NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LAURI A. TUPPER, 

Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

GARY A. TUPPER, 

Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0831 FC 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. DR1998-092983 

The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Lauri A. Tupper, Queen Creek 

Petitioner/Appellee 

 Gary A. Tupper, Gilbert 

Respondent/Appellant 
TUPPER v. TUPPER 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Gary A. Tupper (Father) appeals from the family court’s 

order denying reimbursement of child support payments to Lauri A. 

Tupper, aka Lauri A. Rodriguez (Mother). For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Father and Mother divorced in 1998. They have three 

children—C.T., V.T., and L.T. Father was required to pay child support 

pursuant to a 1998 child support order, which was later modified in 2002. 

¶3 Father paid child support until May 2013, when the 

youngest child, L.T., graduated from high school. In November 2012, 

Mother applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on L.T.’s behalf. 

In October 2013, L.T. was awarded SSI benefits retroactive to December 

2012. Meanwhile, Father did not petition the family court to terminate his 

child support obligation until March 2014, which the court granted in May 

2014. 

¶4 Father requested that the family court order Mother to 

reimburse the November 2012 through May 2013 child support payments. 

The family court denied Father’s request for retroactive reimbursement, 

because those payments predated the termination order. Father timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-

120.21.A.1, and -2101.A (West 2015).1

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
TUPPER v. TUPPER 

Decision of the Court 

3 

DISCUSSION 

¶5 Father argues that the family court erred by finding that 

A.R.S. § 25-527 does not provide for reimbursement of his child support 

payments. We review the family court’s application and interpretation of 

a statute de novo. Thomas v. Thomas, 203 Ariz. 34, 36, ¶ 7 (App. 2002) 

(citation omitted). A court’s decision whether to order reimbursement for 

the overpayment of child support is within its discretion. See A.R.S. § 25-

527.B. A court abuses its discretion when it “commits an error of law in 

the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion.” In re Marriage of 

Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 8 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). 

¶6 “When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to give 

effect to the legislature's intent.” Id. at 548–49, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). The 

statutory language is the best evidence of the legislature's intent. Id. at 

549, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). If the statutory text can be reasonably 

interpreted to have more than one meaning, we look to the historical 

background, spirit, purpose, and effects of the statute to determine 

legislative intent. Id. at 548–49, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). 

¶7 Father argues that A.R.S. § 25-527 provides for 

reimbursement of the November 2012 through May 2013 child support 

payments, even though his child support obligation was not terminated 

pursuant to court order until 2014. We disagree. 

¶8 Under A.R.S. § 25-527, “[a]n obligor whose obligation to pay 

support has terminated may file a request for reimbursement against the 

obligee for support payments made in excess of the amount ordered.” 

Thus, the statute provides for reimbursement of payments made after the 

child support order terminated. See AZ S. F. Sheet, 2004 Reg. Sess. S.B. 

1334 (explaining that the purpose of the statute was to reimburse child 

support payments made after termination due to, for example, 

“notification delays between the obligor, clearinghouse, obligee and 

employer”). 

¶9 Father’s child support obligation did not terminate until 

May 2014. Because Father made his last child support payment in May 

2013—a year before the order terminated—A.R.S. § 25-527 does not apply. 

Furthermore, A.R.S. § 25-327.A would also preclude retroactive 

reimbursement. Under A.R.S. § 25-327.A, the family court cannot 

retroactively reduce or terminate a child support order, and the child 

support here would have been terminated on April 1, 2014—the first day 

of the month following Father’s motion to dismiss. Even if the family 
TUPPER v. TUPPER 

Decision of the Court 

4 

court found “good cause,” the earliest possible effective date to terminate 

or reduce the child support would have been March 26, 2014—the date 

Father filed his motion to dismiss. See A.R.S. § 25-327.A. In either 

scenario our conclusion does not change because Father made his last 

child support payment several months before his support obligation 

would have reduced or terminated. 

¶10 Father also argues that the family court erred “in ruling that 

it did not have jurisdiction to provide retroactive reimbursement.” The 

family court stated in its August 2014 order that it was “without 

jurisdiction” to provide retroactive reimbursement. However, the family 

court clarified in its October 2014 order that “[w]hen the [c]ourt states that 

it is without jurisdiction, the [c]ourt means to say that there is no statutory 

authority for the relief requested by Father.” Therefore, Father’s 

jurisdiction argument is moot. 

¶11 Finally, Mother requests attorney fees on appeal, including 

fees incurred in consulting with an attorney, pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. 

Because Mother is unrepresented on appeal, and in our discretion, we 

decline to award Mother’s fees incurred in consulting with an attorney. 

However, she is entitled to her costs, upon compliance with ARCAP 21. 

CONCLUSION 

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the family court’s order 

denying reimbursement of the child support payments.