EXPERT REPORT

Opinion re “Expert Report of Peter A. Erickson” April 12, 2018

Opinion re “Expert Report of Joseph E. Stiglitz” April 13, 2018

Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana, et al. v. United States of America, et al.

Case No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC

David G. Victor

Professor

University of California at San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive #0519

La Jolla, CA 92093 

Prepared for:

The United States Department of Justice

August 13, 2018

_______________________________________________

David G. Victor

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1 I. INTRODUCTION 

2 This expert report is submitted in connection with the matter known as Kelsey Cascadia Rose 

3 Juliana; Xiuhtezcatl Tonatiuh M., through his Guardian Tamara Roske-Martinez; et al., v. The 

4 United States of America; Donald Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United 

5 States; et al., United States District Court, District of Oregon Case No. 6:15-cv-015-17-TC. I 

6 have been asked to assess claims made by Peter A. Erickson, regarding the U.S. share of GHG 

7 emissions, the feasibility of transitioning to a consumption-based accounting system, and 

8 impacts on emissions from potential reforms to federal fossil fuel subsidies and leases, as 

9 proffered by Mr. Erickson in his Expert Report, dated April 12, 2018. I also have been asked to 

10 assess claims made by Joseph E. Stiglitz, regarding whether U.S. dependence on fossil fuels is an 

11 inevitable consequence of history, and whether the U.S. can adopt meaningful policy 

12 interventions to mitigate climate change without engaging with its international trading partners, 

13 as proffered by Dr. Stiglitz in his Expert Report, dated April 13, 2018. The opinions contained 

14 in this report are based on my professional knowledge, training, and experience. I reserve the 

15 right to supplement this report as additional information is made available. 

16

17 II. QUALIFICATIONS

18

19 I am a professor at UC San Diego where I teach international relations, energy policy and energy 

20 market design at the School of Global Policy and Strategy. I also am an adjunct Professor of 

21 Climate, Atmospheric Science and Physical Oceanography at the Scripps Institution of 

22 Oceanography. Formerly, I was a tenured full professor at Stanford Law School where I taught 

23 industrial organization and also led the Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable 

24 Development. 

25

26 I am a nationally-recognized expert in energy and environmental policy, with more than thirty 

27 years of experience. I am the author or co-author/editor of eight (8) books and approximately 

28 200 articles. My work has been cited more than 14,000 times (per Google Scholar). My 

29 curriculum vitae is included as Appendix A to this report, and a list of my publications from 

30 2008 to the present is contained in Appendix B.

31

32 Since 1990, I have been actively involved in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 

33 (IPCC), the United Nations’ body charged with periodically assessing the science of climate 

34 change, including the science underpinning control of emissions that contribute to climate 

35 change. In 2007, the IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize for its work. I have been engaged in five 

36 (5) IPCC assessments, performing various author, contributor and reviewer roles. In the most 

37 recent IPCC assessment, concluded in 2014, I served as a convening lead author, the term the 

38 IPCC uses for assessment members who have greatest responsibility for the report. I also 

39 contributed to the two key summaries of the study—the “Summary for Policy Makers” and the 

40 “Technical Summary.” 

41

42 I have been Chairman and a member of the advisory board, as well as a member of the Board of 

43 Directors, for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). EPRI is a non-profit organization 

44 established by US and global electric utilities for the purpose of conducting research on 

45 advanced electric power technologies. I am a member of the Global Future Council for the 

46 World Economic Forum, which convenes the annual industry leader event in Davos Switzerland. 

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47 For four years, I have served as a member of the advisory board of the Institute of Nuclear Power 

48 Operators (INPO), the organization established after Three Mile Island with the mission of 

49 independent oversight of the safe operation of all U.S. nuclear reactors. I chair the San Onofre

50 Community Engagement Panel, which helps steward the safe closure and dismantlement of the 

51 San Onofre nuclear reactor complex located south of Los Angeles.

52

53 My undergraduate degree is in History and Science (Harvard), and my Ph.D. is in Political 

54 Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 

55

56 I am a regular participant in academic, industry, and government studies on issues related to 

57 energy sources and energy systems in the U.S. and abroad. Examples of my participation 

58 include the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force regarding the national security 

59 consequences of US dependency on oil imports—I served as task force member and Chief of 

60 Staff with former Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger and former CIA Director John Deutch as 

61 co-chairs. At Stanford, I convened studies on the globalization of the natural gas market, the 

62 organization of the global oil industry, and the globalization of the coal market. I also served on 

63 the advisory board of the MIT study “The Future of Natural Gas,” a major study looking at 

64 developments in the US and overseas gas markets. Most recently, I served as a panel member on 

65 the US National Research Council study on reliability and resilience of the U.S. power grid. 

66

67 In addition to my work at UC San Diego, I am a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings

68 Institution. I am the co-chair and co-founder of the cross-Brookings initiative on energy and 

69 climate. The goal of this initiative is to rethink strategies for effective management of the 

70 climate change problem, within the U.S. and globally. 

71

72 III. SUMMARY OVERVIEW

73

74 The plaintiffs in this case have put forth a series of claims regarding the role played by the U.S. 

75 in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and potential pathways for addressing these 

76 emissions going forward. In my expert opinion, several assertions made by Mr. Peter A. 

77 Erickson in his Expert Report, dated April 12, 2018, are based on insufficient facts and data, and 

78 the incorrect application of generally accepted methods. Specifically, there are five topic areas 

79 discussed by Erickson in his Expert Report, upon which I believe his opinions cannot be 

80 reasonably relied. 

81

82 First, with respect to the U.S. share of global emissions, it is my expert opinion that the analyses 

83 within Erickson’s Expert Report obscures the scope and complexity of policy interventions 

84 needed to control emissions by improperly focusing only on energy-related combustion of fossil 

85 fuels. A full accounting of GHGs and emissions controls indicates that a wide range of industrial 

86 and agricultural activities and policies should be considered when deriving a total estimate of 

87 emissions. By failing to consider the full range of activities and gases that contribute to climate 

88 change, Erickson oversimplifies the scope of the actions necessary to decrease U.S. and global 

89 GHG emissions. Further, Erickson’s own data, as well as the data I reference in this Expert 

90 Report, indicate that the U.S. constitutes only a small portion of global emissions. Even if the 

91 U.S. were to unilaterally eliminate all of its greenhouse gas emissions, 87 to 88% of global 

92 emissions still would remain. The facts support that the U.S. is just one of many emitters; and, in 

93 my view, action to limit climate change requires coordinated international action.

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94 Second, with respect to claims regarding the use of consumption-based accounting methods for 

95 GHGs, it is my expert opinion that such methods are neither administratively, nor politically 

96 straightforward to implement quickly. Erickson oversimplifies the technical feasibility of the 

97 U.S. adopting a consumption-based inventory and accounting system. He also fails to articulate 

98 the length of time that will be needed to design and implement an accurate consumption-based 

99 accounting system. Importantly, Erickson fails to address a central challenge in implementing 

100 such a system: border adjustments to bring emission control incentives for imported products in 

101 line with products manufactured in the U.S. Further, Erickson’s Expert Report fails to note that 

102 even if the U.S. were to shift to a consumption-based accounting system, such a shift would 

103 increase the share of global emissions attributed to the U.S. by only about 1%. As I stated 

104 previously, action to limit climate change requires coordinated international action, regardless of 

105 the accounting method adopted by the U.S.

106

107 Third, with respect to U.S. federal energy subsidies, I believe that Erickson’s Expert Report is 

108 misleading and provides insufficient basis to support his claims. Erickson suggests that U.S. 

109 subsidization of energy is dominated by fossil fuels. I disagree. I estimate that: 1) federal fossil 

110 fuel subsidies are a tiny fraction of total value of the fossil fuel energy industry, and therefore not 

111 material to the industry’s operations; and 2) Erickson appears to cherry-pick data that focuses on 

112 fossil energy subsidies, ignoring the substantial subsidies that exist for other elements of the 

113 energy system, including efficiency and renewable energy. 

114

115 On a straight-dollar basis, I find that subsidies for renewable energy exceed subsidies for fossil 

116 energy by a factor of at least 2. Further, proportional to U.S. energy output, the tax-related 

117 subsidy for renewables is more than 50 times the level of tax-related subsidies for fossil fuels. 

118 When properly analyzed, the data indicate that U.S. subsidies have shifted, and continue to shift, 

119 in the direction of energy sources that require market support – away from fossil fuels, and 

120 towards renewables in support of a diversified energy portfolio.

121

122 Fourth, with respect to the impacts of federal subsidies on oil production, I find that Erickson 

123 selectively targeted data and tailored his methods to inflate the beneficial impacts of subsidy 

124 reform on fossil fuel consumption and associated emissions reductions. Erickson limits the bases 

125 of his opinion to one academic study and one commercial study, even though those and other 

126 reputable studies point to different conclusions. Notably, he is conspicuously silent regarding 

127 the range of expert views on the matter of subsidy reform in the oil production sector. My 

128 examination of these studies, as well as review of the studies that Erickson, himself, relies on as 

129 part of the basis for his conclusions, indicates that the effect of oil subsidy reforms on emissions 

130 will be small to zero. More broadly, the studies that Erickson cites in support of his analysis of 

131 the impacts of subsidies on oil production do not substantiate his claims, and serve to evince that 

132 this topic lacks clear-cut conclusions. Rather than subsidy policy, which is at the margin of key 

133 considerations for the fossil fuel sector, it is my opinion that market and technological forces 

134 mainly drive production, consumption, and emissions associated with the oil industry.

135

136 Fifth, with respect to the impacts of federal coal leasing policies, I again find that Erickson’s 

137 conclusions are not supported by the breadth of nuanced research on this topic. In my expert 

138 opinion, wholesale reform of federal coal leasing policies warrants more rigorous analysis of 

139 attendant impacts than that presented by Erickson in his Expert Report. The foundation of 

140 Erickson’s opinion is qualitative and focused on elementary economic logic that he mis-applies 

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141 to the coal market. In my expert opinion, it is probable that coal extraction will continue to 

142 decline over time, irrespective of federal coal leasing reforms or reversal of preferential tax143 based subsidies.

144

145 I also examined the foundation of Joseph E. Stiglitz’s assertion in his Expert Report, dated April 

146 13, 2018, that the U.S. failed to take affirmative action to eliminate fossil fuels. I maintain that 

147 this assertion is ill-founded and not well-substantiated. Specifically, Stiglitz fails to identify 

148 plausible, real-world actions that the U.S. government could have taken that would have led to 

149 appreciably different outcomes with respect to domestic and international energy systems. It is 

150 my belief that the dependence on fossil fuels which existed prior to the oil crises of the 1970s, 

151 and which exists today, in fact, is the inevitable consequence of history, contrary to the Stiglitz 

152 assertion (page 12 in Stiglitz’ Expert Report). My opinion is shared by nationally-recognized 

153 historians in energy technology. 

154

155 In addition, Stiglitz fails to acknowledge that, in the late 1970s, when he asserts the U.S. failed to 

156 take affirmative actions to move off fossil fuels, there was little experience with renewables 

157 technology. What experience did exist suggests that such technologies could be as much as 25 

158 times more costly than existing rival (fossil fuel) technologies. While advances in wind and solar 

159 technologies have facilitated, and will continue to facilitate, integration of renewables into the 

160 U.S. energy system, these technologies were cost-prohibitive in the 1970s, and the potential for 

161 their future performance was relatively unknown.

162

163 Finally, I find that Erickson and Stiglitz make key errors of omission, in their respective Expert 

164 Reports, by failing to note that climate change requires international cooperation, as a matter of 

165 foreign policy. In my expert opinion, effective solutions to mitigate the adverse impacts of 

166 climate change necessitate engaged cooperation between the U.S. and its international partners. 

167 Stiglitz suggests that the U.S. has been neglectful in the actions needed to achieve international 

168 cooperation on climate problems. I disagree. In fact, the U.S. has been at the forefront of efforts 

169 to engage with its trading partners on issues of global climate, including efforts associated with 

170 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 1992 Framework Convention on 

171 Climate Change, and the 2015 Paris Agreement. 

172

173 It is my expert opinion that the simplistic and narrowly-focused approaches posited by Stiglitz 

174 and Erickson with respect to U.S. engagement on the issue of climate change fails to appreciate 

175 the global nature of the problem and the need for a nuanced foreign policy strategy to obtain 

176 international cooperation. Below, I summarize the bases for my opinions in greater detail.

177

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178 Finding #1: THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF U.S. EMISSIONS NECESSITATES 

179 AN INTEGRATED SOLUTION, AND THE U.S. SHARE OF GLOBAL EMISSIONS IS 

180 DECLINING

181

182 The Plaintiffs in this case have put forth that “the United States is responsible for more than a 

quarter of global historic cumulative CO2 emissions.”1 183 The Federal Defendants have admitted 

184 that “from 1850 to 2012, CO2 emissions from the United States (including from land use) 

constituted more than one-quarter of cumulative global CO2 emissions.”2 185 The Expert Report of 

186 Mr. Peter A. Erickson, dated April 12, 2018, states:

187

188 “The U.S. is responsible for a substantial amount of global GHG [Greenhouse 

189 Gas] emissions.” (page 3)

190

191 I examined the data relied upon, and the techniques applied by, Erickson to support his 

192 conclusion. It is my expert opinion that Erickson’s analysis of the size and composition of U.S. 

193 emissions obscures the scope and complexity of policy interventions needed to control those 

194 emissions. Further, even if the U.S. were to unilaterally eliminate all of its current GHG 

emissions, about 88% of global emissions would still remain.3 195 I state the bases for my opinion 

196 below.

197

198 First, the data that Erickson presents as the basis for his opinion are for only a subset of 

199 greenhouse gases—industrial emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), mainly from burning fossil 

fuels.4 200 In so doing, Erickson creates the impression that emissions control policies should 

201 pinpoint only energy-related combustion of fossil fuels and niche industrial activities, such as 

202 production of cement. This is incorrect, because Erickson’s statistics exclude 35% of global 

203 emissions of GHGs, as shown in Figure 1 and explained below. A proper and full accounting 

204 shows there are many other GHGs that contribute to climate change, beyond the subset of 

205 emissions discussed by Erickson in his Expert Report. Further, in my view, emissions controls 

206 should implicate a range of industrial and agricultural activities in the United States and abroad. 

207 In fact, many other gases and sources beyond CO2 from industrial sources should be considered 

208 when deriving a total estimate of GHG emissions—notably, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 

209 CO2 from changes in land use, and so-called “F-gases” used in industrial operations. Scientific 

210 evidence shows that soot also has a large impact on climate change—most soot comes from 

biomass burning, combustion of diesel fuel, and a host of other activities in the US and abroad.5 211 

 1 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana, et al. v. United 

States of America et al., Case No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, Document No. 7, filed September 10, 2015, page 3, paragraph 

7.

2 Federal Defendants’ Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 7), Kelsey 

Cascadia Rose Juliana, et al. v. United States of America et al., Case No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, Document No. 98, filed 

January 13, 2015, page 5, paragraph 7.

3 See Figure 2 of this Expert Report for an explanation of the derivation of the 88% figure.

4 The Erickson report presents data from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) at the Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory (ORNL). The CDIAC data set, available at http://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/, is focused on fossil 

fuels and industry. It is necessary to look to other data sources to develop a complete picture of GHG emissions.

5 T.C. Bond et al., “Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific assessment,” Journal of 

Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 118:538-5552, 2013. Drew Shindell, et al., “Simultaneously Mitigating NearCase 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 338-2 Filed 08/24/18 Page 6 of 53
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212 In my opinion, by failing to consider the full range of activities and GHGs that contribute to 

213 climate change, Erickson oversimplifies the scope of actions necessary to decrease global GHG 

214 emissions. 

215

216 My opinion is supported by Figure 1, which shows the full accounting for global emissions, as 

reported in the latest assessment of the IPCC.6 217 In my view, policy intervention to mitigate the 

218 growth of GHG emissions requires flexibility and should be broad in scope. Since 1990, the 

219 U.S. has been a leading advocate for such a “comprehensive approach” in emissions statistics 

and emissions control efforts.7 220 The essence of the U.S. approach is that any effort to limit 

221 climate change should engage the full range of activities and GHGs that cause such change. 

222

223 Specifically, I believe that the scope of policy intervention should include not just the whole of 

224 the energy system (a major source of CO2 and CH4), but also agriculture and land policies (a 

225 major source of CH4 as well as N2O and soot and the carbon absorbed in soils and thus CO2

226 emissions), air pollution policy (which affects CH4 and soot), wastewater treatment (a source of 

227 N2O and CH4), many manufacturing industries (where fluorinated “F-gases” are used along with 

228 cement where the chemistry of cement manufacture cases CO2), and forestry (which affects 

229 carbon in soils and in above-ground timber). For these reasons, Erickson’s oversimplification of 

230 the interventions necessary to achieve his stated reductions in GHG emissions fails to consider 

231 the breadth of necessary policy changes, and the complexity of interactions between energy 

232 systems and industrial sectors. 

 

Term Climate Change and Improving Human Health and Food Security,” Science 335(6065):183-189, Jan. 13, 

2012. Jennifer Burney, Charles Kennel, and David G. Victor, “Getting serious about the new realities of global 

climate change,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4):49-57, July 2013. 

6 Figure 1 is based on methods that are widely accepted and used by the United Nations Framework Convention on 

Climate Change, and by the United States Government. Those methods include 100-year “global warming 

potentials” to account for the fact that greenhouse gases differ in their impact on the climate, and in the time 

horizon or which the greenhouse gases live in the atmosphere. See Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth 

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014, available online at: 

http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/. 

7 Jonathan B. Wiener & Richard B. Stewart, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design 

and Practicality, 9 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 83-113 (1992). David G. Victor, 1991, 

"Limits of Market-based Strategies for Slowing Global Warming: The Case of Tradeable Permits," Policy Sciences, 

vol. 24, pp. 199-222. Alan D Hecht and Dennis Tirpak. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and 

Policy History. 1995. 29 Climatic Change 371-402. 

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233

234 Figure 1: Emissions of GHGs. Figure shows emissions of different GHGs converted into 

235 common units known as CO2-equivalents (CO2e). The waterfall on the right side of the chart 

236 indicates uncertainty in the global estimates for each of these emission sources. The percentages 

237 listed on the chart show the portion of global total emissions accounted for by each major type of 

238 emission at each decade. In 2010, 35% of total GHG emissions derived from sources that are 

239 expressly excluded from Erickson’s analysis, and therefore his summary statistics. Source: 

240 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth 

241 Assessment Report, 2014, Chapter: Summary for Policy Makers, page 7, Figure 1, 

242 http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/WGIIIAR5_SPM_TS_Volume.pdf. 

243

244 Second, Erickson presents data on emissions from the U.S. and other countries, asserting that 

245 “The U.S. remains the world’s second largest emitter, and has been responsible for about 15% of 

246 global CO2 emissions since 2010.” (page 4) By ignoring trends over time, Erickson fails to 

247 articulate the fact that overall U.S. emissions contributions have been declining since 2005 (see 

248 inset to figure 2 below). With the decline in U.S. emissions, the ability of the U.S. to have an 

249 impact on the global problem through unilateral action has declined, as well. 

250

251 Figure 2 charts all GHG emissions, unlike Erickson’s data which are narrowly limited to CO2

252 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial sources. As shown, the U.S. share of global GHG 

253 emissions has declined over the last decade. The decline in absolute level of U.S. emissions is 

254 due to several factors, including: (1) the shift from coal to inexpensive natural gas in the power 

sector; and (2) substantial expanded investment in renewable power.8 255 The decline in the U.S. 

 8 See also K. Larsen, J. Larsen, W. Herndon, S. Mohan, and T. Houser, Taking Stock 2017: Adjusting Expectations for 

US GHG Emissions (Rhodium Group, 2017). Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, National CO2 Emissions 

from Fossil-Fule Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751-2014, national-level dataset dated March 5, 

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256 share of global GHG emissions is due to two factors: (1) the decline in US absolute emissions;

257 and (2) the increase in absolute emissions attributable to other countries, such as China and 

258 India.

259

260

261 Figure 2: Share of emissions from the U.S. and other countries that have important geopolitical 

262 impacts on efforts to cooperate on climate change, from 1970 to 2012. The timeline ends in 

263 2012, with the U.S. share at 12%, which reflects the end point for the most reliable updates of 

264 the global data set for GHG emissions. Data for industrial CO2 extends to 2016. Inset figure 

265 shows absolute emissions from the U.S. using two different accounting methods—top line 

266 includes all GHGs and is comparable with the main figure; the bottom line includes only sources 

267 of industrial CO2 and is comparable with the data presented by Erickson. The “all GHGs” data 

268 in the EDGAR data sets exclude CO2 emissions from short cycle biomass burning and exclude 

269 soot and other aerosols due to lack of data reliability and availability. The data in Figure 2 are 

270 drawn from the EDGAR system, which is notable for its coverage and comprehensiveness; 

EDGAR is the same source as that used for Figure 1.9 271

 

2017, http://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/ftp/ndp030/nation.1751_2014.ems. These data indicate that U.S. emissions 

peaked at 1,578,873,000 metric tons of carbon in 2005, and have declined thereafter.

9 Sources: EDGAR 4.2 FT2012 (all GHGs through 2012) and EDGAR 4.3.2 (industrial CO2 up to 2016). Files are the 

GHG timeseries files at:

http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=42FT2012

http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2andGHG1970-2016&dst=CO2emi

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272 My analysis indicates that even if the U.S. eliminates all of its territorial GHG emissions, and by 

273 extension all of its CO2 emissions, a substantial share (88%) of total global GHG emissions 

274 would remain. As shown in Figure 2, the U.S. is just one of many emitters, and action to limit 

275 climate change requires coordinated international action.

276

277 Finding #2. IMPLEMENTING NEW CONSUMPTION-BASED ACCOUNTING METHODS FOR 

278 GREENHOUSE GASES IS NEITHER ADMINISTRATIVELY NOR POLITICALLY STRAIGHTFORWARD

279

280 In his Expert Report, Erickson states:

281

282 “Due to advances in the availability of trade and other economic data, 

283 consumption-based GHG inventories are not difficult to produce – especially at 

284 the national level, even as the concepts and models used to produce them can be 

285 complex.” (page 11)

286

287 Erickson further states:

288

289 “The most common approach is to use global trade data, assembled in a multi290 regional input-output (MRIO) model, to estimate the flow of materials, goods, and 

291 services throughout the world in order to fulfill the consumption of a given 

292 country.” (page 11)

293

294 Erickson concludes:

295

296 “In my opinion, few if any technical barriers would prevent the Federal 

297 Defendants in this case, especially the U.S. EPA or U.S. DOE, from conducting 

298 both consumption-based and extraction-based inventories for the U.S.”

299

300 I assessed the data summarized by Erickson in his Expert Report, and examined academic efforts 

301 to adopt consumption-based accounting systems. In my opinion, Erickson oversimplifies the 

302 technical feasibility of the U.S. adopting a supplemental, consumption-based GHG inventory. 

303 Even if feasible, Erickson fails to articulate the length of time that will be needed to design and 

304 implement a consumption-based accounting structure that: (1) accurately reflects the full range 

305 of GHG emissions; and (2) is implemented with data and cooperation from all significant trading 

306 partners of the United States. Further, Erickson fails to address the most important challenge in 

307 adopting a new accounting system – aligning the new system with border adjustments, such that 

308 imported products face the same emission control incentives as products manufactured in the 

309 U.S. In my expert opinion, even if the U.S. were to shift to a consumption-based accounting 

310 system, such a shift would affect the US share of global emissions by only about 1%. I

311 summarize the bases for my opinions below.

312

313 I agree that, in theory, a shift in emissions accounting could shed light on the number of products 

314 consumed in the U.S. that contribute to emissions in territories outside the U.S. However, I 

 

To compute the US share, on the GHG timeseries worksheet for the EDGAR 4.2 FT2012 dataset, divide cell AS22 

(US emissions in 2012, which were 6343840 metric kilotons of CO2eq) into cell AS238 (global emissions in 2012, 

which were 53937188 metric kilotons of CO2eq). 

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315 believe that any change in accounting scheme also must contemplate adjustments in border 

316 tariffs, thereby creating the necessary incentives for all emitting firms, both global and domestic, 

317 to control their emissions. Simply adopting a new accounting system will not have much impact 

318 on behavior unless that system is coupled to incentives for firms and consumers to adjust their 

319 behavior to reflect the full range of consumption-based emissions. Such border adjustments are 

320 necessary so that U.S.-imported products face the same emission control incentives as products 

321 manufactured within the U.S. Without a comprehensive solution that addresses this differential 

322 in cost, the U.S. will be at an economic disadvantage vis-à-vis its international partners. This 

323 disadvantage will make it harder to create the global incentives needed for global emission 

324 reductions and will also exacerbate the political challenges of sustaining an effective climate 

policy in the U.S.

10 325

326

327 Erickson asserts that “consumption-based GHG inventories are not difficult to produce.” (page 

328 11) As the basis for his opinion, Erickson presumes: 

329

330 1. The technical computation of consumption-based statistics is “a relatively straight331 forward process” (page 11), and the “[m]ethods for conducting them have been widely 

332 studied.” (page 13). Erickson cites to academic studies as the basis for these assertions.

333

2. Other jurisdictions—such as the United Kingdom11 and Oregon 334 12—have conducted 

335 consumption-based inventory and accounting, suggesting that precedent exists and 

336 governments have overcome the technical challenges.

337

338 3. Border adjustments and tariff implications are not an impediment to advancement by 

339 virtue of remaining silent to such issues in his Expert Report. 

340

341 I believe that Erickson’s logic is faulty, and he fails to appreciate the complexity of adopting and 

342 implementing a consumption-based accounting system. Specifically, Erickson fails to recognize 

343 that, even with the agreement of its cooperative trading partners, it would take the U.S. one to 

344 two decades to implement an effective consumption-based accounting system. If the U.S. 

trading partners are not cooperative, then I believe that such a system would take even longer.13 345

 10 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “Cooperation and discord in global climate policy,” Nature Climate 

Change 6:570-575 (2016).

11 United Kingdom Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, “UK’s Carbon Footprint 1997-2015,” 

available online at: 

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/704607/Cons

umption_emissions_May18.pdf.

12 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, “Consumption-based Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory for 

Oregon,” available online at: https://www.oregon.gov/DEQ/mm/Pages/Consumption-based-GHG.aspx

13 A useful example of international cooperative engagement, and the magnitude of the challenges related to such, 

is the current effort by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) to converge International and U.S. Accounting 

Principles – alignment of U.S. generally-accepted accounting principles (or GAAP) and International Financial 

Reporting Standards (IFRS) set by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in London, United Kingdom. 

The AICPA set a goal of “substantial completion of work” between the IASB and the Financial Accounting Standards 

Board (FASB) during 2013; this goal was supported by the G-20 group of countries, but convergence is still 

incomplete. The “Convergence Headquarters” webpage at IFRS.com, a site run by the IFRS Foundation (founded by 

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346 Presently, and for the foreseeable future, there are substantial technical and methodological

347 challenges associated with adopting a consumption-based accounting system. I discuss these 

348 challenges in more detail below.

349

350 First, data are accessible for industrial CO2 emissions, yet a serious and balanced policy strategy 

351 must address the full range of GHGs. The foundational studies on consumption-based 

352 accounting assess implications associated with industrial CO2 and fail to assess other GHGs or 

353 polluting activities. For example, the UK accounting system purports to cover all GHGs. Yet,

354 my assessment of the data reveals that the more detailed estimates within the UK analysis cover 

only industrial CO2 emissions.14 355 In my view, to implement consumption-based accounting in 

356 ways that actually influence the activities contributing to emissions, a broader accounting of 

357 GHGs is necessary than that which the current consumption-based accounting scheme can 

358 support.

359

360 Second, all of the extant accounting efforts, which form the basis for Erickson’s opinion, are 

361 based on average emission factors. Specifically, these methods rely on average emission 

362 coefficients (e.g., for electric power) and average estimates for emissions caused by the 

363 production of different tradeable goods (e.g., steel, cement). This is standard practice for the 

364 input-output data sets and models that underlie the main studies on consumption-based 

365 accounting. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to the limitations associated with relying 

366 on averages. 

367

368 The practical implication of emissions averaging is that particular firms that are selling or buying 

369 products will have an incentive to claim that their production is less emissions intensive than the 

370 average. In some cases, those claims will be accurate. In other cases, firms will simply shift 

371 energy sources so that they assign “clean” production to traded goods, while using “dirty” 

372 production elsewhere. For example, a firm that produces energy-intensive products in China 

373 might claim that it is purchasing electricity from the Chinese grid with a contract that assigns 

374 nuclear power or renewable power to that firm, with no associated emissions. Yet, electrons are 

375 co-mingled on electric grids, and the Chinese grid, on average, is dominated by coal-fired power 

376 plants. How can the claim from the Chinese firm about its electricity supply contract be 

377 validated? In my view, efforts to develop consumption-based accounting systems have not 

 

AICPA), lists a series of updates between October 2012 and February 2015, none of which indicate the 

achievement of full convergence. The latest progress report from the IASB and FASB on the convergence of 

accounting standards dates back to 2010 (accessible at https://www.asb.or.jp/jp/wpcontent/uploads/20100706_11.pdf). In 2016, the SEC Chair issued a public statement stating: “While it is now clear 

that U.S. GAAP and IFRS will continue to coexist in our public capital markets for the foreseeable future, it is just as 

clear that the efforts to enhance the respective standards and reduce differences between them should continue.” 

The full statement is accessible at: https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-2016-01-05.html. The challenge 

of creating convergence and reliability in emissions statistics is much greater than for financial accounting because 

almost none of the foundation for detailed reporting of all underlying emissions, linked to particular firms and 

production methods, exists whereas the task of financial accounting convergence began after a comparable 

foundation was already in place. 

14 United Kingdom Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, “UK’s Carbon Footprint 1997-2015,” 

available online at: 

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/704607/Cons

umption_emissions_May18.pdf.

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378 addressed the challenge of moving beyond simple averages, and in so doing reducing the 

379 potential for leakage. 

380

381 Simply ignoring the problem—as Erickson appears to do—raises the risk that the newly382 instituted consumption-based accounting system would be deemed inconsistent with applicable 

383 trade law under the WTO. In practice, the WTO has allowed border measures, such as those 

384 which would be implemented through consumption-based accounting, but only if countries 

385 implement those border measures in ways that allow better-performing firms and governments to 

386 be treated differently from worse-performing counterparts. In my expert opinion, accounting 

387 systems should be designed to reflect real world behavior, and not simply rely on sectoral 

averages of unknown accuracy.15 388 Quite apart from the question of WTO compliance is the 

389 matter of incentives. The purpose of a consumption-based accounting system is to create 

390 incentives for particular firms and consumers to adjust their behavior and reduce emissions in a 

391 cost-effective manner. Failure to create a sophisticated accounting system that allows individual 

392 firms to adjust their behavior and get credit for emissions lower than the sector average would 

393 undermine the very purpose of adopting a consumption-based accounting system in the first 

394 place. 

395

396 Third, the data needed for a global consumption-based accounting system to be effective is 

397 substantial and obtaining such data from overseas producers would be challenging. For example, 

398 US-based administrators could not effectively review all relevant contracts for power supply in 

399 China in the example offered above. Although I focus on China, because its firms account for 

400 the largest share of emissions exported by virtue of the volume of products shipped to the U.S., 

401 for a consumption based accounting system to work, it would need to cover all significant 

402 trading partners of the United States. Some of the data collection apparatus exists under 

403 implementation of cross-border tax provisions. But, a similar infrastructure does not yet exist for 

404 the collection of global emissions factors and other needed statistics. 

405

406 Further, with respect to Erickson’s use of the UK model as a salient example of a successful 

407 consumption-based accounting system, the UK program is largely an academic, thought 

408 experiment. The UK model is focused on providing a complementary analysis of the UK 

409 “footprint” with respect to global climate change. The Oregon program cited by Erickson tends 

410 to be more transparent and routinized. However, it relies completely on sectoral averages, and 

411 for the reasons discussed above, this renders the Oregon model unreliable. In addition, the

412 Oregon model fails to reveal how methodological challenges will be handled when individual 

producers have an incentive to deviate from those averages.16 413 

 15 For example, see the World Trade Organization (WTO) Report of the Appellate Body, “United States – Import 

Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” Report No. AB-1998-4, available online at: 

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf. While this entrains a number of legal and political 

issues outside the scope of my Expert Report, I note that a member of that WTO Appellate Body (Jim Bacchus) has 

written extensively about how the precedents created at the WTO allow for non-discriminatory border 

adjustments, including the border tax adjustments discussed in this report. See James Bacchus, on behalf of the 

E15 Expert Group on Measures to Address Climate Change and the Trade System, “Global Rules for Mutually 

Supportive and Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes,” January 2016, available online at: 

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Climate_Change_POP.pdf. 

16 For detail on the indexes see Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, “Consumption-based Greenhouse 

Gas Emissions Inventory for Oregon,” available online at: https://www.oregon.gov/DEQ/mm/Pages/ConsumptionCase 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 338-2 Filed 08/24/18 Page 13 of 53
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414 My assessment of the UK and Oregon models reveals that neither system collects the data 

415 needed to move beyond sectoral averages. Further, neither system offers a vision for how such 

416 data could be collected and audited to check for data quality. With substantial cooperation 

417 across different jurisdictions, the necessary data infrastructure could be built, but doing so will 

418 take time and will require engaged international coordination, because building these systems 

419 without the cooperation of governments in exporting countries would set the system up for 

420 failure. In my view, unilateral action by the U.S. is insufficient to achieve this goal. My opinion 

421 is supported by assertions made by Stiglitz in his Expert Report, wherein he relies on standard 

422 economic theory to emphasize the need to “charge” emitters “...for the negative externalities 

423 they create, such as carbon emissions,” but also recognizes that “...the vast majority of negative424 externality carbon emissions across the globe are not priced.” (page 38). Addressing this issue 

425 requires international engagement, such that any sovereign imposing emissions controls on 

426 produced goods also imposes a similar burden on its international trading partners with respect to 

427 the emissions associated with imported goods. It is my expert opinion that failure to engage with 

428 the international community on this issue will result in a flawed consumption-based accounting 

429 system that fails to effectively create the incentives needed for global action. Worse, poorly 

430 implemented consumption-based accounting systems and border adjustments could trigger 

431 retaliation and trade wars, if exporting countries feel their products are being unfairly targeted or 

432 importing countries feel they are at an economic disadvantage. Those side-effects of shifts in 

433 trade-related policies could compromise U.S. policy to preserve a free and fair system for trading 

434 goods and services in global markets. 

435

436 In his Expert Report, Erickson also claims that “U.S. emissions from a consumption-based 

437 perspective have been higher than territorial emissions since about the mid-1980s, as growth in 

438 U.S. consumption of goods has outpaced growth in manufacturing.” (page 9) However, 

439 Erickson fails to articulate how this proportional increase actually affects the U.S. overall share 

440 of global emissions. My assessment of the data reveals that a shift to consumption-based 

441 accounting affected the US share of global emissions by only about 1%. I show the data and 

442 method underpinning this calculation below. 

443

444 In the early 1990s, the U.S. was a net exporter of emissions to other countries. Since 1990, the 

445 share of heavy manufacturing has declined, and the U.S. has become a net importer of emissions. 

446 The effect of this shift is shown in Figure 3 (Peters et al., 2011). I rely on Figure 3 as the basis of 

447 my opinion for two reasons. First, it is consistent with the method and data used in the first 

448 authoritative study based on consumption accounting. Second, it offers country-level data that is 

449 sufficiently transparent to be able to assess the numerical effects of consumption-based

accounting systems.

17 450 According to the data in this study, the U.S. was a net importer of about 

 

based-GHG.aspx, and Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Emissions 

Intensities for Consumption of Materials, Services, Fuels and Electricity,” October 13, 2011, available online at: 

https://www.oregon.gov/deq/FilterDocs/wprSupTechRepGHGInten.pdf.

17 See: (1) GP Peters and EG Hertwich, “CO2 Embodied in international trade with implications for global climate 

policy,” Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5):1401-7, Mar 1, 2008; (2) Edgar G. Hertwich and Glen P. Peters, 

“Carbon Footprint of Nations: A Global, Trade-Linked Analysis,” Environmental Science & Technology, 43(16):6414-

6420, June 15, 2009. These two papers offer foundations for the Peters et al. 2001 analysis. The papers, along 

with the Peters et al 2011 paper, have been cited substantially in the academic community (approx., 3,000 times 

per Google Scholar). See also Steven Davis and Ken Caldeira, “Consumption-Based Accounting of CO2 Emissions,” 

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) March 2010 

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451 480 million metric tons of CO2 emissions annually in 2008. That is, if the U.S. adopted a 

452 consumption-based accounting system, using the methods outlined in the Peters et al., 2011 

453 study, U.S. emissions would have been about 480 million metric tons higher than U.S. emissions 

accrued under a territorial-based accounting system.18 454 For comparison, that 480 million metric 

tons is about 8.6% of US total industrial CO2 emissions in 2008 using territorial accounting.19 455 

456

457 Thus, if the U.S. had adopted a consumption-based accounting system, such as the kind of 

458 system advocated by Erickson’s report, its emissions would rise about 8.6% above those accrued 

459 under the territorial-based accounting system. Applying this 8.6% increase to the most recent 

460 estimates for the US share of world emissions would raise the US share from 12% with territorial 

461 accounting to 13% with consumption-based accounting, i.e., an increase in the overall global 

share of U.S. emissions of 1%.20 462 Concurrently, a shift from territorial-based to consumption463 based accounting systems likely would lower China’s responsibility for emissions by about three 

 

107(12):5687-92 (cited 1100 times). In addition, in his Expert Report, Erickson references four other studies that 

offer distinct methods and analysis:

A) John Barrett et al., “Consumption-Based GHG Emission Accounting: A Case Study,” Climate Policy 13, no. 4 

(July 1, 2013): 451 70.

B) Manfred Lenzen et al., “Building EORA: A Global Multi-Region Input Output Database at High Country and Sector 

Resolution,” Economic Systems Research 25, no. 1(March 1, 2013): 20-49.

C) Peter Erickson, et al., “A Consumption_Based GHG Inventory for the U.S. State of Oregon,” Environmental 

Science & Technology, 46(7):3679-3686, March 22, 2012.

D) Kirsten S. Wiebe and Norihiko Yamano, “Estimating CO2 Emissions Embodied in Final Demand and Trade Using 

the OECD ICIO 2015,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers (Paris: Organisation for Economic 

Cooperation and Development, September 3, 2016), available online at: http://www.oecdilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/5jlrcm216xkl-en.

These other four, measured by number of citations, have had a smaller impact on analytical research about 

consumption based accounting, with citations of 184, 505, 37, and 17 times (per Google Scholar). This citation 

analysis forms the basis for my choice of the Peters et al analysis to illustrate and elaborate my opinions in this 

Expert Report. This exercise is not intended to be a full assessment of the intellectual mapping of which groups 

and papers have had particular influence on the development of methods and analysis in this area. In my view, 

because the methods under development are at an early stage, and there are many different approaches and 

assumptions that could be applied, it is important to offer logic for why a particular study or method is used for a 

particular calculation. 

18 This number reflects the change in average U.S. emissions in 2008 between territorial-based accounting and 

consumption based accounting, as reported in Peters et al., 2011. Specifically, Dataset S1 to Peters et al. 2011, 

Worksheet “7.TSTRD_Transfers” Cell U36, indicates a 2008 “transfer,” or difference between territorial- and 

consumption-based accounting systems of an increase of 479 million metric tons of CO2 emissions.

19 This figure computed by dividing 479 million metric tons into the estimated US industrial CO2 emissions are 

reported in the EDGAR data sources for Figure 2 of my Expert Report (5,602 million metric tons in 2008). Other 

sources produce similar numbers, including official US Government data: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 

Information Administration, Table 12.1 Carbon Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption by Source, 

https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T12.01#/?f=A&start=1973&end=2017&charted=0-

1-13. These data indicate 2008 “total energy CO2 emissions” of 5,815 million metric tons.

20 This calculation requires two proportionality assumptions that underscore why it would be valuable to have 

reliable time-series estimates for consumption-based emissions for all GHGs, and until those estimates exist the 

assumption of proportionality is the best approach for calculation. I assume that the effect of 8.6% is proportional 

to all GHGs and that the effect of shifting to consumption based accounting for the US in 2012 would be 

proportional to 2008. 

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times the increase in emissions attributable to the U.S.21 464 This shift is attributable to the fact that, 

465 since the early 1990s, the main pattern in global trade has been the rise of China as a net 

466 exporter, and the rise of the U.S. and Western Europe as net importers of most of China’s 

467 emissions embodied in the country’s exports.

468

469

470 Figure 3: Shift in emissions (million metric tons of CO2) from 1990 to 2008 due to a shift from 

471 territorial to consumption-based accounting. The top bar of the figure shows the rise in US 

472 territorial emissions (grey bars) over time period of concern plus the incremental increase due to 

473 emissions caused by products that are imported to the U.S. from China (blue bar), India (green 

474 bar) and other developing countries. Source: Peters et al PNAS (2011, Figure 3). 

475

476 Finding #3. US FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES HAVE A SMALL AND DECLINING 

477 IMPACT ON US TERRITORIAL ENERGY PRODUCTION

478

479 When discussing U.S. subsidies, Erickson focuses predominantly on domestic fossil fuel 

480 production, suggesting that U.S. subsidization of energy is dominated by fossil fuels. (page 13) 

481 Notably, in Table 2 of his Expert Report, Erickson summarizes fossil fuel-related, direct 

482 subsidies compiled by the US for the Group of Twenty (G20). (page 14) Erickson relies on the 

483 data presented in Table 2 to highlight the magnitude of the spend made by the U.S. to subsidize 

484 the fossil fuel infrastructure and production. In my expert opinion, Erickson’s use and summary 

485 of these data misleads the reader in two ways. 

486

 21 See Dataset S1 to Peters et al 2011, Worksheet “7. TSTRD Transfers” Cells U36 and U52. China’s estimated 

difference in 2008 between the territorial- and consumption-based accounting systems yields a decrease of 1,329 

million metric tons of CO2 (Cell U52); the corresponding difference for the United States is 479 million metric tons 

(Cell U36). 1,329 / 479 = 2.77, i.e., China’s decrease in emissions from shifting from a territorial-based to a 

consumption-based accounting system is approximately three times as large as the United States’ increase from 

this shift. Other authoritative studies lead to similar conclusions, but, as befits research projects where the 

underlying data about emission factors and trade patterns are contested, there remains uncertainty. For example, 

Davis and Caldeira 2010 report net imports of emissions into the United States from overseas (exclusive of 

intermediate goods) at about 600 million metric tons of CO2 per year. 

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487 First, it is important to put the total subsidy spend into perspective. Using the same numbers 

488 quoted by Erickson ($4.8b of subsidy in 2015, mainly for oil and gas (page 13)), the total market 

value of oil produced in the U.S. in 2015 was about $172b,22 489 and the value of produced natural 

gas was about $73b.23 490 In total, US oil and gas producers extract commodities worth $245b per 

491 year. The subsidy embodied in the output is only about 1.9% of the total market value of 

production.

24 492 In my view, subsidies worth that tiny fraction of the total value are not material to 

493 an industry whose prices can swing many multiples of this percentage in a financial quarter. 

494

495 Second, total energy subsidies include all forms of energy, not just fossil fuels, as suggested by 

496 the focus placed by Erickson in Table 2 of his Expert Report. Total subsidies are much larger 

and more nuanced than the simple direct expenditures summarized in Table 2.

25 497 In my opinion, 

498 by focusing on fossil fuel subsidies reported to the G20, Erickson cherry-picks just one element 

499 of the total subsidies picture. The data reported to the G20 was part of a policy exercise 

500 specifically focused on fossil fuel subsidies. In so doing, Erickson ignores the richer array of 

501 evidence that provides a complete picture of subsidies across the energy sector. Similarly, in his 

502 Expert Report, Stiglitz misleads the reader by focusing on fossil fuel subsidies, not 

503 acknowledging the full array of energy subsidies, and ignoring the shift in U.S. subsidy strategy 

504 away from fossil fuels and toward renewables. For example, Stiglitz asserts:

505

506 “...for at least 40 years...direct and indirect subsidies to fossil fuel producers hinder thea

507 doption of renewable energy and improvements in renewable energy technologies.” (page 

508 38-39)

509

510 As the basis for this assertion, Stiglitz cites an attachment to a 1978 memo from Jim Schlesinger 

511 to President Carter. Stiglitz offers no citations either to current retrospective analysis, (e.g., a 

 22 This is the simple volumetric calculation that multiples US. output for 2015 (9.4 million barrels per day, per U.S. 

Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, 2015 at 9,408 

thousand barrels per day, available online at: 

https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a)) by approximate average price for 

the year ($50/bbl—slightly higher than West Texas Intermediate (WTI) at $49/barrel and slightly lower than Brent 

at $52/barrel, per U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Crude oil prices started 2015 

relatively low, ended the year lower,” January 6, 2016, available online at: 

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24432). 9,408,000 x 365 x $50 = $171,696,000,000, or 

approximately $172 billion.

23 Calculated based on U.S. gas production of 79 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy 

Information Administration, “U.S. natural gas production reaches record high in 2015,” April 15, 2016, available 

online at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25832 ) and a wholesale Henry Hub price averaging 

$2.61 per million British thermal unit (MBBtu) that year (U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 

Administration, “Average annual natural gas spot price in 2015 was at lowest level since 1999,” January 5, 2016, 

available online at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24412 ). 79 bcf is equal to 76.3 trillion BTU 

(conversion factor 0.966), or simply 76,300,000 million BTU. 76.3 x 365 x $2.61 = $72.687 billion, or approximately 

$73 billion.

24 $4.8 billion divided by $245 billion yields approximately 0.02.

25 The U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, provides an array of studies that assess the 

state of governmental financial interventions and subsidies relevant to energy markets. See U.S. Department of 

Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal 

Year 2015,” March 12, 2015, available online at: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/dmeess.php. 

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512 time series analysis of subsidy reform), or to relevant policy and analytical research on 

513 renewables and energy efficiency subsidies. Since 1978 a lot has happened, notably in shifting 

514 direct subsidies away from fossil fuels and toward renewables and energy efficiency. He notes, 

515 approvingly, that the price of solar panels is dropping (page 28). However, Stiglitz does not 

516 indicate that those declines are, in part, due to the direct subsidies that the U. S., Germany, China 

517 and other countries have offered and continue to offer to producers as well as purchasers of 

518 renewable energy equipment, along with a host of other reforms that have made it easier to 

519 connect solar electricity supplies to the grid. Instead, Stiglitz offers a hypothetical thought 

520 experiment as to the kind of redress that is appropriate without any foundational basis:

521

522 “If Defendants stopped providing subsidies and/or implemented carbon pricing policies

523 that allow the U.S. government to further fund research and development of green

524 technologies to decarbonize the economy, such measures would have a large positive

525 impact in the long term...” (page 39)

526

527 In my opinion, if Erickson or Stiglitz were to analyze the breadth of U.S. subsidies, they would 

528 concede a different perspective of U.S. policy with respect to subsidy and preferential treatment 

529 of renewables vis-à-vis fossil fuels. Challenges exist in conducting a meta analysis of this sort. 

530 Determining what constitutes a subsidy can be difficult, and accessing the relevant data 

531 necessitates engaging with many sections of the federal government. Mindful of these 

532 challenges, I elect to rely on the most recent (2012) systematic analysis by the Congressional 

Budget Office (CBO), which compiled a wide array of direct subsidies by energy source.

26 533 I 

534 choose to focus on direct subsidies, because the quantitative information in Erickson’s Expert 

535 Report focuses on a selection of direct subsidies related to the production of fossil fuels. 

536

537 A key finding from the CBO analysis is that tax-based subsidies dominate total federal support 

538 for energy sources. The CBO is systematic in their analysis of tax-based subsidies, which helps 

539 to frame the tax treatment of fossil fuels; starting with this kind of systematic analysis lowers the 

540 risk that statistics will be cherry-picked to favor one particular finding. As I previously stated, 

541 fossil fuels dominate Erickson’s analysis of subsidies, particularly with respect to Table 2 of 

Expert Report.27 542 Figure 4, below, reproduces the CBO’s key findings with respect to tax-based 

543 subsidies. 

544

 26 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. In addition, the Congressional Research Service and 

the Office of Management and Budget have completed cross-sectoral studies of U.S. energy subsidies.

27 The accounting methods used in U.S. Government, “United States Self-Review of Fossil Fuel Subsidies” 

(Submitted December 2015 to the G-20 Peer Reviewers, December 2015), 

http://www.oecd.org/site/tadffss/publication/, which informs Table 2 of Erickson’s Expert Report differ from those 

used in the CBO’s analysis. For a more detailed comparison, contrast Table 2 of Erickson’s Expert Report with Table 

1 in U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. 

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545

546 Figure 4: Energy-Related Tax Subsidies, by Type of Fuel or Technology (billions 2011 USD). 

Figure reports data from 1977 through 2011, the time period of concern in the CBO study28 547 . 

548

549 Although the data captured by the CBO study is through 2011, and the data relied upon by 

550 Erickson from the G20 study is through 2015, a clear message emerges. While the CBO analysis 

551 is systematic, the Erickson analysis relies on cherry-picked subsidy statistics that focus on fossil 

552 energy subsidies, belying the larger picture. As the CBO study makes clear, most of the direct 

553 subsidy spend by the US on energy (as computed through tax preferences) is focused on 

554 renewables, not fossil fuels. Specifically, according to the CBO study, the portion of 2011 tax 

preferences (subsidies) attributable to fossil fuels is about $2.5b.29 555 Whereas, the portion 

556 attributable to renewables is about $12.9b; wherein $6.9b is attributable to biofuels (ethanol and 

557 biodiesel), and the remaining $6b is attributable to other renewable power sources, such as solar 

and wind.

30 558 

559

560 In my opinion, it is instructive to normalize these amounts of tax-based subsidies according to 

561 production of fuels. As a fraction of the total U.S. energy supply, in 2011, fossil fuels accounted 

 28 Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of 

Fuels and Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: 

https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf, based 

on data from Molly F. Sherlock, Energy Tax Policy: Historical Perspectives on and Current Status of Energy Tax 

Expenditures, CRS Report for Congress R41227 (Congressional Research Service, May 2, 2011), p. 26; Joint 

Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2011-2015 (JCS-1-12, January 17, 

2012)pp. 33-35; Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2013: Appendix 

(Feb 2012), p. 1068.

29 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. Within Table 1 (p. 3), the tax preferences for fossil 

fuels sum to $2.5 billion, or $0.8 billion + $0.8 billion + $0.9 billion

30 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. Within Table 1 (p. 3), the tax preferences for 

renewable energy sum to $12.9 billion ($1.4 + $0.7 + $6.1 + $0.8 + $3.9).

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for 78% of total U.S. primary energy supply and received 12% in tax-based subsidies.31,32 562 In 

563 2011, new renewable energy technologies including wind, solar and biomass s accounted for 

564 7.8% of U.S. primary energy supply and received 63% in tax-based subsidies. The numbers for 

renewables are distorted by U.S. biofuels policy.33,34 565 Nonetheless, my assessment reveals that 

566 proportional to U.S. energy output, the tax-related subsidy for new renewables, in 2011, was 

over 50 times the level of tax-related subsidies for fossil fuels.35 567 This assessment reveals that, 

568 when properly analyzed, U.S. subsidies have shifted, and continue to shift, in the direction of 

569 energy sources that require market support, and are favored as contributing elements of a 

570 diversified energy portfolio.

571

 31 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Table 1.2 Primary Energy Production by Source, 

available online at: 

https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T01.02#/?f=A&start=1949&end=2017&charted=1-

2-3-4-6-13. Data indicate that total fossil fuel-based energy production in 2011 was 60.543191 quadrillion Btu, 

compared to 78.035874 total energy production, or approximately 77.58 percent.

32 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. Within Table 1 (p. 3), the tax preferences for fossil 

fuels sum to $2.5 billion, or $0.8 billion + $0.8 billion + $0.9 billion. $2.5 billion divided by total 2011 energy-related 

tax preference as reported in Table 1, or $20.5 billion, yields 0.122, or approximately 12 percent.

33 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Table 1.2 Primary Energy Production by Source, 

available online at: 

https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T01.02#/?f=A&start=1949&end=2017&charted=1-

2-3-4-6-13. Data indicate that total renewables-based energy production in 2011 was 9.223985 quadrillion Btu; of 

that total 3.102852 quadrillion BTU equivalents came from hydroelectricity. I exclude hydroelectricity from my 

calculation of the “renewables” subsidy share, because: (a) there is relatively little tax preference allocated to 

hydro, and (b) most studies about the potential for shifting to renewable energy (and the need for policy 

supporting that shift) focus on what are often called “new renewables,” which is a concept that explicitly excludes 

the large hydro plants that account for nearly all US hydroelectricity production. That leaves 6.121133 quadrillion 

BTU of renewables output, compared to 78.035874 total energy production, or approximately 7.84 percent. The 

data available do not support disentanglig the federal tax preferences for hydroelectricity that might be included in 

the CBO analysis. 

34 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and Production of Fuels and 

Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-fuelsandenergybrief.pdf. Within Table 1 (p. 3), the tax preferences for 

renewables sum to $12.9 billion ($1.4 + $0.7 + $6.1 + $0.8 + $3.9). $12.9 billion divided by total 2011 energyrelated tax preference as reported in Table 1, or $20.5 billion, yields 0.629, or approximately 63 percent.

35 $2.5 billion in tax preference relative to 60.543191 quadrillion Btu of energy produced in 2011 yields 

approximately $0.041292835 billion in tax preference per quadrillion Btu of fossil fuel energy produced. $12.9 

billion in tax preference to 6.122 quadrillion Btu of energy produced in 2011 yields approximately $2.107453 billion 

in tax preference per quadrillion Btu of renewables-based energy produced. $2.107453 / $0.041292385 = 51.04, or 

approximately a factor of 51. (If this calculation is performed to include hydroelectricity, then the result is a factor 

of approximately 34.) 

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572 Finding #4. CHANGING FEDERAL SUBSIDIES ON OIL WILL HAVE MINIMAL

573 IMPACT ON GLOBAL OIL PRICES, OIL CONSUMPTION AND EMISSIONS

574

575 In his Expert Report, Erickson states:

576

577 “... with prices at or near $50 per barrel, the U.S. government is substantially 

578 expanding the country’s future oil production, relative to if these subsidies were 

579 not in place.” (page 16)

580

581 Erickson concludes:

582

583 “... it is my professional opinion that, at least for oil, Federal Government 

584 subsidies are likely to both increase oil industry profits and increase U.S. oil 

585 production. Both of these outcomes make it more difficult for the U.S. to 

586 transition to a low-carbon economy and meet domestic and international climate 

587 goals ...” (page 16)

588

589 In his Expert Report, Stiglitz echoes these views as part of a broader claim that the U.S. is 

590 engaged in a “perpetuation of a national fossil-fuel based energy system.” (page 7) Stiglitz fails 

591 to provide a well-founded basis for this opinion. I focus on the assertions made by Erickson 

592 regarding the impact of subsidies on oil production, because they are quantitative and based on a 

593 model analysis, for which the underlying assumptions about the factors that affect production can 

594 be scrutinized and compared with the literature. 

595

596 In my view, Erickson has selectively targeted data and tailored his methods to inflate the 

597 beneficial impacts of subsidy reform on U.S. consumption of fossil fuels, and associated 

598 reductions in emissions contributions. My assessment of Erickson’s research indicates that

599 Erickson mines the facts to support his arguments about the impact of subsidies on oil 

600 production. Specifically, Erickson is conspicuously silent about the range of expert views on the 

601 matter of subsidy reform in the oil sector. Erickson limits the bases of his opinions to illustrative 

602 calculations from one set of studies (for which Erickson is co-author). Yet other reputable 

603 studies, including studies that Erickson himself cites, point to different conclusions. Based on 

604 my examination of these other studies, I conclude that the effect of oil subsidy reforms on 

605 emissions will be much smaller than suggested by Erickson, because other factors have a much 

606 larger impact on production decisions, the industry is highly competitive and responsive to 

607 changes in market conditions and production costs. In addition, relative to the size of the sector, 

608 the impact on the total financial picture of the industry is extremely small (on the order of 1% of 

609 turnover, as I describe below). Below, I detail the three bases for my conclusions. 

610

611 First, Erickson’s findings are based on a thought exercise that is not reflective of reality. 

612 Erickson’s thought exercise is predicated on substantial changes to the U.S. tax code to remove 

613 all subsidies related to fossil fuels while leaving subsidies that affect the rest of the energy 

614 system untouched. Moreover, Erickson’s Report is misleading, because he offers his opinions in 

615 the context of altering relatively narrow tax measures. Yet, to support his opinions he relies on a 

616 modeling study that actually adopts an expansive notion of subsidy, which includes topics such 

617 as liability transfers to the government for closure of oil wells, transfer of railroad safety risks to 

618 the public, public funding of the strategic petroleum reserve, public coverage of damage to roads, 

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and a host of other measures.36 619 On page 14, Erickson presents Table 2, which lists direct 

620 subsidies for coal, oil and gas—subsidies that he calls “tax measures” (line 602). Then on page 

621 15, Erickson points to other industry and academic studies that examine these “tax measures.” As 

622 a means of further comparison, Erickson then turns to his own opinion, relying notably on a 

peer-reviewed 2017 publication in Nature Energy.

37 623 In fact, the modeling methods and data 

624 utilized in the Nature Energy paper are not limited to tax measures but rely on Erickson’s more 

625 expansive notion of subsidies. Through this sleight of language in Erickson’s Expert Report, the 

626 reader is left with the impression that, at oil prices of $50/barrel, as Erickson says of his team’s 

627 analysis: “...we found that 47% of new U.S. oil investment would depend on subsidies to

proceed.” (page 15). This statement reports data from his Nature Energy paper38 628 that, in fact, is 

629 based on model runs that assume his fully expansive view of subsidies. In his Expert Report, 

630 Erickson then returns to the narrow definition of tax measures, comments on the effect of 

631 intangible drilling costs (a tax measure), and draws the general conclusion: “...the U.S. 

632 government is substantially expanding the country’s future oil production, relative to if these 

633 subsidies were not in place.” (page 16). Erickson never explains (either in his Expert Report, or

634 in the published materials that he cites) how much of the effect is due to tax measures and how 

635 much hinges on his more expansive notion of subsidies. As a result, the reader is left wondering 

636 how the scope of Erickson’s analysis compares with the assertions made in his Expert Report. 

637 For these reasons, I believe that Erickson’s assertions on these matters are unsupported and 

638 unreliable. 

639

640 For Erickson’s thought exercise to be successful, expansive changes would be needed not just in 

641 federal policy, but also to state tax codes and local zoning ordinances associated with 

642 infrastructure improvements. If there were substantial changes in federal policy then states and 

643 localities also would respond, often with counter-acting effects. Yet, in his Expert Report, 

644 Erickson is silent on the breadth of policy intervention that his thought exercise would 

645 necessitate and also silent on possible counter-vailing responses. It is only upon examination of 

646 the underlying technical documentation that informs Erickson’s analysis that the breadth of 

intervention becomes clear.39 647 Further, it is only upon examination of the underlying 

648 fundamentals of Erickson’s analysis that one understands the degree to which Erickson’s 

649 findings rely on unilateral or binary assumptions—if all subsidies were removed, then a preferred 

650 outcome arises. Common sense dictates that policy intervention involves various slopes (or 

 36 See table 1 of P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies on United 

States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017) And for more detail see supplemental materials to 

that article at Supplementary information is available for this paper at https://doi.org/10.1038/. 

s41560-017-0009-8. 37 P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies on United States crude 

oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017) 38 See table 2 of P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies on United 

States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017) 39 In particular, the appendix to the 2017 Working Paper that offers more detail on See P. Erickson, A. Down, M. 

Lazarus, D. Koplow. Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure on U.S. oil production and 

global CO2 emissions. 2017. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper 2017-02. I rely on that working 

paper because it offers a fuller assessment of the modeling work and how it compares with other studies than is 

available in the supplemental materials to the published peer-reviewed article from the same study team, which 

are available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/. 

s41560-017-0009-8.

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651 degrees) of change. In his expert report, Erickson does not contemplate, or analyze the impact 

652 of, degrees of change arising from his proposed policy intervention(s). 

653

654 Second, Erickson frames the basis for his argument in general terms of supply and demand and 

655 points to other industry and academic studies that, he implies, offer supportive conclusions. For 

656 example, he begins his comparison of other studies with the statement “[t]here is evidence that 

657 these tax measures positively affect fossil fuel industry profits and investment...” (page 14) 

658 Perhaps this is a fair statement, because it is so general; but the details can have a large impact on 

659 the conclusions. My examination of the existing literature suggests that the existing literature 

660 nuanced. Reasonable disagreement exists as to whether subsidy reform would have a material 

661 impact on U.S. oil production. 

662

663 Before presenting his results, Erickson points to two others studies that have examined how tax664 based subsidies might affect behavior in the industry. Other materials published by Erickson and 

665 his co-authors allow some detailed comparison between his opinion and these two published 

studies.40 666 My analysis of these comparisons suggests that the differences across the studies are 

667 large. Notably, I believe that this is something that Erickson has found in his own published 

668 research, yet he elects to not mention or explain these differences in his Expert Report. The first 

669 study was completed by Dr. Gilbert Metcalf, a highly respected economist; the second study 

670 was completed by Wood Mackenzie, a highly respected energy research and consultancy 

group.

41 671 

672

673 The study completed by Metcalf has the benefit of being straightforward. Specifically, at 

674 prevailing oil prices of $50/bbl, Erickson’s studies suggest that 72% of the onshore projects by 

independent oil producers depend on the presence of subsidies, 675 42 whereas Metcalf concludes that 

just 8% of the onshore independent producers on subsidy for their decision to drill.

43 676 Offshore, 

 40 P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow. Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure on 

U.S. oil production and global CO2 emissions. 2017. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper 2017-02. 41 These comparisons are referenced in the appendices (Tables A-5 and A-6) to a working paper that Erickson cites 

as technical support for the oil market model, and which he uses as the basis for his Expert Report. See See P. 

Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow. Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure on U.S. 

oil production and global CO2 emissions. 2017. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper 2017-02. 

42 See P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow. Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure 

on U.S. oil production and global CO2 emissions. 2017. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper 2017-02., 

Table A-5, p. 47. See also P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies 

on United States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017)

43 Gilbert E. Metcalf, “The Impact of Removing Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and natural Gas Production: Measuring 

Tax Subsidies by an Equivalent Price Impact Approach,” NBER Working Paper Series, NBER, August 2016, available 

online at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22537.pdf. See Table 5, p. 40, which indicates that the change in drilling 

rates for independent on shore oil producers is an 8.2 decrease (given an absence of subsidy). For consistency I 

will cite the NBER version of the paper because that is what Erickson cited, but the more authoritative version is 

peer-reviewed and published: Gilbert E. Metcalf. "The Impact of Removing Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and Gas 

Production" Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Vol. 5 Iss. 1 (2017) p. 1 – 37. 

Doi: 10.1086/693367

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677 the differences are even larger. Specifically, according to Erickson’s research, 100% of 

independent offshore drilling depends on subsidy, 678 44 whereas Metcalf concludes that just 17% of 

independent offshore drilling depends on subsidy.45 679 

680

681 Erickson’s Expert Report suggests that his findings are consistent with “university and research 

682 studies” (page 15), wherein he specifically cites to the Metcalf study (page 15, FN 33). 

683 However, as per the parameters summarized above, my assessment of the Metcalf analysis 

684 suggests a conclusion that is opposite to that proffered by Erickson. Specifically, at least for oil, 

685 the Metcalf study suggests that Federal government subsidies have little impact on U.S. oil 

686 production because most of the types of wells drilled for new production (onshore and offshore) 

687 are profitable without subsidies. 

688

689 In addition, Erickson cites three times to a policy brief by Joe Aldy, implying a further 

690 consistency between his opinion and that of other experts. (Aldy is an economist—formerly in 

691 the U.S. Government and now at Harvard’s Kennedy School.) My examination of the Aldy brief 

692 suggests that, in fact, it is not consistent with Erickson’s position. Specifically, Aldy concludes 

693 that oil production subsidies “have a very small impact on production, their removal will not 

materially increase retail fuel prices, reduce employment, or weaken U.S. energy security.”46 694

695

696 With regard to the study completed by Wood Mackenzie, which Erickson discussed only in 

697 passing in his Expert Report, the key question of concern is whether preferential tax treatment 

698 associated with Intangible Drilling Costs (IDC) has a material impact on oil production, prices, 

699 oil consumption, and by extension emissions contribution. The oil industry is attentive to IDC, 

700 because it is the largest single subsidy for oil and gas production. In Erickson’s own study 

701 published in Nature Energy, he and his co-authors also find that IDC has the single largest 

impact on the IRR that they estimate for new drilling.47 702 For example, in 2015, it accounted for 

 44 See P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow. Effect of government subsidies for upstream oil infrastructure 

on U.S. oil production and global CO2 emissions. 2017. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper 2017-02., 

Table A-5, p. 47, Table A-5, p. 47.

45 Gilbert E. Metcalf, “The Impact of Removing Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and natural Gas Production: Measuring 

Tax Subsidies by an Equivalent Price Impact Approach,” NBER Working Paper Series, NBER, August 2016, available 

online at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22537.pdf. See Table 5, p. 40, which indicates that the change in drilling 

rates for independent on shore oil producers is an 8.2 decrease (given an absence of subsidy). There are many 

differences between the models that can explain these results, not least of which is the fact that the Metcalf 

results are presented independent of price, whereas Erickson’s team presents their own model with pricedependent results. The Metcalf study is presented in a working paper by an academic foreign policy think tank 

(The Council on Foreign Relations—I am a member of that organization), and the Erickson detailed studies are 

presented in a working paper by a think tank, with which he is affiliated (Stockholm Environment Institute). 

Neither of these working papers appears to be reviewed in the manner typical of academic journals, and neither 

author has been asked to do the detailed model-by-model comparisons that are typical in the energy modeling 

community. 

46 Joseph E. Aldy, “Report: Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies,” February 26, 2013, Proposal 5 in Brookings Institution, 

“15 Ways to Rethink the Federal Budget,” published February 22, 2013, available online at: 

https://www.brookings.edu/research/eliminating-fossil-fuel-subsidies/. 

47 See the waterfall charts in figure 2 of P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil 

fuel companies on United States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017),

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$1.6b/yr in subsidy.

48 703 But this amount must be kept in perspective. As a measure of 

comparison, $1.6b/yr is 0.6% of the produced value of oil and gas in the U.S.49 704 

705

706 In my view, the issue of concern is not whether the oil industry would prefer to preserve a 

707 preferential tax treatment, but rather whether eliminating the preferential treatment (or subsidy) 

708 for IDC has a material impact on oil production. I discuss the particulars of this study by Wood 

709 Mackenzie, and its relevance to Erickson’s opinion in more detail below.

710

711 First, Erickson’s own research—published elsewhere, but not discussed in his Expert Report—

712 reveals that the magnitude of effects in the Wood Mackenzie model differ from those in 

Erickson’s model by a factor of two or more.50 713 By citing the Wood Mackenzie model as a basis 

714 for his opinion, yet offering an opinion that deviates substantially from that study, Erickson 

715 confounds the question of the impact of subsidies on production. Given the breadth of 

716 uncertainty raised by the differences in subsidy effects analyzed in the Erickson, Metcalf, and 

717 Wood Mackenzie studies, the actual impacts of subsidies on oil production appear to be a matter 

718 of substantial debate. In my view, the degrees of difference between all three analysis reinforce 

719 that Erickson’s opinion, as proffered in his Expert Report is unreliable.

720

721 Second, the scope of the Wood Mackenzie study is different than that of Erickson’s research. 

722 Erickson is focused on oil production; oil is a highly marketable commodity, easily transported 

723 to market. By contrast, the Wood Mackenzie study examined the impact of IDC on oil and gas 

724 drilling activity. In general, the drilling costs associated with gas wells tend to be more sensitive 

725 to costs, and therefore more sensitive to changes in preferential tax treatment, because the price 

726 of gas remains low in the U.S. due to the technological advances associated with shale gas 

727 exploration. Erickson is silent on these significant methodological differences in approach 

728 between his analysis and the Wood Mackenzie study. Given these methodological differences, it 

729 is not self-evident that the Wood Mackenzie study supports Erickson’s analysis. In my view, 

730 across the array of studies on which Erickson relies to form the basis of his opinion, there is no 

731 consensus on the effect of subsidies on oil production

732

733 In addition to Erickson’s discussion regarding onshore drilling, which I find to be 

734 unsubstantiated and unreliable, the modeling studies that Erickson uses as a basis for his opinion 

735 include estimates that 73% of undeveloped offshore resources depend on subsidy to be economic 

736 at $50/bbl. In my view, this finding, and thus the opinions in Erickson’s Report that are based in 

 48 According to US Government estimates that are reprinted in Table 2 of Erickson’s expert report.

49 See discussion under Finding #3 of this report. Total market value of oil produced in the United States in 2015 

was about $172b, and the value of produced natural gas in 2015 was about $72b. Therefore, $1.6 billion divided by 

($172b + $72b) yields approximately 0.0065306, or 0.6 percent. Here I focus on oil and gas together because IDC 

applies to both, but Erickson’s analysis looks only at oil. 

50 The Wood Mackenzie study finds that 40% of onshore projects depend on this subsidy, compared with Erickson’s 

own research, suggesting that 18% of onshore projects have such dependency. Offshore, the results are reversed 

and even larger—9% for Wood Mackenzie and 25% for the Erickson team. See Wood Mackenzie, Impacts of 

Delaying IDC Deductibility (2014-2025), prepared for the American Petroleum Institute, 2013, available online at: 

http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/taxes/13-july/api-us-idc-delay-impacts-release-7-11-13.pdf and P. 

Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies on United States crude oil 

production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017), Table A-6, p. 48. 

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737 part on this finding, also is unsubstantiated and unreliable. The study by Metcalf, which looked 

at this issue, offers no such support for that conclusion.51 738 Nor does one find support in the real 

739 world. Prior to 2014, when oil prices were high, a coalition led by BP planned a $20b offshore 

740 oil production project in the Gulf of Mexico called “Mad Dog 2.” Co-located near an existing oil 

741 field (Mad Dog 1), Mad Dog 2 would produce 140,000 barrels per day. When oil prices crashed 

742 in 2014, Mad Dog 2 was idled and redesigned using more standardized platform designs and a 

743 host of improvements that radically reduced costs. In December 2016, when oil prices were 

744 forecasted at $50/bbl, or about half the level prior to the price crash of 2014, BP restarted Mad 

745 Dog 2. In announcing the venture, BP’s CEO stated: “This announcement shows that big deep

746 water projects can still be economic in a low-price environment in the US if they are designed in 

a smart and cost-effective way.” 747 52 Although these changes are under way in the real world, in 

748 Erickson’s peer-reviewed Nature Energy paper, he and his co-authors exclude offshore drilling 

749 from the main display figure. They state: “...Very few projects for offshore Gulf of Mexico are

750 economic at an oil price of US $50 per barrel, and the effect of subsidies is both small in IRR 

terms and highly variable.”53 751 Yet, it is precisely in that real-world context—oil at $50, and 

752 subsidies that have a small and variable effect on the internal rate of return (IRR) for offshore 

753 drilling, that BP restarted Mad Dog 2, arguably one of the largest new oil production projects in 

754 the Gulf of Mexico. This anecdote illustrates that the industry is accustomed to responding to 

755 changes in the fiscal environment for projects that are forecasted to yield returns irrespective of 

756 the contemplated elimination of direct subsidies.

757

758 In my opinion, tinkering at the margins of the fossil fuel sector with subsidy policy—even an 

759 extreme tinkering with Erickson’s proposed realignment of the U.S. tax code—is dwarfed in 

760 relevance by market and technological forces. Direct production subsidies are on the scale of 1% 

761 of industry production; real technological and operational changes have responded to changes of 

762 50% in the value of produced oil in just a few years. Further, the studies Erickson relies upon to 

763 support his arguments fail to evince a clear relationship between subsidy policy and oil 

764 production.

765

766 Finding #5. CHANGING FEDERAL COAL LEASING POLICIES WILL HAVE SMALL 

767 EFFECTS ON US CONSUMPTION OF COAL AND EMISSIONS CONTRIBUTIONS

768

769 In his Expert Report, Erickson states:

770

771 “...federal land leasing practices show how the Federal Government plays a 

772 significant role in aiding and facilitating U.S. fossil fuel extraction” (page 19)

773

774 Essentially, Erickson asserts that the U.S. subsidizes fossil fuel extraction by leasing federal 

775 lands to industry actors, and failing to charge lessees the full cost of extraction from federal 

 51 Gilbert E. Metcalf, “The Impact of Removing Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and natural Gas Production: Measuring 

Tax Subsidies by an Equivalent Price Impact Approach,” NBER Working Paper Series, NBER, August 2016, available 

online at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22537.pdf. 52 Jessica Tippee, “Re-engineered Mad Dog Phase 2 gets the greenlight,” Offshore, January 2, 2018, available online 

at: https://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-77/issue-12/top-offshore-projects/re-engineering-maddog-phase-2-gets-the-greenlight.html.

53 See caption to figure 2 on page 894: P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil 

fuel companies on United States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017)

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776 lands. Erickson, in particular, focuses his analysis of leasing reform on coal. In his Expert 

777 Report, Stiglitz offers supporting comments for coal leasing reforms that would charge producers 

778 the full costs of extraction from federal lands, including charges for the harm caused by GHG 

779 emissions (page 36); Stiglitz asserts that the U.S. should “cease approvals for any new fossil fuel 

780 infrastructure.” (page 39) 

781

782 I examine the impacts of coal leasing reforms as asserted by Erickson in his Expert Report,

783 because this is the area where it is possible to compare Erickson’s assertions with leasing reform 

784 proposals that have been the subject of quantitative examination by other analysts. The issue at 

785 hand is whether eliminating federal leasing practices for coal extraction would have a material 

786 impact on the U.S. output of coal, the price of coal, and thus coal consumption and attendant 

787 emissions contributions in the U.S. I believe that the research on this issue is nuanced and 

788 largely unsupportive of Erickson’s findings. I discuss the basis for my opinion below. 

789

790 First, it is difficult to evaluate the data and methods used by Erickson, and therefore substantiate 

791 his conclusions regarding federal leasing reform. Erickson does not offer a model-based analysis 

792 as the basis for his views, nor does he offer the findings of an independent literature review. 

793 Instead, Erickson appears to base his conclusion on the logic of supply and demand; he suggests 

794 that leasing reforms will constrain supply, prices will then go up, and demand must go down. 

795 He observes that the impact of leasing reforms on fuel prices and CO2 emissions “depends on 

796 one’s view of how fuel markets operate” (page 18). Yet, Erickson’s analysis includes no serious 

797 attention to how the coal market actually functions. The users of coal (mainly electric utilities) 

798 are under extensive regulatory and business pressures that affect the ultimate demand for coal. 

799 Moreover, transportation costs are a larger share of delivered fuel prices. When transport is 

800 expensive, changes in production costs have a smaller impact on the cost of delivered coal. 

801 Further, even if major sources of fossil fuels from federal lands are curtailed—for example, if 

802 coal extracted from federal lands were to become more expensive or curtailed altogether—then, 

803 in a free market structure, other suppliers could potentially offset or erase the effects from federal 

804 leasing reforms. 

805

806 I agree with Erickson that an understanding of how markets operate is critically important; in 

807 my view, the qualitative schematic that Erickson offers to explain behavior in the coal market is 

808 not accurate. In my opinion, wholesale reform of federal fossil fuel leasing policies warrants 

809 more rigorous analysis of attendant impacts than that presented by Erickson in his Expert Report. 

810

811 Second, Erickson demonstrates lack of attention to the existing literature on the topic of federal 

812 fossil fuel leasing reform. Similar to his discussion of subsidy reform, Erickson’s Expert Report 

813 suggests that academic research is supportive of his conclusions. As the basis for his opinion, 

814 Erickson asserts there has been little analysis of the impact on emissions of constraints imposed 

815 on U.S. fossil fuel production. In my opinion, this is incorrect. Erickson also posits that there is 

816 widespread agreement regarding the effects of leasing reform fossil fuel markets. He cites to a 

817 body of literature focused on the function of energy markets (ref 53 in the Erickson report); yet, 

818 he does not elaborate on what those studies actually show. My examination of this literature, and 

819 all the other literature that Erickson cites with regard to the coal market, reveals that, on balance, 

820 the most reliable expert studies are not supportive of Erickson’s position. My review of 

821 Erickson’s Expert Report reveals that, despite citing various bodies of literature in support of his 

822 opinions, Erickson fails to acknowledge and rebut the areas of differences between the literature 

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823 cited and his findings. In fact, the studies cited by Erickson offer a more nuanced view of the 

824 impacts of coal leasing reforms than that asserted by Erickson in his Expert Report. Below, I 

825 discuss my assessment of two studies cited by Erickson

826

827 The first study cited in ref 53 of Erickson is a detailed model analysis by Gerarden et al., 2016. 

828 This study examines the coal leasing reforms that Erickson asserts should be adopted by the U.S. 

829 The Gerarden study reveals interactions that explain why federal leasing reforms have indirect 

and small impacts on emissions contributions.

54 830 Notably, the study reveals that only about 40% 

831 of US coal production comes from federal lands, and thus the impact of leasing reforms on total 

832 production requires modeling of the entire coal market—federal and non-federal sources. The 

833 study further cautions that any such modeling effort also must address the fact that higher prices 

on federal lands likely will be offset by new coal supplies arising from non-federal lands.55 834 It is 

835 instructive to note that, since 2008, U.S. coal shipments to the electric power sector (by far the 

836 dominant user of coal in the country) have already declined 36%--an amount nearly equal to 

Gerarden et al.’s estimate of the entire production from federal lands.56 837 Those declines are due 

838 principally to factors unrelated to coal leasing reform—such as inexpensive natural gas and

larger mandates for (and greater economic competitiveness of) renewable energy 839 57—and are 

840 indicative of the large excess supply of coal that stands ready to fill the market even if changes to 

841 federal coal leasing affected the supply and price of coal. 

842

843 Other academic studies reveal complementary findings to those of Gerarden et al., 2016. For 

844 example, a study by the consultancy ICF looks at a large number of scenarios that include many 

interventions in the federal coal leasing program.

58 845 This study has the advantage that the model 

846 used allows calculation of the full array of energy sources used to generate electricity (known as 

847 the “generation mix”), and thus can examine the impact of coal leasing reforms on consumption 

848 of coal by the industry’s largest customer (power utilities) and total emissions. Erickson cites 

849 this study to support the point that curtailment in federal coal leasing will lead to substitution of 

850 coal by less emission-intensive renewables or natural gas (page 19). In fact, the ICF study is 

851 much more nuanced and generally finds the opposite conclusion regarding the generation mix. 

852 That study concludes that the leasing reforms have little impact because “...increased production 

853 from non-federal coal offsets the reductions in federal coal, leaving national coal-fired 

 54 Todd Gerarden, W. Spencer Reeder, and James H. Stock, “Federal Coal Program Reform, the Clean Power Plan, 

and the Interaction of Upstream and Downstream Climate Policies,” NBER Working Paper No. 22214, issued April 

2016, available online at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22214. An assumption in this analysis is that coal buyers 

face other limits on the cost-effectiveness of coal purchases when compared with other fuels, such as natural gas. 

Gerarden et al., 2016 model those limits using the CPP, but any other set of similar constraints would have similar 

effects and lead to the same conclusion; that is, coal leasing reforms have minimal impact on coal production, 

consumption and emissions. Despite current policy discussions about repeal of the CPP, large coal-fired electric 

utilities (the main buyers of coal in the United States) are making investment and operational plans as if the CPP or 

other incentives, such as state-level policies, would continue to exist. Thus the Gerarden et al analysis remains 

germane to the real world effects of a potential coal leasing reform. 

55 Ibid. 56 US Energy Information Administration. US Coal Shipments Reach Their Lowest Level in Years. 2018. 

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36812 57 K. Larsen, J. Larsen, W. Herndon, S. Mohan, and T. Houser, Taking Stock 2017: Adjusting Expectations for US GHG 

Emissions (Rhodium Group, 2017). 58 Vulcan/ICF, “Federal Coal Leasing Reform Options: Effects on CO2 Emissions and Energy Markets, Summary of 

Modeling Results, Final Report” (Vulcan, Inc. report with analysis supported by ICF International, January 26, 2016)

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854 generation unchanged.” Yet Erickson concludes his assessment of coal leasing reforms with the 

855 statement that “any constraints on coal supply are expected to affect prices and lead to reduced 

856 coal consumption for power generation [and lower CO2 emissions].” (page 19) 

857

858 Erickson offers this conclusion despite the fact that, in the actual U.S. coal market, whether 

859 “any” constraint on supply affects demand depends on the actions of substitute suppliers and on 

860 factors that affect demand for coal. This is especially true in the electric power sector, where 

861 most coal is consumed in the U.S., and where coal competes directly with rival sources of power, 

862 such as renewables and natural gas . For example, Erickson cites a recent study by Houser et al., 

863 which explores whether coal can make a “comeback.” This study is instructive, because it looks 

864 exactly at the kinds of policy scenarios that Erickson is considering. Specifically, Houser et al 

865 assess the effects of coal leasing reforms on the competitiveness of coal, and then assess 

866 outcomes assuming such policies were removed. Houser et al conclude that a shift in policy

867 “could stem the recent decline in U.S. coal consumption, but only if natural gas prices increase 

868 going forward. If natural gas prices remain at or near current levels or renewable costs fall more 

quickly than expected, U.S. coal consumption will continue its decline.”59 869 I believe that current 

870 drilling behavior and technological advances in the gas market suggest that prices for natural gas 

871 will remain low for the foreseeable future. 

872

873 In my opinion, irrespective of federal fossil fuel leasing reforms or reversal of preferential tax874 based subsidies, it is probable that coal extraction will continue to decline over time, and 

875 attendant emissions contributions also will decline. I base this opinion on the breadth of my 

876 institutional expertise and assessment of the literature.

877

878 Finding #6. THE U.S. DID NOT FAIL TO TAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO 

879 ELIMINATE FOSSIL FUELS AFTER THE ENERGY CRISES OF THE 1970S.

880

881 In his Expert Report, Stiglitz asserts that, since the watershed moments of the 1970s, the U.S. has 

882 perpetuated a fossil energy system. Specifically, Stiglitz states:

883

884 “The fact that the U.S. national energy system is so predominately fossil fuel885 based is not an inevitable consequence of history. With the oil crises of the 1970s, 

886 recognition of the risks of dependence on oil was developed (though these risks 

887 were markedly different from those with which we are concerned today). Even 

888 then, it was clear that there were viable alternatives, and with the appropriate 

889 allocation of further resources to R&D, it is likely that these alternatives would 

890 have been even more competitive. Thus, the current level of dependence of our 

891 energy system on fossil fuels is a result of intentional actions taken by Defendants 

892 over many years (including subsidization of fossil fuels and inactions in the form 

893 of not providing adequate support for alternatives).” (page 12)

894

895 Stiglitz further states:

 59 Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters, Center on Global Energy Policy, “Can Coal Make a 

Comeback?” April 2017, available online at: 

http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Center%20on%20Global%20Energy%20Policy%20Can%20Coa

l%20Make%20a%20Comeback%20April%202017.pdf. 

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896 “I would note that inactions in this sense are affirmative decisions by Defendants 

897 not to act.” (page 12)

898

899 In my opinion, this assertion is not well-substantiated and is misleading. Stiglitz does not identify 

900 plausible, real-world actions that the U.S. could have taken that would have led to appreciably 

901 different outcomes. Contrary to what Stiglitz asserts, I believe that the dependence on fossil 

902 fuels which existed prior to oil crises of the 1970s, and which exists today, is the “inevitable 

903 consequence of history.” (page 12) Two facts support my opinion. 

904

905 First, every major industrial economy faced similar challenges during the energy crises of the 

906 1970s, and each of these economies emerged from the crises with energy systems dominated by 

fossil fuels.60 907 Although several of these economies invested in the leading renewable power 

908 system of the day—hydroelectric energy—each economy remained dependent on fossil fuels. 

909 Two of these large industrial economies—France and Japan—invested in nuclear power. In the 

910 case of France, which made the most decisive shift to nuclear power of any major economy, half 

of its energy system relies on fossil fuels and 41% relies on nuclear power.61 911 In the case of 

912 Japan, nuclear power accounted for 15% of the country’s energy system, and fossil fuels 

accounted for 80%.

62 913 Since 1998, the share of fossil fuels has increased. I cite to these examples 

914 to illustrate that the U.S. was not alone in its response to the energy challenges arising from the 

915 crises of 1970. Despite all this sustained attention the challenge of fossil fuel supply across the 

916 global economy and despite substantial spending on alternative energy systems, fossil fuels 

917 remained the dominant energy source for the global economy and all major industrial economies. 

918 In my expert opinion, as a historian of energy technology, I believe that the global race to 

919 dependence on fossil fuels, indeed, was inevitable. Further, my opinion is supported by 

internationally recognized historians in energy technology.

63 920 

921

922 Second, Stiglitz’s assertion that dependence on fossil fuels was not an “inevitable consequence 

923 of history” is based on the premise that viable alternatives to fossil fuels were available, but for a 

924 failure of the Federal government to invest in associated research, development and 

925 demonstration of new technologies (RD&D). Stiglitz misrepresents the magnitude and breadth 

 60 The one possible exception to this statement is the Soviet Union, a large industrial economy that, at the time 

embraced central planning and had significant fossil fuel production of its own. It did not experience the energy 

crises of the 1970s in the same way. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union also maintained a fossil fuel-dominated energy 

system. 

61 These data computed from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, a widely used expert reference source, 

available online at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-worldenergy.html. Data for France are for 2015, the peak year for nuclear since 1965 and thus the year when fossil fuels 

accounted for their smallest share of the French energy system. The French share of fossil energy declined below 

70% for the first time in 1985 as the country’s nuclear deployment program accelerated and has been below that 

level ever since.

62 Ibid.

63 .H. Ausubel, A. Grubel, and N. Nakicenovic, “Carbon Dioxide Emissions in a Methane Economy,” Climatic Change

12:245 (1998). Vaclav Smil, Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertanties Cambridge: MIT Press, 

February 11, 2005. 

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of the Federal government’s contributions to RD&D.64 926 I have examined the data, and contrary to 

927 Stiglitz’s assertion, the U.S. has devoted a substantial and growing fraction of its RD&D budget 

928 in the known alternatives to fossil fuels. Figure 5 shows public-sector energy-related spending 

929 (in constant dollars) on R&D by source. The data supports my conclusion that the U.S. 

930 substantially invested in zero-emission and low emissions technologies: nuclear power, 

931 renewables, and energy efficiency. When viewed holistically, since 1980, a greater proportion of 

932 public-sector spending has focused on non-fossil fuel related energy systems than on fossil fuels. 

933

934 Figure 5: U.S. public sector energy-related spending on research, development and 

935 demonstration (RD&D) since 1980. Source: IEA RD&D database—see the U.S. time series 

936 data, total RD&D in million 2017USD at market exchange rates 

937 (http://wds.iea.org/WDS/TableViewer/dimView.aspx?ReportId=1399)

938

939 A cornerstone of Stiglitz’s opinion is that renewable technologies—zero-emission alternatives—

940 were ripe for increased public-sector investment, and if only the U.S. had made those 

941 investments, then renewables would have become a leading source of the U.S. energy supply

942 instead of fossil fuels. Stiglitz’s but-for argument is a form of revisionist history that is not 

943 supported by the facts of the time. 

944

945 As illustrated in Figure 6, during the energy crises of the 1970s and 1980s, renewable power was 

946 a costly, niche option for energy supply. Specifically, Figure 6 charts time series data on the state 

947 of performance for leading wind and solar technologies, as well as for gas turbines there were 

 64 Stiglitz comments mainly about “R&D,” as a general concept. I use the term RD&D, because for most energy 

technologies the last “D” is important—demonstration of new concepts at commercial scale is usually needed 

before the private sector will, on its own, invest in new technologies. 

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948 also a relatively new technology at the time. Based on my assessment of this chart, I conclude 

949 that advances in wind and solar technology have facilitated, and will continue to facilitate,

950 improvements in renewables in the U.S. energy system. However, at the time of the first energy 

951 crises in the 1970s, these technologies were cost-prohibitive, and the scale of their performance 

952 potential was relatively unknown.

953

954 Figure 6: Performance (measured in $ capital expenditure for kilowatt of energy output 

955 potential) over time for leading photovoltaics (also known as solar cells), wind and gas turbine 

956 technologies. The chart shows the cost of buying each technology, and how cost improved with 

957 time and investment. The basis for my opinion is the snapshot around 19800s, when solar cells 

958 approached $20,000 USD/kw, wind was about $3000 USD/kw, and still immature gas turbines

were more than $1000 USD/kw.

65 959 For comparison, coal fired power plants were, at the time, 

about $700 for coal-fired power plants.66 960 Put differently, the categories of renewable energy 

961 technologies that today are most promising (solar and wind) were approximately 25x to 5x the 

962 capital cost of coal plants. These novel power sources were also less reliable and, in the case of 

963 gas, burned fuel that was more costly. Source: Arnulf Grubler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic and David 

 65 The study for figure 6 is but one, although a fairly comprehensive review of the literature. More recent 

retrospectives on renewable technology point to similar findings—for example, the Lantz et al retrospective on 

wind power, which puts the capital cost of wind projects around 1980 in the US at about $3300/kw (converted to 

1990$ with the GDP deflator). See E. Lantz, M. Hand, R. Wiser. The Past and Future Cost of Wind Energy. 2010. 

NREL Preprint 

66 A major retrospective analysis of coal-fired power plants puts the capital cost at about $1000 USD/kw capacity in 

the 1970s. That figure is in 2006$, which converted to 1990$ using the GDP deflator (to make it comparable with 

figure 6) is about $700. For the retrospective see J. McNerney, J.D. Farmer, and J.E. Trancik, “Historical costs of 

coal-fired electrticity and implications for the future,” 39 Energy Policy 3042-3054 (2011). 

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964 G. Victor, “Dynamics of energy technologies and global change,” Energy Policy 27(5):247-280, 

965 1999.

966

967 Stiglitz fails to acknowledge that, in the late 1970s, there was little experience with renewables 

968 technology, and what experience did exist suggests such technologies would be substantially 

969 more costly than existing commercial rivals. Figure 6 suggests on the order of 10 times more 

970 expensive. Further, during this era, the U.S. was already adopting a range of policies aimed at 

971 supporting renewables and assisting other low-emission technologies to become cost 

972 competitive. For example, in 1978, the U.S. reformed its energy policies to facilitate the entry of 

new energy technologies, including their ability to connect to the U.S. power grid.

67 973 In addition, 

974 the U.S. was actively supporting nuclear power, efficiency, fuel cells and other major options. 

975

976 Finding #7. ERRORS OF OMISSION: CLIMATE CHANGE REQUIRES 

977 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, WHICH IS A MATTER FOR WELL978 PROSECUTED FOREIGN POLICY 

979

980 In my expert opinion, effective solutions to mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change 

981 necessitate engaged cooperation between the U.S. and its international partners. My review of 

982 the expert reports submitted by Erickson and Stiglitz fail to adequately address the importance of 

983 international cooperation in addressing climate change. The omission by Erickson and Stiglitz to 

984 address the importance of international cooperation in addressing climate change leads to 

985 misleading conclusions about the breadth and scope of the challenges associated with slowing 

986 and reversing climate change, and the role of the U.S. in redressing these challenges. Below, I 

987 discuss the basis for my opinion

988

989 First, technologies and fuels are traded globally. GHGs, once emitted, mix globally, as does the 

990 heat created when those GHGs alter the climate. As such, the capacity of the U.S. to alter the 

991 global trajectory of climate change through unilateral domestic action is limited. For example, 

992 assume the U.S. government unilaterally ceased all emissions contributions from its own 

993 footprint. The countervailing impact of its actions would be to reduce global emissions by less 

than 1%, which is less than the annual change in global emissions between 2011 and 2012.

68 994 

 67 See the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, 16 U.S. Code 46 § 2601 et 

seq, enacted November 9, 1978. 

68 The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy (EERE) publishes annual Federal 

Agency Greenhouse Gas Inventory data at 

http://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/Annual/Report/ComprehensiveGreenhouseGasGHGInventoriesByAgencyAndFiscalY

ear.aspx. These data indicate that 2012 greenhouse gas emissions across all Federal Agencies totaled 164.39 

million metric tons of CO2 equivalent. This number can be calculated by summing the subtotals for Scope 1

(15.188 and 45.623 and 0.831 million metric tons), Scope 2 (30.4 and 0.89 and 1.912 million metric tons) , and 

Scope 3 (16.537 and 52.683 and 0.326 million metric tons) emissions across all three of the emissions categories 

provided. The EDGAR 4.2 FT2012 (all GHGs) dataset, referenced as the source for Figure 2 earlier in this Expert 

Report, does not provide data beyond 2012; its estimate for global GHG emissions as of 2012 is 

53,526.3028283888 million metric tons. Dividing approximately 161 million by approximately 53,526 million yields 

approximately 0.003, or 0.3% of global emissions. By comparison, the EDGAR data used in this Expert Report as a 

reference for Figure 2 indicate a year-over-year change in total global greenhouse gas emissions between 2011 

and 2012 of 1.39 percent, or approximately 52,791 million metric tons in 2011 to 53,562 million metric tons in 

2012.

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995 Further, assume that the U.S. economy as a whole eliminated all of its territorial emissions 

996 contributions, which in 2012 accounted for 12% of global emissions. That 12% reduction would 

997 be offset to some degree by countervailing responses in other countries. Lower US demand for 

998 fuels, such as oil could lower the global price for oil and raise consumption and emissions in 

999 other countries. Higher costs of industrial production in the US due to higher energy costs could 

1000 shift industrial activity to other countries, leading to expanded consumption of fossil energy and 

1001 emissions abroad. Higher demand in the US for renewable energy technologies and other 

1002 elements of a zero emission energy system could raise the price of those technologies globally, 

1003 leading to reduced use abroad and higher emissions. Deriving a quantitative measure of such 

1004 impacts requires understanding of how the global markets and other governments would respond 

1005 to such actions. Stiglitz offers no such estimate for the size of these countervailing responses, 

1006 except to say that “U.S. emissions will not be perfectly offset,” (page 41) a statement for which 

1007 he cites a study that does not examine the extreme scenario he contemplates. Nor does Stiglitz 

1008 offer any other citations to supporting literature or analysis; he also does not acknowledge that 

1009 even a complete cessation of US emissions without any offsetting effect would alter global 

1010 emissions only 12%. 

1011

1012 Stiglitz suggests in his Expert Report that if the U.S. were to lead with extreme action, such as 

ceasing approval for any new fossil fuel infrastructure, that others nations would follow.69 1013

1014 Stiglitz does not quantify the magnitude of this effect, nor does he offer guideposts to estimate 

1015 the possible impacts. My review of academic studies that have examined the effects of 

1016 leadership in areas where countries already are instituting reductions in emissions suggests that 

leadership, in fact, does not automatically generate followership.70 1017 Leadership without 

1018 cooperation and coordination can be counter productive, reducing the impact of unilateral actions 

1019 on emissions. Failure to demonstrate cooperation in tandem with leadership can also undermine 

1020 political support needed to sustain emissions controls. 

1021

1022 Second, international cooperation requires international institutions for cooperation, including 

1023 venues to encourage dialogue and treaties to foster engagement. The U.S. has been at the 

1024 forefront of efforts to build those institutions. For example, the U.S. has been a seminal 

participant in the IPCC.

71 1025 The U.S. also was one of the key architects of the 1992 Framework 

1026 Convention on Climate Change, and served as a leading force (along with China and France) in 

creating the 2015 Paris Agreement.72 1027

1028

 69 See page 41. Stiglitz asserts that, because the U.S. is a big emitter leadership though its actions “has a significant 

impact on these global outcomes”, referring to the outcomes of lower emissions globally, and the avoidance of an 

offsetting “leakage” of emissions to other jurisdictions. 

70 David G. Victor et al., “Turning Paris into reality at the University of California,” Nature Climate Change 8:183-

185, 2018. Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “Cooperation and Discord in Global Climate Policy,” Nature 

Climate Change. 2016. DOI: 10.1038/NCLIMATE2937

71 Alan D Hecht and Dennis Tirpak. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History. 

1995. 29 Climatic Change 371-402. 

72 On the US role see for example C.F. Parker and C. Karlsson, “The UN climate change negotiations and the role of 

the United States: assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris” 27 Environmental Politics 519-540 

(2018). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2018.1442388

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1029 In my opinion, mitigating climate change requires the committed engagement of the U.S. and its 

1030 international partners. I believe that the measured progress realized to date reflects mainly the 

1031 complexity and political challenges associated with crafting effective international cooperation,

1032 rather than neglect of the topic by the U.S. government. It is my expert opinion that the 

1033 simplistic and narrowly-focused approaches posited by Stiglitz and Erickson with respect to U.S. 

1034 engagement—which advocate unilateral action and gloss over the challenges inherent to 

1035 international engagement and cooperation—fail to respect the global nature of the problem, the 

1036 need for an integrated, portfolio-based solution and the essential role for diplomacy in the 

1037 process of implementing that solution.

1038

1039 IV. INFORMATION RELIED UPON AND CONSIDERED

1040

1041 Alan D Hecht and Dennis Tirpak. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific 

1042 and Policy History. 1995. 29 Climatic Change 371-402

1043 Arnulf Grubler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic and David G. Victor, “Dynamics of energy 

1044 technologies and global change,” Energy Policy 27(5):247-280, 1999.

1045 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, a widely used expert reference source, available 

1046 online at: https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical1047 review-of-world-energy.html.

1048 Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel

1049 Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751-2014, national-level dataset dated 

1050 March 5, 2017, http://cdiac.ess-dive.lbl.gov/ftp/ndp030/nation.1751_2014.ems.

1051 C.F. Parker and C. Karlsson, “The UN climate change negotiations and the role of the 

1052 United States: assessing American leadership from Copenhagen to Paris” 27 

1053 Environmental Politics 519-540 

1054 (2018). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2018.1442388

1055 Collin Eaton, “The numbers behind the Permian spotlight at OTC,” Houston Chronicle, 

1056 May 1, 2018, available online at: https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/The1057 numbers-behind-the-Permian-spotlight-at-OTC-12878811.php.

1058 David G. Victor and Bruce Jones, “Undiplomatic action: A practical guide to the new 

1059 politics and geopolitics of climate change,” Brookings Institution report, February 2018, 

1060 available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/undiplomatic-action-a1061 practical-guide-to-the-new-politics-and-geopolitics-of-climate-change/

1062 David G. Victor and Kassia Yanosek, “The Next Energy Revolution: The Promise and Peril 

1063 of High-Tech Innovation,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2017), available online at: 

1064 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/next-energy-revolution.

1065 David G. Victor et al., “Turning Paris into reality at the University of California,” Nature 

1066 Climate Change 8:183-185, 2018.

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1067 David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for 

1068 Protecting the Planet, Cambridge University Press: 2011.

1069 Drew Shindell, et al., “Simultaneously Mitigating Near-Term Climate Change and 

1070 Improving Human Health and Food Security,” Science 335(6065):183-189, Jan. 13, 2012.

1071 Edgar G. Hertwich and Glen P. Peters, “Carbon Footprint of Nations: A Global, Trade1072 Linked Analysis,” Environmental Science & Technology, 43(16):6414-6420, June 15, 

1073 2009.

1074 Federal Defendants’ Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 

1075 Relief (ECF No. 7), Kelsey Cascadia Rose Juliana, et al. v. United States of America et al., 

1076 Case No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, Document No. 98, filed January 13, 2015, page 5, paragraph 

1077 7.

1078 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Kelsey Cascadia Rose 

1079 Juliana, et al. v. United States of America et al., Case No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, Document 

1080 No. 7, filed September 10, 2015, page 3, paragraph 7.

1081 Gilbert E. Metcalf, “The Impact of Removing Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and natural Gas 

1082 Production: Measuring Tax Subsidies by an Equivalent Price Impact Approach,” NBER 

1083 Working Paper Series, NBER, August 2016, available online at: 

1084 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22537.pdf.

1085 Glen P. Peters, Jan C. Minx, Christopher L. Weber, and Ottmar Edenhofer, “Growth in 

1086 emissions transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008,” Proceedings of the 

1087 National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS) May 24, 2011 

1088 108(21):8903-8908.

1089 GP Peters and EG Hertwich, “CO2 Embodied in international trade with implications for 

1090 global climate policy,” Environmental Science & Technology, 42(5):1401-7, Mar 1, 2008.

1091 J.H. Ausubel, A. Grubel, and N. Nakicenovic, “Carbon Dioxide Emissions in a Methane 

1092 Economy,” Climatic Change 12:245 (1998).

1093 J. McNerney, J.D. Farmer, and J.E. Trancik, “Historical costs of coal-fired electrticity and 

1094 implications for the future,” 39 Energy Policy 3042-3054 (2011)

1095 James Bacchus, on behalf of the E15 Expert Group on Measures to Address Climate 

1096 Change and the Trade System, “Global Rules for Mutually Supportive and Reinforcing 

1097 Trade and Climate Regimes,” January 2016, available online at: 

1098 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Climate_Change_POP.pdf. 

1099 Jennifer Burney, Charles Kennel, and David G. Victor, “Getting serious about the new 

1100 realities of global climate change,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69(4):49-57, July 

1101 2013.

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1102 Jessica Tippee, “Re-engineered Mad Dog Phase 2 gets the greenlight,” Offshore, January 

1103 2, 2018, available online at: https://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume1104 77/issue-12/top-offshore-projects/re-engineering-mad-dog-phase-2-gets-the1105 greenlight.html.

1106 John Barrett et al., “Consumption-Based GHG Emission Accounting: A Case Study,” 

1107 Climate Policy 13, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 451 

1108 70,https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2013.788858.

1109 Jonathan B. Wiener & Richard B. Stewart, The Comprehensive Approach to Global 

1110 Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 Arizona Journal of International and 

1111 Comparative Law 83-113 (1992). 

1112 Joseph E. Aldy, “Report: Eliminating Fossil Fuel Subsidies,” February 26, 2013, Proposal 5 

1113 in Brookings Institution, “15 Ways to Rethink the Federal Budget,” published February 

1114 22, 2013, available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/eliminating-fossil1115 fuel-subsidies/

1116 K. Larsen, J. Larsen, W. Herndon, S. Mohan, and T. Houser, Taking Stock 2017: Adjusting 

1117 Expectations for US GHG Emissions (Rhodium Group, 2017)

1118 Kirsten S. Wiebe and Norihiko Yamano, “Estimating CO2 Emissions Embodied in Final 

1119 Demand and Trade Using the OECD ICIO 2015,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry 

1120 Working Papers (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 

1121 September 3, 2016), available online at: http://www.oecd1122 ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/5jlrcm216xkl-en.

1123 Lucy Baker, “Of embodied emissions and inequality: Rethinking energy consumption,” 

1124 Energy Research & Social Science 36, February 2018, p. 52-60, available online at: 

1125 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629617303110#bibl0005.

1126 Manfred Lenzen et al., “Building EORA: A Global Multi-Region Input Output Database at 

1127 High Country and Sector Resolution,” Economic Systems Research 25, no. 1 (March 1, 

1128 2013): 20–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/09535314.2013.769938.

1129 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, “Consumption-based Greenhouse Gas 

1130 Emissions Inventory for Oregon,” available online at: 

1131 https://www.oregon.gov/DEQ/mm/Pages/Consumption-based-GHG.aspx.

1132 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, “Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 

1133 Emissions Intensities for Consumption of Materials, Services, Fuels and Electricity,” 

1134 October 13, 2011, available online at: 

1135 https://www.oregon.gov/deq/FilterDocs/wprSupTechRepGHGInten.pdf.

1136 P. Erickson, A. Down, M. Lazarus, D. Koplow, “Effect of subsidies to fossil fuel companies 

1137 on United States crude oil production,” Nature Energy 2:891-898 (2017).

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1138 Peter Erickson, et al., “A Consumption_Based GHG Inventory for the U.S. State of 

1139 Oregon,” Environmental Science & Technology, 46(7):3679-3686, March 22, 2012.

1140 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, 16 U.S. Code 

1141 46 § 2601 et seq, enacted November 9, 1978.

1142 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “Cooperation and discard in global climate 

1143 policy,” Nature Climate Change 6:570-575 (2016).

1144 Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty1145 making, Oxford University Press: 2005. 

1146 Steven Davis and Ken Caldeira, “Consumption-Based Accounting of CO2 Emissions,” 

1147 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 

1148 (PNAS) March 2010 107(12)L5687-92.

1149 T.C. Bond et al., “Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: A scientific 

1150 assessment,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 118:538-5552, 2013.

1151 Todd Gerarden, W. Spencer Reeder, and James H. Stock, “Federal Coal Program Reform, 

1152 the Clean Power Plan, and the Interaction of Upstream and Downstream Climate 

1153 Policies,” NBER Working Paper No. 22214, issued April 2016, available online at: 

1154 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22214.

1155 Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters, Center on Global Energy Policy, “Can 

1156 Coal Make a Comeback?” April 2017, available online at: 

1157 http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Center%20on%20Global%20Energ

1158 y%20Policy%20Can%20Coal%20Make%20a%20Comeback%20April%202017.pdf.

1159 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Financial Support for the development and 

1160 Production of Fuels and Energy Technologies,” Issue Brief, March 2012, available online 

1161 at: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/03-06-

1162 fuelsandenergybrief.pdf.

1163 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Average annual natural 

1164 gas spot price in 2015 was at lowest level since 1999,” January 5, 2016, available online 

1165 at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24412.

1166 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Direct Federal Financial 

1167 Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2015,” March 12, 2015, available 

1168 online at: https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/dmeess.php.

1169 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Field Production of 

1170 Crude Oil, available online at: 

1171 https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a))

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1172 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “U.S. natural gas 

1173 production reaches record high in 2015,” April 15, 2016, available online at: 

1174 https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25832

1175 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Table 1.2 Primary 

1176 Energy Production by Source, available online at: 

1177 https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T01.02#/?f=A&start=19

1178 49&end=2017&charted=1-2-3-4-6-13.

1179 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Table 12.1 Carbon 

1180 Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption by Source, 

1181 https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T12.01#/?f=A&start=19

1182 73&end=2017&charted=0-1-13.

1183 U.S. Energy Information Administration. US Coal Shipments Reach Their Lowest Level in 

1184 Years. 2018. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36812

1185 United Kingdom Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, “UK’s Carbon 

1186 Footprint 1997-2015,” available online at: 

1187 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm

1188 ent_data/file/704607/Consumption_emissions_May18.pdf.

1189 Vaclav Smil, Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertanties Cambridge: 

1190 MIT Press, February 11, 2005.

1191 Vulcan/ICF, “Federal Coal Leasing Reform Options: Effects on CO2 Emissions and Energy 

1192 Markets, Summary of Modeling Results, Final Report” (Vulcan, Inc. report with analysis 

1193 supported by ICF International, January 26, 2016)

1194 Wood Mackenzie, Impacts of Delaying IDC Deductibility (2014-2025), prepared for the 

1195 American Petroleum Institute, 2013, available online at: 

1196 http://www.api.org/~/media/files/policy/taxes/13-july/api-us-idc-delay-impacts1197 release-7-11-13.pdf.

1198 Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 

1199 Panel on Climate Change, 2014, available online at: 

1200 http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/.

1201 World Trade Organization (WTO) Report of the Appellate Body, “United States – Import 

1202 Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” Report No. AB-1998-4, available 

1203 online at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf.

1204

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1205 V. COMPENSATION

1206

1207 My preparatory rate for expert services in this case is $325/hour. My Testimony or Deposition 

1208 rate is $350/hour.

1209

1210 I have not testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four (4) years.

1211

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1212 Appendix A: CV

1213

1214 DAVID G. VICTOR 

1215

1216 A. PROFESSIONAL PREPARATION: 

1217 Harvard University, History and Science, A.B., 1987 

1218 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Political Science, Ph.D., 1997 

1219

1220 B. APPOINTMENTS: 

1221 University of California, San Diego 

1222 Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, 2009 to present 

1223 Director, Laboratory on International Law and Regulation, 2009 to present 

1224 Stanford University 

1225 Professor, School of Law, 2006-2009 

1226 Director, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, 2001-2009 

1227 Council on Foreign Relations, New York 

1228 Robert W. Johnson, Jr., Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, 1998-2009 

1229 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 

1230 Research Scholar, Project on "Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies, 1997-1998 

1231 Co-Leader, Project on "Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 

1232 Commitments (IEC)", 1993-1997 

1233

1234 C. PRODUCTS 

1235

1236 1. Five Most Relevant Products 

1237 [1] David G. Victor, 2011, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for 

1238 Protecting the Planet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 

1239 [2] Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply, Cambridge: 

1240 Cambridge University Press (with David Hults and Mark Thurber, eds). 2012. 

1241 [3] David G. Victor, 2013,” “The Gas Promise,” in: Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., 

1242 Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition, chapter 3, pp.88-106 (Baltimore: Johns 

1243 Hopkins Press). 

1244 [4] "The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics, 9(2010): 7-23. (with 

1245 Robert Keohane) 

1246 [5] “Climate Policy: Ditch the 2 °C Warming Goal.” Nature 514.7520 (2014): 30–31. (With 

1247 Charles Kennel) 

1248

1249 2. Other Significant Products 

1250 [1] “The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making,” 

1251 Perspectives on Politics, 11(2013): 368-386. (with Emilie Hafner-Burton and Alex Hughes) 

1252 [2] “Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Importance of 

1253 Regulatory Credibility,” Energy Journal, 32(2011): 1-24. (with Valentina Bosetti) 

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1254 [3] “A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy,” Science, 309(2005): 1820-1821. (with Joshua 

1255 House and Sarah Joy) 

1256 [4] “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” International Organization, 58(2004): 

1257 277-309. (with Kal Raustiala) 

1258 [5] Markets in Developing Countries: Politics, Law and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge 

1259 University Press. (with Thomas Heller, eds.) 

1260

1261 D. SYNERGISTIC ACTIVITIES: 

1262

1263 1. Selected awards 

1264 Heinz I. Eulau Award, American Political Science Association, 2012. 

1265 Convening Lead Author, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2011-2014. 

1266

1267 2. Selected Fellowships and Lectures 

1268 Keeling Lecture, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, April 2014 

1269 Harold Jacobson Lecture, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, October 2013. 

1270 Banco Mundial lecture, Sao Paulo, Brazil. March 2013. 

1271 Energy Forum Lecture, University of Texas, Austin. February 2012. 

1272 Research Institute of Innovative Technology for Earth featured speaker, Tokyo, Japan. February 

1273 2013. 

1274 Electric Power Research Institute keynote speaker, Summer Seminar, August 2012. 

1275 Cochrane Lecture, University of Minnesota. January 2010. 

1276 Observer Research Foundation plenary lecture, September 2008. 

1277

1278 3. Professional Activities 

1279 American Association for the Advancement of Science 

1280 American Political Science Association 

1281 American Geophysical Union 

1282 American Society of International Law 

1283 International Studies Association 

1284 International Institute for Strategic Studies 

1285

1286 4. Editorial activities 

1287 Editorial Boards: Climatic Change (Deputy Editor responsible for most submissions in the social 

1288 sciences). Oxford University Press Encyclopedia of Global Change. Chinese Academy of Social 

1289 Sciences, Sustainable Development Research. Nature Climate Change. Energy Research and 

1290 Social Science. 

1291 Reviewer (selected): American Journal of International Law. American Journal of Political 

1292 Science. American Political Science Review. Climatic Change. Comparative Political Studies. 

1293 Governance. International Studies Quarterly. Journal of Energy Policy. Journal of Politics. 

1294 Nature. Review of International Studies. Regulation and Governance. Science. World Politics. 

1295

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1296 E. COLLABORATORS AND OTHER AFFILIATIONS 

1297

1298 1. Collaborators and coauthors in past 48 months 

1299 Valentina Bosetti (FEEM), Emilie Hafner-Burton (UCSD), David Hults (Stanford Law School), 

1300 Charles Kennel (SIO/UCSD), Robert Keohane (Princeton), Yonatan Lupu (GWU), Fang Rong 

1301 (UCSD), Varun Rai (UT-Austin), V. (Ram) Ramanathan (SIO/UCSD), P.R. Shukla (IIMA), Barton 

1302 Thompson (Stanford Law School), Mark Thurber (Stanford), Kassia Yanosek (McKinsey and 

1303 Company). 

1304

1305 2. Graduate advisors 

1306 Eugene B. Skolnikoff (MIT), Abraham Chayes (Harvard), Kenneth Oye (MIT). 

1307

1308 3. Ph.D. advising 

1309 Jeremy Carl (Stanford), Danny Cullenward (Stanford), Yassir Eddebarr (UCSD), Stephie Fried 

1310 (UCSD), Ryan Hanna (UCSD), Mark Hayes (Stanford), Lukas Nonnemacher (UCSD), Daniel 

1311 Maliniak (UCSD), Peter Kannberg (Scripps Institution of Oceanography), Wei Peng (Princeton), 

1312 Varun Rai (Stanford), Tamara Sheldon (UCSD), Yanyang Xu (UCSD).

1313

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1314 Appendix B: Publications 2008-Present

1315

1316 Aakre S., Kallbekken S., Van Dingenen R., Victor D.G. Incentives for small clubs of Arctic 

1317 countries to limit black carbon and methane emissions. 2018 . Nature Climate Change, 

1318 8(1), 85-90. 10.1038/s41558-017-0030-8

1319

1320 Abdulla A., Ford M.J., Morgan M.G., Victor D.G. A retrospective analysis of funding and 

1321 focus in US advanced fission innovation. 2017. Environmental Research Letters, 12(8) 

1322 10.1088/1748-9326/aa7f10

1323

1324 Ajami, Newsha K., Barton H. Thompson Jr., David G. Victor. The Path to Water Innovation. 

1325 2014. The Hamilton Project. Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment , 1-40.

1326

1327 Bang G., Victor D.G., Andresen S. California's cap-and-trade programme: The role of 

1328 diffusion. 2017. The Evolution of Carbon Markets: Design and Diffusion, 67-87. 

1329 10.4324/9781315228266

1330

1331 Bang G., Victor D.G., Andresen S. California’s cap-and-trade system: Diffusion and lessons. 

1332 2017.Global Environmental Politics, 17(3), 12-30.10.1162/GLEP_a_00413

1333

1334 Bosetti V., Victor D.G. Politics and economics of second-best regulation of greenhouse 

1335 gases: The importance of regulatory credibility. 2011. Energy Journal, 32(1), 1-24.

1336 110.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ1337

1338 Briggs S., Kennel C.F., Victor D.G. Planetary vital signs. 2015. Nature Climate Change, 5(11), 

1339 969-97010.1038/nclimate2828

1340

1341 Burney J.A., Kennel C.F., Victor D.G. Getting serious about the new realities of global 

1342 climate change. 2013. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69(4), 49 -57. 

1343 10.1177/0096340213493882

1344

1345 Clack C.T.M., Qvist S.A., Apt J., Bazilian M., Brandt A.R., Caldeira K., Davis S.J., Diakov V., 

1346 Handschy M.A., Hines P.D.H., Jaramillo P., Kammen D.M., Long J.C.S., Morgan M.G., Reed 

1347 A., Sivaram V., Sweeney J., Tynan G.R., Victor D.G., Weyant J.P., Whitacre J.F. Evaluation 

1348 of a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power with 100% wind, water, and solar. 2017. 

1349 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 114(26), 

1350 6722-6727. 10.1073/pnas.1610381114

1351

1352 Collins, William, Steven J. Davis, Roger Bales, Jennifer Burney, Ryan McCarthy, Eric 

1353 Rignot, William Torre, David Victor. Science and Pathways for Bending the Curve (Chapter 

1354 3). 2018 IN: Bending the Curve: Ten scalable solutions for carbon neutrality and climate 

1355 stability

1356

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1357 Edenhofer, Ottmar, Ramón Pichs-Madruga, Youba Sokona, Susanne Kadner, Jan C Minx, 

1358 Steffen Brunner, Shardul Agrawala, Giovanni Baiocchi, Igor Alexeyevich Bashmakov, 

1359 Gabriel Blanco, John Broome, Thomas Bruckner, Mercedes Bustamante, Leon Clarke, M 

1360 Conte Grand, Felix Creutzig, Xochitl Cruz-Nunez, Shobhakar Dhakal, Navroz K Dubash, 

1361 Patrick Eickemeier, Ellie Farahani, Manfred Fischedick, Marc Fleurbaey, Reyer Gerlagh, 

1362 Luis Gomez Echeverri, Sujata Gupta, J Hamisch, Kejun Jiang, Frank Jotzo, Sivan Kartha, 

1363 Stephan Klasen, Charles Kolstad, Volker Krey, HC Kunreuther, Oswaldo Lucon, Omar 

1364 Masera, Yacob Mulugetta, Richard Norgaard, T Patt, Nijavalli H Ravindranath, Keywan 

1365 Riahi, Joyashree Roy, Ambuj Sagar, Roberto Schaeffer, Steffen Schlömer, Karen Seto, 

1366 Kristin Seyboth, Ralph Sims, Pete Smith, Eswaran Somanathan, Robert Stavins, C von 

1367 Stechow, Thomas Sterner, Taishi Sugiyama, Sangwon Suh, Kevin Urama, Diana Ürge1368 Vorsatz, Anthony Venables, D Victor, Elke Weber, Dadi Zhou, Ji Zou, Timm Zwickel. 

1369 Technical summary. 2014. IN: Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of 

1370 Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 

1371 Climate Change, 33-107.

1372

1373 Ford M.J., Abdulla A., Morgan M.G., Victor D.G. Expert assessments of the state of U.S. 

1374 advanced fission innovation. 2017. Energy Policy, 108, 194-200.

1375 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.059

1376

1377 Gallo N.D., Victor D.G., Levin L.A. Ocean commitments under the Paris Agreement. 2017. 

1378 Nature Climate Change, 7(11), 833-838. 10.1038/nclimate3422.

1379

1380 Gulbrandsen L.H., Underdal A., Victor D.G., Wettestad J. Theory and method. 2017. The 

1381 Evolution of Carbon Markets: Design and Diffusion, 13-29. 10.4324/9781315228266

1382

1383 Hafner-Burton E.M., Alex Hughes D., Victor D.G. The cognitive revolution and the political 

1384 psychology of elite decision making. 2013. Perspectives on Politics, 11(2), 368-386

1385 10.1017/S1537592713001084

1386

1387 Hafner-Burton E.M., Alex Hughes D., Victor D.G. THE BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ELITE 

1388 DECISION MAKING: IMPL ICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE . 2011. Laboratory on 

1389 International Law and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 9

1390

1391 Hafner-Burton E.M., Haggard S., Lake D.A., Victor D.G. The Behavioral Revolution and 

1392 International Relations. 2017. International Organization, 71, S1-S31.

1393 10.1017/S0020818316000400

1394

1395 Hafner-Burton E.M., Leveck B.L., Victor D.G. No false promises: How the prospect of non1396 compliance affects elite preferences for international cooperation. 2017. International 

1397 Studies Quarterly, 61(1), 136-149. 10.1093/isq/sqw047

1398

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1399 Hafner-Burton, E.M., LeVeck B.L., Victor D.G. How activists perceive the utility of 

1400 international law. 2016. Journal of Politics, 78(1), 167-180. 10.1086/683371

1401

1402 Hafner-Burton, E.M., LeVeck B.L., Victor D.G. How the Prospect of Non-Compliance Affects 

1403 Elite Preferences for International Cooperation: Evidence from a 'Lab in the Field' 

1404 Experiment. 2015. SSRN Working Paper, 1-40

1405

1406 Hafner-Burton E.M., LeVeck B.L., Victor D.G., Fowler J.H. Decision maker preferences for 

1407 international legal cooperation. 2014. International Organization, 68(4), 845-876. 

1408 10.1017/S002081831400023X

1409

1410 Hafner-Burton E.M., Steinert-Threlkeld Z.C., Victor D.G. Predictability versus 

1411 flexibility: Secrecy in international investment arbitration. 2016. World Politics, 68(3),

1412 413-453. 10.1017/S004388711600006X

1413

1414 Hafner-Burton E.M., Steinert-Threlkeld Z.C., Victor D.G. Leveling the Playing Field. 2013. 

1415 Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 18, 1-40

1416

1417 Hafner-Burton E.M., Victor D.G., Lupu Y. Political science research on international law: 

1418 The state of the field. 2012. American Journal of International Law, 106(1), 47-97. 

1419 10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.1.0047

1420

1421 Hafner-Burton E.M., Victor D.G., J.H. Fowler. A Behavioral Approach to Elite Decision 

1422 Making in International Legal Cooperation. 2012

1423

1424 Hafner-Burton E.M., Victor D.G. Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration: An 

1425 Empirical Analysis. 2016. Secrecy in International Investment Arbitration: An Empirical 

1426 Analysis, 7(1), 161-182.

1427 Hafner-Burton E.M., LeVeck B.L., Victor D.G. Strategic Enforcement: Results from an Elite 

1428 Survey Experiment on International Trade Agreements. 2012. SSRN Working Paper, 1-32.

1429

1430 Hafner-Burton E.M., LeVeck B.L., Victor D.G., Fowler J.H. A Behavioral Approach to 

1431 International Cooperation. 2015. International Organization

1432

1433 Hanna R., Disfani V.R., Kleissl J., Victor D.G. A new simulation model to develop and assess 

1434 business cases for commercial microgrids. 2017. 2017 North American Power Symposium, 

1435 NAPS 201710.1109/NAPS.2017.8107381

1436

1437 Hanna R., Ghonima M., Kleissl J., Tynan G., Victor D.G. Evaluating business models for 

1438 microgrids: Interactions of technology and policy. 2017. Energy Policy, 103, 47-61 

1439 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.010

1440

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1441 He G., Victor D.G. Experiences and lessons from China's success in providing electricity for 

1442 all. 2017. Resources, Conservation and Recycling. 122, 335-338. 

1443 10.1016/j.resconrec.2017.03.011

1444

1445 Homer-Dixon T., Klare M.T., Goodman S.W., Kern P.J., Victor D.G. Debating disaster: The 

1446 world is not enough .2008. National Interest, 93

1447

1448 Inchauste, Gabriela and David G. Victor. The Political Economy of Energy Subsidy Reform. 

1449 2017.1-273

1450

1451 Iyer G.C., Clarke L.E., Edmonds J.A., Flannery B.P., Hultman N.E., McJeon H.C., Victor D.G. 

1452 Improved representation of investment decisions in assessments of CO 2 mitigation. 2015. 

1453 Nature Climate Change, 5(5), 436-440. 10.1038/nclimate2553

1454

1455 Jiang B., Wenying C., Yuefeng Y., Lemin Z., Victor D. The future of natural gas consumption 

1456 in Beijing, Guangdong and Shanghai: An assessment utilizing MARKAL. 2008. Energy Policy, 

1457 36(9), 3286-329910.1016/j.enpol.2008.04.031. (Article also published in: IEEE Power and 

1458 Energy Society 2008 General Meeting: Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 

1459 21st Century

1460

1461 Kennel C.F., Briggs S., Victor D.G. Making climate science more relevant: Better indicators 

1462 for risk management are needed after Paris. 2016. Science, 354(6311), 421-422 

1463 10.1126/science.aag3248.

1464

1465 Kennel, C. F., Ramanathan, V., & Victor, D. G. Coping with climate change in the next half1466 century. 2012. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 156(4)4, 398-415.

1467

1468 Keohane R.O., Victor D.G. Cooperation and discord in global climate policy. 2016. Nature 

1469 Climate Change,6(6), 570-575. 10.1038/nclimate2937

1470

1471 Keohane R.O., Victor D.G. After the failure of top down mandates: The role of experimental 

1472 governance in climate change policy (Chapter 14). 2015. IN: Towards a Workable and 

1473 Effective Climate Regime 2015-November, 201-212

1474

1475 Keohane R.O., Victor D.G. The transnational politics of energy. 2013. Daedalus, 142(1), 97-

1476 109. 10.1162/DAED_a_00196

1477

1478 Keohane R.O., Victor D.G. The regime complex for climate change. 2011 Perspectives on 

1479 Politics, 9(1) 7-10.1017/S1537592710004068

1480

1481 LeVeck B.L., Hughes D.A., Fowler J.H., Hafner-Burton E., Victor D.G. The role of self-interest 

1482 in elite bargaining. 2014. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 

1483 States of America, 111(52), 18536-18541. 10.1073/pnas.1409885111

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1484

1485 Pascual, C., Victor, D.G., Fernandez de Casto Medinas, R. Will Mexican Energy Reform 

1486 Survive Political Transition: What Mexicans Think. 2018. Brookings Initiatiive on Energy and 

1487 Climate. Paper 3 (June). 

1488

1489 Peng W., Yuan J., Zhao Y., Lin M., Zhang Q., Victor D.G., Mauzerall D.L. Air quality and 

1490 climate benefits of long-distance electricity transmission in China. 2017. Environmental 

1491 Research Letters, 12(6).10.1088/1748-9326/aa67ba

1492

1493 Rai, V., NC Chung, MC Thurber, DG Victor. PESD Carbon Storage Project Database. 2009.

1494 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 76, 1-9.

1495

1496 Rai V., Victor D.G. Awakening giant: Strategy and performance of the Abu Dhabi National 

1497 Oil Company (ADNOC). 2011. Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World 

1498 Energy Supply, 478-51410.1017/CBO9780511784057.014

1499

1500 Rai V., Victor D.G. Climate change and the energy challenge: A pragmatic approach for 

1501 India. 2009. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(31), 78-85

1502

1503 Rai V., Victor D.G. Identifying viable options in developing countries for climate change 

1504 mitigation: the case of India. 2010.International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) 

1505 Energy Forum , 9-13

1506

1507 Rai V., Victor D.G., Thurber M.C. Carbon capture and storage at scale: Lessons from the 

1508 growth of analogous energy technologies. 2010. Energy Policy, 38(8), 4089 -4098

1509 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.035

1510

1511 Ramanathan, V., J Allison, M Auffhammer, D Auston, A Barnosky, L Chiang, W Collins, S 

1512 Davis, F Forman, S Hecht, D Kammen, CY Lin Lawell, T Matlock, D Press, D Rotman, S 

1513 Samuelsen, G Solomon, D Victor, B Washom, J Christensen. Bending the Curve: Ten 

1514 Scalable Solutions for Carbon Neutrality and Climate Stability (Chapter 1). 2016 IN: Bending 

1515 the Curve: Ten Scalable Solutions for Carbon Neutrality and Climate Stability 

1516

1517 Ramanathan, V., Sanchez Sorondo, M., Dasgupta, P, von Braun, J., Victor, D.G.. Climate 

1518 Extremes and Global Health: New Ways for Making Progress. Foreign Affairs. 2018.

1519

1520 Ramanathan V., Seddon J., Victor D.G. The next front on climate change. 2016. Foreign 

1521 Affairs, 95(2), 135-142

1522

1523 Rong F., Victor D.G. WHAT DOES IT COST TO BUILD A POWER PLANT? Laboratory on 

1524 International Law and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 17, 1-47.

1525

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1526 Rong F., Victor D.G. Coal liquefaction policy in China: Explaining the policy reversal since 

1527 2006. 2011. Energy Policy, 39(12), 8175—8184.10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.017

1528

1529 Sabel C.F., Victor D.G. Governing global problems under uncertainty: making bottom-up 

1530 climate policy work. 2017. Climatic Change, 144(1), 15-27. 10.1007/s10584-015-1507-y

1531

1532 Sand M., Berntsen T.K., Von Salzen K., Flanner M.G., Langner J., Victor D.G. Response of 

1533 Arctic temperature to changes in emissions of short-lived climate forcers. 2016 . 

1534 Nature Climate Change, 6(3), 286-289. 10.1038/nclimate2880

1535

1536 Shukla P.R., Dhar S., Victor D.G., Jackson M. Assessment of demand for natural gas from 

1537 the electricity sector in India. 2009. Energy Policy, 37(9), 3520-3534.

1538 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.03.067

1539

1540 Victor, D. G. The new geometry of climate governance. 2018. Chinese Journal of Population 

1541 Resources and Environment, 1-5.10.1080/10042857.2018.1487185

1542

1543 Victor, D.G., WEF Global Future Council on Energy et al. Transformation of the Global 

1544 Energy System. 2018. World Economic Forum. 

1545

1546 Victor D. G. Foreign aid for capacity building to address climate change. 2017. Aid 

1547 Effectiveness for Environmental Sustainability, 17-49. 10.1007/978-981-10-5379-5_2

1548

1549 Victor D.G. Trump: China could take lead on climate. 2016. Nature, 539(7630), 495. 

1550 10.1038/539495a

1551

1552 Victor D. Plan B for Copenhagen. 2009. Nature, 461(7262), 342-344. 10.1038/461342a

1553

1554 Victor D.G. Taking the lead: Faced with government inaction, private firms emerge as major 

1555 players in climate change mitigation. 2017. Science, 358(6370), 1547.

1556 10.1126/science.aar2637

1557

1558 Victor D.G. Energy and climate: Moving beyond symbolism. 2017. Brookings Big Ideas for 

1559 America, 176-184.

1560

1561 Victor D.G. Three-Dimensional Climate Clubs: Implications for Climate Cooperation and the 

1562 G20. 2017. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development.

1563

1564 Victor D.G. Making the promise of Paris a reality. 2016. The Paris Agreement and Beyond: 

1565 International Climate Change Policy Post-2020, 1 -18.

1566

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1567 Victor D.G. What the framework convention on climate change teaches us about 

1568 cooperation on climate change. 2016. Politics and Governance, 4(3), 133-141. 

1569 10.17645/pag.v4i3.657.

1570

1571 Victor D.G. On the Regulation of Geoengineering. 2009. IN: The Economics and Politics of 

1572 Climate Change. 10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199573288.003.0016

1573

1574 Victor D.G. On the Regulation of Geoengineering. 2008. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 

1575 Volume 24, Issue 2, 1 July 2008, Pages 322–336.

1576

1577 Victor D.G. Embed the social sciences in climate policy. 2015. Nature, 520(7545), 27-29. 

1578 10.1038/520027a

1579

1580 Victor D.G. The Case for Climate Clubs. 2015. E15Initiative. International Centre for Trade 

1581 and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the World Economic Forum

1582

1583 Victor D.G. Copenhagen II or something new (COMMENTARY). 2014. Nature Climate 

1584 Change, 4(10), 853-855.10.1038/nclimate2396

1585

1586 Victor D.G. Why do smart people disagree about facts? Some perspectives on climate 

1587 denialism. 2014. Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 

1588 20, 1-12

1589

1590 Victor D.G. Why the world has failed to slow global warming. 2013. Post-2020 Climate 

1591 Change Regime Formation, 10-31. 10.4324/9780203383353

1592

1593 Victor D.G. Climate diplomacy. 2013. Technology Review, 116(5), 12-

1594

1595 Victor D.G. National oil companies and the future of the oil industry. 2013. Annual Review 

1596 of Resource Economics, 5, 445- 462. 10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151856.

1597

1598 Victor D.G. A political theory of water governance. 2013. Laboratory on International Law 

1599 and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 19, 1-33.

1600

1601 Victor D.G. The Gas Promise. 2013. Laboratory on International Law and Regulation (ILAR)

1602 Working Paper No. 7, 1-24.

1603

1604 Victor D.G. Policy: National effects of global policy. 2012. Nature Climate Change, 2(1).24-

1605 25.10.1038/nclimate1338. 

1606

1607 Victor D.G. Diplomacy's meltdown (Commentary). 2011. Scientific American, 304(1), 14-

1608 10.1038/scientificamerican0111-14

1609

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1610 Victor D.G. Global warming gridlock: Creating more effective strategies for protecting the 

1611 planet. 2011. 358pgs 10.1017/CBO9780511975714

1612

1613 Victor D.G. The Political Context for California’s Climate Change Policy. 2010. Giannini 

1614 Foundation of Agricultural Economics. University of California, 14(1), 6-8.

1615

1616 Victor D.G. THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CARBON OFFSETS. 

1617 2010.Modeling the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Mitigation: Summary of a Workshop, 

1618 132-142.

1619

1620 Victor D.G. Potemkin trading. 2009. Technology Review, 112(4), 12

1621

1622 Victor D.G. Global warming: Why the 2°C goal is a political delusion. 2009. Nature, 

1623 459(7249), 909-10.1038/459909a

1624

1625 Victor D.G. Climate accession deals: New strategies for taming growth of greenhouse gases 

1626 in developing countries. 2009. Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Implementing 

1627 Architectures for Agreement: Research from the Harvard Project on International Climate

1628 Agreements, 618- 648.10.1017/CBO9780511813207.021

1629

1630 Victor D.G. The Politics of Fossil-Fuel Subsidies. 2009. Global Subsidies Initiative, 1-33 

1631

1632 Victor D.G. Smoke and mirrors. 2008. National Interest, 93

1633

1634 Victor D.G. Sources of Alternative Energy and Energy Market Innovations. 2008. The Global 

1635 Politics of Energy, 135-147. 

1636

1637 Victor D.G., Abdulla A., Auston D., Brase W., Brouwer J., Brown K., Davis S.J., Kappel C.V., 

1638 Meier A., Modera M., Zarin Pass R., Phillips D., Sager J., Weil D., McNeilly L., Bockmiller F., 

1639 DIamond C., Dowey E., Elliott J., Eng R., Kaffka S., Kloss M., Mezić I., Morejohn J., Ritzinger 

1640 E., Weissman S., Williams J. Turning Paris into reality at the University of California. 2018. 

1641 Nature Climate Change, 8(3), 183-18510.1038/s41558-018-0103-3

1642

1643 Victor D.G., Akimoto K., Kaya Y., Yamaguchi M., Cullenward D., Hepburn C. Prove Paris 

1644 was more than paper promises. 2017. Nature, 548(7665), 25-27. 10.1038/548025a

1645

1646 Victor, D. G., Almeida, P., & Wong, L. Water Management Policy in Brazil. 2015. Laboratory 

1647 on International Law and Regulation (ILAR) Working Paper No. 21, 1-41.

1648

1649 Victor D.G., Eskreis-Winkler S. In the tank. 2008. Foreign Affairs, 87(4), 70-83.

1650

1651 Victor D.G., Gerlagh R., Baiocchi G. Getting serious about categorizing countries. 2014. 

1652 Science, 345(6192), 34-36. 10.1126/science.1255302

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1653

1654 Victor D.G., Hults D.R., Thurber M.C. editors. Oil and governance: State-owned enterprises 

1655 and the world energy supply. 2012. 1014 pgs. 10.1017/CBO9780511784057

1656

1657 Victor D.G., Hults D.R., Thurber M.C. Introduction and overview. 2012. IN: Oil and 

1658 Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply, 3-32.

1659 10.1017/CBO9780511784057.002

1660

1661 Victor D.G., Hults D.R., Thurber M.C. Major conclusions and implications for the future of 

1662 the oil industry. 2012. IN: Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World 

1663 Energy Supply, 887-928.10.1017/CBO9780511784057.024

1664

1665 Victor, D.G., Jones, B.D. Undiplomatic Action: A Practical Guide to the New Politics and 

1666 Geopolitics of Climate Change. 2018. Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate Paper 

1667 Series #1. Brookings Institution. 

1668

1669 Victor D.G., Kennel C.F. Climate policy: Ditch the 2°C warming goal. 2014. Nature, 

1670 514(7520), 30-31.10.1038/514030a

1671

1672 Victor D.G., Kennel C.F., Ramanathan V. The climate threat we can beat: What it is and how 

1673 to deal with it. 2012. Foreign Affairs, 91(3).

1674

1675 Victor, David G. and Keohane, Robert O. The Regime Complex for Climate Change. 2010. 

1676 APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 1-28.

1677

1678 Victor D.G., Leape J.P. Global climate agreement: After the talks . 2015. Nature, 

1679 527(7579), 439-44110.1038/527439a

1680

1681 Victor D.G., Morgan M.G., Apt J., Steinbruner J., Ricke K. The geoengineering option -

1682 A Last Resort Against Global Warming. 2009. Foreign Affairs, 88(2),64-76

1683

1684 Victor, D. G., & Morse, R. K. Living with coal. Climate policy’s most Inconvenient Truth. 

1685 Sept/Oct. 2009. Boston Review , 7-14

1686

1687 Victor D.G., Ramanathan V., Zaelke D. Air pollution: Harmful soot spurs climate-policy 

1688 action. 2015. Nature, 517(7532), 21-. 10.1038/517021b

1689

1690 Victor D.G., Yanosek K. The next energy revolution the promise and peril of high-tech 

1691 innovation. 2017. Foreign Affairs, 96(4), 124- 131.

1692

1693 Victor D.G., Yanosek K. The crisis in clean energy: Stark Realities of the Renewables Craze. 

1694 2011. Foreign Affairs, 90(4).

1695

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1696 Victor D.G., Yueh L. The new energy order: Managing insecurities in the twenty-first 

1697 century. 2010. Foreign Affairs, 89(1),61 -73.

1698

1699 Victor D.G., Zaelke D., Ramanathan V. Soot and short-lived pollutants provide political 

1700 opportunity. 2015. Nature Climate Change, 5 (9), 796 -798.

1701 10.1038/nclimate2703.

1702

1703 Victor, D. G., Zhou, D., Ahmed, E. H. M., Dadhich, P. K., Olivier, J. G. J., Rogner, H-H., 

1704 Sheikho, K. and Yamaguchi, M. Introductory Chapter. 2014. IN: Climate Change 2014: 

1705 Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment 

1706 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

1707

1708 Wara, Michael and David G. Victor. A realistic policy on international carbon offsets. 2008. 

1709 Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper, 74(1), 24-

1710

1711 Wettestad J., Gulbrandsen L.H., Victor D.G., Underdal A. Comparative analysis and 

1712 conclusions. 2017.The Evolution of Carbon Markets: Design and Diffusion, 229-252.

1713 10.4324/9781315228266

1714

1715 Wilson E.J., Morgan M.G., Apt J., Bonner M., Bunting C., Gode J., Haszeldine R.S., Jaeger 

1716 C.C., Keith D.W., McCoy S.T., Pollak M.F., Reiner D.M., Rubin E.S., Torvanger A., Ulardic C., 

1717 Vajjhala S.P., Victor D.G., Wright I.W. Regulating the geological sequestration of CO2. 2008. 

1718 Environmental Science and Technology, 42(8),2718-2722. 10.1021/es087037k

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