1 – OPINION & ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JILL RENEE OAKES,

Plaintiff,

No. 3:14-cv-1321-HZ 

v.

OPINION & ORDER

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS; 

PORTLAND VA MEDICAL CENTER;

VA OFFICE OF RESOLUTION 

MANAGEMENT; ALICE AVOLIO; 

DEREK THIESSEN; DIRECTOR OF 

PORTLAND VA MEDICAL CENTER;

Defendants.

Jill Renee Oakes

1800 Evergreen St., #7

Walla Walla, WA 99362

Pro se Plaintiff

Jared Hager

U.S. Attorney’s Office

District of Oregon, Civil Division

1000 SW 3rd Ave., Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204

Attorney for Defendants

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2 – OPINION & ORDER

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Jill Renee Oakes brings this action against Defendants Secretary of the 

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Portland Veterans Affairs Medical Center, VA 

Office of Resolution Management, Alice Avolio, Derek Thiessen, and Director of Portland 

Veterans Affairs Medical Center. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in sexual harassment, 

retaliation, and negligence. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rules 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, Defendants move 

for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s second federal lawsuit arising from her work as a Medical 

Support Assistant at the Portland Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“Portland VAMC” or “VA”)

under an “excepted appointment”1 from March 16, 2008 to April 16, 2009. See Oakes v. Sec'y, 

U.S. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, No. 3:11-CV-00671-HZ, 2012 WL 4508000, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 

28, 2012). Toward the end of Plaintiff’s excepted appointment, she applied for two full-time 

permanent positions with the VA but was not selected for either. Id.

Plaintiff filed two Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints in connection with 

her non-selection for a permanent position. In February 2009, Plaintiff filed her first EEO 

complaint, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of disability when she was not 

awarded a permanent position. Hager Decl. Ex. 3. While Plaintiff’s first complaint was pending, 

she filed a second EEO complaint in July 2009, alleging that she was not selected for a 

 1 Plaintiff’s excepted appointment meant that her position was temporary and not to exceed 13 months. 

Oakes v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, No. 3:11-CV-00671-HZ, 2012 WL 4508000, at *1 (D. Or. 

Sept. 28, 2012).

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3 – OPINION & ORDER

permanent position because of her disability or in retaliation for her first EEO complaint. Hager 

Decl. Ex. 5. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that her supervisor, Alice Avolio, discriminated against, 

retaliated against, and harassed Plaintiff by being verbally abusive, refusing to write a letter of 

reference, and providing a poor reference. Id. Both of Plaintiff’s EEO complaints resulted in

final agency decisions finding no discrimination and no evidence to substantiate Plaintiff’s 

allegations. Hager Decl. Ex. 4. 

During the investigation of Plaintiff’s first complaint, an EEO investigator took a 

telephonic affidavit of Plaintiff in which Plaintiff referred to alleged conduct by a VA janitor, 

Derek Thiessen. Hager Decl. Ex. 6, p. 7. Plaintiff was asked whether her disability ever 

hampered her performance at the VA and she responded that her post-traumatic stress disorder 

(which formed part of the basis of her allegation of disability) was exacerbated when Mr. 

Thiessen sexually harassed her. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff stated that she reported Mr. Thiessen’s 

conduct to her manager, Alice Avolio, but she did not file a sexual harassment complaint against 

Mr. Thiessen because she was “under the impression that [the situation] was being worked on” 

by Ms. Avolio. Id. at 8-9. 

When Plaintiff appealed the denial of her second EEO complaint, she asserted for the 

first time a sexual harassment claim based on Mr. Thiessen’s alleged conduct. Hager Decl. Ex. 7, 

p. 3. On March 14, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed the 

agency’s decision finding no discrimination behind Plaintiff’s failure to obtain permanent 

employment. Id. at 4, 8. As to Plaintiff’s allegation of sexual harassment, the EEOC decision 

stated:

[W]e note that in her appeal, Complainant raised for the first time an allegation 

concerning incidents of sexual harassment. That issue is not before us now, and 

Complainant is advised to contact an EEO Counselor with regard to that allegation, if 

Complainant wishes to pursue it further.

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4 – OPINION & ORDER

Id. at 3. Plaintiff did not contact an EEO counselor about the sexual harassment allegations.

Instead, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on June 1, 2011. She alleged retaliation 

and disability discrimination based on her failure to be selected for a permanent position, sexual 

harassment by Mr. Thiessen, hostile work environment based on Ms. Avolio’s conduct, and 

negligence. In a September 28, 2012 Opinion, this Court granted the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Oakes, 2012 WL 4508000. This 

Court found that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed because there was no causal link between 

Plaintiff’s EEO activity and her non-selection for a permanent job. Plaintiff’s disability 

discrimination claim failed because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

selection officials chose not to hire her because she was disabled. Plaintiff’s hostile work 

environment claim failed because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 

defendants’ alleged conduct created an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. Id. at 

*7-10. Finally, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s sexual harassment and negligence2 claims 

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at *10-11. 

On November 15, 2012, Plaintiff brought her claim regarding Mr. Thiessen’s alleged 

sexual harassment to an EEO counselor for the first time, by filing another complaint of 

employment discrimination. Hager Decl. Ex. 8. Because Plaintiff was far outside the time limit 

requiring a party to file a complaint within 45 days of the conduct complained of, Plaintiff filled 

out a “Timeliness Statement” in which she attempted to justify not contacting an EEO counselor 

sooner. Hager Decl. Ex. 9. Plaintiff indicated that she had received training in the EEO 

Complaint Process and had participated in the EEO process before. Id. However, Plaintiff wrote 

 2 The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s negligence claim because it was only supported by a one-word 

allegation in her complaint stating “negligence.” Oakes, 2012 WL 4508000 at *11.

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5 – OPINION & ORDER

that she “really [didn’t] remember [her] orientation due to nerves and ex[c]itement.” Id. at 1. 

Plaintiff explained that her complaint was untimely due to a series of interactions with her 

manager, Ms. Avolio, and other supervisors and EEO counselors, who gave her wrong 

information or who erroneously told her they would report her complaint for her. Id. at 2-6. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that her sexual harassment complaints “sat in the office[s]” of 

Alice Avolio, Mel Metosky, “former HR chief who I mediated with”; Trent Stewart, Portland 

VAMC EEO office; and the Director of Portland VAMC. Id. at 5. 

On January 29, 2013, the VA issued a final decision dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint 

because she failed to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 

Hager Decl. Ex. 2, p. 3. The decision noted that “the harassment complaint was filed over a 

thousand days past the 45 day deadline without adequate reason.” Id. The EEOC rejected 

Plaintiff’s explanation that she filed her complaint so late because she was under the impression 

that her supervisor or human resources and EEO employees would handle the complaint. Id.

Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the EEOC’s opinion. Compl. Ex. 1. The EEOC denied 

Plaintiff’s request and issued her a letter informing her of her right to file a civil action. Id.

On August 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit. Plaintiff’s allegations repeat those 

raised in her last federal complaint and in her most recent EEO complaint. Specifically, she 

alleges sexual harassment based on Mr. Thiessen’s conduct, negligence based on the VA’s actual 

or constructive knowledge of the sexual harassment and failure to stop it, retaliation based on her 

termination after engaging in protected EEO activity, and hostile work environment based on 

Ms. Avolio’s refusal to provide a written reference. In addition, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for 

Amendment” where she added allegations of negligence on the part of the VA. Pl.’s Mot. 

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6 – OPINION & ORDER

Amend. Plaintiff seeks “full reinstatement plus financial compensation” and a written reference. 

Compl. 5.

STANDARDS

I. Motion to Dismiss—Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency 

of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “All allegations of material 

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Am. 

Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the 

court need not accept conclusory allegations as truthful. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide,

Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory 

allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint, and we do not 

necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of 

factual allegations.”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Rather, to state 

a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying 

facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the 

“grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” with nothing “more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 

doubtful in fact)[.]" Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" meaning "when the 

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7 – OPINION & ORDER

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must contain "well-pleaded facts" which "permit 

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]" Id. at 679. 

“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 

106 (1976)) (citations omitted).

II. Motion to Dismiss—Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) tests the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 

court. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional 

attacks can be either facial or factual.” Id. “[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth 

of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Where a 

defendant raises a factual challenge to federal jurisdiction, as here, “the district court may review 

evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment” and “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Safe 

Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

III. Summary Judgment—Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The 

moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and 

identifying those portions of “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the 

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8 – OPINION & ORDER

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present “specific facts” 

showing a “genuine issue for trial.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927–28 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the 

pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). 

The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v. 

Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011). 

If the factual context makes the nonmoving party’s claim as to the existence of a material 

issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support 

his claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Issue Preclusion

This Court previously considered and dismissed with prejudice several of the allegations 

Plaintiff repeats in this action. See Oakes v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, No. 3:11-CV00671-HZ, 2012 WL 4508000, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2012). Plaintiff is precluded from raising 

those allegations again.

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9 – OPINION & ORDER

As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, “[o]nce a court has decided an 

issue, it is ‘forever settled as between the parties[.]’” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 

Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302-03, 191 L. Ed. 2d 222 (2015) (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State 

Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931). “To preclude 

parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects 

their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial 

resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent 

decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S. Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L. Ed. 2d 

210 (1979). The general rule is that “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and 

determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 

determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a 

different claim.” B&B Hardware, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1302-03 (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1980)). A district court may consider the affirmative defense of issue 

preclusion on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Fairbank v. Underwood, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 

1231 n.5 (D. Or. 2013). 

Plaintiff already litigated her allegations that she was not selected for a permanent 

position in retaliation for her EEO activity or her disability, and her allegations that the VA, in 

general, and Ms. Avolio, in particular, created a hostile work environment. Oakes, 2012 WL 

4508000. This Court already entered a valid and final judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims 

with prejudice. Plaintiff does not argue, and this Court does not find, that any exception to the 

general rule of issue preclusion applies in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff is precluded from 

raising these issues again. 

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10 – OPINION & ORDER

II. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

a. Sexual Harassment Claim 

Plaintiff’s previous case before this Court raised the same allegations of sexual 

harassment that Plaintiff repeats in the present complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Mr. 

Thiessen sexually harassed her while the VA and Ms. Avolio failed to prevent or respond to the 

harassment. In the present complaint, Plaintiff adds allegations that other employees, such as the 

VA Chief and “all charge nurses” knew or should have known about the sexual harassment and 

that the VAMC failed to follow its own sexual harassment policy. Compl. 3; Pl.’s Mot. Amend 

2. 

In order to bring a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII, a “plaintiff must exhaust 

her administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate state 

agency, thereby affording the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui 

Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b)). In Plaintiff’s 

first case before this Court, Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims were dismissed because Plaintiff 

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. This 

Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that her failure to exhaust her claims was excusable because 

she erroneously assumed that Ms. Avolio would file a formal sexual harassment complaint on 

her behalf. Oakes, 2012 WL 4508000, at *11 (“Plaintiff's erroneous assumption that Avolio was 

supposed to file a “formal sexual harassment complaint for [her]” by itself is insufficient to 

remedy Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”). 

After this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s prior case in September of 2012, Plaintiff filed a 

formal discrimination complaint with the VA regarding the alleged sexual harassment. Hager 

Decl. Ex. 2, p. 1. On January 29, 2013, the agency issued a final decision dismissing Plaintiff’s 

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11 – OPINION & ORDER

complaint for failure to comply with regulatory time limits. Id. at 3. The decision letter 

explained:

[T]he harassment complaint was filed over a thousand days past the 45 day deadline 

without adequate reason despite your having received [EEO] training on 3 separate 

occasions within 18 months and having filed 4 previous EEO actions since 2009. To 

reiterate, you stated you did not meet the deadline because you did not remember your 

orientation due to nerves and excitement but that you did make your complaint known to 

your supervisor, the former facility HR Chief, the facility EEO Liason officer and the 

director of the facility. In this case, contact with these parties does not satisfy the EEO 

requirement to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days. With regard to your harassment 

claim therefore, we have determined that the reasons you provide in explanation of your 

untimeliness do not rise to the level akin to circumstances being beyond your control.

Id. (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff does not dispute the VA’s findings that she failed to comply with the regulatory 

time period to raise her sexual harassment claims. Instead, she repeats the argument she made 

previously to this Court that she should be excused from the timely filing requirement because 

she was under the impression that Ms. Avolio and other VAMC employees would handle her 

complaint. This Court previously rejected Plaintiff’s excuse and does so again in this Opinion. 

As the VA final decision explained, Plaintiff had received EEO training and had experience 

filing EEO actions. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff was initially unaware of the need to contact an 

EEO counselor regarding her sexual harassment claims, she was made aware by the EEOC on 

March 2, 2011 and this Court on September 28, 2012. Plaintiff failed to contact an EEO 

counselor within 45 days of either of those rulings. 

Summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion is appropriate where there are no disputed 

questions of material fact. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom.

Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403, 190 L. Ed. 2d 307 (2014). This is such a case. Accordingly, the 

Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim because 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

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12 – OPINION & ORDER

b. Negligence Claim

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an important limitation on the subject matter 

jurisdiction of federal courts.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has frequently held “that a waiver of sovereign 

immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Id. (quoting 

Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). The Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA) sets out the limited circumstances in which the government waives its sovereign 

immunity for tort suits:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money 

damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent

or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the 

scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the 

claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by 

the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to 

make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of 

the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of 

this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

Federal regulations dictate that a tort claim is deemed to have been presented when: “a 

Federal agency receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, an 

executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim 

for money damages in a sum certain for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death 

alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident....” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2. The requirement to file 

an administrative claim is jurisdictional. Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 

2000).

Once a moving party has converted a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought 

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13 – OPINION & ORDER

before the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence 

necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale 

Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cnty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 

St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

Defendants submit the affidavit of Michael D. Hughes, Assistant Regional Counsel with 

the Portland VA Regional Counsel’s Office, to assert that Plaintiff never filed a Standard Form 

95 or any other writing which makes a claim for damages against the VA pursuant to the Federal 

Tort Claims Act. Hughes Decl. 2. Plaintiff does not submit any evidence to refute Defendants’

assertion. Instead, Plaintiff states, without any evidentiary support, that “all negligence claims 

has [sic] been written and submitted to the VA, ORM, EEOC as well as Federal Court lawsuit 6 

years ago. Plaintiff has been algeging [sic] negligence since 2009 and has NEVER wavered.” 

Pl.’s Mot. Amend 3. 

The Court finds, based on the evidence, that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative 

remedies under the FTCA. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s negligence claims.3 Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s negligence claims.4

///

///

 3 Because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s negligence claims due to her failure 

to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court declines to address Defendant’s alternative argument that 

Plaintiff’s negligence claims are preempted by Title VII. 

4 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s negligence claims are time-barred because she brings them outside of the two 

year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (“A tort claim against the United States shall be 

forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after 

such claim accrues.”). The conduct underlying Plaintiff’s claim occurred in 2008 and 2009, which places 

her August 18, 2014 filing of this complaint far outside of the two-year statute of limitations for tort 

claims against the United States.

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14 – OPINION & ORDER

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary 

Judgment [63]. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. Pending motions, if any, 

are dismissed as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this ___________ day of _________________________________, 2015.

 

__________________________________________

MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ

United States District Judge

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