IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MARY WICKENKAMP 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

HOSTETTER LAW GROUP, LLP, HOSTETTER 

KNAPP LLP, D. ZACHARY HOSTETTER, D. 

RAHN HOSTETTER, BRUCE HAMPTON, 

VENESE HAMPTON, KEVIN SALI, DAVID 

ANGELI, BENJAMIN N. SOUEDE, MARILYN 

PRESTON SUAREZ, EFRAIN SUAREZ, and 

AMERICAN BANK OF MISSOURI, 

Defendants. 

P i-\P AK, Magistrate Judge: 

2:15-CV-296-PK 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff prose Mary Wickenkamp filed this action against defendants the Hostetter Law 

Group, LLP ("HJG"), Hostetter Knapp LLP ("HK"), D. Zachaiy Hostetter ("Zachmy"), D. Rahn 

Hostetter ("Rahn"), Bruce Hampton ("Bruce"), Venese Hampton ("Venese" and, collectively with 

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Case 2:15-cv-00296-PK Document 30 Filed 06/08/15 Page 1 of 11
Bruce, the "Hamptons"), Kevin Sali, and David Angeli on February 19, 2015. Wickenkamp 

amended her complaint effective April 10, 2015, adding as additional defendants Benjamin N. 

Souede, Marilyn Preston Suarez ("Marilyn"), Efrain Suarez ("Efrain"), and the American Bank of 

Missouri ("ABM"). Wickenkamp amended her complaint a second time effective May 4, 2015. 

By and t1n·ough her second amended complaint, Wickenkamp alleges the liability of defendants 

Rahn, Zachary, Knapp, and the Hamptons to Lloyd Trackwell, Sr. ("Lloyd"), under Oregon 

common law for defamation, the liability of defendants Rahn, Zachaty, Knapp, and the 

Hamptons to Lloyd under Oregon common law for invasion of privacy in two separately pied 

claims, the liability of defendants Rahn, Zachary, Knapp, and the Hamptons to Lloyd under 

Oregon common law for intentional interference with economic relations, the liability of 

defendants Zachaty, the Hamptons, and HLG to Lloyd under Oregon common law for breach of 

contract, the liability of defendants Zachmy and HLG to Lloyd under Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608 for 

unfair business practices, the liability of defendants Zachmy, Knapp, Sali, Angeli, and Souede to 

Lloyd under Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608 for unfair business practices in a second, separately pied 

Section 646.608 claim, the liability of defendants Zachary, Knapp, Sali, Angeli, Souede, HK, 

HLG, and the Hamptons to Lloyd under Oregon common law for wrongful initiation of civil 

litigation, the liability of defendants Zachmy, Knapp, HK, HLG, and the Hamptons to Lloyd 

under Oregon common law for wrongful initiation of civil litigation in a second, separately pied 

wrongful initiation claim, the liability of defendants the Hamptons, Zachmy, and HK to Judith 

Trackwell ("Judith" and, collectively with Lloyd, the "Trackwells") under Oregon common law 

for abuse of process, the liability of defendants the Hamptons, Zachmy, and HK to Judith under 

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608 for unfair business practices in a third, separately pied Section 646.608 

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Case 2:15-cv-00296-PK Document 30 Filed 06/08/15 Page 2 of 11
claim, the liability of defendants Zachary, Knapp, HLG, Angeli, Souede, and Sali to Judith under 

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608 for unfair business practices in a fourth, separately pied Section 646.608 

claim, the liability of defendants Zachary, Knapp, HK, HLG, Angeli, Souede, and Sali to Judith 

under Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608 for unfair business practices in a fifth, separately pied Section 

646.608 claim, the liability of defendant ABM to Lloyd under Oregon common law for breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the liability of defendants Marilyn, Efrain, 

and the Hamptons to Colin Lindsey under Oregon common law for breach of contract in a 

second, separately pied breach of contract claim, the liability of defendants Rahn, Bruce, and 

Marilyn to Lloyd under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 for racketeering activity, and the liability of defendants 

Zachary, Venese, and Knapp to Lloyd under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 for racketeering activity in a 

second, separately pied Section 1961 claim. 1 Wickenkamp fu1iher alleges that Lloyd is Lindsey's 

assignee for purposes of her second breach of contract claim, and that she is the Trackwells' 

assignee for purposes of all claims asse1ied herein and therefore the real party in interest with 

standing to bring her claims. In support of her position that she is the real paiiy in interest, 

Wickenkamp attaches as an exhibit to her second amended complaint a document styled as an 

"Assignment of Claim" signed by Lindsey and Lloyd and purporting to assign "all right, title, and 

interest in any and all claim or claims Lindsey may have" against, inter alia, Marilyn, Efrain, 

and/or the Hamptons, a document styled as an "Assignment of Interest" signed by Lloyd and 

1 Wickenkamp's allegations suggest that she may have intended to allege her invasion of 

privacy claims and intentional interference claim additionally against Scott Hampton, and her 

second Section 1961 racketeering claim additionally against Scott Hampton and Melanie Micka, 

but as neither Scott Hampton nor Melanie Micka is listed as a defendant in the caption of 

Wickenkamp's complaint or described therein as a party, I do not construe those claims as though 

effectively stated against Scott Hampton and/or Melanie Micka. 

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Case 2:15-cv-00296-PK Document 30 Filed 06/08/15 Page 3 of 11
purporting to assign "all right title and interest" in claims arising out of Lloyd's contract dispute 

with ABM and/or all claims transferred to Lloyd by Lindsey to Wickenkamp, and a document 

styled as an "Assignment of Claims" signed by the Trackwells and purporting to assign "all right 

title and interest" in any claim possessed by the Trackwells' bankrnptcy estate to Wickenkamp "in 

order that she may prosecute and recover all such claims for the benefit of the [Trackwells'] 

bankruptcy estate and remit the proc.eeds of such claims to said estate." The Assignment of 

Claims recites no consideration tendered by Wickenkamp to the Trackwells in exchange for such 

assignment. Wickenkamp seeks damages in an unspecified amount. This court has jurisdiction 

over Wickenkamp's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Wickenkamp impliedly 

takes the position that this court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her statelaw claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.2 I make no finding at this time regarding whether this 

court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Wickenkamp's state-law claims. 

Now before the court is Wickenkamp's motion (#25) for an order permitting her to utilize 

a method for service of process not authorized under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4( e) or, in the 

alternative, an order assetting personal jurisdiction over the Hamptons pursuant to Federal Civil 

Procedure Rule 4(n)(2) by seizing real property the Hamptons purportedly own in Oregon. I 

have considered the motion and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth 

below, Wickenkamp's motion is denied with leave to refile as discussed below. 

2 Wickenkamp additionally asserts that this court has jurisdiction over her claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, based on the complete diversity of the parties and the amount in 

controversy, but I note both that Wickenkamp does not assert a right to any specified amount of 

monetary damages and that Wickenkamp's assignor Judith is alleged to be a citizen of Missouri, 

the state under the laws of which defendant ABM is incorporated and in which ABM maintains 

its headquatters. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1359. I therefore make no finding at this time as to 

whether this comt may properly exercise diversity jurisdiction over Wickenkamp's claims. 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

I. Alternate Service of Process 

Service of an individual located within any judicial district of the united States is 

governed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4( e ). Rule 4( e) provides as follows: 

Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual--0ther than a minor, an 

incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed-may be served in a 

judicial district of the United States by: 

(I) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in 

courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is 

located or where service is made; or 

(2) doing any of the following: 

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to 

the individual personally; 

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual 

place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion 

who resides there; or 

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by 

appointment or by law to receive service of process. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). The provisions of Rule 4 are intended "to provide maximum freedom and 

flexibility in the procedures for giving all defendants ... notice of commencement of [an] action 

[against them] and to eliminate unnecessary technicality in connection with service of process." 

Elec. Specialty Co. v. Road & Ranch Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation 

omitted). Constitutional due process requires that any service of notice be "reasonably 

calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 

afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 1Vfullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Rule 4(e) does not expressly countenance any other means of 

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service upon an individual located within the Untied States. 

Oregon's rules governing service of process are codified at Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 

7D. Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 7D(6)(a) provides as follows: 

On motion upon a showing by affidavit or declaration that service cannot be made 

by any method otherwise specified in these rules or other rule or statute, the court, 

at its discretion, may order service by any method or combination of methods 

which under the circumstances is most reasonably calculated to apprise the 

defendant of the existence and pend ency of the action, including but not limited 

to: publication of summons; mailing without publication to a specified post office 

address of the defendant by first class mail and any of the following: certified, 

registered, or express mail, return receipt requested; or posting at specified 

locations. If service is ordered by any manner other than publication, the court 

may order a time for response. 

Or. R. Civ. P. 7D(6)(a). 

II. In Rem and Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction 

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(n)(2) provides as follows: 

On a showing that personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be obtained in the 

district where the action is brought by reasonable efforts to serve a summons 

under this rule, the court may assert jurisdiction over the defendant's assets found 

in the district. Jurisdiction is acquired by seizing the assets under the 

circumstances and in the manner provided by state law in that district. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(n)(2). The circumstances under which Oregon law provides for assertion of 

jurisdiction over a defendant through attachment of the defendant's property are governed by 

Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 84. Oregon's Rule 84 provides, in relevant pati, as follows: 

The plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons or any time afterwards, may have 

the property of the defendant attached, as security for the satisfaction of any 

judgment that may be recovered, in the following cases: 

(a) An action upon a contract, expressed or implied, for the direct 

payment of money, when the contract is not secured by mortgage, 

lien, or pledge, or when it is so secured but such security has been 

rendered nugatmy by act of the defendant. 

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Case 2:15-cv-00296-PK Document 30 Filed 06/08/15 Page 6 of 11
(b) An action against a defendant not residing in this state to recover a 

sum of money as damages for breach of any contract, expressed or 

implied, other than a contract of man'iage. 

( c) An action against a defendant not residing in this state to recover a 

sum of money as damages for injury to property in this state. 

Or. R. Civ. P. 84A(2). To obtain an order for provisional process through attachment of property 

under Oregon law, it is the plaintiffs burden to "file[] with the clerk of the court from which such 

process is sought" evidence sufficient to establish "that the action is one in which provisional 

process may issue" and good cause for its issuance. Or. R. Civ. P. 83A. 

The notes of the Advisory Committee in connection with the 1993 amendment of Rule 

4(n) provide as follows: 

This subdivision provides for in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Paragraph (1) 

incorporates any requirements of28 U.S.C. §1655 or similar provisions bearing 

on seizures or liens. 

Paragraph (2) provides for other uses of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction but limits 

its use to exigent circumstances. Provisional remedies may be employed as a 

means to secure jurisdiction over the property of a defendant whose person is not 

within reach of the court, but occasions for the use of this provision should be 

rare, as where the clefenclant is a fugitive or assets are in imminent clanger of 

disappearing. Until 1963, it was not possible under Rule 4 to assert jurisdiction 

in a federal court over the property of a defendant not personally served. The 

1963 amendment to subdivision ( e) authorized the use of state law procedures 

authorizing seizures of assets as a basis for jurisdiction. Given the liberal 

availability of long-arm jurisdiction, the exercise of power quasi-in-rem has 

become almost an anaclu·onism. Circumstances too spare to affiliate the 

defendant to the forum state sufficiently to support long-aim jurisdiction over the 

defendant's person are also inadequate to support seizure of the defendant's assets 

foituitously found within the state. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, Comments to 1993 An1endments. Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), in 

turn, stands for the proposition that "in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the 

basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of 

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persons in a thing." Schaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 (internal quotation marks, footnote omitted). "The 

standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is 

consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in 

International Shoe [Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)]." Id 

Under International Shoe and its progeny, to be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a 

federal comt, a nonresident defendant must have at least "'minimum contacts"' with the court's 

forum state such that "the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice."' Schwarzenegger v. Fred };fartin lvfotor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 

2004), quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. Two foims of personal jurisdiction are 

available for application to a nonresident defendant: general personal jurisdiction and specific 

personal jurisdiction. Here, Wickenkamp alleges that the Hamptons are residents of the State of 

Washington but offers evidence tending to establish that they own real prope1ty in Oregon. 

Wickenkamp makes no argument or allegation that this court could properly exercise specific 

personal jurisdiction over either of the Hamptons. 

"For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant ... , the defendant must 

engage in continuous and systematic general business contacts ... that approximate physical 

presence in the forum state." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales 

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) and Bancroft & iv/asters, Inc. v. Augusta 

Nat'/, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). "This is an exacting standard, as it should be, 

because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum 

state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world." Id, citing Brand v. l'vfenlove 

Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1986). 

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ANALYSIS 

Wickenkamp moves the court for leave to effect service of process on the Hamptons 

through serving a copy of the summons and copies of the original and amended complaints in 

this action "by mailing same by regular mail with proof of delivery, signature not required," to a 

Post Office Box she believes the Hamptons maintain in Joseph, Oregon. In the alternative, 

Wickenkamp moves that the court assett personal jurisdiction over the Hamptons by seizing real 

prope1ty they own in Oregon. 

In support of her motion, Wickenkamp offers evidence tending to establish that she has 

not attempted service by mail upon the Hamptons at their primmy residence because she 

"believed that such attempts would be futile" based on her failure to effect service in that manner 

in previous litigation against the Hamptons. Wickenkamp futther offers her declaration that she 

attempted to effect personal service on the Hamptons through the efforts of the Wallowa County 

Sheriff's Office, but that these effmts were unsuccessful. Wickenkamp takes the position that the 

Hamptons "deliberately manipulate the addresses in filings required by law in order to avoid 

disclosing an address where they can avoid service by mail and personal service of process." 

Wickenkamp offers no futiher evidence, argument, or allegation that alternate service of process 

could appropriately be granted under Rule 4(e) and/or Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 7D(6)(a) or 

that seizure of the Wikstroms' Oregon prope1ty could be appropriate under Rule 4(n)(2). 

As to Wickenkamp's request for alternate service of process under Rule 4( e ), I note that 

her own evidentimy proffer establishes that she has not attempted service by mail upon the 

Hamptons at their primmy residence, based on her untested belief that to do so would be futile. 

Wickenkamp's untested belief that service by mail would be futile is insufficient to establish that 

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service cannot be made on the Hamptons by an expressly authorized method of service. In 

consequence, Wickenkamp has not met her burden to establish that this comi has authority to 

grant her request for alternate service of process under Rule 4( e ). 

As to Wickenkamp's request for seizure of the Hamptons' Oregon real property under 

Rule 4(n)(2), her proffer is similarly insufficient. First, I note that Wickenkamp has made no 

showing that she has complied with the procedures for obtaining an order effecting attachment of 

property set forth at Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 83. 

Second, Wickenkamp's proffer falls well shmi of establishing that the "exigent 

circumstances" requisite to seizure under Rule 4(n)(2) are present here. There is no allegation, 

evidence, or other suggestion that the Hamptons are fugitives or that assets within the scope of 

Wickenklamp's claims are in imminent danger of disappearing. Absent such circumstances, no 

grounds exist for the invocation of the asset-seizure provision. 

Third, Wickenkamp's proffer similarly falls short of establishing that this cou1i may 

properly exercise general personal jurisdiction over either of the Hamptons. Wickenkamp 

alleges that the Hamptons are Washington citizens, and offers no allegation, evidence, or other 

suggestion that either Hampton has at any material time engaged in continuous and systematic 

general business contacts sufficient to approximate physical presence in Oregon. Absent grounds 

for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Hamptons, this court is without authority to 

seize their Oregon property under Rule 4(n)(2). 

Because Wickenkamp has failed to meet her burden to establish either that this comi may 

properly authorize alternate service of process under Rule 4( e) or that this court may properly 

seize the Hamptons' Oregon prope1iy under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(n)(2), her motion is 

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denied with leave to refile in the event Wickenkamp believes in good faith that she can cure the 

procedural and substantive defects identified herein. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Wickenkamp's motion (#25) for an order pennitting her 

to utilize a method for service of process not authorized under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(e) 

or, in the alternative, an order asserting personal jurisdiction over the Hamptons pursuant to 

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 4(n)(2) by seizing real property the Hamptons purpmiedly own in 

Oregon is denied with leave to refile as discussed above. 

Dated this 8th day of June, 2015. 

//) (~~~) ,, .. i l{/( \ CL ()d) C .. onorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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