1

Filed 7/16/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JOSEPH C. ALTIZER et al.,

Plaintiffs;

WVJP 2017-1, LP,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROBERT H. HIGHSMITH et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 A157921

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. CIV392380)

In 1995, 17 plaintiffs sued defendants Robert and Richard Highsmith 

on several promissory notes, and the parties entered into a stipulation 

whereby a single judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in various 

amounts. In 2005, an attorney representing the plaintiffs renewed the 

judgment using the standard Judicial Council form. The attorney 

subsequently passed away, and when the judgment was again due to be 

renewed in 2015, one of the plaintiffs did so, again using the standard 

Judicial Council form. Defendants eventually moved to vacate the 2015 

renewal, arguing that it was void because to the extent one plaintiff 

purported to file it on behalf of the others, doing so constituted the 

unauthorized practice of law. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. 

We reverse. 
2

BACKGROUND

On May 30, 1995, 17 plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants in

San Mateo County Superior Court. According to that complaint, eight pairs 

of plaintiffs and one individual held promissory notes pursuant to which 

defendants had promised to pay, and failed to pay, certain sums of money. 

The complaint asserted nine separate causes of action corresponding to the

nine promissory notes, which were attached as exhibits to the complaint. 

On November 29, 1995, pursuant to a stipulation among the parties 

and their counsel, the trial court entered a single judgment in favor of the 

plaintiffs for various amounts, in each case slightly less than the face amount 

of the nine promissory notes. The amounts owed the plaintiffs totaled 

$195,678.88. 

In California, a judgment can be enforced for only 10 years from the 

date of entry. (Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020.)1 So, on October 27, 2005, attorney 

David Wexler filed the two-page Judicial Council form EJ-190, “Application 

for and Renewal of Judgment.” Wexler checked a box on the form indicating 

that he was the attorney for the judgment creditor. In the space for 

“Applicant,” the form referred to an “Attachment A” listing the 17 plaintiffs 

and their addresses. In the space for “Judgment debtor,” the form referred to 

an “Attachment B” listing defendants and their address. In the space for 

“Original judgment,” the form provided the case number and date of the 

original judgment, and referred to an “Attachment C” listing the various 

counties in which the judgment had been recorded, along with the instrument 

number. After a box checked for “Renewal of money judgment,” the form 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure. 
3

provided the original judgment amount of $195,678.88, interest after 

judgment of $200,570.67, and a fee for filing the renewal of $36.30, for a total 

renewed judgment amount of $396,285.85. And on the second page, Wexler 

signed and dated the form, providing his title as “Attorney for Judgment 

Creditors.” 

In 2008, Wexler died. 

On October 9, 2015, one of the plaintiffs, John Bisordi, filed a second 

“Application for and Renewal of Judgment,” again using the two-page 

Judicial Council form. He provided his name and address in the space under 

“Attorney or Party Without Attorney,” and checked the box for “Judgment 

creditor.” In the spaces for “Applicant,” “Judgment debtor,” and “Original 

judgment,” Bisordi referred to and attached the same attachments A, B, and 

C from the 2005 renewal. At the bottom of the first page, Bisordi checked the 

box for “Renewal of money judgment,” and provided the previous judgment 

amount of $396,285.85, added interest after judgment of $394,114.42, and the 

renewal filing fee of $30, for a new total renewed judgment amount of 

$790,430.27. On the second page, Bisordi signed and dated the form. 

On October 16, Bisordi filed an “Amended Application for and Renewal 

of Judgment”, substantively identical to that filed on October 9 except that it 

included on “Attachment B” a newer address for defendants.2 

Bisordi did not serve the renewal on defendants, nor did he file any 

proof of service. 

On October 20, 2017, Bisordi filed a declaration indicating that a 

further $159,380.80 in interest had accrued on the judgment from October 16, 

2015 through that date, for a new total of $949,811.07. 

2 The information on the amended form was typewritten instead of 

handwritten. 
4

Meanwhile, by way of several assignments in 2016, 2017, and 2018, 15 

of the 17 original judgment creditors—all save Joseph and Pilar Altizer—

assigned their interests in the judgment to appellant WVJP 2017-1, LP 

(WVJP). 

On June 25, 2018, Kevin Eikenberry of WVJP filed a declaration 

stating that the judgment had accrued $213,085.20 in interest since October 

16, 2015, for a new total of $1,003,515.40. WVJP also moved for the 

appointment of a receiver over several properties in Lake County owned by 

one of the defendants. A writ of execution issued that same day. 

In December 2018, defendants filed a motion to quash the writ and stay 

enforcement of the renewed judgment under section 683.160. And the trial 

court granted the motion on the ground that defendants had not been served 

with notice of the 2015 renewal. 

In March 2019, defendants were served by mail with notice of the 2015 

renewal. And in April defendants moved pursuant to section 683.170 to 

vacate that renewal. They argued that to the extent Bisordi attempted to 

renew the judgment on behalf of the other judgment creditors, that renewal 

was the product of the unauthorized practice of law and was therefore void. 

They also argued that Bisordi’s effort to renew his own portion of the 

judgment was void because it did not provide the separate amount necessary 

to satisfy his portion of the judgment under section 683.150, subdivision (c).3 

3 Section 683.150, subdivision (c) provides: “In the case of a money 

judgment, the entry of renewal shall show the amount of the judgment as 

renewed. Except as provided in subdivisions (d) and (e), this amount is the 

amount required to satisfy the judgment on the date of the filing of the 

application for renewal and includes the fee for the filing of the application 

for renewal.” 
5

And they argued that WVJP was estopped from enforcing the judgment 

because of the failure to serve notice of the 2015 renewal. 

WVJP opposed the motion, arguing that Bisordi’s renewal of the 

judgment did not constitute the practice of law, and in the alternative asking 

that the trial court reduce the amount of the renewed judgment under section 

683.170, subdivision (c) to reflect only the portion of the judgment owed to 

Bisordi, his wife, and his late father—36.72% of the total.4 WVJP also argued 

that in filing the renewal form Bisordi was acting on behalf of a joint venture 

comprised of the 17 judgment creditors.5 In a declaration attached to the 

opposition, Bisordi explained that “[s]ince David D. Wexler had died, I signed 

and filed Exhibit ‘D’ [the 2015 renewal] for myself, as a judgment creditor, 

and for all other Plaintiffs.” 

The motion came on for hearing on May 29, in advance of which the 

trial court had issued a tentative ruling granting the motion. At the hearing, 

the trial court rejected the argument that Bisordi renewed the judgment on 

behalf of a joint venture or general partnership, and also declined to modify 

the amount of the renewed judgment pursuant to section 683.170, 

subdivision (c), and indicated it would adopt its tentative ruling. 

On June 10, the trial court entered its written order, concluding as 

follows: “Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Renewal of Judgment is GRANTED 

4 Section 683.170, subdivision (c) provides: “Upon the hearing of the 

motion, the renewal may be ordered vacated upon any ground provided in 

subdivision (a), and another and different renewal may be entered, including, 

but not limited to, the renewal of the judgment in a different amount if the 

decision of the court is that the judgment creditor is entitled to renewal in a 

different amount.”

5 WVJP also requested that the trial court take judicial notice of 

numerous other judgments against defendants that had been renewed and 

ultimately expired before any amount was paid. 
6

pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. Section 683.170. The renewal of judgment is 

vacated. Plaintiff John Bisordi’s filing of the October 9, 2015 form EJ-190

Application for and Renewal of Judgment and October 16, 2015 Amended 

Application for and Renewal of Judgment constituted the unauthorized

practice of law to the extent that the application was made on behalf of the

seventeen [sic] other judgment creditors who were included on Attachment ‘A’

to that Application and Amended Application. Timberline Inc. v. Jaisinghani

[(1997)] 54 [Cal.App.]4th 1361, 1367; People v. Landlords Professional 

Services, Inc. [1986)] 178 Cal.App.3d 68. The resulting judgment therefore 

cannot stand. Russell v. Dopp [(1995)] 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 775. To the 

extent that Plaintiff John Bisordi’s Application for and Renewal of Judgment 

was made as to the money judgment awarded in his own name, it does not 

comply with the requirements of Code of Civ. Proc. section 683.140.”

6

WVJP appealed. 

DISCUSSION

WVJP argues that Bisordi’s filling out and filing the renewal form was 

not the unauthorized practice of law, and also that Bisordi filed the renewal 

form on behalf of a joint venture made up of the 17 judgment creditors. We 

agree with the first argument, and need not reach the second. 

The Standard of Review

Here, where “the facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether a 

person’s conduct amounts to practicing law without a license.” (Aulisio v. 

Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1523; Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 

114 Cal.App.4th 618, 622 [issue resolved as matter of law].)

6 The trial court also granted WVJP’s request for judicial notice. 
7

The Enforcement of Judgments Law and the Statutory Renewal 

Process

“Before the 1982 enactment of the Enforcement of Judgments Law 

(§ 680.010 et seq.), the sole method by which a judgment creditor could 

extend the enforcement period of a money judgment was by obtaining a new 

judgment against the judgment debtor in an independent action based on the 

judgment. (See Pratali v. Gates (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 632, 637–638.) In the 

Enforcement of Judgments Law, the Legislature adopted an alternative 

summary procedure for renewal. (Ibid.; § 683.050; see Tentative 

Recommendation Proposing the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Oct. 1980) 

15 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1980) p. 2009.) Under this procedure, a 

money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date it is entered. 

(§ 683.020.) To obtain a renewal of the judgment, the judgment creditor must 

file an application for renewal with the clerk of the court that entered the 

judgment before the expiration of the 10–year period of enforceability. 

(§ 683.130, subd. (a); [citation].)” (Goldman v. Simpson (2008)

160 Cal.App.4th 255, 260 (Goldman).)

The applicable statutes in the Enforcement of Judgments Law include 

these two:

“The application for renewal of the judgment shall be executed under 

oath and shall include all of the following: (a) The title of the court where 

the judgment is entered and the cause and number of the action. (b) The 

date of entry of the judgment and of any renewals of the judgment and where 

entered in the records of the court. (c) The name and address of the 

judgment creditor and the name and last known address of the judgment 

debtor. [¶] . . . [¶] (d) In the case of a money judgment, the information 

necessary to compute the amount of the judgment as renewed.” (§ 683.140.) 
8

“Upon the filing of the application, the court clerk shall enter the 

renewal of the judgment in the court records.” (§ 683.150, subd. (a).) 

As numerous cases have held, “[t]he statutory renewal of judgment is 

an automatic, ministerial act accomplished by the clerk of the court; entry of 

the renewal of judgment does not constitute a new or separate judgment.” 

(Goldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262; see Jonathan Neil & Associates, 

Inc. v. Jones (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487 [“[E]ntry of the renewal of 

judgment is purely ministerial”]; Fid. Creditor Serv. v. Browne (2001)

89 Cal.App.4th 195, 198 [“Renewal of a judgment is a ministerial act 

performed by a court clerk upon receipt of an application for renewal”]; 

Beneficial Fin. v. Durkee (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 912, 915 [same].) The Law 

Revision Commission Comments for section 683.150 confirm this: “Section 

683.150 requires that the court clerk enter the renewal of the judgment based 

on the application. The entry of the renewal by the court clerk is a 

ministerial act.” (Creditors’ Remedies Legislation (Sep. 1982) 16 Cal. Law 

Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 1215.) 

The judgment creditor must serve notice of the renewal on the 

judgment debtor. (§ 683.160, subd. (a).) Until proof of this service is filed, 

“no writ may be issued, nor may any enforcement proceedings be commenced 

to enforce the judgment.” (§ 683.160, subd. (b).) However, “there is no 

statutory requirement that the notice of renewal be served on the judgment 

debtor in order for the renewal to be effective. . . . The statute instead 

provides that the judgment creditor may not initiate any enforcement 

proceedings unless and until the judgment debtor has been served with the 

notice of renewal.” (Goldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262, fn. 4.) 

Once the notice of renewal is served, the debtor has 30 days to make a 

motion to vacate or modify the renewal. (§ 683.170, subd. (b)). 
9

Section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides that “[t]he renewal of a judgment 

pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a 

defense to an action on the judgment, including the ground that the amount 

of the renewed judgment as entered pursuant to this article is incorrect . . . .” 

“The judgment debtor bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that he or she is entitled to relief under section 683.170.” (Fid. 

Creditor Serv. v. Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 199.)

Bisordi Was Not Engaged In the Unauthorized Practice of Law

Defendants do not dispute that had Bisordi been the only judgment 

creditor, he could have renewed the judgment in propria persona. However, 

defendants argue that to the extent he purported to renew the judgment on 

behalf of the other judgment creditors, he engaged in the unauthorized 

practice of law. We disagree. 

Business and Professions Code section 6125 provides: “No person shall 

practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State 

Bar.” But the code provides no definition for the term “practice law.” 

People v. Landlords Prof'l Servs. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1599 (Landlords), one 

of the cases cited by the trial court here, had this to say about that: 

“In Baron v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535, 542, our Supreme 

Court noted that as early as 1922, before the passage of the State Bar Act, it 

had adopted a definition of ‘practice of law’ used in an Indiana case: ‘ “ ‘[A]s 

the term is generally understood, the practice of law is the doing and 

performing services in a court of justice in any manner depending therein 

throughout its various stages and in conformity with the adopted rules of 

procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and the 

preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are 

secured although such matter may or may not be depending in court.’ ” ’ 
10

(Quoting People v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 Cal. 531, 535, 

quoting Eley v. Miller (1893) 7 Ind.App. 529; In Re Utz (1989) 48 Cal.3d 468, 

483, fn. 11; see also 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 101–117.) 

“While concluding this definition a proper and sufficient one, the court 

in Baron, nonetheless, noted that ‘ascertaining whether a particular activity 

falls within this general definition may be a formidable endeavor.’ (Baron v. 

City of Los Angeles, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 543; see also Agran v. Shapiro

(1954) 127 Cal.App.2d Supp. 807, 812.) The Baron Court then stated: ‘In 

close cases, the courts have determined that the resolution of legal questions 

for another by advice and action is practicing law “if difficult or doubtful legal 

questions are involved which, to safeguard the public, reasonably demand the 

application of a trained legal mind.” [Citations].’ ” (Landlords, supra, 

215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1604–1605.)

As we have observed, “ ‘[t]he prohibition against unauthorized law 

practice . . . is designed to ensure that those performing legal services do so 

competently.’ (Birbrower[, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court

(1998)] 17 Cal.4th 119, 127; cf. Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 918 

[‘California prohibits the unlawful practice of law . . . to afford protection 

against persons who are not qualified to practice the profession’].)” (People v. 

Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215, 230 (Starski).)

In Landlords the court considered the definition of practicing law in 

California in a way relevant to the issue before us. There, defendant 

Landlords Professional Services (LPS) advertised eviction services to 

landlords. (Landlords, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1601.) Clients came to 

LPS’s offices where they were given a booklet discussing typical forms used in 

an unlawful detainer action and explaining how they should be completed. 

(Id. at p. 1602.) LPS’s employees then conducted personal interviews with 
11

clients during which they explained the unlawful detainer process, answered 

the clients’ questions, and filled out the necessary forms and documents. (Id. 

at pp. 1602–1603.) 

The Orange County District Attorney brought suit against LPS under 

the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200 & 17500), alleging 

that LPS was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. (Landlords, 

supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1603.) The trial court agreed, and imposed 

monetary penalties as well as a permanent injunction. (Ibid.) The Court of 

Appeal affirmed. (Landlords, at p. 1610.) After discussing cases from several 

other states, the court explained: “We believe general California law and the 

approach taken by other states with respect to divorce services teach that 

such services do not amount to the practice of law as long as the service 

offered by LPS was merely clerical, i.e., the service did not engage in the 

practice of law if it made forms available for the client’s use, filled the forms 

in at the specific direction of the client and filed and served those forms as 

directed by the client.” (Id. at p. 1608.) However, LPS’s advertisements 

“implie[d] its eviction services were not limited to clerical functions,” but 

rather gave the impression that “the service accomplished evictions.” (Id. at 

p. 1608.) And LPS’s services “went further” than filling out forms, by offering 

“personal interviews where it was able to provide additional information and 

advice addressed to the specific problems and concerns of its clients,” advice 

that “would undoubtedly be relied upon by its clients, perhaps to their serious 

detriment.” (Id. at p. 1609.) Accordingly, the court concluded that LPS was 

engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 

Applying the above discussions and explanations leads to the 

conclusion that Bisordi did not engage in the unauthorized practice of law 

when he filled out the renewal form on behalf of himself and the other 
12

creditors. Bisordi did not hold himself out as any kind of attorney, offer the 

other creditors any legal advice, or resolve for them any “difficult or doubtful 

legal questions” that might “reasonably demand the application of a trained 

legal mind.” (Landlords, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1605.) He merely filled 

out a two-page standard Judicial Council form with straightforward factual

information about the original judgment and the 2005 renewal. And he 

evidently did so by closely following the example provided by the 2005 

renewal, including by duplicating the same attachments A, B, and C, listing 

the judgment creditors, the judgment debtors, and the ten counties, dates, 

and instrument numbers where the 1995 judgment was recorded. In fact, the 

only difference between the 2005 and the 2015 renewal is in the amount of 

the judgment and the addition of interest, and the indication on the 2015 

renewal that the judgment had previously been renewed. 

In short, in the language of the cases, Bisordi was acting in a “clerical” 

capacity, or as a “scrivener.” That is not the unauthorized practice of law. 

(See Landlords, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1608 [defendant not engaged in 

practice of law to extent service offered was “merely clerical”]; People v. 

Sipper (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844, 846–847 [“If defendant had only been 

called upon to perform and had only undertaken to perform the clerical 

service of filling in the blanks on a particular form in accordance with 

information furnished him by the parties, or had merely acted as a scrivener 

to record the stated agreement of the parties to the transaction, he would not 

have been guilty of practicing law without a license”]; Tuft, Peck and Mohr, 

Cal. Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group 2019) 

¶¶ 1:203 to 1:204.1, p. 1-125.) 

Nor would deeming Bisordi’s actions the unauthorized practice of law 

be consistent with the purpose we noted in Starski: protecting the public by 
13

ensuring that those who practice law do so competently. (Starski, supra, 

7 Cal.App.5th at p. 230.) Defendants do not identify any way in which 

Bisordi filled out the form incorrectly. To the contrary, the other judgment 

creditors were benefited by Bisordi, whose effort prevented their joint 

judgment against defendants from expiring and becoming unenforceable. 

In seeking to avoid this conclusion, defendants argue that Bisordi 

practiced law when he selected the forms that he thought were appropriate 

for all of the creditors’ goal of renewing the judgment, citing In re Powell

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001) 266 B.R. 450, 452: “A non-lawyer engages in the 

unauthorized practice of law when he or she determines for a party the kind 

of legal document necessary in order to effect the party’s purpose.” This 

rather overstates any legal judgment Bisordi brought to his task. There is 

only one form for renewing a judgment, the same form that attorney Wexler 

filed in 2005. This is the form that, in defendants’ words, Bisordi 

“selected”—the form provided by the Judicial Council. 

Defendants also argue that Bisordi engaged in the practice of law by 

filling out the renewal form because doing so required “analysis” of various 

statutory provisions regarding the amount of the judgment and interest, 

including section 685.010, subdivision (a), which provides that “[i]nterest 

accrues at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the principal amount of a 

money judgment remaining unsatisfied.” Again, this rather overstates what 

was necessary to fill out the renewal form. At the bottom of the first page, 

Bisordi simply took the amount of the judgment from the 2005 renewal 

($396,285.85), added $394,114.42 in interest and the then $30 filing fee 

provided by Government Code section 70626, subdivision (b)(4)7, for a new 

7 The fee has since been raised to $45. (Govt. Code, § 70626, subd. 

(b)(4).)
14

total of $790,430.27. The concept of per annum interest is hardly legal, and 

calculating it is a straightforward exercise in arithmetic: multiplying the 

amount of the original judgment by the interest rate, dividing the result by 

365, and multiplying that daily rate by the number of days since the original 

judgment.8 (See Judicial Council Form MC-013-INFO, Information Sheet for 

Calculating Interest and Amount Owed on a Judgment, available at 

https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/mc013info.pdf.) This can hardly be said 

to constitute legal analysis of the statutory text. And it is certainly not a 

calculation that might “reasonably demand the application of a trained legal 

mind.” (Landlords, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1605.)

Finally, defendants argue that filling out the renewal form was the 

practice of law by suggesting, without support, that Bisordi “did not know 

how to properly fill out the forms or that he had to serve them on the 

Highsmiths,” and “[h]ad Mr. Bisordi been a licensed attorney, he would have 

known that he needed the express authority of all of the judgment creditors 

to renew the judgment.” As noted, defendants do not identify any way in 

which Bisordi did not fill out the renewal form correctly, nor do they even 

assert—let alone demonstrate—that Bisordi did not have the express 

authority to file the form on behalf of the other judgment creditors. And 

while it is true that Bisordi did not serve the notice of renewal, this did not 

render the renewal invalid, but merely prevented enforcement of the 

underlying judgment until notice was properly served. (See Goldman, supra,

160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262, fn. 4.) 

8 In his 2017 declaration, Bisordi indicated that “[t]he per diem interest 

that accrues is $216.55.” 
15

Tom Thumb Glove Co. v. Han (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 1 (Tom Thumb) is 

persuasive. There, the plaintiff corporation obtained a judgment against the 

defendant in North Carolina. (Id. at p. 3.) The corporation’s chairman, who 

was not an attorney, then applied for entry of a California judgment based on 

the North Carolina judgment under the Sister State and Foreign Money 

Judgments Act (§§ 1710.10 et seq.), which, like the renewal procedure at 

issue here, provides an alternative to the traditional action on the judgment. 

(Tom Thumb, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 7.) In particular, the statute 

requires an application containing certain information regarding the sister 

state judgment, and “[u]pon the filing of the application, the clerk shall enter 

a judgment based upon the application . . . .” (§ 1710.25, subd. (a); see 

§ 1710.15.)

Defendant moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that the application 

was invalid because of the rule that “a corporation cannot represent itself in 

court, either in propria persona or through an officer or agent who is not an 

attorney.” (Tom Thumb, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 7.) The trial court 

rejected the argument, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that 

defendant’s argument was inconsistent with the legislative purpose:

“The Sister State and Foreign Money Judgments Act (Code Civ. Proc., 

§§ 1710.10–1710.65) provides a simpler and more efficient method of 

enforcing such judgments than the traditional action on the judgment. The 

registration procedure established by the act is designed to allow parties to 

avoid the normal trappings of an original action, e.g., the necessity for 

pleadings. The optional procedure was intended to offer savings in time and 

money to both courts and judgment creditors, yet, at the same time, remain 

fair to the judgment debtor by affording him the opportunity to assert any 

defense that he could assert under the traditional procedure. (See 
16

Recommendation Relating to Enforcement of Sister State Money Judgments 

(Nov. 1973) 11 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1973) pp. 457–459; Epps v. 

Russell (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 201, 203.) If a corporate judgment creditor is 

required to retain the services of counsel in order to make an application for 

the entry of judgment on a sister state judgment, the legislative purpose of 

the act would be to some extent lost for that group of creditors.

“Entry by the clerk of a judgment based on the application is 

mandatory upon the filing of the application. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.25.) 

Entry of the judgment is a ministerial act of the clerk, not a judicial act of the 

court. (See id.; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 49, 

p. 3214.) Thus the application merely requests the clerk to perform a 

ministerial duty; it is not an ‘appearance’ for the purpose of obtaining any 

ruling or order of the court going to the merits of the case. If the judgment 

debtor does not contest the matter, the judgment will be entered and the 

application will have served its purpose, all without any judicial act having 

been performed by the court. Of course, if the judgment debtor contests the 

matter by making a motion to vacate the judgment, a corporate judgment 

creditor properly could argue against the motion before the court only 

through an attorney. [Citations.] In light of the impairment of the legislative 

purpose that would otherwise result, we hold that the mere filing of an 

application for entry of judgment on a sister state judgment pursuant to Code 

of Civil Procedure section 1710.15 is not such an act that a corporation can 

perform only through a licensed attorney. [Citation.]” (Tom Thumb, supra, 

78 Cal.App.3d at pp. 7–8.) 

The reasoning of Tom Thumb is directly applicable here. Like the 

Sister States and Foreign Money Judgments Act, the renewal statutes 

provide a summary procedure as an alternative to the traditional action on 
17

the judgment. (See Goldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 260; Tom Thumb, 

supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 7.) And both statutory schemes contain an 

identical requirement that the clerk “shall” enter the judgment upon receipt 

of the application. (Compare § 1710.25 & § 683.150, subd. (a).) Indeed, the 

Law Revision Commission Comments state that “Section 683.140 . . . is

drawn in part from Section 1710.15 (application for entry of judgment based 

on sister state judgment).” (Creditors’ Remedies Legislation (Sep. 1982) 

16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 1214.) In sum, Tom Thumb’s 

conclusion that the processing of a renewal application is a “ministerial duty” 

that does not involve any “appearance” before the court strongly supports 

that Bisordi’s filling out and filing the renewal application here was not the 

practice of law. 

Defendants attempt to distinguish Tom Thumb on the basis it had to do 

with the relaxation of the rule that a corporation must always be represented 

by an attorney, in contrast to what they claim is the “hard and fast rule that 

a non-attorney individual cannot lawfully represent another person.” But the 

five cases cited by defendants are inapplicable, as all involve non-attorneys 

taking actions that are clearly the practice of law, including the filing of 

pleadings and providing representation at trial.9 That is not the situation 

here. 

9 The cases are: Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 546–549 

(non-lawyer trustee filed lawsuit on behalf of trust); J.W. v. Superior Court

(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 958, 969 (non-attorney mother prohibited from 

initiating an action to establish paternity and for support, custody, and 

visitation on behalf of her son); City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 

Cal.App.2d 775, 779–780 (non-attorney son serving as conservator and 

executor of mother’s estate prohibited from conducting trial on behalf of 

estate); and People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Malone (1965) 232 

Cal.App.2d 531, 532 (non-attorney filed an answer, attended pretrial 
18

Defendants’ reliance on Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 

Cal.App.4th 1361 (Timberline), the other case cited by the trial court, is 

unavailing. In that case, a corporation whose “corporate powers, rights and 

privileges” had been suspended under Revenue and Taxation Code section 

23301 for failure to pay franchise taxes applied to renew a judgment in its 

favor. (Timberline, at pp. 1364–1365.) Defendant moved to vacate the 

renewal, arguing that a suspended corporation could not avail itself of the 

statutory renewal process, which motion was denied. (Id. at p. 1364.) The 

Court of Appeal reversed, holding as follows:

“The corporation seeks to avoid this result. It argues renewing a 

judgment does not really invoke the powers of a California court. It points 

out renewal of a judgment is made virtually automatic by statute. The 

corporation argues renewal of a judgment does not require any action by a 

state court because the court clerk processes the application, making it 

nothing more than a ‘ministerial act.’

“This argument misses the mark. Renewal of a judgment requires 

judicial intervention for its validity, regardless how minimal the activity. For 

example, renewal of a judgment involves at least as much judicial 

intervention in the average case as does the filing of a lien to secure a 

judgment. [¶] . . . [¶]

“We agree with the corporation the original judgment was valid. We 

also agree the corporation was not pursuing a new action or seeking a new 

judgment, but was instead attempting to extend the life of the earlier valid 

conference, appeared at trial and helped select jury, and agreed to settlement 

on behalf of his brother); and Cevallos v. City of Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. 1995) 

914 F.Supp. 379, 385 (plaintiff acting in pro per could not amend complaint to 

represent a class of plaintiffs).
19

judgment. Nevertheless, to do so required invocation of the benefits of 

California laws and the assistance of the California judicial system. These 

rights and privileges are reserved to those corporations which pay their 

franchise taxes in a timely fashion and remain in good standing with the 

California Secretary of State and taxing authorities. As a suspended 

corporation, it is deprived of these benefits and was therefore not entitled to 

renew its judgment.” (Timberline, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1367–1368, 

fn. omitted.) 

Timberline simply held that renewing a judgment is a privilege that 

becomes unavailable to a corporation under Revenue and Taxation Code 

section 23301 when the corporation fails to pay franchise taxes, in part 

because such renewal requires “judicial intervention.” (Timberline, supra, 

54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369.) Such was not needed here, and Timberline did 

not disagree with the ample authority demonstrating that the processing of 

the renewal application is a ministerial act. (See Goldman, supra, 

160 Cal.App.4th at p. 262; Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v. Jones, supra, 

138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487; Fid. Creditor Serv. v. Browne, supra, 89 

Cal.App.4th at p. 198; Beneficial Fin. v. Durkee, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 915.) 

Finally, defendants argue that accepting WVJP’s position could create 

a “dangerous precedent,” noting that non-lawyers could fill out forms to take 

legal actions on behalf of others whenever the processing of those forms is 

simply ministerial so that “large swaths of the legal profession would open up 

to non-lawyers,” giving as examples entry of default, issuance of a writ of 

execution, and placing a lien on real estate owned by a judgment debtor. But 

we are not confronted with a layperson purporting to act for someone else 

when his or her own rights are not at issue, nor are we considering forms 
20

other than that provided by the Judicial Council to renew a judgment. Here, 

there was a single judgment entered against defendants in favor of 17 

plaintiffs, and Bisordi’s renewing that judgment on behalf of himself and the 

other plaintiffs was not the unauthorized practice of law. 

DISPOSITION

The order granting the motion to vacate the renewal is reversed, and 

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

WVJP shall recover its costs on appeal. 
21

_________________________

Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Stewart, J.

Altizer v. Highsmith (A157921)
22

Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable Susan Greenberg

Attorney for Defendants and 

Respondents Robert Highsmith and 

Richard Highsmith:

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 

WVJP 2017-1, LP:

Carr McClellan P.C., Robert A. 

Bleicher, Christian Foote

Moskovitz Appellate Team, Myron 

Moskovitz; Eikenberry Law Firm, 

Kevin S. Eikenberry