J. A24036/18

2019 PA Super 329

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MEGHAN ELIZABETH HAINES, : No. 1827 MDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, October 27, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-0001204-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2019

Meghan Elizabeth Haines appeals from the October 27, 2017 judgment 

of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

following her conviction of two counts of indecent assault of a person less than 

13 years of age.1 After careful review, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

The trial court provided the following synopsis of the relevant procedural 

history:

On July 6, 2017, [appellant] pleaded guilty to two (2) 

counts of Indecent Assault of a person less than 

thirteen years of age. The charges related to incidents 

between both victims and [appellant] that occurred 

sometime between 2005 and 2006, when [appellant] 

was between fourteen and fifteen. The victim did not 

disclose the allegations until 2016, when [appellant] 

was over the age of twenty-one. Prior to sentencing, 

[appellant] filed a motion [entitled] “Motion to Bar 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7).
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Imposition of Megan’s Law Registration pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Muniz[,”2] seeking exclusion 

from lifetime registration pursuant to SORNA.[3] That 

Motion was denied by [the trial court,] and [appellant] 

was sentenced to five (5) years[’] probation on each 

charge, to run consecutively. 

Trial court opinion, 2/16/18 at 1 (footnote omitted). 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on November 27, 

2017.4 The trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely 

complied with the trial court’s order, and the trial court filed an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Can [appellant] be required to register as a sex 

offender where SORNA II, enacted February 21, 

2018, in an ex post facto law, which may not 

be applied to the instant offenses, which were 

committed in 2005?

The applicable registration law changed after 

[appellant] was ordered to register; however, 

the court below held that [appellant] could be 

required to register under a previous, 

unspecified version of Megan’s Law.

 

2 See Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017).

3 Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-

9799.41, amended and replaced by 2018, Feb. 21, P.L. 27, No. 10, § 19, 

immediately effective. Reenacted 2018, June 12, P.L. 140, No. 29, § 14, 

immediately effective. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75 (SORNA II).

4 November 26, 2017 fell on a Sunday. Accordingly, a notice of appeal could 

be timely filed the following business day. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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II. Can [appellant] be required to register as a sex 

offender where she was a juvenile when the 

offense occurred in 2005, and registration as a 

sex offender under those circumstances 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and a 

violation of the due process clauses of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 

States Constitution, and Article [I], Section Nine 

of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania?

The court below found that despite having 

committed a sex offense as a juvenile, 

[appellant] was required to register because she 

was convicted of the offense as an adult.

Appellant’s brief at 4.

In her first issue, appellant challenges the constitutionality of SORNA II. 

SORNA II, however, did not become effective until June 12, 2018, which was 

after the trial court imposed appellant’s judgment of sentence. Clearly then, 

appellant was not sentenced under SORNA II. Therefore, appellant’s 

constitutional challenge to SORNA II is not properly before us, and we decline 

to entertain the challenge.

We will, however, address appellant’s second issue in which she

contends that requiring her to register as a sexual offender for crimes that she 

committed as a juvenile in 2005 constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

and violates the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. (Appellant’s brief at 32.) “Because this issue presents a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 
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plenary.” Commonwealth v. Horning, 193 A.3d 411, 414 (Pa.Super. 2018), 

appeal denied, 204 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2019), citing Commonwealth v. Lee, 

935 A.2d 865, 876 (Pa. 2007).

In In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014), our supreme court addressed the 

issue of whether the imposition of lifetime registration requirements pursuant 

to SORNA on juvenile offenders adjudicated delinquent of certain crimes 

constituted a violation of juvenile offenders’ due process rights through the 

use of an irrebuttable presumption – the risk of reoffending. Id. at 14. We 

recognize that J.B. was decided before Muniz, which clearly holds that 

application of SORNA to sex offenders who committed their crimes prior to 

SORNA’s enactment constitutes an ex post facto violation. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

at 1223. The issue we now consider is whether J.B. applies to criminal 

defendants who committed their crimes as juveniles, but were convicted as 

adults. We hold that it does.

In J.B., the court examined SORNA as applied to seven juveniles 

adjudicated delinquent for sexual offenses. Id. at 2-3. The consolidated cases 

arose from a determination by York County Court of Common Pleas 

Judge John C. Ulher that the SORNA registration requirements, as applied to 

juveniles, were unconstitutional. Id. at 10. In agreeing with the trial court’s 

decision, our supreme court also reviewed and credited scientific research that

concluded that, unlike adult sexual offenders, juveniles exhibit lower levels of 
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recidivism, a fundamental underpinning to the registration requirements of 

SORNA.

We additionally agree with the Juveniles’ assertion 

and the trial court’s holding that SORNA’s 

presumption that sexual offenders pose a high risk of 

recidivating is not universally true when applied to 

juvenile offenders. As credited by the trial court, 

studies suggest that many of those who commit 

sexual offenses as juveniles do so as a result of 

impulsivity and sexual curiosity, which diminish with 

rehabilitation and general maturation. See Tr. Ct. Op. 

at 17-18; see also Halbrook, Amy, Juvenile Pariahs,

65 Hastings L.J. 1, 11–12 (2013).

Id. at 17.

Additionally, the J.B. court looked to the United States Supreme Court’s 

decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), in which the 

High Court held that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for homicide defendants under 18 years of age at the time 

the crime was committed was unconstitutional. This decision in Miller was 

based on the inherent understanding of the fundamental differences between 

adults and children, children’s lack of maturity, and their underdeveloped 

sense of responsibility leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless 

risk-taking. Id. at 471 (citation omitted).

The J.B. court relied on this rationale from Miller to corroborate the 

scientific research involving juveniles and their brain development and stated:

Pennsylvania has long noted the distinctions between 

juveniles and adults and juveniles’ amenability to 

rehabilitation. Pennsylvania utilizes courts which are 

specifically trained to address the distinct issues 
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involving youth, and are guided by the concepts of 

balanced and restorative justice. Indeed, these goals 

are evident in the introductory section of the Juvenile 

Act, which instructs that the Act must be construed as 

follows:

to provide for children committing 

delinquent acts programs of supervision, 

care and rehabilitation which provide 

balanced attention to the protection of the 

community, the imposition of 

accountability for offenses committed and 

the development of competencies to 

enable children to become responsible 

and productive members of the 

community.

42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6301(b)(2). While our courts are 

mandated to be always watchful of juveniles’

rehabilitation, while also providing accountability to 

the victim and society, SORNA’s automatic 

registration removes the juvenile judges’ ability to 

consider the rehabilitative prospects of individual 

juvenile sexual offenders.

Id. at 18 (footnote omitted).

The court then went on to conclude that with respect to juveniles, 

“SORNA’s registration requirements improperly brand all juvenile offenders’

reputations with an indelible mark of a dangerous recidivist, even though the 

irrebuttable presumption linking adjudication of specified offenses with a high 
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likelihood of recidivating is not ‘universally true.’” Id. at 19 (citation 

omitted).

5

Returning to the instant case, appellant was 14 years of age at the time 

she committed the sexual offenses. Clearly, under J.B., had she been 

adjudicated delinquent at that time, no registration requirement would apply 

to her. Appellant’s subsequent conviction of the sexual offenses when she 

was an adult does not diminish the fact that she was a juvenile at the time of 

their commission, and because of that, she should not be held to an 

irrebuttable presumption of reoffending at age 26. J.B. requires us to analyze 

appellant’s behavior at the time the offenses were committed. For these 

reasons, we find that the J.B. court’s holding should apply with equal weight 

to juvenile adjudications as well as to defendants convicted as adults for 

crimes committed as juveniles.

Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

 

5 We note that SORNA II mandates individualized assessments for juveniles 

adjudicated delinquent of certain crimes and who are committed to an 

institution nearing their 20th birthday to determine whether continued 

involuntary civil commitment is necessary. Id. at 19; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9799.58(h). The J.B. court further noted that, “[a] similar process could be 

utilized to assess which juvenile offenders are at high risk to recidivate.” J.B., 

107 A.3d at 19.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2019