UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

___________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.;

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON, 

EUGENE,

Respondent,

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Defendant,

XIUHTEZCATL TONATIUH M., through 

his Guardian Tamara Roske-Martinez, et al.;

Real Parties in Interest,

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 

MANUFACTURERS, et al.;

Intervenors,

----------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLINIC -

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF 

LAW, et al.;

No. 24-684

D.C. No.

6:15-cv-1517

District of Oregon, 

Portland

ORDER

FILED

MAY 1 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Amici Curiae.

Before: BENNETT, R. NELSON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

In the underlying case, twenty-one plaintiffs (the Juliana plaintiffs) claim 

that—by failing to adequately respond to the threat of climate change—the 

government has violated a putative “right to a stable climate system that can sustain 

human life.” Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-01517-AA, 2023 WL 9023339, 

at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2023). In a prior appeal, we held that the Juliana plaintiffs 

lack Article III standing to bring such a claim. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 

1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). We remanded with instructions to dismiss on that basis. 

Id. The district court nevertheless allowed amendment, and the government again 

moved to dismiss. The district court denied that motion, and the government 

petitioned for mandamus seeking to enforce our earlier mandate. We have 

jurisdiction to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We grant it. 

1. “[M]andamus is an extraordinary remedy . . . reserved for extraordinary 

situations.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 

(1988). “[M]andamus is the appropriate remedy” when “sought on the ground that 

the district court failed to follow the appellate court’s mandate.” Vizcaino v. U.S. 

Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Wash., 173 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United

States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of N.Y., 334 U.S. 258, 263 (1948). We review a 

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district court’s compliance with the mandate de novo. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. The petition accuses the district court of failing to execute our mandate 

on remand. District courts must “act on the mandate of an appellate court, without 

variance or examination, only execution.” United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 443 F.3d 

1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]he only step” that a district court can take is “to 

obey the mandate.” Rogers v. Consol. Rock Prods. Co., 114 F.2d 108, 111 (9th Cir. 

1940). A district court must “implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, 

taking into account the [prior] opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” Pit River 

Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

3. In the prior appeal, we held that declaratory relief was “not substantially 

likely to mitigate the plaintiffs’ asserted concrete injuries.” Juliana, 947 F.3d at 

1170. To the contrary, it would do nothing “absent further court action,” which we 

held was unavailable. Id. We then clearly explained that Article III courts could not 

“step into the[] shoes” of the political branches to provide the relief the Juliana 

plaintiffs sought. Id. at 1175. Because neither the request for declaratory relief nor 

the request for injunctive relief was justiciable, we “remand[ed] th[e] case to the 

district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing.” Id. Our 

mandate was to dismiss. 

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4. The district court gave two reasons for allowing amendment. First, it 

concluded that amendment was not expressly precluded. Second, it held that 

intervening authority compelled a different result. We reject each. 

The first reason fails because we “remand[ed] . . . with instructions to dismiss 

for lack of Article III standing.” Id. Neither the mandate’s letter nor its spirit left 

room for amendment. See Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1079. 

The second reason the district court identified was that, in its view, there was 

an intervening change in the law. District courts are not bound by a mandate when 

a subsequently decided case changes the law. In re Molasky, 843 F.3d 1179, 1184 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2016). The case the court identified was Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 

which “ask[ed] whether an award of nominal damages by itself can redress a past 

injury.” 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021). Thus, Uzuegbunam was a damages case which 

says nothing about the redressability of declaratory judgments. Damages are a form 

of retrospective relief. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2001). Declaratory relief is prospective. The 

Juliana plaintiffs do not seek damages but seek only prospective relief. Nothing in 

Uzuegbunam changed the law with respect to prospective relief. 

We held that the Juliana plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims and told 

the district court to dismiss. Uzuegbunam did not change that. The district court is 

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instructed to dismiss the case forthwith for lack of Article III standing, without leave 

to amend.

PETITION GRANTED. 

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