IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MARYALICE INSKEEP, 3:15-cv-00759-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

BRUCE W. BREWER

P.O. Box 421

West Linn, OR 97068

(503) 621-6633

Attorney for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1011

DAVID MORADO

Regional Chief Counsel

JORDAN D. GODDARD

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104-7075

(206) 615-2733

Attorneys for Defendant

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

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BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Maryalice Inskeep seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff’s application

for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the

Act. 

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Following a thorough

review of the record, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this Opinion and Order.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her application for DIB on September 22,

2011. Tr. 112.1 Her application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a

hearing on August 5, 2013, at which Plaintiff was represented by

an attorney. Tr. 30. A vocational expert (VE) also testified at

the hearing. Tr. 30.

The ALJ issued a decision on October 11, 2013, in which he

found Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits. Tr. 10-25. That

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on September 15, 2015, are referred to as “Tr.”

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decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on 

February 27, 2015, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review. Tr. 1-3. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,

106-07 (2000).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on October 30, 1948; was 64 years old on

the date of the hearing; and has a bachelor’s degree. Tr. 33,

112. Plaintiff has prior relevant work experience as a

registered nurse. Tr. 23.

Plaintiff alleges disability since September 14, 2010, due

to depression, anxiety, laminectomy and laminotomy, bilateral hip

replacements, bilateral neuropathy in her feet, high cholesterol,

hypertension, bilateral hand and feet psoriasis, osteoporosis,

and a “back inj[ury].” Tr. 132. Plaintiff’s date last insured

was September 31, 2014. Tr. 128.

Except as noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s

summary of the medical evidence. After carefully reviewing the

medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the

medical evidence. See Tr. 13-23.

STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

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Cir. 2012). To meet this burden a claimant must demonstrate her

inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).

The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1161

(9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence that

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11 (quoting Valentine v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)). It

is “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence but less than a

preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d at 690). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

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supports or detracts from the Commissioner’s decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006).

DISABILITY ANALYSIS

Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act. Keyser v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). See also

Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520. Each step is potentially dispositive. 

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). See also Keyser, 648

F.3d at 724.

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. Stout v. Comm’r Soc.

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Sec Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). See also 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the Commissioner must determine whether a

claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the listed

impairments and are so severe that they preclude substantial

gainful activity. The claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724. The

criteria for the listed impairments, known as Listings, are

enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Listed

Impairments).

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e). See also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p. “A

‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a

week, or an equivalent schedule.” SSR 96-8p, at *1. In other

words, the Social Security Act does not require complete

incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885

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F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). The assessment of a claimant’s

RFC is at the heart of Steps Four and Five of the sequential

analysis when the ALJ is determining whether a claimant can still

work despite severe medical impairments. An improper evaluation

of the claimant’s ability to perform specific work-related

functions “could make the difference between a finding of

‘disabled’ and ‘not disabled.’” SSR 96-8p, at *4. 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). See also

Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs exist in the

national economy that the claimant can perform. Lockwood v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of

a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines set

forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant

is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

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ALJ’S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since September 14, 2010, her

alleged onset date. Tr. 12.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe

impairments: osteoarthritis and allied disorders, spine

disorders, and peripheral neuropathy. Tr. 13-16.

At Step Three the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments do not

meet or equal the criteria for any impairment in the Listing of

Impairments. Tr. 16. 

In his assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC the ALJ found Plaintiff

has the functional capacity to perform a range of light work that

includes being limited to carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently; standing and walking six hours in an eighthour workday; sitting six hours in an eight-hour workday;

occasionally climbing ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and

scaffolds; and frequently stooping, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling. Tr. 16-23.

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform

her past relevant work as a registered nurse. Tr. 23.

At Step Five, however, the ALJ determined Plaintiff acquired

skills from her past relevant work that are transferrable to

other occupations in the national economy and that Plaintiff can

perform, including work as an occupational-health nurse and a

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medical assistant. Tr. 23-24.

Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff is not disabled and,

therefore, is not entitled to benefits. Tr. 24.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) found at Step

Two that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere; 

(2) discredited Plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) discredited the

opinion of Kate Commerford, Ph.D.

I. Step Two

 At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the

Commissioner determines the claimant does not have any medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments. Stout v. Comm’r

Soc. Sec Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). See also

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii); Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). A severe impairment

“significantly limits” a claimant’s “physical or mental ability

to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.921(a), (b). 

Such abilities and aptitudes include walking, standing, sitting,

lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, handling, seeing,

hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions; using judgment; responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work

situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 

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Id. 

The Step Two threshold is low:

[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if

it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal

effect on the individual that it would not be expected

to interfere with the individual’s ability to work 

. . . . [T]he severity regulation is to do no more

than allow the Secretary to deny benefits summarily to

those applicants with impairments of a minimal nature

which could never prevent a person from working. 

SSR 85-28, at *2 (Nov. 30, 1984)(internal quotations omitted). 

The “step-two inquiry “ is ‘a de minimis screening device to

dispose of groundless claims.’” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d

1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The Ninth Circuit has held when the ALJ has resolved Step

Two in a claimant’s favor, any error in designating specific

impairments as severe does not prejudice a claimant at Step Two

if the ALJ considered the impairments when formulating his

assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

682 (9th Cir. 2005)(any error in omitting an impairment from the

severe impairments identified at Step Two was harmless when Step

Two was resolved in claimant’s favor). 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he found at Step Two

that Plaintiff did not have any mental impairments that

constituted “severe impairments.” The ALJ declined to include

any mental impairments at Step Two because the ALJ found mentalstatus examinations throughout the record reflects normal

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findings, the record reflects Plaintiff’s mental-health symptoms

showed improvement, Plaintiff’s “mood problems appear primarily

situational,” and Plaintiff engaged in activities that are

inconsistent with disabling mental-health limitations. Tr. 15. 

Applying the “paragraph B” criteria, the ALJ concluded

Plaintiff’s mental impairments do not cause more than “mild”

limitation in activities of daily living; social functioning; or

concentration, persistence, and pace, and Plaintiff did not have

any episodes of decompensation. Tr. 15-16. Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded Plaintiff’s mental impairments were nonsevere. Tr. 16.

The record reflects, however, that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments are more than minimal. Although the ALJ correctly

noted there are numerous instances in which Plaintiff’s treatment

providers noted improvement in Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression

symptoms or that Plaintiff’s symptoms were under control at that

time (e.g., Tr. 226, 240, 252, 276, 323, 411, 485, 540), the

record as a whole reflects Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression

were significant issues for which Plaintiff sought consistent

treatment from her primary-care providers as well as Dr.

Commerford. The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments did not pass the “de minimis screening device to

dispose of groundless claims” at Step Two, therefore, is not

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supported by substantial evidence in the record.2 See Edlund,

253 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290).

On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ erred

at Step Two when he found Plaintiff’s mental impairments are

nonsevere. This error is not harmless because the ALJ did not

include any mental limitations in his assessment of Plaintiff’s

RFC. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 682.

II. Plaintiff’s Testimony

In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two

requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom

testimony: The claimant must produce objective medical evidence

of an impairment or impairments, and she must show the impairment

or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of symptom. Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th

Cir. 1986). See also Spelatz v. Astrue, 321 F. App’x 689, 692

(9th Cir. 2009). The claimant, however, need not produce

objective medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their

severity. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). 

See also Delgado v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 500 F.

App’x 570, 570 (9th Cir. 2012).

2 In contrast, the Court notes many of the factors that the

ALJ relied on in his erroneous assessment that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments were nonsevere at Step Two are appropriately

considered when the ALJ weighs testimonial evidence and assesses

Plaintiff’s RFC.

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If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not

any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant’s pain testimony only if he provides clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,

750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834

(9th Cir. 1995)). General assertions that the claimant’s

testimony is not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must

identify “what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant's complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester, 81

F.3d at 834).

At the August 5, 2013, hearing, Plaintiff testified she has

difficulty with concentration and memory and cannot perform work

that requires intensive concentration. Tr. 38. Plaintiff

stated, however, that she recently completed coursework in

medical coding and was doing an internship four days per week,

eight hours per day. Tr. 35-36. Plaintiff testified she

experiences neuropathy in both feet, which makes her feet feel

like they have “fallen asleep.” Tr. 40-41. Plaintiff also noted

she suffers from hip and back pain as a result of previous

surgeries, but the pain is not significant. Tr. 40-41.

In her Adult Function Report dated November 16, 2011,

Plaintiff reported she suffers from “a lot of anxiety and

depression” as a result of losing her previous employment as a

registered nurse. Tr. 163. Plaintiff stated she exercises on a

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

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treadmill for 30 minutes per day, helps care for her grandson by

preparing meals and provides him with transportation to and from

school, and can perform daily household chores including laundry

and yard work. Tr. 164-66. Plaintiff reported she has

difficulty with completing tasks and concentration as a result of

her conditions and can pay attention for “sometimes 30 seconds,

sometimes longer.” Tr. 168. In addition, Plaintiff stated she

“feel[s] intimidated by some authority figures” and has a lot of

anxiety when she is around unfamiliar people. Tr. 168-69. 

Finally, Plaintiff stated she “feel[s] better,” is “able to go

about the activities of daily living,” and is “working at finding

work in a different field.” Tr. 170.

The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s testimony because her

“allegations of disability have little to no support” and

Plaintiff’s “allegations of daily living are inconsistent with

disability.” Tr. 17-18. The Court concludes the reasons the ALJ

provided constitute clear and convincing reasons for discrediting

Plaintiff’s testimony.

The ALJ reasonably concluded Plaintiff’s activities

(including exercising at the gym, passing a medical coding class

and certification examination, and participating in an

internship) are inconsistent with her allegations of disabling

mental and physical limitations. Tr. 15, 18. The ALJ also

reasonably concluded treatment providers frequently noted

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Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression were improving and under

control and that Plaintiff frequently did not report any

significant physical impairments. See, e.g., Tr. 226, 379, 426,

443, 540.

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ

provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for rejecting Plaintiff’s allegations of

disabling mental and physical impairments.

III. Dr. Commerford’s Opinion

An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion when it is

inconsistent with the opinions of other treating or examining

physicians if the ALJ makes findings setting forth specific,

legitimate reasons for doing so that are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011). When the medical opinion of

a treating physician is uncontroverted, however, the ALJ must

give “clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting it. Turner v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995)). The

opinion of a treating physician is “given greater weight than the

opinions of other physicians.” Kelly v. Astrue, No. 10–36147,

2012 WL 767306, at *1 (9th Cir. 2012)(quoting Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996)).

A nonexamining physician is one who neither examines nor

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treats the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir. 1995). See also Garrison v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-15103, 2014

WL 3397218, at *13 (9th Cir. 2014). “The opinion of a

nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial

evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an

examining physician or a treating physician.” Taylor, 659 F.3d

at 1233 (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 831). When a nonexamining

physician’s opinion contradicts an examining physician’s opinion

and the ALJ gives greater weight to the nonexamining physician’s

opinion, the ALJ must articulate her reasons for doing so with

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence. See, e.g., Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194,

1198 (9th Cir. 2008). A nonexamining physician’s opinion can

constitute substantial evidence if it is supported by other

evidence in the record. Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Simpson v. Astrue,

No. 10-cv-06399-BR, 2012 WL 1340113, at *5 (D. Or. Apr. 18,

2012).

In a letter dated October 30, 2011, Dr. Commerford reported

Plaintiff’s symptoms of depression included sleep disturbance,

appetite and eating pattern changes, “significant problems with

concentration and decision-making,” decreased motivation,

tearfulness, “worry and ruminations,” low self-esteem, and selfquestioning. Tr. 214. Dr. Commerford stated Plaintiff

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“struggled with completing activities of daily living.” Tr. 214. 

In addition, Dr. Commerford noted Plaintiff

reports limitations in maintaining attention and

concentration, meeting schedules and sustaining

routines, and making simple work-related decisions. 

She is not able to complete a normal workday without

interference from psychologically-based symptoms. She

is highly sensitive to feedback or criticism from

supervisors, and finds it difficult to ask for

assistance.

Tr. 215.

On July 27, 2013, Dr. Commerford wrote a letter that was 

in many respects identical to her October 30, 2011, letter. 

Tr. 589-90. The July 27, 2013, letter additionally indicated

Plaintiff had completed training in medical coding and billing,

and was completing an internship “in a billing setting,” but 

that she had “some problems with memory and concentration 

while working at the internship.” Tr. 590. In addition, 

Dr. Commerford submitted a worksheet reflecting her assessment of

Plaintiff’s mental RFC in which she indicated Plaintiff was

moderately limited in most functions relating to understanding,

memory, concentration, and persistence, but not significantly

limited in most other respects. Tr. 570-73.

The ALJ gave Dr. Commerford’s opinions “zero weight” on the

grounds that they are inconsistent with the normal mental-status

examination findings and the medical record as a whole, they 

are not supported by any mental-status examination findings 

or assessments in Dr. Commerford’s treatment notes, and 

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Dr. Commerford relied on Plaintiff’s subjective self-reporting.

The Court notes Dr. Commerford’s opinion was contradicted 

by the opinion of Paul Rethinger, Ph.D., a nonexamining

psychologist. Tr. 56-57. Accordingly, the ALJ was required to

provide specific and legitimate reasons for discrediting 

Dr. Commerford’s opinion. See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198. Indeed,

the ALJ correctly noted Dr. Commerford’s opinion was explicitly

based in large part on Plaintiff’s subjective reporting. See Tr.

590 (“Ms. Inskeep reports limitations in maintaining attention

and concentration, meeting schedules and sustaining routines, and

making simple work-related decisions.”) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, Dr. Commerford’s testimony that Plaintiff was unable to

maintain her activities of daily living was inconsistent with

many portions of the medical record as well as Plaintiff’s own

testimony.

Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes the ALJ

provided legally sufficient reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Commerford’s opinion.

IV. Remand

Having found the ALJ erred when he improperly failed to find

at Step Two that Plaintiff’s mental impairments are severe, the

Court must determine whether to remand this matter for further

proceedings or to remand for the immediate calculation of

benefits. 

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The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or

for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely

utility of further proceedings. See, e.g., Brewes v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). The court may

“direct an award of benefits where the record has been fully

developed and where further administrative proceedings would

serve no useful purpose.” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit has established a

three-part test for determining when evidence should be credited

and an immediate award of benefits directed. Strauss v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). The

court should grant an immediate award of benefits when: 

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient

reasons for rejecting such evidence, (2) there are no

outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to

find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 

Id. The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question: Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if

the case were remanded for further proceedings. See, e.g.,

Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Here further administrative proceedings are necessary to

formulate an assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC that includes

Plaintiff’s mental limitations and to determine whether Plaintiff

is disabled. Accordingly, the Court remands this matter to the

Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Commissioner and REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings

consistent with this Opinion and Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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