IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRADLEY K. BAUMGARTNER, 6:15-CV-01249-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

DREW L. JOHNSON

170 Valley River Dr.

Eugene, OR 97401

(541) 434-6466

JOHN E. HAAPALA, JR.

401 E. 10th Ave., Ste. 240

Eugene, OR 97401 

(541) 345-3237

Attorneys for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1003

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Case 6:15-cv-01249-BR Document 19 Filed 08/03/16 Page 1 of 20
DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

HEATHER L. GRIFFITH 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

701 Fifth Avenue, Ste. 2900 M/S 221 A

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 615-2531

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Bradley K. Baumgartner seeks judicial review of a

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which he denied Plaintiff's application for

Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social

Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court REVERSES the decision

of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for the immediate

calculation and payment of benefits pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on April 11, 2012,

alleging a disability onset date of April 30, 2010. Tr. 15.1

Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on January 4, 2016, are referred to as "Tr."

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reconsideration. Tr. 79, 91-92, 107. An Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on September 4, 2013. Plaintiff

appeared and testified together with Vocational Expert (VE) Leta

Berkshire. Tr. 32-78. Plaintiff was accompanied by non-attorney

representative Michael Lyons at the hearing. Tr. 32-79. 

On November 14, 2013, the ALJ issued an opinion in which she 

found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled

to benefits. Tr. 12-25. On May 5, 2015, that decision became

the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 1-4. See Sims v.

Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in December 1969 and was forty years old

on his alleged onset date. Tr. 92. He graduated from high

school and completed two years of college to become an R.V.

technician. Tr. 45. Plaintiff has past relevant work experience

as a delivery person, transmission technician, air-system

installer, and a countertop installer for a motor home

manufacturer. Tr. 219. 

Plaintiff stopped working in 2001 because of knee problems

after being injured in an ATV accident in 1991. Tr. 359-60, 397. 

Plaintiff underwent a total knee replacement on April 8, 2011. 

Tr. 352. 

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Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the

medical evidence. See Tr. 20-22.

STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate his

inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

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“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

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activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairments or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed

Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. “A

'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

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659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status

requirements and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

from his April 30, 2010, alleged onset date through his date last

insured. Tr. 17.

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At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe

impairments of sleep apnea, degenerative disc disease, statuspost thyroidectomy, status-post left-knee revision, status-post

right-wrist surgery, obesity, and status-post hernia repair. 

Tr. 17.

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically

determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix

1. Tr. 19. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work

with the following limitations: He can stand and walk for about

four hours and sit for about six hours; he can lift, carry, push,

and pull within light exertional limits; he can never climb

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps and

stairs; he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and

crawl; he can occasionally reach overhead with both upper

extremities; he can frequently handle with his right hand; he can

perform work in which hazards are not present; he cannot work in

a job that requires driving long distances; and he can only

perform work that is unskilled, routine, and repetitive. Tr. 19.

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform

any of his past relevant work. Tr. 24. 

At Step Five the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform jobs

that exist in the national economy, including collator operator,

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table worker, and document preparer. Tr. 24. Accordingly, the

ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 25. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when she (1) rejected

Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony; (2) rejected the

medical opinion of Craig Mohler, M.D.; and (3) rejected the lay

testimony of Wendy Baumgartner. 

I. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear

and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony was not

fully credible.

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence

of an impairment or impairments, and he must show the impairment

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th

Cir. 1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective

medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not

any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant's pain testimony only if she provides clear and

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convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant’s testimony is

not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must identify “what

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the

claimant's complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).

Plaintiff maintained he was unable to work because of pain

in his lower back, neck, knees, and right wrist. Tr. 295. He

alleged he was limited by lightheadedness, lack of balance,

weakness, fatigue, short-term memory loss, and lack of focus and

concentration. Tr. 295. Plaintiff alleged limitations in his

ability to lift, to stand, to walk, and to sit and in his range

of movement. Tr. 295-96. He alleged he had difficulty writing,

typing, gripping, and grasping due to pain and weakness in his

right wrist. Tr. 296. 

The ALJ provided several reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s

credibility. First, he found Plaintiff’s testimony conflicted

with his previous submissions to the Agency. Tr. 21. 

Inconsistencies in a claimant’s testimony can undermine his

credibility. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.

2001). Here Plaintiff did not mention that he completed

additional college course work in his DIB application nor did he

mention at the hearing that he had any mental limitations. See

id. When describing his activities of daily living, Plaintiff

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did not mention at the hearing problems with his right wrist

until prompted by questioning from his representative. Although

this record reflects Plaintiff did not report all of his

limitations at either the application or the hearing stage, it

does not show a contradiction within his statements to the Agency

and, therefore, does not constitute a legally sufficient reason

for rejecting Plaintiff’s credibility.

Second, the ALJ found discrepancies in Plaintiff’s reported

work history undermined his credibility. The ALJ may assign less

weight to a claimant’s testimony when the claimant stopped

working for reasons other than disability. Bruton v. Massanari,

268 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 2001). A claimant’s daily activities

can also provide a clear and convincing reason for rejecting his

subjective symptom testimony when those activities conflict with

the plaintiff’s testimony. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113. Here

Plaintiff testified he stopped working at his previous job

because the business shut down, and the ALJ noted Plaintiff

applied for jobs after his alleged onset date. Tr. 21, 58. In

Copeland v. Bowen, the Ninth Circuit found the ALJ’s inference

that the claimant’s testimony was not credible because he held

himself out as available for work and received unemployment

benefits was proper. 861 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1988). Here,

however, Plaintiff did not receive unemployment benefits, and

nothing in the record confirms Plaintiff was capable of

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sustaining gainful employment despite his efforts to look for

work. The ALJ’s second reason for his credibility determination,

therefore, is not supported by substantial evidence in the

record.

Third, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective allegations

regarding his symptoms were unsupported by the objective medical

evidence. Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had only very

light listhesis and mild degenerative changes at L4-S1 and a

slight protrusion at L5-S1. Tr. 22. In addition, Dr. Noonan,

M.D., recommended only conservative treatment and noted Plaintiff

made a good recovery from his knee surgery. The ALJ is not

entitled to reject a claimant’s testimony simply because the

degree of symptoms alleged is not substantiated by objective

medical evidence. Oteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th

Cir. 1995)(claimant need only produce medical evidence of an

underlying impairment that could reasonably cause the degree of

symptoms alleged). Here Plaintiff provided objective evidence of

multiple knee surgeries and degenerative changes throughout his

cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine with nerve root contact at

L5. Tr. 352, 354, 387, 574. The Court concludes this evidence

could reasonably cause the severity of the symptoms that

Plaintiff alleged in his testimony. In any event, the fact that

the medical record did not mirror Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony does not constitute a legally sufficient reason for

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finding Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible. 

Fourth, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s failure to comply with

treatment reflected negatively on Plaintiff’s credibility. The

ALJ may find a claimant’s testimony was not credible if the

claimant does not follow prescribed treatment “and there are no

good reasons for this failure.” SSR 96-7p. See also Tommasetti,

533 F.3d at 1039 (a claimant’s unexplained failure to follow a

prescribed treatment recommendation is a relevant credibility

consideration). Here Plaintiff had difficulty complying with

recommendations that he use a CPAP machine for his sleep apnea

and that he not take naps. The record, however, reflects

Plaintiff had good reasons for his failure to comply with his

providers’ recommendations because multiple nasal traumas limited

his ability to use a CPAP machine. Tr. 376, 627, 678. Moreover,

the fact that Plaintiff did not take naps as recommended does not

contradict his testimony regarding fatigue. 

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ failed to provide

legally sufficient reasons supported by sufficient evidence in

the record for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony.

II. Dr. Mohler’s Opinion

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion

of Dr. Mohler, Plaintiff’s treating orthopedic surgeon.

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the

medical record, including conflicts among physicians’ opinions. 

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Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). The

Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating,

examining, and nonexamining physicians. The opinion of a

treating physician is generally accorded greater weight than the

opinion of an examining physician, and the opinion of an

examining physician is accorded greater weight than the opinion

of a nonexamining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. An

uncontradicted treating physician’s opinion can be rejected only

for “clear and convincing” reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d

1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast, if the opinion of an

examining physician is contradicted by another physician’s

opinion, the ALJ must provide “specific, legitimate reasons” for

discrediting the examining physician’s opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d

at 830. Specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s

opinion may include its reliance on a claimant’s discredited

subjective complaints, inconsistency with medical records,

inconsistency with a claimant’s testimony, and inconsistency with

a claimant’s daily activities. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d

1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). An ALJ may also discount a medical

source’s opinion that is inconsistent with the source’s other

findings. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir.

2005). It is legal error to ignore an examining physician’s

medical opinion without providing reasons for doing so, and an

ALJ effectively rejects an opinion when he ignores it. Smolen v.

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Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996).

Treating physician Dr. Mohler opined Plaintiff was limited

to working two hours a day and suffered “severe” pain related to

his left knee. Tr. 753. He opined Plaintiff could stand for

thirty minutes at a time and sixty minutes in an eight-hour

workday. Tr. 753. Dr. Mohler also found Plaintiff could sit for

thirty minutes at a time and for a total of two hours in an

eight-hour workday. Tr. 753. He limited Plaintiff to

occasionally lifting five pounds and stated that Plaintiff could

never perform postural activities. Tr. 754. 

Dr. Mohler’s opinion was submitted to the Appeals Council

after the ALJ rendered her decision. The Appeals Council

reviewed Dr. Mohler's opinion but declined to review the ALJ’s

decision. When a claimant “submits evidence for the first time

to the Appeals Council, which considers that evidence in denying

review of the ALJ’s decision, the new evidence is part of the

administrative record, which the district court must consider in

determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1159-60, 1162-63. 

The Court, therefore, considers Dr. Mohler’s opinion when

determining whether the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical record is

based on substantial evidence. Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1159-60,

1162-63. Here the ALJ did not have the opportunity to review 

Dr. Mohler’s opinion and based her decision on the opinions of

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nonexamining physicians Roy Brown, M.D., and Sharon Eder, M.D. 

Tr. 23. Dr. Mohler’s opinion, although rendered after the

relevant period, was probative, however, because of his treatment

relationship with Plaintiff. See Tr. 96 (indicating Dr. Mohler

began treating Plaintiff as early as 2007). The opinion of a

treating physician is generally accorded greater weight than the

opinion of a nonexamining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

Dr. Mohler’s opinion includes limitations that conflict with the

opinions of the nonexamining physicians. As noted, the ALJ did

not have the opportunity to resolve this conflict, and the ALJ's

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 1-4. 

See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). In light of the

administrative record as a whole, which includes Dr. Mohler's

decision, the Court concludes the Commissioner’s evaluation of

the medical evidence is not supported by substantial evidence. 

See Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1232

(9th Cir. 2011)(citing Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1451-54

(9th Cir. 1993)).

IV. Lay Testimony of Wendy Baumgartner

Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly rejected the

lay opinion of his wife, Wendy Baumgartner. The ALJ must

consider lay-witness testimony and is required to provide

“germane reasons” when rejecting lay testimony. Molina, 674 F.3d

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at 1114. The ALJ, however, is not required to address each

witness “on an individualized witness-by-witness basis.” Id. 

Moreover, the ALJ need “not clearly link his determination to”

specific reasons for rejecting lay testimony as long as he cites

“arguably germane reasons” for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 236

F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Wendy Baumgartner completed a third-party function report

regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations. Tr. 266-73. She

stated Plaintiff was limited in his ability to lift, squat, bend,

stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, and climb stairs. Tr. 271. 

Wendy Baumgartner also affirmed limitations in Plaintiff’s memory

and concentration, in the use of his hands, and in his ability to

get along with others. Tr. 271. She also stated Plaintiff has

balance problems, walks with a cane, and has difficulty helping

with household chores. Tr. 268. 

The ALJ accorded little weight to Wendy Baumgartner’s

statements because they conflicted with Plaintiff’s statements

and because they were similar to them. Tr. 23. The ALJ also

rejected Wendy Baumgartner’s testimony because she reported

Plaintiff suffered from mental impairments that the ALJ found

were not medically determinable. Tr. 23. 

For the above reasons, the Court concludes the ALJ’s

rejection of Plaintiff’s credibility was error. The fact that

Wendy Baumgartner’s statements reflected Plaintiff’s testimony,

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therefore, was not a germane reason for rejecting her statements. 

In addition, the Court concludes after reviewing the record that

there are not any straightforward inconsistencies between Wendy

Baumgartner’s statements and Plaintiff’s testimony; Wendy

Baumgartner merely provided a more conservative estimate of some

of Plaintiff’s abilities than Plaintiff provided during the

administrative hearing; the fact that Wendy Baumgartner reported

mental limitations that were not substantiated by the evidence as

medically determinable impairments was not a germane reason for

rejecting the lay testimony; and Wendy Baumgartner’s statements

did not contradict the medical record and were, in fact,

consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony. 

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred when she

rejected the lay testimony of Wendy Baumgartner because the ALJ

did not provide legally sufficient reasons supported by the

record for doing so.

REMAND

The Court must determine whether to remand this matter for

further proceedings or to remand for calculation of benefits.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or

for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely

utility of further proceedings. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

1179 (9th Cir. 2000). The court may “direct an award of benefits

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where the record has been fully developed and where further

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose.”

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test “for

determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate

award of benefits directed.” Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178. The

court should grant an immediate award of benefits when

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to

find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

Id. The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question: Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if

the case were remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1178 n.2.

On this record the Court concludes there are not any

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination

of disability can be made. As noted, the Court has concluded the

Commissioner failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony, the lay-witness testimony, and

the opinion of Dr. Mohler, Plaintiff's treating physician. When

this evidence is credited as true, it is clear from the record

that the Commissioner would be required to find Plaintiff is

disabled. See, e.g., Tr. 753 (Dr. Mohler’s opinion reflects

Plaintiff is limited to working only two hours per day). 

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Accordingly, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision

and remands this matter for the immediate calculation and payment

of benefits to Plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for the immediate

calculation and payment of benefits pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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