IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

REBECCA A. MARSH, 

Plaintiff, 

Case No. 6:15-cv-0332-TC 

V. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

CAROLYNW. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

COFFIN, Magistrate Judge: 

Rebecca Marsh ("plaintiff'') brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner. The 

Commissioner denied plaintiffs application for Title II disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under 

the Act. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision should be reversed and this 

case should be remanded for further proceedings. 

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BACKGROUND 

Born on August 29, 1957, plaintiff attended school until the tenth grade and apparently never 

received a GED. Tr. 488. She has past relevant work experience as a certified nurse's assistant 

("CNA''), night watchman, camp host, in-home care provider, and flagger. Tr. 305. Plaintiff alleges 

disability beginning January 1, 2011 due to neuropathy, ringing in the ears, retinopathy, 

incontinence, back injury, arthritis, depression, diabetes, posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), and 

tremors. Tr. 111, 127. Plaintiff was 53 years old on the alleged onset date of disability, so was 

closely approaching advanced age at that time; as of December 31, 2015, she is considered of 

advanced age under the Act. Id. 

On March 7, 2012, plaintiff filed applications for DIB and supplemental security income 

("SSI"). Id. After the application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, plaintiff timely 

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ'') to dispute only the DIB decision. Tr. 

184-85. On October 8, 2013, an ALJ hearing was held before the Honorable Janice E. Shave, at 

which plaintiff attended remotely via video. Tr. 30-89. She was represented by counsel and testified; 

a vocational expert ("VE") also testified. Id. On November!, 2013, ALJ Shave issued a decision 

finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 21. On December 23, 2014, the 

Appeals Council declined review, making the ALJ' s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 

Tr. 1-3. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards 

and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 

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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 

(1938)). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 

[Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). "Where 

the evidence as a whole can support either a grant or a denial, [the court] may not substitute [its] 

judgment for the ALJ' s." Massac hi v. Astrue, 486 F .3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); 

see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (the court "must uphold the ALJ's 

decision where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation"). 

The initial burden of proofrests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F .2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability 

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

First, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity"; 

if so, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 

At step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairmentorcombinationofimpairments."Yuckert,482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 

416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the impairment meets or equals "one 

of a number of listed impairments that [the Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to 

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preclude substantial gainful activity." Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the claimant 

is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can still perform "past 

relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can 

work, he is not disabled; if he cannot perform his past relevant work, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the 

claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 

142; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. 

THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. Tr. 13. At step two, the ALJ 

determined that plaintiffhad the following severe impairments: "major depressive disorder (without 

psychotic features); dependent personality disorder; PTSD; anxiety disorder; and status post lumbar 

laminectomy/chronic low back pain." Id. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiffs impairment did 

not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 14. 

Because plaintiff did not establish disability at step three, the ALJ continued to evaluate how 

plaintiffs medical impairments affected his ability to work. The ALJ found that plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform medium work with the following caveats: 

The claimant is able to lift up to 50 pounds occasionally and lift/carry 

up to 25 pounds frequently. She is able to stand and/or walk a 

maximum of four hours and sit up to four hours each out of an eightPage 4 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

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hour workday. The claimant is able to perform work that does not 

require more than occasional climbing ofladders, ropes, and scaffolds 

above a three-step stepstool. The claimant is able to perform work 

that does not require concentrated exposure to excessive noise. She 

is able to perform work involving speaking at conversational levels 

or with telephone use, but is limited to jobs never requiring fine 

hearing capability, defined as being capable of listening to work 

instructions at a whisper. The claimant is able to understand, 

remember, and carry out detailed, but not complex, instructions, 

meaning jobs up to SVP 4 levels. 

Tr. 16. At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was able to perform some past relevant work. 

Tr. 19. Despite the ALJ's step four finding, she continued the evaluation process. At step five, the 

ALJ found that there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

plaintiff could perform. Tr. 20. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 21. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by ( 1) improperly assessing her credibility; (2) failing to 

adequately assess the medical opinions of treating physician Thea Peterson, M.D. and examining 

psychiatrist Jennifer Metheney, Ph.D.; and, consequently, (3) providing erroneous findings at steps 

four and five. 

I. Plaintiffs Credibility 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason to reject his 

subjective symptom testimony regarding the extent of his impairment. Pl.'s Br. 13-14. When a 

claimant has a medically documented impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some 

degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no affirmative evidence of 

malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of ... symptoms only 

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by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 

1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 

A general assertion that plaintiff is not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which . 

. . testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F .3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993 ). The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to 

permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's 

testimony." Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). If, however, the 

"ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, we may not engage in 

second-guessing." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiffs medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptoms, but her statements regarding the extent 

of these symptoms were not fully credible concerning their intensity, persistence, and limiting 

effects. Tr. 19. For instance, the ALJ found the objective evidence demonstrated plaintiffs ability 

to perform work-related activities after her alleged onset date. Tr. 17. In evaluating a claimant's 

credibility, an ALJ may consider their daily activities and work record, as well as other "ordinary 

techniques," such as inconsistent statements .. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The ALJ found that plaintiff 

worked part-time as an in-home caregiver from her alleged onset date until November 2012, citing 

her earning records and testimony. Tr. 17. The ALJ also found plaintiff worked in part-time 

elsewhere in 2011. Id. 

Plaintiff argues she did not "hold herself out" as being ready and able to work, and although 

she was employed as a caregiver, had problems keeping her temper in check. Pl.' s Br. 15. Plaintiffs 

first argument is not supported by the record, however, as plaintiff testified she remains on the 

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Oregon State caregiver registry. Tr. 17, 43. Further, in applying for unemployment benefits, she 

specifically certified that she was ready, willing and able to work. Tr. 17, 44-45. Accordingly, the 

ALJ's rationale is valid. While plaintiff cites "PTSD, back pain, incontinence, feet pain, and anger 

outbursts" as the reason she quit her caregiver position, she testified at hearing that she left because 

her client's family was disparaging her. Pl.'s Br. 15; Tr. 51. Plaintiff also argues her"part time work 

activities were as opposed to homelessness." Pl.'s Br. 15. However, the argument is inapposite-the 

question before the ALJ was not plaintiffs incentive for pursuing work, but rather her functional 

ability to perform work. 

In addition, the ALJ found plaintiffs earnings in 2011 and 2012 - within the adjudicatory 

period - were higher than in years past. Tr. 17. The ALJ also provided a detailed explanation of her 

assessment of plaintiffs unemployment benefits, noting that while such benefits do not necessarily 

preclude disability under the Act, but nonetheless may be considered a factor in assessing a 

claimant's testimony. Id. As such, the ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons to support 

her finding regarding plaintiffs concurrent part-time employment. See Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding credibility finding based in part on the 

plaintiffs work as a part-time care-giver and seeking out other employment). 

The ALJ also found that plaintiffs symptom allegations were inconsistent with the objective 

medical evidence ofrecord. Tr. 18. Testimony inconsistent with the objective medical evidence is 

a valid reason for an ALJ to impugn a claimant's credibility; however, it cannot be the sole reason. 

Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ provided 

a summary of plaintiffs treatment for hearing loss and tinnitus, which was found not to be a severe 

impairment, consistent with the opinion of a treating provider that her hearing loss and tinnitus were 

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"annoying ... but certainly not disabling." Tr. 438. Plaintiff does not assign error to the ALJ's 

finding nor identify any functional limitations arising from any hearing and/or tinnitus condition. See 

Pl.'s Br. 15-16. Accordingly, the finding should be upheld. 

Regarding plaintiffs neuropathy allegations, the ALJ found the medication Gabapentin was 

generally effective, and was "adjusted from time to time to accommodate changes in her symptoms." 

Tr. 18. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred, arguing, "she reported the Gabapentin was not working well 

in 2012." Pl.'s Br. 16. Indeed, on one occasion in June 2012, plaintiff reported increased foot pain 

due to neuropathy, and Dr. Peterson advised plaintiff to increase her dosage. Tr. 462-63. The record 

also reflects, however, that plaintiff reported her Gabapentin was effective in December, 2010 (tr. 

474); February, 2011 (tr. 472); and June, 2011 (tr. 469). Dr. James Harrison noted no neuropathyrelated pain on Plaintiffs September 20, 2011 visit, (tr. 466-67), and Dr. Peterson noted no 

neuropathy-related pain on September 28, 2011 (tr. 464-65). Tr. 462-63. Moreover, during the 

administrative hearing, plaintiff indicated she eventually returned to her original dosage of 

Gabapentin, stating, "it does help a lot." Tr. 58. As such, the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence 

was based on substantial evidence and should be upheld. 

The ALJ found plaintiffs allegations of severe anger problems were not substantiated by the 

medical record. Tr. 18. Plaintiff alleges her anger problems prevented her from working, and caused 

her to lose her job as an in-home care provider. Pl.'s Br. 15. Elsewhere in the record, Plaintiff 

provided written testimony that she quit her job due to PTSD, a "back issue," bladder incontinence, 

ringing in the head, and anger outbursts. Tr. 369. However, at the hearing, plaintiff testified she quit 

her job as a caregiver because she was ridiculed by her client's family members. Tr. 51. Moreover, 

as the ALJ noted, plaintiff reported to Dr. Metheny that she got along "great" with coworkers and 

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supervisors and the general public. Tr. 18, 488. The ALJ further noted plaintiff was generally 

pleasant and cooperative with treating and examining physicians, which the record bears out. Tr. 18. 

Accordingly, given plaintiffs inconsistent testimony, the ALJ did not err in finding her credibility 

was diminished. Id. 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erroneously ignored "a clinically significant impairment in 

social functioning" reported by Dr. Metheny. Pl.' s Br. 16; tr. 491. However, Dr. Metheny noted the 

impairment in social functioning in the context of establishing whether Plaintiff met the criteria for 

PTSD. Tr. 491. The ALJ found Plaintiff has PTSD at step two of the sequential process, so it is 

unclear how Dr. Metheny's note furthers plaintiffs argument. Additionally, plaintiff fails to 

articulate why a "clinically significant" finding necessarily establishes any specific functional 

limitation, let alone disability. A claimant may have any number of clinically significant findings 

evincing an impairment or condition; however, the mere presence of a severe impairment is not 

determinative of disability. If that were the case, the sequential evaluation process in the instant case 

would have ended at step two. Moreover, the ALJ is not required to discuss every particular finding 

in rendering a decision. 

Similarly, plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because her PTSD is not "situational," but, 

presumably, family-related, severe and "clinically significant." Pl.' s Br. 16. However, as discussed 

above, the ALJ found plaintiff has the severe impairment of PTSD. Tr. 13. The ALJ explained 

plaintiff"has been living in difficult circumstances for years; the record reflects much of [plaintiffs] 

stress and anxiety is situational and family-related." Tr. 18. Plaintiff fails to provide a cogent reason 

why the ALJ' s interpretation of the evidence is erroneous, what functional limitations the ALJ failed 

to include in the RFC formulation, or why any alleged errors are harmful. See Pl.' s Br. 16-17. 

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Moreover, independent review of the record confirms that ALJ's findings are supported by 

substantial evidence. Tr. 491, 517; Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(harmless error rule applies when the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence 

notwithstanding legal error where it is inconsequential to the ultimate disability determination) 

(citations omitted). Thus, to the extent plaintiff argues the ALJ merely cherry-picked information 

described above, the argument lacks merit. 

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to appropriately consider how plaintiffs reported 

activities of daily living ["ADLs"] undermined her credibility. Pl.'s Br. 17. Reported ADLs may 

adversely effect a claimant's credibility determination when the activities meet a threshold for 

transferable work skills, or if the reported AD Ls conflict with claimant's own testimony. Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, a claimant need not be 

utterly incapacitated to be eligible for disability benefits. Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. Here, the ALJ found 

plaintiffs ADLs demonstrated she was is able to function at a level greater than alleged. Tr. 18. 

In support, the ALJ noted Plaintiff "does all the shopping and food preparation for [her] 

family ... and enjoyed working in her garden and going out rock hunting." Tr. 18. The ALJ also 

noted Plaintiff reported "mak[ing] a point of getting out and going for walks, and was able to read 

her Bible when she was unable to attend church." Id. The ALJ cited Exs. 19F/6 (tr. 510) and 19F/13 

(tr. 517) in support of her finding; Ex. 19F/6 does not, however, contain any relevant evidence. Tr. 

510. The second citation contains the following passage: "she does enjoy getting out in her garden 

and goes ... rock hunting ... she spoke of these activities with enthusiasm. She indicated that she 

is of the Catholic faith and when she is not able to get to church, does read the Bible . . . she does 

make a point of getting out and going for walks currently." Tr. 517. 

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Plaintiff argues her AD Ls does not meet a threshold for work activities, and that she indicated 

she did not prepare meals for her family. Pl.'s By. 17-18. In support, plaintiff references her own 

functional report, in which she responded, "I starve," to the types of food she is able to prepare, that 

she never prepares food, and "quit" cooking. Tr. 339. Further, in response to a question asking why 

she cannot or does not prepare meals, she answered, "Dont [sic] Care to!!". In contrast, plaintiff 

reported she did "all the shopping and food preparation" to Dr. Steven Rolnick. Tr. 512. This is an 

overt contradiction. 

The ALJ did not, however, explain why plaintiffs ability to work in her garden or hunt for 

rocks belies other testimony, or meets a threshold for transferable work skills. As such, the rationale 

does not meet the clear-and-convincing legal standard. Nevertheless, because the ALJ provided other 

valid reasons based upon substantial evidence for impugning plaintiffs credibility, the error is 

harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 

The ALJ also found plaintiffs credibility was diminished by her "unsophisticated, 

flamboyant responses" to her functional report, which, indeed, have the words "crazy" and "none" 

scrawled across several of the pages. Tr. 18; 338-50. The ALJ noted that the state agency 

psychological consultants felt the responses undermined plaintiffs credibility, and that the responses 

were inconsistent with plaintiffs presentation at hearing and to her treating and examining 

physicians. Tr. 18. Plaintiff counters that the responses are illustrative of her impulsiveness and 

inappropriate behavior arising from her mental impairments. Pl.'s Br. 18. However, even if 

plaintiffs responses suggest a level of mental impairment, her failure or inability to provide accurate 

and/or forthright responses in her disability application is a valid reason to accord those responses 

diminished weight. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (ALJ may employ ordinary techniques of 

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credibility evaluation) (citations omitted). Further, because the ALJ' s interpretation of the record was 

reasonable and based upon substantial evidence, it should be upheld. 

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the ALJ' s credibility assessment should be sustained. 

IL Medical Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion evidence of treating 

physician Dr. Peterson and examining psychologist Dr. Metheny. In Social Security jurisprudence, 

there are three types of medical opinions: those of treating, examining, and non-examining doctors. 

Lesterv. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). To rejectthe uncontroverted opinion of a treating 

or examining physician, the ALJ must present clear and convincing reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 

F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)(citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). If a treating or examining doctor's 

opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, it may be rejected by specific and legitimate 

reasons. Id. When evaluating conflicting opinions, however, the ALJ is not required to accept an 

opinion that is unsupported by clinical findings, or is brief or conclusory. Id. (citation omitted). 

Similarly, an ALJ need not adopt any medical opinion to the extent it is based on a claimant's 

subjective symptom allegations, and the ALJ has made an adverse finding regarding the claimant's 

credibility. See. e.g., Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228; see also Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 

F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the medical opinions at issue are both contradicted by the 

state agency physicians of record, the applicable legal standard is specific-and-legitimate. 

A. Dr. Peterson 

The ALJ accorded "little weight" to a medical opinion and questionnaire prepared by treating 

physician Dr. Peterson. Tr. 19. The ALJ found the doctor's assessment was inconsistent with 

plaintiffs reported AD Ls and lifting and carrying limitations, and also the doctor's assessment of 

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Plainitff' s likely absenteeism. Tr. 19. The ALJ further found Dr. Peterson's opinion that plaintiff is 

moderately to markedly impaired by her psychological symptoms inconsistent with the record as a 

whole. Id. 

Plaintiff first argues the ALJ did not adequately explain why plaintiff's activities of 

gardening, rock hunting, and lifting and carying were inconsistent with Dr. Peterson's assessment. 

Pl.'s Br. 8. Dr. Peterson completed two check-the-box type worksheets in May 2013. Tr. 501-504. 

The doctor felt plaintiff was limited to 2 hours of standing and walking per 8-hour workday; 4 hours 

of sitting; and able to lift and carry of 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds. frequently. Tr. 501. 

The ALJ specifically noted Plaintiff's testimony regarding hunting for rocks, gardening, and going 

for walks was contradicted by the limitations imposed by Dr. Peterson. Tr. 19. Indeed, Dr. Rolnick 

indicated he encouraged Plaintiff to continue to partake in "positive activities" she expressed taking 

pleasure in, including gardening and going for walks. Tr. 517, 519. While gardening and walking 

are activities which may not necessarily entail more than 2 hours of standing and 4 hours of sitting 

per day, the ALJ reasonably inferred the activities reflected a greater functional ability than that 

recognized by Dr. Peterson. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation 

omitted). The Court would abuse its discretion to displace the ALJ' s rational interpretation of the 

evidence, even if it is not the only possible interpretation. Id. 

The ALJ' s finding regarding Plaintiff's lifting ability is also supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. During the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff explained she was able to lift up to 50 

pounds., but only 15 pounds frequently. Tr. 66-68. The ALJ reasonably concluded the ability to lift 

50 lbs. occasionally and 15 lbs. frequently was inconsistent with Dr. Peterson's more conservative 

estimates. Tr. 19. Again, although Plaintiff argues for a different interpretation of the medical 

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evidence, the ALJ is the proper arbiter of conflicts and/or ambiguities in the medical record, and the 

ALJ's rational interpretation of that evidence may not be disturbed. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. 

Because the ALJ' s rationale is specific and supported by substantial evidence of record, it should be 

affirmed. 

Finally, the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Peterson's opinion that Plaintiff would miss more than 

three days per month due to mental impairments. Tr. 19. The ALJ provided valid reasons not to 

adopt the doctor's assessment. Id. First, the mental functioning assessment was based largely on 

Plaintiffs self-reports. Tr. 19; see Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228 (citations omitted). Indeed, the doctor did 

not provide any objective medical evidence in support of the mental restrictions. See tr. 502-05. 

Second, Dr. Peterson diagnosed "headache, tinnitus, [and] peripheral neuropathy," but did not 

explain which, if any, of the diagnoses resulted in any functional limitation, and provided no basis 

for her opinion. As such, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to infer the findings were based on 

plaintiffs testimony, which the ALJ properly found not fully credible. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111-12 

(an ALJ is not required to adopt conclusions set forth in check-the-box forms which are unsupported 

by specific reasoning or clinical findings). Here, the ALJ properly set forth her own interpretation 

of the evidence and articulated specific-and-legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Peterson's contrary, 

and conclusory, assessments. Tr. 18; see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ's rational interpretation 

should be upheld. 

B. Dr. Metheny 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to consider and adopt opinions set forth by examining 

psychologist Dr. Metheny. Pl.'s Br. 11. Specifically, Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ's alleged 

failure to include social functioning limitations. Id. However, as previously explained above, Dr. 

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Metheny made no explicit findings regarding Plaintiffs social functioning. See tr. 489-91. While 

Plaintiff reiterates her argument that the doctor's "clinically significant" social functioning limitation 

was ignored, the ALJ was not required to adopt it. Significantly, plaintiff told Dr. Metheny she got 

along "great" with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public - a statement directly at odds with 

an allegedly extreme impairment in social functioning. Tr. 15, 488. Moreover, a "clinically 

significant" limitation does not describe the severity of a functional limitation, but rather merely the 

existence of an undefined degree of functional limitation. Supra. To the extent the ALJ found the 

limitation was mild, the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is not inconsistent with that of Dr. 

Metheny. Tr. 15, 19. Plaintiffs assertions that Dr. Metheny "endorsed" extreme limitations in social 

functioning and failed to include any limitation in social functioning are, therefore, unsupported by 

fact or law. See Pl.'s Br. 11. The ALJ did not err. 

III. RFC Formulation 

Plaintiff argues that the RFC formulation was tainted by the ALJ' s alleged errors in 

evaluating her credibility and the medical opinion evidence discussed above. However, as the Court 

finds the ALJ did not harmfully err in evaluating Plaintiffs credibility or the medical evidence, 

Plaintiffs RFC contentions are inapposite. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539F.3d1169, 1175-76 

(9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ properly incorporated the credible testimonial and medical evidence in 

crafting Plaintiffs RFC. 

Furthermore, the ALJ properly included the limitations set forth in the RFC in posing 

hypothetical employability questions to the VE. The VE responded that, considering her RFC, 

Plaintiff was functionally capable of performing her past relevant work, and additionally, other jobs 

in the national economy. Tr. 19-20, 81-82, 85, 87. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision is supported by 

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substantial evidence and free of harmful legal error. 

CONCLUSION 

For the forgoing reasons, the Commissioner's final decision should be AFFIRMED. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The above Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a United States District Judge 

for review. Objections, if any, are due no later than fourteen days after the date this order is filed. 

The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appealthe District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

If no objections are filed, review of the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on 

that date. If objections are filed, any party may file a response within fourteen days after the date the 

objections are filed. Review of the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement when 

they are due or filed, whichever date is earlier. 

1 

DATED this~ day of June 2016. 

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THOMAS M. COFFIN 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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