IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CHARLES BARKER III 

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:14-cv-2050-MC 

v. OPINION AND ORDER 

U.S. NATIONAL BANK, eta/. 

Defendants. 

MCSHANE, Judge: 

In response to a state foreclosure action, Plaintiff Charles Barker III ("Barker"), 

proceeding prose, filed a 62-page complaint with 18 separate causes of action against 7 banking 

and lending institutions and 25 urinamed Does (collectively "Defendants"). 1 Defendants move to 

dismiss the complaint for lack of standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 1) and 

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Because Barker was 

1 Barker initially named nine banking and lending institutions as defendants, but he has since voluntarily dismissed 

two of them. See ECF No. 20. The remaining defendants are: U.S. National Bank; U.S. Bancorp; U.S. Bank; 

OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems; Bank of America; Citibank, N.A.; and 

Does 1-25. 2 See ECF No. 25,; ECF No. 28 

1 -OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 1 of 11
not the owner of the property in question at the time he filed this action, and because his 

complaint does not comport in any way with federal pleading standards, the Defendants' motions 

to dismiss are GRANTED. Additionally, for the reasons that follow, this Court exercises its 

discretion to deny Barker leave to amend his complaint, and Barker is hereby ORDERED to 

' show cause as to why this Court should not impose sanctions in the form of Defendants' 

reasonable costs and fees. 

BACKGROUND 

In June 2006, Mary R. Dunham signed a note for a $204,750 loan, secured by real 

property located at 1815 East 19th Avenue, Eugene, Oregon (the "Property"). The deed oftrust 

identified Dunham as the borrower, and she was the only signatory to the deed of trust. Although 

Barker purchased the Property in 2004, he transferred his interest to Dunham in 2005. Dunham 

transferred her interest in the Property to Woodstock Financial Corporation in 2008, which in 

tum transferred its interest to Zuma Enterprises, LLC ("Zuma Enterprises") in 2010. 

On December 2, 2014, U.S. Bank as Trustee filed a judicial foreclosure complaint in. 

Lane County Circuit Court3 against Mary R. Dunham, Citibank, Zuma Enterprises, and any other 

person claiming an interest in the Property. Zuma Enterprises, of which Barker was the sole 

member, owned the Property at the time of filing. Barker brought this federal cause of action on 

December 29, 2014, but Barker did not transfer the Property from Zuma Enterprises to himself 

until January 14, 2015. In a separate action, Barker improperly attempted to remove the state 

foreclosure case to federal court on January 9, 2015. See No. 6:15-cv-00046 (D. Or.). 

Barker's complaint lists the following causes of action: (I) Fraud; (II) Violations of ORS 

86.060 et seq.; (III) Unfair, Deceptive, and Fraudulent Practices; (IV) Violations of U.S. 

3 U.S. Bank National Assoc., as Trustee v. Mary R. Dunham, et al., Lane County Circuit Court Case No. 161424269 

2- OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 2 of 11
Securities Laws; (V) Breach of Fiduciary Responsibility; (VI) Violations of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act; (VII) Violations of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations 

Act; (VIII) Conversion; (IX) Restraint of Trade & Public Policy; (X) Obstruction of Justice; (XI) 

Wrongful Foreclosure/Quiet Title; (XII) Unfair Trade Practices; (XIII) RESPA Violations; 

(XIV) Unfair & Bad Faith Dealing; (XV) Violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act; (XVI) 

Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act- Section 1692; (XVII) Unjust Enrichment; 

and (XVIII) Contract of Adhesion. 

Defendants move to dismiss Barker's complaint for lack of standing because he was not 

the owner of the property at the time he filed the lawsuit, nor was he a party to the loan, note, or 

. deed of trust. Defendants also move to dismiss Barker's complaint for failure to state a claim 

because it contains vague allegations of misconduct by the banking and lending industry without 

identifying specific actions by any particular defendants. 

STANDARDS 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 1 ), the 

plaintiff has the burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Ass'n of Am. Med. Call. v. United 

States, 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir.2000). Unlike a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may 

consider affidavits or other evidence properly before the court that is relevant to the issue of 

subject matter jurisdiction. !d. In order to invoke subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must 

establish that he or she has standing to bring a claim. Lee v. State of Or., 107 F.3d 1382, 1387 

(9th Cir. 1997). Standing addresses whether the plaintiff is the proper party to litigate a particular 

matter. !d. 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )( 6), a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that "state[ s] a claim to relief that is plausible on 

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Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 3 of 11
its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its 

face when the factual allegations allow the court to infer the defendant's liability based on the 

alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must 

present more than "the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 678. 

While considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material 

fact as true and construe in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burget v. Lokelani 

Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). But the court is "not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If 

the complaint is dismissed, courts have discretion to deny leave to amend where amendments 

would be futile. Klamath Lake Pharm. Assoc. v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 

1292 (9th Cir. 1983). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(1) 

It is undisputed that Barker did not own the Property when he brought this action. 

Nevertheless, Barker insists that he is a real party in interest because he was the sole member of 

Zuma Enterprises, which owned the Property at the time Barker filed this lawsuit. However, 

Barker may not bring an action pro se on behalf of Zuma Enterprises, even if he is the sole 

member, because Zuma Enterprises is a separate legal entity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, 

Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) ("It is well established that the privilege to represent 

oneself prose provided by [28 U.S.C.] § 1654 is personal to the litigant and does not extend to 

other parties or entities."). 

This information should not come as news to Barker because state and federal courts 

have informed him of this fact multiple times before. In 2012, Barker and Zuma Enterprises filed 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 4 of 11
a prose complaint in Multnomah County Circuit Court in response to a foreclosure action (with 

nearly identical claims as in this case), which the defendants eventually removed to federal court. 

See Barker v. Jantzen Beach Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 2013 WL 244474 (D. Or. Jan. 18, 2013). The 

initial complaint alleged "plaintiff is the owner" of the property, but did not identify whether · 

Barker or Zuma Enterprises was the actual owner. Id. at * 1 n.1. The Multnomah County judge 

dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, and the judge instructed Barker that Zuma 

Enterprises must retain its own legal counsel to participate in further proceedings. Id. at *2. 

Barker filed an amended complaint and did not name Zuma Enterprises as a plaintiff. Id. at n.2. 

In 2013, Barker filed a prose action in Hawaii district court that included claims on 

behalf of various LLCs. See Barker v. Gottlieb, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (2013). The court 

dismissed the complaint with leave to amend, instructing Barker, "if the LLCs or any other 

business entity is added as a plaintiff in this case, the entity cannot represent itself pro se, and 

Plaintiff cannot represent the entity unless he is an attorney authorized to practice in this 

district." Id. at 1176. 

Barker is not an attorney authorized to practice in the District of Oregon, so he cannot 

represent Zuma Enterprises in the current case. The fact that Barker transferred the Property 

from Zuma Enterprises to himself after he filed this action is unavailing. See Newman-Green Inc. 

v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 (1989) ("The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily 

depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed."). Nor has Barker provided any 

documentation properly before the court to establish that he has standing in the claims arising out 

of the loans, note, or deed of trust that Dunham signed. As a result, Barker has not carried his 

burden to prove that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 5 of 11
II. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

"A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of 

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of 

Rule8(a)(2) is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal quotations omitted). 

Barker's 62-page complaint is not a short and plain statement of the claims. To the 

contrary, Barker's complaint can best be described as follows: 

Most of the claims assert no specific misconduct, attack the mortgage system 

in general, and are based on nothing more than notions of public policy and 

unfairness. The only alleged misconduct I can discern from plaintiffs' filings 

is that MERS served as beneficiary in at least some of the transactions at . 

issue, and possibly that some defendants failed to present promissory notes at 

the time of foreclosures. That conduct, even if true, does not violate Oregon 

law. 

Plaintiffs' two claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act apparently 

assert that MERS improperly identified itself as a beneficiary. Plaintiffs' 

RICO claim alleges that the defendants created an illegal scheme of 

recordation, apparently by using MERS as a beneficiary. Plaintiffs' conversion 

claim is apparently based on defendants' "noncompliance" with Oregon law 

by designating MERS a beneficiary. The only other claim, a Truth in Lending 

Act claim, does not allege any misconduct at all but vaguely refers to 

"purposeful deception." Based on the other allegations, the only deception I 

can imagine plaintiff is referring to is "deception" tied to MERS's unlawful 

beneficiary status. 

Barker v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2011 WL 4754529, at *1-2 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 2011). 

One would assume that Barker's above-described 2011 action in the District of Oregon 

involved different claims based on different underlying facts from Barker's 2014 action before 

this Court. However, a cursory inspection ofthe court filings from the 2011 action reveals that 

Barker merely copied large swaths of his 2011 complaint, pasted them to the complaint in the 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER. 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 6 of 11
I 

current action, and then changed the names of some of the defendants. 4 The four claims5 that 

Barker did not copy and paste from the 2011 action he appears to have copied and pasted from a 

different complaint, once again with nearly identical claims, that he filed in the District of 

Oregon in 2013. 6 

Furthermore, in his response brief to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Barker cites to 

Hawaii's Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hawaii state appellate courts as his legal authorities. 

See ECF No. 31 at 13-14. Although the Hawaiian state courts are undoubtedly replete with wise 

and noble jurists, this is a federal action in the District of Oregon. Unsurprisingly, Barker just 

finished yet another unsuccessful lawsuit in Hawaii with some claims that are similarto those in 

the current action. 7 While the Hawaiian and federal rules of civil procedure are similar, this 

Court takes Barker's copied and pasted briefing from his Hawaii case to be one more example of 

how his claims are not particularized to the named Defendants but rather part of his larger 

campaign against the mortgage and lending industry in general. Rather than alleging specific 

facts against specific defendants, Barker simply recycles the same broad allegations in case after 

case, hopeing something sticks. Barker then fails to inform this Court that every other court to 

see his nearly identical claims, arguments, and briefings has rejected those claims. Prose or not, 

Barker's cohduct is improper. 

III. Dismissal with prejudice 

Courts have discretion to deny leave to amend where amendments would be futile. 

Klamath Lake Pharm. Assoc., 701 F.2d at 1292. In looking at the pleadings, this Court cannot 

4 Compare ECF No. 1 with Second Amended Complaint, Barker v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2011 WL 7796835 (D. Or. 

Aug.l7,2011). 

5 Claims IV, V, X, XI 6 Compare ECF No. 1 with Second Amended Complaint, Barker v. Saxon Mortg. Corp., 2013 WL 9592094 (D. Or. 

Aug. 26, 2013). 7 See Barker v. Gottlieb, 2014 WL 5460619 (D. Haw. Oct. 24, 2014). 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 7 of 11
envision an amendment Barker could make that would give him standing or state a cause of 

action arising out of the Property, loans, note, or deed of trust. As a result, leave to amend would 

be futile. 

Given Barker's history in these actions, I also would not expect Barker to comply with 

any court order to amend the complaint in a way that would satisfY Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2). For example, in dismissing Barker's Second Amended Complaint with 

prejudice in the 2011 Or~gon action, Judge Mosman commented: 

Plaintiffs have now had three tries at stating a valid claim. Before filing their 

Second Amended Complaint, they had the benefit of my ruling on their 

request for a preliminary injunction and all of the defendants' motions to 

dismiss and motions for summary judgment. 

Barker, 2011 WL 4754529, at *2. In the Hawaii action, the court dismissed most ofBarker's 

claims from the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice but allowed Barker to amend four 

counts on the express condition that Barker did not have leave to add new claims. See Barker, 

2014 WL 5460619, at *1-2. Barker responded by filing a Third Amended Complaint that 

included the ten claims the judge had dismissed with prejudice, as well as two additional claims 

in direct violation of the previous ruling and the judge's Rule 16 Scheduling Order. !d. at *2. 

Barker's complaint fails to state a claim for relief, and Barker had no standing to bring 

the claims in the first place. There are no amendments this Court can conceive of that would cure 

the complaint's fatal deficiencies. Nor, given his history, does this Court expect that Barker 

would make any effort to properly amend the complaint given the opportunity to do so. 

IV. Sanctions and Order to Show Cause 

Federal courts have inherent power to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct "which 

abuses the judicial process." Chamers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44-45 (1991). "[A]n 

8 -OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 8 of 11
assessment of attorney's fees is undoubtedly within a court's inherent power[,]" such as when a 

party has acted in bad faith. Id. at 45. The sanctioning scheme of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure is not a substitute for the inherent power of the federal courts to impose sanctions for ' ' 

bad-faith conduct because the inherent power of the court "is both broader and narrower than 

other means of imposing sanctions." Id. at 46. As a result, a federal court may "resort to its 

inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad:-faith conduct" even if"that 

conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules." Id. at 50. Although the court 

should ordinarily rely on the Rules to impose sanctions, a federal court has discretion to rely on 

- its inherent power if it determines that "neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task[.]" I d. 

Defendants did not file a motion for sanctions, but a court can impose sua sponte 

sanctions "in situations that are akin to a contempt of court." United Nat'! Ins. Co. v. R &DLatex 

Corp., 242 F .3d 1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although this Court recognizes that Barker is a pro se litigant, that fact does not grant Barker the 

right to abuse the judicial process by repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits and ignoring the 

instructions of the court. 

In the following excerpt, one need only replace "Bigsby" and "Postal Service" with 

"Barker" and "mortgage industry" to capture this Court's sentiments: 

This ~ourt grows weary of expending judicial energy upon meritless and 

frivolous lawsuits. Mr. Bigsby has waged a crusade against the Postal Service 

for several years now, and as already noted, makes his second appearance in 

this district with his claims. 

Pro se litigants are not beyond the purview of the sanctions contained 

in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for the filing of meritless and frivolous 

claims. The Bigsbys are bound by the same obligations as attorneys to 

investigate their claims, both factually and legally, to determine their merit 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 9 of 11
before filing. Such an obligation ensures that judicial resources are not 

wasted, and that defendants are not harassed by disgruntled parties with the. 

rigors of unnecessary litigation. As well, this court always carries with it the 

inherent power to sanction misconduct by the parties appearing before it. 

Sanctions can be monetary, such as the payment of attorneys' fees for the 

opposing party[.] 

Bigsby v. Runyon, 950 F. Supp. 761, 768 (1996). Similar to Mr. Bigsby, Barker has waged a 

crusade against the mortgage and lending industry for several years, and as already noted, makes 

his third appearance in this district with his claims. Furthermore, Barker has not only acted 

contemptuously and in bad faith before the Oregon courts, but he violated the terms of the 

Hawaii federal court's ruling and Rule 16 Scheduling Order as well. 

Barker clearly has no respect for the substantive law governing his claims or the authority 

of the courts in which he files them. Barker copied and pasted claims from previous complaints 

that two federal judges in the District of Oregon have already dismissed, and he should be well 

aware by now that he cannot represent Zuma Enterprises' interests as a pro se litigant. 

Additionally, Barker has refused to acknowledge the fact that his improper removal of the 

underlying state foreclosure action created two separate federal cases, despite irrefutable 

evidence to the contrary. After receiving clear oral instructions on the matter from the court 

during a telephone hearing on the motions to dismiss, Barker even accused the court of falsifying 

the case number in order to create two separate causes of action. See ECF No. 31, p. 2. 

Barker's conduct compels me to impose sanctions that will act as an adequate deterrent to 

prevent Barker from continuing his bad faith pattern of harassing litigation and abuse of the 

judicial process. Therefore, this Court directs Barker to show cause as to why he should not be 

sanctioned for his behavior in this action, including an explanation of why reasonable costs and 

attorneys' fees are not appropriate. 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 10 of 11
CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, the Defendants' motions, ECF No. 25 and 28, are GRANTED, 

and Barker's complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. Barker's Motion 

to Consolidate, ECF No. 31, is DENIED. Barker is hereby ORDERED to show cause within 14 

days as to why Defendants' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees are not an appropriate sanction 

for Barker's bad faith conduct and frivolous filings in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this ~th day of April, 2015. 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

L _L~ Michael McShane 

United States District Judge 

Case 6:14-cv-02050-MC Document 35 Filed 04/09/15 Page 11 of 11