## IN THE COURT O F CRIMINA L A PPEA LS OF TEXA S

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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

v . S T E W A R T L E R I C H A R D S O N , A p p e l l e e O N S T A T E ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W F R O M T H E S E C O N D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T A R R A N T C O U N T Y
J O H N S O N , J . , d e l i v e r e d t h e o p i n i o n o f a u n a n i m o u s C o u r t . O P I N I O N Appellee was char g ed by indictment with multipl e counts of intox ication assault stemming from his involvement in a cra sh that injured the m embers of a family , one of them sever ely

. The indictment included enhanc ement para g raphs that incorporated appellee ’s three convictions in I owa for the offe nse of “oper ating under the influence , unintentionally causing serious injury .” Under I owa law , this offense is a n “ag g rava ted misdemeanor .” The state appea led t he trial c ourt’s re fusal to let it use the I owa c onvictions to enhance the punishment rang e of the char g ed offe nse. The court of appea ls dismiss ed the state’s appea l for lack2

of jurisdiction, and the state petitioned this Court for review

. 1 Article 44.01(a) (1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e permits the state to appea l an order that “dismisses any indictment, information, or complaint o r an y portion of an indictment, information, or complaint.” The plain lang uag e of article 44.01(a) (1) compels us to hold that the
court of appea ls had jurisdiction in this case . We reve rse the court of appea ls and rema nd this cause to that court for

consideration of the merits of the state ’s claim. I. F acts Pursuant to § 12.41(1) of the Penal Code, the state soug ht to use the I owa offe nses as felony 2 convictions so that it could enhanc e appellee ’s sentenc e under § 12.42. Appellee moved to quash 3 the enhanc ement alleg ations in the indictment, arg uin g t h at t he I owa ag g rava ted misdemeanors should be classified as misdemeanors under § 12.41(2); if classified as misdemeanors, the offe nses 4 would be inelig ible to enhanc e appe llee’s se ntence
. 5 At a pretria l hear ing, the trial court g rante d appellee ’s motion to quash the en h an ce ment alleg ations. On Fe bruar

y 8, 2010, the cour

t entere d a wr itten order tha t “ the State may not use the offe nse[s] alleg ed in the repeat offende r not ice of the i ndictment as enhancement parag raphs, and

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S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 1 ( 1 ) p r o v i d e s t h a t “ a n y c o n v i c t i o n n o t o b t a i n e d f r o m a p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r t h i s c o d e s h a l l b e 2
c l a s s i f i e d a s . . . [ a ] ‘ f

e l o n y o f t h e t h i r d d e g r e e ’ i f i m p r i s o n m e n t i n t h e T e x a s D e p a r t m e n t o f C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e o r a n o t h e r p e n i t e n t i a r y i s a f f i x e d t o t h e o f

f e n s e a s a p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t
. ” S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 e n h a n c e s p e n a l t i e s f o r “ h a b i t u a l f

e l o n y o f f e n d e r s . ” 3
S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 1 ( 2 ) p r o v i d e s t h a t “ a n y c o n v i c t i o n n o t o b t a i n e d f r o m a p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r t h i s c o d e s h a l l b e 4
c l a s s i f i e d a s . . . [ a ] ‘ C l a s s B m i s d e m e a n o r ’ i f t h e o f f e n s e i s n o t a f

e l o n y a n d c o n f

i n e m e n t i n a j a i l i s a f

f i x e d t o t h e o f f e n s e a s a p o s s i b l e p u n i s h m e n t
. ”
S e c t i o n 1 2

. 4 2 's e n h a n c e m e n t p a r a g r a p h s a p p l y o n l y w h e n t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s p r i o r f

e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n s . 53

may further not refe r to those offe nses as fe lony convictions, in that they

are misdemeanors.” After g ranting the motion to quash, the t rial court asked the state whether it intended to appea l the decision. The state replied that it had to speak with the complainant’s fa mily

. I t subsequently appea led the trial court’s ruling to the court of appea ls. Concerne d that it did not have jurisdi ct i o n o v er the state’s appea l, the court of appea ls reque sted briefing from the parties “on whether the trial court’s Fe bruar y 8, 2010 order constitutes a dismiss al of any portion of the indictment so that a State’s appea l is authorized under art i cl e 4 4

. 0 1 (a) (1) of the code of criminal p ro ce d u re.” Following briefing from the parties, the court of appea ls held that it did not h av e jurisdiction over the state’ s appea l and dismissed the appea l. The state fi l ed a petition for discretionar y revie w by this Court that raised six g rounds for revie w. We g ranted re view on all six g rounds, all of which are based on the underly ing leg al 6 question: does Art. 44.01 authorize the state to appea l a trial-cour t order quashing the enhanc ement portion of an indictment. The ref ore, our analy sis will focus on this question. II. Analysi s

1

. D o e s j u r i s d i c t i o n l i e p u r s u a n t t o a r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) t o a u t h o r i z e a S t a t e a p p e a l w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t 6 q u a s h e s i n d i c t m e n t p a r a g r a p h s w h i c h a l l e g e p u n i s h m e n t e n h a n c e m e n t ? T e x . C o d e C r i m . P r o c . A n n . a r t
. 4 4

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. D o e s t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f a r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 m e a n w h a t i t s a y s , t h a t i s , t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f “ a p o r t i o n o f a n i n d i c t m e n t ” e n t i t l e s t h e S t a t e t o a p p e a l ? T e x . C o d e C r i m . P r o c . A n n . a r t
. 4 4

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. D i d t h e S e c o n d C o u r t o f A p p e a l s ’ d e c i s i o n c o n t r a v e n e s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n r u l e s b y f a i l i n g t o g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f a r t i c l e 4 4

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. 4 4

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. D i d t h i s C o u r t ’ s S t a t e v . M o r e n o d e c i s i o n m e a n w h a t i t s a i d , t h a t i s , t h a t a r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ’ s p r o v i s i o n a u t h o r i z i n g a n a p p e a l f r o m a n o r d e r “ d i s m i s s i n g a n y p o r t i o n o f a n i n d i c t m e n t ” i s f u l f i l l e d w h e n e v e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t
“ e f f e c t i v e l y t e r m i n a t e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f

e n d a n t ” b y f

o r c i n g a n y a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e i n d i c t m e n t b e f o r e t r i a l a n d t h e S t a t e i s n o t w i l l i n g t o c o m p l y w i t h t h a t o r d e r ? S t a t e v . M o r e n o , 8 0 7 S

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. 4 4

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. D i d t h e S e c o n d C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a l s o r u n a f o u l o f S t a t e v . M o r e n o b y f a i l i n g t o h e e d i t s a d m o n i t i o n n o t t o i m p e d e t h e S t a t e ’ s r i g h t t o a p p e a l b y f o c u s i n g o n t e c h n i c a l p l e a d i n g s ’ d i s t i n c t i o n s ? M o r e n o , 8 0 7 S

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. D i d t h e S e c o n d C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a l s o r u n a f o u l o f S t a t e v . M o r e n o b y r u l i n g c o n t r a r y t o t h e a r t i c l e 4 4

. 0 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) ’ s l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y , d e t a i l e d i n M o r e n o , w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t p r o v i s i o n ’ s e n a c t m e n t s o u g h t t o g r a n t T e x a s p r o s e c u t o r s t h e b r o a d a u t h o r i t y t o a p p e a l a k i n t o t h e b r o a d r i g h t o f a p p e a l e n j o y e d b y f

e d e r a l p r o s e c u t o r s ? S t a t e v [

. ] M o r e n o , 8 0 7 S

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.4 A. P lain L anguage Courts must g ive eff

ect to the plain meaning of a statute’s literal text unless such a rea ding either would lead to absurd, unintended conseque nces or the plain lang uag e is a mbiguous. Boyk

in

v. State , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Article 44.01(a) (1) allows the state to appea l

a decision “dismiss[ ing].

. . any portion of an indictment.” The leg islature’s choosing to use “any ”

as a modifier require s a broad interpr et at i o n of “portion of an indictment.” Fur thermore , Art. 44.01(a) (1) should be “liberally construed [ so as] to achie ve [ i t s ] purpose.” State v. Moreno , 807 S.W .2d 327, 333 (quoting V.T.C.A. Gov’t. Code, Sec. 312.006). Be cause the quashed enhanc ement para g raphs wer e alleg ed in the indictment, and thus are quite literally a “portion of an indictment,” Art. 44.01(a )(1) may

be invoked to per

mit the state’s appe al. This rea ding d o es n o t l ead to absurd or unintended conseque nces. As we discussed in Moreno , the L eg islature “intended to extend to the State appellate power s akin to t h o s e t h at the United States Congr ess had e x tended to the f eder al g overnme nt in a criminal ca se.” Moreno , 807 S.W .2d at 329; see discussion infra Part I I .C. The Supreme Court has held that Congr ess intended the fede ral statute “to allow appea ls [by the fede ral g overnme nt] whene ver the Constit ution would permit.” Id

. at 331 (quoting United States v. W ilson , 420 U.S. 332 (1975))

. Appellee has not alleg ed any constitutional violation. We cannot, there fore , say that allowing this appea l would be an absurd or unintended c onsequenc e of A rt. 44.01(a) (1). B. Brooks v. Stat

e 7 The court of appea ls reje cted the state’s plain-lang uag e arg ument and instead found that “the words ‘indictment’ and ‘enha nceme nt para g raphs’ have particula r meaning s that do not support the

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State’s [ p l ai n l ang uag e] position.” Richardson , 353 S.W .3d at 921. Acc ording to the court of appea ls, “indictment” ref ers to the “

pr i ma r y p leading in a criminal action,” which must include “eve ry thing nece ssary to be proven to sustain a conviction in the guilt/i nnocenc e phase ” of a trial. Id

. (quoting Brooks, emphasis added by court of appea ls). The court of appea ls relied on Calton v. State to disting uish be tween ple ading a prior c onviction as an e lement of an offe nse and pleading 8

a prior conviction as a sentenc e enhanc ement. Id

. at 921-22. The court of appea ls found that a prior conviction that is plead as part of an offe nse is a “portion of the indictment” under Art. 44.01(a) (1), wher eas a prior conviction that is plead as part of an enhanc ement para g raph is not a “portion of the i n d i ct m en t ” s ince the prosec ution is not require d to prove that alleg ation in the g uilt phase of the trial. Id

. at 922. The court of appea ls conclud ed t h at , “[i] n light of the acc epted meaning s of ‘indictmen t ’ an d ‘enha

nceme nt para g raphs,’ the trial court did not dismiss ‘a portion of the indictment.’” Id

. The lang uag e of Art. 44.01(a) (1) and our prior decisions do not support the court of appea ls’s distinction betwee n primary and ancillar y pleading s in an indictment for purposes of the state’s appea l under Art. 44.01(a) (1). This distinction was rele vant in Brooks only beca use the indictment did not inclu d e t h e en hance ment alleg ations; there would be possible constitutional notice implicati o n s i f t he state wer e require d to plead enhanc ement alleg ations in the indictment. See Brooks v. State , 957 S.W .2d at 31. We held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on enhanc ement beca

use the enhanc ement could have been plead by the state in a nother form and the defe ndant admittedly had notice of the enhanc ement. Id

. at 34. I t does not follow that enhanc ement alleg ations are not a “portion of the indictment” under Art. 44.01(a) (1) simply beca use the state was

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not require d to plead enha nceme nt alleg ations in the indictment.

C. State v. Moreno 9 Our decision in Moreno supports jurisdiction for the state’s appea l. The trial court g rante d the defe ndant’s motion to quash the indictment beca use of vag ueness in the state’s alleg ations. 807 S.W .2d at 328. I n the order draw n up by the defe nse and signe d by the trial court, the judge crosse d
out the lang uag e “and this cause is dismiss ed.” Id

. At issue was whether t h e co u rt never theless “dismissed” the indictment for purposes of the state’s a

ppeal unde r Art. 44.01( a)( 1). Id . at 329. We trace d the hi story of Art. 44.01 to determine the mea ning of “dismiss.” Id . at 329-33. When the L eg islature enac ted Art. 44.01, it “borr owed liberally ” from the fede ral statute permitting the state t o appea l, which resulted in some ill-fitting lang uag e being incorporated into the Texas
statute. Id

. at 329. Article 44.01(a) (1) provides that the state may appea l an order that “dismisses”

an indictment, information, or complaint, or any portion there of, but Texas criminal proce dure does not use “dismiss” as the ter m for a c halleng e to the validity of a c harg ing instrument. Id

. To discern the extent of the state’s rig ht t o ap p eal, we trac ed the extent of the fede ral g overnme nt’s rig ht to appea l under the fede ral statute. We found that 18 U.S.C. § 3731 “re move[s] all statutory barr iers to G overnme nt a ppeals.

. . [so as to a llow] appea ls whene ver the Constit ution would permit.” Id

. at 332 (quoting United States v. W ilson , 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975))

. Kee ping our statute in line with its fe dera l c ounterpa rt, we held that Art. 44.01(a) (1) pe rmits the state to appea l

an order conce rning an indictment or information “whe never th e o rder eff ectively terminates the prosec ution i n fa v or of the defe ndant.” Id

. at 332. A trial court dismiss es an information or indictment, or portion there of, when it “ef fec tively fore close[s] the State from proce eding with the

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information [or indictment] under w hich it wished to proce ed.” Id . at 333, n.7. Her e, the state contends that the enhanc ement alleg ations we re centr al to its prosec ution beca use “it wished to proce ed” with an indictment that potentially subjected appellee t o a l ife
sentenc e. By quashing the enhanc ement para g raphs and there by prohibiting the state from ref err ing
to the I owa offe nses as felonies, the trial court’s ruling fore closed the state from proce eding on the indictment “under

which it wished to proce ed.” I n fac t, the state informe d the trial cour t that, if it lost on appea l, it had “no intent of try ing these case s any way other than one or two at a time

. . . so

we have an option of asking this court to stack sentenc es afte r multipl e trials

. . . .” The state arg ues that, under Moreno, the prosec ution was eff ectively terminated beca

use the state would not proce ed on the conteste d indictment without the enhance ment para g raphs.

D. State ex rel Lykos v

. Fin e and State v. Morgan

1 0 1 1 Our decisions in Lykos and Morgan do not support dismiss al of the state’s appea l. I n these

case s, we found Art. 44.01(a) (1) inapplicable beca use the trial-cour

t ruling s at issue d i d n o t fa l l within the plain lang uag e of the statute, which require s the dismiss al of the char g ing instrument or a portion of t he charg ing instrument. I n eac h of t hese cases, a party s o u ght a pretrial ruli ng on an issue that would not alter the f ace of the indictment or infor mation. I n Lykos , a capital- murde r d e f e n d a n t c h a ll e n g e d th e c o n s ti tu

ti o n a li ty o f T e xa s ’s death- penalty
sentenc ing stat u t e t h roug h a pretria l motion. 330 S.W .3d at 906. The state filed petitions of mandamus and prohibition to stop the trial court from holding an evidentiar y hear ing on the motion and from g ranting the defe ndant’s motion befor e the state had the opportunity to prove the

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alleg ations in the indictment to the jury

. Id

. We conditionally g rante d t h e m an d am u s and prohibition re lief, in pa

rt beca use the state would have no a dequate reme dy at law if the trial court g rante d defe ndant’s motion. Id

. at 907. We re j ected the defe ndant’s arg ument that, althoug h the words of the statute would not allow a state’s appea l of a pretria l ruling on that issue, the “spirit” of Art. 44.01(a) (1) would have permitted such an appea l; we found that Art. 44.01 “either does or does
not authorize a State’s appea l [and that it] does not authorize the State to appea l from a pretria l ruling on a possible punishment issue that fails to dismiss any part of the actua l indictment.” Id . at 914. Lyko s t h ere fore stands for the proposition that a pretria l ruling that does not aff ect the fac e of the char g ing instrument may

not be appe aled by

the state unde r Art. 44.01( a)( 1). As in Lykos , Morgan also dealt with an impermissible appea l of a pretria l ruling

. I n Morgan , the state char g ed t h e d ef endant, by information, with the misdemeanor offe nse of driving while intox icated. 160 S.W .3d at 2. I n the information, the state alleg ed a prior DWI conviction in order
to r aise the offe nse to a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to § 49.09 of the Penal Code. Id

. Be cause the judge had previously ruled that simil ar informations alleg ed only C l as s B o ffe nses with an enhanc ement alleg ation, the state filed a pretria l motion for a “d et ermination of whether , if the defen d an t is found guilty , the j ury will be ins tructed to consider a C lass A rang e of punishment if the prior conviction i s found t rue.” Id

. The court ruled that if the defendant was found guilty , the
court would not instruct the jury on a Class A rang e o f p u n i s h m en t
. Id

. The state appea led the ruling , and the court of appea ls held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appea l under Art. 44.01(a) (1), but that there was no err or on the merits. Id

. at 3. We g rante d the state’s petition for discretionar y revie w on the merits and, on our own motion, o n t h e jurisdictional question of whether Art. 44.01(a) (1) a

uthorizes the state’s appe al. Id

.9

We held that Art. 44.01(a) (1) did not auth o rize the state’s appea l. We found that the trial court’s order “[did] not forc e an altera tion of the information befor e the trial can proce ed,” and the
state wa s t h ere fore pursuing an impermissible interlocutory appea l. Id

. at 4-5. Be cause the trial court’s order did not aff

ect the fac e of the char g ing instrument, Art. 44.01(a) (1) did not apply

. This is consistent with our decisions in Moreno and Lykos

. The co urt of appea ls embra ced some broad lang uag e in Morgan that seeme d to limit the scope of the state’s rig ht to appea l pretria l ruling s rela ting to punishment. Richardson , 353 S.W .3d
at 925. But we have alre ady shown that the distinction betwee n primary and ancillar y pleading s in

an indictment is not r eleva nt to an appea l unde r Art. 44.01(a) (1). The distinction in Morgan was 1 2
not nece ssary to the holding beca use the pre- tri al ru l i n g at issue did not aff ect the fac e of the information. Morgan thus stands for the proposition that a pretria l ruling that does not aff ect the fac e of the c harg ing instrument may not be appe aled by

the state unde r Art. 44.01( a)( 1). I n the pre sent ca se, the trial court quashed the enhanc ement para g raphs. B y deleting those para g raphs, the trial court’s order aff ecte d the fac e of the char g ing ins t ru m ent, and this case is there fore distinguishable f rom Lykos and Morgan

.

Conclusion The judgme nt of the court of appea ls is reve rsed. We rema nd this cause to that court so that it may rule on the me rits of the state’ s appea l.

Deliver ed: Novembe r 21, 2012 Publis h

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