IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

DEVELOPERS SURETY AND INDEMNITY 

COMPANY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FORESTRY DEVELOPMENT, INC., JOHN 

CHILDS, and CHAUNCEY CHILDS, 

Defendants. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:15-CV-1936-PK 

OPINION AND 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Developers Surety and Indemnity Company ("Developers") brought this 

declarat01y judgment action against defendants Forestty Development, Inc. ("Forestty"), John 

Childs ("John") and Chauncey Childs ("Chauncey" and, collectively with John, the "Childs") on 

October 13, 2015. Developers is Forestty's insurer; Forestty is a general contractor; the Childs 

are clients ofForestty currently prosecuting a lawsuit against Forestty in the circuit court for 

Clackamas County (the "underlying action") alleging Forestry's liability for negligent 

construction, negligence per se, breach of contract, and fraud. By and through the underlying 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 1 of 14
action, the Childs seek $3 million in damages from Forestry in connection with their negligence 

and breach claims and $1 million in damages from Forestry in connection with their fraud claim. 

Developers is currently unde1iaking Forestry's defense against the Childs' claims in the 

underlying action, as it is required to do under its insurance policy issued to Forestry. By and 

through this action, Developers seeks this court's declaration that Developers will not owe 

Fores try any duty of indemnification in connection with any damage award the Childs might 

obtain against it in the underlying action. Because Developers is an Iowa corporation 

headquartered in California, Forestry is an Oregon corporation headquartered in Oregon, and the 

Childs are citizens of Oregon, this court has diversity jurisdiction over Developers' claim 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the complete diversity of the parties and the amount in 

controvetsy. 1 

Now before the comi is Forestry's motion (#11) to stay these proceedings pending the 

outcome of the underlying action, in which the Childs join. I have considered Forestry's motion, 

oral argument on behalf of the pmiies, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the 

reasons set forth below, Forestry's motion is granted, and these proceedings are stayed pending 

resolution of the underlying action. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

"District comis have inherent authority to stay proceedings before them .... " Gates v. 

Woodford (Rohan ex rel. Gates), 334 F.3d 803, 817 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Landis v. North Am. 

1 Although this is an action for declaratory judgment, it appears relatively clear that 

Developers' potential indemnity obligation to Forestiy- up to $3 million - which is at stake in 

this action, should count toward the jurisdictional minimum. See, e.g., 1Weridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. 

Sadowski, 441F.3d536, 539 (7th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases). 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 2 of 14
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the courts' inherent 

discretion to stay proceedings is an important tool in the promotion of judicial economy: 

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort 

for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the 

exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even 

balance. 

Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55. Whether or not to grant a party's motion for stay of proceedings is 

within the discretion of the district court. See },Iediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong 

Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 

Developers issued Forestry a series of commercial general liability insurance policies 

with respective effective periods of June 23, 2009, to June 23, 2010, of June 23, 2010, to June 

23, 2011, and of June 23, 2011, to June 23, 2012 (the "policies"). See Complaint, Exhs. 1-3. 

The three policies, as amended by an endorsement bearing ID No. 00 02 08 08, appear to have 

identical material provisions. See id. Pursuant to the policies, Developers agreed as follows: 

[Developers] will pay those sums that the insured [i.e., Forestry] becomes legally 

obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to 

which this insurance applies. [Developers) will have the right and duty to defend 

the insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, [Developers) will 

have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily 

injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply. 

Policies, Section I(l)(a). Expressly excluded from "property damage" coverage under the 

policies are, in material or potentially material part, the following: 

"Property damage" to: 

2 The following recitation constitutes my construal of the patties' allegations and of the 

evidentiary record for purposes of the motion now before the coutt only. 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 3 of 14
(5) That particular part of real property on which [Forestry] or any contractors 

or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on [Forestry's] behalf are 

performing operations, if the "prope1iy damage" arises out of those 

operations; or 

( 6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or 

replaced because "[Forestiy's] work" was incorrectly performed on it. 

Policies, Section I(2)(j); the parties refer to these two provisions respectively as the "j(S) 

exclusion" and the "j(6) exclusion." The Section I(2)(j)(6) exclusion is expressly inapplicable 

to"'property damage' included in the 'products-completed operations hazard,'" Policies, Section 

I(2)(j), which is defined in relevant part as prope1ty damage: 

occurring away from premises [Forestiy] own[s] or rent[s] and arising out of 

[Forestry's work or operations, or work or operations perfonned on Forestiy's 

behalf, including materials, pmis, or equipment furnished in connection with such 

work or operations] except: 

(1) Products that are still in [Forestry's] physical possession; or 

(2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned. However, 

[F orestiy's work or operations] will be deemed completed at the 

earliest of the following times: 

(a) When all of the work called for in [Forestry's] contract has 

been completed. 

* * * 

(c) When that part of the work done at a job site has been put 

to its intended use by any person or organization other than 

another contractor or subcontractor working on the same 

project. 

Work that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement, but 

which is otherwise complete, will be treated as completed. 

Policies, Section V(l 6)(a). Thus, under the j(S) exclusion, there is no coverage for property 

damage to any "particular pmi" of real prope1iy on which Foreshy's work is ongoing at the time 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 4 of 14
the damage occurs, ifthe damage is caused by Forestry's work, while under the j(6) exclusion 

there is no coverage for prope1ty damage to any "paiticular pait" of real property upon which 

Forestty worked where the damage is the consequence ofForest1y performing its work 

"inconectly," unless the real property at issue belongs to someone other than F orestty and 

Forestry's work on it is complete. See Policies, Section 1(2)U)(5), Section 1(2)(j)(6), Section 

V(16). 

For purposes of the policies, "prope1ty damage" is defined as: 

a. Physical injury to tangible prope1ty, including all resulting loss of use of 

that prope1ty. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of 

the physical injmy that caused it; or 

b. Loss of use of tangible prope1ty that is not physically injured. All such 

loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occunence" that 

caused it. 

Policies, Section V(l 7). 

According to the Childs' allegations made by and through their complaint in the 

underlying action, in May 2010 the Childs entered into a contract with Forestry pursuant to 

which Forestty agreed to construct a residence for them on property they owned in Oregon City, 

Oregon. See Declaration ofW. Blake Mikkelsen ("Mikkelsen Deel.), Exh. 1 ("Childs' 

Complaint"). The residence was intended to include both an attached pool house and a detached 

garage structure. See Declaration of Travis J. Veenker ("Veenker Deel."), if 3. The Childs 

directly hired a contractor other than F orest1y to fabricate and install sheet metal at the residence, 

and that contractor was responsible for most metal work performed in connection with the 

construction project. See id., if 4. 

In October 2010, John ordered Forestty to stop work on the project because the Childs 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 5 of 14
had run out of money to finance its operations. See id., if 5. In May 2011, John advised Forestry 

that it had secured additional financing and requested that work on the project resume. See id. 

The Childs subsequently ordered Forest1y to stop work on the project from December 2011 

through April 2012 while the Childs considered alternative designs for aspects of the 

construction. See id. 

In May 2012, after work resumed on the project for a second time, Forestry substantially 

completed the detached garage structure. See id., if 3. Thereafter the Childs began using the 

garage to store an antique automobile. See id. Developers alleges that ''[ a]round April 2014, 

before the Project was complete, the Childs te1minated Forestry, and subsequently[] hired a 

different general contractor to complete the Project." Complaint, if 8. 

In approximately October 2014, the Childs sent Forestry a "Notice of Defects" listing 

some 17 classes of construction defects in the residence for which they asserted F orestiy's 

responsibility. Childs' Complaint, ifif 7-9. The defects alleged were as follows: (i) ".the exterior 

stucco finish was installed improperly" with resulting "water intrusion and continuous and 

progressive prope11y damage," (ii) "the exterior stone veneer finish was installed improperly" 

with resulting "water intrnsion and continuous and progressive property damage," (iii) "numerous 

windows and skylights were installed improperly" with resulting "water intrusion and continuous 

and progressive property damage," (iv) "numerous doors were installed improperly" with 

resulting "water intrusion and continuous and progressive property damage," (v) "the roofing 

materials was [sic] installed improperly" with resulting "water intrusion and continuous and 

progressive property damage," (vi) "the elevated balconies and covered entry decks were 

installed improperly" with resulting "water intrusion and continuous and progressive prope1ty 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 6 of 14
damage," (vii) "the exterior waterproof decks were installed improperly" with resulting "water 

intrusion and continuous and progressive property damage," (viii) "the foundation drainage was 

improperly built" with resulting "water intrusion and continuous and progressive property 

damage," (ix) "the crawls [sic] spaces were improperly built" with resulting "water intrusion and 

continuous and progressive property damage," (x) "the cathedral ceilings were improperly built" 

with resulting "water intrusion and continuous and progressive property damage," (xi) "the roof, 

attic and skylights were improperly built" with resulting "continuous and progressive property 

damage," (xii) "the fire sprinkler system was installed improperly" with resulting "continuous 

and progressive property damage," (xiii) "numerous exposed beams were installed improperly" 

with resulting "continuous and progressive property damage," (xiv) "mechanical equipment and 

systems were installed improperly" with resulting "continuous and progressive property damage," 

(xv) "plumbing work was installed improperly" with resulting "continuous and progressive 

property damage," (xvi) "electrical work was installed improperly" with resulting "continuous 

and progressive property damage," and (xvii) "drywall in the theater was not installed with 

proper sound proofing, and fiber optics were not installed" in violation of the Childs' contract 

with Forestry. See id.,~ 9. 

Arising out of the foredescribed construction defects, the Childs filed an action against 

Forestty in state court (the underlying action) on or around April 30, 2015. By and through their 

complaint in that action, as noted above, the Childs allege F orestty's liability in the amount of $3 

million for negligent construction, negligence per se, and breach of contract, and additionally 

allege Forestry's liability in the ainount of $1 million for fraud in connection with Forestty's 

representations to them regarding the costs of subcontractors and suppliers, and with the amounts 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 7 of 14
for which Forestty ultimately invoiced them in connection with the costs incurred by the 

subcontractors and suppliers. See id., prayer for judgment. 

As noted above, Developers has unde1iaken and continues to provide Forestry's defense 

in the underlying action. See Complaint, ~ 11. 

ANALYSIS 

As noted above, Developers seeks this court's declaration that Developers will not owe 

Forestty any duty of indemnification as to any damages awarded against Forestty in the Childs' 

favor in the underlying action. It is Forestry's position that Developers cannot be pe1mitted to put 

Forestty in the position of needing to defend Developers' declaratory judgment action before the 

underlying action is resolved, because to do so would require it to take positions on the facts that 

would be adverse to its interests in the underlying action. 

In a discussion heavily relied upon by both sets of parties in support of their respective 

positions, Allan Windt has addressed the subject matter of the parties' dispute at length in a 

leading treatise on insurance law: 

A declaratory judgment action solely involving the insurance company's duty 

to indemnify, as opposed to its duty to defend, cannot, in general, be 

instituted while the action against the insured is still pending. Until a 

judgment against the insured comes into being, the liability of the insurer is 

contingent and may never materialize; as a result, an adjudication of the insurer's 

policy defenses would usually not serve a useful purpose. 

* * * 

There is an exception, however, to the foregoing rule, which exception constitutes 

[a] reason why an insurance company might file a declaratmy judgment action 

seeking an adjudication as to whether--or in what amount---coverage exists. The 

insurer might need such an adjudication in order to assist it in determining 

how much money to contribute to a settlement on behalf of the insured. As 

discussed in §§ 5:05 and 5: 10 [hereof!, an insurer is, at its peril, obligated to 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 8 of 14
contribute to a settlement an amount representing the reasonable settlement value 

of the covered claims, and a good faith e1rnneous belief as to which claims are 

covered (or how much coverage is available) will not insulate the insurer from 

liability for failing to make such a contribution. Accordingly, courts should, 

with one proviso, allow insurers to pursue declaratory judgment actions 

requesting an adjudication concerning the insurer's potential future duty to 

indemnify if such an adjudication is truly necessary to allow the insurer 

properly to fulfill its duty to settle. 

The proviso is that, as discussed in§ 8:04 [hereof], such a declaratory judgment 

action cannot seek an adjudication of any of the factual matters in dispute in 

the underlying litigation. For example, ifthe insured is being sued, in the 

alternative, for negligence and intentional wrongdoing, and only the former is 

covered, the insurer should not be allowed, in a declaratory judgment action, to 

attempt to prove that the insured is liable and is guilty of intentional wrongdoing. 

In fact, such an attempt by the insurer should constitute bad faith on its part. 

Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims & Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies and 

Insureds, §8:3 (6th ed. 2013). 

It is clear that the Oregon courts agree with Windt that an insurer may not put its insured 

"in the conflictive position of being required to abandon ... denial of liability in [an underlying] 

action in order to [establish coverage in connection with such liability in a separate action]." 

North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Wilson's Distrib. Serv., 138 Or. App. 166, 175 (1995). The courts of this 

District have routinely so interpreted the applicable Oregon decisions: 

Two primary doctrines inform the court's analysis on whether to resolve [the 

question of an insurer]'s duty to indemnify prior to the resolution of the underlying 

action. 

First, "Oregon courts recognize that when the underlying tort action is still 

underway, it is appropriate to stay a simultaneous coverage action 

determining the duty to indemnify if the coverage action places the insured in 

'the conflictive position' of being required to abandon its denial of liability in 

the underlying liability case in order to demonstrate coverage." Charter Oak 

Fire Ins. Co. [v. Interstate ,\;Jech., Inc.], 958 F. Supp. 2d [1188,] 1215 [(D. Or. 

2013)) (citing N Pac. Ins. Co. v. Wilson's Distributing Serv., Inc., 138 Ore. App. 

166, 175, 908 P.2d 827 (1995)). Therefore, Oregon district courts typically 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 9 of 14
wait until the underlying litigation is resolved and liability is determined 

before ruling on an insurer's duty to indemnify. Id. ("Comis typically 

determine the duty to indemnify only after the underlying liability action has been 

completed."); see also Country lvfut. Ins. Co. v. Larson, No. 08-6154-TC, 2010 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27043, 2010 WL 1039790, at *5 (D. Ore. Feb. 26, 2010); Evraz 

Or. Steel iV!ills, Inc. v. Cont'/ Ins. Co., No. CV 08-447-JE, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

133186, 2009 WL 789658, at * 11-12 (D. Ore. Mar. 20, 2009); Travelers Prop. 

Cas. Co. of Am. v. iV!artella, No. CV-04-176-ST, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13614, 

2004 WL 1375283, at *6 (D. Ore. June 18, 2004). 

Second, as both parties address in their briefing, federal courts have discretion 

whether to exercise declarato1y relief jurisdiction. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 958 

F. Supp. 2d at 1216. Generally, a federal court may decline jurisdiction if 

exercising jurisdiction for the purpose of declarat01y relief would require needless 

determination of state law issues, encourage forum shopping, or create duplicative 

litigation. Id (citing factors in Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 

62 S. Ct. 1173, 86 L. Ed. 1620 (1942)). 

Here, the underlying lawsuit is unresolved. Discove1y is not scheduled to close 

until October 27, 2014 and a trial date is currently set for Januaiy 5, 2015 . 

. . . Despite [the insurer]'s argument that [an] exclusion in [its] Policy 

automatically precludes any coverage obligation in the underlying lawsuit, 

this Court is hesitant to make such a determination when the facts of the 

underlying lawsuit have yet to be established. 

Additionally, this declarat01y action puts [the insured] in a conflictive position 

while the underlying lawsuit remains pending. North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Wilson's 

Distrib. Serv., 138 Ore. App. 166, 175, 908 P.2d 827 (l 995)("What plaintiff has 

attempted to do here is to litigate, at least in part, the Wilsons' liability to C-CE in 

the underlying tort action, putting the Wilsons in the conflictive position of being 

required to abandon their denial of liability in that action in order to come within 

the exception to the policy exclusion . . . . An insurer may not put its insured in 

that position."). For example, to defend itself in this action, [the insured] may 

have to posit that the facts could show that [it] was negligent ... in some ... 

manner that falls outside [the insurer]'s ... exclusion. Such a position would 

conflict with a denial of liability in the underlying lawsuit. 

Further, to determine [the insurer]'s duty to indemnify, this Court would have to 

review the facts in the underlying lawsuit, which essentially creates duplicative 

litigation and likely would cause this Court to engage in needless determination of 

state law issues. Thus, consistent with the decisions of this District, I stay this 

action until the underlying lawsuit is resolved. 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 10 of 14
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Ortiz & Assocs., Case No. 3:13-CV-1791-AA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

64286, *9-10 (D. Or. May 9, 2014); see also, e.g., Country 1'1fut. Ins. Co. v. Lund, Case No. 

03:14"CV-594-HZ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95803, 9-10 (D. Or. July 14, 2014) (reaching the 

same result on the same legal principles); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Interstate 1Vlech., Inc., 958 

F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1214-1216 (D. Or. 2013) (same). 

I agree with Forestry that to litigate the indemnity question now would put it in the 

"conflictive position" of arguing that it caused the alleged property damage in a mam1er that 

would not invoke any coverage exclusion while simultaneously denying, in the underlying action, 

either that any prope1iy damage exists or, alternatively, that it caused the property damage in any 

manner at all. As just one logically possible example among many, if its motion were denied 

F orestly could find itself in the position of arguing in this action that it performed work 

"inconectly" on one "particular pmi" of the project in support of its position that damage to 

another "particular part" was caused by water intrusion made possible by the inconectly 

performed work on the first particular pmi rather than by inconectly performed work on the 

second pmiicular pmi (such that coverage could potentially be available for damage to the second 

patiicular pati notwithstanding the Section I(2)(j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions); another class of 

logically possible examples would include scenarios in which Forestry's work on one "particular 

part" of the project caused damage to another part of the project not worked on by Forestly but 

rather within the purview and control of a different contractor hired directly by the Childs (such 

that, again, coverage could potentially be available for damage to the pmi of the project worked 

on by the other contractor notwithstanding the exclusions). Each of these examples presents a 

classic "conflictive position" in light of which the requested stay appears appropriate. 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 11 of 14
Developers argues to the contrary that such conflictive positioning cannot occur here 

because, as the general contractor for the project, the "particular part" of the project on which 

Foreshy perfo1med work is necessarily the entirety of the project, citing in support Ohio Cas. Ins. 

Co. v. Ferrell Devs. LLC, Case No. 3: 10-CV-162-AC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135819 (D. Or. 

July 27, 2011). However, although Ferrell did embrace the proposition that, for purposes of an 

insurance policy containing exclusion provisions substantially similar to those at issue here, 

"particular part" could be "broadly construed to include [all] the property affected by the services 

performed by the insured" rather than to include merely "the specific item the insured is working 

on at the time of the damage," its holding that, on the facts before it, "particular pmi" referred to 

the entire project depended necessarily on the fact that all elements of the project were so 

interrelated that incorrect performance of work on one pmticular pmt had the potential to render 

the entirety of the project unusable. See Ferrell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135819, *25-31. There 

being no suggestion in the record that that circumstance is applicable here, the reasoning of 

Ferrell is inapposite, and no grounds exist for failing to give the te1m "pmticular pmi" the 

meaning suggested by its plain language (namely to narrow the scope of the exclusions relying on 

the te1m to property specifically damaged by the insured's defective work). See, e.g., Fortney & 

Weygandt, Inc. v. Am. i\ifrs. lvfut. Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2010); lvfid-Continent 

Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., 557 F.3d 207, 215-217 (5th Cir. 2009); Scott C. Turner, Insurance 

Coverage of Contruction Defects,§ 29:2 (2013). 

Developers further argues that even if Forestry is correct that litigation of the indemnity 

question would require "pmticular part" by "particular pmt" determination of whether coverage is 

available for each damaged portion of the Childs' real property, such determination would require 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 12 of 14
only findings as to whether Forestry's work was complete, abandoned, or ongoing at the time the 

damage occurred, which purportedly would not implicate factual issues that will be developed in 

connection with the Childs' claims of negligence or of breach of contract. Developers' argument 

is unpersuasive in that it appears clear that development of facts relating to whether work on any 

pmticular pat1 of the project was complete has the potential directly to implicate questions 

regarding which contractor was responsible for the final condition of the work; moreover, 

Developers' argument is belied by its own concession, see Developers' Opposition at 10 n. 2, that 

it would be inappropriate to litigate the indemnity question as to patticular pmts of the project 

upon which work was substantially complete at the time the damage occurred. 

Finally, Developers argues that even if this court is concerned that litigation of the 

indemnity question could require the development of facts material to the underlying litigation, 

the court could appropriately carve off the indemnity issue as to, for example, the Childs' fraud 

claim, or any specific element of the Childs' alleged damages as to which such concerns are not 

present, and issue a finding regarding Developers' indemnity obligation only as to those carvedout aspects of the coverage question. Naturally, such an approach would have the potential to 

multiply these proceedings still fmther, creating the possibility of a paitial indemnity action to 

proceed in parallel with the underlying action and a second partial indemnity action to proceed 

following resolution of the underlying action. Because such unnecessary multiplication of 

proceedings is not in the interest of judicial efficiency, I decline to adopt the approach 

Developers espouses. 

Because of the clear potential for Forestry to be put in the "conflictive position" of 

denying liability in the underlying action while conceding liability for the purpose of establishing 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 13 of 14
eligibility for insurance coverage in this action in the absence of a stay of these proceedings, 

Forest1y's motion to stay these proceedings is granted. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set foiih above, Forestiy's motion (#11) to stay these proceedings is 

granted, and these proceedings are stayed pending resolution of the Childs' underlying action 

against Forestly. 

Dated this 7th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01936-PK Document 29 Filed 04/07/16 Page 14 of 14