PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

GEORGE A. BELTRAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 

FEDERAL SATELLITE PRISON CAMP 

AT SHERIDAN, WARDEN MARION 

FEATHERS IN THE FEDERAL PRISON 

CAMP, in her individual capacity, 

COUNSELOR PEREZ, in his individual 

capacity, COUNSELOR MOCK, in his 

individual capacity, COUNSEL RUIZ, in his 

individual capacity, COUNSELOR 

EVERHART,

1

 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 3:15-cv-00785-SI 

OPINION AND ORDER

George A. Beltran, Reg. #29768-298, Sheridan Federal Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 6000, 

Sheridan, OR 97378, pro se. 

Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney, and Jared Hager, Assistant United States Attorney, 

U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DISTRICT OF OREGON, CIVIL DIVISION, 1000 SW Third Avenue, Suite 

600, Portland, Oregon 97204. Of Attorneys for Defendants. 

 1

 As noted in the Court’s November 30, 2015 Opinion and Order, Dkt. 26 at 1, “Warden 

Marion Feathers” is Marion Feather; “Counselor Perez” is Efren Perez; “Counselor Mock” is 

Robin Mock; and “Counselor Everhart” is Carl Earhart, Jr. “Counselor Ruiz” has not yet been 

identified. 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 1 of 13
PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

Plaintiff George A. Beltran (“Beltran” or “Plaintiff”), a prisoner at the Satellite Federal 

Correctional Institution in Sheridan, Oregon (“Sheridan”), brings suit against Defendants 

Warden Marion Feather (“Warden Feather”) and Counselors Perez, Mock, Ruiz, and Earhart 

(collectively “Defendants”).2 Beltran brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 

violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In his 

first amended complaint (“FAC”), Beltran alleges that Defendants’ denied him an extra mattress 

for his back pain and punished him for having an unauthorized extra mattress by taking away his 

telephone privileges for 30 days and his commissary privileges for 60 days. According to 

Beltran, these policies and procedures violate his free speech and due process rights. Beltran 

further alleges that Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference toward his medical 

requirements in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Beltran requests injunctive relief and 

 2

 The Court does not address Beltran’s renewed claims against the United States, the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons, and Sheridan because the Court dismissed these claims with prejudice 

in the Court’s November 30, 2015 Opinion and Order, Beltran v. United States, 2015 WL 

7722414 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2015), Dkt. 26, and Beltran has not asked for leave to re-plead these 

claims. In any event, Beltran’s invocation of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) does not 

cure the defects in his claims against the United States and the federal agencies. The FTCA 

waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and its agencies and allows federal district 

courts to hear tort actions against the federal government for “injury or loss of property, or 

personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of 

the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b)(1). Beltran does not allege any tort claim, other than an unsupported, conclusory 

statement that Defendants are retaliating against him, but rather continues to allege violations of 

his constitutional rights, for which the United States has not waived sovereign immunity. See 

Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, Beltran does not allege 

that he followed the proper administrative procedures to bring a claim under the FTCA as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The 

FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their 

administrative remedies.”). 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 2 of 13
PAGE 3 – OPINION AND ORDER 

monetary damages.3

 Defendants move to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim or, in the 

alternative, for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. For the reasons 

stated below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

STANDARDS 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no 

cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual 

allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 

Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual 

allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. HewlettPackard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 

F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint 

“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations 

of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). All reasonable inferences from 

the factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office 

Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). The court need not, however, credit the 

 3

 Beltran also requests relief permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 2284. This statute provides for 

the convening of a panel of three district court judges when required by a congressional act. 

§ 2284(a). Beltran argues that he is entitled to such a panel under 18 U.S.C. § 3626 because he 

challenges the constitutionality of his prison conditions. Under § 3626, the three judge panel may 

issue a prison release order “only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that—(i) 

crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will 

remedy the violation of the Federal right.” § 3626(a)(3)(E). Because Beltran has not alleged 

either element required under the statute, he has not stated a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and is 

not entitled to a three-judge panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2284. 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 3 of 13
PAGE 4 – OPINION AND ORDER 

plaintiff’s legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). 

A court must liberally construe the filings of a pro se plaintiff and afford the plaintiff the 

benefit of any reasonable doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), every complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This standard “does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” but does demand “more than an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555). 

BACKGROUND 

Beltran is currently serving a 120-month sentence at Sheridan. Beltran bases his 

complaint, in part, on events that occurred in April 2015. According to Beltran, prison counselors 

searched his cell and confiscated an extra mattress that Beltran had placed on his bed to alleviate 

his back pain. Because Beltran had an extra mattress without authorization, prison policy 

required Beltran to participate in a Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”) hearing. At the 

hearing, prison counselors determined that Beltran had violated internal Code 305 by possessing 

“anything not authorized.” Therefore, Beltran lost telephone privileges for 30 days and 

commissary privileges for 60 days. Beltran did not file an appeal from the UDC determination. 

In May 2015, Plaintiff filed his original complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim and, in the alternative, for summary judgment for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. On November 30, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss and dismissed Beltran’s claims against the United States, Bureau of Prisons, and 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 4 of 13
PAGE 5 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Sheridan with prejudice. The Court granted Beltran leave to file an amended complaint with 

respect to his claims against Warden Feather and Counselors Perez, Mock, Ruiz, and Earhart. 

Beltran filed the FAC on January 11, 2016. Defendants again move to dismiss the complaint and, 

in the alternative, for summary judgment. 

DISCUSSION 

The Court construes Beltran’s complaint as alleging claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).4

 A Bivens claim is “the 

federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman v. 

Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). Bivens provides “an implied private action for damages 

against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. 

Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001). 

A. Claims Against Individual Officers 

Defendants argue that all of Beltran’s claims against the remaining individual officers 

should be dismissed. Beltran alleges that Defendants violated: (1) his First Amendment rights by 

suspending his telephone privileges; (2) his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his bunk; 

(3) his Fifth Amendment rights by not conducting a proper UDC hearing; (4) his Sixth 

Amendment rights by not giving him a fair UDC hearing; (5) his Seventh Amendment rights by 

impeding his right to a fair trial by jury; (6) his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with 

deliberate indifference toward his medical needs; and (7) his Fourteenth Amendment rights by 

depriving him of due process of law.5 

 4

 Beltran’s objections to the Court’s characterization of his claims as Bivens claims are 

unfounded. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows for claims against state agents, whereas Bivens allows for 

claims against federal agents. Here, Beltran brings claims against federal agents. 

5

 Beltran also states that Defendants are retaliating against him. He alleges no facts and 

advances no arguments about why Defendants are retaliating against him. He also does not 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 5 of 13
PAGE 6 – OPINION AND ORDER 

For the reasons stated in the Court’s previous Opinion and Order, Beltran has failed to 

state a claim under the First Amendment. The Court previously analyzed Beltran’s 30-day 

telephone suspension under the four factors in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The 

Court found that: (1) prison administrators could reasonably have believed that the threat of 

restrictions on telephone use serves to deter possession of unauthorized items; (2) Beltran has 

alternative means of exercising his right to free speech; (3) the restriction on Beltran’s telephone 

use is limited; and (4) Beltran has not met his burden to show that available alternatives are 

obvious and easy ways to deter the possession of unauthorized items. 

The only new facts that Beltran asserts in relation to his First Amendment claim are that 

he communicates with his son more effectively over the telephone than through letters and that 

his family lives far from Sheridan. The Court is sympathetic that Beltran’s son benefits from 

telephone calls with his father and that Beltran’s family lives too far away to reasonably visit 

Sheridan. The Turner test does not require, however, that prison administrators implement the 

“least restrictive alternative.” Id. at 90-91. The Supreme Court instructs that “prison 

administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning 

institutional operations.” Id. at 89 (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 

Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977)). Particularly when a prisoner retains other avenues 

through which he may assert his free speech rights, “courts should be particularly conscious of 

the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the 

regulation.’” Id. at 90 (alteration in original) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 

 

contend that the extra mattress found in his cell was anything other than an unauthorized item for 

which Defendants could find him in violation of Code 305. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Therefore, the Court finds that Beltran has 

failed to state a claim for retaliation. 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 6 of 13
PAGE 7 – OPINION AND ORDER 

(1974)). Beltran’s 30-day telephone suspension still allows him to send letters that other 

members of his family may read to his son. Additionally, the suspension is limited in duration. 

According Defendants the appropriate measure of judicial deference to determine prison 

regulations, the Court finds that Beltran’s temporary suspension does not create an unreasonable 

restriction on Beltran’s right to free speech. 

Additionally, the Court explained in its previous Opinion and Order that Beltran failed to 

state a claim under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Beltran v. United States, 

2015 WL 7722414, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 2015).6

 Beltran has not rectified these claims in the 

FAC. Beltran has not stated a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he has no expectation 

of privacy in his prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Beltran has not stated 

a claim under the Sixth Amendment because the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal 

prosecutions and Beltran has not alleged any facts relating to his criminal prosecution. U.S. 

Const. amend. VI. Beltran also has not stated a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because 

the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, not to the federal government, and Beltran has not 

alleged claims against any state government official. 

Beltran’s factual assertions in support of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims in the 

FAC are also materially identical to the claims in his original complaint. For the reasons stated in 

the Court’s previous Opinion and Order, these assertions fail to state a claim under both 

amendments. Beltran, 2015 WL 7722414, at *6-7.7

 In particular, Beltran does not identify “a 

protected liberty interest” or an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

 6

 Dkt. 26 at 7-8. 

7

 Dkt. 26 at 12-16. 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 7 of 13
PAGE 8 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Additionally, Beltran’s allegations that he received 

inadequate medical treatment do not implicate the named individual officers, who are not alleged 

to have any medical treatment roles at Sheridan. The emails to and from Health Services that 

Beltran attaches as exhibits to the FAC also show repeated responses to Beltran’s concerns and 

attention to Beltran’s medical needs.8 Beltran asserts that medical staff have not given him the 

correct prescriptions for his pain, but “[a] difference of opinion does not amount to a deliberate 

indifference to [Beltran’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989). 

Finally, Beltran has not stated a claim under the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh 

Amendment provides for the right to a trial by jury in certain civil cases. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 

The Seventh Amendment is violated when “an individual is not afforded, for any significant 

period of time, a jury trial he would otherwise receive.” Armster v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 

Dist. of Cal., 792 F.2d 1423, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986). Beltran has not asserted any facts showing 

that Defendants have prevented Beltran from being afforded a civil jury trial. Moreover, for the 

reasons discussed above, Beltran has not asserted any facts showing that he is entitled to a civil 

jury trial on any of his claims. 

B. Claims Against Warden Feather 

Defendants move to dismiss Beltran’s claims against all defendants, including Warden 

Feather. Beltran’s claims against Warden Feather rest on “[Warden Feather’s] passive or active 

participation for the UDC hearing determinations exerted upon the inmate-plaintiff for her role 

 8

 The Court considers these exhibits without converting the motion to dismiss into a 

motion for summary judgment pursuant to the standards set forth in United States v. Ritchie, 342 

F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 8 of 13
PAGE 9 – OPINION AND ORDER 

and authority to decide upon the medical requests that were made to her.”9

 In his response to 

Defendants’ motion, Beltran also argues that Warden Feather violated Beltran’s Eighth 

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment because “she should have known that 

the grade of care provided to Beltran for his claims of pain and deliberate indifference were 

triggered at the moment that Perez decided to ignore Beltran’s physical condition requiring 

adequate medical care.”10 Bivens does not allow for holding a supervisor vicariously liable. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. To state a Bivens claim against a supervisor, “a plaintiff must plead that 

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated 

the Constitution.” Id. 

Beltran does not assert that he made any complaint or requests for medical care directly 

to Warden Feather. Nor does Beltran assert that Warden Feather took any direct action that 

infringed his constitutional rights. Beltran argues instead that Warden Feather “should have 

known” that he received inadequate medical care and that Warden Feather demonstrated 

“deliberate indifference” to his medical needs. If a plaintiff shows “that a supervisor acted, or 

failed to act, in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s Eighth Amendment 

rights,” then a supervisor may be held liable for his or her involvement in the constitutional 

deprivation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1206-07. The plaintiff must show, however, “a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. at 

1207 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)). As discussed above, Beltran 

has failed to state a claim for any constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. 

 9

 Dkt. 28 at 7. 

10 Dkt. 31 at 17. 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 9 of 13
PAGE 10 – OPINION AND ORDER 

Accordingly, he has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for supervisor liability under 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference jurisprudence. 

C. Exhaustion Requirement 

Defendants argue that this is one of the rare cases in which the plaintiff’s failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) is clear from 

the face of the complaint such that the Court can grant a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In the rare 

event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)”). In the alternative, Defendants argue that summary judgment is 

appropriate. Defendants offer evidence that Beltran did not submit any administrative appeal or 

request related to his Code 305 violation or medical care. 

 The PLRA provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 

section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has stressed that the PLRA requires “proper 

exhaustion” so that the state grievance system receives “a fair opportunity to consider the 

grievance.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006). Such a fair opportunity does not exist 

“unless the grievant complies with the system’s critical procedural rules.” Id. Congress intended 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) “to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits . . . . In 

some instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s grievance might improve 

prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need for litigation.” Porter v. 

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). Additionally, “the internal review might ‘filter out some 

frivolous claims’” and, for those claims brought to court, create “an administrative record that 

Case 3:15-cv-00785-SI Document 35 Filed 06/01/16 Page 10 of 13
PAGE 11 – OPINION AND ORDER 

clarifies the contours of the controversy.” Id. at 525 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 

737 (2001)). 

“Nonexhaustion” is “an affirmative defense” and defendants have the burden of 

“prov[ing] that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not 

exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171-72. A remedy is “available” where it is 

“capable of use; at hand.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171). Grievance procedures that do not allow for all types of relief sought 

are still “available” as long as the procedures may afford “some relief.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 738. 

If a defendant meets the initial burden, a plaintiff then must “come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

Remedies are “effectively unavailable” where they are “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly 

prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Id. (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 

767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[T]he ultimate burden of proof,” however, never leaves the 

defendant. Id. 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) administrative remedy process allows inmates to 

file a grievance related to any aspect of confinement. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.10. If an inmate cannot 

informally resolve a grievance, the inmate may submit a formal request for a remedy to the 

Warden. § 542.14(a). The inmate has 20 days to appeal any decision by the Warden to the 

Regional Director. § 542.15(a). The inmate then has 30 days to appeal the Regional Director’s 

response to the General Counsel in the Central Office of the BOP. Id. Only after following this 

administrative procedure may an inmate file a federal lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

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PAGE 12 – OPINION AND ORDER 

In the FAC, Beltran contends that his claims are not subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirements, implicitly acknowledging that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.11

Additionally, the FAC expressly incorporates the allegations in Beltran’s original complaint.12 In 

the original complaint, Beltran stated he could have asked for administrative relief but that such a 

request would have been futile.13 He explicitly acknowledges that he chose not to submit a 

formal request for an administrative remedy as required by 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19 Thus, 

although failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, it is clear from the 

face of the FAC that Beltran did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the 

PLRA. 

In his response to Defendants’ motion, Beltran cites case law explaining the futility 

doctrine. Beltran does not, however, allege any facts showing that following the required 

administrative procedures would have been futile. For example, Beltran does not assert that 

prison staff led him to believe a formal grievance was unnecessary or would not be considered in 

his case. He does not assert that he had any reason to believe he would have been denied an extra 

mattress or phone privileges if he had formally appealed the disciplinary decision. Thus, Beltran 

fails to plead sufficient facts showing that exhaustion would have been futile. The Court 

dismisses the FAC based on Beltran’s failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust his 

administrative remedies, which is clear on the face of the complaint and appropriately addressed 

 11 Dkt. 28 at 16. Beltran is mistaken when he asserts that his claims are exempted from 

the PLRA’s requirements. The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements 

apply to claims for money damages based on constitutional violations. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. 

12 Dkt. 28 at 7. 

13 Dkt. 2 at 4. 

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PAGE 13 – OPINION AND ORDER 

through a motion to dismiss. Because the Court dismisses the complaint, the Court does not 

address arguments concerning Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.14

CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Dkt. 29) is granted. Beltran’s 

first amended complaint was substantially identical to his original complaint. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 

F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the 

amendment would be futile.”). Beltran’s claims against Warden Marion Feather and Counselors 

Perez, Mock, Ruiz, and Earhart are dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 1st day of June, 2016. 

 /s/ Michael H. Simon 

Michael H. Simon 

 United States District Judge 

 14 On May 4, 2016, Beltran filed a motion for default judgment based on his assertion that 

he has asked several times that Defendants and their attorney give him access to discovery and 

disclose all evidence related to this matter under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26. According 

to Beltran, he “has been prejudicially ignored.” Dkt. 33 at 5. Because the Court grants 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court denies Beltran’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. 33) 

as moot. 

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