[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-14952

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket Nos. 6:17-cv-00689-JA-GJK; 6:13-cr-00304-JA-GJK-1

WILLIAM A. WHITE, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(March 19, 2021)

Before WILSON, MARTIN, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 1 of 16
2

Petitioner William White, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the 

district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, which 

challenged the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his 

sentence. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the district court abused its discretion 

in denying his Rule 60(b) motion because he had shown that the Government 

engaged in fraud or misconduct that prevented him from fully and fairly litigating 

his § 2255 claims of insanity and incompetence. After careful consideration, we 

discern no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) 

relief.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2013, a federal grand jury charged Petitioner with five counts of extortion 

by interstate communications, alleging that he was a white supremacist who had 

used internet accounts and usernames (including the email address 

nslf_helterskelter@hotmail.com and the screenname “Charlie Fucking Manson”)

to send and post violent threats to state and federal officials in an attempt to cause 

the dismissal of criminal charges against members of the American Front, a white 

supremacist organization. In 2014, a jury found him guilty, and the court 

sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed his 

convictions and sentences. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 2 of 16
3

Petitioner then filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. In a fourth 

amended § 2255 motion filed in June 2017, Petitioner raised 13 grounds for relief

with many sub-claims. Two grounds for relief are relevant here. First, in Ground 

4, Petitioner alleged that he had been tortured while in federal custody in 2008, 

2010, 2011, and during the course of his trial in 2014. In particular, he stated that 

in 2014 he was placed in solitary confinement in a small cell that was continuously

illuminated by bright lights, which caused him to be incompetent during trial due 

to severe pain, sleep disruption, and periods of delirium, dissociation, and 

confusional psychosis. He stated that Dr. Eric Ostrov, a psychologist who had 

examined him in 2015 and 2016, diagnosed him with severe post-traumatic stress

disorder (“PTSD”), “a major psychiatric disorder,” as a result of having been 

tortured while in federal custody in 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2014. Based on these 

allegations, Petitioner claimed that (a) his torture violated his due process rights, 

(b) he was incompetent at trial, and (c) counsel was ineffective for failing to have

him psychologically evaluated for incompetence. 

Second, in Ground 9, Petitioner similarly alleged that he was tortured via 

solitary confinement in cells that were continuously lit, cold, and unsanitary while 

in state and federal custody in 2008, and that he was again tortured via solitary 

confinement while in federal custody in 2010 and 2011, causing him to suffer 

confusional psychosis, waking nightmares, delirium, dissociation, and an inability 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 3 of 16
4

to sleep. He alleged that Dr. Ostrov had prepared a psychiatric report in which he 

opined that Petitioner had “been suffering from PTSD, a major psychiatric illness, 

since September 2010.” According to Petitioner, his PTSD was “capable of

rendering [him] incompetent.” Based on these allegations, Petitioner claimed that 

(a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his psychiatric condition, 

which he alleged rendered him incompetent at the time of the offense and at trial, 

(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of reduced mental 

capacity at sentencing, and (c) the Government had obstructed justice by 

destroying his prison records from 2011 in an effort to prevent him from presenting 

evidence of his incompetence. 

In response, the Government argued, among other things that: “Although 

[Petitioner] claims that he currently suffers from a form a posttraumatic stress, 

[Petitioner] offers no evidence, aside from his own assertions, to support the fact 

that a psychological evaluation would have revealed that he was incompetent to 

stand trial at the time of trial.” Accordingly, the Government argued that Petitioner 

had not shown a reasonable probability that a psychological evaluation would have 

shown that he was incompetent to stand trial. Further, the Government argued that 

an insanity defense would have required a showing by clear and convincing 

evidence that Petitioner was insane at the time of the offense, and that “[n]othing in 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 4 of 16
5

the record suggests a reasonable probability that the jury would have made such a 

finding in this case.” 

In reply, Petitioner argued that the evidence regarding his incompetence 

included not only his own statements regarding his psychological condition, but 

also “the medical report of Dr Ostrov, Exh E(a), the contemporaneous statements 

of Laura Blankman [an investigator with the federal defenders], Exh J(a), [and] the 

extreme sleep deprivation recorded in Exh E(h) [a prison administrative log].” 

(Emphasis in original.) Although Petitioner’s reply referenced exhibits, the record 

did not include those exhibits and Petitioner did not attach them to his reply.1

The court denied Petitioner’s § 2255 motion. As relevant here, the court 

found that Petitioner’s argument in Ground 4 that he was incompetent to stand trial 

because he had been tortured while in custody was procedurally barred because he 

1

 Throughout the § 2255 proceedings, Petitioner made several attempts to file exhibits of various 

types. The district court twice denied Petitioner’s motions to file voluminous exhibits exceeding 

700 pages because he had failed to show good cause for expanding the record. Then, after the 

Government responded to Petitioner’s fourth amended § 2255 motion, Petitioner moved to file 

supporting exhibits. The court denied the motion, however, because Petitioner had not identified 

the proposed exhibits. In conjunction with his construed reply to the Government’s response, 

Petitioner again moved to file supporting exhibits, which he described but did not attach for the 

court’s consideration. Among the numerous exhibits he sought to introduce was Dr. Eric 

Ostrov’s report, which he described as “showing that [he] developed a major psychiatric illness 

with features such as dissociation, which is incompetence, as a result of torture, and, cruel, 

inhuman, and, degrading treatment (‘CIDT’) to which [he] was subject throughout the 

proceedings in this matter.” Notably, this appears to be the first time Petitioner sought to 

introduce Dr. Eric Ostrov’s report. Although Petitioner states on appeal that he had previously 

tried to file Dr. Ostrov’s report, his prior motions to file exhibits did not list the report as a 

proposed exhibit. In any event, the court denied the motion to file numerous exhibits in 

conjunction with his reply brief. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 5 of 16
6

had failed to raise that issue on direct appeal. As to his claims in Ground 4 and 

Ground 9 that he was incompetent prior to and during the criminal proceedings,

and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have him evaluated for 

competency, the court found that Defendant’s allegations were “vague and 

conclusory” and that he “offer[ed] no evidence that a psychological evaluation 

would have revealed that he was incompetent.” Finally, the court found that 

Petitioner’s contention in Ground 9 that the Government obstructed justice by 

destroying his prison records was procedurally barred. Both the district court and 

this Court denied Petitioner a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the 

denial of his § 2255 motion. 

Then, in the district court, Petitioner filed the instant motion for relief from 

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), arguing that the 

Government and its counsel had committed misconduct and fraud during his

§ 2255 proceedings. Petitioner alleged that the Government had told the court that 

he “had not presented competent evidence to support [his] claims of incompetence 

during both the trial proceedings and at the time that the crimes were committed 

while knowing that the reason [he] had not presented competent evidence was that 

[the Government] was restraining [him] from doing so.” He alleged that the 

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had prevented him from receiving an independent 

medical examination until August 2019, when the District Court for the Southern 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 6 of 16
7

District of Illinois compelled the BOP to allow Dr. Richard Samuels to conduct an 

examination and prepare a report. According to Petitioner, Dr. Samuels opined 

that Petitioner had suffered psychosis before the crimes were committed and 

during his trial as a result of his torture in federal custody. But for the 

Government’s “fraud and misconduct,” Petitioner argued, he could have submitted 

Dr. Samuels’s report in support of his claims of incompetence. Further, “[i]n 

conjunction with the[se] frauds,” Petitioner argued that “the United States and its 

agencies fraudulently concealed documents, lied to [his] defense counsels, engaged 

in medical malpractice, and, committed other acts of misconduct to prevent [him]

from fully and fairly litigating this matter.” 

In addition to submitting a sworn declaration to support his motion, 

Petitioner submitted four medical reports. First, a report prepared in 2008 by Dr. 

James Corcoran concluded that Petitioner exhibited a narcissistic personality

disorder but did not have a major psychiatric illness and was not psychiatrically 

unstable or dangerous to the community. Second, according to a 2009 report, Dr. 

Conrad Daum concluded that Petitioner did not have any mental disease or defect 

that would prevent him from understanding and adhering to right and wrong. 

Third, in a 2016 report, Dr. Eric Ostrov described Petitioner’s account of traumatic 

events while incarcerated and diagnosed him with PTSD and a borderline 

personality disorder with narcissistic traits. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 7 of 16
8

Finally, Petitioner attached the report of Dr. Samuels, who stated that the 

“specific purpose” of his psychological evaluation was “to help ascertain 

[Petitioner’s] current mental condition that may have resulted from what 

[Petitioner] described to be traumatic events,” in connection with Petitioner’s

medical malpractice lawsuit against the United States. Dr. Samuels diagnosed 

Petitioner with PTSD, which he stated was likely the result of his experiences in 

federal custody in 2008, 2010, and 2014. He also diagnosed Petitioner with 

narcissistic personality disorder. These diagnoses, Dr. Samuels opined, 

“confirmed” Dr. Ostrov’s prior findings that Petitioner suffered from PTSD and a 

personality disorder with borderline and narcissistic traits. Dr. Samuels further

opined that Petitioner exhibited many of the diagnostic criteria for paranoid 

personality disorder (“a pattern of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others”)

and delusional disorder, persecutory type (“the presence of one or [more] delusions 

that persist for at least one month”), but that additional testing and observation 

would be needed to differentiate between these diagnoses. 

The district court denied Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The court found 

that his allegations of “fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the 

Government” were “vague and conclusory.” The court also found that, “[a]t best, 

Petitioner present[ed] issues already ruled upon by the [c]ourt, either expressly or 

by reasonable implication,” because, in his § 2255 motion, Petitioner had 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 8 of 16
9

(1) argued that he suffered from psychosis before, during, and after the trial, and 

(2) discussed being evaluated by Dr. Ostrov, who concluded that he suffered from 

various mental conditions. Accordingly, the court found that Petitioner had not 

demonstrated any basis for vacating the denial of his § 2255 motion. Following 

the district court’s denial of a COA, we granted Petitioner a COA on one issue: 

“Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying [Petitioner’s] Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) motion.” 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Petitioner challenges the district court’s denial of his motion 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) for relief from the court’s order 

denying his § 2255 motion. “We review a district court’s order on a Rule 60(b)(3) 

motion for abuse of discretion.” Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th 

Cir. 2018). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal 

standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper 

procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly 

erroneous.” Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quotation marks omitted).

Rule 60(b)(3) allows a court to set aside a final judgment if the moving party 

demonstrates that an opposing party obtained the judgment through fraud, 

misrepresentation, or misconduct. Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 9 of 16
10

1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). A federal prisoner may use 

a Rule 60(b) motion to attack a defect in the integrity of a § 2255 proceeding, 

including, for example, fraud upon the court.2

 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 

531–32 & n.5 (2005) (addressing a Rule 60(b) motion in the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

context); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 

(applying Gonzalez in the § 2255 context), overruled on other grounds by 

McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 

2017) (en banc). To vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), a party must show by 

clear and convincing evidence that (1) “an adverse party has obtained the verdict 

through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct,” and (2) “the conduct 

prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Frederick, 

205 F.3d at 1287. 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s 

Rule 60(b)(3) motion because Petitioner did not show by clear and convincing 

evidence either that the Government engaged in misconduct or that any alleged 

misconduct prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his case. First, Petitioner

2 To the extent that the federal prisoner seeks to add a new ground for relief or attack the district 

court’s prior resolution of a claim on the merits, however, the motion constitutes a successive 

§ 2255 motion over which the district court lacks jurisdiction absent prior authorization from the 

appropriate court of appeals. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531–32 & n.4 (2005); 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A); Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting

that, “[w]ithout authorization [from the appropriate court of appeals], the district court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider a second or successive [§ 2255 motion]”).

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 10 of 16
11

did not show that the Government engaged in misconduct. Petitioner’s primary 

argument was that the Government had committed fraud in the § 2255 proceedings 

by arguing that Petitioner could not offer evidence that he was incompetent at trial 

or insane at the time of the crime, while simultaneously obstructing his attempt to 

obtain a medical examination from Dr. Samuels, whose report would have 

supported his claims. Petitioner’s evidence of fraud or misconduct, however, fell 

far below the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.

First, Petitioner argued that the Government had made false statements to 

the court when it argued in response to his fourth amended § 2255 motion that 

“[Petitioner] offers no evidence, aside from his own assertions, to support the fact 

that a psychological evaluation would have revealed that he was incompetent to 

stand trial at the time of trial,” and that “[n]othing in the record suggests a 

reasonable probability that the jury would have made [an insanity] finding in this 

case.” These statements, however, were accurate when the Government filed its 

responsive brief. At that point, the record did not contain any supporting medical 

documentation and Petitioner relied solely on his own assertions that he was 

suffering from psychological defects at the time the crimes were committed and 

during his trial. Only after the district court denied his § 2255 motion—when 

Petitioner filed his Rule 60(b)(3) motion along with Dr. Samuels’s and Dr. 

Ostrov’s reports—did the record contain medical evidence regarding Petitioner’s 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 11 of 16
12

mental status. The record therefore belied Petitioner’s contention that the 

statements in the Government’s responsive brief were false.

3

Despite the accuracy of the Government’s statements, Petitioner argued that 

the statements were nevertheless misleading or fraudulent because the Government 

did not disclose to the court that, in coordination with the BOP, it was 

simultaneously preventing him from obtaining an independent medical 

examination from Dr. Samuels. Specifically, he alleged that, when he asked to be 

examined by a private medical professional, he was informed that “the BOP would 

only allow such a visitor if they were working with an attorney.” But according to 

Petitioner, he “later learned that this was not the policy” and that “the BOP would 

not allow such a visitor at all.” Petitioner asserted that he only received an 

independent medical examination after the District Court for the Southern District 

of Illinois compelled the BOP to permit Dr. Samuels to examine him and offer an 

opinion regarding medical malpractice in April 2019. Petitioner further alleged 

that the Government’s attorneys were responsible for the BOP’s actions in denying 

him access to a private medical examiner because “the BOP ha[d] been in 

continual contact with the [prosecution team,]” as evidenced by the fact that the 

3

 Although Petitioner notes on appeal that the district court had previously struck from the 

record his proposed exhibits, including Dr. Ostrov’s report, he does not challenge the court’s 

orders to that effect. In any event, even if we assumed that the court abused its discretion in 

striking Petitioner’s exhibits, that would not show that the Government’s statements about what 

evidence the record contained were false or misleading when it filed its responsive brief. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 12 of 16
13

FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office had sent informants into the prisons seeking his 

cooperation on other matters. 

These allegations, however, did not support an inference that the prison had 

acted with a fraudulent or otherwise improper motive in denying access to a private 

medical examination, and thus did not show that the Government had misled the 

court during the § 2255 proceeding. Indeed, according to Petitioner, “the BOP 

would not allow such a visitor at all,” meaning that the BOP’s official policy 

prohibited any prisoner from being visited by a private medical examiner. This

allegation undermines not only his contention that the BOP treated him unfairly in

denying his request for a private medical evaluation but also his suggestion that the 

U.S. Attorneys litigating his § 2255 motion influenced the BOP’s denial of that 

request. Without some evidence that the Government’s attorneys conspired with 

the BOP to improperly deny his request for an independent medical examination,

there was no factual basis for finding that the Government engaged in fraud or 

misconduct when it pointed out the lack of medical evidence supporting 

Petitioner’s § 2255 claims. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in rejecting Petitioner’s arguments regarding Government misconduct. 

Even if Petitioner had proven Government misconduct related to the § 2255 

proceeding, however, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his 

Rule 60(b)(3) motion because he also failed to show that the alleged misconduct 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 13 of 16
14

prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his claims of insanity and 

incompetence.

4

 Frederick, 205 F.3d at 1287. In his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, 

Petitioner argued that the Government had “obstructed [his] ability to obtain the 

medical evidence contained in Dr Samuels’ report.” According to Petitioner, “Dr 

Samuels ha[d] found that [he] was suffering from thought dysfunction and 

paranoid delusions,” which he asserted were “forms of incompetence,” during the 

criminal proceedings and before the crimes were committed. Petitioner contended 

that, if he had been able to present Dr. Samuels’s report, the court could not have 

denied his § 2255 claims “on the basis that [he] lacked evidence” of incompetence. 

The copy of Dr. Samuels’s report that Petitioner attached to his Rule 

60(b)(3) motion, however, did not bear out Petitioner’s contentions. As an initial 

matter, Dr. Samuels did not purport to evaluate whether Petitioner suffered from a 

mental defect when the crimes were committed or during his trial. Rather, Dr. 

Samuels stated that the purpose of his evaluation was to ascertain Petitioner’s 

“current mental condition,” as of 2019, in connections with his medical 

4

 A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if his “mental condition is such that he lacks the 

capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with 

counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) 

(emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted). To establish the affirmative defense of insanity, a 

defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, “at the time of the commission of 

the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, 

was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 17(a), (b).

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 14 of 16
15

malpractice lawsuit against the United States. Thus, the report had no bearing on 

Petitioner’s claims of incompetence and insanity years earlier. 

Further, Dr. Samuels findings largely mirrored and “confirmed” Dr. 

Ostrov’s prior diagnosis—that Petitioner suffered from PTSD and a narcissistic 

personality disorder—which Petitioner had already brought to the court’s attention 

in his fourth amended § 2255 motion. While Dr. Samuels also noted that 

Petitioner exhibited characteristics of paranoid personality disorder and a 

persecutory-type delusional disorder, he could not differentiate between the 

diagnoses and did not purport to diagnose Petitioner as suffering from either 

disorder before 2019. Thus, to the extent that Dr. Samuels’s findings went beyond 

Dr. Ostrov’s diagnoses, which Petitioner had previously described for the court, 

they were immaterial.

5

 Petitioner therefore failed to show that his inability to 

present Dr. Samuels’s report prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his 

claims.6

5

 In reply, Petitioner argues that Dr. Samuels also diagnosed him with “thought disfunction, 

‘difficulties in cognitive processing such as confusion, irrational beliefs, inattention, 

forgetfulness, misunderstandings, and, misperceptions.’” The record belies this argument. 

While Dr. Samuels noted that Petitioner “rate[d] highest in Thought Dysfunction” on the 

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, he did not diagnose Petitioner with thought 

disfunction. 

6

 We note that Petitioner offered four other grounds for relief in his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, none 

of which warranted relief. Three of these grounds did not concern misconduct related to the 

§ 2255 proceeding and thus did not call into question the integrity of that proceeding. First, 

Petitioner’s argument that the BOP had obstructed justice by destroying his prison records before 

2013 did not challenge the integrity of the § 2255 proceedings itself. Indeed, Petitioner had 

raised that argument as a ground for relief in his § 2255 motion at the outset of the proceedings. 

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 15 of 16
16

In short, Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence either 

that the Government engaged in misconduct related to his § 2255 proceeding or 

that any alleged misconduct prevented him from fully and fairly litigating his 

§ 2255 claims. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 

denial of Rule 60(b)(3) relief.

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner failed to show that the Government obtained the denial of his 

§ 2255 motion through fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Rule 60(b)(3) motion. 

AFFIRMED.

Second, Petitioner’s contention that the U.S. Attorneys lied to his defense counsel during his trial 

addressed alleged misconduct with respect to his criminal proceedings, not the post-conviction 

proceedings. Third, Petitioner argued that the BOP had engaged in medical malpractice, but 

whether that is true had no bearing on the Government’s conduct in the § 2255 proceedings. As 

a fourth ground for relief, Petitioner asserted that the Government had not timely produced 

records regarding his torture in accordance with his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)

requests. However, this conclusory allegation failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the Government engaged in misconduct because it did not establish that the Government had 

violated its FOIA obligations, much less that it had done so to obstruct Petitioner’s § 2255 

proceeding.

USCA11 Case: 19-14952 Date Filed: 03/19/2021 Page: 16 of 16