J-A11023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAVEN NICHOLE JEFFREY 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 893 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-33-CR-0000451-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 22, 2023

Appellant, Raven Nichole Jeffrey, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

judgment of sentence of 351⁄2 to 71 years’ incarceration, imposed after she 

pled guilty to various sexual offenses. On appeal, Appellant seeks to challenge

the discretionary aspects of her sentence. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, 

J.D. Ryan, Esq., seeks to withdraw his representation of Appellant pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After careful review, we affirm 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Attorney Ryan summarizes the pertinent facts and procedural history of 

Appellant’s case, as follows:

Appellant was charged with multiple offenses, and eventually 

entered pleas of guilty to the following: Filming Sex Acts, 18 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A11023-23

- 2 -

Pa.C.S.[]§ 6312(b)(1), Felony of the First Degree; Conspiracy to 

Commit Filming Sex Acts, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 903, Felony of the First 

Degree; Sexual Exploitation of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 6320(a), 

Felony of the Second Degree; Conspiracy to Commit Sexual 

Exploitation of a Child, 18 Pa. C.S.[] § 903, Felony of the Second 

Degree; and Conspiracy to Commit Rape of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S.[] 

§ 903, Felony of the First Degree. Additionally, she entered a no 

contest plea to Rape of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3121(c), Felony of 

the First Degree. The charges stem from an incident where 

Appellant’s paramour engaged in sexual acts with ... Appellant’s 

young daughter while Appellant recorded the act[s] on a cell 

phone.

Appellant was subsequently sentenced on May 18, 2022, to an 

aggregate period of thirty-five and a half (35.5) years to seventyone (71) years of incarceration.... Appellant filed a timely PostSentence Motion requesting reconsideration of [her] sentence. 

The lower court denied said Motion without a Hearing. 

Anders Brief at 5 (some spacing altered). 

Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from her judgment of sentence. 

However, she subsequently filed a timely petition under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, seeking the reinstatement of her appeal 

rights, which the court granted. Appellant then filed a nunc pro tunc notice of 

appeal,1 and she complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Therein, 

Appellant preserved one issue for our review: “The [trial] court abused its 

discretion in sentencing [Appellant] to excessive and consecutive sentences.” 

____________________________________________

1 We note that the notice of appeal was timestamped by the trial court on 

August 3, 2022, but it was not entered on the trial court’s docket until August 

4, 2022. It is unclear why there is a discrepancy, but the notice of appeal was 

filed within 30 days of the order granting Appellant leave to appeal nunc pro 

tunc regardless of which date is used.
J-A11023-23

- 3 -

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 9/16/22, at 1 (single page). The court filed a 

responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 20, 2022. 

On November 7, 2022, Attorney Ryan filed with this Court a petition to 

withdraw from representing Appellant. That same day, counsel also filed an 

Anders brief, discussing the sentencing claim set forth in Appellant’s Rule 

1925(b) statement. Attorney Ryan concludes that this issue is frivolous, and 

that Appellant has no other, non-frivolous issues she could pursue herein. 

Accordingly, 

this Court must first pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw 

before reviewing the merits of the underlying issues presented by 

[the appellant]. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 

290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).

Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,

counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established 

by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of 

the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a letter 

that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to 

pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any 

points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention 

in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” 
J-A11023-23

- 4 -

Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 

2007), appeal denied, ... 936 A.2d 40 ([Pa.] 2007).

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-80 (Pa. Super. 2014). After 

determining that counsel has satisfied these technical requirements of Anders 

and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to 

ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that 

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. 

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

In this case, Attorney Ryan’s Anders brief complies with the abovestated requirements. Namely, he includes a summary of the relevant factual 

and procedural history, he refers to portions of the record that could arguably 

support Appellant’s claim, and he sets forth his conclusion that Appellant’s 

appeal is frivolous. He also explains his reasons for reaching that 

determination, and he supports his rationale with citations to the record and 

pertinent legal authority. Further, Attorney Ryan states in his petition to 

withdraw that he has supplied Appellant with a copy of his Anders brief. 

Additionally, he attached a letter directed to Appellant to his petition to 

withdraw, in which he informed Appellant of the rights enumerated in 

Nischan. Accordingly, counsel has complied with the technical requirements 

for withdrawal. We will now independently review the record to determine if 

Appellant’s issue is frivolous, and to ascertain if there are any other, nonfrivolous issues she could pursue on appeal. 

According to Attorney Ryan, Appellant believes that the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing “a lengthy prison sentence that included 
J-A11023-23

- 5 -

multiple consecutive sentences, as well as a maximum sentence [on] one 

charge.” Anders Brief at 7. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not 

appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 

73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather, an appellant challenging the 

sentencing court’s discretion must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction 

by (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the 

issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the 

sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a 

separate section of the brief setting forth “a concise statement of 

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence[;]” and (4) presenting a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). 

Id. (citation omitted).

Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272.

Here, Appellant filed a timely appeal after her right to do so was

reinstated, and she preserved her sentencing claim in her timely-filed, postsentence motion. While Attorney Ryan did not include a Rule 2119(f) 

statement in his appellate brief, “[w]here counsel files an Anders brief, this 

Court has reviewed the matter even absent a separate [Rule] 2119(f) 

statement.” Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citations omitted). “Hence, we do not consider counsel’s failure to 

submit a Rule 2119(f) statement as precluding review of whether Appellant’s

issue is frivolous.” Id.

In conducting our review, we are mindful that,

[w]hen considering the merits of a discretionary aspects of 

sentencing claim, we analyze the sentencing court’s decision 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v.

Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2013). In conducting 
J-A11023-23

- 6 -

this review, we are guided by the statutory requirements of 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d). Id. Section 9781(c) provides that this 

Court shall vacate a sentence and remand under three 

circumstances:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines 

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; 

or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing 

guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). In addition, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Zeigler, 112 A.3d at 661-62.

Instantly, in Appellant’s post-sentence motion, she averred that the 

court imposed an excessive aggregate sentence where she was cooperative 

throughout the investigation and prosecution, and she maintained that she 

“acted ... under duress from her co-defendant, who had threatened to kill her 

and her daughter if [she] didn’t assist him in these crimes.” Motion for 

Reconsideration, 5/27/22, at 1 (single page). Appellant also insisted that the 

court had improperly considered that “the subject video [was] posted on the 
J-A11023-23

- 7 -

internet[,]” but this “did not happen.” Id. According to Appellant, “[t]he codefendant had posted other child pornography to the internet[,]” and “[t]he 

victims in those pictures/videos were not [her] daughter.” Id. Appellant 

insisted she “was not involved in those actions[,]” and her aggregate sentence 

is excessive. Id.2

____________________________________________

2 On appeal, Attorney Ryan adds that Appellant wishes to assert that the court

abused its discretion by imposing several consecutive sentences, and the 

statutory-maximum sentence for her conviction of rape of a child is excessive. 

However, those claims were not presented in the post-sentence motion or at 

the sentencing proceeding. Thus, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 

Super. 2003) (“[I]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing

must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by raising the claim during the 

sentencing proceedings.”) (citation omitted). In any event, even if not 

waived, we would deem these arguments frivolous. The statutory maximum 

sentence for rape of a child was the top-end term of the standard-range 

sentencing guidelines applicable to Appellant. Thus, we would conclude that 

the court’s imposition of this sentence is not facially unreasonable. 

Additionally, 

Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose 

its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences

being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. 

Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not 

raise a substantial question. In fact, this Court has recognized the 

imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may 

raise a substantial question in only the most extreme 

circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly 

harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of 

imprisonment. That is[,] in our view, the key to resolving the 

preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to 

sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what 

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the 

criminal conduct at issue in the case.
J-A11023-23

- 8 -

Appellant’s sentencing challenge is frivolous. First, as Attorney Ryan 

points out, each sentence Appellant received was “within the standard 

guideline[ range], albeit at the top end of each range.” Anders Brief at 8. 

Thus, under section 9781(c), Appellant must demonstrate that her sentence 

is “clearly unreasonable.” Considering the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, 

which elaborates on the section 9781(d) factors, she cannot do so. In 

particular, the trial court explained:

Prior to sentencing [Appellant], the [c]ourt reviewed her 

presentence investigation report. (See Sentencing Transcript 

(“ST”), 05/18/2022, [at] 11). It knew everything it needed to 

know about [Appellant] and the offenses to which she had pled 

guilty. That she had never before been convicted of a crime and 

expressed regret about actively participating in the exploitation of 

her young daughter did not outweigh the egregiousness of what 

she had done, though. (See id. at 12-18 (explaining its reasons 

for adoption [of] Probation’s recommendation)).

Quite naturally, a defendant’s focus tends to be singular; [here, 

Appellant] subjectively assesses her own culpability for the crimes 

at issue and expects that her sentence should coincide with that

assessment. The Sentencing Code prescribes a much broader 

focus and objective evaluation.... It demands that the sentencing 

[c]ourt consider not just [Appellant’s] perception of herself, which 

may not realistically account for even her own rehabilitative 

needs, let alone how her conduct[] affected others, but also any 

evidence that contradicts her self-assessment. 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 

9721. It must also consider the nature of her crimes, the impact 

they had or will have on her victim(s), and protecting the public 

as a whole. That being the case, the actual sentence imposed in 

any given case may be substantially greater than what the 

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808–09 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned 

up). For the reasons set forth, infra, we would conclude that the court’s 

imposition of consecutive sentences is not facially excessive, considering the 

seriousness of Appellant’s crimes. 
J-A11023-23

- 9 -

defendant deems to be fair[,] but still reflect an appropriate 

exercise of the [c]ourt’s sentencing discretion. Such is the case 

here.

One can hardly overstate the seriousness of [Appellant’s] criminal 

conduct. Her own mother related in small part the victim’s severe 

emotional trauma, (see ST ... [at] 5-7), and it has become 

common knowledge that childhood sexual abuse often leaves the 

victim feeling vulnerable for the rest of her life. [Appellant] put 

that burden on her own 5-year-old-daughter and, despite 

vocalizing sorrow and regret for her actions, [she] gave the clear 

impression that she failed to appreciate their consequences or 

take responsibility for them. On the contrary, as the hearing 

progressed, [Appellant] attempted to portray herself as a victim 

in this case, denying involvement in the worst parts of her 

daughter’s abuse and downplaying her role in the activities to 

which she had already pled guilty, and maintaining that she had 

no choice but to cooperate with her co-defendant’s plan to 

repeatedly rape and sexually exploit her daughter. In the 

[c]ourt’s mind, that made her a poor candidate for rehabilitation 

and increased her potential to acquiesce in the future to the 

deviate sexual proclivities of a pedophile. Weighing the relevant 

sentencing factors, therefore, the [c]ourt determined that a 

sentence below the recommendation was not warranted. It did 

not thereby abuse its discretion. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/20/22, at 1-2.

Clearly, the trial court considered the requisite, statutory factors when 

fashioning Appellant’s sentence, and the terms of incarceration it imposed are 

not an abuse of its ample discretion. The court’s brief mention that Appellant 

was “putting [videos of her daughter] out on the internet[,]” even if inaccurate

as Appellant claims, does not demonstrate that the court’s sentence was 

significantly influenced by that factor. N.T. Sentencing, 5/18/22, at 13. 

Instead, it is obvious that the court focused on the seriousness of Appellant’s 

crimes, their impact on the victim, her failure to appreciate the consequences 

of her actions, her passing blame onto her co-defendant, that she is a poor 
J-A11023-23

- 10 -

candidate for rehabilitation, and that she poses a risk to the community. In 

light of the court’s explanation for its sentence and the record before us, we 

conclude that Appellant’s sentence is not clearly unreasonable. Thus, we 

agree with Attorney Ryan that Appellant’s sentencing challenge is frivolous. 

Because we can discern no other, non-frivolous claims that Appellant 

could raise herein, we affirm her judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2023