J-S31012-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

MIGUEL ANGEL LANDRAU-MELENDEZ,

Appellee No. 1684 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 31, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000309-2010

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 15, 2016

This is an appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from an order 

of the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas granting Appellee, Miguel 

Angel Landrau-Melendez, relief pursuant to Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546, in the form of reinstatement of his 

right to file a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We reverse the grant of PCRA relief because, 

due to the untimeliness of Appellee’s third PCRA petition, the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction to address it.

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In a prior PCRA appeal, we summarized the early procedural history of 

the case as follows:

In 2010, Appellee was charged with numerous 

sexually-related offenses stemming from incidents 

involving two sisters that occurred between 

November 1, 2009 and February 3, 2010. During 

the pendency of the charges, Appellee hired Attorney 

John Kelsey, Esquire (Attorney Kelsey) to represent 

him. After pretrial maneuvering, Appellee’s case was 

ultimately scheduled for a trial the October 2010 

term of criminal court.

A jury was scheduled to be selected in 

Appellee’s case on October 4, 2010. Immediately 

before jury selection, both counsel asked to meet 

with the trial court in chambers. This meeting was 

not recorded, and a difference of opinion now exists 

with respect to what occurred at it. Attorney Kelsey 

testified at Appellee’s PCRA hearing that the trial 

court promised that he would not impose a sentence 

that exceeded a one-year minimum. This did not at 

all comport with the recollection of the trial court. 

According to testimony at the PCRA hearing, 

Attorney Kelsey returned to Appellee following the 

meeting in chambers. Attorney Kelsey then led 

Appellee to believe that the trial court would impose 

a one-year minimum sentence. Attorney Kelsey 

even advised Appellee that there was a possibility 

that the sentence could be served in the Lebanon 

County Correctional Facility instead of a state 

correctional facility when in fact there was no 

realistic possibility that a local sentence would ever 

be imposed.

Appellee decided to enter a plea of guilty. 

During the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court 

emphasized that the plea was an open one and that 

Appellee could be sentenced to anything up to the 

maximum penalty permitted by law. In addition, the 

trial court reminded Appellee that he was entering a 

plea of guilty on the first day of a scheduled jury 

trial. Because of the prejudice that would be created 
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to the Commonwealth and its witnesses that would 

flow from renewed preparation and trial at a later 

date, Appellee was advised up front that a plea 

withdrawal at a later date would be extremely 

unlikely to occur. Effectively, Appellee was advised 

that his decision to plead guilty would be a final 

decision. Despite knowing this, Appellee proceeded 

to proffer his open plea of guilty.

Several days following the plea, Appellee 

contacted Attorney Kelsey in order to request that a 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea be filed. Attorney 

Kelsey acknowledged that Appellee had requested to 

withdraw his plea.[1] Attorney Kelsey reminded 

Appellee of the colloquy conducted in court with the 

trial court. Attorney Kelsey indicated to Appellee 

that he would not be permitted to withdraw his plea 

of guilty. Therefore, no motion to withdraw the 

guilty plea was filed.

Following Megan’s Law litigation, Appellee was 

directed to appear for sentencing. At Appellee’s 

sentencing date, he requested permission to 

withdraw his plea of guilty. The trial court afforded 

the Commonwealth time to discern whether it would 

suffer prejudice as a result of Appellee’s withdrawal 

of this plea. On June 27, 2011, the trial court 

conducted a hearing. For multiple reasons, the trial 

court determined that Appellee should not have been 

permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty. The trial 

court therefore denied Appellee’s request to 

withdraw his plea.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/25/13, at 2–4.

____________________________________________

1

 We indicated in Appellee’s direct appeal that he had written a pro se letter 

to the court requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. Attorney Kelsey, 

however, did not file a motion to withdraw. Commonwealth v. LandrauMelendez, 2147 MDA 2011, 55 A.3d 152 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum at 2).
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On July 13, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellee to 18 

to 72 months’ imprisonment. Appellee filed a timely notice of 

appeal, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on July 

31, 2012. Commonwealth v. Landrau-Melendez, [2147 MDA 

2011,] 55 A.3d 152 (Pa. Super. [filed July 31,] 2012) 

(unpublished memorandum). Appellee did not file a petition for 

allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

On October 12, 2012, Appellee filed a timely counseled 

PCRA petition. The Commonwealth filed its answer on December 

3, 2012. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on April 8, 2013. 

On April 9, 2013, the PCRA court entered an order granting 

Appellee’s petition and ordering a new trial. On May 7, 2013, 

the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Landrau-Melendez, 842 MDA 2013, 97 A.3d 804 (Pa. 

Super. filed February 18, 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 1–4)(footnote 

omitted).

On appeal to this Court from the order granting relief, the 

Commonwealth argued, inter alia, that the PCRA court erred in concluding 

that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to 

withdraw Appellee’s guilty plea. We concluded the PCRA court erred when it 

determined that plea counsel was ineffective, because the PCRA court’s 

assertions actually demonstrated that it believed there was a reasonable 

probability that the outcome would not have been different if plea counsel 

had filed a timely written motion. We stated that Appellee failed to prove 

prejudice and therefore, did not meet his burden to demonstrate eligibility 

for relief under the PCRA. We held that the PCRA court erred when it 

granted PCRA relief and ordered a new trial; thus, we reinstated the original 
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July 13, 2011 judgment of sentence. Landrau-Melendez, 842 MDA 2013 

(unpublished memorandum at 7–8, 13).

The present PCRA court continued the relevant procedural history, as 

follows:

(6) On March 30, 2015, [Appellee] filed a second PCRA Petition. 

We scheduled a hearing regarding this PCRA Petition for July 23, 

2015.

(7) At the July 23, 2015 hearing, the Commonwealth objected 

to [Appellee’s] second PCRA [petition] as untimely. We initially 

rejected the Commonwealth’s argument based upon testimony 

of [Appellee’s] former counsel provided at the July 23, 2015 

hearing.[2]

(8) On July 27, 2015, we sua sponte changed our decision 

regarding the timeliness of [Appellee’s] second PCRA Petition. 

We therefore granted the Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss 

[Appellee’s] second PCRA Petition. In our [c]ourt [o]rder, we 

indicated that if [Appellee] filed a third PCRA Petition, we would 

entertain it based upon the factual testimony presented at the 

July 23, 2015 court hearing. We included in our [o]rder the 

following:

Should the Commonwealth object to the [c]ourt’s 

intent to decide the third PCRA based upon 

testimony presented at the July 23, 2015 hearing, it 

will be required to file an objection to the [c]ourt’s 

intent to incorporate testimony by reference within 

____________________________________________

2

 Prior, first PCRA counsel testified at the July 23, 2015 PCRA hearing 

relating to Appellee’s second PCRA petition that she erroneously filed an 

untimely petition for allowance of appeal on March 21, 2014, from this 

Court’s February 18, 2014 decision that reversed the grant of PCRA relief 

and reinstated Appellee’s judgment of sentence in the first PCRA appeal. 

N.T., 7/23/15, at 9–11. The petition for allowance of appeal and alleged 

quashal order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not in the record 

certified to us and is not docketed therein.
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ten days following the date on which [Appellee’s] 

third PCRA Petition is filed.[3]

(9) [Appellee] filed a third PCRA Petition on August 10, 2015. 

Although the Commonwealth filed a response to that third PCRA 

Petition, the Commonwealth never lodged an objection to the 

[c]ourt’s declared intent to incorporate by reference the 

testimony presented at the July 23, 2015 court hearing.

(10) On August 31, 2015, we issued a [c]ourt [o]rder to grant 

[Appellee’s] request to file an [a]ppeal with the Supreme Court 

nunc pro tunc.

(11) The Commonwealth filed a timely [a]ppeal of our August 

31, 2015 decision. Shortly thereafter, we directed that the 

Commonwealth file[] a Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal.

(12) On September 29, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a 

Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. Paragraph 1 

alleged that that [Appellee’s] third PCRA Petition should have 

been dismissed as untimely.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 3–4 (footnote omitted).

The Commonwealth raises a single issue for our review: “Whether 

[Appellee’s] [p]etition for Post-Conviction Relief is untimely?” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. We conclude, for the following reasons, that it 

is untimely. Thus, the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to consider the 

merits of the petition.

“In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA 

relief, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the record 

____________________________________________

3

 Appellee did not file an appeal from the PCRA court’s dismissal of his 

second PCRA petition as untimely.
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supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free 

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009)). 

This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports 

the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal 

error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are supported in 

the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support in the 

certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084 (Pa. Super. 

2014). “There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA 

petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no 

genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “[S]uch a 

decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 

617 (Pa. 2015).

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold that may 

not be disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a 

PCRA petition that is untimely. Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 

203 (Pa. 2000). “We have repeatedly stated it is the [petitioner’s] burden to 

allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies. See, e.g., 
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Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1999). Whether [a 

petitioner] has carried his burden is a threshold inquiry prior to considering 

the merits of any claim.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 346 

(Pa. 2013).

In order to be considered timely, a first, or any subsequent PCRA 

petition, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment 

of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of 

sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

As noted, we affirmed Appellee’s judgment of sentence on July 31, 

2012. Our review of the record reflects that Appellee’s judgment of 

sentence became final on August 30, 2012, thirty days after the time 

expired for Appellee to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113. 

Pursuant to the PCRA, Appellant had one year, or until August 30, 2013, in 

which to file a timely PCRA petition. Here, Appellee’s third PCRA petition is 

patently untimely as it was not filed until August 10, 2015.

Nevertheless, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), 
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and (iii), is met.4 “That burden necessarily entails an acknowledgment by 

the petitioner that the PCRA petition under review is untimely but that one 

or more of the exceptions apply.” Beasley, 741 A.2d at 1261. “However, 

the PCRA limits the reach of the exceptions by providing that a petition 

invoking any of the exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the 

claim first could have been presented.” Commonwealth v. Walters, ___ 

A.3d ___, ___, 2016 PA Super 42 at *2 (Pa. Super. 2016) (filed February 

19, 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1146 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2)). In order to be entitled to the 

exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead 

and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the 

____________________________________________

4

 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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sixty-day time frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Carr, 

768 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2001).

To characterize the instant case as having a “tortured” procedural 

path, as did the PCRA court, PCRA Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 2, is an 

understatement. We agree with the Commonwealth that Appellee has failed 

to plead and prove any of the enumerated statutory exceptions. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. Instead, PCRA counsel merely asserted that 

the third PCRA petition was not untimely, or alternatively, that the prior 

order of July 27, 2015, holding that the second PCRA petition filed on March 

30, 2015, was untimely, was error. PCRA petition, 8/10/15, at ¶ 5. As 

noted supra, Appellee never appealed the PCRA court’s decision on July 27, 

2015, which concluded that the second PCRA petition was untimely. The 

propriety of that order is not before us.

As to Appellee’s explanation regarding the alleged timeliness of the 

instant petition, relying upon Pa.R.A.P. 2542 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(3), 

counsel avers that the “deadline for filing the PCRA Petition was April 4, 

2015,” fourteen days after the time for seeking reconsideration of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s quashal of Appellee’s untimely petition for 

allowance of appeal, plus one year. Appellee’s Brief at 3–4. The time 

parameters following disposition of Appellee’s first PCRA petition have no 

bearing on the finality of his judgment of sentence for purposes of PCRA 

eligibility in this case. As we noted supra, Appellee’s judgment of sentence 
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became final on August 30, 2012, thirty days after the time expired for 

Appellee to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court following disposition of his direct appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Thus, pursuant to the PCRA, Appellant had one 

year, or until August 30, 2013, in which to file a timely PCRA petition.

The PCRA court, likewise, also failed to properly analyze the timeliness 

of Appellee’s present PCRA petition, filed August 10, 2015. The PCRA court, 

similarly to Appellee, failed to utilize the proper dates concerning when the 

judgment of sentence became final in this case. The PCRA court stated, 

“Looking simply at dates on a calendar, we agree that [Appellee] did not file 

his PCRA [petition] prior to its due date of March 19, 2015.” PCRA Court 

Opinion, 10/29/15, at 4–5 (emphasis added). While the PCRA court did not 

explain its reasoning regarding its belief that March 19, 2015, was the 

relevant date, it apparently examined the merits of Appellee’s 

ineffectiveness claim5in rendering its decision. We remind the PCRA court 

and Appellee that our Supreme Court has:

____________________________________________

5

 In his counseled, third PCRA petition, Appellee asserted that Elizabeth 

Judd, Esquire, first PCRA counsel, was ineffective in failing to file a timely 

petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following 

our decision on February 18, 2014, reversing the grant of a new trial and 

reinstating the original July 13, 2011 judgment of sentence. Additionally, 

Appellee asserted Ms. Judd’s ineffective assistance in advising Appellee in a 

letter dated March 27, 2014, that a second PCRA petition had to be filed by 

April 19, 2015. Landrau-Melendez, 842 MDA 2013, (unpublished 

memorandum at 13); PCRA petition, 8/10/15, at ¶ 3 (a), (b); N.T., 7/23/15, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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previously rejected attempts to circumvent the timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA by asserting prior counsel’s 

ineffectiveness for failing timely to raise a claim. See 

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 15 A.3d 345, 367 

(2011) (“[I]t is well established that the fact that a petitioner’s 

claims are couched in terms of ineffectiveness will not save an 

otherwise untimely petition from the application of the time 

restrictions of the PCRA.”); Commonwealth v. Crews, 581 Pa. 

45, 863 A.2d 498, 503 (2004); Commonwealth v. Abu–

Jamal, 574 Pa. 724, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (2003); 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94, 97 

(2001); Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 741 A.2d 1258. As we have 

explained, the nature of the constitutional violations alleged has 

no effect on the application of the PCRA time bar. 

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 584 Pa. 576, 886 A.2d 1120, 

1126–27 (2005) (rejecting the claim that the time-bar should 

not apply to a second petition because the underlying claim 

involved a constitutional right, holding that “this is nothing more 

than a convoluted way of attempting to carve out an exception 

to the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA for 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims”); Commonwealth v. 

Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (2000). Rather, the only 

cognizable exceptions are set forth at Section 9545(b)(1).

Edmiston, 65 A.3d at 349. Moreover, it appears the PCRA court was 

referencing the filing date of the second PCRA petition on March 30, 2015, 

which the PCRA court previously held was untimely filed. Once again, we 

note that Appellee did not appeal that order.6

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

at 9–11. In his pro se second PCRA petition, Appellee asserted Ms. Judd was 

ineffective for failing to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal following 

our February 18, 2014 decision. PCRA petition, 3/30/15, at ¶ 5(C).

6

 Despite finding that the March 30, 2015 PCRA petition was untimely on 

July 27, 2015, from which no appeal was filed, the PCRA court, in its August 

31, 2015 order granting Appellee’s third, and instant PCRA petition, also 

“granted” Appellee’s second PCRA petition that it previously dismissed as 

untimely. This was error as well.
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Even if we overlooked the fact that the PCRA court designated the 

wrong date concerning when the judgment of sentence became final in this 

case, its belief that Appellee met the exception outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii), “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence,” also is incorrect. We recently explained the exception in section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a PCRA petitioner:

to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based 

his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the 

exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 

382, 395, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 (2007). Due diligence demands 

that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own 

interests. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. 

Super. 2001). A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 330–31, 781 A.2d 

94, 98 (2001); Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 

1080 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 

1210 (2011). This rule is strictly enforced. Id.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal 

denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015).

The PCRA court, relying upon Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 

1264 (Pa. Super. 2007), determined as follows:

In this case, Attorney Elizabeth Judd provided testimony at 

a hearing that occurred on July 23, 2015. Attorney Judd 

testified that she repeatedly advised [Appellee] that his deadline 

for requesting post-conviction relief would be April 19, 2015. 

(N.T. 13-15). This was incorrect advice; [Appellee’s] actual 

deadline was March 19, 2015. When [Appellee] filed his PCRA 

Petition on March 30, 2015, he was within the time deadline 

communicated to him by Attorney Judd, but he had missed the 

statutory deadline of March 19, 2015.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 10/29/15, at 6.

Referencing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) and § 9545(b)(2), this Court 

reiterated:

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA provides that a PCRA petition 

must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment 

of sentence became final, unless the petitioner alleges and 

proves that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained 

by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

If the petitioner so alleges and proves, the petition will not be 

dismissed as untimely if it was “filed within 60 days of the date 

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

Commonwealth v. Huddleston, 55 A.3d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Attorney Judd testified at the July 23, 2015 hearing that she wrote Appellee 

a letter dated March 27, 2014, informing him that she had missed the 

deadline to file a petition for allowance of appeal from this Court’s February 

18, 2014 decision. N.T., 7/23/15, at 12. Moreover, Attorney Judd testified 

that she contacted Appellee by telephone on September 19, 2014, and she 

“explained my mistake and kind of went through everything that was 

outlined in the letter.” Id. at 13. Thus, at the latest, Appellee was made 

aware of Attorney Judd’s failure to file a petition for allowance of appeal on 

September 19, 2014. Sixty days from that date was Tuesday, November 

18, 2014. Appellee did not file his second PCRA petition until March 30, 

2015, and his third petition until August 10, 2015.

Because the instant PCRA petition was untimely and no exceptions 

were pled or proven, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits 
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and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear untimely 

petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the merits of any 

substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 

1267 (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to 

adjudicate a controversy.”). Therefore, we reverse the August 31, 2015 

order and conclude the Lebanon County Common Pleas Court lacked 

jurisdiction to address the merits of Appellee’s third PCRA petition.

Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Strassburger joins this Memorandum. 

Judge Ott files a Concurring Statement in which Judge Strassburger 

joins.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/15/2016