3:15-cv-00866-ST 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

David H. Madden 

Mersenne Law 

9600 S.W. Oak Street 

Suite 500 

Tigard, Oregon 97223 

(503)679-1671 

ecf@mersenne.com 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

COBBLER NEVADA, LLC, 

Plaintiff 

v. 

Thomas GONZALES, 

Defendant 

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Civil Action No.: ........... 3:15-cv-00866-ST 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS: 

REPLY BRIEF 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY

Plaintiff has helpfully clarified that its “indirect infringement” claim is actually one for 

alleged “contributory infringement.” This boils the dispute down to two discrete issues 

of law on which the parties disagree, namely: 

1. Can a plaintiff meet its obligation to allege “notice” by alleging notice of 

infringement of works of others – works not involved in the suit? 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

2. Does paying the bill for Internet data service at a premises constitute 

“inducing, causing or materially contributing to” all copyright infringement 

allegedly committed by any individual at the premises? 

Defendant submits that the answer to both of these questions is “NO,” and a 

negative answer to either question is dispositive for the purposes of the present motion. 

I. NOTICE OF ALLEGED INFRINGEMENT

Plaintiff focuses exclusively on one part of Defendant’s challenge to the “knowledge” 

prong of the contributory-infringement case: whether actual, or merely constructive, 

knowledge must be alleged. On the strength of a 1992 case applying the common-law 

mailbox rule to a taxpayer’s claim that she had mailed her return timely, Plaintiff asks 

this Court to extend the rule from the physical, envelope-and-stamps world to the 

electronic realm. No consideration is given to the fact that physical mail (delivered by a 

government corporation charged with exactly that task) is significantly different from 

electronic mail (delivered through fortuitous cooperation among anyone who cares to 

operate an email server on the Internet). Neither has Plaintiff presented any authority 

for extending the mailbox rule. But even if the Court was inclined to indulge Plaintiff in 

this unwarranted extension of law, there is another problem of notice that Plaintiff fails 

to even acknowledge. 

The second problem is whether the notice (actual or constructive) concerns 

Plaintiff’s work. Plaintiff’s argument is based on the faulty premise that “notice” for 

purposes of contributory infringement can come from alleged awareness of other 

alleged infringements of other entities’ copyrights. Every time Plaintiff refers in its brief 

to “the infringing activity,” Plaintiff is referring to the allegation that other 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

infringements, of other works not at issue in this case, were committed using an 

Internet connection that is billed to Defendant. This is not the state of the law, and 

indeed, the UMG case Plaintiff cites to insinuate that Defendant “buried [his] head in 

the sand” holds the opposite: 

It is undisputed that, until the filing of this lawsuit, [plaintiff] UMG ‘had 

not identified to [defendant] Veoh any specific infringing video 

available on Veoh’s system.’ UMG’s decision to forgo the DMCA notice 

protocol ‘stripped it of the most powerful evidence of a service 

provider’s knowledge – actual notice of infringement from the 

copyright holder.’ [Citations] [...] 

‘[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a 

computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory 

infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the 

exchange of copyrighted material.’ 

UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 

1020-21 (9th Cir. 2013) 

In short, the notice required to plead a claim for contributory infringement must 

concern the copyright alleged to have been infringed. Plaintiff has not pled such notice, 

and has not represented that it could plead it. For this reason alone, count two should 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

II. MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION

Plaintiff responds to Defendant’s charge that no “material contribution” facts are alleged 

by citing ¶¶ 34 and 35 of its First Amended Complaint: 

34. Defendant knowingly or with willful disregard permitted and after 

multiple notices, facilitated and promoted the use of the Internet 

for the infringing of plaintiff’s exclusive rights under The 

Copyright Act by others. 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

35. After hundreds of express notices and warnings, defendant failed 

to reasonably secure, police and protect the use of their [sic] 

Internet service and or computers against use for improper 

purposes such as piracy, including the downloading and sharing of 

the motion picture by others. 

Paragraph 34 contains nothing but legal conclusions, and to the extent that 

“failure to act” in ¶ 35 counts as a fact, it is one with literally no distinguishing power. 

Assuming (as we must) that someone infringed Plaintiff’s copyright, the allegation is 

true of every single person in the world – everyone failed to thwart the infringer. 

Plaintiff has not represented that it could allege any facts from which one might 

infer that Defendant “facilitated and promoted the use of the Internet for the infringing 

of plaintiff’s exclusive rights,” but its statement that “[p]roviding Internet service is 

sufficient to materially contribute to infringing activity,” (Plaintiff’s Response, docket 29 

at p. 7) suggests that it believes paying the bill for residential Internet service 

constitutes material contribution to infringement. This is not even remotely the 

holding of the Ellison case on which Plaintiff relies. 

In Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004), “[t]he Court agrees with the 

findings of the court in Netcom that ‘[p]roviding a service that allows for the automatic 

distribution of all Usenet postings, infringing and noninfringing,’ can constitute a 

material contribution when the [Internet service provider] knows or should know of 

infringing activity on its system.” 

But Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant “provided a service that allows for the 

automatic distribution of all Usenet postings.” It does not allege that he wrote or 

distributed the BitTorrent software alleged to have been used by the purported direct 

infringer. It does not allege that Defendant did anything at all. It alleges that 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

Defendant failed to do something – something that everyone else also failed to do. 

What Plaintiff might be able to allege (though it has not done so yet) is that 

Defendant paid for another company to provide Internet access to a residence – he paid 

another company to transport data between users at the residence and websites, email 

servers, and other computers around the world. But even if the transport of data was 

directly attributable to Defendant – if the bits traveled through his own routers and 

along his own wires, he still has not done anything like the defendants in Ellison v. 

Robertson (supra, AOL “stor[ed] infringing copies of Ellison’s works on its USENET 

groups and provid[ed] the groups’ users with access to those copies,” id. at 1078) or 

Grokster (“[when defendants] began to distribute their free software, each one clearly 

voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each 

took active steps to encourage infringement.” MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 

U.S. 913, 923-34 (2005)) 

Plaintiff uses the shorthand “Internet service” to conceal the clear difference 

between an individual paying the bill for data transmission service at a private 

residence, and a commercial enterprise operating data centers, store-and-forward 

servers, network devices and transmission lines serving millions of customers. The 

latter might form the basis for “material contribution,” but Defendant is not aware of 

any court ever holding that the former can. 

On the other hand, there is good reason to adopt the contrary position. As Judge 

Thomas Rice of the Eastern District of Washington wrote in January, 2014: 

The underlying premise of Plaintiff’s argument is that internet 

subscribers have an affirmative duty to ensure that their internet access 

cannot be used by a third party for an illegal purpose. [Citations] 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

Neither Sony nor Grokster supports such a sweeping premise. In fact, 

these cases actually undermine Plaintiff’s proposed rule. Sony holds 

that vicarious liability for another’s infringement cannot arise from the 

mere distribution of a product that is “widely used for legitimate, [noninfringing] purposes.” 464 U.S. at 442. There can be no serious dispute 

that internet access meets this description. Thus, under Sony, the mere 

act of making internet access available to a third party (whether 

permissively or inadvertently) cannot give rise to vicarious liability for 

copyright infringement as a matter of law. 

Grokster is even more compelling. That case holds that vicarious 

liability may arise from actively encouraging a third party to use a 

product for an infringing purpose. See 545 U.S. at 936-37 (“[O]ne who 

distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 

copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken 

to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 

third parties.”). Grokster essentially carves out an exception to Sony’s 

“safe harbor” rule for persons who distribute a product capable of both 

infringing and non-infringing uses with the intent that the product be 

used to infringe. Id. at 937-41 & n. 12. Notably, the case holds that a 

mere “failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement,” 

standing alone, cannot trigger vicarious liability. Id. at 939 n. 12. Thus, 

Grokster effectively forecloses any argument that private consumers 

have an affirmative obligation to prevent others from using their 

internet access for illegal copyright infringement. 

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Washington, case no. 2:13-cv-115-

TOR, docket 106 (1/22/2014), 7:5~8:8 (copy attached as Exhibit A) 

Of course, Judge Rice’s decision is not binding on this Court, but his analysis is sound 

and directly on point, and in the absence of guidance from the Oregon bench, 

Defendant respectfully submits that it should be applied here. 

/// 

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/// 

/// 

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Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS: Reply Brief 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s factual allegations are insufficient to make out a case of contributory 

infringement against Defendant. An essential element of the “knowledge” prong is 

missing (and Plaintiff has not represented that it could amend to cure this defect); and 

there is no support under existing law nor under a proposal for a reasonable extension 

of existing law to hold a residential Internet subscriber liable for infringements allegedly 

committed by others using the service he pays for. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s second 

cause of action be dismissed. 

21 January 2016 s/David H. Madden/ 

Date David H. Madden, SBN OR080396 

Attorney for Defendant Thomas GONZALES 

Mersenne Law 

9600 S.W. Oak Street 

Suite 500 

Tigard, Oregon 97223 

dhm@mersenne.com 

(503)679-1671 

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3:15-cv-00866-ST Exhibit A 

EXHIBIT A

Copy of Order Granting in part and Denying in part 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ELF-MAN, LLC,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

CHARLES BROWN, et al.,

 Defendants.

 

 NO: 13-CV-0115-TOR

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

BEFORE THE COURT is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants 

Josephine Geroe and David Starr (“Defendants”) (ECF No. 76). This matter was 

submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the 

briefing and the record and files herein, and is fully informed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Elf-Man, LLC (“Plaintiff”) has sued Defendants for infringing upon 

its copyright to a motion picture entitled Elf-Man. Plaintiff’s primary theory of 

liability is that Defendants illegally copied the movie via a peer-to-peer file sharing 

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protocol known as BitTorrent. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

“indirectly infringed” upon its copyright by failing to prevent third parties from 

copying the movie using their IP addresses. In the instant motion, Defendants 

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for indirect infringement for failure to state a 

claim. Defendants also seek dismissal of the entire Amended Complaint due to 

defect in the manner in which Plaintiff has pled its claims. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court will dismiss only the indirect infringement claims.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of 

the plaintiff’s claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To 

withstand dismissal, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “Naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 557. “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a plaintiff need not 

establish a probability of success on the merits, he or she must demonstrate “more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

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A complaint must also contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing whether Rule 8(a)(2) has 

been satisfied, a court must first identify the elements of the plaintiff’s claim(s) and 

then determine whether those elements could be proven on the facts pled. The 

court should generally draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, see 

Sheppard v. David Evans and Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012), but it 

need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing the motion. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 

988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may disregard allegations that are contradicted by 

matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. Id. The court may also 

disregard conclusory allegations and arguments which are not supported by 

reasonable deductions and inferences. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts to “grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless ... the pleading 

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could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for granting leave to amend is 

generous—the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In determining whether leave to amend is appropriate, a court 

must consider the following five factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 

(9th Cir. 2011).

A. Alternative Pleading Under Rule 8(d)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) allows a plaintiff to assert multiple 

claims “alternatively or hypothetically.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2). When multiple 

claims are asserted in the alternative, a legal deficiency in one claim does not 

defeat the remainder of the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“If a party makes 

alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.”). 

Alternative claims may be asserted “regardless of consistency” between theories of 

liability. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3). 

Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its 

entirety due to a deficiency in the manner in which Plaintiff has pled its alternative 

claims. Specifically, Defendants suggest that Plaintiff’s use of the phrase “and/or” 

defeats an inference of liability as to any Defendant given that the third alternative 

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claim for “indirect infringement” fails as a matter of law. See ECF No. 76 at 6 (“A 

plaintiff who makes a list of ‘and/or’ allegations fails to state a claim if any of the 

alternative possibilities fail[s] to state a claim.”) (emphasis in original).

The Court finds no deficiency in the pleading of Plaintiff’s alternative 

claims. The Amended Complaint alleges that “Defendants and each of them have 

illegally and without authorization from Plaintiff copied, downloaded, shared and 

uploaded Plaintiff’s motion picture using the BitTorrent system, and/or contributed 

to or permitted, facilitated or promoted such conduct by others.” ECF No. 26 at ¶ 

23. The Amended Complaint further specifies that each claim is “stated in the 

alternative” and specifically cites Rule 8(d)(2) in conjunction with the indirect 

infringement claim. ECF No. 26 at 21, 23 & ¶¶ 150-176. Notwithstanding its 

occasional use of the phrase “and/or,” the Amended Complaint specifically alleges 

that each individual Defendant is liable for direct and contributory infringement. 

See ECF No. 26 at 150-166. These allegations distinguish this case from others in 

which courts have read “and/or” allegations to preclude an inference of liability. 

Accordingly, the Court reads the Amended Complaint to allege that each defendant 

is liable for either (1) direct infringement and contributory infringement (First and 

Second Claims); or, in the alternative, (2) indirect infringement (Third Claim). 

The fact that the indirect infringement claim fails as a matter of law (discussed 

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immediately below) does not warrant dismissal of the entire Amended Complaint.1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2).

B. Indirect Infringement Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for “indirect infringement” of its 

copyright for “fail[ing] to secure, police and protect the use of their internet service 

against illegal conduct, including the downloading and sharing of Plaintiff’s 

motion picture by others.” ECF No. 26 at ¶ 170. This is essentially a “fallback” 

claim which applies to any Defendant who did not personally download the ElfMan movie. Plainly stated, Plaintiff’s theory is that these Defendants are liable for 

“permit[ing] other persons to access the Internet by way of their assigned IP 

address[es] without adequate supervision and with apparent disregard of the 

property rights of others.” ECF No. 85 at 13.

Defendants have moved to dismiss this claim for lack of a cognizable legal 

theory. Plaintiff concedes that this claim is not directly supported by any existing 

precedent, see ECF No. 85 at 18, but maintains that its novel theory of “indirect” 

infringement is viable under Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 

 

1 Defendants have not challenged the viability of Plaintiff’s direct infringement and 

contributory infringement claims. See ECF No. 76 at 1 (limiting scope of motion 

to indirect infringement claim). 

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464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 

545 U.S. 913 (2005). In Plaintiff’s view, Sony and Grokster lay the groundwork 

for vicarious liability when a defendant fails to “secure” his or her internet access 

against copyright infringement committed by a third party.

The Court respectfully disagrees. The underlying premise of Plaintiff’s

argument is that internet subscribers have an affirmative duty to ensure that their 

internet access cannot be used by a third party for an illegal purpose. ECF No. 85 

at 17-18. Neither Sony nor Grokster supports such a sweeping premise. In fact, 

these cases actually undermine Plaintiff’s proposed rule. Sony holds that vicarious 

liability for another’s infringement cannot arise from the mere distribution of a 

product that is “widely used for legitimate, [non-infringing] purposes.” 464 U.S. at 

442. There can be no serious dispute that internet access meets this description. 

Thus, under Sony, the mere act of making internet access available to a third party 

(whether permissively or inadvertently) cannot give rise to vicarious liability for 

copyright infringement as a matter of law. 

Grokster is even more compelling. That case holds that vicarious liability 

may arise from actively encouraging a third party to use a product for an infringing 

purpose. See 545 U.S. at 936-37 (“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object 

of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 

affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 

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infringement by third parties.”). Grokster essentially carves out an exception to 

Sony’s “safe harbor” rule for persons who distribute a product capable of both 

infringing and non-infringing uses with the intent that the product be used to 

infringe. Id. at 937-41 & n. 12. Notably, the case holds that a mere “failure to take 

affirmative steps to prevent infringement,” standing alone, cannot trigger vicarious 

liability. Id. at 939 n. 12. Thus, Grokster effectively forecloses any argument that 

private consumers have an affirmative obligation to prevent others from using their 

internet access for illegal copyright infringement. 

Plaintiff suggests that Defendants may be vicariously liable for having 

“failed to secure their [internet] access as required by their ISP agreements.” ECF 

No. 85 at 13-14 n. 3. The thrust of this argument is that Plaintiff is the “intended 

beneficiary” of a standard provision contained in the contracts between Defendants 

and their internet service providers which prohibits Defendants from using their 

internet access for illegal activity. ECF No. 85 at 14-15. 

Assuming for the sake of argument that Defendants actually agreed to such a 

provision—and that Plaintiff is an intended beneficiary thereof—there is no basis 

for imposing vicarious liability. As the Supreme Court explained in Sony, holding 

a defendant vicariously liable for a third party’s copyright infringement effectively 

expands the scope of the monopoly granted to the copyright owner into areas not 

specifically contemplated by the Copyright Act. See 464 U.S. at 440-42. Where, 

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for example, a copyright owner seeks to hold a VCR manufacturer vicariously 

liable for infringement facilitated by its product, a finding of liability effectively 

grants the copyright owner “the exclusive right to distribute” VCRs—a right not 

specifically granted by the Copyright Act. Id. at 441 n. 21. For this reason, courts 

faced with novel theories of vicarious liability must be “circumspect” in construing 

the scope of a copyright owner’s monopoly. Id. at 431. The guiding principle is 

that the benefit conferred by the copyright owner’s monopoly must “ultimately 

serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music and other 

arts.” Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 

156 (1975)). 

Applying that principle here, the Court finds that holding private internet 

users vicariously liable for copyright infringement committed by a third party on 

an “intended beneficiary” theory runs counter to the underlying purpose of the 

Copyright Act. Instead of promoting the “broad public availability” of materials 

that can be accessed via the internet, such a policy would discourage consumers 

from purchasing private internet access for fear of being held liable for third-party 

copyright infringement. At bottom, Sony counsels that copyright owners must 

endure a certain level of infringement when the proposed remedy—an expansion 

of their monopolies—would unduly frustrate the public interest. That reasoning 

applies with particular force to Plaintiff’s novel theory of “indirect infringement,” 

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which would effectively expand Plaintiff’s monopoly into the realm of private 

internet access. Under Sony, such a result cannot stand. Accordingly, the Court 

will dismiss Plaintiff’s alternative claims for indirect infringement with prejudice 

for lack of a cognizable legal theory. 

C. Motion for a More Definite Statement

As an alternative to dismissal of Plaintiff’s indirect infringement claim, 

Defendants have moved for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(e). In light of the foregoing, the Court need not address this 

alternative argument. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

The motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Josephine Geroe and David Starr 

(ECF No. 76) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s claims for 

“indirect infringement” of its copyright (Third Claim for Relief) are DISMISSED

with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims for direct infringement (First Claim for Relief) 

and contributory infringement (Second Claim for Relief) remain pending.

The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order and 

provide copies to counsel and the pro se Defendants at their addresses of record.

DATED January 22, 2014.

 

THOMAS O. RICE

United States District Judge

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3:15-cv-00866-ST Certificate of Service 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the document entitled: 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS: REPLY BRIEF

was served upon the parties listed below on the date indicated, 

 by following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of 

general jurisdiction where the district court is located or where service is made: 

 by delivery of a true copy of the document to the party to be served; 

 by delivering a true copy of the document to the dwelling house or usual place 

of abode of the person to be served, to any person 14 years of age or older 

residing in the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be 

served; 

 by leaving a true copy of the document during working hours at an office 

maintained by the party to be served for the conduct of business, with the person 

who is apparently in charge; 

 by mailing a true copy of the document to the party by first class mail and by any 

of the following: certified, registered, or express mail with return receipt 

requested; 

 by delivering a copy of the document to the individual personally; 

 by leaving a copy of the document at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of 

abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; 

 by delivering a copy of the document to an agent authorized by appointment or by 

law to receive service of process; 

 by electronic filing notification (PACER); or

 other: courtesy copy by electronic mail to crowell@crowell-law.com 

Carl D. Crowell, Esq. 

Crowell Law 

943 Liberty Street S.E. 

P.O. Box 923 

Salem, Oregon 97308-0923 

Attorney for Plaintiff COBBLER NEVADA, LLC 

21 January 2016 

Date David H. Madden 

Case 3:15-cv-00866-SB Document 30 Filed 01/21/16 Page 19 of 19