i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 10 7- CV STATE OF F ICE OF RISK MA NAG EMENT ,

Appellant
v . Edna A. M AR TIN EZ , Appellee Fr om the 37th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2001-CI -17102 Honora ble David A. B erc helmann, Jr., J udg e Presiding OP INION ON AP P ELL EE’S MOTI ON F OR REHEARING Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 24, 2009 REVERSED AND REMANDED The motion for rehe aring filed by appellee Edna A. Martinez is denied. This court’ s opinion and judg ment dated Apr il 1, 2009, are w ithdrawn, a nd this opini on and judg ment are substitut ed. In this wor

kers’ compensation case, the State Offic e of Risk Manag ement appe als the trial court’s pr e-tria l directe d verdic t in favor of Edna A. Ma rtinez, an employ ee of

the Texas Depa

rtment04
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1 ... T he T exa s W ork er s ’ Co mp ens at i on Act provi des an admi ni s t r at i ve proces s f or par t i es t o re s ol ve di s put ed issu e s. T h e fir s t s te p i s a b e n e fit re v ie w c o n fer e n c e . T EX . L AB . C O D E A NN . §§ 410. 021, 410. 023, 410. 024 ( V er n on 2 0 0 6 ). If

i ssue s rem ain b etwe en t he p arti es af t er t he b en efi t rev i ew co nfere nc e, t he p arti es pro ce ed t o a co ntested ca se h e a rin g . Id

. § 4 1 0 .1 5 1 (V e rn o n 2 0 0 6 ).

2 ... A p a rty h a s fif

te e n d a ys to a p p e a l t h e d e c isio n o f t h e c o n te ste d c a se he a rin g o ff ic e r to the d ivisio n a p p e a ls p a n e l. Id

. § 4 1 0 .2 0 2 (a ) (V e rn o n 2 0 0 6 ).

- 2- of P r o te c ti v e an d

Re gu lato r

y Se r v ic e s . We r e v e r s e th e ju d g me n t o f th e tr ia l c o urt a

n d r e ma n d f or further proce eding s. F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND Martinez, a child prote ctive ser vice s ca s ew orker

employ ed by

the Texas Depa

rtment of Protective a

nd Regulatory

Service s, fell while at home on Saturday , J une 9, 2001, sustaininginjuries to he r he a d, ne c k, and

le ft sh ou lde r. Ma

rt ine z imme diate ly

so ught e me rg e nc y

ro om t re atme nt at a local hospital. The f

ollowing Monda

y , Marti n ez re p o rt ed her injury to her super

visor and filed a claim for w orker s’ compensation on the basis that her injury occur red “ while she wa s workingon g ener ic service plans in the kitchen are a” at home. When Ma rtinez later submitt ed her time to her supervisor f

or appr oval, he told her

that the hours for

J une 9, 2001 would not be appr oved and that her w orker s’ compensation claim would be denied be cause she did not have prior approva l to work at home. Subsequently , the State Office of Risk Manag ement denied compensa bility for Ma

rtinez on the g round that she did not sust ai n t h e i n j u ry in the course and scope of employ ment. An informal dispute resolution proce eding and a contested case hear ing ens u ed. 1 Th e c onte ste d c a se hear ing of

fice r ente red f

indings of f

act includingthat Martinez “wa s further ing the bus i n es s and aff airs of the Employ er by making a [si c] reports and se rvice plans that she nee ded to pre sent in court on J une 11, 2001” but co n cl u d ed t h e injury was not compe nsable be cause the ac cident did not involve an i n s t ru m entalit y inhere nt to the employ

ment. Martinez appea led. 2 The a ppeals pa nel04
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3 ... O nce t he appeal s pane l i s s ues i t s r ul i ng , t he part i es have f ort y d ay s t o f

i l e a r eques t f

or r evi ew i n di s t r i ct c o u rt. Id

. § 41 0
. 2 5 2 (a) (V ernon 2 0 0 6 ).

4 ... T he reco rd ref

l ect s t hat M a rti nez’ s m o t i o ns f o r s um m ary judgm ent were de ni ed by t he H o no rable John G a b rie l, p re sid ing ju d g e o f t h e 1 3 1 st J u d ic ia l D istric t C o u rt, B e x a r C o u n ty, T e x a s.

5 ... M a rtine z a lso fil e d a m o tio n in l im ine se e k ing to p re c lud e a ll te stim o n y a b o u t w h e the r M a rtine z d id o r d id no t have p erm i ss i o n t o wo rk at hom e at t he t i m e she was i njured b ecause such t est i m o ny was not rel evant t o co urs e and sc o p e . T h e trial c o u rt a p p e a re d inc line d to gr a n t t h e m o tio n in lim ine , b u t d id n o t r e n d e r a n o ra l o r w ritten ru ling
. See S &A R e sta u ra n t C o rp . v. L e a l, 89 2 S. W
. 2d 855 , 858 ( T ex. 199 5) ( per cur i am) ( words us ed by t r i al cour t mus t conv ey the p re se n t i n te n t t o re n d e r j u d g m e n t); C o m et A l u m i n u m C o . v. D i b rel l, 4 5 0 S .W .2 d 5 6 , 5 8 (T e x .1 9 7 0 ) (j u d g m e n t’s “re n d iti o n is ju d ic ia l ac t b y w h ic h the c o u rt se ttl e s a n d d e c la re s the d e c isio n o f t h e law up o n the m a tter s a t i ssu e ” ).

- 3- ag ree d with Martinez and con cl u d ed t hat Martinez “f ell and sustained injuries while w orkingat home o nJun e 9 , 2 0 0 1 , ” th e r e e xis te d “ e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt t h e h e ar in go f

f ic e r ’ s d e c is io ntha t claimant had authority to work at home,” Ma rtinez was in the “c ourse a nd scope of

her e mploy

ment further ing the business aff airs of he r employ er at the time,” and ther e ex i s t ed a ca usal conne ction betwee n the employ

ment and her

injuries. T h e State Offic e of Risk Manag ement then initiated this suit for judicial revie w. 3 Pr ior to trial , M ar t i n ez filed both a traditional and no- evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt; both were denied. 4 On the day

the par ties appea red f or trial o n t h e m er its, Martinez filed a motion for “pr etrial” dire cted ve rdict and a rgued it was timely beca

use: (1) the State Off

ice of Risk Manag ement’s only basis fo r d en ying that Martinez was ac ting in the c ourse a nd scope of

her e mploy

ment at the ti me s h e w a s in

jur ed, i .e ., that sh e did

no t ha ve pe rm iss ion

to w or k at ho me , w a s ir

re le va nt a s a
matter of law ; 5 and

(2 ) t he e vid e nc e c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e d th at th e State Of fi c e of Ris k Manag ement wa s untimely in contesti n g compensabilit y , there by waivingthat defe nse. Afte r a hear ing on the issues, the trial cour t gr anted the direc ted ver dict on all g rounds prior to any evidenc e beinghear d. The State Of fice of Risk Mana g ement now appea ls, arguing that the trial court e rre d04
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- 4- in gra nti ngthe pr e -t

ri a l motio n for dir e c te d ve rd ic t. I n o ne iss ue on

c ro ss- a pp e a l, M art ine z as se rt s that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de nyinghe r no- e vid e nc e and tr a dit ion a l mo tio ns fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. A N A L Y SIS The State Office of R isk Manag ement first arg ues i t was procedur ally

improper f

or the trial court to g rant Mar

tinez’s moti on for pr e-tria l directe d verdic t befor e it had an opportunity to present evidenc e. We agree that “[o] rdinarily , a direc ted ver dict should not be g rante d ag ainst a par ty befor e the par ty has had a

full opportunity

to present its ca se and ha s rested.” T a n a Oil &Gas Corp. v. McCall, 10 4 S. W.3 d 8 0, 82 (T e x. 20 03 ). In f a c t, i t is g e ne ra lly re ve rs ibl e e rr or fo r t he tr ia l c ourt

to direc t a ver dict without allowing the pla intiff to present al l o f i t s evidenc e. See W edgeworth v. Kirskey, 985 S.W .2d 115, 116 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)
. Howeve r, in at lea st one instance, the Texas Supreme Court has held that a proce dural e rror

in gr anti n g a d i rec ted ver dict befor e the close of evidenc e did notrequire reve rsal whe re no ha rm was shown. See Tana Oil &Gas Corp., 104 S.W .3d at 82 (holdingthat direc ted ver dict g rante d duringfirst witness’s testimony was

“ ir re gula r” but harm les s bec a

us e pr oo f o f a ll c la ims wo uld sti ll n ot e nti tle pla int if

fs to t he on ly damag es soug ht). Acc ording ly , we must examine Martinez’s responsive arguments supporting the trial court’ s pretria l directe d verdic t. We review a direc ted ver dict in the light most favora ble to the nonmovant disreg ardingall contra ry evidenc e an d i n fe re nces in orde r to deter mine whether

there exis ts probative evide nce in the r ecor d to r aise a fac t issue on the matter. Sz c ze pa nik v . F irs t So uth e rn Trust Co., 883 S.W .2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1994). I f there exis ts evidence of probative value on a ny theory of re cover

y , an instructed ve rdict is improper a nd the ca se must be reve rsed a nd rema nded for jury deter mination. Id.04
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6 ... T he W o rke rs’ C o m p en sati o n A ct d efi ne s a “co m p en sab l e injury” as o ne “t ha t arises o ut o f an d i n the c o urse and sc op e o f

em pl oy ment f

or w hi ch com pens at i on i s pay abl e u nder [ t he A ct ]
. ” T EX . L AB . C O D E A NN . § 401. 011( 10) (V ernon 2 0 0 6 ). A cco rdingl y , de t erm i ni ng whet her an emp l oy ee h as s u s t ai n ed a co m p ensable i njury i nvo l ves a t wo - p rong t es t : ( 1) w h et h er t h e i n j u r y oc cu r r ed i n t h e cou r s e an d s cope of e mpl oy men t ; a n d ( 2) w h et h er t he i njury a ros e f r om e m p lo ym e n t. See Te x. Wor ke r s ’ Com pens at i on I ns . Fund. v . Si m on, 9 8 0 S .W .2 d 7 3 0 , 7 3 4 (T e x . A p p .— S a n A n to n io 1 9 9 8 , no p e t.).

- 5- Martinez contends the trial court’s dire cted ve rdict wa s neither pr emature nor improper . She
argue s th e tr ia l c ourt

ini tia lly and c or

re c tly de te rm ine d that the on ly e vid e nc e the State Of fi c e of Ris k Manag ement could of

fer on the issue of whether Martinez was a ctingin the course and scope of her
e mpl oy me nt wh e n sh e su sta ine d he r i nju ri e s ( i.e. , testimony by her supervisor that Mar tinez did not have pr ior approva l to work at home) w as irre levant and ina dmissibl e as a matter of la

w. We disag ree with Martinez’s basic pre mise that the State Offic e of Risk Mana g ement had no other evidenc e. The
rec ord conf

irms that counsel for

the State Off

ice of Risk Man age m ent s oug ht, but because of the direc ted ver dict, was de nied the right to call Martinez as an a dverse witness. Thus, the trial cour t’s actions effec tively prec luded the State Of fice of Risk Manag ement fr om cross-e x amining Ma rtinez’s version of the fac ts. Gener ally , a par ty ’s testimony

raises a n issue of cr edibil i t y for jury deter mination, th er eby

prec luding a

direc ted ver dict. See Col lora v . Na v arro , 574 S.W .2d 65, 69 (Tex. 1978). In fac t, as our S upreme Court has not ed, there ex ist cases “ wher e the c redibility of an int e re ste d w itn e ss o r p art y is s o s us pe c t th at it

mus t g o to the jur

y , e ve n though th e te sti mony is uncontra dicted.” Id. He re , th e pr e matur e g ra nti ng of a dir e c te d ve rd ic t imp ro pe rl y de nie d th e State Of fi c e of Ris k M ana g e me nt t

he ri g ht t o c ro ss- e xami ne Ma rt ine z and the re by c ha lle ng e he r c re dib ili ty
o nd i s p u t e d

f a c ti s s u e s r e l e v an tt o w h e th e r s h e s u s t a i n e d

a c o mp e n s a

b l e i n j ur y. 6 Al te rn ati vel y , Mar tin e z ar gue s th at e ve n if the dir e c te d v e rd ic t w a s p re matur e , it sh ou ld nonetheless be aff

irmed because it esse ntially restate d the g rounds for, a nd expressly

incorporated, Mart inez’s pri or

mot ion s f

or tr a dit ion a l and

no -e vid e nc e summa

ry jud g me nt. In s up po rt

of thi s04
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- 6- argument, Martinez notes that Rule 166a of the Texas Rule s of Civil P roce dure doe s not lim it the number of times a

motion for summary

judgme nt may

be filed or considere d by

the trial cour

t. T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a. T h e r e f

o r e , M arti n e z c o n te n d s th at t h e tr ia l c o urt c o u ld

h av e g r an te d

th e d ir ecte d verdic t based on its rec onsideration of the g rounds set forth in her summary judgme nt motions
. See W inn v
. Martin H

omebuilders, Inc ., 153 S.W .3d 553, 555 (Tex. App.—Amar illo 2004, pet. denied) (denia l of motion for summary judgme nt is an interlocutory rulingsubject to cha

ng e without further motion or prior notice to the pa rt i es unt il final judgme nt is render ed). H oweve r, as Ma rtinez’s argument implicitl y

acknow ledg es, nothingin the rec ord befor e us indicate s that Martinez intended, or the trial c ourt construe d, her motion for dire cted verdic t a s a re- urg ing of her summary judgme nt motions. I n fac t, the order s denying summar y judgme nt remain undist urbed. Acc ording ly , we r ejec t Mart ine z’s argume nts in s up po rt of the dir e c te d v e rd ic t and su sta in t he State Of

fi c e of Ris k Manag ement’s f

irst issue. In its second issue on appeal, t he S tate Office of Risk Manag ement ar gues that the trial c ourt
err ed in g rantingthe motion f or pre- trial direc ted verdic t on the basis of a so- called “ Do wns waiver .” In he r mot ion fo r pr e -t

ri a l dir e c te d ve rd ic t, Ma

rt ine z argue d that “ a c arr ie r wh o f a ils to e ith e r b e g in benef its or file a notice of r efusa l on or befor e the seve nth day afte r re ceivingfirst written notice of inj ur y is b arr e d f

ro m late r c onte sti ngc om pe ns a bil ity on any g ro un d, un le ss b a se d o n n e wl y discovere d evidenc e.” T EX . LAB . C ODE ANN . §§ 409 .0 21 , .02 2 (V e rn on 19 96 ); Continental C

as. Co. v. Downs , 81 S.W .3d 803 (Tex. 2002) . The Downs waiver , howeve r, is no longe r a via ble ar gument fo r Mart ine z in lig ht of the Te xas S up re me Cou rt ’s re c e nt d e c isi on

inSouthwestern Bell Telephone Co. , L. P. v . M

itc he ll , 276 S.W .3d 443 (Tex. 2008). Downs held that sec tion 409.021(a) of the Texas L a bo r C od e re qu ir e d in sura

nc e c arr ie rs to e ith e r i nit iate c omp e ns atio n be ne fi ts or c onte st the m w ith in04
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- 7- se ve n d ay s o f r e c e ivi ngno tic e of inj ur y , a nd that f a ilure to d o s o w aiv ed th e ri gh t to c onte st compensa bility
. See id. at 448. The L eg islature promptly amende d the L abor Code to make c lear that this interpr etation of the Code was incor rec t. Id. Fi n d i n g Downs to be “a n anomaly

in the law,” the court stated that case s fallingwithin the “g ap,” i.e ., betwee n the holding in Downs and the e ffe ctive date of the amendme nt to the L abor Code, should not be held to the er roneous standa

rd pronounc ed in Downs
. Id
. This c ase f alls within that ga

p. Acc ording ly , the Downs waiver does not apply , and the State Off

ice of Risk Manag ement’s se cond issue is sustained. In one issue on cross-a

ppeal, Martinez asser

ts that w e may aff

irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt
on the g ro un d th at he r n o- e vid e nc e and tr a dit ion a l mot ion s fo r summa ry jud g me nt w e re e rr on e ou sly denied. Ma

rtinez contends that the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing he r n o -e v idence and tra ditional motions for summ ary j u d gm en t beca use the State Of

fice of Risk Manag ement had no pr obative
e vid e nc e that Ma

rt ine z did no t sust a in he r inj ur y in the c ours e and sc op e of e mpl oy me nt, and be c a us e the evidenc e conc lusively established as a

matter of la

w that t h e State Offic e of Risk Manag ement did not tim ely

contest the c ompensability of her injury . Gene rally , an orde r deny ing a motion for summary judgme nt, whether

traditional or no-e viden ce, is int erloc utory and not appe alable. See Novak v . Steve ns, 59 6 S. W.2 d 8 48 , 8 49 (T e x. 19 80 ); se e als o T EX . R. C IV . P. 166 a (i ), 19 97 Comme nt. Be caus e th is c a s e d o e s n o t c o me w it h in an e xc e p ti o n to th e g e n e r a l r u le th at a d e n ia l o f

summary judgme nt is int erloc utory and not appe alable, w e conc lude that Martinez’s cross-issue is not revie wable on a

ppeal.04
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- 8- C ONCL US I ON Ba sed on the for eg oing a naly sis, we re verse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand the
c a us e to t he tr ia l c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.
Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice