IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

DENISE HANSEN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

ALAN STUART GRAF, P.C. 

208 Pine Street 

Floyd, VA 24091 

Attorney for plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

United States Attorney 

District of Oregon 

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 SW Third Ave., Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97201-2902 

KATHRYN A. MILLER 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of the General Counsel 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 M/S 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

Of Attorneys for defendant 

Case No. 6:15-cv-01954-AC 

OPINION AND ORDER 
ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: 

Denise Hansen ("plaintiff') seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner 

of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). This court has jurisdiction to review the 

Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on a careful review of the record, 

the Commissioner's decision is affomed. 1 

Procedural Background 

Plaintiff applied for DIB on August 10, 2010, alleging disability as of October 1, 2008, due 

to tail-bone injury, fatigue, depression, fibrous tumors, gall stones, and mood swings. (Tr. 125-26.) 

Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 113, 125.) A hearing convened 

on June 5, 2014, before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 42-111.) On June 17, 2014, the 

ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 12-22.) Plaintiff timely requested review 

of the ALJ' s decision and, after the Appeals Council denied review, plaintiff filed a complaint in this 

court. (Tr. 1-3.) 

Factual Background 

Bom on March 25, 1959, plaintiff was 49 years old on the alleged onset date of disability and 

and 54 years old on the date of the hearing. (Tr. 42, 126.) Plaintiff attended high school through the 

eleventh grade and did not obtain a GED. (Tr. 49.) She did, however, attend a vocational school 

and earned a veterinary tech ce1iificate. Id. 

1 Nancy A. BeITyhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to 

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for Acting 

Commissioner Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant in this suit. 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Standard of Review 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards 

and the findings arn supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammockv. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The court must weigh 

"both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez 

v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). "Where the evidence as a whole can support either 

a grant or a denial, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's." Massachi v. Astrue, 

486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 42 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the 

Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" if so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

At step two, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairment or combination ofimpairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( c ). 

If not, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 
At step three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or 

equals "one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary aclmowledges are so severe as to 

preclude substantial gainful activity." Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( d). If so, the claimant is presumed 

disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant still can perfmm "past 

relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. § 404. l 520(f). If the claimant can work, she 

is not disabled; if she cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work 

existing in significant numbers in the national or local economy. Id. at 142; 20 C.F.R. § 

404. l 520(g). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1566. 

The ALJ's Findings 

At step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date. (Tr. 14.) At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 15.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that the plaintiff did not have an impaitment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled one of a number of impairments that are so severe as to 

preclude substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 17.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ continued the sequential evaluation process to determine how 

plaintiffs medical limitations affected her ability to work. The ALJ resolved that plaintiff had the 

following residual functional capacity ("RFC"): 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 
(Tr. 18.) 

[She can] perform medium exe1tion work with lifting and canying of 

50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, standing and 

walking six hours of an eight-hour workday, and sitting six hours of 

an eight-hour workday. She is limited to frequent Imeeling, 

crouching, and climbing of ramps and stairs. She is limited to 

occasional stooping and kneeling. The claimant must avoid 

concentrated exposure to operational control of moving machinery, 

hazardous machinery, and unprotected heights. 

At step four, the ALJ found plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a 

caregiver. (Tr. 21.) Accordingly, the ALJ did not proceed to step five, but concluded instead that 

plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 22.) 

Discussion 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (I) finding plaintiffs symptom testimony not credible; (2) 

rejecting the opinion of examining physician Anthony Glassman, M.D.; (3) discrediting lay witness 

testimony; and ( 4) finding plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment at step two of the 

sequential evaluation process. 

I. Plaintiffs Testimony 

The Ninth Circuit relies on a two-step process for evaluating the credibility of a claimant's 

testimony about the severity and limiting effect of the stated symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 

2007)). "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 

other symptoms alleged." Lingenfelter, 503 F.3d at 1036 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Second, absent evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the 

severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Smolen v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Fruiher, anALJ "may consider ... ordinmy 

techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent 

statements concerning the symptoms, ... [or J other testimony that appears less than candid .... " 

Id. at 1284. However, a negative credibility finding made solely because the claimant's symptom 

testimony "is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence" is legally insufficient. 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ's credibility 

finding may be upheld even if not all of the ALJ' s rationales for rejecting claimant testimony are 

upheld. See Batson v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). 

At her administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that she was in pain most of the time, and 

had been unable to work full-time since 2012. (Tr. 18, 59.) Plaintiff testified, however, that she 

was seeing three clients as a caregiver, was allotted 31 honrs per week by her employer, and was 

earning $10 anhonr. (Tr. 18, 71.) Plaintiff felt she was able to stand and walk for 3-4 hours per 

8-hour workday, but that she could not work more than two consecutive 8-hour workdays. She 

explained that she needed assistance lifting and transfening two of her clients. (Tr. 18, 71, 73-75.) 

In her SSA disability application materials, plaintiff indicated she can walk a couple of 

blocks and then rest for 5-10 minutes before resuming; can lift 5 pounds with her right arm, but 

finds lifting more than 5 pounds ve1y painful; is able to prepare simple meals and perfonn some 

housekeeping activities, albeit slowly; is able to drive; socializes with fmnily members; can follow 

written or spoken instructions; and gets along "OK" with authority figures. See (tr. 282-87). She 

expressed trouble handling stress, and sometimes feels very angry and "tired of eve1ything." Id. 

The ALJ found plaintiffs statements "concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects" of her symptoms not entirely credible. (Tr. 19.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ ened in 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 
discrediting her mental impairment allegations as to her anger, inability to deal with others, and 

feeling isolated. Plaintiffs Opening Brief ("PL' s Br.") 15. However, the ALJ addressed plaintiffs 

alleged anger issues at step two of the sequential evaluation process, finding that they did not have 

more than a minimal effect on her ability to perform basic work activities. (Tr. 16.) Specifically, 

the ALJ noted that although plaintiffhas had difficulties engaging in appropriate social interactions 

at times due to anger, it did not constitute more than a minimal limitation on her ability to work 

based on a medically determinable impahment. Id 

In support of her findings, the ALJ cited plaintiffs own testimony regarding her ability to 

perfo1m her caregiver job which requires frequent, close interactions with her clients. (Tr. 17.) The 

ALJ further noted plaintiff did not endorse any difficulties with social functioning in her function 

report. Id Accordingly, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discredit plaintiffs 

allegations of disabling anger, and conclude that any limitation was no more than mild. Although 

plaintiff has an alternative interpretation of the evidence, the ALJ' s finding is upheld when, as here, 

it is rational and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Batson v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359F.3dI190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 

The ALJ also discredited plaintiffs allegations as to the functional impact of her physical 

impairments. For example, the ALJ found plaintiffs ability to perfo1m work and work-like 

activities was inconsistent with her allegation of being limited to lifting five pounds. (Tr. 18.) 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ mischaracterized her allegation, citing a comment in plaintiffs function 

report indicating it was ve1y painful to lift more than five pounds. (Tr. 287 .) While Plaintiff 

contends her statement cannot properly be constrned in the manner it was by the ALJ, the relevant 

exhibit also reflects plaintiff additionally alleged she can only lift "about 5 lbs with my right arm." 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 
(Tr. 282.) Moreover, the ALJ recognized that plaintiffs allegations were not consistent throughout 

her function report, as plaintiff "alleged she could only lift five (or 10 per other pmis of the report) 

pounds." (Tr. 18, 283 .) Although plaintiff asse1is that there was a "significant difference" between 

plaintiffs allegations and the ALJ's findings, plaintiff does not explain how any difference was 

significant. See Pl. 's Br. 15. However, even assuming the record is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, the Comi must uphold the ALJ's findings because they are supported by 

inferences reasonably drawn from the record. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff argues next that although she was able to engage in work during the relevant time 

period, she was nonetheless hmnpered by pain, and as a result could not work full-time, and "her 

hours varied greatly." (Tr. 19.) Regardless of the precise variation in plaintiffs work hours over 

the adjudicative time period, the ALJ accurately found that she "had a substillltial amount of paid 

work activity after the alleged onset date until the present." Id The ALJ explicitly addressed 

plaintiffs argument, noting,"[ w ]hile her hours have vm·ied greatly, this work activity supports the 

ultimate finding that she can sustain work within the residual functional capacity." Id Indeed, the 

ability to maintain employment "with a fair amount of success" during an alleged period of 

disability has been upheld as convincing evidence supporting a non-disability decision. Drouin v. 

Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The ALJ further explained that plaintiff lost her job due to missing a meeting Md refusing 

to sign a contract rather thilll any functional impairment arising from a medically-determinable 

condition, and indicated at the hearing that her hours were recently increased. Id That a claimant 

leaves a job for reasons aside from a medically-determinable impairment are valid grounds to 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 
discredit plaintiff testimony. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, 

although plaintiff now suggests her employment ended due to her inability to get along with her 

superiors at work, plaintiff testified that she essentially quit her caregiver job at Ashley Manor in 

2013. (Tr. 15, 19, 63-65.) There is no indication in the record that her employment was to be 

discontinued until she failed to show-up to work after collecting a paycheck. (Tr. 65.) Thereafter, 

she was employed by History Makers beginning in January 2014 through June 2014, the date of the 

decision; further, she was scheduled to increase her hours to 31 hours per week, and had three 

clients at the time. (Tr. 18.) For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ rationally interpreted the record 

and made specific findings with suppmied by the record; thus, plaintiffs alternate interpretation is 

unavailing. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. 

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to adequately support the finding that plaintiffs 

subjective pain allegations were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. Plaintiff provides 

medical imagining evidence and medical descriptions of her degenerative disc disease and facet 

joint arthrosis, both of which, she argues, cause pain. Pl.'s Br. 15. However, as plaintiff 

recognizes, pain is subjective, and an ALJ is not compelled to simply accept all of a plaintiffs pain 

allegations. Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ 

provided other valid rationales in finding plaintiffs allegations not fully credible. See Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) ("While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected 

on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical 

evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling 

effects.") (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). 

Moreover, the ALJ provided a thorough summary and analysis of the medical record, in 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 
which she found significant gaps between treatments. The ALJ pointed out that although the 

adjudicative period in this case began in January 2010, plaintiff did not report back pain until 

November 2010, where she had full range of motion with tenderness in her lumbar spine upon 

examination. (Tr. 20, 367-68, 3 7 4-7 5.) Despite her allegedly disabling pain, she did not again seek 

treatment for her back until May 2012. (Tr. 20, 354, 415-18.) Thereafter, there was a break in 

treatment until January 2014. (Tr. 20, 458-62.) After thoroughly reviewing the medical record, the 

ALJ determined that the "limited treatment record and lack of significant objective findings" 

demonstrated plaintiff was not as limited as she alleged. (Tr. 20.) An" individual's statements may 

be less credible if the level of frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints." 

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted). The ALJ's rationale is valid. 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by evaluating her receipt of unemployment benefits. 

Specifically, plaintiff asserts the record is unclear as to whether she held herself out as being able 

to work full-time in order to receive benefits. The ALJ stated: 

While she claims to be unable to sustain full time [work], receipt of 

unemployment requires that during times her hours were reduced, she 

was willing to accept other full time, pati time, or temporary work, 

and that she was physically and mentally capable of performing such 

work. Therefore, she was affirming that she would be able to work 

additional hours to what she was already. 

(Tr. 19.) Plaintiff agues her position is supp01ted by Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 

F.3d 155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008), in which the Ninth Circuit panel found the record did not clearly 

establish that Carmickle held himself out as able to perform full-time as opposed to merely patt-time 

work. Id The Commissioner contends Carmickle is inapposite because in the instant case plaintiff 

was working pait-time when she requested benefits, so arguably she was able to work more than 

part-time. Def.' s Br. 13. Although the somewhat vague evidence suggests plaintiff was willing to 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 
work more than part-time, the evidence does not necessarily reflect plaintiff was willing to accept 

full-time employment. Given that the record is vague on the issue, the ALJ's rationale does not meet 

the clear-and-convincing legal standard. 

Nonetheless, any etTor in evaluating plaintiffs receipt of unemployment benefits is harmless 

in light of the other valid reasons the ALJ cited for impugning her symptom allegations. In other 

words, despite the enor, the ALJ' s other findings remain supported by substantial evidence, and were 

articulated with adequate clarity and specificity. The remainder of the ALJ's findings regarding the 

credibility of plaintiffs allegations regarding her pain and functional limitations are, therefore, 

upheld. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (citing Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195-97). 

II. Medical Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff assigns enor to the ALJ' s assessment of examining physician Anthony Glassman, 

M.D.2 An ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical testimony. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating or examining 

physician, or specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting contradicted opinions, so long as they are 

supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Nonetheless, treating or examining physicians are owed deference and will often by entitled to the 

greatest, if not controlling, weight. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and 

2 The Court notes that plaintiff does directly contest the ALJ's evaluation of the medical 

opinion of examining psychologist Allan R. Kirkendall, Ph.D in her written arguments. Because 

the court declines to manufacture the argument, and instead will "review only issues which are 

argued specifically and distinctly in a party's opening brief." Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Wash., 

350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Greenwood v. Fed Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 

977 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 
internal quotation omitted). An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement by setting out 

a detailed summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation, and making 

findings. Morgan v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). However, 

"the ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and 

explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citation omitted). 

On this record, Dr. Glassman's assessment was contradicted in part by the State agency medical 

examiners. Accordingly, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the doctor's opinion must be specific and 

legitimate, and supported by substantial evidence. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. 

Dr. Glassman, following a January 2011 musculoskeletal examination, opined that plaintiff 

could stand and walk up to four hours per workday for no more than one hour at a time, and lift 20 

to 35 pounds occasionally and 10 to 20 pounds frequently. (Tr. 20, 330.) The ALJ rejected the 

extent of Dr. Glassman's limitation assessment, adopting instead the State agency doctors' 

limitations of standing or walking six of eight hours, and lifting 50 pounds occasionally and 25 

pounds frequently. (Tr. 18, 21, 120-21, 134-35.) The ALJ explained that she rejected Dr. 

Glassman's findings because they did not correlate to objective findings. (Tr. 20.) Indeed, Dr. 

Glassman noted there were "no objective findings on examination thus subjective complaints do not 

correlate with the exam." (Tr. 330.) The ALJ determined, therefore, that Dr. Glassman's physical 

restrictions wananted only limited weight because they were not supported by objective medical 

findings, although Dr. Glassman performed a widerangeofmusculoskeletal tests. (Tr. 330, 332-33.) 

An ALJ is not required to accept any medical opinion that is brief, conclusory, or otherwise 

inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Both the ALJ and the State 

agency doctors determined that Dr. Glassman's exertional limitations were, by the doctor's own 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 
reckoning, not supported by objective findings. The record substantiates the lack of objective 

findings, as the results from Dr. Glassman's examination results all bear the same checkmark. See 

(tr. 332-33). Dr. Glassman further noted that there was "no evidence of joint deformity, effusion, 

erythema, or crepitus." (Tr. 330.) The doctor also observed full motor strength, nmmal gait, and 

heel and toe walking without difficutly. Id Accordingly, there does not appear to be any objective 

basis for Dr. Glassman's assessed limitations. 

Plaintiff argues that subsequent medical imaging results revealed mild facet joint artlu·osis 

at 14-5 and moderate naiTowing due to degenerative disc disease at 15-Sl. Nevertheless, the 

imaging results do not change the fact that Dr. Glassman did not identify any range of motion 

deficiencies despite exaininingvirtually all of plaintiffs bodily joints. (Tr. 332-33.) Moreover, Dr. 

Glassman himself admitted that plaintiffs subjective pain complaints did not correlate to the absence 

of objective findings. (Tr. 330.) As such, plaintiffs contention that Dr. Glassman "made his 

physical exertional findings consistent with his examination" is not supported by the record. See 

Pl.' s Br. 12. Instead, the A1J reasonably inferred Dr. Glassman assessed physical limitations despite 

finding no objective evidence of physical limitations. (Tr. 330.) Thus, the A1J did not en-. 

Plaintiff further ai·gues the A1J's analysis was deficient to the extent she failed to describe 

how her findings, rather than Dr. Glassman's, were correct. Pl. 's Br. 12. However, the ALJ 

explained that she chose to adopt the State agency doctors' functional assessment because it was 

"consistent with the claimant's work history and her continued work that involves assisting clients 

with transfers." (Tr. 21.) Accordingly, the limitations assessed by the A1J were not mbitrary. 

Plaintiff additionally argues the ALJ erred by failing to account for Dr. Glassman' s opinion 

that plaintiff would need occasional breaks during her six hours of sitting during the workday. Pl.' s 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Br. 12-13. However, the ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason to disregard Dr. Glassman's 

opinion, and regardless of the special deference accorded treating and examining physicians, an ALJ 

is not required to accept any medical opinion that is not adequately supported by clinical findings. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). For all of the foregoing reasons, the ALJ did not err 

in rejecting Dr. Glassman's opinion. 

III. Lay Witness Testimony 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by rejecting the lay witness testimony of her mother, Linda 

Fabrazio, who completed a function report on December 9, 2010. See (tr. 274-81). Lay witness 

testimony is competent evidence which an ALJ must take into account unless the ALJ provides a 

germane reason to disregard it. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919; see also Bruce v. Astrue, 557 F.3d 1113, 

1115 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, the ALJ summarized Ms. Fabrazio's written testimony, which described that plaintiff 

"was easily frustrated, couldn't malce change, and was in pain[,]" but found that "other evidence of 

record does not support the mentally based assertions and there are few mentions of physically based 

limitations .... " (Tr. 19.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ' s reasoning "is not supported by the medical 

evidence," alleging the ALJ enoneously found plaintiff did not have a "severe" mental impairment 

at step two of the sequential evaluation process. Pl.'s Br. 13-14. Plaintiff further argues "the ALJ's 

assertions are not factually based." Id 

Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. The ALJ reasoned that plaintiff had been able to 

maintain work despite her mental and physical limitations. Specifically, the ALJ noted that 

plaintiffs work "require[ d] substantial interaction with clients for years." (Tr. 17 .) The ALJ also 

pointed out that despite her allegations of severe mental limitation at the hearing, plaintiff did not 

Page 14- OPINION AND ORDER 
endorse significant problems in social functioning in her self-report. (Tr. 286-89.) Rather, she 

indicated she did not have problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors or others; is good 

at following spoken instructions; gets along "OK" with authority figures; and has never been fired 

or laid off from a job because of problems getting along with other people. (Tr. 287.) Accordingly, 

it was neither unreasonable nor factually e!Toneous for the ALJ to find Ms. Fabrazio's assertions 

unsupported by the record, particularly considering plaintiffs testimonial evidence. Such an 

inconsistency is routinely upheld as a valid, germane rationale in the Ninth Circuit. See Lewis v. 

Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001) (inconsistency between a lay witness and claimant 

testimony is a germane reason to reject lay witness testimony); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218 

("The ALJ accepted the testimony ofBayliss's family and friends that was consistent with the record 

... he rejected the p01iions of their testimony that did not meet this standard .... "). 

IV. Step Two Assignment ofE!Tor 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by declining to find a severe mental impairment at step two 

of the sequential evaluation process. Here, the ALJ considered whether plaintiff had a medically 

dete1minable mental impairment that significantly limited her ability to perform basic work 

activities, and has lasted or is expected to last for at least 12 months. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). Fmiher, the medically determinable mental impairment must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques, not merely reported symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1528(a), (b). ALJ e!Tors of omission at step two are often harmless if the step is decided in a 

claimant's favor. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2005). When an ALJ considers 

evidence oflimitations posed by all ofa claimant's impahments at step four, any error in omitting 

Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER 
that impairment at step two is harmless. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ decided step two of the evaluation process in plaintiffs favor. (Tr. 15.) 

Fmihermore, despite declining to find any mental impairments at step two, the ALJ nonetheless 

considered and discussed whether plaintiff had any mental limitations that affected her residual 

functional capacity. For example, the ALJ noted plaintiff denied having problems getting along with 

others, despite her contradictmy allegations of severe anger issues. (Tr. 19, 287.) The ALJ also 

considered that despite plaintiffs alleged mental limitations, she was neve1iheless able to engage 

in "a substantial amoUllt of work and work-like activity throughout the alleged period of disability." 

(Tr. 19.) The ALJ additionally observed that plaintiff indicated she stopped working in June 2010 

due to moving to Oregon rather than due to any severe impairment, and described simply walking 

away from her care-giver job at Ashley Manor after collecting a paycheck, rather than being 

terminated for impairment-related reasons. (Tr. 19, 63-65.) Finally, the ALJ foUlld that plaintiff was 

employed at the time of the hearing acting as a care-giver to three clients, and that her hours had 

recently increased to 31 hours per week. (Tr. 19, 71.) As the ALJ indicated, plaintiffs job at the 

time of the hearing constituted substantial gainful activity. (Tr. 15, 21.) For these reasons, the 

record reflects the ALJ properly considered plaintiffs mental impairments at step four. Therefore, 

any error at step two is necessarily harmless. Burch, 400 F.3d at 682; Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911. 

Plaintiff contends that two Ninth Circuit cases illustrate the ALJ erred by not finding any 

severe mental impairment at step two. First, plaintiff cites Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 

115 8 (9th Cir. 2001 ), for the proposition that a step two error may not be harmless where the ALJ 

omits a pariicular a severe impairment, but nonetheless decides the step in plaintiffs favor. Pl.' s Br. 

8-9; Pl.'s Reply 4-5. However, in contrast to Burch, the ALJ's step two error in Edlund was not 

Page 16 - OPINION AND ORDER 
harmless because that ALJ failed to consider the effects of Edlund's mental impahment at 

subsequent steps of the evaluation process. See Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1160 ("[T]he ALJ failed to 

factor Edlund's mental impairments into her step 5 analysis .... "). Thus, Edlund does not stand for 

the proposition that an ALJ' s en·or in finding an impairment non-severe at step two is harmful e1rnr 

per se, even if the step was decided in plaintiffs favor. Rather, Edlund is distinguishable because 

the ALJ in that case neglected to consider all of the impairments at subsequent steps, in contrast to 

the step two en·or alleged in Burch, and that in the case at bar. Supra. 

Plaintiff also asserts that Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2005), requires 

the Commissioner carry the burden of proof at step two to prove that plaintiffs alleged mental 

impahment is de minimus. Pl. 's Reply 1-4. Plaintiff, however, misconstrnes the language in Webb. 

The relevant passage states: 

[A Jn ALJ may find that a claimant lacks a medically severe 

impairment or combination ofimpairments only when his conclusion 

is "clearly established by medical evidence" ... applying our normal 

standard of review to the requirements of step two, we must 

determine whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to find the 

medical evidence clearly established that Webb did not have a 

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 

Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. Plaintiff asserts that the passage stands for the proposition that the 

Commissioner carries the burden of proving that each separate impairment at step two has no more 

than a de minimus impact on the claimant's ability to work. Pl.' s Reply 2. This reading is erroneous. 

First, the passage emphasizes that the Commissioner is "applying our normal standard of 

review to the requirements of step two .... " Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. The normal standard ofreview 

refe1Ted to in Webb is that the burden of proof rests on the claimant as to steps one through four, and 

shifts to the Commissioner only at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); 

Page 17 - OPINION AND ORDER 
accord Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the ALJ in Webb did 

not find any severe impairments at step two, and did not proceed to subsequent steps in the 

evaluation process, the circuit court had to determine if that finding was suppmied by substantial 

evidence. Webb, 433 F.3d at 687. Whereas the plaintiff in Webb alleged the ALJ eJTed in finding 

the claimant did not have "a severe impairment or combination of impairments[,]" here, plaintiff 

contends the ALJ failed to find a specific impairment was severe. Id Plaintiffs reliance on Webb 

is misplaced because here the ALJ subsequently considered the evidence of the impact of the 

allegedly omitted impairment at later steps, nullifying the harm of the alleged error. See, e.g., Lewis, 

498 F.3d at 911; Burch, 400 F.3d at 682; see also Bickellv. Astrue, 343 Fed.Appx. 275, 278 (9th Cir. 

2009). Because the ALJ in Webb ended the inquiry after step two, and found Webb not disabled, 

the error was harmful. See Stout v. Comm 'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ found no severe mental impairment at step two because she 

did not adequately consider medical records from Douglas County Mental Health. Pl. 's Reply 2-3. 

However, for the reasons described above, even assuming the ALJ erred in failing to find a severe 

mental impairment at step two, any error was harmless. Moreover, the record reflects that the ALJ 

explicitly considered records from Douglas County Mental Health in determining whether plaintiffs 

mental impaitment was severe. See (tr. 16 (citing tr. 442)). 

This court's assessment of the Commissioner's decision is "a highly deferential standard of 

review." Valentine v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin, 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). For all the 

reasons explained herein, the ALJ's decision comports with the record as a whole, and is based on 

substantial evidence such that "a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal 

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citations omitted). 

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is 

hereby DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 21st day of April 2017. 

· ed States Magistrate Judge 

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