In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 17, 2024

S23G1128. MELANCON v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Appellant Sidrick Raymone Melancon, Sr., was convicted of 

second-degree murder after his ex-girlfriend Sadai Higgenbotham 

inflicted fatal head trauma on their nine-month-old daughter, Laura

Higgenbotham. Although Melancon was not present when Higgenbotham killed Laura, he had earlier told his girlfriend, Gerallyn 

Long, not to cooperate with a Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) investigation of Higgenbotham that Long had initiated 

after seeing a bruise and fingernail mark on Laura’s cheek. One of 

the State’s theories at trial was that this instruction to Long 

“caused” Laura’s death. The Court of Appeals approved that theory 

on appeal, holding that the evidence authorized a jury to find that 

merely by giving that instruction — almost two months before 
2

Laura’s death — Melancon “caused” Laura’s death at Higgenbotham’s hands, because he “knew” about earlier incidents of 

harm to Laura and “effectively ended” DFCS’s investigation, thus 

preventing DFCS from preventing Higgenbotham from killing 

Laura.

For each kind of murder offense set out in our murder statute, 

the State must prove that the accused “cause[d]” the death of another human being. OCGA § 16-5-1. Although we have explained before that the word “cause” in that statute means “proximate cause,” 

our decisions to this point have described this causation in a number 

of different ways. Those descriptions can be distilled into two components, each of which must be established to prove causation in a 

murder case: cause in fact, and legal (or “proximate”) cause. Cause 

in fact refers to the basic requirement that the conduct must have 

an actual causal relationship to the forbidden result — a relationship that is most often shown through evidence that the result would 

not have happened “but for” the defendant’s conduct. In other words, 

cause in fact is the “cause” in the phrase “proximate cause.” Legal 
3

cause, on the other hand, puts the “proximate” in “proximate cause.” 

This inquiry takes as a given that the defendant’s conduct was causally connected to the forbidden result and asks whether the death 

resulted from the defendant’s conduct in such an unforeseen or attenuated way that the defendant cannot be held accountable for the 

death. As explained more below, our decisions have described these 

distinct components of causation as follows: A defendant’s conduct 

is a cause in fact of a death if his conduct “played a substantial part 

in bringing about or actually causing” the death (again, typically 

shown through evidence that the death would not have happened 

“but for” the defendant’s conduct), or if the defendant’s conduct “materially accelerated the death.” And a defendant’s conduct is a legal 

cause of a death if the death was “reasonably foreseeable” — that is, 

a “probable or natural consequence” of the criminal conduct “according to ordinary and usual experience.”

Measured against these standards, the evidence in this case 

was not sufficient to support the particular theory of causation the 

Court of Appeals addressed. In light of this holding, which we 
4

explain in detail below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated. Because this decision reviews only the theory of causation the 

Court of Appeals addressed, the case is remanded for the Court of 

Appeals to apply the framework we set forth below and consider in 

the first instance whether the evidence of causation in this case was 

sufficient under a theory other than the one we have rejected here.

1. Background

(a) Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial showed the following.

At the time of her death, nine-month-old Laura was living in 

an apartment with Melancon (her father), Higgenbotham (her 

mother), Long (Melancon’s girlfriend), and Melancon and Long’s 

three children. When Higgenbotham and Laura first moved in with 

Melancon and Long, Higgenbotham’s mother (Laura’s grandmother) 

warned Melancon not to leave Laura alone with Higgenbotham. 

Melancon exerted significant control over Long and Higgenbotham 

and physically abused both women.

Long often took care of Laura when Higgenbotham was at 
5

work. Long believed Higgenbotham was unfit to be a mother and 

testified at trial about Higgenbotham’s abuse of Laura. She said that 

Higgenbotham would force feed Laura until she gagged and would 

muffle Laura’s mouth to silence her crying. On one occasion, Higgenbotham left for work and left Laura alone in a hot room for thirty 

minutes. Long once heard Higgenbotham tell Laura to “stop” followed by a slapping sound and Laura crying and, on several occasions, she heard “a loud thump . . . immediately followed by [Laura’s] 

crying.” According to Long, Melancon knew about most of these incidents and “wasn’t surprised” by Higgenbotham’s behavior because 

“[h]e knew she was capable of it.” In particular, Long testified that 

Melancon knew about the time Higgenbotham left Laura in a hot 

room and had seen bruises and scratches on Laura’s body. 

On June 13, 2017, a little under two months before Laura’s 

death, Long babysat Laura. During that time, she saw a bruise and 

a fingernail mark on Laura’s face, and she texted a photo of these 

injuries to Melancon. Long then asked Melancon for permission to 

call DFCS about these injuries. He agreed, and Long contacted 
6

DFCS and reported the bruise and fingernail mark and also told 

DFCS how Higgenbotham would put her hand over Laura’s mouth 

to muffle her crying. But the DFCS investigator noted that Long was 

“not willing to provide a current address,” did not give DFCS her 

own name, and she gave an outdated (and wrong) address for Higgenbotham. 

The next morning, Melancon changed his mind and told Long 

not to “file a report” with DFCS. But he agreed with Long that Higgenbotham’s explanation for the injuries — that Laura fell off the 

bed and hit her face on a dresser — was “bulls**t.” So Melancon had 

Long look after Laura for five days after the incident, and told Higgenbotham by text message that he “took [Laura from her] because 

[Higgenbotham was] abusing her, not taking care of her,” and that 

he knew Laura “didn’t fall out of no f**king bed.” For Long’s part, 

she stopped answering DFCS’s calls. She testified that if Melancon 

hadn’t told her not to “file[] the report,” she would have done so.

The DFCS investigator testified to his unsuccessful investigation after Long’s initial report. On June 14, the day after Long’s call, 
7

the investigator tried to contact Higgenbotham in person, by phone, 

and via social media based on the information Long had provided, 

but to no avail. The investigator also tried to call and text Long that 

day. Long answered two of these calls, but she did not provide additional information to help locate Higgenbotham and Laura and told 

the investigator DFCS could “cancel the report.” DFCS did not “cancel the report” as Long had asked, but it ultimately closed the case 

because the investigator could not find Higgenbotham or Laura. 

On July 22, about two weeks before Laura’s death, Higgenbotham took Laura to a family nurse practitioner for a ninemonth wellness check. The nurse practitioner did not note any concerns of abuse or neglect.

On July 31, about a week before Laura’s death, Long saw new 

evidence of injuries to Laura, including “many scratches” that Long 

recorded in a video, which was entered into evidence at trial. Long 

did not tell Melancon about these scratches or show him the video.

On August 3, four days before Laura’s death, Long noticed that 

Laura could not stand up in her playpen and that her legs were 
8

shaking. Long did not know that, at the time, Laura had a leg fracture. A little after midnight on August 4, Laura screamed in her 

sleep and Melancon took Laura, who had been sleeping in his and 

Long’s room, to Higgenbotham’s room. Around noon on August 5, 

Higgenbotham texted Melancon that Laura had been sleeping since 

he left for work, would not wake up, and “felt hot.” Between 3:30 and 

4:00 p.m., with Melancon’s permission, Higgenbotham left for work, 

leaving Laura alone in her room (Long was home but in her own 

bedroom). 

Around 4:00 p.m., Melancon came home and brought Laura, 

who was strapped tightly into her car seat, to Long in their bedroom.

Melancon then left the apartment. Long noticed that Laura was not 

moving and had one eye open and one eye shut. Long removed Laura 

from the car seat and realized she was strapped into the car seat 

because she was unconscious — when Long lifted Laura, her limbs 

and head dropped immediately. Long saw that one of Laura’s pupils 

was dilated and the other was small, she was drooling on one side of 

her mouth, her breathing was labored, her heartbeat was fast, and 
9

she had thick blood in her mouth. Long called Melancon and tried

CPR on Laura. Melancon told Long not to call 911 because he was 

nearby and would drive her to urgent care, which he did. When 

Laura arrived at the urgent care, she appeared gray, was not breathing, and her head was slumped over in the car seat. Medical personnel tried to resuscitate Laura and called 911. Laura was eventually 

taken by helicopter to the pediatric intensive care unit of a children’s 

hospital, where she was declared brain dead on August 7. She died 

later that day.

An autopsy showed that Laura died as a result of injuries 

caused by intentionally inflicted head trauma and blunt force injuries to her head, neck, abdomen, back, arms, and legs, which were 

all in a state of healing. Laura had recent brain injuries that reflected massive trauma, including brain bleed and retinal hemorrhage, and she had spinal injuries and leg fractures, including some 

older fractures that were partially healed. She also had injuries consistent with undergoing violent shaking back and forth. A medical 

expert testified that the nature and location of Laura’s injuries 
10

indicated that they were likely inflicted intentionally and that she 

had been in distress for several hours before being taken to urgent 

care.

(b) After Melancon’s trial,1 the jury returned verdicts of guilty 

for second-degree murder, second-degree child cruelty, and two 

counts of influencing a witness. Melancon was sentenced to 30 years 

in prison for the second-degree murder conviction and two consecutive sentences of 10 years’ probation for each count of influencing a 

witness. The second-degree child cruelty count merged with the second-degree murder count.

Melancon appealed, arguing in relevant part that the evidence 

was not sufficient to establish that he caused Laura’s death. The 

Court of Appeals rejected that argument. See Melancon v. State, 368 

Ga. App. 340, 344 (1) (890 SE2d 113) (2023). The court recounted 

evidence that authorized the jury to find what it saw as “a natural 

and continuous sequence leading from Melancon’s interference” to 

1 Melancon and Higgenbotham were indicted jointly, but Melancon’s trial 

was severed from Higgenbotham’s. The record does not reflect the disposition 

of the charges against Higgenbotham.
11

Laura’s death, and also that “had Melancon not interfered to end the 

DFCS investigation, Higgenbotham’s abuse of Laura would not have 

continued.” Id. at 345 (1). Although “no direct evidence” showed 

“what DFCS would have done if Long had cooperated,” the court reasoned that a jury could infer that DFCS would have stopped the 

abuse based on evidence that Higgenbotham was “actively abusing 

Laura” while DFCS was taking steps to find her after Long’s first 

report. Id. at 346 (1). Nor did the court consider Higgenbotham’s 

later abuse of Laura an “intervening act that broke the causal chain 

between his interference in the DFCS investigation and Laura’s 

death.” Id. In the court’s view, “[i]t is reasonably foreseeable that if 

one interferes to stop a DFCS investigation into child abuse that the 

abuse will continue to occur,” id., and Melancon also could have reasonably foreseen that Higgenbotham’s continued abuse would “result[] in serious injury to or death of the baby.” Id. at 347 (1). The 

court concluded with a summary: the evidence was sufficient to find 

that Melancon committed second-degree murder and cruelty to children in the second degree because “the jury was presented with 
12

evidence that Melancon, knowing that Higgenbotham was physically abusive to Laura, took steps to stop DFCS from investigating 

and acting to prevent further abuse,” and “that Higgenbotham’s continued abuse caused the baby to suffer and ultimately caused her 

death.” Id.2

We granted review.

2. Causation Principles

For each kind of murder defined by our murder statute, the 

State must prove (among other things) that the accused “cause[d] 

the death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1.3 Although we

have generally described this requirement as a single element of 

“causation” or “proximate cause,” our decisions show that the causation required by our murder statute encompasses two distinct concepts: cause-in-fact, and legal cause.

2 Because it concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Melancon’s 

convictions on this theory of causation, the Court of Appeals expressly declined 

to address the State’s other theories of causation. See Melancon, 368 Ga. App. 

at 344-345 (1).

3 Melancon was convicted of second-degree murder. “A person commits 

the offense of murder in the second degree when, in the commission of cruelty 

to children in the second degree, he or she causes the death of another human 

being irrespective of malice.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (d).
13

Start with State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 647 (2) (697 SE2d 

757) (2010), a seminal decision addressing “what the term ‘causes’

means as used in the felony murder statute.” In that decision, we 

overruled an earlier decision that had interpreted the term “causes” 

to mean that the defendant must have “directly caused” the death 

at issue. See id. at 656 (4), 660 (6) (overruling State v. Crane, 247 

Ga. 779 (279 SE2d 695) (1981)). In place of that rule, we held that

“causes” requires “proximate cause,” so “the felony murder statute 

requires only that the defendant’s felonious conduct proximately 

cause the death of another person.” Id. at 660 (6). 

Along the way to that holding, we offered varied descriptions 

of the causation standard. We first noted that “the term ‘cause’ is 

customarily interpreted in almost all legal contexts to mean ‘proximate cause,’” and then recited a definition of that term from Black’s 

Law Dictionary: “that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, 

unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and 

without which the result would not have occurred.” Id. at 648 (2)

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1103 (5th ed. 1979)). We then 
14

turned to our own decisions. From Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19, 19-

20 (1) (596 SE2d 159) (2004), we quoted a standard for criminal 

cases in general:

“In a criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused’s ‘act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the victim’s injury or damage and . . . the injury or damage was either a direct result 

or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.’”

Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-649 (2). From James v. State, 250 Ga. 655, 

655 (300 SE2d 492) (1983), we quoted a standard for murder cases 

in general: 

“Where one inflicts an unlawful injury, such injury is to 

be accounted as the efficient, proximate cause of death, 

whenever it shall be made to appear, either that (1) the 

injury itself constituted the sole proximate cause of the 

death; or that (2) the injury directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death; or that (3) the injury materially 

accelerated the death, although proximately occasioned 

by a pre-existing cause.”

Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649 (2). From Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 329 

(5) (297 SE2d 237) (1982), and Jones v. State, 220 Ga. 899, 902 (3)

(142 SE2d 801) (1965), we cobbled together a causation standard 

that we described as applicable “[i]n the context of this case”:
15

In the context of this case, proximate causation would exist if (to use “the rule” for felony murder that the Court 

stated a year after deciding Crane) the felony the defendants committed “directly and materially contributed to 

the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause 

of the death,” Durden, 250 Ga. at 329, 297 SE2d 237, or if 

(to use language from a case decided 16 years before 

Crane) “‘the homicide [was] committed within the res gestae of the felony’ ... and is one of the incidental, probable

consequences of the execution of the design to commit the 

robbery.”

Jackson, 287 Ga. at 652 (2). And finally, in distinguishing Crane’s 

“often unhelpful[] direct-indirect dichotomy,” we described “[p]roximate causation” in yet another way, explaining that it “imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of criminal (or, in the 

civil context, tortious) conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, 

and unforeseen intervening cause.” Id. at 654 (3).

On a first read, it is not clear how exactly one should distill

from Jackson’s collection of descriptions a definitive standard or test 

for determining whether the element of causation has been proven 

in a murder case.4 But on a closer review of Jackson and our other 

4 Indeed, after Jackson, our courts have emphasized different formulations of that standard from Jackson in different cases. Compare Daddario v. 
16

causation decisions, two distinct concepts of causation emerge: (1) 

cause in fact (sometimes known as “actual cause”), and (2) legal (or 

“proximate”) cause.

(a) Cause in Fact

As a general matter, “cause in fact” refers to the basic requirement that the defendant’s conduct must have an actual causal relationship to the forbidden result (here, the death of another human 

being). See Burns v. State, 240 Ga. 827, 828 (242 SE2d 579) (1978) 

(explaining that a “causal relationship” between the defendant’s act 

and the victim’s death is required). The cause-in-fact requirement 

shows up in our decisions in the form of various statements that define the necessary causal relationship itself. We have said, for example, that the defendant’s conduct “causes” a death if it “played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the death.” 

State, 307 Ga. 179, 186 (835 SE2d 181) (2019) (focusing on “natural and continuous sequence” definition) with Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 422 (811 SE2d 

392) (2018) (focusing on descriptions Jackson sourced from Durden and Jones). 

At times, we have even stitched several of Jackson’s various standards together to describe the causation standard. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 317 Ga. 519, 

522-523 (893 SE2d 918) (2023).
17

Jackson, 287 Ga, at 648-649 (2) (quoting Skaggs, 278 Ga. at 19-20 

(1)); Chaney v. State, 281 Ga. 481, 482 (1) (640 SE2d 37) (2007) 

(same).5 That showing is ordinarily made through evidence from 

which a jury can infer that the forbidden result would not have happened “but for” the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., Daddario v. State, 

307 Ga. 179, 186-187 (2) (a) (2019) (rejecting argument that evidence 

of causation was not sufficient because evidence was presented 

showing that the victim’s severe injuries would not have occurred 

“but for” the defendant’s act of molestation). See also Bell v. State, 

317 Ga. 519, 523 (893 SE2d 918) (2023) (explaining conduct is considered the “cause” where “without [it] the result would not have 

occurred” (quoting Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648 (2))). And we have made 

5 We have also indicated that cause in fact is satisfied if the defendant’s 

conduct “directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent 

accruing immediate cause of the death.” Williams v. State, 225 Ga. 21, 22 (334 

SE2d 691) (1985); James, 250 Ga. at 655 (quoting Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824, 

829 (10 SE2d 861) (1940)); Durden, 250 Ga. at 329; Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 

586, 587 (278 SE2d 365) (1981). As a description of a way to establish cause in 

fact when the defendant’s conduct is not the most “immediate” cause of a death, 

this statement is accurate, but it is also adequately captured by the requirement that the defendant’s conduct “played a substantial part in bringing about 

the death.” So we focus on the latter description with a view towards distilling 

our myriad descriptions of causation into a clearer standard.
18

clear that such a showing will establish cause in fact whether or not 

the defendant’s conduct was the “sole” or “immediate” cause of 

death. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649 (2) (explaining that a defendant’s injury-creating conduct causes a death if “the injury itself constituted 

the sole proximate cause of the death” or “the injury directly and 

materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing 

immediate cause of the death”). See also Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Subst. 

Crim. L. § 6.4 (b) (3d ed.) (“In order that conduct be the actual cause 

of a particular result, it is almost always sufficient that the result 

would not have happened in the absence of the conduct; or, putting 

it another way, that ‘but for’ the antecedent conduct the result would 

not have occurred.”).6 Finally, if the evidence shows that the death 

would have eventually happened even absent the defendant’s 

6 This description of cause in fact suggests that at least in rare circumstances, a but-for causal relationship may not be necessary. For example, if a 

defendant’s conduct is independently sufficient to cause a death, it may be a 

cause in fact of the death even if the defendant’s conduct operated together 

with another independently sufficient cause of the death. See LaFave, 1 Subst. 

Crim. L. § 6.4 (b) (3d ed.) (explaining that “where two causes, each alone sufficient to bring about the harmful result, operate together to cause it,” the defendant’s conduct is still a cause in fact if it is “a substantial factor in bringing 

about the forbidden result”). But but-for causation is, by far, the usual way to 

establish that the defendant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the death.
19

conduct, we have said that the defendant’s conduct is still a cause if 

it “materially accelerated” the death. Jackson, 287 Ga. at 649 (2) 

(quoting Wilson, 190 Ga. at 829)). See also Wayne R. LaFave, 2 

Subst. Crim. L. § 6.4 (3d ed.) (agreeing that “one who hastens the 

victim’s death is a cause of his death”).

(b) Legal Cause

In addition to cause in fact, our decisions describe a separate 

requirement that we refer to here as legal cause.7 It takes as a given 

that the defendant’s conduct was causally connected to the forbidden 

result — in a “but for” sense or otherwise — and asks whether the 

death resulted from the defendant’s conduct in such an unforeseen 

or attenuated way that the defendant cannot be held accountable for 

the death. See Bell, 317 Ga. at 523 (citing Johnson v. Avis Rent A 

Car Systems, LLC, 311 Ga. 588, 593 (858 SE2d 23) (2021) (“The 

7 We have sometimes called this requirement “proximate cause.” See, 

e.g., Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 568 (2) (a) (894 SE2d 27) (2023). But because we have also referred to the overall element of causation required in 

murder cases as “proximate cause,” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-649 (2), and that 

element includes both cause in fact and legal cause, we use “legal cause” here 

to describe the specific concept that, together with cause in fact, makes up the 

element of causation.
20

requirement of proximate cause constitutes a limit on legal liability; 

it is a policy decision that, for a variety of reasons, e.g., intervening 

act, the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury are too remote 

for the law to countenance recovery.”)). See also LaFave, 1 Subst. 

Crim. L. § 6.4 (b) (3d ed.) (explaining that “even when cause in fact 

is established, it must be determined that any variation between the 

result intended (with intent crimes) or hazarded and (with reckless 

or negligent crimes) the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for 

the actual result”). To that end, the legal-cause requirement shows 

up in our causation decisions as language specifying the requisite 

foreseeability or likelihood of the death happening in the way it did,

given the defendant’s conduct. As we put it recently, legal cause “requires that the death actually happened in a way that was a reasonably foreseeable result of the criminal conduct—that is, the death 

must also have been a ‘probable or natural consequence’ of the criminal conduct.” Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 569 (2) (a) (ii) (894 

SE2d 27) (2023). See also Jackson, 287 Ga. at 654 (3) (“Proximate 
21

causation imposes liability for the reasonably foreseeable results of 

criminal (or, in the civil context, tortious) conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.”); Skaggs, 

278 Ga. at 20 (1) (“In cases of felony murder, ‘for example, legal 

cause will not be present where there intervenes (1) a coincidence 

that is not reasonably foreseeable . . . or (2) an abnormal response.’”

(quoting 1 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 6.4 (h), p. 495 (2d 

ed. 2003)). And “probable” means just that: “a person is not responsible for a consequence which is merely possible, according to occasional experience, but only for a consequence which is probable, according to ordinary and usual experience.” Bell, 317 Ga. at 523 

(cleaned up). See also id. (explaining that “probable” means “not unlikely” or “such a chance of harmful result that a prudent man would 

foresee the risk at issue here, i.e. the risk of serious injury or death”).

Our causation decisions also describe legal cause when they

address “intervening acts” — that is, links in the causal chain, like 

the conduct of another person or other causal forces that happen between the defendant’s conduct and the death. See Eubanks, 317 Ga. 
22

at 570-571 (2) (a) (ii); Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 809 (4) (883 SE2d 

802) (2023) (“[T]he defendant is liable for the reasonably foreseeable 

results of [his] criminal conduct if there is no sufficient, independent, and unforeseen intervening cause.” (cleaned up)); Jackson, 287 

Ga. at 654 (3). As with legal cause generally, the inquiry about intervening acts asks whether an intervening act was itself a natural 

or probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. See Eubanks, 

317 Ga. at 570 (2) (a) (ii) & n.3. That would be true when, for example, the intervening act “ensue[s] in the ordinary course of events,” 

or was “set in motion by the original wrong-doer,” as when the intervening act was undertaken “by someone other than the defendant 

who could reasonably be expected to take that action in response to 

the criminal conduct.” Id. at 570 (2) (a) (ii) (cleaned up). See Bell, 

317 Ga. at 522-523; Skaggs, 278 Ga. at 20 (1). When an intervening 

act was a natural or probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, a finding of legal cause is not precluded. And this is so even 

when the intervening act was “not intended by the defendant,” like

when the victim is “especially vulnerable” or suffers a “medical 
23

complication as a result of the defendant’s conduct.” Eubanks, 317 

Ga. at 571 (2) (a) (ii).

*

So the standard for proving the element of causation for a murder charge can be distilled from our decisions as follows. As we held 

in Jackson, proving that a defendant “caused” the death of another 

human being requires proof of “proximate cause.” Jackson, 287 Ga. 

at 647; id. at 654 (3). This showing has two components: cause in 

fact and legal cause. See e.g., Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-649 (2) (“In a 

criminal case, proximate cause exists when the accused’s act or 

omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually 

causing the victim’s injury or damage and the injury or damage was 

either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act 

or omission.” (quoting Skaggs, 278 Ga. at 19-20 (1)) (cleaned up and 

emphasis added)). See also LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 6.4(a) (3d 

ed.) (describing cause in fact as “the word ‘cause’ in the phrase . . . 

‘proximate cause,’” and legal cause as “the word . . . ‘proximate’ in 

the phrase . . . “proximate cause”). Cf. McGrath v. State, 277 Ga. 
24

App. 825, 828 (627 SE2d 866) (2006) (proving causation in a vehicular homicide case requires showing that “the defendant’s conduct 

was the ‘legal’ or ‘proximate’ cause, as well as the cause in fact, of 

the death” (cleaned up)); Miller v. State, 236 Ga. App. 825, 828 (513 

SE2d 27) (1999) (same). A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of a 

death if the defendant’s conduct “played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing” the death — typically shown through 

evidence that the death would not have happened “but for” the defendant’s conduct — or if the defendant’s conduct “materially accelerated the death.” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-649 (2); Daddario, 307 

Ga. at 186-187 (2) (a); James, 250 Ga. at 655. And a defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of a death if the death was “reasonably foreseeable” — that is, a “probable or natural consequence” of the criminal 

conduct “according to ordinary and usual experience,” not a “merely 

possible” result. Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 569 (2) (a) (ii); Bell, 317 Ga. at 

523. Determining whether the State has proved these requirements 

in any given case is “fact-intensive” and demands “mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent,” so 
25

questions of causation are “generally left to the jury at trial.” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 652 (2).

3. This Case

Having clarified the standard for proving causation under our 

murder statute, we can turn to this case. On appeal from his conviction for second-degree murder, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (d), Melancon contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he 

caused the victim’s death.8 The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the evidence authorized the jury to find that Melancon 

caused Laura’s death at Higgenbotham’s hands by telling Long to 

stop cooperating with DFCS. To review that conclusion, we must 

consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that Melancon’s conduct was the proximate cause 

— both cause in fact and legal cause — of Laura’s death. See Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979)

8 Commission of second-degree cruelty to children is an element of second-degree murder. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (d). Melancon was also charged with 

and found guilty of second-degree cruelty to children, but that count merged 

with the second-degree murder count, so a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting a cruelty to children conviction is not currently before us.
26

(explaining that the “critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a criminal conviction” is “whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”). In doing so, as with any dueprocess sufficiency review, we view the evidence presented at trial 

in the light most favorable to the verdict, id., “leav[ing] to the jury 

the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the 

facts.” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 185) 

(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Cause in Fact

Although the Court of Appeals did not expressly address cause 

in fact, its reasoning indicates that it determined that a rational juror could have found that Melancon’s conduct was a but-for cause of 

Laura’s death. The Court of Appeals accepted the State’s theory, presented in its indictment of Melancon, that Melancon’s instructing 

Long to stop cooperating with DFCS (after she initially reported 
27

Higgenbotham’s abuse of Laura) caused Laura’s death. Melancon, 

368 Ga. App. at 347 (1). In support of that theory, the Court reasoned 

that a jury could find “that, had Melancon not interfered to end the 

DFCS investigation, Higgenbotham’s abuse of Laura would not have 

continued.” Id. at 345 (1). In other words, the Court thought the evidence supported a finding that but for Melancon’s instruction to 

Long, Higgenbotham’s abuse would have stopped, and she would not 

have killed Laura. 

At the outset, this particular kind of cause-in-fact theory faces

an uphill battle. To establish that Melancon’s instruction was a 

cause in fact of Laura’s death, the State had to prove that it “played 

a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing” that death. 

Jackson, 287 Ga. at 653 (2) (quoting Skaggs, 278 Ga. at 19-20 (1)).

In a case where the defendant’s conduct was not the most immediate 

cause of death, this showing is typically made through evidence that 

he nonetheless “directly and materially contributed” in some affirmative way to that immediate cause. For instance, in Skaggs, we held 

that kicking the victim in the face with his steel-toed boots, resulting 
28

in the victim falling headfirst onto the concrete, caused the victim’s 

death some days later from trauma to skull and brain because the 

fall “was the direct and immediate result” of the defendant’s actions

and “[t]he only intervening force was gravity.” Skaggs, 278 Ga. at 20 

(1). See also Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 586, 587 (278 SE2d 365) (1981) 

(upholding felony murder conviction because defendant “caused his 

mother-in-law’s death” when he stabbed her after she tried to stop 

him from assaulting his wife, and his mother-in-law later died from 

a complication of surgery to re-stitch the knife wound (citation omitted)). And in Calhoun v. State, 38 Ga. 146, 150-151 (2) (a) (839 SE2d 

612) (2020), we held that a defendant caused the death by fleeing,

where a police officer’s use of a “PIT” maneuver to end a high-speed 

car chase resulted in the defendant’s car crashing and killing his 

passenger. By contrast, the theory here — that Melancon caused 

Laura’s death by stopping Long from cooperating with DFCS — is 

that the defendant’s conduct merely foreclosed one conceivable way 

that a third party might have intervened to stop another third party

from killing the victim. For such a preventing-someone-from-
29

preventing-murder theory to work (if it can work), the State would 

have to establish not only that the defendant’s conduct in fact prevented the hypothetical intervening third-party conduct, but also 

that the intervention would have in fact succeeded in stopping the 

murder. Without such evidence, it cannot be said that the defendant’s conduct — preventing the putative intervention — played a 

substantial part in bringing about the death, much less that the 

death would not have happened but for the defendant’s conduct.

And that’s precisely the kind of evidence that is missing here. 

The Court of Appeals was right that some evidence showed that but

for Melancon’s instruction to Long, DFCS could have found Higgenbotham and Laura. Long testified that she would have “filed the 

report” about Laura’s fingernail mark and bruise if Melancon had 

not stopped her, and the jury could have inferred from her testimony 

that she would have told DFCS where to find Higgenbotham and 

Laura (even though she did not share their whereabouts when she 

first called DFCS with Melancon’s approval). But as the Court of 

Appeals also acknowledged, the jury heard no evidence at all about 
30

what DFCS would have done next. There was no evidence in the 

record, for instance, that based on allegations of a bruise and fingernail mark, DFCS would have removed Laura from Higgenbotham’s 

custody or taken some other action that would eliminate the possibility of further abuse. The Court of Appeals suggested that the jury 

could nonetheless “infer” that DFCS “would have intervened in a 

way to stop the ongoing abuse,” Melancon, 368 Ga. App. at 346 (1), 

but inferences require some basis in evidence. Without any evidence 

even suggesting how DFCS would have responded to Long’s report 

and cooperation, or the likelihood that it would have done so based 

on the evidence of which it was aware, any conclusion about further 

actions DFCS might have taken — and whether any such actions 

would have prevented Higgenbotham from inflicting fatal head 

trauma to Laura months later — would be speculation, not inference.9 In short, this record did not authorize a jury to conclude

9 In fact, a report from Laura’s nine-month wellness check just a month 

after Long asked DFCS to “cancel” the report noted no concerns about possible 

abuse or neglect. If anything, that evidence, had DFCS known about it, could 

have supported an inference that DFCS would not have seen a basis for removing her from Higgenbotham’s care at that time.
31

beyond a reasonable doubt that DFCS would have prevented Laura’s 

death at Higgenbotham’s hands but for Melancon telling Long not 

to “file a report” about Laura’s fingernail mark and bruise two 

months earlier.

Because the evidence did not authorize the jury to find that 

Laura’s death would not have happened but for Melancon telling 

Long not to cooperate, and the State has not advanced any theory 

other than but-for causation (for example, that Melancon’s conduct

somehow accelerated Laura’s death), we conclude that the evidence 

was not sufficient to establish that instructing Long not to file a report was a cause in fact of Laura’s death.

(b) Legal Cause

As explained above, the analysis of legal cause takes as a given 

that the defendant’s conduct was causally connected to the forbidden 

result and asks whether the death that resulted from the defendant’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable. So here, we ask whether, 

assuming Melancon’s instruction to Long was an actual cause of 

Laura’s death, her death by head trauma at Higgenbotham’s hands
32

two months later was a reasonably foreseeable result of that instruction.10 As we discussed above, that standard is met only if the death 

is a “probable or natural consequence” of the conduct in question.

Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 569 (2) (a) (ii). A death can be a probable or 

natural consequence even if an intervening act happened between

the defendant’s conduct and the death, as long as the intervening 

act, too, was a probable or natural consequence of that conduct. See 

Id. at 570 (2) (a) (ii). In all events, however, a defendant “is not responsible for a consequence which is merely possible, according to 

occasional experience, but only for a consequence which is probable, 

according to ordinary and usual experience.” Bell, 317 Ga. at 523.

Measured against this standard, the evidence here does not 

support a finding that Melancon’s conduct was a legal cause of 

Laura’s death.

10 We address both cause in fact and legal cause in this opinion. But as a 

general matter, the State fails to prove causation if it fails to prove either cause 

in fact or legal cause. See Jackson, 287 Ga. at 648-649 (2). Thus, if a court 

determines that the evidence of cause in fact is not sufficient, the evidence is 

not sufficient to prove causation, and so the court would not be required to go 

on to evaluate legal cause.
33

When Melancon told Long not to “file the report” about the fingernail mark and bruise on Laura, certain consequences may have 

been reasonably foreseeable: Given the evidence of his controlling 

relationship with Long, one could conclude that she was likely going 

to heed his instruction, and indeed, she asked DFCS to “cancel the 

report.” It could also be fair to conclude that ending Long’s cooperation with DFCS might well prevent DFCS from finding Higgenbotham and Laura. And although Melancon addressed this particular incident by putting Laura in Long’s care for several days, 

given evidence that Melancon may have known about not only the

bruise and fingernail mark but also earlier incidents of concern, the 

evidence arguably supported a conclusion that more incidents of 

harm to Laura going forward would be a reasonably foreseeable (i.e., 

natural or probable) consequence of his conduct aimed at stopping 

possible action by DFCS.

But the legal-cause inquiry here is not merely whether it was

reasonably foreseeable that Higgenbotham’s abuse of Laura would 

continue if Melancon stopped Long from filing the report about the 
34

bruise and fingernail mark. The question is whether the intervening 

act of Higgenbotham inflicting fatal injuries, including massive head 

trauma on Laura almost two months later was a natural or probable 

consequence of that instruction. And we see no basis in the record 

for that conclusion. We do not deny that it could be “possible, according to occasional experience,” that declining to help authorities investigate allegations of child abuse of this nature could result in the 

authorities not taking some action that conceivably would have prevented some future act of abuse serious enough to cause the child’s 

death. See Bell, 317 Ga. at 523. But nothing in this record indicates 

that such a consequence is “probable, according to ordinary and 

usual experience” as a general matter, or was so in the particular 

circumstances of this case. Id. As the State concedes, there is no argument that Melancon’s instruction “set in motion” Higgenbotham’s 

later, fatal abuse of Laura, or that he reasonably could have expected it as some kind of “response” to his conduct. See Eubanks, 

317 Ga. at 570 (2) (a) (ii) (citing Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) 

(725 SE2d 280) (2012) (defendant proximately caused death where
35

defendant’s brother fatally shot drug dealer); Robinson v. State, 298 

Ga. 455, 456, 458-459 (1) (782 SE2d 657) (2016) (defendant proximately caused death when store owner they were robbing shot and 

killed his accomplice)). Nor can we see how Laura’s death would be

expected to “ensue in the ordinary course of events” from stopping 

Long’s cooperation with the authorities given Melancon’s knowledge 

of, at most, a small number of milder (relative to the massive and 

fatal trauma that caused Laura’s death) incidents of harm in the 

past. The record shows that Long and Melancon were concerned 

about Higgenbotham’s ability to parent and her treatment of Laura, 

but there was no evidence that Higgenbotham had inflicted any potentially fatal injuries before Laura’s death, much less that Melancon knew about any such incidents.11 So although the evidence may 

11 The Court of Appeals reasoned that Melancon “equivocated at trial 

about the extent of the abuse of which he was aware, and the jury was not 

required to credit his testimony that his knowledge of the abuse was limited.” 

Melancon, 368 Ga. App. at 346-347 (1). Even so, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence supported an inference that Melancon 

knew at most that Laura’s grandmother generally warned him not to leave 

Laura alone with Higgenbotham, and that Higgenbotham had force-fed Laura, 

left her in a “hot room” for thirty minutes, and muffled her crying by covering 

her mouth, in addition to the fingernail mark and bruise.
36

have offered a basis for believing that Laura’s later death at Higgenbotham’s hands was a possible consequence of preventing Long 

from cooperating with DFCS, the record does not support a finding

that Laura’s death by violent head trauma “could reasonably have 

been anticipated, apprehended, or foreseen” as the consequence of 

that instruction. See Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 569-570 (2) (a) (ii) (cleaned 

up).

The attenuated nature of the State’s theory of causation also 

informs this conclusion. The State’s theory was that it was reasonably foreseeable to Melancon that when he told Long not to cooperate

with DFCS, (1) Long would comply, (2) DFCS would not be able to 

find Higgenbotham and Laura, and that (3) Higgenbotham would 

ultimately inflict injuries that caused Laura’s death. All else equal, 

legal cause generally will be harder to establish when it turns on

whether it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant what third 

parties would do in response to his conduct — and even more so 

when, like here, the chain of causation involves multiple third parties acting in particular ways over an extended period of time. See 
37

Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 569 (2) (a) (ii) (explaining that in a hypothetical 

case in which someone dies because they tried to flee from an ongoing robbery by climbing from a third-floor balcony to the balcony below, slipped, and then fell thirty feet to the ground, “proximate cause 

would be a closer question” (citing Stafford v. State, 312 Ga. 811 (865 

SE2d 116) (2021) (decided on other grounds)). That is not to say that 

a finding of legal cause is foreclosed merely because a causal chain 

is made up of a series of events that must happen in sequence, or 

includes third parties, but as a matter of logic and probability, such 

attenuated chains of causation typically will be harder to characterize as “natural or probable.” And when the ultimate result becomes 

“too remote” a possibility in such a case — even though the attenuated chain of causation ultimately happened — legal cause stands 

as a limit on legal liability. Bell, 317 Ga. at 523 (quoting Johnson, 

311 Ga. at 593)); See also LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 6.4 (b) (3d ed.).

Just so here.

Finally, the ramifications of the State’s theory of causation 

here warrant mention. Reduced to its simplest form, that theory is 
38

that the defendant caused a child’s death at the hands of another by 

stopping the reporting of an earlier allegation of that other person’s 

act of abuse against that child. If that were a sufficient theory of 

causation as a general matter, any failure to report an allegation of

almost any type of child abuse likely could be prosecuted as seconddegree murder if the child later dies as a result of abuse. OCGA § 

16-5-1 (d) (“A person commits the offense of murder in the second 

degree when, in the commission of cruelty to children in the second 

degree, he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice.”). And there is no particular reason that this theory 

would not transfer to failures to report conduct outside the context 

of child abuse. Such an expansive construction of our murder statute’s causation element strikes us as untenable, especially since our

legislature has enacted a statute that (1) makes reporting of suspected child abuse mandatory for only a subset of people (like doctors, teachers, and police), and (2) makes the failure to report such 

abuse only a misdemeanor. See OCGA §§ 19-7-5 (c) (1), (h). Because 

what “causes” means as it is used in OCGA § 16-5-1 (d) is, at bottom, 
39

a question of statutory construction, and statutory context is an important indicator of meaning, the serious tension (if not conflict) 

with the mandatory reporting statute that this particular theory of 

causation creates is a final reason to reject it here.

For all of these reasons, the evidence here was not sufficient to 

establish that Melancon’s instruction to Long to not cooperate with 

DFCS was a legal cause of Laura’s murder two months later at Higgenbotham’s hands.

4. Conclusion

In sum, the evidence here did not authorize a jury to conclude 

that Melancon telling Long not to “file a report” with DFCS was either a cause in fact or legal cause of Laura’s death. Because both 

cause in fact and legal cause are necessary components of the element of causation under OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), the Court of Appeals 

erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence of causation

based on the theory of causation it reviewed.

That said, our decision today addresses only the theory of causation the Court of Appeals reviewed below, which was one of three 
40

theories the State included in Melancon’s indictment.12 Thus, on remand, the Court of Appeals should apply the framework set forth 

above and consider in the first instance whether the evidence of causation in this case was sufficient under a theory other than the one 

we have rejected here.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.

12 Melancon was charged with second-degree murder and second-degree 

child cruelty (1) “by causing Gerallyn Long to not cooperate with a Division of 

Family and Children Services investigation into the abuse of Laura Higgenbotham”; (2) “by failing to seek adequate and necessary medical attention 

for said child’s injuries”; and (3) “by leaving the child alone with Sadai Higgenbotham knowing that Sadai Higgenbotham was abusive toward the child.”