2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

6-7-2013

Christine Gillespie v. Clifford Janey

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-4319

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"Christine Gillespie v. Clifford Janey" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 718.

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1

DLD-219 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-4319

___________

CHRISTINE GILLESPIE,

Appellant

v.

MR. CLIFFORD JANEY, Individually and in his capacity as State District Superintendent, 

N.P.S.; MR. RON HALE, Individually and in his capacity as Risk Manager, N.P.S.; MR. 

PERRY LATTEBOUDERE, Esq., Individually, and in his capacity as counsel, N.P.S.; MS. 

CHERRIE ADAMS, Esq., Individually, and in her capacity as counsel, N.P.S.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00885)

District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

May 2, 2013

Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 7, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM
2

Pro se appellant Christine Gillespie appeals the District Court’s denial of her motion to vacate 

the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) & (d).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 & 

n.5 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 

that a motion under the “savings clause” is an independent action subject to de novo review). 

For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

In 2009, Gillespie filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of 

New Jersey alleging various violations of her constitutional, civil, and statutory rights arising 

from tenure charges filed against her by the School District of the City of Newark. On March 

5, 2010, the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, and we affirmed the 

dismissal on appeal. Gillespie v. Janey, 441 F. App’x 890 (3d Cir. 2011). On August 27, 

2012, Gillespie filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) & (d) seeking to vacate the District 

Court’s judgment. The District Court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued. Appellees 

have filed a motion for summary action.

Gillespie maintained that the judgment should be vacated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(d) (“the savings clause”) because there has been a fraud on the court. Specifically, she 

asserts that in dismissing the complaint, the District Court relied on certain documents 

submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Court which were fraudulent. We have set forth the 

demanding standard of proof required to demonstrate fraud upon the court including (1) an 

 

1

 The “savings clause” on which Gillespie bases her motion, in part, was formerly contained 

within Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Although she cites to that provision, Amendments in 2007 

moved the savings clause provision to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d). Gillespie also quotes language 

from case law dealing with motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); however, that provision, 

which provides for relief from injunction or consent decrees, is inapplicable here.
3

intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) 

in fact deceives the court. Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Gillespie clearly cannot meet this standard as the District Court dismissed the complaint on the 

grounds that the claims were either time-barred or premature; the allegedly fraudulent 

documents had no bearing on the propriety of the District Court’s ruling. 

A Rule 60(b)(4) motion on the grounds that a judgment is void may be brought at any 

time. See United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(en banc). A judgment can be voided if the rendering court lacked personal or subject matter 

jurisdiction, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. United Student Aid 

Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, -- , 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377 (2010). Gillespie asserted

that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her complaint; however, her 

complaint included claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, and alleged violations of her constitutional rights. Accordingly, as we 

noted on appeal, the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331 &1343, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367.2 Gillespie also argued that the judgment had been voided by certain decisions of the 

Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. This is, in essence, an attack on the 

reasoning of the judgment, not on the authority of the District Court to render it. See

Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 232 F.3d 1342, 1346 (10th Cir. 2000) (judgment is void if 

the “rendering court was powerless to enter it”). A judgment is not void merely because it is 

 

2

 The motion to vacate our judgment in that appeal is denied. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. We note 

that we had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Gillespie, 441 F. 

App’x at 893. 
4

erroneous. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. at 1377. Moreover, there is no merit to Gillespie’s assertion 

that the “legal and factual landscape” of her case has changed; the majority of her claims 

remain time-barred. Furthermore, many of her contentions are the same arguments which were 

rejected when her complaint was dismissed. 3 Accordingly, because we find that the appeal 

presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order entered 

October 19, 2012. Appellant’s motion for recusal is denied.

Finally, in denying the Rule 60 motion, the District Court noted that Gillespie had come 

“dangerously close . . . to filing a frivolous action” as her motion was a “waste of the Court’s . 

. . [and] defense counsel’s time” and admonished her that the “next time it is filed, fees will be 

imposed along with costs.” Tr. at 14-15. Citing Gillespie’s failure to heed that admonishment 

in filing this appeal, as well as her numerous related filings, Appellees have filed for damages 

and costs pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. Damages are awarded based on the merits of the 

appeal; we do not consider whether an appellant has acted “out of malice, ignorance, or 

deceit.” Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 2004). While “pro se litigants are not [ ] 

beyond the reach of Rule 38,” Marin v. Comm’r, 753 F.2d 1358, 1361 (6th Cir. 1985) (citation 

omitted), we are reluctant to impose sanctions on Gillespie. Although we agree with Appellees 

that she has persisted in her misguided arguments, Appellees were able to use our summary 

action procedure to good effect and will not have to file a brief. We note that the District 

Court’s admonishment, as well as Appellees’ motion and its attendant possible sanctions, 

 

3

Even assuming arguendo that the basis for the decision dismissing the complaint was 

invalidated by subsequent state decisional law, this is insufficient to warrant relief under Rule 

60(b)(6) absent extraordinary circumstances not present here. See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. 

Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001).
5

should serve as sufficient warning to Gillespie as to the potential consequences of similar 

filings in the future, including any frivolous post-decision motions in this appeal. The Rule 38 

motion is, therefore, denied without prejudice. To the extent Appellees seek “an order 

temporarily suspending Appellant’s access to the federal courts pending disposition of 

Appellees’ summary action motion,” the request is denied as moot.