IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 20

- 0141 Filed June 3, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF A.E., Minor Child, A.M., Father, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Kimberly Ayotte , District Associate Judge.

A biological father, whose parental rights were previously terminated, challenges the deni al of his motion to intervene in a child

- in

- need

- of

- assistance action. AFFIRMED.

Jacob van Cleaf of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant father. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Charles K. Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State. Deborah L. Johnson of Deborah L. Johnson Law Office PC, Altoona, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Doyle, P.J. , and Tabor and Greer , JJ.2

TABOR , Judge

. This case involves the denial of a motion to intervene in a child

- welfare

case. In an unusual turn, the unsuccessful interven o r, Arthur, is the eleven

- year old child’s biological father . Arthur voluntarily terminated his parental rights when his daughter , A.E., was an infant. Yet Arthur maintained contact with A.E. through her childhood , including somewhat regular visitation , with the consent of her mother

. In October 2017 , the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) removed A.E. from her mother’s car e. Two years later, Arthur sought to intervene in the child

- in

- need

- of

- assistance (CINA) proceedings under Iowa Code

s ection 232.91(2) (2019) and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.407. In briefing, Arthur alleged he was interested in being considered a “sui table person ” under section 232.117(3)(c)

. 1 The juvenile court denied his motion . The court emphasized Arthur had not

“ consistently been involved in his biological daughter’s life

— including no contact within the last year. ” The court ruled intervention was not in A.E.’s best interest, citing her current placement with relatives , including her sibling, her need for
permanency , and Arthur’s inconsistent contact

. Arthur now appeals, faulting the juvenile court for evaluati ng his intere st as that of a parent, though he did not claim a parental interest. On our review, framing

1 That provision directs the juvenile court, after termination, to transfer guardianship and custody of the child to one of the following: (1) the DHS, (2) a child

- placing agency, or (3) a non

- custodial parent, other relative, or other suitable person. See Iowa Code § 232.117(3)(a)

– (c).3

Arthur’s interest as an “other suitable person” with whom A.E. could be placed , we find no error in the juvenile court ’s denial of the motion to inter vene. 2 Rule 1.407(1) sets out when a person can intervene in an action: a. When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene. [ 3 ] b. When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the acti on and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’ s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’ s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. A proposed i nterven o r has an “interest” if the legal proceeding will affect a legal right. In re A.G. , 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997). “An interest that is indirect, remote or conjectural is generally insufficient to support intervention.” Id. “ [T] he

mere interest or desire to adopt a child will not qu alify as a sufficient interest.”
H.N.B. , 619 N.W.2d at 343. A bit of background is necessary to our analysis. A.E. was born in 2008

. Arthu r voluntarily terminated his parental rights when she was six mon ths old , noting his lack of financial resources. He did not see her again until her third birthday. For a few years, he had regu lar visits with A.E. with the assent of her mother. At the hearing on his motion , he testified he saw A.E. “[t]hree or four” days

2 In most child

- welfare appeals, our review is de novo
— looking at the facts and law anew. In re J.C. , 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). B ut we review the juvenile court’ s denial of a motion to intervene for the correction of legal error. In re H.N.B. , 619 N.W.2d 340, 342

– 43 (Iowa 2000)

. Although our review is on error, we accord discretion to the juvenile court’s determination whether the person seeking to intervene is “interested” in the matter being litigated. Id. We fo cus on the child’s welfare; the ultimate decision “must be compatible with the child’s best interests.” Id. at 344. 3 No unconditional right exists under the circumstances of this case; Arthur does not claim such a right.4

each week anywhere from thirty minutes to “all day plus overnight.” But Arthur largely lost contact when the DHS removed A.E. from her mother’ s care in October
2017. He testified that after the removal he spoke with A.E. on the phone once a week. E ven those weekly calls stopped in July 2019. Despite their waning interaction, Arthur still bases his motion to intervene on his “close, ongoing relationship with A.E.” He urges that he qualifies as an “other suitable person” to be considered a placeme nt for A.E. The juvenile court may transfer custody to a “suitable person” after a dispositional hearing. I owa Code § 232.102(1)(a)

. Our legislature did not define the term “ suitable person .” In re J.C. , 857 N.W.2d 495, 508 (Iowa 2014) . In that vacuum, courts have given the term a “flexible” meaning, leaning on the particular facts of each intervention petition. Id

. “ The sufficiency of the interest asserted by the inter venor under the ‘suitable person’ provision is considered in ligh t of the nature of the proceeding and surrounding facts and circumstances. ” H.N.B. , 619 N.W.2d at 343. “[T] he closeness of the relationship between the child in interest and the intervenor is a critical factor in determining the sufficiency of the intere st of an intervenor. ” Id. at 344. The juvenile court correctly found insufficient support for Arthur’s claim that the strength of his relationship with A.E. secured his interest in intervening. Arthur knew in 2017 that A.E.’s CINA case was open ed . He could have pursued a placement or guardianship at any point. Yet he did not seek to intervene until
2019. The record shows Arthur has not seen A.E. for two years and stopped calling her six months before the hearing. Those gap s in contact undermine his5

claim that their close relationship qualifies him as a suitable person to assume her

care. What does A.E. want? Reports conflict. According to her mother, A.E. does not want to see Arthur or have a relationship with him. But at the hea ring, A.E.’s attorney shared her recent conversation with the child : I asked her, among other things, if there was anything else that she would like the judge to know, and she said that she would like to see her father. And it kind of came out of the blue

. I asked her when the last time she saw her father was, and she said when she was nine years old

. . . .

. . . I asked what she was envisioning, and she said, you know, like regular divorced families, every other weekend and some time during the week. For the record, A.E.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed intervention . The GAL recognized A.E. was “a remarkable child who definitely has strong opinions and has thought them out.” But the GAL argued i t was not in A.E.’s best interests to remove her from h er current placement with her maternal grandparents and half

sister

. B y all reports, A.E. is doing well in that placement. Deferring to the juvenile court’s determination that Arthur lacked a sufficient interest in the CINA case , we find no error in th e denial of his motion to intervene. We reach this conclusion even though A.E. expressed an interest in seeing him again. T o be clear, t his not a case in which the proposed intervenor is a stranger to the child. See In re B.B.M. , 514 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1994) ( noting grandparent s were “strangers” to the child but still allowing intervention under the unique circumstances where child had an unusual genetic disorder )

. But neither is it the kind of relationship with a “suitable person” that courts hav e f ound justifies intervention. See, e.g. , J.C. , 857 N.W.2d at 508 (allowing established but6

nonbiological father to intervene because he had custody of child for three year s while mother was in prison); In re C.L.C. , 479 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa Ct. App.
19 91) ( allowing couple to intervene and seek custody of two children when they babysat those children ten to fifteen hours per week, attended their medical appointments, gave them birthday presen ts, and contributed to them financially , noting the couple was “invo lved in the routine care of these children, and the children have come t o rely upon their love and care ” )

. Unlike those circumstances, Arthur’s belated and generalized desire to be considered a placement

— and A.E.’s in terest in renewing visitation with her biological father after not seeing him for two years

— do not together create a sufficient legal interest . As voiced by her GAL, denial of the petition was in the child’s best interests. The court did not err in denying the mot ion to intervene.
AFFIRMED.