DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

PO-376832 

K&L GATES LLP

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B. John Casey, OSB #120025

Email: john.casey@klgates.com

K&L GATES LLP

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Jerry S. McDevitt (pro hac vice)

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Attorneys for Defendant

World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

PORTLAND DIVISION

WILLIAM ALBERT HAYNES III, 

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT, 

INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:14-cv-01689-ST

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO 

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO OPINION 

AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

TRANSFER VENUE

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I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

By Opinion and Order dated June 25, 2015, Magistrate Judge Stewart (“Judge Stewart”) 

ordered that this putative class action be transferred to the District of Connecticut pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). In concluding that the public and private interests weighed in favor of a 

transfer, Judge Stewart, relying on controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, found that little deference 

should be accorded to plaintiff Haynes’ choice of forum because (a) he brought this case as a 

nationwide class action, (b) “many of the putative class members are subject to mandatory forum 

selection clauses requiring disputes to be resolved in the District of Connecticut,” and (c) 

Haynes’ lead counsel, Konstantine Kyros, (“Kyros”) had filed multiple, entirely duplicative 

actions against WWE across the country, which evidenced forum shopping. Judge Stewart 

found that the rest of the public and private interest factors – the costs of litigation, the respective 

jurisdictions’ relationships to the dispute, and the ease of access to sources of proof – were 

“either neutral or weigh in favor of a transfer of this case” to Connecticut. 

The day after Judge Stewart’s rulings regarding the import of forum selection clauses and 

the forum shopping of Kyros, he filed yet another substantially similar case in Texas. 

Specifically, Kyros filed an action in the Northern District of Texas against WWE on behalf of 

the former girlfriend of a deceased wrestler, Matthew Osborne (“Osborne”). Although Osborne 

died of a drug overdose in 2013, some twenty years after he last regularly performed for WWE, 

the suit attempts to blame his death on alleged traumatic brain injuries caused by performing for 

WWE. The case was filed in Texas even though the plaintiff and her children live in 

Pennsylvania, and in breach of a mandatory forum selection clause contained in Osborne’s 

contract with WWE that establishes the District of Connecticut as the exclusive forum for any 

such claims. Mr. Osborne is a member of the putative class covered by the Haynes case and 

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every other class action suit filed by or on behalf of Kyros since he began the forum shopping 

campaign identified in Judge Stewart’s Order.

1

 The Osborne case represents the fourth time that 

Kyros, and those attorneys acting in concert with him, have ignored mandatory forum selection 

clauses and the unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court in 2013 holding that 

such clauses are to be given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases. Atlantic 

Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).

Now, Haynes objects to Judge Stewart’s ruling under Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), claiming chiefly that the forum-shopping conclusions were wrong and, incredibly, 

that there was no record evidence of mandatory forum selection provisions. Haynes’ Objection 

faces a high burden. He must establish that Judge Stewart’s non-dispositive and highly 

discretionary ruling was “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Id. The Objection comes 

nowhere close to meeting this burden – Haynes merely rehashes arguments that were presented 

to, and rejected by, Judge Stewart. Worse, the Objection flatly misstates the record that was 

before Judge Stewart. 

Haynes specifically objects to the following “private interest” findings made by Judge 

Stewart: (i) “[t]he difference in costs of litigation is neutral,” Order at 6, (ii) “many of the 

putative class members are subject to mandatory forum selection clauses requiring disputes to be 

resolved in the District of Connecticut,” id. at 7, and (iii) Haynes’ counsel “may be engaging in 

forum shopping,” id. Haynes claims that these findings were not supported by the record and 

 1 One might expect that Haynes would have disclosed the filing of the Osborne suit in his 

Objection, given that his lawyers filed it the day after Judge Stewart concluded that there was 

evidence that Haynes’ lawyers had engaged in forum shopping. It was not disclosed. Instead, 

while attempting to justify the prior forum shopping, Haynes’ counsel represented that all of the 

subsequent suits had been filed by individuals in their home districts. Order at p.9. Obviously, a 

suit in Texas on behalf of Pennsylvania residents is not a suit in the home district of those 

plaintiffs.

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were instead a product of “ad hominem” attacks on Kyros and the “successful sale of . . . legal 

conclusions devoid of supporting facts.” Doc. 61, Pl.’s Objections to Op. and Order (“Obj.”) 

at 2.

Haynes’ arguments should be summarily rejected. First, the facts before Judge Stewart, 

if anything, showed that the “costs of litigation” weighed in favor of a transfer because there 

would be more Connecticut witnesses (WWE executives and employees) that would need to 

travel to Oregon than Oregon witnesses that would need to travel to Connecticut (Haynes). 

Further, Haynes never claimed – much less submitted facts showing – that the costs of travel to 

Connecticut would in any sense be burdensome to him.2

Second, as to Judge Stewart’s finding that many class members were subject to 

Connecticut forum selection clauses, Haynes incredibly claims that this finding was “marinated 

in speculation and naked of any supporting facts.” Obj. at 3. He goes even further, emphasizing 

that there is supposedly nothing in the record to suggest the applicability or prevalence of such 

clauses for putative class members. Id. at 4, 8. This is absurd. The evidence before Judge 

Stewart showed that, as far back as 1991, WWE booking contracts typically required that any 

disputes be litigated in Connecticut; that some booking contracts entered into between 1997-

2000 have an arbitration provision requiring arbitration in Connecticut; and that all known 

booking contracts entered into after 2000 contain a Connecticut forum selection clause. Judge 

Stewart, in fact, had no less than five booking contracts before her of members of Haynes’ 

putative class that contained Connecticut forum selection clauses. See Doc. 47-2, Ex. 2 to Deft’s 

 2 This part of the analysis assumes that this matter will survive dispositive motions and 

necessitate travel to a trial on the part of one or the other parties. WWE respectfully submits that 

the polemics by Haynes about the hardship of travel must also be viewed from the standpoint of 

the likelihood that any of his claims survive summary dismissal due to Oregon’s ironclad ten 

year statute of repose. Haynes last performed for WWE in 1988 and, as demonstrated by WWE 

in its Motion to Dismiss, Haynes’ claims were all time barred not later than 1998.

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Mot. to Transfer Venue; Doc. 58-1, Ex. A to May 28, 2015 Declaration of B. John Casey. She 

was perfectly capable of examining those clauses and determining their significance and 

applicability. Moreover, as to the applicability of the forum selection clauses, the record 

reflected that Kyros and other counsel for Haynes agreed that a duplicative class action, the 

Singleton case, they originally filed in Pennsylvania, should be transferred to Connecticut, once 

WWE raised the issue of forum selection clauses in that case.3 Neither Kyros nor any of the four 

lawyers from the two other firms who represent both Haynes and the Singleton plaintiffs make 

any mention of their prior agreement to transfer the Singleton case to Connecticut in their 

objections to Judge Stewart’s Opinions and Order. Likewise, they offer no explanation for 

agreeing to transfer Singleton, but then ignoring such clauses when filing other suits. Indeed, 

they offer no reason at all for filing such multiple duplicative actions, nor explain why they have 

done everything possible to avoid Connecticut ever since agreeing that it was the proper forum 

due to the forum selection clauses.

Third, as to Judge Stewart’s finding regarding forum shopping, Haynes does not and 

cannot dispute that, after he filed the instant action, his lawyers filed, or caused to be filed, two 

other duplicative class actions in other courts, and now two individual actions on behalf of 

former wrestlers who are also members of these putative classes, all in violation of mandatory 

forum selection clauses. Notably, since Judge Stewart’s venue ruling in this case, the third class 

action that Haynes’ counsel caused to be filed against WWE, styled as McCullough et al. v. 

 3

 This parallel case is now styled Singleton, et al. v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., Case 

No. 3:15-CV-00425-VLB (D. Conn.). There were four different law firms listed as plaintiffs’ 

counsel on the original complaint in the Singleton matter, which was originally filed in the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Five lawyers from three of those firms are also counsel in the 

Haynes case. Those lawyers are Kyros, and the Kyros Law office; Charles J. LaDuca and 

Brendan Thompson of Cuneo, Gilbert & La Duca; and Robert Shelquist and Scott Moriarity of 

Lockridge Grindal Nauen.

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World Wrestling Entertainment Inc., No. 15-2662 (C.D. Cal.), also was transferred by the 

Central District of California to the District of Connecticut. See July 23, 2015 Declaration of B. 

John Casey (“Casey Decl.”), Ex. A. In ordering the transfer, the court in McCullough enforced 

the Connecticut forum selection clauses in WWE’s booking contracts, and found that those 

clauses covered the very disputes placed at issue in these cases. The Singleton and McCullough 

actions, along with a related declaratory judgment action filed by WWE in response to Kyros’ 

forum shopping styled World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Robert Windham, et al., Case No. 

2:15-cv-00994 (D. Conn.), have all been consolidated before the Honorable Vanessa L. Bryant in 

the District of Connecticut.

Furthermore, just hours before filing this Response, Judge Bryant, apparently concerned 

with Kyros’ forum shopping and efforts to avoid jurisdiction in Connecticut, issued an order sua

sponte requiring Kyros “to show cause why, in light of the forum selection provisions in WWE’s 

employment contracts resulting in multiple orders of transfer, these actions should continue to be 

filed in other jurisdictions.” McCullough v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., No. 3:15-cv1074-VLB, Doc. 42 (D. Conn. July 23, 2015). 

Thus, two federal judges have already acted to correct Kyros’ forum shopping by 

transferring duplicative class actions to the Connecticut federal court, and a third has ordered 

him to show cause for why he continues to file suits outside of Connecticut in the face of explicit 

Connecticut forum selection provisions. Transfer of all such cases to a single judge promotes 

judicial economy, avoids inconsistent rulings, and curbs Kyros’ forum shopping. Accordingly, 

there is no basis to overturn Judge Stewart’s well-reasoned Opinion and Order, and strong 

principles of comity mandate that it be affirmed.

 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive matter like a venue transfer is 

reviewed under a “deferential standard – ‘clearly erroneous’ and ‘contrary to law.’” United 

States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). 

Unlike dispositive rulings, nondispositive rulings are not subject to de novo review. See British 

Columbia, Ltd. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., No. 08-815, 2009 WL 113766, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 

15, 2009) (affirming Magistrate Judge Papak’s venue transfer order). There is “clear error” only 

“when the court is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed.’” Rapid Funding Grp. v. Keybank Nat. Ass’n, No. CV 07-1348PK, 2009 WL 

1490565, at *1 (D. Or. May 26, 2009) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001)). 

A decision is “contrary to law” only if it “applies the wrong legal standard or neglects to 

consider all elements of the applicable standard.” Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Decker, No. 3:13-

CV-1793-PK, 2015 WL 519884, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2015) (quotations omitted). The reviewing 

court “may not simply substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991). 

III. ARGUMENT

Judge Stewart’s Order clearly shows she applied the correct legal standards, and properly 

considered each of the elements under that standard. Haynes complains only about the result, 

which is an insufficient basis to overturn the decision. 

Plaintiff conceded the first prong of the § 1404(a) analysis – the District of Connecticut 

was an appropriate forum to hear the dispute. Doc. 50, Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Transfer at 3. Thus, 

the only issue before Judge Stewart was the second inquiry under § 1404(a), “whether the 

convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and the interest of justice weigh in 

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favor of transferring venue to that forum.” Order at 4 (citation omitted). This step of the inquiry 

“requires an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Id.

(quoting Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000)). The following 

factors are considered in this inquiry, and Judge Stewart specifically cited the controlling 

decision:

(1) location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed; (2) the state 

that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (4) the 

respective parties’ contacts with the forum; (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s 

cause of action in the chosen forum; (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the 

two forums; (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling 

non-party witnesses; and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Jones, 211 F.3d at 498–99 (internal citations omitted)); see also Order at 4.

As Judge Stewart also correctly noted in her Opinion and Order, “[t]he district court has 

great discretion in deciding whether the relevant factors warrant the transfer of the action to 

another forum.” Order at 5 (citing Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 

1988) (“‘Weighing of factors for and against transfer involves subtle considerations and is best 

left to the discretion of the trial judge.’”) (citation omitted)). Thus, there can be no serious 

question about whether Judge Stewart cited the correct legal standard.

A. Judge Stewart Was Correct In Her Findings On The Relative Costs of 

Litigation

Haynes first quibbles with Judge Stewart’s finding that “[t]he difference in costs of 

litigation is neutral, given that either Haynes must travel to Connecticut or WWE must travel to 

Oregon.” Order at 6. However, if anything, this factor is not just “neutral” – it weighs in favor 

of WWE, which identified at least four witnesses – key WWE executives – who would be 

inconvenienced through travel to Oregon, and whose absence from Connecticut would impair 

WWE operations. See Doc. 43, Am. Compl. ¶ 18; Doc. 46, March 23, 2015 Affidavit of James 

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W. Langham (“Langham Aff.”), ¶ 6; Doc. 57, WWE Reply in Support of Mot. to Transfer Venue 

at 15–16. In contrast, Haynes has failed to identify any witnesses, other than himself, who would 

be burdened if this case were litigated in Connecticut. 

In his Objection, Plaintiff notes that the WWE is a “major public corporation with 

revenues of approximately $500,000,000,” apparently implying that it may not be financially 

burdensome for the WWE to pay for the cost of witness travel to Oregon. Obj. at 7. Judge 

Stewart made no such finding, and this should not be a point of comparison, as Haynes never 

even states – much less submits any evidence showing – that he would have any trouble 

affording travel to Connecticut if in fact his case survived dismissal motions. Doc. 51, Haynes 

Decl. in Support of Opp. to WWE’s Mot. to Transfer Venue at at passim. Moreover, Haynes 

does not claim he is employed, and thus travel would not disrupt any employment. Conversely, 

requiring the top executives of a publicly traded company headquartered in Connecticut to travel 

to and attend proceedings in Oregon would cause substantial disruption of the business affairs of 

WWE. Accordingly, the parties’ relative means here does not favor Haynes in the § 1404(a) 

analysis. See, e.g., May v. Haas, No. 2:12-CV-01791-MCE, 2013 WL 4010293, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 5, 2013) (“Although a party’s financial situation is relevant in the venue transfer analysis, it 

is not entitled to great weight. Unless Plaintiffs can establish financial inconvenience, Plaintiffs’ 

choice of forum receives no greater weight ....”) (internal quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff next argues that it would be “extremely burdensome” for him to travel to 

Connecticut because of “health issues,” Obj. at 7, but he never submitted any medical evidence 

explaining how his alleged ailments would make travel difficult. See Worker’s Comp. Legal 

Clinic of La. v. Bellsouth Telecm’cs, Inc., No. CIV.A. 03-0722, 2003 WL 21750628, at *5 (E.D. 

La. July 28, 2003) (rejecting plaintiff’s conclusory assertion of inconvenience because “much 

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case preparation can be handled by telephone, through the mail, or through other means of 

communication.”). More significantly, as noted in WWE’s Reply, “the availability of electronic 

filing and video and teleconferencing technology limits the need for travel [and] in a civil case, a 

plaintiff may pursue a claim without appearing in court in person.” Doc. 57 at 17 (citing Pratt v. 

Silversea Cruises, Ltd., Inc., No. C 05-0693 SI, 2005 WL 1656891, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 

2005)).

Judge Stewart properly analyzed – and certainly did not commit clear error with respect 

to – the “costs of litigation” issue. Moreover, quibbling about one finding made in an overall 

balancing of many factors and associated discretionary judgments hardly demonstrates clear 

error.

B. The Record Evidence Fully Supports Judge Stewart’s Finding About The 

Connecticut Forum Selection Clauses

In support of her ultimate conclusion that Haynes’ choice of venue should be “accorded 

little deference,” Order at 9, Judge Stewart first cited Ninth Circuit law for the proposition that 

plaintiff’s choice of forum is given less weight when the plaintiff purports to represent a 

nationwide class, id. at 6-7 (citing Lou v. Balzberg, 834 F2d 730, 739 (9th Cir 1987)). Once 

again, reliance on a Ninth Circuit decision is certainly not acting contrary to law. Next, Judge 

Stewart noted that “many of the putative class members are subject to mandatory forum selection 

clauses requiring disputes to be resolved in the District of Connecticut.” Id. at 7 (“Whatever 

remaining deference that is accorded plaintiff’s choice of forum is further eroded by [this forum 

selection clause] evidence[.]”). Remarkably, Plaintiff makes the derogatory remark that this 

finding was “marinated in speculation and naked of any supporting facts.” Obj. at 3. In the very 

next sentence, with emphasis, Haynes claims that “there is nothing in the record to suggest the 

applicability or prevalence of purported forum selection clauses which may exist for absent

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putative class members.” Id. at 4. Haynes repeats this statement a third time on page 8 of his 

Objection. 

These statements are misrepresentations to the Court. Before Judge Stewart were the 

following facts:

• Booking contracts typically entered into between WWE and its wrestlers after 

June 13, 1991 require that any disputes arising out of or relating in any way to the 

booking contracts be litigated in Connecticut. Doc. 46, Langham Aff. at ¶ 16.

• Certain booking contracts entered into between1997-2000 have an arbitration 

provision requiring arbitration in Connecticut. Id.

• All known booking contracts entered into after 2000 have a forum selection 

clause of Connecticut. Id.

• No contract between WWE and a wrestler has a forum selection clause of Oregon. 

Id. at ¶ 17.

• The actual booking contracts, containing Connecticut forum selection clauses, of 

no less than five former WWE wrestlers who would be part of Haynes’ putative 

class – the two named plaintiffs in the Singleton Class Action and the three named 

plaintiffs in the McCullough Class Action. Doc. 47-2, Ex. 2 to Deft’s Mot. to 

Transfer Venue; Doc. 58-1, Ex. A to May 28, 2015 Declaration of B. John 

Casey.4

• The records and e-mails showing that Haynes’ lawyers, including Kyros and two 

other law firms which also represent Haynes, consented to the transfer of the 

Singleton case to Connecticut after WWE raised the issue of forum selection 

clauses.

This is not “speculation.” Obj. at 3. These are facts. And these facts rightly played a 

role in Judge Stewart’s reasoning that little deference should be given to Haynes’ chosen forum, 

as the case law – again undisputed by Plaintiff – confirms. See Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. 

Express Co., No. C 03-3719 SI, 2003 WL 22682482, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2003) (even 

 4

 Kyros also had in his possession three different contracts of Nelson Frazier containing 

such clauses. Thus, at the time of the filing of Haynes’ Objection suggesting there was some 

question as to whether such clauses may exist, Kyros had at least eight different contracts 

produced to him by WWE showing such clauses in fact exist.

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though named plaintiff had no forum selection clause in its contract, transferring putative class 

action to jurisdiction named in forum selection clauses in class members’ contracts).

After falsely representing that Judge Stewart made findings without evidentiary support, 

Plaintiff also contends in his Objection that he “presented counter-evidence that a substantial 

portion of participants in WWE events had no written contract with [WWE].” Obj. at 8. The 

“counter-evidence” to which Haynes refers is a single paragraph from a hearsay declaration – not 

from any wrestler – but from Haynes’ counsel, in which Mr. Kyros states:

I have spoken with many wrestlers who wrestled in WWF/WWE 

events after 1991 who state that they performed with no booking 

contract. Additionally I have reason to believe based on 

investigation that there are hundreds of such wrestlers. These are 

wrestlers that are asked to perform in WWF/WWE events as 

‘jobbers’ or ‘enhancement talent’ with no WWE booking 

agreements. 

Doc. 52, Kyros Decl. in Support of Pl.’s Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to Transfer Venue at ¶ 2. 

As noted in WWE’s Reply, Mr. Kyros’ declaration should be disregarded because it 

consists of inadmissible – and wholly conclusory – hearsay statements that summarize his 

alleged conversations with certain unidentified wrestlers.5

 Doc. 57, Reply at 8; see also LDM 

Sys., Inc. v. Russo, No. CIV.A. 97-3111, 1997 WL 431005, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 1997) 

(transferring case and disregarding affidavit containing conclusory statements); Rossi v. Trans 

World Airlines, Inc., 507 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1974) (district court properly disregarded 

affidavit that contained inadmissible hearsay). Moreover, even if the Court considers this vague 

and conclusory hearsay, it certainly does not contravene Mr. Langham’s sworn statement that 

“[a] substantial majority of the putative class members Plaintiff seeks to certify in this lawsuit 

 5

 None of these jobbers, who are akin to casual labor, have brought suit against WWE or 

been named as a plaintiff in any of the litigation commenced by Kyros against WWE. Without 

exception, in every case filed since Haynes, the wrestler at issue signed a contract with the 

mandatory forum election clause.

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are subject to contracts containing forum selection clauses that require their claims to be litigated 

in Connecticut.” Langham Aff. ¶ 15. 

Even if there was evidence that the forum selection clauses apply to less than the majority 

of the putative class members, which there is not, “this factor still leans in favor of venue 

transfer” since the clause never mentioned Oregon or any other state. See Italian Colors Rest., 

2003 WL 22682482, at *6 (reasoning that transfer was warranted even if only part of putative 

class was subject to forum selection clauses because there were no forum selection clauses 

requiring the dispute to be litigated in the transferor court or any court other than the transferee 

court); see also Langham Aff. ¶ 17 (“No contract between WWE and a wrestler has a forum 

selection clause of Oregon.”).

Plaintiff next argues in his Objection that, “even if such clauses are prevalent,” they may 

not apply, pointing out that plaintiffs “in other related matters” have argued that the clauses are 

unconscionable. Obj. at 8 (emphasis supplied). As an initial matter, Haynes himself never 

argued in this case that the forum selection clauses agreed to by others were unconscionable or

unenforceable for any reason, Doc 50, Opp. at passim, so that matter is not before this Court. To 

be sure, in their attempts to defeat the jurisdiction of the Connecticut federal court, which Kyros 

and two other firms representing Haynes originally agreed to, Kyros did submit, or cause to be 

submitted, such arguments to two other federal courts even though such arguments were 

foreclosed in those circuits when presented, and for that matter, in every circuit. The 

unconscionability argument was expressly rejected in one of the “related matters” after Haynes’ 

objections here were filed. As noted above, the district court in McCullough recently transferred 

that case to Connecticut, enforcing the WWE’s forum selection clause, and rejecting the 

plaintiffs’ argument that the clause is unconscionable. Casey Decl., Ex. A, at p. 5 (“Plaintiffs’ 

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unconscionability arguments against enforcing the forum selection clause still fall far short of 

satisfying their heavy burden.”).6

 

Haynes has not come close to overcoming the heavy burden to show these clauses are 

unenforceable. In Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of 

Tex., the Supreme Court ruled that mandatory forum selection clauses are entitled to “controlling 

weight in all but the most exceptional cases.” 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (internal quotations 

omitted). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that “forum selection clauses are to be 

specifically enforced unless the party opposing the clause clearly shows ‘that enforcement would 

be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or 

overreaching.’” Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). Haynes did not even 

attempt to argue – much less demonstrate – an “exceptional case” here under Atlantic Marine or 

that these forum selection clauses are “unreasonable or unjust” under Manetti-Farrow. See 

WWE Reply at 5-10. The reality is that none of the three law firms representing Haynes which 

also represent the plaintiffs in Singleton disputed the enforceability and applicability of the 

forum selection clauses when raised in that parallel action. WWE submits that, after agreeing to 

transfer the Singleton case to Connecticut, Kyros and co-counsel realized Connecticut also has 

repose statutes, and began a vexatious campaign of forum shopping which ignored the forum 

selection clauses, and which included Kyros attempting to conceal his role in the McCullough

case. As noted, the attempt to invalidate the forum selection clauses before a different trial court 

in this Circuit in that case recently failed. 

In short, Judge Stewart’s finding that “many of the putative class members are subject to 

 6 In the Frazier action, Kyros has also argued that the WWE’s forum selection clause is 

unconscionable in response to the WWE’s motion to transfer venue in that case. See disc. infra.

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mandatory forum selection clauses requiring disputes to be resolved in the District of 

Connecticut” is plainly correct, not plain error. Order at 7. 

C. The Record Evidence Shows That Haynes’ Counsel Has Been Forum 

Shopping 

Haynes’ last point of error is Judge Stewart’s finding that the content and timing of the 

multi-jurisdictional filings constituted evidence of forum shopping, a finding that was also 

relevant to her conclusion that Haynes’ choice of forum should be “accorded little deference.” 

Order at 7, 8 (citing Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“If there 

is any indication that plaintiff’s choice of forum is the result of forum shopping, plaintiff’s 

choice will be accorded little deference.”)). Plaintiff’s counsel apparently does not like the 

language used by Judge Stewart, and argues that WWE has engaged in an “ad hominem attack” 

against them by “advanc[ing] false and misleading claims about Plaintiff’s course and motivation 

for this litigation.” Obj. at 2. Not so. WWE “advanced” facts showing that Plaintiff’s counsel 

was, in fact, forum shopping. The record evidence before Judge Stewart on this issue –

undisputed by Haynes or his counsel – was as follows:

• The Haynes Class Action: Plaintiff’s counsel filed the instant class action on 

October 23, 2014 on behalf of all U.S. residents who currently wrestle or 

formerly wrestled for WWE. In December 2014, the undersigned met and 

conferred with Haynes’ counsel and explained that the claims of Haynes – who 

last wrestled for the WWE in 1988 – were time-barred by Oregon’s ultimate 

statute of repose and were otherwise deficient in a number of respects.

• The LoGrasso/Singleton Class Action: After the meet and confer session in 

Haynes highlighted the repose problems with Haynes’ claims, three of the law 

firms representing Haynes filed a “copy and paste” class action complaint for the 

identical class of putative plaintiffs, on January 16, 2015, naming former WWE 

wrestlers Vito LoGrasso and Evan Singleton as representative plaintiffs in federal 

court in Philadelphia. Both LoGrasso and Singleton signed booking contracts 

with the WWE that contained forum selection clauses specifying the District of 

Connecticut as the mandatory venue for disputes between the parties. After 

initially refusing to withdraw the LoGrasso/Singleton Class Action and refiling in 

Connecticut as required by LoGrasso’s and Singleton’s contracts, and thereby 

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forcing the WWE to file a motion to transfer, Kyros and the other firms 

representing plaintiffs in the case decided not to oppose the motion. In its transfer 

order, the district court in Philadelphia stated that “the plaintiffs do not oppose a 

transfer of venue and agree the District of Connecticut is an appropriate forum.” 

See Doc. 47-4, Ex. 3 to WWE’s Mot. to Transfer Venue at 1, n.1.

• The Frazier Action: Kyros next filed another duplicative suit with identical 

claims and theories of liability for a former wrestler, Nelson Frazier, in 

Tennessee. Frazier v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02198-JPM-cgc 

(WD Tenn). Frazier was a member of the same exact class of plaintiffs that 

Kyros had filed on behalf of in the Haynes and LoGrasso/Singleton Class 

Actions. Once again, Kyros filed the Frazier Action in knowing violation of the 

mandatory forum selection clause in at least three contracts signed by Frazier. 

WWE moved to transfer the Frazier Action to the District of Connecticut, which 

motion is still pending.

• The McCullough Class Action: On April 9, 2015, shortly after conceding that “the 

District of Connecticut is an appropriate forum,” Kyros caused the McCullough 

Class Action to be filed, another entirely duplicative class action in the U.S. 

District Court for the Central District of California, instead of simply joining 

those claims to the then-pending class action in the District of Connecticut. The 

booking contracts between WWE and the three named plaintiffs in the 

McCullough Action contain substantially similar mandatory forum selection 

clauses requiring that action to be litigated in Connecticut. See Doc. 58, Decl. of 

B. John Casey in Support of Def.’s Reply to Motion to Transfer Venue, Ex. A 

(Langham Decl. filed as Document No. 16-7 in the McCullough Action). To 

conceal his involvement in the McCullough Action, Kyros did not sign the 

complaint filed in the McCullough Action, so that California counsel could 

disavow any connection to Kyros’ prior agreement to transfer the Singleton Class 

Action to Connecticut. Kyros and his California co-counsel refused to respond to 

WWE counsel’s multiple requests to confirm or deny that Kyros represents the 

named plaintiffs in the McCullough Class Action, a fact noted by Judge Stewart 

in her opinion. Order at 8. Notably, Kyros’ involvement was placed before the 

California court, and the lawyers there did not dispute his involvement. Likewise, 

in the Opposition to Judge Stewart’s Order, Kyros does not dispute that he was in 

fact involved in that case and attempted to conceal his role. As noted, the district 

court in McCullough recently transferred the case to the District of Connecticut. 

The timing of these suits reveals the reason and purpose of the forum shopping —

avoidance of the repose statutes, first of Oregon and now of Connecticut. No other explanation 

is plausible, and none has been offered. Plaintiff’s counsel offers not one sentence explaining 

why these multiple suits have been brought instead of simply joining all of them to the purported 

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class action which they agreed should be transferred from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to 

Connecticut. The actual facts satisfy the very definition of forum shopping, which is relevant in 

the venue transfer analysis, as Judge Stewart properly noted. Order at 7; see also Italian Colors 

Rest., 2003 WL 22682482, at *4 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has established that courts should 

disregard a plaintiff’s forum choice where the suit is a result of forum-shopping” and transferring 

case where, like here, lawsuit involved “a roster of counsel” who had filed multiple overlapping 

lawsuits in other jurisdictions with different named plaintiffs against the same defendant) (citing 

Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991)).

Remarkably, since Judge Stewart’s ruling, Kyros has engaged in even more forum 

shopping. Specifically, not twenty-four hours after Judge Stewart issued her ruling,

Kyros filed another former wrestler lawsuit in yet another Federal Court in yet another state 

asserting yet the same substantive claims. See Casey Decl., Ex. B. Kyros filed the Osborne

Action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas despite the fact that 

(i) the plaintiff and her children live in Pennsylvania, id. ¶¶ 16–18, which runs directly counter to 

the statement in the Objection that “each subsequent suit against the WWE for concussionrelated injuries was filed by individuals in their home districts,” Obj. at 9 (emphasis supplied); 

(ii) Mr. Osborne agreed to a forum selection clause that establishes the District of Connecticut as 

the exclusive forum for his claims; and (iii) Mr. Osborne is a member of the purported class in 

all three purported class actions initiated by Kyros.7 Given this conduct, Judge Stewart was 

absolutely correct in her conclusion that “[P]laintiff’s choice of Oregon as one state on a hit-list 

 7 In light of the transfer orders in Haynes and McCullough, counsel for WWE asked Kyros 

to voluntarily dismiss Osborne and Frazier without prejudice and re-file in Connecticut. Kyros’ 

let his co-counsel respond and stated that they wanted to wait and see how the Tennessee court 

would rule on WWE’s transfer motion in the Frazier case, showing that they are seeking 

inconsistent court rulings, which itself is evidence of forum shopping. See Casey Decl. Ex. C

(July 14, 2015 counsel email correspondence). 

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of potential venues for his nationwide class action is accorded little deference.” Order at 8 

(internal quotations omitted).

Judge Stewart is not the only federal jurist concerned about Kyros’ forum shopping. The 

same day this Response was filed, Judge Bryant in the District of Connecticut issued an order, 

sua sponte, requiring Kyros to “show cause why, in light of the forum selection provision in 

WWE’s employment contracts resulting in multiple orders of transfer, these actions should 

continue to be filed in other jurisdictions.” McCullough v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., 

No. 3:15-cv-1074-VLB, Doc. 42 (D. Conn. July 23, 2015). Judge Bryant, like Judge Stewart, is 

justifiably concerned that Kyros has purposefully tried to avoid the jurisdiction of the same 

Connecticut court that he originally agreed was the appropriate court in which to bring these 

suits. 

Finally, WWE disputes that Judge Stewart’s ruling has, as Haynes asserts, “the potential 

for harm to counsels’ reputation.” Obj. at 9. It is a measured and well-reasoned opinion which, 

if anything, understates the actions of Haynes’ principal counsel. As set forth herein, two other 

federal jurists have already acted to correct Kyros’ forum shopping, and another has required 

Kyros to show cause for his duplicative filings in multiple jurisdictions, so Judge Stewart’s 

Order hardly stands alone. There simply is no basis to “modify” Judge Stewart’s Order, as 

confirmed by the single case on this issue cited by Haynes.8 See In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 288 

 8 Haynes also takes issue with statements made by WWE’s counsel to the media about his 

attorneys’ forum shopping. Obj. at 10. WWE’s counsel has had to respond to the tactics used 

against it designed to garner media attention and prejudice WWE. Kyros has used the media to 

try to recruit more plaintiffs to file additional lawsuits. See, e.g., Casey Decl., Ex. D at p. 8 

(Transcript of March 27, 2015 “Radio Takedown” Podcast (Kyros: “I can win a case against the 

WWE if people come forward with their stories and their circumstances and their injuries and 

you know ... if every wrestler who believe that they'd been harmed by the WWE right now 

decided to file a lawsuit against the WWE, this would surely decide, I think, an outcome.”)). 

Moreover, Mr. McDevitt’s comment was made after it became clear that Kyros would not be 

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F. Supp. 24 14, 15-16 (D. D.C. 2003) (refusing to modify most of Magistrate’s R&R criticizing 

plaintiff’s counsel in fee award ruling even though it had the potential to harm counsel’s 

reputation; deleting one sentence referring to the “number of times that the Court was required to 

address the issue of lead plaintiffs and the matter of class certification, since it is true that the 

need for these successive motions cannot be attributed entirely to plaintiffs’ counsel”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the underlying briefing, Judge 

Stewart’s Order should be affirmed.

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2015.

K&L GATES LLP

By: /s/ B. John Casey 

B. John Casey, OSB #120025

Email: john.casey@klgates.com

Jerry S. McDevitt, pro hac vice

Email: jerry.mcdevitt@klgates.com

Curtis B. Krasik, pro hac vice

Email: curtis.krasik@klgates.com

Attorneys for Defendant World Wrestling

Entertainment, Inc.

 

deterred by Judge Stewart’s transfer order, as he filed the very next day the Osborne action in 

Texas, not on behalf of Texas residents, but Pennsylvania residents despite a Connecticut forum 

selection clause in Mr. Osborne’s booking contract with WWE. Notably, Mr. McDevitt’s 

comments were in response to press inquiries garnered by Kyros’ inclusion in the Osborne

complaint of pictures of wrestlers who had died, which deaths had nothing to do with any claim 

of Osborne, and the inclusion of which ignored a prior admonition of the federal judge in 

Connecticut in the Singleton case not to include such material. See Casey Decl. ¶ __, Ex. __ 

(June 8, 2015 Hrg. Tr. in Singleton, at p. 62 (“Are you going to reference every wrestler that's 

dead in your complaint? I don't - I don't follow that. You really need to read and get a better grip 

on the pleading standard in the next week and file an amended complaint.”)).

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of July, 2015, I served a copy of the foregoing 

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO OPINION AND ORDER 

GRANTING MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE on the following parties via the Court’s

CM/ECF System:

Steve D. Larson

Joshua L. Ross

Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter P.C.

209 SW Oak Street, Suite 500

Portland, OR 97204

Email: slarson@stollberne.com; jross@stollberne.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff William Albert Haynes III

Pro Hac Vice admitted attorneys for Plaintiffs:

Konstantine Kyros Taylor Asen

Kyros Law Offices, PC Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP

kon@kyroslaw.com tasen@cuneolaw.com

Erica Mirabella Scott Moriarty

Mirabella LLC Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP

erica@mirabellaLLC.com samoriarity@locklaw.com

Brendan Thompson Robert Shelquist

Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP

brendant@cuneolaw.com rkshelquist@locklaw.com

Charles LaDuca

Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, LLP

charles@cuneolaw.com

DATED this 23rd day of July, 2015.

/s/ B. John Casey

B. John Casey

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