This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0062

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Livinus Ndubisi Ezeobi,

Appellant.

Filed January 11, 2016

Affirmed

Schellhas, Judge

Stearns County District Court

File No. 73-CR-14-1371

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, 

Minnesota; and

Janelle Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Reilly, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SCHELLHAS, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of terroristic threats, arguing that (1) the district 

court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony on battering, (2) the evidence was 
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insufficient to support his conviction of terroristic threats, and (3) the court erred by

determining that appellant is subject to the predatory-offender registration requirement.

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We affirm.

FACTS

In or around March 2013, appellant Livinus Ndubisi Ezeobi and L.F. began a 

cohabiting romantic relationship. At that time, L.F. had a young child by another man and 

was pregnant with Ezeobi’s child. In October 2013, police arrested L.F. and cited her for 

misdemeanor domestic assault of Ezeobi. The district court consequently issued a 

domestic-assault no-contact order (DANCO) that prohibited L.F. from having any contact 

with Ezeobi. But L.F. continued to live with Ezeobi. In December 2013, police arrested 

L.F. for violating the DANCO. L.F. nevertheless continued to live with Ezeobi.

In February 2014, Ezeobi allegedly struck L.F., choked her, threatened her with a 

knife, and sexually assaulted her. L.F. reported the alleged crimes to police, resulting in 

her arrest for violating the DANCO. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Ezeobi with 

first-degree criminal sexual conduct, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, second-degree 

assault with a dangerous weapon, terroristic threats, domestic assault by strangulation, and 

misdemeanor domestic assault. Before Ezeobi’s jury trial, the district court ruled that the 

 

1 Appellant also appears to challenge unadjudicated guilty verdicts on charges of domestic 

assault by strangulation and misdemeanor domestic assault. We do not separately address 

this challenge. See State v. Hoelzel, 639 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that 

district court’s finding of guilt was not appealable in absence of official judgment of 

conviction or conviction order entered by court); cf. State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 

(Minn. 1979) (declining to address sufficiency of evidence for jury’s guilty verdict on 

offenses of which defendant was not formally adjudicated guilty and for which defendant 

was not sentenced).
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state could introduce expert testimony “explaining victim behaviors in domestic violence 

situations.” At trial, Scott Miller provided expert testimony on battering, L.F. testified, and 

Ezeobi testified in his own defense. The jury found Ezeobi guilty of terroristic threats, 

domestic assault by strangulation, and misdemeanor domestic assault; it found Ezeobi not 

guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and 

second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. The court stayed imposition of sentence 

for terroristic threats, placed Ezeobi on supervised probation for four years, determined 

that Ezeobi was required to register as a predatory offender, and declined to adjudicate 

Ezeobi’s guilt of domestic assault by strangulation and misdemeanor domestic assault.

This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

Expert testimony

Ezeobi argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Miller’s 

expert testimony on battering, asserting that L.F. “was not a battered woman” and 

“exhibited none of the supposedly common behaviors of battered women.” Ezeobi claims 

that the expert testimony incorrectly insinuated that he was a repeat domestic abuser of 

L.F. We construe Ezeobi’s argument as an attack on the relevance of the expert testimony 

on battering.

“Rulings concerning the admission of expert testimony generally rest within the 

sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 798–99 (Minn. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 

Ct. 1185 (2015). Likewise, “[r]ulings on the relevancy of evidence are generally left to the 
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sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hanks, 817 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Minn. 2012). 

“When the admissibility of evidence is challenged on appeal, [appellate courts] defer to the 

district court’s exercise of discretion in the conduct of the trial, and [appellate courts] will 

not lightly overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling.” Id. at 667 (quotation omitted).

Even if a district court abuses its discretion by admitting expert testimony against a 

criminal defendant, appellate courts will not reverse “if there is no reasonable possibility 

that [the testimony] substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” See State v. Taylor, 869 

N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted) (assuming, without deciding, that district 

court erred by admitting expert testimony and concluding that assumed error was 

harmless).

“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 

an opinion or otherwise.” Minn. R. Evid. 702. “Expert testimony is only admissible if the 

testimony will help the trier of fact in evaluating evidence or resolving factual issues.” 

State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 251–52 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “[T]he standard 

for assessing the helpfulness of proposed expert testimony . . . is an objective standard.” 

Mosley, 853 N.W.2d at 800. That is, “[a]n expert opinion is helpful if the members of the 

jury, having the knowledge and general experience common to every member of the 

community, would be aided in the consideration of the issues by the offered testimony.” 

State v. Dao Xiong, 829 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted).
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“Generally, battered woman syndrome expert testimony may be helpful to juries 

because battered woman syndrome is beyond the understanding of the average person, and 

expert testimony may help to explain a phenomenon not within the understanding of an 

ordinary lay person.” Hanks, 817 N.W.2d at 667 (quotations omitted). More specifically, 

“[the supreme court] ha[s] recognized that battered woman syndrome expert testimony is 

admissible . . . when the State seeks to rehabilitate the credibility of a battered woman in 

the prosecution of her batterer,” id., by “educat[ing] jurors about battered woman syndrome 

(BWS) and counterintuitive behaviors commonly associated with BWS,” State v. Obeta, 

796 N.W.2d 282, 291 (Minn. 2011). “In determining the relevance of battered woman 

syndrome evidence, [appellate courts] consider whether the proffered evidence 

demonstrated that the [parties] had the type of relationship about which the expert will 

testify.” Hanks, 817 N.W.2d at 668.

Here, L.F. testified that Ezeobi had assaulted her multiple times and that her own 

assaults of Ezeobi were defensive or reactive. She also testified that Ezeobi had asked her 

to kill him with a knife, cut up his own Green Card and blamed it on her, expressed 

disapproval of L.F.’s desire to spend time with her parents, punished L.F. when she was 

defiant, damaged electronic devices so that L.F. had “no contact with anything outside,” 

and prevented L.F. from accessing her car keys. On the date of Ezeobi’s alleged crimes, 

L.F. was the mother of an infant and another young child and was pregnant with a third 

child. She had some degree of financial dependence on Ezeobi and knew that she could be 

arrested for violating the DANCO. 
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Ezeobi attacked L.F.’s credibility on the basis of her domestic-assault and DANCOviolation arrests, her lies to her parents and to police, and inconsistencies in her descriptions 

of events. The attacks on L.F.’s credibility created a need for the state to offer a potential 

explanation for L.F.’s otherwise counterintuitive or questionable behavior. See Hanks, 817 

N.W.2d at 667; Obeta, 796 N.W.2d at 291. L.F.’s testimony showed her potential 

vulnerability to battering and depicted a relationship with the battering characteristics that 

Miller described—one’s “attempt to, through use of coercion, violence, [and] threats, . . . 

dominate” another. On these facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting Miller’s testimony to aid the jury in evaluating evidence and resolving factual 

issues.

Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting Miller’s testimony, the 

testimony was limited and harmless. Miller testified only generally about battering, its 

perpetrators, and its victims. He acknowledged that he knew neither L.F. nor Ezeobi and 

had no familiarity with the case “other than it’s a heterosexual couple in a domestic 

violence case.” Miller did not opine that L.F. had been battered or that Ezeobi was a batterer

and acknowledged that men can be battered and women can be batterers. During closing 

argument, the state referred only briefly to Miller’s testimony, stating that it “provided [the 

jury] a lens to view this evidence through, to view this relationship through, to look at the

decisions that [L.F.] made and how those could affect the relationship and her role.” And 

the court instructed the jury that expert “evidence is entitled to neither more nor less 

consideration by [the jury] than any other evidence.” We conclude that any error in the 

court’s admission of the testimony was harmless and warrants no relief because no 
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reasonable possibility exists that Miller’s testimony substantially influenced the jury’s 

decision. See Taylor, 869 N.W.2d at 14 (“An error is harmless if there is no reasonable 

possibility that it substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” (quotation omitted)). 

Sufficiency of the evidence

Ezeobi argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of 

terroristic threats. “When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, [appellate courts] make 

a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient 

to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 258 (Minn. 2014) 

(quotation omitted). “In conducting such a review, [appellate courts] assume that the jury 

believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. 

Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799, 805 (Minn. 2013). “The verdict will not be overturned if, giving 

due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the prosecution’s burden of proving 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could reasonably have found the defendant guilty 

of the charged offense.” Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 258 (quotation omitted).

“Whoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with 

purpose to terrorize another . . . or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror,” 

is guilty of making terroristic threats. Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2012). “[P]hysical 

acts which communicate a threat, as well as oral and written threats, fall within the ambit 

of [Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1].” State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996). 

“[T]he question of whether a given statement is a threat turns on whether the 

communication in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that 
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its originator will act according to its tenor.” State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 399, 237 

N.W.2d 609, 613 (1975) (quotations omitted). “To convict a defendant on a charge of 

felony terroristic threats, a jury must find that the defendant threatened a specific predicate 

crime of violence . . . .” State v. Jorgenson, 758 N.W.2d 316, 325 (Minn. App. 2008), 

review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 2009). “[T]he jury must be informed of the elements of that 

essential predicate offense.” Id.

In this case, L.F. testified that, after choking her against a wall for approximately 12 

seconds, Ezeobi sat on top of her on the floor; grabbed a steak knife; pressed the knife 

against her chest and moved the knife around for about a minute, leaving visible marks; 

and told her that he would “stab” her if she moved. The district court instructed the jury 

that the specific predicate crime of violence for the terroristic-threats offense was seconddegree murder, which includes the element of intentionally “caus[ing] the death of a human 

being.” Ezeobi argues that, even if believed, L.F.’s testimony was insufficient to prove that 

he threatened to intentionally cause the death of a human being. He claims that “[a] threat 

to stab someone . . . is not so much a threat to kill as it is a threat to injure” and that “[a] 

threat to injure is not ipso facto a threat to kill.”

But the question before us is not whether a threat to stab necessarily is a threat to 

kill; the question is whether the jury reasonably could have found that Ezeobi’s words and

actions constituted a threat to intentionally kill L.F. made either with a purpose to terrorize 

L.F. or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, 

subd. 1; Vang, 847 N.W.2d at 258; Murphy, 545 N.W.2d at 916. According to L.F., Ezeobi 

physically overpowered her and, with a knife against her chest, told her that he would stab 
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her if she moved. L.F. testified that Ezeobi’s conduct caused her to believe that Ezeobi was 

threatening to kill her. We conclude that L.F.’s testimony and reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury 

to reach its verdict of guilt on the charge of terroristic threats. 

Predatory-offender registration

Ezeobi argues that the district court erred in determining that he is required to 

register as a predatory offender. Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s 

determination that a person is subject to the predatory-offender registration requirement. 

See State v. Lopez, 778 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2010) (reviewing de novo whether 

defendant was required to register as predatory offender); State v. Patterson, 819 N.W.2d 

462, 464 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Because resolution of [the issue of whether a defendant was 

required to register as a predatory offender] is based on interpretation of the offenderregistration statute, the district court’s implicit determination that [defendant] is required 

to register as a predatory offender is subject to de novo review.”), review denied (Minn. 

Oct. 24, 2012).

A person convicted of an enumerated offense, or of “another offense arising out of 

the same set of circumstances” as a charged enumerated offense, “shall register” as a 

predatory offender. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a) (Supp. 2013). The registration 

requirement is triggered by a person’s conviction of a non-enumerated offense “arising out 

of the same set of circumstances” as a charged enumerated offense even if the person was 

acquitted of the enumerated offense, so long as probable cause existed to support the 

ultimately unproven charge. State v. Haukos, 847 N.W.2d 270, 274–75 (Minn. App. 2014).
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The “same set of circumstances” provision in the statute 

requires registration where the same general group of facts 

gives rise to both the conviction offense and the charged 

[enumerated] offense. In other words, the circumstances 

underlying both must overlap with regard to time, location, 

persons involved, and basic facts. Although the conviction 

offense need not be based on identical facts to the charged 

[enumerated] offense, the facts underlying the two must be 

sufficiently linked in time, location, people, and events to be 

considered the “same set of circumstances.” 

Lopez, 778 N.W.2d at 706. 

First-degree criminal sexual conduct and third-degree criminal sexual conduct are 

enumerated offenses under the predatory-offender registration statute. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii). Terroristic threats is not an enumerated offense. See id., 

subd. 1b(a)(1). Ezeobi therefore is subject to the predatory-offender registration 

requirement if his conviction of terroristic threats “ar[ose] out of the same set of 

circumstances,” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1), as the charges 

of criminal sexual conduct for which he was tried and acquitted. Ezeobi argues that the 

terroristic-threats conviction did not arise from the same set of circumstances as the 

charged sex offenses because the terroristic threat was completed before the alleged sex 

offense occurred, because the two charges did not share the same characteristics, and 

because the two offenses did not overlap.

But L.F. testified that Ezeobi sat atop her on the floor, pressed a steak knife against 

her chest and moved the knife around for about a minute, called her “a whore and a slut 

and stuff like that,” and told her that he would “stab” her if she moved. L.F. testified that 

she kicked and bit Ezeobi to escape, struggled with him over her car keys, and “was trying 
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to run up the hallway” when “[Ezeobi] grab[bed L.F.] from behind” by her shorts. L.F. 

testified that she then tripped and fell and that Ezeobi ripped her underwear, got on top of 

her, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. This testimony showed that the facts 

underlying the terroristic-threats conviction and the facts underlying the charges of 

criminal sexual conduct occurred only minutes apart during an unbroken series of violent 

acts by Ezeobi against L.F. Moreover, the threats of violence underlying the terroristicthreats conviction could have helped Ezeobi to accomplish the alleged sexual assault

underlying the charges of criminal sexual conduct. And by calling L.F. sexually derogatory 

names while threatening to stab her, Ezeobi further entwined the terroristic-threats offense 

with the criminal sexual conduct that allegedly occurred just moments later. 

On these facts, Ezeobi’s terroristic-threats conviction “ar[ose] out of the same set of 

circumstances” as the charges of criminal sexual conduct. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 

1b(a)(1). The district court therefore did not err in determining that Ezeobi is subject to the 

predatory-offender registration requirement.

Pro se claims

In a two-page pro se supplemental brief, Ezeobi states that “[he] ha[s] been . . . 

accused of a crime [he] know[s] nothing about” and attacks L.F.’s credibility and character. 

Ezeobi cites neither legal authority nor the appellate record and makes no legally 

cognizable argument against his conviction or sentence. We therefore do not consider 

Ezeobi’s pro se claims. See State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (“[Appellate 

courts] will not consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported by either arguments 

or citations to legal authority.”).
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Affirmed.