# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O



## . 14-1038

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4


# L IS A 

# K R A M E R 

# , F 

# / K 

# / A 

# L IS A 

# K A S T L E M A N 

# , P E T IT IO N E R 

# ,

v.


# B R Y A N 

# K A S T L E M A N 

# , R E S P O N D E N T

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## T H I R D 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued Septem ber 13, 2016

J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.
The acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doc trine prec ludes a litiga nt from cha lleng ing a

judgme nt after voluntarily acc epting the judgme nt’s benef its: “A litigant cannot trea t a judgme nt as both rig ht and

wrong .” Apply ing t h i s estoppel-ba sed equitable doctrine, the court of appea ls dismiss ed the

1 2 

## petitioner’s appea l challeng ing the proper ty -division and child-we lfare provisions of a final divorce
decr ee. 3

C a r l e v

. C a r l e , 2 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 0 2 , 1 0 0 4 ( T e x
. 1 9 5 0 )

.

1

I d

. 2

2 0 1 4 W L 3 8 0 9 7 5 9 , a t * 4 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. 3

## We last examined the acc eptanc e - o f

- b e n e f its doctrine more than six ty -five y ear s ag o in Carle

v. Carle , which is the only time we have applied the doctrine in a marital-dissolutio n ca s e. We 4



## g rante d revie w in this case beca use, in the intervening y ear s, the doctrine has been applied irreg ularly and has become unmoored from its equitable unde rpinning s. Thoug h “exceptions” ha ve ar isen to
ameliora te harshne ss that would otherwise result from rig id application of the doctrine, the jurisprudenc e trends awa y from the doctrine’ s root principl es
. The trajec tory toward a rig id and
formulaic a

pplication of the doc trine is acute ly problematic in marria g e-dissolution case s beca use
divorce decr ees routinely divide assets in w hich a pa rty ’s rig ht to possession and c ontrol prec eded
the final de cre e.
This case prese nts the opportunity to clar ify that the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine is a fac tdepende nt, estoppel-ba sed doctrine focuse d on preve nting unf air prejudice to the oppos ing party

. Under this doctrine, a merits-base d dispositi on may n ot be denied absent acquie scenc e in the judgme nt to the opposing party ’s irreme diable disadvantag e. Thoug h matters of equity are seldom

amena ble to uny ielding principles and inflexi ble rules, sever al fac tors inform the equitable inquiry

. Be cause those fac tors do not favor an estoppel in this case , we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt
and re mand the ca

use to that court f

or fur ther proc eeding s. I. Background
The nine- y ear

marital union of L isa Kra mer and Br y an Kastleman produce d one child and

a $30 milli on marital estate. Two y ear s into the parties’ acr imonious and expensive marria g eC a r l e , 2 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 0 0 4

- 0 5

. 4


## 2

## dissoluti on proce eding s, they executed two ag ree ments settling all issues. One ag ree ment conce rned

their child, and the other divided the marital estate. The day afte r the final ag ree ment was executed, 5


## the trial cour

t held a br ief e videntiary

hear ing on the divorce petitions. At the hearing , Kastleman
testified the conser

vatorship ag ree ment was in the child’s best interest and the proper ty division was

a fair and equi t ab l e d i v i sion of the marital estate. The trial court orally approve d the settlement 6



## ag ree ments and g rante d the divorce petitions.

More than a y ear passed befor e the trial court’s ruling s wer e reduc ed to writing in a final
divorce decr ee. Be fore that happene d, howeve r, Kra mer revoke d her consent and moved to set aside
the parties’ proper

ty ag ree ment, arg uing it was fra udulently and coer cively procur ed. Among other

acc usations, Kra mer alleg ed Kastleman had forg ed her signa ture on financ ial and re al-estate
d o c u ments and conce aled signific ant assets, vitiating her consent and cre ating a n in e q u it a b le d iv is io n
of the mar ital estate.

Ka s t leman responde d with a motion to enter judgme nt and a motion for sanctions and
attorney fee s, asser

ting Kra mer’s claims wer e false, pree x isted the settlement ag ree ment, and wer e
based on in formation disclosed to her in the pre- settlement discovery proce ss. Kastleman also

T h e p a r t i e s d i s p u t e w h e t h e r t h e a g r e e m e n t d i v i d i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e i s a m e d i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t , a n 5 i n f o r m a l s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t , o r a n a g r e e m e n t i n c i d e n t t o d i v o r c e
. T h e y a l s o d i s p u t e w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a g r e e m e n t
c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r c h i l d i s a m e d i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t

. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e a r l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o e n f o r c e m e n t a n d t h e a b i l i t y t o w i t h d r a w c o n s e n t o r a p p e a l a c o n f o r m i n g j u d g m e n t , b u t t h o s e i s s u e s a r e n o t p r e s e n t e d f o r o u r d i s p o s i t i o n a n d a r e i m m a t e r i a l t o t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d

. S e e T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § § 6

. 6 0 2 ( e n f o r c e m e n t o f m e d i a t e d
s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t i n s u i t f o r d i s s o l u t i o n o f

m a r r i a g e ) , 6

. 0 6 4 ( e n f

o r c e m e n t o f

i n f o r m a l w r i t t e n s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t i n d i s s o l u t i o n s u i t ) , 7

. 0 0 6 ( w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , l i a b i l i t i e s , a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o n d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e ) , 1 5 3

. 0 0 7 1 ( e n f o r c e m e n t o f m e d i a t e d s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t i n v o l v i n g c o n s e r v a t o r s h i p , p o s s e s s i o n , a n d
a c c e s s )

.
B e c a u s e t h e s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t d i d n o t a s s i g n v a l u e s t o t h e a l l o c a t e d p r o p e r t y a n d n o e v i d e n c e o f v a l u e w a s

6 p r o d u c e d a t t h e p r o v e - u p h e a r i n g , w e c a n n o t d i s c e r n w h e t h e r t h e d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y w a s i n t e n d e d t o b e r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l

. 

## 3

## complained that Kra mer had been dilatory in c halleng ing the settlement ag ree ment, waiting near ly

a y ear to challeng e the a g ree ment. Kastleman c laimed that, following the cour t’s oral a pproval of
the ag ree ment, (1) he sold proper ty awa rded to him, and (2) Kra mer collecte d renta l income of more
than $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 per month from interests allocate d to her in the proper ty settlement ag ree ment,
ref inance d loans secur ed by those income-pr oducing proper ties (to remove his name from the loans

as re quired by

the settlement ag ree ment), and took c ash as pa rt of the r efina

ncing

. After an evidentiar

y hear ing, the trial court sanctioned Kra mer for fi l ing a frivolous, badfaith, and hara ssing motion. The court awa rded Kastleman more than $32,000 in attorney fee s plus conditional appellate attorney fee s. Shortly

there afte r, the c ourt rende red a final divorce decr ee. 7



## Kra mer filed sever al post-judgme nt motions challeng ing the decr ee and sanctions order

. I n
ad d i t i on to her previously asser ted g rieva

nces, Kra mer complained that the child-support and child-custody provisions in the final decr ee materia lly deviated from the parties’ ag ree ment. The
trial court corr ecte d the divorce decr ee in cer tain respe cts and modified the conditional appellate
attorney fee s awa

rded in the sanctions order , but substantially denied Kra mer the relief she soug ht.
The corr ecte d final decr ee incorpora tes by ref eren ce the parties’ settlement ag ree ment. Kra mer’s
second motion for ne w trial wa s denied.
On appea l, K

rame r arg ued that (1) the settlement ag ree ment was invalid a nd the trial court

err ed in enf

orcing it, (2) the ter

ms of the decree perta ining to the parties’ child did not conform to
the settlement ag ree ment, (3) the sanctions awa rd was improper, and (4) the trial co u rt err ed in

T h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o a w a r d e d $ 2 , 2 5 0 i n s a n c t i o n s t o a n i n t e r v e n o r , b u t K r a m e r d i d n o t a p p e a l t h a t s a n c t i o n s 7

o r d e r
. 

## 4

## awa

rding additional attorney fee s to Kastleman in the order deny ing her new- trial motion. Shortly
befor e filing a responsive b ri ef , Kastl eman moved to dismiss Kra mer’s appea l under the
acceptanc e-of

-bene fits doctrine. Kastleman arg ued Kra mer is estopped from challeng ing t h e

co rr ec t ed final divorce decr ee beca use (1) she had been collecting at least $20,000 per month i n

renta l income from proper ty awa rded to her in the decr ee, and (2) immediately afte r filing a motion

to se t aside the settlement a g ree ment, she attempted to “ enfor ce” it during a hear ing by reque sting

an opportunity to retrie ve persona l proper ty allocate d to her (dishes, china, and a dining room table
and chair s) from a condominium allocate d to Kastleman, which had been vacated in connec tion with
its impending sale. Kastleman arg ued Kram er was under no financ ial duress when she acc epted 8


## these be nefits bec ause she had ac cess to bank a nd broker ag e ac counts with substantial balance s.
The court of appeals gra

nted Kastleman’s m o t i o n an d dismiss ed the entire appea l without

rea ching the merits. The court held Kra mer was bar re d fr o m p u rsuing her appea l beca use she 9



## acc epted the divorce decr ee’ s benef its. The court found no evidenc e Kra mer had actua lly taken possession of persona l proper ty under the decr ee, but it wa s u n d i s p u t ed that she acc epted at least $20,000 per month in renta l proce eds. The court also noted that Kra mer had ref inance d the renta l 1 0



## proper ty

. Thoug h the di vorce decr ee require d Kra mer to ref inance those proper

ties under t h reat 1 1

N e i t h e r t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s n o r K r a m e r ’ s r e s p o n s e i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e r e c o r d

. T h e p a r t i e s d o n o t c o n t e s t t h e 8

c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ s t a t e m e n t o f t h e i s s u e s , b u t K r a m e r c o n t e n d s t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r a i s e d a d d i t i o n a l i s s u e s s u a s p o n t e
.
2 0 1 4 W L 3 8 0 9 7 5 9 , a t * 4 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. 9

I d

. a t * 3

- 4

. 10

I d

. a t * 3

. 11


## 5

## o f fo rce d sale, the court equated her compli ance with “see k[i ng ] and obtain[ ing] leg al t itle to re al

proper ty awa rded in the judgme nt” and held that “[a] party acc epts the benef its of a judgme nt when
she seeks and obtains leg al title to rea l proper ty awa rded in the judgme nt.” The court further cited 1 2



## as binding a trial-cour

t f inding that Kra mer had ac cepte d more than $1 million in assets a nd funds
since e x ecuting the settlement ag ree ment. 1 3



## I n dismiss ing the appea l, the court said Kra mer failed to establish any exception to the
doctrine’ s application. The court held that a “ca sh benef its” exception to estoppel did not apply
beca use Kra mer, by acc epting $20,000 per month in renta l proce eds and ref inancing the proper

ties,

nece ssarily acc epted the rea l proper ty from which the renta l proce eds derive d. The court reje cted 1 4



## any claim of economic nece ssity as inadequa tely briefe d by Kra mer, lacking evidentiar y support, and

contra ry to evidenc e “that she was awa rded substantial assets in addition to the

. . . renta l proper ty , which g ener ated more than $20,000 per month in funds.” Thoug h Kra mer did not arg ue a third 1 5 

## exception that applies when the appea ling party ’s rig ht to the benef its acc epted could not be aff ecte d by the judgme nt’s reve rsal, the court said the exceptio n d i d n o t apply absent a g uara ntee Kra mer

I d

. a t * 3 n
. 5

. 12

I d

. a t * 3

. I n w r i t t e n f

i n d i n g s o f f

a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h a t “ s i n c e s i g n i n g t h e 13 S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t , L i s a K r a m e r h a s a c c e p t e d s u b s t a n t i a l a s s e t s a n d f u n d s p u r s u a n t t o t h e S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t i n e x c e s s o f $ 1 m i l l i o n U S D

. ” S e e T E X

. F A M

. C O D E § § 6

. 7 1 1 ( o n r e q u e s t i n a m a r r i a g e - d i s s o l u t i o n s u i t i n w h i c h t h e j u d g m e n t d i v i d e s t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t i s s u e f i n d i n g s o f f

a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w c o n c e r n i n g c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n a n d v a l u e o r a m o u n t o f a s s e t s , l i a b i l i t i e s , c l a i m s a n d o f f s e t s , i f d i s p u t e d e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n p r e s e n t e d ) , 1 5 3

. 2 5 8 ( r e q u i r i n g t r i a l c o u r t t o s t a t e “ s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s ” f

o r a v a r i a n c e f

r o m t h e s t a n d a r d c h i l d

- p o s s e s s i o n o r d e r w h e n p o s s e s s i o n i s c o n t e s t e d a n d a p a r t y r e q u e s t s f i n d i n g s )

.
I d

. a t * 3

- 4

. 14

I d

. a t * 4

. 15


## 6

## would be awa rded the same proper

ty she had acc epted if she preva iled in her quest for a redivision
of the mar ital estate. 1 6


## The court did not add re s s wh et h er it was conce ivable that a just and rig ht division would

actua lly result in Kra mer being awa rded assets valued at less than any b enefits she had acc epted;
rathe r, the court found it dispositi ve that division of marital proper ty may simply differ on rema nd. This, of course , is a lway s the case when rema nd is r equire d based on a mater ial err or af fec ting the
trial court’s just-and-rig ht proper ty division; a party could alway s g et more, less, or differ ent. The 1 7



## court also did not consider whether Kastleman had been disadvantag ed by Kra mer’s ac t s of
dominion over mari ta l p r o p erty and aff orded no weig ht to evidenc e Kra mer could restore the benef its

acc epted in the e vent of re mand for a just-and-rig ht divisi on.
I n a supplemental opinion on rehe aring , the court ref used to partially reinstate the appea l as

to the sanctions, attorney -fe es, child-support, and child-custody issues, h o l d i n g Kr amer failed to
addre ss severa

bility of those issues in response to Kastleman’s motion to dismis s. 1 8



## On petition for revie w to this Court, Kra mer contends dismiss al of an appea l is not

appr o p ri ate unless a spouse’s acc eptanc e of benef its under a divorce decr ee prejudice d the other

spouse or the spouse has otherwise clea rly acquie sced in the judgme nt. I n the alterna tive, she arg ues

I d

. a t * 4 n
. 6

. 16

S e e J a c o b s v

. J

a c o b s , 6 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 7 3 1 , 7 3 2 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 5 ) ( “ [ A ] c o u r t o f a p p e a l s m u s t r e m a n d t h e e n t i r e 17

c o m m u n i t y e s t a t e f

o r a n e w d i v i s i o n w h e n i t f i n d s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r w h i c h m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s ‘ j u s t a n d r i g h t ’ d i v i s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y
. ” )

.

2 0 1 4 W L 5 4 2 0 4 1 1 , a t * 1 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. 18


## 7

## the court of appea ls err ed in dismiss ing her appea l in its entirety beca use the disputed child-we lfare , sanctions, and a ttorney -fe es issues ar e unaf fec ted by acc eptanc e of the proper ty division.

We g rante d Kra mer’s petition to examine the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine and to clar ify
the role prejudice play s in the doctrine’ s application. Our dispositi on of that matter obviates the need

to consider whether any issu es we re s ev era ble and whether Kra mer bore the burden of asser ting

sever ability

in response to the motion to dismis s.
II. Discussion
A. The Acc eptance- of-Benef its Doct rine

L it ig a n ts c a n n o t e n jo y th e f r u it s o f a judg ment while simult aneously challeng ing its val id it y
. 19


## This has been the law in Texas for more than 150 y ear s. The acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine is 2 0


## “base d on the principle of estoppel” and prec ludes a party from “first ado p t i ng [a] judgme nt as 2 1 

## rig ht, and then repudia

ting it as wrong , [so as to take] advanta ge[ ] of its being both rig ht and

wrong .” Estoppel preve nts litigants from taking contra dictory positions as a means of g aining an

2 2


## unfair advanta g e from the inconsistency

. Courts, we hav e said, “should not be place d in the 2 3

M a t l o w v

. C o x , 2 5 T e x
. 5 7 8 , 5 8 0

- 8 1 ( 1 8 6 0 )

. 19

S e e i d

. 20

C a r l e v

. C a r l e , 2 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 0 2 , 1 0 0 4 ( T e x
. 1 9 5 0 )

. 21

M a t l o w , 2 5 T e x
. a t 5 8 0

- 8 1

. 22

C f

. P l e a s a n t G l a d e A s s e m b l y o f G o d v

. S c h u b e r t , 2 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l )

. 23


## 8

## attitude of subserving such a purpose; nor wo u l d i t b e fair dealing towards the opposite party to

permit it.” 2 4


## The acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doctrine is thus an chore d in equity and bars an appea l if the appellant voluntarily acc epts the judgme n t ’s b enef its and the opposing party is there by disadvantag ed. The burden of proving an estoppel rests on the party asser ting it, and the failure to 2 5



## prove a ll essential elements is fa tal. 2 6



## C o nceptua lly , the doctrine infers an ag ree ment to terminate the litigation beca use the judgme nt has been voluntarily paid and acc epted, or implies a waiver , rele ase of err ors, or admission
that the decr ee is valid. The doctrine’ s equitable objective of prec luding an appea l when a litigant’s
actions a r e inconsistent with a claim of err or further s finality , prese rves scar ce judicial resour ces, and

g uards a g ainst g amesmanship.

M a t l o w , 2 5 T e x
. a t 5 8 1

. 24

C f

. C o n c o r d O i l C o

. v

. A l c o O i l & G a s C o r p

. , 3 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 3 9 ( T e x
. 1 9 6 5 ) ( “ A n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f 25

e s t o p p e l i s t h a t t h e p a r t y r e l y i n g o n a n e s t o p p e l m u s t h a v e a c t e d o n i t t o h i s p r e j u d i c e
. ” ) ; G o r m a n v

. G a u s e , 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d 2 7 9 , 2 8 1 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o 1 9 3 1 ) ( “ I n o r d e r t o e s t o p a p e r s o n f r o m c l a i m i n g t h e i r j u s t r i g h t s i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e y d o s o m e a c t , o r a c c e p t s o m e b e n e f i t s , t h a t w o u l d p l a c e t h e o p p o s i t e p a r t y t o a d i s a d v a n t a g e
. ” ) , a f f ’ d , 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 5 5 , 8 5 9 ( T e x
. C o m m ’ n A p p
. 1 9 3 3 , j u d g m ’ t a d o p t e d ) ( a f f i r m i n g t r i a l c o u r t ’ s f

a c t f i n d i n g t h a t w i d o w ’ s p o s s e s s i o n a n d
c o n t r o l o v e r r e n t a l p r o p e r t y w a s n o t i n t e n d e d t o b e a c c e p t a n c e u n d e r d e c e d e n t ’ s w i l l , w h e r e s h e h a d m a d e f u l l a c c o u n t i n g o f r e n t s c o l l e c t e d a n d r e n t s w e r e u s e d e n t i r e l y t o b e n e f i t t h e p r o p e r t y ) ; W

. S i d e O i l C o

. v

. M c D o r m a n , 2 4 4 S

. W

. 1 6 7 , 1 7 7 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — A m a r i l l o 1 9 2 2 , n o w r i t ) ( “ ‘ [ P ] r e j u d i c e i s a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t o f e s t o p p e l

. . . . ’ ” ( q u o t i n g 4 F l e t c h e r , C y c
. C o r p
. p
. 3 3 7 8 ; 1 M e c h e m o n A g e n c y , § 3 4 9 ) )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , R i c h a r d s v

. R i c h a r d s , 3 7 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 1 2 , 4 1 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 2 , n o p e t

. ) ( “ T h e 26

a p p e l l e e b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f t o e s t a b l i s h a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f

t h e b e n e f

i t s d o c t r i n e
. ” ) ; W

a i t e v

. W a i t e , 1 5 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 7 , 8 0 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 4 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; G o n z a l e z v

. G o n z a l e z , 6 1 4 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 3 , 2 0 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — E a s t l a n d 1 9 8 1 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ; c f

. B a r f i e l d v

. H o w a r d M

. S m i t h C o

. , 4 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 4 , 8 3 8 ( T e x
. 1 9 6 8 ) ( e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l i n c o n t r a c t d i s p u t e ) ; c f

. a l s o H e c k m a n v

. W

i l l i a m s o n C t

y

. , 3 6 9 S

. W

. 3 d 1 3 7 , 1 6 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) ( “ B e c a u s e t h e f

a c t s p l e a d e d h e r e a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t a c o n t i n u i n g c l a s s l i k e l y u s e d t o e x i s t , a n d b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t s n o w a r g u e t h a t i n t e r v e n i n g e v e n t s h a v e m o o t e d t h e c l a s s ’ s c l a i m s , t h e b u r d e n i s o n d e f e n d a n t s t o e s t a b l i s h t h i s

— c u r s o r y , b l a n k e t s t a t e m e n t s t o t h i s e f f e c t w i l l n o t b e e n o u g h

. ” )

.



## 9

## More than six ty -five y ear s ag o, we applied the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine in a divorce

case for the first and only time. I n Carle v. Carle , we conclude d the husband could not prosec ute 2 7 

## an appeal challeng ing the divorce decr ee’ s proper ty d i v i s i on beca

use he acc epted $7,700 that had
been awar ded to him; the amount of t he undis tributed community funds was “much less than t hat sum”; the benef

it secur ed by h i m u n d er the judgme nt on appea l would there fore “nec essar ily be
aff ecte d” if the appea l preva iled and he wer e succe ssful in a retria l; and the wife’ s rig ht to a partition
of the rea l proper

ty at issue on appea l “mig ht well be prejudice d.” For these rea sons, we held the 2 8


## husband’s acc eptanc e of benef its was not excused under a “nar row” exception that applies when “an appellant acce pts only that wh i ch appellee conce des, or is bound to conce de, to be due him under the judg ment” and the appea l “involves only his right to a f

urther r ecove ry .” 2 9



## T h e e xc e p ti o n d is c u s s e d in Carle is consonant with the doctrine’ s prejudice conce rns beca us e

acc epting only those benef its the litigant was entitled to rec eive works no injusti ce to the opposing
party if an appea l of the judgme nt is succe ssfully prosec uted. Nor could acquie scenc e in the final 3 0 

## judgme nt’s validity be inferr ed if the litig a n t’ s entitlement to the benef it is undisputed and unaff

ecte d by the appea l’s outcome. I n such circ umstances, t h e benef it acc epted is not actua lly at issue on
appea l, cannot be aff

ecte d by reve rsal beca

use the opposing party does not deny the appellant’ s rig ht

C a r l e , 2 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 1 0 0 2

- 0 5

. 27

I d

. a t 1 0 0 4

- 0 5

. 28

I d

. a t 1 0 0 4

. 29

S e e S t u b b s v

. S t u b b s , 6 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 , 7 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 4 ) ( e s t o p p e l r e q u i r e s p r e j u d i c e a n d n o n e 30

a r o s e i n t h i s c a s e b y a c c e p t a n c e o f r e n t s a n d p a r t

- o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t i n a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x , w h i c h w i f e t h e r e a f t e r s o l d t o h u s b a n d , b e c a u s e n o d i s p u t e t h a t t h e c o m p l e x w a s c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y o r t h a t w i f e w a s e n t i t l e d t o a t l e a s t t h e e x t e n t
o f o w n e r s h i p i n t e r e s t a c c e p t e d ) , a f f ’ d , 6 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 5 )

.



## 10

## to reta in t h e benef it, and dissipation by the appea ling party thus could not prejudice the opposing
party

. 3 1



## I n this case , the court of appeals found the entit lement ex ception i n ap p l i ca ble because the
entire marital estate would be subject to a new just-and-rig ht division and, as a result, Kra mer could

not establish that “her rig ht to the benef its acc epted could not possibly be aff ecte d by reve rsal of the jud gm en t

. ” I n a new just-and-rig ht division of the proper ty , the court observe d, it is “entire ly 3 2 

## possible that in the re- division of proper ty , the trial court could aw ar d t o [ Kastleman] the [i ncome- producing renta l] proper ties or [t he more than $1,000,000 in] assets” the trial court found

Kra mer had acc epted under the settlement ag ree ment. Unlike the analy sis in Carle , howeve r, the 3 3



## court did not consider whether Kastleman would be disadvantag ed to any deg ree if that circ umstance

wer e actua lly to occur following rema nd. Kra mer co n t ends the court of appea ls misapplied the

acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doctrine and misconstrued Carle by failing to require Kastleman to establish prejudice as a pr edica te to deny ing a merits-base d dispositi on of the a ppeal.

S e e L o p e z v

. M u n o z , H o c k e m a & R e e d , L

. L

. P

. , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 8 5 7 , 8 6 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( “ [ T ] h e L o p e z e s ’ i n i t i a l 31

a c c e p t a n c e o f a l e s s e r p o r t i o n o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t i s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r l a t e r a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e y w e r e e n t i t l e d t o m o r e
. ” ) ; s e e a l s o T

e x

. S t a t e B a n k v

. A m a r o , 8 7 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 8 , 5 4 4 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 2 ) ( a p p e a l w a s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
a p p e l l a n t ’ s a c c e p t a n c e o f t r u s t m o n i e s t h a t w e r e i n d i s p u t a b l y d u e t o h i m ; a p p e a l i n v o l v e d d i s t i n c t i s s u e ) ; H o r n b l o w e r , W e e k s , N o y e s & T

r a s k , I n c

. v

. R e e d

y , 5 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 3 3 , 4 3 5 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 9 , w r i t r e f ’ d n
. r
. e
. ) ; K i d d v

. K i d d , 5 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 2 , 5 5 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 1 9 7 9 , n o w r i t ) ; c f

. M o l i n a v

. M o o r e , 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 3 , 3 2 6

- 2 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A m a r i l l o 2 0 0 0 , n o p e t

. ) ( a c c e p t a n c e o f t o t a l c o m p e n s a t o r y a w a r d d i d n o t p r e c l u d e a p p e a l s e e k i n g a g r e a t e r r e c o v e r y b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t s e e k r e m a n d f o r r e t r i a l , o n l y r e n d i t i o n o f j u d g m e n t o n a g r e a t e r r e c o v e r y ; c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t ’ s a p p e a l s e e k i n g r e m a n d f o r n e w t r i a l a n d p l a c i n g c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s a t i s s u e d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n e s t o p p e l o n t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s p a r t )

.

2 0 1 4 W L 3 8 0 9 7 5 9 , a t * 4 n
. 6 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. 32

I d

. 33


## 11

## We have not substantively elabor ated on the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine in any context
since Carle , but we have more rec ently descr ibed it as “a specie s of quasi-estoppe l [t hat] prec ludes

a party fr o m as s er ting, to another ’s disadvantag e, a rig ht inconsistent with a position previously
taken” and said it applies “whe n it would be unconsciona ble to allow a person to maintain a position
inconsistent with one to which he a cquiesc ed, or f rom which he acc epted a

benef it.” 3 4 

## Thoug h acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits principles apply t o al l appea ls, Kra mer asser ts failing to
consi der the exis tence of prejudice is espec ially problematic in divorce case s. She points to jurisprudenc e ref

lecting diverg ent views on how restric tively to apply Carle , which can lead to harsh
and inequitable results in marital-dissolution case s. Some courts take a hard- line approa ch that turns

on the fac t of possession and control over community proper ty while ot h er co u rt s employ a (self- d es cr ibed) “enlig htened” approa ch that require s a fac t-driven equitable inquiry into the
exis tence of prejudice and acquie scenc e. We ag ree with Kra mer t h at t he exis tence of prejudice 3 5 

## play s a fundame ntal role in deter mining whether it would b e u n co n scionable and inequitable to permit an appea l to move forwa rd, particula

rly in divorce case s, which are materia lly differ ent from
ty pical civil disputes. 3 6

L o p e z , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d a t 8 6 4

. 34

H a g g a r d v

. H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t ) ( e x a m i n i n g c a s e s t h a t 35

“ g o f u r t h e r t h a n C a r l e r e q u i r e s ” a n d a r e “ u n d u l y r e s t r i c t i v e ” i n i g n o r i n g C a r l e ’ s c o n c e r n w i t h p r e j u d i c e a n d n o t i n g t h e m o r e “ e n l i g h t e n e d ” v i e w t h a t “ a s p o u s e s h o u l d n o t b e e s t o p p e d f r o m a p p e a l i n g a n a w a r d p u r s u a n t t o a d i v o r c e u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s p o u s e w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e a p p e a l t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e w r o n g c o u l d n o t b e r e m e d i e d u p o n r e t r i a l o r u n l e s s t h e a p p e a l i n g s p o u s e h a s c l e a r l y a c q u i e s e d [ s i c ] i n t h e j u d g m e n t

. ” )

.

S e e I r v i n v

. E l l i s , 1 3 S

. W

. 2 2 , 2 3 ( T e x
. 1 8 9 0 ) ( “ ‘ A n e s t o p p e l i n p a i s i s t h e e f f e c t o f t h e v o l u n t a r y c o n d u c t 36

o f a p a r t y , w h e r e b y h e i s p r e c l u d e d , b o t h a t l a w a n d i n e q u i t y , f r o m a s s e r t i n g t h e r i g h t s w h i c h m i g h t , p e r h a p s , h a v e o t h e r w i s e e x i s t e d , e i t h e r o f p r o p e r t y , o f c o n t r a c t , o r o f r e m e d y , a s a g a i n s t a n o t h e r p e r s o n , w h o h a s i n g o o d f a i t h r e l i e d
u p o n s u c h c o n d u c t , a n d h a s b e e n l e d t h e r e b y t o c h a n g e h i s p o s i t i o n f o r t h e w o r s e , a n d w h o , o n h i s p a r t , a c q u i r e s s o m e 

## 12

## B. Th e Divorc e Conte xt P rese nts Uniq ue Concer ns

A c c e ptance -of- benef

its issu e s a

r e d is p r o p o r

ti o n a te ly r e p r e s e n

te d in ma r it a l- d is s o lu

ti o n c a s e s
. The doctrine’ s preva lent application in this contex t n o doubt derive s from the rela tively unique

nature of the proce eding , which involves divisi o n o f share d interests. Be cause judgme nts in 3 7


## marital-dissolution case s ty pically div i d e as s ets in which a party ’s right to possession and control

prec edes the final decr ee, invoking estoppel b as ed o n d o minion over that proper ty while the litigation is ong oing pr esents a mor e complex scena rio than other c ivil dis putes.
I n considering the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine in a marital-dissol ution case , one court explained: By its very nature , a divorce action, insofar as the subject at hand is conce rned, is in
a somewhat differ ent cate g ory from most civil litigation. Whatever the division that is made of the community proper ty

. . . the court is dealing with rig hts which arise out of the marria g e and the preva iling party will usually only be acquir ing proper ty rig hts which to some deg ree wer e alre ady owned. Until the divorce is rende red, most of the proper ty interests of the h u s b an d and wife are held in amalg amated form and the
s ep ar at e rig hts of the parties are inchoate until there is a judicial act of sever an ce which pulls out of the a malg am the sepa rate rig hts that are to c ontrol in the future. Usually neither party g ains by the divorce decr ee; almost invariably there is a net loss to the amalg am of rig hts beca use of the c osts of liti g ation. 3 8

c o r r e s p o n d i n g r i g h t , e i t h e r o f p r o p e r t y , o f c o n t r a c t , o r o f r e m e d y
. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g B r i d g e s v

. J o h n s o n , 7 S

. W

. 5 0 6 , 5 0 7 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 8 ) , a n d c i t i n g B y n u m v

. P r e s t o n , 6 S

. W

. 4 2 8 , 4 3 0 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 7 ) ) ) ; E d w a r d s v

. D i c k s o n , 2 S

. W

. 7 1 8 , 7 2 0

- 2 1 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 6 ) ( s a m e )

.

6 R O Y W

. M C D O N A L D & E L A IN E A

. C A R L S O N , T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. § 1 0 : 4 ( 2 d e d

. r e v
. 2 0 1 4 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t m o s t 37

o f t h e c a s e l a w o n a c c e p t a n c e o f b e n e f i t s i n v o l v e s d i v o r c e a p p e a l s “ d u e t o t h e t y p i c a l n e e d o f d i v o r c e e s t o e x p e n d a s s e t s r e c e i v e d i n t h e d i v o r c e t o p a y f o r t h e c o s t o f d i v o r c e , a c c u m u l a t e d d e b t , a n e w r e s i d e n c e , n e w f u r n i t u r e , c h i l d c a r e , n e w s p o u s e s , e t c
. , a n d t h e n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n o f p e o p l e t o t a k e a n d u s e t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d t o t h e m ” )

.

F i n c k v

. F i n c k , 4 5 2 P

. 2 d 7 0 9 , 7 1 3 ( A r i z
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 6 9 )

. 38


## 13

## Giving due reg ard to the e quitable nature of the doc trine, the c ourt opined that “[ no] hard and fast

rule is appropr iate” in considering whether an appeal i n g party is estopped from seeking a
merits-base d resolution to the litigation. 3 9


## Another c ourt observe d:

Be cause of the unique status o f a d i v o rce judgme nt which divides proper ty that is often jointly owned or at least has been jointly enjoy ed during the marria g e, joint or individual possession of an asset during t he pendenc y of a divorce action does not constitute acc eptanc e of a benef it. 4 0 

## Discussing an ea

rlier c ase on the same topic, the c ourt said: [M] any of the benef

its claimed to have been “ac cepte d” wer e items that the appellant possessed befor e the trial—a house, furnishing s, a car , and a bank acc ount. We said that the appellant was not require d to divest herse lf of these items in order to take an appea l se eking a new trial respe cting the cash settlement cover ing the rema inder of the par ties’ prope rty

. 4 1


## Another court admonished that a rule requiring “possession of all assets, reg ardle ss of their nature , be frozen in the spouse to which they are awa rded if an appea l is contemplated, is un re asonable ,

unrea listi c and unne cessa ry .” 4 2


## The view that mere possession and control of community proper ty does not rise to the level
of acc eptanc e of benef

its i n marital-dissolution case s is not universal, howeve r. Rece ntly , the

I d

. a t 7 1 2

. 39

S p o o n e r v

. S

p o o n e r , 4 7 1 N

. W

. 2 d 4 8 7 , 4 8 9 ( N

. D

. 1 9 9 1 )

. 40

I d

. ; a c c o r d O ’ C o n n o r v

. O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 1

- 5 2 ( I n d

. 1 9 6 9 ) ( “ I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f 41 f i n a n c i a l b e n e f

i t s a c c r u i n g t o a s p o u s e f r o m t h e g r a n t i n g o f a d i v o r c e m a y i n s o m e c a s e s e s t o p t h a t s p o u s e f r o m t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a n a p p e a l

. H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e o b v i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h i s t h e o r y w h e r e t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f c e r t a i n f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t s i s t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o s u p p o r t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a s p o u s e h a s u n q u a l i f i e d l y a c c e p t e d t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e d e c r e e a n d h e n c e i s p r e c l u d e d f r o m a p p e a l

. ” ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) )

.
O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d a t 2 5 2

. 42


## 14

## Oklahoma Supreme Court dismiss ed an appea l under the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine when the

appea ling s p o u s e h ad acc epted rea l and persona l proper ty from the marital estate and near ly
$1 billion in cash. I n Hamm v. Hamm , the court h el d the appellant was not compelled to acc ept 4 3



## proper ty under the divorce decr ee to avoid “‘c hoos[i ng ] betwee n food and the rig ht to appea l,’” and
the appellant had admitted she was not ne cessa rily entitled to the entire awa rd beca use there was a
“small” risk her awar d could be reduc ed on appea l. The court thus conclude d the j udg ment had 4 4


## been f ully satisfied by

pay ment and ac cepta

nce a nd was no long er a

ppeala ble. 4 5



## T h e dissenting opinion in Hamm arg ued that “[r]i g id application of the acc eptanc e of b e n e f it s
rule is no longe r consistent with fundame ntal jurisprudenc e in marital dissoluti on appea ls” g iven the parties’ share d interests in proper ty divided under the decr ee. The dissent commente d: 4 6 

## [Under the analy sis i n t he majority opinion] , Wife’s only option was to reje ct the tender ed chec k and to allow Husband absolute and unfetter ed control over their
m arital property during the pende ncy of wha t would be a leng thy appea l.

. . . . Br ight line application of the acc eptanc e of benef its rule to divorce j udg ments is fundame ntal l y fl awe d. Unlike an awa rd pursuant to a contra ctual obliga tion or judgme nt incidental to a persona l injur y , a divorce decr ee divides joint assets— assets i n whi ch Wife had an existing ownersh ip prior to the judgm ent

. Allowing o n e party to maintain absol ute control of all marital assets during the pendenc y of an

H a m m v

. H a m m , 3 5 0 P

. 3 d 1 2 4 , 1 2 4

- 2 5 ( O k l

. 2 0 1 5 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. 43

I d

. a t 1 2 5 ( q u o t i n g S t o k e s v

. S t o k e s , 7 3 8 P

. 2 d 1 3 4 6 , 1 3 4 7 ( O k l

. 1 9 8 7 ) )

. 44

I d

. a t 1 2 6

. 45

I d

. a t 1 2 8 ( G U R IC H , J

. , d i s s e n t i n g )

. 46


## 15

## appea l, to the detriment of the other spouse, is a drac onian approa ch to divor ce law

compar able to the manne r ca ses wer e re solved in centurie s past. 4 7


## Consist ent with t h e co n cer ns expressed in the Hamm dissent, many jurisdictions trea t prejudice or manifest intent to acc ept the judgme nt’s validity as critica l inquiries bear ing on whether equity demands an estoppel. The prejudice inquiry considers whether the benef its themselves—or 4 8


## the proce eds from their sale—re main available for redistribution or have been so dissipated, wasted,

or otherwise conver

ted as to preve nt their rec overy
. This approa ch fulfills the doctrine’ s equitable 4 9

I d

. ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 47

S e e O ’ C o n n o r v

. O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 ( I n d

. 1 9 6 9 ) ( “ I t i s t h e c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n o f t h i s c o u r t t h a t 48 t o c o n s t i t u t e a n a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e b e n e f i t s o f d i v o r c e s o a s t o p r e c l u d e a n a p p e a l , t h e b e n e f i t s ‘ a c c e p t e d ’ m u s t b e o f s u c h
a n a t u r e a s t o c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e a n i n t e n t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f t h a t s p o u s e t o b e b o u n d b y t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e
. ” ) ; M a r t i n v

. M a r t i n , 6 2 3 P

. 2 d 5 2 7 , 5 3 0 ( K a n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 8 1 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h a t “ w h e n t h e c o m p l a i n i n g p a r t y c a n n o t s h o w p r e j u d i c e , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i v e f

a c t o r s o f a c q u i e s c e n c e i n a d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s c a s e r e v o l v e a r o u n d t h e c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h w h i c h t h e l i t i g a n t i s a t t a c k i n g t h e j u d g m e n t o r t h e s e v e r a b i l i t y o f t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e j u d g m e n t u n d e r w h i c h t h e b e n e f i t s h a v e b e e n a c c e p t e d o r b u r d e n s a s s u m e d ” ) ; R e y n o l d s v

. R e

y n o l d s , 8 6 1 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 5 , 8 2 8

- 2 9 ( M o
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( “ ‘ [ T ] h e g e n e r a l
r u l e p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e a c q u i e s c e n c e i n j u d g m e n t s w i l l n o t b e s t r i c t l y a p p l i e d i n d i v o r c e c a s e s b e c a u s e o f t h e p e c u l i a r s i t u a t i o n s o f

t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d

. ’ ” ( q u o t i n g S m i t h v

. S m i t h , 7 0 2 S

. W

. 2 d 5 0 5 , 5 0 6

- 0 7 ( M o
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 8 5 ) ) ) ; L i m i n g v

. L i m i n g , 7 2 3 N

. W

. 2 d 8 9 , 9 7 ( N e b

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( “ T h e r e m u s t b e u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e m o n s t r a t i n g p r e j u d i c e t o t h e a p p e l l e e , o r a v e r y c l e a r i n t e n t t o a c c e p t t h e j u d g m e n t a n d w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o a p p e a l , t o k e e p a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t f r o m r e a c h i n g t h e m e r i t s o f t h e a p p e a l

. ” ) ; W e t z e l v

. W e t z e l , 5 8 9 N

. W

. 2 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 3 ( N

. D

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( “ T h e r e m u s t b e u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e m o n s t r a t i n g p r e j u d i c e t o t h e m o v a n t , o r a v e r y c l e a r i n t e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a p p e a l i n g p a r t y t o a c c e p t t h e j u d g m e n t a n d w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o a p p e a l , t o k e e p t h i s c o u r t f r o m r e a c h i n g t h e m e r i t s o f t h e a p p e a l

. ” ) ; S

p o o n e r v

. S

p o o n e r , 4 7 1 N

. W

. 2 d 4 8 7 , 4 9 0 ( N

. D

. 1 9 9 1 ) ( “ I t s h o u l d b e a n u n u s u a l s e t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o n e d e m o n s t r a t i n g p r e j u d i c e t o t h e m o v a n t , o r a v e r y c l e a r i n t e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a p p e l l a n t t o a c c e p t t h e j u d g m e n t a n d
w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o a p p e a l , t h a t k e e p s u s f r o m r e a c h i n g t h e m e r i t s o f a n a c t i o n
. ” )

.
S e e B r a c k i n v

. B r a c k i n , 1 8 2 S o
. 2 d 1 , 5 ( F l a
. 1 9 6 6 ) ( “ [ C ] i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e s h o w a n e x t i n g u i s h m e n t o f t h e 49

e s t o p p e l b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d , b y t h e w i f e ’ s t e n d e r , c a n b e p l a c e d i n s t a t u q u o a n d t h e h u s b a n d h a s n o t c h a n g e d h i s p o s i t i o n t o h i s i n

j u r y a n d d a m a g e b y t h e w i f e ’ s a c t s
. ” ) ; I

n r e M a r r i a g e o

f B r a c k e t t , 7 2 2 N

. E

. 2 d 2 8 7 , 2 9 4 ( I l l

. A p p
. C t

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( “ P e t i t i o n e r h a s p r e s e n t e d n o r e a s o n w h y h e w o u l d s u f f e r a d i s t i n c t d i s a d v a n t a g e u p o n r e v e r s a l

. O n r e m a n d t h e m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y c a n b e r e d i s t r i b u t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e A c t

. ” ) ; O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d a t 2 5 2 ( “ F a c t o r s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d a r e t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f t h e ‘ b e n e f i t ’ a n d i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e p a r t i e s o f t h e d i v o r c e , t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t s u c h

‘ b e n e f i t s ’ w i l l b e d i s s i p a t e d a n d t h e u s e t o w h i c h s u c h ‘ b e n e f i t s ’ a r e p u t b y t h e s p o u s e t o w h i c h t h e y a r e a w a r d e d

. ” ) ; A m p l a t z v

. A m p l a t

z , 2 8 9 N

. W

. 2 d 1 6 4 , 1 6 4 ( M i n n
. 1 9 8 0 ) ( “ H o w e v e r , i t n o w a p p e a r s t h a t t h e p o l i c y r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e e s t o p p e l p r i n c i p l e a r e n o l o n g e r a s c o m p e l l i n g
. I n s t e a d , a m o r e r a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h w o u l d r e q u i r e a n e x a m i n a t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r , b y s u c h a c c e p t a n c e , t h e p a r t y i n t e n d e d t o a c q u i e s c e i n t h e j u d g m e n t a n d w h e t h e r , i n t h e e v e n t t h e j u d g m e n t i s u l t i m a t e l y r e v e r s e d o r m o d i f i e d , t h e a s s e t s h a v e n o t b e e n s o d i s s i p a t e d a s t o p r e v e n t t h e i r r e c o v e r y
. ” ) ; S p o o n e r , 4 7 1 N

. W

. 2 d a t 4 9 0 ( “ A c c e p t a n c e o f b e n e f i t s w i l l s e l d o m b e p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e m o v a n t i f e i t h e r t h e b e n e f i t s t h e m s e l v e s o r t h e p r o c e e d s f

r o m t h e i r s a l e r e m a i n a v a i l a b l e f o r r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n s u b s e q u e n t p r o c e e d i n g s
. ” ) ; s e e a l s o D i a l v

. D i a l , 4 4 

## 16

## objective, beca use divorce judgme nts fre quently involve equitable distribut i o n o f jointly owned

proper ty that nece

ssarily will be in one party ’s possession and control at all stag es of the litigation. 5 0



## Two states—Flo ri da and Washington—have g one one step further in addre ssing this conundrum, adopting appellate rules expressly abrog ating the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine in
divorce case s. 5 1



## C. Carle ’s P rogeny
Since we issued our opinion in Carle , Texas appellate co urts have had many occa sions to apply the acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doctrine, predominantly in domestic-re lations case s. As the jurisprudenc e has ripene d, additional “exceptions” ha v e b een identified, helping t o blunt inequity that might other

wise re sult from an over ly formalistic applica tion of the doctrine. T he exceptions

most commonly discussed are the enti t l em en t exception identified in Carle and an
“ec onomic-nec essity ” exception. Other ba ses for a voiding a n estoppel bar

involve consumption 5 2

S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 8 , 7 7 1 ( A r k

. C t

. A p p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( o b s e r v i n g t h e w i f e ’ s “ a c c e p t a n c e o f b e n e f i t s p e n d i n g a p p e a l h a s n o t i m p e d e d
o u r a b i l i t y , n o r s h o u l d i t i m p e d e t h e c h a n c e l l o r ’ s a b i l i t y , t o e f f e c t a n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y u p o n r e v e r s a l ” w h e r e t h e c h a n c e l l o r h a d e q u a l l y d i v i d e d m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , r e t u r n e d a l l p r e - m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , a n d a w a r d e d n o a l i m o n y o r c h i l d
s u p p o r t t h a t m i g h t b e a f f e c t e d b y a c h a n g e i n t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n )

.
S e e F i n c k v

. F i n c k , 4 5 2 P

. 2 d 7 0 9 , 7 1 3 ( A r i z
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 6 9 ) ; L e m o n v

. L e m o n , 1 5 0 N

. E

. 2 d 6 0 8 , 6 1 0 ( I l l

. 50 1 9 5 8 ) ; O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d a t 2 5 1

- 5 2 ; S p o o n e r , 4 7 1 N

. W

. 2 d a t 4 8 9 ; s e e a l s o K a t z v

. K a t z , 2 9 3 N

. E

. 2 d 9 0 4 , 9 0 6 ( I l l

. A p p
. C t

. 1 9 7 3 ) ( “ T h e p l a i n t i f f m a k e s t h e g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s a c q u i r e d p r o p e r t y b e n e f i t s b y t h e j u d g m e n t , b u t s u c h c o n t e n t i o n i s n o t s u p p o r t [ s i c ] b y t h e r e c o r d

. D e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d n o t h i n g b y t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t h e d i d n o t h a v e b e f o r e t h e j u d g m e n t w a s e n t e r e d

. A l l p r o p e r t y h e l d i n j o i n t t e n a n c y w a s t o b e d i v i d e d a n d h e l d b y t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n a n c y i n c o m m o n
. ” )

.

F L A

. R

. A P P

. P

. 9

. 6 0 0 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( “ T h e r e c e i p t , p a y m e n t , o r t r a n s f e r o f f u n d s o r p r o p e r t y u n d e r a n o r d e r i n a f a m i l y 51 l a w m a t t e r s h a l l n o t p r e j u d i c e t h e r i g h t s o f a p p e a l o f

a n y p a r t y
. ” ) ; W A S H

. R

. A P P

. P

. 2

. 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( “ A p a r t y m a y a c c e p t t h e b e n e f i t s o f a t r i a l c o u r t d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t l o s i n g t h e r i g h t t o o b t a i n r e v i e w o f t h a t d e c i s i o n o n l y
. . . i f t h e d e c i s i o n i s o n e w h i c h d i v i d e s p r o p e r t y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e , a l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n , a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n v a l i d i t y o f
m a r r i a g e , o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f a m e r e t r i c i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p
. ” )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , W

a i t e v

. W

a i t e , 1 5 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 7 , 8 0 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 4 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; 52 H a g g a r d v

. H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t )

. 

## 17

## of cash, acc eptanc e of proper ty under a fraudulently procur ed agr eed judgment, and appeals of 5 3 5 4



## sever able por

tions of the judgme nt. 5 5


## Under the economic- nece ssity exception, acc eptanc e is not voluntary if made under financ ial duress, which exis ts when the appellant otherwise lacke d sufficie nt funds to provide the nece ssities

S e e , e

. g

. , L e e d

y v

. L e e d

y , 3 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 5 , 3 4 2

- 4 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) 53 ( a p p e a l i n g s p o u s e f

a i l e d t o p r o v e t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e w a s l a r g e e n o u g h t h a t a c c e p t i n g a c a s h p a y m e n t w o u l d n o t b e p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h e e v e n t o f a r e m a n d ) ; D e m l e r v

. D e m l e r , 8 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9 6 , 6 9 7

- 9 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 9 2 , n o w r i t ) ( w i f e e x p e n d e d f

u n d s f r o m a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t b u t w o u l d h a v e s u f f i c i e n t a s s e t s t o c o v e r a p o s s i b l e r e i m b u r s e m e n t o f t h e m o n e y i n t h e a c c o u n t a n d o t h e r a s s e t s c o u l d b e s o l d t o p r e v e n t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e h u s b a n d i f t h e j u d g m e n t w e r e r e v e r s e d ) , d i s a p p r o v e d o f o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , D a l l a s M k t

. C t r

. D e v

. C o

. v

. L i e d e k e r , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 8 2 , 3 8 6

- 8 7 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 7 ) ; H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 7 7 ( w i f e ’ s u s e o f c a s h c o u l d b e a c c o u n t e d f o r o n r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y , b e c a u s e t h e a m o u n t w a s s m a l l i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e t o t a l e s t a t e , s h e c o u l d n o t b e a w a r d e d l e s s t h a n t h a t a m o u n t o n r e d i v i s i o n , a n d o t h e r a s s e t s c o u l d b e s o l d t o a c c o u n t f

o r t h e d i s s i p a t i o n )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , W

h e e l e r v

. W

h e e l e r , 7 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 4 8 , 1 5 1 ( T e x
. A p p
. — T e x a r k a n a 1 9 8 6 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( w i f e n o t 54

e s t o p p e d f

r o m p u r s u i n g h e r a p p e a l b a s e d o n “ e x e r c i s e o f d o m i n i o n a n d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e a s s e t s a w a r d e d t o h e r a n d h e r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t ” b e c a u s e s h e a l l e g e d f r a u d a n d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s ’ s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t ) ; R a g s d a l e v

. R a g s d a l e , 5 2 0 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 9 , 8 4 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 1 9 7 5 , n o w r i t ) ( w i f e ’ s a c c e p t a n c e o f

c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y u n d e r a n a g r e e d p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n p r o c u r e d b y f r a u d d i d n o t p r e c l u d e b i l l o f
r e v i e w ) ; M c F a r l a n d v

. R e y n o l d s , 5 1 3 S

. W

. 2 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 5 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 1 9 7 4 , n o w r i t ) ( “ [ T ] h e a c c e p t a n c e b y a p p e l l a n t o f t h e c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y d i s p o s i t i o n m a d e i n t h e j u d g m e n t t h a t t e r m i n a t e d t h e m a r r i a g e p u r s u a n t t o a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a p p e l l e e d o e s n o t e s t o p h e r , a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , f r o m a r e v i e w o f t h a t d i s p o s i t i o n i f s h e w a s l e a d i n t o t h e a g r e e m e n t t h r o u g h f r a u d a n d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f a p p e l l e e a n d t h r o u g h n o f a u l t o r n e g l i g e n c e o n h e r p a r t

. ” )

. B u t s e e B i g g s v

. B i g g s , 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 7 , 2 1 0 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 7 7 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( “ W e h o l d t h a t a d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t m a y n o t b e s e t a s i d e b y b i l l o f r e v i e w w h e r e t h e c o m p l a i n a n t h a s v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e j u d g m e n t , u n d e r n o f i n a n c i a l c o m p u l s i o n t o d o s o , c o n t i n u e s t o v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t t h o s e b e n e f

i t s a f t e r t h e a l l e g e d f

r a u d i s d i s c o v e r e d a n d b i l l o f r e v i e w f i l e d , a n d w h e r e t h e r i g h t s o f t h e o t h e r s p o u s e w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d i f t h e j u d g m e n t w e r e s e t a s i d e
. ” )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , H o r n b l o w e r , W e e k s , N o y e s & T

r a s k , I n c

. v

. R e e d

y , 5 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 3 3 , 4 3 5 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 55 1 9 7 9 , w r i t r e f ’ d n
. r
. e
. ) ( e v e n i f a c c e p t a n c e - o f

- b e n e f i t s a p p l i e d , t h e c o n t r o v e r s y w a s n o t m o o t b e c a u s e t h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n i n t h e a p p e a l w a s s t i l l a t i s s u e a n d d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e b e n e f

i t s a c c e p t e d ) ; L i

p s h y v

. L i

p s h y , 5 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 5 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( “ I s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o c u s t o d y o f c h i l d r e n a r e s e v e r a b l e f r o m i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e c r e e o f

d i v o r c e , d i v i s i o n o f

p r o p e r t y , a n d o t h e r m a t t e r s
. ” ) ; c f

. W i l l i a m s v

. L i

f e c a r e H o s

p s

. o f N

. T e x

. , L

. P

. , 2 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 8 , 8 3 4

- 3 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 0 6 , n o p e t

. ) ( w i t h d r a w a l o f e n t i r e c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s a w a r d p r e c l u d e d a p p e a l o f a l l e g e d e r r o r i n j u r y s u b m i s s i o n s a f f e c t i n g p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s b e c a u s e n e w t r i a l c o u l d n o t b e h e l d
s o l e l y o n t h e i s s u e o f p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s ; b o t h c o m p e n s a t o r y a n d p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s w o u l d b e a t i s s u e i n a n e w t r i a l )

. 

## 18

## of life. Charac terization of economic nece ssity as an “ex ce p t i o n ” ap pear s to be a misnomer of 5 6


## sorts, beca

use rathe r than exc using a voluntary acc eptanc e, it rec og nizes there is no contra diction in pursuing an appea l—and thus no estoppel—if acc eptanc e was not voluntary

. Absent voluntariness,
the acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doctrine simply does not apply

. But in char acte rizing economic nece ssity

as an e x ception to the rule , some courts ha ve shifted the burden of disproving voluntar iness to the

appe al i n g party , rathe r than requiring the complaining party to establish the matter to invoke an 5 7 

## estoppel in the first instance. I n t h i s ca s e, the court of appea ls held (1) Kra mer waived the 5 8


## economic- nece ssity exception due to inadequa te briefing , (2) the rec ord did not bear evidenc e of
financ ial duress, an d (3) to the contra ry , the rec ord ref

lected an awa

rd of “substantial assets” in addition to the income-produc ing pr operty she had voluntar ily

acc epted. 5 9


## The case s declining to apply the acc eptanc e - o f

- b e n e f it s d o c tr in e w

h e n fra udulent inducement
is implicated contain littl e analy sis (which is ty pical of case s apply ing the acc eptanc e-of-b enef its doctrine) , but the principle appea rs to derive from the notion that being dece ived into extracting the
benef its of a judg ment does not equa te to voluntary acc eptanc e.

S e e , e

. g

. , T

r e v i n o v

. T

r e v i n o , 5 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d 7 9 2 , 7 9 5

- 9 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t ) ; 56 H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 7 6 ; M c C a r t n e y v

. M e a d , 5 4 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 1 9 7 6 , n o w r i t ) ; s e e a l

s o R o s e v

. R o s e , 5 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 3 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 0 , w r i t d i s m ’ d w
. o
. j

. )

.
S e e , e

. g

. , A r

g o v i t z v

. A r g o v i t z , 1 4

- 0 4

- 0 0 8 8 5

- C V , 2 0 0 5 W L 2 7 3 9 1 5 2 , a t * 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 57 O c t

. 2 5 , 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t

. ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ; W a i t e , 1 5 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 9 9

.
C o p l i n v

. C o

p l i n , 5 7 9 S

. W

. 2 d 2 7 8 , 2 7 9 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 9 , n o w r i t ) ( m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s f a i l e d t o 58

e s t a b l i s h e s t o p p e l b e c a u s e i t l a c k e d a l l e g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w h i c h w a s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e o f v o l u n t a r i n e s s , a n d f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e t h e a m o u n t t h e a p p e l l a n t c o n s u m e d w a s v e r y s m a l l i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o v e r a l l m a r i t a l e s t a t e )

.

2 0 1 4 W L 3 8 0 9 7 5 9 , a t * 4 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. T h e c o u r t d o e s n o t e x p l a i n h o w 5 9 K r a m e r c o u l d h a v e a v o i d e d t h e a c c e p t a n c e - o f

- b e n e f i t s i s s u e b y u s i n g o t h e r a s s e t s a w a r d e d t o h e r t o p a y f o r n e c e s s i t i e s
. W e p r e s u m e , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e c o u r t w a s r e f e r r i n g t o K r a m e r ’ s s e p a r a t e - p r o p e r t y e s t a t e
.



## 19

## T he cash- benef its and sever ability exceptions focus on the absenc e of prejudice

. C as h i s fung ible, and if it c an be restore d or otherwise taken into c onsideration in r edivision of the marital
estate, use of cash does not prejudice the nonappealing party and does not bar an appeal. I n this 6 0



## cas e , th e c o u

r t of appea ls narr owly construed the exception and found it inapplicable beca use Kra mer
also assumed possession and co n t ro l over non-ca sh assets. Thus, the court did not consider 6 1



## Kra mer’s a

bility to restore the re ntal proper ty and any deriva tive proce eds to the marital e state for redivision, if her a

ppeal pr oves succ essful.
The sever ability exception insulates some appellate issues from the estoppel eff ect that may

ensue from acc epting benef its under a sever able portion of the judgme nt. Kra mer attempted to rely 6 2



## on this conce pt to salvag e her appea l of the sanctions, attorney -fe es, child-custody , and child-support
order s. After the court of appea ls dismiss ed the entire appea l on mootness g rounds, Kra mer moved
for r ehea ring , arg uing tha t acc epting assets di d not moot the controversy as to issues distinct from
the proper ty division. The court of appea ls never theless stood firm on the holding that the entire case was moot, bec ause K

rame r had not a sserted se vera bility in response to the motion to dismis s. 6 3

S e e , e

. g

. , D e m l e r v

. D e m l e r , 8 3 6 S

. W

. 2 d 6 9 6 , 6 9 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 9 2 , n o w r i t ) ( a c c e p t a n c e o f c a s h 60 b e n e f i t s d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c e t h e n o n a p p e a l i n g p a r t y ’ s r i g h t s ; n o p r e j u d i c e i f a p p e a l i n g p a r t y ’ s i n d i s p u t a b l e s h a r e o f t h e c o m m u n i t y e s t a t e w o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n t t o s e c u r e r e i m b u r s e m e n t o n r e v e r s a l o f t h e j u d g m e n t ) , d i s a p p r o v e d
o f o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , D a l l a s M k t

. C t r

. D e v

. C o

. v

. L i e d e k e r , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 3 8 2 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 7 )

.

2 0 1 4 W L 3 8 0 9 7 5 9 , a t * 3 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d a t

_ _ _ ; s e e a l s o W h i t e v

. W h i t e , N o
. 1 4

- 1 4

- 0 0 5 9 3

- C V , 2 0 1 6 W L 6 1 9 3 6 9 4 , a t * 4

- 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] J a n
. 7 , 2 0 1 6 , n o p e t

. ) ( m e m
. o p
. )

.

S e e L i p s h y v

. L i

p s h y , 5 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 3

- 2 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 5 , w r i t d i s m ’ d )

. 62

2 0 1 4 W L 5 4 2 0 4 1 1 , a t * 1 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 2 0 1 4 )

. 63


## 20

## Whil e rec og nized exceptions fac ilitate more equitable outcomes, courts often construe them

narr owly , as the court of appea ls did in this case
. I f voluntary acc eptanc e of benef its is established

mere ly by secur ing or reta ining possession a nd control of community proper ty , and exceptions are stingily applied , an unwar rante d risk arises that “the practica lities of l ife after divorce will forc e 6 4



## many appellants to acc ept some benef its and run the risk of dismiss al.” Suffice it to say that, under 6 5



## some views of the doctrine, an estoppel bar is easy to establish and difficult to a void in family -law

case s. Cognizant of t he realities and peculiarities o f t h e marital-dissolution context, other cases 6 6


## have a pproac hed the matter

more e quitably , focusing on the exist ence of pre judice. 6 7

S e e , e

. g

. , C o l b u r n v

. C o l b u r n , 1 4

- 1 3

- 0 0 6 8 0

- C V , 2 0 1 5 W L 3 9 3 2 2 8 , a t * 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 64 J a n
. 2 9 , 2 0 1 5 , n o p e t

. ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ; F

. M

. G

. W

. v

. D

. S

. W

. , 4 0 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 9 , 3 3 3

- 3 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — E l P a s o 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) ; A r g o v i t z v

. A r g o v i t z , 1 4

- 0 4

- 0 0 8 8 5

- C V , 2 0 0 5 W L 2 7 3 9 1 5 2 , a t * 4 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] O c t

. 2 5 , 2 0 0 5 , n o p e t

. ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ; W

a i t e v

. W a i t e , 1 5 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 9 7 , 8 0 4

- 0 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 4 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ; B l o o m v

. B l o o m , 9 3 5 S

. W

. 2 d 9 4 2 , 9 4 7

- 4 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o 1 9 9 6 , n o w r i t ) ; M o r g a n v

. M o r

g a n , 7 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 5 , 4 8 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 1 9 8 7 , n o w r i t ) ; J o h n s o n v

. J

o h n s o n , 5 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d 3 0 7 , 3 0 9 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — T e x a r k a n a 1 9 7 9 , n o w r i t ) ; R o y e v

. R o y e , 5 3 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 4 2 , 2 4 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — T y l e r 1 9 7 5 , n o w r i t )

.

6 R O Y W

. M C D O N A L D & E L A IN E A

. C A R L S O N , T E X

. C IV

. P R A C

. § 1 0 : 8 ( 2 d e d

. r e v
. 2 0 1 4 )

. 65

S e e G o r d o n v

. G o r d o n , 5 4 5 P

. 2 d 3 2 8 , 3 3 3 ( K a n
. 1 9 7 6 ) ( “ [ W ] e h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e p e r t a i n i n g 66 t o a c q u i e s c e n c e i n j u d g m e n t s s h o u l d n o t b e s t r i c t l y a p p l i e d i n d i v o r c e c a s e s b e c a u s e o f t h e p e c u l i a r s i t u a t i o n s o f t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d

. ” )

.

S e e , e

. g

. , R o s e v

. R o s e , 5 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 3 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 0 , w r i t d i s m ’ d w
. o
. j

. ) ( n o e s t o p p e l 67

a b s e n t p r e j u d i c e f

r o m t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f v e t e r a n ’ s b e n e f i t s ) ; H o r n b l o w e r , W

e e k s , N o y e s & T

r a s k , I n c

. v

. R e e d

y , 5 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 3 3 , 4 3 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 9 , w r i t r e f ’ d n
. r
. e
. ) ( “ E s t o p p e l d o e s n o t a p p l y u n l e s s t h e o t h e r p a r t y w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e a p p e a l t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e w r o n g c o u l d n o t b e r e m e d i e d u p o n r e t r i a l o r u n l e s s t h e a p p e a l i n g p a r t y h a s c l e a r l y a c q u i e s c e d i n t h e j u d g m e n t

. ” ) ; C o p l i n v

. C o

p l i n , 5 7 9 S

. W

. 2 d 2 7 8 , 2 7 9 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 9 , n o w r i t ) ( w i f

e s o l d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d t o h e r , d e p o s i t e d t h e p r o c e e d s i n t o a s a v i n g s a c c o u n t a n d u s e d f u n d s f r o m t h e a c c o u n t , b u t t h e a m o u n t a t i s s u e w a s “ a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l i t e m i n p r o p o r t i o n t o [ t h e t o t a l m a r i t a l e s t a t e ] ” a n d n o e v i d e n c e s h o w e d s h e w o u l d n o t b e e n t i t l e d t o a t l e a s t t h a t a m o u n t o n r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e e s t a t e ) ; B i g g s v

. B i g g s , 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 7 , 2 1 0 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 7 7 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t m a y n o t b e s e t a s i d e o n b i l l o f r e v i e w i f b e n e f

i t s v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t f i n a n c i a l c o m p u l s i o n w e r e r e t a i n e d a f t e r d i s c o v e r i n g a l l e g e d f r a u d
a n d s p o u s e ’ s r i g h t s w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d i f t h e j u d g m e n t w e r e s e t a s i d e ) ; H a g g a r d v

. H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t ) ( “ [ A ] s p o u s e s h o u l d n o t b e e s t o p p e d f r o m a p p e a l i n g a n a w a r d p u r s u a n t t o a d i v o r c e u n l e s s t h e o t h e r s p o u s e w o u l d b e p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e a p p e a l t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e w r o n g c o u l d n o t b e r e m e d i e d
u p o n r e t r i a l o r u n l e s s t h e a p p e a l i n g s p o u s e h a s c l e a r l y a c q u i e s e d [ s i c ] i n t h e j u d g m e n t

. ” )

. 

## 21

## Divorce case s involving acc eptanc e-of -bene fits claims prese nt my riad fac tual scena

rios and
multi-face ted aspec ts. Attempting to disting uish or rec oncile the develope d case law would prove
futile and would not benef it the analy sis, so we do not underta ke that task. But two ca s es starkly
illust rating the divide ar e emblema tic of the jurisprude ntial spectrum.

I n Roye v. Roye , the husband was awa rded a pi ck -u p t ru ck , household furnishing s in his possession, and half the community funds held in the court’s reg istry

. The court held the husband 6 8



## was not enti t l ed to these specific items as a matter of rig ht and that his rete ntion of these items,
there fore , estopped his appea l from the proper ty di v i s i o n
. T he court observe d that, under a

6 9 

## just-and-rig ht division “neither party is nece ssarily entitled to insist upon a cer tain am o u n t o f

proper ty

. . . as a matter of rig ht.” Acc ordi n gl y , i n a new trial “the court would still be fre e to 7 0


## divide all the prope rty as it deeme d just, subject only to revie w for abuse of discretion[, and] Appellant might or might not rec eive the same proper ty as he was awa

rded under this divorce
decr ee.” 7 1 

## Despite the court’s acknow ledg ment that the voluntary -ac cepta nce doctrine “is based on the

p ri nciple of estoppel,” Roye ref lects a rig id application of the doctrine that does not consider th e
exis tence of disadvanta g e to the nonappe aling party

. 7 2

5 3 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 4 2 , 2 4 3 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — T y l e r 1 9 7 5 , n o w r i t )

. 68

I d

. a t 2 4 4

. 69

I d

. 70

I d

. 71

I d

. 72


## 22

## I n contra st, the court in Haggard v. Haggard allowed an appea l to p ro ce ed despite the

appellant’ s acc eptanc e of $400 unde r the judg ment, noting “ she wa s then without sufficie nt funds

to provid e the nece ssities of life.” The court observe d that case s issued afte r Carle held that 7 3


## financ ial distress vitiated the voluntariness of a cce ptance , but the court’s holding did not rest on 7 4


## this basis. Rather, the court expressed conce rn that “strict application of the Carle rule can lead to harsh
results and doe s not seem to be c onsistent with more rec ent, enlig htened de cisions in this are a.” 7 5


## The court criticized case s apply ing the acc eptanc e-of

- b e n e f it s d o c tr ine restric tively , observing “[t] he
Carle court was ultimately conce rned with p o s s ible prejudice to the appellee ” and whether the appellant could return funds acc epted, so the trial court would be able to rende r a differ ent division
of the community proper

ty on rema

nd. Thoug h it is “‘most obvious’” that a spouse would be able 7 6



## to use a marital asset for nece ssities while appea ling the judgme nt, the court said the rig ht to appea l
is not conditioned on litigants divesting themselves of jointly or individually possessed assets

awa rded to them in the prope rty division. 7 7 

## Adopting an equitable view of Carle , the court held the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine will
bar an appea l only if “[a] spouse would be prejudice d by the appea l to the extent that the wrong

5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t )

. 73

I d

. ( c i t i n g C h e r o k e e N

a t i o n v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 5 5 F

. 2 d 9 4 5 , 9 4 9 ( C t

. C l

. 1 9 6 6 ) , a n d M c C a r t n e y v

. M e a d , 5 4 1 74 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 5 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 1 9 7 6 , n o w r i t ) )

.

I d

. 75

I d

. 76

I d

. ( q u o t i n g P i

p e r v

. P i p e r , 2 3 4 N

. W

. 2 d 6 2 1 , 6 2 3 ( N

. D

. 1 9 7 5 ) )

. 77


## 23

## could not be reme died upon retria l or unless the appea ling spouse has clea rly acquie sed [si c] in the judgme nt.” Neither possession of a portion of the community es t at e n or consumption of cash

7 8


## benef its is alone dispositi ve, the court explained. I nstead, the critica l inquiry is whether the 7 9



## nonappea ling spouse w ould be pre judiced by

either. 8 0



## To that point, none of the husband’s “re al or persona l proper ty [was] being prejudice d by [t he
wife ’s ] use of [t he cash] while the appea l is pending .” Moreove r, the trial court could take the 8 1


## $400 into considera

tion if the appeal resulted in a new division of assets, beca use “in the e vent of redivision, [t he wife] will nece ssarily be awa rded proper

ty worth more than $400” that could be sold
if nece ssary to restore any dissipated value. Desc ribing Haggard as a “ca sh only ” or “nec essities” 8 2



## case , as Kastleman and some courts have, ignor es the case ’s fundame ntal holding that prejudice is

an esse ntial element of the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits doctrine.

I n line with the view espou s ed i n Haggard , we clar ify that the acc eptanc e-of -bene fits
doctrine is based on estoppel and rooted in equity

. Thus, befor e deny ing a merits-base d resolution

to a dispute, courts must evalua te whether , by asser ting domini o n o ver assets awa rded in the judgme nt under revie w, the appea ling party clea rly intended to acquie sce in the judgme nt; whether

I d

. ( c i t i n g G o r d o n v

. G o r d o n , 5 4 5 P

. 2 d 3 2 8 , 3 3 3 ( K a n
. 1 9 7 6 ) , B r a c k i n v

. B r a c k i n , 1 8 2 S o
. 2 d 1 , 5 ( F l a
. 1 9 6 6 ) , 78 I n r e M a r r i a g e o

f F o n s t e i n , 5 5 2 P

. 2 d 1 1 6 9 , 1 1 7 3 ( C a l

. 1 9 7 6 ) , P i p e r v

. P i

p e r , 2 3 4 N

. W

. 2 d 6 2 1 , 6 2 3 ( N

. D

. 1 9 7 5 ) , O ’ C o n n o r v

. O ’ C o n n o r , 2 5 3 N

. E

. 2 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 1

- 5 2 ( I n d

. 1 9 6 9 ) , K a s s e b a u m v

. K a s s e b a u m , 1 3 5 N

. W

. 2 d 7 0 4 , 7 0 5

- 0 6 ( N e b

. 1 9 6 5 ) , B o h l v

. B o h l , 3 2 N

. W

. 2 d 6 9 0 , 6 9 2 ( S

. D

. 1 9 4 8 ) , a n d K a t z v

. K a t z , 2 9 3 N

. E

. 2 d 9 0 4 , 9 0 6 ( I l l

. A p p
. C t

. 1 9 7 3 ) )

.
I d

. a t 3 7 6

- 7 7

. 79

I d

. 80

I d

. a t 3 7 7

. 81

I d

. 82


## 24

## t h e assets have been so dissipated as to preve nt their rec overy if the judgme nt is reve rsed o r

modified; and whether the opposing party will be unfairly prejudice d. Equity simply will not tolerate

a Catch-22 that involves a choice betwee n relinquishing possessio n and control of community

proper ty and relinquishing the rig ht to appea l. Our holding today is also in keeping with the policy
that “‘a n adjudication on the mer its is prefer red in Te x as.’” 8 3


## Wit h this clar i fica tion, we also bring the vol untary -ac cepta nce doctrine in line with rec ent
eff orts to mitigate the harshne ss of t he v o luntary -pay ment rule, which repr esents the other side of
the acc eptanc e c o in

. U n d e r the voluntary -pay ment rule, “a judgme nt debtor’s voluntary pay ment and
satisfac tion of an adver se judgme nt moots the controve rsy , waives the debtor’s rig ht to appea l, and require s dismiss al of the case .” The purpose of the voluntary -pay ment rule is “‘to preve nt a party 8 4


## who has fr ee l y d ec ided to pay a judgme nt from chang ing his mind and seeking the court’s aid in

rec overing the pay

ment[, beca

use a] party should no t be allowed to mislead his opponent into believing that the controve rsy is over and then contest the pay ment and seek rec overy .’” The rule 8 5


## is based on fa irness to the judgme nt c reditor and does not a pply if the judgme nt cre ditor could not
have be en misled about the judg ment debtor’s intent to pursue an appe al.

S u t h e r l a n d v

. S

p e n c e r , 3 7 6 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 2 , 7 5 6 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 2 ) ( q u o t i n g H o l t A t h e r t o n I n d u s

. , I n c

. v

. H e i n e , 8 3 5 83 S

. W

. 2 d 8 0 , 8 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 2 ) )

.

M i g a v

. J

e n s e n , 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 7 , 2 1 1 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 2 )

. 84

I d

. ( q u o t i n g H i g h l a n d C h u r c h o f C h r i s t v

. P o w e l l , 6 4 0 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 5 , 2 3 6 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 2 ) )

. 85


## 25

## L ike the voluntary -ac cepta nce doctrine, application of the voluntary -pay ment rule could produce harsh consequenc es; acc ording ly , we h el d in BMG Direct Marke ting, Inc. v. Peak e that 8 6


## “the voluntary -pay

ment rule is no longe r outcome deter minative when deciding whether a judgme nt voluntarily paid m oots an appea l. Now, the pay ment of a judgme nt without an ‘ex presse d intent’

to continue an appea l moots the appea l, but pay ment with such an expression does not.” Under the 8 7


## modern view of t h e v o l u n tary -pay ment rule, pay

ment of a judgme nt does not bar prosec ution of

appea l unless the judgme nt debtor clea rly misled the opposing party reg arding the judgme nt debtor’s intent to pursue an a

ppeal.
Wit h respe ct to the acc eptanc e side of the estoppel coin, mere ly using, holding, controlling ,

or secur ing possession of community proper ty awa rded in a divorce decr ee does not constitute clea r
intent to acquie sce in the judgme nt and wi l l not prec lude an appea l absent prejudice to the

nonappea lin g party

. Appea ls from other ty pes of judgme nts may differ

. Whether estoppel of the rig ht to appeal is wa

rra nted involves a fa ct-de pendent inquiry entrusted to the c ourts’ discre tion. 8 8



## D. F actor s Bearing on Acqui esce nce and Pr ejudice
Whil e definitive, brig ht-line rules are hard to come by in m at t er s of equity , sever al
nonexclusive factor s inform the estoppel inquiry , including:

S e e C o n t ’ l C a s

. C o

. v

. H u i z a r , 7 4 0 S

. W

. 2 d 4 2 9 , 4 3 0 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 7 ) ( h o l d i n g v o l u n t a r y p a y m e n t o f j u d g m e n t 86

w i t h o u t d u r e s s , a l t h o u g h u n d e r p r o t e s t , m o o t e d a p p e a l )

.

1 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 3 , 7 7 0 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 5 ) ; s e e a l s o M i g a , 9 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 1 2

. 87

S e e B o c q u e t v

. H e r r i n g , 9 7 2 S

. W

. 2 d 1 9 , 2 1 ( T e x
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( “ M a t t e r s o f e q u i t y a r e a d d r e s s e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s 88 d i s c r e t i o n
. ” )

. 

## 26

## • whether acc eptanc e of benef its was voluntary or was the product of financ ial duress; 8 9



## • whether

the right to joint or i ndividual possession and contr ol prec eded the judgme nt on appea l or exist s only by virtue of the judg ment; 9 0



## • whether the assets have been so dissipated, wasted, or conver ted as to preve nt their re cover

y if the judg ment is rever sed or modified; 9 1



## • whether the appea ling party is entitled to the benef it as a matter of rig ht or by the nonappe aling party ’s conc ession; 9 2



## • whether th e ap p ea l, if succe ssful, may result in a more favor able judgme nt but there is no risk of a

less favor able one ; 9 3



## • if a less favor able judgme nt is possible, whether there is no risk the appellant could rec eive an awa

rd less than the value of the assets dissipated, wasted, or conver ted; 9 4

S e e C o o p e r v

. B u s h o n g , 1 0 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 , 2 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 1 9 9 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( “ A c c e p t a n c e o f b e n e f i t s 89 d u e t o f i n a n c i a l d u r e s s o r o t h e r e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e v o l u n t a r y a c c e p t a n c e
. ” ) ; H a g g a r d v

. H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 6 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 7 , n o w r i t ) ( s a m e ) ; I r v i n v

. E l l i s , 1 3 S

. W

. 2 2 , 2 3 ( T e x
. 1 8 9 0 ) ( “ ‘ A n e s t o p p e l i n p a i s i s t h e e f f e c t o f t h e v o l u n t a r y c o n d u c t o f a p a r t y
. ’ ” ) ( q u o t i n g B r i d g e s v

. J o h n s o n , 7 S

. W

. 5 0 6 , 5 0 7 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 8 ) , a n d c i t i n g B y n u m v

. P r e s t o n , 6 S

. W

. 4 2 8 , 4 3 0 ( T e x
. 1 8 8 7 ) ) )

.

S e e H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 7 6 ( r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e r i g h t t o j o i n t o r i n d i v i d u a l p o s s e s s i o n 90

o f c o m m u n i t y - e s t a t e a s s e t s w h i l e t h e d i v o r c e c a s e i s p e n d i n g )

.

S e e M o r g a n v

. M o r

g a n , 7 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 5 , 4 8 7 ( T e x
. A p p
. — A u s t i n 1 9 8 7 , n o w r i t ) ( “ I t w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e 91 f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o m a k e f u r t h e r o r d e r s d i v i d i n g t h e c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y h e r e b e c a u s e t h e p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d t o a p p e l l a n t h a s b e e n d i s s i p a t e d , a s s e t s c o n v e r t e d , a n d m o n e y s p e n t o r r e i n v e s t e d b y a p p e l l a n t

. ” )

.

C a r l e v

. C a r l e , 2 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d 1 0 0 2 , 1 0 0 4 ( 1 9 5 0 )

. 92

S t u b b s v

. S t u b b s , 6 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 , 7 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 4 ) ( w i f e c h a l l e n g e d s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t 93

a w a r d i n g h e r a f

o r t y p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t i n a n a p a r t m e n t c o m p l e x , a n d i n a n a p p e a l c h a l l e n g i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t , t h e c o u r t f o u n d n o e s t o p p e l b a r b e c a u s e t h e h u s b a n d d i d n o t d i s p u t e s h e w a s e n t i t l e d t o a t l e a s t f o r t y p e r c e n t , s o a p p e a l f o r f u r t h e r r e c o v e r y w a s n o t b a r r e d ) , a f f ’ d , 6 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 5 )

.
S e e H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 7 7 ; c f

. M c C a r t n e

y v

. M e a d , 5 4 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 5 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n 94 [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 1 9 7 6 , n o w r i t ) ( “ [ R ] e g a r d l e s s o f t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n o n a p p e a l , [ t h e a p p e a l i n g p a r t y ] w i l l o w n e n o u g h a s s e t s t o p a y t h e c o s t s w h i c h m i g h t b e a d j u d g e d a g a i n s t h e r
. ” )

. 

## 27

## • whether the appellant aff irmat i v ely soug ht enfor ceme nt of rig hts or obliga tions that ex ist only beca use of the judg ment; 9 5



## • whether

the issue on appe al is sever able f rom the bene fits acc epted; 9 6



## • the pre sence of ac tual or re asonably cer tain prejudice ; and

• whether

any prejudice is curable

. 9 7



## These f actor s—which addr ess concerns reflec ted i n the case l aw—may overla p to vary ing deg ree s, and one or more may be dispositi ve, depending on the circ umstances. For example, absenc e
of prejudice should preve nt the doctrine’ s application in most case s, while the exis tence of prejudice

may not be suffici e nt if, for example, acc eptanc e was compelled by economic nece ssity

. Moreove r, 9 8



## mere depriva

tion of possession, use, and enjoy ment of proper

ty that had been jointly owned is not, in and of itself, suff

icient to constitute prejudice

.

S e e F

. M

. G

. W

. v

. D

. S

. W

. , 4 0 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 9 , 3 3 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — E l P a s o 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a s e p a r a t e 95

a c t i o n a g a i n s t f

o r m e r s p o u s e f

o r m o n e y d a m a g e s t o r e p a i r p r o p e r t y a w a r d e d t o h e r i n t h e d e c r e e )

.
C o m p a r e L i

p s h y v

. L i

p s h y , 5 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 4 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 7 5 , w r i t d i s m ’ d ) ( “ I s s u e s r e l a t i n g 96 t o c u s t o d y o f c h i l d r e n a r e s e v e r a b l e f r o m i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e c r e e o f d i v o r c e , d i v i s i o n o f p r o p e r t y , a n d o t h e r m a t t e r s
. ” ) w i t h C l a r k v

. C l a r k , 3 6 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 5 , 6 5 7

- 5 8 ( T e x
. C i v
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n 1 9 6 2 , n o w r i t ) ( “ H a v i n g v o l u n t a r i l y a c c e p t e d t h e p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e h o m e a n d i t s c o n t e n t s , a p p e l l a n t m a y n o t n o w c o m p l a i n o f t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f a n o t h e r s i n g l e i t e m o f c o m m u n i t y p r o p e r t y a n d l i m i t h e r a p p e a l , a s s i g n m e n t s o f e r r o r , a n d p r a y e r f o r r e l i e f t h e r e t o
. ” )

.

S e e H a g g a r d , 5 5 0 S

. W

. 2 d a t 3 7 7 ; s e e a l s o C o n c o r d O i l C o

. v

. A l c o O i l & G a s C o r p

. , 3 8 7 S

. W

. 2 d 6 3 5 , 6 3 9 97 ( T e x
. 1 9 6 5 ) ( “ A n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f e s t o p p e l i s t h a t t h e p a r t y r e l y i n g o n a n e s t o p p e l m u s t h a v e a c t e d o n i t t o h i s p r e j u d i c e
. ” )

.

I n c o m p a r i s o n , o u t s i d e t h e m a r i t a l

- d i s s o l u t i o n c o n t e x t , e c o n o m i c n e c e s s i t y m a y b e u n a v a i l i n g u n l e s s t h e 98

a p p e l l e e c a u s e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s f i n a n c i a l d i s t r e s s
. S e e G r a y L a w , L

. L

. P

. v

. T & H P a r t n e r s , L t d

. , 2

- 0 8

- 3 8 7

- C V , 2 0 0 9 W L 2 4 1 4 2 9 8 , a t * 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h A u g
. 6 , 2 0 0 9 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ( c i t i n g D e e r C r e e k L t d

. v

. N

. A m

. M o r t g

. C o

. , 7 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d 1 9 8 , 2 0 3 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 9 0 , n o w r i t ) , a n d G a s p a r d v

. L o g i

x C o m m c ’ n s C o r

p

. , N o
. 1 4

- 0 0

- 0 0 6 8 8

- C V , 2 0 0 1 W L 1 5 9 0 0 8 0 , a t * 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] D e c
. 1 3 , 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t

. ) ( n o t d e s i g n a t e d f o r p u b l i c a t i o n ) )

. 

## 28

## E. App lication

Kastleman asserts Kramer is estopped from appea ling the proper ty divisi o n i n t h e divorce
decr ee beca

use she acc epted cer

tain benef its with reg ard to the division of proper ty

. He alleg es that,
befor e and afte r the trial court rende red the fin al divorce decr ee, (1) she acc epted owner ship and
control of all the rea l proper ty awa rded to her, which the trial court found to be valued at g rea ter than
$1 milli on and Kastleman say s is closer to $5 milli on; (2) by virtue of the parties’ settlement

ag ree m en t, she acc epted g ener al and limit ed partne rship interests that had been held as assets by

corpor ations Kastl em an cl ai med as his separ ate proper ty ; (3) she collecte d at least $20,000 per
month from community -prope rty apar tment complexes, starting approximately one y ear befor e the
final divorce decr ee was rende red; (4) she ref inance d loans secur ed by the apar tment complexes in compliance with a require ment in the divorce decr ee; and (5) she asked, during a court hear ing, for 9 9



## an opportunity to retrie ve persona l proper ty awa rded to her in the settlement ag ree ment, beca use the

proper ty had been left behind in a condominium Kastleman wa s s el l i ng
. Ba sed on these acts of
dominion over the proper ty awa rded in the divorce decr ee, Kastleman contends Kra mer clea rly acquie sced in the judg ment.
Wit h reg ard to prejudice , Kastleman contends he lost executiv e ri g hts and control over
manage ment of the community proper ty , explaining he was denied the opportunity to deter mine
whether to alienate the renta l proper ty as marke t values ebbed and flowed in the y ear s following the
settlement ag ree ment’s execution. He also asser ts that, by virtue of the part ies’ settlement

T h e d e c r e e o r d e r e d K r a m e r t o r e f i n a n c e a l l o u t s t a n d i n g t h i r d

- p a r t y d e b t s e c u r e d b y t h e r e n t a l p r o p e r t i e s 99

“ w i t h i n 1 2 0 d a y s ” f

r o m t h e f i l i n g o f s p e c i f i e d t a x r e t u r n s
. T h e d e c r e e o r d e r e d t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y s e c u r i n g t h e d e b t t o b e s o l d i f K r a m e r “ f

a i l [ e d ] t o r e f

i n a n c e a n y s u c h d e b t w i t h i n t h e a l l o t t e d t i m e
. ”



## 29

## ag ree ment, “substantial assets that belong ed to Mr. Kastlema n ’s corpor ate entities, the stock of

which had been adjudicate d his s e p a r a te proper ty , wer e transfe rre d to, and acc epted by Ms. Kra mer.” Thoug h the assets may have been community p roper ty , Kastleman asser

ts irreme diable prejudice
beca use “[t] he loss of the g ener al partne rship interests cannot be fully restore d beca use no Court [si c]

can fashion an order that allows Mr. Kastleman, throug h his corpor ate entity , to g o back in time and
exercise the r ights of a

g ener al par

tner for the time period Ms. Kra

mer ha s controlled the a ssets.”

Kra mer does not dispute she voluntarily acc epted possession and control o f community

proper ty awa rded to her in the decr ee and renta l proce eds from that proper ty

. But, mere acc eptanc e, possession, and control of c ommunity proper ty does not equa te to acquie scenc e.
Kastleman complains, howeve r, that Kra mer’s eff orts to “enf

orce ” the settlement ag ree ment
with respe ct to dishes, china, and a dining room table and chair s validated the ag ree ment and the judgme nt that subsequently adopted it. During a hear ing to canc el a lis pendens on a condominium
allocate d t o Ka s t l eman, Kra mer reque sted an opportunity to retrie ve the items awa rded to her
beca use those items had been left behind when Kastleman vacated the parties’ condominium in

connec tion with its imminent sale. Charac terizing Kram er’s actions as seeking “enf orce ment” is questionable, but ultimately immaterial. Unless someone secur ed the proper ty , it would likely have
been lost to the m arital estate; conseque ntly , actions Kramer took to pre serve those assets visit no prejudice on Kastleman in the e vent of re mand.
The same is true with respe ct to the Kra mer’s actions in re fi n an ci n g l o ans secur ed by the

renta l proper

ty

. The decr ee mandated such action upon pain of forc ed sale; the apar tment complexes

30

## appar ently rema in available t o b e re t urned to the marital estate; and no prejudice to Kastleman is

appar ent. Thoug h the par

ties dispute whether Kra mer’s right to the pa rtnership intere sts prece ded or
derive s from the divorce decr ee, there is no evidenc e the partne rship interests and assets cannot be

returne d and taken into a ccount in a ne w just-and-r ight division, if Kra mer wer e to suc cee d on the
meri t s o f h er appea l. I f Kastleman is corr ect that the trial court could not awa rd the partne rship
int erests to Kra mer following reve rsal and rema nd, Kastleman cer

tainly could not be said to be disadvantag ed by restoring those assets to him. Thoug h we do not fore close the p o s sibili ty that prejud i ce m i gh t arise from temporar y loss of control over estate assets, Kastleman’ s claims of prejudice in this case ar e entire ly specula tive. 1 0 0 

## Kastleman, moreove r, is satisfied with the distribution of proper ty awa rded to Kra mer, both

as t o the t y

pe and share of t he communit y estate. I n fa ct , h e i n sists that she keep it perma nently

. Evidently , the assets are not so unique that Kastleman would be disadvantag ed by their perma nent loss, nor is there evidenc e that Kastleman’ s future interests are prejudice d by the loss of temporar y possession and control. By appea ling, Kra

mer is taking the chanc e she will g et a more favor able j u d gm en t o n
redivision of the proper

ty (if Kastleman has conce aled assets as she alleg es) or that she will, at least,

g et no less in a just-and-rig ht redivision of the estate. But beca use a succe ssful appea l means the 1 0 1

S e e H M C H o t e l P r o

p s

. I I L t d

. P ’ s h i

p v

. K e y s t o n e
- T e x

. P r o p

. H o l d i n g C o r

p

. , 4 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 0 , 9 1 6 ( T e x
. 100 2 0 1 4 ) ( s p e c u l a t i v e e v i d e n c e i s n o e v i d e n c e )

.

S e e S t u b b s v

. S t u b b s , 6 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 7 0 , 7 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 1 9 8 4 ) , a f f ’ d , 6 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 3 ( T e x
. 1 9 8 5 )

. 101


## 31

## entire ma

rital estate w ill be subject to a just-and-r ight division, she may g et more or less; she may

g et t h e s am e p ro perty or something else. Yet Kastleman would be prejudice d by Kra mer’s

succe ssful appea l only if Kra mer rec eives a lesser share of the estate assets on redivision of the estate
and she would be una

ble to make up the differ ence throug h reimburse ment to the estate or by sale
of assets awa

rded to her. Thoug h Kastleman arg ues Kra mer has acc epted possession and control of

near ly half of the estate’ s undisputed value, he does not d i s pute that the renta l pay ments Kra mer

acc epted constitute a rela tively small portion of the estate or that she could restore the value of those

proce eds if the marital assets wer e divided anew
. Nor is there evidenc e or alleg ation that the assets
have been so dissipated, wasted, or conver ted as to preve nt a just-and-rig ht division of the proper ty if the judg ment is rever sed or modified. Finally , Kastleman arg ues Kra mer is es topped from appea ling whether the proper ty
settlement ag ree ment is enfor cea ble beca use (1) she ag ree d to the proper ty division by executing the

proper ty settlement ag ree ment, (2) she waited a y ear to revoke consent, and (3) afte r the ag ree ment

was signe d, the community could claim no rig ht to the income from the renta l proper ties, meaning
the community estate cannot be rec onstitut ed. These matters, howeve r, g o to the merits of Kra mer’s

appea l, not her rig ht to a merits-base d dispositi on of the appea l. On the merits, the court of appea ls

may conclude that the settlement ag ree ment is enfor cea ble and irrevoc able, and Kra mer has there by
waived the rig ht to complain about the proper ty division for that rea son or another

. But that inquiry
is distinctly

differ ent from whe ther Kr amer is barr ed from seeking a determination about whether the g rounds alleg ed in avoidanc e of the ag ree ment’s enf orce ment are meritorious.

32

## Ba sed on the rec ord befor e the Court, we conclude prejudice is lacking and the circ umstances

do not ref lect Kra mer’s clea

r intent to acquie sce i n the judgme nt’s validity

. The court of appea ls
there fore err ed in dismissi ng Kra mer’s a ppeal.
III. Conclusi on
The acc eptanc e-of

-bene fits doctr in e is a f

a c t- d e p endent, estoppel-ba sed doctrine that focuse s

on unfair prejudice to the opposing party

. Courts must there fore ref rain from adher ence to formulaic principles and ha

rd-line r ules that are inconsonant with the doctrine ’s equitable nature.
We hold that a merits-base d dispositi on must not be denied absent disadvantag e to the opposing party and circ umstances ref lecting clea

r intent to acquie sce in the judgme nt’s v a li d it y
. This inquiry is informed by various fac tors, including the appea ling party ’s ability to restore benef its that
have been acc epted. Be cause Kra mer’s dominion over marital assets does not rise to the level of an estoppel, we reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt and rema nd the case to that court for further

proce eding s.

___________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OP INION DELIVERED: J anuar y 27, 2017

33