No. 87-333
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1987

IN THEMATTER OF T.J.F., Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: DistrictCourt of the Thirteenth JudicialDistrict, In and for the County ofYellowstone, The Honorable William J. Speare,Judgepresiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
ForAppellant: Terry L. Seiffert argued, Billings,Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely,Attorney General, Helena,Montana Betsy Brandborg argued,Asst. Atty. General, Helena Harold Hanser,CountyAttorney; Curtis Bevolden, Deputy County Attorney, Billings,Montana ForAmicus Curiae: Allen Smith,Jr. argued for Mental DisabilitiesBoard ofVisitors,Warm Springs,Montana

Submitted: December 3, 1987 Decided: December 22, 1987 [J; (-*

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### 7987 Filed. 

### -Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr.

## , delivered the opinion of the Court.

A youth, T.J.F., appeals from an order of the District Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, County of Yellowstone, committing him to continued treatment of up to 3 months to Rivendell ofBillings, Inc., a lock-up treatment facility for mentally disturbed youths. The Legal Services Program of Warm Springs has filed an amicus brief. The youth,T.J.F., has been discharged from custody and we therefore dismiss this case on the grounds ofmootness. Appeal dismissed. We cannot let this casebe dismissed without commenting
on the facts that gave rise to this appeal. The appellant has alleged serious procedural errors committed by the State. The commitment procedure is governed by S 53-21-101,et seq. MCA. These statutes are clear and must be strictly adhered to. Although we do not pass upon the validity of the appellant's claims today, we will not hesitate to do so in, 4 future cases where there are allegations of procedural abuses,whethermoot ornot. Issues of the appellantare as follows: 1. Did the District Court err by not dismissing the petition for conunitment on grounds of procedural defect? 2. Was there sufficient evidence to find that T.J.F.
wasmentally ill to a reasonablemesical certainty? 3. Was there sufficient evidence to find that T.J.F.
was a danger to himself or others? 4. Did the District Court err when it based its order
on amedical reportnot in evidence? The appellant, T.2.F. was committed to the Rivende1.1 facility for mentally disturbed youths on April. 13, 1987.T.J.F. is a 12 year old male. On July 1, 1987, a petition for extension of commitment was filed by the deputy county attorney. Because the petition was not filed within the statutory time frame, appellant made a motion to dismiss on procedural grounds at the hearing. This motion was never ruled on but on July 8, 1987, the deputy county attorney filed a petition for commitment supported by a June 23 medical report by T.J.F.'s psychiatrist,Dr. Newman. T.J.F. again made a motion to dismiss because no request for commitment had been filed as required by statute and because the appellanthad not been advised ofhis rights prior to the June 23 exam. The DistrictCourt ordered that apsychiatrist examine T.J.F. No examination was ever given pursuant to this order. Without ruling on the motion to dismiss (which went unopposed by the State), the court held a hearing. John Kiedrowski, a certified mental health professional at Rivendell, testified that through his daily contact with T.J.F., he felt that T.J.F. was seriously mentally ill and believed that if placed back in his home he would be dangerous to younger children owing to a past history of abuse. Kiendrowski is neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist but holds a degree in personnel guidance. No personal evaluation of T.J.F. was made nor was any report written. Kiendrowski testified that he concurred with Dr. Newman's June 23 report. The report, however, was never introduced into evidence and Dr. Newman did not testify. Kiendrowski further testified that T.J.F. had not been violent while at Rivendell but had made threats about getting back atpeople. The Court ordered that T.J.F. be committed and attached Dr. Newman's June 23 report to its findings of fact. It is from this order that appellantappeals.It is unnecessary to address the appellant's arguments becausewe hold that the case before us today ismoot. Moot questions may not be addressed by this Court. State ex rel. Miller v. Murray (1979), 183 Mont. 499, 503, 600 P.2d 1174, 1176. We defined a moot question in Murray as "one which existed once but because of an event or happening, it has ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy." 600P.2d at 1176. A casewillbecome moot for the purpose of an an appeal "where by a change of circumstances prior to the appellate decision the case has lost any practical purpose for the parties, for instance where the grievance that gave rise to the case has been eliminated

# . .

# .." 5 Am.Jur.2d, 5 762, Appeal and Error

(1962). Since this action arose, T.J.F. has been released from the Rivendell facility. There is no longer any actual controversy. Dismissed on grounds ofmootness 

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We Concur:

Chief Justice,/"