SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4380-18T3

OAK TREE CASH & CARRY, 

LLC, 

Plaintiff/Third-Party 

 Defendant-Appellant,

v. 

1630 OAK TREE, LLC, 

SAM DOSHI, HINAXI DOSHI 

and JASON DOSHI, 

Defendants/Third-Party 

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

and 

HABIB AMERICAN BANK 

and TRILOCKI BATRA, 

Third-Party Defendants, 

and 

CHIRAG BATRA, 

Third-Party DefendantAppellant.

___________________________

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and hers use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4380-18T3

Submitted October 1, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-8125-12.

Law Offices of Susheela Verma, attorney for appellants 

(Nishi Patel and Susheela Verma, on the briefs).

Robbins and Robbins, LLP, attorney for respondents 

(Spencer B. Robbins, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In our prior decision in this matter, Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC v. 1630 

Oak Tree, LLC, we remanded for the trial court to conduct a proof hearing on the 

causes of action asserted in defendants/third-party plaintiffs 1630 Oak Tree LLC's 

(1630 Oak Tree), Sam Doshi's, Hinaxi Doshi's, and Jason Doshi's (collectively 

"defendants") third-party complaint against Chirag Batra (Batra), and to determine 

the appropriate disposition of $39,600 in escrow funds. No. A-5463-14 (App. Div. 

Apr. 12, 2018) (slip op. at 29-31). Following the proof hearing, the court entered 

an order finding plaintiff Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC (C&C) and Batra jointly 

and severally liable to defendants for compensatory and punitive damages and for 

attorney's fees. The remand court did not directly decide the escrow funds issue.

C&C and Batra appeal from the order, claiming the court exceeded the scope 

of our remand order and made erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

November 30, 2020
3

A-4380-18T3

Based on our review of the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we 

reverse the court's order finding C&C and Batra liable and awarding defendants 

compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees. We remand for the court 

to consider and decide whether monies held in escrow pursuant to a prior trial court 

order should be returned to C&C or defendants.

I.

The facts pertinent to the causes of action asserted in defendants' third-party 

complaint against Batra are detailed in our prior opinion and need not be repeated

at length here. See Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC, slip op. at 8-10. We restate the 

facts only to the extent required to provide context for our discussion of the issues 

raised on appeal.

C&C filed an action against defendants for possession of the property that 

1630 Oak Tree purchased in July 2012 at a sheriff's sale ordered in a foreclosure 

proceeding. The foreclosure proceeding was brought by Habib American Bank 

(HAB) against the property's then-owner Om Namoh Shivoy, LLC (ONS). In 

its complaint against defendants, C&C alleged it was entitled to possession of the 

first floor and basement of a building on the property pursuant to a long-term lease

with ONS. C&C also sought damages based on claims defendants wrongly 

deprived it of use of the property following their purchase of the property at the 
4

A-4380-18T3

sheriff's sale and damaged or converted C&C's personalty on the premises following 

the purchase. 

Following the filing of C&C's complaint, the court entered an order allowing 

C&C's possession of the property pending the outcome of a hearing on its claimed 

entitlement to possession under the purported lease. The court later entered an order 

requiring that C&C make $3,300 monthly rent payments to 1630 Oak Tree and pay 

$39,600 "for unpaid base rent" for the eleven-month period prior to August 2012. 

The court ordered the $39,600 was to be held in defendants' counsel's escrow 

account pending further order of the court. 

Defendants filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint.1 In the four-count 

counterclaim against C&C, defendants alleged: they never entered into a lease with, 

or accepted an attornment from, C&C, and C&C maintained unlawful possession 

of the property and instituted a fraudulent lawsuit for possession based on a 

fraudulent lease (count one); C&C's lawsuit for possession was frivolous (count 

two); C&C's actions prevented defendants' use and occupancy of the property 

(count three); and C&C caused damage to the property during the pendency of its 

lawsuit (count four). 

1

 The original third-party complaint was amended. We summarize the 

allegations in the amended third-party complaint.
5

A-4380-18T3

In the third-party complaint, defendants asserted four claims against Batra 

that mirrored the claims they asserted against C&C in the counterclaim.2 

Defendants alleged: Batra is "the individual owner" of C&C, he executed a 

fraudulent lease to interfere with defendants' use of the property, he maintained 

unlawful possession of the property, and he instituted a "fraudulent lawsuit" for 

possession of the property (count two); Batra brought a frivolous lawsuit for 

possession of the property (count three); Batra's actions deprived defendants of use 

and occupancy of the property (count four); and Batra caused damage to the 

property during the pendency of C&C's lawsuit (count five). 

Batra did not file a responsive pleading to the third-party complaint, and 

default was entered against him in June 2014. The court later denied Batra's motion 

to vacate default, entered a default judgment in defendants' favor against Batra, and 

ordered the scheduling of a proof hearing. The court subsequently denied Batra's 

motion for reconsideration. 

2

 The third-party complaint included a cause of action (count one) against HAB. 

HAB financed the purchase of the property by its former owner, ONS, and, as 

noted, was the plaintiff in the foreclosure action that resulted in the sheriff's sale 

of the property to 1630 Oak Tree. In count one of the third-party complaint 

against HAB, defendants alleged that prior to the sheriff's sale HAB falsely 

represented there were no leases on the property. The disposition of count one 

of the third-party complaint against HAB is not at issue on appeal.
6

A-4380-18T3

The Special Civil Part held a trial on plaintiff's cause of action for possession, 

and entered a May 2, 2013 order finding C&C's 2009 lease "was terminated by the 

[f]inal [j]udgment in [f]oreclosure," and that no "attornment [of the lease] was ever 

created between" HAB and C&C. The court also determined C&C "lost its right to 

possession of" the property and 1630 Oak Tree was entitled to possession. The 

court ordered C&C to vacate the property and remove its belongings within thirty 

days. C&C's damage claims and defendants' counterclaim and third-party 

complaint were transferred to the Civil Part for trial. The court's order did not make 

any provision for the disbursement of the $39,600 it previously directed be paid by 

C&C and held in escrow for back rent. 

Following the parties' opening statements at the subsequent bench trial on the 

parties' respective damage claims, the court dismissed C&C's claims against 

defendants, defendants' counterclaims against C&C, and defendants' third-party 

claims against Batra. Defendants appealed from the dismissal of the counterclaims

and third-party complaint, and C&C cross-appealed from the dismissal of its 

complaint. Batra appealed from the orders denying his motions to vacate default 

and for reconsideration. 

We affirmed the court's dismissal of C&C's complaint against defendants. 

Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC, slip op. at 13-18. We also affirmed the dismissal of 
7

A-4380-18T3

the four causes of action in defendants' counterclaims against C&C. Id. at 18-25. 

We observed the "counterclaims alleged C&C instituted a fraudulent and frivolous 

lawsuit based on a non-existent, sham lease, which caused them damages and legal 

fees," id. at 18, and we concluded the representations in defendants' opening 

statement and in the proffers made to the court did not demonstrate defendants could 

"show[] [Batra] or C&C had acted in bad faith," id. at 25. 

We rejected Batra's claim the court erred by denying his motions to vacate 

default and for reconsideration. Id. at 29. We explained the third-party complaint 

against Batra alleged he "executed 'a fraudulent lease' to interfere with defendants'

possession of the [p]roperty, and that [Batra] instituted a fraudulent lawsuit against 

[defendants] based on 'a non-existent lease that was a sham.'"

3

 Ibid.

We also observed Batra raised "procedural issues" for the first time on appeal. 

Id. at 30. More particularly, we noted Batra claimed he was not a party to the 

lawsuit C&C brought against defendants, and defendants did not name him in their 

Rule 1:4-8(b) demand for withdrawal of C&C's complaint. Ibid. We further found 

Batra did not offer any reason for his failure to raise the procedural issues in either 

3

 The third-party complaint also named Batra's father, Trilocki Batra, as a 

defendant and asserted the same claims against him that were alleged against 

Batra. The claims against Trilocki Batra were dismissed without prejudice after 

he filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 3 n.1.
8

A-4380-18T3

"a properly filed answer" or in his motions challenging the entry of default against 

him. Ibid.

We found the court had failed to hold the proof hearing it had ordered when 

the default judgment was entered against Batra. Ibid. We remanded for the court 

to conduct a proof hearing on defendants' third-party claims against Batra. Ibid. 

We explained we did not express any opinion on whether defendants' claims against 

Batra "replicate[d]" defendants' causes of action against C&C or whether the claims 

against Batra "implicate[d] the procedural issues" under Rule 1:4-8 that he raised 

for the first time on appeal. Id. at 31. Those issues were left to the remand court's 

discretion to consider either at the proof hearing or in a Rule 4:50-1(f) motion. Ibid.

We also directed that the remand court address whether the $39,600 being held in 

escrow, which the Special Civil Part judge ordered C&C to pay for back rent, should 

be disbursed to defendants or returned to C&C. Ibid.

At the proof hearing held pursuant to our remand order, Jason Doshi testified 

as defendants' sole witness. He explained 1630 Oak Tree was formed to purchase 

the property as the new location for a business he owned. Shortly after 1630 Oak 

Tree purchased the property at the sheriff's sale, C&C filed the civil action for 

possession and damages against defendants. 
9

A-4380-18T3

Jason Doshi explained C&C's civil claims were founded on an alleged lease 

that "[didn't] make sense" financially and was false. He testified the mortgage 

payment, taxes, and carrying costs for the property greatly exceeded the rent 

charged under the purported lease and, as a result, the lease was not financially 

feasible. He testified the law firm of Rajan & Rajan, LLP, first represented 

defendants in C&C's civil suit, and then the firm of Robbins & Robbins, LLP, 

represented defendants in the matter. 

Jason Doshi also testified Batra filed criminal complaint-summonses alleging 

theft and criminal mischief offenses against him, Sam Doshi, and Hinaxi Doshi 

(collectively the "Doshis").4 The complaint-summonses were later dismissed. 

Jason Doshi testified the Doshis retained Andrew Maze as their attorney to defend 

the criminal complaint-summonses Batra filed against them. 

During the proof hearing, defendants voluntarily dismissed count five of the 

third-party complaint, which alleged C&C damaged the property while in 

possession during the pendency of C&C's lawsuit. Following the proof hearing, the 

4

 The criminal complaint-summonses alleged that following 1630 Oak Tree's 

purchase of the property, the Doshis entered the premises leased by C&C and 

damaged and stole C&C's property.
10 A-4380-18T3

court issued a written opinion on the three remaining claims against Batra—those 

contained in counts two, three, and four of the third-party complaint. 

In its opinion, the court recognized our remand required a proof hearing "as 

to [Batra] only" on the causes of action against him in the third-party complaint.

Nonetheless, the court found defendants were "entitled to judgment against C&C 

for legal fees incurred in defending against the suit for personal property and the 

criminal complaint" because "both" actions were "frivolous." 

With regards to the three claims remaining against Batra, the court

determined the third count of the complaint asserted a cause of action under the 

frivolous claims statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b). The court dismissed the claim 

against Batra based on its finding defendants failed to provide the requisite notice 

of the claim pursuant to Rule 1:4-8. 

The court construed the remaining counts of the third-party complaint—

counts two and four—as asserting causes of action for common law fraud against 

Batra. The court then detailed a series of actions taken by Batra that the court 

determined constituted material misrepresentations made to defendants. For 

example, the court found Batra: sought to enforce a lease against defendants that 

"made no economic sense"; committed to pay a security deposit and rent to ONS

and the rent receiver but failed to do so; claimed in C&C's lawsuit he did not 
11 A-4380-18T3

abandon the property "when he clearly had done so"; and argued defendants were 

bound to accept the "nominal rent" set forth in the purported lease. The court further 

found Batra made the misrepresentations to the Doshis "with the intent that they 

rely upon them." 

The court also determined that although Batra's actions were taken on behalf 

of C&C, it was appropriate to pierce the corporate veil and hold Batra liable 

individually for his actions. The court found that "[w]hen fraud is committed in a 

corporate name by a person having the right to speak for the corporation for his 

personal gain and benefit, that person must answer personally for their wrongful 

acts." The court concluded that Batra's "fraudulent intent and bad faith have been 

shown by clear and convincing evidence" and that he is personally liable to 

defendants under counts two and four of the third-party complaint.

The court found C&C and Batra jointly and severally liable for $53,700 in 

damages for defendants' eight-month loss of possession of the property during the 

pendency of the civil lawsuit and for costs to restore the utilities following C&C's 

abandonment of the property.5 The court also found C&C and Batra jointly and 

severally liable to defendants for punitive damages in the amount of $40,000. 

5

 The court calculated the damages as follows: $48,000 for the loss of the use 

of the property based on damages of $6,000 per month for eight months; and 

$5,700 for the costs to restore the utilities.
12 A-4380-18T3

The court found defendants were not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 

against Batra under Rule 4:42-9 for the services provided to them by Andrew Maze 

and Rajan & Rajan, LLP. The court, however, ordered that C&C pay defendants 

$10,000 for attorney's fees they previously paid for those counsels' services. The 

court apparently found defendants were entitled to recoup their attorney's fees from 

C&C under the frivolous claims statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b).6

The court found the firm of Robbins & Robbins, LLP, was entitled to an 

attorney's fees award under Rule 4:42-9 because its actions resulted in the creation 

of a fund in court—the $39,600 the court ordered that C&C deposit in escrow for 

past due rent. See R. 4:42-9(a)(2) (allowing an award of attorney's fees, in the 

court's discretion, "[o]ut of a fund in court"). The court considered the affidavit of 

services provided, determined the reasonableness of the time entries, and 

determined the reasonable hourly rate for the services provided. The court 

6

 The court did not make any findings directly supporting its award of $10,000 

in attorney's fees for the services Andrew Maze and Rajan & Rajan, LLP, 

provided to defendants. In its finding C&C's claims against defendants were 

frivolous, the court stated defendants are entitled to a judgment for attorney's 

fees and that the "quantum of fees" would be addressed later in its opinion. 

However, other than finding defendants are entitled to "$10,000" in attorney's 

fees from C&C, the court did not detail its calculation of the amount of that fee.

 
13 A-4380-18T3

determined the firm was entitled to $25,500 and found C&C and Batra jointly and 

severally liable for its payment.7 

The court also directed the disbursement of the $39,600 in back rent the 

Special Civil Part had ordered to be held in escrow. The court directed the escrow 

funds should first be disbursed to satisfy the $25,500 in legal fees awarded to

Robbins & Robbins, LLP, and then to satisfy $10,000 in legal fees awarded to 

Andrew Maze and Rajan & Rajan, LLP. The court ordered that the remaining 

balance of the escrow funds, $4,100, be applied to the $53,700 in damages owed to 

defendants, leaving a $49,600 balance owed to defendants for the compensatory 

damages awarded against C&C and Batra.8 

7

 The court's opinion states, "$25,500 is awarded to [Robbins & Robbins, LLP] 

as a legal fee as against C&C and [Batra] . . . ." The court's order, however, 

provides only that the law firm "is awarded $25,500 for a legal fee" and does 

not specify which party must pay the fee. 

8

 The court's opinion and corresponding order include a mathematical error. 

The court awarded $53,700 in compensatory damages to defendants. The court 

directed the disbursement of $25,500 in fees to Robbins & Robbins, LLP, and 

$10,000 to Andrew Maze and Rajan & Rajan, LLP, from the $39,600 in escrow 

funds. After payment of those fees, the balance in the escrow account that could 

be applied to satisfy the damages award is $4,100, not the $4,150 stated in the 

court's opinion and order, and the amount that remained due to defendants for 

compensatory damages was $49,600 and not the $49,550 stated in the order. 
14 A-4380-18T3

The court entered an order reflecting the decision set forth in its written 

opinion. The court subsequently denied C&C's and Batra's motion for 

reconsideration of the order. This appeal followed. 

II.

C&C and Batra argue the court erred by exceeding the scope of our remand 

order. They contend the remand was limited to a determination of defendants'

claims against Batra and that the remand court erred by admitting evidence against 

C&C, making determinations concerning C&C, and finding C&C liable for

compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees. They also contend our 

remand required only a determination of defendants' frivolous litigation claim 

against Batra and that the court erred by considering and assessing damages on the 

other causes of action in the third-party complaint. Defendants assert the court 

complied with our order and properly awarded damages based on its findings. 

A trial court is required to comply with an appellate court's directives and 

must, on remand, "obey the mandate of the appellate tribunal precisely as it is 

written," Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 292, 306 (App. 

Div. 2010) (quoting Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. Div. 

2003)), even if it disagrees with the appellate court's decision, Tomaino, 364 N.J. 

Super. at 233. 
15 A-4380-18T3

Our decision in Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC clearly stated the parameters 

of the remand. Slip op. at 30-31. We explained it did not appear that the court had 

held the proof hearing that was ordered when default was entered on defendants'

third-party claims against Batra, and we remanded for the court to conduct that 

hearing. Id. at 30. We also directed that the court "address whether the escrowed 

funds should be released to C&C or defendants." Id. at 31. 

As we plainly explained in our prior decision, we affirmed the dismissal with 

prejudice of defendants' claims against C&C. Id. at 3, 18-25. We did not remand 

for the court to revive or reconsider the claims, decide them, or award compensatory 

and punitive damages and attorney fees against C&C based on them. Indeed, it 

would have been illogical to affirm the dismissal with prejudice of defendants'

claims against C&C following a trial and, in the same opinion, remand for the court 

to reconsider the claims against C&C at a proof hearing. The court exceeded the 

scope of our remand in finding C&C was liable to defendants and by awarding 

compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees against C&C. See

Tomaino, 364 N.J. Super. at 233. We reverse the court's order finding C&C liable 

and awarding defendants damages, attorneys fees, and any other relief against C&C. 

We are not persuaded by Batra's claim the court exceeded the scope of the

remand by considering and deciding all the claims asserted by defendants against 
16 A-4380-18T3

him in the third-party complaint. Batra argues the remand was limited to a 

consideration of only defendants' frivolous litigation claim. He is incorrect because 

we expressly remanded for the proof hearing the court ordered when default was 

entered, Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC, slip op. at 30, and there was no limitation 

imposed on the scope of the proof hearing when the court first ordered it. 

Additionally, in our prior decision we did not limit the scope of the proof 

hearing to a particular claim in defendants' third-party complaint. We stated we did 

not express an opinion as to whether the third-party complaint replicated defendants'

complaint against C&C, id. at 31, but that statement did not limit our remand for a 

proof hearing based on Batra's default on the claims asserted in the third-party 

complaint. The court did not exceed the scope of our remand order by considering

each of the causes of action asserted against Batra in the third-party complaint.

III.

As noted, the court dismissed count five of the third-party complaint against 

Batra, and defendants do not appeal from that dismissal. The court also dismissed 

count three, which it characterized as a frivolous litigation claim, see N.J.S.A. 

2A:15-59.1(b), because defendants failed to serve Batra with the requisite Rule

1:4-8 notice. Defendants do not cross-appeal from the dismissal of count three. We 
17 A-4380-18T3

therefore consider Batra's argument the court erred by finding him liable under 

counts two and four of the third-party complaint.

"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is 

limited." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "Findings by the trial judge 

are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and 

credible evidence." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 

484 (1974). "Therefore, an appellate court should not disturb the 'factual findings 

and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so 

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. 

at 412 (alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484). In contrast, "[a] 

trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from 

established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, LP 

v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). 

Here, we consider the court's determinations relating to a defaulting party. 

On remand, the court exercised its discretion and required that defendants present 

evidence establishing Batra's liability. See Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 276-77 

(1961); Heimbach v. Mueller, 229 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 1988). "When a 

trial court exercises its discretion to require proof of liability as a prerequisite to 
18 A-4380-18T3

entering judgment against a defendant who has defaulted, what is required . . . is 

that the plaintiff adduce [a prima facie case.]" Heimbach, 229 N.J. Super. at 23. 

The court does not "weigh[] evidence or find[] facts," it determines only if the party 

prosecuting the claim has presented the "bare sufficiency" of proofs required to 

satisfy the "prima facie standard" for its claims. Kolczycki v. City of E. Orange, 

317 N.J. Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1999). A court may properly dismiss a claim 

at a proof hearing where a party fails to present evidence establishing a prima facie 

case of liability against a defaulting party, or where the "claim [is] barred by some 

rule of law whose applicability was evident either from the pleadings or from the 

proofs presented." Heimbach, 229 N.J. Super. at 23-24. 

The remand court interpreted the causes of action asserted in counts two and 

four of the third-party complaint as alleging common law fraud. Defendants do not 

challenge the court's interpretation of their pleading, and, in fact, they argue on 

appeal the evidence established a prima facie cause of action for common law fraud 

under counts two and four. Batra argues the court erred by finding him liable for 

common law fraud because counts two and four of the third-party complaint do not 

allege fraud with the requisite specificity, see R. 4:5-8(a), and defendants did not 

present evidence establishing a prima facie fraud claim. We therefore consider 
19 A-4380-18T3

whether the evidence presented at the proof hearing established a prima facie claim 

of common law fraud against Batra.

"To establish common-law fraud, a plaintiff must prove: '(1) a material 

misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the 

defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) 

reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.'" Walid 

v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 171, 180 (App. Div. 2012) 

(quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 172-73 (2005)); see also

Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 147 (2015). "Reliance is an essential 

element of common law fraud." Byrne v. Weichert Realtors, 290 N.J. Super. 126, 

137 (App. Div. 1996) (citing Axelrod v. CBS Publ'ns Inc., 185 N.J. Super. 359, 372 

(App. Div. 1982)). Consequently, "[w]ithout reasonable reliance on a material 

misrepresentation, an action in fraud must fail." Triffin v. Automatic Data 

Processing, Inc. (Triffin I), 394 N.J. Super. 237, 249 (App. Div. 2007).

The court's determination Batra is liable for common law fraud is premised 

on its finding Batra made false statements related to the property and lease. The 

court found Batra falsely informed ONS he would provide a security deposit and 

pay rent, falsely advised the rent receiver he would pay rent, and misrepresented to 

HAB there was no tenant in possession of the property. The court also found Batra 
20 A-4380-18T3

"committed to the [rent] receiver and to the court that he intended to continue to 

operate his market [on the property] when his conduct was tantamount to an 

abandonment." There is no evidence, however, Batra made any of those 

representations to defendants, and, as a result, defendants could not have, and did 

not, reasonably rely on them. 

The remaining false statements the court found established the common law 

fraud claims consist of assertions and claims Batra made during the various 

litigations involving the property and defendants. The court found that in the civil 

litigation Batra "resisted the claim that he abandoned the premises when he clearly 

had done so" and that he asserted "he occupied the premises in 2011 when he last 

paid a water bill in June[] 2010." The court also found that in the criminal cases 

filed against the Doshis, Batra falsely claimed that personalty was owned by him 

and that the Doshis sold the personalty. 

Those false statements do not support the common law fraud claims against 

Batra because defendants never relied on them. To the contrary, defendants 

contested Batra's false assertions during the various proceedings. See, e.g., Triffin

I, 394 N.J. Super. at 249 (finding no reliance on the plaintiff's misrepresentation the 

defendant needed to pay him based on counterfeit checks when the defendant chose 

to litigate a claim rather than settle it).
21 A-4380-18T3

In the court's otherwise detailed decision, it does not make any findings on 

the reasonable reliance element of a common law fraud claim, and with good reason. 

The record is bereft of evidence establishing defendants relied on any of the false 

statements the court found Batra made concerning the property and the lease. 

Without such evidence, defendants' common law fraud claim "must fail," ibid., and 

we are constrained to conclude the court erred by finding defendants sustained their 

burden of establishing a prima facie common law fraud claim against Batra. We 

therefore reverse the court's order finding Batra liable to defendants on those claims 

in the third-party complaint.9

The remand court's award of compensatory and punitive damages and 

attorney's fees to defendants is founded on its determination Batra is liable to 

defendants on the common law fraud claims contained in counts two and four of the 

third-party complaint. As a result, we also reverse the court's order awarding 

compensatory and punitive damages to defendants and requiring that Batra pay 

defendants' attorney's fees.

9

 Our determination renders it unnecessary to address Batra's claim the remand 

court should have dismissed counts two and four of the third-party complaint 

because they did not allege common law fraud with sufficient specificity, see R.

4:5-8, and his claim the court erred by piercing the corporate veil as a basis for 

finding him liable for the common law fraud claims. It is also unnecessary to 

address his arguments concerning the court's award of compensatory and 

punitive damages and attorney's fees.
22 A-4380-18T3

In our prior decision, we also remanded for the court to address whether the 

$39,600 held in escrow "should be released to C&C or defendants." Oak Tree Cash 

& Carry, LLC, slip op. at 31. The remand court did not address the issue directly. 

It did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law supporting a determination 

whether the funds in escrow should be released to C&C or defendants. See R. 1:7-4. 

Instead, the court considered the escrow monies as a "fund in court" defendants 

"create[ed] and maintain[ed]," and it ordered the funds to be used to satisfy the

attorney's fees awards and partially satisfy the compensatory damages award to 

defendants, as directed in its written opinion. 

It might be argued the court's order requiring the escrow funds be used to 

satisfy the attorney's fees and compensatory damages the court found C&C 

obligated to pay reflects an implicit determination the funds should have otherwise 

been released to C&C. It would be illogical for the court to order that the escrow 

funds be used to satisfy C&C's obligations to defendants unless the court also 

determined the funds otherwise belonged to C&C. Due to the lack of any factual 

findings or conclusions of law on the issue, we cannot find and will not assume the 

court actually considered the issue or made such a determination. The court's 

allocation of the funds to pay C&C's obligations to defendants is just as easily 
23 A-4380-18T3

explained as an erroneous determination the escrow monies constituted a fund in 

court that simply should be paid to the prevailing party in the lawsuit.

The absence of any findings addressing the issue, and the parties' failure to 

address the issue in their briefs on appeal, permit only speculation as to whether the 

court actually considered and decided the issue, or decided it correctly or 

incorrectly. See, e.g., Gormley v. Gormley, 462 N.J. Super. 433, 449 (App. Div. 

2019) (explaining "we must be provided with adequate reasons for the [court's] 

determinations" to conduct appropriate appellate review). We are therefore 

without an adequate record to determine whether the court actually considered and 

decided the issue we directed it to address on remand: whether the escrow funds 

should be released to C&C or defendants. See Oak Tree Cash & Carry, LLC, slip 

op. at 31. The court must determine based on the entirety of the record whether the 

$39,600 the court ordered on November 27, 2012, be deposited in escrow for back 

rent for the twelve months prior to August 2012 should be returned to C&C or 

disbursed to defendants. 

We again remand for the court to address the issue in the first instance in 

accordance with our prior decision in this matter. See ibid.; see also Gormley, 462 

N.J. Super. at 449 (explaining a trial court's "omission of critical factual 

findings, . . . impedes our review" and necessitates a remand (alteration in 
24 A-4380-18T3

original) (quoting Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 2015))). 

On remand, the court shall conduct such additional proceedings it deems necessary 

to address and decide the issue, and its decision shall be supported by findings of 

fact and conclusions of law. See R. 1:7-4. Nothing in this opinion shall be 

construed as a decision on the merits of the issue. 

Reversed. The matter is remanded for the court to conduct further 

proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.