IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ERIC MEYER, LELA ALSTON, RICHARD C. ANDRADE, REGINALD 

BOLDING JR., MARK A. CARDENAS, KEN CLARK, DIEGO ESPINOZA, 

CHARLENE R. FERNANDEZ, RANDALL FRIES, ROSANNA 

GABALDON, SALLY ANN GONZALES, ALBERT HALE, MATTHEW A. 

KOPEC, JOHNATHAN R. LARKIN, STEFANIE MACH, JUAN JOSE 

MENDEZ, LISA A. OTONDO, CELESTE PLUMLEE, REBECCA RIOS, 

MACARIO SALDATE, CECI VELASQEZ, AND BRUCE WHEELER, 

members of the Arizona State House of Representatives; KATIE HOBBS, 

DAVID BRADLEY, OLIVIA CAJERO BEDFORD, LUPE CONTRERAS, 

ANDREA DALESSANDRO, STEVE FARLEY, BARBARA MCGUIRE, 

ROBERT MEZA, CATHERINE MIRANDA, and MARTIN QUEZADA, 

members of the Arizona State Senate, Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA, a body politic, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0031 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV 2016-092409

The Honorable Joshua D. Rogers, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Rusty D. Crandell

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

FILED 2-5-2019
2

Torres Law Group, Tempe

By Israel G. Torres; James E. Barton, II; Sama John Golestan

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

OPINION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 The State appeals the superior court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Appellees, members of the Arizona House of 

Representatives and Senate who voted against passage of House Bill

(“H.B.”) 2579 (collectively, the “Legislators”), finding Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 23-204, as amended by H.B. 2579, 

unconstitutional because it violates the Voter Protection Act (“VPA”). For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2006, Arizona voters passed Proposition 202, an initiative 

measure commonly referred to as the “Raise the Minimum Wage for 

Working Arizonans Act” (“Minimum Wage Act” or “Act”). The Minimum 

Wage Act is codified at A.R.S. §§ 23-362, -363, and -364. The central 

provision at issue in this appeal falls under the enforcement provision, 

A.R.S. § 23-364, which empowers a county, city, or town to “regulate 

minimum wages and benefits within its geographic boundaries” as long as 

it does “not provide for a minimum wage lower than that prescribed in this 

article.” A.R.S. § 23-364(I) (emphasis added). It goes on to state, “[t]his 

article . . . shall not limit the authority of the legislature or any other body

to adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental 

wages or benefits, or that extends such protections to employers or 

employees not covered by this article.” Id. (emphasis added).

¶3 In May 2016, the legislature adopted H.B. 2579, which

amended A.R.S. § 23-204 and preempted the field of nonwage benefits,

removing from cities and towns the power to regulate nonwage benefits.

H.B. 2579 passed with majority votes in both the House and Senate, but 

neither chamber received a three-fourths’ majority vote. The relevant 

language of the bill provides: 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

3

The regulation of employee benefits, including nonwage

compensation, paid and unpaid leave and other absences, 

meal breaks and rest periods, is of statewide concern. The 

regulation of nonwage employee benefits pursuant to this 

chapter and federal law is not subject to further regulation by 

a city, town or other political subdivision of this state. 

A.R.S. § 23-204(A). 

¶4 In June 2016, the plaintiffs sued the State in the superior court

seeking declaratory relief, asking H.B. 2579 be found unconstitutional 

because it violated the VPA and the home-rule provision of the Arizona 

Constitution. The plaintiffs were comprised of three groups: (1) a labor 

union, United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 99 (“UFCW”); (2) five 

individual city councilmembers from three Arizona cities

(“Councilmembers”); and (3) the Legislators who voted against H.B. 2579. 

The State moved to dismiss the home-rule claims by all three groups of 

plaintiffs and moved to dismiss the VPA claims by UFCW and the 

Councilmembers only. The superior court granted the State’s motion to 

dismiss in full, leaving only the Legislators’ VPA claim. 

¶5 The State and Legislators filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment on the VPA claim. After briefing and oral argument, the court 

granted the Legislators’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that H.B. 

2579 impliedly repealed a portion of the Minimum Wage Act and therefore 

violated the VPA. The court also awarded the Legislators all attorney fees 

requested, including fees for opposing the motion to dismiss. This timely 

appeal from the State followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶6 We review grants of summary judgment and questions of 

statutory interpretation de novo. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek 

Ranch, LLC, 236 Ariz. 363, 365, ¶ 7 (2015). “Our primary objective in 

construing statutes adopted by initiative is to give effect to the intent of the 

electorate.” State v. Gomez, 212 Ariz. 55, 57, ¶ 11 (2006). If the statute’s 

language is unambiguous and is subject to only one reasonable meaning, 

we apply that meaning without resorting to other statutory interpretation 

methods. Id.; see also J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 40-41, ¶ 6 (2014). Only if the 

language is ambiguous do we discern the electorate’s intent by resorting to

secondary interpretation methods, such as consideration of the statute’s 

subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and spirit 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

4

and purpose. BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17, 19, ¶ 9 

(2018) (citation omitted).

I. Applicability of the VPA

¶7 The electorate shares lawmaking power with the legislature 

under Arizona’s system of government. See Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. 

Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 8 (2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he people reserve[d] 

the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact 

or reject such laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the 

legislature” through the initiative and referendum processes. Ariz. Const. 

art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(1). 

¶8 In 1998, Arizona voters adopted the VPA as a constitutional 

amendment, limiting the legislature’s power to amend, repeal, or supersede 

voter-approved laws. See Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6)(B)-(C), (14). When 

the legislature addresses the subject of a voter-approved initiative, the 

constitutional limitations of the VPA apply and limit the legislature’s 

otherwise plenary authority. See id. The VPA prohibits legislative repeal of 

initiative measures approved by the voters and permits a legislative

amendment to an initiative only when the amendment “furthers the 

purposes” of the initiative and is passed by “at least three-fourths of the 

members of each house of the legislature.” Id.

¶9 The VPA’s constitutional limitations apply to the Minimum 

Wage Act because it was passed by voter initiative. Consequently, the 

legislature cannot repeal or supersede the Minimum Wage Act, and any 

amendment would have to further its purpose and be passed by threefourths’ vote in both chambers of the legislature. The parties do not dispute 

that H.B. 2579 was passed without the requisite three-fourths’ vote. The

dispositive question, therefore, is whether the legislature impermissibly 

amended or superseded a portion of the Minimum Wage Act in violation 

of the VPA when enacting H.B. 2579. 

II. Constitutionality of H.B. 2579

¶10 H.B. 2579 did not explicitly repeal or supersede the Minimum 

Wage Act, cf. State Land Dep’t v. Tucson Rock & Sand Co., 107 Ariz. 74, 77 

(1971) (a statute expressly repeals another when it “nam[es] . . . those 

[provisions] to be superseded”), but the parties disagree about whether 

H.B. 2579 impliedly amends or repeals provisions contained within the Act.

To begin, we analyze the two statutes in light of the VPA. See Cave Creek 

Unified Sch. Dist., 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 23 (“Although [the house bill] did not 

expressly state that it repealed, amended, or otherwise changed [the 
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Opinion of the Court

5

initiative], we must consider its effect on the fundamental purposes 

underlying the VPA.” (citation omitted)). “The intent of the VPA, construed 

from its text and structure, was to limit changes to voter-approved laws.” 

Id. 

¶11 A statute can be impliedly amended or repealed through 

“repugnancy” or “inconsistency” with a more recent and apparently 

conflicting statute. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 200 Ariz. 327, 333, 

¶ 29 (2001) (implied repeal); Ariz. State Tax Comm’n v. Reiser, 109 Ariz. 473, 

479 (1973) (implied amendment). “An implied amendment is an act which 

purports to be independent, but which in substance alters, modifies, or 

adds to a prior act.” Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 24 (quoting 

1A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22:13 (7th ed. 2012)). 

¶12 The Minimum Wage Act empowered counties, cities, and 

towns to “regulate minimum wages and benefits,” and authorized “the 

legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires 

payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends such 

protections to employers or employees not covered by this article.” A.R.S. 

§ 23-364(I) (emphasis added). H.B. 2579 explicitly removed from cities, 

towns, and other political subdivisions the authority to regulate “employee

benefits, including nonwage compensation.” A.R.S. § 23-204(A). H.B. 2579 

defines nonwage compensation to include:

[F]ringe benefits, welfare benefits, child or adult care plans, 

sick pay, vacation pay, severance pay, commissions, bonuses, 

retirement plan or pension contributions, other employment 

benefits provided in 29 United States Code § 2611 and other 

amounts promised to the employee that are more than the 

minimum compensation due an employee by reason of 

employment. 

A.R.S. § 23-204(C). Therefore, if A.R.S. § 23-204, as amended by H.B. 2579, 

amends or repeals the Minimum Wage Act, it will have done so in violation 

of the VPA. 

¶13 The State argues the Minimum Wage Act does not apply to 

nonwage employee benefits and accordingly does not grant counties, cities, 

and towns the power to regulate them. The Legislators, on the other hand, 

argue that by its terms, the Minimum Wage Act demonstrably grants 

counties, cities, and towns the power to regulate nonwage benefits. 

Therefore, to discern the constitutionality of H.B. 2579, we must determine 

whether H.B. 2579 and the Minimum Wage Act can be harmonized. This 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

6

analysis hinges on the meaning of the word “benefits” as used in the 

Minimum Wage Act. 

¶14 The State contends that H.B. 2579 and the Minimum Wage 

Act can be read harmoniously because the term “benefits” has a different 

meaning in both statutes. H.B. 2579 defines “benefits” to include nonwage 

employee compensation. See A.R.S. § 23-204(A). Benefits is not defined in 

the Minimum Wage Act. See A.R.S. §§ 23-362, -363, -364; see also State v. 

Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 368 (2009) (“When a word in a statute is undefined, 

courts apply the ordinary meaning of the term.”). The State argues 

“benefits” means “the advantage or privilege something gives” and in the 

context of the Minimum Wage Act, “benefits” means only the benefits 

provided under the Minimum Wage Act—namely, the enforcement rights

provided in A.R.S. § 23-364. The Legislators conversely argue “benefits” 

includes any “non-wage compensation.” The superior court found that “the 

meaning proposed by the State may be a permissible meaning of ‘benefits’ 

according to a dictionary definition of the word, [but] it is not a reasonable 

meaning in light of the context of the word.” We agree. 

¶15 In statutory interpretation, associated words bear on one 

another’s meaning. “[A] statutory term is interpreted in context of the 

accompanying words.” Estate of Braden ex rel. Gabaldon v. State, 228 Ariz. 

323, 326, ¶ 13 (2011). In the context of the Minimum Wage Act, “benefits” is 

used twice—both times in conjunction with the word “wages,” forming the 

phrases “minimum wages and benefits” and “minimum wages or 

benefits,” respectively. Therefore, the word “benefits” has an associated, 

but separate meaning from the word “wages.” 

¶16 When used together, the only reasonable interpretation is that 

“wages” and “benefits” are complementary parts of employee 

compensation as a whole. See Black’s Law Dictionary 343 (10th ed. 2014) 

(“Compensation consists of wages and benefits in return for services” and 

“includes wages, stock option plans, profit-sharing, commissions, bonuses, 

golden parachutes, vacation, sick pay, medical benefits, disability, leaves of 

absence, and expense reimbursement.” (citation omitted)); see generally State 

v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 6 (2014) (“Absent statutory definitions, courts 

. . . may look to dictionaries.”). “[T]he words of a statute are to be given 

their ordinary meaning unless it appears from the context or otherwise that 

a different meaning is intended.” Ariz. ex rel. Brnovich v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. 

Coll. Dist. Bd., 243 Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 7 (2018) (citation omitted). At oral 

argument in the superior court, the State conceded that “non-wage benefits 

received by an employee from an employer is the consistent historical 

meaning of the word ‘benefits’ when used in the syntactic setting of either 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

7

‘minimum wages and benefits’ or ‘wages and benefits.’” It is clear from the 

text that by granting a county, city, or town the ability to “regulate 

minimum wages and benefits,” the intent of the electorate was to grant 

these bodies the ability to regulate wages and nonwage benefits. The State’s 

interpretation ignores the plain text of the statute and the association 

between the words “benefits” and “wages.”

¶17 The State emphasizes that the other provisions of the 

Minimum Wage Act make no mention of benefits, including the substantive 

provision that sets the minimum wage. See A.R.S. § 23-363. Because the only 

provision that mentions benefits is the enforcement provision, § 23-364, the 

State argues “benefits” can only mean those benefits—i.e., enforcement 

rights—that are provided under that provision. However, even considering 

the word “benefit” in the context of the Act—while not explicitly requiring 

the regulation of benefits in the substantive provision—it is reasonable that 

the electorate granted counties, cities, and towns the ability to further

regulate minimum wages and benefits in the enforcement provision, as 

long as they do “not provide for a minimum wage lower than that 

prescribed in [the] article.” A.R.S. § 23-363 sets a mandatory minimum 

wage, whereas the enforcement provision gives these bodies the option to 

further increase wages and benefits, rather than requiring them to do so.

¶18 The State further argues that the Minimum Wage Act uses 

“benefits” and “protections” interchangeably when it authorizes “the 

legislature or any other body to adopt any law or policy that requires 

payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends such 

protections to employers or employees not covered by this article.” A.R.S. 

§ 23-364(I) (emphasis added). First, the plain grammatical reading of this 

sentence is that “higher or supplemental wages” and “higher or 

supplemental . . . benefits” both are protections that the legislature or other 

body can extend to employers or employees not covered by the Minimum 

Wage Act. 

¶19 Second, the State’s argument that this provision uses 

“benefits” and “protections” interchangeably—and “benefits”

encompasses only the minimum wage protections provided in this 

section—is not well taken. The State proposes only one definition of 

“benefits” and does not argue that “benefits” has a different meaning each 

time it is used in the statute. See Obregon v. Indus. Comm’n, 217 Ariz. 612, 

616, ¶ 21 (App. 2008) (“It is a normal rule of statutory construction that 

identical words used in different parts of the same Act are intended to have 

the same meaning.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Equating 

benefit to mean protections under the statute would lead to an impossible 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

8

grammatical difficulty. It is not logical for the statute to read: “A county, 

city, or town may by ordinance regulate minimum wages and protections

within its geographic boundaries.” It makes even less sense to say that the 

statute “shall not limit the authority of the legislature or any other body to 

adopt any law or policy that requires payment of higher or supplemental 

wages or protections,” because protections are not paid in the sense that 

wages and benefits can be paid. 

¶20 Third, the State argues that interpreting benefits to mean 

nonwage benefits renders the “higher or supplemental” language of the 

Minimum Wage Act superfluous because “it does not make sense to say 

that municipalities are free to ‘require[]’ payment of ‘higher or 

supplemental’ fringe benefits when the [Minimum Wage Act] does not 

require payment of any fringe benefits at all.” A grammatical reading of the 

sentence reveals that the phrase “payment of higher or supplemental” 

applies to both “wages” and “benefits.” There is nothing inherently

prohibitive of a city passing a new law requiring payment of higher or

supplemental nonwage benefits—where payment of benefits previously 

was not required—because payment of some benefits is higher than 

payment of no benefits. Further, the payment of nonwage benefits could be 

supplemental in reference to the payment of required wages.

¶21 In contrast, the Legislators’ proposed definition of 

“benefits”—nonwage benefits received by an employee from an 

employer—reflects the ordinary and common meaning of the term when it 

is used in conjunction with wages and when looking at its plain meaning 

as it is used in the Act. Thus, because the meaning of the word “benefits” 

can be discerned from the plain text of the statute, the word “benefits” is 

not ambiguous. 

¶22 The State next asks us to look beyond the statutory text itself, 

urging us to look at the title of the voter initiative and the title of the 

substantive provision in the Act, A.R.S. § 23-363, to conclude that the Act’s 

purpose is to regulate wages, not nonwage benefits. The title and headings 

of statutes are permissible indicators of meaning but cannot override the 

text. See State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 7 (2000) (noting that where an 

ambiguity exists, the title of a statute may be used to aid in its 

interpretation, although headings are not part of the law itself). Because we 

determine the text is not ambiguous, we need not turn to the titles of the

initiative or provisions to aid in interpreting the Minimum Wage Act. 

¶23 The State argues the superior court erred by not considering

other secondary methods of statutory construction beyond the ordinary 
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Opinion of the Court

9

meaning of “benefits.” When interpreting a statute, courts first look to the 

statute’s plain language as “the most reliable indicator of its meaning.”

Harris Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 233 Ariz. 377, 381, ¶ 13 (App. 2013)

(citation omitted). When read in that fashion and the meaning of the statute 

is clear, our analysis ends. See State ex rel. Romley v. Hauser, 209 Ariz. 539, 

541, ¶ 10 (2005) (“When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous 

there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to 

determine the legislature’s intent because its intent is readily discernable 

from the face of the statute.” (citation omitted)). The State urges the court 

to look at the legislative history of the Minimum Wage Act, to interpret the 

Act to avoid ERISA preemption issues and constitutional law difficulties, 

and to interpret the Act in a way that will not impermissibly change the 

law. Again, we need not address these secondary methods of statutory 

interpretation; because the text of the statute is unambiguous, our statutory 

interpretation stops at the plain meaning of the words. We look no further 

than the language of the statutes to conclude H.B. 2579 impliedly amends 

and repeals a portion of the Minimum Wage Act. 

¶24 We are aware that the finding of an implied repeal of statutes 

is not favored, UNUM Life Ins. Co., 200 Ariz. at 333, ¶ 28, but it is required 

when, as here, “conflicting statutes cannot be harmonized to give each 

effect and meaning.” Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist., 233 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 24. H.B. 

2579 explicitly stripped the ability of counties, cities, and towns to regulate 

nonwage employee benefits. A.R.S. § 23-204(A). The Minimum Wage Act 

specifically empowered counties, cities, and towns to regulate benefits, 

which we have found to mean nonwage benefits. H.B. 2579 explicitly 

prohibits what the Minimum Wage Act permits, and thus, the two statutes 

cannot be harmonized. Because H.B. 2579 impliedly amends and repeals a 

portion of the Minimum Wage Act, it violates the VPA’s express limitations 

on legislative changes to voter-approved laws. 

III. Attorney Fees 

¶25 The Legislators requested attorney fees in the amount of 

$33,450 under the private attorney general doctrine. The affidavit for 

attorney fees included time expended representing the Councilmembers 

and UCFW on the VPA claim, representing all three groups of plaintiffs for

the home-rule claim, and opposing the State’s motion to dismiss. The court 

ultimately dismissed the entire home-rule claim and the VPA claims 

brought by Councilmembers and UCFW. 

¶26 We review an award of attorney fees under the private 

attorney general doctrine for an abuse of discretion. Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of 
MEYER, et al. v. STATE

Opinion of the Court

10

Health Services, 160 Ariz. 593, 609 (1989). Attorney fees can be awarded 

under the private attorney general doctrine to “a party who has vindicated 

a right that: (1) benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private 

enforcement; and (3) is of societal importance.” Id. “The purpose of the 

doctrine is to promote vindication of important public rights.” Id. (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). The superior court awarded the Legislators 

all attorney fees they requested. 

¶27 The State acknowledges that our supreme court’s adoption of 

the private attorney general doctrine is binding authority. The State 

contends, however, that the Legislators are not entitled to an award of 

attorney fees for work on arguments on which they did not prevail and that 

the court should have reduced the attorney fees to exclude fees for work on 

opposing the motion to dismiss, which the Legislators lost. We agree. 

¶28 When the result sought in the litigation is accomplished, “fees 

should be awarded for time spent even on unsuccessful legal theories.

Where a party has achieved only partial or limited success, however, it 

would be unreasonable to award compensation for all hours expended, 

including time spent on . . . unsuccessful issues or claims.” Schweiger v. 

China Doll Rest. Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 189 (App. 1983). 

¶29 Here, the Legislators accomplished the result they sought to 

achieve—declaring H.B. 2579 unconstitutional. However, the superior 

court awarded fees for time spent representing plaintiffs on unsuccessful 

claims that were ultimately dismissed. The Legislators are not entitled to 

attorney fees for time spent on the unsuccessful home-rule claim nor for 

time spent representing the dismissed plaintiffs, UCFW and the 

Councilmembers. However, the Legislators were ultimately successful on 

their VPA claim, and that claim meets the criteria to award fees under the 

private attorney general doctrine. 

¶30 First, the resolution of the litigation benefits a large number 

of people in the state, including all employees and employers subject to the 

Minimum Wage Act. The right to regulate wages and benefits belongs to 

counties, cities, and towns; thus, its vindication benefits large numbers of 

Arizonans. The Legislators in this case “sought no recovery for themselves 

and achieved no personal gain or advantage; they did not act for their own 

benefit or for the benefit of a particular class or group, but instead acted to 

vindicate the interests of the entire citizenry of the state.” Kadish v. Ariz. 

State Land Dep’t, 177 Ariz. 322, 329 (App. 1993). 
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Opinion of the Court

11

¶31 Second, the vindication of the right the Legislators asserted 

required a legal challenge to a statute adopted by the legislature and could 

only have been privately enforced. See Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Int. v. Hassell, 

172 Ariz. 356, 371 (App. 1991). Finally, the vindication of the right asserted 

by the Legislators is of societal importance. The Legislators established the 

right of counties, cities, and towns to regulate nonwage benefits. By 

challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 2579, which took away this right, 

the Legislators ensured that these bodies could provide for regulation of 

nonwage benefits for a large number of employees within the state. The 

superior court erred in awarding attorney fees related to the home-rule 

claim as to all plaintiffs, the VPA claim as to the Councilmembers and 

UCFW, and related to the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Legislators

are only entitled to attorney fees for time spent representing the successful 

group of plaintiffs on the VPA claim. 

CONCLUSION 

¶32 We affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the Legislators. We vacate the award of attorney fees in favor of the 

Legislators and remand for a redetermination of the amount of the award 

consistent with this opinion. We award the Legislators their fees on appeal 

upon their compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate 

Procedure.