IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MELANIE NICHOL, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD; GINO 

GRIMALDI, in his individual 

and official capacities; and 

RICHARD L. LEWIS, in his 

individual and official 

capacities, 

Defendants. 

Michael V. Owens 

Owens & McBreen, P.C. 

319 SW Washington St., Ste. 614 

Portland, OR 97204 

Attorney for plaintiff 

Jonathan M. Hood 

Andrea D. Coit 

Jens Schmidt 

Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C. 

360 East 10th Ave., Ste. 300 

Eugene, OR 97401 

Attorneys for defendants 

No. 6:14-cv-1983-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 1 of 17
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

In this retaliation and wrongful discharge action, defendants 

City of Springfield, Gino Grimaldi, and Richard Lewis obtained a 

number of documents that had been timely designated by plaintiff 

Melanie Nichol as protected work product. Plaintiff moved for an 

order modifying defendants' subpoena and requiring defendants to 

destroy the protected materials in their possession. 

reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

For the 

From 2004 to 2013, plaintiff was a dispatcher for the 

Springfield Police Department in Springfield, Oregon. Compl. CJ! 7. 

From 2010 to 2012, plaintiff alleges she reported several fellow 

employees for harassment and sexual misconduct. Compl. CJICJI 8-11, 

17-18. In May 2013, plaintiff was placed on administrative leave 

pending investigation of allegations she had provided false 

information related to two of her complaints. Compl. CJICJI 26-27. In 

June 2013, plaintiff was fired as a result of that investigation. 

Compl. CJ! 35. 

After she was fired, plaintiff communicated extensively with 

her friend John Umenhofer ("Umenhofer"), a former sergeant who was 

fired from his position with the Springfield Police Department in 

June 2014. In October 2014, Umenhofer filed a federal lawsuit 

against the same defendants named in this action. 1 Like plaintiff, 

1 Umenhofer's lawsuit also named one additional defendant. 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 2 of 17
Umenhofer alleged defendants retaliated against him after he 

reported fellow employees for sexual misconduct. 

During discovery in this case, plaintiff produced a number of 

documents related to her correspondence with Umenhofer. 

Specifically, she produced 16 pages of email correspondence between 

plaintiff and Umenhofer; 27 pages of attachments to those emails; 

and 78 pages of hard-copy documents Umenhofer had given to 

plaintiff. Doc. 27 at 2. Plaintiff objected, however, to 

producing certain documents Umenhofer had created. On July 10, 

2015, she served defendants' counsel with a privilege log asserting 

these documents were protected work product. 2 Doc. 27-3 at 2. 

The Umenhofer Documents consist of two subgroups of materials. 

The first subgroup is a set of emails and documents created by 

Umenhofer to advise plaintiff regarding this lawsuit. Plaintiff 

alleges Umenhofer sent these emails and documents because she 

sought his "general advice" on filing a lawsuit against the City. 

Doc. 26 at 2. However, she asserts once she retained counsel, she 

"did not rely on Mr. Umenhofer's assistance to create any legal 

filings or other documents in [this] case" and is not "certain 

[she] even read all of the documents Umenhofer sent to [her]." Id. 

The second subgroup of documents 3 consists of emails and 

2 The documents plaintiff asserts are work product will be 

collectively referred to as the "Umenhofer Documents." 

3 0ne of the documents in this second subgroup is arguably 

not covered by the descriptions in plaintiff's Privilege Log. 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 3 of 17
attachments created by Umenhofer or jointly by Umenhof er and 

plaintiff in connection with plaintiff's licensure revocation 

proceedings before the Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards 

and Training ("DPSST") . 4 Plaintiff alleges because her attorneys 

in this case did not agree to represent her in the DPSST 

investigation until "[s]hortly before" the contested case hearing, 

she "sought Umenhofer's assistance both to generally refute the 

DPSST's proposed license revocation, and specifically to help [her] 

make arguments and present evidence at the DPSST Hearing." Id. at 

2-3. 

In October 2015, defendants' counsel subpoenaed Umenhofer for 

a deposition. The subpoena directed Umenhofer to produce "[a]ll 

documents, including text printouts, email, facebook postings or 

other written documents between John Umenhofer and Melanie Nichol 

from January 2012 to present." Doc. 27-1 at 1. Al though this 

subpoena was served on Umenhofer's personal attorney, defendants' 

However, as plaintiff points out, the Ninth Circuit uses a 

"holistic reasonableness analysis" rather than a bright-line rule 

to assess the timeliness of privilege claims. Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. Of Mont., 408 F.3d 

1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, defendants do not argue 

that single document is discoverable even if the rest of the 

Umenhofer Documents are not. Accordingly, this Opinion and Order 

applies to all the Umenhofer Documents as described in 

Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order (doc. 25 at 6). 

4 In October 2014, DPSST initiated a process to determine 

whether to revoke plaintiff's license to work as a 

telecommunications officer in Oregon. This process culminated in 

a contested case hearing in April 2015. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 4 of 17
counsel inadvertently failed to serve a copy of the subpoena on 

plaintiff's counsel. Doc. 29 at 3. 

When Umenhofer arrived at the deposition, he turned over to 

defendants' counsel a stack of materials. Defendants' counsel made 

copies of the documents, including the subpoena, and provided them 

to plaintiff's counsel. The parties took a 45-minute break for 

lunch and document review before returning to start the deposition. 

During the break, plaintiff's counsel read the subpoena and 

discovered the materials Umenhofer had produced contained the 

Umenhofer Documents. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the use of 

any of the Umenhofer Documents during the deposition. The parties 

agreed to suspend the deposition pending a determination of the 

discoverability of the Umenhofer Documents. 

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for a protective order and 

to modify defendants' subpoena, seeking a determination the 

Umenhofer Documents are protected work product. Defendants then 

submitted the Umenhofer Documents to the Court for in camera 

review. 

STANDARDS 

The work product rule is "not a privilege but a qualified 

immunity protecting from discovery documents or tangible things" 

prepared in anticipation of litigation. Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Dist. Of Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 

198 9) . The work product doctrine has its roots in Hickman v. 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 5 of 17
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947), in the which the Supreme Court 

held the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure did not entitle an opposing litigant to "invad[e] the 

privacy of an attorney's course of preparation[.]" In 1970, work 

product protection was codified as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

26(b) (3). This provision, which for purposes of this decision has 

remained substantially unchanged since enactment, provides: 

(A): Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a 

party may not discover documents and tangible things that 

are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial 

by or for another party or its representative (including 

the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, 

indemni tor, insurer, or agent) . But, subject to rule 

26 (b) (4) [regarding experts], those materials may be 

discovered if: 

(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 

26 (b) (1); and 

(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need 

for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without 

undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by 

other means. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (A). Rule 2 6 (b) ( 3) expanded on the rule 

announced in Hickman in at least one significant way - by making 

clear work product protection could apply to materials prepared by 

non-lawyers. See 1970 Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

2 6 (b) ( 3) (identifying "confusion and disagreement as to the scope 

of the Hickman work-product doctrine, particularly whether it 

extends beyond work actually performed by lawyers" as one of the 

"major difficulties visible in the [pre-197 0] case law") . The 

party asserting the privilege bears the burden of demonstrating 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 6 of 17
work product protection applies. Riverkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1217 (D. Or. 2014). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants contend the Umenhof er Documents are not protected 

work product for three reasons. First, they argue the Umenhofer 

Documents do not fall within the scope of Rule 2 6 (b) ( 3) because 

Umenhofer was not plaintiff's representative when he created them, 

and therefore the documents cannot be protected "work product." 

Second, defendants assert they have overcome any assertion of work 

product protection by showing a substantial need for the materials 

and an inability to obtain their substantial equivalent by other 

means. Finally, defendants aver plaintiff has waived any right to 

work product protection through selective disclosure and putting at 

issue the contents of the Umenhofer Documents. 

1. The Umenhofer Documents are Work Product 

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a two-part test to determine 

whether materials qualify for work product protection: "(l) they 

must be prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, and 

(2) they must be prepared by or for another party or by or for that 

other party's representative." In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark 

Torf/Torf Envtl. Mgmt.), 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue the Umenhofer 

documents do not satisfy the second prong because Umenhofer did not 

act as plaintiff's representative either in this action or in the 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 7 of 17
DPSST hearing. 5 

Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure begins 

with the plain meaning of the text. Whittlestone, Inc. v. HandiCraft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the relevant 

text protects materials prepared "by or for another party or its 

representative." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (A). The plain meaning 

of this broad provision encompasses four categories of materials: 

those prepared (1) by a party; (2) by a party's representative; (3) 

for a party; or (4) for a party's representative. Torf, 357 F.3d 

at 907; see also Republic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 867 

(9th Cir. 2014) ("the phrase 'by or for' [is] somewhat broad 

on [its] face"). The Umenhof er Documents fall into the third 

category, as it is undisputed Umenhofer prepared the materials for 

plaintiff, a party to this litigation. 

Defendants urge this court to conclude the Umenhofer Documents 

are not protected work product because (1) plaintiff was 

represented by counsel in both this action and the DPSST hearing, 

5 Defendants do not argue the Umenhof er Documents were not 

prepared in anticipation of litigation. It is well-settled that 

adversarial administrative proceedings such as the DPSST hearing 

are "litigation" within the meaning of Rule 26(b) (3). Nevada v. 

U.S. Dep't of Energy, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260 (D. Nev. 2007); 

cf. Menchu v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:12-CV01366-AC, 2014 WL 1217128 at *4 (D. Or. 2014) (interpreting 5 

U.S.C. § 552a(d) (5), which protects from disclosure materials 

"compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or 

proceeding," to apply to preparation for administrative hearings 

and noting that quasi-judicial administrative proceedings are 

"functionally similar" to litigation) . 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 8 of 17
and thus an attorney "could have been involved" in the 

communications with Umenhofer; ( 2) Umenhofer did not act at the 

behest of plaintiff's attorney; and (3) plaintiff testified she did 

not rely on Umenhofer' s advice, at least with respect to this 

lawsuit. Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Prot. Ord. at 5. It is true 

courts generally have applied Rule 26(b) (3)'s protections to 

materials prepared by a non-lawyer where the non-lawyer either 

acted as a party's representative or acted under instructions from 

a party's representative. See Hertzberg v. Veneman, 273 F. Supp. 

2d 67, 77 (D.D.C. 2003) (protecting investigatory materials 

compiled by Forest Service investigators at direction of Forest 

Service attorney); Nelsen v. Geren, No. 08-CV-1424-ST, 2010 WL 

3491360 at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 31, 2010) (work product protection 

applied because internal investigator, though not an attorney, was 

plaintiff's "representative"); Devries v. Advanced Am. Constr., 

Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01001-PK, slip op. at 8 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 2014) 

(protecting materials prepared by a non-lawyer friend who acted as 

plaintiff's representative). The dearth of case law matching the 

precise fact pattern here, however, does not authorize the court to 

ignore the plain meaning of Rule 26(b) (3). As one commentator has 

explained, although most work-product cases discuss materials 

generated by attorneys and agents of attorneys, 

those cases should not be read as casting doubt on the 

clear scope of Rule 2 6 (b) ( 3) . Instead, their language 

should be considered as identifying the creator of the 

work product in that case or as reflecting the norm. 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 9 of 17
Since most work product is attorney-generated, the 

language of the cases may merely reflect this typical 

occurrence. 

John W. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege§ 7:21 (3d ed. 

2015) . 

Defendants cite Largan Precision Co. Ltd. v. Genius Elec. 

Optical Co., Ltd., No. 13-cv-02502-JD, 2015 WL 124557 at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 8, 2015), for the proposition that "attorney involvement 

- or the lack thereof - is far from irrelevant" in evaluating a 

claim of work product immunity. The Largan court concluded "the 

involvement of attorneys should be considered as part of the 

'anticipation of litigation' prong of the [Ninth Circuit's two-part 

26(b)(3)] test[]." Id. at *5. Under this view, attorney 

involvement effects a presumption a document was prepared in 

anticipation of litigation, and "a party's burden to demonstrate a 

document's litigious purpose increases - all other things being 

equal as attorney involvement in creating the document 

decreases." Id. (quoting United States v. ISS Marine Servs. , Inc., 

905 F. Supp. 2d 121, 134-35 & n.8 (D.D.C. 2012)). Nothing about 

Largan is inconsistent with the conclusion the Umenhofer Documents 

are work product. Even assuming a lack of attorney involvement in 

creating materials imposes a heightened burden on a party to prove 

they were prepared in anticipation of litigation, plaintiff has met 

that burden. It is undisputed Umenhofer drafted all the documents 

at issue to assist plaintiff with either the DPSST hearing or this 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 10 of 17
lawsuit. Accordingly, the Umenhofer Documents qualify as work 

product under Rule 26(b) (3). 

Defendants contend that even if the Umenhof er Documents meet 

the technical requirements of the rule, they are not work product 

because Umenhof er is an interested third-party witness in this 

case. Although Umenhofer's status as a third-party witness does 

not automatically bring materials he prepared outside the scope of 

the work product rule, defendants are correct that personal 

observations of relevant events are not work product. See 

Brockmeier v. Solano Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. CIV S-05-2090 MCE 

EFB, 2010 WL 148179 at *6 (E. D. Cal. 2010) (collecting cases 

indicating material prepared in anticipation of litigation is 

discoverable to the extent it "disclose[s] only [a] factual account 

of what occurred on the date of the incident"); Schipp v. Gen. 

Motors Corp., 457 F. Supp. 2d 917, 924 (E.D. Ark. 2006) ("[A]ny 

verbatim non-party witness statements are neither privileged nor 

work product and must be produced.") 

An in camera review of the Umenhofer Documents reveals that 

one of the documents contains two statements about Umenhofer' s 

personal observations of potentially relevant events. However, 

both of these statements also include Umenhofer' s opinions and 

mental impressions of those events in connection with strategy for 

plaintiff's lawsuit. The statements of fact and opinion are so 

intertwined a redacted version of the statements is not a viable 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 11 of 17
option. As a result, I conclude all the Umenhofer Documents 

qualify as work product. 6 

2. Defendants Have Not Shown Substantial Need or Undue 

Hardship 

"If the work product privilege is found to apply, the burden 

shifts and the party seeking discovery must show that substantial 

need of the material exists and that the party is unable without 

undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 

materials by an alternative method." Garcia v. City of El Centro, 

214 F.R.D. 587, 591 (S.D. Cal. 2003); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b) (3) (A) (ii). Defendants assert substantial need for the 

Umenhofer Documents on two grounds. First, they argue the 

documents are "critical" to the claims and defenses at issue in 

this lawsuit because they contain information about what 

disclosures plaintiff made to City officials, and when she those 

disclosures. Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Prot. Ord. at 9-10. However, 

the Umenhofer Documents, all of which postdate plaintiff's firing 

6 It is not necessary at this stage to decide whether 

Umenhofer qualifies as plaintiff's "representative" within the 

meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (B) such that any 

documentation of his "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, 

or legal theories" are subject to the heightened protections 

associated with opinion work product. See Republic of Ecuador, 

742 F.3d at 869 n.3 ("Opinion work product . . is virtually 

undiscoverable" (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

However, this Opinion should not be read to rule out the 

possibility Umenhofer acted as plaintiff's representative, 

particularly with respect to the DPSST hearing before the date 

plaintiff's counsel agreed to represent her in that hearing. 

12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 12 of 17
by more than a year, contain no contemporaneous documentation of 

the disclosures. 

Second, defendants assert a substantial need for the documents 

for the purposes of impeachment. However, they fail to point to 

any contradictory statements on core issues in the case - for 

example, they do not assert the Umenhofer Documents show plaintiff 

has changed her story regarding the fact, timing, or extent of any 

disclosures. Defendants give a single example of the Umenhofer 

Documents' purported impeachment value: they point to plaintiff's 

deposition testimony that Umenhofer did not give her advice 

regarding this lawsuit. Doc. 27-4 at 3-4. They contend the 

Umehofer Documents directly contradict this statement. After this 

court's in camera review, I find the Umenhofer Documents have some 

limited impeachment value on this narrow point. Although these 

documents could be construed to undercut plaintiff's deposition 

testimony, however, the conflict is far from clear or direct. 

Moreover, any inconsistency between the Umenhofer Documents and 

plaintiff's testimony is on a collateral rather than core issue in 

this case; the extent of Umenhofer's assistance to plaintiff is not 

critical to any of the claims or defenses in this case. Compare 

Young v. United Parcel Serv., 88 F.R.D. 269, 271 (D.S.D. 1980) 

(finding "substantial need" on the basis of impeachment value where 

work product materials allegedly revealed conflicting statements of 

plaintiffs regarding an issue that "could be an important factor in 

13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 13 of 17
the trial of this case") with Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 

395 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E. D. La. 1974) (stating "minor 

discrepancies" insufficient to demonstrate "substantial need" even 

if materials would have some impeachment value). Accordingly, I 

find defendants failed to demonstrate substantial need for the 

Umenhofer Documents. 

In addition, defendants failed to meaningfully address the 

second requirement: they cannot without undue hardship obtain the 

equivalent evidence by other means. Defendants' only statement 

regarding this prong of the test is a bare assertion they "clearly 

cannot otherwise obtain the equivalent evidence[.]" Def.'s Resp. 

Pl.'s Mot. Prot. Ord. at 11. Actually, Umenhofer appeared at the 

first scheduled deposition and complied with defendants' subpoena. 

Defendants have not explained why Umenhof er should not be expected 

to answer truthfully any questions posed to him at his deposition. 

Thus, defendants have not explained why deposing Umenhofer is an 

inadequate alternative means to obtain the same arguably impeaching 

evidence contained in the Umenhofer Documents. 

3. Plaintiff Did Not Waive Work Product Protection 

Finally, defendants argue the Umenhofer Documents are 

discoverable because plaintiff has waived work product protection. 

A litigant waives work product protection if she attempts to use 

that protection "as both a sword and shield" or puts at issue the 

content of the protected materials. Frontier Refining, Inc. v. 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 14 of 17
Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998); see also 

Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 823 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

waiver of work product protection in the context of a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus). Here, plaintiff has done neither. 

As explained above, plaintiff voluntarily produced a set of 

materials related to her communications with Umenhofer. By 

producing those materials, defendants argue, plaintiff (1) 

effectively conceded materials prepared by Umenhofer are not 

subject to work product protection; and (2) attempted to "have it 

both ways" by "withholding only the most damaging documents." 

Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Prot. Ord. at 12. The court's in camera 

review affirms the Umenhofer Documents are qualitatively different 

from the produced documents: while the Umenhofer Documents contain 

advice from Umenhofer to plaintiff regarding strategy for her DPSST 

hearing and this lawsuit, the other documents contain no such 

advice. For example, one of the produced documents is an email 

from plaintiff to Umenhofer containing a draft version of the 

complaint in this case. But there is no indication Umenhof er 

provided any feedback to plaintiff regarding the complaint; it 

appears to have been sent to Umenhofer simply for his information. 

By contrast, the withheld documents contain, for example, "[e] -mail 

correspondence . . and attached draft document revisions 

outlining arguments Plaintiff should make in [her] DPSST 

hearing." Doc . 2 7 - 3 at 2 . Umenhof er drafted and revised these 

15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 15 of 17
DPSST documents. This attempt to carefully separate materials 

prepared in anticipation of litigation from documents merely 

related to the litigation does not amount to selective disclosure. 

Nor did plaintiff waive work product protection by putting the 

contents of the Umenhofer Documents at issue. A court analyzing 

"at issue" waiver must consider whether (1) the party is asserting 

the protection "as the result of some affirmative act, such as 

filing suit"; ( 2) "through this affirmative act, the asserting 

party puts the privileged information at issue"; and (3) "allowing 

the privilege would deny the opposing party access to information 

vital to its defense." United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 

1195 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Although plaintiff is asserting work product protection after 

filing this action, the second and third prongs of the "at issue" 

waiver test are not met here. First, plaintiff did not put the 

contents of the Umenhofer Documents at issue by filing this 

lawsuit, as she does not "rely on the work product in any way to 

justify [her] right to recovery." Frontier Refining, 136 F.3d at 

704. Second, as explained in Section 2 above, the Umenhofer 

Documents are not central to this lawsuit; accordingly, allowing 

the privilege will not deny defendants access to any critical 

information. Plaintiff has not waived work product protection for 

the Umenhofer Documents. 

CONCLUSION 

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Case 6:14-cv-01983-AA Document 30 Filed 12/18/15 Page 16 of 17
Plaintiff's motion for a protective order and to modify 

defendants' subpoena (doc. 25) is GRANTED. The Court: 

1. MODIFIES defendants' October 12, 2015, subpoena issued 

to John Umenhofer to exclude the Umenhofer Documents; and 

2. ORDERS defendants, and their attorneys and agents, not 

to disclose or use copies of the Umenhofer Documents 

already obtained, and to destroy all copies, summaries, 

transcriptions of, or notes about, any such documents in 

their possession, custody, or control. 

Defendants are hereby ordered to modify the subpoena to Umenhofer 

to exclude the Umenhofer Documents and to destroy all privileged 

materials in their possession. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

I/ ft;\ Dated this j_i:'__ day of December 2015. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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