[Cite as Williams v. State, 2015-Ohio-3771.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102664

J.L. WILLIAMS, JR.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

vs. 

STATE OF OHIO

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-13-819134 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 17, 2015 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Paul A. Mancino 

Mancino & Mancino 

75 Public Square Building 

Suite 1016 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Brian R. Gutkoski 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} J.L. Williams filed a complaint seeking to be declared a wrongfully 

imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 2743.48. The state filed a motion for judgment 

on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) arguing that, as a matter of law, Williams could 

not be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual as statutorily defined. The trial court 

granted the motion. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

{¶2} In 2011, a jury acquitted Williams from three counts of trafficking drugs and 

two counts of drug possession. In that same case, after waiving the jury trial on the 

having weapons while under disability count, Williams was found guilty and sentenced to 

one year in prison by the trial court. Williams successfully appealed. In State v. 

Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97235, 2012-Ohio-3355, a panel from this court 

concluded that Williams’s conviction for having weapons while under disability was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Williams’s conviction was vacated and 

served as the basis of the R.C. 2743.48 claim. 

{¶3} Williams, in the current appeal, advanced three assignments of error, all of 

which depend on whether the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings in 

favor of the state.1

 We review a ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings de 

 1

Williams devotes considerable ink to a claim that the trial court converted the motion for 

judgment on the pleadings into one for summary judgment and considered facts outside the pleadings. 

 The trial court’s final judgment was based on Civ.R. 12(C). Based on the procedural posture, we 

find no merit to Williams’s attempt to interpret the trial court’s final judgment as anything but a 

judgment on the pleadings. Further, we need not address the issue of whether the state can refile the 
novo. Thornton v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-1709, 890 N.E.2d 353, 

¶ 3 (8th Dist.). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C), 

which states as follows: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to 

delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “In order to be 

entitled to a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(C), it must appear beyond doubt that [the 

nonmovant] can prove no set of facts warranting the requested relief, after construing all 

material factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in 

[the nonmovant’s] favor.” State ex rel. Toledo v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 95 Ohio 

St.3d 73, 74, 2002-Ohio-1383, 765 N.E.2d 854. As a matter of law, Williams cannot be 

declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual based on the claims as pleaded. 

{¶4} The trial court granted the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

relying on Holloway v. State, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100586, 2014-Ohio-2971. In that 

case, a panel from this court concluded that pursuant to R.C. 2743.48, an individual 

seeking to be declared wrongfully imprisoned must meet all five enumerated 

requirements of R.C. 2743.48(A), which provides in pertinent part: 

(A) As used in this section and section 2743.49 of the Revised Code, a 

“wrongfully imprisoned individual” means an individual who satisfies each 

of the following: 

* * * 

(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an 

error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined 

 

having weapons while under disability charge. Our decision is not predicated on whether the state 

can charge Williams again, and therefore, we need not reach any conclusions on that issue.
by a court of common pleas that the offense of which the individual was 

found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not 

committed by the individual or was not committed by any person. 

Subsection (A)(5) has two alternative options.2

 The plaintiff can allege actual innocence 

or that an error in procedure that occurred after sentencing and during or after 

imprisonment resulted in the plaintiff’s release. 

{¶5} In Holloway, for instance, the plaintiff’s alleged error in procedure, 

pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), was that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay during 

his trial, as demonstrated by the fact that on the direct appeal the conviction was vacated. 

Id. at ¶ 18. The Holloway panel concluded that because the complaint was limited to the 

allegation that an error occurred at trial and there was no allegation of actual innocence, 

the plaintiff could not be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 

2743.48(A)(5) as a matter of law. Id.; Mansaray v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 277, 

2014-Ohio-750, 6 N.E.3d 35, ¶ 7 (in the absence of allegations of actual innocence, the 

plaintiff must allege error that resulted in the individual’s release that occurred 

subsequent to sentencing or imprisonment under the plain and ordinary reading of the 

statute). 

 2

 We recognize that the Ohio Supreme Court released two decisions recently interpreting R.C. 

2743.48. Neither decision is applicable to the current case. In State v. Bundy, Slip Opinion No. 

2015-Ohio-2138, the court concluded that an offender cannot prove actual innocence by showing his 

conviction was reversed as being unconstitutional. In this case, Williams has not pleaded actual 

innocence. In C.K. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3421, the court interpreted R.C. 

2743.48(A)(4), a factor not at issue in the current case.
{¶6} The same result must follow in this case. In his complaint, Williams alleged 

that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual because a panel of this court vacated his 

conviction based on errors made at trial and before sentencing. There are no allegations 

of actual innocence.3

 As in Holloway and Mansaray, and after construing all material 

factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences in his favor, we must 

conclude that Williams can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief pursuant to R.C. 

2743.48(A). The alleged error in procedure that resulted in his release from prison 

occurred before sentencing. In the absence of allegations of actual innocence, Williams 

cannot be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual. Upon our review of the 

allegations in the complaint, Williams cannot satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) as pleaded, and 

judgment as a matter of law in favor of the state was appropriate. We affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court 

finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 3

The fact that an appellate court vacated a conviction is not actual innocence. Doss v. State, 

135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 22. “[A] trial court adjudicating proof 

of innocence pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully 

imprisoned based solely on an appellate court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to 

insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial.” Id. In light of 

the fact that Williams failed to allege actual innocence in the complaint and solely based his 

allegations on an appellate reversal of his conviction, the trial court could not have considered any 

argument regarding actual innocence. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR