This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-1074 

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Michael John Karau, 

Appellant. 

Filed July 11, 2016 

Affirmed 

Stauber, Judge 

Clay County District Court 

File No. 14CR141136 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela Harris, Assistant County Attorney, 

Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public 

Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and John Smith, 

Judge.*

 

 

*

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

STAUBER, Judge 

 On appeal from his conviction of attempted second-degree intentional murder, 

appellant argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state failed to prove that 

he possessed the specific intent to kill the complainant. We affirm. 

FACTS 

 Following events that occurred in the early morning hours of April 10, 2014, 

appellant Michael Karau was charged by amended complaint with (1) attempted firstdegree premeditated murder; (2) attempted first-degree domestic-abuse murder; (3) firstdegree assault, great bodily harm; (4) second degree assault, substantial bodily harm; 

(5) felony domestic assault; and (6) false imprisonment. At appellant’s bench trial, 

evidence established that J.F. and appellant were good friends who lived together and 

eventually developed a romantic relationship. According to J.F., appellant was 

physically abusive during their relationship, but she never reported any incidents to 

police or sought medical treatment for her injuries. 

 On April 9, 2014, appellant arrived home at about 9:30 p.m. after working his job 

as a laborer for a handyman service. Appellant spent the evening drinking and 

socializing with J.F., but the couple began to argue around midnight. Appellant then 

pulled J.F. into a bedroom by her hair where he climbed on top of her and began to hit 

her on the head and face. According to J.F., appellant told her that “he was going to kill” 

her, and asked her how she “want[ed] to go out.” J.F. also claimed that she was unable to 

“get away” because appellant had taken her cellphone. 
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 After beating J.F. “[c]ontinuously” for about two hours in the first bedroom, 

appellant dragged J.F. through the kitchen and living room area into the master bedroom 

where he continued to assault her with his fists. At some point during the assault in the 

master bedroom, appellant struck J.F. in the head at least three times with a metal 

baseball bat, knocking J.F. unconscious. Appellant also beat J.F.’s head against the 

headboard of the bed, beat her head against the wall, and bit her lip. Near the end of the 

assault, appellant ran water in the bathtub and held J.F.’s head under water until she 

inhaled water, choked, and lost consciousness. 

 Appellant eventually fell asleep at about 5:30 a.m. J.F. was then able to retrieve 

her cellphone, which fell out of appellant’s pocket while he was sleeping, and contacted 

her brother, who arrived and later transported her to the hospital. J.F. was beaten so 

badly that she was unrecognizable to her family members, and exhibits admitted at trial 

depicted the extent of her injuries. J.F. suffered a chipped tooth, broken nose, two 

fractured thoracic vertebrae, broken sacrum, head lacerations that required numerous 

stiches, respectively, and bruises all over her body. J.F. testified that throughout the 

assault, appellant repeatedly threatened to kill her, and at one point threatened to pour 

battery acid on her face and body. 

 During trial, the district court dismissed the attempted-domestic-murder charge. 

The district court later acquitted appellant of attempted first-degree premeditated murder, 

but convicted him of the lesser-included charge of attempted second-degree intentional 

murder. The district court found that when appellant struck J.F. with the bat, and when 

he submerged her head underwater in the bathtub, appellant’s “anger against [J.F.] 
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escalated to the point where he, for a short period of time (a few moments) formed the 

intent to kill the victim, during an unconsidered, rash impulse.” The district court also 

found appellant guilty of second-degree assault, domestic assault, and false 

imprisonment, but not guilty of first-degree assault. Appellant was sentenced to 207 

months for attempted second-degree intentional murder. This appeal followed. 

D E C I S I O N 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court conducts “a painstaking 

analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict 

which [it] did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume that the 

fact-finder believed evidence that supports the verdict and disbelieved conflicting 

evidence. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). We also afford a district 

court’s findings the same weight as a jury verdict and will not set them aside unless they 

are clearly erroneous. Walker v. State, 394 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. App. 1986), review 

denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1986). 

 Appellant was found guilty of attempted second-degree intentional murder. Intent 

to cause the death of a human being is an element of this crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.19, 

subd. 1(1) (2012). Intent “means that the actor either has the purpose to do the thing or 

cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause the result.” 

Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2012); see State v. Noble, 669 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. 

App. 2003) (stating that “[a]n attempt requires that the actor have specific intent to 

perform acts and attain a result which if accomplished would constitute the crime 
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alleged”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2003). “A jury is permitted to infer that a 

person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.” State v. Johnson, 

616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000). 

 Appellant argues that the “state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

possessed the specific intent to kill [J.F.].” Appellant contends that because “the bulk of 

the evidence relied on by the district court to find an intent to kill was the circumstantial 

evidence of the assault,” the circumstantial-evidence standard of review is applicable. 

The state concedes that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies, but 

asserts that under that standard the evidence is sufficient to support the guilty verdict. 

 “A conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants stricter scrutiny.” State 

v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). 

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction based on 

circumstantial evidence, we are required to perform a two-step analysis. State v. Hayes, 

831 N.W.2d 546, 552-53 (Minn. 2013). First, we determine the circumstances proved. 

State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In doing so, we give due 

deference to the fact-finder and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict. Id. at 598-99. 

 Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following 

circumstances were proved by the state. For approximately six hours during the early 

morning of April 10, 2014, appellant continuously beat J.F. with his fists in two separate 

rooms. Appellant also kicked J.F., beat her head against the wall and the headboard of a 

bed, bit her lip, struck her on her head at least three times with a metal baseball bat, and 
6 

held her head under water in the bathtub. J.F. lost consciousness both after being struck 

with the bat and being held underwater. Moreover, appellant continuously stated 

throughout the assault that he “was going to kill” J.F., and repeatedly asked her how she 

“want[ed] to go out.” As a result of appellant’s conduct, J.F. sustained a chipped tooth, a 

broken nose, two fractured vertebrae, a broken sacrum, cuts behind her ear and on her 

mouth that required numerous stiches, and numerous bruises all over her body. And 

because of the broken vertebrae, J.F. was required to wear a neck brace for two months. 

 The second step of the circumstantial-evidence test requires us to determine 

“whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any 

rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations 

omitted). At this second step, we provide no deference to the factfinder’s choice between 

reasonable inferences. State v. Anderson, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329–30 (Minn. 2010). 

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a 

whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 

473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

 Appellant argues that the circumstances proved are insufficient to lead only to the 

inference that he intended to kill J.F. because he did not “employ a gun or knife” to inflict 

J.F.’s injuries. We disagree. First, the metal baseball bat could be used as a lethal 

weapon. See, e.g., State v. Coauette, 601 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting 

that “[o]rdinary objects can . . . be transformed into dangerous weapons”), review denied 

(Minn. Dec. 14, 1999). Second, appellant hit J.F. on the head at least three times with the 
7 

bat and held her head under water until she lost consciousness. The obvious and known 

consequences of such actions is death, and the only reasonable inference from those 

actions is that appellant intended this result. See Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726 (stating 

that a fact-finder “is permitted to infer that a person intends the natural and probable 

consequences of their actions”). The absence of a reasonable inference that appellant did 

not intend to kill J.F. is further demonstrated by appellant’s death threats to J.F. 

throughout the assault. See Johnson, 616 N.W.2d at 726 (stating that “[a] state of mind 

generally is proven circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both 

before and after the incident”). 

 Appellant next argues that the lack of serious injuries to J.F. supports a reasonable 

inference that he lacked intent to kill her. Again, we disagree. If appellant had pointed a 

gun at J.F.’s head, shot, and missed, the lack of a gunshot wound would not diminish his 

intent to kill. Rather, inference of intent to kill arises when an actor commits an act that 

could cause the death of another. See Stiles v. State, 664 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003) 

(noting that “pointing a loaded gun at a person and firing it is likely to cause death, and 

leads to an inference of intent”). Here, J.F.’s near-drowning and being struck repeatedly 

on the head with a baseball bat were life-threatening acts. Intent is not shown only by 

J.F.’s actual injuries, but also by appellant’s actions to inflict those injuries. Those 

actions permit only an inference of intent to kill. 

 Finally, in a related argument, appellant asserts that because his assault did not 

result in J.F.’s death, the known facts do not support a reasonable inference that he 

intended to kill her. Although J.F. survived the prolonged assault, the only reasonable 
8 

inference from appellant’s beating and near-drowning of J.F. is that appellant intended to 

kill her. As the state points out, “[f]ailure in the attempt does not amount to lack of 

intent.” Appellant may have altered his intent several times during the assault, but during 

the aforementioned episodes, the record does not support a rational hypothesis other than 

that appellant intended to kill J.F. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence in the record 

to support appellant’s conviction for attempted second-degree intentional murder. 

Affirmed.