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Page 1 – PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

CHARLES J. PATERNOSTER, OSB # 024186 

Email: cpaternoster@pfglaw.com 

PARSONS FARNELL & GREIN, LLP 

1030 SW Morrison Street 

Portland, Oregon 97205 

Telephone: (503) 222-1812 

Facsimile: (503) 274-7979 

ALAN J. GALLOWAY, OSB #083290 

E-mail: alangalloway@dwt.com 

TIM CUNNINGHAM, OSB #100906 

E-mail: timcunningham@dwt.com 

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP 

1300 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 2400 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Telephone: (503) 241-2300 

Facsimile: (503) 778-5299 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Carrie Medina 

 on behalf of the ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

AT PORTLAND 

CARRIE MEDINA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CITY OF PORTLAND, a municipal 

corporation, CITY OF GRESHAM, a municipal 

corporation, TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN 

TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF 

OREGON, a municipal corporation, OFFICER 

TAYLOR LETSIS, as both an individual and in 

his official capacity as an officer of the 

Gresham Police Department, UNKNOWN 

POLICE OFFICERS NOS. 1, 2 AND 3, both as 

individuals and in their capacities as officers of 

the Portland Police Bureau, 

 Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-00232-BR

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TRICOUNTY METROPOLITAN 

TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF 

OREGON’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

Oral Argument Requested 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Carrie Medina’s allegations support her claims that TriMet violated her First and 

Fourth Amendment rights, as well as her rights under the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§2000aa et seq. (“PPA”). Plaintiff has alleged that without probable cause, and without her 

consent, a member of the Transit Police forcibly detained her, terminated her live broadcast, and 

searched her smartphone as she was peacefully broadcasting the scene of an arrest. She has also 

alleged that the Transit Police are provided by defendant Tri-County Metropolitan 

Transportation District of Oregon (“TriMet”), that TriMet administers the Transit Police and 

appoints its commander, and that TriMet’s liability for the incident flows from the policies, 

customs, training and supervision of the Transit Police. TriMet’s motion to dismiss does not 

argue that these allegations are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under 

47 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Instead, TriMet argues that plaintiff’s additional allegation that the City of Gresham 

employed the primary officer in question—Officer Taylor Letsis (“Officer Letsis”)—completely 

absolves TriMet of any legal responsibility. TriMet’s argument is a red herring: nothing in 

§1983, the PPA, or the jurisprudence interpreting those statutes requires a formal employment 

relationship with an individual tortfeasor for municipal liability to attach, especially where that 

individual was carrying out TriMet’s policies and customs, and was subject to TriMet training 

and supervision. If the formal employment relationship were dispositive, as TriMet argues, then 

any law municipality could avoid liability for its policies by simply contracting out policing to a 

private firm that would hire the individual officers. Plaintiff respectfully asks that the court 

reject TriMet’s attempt to contract away its liability under § 1983 and the PPA and deny 

TriMet’s motion to dismiss. 

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II. ARGUMENT 

A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations 

In relevant part, plaintiff has alleged that TriMet provides a police force called the Transit 

Police which it has opted to administer through intergovernmental agreement. Complaint, Dkt. 

#1 ¶ 14 (hereinafter “Compl.”). “TriMet is a public body liable for the acts and omissions of 

members of the Transit Police and other agents and employees acting within the scope of their 

agency and/or employment.” Id. 

The Transit Police patrols are administered, coordinated, and directed by the 

Portland Police Bureau under an agreement among TriMet, Portland and 

Gresham. The Transit Police Division Commander is selected jointly by Portland 

and TriMet. The Transit Police patrols are staffed by officers from the Portland 

Police Bureau, the Gresham Police Department, and officers from other 

jurisdictions. Selection and assignment of officers and deputies to the Transit 

Police are determined jointly by the command personnel of the officer’s or 

deputy’s jurisdiction (e.g., Portland or Gresham), TriMet, and the Transit Police 

command personnel. Police officers assigned to the Transit Police are subject to 

the General Orders and training requirements of their respective jurisdictions, as 

well as the Transit Police’s Standard Operating Procedures (except to the extent 

that they conflict with the General Orders of the officer’s respective jurisdiction). 

Compl. ¶ 15. As the complaint alleges, a police car marked “Transit Police” was at the scene of 

the incident. Compl. ¶ 27. 

Plaintiff alleged that defendant Officer Taylor Letsis “was an employee of the Gresham 

Police Department.” Compl. ¶ 16. But plaintiff has also alleged (and TriMet has not addressed) 

that “at all times material to this action, defendant Officer Taylor Letsis was working as a 

member of the Transit Police, and acting within the scope of his employment and under color of 

law.” Compl. ¶ 16. As a member of the Transit Police, the scope of his employment included 

abiding by TriMet’s policies, as well as those of Portland (who administers the Transit Police) 

and Gresham. TriMet has failed to address the allegation that Officer Letsis was acting not only 

as a Gresham officer, but as a member of the Transit Police subject to Transit Police policies. 

That failure is critical, and, in fact, is fatal to its motion. 

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Plaintiff’s interactions with Officer Letsis are central to her complaint. She has alleged 

that Officer Letsis terminated her broadcast, seized her smartphone, and searched it while he 

detained her. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 20-46. 

Plaintiff’s specific allegations of municipal liability under §1983 against TriMet include: 

On information and belief, as of February 12, 2013, Transit Police 

officers had a widespread custom and practice of seizing cameras 

and/or recording devices and searching such devices for video 

footage, in the name of searching for evidence, when persons 

recorded or broadcast audiovisual footage of the police in public, 

even in circumstances where there was no reason to suspect the 

person capturing the footage of a crime and where no exigent 

circumstances existed, and Gresham, Portland, and TriMet were, or 

should have been, aware of this custom and practice. 

On information and belief, as of February 12, 2013, Gresham, 

Portland, and TriMet maintained official policies allowing Transit 

Patrol officers to seize cameras and/or recording devices and 

search such devices for video footage when persons recorded or 

broadcast audiovisual footage of the police in public, even in 

circumstances where there was no reason to suspect the person 

taking the footage of a crime and no exigent circumstances existed. 

On information and belief, as of February 12, 2013, Gresham, 

Portland, and TriMet failed to train Transit Police officers about 

the First and Fourth Amendment rights of the public and the press 

to observe, record and broadcast public scenes of police activity, 

displaying deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights 

enjoyed by all persons in the United States. 

On information and belief, as of February 12, 2013, Gresham, 

Portland, and TriMet failed to supervise and discipline Transit 

Police officers for unlawfully interfering with the First 

Amendment rights of the public and the press to observe, record 

and broadcast public scenes of police activity, displaying 

deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights enjoyed by all 

persons in the United States. 

On information and belief, the aforementioned unconstitutional 

policies, customs, and practices of the Gresham, Portland, TriMet, 

and the Transit Police were the moving force behind Officer Letsis' 

violation of Ms. Medina's constitutional rights on February 12, 

2013. 

As a direct and proximate result of the unconstitutional policies, 

customs, and practices of Gresham, Portland, TriMet, and the 

Transit Police, Ms. Medina suffered injuries, including without 

limitation physical and psychological injuries, the interruption of 

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her live broadcast and corresponding loss of footage she would 

have otherwise captured, and invasion of her privacy. As a result 

of those injuries, plaintiff is entitled at least to compensatory 

damages in the amount of twenty-one dollars. 

Compl. ¶¶ 94-98. 

 Finally, plaintiff has alleged that Officer Letsis violated the PPA while a member of the 

Transit Police, a service provided by TriMet, and subject to the Transit Police’s Standard 

Operating Procedures. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15. Because Officer Letsis was subject to TriMet’s 

control, a cause of action exists against TriMet for Officer Letsis’ actions. See generally Compl. 

¶¶ 15, 101-115. 

B. Standard of Review 

The court’s standard of review is well established: 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” [Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,] 

570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 [167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)]. A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but 

it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely 

consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted). 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). See also Bell 

Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The court must accept as true the allegations in the 

complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 

2013). See also Oracle America, Inc. v. Oregon Health Ins. Exch. Corp., No. 3:14-CV-01279-

BR, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL 163394 at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 13, 2015) (stating standard ). 

C. Municipal liability under § 1983 and Monell has never required an 

employment relationship with an individual tortfeasor. 

TriMet attempts to disclaim all liability for the actions of the Transit Police—which is a 

service provided by TriMet—based on TriMet’s policy decision to provide those services 

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through an intergovernmental agreement with other jurisdictions as opposed to hiring its own 

officers. But TriMet’s liability does not turn on which municipality or municipalities employed 

individual officers; TriMet’s liability turns on whether the customs, policies, training or 

supervision of the Transit Police and Officer Letsis (including any deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional rights of police watchdogs such as Ms. Medina) are attributable to TriMet. 

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing them in her favor, she has pleaded that 

they are. 

TriMet does not actually dispute that plaintiff has properly pleaded municipal liability; 

instead TriMet attempts to confuse the issue of municipal liability by arguing that because 

Officer Letsis was not a TriMet employee, no liability can exist against TriMet. TriMet’s 

Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. #23 at 5 (hereinafter “Motion”).1

 But that argument would only succeed 

if plaintiff was asserting respondeat superior liability against TriMet, which the parties agree 

does not exist under §1983. See id. 

Instead, consistent with Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 

2018, 56 L.Ed. 611 (1978), and its progeny, plaintiff has alleged that TriMet’s liability stems 

from a custom of unlawful searches within the Transit Police, Compl. ¶ 93, an official policy 

allowing such seizures within the Transit Police, Compl. ¶ 94, and its failure to train and 

supervise the Transit Police, Compl. ¶¶ 95-96. Plaintiff has alleged the Transit Police are a 

service provided by TriMet, Compl. ¶ 14, that TriMet is involved in the administration of the 

 

1

 TriMet cites City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 769, 799 (1986) and Palmerin v. City of 

Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986) for this proposition, but those cases only hold 

that absent an individual officer’s underlying liability, there can be no claim against a 

municipality as a matter of law. Plaintiff does not dispute that if a jury finds that Officer Letsis 

or Unknown Officers #1, #2, and #3 did not violate any of her Constitutional rights, then her 

Monell claims will necessarily fail. But neither Heller nor Palmerin stand for the broad 

proposition that the lack of a formal employment agreement between Transit Police officers and 

TriMet insulates TriMet from Monell liability. 

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force—including selecting its commander, Compl. ¶ 15, and that Transit Police officers must 

comply with the Transit Police’s Standard Operating Procedures. Compl. ¶ 15.2 TriMet’s 

policies, training and supervision reach outside of its technical “employees;” plaintiff has alleged

that Officer Letsis was a member of the Transit Police, and was acting as a Transit Police officer 

at all relevant times. Compl. ¶ 16. This is sufficient to state a claim under Monell; the entity 

with which Officer Letsis had an employment contract is simply beside the point and none of 

TriMet’s authority suggests otherwise. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[I]t is when execution of a 

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity 

is responsible under § 1983.”).3

 

If TriMet’s argument here reflected the law, then any law municipality could avoid 

liability for its policies by simply contracting with a private firm to administer its police force, 

including hiring its officers. Under those circumstances, the municipality would not have any 

“employees” on the police force whatsoever. But that is not the law. Any municipality that 

attempted such a maneuver would still be liable under Monell for its policies and practices when 

the execution of those policies and practices injures citizens. See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 

 

2

 TriMet’s invocation of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), for the proposition that “a 

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 

individual actions, has violated the constitution,” Motion at 5, is inapposite. TriMet is not a 

“Government-official” defendant; it is a government defendant, and notwithstanding its 

“employee” argument, TriMet does not dispute that plaintiff has stated a claim under Monell. 

3

 Even if Officer Letsis’s “employer” were germane to the inquiry, plaintiff has pleaded 

sufficient facts for a jury to determine that for purposes of liability TriMet was Letsis’s 

employer. See Restatement (Third) of Agency §7.03 cmt. d(2) (“It is a question of fact whether a 

general or special employer, or both, have the right to control an employee’s conduct.”); Dykema 

v. Skoumal, No. 98 CV 5309, 2000 WL 949582 at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2000) (“[T]here is a fact 

issue as to whether [the City of] Joliet can be held liable for plaintiff’s [§1983] and state law 

claims based on Skoumal’s actions, even if Skoumal is also considered a state employee.” 

(emphasis added)). 

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Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This duty is not absolved by contracting with an entity 

such as Prison Health Services. Although Prison Health Services has contracted to perform an 

obligation owed by the county, the county itself remains liable for any constitutional deprivations 

caused by the policies or customs of the Health Service.” (citation omitted)); Warren v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that Monell applies where a 

municipality’s “agents” acted pursuant to municipal policy or custom, and analyzing Monell

claim where “[t]he Corrections Corporation of America operated the prison pursuant to a 

contract with the District.”). 

The fact that plaintiff has alleged that TriMet administers the Transit Police in concert 

with Gresham and Portland does not alter this analysis. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, the 

Supreme Court made clear that when assessing municipal liability under § 1983, “there will be 

cases in which policymaking responsibility is shared among more than one official or body.” 

485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). “If . . . a city’s lawful policymakers 

could insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to 

others, § 1983 could not serve its intended purpose.” Id. at 126. Cf. Ross v. United States, 910 

F.2d 1422, 1428-29 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that “a case could arise where a governmental entity 

transfers its policy-making authority so that it would be consistent with principles of municipal 

liability to hold the entity constitutionally responsible,” but declining to apply the principle 

where the transferring authority “had no authority to influence the [transferee’s] procedures”). 

Applying the above principles, various courts have rejected arguments similar to 

TriMet’s—finding that even absent an “employment” agreement between an individual 

tortfeasor and a municipality, municipal liability can attach under § 1983 where the policies that 

caused the injury were fairly attributable to the municipality. 

For example, in Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2001), the court 

rejected the City of Little Rock’s argument—like TriMet’s here—that because it had contracted 

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its provision of jail services to the County, it was not liable for the County’s treatment of 

prisoners: 

As the City points out, it does not operate the jail. The City of 

Little Rock has no jail of its own. It contracts with the County for 

the housing of City prisoners. What the County does with 

prisoners, therefore, the City says, is not its problem, and there is 

no vicarious liability under § 1983. Although this line of argument 

has some surface appeal, we do not believe that the jury had to 

accept it. City employees were aware of the custom of chaining 

prisoners, and they knew that Ms. Young was being taken back to 

the jail. Strip searching of prisoners is routine procedure, and the 

jury could reasonably infer that the City knew that a person 

entering the jail, in jail clothing with a group of other detainees, 

would be strip searched. In these circumstances, it is far from 

unfair to attribute to the City the policies routinely used by the 

County jail in the housing and processing of City prisoners. 

Id. Similarly, in Ford v. City of Boston, the District of Massachusetts rejected the City of 

Boston’s claim that it could not be liable under Monell where Suffolk County, with which the 

City had contracted for prison services, was the entity that employed all of the individual actors 

and set all of the various policies. 

City liability for the Jail searches of BPD arrestees poses an 

interesting question of institutional responsibility. Again, the 

governing standard derives from Monell: § 1983 provides a cause 

of action against a municipality for violations resulting from 

implementation or execution of city policies or customs. In this 

case, though, the plaintiffs' claims fit none of the standard analytic 

models for municipal liability. For example, the City, unlike the 

County, had no express policy of subjecting all BPD arrestees to 

strip and visual body cavity searches. Indeed, the City claims—and 

I assume, for purposes of this ruling—that it had no control over 

the promulgation of the County policies proximately responsible 

for the challenged searches. Further, the record before me does not 

suggest that any City employees had a practice or custom of 

conducting such searches—let alone a practice sufficiently “well 

settled and widespread” as to be attributable to the City. Finally, 

none of the challenged searches resulted directly from the City's 

failure to promulgate a search policy, nor from its failure to train 

its employees regarding the constitutional prerequisites to a search. 

Nonetheless, the plaintiffs' claims against the City are clearly 

actionable under § 1983. The plaintiffs point to an express 

agreement between the City and the County Sheriff, under which 

the County agreed to “take custody of and house” BPD arrestees at 

the Jail. This case is thus best analyzed as involving a subcontract 

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between the City and the County, under which Jail employees, 

acting as agents of the City, supervised and cared for City 

arrestees. As such, the City had an affirmative obligation—as is 

present in the more standard models for municipal liability—to 

ensure that the policy of the Jail officials did not lead to 

widespread violation of BPD arrestees' constitutional rights. 

154 F. Supp. 2d 131, 148-49 (D. Mass. 2001) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

 Finally, in Rivera v. Lake County, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187, 1189-90 (N.D. Ill. 2013), 

the Northern District of Illinois found that plaintiff stated a claim for Monell liability against 

Lake County based on its control of the “Lake County Major Crimes Task Force,” despite the 

fact that the Task Force was comprised of individual officers from the Waukegan Police 

Department and the Lake County Sheriff’s Department. The court framed the issue as “whether 

Lake County can be held liable under Monell for actions of other Defendants,” and concluded 

that it could because “Plaintiff has pled that Defendant Lake County controlled the policies and 

practices that led to constitutional violation.” Id. at 1190. 

Plaintiff has alleged that Transit Police officers—regardless of which municipality 

employs them—act as agents of TriMet and carry out TriMet policy. Like the governments in 

Young, Ford, and Rivera, TriMet cannot escape liability simply by arguing that it has no 

employees on the Transit Police—a service TriMet itself provides. 

D. Defendant’s arguments against declaratory relief fail for the same reasons. 

Similarly, TriMet argues that because “Officer Letsis was employed by the City of 

Gresham,” plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief must fail. Motion at 6-7. As discussed, 

plaintiff’s constitutional claims do not turn on the entity which employed Officer Letsis—if they 

did, they would be improper respondeat superior claims. Instead, plaintiff’s constitutional 

claims center on TriMet’s liability for the Transit Police’s customs, policies, training and 

supervision. For the same reason, plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims do not turn on the 

entity which employed Officer Letsis and should not be dismissed. 

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E. Under the Privacy Protection Act, Officer Letsis is an “employee” of TriMet 

TriMet’s second argument is that the Privacy Protection Act only runs against a 

governmental unit for violations committed by “their officers or employees,” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000aa-6(a)(1), and that because Officer Letsis is employed solely by the City of Gresham, 

plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. Motion at 5-6.4

 TriMet’s argument fails because Officer 

Letsis qualifies as a TriMet “employee” as that term is used in the Privacy Protection Act. 

The term “employee” is not defined in the PPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7. The 

Supreme Court has noted that “when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, 

we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 

relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.” Commt’y for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (collecting 

cases). In Reid, the Supreme Court buttressed this general proposition with the fact that the 

statute at issue (the Copyright Act) used the term “‘scope of employment,’ a widely used term of 

art in agency law.” Id. at 740. Here too, the term “employee” is undefined and the PPA 

provides for a right of action against a governmental unit for violations “by their officers or 

employees while acting within the scope . . . of their . . . employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa6(a)(1) (emphasis added). The PPA thus covers all “employees” of a governmental unit “as 

understood by common-law agency doctrine.” Cf. Morse v. Regents of University of Cal., 821 F. 

 

4

 TriMet’s unsupported assertion that the Privacy Protection Act was “enacted . . . to protect 

traditional media organizations,” Motion at 5, is belied by both the text of the statute and its 

legislative history. The statute on its face prohibits searches or seizures against a “person 

reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public” not a “media person” or any 

other phrase that indicates a limitation to “traditional media organizations.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa 

(a). The legislative history demonstrates that “the department of justice, in drafting the 

legislation, rejected the idea of a ‘press only’ bill and sought to avoid the chilling effects of 

disruptive searches on the ability to obtain and publish information for all those who have a 

purpose to disseminate information to the public.” 96th Cong. S. Rep. 96-874 at 9 (emphasis 

added). 

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Supp. 2d 1112, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (construing PPA broadly to allow claim for supervisory 

liability). 

Plaintiff has properly pleaded allegations that could allow a jury to determine that Officer 

Letsis was a common-law “employee” of TriMet. Plaintiff has alleged that TriMet provides 

Transit Police Services, Compl. ¶ 14, that TriMet jointly administers the Transit Police and 

assigns officers, Compl. ¶ 15, and that Transit Police are subject to Transit Police Standard 

Operating Procedures, Compl. ¶ 15. Plaintiff has further alleged that Officer Letsis was 

“working as a member of the Transit Police, and acting within the scope of his employment.” 

Compl. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Under the common-law, a person is an “employee” where the 

hiring party has the right to control the manner and means by which work is accomplished. Reid, 

490 U.S. at 751. Because as pleaded, TriMet had the right to control Officer Letsis through its 

provision and administration of the Transit Police, and through Officer Letsis’s duty to abide by 

Transit Police Standard Operating Procedures, a jury could find that he was a TriMet 

“employee” sufficient to attach liability under the PPA. Plaintiff’s PPA claim against TriMet 

should not be dismissed. 

III. CONCLUSION 

TriMet’s § 1983 liability in this case hinges on the policies, customs, training and 

supervision of the Transit Police, which is a service provided by TriMet. Plaintiff has alleged 

that Officer Letsis was working as a Transit Police officer subject to Transit Police procedures, 

and that Transit Police policies, customs, training and supervision were the moving force behind 

her injury. That alone is sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under §1983, regardless 

of the entity that technically employed Officer Letsis. Section 1983 and Monell have never 

required an employment relationship with an underlying tortfeasor to establish municipal 

liability. Introducing such a requirement is unsupported by the case law, would blur the 

distinction between respondeat superior and Monell liability, and more importantly, would allow 

municipalities to contract away their liability under §1983. That cannot be the law and plaintiff’s 

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claim against TriMet under §1983 should not be dismissed. Plaintiff’s declaratory relief claims 

against TriMet survive for the same reasons. 

Similarly, TriMet’s PPA liability turns not on whether it had a formal employment 

agreement with Officer Letsis but on whether it exercised sufficient control over Officer Letsis 

for him to be considered an employee under the common law. Plaintiff has alleged facts 

sufficient for a jury to find as much, and her PPA claim against TriMet should not be dismissed. 

DATED this 27th day of April, 2015. 

PARSONS FARNELL & GREIN, LLP

By s/ Charles J. Paternoster 

Charles J. Paternoster, OSB # 024186 

Email: cpaternoster@pfglaw.com 

Telephone: (503) 222-1812 

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

By s/ Alan J. Galloway 

Alan J. Galloway, OSB #083290 

E-mail: alangalloway@dwt.com 

Tim Cunningham, OSB #100906 

E-mail: timcunningham@dwt.com 

Telephone: (503) 241-2300 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Carrie Medina on behalf of the 

ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. 

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Page 1 – CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM 

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN 

TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT OF OREGON’S MOTION TO DISMISS on the 

following parties at the following addresses by notice of electronic filing using the CM/ECF 

system: 

Robert S. Wagner

David C. Lewis 

Miller & Wagner, LLP 

2210 NW Flanders Street 

Portland, OR 97210-3408 

Phone: 503-299-6116 

Fax: 503-299-6106 

rsw@miller-wagner.com 

dcl@miller-wagner.com 

Denis M. Vannier, Deputy City Attorney

Portland Office of the City Attorney 

1221 SW Fourth Avenue, Suite 430 

Portland, OR 97204 

Denis.vannier@portlandoregon.gov 

Charles J. Paternoster

Parsons Farnell & Grein LLP 

1030 SW Morrison Street 

Portland, OR 97205 

cpaternoster@pfglaw.com 

Kimberly A. Sewell

Tri-Met 

1800 SW First Avenue, Suite 300 

Portland, OR 97201 

sewellk@trimet.org 

Dated this 27th day of April, 2015. 

By s/ Alan J. Galloway 

Alan J. Galloway, OSB #083290 

Tim Cunningham, OSB #100906 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

Case 3:15-cv-00232-BR Document 26 Filed 04/27/15 Page 14 of 14