### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 22
, 200 5 S es sio n

SA MU EL P END ERG RA SS v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 246263 Rebec ca J. Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2004-02304-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Jul y 26, 2005

Th e Ap pe lla nt, S amu e l Pe nd e rg ra ss, app e a ls the Ha mil ton Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt’ s d e nia l of his petition f o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

. O n ap p e a l, Pe n d e r g r a s s ar g u e s th a t h is g u il ty p le a s to four misdemeanor c ounts of passing worthless che cks and one count of fel o n y t heft of pr operty over $1,000 wer e not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. After revie w, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d t h e opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Ruth H . D e L a ng e , Ch a tta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Sa mue l Pe nd e rg ra ss.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Seth P. Kestner, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Boy d Patterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound

On September 9
, 2003, the Appellant pled g uiltyto four misdemea nor counts of pa ssing worthless che cks and one count of theft of property over $1,000, a class D felony . Pursuant to the Ap pe lla nt’ s p le a

a g re e me nt, the tr ia l c ou rt se nte nce d h im t o a n e ff

e c tiv e fo ur -y e ar s e nte nc e a s a R an ge I Ioffe nder. A t the plea he aring , the State summarized the fa ctual basis for the plea a s fo llo ws : First, the pr oof in this case w ould have be en th at t h e d efendant we nt to the business location of J.W . Motor Company on Rossvil le B oulevar d on th ed ate a lleg ed in the indictment. He had le ft a driver’ s license and test driven a Saturn away from-2-

the business. The owne r of the busine ss beca me conc erne d when he did not r eturn wi th the Sa turn w hic h w a s v a lue d o ve r a tho us a nddo lla

rs

.

Ev e ntu a lly , th e de fe nd a nt w a s lo c a te d a t a no the r c ar d e a le rs hip tr y ing to obtain a drive -out tag from a se parate dea lership on the vehic le.

Consequently , he wa s arr ested a nd char g ed with theft of the Saturn. . . .

Ad dit ion a lly , th e Ap pe lla nt p le d g uil ty to pa ssi ng thr e e wo rthle ss c he c ks a t B i- L o a ndon e a t Wa lMart.

On September

25, 2003, the Appellant f iled a pro s e pe tit ion wh ic h h e c apti on e d a s a writ of habe as cor

pus, alleg ing that he had been denied the eff ective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counse l, a petition for post-convic tion rel i ef was filed, and an evide ntiary hearing was he ld on May

24, 2004, at which time the post-c onviction court denied relief . This appea l followed.

Ana lys is

The Appe llant alleg es that his g uiltypleas we re not k nowing and voluntary due to the ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. Specifica lly
, he contends that trial counsel wa s deficie nt in failing to p e rf orm a ny inv e sti g a tio n o f the fa c ts u nd e rl y ing the c ha rg e s.

I n o rd ert o s u cc ee d o n a po s t -c o n v i ct i o n cl ai m , t h e A p p el l an tb ea rs t h e b u rd en o f s h o wi n g, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, the alleg ations set forth in the petit ion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30- 110(f) (2003). To support a Six th Amendment claim of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the A p p e l l a n tm u s te s t ab l i s h t h a tc o u n s e l ’ s p e r f o r m a n c e f e l l b e l o w t h e r a n g e o f

c o m p e t e n c e o f

a t t o r n e ys demande d in c riminal case s. Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , the Appellant must e stablish ( 1) defic ient repr esenta tion and (2) pr ejudice r esulting from the de ficienc y . 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). It is unnecessa ry for a court to addre ss deficie ncy

and pre judice in any

particula r orde r, or e ven to addr ess both if the petitioner makes a n insufficient showing on either. Id . at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Wit h a g uiltyplea, to satisfy the “pre judice” prong , the Appellant “must show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counsel’s e rror s, he would not ha ve pleade d g uiltyand would have insisted on going to trial.” Hi ll

v . Lo c k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. C t. 366, 369 (1985).

The iss ues o f

d e f ic ie n t p e r f

o r man c e b y

c o u n s e l an d p o s s ib le p r e ju d ic e to th e d e f

e n s e are mix ed questions of law and fa ct. State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). “A tria l court’s fin din gs of f

ac t underly ing a

claim of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l are revie wed on a ppeal unde r
a de novo standard, a ccompa nied with a p re s u m p t ion that those findings a re c orre ct unless the preponde ranc e of evidenc e is otherwise .” Fi e lds v . S tat e , 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; He nle y v . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ). Howe ver, c onclusions

o f l a w ar e r e v i e w e d u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard with no presumption of cor rec tness. Fields , 40 S.W .3d at 458.-3-

Trial counse l testified that he wa s appointed to repr esent the A ppellant ten day s prior to the plea he aring . Although trial counsel ha d reque sted dis covery , the State had not re sponded on the date the g uiltypleas we re e ntere d. Counsel acknowle dg ed that he did not visit the Appellant in the jail because it was his policy to obtain discovery first. Counsel’s first contac t with the Appellant was on the date the Appellant’s plea s were enter ed. During this first and only encounte r, the Appe llant briefly related to trial co u n s el hi s version of the f acts lea ding to the c harg es ag ainst him. The Ap pe lla nt a dmi tte d th a t he ha d ta ke n a c ar from J. W. M oto rs fo r a te st dri ve a nddr ov e the c ar t o another deale rship wher e he ta l k ed wi t h one of the employ ees. Trial counsel testified, “ When I asked a bout what this man would testify to, [ the Appellant] was very evasive wi t h m e and base d up on that I tho ug ht he wa s g uil ty .” Cou ns e l re la te d that he tol d the Ap pe lla nt that if the pe rs on “ is g oing to testify

in a way that’s bad for y our case, I would rec ommend that y ou plea. I f he is g oing to testify in a way that’s g ood for y our ca se, I would rec ommend that we go to trial. . . .” F ollowing this convers at i o n , t ri al counse l stated he a dvised the Appe llant that he could “se t the case off f or thirty day s” and “ do a little investiga tive work.” Acc ording to counsel, the Appellant rejecte d the proposal explaining “ I

want to g et o u t of the c ounty jail and g o into the DOC.” Tria l counsel responde d “ther e is one way to do that . . . plead g uilty .” Shortly there afte r, the Appe llant entere d g uiltypleas to the c harg es as indicted.

The Appe llant testified that his onlyconver sation with trial counsel wa s “t h re e or f our minutes” in duration on the date his pleas wer e ente red. A fter ta lking to counse l, the Appellant testified it was obvious to him that counsel was not i ntere sted in repr esenting him, especia lly afte r learning of

his prior criminal history ; theref ore, he believed he had no choice but to acc ept the plea offe r. Howe ver, the Appellant also acknow ledg ed that he “wa s in a hurry to g et the case over w ith.”

“ A c lie nt’ s e xpre sse d in te nti on to pl eadg uil ty do e s not re lie ve c ou ns e l of

the ir du ty to investigate possible defe nses and advise the de fenda nt so that he ca n make a n informed de cision.” S a vino v. M

urray , 82 F.3d 593, 599 ( 4 Cir.), cert de nied
, 4 9 8 U

. S. 8 8 2
, 1 1 1 S. Ct

. 2 2 9 (1996) th (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 4. 1 ( 19 71 ) ( “ [t]he du ty to investigate exist s reg ardle ss of the ac cused’ s . . . stated desire to ple ad g uilty ”). The long standing test for de ter m i n i n g t h e validity of a g uiltyplea is “w hether the plea r epre sents a voluntary and intelligent c hoice a mong the alternative course s of action open to the defe ndant.” North Carolina

v . A lfo rd , 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. C t. 160, 168 (1970).

The re cord be fore us demonstrates that the A ppellant was not provide d a choic e among alternative course s of ac tion from which an inf ormed de cision could be made . Trial counse l never met with the Appellant prior to e ntry of the g uiltypleas, a nd he conduc ted no i n v es tigation of the fac ts. Counsel, in the i nstant case , “provide d perf unctory repr esenta tion by

appea ring in court at [the Appellant’s] side. Be y ond that, he ig nored his duty as [an] advocate.” Tho ma s v . Lo c k ha rt , 738 F.2d 304, 308 ( 8 Cir. 1984). Our review leads us to the conclusion that trial counsel’ s investigation th fe ll b e low the ra ng e of

c omp e te nc e de ma nd e d o f atto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s.

Nonethele ss, in addition to requiring pr oof of de ficient pe rformance ,-4-

“the de fenda nt must show that there is a rea sonable probability that, but for counse l’s

err ors, he would not have pleade d g uiltyand would have insisted on going to trial.” Hi ll , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370 (footnote omitted). A specific explanation of why t h e d efendant alleg es he w ould have g one to trial is require d. Key v . United States , 806 F.2d 133, 138- 39 (7 Cir. 1986). th

Sa nto s v . Ko lb , 880 F.2d 941, 943 ( 7 Cir. 1989). th

The Appe llant’s arg ument rests solely u p o n t he cla im of counsel’s de ficient pe rformance

. We are offe red no e x planation as to how a more thoroug h investigation would have resulted in the Appellant insisting upon a trial. Other than testify ing in his own behalf, the Appellant pre sented no wi t n es s es at t h e h ea ri n g; t h u s , n o p ro o f w as i n tro d u ce d t o es t ab l i s h t h at a m o re t h o ro u gh investigation would have bene fitted the Appe llant o r provided a possible defe nse. As such, the Ap pe lla nt h a s f

a ile d to e sta

bli sh that he wa s p re

jud ic e d b y

c ou ns e l’ s in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss.

A def endant’ s plea of g uiltyconstitutes an admission i n o p en court that the de fenda nt committed the acts c harg ed in the indictment. Brady v. United States , 397 U. S. 742 , 7 48 , 9 0 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (1970). The plea, howeve r, is more than an a dmission; it is t he def endant’ s consent that judgme nt of conviction may be ente red w ithout a trial. Id
., 90 S. Ct. at 1469. A def endant’ s sworn response s to the litany

of questions posed by

the trial judg e at the ple a submission hearing repr esent more than simply

lip service. Indeed, the defe ndant’s sworn statements and admissions of g uilt st and

a s a wi tne ss a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt at the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng wh e n th e de fe nd a nt d isa vo ws tho se state me nts . O ur

re vie w o f the e nti re re c or d, inc lud ing the ple a su bmi ss io n he ari ng , a ff

ir ma tiv e ly demonstrates tha t the Appellant’s g uilty pleas wer e made with an awa rene ss of the conse quence s of the pleas, a nd, as such, the g uiltypleas we re voluntarily and knowingly enter ed. See State v . Mackey , 553 S.W .2d 337, 340 (Tenn. 1977)

.
CO NC LU SION

The judg ment of the Ha milton C ounty Criminal Court is aff

irmed.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE