****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************IN RE ZEN T.* (AC 36083)
Gruendel, Beach and Harper, Js. Argued March 6—officially released March 28, 2014** (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, Gleeson, J.)
Heather S., self-represented, the appellant (respondent mother).
Amor C. Rosario, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, andBenjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Lisabeth B. Mindera, counsel for the minor child.Opinion GRUENDEL, J. The respondent mother, Heather S., appearing as a self-represented party, appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights as to her minor child, Zen T.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that she was denied effective assistance of counsel and was thereby prejudiced. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following relevant factual and procedural history. In March, 2012, the respondent and Cory T. brought the child, who was less than three months old, to the emergency room because his left leg was swollen. An X-ray, CAT scan, and MRI were conducted, which revealed that ‘‘[the child] had sustained at least eight fractures, two additional long bone irregularities

. . . as well as bilateral chronic subdural hematomas, for atotal ofeleveninjuries. These injuries occurred on multiple occasions over a time period of at least three weeks.’’ In addition, ‘‘[a]ll of the injuries resulted from trauma which could not have occurred during the normal handling ofan infant; nor could [the child], who at three months ofage was unable to stand, crawl, or even roll over, have accidently injured himself.’’
The petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, thereafter filed a petition with the court, requesting thatthe parental rights ofthe respondent be terminated. ‘‘The statutory ground alleged in the petition against the respondent motheris thatthe child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance, or control necessary for the child’s physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being, [pursuant to] General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C). The matter was tried to the court

. . . . The respondent mother was present and was represented at trial by counsel.

. . . The petitioner called nine witnesses and introduced twenty exhibits. [The respondent] called nine witnesses, testified in her own behalf and introduced twenty-one exhibits.’’
Afterthe trial concluded, the court held thatthe petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the Department of Children and Families (department) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, as required by § 17a-112 (j) (1); (2) termination was in the best interest of the child, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (2); and (3) with respect to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C), the child’s variousfractures andhematomaswere seriousphysical injuries that were nonaccidental or were otherwise inadequately explained. The court further found that all seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112 (k)2 existed. It then ordered the termination ofthe respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.
The respondent claims that she was denied effective assistance ofcounsel and was prejudiced as a result of this ineffectiveness. She therefore concludes that the
case should be remanded for a new trial. We disagree. ‘‘Ordinarily, we would not review the respondent’s claim because it was not raised at trial, and, therefore, the record is inadequate to review the claim.

. . . The evidence on the face of the record, however, demonstrates that the respondent was not prejudiced by the representationshereceivedattheterminationofparental rights trial. The respondent’s claim, therefore, fails.’’ In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71, 90–91, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).
‘‘In Connecticut, a parent who faces the termination ofhis orherparental rights is entitled, bystatute, to the assistance of counsel.

. . . Because of the substantial interests involved, aparent in atermination ofparental rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to the effective assistance of counsel.

. . . In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 569, 613 A.2d 780 (1992).
‘‘Indeterminingwhethercounselhasbeenineffective in a termination proceeding, we have enunciated the following standard: The range of competence

. . . requires not errorless counsel, and not counseljudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel whose performance is reasonably competent, or within the range of competencedisplayedbylawyerswithordinarytraining and skill in [that particular area of the] law.

. . . The respondent must prove that [counsel’s performance] fell below this standard of competency and also that the lack of competency contributed to the termination of parental rights.

. . . A showing of incompetency without a showing ofresulting prejudice

. . . does not amounttoineffectiveassistanceofcounsel.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn. App. 91. ‘‘In making such a claim, it is the responsibility of the respondent to create an adequate record pointing to the alleged ineffectiveness and any prejudice the respondent claims resulted from that ineffectiveness.’’ In re Christopher C., 129 Conn. App. 55, 59, 20 A.3d 689 (2011). ‘‘Inthe absence offindings bythe trial court inthis regard, we directlyreviewthetrial courtrecord.’’ In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn. App. 15, 36, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926, 64 A.3d 329 (2013).
The respondent claims that her trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he was unprepared to adequatelyanalyzeandchallengethemethodsofevaluation and conclusions drawn by the forensic psychologist who evaluatedthe respondentandtestifiedas anexpert witness at trial;3 (2) he failed to request a continuance to secure reasonable time to prepare the case or ameaningful defense;4 (3) he missed the deadline for disclosure ofevidence;5 (4) he required the respondent to write her own questions when she chose to testify;6 (5) he failed to correct the record of statements she previously made to the department;7 and (6) he wrote inhisbriefthatthe departmentmade reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her.8
In the present case, we need not decide whether the respondent’s counsel provided assistance that fell belowthat oflawyers with ordinarytraining interminationofparentalrights casesbecausetherespondenthas notdemonstratedthathertrialcounsel’srepresentation resulted in prejudice to her. In order to demonstrate prejudice, the respondent has the ‘‘burden of proving that any alleged inadequacy of counsel could have affected the outcome of the termination proceedings.’’ In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 269, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767A.2d 104 (2001).
The respondent does not specify in her brief how any ofthe alleged deficiencies by her counsel resulted in prejudice to her. She makes only conclusory statements, forexample, statingthathercounsel’s deficiencies ‘‘changed the perception ofthe trial courtjudge and ultimately the outcome of the case.’’ Bald assertions such as these are not enough to prove prejudice. The respondent was required to demonstrate that the outcome ofthe case—thejudgmentterminating herparental rights—would have been different had the alleged ineffectiveness ofher counsel not occurred. She failed to dojust that. To the contrary, the record reveals that anyallegedineffectiveness ofhercounsel didnotresult inprejudice because there was overwhelming evidence that supported the court’sjudgment. First, the respondent’s parental rights were terminated on the strength of the petitioner’s case that the child suffered serious physical injuries and that those injuries were not adequately explainedbythe respondent, pursuantto § 17a112 (j) (3) (C). Moreover, as setforthin § 17a-112 (j) (3) (C), ‘‘nonaccidental or inadequately explained serious physical injury to a child shall constitute prima facie evidence of acts of parental commission or omission sufficient for the termination of parental rights.’’ Furthermore, the court ‘‘examined multiple relevant factors [in making its decision] including the child’s interests in physical safety, sustained growth, development, well-being, stabilityandcontinuityofhis environment; his length ofstay in foster care; the nature ofhis relationship with his biological parents; the degree and quality of contact maintained with his biological parents; andhisgeneticbondtotherespondents. The court

. . . also balanced this child’s crucial need for physical safety, emotional stability, validation, consistency and permanencyagainstthepotentialbenefitofmaintaining
a connection with his biological parents.’’ After considering each of these factors, the court determined thatit was in the best interests ofthe child to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. ‘‘Moreover, our Supreme Court has indicated

. . . that the trial judge is a minister ofjustice rather than strictly an umpire in a forensic encounter

. . . . Although as a trial judge must adhere to dictates of impartiality, he or she, nevertheless, has the duty to deter and correct misconduct ofattorneys with respect to their obligations as officers of the court to support the authorityofthe courtandenablethetrialtoproceed with dignity.

. . . Thus, a judge presiding over a proceeding wherein trial counsel had been woefully inadequate would not, consistent with judicial duty sit idly by and permit the client to sufferthe consequences. To besure, thetrialjudgemaybemoreinclinedtovigilance insolemnproceedings, suchasthoseterminatingparental rights, wherein the indigent litigants have obtained court-appointed counsel.

. . . In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 234, 764A.2d739 (2001).’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) In re Dylan C., supra, 126 Conn. App. 92–93. Nowhere in its memorandum of decision or in the transcript ofthe trial did the court give any indication that the respondent was not receiving effective assistance ofcounsel. And, therespondenthasnotidentified where in the record that she alerted the court to her dissatisfaction with counsel. See id.
After reviewing the respondent’s claim ofineffective assistance of counsel and resultant prejudice, we conclude that the respondent did not meet her burden of demonstrating that any alleged inadequacy of counsel prejudiced her in a way that affected the outcome of the terminationproceeding. SeeInreMariahS., supra, 61 Conn. App. 269. In light of the foregoing reasons, the respondent’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

** March28, 2014, thedatethatthisdecisionwasreleasedasaslip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 The respondent father, Cory T., tendered a signed written consent to terminate his parental rights to the court. The court thereafter canvassed the father and found that his consent was knowing, voluntary, and with a full understanding ofall the consequences. It then accepted his consent and terminated CoryT.’sparental rightsto the child. CoryT. is not apartyto this appeal. Accordingly, we referinthis opinionto HeatherS. asthe respondent.

2 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k)providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘[I]ndetermining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion ofthe child with the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended; (3) the terms ofany applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual oragency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age ofthe child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future

. . . and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.’’

3 The psychologist’s ‘‘report indicate[d] that although [the respondent] did not show signs of mental illness, [she] showed indications of substantial psychological problems, which would prevent her from safely caring for an infant.’’ The respondent claims that she ‘‘did not have any unresolved and significantpsychological issues and ifthose issues did not actuallypreclude the possibility ofher safe reunification with [the child], then [she] has been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to adequately prepare for or challenge the psychologist’s testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

4 Since her counsel did not request a continuance, the respondent claims that he did not adequately prepare for trial and that she was therefore deprived of a meaningful defense of psychological fitness, a defense she claims ‘‘could have been a solid defense if it was diligently pursued.’’

5 The respondent claims that she was prejudiced when her trial counsel missed the deadline to disclose evidence, stating that ‘‘several powerful pieces of evidence were never brought to light that would surely have changed the perception ofthe trial courtjudge and ultimately the outcome of the case.’’ She states that this evidence included a calendar of ‘‘many things in orderto watch [the child] and his diagnosed colic and acid reflux,’’ which would have ‘‘disproven certain allegations by the paternal grandparents and

. . . given more credibility

. . . to the [respondent’s] belief of mental abuse by the paternal grandmother

. . . .’’

6 She claims prejudice in this instance because her trial counsel insisted that she write her own questions if she chose to testify. The respondent states that this action ‘‘left an impression on the court of not having the proper respect for his client’’ and forced her to be her own trial counsel at

a crucial time in the trial ‘‘knowing that she had a criminal case of neglect pending where all things in these proceedings could be used against her in criminal court.’’

7 The respondent claims that when her counsel failed to correct her statements, she was unable to give her side of the story.
8 The respondent asserts on appeal that she believed that her case was mismanaged because of ‘‘altered forms, misleading notes and accepting bias[ed] statements without lending the [respondent] the opportunity to shareherside ofthe story.’’ Therespondent, however, hasfailedto challenge any of the trial court’s findings regarding the reasonableness ofthe department’s efforts, and therefore this specific instance of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim is moot. See In re Alison M., 127 Conn. App. 197, 205–206, 15 A.3d 194 (2011) (review of respondent’s challenge to finding that she was unable to benefitfromreunification serviceswas mootbecause she failedto challenge trial court’s findingthat departmentmade reasonable efforts to reunify her with children). As our Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting ofactual reliefor from the determination ofwhich

no practical reliefcan follow.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 556, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).