Our review of the disciplinary panel's findings and 

recommendations is de novo. SCR 105(3)(b); In re Discipline of Stuhff, 108 

Nev. 629, 633, 837 P.2d 853, 855 (1992). 2We therefore "must examine the 

record anew and exercise independent judgment," but the disciplinary 

panel's recommendations nonetheless are persuasive. In re Discipline of 

Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 515, 25 P.3d 191, 204 (2001). Generally, the State 

Bar has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that an 

attorney committed the violations charged, In re Discipline of Drakulich, 

111 Nev. 1556, 1566, 908 P.2d 709, 715 (1995), but where, as here, the 

attorney fails to respond to a complaint, "the charges shall be deemed 

admitted," SCR 105(2). Thus, the only issue before us is the appropriate 

level of discipline. Dy-Ragos did not file an opening brief; therefore, this 

appeal stands submitted for decision on the record. SCR 105(3)(b). 

In determining the appropriate discipline, this court has 

considered four factors to be weighed: "the duty violated, the lawyer's 

mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 

misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." In re 

. . . continued 

2012. It appears that Dy-Ragos has not resolved the prior CLE 

suspension or petitioned for reinstatement. The conduct at issue in this 

case occurred in 2012 and 2013; the formal complaint was filed in 2015. 

Some of the violations in this case are similar to those in the prior 

disciplinary proceeding, in particular violations of RPC 5.3 

(responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants). 

2SCR 105(3)(b) has been amended to give deference to a disciplinary 

panel's factual findings, but that amendment does not apply to this case. 

See In re Amendments to Court Rules Regarding Attorney Discipline, 

Specifically, SCR 105, ADKT 0505 (Order Amending Supreme Court Rule 

105, November 5, 2015) (providing that amendment is "effective 30 days 

from the date of this order"). 

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Discipline of Lerner, 124 Nev. 1232, 1246, 197 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2008). 

The purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public, the courts, and 

the legal profession, not to punish the attorney. State Bar of Nev. v. 

Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 213, 756 P.2d 464, 527-28 (1988). 

The disciplinary panel recommends that Dy-Ragos: (1) be 

suspended from the practice of law for seven months, (2) be required to 

retake and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination 

(MPRE), (3) be subject to the same terms and conditions on reinstatement 

as set forth in the prior disciplinary order entered by this court on April 4, 

2014, and (4) pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding (excluding bar 

counsel and staff salaries). The decision does not specify a start date for 

the suspension. 

A period of suspension is appropriate considering the duties 

violated, the injury to the client, the fact that a formal complaint had been 

filed against Dy-Ragos alleging violations of RPC 5.3 (responsibilities 

regarding nonlawyer assistants) before the conduct at issue in this 

complaint, and the aggravating circumstances (bad faith obstruction of the 

disciplinary proceeding, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the 

conduct, and indifference to making restitution). Compare ABA Standards 

for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Compendium of Professional 

Responsibility Rules and Standards, Standard 7.2 (2015) ("Suspension is 

generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is 

a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential 

injury to a client. ."), with id. Standard 7.1 ("Disbarment is generally 

appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a 

violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a 

benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious 

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Parraguirre 

injury to a client, the public or the legal system."). We agree with the 

panel that a seven-month suspension is sufficient. 

We hereby suspend attorney Ramon Dy-Ragos for seven 

months commencing from the date of this order. The conditions previously 

imposed on his reinstatement in Docket No. 63884 remain in effect, with 

the added condition that Dy-Ragos take and pass the MPRE. Dy-Ragos 

shall also pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding (excluding bar 

counsel and staff salaries) within 30 days from receipt of the State Bar's 

bill of fees and costs. The parties shall comply with the applicable 

provisions of SCR 121.1. 

It is so ORDERED. 

\l'emc , C.J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Chair, Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board 

Ramon Dy-Ragos 

Stan Hunterton, Bar Counsel, State Bar of Nevada 

Kimberly Farmer, Executive Director, State Bar of Nevada 

Perry Thompson, Admissions Office, U.S. Supreme Court 

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