[Cite as Royse v. Dayton, 195 Ohio App.3d 81, 2011-Ohio-3509.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 

 : 

ROYSE, 

Appellant, : C.A. CASE NO. 24172 

v. : T.C. CASE NO. 2008 CV 8296 

 : (Civil Appeal from 

CITY OF DAYTON et al., Common Pleas Court) 

Appellees. : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 15th day of July, 2011. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Terry W. Posey, for appellant. 

John J. Danish, Dayton Law Director, and Norma M. Dickens, 

and Jonathan W. Croft, Assistant City Attorneys, for appellee. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, Presiding Judge. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Ronald Royse, appeals from an order of the 

court of common pleas affirming the decision of the Civil Service 

Board of the city of Dayton. 

{¶ 2} Royse was employed by the Dayton Fire Department for 

14 years. On May 14, 2007, he submitted to a random drug screen 

pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement between the city 

of Dayton and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 
2

136 AFC–CIO. The test results were positive for cocaine. 

Pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, Royse then was 

evaluated by a substance-abuse professional and completed a 

drug-and-alcohol-education program. On May 31, 2007, Royse was 

subjected to a return-to-duty drug screen, which was negative. 

Royse then returned to work with the Dayton fire department. 

{¶ 3} As a result of his May 14, 2007 positive drug test, Royse 

was scheduled to submit to eight follow-up, random drug screenings 

after his return to work. His first two follow-up tests were 

negative, but his November 16, 2007 follow-up test result was 

positive for cocaine. Following a predisciplinary hearing, the 

city of Dayton discharged Royse from his employment with the Dayton 

fire department. 

{¶ 4} Royse appealed his termination to the board. At the 

hearing before the board, two witnesses, Ken Thomas and Maurice 

Evans, testified on behalf of the city of Dayton. They described 

the process that takes place when a firefighter is submitted to 

a random drug test. Evans and an employee of Concentra Medical 

Center collect the urine samples from the firefighter being tested. 

 The samples are sealed and shipped to ATN, a laboratory in 

Memphis, Tennessee. ATN performs tests on the samples to determine 

whether the samples contain drugs. ATN then sends the results 

of the tests to Alternative Safety and Testing Solutions (“ASTS”), 
3

a company in Michigan. A medical-review officer employed by ASTS 

then reviews the results produced by ATN to determine whether the 

test results are positive or negative for the presence of marijuana, 

cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, or PCP. If the medical-review 

officer interprets the results of ATN’s study to be positive for 

any of these five substances, the medical-review officer attempts 

to contact the employee. Finally, ASTS sends the medical-review 

officer’s positive-test report to Ken Thomas, the safety 

administrator for the city of Dayton. 

{¶ 5} At the hearing before the board, the city of Dayton 

submitted copies of the medical-review officer’s two reports that 

found that Royse’s urine samples tested positive for cocaine on 

May 14, 2007, and November 16, 2007. No person testified regarding 

the methodology of the tests performed by ATN or the results of 

the tests that ATN forwarded to ASTS. Further, no person testified 

on behalf of ASTS regarding what particular data the medical-review 

officer reviewed or why the officer concluded that Royse’s test 

results were positive for cocaine. 

{¶ 6} Royse objected to the admission of the medical-review 

officer’s positive reports based on tests performed by ATN as 

inadmissible hearsay. The board overruled the objection and 

affirmed Royse’s discharge on August 21, 2008. Royse filed a 

notice of appeal from the board’s decision in the court of common 
4

pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506. On July 6, 2010, the court 

affirmed the board’s decision. Royse filed a notice of appeal. 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 7} “The trial court erred in applying a deferential standard 

of review instead of conducting a trial de novo.” 

{¶ 8} Royse argues that the trial court applied an incorrect, 

deferential standard of review in reviewing the board’s decision. 

 According to Royse, the trial court should have conducted a de 

novo review of the board’s decision instead of giving the board 

deference on evidentiary and credibility issues. Royse’s argument 

relies on R.C. 124.34(C), which provides for an appeal “on questions 

of law and fact.” 

{¶ 9} “[A] member of a fire or police department may utilize 

either of two distinct avenues of appeal to the court of common 

pleas from a decision of suspension, demotion or removal from office 

by a municipal civil service commission. First, if an appeal is 

brought on questions of law and fact under [R.C. 124.34,] * * * 

the procedure on appeal is governed by the Appellate Procedure 

Act. In such a case, the trial court is required to conduct a 

de novo review of the civil service proceedings. The court may 

conduct an independent judicial examination and determination of 

conflicting issues of fact and law. The court may, in its 

discretion, hear additional evidence, and may substitute its 
5

judgment for that of the commission. Second, if an appeal to the 

court is brought pursuant to [R.C. Chapter 2506], * * * the court 

is required to allow additional evidence only in the circumstances 

enumerated in the statute, and the court must give due deference 

to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts.” 

(Footnotes omitted.) 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (2006) 698, Civil 

Servants, Section 605. See Resek v. Seven Hills (1983), 9 Ohio 

App.3d 224; Giannini v. Fairview Park (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 620. 

{¶ 10} Royse did not identify in his notice of appeal from the 

board’s decision which statutory avenue of appeal he invoked. 

In his brief filed with the court of common pleas, however, Royse 

identified R.C. Chapter 2506 as providing the proper standard of 

review. Further, he noted in a motion to strike that this case 

was an administrative appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 2506.04. 

Finally, in his reply brief submitted to the trial court, Royse 

reiterated the standard used by trial courts when conducting a 

review pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506. At no point did Royse mention 

R.C. 124.34 to the trial court or that he desired a trial de novo. 

{¶ 11} The doctrine of invited error estops an appellant, in 

either a civil or criminal case, from attacking a judgment for 

errors the appellant induced the court to commit. Under that 

principle, a party cannot complain of any action taken or ruling 

made by the court in accordance with the party’s own suggestion 
6

or request. State v. Woodruff (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 326. 

{¶ 12} Royse induced the court to apply the R.C. Chapter 2506.04 

standard of review the court applied. Royse may not now argue 

that in doing so, the court erred in not applying the R.C. 124.34 

standard instead. 

{¶ 13} When reviewing an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 

2506.04, the trial court considers the “whole record,” including 

any new or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03, and 

determines whether the administrative order is unconstitutional, 

illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by 

the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative 

evidence. Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals (2000), 90 

Ohio St.3d 142, 147. The trial court correctly applied that 

standard of review to Royse’s appeal from the board’s decision. 

{¶ 14} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 15} “The trial court erred in considering the evidence of 

the drug tests as a matter of evidence and of law.” 

{¶ 16} The standard of review to be applied by an appellate 

court in an R.C. 2506.04 appeal is “more limited in scope” than 

the standard of review applied by the common pleas court to the 

board’s decision. Henley, 90 Ohio St.3d at 147, quoting Kisil 

v. Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34. In Henley, the Ohio 
7

Supreme Court explained: 

{¶ 17} “ ‘[R.C. 2506.04] grants a more limited power to the 

court of appeals to review the judgment of the common pleas court 

only on “questions of law,” which does not include the same 

extensive power to weigh ”the preponderance of substantial, 

reliable, and probative evidence,” as is granted to the common 

pleas court.’ * * * Appellate courts must not substitute their 

judgment for those of an administrative agency or a trial court 

absent the approved criteria for doing so.” Id. at 147, quoting 

Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261. A “question of law” is “‘[a]n 

issue to be decided by the judge, concerning the application or 

interpretation of the law.’” Henley at 148, quoting Black's Law 

Dictionary (7th Ed.1999) 1260. 

{¶ 18} The trial court found that the testimony of the city 

of Dayton’s two witnesses and documentary evidence of Royse’s 

drug-test records were competent and probative evidence that 

supported the board’s decision. Royse argues that the trial court 

erred in affirming the board’s decision because the primary 

evidence on which the board relied, the report of a medical-review 

officer who had reviewed the results of drug tests that the officer 

concluded were positive for drugs, was inadmissible hearsay 

evidence under the Ohio Rules of Evidence and the board’s own rules 
8

and regulations. 

{¶ 19} “As a general rule, even apart from specific statutes, 

administrative agencies are not bound by the strict rules of 

evidence applied in court. * * * However, an administrative agency 

should not act upon evidence which is not admissible, competent, 

or probative of the facts which it is to determine. * * * The hearsay 

rule is relaxed in administrative proceedings, but the discretion 

to consider hearsay evidence cannot be exercised in an arbitrary 

manner.” Haley v. Ohio State Dental Bd. (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 

1, 6. 

{¶ 20} Dayton Civil Service Board Rules and Regulations 14.5(A) 

provides that “[t]he admission of evidence shall be governed by 

the rules applied by the Courts of Ohio in civil cases.” Therefore, 

while the application of the rules of evidence may be somewhat 

relaxed in administrative proceedings, the board itself chose to 

adopt a rule that requires it to apply the fundamentals of the 

rules of evidence in its proceedings. 

{¶ 21} Dayton Civil Service Board Rules and Regulations 14.5(D) 

provides that “[t]he Board or Hearing Officer conducting a hearing 

shall have full authority to control the procedure of the hearing, 

to admit or exclude testimony or other evidence, to rule upon all 

objections, and take such other actions as are necessary and proper 

for the conduct of such hearing. * * *” This rule explains the 
9

authority of the board to control its hearings, but does not give 

the board authority to ignore its rule, or the well-established 

precedent that “the discretion to consider hearsay evidence cannot 

be exercised in an arbitrary manner.” Haley, 7 Ohio App.3d at 

6. 

{¶ 22} It is undisputed that the documents concerning Royse’s 

drug test that were submitted by the city of Dayton to the board 

were hearsay in that they were offered to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Generally, hearsay evidence 

is inadmissible unless it fits within an exception to the hearsay 

rule. Evid.R. 802, 803, 804. The trial court found that the 

drug-test records qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule 

under the “business records” exception in Evid.R. 803(6). That 

exception provides: 

{¶ 23} “Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, 

report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 

or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information 

transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course 

of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the 

regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 

report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony 

of the custodian or other qualified witness or as provided by Rule 

901(B)(10), unless the source of information or the method or 
10

circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” 

{¶ 24} Royse provided urine samples to Concentra Medical 

Center, which then shipped the samples to ATN, a company in Memphis, 

Tennessee. ATN tested the urine samples for the presence of five 

different substances. ATN then forwarded the test results to a 

medical-review officer in Michigan. The medical-review officer 

reviewed the test results and determined that two of Royse’s tests 

were positive. The medical-review officer’s report of his 

findings was then provided by him to the city of Dayton, which 

relied on the report to terminate Royse and to demonstrate the 

cause of his termination in the proceedings before the board. 

{¶ 25} “To be admissible under Evid.R. 803(6), a business record 

must display four essential elements: (1) it must have been kept 

in the regular course of business; (2) it must stem from a source 

who had personal knowledge of the acts, events, or conditions; 

(3) it must have been recorded at or near the time of the 

transaction; and (4) a foundation must be established by the 

testimony of either the custodian of the record or some other 

qualified person.” State v. Comstock (Aug. 29, 1997), Ashtabula 

App. No. 96-A-0058. 

{¶ 26} The medical-review officer’s reports were produced as 

part of his work for his employer, ASTS, which supplied the report 

to the city of Dayton. “The information in reports that a business 
11

receives from outside sources is not part of its business records 

for the purposes of Evid.R. 803(6).” Babb v. Ford Motor Co. (1987), 

41 Ohio App.3d 174, 177. See also State v. Jackson, Ashtabula 

App. No. 2007-A-0079, 2008-Ohio-6976, at ¶ 32. Therefore, the 

city of Dayton cannot establish that the medical-review officer’s 

records were its own business records admissible under Evid.R. 

803(6). The trial court erred in finding the business-records 

exception satisfied. 

{¶ 27} Authentication, which is evidence sufficient to support 

a finding that the matter in question, including documentary 

evidence, is what its proponent claims, is a condition precedent 

to admissibility of that matter in evidence. Evid.R. 901(A). 

Illustrative examples of proof of authentication are set out in 

Evid.R. 901(B)(1)through (10). A showing that an exception to 

the rule against hearsay applies satisfies the example in Evid.R. 

901(B)(10). The example most frequently applied is in Evid.R. 

901(B)(1): “Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that 

a matter is what it is claimed to be.” 

{¶ 28} No witness with personal knowledge testified about ATN’s 

internal recordkeeping or testing procedures or about the 

recordkeeping at ASTS. Evid.R. 602. The city of Dayton’s only 

two witnesses at the hearing before the board were Ken Thomas and 

Maurice Evans. Ken Thomas is the safety administrator for the 
12

city of Dayton. He testified that he has never been to ATN’s 

laboratories and has never observed their testing process. He 

did not exhibit sufficient knowledge of ATN’s actual testing 

procedures or internal recordkeeping. Further, he testified that 

the medical-review officer does not perform any tests on the urine 

samples but instead reviews the results of the testing performed 

by ATN. 

{¶ 29} Maurice Evans is the city of Dayton’s designated employer 

representative. He testified regarding his familiarity with the 

process used in collecting urine samples for drug tests. But he 

does not test the urine samples and relies on others to provide 

those test results. 

{¶ 30} In short, there is no evidence of record demonstrating 

that the documentary evidence of positive test results and the 

ultimate conclusions reached therefrom were trustworthy. This 

is the very type of evidence that the requirement of authentication 

in Evid.R. 901(A) was meant to preclude from consideration. 

Without testimony from a witness who could testify, based on 

personal knowledge, regarding the testing procedures and internal 

recordkeeping of ATN and ASTS, the board and trial court should 

not have relied on the positive test results. Therefore, the trial 

court erred in finding that the board’s decision was supported 

by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative 
13

evidence. 

{¶ 31} The record suggests that instead of the business-records 

exception to the rule against hearsay, the city of Dayton attempted 

to authenticate the records of the medical-review officer’s report 

pursuant to Evid.R. 901(B)(9), which allows authentication through 

“[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result 

and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.” 

 To do that, the process or system must be described, and there 

must be evidence that the process or system produces an accurate 

result. Those matters may be established by the testimony of a 

person with knowledge of the process or system. Weissenberger, 

Ohio Evidence Treatise (2010), Section 901.121. The testimony 

of the city of Dayton’s two witnesses was insufficient to satisfy 

those requirements. 

{¶ 32} We do not, as Judge Hall suggests, hold that the formal 

and technical requirements of the Rules of Evidence must be 

satisfied in administrative proceedings. Weissenberger writes: 

“Conceptually, the function of authentication or identification 

is to establish, by way of preliminary evidence, a connection 

between the evidence offered and the relevant facts of the case. 

 The connection is necessary in order to establish the relevancy 

of the particular item, since an object or item is of no relevance 

if it is not attributed to, or connected with a particular person, 
14

place, or issue in a case.” Id. at Section 901.1. 

{¶ 33} The city of Dayton offered the report as relevant to 

prove the central issue in the case, which is that Royse had used 

cocaine. But absent evidence of the process by which that 

conclusion was reached, the report demonstrates nothing more than 

that the conclusion was reached by persons who did not testify 

and in accordance with a method of analysis that remains 

unexplained. As evidence, it is nothing more than proof that the 

report had been received by the city of Dayton from a person it 

engaged to prepare such reports. That bare fact does not 

demonstrate that Royse had used cocaine, which was the basis for 

his discharge on which the board was required to pass. 

{¶ 34} The second assignment of error is sustained. The 

judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

FAIN, J., concurs. 

HALL, J., dissents. 

HALL, Judge, dissenting: 

{¶ 35} I agree with the disposition of the first assignment 

of error finding that the appellant pursued his administrative 
15

appeal below as an R.C. 2506.01 appeal rather than pursuant to 

R.C. 124.34. Therefore, he cannot now argue that the trial court 

should have considered his appeal under the standards applied to 

the latter section. 

{¶ 36} However, because I believe that the Dayton Civil Service 

Board had authority to rule on objections to admit or exclude 

evidence, and that the Dayton Civil Service Board reasonably and 

constitutionally admitted the reports of the appellant’s second 

positive cocaine drug test, the trial court was correct in affirming 

the Board’s decision that he be discharged from his position as 

a firefighter. 

{¶ 37} The result of the majority’s opinion, which will require 

the Dayton Civil Service Board to adhere to the Ohio Rules of 

Evidence, is unnecessary and undesirable. Admittedly, Dayton Civil 

Service Board Rules and Regulations 14.5 states: 

{¶ 38} “Procedure at hearings. A. The admission of evidence 

shall be governed by the rules applied by the Courts of Ohio in 

civil cases.” 

{¶ 39} In an administrative setting, however, this rule need 

not, and should not, be construed as adopting the Ohio Rules of 

Evidence for hearings. A more reasonable interpretation is that 

the rule refers to the manner of presenting evidence and the general 

procedure for conducting a hearing. Otherwise, the words “in civil 
16

cases” are superfluous. Those words distinguish the procedure for 

the presentation of evidence at the civil-service level from the 

procedure applicable in criminal cases. The rules of evidence apply 

to both civil and criminal cases, so it is reasonable to infer 

that the words “in civil cases” were included to encompass the 

process for admitting evidence, not to require application of 

the rules of evidence themselves. 

{¶ 40} Moreover, Section 5(D) of Civil Service Rule 14 

specifically states that “[t]he Board or Hearing Officer conducting 

a hearing shall have full authority to control the procedure of 

the hearing, to admit or exclude testimony or other evidence, to 

rule upon all objections, and to take such other actions as are 

necessary and proper for the conduct of such hearing.” This specific 

language in Section 5(D) prevails over the introductory Section 

(5)(A) and grants the board plenary authority to determine the 

admissibility of evidence. 

{¶ 41} A virtually identical rule appears in the decision of 

this court more than 20 years ago in Emmons v. Miamisburg (Mar. 

27, 1989), Montgomery App. No. 11197. There, Section 11.1 of the 

Miamisburg Civil Service Rules and Regulations stated: 

{¶ 42} “Appeal and Hearings: No legal rules of evidence shall 

be required and the Civil Service Commission shall determine the 

manner of conduct of such hearings.” (Emphasis added). 
17

{¶ 43} The next rule, Section 11.2, is identical to current 

Dayton Civil Service Board Rule 14, Section 5. It stated: 

{¶ 44} “Procedure at Hearings: The admission of evidence shall 

be governed by the rules applied by the Courts of Ohio in civil 

cases.” (Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 45} This language from Section 11.2 of the Miamisburg Civil 

Service Rules and Regulations, which is of similar vintage to the 

Dayton rule, cannot possibly be construed to adopt the Ohio Rules 

of Evidence because the previous section (11.1) specifically 

excluded the “legal rules of evidence.” Likewise, Dayton 

Civil-Service Board Rule 14, Section 5(A), need not, and should 

not, be construed to apply the Ohio Rules of Evidence to Dayton 

civil-service hearings. 

{¶ 46} Applicable rules, case law, and statutory procedure all 

support the notion that rules of evidence should not apply to a 

civil-service hearing. The Rules of Evidence explicitly state 

that they govern proceedings “in the courts of this state.” 

(Emphasis added.) Evid.R. 101(A). The Ohio Supreme Court has held 

that “Evid.R. 101(A) does not mention administrative agencies as 

forums to which the Rules of Evidence apply.” Orange City School 

Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio 

St.3d 415, 417. This court, too, has held that hearsay is 

admissible in administrative hearings as long as discretion to 
18

admit is not arbitrarily applied. Haley v. Ohio State Dental Bd. 

(1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 1, 6. 

{¶ 47} Ohio administrative agencies are to determine what 

evidence is to be admitted in their proceedings. R.C. 119.09 

states that “[t]he agency shall pass upon the admissibility of 

evidence.” “[A]dministrative agencies are not bound by the rules 

of evidence applied in courts.” Black v. Ohio State Bd. of 

Psychology, 160 Ohio App.3d 91, 2005-Ohio-1449, at ¶ 17, citing 

Haley at 6. The Ohio Administrative Code, which promulgates rules 

for various administrative hearings, states: “The ‘Ohio Rules of 

Evidence’ may be taken into consideration by the board or its 

attorney hearing examiner in determining the admissibility of 

evidence, but shall not be controlling.” Ohio Adm.Code 

4732-17-03(D)(10). 

{¶ 48} Rules of evidence do not apply, statutorily, to workers’ 

compensation hearings. For example, R.C. 4123.10 provides: “The 

industrial commission shall not be bound by the usual common law 

or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules 

of procedure.” Similarly, the Ohio Rules of Evidence statutorily 

do not apply to unemployment-compensation hearings. In this regard, 

R.C. 4141.281(C)(2) provides that “[h]earing officers are not bound 

by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or 

formal rules of procedure.” Such proceedings are no more or less 
19

significant than Dayton Civil Service Board hearings. And the 

foregoing statutory provisions express the concept recognized by 

this court in Haley, and others. See, e.g., Day Lay Egg Farm v. 

Union Cty. Bd. of Revision (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 555, 556 

(recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules 

of evidence). Furthermore, in reviewing a decision of an 

administrative board, a common pleas court must give “due deference 

to the administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts” and, 

therefore, must not substitute its judgment for that of the 

administrative agency. Hawkins v. Marion Corr. Inst. (1990), 62 

Ohio App.3d 863, 870. 

{¶ 49} The Dayton Civil Service Board’s “Order on Appeal,” 

signed and entered August 21, 2008, is a reasoned and balanced 

decision as to why the board admitted the evidence presented about 

the appellant’s positive-drug-test results. The appellant’s 

underlying protection is that the hearing was required to comport 

with procedural and substantive due process. The “process” the 

appellant was due was the hearing before the Civil Service Board, 

of which he received notice and an opportunity to be heard. He 

introduced not a shred of evidence that his test results were 

inaccurate or unreliable. He presented nothing to the effect that 

he denied abusing cocaine, the possession of which, if not 

prescribed, is a felony. A separately preserved one-half of the 
20

tested urine sample was available to him for independent testing. 

 Yet, upon hearing of the second positive drug report, rather than 

have his own confirmatory test, he checked himself into a 

drug-treatment facility. He refused the city’s request for his 

medical records, which may have corroborated the test results. 

Under these circumstances, the appellant was accorded due process. 

{¶ 50} In addition to a strict legal analysis why the rules 

of evidence do not apply in administrative settings, there are 

numerous practical implications here: (1) this is an administrative 

proceeding in which strict rules of evidence should not apply, 

(2) administrative officials often are not legally trained or 

versed in the nuances of evidentiary rules, (3) at the 

administrative level, there is no burden or expense-shifting 

mechanism, such as a request for admissions, to require parties 

either to admit apparent facts or to bear the cost of proving them, 

(4) out-of-state test suppliers are routinely relied upon for 

accuracy in many walks of life, including medicine, and (5) nothing 

in the record suggests that Royse ever denied having a cocaine-abuse 

problem. 

{¶ 51} The majority holding effectively reinstates a cocaine 

abuser as a firefighter. I dissent. 

 . . . . .