1- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

Stephen M. Feldman, OSB No. 932674

SFeldman@perkinscoie.com

PERKINS COIE LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Telephone: 503.727.2000

Facsimile: 503.727.2222

R. Charles Henn Jr. (admitted pro hac vice)

chenn@kilpatricktownsend.com

Charles H. Hooker III (admitted pro hac vice)

chooker@kilpatricktownsend.com

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800

Atlanta, GA 30309

Telephone: 404.815.6500

Facsimile: 404.815.6555

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

ADIDAS AMERICA, INC., a Delaware 

corporation; ADIDAS AG, a foreign 

entity; and ADIDAS INTERNATIONAL 

MARKETING B.V., a foreign entity,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SKECHERS USA, INC., a Delaware 

corporation,

Defendant.

No. 3:15-cv-01741-JE 

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND 

TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 

REQUEST FOR LIMITED, EXPEDITED 

DISCOVERY

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 1 of 10
2- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

In response to the Motion for an Extension of Time (ECF No. 20) filed by defendant 

Skechers USA, Inc. (“Skechers”), plaintiffs adidas America, Inc., adidas AG, and adidas 

International Marketing B.V. (collectively, “adidas”) respectfully submit this Opposition.

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

adidas filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 6, the “PI Motion”) on 

September 15, 2015,1 to immediately stop Skechers’s egregious and wanton infringement of 

adidas’s STAN SMITH Trade Dress, Three-Stripe Mark, and SUPERNOVA Mark (the “adidas 

Marks”). Even looking only at Skechers’s knock-off of adidas’s famous STAN SMITH Trade 

Dress, Skechers’s bad faith and the immediate, ongoing harm to adidas’s brand are clear.

adidas’s STAN SMITH Footwear Skechers’s Stan Smith Knock-Off

Not only are the designs strikingly similar, but Skechers has gone so far as to use the terms 

“adidas,” “stan smith,” and “adidas original”2 in the source code for Skechers’s website—so that 

searching for “adidas stan smith” or “adidas originals” on skechers.com directs consumers to the 

Stan Smith Knock-Off. (See Declaration of Sara M. Vanderhoff, ECF No. 9, ¶ 17.) In addition, 

Skechers is selling a shoe bearing an identical reproduction of adidas’s famous Three-Stripe 

Mark (PI Motion, at 4), and advertising another shoe using the identical SUPERNOVA® 

trademark owned by adidas. (Id. at 5.)

 1 The PI Motion and its supporting declarations, as well as adidas’s Complaint and the 

other initial filing papers, were served on Skechers on September 17, 2015. (See ECF No. 19.)

2 adidas’s “Originals” business offers adidas classics and retro styles, often featuring the 

adidas Three-Stripe Mark, Trefoil logo, and well-known trade dresses owned by adidas. (See 

Declaration of Brandon Beaty, ECF No. 8, ¶ 7.)

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 2 of 10
3- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

Skechers’s ongoing sale of these obvious infringements is causing immediate irreparable 

harm to adidas and its brand. (See Vanderhoff Decl. ¶¶ 15-22; Beaty Decl. ¶ 18.) Skechers’s 

response to the PI Motion is due on October 5, 2015, and the PI Motion will be fully briefed by 

mid-October. Thus, under the normal schedule prescribed by the Local Rules, the Court would 

be in a position to put a swift end to the irreparable harm being suffered by adidas.

In an obvious ploy to sell through its infringing footwear and render the PI Motion moot, 

Skechers seeks an incredible sixty-day extension that would allow it to continue selling (and 

profiting from) its knock-off products and continue causing irreparable harm to adidas through 

the heart of the holiday selling season. In support of its motion, Skechers nakedly asserts that its 

infringing footwear has been on the market for months; and it claims it needs “limited discovery” 

which it fails to define, articulate, or provide to adidas or the Court.

adidas does not believe that any extension of time is warranted. Skechers offers no 

evidence or testimony to support its bare assertions that its infringing footwear has been on the 

market for months; and, in any event, Skechers cannot rebut plain testimony that adidas only 

recently learned of the infringing footwear. Moreover, Skechers fails to demonstrate the 

requisite good cause for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it fails to provide the 

specific discovery requests (or even the basic discovery categories) it claims to need and does 

not in any way define the scope of the sought-after discovery. Nevertheless, as a matter of 

professional courtesy, adidas has offered Skechers a ten-day extension of time to respond to the 

PI Motion, which adidas submits is more than reasonable in light of the ongoing irreparable harm 

being suffered by adidas.3

 

 3 Nearly a week after adidas served the PI Motion, counsel for Skechers (namely, Mark 

Samuels) contacted counsel for adidas on September 23, 2015, to discuss the briefing schedule. 

(See Declaration of R. Charles Henn Jr. ¶ 4, filed concurrently.) The following day, counsel for 

the parties conferred by telephone, where Skechers’s counsel requested a ninety-day extension 

because they said they had a trial set to begin on November 9. (See id. ¶ 5.) On September 25, 

counsel for adidas notified Skechers’s counsel that, as a professional courtesy, adidas would 

agree to an extension of ten (10) days for Skechers to respond to the PI Motion, but that adidas 

could not agree to a further extension in light of the egregious nature of Skechers’s infringement 

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 3 of 10
4- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

In light of these circumstances, and for the additional reasons discussed below, the Court 

should deny Skechers’s request for a sixty-day extension to respond to the PI Motion, and should 

instead permit no more than a ten-day extension. A ten-day extension would mean that 

Skechers’s response to the PI Motion would be due by October 15, 2015, which would provide 

Skechers with 28 days (i.e., a full 4 weeks) after service of the PI Motion within which to 

respond. That should be more than enough time to prepare and file a response, and any further 

extension would be manifestly unfair to adidas.

II. ARGUMENT

adidas opposes Skechers’s extension motion for three reasons. First, the extension 

Skechers requests unjustly would allow it to continue selling its infringing footwear through the 

busiest selling season of the year. Second, delaying the adjudication of adidas’s PI Motion is at 

odds with the fundamental purpose of seeking a preliminary injunction and would undermine the 

efficacy of any eventual preliminary injunction the Court enters. And, third, Skechers plainly 

fails to satisfy the “good cause” standard.

A. The Requested Extension, If Granted, Would Allow Skechers To Sell Its Infringing 

Footwear Through The Heart Of The Holiday Season

The sixty-day extension Skechers requests would make its response due November 16,

2015. Following adidas’s reply briefing and a hearing, this would mean that Skechers would be 

allowed to sell its infringing footwear throughout the heart of the holiday selling season, if not 

until the end of 2015 and into 2016. Such a result would permit Skechers to continue inflicting 

purposeful and irreparable harm on adidas’s brand and some of adidas’s core trademarks 

throughout the busiest selling season of the year without even having to respond to adidas’s 

 

and the ongoing irreparable harm to adidas’s brand being caused by Skechers’s infringement. 

(See id. ¶ 6.) Notably, Mr. Samuels is incorrect to state in his recently submitted Declaration that 

“the reason adidas did not contact Skechers before filing suit was that adidas was retaliating for 

Skechers having sued a subsidiary of adidas . . . .” (See Samuels Decl., ECF No. 21, ¶ 2.) In 

point of fact, counsel for adidas explained to Skechers’s counsel that the highly egregious nature 

of the infringing footwear, as well as the parties’ history, were the reasons why adidas promptly 

filed suit after learning of Skechers’ latest infringing footwear. (See Henn Decl. ¶ 7.)

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 4 of 10
5- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

allegations until mid-November, and without being held accountable until December 2015 or the 

beginning of 2016—conceivably long after Skechers already had sold through its inventory of 

infringing footwear.

B. A Sixty-Day Extension Would Undermine The Preliminary Injunction adidas Seeks

The protracted extension Skechers asks for is inequitable and would undermine the 

efficacy of any preliminary injunction the Court may issue. “The purpose of a preliminary 

injunction is to preserve rights pending resolution of the merits of the case by the trial.” E. & J. 

Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted); see also Wright & Miller, 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2947 “Purpose 

and Scope of Preliminary Injunctions,” (3d ed. 2015) (“Defined broadly, a preliminary injunction 

is an injunction that is issued to protect plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the 

court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.”). If Skechers is able to 

continue selling its infringing footwear during the busiest selling season of the year, adidas’s 

rights in the adidas Marks will not be preserved, but instead will be diluted and weakened by 

Skechers’s intentional infringement. Moreover, the meaningfulness of any equitable relief the 

Court might eventually enter will be substantially diminished, if not eliminated completely, 

because Skechers’s sales over the holiday season and potentially into 2016 will have been so 

substantial. Indeed, over the course of the next two months (and certainly if it is allowed to sell 

into 2016), Skechers may well sell through its entire inventory of the infringing footwear.

C. Skechers Fails To Meet The “Good Cause” Standard

Skechers plainly fails to meet the “good cause” standard for the vague “limited 

discovery” it claims it needs.4

 To begin with, “expedited discovery is not automatically granted 

 4 “There is scant authority on the standards governing the availability of expedited 

discovery before the Rule 26(f) scheduling conference in civil cases.” Yokohama Tire Corp. v. 

Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612, 613 (D. Ariz. 2001). adidas notes that Skechers cites 

only California District Court cases, and adidas is unaware of any authority from this Court or 

the Ninth Circuit holding that “good cause” is the definitive governing standard. Without 

therefore conceding that “good cause” is the governing standard, adidas demonstrates herein that 

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 5 of 10
6- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

merely because a party seeks a preliminary injunction.” Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 

F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the requesting party “has not shown 

good cause for the Court to grant its motion for expedited discovery”); see also Dimension Data 

N. Am. v. NetStar–1, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 528, 532 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (denying request for expedited 

discovery in part because “the discovery requested is not narrowly tailored to obtain information 

relevant to a preliminary injunction determination”); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Gannett 

Satellite Information Network, Inc., No. 98–CV–2782, 1998 WL 404820, *2–3 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 

1998) (denying motion for expedited discovery where movant’s discovery requests were “wholly 

overbroad in scope” and with no “definitive limitations on the scope of the sought-after 

discovery”).

Rather, courts applying the “good cause” standard commonly consider the following 

factors: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery 

requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the [recipient] 

to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the 

request was made.” Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Here, these factors weigh decidedly against allowing the expedited discovery 

sought by Skechers.

First, Skechers attacks adidas for seeking a preliminary injunction based on Skechers’s 

assertion that “[t]wo of the products alleged to infringe . . . have been on the market for seven 

 

Skechers fails to show good cause and is otherwise not entitled to the undefined “limited 

discovery” it seeks. And, importantly, it should be noted that since Skechers cannot satisfy the 

“good cause” standard, it certainly cannot satisfy the more stringent standard that has been 

adopted by other federal courts when evaluating motions for expedited discovery. See, e.g., 

Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying a four-part test similar to the 

standard for granting a preliminary injunction, and requiring the party seeking expedited 

discovery to show (1) without discovery it would suffer irreparable injury; (2) probability of 

success on the merits; (3) a connection between expedited discovery and avoiding irreparable 

injury; and (4) evidence that the harm that would result if discovery is denied would be greater 

than the harm the opposing party would suffer if discovery were ordered).

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 6 of 10
7- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

months or more, and the other accused product has been on the market for nearly three months.” 

(ECF No. 20 at 6-7.)

5

 But Skechers fails to support this assertion in any way. See Pink Lotus 

Entm't, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:11-CV-03077 JAM, 2012 WL 174971, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) 

(“The undersigned is also troubled by plaintiff’s failure to substantiate certain claims made in its 

moving papers”; finding good cause was not shown and denying request for expedited 

discovery). In contrast to Skechers’s absence of evidence or testimony in support of its 

contention, adidas’s witnesses plainly state that “adidas only recently learned of” Skechers’s 

infringing conduct. (See Vanderhoff Decl. ¶ 22.) Indeed, adidas brought this action and its 

PI Motion quickly upon learning of Skechers’s infringing footwear. 

Second, the discovery Skechers seeks is undefined and, therefore, broad in scope. 

Skechers offers only vague notions of what would be encompassed in the discovery it seeks. 

Skechers calls the discovery “limited” but it fails to attach any specific interrogatories or 

document requests; and what little description it does offer—i.e., depositions of “at least” three 

adidas witnesses (ECF No. 20 at 5)—suggests expansive rather than limited discovery. In the 

cases adidas reviewed in preparing this response, parties seeking limited discovery supplied the 

specific discovery they sought (e.g., particular document requests and interrogatories) with their

motions for limited, expedited discovery. The same is true in the cases Skechers cited.6

 This 

customary practice affords the opposing party and the Court the opportunity to assess the breadth 

and relevance of the discovery sought. See, e.g., Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 

 5 Skechers also chastises adidas for not contacting Skechers “to complain about any of 

the three matters in the Complaint[.]” (ECF No. 20 at 3.) But as adidas has described at length 

in its preliminary injunction briefing, Skechers repeatedly has, over the course of many years, 

encroached on adidas’s rights in a deliberate effort to infringe them, and adidas’s numerous 

prior, non-litigation efforts to stop Skechers’s infringement have proven ultimately to be

unsuccessful. (See Vanderhoff Decl. ¶¶ 8–19.)

6 See, e.g., Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 273, 274 (N.D. Cal. 

2002) (listing particular discovery sought); Quia Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., No. C10-01902 JF (HRL), 

2010 WL 2179149, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2010) (evaluating two deposition notices, “seven 

interrogatories and ten requests for production”; granting in part and denying in part the 

discovery requests).

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 7 of 10
8- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

(collecting cases). Skechers neglects to follow this practice. As such, Skechers’s requested 

discovery is certainly not “narrowly tailored” and, therefore, must be denied. Millennium TGA, 

Inc. v. Doe, No. 2:11-CV-03080 MCE KJN, 2012 WL 219329, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012) 

(“expedited discovery requested is usually . . . narrowly tailored”; denying discovery request); 

see also Dimension Data N. Am., 226 F.R.D. at 532; Philadelphia Newspapers, 1998 WL 

404820, at *2–3.7

Third, adidas strongly suspects that Skechers’s purpose is to delay the entry of a 

preliminary injunction so that it can sell through its inventory (and profit from) its infringing 

footwear—both directly and as a means of driving consumers to its stores to purchase other 

Skechers shoes. Skechers does not identify its purpose in seeking discovery. In fact, when 

Skechers’s counsel originally requested a ninety-day extension, they indicated the primary 

reason was that they had a trial set to begin on November 9, 2015. Curiously, Skechers makes 

no mention of this in its present motion, thus suggesting that the “limited discovery” it seeks is 

purely pretextual. Skechers’s motion also fails to acknowledge that much of the information 

relevant to this matter already is in Skechers’s possession, custody, or control. For example, 

only Skechers has documents or witnesses who may testify regarding why Skechers has chosen 

to design footwear that copies the adidas Marks; and only Skechers has information relating to 

its decision to use “adidas,” “stan smith,” and “adidas original” in the source code for Skechers’s 

website. 

Fourth, the discovery Skechers seeks would both burden and prejudice adidas greatly. 

Because the scope of discovery that Skechers seeks is entirely undefined, granting Skechers’s 

motion would permit unfettered discovery on adidas, thereby creating a virtually unlimited 

burden. Moreover, adidas would be prejudiced by any such discovery because it would delay the 

 7 Any attempt by Skechers to “sand bag” adidas by attaching proposed discovery requests 

to any reply brief it might file would be improper and would serve only to further delay this 

proceeding by compelling adidas to file yet another brief before the Court rules on this extension 

motion.

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 8 of 10
9- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

determination of adidas’s PI Motion and the entry of a preliminary injunction, thus allowing 

Skechers to sell untold quantities of its infringing footwear during the busiest selling season of 

the year, diluting and weakening adidas’s rights and causing it irreparable harm. 

Finally, Skechers’s timing in bringing this motion does not favor granting its requested 

extension. Skechers was served on September 17, 2015. Yet Skechers waited nearly a week 

even to contact adidas’s counsel regarding this motion (see Henn Decl. ¶ 4), and it waited twelve 

days from the time it was served to file its extension motion. Notwithstanding that passage of 

time, Skechers cannot identify with any particularity the discovery it seeks, much less articulate 

why the discovery might be relevant to the pending PI Motion. Skechers’s actions, therefore, 

illustrate the dilatory purpose adidas suspects is at the heart of Skechers’s present motion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Skechers’s request for a sixty-day 

extension to respond to adidas’s PI Motion and, instead, the Court should order Skechers to 

respond to the PI Motion by no later than October 15, 2015 (i.e., a ten-day extension).

DATED: September 30, 2015 PERKINS COIE LLP

By: s/ Stephen M. Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman, OSB No. 932674

SFeldman@perkinscoie.com

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Telephone: 503.727.2000

Facsimile: 503.727.2222

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 9 of 10
10- PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REQUEST FOR

LIMITED, EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

21184-0111/LEGAL128084680.1

Perkins Coie LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, Tenth Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

Phone: 503.727.2000

Fax: 503.727.2222

R. Charles Henn Jr. (admitted pro hac vice)

chenn@kilpatricktownsend.com

Charles H. Hooker III (admitted pro hac vice)

chooker@kilpatricktownsend.com

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800

Atlanta, GA 30309

Telephone: 404.815.6500

Facsimile: 404.815.6555

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 3:15-cv-01741-HZ Document 26 Filed 09/30/15 Page 10 of 10