OPINION AND ORDER – 1 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CHERI SQUIER, ) Civil No.: 6:15-cv-01243-JE 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) OPINION AND ORDER 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1

 ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

____________________________________ ) 

 Merrill Schneider

 Schneider Kerr & Robichaux 

 P.O. Box 14490 

 Portland, OR 97293 

 

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

 Billy J. Williams, U.S. Attorney 

 Janice Hebert, Asst. U.S. Attorney 

 1000 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Suite 600 

 Portland, OR 97204 

 

1

 Nancy A. Berryhill replaced Carolyn W. Colvin as Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 20, 2017, 

and is therefore substituted as the Defendant in this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 2 

 Lorna Li 

 Special Asst. U.S. Attorney 

 Office of the General Counsel 

 Social Security Administration 

 701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221 A 

 Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

 Attorneys for Defendants 

JELDERKS, Magistrate Judge: 

 Plaintiff Cheri Squier brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) seeking judicial 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying 

her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act (the Act). 

Plaintiff seeks an Order remanding the action to the Social Security Administration (the Agency) 

for an award of benefits. The Commissioner concedes reversible error and moves the Court to 

remand for additional administrative proceedings. 

 For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is reversed and the motion 

for remand for additional proceedings is granted. 

Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on January 30, 2012, 

alleging she had been disabled since July 19, 2010. 

 After her claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff timely requested 

an administrative hearing. 

 On January 10, 2014, a video hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 

John Michaelsen. Plaintiff and Kathleen O’Gieblyn, a vocational expert (VE), testified at the 

hearing. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. 

 In a decision dated February 14, 2014, ALJ Michaelsen found that Plaintiff was not 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 3 

 On May 11, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering 

the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. In the present action, Plaintiff 

challenges that decision.

Background 

 Plaintiff was born in 1969 and was 44 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. 

Plaintiff completed the 11th grade and has past relevant work as a medical records clerk, office 

clerk, managed care coordinator, managed care clerk and office specialist clerk. 

Disability Analysis 

 The ALJ engages in a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Below is a summary 

of the five steps, which also are described in Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 Step One. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity (SGA). A claimant engaged in such activity is not disabled. If the claimant is 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to evaluate the claimant’s 

case under Step Two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

 Step Two. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant has one or more severe 

impairments. A claimant who does not have such an impairment is not disabled. If the claimant 

has a severe impairment, the Commissioner proceeds to evaluate the claimant’s case under Step 

Three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

 Step Three. Disability cannot be based solely on a severe impairment; therefore, the 

Commissioner next determines whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of the 

presumptively disabling impairments listed in the Social Security Administration (SSA) 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 4 

regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. A claimant who has such an impairment 

is disabled. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal an impairment listed in the 

regulations, the Commissioner’s evaluation of the claimant’s case proceeds under Step Four. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 

 Step Four. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to perform 

relevant work he or she has done in the past. A claimant who can perform past relevant work is 

not disabled. If the claimant demonstrates he or she cannot do work performed in the past, the 

Commissioner’s evaluation of the claimant’s case proceeds under Step Five. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(f). 

 Step Five. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to do any other 

work. A claimant who cannot perform other work is disabled. If the Commissioner finds that 

the claimant is able to do other work, the Commissioner must show that a significant number of 

jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can do. The Commissioner may satisfy this 

burden through the testimony of a vocational expert (VE) or by reference to the MedicalVocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If the Commissioner 

demonstrates that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant 

can do, the claimant is not disabled. If the Commissioner does not meet this burden, the claimant 

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). 

 At Steps One through Four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

1098. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

ALJ’s Decision 

 As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the requirements for insured status 

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through December 31, 2015. 

 At the first step of his disability analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since the date of her alleged onset of disability, July 19, 2010. 

 At the second step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

obesity, lupus, fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, carpal 

tunnel syndrome, anxiety and depression. 

 At the third step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or equaled a presumptively disabling impairment as set out in the 

Listings, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 

 The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC). He found that 

Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform sedentary work but was limited to no more than 

occasional stooping, kneeling or crouching; to no more than frequent handling, grasping, 

gripping, and fingering bilaterally, and to simple, repetitive, routine tasks requiring no more than 

the occasional interaction with the general public. He also found that Plaintiff should avoid any 

crawling or climbing and would need to avoid concentrated exposure to cold, heights, moving 

machinery and similar hazards, as well as fumes, dust, gases, poor ventilation and other noxious 

odors. In making his determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible. 

 At the fourth step, based on testimony from the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could 

not perform any of her past relevant work. 

 At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform 

other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Based upon testimony 

from the VE, the ALJ cited document preparer and surveillance system monitor as examples of 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 6 

such work. Having concluded that Plaintiff could perform other work, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not been under a disability within the meaning of the Act since July 19, 2010. 

Standard of Review

 A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable “to engage in substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

 423(d)(1)(A). Claimants bear the initial burden of establishing disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 

66 F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996). The Commissioner bears 

the burden of developing the record, DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991), 

and bears the burden of establishing that a claimant can perform “other work” at Step Five of the 

disability analysis process. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 

 The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. The court must weigh all of the evidence, whether it supports or 

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 

1986). The Commissioner’s decision must be upheld, however, even if “the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. 

Discussion 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in improperly rejecting the opinions of her treating 

doctor, treating physician’s assistant and treating counselor; in making step five findings 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 7 

inconsistent with her RFC; and in failing, without explanation, to include in her RFC a limitation 

to 1-2 step tasks as recommended by the state agency evaluators. 

 The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ’s step five finding did not comply with the 

requirement that he resolve the conflict between a limitation to simple, routine or repetitive tasks 

and the Dictionary of Occupations Titles’ (DOT) Level 3 Reasoning classification. The 

Commissioner also concedes that the ALJ did not consider a neuropsychological evaluation 

completed by Dr. Leah Schock in February 2012 and thus did not properly resolve all significant 

conflicts in the medical opinion evidence. The Commissioner also argues that, in light of the 

need for remand, the Commissioner should provide a more detailed discussion of the weight 

given to opinions of the state agency evaluators and explain any material difference between the 

1-2 step limitation they proffered and the VE’s opinion that Plaintiff could perform jobs that 

required Level 3 Reasoning. 

I. Evaluating Medical and “Other Source” Opinions 

 As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting the opinions of her treating physician, physician’s assistant and counselor. 

A. Applicable Standards 

 The ALJ is required to consider all medical opinion evidence and is responsible for 

resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the medical testimony. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). In reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court does not assume the role of 

fact-finder, but instead determines whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in 

light of the record as a whole. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.1992). 

 The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion of a 

non-examining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir.1990). An ALJ must 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 8 

provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinions of an examining 

physician, id., and must provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting opinions of an 

examining physician that are contradicted by another physician. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043. A 

non-examining physician's opinion “cannot by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies 

rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir.1995). 

 Care providers who are not “acceptable medical sources,” such as physicians’ assistants 

and counselors are still considered sources under the regulations that the ALJ can use in 

determining the “severity of [the individual's] impairment(s) and how it affects [the individual's] 

ability to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). An “other” source may not, however, be given 

“controlling” weight as a treating medical source, See SSR 06–03p; and an ALJ may discount the 

opinion of an “other source” by providing “germane reasons” for doing so. Molina v. Astrue, 674 

F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Dr. Raphael Allred, MD 

 Dr. Allred began treating Plaintiff in December 2007. In a July 2011 letter in support of 

Plaintiff’s disability application, Dr. Allred opined that Plaintiff became unable to work in July 

2010 and wrote that Plaintiff 

has been diagnosed with inflammatory arthritis and joint destruction requiring 

high risk medication treatment and she has also been diagnosed with pseudodementia that causes severe difficulties with concentration. She continues to 

struggle with depression and anxiety and overall her quality of life is terrible. 

There are days that she struggles with basic daily activities of living and I do not 

foresee her returning to work any time in the next year. 

Tr. 877. 

 Dr. Allred’s opinion was contradicted by the opinions of other physicians and, therefore, 

the ALJ was required to provide specific and legitimate reasons for the weight assigned Dr. 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 9 

Allred’s opinion. The ALJ recognized Dr. Allred as a treating source but gave his opinion little 

weight as inconsistent with his own treatment notes and Plaintiff’s presentation with treating 

sources. The Commissioner argues the ALJ was permitted to discount Dr. Allred’s opinion 

because it offered only diagnoses and a disability conclusion. However, the ALJ himself did not 

offer this reason in support of his rejection of Dr. Allred’s opinion and so this Court will not 

consider it as part of its review. See Bray v. Commissioner, 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.2009)( 

“Long-standing principles of administrative law require us to review the ALJ's decision based on 

the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt 

to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”)(citations omitted). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on a selective reading of the record to 

find isolated and intermittent instances of improvement or inconsistency with Dr. Allred’s 

opinion. The ALJ noted that at a June 12, 2012 appointment, Plaintiff reported her mood was 

stable using a homeopathic remedy daily and benzodiazepine a couple times a week. He also 

noted that severe numbness in her right arm was linked to typing “too long,” and that abdominal 

pain had improved with a modification in her prescribed medication. The ALJ also noted that 

Dr. Allred was aware that Plaintiff had reported to other providers that she received RFA 

treatment2

 in May 2009 that relieved 75%-90% of her left side neck pain until approximately 

August or September 2013. 

 However, as Plaintiff notes, the isolated treatment notes to which the ALJ cites do not 

show substantial improvement in the impairments upon which Dr. Allred based his opinion 

 

2

 RFA or radiofrequency ablation is a procedure whereby an electrical current produced by a radio wave is used to 

heat up a small area of nerve tissue, thereby decreasing pain signals from that specific area. See 

http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/radiofrequency-neurotomy/basics/definition/prc-20013452 

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regarding Plaintiff’s inability to work. The same note that indicated some mood stability with 

herbal supplements also reflected that the Plaintiff’s treating neuropsychologist believed that 

Plaintiff still had cognitive deficits and that she could benefit from counseling to deal with her 

anxiety. The note also reflected continuing issues with myalgia and abdominal pain. Tr.650. The 

treatment note the ALJ cited for Plaintiff’s right arm pain being related to typing too long also 

linked the severe numbness to “sleeping with her wrist cocked.” and indicated that paresthesia in 

Plaintiff’s left arm wasn’t “much better.” Tr. 846. Treatment notes regarding improvement in 

Plaintiff’s abdominal pain are accompanied by increases in her other pain, as abdominal relief 

came with the cessation of certain pain medications. Tr. 659, 861, 864, 868. 

 Furthermore, the subsequent treatment records from Dr. Allred and other providers are 

not, as the ALJ asserts, inconsistent with Dr. Allred’s opinion. Records reflect consistent reports 

of and treatment for myalgia, joint pain, stiffness, fatigue, depression, anxiety, and cognitive 

difficulties. Tr. 651, 653, 659, 662, 778, 782, 786, 790, 794-95, 798, 846, 860, 864, 868, 901, 

909, 917, 921, 980, 1004. The ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence represents a selective reading 

of both the record as a whole and the specific treatment notes upon which he relied. The ALJ 

erred in relying on only select portions of the evidence and failed to provide legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting Dr. Allred’s opinion. 

C. Tianna Welch, PA-C 

 Plaintiff became a patient with Deschutes Rheumatology in May 2009 and continued her 

treatment there through the disability application process. Physician’s assistant Tianna Welch 

was Plaintiff’s primary treatment provider at Deschutes. In a letter dated July 21, 2011, Ms. 

Welch wrote that Plaintiff 

had some improvement in her symptoms associated with lupus since her 

diagnosis, however I do not feel that her lupus is optimally treated. . . . [e]ven if 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 11 

she becomes asymptomatic for any lupus symptoms, which is highly unlikely 

even with optimal treatment, she still has significant symptoms from 

fibromyalgia, depression and cognitive difficulties. None of these have improved 

significantly with treatment of her lupus, and I do not anticipate them to improve 

in the future. 

Tr. 891. 

The ALJ found Ms. Welch’s opinion to be inconsistent with her “candid observations and 

notations in the routine progress notes” and gave it little weight. Because Ms. Welch is not an 

acceptable medical source, the ALJ was only required to provide “germane” reasons for 

discounting her opinion. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. The ALJ noted that subsequent treatment 

notes indicated that Plaintiff’s lupus did not need to be under further control, that prescribed 

prednisone was probably helping and that Ms. Welch indicated that her “guess” was that updated 

laboratory tests were “going to be normal.” Tr. 30, 902. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of the evidence failed to account for side effects 

from her medication, took treatment notes out of context and failed to consider those treatment 

notes which supported Ms. Welch’s opinion. A thorough review of the record does reflect a 

waxing and waning of Plaintiff’s symptoms, often associated with changes in her medication and 

situational stressors. However, the record also reflects that, contrary to Ms. Welch’s opinion, 

Plaintiff’s conditions did improve with treatment and her most recent treatment regimen was 

“helpful” and well tolerated. Tr. 902, 913, 917. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts 

and ambiguities in the medical evidence. Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the circumstances, the ALJ reasons for discounting Ms. Welch’s 

opinion were germane, and thus legally sufficient.

D. Ann Martin, LCSW 

In January 2014, Ms. Martin completed a form provided by Plaintiff’s attorney in which 

she indicated she had been Plaintiff’s treating mental health provider since May 6, 2013. Tr. 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 12 

1028. Ms. Martin indicated that she interacted with Plaintiff two to four times per month. She 

identified Plaintiff’s primary mental health diagnosis as an adjustment disorder with depression 

and anxiety. She identified symptoms of nervousness, fatigue, worry, jitters, depressed mood, 

hopelessness, and tearfulness. She opined that Plaintiff had extreme limitations in concentration, 

persistence and pace and marked limitations in social functioning, activities of daily living, and 

completing a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based 

symptoms. Ms. Martin also commented that Plaintiff’s ability to tolerate workplace stress would 

be limited. 

 The ALJ found Ms. Martin’s opinion to be inconsistent with contemporaneous routine 

treatment records and gave it little weight. After a thorough review of the record I conclude that 

the ALJ failed to provide a germane reason for rejecting this opinion. First, the ALJ cited to only 

one treatment note in support of his conclusion. An ALJ need not discuss all the evidence of 

record. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F .2d 1393, 1394–95 (9th Cir.1984). However, reliance on one 

treatment note dated over a year prior to the opinion in question is an inadequate basis to support 

a conclusion that there were “notable discrepancies between the routine progress notes” and Ms. 

Martin’s opinion. Tr. 32. Furthermore, I find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed 

to cite to anything in that single treatment note that is actually inconsistent with Ms. Martin’s 

opinion. The treatment note documents Plaintiff’s anxiety, frustration, hopelessness and inability 

to function in the face of life and family stressors. This mirrors the conclusions set forth in Ms. 

Martin’s opinion. The remainder of Ms. Martin’s treatment notes also support her opinion, 

documenting significant mood issues of anxiousness, sadness, depression, fear, anger and feeling 

overwhelmed. Inconsistency with contemporaneous treatment records was, thus, not a germane 

reason for rejecting Ms. Martin’s opinion and the ALJ provided no other basis for his conclusion. 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 13 

This was error. 

II. Step Five Findings 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred at Step Five because the jobs he identified as 

Plaintiff being able to perform both required a Reasoning Level 3, which is inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s RFC which limits her to simple, routine, repetitive tasks. See Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 

F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015). The parties agree that the ALJ erred in failing to recognize and resolve 

this inconsistency. Plaintiff argues that the record is fully developed and remand for an award of 

benefits is warranted. The Commissioner asserts that the record requires further development 

and, as in Zavalin, remand for further proceedings is necessary to allow the ALJ to address the 

conflict. I conclude that the ALJ’s errors in evaluating the medical evidence have left the record 

ambiguous, such that remand for an award of benefits at this stage would be inappropriate. As 

discussed below, further proceedings are necessary to allow for full consideration and legally 

sufficient evaluation of the medical evidence and to provide the ALJ the opportunity to address, 

and resolve, with the assistance of a VE, any resulting conflicts. 

III. Remand 

 A reviewing court has discretion to remand an action for further proceedings or for a 

finding of disability and an award of benefits. See, e.g., Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th 

Cir.1985). Whether an action is remanded for an award of benefits or for further proceedings 

depends on the likely utility of additional proceedings. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179 

(9th Cir. 2000). 

 In determining whether an award of benefits is warranted the court follows the “threepart credit-as-true standard.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Under this 

standard the court considers whether: (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons 

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for rejecting evidence, (2) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were 

credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. If a 

court concludes that a Plaintiff meets the three criteria of the credit-as-true standard, then the 

improperly discredited evidence is credited as true and remand for an award of benefits is 

appropriate unless “the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in 

fact, disabled with the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020–1021 

(citations omitted). 

 Here, the first requisite is met. The Commissioner concedes and I conclude that the ALJ 

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence and that his decision contained 

errors of law. However, I conclude that the second requisite is not met, as the record in this case 

is not fully developed. Given the ALJ’s failure to consider the 2012 neuropsychological 

evaluation conducted by Dr. Leah Schock, his failure to reconcile inconsistencies between 

Plaintiff’s RFC limitation to “simple, repetitive, routine tasks” and the Level 3 Reasoning 

required by the jobs he cited as other work Plaintiff could perform, and the significant conflicts 

in medical opinion that exist even if the improperly discredited opinions of Dr. Allred and Ms. 

Martin are credited as true, the record is far from fully developed and it not clear that Plaintiff is, 

in fact, disabled. Remand for further proceedings is, therefore, the appropriate remedy. Treichler 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a 

legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case 

to the agency.”). 

 On remand, the ALJ shall (1) consider and weigh the opinion evidence of Dr. Schock, (2) 

either credit Dr. Allred’s and Ms. Martin’s opinions or provide legally sufficient reasons for their 

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OPINION AND ORDER – 15 

rejection, (3) reassess Plaintiff’s RFC if that is required by conclusions drawn based on 

reconsideration of the evidence, (4) obtain additional VE testimony regarding what work 

Plaintiff can do, if any, (5) resolve any remaining inconsistencies concerning Reasoning levels 

that exist between the VE’s conclusions and the DOT, and (6) conduct any additional 

proceedings as indicated by the results of the foregoing instructions. 

Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and the 

motion for remand for further additional proceedings (#25) is GRANTED. This action is 

REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for additional 

administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.

 DATED this 24th day of March, 2017. 

 

 /s/ John Jelderks 

 John Jelderks 

 U.S. Magistrate Judge 

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