Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

BRIAN R. GATES ELIZABETH B. SEARLE

TIMOTHY W. WOODS Ball Eggleston PC

J. THOMAS VETNE Lafayette, Indiana

Jones Obenchain, LLP

South Bend, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CO-ALLIANCE, LLP, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 91A04-1211-PL-606

)

MONTICELLO FARM SERVICE, INC., )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Robert W. Thacker, Judge

Cause No. 91C01-1102-PL-10

July 22, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

SHEPARD, Senior Judge 
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Two creditors are involved in a dispute over the priority of their competing 

security interests in crop proceeds. Co-Alliance, LLP, seeks to challenge a trial court

order favorable to Monticello Farm Service, Inc. Concluding that the order is not a final 

judgment or an interlocutory order appealable as a matter of right, we dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Timothy, Lisa, Ross, and Dane Clark and their farming operations pledged their 

2010 crop proceeds as collateral to obtain loans from three different creditors, who 

perfected their security interests in the following order: First Farmers Bank & Trust, CoAlliance, and Monticello. In June 2010, the Bank and Monticello entered into a

subordination agreement in which Monticello agreed to finance the Clarks’ 2010 crops in 

an amount not to exceed the principal sum of $340,000, and in turn, the Bank agreed to 

subordinate its interests in those crops to Monticello’s interests in the same.

Timothy and Lisa filed for bankruptcy in federal court in November 2010. At that 

time, the Bank claimed it was owed $2,382,000, Co-Alliance claimed it was owed 

$221,000, and Monticello claimed it was owed $216,000. In December 2011, the Clarks 

and the three creditors entered into a settlement agreement in which the Clarks and the 

Bank waived any claim to $181,000 of the 2010 crop proceeds. The Bank “assign[ed] 

any interest it may have in those remaining proceeds to Co-Alliance subject to the rights 

and interests of Monticello pursuant to the Subordination Agreement dated June 25, 

2010.” Appellant’s App. p. 305. For their part, Co-Alliance and Monticello waived any 
3

claim to 2010 crop proceeds exceeding $181,000. The Clarks agreed to hold $181,000 in 

the escrow account of their attorney.

Meanwhile, in February 2011, the Bank sought foreclosure and a money judgment 

against Ross and Dane in the White Circuit Court. Several other parties, including CoAlliance and Monticello, were named as defendants due to their interests in the Clarks’

property. Monticello answered and cross-claimed against the other defendants. After the 

settlement agreement was filed in the bankruptcy proceedings, Monticello obtained leave 

to amend its cross-claim to join Timothy and Lisa, who had signed certain promissory 

notes alongside Ross and Dane, so that Monticello could claim the $181,000 available 

from the 2010 crop proceeds.

Co-Alliance counterclaimed against Monticello, asserting that it held the first 

priority lien on the $181,000 and further alleging that Monticello converted a number of 

checks by depositing them without the necessary endorsements. On Co-Alliance’s 

motion, the trial court directed the $181,000 to be transferred to the trial court clerk.

Monticello and Co-Alliance each moved for partial summary judgment, and the 

trial court held a hearing. On October 31, 2012, the court found that Monticello was 

entitled to the disputed funds and thus granted Monticello’s motion and denied CoAlliance’s motion. The order directed the trial court clerk to “continue to hold in trust” 

the $181,000 “until further Order of the Court determines that distribution should and 

shall be made upon the partial summary judgment entered herein.” Id. at 22.

ISSUE

Dispositive in this case is whether we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION

In its Notice of Appeal, Co-Alliance claims the trial court’s October 31, 2012 

order is appealable as a matter of right because it is an interlocutory order for the 

payment of money. See Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(1) (an appeal from an interlocutory 

order “[f]or the payment of money” may be taken as a matter of right). However, the 

court’s order was not for the payment of money. Although the court determined that 

Monticello was entitled to the disputed funds, it explicitly directed the clerk to continue 

to hold the funds in trust until further order. The chronological case summary does not 

reflect that the court has yet ordered the distribution of the funds.

Nor is the court’s order a final judgment. It does not dispose of all claims as to all 

parties or expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay and direct entry of 

judgment. The order is thus “subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 

adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Ind. Trial Rule 

54(B).

“The authority of the Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to exercise 

appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from final judgments.” Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Fields, 842 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2006) (citing Ind. Appellate Rules 4(A)(1), 

5(A)).

This limited authority, among other things, buttresses the ability of trial judges to 

manage litigation as they may think most likely to produce prompt and just outcomes. 

The parties are certainly free to request that Judge Thacker certify for interlocutory 
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appeal those rulings challenged in the appeal we dismiss today, and Judge Thacker will 

likewise be free to do so or not.

CONCLUSION

We therefore dismiss this appeal.

NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.