IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

KIA L. SWAIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN w. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Merrill Schneider 

Schneider Kerr Law Off ices 

P.O. Box 14490 

Portland, Oregon 97293 

Attorney for plaintiff 

Billy J. Williams 

Acting United States Attorney 

Ronald K. Silver 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Leisa A. Wolf 

Case No. 3:14-cv-01960-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Off ice of the General Counsel 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

Attorneys for defendant 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

Plaintiff Kia Swain brings this action pursuant to the Social 

Security Act ("Act") to obtain judicial review of a final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") . The 

Commissioner denied plaintiff's application for Title II disability 

insurance benefits ( "DIB") and Title XVI supplemental security 

income ("SSI") under the Act. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this case is dismissed. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On July 14, 2011, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging 

disability as of January 31, 2011. Tr. 17. On October 3, 2011, 

plaintiff's application was denied initially and on December 15, 

2011, was denied upon reconsideration. Id. On May 15, 2013, a 

hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ( "ALJ") , 

wherein plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified. On May 

30, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled 

within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 14. On October 2, 2014, the 

Appeals Council denied her request for review. Plaintiff then filed 

a complaint in this Court. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Born on January 6, 1975, plaintiff was thirty-eight years old 

at the time of the hearing. Tr. 214. Plaintiff has completed one 

year of college and certified nurse assistant training. Tr. 315. 

She was previously employed as an educational assistant and 

certified nurse's assistant. Tr. 47. Plaintiff alleges disability 

due to depression, a panic disorder with agoraphobia, fibromyalgia, 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 
an ankle fracture, obesity and insomnia. Tr. 19, 630. The ALJ 

determined that plaintiff has met the insured status requirement of 

the Act through December 31, 2013. Tr. 19. 

THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is 

based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 

501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. 

Heckler, 807 F. 2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986) . Variable 

interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the 

Commissioner's interpretation is rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to 

establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th 

Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 

can be expected . . to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential 

process for determining whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. 

Page 3 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. At step 

one, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not engaged in 

"substantial gainful activity" during the period of alleged 

disability. Tr. 19; Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 

404 .1520 (b). 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has a "medically 

severe impairment or combination of impairments," including 

depression, a panic disorder with agoraphobia, fibromyalgia, an 

ankle fracture, and alcohol abuse in partial remission. Tr. 19; 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520©. 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments, 

either singly or in combination, did not meet or equal "one of a 

number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges 

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Tr. 19; 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 

The ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional 

capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of light work: 

[she] is limited to standing and walking for about two of 

eight workday hours; she should not work at unprotected 

heights or around hazardous machinery. She is limited to 

unskilled work requiring no interaction with the public. 

She would work better in a structured setting where 

sudden change in demand is minimal. Tr. 21. 

At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform 

her "past relevant work." Tr. 24-25; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). 

At step five, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform other 

work that exists in significant numbers in the national and local 

economy, including electronics worker, hand packager, and small 

parts assembler. Tr. 25-26; Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; 20 C.F.R. 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 
§ 404.1520(g). The ALJ therefore concluded that plaintiff was not 

disabled under the Act. Tr. 26. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding her not 

fully credible and (2) improperly assessing the medical opinion 

evidence from doctors John Robinson, Ph.D. and Amanda Ragonesi, 

Psy.D. 

I. Plaintiff's Credibility 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate a clear 

and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, for 

rejecting her subjective symptom statements concerning the extent 

and severity of her impairments. When a claimant has medically 

documented impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce 

some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains 

no affirmative evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the 

claimant's testimony about the severity of . . symptoms only by 

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal 

citation omitted). A general assertion that the claimant is not 

credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which ... testimony 

is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not 

credible." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F. 3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) . 

The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). If the "ALJ's 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 
credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation 

omitted) . 

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that the last time she 

worked was in 2011, after she left the medical field, because 

"[i]t's very stressful on your body and mental capacity." Tr. 38. 

Although plaintiff testified she went into the educational field to 

work with children as an educational assistant, she noted she was 

let go from that job because of absences due a mental health issue. 

Id. Plaintiff also testified that in 2011, a car rolled over her 

left ankle and that she is still recovering from that injury. Tr. 

39. She stated that she cannot walk too much on her ankle or sit 

too long, because it "puffs up." Id. She said she had to wear a 

black boot with an ankle stabilizer. Id. Despite being in the boot 

for almost a year and stating that her ankle is still recovering, 

plaintiff clarified that she did not need surgery on her left 

ankle. Id. 

Plaintiff further testified that she has been hospitalized for 

her mental health condition, but not for more than a day. Tr. 44. 

She stated her current treatment includes seeing a psychiatrist, a 

therapist, and a neuropsychologist. Id. "[I] have a lot of things 

going on in my mind and so [my psychiatrist] wanted me to also see 

a, a therapist who I can see more often to talk things through." 

Id. Plaintiff also endorsed problems with panic attacks: "Oh, 

recently, being that what's going on in my life, I've been having 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 
them at least two to three times a month." Tr. 45. In response to 

subsequent questions from the ALJ, plaintiff clarified that one of 

the medications she takes daily, Seroquel, keeps the panic attacks 

away. Tr. 46. Further, she testified that "I like to be out. I love 

to take care of people. That's why I went into nursing and helping 

little kids. I could - I'm angry with my body, because in my mind, 

because it's just not what it used to be." Id. Plaintiff also 

stated that "[I] get scared all the time that my husband's going to 

leave me because I'm not the woman that he married. And I want to 

get better and I want these doctors to help me - and help me get 

better." Id. 

After summarizing plaintiff's 

longitudinal record, the ALJ found 

hearing testimony and the 

that plaintiff's medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce 

some degree of symptoms, but that her statements regarding the 

extent of these symptoms were not fully credible, due to her level 

of daily activity and inconsistencies in the medical evidence which 

contradicted the alleged severe impairments she endorsed. Tr. 21-

22. 

Notably, the ALJ determined that evidence of plaintiff's daily 

activities suggested a greater level of functioning than her 

alleged limitations. Tr. 21-22, 609, 623, 717, 778. "While a 

claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order to be eligible 

for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant's testimony when the 

claimant reports participation in everyday activities indicating 

capabilities that are transferable to a work setting." Molina v. 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and 

internal punctuation omitted) . "Even where those activities suggest 

some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting 

the claimant's testimony to the extent that they contradict claims 

of a totally debilitating impairment." Id. at 1113. In particular, 

plaintiff's doctor mentioned in her August 2010 treatment notes, 

that plaintiff stated she was doing okay and that "Brookside was 

awesome and [she] learned a lot. [She's] still getting together 

with two of the ladies she met there once a month." Tr. 633. 

Additionally, the ALJ found "that treatment notes detailed issues 

with family stress, including [plaintiff's] ongoing household 

responsibilities such as cleaning and cooking in light of her 

husband working 80 hours a week, leaving [plaintiff] to do all of 

the parenting at home for three children, ages 13, 9, and 3 in 

December of 2010." Tr. 21-22, 609, 623, 625, 632. Plaintiff's nine 

year old also requires extra care and attention due to anxiety and 

claims that he hears voices. Id. Lastly, the ALJ noted that on 

November 9, 2011, plaintiff denied problems with caring for her 

youngest child at home. Tr. 21-22, 717. 

Further, the record reveals that on August 24, 2012, plaintiff 

stated that she cares for three children and does not have the time 

to be sick or sedentary. Tr. 22, 778. Moreover, the ALJ noted that 

plaintiff's earnings record shows very little earnings since 2008, 

prompting concern about whether plaintiff's failure to work in the 

past, as well as present, had more to do with the need or desire to 

stay at home and raise her children, rather than her inability to 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 
perform basic work-related activities; plaintiff said she was able 

to drive to her and her kids' appointments, clean her house and 

care for the needs of her three children. Tr. 22, 230-237. The ALJ 

noted that, "There is nothing wrong with this attitude and approach 

as it is a conscious lifestyle decision many people make, however, 

it diminishes the [plaintiff's] allegation of total disability 

greatly as it demonstrates abilities consistent with the capacity 

to perform at least basic work-related activities." Id. While 

variable interpretations of this evidence may exist, the ALJ' s 

analysis was nonetheless reasonable, such that it must be upheld. 

See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th 

Cir. 2004). 

The ALJ also found that the medical evidence did not 

substantiate plaintiff's allegations of her disabling limitations. 

Tr. 24. In particular, the ALJ noted that evidence throughout the 

record indicates overuse of medications, self-increasing dosages, 

not following the recommendations of her treatment providers, 

bargaining with medical providers, and shopping for medical 

providers as part of drug seeking behavior. Tr. 22, 533, 617-618, 

623, 680, 746, 773, 780. Additionally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff 

frequently missed therapy appointments, with her providers 

questioning plaintiff's commitment to therapy. Tr. 22, 623, 682, 

773, 775. 

The ALJ also noted that from plaintiff's allegations and 

hearing testimony, plaintiff believes her primary limitations are 

mental given that her application for benefits emphasized her 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 
claims of mania, panic attacks, and hallucinations. Tr. 21, 43. 

While she testified that she has agoraphobia and is scared all of 

the time, plaintiff failed to reference mania or hallucination 

symptoms during the hearing. Tr. 21, 46. Thus, the ALJ reasonably 

concluded that plaintiff's allegations were unsupported. 

In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting plaintiff's 

subjective symptom statements. The ALJ's credibility finding is 

affirmed. 

II. Medical Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ did not properly 

incorporate the December 2011 opinion of state agency psychological 

consultant John Robinson, Ph.D., into plaintiff's RFC and that the 

ALJ should have given more weight to the September 2011 

psychological assessment completed by Amanda Ragonesi, Psy.D. 

There are three types of medical opinions in social security 

cases: those from treating, examining, and non-examining doctors. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). To reject the 

uncontroverted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, the ALJ 

must present clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Bayliss, 

427 F.3d at 1216 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). If a treating 

or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor's 

opinion, it may be rejected by specific and legitimate reasons. 

Id. An ALJ gives specific, legitimate reasons to discount 

contradicted opinions by providing a detailed and thorough summary 

of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 
interpretation of the evidence, and making findings. Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, "credibility 

determinations do bear on evaluations of medical evidence when an 

ALJ is presented with conflicting medical opinions or inconsistency 

between a claimant's subjective complaints and her diagnosed 

conditions." Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A. Dr. Robinson's Opinion 

In December 2011, Dr. Robinson performed a critical review of 

plaintiff's medical record. Tr. 23, 87-102, 104-119. In his report 

dated December 14, 2011, Dr. Robinson opined that plaintiff's 

mental heal th impairments resulted in moderate restriction of 

activities of daily living, moderate difficulties in maintaining 

social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining 

concentration, persistence, or pace. Tr. 23, 115. Dr. Robinson also 

opined that given plaintiff's symptoms, she should be restricted to 

work tasks that require no more than performance of simple, routine 

tasks requiring no more than superficial public contact. Id. He 

also concluded that plaintiff would work better in a structured 

setting where sudden change in demand is minimal. Tr. 23, 116. 

Given that Dr. Robinson's opinion was consistent with the 

longitudinal record, the ALJ gave great weight to his opinion. Tr. 

23. 

Plaintiff nonetheless argues that the ALJ's RFC and step five 

finding are erroneous because they do not account for all of the 

functional limitations described in Dr. Robinson's report. Pl.'s 

Br. at 4-7. 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed error by 

not including Dr. Robinson's language that plaintiff should have 

advance warning and time to adjust to required changes, and that 

she may have difficulty in regards to sustained work activity as 

part of plaintiff's RFC assessment. Pl.' s Br. at 5. Plaintiff 

further argues that testimony from a vocational expert that does 

not accurately reflect all of plaintiff's limitations does not 

constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. Id. 

In determining a claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider 

limitations imposed by all of a plaintiff's impairments, even those 

that are not severe, and evaluate "all of the relevant medical and 

other evidence," including the plaintiff's testimony. SSR 96-8p, 

available at 1996 WL 374184. 

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical 

testimony and translating the claimant's impairments into concrete 

functional limitations in the RFC. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Only limitations supported by 

substantial evidence must be incorporated into the RFC and, by 

extension, the dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE. 

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2001). 

However, the ALJ is not required to use the exact language in 

his RFC determination as is used in the credited part of a medical 

opinion, so long as the noted limitations are consistent with the 

part of the opinion that is credited by the ALJ. See Turner v. 

Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming 

the ALJ's proper consideration of a medical opinion, because the 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 
limitations used in the RFC were entirely consistent with Dr. 

Koogler' s credited limitations) . Additionally, the ALJ is not 

required to incorporate limitations phrased equivocally into the 

RFC. See Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 691-92 

(9th Cir. 2009); see also Glosenger, 2014 WL 1513995 at *6 

(affirming the ALJ's rejection of functional restrictions assessed 

by Dr. Stradinger because the doctor used "equivocal language 

('might do better' and 'would also likely require')"). Here, the 

ALJ's RFC reflects the limitations found by Dr. Robinson, and I 

find no error. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ's RFC and step five finding 

are erroneous because "unskilled work" in the RFC does not properly 

account for Dr. Robinson's opinion about plaintiff's mental 

limitations. Pl.'s Br. at 6-7. Plaintiff argues specifically that 

Dr. Robinson's statements are equivalent to a restriction to simple 

one-and-two-step instructions, which fall under Reasoning Level 1. 

Id. Plaintiff claims error in the Step Five determination, because 

the jobs the VE testified that plaintiff is still able to perform 

fall under Reasoning Level 2. Id. 

The ALJ found that plaintiff retained the RFC to perform 

unskilled light work requiring no interaction with the public and 

that she would work better in a structured setting where sudden 

change in demand is minimal. Tr. 21. At step five, based on VE 

testimony, the ALJ found that plaintiff retained the ability to 

perform work existing in significant numbers in the national 

economy, including an electronics worker, a hand packager, and a 

Page 13 - OPINION AND ORDER 
small parts assembler. Tr. 25-26. Plaintiff acknowledges that all 

three positions identified by the VE are reasoning level two 

positions. Pl's. Br. at 7. 

Plaintiff next argues the DOT requirements for the jobs 

identified by the VE exceed her RFC because she is limited to 

unskilled work in a structured setting with minimal changes in 

demand. Plaintiff asserts that jobs identified by the VE have a 

Reasoning Level 2, defined as the ability to "apply commonsense 

understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral 

instructions." DOT, Appx. C, § III. Plaintiff contends that jobs 

requiring this level of reasoning are beyond her RFC. 

Defendant responds that the jobs identified each have a 

specific vocational preparation (SVP) of 2, which corresponds with 

unskilled work, i.e., work that "needs little or no judgment to do 

simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of 

time." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(a). Thus, defendant 

contends that the VE testimony does not conflict with the DOT 

classifications. 

Regardless, this court and the Ninth Circuit have found that 

a "reasoning level 2 is generally consistent with the ability to 

perform simple, routine tasks." Delatorre v. Colvin, 2013 WL 

6284389, at *6 (D. Or. Dec 3, 2014); see also Lara v. Astrue, 305 

Fed. Appx. 324, 326 (9th Cir. 2008). As such, the ALJ properly 

accounted for all of the functional limitations described in Dr. 

Robinson's report when determining plaintiff's RFC. Therefore, the 

jobs identified at step five are consistent with unskilled work. 

Page 14 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Accordingly, plaintiff's argument, which is contingent upon a 

finding of harmful error in regard to the aforementioned issues, is 

without merit. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th 

Cir. 2005); Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175-76. The ALJ's RFC 

is upheld. 

B. Dr. Ragonesi's Opinion 

On September 21, 2011, Dr. Ragonesi completed a psychological 

evaluation of plaintiff and diagnosed her with bipolar II disorder, 

panic disorder with agoraphobia, alcohol dependence in sustained 

full remission, and rendered a GAF score of 45. Tr. 24, 672-676. 

Dr. Ragonesi opined that at present, it is unlikely plaintiff would 

be able to function appropriately in a typical work setting because 

symptoms of impulsivity, autonomic arousal, and depression are 

likely to interfere with her ability to exercise judgment and learn 

work-related tasks. Id. 

The ALJ extensively evaluated the medical evidence of the 

entire record, including the specific opinion by Dr. Ragonesi, and 

ultimately found that this "opinion relies heavily on subjective 

reports of symptoms and limitations provided by [plaintiff] and the 

opinion is without substantial support from other evidence of [the] 

record, which renders it less persuasive." Tr. 24. 

It is well-established that "evidence of conservative 

treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony 

regarding severity of an impairment." Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 

742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations marks omitted). "[A]n 

opinion of disability premised to a large extent upon the 

Page 15 - OPINION AND ORDER 
claimant's own accounts of [her] symptoms and limitations may be 

disregarded, once those complaints have themselves been properly 

discounted." Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 

1995); see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 

2001) (claimant's provision of misinformation, unbeknownst to a 

doctor, served as a legally sufficient reason for rejecting that 

doctor's opinion). see also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the rejection of a treating 

source's opinion that "relied only on [the claimant's] subjective 

complaints") ; see also Bray, 554 F. 3d at 122 8. Moreover, the ALJ is 

responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical testimony and 

translating the claimant's impairments into concrete functional 

limitations in the RFC. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 

1174 (9th Cir. 2008) 

The ALJ gave reduced weight to the mental functional 

assessment of Dr. Ragonesi because it relied heavily on plaintiff's 

subjective complaints. For instance, treatment notes from January 

5, 2012, detail a GAF assessment of 60, which was indicative of 

moderate limitations. Tr. 745. Additionally, treatment notes from 

November 26, 2012, also detail a GAF assessment of 60. Tr. 785. The 

ALJ found that these GAF scores "were assigned by treatment 

providers who have had regular contact with the claimant, and 

therefore are found to be more reliable than the one-time 

assessment of Dr. Ragonesi." Tr. 24. Accordingly, the ALJ 

reasonably disregarded Dr. Ragonesi's opinion to the extent it was 

premised on plaintiff's self-reports. Further, the ALJ rationally 

Page 16 - OPINION AND ORDER 
found that Dr. Ragonesi's opinion conflicted with other medical 

evidence in the record as detailed above. Thus, the ALJ's 

evaluation of Dr. Ragonesi's opinion is therefore affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's decision is 

AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this of December, 2015. 

United States District Judge 

Page 17 - OPINION AND ORDER