No. 89-240 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

MILK RIVER PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 

a federal instrumentality, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsBIG HOOK LAND & CATTLE COMPANY, a Montana 

corp.; HAROLD GOOLSBEE, JR., ALYCE GOOLSBEE; 

SHERLEE T. GRAYBILL; GRAYBILL, OSTREM, WARNER 

AND CROTTY; JOHN H. LEEDS, D.V.M., 

Defendants and Appellants. 

BIG HOOK LAND & CATTLE CO., et al., 

Counterclaimants and Third-Party 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

-vsMILK RIVER PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 

a federal instrumentality, 

Counterclaim Defendants and ThirdParty Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Hill, 

The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Leo Graybill, Jr.; Graybill, Ostrem, Warner & Crotty, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Gary S. Deschenes; Alexander, Baucus & Linnell, 

Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 31, 1989 

J)e.cided: October 25, 1989 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Defendants Harold and Alyce Goolsbee appeal a grant of 

partial summary judgment entered against them by the Twelfth 

Judicial District Court, Hill County, Montana. Because the 

partial summary judgment was not a final order and was not 

certified to this Court pursuant to Rule 54 (b) , M.R.Civ.P., 

we dismiss the appeal without prejudice. 

On November 14, 1985, Milk River Production Credit 

Association (Milk River PCA) brought a foreclosure action 

against Big Hook Land and Cattle Company, Harold and Alice 

Goolsbee, and several other defendants. The Goolsbees filed 

an answer and counterclaim in February 1986, alleging a 

breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the need 

for an accounting, nonconsideration for subordination of 

mortgage, and other assertions. On March 4, 1986, Milk River 

PCA moved to strike affirmative defenses and to dismiss 

counterclaims. This motion was granted after oral argument. 

Milk River PCA then filed a motion for summary judgment 

against all defendants on September 29, 1986. After a hearing on this motion in October 1986, the District Court ruled 

from the bench that summary judgment would be granted against 

all defendants. The day after the hearing Big Hook Land and 

Cattle Company filed for bankruptcy. No written order was 

ever filed against any party at that time. 

Over two years later, on January 18, 1989, the District 

Court entered partial summary judgment against defendants 

Harold Goolsbee and Alyce Goolsbee. No order has been entered against any defendant other than the Goolsbees. Further, the Goolsbees did not request that the District Court 

certify the order pursuant to Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P. 

On appeal the Goolsbees raise issues regarding certain 

discovery rulings by the District Court. They also allege 
that the District Court erred in dismissing defendants' 

defenses and counterclaims by determining that the state 

court did not have jurisdiction since Milk River PCA is a 

federal instrumentality. We do not reach these issues since 

we conclude that the Goolsbees' appeal is premature. 

An appeal may he taken from a "final order," Rule 1, 

M.R.App.P., or the district court may certify an order for 

appeal pursuant to Rule 54 (b) , M.R.Civ.P., which states: 

Judgment upon multiple claims or involving 

multiple parties. When multiple claims for relief 

or multiple parties are involved in an action, the 

court may direct the entry of a final judgment as 

to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 

parties only upon an express determination that 

there is no just reason for delay and ,upon an 

express direction for the entry of judgment. In 

the absence of such determination and direction, 

any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims 

or the rights and liabilities of less than all the 

parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 

the claims or parties, and the order or other form 

of decision is subject to revision at any time 

before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 

parties. 

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that a judgment 

which leaves undetermined the liability of one or more defendants cannot be appealed unless it is expressly made final 

upon a determination that there is no just reason for delay. 

Roy v. Neibauer (1980), 188 Mont. 81, 85, 610 ~.2d 1185, 

1188. 

Appellants urge that Milk River PCA has treated this as 

a final order in that this Montana judgment has been entered 

in California against the Goolsbees. They contend that Milk 

River PCA is therefore estopped from raising the certification issue. Appellants misunderstand the certification 
requirement. It is not a mere formality, as stated in the 

recent case of McDonald v. Unirex, Inc. (1986), 221 Mont. 

153, 154-55, 721 P.2d 302, 303: 

We dismissed the appeal in Neibauer because no 

attempt was made to comply with the certification 

requirements of Rule 54(b). In that case, as an 

aid to practitioners, we set out the factors which 

we will consider in reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification. Since that time, we have refused to consider several appeals in which the certification 

requirements were partially, but not adequately 

met. Montana practitioners are held on notice that 

the Rule 54 (b) certification requirement is not 

viewed by this Court as a mere formality, but as a 

necessary and valuable tool for preventing piecemeal litigation and waste of the resources of both 

litigants and the courts. (Citations omitted. ) 

Accordingly, this appeal i t prejudice.