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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

DOROTHEA JOHNSON, Case No. 3:13-cv-00731-AA 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

Merrill Schneider 

Schneider Kerr Law Offices 

P.O. Box 14490 

Portland, OR 97293 

Attorney for plaintiff 

S. Amanda Marshall 

United States Attorney 

Ronald K. Silver 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 S.W. Third Ave., Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204 

Nicole Jabaily 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 M/S 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

Attorneys for defendant 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:13-cv-00731-AA Document 18 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 7
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review of a 

final decision of the Commissioner denying her applications for 

supplemental security income benefits (SSI) under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act (the Act). This court has jurisdiction under 42 

U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c) (3). The Commissioner's decision is 

affirmed. 

BACKGROUND 

On January 6, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for SSI; it 

was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 110-13, 118-19, 

165-68. On July 7, 2011, plaintiff and a vocational expert appeared 

and testified before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 41-77. 

On August 26, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 18-40. On March 14, 

2013, the Appeals Council denied review, rendering the ALJ' s 

decision as the final agency decision. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff now seeks 

judicial review. 

Plaintiff was twenty-eight years old at the time of the ALJ's 

decision, with a high school education, some college course work, 

and no past relevant work. Tr. 2 6, 32, 4 8. Plaintiff alleges 

disability since January 2005 due to various physical and mental 

limitations. Tr. 26, 317. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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supported by substantial evidence in the record and the correct 

application of the law. Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin, 574 

F.2d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). "'Substantial evidence' means more 

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion." Desrosiers v. Sec' y of Health & Human 

Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence 

supports the decision, the court must weigh "both the evidence that 

supports and detracts from the [Commissioner] 's conclusions." 

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Where the 

evidence "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation," 

the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 

400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

COMMISSIONER'S DECISION 

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff's allegation of disability 

pursuant to the relevant sequential process. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 

482. U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff had not engaged ln "substantial gainful 

activity" during the period of alleged disability. Tr. 23; 20 

C.F.R. § 416.920(b). 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had medically 

determinable impairments of morbid obesity, sleep apnea, 

depression, and anxiety. Tr. 23; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). However, 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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Case 3:13-cv-00731-AA Document 18 Filed 05/08/14 Page 3 of 7
at step three, the ALJ found that these impairments did not meet or 

equal "one of a number of listed impairments that the 

[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude gainful 

activity." Tr. 23; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). 

At step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff's residual 

functional capacity (RFC) and found that plaintiff retained the RFC 

to perform light work with some exertional restrictions. Tr. 25. 

The ALJ also found that plaintiff could remember, understand, and 

carry out simple and detailed instructions or tasks, have brief 

contact with the public, interact appropriately with coworkers, and 

respond appropriately to supervision. Tr. 25; 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(e). Based on plaintiff's limited work history, the ALJ did 

not consider plaintiff's ability to perform past relevant work. Tr. 

32; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). 

At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of 

performing light and unskilled work as a garment sorter and retail 

marker. Tr. 32-33; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). Therefore, the ALJ found 

plaintiff not disabled under the meaning of the Act. Tr. 33. 

DISCUSSION I 

Plaintiff argues that in determining plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ 

failed to include the mental limitation of "simple one-to-two" 

steps tasks set forth by two non-examining state agency 

psychologists. Plaintiff emphasizes that the ALJ failed to do so, 

despite placing "great weight" on the opinions of the agency 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:13-cv-00731-AA Document 18 Filed 05/08/14 Page 4 of 7
psychologists and stating that their opinions were accepted. Tr. 

29. Plaintiff maintains that this failure is not harmless because 

the limitations found by the agency psychologists, if accepted, 

render her unable to perform the jobs identified by the ALJ. 

The state agency psychologists opined that plaintiff could 

perform "simple one-to-two step" tasks and was limited in her 

ability to do "more detailed" work. Tr. 29, 455, 693. Specifically, 

Frank Lahman, Ph. D., opined that plaintiff could "remember and 

carry out simple one to two step commands. However, evidence 

shows/suggests that the [claimant] has a more difficult time 

carrying out more detailed commands. Therefore, the [claimant] is 

limited to simple one to two step commands in the workplace." Tr. 

455. Paul Rethinger, Ph.D. also opined that plaintiff was capable 

of understanding, remembering, and carrying out one-to-two step 

tasks, but that she was "incapable of understanding, remembering, 

and carrying out more detailed tasks." Tr. 693. Relying in part on 

these opinions, the ALJ found that plaintiff could "remember, 

understand, and carry out simple and detailed, but not complex, 

instructions or tasks typical of occupations with an SVP of one or 

two." Tr. 25. In find that the ALJ's interpretation of the medical 

record is reasonable and supported by the record. 

Although the ALJ accepted the opinions of the state agency 

psychologists, she also referenced evidence in the record 

supportive of her RFC determination. Tr. 24, 31-32. For example, 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:13-cv-00731-AA Document 18 Filed 05/08/14 Page 5 of 7
during a psychological assessment, plaintiff was able to perform 

mental math "very well,u was not distractible, and exhibited "goodu 

task persistence. Tr. 24, 438. An examining psychologist also noted 

that plaintiff could do "simple and repetitive work type tasksu and 

was "likely capable of performing more difficult and complex tasks 

as well although her anxiety and mood issues might interfere with 

her ability to do that on a full-time basis.u Tr. 31, 676. Further, 

the ALJ noted plaintiff's aunt reported that plaintiff "has no 

problem following spoken or written instructionsu or "paying 

attention.u Tr. 24, 32, 192, 287. In 2010, plaintiff herself 

reported that she was not limited in her ability to follow written 

or spoken instructions. Tr. 303. 

Given this evidence of record, the ALJ's interpretation of the 

medical opinions and her finding that plaintiff can carry out 

simple and detailed tasks are reasonable. Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding the ALJ's 

assessment of "simple, routine, repetitive sedentary worku to be a 

sufficient translation of the medical evidence); Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Even when the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we must 

uphold the ALJ' s findings if they are supported by inferences 

reasonably drawn from the record.u). Thus, the ALJ's RFC 

determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record 

and must be upheld. 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:13-cv-00731-AA Document 18 Filed 05/08/14 Page 6 of 7
' ' .. 

Consequently, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding 

that plaintiff could perform simple, unskilled jobs such as garment 

sorter and retail marker. See DOT 222.687-014, 209.587-034. 

CONCLUSION 

The ALJ's finding that plaintiff was not disabled under the 

Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this ~ay of May, 2014. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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