### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 5
JAM ES R IMME R v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -27299 W. Otis Higgs, Jud ge

No. W2004-02427-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Augu st 26, 2005

Th e pe tit ion e r, Jame s Ri mme r, app e a ls f ro m th e She lby

County Cr imi na l Co urt’ s d e nia l of his petition seeking post-conviction re lief on the g round of inef fec tive assistan ce of

counsel. Af

ter a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the iss ue s a ndapp lic able la w, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the low e r c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

J uni S. Gang uli, Memphis, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, J ames Rimmer.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis ta nt A tto rneyGe ne ra l; Willi a m L . Gib bo ns , Dis tr ic t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; an d Da vid Z ak, As sis ta nt Dis tr ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION The Shelby

CountyGra nd J ury

indicted the petitioner on September 9, 2001, on the
c ha rg e of po sse ssi onof

c oc a ine in an a mou nt g re a te r tha n . 5 g rams w iththe int e nt t o s e ll, a Cla ss B f e lo n y
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-417(a )(3) , (c) (1) ( 2003). At the time of that of fense , the petitioner was serving an eig ht-y ear probationary

sentenc e for

a similar offe nse. On June 6, 2002, pu rs ua nt t o a n a g re e me nt w iththe state , th e pe tit ion e r p le a de d g uilty to the c oc a ine of

fe ns e in exchang e for

an ag ree d sentenc e of e ight y ear s, which re prese nted a minimum, Range I sentenc e for a Class B f

elony . That sentenc e was order ed to be served consecutively to the eig ht-y ear

sentenc e fo r the vio la tio n o f the pe tit ion e r’ s p ro batio n, fo r an e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

16 y e ars
. Su b s e q u e n tl y , o n A p r il 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , th e p e ti ti o n e r f il ed a pr o se pe tit ionfo r p os tconvic t i o n re l i ef a lleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel in connec tion with his plea and the resulting sentenc e. The trial court a ppointed counsel to re prese nt the petitioner; an e vid en t i ary hearing was conducte d on Aug ust 13, 2004. Approxi mately one month later, the trial court e ntere d-2-

a written order de ny ing post-c onviction r elief. A g g rieve d of the de nial of his petition, the petitioner ha s ti me ly

app e a le d to thi s c ou rt

. The fa ctual under

pinning f or the pe titioner’s plea to unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to sell appears in the transcript of the ple a submission conducte d on J une 6, 2002. At that tim e , th e state a dv ise d th e tr ia l c ou rt a s f oll ow s:
The fac ts w hich g ave rise to this i ndictment would have be en that on J uly

8, 2000, Detec tive Ba ss r ece ived information from . . . a reliable informant that a ma le black, K enny , was selling cra ck coc aine out of 1000 Woodbury

with an unidentified fema le black. Detec tive Ba ss did surveillance at that location and ob s erved pede strian foot tra ff i c c o m i n g an d go i n g.
Th e de te c tiv e
. . . o btaine d a se arc h w arr a nt f

or the pr e mis e s, and they di d ex ecute the sea

rch w arr ant. Off

icer s went to that loca t i o n. A Shawn Goodwin ope ned the door at that location. Offic ers e ntere d the pre mises and explained the circ umstances of the
wa rr a nt to [the pe tit ion e r] b e fo rethe se arc h b e g a n. De te c tiv e B a ss and . . . De tective Goodw in asked if ther e wer e any illega l narc otics on the pre mises. Both [men] replied no dr ug s or money

wer e on the pr e mis e s.
Th e y f o u n d a D r
. Pe p p e r c a n w ith a f a ls e c o mp ar tme nt that contained a

hundred and eig hty

dollars in the bedr oom. They found a fa lse compartment in an aer osol can whic h contained eleven hundred dollar s, and a f

alse c ompartment in another can. It contained
s i x p i e c e s o f

s u s p e c t e d c r a c k

c o c a i n e , t o t a l [ i n g ] 1

. 5 g r a m s w e i g h t

. It did test positi ve as be ing c ocaine

. An evidentiary

post-conviction hea

ring was c onducted on Aug ust 13, 2004, at which time the petitioner and pe titioner’s forme r trial counse l testified. Trial counse l, whose law pr actice was ap p r o xim a te ly

9 8 p e r c e n t c r im in a l l a w , c o u ldn o t r e c a ll a s p e c if ic d a te w h e n h e b e g an repr esenting the petitioner. In chec king the petitioner’s prior history , trial counsel lea

rned that the petitioner qualified f

or Rang e I I

or Rang e I I I

sentenc ing. For

that rea son, trial counsel be lieved that the Rang e I , eig ht-y ear plea a g ree ment that was ne g otiated with the state wa s very favor able to the defe ndant. The e ight- y ea r s en t en ce repre sented a minimum sentenc e for

the Class B na

rcotics offe nse. Ac cording to trial counsel, he e x plained to the petitioner that the sentenc e imposed for the probation violation would, by law, run c onsecutively

to the neg otiated eig ht-y ear sentenc e.
Trial counse l was unsure how long he re prese nted t he petitioner or how many

report dates we re sc heduled f

or the c ase. H e wa s certain, howeve r, that at eac h court date he would have spoken at leng th with the petitioner. Trial counsel’s memory of t he fa cts of the c ase ha d diminis hed-3-

over time, but he r eca lled that th e case was not set for trial. Counsel believed that he filed a discovery motion at the beg inning of his r epre sentation. Counsel indicated that he wa s unawa re of any problems betwe en the pe titioner and himself.

B e c aus e c ou ns e l di d not ha ve a c le ar re c oll e c tio n of the c a se , he e xpla ine d tha t hi s customary

prac tice in a c ase like the petitioner’s would be to file a dis covery motion, dis cuss a plea offe r with the state, a nd then consult with the client. He described the petitioner’s c ase a s not being an “e x traordina

ry , difficult ca se” and as being “just down the line.”

On cr oss-examination bythe s tate, trial c ounsel drew on his ex perie nce in handling
narc otics case s in ShelbyCounty . He e x plained that many prosec utors follow plea g uidelines such t h ato n a s ec o n d fe l o n y d ru g o ff en s e, fo r ex am p l e, t h e s t at e wo u l d o ff era p l eao f 1 5 y ea rs as a R an ge I I offe nder. H e “r emember [ed] just neg otia t i n g to ge tting it down wher e [he] could ge t [ the pe tit ion e r] a

Ra ng e On e be c aus e of

the [ pen di ng vi olat ionof pr ob a tio n].” Tria l c ou ns e l a lso explained that many

prosec utors will withdraw a ple a off er onc e motion hearings c ommence, particula rly a suppre ssion hearing. I n counsel’s opinion he negotiate d “the best deal a vailable” for the peitioner. The petiti oner testified that he filed the pos t-conviction petit ion beca use he did not believe th at h e “w as prope rly told what was g oing – a

bout [ his] eig ht-y ear

sentenc e.” In terms of trial counsel’ s repr esentation, the petitioner said that he only met with counsel three or four times when he was sche duled to be in court

. He testified that ea ch mee ting laste d no more than approximately five minutes and that counsel assure d him that every thing was “goi n g t o b e fine beca use the qua ntity[of cocaine ] was a small quantity .”

The pe titioner acknow ledg ed tha t h er e ali ze d

th at h is e ig h t- y e a

r p r o b ati o n a

r y sentenc e on an ea rlier dr ug offe nse wa s violated when he was arre sted on the new char g e. He claimed that he ha d a lmo st c omp le te d th e pr ob a tio na ry te rm a ndthat hewa s to ld h e “ wo uld n’ t ha ve to d o bu t a few months” on the earlier sentenc e. He testified that he “ didn’t find out the whole 16 until [ he] got to the penal farm and they hit the computer and said [he was] doing a 16-y ear sentenc e and didn’ t ha ve [him ] doi ng a ny str e e t tim e or a nythi ng .” Th e pe tit ion e r d e nie d th a t tria l c ou ns e l a dv ise d h im that the ac tual sentenc e would be 16 y ear s at 30 perc ent, and the pe titioner cl ai m ed that he “misunderstood [the] part” conce rning consec utive sentenc ing. He did conc ede that counsel neve r repr esente d that he “w ould rec eive [hi s] stree t c redit for sure.” Acc ording to the petitioner, he ne ver as k ed co u n s el h o w m u ch t o t al t i m e h e w o u l d b e s er v i n g.

The pe titioner responde d in an ar g umentative fa shion to most of t he state’ s questions
on cross-e x amination. He wa s shown the transc ript of his plea submission where in the consec utive nature of the sente ncing was mentioned twic e and w here in the court a dvised him o f his potential exposure of up to 30 y ear s. He c laimed n o t t o k n o w what the w ord “c onsecutive” meant, and he simply dis pu te d b e ing tol d a nythi ng abo ut 30 y e ars
. I n te rm s o f w hat r e lie f h e wa s se e kin g on po stconviction, the petitioner sa id that he wante d to enter a drug abuse pr og ram to ser ve his sentenc e.-4- The trial court took the m atter under advise ment, and on Aug ust 17, 2004, it entered an orde r denying the petition f or post-conviction re lief. The trial court c redited c ounsel’s testimony that he explained to the petitioner that the time he rec eived for the pr obation violation would be
serve d consec utively

to the eig ht-y ear

sentenc e for

the cocaine offense

. Acc ording ly , the trial court found that the pe titioner had fa iled to pr ove ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. I n addition, aside fr om counsel’s pe rformance , the trial court found that the petitioner had been a dvised of the c onsecutive
se nte nc ing a t the ple a su bmi ssi on he ari ng
. Th e re fo re , e ve n if c ou ns e l’ s p e rf

orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt, the petitioner ne verthe less had failed to demonstrate the r equisite prejudice

.

T h e l aw i s s et t l ed t h at t h e po s t -c o n v i ct i o n p et i t i o n erb ea rs t h e b u rd en o f e s t ab l i s h i n g, at the evide ntiary

hearing, his a lleg ations by clea r an d co n v i n cing evidenc e. Te nn. Code. Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003). Evidenc e is clea r and c onvincing when ther e is no serious or substantial doubt about t he correc tness of t he conclusions draw n from the e vidence

. Hodges v . S.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992). An appellate court is bound by the trial court’s finding s of fa ct unless we conclude that the evidenc e in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst those finding s. Black v

. Sta te , 794 S.W .2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

.

For a petitioner to suc cessf ully overturn a

conviction base d on ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel, the petit ioner must first establish that the s ervic es rendere d or the a dvice g iven was be low

“ th e r a n g e o f c o mp e te n c e d e man d e d o f a tt o r n e y s in c r im in a l c ases.” Ba xter v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Second, the pe titione r must show that the defic iencies “ actua lly had an adver se ef fec t on the defe nse.” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Should the petitioner fail to establish either factor , he is not entitled to relief. See id. a t 69 7, 10 4 S. Ct. at 2069. As to g uilty pleas, the petitioner m ust establish that, but for counse l’s err ors, petitioner would not have e ntere d the plea and would have insisted on g oing to tria l. Se e Hi ll v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. C t. 366, 370 (1985).

I n s um, a de fe nd a nt i s n ot e nt it le d to pe rf e c t r e pr e se ntatio n, on ly

c on sti tut ion a lly adequate repr esentation. De nto n v . S tate , 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . I n other words, “in considering claims of i neff ective assistance of counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appr opriate, but only what is constitutionallycompelled.’ ” Burger v. Kem p , 483 U.S. 776, 794, 1 0 7 S

. C t

. 3 1 1 4 , 3 1 2 6 (1 9 8 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Un ite d S tate s v . Cr on ic , 4 66 U. S. 6 48 , 6 55 n. 38 , 1 04 S. Ct

. 2039, 2050 n.38 (1984))

.

Measur ed by

these standards, it is rea dily appar ent that the petitioner failed to car ry his burden, and thee v id e nce in the r ecor d certainly does not preponde rate ag ainst the post-conviction
c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s. B e fo re us , th e pe tit ion e r p re sse s his c la im that c ou ns e l f a ile d to a de qu a te ly

a dv ise him a s to the se nte nc ing c on se qu e nc e s o f his g uil ty ple a . H e a lso arg ue s th a t hi s atto rn e y faile d to l i t i g a t e o r f i l e a n y m e a n i n g f

u l m o t i o n s i n h i s c a s e a n d t h a t h a d c o u n s e l d o n e s o a “ h i g h p r o b ab i l i t y”
e xiste d th a t th e ou tc ome of the c a se wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt.
The trial court did not cre dit the petitioner’s testimony that he wa s not advised about the c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing c on se qu e nc e s o f h is g uil ty ple a
. Th e tr ia l cou rt is i n th e be st p os iti on to-5-

judge the demeanor a nd cre dibilit y of the witnesse s befor e it, and we will not dis turb the trial court’s
cre dibilit y finding s in this case. See State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . Furthermore , the state made the most ge nerous plea offe r possible under the circ umstances

. Although the pe tit ion e r qu a lif

ie d f or Ra ng e I I or Ra ng e I I I se nte nc ing fo r the c oc a ine of fe ns e , th e state a g re e d to a Rang e I minimum , eig ht-y ear

sentenc e for

the Class B f

elony

. As for the outcome of his case being differ ent had counsel pursued meaning ful pretria l motions , the petitioner off ers nothing other than unsupported spec ulation.

The p e ti ti o n e r

h a s f a il e d to d e mo n s tr a te d e f

ic ie n t r e p r e s e n tati o n , mu c h le s s a ny resulting prejudice

.

I n summary , the petitioner offe rs nothing new on appea l to persua de us to disturb the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g . T he tr ia l c ou rt ’s c re dib ili ty de te rmin a tio ns a ndfa c tua l de du c tio ns arec le arl y re a so na ble a ndfo re c los e the ne e d f or a ny pr olo ng e d d isc us sio n o f the iss ue s. Consequently , for th ef

o r e g o in g r e a s o n s , w eaf

f ir m t h ed enial of post-c onviction relief and the dismissal of the petition.

____________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE