J-S55013-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFERY ALLEN NORCROSS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 572 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-43-CR-0001501-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: March 10, 2021

Jeffrey Allen Norcross appeals nunc pro tunc from his November 27, 

2018 judgment of sentence, which was entered after a jury found him guilty 

of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), aggravated 

indecent assault, corruption of minors, and indecent assault. We affirm.

The trial court has authored an apt summary of the factual 

circumstances that stem from an investigation carried out by the Pennsylvania 

State Police (“PSP”), wherein three victims, C.B., T.M.C., and T.B., reported 

being sexually abused by Appellant:

On April 26, 2017, PSP received a ChildLine referral from Mercer 

County Children and Youth Services indicating that a student at 

Grove City Middle School had been sexually abused by her stepfather[, Appellant]. PSP Officer Tyler Craig (“Officer Craig”)[,] 

arrived at Grove City Middle School and interviewed minor victim 

C.B.[, who] disclosed to Officer Craig that she had been sexually 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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abused by Appellant over a time period lasting several years. C.B. 

stated that the sexual abuse started when she was eight (8) years 

old. The sexual abuse included vaginal penetration by the penis 

of Appellant as well as an episode where Appellant forced C.B. to 

perform oral sex on Appellant.

Additionally, two (2) more victims, T.M.C. and T.B., reported to 

PSP that Appellant had sexually abused them. T.M.C. revealed an 

incident that had occurred when she was living at the residence of 

Appellant. [He] had squirted chocolate syrup all over T.M.C. In 

order to rinse the chocolate syrup off, T.M.C. took a shower. While 

T.M.C. was in the shower, Appellant entered the bathroom and 

penetrated T.M.C.’s vagina with his finger. T.B. also disclosed an 

incident that had occurred when she was living at the residence of 

Appellant. T.B. was asleep when she awoke to Appellant touching 

her vagina. 

* * *

C.B. testified that Appellant stopped sexually abusing her when 

she was twelve (12) years old. Moreover, C.B. testified that 

Appellant had stuck his penis into her vagina more than ten (10) 

times.

* * *

T.M.C. was friends with T.B. and lived primarily at Appellant’s 

residence as a teenager. T.M.C. testified that she observed 

Appellant smack T.B.’s butt and that Appellant would frequently 

smack her butt too. T.M.C. testified that Appellant started 

smacking her butt when she was fourteen (14) years old.

T.M.C. testified that she was drinking one night with Appellant. 

[He] proceeded to squirt chocolate syrup from a bottle onto T.M.C. 

T.M.C. then went into the bathroom to take a shower in order to 

rinse off the chocolate syrup. While she was taking a shower, 

Appellant came into the bathroom. T.M.C. testified that Appellant 

whipped open the shower curtain, she kneeled down to cover 

herself, and Appellant stuck his pointer finger inside her vagina. 

T.M.C. immediately left the residence . . . . T.M.C. testified that 

she was sixteen (16) when this incident occurred.

[Appellant] was T.B.’s step-father. T.B. testified that she arrived 

home from work one night and promptly went to bed. At around 
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5:00 AM, T.B. awoke to Appellant moving her underwear and 

placing his finger on her labia. T.B. testified that she was in a 

state of shock and slid into the corner of her bed to get away from 

[Appellant. He] then left T.B.’s bedroom without saying anything 

to her.

[In addition to these allegations,] T.B. testified that Appellant 

would provide her and T.M.C. with alcohol when they were 

teenagers.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 7/15/20, at 3-7 (internal citations omitted). 

In connection with these allegations, Appellant was charged with the 

aforementioned offenses. In addition to the specific allegations of the victims, 

their testimony was corroborated in part by Appellant’s wife, Ashley Norcross, 

who reported that she: (1) witnessed Appellant “smack T.M.C. and T.B.’s 

butt[s];” (2) spoke with T.M.C. by phone on the evening Appellant assaulted 

her in the shower; and (3) had been told by T.B. about Appellant’s early 

morning assault. Id. at 7. The Commonwealth also adduced expert testimony 

from Janice Wilson regarding, inter alia, how perpetrators “establish a 

relationship with their [minor] victims through grooming.” Id. at 8. Ms. 

Wilson testified that “[p]erpetrators will groom the minor victim in order to 

make it easier to assault them sexually,” and noted that “one technique 

perpetrators use to groom minor victims is to provide them with alcohol.” Id.

A jury ultimately convicted Appellant and the trial court sentenced him 

to an aggregate term of thirty to sixty years of incarceration. Appellant did 

not file a direct appeal. Appellant filed a timely pro se petition for relief under 

the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). After counsel was appointed and in 
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response to the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss 

without a hearing, Appellant asserted that prior counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file a direct appeal. On April 28, 2020, the PCRA court reinstated

Appellant’s direct appellate and post-sentence motion rights due to trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to pursue these post-trial prerogatives.

On May 22, 2020, Appellant filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. Both 

Appellant and the trial court have complied with their obligations under 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant has raised the following issues for our 

consideration:

1. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to support 

[Appellant’s] convictions for sexual abuse, in that the evidence 

presented was in conflict with the incontrovertible physical facts 

and contrary to human experience and the laws of nature.

2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 

extraneous offense [for] providing alcohol to minors, and denying 

[Appellant’s] motion for mistrial on this basis.

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Appellant’s first issue implicates the sufficiency of the evidence, over 

which our standard of review is as follows:

As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims 

requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to 

the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence 

will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes 

each material element of the crime charged and the commission 

thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is 

to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak 
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and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact 

can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence 

establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial 

does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with 

the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the 

presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the 

evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a 

defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's 

convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019). 

Additionally, we note that “[t]his Court has long-recognized that the 

uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of 

fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant, despite contrary evidence from 

defense witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 562 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although styled as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, Appellant’s 

arguments are not addressed at the elements of the crimes underlying his 

convictions but focus upon the credibility of the evidence at trial. See 

Appellant’s brief at 15 (“Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is 

in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human experience 

and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law.”)

(citing Commonwealth v. Santana, 333 A.2d 876, 878 (Pa. 1975)). 

Specifically, Appellant takes issue with a number of minor inconsistencies in 

the respective testimonies of the victims and expresses incredulity at how the 
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alleged assaults could have taken place within a “14 x 70 foot trailer” where 

several people were living at the time. Id. at 16-21.

“[A] review of the sufficiency of the evidence does not include an 

assessment of the credibility of the testimony; such a claim goes to the weight 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281-82 

(Pa.Super. 2009). To the extent that Appellant intended to raise a claim 

challenging the weight of the Commonwealth’s evidence, there is no indication 

in the certified record that Appellant ever preserved such an issue for our 

review.1 As such, any challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 497 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“[A] weight 

of the evidence claim must be preserved either in a post-sentence motion, by 

a written motion before sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing. . . . Failure 

to properly preserve the claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court 

addresses the issue in its opinion.”).

With respect to any arguable challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

that can be extrapolated from Appellant’s discussion, we hereby adopt the 

thorough sufficiency analysis contained in the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) 

opinion. The trial court’s assessment contains exhaustive citations to the trial 

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1

 The same day that he was convicted, Appellant filed a motion for judgment 

of acquittal pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(2) (“Challenges to Sufficiency of 

Evidence”). This filing did not contain any preservation of a claim sounding in 

weight of the evidence. Even though Appellant’s post-sentence rights were 

reinstated by the PCRA court, he ultimately did not file any post-sentence 

motions for relief. Rather, Appellant immediately filed a notice of appeal.
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transcripts and authoritatively documents the allegations of the victims 

presented at trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/20, at 11-25. No relief is 

due on Appellant’s putative sufficiency claim.

Appellant’s second issue concerns the admissibility of evidence. We 

note that “[t]he admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of the 

trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 411 (Pa.Super. 2012). In this 

context, “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment 

that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

Under Pennsylvania law, evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to 

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and 

“the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). 

As a general rule, all relevant evidence is admissible and all irrelevant 

evidence is inadmissible. Pa.R.E. 402. However, even relevant evidence may 

be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of, inter alia, 

unfair prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 403. 

Specifically, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by allowing the 

Commonwealth to admit testimony suggesting that Appellant provided alcohol 

to the victims in this case. See Appellant’s brief at 22-25. Overall, Appellant 

asserts that this evidence was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We 
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disagree on both points. As a general matter, we note that evidence of 

extraneous offenses is not per se inadmissible or prejudicial under 

Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, (Pa. 

2014) (admitting evidence of defendant’s arson-related offenses in murder 

prosecution to establish intent and consciousness of guilt).

We may immediately and readily dispose of Appellant’s arguments 

concerning relevance. Testifying as an expert, Ms. Wilson confirmed during 

the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief that perpetrators like Appellant sometimes 

furnish alcohol to minors as part of “grooming” behavior. See N.T. Trial, 

6/13/18, at 140. As such, we discern no error in the trial court’s conclusion 

that testimony concerning Appellant providing alcohol to the victims was 

pertinent to the Commonwealth’s case and spoke to the likelihood that 

Appellant was, in fact, grooming these girls for the abuse to which he later 

subjected them. Accord Pa.R.E. 402. More generally, this evidence is also 

relevant to Appellant’s pattern of inappropriate behavior with the victims.

As to prejudice, Appellant argues that the allegations that he 

“encouraged underage drinking on a regular basis was unfairly prejudicial, and 

encouraged the jury to evaluate the rest of the evidence in a manner that 

harmed [Appellant].” Appellant’s brief at 25. We disagree.

Overall, Appellant’s arguments distort the relative significance of the 

alcohol-related testimony from the victims. “[E]vidence will not be prohibited 

merely because it is harmful to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Page, 
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965 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa.Super. 2009). Rather, “[e]xclusion is limited to 

evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based 

upon something other than legal propositions relevant to the case.” Id. 

Viewed in the aggregate of the Commonwealth’s case, the scattered 

allegations from the victims that Appellant suborned underage drinking are 

perhaps the least-objectionable of the actions he was accused of at trial. The 

mere fact that Appellant provided alcohol to minors was not a central focus of 

the Commonwealth’s case, but was simply an ancillary piece of evidence 

offered to provide a complete picture of his actions. See Hairston, supra at 

666 (“The trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all 

unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant 

to the issues at hand and form a part of the history and natural development 

of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.”).

Based on this discussion, we discern no abuse of direction in the trial 

court’s conclusion that evidence of Appellant furnishing alcohol to the victims 

was relevant evidence whose probative value was not outweighed by 

prejudice. No relief is due on Appellant’s second claim for relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2021