IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

MICHAEL L. MAYES; JONATHAN 

D. M. MAYES, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE STATE OF OREGON, ET AL., 

Defendants. 

FANNER, District Judge: 

1:14-cv-02042-CL 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter comes before me on Plaintiffs' petition to 

proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this civil rights action 

(#2). Plaintiffs initially filed their Complaint (#1) on December 

24, 2014. On January 5, 2015, Magistrate Judge Clarke filed a 

Findings and Reco.IT\ffiendation (#9) recommending that Plaintiff's IFP 

petition be denied and the complaint dismissed with leave to 

amend. On January 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 

Complaint ("FAC") (#I6). 

Upon review, Magistrate Judge Clarke's Findings and 

Recommendation of January 5, ,2015, were proper and appropriate. 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 13
However, Plaintiffs' filing of the FAC superceded the original 

complaint discussed in the Finding and Recommendation. In the 

interests of efficiency and judicial economy, I directly analyze 

Plaintiffs' FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), rather than 

remand the matter to the Magistrate Judge for a new Findings and 

Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' IFP 

petition is DENIED and the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED. 

Legal Standard 

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United 

States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a) (1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for 

meaningful access to the federal courts despite their inability to 

pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize 

a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. 

First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to 

pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) (1). 

Second, it must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B). 

In regard to the second of these determinations, district 

courts have the ppwer under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) to screen 

complaints even before the service of the complaint on the 

defendants, and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a 

claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 

-··-r 

1915 (e) (2) (B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 2 of 13
Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F. 3d 1108, 1112 (9th 

Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal 

pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain 

statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible 

on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct-alleged. The plausibility 

standard . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The court is not required 

to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as 

true. Id. 

Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than 

_pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 

(1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se 

plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefits of any 

doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 

62 3 (9th Cir. 198 8) (citation omit ted) . Additionally, a pro se 

litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 

complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's 

deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Id. 

Discussion 

Plaintiff's FAC brings claims against a variety of state 

actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants include the State of 

Oregon, ~he Governor of Oregon, the Oregon Attorney General, two 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 3 of 13
Justices of the Oregon Supreme Court, seven Judges of the Oregon 

Court of Appeals, a pro tem Judge of the Marion County Circuit 

Court, three Judges of the Josephine County Circuit Court, a Judge 

of the Jackson County Circuit Court, a Trial Court Administrator 

of the Jackson County Circuit Court, the Josephine County District 

Attorney, two Oregon State Police Troopers, four Josephine County 

Probation Officers, a court-appointed criminal defense attorney, 

and~ private law firm based in Josephine County. 

Plaintiffs' FAC is 43 pages long and, although very detailed 

on certain points, it is disjointed and difficult to understand. 

Plaintiffs' claims appear to revolve around a number of state 

court cases, both criminal and civil. Some of these cases are 

apparently ongoing. The precise nature of these cases is not 

adequately explained. Plaintiffs' narrative frequently switches 

between his criminal cases and his civil actions without warning 

and without clearly identifying which case is being discussed. 

At least some of Plaintiffs' civil actions appear to involve 

a 2011 land sale contract and related ejectment proceeding. The 

trial court found against Plaintiff in that matter and Oregon 

appellate courts affirmed. 

Plaintiffs' criminal cases appear to involve controlled 

.substance offense convictions in Josephine and Jackson Counties. 

Plaintiffs appear to dispute the warrants issued in those cases, 

th~ prosecutor's decision to bring the cases, the quality of the 

representation they received from court-appointed counsel, the 

validity of their guilty pleas, the sentences they received upon 

convictiqn, the p~nalties imposed for probation violations, and 

4 - ORDER_ 

Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 4 of 13
the disposition of their criminal appeals. 

It is not clear how Plaintiffs' civil and criminal cases are 

related, if at all. At some point, Plaintiffs contacted the 

Governor and requested that he intervene on their behalf in their 

ongoing legal disputes. The Governor apparently declined to do 

so. 

I. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity 

As an initial matter, I note that fourteen of the named 

Defendants in this case are state court judges ("the Defendant 

Judges"). Judges are absolutely immune _from suit for judicial 

acts performed in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 

U.S. 9, ·11 (1991). To qualify for judicial immunity, a judge must 

have performed "judicial acts" within the scope of his or her 

jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 

"An act is judicial in nature if it is a function normally 

performed by a judge and the parties to the act were dealing with 

the judge in his judicial capacity." McGuire v. Clackamas Cnty. 

Counsel, 2009 WL 4456310, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 24, 2009) (citing 

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362). Judges "enjoy absolute immunity even 

when their actions are erroneous, malicious, or in excess of 

judicial authority." Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 576 (9th Cir. 

198 9) . 

In considering whether a judge is entitled to judicial 

immunity, the scope of the judge's jurisdiction must be "broadly 

construed to effectuate the policies supporting judicial 

immunity." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) 

"To determine if the judge acted with jurisdiction, courts focus 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 5 of 13
on whether the judge was acting clearly beyond the scope of 

subject matter jurisdiction in contrast to personal jurisdiction." 

Id. "Where not clearly lacking subject matter jurisdiction, a 

judge is entitled to immunity even if there was no pers.onal 

jurisdiction over the complaining party." Id. Under the Oregon 

Constitution, circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over 

all actions unless a statute or rule of law divests them of 

jurisdiction. Novich v. McClean, 172 Or. App. 241, 245 (2001) 

Plaintiffs' claims against the state trial court judges in 

this matter relate to actions taken by those judges in their 

judicial capacity. Those actions include ruling on motions, 

issuing orders, ruling on fee waivers, arraigning defendants, 

imposing sentences, and making determinations on pretrial release. 

Plaintiffs allege that the named Judges of the Oregon Court of 

Appeals affirmed trial court rulings in Plaintiffs' appeals of 

their civil and criminal cases. Plaintiffs also allege that the 

named Justices of the Oregon Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' 

petitions for review. All of the alleged actions are within the 

normal judicial functions of appellat& judges and amount to 

nothing more than-~llegations that the courts issued rulings 

adverse to Plaintiffs. 

Because the challenged actions involve criminal proceedings 

and real property disputes in the State of Oregon, the courts have 

subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff contends that ·the court 

lacked jurisdiction in his civil ejectment case, citing to Nelson 

v. ·American Home Mortg. Serv. Inc-., 249 Or. App._ 555 (2012). I 

note, however, that Nelson deals with personal juriidiction, as 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 6 of 13
opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also complain 

about the manner of service in their civil case, citing Or. R. 

Civ. P. 6, 7, and 23. Once again, these rules deal with personal 

jurisdiction, as opposed to subject matter jurisdiction. With 

regard to Plaintiffs' criminal convictions, Plaintiffs allege that 

the court acted beyond its jurisdiction in modifying his criminal c 

judgment. However, Plaintiffs' allege that it was a probation 

officer, rather than a judge, who disqualified Plaintiffs from 

serving home detention. It is not clear from the FAC that the 

judgment was ever amended and, even if it was, it is not an act so 

clearly beyond the court's subject matter jurisdiction that it 

would abrogate judicial immunity. 

I conclude that the actions of the Defendant Judges were all 

taken within the scope of their jurisdiction for the purposes of 

judicial immunity. 

As Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant Judges all relate 

to judicial acts performed in the judicial capacity and within the 

scope of their jurisdiction, I conclude that the Defendant Judges 

are entitled to absolute immunity. As I see no way in which 

Plaintiffs might further amend their complaint to state a claim 

against the Defendant Judges, Plaintiffs' claims agiinst the 

Defendant Judges are DISMISSED with prejudice.-

Plaintiffs al~o bring a related claim against Defendant Bob 

Clecker, the Trial Court Admini-strator of the Jackson County 

Circuit Court.- Under absolute "quasi-judicial immunity," court 

personnel whose challenged activities are an "integral part of the 

judicial process" are immune from liability. Morrison v .. Jones,. 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 7 of 13
607 F.2d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). Court clerks are among those 

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Sharma v. Stevas, 790 F.2d 

1486 (9th. Cir. 1986). Quasi-judici~l immunity also extends to 

those members of court staff responsible for scheduling hearings. 

In re Castillo, 297 F. 3d 940, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2002); Phiffer v. 

Oregon; No. CV-10-1120-SU, 2011 WL 7396602, at *6 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 

2011) . 

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Clecker relate to the 

scheduling of motions on the court docket. Accordingly, I conclude 

that Defendant Clecker is entitled to absolute immunity. As I see 

no way for Plaintiffs to amend their claims against Defendant 

Clecker, this claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

II. Rocker-Feldman Doctrine 

' 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established 

jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts from exercising 

appellate review over final state court judgments." Reusser v. 

Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

doctrine bars federal courts "from exercising subject matter 

jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state 

court judgment." Id. (quotation marks omitted). An action 

brought in federal court constitutes such an appeal if "claims 

raised in the federal court action are 'inextricably intertwined' 

with [a] state court's decision such that adjudication of the 

federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the 

district court to interpret the application of state laws or 

procedural rules." Id. 

Unless expressly authorized by statute, only the Supreme 

8 - ORDER 

Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 8 of 13
Court has jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state court 

judgment. Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th 

Cir. 2007) "The clearest case for dismissal based on the RookerFeldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as a 

l~gal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and 

seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision." 

Id. (quotation omitted). 

The relief sought by Plaintiffs amounts, in large part, to an 

appeal from the decisions of the Oregon state courts. To the 

extent that Plaintiffs seek to collaterally attack the final 

judgments of the state courts, this Court lacks jurisdiction. 

III. Claim Preclusion 

Courts must "giye to a state-court judgment the same 

preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of 

the State in which the judgment was rendered." Migra v. Warrent 

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). In Oregon, 

claim preclusion prohibits "a party who has litigated a claim 

against another from further litigation on that same claim on any 

ground or theory of relief that the party could have litigated in 

the first instance." G.B. v. Morey, 229 Or. App. 605, 608 (2009). 

In this case, Plaintiffs repeatedly argue that the judgments 

entered against them in state court are void. Upon review Qf the 

allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint, as well as 

the exhibits Plaintiffs filed in support of the FAC, it appea,rs 

that Plaintiffs raised many of these arguments at the trial court 

level, where they were rejected. Plaintiffs could and did file 

9 - ORDER, 

Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 9 of 13
direct appeals of the state court judgments, where they could have 

made these same arguments. I conclude that claim preclusion 

applies to Plaintiff's arguments about the validity of the state 

court judgments. 

tv. Other Issues 

Plaintiffs' FAC has other obvious defects. Plaintiffs seek 

to challenge the validity of state court co0victions. The Supreme 

Court has held that civil tort actions, including actions brought 

under § 1983, "are not appropriate vehi~les for challenging the 

validity of outstanding criminal judgments." Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). "[I]n order to recover damages for 

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for 

other harm caused by action whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that 

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal 

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by 

a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. 

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges none of the necessary conditions for 

bringing a § 1983 action for unconstitutional conviction. Rather, 

Plaintiffs allege that their conviction was affirmed on direct 

appeal. 

Plaintiffs bring § 1983 claims against the private law firm 

which successfully represented the adverse party in one of 

Plaintiffs' civil actions. To state a claim under § 1983, a 

plaintiff must allege that the defendant was acting under color of 

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Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 10 of 13
state law at the time the acts complained of were committed. 

Thorriton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 {9th Cir. 

2005) . Private parties may act under color of state law if they 

"willfully participate in joint action with state officials to 

deprive others of constitutional rights." United Steelworkers of 

Am. v. Phelps Dodae Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiffs claims against the law firm appear to stern entirely 

from their role as counsel for an adverse private party in a civil 

action over owners0ip of real property. This is not sufficient to 

demonstrate that the law firm acted under color of state law. 

Plaintiffs' claims against their court appointed counsel are 

similarly not cognizable under § 1983. It is well established 

that court-appointed attorneys who represent clients in a 

traditional adversarial role are not state actors.- Polk Cnty. v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark Cnty. of Nev., 

319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs cannot bring a § 

1983 claim against their court-appointed attorney for actions 

taken in the course of defending them in a criminal proceeding. 

Plaintiffs' claim against the Governor of Oregon alleges that 

the Governor was obligated to intervene in their ongoing legal 

disputes because Plaintiffs sent him a letter asking him to do so. 

The only basis Plaintiffs provide for this claim is the conclusory 

statement that the Governor was obligated to intervene in their 

case under the "take care" clause of the Oregon Constitution. 1 I 

1 "He shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 

Or. Const. art-V, § 10. 

11- ORDER 

Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 11 of 13
find no support fbr the contention that the "take care" clause 

obliges the Governor to intervene in ongoing legal proceedings at 

the request of one of the litigants, nor do Plaintiffs provide any 

support for that contention. Plaintiffs' claim against Governor 

Kitzhaber is frivolous in addition to being deficient. 

Plaintiffs' claims against the Josephine County District 

Attorney relate to his decision to bring criminal charges against 

Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that he lacked probable cause to do 

so. "[P)rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under§ 

1983 for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in 

presenting the State's case' insofar as that conduct is intimately 

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Burns 

v. Reed, 500 U.S .. 478, 486 (1991) (quotation marks omitted). The 

allegations Plaintiffs make against the Josephine County District 

Attorney relate entirely to his decision to bring charges against 

them. Such claims fall squarely into the category of conduct 

protected by prosecU:torial immunity. 

V. Failure to State a Claim 

Despite its length, Plaintiffs' FAC fails to conform to 

federal pleading standards. It does not include a short and plain 

statement of sufficient factual matter to state a facially 

plausible claim for relief. Instead, Plaintiffs provide a 

confused chronology of events which Plaintiffs label as unlawful 

without providing the factual context necessary to understand 

Plaintiffs' claims. As noted, Plaintiffs seek to bring suit 

against numerous state court judges and other entities who are 

12- ORDER 

Case 1:14-cv-02042-CL Document 18-1 Filed 01/26/15 Page 12 of 13
immune from suit. Plaintiffs also seek to use a federal action to 

launch an improper collateral attack on the decisions of the state 

courts. 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' First Amended 

Complaint is DISMISSED. Because I cannot say with certainty that 

Plaintiffs could not state claim by further amendment, dismissal 

is without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

Conclusion 

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (#16) is DISMISSED. 

Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days to file an amended 

complaint. Plaint~ffs' IFP Petition is DENIED (#2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this ~ day of January, 2015. 

OWEN M. PANNER 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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