UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GERALD LEE PATTERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. GEORGE SANTINI, M.D.; CAMACHO, P.A.; FIVE JOHN/JANE DOES, Defendants - Appellees. No. 15-1147 (D.C. No. 1:11-CV -01899-RM-KLM) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , LUCERO , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Gerald Lee Patterson appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to reopen his Bivens suit, which the district cour t administrativel y closed after the parties entered a conditi onal settlement. Because the collateral proceedings that motivated the admini strative closure in this case have been resolved and Mr.

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 12, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Patterson has expressed his desi re to litigate his claims th at are now ripe for review, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Patterson’ s motion to reopen. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefor e reverse the district court and order it to reopen Mr. Patters on’s administratively closed case.
I. BACKGROUND While incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado, Mr. Patterson filed a pro se comp laint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging Federa l Bureau of Prison (BOP) officials were deliberately indifferent to hi s medical needs in violati on of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Mr. Patterson argued BOP offici als demonstrated an indifference to his medical issues relating to herniated discs in his neck . After a magistrate judge recommended denying Defendant s’ motion to dismiss, th e court held a settlement conference, during which the parties indi cated they had reach ed a settlement. The settlement agreement explained that the partie s had reached “a conditional resolution of Plaintiff’s claims.” Under this conditional resolution, the BOP agreed to “reconsider Plaintiff’s application for comp assionate release” an d to make a decision “by September 6, 2014,” in exchange for “t he parties moving to administratively close this case.” The BOP fu rther agreed to “make a good -faith effort to reconsider all of the applicable grounds on which Plai ntiff might be entitle d to compassionate relief, including his medical condition” and to provide Mr. Patterson “appropriate medical care” in the interi m. The settlement agreement contemplated one of two outcomes to Mr. Patterson’s application fo r compassionate relief. First, under the3 terms of the settlement agreement, “Shoul d the [BOP] grant Plaintiff compassionate release, he agrees to dismiss with prejudice all of the claims that were lodged as part of this lawsuit or that coul d have been brought as part of it . . . .” The agreement otherwise contemplated, “If the [BOP] denies Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of his application for compassi onate release, either party may move to have the Court reopen the . . . case to request that judicial acti on be taken with respect to the pending claims.” Based on this agreement, the par ties filed a stipulated motion for administrative closure. The district court granted the motion, orde ring that the matter be “administratively closed” pur suant to the District of Colorado Local Civil Rule 41.2. The order further provided, “The pa rties may reopen this matter upon motion filed showing good cause.” See D. Colo. Civ. R 41.2 (“A district judge or a magistrate judge exercising c onsent jurisdiction may order the clerk to close a civil action administratively subject to reopening for good cause.”). The district court’s order did not explain under what circ umstances Mr. Patters on’s case could be considered dismissed. Less than a month later, Mr. Patterson filed a motion for clarification of the settlement agreement. He alleged that he misunde rstood the meaning of the agreement, that he had entered into it under duress, and that had he been allowed to consult competent counsel, he would not have agreed to the settlement agreement unless it had guaranteed him compassionate release. The district court denied the4 motion, concluding, first, th at Mr. Patterson had no right to counsel and therefore no right to consult and, second, that he fa iled to substantiate his duress claim. Mr. Patterson then filed a request fo r reconsideration for compassionate release to the BOP. The BO P denied the application. 1 As a result of the denial of compassiona te release, Mr. Patt erson filed a motion to reopen his case for good cause, arguing th e settlement had been procured under extreme duress. Specifically, he claimed the BOP manipulat ed the facts, refused to follow the appropriate policy when review ing his application for compassionate release, and failed to provi de adequate medical treatmen t until his promised release date of September 6, 2014. The district court denied th e motion. The court reasoned that the substance of Mr. Patterson’s dur ess claim related to the denial of his application for compassionate release and there was no nexus between that conduct and the procurement of the settlement agreement.

1 Specifically, the BOP concluded that Mr. Patterson did not fit any of the criteria for compassionate-re lease eligibility. First, it determined that although Mr. Patterson was seventy-six years old a nd had served 67 percent of his sentence, his overall medical condition was “unremar kable” and he therefore did not qualify under a category that allows for compassionate release of inmates who are at least sixty-five years old, who have served at least 50 percent of their sentence, and whose health is deteriorating based on a chronic or severe medical c ondition. The BOP also determined Mr. Patterson did not qualify under a second category of compassionate release for inmates who are at least sixty-five years old and have served the greater of ten years or 75 percent of their term of imprisonment. Finally, the BOP considered whether Mr. Patterson would pose a danger to the community, were he released. It concluded that his criminal hi story and the severity of hi s crime (possession with the intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine and evidence showing he was the leader of a criminal conspiracy ) cut against granting his application for compassionate release.5 Mr. Patterson then submitted a renewe d motion to reopen for good cause and submitted a sworn declaration substantiati ng his duress claims. The district court denied the renewed motion. The court rule d that Mr. Patterson’s duress allegations had substantially changed, which “undercut [] significantly the credibility of any single characterization.” And despite Mr. Patterson’s allegation that BOP officials had assured him that he would be released if he agreed to the settlement, the court ruled that “[n]othing in [t he settlement agreement] ca n remotely be taken as suggesting that Plaintiff’s release by Se ptember 6, 2014 was guaranteed.” The court thus concluded that although the settleme nt agreement permits Mr. Patterson to request that his case be re opened, “the Local Rules stil l require good cause,” and, finding none, the court denied the renewe d motion to reopen Mr. Patterson’s case. Mr. Patterson filed a notice of appeal indi cating his intent to appeal the district court’s denial of his renewe d motion to reopen the case. Because the district court had not entered a final judgment or otherw ise indicated that it had dismissed Mr. Patterson’s case, we issued an order for cl arification asking the district court to indicate whether its order denying the rene wed motion to reopen constituted a final, appealable order. In response, the district court entered a separate order dismissing Mr. Patterson’s case with prejudice.
II. DISCUSSION Mr. Patterson argues the district court erred in denying his renewed motion to reopen his Bivens case for failure to show good cause . Because district courts have broad discretion in managing their own dockets, United States v. Nicholson , 983 F.2d6 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1993), we review the denial of a moti on to reopen for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Texas , 457 F.3d 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding “no abuse of discretion in the district court’s . . . decision to reopen the [administratively closed] case”). A court abuses its discreti on when it “issues an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 1239–40 (10th Ci r. 2010). Likewise, an abuse of discretion occurs “where the district co urt clearly erred or ventured beyond the limits of permissible choice under the circumstances.” Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co. , 701 F.3d 1248, 1262 (10th Cir. 2012). We also note Mr. Patterson’s pro se status in the dist rict court and on appeal. “[A] pro se litigant’s [filings] are to be cons trued liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal plead ings drafted by lawyers.” Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (first alteration in orig inal). Viewing Mr. Patterson’s motion to reopen through this liberal construction, we c onclude the district court abused its discretion in denying th e motion and dismissing the case. When a court administrativel y closes a case, the clos ure generally operates as “the practical equiva lent of a stay.” Quinn v. CGR , 828 F.2d 1463, 1465 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1987). “Unlike a stay howev er, an administratively closed case is not counted as active although it remains on the docket . . . .” SEC v. Halek , 537 F. App’x 576, 579 (5th Cir. 2013). Use of the administrative- closure mechanism allo ws district courts “to remove from their pending cases suit s which are temporarily active elsewhere (such as before an arbitration panel) or stayed (such as where a bankruptcy is7 pending).” Mire v. Full Spectrum Lending Inc. , 389 F.3d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 2004);

see e.g. , Quinn , 828 F.2d at 1465 (administrative closure due to pending arbitration); WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm’t, Inc. , 402 F.3d 424, 426 (3d Cir. 2005) (administrative closure due to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings); Halek , 537 F. App’x at 578 (administrative closure due to conditional settlement). B ecause an administratively closed case “still exists on th e docket of the district court, ” it “may be reopened upon request of the parties or on the court’s own motion.” Mire , 389 F.3d at 167 (5th Cir. 2004). Each federal district may promulgate its own rules governing the process for administratively closing and reopening a case. In the District of Colorado, a district court “may order the clerk to close a civil action administ ratively subject to reopening for good cause.” D. Colo. Civ. R. 41.2. Therefore, in the District of Colorado, a party seeking to reopen a case that has been administratively closed must demonstrate good cause. But cour ts have not viewed this good cause standard as an onerous one. Instead, good cause to reopen a ca se exists where “the parties wish to litigate the remaining issu es that have become ripe for review.” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Teamcorp, Inc. , 835 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (D. Colo. 2011); see also Crystal Clear Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. , 415 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Although the district court ordered the pro ceeding ‘administrativel y close[d],’ it is clear from the context of the order that the court contemplated continued litigation after completion of the administrative pr oceedings.” (alteration in original)); Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. , No. 11-CV-02306-RM-KLM, 2015 WL8 1499662, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2015) (“ Because administrative closure is a purely administrative act, it has no effect on the parties’ rights or cl aims. Here, Defendant seeks a determination of the parties’ right s and claims. Thus, good cause exists to reopen the matter.” (citations omitted)); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Cantex, Inc. , No. 13-CV00507-REB-BNB, 2014 WL 2058106, at *1 (D. Colo. May 19, 2014) (“Generally, there is good cause to reopen when parties s eek to litigate remain ing issues that are ripe for review.”). In this case, Mr. Patters on’s case was admini stratively closed after the parties entered a conditional settlement. The se ttlement agreement contemplated two possible outcomes: (1) the BOP woul d grant Mr. Patterson’s petition for compassionate release, which would tri gger Mr. Patterson’s obligation to seek dismissal of his case with prejudice, or (2) the BOP would deny Mr. Patterson’s request for compassionate release, which w ould trigger Mr. Patterson’s right to seek a reopening of his case. The second outcome occurred, and, pursuan t to the terms of the settlement agreement, Mr. Patterson move d the district court to reopen his case. Although Mr. Patterson couche d his good cause argument in terms of duress, he also made clear to the district court that the BOP had denied his petition for compassionate release and that he wished to litig ate the merits of his claims. Because the condition that would have triggered an obligation to dismiss the case failed to occur and because Mr. Patterson expresse d his desire to litigate his claims, good cause existed to reopen Mr. Patterson’s case. See, e.g., Halek , 537 F. App’x at 579– 80 (affirming the reopening of an admi nistratively closed case after proposed9 settlement reach ed an impasse). In requiring proof of somethi ng more than a desire to litigate issues that had become ripe for revi ew, the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of Mr. Patterson’s motion to reopen his case and REMAND with instruction to reopen the case to allow the parties to litigate the merits of Mr . Patterson’s claims. We also GRANT Mr. Patterson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but remind him of his obligation to make partial payments un til the filing fees ar e paid in full. Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge