IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

KELLE KAE TRUEBLOOD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

MEGAN E. GLOR 

621 S.W. Morrison 

Suite 900 

Portland, OR 97205 

(503) 223-7400 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

Acting United States Attorney 

RONALD K. SILVER 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204-2902 

(503) 727-1003 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

3:14-CV-01350-BR 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 1 of 15
DAVID MORADO 

Regional Chief Counsel 

DIANA SWISHER ANDSAGER 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 

Seattle, WA 98104 

(206) 615-3708 

Attorneys for Defendant 

BROWN, Judge. 

Plaintiff Kelle Kae Trueblood seeks judicial review of a 

final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's application 

for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the 

Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the 

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision 

of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. 

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on December 22, 2010, 

alleging a disability onset date of September 25, 2008. 

Tr. 68. 1 The application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a 

hearing on November 29, 2012. ·Tr. 30-57. At the hearing 

1 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by 

the Commissioner on January 2, 2015, are referred to as "Tr." 

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Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. Plaintiff and a 

vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing. 

The ALJ issued a decision on December 26, 2012, in which he 

found Plaintiff was not disabled, and, therefore, was not 

entitled to DIB. Tr. 10-29. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d), 

that decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when 

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. 

Tr. 1-5. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was born March 12, 1978 and was 34 years old at 

the time of the hearing. Tr. 58. Plaintiff has three years of 

college education. Tr. 322. Plaintiff has past relevant work 

experience as an emergency medical technician (EMT), ranger aide, 

and sales attendant. Tr. 22. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to lumbar instability, "si 

joint instability," fibromyalgia, back injury, carpal tunnel 

syndrome, tendonitis of right forearm, trochanteric bursitis of 

the right hip, and "IT band syndrome." Tr. 58. 

Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's 

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the 

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ's summary of the 

medical evidence. See Tr. 17-21. 

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STANDARDS 

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to 

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th 

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her 

inability ''to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which . has lasted or can be expected to last for 

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.'' 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d) (1) (A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is 

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 

453, 459-60 (9t" Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision 

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is 

"relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion." Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 

(quoting Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 

(9th Cir. 2009)). "It is more than a mere scintilla [of 

evidence] but less than a preponderance." Id. (citing Valentine, 

574 F.3d at 690). 

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The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, 

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving 

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 

2009). The.court must weigh all of the evidence whether it 

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even 

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner's findings 

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the 

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F. 3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2006) . 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS 

I. The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation 

The Commissioner has developed a five-step sequential 

inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the 

meaning of the Act. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 

2007). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Each step is potentially 

dispositive. 

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4) (I). See also Keyser v. 

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Comm' r of Soc. Sec., 648 F. 3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). 

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 

404 .1520 (a) (4) (ii). See also Keyser, 648 F. 3d at 724. 

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner 

determines the claimant's impairments meet or equal one of the 

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so 

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a) (4) (iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The 

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are 

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed 

Impairments) . 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must 

assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). The 

claimant's RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related 

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a 

regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404 .1520 (e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. "A 

'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a 

week, or an equivalent schedule.'' SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other 

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete 

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

659 F. 3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 

6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 6 of 15
F.2d 597, 603 (9'" Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the 

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform 

work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4) (iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. 

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five,· she must determine 

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in 

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (4) (v). See also 

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the 

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v. 

Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9'" Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of 

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set 

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, 

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant 

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (1). 

ALJ'S FINDINGS 

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her September 25, 2008, 

alleged onset date. Tr. 15. 

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of lumbar strain, obesity, depression, and anxiety. 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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Tr. 15. 

At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's medically 

determinable impairments do not meet or medically equal one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 

1. Tr. 15-16. The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to perform 

light work. Tr. 16. The ALJ found Plaintiff can stand and walk 

for 30 minutes at a time. Tr. 17. The ALJ also found Plaintiff 

can engage in "occasional postural activities." Tr. 17. The ALJ 

found Plaintiff can frequently grip with the right hand and 

occasionally bend forward at the waist, but can never climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 17. The ALJ found Plaintiff 

"must have the ability to alternate between sitting and standing 

every 30 minutes with no significant interference with the work 

process." Tr. 17. The ALJ also limited Plaintiff to simple, 

routine tasks. Tr. 17. 

At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff cannot perform her 

past relevant work. Tr. 22. 

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff can perform jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 22. 

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he improperly 

(1) rejected Plaintiff's testimony and (2) gave "little weight" 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 8 of 15
' ' ' 

to the opinion of Rodney Jackson, D.C., treating chiropractor. 2 

I. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for partially 

rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. 

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred when he failed to give clear 

and convincing reasons for partially rejecting Plaintiff's 

testimony at the November 2012 hearing. 

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two 

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom 

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence 

of an impairment or impairments, and he must show the impairment 

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to 

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th 

Cir. 1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective 

medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not 

any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the 

claimant's pain testimony only if he provides clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 

750 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th 

2 In her Opening Brief Plaintiff states in a header that the 

ALJ erred in his analysis of the opinion of Jackson, but the body 

of Plaintiff's argument refers to Raymond Larsen, M.D., treating 

physician. Dr. Larsen repeatedly opined Plaintiff had functional 

limitations that are consistent with the ALJ's RFC finding. The 

Court, therefore, finds Plaintiff intended to challenge the ALJ's 

rejection of Jackson's opinion. 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 9 of 15
Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant's testimony is 

not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must identify "what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834). 

At the hearing Plaintiff testified she works part time at a 

community college teaching paramedic classes. Tr. 34. Plaintiff 

stated the biggest obstacle to her working more often than her 

part-time job is an increase in her back pain and "generalized 

pain." Tr. 36. Plaintiff testified sitting and standing 

increases the pain in her back and she suffers fatigue and 

migraines one to three times per week. Tr. 36. Plaintiff also 

testified she has tendinitis in her right wrist and thumb. Tr. 

41. Plaintiff testified mental-health issues are not the main 

reason she cannot work. Tr. 37. Plaintiff takes Dilaudid, 

Norco, Flexeril, and Cymbalta. Tr. 37. Plaintiff noted she has 

attempted physical therapy, use of a TENS unit, chiropractic 

treatment, massage, Pilates, pool therapy, and a work-hardening 

program to improve her symptoms, but nothing has relieved her 

pain. Tr. 42-43. Plaintiff goes to the grocery store with her 

mother but mainly stays at home. Tr. 37. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff's "medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of 

[Plaintiff's) alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's] statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 10 of 15
these symptoms are not fully credible" because they are not 

supported by the medical record. Tr. 17. In particular the ALJ 

noted the record supports a finding that Plaintiff has 

limitations due to back pain, but the record does not support the 

extremity of Plaintiff's allegations of debilitating symptoms. 

The record reflects Plaintiff suffered lumbar strain in February 

2008 when she lifted a patient at work. Plaintiff returned to 

light duty work in April 2008. Plaintiff, however, stopped 

working in September 2008. On September 25, 2008, Plaintiff's 

treating physician, Dr. Larsen, opined Plaintiff could return to 

work with the following restrictions: not to lift more than 25 

pounds, not to bend more than three times per hour, to alternate 

sitting and standing, and not to do any repetitive wrist motion. 

Tr. 390. In October 2008, examining physicians Anthony Woodward 

and Earl Duncan opined Plaintiff had chronic back pain, but she 

did not have any limitation on her ability to work. Tr. 327. On 

January 16, 2009, Plaintiff was discharged from a work-hardening 

program for inability to progress. Tr. 385. The discharging 

doctor noted Plaintiff had "demonstrated the abilities . . . to 

perform in the light/medium category of work" and recommended 

Plaintiff be released to work full time in the light/medium 

category. Tr. 385. In June 2009 Dr. Larsen released Plaintiff 

to work as a legal assistant eight hours per day with the 

limitation that she be able to change positions. Tr. 277-78. In 

11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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May 2010 Dr. Larsen opined Plaintiff was capable of performing 

sedentary work. Tr. 828. 

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff was a caregiver for her ill 

father until October 2012 and continued to work part time as an 

EMT instructor. 

The Court finds the ALJ provided clear and convincing 

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for 

finding Plaintiff's testimony was only partially credible. The 

Court, therefore, concludes the ALJ did not err when he partially 

rejected Plaintiff's testimony. 

III. The ALJ did not err when he gave little weight to the 

opinion of treating chiropractor Rodney Jackson. 

On April 19, 2011, Jackson completed a report regarding 

Plaintiff's functional limitations in which he stated Plaintiff 

required additional education and training before she would be 

eligible for sedentary occupations. Tr. 832. Jackson also noted 

Plaintiff ~cannot tolerate full time activity even with an 

accommodation to sit and stand at will." Tr. 832. 

In September 2011 Jackson completed a Functional Capacity 

Assessment of Plaintiff in which he stated Plaintiff could walk, 

stand, and sit for less than 30 minutes. Tr. 640. Jackson 

stated Plaintiff could walk and stand in combination for 10-20 

minutes and stand and sit in combination for no more than three 

hours. Tr. 640. Jackson noted Plaintiff could occasionally lift 

and carry up to 20 pounds and intermittently kneel, crawl, 

12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 12 of 15
handle, and finger or pinch. Tr. 640-41. Jackson stated 

Plaintiff would need to rest 2-3 hours in an eight-hour work day 

and would have "deficits sustaining concentration, attention, 

focus, persistence, and pace" 21-25% of the time in an eight-hour 

work day. Tr. 644. 

Medical sources are divided into two categories: 

''acceptable'' and ''not acceptable.'' 20 C.F.R. § 416.902. 

Acceptable medical sources include licensed physicians and 

psychologists. 20 C.F.R. § 416.902. Medical sources classified 

as ''not acceptable'' include chiropractors. SSR 06-03p, at *2. 

The ALJ may assign a not-acceptable medical source either greater 

or lesser weight than that of an acceptable medical source. SSR 

06-03p, at *5-6. The ALJ, however, must explain the weight 

assigned to such sources to the extent that a claimant or 

subsequent reviewer may follow the ALJ's reasoning. SSR 06-03p, 

at *6. 

The ALJ gave "little weight" to Jackson's opinions noting 

Jackson had not seen Plaintiff in over a year at the time he 

offered his September 2011 opinion and Jackson did not point to 

specific findings to support Plaintiff's limitations. In 

addition, the ALJ noted Jackson's opinion was contradicted by the 

opinions of Plaintiff's various treating and examining 

physicians. For example, as noted, Dr. Larsen opined in 

September 2008 that Plaintiff could return to work with the 

13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 3:14-cv-01350-BR Document 15 Filed 08/03/15 Page 13 of 15
restriction not to lift more than 25 pounds, not to bend more 

than three times per hour, to alternate sitting and standing, and 

not to do any repetitive wrist motion. Tr. 390. In October 2008 

Ors. Woodward and Duncan opined Plaintiff had chronic back pain, 

but she did not have any limitation on her work abilities. 

Tr. 327. In January 2009 the doctor discharging Plaintiff from 

the work-hardening program noted Plaintiff had ~demonstrated the 

abilities . . . to perform in the light/medium category of work" 

and recommended Plaintiff be released to work full time in the 

light/medium category. Tr. 385. In June 2009 Dr. Larsen 

released Plaintiff to work as a legal assistant eight hours per 

day with the limitation that she be able to change positions. 

Tr. 277-78. In May 2010 Dr. Larsen opined Plaintiff was capable 

of performing sedentary work. Tr. 828. 

The ALJ also noted Plaintiff was a caregiver for her ill 

father until October 2012 and continued to work part time as an 

EMT instructor. 

On this record the Court concludes the ALJ did not err when 

he gave little weight to the opinion of Jackson because the ALJ 

supported his decision by reference to specific, substantial 

evidence in the record. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the 

14 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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' ' 

Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 3rct day of August, 2015. 

ANN~ United States District Judge 

15 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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