J-S31006-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYRELL LIENELL JONES 

Appellant No. 829 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence imposed November 12, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-45-CR-0002216-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2022

Appellant, Tyrell Lienell Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County on November 12, 

2020, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of 

disorderly conduct. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows.

On August 27, 2019, at approximately 9:48 a.m., Pennsylvania 

State Trooper Jonathan Marianelli observed a burgundy Jeep 

Grand Cherokee with no valid license plate traveling East on I 80 

at mile marker 298.7. The vehicle’s back license plate bore a 

message that stated, “NOT FOR HIRE” “PRIVATE PROPERTY” and 

“PRIVATE NOT FOR COMMERCIAL USE PRIVATE MODE OF 

TRAVEL.” The trooper did not recognize this as an approved 

registration plate and initiated a traffic stop at I 80 East MM 298.8 

in Pocono Township. When the [t]ropper approached the 

vehicle[,] the operator refused to lower his front window to speak 

with the [t]rooper and was distracted with his cell phone. The 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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operator eventually lowered his rear passenger window 

approximately an inch to speak through.

The operator related he was travelling and provided a Passport ID 

card and vehicle insurance card, but did not provide a vehicle 

registration or driver’s license. Trooper Marianelli identified the 

operator as [Appellant], and a CLEAN/NCIC search revealed that 

[Appellant]’s license was suspended. Due to observed behaviors 

which indicated [Appellant] may be a sovereign citizen, Trooper 

Marianelli requested an additional unit to assist. The [t]rooper 

then prepared summary citations and requested a tow truck 

because the vehicle was on a limited access highway and 

[Appellant] had a suspended driver’s license and no valid 

registration.

Trooper Marianelli requested [Appellant] exit his vehicle and to sit 

inside the tow truck which arrived at the scene. Despite this 

request, [Appellant] refused to exit his vehicle. [Appellant] then 

requested to speak to Trooper Marianelli’s supervisor, Corporal 

Digregorio, who was already on scene. Corporal Digregorio 

addressed [Appellant] and related the same message as Trooper 

Marianelli. [Appellant] continued to refuse to exit the vehicle and 

Corporal Digregorio told [Appellant] that he had two minutes to 

comply or he was going to be taken to see a judge. [Appellant] 

continued to refuse to exit the vehicle and the police decided that 

he would need to be extracted. A patrol vehicle was placed into 

the right travel lane of I-80 east closing off the lane during a time 

of high traffic which caused a backup on the limited access 

highway. Trooper Marianelli then used a glass break tool to enter 

[Appellant]’s vehicle and unlock the door. [Appellant], still 

refusing to obey commands, was removed from his vehicle and 

placed under arrest.

[Appellant] was tried on November 12, 2020 in a non-jury trial. 

He was found guilty of disorderly conduct (M3) and sentenced to 

pay a fine of $2,500 and the cost of proceedings.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 1-3 (internal citations to record omitted).

Upon denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, Appellant timely filed 

the instant appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence is 

insufficient to support his conviction for disorderly conduct because the police 
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itself created the disturbance by unlawfully electing to tow Appellant’s vehicle. 

We disagree.

“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of 

law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 151 (Pa. 2013).

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every 

element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Diamond, 623 Pa. 475, 83 A.3d 119, 126 

(2013). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” 

Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525–26 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). It is within the province of the fact-finder to 

determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’s testimony 

and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth 

v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of 

the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 767 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. 

Commonwealth v. Rogal, 120 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2019).

As relevant to this case, an individual commits the crime of disorderly 

conduct “if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or 

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . . creates a hazardous or physically 

offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the 

actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). 
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Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant’s 

conduct created a hazardous condition and that his refusal to comply with the 

troopers’ orders did not serve a legitimate purpose. See Appellant’s Brief at 

11-16. We disagree. 

Appellant acknowledges that there was a hazardous or physically

offensive condition. Indeed, the trial court noted that “both parties agree that 

the lane closure on I-80 constituted a physically hazardous condition.” See

Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 5 (citing N.T., 11/12/20, at 49, 51-52). 

Nonetheless, Appellant argues that the police created the condition, not he. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. As persuasively stated by the trial court, “review 

of the trial record in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth supports 

finding that the sole purpose of the lane closure was to remove [Appellant] 

from the vehicle. Simply put, the towing of the vehicle did not cause the lane 

closure. Rather, the sole cause of the lane closure was [Appellant]’s refusal 

to exit the vehicle.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 5 (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant’s 

conduct created a hazardous condition. 

Appellant also argues that towing the vehicle was unlawful because the 

Commonwealth failed to provide any evidence that the troopers’ decision to 

tow was based on public safety concerns. Appellant’s Brief at 12 (relying on 
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Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94 (Pa. 2013))

1

. Appellant is not 

contending that there were not public safety concerns (indeed, it is not 

disputed that there were). See Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 5 (citing N.T., 

11/12/20, at 49, 51-52).). Appellant merely argues that the trooper, in his 

testimony, failed to state that the decision to tow was based on public safety 

concerns. To this end, Appellant notes that Lagenella requires “the 

assessment of safety concerns to be the explicit reason for the officer’s 

decision to tow, not an assessment of safety concerns by the [c]ourt after the 

fact.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. The record does not support Appellant’s 

contention. 

At trial, Trooper Marianelli testified as follows:

Q: Now during the course of communicating with [Appellant] did 

you advise him of him not having a valid license, not having 

insurance - - the registration rather, not being registered properly 

and so forth?

A: Yes.

Q: And what did you advise him about that? As a result of that 

what did you have him do?

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1

In Lagenella, the police pulled over a motorist for failing to use a turn signal 

and then ascertained that his driver’s license was suspended and that the 

vehicle did not have an emissions sticker. Although the defendant said that 

he could call a friend to drive the vehicle home, the police refused and 

impounded the vehicle. At the suppression hearing, the police testified that 

the vehicle was undamaged, it was legally parked at the curb, and that the 

vehicle neither posed a detriment to the flow of traffic nor created a safety 

hazard. The Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth had failed to 

produce any evidence that would allow the police to impound the vehicle. 
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A: As a result of an unregistered and unlicensed vehicle being on 

a limited access highway I advised him that the vehicle needed to 

be removed by a tow.

Q: By a what?

A: By a tow truck.

Q: By a tow truck, okay. And then what was his response?

A: Basically no response. He didn’t - -

N.T. Trial, 11/12/20, at 11-12.

Thus, in light of the foregoing, the record belies Appellant’s argument.

We also agree with the trial court that Appellant’s reliance on Lagenella

is misplaced. It is clear that pursuant to Lagenella, the police could have 

towed Appellant’s car if it was “impeding the flow of traffic” or “parked illegally 

on the street.” Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 102. Here, Appellant’s vehicle was 

“immobilized on the shoulder of I-80, a limited access highway, during a time 

of high traffic,” see Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 8. Since standing or 

parking a vehicle on a limited access highway is prohibited, see 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3353(a)(2)(vii), under Lagenella, the troopers properly towed Appellant’s 

vehicle. 

Finally, Appellant argues that “Appellant was pursuing a legitimate 

purpose by remaining in the car.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Specifically, 

Appellant explains his claim as follows:
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Per the statute, police should have immobilized the car and not 

towed it. [75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(b)][2]then provides a procedure 

to satisfy conditions before a magistrate to allow the car’s release 

and towing without being impounded. The Appellant, if left alone 

with his traffic tickets as he would properly have been, could have 

lawfully pursued the towing of the vehicle in accordance with the 

statute.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. 

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2 Section 6309.2(b) reads as follows:

(b) Procedure upon immobilization.—

(1) When a vehicle is immobilized pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), the operator of the vehicle may appear before the 

appropriate judicial authority within 24 hours from the time 

the vehicle was immobilized. The appropriate judicial 

authority may issue a certificate of release upon:

(i) the furnishing of proof of registration and financial 

responsibility by the owner of the vehicle; and

(ii) receipt of evidence that the operator of the vehicle 

has complied with the pertinent provisions of Title 42 

(relating to judiciary and judicial procedure) and this 

title.

(2) When a vehicle is immobilized pursuant to subsection 

(a)(2), the owner of the vehicle may appear before the 

appropriate judicial authority within 24 hours from the time 

the vehicle was immobilized. The appropriate judicial 

authority may issue a certificate of release upon:

(i) the furnishing of proof of registration and financial 

responsibility by the owner of the vehicle; and

(ii) receipt of evidence that the operator of the vehicle 

has complied with the pertinent provisions of Title 42 

and this title.

(3) If a certification of release is not obtained within 24 

hours from the time the vehicle was immobilized, the vehicle 

shall be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and 

storage agent under subsection (c).
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Appellant, however, neglects to mention that, under Section 6309.2(a), 

the procedure mentioned under subsection 6309.2(b) is applicable unless “in 

the interest of public safety, [the law enforcement officer] direct[s] that 

the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent 

pursuant to subsection (c).” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)3 (emphasis added).

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3 Section 6309.2(a) reads as follows:

(a) General rule.--Subject to subsection (d) [which it is not 

relevant for our discussion], the following shall apply:

(1) If a person operates a motor vehicle or combination on 

a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the 

person’s operating privilege is suspended, revoked, 

canceled, recalled or disqualified or where the person is 

unlicensed, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement 

officer in cooperation with the department, the law 

enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle or 

combination or, in the interest of public safety, direct 

that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate 

towing and storage agent pursuant to subsection (c), and 

the appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified.

(2) If a motor vehicle or combination for which there is no 

valid registration or for which the registration is suspended, 

as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer, is 

operated on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth, 

the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the motor 

vehicle or combination or, in the interest of public safety, 

direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the 

appropriate towing and storing agent pursuant to subsection 

(c), and the appropriate judicial authority shall be so 

notified.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(emphasis added).
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Here, it is undisputed that the vehicle was parked on a limited access 

highway, jeopardizing public safety, which justified the immediate towing of 

Appellant’s vehicle.4 See also Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 8-9. Thus, we 

agree with the trial court that “this safety concern afforded police the authority 

to tow [Appellant’s] vehicle under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.” Id. at 9.5 

Because Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are

without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

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4 The United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 

364 (1976) addressed the “in the interest of public safety” concept as follows:

In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has 

called “community caretaking functions,” Cady v. Dombrowski, 

[413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)], automobiles are frequently taken into 

police custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. To 

permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances 

to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be 

removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police 

engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police 

will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which 

violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the 

public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The 

authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles 

impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is 

beyond challenge.

Id. at 368-69 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 

5 The trial court also noted that Appellant “admitted that the location of his 

vehicle did pose a public safety concern during oral argument at trial and in 

the Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/9/21, at 8 (citing 

N.T., 11/12/20, at 51).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/1/2022