Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay i

JULIA A. OLSON (OR Bar 062230) 

JuliaAOlson@gmail.com

WILD EARTH ADVOCATES

1216 Lincoln Street

Eugene, OR 97401

Tel: (415) 786-4825 

DANIEL M. GALPERN (OR Bar 061950)

dan.galpern@gmail.com

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL M. GALPERN

2495 Hilyard Street, Suite A

Eugene, OR 97405

Tel: (541) 968-7164

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

JOSEPH W. COTCHETT 

jcotchett@cpmlegal.com

PHILIP L. GREGORY (pro hac vice)

pgregory@cpmlegal.com

PAUL N. MCCLOSKEY 

pmccloskey@cpmlegal.com

COTCHETT, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP

San Francisco Airport Office Center

840 Malcolm Road

Burlingame, CA 94010

Tel: (650) 697-6000

Fax: (650) 697-0577

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

KELSEY CASCADIA ROSE JULIANA; 

XIUHTEZCATL TONATIUH M., through 

his Guardian Tamara Roske-Martinez; et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

DONALD TRUMP, in his official capacity as 

President of the United States; et al.,

Federal Defendants.

Case No.: 6:15-cv-01517-TC 

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION 

TO FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO STAY LITIGATION

Request for Oral Argument

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 1

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiffs oppose and respectfully request that this Court deny Federal Defendants’ 

Motion to Stay Litigation (ECF No. 121) (the “Motion to Stay”).

1 This Court should exercise its 

discretion to deny the Motion to Stay because both Federal and Intervenor Defendants failed to 

carry their burden to show that an interlocutory appeal is appropriate. See Plaintiffs’ Response in 

Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal; and 

Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Certification of Order 

for Interlocutory Appeal. Even if this Court were to grant interlocutory appeal, Federal 

Defendants failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating circumstances establishing the 

propriety of a stay. To the contrary, analysis of the circumstances of this case establishes that no 

stay is warranted. Federal Defendants have neither shown that they are likely to succeed on their 

merits nor that they will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay. Further, any delay in resolving 

the merits of this case irreparably prejudices the Youth Plaintiffs in securing and protecting their 

fundamental constitutional rights. Provision of a stay will irreparably exacerbate existing and 

imminent deprivations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. As Federal Defendants themselves 

acknowledge in their Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), “‘business as 

usual’ CO2 emissions” imperil Plaintiffs with “dangerous, and unacceptable economic, social, 

and environmental risks.” ECF 98 at ¶ 150. Federal Defendants’ recent actions demonstrate that 

they intend to act quickly to eliminate the climate programs of the federal government, thus 

escalating and exacerbating the already-occurring substantial injuries to Plaintiffs. Any delay in 

resolving this case will only allow further action at the expense of irreparable injury to Plaintiffs’ 

rights. Lastly, the public interest clearly lies in prompt resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims and a 

																																																						 1 Intervenor Defendants join in Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay. ECF 122 at 2-3. However, 

Intervenor Defendants make no additional or independent arguments as to why this Court should 

grant a stay. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ arguments as to the impropriety of a stay of proceedings 

address only those issues within Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay and Intervenor Defendants’ 

Motion to Stay should be denied outright.

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 2

denial of Federal Defendants’ requested stay. Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to exercise 

its discretion and deny the Motion to Stay.

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A stay of proceedings is “an exercise of judicial discretion and the propriety of its issue is 

dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Niken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 

(2009) (quotations and citations omitted and alterations normalized). As “an intrusion into the 

ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,” a stay “is not a matter of right, even if 

irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

The burden of “making out the justice and wisdom of a departure from the beaten track” of 

continuing proceedings “lay[s] heavily on the petitioners....” Landis v. North American Co., 299 

U.S. 248, 256 (1936). 

The Supreme Court requires that a petitioner for a stay of proceedings must demonstrate 

satisfaction of a four factor test: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that 

he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent 

a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the 

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). 

This test is “substantially identical” to that employed by the Ninth Circuit when deciding 

motions for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. RCC South LLC v. SFI 

Belmont LLC, No. CV11-2356-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 6019279, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“[T]he 

standard for a stay pending appeal is the same as that required for preliminary injunction.”) 

(citation omitted); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“[O]ur analysis is substantially identical for [an] injunction and [a] TRO....”). 

Accordingly, precedent addressing injunction motions provides guidance for any analysis of a 

stay of proceedings. 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 3

In effectuating this test, the Ninth Circuit applies a sliding scale under which a petitioner 

seeking a stay must show irreparable harm and either: “(a) a strong likelihood of success on the 

merits and that the public interest does not weigh heavily against a stay; or (b) a substantial case 

on the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner’s favor.” Leiva-Perez 

v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “As has long been the case,” the 

“relative hardships to the parties provid[e] the critical element in determining” the applicable 

standard under the sliding scale approach. Id. at 970 (quotations and citation omitted); see also 

Landis, 299 U.S. at 259 (“[B]enefit and hardship will be set off, the one against the other...”). As 

explained below, Federal Defendants have not demonstrated satisfaction of any of the Supreme 

Court’s Nken factors.

ARGUMENT 

I. Federal Defendants Have Not Shown That They Are Likely to Prevail on Appeal

“The first factor, a strong showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, requires more 

than a mere possibility that relief will be granted.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added). To 

justify a stay pending appeal of a lower court’s decision, “the applicant must meet a heavy 

burden of showing...that the judgment of the lower court was erroneous on the merits....” Id. at 

439, Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, Federal Defendants fail to demonstrate that they are likely 

to succeed on the merits because their arguments, and the cases upon which they rely, conflate 

the standard applicable to a motion for a stay with that necessary to show “controlling questions 

of law for which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion” – two of the three 

prerequisites to certify an order for interlocutory appeal. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). This is amply 

demonstrated by Federal Defendants’ references to their own briefing on these issues2 as the 

primary basis for their contention that they are likely to prevail on the merits. ECF 121 at 4 

																																																						 2 Plaintiffs’ arguments demonstrating Federal Defendants’ failure to establish that this Court’s 

November 10, 2016 Order presented any controlling issues of law for which there are substantial 

grounds for differences of opinion are set forth in Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal 

Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for interlocutory Appeal and are not repeated herein.

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 4 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 4

(citing Memorandum In Support of Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for 

Interlocutory Appeal at 6-17, 18, 22). 

Federal Defendants’ reliance on Scallon v. Scott Henry’s Winery Corp. likewise suffers 

from the same deficiency, as that case similarly equated the standards for interlocutory 

certification with the required distinct showing of likelihood of success on the merits. No. 6:14-

CV-1990-MC, 2015 WL 5772107, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2015). The Scallon Court explicitly 

based its finding of propriety of a stay pending appeal on its conclusion that “the question...is a 

matter of first impression upon which reasonable jurists could disagree.” Id. at *1. The Ninth 

Circuit employed this same language in discussing the “substantial grounds for disagreement” 

standard governing certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska), Inc., 643 

F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] substantial ground for difference of opinion exists where 

novel and difficult questions of first impression are presented....” upon which “reasonable jurists 

might disagree....”) (quotations and citations omitted and alterations normalized). While “[i]t is 

well settled that the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a question of first impression, 

standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate a substantial ground for differences of opinion,” 

Couch v. Telescope, 611 F.3d 629, 634 (9th Cir. 2010), to conflate the standard governing a 

showing of a likelihood of success on the merits with the “substantial grounds for differences of 

opinion” standard for interlocutory certification would run contrary to the express 

pronouncements of the Supreme Court. In Nken, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that a 

“showing of a likelihood of success on the merits[] requires more than a mere possibility that 

relief will be granted.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added). Hence, even if Federal 

Defendants had demonstrated that any of the issues in this Court’s November 10, 2016 Order 

presented conclusions “upon which reasonable jurists might disagree,” which they have not, such 

a demonstration would plainly be insufficient to carry their burden of showing more than a mere 

possibility of success on the merits. Id. See DKS, Inc. v. Corporate Business Solutions, Inc., No. 

2:15-cv-00132-MCE-DAD, 2015 WL 6951281 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015) (neither the

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 5 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 5

assertion that “reasonable minds can disagree” with an order’s reasoning nor an assertion that 

arguments on appeal are “non-frivolous” is enough to show a likelihood of success on the merits).

Finally, Federal Defendants’ reliance on Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass’n, Inc. v. 

Smith Forzen Foods, is similarly misplaced and insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of 

success on the merits. 962 F.Supp. 1312 (D. Or. 1997). In that case, the court certified an order 

for interlocutory appeal on the joint request of the parties. Id. at 1314. Here, Plaintiffs strongly 

oppose interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the Umatilla court failed to conduct any analysis of 

either party’s likelihood of success on the merits, or any of the other three factors governing a 

stay of proceedings. Instead, the court granted a stay “[g]iven the importance of the issues 

decided...to the rest of th[e] case” – and did not perform the requisite analysis required here. 

Because Federal Defendants rely upon their asserted satisfaction of the requirements for 

interlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and upon case law conflating that standard 

with the required showing here, Federal Defendants have not carried their burden to establish “a 

strong showing of a likelihood of success on the merits[.]” Nken, 556 U.S. at 420. Further, even 

if satisfaction of the Section 1292(b) requirements were sufficient to show a likelihood of 

success on the merits, which it is not, Federal Defendants have failed to carry their burden to 

establish satisfaction of those requirements, as more fully discussed in Plaintiff’s Response in 

Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal. 

Moreover, given the strength of the Court’s orders rejecting Defendants’ Motions to 

Dismiss, and given the great weight of evidence in Plaintiffs’ favor, including the admissions of 

the Federal Defendants, Plaintiffs, rather than Federal Defendants, are likely to prevail on the 

merits in this litigation. Indeed, Plaintiffs were preparing to move for a preliminary injunction in 

order to preserve as much of the status quo as possible during the pendency of this case, and 

have held that motion in abeyance given the Court’s direction that the parties move quickly to 

trial, with a goal of going to trial in the summer or fall of 2017. November 28, 2016 Transcript, 

ECF 100 at 12:2-5. Further, Federal Defendants have failed to marshal or demonstrate the 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 6 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 6

existence of any facts supporting their legal arguments as to their asserted likelihood of success 

on the merits. Federal Defendants fail to carry their burden on this factor.

II. Federal Defendants Have Not Shown Irreparable Injury Absent a Stay

An applicant for a stay “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being 

required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will 

work damage to someone else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255; Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 968 (applicant 

must “show that an irreparable injury is the more probable or likely outcome”). A stay of 

proceedings is “not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the 

appellant.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (citation and quotations omitted).

Federal Defendants’ claims that they will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay are 

premised entirely on their obligations to participate in discovery. ECF 121 at 4-6. Of the two 

cases Federal Defendants rely upon in their discussion of this alleged irreparable harm, only one 

even remotely addresses whether discovery obligations may qualify as imposing irreparable 

injuries. H.A.L. v. Foltz, No. 3:05-cv-873-J-33MCR (M.D. Fla., Feb. 28, 2008). Crucially, in that 

case, plaintiffs filed no opposition to the defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending appeal. Id. 

at *1. The court therefore had no arguments before it from which to conclude that participation 

in discovery does not impose irreparable harm. Additionally, the interlocutory appeal granted in 

that case, during which a stay of discovery was sought, involved the issue of qualified immunity, 

which is intended to “insulate[] public officials not only from liability but also from...discovery.” 

Id. The question on appeal consisted solely of whether the law alleged to have been violated by 

the defendant government officials “was clearly established at the time” of alleged violation – a 

purely “legal question.” Id. In stark contrast to the circumstances of H.A.L., Plaintiffs strongly 

oppose Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay. Further, Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify 

Order for Interlocutory Appeal neither involves a purely legal controlling question of law, nor 

one as to an issue that was specifically intended to insulate public officials from discovery. See 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 7 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 7

Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for 

Interlocutory Appeal at 4-9. 

Contrary to the Middle District of Florida’s conclusion in H.A.L., many courts in the 

Ninth Circuit that have assessed assertions of irreparable harm premised on participation in 

discovery have found such predications insufficient. See, e.g., DKS, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00132-

MCE-DAD, 2015 WL 6951281, at *2 (“CBS’ conclusory contention that Plaintiff has made 

‘crippling demands for voluminous discovery’ is not enough to make a strong showing of 

irreparable harm.”); E.E.O.C. v. Recruit U.S.A., Inc., 939 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant 

would not be irreparably harmed if forced to participate in discovery pending appeal); Lam v. 

City of San Francisco, No. 10-cv-4641-PJH (N.D. Cal., July 22, 2015) (“The only ‘injury’ that 

would result from denial of a stay would be the requirement of plaintiffs’ participation in the 

discovery process...); Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, NO. 2:14-cv-01786-

MMD-GWF, 2016 WL 5867410 (D. Nev. Oct. 6, 2016) (assertions based upon expenses of 

discovery did not amount to irreparable harm).

As with the claims of the defendants in DKS that the plaintiffs in that case had made 

“crippling demands for voluminous discovery,” Federal Defendants offer conclusory statements 

characterizing discovery in this case as “extraordinarily broad” and “virtually limitless.” ECF 

121 at 5. Federal Defendants’ hyperbolic characterizations of discovery in this case are based 

primarily on Plaintiffs’ January 24, 2017 Litigation Hold Demand Letter. ECF 121 at 4-5, Id. at 

Ex. A (January 24, 2017 Litigation Hold Demand Letter). However, pursuant to the January 24 

Letter, Plaintiffs simply informed Federal Defendants of their legal obligation to refrain from 

destroying documents relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. These obligations do not require Federal 

Defendants to take any affirmative action to produce any documents, but merely to refrain from 

their destruction. See Declaration of Julia A. Olson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Federal 

Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal; see also E.E.O.C., 939 F.2d at 

755 (finding no irreparable injury where “the injunction does not require the companies to 

recreate documents no longer in existence. It simply orders them to maintain all relevant records 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 8 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 8

already in existence....”). Plaintiffs issued the January 24 Letter in response to Federal 

Defendants’ removal of information relevant to their claims from public governmental websites, 

seeking to prevent destruction of evidence upon which Plaintiffs’ case depends. See E.E.O.C., 

939 F.2d at 749-50 (claimant would “suffer immediate and irreversible injury to its ability to 

investigate and determine charges...filed against defendants...if any of the business 

records...[were] altered, destroyed, or removed....”); Shutterfly, Inc. v. Forever Arts, Inc., No. 

CR 12-3671 SI, 2012 WL 2911887, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (claimant would “suffer 

irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction if defendants delete or destroy the sought after 

evidence”). As counsel for Federal Defendants have made clear, many of the records relevant to 

Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to passive systems under the protocol of which these records may 

be automatically lost, destroyed, or deleted after a given period. Feb. 7, 2017 Transcript, ECF 

115 at 7: 21-25, 8: 1-2, 10: 3-16. Despite Plaintiffs’ requests, to date, Federal Defendants 

continue to object to altering these protocols, to the scope of Plaintiffs’ January 24 Letter, and to 

responding to discovery in this case, as evidenced by their Motion to Stay and their counsels’ 

statements at the February 7 case management conference. Id.; see Declaration of Julia A. Olson 

in Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for 

Interlocutory Appeal. Notwithstanding those objections, and Plaintiffs’ sensitivity to the need to 

facilitate as swift a discovery phase as possible, the January 24 Letter and the need for discovery 

in this case is justified in light of the nature of the claims and factual circumstances at issue. As 

the Ninth Circuit illustrated in E.E.O.C.:

[C]ourts may conclude that evidence from preceding years is relevant to the 

investigation of specific discriminatory acts and practices. Evidence of 

past...practices may reveal that unlawful conduct was part of a larger pattern of 

discrimination....The types of charges at issue in this case do not admit of isolated 

or narrow time margins. Superimposing an artificially truncated time frame would 

risk excluding evidence relevant to previous instances of similar discriminatory 

practices. 

939 F.2d at 755.

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 9 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 9

Plaintiffs certainly agree to the appropriateness of narrowing discovery in this urgent case 

and are receptive to Federal Defendants’ concerns in that regard. As reflected in the monthly 

status conferences and in keeping with the exigency of the dangers faced by Plaintiffs, counsel 

for Plaintiffs are consistently working with counsel for Defendants and this Court to narrowly 

tailor discovery and identify the key documents and factual matters necessary to bring this case 

to a prompt, thorough, and successful resolution. 

However, Federal Defendants’ discovery obligations would only be delayed, rather than 

narrowed, should this Court certify the November 10 Order for interlocutory appeal and grant a 

stay for the duration of appeal. As an initial matter, none of the issues presented by the 

November 10 Order are suitable for interlocutory appeal. See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition 

to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal; Plaintiffs’ Response in 

Opposition to Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory Appeal. 

Further, as Plaintiffs have explained, appellate review at this stage in the litigation would not 

result in a narrowing of issues for discovery. See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal 

Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal at 4-9, 25-28; Plaintiffs’ Response 

in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Certification of Order for Interlocutory 

Appeal at 4-9, 20-22. Even if this Court’s conclusions in the November 10 Order as to the public 

trust doctrine and the fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining life were 

reversed on interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims, while presenting 

different standards, require similar factual development through discovery. Id. Therefore, a stay 

of proceedings for determination of these issues would serve only to further delay discovery,

which would occur regardless of the results of appeal, thereby exacerbating the irreparable harm 

that will befall Plaintiffs without reducing Federal Defendants’ discovery obligations.

Irrespective of this state of affairs, Plaintiffs remain resolute and earnest in their intentions to 

conduct narrow discovery to the maximum extent practicable while seeking to prove their case,

in keeping with the urgency of the climate crisis upon which their claims are founded.

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 10 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 10

Here again, Federal Defendants belabor their oft-repeated refrain of their preference that 

Plaintiffs litigate the infringements of their fundamental constitutional rights through the 

Administrative Procedure Act. However, it is neither the prerogative of Federal Defendants to 

determine Plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, nor Federal Defendants’ right to exclude evidence 

relevant to their violations of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights merely on the basis of the 

APA’s existence. Cf. E.E.O.C., 939 F.2d at 755 (refusing to superimpose “artificially truncated” 

frame which would exclude relevant evidence). If Federal Defendants have objections to 

discovery propounded in this case, their “remedy is [to seek] a protective order under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) rather than a stay of all proceedings.” DKS, Inc., No. 2:15-cv00132-MCE-DAD, 2015 WL 6951281, at *2, n.2. Federal Defendants have failed to carry their 

burden to show that they will be irreparably injured in the absence of a stay of proceedings. 

III. Federal Defendants Have Not Shown That Plaintiffs Will Not Suffer Substantial 

Injury From a Stay

Even if this Court finds Federal Defendants have shown irreparable injury absent a stay, 

it must “balance the interests of all parties and weigh the damage to each.” Guy v. Cnty. Of Haw., 

No. 14-00400 SOM/KSC, 2014 WL 4702289, at *5 (D. Haw. Sept. 19, 2004) (quoting Los 

Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 

1980)). While the four-factor analysis requires Federal Defendants to show that they will suffer 

“irreparable injury” absent a stay, in assessing the harm that a grant of a stay will work top 

Plaintiffs, this Court need only consider whether “issuance of the stay will substantially injure 

the other parties interested in the proceeding.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added); see also 

CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1962) (“Among these competing interests are the 

possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay” weighed against “the hardship or 

inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward....”) (emphasis added). 

Federal Defendants fail to carry their burden to show that a grant of stay will not result in 

possible substantial injury to Plaintiffs. To the contrary, the dangerous climate impacts befalling 

Plaintiffs as a result of Federal Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct increase in quantity and 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 11 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 11

severity with every delay in resolution of their claims, establishing the actuality of both 

substantial and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs should a stay of proceedings be granted. Federal 

Defendants themselves acknowledge these dangers. See Federal Defendants’ Answer to the FAC, 

ECF 98 at ¶ 150 (“‘[B]usiness as usual’ CO2 emissions” imperil Plaintiffs with “dangerous, and 

unacceptable economic, social, and environmental risks. As Defendants have acknowledged, the 

use of fossil fuels is a major source of these emissions, placing our nation on an increasingly 

costly, insecure, and environmentally dangerous path.”). The Federal Defendants in the Trump 

Administration have repeatedly promised to expand fossil fuel development, and to eliminate 

climate programs of the federal government, thus escalating and exacerbating the alreadyoccurring substantial injuries to Plaintiffs. See note 3, infra.

The irreparable character of environmental injury is well established in precedent binding 

on this Court. In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, the Supreme Court made clear that 

“[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages 

and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable.” 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) 

(quotations omitted) abrogated in part on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Resources Defense 

Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). The Ninth Circuit has employed this precise language in approving 

remedies provided in cases involving environmental injuries. See, e.g. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n 

v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 545). 

Similarly in Envtl. Def. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, the D.C. district court stated: “Because of the 

irremediable nature of many environmental claims, courts have been weary of even relatively 

modest environmental harm.” No. 04-1575, 2006 WL 1992626, at *9-10 (D.D.C. Jul. 14, 2006). 

Further, the constitutional nature of Plaintiffs’ claims establishes that the prolongation 

and exacerbation of Federal Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs’ rights resulting from a stay of 

proceedings constitutes irreparable injury. As the Ninth Circuit has unmistakably established, 

“the balance of equities favor[s] preventing the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” 

Arizona Dream Act Coal., v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014). Likewise, Ninth 

Circuit precedent is clear: “Unlike monetary injuries, constitutional violations cannot be 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 12 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 12

adequately remedied through damages and therefore generally constitute irreparable harm.” 

Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other 

grounds 562 U.S. 134 (2011). Similarly, in Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of 

California, the Ninth Circuit explained that even an “[a]lleged constitutional infringement will 

often alone constitute irreparable harm.” 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Cobine v. 

City of Eureka, No. C 16-02239 JW, 2016 WL 1730084 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016); Guy., No. 14-

00400 SOM/KSC, 2014 WL 4702289. 

Additionally, Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the event of interlocutory 

appeal or a stay of proceedings because of the near certainty of destruction of evidence relevant 

to their claims. Ninth Circuit precedent is clear that destruction of evidence constitutes 

irreparable injury. E.E.O.C., 939 F.3d at 749-50 (“Plaintiff... will suffer immediate and 

irreversible injury...if any of the business records...are altered, destroyed, or removed.... Such 

injury would be irreparable....”); see also DKS, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00132-MCE-DAD, 2014 WL 

4702289at *2 (“[T]he risk of lost evidence as a result of delaying this action...favors denial of 

the instant Motion”); S.E.C. v. Bivona, No. 16-cv-01386-EMC, 2016 WL 2996903, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. May 25, 2016) (“The preliminary injunction will preserve the assets...preventing the 

‘irreparable harm’ of evidence being destroyed or concealed.”); Shutterfly, Inc., No CR 12-3671 

SI, 2012 WL 2911887, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (“Shutterfly will likely suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of an injunction if defendants delete or destroy the sought after evidence.”) 

As counsel for Federal Defendants have made clear, many of the records relevant to Plaintiffs’

claims are subject to passive systems under the protocol of which these records may be 

automatically lost, destroyed, or deleted after a given period. Feb. 7, 2017 Transcript, ECF 115 at 

7: 21-25, 8: 1-2, 10: 3-16. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ good faith efforts to clarify the scope and 

nature of their January 24, 2017 Litigation Hold Demand Letter and address these issues with 

counsel for Federal Defendants, Federal Defendants have failed to share with Plaintiffs the 

protocols that are in place to ensure that evidence is not destroyed, including email 

communications involving climate and energy policy. See Declaration of Julia A. Olson in 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 13 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 13

Support of Plaintiffs’ Response to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory 

Appeal

The risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs should this Court issue a stay of proceedings is 

far from hypothetical. Even in the face of the increasing urgency of the climate emergency, the 

new executive administration has, in the first two months of office, taken and proposed actions 

which profoundly exacerbate the dangers and impacts Plaintiffs face and appointed climate 

science deniers to high ranking office.3 Despite the known dangers to Plaintiffs, the Trump 

Administration is intent on immediately dismantling what little limitations on greenhouse gas 

emissions there were, while expanding fossil fuel extraction, infrastructure, and energy 

production full throttle.

In light of Federal Defendants’ recent actions, in addition to those over the course of the 

past decades, any delay in resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims for interlocutory appeal or a stay of 

																																																						 3 See Exec. Order ___, 82 Fed. Reg. ___ (March 28, 2017) (directing rollback of Clean Power 

Plan, rescinding moratorium on coal mining on federal lands, and rescinding six Obama 

administration executive orders aimed at curbing climate change and regulating emissions, 

including inclusion of climate change impacts in environmental reviews ); Exec. Order 13766, 

82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017) (expediting environmental reviews and approvals for 

infrastructure projects”); Exec. Order 13778 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Feb. 28, 2017) (ordering a 

review of the “Waters of the United States” Rule); Presidential Memorandum Regarding 

Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017), available at 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential-memorandum-regardingconstruction-dakota-access-pipeline (encouraging approval of Dakota Access Pipeline); 

Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017), 

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/24/presidential-memorandumregarding-construction-keystone-xl-pipeline; Media Note: Issuance of Presidential Permit to 

TransCanada for Keystone XL Pipeline (March 24, 2017), available at 

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/269074.htm; Reuters, “President Trump Prepares to 

Withdraw from Groundbreaking Climate Change Agreement, Transition Official Says” (Jan. 20, 

2017) (Detailing possible withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement).

3 Coral Davenport, “E.P.A. Head Stacks Agency With Climate Change Skeptics,” N.Y. Times 

(March 7, 2017) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/us/politics/scott-pruittenvironmental-protection-agency.html; Chris Mooney and Brady Dennis, “On Climate Change, 

Scott Pruitt Causes an Uproar – and contradicts the EPA’s Own Website,” Wash. Post (March 9, 

2017) available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/03/09/on-climate-change-scott-pruitt-contradicts-the-epas-ownwebsite/?utm_term=.b164bb28f26e.

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 14 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 14

proceedings will most certainly result in irreparable injury to Plaintiffs. Federal Defendants’ 

claim to the contrary is wholly without merit. ECF 121 at 6. First, Federal Defendants’ 

estimations of the time needed for discovery and to proceed to trial is without basis, as this Court 

has projected a scheduling of trial for the fall of 2017. See November 28, 2016 Transcript, ECF 

100 at 12:2-5. Second, as Plaintiffs have addressed, given the urgency of their claims, counsel is 

working diligently to narrowly tailor discovery and identify the key documents and factual 

matters necessary to bring this case to as a prompt a resolution as possible and within the time 

frame projected by this Court. Third, Federal Defendants vastly underestimate the delay that 

interlocutory appeal and a stay of proceedings would cause to resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims, as 

well as the severity of the harms that will result from such delay. As the Supreme Court 

recognized in Nken, “[i]t takes time to decide a case on appeal. Sometimes a little; sometimes a 

lot. No court can make time stand still while it considers an appeal, and if a court takes the time 

it needs, the court’s decision may in some cases come too late for the party seeking review.” 556 

U.S. at 421. In light of the looming climactic tipping points after which the effects of climate 

change become irreversible, Plaintiffs’ cannot afford any delay in resolution of their claims. 

Magistrate Judge Coffin recognized this urgency and the importance of this issue to the case, 

asking: “[W]hat is...[the] tipping point at which it becomes irreversible climate change....isn’t 

that, in essence, the thrust of this case?” February 7, 2017 Transcript, ECF 115 at 18: 8-12. 

In Landis, the Supreme Court concluded that a stay of proceedings of one case should not 

extend beyond determination of a related case by another district court, “laying to one side the 

question of whether it should even go so far.” 299 U.S. at 256-57. In doing so, the Supreme 

Court recognized that “[a]lready the proceedings in the District Court have continued more than 

a year. With the possibility of an intermediate appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, a second 

year or even more may go by before” proceedings could continue in the district court.” Id. at 256. 

The same circumstances and reasoning apply here. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in August 

2015. Eighteen months later, the parties are only now in the initial phase of discovery. To delay 

discovery and resolution of Plaintiffs’ exigent claims to allow for interlocutory appeal or a stay 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 15 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 15

of proceedings would cause irreparable harm. See Declaration of Dr. James E. Hansen In 

Support of Plaintiffs’ Claim for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief , ECF 1-1(detailing climate 

science, impacts, tipping points, and urgency).

Federal Defendants’ reliance on Scallon is unavailing here. No. 6:14-CV-1990-MC, 2015 

WL 5772107. The Scallon court’s conclusion that a stay of proceedings would not substantially 

injure the plaintiffs because their “claims date back many decades” is clearly inapplicable here. 

Id. at *2. First, the Scallon plaintiffs sought only monetary relief against parties with whom they 

had been involved in business relationships for many decades, and their claims arose from those 

interactions. Id. at *1-2. The court noted that delay in resolving the claims would merely 

“preserve[] the status quo.” Id. at *2. In stark contrast here, Plaintiffs are youths ranging from 

nine to twenty years of age. They have not had the sort of intimate business relationship with 

Federal Defendants at issue in Scallon. To the contrary, the Youth Plaintiffs have no voice in 

representative democracy such that they have had no connection with the policy decisions and 

actions of Federal Defendants from which their claims arise. Crucially, unlike in Scallon, delay 

in resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims would exacerbate Plaintiffs’ injuries rather than preserve the 

status quo, especially in light of Federal Defendants’ recent actions. The only way to preserve 

the status quo in this case would be to proceed to an immediate trial, and for this Court to order 

Federal Defendants to prepare and enforce a plan to remedy their violations of Youth Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights.

Finally, Federal Defendants assertion that any delay “is eminently justified” because 

“Plaintiffs waited until 2015 to file their complaint” is manifestly devoid of any basis in equity or

reasonableness. ECF 121 at 6-7. First, Federal Defendants identify “no prejudice” that they have

“suffered as a result” of this alleged delay. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 n. 12 (9th

Cir. 2013). More importantly, to assert that Youth Plaintiffs should have brought suit earlier 

obscures the fact that Plaintiffs ranged from eight to nineteen years old at the time they filed their 

complaint, assumes that youth as young as eight possess the capacity at an earlier age to make 

strategic legal decisions to safeguard their rights, and argues for the placement of procedural 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 16 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 16

burdens upon youth without justification, further evidencing the discrimination exacted upon 

Plaintiffs by Federal Defendants. Further, Federal Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs ought to 

have filed suit prior to 2015 serves only to underscore their admission of the urgency of the 

climate crisis and counsels strongly in favor of denying any delay for interlocutory appeal or a 

stay of proceedings in this case. See ECF 98 at ¶ 150. Federal Defendants have failed to show 

that a stay of proceedings will not substantially injure Plaintiffs. To the contrary, it is manifestly 

evident that delay of resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims for interlocutory appeal or a stay of 

proceedings will work profound and irreparable harm to Plaintiffs. The balance of equities here 

weighs strongly in favor of a denial of the Motion to Stay.

III. The Public Interest Weighs in Favor of Denying a Stay of Proceedings

Federal Defendants have failed to carry their burden to establish that “the public interest 

does not weigh heavily against a stay.” Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 967. To the contrary, where, as 

here, the public interest weighs in favor of denial of a stay of proceedings, this Court should 

exercise its discretion to refuse a “departure from the beaten track” continuing proceedings in 

their ordinary course. Landis, 299 U.S. at 256. 

Contrary to Federal Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiffs do not seek to “remove decision 

making authority on...critical issues from our publicly-elected officials, and to have them instead 

decided by the Court.” ECF 121 at 7. Rather, Plaintiffs seek only an order from this Court 

directing Federal Defendants to use their existing authority, including that delegated to Federal 

Defendant agencies by our publicly-elected officials, to prepare a plan of their own devisement 

adequate to remedy their unconstitutional deprivations of Plaintiff’s rights. While, Federal 

Defendants correctly point out that this case touches upon the principle of separation of powers, 

they fundamentally err in their analysis of the application of those principles to this case. Id. 

Like all cases involving infringements of individual constitutional rights, this case implicates the 

separation of powers insofar as “[t]he declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of 

government, was to diffuse power better to secure liberty.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 17 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 17

(1986). As the Supreme Court famously established, “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly 

consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives 

an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 (U.S. 1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). When the political branches 

have failed to protect the constitutional rights of citizens, particularly those who, like Plaintiffs, 

lack a voice in representational government, and have instead actively infringed those rights, the 

principle of separation of powers calls upon the judiciary to discharge its duty to serve as a check 

and a balance to the other branches and safeguard constitutional liberty. Id.

Federal Defendants repeat their objections to the ability of Plaintiffs to propound 

discovery on and this Court’s ability to issue relief applicable to the President. ECF 121 at 7. 

Plaintiffs have addressed these arguments at length. See Plaintiffs Response in Opposition 

Federal Defendants Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal at 18-19. Plaintiffs here 

reiterate that the Supreme Court has clearly stated the judiciary may even go so far as to 

“severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President’s official 

conduct,” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 682, 705 (1997) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 

v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)), and “direct appropriate process to the President himself.” Id. 

(citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). Notwithstanding this Court’s authority in this respect, 

Plaintiffs and their counsel remain steadfast in their efforts and intentions to ensure that 

discovery in this case is as minimally intrusive as possible, consistent with the needs of this case,

in order to secure as prompt a resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims as possible.

Federal Defendants assert that they are entitled to a stay “because of the recent change in 

administration,” citing to a single, readily-distinguishable case to support their argument. ECF 

121 at 8 (citing Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazaar, 612 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 

(D.D.C. 2009)). In Brady, the district court permitted a two-week extension of a briefing 

schedule in response to the Obama administration’s unopposed motion after President Obama 

took office in the middle of proceedings, ten days before its responsive brief was due. Brady, 612 

F.Supp.2d at 10. Defendants in Brady moved for a “two-week extension of the briefing schedule 

to provide the new administration that took office an opportunity to consider the issues raised by 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 18 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 18

the Plaintiffs’ motions.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted and alterations normalized). The 

extension was granted and the Obama administration submitted its briefing on the deadline set by 

the court, just twenty-four days into office. Id. 

The circumstances of the Trump administration’s request for a stay in this case are 

drastically different from those in Brady. First, the Brady case did not even involve a stay of 

proceedings, but only a short extension in briefing schedule. Second, whereas in Brady, the 

Obama administration asked for a two-week extension for submission of briefing due ten days 

after the president took office, the Trump administration here requests an indefinite stay of all 

proceedings and delayed its request for six weeks after inauguration day, while at the same time 

the administration (these same Federal Defendants) are moving swiftly to further violate 

Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights. Further, whereas the Brady plaintiffs did not oppose 

the Obama administration’s motion for extension, Plaintiffs here vigorously oppose Federal 

Defendants’ Motion to Stay. Federal Defendants have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate 

that the public interest weighs in favor of a stay.

To the contrary, the public interest here favors prompt resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims in 

this Court by continuing proceedings in their ordinary course. See, e.g. Cobine, No. C 16-02239 

JW, 2016 WL 1730084 at * 7 (“The Court recognizes the public interest of protecting the public 

health and safety as well as preserving the environment...”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. 

E.P.A., 722 F.3d 401, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The task of dealing with global warming is urgent 

and important at the national and international level.”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 

Importantly, Ninth Circuit precedent recognizes the clear and important public interest in 

upholding individual constitutional rights, such as those of Plaintiffs. “Generally, public interest 

concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a 

stake in upholding the Constitution.” Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Preminger v. 

Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Vayeghan v. Kelly, No. cv 17-0702, 2017 

WL 396531 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2017) (“The Court must consider the public interest in 

upholding constitutional rights”) (citation omitted); Guy, No. 14-00400 SOM/KSC, 2014 WL 

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 19 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 19

4702289, at *6 (“[P]reventing constitutional violations is in the public interest.”). This public 

interest in preserving Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is deserving of great weight here because 

further delay in resolution of their claims is certain to result in additional and irreparable impacts. 

Even where a deprivation of rights is, by contrast, a mere possibility, its prevention serves the 

public interest. See Gebin v, Mineta, 239 F.Supp.2d 967 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“[B]ecause the 

termination of plaintiffs’ employment could constitute a constitutional deprivation, the public 

interest will be advanced by granting the preliminary relief.”) (emphasis added). The public

interest in safeguarding individual constitutional rights is especially pronounced when a court is 

called upon, as this Court is here, to protect the fundamental rights of those most vulnerable. 

Cobine, No. C 16-02239 JW, 2016 WL 1730084, at * 7 (“The Court...recognizes the public 

interest in maintaining the protections afforded by the Constitution to those most in need of 

protection.”). Due to the constitutional nature of their claims, the urgency of the climate crisis 

upon which they are founded, and the vulnerability of their position in our society, the public 

interest in swift resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims surely outweighs any interest Federal Defendants 

have in delaying discovery and trial in this case. Cf. Arizona v. Arpaio, No. CV14-1356 PHX 

DGC, 2016 WL 722949, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2016) (“Because the Constitution is the ultimate 

expression of the public interest, equitable balancing is inappropriate where a party’s 

constitutional rights are at stake.”)

CONCLUSION 

Federal Defendants failed to carry their burden to establish satisfaction of the Supreme 

Court’s four-factor test justifying a stay of proceedings. To the contrary, application of each of 

those four factors here counsels strongly in favor of denying a stay of proceedings. For all of the 

foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request this Court to deny the Motion to Stay.

DATED this 3rd day of April, 2017, at Eugene, Oregon.

Respectfully submitted,

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 20 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 20

/s/ Julia A. Olson

JULIA OLSON (OR Bar 062230)

JuliaAOlson@gmail.com

WILD EARTH ADVOCATES

1216 Lincoln St.

Eugene, OR 97401

Tel: (415) 786-4825

PHILIP L. GREGORY (pro hac vice)

pgregory@cpmlegal.com

COTCHET, PITRE & McCARTHY, LLP

San Francisco Airport Office Center

840 Malcolm Road

Burlingame, CA 94010

Tel: (650) 697-6000

Fax: (650) 697-0577

DANIEL M. GALPERN (OR Bar 061950)

dan.galpern@gmail.com

LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL M. GALPERN

2495 Hilyard Street, Suite A

Eugene, OR 97405

Tel: (541) 968-7164

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 21 of 22
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants’ Motion to Stay 21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the Supporting Memorandum complies with the 

applicable word-count limitation under LR 7-2(b) because it contains 19 pages and 6,950 words, 

including headings, footnotes, and quotations, but excluding the caption, table of contents, table 

of cases and authorities, signature block, exhibits, and any certificates of counsel.

/s/ Julia A. Olson

JULIA OLSON (OR Bar 062230)

JuliaAOlson@gmail.com

WILD EARTH ADVOCATES

1216 Lincoln St.

Eugene, OR 97401

Tel: (415) 786-4825

Case 6:15-cv-01517-AA Document 134 Filed 04/03/17 Page 22 of 22