1 - OPINION & ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BARBARA E. WILSON,

No. 6:14-cv-01326-HZ

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

Richard F. McGinty

McGinty & Belcher, PC

P.O. Box 12806

Salem, OR 97309

Attorney for Plaintiff

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2 - OPINION & ORDER

Billy J. Williams

Acting United States Attorney, District of Oregon

Janice E. Hebert

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97201

Nicole Jabaily

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

SSA Office of General Counsel

701 5th Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104

Attorneys for Defendant

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Plaintiff Barbara Wilson brings this action under the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision

denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. 

Wilson’s challenge to the ALJ’s decision is based almost entirely on the ALJ’s analysis of her 

credibility. Because the ALJ gave legally sufficient reasons for discounting her credibility, the 

Court finds no error and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 

BACKGROUND

Wilson applied for DIB on January 25, 2011, alleging an onset date of January 13, 2011.

Tr. 180. The Commissioner denied her application initially and after reconsideration, and Wilson

requested a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 90, 98, 101. After a hearing in November of 2012, 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Glenn G. Meyers found Wilson was not disabled. Tr. 15–25.

Wilson appealed, but the Appeals Council denied her request for review, making the ALJ’s 

decision the Commissioner’s final decision that Wilson now challenges in this Court. Tr. 1–7. 
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SEQUENTIAL DISABILITY EVALUATION

A claimant is disabled if she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can 

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A). Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. See Valentine 

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). Each step is potentially 

dispositive. At step one, the presiding ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity.” If so, the claimant is not disabled; if not, the analysis continues. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has

one or more severe impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 

416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ determines whether the impairment meets or equals one of the

impairments listed in the SSA regulations and deemed “so severe as to preclude substantial 

gainful activity.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 

416.920(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the analysis moves to 

step four. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). At step four, the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant, despite any impairments, has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform past 

relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his or her 

past relevant work, the analysis moves to step five where the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant is able to do any other work in the national economy considering the claimant’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). 

The burden to show disability rests with the claimant at steps one through four, but if the 

analysis reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a significant 

number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant could perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 
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404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098–1100 (9th Cir.

1999). If the Commissioner demonstrates a significant number of jobs exist in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g).

ALJ DECISION

The ALJ found that Wilson met the insured status requirement for DIB through 

December 31, 2015. Tr. 17. At step one, the ALJ found Wilson had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since January 13, 2011, her alleged onset date. Tr. 17. At step two, the ALJ 

found Wilson had the “following severe impairments: lumbosacral spondylosis without 

myelopathy, postlaminectomy syndrome, lumbar region, sleep apnea, major depressive disorder, 

anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder[.]” Tr. 17. At step three, the ALJ found 

Wilson’s impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any 

listed impairments. Tr. 18. The ALJ next found that Wilson had the following RFC: “[T]he 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(a) except the claimant is limited to unskilled, repetitive, routine work with no public 

contact, and to occasional contact with supervisors and co-workers.” Tr. 20. At step four, the 

ALJ found that Wilson was not able to perform any of her past relevant work. Tr. 23–24. At step 

five, the ALJ found that Wilson was not disabled because jobs existed in significant numbers in 

the national economy that she could perform, including document preparer and file assembler. 

Tr. 24–25. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 
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U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). “Substantial 

evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The court 

must weigh all of the evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s 

decision. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). If the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one reasonable interpretation, the court must uphold the decision. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 

1039–40. A reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and cannot affirm the 

Commissioner by simply isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Wilson contends that the “ALJ’s decision is not sustainable because the full limiting 

effects of Ms. Wilson’s mental limitations were not included in the residual functional capacity.” 

Plaintiff’s Brief (“Pl. Br.”) at 5. Wilson proffers two separate grounds for challenging the ALJ’s 

formulation of her RFC: first, that the ALJ improperly discounted the credibility of Wilson’s 

testimony about the limiting effects of her mental and physical limitations, and second that the 

ALJ’s findings at step two were “not consistent with the residual functional capacity listing.” 

Plaintiff’s Brief (“Pl. Br.”) at 7, 17.

1. Credibility

In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the 

record, including medical records, lay testimony, and the “effects of symptoms, including pain, 

that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 

(quoting SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 404.1545(a), 

416.929(a), 416.945(a) (explaining that, in determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Social 
6 - OPINION & ORDER

Security Administration considers “all . . . symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which 

[those] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence 

and other evidence.”).

An ALJ analyzes the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding her subjective pain 

and other symptoms in two steps. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 

2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain 

or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036 (citation and internal quotation omitted). “The claimant, 

however, need not show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity 

of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some 

degree of the symptom.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Second, if the claimant 

meets the first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject her testimony 

about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so. Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). 

The ALJ’s credibility findings must be “sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing 

court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Orteza v. 

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (en banc )). The ALJ may consider objective medical evidence and the claimant’s 

treatment history, as well as the claimant’s daily activities, work record, and observations of 

physicians and third parties with personal knowledge of the claimant’s functional limitations. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ may additionally employ 

ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as weighing inconsistent statements by the 

claimant. Id.
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The ALJ summarized Wilson’s testimony as follows:

At the hearing, [Wilson] testified that she was in pain 24 hours a day and that the 

pain did not stop. She testified that she had good days, bad days, and mediocre 

days. [Wilson] testified that on bad days she was unable to get out of bed. She 

testified that she was taking muscle relaxers and tramadol, but that these 

medications did not relieve her pain. [Wilson] testified that her back pain, 

depression, and anxiety kept her barricaded in her house, and that she was unable 

to do any of the things she used to do. [Wilson] reported problems with lifting, 

squatting, bending, standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, climbing stairs, 

and concentration.

Tr. 20. At step one, the ALJ found that Wilsons’s “medical determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms,” but found that her “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible.” Tr. 20–21. 

There is no evidence of malingering in the record. Therefore, the ALJ’s reasons for 

discounting Wilson’s credibility must be clear and convincing. The ALJ explained that objective 

medical evidence was inconsistent with her reports of debilitating back pain, that Wilson 

reported improvement of her pain with physical therapy, that her sleep apnea was “significantly 

improved with treatment,” that her allegations of disabling mental limitation were “inconsistent 

with a number of clinical findings and her own self report, and that her daily activities were 

“inconsistent with the allegations of disabling limitations.” Tr. 21. 

After reviewing the record, the Court finds the ALJ’s numerous reasons for discounting 

Wilson’s credibility meet the required “clear and convincing” standard. First, “[w]hile subjective 

pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective 

medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the 

claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). The ALJ discounted Wilson’s credibility because the 
8 - OPINION & ORDER

“[o]bjective medical evidence is inconsistent with [Wilson’s] report of limiting physical pain.” 

Tr. 21. The ALJ pointed to reports that “[i]maging of Wilson’s lumbar spine has been largely 

unremarkable.” Tr. 21 (citing Tr. 295); see also Tr. 422. Her medical providers regularly noted 

she had full range of motion, 5/5 motor strength, and normal gait, sensations, and reflexes. Tr. 

400, 402, 404, 411, 415, 444, 447. In a report from an office visit approximately two weeks prior 

to Wilson’s appearance before the ALJ, Dr. Valerie Coon wrote that she “[did] not think this 

back pain is neurogenic in any fashion, and I reassured [Wilson] that her prior fusion has healed 

well. There is no obvious mechanical cause or imaging that would cause this pain that has been 

affecting her so greatly.” Tr. 521. Although, standing alone, it would not be a sufficient reason 

for discounting Wilson’s testimony about her debilitating pain, the ALJ could reasonably rely on 

the lack of objective medical evidence in combination with other, legally sufficient reasons to

discount Wilson’s credibility.

Second, the ALJ noted that Wilson reported to her medical providers that she began 

visiting a physical therapist and that she thought the physical therapy was helping relieve her 

symptoms. Tr. 475 (Wilson reported “seeing a physical therapist and is making some changes 

with her program but she feels this is working); Tr. 521 (Wilson reported “very good benefit 

from her recent physical therapy experience, and she is now dedicated to a weight loss program 

which includes physical training with exercise and diet.”); Tr. 527 (“Physical therapy seems to 

be giving Barbara more flexibility and reducing her back pain.”). Impairments that can be 

effectively controlled with treatment such as physical therapy are not considered disabling for 

the purposes of determining whether a claimant is disabled, and thus it was legitimate for the 

ALJ to rely on evidence of effective treatment in discounting Wilson’s credibility. Espenas v. 

Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-00355-HZ, 2014 WL 7405655, at *3 (D. Or. Dec. 30, 2014) (citing 20 
9 - OPINION & ORDER

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) & (v); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Third, the ALJ discounted her credibility because Wilson’s “daily activities . . . are 

inconsistent with the allegations of disabling limitations.” Tr. 21. Wilson claims that her back 

pain, depression, and anxiety kept her barricaded in her house, and that, because of her anxiety, 

she is terrified to go outside and is unable to be in a room with more than five people. Tr. 51, 

232. Yet her therapist reported that she regularly attends church and has “benefitted from the 

affiliations she has made there.” Tr. 428. She described attending church meetings and regularly 

singing at church with the help of her anxiety medication. Tr. 428–29. Wilson reported to her 

therapist taking a least two trips to a casino, staying most of the day, and considering singing 

there. Tr. 428, 430. She reported going shopping and camping with friends. Tr. 38–40; 235. 

Wilson also reported that she can pay her bills, manage a savings account and check book, and 

engage in activities like scrapbooking and playing video games, which conflicts with her claim 

that she is unable to concentrate. Tr. 236. 

Wilson claims the ALJ erred when he failed to explain how these daily activities could 

transfer to the workplace, but that argument misunderstands the ALJ’s analysis. There are two 

separate reasons an ALJ can rely on evidence of a claimant’s daily activities to evaluate the 

credibility of her claimed limitations. One is if the claimant “engages in numerous daily 

activities involving skills that [are] transferrable to the workplace.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 

639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The other is when a claimant engages in daily activities 

that are inconsistent with the severity of symptoms alleged. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 

1165 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ reasoned that Wilson’s allegations of crippling anxiety were 

contradicted by her involvement at church, multiple casino trips, and her ability to shop with 
10 - OPINION & ORDER

friends and manage her finances. These contradictions are a legitimate reason for finding Wilson 

less than credible.

Wilson argues vigorously that the ALJ erred in concluding that her “allegations of 

disabling mental limitations are inconsistent with a number of clinical findings and her own self 

report.” Pl. Br. at 7 (citing Tr. 21). But given the numerous, legally sufficient reasons the ALJ 

gave for discounting Wilson’s credibility, any other error in the ALJ’s analysis of Wilson’s 

testimony is harmless. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 

2008) (explaining that an error in one reason for discounting credibility is harmless where an 

ALJ’s “remaining reasoning and ultimate credibility determination were adequately supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.”).

Wilson also argues the ALJ erred by not discrediting specific portions of her testimony, 

such as her claimed inability to be “in a room with more than five people without having anxiety 

attacks.” Tr. 232. But the ALJ considered Wilson’s claims that she “do[esn’t] want to leave my 

house” and that she was “terrified to go outside” because of her high anxiety, and rejected her 

testimony as not credible. See Tr. 20 (ALJ characterizes Wilson’s testimony as claiming “her 

back pain, depression, and anxiety kept her barricaded in her house”). The ALJ adequately 

summarized the evidence, interpreted it, and gave legally sufficient reasons for his decision; the 

law does not require the ALJ to specifically address every line of testimony or every response on 

the claimant’s application for benefits. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. 

Finally, Wilson argues the ALJ “cherry picked” the record to support his “pre-ordained 

conclusion” that she was not disabled. Pl. Br. at 17. The Court disagrees. Although the record 

may be amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusions about 
11 - OPINION & ORDER

Wilson’s credibility are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and therefore must be 

upheld. Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Alleged Conflict Between Findings at Steps Two and Three and the RFC

Wilson contends that the ALJ’s findings at step two and three are inconsistent with the 

limitations in her RFC. She points out the ALJ at step two found she had “marked” difficulties in 

social functioning based on her testimony that her panic attacks sometimes prevent her from 

leaving her house. Tr. 19. She then argues that because “the ALJ was one half the way to finding 

[Wilson] disabled due to meeting a listing,” the RFC should have included more functional 

limitations such as taking unscheduled breaks, arriving at work late or leaving work early, and 

being absent from work more than a typical employee. 

The ALJ’s finding that Wilson had one “marked” restriction in the “paragraph B” 

analysis does not compel a finding that she is disabled. To meet the “paragraph B” criteria at step 

two, the claimant must produce evidence of at least two of the following: marked restriction of 

activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked 

difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04B; § 12.06B). As explained above, 

it is the claimant’s burden at steps one through four to produce evidence that she is disabled; a

claimant who is “one half the way” to meeting a listing has failed to produce sufficient evidence 

to show that she actually meets a listing.

The ALJ addressed Wilson’s mental limitations that were supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and appropriately limited her to unskilled, repetitive, routine work with no 

public contact and only occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
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427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In making his RFC determination, the ALJ took into 

account those limitations for which there was record support that did not depend on Bayliss’s 

subjective complaints. Preparing a function-by-function analysis for medical conditions or 

impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record is unnecessary.”). 

Therefore, the Court finds no error. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this _________ day of _______________________, 2015.

__________________________________ 

MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ

United States District Judge