COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

STEVEN L. ROMINE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1356-95-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JULY 30, 1996 

KAREN A. ROMINE 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 

 Morris H. Fine (Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Debra C. Albiston (Cynthia E. Cordle; Kaufman & 

Canoles, on brief), for appellee. 

 Appellant, Steven L. Romine ("husband"), appeals a decree of 

the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach ("circuit court") 

affirming, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and 

Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Virginia Beach 

("J&DR court") to reinstate an order of spousal support in favor 

of appellee, Karen A. Romine ("wife"), which the circuit court 

initially entered and subsequently abated. We find that the J&DR 

court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the support order and, 

therefore, reverse. 

 I. 

 Husband and wife were divorced by decree entered in the 

circuit court on September 3, 1991. The decree awarded spousal 

support to wife in the amount of $900 per month. The decree also 

transferred to the J&DR court all matters pertaining to the 
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enforcement, modification, or revision of the support award. 

 On March 11, 1994, husband filed a petition in the circuit 

court to reduce the support award on the ground that he was then 

unemployed. On March 18, 1994, the parties agreed to abate 

support payments beginning in April 1994. The agreement was 

incorporated into a decree of the circuit court entered November 

14, 1994. The November decree ordered husband to advise counsel 

of his return to employment and allowed wife to petition for 

reinstatement of support. The November decree did not again 

transfer the matter to the J&DR court. 

 On December 7, 1994, wife petitioned the J&DR court to 

reinstate spousal support on the ground that husband had gained 

employment in June 1994. On March 16, 1995, the J&DR court 

reinstated support in the amount of $900 per month effective June 

1, 1994. 

 Husband noted his appeal, and the J&DR court set a $5,000 

bond with surety, which husband failed to post. Husband 

petitioned the circuit court to permit his appeal without posting 

the bond. However, the circuit court entered a decree, denying 

husband's motion on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction 

and that the J&DR court had jurisdiction to require the bond. 

Implicit in the circuit court's ruling is a finding that the J&DR 

court had jurisdiction to reinstate the support order. 

 On appeal, husband contends, inter alia, that the circuit 

court's exercise of jurisdiction in entering the decree abating 
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the support order divested the J&DR court of jurisdiction to act 

further. We agree.1

 II. 

 Code § 20-79(c) grants authority to a circuit court to 

transfer to a J&DR court "matters pertaining to support and 

maintenance for the spouse" after the entry of a decree of 

divorce.2 A circuit court's transfer of such matters to a J&DR 

 1Because we reverse on the jurisdictional issue, we decline 

to address appellant's additional assignments of error. 

 2Code § 20-79(c) provides, as follows: 

 In any suit for divorce or suit for 

maintenance and support, the court may after 

a hearing, pendente lite, or in any decree of 

divorce a mensa et thoro, decree of divorce a 

vinculo matrimonii, final decree for 

maintenance and support, or subsequent decree 

in such suit, transfer to the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court the 

enforcement of its orders pertaining to 

support and maintenance for the spouse, 

maintenance, support, care and custody of the 

child or children. After the entry of a 

decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii the 

court may transfer to the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court any other 

matters pertaining to support and maintenance 

for the spouse, maintenance, support, care 

and custody of the child or children on 

motion by either party, and may so transfer 

such matters before the entry of such decree 

on motion joined in by both parties. In the 

transfer of any matters referred to herein, 

the court may, upon the motion of any party, 

or on its own motion, and for good cause 

shown, transfer any matters covered by said 

decree or decrees to any juvenile and 

domestic relations district court within the 

Commonwealth that constitutes a more 

appropriate forum. An appeal of an order by 

such juvenile and domestic relations district 

court which is to enforce or modify the 
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court creates concurrent jurisdiction in each court. Crabtree v. 

Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 86, 435 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1993). The 

circuit court retains its continuing jurisdiction to modify 

custody and support matters pursuant to Code §§ 20-108, -109. 

See id. 

 However, although a circuit court retains continuing 

jurisdiction following a transfer pursuant to Code § 20-79(c), it 

does not follow that a J&DR court similarly retains jurisdiction 

pursuant to such a transfer once the circuit court again 

exercises its jurisdiction in the case. Indeed, for the 

following reasons, we hold that it does not. 

 First, the statute does not extend continuing jurisdiction 

over matters of custody and support to J&DR courts. Cf. Code 

§§ 20-108, -109; Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 86, 435 S.E.2d 887 

(discussing statutory authority providing for continuing 

jurisdiction in the circuit court). Rather, the statutory scheme 

provides the circuit courts such jurisdiction and the authority 

to transfer to the J&DR courts jurisdiction over limited matters. 

 The J&DR court's jurisdiction exists only as a result of action 

taken by a circuit court. 

 Second, the cessation of a J&DR court's concurrent 

jurisdiction upon a circuit court's exercise of its continuing 

jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory scheme. See Code 

(..continued) 

decree in the divorce suit shall be as 

provided in § 16.1-296. 
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§ 20-79(a);3

 Code §§ 16.1-241, -244;4Rochelle v. Rochelle, 225 

 

 3Code § 20-79(a) provides, as follows: 

 In any case where an order has been 

entered under the provisions of this chapter, 

directing either party to pay any sum or sums 

of money for the support of his or her 

spouse, or concerning the care, custody or 

maintenance of any child, or children, the 

jurisdiction of the court which entered such 

order shall cease and its orders become 

inoperative upon the entry of a decree by the 

court or the judge thereof in vacation in a 

suit for divorce instituted in any circuit 

court in this Commonwealth having 

jurisdiction thereof, in which decree 

provision is made for support and maintenance 

for the spouse or concerning the care, 

custody or maintenance of a child or 

children, or concerning any matter provided 

in a decree in the divorce proceedings in 

accordance with the provisions of § 20-103. 

 4Code § 16.1-241 provides, in part, as follows: 

 The judges of the juvenile and domestic 

relations district court elected or appointed 

under this law shall be conservators of the 

peace within the corporate limits of the 

cities and the boundaries of the counties for 

which they are respectively chosen and within 

one mile beyond the limits of such cities and 

counties. Except as hereinafter provided, 

each juvenile and domestic relations district 

court shall have, within the limits of the 

territory for which it is created, exclusive 

original jurisdiction, and within one mile 

beyond the limits of said city or county, 

concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile 

court or courts of the adjoining city or 

county over all cases, matters and 

proceedings involving: 

* * * * * * * 

 L. Any person who seeks spousal support 

after having separated from his spouse. A 

decision under this subdivision shall not be 

res judicata in any subsequent action for 
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(..continued) 

spousal support in a circuit court. A 

circuit court shall have concurrent original 

jurisdiction in all causes of action under 

this subdivision. 

 Code § 16.1-244(A) provides, in part, as follows: 

 Nothing contained in this law shall 

deprive any other court of the concurrent 

jurisdiction to determine the custody of 

children upon a writ of habeas corpus under 

the law, or to determine the custody, 

guardianship, visitation or support of 

children when such custody, guardianship, 

visitation or support is incidental to the 

determination of causes pending in such 

courts, nor deprive a circuit court of 

jurisdiction to determine spousal support in 

a suit for separate maintenance. However, 

when a suit for divorce has been filed in a 

circuit court, in which the custody, 

guardianship, visitation or support of 

children of the parties or spousal support is 

raised by the pleadings and a hearing is set 

by the circuit court on any such issue for a 

date certain to be heard within twenty-one 

days of the filing, the juvenile and domestic 

relations district courts shall be divested 

of the right to enter any further decrees or 

orders; such matters shall be determined by 

the circuit court unless both parties agreed 

to a referral to the juvenile court. Upon a 

showing of need to continue any preliminary 

protective order issued by the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court, the 

circuit court shall grant a hearing to the 

parties as a preferential matter on the court 

docket. Nothing in this section shall 

deprive a circuit court of the authority to 

refer any such case to a commissioner for a 

hearing or shall deprive the juvenile and 

domestic relations district courts of the 

jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders 

prior to the entry of a conflicting order of 

any circuit court for any period during which 

the order was in effect or to temporarily 

place a child in the custody of any person 

when that child has been adjudicated abused, 

neglected, in need of services or delinquent 

subsequent to the order of any circuit court. 
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Va. 387, 391-92, 302 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1983); Martin v. Bales, 7 Va. 

App. 141, 145, 371 S.E.2d 823, 825-26 (1988). As these 

provisions demonstrate, the jurisdiction that a J&DR court shares 

concurrently with a circuit court terminates, as a matter of law, 

upon the circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction. There is no 

authority supporting the proposition that a J&DR court's 

jurisdiction does not similarly terminate when its jurisdiction 

is obtained pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). 

 Third, a circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction after 

transfer to a J&DR court conclusively determines that the matter 

will be litigated in a court of record. It follows that the 

circuit court intends to preclude the J&DR court from acting on 

that issue. See Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887. 

 Finally, the cessation of a J&DR court's jurisdiction under 

such circumstances is consistent with the policy considerations 

underlying the relevant statutes. See id. at 86-87, 435 S.E.2d 

at 887. These considerations include the legislative intent that 

the circuit courts retain full jurisdictional power as provided 

by statute, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction of the 

J&DR court. See id. at 86, 435 S.E.2d at 887. To effectively 

implement that legislative intent, the circuit court's 

jurisdiction must, of necessity, encompass the power not only to 

reinstate a case earlier transferred to a J&DR court and 

adjudicate all relevant issues, see id. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887, 

but also the power to decide which court is the more appropriate 
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forum for any necessary review, modification, and enforcement of 

its orders resolving the new issues. Any divestment of a circuit 

court's jurisdictional power to address and decide matters 

properly before it must emanate not from the parties or the J&DR 

court, but by act of the circuit court pursuant to Code 

§ 20-79(c), with specific reference to the matters to be 

transferred. To invest in a J&DR court the power to review, 

modify, or enforce orders of a circuit court in the absence of 

such a mandate would undermine the structure and authority of 

judicial process. 

 Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court's assumption of 

jurisdiction over a support matter subsequent to its transfer 

pursuant to Code § 20-79(c) divests a J&DR court of 

jurisdiction.5

 Thus, the J&DR court in this case had no 

jurisdiction to reinstate the support order which the circuit 

court had previously abated. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the decree of the circuit court 

is reversed and the order of the J&DR court vacated. 

Reversed and vacated.

 

 5

A circuit court may, of course, retransfer the case 

pursuant to Code § 20-79(c).