IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 28 / 04-1893 

Filed May 12, 2006 

CLINTON PHYSICAL THERAPY SERVICES, P.C.,

 Appellant, 

vs. 

JOHN DEERE HEALTH CARE, INC. and 

JOHN DEERE HEALTH PLAN, INC., f/k/a 

HERITAGE NATIONAL HEALTH PLAN, INC., 

Appellees. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Nancy S. 

Tabor, Judge. 

 Appeal from denial of motion for new trial on grounds of 

inconsistent special verdicts. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND 

REMANDED. 

 Peter C. Riley of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for 

appellant. 

 Jeffrey D. Martens of Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, LLP, 

Moline, Illinois, for appellees. 
2 

CADY, Justice.

In this appeal from a judgment entered by the district court 

following a jury verdict in a breach-of-contract action, we must primarily 

consider the parameters within which the district court may resolve and 

correct inconsistencies in a verdict and reform the jury’s answers to 

questions in the verdict in lieu of granting a new trial. We conclude the 

district court erred in failing to grant a new trial in this case. We reverse 

and remand for a new trial on all issues. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings 

Clinton Physical Therapy Services, P.C. (CPT) is an Iowa 

corporation with its principal place of business in Clinton. It also has 

offices in DeWitt and Davenport, Iowa and Morrison and Savanna, 

Illinois. On April 15, 1996, CPT entered into a contract with John Deere 

Health Care, Inc. (John Deere), a health maintenance organization, to be 

a “network provider” of physical therapy services to John Deere plan 

members. The Davenport office was not in existence at the time the 

contract was executed, and the agreement was silent on which of CPT’s 

offices were covered by the agreement. 

 The Davenport office, also called the Plaza office, opened in August 

1997. CPT notified John Deere of the new Davenport office by letter on 

August 11 and indicated it wanted the office to be covered by the 

network-provider contract. John Deere initially paid for services 

provided at the Davenport office, but claimed it did not realize the 

payments were for services performed at the office at the time the 

payments were made. It later took the position that the office was not a 

covered facility under the contract, and denied claims for services 

performed at the Davenport office. 
3 

 John Deere sent CPT letters on April 23 and June 1, 1999 stating 

the Davenport office was not covered by the contract. Nevertheless, CPT 

continued to provide services to John Deere plan members at the 

Davenport office. Ultimately, CPT provided services to approximately 300 

John Deere plan members over 2775 visits at the Davenport office 

without reimbursement from John Deere at the $50-per-visit rate under 

the contract. This amounted to $138,750 in unpaid services up to 

August 2001. Of this amount, $128,200 in services were rendered after 

John Deere notified CPT in writing that services at the Davenport office 

would not be paid. In August 2001, the parties entered into a new 

contract. The new contract contained a specific clause indicating that 

John Deere had discretion to pay for services provided by CPT at a new 

office location. 

 In February 2003, CPT brought a breach-of-contract action against 

John Deere. CPT claimed John Deere breached the 1996 contract by 

refusing to pay for services provided to John Deere plan members at the 

Davenport office. John Deere claimed the Davenport office was not 

covered by the contract. It also claimed that even if it was covered, CPT 

failed to mitigate its damages by continuing to treat John Deere plan 

members at the Davenport office after receiving notice from John Deere 

that the services would not be reimbursed, and not billing the plan 

members for the services.1

 1The failure-to-mitigate-damages issue appears to be based on Restatement 

(Second) of Contracts section 350. Comment b to this section provides: 

As a general rule, a party cannot recover damages for loss that he 

could have avoided by reasonable efforts. Once a party has reason to 

know that performance by the other party will not be forthcoming, he is 

ordinarily expected to stop his own performance to avoid further 

expenditure. . . . The amount of loss that he could reasonably have 

avoided by stopping performance . . . is simply subtracted from the 

amount that would otherwise have been recoverable as damages. 
4 

The case was tried to a jury. At trial, CPT offered the 2001 

contract into evidence as an aid to interpret the 1996 contract. John 

Deere claimed the clause pertaining to new locations in the 2001 

contract was in the nature of a subsequent remedial measure and was 

not relevant. The district court excluded the contract from the evidence. 

The case was submitted to the jury on a verdict form that required the 

jury to answer a series of questions and determine the amount of 

damages in the event a breach of contract was established. The form 

provided: 

We find the following verdict on the questions 

submitted to us: 

Question No. 1: Did the terms of the contract allow 

for the Plaintiff to add its new Plaza or North Scott location 

by providing written notification to Defendants of the 

opening of that office? 

Answer “yes” or “no.” 

ANSWER: _____ 

(If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further 

questions) 

Question No. 2: Did the Plaintiff comply with all the 

terms of the contract that were required unless excused? 

Answer “yes” or “no.” 

ANSWER: _____ 

(If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further 

questions) 

Question No. 3: Did the Defendant breach its 

contract with Plaintiff? 

________________________ 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. b, at 127 (1981). Clinton does not 

challenge the application of this defense, and we do not express an opinion as to 

its applicability. 
5 

ANSWER: _____ 

(If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further 

questions) 

Question No. 4: Did the Plaintiff fail to mitigate its 

damages? 

Answer “yes” or “no.” 

ANSWER: _____ 

 Question No. 5: State the amount of damages 

sustained by the Plaintiff as to each of the following items of 

damages: 

 A. The reasonable value, at the contracted rate, of 

outstanding charges for treatment provided by Plaintiff in its 

Plaza facility to Defendants’ eligible members from 1997 

through July 31, 2001. 

 $ ___________ 

 B. The reasonable value of Plaintiff’s lost profits 

from the loss of referrals of Defendants’ members to its Plaza 

facility from 1997 through July 31, 2001. 

 $ ___________ 

 Question No. 6: State the amount of damages which 

Plaintiff failed to mitigate. 

 $ __________ 

 Question No. 7: State the total amount of 

recoverable damages to the Plaintiff. (The total of the answer 

to Question 6 minus the total of the answer to Question 7).2

 $ __________ 

The parties consented to a sealed verdict, which permitted the jury to be 

discharged after reaching the verdict without reporting its findings in 

open court in the presence of the parties. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.931(3) 

(“When, by consent of the parties and the court, the jury has been 

 2The parenthetical instruction in question 7 contained a mistake and was 

intended to tell the jury the answer to question 7 was the difference of question 5 

(subparts A and B) minus question 6 (not question 6 minus question 7). 
6 

permitted to seal its findings and separates before it is rendered, such 

sealing is equivalent to a rendition and a recording thereof in open court, 

and such jury shall not be polled or permitted to disagree with respect 

thereto.”). 

After a period of deliberations, the jury notified the judge that it 

had reached a verdict. The judge discharged the jury without notifying 

the attorneys for the parties. In response to the first three questions in 

the verdict, the jury found that the network-provider contract did allow 

CPT to add the Davenport office, that CPT complied with all the terms of 

the contract, and that John Deere breached the contract. In response to 

question 4, the jury found that CPT did not fail to mitigate its damages. 

It then found CPT suffered $138,750 in damages in response to question 

5, subpart A. These damages were defined as the reasonable value of the 

service provided to John Deere members at the Davenport office from 

August 1997 through July 2001. However, question 6 required the jury 

to state the amount of damages CPT failed to mitigate. The jury 

answered $128,200. Finally, the jury found the total amount of damages 

CPT could recover was $10,550. The district court entered a judgment 

for $10,550 in favor of CPT. 

 CPT subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. It claimed the 

verdict was inconsistent because the answers showed the jury found it 

did not fail to mitigate damages yet found its damages should be reduced 

by $128,200. It claimed this inconsistency warranted a new trial under 

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(5). CPT also asserted that a new 

trial was warranted because the district court erred in failing to admit 

the 2001 contract into evidence. 

John Deere resisted the motion for new trial. It argued CPT waived 

its right to a new trial by agreeing to a sealed verdict and failing to move 
7 

for resubmission of the case before the jury was discharged. 

Alternatively, John Deere argued the verdict was not so logically 

inconsistent that it could not be harmonized. 

John Deere claimed that a reasonable explanation existed for the 

inconsistent answers based on the changes in the damage figures made 

by the jury on the verdict form. The verdict form revealed the jury 

originally inserted $10,550 for the total amount of damages sustained by 

CPT (value of services provided from 1997 to 2001) in response to 

question 5, subpart A. It also originally inserted zero in response to the 

request in question 6 to state the amount of damages CPT failed to 

mitigate. Thus, up to this point, the verdict answers were not 

inconsistent, and John Deere theorized that the jury had decided that 

CPT’s damages were limited to reimbursement for services it provided 

prior to the time John Deere notified CPT in 1999 that it would not 

provide reimbursement. Question 7 then informed the jury to determine 

the “total amount of recoverable damages” by subtracting the amount of 

damages CPT failed to mitigate from CPT’s total damages (reasonable 

value of services provided from 1997 to 2001). At this point, John Deere 

surmises that the jury understood it needed to show its math by 

subtracting the amount of damages CPT failed to mitigate from the total 

value of the unreimbursed services rendered over the course of the 

contract. John Deere believed the jury went back to questions 5 and 6 to 

show its math, but neglected to return to question 4 to change its answer 

to “yes,” consistent with the procedure required under the instructions to 

reach the recoverable amount of damages. 

The district court determined that CPT did not waive the 

inconsistency issue by failing to object before the jury was discharged. 

However, the court denied the motion for new trial on its merits. The 
8 

court accepted John Deere’s explanation that the jury intended for its 

answers to be consistent. The court then reformed the jury’s answer to 

question 4 (“Did the Plaintiff fail to mitigate its damages?”) to “yes” to 

conform to the remainder of the verdict, and concluded that “[t]he jury’s 

determinations were not inconsistent and the verdict effectuate[d] 

substantial justice between the parties.” 

 CPT appealed. It claimed the district court erred by failing to grant 

a new trial based on the inconsistent answers in the verdict. We 

transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals 

affirmed, reasoning that while the jury’s answers to questions four and 

six were “facially . . . inconsistent,” the jury must have intended to find 

that CPT failed to mitigate its damages because it reduced the total 

damages by $128,200—the amount of damages CPT sustained after 

John Deere’s April 1999 notice that the Davenport office was not covered 

under the contract. It also found the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in failing to admit the 2001 contract into evidence. CPT 

applied for further review, which we granted. 

 II. Standard of Review 

 “ ‘The scope of our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion for 

new trial depends on the grounds raised in the motion.’ ” Richards v. 

Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., 699 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Iowa 2005) (quoting 

Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa 2001)). 

If the motion for a new trial was “ ‘based on a discretionary ground, we 

review it for an abuse of discretion.’ ” Id. (quoting Roling v. Daily, 596 

N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1999)). In contrast, if the motion was “ ‘based on a 

legal question, our review is on error.’ ” Id. (quoting Roling, 596 N.W.2d 

at 76). 
9 

In this case, the underlying ground for the motion for new trial was 

based on a claim of inconsistent answers in the verdict. Generally, the 

trial court has some discretion when faced with inconsistent answers in 

a verdict. See Dutcher v. Lewis, 221 N.W.2d 755, 762 (Iowa 1974) (“The 

trial court has three alternatives where the answers are consistent with 

each other but inconsistent with the general verdict: (1) order judgment 

appropriate to the answers notwithstanding the verdict; (2) order a new 

trial; or (3) send the jury back for further deliberations. Ordinarily, it is 

discretionary with the court as to which of these alternatives to choose.”). 

However, the question whether a verdict is inconsistent so as to give rise 

to the exercise of that discretion is a question of law. See Redmond v. 

Socha, 837 N.E.2d 883, 895 (Ill. 2005) (“[W]hether two verdicts are legally 

inconsistent is a question of law.”); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 

325 (Minn.) (“The question of whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is 

a question of law . . . .” (Citation omitted.)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 

S. Ct. 745, 163 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2005); accord State v. Harris, 983 P.2d 

881, 884 (Mont. 1999); State v. Thompson, 971 P.2d 879, 891 (Or. 1999). 

Therefore, we review the district court’s conclusion as to whether 

answers are inconsistent for correction of errors at law. See Richards, 

699 N.W.2d at 678 (stating when a motion for a new trial “ ‘is based on a 

legal question, our review is on error’ ” (quoting Roling, 596 N.W.2d at 

76)). We generally review the admission of evidence at trial for an abuse 

of discretion. State v. Price, 692 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2005) (citing State v. 

Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa 2003)). 

 III. Verdict 

 We first address the argument by John Deere that CPT waived its 

right to seek a new trial based on inconsistent answers in the verdict by 

consenting to a sealed verdict. When parties agree to a sealed verdict, 
10

they lose their right to have a verdict returned in open court where 

inquiry can be made into its findings. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.931. 

Consequently, it is not possible to use additional deliberations as a 

remedy for an inconsistency in a verdict when a sealed verdict is used in 

a case. However, further deliberation to remedy an inconsistency in the 

verdict is only one available remedy. The other remedies are to grant a 

new trial or attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies. Id. r. 1.934. Thus, 

a sealed verdict may constitute a waiver of the additional-deliberations 

option, but it would not constitute a waiver of other remedies. CPT did 

not waive its right to request a new trial by agreeing to a sealed verdict. 

Thus, we proceed to consider the merits of the claim. 

Jury verdicts in Iowa can be in the form of a general verdict, 

special verdict, or general verdict with special interrogatories. See Iowa 

Rs. Civ. P. 1.932-.934. A general verdict is a verdict in which the jury 

only makes a finding in favor of one party over the other party. See 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1555 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “general verdict” as 

“[a] verdict by which the jury finds in favor of one party or the other, as 

opposed to resolving specific fact questions”). A special verdict consists 

entirely of questions that elicit special written answers to resolve the 

material issues of fact in the case, and the court then enters judgment 

based on the findings made by the jury. Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 

686 N.W.2d 150, 160 (Iowa 2004); see Black’s Law Dictionary 1555 

(defining “special verdict” as “[a] verdict that gives a written finding on 

each issue, leaving the application of law to the judge”); see also

McConnell v. ALCOA, 367 N.W.2d 245, 246 n.1 (Iowa 1985) 

(distinguishing between special verdicts and special interrogatories 

accompanying general verdicts). The answers by the jury become special 

written findings of fact. McConnell, 367 N.W.2d at 246 n.1. No general 
11

verdict is entered by the jury, and the jury does not consider the effect of 

its special findings. See Pexa, 686 N.W.2d at 161 (stating that when 

special verdicts are submitted, “ ‘it is wholly unnecessary and is 

generally improper for the jury to be concerned with the effect of its 

special findings’ ” (quoting Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 

1985))). Instead, the court enters judgment by applying the law to the 

findings. Id. at 160; Black’s Law Dictionary 1555. A special verdict is 

normally used in cases involving complicated legal principles to help 

simplify the resolution of the case and to force the jury to focus on the 

important issues in the case. Poyzer, 360 N.W.2d at 753. 

A general verdict may be supplemented with written interrogatories 

that cover certain issues of fact upon which the verdict is based. Iowa R. 

Civ. P. 1.934. These are called “special interrogatories.” Black’s Law 

Dictionary 825; see also McConnell, 367 N.W.2d at 246 (“In order to avoid 

confusion, a special verdict should not be called an interrogatory.”). Like 

a special verdict, special interrogatories help to focus the jury on the 

important issues in the case that bear upon the general verdict the jury 

must reach. See Willametz v. Guida-Seibert Dairy Co., 254 A.2d 473, 

476 (Conn. 1968) (“The primary purpose of an interrogatory is to elicit a 

determination of material facts and to furnish the means of testing the 

correctness of the verdict rendered.” (Citation omitted.)); Burmac Metal 

Finishing Co. v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2005) (“ ‘The purpose of a special interrogatory is not to instruct the 

jury, but to act as a check on its verdict.’ Specifically, special 

interrogatories are used to test the general verdict against the jury’s 

conclusions as to the ultimate controlling facts.” (Citation omitted.)); 

Freeman v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 635 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ohio 1994) (“The 

purpose of an interrogatory is to ‘test the jury’s thinking in resolving an 
12

ultimate issue so as not to conflict with its verdict.’ ” (Citation omitted.)). 

 Both special verdicts and special interrogatories submitted with a 

general verdict are findings by the jury that the court uses to enter 

judgment—like pieces of a puzzle. In the case of special verdicts, the jury 

merely gives the court the pieces, and the court assembles the puzzle 

and enters judgment. In the case of a general verdict with special 

interrogatories, the jury assembles the puzzle to complete the picture. If 

all the pieces fit together correctly, the court enters judgment. However, 

if the pieces do not fit together correctly, the court can see what went 

wrong and attempt to fix the puzzle instead of starting over again with a 

new jury. Each puzzle piece, or finding, must be supported by the 

evidence presented. Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 

1990). Furthermore, the findings made cannot be internally 

inconsistent. See Dutcher, 221 N.W.2d at 761 (“[W]hen there is an 

irreconcilable conflict between the general verdict and special findings 

the latter must prevail and the general verdict cannot stand.”); 89 C.J.S. 

Trial § 992, at 603 (2001) (stating that when findings in special verdicts 

“are utterly and irreconcilably inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each 

other, they neutralize, nullify, or destroy each other”). 

 Our rules of civil procedure contemplate instances of inconsistent 

findings by the jury, and specifically address conflicts in answers to 

special interrogatories submitted with a general verdict. Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.934. If the interrogatory answers are consistent with each other but 

any answer is inconsistent with the general verdict, then the court has 

three options to consider. Id. It may send the jury back for additional 

deliberations, enter judgment according to the special interrogatory 

answers, or grant a new trial. Id.; accord Berghammer v. Smith, 185 

N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 1971) (noting special interrogatories trump the 
13

general verdict in case of a conflict). However, if the interrogatory 

answers are inconsistent with each other and any is inconsistent with 

the general verdict, the options of the court are narrowed to two. Iowa R. 

Civ. P. 1.934. The court may either send the jury back for additional 

deliberations or grant a new trial. Id. In this instance, the court no 

longer has the option to enter judgment. This option is not available 

because inconsistent answers constitute inconsistent findings that 

cannot support a judgment. See Bangs v. Pioneer Janitorial of Ames, Inc.,

570 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1997) (“If a verdict is internally inconsistent 

. . . , and there is no way to determine the jury’s intent, the proper 

remedy is a new trial.” (citing Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 160; Hoffman v. 

Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc., 442 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1989))); cf. 89 C.J.S. 

Trial § 992, at 603 (stating that when findings in special verdicts “are 

utterly and irreconcilably inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other, 

they neutralize, nullify, or destroy each other”). 

 Although rule 1.933, governing special verdicts, does not 

specifically address the possibility of an internal inconsistency in the 

answers in the special verdict, we recognize that rule 1.934, governing 

special interrogatories supplementing general verdicts, is construed 

together with rule 1.933. See Crookham v. Riley, 584 N.W.2d 258, 269 

(Iowa 1998) (stating the rules are construed in pari materia, meaning 

“taken together as if they were one law, . . . construed together as though 

they constituted one act” (citing Fitzgerald v. State, 220 Iowa 547, 553, 

260 N.W. 681, 683 (1935))). Thus, the rules governing inconsistent 

special interrogatory answers would apply to inconsistent answers in a 

special verdict. Both answers constitute special findings in the case and 

must be internally consistent. If not, the court must either resume 

deliberations or grant a new trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.934. Inconsistent 
14

answers that constitute special findings cannot support a judgment. 

Our prior cases illustrate this rule. Compare Crookham, 584 N.W.2d at 

269 (when answers to special verdict in malpractice action finding lawyer 

negligent were consistent with each other but inconsistent with a general 

verdict for the lawyer on a counterclaim for unpaid fees, trial court had 

discretion to consider all options including entering judgment for client 

on the counterclaim consistent with the answers to the special verdict), 

and Dutcher, 221 N.W.2d at 762 (answers to special interrogatories were 

consistent with each other but one was inconsistent with the general 

verdict; court was within its discretion in ordering new trial in lieu of 

other two options of resubmission or entering judgment), with Bangs, 

570 N.W.2d at 632 (answers to special verdict were inconsistent with 

each other (damage itemization3 awarded $100,000 for past and future 

pain and suffering but $0 for medical expenses); new trial was required 

because there was no way to determine whether jurors denied medical 

expenses because they thought they were paid by a third party or 

whether they compromised on liability by reducing total damages 

awarded), and Guzman v. Des Moines Hotel Partners, Ltd., 489 N.W.2d 7, 

12 (Iowa 1982) (stating the court properly resubmitted the case to the 

jury when answers in special verdict were internally inconsistent in that 

the jury found negligence, but no proximate cause and then proceeded 

further to award damages), and Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 160 (trial court 

abused its discretion in failing to grant new trial where answers in 

special verdict were inconsistent with each other (awarded $21,220 for 

medical expenses but $0 for pain and suffering)), and Shewry v. Heuer, 

255 Iowa 147, 155, 121 N.W.2d 529, 534 (1963) (trial court abused its 

 3Itemizations of damages are treated as special verdicts. Cowan, 461 N.W.2d at 

158. 
15

discretion by failing to order a new trial when special verdicts were 

internally inconsistent (awarded medical expenses but no pain and 

suffering)). But see Berhow v. Kroack, 195 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Iowa 1972) 

(trial court properly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict when 

answers to special interrogatories were internally inconsistent and 

inconsistent with general verdict). 

 The parties maintain that the verdict in this case constituted a 

special verdict, and they dispute how the rules apply to resolve the case. 

While the verdict did not actually require the jury to enter a general 

verdict, it did require the jury to determine the total recoverable damages 

by subtracting the amount of damages CPT failed to mitigate from the 

total damages sustained from the breach of the contract. This is not a 

process normally associated with a special verdict. See Pexa, 686 

N.W.2d at 160 (stating that in a special verdict, “the jury resolves 

pertinent factual issues pursuant to the court’s instructions, and the 

trial court enters the general verdict ‘by applying the applicable law to 

the jury’s factual determinations’ ” (citation omitted; emphasis added)). 

Nevertheless, the rules governing inconsistent answers in a verdict are 

the same. Whether the answers are in response to special interrogatories 

or are answers to a special verdict, if they are inconsistent, then the 

court must either resume deliberations or grant a new trial. Iowa R. Civ. 

P. 1.934; see Crookham, 584 N.W.2d at 269 (stating rules 1.933 and 

1.934 are construed in pari materia). 

 It is fundamental that these principles only apply to inconsistent 

verdicts or inconsistent answers within the verdict. If the answers are 

not inconsistent, the court, of course, is permitted to enter judgment 

consistent with the answers. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.934. Thus, the first step 

in the application of the rule is to determine if an inconsistency exists. 
16

 We have said that a verdict is not inconsistent if it can be 

harmonized in a reasonable manner consistent with the jury instructions 

and the evidence in the case, including fair inferences drawn from the 

evidence. Hoffman, 442 N.W.2d at 126-27. The test recognizes that the 

determination of whether two answers are inconsistent requires the court 

to consider how the jury could have viewed the evidence and how that 

view of the evidence fits into the requirements of the instructions or the 

law applicable to the case. See 66 C.J.S. New Trial § 82, at 172 (1998) 

(“In determining whether findings or answers are inconsistent or 

irreconcilable so as to warrant a new trial, the findings or answers are to 

be construed in light of the surrounding circumstances and in 

connection with the pleadings, instructions and issues submitted.”). 

Ultimately, two answers are not inconsistent if they can be harmonized 

under the evidence and the instructions. See, e.g., Foggia v. Des Moines 

Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Iowa 1996) (jury’s award of 

damages for pain and suffering but no award of damages for medical 

expenses was not inconsistent because the jury could have “found none 

of his medical expenses were caused by the fall at issue”); Brant v. 

Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1995) (jury’s award of “$31,000 

damage for future medical expenses for treatment of facial scarring” and 

no damages for loss of function of the body was not inconsistent because 

“plaintiff presented no evidence of functional impairment due to facial 

scarring,” and the jury could have included the damages on this item 

with the umbrella of future pain and suffering). Thus, the process of 

determining whether answers are inconsistent focuses on the evidence 

and the law, and the court must decide if the two answers at issue can 

be harmonized in light of the evidence and the law. When, under this 

analysis, two answers or findings by the jury would compel the rendition 
17

of different judgments, the answers are inconsistent. 89 C.J.S. Trials

§ 993, at 605-06; see id. § 992, at 604 (“The test to determine if conflict 

between jury questions is irreconcilable is whether one answer would 

establish a cause of action while the other answer would destroy it, or 

whether taking one finding alone a judgment should be entered in favor 

of the plaintiff and taking the other finding alone a judgment should be 

rendered for the defendant.”). 

 This process of determining whether answers are inconsistent by 

attempting to harmonize the answers with the evidence and the law is 

separate from the process of reconciling two answers determined to be 

inconsistent. In this case, for example, there was evidence to either 

support or reject the claim of failure to mitigate damages as instructed 

by the trial court. However, under the instructions, the jury could not 

find that CPT did not fail to mitigate damages and then reduce damages 

based on the failure to mitigate. The two findings by the jury would 

compel different judgments. Thus, the two answers by the jury were 

clearly inconsistent with the instructions. Nevertheless, the district 

court did not proceed to apply the rules governing inconsistencies in a 

verdict, but proceeded to harmonize the inconsistent answers by 

concluding that the jury did not intend to answer “no” to question 4, but 

intended to answer “yes.” In this way, the district court found the 

answers were consistent and entered judgment. However, the district 

court went too far under the guise of harmonizing purportedly 

inconsistent answers and engaged in a process of reconciliation not 

available when two special findings are inconsistent with each other, and 

both are supported by evidence. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.934 (“If the 

answers are inconsistent with each other, . . . the court shall not order 

judgment, but either send the jury back or order a new trial.”). 
18

 A court may reform a verdict by correcting a mistake. Ostrem v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 666 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa 2003). We 

recognize that “verdicts are to be liberally construed to give effect to the 

intention of the jury and to harmonize verdicts if it is possible to do so.” 

Hoffman, 442 N.W.2d at 126 (citations omitted). However, this power is 

very limited and only permits the court to correct mistakes or errors in 

the verdict that are technical or ministerial in nature. Ostrem, 666 

N.W.2d at 546. A judge cannot exercise the power to substitute its 

judgment for the judgment of the jury. Id. 

 In this case, the district court may have uncovered a very logical 

explanation for the inconsistent answers. Yet, this explanation 

necessarily involved some degree of speculation. It involved speculation 

because there was evidence that would have permitted the jury to either 

accept or reject the mitigation-of-damages claim. Verdicts can only be 

reformed when the change “clearly and definitely expresses the jury’s 

intentions.” Id. When two answers in a verdict are both supported by 

substantial evidence but are inconsistent under the instructions, a court 

may not attempt to reconcile the inconsistency and enter a judgment by 

correcting the inconsistency to conform to the intent of the jury because 

the two conflicting views of the evidence would necessarily produce some 

speculation about the intent of the jury. See Ex parte Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 

799 So. 2d 957, 962 (Ala. 2001) (“ ‘Where a jury verdict is the result of 

confusion or is inconsistent in law, the trial court should grant a new 

trial; a new trial is necessary because, once the jury is dismissed, any 

attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in a verdict must be based on 

mere speculation about the jury’s intent.’ ” (quoting City of Bessemer v. 

Foreman, 678 So. 2d 759, 760 (Ala. 1996))). 
19

 The answers in the verdict in this case were internally inconsistent 

as a matter of law. The district court had no power to correct the 

inconsistency in the verdict because there was substantial evidence to 

support both answers. Thus, the court had no power to enter judgment 

following discharge of the jury, but was required (because the jury had 

been discharged) to grant a new trial as a matter of law. It was the only 

remedy available to the court to exercise under the circumstances. 

IV. Evidentiary Ruling 

 Because this case must be remanded for a new trial, we proceed to 

address the disputed evidentiary ruling by the district court because it is 

likely to arise on retrial. See McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 392 

(Iowa 2005) (stating we may consider issues likely to arise on retrial 

(citing McElroy v. State, 637 N.W.2d 488, 501-02 (Iowa 2001); Gacke v. 

Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 184-85 (Iowa 2004); Greenwood v. 

Mitchell, 621 N.W.2d 200, 207-08 (Iowa 2001))). As previously noted, the 

district court excluded evidence of the terms of the 2001 contract 

between John Deere and CPT, ruling it was not relevant to the 

interpretation of the 1996 contract. We must decide whether this was an 

abuse of discretion. See State v. Sinclair, 582 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 

1998) (“This court reviews the trial court's decision on the relevancy of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion.”). 

One issue the jury had to decide in resolving the contract claim in 

this case was whether paragraph 3(c)4 of the 1996 contract applied to 

 4Paragraph 3(c) provided: 

If [CPT] discontinues or adds any service covered by this 

Agreement, [CPT] shall notify [John Deere] prior to discontinuance or 

addition, and the rate set forth in [the ancillary rate structure] shall be 

adjusted by agreement of both parties. [John Deere] shall review, at the 

time of the addition or deletion, the need in the network for the service to 

appropriately handle access. If the need for the addition of the service 
20

services provided at a new location. CPT sought to introduce the 2001 

contract because it contended paragraph 12 of that contract, which 

specifically addressed the situation of opening a new office,5 showed that 

John Deere did not intend paragraph 3(c) of the old contract to cover the 

situation of addition of a new office. Rather, CPT claimed paragraph 3(c) 

only applied to the situation of addition of particular services at existing 

locations. 

Generally, contracts are interpreted based on the language within 

the four corners of the document. See Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 

21 (Iowa 2005) (“It is a fundamental and well-settled rule that when a 

contract is not ambiguous, we must simply interpret it as written.” (citing 

State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Iowa 1999); 

Rogers v. Md. Cas. Co., 252 Iowa 1096, 1098-99, 109 N.W.2d 435, 437 

(1961))). However, when the language is ambiguous, we must engage in 

a process of interpretation to search for “the meanings attached by each 

party at the time the contract was made.” E. Allan Farnsworth, 

Contracts § 7.9, at 458 (3d ed. 1999). To reveal this intent, extrinsic 

evidence is admissible “ ‘when it sheds light on the situation of the 

parties, antecedent negotiations, the attendant circumstances, and the 

objects they were striving to attain.’ ” Dickson v. Hubbell Realty Co., 567 

N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Kroblin v. RDR Motels, Inc., 347 

________________________ 

exists, [CPT] shall comply with [John Deere’s] credentialing requirements 

for that new service. 

5 Paragraph 12 provided: 

[CPT] understands and agrees that if [CPT] opens or enters into 

business in another location, that does not cause automatic inclusion 

into the products listed on [the product participation matrix/fee 

schedule] for services provided at that location. [CPT] must notify [John 

Deere] of the new location and [John Deere] at its sole discretion will 

determine the need of entering into a contractual relationship for the new 

location. 
21

N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1984)). However, the 2001 contract in this case 

does little to shed light on the situation of the parties or any attendant 

circumstances in 1996—the time relevant to the interpretation of the 

governing contract. Id.; see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 346, at 

333-34 (2004) (“The intention, with which the law is concerned in 

construing and giving effect to a contract, is that of the parties at the 

time of entering into the contract, regardless of any events occurring 

afterward, at least if such subsequent events were not reasonably within 

the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.”). A 

specific clause placed in the 2001 contract by the parties concerning new 

offices does not show the intent of the parties in 1996 regarding the 

application of paragraph 3(c) to new offices. Thus, the 2001 contract was 

not relevant to the interpretation of the 1996 contract. It did not make 

either of the competing meanings asserted by the parties more likely or 

less likely than it would be without the evidence. See Iowa R. Evid. 

5.401 (“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 

be without the evidence.”). We find no abuse of discretion in its 

exclusion. 

V. Conclusion 

 We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the 

judgment of the district court, and remand for a new trial. To avoid 

repetition of this resource-wasting result, we repeat out prior admonition 

that “[t]he trial court should not discharge the jury until it determines 

the special verdict is consistent and supported by evidence.” Cowan, 

461 N.W.2d at 160; see also 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1854, at 595 (1992) 
22

(“Ordinarily, when a jury returns inconsistent or incomplete answers to a 

special verdict, it is preferable to send the jury back for further 

deliberation.”). 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.