### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Fe br ua ry 1, 200 6 S es sio n a t N as hvi lle

SHER RY A. HU BBLE ET AL


### . v. D YER NU RS ING HO ME

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for G ibson County No. 15613 Hon. Geor ge R. Ellis, Chan cellor

No. W2005-00503-SC- R3-CV - F iled on Ap ril 12, 2006

This worker s’ compensation action arose out of an automobile acc ident occur ring while the plaintiff

wa s o n h e r w a y

to an o ri e ntatio n s e ssi on he ld at a loc a tio n s e pa

rate fr om the nu rs ing ho me fa c ili ty at wh i ch s he had be en hire d to work. The c hance ry court a war ded the plaintiff 95% perma nent partial disability

and also orde red the defe ndant employ er to reimburse State Fa rm, the insurer

of the driver of the automobile, for medical pay ments made under the driver’ s policy

. The c ourt did not order reimburse ment for a mounts paid by State Fa rm under the liability portion of t he poli cy . On

app e a l, the de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s: 1 ) the plaint if

f wa s no t a n e mpl oy e e a t the tim e of the a c c ide nt; 2) if sh e wa s a n e mpl oy e e , th e inj ury didno t ari se ou t of an d in the c ou rs e of the plaint if

f’ s e mpl oy me nt; 3) the trial c ourt err ed in ordering the defe ndant to reimburse State F arm for medical pa y ments made; and 4) the trial court e rre d in not allowing the de fenda nt a cr edit for those a mounts already paid by State Fa rm. The plaintiff a

ppeals the finding of 95% perma nent partial disability , arg uing that the evidenc e supports a f

inding of perma nent total disability

. State Fa rm appe als the court’s denial of

r e imb u r s e me n t f

o r th e a mo u n t State F ar m p a idu n d e r th e li ab il it y

p r o v is io n o f

th e p o li c y

. We

acc epted r evi ew b ef

o re the ca se wa s hear d or consider ed by the Special Worker s’ Compensation Ap p e a ls Pa n e l. U p o n d u e c o n s id e r a ti o n , w e a f f irm th e d e c is io n o f th e c h a n c e r y court that the plaintiff was an employ ee, that she was injure d in the course and scope of her employ ment, and that she suffe red 95% perma nent partial disabilit y

. We a lso hold that the trial court corr ectly order ed the defe ndant to r eimburse State F arm for the medica l benef

its paid while deny ing r eimbursement f or the amounts paid under the liability provision. Finally , we c onclude that the de fenda nt is not entit led
to a cr edit for the a mount paid by State Fa rm.

Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 50-6-225(e ); Judgm ent of the Trial Court is Aff irm ed

W I L L I AM M. B AR KE R , C.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J r., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J J ., joined.

J ohn D. B urleson and Mic hael L . Mansfield, Jackson, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Dy er Nursing Home.T hi s job invol ved act i vi t i es s uch as making b ed s, pa ss i ng out snacks and i ce t o t he res i d ent s, and s o m e l i ght 1

clea ning o f

ro o m s.

-2- Michae l A. Carter

and C

. Timothy Crocker , Milan, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Sherry

A. Hubble.

J o h n S

. L i t t l e , J a c k s o n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l e e , S t a t e F ar mIn s u r a n c e C o m p a n y.

OP IN ION

F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

Whil e a junior in hig h school, the plaintiff, Sherry Hubble, bec ame inter ested in working at Dy er N ursing Home wher e her mother was employ ed. The plaintiff was se ventee n y ear s old. On Dec ember 15, 2000, the plaintiff went to the nursing home and c ompleted an a pplication to work at that fac ilityas a “ hostess.” As part o f t h e h iring proce ss, the plaintiff was r equire d to take a 1 tuberc ulosis ski n test, which she did on that day

. She returne d on Dec ember 18, at which time she was told that her tube rculosis test was ne g ative.

Whil e at the nursing home on Dec ember 18, the plaintiff met with B etty Caton, the Dire ctor of Nursing . During this meeting, Ms. Caton g ave the plaintif f an “employ ee pa ckag e” w hich

c on ta ine d n ume ro us do c ume nts inc lud ing a po lic y a ndpr oc e du re s ma nu a l, OSH A g uid e lin e s, sa fe ty memos, a statement of residents’ rig hts, a nd a lunch car d for the pla intiff to use at the fa cility . The pla int if f a lso fi lle d ou t a nd sig ne d e mpl oyme nt do c ume nts ne c e ssa ry fo r t a x an d p a yro ll p ur po se s. Th e pla int if

f an d Ms. Ca ton a g re e d tha t the plaint if f wo uld e arn $5 .1 5 pe r hou r. Th e nu rs ing ho me then sent the plaintiff to a near by fac ilityfor a

phy sical examination, which she passe d.

Ms. Caton told the plaintiff that she was require d to attend three day s of orienta tion before
sta rt ing wo rk

a t th e nu rs ing ho me . T he orie ntatio n w a s a t a se pa rate fa c ili ty

loc a te d in B e lls
, Tenne ssee, a

pproxi mately

thirty miles from Dy er, Tennessee

. This fac ilitywas a separ ate nur sing home, not aff

iliated with Dy er N ursing Home. The plaintiff was told to report to work a t Dy er Nursi n g H o me a t s ix o ’ c lo c k in th e mo r n in g o n th e d a y f o ll o w in g h e r o r ie n tati o n tr a in ing . The plaintiff testified that she ha d been unde r the impression that she w ould ge t paid for ha lf the time she spent at the o ri entation. She said that whe n she left the nur sing home on Dec ember 18, she understood that she ha d been hir ed and w as an employ ee of the nursing home bec ause “ Be tty [C aton] told me after I g o t th r o u g h w ith my tr a in in g th a t I w a s to r e p o r t b a c k a t th e n u r s in g h o me the fo llo wi ng da y a ft e r that mornin g a t 6 o ’c loc k a ndthe y wa s [si c ] g oin g to s ho w m e ho w t o c loc k in and show me a

round the nursing home.”

Both B etty

Caton and Jerry

Park, t he adminis trator of Dy er Nursing Home, testi fied that the plaintiff’s employ ment was c onditioned on her attending the three -day orientation session. I n other

wo rd s, it w a s th e ir po si ti on that th e plaint if f w ou ld n ot b e c ome a n e mpl oy e e of the nu rs ing ho me until the orientation wa s complete a nd she ar rived a t the nursing home the following day andT hi s case was consoli d at ed at t ri al wi t h t he case o f She f f i el d v. D y er N urs i ng H o m e, G i b son C o unt y C hancery 2

C our t N o. 157 30

. T he l i abi l i t y po r t i on of M s

. Shef f i el d’ s cas e was t r i ed at t he s ame t i me as t he f i r s t phas e of

t hi s ca s e. A t t h e ti m e o f t h e se c o n d p h a se fo r th e se c a se s, M s. S h e ff ie ld initially re q u e ste d a c o n tinu a n c e a n d the n late r v o lun ta rily d ism isse d he r c a se a g a ins t D ye r N u rs ing H o m e

.
-3- “cloc ked in.” Thus, a ccor ding to the nur sing home , the plaintiff wa s never more than a “prospe ctive” e mploy ee. B etty Caton did te stify

that all employ ees g et paid for the full time spent in orientation and that this pay is refle cted on their

first pay chec k from the nur sing home

. The plaintiff w as to attend orientation at the tra ining c enter in Be lls, Tennessee on Dec ember 19, 2 0
, and 21 for

eig ht hours eac h day . She rode to the f acility with Scarlet Caton, who wa s trave ling to the B ells fac ilityfor a dditional training. A lso i n t h e ca r was a nother ne wly -hired employ ee, Ca sey

Sheffield. At the orientation, the pl aintiff was require d to sign in a nd out so that

2 the nursing home could be notified as to w ho attended the training and could ke ep a r ec o rd for pa yro ll p ur

po se s.

Whil e driving to the fac ilityon the t hird day
, Dec ember 21, 2000, the women we re involved in a n auto mob ile a c c ide nt. As a re su lt o f the a c c ide nt, the plaint if f s us ta ine d s ig nif

ic a nt i nju ri e s to her ba ck, rig ht leg , ankle, and foot. These injuries require d the fusion of her spine at the L 1 level and the f usion of her rig ht a nkle. The plaintiff w as hospitalized for appr ox imately one month, afte r which she unde rwe nt inpatient reha bilitation for four more months. By the time of trial, the plaintiff ha d u nd e rg on e app ro xima te ly tw e nty -e ig ht s ur g e ri e s.
The plaintiff w as trea ted by orthopedic surg eon Dr. Geor g e Wood. Dr. Wood release d the plaintiff at maximum medical i m p ro v em ent on J une 5, 2003, and a ssigne d her a 40% permanent anatomica l impairment to he r body as a whole. Dr . Wood opined that the plaintiff could work in the fu tur e , a lth ou g h s he wa s li mit e d to pe rf ormin g se de nta

ry wo rk wh ic h w ou ld a llo w h e r f

le xibil ity to

m o v e ar o u n d t h r o u g h o u tt h e d a y.
The plaintiff w as eva luated by Dr. Joseph Boals, an orthopedic surg eon, for the purposes of obtaining an anatomica l impairment rating in connec tion with thi s case . Dr. B oals opined that the plaintiff had a

61% permanent anatomical i m p ai rm ent rating to her body as a w hole. He did not disag ree with the restric tions placed on the pla intiff’s ac tiviti es by Dr. Wood, nor did he disag ree with Dr. Wood’s opinion reg arding her a bilityto eng ag e in sede ntary work.

At the def

endant’ s re q u est , the plaintiff wa s evaluated by Patsy Br amlett, a ce rtified reha bilitation counselor and licensed profe ssional c ounselor, for purposes of de termining the extent of the plaintiff’s vocational disability

. Ms. B ramlett found that the plaintiff wa s functioning at below a hig h school equivale ncy level. She testified that the re sults of the testing indicated that the plaintiff would reta in up to a 95% vocational disabilit y as the re sult of her in

j u ri es

. Howeve r, af

ter he r

v o ca t i o n al d i s ab i l i t y

ev al u at i o n wa s co m p l et ed
, t h e p l ai n t i ff d i d s u cc ee d i n co m p l et i n g h erh i gh school educ ation. Ms. Bramlett testified that a s a high school g raduate, and depending on her a ctual activity level, the plaintiff’ s vocational disability was likely

in the neig hborhood of 77%

.St at e Fa rm had pa i d $6 6
, 6 6 6

. 6 6 dir ect l y t o t he R egi o nal M ed i cal C ent er, one of t he p l ai nt i f f ’ s heal t h care 3

p ro v id e rs . T h e re m a inin g $ 3 3 ,3 3 3 .3 4 w a s p a id to the p la intiff ’s atto rn e y. T h e tr ia l co u rt h e ld tha t t h e $ 3 3 ,3 3 3 ,3 4 p a id
t o t h e pl ai n t i f

f ’ s a t t or n ey w ou l d be de du ct ed f r om t h e at t or n ey s ’ f

ee s c ol l ec t ed f

r om of t h e wor k er s ’ c ompen s at i on a wa r d.

-4- At trial, the plainti ff t es t i fi ed that her ability to drive is limit ed; she ha s difficulty lifting minimal amounts of weig ht; she has di fficulty sitti ng or st anding in one position for any leng th of tim e ; a nd sh e c a nn ot do ma ny of the ba sic ho us e ho ld c ho re s. Ho we ve r, sh e te sti fi e d that sh e ba by sit s her br other’s two c hildren, who we re f our y ear s old and nine months old at the time of trial.

At the t ime of t he accident, Scarlet C aton, t he driver of the automobi le in which the plaintiff

was a passeng er, w as in s u red unde r a policy of insuranc e with State Fa rm I nsuranc e Company (“ Sta te F arm ” ). Th is p oli c y c on ta ine d a

$1 00 ,0 00 lim it pe r pe rs on fo r l ia bil ity a nda $1 00 ,0 00 lim it for medic al payments cover ag e for any one injured w hile operating or occupying a

vehicle insure d under t h e p o licy . State Fa rm settled with the plaintiff, paying he r $100,000 for medical e x penses and $100,000 under

the liabilitycover ag e.
The plaintiff f

iled a complaint ag ainst Dy er Nursing Home, seeking worke rs’ c ompensation benef its. S tate F arm soug ht to intervene a s a plaintiff i n t h e ca s e, alleg ing that if Dy er N ursing Home we re f

ound liable t o the pl aintiff for worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits, State Farm was entitled to reimbur s e me n t o f it s s u b r o g a ti o n in te r e s t in th e a mo u n t o f $ 2 0 0
, 0 0 0 p r e v io u s ly p a id to the p l a i n t i f f u n d e r t h e t e r m s o f

S c ar l e tC a t o n ’ s i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y.

The trial c ourt bifurc ated the trial. The fir st phase wa s to determine whe ther the pla intiff was an employ ee of

Dy er N ursing Home at the time the a ccide nt o ccurred and whether the plaintiff’s inj ur ie s f ro m th e a c c ide nt a

ros e ou t of

a ndin the c ou rs e a ndsc op e of the plaint if

f’ s e mpl oy me nt. The sec ond phase w as to determine the extent of the plaintiff’s vocational disability if the def endant was found liable during the first phase of the trial. Following the hearing in the first phase, the trial court found that the plaintiff was a n employ ee of the def endant at the time of the a ccide nt and that her injuries a

rose out of and in the course and scope of her employ ment with defe ndant on that date.

At t h e conclusion of the se cond phase of the trial, the trial court a war ded the plaintiff perma nent partial disabilit y benef its in t he amount of 95% to her b o d y as a whole, plus pa st and fu tur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Th e pa rt ie s stip ulate d th a t th e plaint if f’ s p a st m e dic a l e xpe ns e s r e la te d to the a c c ide nt t ota le d $ 58 7, 33 1. 50 . I n a dd iti on , th e c ou rt or de red th e de fe nd a nt t o r e imb ur se Sta te F ar mf o r $ 1 0 0
, 0 0 0 i n m e d i c a l p a ym e n t s w h i c h i th a d m a d e u n d e r i t s i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y. 3

Dy er N ursing Home appea led. We acc epted r eview be fore the ca se wa s hear d or consider ed by the Spe c ia l Wor

ke rs ’ C omp e ns a tio n A pp e a ls Pane l.

STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

Our standa

rd of r eview of

fact u al i ssues in a worke rs’ c ompensation ca se is de novo upon the re cord of the trial court, acc ompanied by a pre sumption of corre ctness of the trial court’ s fac tual-5-

finding s, unless the prepondera nce of the evidence is otherw ise. Tenn. Code A nn. § 50-6-225( e)( 2) (2005); see also Rhodes v. Capital City I ns. Co., 154 S.W .3d 43, 46 (Tenn. 2004) ; Perrin v. Gay lord En tm’ t Co
., 12 0 S. W.3 d 8 23 , 8 25 -2 6 ( Te nn . 200 3). “Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s w ith re sp e c t to

cre dibilit y and weig ht of the evidenc e may g ener ally be inferr ed from the manner in which the court

re so lve s c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mon y a ndde c ide s the c a se .” Rho de s, 15 4 S. W.3 d a t 46 (c iti ng To bitt v. Bridge stone/Fire stone, I nc., 59 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Tenn. 2001)). Our standa rd of r eview of

questions of law is de novo w ithout a presumption of corr ectne ss. I d.

AN AL YSI S

A. W as the plaintif

f an employe e?

Tenne ssee’ s Wor

k e r s ’ Co mp e n s ati o nL a w d e f in e s an“ e mp loy ee” as “e very person, including a minor, . . . in the ser vice of an employ er, . . . under any contra ct of hire or appr enticeship, written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102( 10)(A) (2005). We ha ve previously held that “[i] n order for one to be an e mploy ee o f an o t h er fo r purposes of our Worker’ s Compensation L aw, it is . . . require d that there be an express or i mplied ag ree ment for the a lleg ed employ er to re munerate the alleg ed employ ee for his ser vices in beha lf of the f ormer.” Bla ck v. Da nce, 643 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1982) ; see a lso Garne r v. Reed, 856 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tenn. 1993) (“the word ‘hir e’ de notes pay ment of some kind”)

.

The de fenda nt arg ues that the pla i ntiff was not a n employ ee at the time of the ac cident beca use there was no “ contra ct of hire ” in place . Acc ording to the d ef en d ant, t here was no

“ c on te mpl a te d mu tua l a sse nt a ndme e tin g of the min ds ” re qu ir e d to fo rm a n e nf or c e able c on tr a c t in Tenne ssee. See Davidson v. Holtzman, 4 7 S.W .3d 445, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ( an ora l ag re em en t is enforc eable if there is a “mutual asse nt to the contrac t’s terms and . . . the te rms are sufficie ntly

definite to be e nforc eable .”). The defenda nt emphasizes the fact that both J erry Park and Be tty Caton testified that a pe rson apply ing f or the “ hostess” position was not allowed to work at the

nu rs ing ho me un til that per so n suc c e ssf ull y c omp le te d a

thr e e -d a y orie ntatio n a ndthe re fo re c ou ld not be an e mploy ee until he or she ac tually

came to work at the nur sing home

.

The de fenda nt relies upon B eac h v. Schwan’ s Sales Enter., Inc., No. M1999-00416- WC -R3- CV, 2000 WL

758341 (Tenn. Worke rs’ Comp. Panel, J une 13, 2000), to support its contention that the plaintiff was not a n employ ee of the defe ndants at the time of the acc ident. I n Be ach, the plaintiff int e rv ie we d w ith th e e mpl oy e r, a t th e e ndof wh ic h th e plaint if

f w a s to ld that “ the po sit ion wo uld be offe red to him if he succe ssfully completed ‘ride day ,’ the next st ep in the application process.” I d. a t *1 . D ur ing ri de da y , th e pla int if f a c c omp a nie d a no the r sa le sp e rs on on that sa le sp e rs on ’s ro ute to o bs e rv e the int e ra c tio n b e tw e e n th e sa le sp e rs on a ndhis c us tom e rs . T he pl ain tif f s lip pe d w hil e stepping out of the truck and was seriously injured. The Worke rs’ Compensation Panel noted tha t t o c o m e u n d e r

t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f e m p l o y e e , t h e p l a i n t i f

f “ m u s tp r o v e t h a t , a tt h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y, there was a n expressed or implied ag ree ment that the worker was to be compensated for his service s by the alleg ed employ er.” I d. (citing Bla ck v. Da nce, 6 4 3 S .W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1982)). T he Panel f o u n d th a t “ [a ]l th o u g h it ap p e ar s f r o m th e r e c o r d th a t th e s a le s p e r s o n w h o m th e c laim a nt was-6-

acc ompany ing pa id for his lunc h on the date of the injury , we f ind in the rec ord no evide nce that he

was or e x pecte d to be compensated by the employ er.” I d. As a result, the Panel af firmed the lowe r

c ou rt ’s de nia l of

wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts.

The fa cts of Be ach are rea dily distinguishable f rom the fa cts in the ca se bef ore us. Unlike the plaintiff in Beac h, the plaintiff in this case w as being paid for he r time at orientation. W hile there is a fac tual dispute as to w hether the plaintiff and Ms. Shef field we re to be paid hour for hour, as the

re prese ntatives of the de fenda nt testified, or to be pa id for half the time spent in training , as the plaintiff and Ms. Sheff

ield understood, ther e is no dispute t h at t h ey wer e to re ceive some level of compensa tion. There was also no dispute that as soon as the orie ntation was over , the plaintiff wa s to report to the nur sing home to beg in her wor k as a hostess at that fac ility

.

The fa cts of t his case are more akin to those in W illiams v. W alden Sec ., No. M2000-01273- WC -R3-C V, 2 0 0 1 WL

363070 (Tenn. Worke rs’ Comp. Panel, April 12, 2001), in which the Wor k er s ’ C o mpensation Panel found that the pla intiff was indee d an employ ee w hile underg oing

a br ief or ie ntatio n. I n Wil lia ms, the plaint if f a pp lie d f or a se c urity po sit ion a t N a sh vil le El e c tr ic Se rv ic e . H e wa s to ld t ha t he ne ede d th e app ro va l of the re pr e se ntativ e of

N. E. S. p ri or

to commencing work. He rec eived this a pproval and was instructed to me et with the g uard whom he would be replacing to rec eive training. This orientation process required approx imately two hours to complete, for

which the plaintiff w as not to be paid. During this training , the plaintiff wa s taken

on a wa lki ng tou r o f the fa c ili ty , a t w hic h ti me he fe ll, su ff e ri ng se ve re inj ury

to h is e y e . In r e sp on se to the defen d an t’s arg ument that the plaintiff wa s not an employ ee at the time of the ac cident, the Panel held that “[ w]e find in the rec ord nothing which would exclude the c laimant and it is clear from the r ecor d that the claimant was under a contra ct of hire at the time of his injury
, whether he was pa id for his time or not.” I d. at *2.

The e vidence in th e p r e s e n t c a s e ma k e s it c le ar th a t th e p lain ti f f w a s o f f e r e d a jo b at the nursing home and that she acc epted that job. While she was r equir ed t o attend thre e day s of orientation bef

ore starting in her

position as hostess
, s h e was to be pa id for this orientation. The orientation wa s n o t p art of the application proc ess in the way that a test or phy sical would be pa rt of t he applic a ti o n p r o c e s s

. Se e , e

. g

. , B lan k e n s h ip v

. A m. O r d n a n c e Sy s

. , LL S, 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d 3 50 (Tenn. 2005) (bac k injury

suffe red w hile perf

orming a stress test in cour se of a pplication proce ss was not compensable beca

use plaintiff wa s not an employ ee) . We hold that the evidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff wa s an employ ee of the def en d ant

nu rs ing ho me a t th e tim e of the a c c ide nt.

B. W as the pla int iff

inj ure d in the c ou rse an d s c op e of e mp loy me nt?

To be c ompensable unde r the wor kers’ compensa tion law, an injury must “aris[e] out of and in the c ou rs e of

e mpl oy me nt. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 0- 6- 10 2( 13 ) ( 20 05 ). “ I n Te nn e sse e , a s in mos t jurisdictions, the statutory require ments that the injur y ar ise out of and oc cur in the c ourse of the employ ment are not synony mous, a lthough both ele ments exi st to ensure a work c onnection to the injury for whic h the employ ee se eks bene fits.” B lankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Sandlin v.-7-

Gentry , 300 S.W .2d 897, 901 (Tenn. 1957) ).

The phra se “a

rising out of

” re fer s to cause or

orig in and “i n t h e co u rse of ” re fer s to tim e, place and cir cumstance s. Hill v. Eag le B end Mfg
., I n c. , 9 4 2 S

. W

. 2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997) . An injury arises out of the employ ment when “ there is a causal conne ction betwee n the conditions under which the wor

k is require d to be performe d and the resulting injury .” Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Fritts v. S afe ty Nat’l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005)) . An injury occur s in the course of employ ment if “it takes place withi n the period of t he employ ment, at a plac e whe re the e mpl oy e e re a so na

bly ma y be , a ndwh ile the e mpl oy e e is f ulf ill ing wo rk

du ti es or engag e d in doing some thing incide ntal there to.” B lankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citation omitt ed).

As a g ener al rule, a n employ ee is not ac tin g wi thin the course of employ ment when the employ ee is g oing to or

coming from wor

k unless the injury

occur s on the employ er’ s premises. See Ho wa rd v. Corne rs ton e Me d. As so c ., 54 S.W. 3d 23 8, 24 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; L oll ar v . Wa l- Ma rt Sto re s, I nc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Tenn. 1989). For example, the employ er’ s parking lot is considered pa rt of the e mploy er’ s premises, see L ollar, 767 S.W .2d at 150, but “[once] the employ ee ha s exi ted the parking are a and be g ins traveling on persona l ti m e, aw ay from the e mploy er’ s premises, he is no longe r in the course of employ ment.” McCurry v. Container Corp. of A merica , 982 S.W .2d 841, 845 (Tenn. 1998)

.

There are , howeve r, sever al exceptions w hich bring an employ ee’ s trave l to and from wor k within the course and scope of his employ ment. Phill ips v. A& H C onstr. Co., 134 S.W .3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2004) . One suc h exception is the “specia l errand exception.” I d.; see a lso St ephens v. Maxi ma Corp., 774 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1989). Unde r this exception, an employ ee ma y be compensa ted for an off- premises injury “while pe rforming some spe cial act, assig nment or mission at the dire ction of the e mploy er.” Stephens, 774 S.W .2d at 934.

Whe n a n e mpl oy e e , h a vin g ide nti fi able t ime a ndsp a c e lim its on his e mpl oyme nt, makes a n off- premises journey which would normally not be cover ed under the usual g oing a nd coming rule, the journe y may be broug ht within the course of e mploy ment by the fa ct that the trouble a nd time of making the journey , or the spec ial inc onve nie nc e , h a zar d, or ur g e nc y of makin g it i n th e pa

rt ic ula r c ir c ums ta nc e s, is itself sufficie ntly

substantial to be viewed a s an integ ral pa rt o f t h e service itself. Upon re view of the case s in which other jurisdictions have applied the spe cial er rand rule ther e is a c ommon thread that the e mploy ee is usually injured while pe rforming some specia l act, assig nment or mission at the direction of the employ er.

I d. (citations omitted).

I n Stephens, the employ ee w as involved in a fatal automobile acc ident o n e mile from he r place of employ ment when, during he r lunch bre ak, she ha d g one home to retrie ve an employ ment

rec ord which ha d to be turned in to her employ er. In d en y i n g co m p ensation and holding that the “spec ial err and or mission” exception did not apply , this Court st ated the e vidence was not suffic ient-8-

to s ho w the e mpl oy e r h a d ins truc te d, dir e c te d o r e ve n s ug g e ste d th a t th e e mpl oy e e re turn h ome to g et the employ ment rec ord and tha t such ac tion on her part had bee n her de cision. I d.

Howeve r, t h is “ s p e c ia l e rr a n d ” e xc e p ti o n w a s f o u n d to ap p ly in tw o c a s e s d e c id e d b ythe Workers’ Compensation Panel whic h have f acts similar to those in the ca se at ha nd. First, in Carter

v. Ut ic a Mu tua l I ns . Co
., No . E 20 02 -0 17 79 -S C- WCM- CV , 2 00 3 WL 22 08 07 88 (T e nn . Wo rk e rs ’ Comp. Pane l, A ug

. 27, 2003), the employ ee, who worke d in Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , was injured while trave ling home f

rom Atlanta whe re she was to have attended a seminar for he r employ er. The Panel held that the “ specia l errand” exception applied be cause :

The e mploy ee’ s g ener al work duties did not require any trave l activities. On the da y in q ue stion , s he wa s r e qu ir e d b y he r e mpl oy e r t o atte ndthe se min ar i n A tla nta there by exposi ng her to risks she w ould not nor m al l yencounte r in g oing to a nd coming from her

work in Chattanoog a. She wa s to be paid re g ular wa g es for

a tte nd ing the se min ar and wa s to be re imb ur se d f or mil e a g e e xpe ns e s. Whil e attending , she would have been e ng ag ed in ac tiviti es bene ficial to her employ er.

I d

. a t * 3

. L ik e w is e , in Ca r te r v

. Ph o e n ix Re s ta

u r a n t G r o u p , N o

. 0 3 S0 1

- 9 6 0 2

- CH

- 0 0 0 1 3
, 1 9 9 7 WL 26 29 6 ( Te nn . Work e rs ’ Comp . Pan e l, Jan. 23 , 199 7) , the c la ima nt, a n ass ist a nt ma ng e r tr a ine e a t a Wendy ’s in J ohnson City , was instructe d to go to the employ er’ s King sport, Tenne ssee location for mandatory testing. The employ ee did and was injured in a tra ffic a ccide nt in route to her home f rom King sport following the test. She was pa id for the time re quired to t ak e t h e t est , but was not reimburse d for mileag e. The court he ld that the “spec ial err and” e x ception applied. I d. at *3.

I n this case, the plaintiff was hire d to work at Dy er N ursing Home, located in Dy er, Tenne ssee. Thus normal trave l from her home to and fr om Dy er N ursing Ho m e wo u l d n ot be considere d to be in the cour se and sc ope of he r employ ment under the “g oing to a nd coming from work” rule. See Stephens, 774 S.W .2d at 934. Howeve r, the acc ident occur red while the plaintiff

wa s o n h e r w a y

to a n o ri e ntatio n s e ssi on th a t w a s b e ing he ld i n B e lls , T e nn e sse e , a pp ro xima te ly thirty miles aw ay from the nursing home in Dy er. This trip fa lls with i n the “spe cial er rand or mission” ex ception bec ause it wa s a spec ial assig nment at the dire ction of the e mp l o y er , and “the fac t that the trouble and time of ma king the journey
, or the spec ial inconvenienc e, hazar d, or urg ency of making it in the pa rt i cu l ar circumstances, is itself suffic iently substantial to be viewed a s an integ ral pa

rt of the se rvice itself.” Stephens, 774 S.W.2d at 934.

C. Did the trial court err in f inding 95% vocational disabilit y?

The trial c ourt awa

rded the plaintiff 95% pe rmane nt partial disability . Howeve r, the plaintiff arg ues that the e vidence preponde rate s in favor of a finding of total disabilit y

. An y award of pe rm a ne nt t ota l di sab il ity mus t be in c omp lia nc e wi th the statut ory de fi nit ion of

tot a l di sa

bil ity contained in Te nnessee Code Annotate d section 50-6- 207(4) ( 2005). The te st as to whether an

e mpl oy e e is p e rm a ne ntly and to tally dis able d r e qu ir e s u s to de te rm ine if the e mpl oy e e is “ tot a lly incapa citate[d]

. . . from working at an occupation t hat brings t he employ ee an income . . . .” T enn.-9-

Code Ann. § 50- 6- 207(4)( B) (2005); see also Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, I nc., 19 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tenn. 2000)

.

The determination of perma nent total disa bilityis to be based on a

varie ty of fa ctors such tha t a complete picture of an indi vidual’s ability to return to g ainful employ ment is presente d to the Court. Vinson v. United Parce l Service
, 92 S.W .3d 380, 386 (Tenn. 2002); Cleek, 19 S .W.3d at 774. Such fac tors include the e mpl oy ee’ s skills , training , education, ag e, job opportunities in the imm e diate a nd su rr ou nd ing c omm un iti e s, a nd the a va ila bil ity of wo rk su ite d fo r a n in div idu a l w ith that particula

r disability . Cl ee k
, 1 9 S

. W

. 3d at 774 (c iting Roberson v. L oretto Casket Co., 722 S.W .2d 380, 384 (Tenn. 1986) ). Thoug h this a ssessment is most often made and pr esente d at trial b y a v o c a t i o n a l e x p e r t , “ i t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t d e s p i t e t h e e x i s t e n c e o r ab s e n c e o f

e x p e r tt e s t i m o n y, an employ ee’ s own assessment of his or her overa ll phy sical condition, including the ability or inabilityto return to g ainful employ ment, is ‘compe t en t t es timonythat should be consider ed.’” Vinson, 92 S.W .3d at 386 (quoting Cleek, 19 S.W.3d at 774).

In s u p p o r to f

h e r ar g u m e n tt h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r t s h o u l d h a v e f o u n d p e r m a n e n tt o t a l d i s ab i l i t y, the plaintiff hig hlights the fac t that both Dr. Wood and Dr. B oals assig ned re latively high anatomical impairment rating s to the body as a w hole: 40% and 61% respe ctively . Additionally , she testified at trial that prior t o t he ac cident she w as in g ood health, but that following the ac cident, she ha s limit ed driving abili ty , difficulty lifting small amounts of weight, a nd trouble sitting or standing for lon g pe ri od s of tim e

. She sa id that he r h us ba ndmus t do the ho us e ho ld c ho re s b e c a us e sh e is u na ble to do them.

The nursing home re sponds that the t rial court’s awa rd of 95% shoul d be affirmed in lig ht of the voc ational testimony

. Dr. Wood opined that the plaintiff should be a ble to work in the futur e at a se dentar

y job that allowed her

the flexibi lity to move around during the day . Dr. B oals did not disag ree . Ms. Bra mlett, the reha bilitation counselor, testified that the plaintiff was betwee n 77% and 95% vocationally

disabled. F inally , the pl aintiff testi fied that she di d g raduate from hig h school afte r the ac cident and is a t least ca pable of baby sitti ng her br other’s two c hildren.

Considering all the evidence presented at trial, both by the experts and by

the plaintiff her self, we hold that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s finding of 95% pe rmane nt p ar t i a l d i s ab i l i t y.
D. Subrogation

1. Payme nts made under the m edical paym ent cov erage prov ision

The trial c ourt order ed Dy er N ursing Home to reimburse State Fa rm for pay ments totaling $100,000 made by

State Fa rm to the plaintiff’s m edica l providers unde r the medic al payment

co v er age p ro v i s i o n o f t h e p o l i cy

. T h e p o l i cyi n q u es t i o n p ro v i d es fo r m ed i ca l p ay m en t s co v er age for bodily injuries sustained by any person oc cupy ing a

vehicle c overe d under the liabilitysection of the policy . Thus, by

virtue of be ing a

passeng er in the ve hicle oper ated b y S ca rl et C at on, the-10-

plai n ti f f q u a li f ie d f o r me d ic a l p a y me n ts c o v e r a g e u p to th e a mo u n t o f $ 1 0 0
, 0 0 0

. H o w e ver, the policy specific ally

provides that medica l pay ment cover ag e bene fits are not pay able “ to the extent worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits are require d to be pay able.”

State Fa rm arg ues that it is entitled to reimbursement for the $100,000 paid to the plaintiff under th e me d ic a l p a y me n t c o v e r a g e b e c a u s e th e w o rk e r s ’ c o mp e n s a ti o n la w r e q u ir e s th at the employ er pay

for the c ost of all rea sonable a nd nece ssary medical c are . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-204(a )(1) (2005). The defe ndant re sponds that not onlydid t h e t ri al court err in r equiring the defe ndant to r eimburse State Fa rm for the $100,000 in medical payments made, but that the c ourt should give the def

endant a cre dit for the full amount of a ll sums paid to t h e p laintiff or he r healthca re pr oviders by

State Fa rm. The defe ndant relies upon Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-112, whic h g ives an e mploy er w ho has paid worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits to an employ ee

a ri g ht o f s ub ro g a tio n a g a ins t a ny re c ov e ry that the e mpl oy e e ob ta ins fr om a thi rd -p art y fo r the sa me i n j u r y.

“Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-204( a)( 1), par t of the worke rs’ c ompens ati on statutory scheme , makes it cry stal clea r that the e mploy er is oblig ated to the e m p l o y ee to pa y

re a s o n ab le a n d n e c e s s ar y me d ic a l e xp e n s e s f o r w o rk

- r e late d in

ju r ie s

. ” M o o r e v

. T own of Colli erville, 124 S.W.3d 93, 99 (Tenn. 2004). Where an em p l o y er is liable for such me dical expenses, the employ er must pa y the medica l providers dire ctly for the c osts of such ca

re, r ather than the employ ee pe rsonally . See Stag g s v. Nat’l Hea lth Corp., 924 S.W .2d 79, 81 (Tenn. 1996) (citing W. Am. I ns. Co. v. Montgomery , 861 S.W .2d 230, 231 (Tenn. 1993) ). Howe ver, w here the employ ee ha s persona lly

paid for the disputed medical trea tment, the employ er must re imburse the employ ee pe rsonally . I d.; see a lso St ate Auto. Mut. I ns. Co. v. Hurley , 31 S.W .3d 562, 565 (Tenn. Workers Comp. Panel 2000). Simil arly , wher e the employ ee’ s health ins uranc e ca rrier has paid for disputed medical e x penses, the employ er is r equire d to r eimburse the health insurance car rier. See Moore, 124 S.W.3d at 99.

As we note d in Moore,

Th e le g isl a tur e ha s de c ide d that it is the e mpl oy e r’ s st a tut ory re sp on sib ili ty to pay rea sonable a nd nece ssary medical e x penses f

or work- rela ted injuries and that worke rs’ compensa tion pr ovisions should be construed to a chieve thei r r emedial purpose. . . .

[O]nc e a fi nd ing ha s b e e n ma de that th e e mpl oy e e ’s inj ury is w or k- re la te d, the he a lth ins u re r ca n seek r eimbursement f rom the employ er f

or expenses paid on the employ ee’ s behalf be cause health i nsuranc e contr acts do not cove r work- rela ted inj u r i e s

. B e f

o r e s u c h a

f i n d i n g i s m a d e , h o w e v e r , e m p l o y e e s m a y h a v e d i f f i c u l ty

re c ov e ri ng e xpe ns e s f

ro m e ith e r the e mpl oy e r o r a he a lth ins ur e r andc ou ld u lti ma te ly be for ced to e ither pay

for their own m edica l expenses or dela y treatment altoge ther. Cle arl y , th is i s n ot a

re su lt e nv isi on e d u nd e r the wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n s ta tut e s.-11-

I d. at 99 (interna l citations and footnote omitted).

I n this c ase, instead of a health insurer paying for the medical expenses, the liabilityinsurer fo r th e d r iv e r o f th e a u to mo b il e p a id $ 1 0 0
, 0 0 0 in me d ic a l e xp e n s e s

. Wh e n th is w a s p aid, the employ er w as denying that the injury was c overe d by

worke rs’ c ompensation, thus forcing the plaintiff t o seek financial compensation elsewhe re. Howeve r, as we have determined, the injury was in f a c t c ov e re d u nd e r the wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n s ta tut e , a ndthe re fo re , th e e mpl oy e r i s li able fo r a ll

nece ssary and reasonable medical ex penses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-204(a )(1) . The State F arm policy specific ally

states that m ed i ca l benef its are not pay able unde r the policy if the medica l expenses are cover ed by worke rs’ compensation. As such, t he parties in this case ar e in a situation almost identical to that in Moore, in that a third-pa rty insurer paid for medical expenses which it was not obligate d to pay

beca use those expenses we re c overe d by worke rs’ c omp ensation and were require d to be paid by

the employ er.

We the re fo re ho ld that Sta te F arm is e nti tle d to re imb ur se me nt fo r the me dical pay ments

ma de to the pla int if

f’ s me dic a l pr ov ide rs

. 2. Payme nts made under the liability cove rage provision

State Fa rm claims that it is entitl ed to “e quitable subrog ation” with r espec t to the $100,000 that it paid to the plaintiff under the liabilityprovision of the policy . The nursing home re sponds that the dr ive r of the a uto mob ile wa s immun e fr om l ia bil ity a s a c o- e mpl oy e e , a ndthe re fo re , e qu ita ble subrog ation should not apply as S tate Farm was not obligated t o pay anything to the plaintiff. The nursing home ag ain ar g ues that it should rece ive a c redit under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50 -6 -1 12 fo r the a mou nt p a id t o th e plaint if f b y Sta te F a rm so the plaint if

f d oe s n ot r e c e ive do ub le

rec overy

. “‘Subrog at i o n i s a right which is founde d upon equity and justice a nd acc rues whe n one person for t he p r o te c ti o n o f h is o w n in te r e s ts , p a y s a d e b t f o r w h ic h a n o th e r

is p r im ar il y

li ab le

. ’” W i mberly

v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading , Pa. (CNA), 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979) ( quoting Amos v. Central Coal Co., 277 S.W .2d 457, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)) . Wit h respe ct to insurance
, “sub ro gat i o n al l ows the insurer to ‘stand in the shoes’ of the insured a nd assert the rig hts of the insured ag ai n s t a t hird party .” Yor k v. Sevier County

Ambulance Auth., 8 S.W .3d 616, 618-19 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Wim berly v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 S.W .2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979) ).

Howeve r, in the abse nce of leg al compuls ion to pay the debt of a nother, voluntary pay ment of anothe r’s de bt, absent fr aud, accident, mis take, or by contra ct with the pay ee, doe s not entitle one to subrog ation. Walker v. Walker, 200 S.W. 825 (Tenn. 1918).

A mere volunteer, intermeddler, or strang er, or one acting officiously in pay ing the debt of a n o th e r , is n o t e n ti tl e d to s u b r o g a ti o n

. . . w h e r e h e p a y s w ith o u t an assig nment of t he debt or an ag ree ment for subrogation. A “voluntee r” or “strang er” within this rule is one who has no oblig ation or liabilityto pay the debt and ha s no-12-

interest in the prope rty

aff ecte d by the debt. Some c ompulsion to pay , such as leg al proce ss, is ordinarily

essential and suf

ficient to support subrog ation.

Goodfrie nd v. United Am. Ba nk, 637 S.W .2d 870, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting 83 C

. J .S., Subrog ation, § 9).

State Fa rm was unde r no oblig ation to pay the plaintiff under

the liabi l i t y p ro vision of the policy held by Scarle t Caton because S carlet Caton was immune fr om suit as a co-e mploy ee of the plaintiff. See Tay lor v. L inville, 656 S.W .2d 368, 370 (Tenn. 1983) (holding that an employ ee c an

no t hold a fe llo w emplo y e e lia ble wh e re , at the tim e of

the a c c ide nt, bo th p art ie s w e re a c tin g wi thi n the sc op e a ndc ou rs e of

the ir employ me nt) . St a te F arm c ho se to s e ttl e a

c la im o f q ue sti on able

va lid ity in an e ff

ort to pr ote c t it s in su re d f ro m li a bil ity abo ve the po lic y

lim its . St a te F arm

wa s in

no way c omp e lle d to pa y

its po lic y lim its by

a ny jud ic ia l de c isi on or

a ny oth e r l e g a lly

e nf or c e able means. Nor

was it bound by

any contra ctual duty

with the plaintiff to pay her the money under the policy . State Fa

rm does not alleg e any

act of fraud, mistake or ac cident which induc ed its pay ment to the pla int if

f. Th e re fo re , St a te F arm ’s pa y me nt t o the plaint if f w a s v olu nta

ry a nddo e s n ot e nti tle State Fa rm to subrog ation.

3. Credit to defendant under Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 50-6-112

T he nursing home not only arg ues that State F arm should not rec eive r eimbursement f or be ne fi ts p a id, bu t th a t th e nu rs ing ho me sh ou ld r e c e ive c re dit fo r that a mou nt p a id b y

Sta te F arm

. Th e nu rs ing ho me re lie s u po n T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 11 2( a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s:

(a ) Wh e n th e inj ury

or de a th fo r wh ic h c omp e ns a tio n is pa y able un de r the Wor ke rs ’ Compe ns a tio n L a w .

. . wa s c a us e d u nd e r c ir c ums ta nc e s c re a tin g a legal lia bil ity ag ainst some person other than the employ er to pay damag es, the injured worke r . . . shall have the rig ht to take compensation under such law

. . . .
(2) In the eve nt the net re covery by the worke r . . . excee ds t he amount paid by the employ er, a nd the employ er ha s not, at the time, paid and dis char g ed the employ er’ s full max imum li ability for worke rs’ compensa tion unde r this c hapter , the employ er shall be entitled to a c redit on the e mploy er’ s future liability , as it acc rues, to the extent the net rec overy

collecte d exceeds the a mount paid by the employ er.

I n essenc e, under Tenne ssee’ s Workers’ Compensation L aw, a n injured employ ee may rec over f rom a th ir d

- p ar ty to r tf

e a s o r w h o s e n e g li g e n c e r e s u lt e d in in ju r y , a n d th e e mp lo y e r w h o h a s p a id or becom e s o bligated to pay

compensation has a rig ht of subrog ation ag ainst such third-party tortfea sor. See Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Spac e, 155 S.W.3d 877, 883 (Tenn. 2005).

Howeve r, this rig ht of subrog ation does not apply to the facts of t his case

. Section 50-6-112 app lie s o nly

wh e re the inj ury

“ wa s c a us e d u nd e r c ir c ums ta nc e s c r e a t i n g a l e g a l l i a b i lit y ag ain st

some person other than the employe r to pa y da ma g e s. ” Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 0- 6- 11 2( a ) ( e mph a sis-13-

added.) “I n interpre ting § 50- 6-11 2 (a ), t h i s Court has held that a c o-employ ee w ho, while ac ting within the course of his employ ment, cause s an injury throug h his neg lige nce is not ‘some pe rson other than the employ er.’ ” Ta y lor, 656 S.W .2d at 370 (quoting Majors v. Moneymaker , 270 S.W .2d 32 8, 33 1 ( Te nn . 1 95 4) ). Th us , a n e mpl oy e e c a n not hol d a fe llo w e mpl oy e e lia

ble wh e re , a t th e tim e of the a ccide nt, both parties were subject t o the workers’ compensation laws and both we re a cting within the scope a nd course of their e mploy ment. I d.

CO NC LU SION

To summarize, we hold that the plaintiff was a n employ ee of the def endant nur sing home at the tim e sh e wa s in

jur e d in the a uto mob ile a c c ide nt. Th e a c c ide nt a ro se ou t of

a ndwa s in the c ou rs e of her employ ment beca

use the travel to the training fac i l i t y fa l ls under the “ specia l erra nd”

e xce pti on to the g e ne ra l rule that tr a ve l to a nd fr om wo rk is n ot w ith in the c ou rs e of e mpl oy me nt. We also uphold the t rial court’s finding that the plaintiff wa s 95% permanently partially disabled. Wit h respe ct to the subrog ation rig hts of the various parties, we aff irm the dec ision of the trial court ordering the defe ndant nursing hom e to reimburse State Fa rm for the medical pay ments made a nd

a g re e that State Farm is not e nti tle d to re imb ur se me nt f or the pa y me nts ma de un de r the lia bil ity provision. L astly
, the defe ndant is not entitled to a cre dit unde r Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50 -6 -1 12 (a ) f

or a mou nts pa id b y

Sta te F arm

to the de fe nd a nt.

Costs of this appea l are taxed equally to D y er Nursing Home a nd State Fa rm I nsuranc e C o m p a n y, a n d t h e i r

s u r e t i e s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM M. B AR KE R, C HIEF JUSTI CE