# NEY GENE QFTEXAS

Honorable Don Hall Criminal District Attorney McLennan County Courthouse Waco, Texas

Dear Mr. Hall: Opinion No. C-387
Re: Whether aperson whose driver’s license has been suspended under the Safety Responsibility Act (Article 67Olh, V.C.S.) must surrender such license to the Department ofPublic Safety on demand pursuant to Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, V.C.S.
You recently requested an opinion ofthis office concerning the following question:

“Should aperson whose driver’s license has been suspended under the provisions ofthe Safety Responsibility Act, (Article 6701h) be required to surrender said driver’s license on demand inview ofSection 32 (4), Article 668713, V.C.S., ofthe Drivers License Law?”
In order to arrive at the correct answer to your question, it is felt necessary to first review the legislative history ofthe particular acts involved and their relationship to each other.
The Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, codified as Article 6701h, V.C.S., was first enacted in 1951by the 52nd Legislature and became effective January 1,1952. Section 31ofthat Act provides as follows :

“Any person whose license or registration shall have been suspended as herein provided, or whose policy ofinsurance or bond, when required under this Act, shall have been canceled or terminated, or who shall neglect to

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furnish other proof upon request of the Department shall immediately return his license and registration to the Department. Ifany person shall fail to return to the Department the license or registration as provided herein, the Department shall forthwith direct any peace officer to secure possession thereof and to return the same to the Department.”
Section 32 (d) ofthe same Act states as follows:

“(d) Any person willfully failing to return license or registration as required in Section 31shall be fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500) or imprisoned not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.”
The two above quoted sections ofArticle 6701h, ifvalid, would provide apractical means for enforcement ofa suspension ofadriver’s license which has been suspended under the Safety Responsibility Act. However, in Attorney General’s Opinion No. C-341 (1964), this office expressed its opinion that Section 32 (d), quoted above, construed in connkction with Section 31,quoted above, is unconstitutional and void, as the term

“immediately ” is so indefinite and uncertain that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to the meaning ofthe term and differ as to its application. Thus, as you have observed, ifthe various law enforcement agencies concerned with enforcement ofArticle 6701hfollow the above mentioned Attorney General’s Opinion, the practical result isthat the State, under the Safety Responsibility Act, is not afforded an effective course ofaction against the person who, after having his license suspended in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 6701h, shall refuse to return his license to the Department ofPublic Safety. However, Article 6687b, Section 32 (4), V.C.S., aportion ofthe Drivers License Law, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person: II

.. . .

“4. To fail or refuse to surrender to the Department on demand any operator’s, commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s license which has been suspended, cancelled, or revoked as provided by law; !I II

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Section 44 ofthat Act provides for penalties for violations ofthe provisions ofArticle 6687b. The question thus arises as to whether or not the penalty provisions ofArticle 6687b may be invoked and used as a means of enforcement against aperson who refuses to return his license which has been suspended under the provisions ofArticle 6701h. Clearly, Section 32(4), Article 6687b, declares it unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to surrender tothe Department alicense which has been suspended as provided bylaw. It does not limit the suspension covered to one obtained under Article 6687b. Itwould seem to logically follow that prosecution could be maintained under this Article for failure to surrender alicense suspended under any other valid statute. However, it must be noted that Section 32 (4) was first enacted bythe Legislature in 1935 [Acts 1935, 44th Legislature, 2dC.S. Page 1785, Ch. 466, Sec. 19(4)]. This Article was retained in the law as it was amended byActs 1937, 45th Legislature, Page 752, Ch. 369. When the old Drivers License Law, above quoted, was repealed in 1941,and our present law, Article 6687b, enacted, Section 32 (4) was included. It is thus seen that the provisions ofSection 32 (4) have been apart ofour Drivers License Law since 1935, some 16years prior tothe effective date ofArticle 6701h.
From the above reviewed legislative history, it is therefore obvious that the suspensions as provided for in Article 67Olh were not in existence until some 16years subsequent to the passage ofArticle 6687b. Since Section 32 (4), Article 668713,refers to all suspensions as provided by law, the fundamental issue to be decided in answering your question may be stated thusly: Is the “as provided by law” Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, to be construed as applying to asuspension under alaw which did not exist until some 16years after Section 32 (4). It is believed evident that the Legislature at the time Section 32 (4) was enacted had no specific intent that Section 32 (4) would apply to asuspension had under Article 67Olh, passed some 16years later. The answer to your question must depend upon the construction to be given the various statutes concerned. There has been found no Texas authority directly in point.
In 50Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 237, is found the following language:

II

. . . .

“The language ofa statute may be so broad, and its object so general, as to reach conditions

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not coming into existence until along time after its enactment. Indeed, it is a general rule ofstatutory construction that, in the absence ofacontrary indication, legislative enactments, which are prospective in operation and which are couched in general and comprehensive terms broad enough to include unknown things that might spring into existence in the future, even though they are words ofthe present tense, apply alike in new situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, methods, inventions, or persons or entities coming into existence subsequent to their passage, where such situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, methods, inventions, persons, or entities are of the same class as those specified, and can reasonably be said to come within the general purview, scope, purpose, and policy ofthe statute, the mischief sought to be prevented, and the evident meaning ofthe terms used.

“The latter rule prevails whether the new subject comes into existence by statute or otherwise

. .. .I’
In 82 C.J.S. Statutes, Section 319,appears the following statement:

“Statutes framed in general terms ordinarily apply to cases and subjects within their terms subsequently arising, and, unless plainly indicating the contrary, are to be construed prospectively, especially where substantive rights are involved. Accordingly, it is a usual rule ofstatutory construction that legislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike toall persons, subjects, and business within their purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage. So, also, where a statute is expressed in general terms and in words of the present tense it will be construed to apply not only to things and conditions existing at its passage, butwill also be given aprospective interpretation, bywhich it will apply to such as come into existence thereafter.” -1831-Hon. Don Hall, page 5(C-387)

InSutherland-Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edition, Section 5102, appears the following:

“Standards established bythe medium of legislation are usually intended tohave considerable breadth with the result that astatute may cover many situations that do not immediately occur to the mind. And so it is a general rule of statutory construction that astatute, expressed in general terms and words ofpresent or future tense, will be applied, not only tosituations existing and known at the time ofthe enactment, butalso prospectively to things and conditions that come into existence thereafter. Legislation must be given elastic operation if it is to cope with the changing economic and social conditions

. .. .

“The rule that astatute will operate prospectively so as to include circumstances unknown at the time ofenactment has been employed in the construction ofpenal as well as remedial statutes. . . .‘I
In Browder vs. United States ofAmerica, 312U.S. 335, 85 L.Ed. 862, 61S.Ct. 599 (1941), Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, made the following statement:

“The fact that at the time ofthe passage of

the act, passports were not customarily used by citizens to assure easy reentry is brought forward bypetitioner to support the argument that Congress did not intend topunish uses such as the one charged here. There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress considered the question of use by returning citizens. Old crimes, however, may be committed under new conditions. Old laws apply to changed situations. The reach ofthe act is not sustained or opposed bythe fact that it is sought to bring new situations under its terms. While astatute speaks from its enactment, even a criminal statute embraces everything which subsequently falls within its scope . . ..‘I (Emphasis added)

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It is thus seen from the authorities above quoted that the general rule ofstatutory construction is that legislation will be given a prospective application, and will apply to conditions and circumstances coming into existence subsequent to the passage ofthe legislation, even though the enacting body did not specifically intend that the new circumstance or condition would be covered by the legislation. The Browder case, supra, although not directly in point to the question here under consideration, indicates that the Supreme Court ofthe United States will follow the general rule as it is applied to criminal statutes, and will apply apenal statute to a condition arising subsequent to the enactment ofthe penal statute, even though the act complained ofwould not have been considered a crime at the time ofthe passage ofthe act.
It has been previously stated that there has been found no Texas authority directly in point. Even so, it is felt that the Texas Courts have expressed atendency to follow the general rule ofstatutory construction outlined above. In Oil Well Drilling Co. vs. Associated Indemnity Corp., 258S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953) affirmed 153Tex. 153, 264 S.W.2d 697 (1954), onpage 529 ofthe opinion ofthe Court of Civil Appeals is found the following:

“Moreover, we believe that our law, even

our statutory law, is aliving thing capable of adjustment within certain limits to meet varying circumstances. Our law is not forever and immutably fixed like the rules ofsyntax ofthe ancient dead Latin and Greek languages. An example of what we mean is our exemption statute, Article 3832, subd. 10,V.A.C.S. When passed in 1870, the statute named a ‘carriage’ as exempt property. The statutory language has remained unchanged tothis day. Certainly in 1870the Legislature did not have automobiles in mind when it used the word ‘carriage’

. Yet our courts had no difficulty inholding that the word ‘carriage’ must be interpreted to include automobiles. Willis v. Schoelman, Tex.Civ.App., 206S.W.2d 283. Our views onthis subject are all the more applicable to a statute like the one now under consideration, which admittedly grants discretionary powers to the Board.”
It should also be noted that inSection 39, Article 6701h, the Legislature indicated that the Safety Responsibility Act should in no respect -1833-Hon. Don Hall, page 7 (C-387)

be considered as a repeal ofthe then existing motor vehicle laws ofthe State, butshould be construed as supplemental thereto. Also, there is nothing in either ofthe acts above discussed, either expressed or implied, which would militate against the result reached by this opinion. Therefore, in view ofthe general rule ofstatutory construction above set out, and because ofthe fact that there has been found no authority which would indicate that the Texas Courts would reach a result other than that ofthe general rule, it is the opinion ofthis office that your question posed should be answered in the affirmative, and aperson whose driver’s license has been suspended under the provisions ofthe Safety Responsibility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S., and who fails or refuses to surrender such suspended license upon demand to the Department ofPublic Safety may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance with the provisions of Article 6687b, V.C.S.
SUMMARY

A person whose driver’s license has been suspended under the provisions ofthe Safety Responsibility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S. and who fails or refuses to surrender such suspended license upon demand tothe Department ofPublic Safety, may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 6687b, V.C.S.
Yours very truly,
WAGGONER CARR Attorney General

Assistant SLK:sss
APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE W. V. Geppert, Chairman Roger Tyler Brady Coleman Vince Taylor -1834-Hon. Don Hall, page 8(C -387) ’

APPROVEDFOR THEATTORNEYGENERAL BY: Stanton Stone

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