Filed 8/18/23 In re H.R. CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re H.R., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B318418

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05023A

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
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Mother T.R. challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

findings and dispositional order removing her daughter H.R. from 

her custody. During the pendency of her appeal, the juvenile 

court terminated dependency jurisdiction over H.R. and released 

her to mother. We decline to exercise our discretion to address

mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings and removal 

order and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services (Department) alleged H.R., then four years old,

came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious 

physical harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect). (Further statutory 

references are to that Code.) Both counts were based on a violent 

altercation between mother and her male companion in H.R.’s 

presence. The altercation involved mother throwing glassencased candles at the male companion; mother chasing the male 

companion in her vehicle, with H.R. inside, at 90 miles per hour, 

rear-ending his vehicle and repeatedly using her vehicle door to 

bang on the male companion’s door; and more, resulting in her 

arrest on several charges, including child endangerment.

On January 26, 2022, the juvenile court found the 

allegations true (with minor amendments); removed H.R. from 

mother’s custody; and made various orders for visitation, anger 

management and counseling programs for mother, and age 

appropriate therapy for H.R. (H.R. was removed from the 

father’s custody as well, but the father’s whereabouts were 

unknown.) 

Mother filed a timely appeal. 
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In July 2023, the trial court found the conditions that 

justified jurisdiction under section 300 no longer existed, and 

terminated jurisdiction with sole legal and physical custody to 

mother. (We take judicial notice, as mother requests, of the 

juvenile court’s July 27, 2022 minute order finding mother’s 

progress was partial and continued jurisdiction was necessary; 

the January 3, 2023 minute order returning the child to mother’s 

custody; and the July 6, 2023 juvenile custody order terminating 

jurisdiction.)

We sent a Government Code letter advising the parties we 

intended to dismiss the appeal as moot unless they establish 

dismissal is not proper. The Department does not oppose 

dismissal of the appeal. Mother filed a letter brief contending we 

should exercise our discretion and reach the merits of mother’s 

challenge to the jurisdictional findings. 

Following the principles described in In re D.P. (2023) 

14 Cal.5th 266 (D.P.), we conclude mother’s appeal is moot, and 

we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the appeal.

DISCUSSION

“[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or 

practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case 

is not moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has 

not made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has 

discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.” (D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)

Here, mother’s jurisdictional challenge is moot, and mother 

makes no serious contention otherwise. The juvenile court 

terminated jurisdiction over H.R. with an order giving mother 

full legal and physical custody. Therefore, the jurisdictional 

findings have not formed the basis for any order that is now 
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adversely affecting or curtailing mother’s rights. (See D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 277–278 [case is not moot where 

jurisdictional finding affects custody rights, curtails contact with 

child, or has resulted in dispositional orders that continue to 

adversely affect a parent].) As in D.P., mother “has not 

demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that would 

be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.” (Id. at 

p. 273.)

However, “[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise 

their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” 

(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In D.P., the Supreme Court 

discussed a nonexhaustive list of factors for assessing whether a 

court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal. (Id. 

at pp. 285–287.) 

First, a court may consider “whether the challenged 

jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or 

could potentially impact the current or future dependency 

proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the 

appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 285 [citing as examples instances where jurisdictional findings 

influence the child protective agency’s decision to file a new 

dependency petition or a juvenile court’s actions in a subsequent 

dependency proceeding].) 

Second, the exercise of discretionary review “may also be 

informed by whether the jurisdictional finding is based on 

particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–286; id. at p. 286 [“[t]hough stigma alone 

will not sustain an appeal, a court may consider the nature of the 

allegations” when deciding whether discretionary review is 
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proper; “[t]he more egregious the findings against the parent, the 

greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings”].)

Third, a court may consider why the case became moot, 

including whether the case became moot due to prompt 

compliance by parents with their case plan. (D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“It would perversely incentivize 

noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of 

appeals from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less 

compliant or for whom the court has issued additional orders.”].)

Mother cites the first factor, arguing discretionary review is 

appropriate because the jurisdictional findings “could impact 

future family law proceedings, especially given [H.R.’s] young age 

of six.” According to mother, the father—whose whereabouts 

were unknown—could come forward in the future and seek 

modification of the custody orders, and “arguably could 

demonstrate a significant change of circumstances by the mere 

fact that his whereabouts were known,” at which time mother 

“could be saddled with improper jurisdictional findings” that 

“potentially could curtail mother’s contact with [H.R.]” in future 

family court custody determinations. 

While many things in life “could” happen, the scenario 

mother poses concerning what a father whose whereabouts are 

unknown might do if he were to come forward is pure 

speculation. Mother has not identified, and we do not see, any 

meaningful prejudice or potential consequences we would dispel 

by reaching the merits of her moot appeal.

Mother does not mention the second factor, and rightly so; 

the conduct giving rise to jurisdiction was not particularly 

pernicious, stigmatizing, or egregious. While dependency 

jurisdiction necessarily involves conduct harmful to children, our 
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assessment of severity or perniciousness is a relative analysis. 

Here, mother’s one-time violent altercation with her male 

companion in the child’s presence is certainly quite serious, but 

we do not consider it so egregious as to merit review. (See D.P., 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; compare with In re M.W. (2015) 238

Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [exercising discretion to conduct merits 

review because findings that the mother “exposed her children to 

a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are pernicious”].)

Mother also relies on the third factor, pointing out the case 

became moot due to mother’s prompt compliance with her case 

plan. (H.R. was removed from mother’s custody on January 26, 

2022, and returned to her custody on January 3, 2023.) While 

prompt compliance may favor discretionary review (D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 286), no single factor is dispositive (ibid.). 

D.P. instructs us to consider all relevant factors, the 

totality of the evidence, and the overarching goal of the 

dependency system to safeguard children, with a focus on 

preserving the family and the child’s well-being. (D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Having examined and balanced the 

pertinent considerations, we decline to exercise our discretion to

consider the merits of mother’s moot appeal.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.