COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LYNN TAYLOR, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0961-00-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 JUNE 5, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Gregory W. Franklin, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Lynn Taylor, Jr. (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial 

for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a violation 

of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he complains the trial court 

erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence 

unconstitutionally obtained during a warrantless body cavity 

search. We agree and reverse the conviction. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 
I. 

 In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion, 

we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party below, the Commonwealth in this instance, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 

S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). 

"Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion 

and probable cause to make a warrantless 

search" involve questions of both law and 

fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal. In 

performing such analysis, we are bound by 

the trial court's findings of historical 

fact unless "plainly wrong" or without 

evidence to support them and we give due 

weight to the inferences drawn from those 

facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers. 

McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 

261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 691, 699 (1996)). "On appeal, it is the defendant's burden 

to show 'that the denial of [the] motion to suppress constitute[d] 

reversible error.'" Moss v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 219, 223, 

516 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1999) (citation omitted). 

 Viewed accordingly, the instant record discloses that, on 

January 11, 2000, Richmond Police Detective Kenneth L. Roane was 

conducting an undercover operation intended "to make . . . street 

level" controlled buys of cocaine. A confidential informant "was 

set up with audio-video assistance," instructed to engage in 

purchases of the drug and transmit a description of the seller to 

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a police "technician," assigned to monitor and videotape each 

transaction. In accordance with the established procedure, the 

informant purchased cocaine from a drug dealer, later identified 

as defendant. A description of defendant was relayed to an 

"arrest team," together with information that defendant was 

"dealing [cocaine] from the crotch area," "going in his pants" for 

the drugs. 

 Instructed to "move in," Officers Bates and Naoroz 

apprehended defendant within a few seconds of the alert, and Bates 

"conduct[ed] a safety pat down." Finding nothing, defendant was 

handcuffed and placed in the patrol car for transport to police 

headquarters. En route, defendant "was moving his hands about, 

sitting on his hands" and "complain[ing] about the handcuffs," 

"doing it so much" that Naoroz, "at least three times[,] . . . 

instructed him to stop moving." 

 Upon arrival at headquarters, defendant was taken to "the 

debriefing area" and interrogated by Bates, Naoroz, and Detective 

Kenneth Peterson. Defendant denied possessing contraband but 

continued to "squirm" in his chair. Recalling a prior arrest of 

defendant for distribution of cocaine, Naoroz was aware defendant 

had then secreted cocaine in his "buttocks area." Additionally, 

both Naoroz and Peterson noted that illicit drugs are often 

concealed in the "anal area," a practice that may endanger the 

offender, although neither could cite an incident of health 

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problems resulting from the anal placement of drugs, and defendant 

had exhibited no difficulties. 

 Confronted with such circumstances and unable to locate the 

drugs upon a cursory search of defendant, Bates removed 

defendant's pants, "search[ed] him" and, finding nothing, "pulled 

down his underwear" and visually inspected his buttocks and 

crotch, again without result. Police then directed defendant to 

"bend over" and "Detective Peterson . . . grabbed both of his butt 

cheeks and spread it open. At that time [Bates] used [his] 

flashlight and looked up and . . . finally saw . . . what [he] 

believed to be crack cocaine inside the small baggies." Bates 

then retrieved the offending cocaine from defendant's anus, 

resulting in the instant conviction. 

II. 

 "[A] lawful arrest of a suspect authorizes the police to 

conduct 'a full search of the [arrestee's] person.'" Commonwealth 

v. Gilmore, 27 Va. App. 320, 328-29, 498 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1998). 

However, "a warrantless search involving a bodily intrusion, even 

though conducted incident to a lawful arrest, violates the Fourth 

Amendment unless (1) the police have a 'clear indication' that 

evidence is located within a suspect's body and (2) the police 

face exigent circumstances." Id. at 330, 498 S.E.2d at 469. 

Thus, "[p]robable cause to believe a suspect possesses drugs, 

which justifies a search of an individual, does not justify a 

. . . body cavity search unless the evidence or circumstances 

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specifically provides the officers with a 'clear indication' that 

the contraband is concealed in a body cavity." Hughes v. 

Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 460, 524 S.E.2d 155, 162 (2000) (en

banc). The requisite "clear indication" must coincide with 

"additional exigencies" in justification of an "intrusion[] beyond 

the body's surface."1 Moss, 30 Va. App. at 226, 516 S.E.2d at 249 

(citation omitted). 

 Accordingly, defendant first contends that the officers did 

not have a "clear indication" he "had drugs in his anus." We 

disagree. Police were aware defendant was "dealing" from the 

"crotch area" of his pants and effected the arrest only moments 

after the informant had purchased cocaine from him. In transit to 

police headquarters, defendant was restless, "squirming around" 

and "sitting on his hands," despite repeated requests to stop. 

Based upon experience as police officers, Naoroz and Peterson were 

aware that narcotics are often concealed in the anal cavity. 

Moreover, Naoroz had discovered drugs hidden in defendant's 

"buttocks area" on a prior occasion. Repeated limited searches of 

defendant's person following arrest had revealed no narcotics. 

Such circumstances provided a sufficiently "clear indication" that 

defendant had hidden the cocaine in his buttocks or "anal area." 

 1

 Exigencies expressly recognized in Moss include "the risk 

of destruction of evidence, imminent medical harm to the 

suspect, or secretion of a weapon." Moss, 30 Va. App. at 226, 

516 S.E.2d at 249. 

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 Defendant next maintains that the instant circumstances 

failed to demonstrate the exigency component indispensable to 

support a warrantless body cavity search. In response, the 

Commonwealth relies upon health concerns related to the absorption 

of cocaine into defendant's body through the anal cavity to infuse 

the requisite exigency. 

 Here, like Moss, the record does not reflect either a threat 

to the evidence or defendant's health resulting from any delay 

attendant to issuance of a search warrant. Defendant was in 

custody and easily monitored, and no evidence suggests an 

impediment to a proper warrant. Moreover, adoption of the 

Commonwealth's argument would judicially countenance warrantless 

body cavity searches upon every "clear indication" that drugs were 

concealed within body cavities, a result clearly at odds with 

existing precedent. 

 Thus, despite a clear indication that narcotics would be 

found within defendant's anal cavity, the absence of attendant 

exigent circumstances precluded the warrantless search. 

Accordingly, the trial court erroneously denied defendant's motion 

to suppress the disputed evidence, and we reverse the conviction, 

remanding for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so 

advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.

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