J-A12002-21

2022 PA Super 49

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MAXWELL DAVID EDGIN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 984 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 4, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-14-CR-0001599-2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED: MARCH 22, 2022

Appellant, Maxwell David Edgin, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County on June 4, 2020. On 

appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence. For the reasons stated below, we vacate and remand.

Following a hearing on Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence, the trial 

court made the following findings:

1. Joshua Maurer is a patrol officer with the State College 

Department.

2. Officer Maurer has been with the State College Police 

Department for 2 years, is experienced in administering 

standard field sobriety tests, has made over a dozen driving 

under the influence (DUI) arrests during his tenure, and has 

dealt with instances of alcohol overdose amongst college 

students.

3. On May 30, 2018, Officer Maurer was dispatched to a report 

of an intoxicated driver in State College, Centre County, 

Pennsylvania.
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4. Officer Maurer received information from dispatch that Nick 

Bradley, a bouncer at Bar Bleu, called 911 at approximately 

7:47 p.m. to report a male intoxicated driver.

5. There was conflicting testimony from Officer Maurer and 

Officer Kenneth Shaffer regarding what was known on the 

night of May 30, 2018 before the incident which led to the 

current suppression motion versus what was learned after an 

investigation was made, and after [Appellant] was in custody.

6. It is clear to the [trial court] that Mr. Bradley observed a male 

recklessly driving a black F-150 truck northbound on Garner 

Street towards College Avenue, an area known for its heavy 

pedestrian traffic. Officer Shaffer testified that in his 

experience, driving recklessly is often synonymous with 

driving intoxicated.

7. Mr. Bradley gave the registration of the male driver, and 

stated he observed damage on the taillights on the rear end 

of the truck.

8. Raymond Raker also called 911 on May 30, 2018[,] at 

approximately 8:04 p.m. to report an accident near Shellers 

Bend. Mr. Raker did not witness the accident.

9. At approximately 7:57 p.m.[,] Julia Rater called to report 

observing a black F-150 run a red light at Westerly Parkway 

and Atherton Street, and almost striking another vehicle.

10. While on the phone with dispatch, Ms. Rater followed the 

truck, and observed it swerving in and out the lane and being 

driven erratically, in general.

11. Ms. Rater followed the vehicle to 110 Raleigh Avenue where 

she observed a white male exit the truck wearing a greyish 

white shirt and blue shorts.

12. Ms. Rater observed the male staggering and stumbling to the 

garage door, enter a code in a keypad, and then enter the 

residence through the garage door.

13. Officer Mauer was in a marked vehicle and in full uniform 

when he arrived at 110 Raleigh Avenue at 8:01 p.m.

14. Upon arrival at the residence, Officer Maurer observed the 

truck with the damage that had been described by the callers.

15. Officer Maurer also observed air actively leaking from the 

right rear tire.

16. Officer Maurer’s colleague, Officer Stover, arrived at the 

residence simultaneously to Officer Maurer’s arrival, and 

Officer Shaffer arrived shortly thereafter, at approximately 

8:07 p.m.

17. Just before Officer Shaffer arrived, he contacted Ms. Rater 

regarding her call to 911. When Officer Shaffer arrived, he 
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observed the F-150 truck to have damage on the right side 

and the rear end. The truck also had dents, scrapes, the 

mirror was off, and there was a large piece of bark or wood 

shoved between the rim and the tire.

18. In an attempt to make contact with the male, Officer Maurer 

and his colleagues announced themselves and pounded on 

the front door and the rear sliding door multiple times with 

no response.

19. The officers contacted their lieutenant, Lieutenant Angelotti, 

who came to the residence. 

20. The officers conveyed their concerns about the welfare of the 

male to Lieutenant Angelotti and inquired about making an 

entry into the house.

21. Officer Maurer was concerned the male may have had a 

medical emergency or was injured based on the damage to 

the vehicle.

22. Officer Shaffer testified Mr. Bradley, the bouncer, believed the 

male was intoxicated. Officer Shaffer also had concerns the 

male may have been diabetic, as Officer Shaffer had prior 

experience with diabetic emergencies.

23. Officers Maurer, Stover, and Shaffer used the rear sliding 

doors to make entry into the residence at 8:27 p.m. At his 

time, it was still daylight.

24. The [o]fficers announced themselves loudly and searched the 

house for the male.

25. The officers found the male asleep in a bedroom on the 

second floor of the residence.

26. Officer Maurer smelled a strong odor of alcohol, and had to 

shake the male several times to wake him up, and recognize 

the officers.

27. After waking the male, Officer Maurer noticed the male’s 

speech was very slurred, his eyes were bloodshot and watery, 

and he stumbled getting out of bed.

28. The officers called for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) at 

approximately 8:29 p.m. for overconsumption of alcohol.

29. The male was identified as [Appellant] via his driver’s license. 

Ms. Rater also returned to the residence to identify 

[Appellant] while he was in the back of an ambulance.

30. After awaking [Appellant] from sleep, Officer Stover put 

[Appellant] in a wrist lock. Officer Maurer testified that 

putting a suspect in a wrist lock is standard to protect the 

officer.

31. Officer Maurer assisted [Appellant] downstairs and led him 

outside.
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32. Once outside, Officer Maurer checked for injuries and 

proceeded to recite to [Appellant] his Miranda[

1] rights.

33. [Appellant] was then interrogated at the scene.

34. [Appellant] denied driving, and denied that his truck was ever 

downtown.

35. EMS arrived at approximately 8:47 p.m.

36. When EMS arrived[,] [Appellant] was taken to the hospital.

37. [Appellant]’s consent to a blood draw is not at issue before 

[the trial court] and testimony surrounding the procurement 

of [Appellant]’s Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) was not 

presented, nor was evidence stating [Appellant]’s BAC level 

presented to [the trial court].

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 11/1/19, at 1-4.

2 (italics added).

Relying on the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 

269 (Pa. 1994), which we discuss in detail infra, the trial court reasoned:

When analyzed together, the factors determining whether a 

warrantless intrusion was justified supports the Commonwealth’s 

argument that exigent circumstances existed at the time law 

enforcement entered [Appellant]’s home. The gravity of the 

offense was quite high as there were multiple calls made to 911 

regarding a black F-150 driving recklessly in a well-populated 

area. 911 caller Julia Rater remained on the phone with dispatch 

while describing the driver erratic driving, near-miss with another 

driver on the road, his running of a red light, and, finally, his 

staggering and stumbling demeanor as he exited his car and 

walked into his home. Ms. Rater’s call coupled with Nick Bradley’s 

call reporting a person recklessly driving a truck matching the 

same description more than adequately expressed [Appellant]’s 

disregard for the safety of others that evening. 

____________________________________________

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

2 Subsequently, Appellant was charged with seven counts under Title 75, 

including: DUI – Section 3802(c) (Count 1); DUI – Section 3802(a) (Count 2); 

traffic control signals – Section 3112(a)(3)(i) (Count 3); one-way roadways –

Section 3308 (Count 4); obedience to traffic control devices, Section 3111(a) 

(Count 5); careless driving, Section 3714(a) (Count 6); and, accidents 

involving damage to unattended vehicles or property, Section 3745(a) (Count 

7). 
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There was a probability [Appellant] was suffering a medical 

emergency. Law enforcement arrived at [Appellant]’s residence 

shortly after [Appellant] entered the home. There were at least 

four marked police vehicles surrounding [Appellant]’s house. 

Shortly after arriving, the officers announced themselves loudly 

and pounded on the door. They received no response. Officer 

Maurer had extensive experience with impaired individuals. 

Officer Shaffer knew the dangers of over-consumption of alcohol, 

but also concerned with the possibility that [Appellant] may be 

having a diabetic emergency. Armed with their experience, Mr. 

Bradley’s report that [Appellant] was highly intoxicated, the 

information gleaned from the call with Ms. Rater, and the visible 

damage to [Appellant]’s truck, the officers came to the conclusion 

that the driver of the truck was either intoxicated or suffering from 

a medical emergency or both. These details were enough to form 

basis of probable cause to enter the home. [. . .]

In consideration of factor four, not only did Ms. Rater provide a 

detailed account of [Appellant]’s actions as she witnessed them, 

but she followed him home, witnessed him exit his truck, and 

enter the residence law enforcement later entered. While Ms. 

Rater did eventually leave [Appellant]’s residence, the officers 

arrived approximately five minutes later. Officer Shaffer testified 

that when he arrived at [Appellant]’s residence the truck’s engine 

was still hot. It was more than reasonable for law enforcement to 

believe [Appellant] was in the house.

Finally, the officers’ entry into the house was peaceable as the 

sliding door they opened to enter the home was unlocked, and the 

entry was done during daylight hours. [The trial court] concludes 

there were exigent circumstances present to justify law 

enforcement’s warrantless entry into [Appellant]’s home. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/1/19, at 6-7. 

After denying Appellant’s motion for suppression of evidence, Appellant 

proceeded to a non-jury trial on the two DUI counts. On June 4, 2020, the 

trial court, after finding him guilty, sentenced Appellant, inter alia, to pay a 
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fine in the amount of $1,000.00, and imposed no additional sentence on the 

second DUI count.3 This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the suppression [court] err in holding that the warrantless 

entry and search of [Appellant]’s residence did not violate 

[Appellant]’s constitutional rights, as set forth in Fourth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, by finding that said search was 

supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Our review of an order denying a motion to suppress is limited:

We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of 

the record as a whole. Where the record supports the 

factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Russo, 594 Pa. 119, 934 A.2d 1199, 1203 

(2007) (citations omitted). As an appellate court, we are not 

bound by the suppression court's conclusions of law; rather, when 

reviewing questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary. Id.

Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d 564, 567 (Pa. 2018). 

With this background in mind, we now address the issue raised in the 

instant appeal.

____________________________________________

3 On the same day, Appellant was sentenced on the remaining counts, after 

pleading guilty to all of them.
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We discern some ambiguity regarding the grounds relied upon by the 

officers in making the warrantless entry into Appellant’s residence, which is 

also present in the Commonwealth’s argument before the trial court and us. 

It appears the Commonwealth is arguing that the officers could enter 

Appellant’s residence under exigent circumstances and/or for emergency aid 

purposes.4 We consider these in turn. 

In Wilmer, our Supreme Court stated:

Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches and seizures without a 

warrant are presumptively unreasonable,” subject only to 

specifically established exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 

U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Birchfield 

v. North Dakota, ––– U.S. –––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 195 

L.Ed.2d 560 (2016); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327, 107 

S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Commonwealth v. Roland, 

535 Pa. 595, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (1994). These exceptions 

include, inter alia, exigent circumstances, the “plain view” 

exception, searches incident to arrest, consent searches, and 

automobile searches. A police officer may also briefly detain a 

person without a warrant or probable cause, so long as the officer 

possesses a reasonable suspicion that the individual is or is about 

to be engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 

U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 567-68 (footnotes omitted). 

____________________________________________

4

 Likewise, the trial court found the entry to be legal on exigent circumstances 

grounds, even though some of the reasons provided seem more consistent 

with emergency aid grounds. In Commonwealth v. Coughlin, 199 A.3d 

401, 406 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) this Court held that the Roland 

factors are of limited utility in determining whether warrantless entry was 

necessary for rendering medical aid. 
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In Roland, the appellant was convicted of furnishing liquor or malt or 

brewed beverages to minors, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and 

possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant's convictions rested on evidence 

obtained when police entered his home, without a warrant, to investigate 

underage drinking. The Roland Court identified seven factors to be 

considered in applying the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 

requirement:

Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a 

home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth 

Amendment. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–90, 100 

S.Ct. 1371, 1378–82, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 648–53 (1980). In 

determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a number of 

factors are to be considered. As stated in Commonwealth v. 

Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 557, 406 A.2d 1026, 1031 (1979),

Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the 

gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is 

reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is 

above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, 

(4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the 

suspect is within the premises being entered, (5) 

whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will 

escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the 

entry was peaceable, and (7) the time of the entry, 

i.e., whether it was made at night. These factors are 

to be balanced against one another in determining 

whether the warrantless intrusion was justified.

Accord Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 298–99, 396 

A.2d 1177, 1179–80 (1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912, 100 

S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980). Other factors may also be 

taken into account, such as whether there is hot pursuit of a 

fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police 

take the time to obtain a warrant, or a danger to police or other 

persons inside or outside the dwelling. See Minnesota v. Olson, 

495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95 

(1990). Nevertheless, “police bear a heavy burden when 
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attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify 

warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 

740, 749–50, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 743 (1984).

Where an offense being investigated by police is a minor one, a 

balancing of the foregoing factors should be weighted against 

finding that exigent circumstances exist. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 

466 U.S. at 750–53, 104 S.Ct. at 2098–99, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743–45 

(1984). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. at 298, 

396 A.2d at 1179 (where no grave offense is involved, particularly 

a crime of violence, the justification for proceeding without a 

warrant is more likely absent).

As stated in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. at 750–53, 104 S.Ct. 

at 2098–99, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743–45,

Before agents of the government may invade the 

sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government 

to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome 

the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to 

all warrantless home entries.

....

[I]t is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home 

arrest that would not be unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is 

extremely minor.

... [A]n important factor to be considered when 

determining whether any exigency exists is the 

gravity of the underlying offense.... [A]pplication of 

the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of 

a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there 

is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, 

such as the kind at issue in this case, has been 

committed.

Roland, 637 A.2d at 270-71. Applying these considerations the Court held 

entry by police into appellant's home was improper. The police were not in 

hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Nor was there a danger to police or other persons 

that would have necessitated an immediate entry. There was no reason to 
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believe that appellant or the minors were armed. Further, the entry occurred 

at nighttime, a particularly suspect time for searches to be conducted. Thus, 

given the minor nature of the offense that triggered the police entry, and the 

lack of exigent circumstances supporting that entry, the Court held denial of 

appellant's motion for suppression was erroneous.

As noted above, applying Roland to the facts at hand, the trial court 

concluded that there were exigent circumstances present to justify law 

enforcement’s warrantless entry into Appellant’s home. We disagree. 

First, we consider the offense gravity. Appellant committed 

misdemeanor DUI offenses in this case. In Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 

2011, 2016 (2021), the United States Supreme Court held that a 

misdemeanant’s successful flight into his or her home does not categorically

give rise to an exigency supporting warrantless police entry. The Lange Court 

noted that “misdemeanors run the gamut of seriousness.” Id. at 2020. In 

arriving at its holding, the Lange Court addressed Welsh, an older drunk 

driving case not involving the suspect’s flight: 

This Court has held that when a minor offense alone is 

involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency 

that can justify a warrantless home entry. In Welsh v.

Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)], officers responded to a call 

about a drunk driver only to discover he had abandoned his 

vehicle and walked home. See 466 U.S., at 742–743, 104 S.Ct. 

2091. So no police pursuit was necessary, hot or otherwise. The 

officers just went to the driver’s house, entered without a warrant, 

and arrested him for a “nonjailable” offense. Ibid. The State 

contended that exigent circumstances supported the entry 

because the driver’s “blood-alcohol level might have dissipated 

while the police obtained a warrant.” Id., at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091.
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We rejected that argument on the ground that the driver had been 

charged with only a minor offense. “[T]he gravity of the 

underlying offense,” we reasoned, is “an important factor to be 

considered when determining whether any exigency exists.” Id., 

at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. “[W]hen only a minor offense has been 

committed” (again, without any flight), there is reason to question 

whether a compelling law enforcement need is present; so it is 

“particularly appropriate” to “hesitat[e] in finding exigent 

circumstances.” Id., at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091. And we concluded: 

“[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the 

context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there 

is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense” is involved. 

Id. In summary, drunk driving can be considered a minor offense.5 And 

where there is no hot pursuit or flight involved, warrantless entry into a home 

under the exigent circumstances doctrine is rarely permissible. Id. 

In Commonwealth v. Fickes, 969 A.2d 1251, (Pa. Super. 2009),

however, this Court wrote that DUI, while a misdemeanor, is ”one of the few, 

if not only misdemeanors, that results in over 500 deaths per year in our 

Commonwealth.” Id. at 1258. Thus, the Fickes Court therefore concluded 

the gravity of the offense before it was high. Id. Reading Fickes in light of 

Lange and Welsh, however, we do not believe a categorial approach is 

appropriate. Rather, we must examine the issue case by case. The instant 

case, like Welsh, did not involve flight from police in hot pursuit. And while 

we do not wish to diminish the seriousness of Appellant’s reckless, drunken 

driving through a well-populated area—conduct that easily could have turned 

deadly, as the Fickes Court explained—we conclude for purposes of the 

____________________________________________

5

 The defendant in Welsh had his license revoked; he did not face criminal 

charges. We nonetheless find Welsh, and the Lange Court’s treatment of 

Welsh, instructive. 
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exigent circumstances analysis that police were not investigating a highgravity offense in this case. Thankfully there were no reported injuries

resulting from Appellant’s offenses; when police arrived at Appellant’s home,

they were investigating reports of his erratic driving after being turned away 

from a bar because of his apparent intoxication. We therefore do not weigh 

this factor in favor of exigency. 

Regarding the second Roland factor, there is no indication in the record 

that would support the officers’ reasonable belief that Appellant was armed. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. “This consideration bears materially on the 

justification for a warrantless entry.” Williams, 396 A.2d at 1179. This factor 

weighs against warrantless entry. 

Third, we must consider whether the Commonwealth showed that “there 

exists not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is requisite even when 

a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of probable cause, 

including ‘reasonably trustworthy information,’ to believe that the suspect 

committed the crime involved.” Williams, 396 A.2d at 1180. In Fickes, 

police received a report of a hit and run automobile collision. Fickes, 969

A.2d at 1252. Following a trial of skid marks, a stop sign apparently bent over 

from a collision, and muddy tire tracks from a vehicle that had run off the 

road, police found the defendant asleep at the wheel of his vehicle in his open 

garage. Id. at 1253-54. The garage appeared to be arranged as a “makeshift 

social imbibing area,” and the vehicle apparently collided with a couch upon 

entry to the garage. Id. at 1258. One open bottle of vodka was on the 
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passenger seat. Id. On these facts, the Fickes Court held that probable 

cause existed in support of the warrantless entry into the defendant’s garage. 

Id. 

Instantly, police received information that Appellant drove away from a 

bar after being denied entry based on his intoxication, and that he drove 

erratically through a crowded area and eventually staggered from his vehicle 

into his garage. Appellant acknowledges that police had strong reason to 

believe he was intoxicated; he disputes whether evidence supported 

warrantless entry for a medical emergency. We address the latter below. For 

purposes of Roland, we conclude police had sufficient probable cause to 

believe Appellant was intoxicated. 

Fourth, there is no dispute Appellant was in the premises being entered.

Fifth, there is no indication that Appellant would have escaped if not 

swiftly apprehended. Commonwealth’s Brief at 27. Several officers 

surrounded the premises; as such, escape was not an option to Appellant, 

particularly in his condition. This factor weighs against warrantless entry. 

Sixth, the entry was peaceable, through an unlocked, sliding door in the 

back of the house at 8:27 pm. Testimony indicates that it was still daylight 

at that time. N.T. Suppression, 3/11/19, at 52. We observe that the 

Commonwealth, in its brief described the entry as occurring in the “evening”. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 22, 23. These factors neither help nor hurt the case 

for exigent circumstances. 
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Next, we consider the Commonwealth’s argument that the dissipation 

of Appellant’s BAC justified the warrantless entry. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

32-33. Quoting from Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1004 (Pa. 

Super. 2005), the Commonwealth argues that “perhaps, [the] most important 

[factor] [is] the likelihood that [Blood Alcohol Content] evidence crucial to a 

DUI charge permitting warrantless arrest in the first place would be lost in the 

time it would take the officer to secure a warrant.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 

32-33 (alterations in original). Id.

In considering this argument, we must take account of developments in 

the law after Dommel. In Commonwealth v. Trahey, 228 A.3d 520 (Pa. 

2020), our Supreme Court noted:

Both breath tests and blood tests constitute “searches” within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, conducting such 

a search without a warrant is reasonable only if it falls within a 

recognized exception to the warrant requirement. One such 

exception . . . applies where the exigencies of the situation make 

the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless 

search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

Although an exigency may present itself in a variety of contexts, 

its defining trait is a compelling need for official action and no time 

to secure a warrant. Such a need may arise, for instance, to 

prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.

Id. at 530 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Commonwealth’s argument assumes that the difficulty in obtaining 

and executing a search warrant prior to the expiration of the two-hour window 

set forth in the DUI statute gives rise to an urgent need for warrantless 

testing. Under this reasoning, given the mechanics of the statute and the 
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operation of intoxication, essentially all DUI cases qualify as an exigent 

circumstance. However, such an argument is inconsistent with Missouri v. 

McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013). In McNeely, “the U.S. Supreme Court 

rejected the government’s argument that the natural dissipation of alcohol in 

a DUI suspect’s bloodstream constitutes a “per se exigency” that categorically 

justifies warrantless BAC testing.” Trahey, 228 A.2d at 531 (citing McNeely, 

569 U.S. at 147). 

Relatedly, “a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because 

evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while 

police obtained a warrant.” Welsh, 466 U.S.at 754. Similarly, in Roland, 

relying on Welsh, our Supreme Court held that even if the evidence of the 

crime might have been removed from appellant’s residence before a warrant 

could have been obtained, “this alone would not have supported a warrantless 

entry to investigate [a summary offense].” Roland, 637 A.2d at 272.6 Thus, 

while destruction of the evidence is certainly a factor to be considered, it is 

not, as suggested by the Commonwealth, the most important. 

Considering all the foregoing, we do not believe the Roland factors 

weigh in favor of an exigency here. Police were investigating a suspected 

____________________________________________

6 We are aware that Welsh involved a noncriminal civil forfeiture offense (a 

driver’s license revocation), Roland involved a summary offense, and that at 

issue here is a misdemeanor. Despite the differences, for the reasons 

explained infra, we believe Welsh and Roland support our conclusion that 

destruction of the evidence was not a factor supporting the lawfulness of the 

entry in the instant matter. 
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drunk driver and nothing more. DUI is a misdemeanor, and there were no 

reported injuries, no reported property damage other than to the vehicle itself, 

and therefore nothing to support a finding of a high gravity offense here. 

There is no indication Appellant was armed, and no indication he would have 

could have attempted to escape. The Roland factors are not meant to support 

warrantless entry any time police have strong reason to suspect drunk driving. 

Moreover, the need to obtain BAC evidence is not sufficient, pursuant to 

McNeely, to create an exigency. We therefore cannot uphold the trial court’s 

denial of his suppression motion on this basis. 

We now consider whether police were justified in entering Appellant’s 

home to render emergency medical aid. 

“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” we have 

often said, “is ‘reasonableness.’” [Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 

U.S. 398, 403 (2006)]. Therefore, although “searches and 

seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 

unreasonable,” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 

1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), that presumption can be overcome. For example, “the 

exigencies of the situation [may] make the needs of law 

enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 

objectively reasonable.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–

394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

Brigham City identified one such exigency: “the need to assist 

persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” 

547 U.S., at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Thus, law enforcement officers 

“may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency 

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from 

imminent injury.” Ibid. This “emergency aid exception” does not 

depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any 

crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. Id., at 

404–405, 126 S.Ct. 1943. It requires only “an objectively 

reasonable basis for believing,” id., at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, that 
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“a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid,” Mincey, 

supra, at 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408.

Brigham City illustrates the application of this standard. There, 

police officers responded to a noise complaint in the early hours 

of the morning. “As they approached the house, they could hear 

from within an altercation occurring, some kind of fight.” 547 U.S., 

at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Following the tumult to the back of the house whence it came, the 

officers saw juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and a fight 

unfolding in the kitchen. They watched through the window as a 

juvenile broke free from the adults restraining him and punched 

another adult in the face, who recoiled to the sink, spitting blood. 

Ibid. Under these circumstances, we found it “plainly reasonable” 

for the officers to enter the house and quell the violence, for they 

had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the 

injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen 

was just beginning.” Ibid.

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47-48 (2009).

While our courts have repeatedly recognized that the Fourth 

Amendment does not prevent police officers from conducting a warrantless 

entry and search when they reasonably believe that a person is in need of 

immediate aid,7the intrusion “must be commiserated with, and limited to, the 

perceived need to provide immediate assistance,” Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 571, 

or, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “strictly circumscribed the exigencies 

which justify its initiation.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 

(1968)). 

Our Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the phrase “strictly 

circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation” stating:

____________________________________________

7 See, e.g., Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S.Ct. 1596 (2021).
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[T]he right of entry into the private dwelling by law enforcement 

officers terminates when either the necessary emergency 

assistance has been provided or it has been confirmed that no one 

inside needs emergency assistance. At that point, law 

enforcement officers must leave the residence unless some other 

exception to the warrant requirement permits their continued 

presence.

Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 572. 

Instantly, the record reflects that Appellant was able to drive himself 

home and enter his home by using the keypad on his garage door. This is far 

removed from the emergencies that have been held to justify warrantless 

intrusions; Coughlin, 199 A.3d at 408-11 (credible report of shots fired from 

an assault rifle in a residential neighborhood noted for gun violence); 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 990 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reports of 

someone screaming and someone with a gun); appeal denied, 190 A.3d 580 

(Pa. 2018). Thus, there is no evidence of anything more than intoxication, 

and there is no support in the law for holding that intoxication by itself creates 

a medical emergency. The Commonwealth’s arguments and the trial court’s 

findings to the contrary—that a high degree of intoxication can itself create a 

medical emergency or that Appellant may have been suffering a diabetic 

emergency—find no support in the record. There is no evidence specific to 

Appellant indicating that a medical emergency existed here. We therefore 

conclude that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement did not 

support entry into Appellant’s house in this case. 

Furthermore, even if we assume that the officers had an objectively 

reasonable basis for believing that Appellant needed immediate assistance, 
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once they ascertained his conditions and acted upon it (by calling the EMS), 

their authority for a warrantless entry into the residence ceased. At that point, 

the officers were required to leave the premises. See Wilmer, 194 A.3d at 

573. Instead, after removing Appellant from his residence, the officers 

proceeded to detain, mirandize, and interrogate Appellant. In doing so, 

however, they exceeded their authority. Id.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress all evidence of wrongdoing procured by the 

unlawful entry into his home. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence 

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judge Musmanno did not participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/22/2022