IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MICHAEL MAKANEOLE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SOLARWORLD INDUSTRIES AMERICA, 

INC., SOLAR WORLD INDUSTRIES 

AMERICA, LP, SOLAR WORLD INDUSTRIES 

SERVICES, LLC, SOLARWORLD POWER 

PROJECTS, INC., and RANDSTAD US, LP, 

Defendants. 

PAPAK, Magistrate Judge: 

3:14-CV-1528-PK 

OPINION AND 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Michael Makaneole brought this putative class action against defendants 

Solarworld Industries America, Inc., SolarWorld Industries America, LP, SolarWorld Industries 

Services, LLC, SolarWorld Power Projects, Inc. (collectively with Solarworld Industries 

America, Inc., SolarWorld Industries America, LP, and SolarWorld Industries Services, LLC, 

"SolarWorld" or the "SolarWorld defendants"), Randstad US, LP ("Randstad") 1, and Kelly 

1 Makaneole inaccurately identified Randstad as "Randstad Professionals US, LP" in his 

complaint as originally filed, and notwithstanding that Randstad has noted the en-or in virtually 

every document it has since filed with the court, Makaneole continues to so misidentify Randstad 

in his current pleading. 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 
Services, Inc. ("Kelly" or "KSI"), in the Multnomah County Circuit Court on August 26, 2014. 

Defendant Randstad removed Makaneole's action to this court effective September 24, 2014. 

Subsequent to removal, Makaneole amended his complaint in this court effective April 6, 2015. 

By and through his amended complaint, Makaneole alleges that the SolarWorld 

defendants are in the business of manufacturing and selling photovoltaic products, and that 

defendants Kelly and Randstad are both in the business of providing temporary workers to 

employers in need of short-term staff. Makaneole alleges that he was employed first by Kelly, 

then by Randstad, and then by SolarWorld, and while serially employed by the three employers 

perfo1med services on behalf of SolarWorld at a Solar World facility in Oregon. It is Makaneole's 

allegation that during all three periods of employment, SolarWorld engaged in a practice of 

programming an electronic time-keeping system to deduct minutes from his hours worked prior 

to reporting them to payroll for purposes of computing his compensation, and that Kelly and 

Randstad used the hours reported to them by SolarWorld following such deduction in calculating 

his compensation during the periods when he worked for those employers; it is fmiher 

Makaneole's position that each of the three employers treated all of their similarly situated 

employees' hours worked in the same fashion during approximately the same time period. 

Arising out of that practice, Makaneole alleges all defendants' liability for violation of Oregon's 

Or. Rev. Stat. 652.120 and 653.010 by failing to pay all wages owed, for violation of Oregon's 

Or. Rev. Stat. 652.120 and 653.010 by failing to pay ove1iime wages owed, and for violation of 

Oregon's Or. Rev. Stat. 652.140 by failing to pay all wages owed at the te1mination of 

employment. Makaneole seeks damages for unpaid wages in an unspecified amount, as well as 

award of his attorney fees and costs. This comi has original federal subject-matter jurisdiction 

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over Makaneole's putative class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 

On September 2, 2016, these chambers recommended (inter alia) that the coutt issue 

summary judgment in Kelly's favor as to all of Makaneole's claims against it, and in Randstad's 

favor as to Makaneole's Section 652.120 claim against it for failure to pay ove1time wages owed. 

On Januaiy 17, 2017, Judge Brown adopted those recommendations without modification. Judge 

Brown entered final judgment as to Makaneole's claims against Kelly on Febrnaiy 28, 2017. 

On January 4, 2018, Makaneole advised the coutt that he had reached a settlement in 

principle with Randstad. In connection with such notice, Makaneole additionally purp01ied to 

provide notice to the court that, in consequence ofMakaneole's settlement in principle with 

Randstad, the currently pending motion for class ce1tification is "presently" moot as to Randstad 

"subject to coutt approval" of the proposed settlement. On that basis, Makaneole purported to 

notify the court that "any rnling as to the pending motion for class certification should be stayed 

and defened as to Randstad, as such a ruling would be contra1y to the parties' settlement effo1ts 

and the cutTent settlement posture of the action with respect to Randstad." I construe such 

purp01ted notice as a motion to stay further proceedings in connection with the cun-ently pending 

motion for class certification to the extent it addresses Makaneole's claims alleged against 

Randstad. SolarWorld opposes Makaneole's motion so construed, arguing that either no stay 

should be imposed or that the stay should have the effect of deferring proceedings in connection 

with the pending motion for class certification as to all defendants equally. 

Now before the coutt is Makaneole's constrnctive motion (#189) for stay of further 

proceedings in connection with the cun-ently pending motion for class certification to the extent 

it addresses Makaneole's claims alleged against Randstad. I have considered the constrnctive 

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motion, oral argument on behalf of the parties, and all of the pleadings and papers on file. For 

the reasons set forth below, Makaneole's constructive motion is denied. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

"A district court has inherent power to control the disposition of the causes on its docket 

in a manner which will promote economy of time and eff01t for itself, for counsel, and for 

litigants." ClvfAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 

U.S. 681, 706 (1997) ("The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident 

to its power to control its own docket."). When considering whether to exercise their discretion 

to stay proceedings, the district courts should consider "the possible damage which may result 

from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a paity may suffer in being required to 

go fo1ward, alld the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or 

complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a 

stay." ClviAX, 300 F.2d at 268, citing Landis v. N Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-255 (1936). 

ANALYSIS 

Although Makaneole takes the position that this court should not decide the currently 

pending motion for class certification to the extent it addresses Makaneole's claims alleged 

against Randstad, he offers no argument (i) that he, the absent putative class members, or 

Randstad would suffer any hardship or inequity in the event the court were to decide the pending 

motion for class ce1tification in its entirety, other than that such a ruling would be "contrary" to 

the parties' settlement efforts and the "cmTent settlement posture" of the action, or (ii) that failure 

to effect the requested stay would complicate any issues of proof or questions of law. For their 

part, the Solar World defendants take the position that if a stay were entered as to the pending 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 
motion for class certification to the extent it addresses Makaneole's claims alleged against 

Randstad only, and not to the extent it addresses Makaneole's claims against SolarWorld, they 

would potentially suffer prejudice in the event the proposed settlement with Randstad were not 

approved, in that under that circumstance it is possible that different filing deadlines might 

thereafter apply to SolarWorld on the one hand and to Randstad on the other. 

Although I find SolarWorld's objections to the requested stay unpersuasive - case 

deadlines could be trivially reconciled by comt order in the event the stay were granted as to 

proceedings against Randstad only and the proposed settlement subsequently disapproved - I am 

similarly not persuaded that good grounds exist for issuing the requested stay in the first instance. 

Makaneole specifically reports that they have reached agreement as to "all of the major te1ms" of 

their proposed settlement, and that thir paitial agreement has been memorialized in a 

Memorandum of Understanding and Term Sheet that expressly provides that it is independently 

enforceable (pending comt approval) even in the event the patties were unable to reach 

agreement as to the remaining te1ms of their proposed settlement. As such, this court's order 

granting or denying class treatment of Makaneole's claims alleged against Randstad would not 

interfere with the parties' still-ongoing settlement negotiations. Moreover, if the stay is denied 

and the class certification motion subsequently resolved prior to approval or disapproval of the 

proposed settlement, the result of ultimate approval of the settlement would be to moot the 

resolution of the class certification motion, to the prejudice of no party, whereas the result of 

ultimate disapproval of the settlement would be that the patties continued to litigate, again to the 

prejudice of no pmty. 

Because no good grounds appear to exist for staying any portion of these proceedings at 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 
this time, Makaneole's constructive motion for stay is denied, and SolarWorld's objections to the 

proposed stay are accordingly disregarded as moot. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Makaneole's constrnctive motion (#189) for partial stay of 

these proceedings is denied. 

Dated this 2nd day ofFebrnaiy, 2018.(~. 

\ 6liil' 

Honorable Paul Papal( 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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