Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

LEANNA WEISSMANN GREGORY F. ZOELLER 

Lawrenceburg, Indiana 

JODI KATHRYN STEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PIERRE FREEMAN, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 15A01-1107-CR-341

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Sally A. Blankenship, Judge 

Cause No. 15D02-0911-FD-239

February 15, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pierre Freeman appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. 

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Freeman to serve 

his suspended sentence.

FACTS

In November 2009, the State charged Freeman with class D felony arson and class 

D felony obstruction of justice. On October 28, 2010, Freeman entered into a written

plea agreement, wherein he agreed to plead guilty to class D felony arson, and the State 

agreed to dismiss the obstruction of justice charge and recommend a 1095-day sentence 

with probation. That same day, the trial court sentenced Freeman to 1095 days with 687 

days suspended to reporting probation. 

Approximately two weeks later, on November 10, 2010, the State filed a notice of 

probation violation, alleging that Freeman had violated probation by failing to report to 

the probation department for probation orientation on November 3 and November 4. The 

trial court set an initial hearing for December 28, 2010, and Freeman failed to appear. 

The trial court then issued a warrant for his arrest. 

During the June 14, 2011 fact-finding hearing, Freeman admitted that he had 

violated probation by failing to report to the probation department on the specified dates 

for probation orientation. After reviewing Freeman’s extensive criminal history, which 

included approximately twenty-two convictions as well as five prior probation violations, 
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the trial court revoked Freeman’s probation and ordered him to serve his 687-day 

suspended sentence. 

DECISION

Freeman argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve 

his 687-day suspended sentence. 

If the trial court finds that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the 

court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time 

of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35–38–2–3(g)(3). We review a trial court’s sentence 

following a probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 

184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), 

trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. 

The record reveals that the trial court had ample basis for its decision to order 

Freeman to serve his 687-day suspended sentence. Within five days of being sentenced 

and placed on probation, Freeman violated the terms of his probation by failing to report 

to the probation department. He then failed to appear for his initial hearing on the 

probation violation, requiring the trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest. In addition 

to Freeman’s lack of respect for the law, he had an extensive criminal and had violated 

probation in the past. Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by ordering Freeman to serve his suspended sentence. See, e.g., 

Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 957-58 (affirming trial court’s revocation of defendant’s 

probation where defendant admitted to probation violation of committing new crimes and 
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failing to appear for appointments with probation officer), trans. denied. For the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Freeman’s probation. 

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.