This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1074 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Michael John Karau, Appellant. Filed July 11, 2016 Affirmed Stauber, Judge Clay County District Court File No. 14CR141136 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela Harris, Assistan t County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. B ond, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minne sota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Ross, Presidin g Judge; Stauber, Judge; and John Smith, Judge. *

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N STAUBER , Judge On appeal from his conviction of atte mpted second-degree intentional murder, appellant argues that his conviction must be re versed because the state failed to prove that he possessed the specific intent to kill the complainant. We affirm. FACTS Following events that o ccurred in the early morning hours of April 10, 2014, appellant Michael Karau was charged by amended complaint with (1) attempted firstdegree premeditated murder; (2) attempted fi rst-degree domestic-abuse murder; (3) firstdegree assault, great bodily harm; (4) second degree assault, substantial bodily harm; (5) felony domestic assault; and (6) false imprisonment. At appellant’s bench trial, evidence established that J.F. and appellant were good friends who lived together and eventually developed a romantic relations hip. According to J.F., appellant was physically abusive during thei r relationship, but she never reported any incidents to police or sought medical treatment for her injuries. On April 9, 2014, appellant arrived homeat about 9:30 p.m. after working his job as a laborer for a handyman service. A ppellant spent the evening drinking and socializing with J.F., but the couple began to argue around midnight. Appellant then pulled J.F. into a bedroom by her hair where he climbed on top of her and began to hit her on the head and face. Acco rding to J.F., appellant told her that “he was going to kill” her, and asked her how she “want[ed] to go out.” J.F. also claimed that she was unable to “get away” because appellant had taken her cellphone.3 After beating J.F. “[c]ontinuously” for about two hours in the first bedroom, appellant dragged J.F. through the kitchen an d living room area into the master bedroom where he continued to assault her with his fist s. At some point during the assault in the master bedroom, appellant struck J.F. in th e head at least thre e times with a metal baseball bat, knocking J.F. unconscious. Appella nt also beat J.F.’s head against the headboard of the bed, beat her head against th e wall, and bit her lip. Near the end of the assault, appellant ran water in the bathtub and held J.F.’s head under water until she inhaled water, choked, and lost consciousness. Appellant eventually fell asle ep at about 5:30 a.m. J.F. was then able to retrieve her cellphone, which fell out of appellant’s po cket while he was sleeping, and contacted her brother, who arrived and late r transported her to the hosp ital. J.F. was beaten so badly that she was unrecognizab le to her family members, and exhibits admitted at trial depicted the extent of her injuries. J.F. suffered a chipped tooth, broken nose, two fractured thoracic vertebrae, broken sacrum, head lacerations that required numerous stiches, respectively, and brui ses all over her body. J.F. testified that throughout the assault, appellant repeatedly threatened to kill her, and at one point threatened to pour battery acid on her face and body. During trial, the district court dismis sed the attempted-domestic-murder charge. The district court later acqu itted appellant of attempted fi rst-degree premeditated murder, but convicted him of the lesser-included char ge of attempted second-degree intentional murder. The district court fou nd that when appellant struck J.F. with the bat, and when he submerged her head underwater in the bathtub, appellant’s “anger against [J.F.]4 escalated to the point where he, for a short period of time (a few moments) formed the intent to kill the victim, during an unconsidere d, rash impulse.” The district court also found appellant guilty of second-degree assault, domestic assault, and false imprisonment, but not guilty of first-degree assault. Appellant was sentenced to 207 months for attempted second -degree intentiona l murder. This appeal followed. D E C I S I O N When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court conducts “a painstaking analysis of the record to de termine whether the evidence, wh en viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.” State v. Webb , 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume that the fact-finder believed evidence that supports the verdict and disbelieved conflicting evidence. State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989 ). We also afford a district court’s findings the same weight as a jury verdict and will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Walker v. State , 394 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1986). Appellant was found guilty of attempted se cond-degree intentiona l murder. Intent to cause the death of a human being is an element of this crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2012). Intent “mean s that the actor either has th e purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if succe ssful, will cause the result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2012); see State v. Noble , 669 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that “[a]n attempt require s that the actor have specific intent to perform acts and attain a result which if accomplished would constitute the crime5 alleged”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 23, 2003). “A jury is permitted to infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions.” State v. Johnson , 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000). Appellant argues that the “state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to kill [J.F.].” Appellant contends that because “the bulk of the evidence relied on by the district court to find an intent to kill was the circumstantial evidence of the assault, ” the circumstantial-evid ence standard of review is applicable. The state concedes that the circumstantial-ev idence standard of review applies, but asserts that under that standardthe evidence is su fficient to support th e guilty verdict. “A conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants stricter scrutiny.” State v. Smith , 619 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2001). In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to su stain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we are require d to perform a two-step analysis. State v. Hayes , 831 N.W.2d 546, 552-53 (Minn. 2013). First, we determine the circumstances proved. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). In doing so, we give due deference to the fact-finder and construe the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the verdict. Id. at 598-99. Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following circumstances were proved by the state. For approximately six hours during the early morning of April 10, 2014 , appellant continuously beat J.F. with his fists in two separate rooms. Appellant also kicked J.F., beat he r head against the wall and the headboard of a bed, bit her lip, struck her on her head at least three times w ith a metal baseball bat, and6 held her head under water in the bathtub. J. F. lost consciousness both after being struck with the bat and being held underwater. Moreover, appellant continuously stated throughout the assault that he “was going to kill” J.F., and repeatedly asked her how she “want[ed] to go out.” As a re sult of appellant’s conduct, J.F. sustained a chipped tooth, a broken nose, two fractured vertebrae, a br oken sacrum, cuts behi nd her ear and on her mouth that required numerous stiches, and numerous brui ses all over her body. And because of the broken vertebrae, J.F. was required to we ar a neck brace for two months. The second step of the circumstantial -evidence test requires us to determine “whether the circumstances proved are consis tent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotations omitted). At this second step, we provide no deference to the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Anderson , 784 N.W.2d 320, 329–30 (Minn. 2010). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that , in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable infere nce other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). Appellant argues that the circumstances pr oved are insufficient to lead only to the inference that he intend ed to kill J.F. because he did not “employ a gun or knife” to inflict J.F.’s injuries. We disagree. First, the metal baseball bat could be used as a lethal
weapon. See, e.g., State v. Coauette , 601 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that “[o]rdinary objects can . . . be transformed into dangerous weapons”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1999). Second, appellant hit J. F. on the head at leas t three times with the7 bat and held her head under water until she lost consciousn ess. The obvious and known consequences of such actions is death, and the only reasonable inference from those actions is that appellant intended this result. See Johnson , 616 N.W.2d at 726 (stating that a fact-finder “is permitted to infer th at a person intends th e natural and probable consequences of their actions”). The absen ce of a reasonable inference that appellant did

not intend to kill J.F. is further demonstrat ed by appellant’s death threats to J.F. throughout the assault. See Johnson , 616 N.W.2d at 726 (stating that “[a] state of mind generally is proven circumstantially, by infe rence from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident”). Appellant next argues that the lack of se rious injuries to J.F. supports a reasonable inference that he lacked intent to kill her. Again, we disagree. If appellant had pointed a gun at J.F.’s head, shot, and missed, the lack of a gunshot wound wo uld not diminish his intent to kill. Rather, inference of intent to kill arises when an act or commits an act that could cause the death of another. See Stiles v. State , 664 N.W.2d 315, 320 (Minn. 2003) (noting that “pointing a loaded gun at a pers on and firing it is likely to cause death, and leads to an inference of intent ”). Here, J.F.’s near-drownin g and being struck repeatedly on the head with a baseball bat were life-thre atening acts. Intent is not shown only by J.F.’s actual injuries, but also by appellant’s actions to inflict those injuries. Those actions permit only an inference of intent to kill. Finally, in a related argument, appellant asserts that because his assault did not result in J.F.’s death, the known facts do not support a reasonable inference that he intended to kill her. A lthough J.F. surv ived the prolonged assau lt, the only reasonable8 inference from appellant’s beating and near-drown ing of J.F. is that appellant intended to kill her. As the state points out, “[f]ailure in the attempt does not amount to lack of intent.” Appellant may have altered his intent several times during the assault, but during the aforementioned episodes, the record does not support a rational hypothesis other than that appellant intended to kill J.F. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support appellant’s conviction for atte mpted second-degree intentional murder. Affirmed.