1 – OPINION AND ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ANITA MARIA PARKER,

Plaintiff, Civ. No. 3:15-cv-01002-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration,

Defendant.

_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:

Plaintiff Anita Parker brings this action for judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for Title II 

Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons set forth 

below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed.

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2 – OPINION AND ORDER

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2011, plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance Benefits. Tr. 158-61. Her 

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 111-16. On December 10, 2013, a 

hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), wherein plaintiff was 

represented by counsel and testified, as did a vocational expert (“VE”). Tr. 35-72. On January 

10, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 

Tr. 13-30. After the Appeals Council denied her request for review, plaintiff filed a complaint in 

this Court.1Tr. 1-5.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Born on May 25, 1958, plaintiff was 52 years old on the alleged onset date of disability 

and 55 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 41, 158. Plaintiff obtained a four-year college 

degree, majoring in criminal justice and minoring in psychology. Tr. 42, 176. She worked 

previously for the State of Oregon in the Child Protective Services department. Id. Plaintiff 

alleges disability as of June 21, 2010, due to depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia, degenerative disk 

disease, and chronic right arm pain. Tr. 175.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

 

1 Error! Main Document Only.The record before the Court constitutes over 600 pages, but with 

multiple incidences of duplication. Where evidence occurs in the record more than once, the 

Court will generally cite to the transcript pages on which that information first appears.

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3 – OPINION AND ORDER

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). The court must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 

[Commissioner’s] conclusions.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner’s interpretation is 

rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. 

Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must 

demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The Commissioner has established a five step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, 

the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled.

At step two, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant has a “medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, she is not disabled.

At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairments, either 

singly or in combination, meet or equal “one of a number of listed impairments that the 

[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.” Yuckert, 

482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the claimant is presumptively disabled; if 

not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.

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4 – OPINION AND ORDER

At step four, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant can still perform “past 

relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can work, she is not disabled; if she 

cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. At step five, the 

Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work existing in significant 

numbers in the national or local economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). 

If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566.

THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

At step one of the five step sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ found 

that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Tr. 15. 

At step two, the ALJ determined plaintiff had the following medically determinable, severe 

impairments: cervical spine degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, somatoform disorder, and 

osteoarthritis. Id. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in 

combination, did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 21. 

Because she did not establish presumptive disability at step three, the ALJ continued to 

evaluate how plaintiff’s impairments affected her ability to work. The ALJ resolved that plaintiff 

had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, except that:

She can lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds 

frequently with both upper extremities or with the left upper extremity alone. 

With the right upper extremity alone [she] can occasionally lift or carry articles 

like docket files, ledgers and small tools. She can stand and/or walk [or sit] for 

about six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks . . . She can 

occasionally reach overhead (shoulder level and above) [or push and pull hand 

controls] with the right upper extremity. [She] can frequently [handle and finger 

or] reach below shoulder level with the right upper extremity . . . She should not 

crawl or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. [She] should avoid extreme heat, 

extreme cold, vibrations and hazards. She can carry out simple and detailed 

instructions. 

Tr. 21.

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5 – OPINION AND ORDER

At step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a 

social worker. Tr. 29. In the alternative, the ALJ found that, based on the VE’s testimony, there 

were a significant number of jobs in the national and local economy that plaintiff could perform 

despite her impairments, such as appointment setter and receptionist.2Tr. 30.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding her not fully credible; and (2) rejecting 

opinion evidence from James Heder, M.D., and Scott Bean, M.D.

I. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ wrongfully discredited her subjective symptom testimony 

concerning the severity of her impairments. When a claimant has medically documented 

impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms 

complained of, and the record contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can 

reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of . . . symptoms only by offering specific, 

clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citation omitted). A general assertion that the claimant is not credible is insufficient; the 

ALJ must “state which . . . testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints 

are not credible.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered 

must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not 

arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 

1995) (internal citation omitted). If the “ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial 

 

2

The representative occupations identified by the VE based on the ALJ’s dispositive 

hypothetical question were significantly less exertionally demanding than plaintiff’s RFC. See

Tr. 65-69 (VE testifying that such “office type jobs” typically rarely involve standing or walking, 

overhead reaching, or the need to lift or carry more than five pounds). 

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6 – OPINION AND ORDER

evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 

F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she is primarily unable to work due to right arm 

pain. Tr. 51-56. While she endorsed symptoms from her other conditions, which had persisted 

for several years, plaintiff explained that “the thing that led [her] to stop working was [her] arm.” 

Tr. 56. When asked to describe a typical day, plaintiff responded that she does “very little.” Tr. 

45; see also Tr. 55 (“I don’t do anything”). When prompted by the ALJ to recount “what [she] 

actually do[es],” plaintiff stated: “I lay down on my bed. I am watching TV for something to do. 

I read. I take care of myself as best I can.” Tr. 45. She denied doing anything for enjoyment and 

stated that she did not provide any care to her elderly mother, with whom she lives. See Tr. 44-46

(plaintiff clarifying that, while she had earnings from the State of Oregon for serving as a 

caregiver to her mother, she actually paid others to do the work and never furnished any “care for 

her other than [being] present”). 

After summarizing her hearing testimony, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptoms, 

but her statements regarding the extent of these symptoms were not fully credible due to her 

inconsistent statements, activities of daily living, ability to work for several years despite her 

longstanding impairments, tendency to exaggerate, and the lack of corroborating medical 

evidence. Tr. 22-25.

Specifically, the ALJ impugned plaintiff’s credibility because of contradictory reports in 

the record regarding when and why she became unable to work. Tr. 23. An ALJ may discredit a 

plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony if she has given prior inconsistent statements or has 

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7 – OPINION AND ORDER

testified in ways that appear to be less than candid. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion in the case at bar.

In July 2010, plaintiff reported to her rheumatologist, Anna Macasa, M.D., that “[s]he 

started experiencing right arm pain two years ago, related to repeated motion at work, but no 

direct trauma.” Tr. 558. However, later that same month, plaintiff communicated to Ezra Rabie, 

M.D., the Workers’ Compensation doctor performing an independent medical exam, that she 

“started developing [right arm] pain in mid-June [and] had two weeks of right arm pain without 

any discreet event precipitating the pain.” Tr. 520. She described to Dr. Rabie her workplace 

conditions as follows: 

she adjusts [her keyboard] about two to three times per day – once when she 

arrives (pulling it out from under the desk), maybe once during the shift (minor 

personal adjustment) and once again at the end of the shift (tucking it back under 

the desk). Adjustment time takes about 10 to 15 seconds. It is an under-the-desk 

keyboard with a tray knob that has to be turned loosened in order to move the 

keyboard . . . . she is not aware of any other work activities or ergonomics of her 

work station that she feels are injurious. She has been doing this job as mentioned 

for the past four years at the same work station without any history of injury or 

problems. She states there is no mechanical malfunction of the keyboard tray or 

its adjustment mechanism [and] did not notice a sudden onset of pain with the 

performance of this activity on any particular singular occasion.

Tr. 522.

Less than two months later, in September 2010, she complained to Raylene Gordin, 

M.D., the orthopedist treating her for her alleged Workers’ Compensation injury, of having to 

adjust her keyboard “two to six times per day” because “the bolt is slightly stripped.” Tr. 545. 

She explained to Dr. Gordin that the repetitive adjusting of her keyboard “contributed to the 

onset of her [right arm] symptoms,” which arose “[i]n May of this year.” Id. The next day she

stated to Dr. Heder, her general practitioner, that “[s]he can remember very specifically the 

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8 – OPINION AND ORDER

onset” of her right arm pain from “when she was pulling [at the knob on her keyboard] one 

time.” Tr. 395.

Yet, in June 2011, she told Dr. Heder that her right arm pain was related to several 

workplace conditions, including a vent that “produced a lot of cold frigid air on her,” “some 

electrical wires [from which] maybe she got an electrical sho[ck],” and having “to brace herself 

to twist the keyboard tray” repetitively. Tr. 423. In July 2011, she communicated to Dr. Heder

that she injured her arm one day while “pressing against the knob [under her desk] . . . suddenly 

she had pain into her right arm so severe that she jumped out, ran to the bathroom, vomited 

several times.” Tr. 424. As the ALJ found, these contradictory statements concerning the onset of 

plaintiff’s allegedly disabling right arm pain undermine her credibility. 

Additionally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff’s hearing testimony pertaining to her role as a 

caregiver for her mother conflicted with the other evidence of record. Tr. 24. In June 2011,

plaintiff reported to mental health nurse practitioner Rita Hurlong that she was “the adult relative 

foster care provider for her mother,” who was “high maintenance.” Tr. 443. In June 2013, she 

remarked that she was “staying [at her] mom’s house this week” and feeling “slightly resentful 

[due to the] lack of time for herself.” Tr. 622. The next week plaintiff reported she was “not 

happy being [a] 24 [hour] nurse to mom.” Tr. 623. In July 2013, plaintiff stated that caring “for 

[her] ill 83 [year old] mom [was] difficult” and she was sleeping with one “ear open for mom.” 

Tr. 624. This evidence suggests that plaintiff played a larger role in providing care to her mother 

than alleged at the hearing. Although plaintiff attempts to characterize these activities as more 

favorable to her claim of disability, because the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence was 

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9 – OPINION AND ORDER

reasonable, it must be upheld. See Febach v. Colvin, 580 Fed.Appx. 530, 531 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(affirming the ALJ’s credibility finding under analogous circumstances).

Further, the ALJ determined that “the record indicates that [plaintiff] is more active than 

she has portrayed in connection with this claim.” Tr. 24. Activities may be used to discredit a 

claimant where they either “are transferable to a work setting” or “contradict claims of a totally 

debilitating impairment.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations 

omitted). In response to direct questioning from the ALJ, plaintiff denied any daily activities; 

other aspects of her hearing testimony nonetheless revealed that she visited her boyfriend at his 

property, attended regular medical appointments, ran errands such as going to the bank or 

grocery shopping, occasionally dined out or went of walks, and engaged in minimal household 

chores. Compare Tr. 45, 55, with Tr. 47, 55, 58. As discussed above, plaintiff furnished some 

form of care to her mother. There is also evidence in the record demonstrating that plaintiff was 

engaging in gardening and/or other outdoor pursuits. See Tr. 583 (Dr. Heder observing in 

October 2012 that plaintiff’s right arm was “well tanned” with no muscular atrophy), 618 

(plaintiff remarking to Ms. Hurlong in March 2013 that she was “spending more and more” time 

out at her boyfriend’s ranch, where she enjoyed “taking seeds and planting them”); see also Tr. 

587 (plaintiff seeking treatment from Dr. Heder in July 2013 for poison oak on her right arm, 

with Dr. Heder questioning just “how much she was using the arm to get that”).

In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 

evidence, for rejecting plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements. As a result, this Court need not 

discuss all of the reasons provided by the ALJ because at least one legally sufficient reason 

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10 – OPINION AND ORDER

exists. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

ALJ’s credibility finding is affirmed.

II. Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected medical opinions from Drs. 

Heder and Bean. There are three types of acceptable medical opinions in Social Security cases: 

those from treating, examining, and non-examining doctors. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). To reject the uncontroverted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, the ALJ 

must present clear and convincing reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2005) (citation omitted). If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another 

doctor’s opinion, it may be rejected by specific and legitimate reasons. Id.

A. Dr. Heder

The record before the Court contains treatment records from Dr. Heder spanning back to 

June 2008. Tr. 318. Initially, Dr. Heder provided treatment, predominantly in the form of 

medication management, for plaintiff’s fibromyalgia, anxiety, and degenerative disk disease. Tr. 

318-73. In mid-June 2010, he began providing care for plaintiff’s right arm pain.3Tr. 374-424, 

479-83, 569-77, 582-90.

Dr. Heder noted at various points in plaintiff’s treatment records that she was unable to 

work or disabled due to her right arm pain. See, e.g., Tr. 386, 391, 403-04, 409, 411, 414. The 

doctor also authored letters in 2011 and 2012 regarding plaintiff’s condition to either her

employer or insurer. Tr. 317, 416, 566, 577. In both the letters and chart notes, Dr. Heder noted 

 

3 Dr. Heder was plaintiff’s “primary care physician [and] not the physician . . . responsible for 

her . . . Workers’ Comp type problems.” Tr. 416. Thus, during the period in which plaintiff’s 

Workers’ Compensation claim was pending, Dr. Heder did not provide treatment for her right 

arm pain. See, e.g., Tr. 380-82, 391, 394, 96, 400, 403, 416. 

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11 – OPINION AND ORDER

the confusion of plaintiff’s providers, including himself, regarding the underlying basis of her

right arm pain, but nonetheless opined that she “is unable to use her right arm in any meaningful 

activity.” Tr. 317, 396, 410-11, 416, 566. He denoted the psychological component of plaintiff’s 

condition and recommended that she obtain “aggressive psychiatric therapy” with someone other

than Ms. Hurlong. Tr. 409, 411, 414, 416, 566, 577.

The ALJ assigned “no weight to the various opinions from Dr. Heder that [plaintiff] was 

‘disabled’ or temporarily unable to work” because “[i]t is not clear what definition of disability 

Dr. Heder utilized and whether or not the claimant is disabled and unable to work is an issue 

reserved to the Commissioner.” Tr. 26. The ALJ rejected Dr. Heder’s statements that plaintiff 

“suffered from severe arm pain and was unable to use the right arm in any meaningful activity” 

because “the evidence does not establish reflex sympathetic dystrophy/complex regional pain 

syndrome as a medically determinable impairment and Dr. Heder’s opinion that the pain was 

disabling regardless of the cause does not provide a basis for awarding disability benefits under 

the Act.” Id. In addition, the ALJ noted that “the record contains no function-by-function 

assessment from Dr. Heder other than his opinions that [plaintiff] was unable to drive because of 

her right arm, but could stand for eight hours.” Tr. 27. Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. Heder’s

statements that plaintiff “was unable to use her right arm was primarily based on [her] less than 

fully credible subjective complaints” and contradicted by her daily activities, including the fact 

that she “drives despite her right arm.” Tr. 26-27. 

An ALJ need not accept a medical opinion that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to 

work” because the ultimate issue of disability is reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527; SSR 96-5p, available at 1996 WL 374183. Likewise, an ALJ can disregard a medical 

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12 – OPINION AND ORDER

report that does “not show how [a claimant’s] symptoms translate into specific functional deficits 

which preclude work activity.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th 

Cir. 1999). An ALJ can also reject a medical opinion that is “based to a large extent on a 

claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible” or inconsistent with the 

evidence of record. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and 

internal quotations omitted).

After carefully reviewing the record before it, the Court finds that the ALJ did not 

commit harmful legal error in evaluating Dr. Heder’s opinion. Significantly, Dr. Heder described 

plaintiff’s fibromyalgia as disabling while was she was still working and the majority of the 

evidence that references disability after the alleged onset date does not suggest an inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Tr. 368, 

386, 391, 40-04. As a result, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Heder’s use of 

the term “disabled” did not correspond to the definition employed by the Commissioner. In any 

event, because Dr. Heder’s statements that plaintiff was disabled or unable to work are 

conclusory, the ALJ was not required to give them deference. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 

884-85 (9th Cir. 2011) (as amended). 

Regarding Dr. Heder’s statements relating to plaintiff’s severe arm pain and 

corresponding incapacity, the Court does not agree with the ALJ’s finding concerning the lack of 

an underlying medically determinable impairment. Even assuming that plaintiff failed to meet 

the diagnostic criteria for reflex sympathetic dystrophy/complex regional pain syndrome, the 

ALJ found that plaintiff’s cervical spine degenerative disc disease and somatoform disorder were

medically determinable and severe at step two. Tr. 15. As Dr. Heder repeatedly indicated, despite 

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13 – OPINION AND ORDER

the fact that there could be a physical basis for some of plaintiff’s right arm pain, the severity 

was likely a “conversion-type reaction” arising from unresolved issues pertaining to plaintiff’s 

prior employment. Tr. 396, 398, 409-10. The other medical evidence of record supports this 

conclusion. See Tr. 546 (Dr. Gordin reporting that, “[a]lthough she may have a generalized 

overuse condition of the upper extremity, it would certainly appear to be substantially out of 

proportion to the history and object circumstances . . . Even in the presence of any actually 

pathology that may come to light . . . it is my strong opinion that she mostly needs psychiatric 

treatment”), 635 (Dr. Bean noting that degenerative changes to plaintiff’s cervical spine were

“likely” responsible for a portion of her right arm pain). As such, contrary to the ALJ’s assertion, 

the record demonstrates the existence of medically determinable impairments that, either singly 

or in combination, could be responsible for plaintiff’s symptoms. 

Nevertheless, because the ALJ provided other legally sufficient reasons, supported by 

substantial evidence, for discrediting the remaining portions of Dr. Heder’s reports, this error 

was inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination. Namely, an independent review 

of the record confirms that Dr. Heder’s various opinions were largely based on plaintiff’s uncredible self-reports. Critically, Dr. Heder never objectively evaluated plaintiff’s arm as she 

would not allow him to complete an examination due to pain. Tr. 374-424, 479-83, 569-77, 582-

90. Indeed, Dr. Heder denoted plaintiff’s inability to use her right arm in the “subjective” portion 

of his treatment notes. Id.; see also Tr. 426, 431-32, 485 (normal MRI and electro diagnostic 

results related to the right arm). A prime example of this is plaintiff’s ability to drive: in August 

2010, Dr. Heder recorded in the subjective section of his report that plaintiff “was unable to drive 

because of the pain in her right arm”; however, at the hearing, plaintiff testified she continues to 

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14 – OPINION AND ORDER

drive, even when it is not a necessity, and that none of her medical providers have indicated that 

she should not be driving. Compare Tr. 386, with Tr. 45, 58-59. Moreover, Dr. Heder did not

observe any signs of atrophy or frozen should, despite plaintiff’s reports that she was not using 

her right arm. Compare Tr. 386, 394, 400, 403, 405, 411-12, 420, 584, with Tr. 420, 422, 425, 

577, 583. In light of this evidence, the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Heder’s opinion evidence is 

upheld.

4

B. Dr. Bean

Dr. Bean assumed care for plaintiff when Dr. Heder retired in 2013. In December 2013, 

Dr. Bean filled out a check-the-box form prepared by plaintiff’s attorney. Tr. 631-35. Plaintiff 

testified that she had seen Dr. Bean twice before meeting with him the day before the hearing; he 

requested her assistance in completing that form in light of their newly-established treatment 

relationship. Tr. 48-49. Accordingly, plaintiff explained that Dr. Bean went through the form 

with her and “answer[ed] the questions as he was though through them.” Tr. 49. The doctor 

checked boxes reflecting that plaintiff would need to take unscheduled breaks every 10 to 15 

minutes, must rest lying down for more than four hours in an eight hour workday, could only 

stand or walk for one hour cumulatively in an eight hour workday, and could rarely use her right 

 

4

In so finding, the Court is mindful of the fact that Dr. Heder is neither a mental health specialist

nor was he providing treatment for plaintiff’s somatoform disorder. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 

F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming the ALJ’s rejection of a physician’s opinion 

regarding exertional limitations that was based predominantly on the claimant’s somatic 

complaints). The Court also notes there is no medical evidence, credible or otherwise, from any 

treating or examining source reflecting specific functional limitations associated with plaintiff’s 

somatoform disorder. See Tr. 605 (Ms. Hurlong opining that plaintiff’s “mental health is not 

limiting her from working”). 

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hand for reaching, handling, or fingering. Tr. 631-32. He also completed an assessment of her 

mental functioning, in which he endorsed major problems in most areas. Tr. 632-34.

The ALJ afforded “no weight” to Dr. Bean’s opinion because it “was primarily based on 

[plaintiff’s] less than fully credible self-report” and contravened by the other medical evidence of 

record. As noted above, an ALJ need not accept a medical opinion that is premised on an uncredible claimant’s self-reports or inconsistent with the record. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041.

Here, both plaintiff and Dr. Bean made clear that his check-the-box assessment was 

premised on plaintiff’s un-credible self-reports, as opposed to Dr. Bean’s own independent 

medical judgment. The two chart notes from Dr. Bean in the record before the Court do not 

indicate that he independently examined plaintiff in any meaningful way prior to rendering his 

opinion or reviewed her longitudinal medical history. Tr. 592-96. Furthermore, these chart notes 

establish that Dr. Bean was not treating plaintiff for her mental impairments. Id. Finally, Dr. 

Bean’s opinion is contradicted Dr. Heder, who opined that plaintiff could stand for eight hours, 

and the other minimal objective physical findings. See, e.g., Tr. 386, 426, 431-32, 523-24, 559. 

The ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence is affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED and this 

case is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 14th day of June 2016.

__________________________________________________

Michael J. McShane

United States District Judge

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