In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1499

In Re Complaint of Holly Marine Towing, Inc.,

owner of the Barge HMT 7, for exoneration 

from or limitation of liability,

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 4750--Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

Argued September 24, 2001--Decided October 26, 2001

 Before Posner, Ripple, and Kanne, Circuit

Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. The Limitation of

Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.

sec.sec. 183-189, limits, with irrelevant

exceptions, the liability of a shipowner

sued in tort to his investment in the

ship and its freight, and establishes a

procedure for obtaining and enforcing the

limitation. 46 U.S.C. sec.sec. 183(a),

185. This limitation of liability, the

purpose of which is to subsidize the U.S.

merchant marine, Grant Gilmore & Charles

L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty, sec.

10-2, pp. 818-19 (1975), is not to be

confused with the more common limited

liability of corporate shareholders,

which would prevent a maritime tort

victim from going against the personal

assets of a corporate shipowner’s

shareholders (though by separately

incorporating each ship the owner could

probably achieve the same protection that

the Limitation Act gives him; cf.

Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9

(N.Y. 1966)).

 Holly Marine owns a barge that it

chartered to a construction company, BH &

H, to perform work on a bridge over the

Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, a

navigable waterway of the United States.

Two employees of the construction

company, Gindl and Staal, were operating

a crane that JLG Industries had

manufactured and sold to the construction

company when the crane pitched over the

side of the barge into the canal, killing
Gindl and injuring Staal. Gindl (actually

his estate, but we’ll call it "Gindl" for

the sake of simplicity) and Staal brought

suit against all three companies in a

state court in Illinois. They could do

this, even though the accident occurred

on a navigable waterway and was thus

subject to adjudication in the federal

district court under the admiralty

jurisdiction, because of the "saving to

suitors" clause in the statute that gives

the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction

over admiralty cases. The clause allows

persons who, were it not for that

exclusive federal jurisdiction, would

have rights under "territorial" (federal

or state) law, to enforce those rights

outside the admiralty jurisdiction,

whether in federal or state court. 28

U.S.C. sec. 1333(1); Lewis v. Lewis &

Clark Marine, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 993, 999

(2001); Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc.,

113 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997).

Essentially, any maritime claim can be

sued on either under the federal

admiralty jurisdiction, naming the

offending ship as the defendant (for the

admiralty jurisdiction is in rem), or

under ordinary state or federal law,

naming the owner or another person as the

defendant. See, e.g., American Dredging

Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 445 (1994);

Hendricks v. Riverway Harbor Service St.

Louis, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 757, 763 (Ill.

App. 2000); Dungey v. U.S. Steel Corp.,

499 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Ill. App. 1986);

Maxson v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 408

N.E.2d 58, 60 (Ill. App. 1980). The

plaintiffs’ state-court suit charges the

defendants with negligence and related

torts under state law.

 As authorized by the Limitation Act,

Holly petitioned the district court for

limitation of liability, depositing with

the court an amount of money ($10,900)

that Holly represented to be its stake in

the barge and so the limit of its

liability. 46 U.S.C. sec. 185. This

section provides that upon compliance

with its requirements, "all claims and

proceedings against the owner with

respect to the matter in question shall

cease." An implementing rule entitles the

shipowner who has satisfied these

requirements to an injunction against the

further prosecution of any action against

the owner with respect to the matter in

question. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3).

Once the injunction has been entered,
claimants can file claims against the

money that the shipowner has deposited in

the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(5).

 Holly followed this procedure and

obtained the injunction, which was

followed by the submission of claims by

Gindl, Staal, and JLG but, for

unexplained reasons, not by BH & H. JLG’s

claim was for contribution from Holly as

a joint tortfeasor should Gindl and Staal

obtain a judgment against JLG for its

role in the accident. Joint Tortfeasor

Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/2;

Truszewski v. Outboard Motor Marine

Corp., 685 N.E.2d 992, 994 (Ill. App.

1997); Alper v. Altheimer & Gray, 257

F.3d 680, 684-87 (7th Cir. 2001). Later,

however, the district court partially

dissolved the injunction, precipitating

this appeal.

 Orders modifying or dissolving

injunctions are appealable without regard

to finality. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1292(a)(1);

Hispanics United v. Village of Addison, 

248 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2001); Lorain

NAACP v. Lorain Board of Education, 979

F.2d 1141, 1147 (6th Cir. 1992). We

needn’t worry whether partial dissolution

is dissolution within the meaning of the

statute, since an order that dissolves a

part of a decree modifies the decree. For

cases holding orders under the Limitation

Act that are similar to the order

appealed from in this case immediately

appealable, see, e.g., Pershing Auto

Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney, 279 F.2d 546,

548 (5th Cir. 1960); A. C. Dodge, Inc. v.

J. M. Carras, Inc., 218 F.2d 911, 913 (2d

Cir. 1955).

 The basis of the partial dissolution,

which allows the plaintiffs to press

their suit in state court but not to

enforce any judgment they obtain there

until Holly’s right to limitation is

determined, was a stipulation they

submitted to the district court in

support of their motion to dissolve the

injunction. (The term "stipulation,"

though customary in Limitation Act

proceedings, is a bit of a misnomer,

since these stipulations are unilateral

promises rather than agreements.) They

stipulated that they would neither ask

the state court to resolve any issue

concerning the limitation of Holly’s

liability nor seek to enforce any

judgment they obtain in state court
against JLG to the extent that such

enforcement would expose Holly to

liability in excess of its stake in the

barge by reason of JLG’s seeking

contribution from Holly. By granting the

motion to dissolve, on the basis of this

stipulation, so much of the injunction as

barred Gindl and Staal from proceeding in

state court until Holly’s right to

limitation is determined, the district

judge thought he was protecting Holly at

the same time that he was allowing Gindl

and Staal to proceed with their tort

claims, as they wanted to do, in state

court in accordance with the savings to

suitors clause.

 Holly argues that the stipulation has a

huge loophole. Since it was not signed by

JLG, the possibility exists that if Gindl

and Staal obtain a judgment, which might

be quite large, in state court, JLG will

seek contribution from Holly in an amount

greatly in excess of Holly’s stake in the

barge. Gindl and Staal emphasize the

district court’s ruling that the

injunction that Holly originally obtained

"remains in effect . . . as a stay

against entry and enforcement of Staal’s

and Gindl’s state court cases pending

determination by this Court of Holly’s

complaint for limitation of liability."

In other words, if Gindl and Staal do

obtain a large judgment against JLG,

collection of it will be stayed while the

parties repair to the federal district

court to limit Holly’s liability; the

result will presumably be an injunction

against JLG’s seeking contribution from

Holly, assuming Holly’s stake is indeed

small. The fact that JLG is not a party

to the stipulation is troublesome,

however, for it means that the

stipulation does not protect Holly from

being held liable, in a suit for

contribution by JLG, in an amount greater

than its stake in the suit. Not only is

JLG not a signer of the stipulation; it

has not even bothered to file a brief in

this appeal. Its plans and intentions are

unknown.

 Granted, the danger of JLG’s seeking

contribution may well be small if Holly’s

stake is indeed only $10,900, since the

district court has retained jurisdiction

to limit Holly’s liability, and, as all

the courts to have addressed the question

hold (ours has not till today, Great

Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of
Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 232 n. 11 (7th Cir.

1993)), such a limitation is good against

a claim by a joint tortfeasor as well as

against a claim by a tort victim. See,

e.g., In re ADM/Growmark River System,

Inc., 234 F.3d 881, 886 (5th Cir. 2000);

Gorman v. Cerasia, 2 F.3d 519, 526-28 (3d

Cir. 1993); In re Dammers & Vanderheide &

Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836

F.2d 750, 755-57 (2d Cir. 1988). For a

good statement of the many reasons

supporting this conclusion, see In re

Garvey Marine, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 560,

565 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The obvious reason

is that without it the objective of the

Limitation Act would be defeated by the

happenstance of the shipowner’s not being

the only tortfeasor. What sense would

that make?

 The Eighth Circuit reached the same

conclusion, though by a different route

(but one that has implications for the

proper disposition of this case, as we’ll

see shortly) and in an obscurely worded

opinion, Universal Towing Co. v. Barrale,

595 F.2d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 1979), that

is often, though we think incorrectly,

read as rejecting the majority rule

because it describes the joint

tortfeasor’s claim as "derivative" from

the tort victim’s rather than as a

separate claim. The court made clear,

however, that the total recovery against

the shipowner could not exceed the

statutory limitation. And likewise the

Sixth Circuit, which adopted the Eighth

Circuit’s reasoning in S & E Shipping

Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 678 F.2d

636, 645 (6th Cir. 1982).

 But the fact that a contribution claim

is a claim subject to limitation is not

in itself enough to protect Holly’s

statutory right to limitation fully. For

in a suit for contribution JLG might try

to show that Holly’s stake exceeded

$10,900 and if it obtained a ruling to

that effect it might try to plead that

ruling as res judicata in the postponed

limitation proceeding. Gindl and Staal go

further, acknowledging in their brief

that Holly may well end up paying more

than its limitation: "If Gindl or Staal

prevail against JLG, Holly may be at risk

only to the extent that its proportional

share of any judgment exceeds the value

of the barge and its contents." "Only"?

But suppose Gindl and Staal obtained a

judgment against JLG for $2 million and
Holly’s proportionate share was adjudged

in a suit for contribution by JLG to be

50 percent. Then Holly would be $1

million in the hole even if the value of

its investment in the barge was, as it

claims, only one one-hundredth of that

amount. That result would be contrary to

the Limitation Act, but the fact that

Gindl and Staal think it’s possible

augurs a long litigation road ahead for

Holly.

 Apart from these obscure and perhaps

chimerical dangers to Holly posed by the

partial dissolution of the injunction,

the Limitation Act entitles the shipowner

to obtain limitation upon the filing of

his petition for limitation in federal

district court and his satisfying the

requirements of the Act, not, possibly

much later, upon the completion of statecourt proceedings. That is where we part

company with the Sixth and Eighth Circuit

decisions (Universal Towing and S & E

Shipping), which don’t treat the

possibility of a future suit for

contribution as creating a situation in

which the shipowner confronts, and is

entitled to relief from, a risk of

multiple claims. It is true that if the

amount paid into court by the shipowner

exceeds the tort claims against him, or

if all the claimants stipulate that their

claims will not subject him to liability

beyond that amount, then he is fully

protected, and, even if there are

multiple claimants, the suits can

continue in state court without

endangering any interest that the Act

protects. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clarke

Marine, Inc., supra, 121 S. Ct. at 1002-

04; In re Complaint of McCarthy Bros.

Co./Clark Bridge, 83 F.3d 821, 832 (7th

Cir. 1996); Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v.

Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir.

1996); Gorman v. Cerasia, supra, 2 F.3d

at 525-26; In re Dammers & Vanderheide &

Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., supra,

836 F.2d 750, 757-60. It is otherwise if,

because neither condition is satisfied,

the shipowner must await the outcome of

state-court litigation to obtain his

protection. Because of the absence of a

stipulation from JLG, Holly cannot be

certain what the outcome of the postponed

limitation hearing will be, and so it

will be obliged to defend itself in state

court against Gindl and Staal (should

they press their suit against Holly,

which they presumably will do if they
doubt that its stake is as small as it

claims) in an effort to minimize any

potential liability.

 In these circumstances, the partial

dissolution of the injunction deprived

Holly of its statutory rights and was

therefore unreasonable, or equivalently,

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377-78 n. 23

(1989), as the cases say, an "abuse of

discretion." Gorman v. Cerasia, supra, 2

F.3d at 523; In re Complaint of Port

Arthur Towing Co., 42 F.3d 312, 317 (5th

Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The judgment of

the district court is therefore reversed

and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.