IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA23-238

Filed 3 September 2024

Harnett County, No. 22 CRS 616

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

GREGORY HAHN, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from order entered 10 October 2022 by Judge C. Winston 

Gilchrist in Harnett County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 August 

2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Michael T. 

Henry, for the State.

Dobson Law Firm, PLLC, by Miranda Dues, for the defendant-appellant.

STADING, Judge.

Defendant Gregory Hahn appeals from the trial court’s order finding him in 

criminal contempt. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court’s order. 

I. Background

In March 2020, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court entered 

an emergency order to address public health concerns over COVID-19. See Order of 

the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 1 to 2 (13 March 2020). Thereafter, 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

2

additional emergency directives (“the emergency directives”) were ordered by the 

Chief Justice for county courthouses, among them Emergency Directive 21, 

addressing the use of face coverings, and Emergency Directive 22, requiring a plan 

for the resumption of jury trials. See Order of the Chief Justice Issuing Emergency 

Directives 21 to 22 (16 July 2020). On 14 May 2021, the emergency directive “that 

pertains to face coverings in court facilities” was modified, and “that decision [was 

left] to the informed discretion of local court officials.” Order of the Chief Justice 

Modifying Emergency Directive 21 (14 May 2021). The next month, the Chief Justice 

revoked all outstanding emergency directives. See Order of the Chief Justice 

Revocation of Emergency Directives (21 June 2021). 

Citing the authority provided by the emergency directives, the Senior Resident 

Superior Court Judge of Superior Court District 11A (the “Senior Resident Superior 

Court Judge, trial court, or judge”) entered an order mandating the use of face masks 

on 25 June 2020. Additionally, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge approved 

a plan to resume jury trials stating that “[p]otential jurors will be notified before 

reaching the courthouse of the rules regarding social distancing and of other 

requirements and steps being taken for the protection of their health and that of 

courthouse personnel and trial participants.” Claiming consistency with “the most 

recent recommendations of the Chief Justice,” on 10 March 2022, the Senior Resident 

Superior Court Judge, entered a “Joint Order on Masks” (“the local emergency order”) 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

3

without an expiration date, that decreed:

1. Masks are optional in hallways, foyers, restrooms, meeting 

rooms and similar areas. Masks are encouraged for 

unvaccinated persons.

2. The presiding judge in each courtroom may decide, in their 

discretion, whether masks are required in their courtroom.

3. The ranking official is [sic] each courthouse agency (e.g., 

Clerk of Court, District Attorney, Guardian Ad Litem) 

shall determine, in their discretion, whether masks are 

required in their respective offices.

4. Any person who so chooses shall be permitted to wear a 

mask.

5. This order is subject to revision based on changing public 

health conditions and CDC guidance.

On 10 October 2022, as required by summons, Defendant reported for jury duty 

at the Harnett County Courthouse. He was directed to the jury assembly room along 

with other potential jurors to await orientation. While in this room, a courthouse 

employee asked Defendant to wear a mask, which he declined. The trial court was 

informed that Defendant would not wear a mask in the jury assembly room. After 

that, Defendant was removed from the jury assembly room during juror orientation 

and taken upstairs to a courtroom.

Once in the courtroom, the judge told Defendant that “it’s a requirement [to 

wear a mask] in this courtroom where you’re going to be a potential juror, and it’s a 

requirement while you’re seated with the other potential jurors downstairs in the jury 

assembly room.” Defendant responded, “with all due respect, I will not be wearing a 

mask, sir.” The judge informed Defendant, “if you decline to wear a mask, it’s 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

4

contempt of court, which is punishable by up to thirty days in the Harnett County jail 

or a 500 dollar fine.” To which, Defendant replied, “yes sir.” Then, the judge charged 

Defendant with direct criminal contempt of court and asked if he had anything to say. 

Defendant responded, “no, sir.” The judge found Defendant in direct criminal 

contempt of court and summarily punished him by imposing a twenty-four-hour jail 

sentence.

On a standardized form provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts 

(“the contempt order”), the judge entered a finding of fact that Defendant “REFUSED 

TO WEAR A MASK AFTER BEING ORDERED TO DO SO [THREE] TIMES.” The 

form’s prepopulated text listed as additional findings that “during the proceeding 

[Defendant] willfully behaved in a contemptuous manner” and his “conduct 

interrupted the proceedings of the court and impaired the respect due its authority.” 

Based on the findings in the contempt order, the judge concluded that Defendant was 

“in contempt of court.” Subsequently, Defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of 

certiorari, which was granted on 23 January 2023.

II. Jurisdiction

Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 5A-17 and 7A-27(b)(1), this Court has jurisdiction to 

hear Defendant’s appeal of his contempt conviction. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 5A-17(a) 

(2023) (“A person found in criminal contempt may appeal . . . .”); id. 7A-27(b)(1) 

(“[A]ppeal lies of right . . . [f]rom any final judgment of a superior court . . . .”). 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

5

III. Analysis

The ability of a judge to maintain order is a necessary function underlying the 

administration of justice. And when appropriate, direct criminal contempt is a proper 

mechanism to facilitate order. Contempt of court is a well-established principle of 

our jurisprudence:

[I]t is a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England and of this 

country, never supposed to be in conflict with the liberty of the citizen,

that for direct contempts committed in the face of the court . . . the 

offender may, in its discretion, be instantly apprehended and 

immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without other proof 

than its actual knowledge of what occurred; and that, according to an 

unbroken chain of authorities, reaching back to the earliest times, such 

power, although arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely 

essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their 

functions. 

Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S. Ct. 77, 83 (1888). 

Inherent in this power is the ability of an entrusted public servant—the 

judge—to assess a criminal conviction to a citizen’s record without the full gambit of 

protections provided by due process. The United States Supreme Court has explained

this narrowly limited exception to due process requirements includes only: 

[C]harges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of 

the judge, which disturbs the court’s business, where all of 

the essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye 

of the court, are actually observed by the court, and where 

immediate punishment is essential to prevent 

“demoralization of the court’s authority” before the public. 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

6

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S. Ct. 499, 509 (1948). As such, it is incumbent 

upon judicial authorities exercising this power to use judicial restraint and act with 

well-reasoned discernment. See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555, 92 S. Ct. 659, 660 

(1972) (“Trial courts . . . must be on guard against confusing offenses to their 

sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.”) (alteration in 

original). Safeguards are apparent in our criminal contempt statutes. See In re 

Oldham, 89 N.C. 23, 25 (1883) (“While the essential judicial functions 

are . . . protected . . . from legislative encroachment, it is equally manifest that 

subordinate thereto, the law-making power may designate the cases in which the 

power to summarily punish for a contempt shall be exercised; may prescribe its 

nature and extent, and prohibit in others.”). In conducting our review, we remain 

mindful of the competing interests vital to our system of justice and are guided by the 

relevant statutory and precedential authority. 

Criminal contempt can be imposed for those grounds enumerated in N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 5A-11 (2023). See In re Odum, 133 N.C. 250, 252, 45 S.E. 569, 570 (1903). For 

a judicial official to find direct criminal contempt, the contemptuous act must be 

committed within their sight or hearing or in immediate proximity to the room where

proceedings are being held that is likely to interrupt or interfere with matters then 

before the court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13(a) (2023); see Nakell v. Att’y Gen., 15 F.3d 

319, 323 (4th Cir. 1994). In response to direct criminal contempt, the presiding 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

7

judicial official may summarily impose punishment “when necessary to restore order 

or maintain dignity and authority of the court and when the measures are imposed 

substantially contemporaneously with the contempt.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14(a) 

(2023). 

“[O]ur standard of review for contempt cases is whether there is competent 

evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings support 

the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.” State v. Wendorf, 274 N.C. App. 480, 

483, 852 S.E.2d 898, 902 (2020). “The trial court’s conclusions of law drawn from the 

findings of fact are reviewable de novo.” Id. Furthermore, “[a]s a contemnor is liable 

to be imprisoned the rule that a criminal statute should be strictly construed is 

applicable.” West v. West, 199 N.C. 12, 15, 153 S.E. 600, 602 (1930).

A. Contemptuous Act

Defendant asserts that the trial court’s findings of fact do not support its 

conclusion of law that his actions amounted to a contemptuous act. The trial court 

based its order on two sections of the criminal contempt statute: “(1) Willful behavior 

committed during the sitting of a court and directly tending to interrupt its 

proceedings” and “(2) [w]illful behavior committed during the sitting of a court in its 

immediate view and presence and directly tending to impair the respect due its 

authority.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 5A-11(a)(1), (2).
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

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The North Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized that interruptions of 

court proceedings include “all cases of disorderly conduct, breaches of the peace, noise, 

or other disturbance near enough and designed and reasonably calculated to 

interrupt the proceedings of a court then engaged in the administration of the State’s 

justice and the dispatch of business presently before it.” State v. Little, 175 N.C. 743, 

745, 94 S.E. 680, 680 (1917). More recently, this Court affirmed a finding of contempt 

when a “[d]efendant was inaudibly speaking throughout the trial, facing the witness 

stand, and made a hand gesture in the form of a gun while the witness was testifying, 

causing the interruption.” State v. Baker, 260 N.C. App. 237, 242, 817 S.E.2d 907, 

910 (2018). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit similarly 

upheld a contempt conviction when the contemnor interrupted ongoing proceedings 

by “refusing to sit down when ordered to do so, refusing to be quiet, being disruptive 

of the proceedings, unduly prolonging the proceedings, pandering to the audience and 

encouraging [the] defendant [in the underlying case] to be disruptive.” Nakell, 15 

F.3d at 321-22. This Court’s precedents also recognize that “[o]ur trial court judges 

must be allowed to maintain order, respect and proper function in their courtrooms” 

because “[c]ourtroom decorum and function depends upon the respect shown by its 

officers and those in attendance.” State v. Randell, 152 N.C. App. 469, 473, 567 

S.E.2d 814, 817 (2002) (holding refusal to stand for adjournment of court or answer 

the judge’s questions are contemptuous actions).
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

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The present matter vastly differs from the cases cited by the State or 

referenced above. The record shows that the actions of Defendant—who was 

reporting for jury service—neither interrupted the trial court’s proceedings nor 

impaired the respect due its authority. Defendant was not a participant in ongoing 

proceedings in a courtroom. Rather, he reported to the courthouse to perform his 

civic duty as a potential juror. Before Defendant’s presence was required in the 

courtroom for jury service, the judge summoned Defendant from the jury assembly 

room to his courtroom. Defendant complied with this direction. Upon entering the 

courtroom, Defendant’s act of not wearing a mask did not disrupt the trial court’s 

proceedings. Even so, the judge ceased ongoing business in the courtroom upon 

learning that Defendant “declined to wear a mask” in another room on a separate 

floor of the courthouse. In response to the inquiries posed by the judge to Defendant, 

he replied “yes, sir” or “no sir.” Throughout their exchange, Defendant was respectful 

to the trial court. After the judge’s admonishment to Defendant that “I’ve ordered 

you to do something” and “it appears that you have refused to do it,” he was found in 

criminal contempt. Contrary to the State’s argument, we see no parallel between 

Defendant’s actions in this matter and the actions of the contemnors in their 

referenced cases. We hold that Defendant’s refusal to wear a face mask was not a 

contemptuous act. Thus, the trial court’s finding that Defendant “behaved in a 

contemptuous manner” is not supported by competent evidence, and, in turn, does 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

10

not support its conclusion of law. See Wendorf, 274 N.C. App. at 483, 852 S.E.2d at 

902. 

B. Lawful Order

The text of the trial court’s order reflects that its ruling is based on N.C. Gen. 

Stat. §§ 5A-11(a)(1) and (2). Even so, the State argues for the applicability of N.C. 

Gen. Stat. §§ 5A-11(a)(3) or (7), reasoning that Defendant was in contempt for 

“[w]illful disobedience of . . . a court’s lawful process, order, directive, or instruction” 

or “[w]illful . . . failure to comply with schedules and practices of the court resulting 

in substantial interference with the business of the court.” To resolve any doubt as 

to which subsection of the statute applies, we next consider whether Defendant was 

in contempt for willful disobedience of the trial court’s lawful process, order, directive, 

or instruction pursuant to a valid local emergency order. Citing the rescinded 14 May 

2021 emergency directive that deferred to the “discretion of local court officials,” as 

well as the 10 March 2022 local emergency order mandating the use of face masks, 

the State maintains that “aside from . . . inherent authority to govern courtroom 

decorum,” the trial court “possessed express discretionary authority to require 

masks.” Order of the Chief Justice Modifying Emergency Directive 21 (14 May 2021). 

The local emergency order was created under the authority provided by the 

emergency directives and purported to be “consistent with . . . the most recent 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

11

recommendations of the Chief Justice.” By statute, the Chief Justice of the North 

Carolina Supreme Court is explicitly permitted to:

Issue any emergency directives that, notwithstanding any 

other provision of law, are necessary to ensure the 

continuing operation of essential trial or appellate court 

functions, including the designation or assignment of 

judicial officials who may be authorized to act in the 

general or specific matters stated in the emergency order, 

and the designation of the county or counties and specific 

locations within the State where such matters may be 

heard, conducted, or otherwise transacted. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-39(b)(2) (2023). Beginning on 13 March 2020, citing this statute, 

emergency directives were issued by the Chief Justice. Order of the Chief Justice 

Emergency Directives 1 to 2 (13 March 2020). However, even emergency directives 

issued under this statutory authority “shall expire the sooner of the date stated in 

the order, or 30 days from issuance of the order, but [ ] may be extended in whole or 

in part by the Chief Justice for additional 30-day periods if the Chief Justice 

determines that the directives remain necessary.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-39(b)(2). In 

any event, on 21 June 2021, the Chief Justice revoked all previously issued 

emergency directives. Order of the Chief Justice Revocation of Emergency Directives 

(21 June 2021). This included the emergency directive deferring to the discretion of 

local court officials to address face coverings in court facilities. Order of the Chief 

Justice Modifying Emergency Directive 21 (14 May 2021). 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

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The authority underlying the local emergency order at issue was revoked. 

Particularly troubling, unlike the emergency directives issued by the Chief Justice 

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-39(b)(2), the local emergency order contained no 

corresponding expiration date. If orders issued by the Chief Justice, necessitated by 

emergency, expire on the earlier event of a stated expiration date or thirty-day time 

limitation, then any such orders derived from this authority cannot exceed the same 

temporal restrictions provided by the General Assembly. Our review of the State’s 

argument on these statutory grounds leads us to conclude that this particular 

administrative order was invalid. Citing Walker v. Birmingham, which affirmed a 

lower court’s holding protestors in contempt for violating an injunction subsequently 

declared invalid, the State maintains that Defendant’s actions were unlawful 

regardless of the local emergency order’s validity. 388 U.S. 307, 320-21, 87 S. Ct. 

1824, 1832 (1967). While this argument ignores the United States Supreme Court’s 

clarification that “this is not a case where the injunction was transparently invalid 

or had only a frivolous pretense to validity,” we nevertheless proceed to evaluate the

willfulness of Defendant’s actions. Id. at 315, 87 S. Ct. at 1829.

C. Willfulness

No matter the basis, to be found guilty of criminal contempt, “an individual 

must act willfully or with gross negligence.” State v. Okwara, 223 N.C. App. 166, 170, 

733 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2012). With contempt proceedings, for an act to be willful, “it 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

13

must be done deliberately and purposefully in violation of law, and without authority, 

justification or excuse.” State v. Chriscoe, 85 N.C. App. 155, 158, 354 S.E.2d 289, 291 

(1987). Willfulness “has also been defined as more than deliberation or conscious 

choice; it also imports a bad faith disregard for authority and the law.” State v. Phair, 

193 N.C. App. 591, 594, 668 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2008) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Gross negligence “implies recklessness or carelessness that shows 

a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the rights of 

others.” Chriscoe, 85 N.C. App. at 158, 354 S.E.2d at 291 (citation omitted). Without 

findings “that [the defendant] had knowledge that court was in session or that he had 

knowledge his conduct was interfering with the regular conduct of business at a court 

session,” there is not support for the conclusion that such conduct constitutes a willful 

interference with the orderly functioning of a session of court. In re Hennis, 276 N.C. 

571, 573, 173 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1970).

Here, a misapplication of the local emergency order served as the impetus of 

the conflict. The text of the local emergency order plainly states that “[m]asks are 

optional in hallways, foyers, restrooms, meeting rooms and similar areas.” Defendant 

had not violated the text of the local emergency order when confronted by an 

employee of the courthouse—not the judge, and he was in the jury assembly room—

not the judge’s courtroom. Even so, the judge compelled Defendant to enter the 

courtroom on another floor of the courthouse because the judge believed “it’s a 
STATE V. HAHN

Opinion of the Court

14

requirement [to wear a mask] while . . . in the jury assembly room.” The judge also 

informed Defendant of the same requirement in his courtroom where Defendant was 

“going to be a potential juror.” But the record is clear that Defendant had not yet 

been called to the courtroom for this reason. Instead, he was preemptively summoned 

before the judge to address the incorrect belief that mask-wearing was required in 

the jury assembly room as well as perceived future noncompliance in his courtroom. 

There are no findings, nor evidence in the record sufficient to support findings, that 

Defendant could have known his discussion with the courthouse employee in the jury 

assembly room might directly interrupt proceedings or interfere with the court’s order 

or business. See id. In the absence of these findings, there is no support for the 

conclusion that Defendant’s conduct amounted to willful interference with the orderly 

functioning of a court session. See id. Accordingly, our review of the State’s argument 

shows that Defendant did not willfully fail to comply with any of the asserted 

statutory grounds for criminal contempt. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and order 

finding Defendant in direct criminal contempt of court.

REVERSED.

Judge WOOD concurs.

Judge GRIFFIN concurs in the result by separate opinion.
No. COA23-238 – State v. Hahn

GRIFFIN, Judge, concurring in result.

Mr. Hahn appeals from a trial court order finding him in contempt of court. 

The majority holds the State failed to show that Mr. Hahn willfully failed to comply 

with any of the asserted statutory grounds for criminal contempt. I agree with the 

result. However, I would hold the trial court’s findings fail to support the conclusion 

that Mr. Hahn’s act was “likely to interrupt or interfere with matters then before the 

court[,]” as necessary to support a direct criminal contempt action. See N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 5A-13 (2021).

On 10 October 2022, Mr. Hahn appeared at the Harnett County Courthouse in 

response to a summons for jury duty. He was not provided prior notice of the court’s 

COVID-19 guidelines. There were no signs or publications posted directing him to 

wear a mask upon arrival at the courthouse. Mr. Hahn assembled with other 

potential jurors, both masked and unmasked, before being singled out by a clerk for 

not wearing a mask. Mr. Hahn declined to wear one when asked by a clerk. Judge 

Gilchrist summoned Mr. Hahn into his courtroom, interrupting an on-going 

proceeding, to examine him about wearing a mask. Mr. Hahn respectfully answered 

every question Judge Gilchrist presented to him. In fact, Mr. Hahn bookended his 

answers with “Sir.” However, Mr. Hahn would not put on a mask as requested. Judge 

Gilchrist held him in direct criminal contempt and sentenced Mr. Hahn to twenty-
STATE V. HAHN

GRIFFIN, J., concurring

- 2 -

four hours in jail. After sentencing but prior to being taken into custody, Mr. Hahn 

asked whether he would have the ability to contact his minor children. The trial 

judge stated he did not know about that. Notably, Mr. Hahn alleges Judge Gilchrist 

was not wearing a mask during the proceedings.

We review a criminal contempt order to determine ‘“whether there is 

competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the 

findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.’” State v. Wendorf, 

274 N.C. App. 480, 483, 852 S.E.2d 898, 902 (2020) (quoting State v. Phair, 193 N.C. 

App. 591, 593, 668 S.E.2d 110, 111 (2008)). “Findings of fact are binding on appeal if 

there is competent evidence to support them, even if there is evidence to the 

contrary.” State v. Robinson, 281 N.C. App. 614, 619, 868 S.E.2d 703, 708 (2022) 

(citation and internal marks omitted). 

Section 5A-11 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides an exhaustive 

list of acts constituting criminal contempt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-11 (2023). Direct 

criminal contempt occurs when an “act [enumerated in section 5A-11]: (1) [i]s 

committed within the sight or hearing of a presiding judicial official; and (2) [i]s 

committed in, or in immediate proximity to, the room where proceedings are being 

held before the court; and (3) [i]s likely to interrupt or interfere with matters then 

before the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13 (2023). “Criminal contempt is generally 

applied where the judgment is in punishment of an act already accomplished, tending 

to interfere with the administration of justice.” State v. Simon, 185 N.C. App. 247, 
STATE V. HAHN

GRIFFIN, J., concurring

- 3 -

251, 648 S.E.2d 853, 855 (2007) (citation and internal marks omitted). While mindful 

that a trial court judge’s ability to maintain order in their court room is paramount 

to the efficient administration of justice, see State v. Randell, 152 N.C. App. 469, 473, 

567 S.E.2d 814, 817 (2002) (“Our trial court judges must be allowed to maintain order, 

respect and proper function in their courtrooms.”), their discretion is not unfettered. 

Rather, “the law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be 

sensitive to the winds of public opinion . . . [t]rial courts . . . must be on guard against 

confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of 

justice.” In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (citations and internal marks omitted).

Here, the facts do not support a finding that Mr. Hahn’s act was “likely to 

interrupt or interfere with matters then before the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-13 

(2023). For one, Mr. Hahn was not involved in any proceeding before the court when 

first admonished for failing to wear a mask. Rather, Mr. Hahn was present in an 

“assembly room” for potential jurors which could reasonably be construed to be a 

meeting room where masks were optional per the 10 March 2022 order. Moreover, 

Mr. Hahn’s failure to wear a mask was unlikely to interrupt or interfere with any 

court business. The record fails to show evidence that Mr. Hahn took any affirmative 

action to impede a court proceeding. Instead, the record reflects that Judge Gilchrist 

stopped the proceedings in his courtroom to address Mr. Hahn. Simply put, the facts 

presented here reflect an offense to sensibilities, not an “obstruction to the 

administration of justice.” In re Little, 404 U.S. at 555 (citation and internal marks 
STATE V. HAHN

GRIFFIN, J., concurring

- 4 -

omitted).

I would hold these facts alone do not support the conclusion that Mr. Hahn 

interfered with the administration of justice.