IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

ROSS REDDICK, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GLOBAL CONTACT SOLUTIONS, LLC, 

Defendant. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:15-CV-425-PK 

OPINION AND ORDER 

AND ORDER TO SHOW 

CAUSE 

Plaintiff Ross Reddick filed this putative class action against defendant Global Contact 

Solutions, LLC ("GCS"), in the Multnomah County Circuit Court on behalf of himself and all 

others similarly situated on January 29, 2015. By and through his state-court complaint, Reddick 

alleged GCS' liability under Oregon statut01y law for failure to pay wages and for failure to pay 

all wages due and owing at the termination of employment, both such failures arising out of GCS' 

alleged practice of requiring all of its employees to attend mandato1y training at the beginning of 

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their employment, without compensation. GCS removed Reddick's action to this court effective 

March 13, 2015, on the purported basis of original federal jurisdiction under the Class Action 

Fairness Act of2005 ("CAFA"). Reddick moved for remand of this action to the Multnomah 

County Court on April 15, 2015, and oral argument was held in connection with Reddick's 

motion on May 26, 2015. 

It is well established that a defendant may remove to federal court any civil action filed in 

state court that could have been filed originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The 

plaintiff in such an action may thereafter seek to have the removed case remanded to state court 

ifthe district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action notwithstanding its removal, 

or if there was any defect in the defendant's fulfillment of the procedural requirements attending 

removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The removal statutes are generally construed restrictively, so 

as to limit removal jurisdiction. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 

(1941); see also, e.g., Gaus v. lvfiles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We strictly 

construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction") (citations omitted). 

If at any time prior to final judgment it appears that a federal court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over a removed case, the court must remand the action to state comi. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(c). Cases first filed in state comt and then removed to federal court are generally subject 

to a "strong presumption" against finding removal jurisdiction. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; St. 

Paul lvfercwy lnde111. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-292 (1938). However, in the 

context ofpurpo1ted federal subject-matter jurisdiction arising under CAFA, "no antiremoval 

presumption" applies, because CAP A was enacted specifically "to facilitate adjudication of 

ce1tain class actions in federal court," specifically large class actions that are essentially interstate 

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or multi-state in character. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 

554 (2014). 

The burden of establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of removal is 

on the pmiy seeking removal, see Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 

2004), see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006), and 

factual questions regarding the basis for removal are generally to be resolved in favor of 

remanding the case to state comi, see lvlatheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 

1090 (9th Cir. 2003). Where federal subject-matter jurisdiction purpmiedly arises under CAF A 

and the elements of such jurisdiction cannot be established on the sole basis of the allegations of 

the plaintiff's complaint, the burden of the defendant seeking removal or resisting a challenge to 

removal is to establish "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the elements not established on 

the face of the pleading are present. Ibarra v. }vfanheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 

(9th Cir. 2015); Rodriguez v. AT & T 1'1/obility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Once jurisdiction under CAFA is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it becomes the 

burden of the pmiy challenging federal subject-matter jurisdiction to establish the applicability of 

any statutory exception to CAFAjurisdiction. See Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 

1024 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In considering a post-removal challenge to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the comi 

assumes the truth of the allegations in the complaint and that a ju1y will ultimately return a 

verdict in the plaintiff's favor on all claims alleged therein. See, e.g., Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. 

A/organ Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002). In addition, the court 

may consider the contents of the defendant's removal petition, relevant "summary-judgementPage 3 - OPINION AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

Case 3:15-cv-00425-PK Document 17 Filed 06/01/15 Page 3 of 9
type evidence" proffered at the time of removal, and supplemental evidence proffered at the time 

federal subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 

(9th Cir. 2004); see also Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002). It is well 

established that "[c]onclusory allegations" or allegations based on "information and belief" are 

insufficient to satisfy the defendant's burden. i'vfatheson, 319 F.3d at 1090-1091; Valdez, 372 at 

1117. If, after consideration of all material allegations and evidence, "doubt regarding the right 

to removal exists, [the] case should be remanded to state court." lvfatheson, 319 F.3d at 1090. 

Here, Reddick challenges both whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction over his action arises 

under CAF A in the first instance and whether his action is within the scope of either of two 

statutory mandatory abstention rules, pursuant to which the federal courts are required to decline 

to exercise jurisdiction over controversies essentially intrastate in character. 

Under CAFA, the federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any class action in 

which: (1) the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollms exclusive of interest and costs, 

(2) any plaintiff class member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant, (3) the primary 

defendants are not states, state officials, or other govermnent entities against whom the district 

court may be foreclosed from ordering relief, and (4) the number of plaintiffs in the class or 

classes at issue is at least 100. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(5); Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 

478 F.3d 1018, 1020-1021, 1021 n. 3, 1021n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

However, the district courts are required to decline to exercise jurisdiction under Section 

1332(d)(2) under both the "local controversy" abstention rule codified at 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(4)(A) and the "home-state controversy" abstention rule codified at 28 U.S.C. § 

1332( d)( 4)(B). The "local controversy" abstention rule requires the federal courts to decline to 

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exercise CAFA jurisdiction over any class action in which: 

(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff 

classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action 

was originally filed; 

(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant-

(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the 

plaintiff class; 

(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the 

claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 

(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was 

originally filed; and 

(Ill) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related 

conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the 

action was originally filed; and 

during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class 

action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any 

of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). The "home-state controversy" abstention rule similarly requires the 

federal comts to decline to exercise CAF A jmisdiction over any class action in which "two-thirds 

or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primmy 

defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed." 28 U.S.C. § 

1332( d)( 4)(B). The Ninth Circuit treats these provisions as setting forth "exceptions to 

jurisdiction" under CAFA. Serrano, 478 F.3d at 1023. 

In addition, CAF A expressly provides that, under ce1iain circumstances, the courts are 

permitted in their discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction under Section 1332( d)(2). Such 

discretion to decline to exercise federal subject-matter jurisdiction is available where "greater 

than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the 

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aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally 

filed," 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), and is to be based on consideration of: 

Id. 

(A) whether the claims assetied involve matters of national or interstate 

interest; 

(B) whether the claims assetied will be governed by laws of the State in which 

the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States; 

(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid 

Federal jurisdiction; 

(D) whether the action was brought in a fornm with a distinct nexus with the 

class members, the alleged hatm, or the defendants; 

(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was 

originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is 

substantially larger than the number of citizens from any other State, and 

the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed 

among a substantial number of States; and 

(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 

1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf 

of the same or other persons have been filed. 

Assuming arguendo that GCS has been or will be successful in establishing the four 

elements of federal subject-matter jurisdiction under CAFA, the court will be called upon to 

detetmine whether Reddick's action falls within the scope of either of the two mandatmy 

abstention rules set fotih at Sections 1332(d)(4)(A) and 1332(d)(4)(B) or the discretionaty 

abstention rule set fotih at Section 1332( d)(3). All three provisions require the court to make a 

finding of fact regarding the proportion of putative class members that were citizens of Oregon as 

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of March 13, 2015, the date GCS removed Reddick's action to this court. 1 

The only evidence ofrecord bearing even marginally on this question is the declaration 

testimony of John Kania, proffered by GCS, that "there is at least one member ofth[e] putative 

class [as defined by Reddick] who is a citizen of a State other than Oregon," and that "GCS has 

two office locations, which are 13-15 miles, respectively [sic], from the Washington/Oregon 

border." Declaration of John Kania, ~~ 5-6. In addition, this court may properly take judicial 

notice, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, that as of the date the data underlying the 2010 U.S. 

Census were collected, approximately 80% of the population of the so-called PortlandVancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Metropolitan Statistical Area (in which region it is likely, but not 

established by evidence, that all or nearly all class members resided during the time of their 

employment by GCS) were residents of Oregon. It is reasonable to conclude from such evidence 

that it is empirically unlikely that in excess of one third of all class members were, as of March 

13, 2015, residents of states other than Oregon, but it is not reasonable to conclude that that fact 

has been established to any degree of certainty. 

In light of the Ninth Circuit's recent holding that "there must ordinarily be at least some 

facts in evidence from which the district court may make findings regarding class members' 

citizenship for purposes of CAFA's local controversy exception," "11fondragon v. Capital One 

Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2013), it would be improvident for this cou1t to base 

analysis of the applicability of the statuto1y abstention rules discussed above on the sole basis of 

1 It is undisputed that GCS, the sole defendant herein, is an Oregon company with its 

principal place of business in Oregon, and similarly undisputed that the injuries allegedly flowing 

from GCS' complained-of conduct were incurred in Oregon, where GCS does business. Reddick 

offers his counsel's unsupported asse1tion that no class action based on facts similar to those 

underlying this action has been filed against GCS in the past three years. 

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judicially noticed evidence whose materiality is even partly conjectural. However, because the 

judicially noticed evidence discussed above is sufficient to create significant doubt as to whether 

this court could properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over Reddick's claims, and because 

of the imp01tance of avoiding federal disposition of any claim not subject to federal jurisdiction, 

the parties are hereby ordered to show cause, within 45 days of the date hereof, why this action is 

not subject to mandatory remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4) or to discretionary remand under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). For the same reasons, all other fmther proceedings in this action are 

stayed pending GCS' response to this comt's order to show cause, other than discovery calculated 

to lead to the production of admissible evidence regarding the place of citizenship of the 

members ofReddick's proposed class of plaintiffs as of the date this action was removed.' 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set f01th above, the parties are ordered to show cause, within 45 days of 

the date hereof, why this action should not be remanded to state comt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4), and all other fmther proceedings in this action are stayed 

other than discovery tailored as discussed above to the limited purpose of uncovering evidence 

I II 

II I 

II I 

Ill 

2 Discussion in lvlondragon, supra, establishes that evidence of the putative class 

members' domicile or residence, whether as of or prior to the date of removal, while not 

dispositive of the citizenship question, is neve1theless material to dete1mination of the putative 

class members' citizenship at the material time. See J\Iondragon, 736 F.3d at 885-886. 

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sufficient to pennit a finding of fact as to the proportion of Reddick's proposed class of plaintiffs 

that were residents of states other than Oregon as of March 13, 2015. 

Dated this 1st day of June, 2015. 

onorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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