FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DE WITT LAMAR LONG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SUGAI, Correctional Sgt. at Halawa 

Correctional Facility, sued in his/her 

individual and official capacities; 

LYLE ANTONIO, Chief of Security 

at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued 

in his/her individual and official 

capacities; WYATT, Correctional Sgt. 

at Halawa Correctional Facility, sued 

in his/her individual and official 

capacities; TORRES, Case 

Manager/Correctional Counselor at 

Halawa Correctional Facility, sued in 

his/her individual and official 

capacities; INMATE GRIEVANCE 

OFFICER, Halawa Correctional 

Facility, sued in his/her individual and 

official capacities; DOES, John and 

Jane, 1-50, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-15997 

D.C. No. 1:19-cv00235-JMS-RT 

OPINION
2 LONG V. SUGAI

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and Submitted November 8, 2023 

Pasadena, California

Filed February 5, 2024 

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, William A. Fletcher, and John 

B. Owens, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

SUMMARY*

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated 

in part the district court’s judgment in favor of prison 

officials in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

by Hawaii prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long, a practicing 

Muslim, alleging that prison officials violated his First 

Amendment right to free exercise of religion and 

unconstitutionally retaliated against him for engaging in 

protected First Amendment activity. 

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, at the 

screening stage, of Long’s claims for injunctive 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LONG V. SUGAI 3

relief. Although Long’s pro se complaint alleged only past 

actions by defendants, his “Request for Relief” asked, 

among other things, that staff be properly trained and that 

Ramadan meals be served hot. The district court should 

have allowed Long to amend his complaint to allege facts 

showing a need for injunctive relief.

The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment 

in favor of Sergeant Lee, holding that delivery of Long’s 

evening meal at 3:30 p.m. during Ramadan substantially 

burdened his free exercise of religion. The district court 

should have evaluated the four factors set forth in Turner v. 

Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), to determine whether the burden 

was justified. The panel remanded to allow the district court 

to conduct that analysis.

The panel affirmed the district court’s partial summary 

judgment in favor of Chief of Security Antonio on Long’s 

claim that he was transferred from a medium-security 

facility to a high-security facility in retaliation for filing 

grievances. The panel agreed with the district court that the 

sequence of events leading to the transfer was insufficient to 

show retaliatory intent.

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, 

following a bench trial, in favor of Sergeant Sugai on Long’s 

free exercise of religion and retaliation claims, determining 

that ample evidence supported the district court’s findings.

Finally, the panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, 

following a bench trial, in favor of Chief of Security Antonio 

on Long’s free exercise claim. The district court did not err 

by concluding that (1) the substantial burden on Long’s free 

exercise rights caused by his transfer to a high-security 

facility was justified; and (2) Chief of Security Antonio was 

not authorized to arrange weekly transportation to a 
4 LONG V. SUGAI

medium-security facility for religious services and therefore 

was not a proper defendant. 

COUNSEL

Curt Cutting (argued) and Rebecca G. Powell, Horvitz & 

Levy LLP, Burbank, California; Maxwell Lyster and Macy 

Merritt (argued), Certified Law Students, Pepperdine Caruso 

School of Law Ninth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Clinic, 

Malibu, California; for Plaintiff- Appellant. 

Jennifer H. Tran (argued), Caron M. Inagaki, and Isaac H. 

Kenneth Ickes, Deputy Attorneys General; Anne E. Lopez, 

Hawaii Attorney General; Hawaii Attorney General’s 

Office, Honolulu, Hawaii; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

Hawai‘i prison inmate DeWitt Lamar Long is a 

practicing Muslim. In a pro se complaint, he alleged various 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials, 

including Sergeant Rodney Sugai, Chief of Security Lyle 

Antonio, and Sergeant Wyatt Lee. As relevant to this appeal, 

Long alleged that defendants violated his First Amendment 

right to free exercise of his religion and unconstitutionally 

retaliated against him for engaging in protected First 

Amendment activity.

Long appeals from the district court’s screening 

dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief; its summary 
LONG V. SUGAI 5

judgment in favor of Sgt. Lee; its partial summary judgment 

in favor of Chief Antonio; and its judgment after a bench 

trial in favor of Sgt. Sugai and Chief Antonio. 

We reverse the district court’s dismissal of Long’s 

claims for an injunction and vacate its summary judgment in 

favor of Sgt. Lee. We otherwise affirm.

I. Factual Background

Long is a practicing Muslim. With the exception of a 

short period in a private prison in Arizona, he has been 

imprisoned at Halawa Correctional Facility (“HCF”) in 

Aiea, Hawai‘i. He was incarcerated in HCF’s mediumsecurity facility between December 16, 2015 and May 8, 

2017, when he was transferred to HCF’s high-security 

facility. 

A. Non-Pork Meals

Soon after his arrival at HCF in December 2015, Long 

requested meals consistent with his Islamic faith. He did not 

insist on a strict halal diet, but he did request a “non-pork 

diet.” Long stated in a prison grievance that after submitting 

his request he was served meals with pork seven or more 

times and was not offered a substitute meal. On January 6, 

2016, prison officials approved Long’s request for a 

specialized diet. For approximately a month following the 

approval, Long received accommodating religious meals.

During his time at HCF, Long filed several grievances 

relating to his meals at the medium-security facility, 

accusing Sgt. Sugai of harassment and of deliberately 

denying him non-pork meals, in violation of the posted mealaccommodations list. The district court concluded that 

Sugai was not responsible for the denial of non-pork meals. 

The court found that several of the denials occurred before 
6 LONG V. SUGAI

Long’s religious-diet request was approved. The court also 

found that Sugai did not disregard the posted mealaccommodations list. 

In early February 2016, while Sgt. Sugai was overseeing 

the kitchen, Long received a meal containing pork remnants. 

Long exchanged the meal for a pre-wrapped substitute 

vegetarian meal. The district court found that the substitute 

meal also contained strands of pork and that Long became 

sick from the meal. Long contended that Sugai had directed 

inmates who worked in the kitchen to contaminate Long’s 

meal with pork, but the district court found that “any crosscontamination between pork-based foods and Plaintiff’s 

vegetarian foods was not attributable to Sgt. Sugai.” The 

court noted that Gary Kaplan, a prison “program control 

administrator,” attributed the cross-contamination to “the 

fact that the kitchen uses the same utensils for the vegetarian 

meal that they use to serve the pork.” 

Long testified at trial that on at least three occasions 

between March 2016 and May 2017 Sgt. Sugai prevented 

him from getting any food at all, and that, at other times, 

Sugai directed inmate workers to give Long smaller 

portions. The record contains a signed declaration from an 

inmate-worker stating that Sugai would direct him to make 

“Mr. Long’s trays smaller than other trays.” Crediting 

Sugai’s testimony, the district court found that Sugai had not 

prevented Long from getting meals and had not directed

anyone to give him smaller portions. 

On July 23, 2016, Long filed a grievance alleging that 

Sgt. Sugai had denied him a non-pork meal and had 

intimidated him by cursing at him and calling him a crybaby. 

Long testified at trial that the “next time when [he] went to 

the chow hall,” Sugai ordered him to pick up his non-pork 
LONG V. SUGAI 7

meal and take it back to his housing unit rather than eat in 

the dining hall. Long testified that Sugai effectively imposed 

his own version of the prison’s “meals to modules” 

program—a meal-delivery program reserved for inmates 

whose mental or physical disabilities required that they eat 

in their cells. Long testified that he was forced to eat in his 

cell for the next six to eight months. However, the district 

court found that Sugai had sent Long to eat in his housing 

unit only a “few times,” and that he did so because Long 

“was being ‘argumentative’ and ‘disruptive’ with the kitchen 

staff regarding the food service.” 

B. Transfer to High-Security Facility

On May 8, 2017, three days after he filed his last 

grievance against Sgt. Sugai, Long was transferred from the 

medium-security facility to a high-security facility at HCF. 

Chief Antonio testified at trial that he ordered the transfer to 

the high-security facility in order to create a “cooling off 

period” between Sgt. Sugai and Long. 

In the high-security facility, Long lost access to many 

benefits he had enjoyed at the medium-security facility. His 

telephone use was restricted to fifteen minutes every other 

day. He was not allowed to buy food in the commissary, to 

use the microwave, or to use a law library. He was strip 

searched and escorted when he moved about the facility.

Finally, he was unable to attend Friday Jumu’ah prayer 

services, which were held only in the medium-security 

facility. Jumu’ah services are “commanded by the Koran 

and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith 

and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer.” O’Lone v. Est. of 

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (citing Koran 62:9–10). 

After Long was transferred to the high-security facility, 

he filed a grievance against Chief Antonio complaining 
8 LONG V. SUGAI

about the lack of access to prayer services and requesting 

transportation to Friday Jumu’ah services at the mediumsecurity facility. The request was denied. The district court 

found that Antonio credibly testified that it was not feasible 

to transport Long to the medium-security facility to attend 

the prayer services. Two days after filing another grievance 

regarding restrictions in the high-security facility, Long was 

moved to a private prison in Arizona. He was later 

transferred back to HCF, and was incarcerated there when 

he filed his complaint in this case. 

C. Evening Meal Delivery during Ramadan

Shortly after his transfer to the high-security facility, 

Ramadan began. During Ramadan, Sgt. Lee delivered his 

evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m.—even though Long 

could not break his fast until sundown, at about 7:30 p.m. 

Long stated that by the time he could eat, the food was cold, 

congealed, and unsafe under prison food-safety guidelines. 

He stated further that the cold food aggravated his stomach 

ulcers, and that on several occasions he was “unable to eat 

the dinner meal.” He stated that he asked if Lee could call 

the kitchen to request a hot meal or allow Long to use a staff 

microwave to reheat the food. Lee refused, telling Long that 

the kitchen was closed and that prison policy forbade staff 

from using a staff microwave to heat food for inmates. 

II. Procedural Background

Long alleged several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, Sgt. Lee, a case manager 

named “Ms. Torres,” and unnamed Doe defendants in their 

official and individual capacities. Long was pro se in the 

district court. He was assigned pro bono counsel for this 

appeal. 
LONG V. SUGAI 9

Long alleged § 1983 claims based on First Amendment 

protections against government infringement on the free 

exercise of religion and against government retaliation for 

protected speech. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 

(9th Cir. 2008) (righ to free exercise of religion); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (right to file 

grievances). He also alleged a § 1983 claim based on the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, contending 

that the Doe defendants violated his due process rights by 

failing to respond to and address his prison grievances. See 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). He 

requested injunctive relief and damages. 

In a screening order, the district court dismissed with 

prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive relief and damages 

against all defendants in their official capacities. The court 

dismissed without prejudice Long’s § 1983 individualcapacity claims against Ms. Torres and the Doe defendants. 

The court allowed Long’s § 1983 individual-capacity claims 

against Sgt. Sugai, Chief Antonio, and Sgt. Lee to go 

forward and ordered that these three defendants be served. 

In a subsequent order, the district court granted summary 

judgment to Sgt. Lee on Long’s free exercise claim arising 

out of the early food delivery during Ramadan. In the same 

order, the court also granted partial summary judgment to 

Chief Antonio on Long’s retaliation claim arising out of his 

transfer to the high-security facility. 

The remaining claims—Long’s free exercise and 

retaliation claims against Sgt. Sugai and his free exercise 

claim against Chief Antonio—went to trial. After a bench 

trial, the district court entered judgment for Antonio and 

Sugai.
10 LONG V. SUGAI

III. Discussion

A. Screening of Claims for Injunctive Relief

As noted above, at the screening stage, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) of the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), the district 

court dismissed with prejudice Long’s claims for injunctive 

relief. Long did not ask the district court for leave to amend.

The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at 

screening is the “same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). We review 

the dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s complaint at screening de 

novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 1997)); 

Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112. 

The district court correctly noted that Long’s pro se 

complaint alleged only past actions by defendants. 

However, in the “Request for Relief,” Long’s complaint 

asked “that staff rea[ss]ess their policy and proce[]dures, and 

be properly trained so as the religious rights of all are 

respected equally[;] that the policy or practice of not 

allowing (High) prisoners to attend Friday Islamic services 

be changed, as well as during Ramadan evening meals be 

served hot and or the microwave be made available.” 

For claims under the PLRA, we have “held that ‘a district 

court should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.’” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130.
LONG V. SUGAI 11

Long, who is currently incarcerated at HCF, argues that 

he should have been allowed to amend the complaint to 

allege facts showing a need for injunctive relief. We agree. 

Because we can “conceive of facts” that would justify 

injunctive relief, the district court should have granted leave 

to amend. Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1116 

(9th Cir. 1975). 

B. Summary Judgment

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. We must “determine 

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of 

material fact and whether the district court correctly applied 

the relevant substantive law.” Id.

1. Free Exercise Claim against Sgt. Lee

As noted above, while Long was confined in the highsecurity facility during Ramadan, Sgt. Lee brought Long’s 

evening meal to him at about 3:30 p.m. By the time Long 

could break his fast at about 7:30 p.m., the food was cold, 

unappetizing, and potentially unsafe to consume. The food 

also exacerbated his stomach ulcers. Long contended that 

delivering his evening meal during his fast violated the Free 

Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court 

granted summary judgment to Lee. 

In granting summary judgment, the district court relied 

on a single case, LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th 

Cir. 1993), in which we held that serving prisoners 

unappetizing but nutritious “Nutraloaf” did not constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 

We wrote in LeMaire that food “served cold, while 

unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.” 
12 LONG V. SUGAI

Id. (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 

(11th Cir. 1985)).

LeMaire, decided under the Eighth Amendment, does 

not control Long’s First Amendment claim. The question in 

the case before us is not whether serving cold, unappetizing, 

and possibly unsafe food is cruel and unusual punishment. 

Rather, it is whether serving such food unconstitutionally 

burdened Long’s free exercise of his religion.

In ruling on a prisoner’s First Amendment free exercise 

claim, we first determine whether the challenged prison 

policy or practice substantially burdened the prisoner’s free 

exercise of his or her religion. See Jones v. Williams, 791 

F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). If it does, we then apply 

the four factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 

(1987), to determine whether the burden was “reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests.” Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

Long, by the time Long could eat his evening meal at about 

7:30 p.m., the food was often inedible and potentially unsafe, 

and, if eaten, exacerbated his stomach ulcers. We take 

judicial notice of the fact that some food cannot safely sit at 

room temperature for four hours. See Food Facts: Serving 

Up Safe Buffets, F.D.A. (2017), 

https://www.fda.gov/food/buy-store-serve-safefood/serving-safe-buffets [https://perma.cc/36EW-CVJ5] 

(strongly advising that perishables left at room temperature 

for more than two hours be discarded); Leftovers and Food 

Safety, U.S.D.A., https://www.fsis.usda.gov/foodsafety/safe-food-handling-and-preparation/food-safetybasics/leftovers-and-food-safety [https://perma.cc/QQ8FG8CP] (last updated July 31, 2020) (describing food left out 
LONG V. SUGAI 13

for more than two hours as in the “danger zone” because 

bacteria can rapidly grow at room temperature); 10 

Dangerous Food Safety Mistakes, C.D.C., 

https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/ten-dangerousmistakes.html [https://perma.cc/DTG7-Y4SX] (last updated 

Oct. 24, 2023). 

The evidence before the district court, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Long, establishes that the 3:30 p.m. 

delivery of Long’s evening meal during Ramadan 

substantially burdened his free exercise of his religion. A 

“substantial burden exists when the state places ‘substantial 

pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 

his beliefs.’” Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 

2022) (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 

(9th Cir. 2005)). “[M]ore than an inconvenience on religious 

exercise,” a substantial burden has “a tendency to coerce 

individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs.” 

Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2013)). A prison practice “may impact religious exercise 

indirectly, by encouraging an inmate to do that which he is 

religiously prohibited or discouraged from doing.” Slade, 23 

F.4th at 1140; see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 

(“[C]ompulsion may be indirect. . . .” (quoting Thomas v. 

Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981))).

We have consistently held that the failure to provide food 

consistent with a prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs 

constitutes a substantial burden on the prisoner’s free 

exercise. In Shakur, 514 F.3d at 881–82, a Muslim prisoner 

requested a kosher meat diet consistent with Islamic Halal 

requirements because the vegetarian diet offered to him gave 

him gas and irritated his hernia. When the prison denied his 

request, he brought an action under the Free Exercise Clause. 
14 LONG V. SUGAI

Id. at 882–883. We held that the prison’s refusal 

“implicate[d] the Free Exercise Clause” and that the district 

court was therefore required to analyze the Turner factors. 

Id. at 885; see also McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 

(9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (“Inmates . . . have the right to 

be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good 

health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.”); Ward 

v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding same); 

Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(holding same).

Our sister circuits agree that nourishment consistent with 

a prisoner’s religious beliefs and practices must be provided 

in a reasonable manner. See, e.g., Holland v. Goord, 758 

F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that pressure “to 

provide a urine sample by drinking water during [inmate’s] 

fast . . . placed a substantial burden on [his] religious 

exercise.”); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199–200 (4th Cir. 

2006) (“Under . . . the Free Exercise Clause . . ., a prisoner 

has a ‘clearly established . . . right to a diet consistent with 

his . . . religious scruples,’ including proper food during 

Ramadan.” (last two ellipses in original) (quoting Ford v. 

McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003))); Ford, 352 

F.3d at 597 (recognizing a clearly established right to the Eid 

ul Fitr feast, which celebrates the successful completion of 

Ramadan); Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682, 689 (8th Cir. 2000) 

(finding that prison officials substantially burdened an 

inmate’s free exercise rights by refusing to provide meals in 

his cell at particular times to accommodate his religious 

practices).

Makin v. Colorado Department of Corrections, 183 F.3d 

1205, 1215 (10th Cir. 1999), is directly on point. There, a 

Muslim prisoner housed in punitive segregation during 

Ramadan was unable to eat his evening meal when it was 
LONG V. SUGAI 15

delivered to his cell. Id. at 1208–09. To maintain his fast, 

he saved his “supper and food such as dry cereal and crackers 

. . . from lunch and breakfast” to eat after sundown. Id. at 

1209. Although the inmate managed to fast under these 

circumstances for the entire month of Ramadan, the Tenth 

Circuit held that the prison’s actions infringed on the 

inmate’s right to free exercise of his religion and that the 

defendants had not offered “any legitimate penological 

interests to justify that infringement” under Turner. Id. at 

1214. In Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1134–35 (10th 

Cir. 2021), the court characterized Makin as “clearly 

establish[ing] a substantial burden for a partial religious 

deprivation” where “prison officials failed to provide meals 

to an inmate at appropriate times throughout the month of 

Ramadan.” 

Our own cases as well as out-of-circuit cases thus clearly 

establish that delivery of Long’s evening meal at 3:30 p.m. 

during Ramadan substantially burdened his free exercise of 

religion. The district court should have evaluated the four 

Turner factors to determine whether the burden was 

justified. Because the court did not conduct that analysis, we 

remand to allow it to do so. The district court also did not 

conduct a qualified immunity analysis. If the court 

concludes, after conducting the Turner analysis, that the 

burden was not justified, our remand allows the court to 

conduct a qualified immunity analysis. 

2. Retaliation Claim against Chief Antonio

As noted above, Chief Antonio transferred Long from 

the medium-security facility to the high-security facility 

within HCF after Long filed grievances against Sgt. Sugai. 

Long contended that the transfer was retaliation for filing the 
16 LONG V. SUGAI

grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. The district 

court granted summary judgment to Antonio on this claim.

A successful First Amendment retaliation claim by a 

prisoner requires “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took 

some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled 

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and 

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567–68 (footnote 

omitted). With respect to the fifth factor, the Supreme Court 

has cautioned that “‘federal courts ought to afford 

appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying 

to manage a volatile environment,’ especially with regard to 

‘the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life, a 

common subject of prisoner claims.’” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472, 482–83 (1995)).

The district court found that the first, third, and fourth 

factors weighed in favor of Long. However, with respect to 

the second and fifth factors, the court found that Chief 

Antonio’s transfer advanced the legitimate correctional goal 

of maintaining order and safety within the prison, and that 

there was insufficient evidence to show that this asserted 

goal was pretextual. To establish impermissible motivation, 

Long must “put forth evidence of retaliatory motive, that, 

taken in the light most favorable to him, presents a genuine 

issue of material fact as to [Antonio’s] intent” in transferring 

Long. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005)).

Chief Antonio maintained that he transferred Long for 

permissible reasons: He stated that he was aware that Long 

“had complained of harassment and retaliation by Adult 
LONG V. SUGAI 17

Correctional Officer (‘ACO’) Rodney Sugai,” and that 

reports “had been prepared by HCF Staff, including ACO 

Sugai that related to Plaintiff’s misconducts.” He further 

stated that “[b]ased on these circumstances, [he] decided that 

it was in the best interest of Plaintiff and ACO Sugai to 

separate them in order to 1) prevent any further conflicts, 

2) to allow time for HCF administration to investigate the 

complaints, and 3) in the case that the allegations were 

substantiated to prevent any further improper conduct on the 

part of either party. [] Because ACO Sugai was responsible 

for the kitchen area that the [medium-security facility] 

utilizes, it was necessary to move Plaintiff to the Special 

Needs Facility (‘SNF’).” 

Pointing only to this sequence of events, Long asks us to 

infer that Chief Antonio had a retaliatory motive. We agree 

with the district court that this sequence, standing alone, is 

insufficient to show retaliatory intent. Without additional 

evidence, there is no genuine dispute of material fact over 

whether Antonio transferred Long based on an improper 

motive. 

C. Bench Trial

After a bench trial, the district court ruled against Long 

on his three remaining claims: two against Sgt. Sugai and 

one against Chief Antonio. On appeal, Long challenges 

several findings supporting the district court’s rulings. We 

can reverse “only if the district court’s findings are clearly 

erroneous to the point of being illogical, implausible, or 

without support in inferences from the record.” Oakland 

Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 960 

F.3d 603, 613 (9th Cir. 2020). A finding is “clearly 

erroneous” only when the reviewing body, looking at the 

entire body of evidence, “is left with the definite and firm 
18 LONG V. SUGAI

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. 

Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 

395 (1984)). 

1. Claims against Sgt. Sugai

The district court tried the free exercise and retaliation 

claims against Sgt. Sugai. 

a. Free Exercise

Long contended that Sgt. Sugai had violated his First 

Amendment free exercise right in four ways: (1) denying 

Long non-pork meals; (2) directing kitchen workers to 

contaminate Long’s meal with pork strands; (3) directing 

kitchen workers to give Long smaller portions; and 

(4) forcing Long to eat in his housing unit for six to eight 

months. 

The district court rejected Long’s contentions. As to (1), 

the district court found that, to the extent that Long was 

denied non-pork meals, Sugai was not responsible for the 

denials. The court held that the evidence showed that, on the 

occasions at issue, Long was not on the mealaccommodations list and that Sugai had no role in compiling 

that list. As to (2) and (3), crediting Sugai’s testimony, the 

court found that Sugai did not so direct kitchen workers. As 

to (4), the court found that Sugai directed Long to take his 

meals in his housing unit on only a few occasions and that 

he did so based on permissible security concerns. Ample 

evidence supports the district court’s findings.

b. Retaliation

Long contended that Sgt. Sugai retaliated against him for 

exercising his First Amendment right to file grievances. The 
LONG V. SUGAI 19

alleged retaliatory acts were the same predicate acts as for 

Long’s free exercise claim against Sugai. The district court 

rejected his retaliation claim for the same reasons it rejected 

his free exercise claims. Ample evidence supports the 

district court’s findings. 

2. Claim against Chief Antonio

The district court also tried the free exercise claim 

against Chief Antonio. Long contended that Antonio 

violated his First Amendment free exercise right in two 

ways: (1) by transferring him to the high-security facility 

where there were no Friday Jumu’ah prayer services, and 

(2) by refusing to arrange transportation to the mediumsecurity facility so that Long could attend Jumu’ah services 

there. As to (1), the district court concluded that Long’s free 

exercise rights were substantially burdened by the transfer, 

but after applying the four Turner factors, the district court 

found that the burden was justified. We find no error in that 

conclusion. As to (2), Antonio testified that he would have 

forwarded any request to attend religious services to an 

official with authority to approve such requests. Based on 

this testimony, the court found that Antonio was not 

authorized to arrange weekly transportation to the mediumsecurity facility for religious services, and that he was 

therefore not a proper defendant. We also find no error in 

that conclusion. 

Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED in part, 

REVERSED in part, VACATED in part, and 

REMANDED. 

Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.