IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

ADAM MICHAEL HORSTMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF HILLSBORO, DA YID BONN, 

JORDAN SCHREINER, JIM DERRICKSON, 

BRIAN WILBER, JESUS RIOS, KELLEY 

BERTRAND, and TED SCHRADER, 

Defendants. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3: 15-cv-00203-PK 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Adam Horstman initiated this § 1983 action against Defendants, alleging 

violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fomieenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution. Now before the court is third party Christle Horstman's Motion to Quash 

Subpoenas (#27) ("Motion to Quash"). For the reasons provided below, Horstman's Motion to 

Quash is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

In the summer of2014, four pharmacies in Hillsboro, Oregon were robbed oflarge 

amounts of prescription opiates. One of those pharmacies was Rite Aid. Plaintiff David 

Horstman subsequently went to that Rite Aid to fill a prescription. After Plaintiff left the store, 

the manager called the police and reported that Plaintiff looked like the person who had 

previously robbed the phmmacy. Upon questioning by police, the pharmacy attendant and 

another employee expressed their belief that Plaintiff was the robber. 

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Defendants began investigating Plaintiff and eventually determined that they had 

probable cause to affest him for the robberies. Defendants based their probable cause 

determination, in part, on reports of drng use in Plaintiffs home. The reported drug use included 

reports of prescription opiate abuse by Plaintiffs wife-Christle Horstman. 1 Defendants aiTested 

Plaintiff for the robberies, and he was jailed for several days. Defendants subsequently 

dete1mined that Plaintiff was not responsible for the robberies, and all charges against him were 

dismissed. Plaintiff then filed this suit. 

One of the primary issues in this case is whether Defenda!lts had probable cause to aJTest 

Plaintiff. In a purported effort to inform that issue, Defendants served subpoenas on Bi-Mart 

Phaimacy in Forest Grove, Oregon and Rite Aid Pharmacy in Hillsboro, Oregon. Both 

subpoenas seek Horstman's prescription records for Oxycodone, OxyContin, Hydrocodone, and 

Ambien. Horstman now moves the comt to quash those subpoenas. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45 govern discovery by subpoena. Rule 26(b) 

sets f01th the permissible scope of discovery. That rule provides, in pertinent part: 

Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 

to any party's claim or defense and prop01tional to the needs of the case, 

considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the paities' 

resources, the imp01tance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 

burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 

Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to 

be discoverable. 

1 For the purpose of brevity, I hereinafter refer to David Horstman as "Plaintiff' and Christle 

Horstman as "Horstman." 

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Id. The Rule further provides: "The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 

or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... " Id 

(c)(l). 

Rule 45(a)(l)(C) pennits a party to serve a subpoena commanding a nonparty to produce 

documents that are within the scope of discovery. However, upon a timely motion, the comi 

must quash or modify a subpoena that "requires disclosure of privileged or other protected 

matter." Id. (d)(3)(A)(iii). "On a Rule 45 motion to quash a subpoena, the moving party has the 

burden of persuasion, but the party issuing the subpoena must demonstrate that the discovery 

sought is relevant." Pers. Audio LLC v. Togi Entm't, Inc., No. 14-MC-80025 RS (NC), 2014 WL 

1318921, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Parties' Arguments 

Horstman moves the court to quash the subpoenas because they seek information that is 

not relevant to this suit. Horstman argues that her prescription records have no bearing on 

whether Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Horstman further argues that the 

records are protected information not subject to discovery. Finally, Horstman argues that the 

subpoenas impose an undue burden on her. 

In response, Defendants argue that Horstman's prescription records are relevant to the 

extent they corroborate the arresting officers' belief that they had probable cause to arrest 

Plaintiff. Defendants further argue that the records are relevant for impeachment purposes. 

Defendants also contend that Horstman's privacy interest in her prescription records is 

outweighed by Defendants' interest in discovery. 

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II. Analysis 

I find that Horstman's prescription records are not discoverable.2 Horstman enjoys a 

"constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." NormanBloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); accord Planned 

Parenthood ofS. Arizona v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 

429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)); but see Seaton v. i\!Jayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(calling into question the constitutional basis of the right to privacy in sensitive information). 

That privacy interest "clearly encompasses medical information and its confidentiality." 

Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269. District comis within this circuit recognize that the 

privacy interest in medical infonnation can be raised in response to discovery requests. See, e.g., 

Lind v. United States, No. CIV 13-032-TUC-CKJ, 2014 WL 2930486, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 30, 

2014); Allen v. Woodford, No. CVF0511040WWLJO, 2007 WL 309485, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

30, 2007). I agree with the reasoning of those comis and further hold that prescription records 

may qualify as "other protected matters" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45( d)(3)(A)(iii). 

See also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining "protected health information"). 

However, the privacy interest in prescription records does not present an absolute bar to 

discovery. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269-70; Planned Parenthood ofS. Arizona, 307 

F.3d at 789-90. Rather, the court must balance the value of the requested information to the 

issues in the case against the asserted privacy interest. See, e.g., Lind, 2014 WL 2930486, at *2; 

Allen, 2007 WL 309485, at *6; Sedaghatpour v. California, No. C 07-1802 WHA (MEJ), 2007 

WL 4259214, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007); Fritsch v. City a/Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 634 

2 Horstman has standing to challenge subpoenas that seek her prescription records. See, e.g., 

1\feyer v. Receivables Pe1formance 1\fgmt., LLC, No. C12-2013RAJ, 2014 WL 1976664, at *3 

(W.D. Wash. May 14, 2014) (citing Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Rebel Oil Co., 157 F.R.D. 691, 

695 (D.Nev.1995)). 

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(S.D. Cal.), modified sub nom., Doe v. City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999); 

Ragge v. }vfCAIUniversal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1995). This balancing 

approach is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b )(1 ). 

Defendants argue that Horstman's prescription records are relevant to whether they had 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. I disagree. The existence of probable cause turns on 

whether-at the moment of arrest-the officers knew of facts and circumstances that would lead 

a reasonably prudent person to believe Plaintiff had committed an offense. See, e.g., Edgerly v. 

City & Cty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 

89, 91 (1964)). Thus, facts garnered after the arrest are irrelevant to whether the alTest was 

justified by probable cause. See id. Defendants contend their probable cause determination was 

based, in part, on their belief that Horstman was an opiate abuser. However, that belief was not 

based on Horstman's prescription records. Indeed, it is undisputed that Defendants did not 

possess those records at the time they alTested Plaintiff. See Defs' Resp. 3 (#30); Edenhofer 

Deel. Ex. 1, at 4 (#31-1); Merrithew Deel. i! 5 (#28). Thus, Horstman's prescription records are 

not relevant whether Defendants had probable cause to mTest Plaintiff. See Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 

953 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91). 

Defendants additionally contend that Horstman's prescription records are relevant for 

impeachment because Plaintiff or Horstman may question the accuracy of the officers' belief that 

Horstman was an opiate abuser. While I agree with Defendants that Horstman's prescription 

records may have some impeachment value, I find that value to be speculative and limited. The 

accuracy of the officers' belief that Horstman was an opiate abuser is not determinative of 

whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The key inquiry is whether the 

officers' belief was reasonable at the time of the a!1'est, not whether it was accurate. See, e.g., 

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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 661 (1987) ("The concept of probable cause leaves room 

for mistakes, provided always that they are mistakes that could have been made by a reasonable 

officer."); Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 953. 

Moreover, Defendants have not established that the requested prescription records will 

indicate that Horstman was an opiate abuser. See Pers. Audio, 2014 WL 1318921, at *2 ("[T]he 

party issuing the subpoena must demonstrate that the discovery sought is relevant." (citation 

omitted)). Rather, Defendants merely speculate that they may have to impeach Plaintiff and 

Horstman, and if they do, that Horstman's prescription records may provide impeachment 

material. I am reluctant to order disclosure ofHorstman's private medical information for the 

sole purpose ofpe1mitting Defendants to "explore whether [their] speculation is true." Lind, 

2014 WL 2930486, at *4 (citation omitted). 

However, I assume, arguendo, that Defendants have carried their burden of establishing 

that Horstman's prescription records are relevant for impeachment purposes. Even operating 

under that assumption, however, I cannot find that the Defendants' limited interest in obtaining 

the records outweighs Horstman's privacy interest in her sensitive medical information. See, 

e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269; Fritsch, 187 F.R.D. at 634, modified sub nom., 196 

F.R.D. 562. Defendants already have information that could presumably be used to impeach any 

challenge to the accuracy of their belief that Horstman was an opiate abuser. After all, 

Defendants did not have Horstman's prescription records at the time they fmmed that belief. 

Rather, Defendants formed the belief entirely on other information. Defendants contend that the 

other info1mation was sufficient, in pmi, to justify the arrest and imprisonment of Plaintiff, and I 

therefore find that it is sufficient for impeachment purposes as well. 

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In sum, I find that the Horstman's constitutionally protected privacy interest in her 

prescriptions records outweighs the value of those records to the issues in this case. Horstman's 

Motion to Quash is therefore granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons provided above, Horstman's Motion (#27) is GRANTED. 

Dated this 14th day of January, 2016. 

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