THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Steven K. Alukonis, Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Wayne K. Smith, Jr., Respondent/Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001441

Appeal From Spartanburg County Phillip K. Sinclair, Family Court Judge

Opinion No. 5745 Heard February 11, 2020 – Filed July 22, 2020

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Richard H. Rhodes and Willia m Hardwick Rhodes, both of Burts Turner & Rhodes, of Spartanburg, for Appellant/Respondent.

Meliah Bowers Jefferson and Wallace K. Lightsey, of Wyche Law Firm, both of Greenville, for Respondent/Appellant.

Angela Johnson Moss, 

### of the Seventh Circuit Public Defender's Office, of Sparta nburg, Guardian ad Litem,

pro se.

HUFF, J.: This matter involves cross-app eals over the custody of a minor child (hereinafter, Child) between Steven K. Alukonis, the mate rnal grandfather (hereinafter, Grandfather), and Wayne K. Smith, Jr., the natural father of Child(hereinafter, Father), following the d eath of Katelyn Alukonis, Child's natural mother (hereinafter, Kate). Grandfather challenges th e family court's award of primary custody to Father and the award of $10,000 in attorney's fees to Father. Father appeals the award of joint custod y to Grandfather and the family court's
failure to award him all fees and costs e xpended in this litigation. We reverse the award of primary custody to Father, reve rse and remand the award of attorney's fees to Father, and remand for the family court to set a visitation plan for Father.

FACTUAL/PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND

This is a very sad case stemming from a custody action brought about after Child's mother, Kate, committed suicide. Child was born on July 1, 2010, to Kate and
Father. The two were never a couple, and Kate travelled back and forth with Child between South Carolina, where Father lived, and her family home in Florida— living in both states for various periods of time. Kate had mental health issues and worked only sporadically. While in bot h South Carolina and Florida, Grandfather provided financial support for Kate and Child, and also provided emotional and hands on support at all times while the two were in Florida. Grandfather, Kate's sisters, and Kate's step-mother were all ve ry involved in Child's life. Prior to Kate's death, it appears Father engaged in limited interaction with Child, and then only when Child was present in South Carolin a. Child was cared for, at times, by Father or his family members while in South Carolina, most often staying at Child's great-grandmother's home. When Kate committed su icide on August 18, 2015, in South Carolina, Father assu med custody of Child. After several
encounters with Grandfather and/or his fam ily, Father's family feared they would try to take Child back to Florida and re fused to allow Kate's family any contact with Child. Grandfather brought this acti on and, a few months after Kate's death, he was awarded temporary custody of Child. Following this order, Child lived in
Grandfather's home for anot her nineteen months.

A final hearing on the matter was he ld March 20-30, 2017. Following the submission of extensive testimony and eviden ce, the family court noted the amount of time Child spent living in Florida and in South Carolina. 1 It stated that when Kate and Child resided in Florida, Gran dfather provided them with support, care,

1 The family court initially found that at th e time of the filing of this action, Child had spent half his life in Florida and half in South Carolina, but it subsequently amended such to provide Child had spent th irty-five months in Florida and twentyeight months in South Carolina prior to the f iling of this action. This finding is not challenged on appeal.and a place to live. It found Grandfather would often parent Child when they lived
in Florida because Kate was unable to do so. The family court found Grandfather financially supported Kate, a nd thus indirectly supported Child, while they were in
South Carolina as well as in Florida. In addition, Grandfather provided direct financial support for Child while they resi ded in Florida when Kate was unable to care for Child. Therefore, the court ruled there was "clear and convincing evidence that [Grandfather] is a de f acto custodian of . . . [C]hild, as there were periods that [Grandfather] was the primary caregiver fo r and financial supporter of . . . [C]hild, and that . . . [C]hild resided with [Grandf ather] (and . . . [C]h ild's mother) for a period of one year or more."

The family court next examined whether Father was unfit to parent Child, citing Kay v. Rowland , 285 S.C. 516, 331 S.E.2d 781 (1985), for the proposition that our courts recognize superior rights of a natura l parent in a custody dispute with a third party and "[o]nce the natural pa rent is deemed fit, the issue of custody is decided." The court found Father had a civil, work ing relationship with the mother of his second child. Although the court noted the status of Father's relationship with the mother of his third child was questiona ble and his unsettled living arrangement was a concern, it determined this did not render Father unfit as a parent. The court found Father and his family had been involved with Child from shortly after Child's birth to the present. The court r ecognized Father did not visit Child or send any direct support or gifts to Child while he was in Florida. However, it found
even when Kate and Child were in Florid a, Father provided health insurance for Child and listed him as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy. It noted Father did not do much in the way of contact or support while Child was in Florida with Kate but found, once Child returned to S outh Carolina, Father was involved in his life and provided support and contact. The family court observed the text messages between Father a nd Kate demonstrated Fath er and his family were involved with Child and that Father provi ded support and care for Child. Although the court acknowledged Father 's delay in responding to Kate was due to the dynamics of their relationship in that Father was not interested in having a relationship with Kate as she desired, it he ld Kate and Father "maintained a civil, working relationship for the sake of [Child ]." The court discounted the Guardian Ad Litem's (GAL) concerns that Father was not present during Child's birth and did not visit Child while he was in the hospital, 2 explaining Father was unsure of Child's paternity. It similarly found the GAL's concern regarding Child's absence

2 There were complications with Child 's birth and he de veloped pneumonia, resulting in a nine-day stay in a neona tal intensive care unit at two different hospitals.from Kate's memorial service did not impact Father's parental fitness, as this was due to Grandfather's filing of a custody ac tion in Florida and a text message from Kate's sister refusing to assure Father that she and Grandfather did not want to "take" Child, such that Father was fearfu l Child would not return from Florida. The family court, therefore, concluded Fa ther was a fit and proper parent to Child and found primary custody of Child sh ould be awarded to Father.

The court, however, also found compelling circumstan ces existed to warrant making both parties joint custodians of Ch ild, with Father the primary custodian and Grandfather the secondary custodian. The family court granted Father final decision-making authority with respect to Child, and noted Grandfather's designation as secondary custodian did not infringe on that decision-making authority. It set an extensive visitation schedule and ordered Fa ther to take Child to grief counseling. The court ordere d Grandfather to pay $10,000 of Father's requested $ 97,210.50 in attorney's fees and co sts. It also ordered the parties to pay equal shares of the GAL's fees. Followi ng a hearing on Grandfather's motion for reconsideration and to alter or amend, th e family court refused to alter its ruling that Father was a fit parent and denied Grandfather's request for primary custody of Child, explaining, "The Court finds th at its determination of compelling circumstances entitles [Grandfather] to e xpanded visitation with [Child], but does not overcome the superior custody rights of a fit natural parent." These crossappeals followed.

ISSUES

Grandfather challenges the family court' s award of primary custody to Father asserting: the family court erred in finding that Father was a fit parent for custody; the priority of a natural parent to cust ody of a child over a third party is now a rebuttable presumption; and Grandfather qua lified as a psychological parent or de
facto custodian such that Child's best inte rests were for Grandfather to be awarded custody. Grandfather also ap peals the award of $10,000 in a ttorney's fees to Father asserting that he should have prevaile d on the custody award and, even assuming the family court properly awarded cust ody to Father, the subject action was required by Father's refusal to allow Gra ndfather any contact with Child. Father appeals the award of joint custody to Grandf ather asserting: upon finding him to be a fit parent, the family court should have ended its inquiry; and the family court failed to provide an analysis of compelli ng circumstances that existed to warrant joint custody. Father also appeals the fa mily court's failure to award him all fees and costs expended in this litigation sin ce he prevailed on the issue of custody.STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In appeals from the family court, this [c ]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de

novo." Simmons v. Simmons , 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011). Thus, this court "has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence." Lewis v. Lewis , 392 S.C. 381, 384, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651 (2011). "However, this broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to disregard the fact that the family c ourt, which saw and heard the witnesses, was in a bette r position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony." Tomlinson v. Melton , 428 S.C. 607, 611, 837 S.E.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App. 2019). "Therefore, the appellant bears the burden of convincing the appellate cour t that the family court co mmitted error or that the preponderance of the evidence is against the court's findings." Id. at 611-12, 837
S.E.2d at 232.

LAW/ANAYSIS

I. Primary Custody

Grandfather argues the family court e rred in denying him primary custody of
Child. He asserts that while Father ca n support Child and safely monitor him during weekend or summer visitation, Father is not fit to be the primary custodian.
Grandfather further asserts that even if Fa ther is fit, Grandfather has rebutted the presumption that custody should be with th e natural parent. He maintains Father only spent time with Child when it was conveni ent and showed a lack of interest in
Child when Child was in Flor ida; Father is aloof to Ch ild's emotions and needs and
indifferent to his education and overall de velopment; Father's testimony about his financial support of child is not credible; and there are inconsis tencies in Father's
and his witnesses' testimonies . Grandfather argues he is the psychological parent of Child and granting him primary custody woul d be in Child's best interests. He asserts he has been directly involved w ith the caring and nurturing of Child since birth and Child is very bonded with hi m. He contends he possesses the ten characteristics of a good parent as set forth by his expert, Dr. Jonathan Gould.

We agree with Grandfather th at the family court erred in awarding primary custody to Father. First, the family court may have committed an e rror of law by relying solely on its finding that Father was a fit pa rent and, thereafter, failing to consider other compelling circumstances and the best interest of Child in making the primary custody determination. At any ra te, in our de novo review, we find clear and convincing evidence of compelling ci rcumstances to warrant our conclusionthe family court erred finding Father should receive primary custody over
Grandfather.

Without a doubt, a natural parent has supe rior rights in a custody dispute with a third party. Kay , 285 S.C. at 517, 331 S.E.2d at 782. Our supreme court in Kay held, "[W]e recognize[] the superior rights of a natural parent in a custody dispute with a third party. Once the natural parent is deemed fit, the issue of custody is
decided." Id . The court in Kay "placed a substantial burden on any third party attempting to take custody over a biological parent." Moore v. Moore , 300 S.C. 75, 79, 386 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1989). Additi onally, "[g]enerally, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the right to custody of a minor child automatically reverts to the surviving parent wh en the custodial parent dies." Dodge v. Dodge

, 332 S.C. 401, 410, 505 S.E.2d 344, 348 (C t. App. 1998) (emphasis added). However, our courts have, since Kay , "also recognized that in all custody controversies, including those between natural parents and third parties, the best interest of the child remains the pr imary and controlling consideration." Id. "Indeed, the superior rights of the natural parent must yield where the interest and welfare of the child clearly require alternative custodial supervision." Id. See also

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-2 30(A) (Supp. 2019) ("The c ourt shall make the final custody determination in the best interest of the child based upon the evidence presented.").

The following criteria should be considered by the courts in determining custody when the claim of a natural parent is involved:

1) Whether or not the parent is fit, able to properly care for the child and can provide a good home;

2) The amount of contact in the form of visits, financial support or both, which the parent had with the child while it was in the care of the third party;

3) The circumstances under which temporary relinquishment of custody occurred; and

4) The degree of attachment between the child and the temporary custodian.Hogan v. Platts , 312 S.C. 1, 3-4, 430 S. E.2d 510, 511 (1993) (citing Moore , 300
S.C. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458). "The rebuttable presumption standard requires a case by case analysis." Moore , 300 S.C. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.

Our courts have sanctioned the award of cu stody to paternal gr andparents over a fit parent based upon the best interests of the child. In Cook v. Cobb , 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1978), our supreme court empha sized that the best interest of a child is paramount to the legal right s of a parent, stating as follows:

The rule that obtains in this and practically all jurisdictions at the present day is, that the well-being of the child is to be regarded more than the technical legal rights of the parties, so that, following this rule, it is generally held that the child will not be delivered to the custody of either parent where it is not to its best interest. The right of the parent is not absolute and unconditional. The primary consideration for the guidance of the Court
is what is best for the child itself. This is declared not only in specific terms by our statute . . . but it has been so declared time and again by the Court.

Id. at 140-41, 245 S.E.2d at 614-15 (quoting Driggers v. Hayes , 264 S.C. 69, 70, 212 S.E.2d 579, 579-80 (1975)). The court "base[d] [its] conclusion affirming custody in the grandparents, not on any inhere nt or statutory right that they might have to the custody of grandch ildren, but rather on what i[t] regard[ed] to be in the
best interests of the child unde r the facts of th[e] case." Id. at 143, 245 S.E.2d at

616.

This court first announced a four-prong test to determine "how a party establishes that he or she is the psychological parent to a child of a fit, legal parent" in
Middleton v. Johnson , 369 S.C. 585, 595, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (Ct. App. 2006). That case involved an action by a non-biologi cal third party seeking visitation of a child. 369 S.C. at 591-92 n.1, 833 S.E.2d at 166 n.1. The facts revealed that
Middleton took an active role in the child 's life from the time that he was three months old, believing initially that th ey were biologically related. Id. at 589, 833
S.E.2d at 164. When the child was around one year old, Middleton learned he was not the biological father. Id. Nonetheless, he continue d to love and care for the child with the blessing of the mother, and Middleton and mother essentially entered into a joint custody arrangement. Id. When the child was nine years old,
the mother terminated all contact between the child and Middleton. Id. at 589,591, 833 S.E.2d at 164, 166. This court re versed the denial of visitation to Middleton, finding overwhelming evidence to reverse the family court's finding that Middleton was not the child's psychological parent. Id. at 604, 833 S.E.2d at

172. However, we also cau tioned that the decision in Middleton did not "automatically give a psychological parent the right to demand custody in a dispute between the legal pare nt and psychological parent," a nd stated "[t]he limited right of the psychological parent cannot usuall y overcome the legal parent's right to control the upbringing of his or her child." Id.

In Marquez v. Caudill , our supreme court affirmed the family court's award of custody of a child to the child 's stepfather over the mate rnal grandmother after the
natural mother committed suicide. 376 S.C. 229, 233-34, 656 S.E.2d 737, 739 (2008). In doing so, the court noted our courts recognized the notion of a psychological parent in Moore

. Id. at 241, 656 S.E.2d at 743. The court further approved this court's adoption of the four-prong test in Middleton for determining whether a person has become a psychological parent. Id. at 241-42, 656 S.E.2d at

743.

The four-prong test states th at, in order to demonstrate the existence of a psychological parent-child relationship, the petitioner must show:

(1) that the biological or adoptive parent[s] consented to, and fostered, the petiti oner[']s formation and establishment of a parent-lik e relationship with the child;

(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;

(3) that the petitioner assume d obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibi lity for the child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation; [and]

(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relati onship parental in nature.Id. at 242, 656 S.E.2d at 743 (quoting Middleton , 369 S.C. at 596- 97, 633 S.E.2d at 168).

The court in Marquez observed that this court in Middleton considered the first
factor critical "because it ma kes the biological or adoptiv e parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent 's relationship with the child." Id. at 242,
656 S.E.2d at 744. The court further stated , "[t]his factor reco gnizes that when a legal parent invites a third party into a child 's life, and that invitation alters a child's life by essentially providing hi m with another parent, the legal parent's rights to unilaterally sever that relations hip are necessarily reduced." Id. As to the second prong, the court observed "t he requirement that the ps ychological parent and the child have lived together further protects th e legal parent by restricting the class of third parties seeking parental rights." Id. at 243, 656 S.E.2d at 744. The court further noted that the last two prongs of the test were the most important of the four prongs "because they ensure both that the psychological parent assumed the responsibilities of parenthood and that ther e exists a parent-child bond between the psychological parent and child." Id. In discussing these prongs, the court declared that the psychological parent must unde rtake the obligations of parenthood by being affirmatively involved in the child's life, the psychological parent must assume caretaking duties a nd provide emotional support for the child, and such
duties must be done for reasons other than financial gain, thereby guaranteeing that a paid babysitter or nanny could not qualify as a psychological parent. Id. Finally,
the Marquez court observed this court "noted that when both biological parents are involved in the child's life, a third party' s relationship with the child could never rise to the level of a psychological parent, as there is no parental void in the child's
life." Id.

Utilizing the four-prong test, the Marquez court found the child's stepfather met the requirements of a psychological parent and concluded the family court appropriately determined it was in the child's best interest for the stepfather to have custody of him over the ma ternal grandmother. Id. at 245, 656 S.E.2d at 745. Importantly, however, the court recognized that Marquez was a custody action between a stepfather and a grandmother and did not involve custody rights of a natural parent. Accordingly, there was no reason to r ecognize the superior rights of a natural parent. Id. Further, the court found th e grandmother could not step into her daughter's place, and the grandm other was merely a third party seeking custody. Id.

In 2006, our legislature adopted secti on 20-7-1540 of the South Carolina Code, which has since been replaced by section 63-15-60. S.C. C ode Ann. §§ 20-7-1540(2006) and 63-15-60 (2010). This sec tion is titled "De facto custodian" and provides in pertinent part as follows:

(A) For purposes of this s ection, "de facto custodian" means, unless the context requires otherwise, a person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the primary car egiver for and financial supporter of a child who:

(1) has resided with the person for a period of six months
or more if the child is unde r three years of age; or

(2) has resided with the person for a period of one year or
more if the child is thr ee years of age or older.

Any period of time after a legal proceeding has been commenced by a parent seeking to regain custody of the child must not be included in determining whether the child has resided with the person for the required minimum period.

(B) A person is not a de facto custodian of a child until the court determines by cl ear and convincing evidence that the person meets the definition of de facto custodian with respect to that child. If the court determines a person
is a de facto custodian of a child, that person has standing to seek visitation or custody of that child.

(C) The family court may gran t visitation or custody of a
child to the de facto custodi an if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child's natural parents are
unfit or that other compelling circumstances exist

.

S.C. Code. Ann. § 63-15-60 (2010) (emphasis added).

While the de facto custodian statute provide s for the best interests of the child to prevail by allowing visitation and custody rights to third parties when justified, it recognizes the superior rights of natu ral parents by requiring of third partiesseeking these rights a high standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence 3

— that a natural parent is unfit or there ar e other compelling circumstances warranting
the same. Father does not contest the fami ly court's finding Grandfather was a de
facto custodian. Therefore this fi nding is the law of the case. See Dixon v. Dixon

, 336 S.C. 260, 264, 519 S.E.2d 357, 359 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding an unappealed finding in a custody matter was the law of th e case, as an unchallenged ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case).

Regardless, under our de novo review, we find clear and convincing evidence that
Grandfather is Child's de facto custodian. The record demonstrates Child resided over half his life with Grandfather prior to the commencement of this action and Grandfather was his primary caregiver duri ng this time. When Child was a baby, Grandfather helped with whatever Kate needed, changing diapers, bathing Child, administering nebulizer treatments, getti ng up with Child in the middle of the night, feeding Child, and teaching Kate how to be a parent to Child. When Kate
and Child were in Grandfather's home in Florida and Kate was mentally and physically very fragile, Grandfather cared for both Child and Kate. Additionally,
when Kate and Child were in South Caro lina, Grandfather remained in frequent contact with Kate by way of phone calls and text messages and continued to provide financial support.

Although not required to obtain custody under the de facto custodian statute, we
find the evidence also establishes Grandf ather was the psychological parent of Child. Turning to the facts of this case, we address the four-prong test adopted by
this court in Middleton —and affirmatively approved by our supreme court in Marquez —used in determining whether a psyc hological parent-child relationship
exists between Grandfather and Child.

The first prong to consider is whether the biological or adoptive parent consented to and fostered the alleged psychological parent's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child. Marquez , 376 S.C. at 242, 656 S.E.2d at

743. We find Kate consented to and foster ed Grandfather's parent-like relationship
with Child. When Child was a newborn in the hospital, Kate as ked Grandfather to be in charge of decision making for Child and Grandfather orchestrated the transfer

3 "Clear and convincing evidence is an elevated standard of proof, which lies
between the lesser standard of 'preponderance of the evid ence,' used in most civil cases, and the higher standard of 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' which is required in
criminal cases." Wise v. Broadway , 315 S.C. 273, 282, 433 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1993) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).of Child from one hospital to the other. Once Kate and Child were home with Grandfather in Florida, Grandfather t ook on the role of primary caregiver. Grandfather's daughter, wife, his neighbor s, his friends, and Child's pre-school
teacher characterized Grandfather as the fa ther figure for Child while they were in
Florida. There is no evidence Father objected to Grandfather's extensive and sustained role in raising Child. Through his own absence from Child's life, Father acquiesced to Grandfather taking on this role . Accordingly, we find Father was "a participant in the creation of the psychologi cal parent's relationship with the child."
Id. at 242, 656 S.E.2d at 744.

Second, the court must consider whether the alleged psychologi cal parent and the child lived together in the same household. Id. at 242, 656 S.E.2d at 743. The trial court found, and it is uncontested, that Child had spent thirty-five months in Florida and twenty-eight months in Sout h Carolina. Thus, the record clearly demonstrates Child lived the majority of hi s life in Grandfather's home prior to the
institution of this action.

Third, the court must look at whether the alleged psychologi cal parent "assumed obligations of parenthood by taking signifi cant responsibility for the child's care, education, and development, including co ntributing towards the child's support, without expectation of financial compensation." Id. There is overwhelming evidence Grandfather provided financial suppo rt for Child while he was living with Kate in South Carolina and provided direct support while under his roof in Florida, all with no expectation of financial co mpensation. Further, the evidence is uncontested that Grandfather was often actively involved in the day to day care of Child from birth through the time this action was filed. Specifically, Grandfather was responsible for making medical decisions for Child, feeding, changing diapers, bathing, and potty training Child, administ ering nebulizer treatments to Child, and getting up with Child in the middle of the night. Grandfather also assumed Kate's responsibilities for Child in Florida when she faced her mental health crises and was unable to care for Child. Additionally, Grandfather took an active role in Child's education and provided em otional support for Child.

Last, the court must look at whether the a lleged psychological parent "has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship that is parental in nature." Id. The evidence Grandfather meets this prong is also ex tremely strong. Testimony from numerous witnesses reveals that by the time this ac tion was filed, Grandf ather and Child had a very close relationship and a very clear bond of trust; while Ka te and Child were living in Florida, Grandfather was the fa ther figure for Child; Grandfather treatedChild like the son he never had; and wh ile Child was in prekindergarten, he verbally identified Grandfather as his father. Further, although Grandfather's expert, Dr. Gould, acknowledg ed he had not performed an analysis of the nature and quality of Grandfather's relationship with Child be fore Kate's death, he testified that a child's forming of attachme nt is a process that occurs over time, and it was unlikely such began at the time of Kate's death given the significant contact
Child had with Grandfather. Dr. Gould also testified that he was "absolutely blown away by the quality of interacti on and the way [Child] takes to his grandfather," and found the quality of the relationship be tween the two was "absolutely extraordinary."

Middleton and Marquez place greatest importance on th e last two prongs, and we
find Grandfather has more than demonstr ated he met these prongs, undertaking the obligations of parenthood by being affirma tively involved in Child's life, assuming the day to day caretaking duties, and pr oviding emotional support for Child on a continuing basis. Additionally, we note, as stated in Middleton and Marquez

, "when both biological parents are involve d in the child's life, a third party's relationship with the child could never rise to the level of a psychological parent, as there is no parental void in the child's life." Middleton , 369 S.C. at 598, 633 S.E.2d at 169; Marquez , 376 S.C. at 243, 656 S.E.2d at 744. Because Father abdicated his parental role for much of Child 's life prior to Kate's death, we believe he left a void there that was gladly and graciously filled by Grandfather.

If Father and Grandfather were on equal f ooting, we could resolve the case easily
in Grandfather's favor. Ho wever, the law is very clea r that the parties are not on equal footing. Whether Grandfather is a de facto custodian and/or a psychological parent to Child, Grandfather has a substan tial burden to overcome in order to gain custody. See Moore , 300 S.C. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 458 (observing our courts place a substantial burden on any third party attempting to take custody of a child over a natural parent). Father, as the natural parent, has superior rights to Child. Hogan

, 312 S.C. at 3, 430 S.E.2d at 511. Additionally, there is a rebuttable presumption that the right to custody of Child automa tically reverts to him as the surviving parent as a result of Kate's death. See id. ("There is a rebuttable presumption that the right to custody of their minor child automatically reverts to the surviving parent when the custodial parent dies."). The fact that one is determined to be a psychological parent does not, by itself, ove rride the rebuttable presumption that it
is in the best interests of a child to be in the custody of his biological parent. See

Moore , 300 S.C. at 80-81, 386 S.E.2d at 459 ("Even though there may exist a psychological parent-child relationship, the mere existence of such a bond is inadequate ground to justify awarding permanent custody to a [non-biologicalparent]."); Middleton , 369 S.C. at 604, 833 S.E.2d at 172 (cautioning that our decision did not "automatically give a psychological parent the right to demand custody in a dispute between the legal parent and psychological parent," and stating "[t]he limited right of the psychological parent cannot usuall y overcome the legal parent's right to control the upbringing of his or her child"). Even so, this presumption is rebuttable, and it re quires a case by case analysis. Moore , 300 S.C. at 80, 386 S.E.2d at 458. Further, secti on 63-15-60 makes clear that a de facto
custodian may receive custody of a child over a natural parent, even if the natural parent is fit, when there are "other compelling circumst ances." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-60(C) (2010). However, "the best in terest of the child remains the primary and controlling consideration in child custody controversies." Hogan , 312 S.C. at 3, 430 S.E.2d at 511.

Our courts have identified the following cr iteria to be considered in determining custody when the claim of a natural parent is involved: (1) Whether or not the parent is fit, able to properly care for the child and can provide a good home; (2)
the amount of contact in the form of vis its, financial support or both, which the parent had with the child while the child wa s in the care of the third party; (3) the circumstances under which temporary reli nquishment of custody occurred; and (4) the degree of attachment between the child and the temporary custodian. Hogan

, 312 S.C. at 3-4, 430 S.E.2d at 511; Moore , 300 S.C. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458. While these factors have traditionally been considered in circumstances involving the temporary voluntary relinquishment of custody by a natural parent, we find them instructive in considering whether th e presumption in favor of Father as the natural parent has been rebutted and co mpelling circumstances warrant awarding primary custody to Grandfather. First, while we believe Father may be fit and able to properly care for Child, we are concerned about his ability to provide Child a good home given the instability of Father's living arrangements at the time of the trial. Second, we find Father had very little to no contact with Child and provided limited financial support while Child was under Grandfather's care in Florida. Third, while Father did not technically relinquish custody of Child, he tacitly condoned Child living in Florida under Gra ndfather's roof for the majority of Child's life and offered no explanation as to why he did not attempt to assume custody or even seek visitation of Child during these times. Fourth, we find the evidence establishes an extremely strong degree of attachment between Child and
Grandfather.

Additionally, the record shows Grandfathe r gladly has taken on the responsibilities of caring for Child, while Father shirked his responsibilities until the filing of this action. From Child's birth on, Grandfathe r has been the primary source of financialsupport. Even when Child was with Kate in South Car olina, Grandfather visited
and communicated with them often. Mo re importantly, Grandfather has been hands-on in the day to day tasks of caring for a young child while Child resided in his home. Grandfather fed, bathed, and dressed child and took him to school and doctor's appointments. He participated in extracurricular activities with Child such
as soccer and Cub Scouts. He worked w ith Child to ensure his academic success and provided counseling to ensure Child's emotional well-being. For example, when Child initially enrolled in his Flor ida kindergarten after the November, 2015 temporary hearing, his teacher indicated Child may have to repeat the grade. Child's report card from that time reflected he was not meeting expectations and had deficits in reading, writi ng, and mathematics. His teacher tes tified he was also very shy and withdrawn. However, w ith Grandfather's help, by May 2016, Child had made dramatic improvement in all areas . At the time of the final hearing, Child was reading above grade level, hi s math was above le vel, and he was excelling socially. In addition, Grandfat her enrolled Child in a grief counseling program. Child's counselor stated wh en he began the pr ogram he was shy, tentative, and reticent to a ttend, but over the year he blossomed into a child who
felt secure and comfortabl e and he has benefited fro m the program. Dr. Gould described the relationship between Gra ndfather and Child as "among the most extraordinarily positive and h ealthy I have observed."

On the other hand, Father was largely ab sent from Child's life during the time he lived in Florida. Father provided limited financial support and never visited him in Florida. Father was a part of Child's life when Child and Kate resided in South Carolina. However, his family seemed to take care of Ch ild more than Father did. Father admitted Child stayed with him only two to three times during the two
months Kate and Child lived in South Caro lina before Kate's de ath. Even after Kate died, Child stayed w ith Father's grandmother—Child's great-grandmother— more than he stayed with Father. Also, tellingly, the text messages between Kate and Father during the last months of Ka te's life reveal, while Kate often sought
assistance from Father and his various family members in keeping Child, especially after Kate beca me employed, not one message showed Father actively sought to spend time with Child. 4

4 We further note, although Father testifie d his disagreements with Kate did not detrimentally affect his co-parenting with her and he denied de clining to spend any time with Child during this period, their te xt messages reflect the contrary. The text messages between Kate and Father reveal a c ontentious relationship between the two, with Kate displaying attempts to involve Father in her life as well asWe recognize that since the filing of th is action, it appears Father committed himself more to parenting Child. Even the GAL, who seemed to favor Grandfather, described Child as flouris hing during her observation of Father and his family at a restaurant. She heard Child call Father "dad or daddy" for the first
time and she observed Child crawl into Fath er's lap to watch a video on his phone. She stated "I saw more connection, emoti onal connection, and he just seems to be doing very well the way the situation is." However, the situation to which the
GAL referred was one in which Grandfat her had primary custody and Father had
visitation. The GAL attributed the im proved relationship be tween Father and Child to the time Child spent in Flor ida under the care of Grandfather.

We do not discount that Father is a natura l parent to Child—whose custodial parent died—and Father qualifies as a fit parent. As previously noted, "[g]enerally, there exists a rebuttable presumption that the right to custody of a minor child automatically reverts to the surviving pare nt when the custodial parent dies." Dodge , 332 S.C. at 410, 505 S.E.2d at 348. Further, as this court observed in
Middleton , 369 S.C. at 604, 833 S.E. 2d at 172, a psychological parent does not automatically have the right to demand cust ody in a dispute with a natural parent. Additionally, for a de facto custodian to obta in custody of a child of a fit parent, he must meet the rigorous burden of provin g by clear and convincing evidence that compelling circumstances exist to warrant such. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-60(C) (2010). However, we must also keep in mind that "in all cu stody controversies, including those between natural parents and third parties, the best interest of the child remains the primary and controlling c onsideration," and "the superior rights of the natural parent must yield where the interest and welfare of the child clearly require alternative cu stodial supervision." Dodge , 332 S.C. at 410, 505 S.E.2d at

348.

Child's life; Father often responding rudely , indifferently, or not at all; and Kate often responding to Father wi th anger. While Father made clear he was not
interested in Kate's life and wanted he r to only communicate with him regarding matters related solely to Child, the messages reveal Father's refusal to communicate was, at times, to the detrimen t of Child. In other words, Father put his need to avoid being involved in any way with Kate above the needs of Child. Though Father's affidavit submitted for the temporary hearing stated that he and Kate got along and co-parented Child from the beginning and, after Kate moved back to South Carolina in June 2015, they "continued to get along as always, because [they] always did," and they "r aised [their] son together," the text messages certainly show otherwise.We acknowledge that in most circumstan ces, a grandparent or other third party
would find it an insurmountable obstacle to obtain custody of a child over a fit, natural parent. However, the record fro m the final hearing demonstrates that Grandfather established by clear and convincing evidence that compelling circumstances exist to award him primar y custody of Child. Our review of the evidence persuades us there is overw helming evidence primary custody with
Grandfather is in the best interest of Ch ild. Accordingly, we reverse the award of primary custody to Father and grant prim ary custody of Child to Grandfather. 5

II. Attorney's Fees

Both Father and Grandfather appeal the award of $10,000 in attorney's fees to Father. Father challenges the sufficiency of the award, arguing the family court erred in failing to award him all fees and costs expended in this litigation since he prevailed on the issue of custody. Grandfat her argues that if this court determines he should be awarded custody, the award of attorney's fees should be reversed. He additionally contends, regard less of this court's custody determination, we should reverse the attorney's fees award becaus e Father made this action necessary by denying Grandfather all contact with Child . He also assert s he prevailed in receiving substantial visitation with Child.

"In determining whether an attorney's fe e should be awarded, the following factors should be considered: (1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney ; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the a ttorney's fee on each party's standard of living." E.D.M. v. T.A.M. , 307 S.C. 471, 476-77, 41 5 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992). When determining the reasonableness of a fee award, the court should consider the following factors: "(1) the nature, extent , and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5) benefici al results obtained; [and] (6) customary

5 Based upon our determination that pr imary custody should be awarded to Grandfather, we need not reach Father's appeal of the award of joint custody to
Grandfather. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court ne ed not address remaining issues on appeal when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).legal fees for similar services." Glasscock v. Glasscock , 304 S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991).

Father's argument that the fees were insufficient is not preserved. While the court recited the factors for deciding whether to award attorney fees, it did not discuss the parties' ability to pay their own fees, their respective financial conditions, or the effect of the fee on each party's standard of living. Further, Father did not file a Rule 59 motion asking the family court to address these factors or asserting the
award made was insufficient. Accordingly, we agree with Grandfather this issue is not preserved. See Buist v. Buist , 410 S.C. 569, 577, 766 S.E.2d 381, 385 (2014) (stating argument that the family c ourt did not adequately apply the Glasscock or E.D.M. factors was not preserved when hus band's argument in Rule 59(e) motion was not sufficiently specific); Dodge , 332 S.C. at 418, 505 S .E.2d at 352-53 ("The father's argument regarding the amount of the [GAL's] fee is not preserved for appeal inasmuch as the father failed to sp ecifically raise the issue in his Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion for reconsideration."). At any rate, in light of our decision to reverse the award of primary custody to Fa ther, the basis for Father's request for
additional fees fails.

Inasmuch as we reverse the family c ourt's custody determination, we find it appropriate to reverse the aw ard of attorney's fees to Father and remand the issue to the family court for consideration of the effects of this appeal. See Sexton v.
Sexton , 310 S.C. 501, 503-04, 427 S.E. 2d 665, 666 (1993) (reversing and remanding the issue of attorney's fees fo r reconsideration when the substantive results obtained by counsel were reversed on appeal). We note, while the family
court recited the E.D.M. factors in its order, it did not specifically address these factors or make any findings thereon. On remand, the family court should set forth its specific findings of f act as to each of the E.D.M. factors in considering an award of attorney's fees, if any, to Father. 6

CONCLUSION

We hold, under our de novo review, Grandfather met the significantly higher burden required to show primary custody of Child should be placed with him over Father. He rebutted the presumption in fa vor of Father as the natural parent, and we find clear and convincing evidence that Grandfather is a de facto custodian and compelling circumstances warrant custody of Child being awarded to him. We

6 For example, the family court may cons ider the expansive visitation awarded to Father, as well as Grandfathe r's absorption of visitation costs, in its analysis.therefore reverse the award of primary cu stody to Father and grant primary custody
to Grandfather. We remand the case to th e family court to set a visitation schedule for Father—in accord with the significan t visitation Grandfather agreed in his testimony should be given to Father—as well as to consider Grandfather's testimony concerning his willingness to absorb many of the costs associated with
Father's visitation. We also reverse a nd remand the issue of attorney's fees to Father. In recognition of the need to br ing stability to Child's living arrangement, we direct the family court to hold the remand hearing as expeditiously as possible.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

THOMAS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.