1

Filed 2/28/23 Garr v. Schmorleitz-Garr CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DIRK B. GARR,

Respondent,

v.

ERIN SCHMORLEITZ-GARR,

Appellant.

 D078683

 (Super. Ct. No. 18FL001100E)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, reversed in 

part and remanded with instructions.

Erin Schmorleitz-Garr, in pro. per., for Appellant. 

Dirk B. Garr, in pro. per., for Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Erin Schmorleitz-Garr (Wife) appeals a judgment in the dissolution 

proceedings regarding her marriage to Dirk B. Garr (Husband). Wife 
2

contends the trial court erred by finding that: (1) she was not credible; 

(2) certain real property was transmuted to Husband’s separate property; 

(3) Husband did not breach his fiduciary duty when he liquidated his 401(k) 

account for necessities of life; and (4) she was not entitled to attorney fees as 

sanctions against Husband. She also contends the court was biased against 

her. We reject these contentions. 

Wife also contends the trial court erred by ordering that she reimburse 

Husband for mortgage payments he made on his separate property during 

her post-separation stay, under Family Code1 section 914, subdivision (b)(2), 

and for health insurance premiums he paid for her and her adult child. We 

conclude the trial court misapplied section 914, subdivision (b)(2), and 

reverse the order awarding Husband reimbursement of $7,721.48. We 

conclude the trial court’s order regarding health insurance premiums is an 

interlocutory, non-appealable order and dismiss that claim for lack of 

jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married on April 11, 2016 and did not have any 

children from the marriage. Less than two years later on January 30, 2018, 

Husband filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage.2 On February 23, 

Wife filed a response and asserted the parties’ date of separation was 

January 23, 2018.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

2 During the proceedings, the parties were represented by counsel at 

various times and at other times proceeded as self-represented litigants. At 

trial, Wife was represented but Husband was not. In this appeal, both are 

self-represented litigants.
3

Over three days, the trial court conducted a trial on the parties’ 

disputed issues, which included the date of separation, characterization and 

division of property, spousal support, credits and reimbursements, and 

sanctions pursuant to section 271. At the conclusion of trial, the court issued 

a 27-page written statement of decision detailing its findings and orders. 

The trial court found both parties had “significant credibility 

problems.” It determined the parties’ date of separation was January 23, 

2018, and dissolved their marriage as of March 10, 2020. Weighing the 

factors under section 4320⎯and finding the marital standard of living was 

lower middle class, the parties had not owned a home together, had 

experienced housing instability throughout their marriage, and had not 

accumulated significant assets⎯the court terminated jurisdiction over 

spousal support upon Husband’s payment of a stipulated amount of $750 to 

Wife.

The trial court determined the property at Starlight Way in Julian, 

California (Starlight Way) was Husband’s separate property. It made further 

orders, which we later discuss in detail, to divide personal property and 

community debts; award or deny credits and reimbursements; and set 

equalization payments. The net of the court’s orders resulted in Wife owing 

Husband an equalizing payment of $3,197.65. Lastly, the court declined to 

award section 271 sanctions to either party. On December 31, 2020, the court 

entered a judgment of dissolution. Wife timely appealed.3

3 On February 15, 2023, the date of oral argument, Wife filed a request 

that we take judicial notice of certain records or other documentary evidence, 

consisting of 461 pages, that mostly involve matters that occurred after the

December 31, 2020 judgment being appealed or matters not first presented to 

the trial court. We deny her request for judicial notice (RJN) for failure to 

comply with well-established rules regarding the filing of an RJN. (See Evid. 
4

DISCUSSION

I.

General Principles of Appellate Review

Our review of Wife’s contentions on appeal is limited by the standards 

and presumptions that involve substantial deference to the trial court on its 

discretionary decisions and its resolution of factual issues. We begin with the 

cardinal rule that the judgment is presumed correct and all ambiguities are 

resolved in favor of affirmance. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 

608−609 (Jameson).) 

As the party seeking reversal, the appellant carries the burden to 

overcome the presumption of correctness and show prejudicial error. She 

must do so by providing an adequate record on appeal and presenting

argument and legal authority on each contention showing the trial court 

erred. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608−609.) Although we appreciate

the challenges of appearing as a self-represented litigant, an appellant who 

does so “is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration” as any other 

attorney or litigant on appeal and is required to follow the rules. (McComber 

v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 523 [“Although [appellant] is representing 

herself in this appeal she is not entitled to special treatment and is required 

to follow the rules.”].)

Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a); 

People v. Preslie (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 494 [RJN should be filed before 

briefs are due]; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4

[postjudgment events or documents not proper matters for RJN]; Brosterhaus 

v. State Bar of California (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325 [reviewing court may 

exercise discretion to deny RJN of matters not first presented to the trial 

court].)
5

When a trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, we review the 

trial court’s finding for substantial evidence. (Winograd v. American 

Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 (Winograd).) Under this

standard of review, we determine only “if substantial evidence exists to 

support the [judgment] in favor of the prevailing party, not to determine 

whether substantial evidence might support the losing party’s version of 

events.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581−582

(Schmidt).) Although substantial evidence is not synonymous with any 

evidence or a mere scintilla of evidence, but is only evidence that is of 

ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid 

value (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005−1006), the 

testimony of a single credible witness may constitute substantial evidence (In 

re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614). We are required to accept all 

evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment, completely disregard contrary 

evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

judgment. (Schmidt, at pp. 581−582.) 

When an appellant challenges a trial court’s discretionary decision, it is 

her burden on appeal to affirmatively show the decision was an abuse of 

discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.) Under this standard 

of review, we will find a trial court abused its discretion only when its action 

is arbitrary, capricious, or exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Cortez (1971)

6 Cal.3d 78, 85.) In other words, we must conclude that under all the 

circumstances, viewed most favorably in support of the decision, no judge 

reasonably could have made that decision. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 86, 104.)

An appeal is not a second trial. Under either standard of review, “[w]e 

do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” (Pope v. 
6

Babick (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246 (Babick).) “We are ‘not a second 

trier of fact.’ ” (Ibid.) We defer to the trial judge’s resolution of factual issues 

as he or she had the benefit of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and is 

in a better position to assess credibility. (Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney 

Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 622 (Johnson) [“Credibility is an 

issue for the fact finder.”].) 

II.

Trial Court’s Credibility Determinations

The trial court found both parties had “significant credibility problems.” 

We therefore reject Wife’s erroneous assertion the court erred by finding 

Husband was credible. As for Wife’s contention that the court erred in 

finding her not credible, we have already explained, “[c]redibility is an issue 

for the fact finder” (Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 622), and on appeal 

“[w]e do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses” 

(Babick, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246). Wife has failed to present any 

argument demonstrating the trial court’s credibility determinations were not

supported by substantial evidence. Instead, she essentially argues her 

version of the events. This is inadequate to carry her burden on appeal. (See 

Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581−582.) 

On the record before us, we conclude there was ample evidence to 

support the trial court’s assessment of Wife’s credibility. After hearing three 

days of evidence and observing Wife’s demeanor on the witness stand, the 

court found Wife was not credible based on a number of events that 

reasonably demonstrated a lack of candor. In a trial exhibit she presented, 

Wife claimed under penalty of perjury that certain debts were community 

obligations when the court found “her own documentation showed that they 

were not incurred during the marriage” at all. The court also found Wife 
7

willfully violated court orders and agreements reached by the parties, and it 

weighed such conduct “as negatively affecting her credibility.” In a 

stipulation dismissing a related domestic violence case,4 the parties agreed 

the court would grant Husband “exclusive use and possession” of Starlight 

Way. In another stipulation, the parties agreed to hire a specific appraiser to 

value the property. In violation of the stipulated court order and without 

Husband’s permission, Wife entered Starlight Way. She also brought a real 

estate appraiser onto the property who was not the agreed-upon appraiser, 

despite telling the court in a previous hearing that she would not be having 

an appraisal done. Wife did not seriously dispute any of this. Instead, she 

asserted she felt it was acceptable to enter the property because “she ‘knew 

[Husband] was not there.’ ” 

 In sum, Wife has failed to demonstrate the trial court’s negative 

assessment of her credibility was arbitrary, capricious or exceeds the bounds 

of reason, nor has she demonstrated it lacked substantial evidence. There is 

no error here.

4 Wife and Husband each filed a request for a domestic violence 

restraining order (DVRO) against one another, on January 25 and February 

14, 2018, respectively. Both requests were dismissed by the parties’ 

stipulation on May 24. According to the statement of decision, Wife alleged 

Husband “threw her to the floor multiple times, choked her with both hands, 

[and] hit her dog” on January 22, causing “bumps on her head and bruising to 

her wrists, face, and neck,” and that previously on January 7, Husband 

“yelled, berated her, slapped her, pushed her down, and threw her into a 

wall.” Husband alleged Wife “hit him with lumber and threw rocks at him 

resulting in bruising and cuts” and that “on multiple dates . . . she has yelled, 

scratched, punched, and kicked him, as well as throwing rocks, bottles, 

lumber, glasses, and mugs at him.”
8

III.

Transmutation of Starlight Way

Property acquired during marriage and before separation is community 

property unless it is (1) traceable to a separate property source or 

(2) acquired by gift or inheritance. (§§ 760 [“Except as otherwise provided by 

statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a 

married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is 

community property.”], 770, subd. (a)(1), 771, subd. (a).) The spouse 

asserting its separate character must overcome this presumption by a 

preponderance of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Valli (2014) 58 Cal.4th 

1396, 1399 (Valli); In re Marriage of Grinius (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1179, 

1186.) 

“Married persons may, through a transfer or an agreement, 

transmute—that is, change—the character of property from community to 

separate or from separate to community. [Citation.] A transmutation of 

property, however, ‘is not valid unless made in writing by an express 

declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse 

whose interest in the property is adversely affected.’ [Citation.] To satisfy 

the requirement of an ‘express declaration,’ a writing signed by the adversely 

affected spouse must expressly state that the character or ownership of the 

property at issue is being changed.” (Valli, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1400; see 

§§ 850, 852.) 

“[W]henever there is a transfer [of property] from one spouse to another 

a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises if the transaction gives

one spouse an unfair advantage over the other.” (In re Marriage of Kushesh 

& Kushesh-Kaviani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 449, 456; In re Marriage of 

Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624 (Mathews).) That is because under 
9

section 721, subdivision (b), “spouses are subject to the general rules 

governing fiduciary relationships that control the actions of persons 

occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential 

relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each 

spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” (In re 

Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 287 (Haines); accord Mathews,

at p. 628.) 

As to Starlight Way, Husband introduced the following evidence: The 

purchase was financed with a mortgage loan from a bank with only Husband 

listed as the mortgagee. On November 14, 2017, the sellers executed a 

“GRANT DEED” transferring Starlight Way to Husband, with Husband 

taking title as “a Married Man As His Sole and Separate Property.” On 

December 15, 2017, Wife signed an “INTERSPOUSAL GRANT DEED” before 

a notary public. On December 18, 2017, both the Grant Deed and 

Interspousal Grant Deed (deed) were recorded with the San Diego County 

Recorder. The deed stated: Wife “HEREBY GRANTS to [Husband], a 

Married Man as his sole and separate property” Starlight Way.

The trial court properly found Starlight Way was presumptively 

community property because it was purchased during marriage in December 

2017 and before the date of separation of January 23, 2018. The court found 

the parties transmuted the property to Husband’s separate property with the 

execution of the deed, and that Husband rebutted the presumption of undue 

influence under section 721. Accordingly, the trial court determined 

Starlight Way was Husband’s separate property. 

Wife contends the trial court erred by finding the parties transmuted 

Starlight Way to Husband’s separate property. She does not present any 

argument to dispute that the deed satisfied the writing requirement for a 
10

valid transmutation under section 852. We conclude in any event that

substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that it did. “ ‘Though 

no particular terminology is required [citation], the writing must reflect a 

transmutation on its face, and must eliminate the need to consider other 

evidence in divining this intent.’ ” (In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 

Cal.App.4th 1411, 1428.) The deed stated: “It is the express intent of [Wife], 

being the spouse of [Husband], to convey all right, title and interest of [Wife], 

community or otherwise, in and to [Starlight Way] to [Husband] as his sole 

and separate property.” As such, it is an express declaration by Wife that the 

character or ownership of the property at issue was being changed. (Valli, 

supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1400; see §§ 850, 852.) 

The focus of Wife’s challenge is her assertion that the trial court erred 

in finding Husband had rebutted the presumption of undue influence under 

section 721. She points to her own testimony that she was “forced to sign” 

the deed to close the mortgage loan; that she signed it “under duress and 

pressure” from Husband, who committed domestic violence against her5; that 

she had experience in insurance (including selling homeowner insurance 

policies) but “no expertise in financing, lending or real estate transactions”; 

and that she is not “highly educated.” But as we have explained, Wife cannot 

carry her burden of demonstrating reversible error by merely relying on her 

own testimony that supports her version of the events. The trial court found 

her testimony to be not credible, and our role is not to reweigh the evidence, 

substitute our own inferences from the evidence, or make different 

assessments of credibility. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.) We 

5 As noted, the parties dismissed their DVRO requests against each 

other without any judicial finding of domestic violence. (See footnote 4, ante.)
11

must affirm the judgment if substantial evidence supports it, even if other 

substantial evidence would have supported a contrary judgment or finding. 

(Ibid.) 

On that point, Wife fails to cite evidence and inferences favorable to the 

trial court’s finding that Husband rebutted the presumption of undue 

influence. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence to 

support a finding, her opening brief must set forth all the material evidence 

on that issue and cannot merely state facts favorable to her position. 

(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman &

Clark).) When an appellant’s opening brief states only favorable evidence 

and ignores evidence supporting the finding, we may treat the substantial 

evidence claim as waived and presume the record contains evidence to 

support the trial court’s factual findings. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases

(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1072 (Delta Stewardship).) 

Although we are not required to undertake an independent 

examination of the record on appeal, our review of the record does reveal 

substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding. Here, this court’s 

decision in Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 624 is instructive. In Mathews, 

a couple purchased a residence during marriage. To obtain a more favorable 

interest rate on a mortgage, wife quitclaimed her interest in the residence to 

husband, and the residence was acquired in his name alone. (Id. at p. 627.) 

The quitclaim deed was validly executed and recorded. Wife acknowledged 

the residence was acquired solely in the husband’s name but believed her 

name would be added to the title at a later date. Throughout the marriage, 

wife and husband both believed the residence was community property and 

after the separation discovered title to the residence was in his name alone. 

(Ibid.) We concluded these circumstances were sufficient to support a finding 
12

that wife entered into the transaction freely, voluntarily and with a full 

understanding of the quitclaim deed. (Id. at p. 631.) 

We agree with the trial court’s observation that the circumstances in 

this case are similar to those in Mathews.6 Here, the court found it 

persuasive that Wife acknowledged she had “[a] greater understanding of the 

process and financial matters,” that “part of the discussion [for executing the 

deed] involved her bad credit,” and she understood “her name would not be on 

title.” Wife’s own testimony supported the trial court’s findings. Wife agreed 

it was accurate to state she had “a greater understanding of how to interact 

with . . . real estate than [Husband].” She testified she was the person 

“primarily involved in negotiating the purchase” of Starlight Way. She 

admitted that the lender asked her to sign the deed because the loan would 

not close if her name was on it because of her debt and credit score; Husband 

did not tell her that he would not buy the house if she did not sign the deed, 

but rather he would not be able to buy it unless she signed it; and she signed 

the deed in order to close the loan transaction because she did not want to 

lose the house and needed a place to live, and it would possibly be years 

before she repaired her credit. Wife also acknowledged the only other person 

in the room when she signed the deed was the notary public. 

Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding, we conclude there was 

substantial evidence to support the finding that Husband demonstrated by a 

6 We do not find Wife’s attempts to distinguish Mathews persuasive, 

including her assertion that, unlike this case, Mathews did not involve 

domestic violence. Although Wife asserts Husband was “aggressive and 

abusive” toward her, there was no factual finding that either party 

committed domestic violence because the parties agreed to dismiss their 

respective requests for DVROs. (See footnote 4, ante.)
13

preponderance of the evidence that the transaction “ ‘was freely and

voluntarily made, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a 

complete understanding of the effect of the transfer.’ ” (Haines, supra, 33 

Cal.App.4th at p. 296; Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 631 [concluding 

the burden of proof of rebutting § 721’s presumption is by a preponderance of 

the evidence].) 

Wife’s other arguments are also unavailing. She takes issue with the 

trial court’s date of separation finding, asserting the court erred in finding 

Husband gave notice of his intent to divorce her by a “text [message] in 

September 2017.” Although she does not explain how that purported error 

would affect the court’s transmutation finding, the court found the parties’ 

date of separation was January 23, 2018, not Husband’s asserted date of 

September 2017.7 Wife does not contend there is insufficient evidence to 

support the court’s finding; indeed January 23, 2018 was the separation date 

Wife claimed to be true in her own pleadings. Regardless, we fail to see how 

Wife’s argument on this point demonstrates an error in the court’s 

transmutation finding.

Wife next argues the trial court erred in placing “great faith in 

[H]usband’s integrity to tell the truth,” asserting for example that Husband 

refused to provide his “financials” throughout the proceedings, he “falsified 

taxes, income, receipts, rendering his declarations of disclosure defective,” he 

7 In its statement of decision, the trial court explained its finding was 

based on the fact that Husband was arrested on January 23, 2018 and “the 

parties have not resided together since.” The court acknowledged Husband 

“in good faith believed that he had been clear in his desire to terminate the 

marriage before then” (italics added), but found “it would not have been clear 

to the reasonable person that his conduct was consistent with the intent to 

end the marriage.” 
14

“committed perjury” in his testimony regarding the date of separation. But 

again, we do not reweigh the trial court’s credibility determinations. 

Although the court made no finding that Husband committed fraud in the 

dissolution proceedings, Wife fails to explain how fraud in the dissolution 

proceedings would even be relevant to the transmutation. She does not 

assert fraud occurred in the transmutation, including for example in the 

execution of the deed.

Finally, Wife asserts the trial court erred in tracing the down payment 

on Starlight Way to Husband’s separate property. The court found Husband 

used a $4000 loan on the 401(k) account for the down payment, but because 

the loan was “significantly less than his separate property interest” in the 

account and he paid back the loan with his separate property assets postseparation, the court ruled “there was not a community interest from the 

down[ ]payment.” Wife’s assertion of error, again, asks us to improperly 

reweigh the evidence and merely advances her version of the events, while 

ignoring evidence that supports the court’s factual findings. She also fails to 

explain how this asserted error would affect the court’s finding that Starlight 

Way was transmuted to Husband’s separate property. 

In sum, we conclude substantial evidence supported the trial court’s

transmutation finding.
15

IV.

Reimbursements8

A. Husband’s Mortgage on His Separate Property Was Not a Debt Incurred 

by Wife for Her Common Necessaries, Within the Meaning of Section 

914, Subdivision (a)(2), and Reimbursement to Husband for the 

Mortgage Payments Was Improper

On January 25, 2018, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued 

against Husband for Wife’s protection. The TRO included a move-out order 

requiring Husband to vacate Starlight Way. It also contained an order that 

Husband continue to make payments on the mortgage for Starlight Way, 

while Wife resided there during the pendency of the domestic violence case. 

Notably, nothing in the record reveals the court reserved jurisdiction to later 

reallocate the payment of the mortgage while the TRO was in effect. These 

orders were continued at various times and remained in effect until May 24, 

2018, when the parties stipulated to dismiss their respective TROs against 

each other and requests for DVROs. Thus, the trial court found Wife had 

exclusive use of Starlight Way from the date of separation on January 23, 

2018 until May 24, 2018, at which point Husband resumed possession. 

At trial, Husband asserted Wife owed him fair market rent for 

Starlight Way during the five months she lived in the house post-separation, 

8 Wife incorrectly refers to the trial court’s award of reimbursements as 

“equalizing payments.” Equalizing payments are used in the specific context 

of dividing community property. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Andresen (1994) 

28 Cal.App.4th 873, 880 [family law court has broad discretion in 

determining how to effect an equal allocation of community property and 

“may award one or more items of the property to one party and require that 

party to make an equalizing payment to the other”].) 
16

or Wife owed him for the rent he had paid9 on his rental as a result of his 

non-possession of Starlight Way. The court agreed with Wife that Husband

was not entitled to either rent on Starlight Way or to reimbursement of his 

rent, and denied his request. 

However, the trial court treated Husband’s request “as a request for 

reimbursement under . . . section 914, subdivision (a)(2)” for Wife’s “postseparation use of his separate property.” Section 914, subdivision (a)(2),

provides that “a married person is personally liable for the following debts 

incurred by the person’s spouse during marriage: [¶] . . . a debt incurred for 

common necessaries of life of the person’s spouse after the date of separation 

of the spouses.” (Italics added.) The court found “[t]he mortgage is a debt,”

and “[t]hat debt was paid⎯during the time period [Wife] used the property 

post-separation⎯for [Wife’s] necessities of life, namely shelter.” It found 

Husband paid a monthly mortgage payment of $1,930.37 during Wife’s postseparation use of the property. The court then ordered Wife pay Husband a 

reimbursement in the total amount of $7,721.48,10 under section 914, 

subdivision (a)(2).

Wife asserts the trial court erred in awarding Husband the 

reimbursement under section 914, subdivision (a)(2). We agree. As we shall 

9 Husband requested an award of $400 per month, apparently for rent he 

paid for an apartment from January 24, 2018 through May 31, 2018. 

10 The court calculated the amount as follows: For Wife’s 8 days of use 

from January 23 to January 31, 2018, it divided $1,930.37 by 31 and 

multiplied by 8 for a pro rata share of $498.16. For February through April 

2018, 3 months of mortgage payments totaled $5,791.11. For 23 days of use 

from May 1 to May 23, it divided the monthly mortgage by 31 and multiplied 

by 23 for a pro rata share of $1,432.21.
17

explain, the court’s decision was based on an erroneous application of section 

914, subdivision (a)(2).

Section 914, subdivision (a), provides:

“Notwithstanding Section 913, a married person is personally 

liable for the following debts incurred by the person’s spouse

during marriage:

“(1) A debt incurred for necessaries of life of the person’s spouse 

before the date of separation of the spouses.

“(2) Except as provided in Section 4302, a debt incurred for

common necessaries of life of the person’s spouse after the date of 

separation of the spouses.” (Italics added.)

“[C]ommon necessaries [of life] are those that all families need (e.g.,

food, clothing, and shelter),” and depends on the circumstances of the 

particular marriage. (Direct Capital Corp. v. Brooks (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 

1168, 1174 (Direct Capital).) 

“Section 914 is an exception to the general rule that a married person’s 

separate property is not liable for debts incurred by his or her spouse during 

marriage.” (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 

309, italics added.) “It does not hinge on the separate or community nature of 

the non[-]debtor spouse’s property, but instead ascribes liability to ‘a married 

person’ for specified debts incurred by the debtor-spouse, with different 

language for debts incurred pre- and post[-]separation.” (Direct Capital, 

supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172, italics added.) 

As should be now clear, “the express terms of section 914 . . . governs 

‘debts incurred by the person’s spouse.’ ” (CMRE Financial Services Inc. v. 

Parton (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 263, 268 (CMRE Financial), italics added.) 

Thus, in Direct Capital, husband was held liable to a computer equipment 

company for a $40,000 debt incurred by wife pre-separation, for an office 

computer used in her law practice that generated community property 
18

income. (Direct Capital, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1170, 1172.) The trial 

court’s finding that “the debt was a community property obligation” under 

section 914, subdivision (a)(1), was upheld on appeal. (Id. at p. 1171.) In 

CMRE Financial, wife would ordinarily have been liable for hospital and 

medical bills incurred by husband post-separation to the hospital’s assignee 

under section 914. (CMRE Financial, at pp. 265−266.) But wife’s liability for 

husband’s post-separation debt was discharged under section 916 when 

judgment of dissolution was entered without express assignment to wife of 

any liability for husband’s hospital and medical costs. (CMRE Financial, at 

p. 269.) 

Here, unlike in Direct Capital or CMRE Financial where the debtorspouse owed money to a third party creditor, Wife (the purported debtorspouse) incurred no debt whatsoever within the meaning of section 914. She 

owed no one money. The mortgage was a debt incurred by Husband, and it 

was incurred by him to finance his separate property, not to provide Wife with 

shelter. Wife was simply staying at his house without paying rent. The trial 

court expressly rejected Husband’s request that Wife pay him fair market 

rent during her 5-month stay, but the court’s reimbursement award under 

the guise of section 914 effectively ordered Wife to do just that. Moreover, if 

Wife had incurred a debt for her common necessaries, section 914 makes 

Husband liable for that community obligation. (See Direct Capital, supra, 14 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1171−1172.) And nothing in section 914 authorizes a 

reimbursement to a spouse for a debt paid under the statute.11 By its 

11 The trial court suggested its reimbursement award was “potentially . . . 

equitable relief similar to a Watts credits for reimbursement of the fair 

market value of [Wife’s] use of his separate property asset.” It then found 

“the mortgage payment amount is credible evidence of the fair market value 
19

express terms, section 914 simply did not apply in this case, and it was error 

for the trial court to order Wife to reimburse Husband for a debt he incurred 

to finance his separate property. 

Judicial discretion is not unfettered. “The scope of discretion always 

resides in the particular law being applied by the court, i.e., in the ‘ “legal 

principles governing the subject of [the] action[.]” ’ ” (Nakamura v. Parker

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) If the court’s decision reflects “ ‘an 

erroneous understanding of applicable law . . . the court has not properly 

exercised its discretion under the law. . . . [A] discretionary order based on 

an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an 

exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.’ ” (Eneaji v. Ubboe

(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.) Because the trial court erred in its 

application of section 914, subdivision (a)(2), and erroneously concluded it 

had discretion under that statute to reimburse Husband for his mortgage 

payments, we reverse the court’s reimbursement award to Husband of 

$7,721.48. (See Eneaji, at p. 1463.) Because we reverse on this ground, we 

of the property.” This is also incorrect. Known as “Watts charges,” when one 

spouse has exclusive use of a community asset after separation, such as a 

residence, the court can order that the spouse reimburse the community for 

the value of the exclusive use. (In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 

Cal.App.3d 366, 373−374.) A spouse who, after separation, uses earnings or 

other separate funds to pay preexisting community obligations is entitled to 

reimbursement called “Epstein credits.” (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 

Cal.3d 76, 84−85.) So when a spouse makes payments on the community

residence that the other spouse was exclusively using post-separation, with 

his separate funds after separation, he is entitled to reimbursement. (In re 

Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 548, 552−553.) Neither Watts

charges nor Epstein credits are available here because Starlight Way was 

determined to be Husband’s separate property.
20

need not reach the merits of Wife’s other contentions of error as to the 

reimbursement award.

B. The Order for Reimbursements to Husband for Payment of Wife’s and 

Her Adult Child’s Health Insurance Premiums Was Interlocutory and Is 

Not Appealable

Wife asserts the trial court erred by ordering her to reimburse 

Husband for his payment of health insurance premiums that covered Wife 

and her adult daughter from February through December 2018. Among 

other reasons, she argues Husband was not entitled to reimbursement 

because the evidence showed he intentionally cancelled health insurance 

coverage for her and her daughter, in violation of the automatic temporary 

restraining orders (ATROs) imposed upon commencement of the proceedings. 

(§ 2040, subd. (a).)12 However, based on our review of the dissolution 

judgment, we conclude the trial court’s order regarding Husband’s 

entitlement to reimbursement for health insurance premiums for Wife and 

12 Section 2040, subdivision (a), provides in part: “[T]he summons shall 

contain a temporary restraining order: [¶] . . . [¶] (2)(A) [r]estraining both 

parties from transferring . . . or in any way disposing of, any property, real or 

personal, whether community, quasi-community, or separate, without the 

written consent of the other party or an order of the court, except in the usual 

course of business or for the necessities of life, and requiring each party to 

notify the other party of proposed extraordinary expenditures at least five 

business days before incurring those expenditures and to account to the court 

for all extraordinary expenditures made after service of the summons on that 

party. [¶] . . . [¶] (3) [r]estraining both parties from cashing, borrowing 

against, canceling, transferring, disposing of, or changing the beneficiaries of 

insurance or other coverage, including life, health, automobile, and disability, 

held for the benefit of the parties and their child or children for whom support 

may be ordered.” (Italics added.)
21

her adult child was not a final order. Rather, it was an interlocutory order

and thus non-appealable.13 

An appealable order or judgment is essential to appellate jurisdiction 

and an order or judgment is not appealable unless expressly made so by 

statute. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 

696–697 (Griset); Allabach v. Santa Clara County Fair Assn. (1996) 46 

Cal.App.4th 1007, 1010.) Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision 

(a), sets forth those judgments and orders that are appealable, stating in 

relevant part: “An appeal . . . may be taken from any of the following: [¶] 

(1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory judgment, other than as 

provided in paragraphs (8), (9), and (11)[.]” To be appealable, a judgment or 

order generally must be “final” and not “interlocutory.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Griset, at p. 698.) 

The test whether a judgment or order is final and appealable is as 

follows: “ ‘[W]here no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of 

compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is 

final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of 

the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the 

13 Because this issue was not raised by either party in the briefing on 

appeal, we issued an order requesting the parties submit supplemental letter 

briefs addressing the question of whether Wife’s appeal as to the court’s order 

regarding the health insurance premiums should be dismissed as nonappealable. We also requested that the parties submit a copy of any order 

issued by the Superior Court after December 31, 2020 addressing and/or 

deciding any request by Husband for reimbursement of the health insurance 

premiums, and to address whether we should take judicial notice of any such 

order. We have received and considered the parties’ supplemental briefs. We 

have not been advised by either party that the trial court made any further 

orders on this matter since its December 31, 2020 judgment. 
22

decree is interlocutory.’ ” (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698, italics added; 

cf. Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304 (Sullivan) [to 

be appealable, judgment or order must be final in that it leaves no issue to be 

determined]; Yeboah v. Progeny Ventures, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 443, 

448 (Yeboah) [order directing an accounting is interlocutory and nonappealable if further judicial action is required after the accounting is 

ordered].) “An interlocutory order or judgment has two characteristic 

features: It is not final for purposes of appeal, and is also not final in the 

trial court, when it may be modified after further evidence or law has been 

considered.” (Yeboah, at p. 449.)

At trial, Husband had requested reimbursement for payments he made 

for health insurance and dental insurance coverage for Wife and Wife’s adult 

child. He presented evidence he paid a monthly amount of $465.96 for health 

insurance and a monthly amount of $20.08 for dental insurance, and that he 

paid a total of $5,346.66 for 11 months from February to December 2018. 

However, the trial court found this was “the entire cost for [Husband] plus 

family.” Because it had no evidence of what portion of the health insurance 

premiums was attributable to coverage for Wife and her adult child, the court 

did not make any order of reimbursement. Instead, it made only an initial 

finding that Husband’s payment of health insurance premiums for coverage 

of Wife and her adult child was not in lieu of spousal support and Husband 

would be entitled to reimbursement for that portion of his premium 

payments attributable to that additional coverage. 

It then reserved jurisdiction over the reimbursement of health insurance 

premiums, for 90 days after final judgment, to allow Husband to file a 

request for order with documentation of the proportional break-down of the 

payments. Only then would the court presumably finally decide whether to 
23

award Husband reimbursement and the amount of any such reimbursement 

award. If Husband failed to file a request for order with documentation 

within the 90-day period, jurisdiction would expire. 

Because on the face of its order the court contemplated further judicial 

action, the order was interlocutory only and not a final, appealable order. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698;

Sullivan, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 304; Yeboah, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 448.) Therefore, to the extent Wife appeals the order in the December 31, 

2020 judgment regarding health insurance reimbursement, we dismiss her 

appeal of that claim for lack of jurisdiction to consider a non-appealable 

order.14

V.

401(k) Account

At trial, Wife asserted Husband liquidated the entire balance of a 

401(k) account in violation of his fiduciary duty to her and the ATROs. The 

trial court found the evidence had established Husband accessed the funds 

for “necessities of life,” an exception under section 2040, subdivision (a)(2)(A), 

and declined to find that he breached his fiduciary duty. However, the court 

also found the 401(k) account had “a significant community interest” and 

Wife was entitled to her share of that community property interest. It 

determined the appropriate date for valuation of the account was time of 

trial, or July 31, 2020, and ordered the parties to hire an expert, at 

Husband’s expense, to calculate what the value of the account would have 

14 We note that if and when the trial court issues an order after December 

31, 2020 regarding health insurance reimbursement, that postjudgment 

order may constitute an appealable postjudgment order pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
24

been on that date “were it not emptied” and what portion belongs to the 

community. The court reserved jurisdiction over the selection of the expert 

and the division and distribution of the asset, as well as how it affects other 

equalizing payments. 

Wife asserts the trial court erred in its finding that Husband liquidated 

his 401(k) plan account for necessities of life and that he did not breach his 

fiduciary duty. She incorrectly requests we apply a de novo standard of 

review. (Winograd, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 632 [when a trial court has 

resolved a disputed factual issue, we review the court’s finding for substantial 

evidence].) She argues, without any citations to record support, that

Husband failed to present evidence he provided her with the required notice 

of at least five business days before incurring any proposed extraordinary 

expenditures and an accounting of those expenditures. And the court erred 

in crediting Husband’s testimony he withdrew the funds for necessities of life, 

because Husband is untrustworthy for a host of reasons, including because he 

has a “clear pattern of hiding assets.” 

As we have explained in resolving Wife’s other contentions, such 

arguments cannot overcome the presumption of correctness and fails to show 

reversible error. Though she asserts Husband failed to provide her with the 

required notice, she does not point us to where in the record on appeal we 

would find evidence to support her contention, or that she requested the trial 

court to find that Husband failed to provide her with the required notice, or 

that she requested the trial court provide her relief for the alleged notice 

violation. Her failures result in waiver and forfeiture of the contention. (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894; Baxter v. State Teachers’ 

Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 378.) 
25

Wife’s opening brief states only favorable evidence to her and fails to 

acknowledge evidence and inferences favorable to the trial court’s finding 

that Husband accessed the 401(k) funds for necessities of life. (Foreman & 

Clark, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881 [an appellant’s opening brief must set forth 

all the material evidence on that issue and cannot merely state facts 

favorable to her position].) As such, we may treat Wife’s substantial evidence 

claim as waived and presume the record contains evidence to support the 

trial court’s factual findings. (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1072.) 

Again, although we are not required to undertake an independent 

examination of the record, we note the trial court’s statement of decision does 

reference Husband’s failure to provide Wife with the required five-day notice. 

The court found Husband did not violate the ATROs or his fiduciary duty 

when he withdrew funds from the 401(k) account, but it viewed his failure to 

notify Wife five days before the liquidation “as something that would justify 

sanctions.” As we discuss later, the court declined to sanction either party for 

what it determined was sanctionable conduct by both. Thus the court 

considered, but rejected, an appropriate remedy for Husband’s violation of 

the notice requirement and Wife presents no argument or authority to 

establish the court’s ultimate resolution of the violation was an abuse of 

discretion. 

Finally, the trial court, sitting as the sole trier of fact, was entitled to 

credit Husband’s testimony that he needed the funds for necessities of life. 

We do not reweigh the court’s credibility determinations. (Babick, supra, 229 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1246 [“We do not reweigh evidence or reassess the 

credibility of witnesses.”].) Here, the court accepted Husband’s testimony 

that the continued payments of the insurance premiums for Wife and her 
26

adult child “increased the [already existing] financial strain” on him after the 

parties separated, and that his involuntary loss of work (whether he was 

fired or laid off) “ma[de] it credible that he did not [have] other financial 

means to maintain the necessities of life.” Husband’s testimony alone 

constitutes substantial evidence to support the court’s finding and requires us 

to affirm the finding. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 581−582; In re 

Marriage of Mix, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 614.) 

VI. 

Section 271 Sanctions

Each party had requested attorney fees as sanctions under section 271 

against the other. Husband requested $5,687.50; Wife requested $33,674.75. 

The court denied both requests. Wife asserts the court erred in denying her 

request for fees against Husband. We review a court’s decision whether to 

award sanctions under section 271 for abuse of discretion. (In re E.M. (2014) 

228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850.) “The imposition of sanctions under section 271 is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court’s order 

will be upheld on appeal unless the reviewing court, ‘considering all of the 

evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable 

inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.’ ” (Ibid.) 

We conclude Wife has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the 

court’s denial of her request for section 271 sanctions against Husband.

The trial court denied both parties’ request for sanctions because it 

found that imposition of sanctions against either party would impose an 

undue financial burden on both Husband and Wife. Section 271, subdivision 

(a), provides “[t]he court shall not impose a sanction . . . that imposes an 

unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is 

imposed.” (Italics added.) In asserting error, Wife fails to address the court’s
27

finding that imposition of Wife’s requested $33,000 in attorney fees against 

Husband would impose an unreasonable financial burden on him. Although 

this omission alone is a basis to reject her contention, we see no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s decision. At the time of trial, the court had 

found Husband was unemployed and receiving unemployment compensation, 

he had $150 in his bank accounts and more than $24,000 in debt, and he did 

not have the ability to pay spousal support. On this record, the trial court’s 

finding that a sanction of $33,000 would impose an unreasonable financial 

burden on Husband is not arbitrary, capricious or outside the bounds of 

reason. 

But even if sanctions would not impose an undue financial burden, the 

trial court stated it would not award sanctions to either party because of both

parties’ conduct in the litigation. The court explained it would examine “ ‘the 

entire record’ ” to determine whether to impose sanctions, and that it 

“view[ed] this as not just looking at the overall behavior of one party in the 

context of the entire case, but also to include a comparison of the behaviors of 

each party.” The court then found that both Husband and Wife had engaged 

in conduct that frustrated the promotion of settlement and cooperation, 

including for example: 

Both parties violated various court orders⎯Husband “chained the toilet 

shut in the Starlight [Way] property while temporary restraining orders were 

in place and [Wife] was exercising a majority of possession of the property,” 

which the court found to be “absolutely egregious conduct” by Husband. Wife 

violated the stipulation resolving the mutual restraining orders by entering 

the property after an agreement giving Husband exclusive use and control, 

and by “surveilling” Husband. Although the “stipulation was to prevent the 

risk of future domestic violence or abuse between the parties,” Wife 
28

“drastically minimize[d] the severity” of her conduct. Because the court 

viewed her conduct “as potentially criminal,” it advised Wife of her Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing on Husband’s 

request for a new restraining order. 

Both parties failed to timely file their final declarations of disclosure, 

resulting in delays. Both parties’ property declarations contained 

“inconsistencies” about the purchase date of Starlight Way and the value of 

other items. But specifically, the trial court found Wife’s testimony, live or by 

declaration, on her requests for reimbursements for debts to be “false.” And 

although the court found Husband did not violate the ATROs or his fiduciary 

duty when he withdrew funds from the 401(k) account, the court viewed his 

failure to notify Wife five days before the liquidation “as something that 

would justify sanctions.”

The trial court expressly understood its finding that each party had 

engaged in conduct frustrating the promotion of settlement and cooperation 

“does not preclude an award to either party,” but it viewed “the parties’ 

behaviors as cancelling each other’s conduct out.” For that reason, the court 

in its discretion declined to award either party sanctions. In asserting error, 

Wife ignores the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings regarding her 

own conduct, and discusses only evidence she believes is favorable to her 

version of the events. Wife again overlooks the principles that constrain our 

review. She reargues the facts and ask us to reweigh the evidence and 

credibility determinations, including by recasting the trial court’s finding of 

her false testimony or violations of court orders as simply “Wife’s mistakes.” 
29

We conclude Wife has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion by the 

court here.15 

VII.

Asserted Judicial Bias

Although Wife’s opening brief does not expressly set forth a separate 

contention that the judgment must be reversed because of trial court bias, 

her brief included tangential and conclusory assertions, intermingled with

her contentions of error, that the trial court was biased against her or in 

favor of Husband. By way of example, Wife asserts: the trial court’s citation 

of testimony that the deed was required by the loan officer to close the loan 

showed the court’s bias against her; the court’s questioning of her at trial was 

“prosecutorial, with a specific end in mind,” and it was “specifically looking 

throughout the trial to impeach [her]”; the court showed its bias in favor of 

Husband by advising him, as a self-represented litigant, regarding 

15 Elsewhere in her opening brief, Wife asserts the trial court erred in not

awarding her attorney fees as a sanction because Husband failed to provide

“taxes and basic financial documents,” including the couple’s 2017 tax return. 

And for that reason, the court erred when it awarded her an equalizing 

payment of $251 for 2017 taxes “based on [H]usband’s incomplete 

documents.” To the extent this is separate contention of error, Wife fails to 

explain how the asserted error is a basis for reversal of the equalizing 

payment to her. On that basis, we reject it.

At trial, Husband “described” a 2017 tax return of $502 and provided 

an unsigned copy of the 2017 tax return. The trial court determined the tax 

return was community property and awarded Wife her one-half interest of 

$251. Wife did not take a position in the trial court on what amount she was 

owed, if different than the $251. On appeal, Wife does not challenge the 

amount of the equalizing payment awarded to her; she only contends the trial 

court should not have relied on Husband’s “incomplete documents.” 

Husband’s testimony and the unsigned copy of the 2017 tax return was 

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination.
30

procedures for filing a proof of service, but not advising her that a motion to 

compel was required to obtain a finding regarding his discovery violations.

We conclude Wife has waived or forfeited any claim of judicial bias by 

not filing a motion to disqualify the trial court pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 170.3, or otherwise timely raising or objecting to the 

purported bias in the proceedings below. In Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. 

Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, the court concluded the appellants had 

failed to “preserve their claim of judicial bias for review because they did not 

object to the alleged improprieties and never asked the judge to correct 

remarks made or recuse himself.” (Id. at p. 1218.) Here too, Wife, who was 

represented by counsel at trial, was required to object “at the earliest 

practicable opportunity.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) She did not. 

Because Wife failed to object below and never asked the trial judge to correct 

any improper remarks or recuse himself, she has failed to preserve the claim 

for appeal. (Moulton, at p. 1218; In re Steven O. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 46, 

53−55.)

We further conclude that, under the principles of appellate review we

have previously explained, Wife has waived or forfeited any claim of judicial 

bias by: (1) making only conclusory and/or speculative assertions of judicial 

bias, and that are, for the most part, unsupported by citations to the record;

and (2) not presenting any substantive legal analysis showing any prejudicial

bias by the trial court. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608−609.) Although 

Wife cites certain canons for judicial conduct regarding integrity, 

independence, fairness, impartiality, and diligence, she does not present any 

substantive legal argument showing the trial court violated any of those 

canons. Rather, she only cites certain findings by the court with which she 

disagrees. 
31

Also, to the extent Wife asserts the trial court showed its bias by 

finding Husband more credible and his evidence more persuasive and/or by 

making findings and decisions adverse to her, she does not show it acted 

outside the normal function of a trial court in considering and weighing the 

evidence admitted at trial and making findings of fact based on the evidence. 

“The mere fact that the trial court issued rulings adverse to [Wife] on several 

matters in this case, even assuming one or more of those rulings were 

erroneous, does not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate 

actual bias.” (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 

665, 674; see also, Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 

59–60 [mere erroneous rulings do not show appearance of bias].) Likewise, 

“[m]ere expressions of opinion by a trial judge based on actual observation of 

the witnesses and evidence in the courtroom do not demonstrate a bias.” 

(People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111 (Guerra).)

Finally, to the extent Wife asserts that she was denied her 

constitutional right to due process because of the trial court’s alleged bias, 

she has the burden to show such bias was so prejudicial that it deprived her 

of a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial. (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) 

Wife must demonstrate she was denied her right to a fair trial and, in 

particular, show that the trial court’s alleged bias was so great that it became 

constitutionally intolerable. (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1001.) 

We have reviewed the record on appeal. Contrary to Wife’s assertions, the 

record demonstrates Wife received a fair trial by an impartial and unbiased 

court.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed to the extent Wife challenges the December 31, 

2020 order regarding Husband’s request for reimbursement of health 
32

insurance premiums he paid. The judgment is reversed to the extent it 

awards Husband $7,721.48 as reimbursement for Wife’s post-separation use 

of the Starlight Way property, and the judgment is otherwise affirmed. The 

matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to recalculate the 

balance of equalization payments consistent with this opinion. 

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.