Section 514(a) of ERISA provides, in relevant part, that ERISA “shall supersede any and
all state laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The
Supreme Court has explained that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899-900 (1983). “ERISA preemption is . . . not
limited to displacement of state laws affecting benefit plans, but rather extends to any state cause
of action that has a connection or reference to an ERISA plan.” Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Health and Welfare Fund v. Neurobehavioral Assocs. P.A., 53 F3d 172, 174 (7" Cir. 1995).
Thus, ERISA preemption is very broad. FMC Corp v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58, 111 S.Ct.

403, 407 (1990) (ERISA’s preemption claims is “conspicuous for its breadth”).

The parties do not dispute that the Rule of 85 is part of Defendant’s retirement plan and
is, therefore, governed by ERISA. Plaintiff's claims clearly have “a connection with or reference
to” the plan. Both state law counts are premised on the Rule of 85 and relate to an alleged
promise and implied obligation in this ERISA governed plan. (See R. 1-1, Pl.’s Compl., ff 25,
27, 29.) ERISA, therefore, preempts these state law claims. See Cook v. Exelon, Corp.,

No. 01 C 7406, 2002 WL 31133274 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2001)(“where a claim alleges that
an employer promised to create a pension plan with ‘certain attributes’ and did not live up to that
promise, then the claim relates to a pension plan under ERISA”).

Furthermore, Plaintiff admits in her response to Defendant’s motion that her claims
require an interpretation of the Rule of 85. She states, “The policy language in [Advance’s]
Pension Plan is clear... . The provisions for normal retirement and the ‘Rule of 85’ contained in

the Pension Plan can reasonably be interpreted as an inducement for permanent employment.”



be established consistent with [the] allegations." Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d
1073, 1078 (7"" Cir. 1992).

The Court views all the facts alleged in the complaint, as well as any reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Stachon v. United
Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7" Cir. 2000); Tatz v. Nanophase Techs. Corp.,

No. 01 C 8440, 2002 WL 31269485, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2002). Dismissal is appropriate only
where it appears beyond doubt that under no set of facts would plaintiff's allegations entitle him
to relief. Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7" Cir. 1999); Kennedy v. National Juvenile
Detention Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 695 (7" Cir. 1999). The complaint, however, must allege that
each element of a cause of action exists in order to withstand a motion to dismiss. Lucien v.
Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7" Cir. 1992). Furthermore, a plaintiff “cannot satisfy federal
pleading requirements merely by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to
outline the bases of their claims.” Collins v. Snyder, No. 02 C 4493, 2002 WL 31749173, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

Il. ERISA PREEMPTS THE STATE LAW CLAIMS

Defendant Advance argues that counts three and four of Plaintiff's Complaint -- the state
law claims for breach of contract -- are preempted by ERISA.' Plaintiff contends that ERISA
does not preempt her state law claims because neither claim requires the Court to interpret
Advance’s retirement plan and because Plaintiff does not seek benefits available under the

retirement plan.

' Given that the Court agrees that ERISA preempts Counts Three and Four, the Court need not
address the state law claims.


(See R. 12-1, Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, p. 5.) Her allegations of reliance upon promises in
the Rule of 85 depend on an interpretation of what promises, if any, were contained in Advance’s
Pension Plan. Further, Plaintiff's allegations that she reasonably expected Defendant to make “a
good faith effort to allow [her] to continue with [Advance] until her ‘Rule of 85' benefits became
vested” requires the Court to interpret whether the Rule of 85 implied any such obligation.

Accordingly, ERISA preempts the breach of contract claims in counts three and four. See
Bowles v. Quantum Chemical Co., 266 F.3d 622, 631 (7" Cir. 2001) (“ERISA will preempt a
State law breach of contract claim if the claim requires the Court to interpret or to apply the terms
of an employee benefit plan”).

CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four (R. 7-1) is granted,

DATED: February 3, 2003 ENTERED

(hay AA E

AMY J. SIS

United Statés District Court Judge



_ Minute Orde? Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Minois

Name of Assigned Judge Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge Amy J. St. Eve than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 4602 DATE 2/3/2003
CASE Vetucci vs. Advance Transformer
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
DOCKET ENTRY:
qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) o Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qo Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer brief due.
4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on set for at
(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for __at :
(7) iat} Trial{set for/re-set for] on at _.
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OOFRCP4(m) CLocal Rule 41.1 CIFRCP41(a)(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) [Other docket entry] Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts Three and Four (R.7-1) is granted.
al) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required,
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by (clephone
oY | Docketing to mail notices.
Mail AO 450 form.
Copy (o judge/magistrate judge. Lado benign
; date mailed notice
courtroom
THY deputy’s pe be yy
initials ro

Datc/time received in

mailing deputy initials

central Clerk's Office i
ss



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINE VERTUCCI, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 02 C 4602
)
v. )
: )
ADVANCE TRANSFORMER CO., a division of ) a pane
Philips Electronics North America Corporation, ) Pea 4~ 2002
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge:

Defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss counts
three and four of Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant’s motion is granted for the reasons set forth
below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former employee of Defendant Advance Transformer Co. (“Advance”), has
sued Defendant in a four count complaint. Count one alleges that Defendant discriminated
against Plaintiff on the basis of her age; count two alleges a violation of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”); and counts three and four allege state law claims
based on breach of contract. Counts three and four are the only counts at issue in this opinion.

Vertucci alleges that Advance’s employee retirement plan contained a provision known
as the “Rule of 85” which provided full retirement benefits to employees whose combined age

and years with the company total “85.” (See R. 1-1, Pl.’s Compl., 4 20.) Plaintiff contends that

1 { (



Advance terminated her “less than sixty-five months before her 63” birthday, at which time the
retirement benefits to which she would be entitled under the “Rule of 85" would have
substantially increased.” (/d.) At the time Advance terminated her, Vertucci was 57 years old
and had been employed by Advance for over 17 years. Vertucci further claims that Advance
terminated her employment “with the specific intent of interfering with her vesting in additional
retirement benefits to which she would have become entitled at the age of 63.” (Id. { 21.)

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the “Rule of 85” promised full retirement benefits if
[Advance employees] attained an age and experience with [Advance] that totaled 85 years.” (See
R. 1-1, Pl.’s Compl., 25.) Plaintiff contends that she relied on the Rule of 85 promise causing
her to continue her employment at Advance and “forego other employment opportunities.” (Jd.
| 26.) Finally, Vertucci alleges that she conferred substantial benefits on Advance and
consequently “had a reasonable expectation to be fairly paid for said benefits conferred, such
payment including a good faith effort to allow Vertucci to continue with [Advance] until her
“Rule of 85” benefits became vested.” (/d. § 29.)

ANALYSIS

L LEGAL STANDARDS

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the case. Triad Assocs., Inc. v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7" Cir. 1989); Majchrowski v. Norwest Mortgage,
Inc., 6 F.Supp.2d 946, 952 (N.D. Ill.1998). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers "whether relief is possible under [any] set of facts that could