Filed 10/23/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.W., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B303310 

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. TJ23502)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.W.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Melissa N. Widdifield, Judge. Affirmed.

Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorney General, and 
2

Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

* * * * * *

Under the “routine booking question” exception to Miranda 

v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), Miranda warnings 

need not be given before a suspect being booked into custody is 

asked about his “name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of 

birth, and current age.” (Pennsylvania. v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 

582, 601-602 (Muniz) (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) But what if any 

of these core “booking questions”—in this case, the suspect’s age 

and date of birth—is an element of the crime with which he is 

ultimately charged? Does the routine booking question exception 

still apply, or is the suspect’s answer subject to exclusion because 

asking the question in that particular case was “reasonably likely

to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” (Rhode 

Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 (Innis))? Consistent with 

our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Elizalde (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 523 (Elizalde), we hold that the routine booking 

question exception categorically applies to all of the core “booking 

questions” enumerated in Muniz and authorizes the admission of 

the defendant’s answers to those specific questions into evidence 

“without [the need to] assess[] th[ose questions’] incriminatory 

nature on a case-by-case basis.” (Id. at p. 535.) We accordingly 

affirm the juvenile adjudication in this case.1

1 On August 27, 2020, after briefing was concluded, 

defendant filed a request that the court dismiss his appeal. 

Because the case raises “issues [that] are important and of 

continuing interest,” we deny defendant’s request to dismiss in 

order to resolve the issues presented herein. (Burch v. George

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 253, fn. 4; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.316(b)(2).) 
3

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. The crime

On November 15, 2019, 16-year-old J.W. (minor) took off 

running after he made eye contact with two Los Angeles Police 

Department officers who encountered him on the street. The 

officers gave chase. As he fled, minor discarded a backpack he 

had been wearing. After catching up to minor in a laundromat, 

the officers retrieved the backpack. The backpack contained a 

loaded, semi-automatic handgun, with one round in the chamber. 

As he was being handcuffed, minor spontaneously told the 

officers that he was carrying the gun for protection. 

B. Post-arrest

The officers transported minor to the station house to be 

booked. As part of the booking process, minor was asked his age 

and date of birth. He replied that he was 16 and provided his 

birthdate. Minor was read his Miranda rights, waived them, and 

repeated that he was carrying the gun for protection. 

II. Procedural Background

The People filed a petition asking the juvenile court to 

declare minor a “ward” based on the allegation that he had 

committed the felony crime of being a minor in possession of a 

firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610). 

The matter proceeded to trial in December 2019. After the 

prosecutor rested the People’s case-in-chief, minor pointed out 

that the People had not introduced any evidence of minor’s age, 

which is an element of the sole offense alleged in the petition. 

Over minor’s objections based on hearsay, lack of foundation, and 

Miranda, the juvenile court allowed the prosecutor to recall one 

of the arresting officers to testify that (1) he asked minor his age 
4

and date of birth, which minor provided during the booking

process, (2) the officer subsequently “verified” minor’s age and 

date of birth by running “department resources,” and (3) the 

officer also verified that information with the California 

Department of Justice. 

The juvenile court sustained the petition, designated the 

sustained offense as a felony, ordered that minor be placed at 

home on probation, and directed that minor live in his father’s 

home in Glendale, Arizona. 

Minor filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Minor argues that there is insufficient evidence to support 

his adjudication as a ward because (1) the statements he made to 

the booking officer about his age and date of birth are 

inadmissible under Miranda, and (2) without those statements, 

the People did not prove that he was a minor in possession of a 

firearm. Minor is correct that the People are required to prove 

every element of offenses against juveniles beyond a reasonable 

doubt (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 105), and that a 

defendant’s status as a minor is certainly an element of being a 

minor in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610); In re I.A.

(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778). Consequently, the validity of 

the juvenile court’s order sustaining the allegations against 

minor turns on whether Miranda bars admission of the

statements he made about his age and date of birth during the 

booking process.2 We independently review the legal contours of 

2 In light of our conclusion that Miranda does not bar the 

admission of his answers, we have no occasion to address 

whether the rules of evidence bar the officer’s testimony that he 
5

Miranda’s rule as well as whether Miranda applies to the 

particular statement in a case. (People v. Cromer (2001) 24 

Cal.4th 889, 901 [meaning of constitutional law]; People v. 

Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385 [application of Miranda].)

“Miranda established the now-familiar rule that 

prosecutors may not admit a suspect’s statements in their casein-chief against the suspect-defendant unless: (1) the defendant 

was advised that (a) ‘he has a right to remain silent,’ (b) anything 

he says ‘may be used as evidence against him,’ (c) ‘he has a right 

to the presence of an attorney,’ and (d) the defendant will be 

provided an attorney if he cannot afford one; (2) the defendant 

waived those rights, either expressly (by affirmatively indicating 

a wavier) or implicitly (by answering questions); and (3) prior to 

making the statements to be admitted, the defendant did not 

invoke either his right to remain silent or his Miranda right to an 

attorney.” (People v. Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 811, 

quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 473-474, 476; 

People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338-339 (Jackson).) 

Miranda’s protections apply to juveniles as well as adults. (In re 

Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 810-811.)

Miranda’s protections only apply, however, to statements 

made in the course of “custodial interrogation.” (Miranda, supra, 

384 U.S. at 444.) There is no doubt that minor was in police 

“custody” when he was being booked, so the critical question is 

whether the questions put to him by the booking officer 

constituted “interrogation.” For purposes of Miranda, 

“interrogation” means (1) “express questioning,” or (2) “any words 

or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally 

was able to verify minor’s age and date of birth through other 

sources.
6

attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 

suspect.” (Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.) What matters most 

is “‘the perceptions of the suspect,’” not “‘the intent of the police.’” 

(Ibid.; Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 601 (plur. opn. of Brennan, 

J.).) 

Not all responses to express questioning by law 

enforcement are barred by Miranda. As is most pertinent here, 

the United States Supreme Court in Muniz held that a suspect’s 

answers to express questions during the booking process 

regarding the suspect’s “name, address, height, weight, eye color, 

date of birth, and current age” are not barred by Miranda, even 

when not preceded by the above described Miranda warnings. 

(Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 586, 601 (plur. opn. of Brennan, 

J.), italics added; id. at p. 608 (conc. & dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) 

Muniz referred to this as the “‘routine booking question’ 

exception” to Miranda. (Id. at p. 601 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

Because in this case some of the booking questions were 

used to prove an element of the offense alleged against minor, 

this case squarely presents the following question: Does the 

routine booking question exception to Miranda still apply when 

the questions posed—here, date of birth and current age—fall 

squarely within Muniz’s core definition of “booking questions” 

but, on the facts of the specific case, are nevertheless “reasonably 

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect” (Innis, 

supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301)?

There is a split of authority on how to answer this question.

In Elizalde, our Supreme Court strongly suggested that the 

routine booking question exception still applies. There, the issue 

was whether a suspect’s answers to booking questions regarding 
7

his gang affiliation fell within the exception. The court held they 

did not. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 538.) In reaching this 

conclusion, the court drew a distinction between “the basic 

biographical data contemplated in Muniz” (that is, the seven 

questions bearing on “basic identifying biographical data” 

specifically identified in Muniz) and other “questions asked 

during booking that are reasonably related to administrative 

concerns.” (Id. at pp. 535-536, 538.) Elizalde held answers to 

booking questions regarding the categories of biographical data 

listed in Muniz “may be admitted without assessing their 

incriminatory nature on a case-by-case basis,” while answers to 

other booking questions could be admitted only if the questions 

fell outside the usual test for “‘interrogation’”—that is, if the 

questions were not “‘reasonably likely to elicit’” a response from 

the suspect that was incriminating in that case. (Id. at pp. 535, 

538.) Because the booking question regarding gang affiliation did 

not deal with one of the seven categories of “basic identifying 

biographical data” set forth in Muniz, and was reasonably likely 

to elicit an incriminating answer in light of the gang allegations 

likely to be at issue in Elizalde’s prosecution, the court held that 

Miranda barred admission of his answers. (Id. at p. 540.) PostElizalde opinions from the Courts of Appeal have adhered to the 

distinction drawn by Elizalde. (E.g., People v. Roberts (2017) 13 

Cal.App.5th 565, 574-576 [applying distinction, as regarding 

gang affiliation]; People v. Villa-Gomez (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 527, 

536-537 [same].) 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

(the Ninth Circuit) has taken a different approach. In the Ninth 

Circuit, any and all questions asked during the booking process—

even if those questions seek any of the seven categories of “basic 
8

identifying biographical data” enumerated in Muniz—are subject 

to exclusion under Miranda if “a police officer has reason to know 

that [the] suspect’s answer may incriminate him.” (United States 

v. Henley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 [“even routine 

questioning may amount to interrogation”]; accord, United States 

v. Williams (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 1143, 1147 [applying this 

rule, albeit as to gang affiliation outside Muniz’s seven 

categories]; United States v. Equihua-Juarez (9th Cir. 1988) 851 

F.2d 1222, 1226-1227 [applying this rule, albeit as to name and 

place of birth]; United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval (9th Cir. 

1990) 894 F.2d 1043, 1046-1047 [same].) Applying this approach, 

United States v. Disla (9th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2d 1340, 1347, held 

that a suspect’s answer to a booking question about his current 

address was inadmissible under Miranda because it could be 

used to implicate him for “cocaine and cash” police discovered at 

his residence during the execution of an unrelated search 

warrant.

As one would expect, minor urges us to follow the Ninth 

Circuit’s approach while the People urge us to follow the 

California Supreme Court’s approach. We choose to follow the 

California Supreme Court’s approach, and we do so for three 

reasons.

First, and most obviously, we follow the path staked out for 

us by our Supreme Court in Elizalde because it is the Supreme 

Court’s role to blaze the trails and our role to follow the trail so 

blazed. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 

Cal.2d 450, 455-456 [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must 

accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction”].)

Second, we agree with Elizalde’s implicit conclusion that its 

approach is the approach more consistent with Muniz itself. Like 
9

Elizalde, Muniz also drew a distinction between the seven 

categories of basic biographical data falling within its “‘routine 

booking question’ exception” to Miranda and other “question[s] 

asked during the booking process,” which it said did not “fall[] 

within that exception.” (Muniz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 601-602 & 

fn. 14 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) What is more, Muniz chose to 

define a “‘routine booking question’ exception.” (Id. at 601, italics 

added.) If, as the Ninth Circuit cases hold, the default test for 

“interrogation” still applies to questions regarding the seven 

categories of basic biographical data listed in Muniz, then 

Muniz’s “exception” would still be applying Miranda’s rules 

regarding what constitutes interrogation but with an overlay that 

rebuttably presumes that booking questions regarding the seven 

Muniz categories are not reasonably likely to elicit an 

incriminating response. In our view, reading Muniz in this way 

means that it is still subject to—and hence not excepted from—

Miranda, and thus is not really, as Muniz purported to create, a 

“routine booking question exception.” 

Lastly, Elizalde is more consistent with the rationale 

underlying Miranda. Miranda created its prophylactic 

protections “[t]o safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling 

pressures’ of custodial interrogation” (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th 

at pp. 338-339) because, when present, those “pressures . . . work 

to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to 

speak where he would not otherwise do so freely” (Muniz, supra,

496 U.S. at p. 589). Given this underlying function, the United 

States Supreme Court has declined to apply Miranda in 

situations that “do not implicate the concerns underlying 

Miranda” because “the coercive atmosphere” of custodial 
10

interrogation “is lacking” (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 

296), or in situations in which competing concerns “outweigh[] 

the need for” Miranda’s “prophylactic rule” and the time 

consuming “on-the-scene balancing process” it entails (New York 

v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 657-658). 

Questions about the seven categories of basic identifying 

biographical data listed in Muniz during the booking process do 

not subject suspects to “inherently compelling pressures” that 

might “compel them to speak” when they would not otherwise do 

so. Although suspects being booked are most certainly in 

custody, a booking officer asking them for their name, date of 

birth and similar biographical data—information that is “likely to 

be . . . insignificant in the scheme of things” because it is 

“incriminating only in unusual circumstances”—is not subjecting 

them to inherently compelling pressures over and above those 

from merely being in custody. (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 

Court (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 191.) But something more than being

in “custody” is required. (Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 300 

[“‘interrogation’” “reflect[s] a measure of compulsion above and 

beyond that inherent in custody itself”].) This is undoubtedly 

why Innis excludes from the definition of “interrogation” “words 

or actions . . . normally attendant to arrest and custody.” (Id. at 

p. 301; Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 535 [so noting].) 

Moreover, it is critical for law enforcement to know who it 

is admitting into its custody. This competing consideration 

justifies a rule that dispenses with the otherwise necessary “onthe-scene balancing” as to whether any of the seven categories of 

basic biographical data might prove incriminating based on the 

underlying crime and the charges that might be filed in each 

particular case. Indeed, this case vividly illustrates the 
11

importance of this basic biographical information. Consistent 

with the state’s “‘parens patriae interest in preserving and 

promoting the welfare’” of juveniles who are suspected of 

committing crimes (Alfredo A. v. Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal.4th 

1212, 1225, quoting Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253), law 

enforcement is required by statute to treat minors differently 

than adults: Minors must be housed in juvenile halls (not jails) 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 207.1, subd. (a)), and officers must “notify” 

the minor’s parents or caregivers about any arrest and where the 

minor is being housed (Id., § 627, subd. (a)). Knowing an 

arrestee’s age is critical to complying with these statutes, and the 

most logical way to obtain this information is by asking about it 

during the booking process. Given these important, competing 

concerns, having an exception that obviates the need to engage in 

a case-by-case analysis of the possibly incriminating impact of 

asking basic biographical questions makes sense, particularly 

given the rarity with which those questions elicit answers that 

might prove to be incriminating. (Elizalde, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 

p. 535 [noting how Muniz’s questioning “is generally unrelated to 

crime and unlikely to elicit an incriminating response”].)

In light of this analysis, the trial court did not err in 

admitting the officer’s testimony regarding minor’s answers to 

the booking questions about his age and date of birth, both of 

which fall squarely within Muniz’s categories of basic 

biographical data. With that evidence as part of the record, there 

was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

adjudication. 
12

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P.J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ