IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MICHAEL L. MAYES and 

JONATHAN D. MAYES; 

PlaintifTs; 

v. 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

STEVEN D. CAMPBELL, RYAN MULKINS 

TONY A HENDERSON, JESS ELZY, DAREN 

CALVERT, BRIAN SORENSON, MATT 

SCAGLIONE, KEVIN BLIACH, ROBERTS. 

BAIN, JOHN E. DAVIS, RICHARD BILLIN, 

and ROGER L. ADDINGTON; 

Defendants. 

CLARKE, Magistrate Judge. 

Case No. 1: 14-cv-02042-CL 

REPORT& 

RECOMMEDATION 

Plaintiffs Michael Mayes ("M. Mayes") and Jonathan Mayes ("J. Mayes") (collectively, 

"Plaintiffs") seek to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this civil rights action. On January 26, 

2015, this Court dismissed (#18) PlaintitTs' First Amended Complaint without prejudice and 

denied Plaintiffs IFP petition. On February 24, 2015, PlaintitTs filed a Second Amended 

Complaint (#23, "SAC") and moved to set aside (#26) the Court's denial of their IFP application. 

Because the Court is barred from hearing the claims raised in the amended pleading, Plaintiffs' 

Second Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED and their IFP petition should be DENIED 

as moot. 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay 

a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(l), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts 

despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant 

to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the 

litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l ). Second, it 

must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

In regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the power under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) to screen complaints even before the service of the complaint on the 

defendants, and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply the same 

standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To 

survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a 

short and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard ... asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The Court is not 

required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true.l9..: 

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Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se 

plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Additionally, a prose 

litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, 

unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.~ at 623. 

DISCUSSION 

This action arises from multiple civil and criminal cases in Oregon state court. Plaintiffs 

assert "state court judges and attorneys, law enforcement, probation officers, private attorneys 

and persons" conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and to secure fraudulent 

state court judgments against them.· SAC ,1 18. Plaintiffs' allegations are dense and somewhat 

difficult to differentiate. The following is a general synopsis of their Second Amended 

Complaint. 

Plaintiffs' allege Defendant Addington, who sold land to Plaintiffs, conspired to have 

Plaintiffs illegally removed from their land and attempted to shoot M. Mayes with a homemade 

spear-gun. SAC ,1,1 24, 29. M. Mayes tried to file a citizen's complaint for attempted murder 

against Defendant Addington but a state court judge denied his request. SAC ,1 34. M. Mayes 

visited the district attorney's office and demanded that they prosecute Defendant Addington. 

SAC ~ 35. Defen~ant Campbell refused. SAC ,1 35. Defendant Meyers arrested M. Mayes for 

"MCS; PCS, and DCS for marijuana" in retaliation for his efforts to compel Defendant 

Addington's prosecution. SAC ,135. Meanwhile, Defendant Addington commenced an ejectment 

action against M. Mayes and secured a default judgment against him by fraudulently 

representing that M. Mayes failed to appear for a deposition when, in fact, M. Mayes had never 

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been served with notice of the deposition. SAC ,I 41. Thereat1er, Defendants fraudulently seized 

Plaintiffs' property. SAC ,142. 

On September 22, 2011, Plaintiffs allege Defendants conducted an illegal search of their 

property and medical marijuana grow. SAC ,1,146, 49. Plaintiffs allege Defendant Meyers forged 

a search warrant and failed to comply with Oregon's warrant return process. SAC ,I 47. They 

assert law enforcement "planted [ ] 22-shells on Mr. J. Mayes' desk in his bedroom" as 

evidenced by a "smudge mark through the otherwise undisturbed dust" on the desk. SAC ~ 53. 

The state court denied Plaintiffs' motions to "?uppress and controvert" evidence secured through 

the search and prevented Plaintiffs from examining witnesses in order to "expose corruption of 

the court." SAC ,161. J. Mayes was forced to plead guilty to related charges because his attorney, 

Defendant Bain, rendered inadequate representation. SAC ,I 64. He served seventeen days on a 

work crew which Plaintiffs call "involuntary servitude." SAC ,164. 

Defendants conspired to disqualify M. Mayes from home detention by fraudulently 

. . 

representing that he did not comply with court orders. SAC ,1,1 68-69. Defendants Henderson and 

Scaglione unlawfully entered Plaintiffs' property and arrested M. Mayes without probable cause 

"in continuance of Addington's and Meyer's conspiracy." SAC ,1~ 74-76. Defendant Mulkins 

intentionally acquired false statements from witnesses to use in M. Mayes' ensuing prosecution. 

SAC ,187. 

I. The Rool<er-Feldman Doctrine 

While more detailed and focused than their original t\VO complaints, Plaintiffs' Second 

Amended Complaint still fails under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine bars federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court 

judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). A district 

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court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state 

court's prior decision. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 

(I ~83). The Ninth Circuit has found claims to be "inextricably intertwined" where a federal 

action requests relief that "would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling." 

Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fontana Empire Ctr .. LLC v. Citv 

of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002)). Rooker-Feldman's bar applies even \Vhen a 

challenge to a state court decision implicates federally protected rights. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 

512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) ("[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in 

.. 

substance would be appellate review ofthe state judgment in a United States District Court based 

on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itselfviolates the loser's federal rights."). 

Plaintiffs invoke the extrinsic fraud exception to Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional bar. In 

KoLHrasian v. TMSL. Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit 

distinguished between a federal suit alleging that an adverse party committed a wrongful act 

during a state proceeding and a federal suit alleging a legal error by a state court. It explained, 

"Rooker-Feldman [] does not bar subject matter jurisdiction when a federal plaintiff alleges a 

cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to set aside a state court judgment 

obtained by that fraud." Id. at 1141. "Extrinsic fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by 

that court." 14:. It is a wrongful act that "prevents a party from having an opportunity to present 

his claim or defense in court." Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 

1978). 

Where alleged fraud goes "to the very heart of the issues contested in the state court 

action[,]" it can "hardly be considered extrinsic or collateral to the matters involved in the 

action." 14:. In such cases, Rooker-Feldman governs. For example, in Dixon v. State Bar of 

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California, 32 F.App'x 355, 356-57 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit found that allegations of 

"discriminatory prosecution, the use of fabricated evidence, and the wrongful exclusion of 

supposedly exculpatory evidence" described intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud. 

The fraud, misconduct, and misrepresentations alleged by Plaintiffs are not extrinsic or 

collateral to the matters involved in their Oregon court cases. Rather, Plaintiffs allege a 

conspiracy involving the state court. They challenge the very basis of the state judiciary's 

decisions: asserting local judges worked with law enforcement and private persons to secure 

false judgments against them. If true, this undoubtedly amounts to intrinsic fraud. Moreover, 

their complaint raises issues that Plaintiffs have already presented in state court to no avail. This 

Court's adjudication of those claims would "undercut the state ruling[s]." Bianchi v. 

Rvlaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, Plaintiffs' federal action is "inextricably 

intertwined" with the state court decisions they seek to void and must be dismissed for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 1.4: Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court does not 

have authority to hear Plaintiffs' claims. 

II. Claim Preclusion 

Furthermore, claim preclusion applies to Plaintiffs' arguments against the validity of the 

Oregon court judgments. Federal courts must give to state court judgments "the same preclusive 

effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 

rendered." Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). In Oregon, 

claim preclusion prohibits there-litigation of a case that is "based on the same factual transaction 

that was at issue in the first [case], seeks a remedy additional or alternative to the one sought 

earlier, and is of such a nature as could have been joined in the first action." Rennie v. Freeway 

Transport, 294 Or. 319, 323 (1982). Plaintiffs' current federal claims arise from the same factual 

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transactions that were at issue in their state cases. They were, or could have been, litigated in 

those proceedings. Plaintiffs had the opportunity to appeal the trial court's handling of those 

matters, and it appears that they have done so. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are barred under the 

doctrine of claim preclusion. 

RECOMMENDATION 

Because Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman and claim preclusion 

doctrines, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (#23) be 

DISMISSED with prejudice, their motion to set aside (#26) DENIED as moot, and judgment 

entered for Defendants. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. 

The Report and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this 

Report and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. If an 

objection is filed, any response to the objection is due within fourteen (14) days from the date of 

the objection. See FED. R. C!v. P. 72, 6. Parties are advised that the failure to file objection 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

MARK D. CLARKE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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