J-A01028-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

MARTIN C. FINSTERBUSH,

Appellee No. 689 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-CR-0007449-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2018

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the oral motion for 

extraordinary relief of Appellee, Martin C. Finsterbush,1 and vacating his 

conviction of numerous sexual offenses committed against two of his 

granddaughters. We reverse and remand. 

On September 23, 2016, after a bench trial, the court convicted 

Appellant of all charges, five charges of indecent assault and one charge of 

corruption of minors, against two minor granddaughters. On January 18, 

2017, the trial court judge (the same judge who presided over the waiver 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellee’s name is also spelled “Finsterbusch” in the record before us. 
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trial), granted new defense counsel’s oral motion for extraordinary relief 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B).2 The judge found that defense trial counsel’s 

performance was “wholly inadequate” and that “the normal appellate process” 

for post-conviction relief, would be “unduly burdensome” and “a waste of 

judicial resources.” (Order, 1/18/17). This timely appeal followed the trial 

court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration. 

The application of a rule of criminal procedure under our caselaw 

presents a pure question of law for which our standard of review is de novo, 

and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 

994, 998 (Pa. 2011). Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that since 

2002, the general rule under Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 738 

(Pa. 2002), is that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are deferred until 

collateral review pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. See Commonwealth v. Delgros, No. 27 WAP 

2017, 2018 WL 1959478, at *1 (Pa. filed April 26, 2018), citing Grant, supra. 

The defense and the trial court have failed to establish either of the 

narrow exceptions identified in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 

563–64 (Pa. 2013), or the new exception adopted in Delgros, supra. Our 

Supreme Court reaffirmed in Holmes that, absent extraordinary 

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2 Although the order is dated as of January 19, 2017, we follow the official file 

date stamp and the consistent docket entry, which both confirm the date of 

the order as January 18, 2017. 
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circumstances, such as issues of “primary constitutional magnitude,” claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel should still be deferred until collateral 

review, as previously held in Grant. “[W]e reaffirm Grant and hold that, 

absent the circumstances we address below, claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should not entertain 

claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such claims should 

not be reviewed upon direct appeal. Holmes, supra at 576. 

“[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [appellant] bears the

burden of proving otherwise.” To prevail on an ineffectiveness 

claim, appellant must establish:

(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no 

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to 

act; and (3) [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel’s error such that there is a reasonable probability 

that the result of the proceeding would have been different 

absent such error.

Failure to prove any prong of this test will defeat an 

ineffectiveness claim.

Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. 2014). Furthermore, 

[Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(B)] is intended to allow the trial judge the 

opportunity to address only those errors so manifest that 

immediate relief is essential. This Court has repeatedly held that 

we will not allow such motions as a “substitute vehicle” for raising 

a matter that should be raised in a post-sentence motion. More 

particularly, this Court has determined that claims of 

ineffectiveness of counsel, as raised herein, should be raised via 

a post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 

A.2d 670, 674 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 686, 844 

A.2d 551 (2004) (claims of ineffectiveness of counsel improperly 

raised as motion for extraordinary relief).

Commonwealth v. Grohowski, 980 A.2d 113, 115–16 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse and remand so that the 

proper procedure may be followed. We direct the trial court to reinstate the 

verdict of conviction, and to proceed with sentencing. 

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/18