IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

KIMBERLY SUE WRIGHT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COL VIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Nancy J. Meserow 

Law Office of Nancy J. Meserow 

7540 SW 51st Avenue 

Portland, OR 972219 

Attorney for plaintiff 

Janice E. Hebert 

Assistant United States Attorney 

United States Attorney's Office 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Heather L. Griffith 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of General Counsel 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MIS 221A 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

Attorneys for defendant 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 3:15-cv-01356-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 1 of 12
AIKEN, Judge: 

Plaintiff Kimberly Sue Wright brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act ("Act"), 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied plaintiff's application for Title II disability 

insurance benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is reversed and this 

case is remanded for further proceedings and a partial award of benefits. 

BACKGROUND 

Born October 25, 1961, plaintiff was 40 years old when she alleges she became disabled and 

52 years old on the date of her disability hearing. Tr. 191. She completed the tenth grade and 

earned her GED. Tr. 59. Her most significant work history is as a licensed correctional officer, a 

job she performed full-time for four years in the early 1990s. Tr. 204, 211. She also has worked as 

a hair stylist, care provider, fast food cashier, motel clerk, and gas station attendant. Tr. 204, 211. 

In her application for benefits, plaintiff alleged she suffers from bipolar disorder, post 

traumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Tr. 203. Plaintiff asserts her 

struggles with mental health began after her children were born. She reports being depressed after 

the birth of each of the first three children, and believes the birth of her fourth child triggered her first 

manic episode with psychotic features. Tr. 296. Both plaintiff and her husband attribute her losing 

her job as a corrections officer to her mental health problems. Tr. 7, 77. Plaintiff began attempting 

to treat her depression and mania with medication in about 1994, and she was diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder after her first inpatient hospitalization, in 1996 or 1997. Tr. 65. 

In the early 2000s, plaintiff had a series of hospitalizations and run-ins with law enforcement. 

July 10, 2000, she was extremely combative when she was taken to the hospital after a car accident. 

Tr. 314. She screamed obscenities, spit in the face of hospital staff, refused most treatment, and left 

against medical orders; shortly thereafter, Coos County Sheriff's Deputies arrested her in the hospital 

lobby. Tr. 304. A week later, on July 17, 2000, plaintiff was admitted to the same hospital after 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 2 of 12
ambulance personnel found her "combative and out of control" at her home. 1 Tr. 302. Medical 

records from her admission list her chief complaint as "[s]creaming and out of control." Tr. 304. 

Dr. Charles Reagan evaluated plaintiff and concluded the incident stemmed from her bipolar disorder 

and alcohol abuse. Tr. 302-03. Dr. Reagan wanted plaintiff to stay in the hospital longer to track 

her response to a new medication, but plaintiff "demanded" to leave on July 19, 2000. Tr. 302. 

Three days later, on July 22, 2000, Coos County Sheriffs Deputies brought plaintiff back to the 

hospital. Tr. 294. Plaintiff told the admitting physician she "just could not take her medicines" and 

she "didn't feel safe at all." Tr. 294. Plaintiff described a 48-hour period of "racing thoughts" and 

"impulsive behavior" following a period of"decreased energy" and "worthlessness." Tr. 292. She 

was admitted "for what appeared to be a manic episode" and stayed in the hospital for nine days. 

Tr. 292. 

In 2001, plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy to address "severe dysmenorrhea,"2 which her 

doctors suspected was exacerbating her manic symptoms. Tr. 278. June 12, 2003, plaintiff was 

admitted to the hospital during another manic episode. Tr. 267-69. She reported she had been off 

her medications for two to three weeks after she temporarily separated from her husband and left her 

medications at their shared home. Tr. 267. After plaintiff had a "confrontation" with a "very 

threatening" male patient, she requested discharge because "she felt uneasy with [that] patient on the 

unit." Tr. 265. The discharging doctor's notes state plaintiffs improvement was "very rapid" but 

characterize it as "unfortunate" that she left after only two days. Tr. 265. 

In January 2006, plaintiff attempted "suicide by cop" when she brandished a toy pistol at 

police officers. Tr. 66, 386. She was shot in the thigh. Tr. 383. She spent twelve days in the 

hospital undergoing psychiatric treatment and wound care. See Tr. 321-57. Her admission was 

1 It is unclear why an ambulance was called to plaintiffs house; the note from the 

admitting physician states plaintiff "could provide no useful history since she was very 

combative and out of control." Tr. 304. 

2 "Dysmennorhea is the medical term for pain with menstruation." Cleveland Clinic, 

Diseases & Conditions: Dysmenorrhea, 

myclevelandclinic.org/health/diseases _ conditions/hic _ Dysmenorrhea (last visited Jun. 30, 2016). 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 3 of 12
voluntary, but the admitting physician noted if she had attempted to leave, he would have placed her 

on a hold. Tr. 334. She also was incarcerated for ninety days. Tr. 8, 73. Plaintiff characterized this 

period in the early and mid-2000s as the "worst dark, dark years." Tr. 65. Her husband, Roy Wright 

("Roy"), submitted a letter to the Appeals Council describing "a long, long period where there would 

be spray painting on the walls, sorting through every piece of paper in the house, drinking and yes, 

drugs, as she slowly went completely off the rails." Tr. 7. 

Since 2006, the record contains no evidence of hospitalization or problems with law 

enforcement. Plaintiff has been treated by Dr. Reagan on a somewhat regular basis since 1999 .

3 See 

Tr. 406-23 (documenting seventeen visits between June 2003 and June 2008); 395-404 

(documenting twelve visits between April 2009 and April 2012), 435-48 (documenting ten visits 

between May 2012 and July 2013). At times, plaintiff saw Dr. Reagan as frequently as once every 

few weeks, but there are also stretches of up to a year without any recorded visits. The longest of 

these stretches aligns with a year plaintiff spent in Thailand, volunteering as an English teacher. Tr. 

69, 74-75, 398-99. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she had a good experience in Thailand 

because she lived with a group of volunteers, "almost [all of whom were] also suffering from some 

sort of depression or something." Tr. 68. When she was "having an episode," others would cover 

for her. Tr. 74-75. She estimated she missed two to three days of work every couple of weeks due 

to bipolar disorder. Tr. 75. She also stated that because she was a volunteer, she could "kind of get 

away with" not being "a hundred percent." Tr. 75. 

Plaintiff's medical records consistently document problems with her marriage. See, e.g., Tr. 

302 (during first July 2000 hospitalization, plaintiff reporting her husband "has begun to harass her 

and suggest divorce"); Tr. 296 (during second July 2000 hospitalization, documenting plaintiff's 

3 The ALJ found plaintiff's treatment relationship with Dr. Reagan began in 2003, which 

is consistent with plaintiff's testimony. Compare Tr. 20 with Tr. 70. However, the medical 

records from plaintiff's hospitalizations show that outpatient treatment was already ongoing by 

2000. See Tr. 302 (medical record dated July 19, 2000, noting that plaintiff was followed by Dr. 

Reagan on an outpatient basis for bipolar disorder). Roy stated Dr. Reagan first began treating 

plaintiff in 1999, following two hospitalizations in the "mental ward of Coos Bay Hospital." Tr. 

8. 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 4 of 12
allegations of serious emotional abuse of serious emotional abuse); Tr. 265 (during 2003 

hospitalization, noting "problems in a partner relationship, with her marriage of six years"); Tr. 333 

(during 2006 hospitalization, noting a "[l]ong history of domestic discord and possibly violence but 

no well documented violence"); Tr. 401 (in 2009, plaintiff stating she is doing "pretty good" and that 

"Roy is the only problem in her life now"). Plaintiff testified she considers herself more than fifty 

percent responsible for her marital problems, because "it is probably impossible to live with someone 

who has bipolar or some kind of a mental problem like this because this person - like I'm all over 

the place." Tr. 79. 

The record reflects a number of changes in type and dosage of medication over the years. 

See, e.g., Tr. 8, 298, 302, 396. Plaintiff testified that for years, 

[T]hey were trying to find the right combination of medications. I pretty much tried 

them all, and so those were all years of medications that failed or didn't do what they 

thought and hoped that they would do, and then trying something else and having that 

have the side effects. 

Tr. 66. She also stated she fell into the "very common pattern" of going on and off her medications. 

Tr. 66. After the 2006 shooting, plaintiff and Dr. Reagan "pretty much found the meds that will 

work." Tr. 70. Plaintiff testified that because of the shooting, she "learned a lot" about the 

consequences of failing to take her medication. At the hearing, plaintiff reported being on Topamax, 

Lamictal, and Seroquel. Tr. 72. She also takes NephrAmine (essential amino acids), medication for 

recently diagnosed type two diabetes, and thyroid medication. Tr. 72. 

In September 2013, Dr. Reagan completed a questionnaire prepared by plaintiffs lawyer. 

The questionnaire specifically asks about plaintiffs functional limitations on or before June 30, 

2004, which is plaintiffs date last insured. Tr. 449. In the questionnaire, Dr. Reagan opined 

plaintiff would miss more than two days of work per month due to her conditions; would be unable 

to consistently work an eight hour day five days per week; and would have significant problems with 

concentration and irritability. Tr. 449-50; see also Tr. 57. 

In a June 2012 disability report, plaintiff stated her "illness ... has severely affected [her] 

quality oflife and [her] independence." Tr. 230. She alleged when she is having a manic episode, 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 5 of 12
she has to take medication to slow her mind down, resulting in at least three to seven days and up 

to two weeks of bed rest. Tr. 230. When she is depressed, she is unable to function, is sometimes 

suicidal, and is a danger to herself and others; at these times, she is unable to cook, clean, or even 

maintain proper personal hygiene. Tr. 230. In his letter to the Appeals Council dated April 3, 2014, 

Roy stated plaintiff "doesn't bathe often, has conflict with family members and others, ... and often 

withdraws to be by herself." Tr. 9. 

Plaintiff alleges disability beginning December 31, 2001. Her application was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 98, 106. In November 2013, plaintiff was represented by 

counsel at a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 52. After the ALJ issued an 

unfavorable decision, Tr. 23, the Appeals Council denied review, Tr. 1, rendering the ALJ' s decision 

the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then filed this appeal. 

THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4). At 

step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" between the 

alleged disability onset date (December 31, 2001) and the date last insured (June 30, 2004). Tr. 17; 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff 

suffers from a single medically severe impairment: bipolar disorder. Tr. 17; Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 

140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ determined plaintiffs 

impairment did not meet or equal "one of a number oflisted impairments that the [Commissioner] 

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Tr. 17-18; Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). 

The ALJ determined plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") to perform the 

full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to a set of nonexertional limitations: no more than 

occasional superficial interaction with the public; only superficial interaction with coworkers; only 

unskilled work due to concentration problems; and work that is low-stress, is not fast- or productionPage 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 6 of 12
paced, and does not involve persuasive communication. Tr. 19; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At step 

four, the ALJ concluded plaintiff could not perform her past work as a corrections officer, care 

provider, hair stylist, or fast food cashier, because those jobs all required social interactions beyond 

the limits set in the RFC. Tr. 21; Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). At 

step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to find plaintiff could work 

as a cleaner of manufactured homes, bundle clerk, or stock helper. Tr. 22; Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 142; 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). Accordingly, the ALJ found plaintiff not disabled and denied 

her application for benefits. Tr. 23; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(c). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammockv. Bowen, 

879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). The Commissioner concedes the ALJ's decision in this case is 

not supported by substantial evidence. Def.'s Br. 1-2 (doc. 21). The only issue is whether the 

decision should be remanded for further proceedings or for an immediate award of benefits. 

District courts have discretion to decide whether to remand for further proceedings or for an 

award of benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The issue turns on the utility of further proceedings. Treichler v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 

F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2014). Remand for an award of benefits is appropriate when "no 

useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings and the record has been 

thoroughly developed. Id (quoting Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). 

In the Ninth Circuit, courts determine which sort of remand is warranted by applying the 

"credit-as-true doctrine." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Strauss 

v. Comm 'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635F.3d1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding district courts may 

not award benefits punitively and must conduct a credit-as-true analysis whenever the 

Commissioner's decision will be reversed). The "credit-as-true" doctrine is "settled" and binding 

on this Court. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 999. The Ninth Circuit articulates the rule as follows: 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 7 of 12
The district court must first determine that the ALJ made a legal error, such as failing 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence. If the court finds such an 

error, it must next review the record as a whole and determine whether it is fully 

developed, is free from conflicts and ambiguities, and all essential factual issues have 

been resolved. In conducting this review, the district court must consider whether 

there are inconsistencies between the claimant's testimony and the medical evidence 

in the record, or whether the government has pointed to evidence in the record that 

the ALJ overlooked and explained how that evidence casts into serious doubt the 

claimant's claim to be disabled. Unless the district court concludes that further 

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with 

a direction to provide benefits. 

If the district court does determine that the record has been fully developed 

and there are no outstanding issues left to be resolved, the district court must next 

consider whether the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand 

if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true. Said otherwise, the 

district court must consider the testimony or opinion that the ALJ improperly 

rejected, in the context of the otherwise undisputed record, and determine whether 

the ALJ would necessarily have to conclude that the claimant were disabled if that 

testimony or opinion were deemed true. If so, the district court may exercise its 

discretion to remand the case for an award of benefits. A district court is generally 

not required to exercise such discretion, however. District courts retain flexibility in 

determining the appropriate remedy and a reviewing court is not required to credit 

claimants' allegations regarding the extent of their impairments as true merely 

because the ALJ made a legal error in discrediting their testimony. 

Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F Jd 403, 407-08 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

Because the Commissioner concedes legal error, the first step here is to review the record as 

a whole to determine whether it is fully developed such that there is no "serious doubt" that plaintiff 

is disabled. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014). If the record has been fully 

developed, I must proceed to determine whether a finding of disability would be required on remand. 

Dominguez, 808 F.3d at 407. I conclude plaintiff is entitled to an immediate award of benefits for 

the period between December 31, 2001 and January 28, 2006, but further proceedings are necessary 

to determine whether and for how long plaintiff remained disabled after January 2006. 

1 Period Before January 28, 2006 

The evidence in the record relevant to determining disability between December 31, 2001, 

and January 28, 2006, includes plaintiffs testimony; Roy's letter to the Appeals Council; medical 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 8 of 12
records, both from Dr. Reagan and from other physicians, related to plaintiffs four hospitalizations 

between 2000 and 2006; Dr. Reagan's outpatient treatment records from 2003 to 2006;4 and the 

questionnaire completed by Dr. Reagan. Roy's statement summarizes this evidence well, noting that 

plaintiffs bipolar disorder "led to the loss of her job, her position in the church, led her to be shot, 

sent her to jail on multiple occasions, forced her to leave the community and tagged her with a 

criminal record." Tr. 9. Dr. Reagan and other physicians assessed Global Assessment of 

Functioning ("GAF") Scale scores of between 38 and 60 during this time period, with the majority 

of assessments at 50 or below, reflecting significant impairment in psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning. 5 

Crisis points Gob loss, family strife, hospitalization, arrest, etc.) in the record punctuate 

stretches of relative calm. This tracks the familiar pattern of bipolar disorder, which this Court 

recently acknowledged is "inherently cyclical": 

Cycles ofimprovement and debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence, and in 

such circumstances it is error for an ALJ to pick out a few isolated instances of 

improvement over a period of months or years and to treat them as a basis for 

concluding a claimant is capable of working. The regulations themselves provide 

[that] proper evaluation of ... impairments must take into account any variations in 

the level of your functioning in arriving at a determination of severity over time .... 

When a person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression 

improves, that does not mean that the person's impairments no longer seriously affect 

her ability to function in a workplace. Occasional symptom-free periods - and even 

the sporadic ability to work - are not inconsistent with disability. 

Sunwall v. Colvin, - F. Supp. 3d-, 2016 WL 259703, *3 (D. Or. Jan. 21, 2016) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted, punctuation and alterations normalized). The ALJ noted the connection 

between the crises and other issues - plaintiffs alcohol and drug abuse, martial problems, and 

4 The record contains no outpatient treatment records from before 2003. 

5 A GAF score between 31 and 40 reflects "some impairment in reality testing or 

communication" or "major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, 

judgment, thinking, or mood." American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition Text Revision 34 (2000) ("DSM-IV"). A GAF 

score between 41 and 50 reflects "serious symptoms" such as "suicidal ideation" or "any serious 

impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning." Id. A GAF score between 51 and 60 

reflects "moderate symptoms" or "moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school 

functioning." Id. 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 9 of 12
"going off' her medications. Far from suggesting the symptoms caused by plaintiffs bipolar 

disorder were not that serious, these issues all appear to have been either caused or greatly 

exacerbated by plaintiffs underlying mental health issue. Viewing the record as a whole, it is clear 

the driving force behind plaintiffs problems is bipolar disorder. 

Having found that the record is fully developed as to the period up to January 28, 2006, I now 

must determine whether the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled on remand if the 

improperly discredited evidence were credited as true. I conclude the answer to this question is yes. 

Dr. Reagan opined plaintiff would miss more than two days per month due to her condition, 

could not work a full-time schedule consistently, and would struggle to concentrate or complete 

simple tasks. Tr. 450. This opinion is expressly limited to the period before plaintiffs date last 

insured. Tr. 449. I find Dr. Reagan's opinion about plaintiffs limitations consistent with his 

contemporaneous treatment notes and give it great deference based on his long relationship with 

plaintiff. At the hearing, the VE confirmed that missing two or more days per week or being off-task 

more than ten percent of the time would preclude competitive employment. Tr. 88. Crediting Dr. 

Reagan's opinion as true, therefore, the ALJ would be compelled to find plaintiff disabled through 

June 30, 2004. 

Moreover, I infer from the record as a whole that plaintiffs disability continued until at least 

January 28, 2006, when she was discharged from the hospital following her suicide attempt. 

Although there are limited medical records between plaintiffs date last insured and the shooting, 

medical records from plaintiffs hospitalization in 2006 show her symptoms from bipolar disorder 

continued to be disabling. The admitting physician documented substantial symptoms of mania and 

depression, "dirt caked under her nails," strange dress, skin covered in flea bites, and continuing 

marital strife. Tr. 3 34-3 5. On remand, plaintiff is entitled to an immediate award of benefits for the 

period between December 31, 2001 and January 28, 2006. 

11 Period After January 28, 2006 

Further proceedings are warranted, however, with respect to the period after the suicide 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 10 of 12
attempt and subsequent hospitalization. The regulations contemplate awards of benefits for a closed 

period of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) ("[I]t is possible for you to have a period of 

disability for a time in the past even though you do not now have a severe impairment."); id. § 

404.1594 (describing "[h]owwe will determine whether your disability continues or ends" including 

whether there has been medical improvement relevant to ability to work). Here, further proceedings 

are necessary because gaps and conflicts in the record leave serious doubt as to whether and how 

long plaintiff remained disabled after January 28, 2006. 

First, Dr. Reagan's opinion regarding plaintiffs limitations is expressly limited to the period 

before June 30, 2004. Tr. 449. Accordingly, it is not an assessment of plaintiffs limitations after 

that date. Second, plaintiff made at least two statement suggesting the suicide attempt was a turning 

point in the success of her treatment. See Tr. 70 (stating that after 2006 shooting, Dr. Reagan "pretty 

much found the meds that will work" to manage the bipolar disorder); Tr. 65 (characterizing the time 

leading up to her suicide attempt as the "worst dark, dark years"). Third, Dr. Reagan's treatment 

records document improvement beginning in 2006. As noted above, between 2001 and 2004, 

treatment records generally assessed a GAF of 50 or below, and never provided a GAF higher than 

60. By contrast, treatment records between 2006 and 2013 only twice included a GAF below 60, 

and frequently listed a GAF of 70. 6 The post-2006 records also frequently state plaintiff is doing 

"well" with "mild" problems; though there are documented episodes of "fast thoughts" and 

depression, there is no reference to severe problems rising to the level of the incidents documented 

in 2000, 2003, and 2006. See Tr. 396, 399, 401, 402. Finally, plaintiffs two long-term trips to 

Thailand to work as a volunteer provide further evidence ofimprovement. On remand, the ALJ must 

reconcile these records with plaintiffs statements, Roy's letter, and other evidence regarding the 

continuing limiting effect of her bipolar disorder. 

6 A GAF of between 61 and 70 reflects "some mild symptoms ... but generally 

functioning pretty well." DSM-IV at 34. 

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Case 3:15-cv-01356-AA Document 23 Filed 07/06/16 Page 11 of 12
CONCLUSION 

The Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings and 

a partial award of benefits. On remand, the ALJ must (1) find plaintiff disabled for at least the 

period of December 31, 2001 to January 28, 2006, and award benefits for that period; and (2) assess 

whether and for how long plaintiffs disability persisted after January 28, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this b iikJ. of July 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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