COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

FIELDCREST CANNON, INC. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2567-96-2 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

WANDA B. MARSHALL 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Gregory T. Casker; Daniel, Vaughan, Medley & 

Smitherman, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Geoffrey R. McDonald; Laura L. Geller; 

McDonald & Snesil, on brief), for appellee. 

 This appeal stems from a February 28, 1995 award entered by 

the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) to Wanda B. 

Marshall (claimant) approving a Memorandum of Agreement executed 

by claimant and Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. (employer) which provided 

benefits for claimant's right carpal tunnel syndrome. After the 

Supreme Court's decision in The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 

Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), employer moved the commission to 

vacate the award, arguing that the commission had no subject 

matter jurisdiction over the claim. The commission refused, and 

employer appeals. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of 

the parties, we find that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 In the case at bar we are constrained to observe the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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doctrine of res judicata, in which "a point once adjudicated by a 

court of competent jurisdiction may be relied upon as conclusive 

upon the same matter as between the parties or their privies, in 

any subsequent suit, in the same court or any other court, at law 

or in chancery." Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 611, 74 

S.E.2d 204, 207 (1953). "A plea of res judicata will be 

sustained if the prior adjudication was between the same parties 

or their privies and a valid final judgment was entered which 

resolved the claim on its merits." Waterfront Marine Constr., 

Inc. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417, 430, 468 S.E.2d 894, 902 

(1996); see Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917, 

920-21 (1974). 

 Employer argues that res judicata does not apply because the 

commission never had subject matter jurisdiction and that the 

award was therefore void ab initio. This argument is 

disingenuous. When the parties submitted the executed memorandum 

of agreement, the commission found that it had jurisdiction to 

award benefits. Employer had every opportunity to contest the 

claim, but it chose to agree to its compensability and the 

commission entered an award. Employer did not appeal the 

commission's award, therefore the award became a point 

"adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction [to be] relied 

upon as conclusive upon the same matter as between the parties." 

 The case before us today is the same matter between the same 

parties, and the commission's past award continues to bind the 
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parties.1

 

 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1We note that, were we to revisit the issue of claimant's 

entitlement to benefits, we would not retroactively apply Jemmott

to vacate her award. As Jemmott overruled the past consistent 

decisions of both the commission and this Court, and as a 

retrospective application would result in substantial inequity to 

claimants whose claims in tort are now barred by the statute of 

limitations, Jemmott should be applied only prospectively. See

City of Richmond v. Blaylock, 247 Va. 250, 252, 440 S.E.2d 598, 

599 (1994); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 241 Va. 232, 

237-40, 401 S.E.2d 868, 871-73 (1991).