alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Agreement selling real estate owned by DeAn Joint Venture dated July 11, 2008



 Exhibit 10.3 
 AGREEMENT 
 Party A : Dynacq Healthcare, Inc., formerly Dynacq International, Inc. 
 Party B : Shanghai International Automobile City Spare Parts Assembly Inc. 
 Party C : Shanghai De an Hospital Inc. 
 Party A signed a development agreement on a tract of land located at Muoyu Road northwest, Anting Town,
Jiading District, Shanghai on November 14, 2003. Party C had started the development procedures with Jiading District Housing and Land Administration Bureau on May 6, 2005. Due to the delay in developing the project, Shanghai City Housing
and Land Administration listed the project as inactive. After discussion and negotiation, Parties A, B and C agreed to the following resolutions: 
 Party A
and C will give up the right to develop the project with Jiading District Housing and Land Administration Bureau and return the land to Party B for development. 
 Party B will refund RMB $28,160,000 to Party C for the land of 114,505 square meters. 
 Part B will compensate Party C for the economic loss of RMB
$12,320,000 for acquisition of the right to the land due to delay in development beyond its control. 
 Ten days after this Agreement date, Party B will pay
Party C RMB $28,160,000. Within one month after the completion of all procedures with Jiading Housing and Land Administration Bureau, Party B will pay Party C RMB $12,320,000. If Party B does not pay Party C on a timely basis, Party B will pay Party
C RMB $30,000 per day until fully paid. 
 Parties A and C guarantee that there is no lien on the land and will fully responsible for all economic disputes
arising before this Agreement date, and Party B has no responsibility for the disputes. 
 This Agreement has to be signed and stamped by the legal
representatives of Parties A, B and C to be effective provided that Parties A and C have submitted notice of giving up the right for the land and asked for a refund with Jiading Housing and Land Administration Bureau. 
 This Agreement has seven copies. Each of parties A, B and C has two copies and Jiading Housing and Land Administration Bureau has one copy. 







 Party A : Dynacq Healthcare, Inc., formerly Dynacq International, Inc. 
 /s/ Chiu Moon Chan 
     Chiu Moon Chan, Legal Representative 
 Party B : Shanghai International Automobile City Spare Parts Assembly, Inc.

 /s/ Sun Yi Qun 
 Legal
Representative 
 Party C : Shanghai De An Hospital, Inc. 
 /s/ Chiu Moon Chan 
 Chiu Moon Chan, Legal Representative 
 Date: July 11, 2008
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________ 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff(s)

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant(s)

SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION

To: (Defendant’s name and address)

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you

are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,

whose name and address are:

If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. 

You also must file your answer or motion with the court.

CLERK OF COURT

Date:

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

 District of Oregon

COUNTRYMAN NEVADA, LLC, 

3:15-cv-00437-SI

COREY COFFMAN, 

Corey Coffman 

1103 NE Thompson St 

Portland, Oregon 97212 

CROWELL LAW 

CARL D. CROWELL 

943 LIBERTY STREET SE 

PO BOX 923 

SALEM, OR 97308 

07/30/2015 By: s/Sutawnee Sellers, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:15-cv-00437-SI Document 18 Filed 07/30/15 Page 1 of 1
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1381

_____________________________

SILAS KENDRICKS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Steven B. Whittington, Judge.

January 28, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Silas Kendricks, Pro Se, Appellant.
2

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### STATE of Arkansas *v.*Rickey Dale NEWMAN

CR 03-1257

205 S.W.3d 795

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered March 24, 2005

*Mike Beebe,*Att’y Gen., by: *Clayton K. Hodges,*Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.

*Bruce Eddy,*Federal Public Defender, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appellant Rickey Dale Newman moves this court to dissolve its temporary stay of his execution. The State has filed a response, stating that Newman’s motion should be granted as all matters pending in the circuit court have been resolved. Bruce Eddy, a federal public defender, has also filed a response to Newman’s motion, arguing that it should be denied as it is premature.

On February 3, 2005, the circuit court held an inquiry hearing after the federal public defenders filed a petition for writ of *habeas corpus*on Newman’s behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found Newman to be competent to make decisions regarding his case. Newman then, in open court, fired the federal public defenders attempting to represent him in circuit court. Thereafter, the circuit court, ruling from the bench, *238dismissed any pending matters, finding that the federal public defenders did not represent Newman for any state proceedings.

At this time, we are unable to rule on Newman’s motion to dissolve the stay of execution, because there is nothing before us to indicate that the trial court entered a written order denying the *habeas*petition filed on Newman’s behalf. We therefore instruct the trial court to enter a written order consistent with its ruling from the bench at the February 3, 2005, hearing within thirty days from this order. Once that order has been entered, we will consider the merits of Newman’s motion to dissolve the temporary stay of execution.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v T. J. Graham, Appellant.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Kupferman, Ross, Carro and Kassal, JJ.
. . ’

.e 

## 305

oplnlonEo. O-7.502 %I?: Is it mfudatorythat the city health officerbe ap lntetl.sacb

year snd cl 2-e ted questlon8. Your letter of flwentber 9, 1966 has been reoeivedr-eguestingan opkfon of this department MC! presenting

the following two questione:



### WI. asndatorythat the c ty hetith dfficsris appointed

Atrordiy to ,,the~

state. l&s is it

every two ye%rs? '

‘(2). is z-e-elected

entire1 sL%yor and city counta ; city health officer ey wish to keep the sams 8 It necesscqr for the govern- * body ta agaia 08ficially appointthe health officer Sor a new tea-&" prorides

: Article 4425, ILevisod Civil Statutesof Tsxas, as amended,

. . "The goyerniig.

bod;r of each inoorporated city and tom within this State shzS. elect l qualified person for the office of City health officerby s najority of the vo';os

of the governing

body, except in cities uhich aay be o*rat.ed under e charterprovidingfor a different

net!& of se1ecti.q city fh yaicians,in which event the dfiS.ce

of city healthoff cer &all be filled as ie now PiLeG by the city physicist,, butSin no iustaneesl;&.et~tof:ice02 city health ofricerbB aboliabed. -- liealtk

ofilcer after amointzzent shall talcc

em? sub&be to the of1 -1 ciCl o.&; ant?

ah dl flL - copy of such oath end a copy of his a~~oiWmrzt\

.

Ilon. oebrgo WI co% - P%w 2

~t&theTaxasStateBoard ofKee&h, and ahallnotbe 

### debti ",z

;&a;~ qualified

untilaaidcoptee

ohall

. Ho tenure of affieo ir proaadbad for the oit health officer,80 the 

## etty wouldhaye authoriOy'to preeoriba

I;r ordinanoo what the authorities felt would-be the properlength of tho.Wrm of a 

## cityhealth officer. However,. the tena 

## of officecould not be fixed for a term longer.than two yearsbecause of the limitation6 providedin Article XVI Section 30, of the Texas Cowtitution. 380 &SO ca~b&%ll VS. k&OWfl, 30 3.4. 322; h2hld.c: Vll. City Of ' Dallas, 63 SAT;'.

2nd 175, af-tirn?od

# S.X. 2nd 167, oplnioil withdrawn on rdmaring and reversed on ether grounds,103 S.W. 2nd 725. provides:

Row&w, Article XVI, Section17, of the State Constlti%ion

(7) .ihll officers

within the Stat6 eh&U continueto performthe &tie8 0: their offioeer until their 5wz- .b.. oe88or8 13hal.3. be dd.. qu&ified.R 'Pherbforo,

our antwer Lo ]iour

first q&t&on is that a city health officer&tee no-t havo to be appo$ntbd every two ywr6, but his ternlofofflce c#u¶not+befor8longortwm~aQtwoye~* ia that it would not be a&o ol'ficially

ap it?% if that person now olds

r ofMaa u ntil hi6 l u o c e sadvisable

if the city .~.
#### James MacDONALD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert J. HERNANDEZ, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-55353.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 16, 2007.*

Filed April 20, 2007.

James MacDonald, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

*797Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner James MacDonald appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging the denial of parole. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, *Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms,*461 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm.

Despite MacDonald’s contentions to the contrary, there is some evidence in the record supporting the parole board’s denial of parole. *See Sass,*461 F.3d at 1128-29 (holding that there is no due process violation if there is some evidence in the record that could support disciplinary board’s conclusion). MacDonald was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court as he claims, because it would not have changed the outcome. *See Williams v. Taylor,*529 U.S. 420, 432-33, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); *Sass,*461 F.3d at 1129.

We decline to address MacDonald’s unexhausted challenge to a subsequent gubernatorial finding that he continues to be unsuitable for parole. *See*Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); *see also*28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); *In re Rosenkrantz,*29 Cal.4th 616, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174, 183 (2002) (holding that Governor’s reversal of parole grant is subject to state judicial review).

AFFIRMED.

**

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Megan E. Glor, OSB No. 930178

Email: megan@meganglor.com

Megan E. Glor, Attorneys at Law, P.C.

707 NE Knott Street, Suite 101

Portland, OR 97212

Telephone: (503) 223-7400

Facsimile: (503) 751-2071

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

DANICA LOVE BROWN, individually and

on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

STORED VALUE CARDS, INC. (d/b/a

NUMI FINANCIAL); and CENTRAL

NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST

COMPANY, ENID, OKLAHOMA,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-1370-MO

PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO

ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

PURSUANT TO LR 83-11(a)

Expedited Review Requested

CERTIFICATION PER L.R. 7.1

The undersigned certifies that she has conferred with Defendants’ counsel, Eric Nystrom,

regarding this Motion, and that he has advised that Defendants do not oppose it.

Page 1 - PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO

ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

Megan E. Glor, Attorneys at Law

707 NE Knott Street, Suite 101

Portland, OR 97212

503-223-7400

Case 3:15-cv-01370-MO Document 209 Filed 05/21/20 Page 1 of 2
MOTION

The undersigned hereby moves for the entry of an Order permitting Sabarish P.

Neelakanta to withdraw as counsel of record for Plaintiff. Mr. Neelakanta is no longer associated

with the Human Rights Defense Center or involved in the case. The undersigned will remain as

counsel for Plaintiff.

DATED: May 21, 2020

Respectfully Submitted,

s/ Megan E. Glor_____________________

Megan E. Glor, OSB No. 930178

Page 2 - PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO

ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL

Megan E. Glor, Attorneys at Law

707 NE Knott Street, Suite 101

Portland, OR 97212

503-223-7400

Case 3:15-cv-01370-MO Document 209 Filed 05/21/20 Page 2 of 2
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(91 Hun, 229.)

#### SOUTH BROOKLYN SAWMILL CO. v. CRONIN et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

December 2, 1895.)

Principal and Agent—Authority op Agent.

Evidence that one B., the agent of plaintiff corporation, which had sold goods to defendant, said that he had a job for defendant to hire a pile driver to one M.; that defendant replied, “1 will collect this from you;” and ' that B. answered, “I am all right; we are good for the bill,”—shows that defendant hired the pile driver to M., and that B. was to collect "the bill, but imposes no liability on plaintiff for the hire of the pile driver.

Appeal from circuit court, Kings county.

Action by the S’outh Brooklyn Sawmill Company against Richard Cronin and others to recover the sum of $101, with interest,—a balance alleged to be due for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendants. From a judgment entered on a verdict directed by the court in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.

James C. Church, for appellants.

Hyland & Zabriskie, for respondent

DYKMAN J.

This is an appeal from a judgment and an order denying a motion for a new trial upon the minutes of the court. The *935action was for the recovery of $101, with interest, for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants. The answer admitted the claim of the plaintiff, and set up a counterclaim of $96, for the use of a pile driver, and the counterclaim was controverted by the plaintiff. The testimony of one of the defendants upon that subject was that Mr. Buckley, who was acting for the plaintiff, said to him;

> “ T have got a big job down there,’ he says, ‘for you to hire a pile driver, and I told him $10 a day.’ Says 1, ‘Who is it for *T*He said, ‘McBean,—a fellow by the name of McBean.’ Says 1. T am told that this man is a great blower,’—so I heard,—‘and Buckley,’ says I, ‘1 will collect this bill from you.’ And Buckley says, T am all right; we are good for the bill;’ and so I gave it to Buckley.”

The true construction of that testimony is that the pile driver was hired to McBean, and Buckley was to collect the bill for the defendants. That arrangement imposed no liability upon the plaintiff, and constituted no counterclaim in favor of the defendants. The verdict was properly directed for the plaintiff, and the judgment and order denying the motion for a new trial should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

866 

KA 10-02084 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND LINDLEY, JJ. 

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KALVIN M. SMITH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County

(Joseph D. Valentino, J.), rendered December 18, 2009. The judgment

convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of burglary in the second

degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him following a

jury trial of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]),

defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel

on the ground that defense counsel, during the Sandoval hearing,

conceded that defendant could be cross-examined, should he testify at

trial, with respect to a 2004 conviction of criminal possession of

stolen property in the fourth degree, a class E felony. We reject

that contention. “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, it is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of

strategic or other legitimate explanations” for defense counsel’s

allegedly deficient conduct (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709; see

People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-713). Here, defense counsel

conceded an issue that, in any event, would likely have been decided

against defendant (see generally People v Williams, 98 AD3d 1234,

1235, lv denied 21 NY3d 947; People v Robles, 38 AD3d 1294, 1295, lv

denied 8 NY3d 990), while at the same time arguing that the People

should be precluded from using on cross-examination various other

criminal convictions to impeach defendant’s credibility. Supreme

Court agreed in part with defense counsel and precluded crossexamination of defendant with respect to three other criminal

convictions. Under the circumstances, we conclude that defendant

failed to meet the requisite burden in support of his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel (see Rivera, 71 NY2d at 709).
-2- 866 

KA 10-02084 

Even assuming, arguendo, that defense counsel erred in making the

limited Sandoval concession, we conclude that the single error was not

so egregious as to deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial (see

generally People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 480; People v Cosby, 82 AD3d

63, 67, lv denied 16 NY3d 857). Viewed as a whole, the record

establishes that defense counsel provided meaningful representation

(see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147; People v Long, 96

AD3d 1492, 1494, lv denied 19 NY3d 1027). 

Entered: September 26, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Enrique Castillo, Also Known as Enrique C. Fernandez, Appellant.

[944 NYS2d 495]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel P. Conviser, J.), rendered July 12, 2010, as amended August 6, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree (three counts) and attempted petit larceny, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 3 to 9 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly admitted evidence of an uncharged crime. Defendant was charged with filing documents that falsely represented himself as the owner of a building. The court properly received evidence of a similar, uncharged scheme involving a Brooklyn property. The perpetrator of the Brooklyn scheme also filed fraudulent documents, using the same variation on defendant’s name, the same address, and the same falsified notary stamp that were used with respect to the property involved in the charged crime. The uncharged scheme was highly relevant to trial issues concerning knowledge, fraudulent intent and motive *(see e.g. People v Potter,*30 AD3d 313, 314 [2006], *lv denied*7 NY3d 816 [2006]). Furthermore, the charged and uncharged crimes shared a distinctive pattern and were thus admissible as evidence of identity *(see People v Beam,,*57 NY2d 241, 253 [1982]). There was ample evidence to support the inference that defendant was the perpetrator of the Brooklyn scheme *(see People v Robinson,*68 NY2d 541, 544-545 [1986]). Defendant’s challenge to the court’s limiting instruction is unpreserved and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal.

The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting testimony by a judge who had been the attorney for the deceased owner of the property that was the subject of the charged crimes. Defendant argues that this testimony was cumulative to other evidence and served no purpose except to impress the jury by having a judge testify for the prosecution. However, the judge’s testimony was clearly relevant, and it could not have caused any prejudice. The word “judge” was mentioned only once, when the witness stated his present employment. Furthermore, the court offered to instruct the jury that a judge’s testimony should be treated like that of any witness, but defendant declined that offer.

*679The court properly admitted statements made at arraignment by defendant’s former counsel. These were vicarious admissions by defendant, made through his agent (see *People v Brown,*98 NY2d 226, 232-233 [2002]). Accordingly, these statements were properly introduced into evidence by way of the testimony of a court reporter. Defendant’s argument that the circumstances required the People to call the former counsel as a witness is unpersuasive.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Andrias, J.P, Saxe, Catterson, Renwick and Román, JJ.