- . 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CONSUMER CELLULAR, IN CORPORA TED, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, CONSUMERS 

UNIFIED, LLC, and DAVID ZACHARY CARMAN, 

Defendants. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:15-CV-1908-PK 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Consumer Cellular, Inc. ("CCI"), filed this action against defendants 

ConsumerAffairs.com. Inc. ("ConsumerAffairs"), Consumers Unified, LLC ("Consumers 

Unified"), and David Zachaty Carman in the Multnomah County Circuit Court on August 19, 

2015. Defendants removed CCI's action to this court effective October 9, 2015, on the basis of 

both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. 

CCI is a mobile virtual network operator providing cellphone service to its customers. 

ConsumerAffairs operates a consumer review website hosting consumer reviews regarding a 

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large number of products and brands. Consumers Unified is a closely related affiliate of 

ConsumerAffairs, and Caiman is the principal of both corporate defendants. By and through its 

complaint as filed in the Multnomah County court, CCI alleges that defendants improperly 

manipulated the conterit and presentation of consumer reviews on the ConsumerAffairs website 

in order to provide a significant competitive advantage to product manufacturers and service 

providers who pay a large monthly fee to defendants, relative to manufacturers and providers 

who decline to pay such fees. Arising out of the foregoing, CCI alleges defendants' liability 

(i) for violation of Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act (the "UTP A"), (ii) for intentional 

interference with prospective economic relations under Oregon common law, (iii) for conduct of 

or participation in an enterprise engaged in wire fraud and extortion in violation of the federal 

Racketeer Influenced and Conupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), and (iv) for defamation under 

Oregon common law. CCI seeks monetary damages in the approximate amount of $5 million, 

equitable relief under the UTPA, treble damages under RICO, and award of its fees and costs. 

This court has federal-question jurisdiction over CCI's RICO claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

and may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over CCI's state-law claims pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367; in addition, it is possible1 that the court may properly exercise diversity 

jurisdiction over CCI's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) based on the (apparent) complete 

diversity of the patties and the amount in controversy. 

Now before the court is defendants' special motion (#9) to strike, brought under Or Rev. 

1 Defendants have filed a Corporate Disclosure Statement on behalf of Consumers 

Unified (a limited liability corporation), by and through which they asse1t that Consumers 

Unified is a citizen of "Delaware, Virginia, Florida, New Mexico, Massachusetts, Colorado, 

California, Nevada, and Oklahoma." Defendants do not otherwise disclose the identities or 

citizenship of the members of Consumers United. 

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Stat. 31.150 (Oregon's "anti-SLAPP" statute), by and through which defendants seek an order 

striking all of CCI's claims against them or, in the alternative, an order striking CCI's claims 

against Carman or, in the further alternative, an order dismissing CCI's RICO claim for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I have considered the motion, oral argument on 

behalf of the pat1ies, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, 

defendants' motion should be denied in its entirety. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

I. Special J\tlotion to Strike 

"Or. Rev. Stat.§§ 31.150- 31.155 comprise Oregon's anti-SLAPP ("Strategic Lawsuit 

Against Public Pat1icipation") statute[]. Anti-SLAPP statutes are designed to allow the early 

dismissal of meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming 

litigation." In re Gardner, 563 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. 

Covad Comms. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Section 31.150 allows defendants to bring a special motion to strike a claim which 

shall be treated as a motion to dismiss under Or. R. Civ. P. 21 A and requires the 

cou11 to enter a "judgment of dismissal without prejudice" ifthe motion is granted. 

The court's consideration of a special motion to strike is a two-step process. 

First, the defendant has the initial burden to show that the challenged 

statement is within one of the categories of civil actions described in Or. Rev. 

Stat. § 31.150(2). If the defendant meets the initial burden, "the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff in the action to establish that there is a probability that 

the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to 

support a prima facie case. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the court shall 

deny the motion." Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150(3). 

In re Gardner, 563 F.3d at 986 (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). 

In evaluating special motions to strike under Section 31.150, the Oregon courts consider 

"the facts underlying plaintiffs' claims in the light most favorable to plaintiffs," Neumann v. Liles, 

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261 Or. App. 567, 570 n. 2 (2014), and do not weigh the evidence or make any determination of 

the likelihood that plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, citing Young v. Davis, 259 Or. App. 497, 508 

(2013). Each of the two steps of the process -the defendant's burden to show that the challenged 

statement is within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute and the plaintiff's burden to establish "a 

probability" that the claims will prevail "by presenting substantial evidence to supp01i a prima 

facie case" - presents a question oflaw. Id at 572, citing Young, 259 Or. App. at 507-510. 

Section 31.150 is intended to create and does create a "low bar" for plaintiffs to overcome, and is 

intended only "to weed out meritless claims meant to harass or intimidate-not to require that a 

plaintiff prove its case before being allowed to proceed fmiher." Young, 259 Or. App. at 508, 

citing Staten v. Steel, 222 Or. App. 17, 32 (2008) ("The purpose of the special motion to strike 

procedure ... is to expeditiously te1minate unfounded claims that threaten constitutional free 

speech rights, not to deprive litigants of the benefit of a jury determination that a claim is 

meritorious" (emphasis original)). A plaintiff meets its burden under Section 31.150 by 

submitting evidence that, if credited, "would pe1mit a reasonable factfinder" to rule in the 

plaintiff's favor. Neumann, 261 Or. App. at 575; see also Young, 259 Or. App. at 508 ("the 

presentation of substantial evidence to support a prima facie case is, in and of itself, sufficient to 

establish a probability that the plaintiff will prevail; whether or not it is 'likely' that the plaintiff 

will prevail is inelevant in determining whether it has met the burden of proof set fo1ih by ORS 

31.150(3)" (emphasis original)). As necessarily follows from the foregoing, the fact that the 

defendant may present substantial evidence to the contrary is likewise irrelevant to determining 

whether the plaintiff has met his burden. See Young, 259 Or. App. at 510. 

The Oregon comis "look to California case law [in construing Section 31.150 et seq.] 

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because Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute was 'modeled on California statutes' and '[i]t was intended 

that California case law would infonn Oregon cou1is regarding the application of ORS 31.150 to 

ORS 31.155."' Neumann, 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 296, *9 n. 3, quoting Page v. Parsons, 249 Or. 

App. 445, 461 (2012). 

II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule l 2(b )( 6), a complaint 

must contain more than a "fo1mulaic recitation of the elements ofa cause of action;" specifically, 

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. T>11ombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level, "[t]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 

that merely creates a suspicion [ ofJ a legally cognizable right of action." Id., quoting 5 C. Wright 

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a). Instead, the plaintiff must plead affirmative factual content, as opposed to any 

merely concluso1y recitation that the elements of a claim have been satisfied, that "allows the 

co mi to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. "In sum, for a 

complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclus01y 'factual content,' and reasonable 

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to 

relief." lvfoss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. 

"In ruling on a l 2(b )( 6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations contained 

in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial 

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notice." Swartz v. KP"11!G LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, this court accepts all of the allegations in the complaint as true and c·onstrues them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Moreover, the court "presume[ s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 

necessary to support the claim." Nat'! Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994), 

quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The court need not, however, 

accept legal conclusions "cast in the form of factual allegations." Western 1Vfining Council v. 

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

MATERIAL FACTS 

I. The Parties 

Plaintiff CCI is a mobile vhiual network operator providing cellphone service to its 

customers. CCI is headquatiered in Oregon and organized under Oregon law. 

Defendant ConsumerAffairs operates a website hosting consumer reviews of a variety of 

products, brands, and services. ConsumerAffairs is organized under Nevada law and appears to 

be headquartered in Oklahoma. Defendant Consumers Unified is a closely related affiliate of 

ConsumerAffairs, is organized under Nevada law, and apparently has members who are citizens 

of California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 

and Virginia. Defendant Carman is the principal of both corporate defendants, and is a citizen of 

Oklahoma. 

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II. History Underlying the Parties' Dispute2 

ConsumerAffairs has been in existence since 1998. Carman acquired ConsumerAffairs in 

2010, at which time he modified its business model in order to earn increased revenue by 

inducing manufacturers and providers whose products and services were reviewed on the 

ConsumerAffairs website to pay fees to become accredited members entitled to preferential 

treatment in the display and use of consumer ratings. Specifically, (i) Consumer Affairs 

conspicuously characterizes customer reviews of the products and services offered by paying 

accredited members as "Reviews and Complaints" whereas it equally conspicuously characterizes 

the reviews of other entities' products and services as "Complaints and Reviews," (ii) ConsumerAffairs permits accredited members to challenge or otherwise respond to negative reviews, 

eliminating such reviews where members assert that the complaints are not based in fact or where 

the consumer who originally posted the negative review fails to rebut the members' response, 

whereas other entities are not given any oppotiunity to challenge or respond to negative reviews, 

(iii) the pages dedicated to reviews of non-accredited members' products and services all include 

a section containing the text "Not Impressed With [the entity whose products or services are 

under review]? Find a company you can trust," followed by a link to "Top Alternatives" headed 

by an accredited member, whereas the pages dedicated to reviews of accredited members contain 

no such sections, and (iv) reviews are presented in reverse chronological order on the pages 

dedicated to review of non-accredited members' products and services, whereas positive reviews 

are moved to the top of the display of reviews of accredited members' products and services. 

2 Except where otherwise indicated, the following recitation constitutes my construal of 

the parties' evidentiary proffers in the light most favorable to CCI. 

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On August 19, 2014, Andrew Polacek, a sales executive at ConsumerAffairs, began a 

series of email solicitations directed to Brian Hepner, a marketing executive at CCI. Polacek's 

first email message indicated that the ConsumerAffairs page dedicated to hosting reviews of 

CCI's products had been viewed 1 ~,000 times during the previous 30 days, and that the page 

hosted "149 reviews and complaints that have not been addressed by [CCI]," with the stated 

consequence that CCI's "brand [wa]s cutTently being defined on the page by detractors in a highly 

visible way." Polacek offered to help CCI "turn[] the page positive and transform[] it into a 

positive branding message." Hepner did not respond to Polacek's initial message. 

Polacek sent Hepner further similar messages on September 2 and September 9, 2014. 

On September 12, 2014, CCI digital marketing manager Dominic Aliero agreed to speak with 

Polacek on September 16, 2014. 

On September 16, 2014, Polacek explained to Aliero that ConsumerAffairs could erase or 

raise negative ratings by pe1mitting CCI to challenge or otherwise respond to such ratings, and 

could additionally affirmatively solicit positive reviews of CCI's services. 

On October 7, 2014, Polacek emailed Artero to assert that the ConsumerAffairs page 

dedicated to reviews of CCI had been viewed more that 18,000 times in the previous 30 days. 

On October 10, 2014, Polacek emailed Artero a PowerPoint presentation advising that Google 

searches for "Consumer Cellular" or for "Consumer Cellular reviews" yielded ConsumerAffairs' 

CCI page as either the third or fomih result, and that the page currently rated CCI overall with 

two out of five possible stars. The presentation indicated that the 2/5 rating could be increased to 

a "strong positive" in exchange for a $15,000 "setup" fee and a recurring $5,000 monthly fee 

thereafter. The presentation indicated that such a change could immediately yield "$7 ,200 a 

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month in customer lifetime revenue" and that "once we've turned the pages around to being net 

positive" that amount could be expected to increase by a factor of ten. The presentation indicated 

that these numbers were based on "a low [then-current estimated] conversion rate [i.e., the 

percentage of customers viewing reviews who ultimately enter into a business relationship with 

the entity whose services are being reviewed] ... [of] 2%, "

3 and the presumption that the 

"conversion rates ofleads and sales are typically much higher than that once [defendants had] 

turned the pages around to being net positive [i.e., after the entity at issue became an accredited 

member] (more like 10% and 20%, respectively)." 

In or around late October or early November 2014, CCI CEO John Marick declined to do 

business with defendants. On November 18, 2014, Polacek emailed Marick directly, inquiring as 

to why Marick would decline an arrangement that would "pay for ... itself and then some" from 

its inception. Polacek included as attachments to his message computer screenshots indicating 

that the ConsumerAffairs CCI page had been viewed nearly 24,000 times in the previous 30 days, 

and that CCI had a then-shrinking 1.5/5 star rating. 

In December 2014, ConsumerAffairs produced an article summarizing its hosted 

consumer reviews of CCI's services and linking to one extremely positive review: At 

approximately that same time, CCI received positive feedback from a CCI customer. CCI 

encouraged the customer to submit a review to ConsumerAffairs, and the customer replied that 

he had already submitted a positive review to that website. ConsumerAffairs did not post the 

3 CCI offers the declaration testimony of its President and CEO, John S. Marick, that 

between Januaiy 1, 2014, and July 15, 2015, members of the public who viewed CCI's website 

became CCI customers between approximately 1.7 and 2.3% of the time. See Declaration of 

John S. Marick, ~ 9. 

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review. CCI believes that other, similarly situated customers submitted positive reviews to 

ConsumerAffairs following Marick's refusal to do business with the defendants that were not 

ultimately posted. 

On Februmy 18, 2015, Polacek emailed Hepner indicating that Google searches for 

"Consumer Cellular" then yielded ConsumerAffairs' CCI page as the second result and that 

Google searches for "Consumer Cellular reviews" yielded ConsumerAffairs' CCI page as the top 

result, that CCI had an overall rating of 1. 5 stars on the ConsumerAffairs CCI page, and that the 

page had been viewed 22,000 times in the previous 30 days. 

At some time thereafter, the link in the article of December 2014 was redirected from the 

positive review of CCI's services to the ConsumerAffairs CCI "Complaints and Reviews" page. 

Between October 26, 2013, and April 15, 2014, defendants posted at least eight 5-star 

reviews ofCCI's services that had been submitted by CCI customers. Between April 15 and 

August 19, 2014, defendants posted only one positive review ofCCI's services, specifically a 4-

star review. During the period when defendants were soliciting CCI's business, defendants 

posted two positive reviews of CCI's services, one a 5-star and one a 4-star review. Between 

October 1, 2014, and August 19, 2015, when this action was filed, defendants posted one single 

positive review of CCI's services (a 5-star review) and deleted from its website a formerly 

negative review that had been revised by the original reviewer to become a positive 5-star 

review. The largely negative reviews on the ConsumerAffairs CCI page are anomalous by 

comparison with reviews of CCI's services appearing on other sites, including those of the Better 

Business Bureau, Prepaid Reviews, CNET, Yelp, and Pissedconsumer.com. 

ConsumerAffairs hosts reviews of 40 cellphone service providers, only one of which is an 

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accredited member. That accredited member has nearly a perfect 5-star rating on the 

ConsumerAffairs website, whereas none of the other 39 providers whose services are reviewed 

on ConsumerAffairs.com has as high as a 2-star rating. Prior to that entity becoming an 

accredited member, it had virtually no positive reviews on the ConsumerAffairs website. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Defendants' Special Motion to Strike 

Oregon's Anti-SLAPP statute specifically provides as follows: 

(1) A defendant may make a special motion to strike against a claim in a civil 

action described in subsection (2) of this section. The court shall grant 

the motion unless the plaintiff establishes in the manner provided by 

subsection (3) of this section that there is a probability that the 

plaintiff will prevail on the claim. The special motion to strike shall be 

treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A but shall not be subject to 

ORCP 21 F. Upon granting the special motion to strike, the couit shall 

enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice. If the couit denies a 

special motion to strike, the court shall enter a limited judgment denying 

the motion. 

(2) A special motion to strike may be made under this section against any 

claim in a civil action that arises out of: 

(a) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other document 

submitted, in a legislative, executive or judicial proceeding or other 

proceeding authorized by law; 

(b) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other document 

submitted, in connection with an issue under consideration or 

review by a legislative, executive or judicial body or other 

proceeding authorized by law; 

(c) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other 

document presented, in a place open to the public or a public 

forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or 

( d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the 

constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of 

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free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of 

public interest. 

(3) A defendant making a special motion to strike under the provisions of 

this section has the initial burden of makiug a prima facie showing 

that the claim against which the motion is made arises out of a 

statement, document or conduct described in subsection (2) of this 

section. If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff in the action to establish that there is a probability that the 

plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to 

support a prim a facie case. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the court 

shall deny the motion. 

( 4) In making a determination under subsection (1) of this section, the 

court shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits 

stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. 

(5) If the court dete1mines that the plaintiff has established a probability that 

the plaintiff will prevail on the claim: 

(a) The fact that the dete1mination has been made and the substance of 

the dete1mination may not be admitted in evidence at any later 

stage of the case; and 

(b) The dete1mination does not affect the burden of proof or standard 

of proof that is applied in the proceeding. 

Or. Rev. Stat. 31.150 (emphasis supplied).4 

CCI argues, first, that defendants' motion should be summarily denied because the antiSLAPP statute is a creature of state law (which it is), because the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure do not provide any equivalent mechanism for early dismissal of meritless lawsuits 

intended to chill the exercise of free speech rights (which they do not), and because the antiSLAPP statute is - purportedly - strictly procedural rather than substantive, and therefore outside 

4 Oregon Civil Procedure Rule 21 A provides a procedural mechanism for motions to 

dismiss, see Or. R. Civ. P. 21 A, while Oregon Civil Procedme Rule 21 F (which is expressly not 

applicable to motions brought under Section 31.150, see Or. Rev. Stat. 31.150(1)) pe1mits 

motions to dismiss to be consolidated with other motions, see Or. R. Civ. P. 21 F. 

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the purview of the federal courts to enforce (see, e.g., i'vfangold v. California Pub. Utils .. Comm'n, 

67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (federal courts sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over state-law claims generally apply state substantive law and federal procedural 

law) (citations omitted)). It is true that there is a significant procedural component to Oregon's 

anti-SLAPP statute, see Or. Rev. Stat. 31.155(2) ("ORS 31.150 and 31.152 create a procedure for 

seeking dismissal of claims described in ORS 31.150 (2) and do not affect the substantive law 

governing those claims"), but nothing in the statute or its legislative history suggests that the 

statute lacks any substantive component whatsoever. Moreover, it is well established that, when 

sitting in diversity or exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, "federal com1s 

... must give full effect to state procedural rules when those rules are 'intimately bound up with 

the state's substantive decision making' or 'serve substantive state policies," Cnty. of Orange v. 

United States Dist. Court, 784 F.3d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 2015), quoting Feldman v. Allstate 

Insurance Co., 322 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 2003), and in any event the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly 

held that, in the absence of any conflict between federal procedural law and a state-enacted antiSLAPP statute, such statutes should be applied and enforced in the federal courts, see, e.g., 

United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed lvfissiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972-973 (9th 

Cir. 1999), including Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute, see Northan v. Rule, 637 F.3d 937, 938-939 

(9th Cir. 2011), Englert v. AlacDonel/, 551F.3d1099, 1101-1102 (9th Cir. 2009). I therefore 

reject CCI's argument for summmy denial of defendants' special motion to strike as contrary to 

applicable law.5 

5 Notwithstanding the foregoing, to the extent that Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute provides 

for an automatic stay of discove1y when a special motion to strike is filed, because that provision 

would conflict with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56(:1) as 

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In the alternative to its argument for wholesale summary denial of defendants' special 

motion, CCI argues as a preliminary matter that its RJCO claim, as a cause of action arising 

under federal law, is necessarily outside the scope of Oregon'a anti-SLAPP statute. I agree with 

CCI that state anti-SLAPP statutes are as a matter of law necessarily inapplicable to federal 

causes of action. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010). Defendants' 

special motion to strike should therefore be summarily denied (qua motion to strike) as to CCI's 

RJCO cause of action.· However, where, as here, the claimant has availed itself of the 

opportunity to submit briefing in support of the proposition that its at-issue claim is well pied, the 

courts of the Ninth Circuit may appropriately consider sua sponte whether such a claim is subject 

to dismissal under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), see Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. 

Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335-336 (9th Cir. 2015), and this court may therefore appropriately 

construe defendants' motion as a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to dismiss to the extent it addresses CC I's 

RJCO claim, see LaHodny v. 48 Hours, Case No. 6:13-CV-2102-TC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

38447, * 14 (D. Or. Feb. 17, 2015). I recommend that this court so construe defendants' special 

motion to strike as it applies to CCI's RlCO claim, and I analyze the motion so construed below. 

A. Defendants' Burden to Establish that CCI's State-Law Claims are within the 

Scope of the Anti-SLAPP Statute 

As noted above, CCI brings three state-law claims, one for violation of Oregon's UTP A, 

one for intentional interference with prospective economic relations under Oregon common law, 

and one for defamation under Oregon common law. As to CCI's first state-law claim, the UTP A 

requiring discovery to proceed "where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to 

discover information that is essential to its opposition," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986), such automatic stay of discovery is necessarily inapplicable in federal 

court. See lvletabolife Int'/ v. Warnick, 264 F.3d 832, 846-847 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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provides that "a person that suffers an ascertainable loss of money or propetty, real or personal, 

as a result of another person's willful use or employment of a method, act or practice declared 

unlawful under ORS 646.608, may bring an individual action in an appropriate court to recover 

actual damages or statutmy damages of$200, whichever is greater." Or. Rev. Stat. 646.638(1). 

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608, in relevant pati, provides that: 

A person engages in an unlawful practice if in the course of the person's business, 

vocation or occupation the person does any of the following: 

* * * 

(b) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 

source, sponsorship, approval, or cettification of real estate, goods 

or services. 

* * * 

( e) Represents that real estate, goods or services have sponsorship, 

approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, quantities or 

qualities that the real estate, goods or services do not have or that a 

person has a sponsorship, approval, status, qualification, affiliation, 

or connection that the person does not have. 

* * * 

(h) Disparages the real estate, goods, services, property or business of 

a customer or another by false or misleading representations of 

fact. 

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.606(1). It is CCI's position that defendants violated the UTPA by curating and 

presenting consumer reviews on its website in a manner calculated to cause a likelihood of 

confusion regarding approval of its services and to disparage CCI's services misleadingly. 

As to CCI's second state-law claim, under Oregon law: 

To state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff 

must allege: (1) the existence of a professional or business relationship; (2) 

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intentional interference with that relationship; (3) by a third party; ( 4) 

accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal 

effect between the interference and damage to the economic relations; and ( 6) 

damages. 

Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 328 Or. 487, 498 (1999), citing J'vlcGanty v. 

Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 535 (1995). The requisite "professional or business relationship" may 

be purely prospective in nature. See Cron v. Zimmer, 255 Or. App. 114, 125 (2013), quoting 

1vlcGanty, 321 Or. at 535. "Generally, commercial and contractual relationships enjoy the 

protection of the t01t." Id., citing Allen v. Hall, 328 Or. 276, 281 (1999). "However, a defendant 

can be liable for interference 'even though the arrangement interfered with does not rise to the 

dignity of a contract."' Id., quoting Luisi v. Bank of Commerce, 252 Or. 271, 275 (1969). 

"Liability for intentional interference with prospective business advantage ... arises when the 

defendant, without a privilege to do so, induces a third person not to enter into or to continue a 

business relationship with the plaintiff." Thompson v. Telephone & Data Sys., 130 Or. App. 302, 

313 ( 1994); citing Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 206 (1978). It is 

CCI's position that defendants intentionally interfered with its prospective business relationships 

with consumers affirmatively seeking reviews of its services on defendants' webpages by curating 

and presenting those reviews in a manner calculated to cause viewers to avoid doing business 

with CCI. 

As to CCI's third state-law claim, under Oregon law, "[t]he elements of a claim for 

defamation are: (1) the making ofa defamatory statement; (2) publication of the defamatory 

material; and (3) a resulting special harm, unless the statement is defamatory per se and therefore 

gives rise to presumptive special harm." Nat'/ Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Starplex Corp., 220 Or. 

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App. 560, 584 (2008), citing L & D of Or. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 171 Or. App. 17, 22 (2000). "A 

defamatory statement is one that would subject another to hatred, contempt or ridicule or tend to 

diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the other is held or to excite 

adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against the other." Id. (internal 

modifications omitted), quoting lvfar/eau v. Truck Ins. Exch., 333 Or. 82, 94 (2001). It is CCI's 

position that its business was haimed by defendants' curation and presentation ofreviews in a 

manner calculated to disparage CCI's services. 

In light of the foregoing, defendants take the position that CCI's state-law claims arise out 

of one or both of the categories of cases listed under Or. Rev. Stat. 31.150(2)( c) and/or ( d), 

namely: 

( c) Any oral statement made, or written statement or other document 

presented, in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection 

with an issue of public interest; or 

( d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 

public issue or an issue of public interest. 

Or. Rev. Stat. 31.150(2). CCI counters that its state-law claims do not arise out of statements 

constituting expressions of free speech, but rather out of bad-faith removal or concealment of 

positive reviews and out of deceitful and manipulative nondisclosure of information material to 

interpretation of published expressions of free speech. That is, CCI characterizes the conduct out 

of which its claims arise as calculated to inhibit rather than to further constitutional free speech 

rights, and on that basis argues that its state-law claims are outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP 

statute. 

Assuming arguendo that CCI is correct that the complained-of conduct cannot constitute 

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the making of a written statement or the presentation of a document, I find that all of the 

complained-of conduct would nevertheless fall within the scope of Section 31.150(2)( d). First, it 

appears clear that hosting a consumer reviews website accessible to the public constitutes a 

public issue or issue of public interest for purposes of Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., 

Gardner v. 1Hartino, Case No. CV-05-769-HU, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38970, *13-20 (D. Or. 

Sept. 19, 2005) (so finding on the basis of collected material Oregon and Califomia cases). 

Second, there can be no serious argument that the expression of opinion regarding the quality of 

services provided to the public is not conduct in fu1iherance of the exercise of the constitutional 

right to free speech. Third, defendants' complained-of actions - removing positive reviews, 

increasing the salience of negative reviews, etc. - constitute elections made in the course of 

editing, curating, and presenting the consumer reviews submitted to the ConsumerAffairs 

website. As such, that conduct, too, is necessarily conduct in futiherance of the exercise of the 

constitutional right to free speech for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. I therefore find that 

defendants have met their burden to establish that CCI's state-law claims are within the scope of 

Section 31.150(2). In consequence, the burden shifts to CCI to establish a probability of success 

on the merits as to each of its state-law claims. 

B. CCI's Burden to Establish a Probability of Success on the Merits as to Each 

of its State-Law Claims 

1. CCl's Burden to Establish a Probability of Success on the Merits as to 

its UTP A Claim 

As noted above, the UTP A provides that "a person that suffers an asce1iainable loss of 

money or propetiy, real or personal, as a result of another person's willful use or employment of a 

method, act or practice declared unlawful under ORS 646.608, may bring an individual action in 

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an appropriate court to recover actual damages or statuto1y damages of $200, whichever is 

greater." Or. Rev. Stat. 646.638(1). Or. Rev. Stat. 646.608, in relevant part, provides that: 

A person engages in an unlawful practice if in the course of the person's business, 

vocation or occupation the person does any of the following: 

* * * 

(b) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 

source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of real estate, goods 

or services. 

* * * 

( e) Represents that real estate, goods or services have sponsorship, 

approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, quantities or 

qualities that the real estate, goods or services do not have or that a 

person has a sponsorship, approval, status, qualification, affiliation, 

or coimection that the person does not have. 

* * * 

(h) Disparages the real estate, goods, services, property or business of 

a customer or another by false or misleading representations of 

fact. 

Or. Rev. Stat. 646.606(1 ). 

Although it does not appear that the Oregon courts have addressed the question, the 

courts of this district have persuasively interpreted the legislative hist01y of the UTP A as 

providing a cause of action only to consumers, and not to business rivals. See, e.g., Benson 

Tower Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Victaulic Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d. 1126, 1135-1137 (D. Or. 2014) 

(and cases discussed therein). Defendants argue that CCI is not a consumer but rather a provider 

of services to consumers, and on that basis argue that CCI caimot establish a probability of 

success on the merits of its UTP A claim. 

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I agree with the defendants that the legislative history of the UTP A leaves little room for 

the conclusion that a non-consumer may bring a private cause of action under the statute. See 

Denson v. Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc., 279 Or. 85, 90 (1977) (discussing the legislative 

hist01y of the UTP A and concluding that it was not intended to protect competitors but rather to 

protect only consumers); Lund v. Arbonne Int'/, Inc., 132 Ore. App. 87, 93 n.7, 887 P.2d 817, 822 

n.7 (1994) (discussing legislative hist01y of the UTPA indicating that victims of unlawful trade 

practices other than consumers are "excluded" from the protections of the statute); see also 

Co/legeNET, Inc. v. Embark com, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173-1175 (D. Or. 2000) 

(discussing legislative history). However, it is by no means clear that CCI is not, as defendants 

contend, a consumer for purposes of the statute. I note in this connection that a corporate entity 

can constitute a "person that suffers an ascertainable loss of money or propetty" for purposes of 

Section 646.638(1), see Or. Rev. Stat.§ 646.605(4), such that there can be no argument that CCI 

is barred from bringing a UTPA claim on sole the basis of its status as a corporate entity engaged 

in business. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 129 Or. App. 206, 

217 (1994). 

Furthe1more, CCI is in no sense a competitor or a business rival of defendants. As 

discussed above, CCI is a mobile virtual network operator in the business of providing cellphone 

services; defendants own and operate a consumer review website. CCI's revenue comes from 

consumers who purchase their cellphone services, whereas defendants eatn revenue from two 

different classes of consumers: purchasers of advertising space on defendants' website, and 

purchasers of memberships in defendants' accreditation program. 

Moreover, as discussed above CCI expressly alleges that defendants repeatedly and 

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persistently solicited CCI to become a purchaser of the services defendants offer to their 

accredited members, namely rating-improvement services. Defendants' alleged solicitations 

establish for purposes of this stage of these proceedings that CCI was squarely within the class of 

potential consumers of defendants' membership services. 

Finally, it is clear that the Oregon courts do not require that a UTPA plaintiff have 

actually purchased the defendant's products or services or otherwise have entered into privity 

with the defendant, but rather require only that the plaintiff be a consumer damaged by the 

defendant's unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Ore. App. 

166, 171-172 (1982) (finding that plaintiffs who were harmed by a business entity's 

misrepresentations had statutory standing to bring a UTP A claim despite not having purchased 

any products or services from the defendant and despite the fact that the defendant had no 

knowledge that its misrepresentations would be communicated to the plaintiffs at the time they 

were made). As a potential consumer of defendants' services allegedly harmed by defendants' 

complained-of unlawful conduct, under Oregon law the requirement that a UTPA plaintiff be a 

"consumer" rather than a business rival presents no bar to CCI's UTP A claim. 

For its pati, CCI has adduced evidence on the basis of which, if viewed in the light most 

favorable to CCI, a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that defendants manipulated the 

consumer reviews hosted on its page in a manner calculated to create a more negative impression 

of CCI's services than would have been the case had the reviews been unmanipulated. See 

Decimation of Robert B. Lowiy ("Lowry Deel.") (and exhibits attached thereto); Declaration of 

John S. Marick ("Marick Deel.") (and exhibits attached thereto); Declaration ofNancy S. Koppy 

("Koppy Deel.") (and exhibits attached thereto). In addition, CCI has adduced evidence on the 

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basis of which, if viewed in the light most favorable to CCI, a finder of fact could reasonably 

conclude that CCI suffered asce11ainable losses as a consequence of such manipulations. See 

Marick Deel., if 9 (and associated exhibits attached thereto). I therefore find that CCI has met its 

burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of its UTP A claim. Defendants' special 

motion to strike should therefore be denied as to that claim. 

2. CCI's Burden to Establish a Probability of Success on the Merits as to 

its Intentional Interference Claim 

As noted above, under Oregon law: 

To state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations, a plaintiff 

must allege: (1) the existence of a professional or business relationship; 

(2) intentional interference with that relationship; (3) by a third party; 

(4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a 

causal effect between the interference and damage to the economic relations; and 

( 6) damages. 

Northwest Natural Gas, 328 Or. at 498, citing 1vlcGanty, 321 Or. at 535. The requisite 

"professional or business relationship" may be purely prospective in nature. See Cron, 255 Or. 

App. at 125, quoting 1vfcGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 535 (1995). "Generally, commercial 

and contractual relationships enjoy the protection of the tort." Id., citing Allen v. Hall, 328 Or. 

276, 281 (1999). "However, a defendant can be liable for interference 'even though the 

anangement interfered with does not rise to the dignity ofa contract.'" Id., quoting Luisi, 252 Or. 

at 27 5. "Liability for intentional interference with prospective business advantage ... arises when 

the defendant, without a privilege to do so, induces a third person not to enter into or to continue 

a business relationship with the plaintiff." Thompson, 130 Or. App. at 313; citing Top Service, 

283 Or. at 206. 

Moreover, "[d]eliberate interference alone does not give rise to tort liability." Cron, 255 

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Or. App. at 125; see also Top Service, 283 Or. at 209-210 ("[A] claim [of tort liability for 

intentional interference with contractual or other economic relations] is made out when 

interference resulting in injmy to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 

interference itself. Defendant's liability may arise from improper motives or from the use of 

improper means. They may be wrongful by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a 

recognized rule of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession."). 

The Northwest Natural Gas court specified that: 

To be entitled to reach a jury, a plaintiff must not only prove that defendant 

intentionally interfered with [its] business relationship but also that defendant had 

a duty of non-interference; i.e., that [it] interfered for an improper purpose rather 

than for a legitimate one, or that defendant used improper means which resulted in 

injmy to plaintiff. Therefore, a case is made out which entitles plaintiff to go to a 

ju1y only when interference resulting in injmy to another is wrongful by some 

measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. 

Northwest Natural Gas, 328 Or. at 498 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted). 

It is defendants' position that CCI cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the 

merits of its intentional interference claim because it had no existing contractual relationship or 

any non-speculative prospective economic relationship with members of the public who viewed 

reviews of CCI's services on defendants' website, and because, in the absence of any such 

existing or affinnatively prospective relationship, it cannot show that defendants' purpo1ted 

interference with such relationships could have been intentional. CCI counters that its 

prospective business relationships with members of the public affirmatively seeking out reviews 

of its services were more than merely speculative and at all material times were known by 

defendants, in patt because as a matter of logic either all or nearly all such persons can be 

expected to have been affirmatively considering entering into a business relationship with CCI at 

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the time they visited defendants' website, and in part because of evidence tending to establish that 

a small but determinable percentage of persons who seek out information regarding CCI's 

services can be predicted as a matter of statistics to make the ultimate decision to do business 

with CCI. 

The Oregon case law does not provide significant guidance as to what sorts of 

"anangements" between parties that do not "rise to the dignity of a contract" can constitute a 

prospective economic relationship for purposes of the tort. While it is well settled that the 

requisite "professional or business relationship [may constitute], e.g., ... a prospective economic 

advantage," J'vfcGanty, 321 Or. at 535, the cases do not establish guidelines for distinguishing 

purely speculative potential economic relations with member of the public generally from 

cognizable prospective relationships that can be identified with adequate certainty 

notwithstanding the absence of any enforceable business agreement, but rather establish only that 

interference with a potential economic advantage may be actionable where the defendant 

"know[ s] of the plaintiffs prospective relationship and intentionally interfere[ s] with that 

relationship" via improper means or purpose, to the plaintiffs asce1iainable harm. United 

Employer Benefit Corp. v. Department of Ins. & Fin., 133 Or. App. 477, 487 (1995), citing 

Glubka v. Long, 115 Or. App. 236, 239 (1992). In United Employer, the court of appeals 

affirmed the decision of the trial cou1t below to direct verdict in favor of an intentional 

interference defendant on the gro1md that the defendant's interference was accomplished neither 

through improper means nor for any improper purpose, but apparently considered the other 

elements of the tort to have been satisfied by evidence that the defendant had knowledge of the 

plaintiffs intent to solicit potential customers whose names appeared on a list, a substantial 

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propo1tion of whom had had no prior contact with the plaintiff, that despite such knowledge the 

defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs ability to solicit the customers, and that the 

plaintiff was damaged in its business in consequence. See id. at 484, 487. It thus appears that, 

under Oregon law, a third party's conduct in intentionally inducing a person not to enter into a 

business relationship with another may be actionable where the prospect that the possible 

business relationship would be consummated was sufficiently cognizable that the third paity 

could be aware that such prospect existed. See id.; see also Top Service, 283 Or. at 206. 

The record herein contains evidence on the basis of which a finder of fact could 

reasonably conclude that such a prospect of economic relations between CCI aiid persons 

searching for reviews of CCI's services existed, and that defendants were aware of it at the 

material times. Specifically, the record contains both Marick's declaration testimony that an 

asce1tainable percentage of members of the public who choose to access CCI's website ultimately 

elect to do business with CCI, see Marick Deel.,~ 9, and evidence that defendants, by and 

tln·ough their employee Polacek, admitted to CCI that they were able to asce1tain as a matter of 

statistics both the percentage of persons affirmatively searching for consumer reviews of CCI's 

services who ultimately elected to do business with CCI and the expected increase in that 

percentage should CCI become an accredited member of ConsumerAffairs, see Declaration of 

Brian E. Hepner ("Hepner Deel.") (and exhibits attached thereto), Marick Deel., Exh. 1. In 

addition, as noted above, CCI has adduced evidence on the basis of which a finder of fact could 

reasonably conclude that defendants intentionally and improperly manipulated the consumer 

reviews hosted on its page in a manner calculated to create a more negative impression of CCI's 

services than would have been the case had the reviews been unmanipulated, see Low1y Deel. 

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(and exhibits attached thereto), Mari ck Deel. (and exhibits attached thereto), Koppy Deel. (and 

exhibits attached thereto), as well as evidence on the basis of which a finder of fact could 

reasonably conclude that CCI suffered ascertainable losses as a consequence of such 

manipulations, see Marick Deel., ~ 9 (and associated exhibits attached thereto). On the basis of 

that evidence, I find that CCI has met its burden to establish a probability of success on the 

merits of its intentional interference claim. Defendants' special motion to strike should therefore 

be denied as to that claim. 

3. CCI's Burden to Establish a Probability of Success on the Merits as to 

its Defamation Claim 

As noted above, under Oregon law, "[t]he elements of a claim for defamation are: (1) the 

making of a defamatory statement; (2) publication of the defamatmy material; and (3) a resulting 

special hmm, unless the statement is defamatory per se and therefore gives rise to presumptive 

special harm." Nat'! Union, 220 Or. App. at 584, citing L & D, 171 Or. App. at 22. "A 

defamatmy statement is one that would subject another to hatred, contempt or ridicule or tend to 

diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the other is held or to excite 

adverse, derogato1y or unpleasant feelings or opinions against the other." Id. (internal 

modifications omitted), quoting lvlar/eau, 333 Or. at 94. Defendants take the position that CCI 

cannot establish a probability of success on the merits of its defamation claims because the 

statements regarding CCI's services that appear on its website are statements of opinion, and as a 

matter of law statements of opinion cannot be defamatory. Defendants additionally argue that 

any defamatmy statements made in the consumer reviews published on its website are 

attributable solely to the authors of the reviews pursuant to the federal Communications Decency 

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Act, and cannot be actionable against the defendants. 

I agree with defendants that, as a general rule, "expressions of opinion ... which cannot 

be interpreted reasonably as stating actual facts, are not actionable [as defamation] because they 

are constitutionally protected." Reesman v. Highfill, 327 Or. 597, 606 (1998), citing lvlilkovich v. 

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990). Here, however, CCI's defamation claim is not 

premised on the opinions expressed by the consumers whose reviews are hosted on defendants' 

webpages, but rather on defendants' own affomative statements, primarily - perhaps exclusively 

- defendants' statements regarding the aggregate" overall satisfaction rating" that it calculates on 

the basis of all of the reviews of CC I's services hosted on its site, and presents in salient fashion 

on the same page as the reviews themselves. It is CCI's position that defendants' own statement 

that the "overall satisfaction rating" of CCI's services was (for example) 1.5 out of a possible 5 

stars was defamatory; specifically, it is CCI's position that defendants made and published the 

statement, that the statement tended to diminish the confidence of the public in the quality of 

CC I's services, that it was damaged in its business by the defamatory character of the statement, 

and that defendants knew the statement was false when they published it, in that defendants 

knowingly failed to include positive reviews in their calculation of the rating. CCI has proffered 

evidence from which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that each of those propositions is 

accurate. See Lowry Deel. (and exhibits attached thereto); Marick Deel. (and exhibits attached 

thereto); Koppy Deel. (and exhibits attached thereto); Hepner Deel. (and exhibits attached 

thereto). 

Moreover, because the statement( s) actually at issue are not those of third parties to this 

action that are merely hosted and curated by the defendants but rather the defendants' own factual 

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representation(s) regarding those third-party expressions of opinion, the immunity provision of 

the Communications Decency Act, which provides only that "[n]o provider or user of an 

interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any infonnation 

provided by another info1mation content provider," is entirely inapplicable to CCI's defamation 

claim to the extent so premised. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 

For the foregoing reasons, CCI has met its burden to establish a probability of success on 

the merits of its defamation claim. Defendants' special motion to strike should therefore be 

denied as to that claim. 

4. CCl's Burden to Establish a Probability of Success on the Merits as to 

its State-Law Claims to the Extent Alleged against Carman 

Defendants argue, in the alternative to their arguments in favor of striking all of CCI's 

state-law claims in their entirety, that CCI's state-law claims should be stricken to the extent 

alleged against Caiman, the principal of both corporate defendants. In support of that argument, 

defendants assert that CCI failed to allege Caiman's direct involvement in any of the complainedof conduct. 

Notwithstanding defendants' assertion, CCI in fact alleged that Caiman "established a 

new business model" for the ConsumerAffairs business, specifically the business model 

complained of herein pursuant to which defendants allegedly manipulate the presentation of 

consumer reviews and suppress positive reviews in order to create a less favorable than 

warranted impression of the products and services of entities that decline to become accredited 

members of defendants' scheme. Complaint, ifif 3, 11. More critically, CCI has adduced 

evidence on the basis of which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Caiman directed 

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the corporate entities to engage in the allegedly t01tious conduct described in CCI's complaint. 

See Declaration of Mike Strain ("Strain Deel."), Exh. 1. Under Oregon law, an officer or director 

of a corporate entity will be liable for tortious conduct the officer or director affomatively directs 

the corporate entity to engage in. See Cortez v. Nacco l'vfaterial Handling Group, Inc., 356 Or. 

254, 270 (2014); see also Lewis v. Devils Lake Rock Crushing Co., 274 Or. 293, 298 (1976); 

Pelton v. Gold Hill Canal Co., 72 Or. 353, 357-358 (1914). It follows that CCI has met its 

burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of its state-law claims to the extent 

alleged against Caiman, and that defendants' special motion to strike should be denied to the 

extent it addresses CCI's claims as alleged against Carman specifically.6 

II. Defendants' Constructive Motion to Dismiss CCl's RICO Claim 

As noted above - and as defendants concede by and through their reply memorandum -

CCI's federal RICO claim is necessarily outside the scope of defendants' special motion to strike. 

Also as noted above, it is appropriate (where, as here, the nonmoving patty has had an 

opportunity to submit briefing defending the adequacy of its allegations to suppo1t the federal 

claim) to treat a special motion to strike a federal claim as a motion to dismiss arising under 

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b). See Seismic Reservoir, 785 F.3d at 335-336; LaHodny, 2015 

6 Moreover, assuming arguendo that CCI's evidentimy proffer in suppo1t of its state-law 

claims to the extent alleged against Cannan were insufficient to meet its burden at the second 

step of the two-step process, because evidence of Carman's direct involvement in or affirmative 

direction of the t01tious conduct complained of in CCI's complaint would, assuming such 

evidence exists, necessarily be within defendants' possession and control, it would be 

inappropriate under 1Vfetabolife, supra, to grant defendants' special motion to strike as to any of 

the state-law claims to the extent alleged against Cmman without first giving CCI the opportunity 

to conduct relevant discovety. See lvfetabolife, 264 F.3d at 846-847. On that arguendo 

assumption, therefore, defendants' special motion to strike as to CCI's state-law claims to the 

extent alleged against Cannan would most appropriately be treated as a motion for summmy 

judgment under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56. 

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38447 at *14. 

The federal RICO Act provides a civil action for "[a]ny person injured in his business or 

propertybyreasonofaviolationof[18U.S.C. § 1962]." 18U.S.C. § 1964(c). 18U.S.C. § 

1962(a) through (c) "prohibit ce1iain 'pattems of racketeering activity' in relation to an 

'enterprise."' United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, 770 

F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal modifications omitted), quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962. The 

conduct constituting "racketeering activity" for purposes of Section 1962 - generally refe1Ted to 

as conduct constituting a "predicate act" for purposes of a RICO claim - is set forth in full at 18 

U.S.C. § 1961, paiiicularly Section 1961(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Here, as noted above, CCI 

alleges that defendants' complained-of conduct constitutes predicate acts of wire fraud and of 

extortion. 

Defendants argue, first, 7 that CC I's RICO claim is inadequately pled in that CCI has not 

alleged each defendant's specific involvement in conducting or directing the affairs of the alleged 

RICO enterprise. Defendants are conect that civil RICO liability is limited to persons or entities 

who play "some part in directing the enterprise's affairs," Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 

179 (1993) (emphasis original), but it is likewise true that a RICO defendant need not have 

"significant control over or within [the] enterprise" for RICO liability to attach, id. at 179 n. 4. 

The courts of the Ninth Circuit have found the following factors relevant to dete1mining whether 

the Reves standard for control over or direction of the enterprise has been satisfied: (I) whether 

the defendant "occup[ied] a position in the chain of command ... through which the affairs of 

7 For purposes of determining the merits of defendants' constructive motion to dismiss 

CCI's RICO claim, I disregard defendants' arguments that necessarily pe1iain only to its 

arguments in favor of striking the RICO claim under Oregon's anti-SLAPP statute. 

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the enterprise [were] conducted,"(2) whether the defendant "knowingly implement[ed] decisions 

of upper management," and (3) whether the defendant's "pa1ticipation was vital to the mission's 

success." Walter v. Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations, internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Here, CCI has alleged that all three defendants, "and each of them," directed the corporate 

defendants' agents to engage in complained-of conduct, including Polacek's email messages to 

CCI's employees and officers and the maintenance of a collection of consumer reviews hosted by 

a purp01tedly unbiased consumer advocacy organization that in reality presents an unwanantedly 

positive impression of defendants' paying customers and an unwarrantedly negative impression 

of entities who refuse to become paying customers of the defendants. See Complaint, iii! 34-38. 

Defendant argues that such allegations constitute improper "group pleading," but in fact a fair 

reading of the allegations is that each defendant directed the corporate defendants' agents to 

engage in the complained-of conduct (thus necessarily occupying positions in the chain of 

command of the enterprise), which is sufficient to satisfy the Reves standard. If defendants take 

issue with the accuracy of those allegations, the proper mechanism for challenging the factual 

basis of CCI's position that each defendant played a patt in directing the alleged enterprise is a 

motion for summary judgment. Defendants' specific-involvement argument provides no grounds 

for dismissing CCI's RICO claim at this pleading stage of these proceedings. 

Second, defendants argue that CCI has not adequately alleged a "pattern" of racketeering 

activity. Specifically, defendants argue that CCI has alleged, at most, a single scheme to induce 

CCI to become one of defendants' accredited members, which defendants assert is insufficient to 

satisfy the pattern requirement. 

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The courts of the Ninth Circuit require a "threat of continuing activity" in order to find a 

"pattern" ofracketeering activity. JV!edallion Television Enters. v. SelecTV of Cal., 833 F.2d 

1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987). "Continuity does not require a showing that the defendants engaged 

in more than one 'scheme' or 'criminal episode.' ... The circumstances of the case, however, 

must suggest that the predicate acts are indicative of a threat of continuing activity." Id. 

(citations omitted). Here, CCI has alleged just such a threat of continuing activity, in that, 

according to CCI's allegations, defendants continue to suppress positive reviews of CCI's 

services, continue to hold out their organization as one dedicated to unbiased consumer 

advocacy, and continue to offer relief from their improper manipulation of third-party consumer 

reviews to reviewed entities that pay significant sums of money to become accredited members. 

This alleged continuing activity is sufficient to satisfy the pattern requirement. Moreover, CCI 

has in any event alleged both several instances of efforts to use the threat of economic harm to 

CC I's business to extort payments from CCI and the deception of the public at large, effected via 

the internet, regarding the unbiased nature of the third-party reviews hosted on defendants' 

webpage. Those allegations support the inference that defendants engaged in at least two 

predicate acts of racketeering (multiple attempts to commit extortion and at least one act of wire 

fraud). Defendants' pattern argument thus provides no grounds for dismissing CCI's RICO claim 

at this pleading stage of these proceedings. 

Third, defendants argue that CCI has not successfully alleged any predicate acts of wire 

fraud. In support of that argument, defendants assert both that CCI has failed to allege wire fraud 

with sufficient particularity to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Federal Civil 

Procedure Rule 9(b) and that CCI has failed to allege that it suffered harm directly caused by 

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alleged wire fraud. 

To address defendants' arguments, it is necessary first to differentiate between the wire 

fraud actionable under the RICO statute and common-law fraud under Oregon law. It is well 

established that "state law is inelevant in determining whether a certain course of conduct is 

violative of the wire fraud statute" for RICO purposes. United States v. Lauderman, 576 F.2d 

1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978). The wire fraud statute, by contrast with common-law fraud, makes 

unlawful "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of 

false orji·audulent pretenses, representations, or promises" where the person who devised or 

intended to devise such scheme "transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or 

television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, 

pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or miifice." 18 U.S.C. § 1343 

(emphasis supplied). Moreover, "[t]he fraudulent nature of the 'scheme or artifice to defraud' is 

measured by a non-technical standard." United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 

1980), citing Lauderman, 576 F.2d at 1389. "Thus, schemes are condemned which are contrary 

to public policy or which fail to measure up to the 'reflection of moral uprightness, of 

fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of 

society."' Id., quoting Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958). As such: 

The common-law requirements of "justifiable reliance" and "damages," for 

example, plainly have no place in the federal [wire, mail, and bank) fraud statutes. 

See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 960 (CAlO 1989) ("Under the 

mail fraud statute, the government does not have to prove actual reliance upon the 

defendant's misrepresentations"); United States v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747, 749 (CA2) 

(L. Hand, J.) ("Civilly of course the mail fraud statute would fail without proof of 

damage, but that has no application to criminal liability"), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 

554, 76 L. Ed. 1289, 52 S. Ct. 579 (1932). By prohibiting the "scheme to 

defraud," rather than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage 

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would clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted. 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) (internal modifications omitted); see also 

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 657-659 (2008) (noting that the common 

law recognizes a cause of action against persons who defraud other persons for the purpose of 

causing moneta1y hmm to third parties; further noting that while teliance may sometimes be 

invoked in order to prove the element of causation, it is not thereby incorporated as an element of 

federal fraud). 

CCI has alleged that defendants maintain a website which purpo1is to host consumer 

reviews of CCI's products without regm·d to whether such reviews may be chm·acterizable as 

reviews or complaints, but which in fact does not include all positive reviews of entities which 

refuse to become defendants' accredited members. Specifically, CCI has alleged that defendants 

have maintained that website at all material times up to and including the present. CCI has 

alleged that the website is specifically hosted by ConsumerAffairs, that Cmman is 

ConsumerAffairs' principal, that Consumers Unified is the entity by and through which 

accredited members contract with defendants, and that Carmmi is Consumers Unified's principal. 

It is CCI's position that this mTangement constitutes a scheme to deceive the public through the 

use of the wires for the purpose of causing CCI to suffer pecuniary harm. If the truth of CCI's 

allegations were· established, that scheme would constitute wire fraud under Section 1343, and its 

elements have been alleged with pmiicularity. Defendants' Rule 9(b) argument thus provides no 

grounds for dismissing CCI's RICO claim at this stage of these proceedings. Moreover, CCI has 

alleged asce1iainable pecunimy hmm directly caused by defendants' alleged deception of 

members of the public seeking reviews of CCI's services. See Complaint, 'if 24. Defendants' 

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direct-damage argument thus likewise provides no grounds for dismissal of CCI's RICO claim. 

Fomih and finally, defendants argue that CCI has not successfully alleged any predicate 

acts of extortion. In supp01i of that argument, defendants assert that CCI has alleged only that 

defendants advised CCI of the likelihood that it would suffer loss if it did not avail itself of 

defendants' legitimately beneficial services, and not that defendants improperly tln·eatened to 

hmm CCI's business in order to obtain wrongful payments from it. 

For RICO purposes, the predicate act of ext01iion can be defined under state law, so long 

as the state law provides for the possibility of punishment by imprisonment for more than one 

year. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A). Oregon's extortion statute, Or. Rev. Stat.§ 164.075, defined 

ext01iion as a Class B felony, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.075(2), and as such is punishable by up to 

ten years of imprisonment, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.605. Violation of Oregon's extortion statute 

can therefore constitute a predicate offense for RICO purposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 196l(l)(A). 

Under Oregon's statute: 

A person commits theft by extortion when the person compels or induces another 

to deliver property to the person or to a third person by instilling in the other a fear 

that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or a third person will in the 

future: 

* * * 

(b) Cause damage to property; 

( c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; 

* * * 

( e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 

tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; 

* * *;or 

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(i) Inflict any other harm that would not benefit the actor. 

Or. Rev. Stat.§ 164.075(1). 

I agree with the defendants that, under Oregon's statut01y scheme, it is not extortion for a 

person to "threaten" only to withhold a benefit from another who lacks any right to that benefit, 

and where it is not independently wrongful for the benefit to be withheld. However, contrary to 

defendants' argument, CCI does not allege that defendants "threatened" only to withhold a 

beneficial service to which CCI had no pre-existing right, but rather that defendants, in addition 

to not permitting CCI to respond to or challenge negative reviews or to benefit from more 

favorable presentation oflegitimately submitted third-pmiy reviews, also affirmatively 

suppressed positive reviews without informing users of its webpage that it had done so, and 

indicated that it would continue doing so unless CCI became an accredited member. It is thus 

CCI's position that defendants attempted to extort tens of thousands of dollars in accredited 

membership fees from CCI under threat of improper hmm to its reputation and to its business. 

As such, CCI has adequately alleged the predicate act of exto1iion, and defendants' final 

argument provides no grounds for dismissal of CCI's RICO claim. 

In the absence of any grounds for dismissal of CCI's RICO claim, defendants' 

constructive motion to dismiss should be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, defendants' special motion (#9) to strike should be denied 

in its entirety, both qua special motion to strike and qua constructive motion to dismiss. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be refened to a district judge. Objections, if any, 

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are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno objections 

are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due fomieen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

D'l<d lhi• 29th day olfobru,,y, 20 \:-:) 

-'r-----!7"..L!A4--\-----"'-~j~ .onorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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