II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1083

To provide structure for and introduce balance into a policy of meaningful

engagement with the People’s Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 29, 1997

Mr. MACK (for himself, Mr. HUTCHINSON, and Mr. ASHCROFT) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

Foreign Relations

A BILL

To provide structure for and introduce balance into a policy

of meaningful engagement with the People’s Republic

of China.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States-People’s

5 Republic of China National Security and Freedom Protec6 tion Act of 1997’’.

7 SEC. 2. DECLARATION OF POLICY.

8 The policy of Congress with respect to the People’s

9 Republic of China is as follows:
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1 (1) To encourage the liberalization of the Gov2 ernment of the PRC, responsible behavior by the

3 PRC, and integration of the PRC into the commu4 nity of nations.

5 (2) To support a strong presence, and commit6 ment to leadership and involvement in the Asian Pa7 cific region, to support integration of the PRC both

8 regionally and globally, and to share a stake in the

9 future of China with the people of the People’s Re10 public of China, the region, and the world.

11 (3) To encourage friendship between the United

12 States and the People’s Republic of China, while

13 protecting national interests and acting on national

14 values.

15 (4) To recognize the PRC does not today, and

16 will not for the foreseeable future, pose a direct mili17 tary threat to the United States. To recognize that

18 the PRC is not an enemy of the United States and

19 should not be made out as such.

20 (5) To develop a policy toward the PRC that

21 contains resolute and straight-forward toughness,

22 and to not paper over issues which make the PRC

23 feel uncomfortable, but to not allow the issues to

24 dominate the United States relationship with the

25 People’s Republic of China.
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1 (6) To seek to overcome differences with the

2 PRC, to act honestly and directly, and to provide the

3 American people with a foreign policy that is honest

4 and direct.

5 (7) To implement a policy that is one of ‘‘mean6 ingful engagement’’ which includes the mechanisms

7 set forth in this Act.

8 SEC. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

9 The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

Sec. 3. Table of contents.

Sec. 4. Definitions.

TITLE I—NATIONAL SECURITY

Sec. 101. Congressional findings.

Sec. 102. Prohibition of PLA commercial activities in the United States.

Sec. 103. Reporting requirements.

Sec. 104. Taiwan relations.

Sec. 105. Missile nonproliferation enforcement.

TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS

Sec. 201. Congressional findings.

Sec. 202. International broadcasting.

Sec. 203. Freedom from religious persecution.

Sec. 204. Forced abortion.

Sec. 205. Combating slave labor and ‘‘reeducation’’ centers.

Sec. 206. Political freedom in China.

TITLE III—TRADE

Sec. 301. Findings.

Sec. 302. Statement of policy regarding People’s Republic of China accession.

Sec. 303. Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization.

TITLE IV—REVIEW OF POLICY

Sec. 401. Review of policy.

10 SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

11 In this Act:
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1 (1) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—For

2 purposes of this Act, the terms ‘‘People’s Liberation

3 Army’’, and ‘‘PLA’’ mean any branch or division of

4 the land, naval, or air military service or the police

5 of the Communist Government of the People’s Re6 public of China and any member of any such service

7 or such police.

8 (2) PRC.—The term ‘‘PRC’’ means the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China.

10 (3) COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY COM11 PANY.—The term ‘‘Communist Chinese military

12 company’’ has the meaning given that term in sec13 tion 102(b)(1)(B) of this Act.

14 TITLE I—NATIONAL SECURITY

15 SEC. 101. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

16 (a) FINDINGS ON THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL

17 SECURITY THREAT FROM THE PLA.—Congress makes

18 the following findings with respect to the national security

19 threat from the PLA:

20 (1) The People’s Liberation Army poses no di21 rect military threat to the United States of America

22 and will not have the capability to do so for the fore23 seeable future, however, the PLA’s practice of weap24 ons proliferation poses a clear and present danger to

25 the global interests of the United States.
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1 (2) Through the sale of weapons and weapons

2 technology sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, the

3 PRC, and PLA threaten United States security.

4 (3) The PLA is an instrument of oppression

5 within the People’s Republic of China which the

6 United States finds offensive and unacceptable.

7 (4) The People’s Liberation Army is engaged in

8 a military buildup, for undisclosed purposes, which

9 since 1992 has involved a doubling of military

10 spending by the People’s Republic of China.

11 (5) The People’s Liberation Army is engaging

12 in a major ballistic missile modernization program

13 which could undermine peace and stability in East

14 Asia, including 2 new intercontinental missile pro15 grams, 1 submarine-launched missile program, a

16 new class of compact, long-range cruise missiles, and

17 an upgrading of medium- and short-range ballistic

18 missiles.

19 (6) The People’s Liberation Army is working to

20 co-produce the SU–27 fighter with Russia, and is in

21 the process of purchasing several substantial weap22 ons systems from Russia, including the 633 model of

23 the Kilo-class submarine and the SS–N–22 Sunburn

24 missile system specifically designed to incapacitate

25 United States aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers.
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1 (7) The People’s Liberation Army has carried

2 out acts of aggression in the South China Sea, in3 cluding the February 1995 seizure of the Mischief

4 Reef in the Spratley Islands, and the July 1995 and

5 March 1996 missile tests near Taiwan. These ac6 tions cause concern over China’s future intentions

7 and threaten regional stability.

8 (8) In March 1996, the People’s Republic of

9 China effectively demonstrated the capacity to block10 ade both the international shipping lanes of the Tai11 wan Strait and the airspace over Taiwan by means

12 of repeated launches of M–9 ballistic missiles in the

13 South China Sea. This was a deliberate attempt to

14 intimidate the people of Taiwan.

15 (9) The effective blockade of Taiwan’s two larg16 est ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, and Taiwan’s air17 space interfered with United States commercial ship18 ping and aviation and impinged upon the national

19 security interests of the United States, requiring the

20 dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the

21 South China Sea.

22 (10) The People’s Liberation Army has contrib23 uted to the proliferation of technologies relevant to

24 the refinement of weapons-grade nuclear material,

25 including transferring ring magnets to Pakistan.
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1 (11) The People’s Liberation Army and associ2 ated defense companies have provided ballistic mis3 sile components, cruise missiles, and chemical weap4 ons ingredients to Iran, a country that the executive

5 branch has repeatedly reported to Congress as

6 among the greatest sponsors of terrorism in the

7 world.

8 (12) In May 1996, United States authorities

9 caught representatives of the People’s Liberation

10 Army enterprise, Poly Technologies, and the civilian

11 defense industrial company, Norinco, attempting to

12 smuggle 2,000 AK–47s into Oakland, California,

13 and offering to sell to Federal undercover agents

14 300,000 machine guns with silencers, 66-millimeter

15 mortars, hand grenades, and ‘‘Red Parakeet’’ sur16 face-to-air missiles, which, as stated in the criminal

17 complaint against one of those representatives,

18 ‘‘. . . could take out a 747’’ aircraft.

19 (13) The China National Precision Machinery

20 Import-Export Corporation is marketing the C–802

21 model cruise missile which poses a clear and present

22 danger to the United States Fifth Fleet in the Per23 sian Gulf. The United States escort vessel U.S.S.

24 Stark was struck by a cruise missile in the Persian

25 Gulf, causing the death of 37 United States sailors.
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1 (14) The China National Precision Machinery

2 Import-Export Corporation delivered 60 C–802

3 cruise missiles to Iran for use by vessels of the Ira4 nian Revolutionary Guard Navy.

5 (15) Iran is constructing sites and equipment to

6 launch C–802 cruise missiles which will provide its

7 armed forces with a weapon of greater range, reli8 ability, accuracy, and mobility than before.

9 (16) Fifteen thousand members of the United

10 States Armed Forces are stationed within the range

11 of the C–802 cruise missiles acquired by Iran.

12 (17) Although the Department of State believes

13 that ‘‘[t]hese cruise missiles pose new, direct threats

14 to deployed United States forces,’’ the President has

15 concluded that the known types of C–802 cruise

16 missiles are not of a ‘‘destabilizing number and

17 type’’.

18 (18) The delivery of cruise missiles to Iran by

19 the PRC is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non20 proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

21 (b) FINDINGS ON THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL

22 SECURITY INTEREST IN TAIWAN.—Congress makes the

23 following findings with respect to the national security in24 terests in Taiwan:
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1 (1) The security of Taiwan is vital to the peace

2 and stability in East Asia and is a vital national se3 curity interest of the United States.

4 (2) The People’s Republic of China’s current

5 missile modernization program could threaten Tai6 wan, thereby destabilizing East Asia.

7 (3) Taiwan has requested further United States

8 cooperation on missile defense, including the conduct

9 of a joint architecture study of the requirements for

10 the establishment and operation of a theater ballistic

11 missile defense system for Taiwan, including the

12 Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.

13 (4) Establishment of an effective missile de14 fense for Taiwan, including the Penghu Islands,

15 Kinmen, and Matsu, is a direct and appropriate re16 sponse to the threat posed by increased development

17 and aggressive use of ballistic missiles by the Peo18 ple’s Republic of China. Deployment of such a sys19 tem could deter attempts at intimidation in the fu20 ture and would thereby reduce the potential need for

21 United States intervention.

22 (c) FINDINGS ON THE COMMERCIAL SUBSIDIZATION

23 OF THE PLA.—Congress makes the following findings

24 with respect to the PRC’s subsidization of the PLA’s com25 mercial activities:
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1 (1) The estimated $2,000,000,000 to

2 $3,000,000,000 in annual earnings of PLA’s com3 mercial enterprises subsidize the military expansion

4 and activities of the People’s Liberation Army.

5 (2) The aggregate value of outstanding Chinese

6 securities currently held by Chinese nationals and

7 foreign persons is $175,000,000,000, and from 1993

8 through 1995 foreign persons invested

9 $10,540,000,000 in Chinese stocks.

10 (3) Entities controlled by the Government of

11 the People’s Republic of China have issued 75 bonds

12 since 1988, including 36 dollar-denominated bond

13 offerings valued at more than $6,700,000,000. The

14 total value of long-term Chinese bonds outstanding

15 as of January 1, 1996, was $11,709,000,000.

16 (4) The People’s Republic of China received al17 most $1,000,000,000 in foreign aid grants and an

18 additional $1,566,000,000 in technical assistance

19 grants from 1993 through 1995. In 1995, the PRC

20 received $5,540,000,000 in bilateral assistance

21 loans, including concessional aid, export credits, and

22 related assistance.

23 (5) The bonds and stocks underwritten and sold

24 on the United States securities market by the Peo25 ple’s Liberation Army are used to subsidize the op-
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1 erations and modernization activities of the People’s

2 Liberation Army.

3 SEC. 102. PROHIBITION OF PLA COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

4 IN THE UNITED STATES.

5 (a) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provi6 sion of law, commercial activities in the United States of

7 the People’s Liberation Army or any other Communist

8 Chinese military company are prohibited.

9 (b) PROHIBITION.—

10 (1) DETERMINATION OF COMMUNIST CHINESE

11 MILITARY COMPANIES.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara13 graphs (B) and (C), not later than 90 days

14 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Sec15 retary of Defense, in consultation with the Sec16 retary of the Treasury, the Attorney General,

17 the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Di18 rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

19 shall compile a list of persons who are Com20 munist Chinese military and who are operating

21 directly or indirectly in the United States, its

22 territories and possessions, and shall publish

23 the list of such persons in the Federal Register.

24 On an ongoing basis, the Secretary of Defense,

25 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treas-
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1 ury, the Attorney General, the Director of

2 Central Intelligence, and the Director of the

3 Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall make ad4 ditions or deletions to the list based on the lat5 est information available.

6 (B) COMMUNIST CHINESE MILITARY COM7 PANY.—For purposes of making the determina8 tion required by subparagraph (A), the term

9 ‘‘Communist Chinese military company’’ means

10 a person that is—

11 (i) engaged in providing commercial

12 services, manufacturing, producing, or ex13 porting, and

14 (ii) provides financial subsidies de15 rived from the commercial activities de16 scribed in clause (i) to the People’s Libera17 tion Army.

18 The term includes any person identified in the

19 United States Defense Intelligence Agency pub20 lication numbered VP–1920–271–90, dated

21 September 1990, or PC–1921–57–95, dated

22 October 1995, or any update of such reports.

23 (2) AUTHORITY TO BAN COMMERCIAL ACTIVI24 TIES OF PLA AND MILITARY COMPANIES.—

25 (A) BAN ON COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY.—
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1 (i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding

2 the provisions of section 202 of the Inter3 national Emergency Economic Powers Act

4 (50 U.S.C. 1701), the President shall have

5 the authority provided for in section 203 of

6 such Act with respect to commercial activ7 ity of the PLA or of any Communist Chi8 nese military company in the United

9 States.

10 (ii) PENALTIES.—The penalties pro11 vided in section 206 of such Act shall

12 apply to violations of any license, order, or

13 regulation issued pursuant to the authority

14 of clause (i).

15 (B) BAN ON IMPORTS.—Notwithstanding

16 any other provision of law, the President shall

17 prohibit the importation of any product that is

18 produced, manufactured, or grown by the PLA

19 or by a Communist Chinese military company.

20 (C) BAN ON CERTAIN SECURITIES TRANS21 ACTIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision

22 of law, the President shall prohibit the sale of

23 any debt on the United States bond market

24 which benefits the PLA or a Communist Chi25 nese military company.
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1 SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

2 (a) REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE

3 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

4 (1) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Director of

5 Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal

6 Bureau of Investigation, jointly, in consultation with

7 the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, in8 cluding the National Security Agency, and the De9 partments of Defense, Justice, Treasury, and State,

10 shall prepare and transmit to Congress a report on

11 intelligence activities of the People’s Republic of

12 China directed against or affecting the interests of

13 the United States.

14 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under

15 paragraph (1) shall include information concerning

16 the following:

17 (A) political, military, and economic espio18 nage;

19 (B) intelligence activities designed to gain

20 political influence, including activities under21 taken or coordinated by the United Front Work

22 Department of the Chinese Communist Party;

23 (C) efforts to gain direct or indirect influ24 ence through commercial or noncommercial

25 intermediaries subject to control by the People’s
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1 Republic of China, including enterprises con2 trolled by the People’s Liberation Army; and

3 (D) disinformation and press manipulation

4 by the People’s Republic of China with respect

5 to the United States, including activities under6 taken or coordinated by the United Front Work

7 Department of the Chinese Communist Party.

8 (3) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than

9 March 31 of each year, the Director of Central In10 telligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

11 Investigation, jointly, shall submit to the Speaker

12 and minority leader of the House of Representatives,

13 the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the

14 Chairman and Ranking Member of the Permanent

15 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of

16 Representatives, and the Chairman and Vice-Chair17 man of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the

18 Senate, classified and unclassified versions of the re19 port described in paragraph (1).

20 (b) REPORT ON PRC MILITARY MODERNIZATION.—

21 (1) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of

22 Defense shall prepare and transmit to Congress a

23 report on the military modernization of the People’s

24 Liberation Army.
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1 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under

2 paragraph (1) shall include developments within the

3 People’s Liberation Army and the implications of

4 the developments for United States policy toward

5 the People’s Republic of China. Information should

6 describe the scope and pace of PLA modernization.

7 The report shall also analyze, to the extent possible,

8 the intent of the modernization programs. The re9 port should complement and not replace applicable

10 sections of the State Department’s annual report on

11 human rights in China.

12 (3) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than

13 March 31 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, in

14 consultation with the Secretary of State, shall sub15 mit to the Speaker and minority leader of the House

16 of Representatives, the majority and minority lead17 ers of the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Mem18 ber of the International Relations and National Se19 curity Committees of the House of Representatives,

20 and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the For21 eign Relations and Armed Services Committees of

22 the Senate, classified and unclassified versions of the

23 report described in paragraph (1).

24 (c) REPORT ON PLA COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES.—
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1 (1) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of

2 the Defense shall prepare and transmit to Congress

3 a report on the commercial activities of the People’s

4 Liberation Army and any other Communist Chinese

5 military company.

6 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under

7 paragraph (1) shall include the list of all persons

8 identified pursuant to section 102(b)(1) and the

9 commercial activities in which each such person is

10 engaged in the United States.

11 (3) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than

12 March 31 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, in

13 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, Di14 rector of Central Intelligence and the Director of the

15 Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the

16 Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Rep17 resentatives, the Majority and Minority Leaders of

18 the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of

19 the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of

20 the House of Representatives, and the Chairman

21 and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on In22 telligence of the Senate, the report described in

23 paragraph (1).

24 (d) PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER; PUB25 LIC AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified version of each re-
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1 port required by this section shall be published in the Fed2 eral Register and shall be available to the public.

3 SEC. 104. TAIWAN RELATIONS.

4 (a) APPLICABILITY OF TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT.—

5 Section 3 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302)

6 is amended by adding at the end the following new sub7 section:

8 ‘‘(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) super9 sede any provision of the Joint Communique of the United

10 States and China of August 17, 1982.’’.

11 (b) TAIWAN MISSILE DEFENSE.—

12 (1) JOINT STUDY RELATING TO ESTABLISH13 MENT AND OPERATION OF A THEATER BALLISTIC

14 MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM FOR TAIWAN.—

15 (A) STUDY.—The Secretary of Defense

16 shall carry out, with appropriate representatives

17 of the Government of Taiwan, a joint study of

18 the architecture requirements for the establish19 ment and operation of a theater ballistic missile

20 defense system for Taiwan, including the

21 Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu. The study

22 shall include the following:

23 (i) An assessment of missile threats to

24 Taiwan.
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1 (ii) Identification of the requirements

2 of Taiwan for deployment of an effective

3 theater ballistic missile defense system.

4 (iii) Identification of existing theater

5 ballistic missile defense systems or existing

6 technology for such systems, that the Unit7 ed States could sell to Taiwan to assist in

8 meeting the requirements identified under

9 clause (ii).

10 (iv) Systems or technologies the Unit11 ed States is developing that could address

12 the missile threats to Taiwan’s security.

13 (v) Identification of potential joint co14 operative efforts by the United States and

15 Taiwan to develop theater ballistic missile

16 defense systems.

17 (B) REPORT.—Not later than July 1,

18 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to

19 the Committee on National Security and the

20 Committee on Appropriations of the House of

21 Representatives and the Committee on Armed

22 Services and the Committee on Appropriations

23 of the Senate the study conducted under sub24 paragraph (A).
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1 (C) FORM OF STUDY.—The study under

2 subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in both

3 classified and unclassified form.

4 (2) SALE OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DE5 FENSES TO TAIWAN.—It is the sense of Congress

6 that the President, if requested by the Government

7 of Taiwan and in accordance with the results of the

8 study conducted under paragraph (1), should sell to

9 the Government of Taiwan appropriate defense arti10 cles, defense services, or design and construction

11 services for the purpose of establishing, deploying,

12 and operating a defensive theater ballistic missile de13 fense system for Taiwan, including the Penghu Is14 lands, Kinmen, and Matsu.

15 (3) STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO EAST

16 ASIAN MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION.—Congress

17 declares that it is in the national interest of the

18 United States that Taiwan be included in any effort

19 at ballistic missile defense cooperation, networking,

20 or interoperability among East Asian nations.

21 SEC. 105. MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION ENFORCEMENT.

22 Congress—

23 (1) finds that the delivery of cruise missiles to

24 Iran is of a destabilizing number and type and,

25 therefore, is a violation of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
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1 proliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note);

2 and

3 (2) urges the President to enforce the Iran-Iraq

4 Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 (50 U.S.C. 1701

5 note) with respect to the acquisition by Iran of C6 802 model cruise missiles.

7 TITLE II—HUMAN RIGHTS

8 SEC. 201. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

9 (a) FINDINGS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT.—

10 Congress makes the following findings with respect to the

11 report on human rights:

12 (1) Congress concurs in the following conclu13 sions of the Department of State regarding human

14 rights in the People’s Republic of China in 1996:

15 (A) The People’s Republic of China is ‘‘an

16 authoritarian state’’ in which ‘‘citizens lack the

17 freedom to peacefully express opposition to the

18 party-led political system and the right to

19 change their national leaders or form of govern20 ment’’.

21 (B) The Government of the People’s Re22 public of China has ‘‘continued to commit wide23 spread and well documented human rights

24 abuses, in violation of internationally accepted

25 norms, stemming from the authorities’ intoler-
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1 ance of dissent, fear of unrest, and the absence

2 or inadequacy of laws protecting basic free3 doms’’.

4 (C) ‘‘[a]buses include torture and mistreat5 ment of prisoners, forced confessions, and arbi6 trary and incommunicado detention’’.

7 (D) ‘‘[p]rison conditions remained harsh

8 [and] [t]he Government continued severe re9 strictions on freedom of speech, the press, as10 sembly, association, religion, privacy, and work11 er rights’’.

12 (E) ‘‘[a]lthough the Government denies

13 that it holds political prisoners, the number of

14 persons detained or serving sentences for

15 ‘counterrevolutionary crimes’ or ‘crimes against

16 the state’ and for peaceful political or religious

17 activities are believed to number in the thou18 sands’’;

19 (F) ‘‘[n]on-approved religious groups, in20 cluding Protestant and Catholic

21 groups . . experienced intensified repression’’.

22 (G) ‘‘[s]erious human rights abuses persist

23 in minority areas, including Tibet, Xinjiang,

24 and Inner Mongolia [, and] [c]ontrols on reli-
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1 gion and other fundamental freedoms in these

2 areas have also intensified’’.

3 (H) ‘‘[o]verall in 1996, the authorities

4 stepped up efforts to cut off expressions of pro5 test or criticism. All public dissent against the

6 party and government was effectively silenced

7 by intimidation, exile, the imposition of prison

8 terms, administrative detention, or house ar9 rest. No dissidents were known to be active at

10 year’s end.’’.

11 (2) In addition to the State Department, credi12 ble independent human rights organizations have

13 documented an increase in repression in China dur14 ing 1996, and effective destruction of the dissident

15 movement through the arrest and sentencing of the

16 few remaining pro-democracy and human rights ac17 tivists not already in prison or exile.

18 (3) Among the activists sentenced were—

19 (A) Wang Dan, a student leader of the

20 1989 pro-democracy protests, sentenced on Oc21 tober 30, 1996, to 11 years in prison on

22 charges of conspiring to subvert the Govern23 ment;

24 (B) Li Hai, sentenced to 9 years in prison

25 on December 18, 1996, for gathering informa-
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1 tion on the victims of the 1989 crackdown,

2 which according to the court’s verdict con3 stituted ‘‘state secrets’’; and

4 (C) Liu Nianchun, an independent labor

5 organizer, sentenced to 3 years of ‘‘reeducation

6 through labor’’ on July 4, 1996, due to his ac7 tivities in connection with a petition campaign

8 calling for human rights reforms.

9 (4) Many political prisoners are suffering from

10 poor conditions and ill treatment leading to serious

11 medical and health problems, including—

12 (A) Wei Jingsheng, sentenced to 14 years

13 in prison on December 13, 1996, for conspiring

14 to subvert the government and for ‘‘communica15 tion with hostile foreign organizations and indi16 viduals, amassing funds in preparation for over17 throwing the government and publishing anti18 government articles abroad,’’ is currently held

19 in Jile No. 1 Prison (formerly the Nanpu New

20 Life Salt Farm) in Hebei province, where he re21 portedly suffers from severe high blood pressure

22 and a heart condition, worsened by poor condi23 tions of confinement;

24 (B) Gao Yu, a journalist who has a heart

25 condition sentenced to 6 years in prison on No-
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1 vember 1994 and honored by UNESCO in May

2 1997; and

3 (C) Chen Longde, a leading human rights

4 advocate now serving a 3-year reeducation

5 through labor sentence imposed without trial in

6 August 1995, has reportedly been subject to re7 peated beatings and electric shocks at a labor

8 camp for refusing to confess his guilt.

9 (5) Currently there is only 1 official in the

10 United States Embassy in Beijing assigned to mon11 itoring human rights in the People’s Republic of

12 China. There are no officials assigned to monitor

13 human rights in United States consulates in the

14 People’s Republic of China.

15 (6) The People’s Liberation Army is a principal

16 instrument of repression within the People’s Repub17 lic of China, responsible for occupying Tibet since

18 1950, massacring hundreds of students and dem19 onstrators for democracy in Tiananmen Square on

20 June 4, 1989, and running the Laogai (‘‘reform

21 through labor’’) slave labor camps.

22 (b) FINDINGS ON COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING

23 PRACTICES OF THE PRC.—Congress makes the following

24 findings with respect to family planning practices:
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1 (1) For over 15 years there have been frequent

2 and credible reports of forced abortion and forced

3 sterilization in connection with the coercive popu4 lation control of the People’s Republic of China.

5 (2) Forced abortion was rightly denounced as a

6 crime against humanity by the Nuremberg War

7 Crimes Tribunal.

8 (3) Although it is the stated position of the po9 litburo of the Chinese Communist Party that forced

10 abortion and forced sterilization have no role in the

11 population control program, in fact the policy of the

12 Communist Chinese Government seems to encourage

13 both forced abortion and forced sterilization through

14 a combination of strictly enforced birth quotas and

15 impunity for local population control officials who

16 engage in coercion. Officials acknowledge that there

17 have been instances of forced abortions and steriliza18 tion, yet there is no evidence that the perpetrators

19 have been punished.

20 (4) The People’s Republic of China population

21 control officials, in cooperation with employers and

22 works unit officials, monitor women’s menstrual cy23 cles and subject women who conceive without gov24 ernment authorization to extreme psychological pres25 sure, to harsh economic sanctions, including
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1 unpayable fines and loss of employment, and to

2 physical force.

3 (5) Official sanctions for giving birth to unau4 thorized children include fines in amounts several

5 times larger than the per capita annual incomes of

6 residents of the People’s Republic of China. In

7 Fujian, for example, the average fine is estimated to

8 be twice a family’s gross annual income. Families

9 who cannot pay the fine have had their homes and

10 personal property confiscated and destroyed.

11 (6) Especially harsh punishments have been in12 flicted on those whose resistance is motivated by re13 ligion. For example, according to a 1995 Amnesty

14 International report, the Catholic inhabitants of 2

15 villages in Hebei Province were subjected to popu16 lation control under the slogan ‘‘better to have more

17 graves than one more child’’. Enforcement measures

18 included torture, sexual abuse, and the detention of

19 resisters’ relatives as hostages.

20 (7) Forced abortions in Communist China often

21 take place in the very late stages of pregnancy, or

22 even during the process of birth itself.

23 (8) Since 1994 forced abortion and sterilization

24 have been used in Communist China not only to reg25 ulate the number of children, but also to eliminate
28

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1 those who are regarded as defective in accordance

2 with the official eugenic policy known as the ‘‘Natal

3 and Health Care Law’’.

4 (c) FINDINGS ON RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN THE

5 PRC.—Congress makes the following findings with re6 spect to religious persecution:

7 (1) Despite public assurances by the Govern8 ment of the People’s Republic of China that it would

9 abide by the principles of the Universal Declaration

10 of Human Rights and despite the United Nations

11 Charter requirement that all members promote re12 spect for and observance of basic human rights, in13 cluding freedom of religion, the Chinese Government

14 continues to place severe restrictions on religious ex15 pression and practice.

16 (2) It has been reported that at an internal

17 Central Communist Party meeting in 1994, Presi18 dent Jiang Zemin asserted that religion is one of the

19 biggest threats to Communist Party rule in China

20 and Tibet.

21 (3) On January 31, 1994, Premier Li Peng

22 signed decrees number 144 and 145 which restrict

23 worship, religious education, distribution of Bibles

24 and other religious literature, and contact with for25 eign coreligionists.
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1 (4) The Chinese Government has created offi2 cial religious organizations that control all religious

3 worship, activity, and association in China and Tibet

4 and supplant the independent authority of the

5 Roman Catholic Church, independent Protestant

6 churches, and independent Buddhist, Taoist, and Is7 lamic associations.

8 (5) In July 1995, Ye Xiaowen, a rigid com9 munist hostile to religion, was appointed to head the

10 Bureau of Religious Affairs, a Chinese Government

11 agency controlled by the United Front Work Depart12 ment of the Chinese Communist Party. The Bureau

13 of Religious Affairs has administrative control over

14 all religious worship and activity in China and Tibet

15 through a system of granting or denying rights

16 through an official registration system. Those who

17 fail to or are not allowed to register are subject to

18 punitive measures.

19 (6) In the past year, the Chinese Government

20 has expressed great concern over the spread of

21 Christianity and particularly over the rapid growth

22 of Christian religious institutions other than those

23 controlled by the Chinese Government, including the

24 Roman Catholic Church and the evangelical Chris25 tian ‘‘house churches’’.
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1 (7) Hundreds of Chinese Protestants and

2 Catholics are among those now imprisoned, detained,

3 or continuously harassed because of their religious

4 beliefs or activities.

5 (8) The prisons and labor camps which hold

6 these religious prisoners are run by the Ministry of

7 Public Security and the Ministry of Justice of the

8 Chinese Government.

9 (9) Although some negotiations have taken

10 place, the Chinese Government refuses to permit the

11 appointment by the Vatican of Catholic bishops and

12 the ordination of priests not approved by the Gov13 ernment and insists on appointing its own ‘‘Catholic

14 bishops’’.

15 (10) The Tenth Panchen Lama died in January

16 1989 at Tashilhunpo Monastery, his traditional spir17 itual seat in Shigatze, Tibet’s second largest city.

18 (11) It has always been the right and the role

19 of the Dalai Lama to recognize the successor to the

20 Panchen Lama. On May 14, 1995, His Holiness the

21 Dalai Lama announced recognition of a six-year-old

22 boy, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, as the Eleventh Pan23 chen Lama, according to Tibetan tradition.

24 (12) The young boy, recognized by the Dalai

25 Lama, and his family have been brought to Beijing
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1 by Chinese authorities and have not been seen for

2 months. The Chinese authorities announced publicly

3 in June 1996 that they are holding Gedhun Choekyi

4 Nyima.

5 (13) Chadrel Rimpoche, abbot of Tashilhunpo

6 Monastery and head of the original search commit7 tee for the Eleventh Panchen Lama, and his assist8 ant, Champa Chung, are believed to have been

9 seized and detained by Chinese authorities in May of

10 1995.

11 (14) Chinese Government authorities subse12 quently detained other Tibetan Buddhists in connec13 tion with the selection of the Eleventh Panchen

14 Lama, including Gyatrol Rimposhe, Shepa Kelsang,

15 Lhakpa Tsering, and Ringkar Ngawang.

16 (15) The Chinese Government convened a con17 ference in Beijing where Tibetan monks were co18 erced to select a rival candidate to the child recog19 nized by the Dalai Lama as the Eleventh Panchen

20 Lama.

21 (16) On November 29, 1995, officials of the

22 Chinese Government orchestrated an elaborate cere23 mony designating a six-year-old boy selected by the

24 Chinese Government as the Eleventh Panchen Lama

25 and on December 8, 1995, a Government-sponsored
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1 ceremony was held in Shigatze, Tibet, where the boy

2 selected by the Government was enthroned as the

3 Eleventh Panchen Lama.

4 (17) By seeking to impose its own candidate as

5 the Eleventh Panchen Lama and detaining the six6 year-old boy recognized for that position in accord7 ance with Tibetan tradition, the Chinese Govern8 ment is infringing on a purely Tibetan religious mat9 ter, in blatant violation of the fundamental human

10 rights of the Tibetan people.

11 (d) FINDINGS ON SLAVE LABOR AND ‘‘REEDUCA12 TION’’ CAMPS IN THE PRC.—Congress makes the follow13 ing findings with respect to slave labor and reeducation

14 camps:

15 (1) The People’s Republic of China operates

16 and maintains an extensive forced labor camp sys17 tem—the Laogai.

18 (2) The Laogai is made up of more than 1,100

19 forced labor camps, with an estimated population of

20 6,000,000 to 8,000,000 prisoners.

21 (3) In one part of the Laogai system, known as

22 laojiao, or reeducation-through-labor, Chinese citi23 zens can be detained for up to 3 years without any

24 judicial review or formal appearance in the judicial

25 system.
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1 (4) The Laogai sector of the export economy of

2 the People’s Republic of China is engaged in the ex3 port to the United States of the goods made with

4 forced labor.

5 (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of

6 China employs a system of dual names for the

7 camps to deceive the international community.

8 (6) The United States Customs Service has

9 taken formal administrative action banning the im10 portation of 27 different products found to have

11 been made in the Laogai.

12 (7) Despite the fact that the People’s Republic

13 of China has entered into binding agreements with

14 the United States (the 1992 Memorandum of Un15 derstanding on Prison Labor, and the 1994 State16 ment of Cooperation on the Implementation of the

17 Memorandum of Understanding on Prison Labor) to

18 allow inspections of its forced labor camps to deter19 mine the origins of suspected Laogai imports to the

20 United States, the People’s Republic of China has

21 frustrated the implementation of these agreements.

22 (8) The State Department’s Human Rights

23 Country Reports in 1995 and 1996 each stated,

24 ‘‘Repeated delays in arranging prison labor site vis25 its called into question Chinese intentions regarding
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1 the implementation of’’ the agreements referred to

2 in paragraph (7).

3 (9) Concerning the ability of the United States

4 Customs Service to identify Communist Chinese

5 products that originate in the Laogai, the Commis6 sioner of Customs stated in testimony before the

7 Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 22,

8 1997: ‘‘We simply do not have the tools within our

9 present arsenal at Customs to gain the timely and

10 in-depth verification that we need.’’.

11 (e) FINDINGS ON THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL

12 BROADCASTING INTO THE PRC.—Congress makes the

13 following findings with respect to broadcasts to the Peo14 ple’s Republic of China:

15 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of

16 China systematically controls the flow of information

17 to the Chinese people.

18 (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of

19 China threatened economic development by announc20 ing in January 1996 that its official news agency

21 Xinhua, will supervise wire services selling economic

22 information, including Dow Jones-Telerate,

23 Bloomberg, and Reuters Business, and in announc24 ing in February of 1996 the ‘‘Interim Internet Man-
35

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1 agement Rules’’, which have the effect of censoring

2 computer networks.

3 (3) Under the May 30, 1997, order of Premier

4 Li Peng, all organizations that engage in business

5 activities related to international computer

6 networking must apply for a license, increasing still

7 further government control over access to the

8 Internet.

9 (4) Both Radio Free Asia and the Voice of

10 America, as a surrogate for a free press in the Peo11 ple’s Republic of China, provide an invaluable source

12 of uncensored information to the Chinese people, in13 cluding objective and authoritative news of in-coun14 try and regional events, as well as accurate news

15 about the United States and its policies.

16 (5) Radio Free Asia currently broadcasts only

17 5 hours a day in the Mandarin dialect and 2 hours

18 a day in Tibetan.

19 (6) Voice of America currently broadcasts only

10 hours a day in Mandarin and 31 20 ⁄2 hours a day

21 in Tibetan.

22 (7) Radio Free Asia and Voice of America

23 should develop 24-hour-a-day service in Mandarin,

24 Cantonese, and Tibetan, as well as further broad-
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1 casting capability in the dialects spoken in Xinjiang

2 and other regions of the People’s Republic of China.

3 (8) Radio Free Asia and Voice of America, in

4 working toward continuously broadcasting to the

5 People’s Republic of China in multiple languages,

6 have the capability to immediately establish 24-hour7 a-day Mandarin broadcasting to that nation by stag8 gering the hours of Radio Free Asia and Voice of

9 America.

10 (9) Simultaneous broadcasting on Voice of

11 America radio and Worldnet television 7 days a

12 week in Mandarin are also important and needed ca13 pabilities.

14 SEC. 202. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING.

15 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR IN16 CREASED FUNDING FOR RADIO FREE ASIA AND VOICE

17 OF AMERICA.—

18 (1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR

19 INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING TO CHINA.—In ad20 dition to such sums as are otherwise authorized to

21 be appropriated for ‘‘International Broadcasting Ac22 tivities’’ for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, there are

23 authorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International

24 Broadcasting Activities’’ $46,900,000 for fiscal year

25 1998 and $31,200,000 for fiscal year 1999, which
37

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1 shall be available only for broadcasting to the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China.

3 (2) LIMITATIONS.—

4 (A) RADIO FREE ASIA.—

5 (i) Of the funds authorized to be ap6 propriated under paragraph (1),

7 $26,900,000 is authorized to be appro8 priated for fiscal year 1998 and

9 $21,200,000 is authorized to be appro10 priated for fiscal year 1999 for Radio Free

11 Asia.

12 (ii) Of the funds under paragraph (1),

13 $1,200,000 is authorized to be appro14 priated for each such fiscal year for addi15 tional personnel to staff Cantonese lan16 guage broadcasting.

17 (iii) Of the total funds under para18 graph (1), $900,000 is authorized to be

19 appropriated for additional advanced edit20 ing equipment.

21 (B) FISCAL YEAR 1998.—

22 (i) Of the funds under paragraph (1)

23 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal

24 year 1998, $11,800,000 is authorized to be

25 appropriated for capital expenditures for
38

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1 the purchase and construction of trans2 mission facilities.

3 (ii) Of the funds under paragraph (1)

4 authorized to be appropriated for fiscal

5 year 1998, $3,000,000 is authorized to be

6 appropriated to facilitate the timely aug7 mentation of transmitters at Tinian, Mar8 shall Islands.

9 (3) ALLOCATION.—Of the amounts authorized

10 to be appropriated under paragraph (1), the Direc11 tor of the United States Information Agency and the

12 Board of Broadcasting Governors shall seek to en13 sure that the amounts made available for broadcast14 ing to nations whose people do not fully enjoy free15 dom of expression do not decline in proportion to the

16 amounts made available for broadcasting to other

17 nations.

18 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90

19 days after the date of enactment of this Act, in consulta20 tion with the Board of Broadcasting Governors, the Presi21 dent shall prepare and transmit to Congress a report on

22 a plan to achieve continuous broadcasting of Radio Free

23 Asia and Voice of America to the People’s Republic of

24 China in multiple major dialects and languages.
39

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1 SEC. 203. FREEDOM FROM RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

2 (a) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is

3 the sense of Congress that the President should make free4 dom of religion one of the major objectives of United

5 States foreign policy with respect to the People’s Republic

6 of China. As part of this policy, the Department of State

7 should raise in every relevant bilateral and multilateral

8 forum the issue of individuals imprisoned, detained, con9 fined, or otherwise harassed by the Chinese Government

10 on religious grounds. In its communications with the Chi11 nese Government, the Department of State should provide

12 specific names of individuals of concern and request a

13 complete and timely response from the Chinese Govern14 ment regarding the individuals’ whereabouts and condi15 tion, the charges against them, and sentence imposed. The

16 goal of these official communications should be the expedi17 tious release of all religious prisoners in China and Tibet

18 and the end of the Chinese Government’s policy and prac19 tice of harassing and repressing religious believers.

20 (b) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE PAR21 TICIPATION OF CERTAIN CHINESE OFFICIALS IN CON22 FERENCES, EXCHANGES, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES.—

23 (1) PROHIBITION.—

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any

25 other provision of law, for fiscal years after fis26 cal year 1997, no funds appropriated or other-
40

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1 wise made available for the Department of

2 State, the United States Information Agency,

3 or the United States Agency for International

4 Development may be used for the purposes of

5 providing travel expenses and per diem for the

6 participation of a national of the People’s Re7 public of China described in subparagraph (B).

8 (B) NATIONAL DESCRIBED.—A national

9 described in this subparagraph means any mili10 tary or civilian official or employee of the Gov11 ernment of the People’s Republic of China who

12 is directly involved in any of the following poli13 cies or practices or who was responsible for the

14 supervision of persons directly involved in such

15 policies or practices:

16 (i) Formulating, drafting, or imple17 menting repressive religious policies.

18 (ii) Imprisoning, detaining, or

19 harassing individuals on religious grounds.

20 (iii) Promoting or participating in

21 policies or practices which hinder religious

22 activities or the free expression or religious

23 beliefs.

24 (2) CERTIFICATION.—
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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—Each Federal agency

2 subject to the prohibition of paragraph (1) shall

3 certify in writing to the Committee on Foreign

4 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on

5 International Relations of the House of Rep6 resentatives, not later than 120 days after the

7 date of enactment of this Act, and annually

8 thereafter, that the agency did not pay for, ei9 ther directly or through a contractor or grantee,

10 travel expenses or per diem of any national of

11 the People’s Republic of China described in

12 paragraph (1)(B).

13 (B) CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATION.—Each

14 certification under subparagraph (A) shall be

15 supported by the following information:

16 (i) The name of each employee of any

17 agency of the Government of the People’s

18 Republic of China whose travel expenses or

19 per diem were paid by funds of the report20 ing agency of the United States Govern21 ment.

22 (ii) The procedures employed by the

23 reporting agency of the United States Gov24 ernment to ascertain whether each individ25 ual under clause (i) did or did not partici-
42

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1 pate in activities described in paragraph

2 (1)(B).

3 (iii) The reporting agency’s basis for

4 concluding that each individual under

5 clause (i) did not participate in such activi6 ties.

7 (c) CERTAIN OFFICIALS OF THE PRC INELIGIBLE

8 TO RECEIVE VISAS AND EXCLUDED FROM ADMISSION.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other

10 provision of law, any national of the People’s Repub11 lic of China described in subsection (b)(1)(B) shall

12 be ineligible to receive a visa and shall be excluded

13 from admission into the United States.

14 (2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the

15 provisions of paragraph (1) in order to carry on the

16 normal course of foreign policy.

17 SEC. 204. CONDEMNATION OF FORCED ABORTION.

18 (a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to

19 condemn those officials of the Chinese Communist Party,

20 the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and

21 other persons who are involved in the enforcement of

22 forced abortions, by preventing such persons from enter23 ing or remaining in the United States.

24 (b) DENIAL OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES

25 OF PERSONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA EN-
43

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1 GAGED IN ENFORCEMENT OF FORCED ABORTION POL2 ICY.—

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may

4 not issue any visa to, and the Attorney General may

5 not admit to the United States, any national of the

6 People’s Republic of China, including any official of

7 the Communist Party or the Government of the Peo8 ple’s Republic of China including regional and local

9 authorities of the People’s Republic of China, who

10 the Secretary finds, based on credible information,

11 has been involved in the establishment or enforce12 ment of population control policies resulting in a

13 woman being forced to undergo an abortion against

14 her free choice, or resulting in a man or woman

15 being forced to undergo sterilization against his or

16 her free choice.

17 (2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the

18 provisions of paragraph (1) in order to carry on the

19 normal course of foreign policy.

20 SEC. 205. COMBATING SLAVE LABOR AND ‘‘REEDUCATION’’

21 CENTERS.

22 (a) AUTHORIZATION FOR ADDITIONAL CUSTOMS AND

23 STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL TO MONITOR EXPOR24 TATION OF SLAVE LABOR PRODUCTS BY THE PEOPLE’S

25 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—There are authorized to be appro-
44

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1 priated $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 and $2,000,000

2 for fiscal year 1999 for monitoring by the United States

3 Customs Service and the Department of State products

4 exported by the People’s Republic of China to the United

5 States of products which may be made with slave labor,

6 in violation of section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or

7 section 1761 of title 18, United States Code.

8 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON EXPORTATION OF

9 PRODUCTS MADE WITH SLAVE LABOR.—

10 (1) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Commissioner

11 of Customs and the Secretary of State shall each

12 prepare and transmit to Congress reports on the

13 manufacturing and exportation of products made

14 with slave labor in the People’s Republic of China.

15 (2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under

16 paragraph (1) shall include information concerning

17 the following:

18 (A) The extent of the use of slave labor in

19 manufacturing products for exportation by the

20 People’s Republic of China, as well as the vol21 ume of exports of such slave labor products by

22 that country.

23 (B) The progress of the United States

24 Government—
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1 (i) in identifying products made with

2 slave labor in the People’s Republic of

3 China that are destined for the United

4 States market in violation of section 307 of

5 the Tariff Act of 1930 or section 1761 of

6 title 18, United States Code, and

7 (ii) in stemming the importation of

8 such products.

9 (3) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—Not later than 1

10 year after the date of enactment of this Act and an11 nually thereafter, the Commissioner of Customs and

12 the Secretary of State shall each submit to the

13 Speaker and minority leader of the House of Rep14 resentatives, the majority and minority leaders of

15 the Senate, the Chairman and Ranking Member of

16 the Committee on International Relations of the

17 House of Representatives, and the Chairman and

18 Ranking Member of the Committee on Foreign Rela19 tions of the Senate, classified and unclassified ver20 sions of the report described in paragraph (1).

21 (c) RENEGOTIATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UN22 DERSTANDING ON PRISON LABOR WITH THE PEOPLE’S

23 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—It is the sense of Congress that,

24 since the People’s Republic of China has substantially

25 frustrated the purposes of the 1992 Memorandum of Un-
46

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1 derstanding with the United States on Prison Labor, the

2 President should immediately commence negotiations to

3 replace the current Memorandum of Understanding on

4 Prison Labor with one providing for effective monitoring

5 of forced labor in the People’s Republic of China, without

6 restrictions on which prison labor camps international

7 monitors may visit.

8 SEC. 206. POLITICAL FREEDOM IN CHINA.

9 There are authorized to be appropriated $2,200,000

10 for fiscal year 1998 and $2,200,000 for fiscal year 1999,

11 to support personnel in the United States Embassy in

12 Beijing, as well as the American consulates in Guangzhou,

13 Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Hong Kong to mon14 itor political repression in the People’s Republic of China

15 and the use of the Laogai system of forced labor and re16 education as tools of political repression.

17 TITLE III—TRADE

18 SEC. 301. FINDINGS.

19 (a) FINDINGS ON UNITED STATES INTERESTS.—

20 Congress makes the following findings with respect to

21 United States interests:

22 (1) The United States has an interest in seeing

23 that the People’s Republic of China’s membership in

24 the World Trade Organization (in this title referred

25 to as the ‘‘WTO’’) is based on a commitment to
47

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1 open its economy to international trade and invest2 ment and to adhere to all World Trade Organization

3 rules.

4 (2) The purpose of the World Trade Organiza5 tion is to enable member countries to conduct trade

6 based upon free market principles, by limiting gov7 ernment intervention in the form of state subsidies,

8 by limiting non-tariff barriers, and by encouraging

9 reciprocal reductions in tariffs among members.

10 (3) The WTO is based on the assumption that

11 the import and export of goods are conducted by

12 independent enterprises responding to profit incen13 tives and market forces.

14 (4) The WTO requires that countries with non15 market economies implement significant reforms to

16 change centralized and planned economic systems

17 before they may be considered for WTO member18 ship, and the existence of a decentralized and a free

19 market economy is considered a condition for fair

20 trade among WTO members.

21 (b) FINDINGS ON TAIWAN’S ADMISSION INTO THE

22 WTO.—Congress makes the following findings with re23 spect to Taiwan:
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1 (1) Pursuant to its charter and rules, member2 ship in the WTO is not limited to nations nor indic3 ative of sovereignty.

4 (2) Taiwan has applied for membership in the

5 WTO as a separate customs territory including Tai6 wan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan’s appli7 cation is under review by a Working Party appointed

8 under Article XXXIII of the GATT 1994 (as de9 fined in section 2 of the Uruguay Round Agree10 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3501)).

11 (3) Taiwan has a free market economy that has

12 existed for more than 3 decades, and is currently the

13 14th largest trading nation in the world.

14 (4) Taiwan’s gross national product is the 20th

15 largest in the world, its foreign exchange reserves

16 are the 3rd largest in the world, and it has become

17 the world’s 7th largest foreign investor.

18 (5) Taiwan is the 7th largest trading partner of

19 the United States and its purchases of United States

20 exports are more than 60 percent greater than those

21 of the People’s Republic of China.

22 (6) Taiwan has already agreed to reduce the

23 tariff level of many products, and to eliminate other

24 non-tariff barriers as a condition of its admission to

25 the WTO.
49

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1 (7) The United States and Taiwan have enjoyed

2 a longstanding and uninterrupted friendship, which

3 has only increased in light of the remarkable eco4 nomic development and political liberalization in Tai5 wan in recent years.

6 (8) Taiwan reached a historic turning point in

7 the development of Chinese democracy on March 23,

8 1996, when it conducted the first competitive, free,

9 fair, direct, and popular election of a head of state

10 in over 4,000 years of recorded Chinese history,

11 leading to Lee Teng-hui’s inauguration as President

12 on May 20, 1996.

13 (9) For the past century the United States has

14 promoted democracy and economic freedom through15 out the world, and the evolution of Taiwan is an

16 outstanding example of the success of that policy.

17 (10) Taiwan’s accession to the WTO is impor18 tant to the United States because it is the largest

19 importer of United States goods of any country that

20 is not a member of the WTO, and because Taiwan’s

21 entry into the WTO would promote significant new

22 market opportunities for United States exporters

23 and investors.

24 (11) A declaration of the European Parliament

25 made on July 18, 1996, rightly found that ‘‘the peo-
50

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1 ple of Taiwan ought to be better represented to

2 international organizations than they are at present,

3 which would benefit both Taiwan and the whole of

4 the international community’’.

5 (12) Notwithstanding these circumstances, the

6 People’s Republic of China has sought to block the

7 admission of Taiwan to the WTO until the People’s

8 Republic of China accedes to membership.

9 (13) The People’s Republic of China, in con10 trast to Taiwan, has applied for membership in the

11 WTO not as a developed nation, but rather as a de12 veloping nation, so that it would be relieved of the

13 obligations to reduce its tariffs and eliminate its

14 subsidies for government-controlled industries, even

15 after its admission to the WTO.

16 (14) In contrast to Taiwan, the Communist

17 government of the People’s Republic of China main18 tains strict government controls over most trade

19 within its territory, restricts and often outlaws free

20 market competition, and denies legal and regulatory

21 protection of property rights, all in ways that are in22 compatible with WTO principles.

23 (c) FINDINGS ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI24 NA’S ADMISSION INTO THE WTO.—Congress makes the
51

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1 following findings with respect to the People’s Republic

2 of China:

3 (1) The Communist Government of the People’s

4 Republic of China maintains an intricate system of

5 restrictive and punitive tariff and non-tariff adminis6 trative controls to implement its centrally planned

7 industrial and trade policies, with tariffs on foreign

8 goods, such as automobiles, as high as 150 percent,

9 even though the People’s Republic of China has

10 made commitments in the Memorandum of Under11 standing on market access it signed with the United

12 States on October 10, 1992, and reaffirmed in

13 March of 1995, to reform significant parts of its im14 port regime.

15 (2) The Communist Government of the People’s

16 Republic of China has denied conditions necessary

17 for free trade in announcing in January of 1996

18 that its official news agency, Xinhua, will supervise

19 wire services selling economic information, including

20 Dow Jones-Telerate, Bloomberg, and Reuters Busi21 ness, and in announcing in February of 1996 the

22 ‘‘Interim Internet Management Rules’’, which have

23 the effect of censoring computer networks.

24 (3) Under the May 30, 1997, order of Premier

25 Li Peng of the People’s Republic of China, all units
52

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1 which engage in business activities related to inter2 national computer networking must now apply for

3 a license, increasing government control over access

4 to the Internet.

5 (4) The People’s Republic of China’s failure to

6 implement its March 11, 1995, agreement with the

7 United States to curtail piracy of products protected

8 by intellectual property rights, including music, vid9 eos, books, and software, prompted a threat by the

10 United States to impose trade sanctions propor11 tionate to the estimated loss of $2,300,000,000 to

12 the United States economy in 1995 caused by the

13 piracy.

14 (5) The Communist Government of the People’s

15 Republic of China continues to use direct and indi16 rect government subsidies to unfairly advantage its

17 own exports in contravention of market principles.

18 (6) Approximately 100,000 state enterprises are

19 currently operating in the People’s Republic of

20 China, accounting for over a third of the total indus21 trial production and employing two thirds of the

22 urban workforce in that country.

23 (7) The People’s Liberation Army contributes

24 to the People’s Republic of China’s failure to meet

25 the standards of the 1995 Memorandum of Under-
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1 standing with the United States on intellectual prop2 erty rights by running factories which pirate videos,

3 compact discs, and computer software that are prod4 ucts of the United States.

5 (8) The People’s Liberation Army contributes

6 to the People’s Republic of China’s failure to meet

7 the standards of the February 1997 Memorandum

8 of Understanding with the United States on textiles,

9 by operating enterprises engaged in the trans10 shipment of textile products to the United States

11 through third countries.

12 (9) The commercial activities of the People’s

13 Liberation Army are frequently conducted on non14 commercial terms, or for noncommercial purposes

15 such as military or foreign policy considerations.

16 (10) As a consequence of these practices, the

17 People’s Republic of China is not ready for, and

18 does not meet the criteria for, admission to the

19 WTO either as a developed nation or a developing

20 nation.

21 SEC. 302. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING PEOPLE’S

22 REPUBLIC OF CHINA ACCESSION.

23 It is the policy of Congress that the United States

24 should aggressively support the People’s Republic of Chi-
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1 na’s accession to the WTO under commercially viable

2 terms.

3 SEC. 303. TAIWAN’S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE OR4 GANIZATION.

5 It is the sense of Congress that—

6 (1) Taiwan should be admitted to the WTO as

7 a separate customs territory without making such

8 admission conditional on the previous or simulta9 neous admission of the People’s Republic of China

10 to the WTO, whether as a developing or a developed

11 nation; and

12 (2) it should be United States policy to support

13 Taiwan’s admission to the WTO forthwith, without

14 making such admission conditional on the previous

15 or simultaneous admission of the People’s Republic

16 of China to the WTO.

17 TITLE IV—REVIEW OF POLICY

18 SEC. 401. REVIEW OF POLICY.

19 The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Commit20 tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Chairman

21 and Ranking Member of the Committee on International

22 Relations of the House of Representatives shall review the

23 provisions of this Act at the request of the President or

24 upon any of the following conditions being met:
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1 (1) The People’s Republic of China’s entry into

2 the WTO.

3 (2) The President’s certification to Congress

4 that the People’s Republic of China has fully imple5 mented and is in compliance with bilateral and inter6 national nonproliferation agreements and standards.

7 (3) The President’s certification to Congress

8 that the People’s Republic of China is actively and

9 effectively combatting all forms of religious persecu10 tion.

11 (4) The People’s Republic of China’s reevaluat12 ing its official view of the Tiananmen Square Mas13 sacre of June 4, 1989, consistent with the findings

14 of this Act.

15 (5) The People’s Republic of China’s publica16 tion of a defense white paper that provides a com17 prehensive description and transparency of the

18 PLA’s modernization program roles and missions.

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