II

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1806

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a

missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United

States against limited ballistic missile attack.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 19, 1998

Mr. COCHRAN (for himself and Mr. INOUYE) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To state the policy of the United States regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of defending

the territory of the United States against limited ballistic

missile attack.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited at the ‘‘American Missile Pro5 tection Act of 1998’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:
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1 (1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction

2 delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among

3 the most serious security issues facing the United

4 States.

5 (A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President

6 Clinton certified, that ‘‘I . . . find that the pro7 liferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical

8 weapons (‘weapons of mass destruction’) and

9 the means of delivering such weapons, con10 stitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to

11 the national security, foreign policy, and econ12 omy of the United States, and hereby declare a

13 national emergency to deal with that threat.’’

14 This state of emergency was reaffirmed in

15 1995, 1996, and 1997.

16 (B) In 1994 the President stated, that

17 ‘‘there is nothing more important to our secu18 rity and the world’s stability than preventing

19 the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic mis20 siles’’.

21 (C) Several countries hostile to the United

22 States have been particularly determined to ac23 quire missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

24 President Clinton observed in January of 1998,

25 for example, that ‘‘Saddam Hussein has spent
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1 the better part of this decade, and much of his

2 nation’s wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi

3 people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and

4 biological weapons and the missiles to deliver

5 them’’.

6 (D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ‘‘it

7 is in the supreme interest of the United States

8 to defend itself from the threat of limited ballis9 tic missile attack, whatever the source.’’

10 (2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the

11 United States is increasing.

12 (A) Several adversaries of the United

13 States have stated their intention to acquire

14 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of at15 tacking the United States.

16 (i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi

17 has stated, ‘‘If they know that you have a

18 deterrent force capable of hitting the

19 United States, they would not be able to

20 hit you. If we had possessed a deterrent—

21 missiles that could reach New York—we

22 would have hit it at the same moment.

23 Consequently, we should build this force so

24 that they and others will no longer think

25 about an attack.’’
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1 (ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Pal2 estine Liberation Front, has stated, ‘‘I

3 would love to be able to reach the Amer4 ican shore, but this is very difficult. Some5 day an Arab country will have ballistic

6 missiles. Someday an Arab country will

7 have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the

8 United States and for Israel to reach peace

9 with the Palestinians before that day.’’

10 (iii) Saddam Hussein has stated,

11 ‘‘Our missiles cannot reach Washington. If

12 we could reach Washington, we would

13 strike if the need arose.’’

14 (iv) Iranian actions speak for them15 selves. Iran’s aggressive pursuit of me16 dium-range ballistic missiles capable of

17 striking Central Europe—aided by the con18 tinuing collaboration of outside agents—

19 demonstrates Tehran’s intent to acquire

20 ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.

21 (B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess

22 ballistic missiles, with at least 10 of those coun23 tries developing over 20 new types of ballistic

24 missiles.
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1 (C) From the end of World War II until

2 1980, ballistic missiles were used in one con3 flict. Since 1980, thousands of ballistic missiles

4 have been fired in at least six different con5 flicts.

6 (D) The clear trend among countries hos7 tile to the United States is toward having ballis8 tic missiles of greater range.

9 (i) North Korea first acquired 300-kil10 ometer range Scud Bs, then developed and

11 deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is

12 currently deploying the 1000-kilometer

13 range No-Dong, and is developing the

14 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and

15 6000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2,

16 which would be capable of striking Alaska

17 and Hawaii.

18 (ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range

19 CSS–8s, progressed through the Scud B

20 and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-

21 kilometer range Shahab–3 and 2000-kilo22 meter range Shahab–4, which would allow

23 Iran to strike Central Europe.
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1 (iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash pro2 gram, produced a new missile, the Al-Hus3 sein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.

4 (iv) Experience gained from extending

5 the range of short- and medium-range bal6 listic missiles facilitates the development of

7 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

8 (E) The technical information, hardware,

9 and other resources necessary to build ballistic

10 missiles are increasingly available and accessible

11 worldwide.

12 (i) Due to advances in information

13 technology, a vast amount of technical in14 formation relating to ballistic missile de15 sign, much of it formerly classified, has be16 come widely available and is increasingly

17 accessible through the Internet and other

18 distribution avenues.

19 (ii) Components, tools, and materials

20 to support ballistic missile development are

21 increasingly available in the commercial

22 aerospace industry.

23 (iii) Increasing demand for satellite24 based telecommunications is adding to the

25 demand for commercial Space Launch Ve-
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1 hicles, which employ technology that is es2 sentially identical to that of interconti3 nental ballistic missiles. As this increasing

4 demand is met, the technology and exper5 tise associated with space launch vehicles

6 also proliferate.

7 (F) Russia and China have provided sig8 nificant technical assistance to rogue nation

9 ballistic missile programs, accelerating the pace

10 of those efforts. In June of 1997, the Director

11 of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress

12 on weapons of mass destruction-related equip13 ment, materials, and technology, stated that

14 ‘‘China and Russia continued to be the primary

15 suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to

16 stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern

17 weapons to countries of concern.’’

18 (G) Russia and China continue to engage

19 in missile proliferation.

20 (i) Despite numerous Russian assur21 ances not to assist Iran with its ballistic

22 missile program, the Deputy Assistant Sec23 retary of State for Nonproliferation testi24 fied to the Senate, that ‘‘the problem is

25 this: there is a disconnect between those
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1 reassurances, which we welcome, and what

2 we believe is actually occurring.’’

3 (ii) Regarding China’s actions to dem4 onstrate the sincerity of its commitment to

5 nonproliferation, the Director of Central

6 Intelligence testified to the Senate on Jan7 uary 28, 1998, that, ‘‘the jury is still out

8 on whether the recent changes are broad

9 enough in scope and whether they will hold

10 over the longer term. As such, Chinese ac11 tivities in this area will require continued

12 close watching.’’

13 (H) The inability of the United States to

14 defend itself against weapons of mass destruc15 tion delivered by long-range ballistic missile

16 provides additional incentive for hostile nations

17 to develop long-range ballistic missiles with

18 which to threaten the United States. Missiles

19 are widely viewed as valuable tools for deterring

20 and coercing a vulnerable United States.

21 (3) The ability of the United States to antici22 pate future ballistic missile threats is questionable.

23 (A) The Intelligence Community has failed

24 to anticipate many past technical innovations

25 (for example, Iraq’s extended-range Al-Hussein
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1 missiles and its development of a space launch

2 vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue

3 states to surmount traditional technological ob4 stacles to obtaining or developing ballistic mis5 siles of increasing range.

6 (B) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen7 tral Intelligence reported to Congress that

8 ‘‘many Third World countries—with Iran being

9 the most prominent example—are responding to

10 Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying

11 more on legitimate commercial firms as pro12 curement fronts and by developing more con13 voluted procurement networks.’’

14 (C) In June of 1997, the Director of Cen15 tral Intelligence stated to Congress that ‘‘gaps

16 and uncertainties preclude a good projection of

17 exactly when ‘rest of the world’ countries will

18 deploy ICBMs.’’

19 (D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intel20 ligence testified that Iran would have a me21 dium-range missile by 2007. One year later the

22 Director stated, ‘‘since I testified, Iran’s suc23 cess in getting technology and materials from

24 Russian companies, combined with recent indig25 enous Iranian advances, means that it could
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1 have a medium-range missile much sooner than

2 I assessed last year.’’ Department of State offi3 cials have testified that Iran could be prepared

4 to deploy such a missile as early as late 1998,

5 nine years earlier than had been predicted one

6 year before by the Director of Central Intel7 ligence.

8 (4) The failure to prepare adequately for long9 range ballistic missile threats could have severe na10 tional security and foreign policy consequences for

11 the United States.

12 (A) An attack on the United States by a

13 ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass

14 destruction could inflict catastrophic death or

15 injury to citizens of the United States and se16 vere damage to their property.

17 (B) A rogue state’s ability to threaten the

18 United States with an intercontinental ballistic

19 missile may constrain the United States’ op20 tions in dealing with regional threats to its in21 terests, deter the United States from taking ap22 propriate action, or prompt allies to question

23 United States security guarantees, thereby

24 weakening alliances of the United States and

25 the United States’ world leadership position.
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1 (5) The United States must be prepared for

2 rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles

3 armed with weapons of mass destruction.

4 (A) In its resolution of ratification for the

5 START II Treaty, the United States Senate

6 declared that ‘‘because deterrence may be inad7 equate to protect the United States against

8 long-range ballistic missile threats, missile de9 fenses are a necessary part of new deterrent

10 strategies.’’

11 (B) In September of 1994, Secretary of

12 Defense Perry stated that in the post-Cold War

13 era, ‘‘we now have opportunity to create a new

14 relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual

15 Assured Destruction, but rather on another ac16 ronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.’’

17 (C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Sec18 retary of Defense for Policy testified to the

19 Senate that ‘‘I and the administration are quite

20 willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue

21 state, a potential proliferant, beginning to de22 velop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching

23 the United States, we would have to give very,

24 very serious attention to deploying a limited na25 tional missile defense.’’
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1 (6) The United States has no defense deployed

2 against weapons of mass destruction delivered by

3 long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy

4 such a national missile defense system.

5 SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

6 It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon

7 as is technologically possible a National Missile Defense

8 system capable of defending the territory of the United

9 States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether ac10 cidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).

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