PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CINDY KAY LORENZ and 

DAVID BRYAN LORENZ,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 

COMPANY, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley

ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE4; LANE 

POWELL PC; PILAR FRENCH; TERESA 

SHILL; ROBERT E. MALONEY, JR.; 

GREGORY P. DOLINAJEC; 

NORTHWEST TRUSTEE SERVICES; 

DECISION ONE MORTGAGE 

COMPANY, LLC; MORTGAGE 

ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 

COMPANY; WELLS FARGO BANK, NA; 

and RCO LEGAL,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-680-SI

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, appearing pro se, alleged in their First Amended Complaint seven claims for 

relief against eleven Defendants, who then moved to dismiss. In an Opinion and Order, the Court 

granted Defendants’ motions and allowed Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. 

Dkt. 57. Among other things, the Court explained in its Opinion and Order that if Plaintiffs chose 

to file a Second Amended Complaint but failed to cure the deficiencies identified, the Court 

would dismiss this case with prejudice and without leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. On 

August 13, 2015, Plaintiffs timely filed their Second Amended Complaint, alleging the following 

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six claims: (1) Section 1962(a) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); (2) Section 1962(c) of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (3) breach of 

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) fraud; (5) unjust enrichment; and 

(6) unfair and deceptive business practices. Dkt. 59. Defendants move to dismiss all claims on 

numerous grounds. Dkts. 60, 61, 62, and 63. Because Plaintiffs have failed to cure the 

deficiencies in their First Amended Complaint previously identified by the Court and because it 

is clear to the Court that these deficiencies cannot be cured by further amendment, Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss are GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no 

cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual 

allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 

Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual 

allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. HewlettPackard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 

992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 

“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations 

of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). All reasonable inferences from 

the factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office 

Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the 

plaintiff’s legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678-79 (2009).

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A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an 

entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the 

expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

A court also must liberally construe the filings of a pro se plaintiff and afford the plaintiff 

the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). “A pro 

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles 

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 

(9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122 (9th Cir. 2000)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), however, every complaint 

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” but does demand “more 

than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading 

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from an Oregon state court proceeding involving both a contested 

judicial foreclosure and a claim to enforce a settlement agreement. The action concerns real 

property located at 17013 Northwest Johnson Road, Hillsboro, Oregon (the “Property”). In 2006, 

Plaintiff David Lorenz borrowed $640,000 from Decision One Mortgage Company (the “Loan”). 

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Plaintiff David Lorenz signed and delivered a promissory note in the amount of $640,000 (the 

“Note”). As part of the same transaction, Plaintiff David Lorenz signed a Deed of Trust securing 

the Property, dated February 21, 2006, and recorded on February 28, 2006, under Recorder No. 

2006-036838 (“Deed of Trust”). Plaintiff Cindy Lorenz did not sign either the Note or the Deed 

of Trust.

Approximately one year after obtaining the Loan, on or about February 26, 2007, 

Plaintiff David Lorenz, the then-owner of the Property, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in 

which he identified and admitted the Loan in his bankruptcy schedules and admitted that 

Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS 

Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE4 (“DBNTC”), through its servicer, Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, 

NA d/b/a America’s Servicing Company, held a lien to secure the Loan on the Property. Plaintiff 

David Lorenz was discharged from any personal liability on the Loan, and no payments have 

been made on the Loan since January 2010.

After DBNTC began a non-judicial foreclosure following David Lorenz’s default, 

Mr. Lorenz filed a lawsuit. In that action, Mr. Lorenz admitted that he entered into the Loan but 

claimed that the non-judicial foreclosure was illegal because the Deed of Trust involved 

Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”). This lawsuit was 

dismissed by stipulation after DBNTC voluntarily agreed to rescind the notice of sale and pursue 

an action for judicial foreclosure.

DBNTC then filed an action in Multnomah County Circuit Court (the “State Court”),

captioned as Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS 

Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-HE4, its successors in interest and/or assigns v. David B. Lorenz, 

Cindy K. Lorenz, et al., Case No. 1112-16883 (the “State Court Case”). In the State Court Case, 

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DBNTC sought to judicially foreclose its Deed of Trust that secured the $640,000 loan made to 

Mr. Lorenz in February 2006. Although Cindy Lorenz was never a party to the loan and never 

signed the loan documents, she opposed the judicial foreclosure both as an “occupant” of the 

Property and as an alleged owner of the Property (with her purported ownership being claimed 

through a quitclaim deed from David Lorenz recorded in April 2013). DBNTC responded that it 

had previously recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on June 15, 2012, which under Or. Rev. Stat. 

§ 93.740(2) voided the “quitclaim deed,” according to DBTNC.

During the State Court Case, DBNTC on the one hand, and David and Cindy Lorenz and 

their adult son and daughter-in-law, Cody and Christy Walton (who were also occupants of the 

Property at that time), entered into a settlement agreement under which the Lorenzes and the 

Waltons agreed to stipulate to a judgment of foreclosure and to vacate the Property by August 

25, 2013. According to DBNTC, the Lorenzes and the Waltons then breached the settlement 

agreement, resulting in DBNTC amending its complaint and including a claim to enforce the 

settlement agreement against the Lorenzes and the Waltons.

After hearing motions for summary judgment by DBNTC and considering opposition 

filings and argument by the Lorenzes, the State Court issued detailed written decisions on 

August 28 and 30, 2013. The State Court granted DBNTC’s motions for summary judgment to 

foreclose its trust deed and separately to enforce the settlement agreement. The State Court found 

DBNTC was entitled to foreclose its trust deed and that the Lorenzes and the Waltons had 

breached the settlement agreement. The State Court also found that the Lorenzes twice made 

untruthful representations to the State Court that they had produced all documents and emails 

sent to them by their former attorney, which emails contradicted the Lorenzes’ claim that they 

did not agree to the settlement. In the August 2013 order enforcing the settlement agreement, the 

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State Court ordered the Lorenzes and the Waltons to vacate the Property not later than 

November 1, 2013. Neither the Lorenzes nor the Waltons timely obeyed the State Court’s order, 

although the Waltons have since vacated the property.

After these summary judgment orders in the State Court Case, the Lorenzes filed separate 

bankruptcy cases, which were ultimately dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court for failure to pay 

filing fees (David Lorenz) and failure to submit a confirmable plan among other things (Cindy 

Lorenz). After dismissal of the two bankruptcy cases, the State Court entered a final general 

judgment against David and Cindy Lorenz (as defendants in the State Court Case) on July 28, 

2014 (the “General Judgment”).

1 On the morning of the scheduled foreclosure sale, March 23, 

2015, Plaintiffs jointly filed a new bankruptcy case, which again postponed the foreclosure sale.

On April 22, 2015, the Lorenzes, acting pro se, commenced this action in federal court

against Defendant DBNTC, seeking, among other things, a temporary restraining order to enjoin 

the impending judicial foreclosure sale. Dkts. 1 and 4. On April 23, 2015, the Court heard 

argument on Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and denied that motion. Dkt. 9. 

The following day, April 24, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of 

counsel, Dkt. 10, and appointed an attorney for Plaintiffs. Dkt. 11. On April 29, 2015, the Court 

received a request from the Lorenzes that the appointment of the attorney assigned to represent 

them pro bono be terminated. Dkt. 16. At Plaintiffs’ request, the Court terminated the 

 

1 According to DBNTC, although the General Judgment in the State Court Case states on its 

face that it is limited to Cindy Lorenz, the Oregon Court of Appeals determined that the General 

Judgment is a general judgment as to all defendants in the State Court Case (including both David 

and Cindy Lorenz) and that the prior document entitled a General Judgment for Specific Performance 

and Foreclosure of Trust Deed entered by the State Court on November 22, 2014, is incorporated into 

the General Judgment against Cindy Lorenz. In recognition of this holding by the Oregon Court of 

Appeals, DBNTC refers to the General Judgment entered July 10, 2014, with all incorporations, 

simply as the “General Judgment.” This Court will do the same. 

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appointment of Plaintiffs’ counsel. Dkt. 18. Since then, Plaintiffs have continued to represent 

themselves in this matter.

Also on April 29, 2015, Plaintiffs, acting pro se, filed their First Amended Complaint. In 

their amended pleading, Plaintiff added ten new Defendants, including, among others, the law 

firm and two of its individual attorneys who have been representing DBNTC. Plaintiffs also 

named as a Defendant the individual attorney who represented Plaintiffs in the State Court Case.

On May 1, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their second motion for a temporary restraining order. 

Dkt. 20. On May 4, 2015, the Court denied that motion. Dkt. 23.

DBNTC obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay, and the foreclosure sale occurred on 

May 4, 2015. According to DBNTC, in granting relief from the stay, the bankruptcy court found 

that the Lorenzes had engaged in a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud DBNTC that included the 

bankruptcy filings by the Lorenzes. After the sale was concluded, the Lorenzes filed a motion to 

dismiss the bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court dismissed the bankruptcy case upon the trustee’s 

motion. On August 25, 2015, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office served a Writ of 

Assistance on the Lorenzes, resulting in their eviction from the Property. The Lorenzes have 

appealed the General Judgment in the State Court Case to the Oregon Court of Appeals, and that 

appeal is pending.

On May 19, June 17, and June 22, 2015, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the First 

Amended Complaint. Dkts. 31, 40, and 42. Several Defendants also requested that the Court take 

judicial notice of the related bankruptcy cases, the State Court Case (including the order by the 

Oregon Court of Appeals), and several public filings related to the Property and the judicial 

foreclosure sale. Dkt. 45. On July 24, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ motions. Dkt. 57.

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In response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, 

Plaintiffs “concede[d] that additional facts and pleading with more particularity may be 

necessary as to claims of fraud.” Dkt. 41 at 2. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“a party must 

state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud”). As the Court explained in its 

Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ 

RICO claims are based on predicate acts of either federal mail or wire fraud, those predicate acts 

also must be alleged with particularity. See Lancaster Comm. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. 

Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying Rule 9(b) to allegations of mail fraud as RICO 

predicate acts); Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(applying Rule 9(b) to allegations of mail and wire fraud as RICO predicate acts). Dkt. 57, at 8.

The Court further explained that to satisfy Rule 9(b), “a pleading must identify ‘the who,

what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged,’ as well as ‘what is false or misleading 

about [the purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.’” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 

Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 

616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)). In addition, “Rule 9(b) does not does not allow a complaint 

to merely lump multiple defendants together but ‘require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their 

allegations when suing more than one defendant . . . and inform each defendant separately of the 

allegations surrounding his [or her] alleged participation in the fraud.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 

476 F.3d 756, 764-65 (9th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). These details 

are required for Plaintiffs’ fraud claim as well as for Plaintiffs’ two RICO claims. Dkt. 57, at 8.

The Court also explained that with regard to Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, under Oregon law, every contract contains an implied 

duty of good faith and fair dealing. Arnett v. Bank of America, N.A., 874 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1033 

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(D. Or. 2012). “A duty of good faith and fair dealing, however, may be implied as to a disputed 

issue only if the parties have not agreed to an express term that governs that issue.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs must allege, for each Defendant with whom 

they claim to have had a contractual arrangement that was materially breached by that 

Defendant, how that defendant breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by doing 

something other than that which the Defendant had an express contractual right to do. Dkt. 57, 

at 9. The Court added that with regard to Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment, the elements of 

the quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment are a benefit conferred, awareness by the 

recipient that a benefit has been received and, under the circumstances, it would be unjust to 

allow retention of the benefit without requiring the recipient to pay for it. Arnett, 874 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1035 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Also, there “cannot be a valid legally 

enforceable contract [for Plaintiffs’ good faith claim] and an implied contract covering the same 

services.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Dkt. 57, at 9.

With regard to Plaintiffs’ claim for “unfair and deceptive business practices,” the Court 

informed Plaintiffs that they must first specify which state or federal law Plaintiff is relying 

upon. Plaintiff also must allege, in a fashion that is not merely conclusory, how each Defendant 

sought to be held liable under that statute violated that law. Dkt. 57, at 9.

Finally, the Court reiterated to Plaintiffs the standards that govern a motion to dismiss. 

The Court said that a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Second, the court need not 

credit the plaintiff’s legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations and “a pleading that 

offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

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PAGE 10 – OPINION AND ORDER

not do.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (2009). Third, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the 

opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 

F.3d at 1216. And fourth, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Dkt. 57, at 10.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs’ RICO and Fraud Claims

To state a claim under RICO where the predicate acts involve either mail or wire fraud 

and to state a claim for common law fraud, Plaintiffs “must identify ‘the who, what, when, 

where, and how of the misconduct charged,’ as well as ‘what is false or misleading about [the 

purportedly fraudulent] statement, and why it is false.’” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 

637 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 

993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)). In addition, “Rule 9(b) does not does not allow a complaint to merely 

lump multiple defendants together but ‘require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when 

suing more than one defendant . . . and inform each defendant separately of the allegations 

surrounding his [or her] alleged participation in the fraud.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 

764-65 (9th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs’ allegations are 

conclusory in nature, and Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to contain sufficient 

factual allegations plausibly to suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ RICO and fraud claims are dismissed with prejudice.

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B. Plaintiffs’ Claim of Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

To state a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 

Plaintiffs must allege, for each Defendant with whom they claim to have had a contractual 

arrangement that was materially breached by that Defendant, how that defendant breached the 

implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by doing something other than that which the

Defendant had an express contractual right to do. Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory in nature, 

and Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations 

plausibly to suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ 

Claim of Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is dismissed with 

prejudice. In the alternative, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this 

state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

C. Plaintiffs’ Claim of Unjust Enrichment

To state a claim of unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs must allege a benefit conferred, 

awareness by the recipient that a benefit has been received, and how under the circumstances it 

would be unjust to allow retention of the benefit without requiring the recipient to pay for it.

Arnett, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ 

allegations are conclusory in nature, and Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to contain 

sufficient factual allegations plausibly to suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Claim of Unjust Enrichment is dismissed with prejudice. In the 

alternative, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

D. Plaintiffs’ Claim of Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Deutsche Bank, Northwest Trustee Services, Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Company, and Decision One Mortgage Company, violated Or. Rev. Stat. 

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PAGE 12 – OPINION AND ORDER

§§ 646.607(1), (2), (6), and (7) and 15 U.S.C. § 45 and that Defendants Lane Powell PC, Pilar 

French, Robert E. Maloney, Jr., and Teresa Shill worked “in collusion” with the principal 

Defendants “in furtherance of the deceptive business practices.” Plaintiffs’ allegations are 

conclusory in nature, and Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to contain sufficient 

factual allegations plausibly to suggest an entitlement to relief. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Claim of Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices is dismissed with 

prejudice. In the alternative, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this 

state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

In addition, Plaintiffs’ claim under Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.607 fails because claims under 

that statute may be prosecuted only by the State of Oregon, and Oregon law “does not create a 

private right of action for violations of ORS 646.607.” Norton v. Nelson, 252 Or. App. 611, 

619-20 (2012). Further, the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act (“UTPA”) does not apply to 

the Loan at issue here because it was extended under an earlier version of the UTPA that did not 

extend to "loans and extensions of credit." Roisland v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 989 F. Supp. 2d 

1095, 1108 (D. Or. 2013).

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek to bring this claim under 15 U.S.C. § 45 

(Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act), it fails because there is no private right of 

action under this particular federal law. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 

1973). For these reasons as well, Plaintiffs’ Claim of Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

E. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred by Issue Preclusion

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs have repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged in 

state court the foreclosure and settlement enforcement proceedings that are challenged in this 

action. Issue preclusion prevents re-litigation in a later proceeding of an issue of ultimate fact 

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that has been finally determined by a valid prior proceeding. Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 

F.2d 1318, 1320 )0th Cir. 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Moreover, the General Judgment in 

the State Court Case currently is on appeal before the Oregon Court of Appeals, and the 

pendency of an appeal does not eliminate a judgment’s preclusive effect. Ron Tonkin Gran 

Turismo, Inc. v. Wakehouse Motors, Inc., 46 Or. App. 199, 207 (1980). Plaintiffs’ arguments 

challenging the state court rulings should be resolved by the Oregon Court of Appeals, not by 

this Court. 

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Dkts. 60, 61, 

62, and 63) are GRANTED. Because Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies in their First 

Amended Complaint previously identified by the Court and because it is clear to the Court that 

these deficiencies cannot be cured by further amendment, this case is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs’ Third Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 64) is DENIED 

AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 5th day of October, 2015.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge

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