IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

NATHANIEL T. THORNTON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Nelson Hall 

Bennett, Hartman, Morris & Kaplan, LLP 

210 S.W. Morrison Street, Suite 500 

Portland, Oregon 97204 

Attorney for plaintiff 

Janice E. Hebert 

United States Attorney's Office 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 3:15-cv-01038-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 1 of 12
Heather L. Griffith 

Social Security Administration 

Office of the General Counsel 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MIS 221A 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

Attorneys for defendant 

AIKEN, Judge: 

PlaintiffN athaniel T. Thornton brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiffs applications for Supplemental 

Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, 

the Commissioner's decision is affirmed. 

BACKGROUND 

Born December 7, 1972, plaintiff was 34 on the alleged disability onset date and 40 on the 

date of his disability hearing. Tr. 30. He has worked as a cashier, customer care professional, and 

technical support representative. Tr. 214. He started a technical support business called "Dragonfly 

Tech" in 2002, but the business failed in 2004. Tr. 47, 323. 

In November 2006, plaintiff was laid off from a technical support job at InFocus after his 

position was outsourced. Tr. 289. Plaintiff worked for InFocus for approximately two and a half 

years before he was laid off. Tr. 303. At InFocus, he had significant problems with attendance and 

punctuality. See Tr. 292-93 (documenting eight absences and thirty-six instances of tardiness in an 

eight-month period). After he was laid off, he worked for three months as a DJ at a strip club. Tr. 

49. He quit in October 2007 because being at the strip club was "too much." Tr. 49. 

At that point, plaintiff became the primary caregiver for his son. Tr. 49-50, 332. His partner, 

Lara Lohne, got a job around the time he left the strip club; he considered this "like fate was like 

saying okay, well maybe you should be the dad[.]" Tr. 49. He describes himself as a "helicopter 

parent" who watches his son all the time. Tr. 50. His son is autistic and requires "a lot more handson" care than other children his age. Tr. 50. Plaintiff worked part-time from home as a technical 

support representative from 2010 to 2013. Tr. 33-35. 

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Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 2 of 12
In November 2011, plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB. Tr. 167, 174. He alleged disability 

beginning October 19, 2007 due to a host of mental impairments, including anxiety, panic attacks, 

and agoraphobia. Tr. 37, 53, 167, 174, 252. His applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. Tr. 70, 75, 88, 100. On November 13, 2013, a hearing was held before an 

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 27, 147. Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified, as did 

a vocational expert ("VE"). Tr. 26-27. On May November 21, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable 

decision. Tr. 20. After the Appeals Council denied his request for review, plaintiff filed a complaint 

in this Court. Tr. 1. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based upon proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 

Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere 

scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion." Gutierrezv. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ's" decision. Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 

(9th Cir. 2001). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation but the 

Commissioner's decision is rational, the Commissioner must be affirmed, because "the court may 

not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner." Edlund v. Afassanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 

1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 

COMMISSIONER'S DECISION 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability 

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

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Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 3 of 12
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4). At 

step one, the ALJ found plaintiff engaged in "substantial gainful activity" from January 1, 2011 to 

March 31, 2012. Tr. 11, 13; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). The ALJ accordingly defined the 

"period under review" as April 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, plaintiffs date last insured. 1 

Tr. 11, 13. At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff suffers from severe anxiety disorder. Tr. 13; 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ determined plaintiffs impairment did not 

meet or equal a listed impairment under the regulations such that plaintiff should be deemed 

presumptively disabled. Tr. 14; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). 

The ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") 

to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following 

nonexertional limitations: he should only have brief superficial interactions with coworkers and the general public; he should be in a structured work environment with 

clear expectations regarding job requirements; and he would do better with more 

complex jobs rather than simple jobs, i.e., he would not do well with simple work. 

Tr. 15; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At step four, the ALJ concluded plaintiff could not perform any 

of his "past relevant work." Tr. 18, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). At step five, the ALJ found 

plaintiff could perform a number of jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, 

including inventory clerk, return clerk, and circuit board assembler. Tr. 19, 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520( a)( 4)(v), (g). The ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and denied his application for benefits. 

Tr. 19. 

DISCUSSION 

All plaintiffs arguments focus on the ALJ' s formulation of the RFC. Plaintiff contends the 

ALJ erred by (1) discrediting plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony; (2) discrediting the lay 

1 Although the ALJ defined the period under review to begin April 1, 2012, she ultimately 

concluded plaintiff had not been disabled from October 19, 2007 through the date of her 

decision. Tr. 19. The ALJ did not explain why she excluded October 19, 2007 through 

December 31, 2010 when defining the period under review. For the purposes of this opinion, the 

period under review includes October 19, 2007 to January 1, 2011 and April 1, 2012 to 

December 31, 2012. 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

I 

Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 4 of 12
witness statement of plaintiffs partner, Lara Lohne; and (3) improperly resolving conflicts in the 

medical evidence. I address each contention in tum. 

I. Plaintiff's Subjective Symptom Testimony 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in her evaluation of his subjective symptom testimony. 

Specifically, plaintiff argues the ALJ failed meet her duty to identify which specific testimony she 

was discrediting. Plaintiff also avers the ALJ' s general reasons for discrediting his testimony are 

unsupported by substantial evidence. 

In evaluating subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ must engage in a two-step process. 

First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Second, if the claimant has produced 

that evidence, and the ALJ has not determined that the claimant is malingering, the 

ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's 

testimony regarding the severity of the claimant's symptoms. 

Treichler v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). If the ALJ rejects subjective symptom testimony, she must "specifically 

identify the testimony" found not credible. Id 

In a written function report, plaintiff alleged he finds it mentally exhausting to leave his 

house. Tr. 249. He does dishes but cannot cook or do most other chores, as they trigger his anxiety. 

Tr. 251. He does not go outside because "people are scary" and "outside is not safe." Tr. 252. He 

fears "[o]pen spaces, alien technology, emotional people, loud people, [and] police/military 

corruption." Tr. 255. At the hearing, plaintiff elaborated that he finds it very difficult to leave his 

home because the "people" and "unpredictability" make it too stressful. Tr. 42. He is able to go to 

the grocery store, but he stays the "minimum amount of time" and adheres to a "route" with 

"maximum efficiency." Tr. 42. He estimates he must expend "double to triple the amount of mental 

energy" required of a "normal person" to complete tasks. Tr. 46. He has "difficulty going to places 

that [he] ha[s]n't been before." Tr. 47. He has panic attacks "every three to four weeks," but had 

them "(w]eekly" when he was working. Tr. 53. The attacks last "four to six hours" and make him 

"feel like [he is] dying." Tr. 53. 

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I Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 5 of 12
The ALJ found plaintiffs anxiety "could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 

symptoms." Tr. 16. However, she found plaintiffs "allegation that his is incapable of all work 

activity" unconvincing for three reasons. Tr. 16. 

First, the ALJ noted the timing of plaintiffs purported disability onset date and his immediate 

transition to being a full-time parent for his young son. The ALJ found the timing raised questions 

about plaintiffs "motivations, and whether his failure to work has more to do with the desire to stay 

at home and raise his child, rather than the inability to perform basic work-related activities because 

of his alleged impairments." Tr. 17. Relatedly, the ALJ found plaintiffs ability to care full-time for 

a special needs child "suggests abilities consistent with the capacity to perform basic work-related 

activities." Tr. 17. 

Second, the ALJ found that although there was "an obvious mental health impairment that 

causes" plaintiff "some hardship," the medical records undermined plaintiffs testimony about the 

type and severity of his symptoms. Tr. 17. The ALJ noted that plaintiff had cycled through a 

number of mental heal th providers, and that many of those providers noted plaintiffs symptoms 

were vague and made diagnosis difficult. One doctor, after reviewing plaintiffs records, concluded 

he was systematically presenting different constellations of symptoms to different healthcare 

providers in search of various diagnoses to support his disability application. The ALJ noted the 

absence of any longitudinal treatment relationship addressed to any of his problems other than his 

anxiety disorder. 

Third, the ALJ cited plaintiffs failure to take medication to address his symptoms despite 

multiple providers recommending medication. She stated that "[w]ith adequate treatment, some 

individuals with chronic mental disorders not only to have their symptoms and signs ameliorated, 

but they also return to a level of function close to the level of function they had before they 

developed symptoms or signs of their mental disorders." Tr. 17. Although the ALJ did not give 

plaintiffs failure to try any medication for longer than two days "conclusive" weight, she found "his 

reluctance to even give psychiatric medications an opportunity strongly suggests he has no interest 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 6 of 12
in achieving medical and functional improvement." Tr. 17. 

I conclude the ALJ' s lack of specificity in discrediting plaintiffs testimony does not require 

reversal. The requirement to "specifically identify" the testimony being discredited derives from the 

requirement to review the reasoning of an agency's decision rather than that decision's end result. 

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102. A reviewing court may not "substitute [its] conclusions for the ALJ's, 

[n]or speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions." Id at 1103. Nonetheless, a decision 

explained with "less than ideal clarity" may be upheld so long as "the agency's path may reasonably 

be discerned." Id. at 1099 (citing Alaska Dep 't of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 

U.S. 461, 497 (2004) (quotation marks omitted)). 

The ALJ discredited plaintiffs testimony "he can do no work at all." Tr. 18. She also took 

pains to explain it was "evident" plaintiff suffered from "severe health impairments" that limited his 

ability to function. Looking to plaintiffs statements in the record and the limitations the ALJ 

included in the RFC, the only reasonable interpretation of these two statements together is as 

discrediting statements that plaintiff could not leave the house at all while crediting more specific 

limitation statements, for example regarding plaintiffs difficulty with crowds and new, 

unpredictable situations. The ALJ could have been clearer in identifying the testimony she was 

discrediting. Nonetheless, because the reasoning underlying her decision can be discerned, the 

decision's "less than ideal clarity" is not a ground for reversal. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099. 

I further conclude the ALJ' s decision to give limited weight to plaintiffs subjective symptom 

testimony is supported by substantial evidence. An ALJ permissibly may consider "daily activities 

involving skills that may be transferred to the workplace" and "unexplained, or inadequately 

explained, failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment" in deciding how 

much weight to give a plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

346 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (quotation marks omitted). The ALJ reasonably concluded full-time 

parenting of a special needs child showed plaintiff possessed skills transferrable to a job. The ALJ 

also reasonably interpreted plaintiffs frequent transitions from mental health provider to mental 

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Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 7 of 12
health provider and failure to try to treat his symptoms with medication to mean he was not serious 

about getting better. The ALJ's conclusions are not compelled by the record; there are other ways 

to interpret plaintiffs activities of daily living and treatment choices. But the question is not whether 

an ALJ' s determination is the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence, but whether that 

determination is a plausible interpretation of the evidence. Rollins v. Massanari, 26 l F .3d 853, 857 

(9th Cir. 2001). Because the ALJ's interpretation meets that standard, it must be affirmed. 

II. Lahne 's Third-Party Function Report 

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ's decision to discredit a third-party function report filled 

out by Lohne. Lohne stated plaintiffs anxiety and paranoia make it "nearly impossible" for him to 

be around others. Tr. 234. The ALJ concluded the report appeared to be "colored by [Lohne's] 

affection" for plaintiff and found Lohne had insufficient motivation to give an objective assessment. 

Tr. 15. 

Lay testimony from family members and friends is "competent evidence that an ALJ must 

take into account." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may discredit lay 

testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms only if she supports her decision with "reasons germane 

to each witness." Id. An ALJ may not question the candor of a lay witness simply because the 

witness shares a close personal or emotional relationship with the claimant. See Valentine v. 

Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[I]nsofar as the ALJ relied on 

characteristics common to all spouses, she ran afoul of our precedents."). 

Here, however, specific evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion. In March 2011, plaintiff 

was investigated by the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit on suspicion of attempting to 

fraudulently obtain disability benefits. Tr. 339. When agents went to plaintiffs home looking for 

him, Lohne told them plaintiff was not home and would not be back for "several hours." Tr. 343. 

As the agents left the house, they received a phone call from plaintiff, who revealed he was working 

upstairs. Tr. 344. When the agents returned to the house, Lohne "apologized for having lied" and 

explained she feared plaintiff was going to be arrested. Tr. 344. 

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Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 8 of 12
The ALJ rationally concluded Lohne's willingness to lie to government agents to protect 

plaintiff from being arrested suggested a willingness to exaggerate plaintiffs symptoms to help him 

obtain disability benefits. The ALJ did not err in discrediting Lohne's statement. 

III. Weighing Medical Evidence 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in omitting from the RFC limitations suggested in a 

series of psychological evaluations. Plaintiff contends the limitations must be included in the RFC 

because the ALJ partially discredited the opinions of plaintiffs examining physicians without 

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so. 

An ALJ must consider all medical opinions in the record. 20 C.F .R. § 404. l 527(b ). "When 

evaluating the medical opinions of treating and examining physicians, the ALJ has discretion to 

weigh the value of each of the various reports, to resolve conflicts in the reports, and to determine 

which reports to credit and which to reject." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1042 (9th Cir. 

2007). Although the opinions of treating physicians are given deference, the ALJ may reject them 

for "specific, legitimate reasons" if "they are contradicted by the opinion of a non-treating 

physician." Id. 

The medical records in this case are riddled with conflict and ambiguity. In August and 

October 2010, Dr. Carter evaluated plaintiff. Tr. 328. Dr. Carter found "predominant aspects of 

[plaintiffs] profile" were "Eccentric Cluster Personality Features (with related cognitive 

distortions/paranoia, social difficulties, and emotional dysregulation) and acute anxiety-related 

problems, including likely post-traumatic stress." Tr. 334. Dr. Carter concluded "these difficulties 

affect his daily ability to function within the normal constraints of working society, interact with 

others at work appropriately and maintain a consistent persistence and pace that is necessary to 

maintain employment." Tr. 336. The record contains no evidence of further treatment with Dr. 

Carter. 

In March 2012, Dr. Spangler treated plaintiff on three occasions over the course of about two 

months. In his initial evaluation, Dr. Spangler diagnosed possible "panic disorder with 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 9 of 12
agoraphobia," possible anxiety disorder, and possible schizotypal personality disroder. Tr. 360. Dr. 

Spangler emphasized that these diagnoses could not be "confirmed with one visit." Tr. 360. After 

the third visit, Dr. Spangler opined plaintiff had a "very atypical collection of symptoms" and 

"atypical reaction[s]" to medication. Tr. 461. Dr. Spangler did not provide any opinion about 

workplace limitations in his treatment notes. 

For about six months in late 2011 and early 2012, plaintiff participated in counseling with 

a Qualified Mental Health Professional at Dr. Spangler's clinic. Tr. 365-71, 463-50. The counseling 

notes do not clarify plaintiffs diagnoses except to consistently document problems with anxiety. 

In July 2012, Dr. Alvord examined plaintiff on a referral from the state disability office. Dr. 

Alvord concluded a definitive diagnosis was "difficult" due to plaintiffs "vague symptoms." Tr. 

337. He diagnosed schizoaffective disorder (bipolar type), dissociative identity traits, and schizoid 

personality traits. Tr. 3 77. Dr. Alvord noted plaintiff was functioning occupationally, "suggest[ing] 

he has been able to keep his symptoms in check on some level." Tr. 377. 

Between November 2012 and August 2013, plaintiff attended monthly cognitive therapy 

appointments to treat anxiety and depression. Tr. 413-34. 

In February 2013, Dr. Fishman conducted a psychological evaluation of plaintiff. Tr. 400. 

Dr Fishman diagnosed Asperger' s syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder with panic/agoraphobia, 

bipolar disorder, and schizotypal personality features. Tr. 407. Dr. Fishman opined plaintiff has 

"adequate cognitive abilities to function successfully in a competitive work environment, but 

treatment and accommodations ... will be necessary" to increase the likelihood of maintaining longterm employment. Tr. 408. He recommended a variety of workplace modifications, including 

placement in a work setting where "minimal social interaction is required" and a "stable, consistent 

environment" with "clear expectations and chain of command." Tr. 408. 

In short, over the course of three years, plaintiff received sometimes-overlapping, sometimesconflicting diagnoses and treatment recommendations from six different doctors and other mental 

health professionals. The doctors disagreed not only over the correct diagnosis but also over whether 

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Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 10 of 12
plaintiff would be able to function in a work environment. The ALJ had a duty to resolve these 

conflicts, determine which ofplaintiff s impairments (if any) were severe, and extract concrete work 

limitations to be incorporated into the RFC. The ALJ resolved the conflicts by looking to yet another 

medical opinion in the record, that of a non-examining physician employed by the State of Oregon 

Department of Human Resources Vocational Rehabiliation Division, Dr. Ude. Tr. 14. Dr. Ude 

reviewed the mental health evaluations described above and concluded plaintiff "definitely has 

mental health issues, but ... is systematically presenting symptoms of first one disorder, and then 

another, completely different disorder, at various mental health centers, hoping to get 'proof of one 

or more disorders." Tr. 506. The ALJ gave "great weight" to Dr. Ude's opinion and "some weight" 

to the opinions of the examining and treating physicians. Tr. 12, 14. She determined Dr. Ude's 

quest-for-a-diagnosis theory supplied "[p ]erhaps the best" explanation of the conflicting diagnoses, 

changing symptoms, and brief treatment histories with each provider. Tr. 14. Although that 

determination is not the only possible way to read the record, it is rational and as such must be 

upheld. 

The ALJ concluded the record as a whole supported finding anxiety disorder was a severe 

impairment and incorporated into the RFC limitations from the examining and treating physicians 

that related to plaintiffs anxiety (including related panic and agoraphobia). The limitations to "brief 

superficial interactions with coworkers and the general public" and a "structured work environment 

with clear expectations regarding job requirements" closely track the workplace limitations 

recommended by Dr. Fishman, for example. Compare Tr. 16 with Tr. 408. This selective 

incorporation of workplace limitations from the examining doctors' medical opinions is consistent 

with the ALJ' s decision to give "some weight" to those opinions. Because the ALJ permissibly 

relied on Dr. Ude's opinion to view plaintiffs reported symptoms with skepticism, she was not 

required to incorporate all limitations suggested by each doctor into the RFC. 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01038-AA Document 26 Filed 09/05/16 Page 11 of 12
CONCLUSION 

The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is dismissed. 

IT IS SO O~ERED. ~ ~ 

Dated this Jday of Atrgcrst 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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