J-A26025-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.M.G., MOTHER

No. 848 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Juvenile Division at No.: 33 Adopt 2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.M.G., MOTHER

No. 849 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No.: 31 Adopt 2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.M.G., MOTHER

No. 850 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2015
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in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County

Orphans' Court at No.: 32 Adopt 2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2015

In these consolidated appeals1, J.M.G. (Mother) appeals from the 

orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, entered April 20, 

2015, that terminated her parental rights to her children A.D., C.D., and 

K.D. (Children), and changed their permanency goals to adoption. We 

affirm.2

We consider these appeals on remand from our memorandum entered 

May 21, 2014, in which this Court reversed the trial court’s order that 

dismissed the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights filed by Franklin 

County Children and Youth Service (CYS), and in which this Court reversed 

the trial court’s order denying CYS’ petition to change the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption. We remanded with instructions to determine 

the best interests of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), which 

the trial court had not yet considered when it dismissed CYS’ petition.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 This Court consolidated these appeals, sua sponte, on May 21, 2015.

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, D.R.D., 

II, on September 19, 2013; he did not appeal that termination.
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This Court set forth the facts of this case, as related in our 

memorandum entered May 21, 2014, as follows:

We consolidated these nine appeals sua sponte and listed 

them before the same panel for disposition.1 In the appeals 

assigned docket Nos. 1602, 1603, and 1604 MDA 2013, the 

guardian ad litem appointed to represent [K.D.], A.D., and C.D. 

appeals from the orphans’ court order entered on August 2, 

2013. In that order, the orphans’ court dismissed the petition 

filed by [CYS] to involuntarily terminate [Mother’s] parental 

rights to the three [C]hildren. At Nos. 1878, 1879 and 1880 

MDA 2013, the guardian ad litem appeals the September 19, 

2013 juvenile court order denying CYS’s petition to change the 

[C]hildren’s permanency goal in the dependency proceedings 

from reunification to adoption.2 For its part, CYS challenges the 

juvenile court’s September 19, 2013 order in the appeals 

assigned docket Nos. 1874, 1875, and 1876 MDA 2013. As the 

nine appeals arise from identical facts and the trial court 

addressed the overlapping claims of error in concurrent opinions 

relating to the termination of parental rights and the goal change 

respectively, we consolidate the appeals for disposition, and 

after careful review, we reverse both orders and remand for 

further proceedings.3

CYS became involved with this family on December 12, 

2011, when it received a referral from a child service agency in 

Texas alerting it that Mother and D.R.D., II (“Father”) had 

relocated with [the Children] from Texas to Franklin County, 

Pennsylvania, in violation of an active child safety plan. The 

following day, CYS placed the [C]hildren in its legal and physical 

custody. Among other things, the Texas child safety plan 

prohibited Father from being in contact with the [C]hildren due 

to allegations that he sexually abused A.D. during August 2011 

and due to a finding by the Texas agency of “reasons to believe,” 

the evidentiary equivalent of the preponderance of the evidence, 

that the abuse occurred.

A brief history of Mother’s and Father’s extensive 

interactions with the Texas agency is warranted. During 1999, 

the Texas agency found “reasons to believe” Father physically 

abused his twin infant children from a prior relationship. Father 

was involved with the Texas agency again during 2001 based 

upon a “reason to believe” that he committed neglectful 
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supervision of two other children, the two-month-old daughter 

he had with his second wife and his second wife’s four-year-old 

son. No criminal convictions flowed from any of the previous 

incidents. Mother was aware of Father’s interactions with the 

Texas agency for those prior incidents. Additionally, while 

Mother and Father were dating during 2003, the Texas agency 

found “reasons to believe” that Father sexually abused Mother’s 

daughter from her former marriage. Rather than terminate her 

relationship with Father after that revelation, Mother 

relinquished custody of her eldest daughter to her ex-husband, 

the child’s birth father. All of the events occurred several years 

before Mother discovered Father was sexually abusing A.D. 

during August of 2011.

On January 19, 2012, the juvenile court adjudicated 

[K.D.], A.D., and C.D. dependent as the term is defined in 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6302(1). The initial permanency goal was 

reunification. Both parents were determined to be perpetrators 

of abuse. Mother was designated perpetrator by omission, and 

the trial court found aggravated circumstances that would have 

otherwise relieved the agency from providing reunification 

services. Nevertheless, the juvenile court directed the agency to 

establish reunification services for Mother. The court relieved 

CYS from an obligation to provide Father reunification services.

The three [Children] currently reside together in a preadoptive foster home. At the time of the termination 

proceedings, the respective ages of [K.D.], A.D., and C.D. were 

eight, seven, and two years old.

Pursuant to the juvenile court’s directive, CYS ordered 

services for Mother to participate in a parental fitness 

assessment, submit to psychiatric and psychological evaluations, 

attend parenting classes, maintain financial stability, appropriate 

housing, and consistent visitation with the [C]hildren. Mother 

never submitted to a psychiatric evaluation, but she participated 

in two parental fitness assessments that included several 

psychological components. Following those assessments, Mother 

was directed to participate in extensive counseling and CYS 

presented to her a list of acceptable providers. Mother complied 

with the counseling requirement for seven months between June 

of 2012 and January of 2013. However, Mother did not utilize 

any of the counselors whom CYS identified, and the counselors 

whom she selected independently proved to be ineffective at 

identifying and addressing her psychological needs. Mother 
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stopped attending counseling between January and June 2013. 

Despite working at a telephone call center in Maryland, Mother 

has not obtained independent housing. Instead, she continues 

to reside rent-free with her parents in Pennsylvania.

In relation to visitation with the [C]hildren, Mother has 

consistently attended her weekly supervised visitation. She was 

initially granted one hour of visitation per week, but the duration 

of the visits increased to three hours over the course of CYS’s 

involvement. Visitation is still supervised, however, because of 

CYS’s concerns that Mother is whispering inappropriate things to 

the [C]hildren during the visitations.

On June 18, 2013, CYS filed a petition to terminate 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and to change the 

permanency goal for [the Children] from reunification to 

adoption. As it relates to Mother, CYS’s petition for termination 

of parental rights averred that the [C]hildren were removed from 

Mother’s care on December 13, 2011, due to her failure to 

protect them from abuse following her knowing and voluntary 

violation of the Texas safety plan. Specifically, CYS alleged that 

while Mother acknowledged that she violated the safety plan by 

moving with Father and the [C]hildren to Pennsylvania, she did 

not understand how her decision placed the [C]hildren at risk. 

During the ensuing hearings, CYS presented testimony 

from the CYS caseworker assigned to the family, two 

psychologists: Amy Taylor, Ph.D., who conducted an assessment 

of Mother’s parental fitness, and Kasey Shienvold, Ph.D., who 

performed a bonding assessment among Mother, [the Children], 

the children’s therapist, and the foster parents. The guardian ad 

litem presented Mother’s testimony relative to the goal change 

proceedings. As we discuss below, neither Mother nor Father 

presented any evidence during the hearings.

With regard to the first issue we address in this appeal, the 

foster parents testified during the hearings that while [K.D.] and 

A.D. have been in their home, they have both disclosed 

additional incidents of sexual abuse perpetrated against them by 

Father while the family lived in Texas. The foster parents also 

testified that the two children indicated that they informed 

Mother about the additional incidents, but she failed to stop the 

abuse. [K.D.] and A.D. testified in camera.

4 Both children 

indicated that additional abuse occurred in Texas and confirmed 

that they informed Mother of those episodes.
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At the close of CYS’s case-in-chief on July 29, 2013, the 

trial court convened a hearing in chambers to (1) determine the 

propriety of terminating only one parent’s parental rights and (2) 

discuss the sua sponte dismissal, in the nature of a compulsory 

nonsuit,5of CYS’s petition against Mother. During the 

conference, the trial court concluded that the evidence CYS 

adduced during its case-in-chief to support terminating Mother’s 

parental rights was insufficient to proceed. Therefore, the court 

announced its intention to dismiss that petition, and accordingly, 

it immediately entered an order that formally dismissed CYS’ 

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. In reference to 

Mother’s putative testimony concerning the yet unresolved 

permanency and goal change issues, the trial court advised 

Mother’s counsel, “the worst thing [he] could do is put [Mother] 

on the stand and say that this [additional abuse] did not 

happen.”6 

Thereafter, the court adjourned until August 2, 2013, when 

it reconvened the hearing regarding the termination of Father’s 

parental rights and the goal change proceedings as to both 

parents. In the interim, Father, CYS, and the guardian ad litem 

filed petitions requesting that the trial court recuse from the 

ensuing termination and permanency proceedings. The trial 

court denied Father’s and CYS’s motions by orders entered on 

August 1, 2013, and it denied the guardian ad litem’s motion in 

open court on the following day. 

During the ensuing hearing on August 2, 2013, the 

guardian ad litem called Mother as a witness. After receiving 

additional evidence regarding the [C]hildren’s permanency goals, 

the trial court entered an order on September 19, 2013, that 

denied CYS’s petition to change the [C]hildren’s permanency 

goal from reunification to adoption. Instead, the court directed 

CYS to provide Mother additional services to prepare her for 

reunification with the [C]hildren. These timely filed appeals 

followed.7

__________________________

1 There were initially twelve related appeals. In a separate 

opinion, we affirmed the orphans’ court order terminating the 

parental rights of the [C]hildren’s father, D.R.D., II. Those 

appeals were assigned Nos. 1842-1844 MDA 2013.
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2

Pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101, et seq. 

involuntary termination of parental rights is conducted under the 

jurisdiction of the orphans’ court. Conversely, permanency 

planning for dependent children is conducted in the juvenile or 

family division under the aegis of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

6301, et seq. In these cases, the same trial judge presided over 

both matters.

3 Where appropriate, we refer to CYS and the guardian ad litem 

collectively as Appellants.

4 When the [C]hildren testified in the courtroom, Mother was 

excluded.

5 Although the trial court styled its decision akin to a directed 

verdict, since these proceedings were not before a jury, we find 

that the court’s decision is more aligned with a compulsory 

nonsuit. See Pa.R.C.P. 230.1.

6 The in-chambers conference was not recorded. However, the 

trial court took judicial notice of its statement during a 

subsequent record proceeding. 

7 The guardian ad litem filed its notice of appeal from the 

orphans’ court order on September 3, 2013, the first business 

day following the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period on 

Sunday, September 1, 2013, and the observance of Labor Day 

on September 2, 2013. The guardian ad litem appealed the 

September 19, 2013 juvenile court order within the thirty-day 

appeal period. As noted, CYS did not appeal the orphans’ court 

order. It filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court order on 

October 21, 2013, the first business day following the expiration 

of the thirty-day appeal period on Saturday, October 19, 2013. 

Hence, these appeals are timely.

(In the Interest of K.D., A.D., and C.D., 1602 MDA 2013, 5/21/14, 

unpublished memorandum at *4-11 (footnotes in original; record citations 

omitted)).

In reversing the trial court’s decision to dismiss CYS’ petition to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights this Court concluded, after a review of the 

record, that “CYS established its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
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evidence the statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).” (Id. at *32-33). Left open, however, was the 

question of the bond between Mother and the Children because the trial 

court never reached the issue. In addressing this question, this Court 

observed: 

The extent of the orphans’ court’s bond-effect analysis 

depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. In re 

K.Z.S., supra at 763. Instantly, the orphans’ court did not 

engage in the § 2511(b) analysis because it had concluded that 

CYS failed to establish the statutory grounds for terminating 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a). While we are 

tempted, at least initially, to perform the required analysis in this 

children’s fast track case based upon the ample evidence in the 

certified record, we are constrained to remand the matter to the 

orphans’ court to perform the need-and-welfare analysis in the 

first instance.

We observe that since the record contains abundant 

evidence regarding the existence and nature of the parent-child 

bonds and the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare of the [C]hildren, additional hearings will not be 

required unless the orphans’ court desires to update the 

[C]hildren’s status on this record. Specifically, in its current 

form, the certified record includes Dr. Shienvold’s testimony 

regarding his bonding assessment and his conclusion with a 

reasonable degree of psychological certainty that, while the 

[C]hildren maintain an attachment with Mother, in light of the 

strong bond that they have with the foster parents, the parentchild relationships can be severed in these cases without 

significant risk of long-term consequences. Essentially, Dr. 

Shienvold concluded that the [C]hildren’s strong healthy bonds 

with the foster family would mitigate the risks associated with 

terminating their attachment to Mother. 

The certified record also includes testimony from the 

[C]hildren’s therapist and foster parents that establishes that the 

[C]hildren are currently thriving in their pre-adoptive home. On 

remand, the trial court is directed to perform its needs and 

welfare analysis in light of the forgoing evidence and mindful of 

the [C]hildren’s safety needs. Likewise, it must consider the 
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evidence establishing the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the [C]hildren enjoy with their foster family, the importance to 

the [C]hildren of continuing those beneficial relationships, and 

the fact that those relationships will mitigate the risks 

concomitant with severing their attachment to Mother.

(Id. at *35-36) (record citations omitted). 

The trial court did take additional testimony in this matter in hearings 

held on January 28 and 30, February 19, and March 12 of 2015. Testifying 

at those hearings were CYS caseworker, Keri Coccagna; program director of 

Alternative Behavioral Consultants, Emily Bakner; psychologist, David 

Leaman, Ph.D.; licensed counselor, Kevin Haney; the Children’s therapist, 

Donna Roland; the Children’s grandfather, J.B.; Cumberland County CYS 

caseworker, Donna Kissinger; licensed professional counselor, Deann 

Blankenship-Sanders; Mother’s husband, D.G., Jr.; psychologist, Timothy 

Gibian; Foster mother, D.R.; and program coordinator for Children’s Aid 

Society, Stacy Gutshall. Mother testified on her own behalf. We note that it 

appears that all of these individuals, except the Children’s foster mother, 

D.R., and Stacy Gutshall, were called to testify in Mother’s case in chief. 

The trial court entered its orders terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to sections 2511(a)(8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8) and (b), and changing the Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption, pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, 

on April 20, 2015. Mother filed her timely notice of appeal and concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on May 14, 2015. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
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Mother raises the following questions on appeal:

1. Whether [Mother] was denied substantive and procedural due 

process rights when the case was remanded by the Superior 

Court after the trial court sua sponte dismissed [CYS’] petition 

for termination of parental rights (TPR) and Mother was not 

afforded the opportunity to provide evidence in support of her 

position against termination of parental rights?

2. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion 

and error of law when it constrained its review of the evidence 

for termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§2511(a)(8) and §2511(b) to only the evidence that existed 

prior to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights 

on June 18, 2013, despite the existence of compelling evidence 

that Mother had made extraordinary and measurable progress 

after the filing of the petition through court-ordered reunification 

counselors and her therapist?

3. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion 

and error of law when it failed to properly give weight to the 

bonding efforts through a court-ordered reunification counselor 

and Mother’s therapist that determined a strong bond existed 

and Mother’s ability to parent her children was present?

(Mother’s Brief, at 5) (quotation marks, emphases, and unnecessary 

capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). 

Further, we have stated:
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Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

We note our standard of review of a change of goal:

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard 

is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not 

apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. . . . 

In re S.G., 922 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Here, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), and (b). (See Trial Court Opinion, 4/20/15, at 41). 

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are governed 

by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

Instantly, as noted above, the trial court concluded that termination 

was appropriate under § 2511(a)(8). 

With regard to Section 2511(a)(8), in order to terminate 

parental rights, an agency must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that (1) that the child has been removed from the care 

of the parent for at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the 

conditions which had led to the removal or placement of the 

child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. . . . 
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In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

Additionally, 

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). 
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The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make 

specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but 

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

In support of her first claim, that her due process rights were violated, 

Mother states:

Mother’s procedural due process rights were violated 

because the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt failed to consider those postpetition efforts that occurred from August 2013 through May 21, 

2014. For the reasons that are developed herein below, [t]his 

Honorable Court should not construe Sections 2511(a)(8) and 

2511(b) conjunctively to allow termination of Mother’s parental 

rights when post-petition efforts were court ordered and fulfilled. 

Rather, the compelling testimony of the witnesses, Dr. Timothy 

Gibian and Ms. Deann Blankenship Sanders, presented by 

[Mother] should have been considered by the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt.

(Mother’s Brief, at 30).

The trial court addressed this issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, 

filed May 26, 2015, in which it stated correctly:

Mother argues that she was denied her right to substantive 

and procedural due process on remand as she was not afforded 

the opportunity to provide evidence in support of her position 

against termination of parental rights. This claim lacks merit.
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Mother was permitted to and in fact did offer evidence in 

defense of her parental rights, perhaps contrary to the directive 

of the Superior Court, on remand. In addition to her own 

testimony, Mother, over the course of several days, some of 

which scheduled to accommodate Mother’s witnesses, produced 

the testimony of case worker, Kari Coccagna; parental fitness 

evaluator, Dr. David Leaman; counselor, Kevin Harney; ABC 

House program director, Emily Bakner; family therapist, Deann 

Blankenship-Sanders; Foster Mother, [D.R.]; Maternal 

Grandfather; and Mother’s therapist, Dr. Timothy Gibian. A 

complete discussion of Mother’s evidence appears in this 

[c]ourt’s April 20, 2015 [o]pinion at pages 14-30. Given the 

opportunity to present evidence on her own behalf after remand, 

it is difficult to see how Mother’s substantive or procedural due 

process rights were implicated.

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/15, at 4-5).

We fail to understand how Mother’s due process rights were violated in 

this case. “Formal notice and an opportunity to be heard are fundamental 

components of due process when a person may be deprived in a legal 

proceeding of a liberty interest, such as physical freedom, or a parent’s 

custody of her child.” Everett v. Parker, 889 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (citations omitted). There is no question that Mother had notice of 

the proceeding and, as we explain, the trial court gave her an opportunity to 

be heard. In addition, this Court has concluded that subsection (b)’s 

restriction of a trial court’s consideration of evidence only to that relevant to 

the time prior to the filing of a termination petition does not violate due 

process. See Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1056-57 (Pa. Super. 

2015). 

This Court, in the memorandum entered on May 21, 2014, found that 

there was sufficient evidence in the record to terminate Mother’s parental 
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rights pursuant to subsection (a)(8). This Court also observed “since the 

record contains abundant evidence regarding the existence and nature of the 

parent-child bonds and the developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare of the [C]hildren, additional hearings will not be required unless 

the orphans’ court desires to update the [C]hildren’s status on this record.” 

(In the Int. of K.D., supra at *35). 

The record reveals that, on remand, the trial court conducted four 

days of additional hearings in which it heard testimony from twelve 

witnesses, most of them called by Mother. Those witnesses gave testimony 

regarding the elements of subsection (a)(8) as well as subsection (b). Thus, 

the trial court gave Mother ample opportunity to be heard. There is no 

question that Mother was afforded due process in this proceeding. 

Mother’s claim that the trial court, “failed to consider those postpetition efforts that occurred from August 2013 through May 21, 2014[,]” 

(Mother’s Brief, at 30), does not implicate due process. Subsection (b) 

provides, in pertinent part:

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), 

(6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent 

to remedy the conditions described therein which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The trial court gave Mother a full opportunity to be 

heard and then properly disregarded that part of the testimony she 

presented that was statutorily irrelevant to its deliberations. Mother’s first 

claim is without merit. 
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In her second issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred when it 

refused to consider any evidence that related to the time after the filing of 

CYS’ petition to terminate. (See Mother’s Brief, at 30).

Here, the clear and unambiguous language of the statute 

affords the only interpretation that would not otherwise lead to 

an absurd result. That is, the “efforts by the parent” cannot be 

considered and not the efforts that are ordered to be 

undertaken by a court or the efforts of an agency. (See

Orphans’ Court Order dated September 13, 2013; attached 

hereto as Appendix at “A57 “). Certainly had Mother engaged an 

individual therapist and a reunification counselor on her own to 

supply her and her family with services, it would fit squarely 

within the language of §2511(b). However, that is not the case. 

After determining that [CYS] had failed to provide reasonable 

efforts to reunify Mother and her children, the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt 

specifically ordered [CYS] to engage an individual therapist, a 

reunification therapist, and coordinate those reunification efforts 

with the children’s current therapist. (See September 13, 2013 

Order).

(Id. at 33) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

Mother tortures the statute to make an absurd distinction between 

things she did, and things that the trial court ordered done for her by 

asserting that any post-petition court-ordered services in which she engaged 

were not “efforts by [Mother] to remedy the conditions” which led to the 

Children’s placement. (Id. at 32). We note that subsection (8) does not 

require consideration of a parent’s efforts to remedy the conditions that led 

to placement, but only whether “the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist” at the time the petition is filed. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Our examination of the record clearly indicates that 

the trial court did not err when it found that the conditions that led to the 
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placement of the Children still existed when CYS filed its petition to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights. Any services the trial court might have 

ordered after CYS filed its petition could have no effect on conditions that 

existed pre-petition. 

We quote the trial court’s analysis of this issue, with approval:

This [c]ourt can find no support for Mother’s assertion that 

it could have or should have ignored the clear language of 

§2511(b) and considered evidence of her efforts and/or progress 

toward remedying the conditions which led to the [C]hildren’s 

removal from her case after the date the TPR Petition was filed. 

The law is well-settled that efforts by a parent to remedy the 

conditions that led to the [C]hildren’s placement that are 

initiated after the petition has been filed may not be 

considered by the court. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b); In re 

T.A.C., 110 A.3d 1028 (Pa. Super. 2015). Further, “Termination 

under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate 

a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions 

that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of 

DHS services.” In re T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119, 1125 (Pa. Super. 

2013), quoting In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 

2008). While the statute makes no exception for the scenario 

presented by this case, the purpose of the statute, to ensure 

timely permanency, would be frustrated by such a result.

(Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/15, at 6-7) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 

Our review of the record reveals that the conditions that led to the 

placement of the Children, namely Mother’s inability to see that her actions 

or failures to act place the welfare of the Children in jeopardy, existed at the 

time the petition was filed. Mother’s second issue is without merit. 

In her final issue, Mother complains that the trial court failed to give 

proper weight to evidence that indicated that a strong bond existed between 

herself and the Children. (See Mother’s Brief, at 40). In support of her 
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claim, Mother revisits the evidence and asks us to reach a conclusion 

different from that reached by the trial court. (See id. at 41). This we may 

not do. As this Court has said:

. . . The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the 

responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and 

resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence. When the trial court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support an opposite result.

In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). In 

other words, the trial court, not this Court, is responsible for weighing the 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

findings. “Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s 

consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and 

we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.” S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 

623 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). We have examined the record and 

we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found 

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would serve the best 

interests of the Children. We quote the trial court’s analysis of the Children’s 

best interest pursuant to subsection (b), with approval: 

[CYS] called Dr. Kasey Shienvold (“Dr. Shienvold”) in its 

case-in-chief on July 2, 2013 regarding the bonding assessment 

he performed on Mother and the [C]hildren in July, 2012. 

Specifically, Dr. Shienvold understood that his role was to assess 

‘the relationship and the bond that exist [sic] between the child 

[sic] and the parents to determine whether there is an increased 

risk for long term harm if that bond is severed. . .’ Dr. 

Shienvold’s report was made part of the record. He concluded,
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At the time it was fairly clear that the 

attachment—while there was an attachment between 

[Mother] and the [C]hildren, it did not appear that 

the loss of that attachment would create significant 

risk of long term consequences given that they had 

available attachment figures who they had developed 

also strong relationships with in the foster parents.

Dr. Shienvold acknowledged on cross-examination that he 

had not performed any reevaluation of Mother and the [C]hildren 

since his assessment in July, 2012. 

[Blankenship-]Sanders testified that the [C]hildren were 

bonded with Mother before the family therapy began (in October, 

2013). She observed a strong bond between Mother and the 

[C]hildren. [Blankenship-]Sanders was of the opinion that 

reunification was appropriate and worked with Dr. Gibian and 

Roland to coordinate the effort to reunify the [C]hildren with 

Mother. However, [Blankenship-]Sanders’ work with Mother and 

the [C]hildren ended in August, 2014, after this [c]ourt changed 

the permanency goal to adoption as directed by the Superior 

Court.

As to the parent/child bond, Roland acknowledged that the 

[C]hildren do love [Mother]. Roland explained that while the 

loss of [Mother] will cause the [C]hildren grief, leaving the foster 

family would also result in intense grief.

At this time, the [c]ourt has the very real benefit of 

hindsight. The [C]hildren have not visited with Mother since 

August, 2014. The have had only minimal contact through gifts 

and cards. They have chosen not to read the cards Mother sent, 

but rather to place them in a special keepsake box to read when 

they are ready. The evidence supports a finding that the 

[C]hildren’s lack of contact with Mother has not proven to be 

detrimental over the intervening months. Instead, the 

[C]hildren seem to have recovered rather easily. They are more 

open about their feelings in their individual therapy with Roland. 

Their negative behaviors have decreased to the point of nearly 

disappearing. There are doing well both academically and 

behaviorally in school. Their behaviors in the foster home are 

appropriate.

[K.D.] is very open about his desire to be adopted. [A.D.] 

has more mixed feelings, but ‘can find more reasons that it 

would be better for her to remain where she is,’ according to 
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Roland. Roland has not observed anything in the [C]hildren’s 

behaviors that would suggest that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would be detrimental to them beyond the typical 

grief and loss one would expect.

The [C]hildren have formed a parent-child bond with the 

foster parents. The [C]hildren look to the foster parents for 

love, guidance, support, comfort and security. They are 

certainly a part of the foster family and have bonded with the 

other children in the foster family. Importantly, the foster 

parents are an adoptive resource and desire to make all three 

children a permanent part of their family.

After careful consideration of the evidence, this [c]ourt 

must find that it is in the [C]hildren’s best interests that Mother’s 

parental rights be terminated, thereby freeing them for adoption 

and creating permanency in their lives. Further delay in 

establishing permanency would be harmful to the [C]hildren and 

is therefore not in the [C]hildren’s best interests.

(Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/15, at 39-40) (record citations omitted). Mother’s third 

issue is without merit.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm the orders of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Franklin County that terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b), and changed the Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption under section 6351 of the Juvenile Act. 

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2015