NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-3025 MIGUEL J. BOQUE, Petitioner,

v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent.

Elaine Rodriguez-Frank , of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for petitioner. J. Reid Prouty , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigat ion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Ju stice, of Washington, DC, for re spondent. With him on the brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz , Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Todd M. Hughes , Deputy Director. Of counsel was A. Bondurant Eley , Trial Attorney. Appealed from: Merit S ystems Protection BoardNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-3025

MIGUEL J. BOQUE Petitioner,

v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent.
Petition for review of the Merit Syst ems Protection Board in NY3443060353-C-1.

____________________________ DECIDED: August 6, 2008

____________________________

Before MAYER, LOURIE, and PROST, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM DECISION Miguel J. Boque (“Boque”) appeals from the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying his petit ion to enforce a settlement agreement. Boque v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs , NY-3443-06-0353-C-1 (M.S.P. B. July 17, 2007) ( Initial Decision ). Because Boque fails to identify any reversible error, we affirm

.BACKGROUND In 2006, Boque was employed as a pos tgraduate medical resident at the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). On April 14, 2006, he was separated from his position for “unprofessional behavior.” Boque appealed his separation and on January 3, 2007, Boque and the VA executed a settlem ent agreement. In exchange for Boque’s dismissal of his Board appeal and his agreement to submit his voluntary resignation, the VA agreed to verify his employment to prospective employers and to expunge the removal action from his file. Relevant to this appeal, the agreement also contained two additional provisions. First, Paragr aph 4 of the agreement stated that: The Agency agrees to issue a letter to the Appellant ce rtifying that the Appellant fulfilled the minimum requirem ent of twelve months in clinical training in the subspecialty of Critical Care Medicine. Initial Decision at 3. In addition, Pa ragraph 8(d) of the agreem ent also set forth an integration clause that stat ed that “this Agreement cons titutes the entire understanding between the parties, and there are no other terms or commitments, verbal or written.” Id. On February 13, 2007, Dr. R odriguez, Chief of the Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine Training Program, issued a lette r pursuant to Paragraph 4 using nearly identical language to that set forth in the settlement agreement. The letter stated the following: This is to certify that [D]oct or Miguel Boque fulfilled the minimum requirement of twelve m onths in clinical traini ng in the Subspecialty of Critical Care Medicine at our Training Program. Id. at 4. Boque did not accept the letter. Rather, he reques ted “a certificate that is valid for ‘credential purposes.’” In particular, B oque asserted that the letter should indicate

2008-3025 -2-the dates during which he parti cipated in the training progr am and requested that the document be labeled “Certificate of Training.” Id. The VA refused to modify the letter or issue a certificate and Boque appealed to the B oard for enforcement of the settlement agreement. The Board denied Boque’s petition. In doi ng so, the Administrative Judge (“AJ”) determined that the VA complied with the se ttlement agreement. The AJ found that under the agreement, the VA was r equired to issue a letter certifying that Boque fulfilled the minimum requirement of twelve months in clinical training in the subspecialty of critical care medicine, and wa s not required to specify when the training occurred or to issue a certificate. Thus, the AJ dete rmined that the February 13, 2007 letter met the requirements of the settlement agreement. Boque appealed the AJ’s decision to the full Board, which denied his petition for review, thereby rendering the AJ’s decision final. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. Boque timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). DISCUSSION The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision of the Boar d is limited. We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwis e not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); see Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). On appeal, Boque primarily argues that the Board erred by failing to take into account the intent of the negotiating parties. Boque contends that he intended to obtain

2008-3025 -3-credit for the grade he obtained wh ile he trained at the VA as part of the critical care program. Moreover, Boque asserts that the VA failed to comply with an implied clause of fair dealing and failed to act in good faith. In response, the government argues the AJ correctly det ermined that the VA complied with the settlement agr eement. According to the government, the letter issued by Dr. Rodriquez strictly complied wit h the unambiguous language of the settlement agreement. Moreover, the government cont ends that Boque’s demand for a certificate as if he completed a residen cy is unsupportable in light of the settlement agreement’s integration clause. We agree with the government. It is well- settled that “a settlement agreement is a contract [and] . . . interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law.” Greco v. Dep’t of the Army, 852 F.2d 558, 560 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In interpreting a contract, we first look to the plai n language of the agreement. Gould, Inc. v. U.S. , 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Here, the agreement clear ly provides that the VA was required to issue a letter to Boque “certifying that [ he] has fulfilled the minimum requirements of twelve months in clinical tr aining in the subspecialty of Cr itical Care Medicine.” The February 13, 2007 letter issued by Dr. Rodr iguez, which contained nearly identical language, clearly met that requirement. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Boque’s a ssertion that the letter should have contained additional information based on the parties ’ intent, particularly in light of the integration clause contained in the agreement. Indeed, a party “attempting to add terms to a contract with an int egration clause ‘carries an extremely heavy burden in overcoming this attestation to the doc ument’s finality and completeness.’” Rumsfeld v.

2008-3025 -4-2008-3025 -5- Freedom NY, Inc. , 329 F.3d 1320, 1328 Fed. Cir. 2003). Boque fails to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the int egration clause contained in the agreement, the VA was required to include any information beyond the pl ain language set forth in Paragraph 4. Thus, because Boque fails to meet his ex tremely heavy burden, his argument fails. Lastly, we are likewise unpersuaded by B oque’s assertion that the VA failed to act in good faith and failed to comply with an implied clause of fair dealing. The record demonstrates that the VA upheld its obligations under the agr eement in part by issuing the February 13, 2007 letter and is devoid of any evidence indicating that the VA acted in bad faith during its dealings with Boque. We thus conclude that the Board properly denied Boque’s petition to enforce the settlement agreement. Accordingly, because Ba ldwin fails to identify any reversible

error, we affirm

.