IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MARY STRONG 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTRYWIDE HOME 

LOANS, INC. ET AL., 

Defendants. 

MCSHANE, Judge: 

Case No. 6:15-cv-01536-MC (Lead Case) 

Case No. 6:15-cv-1966-MC (Trailing Case) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint. For the reasons below, 

defendants' motion is GRANTED. 1 

STANDARD 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient 

facts that "state claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the supporting factual allegations 

allow the court to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than "the mere possibility 

of misconduct." Id. at 678. In the case of prose litigants a court reviews the pleadings with a less 

stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers; the court views the complaint liberally but will 

not supplant vague and conclusory allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); 

Litman v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014). 

1 Because this Court dismisses plaintiffs federal claims, this Court also dismisses the remaining state law claims for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(1). 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-01536-MC Document 41 Filed 11/13/15 Page 1 of 6
BACKGROUND 

On July 14, 2015, plaintiff, appearing prose, filed ten causes of action in Deschutes 

County, Oregon, against defendants relating to the March 2007 refinancing of her home under 

the Countrywide mortgage. See generally Pl. Compl. 1-13, ECF No. 2. Defendants removed the 

case to federal court because the action included claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 

and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESP A). Id. On May 26, 2015, defendant filed a 

motion to dismiss the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On October 1, 2015, after hearing 

oral argument, this Court orally granted defendant's motion, but provided plaintiff leave to 

amend her complaint with specific instructions to write in plain English and allege in detail the 

specific actions defendants took pertaining to the Countrywide mortgage. 

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2015, which largely mirrored her 

previous complaint regarding the Countrywide mortgage. On October 16, 2015, plaintiff filed a 

new complaint against additional defendants relating to an April 2007 mortgage on her home 

(GMAC Mortgage). This Court merged the two cases under its own authority. See Strong v. 

GMAC Mortgage, LLC et al., 6:15-CV-01966-MC, ECF No. 8. 

Defendants now move to dismiss, alleging that the amended complaint remains factually 

inadequate to support a claim and that all federal claims are time barred. See Def. Mot. Dismiss, 

ECF No. 36. Plaintiffs response is unresponsive to defendant's arguments. See Pl. Resp. Mot. 

Dismiss, ECF No. 37. Plaintiff also filed an additional response, which argues that her claims are 

not time barred because she had no knowledge of defendant's actions. See Pl. Resp. Opp'n. Mot., 

ECFNo. 39. 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-01536-MC Document 41 Filed 11/13/15 Page 2 of 6
DISCUSSION 

I. Failure to Comply with the Applicable Statute of Limitations and Failure to Plead 

Sufficient Facts 

The TILA provides for a one-year statute of limitations from the date of a violation 

occurred, and a three-year statute of limitations for violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639, 1639B, 

1639C. TILA statute of limitation periods run from the date of transaction consummation. See 

e.g., Kingv. California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff signed the underlying 

refinance notes for the Countrywide and GMAC Mortgages in 2007. The statute of limitations 

for any alleged violations under TILA has therefore run. 

RESP A provides a one-year statute oflimitations for violations under 12 U.S.C. §§ 2607 

and 2608, and a three-year limitation on § 2605 violations. Like TILA, RESP A violations 

generally occur at the time of consummation of the transaction. See e.g., Drennan v. PNC Bank, 

NA, 622 F.3d 275, 281 (3rd Cir. 2010); Snow v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 332 F.3d 356, 359-60 

(5th Cir. 2003). 

RESP A prohibits giving or accepting portions of any mortgage-related charge made or 

received other than for services actually performed. See Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 

Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff alleges RESPA violations based upon fees 

distributed between Defendants. See PL Amend. Compl. at 19-20. Plaintiff has not provided any 

information indicating what or when fees were illegally distributed. However, as to the 

Countrywide mortgage, the last transfer of the deed of trust occurred in 2011. See Laurick Deel. 

Ex. 4. The last action regarding any interest in Plaintiffs property appears to have occurred in 

March 2012, when foreclosure was attempted, or as late as July 18, 2012, when the notice of 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-01536-MC Document 41 Filed 11/13/15 Page 3 of 6
default was rescinded.2 See id at Ex. 6. Because any alleged violation would have occurred prior 

to three years from the time of Plaintiff's filings in the instant action, the applicable statute of 

limitations bars her claims. 

Finally, both TILA and RESP A are subject to equitable tolling, which suspends the 

limitations period until the point in which the borrower discovered or had a reasonable 

opportunity to discover the violations. See id; Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 

1036 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, equitable tolling is not appropriate. A party seeking equitable tolling 

must establish: 1) a diligent pursuit of their rights; and 2) "some extraordinary circumstance that 

stood in [their] way." See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). While providing 

evidence of defendant's general wrongdoing nationwide and correspondences between the 

parties relating to loan modification, Plaintiff has shown neither a diligent pursuit of her TILA 

and RESP A rights nor extraordinary circumstance. See Lien Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 

465 F.3d 992, 1003-05 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding equitable tolling not applicable when the 

plaintiff held all information required to bring their claims earlier and the alleged actions of the 

defendant were not "unusual," or "special"). 

Setting aside the limitations period on her claims, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient 

facts beyond a formulaic recitation of the legal elements of her claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For example, relating to the TILA claims, plaintiff does not describe with 

any detail what disclosures were not provided or how they differ from the statutory requirements. 

See Pl. Amend. Compl. at 18-19. Instead, plaintiff generally alleges "Defendants violated 

TILA/HOEPA by failing to provide Plaintiff with accurate material disclosures required under 

2 Plaintiff provides an exhibit to the GMAC Mortgage complaint identifying two assignments of the Deed of Trust, 

recorded on May 7, 2015, and a notice of default, recorded on August 11, 2015. See Pl. GMAT Compl. Ex. 8. 

However, the Deed of Trust was not tmnsferred to a defendant, indicating that any alleged fee sharing between 

defendants did not occur on this date. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-01536-MC Document 41 Filed 11/13/15 Page 4 of 6
TILA/HOEPA .... " Id. at 18. Regarding RESPA, plaintiff alleges that HUD policy establishes a 

two-part test for determining the legality of lender payments to mortgage brokers under RESP A. 

Id. at 19. Further, plaintiff alleges a failure to disclose that, "[Defendants] will gain a financial 

benefit while Plaintiff suffer[ s] financially as a result of the loan product sold to Plaintiff." Id. 

Plaintiff then alleges, "the payments between Defendants were misleading and designed to create 

a windfall." Id. at 19-20. These allegations fail to plead any particularized wrongdoing that 

would provide notice as to what disclosures were deficient or what fee distributions were illegal. 

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs TILA/HOEPA and RESP A claims are dismissed with prejudice 

as to both moving and non-moving defendants, save for GMAC Mortgage LLC and Residential 

Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., for the reasons discussed below.3 

II. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Remand of State Law Claims 

Defendants in the Lead Case removed this action based upon federal question 

jurisdiction, which is no longer present based on the Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs federal 

claims. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the residual state law 

claims. See Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int'! Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(court has discretion to retain state law claims under supplemental jurisdiction where removal 

was proper but the federal question claims are defeated on the merits). Plaintiffs state law claims 

against all defendants in the Lead Case and Member Case are dismissed with leave to refile in 

state court. 

III. Bankruptcy Stay as to GMAC Mortgage and Residential Asset Mortgage Products 

On November 6, 2015, GMAC Mortgage, LLC, also named by Plaintiff in the Member 

Case caption as Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., filed a Notice of Bankruptcy Status 

3 Defendants in the Member Case, Strong v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC et al., 6: 15-CV-01966-MC, did not separately 

move to dismiss. Consistent with the court's reasoning for consolidation and the reasons contained within this 

opinion and order, Plaintiff's claims against the non-moving defendants are dismissed. 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-01536-MC Document 41 Filed 11/13/15 Page 5 of 6
with this court. See 6:15-cv-1966-MC, ECF No. 15. Due to pending bankruptcy proceedings in 

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, any action as to those 

parties must be placed under an automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l). Accordingly, the above 

dismissal as to all other named defendants does not extend to GMAC Mortgage, LLC or 

Residential Asset Mortgage Products, Inc., and Plaintiffs action against those parties is stayed 

pending update in bankruptcy status. 

Those parties are ordered to notify this court within thirty days of the conclusion of their 

bankruptcy proceedings or, alternatively, ifthe Bankruptcy Court grants them limited relief from 

the automatic stay requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 362. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs 

outstanding motions are DENIED as moot. Plaintiffs claims are dismissed as to all defendants in 

both the Lead and Member Cases save for GMAC Mortgage, LLC and Residential Asset 

Mortgage Products, Inc. The action as to those two defendants is stayed pending bankruptcy 

proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this J]_ day of November, 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Michael McShane 

United States District Judge 

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