case falls within the definition of the proposed class: he allegedly received the form letter, set forth

in Exhibit G to the complaint, that is the subject of the class claim plaintiff seeks to pursue against

CRI. With these prerequisites satisfied, we now examine the four requirements under Rule 23(a).
A. Numerosity

A prerequisite lo class certification is that a proposed class is “so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). ‘There is no set number required to fulfill
the numerosity requirement. Keele v, Wexler, No. 95 C3483, 1996 WL 124452, at *2 (N.D. Ill
March 19, 1996), aff'd 149 F.3d 589 (7" Cir. 1998); in a given case, 40 or fewer putative class
members can be sufficient, See Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 n.9
(7” Cir, 1969). Moreover, the precise number of putative class members need not be known. A
plaintiff can offer good faith estimates of class size if the specific number of class members may be
difficult to assess, and the Court may usc “common sense assumptions” to determine the validity of
those estimates. Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493, at *12,

The plaintiff here offers no specifics as to (he number of individuals who allegedly received
the lype of form letter that is the basis of the claim against CRI, Rather, the plaintiff asks the Court
to infer numerosity because a company the size of CRI (according to CRT’s DUNN & BRADSTREEY
report, it employs 85 persons and has revenues of $9 million per year) likely would send out this
standard form leiter on behalf of a large client (o more than 20 to 40 persons in a given year (Pl.’s
Mot. at 4), These kinds of extrapolations have been used by other courts in deciding that the
numerosity requirement has been meet, See Davis v, Suran, No. 98 C 0656, 1998 WL 474105, at
*2(N.D, IIL. Aug. 3, 1998) (using a defendant’s 10-K Form to determine the size of the company and

the approximate frequency of transactions at issue); Sledge v, Sands, 182 F.R.D. 255, 258 (N.D. Ill.



The Court finds that these factors all support class certification. The damage claims of
individual ¢lass members would be individually small, thus giving them a limited interest in
individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; on the other hand, providing one action
in which these individually small claims may be collected and addressed advances a fundamental
purpose of the class action vehicle, See Philips Petroleum Co, v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985)
(“class actions . .. may permit the plaintiff to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually”). The partics have not made the Court aware of any litigation that alrcady cxists
between members of the pulalive class and CRI regarding the mattcrs presented in this case.
Moreover, given that the putative class consists of persons with addresses throughout the state of
Milingis who received the same form of letter, the intcrests of judicial economy and avoiding
duplicative litigation and potentially inconsistent results underscores the desirability of concentrating
the claims in one forum. linally, Congress has expressly recognized the utility of the class action
vehicle in cases brought under the FDCPA, by providing special statutory provisions governing
damages in class actions under the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B) and (b)(2). Not
surprisingly, numerous FDCPA claims have been certified as class actions in this district. We sec
nothing about this case suggesting that there are unusual difficulties that would be encountered in

managing a class action that would militate against certification.

9



Icgal questions raised need to be common, so long as a single issue is common to all class members,
Spencer v. Central States Pension Fund, 778 F. Supp. 985, 989 n.2 (N.D, Ill. 1991). And, claims
arising out of standard documents present a “classic case for treatment as a class action.” Haroco,
Inc, v, Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 121 F.R.D. 664, 668 (N.D. Ill, 1998).

In this case, there plainly are questions of law and fact common to the class. The claims in
this case all depend on whether a standard form of letter violates Section 1692p(a)(1) of the Act by
failing to clearly describe the amount of the debt allegedly due. The plaintiff has satisfied the
commonality requirement.

€, Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires the claims of the representative parties to be typical of the claims of
the class as a whole. A plaintiff's claim is typical “if it arises from the same event OT practice or
course of conduct thal gives rise to the claims of other class members and his or her claims are based
on the same legal theory.” See, e.g., De Lu Fuente y, Stokely-Van Camp, Ine., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7"
Cir. 1983); see also Riordan v. Smith Barney, 113 F.R.D. 60, 63 (N.D, TI. £986). Here, the letter
that plaintiff claims he reccived, and that he claims violates the FDCPA, is of the same form that
CRI allegedly sent to all the putative class members, CRI’s alleged conduct as to cach plaintiff is
thus the same, as is the legal theory underlying the plaintifis’ FDCPA claim. See Rosario vy.
Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7" Cir. 1992). Thus, p laintiffhas met the typicality requirement.

Id.

6


1998) (considering the agency’s size in determining the frequency with which Ictters would be sent);
Carr v. Transunion Corp., C.A, 94-22, 1995 WL 20865 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1995) (inferring
numcrosity from the use of form collection letters),

In this casc, we are puzzled that the plaintiff has not provided more specificity as to the
number of putative class members. Discovery has been completed, and the plaintiff presumably has
had the opportunity to determine how many of these Ictters were sent in the year prior to the filing
of this lawsuit, and to whom. That said, we do believe it reasonable to make the “common sense
assumption” that in a state such as Illinois, a company such as CRI likcly would send letters of the
type set forth in Exhibit G to the complaint to as many as 40 people within a particular 12-month
period. We draw further confidence in this assumption from the fact that CRI has chosen not to offer
any argument or evidence to the contrary. In these circumstances, we believe it appropriate 0
Tesolve any questions on numerosity in favor of the plaintiff. See Evans vy. U.S. Pipe & Foundry,
Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11 Cir. 1983) (noting that some cases have held that “where the numerosity
question is a close one, a balance should be struck in favor or a finding of numerosity, since the
Court has the option to decertify pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)”).

B. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to prove (hat “there are questions of law or fact common
to the class.” Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “Where a question of law relers to a standardized conduct
of the defendants toward members of a proposed class, a common nucleus of operative facts is
typically presented and the commonality requirement . . . is usually met.” Franklin v. City of
Chicago, 102 F.R.D. 944, 949 (N.D. Ll. 1994) (citing Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 V'.R.D. 510,

514 (W.D, Pa. 1971)); Rosario v, Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7" Cir, 1992), Not all factual or



superiority of the class action mechanism.” Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493, at *16. We consider each
point in tum.
A

The predominance element clearly is met here. The common nucleus of operative fact in this
case concerns onc particular form of letter sent by CRI. The central legal issue is whether the text
of that letter violates the FDCPA. When standardized documents arc at issue, class actions are
generally appropriate because the document is the focal point of analysis. Haroco, 121 F.R.D. at
669; see also, Heastie v. Community Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669, 673-76 (N.D. Il.
1989). This is truc cven though the nature and amount of damages may differ among members of
the class, /d. And, here, even that is not a consideration, as the FDCPA establishes a set range of
damages that can be awarded to plaintiffs as a group in a class action. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1692k(a)(2)(B) and (6)(2).

B.

The plaintiff also has established the superiority of the class action mechanism. Matters
pertinent to a finding that the class action mechanism is superior to multiple individual
determinations include: ‘(a) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of scparate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation conceming the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (c) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (d) the

difficullies likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.” Rahim, 2001 WL

1263493, at TM15.



‘Minute Order Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

N igned Judy i i Sitting Judge if Oth
ary Magis Duden Sidney I. Schenlkier cha Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 6608 DATE 18/2003
CASE Terrence Ingram vs. Corporate Receivables, Inc., et al.
TITLE

[ln the following box (u} indicate the party filing the motion, e.g.,.pluintif[, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nawre

fthe motion being sented.
MOTION: ° i Prosonied.|

DOCKET ENTRY:

qa) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) a Brief in support of motion due

(3) oa Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer bricfdue___.

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearingon set for. at.

(5) o Status hearing[held/continued to} [set for/re-set for]on | ___setfor___at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference{held/continued to] [set for/re-sct for]on__sset for at_
(7) Oo Trial[set for/re-sct for]on____at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continved to. ___ at

(9) QO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

COFRCP4(m) ClLocal Rule 41.1 CLFRCP41(a\(1) OFRCP41(a)(2).

qo) [Other docket entry) ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Plaintiff’s motion
for class certification [doc. # 5] is GRANTED as to CRI and DENIED as to OSI. The Court hereby
certifies the following class undcr Rule 23(b)(3) for liability and damages on the claim against CRI: All
natural persons with Illinois addresses who were sent a letter in the form represented by Exhibit G to the
complaint, seeking to collect an amount allegedly owed to Household, on or before a date one year prior
to the filing of this action.

qi) ff [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No natices required, advised in open court.

No notices required. ber of
nunber ofootves

a | Notices mailed by judge’s stat

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices Cd
450 .. at
Mail AO 450 form. Lufiad yoruisia S fn
Copy to judgc/magistrate judge. * ara
u
; Q
courtroom sail RW 61 anv co
I deputy’s .
initials eee Ha
SHE aay fone nic received in
feenttal Clerk's Office stwiling deputy (witials



CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants plaintiff's motion for class certification (doc. #
5), and hereby certifics the following class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability and damages:

All natural persons with Ulinois addresses who were sent a letter in
the form represented by Exhibit G to the complaint, seeking to collect

an amount allegedly owed to Houschold, on or after a date one year
prior to the filing of this action.

Ke, T ACL

SIDNEY I. SEHENKIER
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August "4 2003



D, Adequacy

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a class representative must “possess the same
interest and suffer the same injury” as others in the class. Gea. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 156 (1982); East Texas Motor Freight Sys. Ine., v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)
(quoting Schlesinger vy, Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S, 208, 216 (1974)). ‘To ensure
that the representative party will fairly and adequately protected the interests of the class, the Court
considers whether: (1) the plaintiff has claims antagonistic to the interests of the class, (2) the
plaintiff has sufficient interest in the litigation to provide an incentive for effective advocacy of the

case, and (3) the plaintiff's counsel is competent to pursue the action on behalf of the class. Retired

Chicago Police Ass'n, 7 F.3d at 598.

Here the Court has been presented with nothing to suggest that plaintiff has interests
antagonistic to those of the class (as our findings on commonality and typicality suggest), or that he
has an insufficient stake in the case to pursuc it vigorously, Nor can there be any dispute that class
counsel is highly expericnced in this genre of litigation (class actions under the FDCPA). The
plaintiff has met the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4)

Ti.

We now tum to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), which permit class certification when “the
Court finds that the questions of Jaw or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The

rule thus requires two findings: “predominance of common questions over individual questions and



In considering a motion for class certification, the Court must accept the allegations in the
complaint as truc, and must not decide the outcome based on the merits of the claim. Lisen v.
Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). “[NJothing in either the language or the history
of Rule 23 .. . gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as aclass action.”) /d. A meritorious claim may
be resolved adversely to the plaintiffs after a court certifies a Rule 23 class, resulting in a res judicata
effect on the class. See Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, SB, 70 F.3d 937, 941-42 (7 Cir. 1995).
Thus, “while the ‘boundary between a class determination and the merits may not always be easily
discernable,” . . . because the Court’s certification decision depends on factors “enmeshed in the
factual and Icgal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action,’ ... it nonetheless is a boundary
that must be respected.’” Rahim v. Sheahan, No. 99 C 0395, 2001 WT. 1263493, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
19, 2001) (quoting Retired Chicago Police Ass'n., 7 F.3d at 598-599).

I.

The prerequisites to class certification under Rule 23(a) are numerosity, commonality,
typicality and adequacy of representation. We will address each of those elements below, in turn,
but beforc doing so, we note that there are two implied prerequisites to class certification that must
be satisfied prior to addressing thc issues raised by Rule 23(a). Firsi, the class must be sufficiently
defined so that the class is identifiable. Second, the namcd representatives must fall within the
proposed class. Rahim, 2001 WL 1263493, at *10 (quoting Guillory, 2001 WL 290603, at *2). In
this case, these two prerequisites arc met. The proposed class is defined with enough specificity to
allow the Court to “determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class,”

and is not overly broad. Guillory, 2001 WL 290603, at *2. Moreover, the named plaintiff in this



(b) with Illinois addresses (c) who were sent a letter in the form represented by Exhibit G [to the
complaint], (d) seeking lo collect on an amount allegedly owed to Household (@) on or afler a date
one year prior to the filing of this action” (P1.’s Motion, at 1-2).' CRI has declined to file any
opposition to plaintiff's motion for class certification: CRI states that “it does not consent to class
certification, but rather leaves it to the Court’s discretion to determine if class certification is
appropriate” (doc. #31: CRI’s Response to Pl.’s Motion, at 1). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court grants the plaintif{’s motion for class certification under Fed, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
L

To certify a class under Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(b), a plaintiff must first prove the existence of all
four prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a). Next, ihe plaintiff must satisfy one of the requirements sct
forth in Rule 23(b). Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 58 (IN.D. II. 1996). ‘The burden of
proof to mect all the requirements of Rule 23 rests with the plaintiff, Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 162 (1982), and the failure to satisfy these requirements precludes certification ofa class.
Retired Chicago Police Assoc. v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 596 (7° Cir. 1993). “[T]he court
maintains broad discretion to determine whether a proposed class satisfies the requirements and
should err in favor of maintaining class actions.” Guillory v. Am. Tobaeco Co,, 2001 WL 290603,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. March 20, 2001) (citing Patterson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476, 480 (7" Cir.

1980)).

'The motion for class certification also asks that two classes be certified against OSI (see Pl.'s Motion at 1).
However subsequent to the motion for class certification, OSI filed a petition for bankruptcy and, as a result. all
proceedings in this action have been stayed as to OSI (doc. # 30). Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's motion lor
class certification as to OST without prejudice,

7COn December 16, 2002, by consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U 636(c), the case was reassigned
to this Court far all proceedings, including the entry of final judgment (doc. ## 14-17).

2



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TERRENCE INGRAM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 02 C 6608
vs. )
) Magistrate Judge Schenkier
CORPORATE RECFIVABLES, INC., )
and OSI COLLECTION SERVICES, INC, ) Dey,
)
Defendants. ) Aug i 9» 177]
‘003

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On September 17, 2002, the plaintiff, Terrence N. Ingram, filed a two-count complaint
against OSI Collection Services, Inc. (“OSI”) and Corporate Receivables, inc, (“CRI”) under the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“the FDCPA” or “the Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et sey. The claims
set forth in the complaint arise out of certain letters sent by OSI and CRI to collect a debt allegedly
owed by Mr. Ingram. In Count I, the plaintiff claims that OSI sent a series of six collection letters
which violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692¢ and/or 1692g of the FDCPA. In Count II, the plaintiff claims that
CRI sent one letter that violated Section 1692a, On October 28, 2002, OST answered the complaint
(doc. #7), On December 17, 2002, CRI moved to dismiss the complaint (doc. #18). ‘This Court
granted the motion to dismiss the claim that CRI had violated Section] 692g(a)(3) of the Act, but
denied the motion as to the allegation that CRI had failed to clearly state the amount of the debt due,
in violation of Section 1692g(a)(1). /agram v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., No. 02 C 6608, 2003
WL 21018650 (N_D, ILL, May 5, 2003).

Now pending before the Court is the plaintiff's motion for class certification (doc. # 5),

which asks the Court to certify a class on the claim against CRI consisting of “(a) all natural persons

2