J-S62002-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.H., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 786 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree entered April 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County 

Orphans' Court at No: 2016-00012

BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 11, 2017

B.S. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered April 3, 2017, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County, which involuntarily terminated his 

parental rights to his minor son, R.H. (“Child”), born in July 2014.1 After 

careful review, we affirm. 

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows. Child entered foster care on June 3, 2015, after Mother 

informed Mifflin County Social Services Agency (“the Agency”) that she was 

unable to care for Child and his half-brother. N.T., 12/12/16, at 62. Child 

was adjudicated dependent by order dated June 22, 2015. Petitioner’s 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The decree also terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, E.H. 

(“Mother”). Mother did not file a brief in connection with this appeal, nor did 

she file her own separate appeal. 
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Exhibit R.H. - 1 (Order of Adjudication – Child Dependent). At the time Child 

was adjudicated dependent, Father was incarcerated at Mifflin County 

Correctional Facility due to “drug charges as well as DUI and driving without 

a license.” N.T., 12/12/16, at 67. Father received visits with Child while 

incarcerated, starting in July 2015. Id. at 30. However, Father’s visits 

ended after he pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was 

transferred to State Correctional Institution – Smithfield (“SCI Smithfield”) in 

December 2015. Id. at 32, 67. Father was released from SCI Smithfield on 

July 25, 2016, and then spent about three weeks in federal custody before 

entering a halfway house in August 2016.2 Id. at 67, 133-34. 

On September 27, 2016, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights to Child. The orphans’ court conducted a 

termination hearing on December 12, 2016. Following the hearing, on April 

3, 2017, the court entered a decree terminating Father’s parental rights.3

____________________________________________

2 The record indicates that Father will remain on state parole until November 

2017, and will remain on federal parole until “a few months after 

November.” N.T., 12/12/16, at 67, 150. 

3

It appears that the orphans’ court waited to enter its termination decree 

until it could enter a single decree terminating both Father’s and Mother’s 

parental rights at the same time. Mother initially executed a consent to 

adoption form on December 12, 2016. However, Mother later filed a petition 

to revoke her consent on February 17, 2017, which the court granted on 

February 22, 2017. The court then scheduled an additional termination 

hearing as to Mother only on March 24, 2017. 

We note that, prior to the hearing, on March 22, 2017, the Agency 

filed a motion to supplement the record, indicating that Father had been 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Father timely filed a notice of appeal on May 2, 2017, along with a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now raises the following issues, which we have reordered for 

purposes of our review.

Question [1]: Did the [orphans’] court err in finding that there 

was clear, convincing and sufficient evidence establishing all 

elements of the statutory grounds alleged for the involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights? 

Question [2]: Did the [orphans’] court err in ordering the 

termination of Father’s parental rights as being in the best 

interest of the child and as best serving the needs and welfare of 

the child, where the record does not contain clear, convincing 

and sufficient evidence as to both the nature and strength of the 

father/child attachment and effects on the child of the severing 

of that attachment?

Father’s Brief at 3 (orphans’ court answers and suggested answers omitted). 

We address these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

arrested once again and charged with a new criminal offense. The orphans’ 

court entered an order indicating that it would consider the motion at the 

March 24, 2017 hearing. It is not clear from the record whether the court 

ultimately granted or denied the Agency’s motion, because Father did not 

request that the March 24, 2017 hearing be transcribed, and because the 

court did not address the motion in its opinion or enter a subsequent order 

disposing of the motion.
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or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with 

the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we 
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analyze the court’s decision to terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provides as follows.4

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

____________________________________________

4 We note that the orphans’ court erred by concluding that Father’s parental 

rights could be terminated under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8). Both of these 

Sections require that the subject child have “been removed from the care of 

the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency” in 

order to be applicable. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8). Because Child was 

not removed from Father’s care, his parental rights cannot be terminated 

under these Sections. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. 

2000) (en banc) (concluding that termination was inappropriate under 

Sections 2511(a)(5) and (8) “because the record reflects that C.S. was 

never in Appellant’s care and, therefore, could not have been removed from 

his care.”).
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 

2002) (citations omitted). Importantly, “a parent’s incarceration is relevant 

to the section (a)(2) analysis and, depending on the circumstances of the 

case, it may be dispositive of a parent’s ability to provide the ‘essential 

parental care, control or subsistence’ that the section contemplates.” In re 

A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court found that Father is incapable of 

parenting Child and that Father cannot remedy his parental incapacity in a 

timely manner. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/3/17, at 9-10. The court 

reasoned that Father made no effort to maintain contact with Child after he 
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was transferred from Mifflin County Correctional Facility to SCI Smithfield in 

December 2015. Id. at 8-9. The court further reasoned that Father 

displayed a lack of interest in complying with court-ordered services, 

because he failed to complete a parenting program during Child’s 

dependency, and because he participated in drug and alcohol treatment only 

as a condition of his parole, and only after the Agency filed a petition to 

terminate his parental rights. Id. at 9. 

Father argues that he substantially completed the goals set forth for 

him in Child’s permanency plan, and remedied his parental incapacity. 

Father’s Brief at 12-13. Specifically, Father argues that he participated in 

drug and alcohol treatment programs, participated in a federal reentry 

program, cooperated with parole since being released from incarceration, 

and avoided any new criminal charges. Id. at 13. Father further argues 

that he demonstrated parenting skills during his visits with Child, that he 

took parenting classes in 2009, and that he has other sons who presently 

reside with him. Id. Finally, Father argues that he has housing and 

employment. Id.

Our review of the record supports the findings of the orphans’ court. 

During the termination hearing, the court heard the testimony of Mother. 

Mother testified that she and Father separated in December 2013, before 

Child was born. N.T., 12/12/16, at 7. Mother testified that Father saw Child 

in person only once prior to his placement in foster care. Id. Specifically, 

Father came to visit Mother and Child when Child was “a few weeks old,” in 
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approximately August 2014. Id. at 7, 20. Mother recalled that Father gave 

her thirty dollars, and asked for a paternity test. Id. at 7, 17. Mother filed 

for child support and obtained paternity testing. Id. at 11. However, Father 

was already incarcerated by the time Mother received confirmation of his 

paternity, and she never received any additional financial support. Id. at 

10-11. 

The orphans’ court also heard the testimony of Gwen Steiner, 

Reunification Supervisor for Family Intervention Crisis Services (“FICS”). 

Ms. Steiner testified that FICS provided visits, parenting instruction, and 

counseling sessions for Father starting in July 2015, while he was 

incarcerated at Mifflin County Correctional Facility. Id. at 30-33, 36. As 

noted above, Ms. Steiner testified that Father’s visits ended when he was 

transferred to SCI Smithfield in December 2015. Id. at 38. FICS did not 

provide visits to Father while he was incarcerated at SCI Smithfield, because 

he did not ask for visits, and because “[w]e also have to look at the well[-

]being of the child and their age and what would be appropriate for them 

looking at the distance we’re traveling to.” Id. Even after his release from 

SCI Smithfield on July 25, 2016, Father did not contact FICS regarding 

visits.5 Id. at 38-39.

____________________________________________

5 Father testified that he was released on July 16, 2016, and spent about 

three weeks in federal custody before being released to a halfway house. 

N.T., 12/12/16, at 133-34.
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In addition, the orphans’ court heard the testimony of Agency 

caseworker, and Assistant Administrator, Nicole Patkalitsky. Ms. Patkalitsky 

testified that Father has a lengthy history of substance abuse, criminal 

activity, incarceration, unstable housing, financial instability, and inability to 

demonstrate proper parenting. Id. at 65-66. Based on this history, the 

Agency presented Father with a series of permanency plan goals. Id. at 65. 

These goals included participating in drug and alcohol counseling and 

parenting classes while incarcerated. Id. The goals also included refraining 

from illegal activity upon being released from incarceration, as well as 

demonstrating parenting skills, obtaining and maintaining stable housing and 

income, and cooperating with service providers. Id. 

Concerning Father’s progress in completing these goals, Ms. 

Patkalitsky testified that Father has only recently begun to cooperate with 

the Agency by providing information regarding his compliance. Id. at 96. 

Ms. Patkalitsky acknowledged that the Agency did not provide visits or 

services to Father after he was transferred to SCI Smithfield, because it is 

the Agency’s policy not to provide visits or services to parents who are 

incarcerated in state prison. Id. at 88. However, she explained that Father 

did not request visits or services while at SCI Smithfield, nor did he contact 

the Agency in any way. Id. at 69-71, 101. After his transfer to SCI 

Smithfield in December 2015, Father failed to contact the Agency until at or 

near the time the termination petition was filed in September 2016. Id. at 

69-70. 
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Thus, the record confirms that Father is incapable of parenting Child, 

and that he cannot remedy his parental incapacity. Father has a substantial 

criminal history, which has resulted in his being incarcerated for much of 

Child’s life. At the time of the termination hearing, Father had only been 

released from state and federal custody for approximately four months, and 

it remained to be seen whether he would be able to maintain a crime-free 

lifestyle for any significant period of time. Moreover, Father has shown 

virtually no interest in Child. Prior to his incarceration at Mifflin County 

Correctional Facility, Father visited with Child only once. Although Father 

participated in visits with Child while incarcerated in Mifflin County, he made 

no effort to continue with visits or to maintain contact with the Agency after 

his transfer to SCI Smithfield. Father was transferred to SCI Smithfield in 

December 2015, and it was not until September 2016 that Father made 

contact with the Agency. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be 

held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Further, while Father argues that he substantially completed the goals 

set forth for him in Child’s permanency plan, it was within the discretion of 

the orphans’ court to reject Father’s progress as insufficient. During the 

termination hearing, Father testified that he is participating in a federal 
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reentry program. N.T., 12/12/16, at 134, 146. Father also presented 

various certificates showing that he completed parenting and first aid 

programs while incarcerated in federal prison in 2009. Id. at 127-28, 151; 

Respondent’s Exhibit 1. Father presented a certificate showing that he 

completed a “maturity into manhood program” entitled “Knights of the 21st

Century” while incarcerated at Mifflin County Correctional Facility in April 

2015, prior to Child’s dependency. N.T., 12/12/16, at 130; Respondent’s 

Exhibit 2. Finally, Father testified that he completed outpatient drug 

treatment at SCI Smithfield as a condition of his parole. N.T., 12/12/16, at 

132. Father presented a letter showing that he has been participating in an 

additional outpatient program since October 2016, also as part of his parole. 

Id. at 136; Respondent’s Exhibit 3. At best, Father’s testimony 

demonstrates that he participates in services when he is forced to do so 

because of his criminal convictions, or when he simply has nothing else to do 

because he is incarcerated. These minimal efforts do not overcome Father’s 

unresolved criminal history, and his lack of interest in Child.6

____________________________________________

6 We also reject Father’s argument that his alleged success in caring for his 

other children should prevent the termination of his parental rights with 

respect to Child. It is well-settled that “evidence concerning a parent's 

ability to care for another child is irrelevant and inadmissible in a proceeding 

to terminate parental rights with regard to the child at issue.” A.L.D., 797 

A.2d at 338 (citations omitted).
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We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) bestinterest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court found that terminating Father’s parental 

rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

4/3/17, at 16. The court emphasized that Father’s only significant contact 

with Child occurred between July 2015 and December 2015, and that Father 
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enjoyed only weekly one-hour supervised visits. Id. at 14. The court 

further emphasized that terminating Father’s parental rights will allow Child 

to achieve a permanent, healthy, safe, and secure relationship with his 

foster parents, with whom he has lived for nearly his entire life, and will 

allow him to continue residing in the same foster home as his half-brother. 

Id. at 15-16. 

Father argues that Child is bonded to him, and that the evidence does 

not support the conclusion of the orphans’ court that no bond exists. 

Father’s Brief at 8-9. Father argues that he was prevented from further 

developing his bond with Child because the Agency and the “Judges of Mifflin 

County” have a policy of not allowing children to visit their parents in state 

prison, and because the Agency did not offer him visits after his release from 

prison. Id. at 9-10. 

We again discern no abuse of discretion. Regarding Child’s 

relationship with Father, Ms. Steiner testified that she did not view any of 

their visits personally, but that she reviewed FICS records describing the 

visits. N.T., 12/12/16, at 47. Ms. Steiner testified that Child referred to 

Father as “Dahdah” during visits. Id. at 48. However, Child’s reaction to 

Father was not always positive. Id. Child would sometimes go to Father for 

comfort, and would sometimes go to FICS staff. Id. Child would sometimes 

be happy to see Father, but other times would cry. Id. When asked if she 

saw any bonding between Father and Child, Ms. Steiner explained, “I think 

[Child] was at times comfortable going to him and playing with him. In 
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terms of when he needed to be comforted or soothed he was not always 

comfortable with that and would, also, go to staff and relied on staff for 

that.” Id. at 56-57. Ms. Steiner further testified that Child refers to his 

foster parents as “mom and dad.” Id. at 58. He appears to be comfortable 

and is adjusting very well in the foster home. Id. at 59.

Similarly, Ms. Patkalitsky testified that Child has no bond with Father, 

and instead is bonded with his foster parents. Id. at 71-72. She provided 

the following explanation. 

It would be my assessment that [Child] has not seen his 

biological father for almost a year, if not just a year. Um, he’s 

two years old. He would not know who his father is. His mom 

and dad are the foster parents. That is who he calls mom and 

dad. That’s who he looks to for everything a mom and dad 

would give to him. And I don’t see how him being introduced to 

[Father] now would be beneficial to him.

***

Like I said before, they[7] depend on the foster parents for 

everything a mom and dad do. Whenever [Child] gets up from a 

nap he goes straight to his foster mom and he calls her mom. If 

[A.], who is the foster dad, tries to walk out the door to go 

outside for something he’s at the door wanting to go with dad. 

They are his parents.

Id.

Thus, the record confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights will 

best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Child has had minimal contact with 

____________________________________________

7 As noted by the orphans’ court, Child resides in the same foster home as 

his half-brother. 
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Father, and has not seen Father at all since December 2015. Child clearly 

does not share a parent/child bond with Father, and there is no indication in 

the record that Child would suffer any emotional distress if Father’s parental 

rights are terminated. To the contrary, Child is bonded with his foster 

parents, and views them as his mother and father. By terminating Father’s 

parental rights, the orphans’ court will allow Child to achieve permanence 

and stability, and will allow Child to remain with his half-brother, who 

resides in the same foster home. 

While Father argues that he was prevented from developing his 

relationship with Child because the Agency did not permit him to have visits 

at SCI Smithfield, the record is clear that Father failed to request visits, or to 

contact the Agency at all, during that time. Moreover, Father’s incarceration 

was entirely his own doing. This Court will not delay permanence for Child 

because of Father’s criminal behavior. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights to Child 

involuntarily. Therefore, we affirm the court’s April 3, 2017 decree.
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Decree affirmed

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/11/2017