FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT APRI L29, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

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N o. 04- 1315 2 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D. C. Dock etNo. 0 0- 00 51 3- CV-FTM -2 9- DNF DERRICK ANTOINE POW ELL, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us SE CRE TA RY, DO C, Respondent -Appellee.

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(Apr il 29, 200 5) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, T JO FL A T and D U BIN A , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.2

PE R CU RIA M:

D er ri ck A nto ine P ow el l, aF lor ida pr iso ne r se rv ing ali fe se nte nc e an d two concurre nt seven and a half y ears’ sentences for f irst degree f

elony m urder, ar m ed r obbe ry , and arm ed

bur glary , appe al s pr o se the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of his pe tit ionf or w ri t of ha be as c or pus, pur suant t o 28 U . S. C. § 22 54. T his appe al is go ve rn edby the Ant it erro ris m an d Eff ect iv e Deat h P en al ty A ctof 1 99 6 (AEDPA). The district court granted a certificate of a ppealability(CO A) on (1) whether Powe ll was denied his Fifth and Fourteenth Am endm ent right to a fair tria l “ when the S ta te c al le d thre e adm itt ed ly im pli cate d w itn es se s to the stand f or the pur pose of havin g th e w itn es se s take the F if th A m en dm en t i n f

ro nt o f the j ur

y ”; and (2 ) w he the r the intro duc tio n of pos t- ar re st c onf es sio ns b y

P ow el l’ s c ode fe ndants ag ai ns t h im

vi ol at edth e Co nf

ro nt at io n C la us e an d re qu ire d a ne w tri al . No r e v e r s i b l e e rr o r

h a s b e e n s h o w n ; w e a f

f i rm. BACKGRO UND

Po w el l w as aj uve nil e ch ar ge d a s an a dul t f or his part ic ipatio n inthe shoo ting d eath of E m anuel W ooders durin g a robbery /burglary . Thre e3

ac co m pli ce s w er e ch ar ge d se parate ly a s a dul ts w iththe sam e cr im es : the state planned to call ea ch to testify in Powell’ s 1995 trial. D efense c ouns el obje cted that c al lin g aw itn es s f

or the pur pose of inv oki ng h is F if

th A m en dm en t pr ivi le ge wa s i rr el ev an tan dp re

ju d i ci al . Th e t ri al co u rt t o o ka p ro ff ero u t s i d e t h e ju ry’s pr es en ce o n e ach wit ne ss ; an d a ll th ree i nv ok edth ei r Fi fth Am en dm en t p riv il eg e. A t the state ’ s r eque st, the tr ia l c ourt de cl ar ed e ac h a cc om

pli ce unava ila

ble a s a witness. The c ourt then allowed, over obj ection, the prosecutor to call ea ch accom plice in front of the j ury

to ask if he rec alled the night that Mr. W ooders was shot . E ac h a cc om

pli ce e xe rc ise d hi s F if

th A m en dm en t pr ivi le ge and w as e xc use d. T he state the n so ught

to intro duc e portio ns o f the pos t- ar re st s ta te m en ts o f two of the ac com

plices, and a portion of the guiltyplea proffe r of the third, under the declaration against penal interest exception to th e rule a gainst hearsay , F la. Stat. Ann. § 90.804(2)(c). Pow ell objec ted, am ong o ther things , that this violated his right to cross-exam ine adverse w itnesses. T he trial court adm itted edited versions of the statem ents -- re dacted to exclude refe rences to Pow ell and plural pr onouns - - thr oughthe te sti m ony of apol ic e of

fi ce r. T he j ur

y c onvi ct ed

P ow el l; an d th e state appe llate c ourt a ff irm ed P ow el l’ s c onvi ct ion s in199 8. P ow el l v. State, 724 So. 2d 120 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. C t. App. 1998).4 DISC US SION

“ W e re vie wde nov o adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of aha be as pe tit ionund er

28 U . S. C. § 22 54. ” Mahara

j v. S ec ’ y f or the D ep ’ t of

Co rr . , 304 F . 3d 1 345, 134 8 (1 1 t h Ci r. 2 0 0 2 ). “ Ou r r ev i ew (a n dth e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s re v i ew ) o f a s t at e c o u rt ’s de ci sio n inaha

be as c or pus ca se is gove rn ed

- - an d li m ite d - - by

28 U . S. C. § 22 54 as am ended by

AE DP A. ” H aw kins v . A labam a, 318 F.3d 1302 , 1305 (11th Cir. 2003 ). Sec tion 2 254(d) provi des

An application for a writ o f h ab ea s corpus on behalf of a person in custodypursuant to the j udgm ent of a State court shall not be granted w ith respect to any claim that wa s ad j udi cate d onthe m er its in St at e co urt pr oc ee din gs unle ss the adj udication of the claim --( 1) resulted in a decision that w as c ontrary

to, or inv olv ed an unr ea sona

ble appl ic at ion of , c le ar ly e sta bli she d F ed er al law , a s de te rm ine d by the Su pr em e Co urt of

the U nit ed

S ta te s. 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) (1 ). T he S upr em e Co urt ha s st at ed that a state c ourt de ci sio n is “ contrary

to” Suprem e Court prec edent if (1) “ the state court applies a rule that contradicts the gov erning law set f orth in ou r ca ses”; or (2) the state court co nf ro nts “ a se t of

f ac ts tha t are m at er ia lly

ind ist ing uis hable f

ro m ade ci sio n of this Court and n evertheless arr ives at a re sult di ffer ent from our precedent. ” W illiam s v. T ay lor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 , 1519-20 (2000 ). A nd a decision is an5

“ unreasonable application ” of Suprem e Court prec edent “ if the state court ide nti fi es the c or

re ct gov er nin g le ga l pr inc ipl e fr om thi s C ourt’ s de ci sio ns b ut unr ea sona

bly appl ie s th at

pr inc ipl e to the f

ac ts o f the pr iso ne r’ s c as e. ” L oc ky er v. A ndr ad e, 123 S . Ct . 116 6, 117 4 ( 2003 ) (c itatio n om itt ed ). I n othe r w or ds, the state co urt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

c le ar ly e sta bli she d law“ m

ust be m or e than in co rr ec t or er ro ne ous” : i t m

ust be “ obj ec tiv el y

unr ea sona

ble . ” I d. Po w el l arg ue s f

ir st tha t the state ’ s c al lin g of the thr ee part ic ipants to the stand, in the pr es en ce of

the j ur y and f or the pur pose of havin g th em

e xe rc ise the ir Fifth Am endm ent privilege against self-incrim ination , a llowed the j ury to infer P o w e l l ’s g u i l ta s an a c c o mp l i c e f r o m th e r e f

u s a l s t o t e s t i f

y. T he state c ourt’ s a llo w ing the thr ee a cc om pli ce s to e xe rc ise the ir

F if th Am endm ent privilege in front of the jury wa s not “ contrary

to” clear ly

established Fe de ra l l aw . P ow el l c ite s N am et v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 83 S . Ct . 115 1 ( 1963 ), to supp ort his po sition . Nam et w as a ca se about a claim of evidentiary

err or wher e the prosecutor asked two witnesses incrim inating question s, while kno wing that th e wit ne ss es were p rep ared to in vo ke th ei r pr iv il eg e ag ai ns t s el f-i nc riminat io n. 83 S . Ct . a t 11 54. B ut the Co urt w ro te that “ [n ] o c onst itu tio na l i ssu es of any kin d [w er e] pr es en te d. ” I d. A nd P ow el l ha s c ite d aN o S upr em e Co urt c as e hol din g that a de fe ndant’ s du e pr oc es s r igh ts are vio la te d w he n th e gove rn m en t c al ls a6

w itn es s w iththe kno w le dge that the w itn es s w oul d in voke his F if th A m en dm en t pr ivi le ge in fr ont

of the j ur y . S ee W as hin gto n v. Cr osby , 324 F . 3d 1 263, 126 5 ( 1 1 t h C i r . ) , c e rt . d e n i e d , 1 2 4 S . C t . 4 2 9 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ( s t a t i n g th a t , w h e r e n o S up r e me Co u rt p re ce d en ti s o n p o i n t , t h i s Co u rt ca n n o ts ay t h at th e s t at e c o u rt ’s co nc lus ionis co ntr ar

y to cl earl y

e sta bli she d F ed er al lawa s de te rm ine d by the Suprem e Court) ( citation om itted). A nd the state c ourt di d no t un re as ona bly appl y gov er nin g le ga l pr inc ipl es to the facts of this case. T he Nam et decision dis cussed two theories under which low er c ourts h ad

f ound e rr or : ( 1) “pr ose cu tor ia l m isc ondu ct , w he n th e G ove rn m en t m ak es ac onsc iou s and f la gr an t a tte m

pt t o bu ild

it s c as e out

of inference s arising from

use of the testim onial privil ege”; and (2) when “ inference s fr om aw itn es s’ r ef

usa l t o answ er

a dde d c ri tic al w ei ght

to the pr ose cu tio n’ s c as e in a fo rm not sub j ec t t o c ro ss- ex am inatio n, and thus unf ai rl y pr ej udi ce d th e de fen da nt .” Nam et83 S.Ct . at 1 15 4- 55 . T o th e ex te nt tha t the state ’ s a ct s he re in ca lli ng the a cc om pli ce s m ay

have am ount ed to prosecutorial m iscondu ct, this byitself “ does not raise a distin ct co nst itu tio na l i ssu e. ” Bu sby v. H olt , 781 F . 2d 1 475, 147 6 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) ( not ing that “ in som e egre giou s instances prosecuto rial bad faith m ay in itself constitu te a dis tin ct due pr oc es s vi olatio n, ” but that “ the f

oc us o f the due pr oc es s in qui ry is on7

the f ai rn es s of the tr ia l, not

the c ulp ab ili ty

of the pr ose cu tor ”) ( quot at ionand citation om itted). A nd P ow el l ha s no t sh ow n pr ej udi ce by the pr ose cu tor ’ s c ondu ct . A ny inf er en ce of his inv olv em en t i n th e ch ar ge d c ri m es m er el y w as c um ulativ e to the inference s raised by

other evidence. See id. at 1477. T his oth er e vidence showed that P ow el l w as w ithone or m or e of the a cc om

pli ce s be fo re and a ft er

the sho oti ng, that P ow el l a dm itt ed

that he w as a t the W oode rs ’ hou se and a ske d to use the ph on e, an d t ha t M r. W oo de rs was s ho t af te r so m eo ne ha d a sk edto us e th e p ho ne . And, the onlyquestion to which the acc om plices invo ked their privilege was whether they

rem em bered the night th at Mr. W ooders was shot: the state elicited ne ith er r ep eate d in voc at ion s of

the pr ivi le ge , nor

inv oc at ion s of

the pr ivi le ge in re spon se to spe ci fi c que sti ons. Po w el l arg ue s se co nd tha t the tr ia l c ourt’ s a dm iss ionof the a cc om

pli ce s’ state m en ts v iol at ed

his Co nf ro ntatio n C lause r igh ts, c iti ng C raw fo rd v. W as hin gto n, 124 S . Ct . 135 4 ( 2004 ). H e as se rt s th at the he ar say

e xc ep tio n f

or de cl ar at ion s a ga ins t pe na l i nte re st i s no t a f irm ly r oot ed e xc ep tio n un de r Fl or ida

or Federa l law and that the accom plices’ statem ents lacked particularized guarantees of tr ustw orthi ne ss.Crawf ord abr og ated Rober

ts. See Crawf

ord, 124 S.Ct. at 1370-74. 1 8 A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d, und er c ur re nt S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t, the adm issio n of these statem ents -- w hich wer e testim onial and which wer e adm itted without the prior opp ortunityfor P owell to cross-exam ine the declarants -- violated th e Confrontation Clause. S ee Cr aw ford, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 (stating that adm iss ionof

out -o f- co urt, te sti m oni al state m en ts i s barr ed und er the Co nf ro ntatio n C lause unl es s th e w itn es s is unava ila ble and the de fe ndant h ad a pr ior opp ortun ity

to cr oss -e xa m ine the w itn es s) . B ut C raw fo rd w as not the c le ar ly established Federal lawwhen P owell’ s convictio ns were aff irm ed in 199 8. S ee Locky er, 123 S.Ct. at 1172. Pow ell point s to no p re-C raw ford Suprem e Court ca se hol din g th at

ade fe ndant’ s C onf

ro ntatio n C lause r igh ts are vio la te d by the adm iss ionof

c onf es sio ns f ro m a cc om pli ce s th at

r ed ac te d r ef

er en ce s to the de fe ndant: the state c ourt’ s a dm iss ionof the state m en ts w as not

c ontrary to cl earl y es tabl is he d F ed eral law. And the state court’ s determ ination that the redacted statem ents wer e ad m is si bl e was no t an un reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f cl earl y est ab li sh edFed eral law. T he appl ic ab le S upr em e Co urt pr ec ed en t a t the ti m e, O hio v. Ro be rt s, 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 2539 (1980), allowed f or the adm issio n of the hearsay statem ent of an un av ai labl e wit ne ss as l on g a s t he st at em en t b or e ad eq ua te “ in di ci a o f rel iabi li ty.” 1After Powell’s convictions wer e aff irmed, the Supreme Court de termin ed , fo r C onfrontation 2 Clause purposes, that the decla ration ag ainst penal intere st ex ception wa s not a firmly rooted he arsa

y exception. See L illy

v. Virg inia, 119 S.Ct . 1887, 1899 (1999). 9 A nd r el ia bil ity “ can be inf

er re d w ith out

m or e in a

c as e w he re the e vid en ce f al ls w ith in a f irm ly r oot ed he ar say e xc ep tio n. I n othe r ca se s, the e vid en ce m ust be ex cl ude d, a t l ea st a

bse nt a sho w ing of

part ic ulari ze d gu ar an te es of tr ustw orthi ne ss. ” I d. The st at e co ur t m ay

ha ve in co rrec tl y

ad m it te d t he st at em en ts un de r Ro be rts . State pre cedent prior to the aff irm ance of P owell’ s convictio ns strong ly suggest ed that the “ statem ent against penal int erest” e xception is not a firm ly rooted hearsay ex ce pti on. S ee F ranqui v. S ta te , 699 S o. 2d 1 312, 131 9 ( Fl a. 199 7) . B ut the 2 adm itt ed state m en ts w er e not

inc ri m inatin g a ga ins t P ow el l: an y r ef er en ce s to Po w el l or oth er c ode fe ndants w er e re da ct ed . T he state c ourt’ s de ci sio n in adm itt ing the se state m en ts w as not obj ec tiv el y

unr ea sona

ble . C f. D ougl as v. A la ba m a, 85 S . Ct . 107 4, ( 1965 ) (o pin ing that de fe ndant’ s C onf ro ntatio n C lause ri ght s w er e vio la te d w he n c ourt a dm itt ed sub stanc e of

c ode fe ndant’ s c onf

es sio n incrim inating defendant, and confessio n was only direct evidence of guilt ). AFFIRMED.