IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

JEANETT A R. LAMB, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

CAROLYN W. COL VIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

KATHRYN TASSINARI 

DREW JOHNSON 

DREW L. JOHNSON, P.C. 

1700 Valley River Dr. 

Eugene, Oregon 97401 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

United States Attorney 

JANICE E. HEBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

District of Oregon 

1000 SW Third Ave., Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97204-1011 

JOHN C. LAMONT 

EUGENE DIVISION 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of the General Counsel 

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 MIS 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 6:15-cv-00391-PA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 1 of 11
I 

Of Attorneys for Defendant 

P ANNER, District Judge: 

Jeanetta R. Lamb ("Plaintiff') seeks judicial review of the final decision by the Social 

Security Commissioner ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). This Court has jurisdiction to 

review the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Administrative History 

On July 1, 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB. Tr. 14. Plaintiff alleged disability since July 1, 

2011. Id. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Id. Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which took place on January 

25, 2012 before ALJ Marilyn Mauer. Id. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified, as did 

a vocational expert ("VE"). Tr. 32-60. On December 23, 2013, ALJ Mauer issued a decision 

finding Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 25. Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council on 

February 12, 2014. Tr. 1. The Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review on January 

13, 2015, and this action followed. Id. 

Background 

Born in 1957, Plaintiff was 56 years old on the alleged disability onset date. Tr. 33. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to pain, limitation fractures on her left femur, left forearm, and 

right tibia, chronic venous stasis of the lower extremities, morbid obesity, insulin dependent 

diabetes mellitus, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). Plaintiff graduated 

from high school and has an AA degree. Tr. 34. Plaintiff has worked as an administrative clerk, 

facilities manager, contract administrator, and a sale clerk. Tr. 50-53, 56-57. 

Standard of Review 

2 OPINION AND ORDER 

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The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal 

standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. 

Bowen, 879 F .2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and detracts from the 

[Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's interpretation is 

rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. 

Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must 

demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502 and 

404.920. First, the Commissioner considers whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful 

activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). If so, the claimant 

is not disabled. 

At step two, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520( c) and 416. 920( c ). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not 

disabled. 

3 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 3 of 11
At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairments, either 

singly or in combination, meet or equal "one of a number of listed impairments that ·the 

[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Yuckert, 

482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). If so, the claimant is 

presumptively disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant can still perform "past 

relevant work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(±) and 404.920(f). If the claimant can work, he is not 

disabled; if he cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. 

At step five, the Commissioner must demonstrate that the claimant can perform other 

work existing in significant numbers in the national or local economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-

42; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the 

claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566 and 416.966. 

The ALJ's Findings 

At step one of the sequential evaluation process outlined above, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, July 1, 2011. 

Tr. 16. 

At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: insulin 

dependent diabetes mellitus, type II; status post multiple limb fractures with open reduction and 

internal fixation of the left femur, left forearm, and right tibia; morbid obesity; and lower 

extremity venous stasis. Id. The ALJ identified other injuries and mental conditions that did not 

rise to the level of severe impairment. Tr. 16-17. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments, either singly or in combination, 

did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 18. Because Plaintiff did not 

establish disability at step three, the ALJ continued to evaluate how Plaintiffs impairments 

4 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 4 of 11
affected her ability to work during the relevant period. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform less than the full range of sedentary work and: 

Tr. 19. 

[t]he claimant can lift 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently. 

The claimant can sit at least 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant can stand and 

walk in combination for 2 hours in an 8-hour day. The claimant requires the use 

of a cane for ambulating distances over 30 yards. She should not walk on uneven 

ground at work. The claimant can frequently balance. She can occasionally stoop 

and crouch. She can never crawl or kneel. She can never climb ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds. She can frequently grasp objects and perform fine finger manipulation 

bilaterally. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as an 

administrative clerk, sedentary as performed, and space scheduler, sedentary per the Dictionary 

of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). Tr. 25. 

Discussion 

Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred by improperly assessing: (1) Plaintiffs credibility; (2) 

Plaintiffs mental health impairments; (3) the medical opinion evidence; (4) Plaintiffs ability to 

perform past relevant work. 

I. Plaintiff's Credibility 

The ALJ must consider a claimant's symptom testimony, including statements regarding 

claimant's pain and workplace limitations. 20 CPR§ 404.1529, 416.929. The ALJ is responsible 

for determining the credibility of such statements. Andrews v. Shala/a, 53 F .3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing the claimant is malingering, the 

Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's subjective testimony must be clear and 

convincing. Burch, 400 F .3d at 680. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and 

what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints. Id; Reddickv. Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 722 

(9th Cir. 1998). The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial. See Reddick 157 

5 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 5 of 11
F .3d at 724. The ALJ' s overall credibility decision may be upheld even if some of the ALJ' s 

reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are overturned. Batson v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to give clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting her testimony. 

The ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because she failed to follow her doctor's 

recommended treatment regimen. A plaintiffs failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment 

is a clear and convincing reason to doubt her credibility. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 

1040 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had poor control of her diabetes, despite 

having everything she needed to control it. Tr. 20. She frequently ran out of insulin and supplies, 

and did not test her blood sugar the recommended three times daily. Tr. 20. Plaintiff argues her 

poor compliance with her treatment regimen was due to financial concerns. The ALJ agreed in 

part, but disagreed that all of Plaintiffs noncompliance could be attributed to financial hardship. 

Plaintiffs physician referred her to financial and prescription assistance, which alleviated her 

financial hardship. Tr. 301. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in identifying Plaintiffs 

noncompliance as a reason to doubt her credibility. 

The ALJ also found Plaintiff not credible because she was able to work with her 

impairments and quit working for reasons other than her impairments. When a plaintiff quits her 

job for reasons not related to her impairment, an ALJ may find her not credible. Bruton v. 

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs allegedly disabling impairments 

include diabetes and injuries from a motor vehicle accident. Her diabetes was diagnosed in 2001 

and the accident occurred in 2004. Tr. 366. Some years later, Plaintiff was moved to an 

administrative position from 2009 until 2010, when the position was eliminated due to budget 

cuts. Tr. 243. Plaintiff then briefly returned to her former job as facilities manager before she 

was fired. Tr. 42-43. The ALJ rationally interpreted the record of Plaintiffs ability to work at an 

6 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 6 of 11
administrative position despite her allegedly disabling impairments. Because Plaintiff left her 

position due to budget cuts and not her allegedly disabling impairments, the ALJ did not err in 

doubting her credibility. 

Plaintiff argues that her administrative job was eliminated because she typed too slowly 

and the tasks were "doled out to other people," which means she was effectively fired due to her 

job performance, and ostensibly her physical limitations. Tr. 43. Variable interpretations of the 

evidence are insignificant, however, if the Commissioner's interpretation is rational. Burch, 400 

F.3d at 679. There is no evidence ofrecord Plaintiff was fired because she typed too slowly; the 

ALJ' s interpretation of the record is rational and is therefore upheld. 

Next, the ALJ doubted Plaintiffs credibility because her activities of daily living were 

inconsistent with her stated limitations. Inconsistencies between a plaintiffs activities of daily 

living and reported symptoms can be used to support an adverse credibility finding. Berry v. 

Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff stated she can walk for a block, sit for an 

hour, lift five pounds, and has limited use of hands; but Plaintiffs acitvities appear to indicate 

greater functioning. Tr. 39-40, 177. Plaintiffs activities of daily living include caring for her 

mother, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease, by making her meals, bathing her, and visiting 

her twice a day. Tr. 277. Plaintiff also does housework, drives herself, and can shop online or in 

stores. Plaintiff argues that she needed to rest during some of these activities, and cannot perform 

them fully. However, the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is rational, and when evidence 

susceptible to more than one interpretation the ALJ' s conclusion must be upheld. Burch, 400 

F.3d at 679. 

The ALJ's assertion that Plaintiffs subjective complaints regarding diabetes are not 

consistent with medical evidence is erroneous. The ALJ does not identify any complaints stated 

by Plaintiff to contrast with the medical evidence cited. As such, the ALJ failed to satisfy the 

7 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 7 of 11
specificity requirement. Any evidence offered by the Commissioner is post hoc. However, this 

error was harmless because the ALJ offered numerous clear and convincing reasons to doubt 

Plaintiffs credibility. 

II. Plaintiff's Mental Impairments 

The ALJ determined Plaintiffs mental impairments did not rise to the level of "severe" 

as required in step two of the five step analysis. Tr. 21. Generally, a plaintiff must prove that the 

alleged mental impairments significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(c) (2007); see also Burch 400 F.3d at 682-83. Because Plaintiff alleged a mental 

impairment, the ALJ used the "special psychiatric review technique." 20 C.F .R. § 404. l 520a. For 

a mental impairment to be deemed severe under the special psychiatric review technique, it must 

be analyzed using the four functional areas known as the "paragraph B" criteria. 20 C.F.R. part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, 12.00(C). These four functional areas are: (a) activities of daily 

living (b) social functioning ( c) concentration, persistence, pace and ( d) periods of 

decompensation. Id. The first three are rated on a five point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, 

and extreme. Id. 

The ALJ assessed Plaintiff with "mild" difficulties in social functioning because she 

visited her mother and interacted with siblings and close friends daily. Tr. 17. Additionally, she 

attended church, met friends for lunch or dinner frequently, and had a social network on the 

computer. Tr. 17. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by finding only "mild" limitations in social functioning. 

The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Smolen, the examining physician, who found 

Plaintiff "moderately depressed." Tr. 279. Dr. Smolen stated the question of Plaintiffs social 

functioning was thorny, and opined that if Plaintiff were not to have any physical problems she 

would be able to get along well with people. Tr. 279. The ALJ interpreted the doctor's opinion to 

8 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 8 of 11
mean "mild" limitations in social functioning because Plaintiff does have physical problems. 

While Plaintiff disagrees, when evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one way, the 

court must uphold the ALJ's decision. Auk/and v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

Plaintiff argues the state agency reviewing doctors Boyd, Anderson, and Johnson all 

assessed her with "moderate" difficulties in social functioning. She further argues that because 

the ALJ assigned those opinions great weight, by assigning Plaintiff "mild" limitations in social 

functioning the ALJ's opinion is internally inconsistent. The Plaintiff's argument, while 

compelling, fails because the ALJ addressed this inconsistency in the opinion. The ALJ stated "I 

give the State assessments great weight. .. However, given Dr. Smolen's mild findings, I have 

not found a severe mental impairment." Tr. 24. The ALJ gave great weight to other sections of 

the state reviewing physicians' opinions, but did not give great weight to the section regarding 

social functioning. 

Plaintiff argues she has more than mild difficulty with social functioning. She points to 

evidence of being fired for having "outbursts." Tr. 177. However, the only evidence of these 

"outbursts" comes from Plaintiff herself. Of the three letters written on her behalf by former 

colleagues and supervisors, none mention any sort of outbursts or issues with social functioning. 

Tr. 218-21. Similarly, Plaintiff contends when she gets mad she throws things, screams, and 

yells, but this is not documented in the record other than her own statements. 

While the ALJ erred by stating Plaintiff was not taking antidepressant medication, 

Plaintiff failed to develop her argument beyond pointing out the factual inaccuracy. Tr. 17. The 

court will not address insufficiently developed arguments. Similarly, the Commissioner's 

argument that Plaintiff did not engage in any significant mental health treatment is inaccurate. 

Plaintiff utilized antidepressant medication to help control her moderate depression. 

9 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 9 of 11
III. Medical Opinion Evidence 

The ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical testimony. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted medical opinion of a treating or examining 

physician, or specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting contradicted opinions, so long as they 

are supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 

However, "[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 

physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings." 

Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012). Additionally, the ALJ may discount 

physicians' opinions based on internal inconsistencies, inconsistencies between their opinions 

and other evidence in the record, or other factors the ALJ deems material to resolving 

ambiguities. Morgan v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Dr. Marshall performed an evaluation of Plaintiff in 2013. Dr. Marshall found that 

Plaintiff was unable to grasp and hold objects securely by the palm and with the last three digits 

on her left hand. Tr. 369. Dr. Marshall also found that Plaintiff could not travel without a 

companion, climb, walk without an assistive device, or walk a block. Tr. 377. Finally, Dr. 

Marshall limited Plaintiff to lifting up to 10 pounds, and while she limited Plaintiff to walking or 

standing for an hour each day, Plaintiff could sit without limitation. Tr. 3 72-73. 

The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Marshall's opinion because Plaintiffs presentation 

at the consultation was extremely inconsistent with her usual presentation. Tr. 23. Plaintiff 

argues she had been hospitalized by cellulitis 10 days before the appointment and was still 

suffering the after-effects. Plaintiff used a walker at the appointment due to her acute cellulitis, 

which was not consistent with her normal walking needs; Plaintiff typically used a cane or no 

walking aid. Tr. 368. Dr. Marshall was not able to fully examine Plaintiffs coordination, station, 

10 OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:15-cv-00391-PA Document 23 Filed 07/27/16 Page 10 of 11
and gait because she needed to use her walker. Tr. 368. These results are not disputed by the 

Commissioner, rather, they are disputed as being representative of Plaintiffs overall disability on 

a normal day. The more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight will 

be given to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4). Additionally, the court may consider other 

factors which tend to support or contradict an opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(6). Here, 

Plaintiff was still suffering the after-effects of her hospitalization for acute cellulitis. The ALJ 

rationally interpreted the record as being inconsistent with Plaintiffs normal presentation. 

The Commissioner declined to endorse the ALJ' s other reasons for giving Dr. Marshall's 

opinion little weight. For the other reasons stated above, the ALJ provided legally sufficient 

reasons for giving Dr. Marshall's opinion little weight. 

IV. Performing Past Work 

Plaintiffs arguments are premised on the ALJ finding her symptom allegations credible 

and that her depression is a severe impairment. For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ did not err in 

evaluating those issues; therefore, Plaintiffs step four arguments are inapplicable. 

Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiffs application for 

disability insurance benefits is affirmed and this case dismissed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this ~1ay of July, 2016. 

United States District Judge 

11 OPINION AND ORDER 

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