II

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1873

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a

missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United

States against limited ballistic missile attack.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 27, 1998

Mr. COCHRAN (for himself, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. LOTT, Mr.

THURMOND, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. HELMS, Mr. WARNER, Mr. LUGAR, Mr.

NICKLES, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. BURNS, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. KEMPTHORNE,

Mr. ALLARD, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr.

SHELBY, Mr. THOMPSON, Mr. BOND, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. FRIST, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. KYL, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. MCCAIN, Ms.

SNOWE, Mr. ASHCROFT, and Mr. GRAMS) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending

the territory of the United States against limited ballistic

missile attack.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘American Missile Pro3 tection Act of 1998’’.

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

5 Congress makes the following findings:

6 (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction

7 delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among

8 the most serious security issues facing the United

9 States.

10 (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President

11 Clinton certified, that ‘‘I . . . find that the pro12 liferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical

13 weapons (‘weapons of mass destruction’) and

14 the means of delivering such weapons, con15 stitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to

16 the national security, foreign policy, and econ17 omy of the United States, and hereby declare a

18 national emergency to deal with that threat.’’

19 This state of emergency was reaffirmed in

20 1995, 1996, and 1997.

21 (B) In 1994 the President stated, that

22 ‘‘there is nothing more important to our secu23 rity and the world’s stability than preventing

24 the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic mis25 siles’’.
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1 (C) Several countries hostile to the United

2 States have been particularly determined to ac3 quire missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

4 President Clinton observed in January of 1998,

5 for example, that ‘‘Saddam Hussein has spent

6 the better part of this decade, and much of his

7 nation’s wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi

8 people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and

9 biological weapons and the missiles to deliver

10 them’’.

11 (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ‘‘it

12 is in the supreme interest of the United States

13 to defend itself from the threat of limited ballis14 tic missile attack, whatever the source.’’

15 (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the

16 United States is increasing.

17 (A) Several adversaries of the United

18 States have stated their intention to acquire

19 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of at20 tacking the United States.

21 (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi

22 has stated, ‘‘If they know that you have a

23 deterrent force capable of hitting the

24 United States, they would not be able to

25 hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent—
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1 missiles that could reach New York—we

2 would have hit it at the same moment.

3 Consequently, we should build this force so

4 that they and others will no longer think

5 about an attack.’’

6 (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Pal7 estine Liberation Front, has stated, ‘‘I

8 would love to be able to reach the Amer9 ican shore, but this is very difficult. Some10 day an Arab country will have ballistic

11 missiles. Someday an Arab country will

12 have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the

13 United States and for Israel to reach peace

14 with the Palestinians before that day.’’

15 (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated,

16 ‘‘Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If

17 we could reach Washington, we would

18 strike if the need arose.’’

19 (iv) Iranian actions speak for them20 selves. Iran’s aggressive pursuit of me21 dium-range ballistic missiles capable of

22 striking Central Europe—aided by the con23 tinuing collaboration of outside agents—

24 demonstrates Tehran’s intent to acquire

25 ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.
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1 (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess

2 ballistic missiles, with at least 10 of those coun3 tries developing over 20 new types of ballistic

4 missiles.

5 (C) From the end of World War II until

6 1980, ballistic missiles were used in one con7 flict. Since 1980, thousands of ballistic missiles

8 have been fired in at least six different con9 flicts.

10 (D) The clear trend among countries hos11 tile to the United States is toward having ballis12 tic missiles of greater range.

13 (i) North Korea first acquired 300-kil14 ometer range Scud Bs, then developed and

15 deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is

16 currently deploying the 1000-kilometer

17 range No-Dong, and is developing the

18 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and

19 6000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2,

20 which would be capable of striking Alaska

21 and Hawaii.

22 (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range

23 CSS-8s, progressed through the Scud B

24 and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-

25 kilometer range Shahab-3 and 2000-kilo-
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1 meter range Shahab-4, which would allow

2 Iran to strike Central Europe.

3 (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash pro4 gram, produced a new missile, the Al-Hus5 sein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.

6 (iv) Experience gained from extending

7 the range of short- and medium-range bal8 listic missiles facilitates the development of

9 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

10 (E) The technical information, hardware,

11 and other resources necessary to build ballistic

12 missiles are increasingly available and accessible

13 worldwide.

14 (i) Due to advances in information

15 technology, a vast amount of technical in16 formation relating to ballistic missile de17 sign, much of it formerly classified, has be18 come widely available and is increasingly

19 accessible through the Internet and other

20 distribution avenues.

21 (ii) Components, tools, and materials

22 to support ballistic missile development are

23 increasingly available in the commercial

24 aerospace industry.
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1 (iii) Increasing demand for satellite2 based telecommunications is adding to the

3 demand for commercial Space Launch Ve4 hicles, which employ technology that is es5 sentially identical to that of interconti6 nental ballistic missiles. As this increasing

7 demand is met, the technology and exper8 tise associated with space launch vehicles

9 also proliferate.

10 (F) Russia and China have provided sig11 nificant technical assistance to rogue nation

12 ballistic missile programs, accelerating the pace

13 of those efforts. In June of 1997, the Director

14 of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress

15 on weapons of mass destruction-related equip16 ment, materials, and technology, stated that

17 ‘‘China and Russia continued to be the primary

18 suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to

19 stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern

20 weapons to countries of concern.’’

21 (G) Russia and China continue to engage

22 in missile proliferation.

23 (i) Despite numerous Russian assur24 ances not to assist Iran with its ballistic

25 missile program, the Deputy Assistant Sec-
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1 retary of State for Nonproliferation testi2 fied to the Senate, that ‘‘the problem is

3 this: there is a disconnect between those

4 reassurances, which we welcome, and what

5 we believe is actually occurring.’’

6 (ii) Regarding China’s actions to dem7 onstrate the sincerity of its commitment to

8 nonproliferation, the Director of Central

9 Intelligence testified to the Senate on Jan10 uary 28, 1998, that, ‘‘the jury is still out

11 on whether the recent changes are broad

12 enough in scope and whether they will hold

13 over the longer term. As such, Chinese ac14 tivities in this area will require continued

15 close watching.’’

16 (H) The inability of the United States to

17 defend itself against weapons of mass destruc18 tion delivered by long-range ballistic missile

19 provides additional incentive for hostile nations

20 to develop long-range ballistic missiles with

21 which to threaten the United States. Missiles

22 are widely viewed as valuable tools for deterring

23 and coercing a vulnerable United States.

24 (3) The ability of the United States to antici25 pate future ballistic missile threats is questionable.
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1 (A) The Intelligence Community has failed

2 to anticipate many past technical innovations

3 (for example, Iraq’s extended-range Al-Hussein

4 missiles and its development of a space launch

5 vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue

6 states to surmount traditional technological ob7 stacles to obtaining or developing ballistic mis8 siles of increasing range.

9 (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen10 tral Intelligence reported to Congress that

11 ‘‘many Third World countries—with Iran being

12 the most prominent example—are responding to

13 Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying

14 more on legitimate commercial firms as pro15 curement fronts and by developing more con16 voluted procurement networks.’’

17 (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen18 tral Intelligence stated to Congress that ‘‘gaps

19 and uncertainties preclude a good projection of

20 exactly when ‘rest of the world’ countries will

21 deploy ICBMs.’’

22 (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intel23 ligence testified that Iran would have a me24 dium-range missile by 2007. One year later the

25 Director stated, ‘‘since I testified, Iran’s suc-
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1 cess in getting technology and materials from

2 Russian companies, combined with recent indig3 enous Iranian advances, means that it could

4 have a medium-range missile much sooner than

5 I assessed last year.’’ Department of State offi6 cials have testified that Iran could be prepared

7 to deploy such a missile as early as late 1998,

8 nine years earlier than had been predicted one

9 year before by the Director of Central Intel10 ligence.

11 (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long12 range ballistic missile threats could have severe na13 tional security and foreign policy consequences for

14 the United States.

15 (A) An attack on the United States by a

16 ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass

17 destruction could inflict catastrophic death or

18 injury to citizens of the United States and se19 vere damage to their property.

20 (B) A rogue state’s ability to threaten the

21 United States with an intercontinental ballistic

22 missile may constrain the United States’ op23 tions in dealing with regional threats to its in24 terests, deter the United States from taking ap25 propriate action, or prompt allies to question
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1 United States security guarantees, thereby

2 weakening alliances of the United States and

3 the United States’ world leadership position.

4 (5) The United States must be prepared for

5 rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles

6 armed with weapons of mass destruction.

7 (A) In its resolution of ratification for the

8 START II Treaty, the United States Senate

9 declared that ‘‘because deterrence may be inad10 equate to protect the United States against

11 long-range ballistic missile threats, missile de12 fenses are a necessary part of new deterrent

13 strategies.’’

14 (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of

15 Defense Perry stated that in the post-Cold War

16 era, ‘‘we now have opportunity to create a new

17 relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual

18 Assured Destruction, but rather on another ac19 ronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.’’

20 (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Sec21 retary of Defense for Policy testified to the

22 Senate that ‘‘I and the administration are quite

23 willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue

24 state, a potential proliferant, beginning to de25 velop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching
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1 the United States, we would have to give very,

2 very serious attention to deploying a limited na3 tional missile defense.’’

4 (6) The United States has no defense deployed

5 against weapons of mass destruction delivered by

6 long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy

7 such a national missile defense system.

8 SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

9 It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon

10 as is technologically possible an effective National Missile

11 Defense system capable of defending the territory of the

12 United States against limited ballistic missile attack

13 (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).

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