IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

WILLIAM CHAMBERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WASHINGTON COUNTY, PAT GARRETT, 

and JOSH McCARTHY, 

Defendants. 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:14-CV-1876-PK 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff William Chambers filed this action against defendants Washington County, Pat 

Ga11'ett (collectively with Washington County, the "Washington County defendants"), and Josh 

McCmthy in the Circuit Coutt of the State of Oregon for Washington County on October 16, 

2014. By and through his complaint as filed in the Washington County court, Chambers alleged 

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the Washington County defendants' liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his 

constitutional rights to due process and to liberty, under Oregon common law for false 

imprisonment, and under Oregon common law for negligence, and alleged the liability of 

McCarthy, his fmmer attorney, under Oregon common law for professional negligence. On 

November 24, 2014, the Washington County defendants removed Chambers' action to this court. 

On January 30, 2015, Chambers reported his claim against McCarthy settled. This court has 

federal-question jurisdiction over Chambers' Section 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 

and may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Chambers' state-law claims against the 

Washington County defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 1 

Now before the court is the Washington County defendants' Federal Civil Procedure Rule 

12(b)(6) motion (#4) to dismiss Chambers' claims against them. I have considered the motion, 

oral argument on behalf of the parties, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Washington County defendants' motion should be granted. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 

must contain more than a "fo1mulaic recitation of.the elements of a cause of action;" specifically, 

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level, "[t]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 

that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id, quoting 5 C. Wright 

1 Because it appears that Chambers' claim against McCaiihy has been settled, I make no 

finding herein as to whether removal of Chambers' professional negligence claim to this court 

was proper on subject-matter jurisdictional grounds. 

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& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a). Instead, the plaintiff must plead affomative factual content, as opposed to any 

merely conclus01y recitation that the elements of a claim have been satisfied, that "allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). "In sum, for a complaint to 

survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclus01y 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from 

that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." lvloss v. 

United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations contained 

in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial 

notice." Swartz v. KP1VJG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, this court accepts all of the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Moreover, the court "presume[ s] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 

necessaty to supp01i the claim." Nat'! Org.for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994), 

quoting Lujan v. Defenders a/Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). The court need not, however, 

accept legal conclusions "cast in the form of factual allegations." Western lvlining Council v. 

Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 

As a preliminmy matter, the Washington County defendants and Chambers request that 

this court take judicial notice of various matters of public record. Specifically, the Washington 

County defendants request that this comi take judicial notice of adjudicative facts set fotih in 

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(i) a bench warrant issued on June 12, 2001, by the Superior Court of Madison County of the 

State ofindiana for the atTest of William L. Chambers, identified as a white male, for felonious 

nonsupport of a dependent child, (ii) an order issued on October 1, 2012, by the Washington 

County court for the arraignment of William Chambers, setting an appearance for Chambers for 

October 9, 2012 in connection with fugitive proceedings initiated against him, and authorizing 

his incarceration pending the appearance of October 9, 2012, (iii) an order issued on October 9, 

2012, by the Washington County to request a governor's waiTant for Chambers' extradition to 

Indiana in connection with the then-ongoing fugitive proceedings against him and to establish as 

a condition for Chambers' release from custody that he post 10% of a bail amount set at 

$100,000, (iv) a motion and order issued on November 6, 2012, by the Washington County 

Circuit Court for the dismissal of the fugitive proceedings against Chambers, and ( v) a copy of 

the Washington County Circuit Court's docket for the fugitive proceedings against Chambers, 

listing all filings and actions taken in connection with those proceedings, while Chambers 

requests that this court take judicial notice of adjudicative facts set foiih in (i) a motion filed by 

the State ofindiana before the Superior Comi of Madison County of the State ofindiana on 

October 17, 2012, to treat as nolle prosequi the felony nonsupport proceedings against William 

L. Chambers in that court, (ii) an order issued on October 23, 2012, by the Superior Court of 

Madison County of the State ofindiana to treat as nolle prosequi the felony nonsupport 

proceedings against William L. Chambers in that court, and (iii) a motion and order filed before 

the Washington County Circuit Court on November 6, 2012, by the State of Oregon to dismiss 

fugitive proceedings against Chambers in that court. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 20l(d) provides that "[a] comi shall take judicial notice [of an 

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adjudicative fact] if requested by a party and supplied with the necessmy infonnation." An 

adjudicative fact is subject to judicial notice when the fact is "not subject to reasonable dispute in 

that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 

capable of accurate and ready determination by reso1i to sources whose accuracy cannot be 

reasonably questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 20l(b). I agree with each set of parties that the identified 

documents are public records whose authenticity may be accurately and readily determined, and 

that each contains adjudicative facts material to issues raised by Chambers' allegations in support 

of his causes of action against the Washington County defendants. On that basis, I take judicial 

notice of all adjudicative facts contained within each of the five documents identified by the 

Washington County defendants and each of the three documents identified by Chambers. 

As a further preliminmy matter, I note that, by and through his complaint, Chambers 

alleges that on October 15, 2012, the Jail Commander for Madison County, Indiana, sent a 

teletype message to the Washington County Circuit Comi, and that each of Chambers' causes of 

action against the Washington County defendants in these proceedings is premised in part on 

information communicated by and through that teletype message. The teletype is not attached as 

an exhibit to Chambers' complaint, but is offered into evidence by Chambers in connection with 

his opposition to the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the teletype 

forms the basis underlying some or all of Chambers' claims remaining at issue in this action, the 

comi may treat it as incorporated by reference into Chambers' complaint, and on that basis may 

consider its contents without conversion of the pending motion to dismiss into a Federal Civil 

Procedure Rule 56 motion for summmy judgment. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

907-908 (9th Cir. 2003); Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

I. The Parties 

Plaintiff Chambers is an individual resident of the State of Oregon. Defendant 

Washington County is a county of the State of Oregon. Defendant Garrett is, and at all material 

times was, Sheriff of Washington County. Defendant McCarthy is the court-appointed attorney 

who represented Chambers in connection with fugitive proceedings brought against Chambers by 

the State of Oregon before the Washington County Circuit Court on October 1, 2012. 

II. The Parties' Dispute2 

On June 12, 2001, the Superior Court of Madison County of the State of Indiana issued a 

bench warrant for the arrest of William L. Chambers for nonsupport of a dependent child., a 

Class C felony under Indiana law. The parties do not dispute that the "William L. Chambers" 

who was the subject of the June 12, 2001, bench warrant was plaintiff Chambers. 

On September 30, 2012, Chambers was anested in Washington County in connection 

with the June 12, 2001, bench warrant. On October 1, 2012, Chambers was anaigned in 

Washington County and former defendant McCmthy was appointed to serve as his attorney in 

connection with fugitive proceedings against him. The coUlt ordered Chambers' detainment 

pending a fugitive hearing set for October 9, 2012. 

On October 9, 2012, McCarthy appeared as Chambers' representative at the scheduled 

hearing. At that hearing, bail was set for Chambers in the amount of$100,000, and the coUli 

established as a condition for Chambers' release that 10% of that amount be posted on his behalf. 

2 Except as otherwise noted, the following recitation constitutes my construal of the 

allegations of Chambers' complaint and of the matters properly subject to judicial notice in the 

light most favorable to Chambers. 

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Chambers refused to waive extradition, and in consequence the Washington County Circuit 

Court directed that a governor's wa1Tant for Chambers' extradition to Indiana be requested. On 

October 10, 2012, foimal request for such governor's warrant issued. 

On October 15, 2012, in response to the Washington County Circuit Court's request for a 

governor's warrant, the Jail Commander for Madison County, Indiana, sent the Washington 

County District Attorney's office, the Washington County Sheriff's office, and the Washington 

County jail a teletype message as follows: 

While researhing [sic] for a gov. wa1Tant it was dete1mined that 1) the amount of 

money required for this to be a C felony had not been met, 2) the child in [sic] 

which the money was intended (victim) had passed away. 

Therefore the pros[ ecutor's] office [for Madison County, Indiana] has decided that 

they are NOT going after a Gov. Wa1Tant for this charge and will not Extradite. 

Wa1Tant remains active at this time but is under review by the pros[ ecutor's] office 

for a status of the case. 

Also on October 15, 2012, the Madison County Jail Commander relayed the same information 

via telephone to the Washington County Jail Commander. 

On October 16, 2012, Chambers advised his court-appointed attorney, foimer defendant 

McCarthy, that the Madison County prosecutor's office would not seek his extradition to Indiana 

in connection with the June 12, 2001, bench wa1Tant. 

On October 17, 2012, the State oflndiana moved the Superior Court of Madison County 

of the State of Indiana to treat as nolle prosequi the felony nonsupport proceedings against 

Chambers in that comt. 

Chambers alleges that on October 20, 2012, the Washington County District Attorney's 

office requested an increase in the amount of Chambers' bail, and that at a hearing in connection 

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with that request, McCarthy failed to advise the court that Indiana did not intend to seek 

Chambers' extradition. Notwithstanding Chambers' allegations, the Washington County Circuit 

Court docket for the fugitive proceedings against Chambers does not indicate that any request for 

an increase in Chambers' bail was ever made, or that McCaiihy made any appearance on 

Chambers' behalf between the date of the October 15, 2012, teletype message and the date 

Chambers was released from Washington County's custody. For purposes of determining the 

merits of the pending motion to dismiss, I neve1iheless assume the truth of Chambers' 

allegations, and that the omission of the bail increase request and of McCarthy's appearance on 

Chambers' behalf on or around October 20, 2012, from the Washington County Circuit Court 

docket was the result of administrative error. 

On October 23, 2012, the Madison County court issued an order to treat as nolle prosequi 

the felony nonsupport proceedings against Chambers. 

On or around October 24, 2012, Chambers' wife advised McCarthy that the State of 

Indiana would not seek Chambers' extradition on felony nonsupport charges. Also on October 

24, 2012, an unspecified pmiy provided the Washington County defendants with a copy of the 

Madison County comi's October 23, 2012, nolle prosequi order. 

On November 6, 2012, the State of Oregon moved for dismissal of the fugitive 

proceedings against Chambers on the asse1ied ground that "a teletype ha[ d] been received from 

[the State of Indiana] by the Washington County D.A.'s Office asking that their hold be 

withdrawn." That same day, a release hearing was held before the Washington County Circuit 

Comi, at which McCarthy appeared as Chambers' legal representative. At that hearing, the 

charges against Chambers were dismissed. Chambers was released from custody that same day. 

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It is Chambers' express position that the delay between Washington County's receipt of 

the teletype message of October 15, 2012, and his release from custody on November 6, 2012, 

constituted both (i) a deprivation of his Constitutional rights to due process and to liberty and 

(ii) false imprisonment. It is further Chambers' express position that such delay was caused by 

the Washington County defendants' policy and/or custom and practice of "permitting the jail 

commander to hold a person in custody without a lawful order to do so," of "pe1mitting the jail 

commander to hold a person in custody even when the jail commander has information and 

knowledge that a person is being held in the jail without legal authority," or of "pe1mitting the 

jail commander to hold a person in custody even when the jail commander has infmmation and 

knowledge that a person is being held injail when the original state that had a lawful order to 

hold the person withdraws that order." Necessarily if implicitly in the alternative, Chambers 

further takes the express position that such delay was caused by the Washington County 

defendants' negligence. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Chambers' Claims against Garrett 

As noted above, Chambers alleges Garrett's liability in connection with his Section 1983 

claim for violation of his Constitutional due process and liberty rights, with his state-law false 

imprisonment claim, and with his state-law negligence claim. There appears to be no dispute 

that, in connection with all three claims against Ga!Tett, Garrett is alleged to have acted at all 

material times under color of state law in his capacity as Sheriff of Washington County, and that 

he is sued in his official capacity only. 

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A. Chambers' Section 1983 Claim against Garrett 

By and through his complaint, Chambers expressly alleges the liability of both 

Washington County defendants on the basis of those defendants' purported "policy and/or custom 

and practice" of "petmitting the jail commander to hold a person in custody without a lawful 

order to do so," of "permitting the jail commander to hold a person in custody even when the jail 

commander has infotmation and knowledge that a person is being held in the jail without legal 

authority," or of "permitting the jail commander to hold a person in custody even when the jail 

commander has information and knowledge that a person is being held in jail when the original 

state that had a lawful order to hold the person withdraws that order." Although the issue was 

not raised by the Washington County defendants in support of their motion to dismiss, I note that 

other than by vitiue of purportedly maintaining such "policy and/or custom and practice," 

Chambers does not allege GatTett's personal involvement in the complained-of Constitutional 

deprivations. 

Allegations of liability on the sole basis of a "policy and/or custom and practice" can 

suppoti the liability of a municipality under Jvfonell v. Dep't a/Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 

(1978), see, e.g., Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006), but cannot 

support the liability of an individual, see, e.g., Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989), Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001). At oral argument in connection with 

the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss, counsel for Chambers conceded on that 

basis the inadequacy of his pleading to suppoti a Section 1983 claim against Garrett. 

Chambers has not requested leave to amend his complaint to allege Garrett's personal 

involvement in the complained-of deprivations. For reasons addressed by the Washington 

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County defendants in support of their motion, it would in any event be futile to grant such leave. 

"[P]ublic officials who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders are entitled to absolute 

immunity." Engebretson v. },fahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2013), citing 1vfatthews v. 

Densmore, 109 U.S. 216, 218-219 (1883), Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. 613, 616-617 (1872); 

see also id. at 1039-1040 (and cases cited therein); Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1119-1120 (9th 

Cir. 2011); Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Services, 834 F.2d 758, 764-765 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Construing Chambers' allegations and the facts of which this comi is properly 

cognizant in the light most favorable to Chambers, it is clear that (i) Chambers' incarceration 

between October 15, 2012 (the date the Washington County defendants received the teletype 

message by and through which it is Chambers' position that those defendants knew or should 

have known that his continued incarceration was purportedly improper), and November 6, 2012 

(the date Chambers was released from custody) was pursuant to one or more facially valid comi 

orders (the Washington County Circuit Comi orders of October 9, 2012, and/or October 1, 2012), 

that (ii) at no time prior to November 6, 2012, was either the comi order of October 9, 2012, or 

the comi order of October 1, 2012, vacated, that (iii) the earliest date upon which any facially 

valid court order for Chambers' release from custody issued was November 6, 2012, and that 

(iv) Chambers was released from custody promptly following issuance of the court order of 

November 6, 2012. In consequence, Garrett enjoys absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity 

from suit in connection with Chambers' incarceration between October 1, 2012, and November 6, 

2012. See Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1038. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss should 

be granted as to Chambers' Section 1983 claim against Garrett, and that claim should be 

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dismissed without leave to amend to the extent alleged against Ganett. 

B. Chambers' State-Law Claims against Garrett 

Although the issue was not raised by the Washington County defendants in suppott of 

their motion to dismiss, it is a well established matter of Oregon statutoty law that no tort claim 

may be maintained against any state official in connection with that official's performance of his 

or her employment duties. See Or. Rev. Stat. 30.265(1 ), (2); see also Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. 

Univ., 343 Or. 581, 589-590 (2007); Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or. 412, 417 (2002). Under Section 

30.265(1 ), the sole cause of action available to an injured party for the to1ts of a public official is 

an action against the public body that employs that official. See Or. Rev. Stat. 30.265(1 ); Clarke, 

343 Or. at 589. Here, each of the state-law tort claims alleged against Ganett is also alleged 

against Washington County, the public body that employs him. In consequence (as Chambers 

conceded at oral argument), the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss should be 

granted as to Chambers' state-law claims against Garrett, and Chambers' false imprisomnent and 

negligence claims should be dismissed without leave to amend to the extent alleged against 

Gan·ett. 

II. Chambers' Claims against Washington County 

As noted above, Chambers alleges Washington County's liability on a 1Vfonell theo1y in 

connection with his Section 1983 claim for violation of his Constitutional due process and liberty 

rights, and additionally alleges Washington County's liability under state law for false 

imprisomnent claim, and, in the alternative to his Section 1983 claim, for negligence. 

A. Chambers' Section 1983 Claim against Washington County 

Municipal liability under Section 1983, frequently referred to as 1Vfonell liability, is 

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predicated on the deprivation of a plaintiffs rights caused specifically by operation of a 

municipal policy or custom: 

Municipalities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus may be liable for 

causing a constitutional deprivation. lvfonell [v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.], 436 U.S. 

[658,] 690 [(1978)]. A municipality may not be sued under§ 1983 solely because 

an iajury was inflicted by its employees or agents, however. Id. at 694. Instead, it 

is only when execution of a government's policy or custom inflicts the injury 

that the municipality as an entity is responsible. Id A policy is "'a deliberate 

choice to follow a course of action ... made from among various alternatives by 

the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 

subject matter in question.'" Fairley v. Luman, 281F.3d913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(per curiam) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Pembaur v. City a/Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. 

Ed. 2d 452 (1986)). 

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis supplied). "The 

'official policy' requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of 

employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action 

for which the municipality is actually responsible." Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (emphasis original; some internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Pembaur v. City 

of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-480 (1986). It is well established, however, that the policy need 

not have been expressly adopted by the municipality, but rather can take the form of a 

"longstanding practice or custom" so widespread "as to have the force of law." Id, quoting 

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) and citing Board a/County Comm'rs 

o/B1yan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). In addition, the official-policy requirement 

may be satisfied in case of isolated deprivations of rights where the deprivation is caused by a 

person with "final policymaking authority" for the municipality, id., citing City o/St. Louis v. 

Praprotnik, 485 U.S. l 12, 123 (1988) (plurality), where a person with such final policymaking 

authority for the municipality expressly ratifies the conduct of a subordinate which caused the 

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deprivation, id at 1238, citing Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, or where a person with such final 

policymaking authority affirmatively acts with deliberate indifference to deprivations caused by a 

subordinate's conduct, see id. at 1240, citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 

However the official-policy requirement is satisfied, the plaintiff must further establish that the 

policy "was (1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation." 

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Arnold v. International Business 

1Wachines Cmp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 

The Gibson court acknowledged in connection with 1vfonell liability that "it is difficult to 

determine the subjective state of mind ofa government entity," Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188, n. 10, 

citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841, but noted that the requisite state of mind can neve1theless be 

proven by at least two methods: "First, it is certainly possible that a municipality's policies 

explicitly acknowledge that substantial risks of serious hmm exist. Second, numerous cases have 

held that municipalities act through their policymakers, who are, of course, natural persons, 

whose state of mind can be determined." Id., citing Board of County Comm'rs of B1yan County 

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-404 (1994). Neve1iheless, "it is not always necessmy to prove a 

person's subjective awareness, as this inquhy is 'subject to demonstration in the usual ways, 

including inference from circumstantial evidence.'" Id. at 1190, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

842. 

Here, as noted above, Chambers alleges Washington County's 1vfone/l liability on the 

basis of its alleged policy and/or custom and practice of "permitting the jail commander to hold a 

person in custody without a lawful order to do so," of "permitting the jail commander to hold a 

person in custody even when the jail commander has information and knowledge that a person is 

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being held in the jail without legal authority," or of "pe1mitting the jail commander to hold a 

person in custody even when the jail commander has info1mation and knowledge that a person is 

being held in jail when the original state that had a lawful order to hold the person withdraws that 

order." The Washington County defendants move for dismissal of Chambers' Section 1983 claim 

primarily on grounds of the County's purported absolute immunity to suit in connection with the 

conduct complained of here, and secondarily on the grounds that Chambers' allegations of 

improper policy and/or custom and practice are too vague and/or conclusory to support a finding 

of }vfonell liability. 

The Washington County defendants' primaiy argument is not well taken. It is well 

established that "municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit -- either absolute or qualified --

under§ 1983," under any circumstances. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence 

& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993). The Washington County defendants are 

therefore not entitled to dismissal of Chambers' Section 1983 claim against Washington County 

on immunity grounds. 

By contrast, the Washington County defendants' secondary argument in favor of dismissal 

of Chambers' Section 1983 claim, although cursorily articulated, has discemable merit. As to 

Chambers' first- and second-proffered bases for Washington County's municipal liability - its 

alleged policy and/or custom and practice of "pe1mitting the jail commander to hold a person in 

custody without a lawful order to do so" or of "pe1mitting the jail commander to hold a person in 

custody even when the jail commander has information and knowledge that a person is being 

held in the jail without legal authority" - it is clear that neither can have been either the "cause in 

fact" or the "proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation" Chambers complains of, Trevino, 

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99 F.3d at 918, in that the allegations construed in the light most favorable to Chambers and the 

adjudicative facts of which this court is properly cognizant clearly establish that Chambers was at 

all material times incarcerated pursuant to a lawful and facially valid court order expressly 

confelTing legal authority to do so upon the County. As Chambers expressly conceded at oral 

argument in connection with the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss, Chambers' 

theory of Washington County's municipal liability under Section 1983 therefore necessarily fails 

without possibility of cure by amendment to the extent premised on either of the first two 

proffered bases. 

The analysis differs as to Chambers' third-proffered basis for Washington County's 

municipal liability, namely the County's alleged policy and/or custom and practice of "permitting 

the jail commander to hold a person in custody even when the jail commander has info1mation 

and knowledge that a person is being held in jail when the original state that had a lawful order to 

hold the person withdraws that order." Again, the proffered basis as cu1Tently alleged falls afoul 

of adjudicative facts of which this comt is properly cognizant, in that Chambers' incarceration by 

Washington County was not pursuant to the Madison County bench wm1'ant of June 12, 2001, 

which was vacated by the Madison County comt effective October 23, 2012, but rather pursuant 

to the Washington County Circuit Comt's orders of October 1and9, 2012, which were never 

vacated and were not superceded prior to the date of Chambers' release from custody; for that 

reason, Chambers' Section 1983 claim against Washington County is subject to dismissal to the 

extent premised on Chambers' third-proffered basis for the County's }vfonell liability. However, 

at oral argument Chambers clarified that his intention in articulating the third-proffered basis was 

to allege that Washington County maintains a policy, custom, or practice of affomatively 

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prohibiting its jail commander and/or other officials from disseminating information within such 

officials' possession and control to incarcerated persons, their counsel, and/or judicial bodies, 

where such infonnation bears upon the possibility that an order pursuant to which an incarcerated 

person is being held in custody may be subject to vacatur. Presumably, if given the opp01iunity 

to amend his pleading, Chambers would modify his allegations in accordance with his expressed 

intent. If alleged, that policy or practice (by contrast with the first two alleged policies or 

practices) would not fall innnediately afoul of any adjudicative fact of which this court is 

properly cognizant. 

I nevertheless find that to grant Chambers leave to amend his pleading to clarify the 

alleged basis of Washington County's ivfonell liability would be futile, on at least two grounds. 

First, such a policy can have been neither the "cause in fact" nor the "proximate cause of the 

constitutional deprivation" Chambers complains of, Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918, in that Chambers 

alleges that on October 16, 2012, he personally advised McCarthy, his court-appointed defense 

counsel, of the Madison County jail connnander's teletype message of October 15, 2012, and its 

contents, and that on October 24, 2012, his wife personally advised McCatihy of the Madison 

County comi's no/le prosequi order of October 23, 2012. McCaiihy, unlike Washington County 

or any of its officials, owed Chambers a clear and well-established duty to act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing Chambers' interests as his appointed advocate. See, 

e.g., Or. R. P. C. 1.3. Because McCarthy actually and reasonably promptly received the 

information that Washington County was arguendo obliged to disseminate to him, and because 

he was subject to a duty to make reasonably diligent effo1is to use that information to effect 

Chambers' release from custody, Washington County's failme to provide the infonnation directly 

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to McCaiihy or to the coutt cannot have been the cause of any delay in Chambers' release. 

Second, no decision of any couti of any jurisdiction of which I am aware has ever 

imposed a duty to disseminate potentially exculpatmy infotmation on a municipality or prison 

official, Chambers has identified no such decisions, and Ninth Circuit jurisprudence strongly 

suggests that no such duty could exist as a matter of law. In Stein v. Ryan, supra, the Ninth 

Circuit considered the case of a plaintiff who had been incarcerated for "just over three years in 

prison pursuant to an erroneous sentence" following issuance of a decision by the Arizona 

Supreme Court (State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, 195 P.3d 641 (2008)) which established the 

affitmative illegality of the plaintiffs sentencing order. Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th 

Cir. 2011). In connection with a Section 1983 claim premised on the violation of the plaintiffs 

Eighth Amendment rights, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as follows: 

[Stein's] allegation that prison officials should have discovered that his sentence 

was illegal does not establish that they acted with deliberate indifference to his 

libe1ty interest. Prison officials have the duty to execute the sentencing orders 

delivered by the courts. They may have a duty to calculate accurately the 

prisoner's release date according to the terms of a sentencing order, but no 

reasonable prison official would understand that executing a court order 

without investigating its potential illegality would violate the prisoner's right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 

* * * 

Peek made clear that Stein was entitled to have his sentence vacated as a matter of 

Arizona law. However, prison officials have a duty to enforce a sentencing 

order until the order is vacated or the prisoner otherwise becomes eligible for 

release. To say that defendants should have released Stein as soon as the 

Arizona Supreme Court decided Peek (or at any time prior to the court's 

order vacating sentence) would be to impose on them the judicial 

responsibility of reviewing the legality of a sentencing order. In other words, 

Peek may have given Stein the right to have his sentence vacated, but it was the 

vacatur of his sentence by the couti hearing his case that gave him the right to be 

released. Even if Peek made it clear that Stein's sentence was erroneous, 

defendants did not violate his constitutional rights by holding him in prison while 

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the sentencing order remained in force. 

Stein, 662 F.3d at 1119-1120 (emphasis supplied).3 Although the Stein court did not expressly 

hold that incarcerating officials were not subject to any duty to disseminate information regarding 

the potential that an order of incarceration could be subject to vacatur, its reasoning strongly 

suggests that no such duty exists. In the absence of any court decision to the contrary I decline to 

recommend that the court make new law by finding that a valid Section 1983 claim could be 

premised on any such duty. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss should 

be granted as to Chambers' Section 1983 claim against Washington County, and that claim 

should be dismissed without leave to amend to the extent alleged against the County. 

B. Chambers' State-Law Claims against Washington County 

The Washington County defendants argue that Washington County is entitled to 

immunity from suit in connection with each of Chambers' state-law claims against it. I agree. 

The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized the same principles of judicial (or quasi-judicial) 

immunity recognized in Engebretson and discussed above: 

The common law has long recognized that some public officials should be 

immune from civil actions for some of the actions taken in the execution of their 

public employment. Judicial immunity has long been a part of the immunities 

afforded public officials, being mentioned in the Book of Assizes, 27 Edw III, pl 

18 (1354). The doctrine of immunity for acts performed by a judge acting within 

the court's jurisdiction has been recognized in this country since at least Randall v. 

3 Stein further establishes that a person subject to incarceration receives all due process 

required under the Constitution when the person has an opportunity to be heard and to present a 

defense prior to incarceration, and that incarcerating officials' subsequent actual or constructive 

knowledge that the original basis for the person's incarceration had become invalid following 

such oppottunity does not trigger any new or fmther right to additional process. See Stein, 662 

F.3d at 1119. 

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Case 3:14-cv-01876-PK Document 23 Filed 02/09/15 Page 19 of 22
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 523, 19 L Ed 285 (1868). 

This court recognized the existence and the limitations on the doctrine of judicial 

immunity in Shaw v. },foon, 117 Or 558, 245 P 318 (1926). The common law 

recognized that there is a public good to be gained from the principled and 

fearless decision-making of judicial officers freed from concern over suits by 

disappointed litigants. To gain this good, it is necessary to cloak judicial officers 

with immunity from civil liability for their acts, so long as these acts are within 

the jurisdiction of the officer. 

* * * 

Immunity for judicial acts extends not merely to judges. Other officials who 

are performing acts associated with the judicial process may be. protected as well. 

Watts v. Gerking, 111Or641, 222 P 318, 228 P 135 (1924). This comihas 

indicated that the common-law immunity for judicial and quasi-judicial acts is 

part of those immunities preserved for discretionary acts under the OTCA, ORS 

30.265(3). 

Judicial immunity depends on the performance of a judicial function. When such 

judicial functions are performed by a public officer other than a judge, the 

immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction 

of name and not a distinction of immunity. Watts v. Gerking, supra; see also 

Imbler v. Pach/man, 424 U.S. 409, 423, 96 S Ct 984, 47 L Ed 2d 128 (1976). 

Judicial immunity is granted or withheld on the basis of the nature of the 

function being performed, and not on the basis of the office. Shaw v. 1\1oon, 

supra; see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S., 108 S Ct 538, 98 L Ed 2d 555 

(January 12, 1988). 

Several factors are commonly examined to determine if a particular duty can 

be considered judicial or quasi-judicial for the purpose of extending 

immunity to the official performing the action. These factors include 

whether the official's actions are functionally comparable to judicial actions 

or involve decisions normally performed by judges iu their judicial capacity, 

whether the action depends on legal opinions or discretionary judgments 

comparing the facts of a present situation with general legal questions, and 

whether the acts in question are primarily concerned with the official's role 

as a judicial or quasi-judicial officer. See Ashbrook v. Hoffinan, 617 F2d 474 

(7th Cir 1980); Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F 2d 64 (7th Cir 1978), cert den 441 U.S. 

931 (1979); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F Supp 1072 (ED Pa 1980). 

Praggastis v. Clackamas County, 305 Or. 419, 426-427 (1988) (footnote omitted; emphasis 

supplied); see also Fay v. Portland, 311 Or. 68, 73 (1991) ("For a public official or employee to 

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have absolute immunity for acts performed under a court order or directive, two criteria must be 

established. First, the court order or directive must be a permissible exercise of judicial 

authority. Second, the acts must comply with the court order or directive." (footnote omitted)). 

It is clear as a matter of law that the Washington County Circuit Comt's orders of October 

1 and 9, 2012, constituted permissible exercises of judicial authority. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. 

135.010 et seq., 135.070 et seq., 135.175 et seq., 135.230 et seq. Moreover, as discussed above, 

it is established that Chambers' incarceration between October 15, 2012 (the date the Washington 

County defendants received the teletype message by and through which it is Chambers' position 

that the County knew or should have known that his continued incarceration was purp01tedly 

improper), and November 6, 2012 (the date Chambers was released from custody) was in 

compliance with and pursuant to those orders. In consequence, Washington County is entitled to 

absolute immunity from suit in connection with Chambers' false imprisonment and negligence 

claims as a matter of Oregon law. See Praggastis, 305 Or. at 426-427; Fay, 311 Or. at 73.4 The 

Washington County defendants' motion to dismiss should therefore be granted as to Chambers' 

state-law claims against Washington County, and the false imprisonment and negligence claims 

should be dismissed without leave to amend to the extent alleged against the County. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Washington County defendants' motion (#4) to 

4 By contrast with the absence of municipal immunity under Section 1983, discussed 

supra, no Oregon case holds that municipalities do not enjoy immunity from tort in the same 

manner as state officials. This follows from the fact that municipal liability under Section 1983 

is not a form of vicarious liability for the acts of the municipality's officials, but rather is 

premised on a municipal policy of practice of causing deprivations of constitutional rights 

independent of the actions of municipal officials, whereas the liability of public bodies in tmt 

under Oregon law is expressly premised on the tortious conduct of the officials themselves. 

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Case 3:14-cv-01876-PK Document 23 Filed 02/09/15 Page 21 of 22
dismiss should be granted, and Chambers' Section 1983, false imprisonment, and negligence 

claims against the Washington County defendants should be dismissed with prejudice. 

SCHEDULING ORDER 

The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, 

are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. Ifno objections 

are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due fomieen (14) days after being served with a 

copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings 

and Recommendation will go under advisement. 

Dated this 9th day of February, 2015.\ / ) 

.:----' l 

) 

·"ij; ~ 7 

I~ 

Honorable Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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