IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

WINKY CHIN, 3:15-CV-00570-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

MERRILL SCHNEIDER

Schneider Kerr Law Offices

P.O. Box 14490

Portland, OR 97293

(503) 255-9092 

Attorneys for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1003

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 1 of 19
DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

SARAH L. MARTIN 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/A 221A

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 615-37-5

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Winky Chin seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's application

for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the

Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court REVERSES the decision

of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this Opinion and Order.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on June 30, 2011,

alleging a disability onset date of August 31, 2002. Tr. 138.1

The application was accepted for a closed period of disability

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on August 27, 2015, are referred to as "Tr."

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 2 of 19
from April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011, initially and on

reconsideration. Tr. 90, 65. Plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing to appeal his onset date. An

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on October 2, 2013. 

Tr. 30-49. At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an

attorney. Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified at

the hearing. 

The ALJ issued a decision on October 17, 2013, in which he

found Plaintiff was not disabled at all before his September 30,

2011, date last insured and, therefore, was not and is not

entitled to benefits. Tr. 16-25. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.984(d), that decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner on February 4, 2015, when the Appeals Council denied

Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 1-6. See Sims v. Apfel, 530

U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born November 9, 1974, and was 38 years old at

the time of the hearing. Tr. 138. Plaintiff has a Master’s

Degree in Divinity. Tr. 34. Plaintiff has past relevant work

experience as a web developer and a help-desk support person. 

Tr. 24. 

Plaintiff alleges disability during the relevant period due

to “post surgical neuralgia/diff neuralgia/cluster headaches,”

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 3 of 19
low thyroid, insomnia, and depression. Tr. 164. 

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the

medical evidence. See Tr. 21-23.

STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate his

inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 4 of 19
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). "It is more than a mere scintilla [of

evidence] but less than a preponderance." Id. (citing Valentine,

574 F.3d at 690). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation

The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential

inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 5 of 19
meaning of the Act. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.

2007). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Each step is potentially

dispositive. 

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509,

404.1520(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed

Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 6 of 19
§ 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. “A

'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work he has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 7 of 19
ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity from his August 31, 2002, alleged

onset date through his September 30, 2011, date last insured. 

Tr. 18.

At Step Two the ALJ found before Plaintiff's date last

insured Plaintiff had the severe impairments of chronic pain and

cluster headaches. Tr. 18. The ALJ, however, found before

Plaintiff’s date last insured Plaintiff’s impairment of

depression was nonsevere. Tr. 19. 

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically

determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal one of

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, 

appendix 1, before his September 30, 2011, date last insured and

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work

through his date last insured. Tr. 20. 

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of

performing his past relevant work as a web developer and helpdesk support employee before his date last insured. Tr. 24. 

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled before his

September 30, 2011, date last insured.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) improperly

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 8 of 19
partially rejected Plaintiff’s testimony; (2) improperly gave

only some weight to the opinions of Scott Prichard, M.D., and

Sharon Eder, M.D., reviewing physicians; and (3) improperly gave

little weight to the opinion of Benjamin Erickson, M.D., treating

physician.

I. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for partially

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear

and convincing reasons for partially rejecting Plaintiff's

testimony.

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence

of an impairment or impairments, and he must show the impairment

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th

Cir. 1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective

medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not

any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant's pain testimony only if he provides clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th

Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant's testimony is

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 9 of 19
not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must identify "what

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the

claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).

At the hearing Plaintiff testified he began to have “trouble

walking decent distances” beginning August 31, 2002. Tr. 36. 

Plaintiff testified he is disabled by “high levels of constant

[testicular] pain.” Tr. 38. Plaintiff stated he had “maybe an

hour’s worth of time [in a typical day] where I feel like I can

interact with people on a kind of reasonable basis.” Tr. 38. 

Plaintiff noted he sleeps 12 hours per day, and the “other 11

remaining hours a day I mostly need to be lying down and resting. 

Maybe I can do some light reading.” Tr. 38. Plaintiff testified

“it hurts to stand, it hurts more to walk, it hurts even more to

climb stairs or to run or any sort of activity like that.” 

Tr. 38. “Even just sitting for more than a couple [of] hours

causes an increase in pain.” Tr. 39. Plaintiff testified he can

sit for “maybe two hours” before his pain becomes unmanageable. 

Tr. 45. Plaintiff also noted his “mental clarity is pretty low”

due to his pain medications. Tr. 39. Plaintiff noted he has had

a number of surgeries. He received some relief from his

ilioinguinal pain after his latest surgery, but the majority of

his pain is coming from the genitalfemoral nerve, which surgery

did not address. Tr. 41. Plaintiff testified he has used a

wheelchair since 2008 whenever he leaves the house, and he uses a

10 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 10 of 19
cane when he is at home. Tr. 42-43. Plaintiff noted he received

his graduate degree in 2006, and he continued to do some webdesign work from home until some time in 2010, at which point he

felt he “lacked the ability to concentrate and to focus on work.”

Tr. 44-45. Plaintiff testified he also suffers from cluster

headaches “[t]ypically once a day” that last “from eight to 14

hours.” Tr. 46. Plaintiff noted the intensity of his headaches

has decreased “considerably” with medication, but “they’re not

gone by any means.” Tr. 46.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably he expected to cause the alleged

symptoms,” but Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

entirely credible” as to the relevant period. Tr. 21. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s activities of daily living before

his September 30, 2011, date last insured indicate Plaintiff has

fewer limitations than alleged. Specifically, Plaintiff attended

school and obtained his Master’s Degree in 2006; he worked from

home as a part-time web designer until 2010; he took a cruise

with his wife in 2008; and he also indicated in his July 2011

Adult Function Report that he cooks for his children (five and

eight years old), drives them to and from school, cares for them

while his wife is at work, washes dishes, and helps with dinner

preparation. Tr. 195-98. Plaintiff noted in his Adult Function

11 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 11 of 19
report that he is able to pay bills, plays board games about once

per week, reads occasionally, spends time on computer social

networks daily, spends time with other parents while their

children play, goes to church, attends a weekly game night, and

attends his children’s school events and activities. Tr. 195-98. 

In addition, the record reflects in June 2008 Plaintiff reported

his headache pain was at level one on a one-to-ten scale and he

was feeling only pressure. Tr. 281. In January 2009 Plaintiff

reported the medications he had been taking had “cut down on the

severity of his headaches,” and he seldom used Imitrex because

“his headaches are rarely that severe and it is . . . quite

expensive.” Tr. 303.

On this record the Court finds the ALJ provided clear and

convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the

record for finding Plaintiff's testimony was not entirely

credible as to the limiting effects of his impairments during the

relevant period. The Court, therefore, concludes the ALJ did not

err when he rejected Plaintiff's testimony in part.

II. Physicians’ Opinions.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he gave only “some

weight” to the opinions of Drs. Eder, Pritchard, and Erickson.

An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion when it is

inconsistent with the opinions of other treating or examining

physicians if the ALJ makes "findings setting forth specific,

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 12 of 19
legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial

evidence in the record." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957

(9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751

(9th Cir. 1989)). When the medical opinion of a treating

physician is uncontroverted, however, the ALJ must give "clear

and convincing reasons" for rejecting it. Thomas, 278 F.3d at

957. See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-32 (9th Cir.

1995).

A nonexamining physician is one who neither examines nor

treats the claimant. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. "The opinion of a

nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an

examining physician or a treating physician." Id. at 831. When

a nonexamining physician's opinion contradicts an examining

physician's opinion and the ALJ gives greater weight to the

nonexamining physician's opinion, the ALJ must articulate his

reasons for doing so. See, e.g., Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). A nonexamining

physician's opinion can constitute substantial evidence if it is

supported by other evidence in the record. Id. at 600.

A. Drs. Eder and Pritchard.

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred when he gave only “some

weight” to the opinions of reviewing physicians Eder and

Pritchard. On February 2012 Dr. Pritchard indicated Plaintiff

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 13 of 19
was not capable of even sedentary work and, therefore, was

disabled from April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011. Tr. 60. 

Dr. Eder issued a similar opinion in August 2012. Tr. 74. From

April 2011 through Plaintiff’s September 30, 2011, date last

insured Drs. Pritchard and Eder indicated Plaintiff was capable

of sedentary work. The ALJ gave the opinions of Drs. Pritchard

and Eder only “some weight” and found Plaintiff could perform “a

full range of sedentary work from the [August 31, 2002] alleged

onset date through the date last insured.” Tr. 23. The ALJ

relied generally on “the medical evidence and [Plaintiff’s]

activities” without specificity. The ALJ noted there was

“minimal” evidence of Plaintiff’s disabling symptoms until 2007,

but, as noted, Drs. Pritchard and Eder found Plaintiff to be

disabled only after April 1, 2009. The ALJ also pointed out the

opinion of Vladimir Fiks, M.D., in which Dr. Fiks reported

Plaintiff’s inguinal pain had “substantially improved” in

September 2011, and Plaintiff was “no longer bothered by it.” 

Tr. 369. As noted, however, Drs. Pritchard and Eder found

Plaintiff was no longer disabled after March 31, 2011, and,

therefore, Dr. Fiks’s September 2011 report does not actually

contradict the opinions of Drs. Pritchard and Eder.

The ALJ also noted Linda Okereke, M.D., advised

Plaintiff in November 2009 to reduce his use of a wheelchair to

prevent deconditioning. Tr. 321. Dr. Okereke, however, also

14 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 14 of 19
noted Plaintiff’s left groin pain “seems to really be affecting

his mobility.” Tr. 321. 

The ALJ noted treating physician James Bertola, M.D.,

reported Plaintiff was able to walk and to transfer from sitting

to standing comfortably. Tr. 334. Dr. Bertola, however, also

noted Plaintiff’s pain was “quite debilitating.” Tr. 334. 

Dr. Bertola assessed Plaintiff with “neuralgia after the trauma

of multiple inguinal surgeries” and noted Plaintiff “had several

good questions regarding his condition and his treatment

options.” Tr. 335.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ erred when

he gave only some weight to the February 2012 and August 2012

opinions of Drs. Pritchard and Eder, particularly as to

Plaintiff’s disability from April 1, 2009, through March 31,

2011, because the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing

so.

B. Dr. Erickson

On October 1, 2013, Plaintiff’s treating physician

submitted a letter in which he had been treating Plaintiff since

October 2012. Dr. Erickson noted Plaintiff had side-effects from

medication of fatigue and sleep disturbance, used a walker or

wheelchair, and had difficulty doing “light activity.” Tr. 464. 

Dr. Erickson opined it would be “very difficult” for Plaintiff

15 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 15 of 19
“to work in any substantial capacity in his current state, which

has not improved significantly in the past several years.” 

Tr. 464. The ALJ gave Dr. Erickson’s opinion “little weight”

because he did not begin treating Plaintiff until one year after

Plaintiff’s September 30, 2011, date last insured and he did not

offer his opinion until two years after Plaintiff’s date last

insured. In Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1999),

the Ninth Circuit held “the fact that [at treating physician] did

not examine [the plaintiff] until . . . more than a year after

the expiration of her insured status” supported the ALJ’s

rejection of the treating physician’s opinion.

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err

when he gave “little weight” to the October 2013 opinion of Dr.

Erickson because the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing

so. 

C. The error in giving only some weight to the opinions of

Drs. Pritchard Eder and is not harmless.

The Court finds the ALJ’s error in giving only some

weight to the opinions of Drs. Pritchard Eder is not harmless

even though Plaintiff received benefits for the period of 

April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011, because Plaintiff’s date

last insured could be later than September 30, 2011, if the eight

quarters of Plaintiff’s closed period of disability were

considered in the calculation of his date last insured as

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 16 of 19
required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.130(b),(f). This is particularly

relevant because the ALJ also gave little weight to the October

2013 opinion of Dr. Erickson because Dr. Erickson began treating

Plaintiff in October 2012, which is one year after Plaintiff’s

September 30, 2011, date last insured. If Plaintiff’s date last

insured is properly calculated as after September 30, 2011, 

Dr. Erickson’s opinion likely should be considered. 

REMAND

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or

for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely

utility of further proceedings. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

1179 (9th Cir. 2000). When "the record has been fully developed

and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award

of benefits." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir.

2004). 

The decision whether to remand this case for further

proceedings or for the payment of benefits is a decision within

the discretion of the court. Harman, 211 F.3d 1178.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or

for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely

utility of further proceedings. Id. at 1179. The court may

"direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 17 of 19
developed and where further administrative proceedings would

serve no useful purpose." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292.

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for

determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate

award of benefits directed." Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178. The

Court should grant an immediate award of benefits when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting . . .

evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues

that must be resolved before a determination

of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled were

such evidence credited.

Id. The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question: Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if

the case were remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1178 n.2.

As noted, the Court has concluded the ALJ erred when he gave

only “some weight” to the opinions of Drs. Eder and Pritchard,

particularly with respect to their opinion that Plaintiff was

disabled from April 1, 2009, through March 31, 2011. Crediting

as true the opinions of Drs. Eder and Pritchard may result in the

recalculation of Plaintiff’s date last insured and, in turn, to a

requirement that the ALJ consider the October 2013 opinion of 

Dr. Erickson. The Court, therefore, concludes this matter must

be remanded.

Accordingly, the Court remands this matter for further

administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order

18 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 18 of 19
specifically to allow the ALJ to develop the record to determine

the effect of crediting as true the opinions of Drs. Eder and

Pritchard on Plaintiff’s date last insured and on consideration

of the October 2013 opinion of Dr. Erickson.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this Opinion and Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 5th day of April, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

19 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case 3:15-cv-00570-BR Document 15 Filed 04/05/16 Page 19 of 19