2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-4-2012

Assem Abulkhair v. Dir NJ Dept of Human

Services

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-3913

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Recommended Citation

"Assem Abulkhair v. Dir NJ Dept of Human Services" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 1182.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3913

___________

ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR,

Appellant

v.

DIRECTOR OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-003375)

District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 3, 2012

Before: AMBRO, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: April 4, 2012)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Assem Abulkhair appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey’s dismissal of his complaint. For the reasons 

that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
2

I.

In 2011, Abulkhair filed a complaint alleging that the New Jersey Department of 

Human Services (“the Department”) reduced his food stamp benefits in retaliation for 

filing a lawsuit against the Director of the Department. He asserted that the Department 

reduced his benefits in January 2009 but that a state administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

later reinstated the benefits. Soon thereafter, the Director “intervened and reversed” the 

ALJ’s decision. Abulkhair appealed from that decision administratively and in the New 

Jersey state courts. See Abulkhair v. Passaic County Bd. of Social Services, 2010 WL 

1753302 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2010). His federal court complaint asserts 

that the decision to reduce his benefits was “not based upon substantial evidence, [but 

was] based upon fundamental assertion error made up by the Director to retaliate against 

Abulkhair for his suit against her and its agency.”

Upon granting Abulkhair permission to proceed in forma pauperis, the District 

Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The District Court considered whether it should allow Abulkhair to 

amend his complaint but determined that doing so would be futile, as “the facts as set 

forth . . . seemingly indicate that Defendant’s decision to reduce Plaintiff’s food stamp 

benefits occurred before Plaintiff even initiated a lawsuit against defendant.”

Abulkhair timely appealed from the District Court’s decision, and we requested 

that the parties file briefs discussing whether the District Court correctly dismissed the 

complaint without leave to amend.
3

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the 

District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint is plenary. Allah v. Seiverling, 229

F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm the District Court on any basis that finds 

support in the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).

Upon our initial reading of the complaint, we, as did the District Court, believed 

that Abulkhair was attempting to raise a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

However, Abulkhair’s appellate brief states that the District Court erred by assessing his 

claims under this statute. Rather, he asserts that his complaint constitutes an 

administrative appeal from the Department’s and the New Jersey state courts’ decisions 

affirming the reduction of his food stamp benefits. While the district court may have 

misconstrued Abulkhair’s complaint, we will not remand the case because his claims are 

clearly prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Ct. of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 

(1923).

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “state-court losers” are barred from 

“complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “inviting district court 

review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the 

. . . doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 

complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were 
4

rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 

to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations, quotations, and 

alterations omitted).

Here, Abulkhair repeatedly states that he “filed a complaint [with the District 

Court] to appeal and to contest the wrong determination of his administrative action,” and 

he asserts that he is disputing the state courts’ orders. His complaint thus asks the 

District Court to exercise appellate review over state administrative and judicial 

decisions, which federal courts lack authority to do absent specific statutory 

authorization. Parties aggrieved by state administrative and judicial decisions must 

pursue review in state appellate tribunals, with the ultimate opportunity to petition the 

United States Supreme Court for review. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291-92 

(explaining the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).1

Accordingly, because the District Court lacks the authority to consider 

Abulkhair’s claims, we will affirm its dismissal of the complaint.

 

1 We note that Abulkhair incorrectly asserts that federal review of these decisions 

is available because he has “exhausted his administrative remedies.” As to the basis for 

federal judicial review, Abulkhair’s complaint cites to statutes providing for review of 

decisions made by the Commissioner of Social Security. Those statutes are not relevant 

to Abulkhair’s current claims.