Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 15, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-22-00214-CR

PHILIP KRAMER TAGGART, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-84192-2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove

Opinion by Justice Nowell

A jury convicted Philip Kramer Taggart of three counts of indecency with a 

child by contact. In two issues, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient and the 

trial court abused its discretion by providing unreasonable conditions of community 

supervision. We affirm the trial court’s judgment for Count I. We modify the 

judgments for Counts II and III and affirm as modified.

A. Sufficiency

In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he 

committed three separate and distinct offenses as charged. When reviewing the 
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sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the verdict. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2021). The verdict will be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have 

found all the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly 

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). The finder of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the 

evidence. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655. When considering a claim of evidentiary 

insufficiency, we must keep in mind that the finder of fact may choose to believe or 

disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented. Id. The evidence is sufficient 

to support a conviction if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable 

based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light 

most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 655-56 (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 

903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). When faced with conflicts in the evidence, a reviewing 

court shall presume that the fact finder resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict 

and defer to that determination. Id.

As is relevant here, a person commits an offense if the person engages in 

sexual contact with a child younger than 17 years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 

§ 21.11(a)(1). “Sexual contact” means one of a list of acts if committed with the 

intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, including any touching of 
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the breast through clothing. See id. § 21.11(c). A child victim’s testimony alone is 

sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child. Keller v. State, 604 

S.W.3d 214, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d). In the context of indecency 

with a child, the fact finder can infer the requisite intent to arouse or gratify sexual 

desire from a defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding circumstances.

Id.

M.H. testified she began taking private cello lessons with appellant when she 

was in sixth grade, which was when she was twelve or thirteen years old. During 

those lessons, appellant would touch her shoulder or knee to tap out a beat or he 

would touch her shoulders, elbows, upper hand, or fingers to correct her form. 

M.H.’s relationship with appellant gradually changed when she was in ninth 

grade. Appellant told her she was beautiful, said she could come to his studio if she 

needed a place to go without her parents knowing, and said she could “tell him 

anything and have my parents not know about it.” When she made mistakes during 

lessons, appellant made “jokes about tying me up and spanking me or whipping me 

with the bow or punishing me.” He told her about “inappropriate scenes” in movies,

about his marital problems, he often thought about her between lessons, she was 

special and he adored her, and “I was dangerous or looking to get him in trouble.” 

Appellant and M.H. exchanged text messages; most of those messages related to the 

cello lessons. However, he also texted her: “You’re a very special girl,” “Very sweet 

very talented and a little dangerous,” “Always dangerous,” “Behave or I’ll tie you 
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to something and apank [sic] you,” and “I would love you forever.” M.H. testified 

appellant also made sexual comments to her about violent sexual acts, such as 

“[s]panking, tying me up, whipping me, those things.”

During M.H.’s lessons, appellant continued touching her shoulder and knee 

as he had done before, but over time “the touches would move. Taps on the shoulder 

would come down to taps lower on the shoulder to onto [sic] my [upper] chest.”

Likewise, the taps on her knee “would move up my leg over time to my upper thigh 

or near my crotch.” Eventually, appellant’s taps moved “to the top part of my breast 

to later cupping the side of my breast.” M.H. testified she recalled three specific 

incidents when appellant touched her breast, although he did so more than three 

times; she explained the details of the incidents ran together. 

On one occasion, appellant placed his hands on M.H.’s shoulders while they 

were talking. As he leaned forward to point to something in the music, “with his 

other hand, he brought it down to cup my breast and left it there.” On a different 

occasion, appellant had his arm around M.H. to hug her and congratulate her on 

playing music she had struggled to play well. While his arm was around her 

shoulder, he moved it down to touch and cup her breast “while stroking his thumb 

across” the top part of her breast. She testified she was wearing a tank top and had 

exposed skin. M.H. testified there was another occasion when he touched her breast 

“the same way as before.” 
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Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to show he committed three 

separate and distinct offenses as charged; rather, he argues, the evidence shows one 

or two separate offenses. We disagree. As described above, M.H. testified about 

three separate incidents: one when he was standing behind her and cupped her breast 

while pointing to the music, a second when he hugged her to congratulate her on 

playing the music well, and a third when he touched her breast “the same way as 

before.” Applying the standard of review for legal sufficiency in a criminal case, we 

conclude the evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found all the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant’s 

first issue. 

B. Conditions of Community Supervision

In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

providing unreasonable conditions of community supervision. Appellant’s second 

issue relates only to the judgments for Counts II and III.

1. Preservation & Invited Error 

The State’s initial response to appellant’s second issue is that he failed to 

preserve any error relating to the conditions of community supervision for review. 

On February 11, 2022, the jury assessed punishment for each count. As to 

Count II, the jury assessed punishment at eight years’ confinement and 

recommended community supervision. As to Count III, the jury assessed punishment 

at two years’ confinement and recommended community supervision. The trial court 
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sentenced appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict on that day. At that time, 

the judge stated the terms and conditions of community supervision would follow 

later. Appellant filed his motion for new trial on March 10, 2022. The conditions of 

community supervision were filed with the district clerk on March 15, 2022.

A defendant must file a motion for new trial “no later than thirty days after 

the date when the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open court.” TEX. R.

APP. P. 21.4(a). The motion may be amended without leave any time within the 

thirty-day limit so long as the trial court has not already ruled on the motion. TEX.

R. APP. P. 21.4(b). Rule 21.4 bars amendments outside of the thirty-day time limit, 

even with leave of the court, so long as the State properly objects. State v. Zalman, 

400 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also State v. Arizmendi, 519 

S.W.3d 143, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The motion can be amended at any time 

during that thirty-day period, but the trial court is barred from considering a ground 

raised outside the thirty-day period if the State properly objects.”). 

In this case, the trial court imposed the sentences in open court on February 

11, 2022. The conditions of community supervision about which appellant 

complains were not filed until March 15, 2022, after the expiration of the thirty-day 

time period wherein appellant could have filed an amended motion for new trial. 

Appellant filed his motion for new trial on March 10, 2022; at that time, he could 

not have raised his complaints about the terms of community supervision because 

the conditions were unknown to him. 
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The timing of the trial court’s entry of the terms of community supervision in 

Counts II and III left appellant without the ability to preserve his objections before

the trial court. Appellant could not include objections to the terms of community 

supervision in his motion for new trial because the conditions had not yet been filed. 

Based on the facts in this case, we conclude appellant did not have an opportunity to 

raise his complaints about the terms of his community supervision for the trial court 

to consider. Accordingly, he has not waived his complaints by failing to raise them

in a motion for new trial. See Dansby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 441, 447 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014) (to be subject to procedural default for failure to object to terms of 

community supervision, “a defendant must be aware of the condition of community 

supervision in time to object at trial”); see also Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577-

78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“An appellant fails to preserve error by failing to object 

when he had the opportunity; conversely, if an appellant never had the opportunity 

to object, then he has not forfeited error.”).

The State next argues appellant specifically consented on the record to 

conditions 15 and 34 (terms about which he now complains) and he “agreed and 

actually seemed to insist” on those conditions on the record. Condition 15 requires 

appellant to submit to and complete a Sex History Polygraph, and condition 34 states 

appellant shall promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries and furnish all 

information requested by the Supervision Officer. At sentencing, the trial court 
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stated the terms and conditions of community supervision would follow. The 

following exchange then occurred:

[Court]: The following terms and conditions will be standard, 

what I’ll call, sex offender conditions, sex offender caseload. I don’t 

think it’s standard to polygraph either sexual history or instant offense 

polygraphs. That’s not standard, is it?

[Appellant’s Counsel]: I think it is. It’s mandated as part of the 

State program. So when they do the sex offender counseling, they’re 

mandated to do that, and he’s required to participate faithfully in sex 

offender counseling. So that loops it in for - -

[Court]: Okay. I just want to make sure that’s part of the 

conditions of probation.

[State’s Attorney]: Yes.

The State asserts this exchange shows appellant consented to these conditions and 

cannot now challenge them. The exchange shows appellant’s lawyer believed the 

polygraph of sexual history or “instant offense” was standard and stated appellant 

would be required to participate in sex offender counseling. We disagree with the 

State’s characterization that, through his statements, appellant’s counsel agreed or 

insisted that conditions 15 and 34 be included in the terms of community 

supervision. Rather, there was a vague exchange that the “standard” conditions 

would be ordered and what those might be. Based on this exchange, we cannot 

conclude appellant consented to any terms of community supervision. 

2. Conditions of Community Supervision

A judge may impose “any reasonable condition [of community supervision] 

that is not duplicative of another condition and that is designed to protect or restore 

the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the 
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defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 42A.301(a). “[T]he trial court has broad 

discretion, not only in deciding whether to grant community supervision, but also in 

determining the conditions of that supervision.” Butler v. State, 189 S.W.3d 299, 

303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Adams v. State, No. 05-21-00521-CR, 2022 

WL 1793416, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 2, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). A condition of community supervision may be invalid 

if it: (1) has no relationship to the crime, (2) relates to conduct that is not in itself 

criminal, and (3) forbids or requires conduct that is not reasonably related to the 

future criminality of the defendant or does not serve the statutory ends of community 

supervision. Adams, 2022 WL 1793416, at *2 (citing Mitchell v. State, 420 S.W.3d 

448, 449–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). When a trial court 

imposes an invalid condition of community supervision, the proper remedy is to 

reform the judgment by removing the condition. Shortt v. State, No. 05-13-01639-

CR, 2018 WL 2042008, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (citing Ex parte Pena, 739 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1987)).

In the judgments for Counts II and III, appellant was ordered to comply with 

55 conditions of community supervision. On appeal, he challenges fourteen of those 

conditions: numbers 6, 10, 12, 15, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, and 46.1 The 

 

1 The fact section for appellant’s second issue contains screenshots of some of the conditions of 

community supervision signed by the judge. The screenshots include condition 38. However, in the analysis 
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State’s brief includes no responsive arguments to appellant’s substantive challenges 

to these fourteen conditions. 

a. Condition 6

Condition 6 states: “Avoid injurious or vicious habits.” Appellant argues this 

condition is unreasonable because it is vague, indefinite, or uncertain. The conditions 

of community supervision should be expressed clearly and explicitly so that the 

defendant understands what is expected of him. See Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 

900, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Menchaca v. State, No. 2-04-283-CR, 

2005 WL 247796, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 3, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). The code of criminal procedure provides that 

conditions of community supervision may include conditions requiring the 

defendant to “avoid injurious or vicious habits.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 

42A.301(b)(2).

While the trial court could impose conditions requiring appellant to avoid 

injurious or vicious habits, simply stating that appellant must avoid injurious or 

vicious habits is not a condition that satisfies the statute. Condition 6 does not clearly 

and explicitly set forth the actions appellant must avoid such that appellant can 

understand what is expected of him. We conclude this condition is ambiguous and 

should be removed.

 

section for appellant’s second issue, appellant does not argue condition 38 is invalid. We conclude appellant 

has not challenged condition 38 on appeal.
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b. Conditions 10, 12, and 30

Appellant argues conditions 10, 12, and 30 are invalid. These conditions 

require appellant to submit urine samples for testing, submit to a substance abuse 

evaluation, and not purchase, possess, or consume prescription medications not in 

his name and not consume alcohol for any reason. Appellant asserts there is no 

evidence he has any type of substance abuse issue or that alcohol or other substances 

played any role in the offense. Further, he argues, except for the requirement that he 

not consume prescription medications not in his name, none of these conditions 

relates to conduct that is itself criminal. Finally, because there is no evidence he has 

a substance abuse problem, the requirements are not reasonably related to his future 

criminality. We agree. With the exception of the requirement that appellant not 

consume prescription medications not in his name, conditions 10, 12, and 30 have 

no relationship to the crime, do not relate to conduct that is criminal, and do not 

forbid or require conduct reasonably related to appellant’s future criminality.

We remove conditions 10 and 12 from the judgments for Counts II and III. 

We modify condition 30 to state: “The defendant shall not consume prescription 

medications not in the defendant’s name. The Supervision Officer shall be informed 

of all prescriptions.”

c. Conditions 15 and 34

Appellant argues conditions 15 and 34 are invalid because they violate his 

Fifth Amendment constitutional right against self-incrimination. Condition 15 
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requires appellant to “submit to and successfully complete a sex history polygraph,” 

and condition 34 requires him to “promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries 

directed to [him] and furnish all information requested by the supervision officer. 

This includes any report or form that the community supervision and corrections 

department would require.” Appellant’s argument relies on the court of criminal 

appeals’ decision in Dansby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We 

consider Dansby distinguishable.

Dansby pleaded guilty to indecency with a child. Id. at 444. The trial court

placed Dansby on deferred-adjudication community supervision and ordered him to 

comply with “sex offender terms and conditions,” without providing any specific 

details as to what the conditions would require. See id. That same day, the general 

conditions were modified to require Dansby to take and pass a polygraph 

examination “without any admissions” and to successfully complete a sex offender 

treatment program. See id. 

Dansby complied with most of the requirements of his community 

supervision, except that he refused to answer questions about his victims other than 

the complainant in his case. See id. Based on his refusal to answer questions about 

other victims, he was determined to have failed to participate fully in his sex offender 

treatment, and the State moved to revoke his community supervision. See id. at 444–

45. Dansby pleaded “not true” and filed a motion to quash the State’s motion to 

revoke and the order modifying the conditions of community supervision asserting 
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the conditions he allegedly violated infringed on his Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination. See id.

The court of criminal appeals addressed only the “narrow question . . . whether 

the record shows that appellant was placed on notice that his conditions of 

community supervision would require him to waive his Fifth Amendment 

constitutional right with respect to his revelations about other victims while 

discussing his sexual history.” Id. at 446. The court concluded Dansby did not forfeit 

his complaint that his Fifth Amendment rights would be violated if he were to answer 

questions during sex-offender counseling and a polygraph examination about 

sexual-assault victims other than the complainant in this case. See id. at 452. 

Notably, the court did not decide whether the mere existence of conditions like the 

ones about which appellant complains in this case violate a person’s Fifth 

Amendment rights. Accordingly, we do not conclude Dansby controls the analysis 

of this issue. 

“[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion by requiring a defendant to submit 

to a polygraph examination as a condition of community supervision.” Selby v. State, 

525 S.W.3d 842, 853 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Renfro, 

999 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d)). 

“Polygraph examinations are reasonable conditions if used to assist in treatment, 

planning, and case monitoring.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. State, 420 S.W.3d 448, 451

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). The condition is not unreasonable 
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because it requires the appellant to either submit to an examination or assert his Fifth 

Amendment right to remain silent, because a defendant cannot be penalized for 

asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. (citing Mitchell, 420 S.W.3d at 451-52).

Appellant does not yet know whether he will be asked to respond to any 

incriminating questions that would implicate his Fifth Amendment right. “The mere 

fact that he [will be] required to submit to polygraph questioning as a condition of 

his community supervision [does] not constitute an infringement of the privilege 

against self-incrimination.” Arnone v. Syed, No. 3:17-CV-03027-E, 2020 WL 

2085594, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2020). We conclude appellant’s complaint about 

conditions 15 and 34 is premature. If, in fact, appellant faces a situation similar to 

that in Dansby, then he may raise his Fifth Amendment objection at that time. 

d. Conditions 31 and 42

Appellant argues conditions 312and 42 are impermissible delegations of 

authority by the trial court and, as a result, are invalid. Condition 31 states appellant 

shall reside where the supervision officer directs and shall not move without the 

supervision officer’s prior approval; appellant challenges the supervision officer’s 

 

2 Appellant relies on McArthur v. State, 1 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) to 

support his argument that the trial court impermissibly delegated authority to the supervision officer. In 

McArthur, the appellant challenged eleven conditions of community supervision as improper delegations 

of authority to the supervision officer. See id. at 333. In its analysis, the McArthur court relied on a statute 

stating that, absent a few enumerated exceptions, only the trial court could fix the terms and conditions of 

community supervision and the authority could not be delegated to a supervision officer. See id. (discussing 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 41.12, § 10(a)). However, that statute was later repealed. See Repealed 

by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 770 (H.B. 2299), § 3.01. Accordingly, we do not consider McArthur persuasive 

authority as to delegation. 
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authority to direct where he lives and does not challenge that he must obtain approval 

prior to moving. We agree that appellant’s residence had no relationship to the crime,

does not relate to conduct that is criminal, and the condition giving unfettered power 

to the supervision officer to direct where appellant shall live does not forbid or 

require conduct that is reasonably related to the future criminality of appellant and 

serves the statutory ends of community supervision. See Adams, 2022 WL 1793416, 

at *2. We remove the portion of condition 31 stating “The defendant shall reside 

where the Supervision Officer directs.” Condition 31 shall state: “The defendant 

shall not move without prior approval from the Supervision Officer.” 

Condition 42 states appellant shall abide by the Halloween Instruction Sheet 

given by the supervision officer. The record contains no information about the 

contents of the Halloween Instruction Sheet. Without information about the specific 

instructions, we cannot determine the trial court abused its discretion by imposing 

condition 42. 

e. Conditions 35 and 36

Appellant asserts conditions 35 and 36 are unreasonable restrictions on his 

First Amendment right to free speech. Condition 35 states appellant shall not access 

social networking sites, personal ad web pages, message boards, or online gambling 

sites until specifically approved by the supervision officer based on a predetermined 

authorized plan of use. Condition 36 states appellant shall not access the Internet for 

any reason from any Internet capable device unless specifically approved by the 
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supervision officer based on a pre-determined authorized plan of use to include 

Internet monitoring.

Our sister court recently considered a similar argument in Archer v. State, No. 

13-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 2221677 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 

23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Archer, the appellant 

argued a restriction on his use of electronic social media violated his First 

Amendment rights. See Archer, 2019 WL 2221677, at *1. The court concluded that 

“because the conditions of Archer’s community supervision were not a permanent 

ban on internet usage, but rather temporary conditions during his period of 

supervision,” the restriction was not unconstitutional. See id. at *3 (discussing 

United States v. Farrell, No. 4:06-CR-103, 2018 WL 1035856, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 

23, 2018)). We agree with the Archer court. Conditions 35 and 36 are not 

unreasonable restrictions on appellant’s First Amendment right to free speech.

Additionally, article 42A.454 of the code of criminal procedure, titled Certain 

Internet Activity Prohibited, recognizes a trial court may limit Internet access for a 

defendant who is required to register as a sex offender under Chapter 62, is convicted 

of violating penal code section 21.11, used an electronic device used for internet 

access to engage in the conduct for which the person is required to register under 

Chapter 62, and is assigned a numeric risk level of two or three based on an 
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assessment conduct under Article 62.007.3 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 

42A.454. Appellant was convicted of indecency with a child by sexual contact

pursuant to section 21.11 of the penal code, is required to register as a sex offender, 

and used his phone to send inappropriate texts to M.H.; appellant will be placed on 

community supervision when his terms of incarceration are completed. The 

conditions imposed on appellant are consistent with article 42A.454. Because of the 

nature of the offense, it is apparent that the trial court intended to limit appellant’s 

access to the Internet generally and prohibit his access to internet sites where he 

might encounter children or other sex offenders. Minimizing the online spaces where 

appellant may encounter children or other sex offenders online furthers the goals of 

community supervision, which include protecting the community and punishing and 

reforming the defendant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42A.301 (“The judge 

may impose any reasonable condition that is not duplicative of another condition 

and that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, 

or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.”). 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing conditions 

35 and 36.

 

3

Information about appellant’s assigned numeric risk level under Article 62.007 is not in our record.
–18–

f. Conditions 39, 40, 43, and 46

Appellant argues conditions 39, 40, 43, and 46 are legally coerced and 

invalid. Condition 39 states appellant shall not request early release from the 

community supervision term; condition 40 states appellant shall not file a motion 

to modify the conditions of supervision for a period of three years and any 

modification must be agreed to by the State; condition 43 states appellant waives 

his right to appeal or file any motion for new trial; and condition 46 states he 

waives any future due diligence claims.

Conditions 39, 40, 43, and 46 do not have a relationship to the crime for 

which appellant was convicted, do not relate to conduct that is criminal, and forbid 

conduct that is not reasonably related to the future criminality of appellant and do 

not serve the statutory ends of community supervision. See Adams, 2022 WL 

1793416, at *2. Accordingly, we reform the judgments for Counts II and III by 

removing the conditions 39, 40, 43, and 46. 

C. Conclusion

We affirm the judgment for Count I.

As to Count II: 

 We remove conditions 6, 10, 12, 39, 40, 43, and 46 from the terms of 

community supervision.

 We strike the portion of condition 30 stating “The Defendant shall not 

consume alcohol for any reason.” Condition 30 shall state: “The 
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defendant shall not consume prescription medications not in the 

defendant’s name. The Supervision Officer shall be informed of all 

prescriptions.”

 We strike the portion of condition 31 stating “The defendant shall reside 

where the Supervision Officer directs.” Condition 31 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not move without prior approval from the Supervision 

Officer.”

As modified, we affirm the judgment for Count II.

As to Count III: 

 We remove conditions 6, 10, 12, 39, 40, 43, and 46 from the terms of 

community supervision.

 We strike the portion of condition 30 stating “The Defendant shall not 

consume alcohol for any reason.” Condition 30 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not consume prescription medications not in the 

defendant’s name. The Supervision Officer shall be informed of all 

prescriptions.”

 We strike the portion of condition 31 stating “The defendant shall reside 

where the Supervision Officer directs.” Condition 31 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not move without prior approval from the Supervision 

Officer.”
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As modified, we affirm the judgment for Count III.

/Erin A. Nowell//

ERIN A. NOWELL

JUSTICE

220214f.u05

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

PHILIP KRAMER TAGGART, 

Appellant

No. 05-22-00214-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-84192-

2018.

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Goldstein and Breedlove 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date:

The judgment for Count I is AFFIRMED.

As to Count II: 

 We remove conditions 6, 10, 12, 39, 40, 43, and 46 from the terms of 

community supervision.

 We strike the portion of condition 30 stating “The Defendant shall not 

consume alcohol for any reason.” Condition 30 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not consume prescription medications not in the 

defendant’s name. The Supervision Officer shall be informed of all 

prescriptions.”

 We strike the portion of condition 31 stating “The defendant shall reside 

where the Supervision Officer directs.” Condition 31 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not move without prior approval from the Supervision 

Officer.”

As modified, the judgment for Count II is AFFIRMED.

As to Count III: 

 We remove conditions 6, 10, 12, 39, 40, 43, and 46 from the terms of 

community supervision.
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 We strike the portion of condition 30 stating “The Defendant shall not 

consume alcohol for any reason.” Condition 30 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not consume prescription medications not in the 

defendant’s name. The Supervision Officer shall be informed of all 

prescriptions.”

 We strike the portion of condition 31 stating “The defendant shall reside 

where the Supervision Officer directs.” Condition 31 shall state: “The 

defendant shall not move without prior approval from the Supervision 

Officer.”

As modified, the judgment for Count III is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 15th day of August, 2023.