State corrective process is ineffective is without merit inasmuch as the delays were
largely caused by Woodson and therefore the delays cannot be attributed to the
“state for purposes of rendering [Illinois’] state [corrective] process ineffective under
§ 2254(b).” See Sceifers, 46 F.3d at 703-04(stating that “errors of the public
defender could not be attributed to the state” because a petitioner has “no
constitutional right” to an attorney during state collateral proceedings.).
Accordingly, a hearing in this matter is not warranted since Woodson has not
disputed the state court docket entries in the certified statement from the Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County which clearly reveals that the delay was not
unjustifiable. Sceifers, 46 F.3d at 703-04. Therefore, Woodson is not excused from
exhausting his state court remedies before filing his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. Id.

II. Equal Protection Claim

Woodson claims that he is entitled to habeas review because his equal
protection rights have been violated due to a congpiracy by his counsel and others to
conceal favorable evidence in his case. (Pet. 5). Respondent contends that
Woodson’s equal protection claim in his petition for writ of habeas corpus is not
cognizable since Woodson has not claimed that the “state collateral review itself”

violated Woodson’s equal protection rights. (Resp’t Reply 6).


court.” See id. at 704(finding that the eleven-year delay in the adjudication ofa
petitioner’s post-conviction relief did not render the state’s corrective process
ineffective or excuse the exhaustion requirement since the delay was partially caused
by the petitioner and by the “uninspired performance of his post-conviction
counsel.”).

Respondent argues that the delay in Woodson’s collateral appeal proceedings
was largely due to Woodsen and his counsel. Woodson blames the delay on his
“own postconviction counsel,” but claims that a hearing is warranted in order for
him to prove that a “conspiracy” existed between his post-conviction counsel and
others to delay his collateral appeal proceedings. (Pet’r Resp. 2, 6). However,
Respondent attached to his motion to dismiss a certified statement from the Clerk of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, containing docket entries from Woodson’s
collateral appeal proceedings in the Illinois State courts, which reflects that
Woodson’s prolonged collateral appeal proceedings are largely attributable to
continuances either made by, or agreed to by, Woodson or his post-conviction
counsel. (Resp’t Mot. Ex. A). In Woodson’s response to Respondent’s motion to
dismiss, Woodson failed to address the state court docket entries in the certified
statement from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Woodson instead
contended that the delay was caused by his counsel who was in a conspiracy with
others. (Pet’r Resp. 2-7). First, Woodson’s allegation of a conspiracy is

unsubstantiated and speculative. Second, Woodson’s allegation that the Illinois


The Seventh Circuit has stated that “federal habeas corpus review provides
“no relief for errors in state collateral review.” Jackson, 112 F.3d at 880(emphasis
added). However, where the “the state's conduct in the collateral proceedings”
violates a petitioner’s equal protection rights, “habeas relief might be appropriate.”
Jackson, 112 F.3d at 880(quoting Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th
Cir. 1996)(emphasis added). Since Woodson has failed to sufficiently allege
conduct on the part of the State of Illinois in violation of his equal protection rights
during his collateral appeal proceedings, Woodson has failed to allege a cognizable
equal protection claim. Jackson, 112 F.3d at 880. Therefore, we find that Woodson

has failed to set forth a cognizable equal protection claim.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Respondent’s motion and dismiss

Woodson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice.

4
Samuel SRT, 6 .

United States District Court Judge

Dated: April 21, 2005


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
DWAYNE M. WOODSON,

Petitioner,
No. 04 C 4733

ve

CHARLES L. HINSLEY, Warden,

Nee ee eS a

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss Petitioner
Dwayne M. Woodson’s (“Woodson”) petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the
reasons stated below, we grant Respondent’s motion and dismiss Woodson’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice.

BACKGROUND
Woodson, a state prisoner, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this

court and has indicated in his petition that he has not exhausted his state court


remedies and that he presently has a petition for post-conviction relief pending in the
Illinois state courts. Woodson argues that his petition for post-conviction relief has
been inordinately pending in the Illinois state courts for over eleven years and
circumstances exist that warrant a finding that the Illinois state corrective process is
ineffective, and that as a result he should be able to now proceed to federal habeas
review. Woodson also alleges that his equal protection rights were violated because
his own counsel was in a conspiracy with others to conceal favorable evidence in his
case during his state collateral appeal proceedings. (Pet. 5). Respondent contends
that Woodson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed because
Woodson’s equal protection claim is not cognizable under Aabeas review and he has

failed to exhaust his State court remedies. (Resp’t Mot. 2; Reply 5-7).

LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may entertain a habeas corpus petition from a “person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b):

(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that--

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the


rights of the applicant.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

DISCUSSION
I_Inordinate Delay Issue

Respondent contends that Woodson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
should be dismissed without prejudice since he has failed to exhaust his state court
remedies. Woodson argues that he should be excused from exhausting his state
court remedies because the delay in the adjudication ofhis petition for post-
conviction relief has been unjustified and because the Illinois state corrective process
is ineffective.

While a petitioner bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus is generally
required to first exhaust his state court remedies, “[i]nordinate, unjustifiable delay in
a state-court collateral proceeding excuses” such a requirement. Jackson v.
Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1997). A delay of eleven years, as is this
case here, in the adjudication of a petition for post-conviction relief in a state court is
considered an “inordinate” delay. Sceifers v. Trigg, 46 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir.
1995). However, where the record reveals that the inordinate delay was not
unjustified and that such delay could not be attributed to the State for purposes of
“rendering [its] state [corrective] process ineffective under § 2254(b),” the petitioner

“must exhaust his state court remedies before bringing [his] habeas action to federal