UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4239

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARCELLUS RAYNARD BROOKS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior 

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00468-PMD-1)

Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: March 28, 2012

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, P.A., Darlington, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, Robert F. Daley, Jr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Marcellus Raynard Brooks pleaded guilty to being a 

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006) and was sentenced to 210 months’

imprisonment. On appeal, Brooks raises two sentencing issues: 

(1) whether the district court erred by sentencing him as an 

armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006); and 

(2) whether the district court erred by finding that he failed 

to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility under U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3E1.1 (2010). For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we

review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 49 (2007). Brooks first claims that he should not have been 

sentenced as an armed career criminal offender, arguing that his 

three state drug offenses should have been considered one 

offense. A defendant is an armed career criminal and subject to 

a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence if he violates 

§ 922(g) and has at least three prior convictions for violent 

felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions 

different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see USSG

§ 4B1.4(a). We review a district court’s application of a 

statutory sentencing enhancement de novo. United States v. 
3

Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 334 (4th Cir. 1995). This claim is 

without merit as Brooks’ three drug offenses took place on 

different dates and were not otherwise related. Id. at 334-35.

Next, Brooks argues that he should have received a 

three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under 

USSG § 3E1.1, because he pled guilty. We conclude that the 

district court did not clearly err by denying Brooks this 

reduction. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 

2007) (providing standard of review). The burden was on Brooks 

to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was

entitled to the adjustment, United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 

F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1989), and we have previously 

upheld denial of the reduction where the defendant continued to 

deal drugs after his guilty plea. United States v. Underwood, 

970 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1992).

Finally, we note that Brooks’ sentence was at the 

bottom of his properly calculated advisory Sentencing Guidelines 

range, and thus is entitled to an appellate presumption of 

reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 

Brooks. Id. at 49; United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 

(4th Cir. 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
4

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED