their rights as an alleged father and the steps necessary

to elevate their status to that of a presumed father (see § 316.2,

subd. (b)); (3) the court’s corresponding duty to inquire into an

individual’s possible parentage through various extrinsic sources

apart from the individual’s own self-reporting (see § 316.2,

subd. (a)); and (4) if the whereabouts of an alleged father are

unknown, the state’s constitutional duty to exercise reasonable

diligence to find him, so that he may be given proper notice of the

proceedings.’ [Citation.]” (In re A.K. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 252, 

264.) 

Zachary invokes the second category of rights under section 

316.2, which requires providing an alleged father “notice at his 

last and usual place of abode by certified mail return receipt 

requested alleging that he is or could be the father of the child. 

The notice shall state that the child is the subject of proceedings 

under Section 300 and that the proceedings could result in the 
12

termination of parental rights and adoption of the child. Judicial 

Council form Paternity-Waiver of Rights (JV-505) shall be

included with the notice.” (§ 316.2, subd. (b).) 

Section 388 permits any parent or other person having an 

interest in a child who is a dependent of the juvenile court to 

petition “for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of 

court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the 

court” on grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. 

(§ 388, subd. (a).) A section 388 petitioner must “establish[ ] by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (1) new or changed 

circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote 

the best interest of the child. [Citation.]” (In re S.J. (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 953, 959.) A parent may file a section 388 petition to 

raise a due process challenge based on inadequate notice. 

(Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 189; see In re Alayah J.

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 478 [section 388 provides due process 

while accommodating the child’s right to stability and 

permanency].)

We generally review the denial of a section 388 petition for 

an abuse of discretion. (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 

1228.) The appropriate test is “‘“whether the trial court exceeded 

the bounds of reason.”’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,

318–319.) The court’s factual findings are reviewed for 

substantial evidence. (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 846.) 

2. Analysis

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

DCFS acted with reasonable diligence in locating Zachary. When 

this case began in March 2021, mother was asked about G.W.’s 

father. Mother identified Zachary, provided his approximate 
13

birth date, and reported his custodial status in federal prison. 

Several weeks later, DCFS located Zachary at USP Victorville. 

An investigator called the facility to speak with Zachary but was 

refused contact, as Zachary declined to speak “regarding the 

case.” 

Notwithstanding Zachary’s refusal to participate, DCFS 

mailed him notices of the proceedings at the USP Victorville 

address and filed form orders for his appearance from prison. In 

July 2021, DCFS was informed Zachary was no longer housed at 

USP Victorville. An investigator inquired into his whereabouts 

and was told the information was confidential. When the website 

to which DCFS was directed failed to update Zachary’s location, 

investigators searched local and state inmate locators and 

contacted a federal supervisor of records. The supervisor 

acknowledged Zachary’s custodial status but stated he was 

unable to appear for court (telephonically or in-person) “for an 

unknown period of time.” 

These efforts, and more, were summarized in DCFS’s due 

diligence report.14 They support the juvenile court’s finding 

DCFS engaged in reasonable and diligent efforts to locate 

Zachary. They also readily distinguish this case from the cases 

on which Zachary purports to rely. (See Ansley, supra, 185 

Cal.App.3d at p. 481 [“There is no evidence on the record that the 

Department made any attempt to serve petitioner with notice of 

14 The parties’ appellate briefs further reveal the issues attempting 

to locate Zachary in federal custody. When discussing his 

incarceration, Zachary avers he was incarcerated at FCI Victorville. 

The respondent’s brief adopts Zachary’s factual background, and it too

refers to his incarceration at FCI Victorville. Zachary was housed at 

USP Victorville, not FCI Victorville.
14

the proceedings”]; In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 715–

716 [“Father made a prima facie showing that the Agency made 

little to no effort to give him notice until it was poised to 

terminate parental rights”].) 

Notwithstanding this conclusion, we agree with Zachary’s 

second contention that DCFS provided him inadequate notices 

under section 316.2. (But see In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 

Cal.App.4th 903, 910 [excusing compliance with procedural 

statute when it is impracticable, impossible, or futile to comply].) 

Zachary was sent three notices at the USP Victorville address for 

the detention hearing, the original disposition hearing, and the 

continued disposition hearing, respectively. All three notices 

properly indicated G.W. was subject to proceedings under section 

300 in which termination of parental rights and adoption was 

possible. (§ 316.2, subd. (b).) However, only the third notice 

verified mailing by certified mail return receipt requested; the 

first and second notices did not. Further, it does not appear that 

DCFS attached Judicial Council form JV-505 to any of the 

notices. (Ibid.)

As Zachary concedes, however, our analysis does not end 

upon a finding of error. “‘We typically apply a harmless-error 

analysis when a statutory mandate is disobeyed, except in a 

narrow category of circumstances when we deem the error 

reversible per se. This practice derives from article VI, section 13 

of the California Constitution, which provides: “No judgment 

shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause . . . for any 

error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination 

of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of 

the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a 
15

miscarriage of justice.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 

Cal.App.4th 1113, 1122 (Kobe A.).) 

Applying that standard here, we deem the error in sending 

noncompliant notices harmless. Assuming Zachary received 

statutorily compliant notice, he would not have been able to show 

he was entitled to reunification services. He took no action to 

prove a biological connection with G.W. He did not file a 

declaration of paternity at or after the time of Zachary’s birth. 

(Fam. Code, §§ 7571, subd. (a); 7551.) Nor did he meet the 

standards for declaring him a presumed father. (See id., § 7611.) 

Zachary adduced no evidence of marriage to mother (id., § 7661, 

subds. (a)-(c)), receiving G.W. into his home, or openly holding out 

the child as his own (id., § 7661, subd. (d)). Because Zachary did 

not demonstrate he was the biological or presumed father of 

G.W., he was not entitled to reunification services. (Kobe A., 

supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1120; see § 361.5, subd. (a) 

[permitting reunification services to biological father “[u]pon a 

finding and declaration of paternity” and where services “will 

benefit the child”].) 

Even if Zachary had shown he was a biological or presumed 

father, his criminal history left the juvenile court with limited 

discretion to provide him with reunification services. Section 

361.5 provides reunification services need not be provided to a 

parent who “has been convicted of a violent felony, as defined in 

subdivision (c) of Section 6675.5 of the Penal Code,” unless there 

is a finding that reunification would be in the best interests of the 

child. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12).) Beyond the conviction for which 

Zachary was (and is currently) serving in federal prison, he was 

convicted of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)), which is 

listed in section 667.5 of the Penal Code. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(17).) 
16

We discern no factual basis on which the juvenile court 

could find reunification with Zachary was in G.W.’s best 

interests. (§ 361.5, subd. (e).) It is undisputed Zachary was 

incarcerated shortly after G.W.’s birth and is not scheduled for 

release until May 2037, well after the maximum 18-month 

reunification period, and after G.W. attains the age of majority. 

(See § 361.5, subd. (a).) Zachary’s custodial status prevented and 

continues to prevent him from providing a home for G.W. (See 

Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 937 [declining 

to recognize constructive receipt of child into incarcerated 

parent’s home].) Zachary identified no evidence to rebut mother’s 

report he “never had a relationship” with G.W. prior to his 

incarceration either. 

On the contrary, the facts strongly suggest Zachary refused 

to participate in the case despite having actual notice of the 

proceedings. As of April 2021, Zachary knew about the case and 

mother’s desire to “get G.W. back” from DCFS. Despite this 

knowledge and having some contact with G.W., he refused to 

speak with DCFS about the case and did not appear before 

termination of reunification services. As such, we “conclude that 

the failure to give him the specific notice required by section 

361.2 did not affect the ultimate outcome of the dependency 

proceedings.” (Kobe A., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) 

B. Failure to Inquire of Indian Ancestry of Alleged 

Father

Finally, Zachary contends DCFS violated its duties to 

inquire of him and his family about their possible Indian lineage. 

DCFS contends it was not dutybound to inquire of individuals 
17

who do not meet the definition of “parent” under relevant law. 

We agree.

ICWA defines “parent” as “any biological parent or parents 

of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted 

an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. 

It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not 

been acknowledged or established.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(9); In re

C.A. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 511, 520 [definition of parent does not 

include an unwed father where paternity has not been 

acknowledged or established]; In re E.G. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 

1530, 1533 [“absent a biological connection, the child cannot 

claim Indian heritage through the alleged father”].)

The limited definition of “parent” under ICWA has caused 

courts of this jurisdiction to resolve the issue under state law. 

“[I]n California an alleged father may acknowledge or establish 

paternity by voluntarily signing a declaration of paternity at the 

time of the child’s birth, for filing with the birth certificate (Fam. 

Code, § 7571, subd. (a)), or through blood testing (Fam. Code, 

§ 7551).” (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708–709; 

see e.g., In re Gabriel G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1166 & 

fn. 5 [ICWA inquiry and notice requirements triggered where 

minor’s birth certificate designated father as the biological 

father].) Section 316.2 provides additional facts a dependency 

court may consider in determining that a man should be 

considered a “presumed” father, rather than an alleged father. 

(See § 316.2, subd. (a) [listing factors such as a man’s 

cohabitation with child’s mother at the time of conception or 
18

birth, or a man’s payment or promises of support with respect to 

the child].)

Zachary meets none of these standards. As we have 

discussed, Zachary did not establish a basis to qualify for

biological or presumed father status. Beyond having limited

telephonic contact with G.W. during his incarceration, he had no 

relationship with the child and took no action to assert his 

paternity despite having knowledge of the proceedings as early as 

April 2021. Because Zachary was an alleged father who had not 

taken the steps to acknowledge or establish his paternity, DCFS 

had no duty to inquire of him or his family on possible Indian 

ancestry. 

DISPOSITION

The orders denying the section 388 petition and

terminating parental rights are affirmed.

MORI, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.