IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTL~ND DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CHAD STEPHEN WILSON, 

Defendant. 

JONES, J. 

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) 

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) 

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NO. 3:15-CR-00080-J0-1 

OPINION AND ORDER 

In 2015, Officers Bryson and Kerridge of the Portland Police Bureau, stopped a gray 

Lexus in Northeast Portland, believing that the driver of the car failed to signal a lane change in 

violation of Oregon law. The defendant, Chad Stephen Wilson, was riding in the back seat of the 

Lexus at the time of the stop. The driver consented to a search of the vehicle and Officer Bryson 

discovered a closed red drawstring Nike bag on the floor of the back seat near where Wilson had 

been sitting. Inside the bag, which belonged to Wilson, Officer Bryson discovered a hand gun. 

Wilson was placed under arrest and later confessed to owning the gun. 

Wilson now moves to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, on two 

grounds. First, he argues that the police had no basis to initiate the investigatory traffic stop 

because the driver of the car properly signaled a lane change. Second, he contends that the 

waiTantless search of the Nike bag was unconstitutional and cannot be justified by any exception 

to the warrant requirement. I find the officers justified in initiating the traffic stop and searching 

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the Nike bag based on the officers' reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car were 

aimed. Therefore, I DENY the motion to suppress [30]. 

BACKGROUND 

I. The Traffic Stop 

On the evening of January 26, 2015, Officers Bryson and Kerridge were patrolling NE 

Sandy Boulevard in Gresham, Oregon. As they proceeded westbound on NE Sandy Blvd., 

Officer Bryson ran license plate numbers of the passing cars, checking for outstanding WatTants 

or registrations tagged as stolen vehicles. (#45, Att. 2 at 27) The officers noticed a gray Lexus 

traveling eastbound and made a U-turn to travel eastbound on behind it. As the patrol car 

completed the U-turn, the officers observed the Lexus signal a lane change for approximately 20 

feet before abrnptly changing lanes from the inner eastbound lane to the outer eastbound lane, 

and then immediately into the parking lot of Maddy's, a video poker establishment. (#37 Ex. A 

at 3) The officers followed the Lexus into the pai·king lot, where it had pulled into a stall, 

stopped behind it and initiated a traffic stop. (#45 Att. 2 at 6) 

Officer Bryson approached the driver's side of the car while Officer Kerridge went to the 

passenger side. (#45 Att. 2 at 7) Officer Bryson requested the occupants' identifications. The 

driver, Richard Hauck provided a Wisconsin driver's license and threw the car keys on to the 

dashboard of the car. (#45 Att. 1 at 10) Keith Smith, who sat in the front passenger seat, 

searched for his wallet. Officer Kerridge observed Smith toss a pocket knife onto the floor of the 

vehicle. Officer Kerridge told Smith to leave his hands in his lap and not to reach for the knife. 

Smith verbally provided Officer Kerridge with his name and driver's license number, which she 

passed along to Officer Bryson. (#45 Att. 1 at 11) Defendant Chad Wilson gave Officer Bryson 

his natne, birthdate and last four digits of his social security number. (#37 Ex. A at 3) 

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Officer Bryson ran the occupants' information in LEDS/NCIC stayed at the Lexus and 

leamed that Hauck had an outstanding Multnomah County felony wmrnnt for delivery of 

methamphetamine and that Wilson was on post-prison supervision for felony convictions of 

Burglary I, Theft I, and Menacing. (#45 Att. 2 at 8-9) Officer Bryson also found that both Smith 

' 

and Wilson had prior weapons convictions. (#45 Att. 1 at 13) After Officer Bryson discovered 

the outstanding wanant, he requested the assistance of a third officer, Officer Kindrick, who was 

dispatched to the scene. (#45 Att. 1at16) 

Meanwhile, Officer Kenidge shined her flashlight around the interior of the vehicle and 

identified mace spray attached to the driver's car keys. (#45 Att. 1 at 12) Officer Bryson 

returned to the car and helped Officer Kenidge remove Smith from the car. After a pat-down of 

Smith, which yielded nothing, the officers instructed Smith to sit on the curb on the passenger 

side of the Lexus. (#45 Att. 2 at 10) Officer Ke1Tidge took the pocket knife from the floor of the 

front seat passenger area and placed it on the hood of the patrol vehicle. 

Officer Bryson returned to the other side of the car and advised Hauck he had an 

outstanding wanant and arrested him. (#45 Att. 2 at 12) Officer Bryson advised Hauck of his 

Miranda Rights and Hauck replied that he understood them. (#45 Att. 2 at 13) As Officer 

Bryson removed Hauck from the car, he observed a small folding knife on the door frame next to 

driver's side door. (#37 Ex.Cat 3) Hauck confirmed he owned the Lexus and consented to a 

search of the car. (#45 Att. 2 at 13) Officer Bryson asked Hauck ifthere was anything in the 

vehicle that he needed to know about and Hauck replied, "Not that's mine," and then said that he 

was "pretty sure [Wilson] has meth." The officers placed the handcuffed Hauck in the back of 

the patrol vehicle. (#45 Att. 1 at 19) 

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Next, Officer Kenidge instructed Wilson to step out of the vehicle so she could perform a 

pat-down to check for weapons. (#45 Att. 2 at 14) Wilson advised Officer Kenidge that he had a 

knife in his front right pants pocket. Officer Kerridge lifted Wilson's shirt and saw the clip from 

the knife hanging out of the pocket. Officer Kenidge removed the knife and dropped it on the 

ground from a height of approximately one foot. When the knife hit the ground, the blade swung 

open. Officer Kenidge determined the knife to be a weapon restricted for felons. (#45 Att. 1 at 

20-1) 

Officer Kenidge asked Wilson ifhe had any other knives or sharp objects and he 

responded that he did not. She continued her pat down and found another small folding knife in 

Wilson's rear pants pocket. When asked why he didn't tell her about the second knife, Wilson 

responded that he did not remember he had it. Officer Kenidge instructed Wilson to sit on the 

curb along with Smith. (#45 Att. 1 at 23-5) 

Officer Kindrick arrived on the scene and maintained watch over Smith and Wilson while 

Officers Bryson and Kerridge searched the Lexus. (#45 Att. 1at16) While the search of the car 

progressed, Smith asked for and received permission to stand up from the curb. (#45 Att. 1 at 27) 

II. The Search 

During the search of the Lexus, the officers located a red drawstring Nike bag on the 

floor in the back seat, behind the driver's seat. The bag was drawn shut and was full and very 

heavy. Officer Bryson placed the bag on the hood of the patrol vehicle, 10 to 15 feet away from 

Smith and Wilson. Officer Bryson asked to whom the bag belonged and Wilson said it was his. 

Officer Bryson asked Wilson for consent to search the bag and Wilson refused consent. Officer 

Bryson opened the drawstring bag, looked inside and immediately saw the grip of what appeared 

to be a handgun. (#45 Att. 2 at 18-20) At the time of the search, both officers were concerned 

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about officer safety and thought it was possible Smith or Wilson could have made a break, gotten 

to the hood of the patrol car to get the bag. (#45, Att. 1 at 27-28 and Att. 2 at 17-20) 

Officers Bryson and Kenidge arrested Wilson on charges of being a felon in possession 

of a restricted weapon and felon in possession of a firearm and placed him in handcuffs. The 

officers advised him of his Miranda Rights, which Wilson stated he understood. The officers 

searched Wilson and found a third knife between the waistband of his underwear and his pants. 

The third knife was also spring-assisted and the blade propelled into position with the push of a 

button. 

III. Statements 

Officer Bryson advised Wilson of the basis for the anest and stated Officer Bryson knew 

there was a gun in the bag. Wilson replied that the bag belonged to Hauck and that he would do 

anything to keep from going to jail. (#45 Att. 1 at 28-9) After the officers took Wilson into 

custody, Officer Wilbon anived at the scene to inspect and collect DNA from the gun. Officer 

Wilbon specifically asked Wilson where he got the gun and to whom it belonged. Wilson 

explained, "It's mine, the gun's mine, and the red bag is mine." Wilson further confessed that he 

lied because he was a felon, he had a recent conviction for possessing a gun and an earlier 

burglary conviction, and he did not want to return to jail. (#37 Ex.Bat 3) 

Following the mTests of Hauck and Wilson, Smith received pe1mission from the officers 

and Hauck to drive the Lexus away from the scene. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Reasonableness of the Traffic Stop 

An officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop if the officer "reasonably suspects 

that a traffic violation has occuned." United States v. lvfiranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1236 

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Case 3:15-cr-00080-JO Document 47 Filed 05/18/16 Page 5 of 10
(91

h Cir. 2006). Whether that suspicion is reasonable is an objective inquiry. See Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (officer's subjective intent irrelevant). Even when the 

police mistakenly believe that a traffic violation has occurred, a traffic stop remains reasonable if 

the error is factual and the police correctly understand the law. See United States v. 1Vfariscal, 

285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (91

h Cir. 2002). (A mere mistake of fact will not render a stop illegal, if the 

objective facts known to the officer gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 

afoot."); United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739 (9'" Cir. 2001) ("an officer's correct 

understanding of the law, together with a good-faith error regarding the facts, can establish 

reasonable suspicion"). 

Here, the officers stopped the Lexus for failure to signal a lane change, in violation of 

Oregon traffic laws. Oregon law requires a driver operating a vehicle "to give an appropriate 

signal continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle before changing 

lanes." Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.375. The Oregon Court of Appeals found that the statute 

"unambiguously refers to distance-'the last 100 feet traveled'-not duration of time." State v. 

Kelly, 206 P.3d 1098, 1100-01 (Or. App. 2009). 

Whether this stop was reasonable, and therefore legal, tums on two questions: first, 

whether the Lexus failed to signal properly before changing lanes; and second, if not, whether 

any mistake on the part of the officers was factual or legal. 

The Government argues that Officers Bryson and Kerridge had reasonable suspicion to 

stop the Lexus for violating Or.Rev.Stat. § 811.400 because the Lexus failed to signal for 100 

feet before changing lanes. In his police report, Officer Bryson estimated that the Lexus "only 

signaled its lane change for less than 20 feet." (#37-3 at p. 3) At the hearing on the motion to 

suppress, he testified the Lexus signaled for about 20 feet before abruptly making two lane 

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Case 3:15-cr-00080-JO Document 47 Filed 05/18/16 Page 6 of 10
changes in one continuous motion and turning into the parking lot at Maddy's. (#45 Att. 2 at 5) 

Thus, the Government contends, the driver failed to signal for a long enough distance before 

making two continuous lane changes and a 90 degree turn justifying the traffic stop. 

Wilson asserts that the Lexus's turn signal operated for at least 100 feet and did not 

violate Oregon statutes. Wilson contends that Officer Bryson was tentative, at best, in describing 

how long the turn signal was on before the Lexus changed lanes. Officer Bryson did not 

remember where he was when he saw the Lexus's turn signal come on. ( #45 Att. 2 at 31) On 

cross examination, Officer Bryson testified that when following the Lexus he travelled at the 

speed limit (35 mph) for approximately 5 to 10 seconds before turning into Maddy's behind the 

Lexus. (# 45 Att 2 at 29-32) Based on that information Wilson argues that using a simple 

mathematical equation, the Lexus's turn signal had to have been operating for at least 100 feet. 

Accordingly, the vehicle did not violate Oregon statutes and the stop cannot be justified by 

reasonable suspicion. 

I find the Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. While Officer Bryson 

equivocated as to why he turned his vehicle from a westbound to eastbound direction, where he 

was when he saw the Lexus, and how fast he was travelling, he was ce11ain the lane change 

seemed abrnpt to him. (#45, Att. 2 at 31-2) He was also ce11ain that he saw the turn signal on for 

about 20 feet before the Lexus changed lanes. While Wilson's mathematical argument is 

intriguing, it lacks specificity as to exactly how fast the cars were traveling and the amount of 

time Officer Bryson observed the turn signal prior to the Lexus's first lane change. Most cars 

slow down before making a 90 degree turn into a driveway and here, the Lexus's lane changes 

and turn into the parking lot were all one continuous movement. 

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Even if Officer Bryson was inconect as to how long the tum signal operated before the 

Lexus changed lanes, his mistake is one of fact and not one oflaw. The mere mistake of fact 

does not render the stop illegal. lvfariscal, 285 F.3d at 1131. 

II. The Search of the Bag and Wilson's Statements Following Arrest 

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against 

umeasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Wanants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supp01ied by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S: Const. amend. IV. The touchstone of the 

Fomih Amendment inquiry is reasonableness, as manifested in a person's "reasonable 

expectation of privacy." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J. 

concurring). The government violates the Fomih Amendment when it conducts an umeasonable 

search or seizure. See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177, 187 (1990). Here, the Government 

argues that the search of Wilson's Nike bag was reasonable because the officers had reasonable 

suspicion that there were weapons in the car.

1 

A. Reasonable Suspicion that Weapons were in the Car 

Under Terry v. Ohio, a police officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect may be 

"aimed and dangerous" may frisk that person "to detennine whether the person is ... carrying a weapon." 

392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). In Michigan v. Long, the Comt enlarged Terry's applicability to include "search[ es] 

of the passenger compmtment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed 

or hidden." 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Vehicle searches based on reasonable suspicion are justified 

because "roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and danger may arise 

from the possible presence of weapons in the area smrnunding a suspect." Id. Further, the police may 

1 The Government also contends the officers had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband 

justifying a search pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and as a search incident to an 

arrest. Because I find the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe weapons were in the car, I do not address 

these arguments. 

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search the inside of a car when they have reasonable suspicion to believe that any passenger, not just the 

suspect or arrestee, may be armed and dangerous. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47 (2009). 

Finally, reasonable suspicion allows the search of items found within a car, in addition to the car itself. 

See, e.g., Long, 463 U.S. at 1048-49 (citing New Yorkv. Belton for the proposition that a search of the 

interior of a car includes items and containers found within the car). 

The Government contends that the search of the Nike bag was justified by the officers' 

reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car were armed and posed a threat to the safety of the 

officers. (#45 at 9) That suspicion was based on Houck's outstanding felony arrest watTant for 

distributing methamphetamine, the presence ofa mace canister on Houck's keychain, the small folding 

knife near the driver's side door frame, Houck's statement that he was pretty sure Wilson had 

methamphetamine in the car, Wilson's history of weapons possession, Smith attempting to hide his knife 

on the floorboard of the car, Wilson's status as a felon on post-prison supervision following convictions 

for Burglary I, Theft II and Menacing, Wilson's possession of two knives, one of which was illegal for 

him to possess and the second about which he lied, and the weight of the Nike bag indicating it could be 

concealing a weapon. 

Wilson argues that the logic of Terry and Long is rooted in the principles of officer safety. He 

contends that once Officer Bryson removed the Nike bag from the car and placed it on the patrol car, 

secured from the occupants of the Lexus, it no longer tln·eatened the safety of the officers. If officer 

safety is no longer implicated, then the search can no longer be justified and there is no broad exception to 

that principle simply because the container came out of an automobile. 

I find that the facts known to the officers at the time of the search provided reasonable suspicion 

that the occupants of the car were anned, justifying a protective search of both the occupants and interior 

of the car. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24; Long 463 U.S. at 1048-49. Reasonable suspicion does not rise and 

fall with an officer's subjective feelings of fear; rather, it is based on an officer's reasonable belief, based 

on atticulable facts, that a person may be armed and dangerous. Here, the officers possessed aiticulable 

facts, regarding the occupants of the Lexus that could lead them to suspect that the occupants were armed 

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and posed a threat to the safety of the officers. These facts, listed above and known to the officers at the 

time of the search, provided the basis to form a reasonable suspicion that the occupants were aimed, 

justifying a protective search of the car and the items found within. Thus, the search of the Nike bag and 

the discovery of the weapon did not violate Wilson's Fomth Amendment rights and the evidence is 

admissible. 

Wilson's statements 

Because I find the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, there is no poisonous tree to 

taint Wilson's statements that the Nike bag and gun belonged to him. He made those statements after 

being advised of his Miranda rights and after acknowledging he understood his rights. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Wilson's motion to suppress [30] is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

l> 

DATED this~ day of May, 2016. 

-10- OPINION AND ORDER 

ones 

United t te District Judge 

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