J-S02001-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.I.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2735 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree August 9, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0001127-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0001433-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and RANSOM*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2018

A.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the August 9, 2017 decree that 

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, N.I.D., 

born in May 2013.1 We affirm. 

The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became 

involved with N.I.D. in April 2015, based on concerns that Mother was 

engaging in drug use and neglecting N.I.D.’s medical needs. Mother suffered 

from mental health issues, and she had a history of engaging in domestic 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court continued the involuntarily termination proceedings as to 

N.I.D.’s father, J.D. (“Father”). Although the certified record does not reveal 

whether the court ultimately terminated Father’s parental rights, the result of 

those proceedings is irrelevant to our review herein. See In re Burns, 379 

A.2d 535, 541 (Pa.1977) (“When an agency having custody of a child petitions 

for termination of parental rights, the rights of the respective natural parents 

must be determined independently.”).
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violence with Father, who was a convicted child sex offender. DHS obtained 

protective custody of N.I.D. on May 29, 2015, after Mother’s homeless shelter 

evicted her for threatening a staff member. The trial court entered a shelter 

care order on June 1, 2015, and it adjudicated N.I.D. dependent on June 16, 

2015. The court placed N.I.D. in kinship care with the maternal grandmother, 

whom N.I.D. refers to as “mommy.” While the initial permanency goal was 

reunification, she remains in her grandmother’s and grandfather’s care. 

Following N.I.D.’s adjudication of dependency, APM,2the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) that administered the family services for DHS, 

prepared a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) for Mother. Mother’s SCP objectives were 

to: (1) sign releases of information for service providers; (2) provide CUA with 

updated contact information; (3) attend a Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) 

referral for a dual diagnosis assessment and drug screens; (4) comply with 

CEU recommendations; (5) follow medication management 

recommendations; (6) continue weekly therapy; (7) attend weekly sessions 

of supervised visitation with N.I.D.; (8) complete parenting classes; and (9) 

locate appropriate housing. 

For the ensuing eighteen months, Mother made minimal progress 

toward her SCP objectives. She participated in a dual diagnosis assessment

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2 APM (Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha) “is a community-based agency 

that is responsible to improve the safety, stability, and well-being of the 

children and families in the 24th and 26th police districts through 

Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS).” See

https://apmphila.org/services/family-services/community-umbrella-agencyapm-cua/
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and compiled with CEU’s recommendation to attend intensive outpatient 

treatment, but she exhibited little motivation to overcome her substance 

abuse issues. In fact, during 2016, Mother submitted positive drug screens 

for marijuana and oxycodone. In regard to her mental health, Mother 

attended only two of seventeen mental health treatment sessions. Likewise, 

she failed to complete a parenting program, remained without stable housing, 

and inconsistently attended the weekly one-hour visitations with N.I.D. 

On November 21, 2016, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to N.I.D. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), (8), and (b). The trial court conducted a termination hearing on August 

9, 2017, during which it heard the testimony of the CUA case manager

assigned to the family, Crystal Robinson, and Mother.3 Following the hearing, 

the court entered a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother 

timely filed a notice of appeal on August 24, 2017, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review. 

1. Did the Trial Court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)[?]

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3 The trial court appointed Joshua Weil, Esquire, to represent N.I.D.’s legal 

interests. Her best interest was represented by the guardian ad litem, Ruth 

Brice, Esquire. Neither attorney filed a brief in this appeal. 
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2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that termination of parental 

rights best served the child’s developmental, physical and 

emotional needs under Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b)?

3. Did the Trial Court err in changing the child’s goal to adoption?

Mother’s brief at vi.4

We consider Mother’s issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review. 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

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In her notice of appeal, concise statement, and brief, Mother indicates that 

she is appealing both the termination of her parental rights and the trial court’s 

decision to change N.I.D.’s permanent placement goal to adoption. In its 

opinion, the trial court requests that we affirm its August 9, 2017 goal change 

order. However, our review of the certified record confirms that no goal 

change took place. The court did not indicate at the conclusion of the 

termination hearing that it would be changing N.I.D.’s goal, and the court’s 

August 9, 2017 permanency review order maintained N.I.D.’s goal as return

to parent or guardian. As the goal change is not a prerequisite to the 

termination of parental rights, we address only the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. See In Re: Adoption of S.E.G., 901 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 2006) 

(goal change is not condition precedent to termination of parental rights).
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Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with 

the court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b), in order 

to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s 

decision to terminate under § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 
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abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). 

It is a well-ensconced principle that “[t]he grounds for termination due 

to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as 

well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 

337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
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Presently, the trial court concluded that Mother was incapable of 

parenting N.I.D., and that she cannot, or will not, remedy her parental 

incapacity, and that her “eleventh-hour attempt to . . . make it appear as if 

she’s remedying some of the issues” was unconvincing. Trial Court Opinion, 

10/26/17, at 14-15; N.T., 8/9/17, at 45. Specifically, the court determined 

that the CUA case manager, Crystal Robinson, credibly testified that Mother 

failed to comply with her SCP objectives. Id. at 15. 

Mother counters that she demonstrated moderate compliance. She 

contends that she was attending mental health and substance abuse 

treatment, and making progress in both areas when DHS filed its petition to 

terminate her parental rights. Mother’s brief at 3. Mother also contends that

she was searching for housing and attending visitation with N.I.D. Id.

The certified record supports the trial court’s findings. During the 

termination hearing, Ms. Robinson testified that Mother’s substance abuse 

issues remained unresolved. Ms. Robinson recalled that she spoke to Mother 

in June 2017, and that Mother admitted that she was no longer attending a 

substance abuse treatment program. N.T., 8/9/17, at 22. In addition, Mother 

admitted that she was using Percocet to self-medicate her depression. Id. at 

21-22. While Mother eventually re-enrolled in substance abuse treatment, 

she did not do so until July 26, 2017. Id. at 31-32.

Mother’s mental health issues also continued to be a concern. Ms. 

Robinson testified that, on the day of the termination hearing, Mother provided 

her with a document indicating that she began attending mental health 
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treatment at Best Behavioral Health during January 2017. Id. at 31. 

However, Ms. Robinson stressed that she had not yet had time to contact the 

facility and verify the consistency of Mother’s attendance. Id.

In addition, Ms. Robinson testified that Mother had not completed a 

parenting program. Id. at 32. In fact, the record is replete with examples of 

Mother’s parenting deficiencies. For instance, Ms. Robinson described a 

particularly troubling event that occurred at supervised visitation when Mother

claims that she was progressing toward her goals. Id. at 23. Ms. Robinson 

recalled that Mother “came [to] the visit dressed [in]appropriately . . . [a]nd 

when staff asked her to leave, to cancel her visit, she became irate. [She 

s]tarted yelling and cursing and threatening staff in the presence of her child.” 

Id. at 23-24. N.I.D. began to cry and staff had to escort her away. Id. at 

24. This conduct belies the image of the caring parent that Mother attempts 

to project. 

Mother also remained without appropriate housing. Id. at 25. Indeed, 

Mother reported to CUA that she “lives in a room,” but she neglected to 

provide the street address. Id. at 23. Finally, Mother’s attendance at 

visitations with N.I.D. continued to be inconsistent. Id. Mother attended 

visitation sporadically during May and June 2017, and in the month preceding

the August 2017 termination hearing, Mother participated in only one 

supervised visitation with her daughter. Id. at 24. 

Thus, the record confirms that Mother is incapable of parenting N.I.D., 

and that she cannot, or will not, remedy her parental incapacity. By the date
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of the termination hearing, N.I.D. had been in foster care for over two years.

During that time, Mother did little to comply with her SCP objectives and work 

toward reunification. While Mother re-enrolled in substance abuse and mental 

health treatment in 2017, those efforts were insufficient. It is well-settled

that “a parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness 

regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as 

untimely or disingenuous.” A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (citing In re J.W., 578 

A.2d 952, 959 (Pa.Super. 2002)). As this Court has stated, “a child’s life 

cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a 

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). We find no basis to disturb the 

trial court’s conclusion that DHS established the statutory grounds to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).

We next consider whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion 

by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). 

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 
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it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

The trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental rights would 

best serve N.I.D.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. 

Again, the court found Ms. Robinson’s testimony credible. Specifically, in 

relation to the lack of a meaningful parent-child bond, the court highlighted 

Ms. Robinson’s testimony that N.I.D. established a primary bond with her 

maternal grandparents, whom she calls “mommy” and “tata.” N.T., 8/9/17,

26. The court determined that N.I.D. does not have a meaningful bond with 

Mother, and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would not cause 

N.I.D. to suffer irreparable harm. 

Mother argues that her visits with N.I.D. went well, and she challenges 

the trial court’s finding that the bond she shares with N.I.D. was 

inconsequential. In support of her position, Mother invokes the aspects of Ms. 

Robinson’s testimony that indicated that the visitations usually went “pretty 
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well,” and that Mother and daughter shared some type of a bond. N.T., 

8/9/17, at 32. Ms. Robinson recalled that there were “maybe one or two 

occasions where [N.I.D.] would cry because she didn’t want the visit to be 

over.” Id. at 33. 

Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s findings. 

Consistent with the court’s conclusions, the record demonstrates that, while 

the visitations that mother attended were uneventful, they did not illustrate a 

meaningful mother-daughter relationship. The most compelling expression of 

this reality is that, if N.I.D. acknowledged Mother at all during the visitations, 

the four year old referred to Mother by her first name. Id. at 32. Thus, rather 

than evince any of the hallmarks of a meaningful parent-child bond, N.I.D.’s 

behavior indicated that she viewed Mother as a playmate. 

In contrast to the tenuous connection that Ms. Robinson observed 

between N.I.D. and Mother, she testified that N.I.D. has “a very healthy bond 

and attachment” with her maternal grandparents, with whom she has resided 

since June 2015, when she was two years old. Id. at 26. She characterized 

the home as loving, nurturing, and safe. Id. Significantly, Ms. Robinson 

opined that N.I.D. views her grandparents “in a parental role,” and as we 

previously noted, the four-year-old child refers to them as “mommy,” and 

“tata.” Id. Thus, it is evident that N.I.D.’s primary parental bond is with her 

maternal grandparents. 

Mindful that a trial court can “consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent” 
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and “the importance of continuity of [those] relationships[,]” we find sufficient 

evidence in the certified record to sustain the trial court's determination. See 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., supra at 1219. Stated plainly, it was within the 

trial court’s discretion to conclude that terminating Mother’s parental rights in 

order for N.I.D. to attain permanency with maternal grandparents satisfied

the child’s developmental, emotional, and physical needs and welfare. 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decree 

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to N.I.D. pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/18