NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANDREE TABOR, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0280 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-446571-001 

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix 

By Tennie B. Martin 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. TABOR 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined. 

J O H N S E N, Judge: 

¶1 This appeal was timely filed in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969), 

following Andree Tabor's convictions of six counts of organized retail theft, 

Class 4 felonies. Tabor's counsel has searched the record on appeal and 

found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. See Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders, 386 U.S. 738; State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530 (App. 

1999). Tabor was given the opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did 

not do so. Counsel now asks this court to search the record for fundamental 

error. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm Tabor's convictions and 

sentences. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 On six separate occasions in September 2013, Tabor entered a 

convenience store, took beer from the shelf and left without paying.1 Tabor 

later admitted to detectives she stole the beer for resale. After Tabor failed 

to appear for a December 18, 2013, pretrial conference, a bench warrant was 

issued for her arrest. Tabor eventually was tried in absentia. A jury 

convicted her of six counts of organized retail theft under Arizona Revised 

Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-1819(A)(1) (2016).2 The superior court 

sentenced her to two terms of 1.5 years' incarceration and four terms of 

three years' incarceration, all running concurrently, with 161 days of credit 

for presentence incarceration. 

 

1 Upon review, we view the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury's verdicts and resolve all inferences against Tabor. State 

v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 

2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version. 
STATE v. TABOR 

Decision of the Court 

3

¶3 Tabor timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 

12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2016) and -4033 (2016).

DISCUSSION 

¶4 The record reflects Tabor received a fair trial. She was 

represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings against her. 

¶5 Tabor was tried in absentia. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 9.1, "a defendant may waive the right to be present at any 

proceeding by voluntarily absenting himself or herself from it," and "[t]he 

court may infer that an absence is voluntary if the defendant had personal 

notice of the time of the proceeding, the right to be present at it, and a 

warning that the proceeding would go forward in his or her absence should 

he or she fail to appear." See also State v. Hall, 136 Ariz. 219, 222-23 (App. 

1983) (defendant informed of trial date at arraignment was voluntarily 

absent by failure to appear at subsequent proceedings). The court told 

Tabor at her arraignment and initial pretrial conference that she could be 

tried in absentia if she failed to appear. Tabor did not appear for the first 

comprehensive pretrial conference on December 18, 2013, and was absent 

from all subsequent proceedings until sentencing on January 28, 2015. See

State v. Muniz-Caudillo, 185 Ariz. 261, 262 (App. 1996) (defendant was found 

to be voluntarily absent, even without actual notice of trial date, when 

informed that failure to attend pretrial conference could result in a trial in 

absentia). After Tabor absconded, her counsel did not object to her trial in 

absentia and informed the court during sentencing that her absence had 

been voluntary. The prosecutor did not comment on Tabor's failure to 

appear during trial, and the jury was instructed not to speculate about her 

absence in determining guilt. 

¶6 The court held appropriate pretrial hearings. It did not 

conduct a voluntariness hearing; however, the record does not suggest a 

question about the voluntariness of Tabor's statements to police. See State 

v. Smith, 114 Ariz. 415, 419 (1977); State v. Finn, 111 Ariz. 271, 275 (1974). 

¶7 The State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence 

on each of the six counts sufficient to allow the jury to convict. The jury 

was properly comprised of 12 members. The court properly instructed the 

jury on the elements of the charges, the State's burden of proof and the 

necessity of a unanimous verdict. The jury returned a unanimous verdict, 

which was confirmed by juror polling. 
STATE v. TABOR 

Decision of the Court 

4

¶8 The court received and considered a presentence report,

addressed its contents during the sentencing hearing and imposed legal 

sentences for the crimes of which Tabor was convicted. See A.R.S. § 13-

703(A), (I) (2016).3

CONCLUSION 

¶9 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none, and therefore affirm the convictions and resulting sentences. See 

Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300. 

¶10 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligations 

pertaining to Tabor's representation in this appeal have ended. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform Tabor of the outcome of this appeal 

and her future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds "an issue 

appropriate for submission" to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for 

review. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). On the court's 

own motion, Tabor has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if 

she wishes, with a pro per motion for reconsideration. Tabor has 30 days 

from the date of this decision to proceed, if she wishes, with a pro per

petition for review. 

 

3 The record does not allow us to ascertain the number of days of 

presentence incarceration credit to which Tabor was entitled, but neither 

party has raised any objections to the award of 161 days' presentence 

incarceration credit.