[Cite as Wu v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. , 2021-Ohio-1541.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO

JIASHIN WU, PH.D., : O P I N I O N Appellant, : CASE NO. 2020-P-0065 - vs - : OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, et al., : Appellee. :
Civil Appeal from the Porta g e Count y Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2020 CV 0039. Jud g ment: Affirmed. Jiashin Wu , Ph.D. , pro se, 6257 Canterbur y

Drive, Hudson, OH 44236 ( Appellant )

. Dave Yost , Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Stre et, 16th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215; and Wayne Williams , Assistant Attorney General, State Office Building, 11th Floor, 615 West Superior Avenue, Cleveland, OH 4 4113-1889 (For Appellee )

.

MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J. {¶1} Appellant, Jiashin Wu, Ph.D. (“Dr. Wu”), appeals from the judgm ent entry of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas affirming a letter of determination upon reconsideration issued by appellee, the Ohio Civil Rights Commi ssion (the “commission”). The commission’s letter dismissed Dr. Wu’s charge of discrimina tion against Northeast Ohio Medical University (“NEOMED”), finding no probable cause t o issue an administrative complaint and no jurisdiction to pursue the matt er.2 {¶2} Dr. Wu presents seven assignments of error on appeal, which we group into three categories for purposes of discussion. {¶3} First, Dr. Wu challenges the commission’s adjudication procedur es, arguing that the commission (a) was required to provide him an opportun ity for a hearing on his charge of discrimination pursuant to R.C. 119.06 and (b) violat ed his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutio n. {¶4} Second, Dr. Wu challenges the trial court proceedings, arguing that the trial court failed to (a) consider the “whole record” in rendering it s judgment, contrary to requirements in R.C. 4112.06, R.C. Chapter 119, and R.C. Chapte r 2506, and (b) issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52. {¶5} Third, Dr. Wu challenges the trial court’s substantive review o f the commission’s order, arguing that the trial court erred by (a) f ailing to overturn the commission’s factual findings, and (b) failing to find that one of the commission’s findings rendered its order “illogical.” {¶6} After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we conc lude that Dr. Wu has not established that the trial court abused its discreti on in affirming the commission’s order. {¶7} First, we find that the commission (a) was not subject to R.C. 119.06 for purposes of issuing its determination letters and (b) did not v iolate Dr. Wu’s due process rights because it afforded Dr. Wu the adjudicatory procedures r equired under R.C. Chapter 4112 and Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-04. {¶8} Second, we find that (a) the trial court considered the “whole record” for purposes of reviewing the commission’s order because the commis sion did not receive3 formal evidence during its preliminary investigation, and (b) t he requirements in R.C. 4112.06, R.C. Chapter 119, R.C. Chapter 2506, and Civ.R. 52 wer e not applicable. {¶9} Third, we find that (a) the trial court’s review of the commiss ion’s factual findings was limited to whether they made the commission’s orde r “unlawful, irrational, arbitrary or capricious,” (b) the trial court employed a sound reasoning process in affirming the commission’s order, and (c) one of the commission’s finding s contained an unintentional clerical mistake that did not render its order “i llogical.” {¶10} Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Portage County Court of Com mon Pleas. Substantive and Pr ocedural History {¶11} In March 2019, Dr. Wu, proceeding pro se, filed a charge of dis crimination with the commission alleging that NEOMED engaged in several unl awful discriminatory practices. {¶12} Specifically, Dr. Wu alleged that NEOMED has been consistently discriminating against people of Chinese origin by (1) excludin g ethnic Chinese people from its faculty; (2) discriminating against ethnic Chinese peo ple in student admission; and (3) discriminating against faculty members of Chinese origi n through lay-off, forced resignation, demotion, harassment, and failure to provide a rea sonable accommodation. Dr. Wu further alleged that NEOMED’s exclusion of and discrimin ation against ethnic Chinese people is currently on-going. Dr. Wu attached document ation in support of his charge, including faculty demographics and student enrollment d ata. {¶13} In June 2019, the commission issued a letter of determination. The commission stated that it investigated Dr. Wu’s allegations by “consider[ing] relevant documents and testimony.” The c ommission found that “[t]he inf ormation gathered does4 not support a recommendation that [NEOMED] unlawfully discrimin ated against [Dr. Wu].” Specifically, the commission found that “the faculty member [Dr . Wu] alleged was denied a reasonable accommodation by [NEOMED] was actually granted an accommodation.” The commission further found that it did not have jurisdiction over the balance of the allegations because Dr. Wu’s allegations of “demotion, failure to hire, layoff, termination, forced to resign, promotion, discipline, and harassment” occurr ed more than six months prior to Dr. Wu’s filing of his charge of discrimination. {¶14} The commission determined that it was not probable that NEOMED engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice in violation of R.C. Chapter 4112 on the “basis of disability, race, [and] national original on the issu e of reasonable accommodation.” It further determined that there was no jurisd iction under R.C. Chapter 4112 on the issues of “faculty demographics, student enrollment , demotion, failure to hire, layoff, termination, forced to resign, promotion, discipline an d harassment.” Therefore, the commission dismissed the matter. {¶15} Dr. Wu filed a notice of request for reconsideration of the com mission’s determination, setting forth numerous facts that the commission allegedly failed to consider and disputing the commission’s finding that it had no jurisdiction over some of Dr. Wu’s claims. {¶16} The commission accepted Dr. Wu’s application for reconsideratio n and, in December 2019, issued a letter of determination upon reconsider ation. The commission stated that it “re-examined the information gathered during its original investigation,” including “a review of all the relevant information provided by the parties.” The commission found that “[a]fter reconsideration,” there was “no new evidence to warrant the reversals of its original No Probable Cause and No Jurisdic tion decision.” The5 commission again determined that there was no probable cause to issue an administrative complaint against NEOMED and no jurisdiction und er R.C. Chapter 4112 to pursue the matter. Therefore, the commission dismissed the matter. {¶17} In January 2020, Dr. Wu filed a petition for judicial review of the commission’s letter of determination upon reconsideration in th e trial court. 1 The magistrate filed an order establishing a briefing schedule. {¶18} The commission filed “the record,” which consisted of an affida vit from its director of enforcement and compliance and a copy of its letter of determination upon reconsideration. {¶19} Dr. Wu and the commission both filed briefs, and Dr. Wu filed a reply brief. {¶20} In June 2020, the trial court filed a judgment entry affirming the commission’s order and overruling Dr. Wu’s administrative appea l. The trial court stated that its review was “confined to the record before it and only involves a limited examination of the agency’s determination” to determine whether the commiss ion’s decision was “unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable , or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence.” The trial court found that the commission “adequately and sufficiently explained its decis ion not to pursue legal action” against NEOMED. The commission’s determination “was cl ear” that it “did not have jurisdiction over some claims made by” Dr. Wu and “did not find evidence of discrimination in the other claims.” Therefore, the trial cour t determined that the

1. Dr. Wu’s petition listed himself as “plaintiff” and NEOMED as “defendant.” Subsequently, NEOMED filed a motion to dismiss itself as a party pursuant to Civ.R. 21, an d Dr. Wu filed a motion to add the commission as “defendant-appellee.” The trial court granted both motions.6 commission’s order was not “unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrar y, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable an d probative evidence.” {¶21} Dr. Wu appealed the trial court’s judgment entry and presents t he following seven assignments of error for our review: {¶22} “[1.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.d. 19) by agreein g with Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s NO JURISDICTION decision, which viola tes Ohio R.C. §4112. {¶23} “[2.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.D. 19) by accepti ng the Commission’s illegal total ignorance or misinterpretation of al l undisputed factual evidences [sic] of NEOMED’s ongoing systematic discriminations [sic] based on ethnicity, race, national origins [sic], gender and ethnic cleansing, by p ermitting the Commission making [sic] its Determination against these undisputed facts w ithout justification, and by accepting [the] Commission’s praise and covering up of NEOMED’s unlawful discrimination. {¶24} “[3.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.d. 19) by allowin g the Commission to make and keep the illogical same decisions after the Commission changed its Findings of Fact statement to the opposite in its L etter of Determination upon Reconsideration (Td. 14, Exhibit 4) by removing ‘NOT’ from ‘All jurisdictional requirement [sic] for filing a charge had NOT been met’ in its earlier Lett er of Determination (Td. 14, Exhibit 2). {¶25} “[4.] The Trial Court erred by making its judgment (Judgment En try T.d. 19) without justification, reasoning, analyses, or any references t o Dr. Wu’s assignments of error, issues presented for review, and undisputed facts, in vi olation of Civ. R. 52. {¶26} “[5.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.d. 19) by failing to consider the ‘whole record’, because the Trial Court’s record was not ‘w hole’, missing the secret7 findings that [the] Commission claimed owning and solely depend ed on in making its Determinations against all undisputed true facts submitted by D r. Wu. {¶27} “[6.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.d. 19) by failing to identify the invalidity of [the] Commission’s Determination because the Comm ission did not give Dr. Wu an opportunity for a hearing. {¶28} “[7.] The Trial Court erred (Judgment Entry T.d. 19) by allowin g [the] Commission’s violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unite d States Constitution.” Standard of Review {¶29} We review a trial court’s judgment affirming an order from the commission for an abuse of discretion. Yeager v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 148 Ohio App.3d 459, 2002-Ohio-3383, 773 N.E.2d 1097, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal deci sion-making.’” State v. Beechler , 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004). {¶30} When a pure issue of law is involved in appellate review, the m ere fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enoug h to find error (although harmless errors and errors not preserved for appellate review a re not reversible). Id . at ¶ 67, fn. 2. By contrast, where the issue on review has been c onfided to the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would h ave reached a different result is not enough, without more, to find error. Id . at ¶ 67. R.C. Chapter 4112 {¶31} We begin by summarizing the applicable statutory procedures reg arding a charge of discrimination.8 {¶32} The commission was created under R.C. 4112.03 and operates purs uant to R.C. Chapter 4112, as supplemented by Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 411 2. The commission is authorized to “[r]eceive, investigate, and pass upon written charges made under oath of unlawful discriminatory practices[.]” R.C. 4112.04(A)(6). {¶33} R.C. 4112.02(A) provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discri minatory practice * * * [f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that pe rson with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” {¶34} “Any person may file a charge with the commission alleging that another person has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice” under R.C. 4112.02(A). R.C. 4112.05(B)(1). “[T]he charge shall be in wri ting and under oath and shall be filed with the commission within six months after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice was committed.” Id

. {¶35} “Upon receiving a charge, the commission may initiate a prelimi nary investigation to determine whether it is probable that an unlaw ful discriminatory practice has been or is being engaged in.” R.C. 4112.05(B)(2). See State ex rel. Westbrook v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. , 17 Ohio St.3d 215, 216, 478 N.E.2d 799 (1985) (holding that since the statute does not mandate a preliminary investigation, “the commission has discretion in determining whether an investigation must be made ”). {¶36} This informal procedure is conducted by a member or members of the commission staff to examine the factual basis behind the charge and to obtain the information necessary for the commission to determine whether i t is probable that the9 respondent has engaged in any unlawful discriminatory practices

. McCrea v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. , 20 Ohio App.3d 314, 315-316, 486 N.E.2d 143 (9th Dist.1984); see Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-03(A) and (B). {¶37} If the commission initiates a preliminary investigation, it may proceed in one of two ways. {¶38} “If the commission determines after a preliminary investigation * * * that it is probable that an unlawful discriminatory practice has been or i s being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate the practice by informal methods of confe rence, conciliation, and persuasion, or by alternative dispute resolution.” R.C. 4112.0 5(B)(4). If conciliation fails, the commission shall serve the respondent with a complaint and notice of formal hearing to be held before the commission, a member thereof, or hearing examiner. R.C. 4112.05(B)(5). {¶39} At the hearing, testimony is taken under oath, reduced to writi ng, and filed with the commission. R.C. 4112.05(F). If, upon review of all the reliable, probative and substantial evidence, the commission determines that the respon dent has or is engaged in discriminatory practices, it will set out its findings of fa ct and conclusions of law and issue a cease-and-desist order to the respondent. R.C. 4112.05 (G)(1)(a)(i). In addition, the commission may require the respondent to reinstate certain employees, upgrade the employees and award back pay, if appropriate. R.C. 4112.05(G)( 1)(a)(ii). The commission may, however, conclude from all the reliable, probat ive and substantial evidence that the respondent has not engaged in any unlawful di scriminatory practices. In such a case, the commission will state its findings of fact and issue an order dismissing the complaint. R.C. 4112.05(H).10 {¶40} Alternatively, “[i]f the commission determines after a prelimin ary investigation * * * that it is not probable that an unlawful di scriminatory practice has been or is being engaged in, it sha ll notify [the complainant] * * * that it has so determined and that it will not issue a complaint in the matter.” R.C. 4112.0 5(B)(4). See also Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-03(F). In addition, the commission “shall stat e its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the complainant an order dismissing the complaint as to the respondent.” R.C. 4112.05(H). {¶41} A party may apply to the commission for reconsideration of its determination, which the commission may, in its discretion, acc ept or reject. Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-04(A) and (B). If the commission accepts an ap plication for reconsideration, it shall make a determination and notify all p arties. Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-04(B)(2). {¶42} The final orders of the commission are subject to judicial revi ew upon the filing of a petition in the court of common pleas by the aggrie ved party. R.C. 4112.06(A). The commission is required to file with the court a transcript of the record of the proceedings at the hearing, including all evidence and proffers of evidence. R.C. 4112.06(B). {¶43} Judicial review of the commission’s orders is based upon the tr anscript and such additional evidence as the court allows. R.C. 4112.06(B) and (D). The commission’s findings of fact cannot be disturbed by a reviewin g court if such findings are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. R.C . 4112.06(E). Judicial Review - “No Probable Cause” Determination {¶44} In McCrea , supra , the Ninth District explained judicial review in the context of a “no probable cause” determination:11 {¶45} “Prior to the filing of a complaint, the procedure set out in t he statute is informal and in the nature of an ex parte proceeding. Although the commission investigates the charge, it does not seek to receive formal evi dence. Unlike the procedure set forth for a post-complaint formal hearing, R.C. 4112.05 doe s not provide for the swearing of witnesses, the taking of testimony, or the keeping of a record during the preliminary investigation. A determination of no probable caus e is one which cannot, therefore, be reviewed on the basis of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. This standard can be applied by a reviewing court only to orders whi ch come about subsequent to or as the result of an evidentiary hearing. In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence to review on appeal—reliable, probative, s ubstantial, or otherwise. To apply this standard to a probable cause determination would be to create a burden upon the commission where clearly none was contemplated by the legislature. {¶46} “Thus, although the statute requires the commission’s investiga tor to set forth findings of fact in a determination of no probable cause, these findings of fact are not subject to judicial review in the sense that the court can examine the record to see whether the findings are supported by the evidence. Neverthele ss, the legislature intended that the commission set forth the factual findings und erlying its decision not to issue a complaint and also that this decision would be subject to judicial review. As an appeal of the commission’s determination of no probable cause c annot include a review of its findings of fact, the permissible scope of judicial revi ew is brought into sharper focus. {¶47} “R.C. 4112.05 vests the commission with the responsibility of m aking the determination of whether or not it is probable that any unlawfu l discriminatory practices have been engaged in by the respondent. Due to the inherently subjective nature of the concept of probable cause, such a determination necessarily inv olves the exercise of the12 commission’s specialized knowledge and expertise, good judgment , and sound discretion. It would therefore be wholly improper and contrary to the clear legislative intent for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for tha t of the commission. A refusal to issue a complaint on the grounds of a lack of probable cause must, however, have a legal, rational, and defensible basis. In order to successfull y withstand judicial review, the refusal to issue a complaint cannot be based upon unlawful, irrational or arbitrary reasons. Thus, except in those rare instances where the commis sion’s factual findings can be challenged without resort to a re-evaluation by the cour t of the evidence, the court’s review should be confined to a limited examination of t he commission’s decision for the purpose of determining whether the findings of fact sho w sufficient justification for its decision not to issue a complaint. Unless the reviewing co urt finds that the findings of fact show that the commission’s decision not to issue a complai nt is unlawful, irrational, arbitrary or capricious, the court should not disturb the commi ssion’s action.” Id . at 316- 317. {¶48} The McCrea court concluded that “the standard of reliable, probative and substantial evidence is applicable only to post-complaint decisions and orders of t he commission. The applicable standard of review for a pre-compla int decision not to issue a complaint for lack of probable cause is whether the decision is unlawful, irrational, and/or arbitrary and capricious.” (Emphasis sic.) Id . at 317. {¶49} The decision and reasoning in McCrea have been widely adopted. Hous. Advocates, Inc. v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 86444 & 87305, 2006- Ohio-4495, ¶ 10, fn. 9 (collecting cases). This court has also adopted the McCrea standard. See Yeager , supra , at ¶ 12, quoting Coleman v. Warner , 82 Ohio App.3d 263, 265, 611 N.E.2d 878 (6th Dist.1992) (“‘Upon review of a determi nation that no probable13 cause exists [to issue a complaint], the common pleas court mus t determine whether [the commission’s] decision is unlawful, irrational, and/or arbitrar y and capricious’”). {¶50} In light of the foregoing, we address Dr. Wu’s assignments of e rror. For ease of discussion, we do so out of order and, at times, collec tively. Commission Proceedings {¶51} We first address Dr. Wu’s challenges to the commission’s adjudi cation procedures. Hearing {¶52} In his sixth assignment of error, Dr. Wu contends that the tria l court erred by failing to overturn the commission’s order on the basis that the commission did not provide him an opportunity for a hearing on his charge of discr imination. {¶53} In support, Dr. Wu cites R.C. 119.06, which states, in relevant part, that “[n]o adjudication order shall be valid unless an opportunity for a h earing is afforded in accordance with sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code. Such opportunity for a hearing shall be given before making the adjudication order exc ept in those situations where this section provides otherwise.” {¶54} R.C. Chapter 119, the Administrative Procedure Act, establishes the procedural framework within which state agencies must operate. Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Commt. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 193, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981) (“ Plumbers ”). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, R.C. 119.01 defines “agency” in three ways for purposes of the Act. Id . The first category consists of agencies enumerated in the statute. Id . The second category includes “‘the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, divisi on, * * * or commission * * * specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised14 Code.’” (Emphasis added.) Id ., quoting R.C. 119.01(A)(1). Administrative agencies with the authority to issue, suspend, revoke or cancel licenses comp rise the third group of agencies. Id . The statute also exempts certain other named agencies from i ts coverage. Id

. {¶55} The commission is neither expressly included in nor expressly e xcluded from the statutory definition of agency, and the commission doe s not engage in licensing activities. Id . Therefore, the only potentially applicable portion of the st atutory definition is the second category. Id

. {¶56} Some of the commission’s functions are specifically subject to R.C. Chapter 119. See , e.g ., R.C. 4112.05(D) (rulemaking); R.C. 4112.05(G)(1)(a) (service of probable cause order); R.C. 4112.05(I) (modification or setting aside of a finding or order). {¶57} In Plumbers , the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the commission is not subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial review because the applicable statute, R.C. 4112.06, makes no reference to it. Id . at 194. {¶58} Here, the commission’s letter of determination was issued follo wing its preliminary investigation. R.C. 4112.05(B)(4) does not require the commission to hold a hearing prior to issuing such an order. See McCrea at 316. In addition, R.C. 4112.05(B)(4) makes no reference to R.C. Chapter 119. {¶59} Further, the commission’s reconsideration of its determination is governed by Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-04. This provision does not require th e commission to hold a hearing prior to making a determination, and it also makes no r eference to R.C. Chapter 119. {¶60} Therefore, we find that the commission was not subject to R.C. 119.06 in making its determinations.15 {¶61} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not overturning the commission’s order on the basis that the co mmission did not provide Dr. Wu an opportunity for a hearing. {¶62} Dr. Wu’s sixth assignment of error is without merit. Due Process {¶63} In his seventh assignment of error, Dr. Wu contends that the tr ial court erred by failing to overturn the commission’s order on the basis that the commission violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Un ited States Constitution. {¶64} Dr. Wu argues that the commission violated his due process righ ts by basing its determinations on “secret information”; failing to p repare a record of evidence; failing to prepare written finding s of fact and the reasons for its determinations; and failing to provide him with opportunities for a hearing and to cross-ex amine witnesses. {¶65} The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Due Pr ocess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires “‘at a minimum * * * that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and o pportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co ., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), quoting Mullane v. Centr. Hanover Bank & Trust Co ., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). A cou rt must engage in a “two-part inquiry: * * * [1] whether [the claimant] was depr ived of a protected interest, and, if so, [2] what process was his due.” Id

. {¶66} In Logan , the claimant’s protected property interest was his right to h ave his state’s fair employment practices commission consider his emplo yment discrimination charge pursuant to the applicable statutory adjudicatory proced ures, which that16 commission failed to do. Id . at 424-426, 431. Accordingly, the court found that the claimant’s due process rights were violated. Id . at 437. {¶67} In Salazar v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 39 Ohio App.3d 26, 528 N.E.2d 1303 (6th Dist.1987), the Sixth District applied the Logan inquiry in the context of a “no probable cause” determination from the commission. The claimant had fil ed a charge of unlawful handicap discrimination against his employer with the commissio n. Id . at 27. The commission conducted a preliminary investigation and found that there was no probable cause to believe that the claimant had been unlawfully discrimi nated against on the basis of his handicap. Id

. {¶68} On appeal, the claimant argued that the Due Process Clause of t he Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed him the right to be heard at an evidentiary hearing at the preliminary investigation stage, where he could have presen ted evidence, crossexamined witnesses, and inspected the commission’s investigativ e file. Id . at 29. {¶69} The Sixth District held that the claimant had a protected prope rty interest in filing a charge of discrimination with the commission and in ha ving the commission pass upon it. Id . However, Ohio law had not conferred upon the claimant “an in dividual entitlement to an adversary-oriented, evidentiary hearing at th e preliminary investigation stage” of his discrimination charge. Id . at 30. The court concluded that there was no basis upon which to invoke the protections accorded to “propert y” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id . Accordingly, the court held that the claimant “did not posse ss any protected property interest susceptible of deprivation without due process of law.” Id .; see Tarshis v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-172, 2019-Ohio3633, ¶ 13 (holding same).17 {¶70} We agree with the Sixth District’s analysis and conclusion. In this case, the commission afforded Dr. Wu the adjudicatory procedures required under R.C. Chapter 4112 by conducting a preliminary investigation, making a “no pr obable cause” determination, and notifying Dr. Wu of its determination, findi ngs of fact, and order dismissing the matter. {¶71} The commission also afforded Dr. Wu the adjudicatory procedures set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 4112-3-04 by accepting Dr. Wu’s application fo r reconsideration, making a determination, and notifying Dr. Wu of its determinati on. {¶72} Dr. Wu’s arguments appear to be based on his dissatisfaction wi th the commission’s existing procedures. However, this is insufficien t to establish a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Desired changes to the commission’s adjudicatory procedures would be best addressed to the commission itself. Salazar at 31. {¶73} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not overturning the commission’s order on the basis that the co mmission violated Dr. Wu’s due process rights. {¶74} Dr. Wu’s seventh assignment of error is without merit. Trial Court Proceedings {¶75} We next address Dr. Wu’s challenges to the trial court’s proced ures in reviewing the commission’s order. The Record {¶76} In his fifth assignment of error, Dr. Wu contends that the tria l court failed to consider the “whole record” in rendering its judgment.18 {¶77} Dr. Wu first argues that the commission illegally “collected an d used secret information” that it omitted from the record filed in the trial court, in violation of R.C. 4112.06. {¶78} As Dr. Wu correctly notes, R.C. 4112.06(B) provides that after the filing of a proceeding for judicial review, “the commission shall file wi th the court a transcript of the record upon the hearing before it . The transcript shall include all proceedings in the case, including all evidence and proffers of evidence.” (Empha sis added.) In addition, R.C. 4112.06(G) provides that “[t]he commission’s copy of the testimony shall be available at all reasonable times to all parties without cost f or examination and for the purposes of judicial review of the order of the commission. The petition shall be heard on the transcript of the record without requirement of printing.” (Emphasis added.) {¶79} As indicated, the commission does not receive formal evidence i n its preliminary investigation of a charge of discrimination. McCrea at 316. Unlike the procedure set forth for a post-complaint formal hearing, R.C. 4 112.05 does not provide for the swearing of witnesses, the taking of testimony, or the keeping of a record during the preliminary investigation. Id. Thus, the “record” that is available for review is limited when dealing with a preliminary investigation by the commission

. Van Horn v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 94-T-5117, 1996 WL 200577, *2 (Feb. 9, 1996). {¶80} As this court has recognized, R.C. 4112.05(H) requires the comm ission to set forth “findings of fact” which support its determination th at no probable cause exists in support of a claim of discrimination. Id . It is these findings of fact that the trial court considers, pursuant to its judicial review function under R.C. 4112.06, when reviewing a preliminary investigation conducted by the commission. Id

.19 {¶81} Therefore, the trial court correctly confined its review to the record as filed by the commission, namely the commission’s letter. See McCrea at 317; Cox v. Dayton Public Schools Bd. of Edn ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28261, 2019-Ohio-2591, ¶ 42; May v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 58 Ohio App.3d 56, 57, 568 N.E.2d 716 (1st Dist.1989). {¶82} Dr. Wu also argues that the commission violated R.C. 119.12, wh ich governs judicial review of orders issued by state agencies purs uant to an adjudication and requires the agency to “ prepare and certify to the court a complete record of the proceedings of the case.” R.C. 119.12(J). Similarly, within h is second assignment of error, Dr. Wu argues that the commission violated R.C. 119.09 b y failing to include in its record Dr. Wu’s “proffer of evidence” that he submitted with hi s charge of discrimination. {¶83} The Supreme Court of Ohio has expressly determined that the com mission is not subject to R.C. 119.12 for purposes of judicial review. Plumbers , supra , at 194. R.C. 4112.06(B), which governs the commission’s filing of the r ecord in the trial court, also makes no reference to R.C. Chapter 119. Therefore, we fin d that the commission was also not subject to R.C. 119.09. {¶84} Dr. Wu further argues that the commission and the trial court w ere subject to the procedural requirements in R.C. Chapter 2506, which addr esses “appeals from orders of administrative officers and agencies.” Dr. Wu cites R.C. 2506.02, which requires “the officer or body from which the appeal is taken” t o “prepare and file in the court to which the appeal is taken, a complete transcript of al l the original papers, testimony, and evidence offered, heard, and taken into consider ation in issuing the final order, adjudication, or decision.” Dr. Wu also cites R.C. 2506 .03(B), which requires the trial court to hear additional evidence if any of the circumsta nces set forth in R.C. 2506.03(A)(1) to (5) apply.20 {¶85} R.C. Chapter 2506 expressly applies to final orders “of any off icer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other divi sion of any political subdivision of the state .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2506.01(A). The commission is an agency of the state, not an agency of a political subdivision o f the state. Toliver v. Montgomery Cty. Jobs and Family Servs. Div ., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22979, 2009- Ohio-3521, ¶ 36; see R.C. 4112.03. By contrast, R.C. 4112.06 expressly applies to the judicial review of the commission’s final orders. Thus, we fin d that R.C. 2506.02 and R.C. 2506.03 were not applicable. {¶86} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court considered the “w hole record” applicable to its review of the commission’s order and, thus, d id not abuse its discretion. {¶87} Dr. Wu’s fifth assignment of error and the discussed portion of his second assignment of error are without merit. Civ.R. 52 {¶88} In his fourth assignment of error, Dr. Wu contends that the tri al court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law pur suant to Civ.R. 52. {¶89} Civ.R. 52, entitled “findings by the court,” states, in relevan t part, as follows: {¶90} “When questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the parties in writing requests otherwise before the entry of judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 58, or not lat er than seven days after the party filing the request has been given notice of the court’s a nnouncement of its decision, whichever is later, in which case, the court shall state in wri ting the findings of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.” (Emphasis added.)21 {¶91} In this case, there is no indication in the record that Dr. Wu requested findings of fact in writing, as required by the rule. Further, we find that Civ.R. 52 was not applicable to the trial court’s review of the commission’s orde r. {¶92} The applicability of Civ.R. 52 to administrative appeals depend s on the role assumed by the trial court. Pataskala Banking Co. v. Etna Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 5th Dist. Licking Nos. 07-CA-116, 07-CA-117, & 07-CA-118, 2008- Ohio-2770, ¶ 18. When no factual determinations are made, Civ.R. 52 is not appli cable. Roseman v. Reminderville , 14 Ohio App.3d 124, 129, 470 N.E.2d 224 (9th Dist.1984). {¶93} When a claimant appeals to the common pleas court from a “no pr obable cause” determination, the common pleas court acts as a reviewin g court. Hous. Advocates , supra , at ¶ 28; see May , supra , at 57 (“There is no provision in the statutory scheme for a trial de novo in the common pleas court”). The tr ial court’s review is “confined to a limited examination of the commission’s decision for the purpose of determining whether the findings of fact show sufficient justif ication for its decision not to issue a complaint.” McCrea at 317. R.C. 4112.06(D), which permits the admission of additional evidence, only applies when the commission has held an evidentiary hearing. Hous. Advocates at ¶ 28. {¶94} Since the trial court did not make factual determinations, Civ. R. 52 was not applicable. {¶95} Dr. Wu’s fourth assignment of error is without merit. The Trial Court’s Decision {¶96} Finally, we address Dr. Wu’s challenges to the trial court’s su bstantive review of the commission’s order.22 Factual Findings {¶97} In his first assignment of error and within his second assignme nt of error, Dr. Wu contends that the trial cour t erred by failing to overtu rn the commission’s factual findings that (1) it did not have jurisdiction over some of Dr. Wu’s allegations; (2) it was not probable that NEOMED had engaged in an unlawful discriminat ory practice; and (3) NEOMED actually granted a reasonable accommodation to the facul ty member referenced in Dr. Wu’s charge of discrimination. {¶98} According to Dr. Wu, the commission ignored and/or misinterpret ed the evidence regarding NEOMED’s discriminatory practices. In essen ce, Dr. Wu argues that the trial court erred by failing to reevaluate the evidence und erlying the commission’s factual findings. {¶99} The trial court did not have such authority, and, in most cases , reevaluation of the commission’s evidence is not possible. As the McCrea court recognized, “[i]n the absence of an evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence to revi ew on appeal—reliable, probative, substantial, or otherwise.” Id . at 317; see Pease v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102016, 2015-Ohio-1386, ¶ 7 (“[T]he prod uct of the [the commission’s] investigation does not constitute evidence that c ould be reevaluated by the trial court, but rather only contains the factual findings cont ained in its Letter”). {¶100} “Due to the inherently subjective nature of the concept of prob able cause, such a determination necessarily involves the exercise of the c ommission’s specialized knowledge and expertise, good judgment, and sound discretion. It would therefore be wholly improper and contrary to the clear legislative intent fo r a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the commission.” McCrea at 317. Unless “the findings of fact show[ed] that the commission’s decision not to issue a complaint [was] unlawful,23 irrational, arbitrary or capricious,” the trial court may not “ disturb the commission’s action.” Id . The trial court shall not delve into how the commission arri ved at its decision. Van Horn at *3. {¶101} Dr. Wu’s strong disagreement with the commission’s evaluation o f the evidence did not create a legal basis upon which the trial cour t could reverse the commission’s order. As an appellate court, our review is furth er limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. {¶102} The trial court found that the commission “adequately and suffi ciently explained its decision not to pursue legal action against [NEOM ED]. The determination was clear that the [commission] did not have jurisdiction over some claims made by [Dr. Wu] and the [commission] did not find evidence of discriminatio n in the other claims.” {¶103} Since the trial court’s judgment reflects a sound reasoning pro cess, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in r eviewing the commission’s order. {¶104} Dr. Wu’s first assignment of error and the remainder of his sec ond assignment of error are without merit. Jurisdiction Finding {¶105} In this third assignment of error, Dr. Wu contends that the tri al court erred in failing to find that one of the commission’s findings render ed its order “illogical.” {¶106} As Dr. Wu accurately notes, the commission’s earlier letter of determination stated that “[a]ll jurisdictional requirements for filing a cha rge have NOT been met,” while its letter of determination upon reconsideration stated that “[ a]ll jurisdictional requirements for filing a charge had been met.” (Emphasis sic.) According to Dr. Wu, the commission’s24 removal of the word “not” was intentional, and the commission “ could no longer derive the same conclusions” from this statement. {¶107} Contrary to Dr. Wu’s assertions, it appears that the commission made an unintentional clerical mistake in its reconsideration order. I n making the challenged statement, the commission was referencing its earlier letter of determination, where it found that it did not have jurisdiction over some of Dr. Wu’s a llegations because the alleged discriminatory practices took place more than six month s prior to Dr. Wu’s filing of his charge. Therefore, the intended meaning of the challeng ed statement is readily apparent from the record. {¶108} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to overturn the commissi on’s order on the basis that it was “illogical.” {¶109} Dr. Wu’s third assignment of error is without merit. {¶110} In sum, Dr. Wu has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in its review of the commission’s order. {¶111} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County C ourt of Common Pleas is affirmed.

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.