[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re R.B. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5476.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -5476

I N RE R.B. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as In re R.B. , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5476.] Juvenile law—Sex-offender-classification hearing—A juvenile court does not lose jurisdiction to enter an order pursuant to R.C. 2152.84 once the juvenile reaches the age of 21—While a juvenile court’s failure to hold a hearing in compliance with R.C. 2152.84 in a timel y manner may support other claims for relief, the statutory directive that the hearing be held upon a juvenile’s completion of his disposition is not a jurisdictional requi rement—A hearing may take place within a reasonable amount of time after a juvenile completes his disposition—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause
remanded. (No. 2019-1325—Submitted August 5, 2020—Decided December 2, 202 0.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, Nos. C-170622 and C-170623, 2019-Ohio-3298.

_______________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 D E W INE , J. {¶ 1} This case involves the procedures by which a juvenile is classi fied as a sex offender. When R.B. was a teenager, he sexually abused h is two four-yearold cousins. The juvenile court adjudicated R.B. delinquent, c lassified him as a sex offender, and imposed a disposition that included probation unt il his 21st birthday. In juvenile cases, the court is required to hold a second sex-o ffender-classification hearing upon the juvenile’s completion of the disposition. The court held the second hearing and kept R.B.’s classification the same. R.B. c hallenges the timing of that hearing. {¶ 2} R.B. first contends that the juve nile court was required to hol d the review hearing and issue its decision on the exact day his disp osition ended (in other words, the day that his term of probation expired). He s ays that once he completed his disposition, the court lost jurisdiction to conti nue his classification, and he may no longer be classified as a sex offender. We disag ree. The language “upon completion of the disposition,” R.C. 2152.84(A)(1), does not require a hearing and order on the exact day the disposition ends. Rathe r, the court’s review may take place within a reasonable time of the juvenile’s compl etion of his disposition. {¶ 3} Second, R.B. argues that the juve nile court lacked jurisdiction because its order continuing his classification was not issued until after his 21st birthday. Here, too, we disagree. By statute, the juvenile co urt maintains jurisdiction to review a juvenile’s sex-offender classification after the juvenile reaches the age of 21. See R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). Because the court of appeals concluded that the juvenile cour t lacked jurisdiction, we rever se its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. I. The juvenile sex-offend er-classification process {¶ 4} When a juvenile commits a sex o ffense, the juvenile court has t he ability to classify the juvenile as a sex offender. See generally R.C. 2152.82January Term, 2020

3 through 2152.86; 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act ). A juvenile who has been classified as a sex offender has certain legal obl igations, such as registering and periodically verifying his address in person wi th the sheriff. See R.C. 2950.07. The frequency with which the juvenile must repor t and the duration of his reporting requirements de pend on the level of the classi fication imposed. Id

. {¶ 5} Unlike adult offenders, whose cl assification levels are based s olely on the underlying offense, see R.C. 2950.01, the juvenile court has discretion to determine the appropriate cla ssification for a juvenile offende r, see R.C. 2152.83(A)(2) and (B)(2). Additionally, while adult classifica tions flow directly from the conviction and are not subject to modification, the ju venile court retains jurisdiction to review a juvenile offender’s classification. T he classification process is set forth in a series of statutes (the “classificati on statutes”). The juvenile court conducts a hearing at the time of the juvenile’s disposit ion, see R.C. 2152.83, and at the time the juvenile completes the disposition, see R.C. 2152.84. After that, the juvenile may petition the juvenile court for review every t hree or five years.
See R.C. 2152.85. {¶ 6} R.B.’s disposition ended on his 21st birthday. A Hamilton Coun ty juvenile-court magistrate held R.B.’s completion-of-disposition hearing two months before his birthday and i ssued orders continuing his sex -offender
classification the week before he turned 21. The juvenile cour t adopted the magistrate’s decision to maintain R.B.’s sex-offender classific ation, but it did not do so until after R.B.’s dispos ition had ended and he had turne d 21. R.B. therefore
contends that the classificati on order is invalid and that he d oes not have a duty to register as a sex offender. {¶ 7} In order to better understand R.B.’s challenge, it is helpful t o lay out the relevant portions of the statutes outlining the sex-offende r-classification process for juveniles before we delve fu rther into the facts of this ca se.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 8} R.C. 2152.83 addresses what we w ill refer to as the “initial classification hearing.” With r espect to juveniles who, like R .B., committed their offenses at the age of 14 or 15, the court has discretion wheth er to hold a classification hearing or impose a classification at all. R.C. 2152.83(B)(1) and (2).
If the court decides to conduct a hearing, the statute provides for it to be held “at the time of disposition of the child or, if the court commits t he child for the delinquent act to the custody of a secure facility, * * * at th e time of the child’s release from the secure facility.” R.C. 2152.83(B)(1). Then “ upon completion of the hearing,” the court may classify the juvenile as a sex offe nder or may decline to do so. R.C. 2152.83(B)(2). If the court imposes a classifi cation, the court must notify the juvenile of his regi stration and reporting requireme nts. R.C. 2152.83(C)(3). The court is also r equired to tell the juvenile that a second hearing will be held at the end of his disposition pursuant to R.C. 215 2.84 and that his classification may be modified or terminated at that time. R.C . 2152.83(C)(3). {¶ 9} R.C. 2152.83(E) provides that the initial classification order “shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section 29 50.07 of the Revised Code, subject to a modification or termination of the order und er section 2152.84
of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2950.07 outlines the duration of a juvenile offender’s duty to register. For a juvenile classified as a Tier I offend er, the duty to register lasts for 10 years; for a Tier II juvenile offender, the obliga tion continues for 20 years; and a juvenile classified as a Tier III offender must re gister for life. R.C. 2950.07(B). Further, “[t]he child’s attainment of eighteen or twenty-one years of age does not affect or terminate the order, and the order remai ns in effect for the period of time described in t his division.” R.C. 2152.83(E). {¶ 10} The juvenile court must hold a second hearing to review the classification “upon completi on of the disposition” (we will ca ll this the “completion-of-disposition hearing”). R.C. 2152.84. The purpo se of the hearing
isJanuary Term, 2020

5 to review the effectiveness of the disposition and of any treat ment provided for the child, to determine the risks that the child m ight reoffend, to determine whether the prior classification of the ch ild as a juvenile offender registrant should be continued or terminate d * * *, and to determine whether its prior determination * * * a s to whether the child is a tier I sex offender/child-victim offende r, a tier II sex offender/child-victim offender, or a tier III sex offend er/childvictim offender should be continued or modified * * *.

R.C. 2152.84(A)(1). “Upon completion of [this] hearing,” the c ourt may either continue the juvenile’s previous classification, reduce the lev el of his classification,
or terminate his classifica tion altogether. R.C. 2152.84(A)(2)

. {¶ 11} Finally, R.C. 2152.85 allows a juvenile classified as a sex off ender to petition the juvenile court at certain intervals to have his classification modified or removed (we will call this the “periodic-review provision”). The juvenile may first petition the court for review three years after the compl etion-of-disposition hearing. R.C. 2152.85(B)(1). The juvenile may petition the co urt a second time three years after the first petition was filed, R.C. 2152.85(B) (2), and then every five years after that for the dura tion of the registration period, R .C. 2152.85(B)(3). See
also In re D.S. , 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 36. {¶ 12} With that understanding, we tur n to the history of this case.
II. R.B.’s classification {¶ 13} When R.B. was 14 years old, he sexually abused his two four-yearold cousins. He confessed what he had done, and in October 201 1, he was adjudicated delinquent on two c ounts of gross sexual imposition . The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on December 2. The court pl aced R.B. on probation with a suspended commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth ServicesS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 that was to remain in place until he reached the age of 21. As a condition of probation, the court required R.B. t o complete a residential tr eatment program. {¶ 14} The juvenile court issued an entry the following week continuin g the case to January for the court to hold an initial sex-offender-c lassification hearing. After the hearing, the court classified R.B. as a Tier I offend er. At that time, the court provided R.B. and his moth er a form notifying them that a s a result of R.B.’s classification, he would be require d to register annually for a period of ten years. {¶ 15} After his initial classification hearing, R.B. continued to com ply with his probation obligations. R.B. successfully completed th e residential portion of his treatment program in February 2013 and reentered the com munity under an electronic-monitoring requireme nt. He attended counseling and sex-offender treatment on an outpatient basis. In July 2013, the probation department notified
the court that R.B. had satisfi ed the terms of his probation. The court therefore
ordered that R.B. “be release d from official probation and plac ed on non-reporting probation with Monitored Time.” See R.C. 2929.01(Y) (monitored time is “a period of time during which an offender continues to be under t he control of the sentencing court * * *, subject to no conditions other than lea ding a law-abiding life”). {¶ 16} R.B. stayed out of trouble and little happened in his case for another year. In July 2014, R.B. filed an application asking to have h is record sealed, which the juvenile court denied two months later, noting that the “re quisite requirements for eligibility have not yet been met” and that R.B. remained u nder a duty to register
as a sex offender until 2022. {¶ 17} Following that decision, the court scheduled a completion-ofdisposition hearing pursuant to R.C. 2152.84. The hearing was first set for November 19, 2014, but the matter was continued three times at the defense’s request. Then, on April 28, 2015, the court issued an entry st ating that the defense’s request for reclassification had been “withdrawn.” The court d id not hold the R.C.January Term, 2020

7 2152.84 completion-of-disposition hearing or enter an order con tinuing or terminating R.B.’s cla ssification at that time. {¶ 18} The court took no further action on R.B.’s classification until October 24, 2016, when the state f iled a motion asking the juve nile court to hold a completion-of-disposition hearing. R.B. objected to the state’ s request, asserting that the juvenile court lacked j urisdiction to go forward with the hearing because it had not been held “upon comple tion of the disposition,” as requ ired under R.C.
2152.84. {¶ 19} In January 2017, a juvenile-court magistrate held a hearing to
determine whether the court ha d jurisdiction to conduct the com pletion-ofdisposition hearing. R.B. contended that he had completed his disposition at the time he finished outpatient treatment and was released from his probation reporting obligations and that the hearin g was therefore untimely. Alter natively, if the court determined that nonreporting pr obation was a valid dispositiona l order, then R.B. reasoned that he had not yet com pleted his disposition and the state’s attempt to hold the hearing was premature. {¶ 20} The juvenile-court magistrate det ermined that she could proceed with the completion-of-dispositi on hearing. R.B. filed objecti ons, and the parties argued the matter before the j uvenile-court judge. On March 6, 2017, the judge issued a decision finding that the court had jurisdiction to pr oceed with the completion-of-disposition hearing. The court concluded that R. B. remained on nonreporting probation with a sus pended commitment to DYS and t hat R.B. was therefore still subject to the j urisdiction of t he juvenile cou rt. {¶ 21} The magistrate held the completion-of-disposition hearing on Ma y 8, 2017, and issued orders on July 13 and 14, 2017, continuing R.B.’s Tier I classification. R.B. turned 21 ye ars of age one week later, on July 20, 2017. {¶ 22} R.B. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The juveni le-court judge held a hearing on the objec tions in September and issued a written decisionS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 the following month adopting the magistrate’s orders continuing R.B.’s Tier I
classification. {¶ 23} R.B. appealed, asserting that his initial classification order was invalid, that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to hold th e completion-ofdisposition hearing because it did not take place at the time t he disposition was completed, that the juvenile cour t violated R.B.’s due-process rights by not holding the completion-of-disposition hearing at the time that he had c ompleted his treatment, and that t he juvenile court abus ed its discretion in continuing R.B.’s
classification. The First Distr ict Court of Appeals ordered fu rther briefing on the question whether the juvenile c ourt lost jurisdiction to adopt the magistrate’s order continuing R.B.’s classification once R.B. reached 21 years of age. The court of appeals concluded that the juven ile court lacked jurisdiction t o issue orders continuing R.B.’s classification both because he had reached th e age of 21 and because his disposition had ended when he turned 21. It theref ore vacated the
classification orders. 2019-Ohio-3298. Based on its resolutio n of the jurisdiction question, the court of appeals he ld that R.B.’s other arguments were moot and
declined to address them. {¶ 24} We accepted the state’s appeal, which raised the following proposition of law: “Once a juven ile court makes an appropriate initial classification under R.C. 2152.83, it is permanently vested wit h jurisdiction to
review the classification in accordance with R.C. 2152.84 and 2 152.85.” See 157 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2019-Ohio-5327, 137 N.E.3d 102. {¶ 25} R.B. filed a cross-appeal raising three propositions of law. W e accepted discretionary review ove r one of them, which asserts t hat the completionof-disposition hearing must be held at the time the juvenile co mpletes treatment to comply with due process. Id

.January Term, 2020

9 III. The juvenile court does not lose juris diction to enter an order pursuant to R.C. 2152.84 when the juven ile reaches the age of 21 {¶ 26} We first take up the portion of t he First District’s holding th at the juvenile court lost jurisdiction to continue R.B.’s Tier I clas sification once he turned
21. {¶ 27} R.C. Chapter 2152 outlines the ju risdiction of juvenile courts with respect to delinquent children. T he general rule is that a juv enile court has jurisdiction over juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquen t until they reach the age of 21:

The juvenile court has jurisd iction over a person who is adjudicated a delinquent child o r juvenile traffic offender pri or to attaining eighteen years of age until the person attains twenty -one years of age, and, for purposes of that jurisdiction related to that adjudication, except as otherwise provided in this division, a person who is so adjudicated a delinque nt child or juvenile traffic of fender shall be deemed a “child” until the person attains twenty-one y ears of age.

R.C. 2152.02(C)(6); see also In re J.V. , 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, 979 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 23. R.B. would have us stop there and hold that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction to hold the completion-of-disposition hearing once he turned 21 and was no longer a “child” under R.C. 2152.02(C)(6). {¶ 28} That argument might be successful if that statute was the only source of the juvenile cour t’s jurisdiction. But another provision gr ants the juvenile court “exclusive original jurisdiction” to carry out its obligations under the sex-offenderclassification statutes: “[t]o conduct the hearings, and to mak e the determinations, adjudications, and orders author ized or required under sections 2152.82 to 2152.86S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 and Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code regarding a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent child.” R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). In other words, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to conduct sex-offende r-classification hearings an d issue classification
orders under the terms of the classification statutes. {¶ 29} R.B. picks up on the word “child” in R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). He contends that R.C. 2152.02(C)(6)— which states that a person who has been adjudicated delinquent “shall be deemed a ‘child’ until the per son attains twentyone years of age”—provides the meaning of the word “child” for purposes of R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). Because the statu te authorizes the juvenile co urt to conduct hearings and issue classification orders “regarding a child,” R .C. 2151.23(A)(15), and a juvenile who has been adj udicated delinquent is only cons idered to be a child until he reaches the age of 21, R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), R.B. says t he court’s jurisdiction to carry out its obligations unde r the classifica tion statutes ends on a juvenile’s 21st birthday. {¶ 30} The difficulty with that reading is that, by their plain terms, the classification statutes extend a juvenile court’s authority ove r classification orders beyond a juvenile’s 21st birthday. As outlined above, the peri odic-review provision allows the juvenile to petition the juvenile court to reduce or remove his classification at the following times: three years after the co mpletion-of-disposition hearing; three years after the first petition; and every five y ears after that. R.C. 2152.85(B). The statute permits the juvenile registrant to pet ition the court for review as long as the classification remains in effect, which m ay in some cases be the rest of the juvenile’s life. See R.C. 2950.07(B)(1). Thus, the periodic-review provision necessarily grants the juvenile court the authority t o issue classification orders beyond the juvenile’s reaching the age of 21. If we wer e to apply R.B.’s interpretation of “child” to the jurisdictional statute, we wou ld be forced to conclude that the plain language of the classification statutes notwithstanding, aJanuary Term, 2020

11 juvenile loses his ability to have a classification removed as soon as he becomes an
adult. {¶ 31} Thus, the language in R.C. 2152.02(C)(6) stating that a person who has been adjudicated delinquent “ shall be deemed a ‘child’ unti l the person attains twenty-one years of age” cannot control the meaning of the word “child” as it is used in R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). We think the better reading comes from looking at how the word is used in conjuncti on with the surrounding text. The statute grants the juvenile court jurisdiction to conduct the hearings and iss ue the orders permitted by the classification statutes “regarding a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent child.” R.C. 2151.23(A )(15). The use of the words “has been” suggests a juvenile registrant need not still be a “child” for the court to have jurisdiction to
review his classification but rather that the court has continu ing jurisdiction to
review the classifications of juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated delinquent. {¶ 32} We therefore conclude that R. C. 2151.23(A)(15) vests the juveni le court with jurisdiction to carry out its requirements under the classification statutes, independent of whether the “delinquent child ” has reached the a ge of 21. {¶ 33} This court’s holding in State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch , 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E.2d 302, does not compel a contrary result. That case dealt with the juvenile court’s imposition o f an initial classification order pursuant to R.C. 2152.83. As noted above, that provision requires the court to impose the initial classification either as part of the dispositional order or at the time of the juvenile’s release fr om a secured facility. This court concluded that the j uvenile court lacked statutory a uthority to impose the initial classification order after it had terminated the ju venile’s disposition and after the juvenile ha d reached the age of 21. Id . at ¶ 28. {¶ 34} In this case, the juvenile court had issued its initial classif ication under R.C. 2152.83 prior to R.B.’s 21st birthday and that class ification remained inS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 effect for the duration of R.B.’s registration period. See R.C. 2152.83(E) (the initial
classification order “shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the Revised Code”). Thus, the imposition of the ini tial classification order in this case triggered the statutory-review process outli ned in the classification statutes, and the juvenile court retained jurisd iction to review R.B.’s classification pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(15). IV. The timing requirements of R.C. 2152.84 are not jurisdicti onal A. The meaning of “upon completion of the disposition” {¶ 35} The First District determined that R.B.’s disposition, by its o wn terms, ended at the same time he turned 21. 1 2019-Ohio-3298 at ¶ 14. It concluded:

Because the trial court did not c omplete the statutorily-requir ed process for classifying R.B. prior to the completion of his disposition upon his turning 21, it had no jurisdiction to clas sify him
as a Tier I offender. The initial classification order is not revived or still in effect, and therefore, there is no order in place requ iring R.B. to register as a sex offender.

Id . Thus, the court of appeals read the language “upon completio n” in the statute as requiring the hearing to occur prior to the completion of the disposition. {¶ 36} R.B. contends that “upon completion” means the hearing must be held on the very day that the juvenile’s disposition ends—no ea rlier and no later. We find this to be an excessively technical reading of the word “upon.” Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, such an interpretation would m ean that if the

1. In his cross-appeal, R.B. raised a proposition of law in whi ch he argued that the dispositional order of nonreporting probation with monitored time was not val idly imposed. We declined to accept that proposition and therefore, for the purposes of answ ering the jurisdictional question, we assume without deciding that the First District was correct in holding that R.B. was under a valid disposition.January Term, 2020

13 disposition ends upon the juvenile’s reaching the age of 21, th e juvenile court would be foreclosed from holding the completion-of-disposition hearin g altogether: under R.B.’s view, the court can’t hol d it before the disposition is complete, but it loses jurisdiction to hold it as soon as R.B. turns 21. {¶ 37} Moreover, R.C. 2152.84 not only provides that the hearing be he ld “upon completion of the dispos ition,” R.C. 2152.84(A)(1), but a lso that the judge’s
classification order be issued “upon completion of [the] hearin g,” R.C. 2152.84(A)(2). Reading “upon” in the manner suggested by R.B. would require that the hearing be conducted on the day that the disposition e nds and that the court issue its decision regarding the juvenile’s classification imme diately after the hearing is complete, without any time to consider and review th e evidence presented. In some jurisdictions , as in this case, the complet ion-of-disposition hearing and classification orde rs are issued by magistrate judg es and then adopted or rejected by juvenile-court judges. It follows that under R. B.’s view, the magistrate would have to hold a hearing and issue its classific ation order, the parties would have to file objections, a nd the juvenile-court judge wou ld have to rule on those objections and issue its ow n decision—all in the course o f a single day. {¶ 38} Instead, we find that the phras e “upon completion” is given mea ning by the surrounding language. R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) states that “u pon completion of the disposition,” the judge “sha ll conduct a hearing to review the effectiveness of the disposition and of any trea tment provided for the child * * *.” That the juvenile
court is directed to review the effectiveness of the dispositio n and treatment suggests that the hearing may be held after the disposition and treatment have been completed. {¶ 39} Thus, we do not read the phrase “upon completion” to limit the juvenile court’s ability to conduc t a completion-of-disposition hearing to a single day. The lack of more specific language lends itself to a read ing that the juvenile court is directed to conduct the completion-of-disposition hear ing within aS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 reasonable proximity—either before or after—the date the dispos ition is scheduled
to end. B. The timing requirement of R.C. 2152.84 is not jurisdictional {¶ 40} R.B.’s argument fails for another reason: the requirement that the hearing be held “upon completi on of the disposition” is not jur isdictional. The question whether the timing requirement is jurisdictional goes to the juvenile court’s subject-matter jurisdic tion—its power to hear the case. See Pratts v. Hurley , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 34. As we have already explained, R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) gra nts the juvenile court “exclu sive original jurisdiction * * * [t]o conduct the hearings, and to make the d eterminations, adjudications, and orders authoriz ed or required” under the cla ssification statutes. {¶ 41} R.B. focuses on the word “shall” in R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) (“upon completion of the disposition * * * the judge * * * shall condu ct a hearing”). He contends that the timing requirements “must be read as mandator y and therefore jurisdictional.” {¶ 42} But not all mandatory provisions a re jurisdictional in nature. Smith v. May , 159 Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 31; State v. Martin , 154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio- 3226, 11 6 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 27. We s ee no language in R.C. 2152.84 indicating that a failure to comply with this t iming requirement divests the juvenile court of jur isdiction to hold the hearing altogether. Nor does the statute specify a remedy for a court’s failure to adhere to the timing requirement. In the absence of language clearly stating that the failure to comply with the timing provision creates a jurisdictional barrier, this court will be reluctant to find one. See May at ¶ 24, citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 515-516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.E.2d 1097 (2006); Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision , 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980). {¶ 43} This does not mean that the j uvenile court may conduct the completion-of-disposition hearing any time it wants as long as the registration orderJanuary Term, 2020

15 remains in effect. That would render the language “upon comple tion of the disposition” meaningless. (Indeed, the failure to hold a heari ng within a reasonable time could affect the ability of the juvenile to seek further r eview of his classification pursuant to R.C . 2152.85, as the time for review under that section begins from the order following the completion-of-disposition h earing. R.C. 2152.85(B)(1).) If the juvenile c ourt fails to conduct the man datory R.C. 2152.84 completion-of-disposition hearing, the juvenile could file an a ction in procedendo to compel the court to hold the hearing. See In re Davis , 84 Ohio St.3d 520, 523, 705 N.E.2d 1219 (1999). Additionally, a juvenile may still obj ect to noncompliance with the timing requirements for holding the hear ing, that issue may be reviewed on direct appeal, a nd the court of appeals may dete rmine an appropriate remedy for an untimely hearing. See May at ¶ 31. {¶ 44} But the question in this case is whether the juvenile court los es jurisdiction to hold the hearin g based on an alleged failure to comply with a statutory timing requirement. W e conclude that it does not. C. The effect of the completion-of-disposition hearing on the initial classification
order {¶ 45} The First District held that b ecause the juvenile court did not hold the completion-of-disposition hearing before R.B.’s disposition ended, R.B. was no longer under a valid classifi cation order. 2019-Ohio-3298 at ¶ 14. The state
contends that the initial classification order remained in effe ct pursuant to R.C. 2152.83(E) (the initial classificati on order “shall remain in e ffect for the period of time specified in section 2950.07 of the Revised Code, subject to a modification or
termination of the order unde r section 2152.84 of the Revised C ode”). {¶ 46} R.B. insists that the failure of a juvenile court to hold the R .C. 2152.84 completion-of-disposition hearing within a certain time frame invalidates
the initial classification order. He contends that under R.C. 2152.83(E), the initial classification order is “subject to” the provisions of R.C. 215 2.84. Thus, in hisS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 view, if the completion-of-disposition hearing is not held with in the timeframe required by R.C. 2152.84, then the initial classification order ceases to have any
effect. {¶ 47} The plain language of R.C. 2152.83( E) belies that conclusion. That provision says that the initial classification order is subject to modification or

termination under R.C. 2152.84. Rather than suggest that the court’s fail ure to comply with the procedural requirements for the completion-of-d isposition hearing
voids the initial classificati on order, R.C. 2152.83(E) is expl icit that the initial classification order remains in effect for the entire registrat ion period unless it is
modified or terminated.
V. We decline to reach R .B.’s due-process argument {¶ 48} R.B. raised an assignment of error in the court of appeals cont ending that his due-process rights were violated as a result of the am ount of time that passed between the date that he completed his treatment and the completion-ofdisposition hearing. As noted above, the First District determ ined that this question was moot as a result of its conclusion that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order continuing R.B.’ s classification. R.B. concede d this point in his brief in support of jurisdiction. Because there is no judgment below for us to review on the due-process question, we dismiss this proposition as hav ing been improvidently allowed.
VI. Conclusion {¶ 49} R.C. 2151.23(A)(15) grants the j uvenile court jurisdiction to r eview classifications, hold hearings, and issue orders authorized und er the classification statutes, and this jurisdicti on necessarily extends beyond the juvenile’s having reached the age of 21. While the failure of the juvenile court to hold the R.C. 2152.84 hearing in a timely manner may support other claims for relief, we conclude that the statutory dir ective that the hearing be held “upon completion of the disposition” is not a jurisdi ctional requirement. We there fore reverse theJanuary Term, 2020

17 judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for that court to consider the assignments of error it previously deemed moot. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.

K ENNEDY , F RENCH , G ALLAGHER , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurs in judgment only.

E ILEEN A. G ALLAGHER , J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting
for F ISCHER , J.

_________________ Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pau la Adams, Assistant Prosecuting A ttorney, for appellant and cross- appellee. Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton Count y Public Defender, and Julie K ahrs Nessler, Assistant Public Defen der, for appellee and cross-appe llant. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assis tant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amici curiae Office of t he Ohio Public Defender, Children’s Law Center , Justice for Children, Juvenile Law Center,
National Juvenile Defender Cent er, and Professor Catherine Carp enter. Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, and Daniel T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curi ae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

_________________