OPINION & ORDER – 1 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

LESLIE ANN STITES, ) Civil No.: 3:14-cv-01211-JE 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) OPINION AND ORDER 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

____________________________________ ) 

 Nelson R. Hall

 Bennett, Hartman, Morris & Kaplan, LLP 

 210 SW Morrison Street, Suite 500 

 Portland, OR 97204 

 Attorney for Plaintiff 

 Billy J. Williams, Acting U.S. Attorney 

 Janice Hebert, Asst. U.S. Attorney 

 1000 S.W. 3rd Avenue, Suite 600 

 Portland, OR 97204 

 Franco Becia 

 Special Asst. U.S. Attorney 

 Office of the General Counsel 

 Social Security Administration 

 701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221 A 

 Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

 Attorneys for Defendants 

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OPINION & ORDER – 2 

JELDERKS, Magistrate Judge: 

 Plaintiff Leslie Ann Stites brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) seeking 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) 

denying her application for Disability Income Benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act (the 

Act). Plaintiff seeks an Order remanding the action to the Social Security Administration (the 

Agency) for an award of benefits. 

 For the reasons set out below the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 

Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB on November 25, 2008, 

alleging she had been disabled since November 1, 2006. After her claim was denied initially and 

upon reconsideration, Plaintiff timely requested an administrative hearing. On January 19, 2011, 

a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Charles Evans. Plaintiff; Thomas 

Weiford, a Vocational Expert (VE); and Dr. Julie Frederick, Ph.D., an impartial medical expert 

(ME) testified at the hearing. On January 28, 2011 the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision and 

Plaintiff appealed. 

 On May 2, 2012, the Appeals Council issued an Order vacating the ALJ’s decision and 

remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. On December 3, 2012, a hearing was 

held before ALJ Riley Atkins. Plaintiff and VE Susan Burkett testified at the hearing. 

 In a decision dated December 20, 2012, ALJ Atkins found that Plaintiff had not been 

disabled at any time from her alleged onset date through the date of the decision. The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 30, 2014, rendering the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. 

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Background 

 Plaintiff was born in 1963 and was 49 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision after 

remand. She graduated from high school and attended two years of college. She has past relevant 

work as a fast food worker, waitress, cashier, sewing machine operator, telephone solicitor, 

cleaner and caregiver. 

Disability Analysis 

 The ALJ engages in a five-step sequential inquiry to determine whether a claimant is 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Below is a summary 

of the five steps, which also are described in Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 

1999). 

 Step One. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity (SGA). A claimant engaged in such activity is not disabled. If the claimant is 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner proceeds to evaluate the claimant’s 

case under Step Two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

 Step Two. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant has one or more severe 

impairments. A claimant who does not have such an impairment is not disabled. If the claimant 

has a severe impairment, the Commissioner proceeds to evaluate the claimant’s case under Step 

Three. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). 

 Step Three. Disability cannot be based solely on a severe impairment; therefore, the 

Commissioner next determines whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of the 

presumptively disabling impairments listed in the Social Security Administration (SSA) 

regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. A claimant who has such an impairment 

is disabled. If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal an impairment listed in the 

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OPINION & ORDER – 4 

regulations, the Commissioner’s evaluation of the claimant’s case proceeds under Step Four. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). 

 Step Four. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to perform 

relevant work he or she has done in the past. A claimant who can perform past relevant work is 

not disabled. If the claimant demonstrates he or she cannot do work performed in the past, the 

Commissioner’s evaluation of the claimant’s case proceeds under Step Five. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(f). 

 Step Five. The Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to do any other 

work. A claimant who cannot perform other work is disabled. If the Commissioner finds that 

the claimant is able to do other work, the Commissioner must show that a significant number of 

jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can do. The Commissioner may satisfy this 

burden through the testimony of a vocational expert (VE) or by reference to the MedicalVocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If the Commissioner 

demonstrates that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant 

can do, the claimant is not disabled. If the Commissioner does not meet this burden, the claimant 

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). 

 At Steps One through Four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

1098. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform 

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

Medical Record and Testimony 

 The court has carefully reviewed the medical record and testimony and the parties are 

familiar with both. Accordingly, the details of that evidence will be set out below only as they 

are relevant to the issues before the court. 

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OPINION & ORDER – 5 

ALJ’s Decision 

 As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of 

the Act through December 31, 2012. 

 At the first step of his disability analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset of disability on November 1, 2006. The ALJ 

noted that, according to Plaintiff’s testimony, she worked for Taco Bell for approximately seven 

months in 2007-2008. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s earnings from this work did not 

meet the threshold for substantial gainful activity. 

 At the second step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s depression, anxiety, fibromyalgia and 

obesity were severe impairments. 

 At the third step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or equaled a presumptively disabling impairment set out in the listings, 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 

 The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC). He found that 

Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform light work except that 

[s]he can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, and frequently 

lift and/or carry 10 pounds. She can stand and/or walk 

approximately six hours with normal breaks during the workday. 

She has no sitting limitations. She should not be required to climb, 

other than stairs and ramps. She would work best in a simple 

routine work environment. She is limited to no more than 

occasional public contact. She should avoid exposure to hazards, 

dangerous machinery, and heights in the workplace. 

In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her alleged symptoms were not credible to the extent 

they were inconsistent with the above RFC. 

 Based upon the testimony of the VE, at the fourth step of his disability analysis the ALJ 

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OPINION & ORDER – 6 

found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. 

 At the fifth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the functional capacity required to 

perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. Based upon the VE’s 

testimony, the ALJ cited cannery worker, laundry folder and garment sorter as examples of the 

work Plaintiff could perform. Based upon the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform such work, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 

Standard of Review

 A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable “to engage in substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

 423(d)(1)(A). Claimants bear the initial burden of establishing disability. Roberts v. Shalala, 66 

F.3d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1122 (1996). The Commissioner bears the 

burden of developing the record, DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991), and 

bears the burden of establishing that a claimant can perform “other work” at Step Five of the 

disability analysis process. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. 

 The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. The court must weigh all of the evidence, whether it supports or 

detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 

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OPINION & ORDER – 7 

1986). The Commissioner’s decision must be upheld, however, even if “the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. 

Discussion 

 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting her testimony; improperly rejected the opinion of treating physician, Dr. Rosa GarciaJordan; and improperly discounted the opinion of the administrative hearing ME, Dr. Frederick. 

I. Plaintiff’s Credibility 

A. Applicable Standards 

 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. If a claimant produces medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment that is reasonably expected to produce some degree of the 

symptoms alleged and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, an ALJ must provide 

“clear and convincing reasons” for an adverse credibility determination. Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996); Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2006).1 If 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination, that determination must be 

upheld, even if some of the reasons cited by the ALJ are not correct. Carmickle v. Commissioner 

of Social Security, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir.2008). 

 The ALJ must examine the entire record and consider several factors, including the 

claimant's daily activities, medications taken and their effectiveness, treatment other than 

medication, measures other than treatment used to relieve pain or other symptoms, and “any 

 

1

 The Commissioner argues a more deferential standard applies, citing Molina v. Astrue, 775 F.3d 1104, 1136 (9th

Cir. 2012) for the proposition that merely reasonable conclusions drawn from the evidence suffice. Def.'s Br. 7, n.1. 

I decline to accept the Commissioner's argument. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(reasserting that the ALJ must provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons” to support a credibility analysis). 

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OPINION & ORDER – 8 

other factors concerning the individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or 

other symptoms.” SSR 96–7. An ALJ may also consider such factors as a claimant's inconsistent 

statements concerning symptoms and other statements that appear less than candid, unexplained 

or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment, 

medical evidence tending to discount the severity of the claimant's subjective claims, and vague 

testimony as to the alleged disability and symptoms. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 

(9th Cir.2008). 

B. Analysis 

Plaintiff testified that her depression, anxiety and chronic pain prevented her from 

working. Tr. 72, 77. Plaintiff alleged her depression caused her to feel physically sick, she had 

no energy or desire to do anything, her body ached and she felt like she had the flu. She alleged 

that arthritis and fibromyalgia caused her significant pain. Plaintiff also alleged that she 

experienced 1-2 panic attacks per month, which she relieved by going to her bedroom or reading 

and that it was hard for her to work around others because she felt she was being scrutinized. 

 Because Plaintiff produced medical evidence of an underlying impairment that was 

reasonably expected to produce some degree of the symptoms she alleged and there was no 

affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to provide “clear and convincing 

reasons” for his adverse credibility determination. 

 The ALJ offered a number of reasons supporting his credibility determination. He noted 

that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the limiting effects of her symptoms were inconsistent 

with her activities of daily living, with the medical record, and with her work activities. The ALJ 

also discounted Plaintiff’s credibility because he found that she had not followed recommended 

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OPINION & ORDER – 9 

medical treatment, that many of her mental health issues were due to “situational stressors” and 

that her criminal history “reflect[ed] unfavorably on her veracity and truthfulness.” Tr. 21. 

 An ALJ may support a determination that the claimant was not entirely credible by 

identifying inconsistencies between the claimant's complaints and the claimant's activities of 

daily living. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir.2002). In evaluating Plaintiff's 

credibility, the ALJ cited activities of daily living that were inconsistent with Plaintiff's 

testimony concerning the severity of her symptoms and impairments. The ALJ noted, and the 

record reflects, that Plaintiff prepared meals, showered and dressed herself daily, drove a car and 

was teaching her daughter to drive, shopped for groceries, performed household chores, cared for 

her two daughters, went out with friends once or twice a week, attended Alcoholics Anonymous 

meetings three times a week where she occasionally acted as chairperson and treasurer and made 

trips to California to visit family. Tr. 18, 21, 76, 310, 312, 516, 518, 567, 662-663. 

 Even if these activities do not rise to the level of transferable work skills, they are 

inconsistent with allegations of completely debilitating impairment. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1113 (9th Cir.2012) (ALJ may discredit a claimant's testimony when he or she reports 

activities of daily living that “indicat[e] capacities that are transferable to a work setting” or 

“contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the 

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and her complaints was a clear and 

convincing reason to find her testimony not credible with regard to her symptoms. 

 In addition, the ALJ appropriately found the credibility of Plaintiff’s statements 

undermined by her criminal history. A plaintiff’s reputation for truthfulness is a valid 

consideration for an ALJ in determining that plaintiff's credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. 

Plaintiff’s convictions for theft and writing bad checks are crimes involving dishonesty. These 

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OPINION & ORDER – 10 

convictions, along with charges of methamphetamine possession, occurred during the period 

Plaintiff was alleging disability and little more than five years prior to the ALJ’s decision. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in discrediting Plaintiff’s statements based on her prior criminal 

history. See Crowell v. Astrue, No. 3:11-CV-00094-HU, 2012 WL 6706023, at *25 (D. Or. Sept. 

12, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 03:11-CV-00094-HU, 2012 WL 6706063 

(D. Or. Dec. 26, 2012)(upholding adverse credibility determination based, in part, on plaintiff’s 

history of arrests and/or convictions related to stealing and forgery); see also Newport v. Astrue, 

No. EDCV 11-180-JEM, 2012 WL 1044487, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2012)(upholding 

adverse credibility determination based, in part, on the claimant's history of arrests for theft and 

possession of drugs). 

 The ALJ here provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence 

for finding Plaintiff’s statements less than fully credible. As such, this Court need not discuss all 

of the reasons provided by the ALJ since at least one legally sufficient reason exists. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162–63. The ALJ's credibility finding, therefore, is affirmed. 

II. Evaluating Medical Opinion 

A. Applicable Standards 

The ALJ is required to consider all medical opinion evidence and is responsible for 

resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the medical testimony. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041. In 

reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court does not assume the role of fact-finder, but instead 

determines whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in light of the record as a 

whole. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.1992). 

 In order to reject the opinions of non-examining physicians, an ALJ need only provide 

“reference to specific evidence in the medical record.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 

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(9th Cir. 1998)(citations omitted). However, because treating physicians have a “greater 

opportunity to know and observe” their patients, their opinions are given greater weight than the 

opinions of other physicians. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1285. An ALJ must provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting a treating physician's uncontroverted opinions, Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.2d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir.1995), and must provide “specific, legitimate reasons ... based 

upon substantial evidence in the record” for rejecting opinions of a treating physician which are 

contradicted. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989)(citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, a treating physician's opinion is not conclusive as to the ultimate question of 

disability. Morgan v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)(citations 

omitted). 

B. Treating Physician Dr. Garcia-Jordan 

As noted above, Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of her 

treating physician, Dr. Garcia-Jordan. 

 Dr. Garcia-Jordan began treating Plaintiff in 2009. In September, 2010 she drafted a letter 

in which she opined that Plaintiff “is unable to work in any capacity.” Tr. 549. In November, 

2010, Dr. Garcia-Jordan completed an assessment form in which she indicated that Plaintiff 

suffered from “severe anxiety and depression,” and fibromyalgia. In check-box responses, she 

opined that Plaintiff was “markedly limited” in maintaining attention and concentration for 

extended periods of time; performing activities within a schedule; sustaining an ordinary routine 

without special supervision; and in completing a normal workday or workweek without 

interruption from psychological symptoms. Dr. Garcia-Jordan also opined that Plaintiff was not 

significantly limited in her ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; carry out 

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OPINION & ORDER – 12 

very short and simple instructions and carry out detailed instructions. She indicated that Plaintiff 

had no limitations in social functioning. Tr. 632-34. 

 In November, 2012, Dr. Garcia-Jordan submitted another letter in which she addressed 

internal inconsistencies in her November 2010 assessment by explaining that “[Plaintiff] is able 

to ask questions, follow directions and interact with the general public. She has a poor attention 

span and impaired concentration which will additionally impact ability to maintain any 

reasonable work.” Tr. 691. Dr. Garcia-Jordan wrote that the limitations she referenced in 2010 

remained accurate and that “[a]lthough, there may be brief periods when [Plaintiff’s] functioning 

improves, she decompensates quickly when faced with stressors.” Id. She opined that Plaintiff 

would have “great difficulty sustaining employment in any work setting because of depression 

and anxiety.” Id. 

 The ALJ gave Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s opinion “little weight” because he found it was 

inconsistent with her treatment notes. As an example, he cited a February 2011 treatment note in 

which Dr. Garcia-Jordan remarked that Plaintiff’s anxiety/panic disorder and agoraphobia were 

“markedly improved” on Abilify. Tr. 19, 684. During that same visit she noted that Plaintiff 

appeared in “[n]o acute stress. Alert and oriented. Able to speak full sentences. Appears much 

calmer than usual. No pressured speech. Speech pattern is normal. She does not appear agitated.” 

Tr. 684. The ALJ also cited treatment notes that indicated Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was “stable” 

with medication, that she denied suicidal ideation and that she had travelled to California 

annually to visit family. 

 Both Plaintiff and the Commissioner cite to additional evidence in the record that they 

assert supports their respective arguments regarding whether Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s treatment notes 

were consistent with the opinions rejected by the ALJ. This court is constrained to review only 

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OPINION & ORDER – 13 

the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a 

ground upon which he did not rely. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir.2003). 

However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and where evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir.2006); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 679 (9th Cir.2005). After thoroughly reviewing the record, I conclude that the ALJ’s 

reliance on the cited inconsistencies between Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s opinion and her treating 

records was legally sufficient and supported by substantial evidence. 

 The ALJ also discounted Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s opinion because he found that she 

“deferred any extensive mental health input to a mental health specialist because such opinions 

and treatment are outside her area of expertise.” Tr. 19. It is clear from the record that as one of 

Plaintiff’s treating providers, Dr. Garcia-Jordan was involved in treating Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments. Ordinarily, the court considers a physician competent to testify on psychiatric 

conditions when the conclusions are based on clinical observations. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 

F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.1987). However, the record also is clear that Dr. Garcia-Jordan 

specifically indicated that in completing the social security questionnaire she would defer to the 

input and expertise of a mental health specialist. The ALJ considered the opinion of State agency 

reviewing psychological consultant Dr. Joshua Boyd more reliable based upon Dr. Boyd’s 

expertise and the broader record he had available to him upon which to base his conclusions. It is 

the ALJ’s responsibility to assess and weigh the medical evidence. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008)(ALJ responsible for resolving conflicts in medical testimony). 

Under the circumstances, it was not improper for the ALJ to discredit Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s 

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OPINION & ORDER – 14 

opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental health as outside her area of expertise. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(5). 

 The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 

the record for giving less weight to Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s opinion. Accordingly, the ALJ did not 

err in his evaluation of Dr. Garcia-Jordan’s opinion. 

C. Administrative Hearing Medical Expert Dr. Frederick 

 Dr. Julie Frederick, Ph.D. testified as a medical expert at the January 19, 2011 

administrative hearing. She opined that Plaintiff had mild difficulties in activities of daily living; 

moderate difficulties in social functioning; marked difficulties in concentration, persistence and 

pace; and experienced 1-2 episodes of decompensation. Tr. 20. 

 The ALJ gave “moderate weight” to Dr. Frederick’s opinion because she was a “medical 

doctor who had the benefit of reviewing treatment records from several medical sources and had 

a longitudinal picture of claimant’s health.” Id. However, he found that her opinions that Plaintiff 

had experienced 1-2 episodes of decompensation and had marked difficulties in concentration, 

persistence, or pace were not supported by the record. Id. Specifically, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff had never been hospitalized due to her mental impairments and she reported that she 

drives a car and is able to relieve her mental symptoms by going to her bedroom or reading. Id. 

 Plaintiff only challenges the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Frederick’s opinion regarding her 

“marked” limitations in concentration, persistence and pace, arguing that he failed to explain 

why the activities he cited undermined Dr. Frederick’s opinion. However, as noted above, in 

order to reject the opinion of a non-examining physician, the ALJ need only reference specific 

evidence in the record. Sousa, 143 F.3d at 1244. Here, the ALJ cited evidence that Plaintiff was 

able to drive a car. Elsewhere in his decision the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s limitations with 

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OPINION & ORDER – 15 

regard to concentration, persistence, or pace and noted that Plaintiff reported she watches 

television, reads books and is able to follow written and spoken instructions “good.” Tr. 15, 312, 

313. He also cited medical record evidence that noted Plaintiff was able to perform one and twostep commands. Tr. 15, 516. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s ability to engage in these 

activities did not support a finding of “marked” limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. 

Even if there is evidence that supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must defer 

to the ALJ’s decision. Batson v. Comm'r. of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th 

Cir.2004.) Accordingly, this court defers to the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Frederick’s opinion. 

III. Plaintiff’s RFC 

 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC because the opinions of 

medical sources upon which he relied to support his finding did not constitute substantial 

evidence. 

 The RFC is the maximum a claimant can do despite her limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1545, 416.945. In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all of 

a claimant’s impairments, even those that are not severe, and evaluate “all of the relevant 

medical and other evidence,” including the claimant’s testimony. SSR 96-8p, available at 1996 

WL 374184. The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical testimony and 

translating the claimant’s impairments into concrete functional limitations in the RFC. StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Only limitations supported by 

substantial evidence must be incorporated into the RFC. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 

1163-65 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly gave “great weight” to the opinion of State 

agency reviewing psychological consultant Dr. Joshua Boyd. In July, 2009 Dr. Boyd completed 

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OPINION & ORDER – 16 

a Psychiatric Review Techinique (PRT) form and Mental Residual Functional Capacity 

Assessment (MRFCA) concerning Plaintiff. Tr. 526-542. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Boyd’s 

opinion cannot constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s RFC determination 

because he reviewed “very little evidence of record” and failed to provide any explanation for his 

opinion or define the ratings he assigned Plaintiff. 

 Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. Dr. Boyd completed his assessments in July of 2009 

and notes that the assessment covers the time period between May 1, 2008 and the date of the 

assessment. Tr. 526, 540. He discusses with specificity medical records that document Plaintiff’s 

condition during that period of time. Defendant correctly notes that Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate how Dr. Boyd’s medical opinion regarding her limitations during the time covered 

by his assessment was inaccurate and therefore not substantial evidence. Furthermore, although 

Dr. Boyd, himself, does not define the ratings he assigned Plaintiff, the forms he completed are 

Agency forms and, as noted by the ALJ, Dr. Boyd is an expert in evaluating Social Security 

applications. Tr. 20. The Agency itself defines the terms set out in both the PRT and MRFCA 

See SSA Program Operations Manual System DI 24510.063; 24505.025(F) and thus the 

definitions were available and, arguably, familiar to both the ALJ and Dr. Boyd. The ALJ did not 

err in relying on Dr. Boyd’s opinion to support his RFC determination. 

 Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of findings made by examining 

psychologist, Cheryl Brischetto, Ph.D., and the opinions provided by Licensed Clinical Social 

Worker, Scott Hines. She argues that the ALJ failed to consider evidence contained in these 

medical source opinions that was helpful to Plaintiff and thus mischaracterized the evidence. 

 Plaintiff’s challenges to the ALJ’s treatment of these medical opinions essentially ask this 

court to arbitrate a battle of evidence interpretation. That is not the court’s role here. It is true that 

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OPINION & ORDER – 17 

there is evidence in the record both helpful and detrimental to Plaintiff’s claim of disability. 

However, it remains solely the province of the ALJ to resolve conflict in the record and decide 

which medical opinions to credit. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

Furthermore, “[t]he key question is not whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding 

of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's actual 

finding that the claimant is not disabled.” Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th 

Cir.1997). As discussed above, the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence here was reasonable and 

thus his RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence. Batson, 359 F3d at 1197(ALJ 

need not include in RFC opinion evidence that is properly discounted). Accordingly, his 

determination will not be set aside by this court. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 679 (where the evidence 

supports multiple conclusions, including the ALJ's reasonable interpretation, the ALJ's 

interpretation must be upheld); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir.2001) (even 

where the record evidence is somewhat equivocal, a court should not second-guess the ALJ's 

judgment when it is supported by substantial evidence). 

Conclusion 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED and this 

action is DISMISSED. 

 DATED this 27th day of June, 2016 

 

 /s/ John Jelderks 

 John Jelderks 

 U.S. Magistrate Judge 

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