Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Danielle L. Gregory

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

– Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILD SERVICES

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.

DeDe K. Connor

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

S.B., B.L., Elv.L, Eli.L., and 

A.L. (Minor Children) and

C.L. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

August 13, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-224

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Larry Bradley, 

Magistrate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 2 of 7

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner,

And

Child Advocates, Inc.,

Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.

Trial Court Cause Nos.

49D09-1805-JT-577

49D09-1805-JT-578

49D09-1805-JT-579

49D09-1805-JT-580

49D09-1805-JT-581

Mathias, Judge.

[1] The Marion Superior Court terminated the parent-child relationship of C.L. 

(“Mother”) and her five children, S.B., B.L., Elv.L., Eli.L., and A.L. on 

December 14, 2018. Mother argues she was entitled to dismissal of the 

termination petition because the factfinding hearing was outside the statutory 

parameters of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 27, 2016, all five children were adjudicated Children in Need of 

Services (“CHINS”) and placed in foster homes. Mother was ordered to 

successfully complete services including home-based therapy and a domestic 

violence assessment. Mother improved, and the children progressed in therapy 

throughout 2017. On August 2, 2017, the children were placed with Mother in 

temporary in-home trial visitation (“TTV”). The children were again removed 

from Mother’s care in September 2017 because of a variety of concerns 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 3 of 7

including the lack of utilities in the home, inappropriate discipline, domestic 

violence and Mother’s non-compliance with drug screens. The children’s 

providers noted that the children regressed during TTV and many of their 

problematic behaviors reappeared. Tr. pp. 37–38, 171, 176. After the children 

were removed, Mother was noncompliant and did not participate in case 

management to address her issues of housing, employment, parenting skills, 

healthy relationships, and the children’s trauma. The Marion County 

Department of Children Services (“MCDCS”), Guardian ad Litem, and other 

providers did not recommend resuming Mother’s visitation with the children, 

and the placement plan changed from reuniting the family to adoption. Ex. 

Vol., Petitioner’s Ex. 30. 

[3] On May 13, 2018, MCDCS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of the 

parent-child relationship for each child. Appellant’s App. Vol II, pp. 50–53, 

Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 2–13. Mother requested a mediation date and a 

factfinding hearing date at a pre-trial hearing on August 3, 2018, eighty days 

after MCDCS filed the termination petitions. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 84. 

The court scheduled mediation for October 1, 2018, and set the factfinding 

hearing for December 4 and 11, 2018. Id. at 83-84. There is no indication that 

Mother objected to the hearing dates set. 

[4] Mediation was rescheduled for November 7, 2018, 176 days after MCDCS filed 

the termination petitions. Id. at 92. No agreement was reached in mediation, 

and the factfinding hearing began December 4, 2018, 210 days after the 

termination petitions were filed. Id. at 97. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 4 of 7

[5] At the beginning of the December 4 hearing, Mother orally requested dismissal 

of the termination matter, arguing the hearing was beyond the statutory limit of 

180 days after the petitions were filed. Tr. p. 4. The trial court denied the 

motion. 

[6] The trial court issued findings of fact and terminated the parent-child 

relationship as to all five children. Mother does not challenge the findings and 

conclusions of the trial court. Mother solely appeals the trial court’s denial of 

her motion to dismiss. 

Discussion and Decision

[7] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6 specifies the timeline for conducting factfinding 

hearings in parental rights termination proceedings. The statute provides: 

(a) Except when a hearing is required after June 30, 1999, under 

section 4.5 of this chapter, the person filing the petition shall 

request the court to set the petition for a hearing. Whenever a 

hearing is requested under this chapter, the court shall:

(1) commence a hearing on the petition not more than 

ninety (90) days after a petition is filed under this chapter; 

and

(2) complete a hearing on the petition not more than one 

hundred eighty (180) days after a petition is filed under 

this chapter. 

(b) If a hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection 

(a), upon filing a motion with the court by a party, the court shall 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 5 of 7

dismiss the petition to terminate the parent-child relationship 

without prejudice. 

I.C. § 31-35-2-6. Here, the factfinding hearing commenced 210 days after the 

termination petitions were filed and concluded 217 days after the petitions were 

filed. Mother asserts she is entitled to dismissal of the petitions due to the 

untimeliness of the hearings and that the failure to dismiss denied her right to 

due process. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. 

[8] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. 

Matter of N.C, 83 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing In re Adoption of 

M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). 

[9] The State argues that Mother acquiesced to the hearing date and thus waived 

her right to challenge the setting of the factfinding hearing date, even though it 

fell outside the statutory 180 days. Appellee’s Br. at 15. There is no record of 

Mother objecting to the timeliness of the dates set at the August 3, 2018 pre-trial 

hearing. 

[10] This matter is directly addressed in Matter of N.C., where the court determined 

the parents waived the right to dismissal for untimeliness by requesting a 

continuance of a scheduled hearing date, and then agreeing the date “sound[ed] 

good.” 83 N.E.3d at 1267.

1 In the present case, Mother also agreed to the 

1 Mother attempts to distinguish the present case from Matter of N.C., stating that she requested the hearing 

date, not MCDCS; her counsel was unaware of the close deadline or that the matter was being scheduled 

outside of the deadlines; and her counsel did not request a continuance of the proceedings. However, Mother 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 6 of 7

mediation and hearing dates set on August 3, 2018. Her assent to the 

factfinding hearing dates constitutes a waiver of her right to object to the 

timeliness of the hearing. 

[11] The State also argues that Mother failed to meet the requirements of Indiana 

Code section 31-35-2-6(b) because she orally moved for dismissal at the outset 

of the factfinding hearing and failed to file a motion for dismissal. The court in 

Matter of N.C. determined the plain language of the statute contemplates the 

filing of a motion and that orally moving for dismissal does not satisfy the 

requirements of subsection (b). 83 N.E.3d at 1267.

2 Mother’s failure to submit a 

written motion for dismissal waives her right to challenge the court’s denial. 

[12] Mother’s failure to object to the mediation and factfinding hearing dates set at 

the pre-trial hearing on August 3, 2018 constitutes a waiver of the right to 

challenge the factfinding hearing date, even though it fell outside the statutory 

180 days. Mother further failed to preserve an issue for appellate review 

through her failure to submit a written motion to dismiss. Mother can be 

afforded no relief on this appeal.

fails to develop these arguments any further. “Each contention must be supported by citations to the 

authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 

22.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Accordingly, we consider them waived for failure to state a cogent 

argument. See In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ind. Appellate Rue 

46(A)(8)(a)).

2 Mother argues that her due process rights were violated by the untimeliness of the factfinding hearing. 

However, her assent to the factfinding hearing dates and failure to submit a written motion to the trial court 

waive her due process arguments. Mother further failed to show how she was prejudiced by this delay in any 

way. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-224 | August 13, 2019 Page 7 of 7

Conclusion

[13] Mother agreed to the setting of the factfinding hearing date outside the statutory 

parameters and failed to submit a written motion to dismiss the termination 

proceedings. She thus preserved no issue for appellate review under Indiana 

Code section 31-35-2-6. 

[14] Affirmed. 

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.