IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CINDY NORBERG, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

GEORGE J. WALL 

1336 E. Burnside 

Suite 130 

Portland, OR 97214 

(503) 236-0068 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

United States Attorney 

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204-2902 

(503) 727-1003 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

3:15-CV-00427-BR 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 1 of 18
DAVID MORADO 

Regional Chief Counsel 

HEATHER L. GRIFFITH 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104 

(206) 615-3709 

Attorneys for Defendant 

BROWN, Judge. 

Plaintiff Cindy Norberg seeks judicial review of a final 

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications for 

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (DIB) under Titles XVI and II of the Social Security 

Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's 

final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision 

of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. 

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on 

July 15, 2011, and alleged a disability onset date of 

August 9, 2010. Tr. 19, 101. 1 Her applications were denied 

initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge 

1 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by 

the Commissioner on July 21, 2015, are referred to as "Tr." 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 2 of 18
(ALJ) held a hearing on July 19, 2013. Tr. 42-100. At the 

hearing Plaintiff, a vocational expert (VE), and a lay witness 

testified. Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. 

On August 9, 2013, the ALJ issued an opinion in which she 

found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled 

to benefits. Tr. 19-34. On February 25, 2015, that decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 1-7. See 

Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was born on August 13, 1958. Tr. 141. Plaintiff 

was 54 years old at the time of the hearing. Plaintiff graduated 

from high school and has one year of college. Tr. 46. Plaintiff 

has past relevant work experience as a check cashier, bookkeeper, 

loan officer, restaurant manager, retail manager, program 

writer, waitress, and fast-food manager. Tr. 32. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to breast cancer, 

complications with reconstructive surgeries, depression, anxiety, 

and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's 

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the 

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ's summary of the 

medical evidence. See Tr. 25-31. 

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STANDARDS 

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to 

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th 

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her 

inability ''to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which . has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d) (1) (A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is 

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 

453, 459-60 (9ili Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision 

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 

u.s.c. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9ili Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is 

"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.n Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 

(quoting Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 

(9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence] 

but less than a preponderance. 

at 690). 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d 

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The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving 

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 

2009) . The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it 

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even 

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner's findings 

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the 

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F. 3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006) . 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS 

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation 

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) (4) (I), 416.920(a) (4) (I). 

also Keyser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

See 

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe 

impairments or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

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§§ 404 .1520 (a) (4) (ii), 416. 920 (a) (4) (ii). 

F.3d at 724. 

See also Keyser, 648 

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the 

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so 

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404 .1520 (a) (4) (iii), 416. 920 (a) (4) (iii). See also Keyser, 648 

F.3d at 724. The criteria for the listed impairments, known as 

Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, 

appendix 1 (Listed Impairments) . 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must 

assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). The 

claimant's RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related 

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a 

regular and continuing basis despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). See also Social Security Ruling 

(SSR) 96-8p. "A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a 

day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p, 

at *1. In other words, the Social Security Act does not require 

complete incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 659 F. 3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair 

v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the 

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a) (4) (iv), 

416.920(a) (4) (iv). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. 

If the Corrunissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine 

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in 

the national economy. 20 C. F. R. §§ 404. 1520 (a) ( 4) (v), 

416.920(a) (4) (v). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the 

burden shifts to the Corrunissioner to show a significant number of 

jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. 

Lockwood v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th 

Cir. 2010). The Corrunissioner may satisfy this burden through the 

testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational 

Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, 

subpart P, appendix 2. If the Corrunissioner meets this burden, 

the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(l), 

416. 920 (g) (1). 

ALJ' S FINDINGS 

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her August 9, 2010, alleged 

onset date. 2 Tr. 21. 

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe 

2 The ALJ identifies Plaintiff's onset date as August 10, 

2009, at Step One, but it is clear from the record and the ALJ's 

opinion that Plaintiff's onset date is August 9, 2010, and that 

is the date the ALJ considered in her analysis. 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 7 of 18
impairments of breast cancer, an affective disorder, and an 

anxiety disorder. Tr. 21. The ALJ found Plaintiff's impairment 

of "subclinical hyperthyroidism" is not severe. Tr. 22. 

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically 

determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 

1. Tr. 24. The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light 

work. Tr. 24. The ALJ found Plaintiff could frequently reach, 

handle, and finger. Tr. 24. The ALJ further limited Plaintiff 

as follows: 

Tr. 24. 

She is capable of relatively simple work 

equivalent to low, semi-skilled jobs or 

well-learned tasks. She can have superficial 

contact with the public, which means she is able 

to engage in contact with the public that would 

include providing directions, answering questions, 

giving change, and performing routine services for 

the public. She could not engage in intensive 

mediation, problem solving, dispute resolution or 

the kind of interactions with the public required 

to work in a complaint department or possibly even 

as a loan officer. 

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is capable of 

performing her past relevant work as a check cashier and 

waitress. Tr. 32. 

The ALJ also made an alternative Step Five finding that 

Plaintiff is capable of performing other jobs existing in the 

national economy as a mail sorter, price marker, and electronics 

worker. Tr. 33-34. Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 8 of 18
disabled. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when she (1) improperly 

gave "little weight" to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating 

physician Grace Lee, M. D.; (2) improperly gave "little weight" to 

the lay-witness testimony of Richard Olson and the lay-witness 

statement of LeeAnn Dickinson; and (3) improperly found at Step 

Four that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. 

I. The ALJ did not err when she gave "little weight" to 

Dr. Lee's opinion. 

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred when she gave "little 

weight" to the opinion of treating physician Dr. Lee. 

An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion when it is 

inconsistent with the opinions of other treating or examining 

physicians if the ALJ makes "findings setting forth specific, 

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial 

evidence in the record." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F. 2d 747, 751 

(9th Cir. 1989)). When the medical opinion of a treating 

physician is uncontroverted, however, the ALJ must give "clear 

and convincing reasons'' for rejecting it. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

957. See also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-32. 

On July 9, 2013, Dr. Lee provided an opinion letter and 

Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of Plaintiff in 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 9 of 18
which she stated 

It is more than likely that [Plaintiff] would have 

difficulty concentrating to remain on task for 

more than four hours total in an eight hour work 

day. Further, she would probably be unable to 

maintain a regular work schedule and have multiple 

unscheduled absences. The combination of 

[Plaintiff's] mental and physical health 

conditions would more than likely result in her 

missing at least two or more days of work a month 

and she would not be able to sustain employment in 

work requiring regular attendance, that is, five 

days a week, eight hours per day, for more than 

two to three days at a time. 

Tr. 1090. Dr. Lee opined Plaintiff had "moderately severe" 

limitations in her ability to remember locations and work-like 

procedures, to "understand and [to] remember detailed (three or 

more step) instructions," to "carry out detailed (three or more 

step) instructions," to maintain concentration for at least "two 

straight hours with at least four such sessions in a workday," to 

work in coordination with or proximity to others without being 

distracted, to make "simple work-related decisions," to complete 

a normal workday and work week "without interruptions from 

psychologically based symptoms," to interact appropriately with 

the general public or customers, to accept instructions and 

criticism from supervisors, to get along with coworkers or peers, 

and to set realistic goals. Tr. 1092-93. 

The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Lee's July 2013 opinion 

because it relied heavily on Plaintiff's self-report and was 

otherwise unsupported by the record. Dr. Lee stated in her 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 10 of 18
report that Plaintiff "reports symptoms . [and] as a result 

of the above symptoms, it is more than likely that [Plaintiff] 

would have difficulty concentrating to remain on task for more 

than four hours total in an eight hour work day." Thus, the 

record reflects Dr. Lee's opinion was based in part on 

Plaintiff's self-reports. The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff's 

testimony was not entirely credible, and Plaintiff does not 

challenge that finding. 

In addition, the ALJ noted Plaintiff underwent a 

neuropsychological evaluation with Molly McKenna, Ph.D., in April 

2013, just three months before Dr. Lee issued his opinion. 

During that evaluation Plaintiff was given the test for Premorbid 

Function (TOPF), the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of 

Neuropsychological Status (RBANS), the Sentence Repetition Test, 

the TrailMaking test A and B, and the Frontal Assessment Battery. 

Tr. 1033. Dr. McKenna noted on Plaintiff's TOPF, her "score was 

unusually low, resulting in an estimated IQ of 75 which was "well 

below the predicted level based on demographic criteria which 

would predict IQ of 105. This discrepancy between the two 

estimates is quite unusual in the general population," and "seems 

unusually low given her history of employment level." Tr. 1034. 

Dr. McKenna found Plaintiff's RBANS scores "were highly 

variable[,] relatively unusual . [, and] likely to be 

invalid given their inconsistency with her observed behavior and 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 11 of 18
known brain function." Tr. 1034. Plaintiff "struggled with 

digit span . [s]uggestive of poor effort in the general 

population." Tr. 1034. On the Sentence Repetition Test 

Plaintiff received a score "below the first Percentile[,] . a 

statistically unusual score and relatively inconsistent with her 

observed abilities." Tr. 1035. On the Trail-Making Test 

Plaintiff scored in the seventh percentile on part A and below 

the first percentile on part B." Tr. 1035. In summary 

Dr. McKenna concluded Plaintiff was "very depressed and highly 

distraught." Tr. 1035. Dr. McKenna also found Plaintiff's 

"expression of her psychological symptoms is very dramatic and 

possibly amplified slightly; she uses fairly extreme terms to 

describe her experiences." Tr. 1036. Dr. McKenna stated 

Plaintiff did not have any "notable signs of interview that 

indicated obvious cognitive deficits," but Plaintiff "may have 

periodic difficulty with attention, concentration, and 

simultaneous processing of information due to the interference of 

psychiatric symptoms." Tr. 1036. 

Similarly, throughout April and May 2013 Plaintiff's mental12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 12 of 18
health counselor assessed her with GAFs of 60 3 indicating 

moderate symptoms. The ALJ noted even when Plaintiff was 

admitted to in-patient psychiatric care in April 2012 following 

the death of her son and her diagnosis with breast cancer, her 

examining psychiatrist assessed her with a GAF of 55 on admission 

and a GAF of 654 on discharge. 

The ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff collected unemployment 

benefits in 2011 and 2012 until they were exhausted. Plaintiff 

testified at the hearing that she had to apply for three jobs per 

week to collect her unemployment benefits, but she applied for as 

many as five jobs per week including jobs in management, as a 

bank teller, and as a receptionist. The ALJ found these jobsearch activities were inconsistent with Dr. Lee's assessment 

that Plaintiff has disabling symptoms and limitations. 

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when 

3 Although the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders issued May 27, 2013 (DSMV), abandoned the GAF scale in favor of standardized assessments 

for symptom severity, diagnostic severity, and disability, at the 

time of Plaintiff's assessment and the ALJ's opinion the GAF 

scale was used to report a clinician's judgment of the patient's 

overall level of functioning on a scale of 1 to 100. See 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV, 31-34 

(4'h ed. 2000)). In the fourth edition, a GAF of 51-60 indicated 

moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, 

or school functioning. 

4 A GAF of 61-70 indicates mild symptoms (e.g. depressed 

mood and mild insomnia) or some difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school functioning, but generally functioning 

pretty well and has some meaningful interpersonal relationships. 

13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:15-cv-00427-BR Document 17 Filed 03/04/16 Page 13 of 18
she gave little weight to Dr. Lee's opinion because the ALJ 

provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record for doing so. 

II. The ALJ did not err when she gave "little weight" to laywitness testimony and statements. 

Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred when she gave little weight 

to the lay testimony of Richard Olson, Plaintiff's partner, and 

LeeAnn Dickson, Plaintiff's friend. 

Lay testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms is competent 

evidence that the ALJ must consider unless he "expressly 

determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane 

to each witness for doing so." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F. 3d 503, 511 

(9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's reasons for rejecting lay-witness 

testimony must also be "specific." Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 

1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006). When "the ALJ' s error lies in a 

failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to 

the claimant, a reviewing court cannot consider the error 

harmless unless it can confidently conclude that no reasonable 

ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a 

different disability determination." Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056. 

Olson testified at the hearing that after Plaintiff's son 

died in August 2010 Plaintiff "hardly got out of bed, cried a 

lot [, ] couldn't take showers [or] baths [and] quit 

cleaning the house." Tr. 82. Olson testified Plaintiff, at the 

time of the hearing, was unable to pay her bills, to track her 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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appointments, to track her medications, or to cook because she 

has problems with concentration. Tr. 81-82. Olson testified 

Plaintiff's health problems resulting from a staph infection in 

2012 affected her cognitive abilities. Tr. 83. Olson noted he 

and Plaintiff have their grandchildren over almost every weekend 

when Olson is home from work. Tr. 85. Olson also noted he and 

Plaintiff traveled to visit their grandchildren, Plaintiff and 

her daughter visited Olson at his job in Seattle, and he and 

Plaintiff traveled to Alaska to visit Plaintiff's friend. 

Tr. 86-88. 

LeeAnn Dickson submitted a letter on July 10, 2013, in which 

she noted in the previous two years that Plaintiff's "ability to 

withstand stress and trauma change[d] to a point of having to be 

hospitalized because she was unable to stop crying." Tr. 303. 

Dickson stated Plaintiff is frequently distracted and unable to 

remember previous conversations, and "her cognitive abilities 

[have] diminish[ed] in the area of memory and ability to focus." 

Tr. 303. 

The ALJ gave little weight to Olson's testimony as to 

Plaintiff's degree of difficulty with memory and concentration as 

well as to her activities of daily living and also gave little 

weight to Dickson's statement because their opinions of 

Plaintiff's impairments relied at least in part on Plaintiff's 

representations, which the ALJ had already found were not fully 

15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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credible. The ALJ also noted Olson's testimony and Dickson's 

statement as to Plaintiff's difficulties with memory, 

concentration, pain, and depression were not supported by Olson's 

reports of Plaintiff's travel and sightseeing or by the medical 

record. Tr. 32. 

The Court concludes on this record that the ALJ did not err 

when she gave little weight to Olson's testimony as to 

Plaintiff's degree of difficulty with memory and concentration as 

well as to her activities of daily living and gave little weight 

to Dickson's statement because the ALJ provided legally 

sufficient reasons for doing so. 

III. The ALJ did not err at Step Four when she found Plaintiff 

could perform her past relevant work. 

The ALJ found at Step Four that Plaintiff can perform her 

past relevant work as a check cashier and waitress, both of which 

are rated as requiring Reasoning Level Three by the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (DOT). Plaintiff, however, asserts the ALJ's 

finding at Step Four is unsupported because the ALJ limited 

Plaintiff to "relatively simple work equivalent to low, 

semi-skilled jobs or well-learned tasks," which, according to 

Plaintiff, is inconsistent with Reasoning Level Three. Plaintiff 

relies on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 

F. 3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015), to support her position. 

In Zavalin the ALJ found the plaintiff retained the RFC to 

perform "simple, routine, or repetitive tasks." The ALJ also 

16 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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found at Step Five that the plaintiff was not disabled because he 

was able to perform the jobs of cashier and surveillance system 

monitor, both of which are categorized as Reasoning Level Three 

in the DOT. The Ninth Circuit noted Reasoning Level Three is 

defined in the DOT as "the ability to follow written, oral, or 

diagrammatic instructions and to deal with problems involving 

several variables from a standardized situation" and found the 

ALJ in that case failed to ask the VE "to explain how a person 

who can only do simple[, routine, or repetitive] jobs because of 

impairments . could meet Level 3 Reasoning's requirements." 

Id. at 844. Ultimately the court concluded "there is an apparent 

conflict between [the plaintiff's] limitation to simple, routine, 

or repetitive tasks . and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning." 

Id. at 843-44. 

Here, however, the ALJ found Plaintiff was limited to 

"relatively simple work equivalent to low, semi-skilled jobs or 

well-learned tasks." When the ALJ asked the VE about a 

hypothetical claimant's ability to perform Plaintiff's past 

relevant work, the ALJ specifically differentiated her finding 

from a limitation to only simple, routine, or repetitive tasks: 

Q: I'd like to ask you to assume someone the 

same age and educational background as [Plaintiff] 

. limited to relatively simple work, and by 

that I mean simple or well-learned tasks, but not 

- I'm not talking one-to-two steps, I'm -

A: OK, so what you're saying is, is low 

semiskilled . work. 

17 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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Tr. 92-93. The VE testified an individual with Plaintiff's 

limitations was capable of performing the jobs of cashier and 

waitress. Tr. 93-95. 

The ALJ also asked the VE to advise whether any of her 

testimony conflicted with the DOT. The VE, however, did not 

testify that her finding of check cashier or waitress was 

inconsistent with the DOT as to the hypothetical task limitation 

and Reasoning Level Three. 

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err at 

Step Four when she found Plaintiff can perform her past relevant 

work as a check cashier or waitress. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the 

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 4th day of March, 2016. 

ANNA J. BROWN 

United States District Judge 

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