Due to the sha red sur name of the appe llees, we will ref

er to them by their first names where 1 nece ssary to avoid confusion. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5 -00 275 -CV

Ja c kie Do ss S m it h , A ppe lla nt

v. Virginia Lagerstam , Em il Lagerstam , Kat hryn Lagerstam Wilbeck, Vivian L agerst am Savage, and An nik a Lagerstam Kaye , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN40275 3 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J ackie Doss Smit h soug ht to rescind thre e d ee d s u n der w hich she c onvey ed her roy alty interest to he r cousins, Kathry n L ag erstam Wil beck, Vivian L ag erstam Savag e, and Annika L ag erstam Ka

y e (the “L ag erstam da

ug hters”) . Smit h reque sted that the cour t invalidate the dee ds on the g rounds of mutual and unilatera l mistake beca use, at the time of the transac tion, the parties
wer e mistaken re g ardingthe intere st that was convey ed. I n response , the L ag erstam daug hters and their par ents, Virg inia and Emil L ag erstam ( collectively the “L ag erstams” ), filed a m o t i on for 1 summary judgme nt, asserting that the elements of bot h ty pes of mistake w ere not met. The district
c ourt g ra nte d th e L a g e rs tams’ mot ion for su mma ry jud g me nt, and

Smit h n owa pp e a ls. We w ill

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.T h e J an u ar y an d F e b r u ar y 2 0 0 4 r o ya l t y c h e c k s w e r e $ 3 2 9
. 9 0 an d $ 3 5 3
. 8 5 , r e s p e c t i v e l y. 2 2 BACK GR OUND Smit h and her

aunt, Virgina L ag erstam, inherited identical mi nera l interests to land in Robertson County , Texas. I n 1984, S m i th and Virg inia lease d their minera l interests to XTO Energ y by separ ate oil and g as lea ses. XTO Ene rg y subsequently

cre ated a pooled unit, which included Smith’s and Virg inia’s intere sts. Sm ith and Virg inia wer e ea ch entitled to a .0 00 99 01 ro y a lty

int e re st o n th e pr od

uc tio n o f o il f

ro m any we lls on the po ole d unit

. Smit h and Virg inia beg an to rec eive roy alty pay ments in 1985 when the fir st well was completed. For

sever al y ear s the roy alty

pay ments amounted to less than $100 per y ear , but in 2002,

a se c on d we ll wa s c omp le te d and pa y me nts ro se to $2 50 -$ 30 0 pe r mon th. I n 2 00 3, pa y me nts a g a in rose when a third well was c ompleted. B y the start of 2004, Smith and Virg inia wer e re ceiving over $3 00 pe r m on th i n r oy a lty pa y me nts
. 2 On F e br ua ry 9, 20 04 , Sm ith re c e ive d an un so lic ite d off e r fr om San

Sa ba Roy a lty to purcha se her

entire inter est for $6,658.99. She had rec eived other offe rs befor e, but this offe r wa s considera bly highe r than a

ny of the pre vious offer s. Due to the lar g e amount offe red a nd the fa ct that Sm it h h a d r e c e n tl y le ar n e d h e r s o no w e d

o v e r $ 6 , 0 0 0 in

b a c k taxe s , s h e c o n s id e r e d

a c c e p ti n g the of fe r. Con se qu e ntl y , Smith ph on e d Vir g ini a , who Smit h ass ume d ha d r e c e ive d th e same of fe r, in order to discuss her options. Virg inia stated that she would pur chase Smit h’s roy alty interest for

the same pric e and explained that she wanted to g ive the intere st to her three daug hters. De siring to ke ep the intere st in the family

and to help her

son, Smi th ag ree d to Virg inia’s offe r. On Mar ch 9, 2004, Smit h executed thre e dee ds, convey ing he r entire interest to the L ag erstam da ug hters for

$6,660.I t is worth noting that af ter the s al e h ad completed a nd befor e re ceivingthe sec ond offe r 3 from San Saba, a

nother c ompany

offe red to purc hase V irg inia’s minera l interest for $1,087.50.

3 I n J anuar y and F ebrua

ry 2 0 0 4 , just prior to the sale, two additional we lls were ins ta lle d on the po ole d unit . H ow e ve r, du e to t he la g be tw e e n o il p ro du c tio n a nd ro y a lty pa y me nts , neither pa rty had re ceive d roy alty pay

ments from these two wells at the time of the sa le. For sever al months a fter the sale, Smit h continued to r ece ive roy alty pay ments for the oil pr oduct i o n that
occur red pr ior to the sale. These post-sale pa y ments ref lected the production fr om the additional two wells and we re f

or the amounts of $510.10 in March, $1,025.90 in April, and $974.85 in M ay . After
rec eiving these pay

ments, Smit h claims she attempted to verify their ac cura cy

but was unsucc essful i nc o n t a c t i n g X T O E n e r g y.

I n J une 2004, Smith rece ived a tra nsfer order from XTO Energ y , indicating that she had succ essfully

transfe rre d her e ntire intere st, including he r intere st in production from the two new wells, to the L ag erstam da ug hters. On that same day , Smit h rec eived a nother purc hase of

fer from San Sa ba , th is o ne fo r $ 62 ,6 51 .3 8. Af te r r e c e ivi ngthi s o ff

e r, sh e c on ta c te d V ir g ini a and ult imate ly wrote a letter to the L ag erstam daug hters, requesting that they sell her r oy alty

interest bac k to her for the orig inal purcha se price of $6,600 plus interest. The L ag erstam da ug hters re fused. 3 Smit h then filed su i t t o resc ind the three deeds on the g rounds that the dee ds were enter ed into under a

mutual or a unilater al mistake. Specific ally , she aske d that th e t ransfer be
resc inded bec ause, at the t ime of the c onvey ance , she wa s unawa re that additional ga s wells had bee n place d on the prope rty . As a re sult, she insist s that she was mist ak en about t he intere st she was convey ing. I n response , the L ag erstams filed a mot ion for summary judgme nt, contending that the4

de e ds sho uld

be up he ld b e c a

us e the re wa s n o mi sta

ke , mutua l or

oth e rw ise , r e g ard ingthe int e re st that wa s so ld. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d the mot ion , and Smit h a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

DI SCU SSIO N Summ ary Judgm ent Mot ion

On ap p ea l , Smit h contends that the district c ourt err ed whe n it gr anted the L ag erstams’ mo t ion beca use fa ct issues wer e pre sent reg ardingwhether the dee ds should be
resc inded on the basis of a mutual or unilatera l mist ake. B efor e addr essing the merits of this case , we ne ed to addr ess th e d i s s en t ’s conc erns r eg ardingthe L ag erstams’ summar y judgme nt motion. Essentially , the dissent attacks the adequa cy of the L ag erstams’ motion on the basis of its length and its lack of citation to ca se law.

Although the L ag erstams’ motion asser ted that the L ag erstams we re e ntitled to relief
un de r b oth

tr a dit ion a l and

no e vid e nc e su mma

ry jud g me nt s tand ard s, the mot ion is m or e pr op e rl y read as a tr aditional motion for summary judgme nt beca

use it did not specify

which ele ments of Smit h’s claims there was no e vidence for and beca use i t ref err ed to evidenc e attac hed to the motion as proof that the L ag erstams were entitled to relief as a matter of la w. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ) (in no evidenc e motion, movan t “m u s t s t ate e lements as to which ther e is no evidenc e.”)

. Acc ording ly , we will limit our discussion t o the re quirements of tra ditional summ ary -judg ment motions and need not addr ess the dissent’s assertions that the motion fails as a no-e vidence summary judgme nt motion.5 We first note that Smit h did not c ontest the ade quacy of the motion to the trial court and raises no issue reg arding the sufficie ncy of the motion on appe al. See McConnell v. Southsi de In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 858 S. W.2 d 3 37 , 3 42 -4 3 ( Te x. 19 93 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t in or de r f or no n- mov a nt t o complain on appe al that g rounds raised in motion for summ ary judgme nt wer e uncle ar, non- movant
mus t f ile e xce pti on

to m oti on ); Lochabay v. Southwestern Be ll Media, Inc. , 828 S.W .2d 167, 170 n.2 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 92 , n o w ri t) (s a me ). As su min g wi tho ut d e c idi ng that it is pr op e r in this c a se to review th e s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e mo ti o n w h e n n e it h e r p arty h a s a s k e d u s to , w e b e li e v e that the motion satisfies the require ments of a tra ditional summ ary judgme nt motion. Th e mot ion

is a dmi tte dly

br ie f; ho we ve r, to b e e ff

e c tiv e , th e mot io n need only lis t t h e g r o u n d s u

p o nw h i c h r e l i e f

i s r e q u e s t e d , an d

t h e s p e c i f

i e d g r o u n d s m ay b e s t a t e d

“ c o n c i s e l y, wi t h o u t d etail and a

rg ument.” Lochabay , 828 S.W .2d at 170 n.2 (af firming summary

judgme nt motion on deceptive tra de pra ctice g rounds when motion simply stated that non-moving party ’s counter claim “c iting [the movant’s] use of dece ptive trade prac tices is wholly unsupported by

leg al authority .”). The motion st ated that Smith is not entitl ed t o relief on the g rounds of unilater al or mutual mist ake. F urther, the L ag erstams attached se vera l documents to their motion for summary judgme nt, including Vir g inia’s af fidavit, an off

er le tter fr om San Saba, an d the dee ds convey ing Smit h’s intere st to the L ag erstam da ug hters. In their motion, the L ag erstams re fer red to the attached evidenc e and stated that the evidenc e “c onclusively establishes” that the L ag erstams “ never intended fo r t he ir purc ha se to be any

thi ng oth e r tha

n fo r the e nti re int e re st ow ne d by” Smit h and that Smi th

“ ne ve r s a id or did any

thi ng to ind ic a te that the sa le wa s su pp os e d to be a tr ans fe r on ly of an in te re st that involved a ce rtain number of exis ting we lls.”6 I n light of the prec eding , the m otion falls far s hort of t he ty pe of motions that have been he ld ineffect i v e b ecause they prese nted no g rounds for c onsideration. Se e, e .g ., Mc Con ne ll , 858 S.W .2d at 338, 341 (holding that s u m mary judgme nt that only

stated there wer e “no g enuine issues as to any m aterial fac ts” was insuff icient); Bean v . Rey nolds Realty Group, Inc

. , 19 2 S.W. 3d 85 6, 85 9 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 06 , no pe t.) (h old ingthat mo tio n th a t st a te d o nly that “ther e is no evidenc e to s u pport the plaintiff’s c auses of actions and a lleg ations” wa s ineffe ctive); Great-Ness Prof ’l S er vs., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank , 704 S.W .2d 916, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1986, no writ) (holding that motion was ineffe ctive in bre ach- ofle a se c a se be c a

us e mot ion ma de no me nti on of br e a c h- of -l e a se c la im a

nd , in ste a d, state d a s it s o nly g round that “[t] his is a suit on a sworn ac count.”)

.

For all the re asons pre viously g iven, we c onclud e that the L ag erstams’ motion for summary judgme nt was ef

fec tive. We now turn to the s tandar d with which appe llate cour ts review district court dete rminations reg ardingsummary judgme nt motions

. A s ummary judgme nt may be upheld only

if no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi sts. Tex . R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). To esta blish that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exis ts, a defenda nt moving f

or summary

judgme nt must di sprove at least one e lement of the pla intiff’s cause of ac tion. Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc . v. Johnson , 89 1 S. W.2 d 6 40 , 6 44 (T e x. 19 95 ); Arbelaez v. Ju s t B r a ke s Corp. , 149 S.W .3d 717, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). I n revie wingthe summary judgmen t ev i d ence, all evidenc e favor able to the nonmovant must be take n as true. Johnson , 891 S.W .2d at 644.
M ut ual M ist ake

I n her f irst issue on appea l, Smi th cl aim s that there w as a f act issue a s to whether there exis ted a mutual mistake wa rra nting r escission of the de eds. Smi t h argues that the pa rtiesT h i s es t imate is based on San Saba ’s offe r to purcha se the intere st for $62,651.38, made 4 afte r the sale , and on testimony that the intere st was worth $28,000 at the time of sale.

7 enter ed the sa les contra ct under the mistaken belief

that she was selling, a

nd the L ag erstams we re buy ing, only

three producingwells. Th i s mistake about the number of produc ing w ells, she contends, mate rially

aff ecte d the sales transac tion a nd cause d her to se ll her intere st for betwe en 11% to 25% of its true value

. 4

Under Texas law, when pa

rties to an ag ree ment have c ontrac ted under a mut u al misconception of mate rial fa ct, the ag ree m en t i s v o idable under the doctrine of mutual mistake. W ill iam s v . G las h , 7 89 S.W. 2d 26 1, 26 4 ( Te x. 19 90 ). Ho we ve r, the do c tr ine of mut ua l mi sta ke is

a pp lie d o nly

in r are c ir c ums tanc e s in or de r t o a llo w p art ie s to “ re ly on the fi na lity ” of

the ir ag ree ments and to preve nt the routine use of the doctrine t o av o i d t h e effects of a n “unhappy barg ain.” Id. a t 26 5; see W all e rst e in v . S

pir t , 8 S.W .3d 774, 781 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). A mutual mistake must be proven by “cle ar, ex ac t , an d s at isfactor y evidenc e.” Es te

s v . R e pu bli c Nat’l Bank , 4 6 2 S
. W
. 2 d

2 7 3 , 2 7 5 (T ex . 1 9 7 0 ) ( ci t i n g Su n Oil Co. v . B e nn e tt , 84 S.W .2d 447, 452 (Tex. 1935)). To be entitled to r escind an ag ree ment due to a mutual mistake, a party must show that there exis ts ( 1 ) a mistake of fac t, (2) held mutually

by the par ties, (3) whic h materia lly aff ects the ag ree d upon exchang e. W all e rst e in , 8 S.W. 3d

at 78 1; De M

onet v. PER

A , 877 S.W .2d 352, 357 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no wr it). “[T] he mistake must relate to the s ubject matter of the c ontrac t and not to a matter

that is merely

collater al or incide ntal to the contra ct.” Petrey v. John F . Buck ner & Sons , 28 0 S.W. 2d 64 1, 64 3 (T e x. Civ

. Ap p. —Wa c o 19 55 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; see also De M onet , 877 S.W .2d at 359 (r el i ef o n ly appropr iate whe re mistake upse ts basis of contra ct);8

Chambers v. Huggins , 7 09 S.W .2 d 219 , 2 24 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 86 , n o w ri t) (re quiring party

show that mistake was mutual a nd that it was materia l inducement to t ransa ction). When determining whether there was a m utual mistake, courts must consider the lang uag e of the ag ree ment. See, e .g. , Sun Oil Co. , 8 4 S. W.2 d at 44 9 ( re fu sin g to i nv a lid a te le a se
on g ro un d it mis ta ke nly inc lud e d p art ic ula

r t ra c t of la nd , w he re int e nt to inc lud e land in c on tr ov e rs y

“ c le arl y and un mis taka

bly a pp e ar[e d] f

ro m th e langua g e of

the le a se ” ); see also Estes , 462 S.W .2d at 275 (pre sume written ag ree ment embodies par ties’ intentions). Ho we v er , the
e xiste nc e of

a mut ua l mi sta ke c ann ot a lw ay s b e de te rm ine d excl us ive ly by the langua g e in a c on tr a c t. W illiams , 789 S.W .2d at 264. I n such ca ses, other obje ctive cir cumstan ce s s u rr o u nding the execution of the docume nt may also b e conside red. Id. (“ the qu e sti on of mut ua l mi sta ke is deter mined not by

sel f- s er v i n g s ubjective state ments of the par ties’ intent . . . but rather

solely by objective c ircumstance s”). The se i n cl u d e t h e knowledg e of the parties a nd the substance of the neg otiations at the time of the contra ct execution. De M onet , 8 77 S.W. 2d

a t 358; see W

illiams , 789 S.W .2d at 264. Essentially , the par ty seekingref

ormation due to mistake mus t show what the true ag ree ment betwee n the parties was and must prove that the written a g ree ment does not comport

w it h th e tr u e a g r e e me n t b e c a

u s e o f a mutu a ll y h e ld mi s ta ke. Estes , 462 S.W .2d at 275; Be y e rs v . R ob e rts , 199 S.W .3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2006, pet. denied)

.

Ev e n w he n th e evi den ce is v ie we d in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to S mith, it f

a ils to
cr eate a fa ct issue re g ardingwhether there exis ted a mutual mistake mate rially aff ectingthe

a g re e me nt. Th e re le va

nt l angua g e of

the de e ds re a ds a s f

oll ow s:9

al l o f [ t h e] Gr an t o r’ s i n t er es ti nan d t o al l o i l , gas , m i n er al s an d ro y al t i es , i n cl u d i n g, bu t no t li mit e d to , a

0. 00 09 901 ro y a lty , mi ne ra l in te re st, ro y a lty int e re st, le a se ho ld interest, re versionar

y inter e s ts , a f

te r a c q u ir e d p r o p e r ty inte rests, rig hts of substitut ion, rig hts of entry

and re -entry , interests in claims or c auses of acti o n , rig hts of subrog ation, reg ardle ss of whether any of such r ights, titles and intere sts are ve sted now or will be ve sted in the future

. . . . The langua g e in t h e d e e d s is b r o a d

. Rath e r th ans p e c if

ic a ll y d e li n e a te o r

li mi t t h e in te r e s t t o be
con v e y e d , th e d e e d s o u tl in e a c o mp r e h e n s iv e , n o n - e xh a u s ti v e li s t o f w h a t is to b e in c lude d in the
conve y an ce . I t list s Smi th’s specific mineral intere st in the property but also convey s any

other interest Smith mi g ht have in the pr operty . There is no indication in the la ng uag e of the deeds that the par ties intended to conve y

any thing other than S mith’s entire interest, whateve r t hat m ight have been, inc luding he r stake in the production from whateve r we lls were on the proper ty at the time of the c on ve y anc e . T he de e ds do no t lim it the int e re st t o b e c on ve y e d to any numbe r o f w e lls and , in fac t, make no mention of we lls. Cf. Sun Oil Co. , 84 S.W.2 d at 4 52 (l angua g e of de e d w ri tte n b ro a dly fo r pur po se of e ns ur inge nti re int e re st c on ve y e d a nd pr e ve nti ngg ra

nto r f ro m r e ta ini ngany

int e re st in property

due to lack of

prec i s i o n i n d es cribing proper ty or lac k of knowledg e of totality of interest by

parties)

. Second, although documents at t he ti me of the s ale indicate t hat onl y three wells wer e producing , the evidenc e conc erningthe var ious discussions and neg otiations between Sm i t h and Virg inia demonstrate that the parties unde rstood themselves to be buy ing a nd selling Smith’s entire mineral intere st. I n Smit h’s deposition, she admitted that she unde rstood the San Saba of fer to be fo r h e r e nti re int e re st a

nd fu rt he r a dmi tte d tha t sh e int e nd e d to se ll the L a g e rs tams t he e xac t in te re st she would have sold to S an Saba. San Saba’s of fer letter made no mention of any wells; on the10

c on tr ary , th e of

fe r l e tte r s ta te d th a t th e of fe r w a s f or “ any and a ll o f the ro y a lty int e re st that” Smith
ow ne d at the tim e of the of fe r. I n a dd iti on

to t he le tte r, San Sa

ba a tta c he d a

do c ume nt t

hat w ou ld have a llo we d Sm ithto t

ra ns fe r h e r o wn e rs hip to S an Sa ba . L ike the of

fe r l e tte r, thi s d oc ume nt d id not list any

wells. Moreove r, conta ined within the document was the following phrase written in a f on t t hat was si gnif

ica nt ly lar ger th an fo nt s u sedfor th e ot her p art s o f t he d ocu men t: “BY EX ECU TI

NG AN D DE L I VE RI

NG TH I S I

NST RU ME NT YO U A RE S EL L I NG YO UR

EN TI RE MI NERAL AND ROYA L TY I

NTEREST I

N THE PROPERTY DESCR I BED AB OVE.” Although in he r af

fidavit Smit h say s she believe d her inter est included the pr oduction fr om o nly thr e e we lls , no thi ng in the re c or d s ug g e sts that Smi th atte mpt e d to c on ve y on ly thr e e we lls or to limit the conve y ance in any way . Moreove r, nothing in t h e re cord sugg ests that the par ties
ne g oti a te d r e g ard ingthe numbe r o f w e lls on the pr op e rt y . On the c on tr ary , in

he r d e po sit ion

Smith admitted that she did not communicate a desire to c onvey only her inter est in three w ells. Furthe r, Vi rg ini a ’s a ff

ida vit state s th a t ne ith e r pa

rt y me nti on e d th e numbe r o f w e lls pr ior to t he sa le , a nd thi s testimony was not controve rted. I n support of her argument that the mistake was materia l, Smith relies on a c omment
and an illu str a tio n ac c omp anying se c tio n 152 of the re state me nt of c on tr a c ts. Se c tio n 152 pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) Wh e re a mi st ake of

bo th p art ie s at th e tim e a c on tr a c t w a s ma de a s to a ba sic assumption on which the contr act wa s made ha s a mater ial eff ect on the a g ree d e xch ang e of perf

or manc e s, the c on tr a c t is vo ida ble by the a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c te d p art y unless he bea

rs the risk of the mistake . . . .11

Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 152 (1981 ). The f irst illus tration to this section provides as fo llo ws :
A contra cts to sell and B to buy a t ra ct o f land, the va lue of whic h has depe nded ma inl y on the tim be r on it. B oth A a nd B be lie ve that th e tim

be r i s st ill the re , b ut i n fac t it has been de stroy ed by fire. T he contr act is voidable by B. Id. § 1 52 , il lus . 1 . Sm itha sse rt s th a t th is c a se inv olv e s th e re ve rs e of the sit uatio n d e sc ri be d in th is example. Specifica lly , she conte nds that, beca use the ad d i t i on of the we lls increase d the value of the prope rty , she should be allowe d to rescind he r conve y ance s.

Our c ase is not ana logous to this example. The example addresses what happens when ther e i s a m i s t ake about the ver y essenc e of w hat is sold—a bare trac t of land ver sus tim be rl and . T he re is n o s uc h b a sic mis take in o ur c a se : bo th pa rt ie s be lie ve d th e y

we re de a lin g wi th a minera l interest, and both parties knew that the l and was actively producing minerals. Moreover, a mistake in the number of we lls convey ed d oes not rende r the e ssence of the e x chang e—the conveyance of an a ctive minera l interest—inhere ntly differ ent from the i ntended c onvey ance . The Restatement example would be more applicable if the mi s t ak e in the illustration was about the number of trees on the l ot rathe r t han the exis tence of any tree s at all. Fina lly , the example cited by Smit h does not addre ss the situation here whe re the s el l er wants t o undo a tra nsaction due to a mistake. Com me nt b to s e c tio n 1 52 re a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:

The p arti e s ma

y h a v e h a d s u c h a “ b a s ic a s s u mp ti o n , ” e v e n th o u g h th e y w e r e not conscious of a lternatives. . . . Where, for example, a par

ty purcha ses an a

nnuity on the life of a

nother person, it can be s aid t hat it was a ba sic assumption that the other12

person wa s al i v e at the time, e ven thoug h the par ties never consciously

addre ssed themselves to the possibility that he wa s dead. Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 152, cmt. b. However, as with the previous example, the situation described in the comment is not cong ruent to the c ircumstance s prese nt in this appea l. The basic a ssumption underly ing the ag ree ment in this case is that there wa s g as pre sent on the pooled unit, not the precise va lue of the inter est or t he amount pumped f rom the pooled unit. This comment would have mor e applica bility to a si tuation in which two parties believed that g as wa s prese nt on the prope rty

when the sa le was f

inalized but later discover ed that the unit was dr y . I n further support of h er a

rg ument, Smit h ref

ers to two ca ses in which a c ourt
c on c lud e d th e re wa s a fa c t is su e re g ard ingthe e xiste nc e of a mut ua l mi sta ke : De M

onet v. PER

A and W ill iam s v . G las h . I n De M

onet , t h e pa rt i es en t er ed i n t o an agr ee m en t t o s el l an o ff i ce b u i l d i n g. 877 S.W .2d at 354. Prior to the sale, the sellers discovere d that the building conta ined asbe stos and hired a company to remove it. Id. at 355. The pa rties extensively

neg otiated re g ardingthe re moval of the a sbestos prior to the sale be ing f inalized, and the sellers ma de seve ral repre sentations that the asbestos would be r emoved pr ior to the sale. How ever , the purc haser discovered asbe stos in the building af

ter the sal e wa s fi nalized. Due to the var ious actions perf ormed by the par ties and the signific ant neg otiations conce rning the asbestos, the court conclude d there was a fac t issue reg arding whether the sellers a ssumed the risk of there being a mistake reg arding the asbe stos or whether the mistake was so “funda mental to the parties’ ag ree ment” that it “ materia lly al t er ed the ag ree ment.” Id. at 359.13 DeMo ne t is disti ng uishable fr om this case. In De M onet , the sellers w ere require d to e ng a g e in c e rt a in a c tio ns and wa rr ant that the y ha d co mpl e te d thos e ta sk s bef or e the buy e rs wo uld ag ree to purcha se the b u ilding, and the mistake both parties ha d was the be lief that the a ction had be en com pl eted. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e pa rt ie s d id n ot n e g oti a te re g ard ingthe nu mbe r o f w e lls pr e se nt o n th e pr op e rt

y , a nd ne ith e r p art

y ma de any

re pr e se ntatio ns re g ard ingthe we lls

. Fur thermore , there was no action either party neede d to complete bef

ore the L ag erstams would a g ree to pur c h a s e Sm it

h ’ s mi n e r a l in te r e s t, an d a c c o r d in g ly , th e r e is n o mi s ta k e r e g ar d in g an y

action eng ag ed in by

Smit h: she ag ree d to sell all of her miner al intere st to the L ag erstams for an ag ree d price , and subseque ntly

convey ed the pr operty

to the L ag erstam da

ug hters. I n W ill iam s v . G las h , Wil liams was involved in a ca r ac cident but did not fee l injured immediately afte r the acc ident and stated on her claim form that no one had been i n j u re d i n the
acc ident. 789 S.W .2d at 263. The other driver’ s insurance company ag ree d to pay

to fix Wil liams’s
car . Id. During the var ious neg otiations W illiams had with the insurance company , neither she nor any of t he company ’s employ ees me ntioned a per sonal-injury claim. Id. Fur

ther, the code stamped on the check the insurance company g ave Wi lliams to repa ir her car sig nified that the c ase did not inv o lv e a p e r s o n a l in

jury

. Id. Ho wever, the c heck did c ontain a re lease clause stating that the amount offe red c onstitut ed a f ull settlement precludingfuture claims for pr operty or per sonal-injury damag es. Id. After

depo s i ting the c heck, Williams discovered that she had be en injured in the
acc ident. Id. Gi v en the lack of knowledg e of a

n injury at the time the re lease was sig ned, the absenc e of a

ny neg otiation concer

ning personal injuries, the a mount of money

offe red, a nd the code14

on the che ck, the supreme cour t concluded that there w as a f act issue a s to whether the parties intended the r elea se to cove r per sonal injuries. Id. at 264.

Smit h’s re liance on this ca se is misplaced. In W illiams , there was e vidence that
c re a te d a fa c t is su e a s to wh e the r t he pa rt ie s in te nd e d th e re le a se to c over the unkn ow n, pe rs on a linjury claims. This case does not involve a deter mination of whether

an ag ree ment enter ed into by the par ties fore closes the possibility of asse rting unknown future claims. Reg ardle ss of the number of we lls on

the pr op e rt

y , th e dis pu te in th is case invol ve s o nly on e kn ow n c la im t o one minera l interest.

The languag e of the deed and t he objective circ umstances surrounding the execution of the de e ds a ll ind ic a te tha t th e su bje c t matte r o f t

he c on ve y anc e wa s Smi th’ s e nti re min e ra l in te re st, not the number of w ells prese nt o n t h e p o o l ed unit . Acc ording ly , any mistake conc erningthe number of w ells did not materially aff ect the e x chang e. Mo re ov e r, e ve n if

a mis take a

bo ut the numbe r of we lls we re ma te ri a l, re lie f w ou ld still b e barred by

the principle that a par

ty to an ag ree ment may

not seek re lief on the g round of mistake if the risk of the mistake is allocated to that pa rty
. Se e Che rry

v . M c Cal l , 138 S.W .3d 35, 40 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 04 , p e t. de nie d)

. A part y be ars the ri sk of a mis take wh e n “ the ri sk is allocated to him by ag ree ment of the parties.” Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 154(a) ( 1981). Th e ri sk of a mis take wa s a llo c a te d to Smith b y the te rm s o f t

he deed s she s ig ne d. Th e te rm s sp e c if ie d th a t Smi th a g re e d to se ll “ all oil, ga s, minerals, and r oy alties, inc lud ing bu t no t li mi te d to , a .0009901 roy alt y , mineral intere st, roy alty interests, . . . regardless of whether any of such

. . . int e re sts ar e v este d no w or

will be v este d in thefutur e .” (E mph a sis a dd e d) . A dd iti on a lly , r e lie f i sOu r conclusion t hat the dee ds are not subject to resc ission is bolstered by Smit h’s 5 admission on appea l that she would be unable to resc ind the agr eeme nts if the wells had be en adde d afte r the sale was c ompleted. When making this statement, Smi th nece ssarily admitted that she wa s not under the mistaken be lief that the va lue of the proper ty could not be incr ease d by the addition of future wells. 15 also barr ed by the principle that a mistake must ordina rily not be due to ne g lige nce on the par t of the petitioner. Se e Com me rc ial Standa rd Ins . Co. v . W hit e , 423 S.W .2d 427, 433 (T e x. Civ . App .—

Am ari ll o 19 67 , wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; see also Barke r v. Roelk e , 105 S.W .3d 75, 85 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. de nied) (pa rty may not a void c ontrac t on basis of mistake if knew
or ha d r e a so n to kn owof mis ta ke ); Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of Con tr a c ts § 15 4( b) (1 98 1) (p a rt y assumes risk of mistake if he “is awa re, at the tim e t he contr act is made , that he has only limit ed knowledg e with re spect to the fa cts to which the mistake r elates but tre ats his lim ited knowledg e as
su ff ic ie nt. ” ). As dis c us se d mo re thor ou g hly in t he ne xt se c tio n, de sp ite the fa c t th a t he r r oy a lty pay me nts h a d in c r ease d signific antly

in rec ent y ear s, Smi th failed to asc erta in or investigate the value of he r i nte re st p ri or

to s e lli ngit t o th e L a g e rs tams. 5 For all the re asons pre viously g iven, we c onclude that the c onvey ance was not subject to rescission under

the doctrine of mutual mistake and ove rrule Smith’s first issue on appe al. I n a dd iti on

to a tta c kin g the mot ion ’s a de qu a c y , the dis se nt a lso imp ro pe rl y lim its its dis c us sio n to on e e le me nt of mut ua l mistake

. I n the ir mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt, a ft e r g e ne ra lly stating that Smi th may

not employ the doctrine of mutual mist ake a nd noting that a

claim of mutual mistake involves proving sever al eleme nts, the L ag erstams stated that “[t] he most basic ele ment of this c ause of action is that the mistake was MUTUAL .” I n light of this stateme nt, the dissent rea sons that this Court m ay

only addre ss whether

Smit h and the L ag erstams wer e mutually mistaken about16

the number of wells. I n essenc e, the dissent ar g ues that by specific ally

listi ngthe word “ mutual,” the L ag erstams have only prese nted one e lement for c onsideration. We see no re ason to conc lude that af ter g ener ally

stating that Smit h may

not rely on mutual mist ake, the L ag erstams e ffe cti v el y co n cede d or wa ived the mater iality require ment by individually

listi ng the mutuality

require ment. Moreove r, were we to limi t our conc lusion in t he
s a m e m an n e r

a s t h e d i s s e n t , w e w o u l d b e i g n o r i n g o n e o f

t h e w e l l

- s e t t l e d

p r i n c i p l e s o f

s u m m a ryjud g me nt j ur isp ru de nc e . When , as he re , a distri c t court do e s not spe c if y the g ro un ds up on

wh ic h it g ran t ed s u m m ar y

judgme nt, this C ourt must affirm the summar y judgme nt if any

of the g rounds pr e se nte d to the dis tr ic t c ourt a re me ri tor iou s. J

oe v . Two Thi rty

Nin e J oint Ve ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004). The L ag erstams c laimed that Smith i s not entitled to recove ry under the doctrine of

mutual mist ake, a

nd it is t here fore appr opriate f or this Court to consider whether the diffe renc e in the number of we lls was materia l to the transac tion. F ur the rm or e , a s me nti on e d pr e vio us ly , a lth ou g h th e L a g e rs tams d id n ot s pe c if ic a lly
us e the wo rd

ma te ri a l in

the ir mot ion , th e y did state that the y “ ne ve r i nte nd e d f

or the ir purc ha se to be any thi ngoth e r t

ha n f or the e nti re int e re st own ed by ” Smit h a nd that Smi th “ ne ve r s a id o r d id any thing to indicate that the sale w as supposed to be a transfe r only

of an inter est t h at i n v o lved a
cer tain number of e x isting we lls.” By making these statements, the L ag erstams e ffe ctively argued that the exact number of

wells was not mater ial to the transac tion at issue in this case . Uni lat e r al M ist ake

I n her second issue on appea l, Smit h claims that there was a fac t issue as to whether there exis ted a unilatera l mistake nece ssitating rescission of t he deeds. I n order to obtain relief due17

to a unilatera l mist ake, the following require ments need to be satisfied: (1) the mistake must be “of
so g re a t a c on se qu e nc e that to e nf or c e the c on tr a c t a s ma de wo uld be un c on sc ion a ble ” ; ( 2) it mus t

“ re la te to a

ma te ri a l f

e a tur e of the c on tr a c t” ; ( 3) it “ mus t ha ve be e n ma de re g ard le ss o f t he e xer c ise of ordinar

y car e”; an d (4 ) “the parties c an be pla ced in status quo in the equity sense.” Tay lor v . A rli ng ton In de

p. Sc h. Di

st. , 3 35 S.W. 2d

37 1, 37 3 ( Te x. 19 60 ); see Zapatero v. Canales , 730 S.W .2d 111, 114 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1987, writ ref ’d n.r.e.)

. The pa

rty seekingrelief

has the burde n of establishing all these e lements. Zap ate ro , 73 0 S.W. 2d a t 11 4. Re qu ir ingthat th e se elements be met preve nts a mere ly dissatisfied party

from see king to se t aside an a g ree ment by claiming that he did not understand the ag ree ment he wa s s i gn i n g . Cf. W heele r v. Holloway , 276 S.W . 653, 654 (Tex. 1925).

Smit h arg ues that all four

elements a

re satisfied in this case. Specif ically , she ar g ues that her mistake r eg ardingthe number of wells was mate rial to the contra ct and le d t o the unconsciona

ble re sult in which she lost thousands of dollar s. Furthe r, she a rg ues that she is willing to r eturn the $6,600 the L ag erstams paid for the inter est and that, ther efor e, re scission of the contra ct would place the parties in the pos ition they wer e in prior to the sa le. Moreove r, she c laims that her actions we re not the r esult of a f ailure to ex erc ise ordinary car e that would prohibit rescinding the
c on tr a c t. S he argue s sh e ha s li ttl e kn ow le dg e re g ard ingmin e ra l in te re sts , b e liev ed $6 ,6 00 wa s a
rea sonable pric e for

the amount of roy alty pay ments she receive d, and relied on the L ag erstams for advice on whether

to sell her intere st. Finally , she contends that her a ctions were rea sonable unde r the se c ir c ums tanc e s.I n light of our discussion of materia lity in the previous section, we also conc lude that the 6 ma te ri a lity

re qu ir e me nt o f a

un ilate ra l mi sta

ke is n ot m e t. 18 We disag ree with Smi th for sever al rea sons. I n g ener al, a party is not e ntitled to relief due to its unilater al mistake if the mistake wa s not known or induced by the other pa

rty
. Johnson

v . S ne ll , 5 04 S.W. 2d

39 7, 39 9 ( Te x. 19 73 ); Zap ate ro , 7 30 S .W .2 d at 11 4. Smith ma ke s n o c la im that her mistaken belief was induced by the L ag erstams or that the L ag erstams kne w the true number of we lls on the property

and re alized Smi th did not. Se e Zap ate ro , 730 S.W .2d at 114 (appe llant not entitl ed t o relief

under doc trine of unilater al mistake bec ause no e vidence was pre sented showing that appellee knew of

appellant’ s mistaken belief)

. Mo re ov e r, e ve n v ie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to Smit

h, we mus t conclude that the evidenc e pre sented disprove s at least one of the re quired e lements of Smith’s claim: that Smit h’s mistake would have been ma de re g ardle ss of the exercise o f o rd i n ar y car e. 6 Even though the roy alty pay ments Smit h rec eived in the months be fore the sale stated t h at the pay ments were for pr oduction from thre e we lls, the documents also specifie d that the pay ment was for g as produc tion that had occur red months e arlier

. I n other wor ds, the documents did not provide
an ac curate assessment of activity that was c urre ntly

happeningon the unit either in terms of the amount of g as that wa s pumped or the number of we lls that were a ctive. I n addition, the number of w ells prese nt on t h e p ro perty has incre ased ove r time. Fr om the time Smith be g an rec eiving roy alty pay ments to the time of the sale, three wells wer e adde d to the proper

ty . Of these t h re e we lls, two were a dded in the two y ear s prec eding the sale. Eve n assuming that Smi th never knew the number of wells on the property , Smit h was a war e that amount19

of he r r oy a lty

pa y me nts ha d in c re a se d s ub sta nti a lly . In th e tw o y e ars pr ior to s a le , Sm ith ’s ro y a lty pay ments incre ased by more than three fold. Howeve r, Smit h made no eff ort to asce rtain the number of we lls on he r p ro pe rt

y or de te rm ine the va lue of he r m ine ra l in te re st unti l a ft e r s he so ld h e r i nte re st to the L ag erstams. See W heele r , 276 S.W. a t 65 4 ( c ourt c on c lud e d th a t be c a

us e Ho llo wa

y fa ile d to eng ag e in any

eff ort to determine e nd p o i n t o f p ro p erty he ac quired, he was not entitled to relief under doc trine of unilater al mist ak e: “T h e whole trouble in this case is that Hollway trade d and inv e sti g a ted af

te rw ard . H e sh ou ld h a ve re ve rs e d th is p ro c e dure .” ); Zap ate ro , 730 S.W .2d at 114 (p art y c ann ot c la im unil a te ra l mi sta ke c on c e rn ingou tst and ingmin e ra l in te re st b e c a us e int e re st f

ull y de sc ri be d in

de e d r e c or ds ); se e als o A nd e rso n B ro s. Cor

p. v . O ’M e ara , 306 F.2d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 19 62 ) (a pp e lle e no t ent itl e d to re lie f by un ilate ra l mi sta

ke be c a us e , p ri or to p ur c ha sin g e qu ipm e nt, he did n o t at t em p t to asce rtain whe ther e quipment was suited for his purpose s). A par ty cannot obtain relief

from an a g ree ment as a r esult of a unilater al mistake if the pa rty ’s “ig noranc e of the fac ts was the re sult of car elessness, indiffe renc e, or inattention.” Roland v. Mc Cullough , 561 S.W .2d 207, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1978, writ re f’d n.r .e.).

For all the re asons pre viously g iven, we c onclude that the c onvey ance was not subject to refor mation or resc ission under t h e doctr ine of unilater al mistake and ove rrule Smith’s second issue on a

ppeal.
Re spo nse to th e Di sse nt

I n arguing that, on the merits, summary judgm en t was im proper in this case, the dis se nt i g no re s th e c le ar w arn ingart ic ulate d by the su pr e me c ourt that court s shou ld o nly sp ari ng ly20

a llo w ba rg a ins to be un do ne du e to a mis take by on e or mor e of the pa rt ie s to an ag re e me nt. W illiams , 789 S.W .2d at 265. I t is not t he job of the c ourts to ensure that all parties to a tra nsaction equally benef it from their barg ain or that the s ale price of an it em ac curately ref lects the true value of that it e m. F or a va

ri e ty of re a so ns , pe op le of te n s e ll i te ms f

or a mou nts that are sig nif

ic antl y le ss tha n ma rk e t va lue . A lth ou g h th e se lle r m ay lo se th e fu ll b e ne fi t of the ba rg a in, it i s p os sib le that, in t he se lle r’ s ey e s, that lo ss i s w e ll w or th t he be ne fi t of

qu ic kly se lli ngan a sse t. It is a lso po ssi ble that a seller

may choose to e x ert ab s o l utely no eff ort to asce rtain the true value of the item befor e
se lli ngit t o avo id t

he ha ssl e of ins pe c tin g or a pp ra isi ngthe pr op e rt

y . Co ur ts s ho uld tr e a d c are fu lly b e f o r e e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e b u s i n e s s o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r , i nh i n d s i g h t , t h e b e n e f i to b t a i n e d

b y a quick sale or

by being able to sell an item without valuing an asse t i s equivalent to the diff ere nce betwee n the marke t value and the sale pric e.

CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled Smith’s two is sues on appe al, we af fi rm the judg ment of the district court.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear ; Dissenting O pinion by J ustice Patterson Affir med Filed: June 1, 2007