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*JL- ' CO CT>C/) Ho en O'— V© ~an<- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

MARCQUES E. CRAWFORD, Appellant. No. 73131-9-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: August 8, 2016 

### Appelwick, J. — Crawford was convicted of rape of a child in the third 

### degreeanddeliveryofmethamphetamine. Thecourtsentenced himtoastandard rangesentenceof18monthsontherapeconviction and61 monthsonthedelivery conviction. He argues that thetrial court erred by considering theallegations of 

### promoting commercial sexual abuse ofaminorin imposing thesesentences. We

affirm. FACTS 

### Marcques Crawford wascharged with promoting commercial sexual abuse 

### of a minor, rape of a child in the third degree, and violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW—delivery ofmethamphetamine 

### (meth) to a minor. The charges stemmed from Crawford's relationship with aNo. 73131-9-1/2

female minor, 15 year old N.J. The State alleged that Crawford had a sexual relationship with N.J., supported her commercial sexual abuse and profited from it, and that he supplied her with methamphetamine. The case proceeded to trial, and N.J. testified. N.J. explained that during the summer of 2013, she ran away from home. During that summer, she met Crawford on a website. N.J. began spending time with Crawford. They smoked 

### methamphetamine together, which Crawford obtained for them. Shortlyafter they met, Crawford began talking to N.J. about working as a prostitute. And, they started having sexual intercourse. N.J. testified that Crawford continued bringing up the subjectof prostitution. 

### Eventually, N.J. agreed, because she believed Crawford would keep asking her. Over several months, N.J.engaged in prostitution bywalking the streets and using Internet ads, and she gave Crawford the money she received. In December, N.J. became afraid that Crawford would hurt her. She called 

### 911 totell the police that Crawford was pimpingjuveniles and that he had a gun. Thepolice arrived at Crawford's apartment, and he was arrested that day. The juryconvicted Crawford of the rape and delivery charges. However, 

### thejury could notreach a verdict on the promoting charge. The State agreed to dismiss this charge. 

### Thetrial courtproceeded to sentence Crawford. Itimposed standard range sentences of 18 months for the rape conviction and 61 months for the delivery conviction. Crawford appeals.No. 73131-9-1/3

DISCUSSION Crawford argues that the trial court relied on the unproved allegations of promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor to impose his sentences for rape and delivery. He asserts that by doing so, the courtviolated the real facts doctrine. Generally, sentences within the standard sentence range are not appealable. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). The trial court has discretion to sentence a defendant within the sentence range, and so long as the sentence falls withinthe standard sentence 

### range, there can be no abuse ofdiscretion as to the sentence's length. RCW 9.94A.530(1); State v. Williams. 149 Wn.2d 143, 146-47, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003). A defendant may appeal a standard range sentence only if the sentencing court 

### failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, orconstitutional requirements. State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d at 481-82. Cases permitting such a procedural challenge to a standard 

### range sentence have typically involved errors in calculating the appropriate standard range. State v. Mail, 65 Wn. App. 295, 298, 828 P.2d 70 (1992), affd, 121 Wn.2d 707, 845 P.2d 1042 (1993). 

### Crawford argues that his standard range sentence is appealable, because the trial court committed a procedural error by considering facts relating to the 

### unproved promoting charge. He relies on RCW 9.94A.530(2), which sets out the real facts doctrine. That provision ofthe SRA provides, 

### In determining any sentence other than a sentence above the standard range, the trial court may rely on no more information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, orNo. 73131-9-1/4 proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing, or proven pursuant to RCW 9.94A.537. Acknowledgment includes not objecting to information stated in the presentence reports and not objecting to criminal history presented at the time of sentencing. Where the defendant disputes material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point. The facts shall be deemed proved at the hearing by a preponderance of the evidence, except as otherwise specified in RCW 9.94A.537. On remand for resentencing following appeal or collateral attack, the parties shall havethe opportunity to presentand the courtto consider all relevant evidence regarding criminal history, including criminal history not previously presented. RCW 9.94A.530(2). This doctrine limits sentencing decisions to the facts that were 

### acknowledged, pleaded to, or proven. State v. Houf. 120 Wn.2d 327, 332, 841 P.2d 42 (1992). And, itensures that sentencing courts do notbase exceptional sentences on unproved or uncharged crimes. State v. Morreira, 107 Wn. App. 450, 458, 27 P.3d 639 (2001). 

### Crawford points to evidence in the record to show that the courtrelied on the facts relating to the promoting charge to sentence him. The State recommended a sentence toward the higher end of the range, given Crawford's 

### overarching behavior and the fact that the hung jury voted nine in favor of conviction,three infavor of acquittal. Crawford objected, becausethesefacts were related to the dismissed charge of promoting. The court did notexplicitly rule on 

### thisobjection. In announcing itsdecision, the courtaddressed Crawford: The crimes you're convicted of are really serious, though, and it's 

### really important—I realize you disagree with a lotofthe facts and it's your right to do that, but the actions that you took, even if Ionly considered the crimes that you were convicted of, really had a 

### profoundeffecton[N.J's] life. Andthat's true evenifshe was already addicted to meth when she met you, that was true even ifshe was involved in various sexual activities before she met you. . . . AndNo. 73131-9-1/5 there isn't really anything the court can do that's going to make all this right, but Ithink it's really importantthatyou acknowledge, ifonly to yourself, that you played a significant role in harming this young

woman. The court continued by telling Crawford that he would have to make choices about whatkind ofrelationship he would have withotherpeople, including women, going forward. The court ultimately decided that neither a low end nor a high end sentence was appropriate considering the facts ofthe case. From these statements, Crawford asserts thatthetrialcourtviolated the real facts doctrine. He contends that by stating "even ifIonly considered the crimes 

### that you were convicted of," the court acknowledged that it was considering the 

### promoting charge as well as the rape and delivery convictions. Hesuggests that 

### by mentioning N.J.'s sexualactivities before she metCrawford, thecourt alluded to N.J.'s prior acts ofprostitution. And, he asserts that the court'swarning that Crawford will have to make choices about the relationships he will have with

women meant that he will have to decide whether he can stop treating women as objects from which he can profit. 

### We disagree thatthese statements signaledconsideration ofthe promoting 

### charge. Rather, they indicated that the court would not consider the facts underlying that charge as the State had urged. The courtimposed a sentence 

### based on only the crimesfor which Crawford was convicted. Crawford does not allege an error in calculating the range itself. And, the cases he relies upon to assert a violation ofthe real facts doctrine all involve exceptional sentences, rather 

### than standard range sentences. See, e.g., Morreira. 107 Wn. App. at 454-55; State v. Tiernev. 74Wn. App. 346, 350, 872 P.2d 1145 (1994); State v. Houf, 120No. 73131-9-1/6

Wn.2d 327, 328, 841 P.2d 42 (1992). We hold that Crawford's standard range sentence is not appealable. In his reply brief, Crawford asserts that appellate costs should not be imposed. Crawford's argument relates to this court's recent decision in State v. Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. 380, 367 P.3d 612 (2016). InSinclair, we noted that RAP 15.2(f) created a presumption ofcontinued indigencythroughout review. 192 Wn. App. at 393. Because there was no findingthat Sinclair's financial condition had 

### improved and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of indigency, we ruled that appellate costs were not appropriate, jd. We follow Sinclair here. The trial courtfound that Crawford lacked sufficient 

### funds to pursue an appeal and determined that he was entitled to appellate counsel 

### at public expense. The State has not overcome the continuing presumption of 

### indigency. Therefore, weconcludethat appellate costs should not be awarded to
the State.
We affirm.

WE CONCUR: 

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