The Honor able John R
. Adams, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Ohio, Easter

n Division, sit ting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0618n.06 F iled: August 24, 2007 No. 06-1752 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
SHARRON L AROCQUE, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. CI TY OF EASTPOI

NTE, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN AT D E T R O IT

Be fore : DAUGHT REY and GI L MAN, Circuit J udg es; ADAMS, District J udg e. *
PER C URI AM. Pro se Appe llant Sharron L aroc que appe als the district court’s g ranting of summary judgme nt for Appe llee City of Eastpointe. Ap p el l an t broug ht this action under Title VI I , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., an d M ic h ig a n’s Elliott -L arse n Civil Rights Act, M.C.L . § 37.2101, et seq., alleg ing hostile w ork environment, sex discrimination and unlawf ul retaliation by

her f ormer e mploy er, A

ppellee Cit y of Eastpointe (“ the City ”). The district c ourt g rante d the City ’s motion for summary judgme nt on the fede ral c laims and declined to e x erc ise jurisdiction over Appe llant’s rema ining state -law c laims. For the r easons se tNo. 06-1752

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- 2 - forth below, w e AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND
I n Marc h 1999, Appellant wa s hired b y t he City as a pa rt-time Code Enfor ceme nt Office r (“CEO” ). The positi on of C EO i s within the Police Depa rtment but is held by

a civilian. The duties of a CEO include impounding abandone d vehicles, issuing citations, and monito ri n g o rd i nance violations. Appellant repor ted to and wa s supervised by mem b er s o f t he police f orce with the following order

of command: Chief of

Police, I nspector, L ieutenant, Serg eant, Corpor al, and Patrol O f f i c e r . H e r d i r e c ts u p e r v i s o r c h an g e d , d e p e n d i n g o nt h e p art i c u l ar a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f

f i c e r o nd u t y. Appellant wa s an “at will” employ ee.
Whe n App e lla

nt b e g an he r po sit ion , s he too k a n O a th o f O ff

ic e , a c kn ow le dg inghe r d

uty to “sec ure a nd maintain the honest and e fficie nt administration of the aff airs” of the City . Appellant also rec eived a

Policies and Procedur es handout c overingthe rules a nd regulations of the De pa rtme nt. Th is ha

nd ou t re qu ir e d h e r t o “ pe rf or m [he r] d uti e s in an e ff ic ie nt, ho ne st, and

bu sin e sslike manner .” I t also stated that, “[n]o m ember or employ ee sha ll knowingly fa l sify any officia l repor t or enter or ca use to be enter ed any inacc urate , false or improper infor

mation in the rec ords of the Depa rtment.” Violation of the r ules could re sult in di scipline up to and includi n g discharg e. I. Al le ge d Se xua l Ha r as sm e ntNo. 06-1752

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- 3 - Appellant sets out two incidents of a lleg ed sexual hara ssment -- one in October 2003 in the ha llw ay a t th e De pa

rtme nt a nd on e in N ov e mbe r 2 00 3 in the pa rk inglot of the De pa rtme nt.

A. The Hal lwayInc ide nt
On September 30, 2003, w hile dispatched to a n abandone d vehicle, A

ppellant claimed that she wa s y elled at ove r the ra dio by Offic er L ance L amm. This i n ci d en t u p set Appellant a nd she asked he r super

visor to speak to Off

icer L amm about his behavior. T wo day s later, while w orking at the De partment, Appe llant overhe ard O ffice r R icky Hill speaking to Offic er L amm. She alleg ed that Offi c e r H il l to ld O f

f ic e r L a mm th a t th e r e a s o n A p p e ll an t g o t s o u p s e t a b o u t th e in c ide nt was beca use she wa

nted to have sex with him (Off icer L amm) and that he should take he r out and “ do her” or “hump he r,” making r efe renc e to a pr ior Christmas party . Appel lant stated that Off icer L amm told Of

fice r Hill to “cut it out” and that he smiled as he wa lked awa y . Be coming upset about the inc ide nt, Ap pe lla

nt m a de the e xcu se that she wa s sic k, and le ft wo rk . O n O c tob e r 6 , 2 00 3, Cpl
. Przy w ar a s p o k e w it

h A p p e ll an t a

b o u t w h y s h e h a d le f

t th a t d ay . A p p e ll an t to ld h im a bout the incident. Cpl. Prz y

war a told her that he would speak to Office r Hill, but he neve r did.
B. T he P ar king LotInc ide nt Appellant alleg ed that, on Nove mber 27, 2003, she me t Offic er Hill in the parkinglot at the Depa rtment. Althoug h the two conve rsed, both stay ed in th ei r vehic les. Appellant c laimed thatNo. 06-1752

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- 4 - Offic er H ill tol d her that he believed s he and L amm had previously had a sexual relationship and that she wa nted to start a se x ual re lationship with hi m ag ain. She also alleg ed that Of fice r Hill stated that she wa s sleeping with ever y one in the Department and that she was try ing to r uin L amm’s ca

ree r and “fuc k up his life” by making false alleg ations. Appellant alleg ed Of fice r Hill told her that she wa s “trying to fuck up a

n office r and e nd his care er.” Appellant cla imed she wa s warne d to “stay awa y fr om t he su pe rv iso rs ” and

“ ke e p [he r] s e xua l re la tio ns hip wi th [L a mm] ou tsi de of the job .” Th is incident was r eporte d to Cpl. Genter by Appellant, but he took no ac tion. II. Investigation
On Dec ember

4, 2003, Chief Danbe rt called a mee ting with Appe llant and the two off icer s
a ssi g ne d to pe rf

or m the inv e sti g a tio n, Sg t. B ourg e ois and L t. Z a vis lak. Sg t. B ourg e ois , n e w t o th e se ty pes of investig ations, was assig ned to investig ate the matter. L t. Z avislak was a ssigne d to oversee the investig ation and to re commend any action to be taken by the Department. Chief Danbe rt asked Appellant to desc ribe he r alleg ations of sexual harassment a nd to put her complaint in writing
. Both Sg t. Bourg eois and L t. Z avislak per formed a n investigation and prepa red w ritten
re po rt s. Sg t. B ourg e ois re vie we d App e lla nt’ s w ri tte n c omp la int , the da ily tim e sh e e ts a nd logsh e e ts for Appe llant an d Offic er H ill, and the in-ca r audio/video tape s from Off icer Hill’s vehicle on November

24, 2003. He inter

viewed A ppellant; Offic ers Hill, L amm, Gibson, and Rebant; Animal Con tr ol O ff

ic e r S c hr oe de r; and tw o c ivi lia n e mpl oy e e s -- Ca ste rn e lli and L e wt on . Sg t. B ourg e ois had Appe llant reviewthe tape of the Novembe r 24th meeting betwee n App el l ant and Hill, whichNo. 06-1752

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- 5 - contra dicted her

alleg ations. Appellant g ave no e x planation for the discrepa ncy . The next day , she repor ted to the investig ators that she be lieved the conver sation she was ref err ing to in the complaint had ac tually

occur red two wee ks prior. Despite Appellant’s e x planation, Sgt. B ourg eois deter mined that her a lleg ations were unfounded a nd that no other meeting occur red at or near

the Depa rtment other than the one that wa s contained in the a udio rec ording
. L t. Z avislak also pre pare d a re port of his investigation. He fo u n d that the alleg ation reg arding the hallway incident could neither be proven nor disproven because it was a “he sa id she said” situation. L t. Z avislak, howe ver, f ound that Appellant’s a lle g ations reg ardingstatements made by Offic er H ill in t he par

king lot of the Depa

rtment wer e unfounde d based on the videotape evidenc e. He also s et o u t wh at he be lieved we re mistakes ma de by the offic ers who ha

ndled the initial complaints. L t. Z avislak found that Cpl. Przy war a fa iled to document the initial complaint
or pe rf or m any fo llo w- up a c tio ns . He a lso de te rm ine d th a t Cp l. G e nte r s ho uld have fo llo we d u

p w ith Appellant whe n she re ported sexual hara ssment conce rns to him a nd documented a

nd investigated her c oncer

ns. These r eports we re r eviewe d by Chief L aure tti, who succee ded Chief Da nbert.
III. Term ination
On J uly 12, 2004, Appellant rec eived a letter from the City notify ing her that she had be en char g ed with misconduct. The letter set f orth alleg ations that she had made false ve rbal a nd written repor ts about the conve rsation she ha d with O ffice r Hill on November 24, 2003. Appellant wa s direc ted to the Policies and Proce dures manua l reg ardingthe g ener al rules on c onduct, discipline,No. 06-1752

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- 6 - integ rity , repor

ts and bookings, and truthfulness. A hearing was held on J uly 15, 2004. Appellant submitt ed a le tter in su p p o rt o f h er prior stateme nts, reiterating that he r date s could have been in c o r r e c t b u t t h a t a ll f a c ts w e r e tr

u e . Sh e p u t o nn o o th e r e v id e n c e o r

te s ti mo n y . A ppellant’s
e mp l o ym e n tw a s t e r

m i n a t e d o n J u l y 1 9 , 2 0 0 4
. S h e r e c e i v e d n o t i c e t h r o u g h a

l e t t e r f r o m t h e C i t y.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
Sum mary jud g me nt is ap pr op ri a te “ if the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og a tor ie s,
and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s, if any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law .” F ed. R. Civ. P. 5 6( c ); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “The moving pa rty bear s the i nitial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of m ater ial fac t.” Plan t v . M or ton In t’ l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party must produce e vidence showing that a g enuine issue r emains. Id.
Th e c ourt mus t c re dit

a ll e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y the no nmo vin g pa

rt y and dr aw a ll j us tif

ia ble infere nces in that party ’s favor. Id. The nonmovant must, howeve r, “do more than simply show that there is some metaphy sical doubt a s to material fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita El e c . Ind us . Co. Ltd. v . Ze nit

h Radio Corp., 47 5 U .S. 57 4, 58 6 ( 19 86 ). Sum mary jud g me nt i s p ro pe r w he n th e no nmo vin g pa rt y h as h ad ad eq uate time for discovery

and y et “f

ails to make a showingsufficie nt to establish the exis tence of an e lement essential to that par ty ’s ca se, and on w hich that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. We r eview a district court’s g rant of summar y judgme ntNo. 06-1752

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- 7 - de novo. See, e .g., Spence r v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
DI SCU SSIO N
I n o p p o s in g th e mo ti o n f

o r s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t, A p p e ll an t a tt a c k e d th e tr u th f u lne ss of the statements made by

the offic ers who were involved in the incidents and makes newalleg ations about the investig ating office rs. Howe ver, when revie wing a motion for summary judgme nt, a cour

t does not weig h the credibility

of the witnesse s. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc ., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ( holding that “ [c] redibility deter minations, the weig hing of the evidenc e, and the dr awingof leg itimate infere nces f

rom the fa cts are jury

functions, not those of a judge , [when] he is ruling on a motion for summary

judgme nt” ). A c ourt’s func tion, at the district c ourt level a nd on a de novo revie w at the a

ppellate level, is to revie w the evidenc e in a light most favor able to the nonmoving pa rt y to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he re is a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t.
I. TITL E VII SE X DISCRIMINA TION/HO STIL E WORK ENVIRONM ENT
Ti tle VI Iof

the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of 19 64 pr oh ibi ts an e mpl oy e r f ro m di sc ri min a tin g “ a g a ins t any individual with respect to his[/her] co m p en s ati on, terms, conditions, or privileg es of
e mpl oy me nt, be c a

us e of su c h in div idu a l' s r a c e , c olo r, re lig ion, s e x, or natio na l or ig in. ” 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-2( a)( 1). A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VI Iby proving that the discrimination based on sex cre ated a hostile or abusive w ork environme nt. See M eritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 47 7 U .S. 57 , 6 6 ( 19 86 ); Black v . Zaring Homes , Inc. , 104 F.3d 822, 825 (6th Cir.1997)
. Sex discrimination in this form occ u rs “[w]hen the workplac e is perme ated with discriminatoryNo. 06-1752

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- 8 - intimi dation, ridicule, a

nd insult t hat is sufficiently sever e or pe rvasive to alter the c onditions of the victim's e mploy

ment and create an abusive working e nvironment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc

. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). How ever , not all conduct that has sexual overtones is for bidden under

the statute. Meritor , 477 U.S. at 67. The ha rassment must aff ect a “ter m, condition, or privil eg e” of the employ ment. Id. The Ha rri

s Court state d th a t:

mere utteranc e of an ... epithet whic h eng ender s offe nsive fee lings in an e mploy ee, d o e s n o ts u f

f i c i e n t l y a f f e c t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f

e mp l o y m e n tt o i mp l i c a t e T i t l e V II. Conduct that is not s ever e or pe rvasive e noug h to cre ate a n objectively

hostile or abusive work en v i ronm ent--a n environment that a

rea sonable pe rson would find hostile or abusive-- is bey ond Title VI I ’s purview. L i k ew i s e, if the victim does not su bje c tiv e ly pe rc e ive the e nv ir on me nt t o b e a bu siv e , th e c on du c t ha s n ot a c tua lly altere d the conditions of the victim’s employ ment, and ther e is no Title VI Iviolation. 510 U.S. at 21-22 (inter

nal citations omitted).
I n Meritor, the Sup re me Court state d th a t “ [f]o r s e xua l ha ra ssm e nt to be a c tio na

ble , it mus t be suff iciently sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c onditions of [t he victm’s] employ ment and cr eate an abusive wor

king environment.” 477 U.S. at 67 (interna l citations omit ted). The Ha rri s Court set forth a none x clusive list of fac tors to co n s i d er when determining whether the environme nt was ho sti le or a bu sive , in clud ingthe fr e qu e nc y and se ve ri ty of the c on du c t, w he the r i t w a s p hy sic a lly thr e a te nin g or

humil ia tin g , w he the r i t w a s me re ly an u tte ra

nc e , a nd whether it unr e a so na

bly interfe red w ith the person’s wor k perf ormanc e.
I n order for a plaintiff to e stablish a prima fac ie case of hostile w ork environment ba sed on
se xua l ha ra ssm e nt b y

a c o- wo rk e r u

nd e r T itl e VI I , th e fo llo wi nge le me nts mus t be de mon str a te d:No. 06-1752

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- 9 - (1) [the plaintiff] was a membe r of a protec ted class; (2) [t he plaintiff] was subjec ted to unwelcome ha

rassment; (3) the har assment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the har assment unre asonably interfe re d with the plaintiff’s wor k perf ormanc e or cre ated a hostile or offe nsive work environment that was sever e and perva sive; and (5) the e mploy er knew or should have known of t he charg ed sexual hara ssment and failed unr easona

bly to take prompt and a

ppropriate corr ective a ction. Fenton v. H

iSAN, Inc. , 174 F.3d 827, 829- 30 (6th Cir. 1999) . Th e re a so na

ble ne ss s tand ard

ann ounc e d in

fa c tor fi ve a

bo ve ho lds an e mpl oy e r l ia ble on ly when the e mploy er responds to char g es of c o-worke r sexual hara ssment and demonstrate s “indiffe renc e or unr easona bleness in light of

the fa cts the employ er knew or should have known.” Blankenship v. P arke Care Ctrs., Inc. , 123 F.3d 868, 873 ( 6th Cir. 1997 ). This analy sis involves both objective and subje ctive compone nts: “(1) whe ther a rea sonable pe rson would find the environment objec tively hostile, a nd (2) whether the plaintiff subjec tively found the c onduct ‘seve re or per vasive.’” W

ill iam s v . G e n. Mo tor

s Co rp ., 18 7 F .3 d 5 53 , 5 68 (6 th Cir .1 99 9) . A dd iti on a lly , th is Court must l ook to the “totality of the c ircumstance s” in deter mining a hostile wor

k environment claim. Ha rri

s , 510 U.S. at 23. “Eve n wh er e i n d i v i dual instance s of sexual harassment do not on the ir ow n c re a te a

ho sti le e nv ir on me nt, the a c c umu la te d e ff e c t of su c h in c ide nts may

re su lt i n a Ti tle VI Iviolation.” W

illiams, 187 F.3d at 563.
I t is not disputed that Appellant satisfies the first three elements because she i s a member of
a protec ted class who w as subjecte d to unwelcome ha rassment, a

nd the har assment complained of was ba sed on sex. Appellant does not argue that t h e h ar as sment interfe red w ith her work pe rf or manc e . O n th e c on tr ary , sh e a c c e ntu a te s he r so lid pe rf or manc e re c or d w iththe De pa rtme nt.No. 06-1752

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- 10 - There fore , she must demonstrate that the ha rassm en t “c reated a hostile or of fensive w ork environment that wa s sever e and pe rvasive.” Fenton , 174 F.3d at 830. Although ve rbal c onduct alone can be the basis of a hostile wor k environment c laim, Black, 1 0 4 F.3d at 826. Appellant fa iled to establish that a re asonable person would c onsider the environment objec tively

hostile. The comments made in the hallway wer e not directe d at Appellant and there is no indication that the conver sation was desig ned for her to he ar what was be i n g s aid. Th is o c c ur

re nc e a pp e ars to be no mor e tha

n a me re utt e ra

nc e , a nd thu s is no t a c tio na

ble un de r T itl e VI I . I t is therefor e unnec essar y to discuss whether the employ er took prompt ac tion.
Th e pa rk inglot inc ide nt a lso do e s n ot d e mon str a te an o bjective ly ho sti le e nv ir on me nt. Appellant did not work with the se off icer s on a daily

basis. I t appea

rs that she a

nd the offic ers ha d no contac t apar

t f rom occa sional calls that would bring them to the same location or instances whe n they wer e at the D epar

tment at the same time. Althoug h Appellant claims she was threate ned, eve n in her stateme nt she does not alleg e that Of fi ce r Hil l made a phy sical or ve rbal thre at ag ainst her other than te lling her t o s t ay away from super

visors. The comments we re ba sed in rumor a nd innuendo. Ther e wa s only one ins tance when comments wer e made direc tly to Appellant. Ag ain, the incident appe ars to be no mor e than a mere offe nsive utteranc e and does not r ise to the level of
cre ating an objec tively

hostile work environment. We also note that when he r super visor was informed of

the sec ond incident, he immediately beg an an inve stigation.
B e caus e Ap pe lla

nt f a ile d to se t f

or th a pr ima fa c ie c a se of

se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt a

nd ho sti leNo. 06-1752

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- 11 - work e nvironment, there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fa ct and summary judgme nt for the City

was proper . II. RE TA LIA TIO N
To establish a prima fac ie case of reta liation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he/she e ng ag ed in a protec ted ac tivity ; (2) the de fenda nt had knowledge of t he protected c onduct; (3) the de fenda nt took a n adver se employ

ment action ag ainst the plaintiff; and (4) a ca usal conne ction exis ted betwe en the protec ted activity and the a dverse employ ment action. W

eigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tennessee, 30 2 F .3 d 3 67 ,3 81 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) (a pp lyingthe fa c tor s f

ro m McD onnell Douglas Corp. v

. Gr een, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), to a r etaliation claim). U pon a showing of a pr ima fac ie ca se of reta liation, the burden shifts to the employ er to a rticulate some leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for the e mploy er’ s actions. Id. I f the e mploy er makes such a showing , the plaintiff bea rs the burde n of per suasion, by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, and must demonstrate that the propose d rea son
was mer ely

prete x t for the unlaw ful reta liation. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792-93 (6th Cir. 2000). A pla intiff must provide evidenc e to show that the e mploy er did not “‘hone stly believe’ in the proffere d non-discriminatory rea son for its adver se employ ment action.” Braithwai te v. Timke n Co. , 2 5 8 F. 3 d 4 8 8 , 4 9 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Smith v. Chrysler , 155 F.3d 79 9, 80 6- 07 (6 th Cir
. 19 98 ))
. Th e Cou rt loo ks to w he the r t

he e mpl oy e r c an e sta

bli sh“ re a so na

ble
re l i an ce ” on the fa cts befor e it when the de cision was made
. Sm ith , 1 5 5 F
. 3 d a t 8 0 7 ( “ [T ]he ke y inquiry is whether the employ er ma de a r easona bly informed and considere d decision bef ore taking an adve rse e mploy

ment action.”)
.No. 06-1752

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- 12 - Viewingthe evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to Appellant, we c onclude that she has made a prima f acie case for r etaliation. Appellant e ng ag ed in the prote cted a ctivity of repor ting perc eived sexual harassment to her supervisor o n ea ch o f the two oc casions she ide ntified. The City had knowledg e, throug h its a g ents, of the protec ted conduc t. The City terminated he r employ

ment and that termination was c ausally connec ted to her r eporting the alleg ed har assment. The City , howeve r, ar

ticulated its rea son for ter minating Appe llant, claiming that she was dishonest and had f

iled a fa lse repor

t of sexual harassment, thus violating the rules of employ ment
se t out in the poli cies a

nd pr oc e dure s ma

nu a l. T he De pa

rtme nt c omp are d App e lla nt’ s st a te me nts about the h ar as s m en t by Offic er H ill to t he video tape from Of fice r Hill’s police c ruiser a nd deter mine d t h at Appellant had made f alse stateme nts. Base d on this, the Depar tment made the decision to terminate A

ppellant’s employ

ment. We ag ree with the finding of the district cour t that the re ason stated by the City is a leg itimate, nondisc riminatory rea son for Appe llant’s termination.
Th e burd e n n e xt shi ft s b a c k to Ap pe lla nt t o e sta bli sh that the of

fe re d e xplanatio n w a s me re ly pr e te xt for th e City ’s re ta liator y a c tio ns . Appellant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgme nt a sserted that the investigation of her alleg ed misconduct was untimely and one-sided, a nd, thus, merely

a cove r-u p fo r the re al re ason, name ly reta liation. Appellant’s ar g ument is without merit.
This Court stated in Balmer v. H CA, Inc., 423 F.3d 606 ( 6th Cir. 2005):
Th e pla int if

f m us t p r od uc e su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e fr om w hic h th e jur y c ou ld “ re a so na

blyNo. 06-1752

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- 13 - re je c t [th e de fe nd ants ’] e xplanatio n” and infer t hat the de fe nd ants “ int e nti on a lly discriminated” a g ainst her. W o y th a l v . T e x - T e n n Cor p ., 11 2 F. 3d

24 3, 24 6- 47 (6 th Cir . 1 99 7) . T he pla int if

f m us t su bmi t e vid e nc e de mon str a tin g that the e mpl oy e r d id no t “ ‘h on e stl y

be lie ve ’ i n th e pr of

fe re d n on -d isc ri min a tor

y re a so n f or its a dv e rs e employ ment action.” Braithwai te v. Timke n Co. , 258 F.3d 488, 494 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (c i t i n g Smith v. Chrysler , 155 F.3d 799, 806- 07 (6th Cir. 1998)). To inquire into the de fe nd ant’ s “ hones t bel ief ,” the c ourt

loo ks to w he the r t

he e mpl oy e r c an e sta

bli sh “re asonable relianc e” on the particularized fac ts that wer e bef ore the employ er w hen the dec ision was made. Smith, 155 F.3d at 807. Id. at 614. Appellant has offer ed no evidenc e upon which a jur y could re asonably

base a reje ction of the offe red e x planation. Additionally , an investig ation was pe rf ormed, e vidence was re viewed, a nd wi tne sse s w e re qu e sti on e d. Th e re po rt s fi le d by the of fi c e rs and the te rm inatio n le tte r a ll i nd ic a te that the s ole reason for the adverse employ ment action was the Department’s be lief that Appe llant was dishonest about the a lleg ed har assment and ha d filed a fa l s e re p o rt. Ther efor e, without evidenc e to the contr ary , we c onclude that the employ er made a rea sonably informed decision about terminating Appellant’s e mploy ment. Be cause Appellant failed to de monstrate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t reg arding

her r etaliation claim, summary judgme nt for the City

was prope r.
CO NC LU SION
For the re asons set for

th above, we AFF I RM the judgment of the district court.