[Cite as Colvin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2012-Ohio-5394.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

CEDRIC COLVIN 

 Appellant 

 v. 

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 

REVISION, et al. 

 Appellees 

C.A. No. 26329 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 2010-Q-2723 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: November 21, 2012 

 

BELFANCE, Judge. 

{¶1} Cedric Colvin appeals the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals affirming the 

dismissal of his complaint by the Summit County Board of Revision. For the reasons set forth 

below, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} Mr. Colvin purchased the property at issue in this case in February 2009. He filed 

a complaint regarding the property’s 2008 tax valuation in March 2009. The Summit County 

Board of Revision denied his claim. When Mr. Colvin attempted to appeal, the Board of Tax 

Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. 

{¶3} Mr. Colvin filed a second complaint in March 2010, challenging the tax valuation 

for the 2009 tax year. The Summit County Board of Revisions dismissed his complaint, finding 

that it was barred by R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). Mr. Colvin appealed the decision to the Board of Tax 

Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Summit County Board of Revision. Mr. Colvin has 
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appealed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, raising a single assignment of error for our 

review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

UNDERLYING COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS A SECOND 

FILING WITHIN THE INTERIM PERIOD BECAUSE (1) THE APPELLANT 

HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO FILE THE FIRST COMPLAINT; (2) THE SALE 

OCCURRED AFTER THE TAX LIEN DATE FOR THE TAX YEAR FOR 

WHICH THE PRIOR COMPLAINT WAS FILED; AND, (3) THE EFFECT OF 

THE SALE ON VALUE COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN TAKEN 

INTO CONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PRIOR COMPLAINT. 

{¶4} Mr. Colvin argues that, because he did not own the property in 2008, he did not 

have standing to challenge the tax valuation for that year, and, therefore, his 2009 complaint did 

not preclude his 2010 complaint regarding the 2009 tax year valuation. He also argues that, even 

if R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) would generally preclude his 2010 complaint, his complaint was still 

permitted because it fell under the exception provided by R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a). 

{¶5} R.C. 5715.19 regulates the manner in which a person or entity may dispute the 

“[t]he determination of the total valuation or assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list 

* * *.” R.C. 5715.19(A)(1)(d). A person may institute such a challenge by filing a complaint 

with the county auditor. R.C. 5715.19(A)(1). However, 

[n]o person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuation or 

assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against 

the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same 

interim period, unless the person, board, or officer alleges that the valuation or 

assessment should be changed due to one or more of the following circumstances 

that occurred after the tax lien date for the tax year for which the prior complaint 

was filed and that the circumstances were not taken into consideration with 

respect to the prior complaint: 

(a) The property was sold in an arm’s length transaction, as described in section 

5713.03 of the Revised Code; 
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(b) The property lost value due to some casualty; 

(c) Substantial improvement was added to the property; 

(d) An increase or decrease of at least fifteen per cent in the property’s occupancy 

has had a substantial economic impact on the property. 

R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). 

{¶6} Thus, R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) does not permit a person to file subsequent complaints 

in the same interim period unless the person can meet certain exceptions contained in the statute. 

Mr. Colvin argues that his second complaint regarding the 2009 tax year which was filed in the 

same interim period was not barred by R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). He argues that he was not permitted 

to make the complaint regarding the 2008 tax year because he did not yet own the property until 

2009. Essentially, Mr. Colvin is arguing that he lacked standing to bring the first complaint, 

rendering it and any decision emanating from it a nullity. However, Mr. Colvin has cited no 

authority to support his argument. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of 

argument that Mr. Colvin is correct that a complaint brought by a person lacking standing does 

not operate as a bar under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), “[a]ny person owning taxable real property in the 

county or in a taxing district with territory in the county * * * may file * * * a complaint 

regarding any such determination affecting any real property in the county * * *.” (Emphasis 

added.) R.C. 5715.19(A)(1). Mr. Colvin has not pointed to any evidence in the record that he 

did not own taxable real property in Summit County in 2008; thus, the record does not support a 

finding that he lacked standing to bring the complaint regarding the 2008 tax valuation. 

{¶7} Mr. Colvin also argues that his second complaint was permitted by R.C. 

5715.19(A)(2)(a), which allows a second complaint to be filed if the property was sold in an 

arm’s length transaction “after the tax lien date for the tax year for which the prior complaint was 

filed and that the circumstances were not taken into consideration with respect to the prior 
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complaint[.]” “[F]ull compliance with R.C. 5715.19 * * * is necessary before a county board of 

revision is empowered to act on the merits of a claim. Thus, a complainant, to file a second 

complaint for the same interim period, must allege and establish one of the four circumstances 

set forth in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Developers 

Diversified Ltd. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 32, 35 (1998). In this case, Mr. 

Colvin alleged that R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) applied; however, at the hearing he failed to establish 

that the exception applied. 

{¶8} In order to meet the exception contained in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a), Mr. Colvin 

was required to establish that property was sold in an arm’s length transaction after the tax lien 

date for the tax year for which the prior complaint was filed and that the circumstances were not 

taken into consideration with respect to the prior complaint. There is no dispute that the sale 

occurred after the tax-lien date. The issue in this case is whether Mr. Colvin satisfied the second 

portion of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a), namely, that the circumstances surrounding the arm’s length 

sale were not taken into account with respect to the 2008 tax-year complaint. Mr. Colvin does 

not point to any evidence in the record suggesting that he established this prong of the exception. 

At the hearing on the second complaint, when Mr. Colvin was asked if he had filed on the sale 

price in his first complaint, he stated that “[n]obody ever looked at the sale price.” However he 

then admitted that he had “submitted the purchase contract to the county when [he] bought the 

property.” 

{¶9} Mr. Colvin suggests that Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, is dispositive on this issue. In Worthington

City, 

the jurisdictional issue ar[o]se[] because the school board presented the May 2003 

purchase price in a complaint that challenged the auditor’s valuation for tax year 
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2003. Subsequently, the school board initiated the present case by filing a 

complaint seeking an increase for tax year 2004 on the basis of the May 2003 

sale. 

Id. at ¶ 19. The property owners asserted that the 2004 complaint was barred by R.C. 

5715.19(A)(2). See id. at ¶ 16. However, the Supreme Court held that R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) 

applied because 

the sale took place in May 2003—after the January 1, 2003 lien date to which the 

earlier complaint related. Moreover, although the May 2003 sale formed the basis 

for the tax–year–2003 complaint, the BOR set the value for 2003 without regard 

to the sale price because the buildings at issue were only partially completed as of 

January 1, 2003. Because the record shows that the construction was fully 

completed by January 1, 2004, and because the May 2003 sale culminated a 

January 2003 purchase contract that contemplated completed construction, the 

effect of the May 2003 sale price on value was “not taken into consideration” 

under the statute for tax year 2003. 

Id. at ¶ 20.1

{¶10} The circumstances in Worthington City are clearly distinguishable from the 

instant matter. Furthermore, notwithstanding Mr. Colvin’s argument to the contrary, “[a]n 

arm’s-length sale may take place after the lien date of a prior tax year and still furnish the 

criterion of value for that earlier year.” (Emphasis sic.) Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit 

Cty Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, ¶ 21-22. Thus, unlike Worthington 

City, the sale price could have been contemplated during the earlier complaint, and we cannot 

conclude based upon the limited record before us, which does not contain any evidence 

concerning the decisions of the Board of Revision or the Board of Tax Appeals for Mr. Colvin’s 

 1

 The Supreme Court also alternatively found R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(c) to apply. See 

Worthington City at ¶ 21. 
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first complaint, that the Board of Revision failed to do so. See Akron Centre at ¶ 21, fn. 5 (“If 

the board of revision ruled in connection with the earlier complaint that the sale was not recent 

with respect to the prior year’s lien date, the arm’s-length sale price has not been ‘taken into 

consideration.’”). 

{¶11} It was Mr. Colvin’s burden to establish that the R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) exception 

applied, and he failed to carry that burden. See Developers Diversified Ltd., 84 Ohio St.3d at 35. 

Accordingly, Mr. Colvin’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶12} Mr. Colvin’s assignment of error is overruled. The decision of the Board of Tax 

Appeals is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Ohio Board of Tax 

Appeals, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified 

copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, P. J. 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

CEDRIC B. COLVIN, pro se, Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and TIMOTHY J. WALSH, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellees.