MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 97 Docket: Ken

- 16

- 423 Submitted On	Briefs: February	23,	2017 Decided: May	18,	2017 Panel: ALEXANDER ,	MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

IN	RE	PAIGE	L.

ALEXANDER ,	J. [¶1]		The	Legislature	enacted 22 M.R.S.	§ 4036(1

- A)	(2016) authorizing a	 court	 that	 has	 made	 a	 finding	 of	 jeopardy	 in	 a	 title	 22	 child	 protection proceeding	 to	 “enter	an	order	awarding	parental	 rights	and	 responsibilities” pursuant	to 19

- A	M. R.S.	§	1653	(2016) ,	“if	the	court	determines	that	the	order will	protect	the	child	from	jeopardy	and	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest.” A title
19

- A	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order can	provide	more	permanent protection	for a child	when,	as	in	th is	case,	at	least	one	parent	is	fit	to	care	for the	child. [¶2 ]	 	 Section	 4036(1

- A)(A)	 provides	 that when , “upon	 request	 of	 a parent,”	a court presiding	over	a	child	protection	proceeding determines	that entry	of	a	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order	is	appropriate,	 the	court “shall	direct	the	clerk	to	open	a	family	matters	case	on	behalf	of	the	parties	.	.	. without	a	separate	initial	filing	by	the	parties.”		The	trial	court	in	this case	did2 not	 direct	 the	 opening	 of	 a family	 matters	 case,	 instead it	 amended	 the parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order	that had	been issued	in	the	parties’ divorce	judgment	three	years	earlier	and	that	was	in	effect	at	the	time	of	the jeopardy	 hearin g. In	 this	 appeal,	 we	 address	 the	 application	 of	 section 4036(1

- A)	to	preexisting	parental	rights	orders. [¶3 ]	 	 The	 father	 of	 Paige	 L. appeals	 from a	 judgment	 entered	 in the
District	Court (Augusta, E. Walker,	J. ) after	a	jeopardy	hearing was conducted
pu rsuant	 to	 22	M.R.S.	 §	 4035	 (2016).	 	 The	 court’s initial jeopardy judgment dismissed	 the	 child	 protection	 action	 and awarded sole	 parental	 rights	 over the	 child	 to	 the	 mother	 by	 amending	 a	 preexisting	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	 order	 pursuant	 to	 section	 4036(1

- A). See 22	 M.R.S. § 4036(1

- A)(D

- 1)(1)

. Then,	in	 response	 to a	motion for	 findings	 of fact	 and conclusions	of	law filed	by	the	father, the	court	made	a	specific	finding	that	the father	created	circumstances	of	jeopardy	for	his	child. The	father	also	appeals from the	court’s	order	on his motion	for	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of	law and the denial	of his motion	to	alter	or	amend	the amended	judgment

. [¶4 ] The	father	argues	that	the	court	erred	by	(i)	improperly	admitting child	 hearsay	 testimony	 and	 evidence	 of	 prior	 incidents	 of	 abuse	 at	 the jeopardy hearing,	(ii) failing to	clearly explain what	would	constitute	a	future3 substantial change	 of	 circumstances in	 the initial amended	 order,	 and (iii) denying	his	motion	to	amend	the amended judgment in	the	family	matter

. Because	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 supports	 the	 court’s	 finding	 of jeopardy,	and because the	court	did	not	abuse its	discretion	by	amending	the preexisting	 parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 order	 pursuant	 to	 section 4036(1

- A),	we	affirm.
I.		PROCEDURAL	HISTORY [¶5 ] The	mother	and	father	were	married	in	2009 ,	and Paige was	born in	January 2010. The	father	initiat ed	a	divorce	action	in	September	2012,	and the parties were divo rced	 by	 a	 judgment ( Chandler,	 M. ) dated	 April 4, 2013

. Pursuant	to	the	divorce	judgment,	the	parties were	awarded shared	parental rights	 and	 responsibilities, the	 mother was	 awarded primary physical residence	 of	 the	 child ,	 and	 the	 father	 was	 awarded	 contact	 every	 weekend “and	other	times	by	agreement	of	the	parties.” In	July	2013, by	agreement	of the	parties, the	court ( Fowle,	J. ) granted	the	mother	a	final	order	for	protection from	abuse	ag ainst	the	father. Although	the protection from	abuse order was also	 issued	 on	 behalf	 of	 Paige,	 the	 only	 substantive	 change	 it	 made	 to	 the contact	schedule	was	to	name	a	third	party	who	was	to	“facilitate”	transfers	of the	child

.4 [¶ 6 ] On	October	8,	2015, the	Department	of Health	and	Human	Services (the Department)	 filed	 a	 child	 protection	 petition	 and	 a	 request	 for	 a preliminary	 protec tion	 order. S ee 2 2	 M.R.S.	 §§	 4032,	 4034	 (2016). The Department’s	petition	alleged that	the	child	was	in	jeopardy	in	the	c are	of	her father	 based	 on	 the	 father’s	 extensive	 history	 of	 child	 abuse	 and	 recent reports	 to law	 enforcement	 that	 the	 father’s current	 wife, a	 convicted	 sex offender	 and	 a	 direct	 caregiver	 for	 Paige,	 had	 sexually	 abused	 her	 minor children

. The	petit ion also	asserted	that	Paige was	not	in	jeopardy	in	the	care of	 her	mother and	 stated, “The	Department	is	 asking	 that	 the	 court	 provide protection	 for	 Paige	 [L.]	 by	 granting	 [the	 mother]	 full	 custody	 of	 Paige	 to ensure	that	she	can	fully	protect	her	daughter from	threats	of	immediate	harm by	[the	father]	and	[his	wife]

. ” [¶7 ] The court	 ( Mullen, J. )	 issued	 a	 preliminary	 protection	 order	 that day ,	awarding custody	 of	 the	 child	 to	 the	mother

. That	 order	also	 provided that	 the	 father	 could	 have	 no	 unsupervised	 c ontact	 with	 Paige

. The	 father waived his	right	to	have a	summary	preliminary	hearing , and,	as	a	result,	that order	re mained	in	place	for	the	next	four months

. See 22	M.R.S.	§	4034(4). [¶8 ] The	court	( E.	Walker,	J. )	conducted	a	two

- day	jeopa rdy	hearing	in February 2016. At	the	beginning	of	the	hearing,	the	Department	presented	a5 proposed	 order	 of “ nonjeopardy ” as	 to	 the	 mother, which the	 c ourt	 issued without	 objection. The	 court	 also	 noted	 on	 the	 record	 that

— if it	 found jeopardy concerning the	 father

— it	 could	 modify	 the	 parties’ preexisting parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order. 1 [¶9 ] The	evidence at	the	jeopardy	hearing consisted	of	testimony	from several	 witnesses	 including	 the	 mother,	 the	 father,	 a	 detective	 from	 the Augusta	 Police	 Department,	 the	 guardian	 ad	 litem,	 and five	 social	 workers, and	 exhibits	including a	 child’s	 drawing	 of	 a wooden paddle,	 the	 temporary and final	 protection	 from	 abuse	 orders against	 the	 father ,	 a	 doctor’s	 report, the	father’s	milit ary	discharge	paperwork,	and	a reunification	plan. [¶1 0 ] On	April	8,	2016,	 the	court	issued	a “ dispositional ” order in	 the child	protection proceeding , and , as	aut horized	by section	4036(1

- A), attached an	amended	parental	rights	and	respon sibilities	order	modifying	the	parental rights	 and	 responsibilities	 order	 issued	 in	 the	 divorce	 judgment. The dispositional	order	was	docketed	in	the	child	protection	matter. In that	order, the court stated only that	 the	 “[c]hild	is	 doing	 well	in	mother’s	 care	 and	 all parties	 agree	 that	 the	 child	is	 n ot in	 Jeopardy	in	mother’s	 care.” The order

1 By	referencing	its	capacity	to	modify	the	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order,	the	court provide d the required notice	 “that	 the	child	protective	case	may	be	disposed	of	 through	an	order awarding	 parental	 rights	and	 responsibilities

. ” 22	M.R.S. § 4 03 6 (1

- A)	 (2016).	 	 The	 sufficiency	 of that	notice is	not	an	issue	in	this	appeal.6 contained no finding	of	jeopardy	as	 to	 the	 father. Through	 the dispositional order , the	court also	purported	to	dismiss the	child	protection	action	pursuant to	22	M.R.S.	§ 4036(1

- A)(D

- 1)(1). [¶1 1 ] The	amended parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order,	docketed in	 the	 pre existing	 family	 matter,	 awarded	 sole	 parental	 rights	 and responsibi lities	 to	 the	mother	and	 supervised contact to	 the	 father pursuant
to 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 1653

. The	 amended	 order	 stated	 that	 “[i]t	 shall	 be	 a significant	 change	 of	 circumstances	 if	 the	 father	 addresses	 the	 issues	 that resulted	 in	 this	 Or der.” Otherwise,	 the	 amended	 order	 did	 not	 contain	 any findings	 of	 fact	 but	 noted	 that	 it	 “was	 entered	 as	 part	 of	 a	 disposition	 in	 a related	matter”	after	notice	and	hearing. 2 [¶1 2 ] T he	 father	 timely	 filed	 a	 motion	 for	 findings	 of	 fact	 and conclusions	 of	 law	 a nd	 a	 motion	 t o	 alter	 or	 amend	 the	 judgment.
See M.R. Civ. P.	52(a)

- (b),	59.		The captions	 for	the father’s	motions identified the	docket	number in	the	child	protec tion	matter. In	his	motion for	findings , the	 father	 argued	 that	 the	 court had made	 no findi ngs — oral or	 written

— regarding	 the	 father,	 how	 the	 disposition	 would	 protect	 the	 child	 from

2 Title	 2 2	 M.R.S.	 §	 4036(1

- A)(A

- 1) specifically	 directs	 that	 the	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	order	“may	not	include	reference	to	or	discussion	of	the	child	protectiv e	case.”		This is	 because	 child	 protective	 cases	 are	 confidential	 by	 statute. Id .	 	 Because	 of	 the	 confidentiality mandate,	this	opinion	will	not	address	information	beyond	that	which	is	usually	stated	in	opinions resolving	appeals	from	child	protection	ma tters

.7 jeopardy,	 or	how	 the	disposition	was	in	 the	child’s	best	int erest. The	 father further	argued	that	the	amended	order	was	ambiguous	regarding	what	would
constitute	a future substa ntial	change	of	circumstances. [¶1 3 ] T he	court	granted	the	father’s	motion	for	further	findings	of	fact and	 conclusions	 of	 law,	 but	 denied	 his	 motion	 to	 alter	 or	 amend	 the judgment. 3 The	 court	 issued four	 pag es	 of	 factual	 findings	 and	 found “by	 a preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence	 that	 [the	 child]	 would	 be	 in	 jeopardy	 to	 her health	 and	 welfare	 if	 she	 were	 returned	 to	 the	 custody	 of	 her	 father.”	 	 The court	 further	 found	 that	 the	 child	 is	 not	 in	 jeopardy	 whe n	 she	 is	 in	 her mother’s	care. In	additi on, the	court	concluded	that	awarding	the	mother	sole parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 and	 primary	 residence , and	 limiting	 the father	to	supervised contact based	on	the	overall	threat	pos ed	to	the	child	by the	father,	wa s	in	the	child’s	best	interest. The	court	also	advised: Father	 asks	 this	 court	 for	 guidance	in	 addressing	 his	issues	 that resulted	 in	 this	 order	 so	 that	 he	 may	 know	 what	 the	 court	 will view	 as	 a	 “significant	 change	 of	 circumstances”	 for	 future purposes.	 	 This	 is	 a	 reasonable	 request	 and the	 court	 probably should	have	been	more	specific	about	this	issue	in	its	order.		This court	 would	 consider	 it	 a	 significant	 change	 of	 circumstances	 if

3 The	Department’s	brief	correctly	points	out	a	misstatement	of	law	in	the	court’s	post

- judgment order : the	court stated	that	it	should	have	conducted a	family	matter s hearing	instead	of	a	jeopardy hearing because	 the	 Department	 was	 not	 seeking	 a	 finding of	 jeopardy	 against	 the	 mother. However,	the	jeopardy	hearing and	the	court’s	action	after	the	jeopardy	hearing	were appropriate because	the	father	was	properly	served	notice	pursuant	to 22	M.R.S.	§	4035(2) (C)	(2016)

. See , e.g., In	re	Alivia	B. ,	2010	ME	112, ¶ 2,	8	A.3d	625

.8 Father	were	to	attend	a	certified	batterer’s	intervention	program and	 complete	 at	 least	 26	 of	 the	 48	 we eks	 of	 that	 program. Additionally,	Father	needs	to	attend	and	complete	an	assessment with	 a	 licensed	 psychiatrist	 and	 abide	 by	 any	 of	 his	 or	 her recommendations	 for	at	least	6	months	or	 for	a	shorter	period	if the	psychiatrist	 feels	 that	 that	length	of	 tr eatment	is	not	needed. Father	 must	 take	 any	 and	 all	 medications	 prescribed	 by	 the psychiatrist	 if	 there	 is	 such	 a	 recommendation.	 	 Lastly,	 Father must	 take	and	complete	a	parenting	class	so	 that	he	can	come	 to appreciate	 the	 negative	 effects	 his	 behaviors have	 had	 on	 Paige and	appreciate	what	help	she	will	need	in	the	future	to	overcome this	trauma. [¶1 4 ] The	 father	 timely	 filed	a	notice	of	appeal	in	 the	chi ld	protection
matter, 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4006	 (2016) ,	 but	 did	 not	 file	 a	 notice	 of	 appeal in	 the family matter, 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1652(5)	(2016)

. W hen	the	child	protection action is	 dismissed pursuant	 to 22	 M .R.S.	 §	 4036(1

- A)(D

- 1)(1) ,	 as	 occurred	 in	 this

case , 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4036(1

- A)(F) directs	 that “the	 court shall terminate	 the appointments	 of	 the	 guardian	 ad	 litem	 and	 attorneys	 for	 parents	 and guardians.		After	the	appointments	are	terminated,	the	attorneys	and	guardian ad	litem	have	no	further	responsibilities	t o	their	clients	or	the	court.” [¶15] Despite	 that	 l anguage,	 counsel	 for	 the	 father	 has appropriately continued	to	represent	him	in	this	appeal , because	the	appeal	is taken	from a
t itle	22 jeopard y	order. We	will	address	below the	complications	created	for counsel	 assigned	 to	 represent	 parents	 in	 child protectio n	 cases	 when	 those9
cases	convert to	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	cases,	where	 there	is	no statutory	right	to	assignment	of	counsel.
II.		FINDINGS	BY	THE	COURT [¶1 6 ] Responding	 to	 the	 father’s	motion	 for	 findings,	 t he	 court	 found the	 foll owing	 facts,	by	a	preponderance	of	evidence,	which	are	supported	by competent	 record	 evidence. See 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4035(2); In	 re	 Nicholas	 S. , 2016 ME	82,	¶	9,	140	A.3d	1226

. [¶1 7 ] The	 father	 was verbally	 and	 physically	 abusive	 to	 the	 mother during	the	marr iage , including	punching	or	hitting	the	mother on	at least	ten different	 occasions .	 	 The	 father	 threatened	 to	 have	 the	 mother	 followed,	 to have	 her	 tires	 slashed,	 to	 hurt	 her	 if	 she	 called	 the	 police,	 to	 make	 false allegations	to	the	Department	to	have	the child	taken	away	from	the	mother, and	 to	 kill	 her

. Some	 of	 the	 episodes	 of	 domestic	 violence	 occurred	 in	 the
presence of	the	child. [¶1 8] After	 th e	 parties	 divorced ,	 the	 father	 disciplined	 the th en - three

- year - old	 child	 and	 other	 children	living	 with	 him	 with	 a	 wooden paddle. The	father justified	paddling	the	children	by	referencing h is	religious beliefs.	 	H e	 disposed	 of	 the wooden paddle	 while	 a	 police investigation	 was10 pending. The	 father	 has	 made	 derogatory comments	 to	 the	 child	 such	 as calling her	“fat,”	“loser,”	and	“bad.” [¶1 9 ] In August	2014,	the	father	married a	registered	sex	offender. The father stated	 that	 he	 admired	 his	 new	 wife’s honesty	 in	 disclosing	 her conviction	 and	 did	 not	 consider	 whether	 she might	 pose	 a	 danger	 to	 Paige because	his	wife ’s	 v ictim	was	a	male	child. Recently,	 the	 father’s	new wife’s minor	children	from	a	prio r	relationship	have witnessed	the	fa ther	physically assaulting	their	mother,	and they	are	a fraid	of	the	father. Paige has stated	that she	 does	 not	 want	 to	 visit	 her	 father	 and became	 upset	 to	 the	 poi nt	 of hyperventilating	at	the	prospect of	a	visit. [¶20 ] The	father	ha s	a	lengthy	criminal	record including convictions	for assault	 in 2010	 and	 2011, violatio n	 of	 a	 protective	 order	 in	 2010,	 and domestic	violence	assault	and	violation	of	conditions	of	release	in	2012. The father	claims	that	he	has	little	or	no	memory	of	these crimes. [¶21 ] The	 fathe r	 admits that	 he	 needs anger	management	 counseling and	that	he did	not	comply	with	the	Department’s	reunification	plan requiring such	 counseling	 because	 he	 prefers	 that his	 pastor	 provide counseling
service s. Despite	substantial	evidence	to	the	contrary, t he	father	asserted	that11 “everything	 was	 fine”	 until the	 fall	 of	 2015 , when the	 current	 investigation started,	and he	asserted	that the	Department is	biased	against	him. [¶ 2 2 ] Regarding	 the	 mother,	 the	 court	 found	 that she has	 resolved some	past	issues and that her	h ome	is	safe	and	secure. The	child	is	loved	in the	mother’s	home

. II I

. LEGAL	ANALYSIS
A. Justiciability	of	Appeal	of	Amended	Parental	Rights	Order [¶23 ] On	appeal,	the	father	purports	to	challenge	the	amended	parental rights	and	responsibi lities	order	issued	in	 the	 title	19

- A	proceeding .		A party to	a	 proceeding	who wishes	 to	appeal	 from	an	 order,	including	an	amended order,	must	file	a	notice	of	appeal in the	proceeding	in	which	the	order	issued, here	 the	 title	 19

- A	 proceeding. See In re Melissa	 T. ,	 2002	 ME	 31,	 ¶	 5,
791 A.2d 98 (dismissing the mother’s	 appea l	 challenging	 a	 jeopardy	 order when	the	mother	filed	a	brief	but	did	not	file	a	notice	of	appeal) ; s ee	also Costa v.	Vogel ,	2001	ME	131,	¶	1	n.1,	777	A.2d	827 ; Town	of	Mount	Desert	v.	S mith , 2000	ME	88,	¶ 8,	751	A.2d	445 (holding	that	the	timely	filing	of	a	cross

- appeal to	 the	 Law	 Court	 will	 not	 cure	 a	 procedural	 de fect	 of	 failing	 to	 file	 a

cross - appeal	to	the	Superior	Court	from	a	District	Court	order)

.12 [¶24 ] T he	father	never	filed	a notice	of	appeal	in	the	family	matter	case, and , ordinarily, the	 father’s	attempt	at	a	 direct	appeal	 of	 the	modification	 of the	title	19

- A	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order would be	dismissed. [¶25 ] Because the	 father	 timely	 appealed	 from	 the je opardy	 order	in the title	22	proceeding ,	and	because	we	have	not	before	had	the	opportunity to	provide	any	guidance	o n	how	to address this	overlap	of	titles	22	and	19

- A, we	 will	 address	 both	 the	 court’s	 order	 finding	 jeopardy	 and	 it s	 order amending	the	parental	rights	and	responsibilities	order

. [¶26 ] Going	 forward,	 however,	 we	 caution	 that, in	 such	 appeals ,	 the parent

— or the	 parent’s counsel

— who	 wishes	 to	 challenge	 a	 parental	 rights and	 responsibilities	 order	 issued	 after	 a	 jeopardy finding must appeal	 from both	 the	 title	 22 jeopardy order	 and	 the	 title	 19

- A	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	 order.	 	 That will	 be	 required whether	 the	 order	 at	 issue	 is entered	 in	 a	 newly	 opened parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities case,	 as contemplat ed	 by	 section	 4036(1

- A)(A),	 or	 amends	 a preexisting parental rights	order,	as	occurred	here. 4

4 When a	parental	 rights	and	 responsibilities	order is issued	as	 the	disposition	after	an	order that	cannot	be	appealed,	e.g.,	a	judicial	review	order , 22	M.R.S.	§§	4006,	4038 (2016) ,	the	notice	of appeal must identify	the	parental	rights	order	as	the	order	being	appealed and	must	be	filed	in	the parental	rights	and	responsibilities	action

.13 B. Challenges	to	Findings	of	Fact [¶27 ] The	 court’s	 findings,	 stated	 above,	 are	 fully	 supported	 by competent	evidence	in	 the	record. The	 father	argues	 that	 the court’s	 factual findings	 are	 improperly	 based	 on	 hearsay	 evidence	 because	 the	 amended order	was	entered	pursuant	to 19

- A	M.R.S. § 1653,	and,	had	the	hearing	been conducted	 in	 a family	 matter s proceeding	 rather	 than a	 jeopardy	 hearing, child	 hearsay	evidence	would have	 been	in admissible absent	 the	availability of	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule

. He	 also	 contends	 that	 the	 court improperly	 considered	incidents	 that	 occurred	 prior	 to	 the	last modification of	the	paren tal	rights	and	responsibilities	order. 5 [¶28 ] Although	t he	father	did	not	object	at	the	jeopardy	hearing to the admission	of	child	hearsay	testimony	or to	the	mother’s	request	that	the	court dispose	 of the	 case	 with	 a	 modification	 of the	 parental	 rights and responsibilities	order ,	his	argument	on	appeal	is	properly	presented	because his	objections	would	have	been	overruled	in	the	jeopardy	proceeding , where admission	of	such	evidence	was	proper.

5 The	father	also	argues	that	the	court’s	factual	findings	do	not	support	a	finding	that	there was a	substantial	change	of	circumstances	since	the	prior	modification. The court’s	findings	that	there had	been	recent	domestic	violence	in	the	father’s	ho me	and	that	the	father	had ma rried	a	registered sex	 offender are	 sufficient	 to demonstrate	 that	 th ere	 had	 been a	 subs tantial	 change	 of circumstances. See 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1657(2)(B)	(2016) ; see	also 19

- A	M.R.S.	§	1653(3)(R)	(2016)

.14 1. Child	Hearsay	Evidence [¶29 ] “All	child	protection proceedings	shall	be	conducted	according	to the	 rules	 of	 civil	 procedure	 and	 the	 rules	 of	 evidence,	 except	 as	 provided otherwise	in ”	the Child	and	Family	Services	and	Child	Protection	Act ,	22	M.R.S. §§	4001	to	4099

- H	(2016). 22	M.R.S.	§	4007(1)	(2016) .		“ The	court	may	admit and	 consider	 oral	 or	 written	 evidence	 of	 out

- of

- court	 statements	made	 by	 a child,	 and	 may	 rely	 on	 that	 evidence	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 its	 probative	 value.” Id. § 4007(2) (2016) ; see In	 re	 Kayla	 S. ,	 2001	 ME	 79,	 ¶	 7,	 772	 A.2d	 858 ; In re Robin T. ,	651	A.2d	337,	338	(Me.	1994)

. Upon	a	finding	of	jeopardy,	the court	 shall	 “make	 a	 written	 order	 of	 any	 disposition	 under	 section	 4036.”
22 M.R.S. § 4035(3).		Pursuant	 to	section	4036 (1

- A) ,	“the	court	may	enter	an order	 awarding	 parental	 rights	 and	 r esponsibilities	 pursuant	 to	 Title	 19

- A, section	1653	if	the	court	determines	that	the	order	will	protect	the	child	from jeopardy	 and	 is	 in	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 as	 defined	 in	 Title	 19

- A,	 section 1653,	subsection	3.” [¶30 ] Title	 22	 allows	 a	 cou rt to	 a dmit	 child	 hearsay evidence in	 a jeopardy	 hearing	 and	 to	 protect	 a	 child	 from	jeopardy	 by	issuing	 a	 parental rights	and	responsibilities	order	pursuant	to title 19

- A.		22 M.R.S.	§§ 4007(2), 4036(1

- A). Moreover,	 22	 M.R.S. § 4036(1

- A)(A

- 1) provides that	 “the	 court15 shall	seal	and	keep	confidential	any	documents	from	the	child	protective	case that	are	made	a	part	of	 the	record	of	 the family	matters	case	.

. .	.”		Thus,	 the statutory	 scheme contemplates	 that	 a	 court issuing	 a	 parental	 rights	 and
respon sibilities	 order under	 these	 circumstances	 will rely	 on	 its	 factual findings	 from	 the	 jeopardy	 hearing,	 which	 may be	 based	 on	 evidence	 that include s child	 hearsay. See In re Jacob	 C. ,	 2009 ME	 10,	 ¶	 9,	 965	 A.2d	 47 (considering	 the	 whole	 statutory	 scheme	 so that	 a	 harmonious	 result, presumably	 the	 intent	 of	 the	 Legislature,	 may	 be	 achieved). Therefore,	 the court	 did	 not	 err	 in	 considering statements	 ascribed	 to the child	 when determining,	first,	that	t he	father created	jeopardy	for Paige , and,	second,	that the	appropriate	disposition	was	to	award	the	mother	sole	parental	rights	and responsibilities.
2. Considerati on	of	Prior	Incidents [¶31 ] “ I n child protection proceedings,	 what	 is	 past	 is	 often	 prologue regarding	 the	 threat	 of	 serious	 harm	 posed	 by	 the	 parent	 .	 .	 .	 .” In	 re	 E.A. , 2015 ME	 37,	 ¶	 9,	 114	 A.3d	 207 (quoting In	 re	 E.L. ,	 2014	 ME	 87,	 ¶	 14,
96 A.3d 691 ).	 	 “Evidence	 of	 historical	 behavior	 is	 relevant	 to	 a finding	 of jeopardy	.	.	.	.	[T]he	court	must	consider	whether	there	is prospective jeopardy.16 And	in	making	that	determination,	.	.	.	the	trial	court	must	consider	what	has happened	in	the	past.” Id

. [¶ 3 2 ] Accordingly ,	 the	 court	 properly	 considered evidence	 of	 the father’s	extensive	history	of	domestic	 violence	and	abuse	 toward	ch ildre n	in making its	 jeopardy	 finding s . Even	 in	 a hearing	 on	 a	 motion	 to	 modify	 a parental	 rights	 order,	 the	 evidence could be	 relevant	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 what custody	 arrange ment	is	in	 the	 child’s	 best	interest. See Aranovitch	 v.	 Versel , 2015	ME	146,	¶	15,	127 A.3d 542 (“Generally,	 the	substantial	change	inquiry is	temporally	limited	to	events	following	the	most	recent order governing	the children’s	residential	care.		However,	if	the	court	determines	that	a	substantial change	 in	 circumstances	 has occurred since	 the	 most	 recent order ,	 it	 may consider	 events	 before	 that order to	 provide	 context	 for	 evaluating subsequent	 events, if	 the	 pre

- order events	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	issue	 of	what parental	 rights arrangement	 will	 further	 the	 children’ s	 best	 interests

. ” (c itation	omitted)). [¶33 ] T he trial	 court	 properly	 relied	 on	 evidence concerning prior incidents when deciding	 whether	 th e	 father created jeopardy for Paige	 and when	determining	how	best	to	alleviate	that	jeopardy

.17 C. Clarity	of	Future	Substantial	Change	of	Circumstances [¶34 ] The	 fa ther	 contends	 that	 the	 court’s	 direction regarding	 what would	 constitute	 a	 future	 substantial	 change	 of	 circumstances	in	 the	 court’s amended	 order	 is	 ambiguous,	 and that the	 court	 erred	 by	 explaining	 the provision	 in	 the	 child	 protection	 matter	 instead	 of in the	 amended	 order. Despite	 the	 fathe r’s	 claims	 to	 the	 contrary,	 t he court’s	 detailed	 statement of what	would	constitute	a	 future	change	of	circumstances	was	properly	stated in	the	child	protection	proceeding	and	provides	the	requisite	clarity	for	what is	expected	of	the	father.
D. Basis for the	Amended	Parental	Rights	Order [¶35 ] The	father	argues	that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	by	denying his	 motion	 to	 amend	 the parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities judgment because the	amended	order in	 the	 family	matter	is silent	regarding	 the	legal predicates	upon	which	it	is	based. 6 [¶36 ] T he	 court’s amended	 parental	 rights	 order does not	 include findings	of	 fact	or conclusions	of	law ;	however,	 the	extensive	 findings	of	 fact

6 The	father	also	contends	that	the	court’s	orders	should	be	vacated	because	section 4036(1

- A) “indicate[s]	 that	 any	 post

- judgment	 motions	 filed	 under	 circumstances	 such	 as	 these	 should	 be captioned	under	the	 family	matter	docket,	and	that	any	order	in	res ponse	to	such	motions	should likewise	be	issued	under	the family	matter	docket	number.” Here,	the	court	properly	entered	the amended	order	under	the	family	matter	docket	number. S ee 22 M.R.S.	§	4036(1

- A)(A).		The	father filed	 a	 single	 post

- judgment	 motio n	 under	 the	 child	 protection	 docket	 number,	 and	 th e	 court responded	accordingly. Thus,	there	was	no	error , and	the	father’s	contention	is	without	merit.18 and	 conclusions	 of	 law	 that	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 amended	 order	 are

con tained	in	 the	 court’s	 post

- judgment	 order	in	 the	 child	 protection	matter

. Because	 a	 parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities	 orde r	 issued	 pursuant	 to
section 4036(1

- A)	may	not	refer	to	or	discuss	the	originating	child	protection matter,	 the	 court	was	 prohibit ed	 from	including	its	 findings	in	 the	amended parental	rights order. See 22	M.R.S.	§ 4036(1

- A)(A

- 1). [¶37 ] Turning	 to	 the	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 conclusions	 of	 law, and recognizing	 that	 the	 court	 was	 deciding	 both whether	 the	 State	 had	 proved jeopardy and	whether	the	child	could	be	protected	from	that	jeopardy	without the continuing need	 for	a	child	protection	 order , the	court	did	not	expressly state	that	it	was	considering	each	of	the	factors	listed	in section 1653(3).		The

court did ,	 however,	 state	 t hat	 “the	 overall	 revised	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	order	is	clearly	in [the	child’s]	best	interest.” [¶38 ] Notably,	 t he	 court’s	 findings relate	 to nine	 of	 the	 nineteen	 best interest	 factors	 listed	 in	 section	 1653(3),	 including	 the	 age	 of	 the	 ch ild;	 the relations hip	of	 the	child	with	 the	child’ s	parents	and	any	other	persons	who may	 significantly	 affect	 the	 child’s	 welfare;	 the	 preference	 of	 the	 child;	 the parties’	capacities	to	give	the	child	love,	affection , and	guidance;	the	existence of	domes tic	abuse	between	the	parents,	in	the	past	or	currently;	the	existence19 of	any	 history	 of	 child	abuse	 by	a	 parent;	 the	existence	 of	a	 person	 residing with	 the	 parent who	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 certain	 sex	 crimes ;	 whether allocation	 of	 some	 or	 all	 parental	 ri ghts	 and	 responsibilities	 would	 best support	 the	 child’s	 safety	 and	 well

- being;	 and	 all	 other	 factors	 having	 a reasonable	bearing	on	the	physical	and	psychol ogical	well

- being	of	the	child. [¶39 ] As	 noted	 above, the	 order	 issued	 by	 the	 court	 could	 best	 be described	 as	 a	 “hybrid”	 of	 a	 jeopardy	 order	 and	 a	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	 order.	 	 Even	 if	 it	 had	 been	 exclusively	 a	 parental	 rights	 and responsibilities	 order,	 however, the court	 was	 not	 required	 to	 address	 each best	interest factor	in	its decision

. See Nadeau v.	Nadeau ,	2008	ME	147,	¶	35, 957 A.2d	108

. T he	trial	court rather	evidently evaluated	the	evidence	with	the best	interest	 factors	in	mind	and	 did	 not	abuse	its	 discretion	in	 reaching	its ultimate	conclusion. The	entry	is: The	 jeopardy order and	 the	 amended parental rights	 and	 responsibilities order	 issued pursuant	to	22	M.R.S.	§	4036(1

- A)	are	affirmed

.20
Thomas W. Bell, Esq., The Law Office of Thomas W. Bell, Esq., Topsham, for appellant father Lorne Fairbanks, Esq. , Lewiston, for appellee mother Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Augusta District Court docket number PC

- 2015

- 57 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY