IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

JAMES K. CULP, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

Defendant. 

BROWN, Judge. 

3:14-CV-01133-PK 

ORDER 

Magistrate Judge Paul Papak issued Findings and 

Recommendation (#49) on September 28, 2015, in which he 

recommends the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion (#30) for Summary 

Judgment, deny as moot Defendant's Cross-Motion (#31) for Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff's Benefit Claim, and grant Defendant's 

Motion (#32) for Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim. 

Defendant filed timely Objections to the Findings and 

1 - ORDER 

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Recommendation. The matter is now before this Court pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). 

When any party objects to any portion of the Magistrate 

Judge's Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make 

a de nova determination of that portion of the Magistrate Judge's 

report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1). See also Dawson v. Marshall, 561 

F.3d 930, 932 (9'" Cir. 2009); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9t" Cir. 2003) (en bane). 

Defendant objects only to the Magistrate Judge's finding 

that Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the Oregon 

statutory rate. 

I. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest. 

Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that 

Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on his ERISA 

benefits claim. In its Objections Defendant reiterates the 

arguments contained in its Motion for Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff's Benefit Claim, its Reply in support of its Motion for 

Summary Judgment, its response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 

Judgment, and its statements at oral argument. This Court has 

carefully considered Defendant's Objections and concludes they do 

not provide a basis to modify the Findings and Recommendation. 

The Court also has reviewed the pertinent portions of the record 

de nova and does not find any error in the Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendation. 

2 - ORDER 

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II. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate 

set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1961. 

Defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding 

that Plaintiff should receive prejudgment interest at Oregon's 

statutory rate rather than at the rate set out in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1961. 

The Ninth Circuit has held in ERISA benefits cases that 

"[g)enerally 'the interest rate prescribed for post-judgment 

interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 1 is appropriate for fixing the 

rate of pre-judgment interest unless the trial judge finds, on 

substantial evidence, that the equities of that particular case 

require a different rate.'" Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assur. 

Co. of Boston, 486 F.3d 620, 628 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting GroszSalomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th 

Cir. 2001)). "Substantial evidence" is "such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Blanton v. Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

In Blankenship the plaintiff prevailed on his ERISA benefit 

claim and the district court awarded the plaintiff prejudgment 

interest at 10.01% rather than at the T-bill rate set out in 28 

1 28 U.S.C.§ 1961(a) provides: "[I]nterest shall be 

calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate 

equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury 

yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the 

judgment." 

3 - ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01133-PK Document 55 Filed 01/08/16 Page 3 of 8
u.s.c. § 1961. 486 F.3d at 622, 628. The Ninth Circuit held the 

district court did not err when it awarded the plaintiff a rate 

higher than the rate set out in § 1961 because the district court 

made the necessary factual findings to establish there was 

substantial evidence that the equities of that case required a 

different rate. Id. at 628. Specifically, the district court 

relied on the plaintiff's declaration in which he testified: 

[A)s a result of Liberty Life's nonpayment of 

benefits, Blankenship was forced to replace the 

$6,093.82 per month he would have received with 

his own personal funds. Those funds would 

otherwise have been invested in a Vanguard mutual 

fund in which he had already invested over one 

half million dollars, and which had a 

10.01-percent return since its inception in June 

2000. Based on this factual record, the court 

concluded that ftin order for Blankenship to be 

adequately compensated for Liberty's wrongful 

nonpayment of benefits," it was awarding 

prejudgment interest at a rate of 10.01 percent, 

compounded monthly. 

Id. The Ninth Circuit held the district court's factual findings 

were ftsupported by the record, and . adequate to satisfy 

the 'substantial evidence' requirement." Id. 

Here Plaintiff does not point to any evidence similar to 

that in Blankenship to suggest the equities of this case require 

the Court to award prejudgment interest at a rate higher than 

that permitted in § 1961. Instead Plaintiff relies on two cases 

from the Tenth Circuit and cases from district courts in the 

Tenth Circuit in which the courts awarded prejudgment interest in 

ERISA benefit cases at the state's statutory rate rather than the 

4 - ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01133-PK Document 55 Filed 01/08/16 Page 4 of 8
rate set in § 1961. The Tenth Circuit, however, applies a 

different analysis than the Ninth Circuit as to whether interest 

should be awarded at the rate set in § 1961 or the state rate. 

The Tenth Circuit cases, therefore, are not pertinent. 

Plaintiff also relies on a case from the Western District of 

Tennessee (Warden v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) in 

which the court concluded: ~The rate of prejudgment interest 

will be determined under Tennessee law unless MetLife can 

demonstrate that this state law overcompensates Plaintiff.n 574 

F. Supp. 2d 838, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). Warden relies on Ford v. 

Uniroyal Pension Plan, a Sixth Circuit case that does not support 

an award of prejudgment interest at the state's rate of interest 

rather than the interest rate set in § 1961 nor does it indicate 

a defendant must establish the state rate would overcompensate a 

plaintiff. The court in Ford stated: 

5 - ORDER 

Although a district court may look to state law 

for guidance in determining the appropriate 

prejudgment interest rate, we have held previously 

that the statutory postjudgment framework set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is a reasonable method 

for calculating prejudgment interest awards. The 

magistrate judge determined that the average 

52-week U.S. Treasury bill rate over the relevant 

period was 8.68%. He then selected the flat rate 

of 9% per annum, ~to avoid the complexities of 

compounding interest.n J.A. at 166 (Magis. J. R & 

R) . The district court adopted the recommended 9% 

annual rate. Because the 9% rate was based on the 

average 52-week United States Treasury bill rate 

over the relevant time period, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

utilizing a 9% prejudgment interest rate. 

Case 3:14-cv-01133-PK Document 55 Filed 01/08/16 Page 5 of 8
154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Although 

the Ford court noted a district court may look to state law for 

guidance, the court did not apply the state interest rate. Ford, 

therefore, does not support the Warden court's use of the 

Tennessee state rate, and it does not support Plaintiff's request 

for this Court to apply the Oregon rate of interest. 

In Stone v. Bayer Corporation Long Term Disability Plan this 

Court declined to award prejudgment interest in an ERISA benefit 

case at the Oregon statutory rate: 

Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to 

establish she suffered the loss of an ability to 

invest money in funds at a rate of return higher 

than that earned on T-Bills or that she had to 

borrow money at a higher rate to compensate for 

lost benefits. Plaintiff merely states the rate 

under § 1961 "will not adequately compensate [her) 

for the denial of benefits over the five year 

period." Absent any authority to support a rate 

other than that proscribed in § 1961, the Court 

awards Plaintiff prejudgment interest at the 

one-year T-Bill rate found at 

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Hl5/current/. 

No. 08-CV-356-BR, 2010 WL 2595675, at *4 (D. Or. June 21, 2010). 

Other courts in this district also have declined to award 

prejudgment interest in ERISA benefits cases at the Oregon 

statutory rate or at rates different from the one set out in 

§ 1961. See, e.g., Rabbat v. Standard Ins. Co., 894 F. Supp. 2d 

1311, 1323-24 (D. Or. 2012) (an ERISA plaintiff was not entitled 

to prejudgment interest at Oregon's statutory rate of nine 

percent because he did not "set forth any evidence demonstrating 

6 - ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01133-PK Document 55 Filed 01/08/16 Page 6 of 8
that the equities require this court to deviate from the rate 

prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 1961."); Topits v. Life Ins. Co. of N. 

Am., No. 3:12-CV-00661-ST, 2013 WL 5524129, at *12 (D. Or. 

Apr. 11, 2013), adopted 2013 WL 5524131 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2013) 

(plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest at Oregon's 

statutory rate of nine percent because the plaintiff had not 

submitted evidence justifying a deviation from the rate 

prescribed in 29 U.S.C. § 1961). 

As noted, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence in the 

record to establish that he suffered the loss of his ability to 

invest money in funds at a rate of return higher than that earned 

on T-Bills or that he had to borrow money at a higher rate to 

compensate for lost benefits. The Court, therefore, concludes on 

this record that Plaintiff should be awarded prejudgment interest 

at the rate set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 rather than the Oregon 

statutory rate. Accordingly, the Court declines to adopt that 

portion of the Findings and Recommendation in which the 

Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff should be awarded prejudgment 

interest at the Oregon statutory rate. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court ADOPTS AS MODIFIED Magistrate Judge Papak's 

Findings and Recommendation (#49), and, accordingly, GRANTS 

Plaintiff's Motion (#30) for Summary Judgment, DENIES as moot 

7 - ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01133-PK Document 55 Filed 01/08/16 Page 7 of 8
Defendant's Cross-Motion (#31) for Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff's Benefit Claim, and GRANTS Defendant's Motion (#32) 

for Summary Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim. 

The Court DIRECTS the parties to confer and to submit a form 

of Judgment to this Court consistent with this Order no later 

than January 25, 2016. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this gth day of January, 2016. 

ANNA J. BROWN 

United States District Judge 

8 - ORDER 

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