* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate recor d, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. Se e Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered s ubmitted without oral argument. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 12 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

CLAYTON BRUCE PHILLIPS, Petitioner - Appellant, vs. MICHAEL WILLIAMS, Warden and ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents - Appellees. No. 00-1196 (D.C. No. 99-D-754) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , KELLY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner Clayton B. Phillips, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him t o appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Phillips has failed to make “a substant ial showing of the denial of a- 2 -

constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 22 53(c)(2), we deny his request and dismiss the appeal. In 1991, Mr. Phillips was charged in Colorado state court with two counts of aggravated robbery, one crime of violence count, and seven habitual offender counts for the robbery of a fast-food sandwich shop in which $88 was stolen. The court appointed the state public defender to repres ent him. R. doc. 18 at 2. Mr. Phillips ultimately pled guilty to one count of agg ravated robbery and the crime of violence count and was sentenced to twenty-eight ye ars in prison and five years of mandatory parole. R. doc. 3 at 2. Mr. Phillips d id not file a direct appeal but, several years later, challenged his Colorado convic tion and sentence in collateral proceedings pursuant to Colo. Crim. P. R. 35(c) req uesting that he be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assista nce of counsel. His motion was denied and that denial was affirmed on appeal. State v. Phillips , No. 96CA2023, at 1, 9-11 (Colo. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 1997) (unpublis hed). Mr. Phillips filed the instant federal habeas petition claiming his guilty plea was involuntary and ineffective assistance of counsel. R. doc. 3. Th e district court found the involuntary plea claim procedurally defaulted, deni ed the ineffective assistance claim on the merits, and denied a COA. R. doc. 18 at 7, 10-11; R. doc. 23. Mr. Phillips raises a single issue before this court: ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Aplt. Br. at 16. Mr. Phillips asse rts that “counsel’s representation- 3 -

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and prejudiced his defense, Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984), for two reasons

. First, counsel failed to investigate Mr. Phillips’ assertions that he had received a large sum of money the day of the robbery and faile d to interview any exculpatory witnesses. Second, counsel erroneously instructed Mr. Phillips that if he pled guilty he could not be extradited to another state prior to the conclusion of his Colorado sentence. Aplt. Br. at 15. On federal habeas review, we must deny relief unles s the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supre me Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2); see also Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Because the Stricklandtwo-part test applies to guilty pleas, Mr. Phillip s must show not only that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also that “there is a reasonabl e probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Colorado Court of Appeals held that counsel’s l ack of investigation was reasonable given that Mr. Phillips “did not ind icate what the substance of- 4 -

‘other people’s’ testimony would have been or what information the investigation would have revealed, other than that he had a subst antial sum of money the day of the robbery.” Phillips , No. 96CA2023, at 7-8. As for counsel’s erroneous advice, the state court found that no promises were made to Mr. Phillips regarding sentencing and that “defendant was subject to prose cution in the other states before he pleaded guilty in this case. This circum stance did not change when defendant entered his guilty plea. Thus, the plea here did not give rise to any potentially adverse consequences that otherwise wou ld not have existed.” Id. at 10-11. According to the state court, the “defendan t failed to establish that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel or that any alleged inadequacies of counsel’s performance prejudiced his defense.” Id. at 9-10. This resolution does not constitute an unreasonable application of Stric kland . See Williams , 529 U.S.
at 411-12. We DENY Mr. Phillips’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis, DENY his request for a COA and DISMISS this appeal. Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge