### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 13, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TON Y O . JOHN SON
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 00-05967 W. F red Axley, Judge

No. W2003-02098-C CA-R 3-CD - Septem ber 21, 2004

The a ppellant, Tony

O. J ohnson, was convic ted by a j u ry in the Shelby

CountyCriminal Court of second de g ree murder. Following the appellant’s conviction, t he trial court im posed a sentence of twenty -five y ear s incar cer ation in the Tennessee D epartment of Correc tion. On appea l, the appellant challeng es the suff

iciency of the e vidence supporting his c onviction and the trial c ourt’s application of ce rtain enha nceme nt fac tors. Upon our re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, we aff irm the judgme nt of the trial court.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.
Gar land Erg üden and Robe rt Wil son J ones, Memphis, Tenne ssee ( on appea l); and Will iam Yonkowski and Timothy

Albers, Memphis, T ennesse e (at trial), for the appellant, Tony O. J ohnson.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Mic ha e l Ma rk ha m, A ssi stant Att orne y

Ge ne ra l; Wi ll ia m L

. G ib b o n s , District Attorney Gene ral; and Reg inald Hende rson and Scott B ear up, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
On No ve mbe r 7, 19 99 , L ola r S te wa rt wa s li vin g in b uil din g 13 56 of Cle me nti ne Ap art me nts

. At approximately

2:00 p.m., St ewa

rt was sitting on the outside stairs, t al k i n g wi th severa l other residents when she saw the vi ctim, J ohn Cooper, standing in front of he r building. Cooper was soon joi ne d b y me mbe rs of

a g a ng kn ow n a s th e Gang ste r D isc ipl e s. Th e g a ng me mbe rs we re Sha kir Ad a ms, oth e rw ise kn ow n a s “ Sha c k” ; Ma ri o Wal ls, oth e rw ise kn ow n a s “ Sle e py ” ; the appel la nt,T h e re c o rd d o e s n o t re v e a l t h e full na m e o f t h e ind ivid u a l kn o w n a s H e rs h e y. 1

See M i randa v. A ri zo na, 38 4 U

. S. 43 6 , 86 S. C t

. 16 0 2 (19 6 6 ). 2
-2- otherwise know n as “Tony Creep” ; and a man named Frank, othe rwise known a s “He rshey .” The 1 g ang members c onfronted Coope r reg arding his potential involvement in the shooting of a Gang ster Disciple named “He ad” who had been shot the previous evening

. Cooper denie d any knowledg e of the shooting a nd walked to his g irlfriend’ s apartment in the Clementine complex. Although some of t he gang members followed Cooper; t he appe llant did not. C ooper e ntere d his girlf riend’s a partment and emer g ed holding a telephone . He diale d a number , then he pa ssed the telephone to one of t he gang members. After the call, all of t he men dispersed, with Cooper he ading in a direc tion differe nt from the g ang members. Cooper s t o p p ed when He rshey reque sted that Cooper come toward h i m
. Cooper appr oache d and stood nea r He rshey . Her shey

asked Cooper

a question, then hit Cooper. The a ppellant was “ [a] g ood littl e distance away ” from the alter cation.
After the blow, C ooper stumbl ed and beg an running away . Her shey , Adams, Walls, and the appellant c hased Cooper. Stewart saw Adams with a g un and hea rd four g unshots. At trial, St ewa rt tes t i fi ed t h at she did not see the appellant with a g un, but she knew he usually car ried a g un. F oll ow ing the fi rs t f

ou r sh ot s, Co op er r a n a

ro un d th e c orne r o f o ne of the apa rt me nt b uil din g s. Stewart c ould not discern if Cooper had bee n sho t , b u t s h e re called that she did not see Cooper bleeding when he turned the corne r. After the g ang members turned the corne r in pursuit of Cooper, Stewart he ard f

ive more sho t s
. S u b sequently , Stewart we nt to see what had happe ned and discovere d that Cooper had f allen two apa

rtment buildings aw ay

from her own. Serg eant Robert Shemwell was working with the homicide division of the Me mphis P olice Depa rtment on Novembe r 7, 1999, when he was instructe d by his lieutenant to investigate a shooting at Clementine Apa

rtments. Serg eant Shemwell was told that the shooting victim, Cooper , had died at Methodist South Hospi tal shortly afte r the incide nt. When Serg eant Shemwe ll arrived at the apartment co m p l ex, other office rs had a lrea dy se c ur e d the are a aro un d 13 86 Cle me nti ne , the are a wh e re Coo pe r “ c a me to r e st. ” Du ri ng the c ou rs e of hi s inve s ti g a ti o n , Se r g e a n t S h e mw e ll d is c o v e r e d th a t th e p e rp e tr a to r s w e r e me mb e r s o f the Gang ster Disciples. Spec ifically , the appe llant was implicated.
The a ppellant was a

rre sted, g iven his Miranda rights, and questi o n e d a b out the incident. The 2 appellant state d that he knew police wanted to que stion him about the Clementine shooting . The appellant told Serg eant Shemwe ll that he did not know C ooper, but Her shey , Adams, and W alls had qu e sti on e d Co op e r a

bo ut the sh oo tin g a ndro bb e ry of “ Ma c He a d. ” Accord ing to the app e lla nt, Wal ls h it Co op e r, a nd Coo pe r ra n aw a y . H e rs he y tol d th e app e lla nt that Co op e r h a d a g un . A da ms a ndthe app e lla nt b e g a n f

ir ing a t Coop e r’ s bac k. Th e app e lla nt state d tha t he wa s firing a .3 80 pis tol , a ndAd a ms w a s u sin g a

9 mi lli me te r p ist ol. Th e app e lla nt tol d Ser g e a nt She mw e ll, “ I sh ot at him

. I might have hit him. Might have not , but they said I did. I saw Shac k standing over him and shoot-3-

twice.” As Cooper rounde d the corner, the appellant’ s g un jammed, and he stopped to fix the g un. The a ppellant l ooked around the corner and saw Cooper on the g round, being kicked by Her shey and Wal ls. Th e n, Coo pe r wa s shot by Ad a ms. Af te r the inc ide nt, the app e lla nt g a ve his g un to Wa lls for disposal.
Se rg e a n t S h e m w e l l s t a t e d t h a t n o g u n b e l o n g i n g t o t h e ap p e l l a n t w a s f o u n d a t t he c ri me s ce n e. Ho we v er , p o l i ce re co v er ed a 9 mi l l i m et er p i s t o l b el o n gi n g t o Ad am s
. S p en ts h e l l c a s i n gs ne ar the loc a tio n w he re Coo pe r’ s b od y wa s f ou ndwe re de te rm ine d to be fr om Ad a ms’ pis tol

. Additionally , Serg eant Shemwe ll noted that a live round wa s rec overe d near the l ocation whe re the appellant c laimed his g un jammed, lending some cre dence to the appellant’ s version of e vents. Serg eant Shemwe ll testified that during t h e co u rse of his investigation, he le arne d from witnesses t h at t h e i n cident began at 1350 or 1360 Clementine a nd ended at 1386 Clementine. Additionally , there was a report that C o o p er “was a lrea dy bleeding from the mouth and holding blood as he wa s running , prior to circ ling the e nd of the a partment complex and g oing to the outside unit wher e he fell.” The serg eant opined that this version of events indicated that Cooper ha d been shot while he wa s running but before he rounde d the corner. At trial, Dr. O’ Brien Cleary Smit h testified as a n expert in f orensic pathology . He state d that he per formed the autopsy on Cooper’s body and deduce d that Cooper died f rom multipl e g unshot wounds. One of t he wounds, g unshot wound A, enter ed the ba ck of Cooper ’s left shoulder and trave led throug h his body , severing veins and arteries, f inally exit ing on the rig ht side of Cooper’ s ne c k. Gu ns ho t w ou ndB e nte re d a nde xite d th ro ug h th e up pe r p art of Coo pe r’ s lef t arm a ndc ou ld be cla ssified as a “ flesh wound.” Gunshot wound C e ntere d the front of Cooper’s thig h, fra cturing his femur.
Dr . Sm ith op ine d th a t th e g un sh ot w ou nd s c a us e d in ter nal ble e din g , u lti ma te ly le a din g to Cooper’s death. He stated that g unshot wound A, the wound to the back, was consistent with a shot fired f rom behind Cooper. The doctor c oncede d that the wound could ha ve conc eivably occur red if Cooper ha d been ly ing on his rig ht side on the ground when he wa s shot. Dr. Smit h stated that the wound to Cooper’s thig h must h av e b ee n cause d by someone fa cing Cooper and c ould not have occur red f rom someone f

iring at Cooper’ s back. Finally , Dr. Smith stated that the wound to Cooper’s ba ck wa s
No t a n in sta ntane ou sly

inc apa c itatin g wo un d, so a pe rs on c ou ld s til l rema in active, or

mobile, after

rec eiving such a w ound.

. . . . It w i l l t ak e s o m e t i m e f

o r t h e b l e e d i n g t o b e g i n t o [ a ] f f e c tt h e b o d y, t h e i n t er fer ence with breathing to the body . So it’s possi ble for a-4- person to re main conscious and a ble to undertak e voluntary action, for some pe riod of time. Dr. Smith asserted that Cooper would not have be en able to walk or run a fter sustaining the wound to h is thig h b e c a us e th e leg would n o lo ng e r b e c apa ble of e ff e c tiv e ly be ari ng we ig ht. Dr . Sm ith observe d that Cooper’s bod yshowed sig ns that he bled fr om the exit wound in his neck a nd the blood was “e x pirated,” meaning t h e b l o o d was mix ed with air a s it ex ited the wound to Cooper’ s windpipe as Cooper

breathed.
After ex am i n i n g t h e gu n s h o two u n d s , Dr

. S m i t h co u l d n o td ef i n i t i v el y s ayi f t h e w ounds were cause d by a .380 ca liber bullet or a 9 millimeter bullet. The doctor explained, “The .380 and the 9 [ milli meter] differ

by about two thousandths of an inc h in diameter. So they ’re both considere d medium caliber

wea pons and they

both have e noug h ener g y to produce the wounds.”
Th e vic tim ’s mothe r, Che ryl Coo pe r- Ha rris, te sti fi e d that sh e sa w h e r s on fo r the la st t ime on the Thursda y

prior to his death. She stated that Cooper was twe nty -three y ear s old at the time of his death, and he left behind a y oung daug hter.
Ba sed upon the for eg oing pr o o f, t h e jury convicted the appellant of the lesser -included offe nse of second deg ree murder. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the ma x imum sentenc e of twenty -five y ear s incar cer ation. On appea l, the appellant c halleng es the suff iciency of the evidenc e supporting his conviction and the trial c ourt’s applicat i o n o f certain enha nceme nt fac tors.
II. Ana lys is
A. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e First, we will address the suf ficienc y of the e vidence underlying the appellant’ s conviction for se cond deg ree murder. O n appea l, a jury conviction remove s the presumption of the a ppellant’s innocenc e and r eplac es it with one of g uilt, so that the appe llant car ries the bur den of de monstrating to this court w hy the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s finding s. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . The a ppellant must establish that no “rea sonable trier of fa ct” c ould have found the essential elements of the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ).
Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces w hich may be drawn t here from. See S tate v. Wil liams, 657 S.W .2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983) . I n other wor ds, questions conce rn i n g t h e cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evidenc e, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e, are resolved by

the trier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.-5-

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-210(a )(1) (1997) define s second de g ree murder a s the kn ow ing kil lin g of

a no the r. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 11 -3 02 (b ) ( 19 97 ) p ro vid e s: “Knowing ” re fer s to a person who acts knowing ly with respe ct to the conduct or

to circumst ance s surrounding the conduc t when the pe rson is a wa re of the natur e of

the c on du c t or

that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s e xist. A per son acts knowing ly with respec t to a re s u l t of the pe rson’s c on du c t w he n the pe rs on is a wa re that th e c on du c t is re a so na bly certain to cause the re sult.
I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e app e lla nt a dmi tte d to Se rg e a nt S he mw e ll tha t he re pe a te dly fi re d h is .380 pistol at Cooper’s bac k as Cooper w as flee ing, but he did not know if any of his bullets struck C o o p er
. Dr

. S m i t h s t at ed t h at o n e o f t h e w o u n d s wh i ch ca u s ed t h e b u l k o f t h e i n t er n al d am age e nte re d Coo pe r’ s ba c k a nd e xite d his ne c k. Ad dit ion a lly , Se rg e a nt S he mw e ll s ta te d th a t a wi tne ss to the offe nse obser ved Cooper ble eding as if from a g unshot wound prior to turning the corner of one of the apartment buil d i n gs. Taking this proof in the light most favor able to the State, we conclude that there was suff icient evidenc e to sustain the appe llant’s conviction for second de g ree murder. See State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 55-56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
B. Sente ncing Finally , the appe llant complains reg ard i n g the trial court’s application of va rious enhanc ement fa ctors. Ge nera lly , appellate revie w of t h e l ength, ra ng e or ma nner of service of a sentenc e is de novo. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). I n conducting its de novo review , this court considers the following fac tors: (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se nte nc ing he ari ng ; ( 2) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (3 ) the princ ipl e s of se nte nc ing a ndarg ume nts a s to sent e n c in g a lt e r n a ti v e s ; ( 4 ) th e n a tu r e a n d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f th e c r im in a l c o n d u c t i n v o lv e d ; ( 5) evidenc e and inf

ormation offe red by

the parties on enhanc ement a n d m itigating fac tors; (6) any sta te m e n tb y

t h e d e f e n d a n ti n h i s o w n b e h a l f ; a n d ( 7 ) t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r r e h ab i l i t a t i o n o r

tr e a t m e n t. See Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35- 102, -103, -210 ( 2003); see also St ate v
. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991)

. The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the impropriety of his sentenc e(s)

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, Sentencing Commi ssion Com m en t s
. M o reover, if the r ecor d reve als that the trial co u rt ad eq uately considere d sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and c ir c ums ta nc e s, thi s c ou rt

wi ll a c c or d the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns a pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. I n the instant case , t h e t ri al co u rt inappropriately applied c e rt a in e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s a nddidno t a c kn ow le dg e c on sid e ratio n o f the se nte nc ing princ ipl e s. Acc ording ly , we will re view the a ppellant’s sente nce pur ely de novo.
The a ppellant was found g uilty of second deg ree murder, a Class A fe lony . The trial c ourt was re quired to beg in its sentencing deter m i n at ion with the presumptive sentenc e at the midpoint of the rang e. See T enn. Code A n n
. § 40-35-210( c) ( 2003). F or a standa rd Rang e I

offe nder, the sentenc ing r ang e for

a Class A fe lony is not less than fifteen t o no more than twe nty -five y ear s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 1) (2003). The parties ag ree d that the appell an t wa s a s t andar dO n Ju l y 4, 2002, t h e s t at u t or y en h an ce men t f ac t or s we r e r en u mber ed. Se e T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 35- 114 3 (20 0 3 ). -6- Rang e I offe nder; a ccor dingly , the pre sumptive sentenc e was twenty y ear s. I d. The trial court was then re quired to incre ase the sentenc e for any enhanc ement fa ctors and r educe the sentenc e for any mitigating fac tors. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d) a nd (e)

. I n the instant case , the trial court f ound no mitigating fac tors. Howeve r, the trial court f ound the e xiste nc e of

the fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s: (2) The defe ndant has a

previous history

of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to those necess ary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (6 ) T he de fe nd a nt t

re a te d o r a llowed a

vic tim to b e tr e a te d w ith e xce pti on a l c ru e lty

du ri ng the c omm iss ionof the of fe ns e ; (9 ) T he de fe nd a nt h a s a

pr e vio us his tory of un wi lli ng ne ss to c omp ly w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a

s e n t e n c e i n v o l v i n g r e l e a s e i n t h e c o m m u n i t y; (10) The d efe ndant possessed or employ ed a f

irea rm, explosi ve device or ot her deadly wea pon during the commi ssion of the off ense; (11) The defe ndant had no hesitation about committing a c rime whe n the risk to human life wa s high; (1 3) Du ri ng the c omm iss ionof the fe lon y , the de fe nd a nt w ill fu lly inflicted bodily

injury upon another

perso n , or the a ctions of the defe ndant re sulted in the death or serious bodily injury to a victim or a pe rs on oth e r tha n th e int e nd e d v ic tim ; (17) The crime w as committed under circumstanc es under which the potential for bodily

injury to a victim was g reat; and (21) The defe ndant was adjudicate d to ha ve committed a delinquent act or acts as a j u v en i le that would constitute a fe lony if committed by a n a du lt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2) , (6), ( 9)-( 11), (13) , (17), a nd (21) ( 2003). 3

I n th e ini tia l app e llate brie fs fi le d in the ins ta nt c a se , th e app e lla nt c on c e de s, a ndthe State ag ree s, that the trial court properly found the e x istence of

enhanc ement fa ctors (2) , (10), a nd (21). Additionally , the appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed in apply ing e nhance ment fac tors (6),-7-

(9), ( 11), (13) , and (17). The S tate concede s the t rial court’s err or i n apply ing e nhance ment fac tors (9), ( 11), (13) , and (17)

. Prior to o u r re v i ew on appea l, the United States Supreme Court re lease d Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S.

_ _ , 1 2 4 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), whic h opinion impacts Tennessee ’s sentenc ing structure . Subsequent to the issuance of Blakely , the appellant moved this c ourt to consider a s an a dd iti on a l is su e on app e a l th e imp a c t of the Blak e ly

de c isi on up on the app e lla nt’ s se nte nc e . T his c ou rt g rante d th e app e lla nt’ s r e qu e st, a ndwe fu rthe r g rante d th e Sta te the op po rtun ity to r e sp on d to the appe llant’s arg uments on this is sue.
Th is c ou rt

ha s re c e ntl y re c og nize d th a t B lake ly “ c a lls int o q ue sti on the c on tin uin g va lid ity of our c urre nt sentencing scheme .” State v. J ulius E. Sm ith, No. E2003-01059-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606998, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly 19, 2004); see a lso St ate v. Micha el Way ne Poe , N o. E 20 03 -0 04 17 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 WL 16 07 00 2, a t *9 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t K no xvill e , July 19 , 2 00 4) . In B lake ly , th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld that the “statutory

maxi mum” for Appr endi[v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 1 2 0 S. Ct

. 2 3 4 8 , 2 3 6 2

- 6 3 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ] p u rp o s e s is th e ma ximum sentenc e a judge may

impose solely on the bas is of the facts reflecte d in the jury verdic t or admitted by the defe ndant. I n other wor ds, the re l ev an t“s t at u t o rym ax i m u m ” i s n o tt h e m ax i m u m s en t en ce a j u d ge may impose after finding additional fac ts, but the max imum he may impose without

a ny a dd iti onal find ing s. Whe n a jud g e inf

lic ts punishment that the jury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow, t he juryhas not found all the fa cts “whic h t h e law ma kes esse ntial to the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y.
Blakely , __ U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct . at 2537 (c itations omi tted).
I n its supplemental brief, the State ag ain concedes that enhanc ement factors (9) , (11), ( 13), a nd(1 7) we re imp ro pe rl y app lie d “ un der the c ur

re nt s e nte nc ing sc he me .” Ad dit ion a lly , th e State admits that “application of fac tor (6) w as impermissi b l e u n d er t h e rule of Appre ndi.” I n light of Blakely , we ag ree that the trial court improperly applied enhanc ement fac tors (6), ( 9), (11) , (13), a nd (1 7 )

. H o w e v e r , th e St a te ar g u e s th a t “ ap p li c a ti o n o f th r e e o f th e r e main in g f a c to r s [( 2 ), (10) , and (21)] was prope r under

Appre ndi and B lakely .” Clearly , the application of enhanc ement fac tor (2), which is ba sed on the exis tence of a defe ndant’s prior c riminal convictions, does not violate the dictate s of B lakely . Acc ording ly , based upon Bla kely and the fac ts adduce d in the i nstant case , we conclude that the t rial court did not err in apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (2) to the a ppellant. We note that, g ener ally , the constitutionalityof the a pplicat i o n o f t h e re maining statutory enhanc ement fa ctors without supporting f ind ings by

a jury rema ins to be seen. See State v. Terry-8-

Ly nn Byington, No. E 2003-02316-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606993, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly

19, 2004). Howe ver, B lakely indicates a

pproval of the use of enhanc ement fa ctors su pp orte d b y

fa c ts “ admitted by the de

fendant .” B lake ly , __ U.S. a t __ , 1 24 S. Ct . at 25 37 ; se e a lso Appre ndi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. C t. at 2362-63. I n his Blake ly arg ument, the appellant contends that his sentence should be reduc ed bec ause the “trial c ourt imposed sentenc e based upon fac ts not re fl e c te d in the jury

ve rd ic t or

a dmi tte d b y

the [ap pe lla nt]. ” Ho we ve r, the re c or d c le arl y be lie s th is contention. As the State notes in its supplemental brief, the appellant admitted at trial and on a ppeal t h a tt h e r e w e r e f

a c t s s u p p o r t i n g t h e ap p l i c a t i o n o f e n h a n c e m e n t f a c t o r s ( 1 0 ) a n d ( 2 1 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we c onclude that ther e wa s no err or in apply ing e nhance ment fac tors (2), ( 10), and (21) to the appellant. See State v. Steven M. Stinson, No. E2003-01720-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1698203, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knox ville, J uly 29, 2004); State v. Antonio Fuller, N o
. M 2 0 02-02377-CCAR3-CD, 2004 WL

1562546, at *14 n.2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, J uly 13, 2004), application for pe rm. to appea l filed, (Sept. 2, 2004). Reg ardle ss, give n the appe llant’s extensive criminal hist o ry , we conclude that if the application of enhanc ement factors (10) and (21) wer e error, the application of e nhance ment fac tor (2) a lone was en t i t l ed t o sufficie nt weig ht to warrant the imposit ion of the maxim um sentence of twenty -five y ear s. See S tate v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475-76 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that determining the c orre ct leng th of sentenc e is not the result of a mathematica l formula; rather, it is l eft to the discr etion of the c ourt to assig n the appr opriate w eig ht to ex isting fa ctors). In other wo rd s, if the app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s (1 0) a nd (2 1) we re e rr or , th e e rr or wa s h arm le ss. See Stinson, No. E2003-01720-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1698203, at *8.
III. Conclusi on Finding no reve rsible er

ror, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE