IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PETER GAKUBA, 3:15-cv-00496-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

HOLLYWOOD VIDEO, INC., aka

Movie Gallery, dba Hollywood 

Video/Movie Gallery Customer 

Service; LORETTA LYNCH, in her 

official capacity as United 

States Attorney General; LISA 

MADIGAN, in her official capacity 

as Illinois Attorney General,

Defendants.

PETER GAKUBA

Robinson Correctional Center

13423 E. 1150th Ave.

Robinson, IL 62454

Plaintiff, Pro Se

 - OPINION AND ORDER 1
BILLY J. WILLIAMS

Acting United States Attorney

KEVIN C. DANIELSON

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204

(503) 727-1000

Attorneys for Defendant Loretta Lynch, U.S. Attorney

General

SUNIL S. BHAVE

Illinois Attorney General’s Office

100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 814-4550

Attorney for Defendant Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney

General

BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Illinois

Attorney General Lisa Madigan’s Motion (#47) to Dismiss and

Defendant U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch’s Motion (#57) to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow,

the Court GRANTS Illinois Attorney General Madigan’s Motion to

Dismiss, GRANTS U.S. Attorney General Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss,

and DISMISSES all claims as to Attorneys General Madigan and

Lynch without prejudice to Plaintiff’s prosecution of his related

claims in Gakuba v. O’Brien, 12-cv-7294, in the Northern District

of Illinois. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),

the Court also ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause no later than

October 28, 2015, why his remaining claims against Hollywood

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Video, Inc., should not be dismissed without prejudice for

failure to effectuate service. In addition, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion (#53) for Summary Judgment as moot as to

Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

as premature as to Hollywood Video, Inc.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (#30), attached documents, and materials

subject to judicial notice and are accepted as true at this stage

of the proceedings:

On November 3 and 4, 2006, Illinois State Police (ISP)

working in conjunction with special agents from the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were conducting a criminal

investigation regarding allegations of sexual abuse of M.S., a

minor, in Rockford, Illinois. M.S. alleged a man sexually abused

him in a Marriott hotel room and that the man had three movies

("Scary Movie 1," "Scary Movie 2," and "Scary Movie 3") rented

from a local Hollywood Video store in Rockford.

Based on information received from M.S., the officers

located the hotel and room in which M.S. alleged he was sexually

abused. Officers spoke to the hotel clerk who indicated that

room was rented by Plaintiff Peter Gakuba. In addition, M.S.

described to officers the vehicle that his alleged abuser drove. 

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Officers identified a vehicle matching that description outside

of the Marriott hotel.

After the officers obtained Plaintiff's name from the hotel

clerk and located the automobile matching M.S.'s description

outside of the Marriott, the ISP officers contacted Hollywood

Video and asked who rented "Scary Movie 1," "Scary Movie 2," and

"Scary Movie 3." Hollywood Video employees reported to the

officers that Plaintiff rented those movies. ISP officers did

not have any warrant or court order authorizing them to obtain

records of Plaintiff's movie rentals.

ISP officers searched Plaintiff's hotel room with the

consent of the Marriott, but without any warrant or Plaintiff's

consent. After searching the hotel room, ISP officers arrested

Plaintiff.

During his state-court criminal proceeding Plaintiff moved

to suppress evidence under both the Fourth Amendment and the

Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2710, based on

the officers obtaining information concerning his movie rentals

from Hollywood Video and the warrantless entry into Plaintiff's

hotel room. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion based on

the VPPA and suppressed information received from the Hollywood

Video, but the court denied Plaintiff's motion based on the

Fourth Amendment and the warrantless entry into his hotel room.

Plaintiff alleges he became aware of the VPPA and

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constitutional violations in 2011 during the pendency of his

state criminal proceedings.

In addition to his state-court criminal action, Plaintiff

has filed several lawsuits regarding alleged constitutional and

statutory violations implicated by the officers' actions during

the investigation. One of these actions, Gakuba v. O’Brien, 

12-cv-7294 (N.D. Ill.), remains ongoing. In that case Plaintiff

brought 157 claims against various law-enforcement and private

defendants (including Hollywood Video) arising from the

investigation and his arrest. In many of those claims Plaintiff

alleges the defendants violated the VPPA and Plaintiff’s rights

under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff filed that action on

September 12, 2012.

Here Plaintiff asserts four claims: Claim One, Plaintiff

contends Defendants violated his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments when the investigating officers obtained

protected speech material from Hollywood Video; Claim Two,

Plaintiff alleges the law-enforcement Defendants and Hollywood

Video violated Plaintiff's rights under the VPPA when the

officers obtained information about the movies that Plaintiff

rented from Hollywood Video; Claim Three, Plaintiff asserts a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "conspiracy" as a result of

Hollywood Video providing Plaintiff's personally identifiable

information to the law-enforcement Defendants; and Claim Four,

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Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim for "supervisor liability"

against Defendants because the alleged misconduct was carried out

pursuant to the policies and practices of the United States

Department of Justice and the Illinois Attorney General.

ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL MADIGAN’S MOTION (#47) TO DISMISS

Illinois Attorney General Madigan moves to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that this Court

does not have personal jurisdiction over her, and, in any event,

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

I. Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

The party seeking to invoke the personal jurisdiction of the

federal court has the burden to establish that the Court has

jurisdiction. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557

F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). See also MGA Entertainment,

Inc. v. Innovation First, Inc., 525 F. App’x 576, 577 (9th Cir.

2013). When “a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack

of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Schwarzenegger

v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to

assist it in its determination and may order discovery on the

jurisdictional issues.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922

 - OPINION AND ORDER 6
(9th Cir. 2001)(citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc.,

Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

If the court makes a jurisdictional decision based only on

pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties and does not

conduct an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff need make only a

prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the

motion to dismiss.” Doe, 248 F.3d at 922 (quoting Ballard v.

Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)). When determining

whether the plaintiff has met the prima facie showing, the court

must assume the truth of uncontroverted allegations in the

complaint. Ochoa v. J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d

1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). When the court rules on a

defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction

without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff's version

of the facts, unless directly contravened, is taken as true, and

the court must resolve factual conflicts in the parties'

affidavits in the plaintiff's favor. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins.

Serv., Inc. v. Bell & Clements LTD, 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

2003).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility when

 - OPINION AND ORDER 7
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. “The plausibility standard

is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 546). When a complaint is based on facts that are

“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short

of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement

to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557). See also Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56. The court

must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe

them in favor of the plaintiff. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 859

(9th Cir. 2013).

The pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). See also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 

“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint also does not

suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further

factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

 - OPINION AND ORDER 8
"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally

consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits

attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to

judicial notice." Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th

Cir. 2007)(citing Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d

1198, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). A court, however, "may consider a

writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly incorporated

therein if the complaint relies on the document and its

authenticity is unquestioned." Id. (quoting Parrino v. FHP,

Inc., 146 F.3d 699,706 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on

other grounds as stated in Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676

(9th Cir. 2006)).

A pro se plaintiff's complaint "must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Thus, the court must

construe pro se filings liberally. If a plaintiff fails to state

a claim, "[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the pleading

'could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts,'

and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs." 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)).

II. Discussion

As noted, Illinois Attorney General Madigan moves to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against her on the grounds that this Court

 - OPINION AND ORDER 9
does not have personal jurisdiction over her, and, in the

alternative, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which

relief can be granted.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining

the bounds of their jurisdiction over [defendants].” Daimler AG

v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014). “Oregon law authorizes

personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent

permitted by the United States Constitution.” Ranza v. Nike,

Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015)(citing Or. R. Civ. P.

4). The Court, therefore, must inquire whether the exercise of

jurisdiction over Illinois Attorney General Madigan “‘comports

with the limits imposed by federal due process.’” Ranza, 793

F.3d at 1068 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 793).

 “For the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

defendant, due process requires that the defendant ‘have certain

minimum contacts’ with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance

of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Int’l

Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “ The

strength of contacts required depends on which of the two

categories of personal jurisdiction a litigant invokes: specific

jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068.

“Specific jurisdiction exists when a case ‘aris[es] out of

 - OPINION AND ORDER 10
or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum.’” 

Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). Specific

jurisdiction, therefore, “is ‘specific’ to the case before the

court,” because it “‘depends on an affiliation between the forum

and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore

subject to the State's regulation.’” Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068

(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.

Ct. 2846, 1851 (2011)).

General jurisdiction, on the other hand, “permits a court to

hear ‘any and all claims’ against a defendant, whether or not the

conduct at issue has any connection to the forum.” Ranza, 793

F.3d at 1068 (quoting Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062,

1066 (9th Cir. 2014)). A district court has general jurisdiction

over the defendant if the plaintiff shows the defendant has

“substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with the

forum state. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163,

1171 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,

466 U.S. at 415). This standard is “fairly high” and requires

the contacts to be of the kind that approximates physical

presence within the state. Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,

341 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal citations omitted). 

Pertinent factors are whether the defendant “makes sales,

 - OPINION AND ORDER 11
solicits or engages in business, serves the state's markets,

designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, has

employees, or is incorporated [in the state]." Gator.Com Corp.,

341 F.3d at 1076-77 (quotation omitted).

After reviewing the record, the Court concludes the

allegations against Illinois Attorney General Madigan in

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are insufficient to

establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction over

her. As a state official in Illinois, there is not any evidence

in the record that demonstrates Illinois Attorney General Madigan

had such substantial or continuous and systematic contacts with

the State of Oregon to establish general personal jurisdiction in

this Court.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of

establishing that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction

over Illinois Attorney General Madigan. The only allegation in

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint that relates to any

Defendant’s contact with the State of Oregon is the fact that

Hollywood Video was headquartered here at the time that the

investigation occurred. Although “[a] single forum state contact

can support jurisdiction if “the cause of action . . . arise[s]

out of that particular purposeful contact of the defendant with

the forum state,” there is not any indication that the ISP

officers’ single, highly attenuated contact with the State of

 - OPINION AND ORDER 12
Oregon was purposeful. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme

Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In summary, the Court concludes on this record that it does

not have personal jurisdiction over Illinois Attorney General

Madigan, and, therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims

against Illinois Attorney General Madigan.

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL LYNCH’S MOTION (#57) TO DISMISS

As noted, U.S. Attorney General Lynch moves to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against her pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. Standard

When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider

affidavits and other evidence supporting or attacking the

complaint's jurisdictional allegations. Autery v. U.S., 424 F.3d

944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005). The court may permit discovery to

determine whether it has jurisdiction. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.

Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977). See

also Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th

Cir. 2003). As noted, when the court “receives only written

submissions, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing

of jurisdiction.” Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284

F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).

 - OPINION AND ORDER 13
II. Discussion

U.S. Attorney General Lynch contends Plaintiff’s claims

against her must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to

identify any valid waiver of sovereign immunity.

A. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Standard

“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit

unless it waives such immunity.” Chadd v. United States, 794

F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015). The test for waiver of

sovereign immunity is a “stringent one.” Hypolite v. Cal. Dep’t

of Corr., 585 F. App’x 628, 628 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Coll.

Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527

U.S. 666, 675-78 (1999)). “[A] waiver of sovereign immunity must

be ‘unequivocally expressed in statutory text.’” F.A.A. v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012). Sovereign immunity may not

be impliedly or constructively waived, and courts must “indulge

every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Coll. Sav. Bank,

527 U.S. at 678-82 (waivers of sovereign immunity must be

“unmistakably clear”). Furthermore, “any legislative waiver of

immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and

‘not enlarged beyond what the language requires.’” Munoz v.

Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting United States v.

Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)).

B. Claim One - First and Fourteenth Amendments

In Claim One Plaintiff contends U.S. Attorney General Lynch

 - OPINION AND ORDER 14
violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when the ISP officers

obtained Plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” from

Hollywood Video. 

In the absence of a specific statutory waiver of sovereign

immunity, the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity

for constitutional claims. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-

78 (1994). See also James v. United States, 467 F. App’x 611,

612 (9th Cir. 2012).1 Here, Plaintiff has not identified any

valid waiver of sovereign immunity as to Claim One.

Moreover, amendment of Plaintiff’s Claim One would be

futile. Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain Claim One for

prospective relief because there is not a “sufficient likelihood

that he will again be wronged in a similar way”; i.e., the record

does not include any plausible allegation that demonstrates a

reasonable likelihood that the government will again illegally

obtain Plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” from a

movie-rental retailer. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 111 (1983). See also Brown v. Oregon Dep’t of

Corrections, 751 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2014).

In addition, any reformation of Plaintiff’s Claim One for

damages would be futile. Even assuming Plaintiff could amend

1 In addition, the Court notes Plaintiff does not allege any

action taken by U.S. Attorney General Lynch or any other federal

officer in connection with the inquiry to Hollywood Video

concerning Plaintiff’s movie-rental records.

 - OPINION AND ORDER 15
Claim One to state a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), against newly-named individual-capacity defendants, such

a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. “The

statute of limitations for a Bivens action is defined by the

relevant state's personal injury statute.” Yasin v. Coulter, 499

F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2011). Both Oregon and Illinois have

a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions. 

See Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202; Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1). 

Plaintiff alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that he

discovered the facts that gave rise to his claims in 2011, which

was more than three years before Plaintiff filed this action. 

The statute of limitations, therefore, expired on any potential

Bivens claim.

Accordingly, on this record the Court dismisses Claim One as

to U.S. Attorney General Lynch.

C. Claim Two

As noted, in Claim Two Plaintiff alleges U.S. Attorney

General Lynch violated the VPPA when the ISP officers obtained

Plaintiff’s movie-rental records from Hollywood Video without a

warrant.

The VPPA provides: “A video tape service provider who

knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable

information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be

 - OPINION AND ORDER 16
liable to the aggrieved person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). 

Videotape service providers may disclose such personally

identifiable information to a law-enforcement agency pursuant to

a warrant, a grand-jury subpoena, or a court order. Id. at §

2710(b)(2)(C). The VPPA authorizes a cause of action for “[a]ny

person aggrieved by any act of a person in violation of this

section may bring a civil action in a United States district

court.” Id. at § 2710(c)(1).

There is not any language in the VPPA, however, that waives

the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims under the VPPA,

and Plaintiff has failed to identify any valid waiver of

sovereign immunity as to Claim Two. Moreover, amendment of Claim

Two would be futile for the same reasons as Claim One. 

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes it does not

have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Claim Two

against U.S. Attorney General Lynch under the VPPA, and,

therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Claim Two as to U.S.

Attorney General Lynch.

C. Claims Three and Four

As noted, in Claims Three and Four Plaintiff brings claims

against U.S. Attorney General Lynch under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for

“conspiracy” to obtain Plaintiff’s movie-rental records in

violation of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and

the VPPA and for “supervisor liability” as a result of U.S.

 - OPINION AND ORDER 17
Attorney General Lynch’s personal knowledge, facilitation, and

approval of a pattern and practice of the officers’ allegedly

unconstitutional conduct.

An action against federal officials who are not acting under

color of state law, however, cannot be brought under § 1983, but

instead are properly raised as Bivens actions. Hydrick v.

Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 940 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). As noted,

however, Plaintiff’s claims under Bivens are barred by the

statute of limitations.

Accordingly, on this record the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s

Claims Three and Four as to U.S. Attorney General Lynch.

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff filed this action on March 25, 2015. Although

more than 120 days have elapsed since Plaintiff filed this

action, Plaintiff has not yet effectuated service on Defendant

Hollywood Video, Inc. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m), the Court directs Plaintiff to show good

cause in writing no later than October 21, 2015, as to why this

action should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to

serve Hollywood Video, Inc.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Illinois

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Attorney General Madigan’s Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS U.S.

Attorney General Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES all

claims as to Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch without

prejudice to Plaintiff’s prosecution of his related claims in

Gakuba v. O’Brien, 12-cv-7294, in the Northern District of

Illinois. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the

Court also ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing no later

than October 28, 2015, as to why the remaining claims against

Hollywood Video, Inc., should not be dismissed without prejudice

for failure to effectuate service. In addition, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion (#53) for Summary Judgment as moot as to

Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion

as premature as to Hollywood Video, Inc.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 30th day of September, 2015.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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