ALJ’s Credibility Determination

Based on inaccurate case law citations’, plaintiff argues that we must remand
this case because the ALJ did not provide an “explicit and reasoned reflection of
plaintiffs testimony”, which is “essential for meaningful appellate review” of the ALJ's
credibility determination. Pi.’s Mem. at 4-5. Under Jens, an ALJ's failure to specify
which parts of a claimant's testimony lacked credibility and to provide an evidentiary
basis for his credibility finding “does not demonstrate that [his] credibility finding is not
supported by substantial evidence.” Jens v. Bamhart, 347 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir.
2003). “[Because hearing officers are in the best position to see and hear the
witnesses and assess their forthrightness, we afford their credibility determinations
special deference. We will reverse an ALJ's credibility determination only if the
claimant can show it was patently wrong.” /d. (citing Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431,
435 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ's credibility determination was
patently wrong. In the “findings” section of his decision, the ALJ concluded that
plaintiff's “allegations regarding her limitations were not totally credible.” In the body of
his decision, the ALJ set forth his basis for that finding, making clear that although he
credited plaintiff's testimony about her current abilities, he rejected her assertion that
she was incapable of substantial gainful activity. Specifically, the ALJ cited plaintiffs

testimony that, inter alia, she could walk six to eight blocks to her clients’ homes, stand

3Plaintiff incorrectly cites Aviles v. Heckler, an opinion by District Court Judge Shadur, as
a Seventh Circuit decision. 618 F. Supp. 1286 (D.C. Ill. 1985). She also provides an
inaccurate citation to Stephen v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1985), citing it as 766 F.2d
294. Further, plaintiff fails to provide pinpoint citations for either case.

13


Medical Evidence

On June 23, 2001, plaintiff was admitted to Little Company of Mary Hospital
(‘Little Company”) complaining of shortness of breath. (R. 159). Plaintiff was
diagnosed with pulmonary edema, hypoxia, acute respiratory failure, cocaine abuse,
and hypertension. (R. 160). Plaintiff's lab tests were positive for opiates,
benzodiazepine and cocaine, and her pulmonary edema and congestive heart failure
were found to be secondary to cocaine abuse. (R. 162). Plaintiff was intubated and
placed in the intensive care unit. Id. Her medical records from Little Company reflect
that she was known to be hypertensive, but was not taking her medications. (R. 166).
At discharge on June 27, plaintiff was stable and her blood pressure was controlled. Id.
She was advised to engage in physical activity as tolerated. (R. 166). On July 6, 2001,
plaintiff went to Cook County Hospital for a prescription refill, but did not report any
specific medical complaints, (R. 192-93).

On August 15, 2001, Dr. Kevin Lai filled out a respiratory report based on
plaintiffs treatment at Little Company in June, 2001. (R. 201-02). Dr. Lai noted that
plaintiff had not returned to Little Company since her discharge on June 27, 2001,
making it difficult to evaluate her current condition and response to treatment. (R. 202).
Dr. Lai diagnosed cardiomyopathy, resolved pulmonary edema, and cocaine and other
substance abuse. /d. He also noted that plaintiff was able to ambulate without difficulty
in the hospital, which included, inter alia, sitting, standing, and moving. /d.

On August 31, 2001, plaintiff visited the Fantus Health Center at Cook County

Hospital for a chest x-ray. (R. 195). The x-ray revealed congestive heart failure and


performing any work in the national economy.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. If at any step
in the inquiry the ALJ determines that the claimant is not disabled, the analysis ends.
Goodson v. Barnhart, 217 F.Supp.2d 892, 900 (N.D.IIl. 2002). The claimant has the
burden of establishing a disability at steps 1 through 4. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F. 3d
881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001). However, if the claimant reaches step 5, “the burden shifts to
the ALJ to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.” /d.

Steps 1 through 3 of the ALJ's analysis are not contested. At step 1, ALJ
Harmon found that plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial work as defined by 20
C.F.R. §404.1572 for the time period relevant to this case. At step 2, the ALJ
concluded plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of hypertension, pulmonary
edema, a history of congestive heart failure, asthma, and cardiomegalya. At step 3, he
opined that these impairments failed to “meet or medically equal [any of those listed] in
Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(e).

At step 4, the ALJ concluded that Brown had the RFC to perform a significant
range of unskilled, light work. He also opined that she could not perform her past
relevant work and, therefore, proceeded to step 5 in the analysis. At the final step, the
ALJ found that plaintiff could not perform the full range of light work because she could
not work around heights, scaffolds and concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants,
and could only occasionally work with stairs, ramps and perform stooping motions.
However, based on those limitations, the ALJ concluded plaintiff could still perform'a

wide range of unskilled light work and that “there [were] a significant number of jobs in


also scheduled an echocardiogram, noting that plaintiffs last one in October, 2001
showed mild left ventricle hypertrophy. (R. 190). Plaintiff returned a week later and
reported feeling better. (R. 189). She did not complain of chest pain and told the
doctor she could walk four to five blocks without experiencing shortness of breath. (R.
189). The doctor noted noncompliance with her blood pressure medication and
encouraged plaintiff to comply. (R. 189).

Plaintiff returned to the Fantus Health Clinic on March 7 for a routine check-up.
{R. 187). The doctor noted uncontrolled hypertension because plaintiff was not taking
her medication. /d. He described plaintiff's chronic obstructive pulmonary disease as
stable on medication, and instructed plaintiff to return in eight weeks. /d. Plaintiff
returned on May 2 and reported feeling okay. (R. 219). The doctor described her
hypertension as controlled and her asthma was well controlled. (R. 223).

Plaintiff did not have any complaints at her next clinic visit on August 5, 2002.
(R. 218). Plaintiff's asthma was still well controlled, and her blood pressure was
elevated due to poor compliance with her medications. Id. The doctor reviewed
plaintiffs medications with her and conducted “patient education regarding low sodium.”
Id.
Vocational Expert’s Testimony

In addition to Brown, VE Mendrick also testified at the hearing. (R. 26). ALJ
Harmon posed a number of questions to the VE. First, he asked VE Mendrick to
classify the skill level and exertional requirements associated with plaintiff's previous

employment, as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (‘the DOT”). (R. 58).


enlargement of the heart, known as cardiomegaly, but no effusion or pneumonia. Id.

On September 28, 2001, at the request of the SSA, Dr. Epner performed a
consultative internal medicine examination on plaintiff. (R. 205). Dr. Epner's
examination revealed bilateral plus two edema from plaintiff's feet to her knees, but was
otherwise normal. He diagnosed congestive heart failure and significant hypertension.
{R. 208). He also reported that plaintiff was on multiple medications and her blood
pressure was under moderate control. id. On November 8, 2001, plaintiff returned to
the Fantus Health Center for a follow-up visit to monitor her hypertension. (R. 191).
She did not report any significant medical complaints and the doctor found her
hypertension under control. fd.

On December 20, 2001, Dr. Robert England reviewed Brown's medical records
and completed a physical Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") Assessment. (R. 209-
16). The doctor concluded that Brown could perform light work. (R. 219). Specifically,
he found that she could lift up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently.
She could stand and/or walk and sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour day and her ability to
push and/or pull was unlimited. (R. 210). He did not find any manipulative, visual,
communicative, or environmental limitations. However, he did conclude that plaintiff
could only occasional climb ramps and stairs and could never climb ropes, ladders, or
scaffolds. (R. 211). Another state agency physician affirmed Dr. England's findings on
April 3, 2002. (R. 216).

On January 10, 2002, plaintiff returned to Cook County Hospital for a routine
exam. (R. 190). The doctor adjusted her medication because he found plus two

bilateral edema in her extremities and evidence of chronic heart failure. (R. 190). He

5


evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We must consider the entire administrative record, but we will
not “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute our
own judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Lopez v. Bamhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7" Cir. 2000)). We will conduct
a “critical review of the evidence” and will not let the Commissioner's decision stand “if it
lacks evidentiary support or an adequate discussion of the issues.” /d. (quoting Steele,
290 F.3d at 940.). The ALJ “must build an accurate and logical bridge from the
evidence to [his] conclusion,” however he need not discuss every piece of evidence in
the record. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
Legal Analysis

A person is disabled under the Act if "he or she has an inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C.
423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether the claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider
the following five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.1920(a)-(f): “(1) whether the
claimant is currently employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3)
whether the claimant's impairment is one that the Commissioner considers conclusively
disabling, (4) if the claimant does not have a conclusively disabling impairment, whether

she can perform her past relevant work, and (5) whether the claimant is capable of


Minutg Order Form (06/97)

) ; ( United States District Court, Northern District of Ilinois

Name of Assigned Jud; i Sitting Judge if Oth
or Magistrate Judee Michael T. Mason thea Assigued Sudse
CASE NUMBER 04 C 323 DATE 712712004
CASE Cathy Brown vs. Jo Anne B. Barnhart
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plait ‘and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) a} Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) ia} Brief in support of motion due

(3) Qa Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue___-

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon__—_—ssetfor__— att

(5) Oo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-setfor]on___——ssetfor_ at

(6) im} Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—at___.
(+) Q Trial[set for/re-set for]on__at

(8) Oo [BenclyJury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__—__at

(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a\(1) CFRCP41(2)(2).

(10) MH [Otherdocketentry] As stated in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment [18-1, 20-1] is denied and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [19-
1Jis granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of Social Security, and against plaintiff, Cathy Brown. Enter Memorandum Opinion and
Order.

(11) +f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]
No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required.

~ | Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices
*7~] Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge. yynoo LouLsia son
hen
courtroom
. inal £01 W L270" tt
te; ci) in
ogee dell dnes



Brown argues that her bilateral edema requires her to “elevate her feet and stay
Off of her legs significant periods each day.” PI.’s Memo. at 3-4. However, she does
not cite and we cannot find any evidence in the administrative record to support this
Statement. Plaintiff's medical records do not contain instructions from any doctor
Suggesting that she stay off her feet or legs for any period of time. Although her
treating and examining doctors do note bilateral edema, none imposed any work
restrictions based on that diagnosis.

Similarly, plaintiffs own testimony does not support her assertion. At the
hearing, Brown's counsel inquired as to whether any doctors ever said anything about
elevating her feet. Plaintiff responded “[the doctor] told me at the end of the dayto...
kind of elevate them for at least a half hour to an hour.” (R. 54). Plaintiff never testified
that she was instructed to “elevate her feet and stay off of her legs significant periods
each day.” The need to elevate her feet for a half hour to an hour at the end of the day
would not preclude light work and limit her to no more than sedentary work.

Plaintiff also argues that because the ALJ acknowledged that she could not
perform her current job as a home caretaker, which the VE classified at the heavy
exertional level, on a full-time basis, she is therefore limited to sedentary work. PI.’s
Mem. at 4. The reasoning behind this argument eludes us. An ALJ's finding that a
claimant cannot perform full-time work at the heavy exertional level in no way precludes
a finding that she can perform full-time work at the light exertional level. Additionally, it
does not mandate a finding that plaintiff is limited to sedentary work. In fact, the ALJ

properly relied on plaintiff's testimony that she was performing heavy exertional level

11



the national economy that she could perform.” Examples included officer helper, bench
assembler and inspector.

Through very cursory briefing’, plaintiff makes three unpersuasive arguments in
support of her request that we either reverse the decision of the ALJ and find plaintiff
disabled, or remand her case back to the ALJ for further proceedings. As discussed
infra, each of plaintiffs arguments lack merit, and in some cases factual support.
Consequently, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.

ALJ’s RFC Determination

First, plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s RFC determination, arguing his finding
that plaintiff could perform a significant range of unskilled, light work is contrary to the
medical evidence in the record. Plaintiff contends that the evidence in the
administrative record requires a finding that Brown is limited to no more than sedentary
work. Specifically, without citing to the record, plaintiff asserts that because she has
documented bilateral edema from her feet to her knees, she is precluded from
performing any work beyond the sedentary exertional level. Brown's position is contrary

to the medical evidence and her own testimony.

Plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment is less than six
pages and fails to provide evidentiary or case law support for a number of propositions
contained therein. Even more disturbing, the text of her reply brief is less than two pages and
mischaracterizes defendant's motion for summary judgment. For example, in her reply, plaintiff
states “[d]Jefendant argues that despite findings of edema, no doctor adjusted her medication to
account for this symptom of congestive heart failure.” Pi.’s Reply at 1 (citing Def.’s Mem. at
10). Defendant actually stated “[p]laintiff had edema of her lower extremities on exam, but
none after her doctor adjusted her medication to account for this symptom of congestive heart
failure” Def.’s Mem. at 10 (internal citations omitted).

10



Based on plaintiff's testimony that as a records clerk she was required to lift up to 20
pounds and walk up and down stairs three to four times each day, the VE found
plaintiff's records clerk position, as she performed it, to be semi-skilled, light work. (R.
58). Based on plaintiff's testimony regarding her duties as a home caretaker, the VE
classified that job as unskilled, heavy work. (R. 59). However, the VE noted that if
plaintiff's clients did not need assistance with self-care, the position would be classified
as either light or medium exertional work. Id.

To aid the ALJ in his step 5 analysis, he also posed a series of hypotheticals to
the VE based on plaintiff's functional limitations as demonstrated by the evidence
before him. Specifically, the ALJ inquired as to whether there were any jobs in the
economy that could be performed by a hypothetical person of a plaintiff's age,
education, and work experience; who was limited to unskilled, light work; and who was
limited to occasional climbing of stairs and ramps; no work on ladders, ropes,
scaffolding, or at unprotected heights and around hazardous moving machinery; and
could not be exposed to concentrated pulmonary irritants, fumes, dust and strong
odors. The VE opined that jobs for such a hypothetical person did exist in significant
numbers in the economy. Specifically, such a hypothetical person could work as an
officer helper and could perform general assembly or inspection work.

Standard of Review

We must affirm the ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and

free from legal error. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Steele v. Bamhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence and is “such relevant


stated she walks slowly and stops frequently, because she becomes very tired. (R. 52-
55). Plaintiff's duties as a home caretaker entail cooking, dusting, and generally helping
her clients with their hygiene, which includes aiding them in bathing and combing their
hair. (R. 36). Brown also assists some of her clients move about the house. For
example, some of her clients require assistance moving from their beds to the
bathroom. (R. 36). At her current job, plaintiff is able to sit and rest occasionally for at
teast 10-15 minutes in a 4-hour shift. (R. 43). Sometimes, during those breaks, she is
allowed to take brief naps. (R. 45).

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she lives alone in an apartment and does
her own cooking, grocery shopping, and housekeeping. (R. 40). However, she stated
that doing household chores makes her tired and she is bothered by dust. (R. 40).
Plaintiff also testified that her medication makes her drowsy during the day and impairs
her ability to sleep at night. (R. 40-41). Brown stated that sometimes her feet, ankles,
and legs swell and ache, especially when she works an 8-hour day. (R. 42-43). She
also stated that she suffers from frequent wheezing, congestion in her chest, and chest
and stomach pain. (R. 47-48, 50). Plaintiff testified that she could stand for at least 30
minutes at a time, but she would not be able to sit for an hour because during that hour
she would need to stand up due to stiffness. (R. 52). Brown thinks she can lift 20
pounds. (R. 52-53). She told the ALJ that her doctor advised her not to do too much
standing or lifting, and to elevate her feet at the end of the day for half an hour to an
hour. (R. 51, 54). She also stated that about a month before the hearing, she stopped

using illegal drugs on her own. (R. 47-48).



for 30 minutes, sit for about five hours total per day, and lift up to 20 pounds. The ALJ
found this testimony credible, however, he rejected plaintiff's assertion that she could
not perform substantial gainful activity. Plaintiff has failed to show that this
determination was patently wrong.

ALJ's Application of the Guidelines

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in mechanically
applying the medical vocational guidelines to her case. Like plaintiff's two previous
arguments, this one also lacks merit. A sine quo non to the application of 20 C.F.R.
§404.1563(a), which provides, inter alia, that the Commissioner “will not apply ... age
categories mechanically in borderline cases,” is a finding that plaintiff has a borderline
case. Hawkins v. Apfel, 1998 WL 378421 *1 (N.D. lll. 1998) (citing Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462 (1983). A borderline case exists “when there would be a
shift in results caused by the passage of a few days or months.” /d. n.3 (citing Social
Security Ruling 82-46C). !n other words, if plaintiff's impending birthday, approximately
two months after the ALJ issued his decision, could have changed the ALJ’s decision,
§404.1563 precludes a mechanical application of the age categories.

Plaintiffs case could only have been considered borderline if the ALJ found that
she was limited to no more than sedentary work. As stated above, the ALJ found that
plaintiff could perform a substantial range of light work and was not limited to sedentary
work. This decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly,
plaintiff did not have a borderline case, mooting her argument regarding the propriety of

the ALJ’s mechanical application of the age categories.

14


Pi dural Histo!

Brown filed an application for DIB and SSI on July 28, 2001, alleging a disability
onset date of June 23, 2001. (R. 17-18). Both claims were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. (R. 17). Subsequently, plaintiff requested a hearing, which ALJ
Percival Harmon conducted on December 18, 2002. (R. 17). Brown and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) Frank Mendrick testified at the hearing. (R. 26-27). On December 24,
2002, the ALJ issued an opinion denying Brown's petition for DIB and SSI benefits. (R.
14-24). The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on December 6, 2003,
making ALJ Harmon’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See Zurawski
v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7" Cir. 2001); Reg. § 416.1481.

Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff was born on February 27, 1953, making her 49 years-old at the time of
the hearing and approximately two months shy of her fiftieth birthday when the ALJ
issued his opinion. (R. 32). Brown graduated from high school and attended two years
of college, but did not earn a degree. (R. 32). She has prior work experience as a
records clerk for an insurance company. (R. 33, 56). At the time of the hearing, she
was working part-time as a home caretaker. (R. 35). She testified that she currently
works 20 hours per week; 8 hours on Tuesdays and Thursdays and 4 hours on
Wednesdays. (R. 38). On Tuesdays and Thursdays, Brown has a morning client and
an afternoon client. She spends 4 hours with each client. (R. 38).

Plaintiff further testified that to reach her clients’ homes, she travels 50 to 75

minutes on public transportation and walks up to eight blocks. (R. 44, 51). Plaintiff


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION AAI

Boncle i}

CATHY BR ,
THY BROWN JUL 2 8 2004

Plaintiff,
No. 04 ¢ 0323
Vv.
Mag. Judge Michael T. Mason
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security

~~ ee SS SS SS SS

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Michael T. Mason, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff, Cathy Brown (“Brown” or “plaintiff”), has brought a motion for summary
judgment seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security “Commissioner” or “defendant"), who denied Brown’s claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) under
the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(1), 423(d), 1381a (2000).' Defendant,
Barnhart, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asking that we uphold the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). We have jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). For the following reasons, we

deny plaintiff's motion and grant defendant's motion, affirming the decision of the ALJ.

1Plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment is not
paginated. We will refer to the page with the heading “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion [for] Summary Judgment” as page 1. Plaintiff's reply brief to defendant's motion for
summary judgment is also not paginated. We will refer to the page incorrectly labeled
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support” as page 1.

1


work on a part-time basis as support for a finding that she was not limited to sedentary
work.

Further, plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ failed “to build an accurate and
logical bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion" and that his conclusion is not
supported by substantial evidence. Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. Unfortunately, as further
evidence of the poor quality work product exhibited throughout plaintiffs submissions to
this court, we cannot clearly decipher the basis for this argument. The statement “[the
ALJ] never explained how or why plaintiff could perform work which required her to
elevate her legs and stay off of them as much as possible” makes no sense. We
assume plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ failed to build an accurate and logical bridge
from the evidence in the administrative record to his conclusion that plaintiff could
perform a substantial range of light work. It also appears plaintiff believes that the
ALJ's conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

This two-part argument must fail. As a basis for his conclusion, the ALJ cited to
the only RFC assessment in the record, which was affirmed by another SSA physician
and limited plaintiff to light level exertional work. The ALJ also cited the findings of
plaintiff's treating physician at Little Company, which noted plaintiff's ability to ambulate
without difficulty, including sitting, standing, and moving. Further, the ALJ cited to
Plaintiff's testimony and her medical records which support an RFC of light work.
Accordingly, we find that not only has the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge from

the evidence to his conclusion, but his conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

12


Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the ALJ's findings are
supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge
from the evidence in the administrative record to his conclusion that Brown was not
disabled and could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy.
Accordingly, we DENY Brown’s motion for summary judgment and GRANT the

Commissioner's motion, affirming the decision of the ALJ. It is so ordered.

ENTER:

MICHAEL T. ea

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July yal » 2004

15