IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

SUBRINA POUPAK SEHAT, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

ILLINOIS; WASHINGTON 

COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; 

RYAN CORBRIDGE, 

Defendants. 

Papak, Magistrate Judge. 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

Civ. No. 3:14-cv-01433-PK 

FINDINGS& 

RECOMMENDATION 

This matter comes before the Court on Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff Subrina Sehat' s 

Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 184, filed by Defendants Washington County Sheriffs 

Office, ECF No. 201, Defendant Ryan Corbridge, ECF No. 203, and Defendant Progressive 

Universal Insurance Company of Illinois, ECF No. 211. Defendants' Motions should be 

GRANTED and the Third Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

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BACKGROUND 

The following facts are taken from the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") and the 

supporting declarations and exhibits: 

Plaintiff Subrina Sehat is an Iranian citizen living in the United States as a legal 

permanent resident. TAC~ 7. 

In April 2013, Plaintiff purchased an auto insurance policy from Defendant Progressive 

Universal Insurance Company of Illinois ("Progressive"). TAC ~ 35. Plaintiffs premiums 

increased in May 2013 and Progressive demanded payment within two weeks. TAC ~ 12. 

Plaintiff did not pay within two weeks, but instead "made arrangements to make a payment in 

July, 2013." TAC~ 12. Plaintiff was involved in an accident on July 28, 2013, which resulted 

in extensive damage to Plaintiffs car and injuries to Plaintiff herself. TAC ~ 13. After the 

accident, Plaintiff paid off the outstanding balance with Progressive. TAC~ 13. Progressive 

issued a letter reserving its right not to pay on the July 28, 2013 accident because Plaintiff had 

not paid her policy until after the accident and had initially given July 29, 2013 as the date of the 

accident. TAC~ 13. In September 2013, Plaintiff purchased excess coverage from Progressive 

to cover her rental car. TAC~~ 13, 46, 47. 

On September 21, 2013, Plaintiff was involved in a single-car accident while driving a 

rental car. TAC ~~ 14, 48. The TAC and its supporting exhibits give divergent and 

contradictory accounts of the accident, but it generally appears that Plaintiff fell asleep or 

otherwise lost control of the vehicle and veered off of the road and into an agricultural field. 

TAC ~ 14. The police report and Plaintiffs subsequent criminal charges indicate that she 

crashed into a utility pole, but Plaintiff disputes this. TAC ~ 50. 

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A Washington County Sheriff's Deputy named O'Reilly responded to the incident and 

attempted to question Plaintiff, apparently on suspicion that Plaintiff was driving under the 

influence. TAC~~ 49, 50, 51. The TAC and Plaintiff's supporting exhibits give contradictory 

accounts of the interaction between Plaintiff and Deputy O'Reilly, but the encounter ended with 

Plaintiff being taken into custody and transported to the Washington County jail. TAC~~ 53, 54. 

Plaintiff's possessions were searched during the booking-in process and the deputies 

discovered benzodiazepine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. TAC~ 57. Plaintiff declined to 

submit to urinalysis. TAC ~ 63. Plaintiff was charged with DUII and Possession of a Controlled 

Substance. TAC ~~ 69, 71. As a non-citizen, Plaintiff was also subject to an immigration 

detainer issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") beginning on September 21, 

2013. TAC~ 79. 

On September 24, 2013, Defendant Ryan Corbridge ("Corbridge"), a private criminal 

defense attorney, was retained to represent Plaintiff. TAC ~ 82. It appears that Plaintiff's exboyfriend paid Corbridge's retainer. TAC ~ 19; Sehat Deel., at 25, ECF No. 187. Plaintiff 

remained in custody during the pendency of the charges. 

On Corbridge's advice, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to DUII and Possession of a Controlled 

Substance. TAC ~ 25. Plaintiff was then transported to an immigration detention facility in 

Tacoma, Washington. TAC~ 26. Plaintiff's immigration problems were ultimately resolved and 

she was not depmied. TAC~ 26. Plaintiff was released after 89 days in custody. TAC~ 26. 

After she returned to Oregon, Plaintiff learned that she was obliged to pay more than 

$13,000 in restitution as pati of her criminal judgment, largely to repair damage caused to the 

utility pole. TAC ~ 28. Plaintiff disputed the validity of this sum. TAC ~ 28. Plaintiff also 

believed that Progressive should cover the restitution amount, as well as her court-ordered drug 

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and alcohol treatment. TAC ~ 29. Plaintiff also alleges that personal prope1ty was removed 

from her car following the September 2013 crash and that Progressive should pay for the return 

of that prope1ty. TAC ~ 29. It is not clear from the TAC what benefits Progressive has paid on 

Plaintiffs claims and which claims remain unpaid. See TAC ~~ 122-24 (indicating that 

Progressive accepted liability for claims brought by third parties as a result of the September 

2013 crash). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Failure to Comply Court Order 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Rule 8 "applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 

12(b)(6)." McHemy v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nevijel v. N. Coast Life 

Ins. Co., 651F.2d671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981)). Excessive length or verbosity, standing alone, does 

not justify dismissal under Rule 8. Hearns v. San Bernadina Police Dep't, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131 

(9th Cir. 2008). However, a complaint will run afoul of the requirements of Rule 8 if it is 

confused, conclusory, or "replete with redundancy and largely irrelevant." Id at 1131-32. 

This Co mt has dismissed Plaintiffs two prior complaints in this action and each time the 

Comt has attempted to explain the deficiencies in those complaints in order to permit Plaintiff to 

remedy them, if possible. ECF Nos. 56, 99, 179, 181. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, 

ECF No. 18, was seventy-four pages long. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), 

ECF No. 115, was 148 pages long and was accompanied by over 300 pages of exhibits, ECF Nos 

116-132. This Court found that the SAC did not comply with the requirements of Rule 8 

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because it failed to include a "short and plain statement" showing that Plaintiff was entitled to 

relief. This Court observed that: 

It is critical that Sehat recognize that the deficiencies in her SAC cannot be cured 

by simply adding more content. Indeed, the primary problems with her SAC are 

that it contains too much irrelevant and redundant material and that it fails to 

connect the relevant material with her legal claims. Sehat is reminded that her 

complaint is not the place to include any and all evidence that may support her 

claims. 

Findings and Recommendation, at 4. ECF No. 179. 1 

The Court went on to direct Plaintiff to consult with the Co mt' s Guide for SelfRepresented Parties and Complaint Forms in drafting her subsequent complaint. 

On July 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint. ECFNo. 184. The TAC 

is fifty-two pages long and is accompanied by over 700 pages of supporting declarations and 

exhibits. ECF Nos. 184, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195. As with her previous Complaints, 

Plaintiff devotes considerable time and attention to irrelevant matters, including lengthy 

descriptions of nineteenth-century Oregon politics, the formation of Washington County, TAC ~ 

9, Progressive's Internet-based business strategy, TAC ~ 8, and the manner in which a 

Washington County jail inmate identified only as Laura was transpo1ted to and from the jail 

showers, TAC~ 95. Plaintiff's supporting documents are similarly replete with irrelevant and 

redundant material, including long digressions on Plaintiff's difficulties with her family, her 

objections to traditional Middle Eastern cultural norms, and her tumultuous relationship with her 

significant other. See, e.g., Sehat Deel., at 9-10; 25-27. ECF No. 187. It is clear that Plaintiff 

has not complied with this Court's order that she submit a short and plain statement consistent 

with the requirements of Rule 8. 

1 The Findings and Recommendation was adopted on May 16, 2016. ECFNo. 181. 

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"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (b) authorizes a district comt to dismiss a complaint 

with prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)." Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1129. Dismissal with 

prejudice is a "harsh remedy" and should only be imposed when other, less drastic alternatives 

have been considered. Nevijel, 651 F.2d at 674. Alternatives include allowing further 

amendment, more time, or association with experienced counsel. Id Although there are a "wide 

variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need not exhaust them all 

before dismissing a case." Id The comt must also consider whether "public policy strongly 

favors resolution of this case on the merits." Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1132 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

In this case, Plaintiff has been given several opportunities to amend her complaint with 

the benefit of explicit guidance from the Comt and each attempt has resulted in increasingly 

voluminous and confused pleadings. This Comt has also endeavored to secure pro bono counsel 

to assist Plaintiff, but without success. ECF No. 175. Given the age of this case and Plaintiffs 

numerous opportunities to amend, it is clear that less drastic alternatives would be unavailing. 

Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to 

comply with the requirements of Rule 8 and this Comt's previous orders. 

II. Failure to State a Claim 

Defendants Ryan Corbridge and Progressive also move to dismiss Plaintiffs claims 

against them for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To 

survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient facts that 

"state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'' Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise the right to relief above the speculative 

level ... [and cross the] line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. at 

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555-57. A claim is plausible on its face when the supporting factual allegations allow the court 

to infer the defendant's liability based on the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

663 (2009). 

The factual allegations must present more than "the mere possibility of misconduct." Id 

at 678. In the case of pro se litigants, a court reviews the pleadings with a less stringent standard 

than those drafted by lawyers. The court views the complaint liberally, but will not supplant 

vague and conclusory allegations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Litmon v. 

Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014). 

A. Progressive 

Although the TAC contains a confused and conclusory reference to the Sherman Act, 

Plaintiff's sole claim against Progressive appears to be for breach of contract. To state a claim 

for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a contract; (2) its relevant 

terms; (3) plaintiff's full performance and lack of breach; and ( 4) defendant's breach resulting in 

harm to plaintiff. Slover v. Or. Bd Of Clinical Social Workers, 144 Or. App. 565, 570 (1996). 

Under Oregon law, "in an action on an insurance policy the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient 

to bring the loss within the provisions of the policy .... [flor this purpose it is also essential that 

the complaint allege facts sufficient to show that the plaintiff sustained or suffered a loss." 

Prevosky v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 262 Or. 435, 438 (1972). 

Although the TAC contains a section entitled "Statement of Claims," that section is 

largely confused and unintelligible. Plaintiff alleges the existence of an insurance contract 

between herself and Progressive and that Progressive failed to pay claims as required. Plaintiff 

does not, however, clearly allege the relevant terms of the contract, nor does she identify what 

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benefits were due and unpaid. Indeed, the TAC appears to allege that Progressive did pay for 

claims brought by third parties as a result of Plaintiffs September 2013 crash. TAC~~ 122-124. 

Nor does Plaintiff clearly allege how Progressive's alleged breach led to many of the 

injuries claimed by Plaintiff. For instance, Plaintiff claims that Progressive's breach of contract 

"caused her to endure prolonged incarceration in WCCC's solitary confinement cell," but it is 

left entirely unclear how Progressive is supposed to have done this. TAC~ 115. Plaintiff also 

assetts that Progressive's refusal to pay for her stolen personal property was "without any basis 

or justification in Common law," but fails to clearly allege that Progressive was obliged to pay 

that claim under a patticular provision of the contract. TAC ~ 121. Plaintiff also appears to 

object to Progressive's decision to accept liability for damage to the utility pole, TAC ~~ 126-

129, but it is unclear how Plaintiff was, or could have been, harmed by that decision. 

Despite characterizing the claim as one for breach of contract, Plaintiff abruptly shifts to 

accusing Progressive of "price gauging" in violation of the Sherman Act, without any suppotting 

facts. TAC~~ 131-143. The TAC also asserts a conspiracy of some kind between Progressive, 

the Washington County Sheriffs Office, and Ryan Corbridge, apparently in furtherance of a 

violation of the Sherman Act. TAC~ 142. As Progressive points out, this claim is conclusory, 

without factual suppott, and can only be described as gibberish. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract against Progressive and 

Progressive's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 211, should be GRANTED. As Plaintiff has been 

afforded numerous opportunities to amend her complaint, dismissal should be with prejudice. 

B. Corbridge 

Plaintiff brings claims against Ryan Corbridge for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

"simulation of legal process." 

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1. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

In order to state a claim for violation of§ 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts that give rise 

to a plausible inference that the defendant deprived her of a Constitutional right while acting 

under color of state law. Najfe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). An individual 

acts under color of state law when he or she "exercises power 'possessed by vittue of state law 

and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law."' Id at 

1036 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Conclusory allegations of a 

conspiracy between a private party and a state actor are insufficient to sustain a claim under § 

1983. Schucker v. Rockwook, 846 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In this case, the TAC does not allege any facts to support Plaintiffs claim that Corbridge, 

a privately retained criminal defense attorney, was a state actor. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the 

conclusory allegation that the Washington County Sheriffs Department used the threat of 

criminal charges to coerce Plaintiffs ex-boyfriend into hiring Corbridge to represent her. TAC 'if 

19. Plaintiffs allegations are factually deficient, conclusory, and implausible. Plaintiffs§ 1983 

claim against Corbridge should be dismissed. 

2. "Simulation of Legal Process" 

Plaintiff also brings claims for "simulation of legal process" against Corbridge pursuant 

to ORS 162.355. ORS 162.355 is a criminal statute prohibiting simulating legal process "with 

the intent to harass, injure or defraud another person." ORS 162.355(1). From the TAC, it 

appears that Plaintiff is alleging that Washington County Circuit Court, where she pleaded guilty 

to DUH and felony Possession of a Controlled Substance, is not a valid Oregon court, but is 

instead a county court incapable of hearing felony matters and that Corbridge' s representation of 

her before that comt constituted a violation of ORS 162.355. 

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As a preliminary matter, Washington County Circuit Court is a valid Oregon state comi, 

constituting Oregon's 20th Judicial District. ORS 3.012(1)(t). It has subject matter jurisdiction 

over all actions, unless specifically divested of jurisdiction. Or. Const., Art VII (Original), § 9 

("All judicial power, authority, and jurisdiction not vested by this Constitution, or by laws 

consistent therewith, exclusively in some other Court shall belong to the Circuit Courts, and they 

shall have appellate jurisdiction, and supervisory control over the County Comis, and all other 

inferior Courts, Officers, and tribunals."); Or. Const., Art. VII (Amended), § 2 ("The comis, 

jurisdiction, and judicial system of Oregon, except so far as expressly changed by this 

amendment, shall remain as at present constituted until otherwise provided by law."); Specialty 

Risk Serv. v. Royal lndem. Co., 213 Or. App. 620, 624-25 (2007). The jurisdiction of Oregon's 

circuit comis extends to felony prosecutions. Or. Const. Ali. VII (Amended), § 5 (describing the 

means by which a person may be charged with a felony in an Oregon circuit court); State v. 

Caldwell, 187 Or. App. 720, 723-24 (2003). Plaintiffs state criminal charges, which were 

brought in Washington County Circuit Comi, and to which Plaintiff pleaded guilty and was 

sentenced, were real and not "simulated." 

Fmihermore, ORS 162.355 is a criminal statute. In Doyle v. City of Medford, 356 Or. 

336 (2014), the Oregon Supreme Court laid out a two-stage process for determining whether an 

Oregon statutory provision creates a private right of action. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. 

Linderman, 116 F. Supp.3d 1183, 1189-1191 (D. Or. 2015) (Mosman, J., applying the Doyle test 

and concluding that Oregon's criminal theft statute did not create a private cause of action). 

First, the Comi must ask "whether the statute expressly or impliedly indicates that the 

legislature intended to create or to deny such a right of action." Doyle, 356 Or. at 363. Next, 

"[i]f that inquiry discloses no discernable legislative intent to create or deny a right of action, the 

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court must then decide whether creating a common-law right of action would be consistent with 

the statute, appropriate for promoting its policy, and needed to ensure its effectiveness." Id. 

The first step requires the court to examine the statutes "text, context, or legislative 

history" for an indication that the legislature intended to create a private right of action. Id. at 

345. ORS 162.355 does not expressly create a cause of action. In determining whether the 

legislature impliedly created a cause of action, the court must consider "(1) whether the statute 

refers to civil liability in some way;" and "(2) whether the statute provides no express remedy, 

civil or otherwise, for its violation and, therefore, there would be no remedy of any sort unless 

the court determined that the legislature impliedly created one or the court itself provided one.'' 

Doyle, 356 Or. at 345-46. Although ORS 162.355 forbids the simulation of both civil and 

criminal processes, it does not refer to civil liability. The statute does provide for a remedy, 

however, in that it establishes that simulating legal process is a Class C felony. ORS 162.355(3). 

The text and context of ORS 162.355 do not suppoti the conclusion that the legislature intended 

to create a private cause of action for simulating legal process. 

The next step of the Doyle inquity is to determine whether, in the absence of a legislative 

intent to create a private cause of action, the comi should create a common-law right of action to 

address the violation. Doyle, 356 Or. at 346. The Oregon Supreme Comi cautions, however, 

that the circumstances in which such a creation would be warranted are "limited.'' Id. Comis 

must consider: 

[T]he nature of the legislative provision at issue, the adequacy of existing claims 

for relief and associated remedies, the extent to which a common-law right of 

action will aid, supplement, or interfere with existing claims arid remedies and 

other means of enforcement, the significance of the purpose that the legislative 

body is seeking to effectuate, the extent of the change in existing common law 

principles that provision of a right of action would produce, and the burden that 

the right of action would place on the comis. 

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Id. at 363-64. 

In Linderman, Judge Mosman explained that the creation of a private cause of action for 

criminal theft "would do little to supplement the work that criminal sanctions and judgments of 

restitution do in advancing the legislature's goals in adopting the theft statutes." Linderman, 116 

F. Supp.3d at 1191. Judge Mosman also noted that the harms caused by theft were already 

encompassed by existing p1ivate causes of action, such as conversion or fraud. Id. 

That reasoning is readily applicable to the present case. This CoU1i should decline to find 

that a private cause of action exists for criminal simulation of legal process and dismiss 

Plaintiffs claims against Corbridge for violation of ORS 162.355. As Judge Mosman observed 

in Linderman, it would be futile to permit amendment of a claim that is not legally cognizable. 

Accordingly, dismissal should be with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendant Washington County Sheriffs Office's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 201, in 

which Defendant Progressive and Defendant Corbridge join, should be GRANTED. Defendant 

Ryan Corbridge's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 203, should be GRAL'!TED. Defendant 

Progressive's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 211, should be GRANTED. Plaintiffs Third 

Amended Complaint, ECF No. 184, should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to comply 

with the requirements of Rtile 8 and this Court's previous orders. Defendants Progressive and 

Corbridge have also demonstrated that they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against 

them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). A judgment should enter dismissing this case accordingly. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be refened to a district judge. Objections, if 

any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no 

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objections are filed, then the Findings and Reconunendation will go under advisement on that 

date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Reconunendation will go under advisement. 

NOTICE 

A party's failure to timely file objections to any of these findings will be considered a 

waiver of that party's right to de nova consideration of the factual issues addressed herein and 

will constitute a waiver of the party's right to review of the findings of fact in any order or 

judgment entered by a district judge. These Findings and Recommendation are not inunediately 

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Couti of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(l) 

of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entty of judgment. 

lflon. Paul Papa 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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