IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

SEAN L. FARLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COL VIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Kathryn Tassinari 

Mark A. Manning 

Harder, Wells, Baron & Manning, P.C. 

474 Willamette Street, Suite 200 

Eugene, OR 97401 

Attorneys for plaintiff 

Janice E. Hebert 

Assistant United States Attorney 

United States Attorney's Office 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Jeffrey E. Staples 

Social Security Administration 

Office of General Counsel 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

Attorneys for defendant 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 6:15-cv-00643-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 1 of 15
AIKEN, Judge: 

Plaintiff Sean Farley brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiffs 

application for Title II and Title XVI benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's 

decision is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND 

On April 19, 2011, plaintiff applied for Title II disability benefits. Tr. 126. On July 19, 

2011, plaintiff applied for Title XVI benefits. Tr. 222. Both applications allege plaintiffs disability 

began in January 2006. Tr. 218, 222. Plaintiff argues he is disabled because of hemophilia, 

Hepatitis Band C, severe arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, and extreme high blood 

pressure. Tr. 239. Plaintiffs applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 168-170, 

175. On June 12, 2013, plaintiff was represented by an attorney and testified at a hearing held by 

an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 21. On July 23, 2013, the ALJ ruled plaintiff was not 

disabled. Tr. 18. In the July 2013 decision, the ALJ considered only whether Farley was disabled 

in the period since the final denial of a prior disability application on October 13, 2010. Tr. 21. On 

February 13, 2015, the Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review, rendering the ALJ's 

decision final. Tr. 1. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based upon proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 

Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion." Gutierrezv. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's" decision. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 2 of 15
(9th Cir. 2001 ). A rational decision by the ALJ must be affirmed, even if the evidence is susceptible 

to more than one interpretation, because "the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 

THE ALJ'S DECISION 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to 

establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th 

Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 

. . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S. C. § 423 (d) (1) (A) . 

The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential process to determine whether a person is 

disabledundertheAct. Bowenv. Yuckert,482U.S. l37, 140(1987);20C.F.R. §404.1520. At step 

one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since October 13, 2010. 

Tr. 24. At step two, the ALJ classified plaintiff's hemophilia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine as severe. Tr. 24. At step three, the ALJ 

found plaintiff's medically severe impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one 

of the listed impairments the Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial 

gainful activity. Tr. 25. 

The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light 

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1567 (b) and 416. 967 (b), subject to the 

following limitations: "lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time, 

no more than frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 10 

pounds[, and] no more than frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling, and climbing . with no more than occasional fingering 

with his right hand." Tr. 25. Based on the RFC and the testimony 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 3 of 15
of a vocational expert, the ALJ found plaintiff was unable to 

perform past relevant work. Tr. 29. Using plaintiff's age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded plaintiff 

could perform jobs available in the national economy and therefore 

was not disabled. Tr. 30. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ made five errors in concluding he is 

not disabled. Pl.'s Br. (doc. 17) at 12. The plaintiff challenges 

the ALJ's adverse credibility determination, the ALJ's choice to 

assign little weight to the opinion of a treating physician, the 

ALJ's failure to discuss hemophilic arthropathy or severe arthritis 

at step two, and the ALJ' s application of a presumption of 

nondisability based on a 2010 denial of disability benefits. The 

plaintiff also disputes whether the defendant met her burden of 

proving plaintiff can work at step five. 1 

I. Plaintiff's Credibility 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony concerning the 

severity of his symptoms. Pl. 's Br. at 14. When a claimant's 

medically documented impairments reasonably could be expected to 

produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record 

contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can 

reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of 

1 This last argument is based solely on the first four alleged errors and therefore is not 

discussed separately in this opinion. 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 4 of 15
symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 

1996) . A general assertion the claimant is not credible is 

insufficient; the ALJ must "state which . testimony is not 

credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not 

credible." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F. 3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 19 93) . 

The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995). If the "ALJ's credibility finding is 

supported by substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may 

not engage in second guessing. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

959 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons for 

finding plaintiff not credible. First, the ALJ fairly concluded 

plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with the treatment record. 

Tr. 26. While an ALJ cannot reject the severity of subjective 

complaints solely on the lack of objective evidence, an ALJ may 

look to the medical record for inconsistencies. See Morgan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599-600 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Further, impairments that can be controlled effectively with 

medication or treatment are not disabling for purposes of 

determining eligibility for benefits. Warre v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). At the hearing, 

plaintiff asserted his carpal tunnel and back problems were among 

the issues preventing him from working. Tr. 46-47. Specifically, 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 5 of 15
plaintiff asserted he needed to shift positions every ten to 

fifteen minutes, could not walk all the way around the block where 

he lived, and could not help with household chores. Tr. 47-49. 

However, objective medical evidence shows mild findings for his 

back and wrist ailments. Physical exams in December 2012, January 

2013, and April 2013 all indicate normal gait and station. Tr. 

1035, 1040, 1044. The same exams indicate plaintiff, save for some 

tingling and numbness in his hand, had normal neurologic exam 

results. Tr. 1035, 1039, 1043. An October 2011 evaluation of his 

carpal tunnel showed "good range of motion in his right wrist, 

thumb, and digits" with mild conditions. Tr. 1080-81. Further, 

plaintiff's hemophilia, except to the extent it impacted his 

shoulder, was fairly characterized as manageable. Tr. 27. The 

plaintiff worked as a roofer from 1997 to 2006, and while he said 

he missed work because of his hemophilia, his absences did not 

prevent him from working entirely and his disease was under fairly 

good control with treatment. Tr. 44-45. Because the mild clinical 

findings and work history conflict with plaintiff's representations 

about the impact of some of his afflictions on his ability to work, 

the ALJ permissibly considered them in determining whether to 

credit plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony. 

Second, the ALJ fairly concluded the plaintiff's testimony 

about the severity of his symptoms was inconsistent with his selfreported activity level. Daily activities may serve as a basis for 

discrediting a claimant when they "contradict claims of a totally 

debilitating impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F. 3d 1104, 1113 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 6 of 15
(9th Cir. 2 012) . Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of 

January 2006 and maintained through all the stages of his 

application that his disability persisted for the entire period 

from 2010 to 2013. Tr. 44-45. At various stages of his 

application, plaintiff either represented a severely restricted 

existence or offered vague responses unhelpful to a process of 

determining his disability. In his Function Report dated August 

10, 2011, plaintiff asserted his entire day consisted of "try[ing] 

to get up take shower sit and rest." [sic] Tr. 279. He also says 

he "can't walk much can't move fingers or wrists ankels knees can't 

cut or bang body parts do to bleeding." [sic] Tr. 278. When 

prompted to describe how he helps with chores, meals, and 

transportation, plaintiff offers variations of "depends." Tr. 

280-81, 283. Despite these representations, plaintiff reported 

moving boxes in March or April of 2011, fixing cars in December 

2010, and recreating on sand dunes in January 2011. Tr. 601, 859, 

856. The ALJ reasonably concluded engaging in these moderately 

demanding physical activities was inconsistent with plaintiff's 

symptom testimony. 

Plaintiff also conceded he was laid off from his last job and 

that he worked for "six or seven months" after the alleged onset of 

his disability in January 2006. Tr. 46. Even though the period 

under review-October 2010 to June 2013-included no gainful work by 

the plaintiff, the plaintiff's representation that he was disabled 

beginning in 2006 conflicts with this work history. Applying 

"ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation," the ALJ 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 7 of 15
permissibly concluded this conflict undermined the credibility of 

plaintiff 1 s symptom testimony. Smolen 1 80 F.3d at 1284. 

However 1 the ALJ 1 s analysis of plaintiff 1 s credibility also 

included errors. First 1 the ALJ erred in concluding plaintiff 1 s 

story about how he began dating his girlfriend suggested he was not 

credible. Tr. 28. Plaintiff testified that he dated his 

girlfriend for a time in high school 1 and she got back in touch 

years later when she found his phone number. Tr. 51; 58-59. The 

ALJ summarizes the story as " [the girlfriend] randomly called 

[plaintiff] and started coming over all the time" and concludes 

"the testimony [is] almost nonsensical and not entirely reliable. 11 

Tr. 28. The ALJ provides no further explanation of why he 

considers plaintiff 1 s entirely plausible story "nonsensical. 11 

Accordingly 1 plaintiff 1 s statements about his girlfriend are not a 

convincing reason to disbelieve his symptom testimony. Next 1 the 

ALJ 1 s assertion that plaintiff 1 s poker 1 computer game 1 and 

television habits were inconsistent with disability is neither 

convincing nor supported by substantial evidence. Tr. 28. 

Sedentary activities like watching television and playing computer 

games are fully consistent with plaintiff / s subjective symptom 

testimony. See Fair v. Bowen 1 885 F.2d 597 1 603 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(performance of "home activities . . . not easily transferable to 

what may be the more grueling environment of the workplace 11 is not 

a clear and convincing reason to discredit symptom testimony) . The 

ALJ could not reasonably use these two pieces of testimony to 

impugn plaintiff 1 s credibility. 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 8 of 15
Even when an ALJ commits legal error, courts uphold the 

decision where that error is harmless. "We have long recognized 

that harmless error principles apply in the Social Security Act 

context." Molina, 674 F. 3d at 1115. An error is harmless if it is 

"inconsequential to the ultimate nondisabili ty determination," id. , 

or "if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned," even if the 

agency "explains its decision with less than ideal clarity," Alaska 

Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004) 

(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight System, Inc., 

419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). Here, the ALJ provided several clear 

and convincing reasons to discredit the plaintiff's testimony. See 

Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 

(9th Cir. 2008) (upholding adverse credibility finding when ALJ 

rested finding on four reasons, two of which were not supported by 

substantial evidence) . 

affirmed. 

II. Dr. Taylor's Opinion 

The ALJ' s credibility determination is 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ improperly gave little weight to 

the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Jason Taylor. Pl.'s Br. at 

16. There are three types of medical opinions in social security 

cases: those from treating, examining and non-examining doctors. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The medical 

opinion of a treating physician is entitled to "special weight" 

because the physician "has a greater opportunity to know and 

observe the patient as an individual." Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F. 2d 

759, 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). If a treating 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 9 of 15
doctor's opinion is contradicted by a non-examining physician, an 

ALJ may reject it only by providing specific and legitimate reasons 

that are supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 

427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-

31) . The contrary opinion of a non-treating medical expert does 

not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a 

treating physician's opinion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

752 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Relying on the opinions of nonexamining physicians, the ALJ 

concluded plaintiff could lift 10 pounds no more than frequently 

and 20 pounds no more than occasionally. Tr. 25, 28, 142, 165. 

Dr. Taylor's opinion recommends plaintiff lift 10 pounds no more 

than occasionally and never lift 20 pounds. Tr. 982. Dr. Taylor 

also asserts plaintiff would be unable to maintain a regular work 

schedule more than twice a month. Id. 

The ALJ failed to provide specific, legitimate reasons to 

discredit Dr. Taylor's opinion. The ALJ found Dr. Taylor's opinion 

inconsistent with his own treatment notes. Tr. 28. Specifically, 

the ALJ questioned Dr. Taylor's opinions regarding plaintiff's 

hemophilia and hepatitis C, finding Dr. Taylor "was primarily 

following the claimant for right shoulder pain." Tr. 28-29. This 

finding is contrary to the record. While Dr. Taylor acknowledged 

shoulder pain at the beginning of his note, he formulated a 

treatment plan for plaintiff's hemophilia, incorporated by 

reference a treatment note from a hematology fellow, Dr. Meghan 

Liel, and indicated that plaintiff would be referred to orthopedics 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 10 of 15
for his shoulder problems. Tr. 963, 967-68. The record indicates 

Dr. Taylor treated plaintiff's hemophilia. Therefore, the ALJ 

improperly concluded it was inconsistent for Dr. Taylor to speak to 

the severity of that condition. Beyond this misunderstanding about 

Dr. Taylor's treatment of the plaintiff, the ALJ does not point to 

any specific examples of such inconsistencies, and I find none 

apparent in the record. Further, objective medical evidence 

elsewhere in the record supports Dr. Taylor's opinion. First, 

plaintiff's visit with a physical therapist in February 2012 

revealed atrophy in his right shoulder muscles, crepitus in his 

joints, and a decreased range of motion in his right shoulder; the 

visit culminated in a diagnosis of a clinical joint deformity. Tr. 

965-66. Second, an MRI in December 2008 revealed a diagnosable 

shoulder impingement. Tr. 840. Contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, 

Dr. Taylor's opinion is not inconsistent with his own treatment 

notes or the medical record. 

I cannot conclude the ALJ's error in weighing Dr. Taylor's 

opinion was harmless. The scope of Dr. Taylor's treatment of 

plaintiff allowed Dr. Taylor to express an opinion on plaintiff's 

RFC. He observed a relationship between plaintiff's hemophilia and 

joint disease throughout his medical evaluation. Tr. 980-981. 

Drs. Taylor and Liel' s clinical observations of a "markedly 

decreased" range of motion and swelling in plaintiff's right 

shoulder support crediting Dr. Taylor's opinion as to plaintiff's 

ability to lift. Tr. 963, 968. 

I agree with the ALJ that it is unclear what led Dr. Taylor to 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 11 of 15
conclude that plaintiff will miss two or more days of work per 

month. Tr. 29. On remand, the ALJ also should reconsider this 

aspect of Dr. Taylor's opinion, keeping in mind an ALJ's duty to 

develop the record to resolve ambiguities in the medical evidence. 

Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459-60. 

III. The Role of Hemophilia in the Step Two Analysis 

Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ's omission of hemophilic 

arthropathy from the step two analysis. Pl.'s Br. at 18. Step two 

is "a de minimis screening device [used] to dispose of groundless 

claims." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. "An impairment or combination 

of impairments may be found not severe only if the evidence 

establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal 

effect on an individual's ability to work." Webb v. Barnhart, 433 

F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted) (emphasis in original) . At step two, the ALJ is bound to 

consider all relevant medical evidence and may find an impairment 

nonsevere only if the nonseverity is "clearly established by 

medical evidence." (quoting SSR 85-28) . 

While the ALJ recognized the purported connection between 

plaintiff's hemophilia and shoulder pain, the ALJ concluded the 

shoulder impairment was "non-severe" because it had "not yet lasted 

12 months." Tr. 27, 24. On the other hand, the ALJ found 

plaintiff's hemophilia to be severe but manageable. Tr. 24, 27. 

The ALJ also mentioned plaintiff's "other symptoms and complaints 

that appear periodically throughout the record . includ[ing] 

but not limited to a history of alcohol and substance abuse, 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 12 of 15
hepatitis C, hypertension, and depression" and concluded "these 

conditions, considered singly or in combination, have caused only 

transient and mild symptoms" and were not severe. Tr. 24. Despite 

this long list of nonsevere impairments, the ALJ did not discuss 

plaintiff's severe arthritis or hemophilic arthropathy at all in 

the step two analysis. 

The ALJ's discussion of plaintiff's hemophilia raises serious 

questions about whether the ALJ's decision at step two rested on a 

complete and correct understanding of the record. The question to 

the ALJ was not whether the hemophilia, standing alone, caused 

plaintiff's disability, but rather whether the hemophilia, together 

with other severe or nonsevere problems, "significantly limit 

[plaintiff's] ability to perform basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). By omitting any discussion of 

arthritis and the potential for hemophilia to cause joint pain, the 

ALJ failed to consider all relevant evidence at step two. 

Also, the ALJ's conclusion the shoulder impingement was not 

severe was not supported by medical evidence. Despite objective 

medical evidence plaintiff's shoulder was significantly compromised 

in February 2012, the ALJ used the date of a formal diagnosis made 

during surgery in April 2013 as the onset date. Tr. 963-68; 24. 

Further, the ALJ reasoned that because the shoulder surgery was 

"successful" the impingement could not contribute to a finding of 

disability. Tr. 27. This conclusion is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Dr. Garry Vallier operated on plaintiff's 

shoulder on April 15, 2013. Tr. 1002-1003. The ALJ supported his 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 13 of 15
finding the surgery "successful" by citing generally to 7 9 pages of 

medical records from North Bend Medical Centers, of which only one 

two-page note records an interaction after the surgery. Tr. 27, 

1031-1109. Though it transcribes a post operative visit, insofar 

as the note discusses plaintiff's shoulder condition, it is 

identical to a note from before the surgery. Compare Tr. 1031-1032 

and Tr. 1033 -34. The records cited by the ALJ simply do not 

support his conclusion the surgery successfully resolved 

plaintiff's shoulder impingement. 

I cannot conclude the errors at step two were harmless. The 

inclusion of arthritis or hemophilic arthropathy in the list of 

severe or nonsevere impairments could change the formulation of the 

RFC and what jobs are available to the plaintiff. In assessing an 

RFC, an ALJ is bound to consider limitations and restrictions 

imposed by all of an individual's impairments, even those deemed 

not severe. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 

2005) (citing Social Security Ruling 96-Sp); 20 C.F.R. § 

404 .1545 (a) (2). Likewise, an assessment of the plaintiff's RFC 

will be more accurate with medical evidence of the current state of 

his shoulder impingement. 

IV. Presumption of Non-Disability 

Finally, plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred in finding the 

plaintiff did not meet his burden of rebutting the presumption of 

continuing non-disability. Pl.'s Br. at 12. If a claimant makes 

a second attempt to receive benefits after an earlier denial, the 

claimant is presumed to be not disabled for the period between the 

Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 14 of 15
claims. Lester, 81 F.3d at 827. A plaintiff can overcome that 

presumption if he shows both changed circumstances and greater 

disability since his last claim. Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691, 

693 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ cone 1 uded there were no changed 

circumstances in this case. Tr. 21. That conclusion was error; 

medical evidence supports a conclusion plaintiff's hemophilia and 

related limitations impacted him differently after the May 2010 

denial. However, the error was harmless because the ALJ went on to 

make a determination of plaintiff's rights under the Act with a 

full five-step analysis. 

CONCLUSION 

The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED. On 

remand, the ALJ must: (1) perform a step two analysis that 

explicitly determines whether and when plaintiff's hemophilic 

arthropathy, severe arthritis, and/or shoulder pain became severe 

medically determinable impairment(s); (2) reformulate the RFC 

giving Dr. Taylor's opinion due weight considering all medical 

evidence, including Dr. Liel's note and other evidence from 

treating providers; and (3) conduct a new step five analysis to 

determine if plaintiff is disabled. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.} 

"·~ Dated this day ofJ1'.ify, 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00643-AA Document 24 Filed 06/27/16 Page 15 of 15