Filed 11/29/22 P. v. Mejia CA5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DANIEL MEJIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F081568

(Super. Ct. No. BF171504A)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M. 

McNamara, Judge.

Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. 

White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo-
2.

INTRODUCTION

On November 24, 2017, defendant Daniel Mejia, while driving under the influence 

of alcohol, collided into Juan R.’s1 white Jeep causing the deaths of both Karla M. and 

A.M., along with significant injuries to Z.M. Defendant was convicted of numerous 

counts arising from the collision. He was sentenced to a determinate term of seven years, 

with a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life. 

On appeal, Mejia contends (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting 

evidence of a prior car collision to establish knowledge pursuant to Evidence Code 

section 1101, subdivision (b); (2) this court should independently review the sealed 

Pitchess2 material regarding Officer N. Petty to determine whether discovery was 

properly disclosed; and (3) this case should be remanded for resentencing in light of the 

passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (Assembly Bill 518). The People concede Assembly 

Bill 518 applies retroactively to Mejia’s case and therefore this matter should be 

remanded for resentencing. 

We accept the People’s concession, vacate the sentence, and remand for 

resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgement. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 2, 2020, a jury convicted Mejia of the second degree murder of 

Karla M. (Pen. Code,3 § 187, subd. (a), count 1); the second degree murder of A.M. 

(§ 187, subd. (a), count 2); gross vehicular manslaughter of Karla M. (§ 191.5, subd. (a), 

count 3), with the special allegation that Mejia proximately caused the death and great 

bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558); gross vehicular 

1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their 

first names or initials. No disrespect is intended.

2 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

3 All other references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated. 
3.

manslaughter of A.M. (§ 191.5, subd. (a), count 4), with the special allegation that Mejia 

caused death and great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558); 

driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury to Z.M. (Veh. Code, 

§ 23153, subd. (a), count 5), with the special allegations Mejia caused death and great 

bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), Mejia caused great bodily 

injury to both A.M. and Z.M. (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (d)), and Mejia’s blood alcohol 

content exceeded .15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578); driving under the influence of 

alcohol with a .08 percent blood alcohol content causing bodily injury to Z.M. (Veh. 

Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 6) with the special allegations Mejia proximately caused 

death to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), Mejia caused great bodily injury to 

both A.M. and Z.M. (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (d)), and Mejia’s blood alcohol content 

exceeded .15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578). 

Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mejia as to count 1 to an indeterminate 

term of 15 years to life. As to count 2, the trial court sentenced Mejia to an indeterminate 

term of 15 years to life, to run concurrent with count 1. As to count 5, the trial court 

sentenced Mejia to the middle term of two years, plus an additional five years for the 

great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)), for a total of seven years to be 

served consecutive to count 1.4 As to counts 3, 4, and 6, the trial court sentenced Mejia 

to multiple middle terms and imposed sentences for several enhancements and 

allegations, but stayed these sentences pursuant to section 654. The total term imposed 

was 15 years to life, plus seven years. 

4 The trial court stayed the other enhancements and allegations in count 5 pursuant 

to section 654. 
4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Prosecution Case-In-Chief

A. Juan R.’s Testimony

During the afternoon of November 24, 2017, Juan drove a white Jeep Cherokee 

southbound on Highway 99 with his wife, Karla M., and his five-year old son, A.M. and 

three-year old daughter, Z.M. During this time, Juan pulled over with a flat tire on the 

left side of the highway. Juan turned on the Jeep’s hazard lights and stepped out of the 

vehicle to repair the flat tire, while Karla, A.M., and Z.M. remained inside. As Juan fixed 

the tire, a black Silverado truck hit the parked Jeep from behind causing it to catch fire. 

Juan ran over to the Jeep to try and help his family. 

Subsequently, Karla and Z.M. were taken to the hospital. Z.M. suffered a 

fractured hip and injuries to her left and right leg. A.M. also suffered injuries, but died en 

route to the hospital. Karla was transported to the hospital with internal injuries, and

eventually died at the hospital. 

B. Percipient Witnesses

5

Jaime R. drove southbound on Highway 99 when he observed a black truck6

speeding close to 80 miles per hour, swerving in and out of two lanes, and driving in the 

dirt next to the road. He noticed the truck’s driver was a Hispanic male with short hair. 

Jaime eventually called 911. 

Joshua M. drove southbound on Highway 99 when he observed a “truck that was 

cutting other cars off, driving on both lanes in the middle, and also swerving.” Joshua 

estimated the driver was traveling 100 miles per hour and he observed the truck almost 

collide with two or more other vehicles. Hortencia S., Joshua’s wife, was a passenger in 

5

In their case-in-chief, the People introduced eight 911 calls made during or 

immediately after the collision. 

6

Jaime testified the truck was either a Silverado or a Ram. 
5.

the vehicle when she saw a black truck driving on the frontage road of the highway at a 

“very, very fast speed - - very alarming, fast speed.” She called 911 and observed the 

truck for approximately one-minute. 

Crystal B. drove southbound on Highway 99 when she observed a black truck pull 

in front of her and press its brakes causing her to almost hit the truck from behind. The 

driver then got out of the truck and Crystal’s sister said, “Go. He’s drunk.” The driver 

“stumbled out of the truck” and “when he started walking towards [Crystal’s] car [,] ... 

he started leaning on the side of his truck to kind of hold on.” At this point, Crystal 

called 911. 

Emily H. was a passenger in a vehicle traveling southbound on Highway 99 when 

she heard her mom say there was a truck driving really fast from behind. She called 911 

after observing the truck driving back and forth and “going super, super fast.” 

Tana C. drove southbound on Highway 99 when she observed a black pickup 

truck drive up behind her and almost hit her vehicle. She described the pickup’s driving 

as “[v]ery reckless” and observed the truck “go[] from a lane all the way across, all the 

way back.” Within two or three minutes, Tana saw a “cloud of smoke, and [they] came 

up on the accident.” She observed the collision scene and observed a vehicle flipped over 

and on fire. 

Jason S. drove northbound on Highway 99 when his wife spotted an accident on 

the southbound side of the highway. He ended up pulling over to render assistance and 

observed a white vehicle on its side. Jason noticed a female stuck inside the driver’s area 

of the vehicle. Two men eventually pulled the female out of the vehicle. Additionally, 

six or seven other people attempted to help a “little girl” get out of the vehicle. Jason 

then found a boy and offered assistance by performing “mouth-to-mouth” on the child. 

Rosa Z. was traveling southbound on Highway 99 when her vehicle was “almost 

driven off the road by a truck.” The truck was going very fast and swerving between the 
6.

lanes. Rosa called 911 because the driver “was driving so fast and so crazy ... that [she] 

felt like he was going to hit somebody.” 

Sergeant J. Coleman testified he is employed with the Kern County Sheriff’s 

Office. Sergeant Coleman was off duty traveling southbound on Highway 99 when he 

observed a white Jeep flip over on the center divider. He then observed a male subject 

chasing the Jeep. At this point, Sergeant Coleman got out of the car and attempted to 

help the passengers inside the Jeep. He and several other bystanders stabilized the Jeep 

to allow others to pull out the occupants of the Jeep. The woman and child were 

eventually pulled out of the Jeep. 

Subsequently, Sergeant Coleman located a black Chevrolet or GMC truck further 

south on the highway and observed Mejia inside the truck. Sergeant Coleman contacted 

Mejia and noticed he had red, watery eyes and his breath smelled of an alcoholic 

beverage. Moreover, Sergeant Coleman noticed several beer bottles in the back of the 

truck and one or two beer bottles inside the truck’s cabin. 

C. Subsequent Emergency Response

Paramedic Jamie S. testified she was dispatched at approximately 4:16 p.m. to a 

traffic collision on Highway 99. Jamie arrived on scene and CPR was performed on a 

five-year-old boy, later identified as A.M. A.M. was declared dead at the scene of the 

collision due to a broken neck. Moreover, CPR was performed on an unconscious 23-

year-old female, later identified as Karla. Lastly, she noticed a little girl, later identified 

as Z.M., who had an injury to her leg. Critical Care paramedic Jeffrey G. treated Z.M. 

and loaded her onto the ambulance. He noticed a laceration on Z.M.’s left foot and above 

her right eye. At this point, Z.M. was transported to the hospital. Z.M. suffered a 

thighbone fracture and a laceration to her left foot. 

Jamie also called in a medical evacuation helicopter. Subsequently, part-time 

flight paramedic Nathan K. was dispatched to the intersection of Highway 99 and State 

Route 119 regarding a traffic collision. The helicopter flew over the scene and Nathan 
7.

noticed major damage to the white Jeep. Nathan unloaded Karla from the ambulance and 

loaded her onto the helicopter. Karla was transported via helicopter to the hospital and 

was subsequently treated by the hospital staff. However, Karla was pronounced dead at 

the hospital due to blunt injuries. 

D. Subsequent Law Enforcement Investigation

Officer M. Askins is employed as an officer with the California Highway Patrol 

(CHP). On November 24, 2017, he was monitoring radio traffic when a call came in 

regarding a black Chevrolet Silverado driving recklessly all over the road. He then

observed a white Jeep on its side and on fire. Officer Askins noticed A.M. laying on the 

highway and proceeded to assist him. Eventually, the fire department and medical 

personnel arrived on scene to take over A.M.’s care. Officer Askins then looked inside 

Mejia’s vehicle and observed empty and full beer bottles. During an inventory search, 

officers located three full and two empty beer bottles inside the truck’s cab and a beer 

container and more beer bottles in the truck’s bed. 

CHP Officer C. Peyton subsequently arrived on scene to assist with a sketch 

diagram and measurements of the collision scene. The sketch showed Mejia’s vehicle 

strike Juan’s stationary vehicle, which was stopped within the center median. Mejia was 

traveling between 94 and 98 miles per hour and the accelerator was depressed all the way 

to the floor immediately before the collision. 

Officer Askins then contacted CHP Officer N. Petty who had Mejia seated to the 

left of his truck on the ground. Officer Askins contacted Mejia and noticed slurred 

speech, red, watery eyes, and a distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from his 

breath. Mejia stated he was driving southbound on Highway 99 when he fell asleep. At 

this point, Officer Askins asked Mejia pre-sobriety test questions and Mejia admitted to 

drinking two beers before driving. Additionally, Officer Askins had Mejia perform field 

sobriety tests, which included the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer Askins noticed 

a lack of smooth pursuit in each eye, which indicated intoxication. He did not have Mejia 
8.

perform any other field sobriety tests because Mejia complained of leg pain. Officer 

Askins opined Mejia was unable to safely operate a vehicle due to his intoxication. 

Officer Askins then placed Mejia under arrest and transported him to a hospital for 

a blood draw. He observed a nurse extract Mejia’s blood at 6:53 p.m. Subsequently, 

forensic lab technician Mahlea A. analyzed the blood and determined the blood alcohol 

content was .251 percent. Criminalist D. Zimmerman testified an individual with a blood 

alcohol content of .251 percent is impaired and cannot safely operate a motor vehicle. 

E. Evidence of Mejia’s Prior “Knowledge” Regarding the Dangers of 

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

Department of Motor Vehicles Investigator Robert V. testified Mejia filled out a 

driver’s license application, which contained certain advisements. The first advisement 

indicated Mejia “agree[d] to submit to a chemical test of [his] blood, breath, or urine for 

the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of [his] blood.” The second 

advisement stated:

“[B]eing under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both impairs the ability 

to safely operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to 

human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or both. If [he] 

drive[s] while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or both, and as a 

result, a person is killed, [he] can be charged with murder.” 

L.B. testified she previously dated Mejia and was aware he drove a black 

Chevrolet truck. She told Mejia more than once “not to drink so much and not to - - like, 

not to drink and drive because it was ... not safe.” Mejia acknowledged to L.B. it was 

dangerous to drink and drive. 

Veronica Q. testified that on February 6, 2017, she was asleep at home when she 

heard a loud crash outside. She ran outside and noticed a gray truck in the middle of her 

front yard. Veronica noticed her vehicle had been hit causing significant damage. She 

ended up calling the police. Officer R. Williamson with the Redlands Police Department 

arrived on scene and discovered the gray truck was registered to Mejia. On that same 
9.

night, Officer Williamson contacted Mejia who was intoxicated. Mejia stated he was a 

passenger in the truck when it struck Veronica’s vehicle. 

DISCUSSION

I. The February 6, 2017 Collision

On appeal, Mejia contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 

February 6, 2017 car collision where he was only a passenger in the vehicle because it 

was impermissible propensity evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (b). In the alternative, Mejia argues section 352 required exclusion of 

evidence of the collision and that this evidence violated his constitutional rights to due 

process and a fair trial. We disagree. 

A. Additional Factual Background

The People during motions in limine moved to admit evidence of a prior collision 

that took place in Redlands on February 6, 2017. Specifically, the People moved to admit 

evidence Mejia’s vehicle was involved in a hit and run collision and that he was 

intoxicated during his contact with law enforcement. The People asked to call Veronica 

and Officer Williamson to testify to this incident. The People argued the evidence was 

admissible to establish knowledge pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 

(b) because “[c]learly this incident showed [Mejia] how dangerous it is to drive while 

intoxicated ... [and] [t]his incident illustrates [Mejia] personally was made aware that 

driving under the influence is dangerous whether he was the driver or not.” Trial counsel 

objected stating:

“The fact that [defendant] may have been involved in a hit-and-run, 

may have made a false statement wouldn’t be evidence that he knows that 

drinking and driving is a dangerous offense. So I don’t - - I don’t 

understand that argument. I don’t think that argument applies to this case. 

This case is distinguished where he allegedly hit a parked car and then left 

the scene and reported his vehicle stolen. That seems to be - - to me, that 

would be a confusing issue for the jury, wouldn’t help them reach a 
10.

decision as to his state of mind, whether or not he’s guilty or innocent in 

this matter. I would request that it be excluded.” 

The trial court requested the parties provide additional cases on the issue, subsequently 

reviewed these cases, and concluded:

“The Court did read these cases. It focused very much on the facts 

of these cases and applied it to the facts related to uncharged acts here. It’s 

uncharged ‘act’ here. The Court rules as follows: The 1101 (b) motion 

requested by the prosecution lists one uncharged act where the defendant’s 

car struck a parked BMW in a residential neighborhood. The defendant 

was intoxicated when contacted by police. The defendant was not charged 

in this case. The defendant did falsify a police report that the car was 

stolen. He later admitted that he was in the vehicle. The prosecution 

requests to use this evidence to prove intent and knowledge in this case. 

The relevance depends in part on whether the fact is sufficiently similar to 

the current charges to support a rational inference of intent and/or 

knowledge. The least degree of similarity between the uncharged act and 

the charged offense is required in order to prove intent. In order to be 

admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently 

similar to support the inference that the defendant probably harbored the 

same intent in each instance.

“Given the fact, scenarios presented by the prosecution in their trial 

brief and information supplied in argument and the law stated above, the 

Court will only consider the prosecution’s request under knowledge for 

1101 (b) purposes. The fact that no case was filed against the defendant 

and the driver of the vehicle is undetermined, the Court did not find the 

uncharged act sufficiently similar to perceive as to intent. A second 

consideration is the probative value of the evidence of [defendant’s] 

uncharged act against the potential for prejudice resulting from his 

improper use by the jury. The evidence to be presented is not particularly 

inflammatory and does not contain highly prejudicial details. Indeed, it 

does little more than show the occurrence of a previous accident. 

Therefore, probative value of this knowledge is high and outweighs the 

prejudicial effect. The Court finds the testimony involved in the uncharged 

act will not take up a substantial consumption of time given the length of 

the trial. Moreover, jury confusion is unlikely because the Court will 

provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

“[¶] ... [¶]
11.

“Here, the probative value outweighs the substantial danger of undue 

prejudice. After weighing these factors, the Court will admit the evidence 

of the uncharged act. Here, the Court finds the facts of the uncharged act 

can impugn knowledge of the defendant as an occupant in a vehicle that 

driving a vehicle recklessly can cause injury or property damage.” 

Immediately after Veronica and Officer Williamson’s testimony, the trial court 

instructed the jury as follows: 

“Ladies and gentlemen, I’ll take a moment to explain the context of 

that evidence you heard, just the last two witnesses. I’ll read it to you.

“Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the 

defendant has been previously contacted by law enforcement while he was 

a passenger in his own car which caused vehicle damage to another vehicle. 

Such evidence, if believed, is not received and may not be considered by 

you to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a 

disposition to commit crimes. Such evidence is received and may be 

considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to 

show that the defendant’s previous contact with police can impugn 

knowledge on the defendant as an occupant in a vehicle involved in an 

accident that driving a vehicle recklessly can cause injury or property 

damage. This is relevant as to whether or not the defendant acted with 

gross negligence in Counts 3 and 4. For the limited purpose for which you 

may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you 

do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider such 

evidence for any other purpose. I’ll instruct you further on this issue after 

evidence has concluded.” 

After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that “[d]uring the trial, 

certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may consider that evidence 

only for that purpose and for no other.” (CALCRIM No. 303.) Moreover, the trial court 

instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 375 as follows:

“The People presented evidence that the defendant has been 

previously contacted by law enforcement while he was a passenger in his 

own car which caused vehicle damage to another vehicle. You may 

consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the defendant, in fact, had been previously contacted by 

law enforcement while he was a passenger in his own vehicle which caused 

vehicle damage to another vehicle. Proof by a preponderance of the 

evidence is a different burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable 
12.

doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude 

that it’s more likely than not that the fact is true. If the People have not met 

this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely. If you decide that 

the defendant was previously contacted by law enforcement while he was a 

passenger in his own vehicle which caused vehicle damage to another 

vehicle, but are not required to - - you may, but are not required to, consider 

that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether this incident can 

impugn knowledge on the defendant as an occupant in a vehicle involved in 

an accident, that driving a vehicle recklessly can cause injury or property 

damage. Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. Do not 

conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is 

disposed to commit crime.

“If you conclude that the defendant’s previous contact with police 

can impugn knowledge on the defendant as an occupant in a vehicle 

involved in an accident that driving a vehicle recklessly can cause injury or 

property damage, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with 

all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the 

defendant is guilty of Counts 3 and 4 and any lesser charges associated with 

these counts. The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” 

B. Applicable Law

The general rule is “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her 

character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of 

specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her 

conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a); see People v. Ewoldt

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393.) However, under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 

(b), “evidence that a defendant has committed an offense ... may be received to establish, 

among other things, identity, intent, motive, ... plan,” or knowledge. (People v. Bradford

(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1316.) 

This court reviews questions concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.) This includes a trial 

court’s decision to admit “other crimes” evidence pursuant to section 1101, subdivision 

(b). (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 587 [“We review the trial court’s ruling on 

the admissibility of other crimes evidence for abuse of discretion”].) Our review 
13.

examines “the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” (People v. 

Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 711.) We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent a 

showing the court “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Morales

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 97 (Morales), quoting People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-

10.) 

In People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, our Supreme Court held that murder 

charges may arise out of vehicle accidents where the evidence reveals implied malice 

when “a person, knowing that his conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless acts 

deliberately with conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at p. 296.) “[A] finding of implied 

malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk

involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Id. at pp. 296-297.)

However, unlike second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while 

intoxicated is defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice 

aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 

23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate 

result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross 

negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce 

death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (§ 191.5, subd. (a).) 

“ ‘[G]ross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a 

presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. [Citation.] The test is 

objective: whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been 

aware of the risk involved.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (Ochoa).)

In Ochoa, the prosecutor sought to present evidence of the defendant’s prior 

conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, his resulting probation, and the fact 

he attended traffic school, including a class specifically addressing the dangers of 

drinking and driving. (Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1204-1205.) The trial court 
14.

admitted the evidence finding it was relevant to demonstrate the defendant was aware of 

the dangers of drinking and driving. (Id. at p. 1205.) The defendant argued that because 

the test for gross negligence is an objective one, based on an inquiry as to whether a 

reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been aware of the risks, 

evidence relevant to the defendant’s subjective state of mind was both irrelevant and 

unduly prejudicial. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court disagreed and stated, “[A]lthough the test 

for gross negligence [is] an objective one, ‘[t]he jury should therefore consider all 

relevant circumstances ... to determine if the defendant acted with a conscious disregard 

of the consequences rather than with mere inadvertence. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] [T]he 

evidence at issue here was relevant to defendant’s awareness of the risk, and was 

admissible on that basis.” (Id. at pp. 1205-1206, italics in original.) The trier of fact may 

conclude from a defendant’s “course of conduct and preexisting knowledge of the risks 

that he exercised so slight a degree of care as to exhibit a conscious indifference or ‘I 

don’t care attitude’ concerning the ultimate consequences of his actions. Applying the 

objective test for gross negligence, any reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position 

would have been aware of the risks presented by his [or her] conduct. [Citation.] ... 

‘[T]he finding of gross negligence ... may be based on the overall circumstances 

surrounding the fatality.’ ” (Id. at p. 1208, italics omitted.)

Moreover, in People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104 (Ortiz), a jury found the 

defendant guilty of second degree murder after several witnesses reported seeing the 

defendant driving in an aggressive and reckless manner immediately preceding the crash. 

(Id. at pp. 107-108.) The defendant was not intoxicated. (Id. at p. 108.) Nevertheless, 

the prosecution argued the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (b), to prove the defendant’s knowledge of the dangers posed by reckless 

driving. (Id. at pp. 111-112.) On appeal, the defendant claimed the evidence was 

inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). (Id. at p. 112.) 
15.

The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the evidence because “courts have recognized repeatedly that a motor vehicle 

driver’s previous encounters with the consequences of recklessness on the highway ... 

sensitizes him to the dangerousness of such life-threatening conduct.” (Ortiz, supra, 109 

Cal.App.4th at p. 112.) Moreover, the court stated for the “purposes underlying the 

admissibility issue under section 1101(b), it does not matter whether alcohol or other 

inebriates are involved in the uncharged misconduct or whether it is caused by something 

else.” (Id. at p. 116, italics added.) 

C. Analysis

i. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

Here, the trial court admitted evidence of the February 6, 2017 car collision 

because “the facts of the uncharged act can impugn knowledge of the defendant as an 

occupant in a vehicle that driving a vehicle recklessly can cause injury or property 

damage.” Therefore, the trial court concluded this evidence was admissible to establish 

knowledge pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the February 6, 

2017 collision. Mejia’s presence in his registered vehicle during the collision, even as a 

passenger, established his “preexisting knowledge of the risks that he exercised so slight 

a degree of care as to exhibit a conscious indifference or ‘I don’t care attitude’ 

concerning the ultimate consequences of his actions.” (Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 

1208.) Moreover, the trial court could have concluded the prior collision “ ‘increase[d] 

[his] subjective awareness of the perils of driving badly’ ” and the court had “ ‘to find out 

what he was exposed to that most people aren’t exposed to in order to understand his 

level of awareness of the dangers of driving badly.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 116.) As the trial court stated on the record, “[T]he uncharged act can impugn 

knowledge of the defendant as an occupant in a vehicle that driving a vehicle recklessly 

can cause injury or property damage.” This prior knowledge of reckless driving would 
16.

support a finding Mejia acted grossly negligent for the crimes of gross vehicular 

manslaughter, as alleged in counts 3 and 4. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by allowing the prior car collision into evidence for purposes of 

establishing prior knowledge pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). 

(See People v. Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 587.)

Nonetheless, Mejia argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the 

collision because “[i]n the prior incident, [Mejia] was merely an intoxicated passenger in 

a car that hit a parked vehicle, and there was no evidence presented that [Mejia] had been 

the driver of that vehicle, or that the driver had been driving recklessly, or that [Mejia] 

had any knowledge that the driver had been driving recklessly.” The collision evidence 

was still relevant even though Mejia was not the driver. Veronica testified she was asleep 

at home when she heard a loud crash outside and subsequently noticed a gray truck, 

registered to Mejia, in the middle of her lawn in the front yard. Although there was no 

evidence regarding the vehicle’s driving pattern or its speed, it was reasonable to infer the 

vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed based on it crashing into the front yard of a 

residence, along with the fact Veronica heard a loud crash outside her house late at night. 

Therefore, as noted above, Mejia’s presence even as a passenger “increase[d] [his] 

subjective awareness of the perils of driving badly and speeding.” (Ortiz, supra, 109 

Cal.App.4th at p. 116, italics omitted.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior collision pursuant to Evidence 

Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The record indicates the trial court considered this 

2017 collision evidence for that limited purpose and thus, the trial court’s ruling was not 

arbitrary, and Mejia points to nothing in the record to suggest manifest injustice arose 

from its decision. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97.) 
17.

ii. Evidence Code Section 352

Mejia further contends the collision evidence should be excluded pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 352 because “[t]he prejudicial effect of prior ‘bad acts’ evidence 

clearly outweighed its probative value.” 

“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 

issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “ ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to 

prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case. The stronger the evidence, 

the more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice” referred to in Evidence Code section 352 

applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the 

defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying 

section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.” ’ ” (People v. Karis

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, italics added.)

Here, Ortiz is again instructive. The Ortiz court noted minimal potential for 

prejudice existed because evidence of the prior acts were “ ‘no stronger and no more 

inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 109 

Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) Moreover, the court concluded the trial court properly conducted 

an Evidence Code section 352 analysis because it “neither granted nor rejected admission 

of the proffered evidence in toto,” but “[i]nstead, [the trial court] ruled some of the 

People’s evidence admissible and some inadmissible.” (Id. at p. 117.) Finally, the trial 

court instructed the jury it could only consider evidence of prior misconduct for the 

limited purpose of evaluating the defendant’s intent. (Id. at p. 118.) 

The trial court in this case conducted a 352 analysis and admitted the evidence 

because “[t]he evidence to be presented is not particularly inflammatory and does not 

contain highly prejudicial details” and “it does little more than show the occurrence of a 

previous accident.” The risk of prejudice was low because the facts of this case involved 
18.

a DUI crash with two fatalities and serious injuries, whereas the prior 2017 collision 

involved only property damage. (See Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) 

Additionally, the trial court “neither granted nor rejected admission of the proffered 

evidence in toto” because it admitted the evidence for purposes of establishing 

knowledge, but excluded the evidence to prove intent. (Id. at p. 117.) Lastly, the trial 

court instructed the jury, both before Veronica’s and Officer Williamson’s testimony and 

after the presentation of evidence, the testimony was offered for the limited purpose of 

deciding whether this collision can impugn knowledge on Mejia that driving a vehicle 

recklessly can cause injury or property damage. (Id. at p. 118.) Therefore, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion because it properly conducted an Evidence Code section 352 

analysis.

iii. No Due Process Violation Occurred and Any Alleged Error was 

Harmless.

Mejia further contends the admission of the prior 2017 collision violated his rights 

to due process and a fair trial and prejudiced this case.7 We conclude Mejia’s 

constitutional rights were not violated. However, even if we concluded the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence of the prior collision, any error was harmless.

“ ‘The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the 

evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” 

(People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805; see People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 

at p. 439 [the defendant’s right to due process was not violated when the trial court 

7 Mejia argues the alleged error triggers review under Chapman v. California (1967) 

386 U.S. 18 (Chapman). He claims it violated his federal constitutional rights to due 

process and to a fair trial. Chapman review does not apply here because the error 

complained of concerns the application of state evidentiary law, and Mejia fails to show 

admission of the car collision rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida 

(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [“Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting 

evidence is subject to the traditional [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836] 

test”].) 
19.

admitted gang evidence over an Evid. Code, § 352 objection]; People v. Westerfield

(2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 700 [purported error in allowing evidence prohibited by Evid.

Code, § 1101, subd. (a) did not result in a due process violation].)

Here, we fail to see how the admission of the 2017 collision rendered Mejia’s trial 

fundamentally unfair. By the time the evidence was introduced, the jury heard multiple 

911 calls related to the underlying collision, testimony regarding defendant’s reckless 

driving, his high blood-alcohol content of .251 percent, and evidence of the collision 

scene. In relation to the underlying case, the 2017 collision evidence was comparatively 

innocuous. Moreover, as noted above, the jury was twice instructed it could only 

consider this evidence for the limited purpose of establishing knowledge. Therefore, no 

due process violation occurred.

However, even if we concluded the trial court erred in admitting this evidence, 

Mejia has failed to establish he was prejudiced. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.) 

The standard requires the defendant to establish “that it is ‘ “reasonably probable that a 

result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of 

the error.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195, quoting Watson, supra, at 

p. 837.) 

Specifically, Mejia argues this evidence was prejudicial because “despite the 

[trial] court’s instruction that the prior incident only applied to counts 3 and 4, it would 

have been impossible or unlikely that the jury was able [to] ignore that evidence in 

determining whether [Mejia] acted with implied malice in counts 1 and 2.” We disagree. 

First, “[w]e presume that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.” (People 

v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 414.) Therefore, unless evidence says otherwise, we 

presume the jury did not use the uncharged acts evidence in relation to the murder 

charges. Second, even assuming the jury impermissibly used the evidence, it is not 

reasonably probable Mejia would have received a more favorable verdict. Evidence in 

support of the murder charges (counts 1 and 2) was overwhelming.
20.

The jury heard testimony from multiple witnesses and listened to several 911 calls 

regarding Mejia’s erratic driving and that he drove between 94 and 98 miles per hour 

immediately prior to the collision. Further, the jury heard testimony the accelerator was 

depressed all the way to the floor and that the pedal’s position was “[m]ost likely not” 

done by accident. The jury also heard evidence Mejia had a blood alcohol content of 

.251 percent, more than three times the legal limit. Lastly, the jury heard evidence Mejia 

was advised when he obtained his license that “being under the influence of alcohol ... is 

extremely dangerous to human life ... and as result, [if] a person is killed, [he] can be 

charged with murder” and also acknowledged drinking and driving was unsafe to his 

girlfriend, L.B. Accordingly, the evidence of implied malice was so overwhelming that 

even if the jury did not hear evidence of the 2017 collision, it was not reasonably 

probable he would have received a more favorable verdict and thus any error in admitting 

the evidence was harmless.

II. The Pitchess Motion

Mejia further asks this court to conduct a review of the files reviewed by the trial 

court to determine (1) whether there were any additional discoverable records that should 

have been disclosed and (2) whether the trial court followed the correct procedures in the 

in camera proceedings. 

A. Additional Factual Background

Prior to the trial, trial counsel filed a Pitchess motion seeking all of Officer Petty’s 

personnel records. Without providing specific details, the motion alleged Officer Petty 

had engaged in excessive force and filed false police reports. In part, the motion cited 

Brady8 as grounds for disclosure of Officer Petty’s personnel records. 

Mejia stated in his declaration that he received a letter from the Kern County 

District Attorney’s Office that Officer Petty was “on administrative leave” as of 

8 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady)
21.

September 20, 2019. Trial counsel stated in his declaration that Officer Petty “in the 

above captioned matter may have falsified information in the ensuing police 

[investigation] after the incident.” 

In November 2019, the trial court heard Mejia’s Pitchess motion regarding Officer 

Petty’s personnel file. The trial court “grant[ed] the motion to do an in camera review on 

CHP Officer Petty for dishonesty ... because the D.A. told the defense they should do a 

Pitchess motion ... [and] once the D.A. tells the defense to do it, I need to do it.” After 

conducting an in camera review, the trial court granted the Pitchess motion and 

subsequently ordered two witness names and contact information to be released to trial 

counsel. 

B. Applicable Law

In some circumstances, a criminal defendant may gain access to a law 

enforcement officer’s personnel file. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219.) In 

a Pitchess motion, a defendant must describe the type of records or information sought, 

and include affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought. (Mooc, 

supra, at p. 1226.) The defendant must set forth the materiality of the requested 

information to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and the affidavits may 

be based on information and belief, and need not be based on personal knowledge. 

(Ibid.) However, the information sought must be requested “with sufficient specificity” 

to preclude a possibility a defendant is “simply casting about for any helpful 

information.” (Ibid.) A defendant must demonstrate a logical link between any proposed 

defense and the pending charge, and describe with some specificity how the sought 

discovery would impeach the officer’s version of events or support such a defense. 

(People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 720.) 

An abuse of discretion standard is used to review a trial court’s decision regarding 

a motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records. (Alford v. Superior Court

(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1039, overruled on other grounds in Facebook, Inc. v. Superior 
22.

Court (Touchstone) (2020) 10 Cal.5th 329, 345-346, fn. 6.) We will not disturb the trial 

court’s ruling absent a showing the court “ ‘ “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 

justice.” ’ ” (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 97, quoting People v. Rodriguez, supra, 20

Cal.4th at pp. 9-10.)

C. Analysis

Based on our independent review of the sealed record, which includes the trial 

court hearing transcript of the in camera Pitchess hearing on November 12, 2019, we 

conclude the trial court properly considered whether any of the personnel records of 

Officer Petty were discoverable. The records were adequately described and discussed 

on the record, and the trial court ordered contact information to be released to trial 

counsel as a result of the hearing. We conclude, as did the trial court and custodian of 

records, there were no physical records constituting relevant discoverable Pitchess 

material. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to release confidential records of Officer Petty, but rather chose to only release 

the names and contact information of two witnesses to trial counsel.

However, even if the trial court erred, Mejia was not prejudiced by this error. The 

proper standard of analysis to be applied in determining whether Mejia was prejudiced 

from the denial of Pitchess discovery is whether “there was a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the case would have been different had the information been disclosed to 

the defense.” (People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 422.) Officer Petty did not 

testify at the trial and was minimally involved in the underlying DUI investigation 

because he was only responsible for transporting Mejia to the hospital. Accordingly, 

even if the trial court erred in both failing to follow proper procedures and releasing

certain information, any error was harmless.
23.

III. Assembly Bill No. 518

In supplemental briefing, Mejia contends he is entitled to resentencing under 

newly passed Assembly Bill 518, which amended section 654. The People concede 

Mejia is entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 518 and that remand is required. We 

therefore agree Mejia is entitled to the retroactive benefits of Assembly Bill 518. 

A. Applicable Law

Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a), to provide: “An act or 

omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be 

punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be 

punished under more than one provision.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) 

Previously, “the sentencing court was required to impose the sentence that ‘provides for 

the longest potential term of imprisonment’ and stay execution of the other term. 

[Citation.] ... [S]ection 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and 

execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and 

executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.” (People v. Mani (2022) 

74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) 

Under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, “ ‘[w]hen the Legislature 

has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will 

assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended statute 

to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative 

date.’ ” (People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 872.) 

B. Analysis

Here, the trial court sentenced Mejia as to count 1 to an indeterminate term of 15 

years to life. As to count 5, the trial court sentenced Mejia to the middle term of two 

years, plus five years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)) to be 

served consecutive to count 1. As to counts 3, 4, and 6, the trial court sentenced Mejia to 

multiple terms, but stayed these sentences pursuant to section 654. 
24.

Mejia’s judgment is not yet final because his appeal is presently before us. (See 

People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 682 [“For purposes of the Estrada rule, a 

judgment is not final so long as courts may provide a remedy on direct review.”].) 

Moreover, nothing in Assembly Bill 518 suggests legislative intent the amendments 

apply prospectively only. Therefore, Mejia is entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 

518. (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673 [“Assembly Bill 518 ... applies 

retroactively to defendants ... whose convictions were not yet final when the law became 

effective January 1, 2022.”].)

DISPOSITION

Mejia’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for resentencing. In all 

other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

SMITH, J.

WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.