NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SKYCORP LTD,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. KING COUNTY, a municipal subdivision of State of Washington,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 21

- 35043
D.C. No. 2:20

- cv - 01632

- JCC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 3, 2021

Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, * * District Judge. SkyCorp Ltd appeals the district court’s grant of King County’s motion to dismiss its claims seeking declaratory judgment arising under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

SEP 22 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

United States Constitution. T he parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and w e affirm in part and dismiss in part. The district court appropriately dismissed SkyCorp’s Due Process Clause claim because SkyCorp fa iled to allege facts sufficient to meet the federal pleading
standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That standard “demands more than an unadorned, the

- defendant

- unlawfully

- harmed

- me accusation,” and a complaint will not suffice if it “tenders ‘naked asse rtion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). SkyCorp’s spare and conclusory allegations that the challeng ed ordinance “expressly deprive[s] [SkyCorp] of its rights and liberties . . . in a manner which fails to advance any legitimate interest of King County,” and as a result “directly and proximately deprived [SkyCorp] of [its] property rights absent substant ive due process of law” do not meet this standard. Thus, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of this claim. We dismiss SkyCorp’s Dormant Commerce Clause claim, albeit on different grounds than the district court. Although the parties did not address standing in their appellate briefing, we have “an obligation to assure ourselves” of litigants’ standing under Article III. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 3403

(2006) (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
I nc. , 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)). “Article III standing requires an injury that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc. , 709 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist. , 228 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) ). In the context of declaratory or injunctive relief, the plaintiff also must demonstrate a “real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury.” Id. SkyCorp has not alleged facts sufficient to establish standi ng to assert its Dormant Commerce Clause claim. For example, SkyCorp’s allegations regarding
its out

- of

- state waste disposal are silent as to whether King County has ever enforced the challenged ordinance against it for such conduct in the past

— or intends to do so in the future. Thus, absent allegations of a “real or immediate threat of irreparable injury,” SkyCorp cannot establish Article III standing to pursue its Dormant Commerce Clause claim. Id. We note, however, that King County acknowledged at or al argument that SkyCorp’s claims might be viable in the future in the event of appropriate allegations.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. Each party shall
bear its own costs.