IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EMMA L. CARSON, 6:15-CV-00409-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

ALAN STUART GRAF

208 Pine Street

Floyd, VA 24091

(540) 745-2519

Attorney for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

Acting United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1011

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 6:15-cv-00409-BR Document 22 Filed 05/10/16 Page 1 of 20
DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

THOMAS M. ELSBERRY 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104-7075

(206) 615-2112

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Emma L. Carson seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications for

Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security

Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Following a review of the record, the Court AFFIRMS the

decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. 

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications on 

December 20, 2010, and alleged a disability onset date of 

March 9, 2007. Tr. 207, 222.1 The applications were denied

initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on September 10, 2015, are referred to as "Tr."

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(ALJ) held a hearing on February 1, 2013. Tr. 90-105. At the

hearing Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Plaintiff and

a vocational expert (VE) testified. A second hearing was held on

September 30, 2010. Tr. 36-79.

The ALJ issued a decision on September 25, 2013, in which he

found Plaintiff is not disabled. Tr. 19-30. That decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner on January 6, 2015,

when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. 

Tr. 1-7. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court

seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in December 1961 and was 48 years old on

her alleged onset date. She completed the ninth grade in

special-education classes. Tr. 94. Plaintiff has past relevant

work experience as a fuel attendant, rodent-control worker,

kennel attendant, cashier, and fast-food worker. Tr. 28-29.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to “degenerative disc

disease, hepatitis, asthma, high blood pressure, anxiety,

Shambergs disease, recurring pneumonia, emphyzema, low thyroid,

[and] depression.” Tr. 240.

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STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her

inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690). 

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The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). 

See also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th

Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d

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at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648

F.3d at 724. The criteria for the listed impairments, known as

Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 1 (Listed Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). See also Social Security Ruling

(SSR) 96-8p. “A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a

day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p,

at *1. In other words, the Social Security Act does not require

complete incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair

v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

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416.920(a)(4)(iv). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of

jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. 

Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2010). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the

testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,

subpart P, appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),

416.920(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity (SGA) since her March 9, 2007,

alleged onset date. Tr. 21. The ALJ found Plaintiff met the

insured status requirements through September 30, 2010.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments

including degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; asthma;

carpal-tunnel syndrome of the left, nondominant hand; a history

of carpal-tunnel syndrome of the right hand; hypertension;

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depression; anxiety; obesity; cannabis abuse; and mathematics

disorder. Tr. 22. 

At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments do not

meet or equal any listed impairment. Tr. 22. The ALJ found

Plaintiff has the RFC for less than a full range of mediumexertion work and can lift, carry, push, and pull 25 pounds

occasionally and 20 pounds frequently; can stand and walk for six

hours; and can sit for six hours in an eight-hour work day. She

can tolerate frequent but not constant exposure to respiratory

irritants such as dust, odors, gases, and fumes; is occasionally

able to handle, finger, and feel with the nondominant left upper

extremity; is able to work with things rather than people or

data; is able to use commonsense understanding to perform

instructions provided in oral, written, or diagrammatic form

consistent with a range of unskilled work at or below reasoning

level (SVP) three as those terms are defined in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (DOT); and should avoid jobs in which the

ability to perform mathematics is an essential component of the

work. Tr. 27.

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform

any past relevant work. Tr. 28. 

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff is able to perform the

occupations of sales attendant, router, and laundry sorter. 

Tr. 29. 

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the Commissioner erred by (1) improperly

rejecting the opinion of Gregory A. Cole, Ph.D., an examining

physician; (2) improperly finding Plaintiff capable of other work

at Step Five; (3) failing to fully develop the record; and 

(4) not considering the combined effects of Plaintiff’s mental

and physical impairments at Step Three. 

I. The ALJ did not err in assessing the medical evidence.

Disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1); 416.927(e)(1). If no conflict arises

between medical source opinions, the ALJ generally must accord

greater weight to the opinion of a treating physician than that

of an examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. More weight

is given to the opinion of a treating physician because the

person has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient

as an individual. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir.

2007). In such circumstances the ALJ should also give greater

weight to the opinion of an examining physician over that of a

reviewing physician. Id. If a treating or examining physician’s

opinion is not contradicted by another physician, the ALJ may

only reject it for clear and convincing reasons. Id. (treating

physician); Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.

2006)(examining physician). Even if one physician is

contradicted by another physician, the ALJ may not reject the

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opinion without providing specific and legitimate reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing so. 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1066. The opinion of

a nonexamining physician by itself is insufficient to constitute

substantial evidence to reject the opinion of a treating or

examining physician. Widmark, 454 F.3d at 1066 n.2. The ALJ may

reject physician opinions that are “brief, conclusory, and

inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Bayliss v.

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

Dr. Cole examined Plaintiff on March 7, 2013. Tr. 721-31. 

He conducted an interview, reviewed records, and administered the

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV and Beck Depression

Inventory-II. 

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Cole that she attended school

through tenth grade, had poor grades, and received special

education in reading and mathematics. Tr. 722. She quit school

when she became pregnant. She has a significant history of

substance abuse: She last used methamphetamine in December 2012

and uses it every three months. She also smokes marijuana about

twice a month. 

On examination there was not any evidence of psychomotor

agitation or slowing. Plaintiff reported feeling depressed on

and off for most of her life, but she denied feeling hopeless and

experiencing suicidal ideation. Plaintiff said she startled

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easily at night and had anxiety “in crowds and in traffic.” Tr.

723. 

Dr. Cole found Plaintiff was able to complete a multiplestep task without errors, she was able to do simple calculations,

and her delayed memory capacity was average although she gave up

easily on tasks designed to assess her memory capacity. Tr. 723. 

Intelligence testing placed Plaintiff at the borderline level of

functioning. She had a Full Scale IQ score of 77, a Verbal

Comprehension score of 80, and a Perceptual Reasoning score of

90. Tr. 726. Plaintiff’s score on the Beck Depression

Inventory-II was 36, which indicates a severe level of depressive

symptomatology. Tr. 726. 

Dr. Cole stated Plaintiff would not have any difficulty

understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions;

would have moderate difficulty understanding, remembering, and

carrying out complex instructions; would have moderate difficulty

interacting appropriately with the public, supervisors, and coworkers; and would have difficulty responding appropriately to

usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. 

Tr. 729-30.

Dr. Cole diagnosed Plaintiff with Major Depression,

Recurrent; Anxiety Disorder, NOS; Cannabis Abuse; Learning

Disorders in the areas of reading and mathematics; and posttraumatic stress disorder. She also had a history of alcohol and

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amphetamine abuse. Tr. 726. On Axis II Dr. Cole diagnosed

Plaintiff with Borderline Intellectual Functioning. He assessed

a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)2

 score of 51. 

Dr. Cole found:

Results of this evaluation indicated that the

client exhibited problems in the areas of 

attention and concentration. She also was

noted to have below average immediate, delayed,

and working memory capabilities. It should be

noted, however, that the client tended to give

up easily on tasks designed to assess her

memory abilities. The client had some difficulty

sustaining simple routine tasks, but no problems

completing a simple multiple-step task were 

observed. From the results of this evaluation,,

if the client pursues a vocational placement in

the near future, then it is presumed that her:

intellectual deficits/claimed learning disorders,

level of anxiety/anger management difficulties,

tendency to give up easily on tasks, problems in 

the areas of attention and concentration, and 

claimed pain problems, would be the primary 

factors, which would impact her overall level of

vocational success. In the latter area, further

medical evaluation is suggested . . . .

Tr. 727.

Dr. Cole also completed a Medical Source Statement of

2 Although the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders issued May 27, 2013,

abandoned the GAF scale in favor of standardized assessments for

symptom severity, diagnostic severity, and disability (see

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V (DSM-V)

16 (5th ed. 2013)) at the time of Plaintiff’s assessment, the GAF

scale was used to report a clinician’s judgment of the patient’s

overall level of functioning on a scale of 1 to 100 (see

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV)

31-34 (4th ed. 2000)). In the fourth edition a GAF of 51-60

indicated moderate symptoms such as flat affect and

circumstantial speech, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,

few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).

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Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental). See SSA Form HA1152-U3. Tr. 729-31. Dr. Cole checked boxes indicating

Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to interact with

the public, to interact with supervisors, and to interact with

co-workers. Tr. 730. Dr. Cole indicated Plaintiff was also

moderately limited in her ability to understand and to remember

complex instructions; to carry out complex instructions; and to

make judgments on complex, work-related decisions. Tr. 729. The

form defines “moderate” limitation as “more than a slight

limitation in this area but the individual is still able to

function satisfactorily.” Tr. 729. 

The ALJ summarized Dr. Cole’s opinion, but he did not

indicate the weight he gave to it. Tr. 25. The ALJ found

Plaintiff is limited as follows:

. . . . perform medium work . . . with the 

following limitations: able to lift, carry

push and pull 25 pounds occasionally and

20 pounds frequently; able to stand and walk

six hours in an eight-hour workday; able to 

sit six or more hours in an eight-hour workday; able to tolerate frequent but not constant

exposure to respiratory irritants such as dust,

odors, gases, and fumes; occasionally able to 

hand, finger, and feel with nondominant left

upper extremity; able to work with things rather

than people or data, able to use commonsense

understanding to perform instructions provided

in oral, written, or diagrammatic form, consistent

with a range of unskilled work, at or below

reasoning level (SPV3), as those terms are 

defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

(DOT); should avoid jobs in which the ability 

to perform mathematics is an essential component

of the work.

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Tr. 27.

 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate

in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC all of the limitations

identified by Dr. Cole. Plaintiff initially argued the limit “to

work with things rather than people or data” does not adequately

incorporate Dr. Cole’s diagnosis of Plaintiff as moderately

limited in the ability to work with coworkers, the public, and

supervisors. Because the jobs identified by the VE did not

include extensive contact with the public or coworkers, however,

Plaintiff concedes the ALJ’s error is harmless. Tr. 71-73. 

Plaintiff, nevertheless, continues to argue that all of the jobs

cited by the VE require contact with a supervisor, and the ALJ

failed to include a moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to

work with supervisors. Plaintiff cites SSR 85-15 to support her

position:

The basic mental demands of competitive,

remunerative, unskilled work include the

abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple 

instructions; to respond appropriately to

supervision, coworkers, and usual work

situations; and to deal with changes in a

routine work setting.

The Commissioner, in turn, contends the ALJ did not err

because Dr. Cole did not preclude Plaintiff from dealing with

supervisors. The Commissioner points to the SSA Form HA-11152-U3

definition of “moderate” limitation as “still able to function

satisfactorily” in dealing with people, including supervisors.

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The clear language of the Form’s definition of moderate

limitation supports the Commissioner’s argument.

In any event, Plaintiff argues SSA Form HA-11152-U3 is

inherently defective because it requires a physician to make an

assessment of a patient’s vocational ability without knowing the

kind of employment that the patient might seek, and a “moderate”

limitation will not preclude any employment due to the definition

of “moderate.” In addition, Plaintiff points to case law as well

as to SSA Regulations that indicate vocational opinions are

beyond the expertise of a medical professional. The Court notes,

however, a medical professional completing an SSA Form can and

presumably does read the definition of terms and then proceeds to

offer his or her opinion.

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ did

not err because the ALJ adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s

limitation set out by Dr. Cole, and the ALJ provided legally

sufficient reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record for the consideration he gave to Dr. Cole’s opinion.

II. The ALJ did not err at Step Five.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he posed a

hypothetical question to the VE that was less restrictive as to

Plaintiff’s limitations than the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s

RFC. 

The first hypothetical question posed to the VE was

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consistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment:

[A]ble to lift, carry, push and pull 25 

pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently; 

able to stand and walk six hours in an eight-hour

workday; able to sit six or more hours in an 

eight-hour workday; able to tolerate frequent but 

not constant exposure to irritants such as dust,

odors, gases, and fumes; frequently, but not 

constantly handle - perform gross handling with

the left upper extremity, which is the nondominant extremity. . . . This individual is able 

to work with things rather than people or data, and 

able to use commonsense understanding to perform

instructions provided in oral, written, or 

diagrammatic form, which is consistent with a 

range of work, at or below reasoning level 3, 

but I’ll further specify that I’m looking at 

unskilled work at or below reasoning level 3, 

as those terms are defined in the Dictionary 

of Occupational Titles.

Tr. 63. The ALJ also found mathematical calculations could not

be an essential component of Plaintiff’s work. Tr. 64. 

The VE testified Plaintiff could not do her prior work under

the ALJ’s hypothetical, but Plaintiff could perform work as an

industrial cleaner, counter-supply worker, and laundry laborer. 

Tr. 64. 

The ALJ modified the hypothetical posed to the VE to include

limitations as to “the handling, gross handling with the left

upper extremity to occasional, as - instead of frequent, does

that affect the [claimant’s] ability to perform those jobs?” 

Tr. 65. The VE testified the added limitation would allow the

performance of work as a sales attendant, router, and laundry

sorter. Tr. 65. The VE said the “Dictionary of Occupational Job

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Titles labels those [jobs] as requiring frequent use bilaterally;

however, based on my knowledge, understanding, and experience in

the field of vocational rehabilitation, if one has limited use of

the non-dominant left upper extremity that could be used on

occasional basis, that it would not exclude those positions.” 

Tr. 66. 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s decision limited Plaintiff to

“occasionally able to hand[le], finger, and feel with [her]

nondominant left upper extremity.” Tr. 27. Plaintiff contends 

the hypothetical posed to the VE did not address Plaintiff’s

limitations in fingering or feeling. Tr. 66. The Commissioner,

however, contends the VE did not limit his answer to occasional

handling, but instead to general overall occasional use, which

includes handling, fingering, and feeling. The Court finds the

VE’s language was reasonably considered by the ALJ as including

limitations of handling, fingering, and feeling. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes on this record that the

ALJ’s hypothetical and his decision at Step Five are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. 

III. The ALJ did not fail to develop the record.

 Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to develop the record in

light of the fact that Dr. Cole did not record Plaintiff’s

Performance IQ score or her Verbal IQ score. Dr. Cole

administered the WAIS-IV in which the terms Verbal IQ (VIQ) and

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Performance IQ (PIQ) have been replaced with the terms Verbal

Comprehension Index (VCI) and Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI). 

Dr. Cole reported Plaintiff had an VIQ of 80 and PRI of 92. 

There is not any authority in this Circuit that recognizes

the Verbal Comprehension Index score and Perceptual Reasoning

Index scores in the WAIS-IV as the functional equivalent of the

Verbal IQ score and the Performance IQ score used in the WAISIII. Other courts, however, have found the scores to be

functionally equivalent. See, e.g., Fatheree v. Colvin, No.

1:13-CV-01577-SKO, 2015 WL 1201669, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16,

2015); Plank v. Colvin, No. 12-4144, 2013 WL 6388486 (E.D. Pa.

Dec. 6, 2013). This Court finds the reasoning of those decisions

is persuasive and, accordingly, concludes the VCI and PRI scores

in the WAIS-IV are the functional equivalent of the Verbal IQ

score and Performance IQ score used in the WAIS-III. 

Thus, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not

fail to develop the record regarding Plaintiff’s IQ scores. 

IV. The ALJ adequately considered the combination of Plaintiff’s

impairments.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Three by failing to

consider whether the combination of her physical and mental

impairments met or equaled in severity a Listed Impairment. 

Plaintiff, however, does not identify the Listed Impairment that

she allegedly meets or equals in severity. 

Plaintiff cites counseling notes from Jared E. Juett,

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L.C.S.W. In October 2011 Juett reported that “chronic pain in

[Plaintiff’s] back and neck are significantly impacted by high

stress by way of increased hypersensitivity to pain and increased

muscle tension.” Tr. 550. Juett also noted Plaintiff “has not

been practicing the breathing and relaxation skills since we last

met.” Id. The following month Juett reported: “[T]here

continues to be a need for reducing stress impact on her pain and

making additional progress with relaxation training, however

other factors requiring a focus on mental health treatment are

impeding such progress.” Tr. 549. 

Plaintiff points out the following September 2012 chart note

by Juett:

There is a strong connection between stress

and increasing muscle tension and the 

fluctuations in the pain she experiences.

Frustration and anger towards the pain is 

also a factor in escalating tension buildup and sympathetic over-activity. There is

evidence that chronic back pain can be significantly exacerbated by steady maladaptive

stress levels. Evidence shows that such stress

impact can be reduced through relaxation

training and cognitive modifications.

Tr. 515.

 

Plaintiff, however, does not recite the following, which is

the rest of Juett’s chart note:

This patient benefitted from this in the past

and remains capable of responding again at 

this time. She has stopped implementing

all skills learned previously which would

help her at this time to lower stress, 

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tension, and overall pain frequency and

intensity.

Id.

The ALJ noted Juett’s opinion and considered Plaintiff’s

mental and physical impairments. Tr. 22-27. Although Plaintiff,

nevertheless, asserts the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s

stage two kidney disease, Plaintiff does not identify any

functional limitations arising from that condition.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ adequately

considered at Step Three the combination of Plaintiff’s mental

and physical impairments and the ALJ’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the record.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 10th day of May, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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