Filed 4/1/20 Certified for P ublication 4/24/20 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LORIK MIKH AEILPOOR

,

Plaintiff and Appellant

,

v.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al.

,

Defendant s and Respondent s

. B 293987

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No . BC611197 )

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Rando lph M. Hammock , Judge. Affirmed

.

_____ __________

_ _ Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner and Arlyn L.
Escalante for Plaintiff and Appellant. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson and Mark W.
Allen for Defendants and Respondents.

____ __________ __

__2 Lorik Mikhaeilpoor (Mikhaeilpoor) appeals fr om the trial court’s order awarding her attorney fees following the trial of
her action against BMW of North America LLC and Finchey Corporation of California ( collectively, BMW) under the Song

- Beverly Consu mer Warranty Act (the Song

- Beverly Act). (Civ. C ode

, § 1790 et seq.) 1 Mikhaeilpoor sued BMW after she purchased a defective 2013 BMW 328i that BMW was unable to repair.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. Mikhaeilpoor’s Complaint
On February 22, 2016, Mi khaeilpoor sued BMW and Finchey Corporation of Ca lifornia ( erroneously named in
the complaint as Pacific BMW) , an auto dealership, asserting

causes of action under the Song

- Beverly Act stemming from
her September 13, 2014 lease of the 2013 BMW 328i for
whi ch BMW had issued a warranty. Mikhaeilpoor alleg ed
that defendants : (1) failed to promptly replace her car or make restitution, in violation of section 1793.2, subdivisions (a)(2)
and (d)(1); (2) failed to commence repairs aimed at conforming the

car to its warranty, in violation of section 1793.2, sub division (b); (3) failed to make available service and repair facilities (including parts and literature) sufficient to effectuate repairs, in violation
of section 1793 .2 , subdivision (a)(3); (4) breached th e express warranty, as defined in section 1791.2, subdivision (a); and (5) breached the implied warranty of merchantability, as defined
in section 1791.1. Plaintiff ’s complaint sought restitution, an
award of actual damages, a civil penalty of two times actual damages and attorney fees and costs.

1 Unless otherwise specifie d, subsequent statutory references are to the Civil Code

.3 B. Th e Trial

The t rial commenced on February 21, 2018, and spanned
six days. On February 28, 2018, the jury returned a special verdict
in favor of Mikhaeilpoor. The jury awarded $35,805.08, comprised of $17,902 .54 in compensatory damages and $17,902.54 in civ il penalties.

C. Mikhaeilpoor’s Motion for Attorney Fees
On June 8, 2018, Mikhaeilpoor filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to s ection 1794 , subdivision (d)

, seeking $344,639. This figure consisted of $226,426, plus a 0.5 multiplier enhancement (tota ling $113,213), and $5,000 for addressing the attorney fee resolution process. The fee motion was accompanied by declarations from Payam Shahian, the managing attorney for Mikhaeilpoor’s
trial counsel, and C hristine Haw, lead trial counsel. Shahian’s
decl aration contained a bevy of information about his credentials and experience in unrelated Song

- Beverly Act cases where his
clients were awarded fees. Shahian’s declaration also included

18 exhibits comprise d of minute orders and notices of rulings on
fee motions in unrelated cases ; t his despite the fact that no fees
were billed for services by Shahian. Shahian’s declaration also
identified 10 attorneys who worked on this case along with their proffered bill ing information: Gregory Yu ($495 per hour), Jac ob Cutler ($385 per hour in 2016

, $395 per hour in 2017, and $410

per hour in 2018), Benjamin Beck ($400 per hour), Christine Haw ($365 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in 2018), Eleazar Kim ($350 per hour in 2017 and $370 hour in 2018), Yoon Kim (former attorney) ($365 per hour), Michael Robinson (former attorney) ($595 per hour), Heather Rodriguez (former attorney) ($325 per hour), Carey Wood ($370 per hour in 2017 and $375 per hour in4

2018), Armig Khodan ian (former attorney) ($325 per hour).
Shahian’s declaration also attached a copy of the billing records
for Mikhaeilpoor’s trial counsel. The fee motion was opposed because : the billing records vastly overstated the work performed ; the hourly rates were
excessive ; and an 0.5 multiplier adjustment was unwarranted.
The defense argued that fees should be reduced by at least $83,206.05

, and the proffered hourly billing rates of $325 to $595
were not based on market value. Mikhaeilpoor replied, defending the amounts claimed.
Before hearing the motion, the trial court issued a tentative ruling awarding $94,864 in attorney fees: $95,900 less an offsetting
amount owed to defendants. The court heard the motion on July 31, 2018. During argument, Judge Hammock e xplained that he “went through all
the bills” and was “aghast” that counsel sought $343,000 in fees. He “saw the motions, the discovery motion,” and “the motion for terminating sanctions, which was much ado about nothing.” He found before him “a very sim ple case, straightforward trial,” and “not a comp licated case.” In assessing fees, the court “looked at all the bills”
and then “calculated what [it] thought was reasonable. ” The

court understood that it had the “ability to exercise [its ] sound
discretio n,” but could not “do it arbitrarily.” The court emphasized that its analysis was not based on limiting plaintiff ’s fees to a proportion of the trial recover y ; the court “recognize [ d ] that even though [the recovery] was [ $ ] 17,000, doubled to 34, this cou ld justify a large attorney fee award.” Also, th e court did not take
into account whether plaintiff should have accepted a Code of Civil
Procedure section 998 offer. The court found the requested fee amount “was just not
reasonable.” The court “went thr ough the bill and [it] decided what5

[it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks
that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done

. . . . [I]t added up
to 225 hours.” The co urt decided that $350 “is a reasonable hourly

rat e for the services that were done.” During argument, plaintiff ’s counsel made two main arguments. First, counsel argued the court could not reduce plaintiff ’s requested fee amount by more than the $83,206 .05
reduction because that would constitute enter taining “objections

not raised by [defendants]

. ” Second, counsel argued that
defendants had the burden to prove grounds for a fee reduction.
The court took the matter under submission in order to review
th e billing records again. Ultimately, the court f ound that $95,900

was the reasonable amount of attorney fees for work performed on behalf of Mikhaeilpoor. After offsetting certain fees and costs that had been awarded to defendants, the net amount of awar ded fees totaled $94,864.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An a ward of attorney fees under the Song

- Beverly Act
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 462, 470 ( Goglin ) .) The reviewing court presumes that the tri al court’s award is correct
and infers that a req uest for fees is inflated when the trial court substantially reduces the requested amount. ( Etcheson v. FCA
US LLC (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 831, 840.) These rules apply
because the experienced trial judge is best positioned to evaluate the professional serv ices rendered in his or her courtroom. ( Ibid

., citing Goglin

, supra , 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 470

– 471.) The trial
court’s decision must not be disturbed “ ‘unless [the Court of Appeal is] convinced that it is clearly wrong, meaning that it is

an abuse of dis cretion.’ ” ( Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.6

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 148 ( Graciano ) , citing In re Vitamin
Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052.) Accordingly, this

c ourt’s review of an order aw arding attorney fees “must be highly
deferential to the views of the trial court.” ( Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1239.) “ ‘The only proper basis of
reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount
awarded is so la rge or small that it shocks the conscience and

su ggests that passion or prejudice influenced the determination.’ ” ( In re Tobacco Cases I (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 570, 587.) In particular, “the lodestar method vests the trial court
with the discretion to de cide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were ‘reasonably spent’ on the litigation” ( Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437,
449 ( Meister ) )

, and to determine the hourly rates that should
be used in the lodestar ca lculus. ( 569 E. County Boulevard LLC

v. Backcoun try Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 436

- 437 .) The methodology embodied in this language
is consistent with California’s lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees. (See Robert son v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, I nc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818 ( Robertson ) .) As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d)
makes clear, the trial court is “to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably
incurred

— both from th e standpoint of time spent and the amount charged.” ( Robertson

, supra , at p. 817.) In the case of contingency fee arrangements, “a prevailing buyer

. . . is entitled to an award
of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his

or her attor neys .” ( Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994)
31 Cal.App.4th 99, 10 5, fn. 6 ( Nightingale ), italics added

. ) Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actua l time expended and then “ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the7

amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.” ( Nightingale

, supra , 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.) Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. ( I bi d .) The prevailing party and fee applicant bears “the burden of showing
that the fees incurred were

. . . ‘ reasonably necessary to the conduct
of th e litigation, ’ and were ‘ reasonable in amount. ’ ” ( Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816; see Corbett v. Hayward Dodge, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 915, 9 2 6 [“ [c] ourts have uniformly held that the party moving for statutor y attorney fees or sanctions has the burden of proof ”].) It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under t he circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” ( Nightingale

, supra , 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.) The amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to the
lodestar adjustment method may be increased or d ecreased. Such an adjustment is commonly referre d to as a “fee enhancement”

or “multiplier.” (

Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 ( Ketchum ) .) The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required to, award a multiplier. (See Montgomery v. Bio

- Med Specialties,
Inc. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1 292, 1297 [“That figure may then be
increased or reduced by the application of a multiplier after the court has taken into consideration other factors concerning the lawsuit”], citing Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311,
321

– 324 ( Press ) ; see a lso Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242 [“ t he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement for exceptional skill, novelty of the questions involved, or other fact ors. Rather, applying a multiplier
is discretion ary.”].) The Supreme Court has “set forth a number of8

factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure.
These include: ‘(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and t he skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the ex tent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and
the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.’ ” ( Press,

supra, at p. 322, fn. 12 , italics omitted .) Mikhaeilpoor argues that the trial court’s ruling must be reversed because the court acted arbitrarily and failed to utilize the lodestar adjus tment method to calculate reasonable attorney fee s. The record belies this assertion. In finding that $95,900 was the reasonable amount of attorney fees in this case, the trial court expressly invoked the lodestar method. Despite the trial court’s clarit y, Mikhaeilpoor mischaracterizes the analysis the court employed in order to create
the illusion of error where there is none. Mikhaeilpoor claims that the trial court improperly applied
“across

- the

- board” percentage reductions in the fees claimed
because it found that only 274 of plaintiff ’s claimed 59 5 hours
of work were reasonably incurred and that a reasonable hourly

rate for these reduced hours was $350 per hour. But the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision,
does n ot show that the court made any “across

- the

- board ” percentage reductions. Thus, plaintiff ’s reliance on the decision
in Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88 ( Kerkeles )
and Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
266 ( Mo untjoy ) is misplaced.
Kerkeles concerned an appe al from an order awarding a plaintiff a fraction of the fees he requested following the settlement of his civil rights case. (See Kerkeles

, supra , 243 Cal.App.4th at

p. 92.) The plaintiff filed a motion se eking $1,448,397 in fees and9

$75,255 in costs und er section 1988 of title 42 of the United States
Code and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. ( Kerkeles

, supra , at p. 94.) This figure was based on 2,419.9 in attorney hours, with billable rates rangin g from $425 to $650 per hour. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amo unt . ( Ibid. )
The total amount requested was $2,350,848. ( Ibid .) In response, defense counsel urged “a 50 percent reduction of the total lodestar

amount .” ( Id. at pp. 95

– 96.) The trial court calculat ed the lodestar amount by multiplying the hourly rates by the full number of hours claimed, reaching a total of $873,615. The court then reduced the total lodestar by 50 percent, yielding $436,807.50 in att orney fees. ( Id. at p. 97.) In reversing, the a ppellate court deemed inadequate the
trial court’s explanation for its fee reduction. ( Kerkeles

, supra , 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101

– 102.) The Court of Appeal noted that while trial courts may make “ ‘ across

- the

- board percentage cuts
either in the number o f hours claim ed or in the final lodestar figure, ’ ” they must set forth a “ ‘ concise but clear’ explanation of reasons for choosing a given percentage reduction. ” ( Id. at p. 10 2 .)
In lieu of that, the tria l court in Kerkeles had simply explained that
the plaintiff ’ s attorneys “expended far more time than a reasonable attorney could ever bill a paying client for.” ( Id. at p. 101. ) Such reasoning d id “ not meet the federal criterion of a clear and specific explanation sufficient for meaningful appellate r eview.” ( Id. at

p. 104.) Similarly, in Mountjoy, the trial court awarded $59,334.60 in fees after the moving party sought $308,425, based on 760.70 hours of work billed at hourly rates ranging from $ 200 to $ 450 . ( Mountjoy,

supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 26 9.) In reducing the fees sought,
the trial court explained: “ ‘ Approximately half of [the Mountjoys ’ ] pleading [s] amounted to unnecessary general legal argument warranting a reduction in the time it took t o prepare that filing.10

Approximately half of [th e] “ facts ” [the Mountjoys] crafted in [o] pposition to the summary judgment motion . . . were improper. Perhaps most critically, well over 70 % of the billing entries fall
into one or more of the following cat egories: prohibitively vague

“ block billing, ” ex cessive time spent on the stated task (including
but not limited to drafting the complaint and opposition to summary judgment motion and document review tasks discussed above), double billing where two attor neys completed the same task, attorney fees for n on

- attorney work, fees for filings that did not actually occur in this case, and fees for otherwise unreasonable
tasks. [¶] In light of the foregoing and the other various reasons
stated in [d] efendants’ [ o] pposition, the [c] ourt in its discretion
reduce s [the Mountjoys’] requested “ hours worked ” by 7 0%

. . . to a more reasonable total of 228.21. ’ ” ( Id. at pp. 270

– 271.) The Court of Appeal reversed, explaining that the trial

court “determined that becaus e well over 70 percent of the billing
entries suf

fered from one or more flaws, it was appropriate to simply reduce the total hours claimed by 70 percent.” ( Mountjoy

, supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) This approach was flawed because there did not appear to be any “reasonable basis for the
conclusion t hat the total hours included in the 70 percent

- plus time entries that were flawed in one or more ways was even reasonably
close to 70 percent of the total time claimed.” ( Ibid. ) For example,
the flawed tim e entries may have only amounted to 50 percent
of the total hours claimed; it was unclear whether the number
of flawed billing entries were equivalent to the number of flawed hours. ( Ibid. )
In contrast to Kerkeles and Mountjoy, the court here did not mak e an “across

- the

- board” percentage reduction of t he attorney fees claimed. Rather, the court explained that its reduction resulted because the fees claimed “include[ed] dual billing of attorneys when the work of only one (at times) was reasonably11

required ” and trial counsel spent time on tasks that “sho uld

not have required anything more than [a] slight factual
modification to [an] existing boilerplate.” Plaintiff ’s counsel
spent an unreasonably excessive amount of time dealing with
this non

- complex case . Thus, the trial court did not apply an arbitra ry percentage (as in Kerkeles) or use flawed logic (as
in Mountjoy). To the contrary, the court “went through the
bill” multiple times and “decided what [it] felt was a reasonable

amount of hours for a reas onably experienced attorney

, in similar
circumsta nces , to do the tasks that they claim to have done

. . . . [I]t added up to 225 hours.” Dissatisfied with this explanation, Mikhaeilpoor questions how the trial court decided on the billing entries subject t o reduction. Plaintiff would impose on the trial court the requirement of detailed explanatory orders. But this very

same argument was rejected in Mountjoy, where the plaintiff faulted the court’s explanation of its fee reduction because it

“ ‘ did not br eak out how many hours it thought were devoted

to double billing the same tasks, work on non

- attorney tasks, excessive billing for working on the complaint or summary judgment opposition, or work on documents that were not filed. ’ ” ( Mountjoy, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 280

. ) Mikhaeilpoor also relies on Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9 th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106 ( Moreno ) to support her claim that the trial court inadequately explained “which tasks were cut

or reduced and why.” Moreno , however, is not bi nding on this

c ourt and it is distinguishable. ( Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship Management Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451 [indicating that federal decisions are persuasive rather than binding authority]. ) In Moreno, the plaintiff prevailed in a federa l
civil rights action and the district court impo sed percentage reductions on plaintiff ’s requested fees . ( Moreno, supra , 534 F.3d12

at pp. 1112

- 1116.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The federal district court did not identify those fees it thought duplicative or why it cut the costs clai med for trial preparation. ( Ibid.) But Moreno is not based on principles applied in California,
where trial courts are not required to state “each charge they find

to be reasonable or unreasonable, necessa ry or unnecessary

. . . . A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation
that an attorney over [

- ] litigated a case.” ( Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal

. App.4th 44, 101; see also Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [“T he superior court was

not required to issue a sta tement of decision with regard to the fee award.”]

. ) This view was recently reaffirmed in Morris v. Hyundai
Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 37

, footnote 6 ( Morris ),
where the c ourt explained that su ch a heightened standard of requiring courts to e xplain fee determinations is not appropriate “for appellate review of fee awards under the Song

- Beverly Act.” ( Ibid .) Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court improperly tied the fee award to plaintiff ’s modest amount of recovered damages. But the
trial cour t disclaimed tying the amount of fees to the damages and the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, does not show that the court tied “the fee award to some proportion” of the damages award. ( Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (201 8)
30 Cal.App.5th 24, 37 ( Warren ).)

“ [ I ] t is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion
to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing [ buyer’s ] damages or recovery in a Song

- Be verly Act action, or pursuant to another consumer protection statute with a mandator y fee

- shifting provision.” ( Warren

, supra , 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37 .) If
the reasons for the reduction “include tying the fee award to some proportion of the buyer’s damag es recover y , the court abuses its discretion.” ( Ibid. ) But the two cases plaintiff invokes, Graciano

,13

supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p age 140 and Warren

, supra , 30 Cal.App.5th at p age 37, help demonstrate that the court
here committed no error.
Graciano conce rned a plaintiff ’s appeal from an order awarding her attorney fees following her post

- verdict settlement with the defendant. ( Graciano

, supra , 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.)
The trial court awarded $27,570 ; $235,000 in fees had been requested. ( Ibid. ) The trial court set the reasonable hourly rate

at $2 50 per hour, which was based on a local rule setting hourly rates for expert witnesses, and applied that rate to the 367.6 hours of legal services expended by the plaintiff ’s attorneys. ( Id. at

p. 148.) A fter calculating the lodestar at $91,900, the cou rt applied several multipliers, including a .3 negative multiplier “ ‘ “ to ensure the fee awarded is within the range of fees freely negotiated in
the legal market place. ” ’ ” ( Ibid. ) As relevant here, the trial court explicitly tied its fee award to the plaintiff ’s damages recovery, reasoning: “ ‘ [T]he settlement amount for the [p] laintiff was $45,000 plus whatever fees, if any, the court might award. It is

not uncommon for contingent fee agreements to require [p] laintiff

to pay forty percent (more or less) of the recovery through trial

to his/her counsel. If $45,000 represents [p] laintiff ’s sixty percent portion of the total settlement, then the forty percent fee portion,
would be $30,000 ($75,000 x

. 40). In order to adjust the lodestar amount of $ 91,900 “ to ensure the fee awarded is within the range
of fees freely negotiated in the legal market place[, ” ] a “ .30 ” factor should be applied. $91,900 times 3 yields $27,570, which amount
is within the mar ket place range of fees. ’ ” ( Id . at p. 162.) Un der this rationale, the Court of Appeal perceived an improper downward adjustment based on the trial court’s notion of an appropriate contingent fee percentage. ( Id. at p. 164.)
In Warren , the trial court a pplied a 33 percent negative multiplier to plaint iff ’s requested lodestar fees. ( Warren

, supra ,14

30 Cal.App.5th at p. 24.) The court noted “ ‘ a disconnect’ between the verdict amount of ‘$17,000’ and the over $500,000 in requested attorney fees.” ( Id

. a t p. 33 .) The appellate court concluded that
the negative multiplier was applied “with at least the partial goal
of arriving at an attorney fee award that was roughly proportional
to or more in line with [the plaintiff ’s ] modest $17,455.57 damages
award. ” ( Id. at p. 39. ) Here by contrast, the trial co urt did not expressly or implicitly base any portion of its fee calculation on plaintiff ’s damage recovery. Unlike the situation in Graciano , the trial court here did not calculate the amount of fees using a methodology that ensured the fee and damages a wards were proportional; accorded with a
market

- rate contingency agreement, or created a relationship to the damages awarded. Instead, the trial court “went through the bill
and [it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney

, in similar circumstances, to do the tasks that [plaintiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done

. . . . [I ] t added up to 225 hours.”
Warren is similarly distinguishable. Here, unlike in Warren,
the trial court was concerned because th e $344,639 was shockingly unreasonable, irrespective of the damages awarded. And, of course, the court here unequivocally disclaimed tying the fee award to the verdict amount because it “recognize [ d ] that e ven though [the recovery] was [$] 17,000 doubled t o 34, this could justify a large attorney fee award.” Also, instructive here is Morris, supra , 41 Cal.App.5th at

p age 24, where the c ourt affirmed an order reducing request e d
fees by more than 40 percent in a Song

- Beverly Act case. In Morris, the trial co urt reduced plaintiff ’s requested fees by

42 percent

— from $191,688.75 to $73,864. On appeal, plaintiff argued

— as Mikhaeilpoor does here

— that the “trial court engaged in a prohibited proportionality analysi s in setting the attorney fee15

award.” ( Id. at p. 35.) To support that claim, the plaintiff relied

on selective portions of the hearing transcript where the trial judge stated, “ ‘S o this is [a request for] $192,000 for a case that

you settled for $85,000 and didn’t go to trial. Don’t you think
that ju st on its face, that’s a little much. ’ ” ( Ibid. ) According to
the plaintiff, the trial court “slashed the requested award by more
than 42 percent, to $73,864 , t o render the award ‘more in proportion
to the $85,000 damages.’ ” ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal disagreed, explaining that the trial

court “did not suggest in any respect that the court reduced the attorney fee award based on the size of the settlement award.” ( Morris

, supra , 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 37. ) To the contrary, the

court “indicated a fee re duction was warranted because it was unreasonable to have so many lawyers staffing a [Song

- Beverly Act] case that did not present complex or unique issues, did not involve discovery motions, and did not go t o trial.” ( Ibid. ) Here, as in Morris, there is no indication that the trial

court reduced fees based on the amount of damages awarded to plaintiff. Rather, the court said a reduction of the requested fees
was warranted because : P laintiff sought fees th at “include [ d ]
dual billing of attorneys when the work of only one (at times)

was reasonably required” ; her trial counsel spent time working on
tasks that “should not have required anything more than [a] slight
factual modification to [an] existing boilerp late” ; and

— overall

— an unreasonably excessive amou nt of time was spent on a noncomplex matter. Additionally, the trial court “went through the bill and [it] decided what [it] felt was a reasonable amount of hours for a reasonably experienced attorney

, in s imilar circumstances, to do
the tasks that [plain tiff ’s trial counsel] claim to have done.

. . . [I ] t added up to 225 hours.” The court did not engage in any proportionality analysis when it determined that $95,900 was
the reasonable amount of attorney f ees for the work performed.16

Mikhaeilpoor claims the trial court based its fee award on an improper impressionistic basis.
In Morris

, supra , 41 Cal.App.5th at page 37, the trial court stated during a fee motion hearing that the total proposed fee sought by the plaintiff was “ ‘ a little much’ considering the case settled for $85,000 and did not go to trial.” ( Ibid .) On appeal, plaintiff argued the court’s statement “betrayed that at least one
of the court’s intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it more in line with the settlement amount.” ( I bid. ) Morris rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that such trial court statements disclosed

an alternate, prohibited motive for reducing plaintiff ’s proposed
attorney fees. Morris contends that, as in Warre n , the trial court ’ s comments during the hearing

— suggesting that the total proposed
fee was “a little much” considering the case settled for $85,000
and did not go to trial

— betrayed that at least one of the court ’ s intentions in reducing the fee award was to bring it more in line
with the settlement amou nt. Given the court ’ s clear expression
in its final order of its reasons for the reductions, we will not speculate, based on a stray remark the court made at the hearing, that it had other, prohibited reaso ns that would require reversal. (See Key v. Tyle r (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 539, fn. 16 [holding
the court ’ s “oral comments were not final findings and cannot impeach the court ’ s subsequent written ruling”]; Jespersen v.
Zubiate

- Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal. App.4th 624, 633 [ “ a judge’s comments in oral arg ument may never be used to impeach the final order, however valuable to illustrate the court ’ s theory they might
be under some circumstances ” ].) Mikhaeilpoor contends that the trial court impermissibly
reduc ed fees below the level defendants proposed. Pla intiff argues “[a]ny objections to the fees and rates requested not made by BMW17

should have been deemed waived by the trial court.” This argument
is meritless. At the outset, defense counsel did not limit i ts request

to reduce p laintiff ’s request ed fees by only $83,206.05 as Mikhaeilpoor erroneously represents. Rather, defendants argued that plaintiff ’s fees should be reduced by at least $83,206.05. As such, Mikhaeilpoor’s argument that the trial court r educed her fees below the level defendants propos ed is based on a false premise. To support its position that the trial court cannot reduce fees
absent

— or below the non

- moving party’s specific objection, plaintiff
cites Blum v. Stenson (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 892, fn. 5, a federal

case concerning fees in a federal civil rights action. In Blum , the defendant waived its challenge to a district court determination
of reasonable hours billed by failing to submit any evidence challenging the accuracy and reasonabl eness of the hours charged. ( I bid .) In contrast to Blum , defendants here are not challenging the trial court’s decision but showing it was not an abuse of discretion. And defendants did not waive any challenge to the fee award. Rather, defendants chall enged fees in the trial court on grounds the
tria l court found applicable. The extent of a court’s discretion to unilaterally reduce
fees is also apparent in Morris. There, appellant argued that fees were arbitrarily reduced in those circumstances where p articular fee amounts claimed were not the subjec t of defense objections. ( Morris

, supra , 41 Cal.App.5th at p p . 38

– 39 .) Notwithstanding
this argument
, Morris was “satisfied that the trial court did not
abus e its broad discretion to determine the reasonab le value of
the professional services performed b y the [appellant’s] attorneys.” ( Id. at p. 40.) Mikhaeilpoor also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award a multiplier. The argument rests

on some of the same unmeritorious arguments advanced with18

regard to the trial court ’s reduced lodestar award. There was no
abuse of discretion.
While the court’s rationale for the lodestar reduction also influenced the denial of a multiplier, the court went further as to the multiplier i ssue, emphasizing that this was “not a complicate d

case ,” and the “request for a multiplier was specious.” These findings weigh on the issue of the “ ‘ novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, ’ ” which is a factor that trial courts may consider wh en a multiplier is requested. ( Press

, supra , 34 Cal.3d

at p. 322, fn. 12.) This factor is separate from the trial court’s finding that plaintiff ’s counsel litigated the case inefficiently. Moreover, even though the trial court did not specifically ment ion
other factors open to consideration when a mu ltiplier is under
consideration

, t his c ourt must presume that the trial court considered all factors in reach ing its decision, “even though the
court may not have mentioned or discussed them in its written

r uling.” ( Mountjoy

, supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Mikhaeilpoor argues that the attorney fee award is not supported by the evidence. This claim has no merit. The c ourt has no authority to disturb the tr ial court’s factual findings if they are

suppor ted by substantial evidence. ( Meister , supra, 67 Cal.App.4th
at p. 453.) Here, substantial evidence amply supports the trial

court ’ s fee award because the record demonstrates the relative simplicity of plaintiff ’s lawsuit and the inefficiency of her cou nsel’s litigation activities.
The case concerned the simple issue of a purported engine defect in plaintiff ’s vehicle that was

— in plaintiff ’s view

— not fixed after multiple attempts. To prevail, plaintiff ’s attorneys were only required to establish that their client purchased the vehicle, that
it had a written warranty, that the vehicle had a defect, and that
the vehicle was not repair ed or replaced after the manufacturer
had a reasonable opportunity to do so. (CACI No. 3201.) Plaintiff19

was under no ob ligation to establish the cause of the purported defect. ( Ibid

. ; see Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102, fn. 8 [rejecting manufacturer’s claim that plaintiff buyer was required to prove cause of leak to establish remedy under the Song

- Beverly Act].) What follows is t he trial court’s altogether warranted conclusion that this was a noncomplex
case. The record shows that Mi kha eilpoor filed one discovery
motion

, propounded a single set of discovery

, took three depositions (Jose Conde, defendants’ person most qualified; a nd Luis Holguin,
defendants’ expert), and retained the services of a single expert, Dan Calef. These were modest litigation efforts. Additionally, the record demonstrates the highly inefficient
manner in w hich plaintiff litigated her case. Plaintiff ’s trial counsel claims “extensive experience with claims brought under the Song

- Beverly [ Act ] .” Payam Shahian, the senior attorney among plaintiff ’s trial counsel, supervises the other attorneys in his firm, but does not “materially ” get involved “ unless t hey involve complex legal issues , reach significant stages of litigation, or require [ his ]
assistance.” (Italics added.) Shahian did not bill time to this case, confirming the case did not involve complex legal issues. Yet, despite counsel’s experience litigating “hundreds of automotive defect cases involving California’s consumer protection statutes, including Song

- Beverly ,” an astonishing array of 10 different attorneys litigated this case

, with multiple attorneys staffed at different times. Further, counsel’s billing entries demonstrate a
lack of efficiency in litigating the case and a lack of clarity in tasks performed. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that plaintiff ’s counsel failed to act efficiently. Similarly, plaintiff ’s lead counsel, Christine Haw, had experience with Song

- Beverly Act claims. Plaintiff sought hourly rates of $365 and $375 for Haw, but acknowledged that similar or more experienced attorneys had previously been a warded hourly20

billable rates of $345 and $350. A s such, the trial court’s award
of a $350 hourly billable rate is supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, at the time of the hearing on the fee motion, Haw
had been an attorney for approximately fi ve years and had litigated

“ hundred s of automotiv e defect cases involving [ the ] Song

- Beverly [ Act ] .” Notw i thstanding, the court reasonably found that Haw did not leverage her experience to produce efficient litigation. Haw personally billed more than 240 hours

, and required the help of
nine other attor neys at various points in the litigation. Ultimately, the trial court was in the best position to
evaluate the professional services rendered before it. ( Ketchum,

supra , 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132

. ) The court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. There was no abuse of discretion.21 DISPOSITION The order awarding fees is affirmed. Respondents are
awarded their costs on appeal.

WHITE, J. *
We concur.

ROTHSCHILD

, P. J.

CHANEY , J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.Filed 4/24/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LORIK MIKHAEILPOOR

,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al.

,

Defendants and Respondents

. B 293987

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC611197 )

CERTIFICATION AND ORDER FOR PUBLICATION

THE COURT:
The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on April 1,
2020 , was not certified for publication in the Of ficial Rep orts. For

goo d cause, it now appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

____________________________________________________________ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY , J. WHITE , J. *

* Judge of t he Los Angeles Superi or Court, a ssigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.