Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed October 2, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-0566

Lower Tribunal No. 21-17014-CA-01

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McLane Foodservice, Inc.,

Petitioner,

vs.

Elizabeth Wool,

Respondent.

A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose 

M. Rodriguez, Judge.

Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A., and Jessica L. Gross and 

Nina N. Batista, for petitioner.

Lauri Waldman Ross, P.A., and Lauri Waldman Ross; South Florida 

Appeals, PA, and Wm. Allen Bonner, for respondent.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and BOKOR, JJ. 

LINDSEY, J.
2

Petitioner McLane Foodservice, Inc. (Defendant below) seeks a writ of 

certiorari quashing the trial court’s order compelling the deposition of its 

current President. We grant the petition for the reasons set forth below.

INTRODUCTION

The instant petition involves a discovery dispute in an underlying 

negligence action. Respondent Elizabeth Wool (Plaintiff below), an

employee of a Miami-based Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, alleges she 

sustained injuries when she attempted to unstack boxes of chicken that

McLane delivery drivers had delivered earlier that same day. Wool alleges 

that McLane’s negligence caused her injuries.

McLane is a nationwide company that distributes food and foodservice 

items to restaurants throughout the United States. A multibillion-dollar 

company with 48 distribution centers around the nation, McLane employs 

more than 9,000 people. Susan Adzick is McLane’s current President. The 

order under review compels her deposition. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The lengthy procedural history below informs our decision herein. On 

September 9, 2022, Wool noticed the deposition of a McLane corporate 

representative prepared in accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.310(b)(6). In the notice, Wool designated certain matters/topics for the 
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deposition regarding the subject incident, including: the policies and 

procedures for unloading boxes, the transportation and/or delivery of boxes,

the policies and procedures for placement and/or stacking of boxes, and the 

training and supervision provided in connection therewith. McLane produced 

Lamont Lawson as the corporate representative.

McLane also produced two documents in response to Wool’s request 

for production of “[a]ny and all contracts pertaining to the delivery of 

foodservice products to the Subject Property on March 1, 2021.” The two

documents were entitled (1) the Participant Distribution Joinder Agreement 

and (2) the Master Distribution Agreement, collectively (the “Agreements”). 

Both Agreements were entered into by McLane and non-parties. And Adzick 

signed both in her then role as Senior Vice President of Sales and Strategic 

Relations.1

Wool deposed Lawson, McLane’s designated corporate 

representative, on October 11, 2022. Lawson was asked about the two 

Agreements but proved unable to discuss them. We note, however, that the 

1

 Since that time, Adzick has been promoted to her current position as 

President of McLane.
4

Agreements were not specifically designated as an area of inquiry in the 

September 9, 2022 notice of deposition.2

Thereafter, Wool moved to compel the deposition of Adzick on the 

basis that she was a signatory to the Agreements. In response, McLane 

moved for a protective order and filed an accompanying Affidavit from Adzick 

averring that she does not have any personal knowledge or unique 

information pertaining to the facts or issues being litigated. 

On August 11, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Wool’s Motion to 

Compel and McLane’s Motion for Protective Order. At the hearing, Wool 

argued that because Adzick signed the Agreements, Wool should be entitled 

to take Adzick’s deposition. McLane responded that the Apex Doctrine 

forecloses deposing Adzick.3 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court 

sua sponte stated on the record that it would allow Wool “to designate new 

areas of inquiry of the corporate rep.” Thereafter, on August 14, 2023, the 

trial court entered a written order deferring ruling on Wool’s Motion to Compel 

and McLane’s Motion for Protective Order and ordering McLane to produce 

2 Thus, Wool’s complaint that Lawson did not have adequate knowledge of 

the Agreements is of no moment.

3 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(h). Effective January 1, 2025, the Apex Doctrine 

Rule will be moved from 1.280(h) to 1.280(i). See In re Amends. to Fla. R.

Civ. P., 386 So. 3d 497 (Fla. 2024).
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a corporate representative for deposition “on topics related to the contracts 

produced by McLane” and signed by Adzick. 

Then, on August 31, 2023, Wool served a second notice for a corporate 

representative deposition. In the notice, McLane designated certain 

matters/topics regarding the content of the Agreements, compliance with the 

Agreements with respect to delivery and/or stacking of boxes, the rationale 

for entering into the Agreements, the due diligence process in evaluating the 

decision to enter into the Agreements, and information regarding all persons 

with decision-making authority to enter into the Agreements. 

In response, McLane produced Paul Frazier for deposition on October 

6, 2023. Frazier knew about the Agreements and confirmed that they do not 

contain any details about the delivery height of any boxes, the height or the 

weight of deliveries, or the performance standards having to do with the 

method boxes are delivered. However, Frazier had limited knowledge about 

the details of the Agreements because he was not involved in their 

preparation. He did, however, identify other individuals at McLane who 

would have more knowledge. Thereafter, on October 27, 2023, Wool filed a

Renewed Motion to Compel the Deposition of Adzick alleging that Frazier 

“was unable to answer multiple critical questions about the contracts, and 

the designated deposition topics, due to his lack of knowledge.” 
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On February 28, 2024, the trial court entered a written order granting 

Wool’s Motion to Compel the deposition of Adzick and denying McLane’s 

Motion for Protective Order. In its order, the trial court acknowledged that 

Adzick had filed an Affidavit averring that she had no personal knowledge or

unique information pertaining to the facts or issues being litigated. Yet, in 

concluding that the Apex Doctrine does not preclude Wool from deposing 

Adzick at this stage in the proceedings, the trial court found that Wool 

demonstrated that she exhausted other discovery, that such discovery is 

inadequate, and that Adzick has unique personal knowledge of discoverable 

information.

This timely petition followed.

ANALYSIS

A writ of certiorari is proper where a petitioner demonstrates “(1) a 

material injury in the proceedings that cannot be corrected on appeal 

(sometimes referred to as irreparable harm); and (2) a ‘depart[ure] from the 

essential requirements of the law.’” E.g., Nader v. Fla. Dept. of Highway 

Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 721 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Belair v. 

Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 2000)). “A finding that the petitioning 

party has ‘suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct 

appeal’ is a ‘condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari 
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jurisdiction.’” Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. 

Enters., LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 454-55 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Jaye v. Royal 

Saxon, Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998)).

Certiorari jurisdiction lies to review an order compelling the deposition 

of a high-level corporate official because “[o]nce discovery is wrongfully 

granted, the complaining party is beyond relief.” DecisionHR USA, Inc. v. 

Mills, 341 So. 3d 448, 452 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (quoting Miami Dade Coll. v. 

Allen, 271 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)). “We therefore address 

the merits of the petition—whether the trial court departed from the essential 

requirements of the law . . . .” Tesla, Inc. v. Monserratt, 384 So. 3d 194, 196 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2024).

In August 2021, the Florida Supreme Court adopted Florida Rule of 

Civil Procedure 1.280(h), thereby codifying the Apex Doctrine, which 

protects “high-level corporate officers from the risk of abusive discovery, 

while still honoring opposing litigants’ right to depose such persons if 

necessary.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280, 324 So. 3d 459, 459 (Fla. 

2021).

4

 “[O]nce the supreme court codified the apex doctrine, the 

4 Before the adoption of Rule 1.280(h), “Florida’s version of the apex 

doctrine, developed by the district courts of appeal as a common law gloss 

on our rules of civil procedure, protect[ed] only high-level government 

officials.” In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 459.
8

requirements of the rule became clearly established principles of law.” 

Chewy, Inc. v. Covetrus, Inc., 384 So. 3d 265, 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024)

(citing DecisionHR USA, 341 So. 3d at 453).

“We construe rule 1.280(h) as we would a statute, which means that if 

the text of the rule is unambiguous, we apply the rule as written without resort 

to principles of construction. The text of rule 1.280(h) is unambiguous, and 

our supreme court has provided a detailed explanation of the reasons for the 

rule and key aspects of its application.” DecisionHR USA, 341 So. 3d at 454 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citations omitted). We turn now to the essential 

requirements of the rule. 

Under the Apex Doctrine rule, “[a] current or former high-level 

government or corporate officer may seek an order preventing the officer 

from being subject to a deposition.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(h). Here, it is 

undisputed that Adzick, the President of McLane, is a current high-level 

corporate officer; therefore, this requirement is satisfied. Cf. In re Amends.

to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 462 (“When that person’s ‘high-level’

status is disputed, the burden is on the person or party resisting the 

deposition to persuade the court that this requirement is satisfied.”).

Next, the rule requires “an affidavit or declaration of the officer 

explaining that the officer lacks unique, personal knowledge of the issues 
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being litigated.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(h). It is undisputed that Adzick filed an 

Affidavit in response to Wool’s first Motion to Compel, disclaiming personal 

knowledge of the issues being litigated, and at no point below did Wool 

challenge the sufficiency of the Affidavit.5 

Once McLane established that Adzick was a high-level corporate 

officer and produced a sufficient Affidavit, the court was required to issue an 

order preventing the deposition, “unless the party seeking the deposition 

demonstrates that it has exhausted other discovery, that such discovery is 

inadequate, and that the officer has unique, personal knowledge of 

discoverable information.” Id. We conclude that the trial court departed from 

the essential requirements of the law because Wool failed to satisfy these 

burdens.

Prior to ordering Adzick’s deposition, the trial court ordered McLane to 

provide a corporate representative with knowledge of the Agreements. 

McLane produced Paul Frazier, Vice President of National Accounts. In his

deposition, Frazier stated that he knew of the Agreements but had no 

knowledge of the details because he was not involved with the preparation 

of the Agreements. He did, however, testify that there were other individuals 

5 Moreover, the trial court made no findings with respect to the sufficiency of 

Adzick’s Affidavit, thus implicitly approving of the same. Instead, the trial 

court focused on Wool’s burdens under the Apex Doctrine.
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at McLane who would have more knowledge of the Agreements, such as Jeff 

Hayes:

Q Okay. If I wanted to ask someone else at McLane 

about the provisions in these agreements that you 

were not familiar with, is it -- is it fair to assume that 

Ms. Adzick would have knowledge about those

provisions?

. . . .

THE WITNESS: Fair, I would think Jeff Hayes would 

be the -- the person more intimately familiar with 

some of this terminology.

Frazier also identified Tom Zatina as the president of McLane when 

the Agreements were put into effect:

Q Is the -- and the McLane Foodservice president, is 

that Ms. Adzick?

A At the time that this agreement was put into effect, 

that would have been Tom Zatina.

When asked who had knowledge about McLane’s delivery policies

and procedures, Frazier identified the individual general managers:

Q Okay. Now, does McLane have policies and 

procedures that maybe expound on this deemed 

delivered language and require the McLane drivers 

not only to place the product in the correct storage 

area, but to stack the products in a certain way or 

leave them in a certain way at a store?

A That would really be out -- outside my area of

expertise . . . .
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Q Okay. And who would have knowledge about that

at McLane?

. . . .

THE WITNESS: . . . That would have to be the 

individual general managers of the -- of the 

warehouses and/or their operational leadership.

The record before us is devoid of any effort on the part of Wool to 

depose Hayes, Zatina, or any of the individual managers supervising the 

day-to-day delivery operations, as Frazier identified in his deposition. Thus, 

Frazier’s references to others who “would be more intimately familiar” with 

the contract language demonstrate that Adzick’s knowledge is not “unique”

and that Wool did not meet her burden to “exhaust” discovery on this issue.

See Tesla, 384 So. 3d at 197 (granting petition for writ of certiorari because 

“Plaintiff has not shown that the existing discovery is inadequate or that Mr. 

Musk has unique, personal knowledge of discoverable information”); Chewy,

384 So. 3d at 273 (granting petition for writ of certiorari because respondent 

failed “to exhaust discovery before seeking to depose the CEO, it also failed, 

as discussed above, to sustain its burden that the CEO has unique, personal 

knowledge of discoverable information (i.e., information that cannot be 

obtained from other sources)”).

CONCLUSION
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For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court departed from 

the essential requirements of the law in determining that Wool met her 

burden under Rule 1.280(h) because she failed to demonstrate that she

exhausted other discovery, that such discovery was inadequate, and that 

Adzick has unique, personal knowledge of discoverable information. 

Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order 

below compelling Adzick’s deposition.

Petition granted; order quashed.