2003). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant to come
forward with a legitimate, non-invidious reason for the adverse employment action.” Jd. “Once the
defendant presents a legitimate, non-invidious reason for the adverse employment action, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reason is pretextual.” Jd. At all times, the
burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff. Id.

In her response to Potter’s motion for summary judgment, Cannon-Stokes fails to address
the elements necessary to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, cite to pertinent authority, or
argue as to how any of the alleged acts satisfy the elements. As a result, Cannon-Stokes has waived
her claim of retaliation. See 330 West Hubbard Restaurant Corp. v. United States, 203 F.3d 990,
997 (7" Cir, 2000) ("A party's failure to address or develop a claim in its opening brief constitutes
a waiver of that claim. . . . In order to develop a legal argument effectively, the facts at issue must
be bolstered by relevant legal authority; a perfunctory and undeveloped assertion is inadequate to

raise a separate basis for appeal.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Even if the court were to consider the evidence offered by Cannon-Stokes in support of her
claim of retaliation, this claim fails because many of the purported incidents of retaliation do not
constitute adverse employment actions and because she has not identified any similarly situated
employees who were treated more favorably. The Seventh Circuit has defined adverse employment
actions “quite broadly,” Smart v. Ball State Univ.,89 F.3d 437, 441 (7" Cir. 1996), yet an adverse
employment action must be more than a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities”
to be actionable. Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7" Cir. 1993). A
“materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion

evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,

20


Cc. Cannon-Stokes’ Limitations

Cannon-Stokes’ PTSD has rendered her unable to deliver mail ona residential delivery route.
DSOF 4 9. Cannon-Stokes is unable to enter small residential apartment buildings or private
residences if there is a possibility that she might have to interact with an individual by herself, and
she cannot deal with customers on a “one on one” basis unless other familiar people are nearby and
there is a barrier in between herself and the customer. PSOF { 72. She eats most of her meals at
home; she does not go to movies; she does not go to the grocery store; she has not taken any
vacations or gone away for a weekend; she does not walk her children to school; and she never rides
the “L” or subway. PSOF §/ 71. She is no longer married and does not have a normal family life.
PSOF 4 72.

Despite these limitations, Cannon-Stokes is able to deliver mail on a commercial route,
regardless of whether it is inside or outside. DSOF J§ 6, 10. She also is able to perform clerical
work and to case mail inside any postal facility. DSOF 47, 11. She would be able to deliver mail
inside an office building or a high-rise apartment building with a mail room. DSOF {| 8. Cannon-
Stokes is able to drive, go to the park, ride the bus, and eat in restaurants. DSOF § 12, 13, 14, 15.
She has driven to her attorney’s office and to work. DSOF {ff 16, 19. She walked from her
attorney’s office to the federal building for her deposition. DSOF 4 18. She admits that she has no
trouble walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, grooming herself, getting ready for work in
the morning, taking care of her son, or performing manual tasks like cooking and writing. DSOF

420.

14


19886, 2002 WL 31356404, *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2002) (finding that the denial of overtime was not
an adverse employment action because the plaintiff received a substantial amount of overtime, and
she was not entitled to work overtime each time she requested it). Cannon-Stokes’ claim fails,
however, because Cannon-Stokes has not established that she was denied overtime. See PSOF at
{ 160. In support of this claim, she cites to her deposition testimony, which discusses other
employees who received overtime, but does not include any facts or information regarding the denial

of overtime as it relates to herself. See id.

Additionally, while other employees may have received overtime assignments, these
employees are only relevant to Cannon-Stokes’ claim of retaliation if they are comparable or
similarly situated to her. In order to establish that a similarly situated employee was treated more
favorably, an employee must offer evidence about someone who is “similarly situated with respect
to performance, qualifications, and conduct.” Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d
535, 546 (7" Cir, 2002), quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark, 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7" Cir, 2000). This
comparison is normally established by showing that the “two employees dealt with the same
supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such
differentiating of mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s
treatment of them.” /d., quoting Radue, 219 F.3d at 618. Cannon-Stokes’ references four employees
who were allowed to work overtime hours and mentions whether these employees were on light duty
or limited duty and their place of employment. See PSOF {| 166, 167, 168, 170, Notwithstanding
such information, the court cannot determine whether these employees were similarly situated to
Cannon-Stokes because she has not offered evidence regarding their job responsibilities, medical

restrictions, supervisors, qualifications, or whether they engaged in similar conduct.

24


In November of 1995, Cannon-Stokes was grabbed and sexually assaulted by a postal
customer while delivering mail. Plaintiff's Additional Statement of Uncontested Facts (“PSOF”)
4.65. Asa result of the attack, Cannon-Stokes was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”). PSOF at 4/67. She received medical treatment and, for medical purposes, was restricted
from delivering mail on a residential delivery route. PSOF at {{ 68, 69. She notified the Postal
Service of her PTSD diagnosis and that her condition and medical restrictions were permanent.
PSOF 468. In response to this diagnosis, the Postal Service placed Cannon-Stokes on limited duty,
which meant that she did not have to deliver mail on a route with residential buildings. DSOF {| 46,
PSOF { 101.

B. Events Giving Rise to Cannon-Stokes’ Claims in the Present Lawsuit

1, The Austin Postal Station

On December 18, 1995, John Sims, the manager of the Austin postal station where Cannon-
Stokes worked, sent a letter to the Postal Service’s medical unit asking that Cannon-Stokes and all
other limited duty employees submit to fitness for duty examinations. PSOF 495. The letter stated
further that if these employees were unable to perform their duties, they should be discharged. /d.

Sims subsequently sent a letter to Joyce Alston of the Postal Service’s Human Resources
Department on December 29, 1995. PSOF 92; DSOF 4/24. Sims stated in this letter that there was
nothing physically wrong with Cannon-Stokes but that she said that she had mental and emotional
problems with returning to the street to deliver mail. PSOF § 92. Sims indicated his belief that

Cannon-Stokes wanted a transfer to the Loop Postal Station, that this was the only way she could get


significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular

situation.” Smart, 89 F.3d at 441 (citation omitted).

Cannon-Stokes offers the following incidents as evidence of retaliation: (1) after writing the
letter to Senator Moseley Braun, Cannon-Stokes’ supervisor came to her house and told her that she
was being transferred because of the letter; (2) being warned by the same supervisor not to come
back to the Austin station; (3) being told by Holman to return to the Austin station and then being
told by Sims to “get out;” (4) Sims statement to the EEO investigator that Cannon-Stokes was
causing morale problems; (5) being told by that she was being transferred to Hedgewich station
because of her EEO charge at the Grand Crossing station; (6) Cannon-Stokes was denied overtime
even though other employees, some of whom were on light or limited duty, were allowed to work
overtime; (7) being passed over on vacation requests each year even though such requests should
have been made by seniority; (8) other carriers received transfers to clerk positions while Cannon-

Stokes was denied such an opportunity.'®

As discussed by Potter, three of Cannon-Stokes’ examples of retaliation are based on
distortions of the factual record. First, Cannon-Stokes was advised by her supervisor that she was
being transferred because she had requested a transfer in her letter to Senator Moseley Braun and not,
as Cannon-Stokes asserts, because she sent the letter to the senator. Second, Cannon-Stokes testified
with regard to being passed over on vacation requests that when it became apparent that she had been

skipped inadvertently, she was able to bump people who had selected their vacations before her.

'SCannon-Stokes also asserts generally that the actions discussed in section II of her brief were based on
retaliation, see Plaintiff's Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 16, but she does not specify
which of these actions constituted retaliation or provide any legal analysis of these actions.

21


Additionally, being accused of causing morale problems and told not to return to a postal station
after being transferred, while certainly not complimentary, do not constitute an adverse employment

action in the absence of a tangible job consequence.

To the extent that the Postal Service refused to allow Cannon-Stokes to change her craft
from a letter carrier to a clerk position, such an action may constitute adverse employment action
under Title VII.'° Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Cannon-Stokes ever requested a change
in craft to a clerk position and, as a result, was never denied the opportunity to change her craft to
aclerk position. She instead requested a change of craft “‘into a field that may be available and/or
of interest to me. If] were given a preference it would be to motor vehicles or even the phone center

representative position.” See Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts at | 62.

Cannon-Stokes also asserts in a conclusional fashion that “[o]ther employees, some of whom
were on light or limited duty, were allowed to work overtime while Plaintiff was wrongly denied
overtime.” Plaintiff's Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 16. Being denied
an overtime assignment overtime also may constitute an adverse employment action “because the
denial of overtime would affect the overall pay, even if it would not affect [her] salary.”'’ Market
v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., No. 01 C 3841, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20397, 2003 WL 22697284 at *8 (N.D.

Ill. Nov. 13, 2003); but see Cisneros v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 8059, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

‘€Cannon-Stokes offers no argument or authority for the proposition that the denial of a transfer to another
position constitutes an adverse employment action. Nor does Cannon-Stokes assert that the transfer to a clerk
position would constitute a promotion.

'7again, Cannon-Stokes cites to no authority for the proposition that the denial of an assignment of
overtime constitutes an adverse employment action. In addition, there is no evidence as to the nature of overtime
assignments, e.g., whether such assignments are discretionary. Such information is vita] to determining whether an
adverse employment action occurred because an adverse employment action does not include an employer’s refusal
to grant an employee a discretionary benefit, such as a bonus, to which she is not automatically entitled. See
Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488-89 (7" Cir. 1996).

23


difficulty engaging in these activities because ofher PTSD." Cf McAlindin v. County of San Diego,
192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9" Cir. 1999), amended on other grounds, 201 F.3d 121 1 (9" Cir.2000), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1243 (2000) (plaintiff offered medical evaluations documenting his difficulty
interacting with others in support of his claim that he was substantially limited in the major life
activity of interacting with others). Under Seventh Circuit precedent, “these conclusory allegations,
unsupported by the record, are insufficient to avoid summary judgment.” Albiero v. City of
Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927 at 933 (7" Cir. 2001), citing Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293,
1295 (7" Cir, 1993); Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 887 (7" Cir. 1998).

Likewise, Cannon-Stokes’ inability to enter a small apartment building or residence where
she may meet with a postal patron or deal with customers on a “one on one” basis unless other
employees or people with whom she is familiar are near her and there is a barrier, see Plaintiff's
Statement of Additional Uncontested Facts at {J 71-72, is not sufficient to demonstrate that she is
substantially limited in her ability to interact with others while alone. This is but a mere scintilla of
evidence and insufficient to withstand summary judgment.

Because Cannon-Stokes has failed to offer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that she has a disability, an element essential to her claims under the Rehabilitation

'3During her deposition, Cannon-Stokes testified that she does not go grocery shopping because “{i]t’s
uncomfortable” because she feels “disorganized.” See Exhibit 3 at 7-8. When asked to describe her feelings about
grocery shopping, Cannon-Stokes said that “it’s about being out in public.” Exhibit 3 at 8. She also testified that she
has no leisure activities; she goes to the park once or twice a week; and she drives her mother’s car once or twice a
week, Exhibit 3 at 8-9. Cannon-Stokes responded in the negative when asked whether she ever goes to the beach or
goes swimming; whether she had been on vacation or taken a weekend trip in the past several years; and whether she
exercises. See Exhibit 3 at 10-11. Notably, Cannon-Stokes did not testify that she does not and has not engaged in
these activities because of her emotional condition. She also did not testify that she does not go to the movies, walk
her children to school, or ride the “L” or subway because of her emotional condition. In her affidavit, however,
Cannon-Stokes testified that she is not emotionally able to walk her children to school or take care of all of their
needs and that she does not ordinarily walk outside in a residential area with them unless she is with a friend. See
Exhibit A at 49.

18


commercial route. PSOF § 76, 111. Prater instead recommended that Cannon-Stokes request a
change in craft to an available position and that Cannon-Stokes direct her request to Postmaster
Rufus Porter. Jd.

Cannon-Stokes sent a letter to Porter requesting a change in craft into a field that may be
available and/or of interest to her. DSOF 4 62. Cannon-Stokes specified that she preferred a
position in motor vehicles or as a phone center representative. Jd. Porter responded by a letter dated
July 18, 1996 in which he informed Cannon-Stokes that there were no available positions in the
crafts mentioned in her letter and that it was not possible to anticipate when a vacancy would occur.
DSOF J 59, 63. Asa result, the Postal Service was unable to grant her request for a change in
craft. PSOF § 112.

4. Clearing Postal Station

Cannon-Stokes was reassigned to the Clearing postal station in August or September of 1996
and worked at that station until February of 1997. PSOF 4 114. Although the job offer at this postal
station set Cannon-Stokes’ starting time at 6:00 a.m, Cannon-Stokes’ managers frequently changed
her starting time to anywhere from 3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. PSOF 4 115. These changes occurred
despite the fact that the Postal Service’s policies dictated that a manager must inform and obtain the
approval of the Injury Compensation unit ifhe or she wants to change the starting time ofa limited-
duty employee. Jd.

Like her position at the Austin station, Cannon-Stokes also sorted mail at the Clearing
station. Jd.; PSOF § 116. Cannon-Stokes, however, found her assignment at the Clearing station
less desirable than her previous placements because of the earlier starting time and because she

worked longer hours without a lunch break. DSOF 25. She did not know what her assignment

10


2. Transfer to Graceland Annex Postal Station

A few months later, Cannon-Stokes’ psychologist, Dr. Katherine Jeans, sent a letter to
Postmaster Rufus Porter requesting that Cannon-Stokes be transferred to another postal station from
the Austin station because of her PTSD. PSOF § 97. Porter responded to Cannon-Stokes’
psychologist by a letter dated March 8, 1996. /d. Porter informed Dr. Jeans that in order to process
transfers, a legitimate vacancy must exist and that all stations were at their full complement at that
time. As a result, he was unable to approve Cannon-Stokes’ request for a transfer.*

Thereafter, Cannon-Stokes sent a letter to U.S. Senator Carol Moseley Braun on March 26,
1996. PSOF 4 98. In her letter, Cannon-Stokes apprised the senator of her sexual assault and the
failure of the Postal Service to respond to her request for a transfer.> Cannon-Stokes also requested
the senator’s assistance in obtaining a desk job answering telephones. Shortly thereafter, Ms.
Campbell, a supervisor at the Austin station, came to Cannon-Stokes’ house and informed Cannon-
Stokes that she was being transferred from that station to the Graceland Annex as the result of her

request for a transfer in the letter to Senator Moseley Braun. Ms. Campbell also told Cannon-Stokes

‘Again, Potter objects to Cannon-Stokes’ characterization of the contents of a letter, which, in this instance.
is the March 8, 1996 letter of Rufus Porter. See Defendant’s Response to PSOF {| 97. Potter is correct in that Porter
did not state that there were “no open positions anywhere else,” as stated by Cannon-Stokes. See PSOF 997. At the
same time, neither party disputes that the letter was sent by Porter or the contents of the letter. As a consequence, the
court will consider the contents of the letter as written by Porter and not as characterized by either party.

5In PSOF ff 98 and 153 and repeatedly in her response memorandum, Cannon-Stokes asserts that she
complained that she was being discriminated against by her managers in her letter to Senator Moseley Braun and that
the Postal Service had refused to grant her requests for accommodations. While the letter states that the Postal
Service had not shown her “any professionalism, support, and consideration since the incident occurred” and
discusses incidents demonstrating how the management team was “not taking her job-related injury seriously,”
nowhere in the letter does Cannon-Stokes state that she was being discriminated against by her managers or mention
a request for an “accommodation.” In addition, the cited evidence does not support Cannon-Stokes’ assertion that
Campbell informed Cannon-Stokes that she was being transferred because of her letter to Senator Moseley Braun.
PSOF q[§1 99, 154. The evidence, instead, shows that Campbell informed Cannon-Stokes that she was being
transferred because she had requested a transfer in her letter to Senator Moseley Braun.

7


atransfer, and that she did not want to work outside in the cold. PSOF 4 92. The letter also advised
that Cannon-Stokes had caused morale problems since going on limited duty. DSOF {| 24.

Sims also informed Yvonne Coleman of the Postal Service’s Human Resources Department
that Cannon-Stokes was causing morale problems and had done so since going on limited duty.
PSOF 4 93, 157. Additionally, Sims notified Cannon-Stokes and the other limited duty employees
at the Austin station that they could not speak to other co-workers and that they had to inform a
supervisor any time they left the workroom floor, even if it was to go to the washroom. PSOF q| 94.
Sims did not give this order to the employees who were not on limited duty. PSOF § 94.

On another occasion, Sims orally informed Cannon-Stokes that her schedule was being
changed to 4:00 a.m. PSOF {j 96. Cannon-Stokes had not received prior notice of the change, and
Sims did not provide her with any documentation or forms for this change. /d. Cannon-Stokes filed
a grievance, which the parties settled. /d. In settling the grievance, the Postal Service agreed that
there was “no reason or justification” for changing Cannon-Stokes’ schedule. Jd. At some other

point, Cannon-Stokes filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) charge.

?Potter disputes Cannon-Stokes’ portrayal of the letter. In PSOF § 92, Cannon-Stokes states that Sims
wrote in his letter “that despite Plaintiff's mental and emotional problems, there was nothing wrong with her. Sims
accused Plaintiff of seeking a transfer and trying to avoid working in the cold.” The letter states, however, “There is
nothing wrong with her physically, but she says she has mental and emotional problems with returning to the street
delivering mail. . . . It is my belief that Ms. Cannon Stokes wants a transfer to Loop Station and maybe this is the
only way she could get it. And that she does not want to work out side [sic] in the cold.” Ex, F at USPS C-S 00707
While Cannon-Stokes’ characterization of the letter slightly stretched its actual contents, neither party disputes the
content of the letter or the fact that this letter was sent. See, e.g., DSOF { 24. Accordingly, the court will consider
only the actual content of the letter rather than either party's characterization of its content.

3In paragraph 156 of Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Uncontested Facts, Cannon-Stokes states that she
filed an EEO charge in late 1995 without providing any evidence supporting the date or existence of this charge. In
fact, the existence of a 1995 EEO charge is refuted by her later statement regarding her other EEO charges. See
Plaintiff's Rule 56.1(b)(3) Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts and Statement of Additional Uncontested
Facts at 64 (“Plaintiff has filed five (5) EEO complaints. She has filed the following charges: 4-J-606-1208-96, 4-
J-606-0013-00, 1999; 4-J-606-0252-00, 2000; 4-J-606-0173-01, 2001; and 4-J-606-0211-03, 2003.”). Additionally,
Cannon-Stokes reterences these other EEO charges but does not provide details of these charges, such as the basis of
her complaints in these charges. See Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Uncontested Facts at (¥] 156, 158, 159.

6


Act, Potter is entitled to summary judgment on Cannon-Stokes claims of disability discrimination
and failure to accommodate.

B. Retaliation

As with other employment-related claims, a plaintiff may proceed with a claim of retaliation
pursuant to either the direct or indirect method. Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 714 (7
Cir. 2004). Cannon-Stokes has presented no direct evidence that Potter retaliated against her for
filing an EEO charge. Thus, she must proceed under the indirect burden-shifting method of proof
established by McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 36 L. Ed. 2d, 93 S. Ct. 1817
(1973). See DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir.1995) (applying the McDonnell-
Douglas method to ADA cases).

Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
showing that (1) after lodging a complaint about discrimination," (2) only she, and not any otherwise
similarly situated employee who did not complain, was (3) subjected to an adverse employment
action even though (4) she was performing her job in a satisfactory manner. Johnson v. Cambridge
Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 897 (7" Cir. 2003), quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281
F.3d 640, 642 (7" Cir. 2002). When utilizing the indirect-method, the plaintiff does not need to

show “even an attenuated causal link.” Haywood v. Lucent Techs., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7 Cir.

4 1¢ is undisputed that Cannon-Stokes filed an EEO charge against the Postal Service. In fact, she has filed
five EEO complaints against the Postal Service: (1) 4-J-606-1208-96; (2) 4-J-606-0013-00; (3) 4-J-606-0252-00; (4)
4-J-606-0173-01; and (5) 4-J-606-0211-03. Unfortunately, neither party chose to explain the circumstances of or
direct the court’s attention to any evidence of the June 21, 1996 EEO charge, which is the basis of this matter, see
Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, No. 03 C 1942, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3272, at *3 (N.D. IIL Mar. 5, 2004), or Cannon-
Stokes’ subsequent EEO charges. This gap in the evidentiary record makes it impossible for the court to determine
what allegations were included in the original charge, what incidents of retaliation may have resulted from the
charge, and whether the subsequent EEO charges related to or arose from the original EEO charge. See Ezell v.
Potter, 400 F.3d 1041 (7" Cir. 2005) (in determining whether the plaintiff's current allegations fall within the scope
of the earlier charges, the court “looks to whether the allegations are like or reasonably related to those contained in
the EEOC complaint.”).

19


did not attempt to speak with anyone else regarding why or how Cannon-Stokes came to be assigned
to the Graceland Annex. /d. Holman also had asked Sims if Cannon-Stokes was on limited duty.
PSOF 4109. According to Holman, Sims had claimed that Cannon-Stokes was not on limited duty.
Id.

After informing Cannon-Stokes that her offer was rescinded and that she should return to the
Austin station, Holman telephoned Sims, notifying him that she was sending Cannon-Stokes back
to the Austin station. PSOF 4 107. Sims replied, “Okay.” /d. Cannon-Stokes also contacted Sims
but received a different reaction. Id. Sims informed Cannon-Stokes that she did not belong at the
Austin station and told her to “get out.”” /d. Because Holman and Sims refused to allow Cannon-
Stokes to remain at or return to their respective postal stations, Cannon-Stokes was not allowed to
work for approximately seven to eight weeks and, as a result, lost annual and sick leave and a step
increase in pay. PSOF 4] 110.

3. Another Transfer Request

In May of 1996, Dr. Jeans sent a letter to Wanda Prater, the acting supervisor of customer
support for the Postal Service, requesting a reassignment for Cannon-Stokes to a strictly commercial
district or a change in craft. PSOF 4 76.* Prater responded to this request by a letter dated June 13,

1996. PSOF ff 76, 111. Prater denied Cannon-Stokes’ request to deliver mail on a strictly

“According to Sims, he does not recall speaking with Cannon-Stokes when she returned to Austin. See
Postal Service’s Response to Plaintiff's Additional Statement of Uncontested Facts at 107. Cannon-Stokes’ cited
materials reveal that she contacted Sims both by telephone and in person, but her statement of uncontested facts does
not differentiate between the two events. Sims only references her return to the Austin Postal Station, not the
telephone conversation. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Cannon-Stokes, Cannon-Stokes spoke with
Sims and he informed her that she did not belong at the Austin station and he told her to “get out.”

She court notes that Cannon-Stokes referred to the May 1996 letter from Dr. Jeans to Wanda Prater and
Prater’s response in PSOF {if 76and 111. In both instances, Cannon-Stokes suggested that Dr. Jeans’ letter included
a request for an accommodation. Potter did not contest { 76 but contested J 111 because Cannon-Stokes used the
term “accommodation” but neither Dr. Jeans’ letter nor Prater’s letter referred to an “accommodation.”

9


The only possible incident of retaliation that the evidence may support involves Cannon-
Stokes’ rescinded transfer between the Graceland Annex and the Austin station in April of 1996.
The evidentiary record supports a finding that Cannon-Stokes contacted the EEO office or made
some form of an EEO complaint prior to April of 1996. See PSOF { 157. As a result of the
rescinded transfer, Cannon-Stokes was unassigned to any postal station for eight weeks and,
consequently, not working. This, in turn, caused her to lose annual leave, sick leave, and an increase
in pay. See PSOF J 110. Such temporary losses may constitute an adverse employment action. See
Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456 at 465-66 (7" Cir. 2002) (discussing that materially
adverse employment actions may include “a material loss of benefits” while noting that an adverse
employment action “need not be quantifiable in terms of pay or benefits.”); of. Stutler v. Ill. Dep't
of Corr., 263 F.3d 698 (7" Cir. 2001) (plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim of retaliation where
temporary suspensions and a lateral transfer did not result in a decrease in benefits). Unfortunately,
Cannon-Stokes made no argument or attempt to develop the record in this regard and, instead,
focused her claim of retaliation on the words of her supervisors, e.g., being told by Holman to return
to the Austin station and being told by Sims to “get out,” rather than on the effects of her
supervisors’ actions. Cannon-Stokes also has not identified any similarly situated individuals who
successfully transferred from postal station to postal station despite neither station having an

available position to meet their restrictions, and, thus, fails to state a claim of retaliation.

Because Cannon-Stokes has failed to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, the court

grants Potter’s motion for summary judgment on that claim."

'SSince the court has decided Potter’s motion for summary judgment on its merits and in his favor, the court
finds it unnecessary to address Potter's argument regarding judicial estoppel.

25


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TRACI CANNON-STOKES,

Plaintiff,

No. 03 C 1942
Judge Joan H. Lefkow

vs.

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Traci Cannon-Stokes (““Cannon-Stokes”), a postal worker, filed this action against
John E. Potter (“Potter”), the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“Postal
Service”). Cannon-Stokes alleges that the Postal Service discriminated against her because of her
disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et
seq., and retaliated against her for complaining of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 et seg. The court has jurisdiction over this
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 29 U.S.C. § 791. Before the court is Potter’s
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and assess the

proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part


6. Grand Crossing Postal Station

Although Cannon-Stokes had received a formal job assignment for the Grand Crossing
station, she was forced to explain her assignment and provide evidence of her limited-duty or
modified assignment each time a new manager was assigned to the Grand Crossing station. PSOF
| 125. Additionally, Cannon-Stokes was injured when attempting to comply with a request that she
case mail for seven-and-a-half consecutive hours even though a carrier is entitled to two breaks and
a lunch during a shift." PSOF 4 126. Cannon-Stokes’ duties at the Grand Crossing station also
included interacting with customers who came to the postal station to pick up their mail. DSOF 4
23. Cannon-Stokes never objected to this responsibility. Jd.

In 1999, Cannon-Stokes filed an EEO charge in which she complained that a supervisor at
the Grand Crossing station, Mr. Hibbler, was sexually harassing her. DSOF 4 42; PSOF 4 158. As
a result of the charge, the Postal Service attempted to transfer Cannon-Stokes from the Grand
Crossing station to the Hegewisch station, but Cannon-Stokes said that she did not want to be
transferred. /d.; PSOF 4 158.

Each of the three years that Cannon-Stokes worked at the Grand Crossing station, she was
passed over in choosing vacation dates despite the fact that vacation is assigned according to
seniority. PSOF J 162. Cannon-Stokes would bring this oversight to management’s attention and
would bump someone from their allotted vacation time.

In August of 2000, Ms. Prater, a manager at the Grand Crossing station, informed Cannon-

at some point, Cannon-Stokes was transferred from the Grand Crossing station to the Jackson Park
station because the Grand Crossing station had a rodent problem. DSOF § 33. After working for two days at the
Jackson Park station, Cannon-Stokes was transferred to the South Chicago station, where she worked for several
months. PSOF { 136. Cannon-Stokes was then transferred back to the Grand Crossing station, where she stayed
until 2000. /d.; DSOF §36. Despite the transfers, her job responsibilities remained similar from station to station.
DSOF 4f 34, 35, 37.

12


would be day to day and, instead, had to ask her supervisor what she was supposed to do next after
finishing a task. DSOF 29. Her assignment at the Clearing station also differed from her previous
position in that she unloaded trucks of mail at the Clearing station. DSOF § 30.

On one occasion, Ms. Curtis, Cannon-Stokes’ supervisor at the Clearing station, demanded
that Cannon-Stokes give her Cannon-Stokes’ doctor’s telephone number in front of the other mail
carriers. DSOF 428; PSOF 4 119. Ms. Curtis then telephoned Cannon-Stokes’ doctor to push back
the time of Cannon-Stokes’ appointment.” Jd.

5. Search for a New Position

After the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs determined that Cannon-Stokes’
restrictions were permanent, John Richardson, the Postal Service’s Human Resources manager, sent
a request to the area managers and officials of other postal stations on November 13, 1996, asking
that they provide a position that met Cannon-Stokes’ job restrictions. PSOF { 120. This request was
sent out again on December 17, 1996. /d. After receiving negative responses, Richardson directed
the managers to look harder for an available position for Cannon-Stokes. PSOF { 121.

On February 12, 1997, Richardson sent Cannon-Stokes a job description for a modified
carrier position with the Grand Crossing station. DSOF 53; PSOF § 122. The Postal Service had
modified Cannon-Stokes’ job responsibilities to comply with her medical limitations. DSOF | 54.

Cannon-Stokes accepted the job offer on February 20, 1997. DSOF 4 32, 47, 55.

°Cannon-Stokes also asserts that Ms. Curtis told Cannon-Stokes’ co-workers that nothing had happened to
Cannon-Stokes while she worked at the Austin station and that Cannon-Stokes had invented the incident. PSOF
4118. Such testimony is inadmissible hearsay, however, because Cannon-Stokes testified that she did not hear Ms.
Curtis make these statements; instead, she is attempting to offer what her co-workers told her for the truth of the
matter asserted: that Ms. Curtis made such statements about Cannon-Stokes.

1h


not to come back to the Austin station.

On April 20, 1996, Cannon-Stokes was transferred to the Graceland Annex. DSOF {[ 48.
That day, her new supervisor, Ms. Little, ordered Cannon-Stokes to sort and deliver a postal route.
DSOF 4] 49. Cannon-Stokes repeatedly asked Ms. Little whether the route was commercial or all
residential, and Ms. Little informed her that it was mixed. DSOF 50. Cannon-Stokes then gave
Ms. Little a copy of her limited-duty restrictions, which showed Cannon-Stokes was unable to
deliver mail on a route that had residential buildings. PSOF 4101. Ms. Little refused to look at the
document and directed Cannon-Stokes to deliver the mail. /d. Ms. Little told Cannon-Stokes that
she believed that Cannon-Stokes’ transfer to the Graceland Annex was at Cannon-Stokes’ request
and that Cannon-Stokes was a full-duty carrier. DSOF 4 51. Cannon-Stokes tried to make a delivery
but returned to the postal station without completing her route because she was “terrified.” DSOF
4/52; PSOF § 102.

On the following Monday, Cannon-Stokes spoke with Barbara Holman, the manager of the
Graceland Annex, who informed Cannon-Stokes that her transfer to the Graceland Annex was
rescinded and that she should return to the Austin station. PSOF § 103. Holman told Cannon-Stokes
that she had not asked for a limited-duty carrier and that Cannon-Stokes was such a carrier. ° /d.
Holman had received no prior notice that Cannon-Stokes was assigned to the Graceland Annex until

Cannon-Stokes arrived for work on April 20, 1996. PSOF 4 104. Holman had contacted Sims but

“Potter raises a hearsay objection to Cannon-Stokes’ characterization of what Holman told her. See
Defendant's Response to PSOF § 103. In PSOF { 103, Cannon-Stokes claims that Holman told her that she,
Holman, had asked for a “full-body carrier” and that she did not want Cannon-Stokes because she was on limited
duty. The cited evidence fails to support Cannon-Stokes’ use of the “full-body carrier” language. Thus, the court
will consider only Cannon-Stokes’ version of the conversation to the extent that it is supported by her testimony.
Such testimony is not hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, e.g, that Holman had
not asked for a limited-duty carrier, but to show Holman’s motive for rescinding Cannon-Stokes’ assignment to the
Graceland Annex.


Third, when Cannon-Stokes was informed that she would be transferred to the Hedgewich station
because of her unrelated EEO charge of harassment at the Grand Crossing station, she objected to
the transfer. Because of her objection, Cannon-Stokes remained at the Grand Crossing station until

she was transferred to the Garfield station at her request.

With regard to Cannon-Stokes’ transfers and the Postal Service’s attempt to transfer Cannon-
Stokes following her EEO charge of sexual harassment at the Grand Crossing station, Cannon-
Stokes has not shown how such transfers or the attempt to transfer her significantly altered the terms
and conditions of her employment. As recognized by the Seventh Circuit, “[b]y definition, any
lateral job transfer will result in changes to an employee’s job responsibilities and work conditions.
To sustain a federal employment discrimination suit, a plaintiff must show something more than the
ordinary difficulties associated with a job transfer.” O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909 at 913
(7 Cir. 2004), citing Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712 (7 Cir. 2000) (“A
materially adverse change in employment conditions must be more disruptive than mere
inconvenience or alteration of job responsibilities.”). Cannon-Stokes has conceded that her job
responsibilities remained essentially the same despite the transfers, and “being shifted to an
essentially equivalent job that [an employee does] not happen to like as much does not a Title Vil
claim create.” Jd., quoting Place v. Abbot Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 810 (7" Cir, 2000). Likewise,
having to ask her supervisor each day for her assigned tasks, unloading mail trucks, different starting
times, and working longer before taking a lunch break are more properly classified as “mere
inconveniences” than as adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Grube v. Lau Indus., 257 F.3d 732,
728 (7" Cir. 2001) (change in working hours did not rise to the level of adverse employment action

where unaccompanied by any change in pay, title, or significantly diminished job responsibilities).

22


In response to Plaintiffs Additional Statement of Uncontested Facts, Potter also challenges
the accuracy of Cannon-Stokes’ portrayal of the cited evidence. See {{] 66-69, 71, 74, 80, 82, 83, 88,
89, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126,
127, 128, 130, 135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 162,
164, 166, 167, 168, 170. To the extent that the court agrees or disagrees with Potter’s challenges,
or Cannon-Stokes’ challenges to Potter’s submissions, the court will note its findings in the context
of the facts. The court will consider only those facts which are supported by the cited evidence.
Likewise, the court will disregard documents submitted with a motion that are not referred to in the
statement of facts or statement of additional facts, e.g., Defendant’s exhibits 8, 16, 17, 18. See
Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 583 (noting that “[e]xperience has amply demonstrated the danger of making
arguments a party has not advanced by relying on exhibits not explained by either side.”).
lll, FACTS'

A. Background

The Postal Service has employed Cannon-Stokes since 1989 and continues to do so today.
Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts (“DSOF”) § 1. After working as a
part-time employee, Cannon-Stokes became a career employee as a city letter carrier in December

1989. DSOF § 2.

'The court has done its best to puzzle together the events and incidents giving rise to this lawsuit but notes,
with not a little frustration, the parties" failure to provide substantive fact sections in their briefs and/or organize their
Local Rule 56.1 statements chronologically. In his memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment,
Potter chose to present background information only. Cannon-Stokes ignored the obligation of submitting a fact
section altogether. As Judge Castillo wisely counseled in Malec v. Sanford, “{t}he purpose of the fact section [in a
memorandum in support of or opposition to summary judgment] is to provide the context of the case. As such, we
strongly recommend organizing the facts chronologically. This section should inform the Court of the broad
circumstances giving rise to the dispute but detail only those facts relevant to the motion.” Malec, 191 F.R.D. at
585. By failing to provide such a context, the parties made the court’s job of determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists extremely difficult and time consuming.

4


III. DISCUSSION

A. Disability under the Rehabilitation Act

Cannon-Stokes claims that Potter violated the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against
her because of her disability and by failing to accommodate her disability. The Rehabilitation Act
protects a “qualified individual with a disability” from discrimination solely because of her disability
in any program receiving federal financial assistance. Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896 at 902 (7"
Cir. 2004), citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, Cannon-Stokes must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the
statute, (2) she is otherwise qualified to perform her job, (3) she was involved in programs receiving
federal financial assistance, and (4) she was excluded from participation, denied benefits, or
otherwise discriminated against solely because of her disability. /d., citing Silk v. City of Chicago,
194 F.3d 788, 798 n.6 (7" Cir. 1999).

Under the Rehabilitation Act,’ a person is disabled if she has (a) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a
record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. /d., citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(20)(B). The parties confine their analysis to the first method of establishing disability, having
a physical or mental impairment, and the court will do likewise.

In this case, Cannon-Stokes has not met her burden of establishing that she is disabled within

the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act because she has failed to show that she is substantially limited

"The Rehabilitation Act provides that the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 ef seq., are to be used in determining whether a violation of the Rehabilitation Act has occurred
within the context of employment. /d., citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 842 (7
Cir. 2002); Silk, 194 F.3d at 798 n.7. Accordingly, the court will refer to the ADA’s provisions and standards in
determining whether a violation of the Rehabilitation Act occurred.

15


24269 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2002) (“Interacting with co-workers or peaceful interaction with others in
any context is an activity that is central to most people’s daily lives and therefore constitutes a major
life activity.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Wagner v. Ill. Dep't of Pub. Aid, No. 98
C 7268, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22562 at *15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2004) (holding that, as a matter of
law, plaintiff was not substantially limited in the major life activity of interacting with others);
Perkins v. Ameritech Corp., No. 00 C 5655, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17232 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2004)
(plaintiff had presented some evidence that she was limited in her ability to interact with others).
Cannon-Stokes has qualified this activity further by asserting that she is substantially limited in her
ability to interact with others while alone. The court is not convinced that “the ability to interact
with others while alone” is a separate and distinct major life activity from the more general “ability
to interact with others,” and Cannon-Stokes has offered no argument as to why the court should
consider it as such.

Assuming, however, that the ability to interact with others while alone is a major life activity,
Cannon-Stokes has not offered sufficient evidence to establish that she is substantially limited in this
major life activity because of her PTSD. Cannon-Stokes has averred that she does not go to the
grocery store or walk her children to school or ride the subway. She also has stated that she does not
have a normal family life and is no longer married. Absent from these facts is evidence, such as the
testimony or affidavit of her psychiatrist or other treating physician, that Cannon-Stokes is unable
to go to the grocery store or walk her children to school or use public transportation because of her

PTSD. She instead relies on her conclusional testimony and affidavit as evidence that she has

17


in the moving party's statement, including in the case of any disagreement, “specific references to
the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” The rule is very clear
that “all material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed
admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B).

In Plaintiff's Rule 56.1(b)(3) Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts and Statement of
Additional Facts, Cannon-Stokes decided against filing any response to the material facts set forth
in paragraphs 1-11, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 31, 32, 34-39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 53-56, 60, and 62 of
Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts. Thus, these facts are deemed
admitted.

Cannon-Stokes also admitted certain statements and/or denied certain statements but then
improperly included additional facts in her response to paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26,
33, 40, 46, 51, 52, 57, 58, 59, 61, and 63 of Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested
Facts. Asaresult, the court will disregard the additional information in these paragraphs. See Malec
v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581 at 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Rule 56. 1(b)(3)(B) ‘provides the only acceptable
means of. . . presenting additional facts.””), quoting Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311,
1316 (7" Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original).

Potter also improperly included additional information in response to paragraphs 97, 1 12,
128, 137, 139, 140, 145, 156, 158, and 165 of Cannon-Stokes’ Additional Statement of Uncontested
Facts. Portions of Potter’s responses to these paragraphs went beyond identifying improper
characterizations of testimony or facts unsupported by the cited material and included new facts or
additional information in an attempt to qualify the stated fact. Accordingly, the court will disregard

the additional information contained in these paragraphs.


ORDER

For the reasons stated above, Potter’s motion for summary judgment [#40] is granted. This

case is terminated.

ENTER:

o7 7 7
(/JOAN HUMPH LEFKOW

United States District Judge

Dated: November 3, 2005

26


of the record. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c) Advisory Committee’s notes. The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). In response, the nonmoving
party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed above to designate
specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. /d. at 324; Insolia v. Philip
Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact must be outcome determinative
under the governing law. Insolia, 216 F.3d at 598-99. Although a bare contention that an issue of
fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492
(7th Cir. 2000), the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party
as well as view all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477
US. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
Il. LOCAL RULE 56.1

Before reaching the merits of the motion for summary judgment and determining whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must address the deficiencies in the parties’ Local
Rule 56.1 filings. Local Rule 56.1(a) provides that a motion for summary judgment must include,
inter alia, a “statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine
issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law.” This statement of material
facts “shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support
the facts set forth in that paragraph." Part (b) of Local Rule 56.1 requires a party opposing summary
judgment to file, inter alia, a concise response to the movant’s statement of material facts. For

purposes relevant here, that statement is required to include a response to each numbered paragraph


Stokes that she was no longer needed at that station and directed her to return to the Postal Service’s
Injury Compensation Unit. PSOF {| 137. Ms. Prater then began to yell at Cannon-Stokes in front
of other employees about Cannon-Stokes’ PTSD. Id. Cannon-Stokes remained at the Grand
Crossing station until she was transferred at her request to the Garfield Park station. DSOF {| 38.

7. Garfield Park Station

When Cannon-Stokes transferred to Garfield Park, the manager of Garfield Park, Ms.
Montgomery, gave Cannon-Stokes her personnel file and told her to return downtown. PSOF 4 138.
Cannon-Stokes then contacted the area manager, Ms. Jalla, who told Cannon-Stokes to return to the
Garfield Park station. /d. At some point, Cannon-Stokes was directed to deliver two parcels and
express mail on a residential route in violation of her medical restrictions. PSOF § 139. Cannon-
Stokes responded by informing the individuals to read her restrictions, and they had other employees
deliver the mail. Cannon-Stokes also was directed to shovel snow, sweep the floor, and empty the
garbage even though her modified carrier position restricted her to inside duties only.'' PSOF 4 140.

8. Austin Station

Cannon-Stokes worked at the Garfield Park station for three years until she was transferred
to the Austin station, where she remains, DSOF 439. Her job responsibilities at the Austin station
have included marking mail to return it to the sender, loading mail on and off trucks, and casing

mail. DSOF § 40.

\“Cannon-Stokes asserts that these duties were outside her medical restrictions. See PSOF {| 140. The only
medical restriction that Cannon-Stokes has identified, however, is delivering mail in residential areas.

13


in one or more of her major life activities. A major life activity is an activity of central importance
to daily life. Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615, 197
122 S. Ct. 681 (2002). ADA regulations provide the following representative list of major life
activities: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning
and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Cannon-Stokes admits that she has no trouble walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, grooming herself, getting ready for work in the morning, casing mail,
taking care of her son, or performing manual tasks like cooking and working. She asserts, however,
that she is significantly limited in her ability to be outside in a residential area, to enjoy life, and to
interact or communicate with people while alone.

The ability to enjoy life is not a major life activity within the meaning of the Rehabilitation
Act, and, as Potter points out, is instead a state of being or existence, To the extent that Cannon-
Stokes is unable to be outside in a residential area or engage in leisure activities, such as going to
the movies, taking vacations, or going away for a weekend, these activities generally do not have the
same significance as major life activities, including breathing, hearing and leaming. See Sinkler v.
Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. Pshp., 209 F.3d 678 at 684 (7" Cir. 2000) (“consider unlisted activities
in contrast to listed activities to determine whether the unlisted activity has equal‘significance.””).

Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed whether interacting with others constitutes
a major life activity for ADA or Rehabilitation Act purposes, courts within this district have
recognized that interacting with others is a major life activity. See McKay v. Town & Country
Cadillac, Inc., No. 97 C 2102, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10257 (N.D. IH. June 7, 2002) (relying on
previous memorandum opinion and order, court determined that family and social relations

constitute a major life activity); Fitch v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 01 C 1149, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

16