IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

STERLING W. SPRINGS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: 

EUGENE DIVISION 

Case No.: 6:14-CV-01195-AC 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Sterling Springs ("plaintiff') seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner 

of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the 

Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). All parties have consented to allow a 

Magistrate Judge enter final orders and judgment in this case in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 

and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Based on a careful review of the record, the Commissioner's decision is 

affirmed and this case is dismissed. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 1 of 19
Procedural Background 

Plaintiff applied for DIB on January 3, 2011, alleging disability as of January 27, 2010, due 

to abdominal migraines, degenerative disc disease, left knee injuiy, chronic right shoulder 

dislocation, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and insomnia. 1 (Tr. 18, 166-68, 183.) His 

application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 123-31.) A hearing was held on 

August 14, 2012, before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 44-97.) On December 28, 

2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 18-32.) Plaintiff timely requested 

review of the ALJ's decision and, after the Appeals Council denied his request for review, filed a 

complaint in this Court. (Tr. 1-6.) 

Factual Background 

Born on January 31, 1976, plaintiff was 33 years old on the alleged onset date of disability 

and 36 years old at the time of the hearing. (Tr. 49, 166.) He obtained his GED and worked 

previously as a prep cook, reforestation technician, and baker helper. (Tr. 31, 50, 88-89, 184.) 

Standard of Review 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards 

and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammockv. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 

1 Although neither party addresses this issue and there is scant documentation thereof, 

plaintiff previously applied for, and was denied, DIB on May 14, 2010. (Tr. 179); see also 

Epperson-Nordlandv. Colvin, Case No. 2:12-CV-01985-AA, 2013 WL 5774110, *3-4 (D. Or. 

Oct. 22, 2013) (explaining the process to reopen a prior claim or overcome the presumption of 

continuing disability where the claimant has successive applications). Additionally, the record 

before the Court constitutes nearly 700 pages, but with some incidences of duplication. Where 

evidence occurs in the record more than once, the Court will generally cite to the transcript pages 

on which that information first appears. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 2 of 19
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The court must weigh 

"both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. 

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). "Where the evidence as a whole can support either a 

grant or a denial, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's." Massachi v. Astrue, 

486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Conunissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520. First, the 

Commissioner evaluates whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity"; if so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

At step two, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairment or combination ofimpairments." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520( c ). 

If not, the claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant meets or equals "one of 

a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude 

substantial gainful activity." Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520( d). If so, the claimant is presumed disabled; 

if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

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At step four, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can still perform "past 

relevant work." Id.; 20 C.F.R.§ 404.1520(f). If the claimant can work, he is not disabled; if he 

cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work existing in 

significant numbers in the national or local economy. Id. at 142; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the 

Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. 

The ALJ's Findings 

At step one of the five-step process outlined above, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 20.) At step two, the ALJ 

determined that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "attention deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD); bipolar disorder II; generalized social phobia; alcohol dependence in current 

remission; opiate addiction in remission; history ofleft posterior cruciate ligament (PCL) tear/strain 

with degenerative joint disease; history of right shoulder instability status post Bankart 

reconstruction and possible impingement; cervical degenerative disc disease; sleep apnea; 

gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) vs. abdominal migraines; mild lumbar and thoracic 

scoliosis; and headaches." (Tr. 20-21.) At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiffs impairments, 

either singly or in combination, did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impahment. (Tr. 

22.) 

As such, the ALJ continued the sequential evaluation process to determine how plaintiffs 

medical limitations affected his ability to work. The ALJ resolved that plaintiff had the residual 

functional capacity ("RFC") to perform medium work: 

with lifting and canying of 50 pounds occasionally and 25 frequently. He can 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 4 of 19
perform occasional overhead work with the left upper extremity and no overhead 

reaching with the right upper extremity. He can perform no squatting or stooping, 

or lifting from below waist level. He can understand, remember and carry out only 

simple instructions that can be learned in 30 days or less. 

(Tr. 24.) At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. 

(Tr. 30.) At step five, the ALJ found, based on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), that 

plaintiff could perform a significant number oflight exertion, unskilled jobs existing in the national 

and local economy despite his impairments, such as bakery line worker, laminating machine 

operator, and dealer account representative. (Tr. 31-32.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that 

plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 32.) 

Discussion 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding him not fully credible; (2) improperly 

assessing medical evidence from William Trueblood, Ph.D.; and (3) formulating an incomplete RFC, 

such that the step five finding was invalid. (Pl.'s Opening Br. 5-6.) 

I. Plaintiffs Credibility 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide a specific, clear and convincing reason, 

supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting his subjective symptom testimony concerning the 

severity of his impairments. When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could 

reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record 

contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, "the ALJ canreject the claimant's testimony about 

the severity of ... symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so." 

Smolen v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). A general assertion that 

the claimant is not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which ... testimony is not credible 

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and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. Shala/a, 12 F.3d 915, 918 

(9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing collli 

to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shala/a, 

50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). If the "ALJ's credibility finding is suppmied 

by substantial evidence in the record, [the collli] may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

At the hearing, plaintiff testified that he is unable to work primarily as a result of his right 

shoulder impairment and abdominal migraines, which result in a limited range of motion and 

constant pain, nausea, and vomiting. (Tr. 58-61, 63-64.) He also endorsed shoulder dislocations 

multiple per daily, as well as extreme neck and knee pain, insomnia, headaches, numbness in his 

hands and feet, and anxiety. (Tr. 62, 65-73.) As for activities of daily living, plaintiff remarked that 

he "spend[s] most of the days trying to stretch [his] neck [and] back," but "really in the last few years 

[can] not [even do the stretching] that much." (Tr. 74.) Instead, he currently watches television, 

"pick[ s] up some small clutter around the house," like clothes, and "maybe make[ s] the bed with one 

arm" although it "takes ... quite a while." (Id) As for functional abilities, plaintiff stated that he 

can walk for"[ m ]aybe a couple of blocks" before needing to rest, and stand for four minutes and sit 

for "[m]aybe 20 minutes to half an hour" at one time. (Tr. 71-72.) 

After summarizing his hearing testimony, the ALJ determined that plaintiffs medically 

determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to produce some degree of symptoms, but 

his statements regarding the extent of these symptoms were not fully credible due to his inconsistent 

reports and tendency to exaggerate, as well as the lack of corroborating medical evidence. (Tr. 25-

30.) 

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Notably, the ALJ found that plaintiffs credibility was eroded by his contradictory statements. 

(Id) Inconsistencies in a claimant's testimony or behavior can serve as a clear and convincing 

reason for an adverse credibility finding. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). The 

record is replete with evidence supporting the ALJ's finding, as plaintiff gave conflicting accounts 

concerning his functional abilities and activities of daily living, hospitalizations, alcohol use, etc. 

For instance, plaintiff stated in his January 2011 Adult Function Rep mi that he "cannot function at 

all" on "bad days," which "are the majority," but may "eat, keep meds down [and] do a couple of 

chores" on "good days"; he estimated that he could walk for one-half mile before needing to rest. 

(Tr. 194-99.) In March 2011, plaintiff expressed to Michelle Whitehead, Ph.D., that he "rides a bike 

and walks" regularly - such that he "appear[ ed] healthy and in good physical shape" - and played 

video games, watched television, used the internet, wrote stories, and did chores, like cleaning the 

litter box, vacuuming, and folding laundry, on a daily basis. (Tr. 529-30); see also Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (daily activities may be used to discredit a claimant where 

they are either "transferable to a work setting" or "contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment") (citations omitted). He sat for one hour during that examination with "minimal" 

outward pain behavior. (Tr. 529.) 

On top of"do[ing] a lot of cooking," he recited similar daily activities to Mike Henderson, 

M.D. (Tr. 533.) He also repmied the ability to sit and stand for 60 minutes at one time, and walk 

for one-quaiier of a mile before needing to rest. (Id) In September 2011, he recounted to a different 

provider an "enjoyable" drive that he took from Bend to Salem "and back," a round-trip of 

approximately five hours; he also cooked and attended a wedding, despite undergoing treatment for 

an "aggressive [tooth] infection." (Tr. 644-45, 674.) In his August 2012 letter, submitted before the 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 7 of 19
hearing, plaintiff indicated severe limitations on most days, such that he performed essentially no 

daily activities. (Tr. 248-49.) While he testified that he could sit for no more than 30 minutes at one 

time, plaintiff "remained seated for the 60 plus minute hearing." (Tr. 25-27, 46, 71-74. 97 .) Less 

than two months later, during his return visit with Dr. Henderson, he endorsed the ability to sit for 

15 minutes at one time but, upon examination, the doctor could "not find objective evidence to limit 

sitting, standing or walking." (Tr. 685.) 

Regarding hospitalizations for his abdominal condition, plaintiff reported to one provider in 

August 2010 that he had "similar episodes of abdominal pain in 2004 [and] 2008." (Tr. 353.) In 

September 2010, he specified previous "[stomach] episodes in 2003 and 2007." (Tr. 4 33 .) In March 

2011, he explained to Dr. Henderson that he had only "been hospitalized 3 times in his lifetime for 

abdominal pain [but] is now going to the hospital 3 times per year." (Tr. 26, 532-33.) That same 

month, he communicated to Dr. Whitehead, while recounting his '"undiagnosed' stomach 

problems," that "[h]e has been hospitalized five times during the past two years and ten times to the 

emergency room." (Tr. 527.) During his subsequent exam with Dr. Henderson in October 2012, 

plaintiff disclosed that "he has been to the ER about 30 times and admitted to the hospital 

approximately 8 times in the last 10 years" for nausea and vomiting. (Tr. 26, 683.) Plaintiffs 

August 2012 letter specified that, in a "good month," he "throw[s] up a couple of times a day and 

a couple of times at night," and a "bad month is non stop vomiting for weeks on end," such that he 

"usually come[ s] back to the E.R. eve1y few days for another month then the cycle staiis again." (Tr. 

26, 248.) However, plaintiff"finally agreed at the hearing that his stomach condition had been better 

over the last year" - i.e. he has been "able to eat solid food" and only "throw[s] up here and there" 

- such that he had not presented to the emergency depaiiment since June 2011, when he was not 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 8 of 19
admitted. (Tr. 26, 54, 66.) He nonetheless testified at that time that, up until June 2011, he "was 

going [to the emergency room] about every month, sometimes every week." (Tr. 53.) An 

independent review of the record reveals that plaintiff underwent two clusters of emergency 

treatments related to his stomach during the relevant time period, one in August/September 2010 and 

the other in December 2010. (Tr. 26, 353-62, 366, 368, 435-53, 466-73, 489-93, 535.) 

Although he repeatedly told his providers that ceasing to drink improved his nausea, 

vomiting, and stomach pain, he did not significantly reduce his chronic alcohol consumption until 

at least the end of 2010 or beginning of 2011. (Tr. 26, 58, 76); see also (Tr. 433 (reporting in 

September 2010 that he "swore off all caffeine and alcohol" when "when his most recent abdominal 

syndrome and vomiting recmTed," and "has been fine since"), 444 (indicating in December 2010 that 

he had resumed drinking until his last abdominal episode began), 447 (stating to another provider 

in December 2010 that he "only rarely drinks"), 500 (disclosing to yet another provider in December 

2010 that he is a"[ d]aily," "heavy alcohol drinker"), 529-31 (remarking in March 2011 he used to 

drink "heavily," "his last alcohol use was three days ago," and that he "craves to drink daily," such 

that Dr. Whitehead opined "[i]t is possible [plaintiff] drinks more than he is willing to repmt"), 534 

(expressing to Dr. Henderson in March 2011 that he only has "2 drinks per week"), 645 (explaining 

in October 2011 that he felt an abdominal episode "coming on but 'no alcohol and rest seemed to 

alleviate"' his symptoms), 673 (specifying to Dr. Trueblood in September 2012 that his "[ d]rinking 

was heavy from [ages] 19 to 34" - i.e. a "16 pack of beer on a daily basis or three quarters of a fifth 

of rum in a day" - but "[h]e currently only has one drink about every two weeks").) As the ALJ 

reasonably concluded, these inconsistencies belie plaintiffs subjective symptom statements. 

The ALJ also determined plaintiffs tendency to exaggerate undermined his credibility. (Tr. 

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26-28.) A tendency to exaggerate is a legitimate consideration in evaluating a claimant's credibility. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F .3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Numerous providers questioned 

plaintiffs effort on exams, noted "irregularities" between his behavior and test results, described him 

as "overly-dramatic," and/or observed that his complaints were "excessive." (Tr. 274, 429, 530, 532, 

535,568-69,683,685.) 

In addition, the ALJ found that plaintiffs subjective complaints were not supported by the 

medical record. (Tr. 27-28.) "While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground 

that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant 

factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects." Rollins v. 

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, plaintiffs attestations of frequent migraine 

headaches and knee pain are unsupported by the record, as he received very little treatment during 

the adjudication period for these allegedly debilitating impairments. (Tr. 27, 62, 71, 83-83, 607-22, 

648-54); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ may consider an 

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 

treatment in assessing credibility). Further, plaintiff testified that he needed to "brea[k] off bone 

spurs" in his neck daily and was told that neck surgery would "kill [him] or paralyze [him] for life," 

yet the medical record does not contain any evidence to that effect. (Tr. 27, 62, 79-82.) 

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ "had the responsibility to develop the record in order to 

obtain such medical evidence" to support his subjective symptom statements (Pl. 's Opening Br. 27; 

Pl.' s Reply Br. 4, 7-11 ), but he misconstrnes the law. A claimant bears the burden of proving the 

existence or extent of an impairment, such that the ALJ' s limited "duty to further develop the record 

is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 10 of 19
proper evaluation." Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 2001). In this case, plaintiff 

failed to furnish evidence substantiating the majority of his claimed limitations, despite the fact the 

ALJ noted these shortcomings and left the record open post-hearing to allow for supplementation. 

(Tr. 58-62, 64-70, 79-82, 95-96.) 

That plaintiff neglected to carry his burden of proof, in part because he did not seek regular 

treatment for some of his allegedly disabling impairments, does not establish an ambiguity or 

inadequacy in the record, especially in light of the fact that the ALJ refe1Ted plaintiff to two 

additional consultive evaluations in order to generate additional medical evidence relating to 

severity. (Tr. 95-96.) Moreover, plaintiffs argument that the ALJ's decision was deficient because 

it lacked the requisite specificity is unfounded. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the ALJ 

did not arbitrarily discredit plaintiffs self-repmts. Lastly, plaintiffs attempts to equate the ALJ's 

step two determination with a positive credibility finding are misplaced; it is well-settled that step 

two findings do not directly translate to the RFC, in large patt because the "the step-two inquiry is 

a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. 

Similarly, plaintiff offered sworn statements that he dislocates his right shoulder multiple 

times per day, such that he was prescribed a shoulder brace to wear at all times, but the medical 

record neither reflects that he was prescribed a brace on those terms nor shows any significant 

treatment for or limitation of that shoulder during the relevant time period. (Tr. 25, 27, 58-61, 371, 

532-35, 604, 685.) In fact, although right shoulder surgery was recommended in July 2010, plaintiff 

elected not to go through with it, citing financial reasons. (Tr. 335-36.) Plaintiffs surgeon was 

"confused" over this choice - noting that a discounted payment plan had been offered which was "not 

financially out of reach for him" - especially because plaintiff "came in to the appointment today 

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explaining that his life is 'ruined' because of his right shoulder" and the surgery "would help him 

dramatically." (Tr. 336.) While plaintiff offers an alternative reading of this evidence, the ALJ's 

interpretation was nonetheless rationale, such that it must be upheld. Batson v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Thus, the ALJ provided several specific, clear and convincing reasons, suppotied by 

substantial evidence, for rejecting plaintiffs subjective symptom statements. As a result, this Comi 

need not discuss all of the reasons provided by the ALJ because at least one legally sufficient reason 

exists. Carmickle v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ's 

credibility finding is affirmed. 

II. Medical Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to provide a legally sufficient reason, supported 

by substantial evidence, for discrediting the medical opinion Dr. Trueblood.2 There are three types 

of medical opinions: those from treating, examining, and non-examining doctors. Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). To reject the uncontrovetied opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, the ALJ must present clear and convincing reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 

1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Ifa treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted 

by another doctor's opinion, it may be rejected by specific and legitimate reasons. Id 

In September 2012, Dr. Trueblood performed a one-time examination to assess plaintiffs 

mental functioning. (Tr. 670-78.) Dr. Trueblood's opinion was based on plaintiffs self-repotis, a 

2 In the alternative, plaintiff argues that, if there was an "ambiguity or inconsistency 

between [Dr. Trueblood's opinion and the other medical evidence ofrecord, her] responsibility 

was to recontact Dr. Trueblood for clarification." (Pl. 's Opening Br. 28.) For the reasons 

discussed herein, the ALJ's duty to more fully develop the record was not triggered. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 12 of 19
cognitive screening, and the review of limited medical records. (Tr. 670.) The doctor diagnosed 

plaintiff with ADHD, bipolar disorder II, generalized social phobia, and alcohol dependence in full 

sustained remission. (Tr. 677.) He also listed "Cognitive Disorder NOS" as a provisional diagnosis 

and "schizotypal personality characteristics" as a rule out possibility. (Id.) Dr. Trueblood assigned 

plaintiff a global assessment of functioning ("GAF") score of 51,3 classifying plaintiffs alleged 

physical problems, as well as his unemployment, "mild social isolation," and financial stress, as 

contributing factors. (Id.) In the narrative section of his evaluation, Dr. Trueblood denoted the 

following conclusions: 

This gentleman rep01is having attention problems back to childhood, with these 

worsening over the last 10 years. He reports memory problems since his late teens 

but these have been worse in the last 10 years. Cognitive screening results involve 

normal performance on a memory screening task. There is suggestive evidence for 

working memory impairment in terms of mildly impaired calculations and mildly low 

digit repetition, while mental tracking performance is rated as normal. Overall 

tentative impression is of acquired cognitive impairment in the milder range. I 

cannot rule out that it might be greater than that. This gentleman's history that 

involves a number of very plausible contributing factors to acquired cognitive or 

neuropsychological impairment does lead me to believe that there likely is at least 

some such impairment. Hist01y includes repeated head injuries (involvement in 

mixed martial arts for a number of years), very long-term benzodiazepine use, past 

alcohol abuse, bipolar disorder, and ADHD ... 

Infonnation that is relevant in rating [plaintiffs] ability to understand and remember 

instructions includes that there was just one instance when [he J had any difficulty 

3 To the extent he contends his GAF score, alone, establishes his entitlement to benefits, 

plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. A GAF of51to60 merely equates "[m]oderate symptoms 

(e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in 

social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or 

co-workers)." The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000); see also Skelton v. Comm 'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 6:13-CV01117-HZ, 2014 WL 4162536, *11 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2014) (explaining that the fifth and most 

recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders abandoned the GAF 

scale for several reasons, including "its lack of conceptual clarity" and "questionable 

psychometrics in routine practice") (citation and internal quotations omitted). 

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understanding something that I said to him[.] Overall tentative impression is that 

impairment in ability to remember instructions is probably mild to moderate or less. 

Again, though, it certainly is possible that the impairment is greater than that, 

especially in view of the number of plausible contributing factors in this gentleman's 

hist01y[.] Regarding [plaintiffs] ability to sustain attention/concentration and 

persist, his presentation on this evaluation did involve tangential speech that was of 

a degree and nature that leads me to believe that it probably is based in an underlying 

attention disturbance. [I] suspect that there is significant impairment in this 

gentleman's ability to sustain attention/concentration and persist [but it is important 

to mention] that the history of holding jobs for long spans of time is some evidence 

for good persistence and sustaining attention. Regarding [plaintiffs] ability to engage 

in appropriate social interaction, he has some long-term friendships. He has limited 

but some social contact. He does have significant temper problems and these seem 

to be at a level such that he is susceptible to having incidents of loss of temper 

towards strangers in public settings. There is significant interpersonal anxiety and 

avoidance. This gentleman's historyofholdingjobs for long spans of time is a piece 

of evidence in favor of his ability to get along with others. 

(Tr. 675-77.) 

On an accompanying Medical Source Statement, Dr. Trueblood checked boxes reflecting that 

plaintiff was: not limited in his ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions and to 

understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; mildly limited in his ability to interact 

appropriately with co-workers; moderately limited in his ability to respond appropriately to usual 

work situations, make judgments on complex work-related decisions, and understand, remember, 

and carry out complex instructions; and markedly limited in his ability to interact appropriately with 

the public and supervisors.4 (Tr. 680-81.) In regard to the latter restriction, Dr. Trueblood explained 

"[it is a] close call as to whether to rate interacting with the public and supervisors as marked or 

moderate, but the combination of temper problems and anxiety seem to warrant [the] marked rating." 

4 This form defined "moderate" as "more than a slight limitation in this area but the 

individual is still able to function satisfactorily" and "marked" as less than "extreme" - i.e. 

"[t]here is serious limitation in this area [and] a substantial loss in the ability to effectively 

function." (Tr. 680.) 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 14 of 19
(Tr. 681.) 

The ALJ accepted the majority of Dr. Trueblood's opinion and therefore limited plaintiff to 

work involving "only simple instructions that can be learned in 30 days or less." (Tr. 24, 30.) 

However, on the narrow issue of the plaintiff's social functioning, the ALJ gave Dr. Trueblood's 

assessment "limited weight" because: (1) his formulation of plaintiff's anxiety was "ill-defined"; (2) 

plaintiff"did not allege the same socially based issues to Dr. Whitehead previously"; and (3) there 

is "little" in the record to support such limitations, as plaintiff's own remarks indicate that "job 

losses have been due to physical problems" and he "denied ever losing a job due to problems getting 

along with others." (Tr. 30.) 

Initially, an ALJ is not required to accept medical limitations plu·ased equivocally. Valentine 

v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2009). An ALJ may also discredit a 

medical opinion that is "conclus01y, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole [or] by objective 

medical findings." Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (citation omitted). Moreover, an ALJ can satisfy the 

"substantial evidence" requirement by "setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Reddick v. 

Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

Here, the ALJ did not err to the extent she afforded less weight to Dr. Trueblood's opinion. 

As both the narrative portion of his assessment and his check-the-box explanation demonstrate, Dr. 

Trueblood's discussions of plaintiff's social limitations were phrased in noncommital terms. He 

recorded plaintiff's temper problems, which were not independently observed, and anxiety, but he 

also noted plaintiff's history oflong-term friendships, limited but nonetheless existent social contact, 

and ability to hold jobs for long periods of time with no interpersonal issues. (Tr. 671-77.) In other 

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words, as Dr. Trueblood resolved on the check-the-box form, the extent of plaintiffs social 

impairment was unclear and he gave plaintiff the benefit of the doubt due to plaintiffs self-repo1is. 

(Tr. 681.) Accordingly, it was reasonable for the ALJ to construe Dr. Trueblood' s vaguely-defined 

social restrictions as "not represent[ing] work-related limitations offunction that need to be reflected 

in the RFC." Griffith v. Colvin, Case No. 3:13-CV-00585-HZ, 2014 WL 1303102, *5 n.3 (D. Or. 

Mar. 30, 2014); see also Glosenger v. Comm 'r a/Soc. Sec. Admin., Case No. 3:12-CV-1774-ST, 

2014 WL 1513995, *6 (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2014) (affirming the ALJ's rejection of functional 

restrictions because the doctor used "equivocal language ('might do better' and 'would also likely 

require')"). 

Further, an independent review of the record evinces that plaintiff has no significant issues 

getting along with others. See, e.g., (Tr. 56, 77-78, 200, 248-50, 428-30, 527-30, 617-18, 643-46, 

648-49, 652.) Namely, plaintiff did not disclose psychological symptoms at the hearing, despite 

being provided an ample opp01iunity to do so, or in his August 2012 letter; in his January 2011 Adult 

Function Repo1i, he expressly denied ever being "fired or laid off from a job because of problems 

getting along with other people" and stated that he got along "okay" with "authority figures [such 

as] bosses." (Tr. 49-87, 95, 200, 248-49.) Plaintiffs statements to Dr. Trueblood distinctly diverged 

from those furnished to Dr. Whitehead in that he did not endorse having extreme anger and anxiety 

problems, or a "ve1y hard time being out in public," to Dr. Whitehead. (Tr. 527-31, 671-74.) As 

such, neither Dr. Whitehead nor the state agency consulting sources found restrictions in social 

functioning. (Tr. 103, 115-16, 531.) In fact, as the ALJ noted, plaintiff was still receiving 

unemployment benefits at the time of Dr. Whitehead's March 2011 assessment, meaning that he was 

publicly holding himself out as capable of working. (Tr. 29, 429, 529); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 16 of 19
763 FJd 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) ("receipt of unemployment benefits does cast doubt on a claim 

of disability") (citation omitted). Regardless, as Dr. Trueblood acknowledged, plaintiffs self-repmis 

did not indicate any problems with authority figures and revealed that he is capable of engaging in 

long-term romantic, platonic, and professional relationships. (Tr. 671-77 .) For example, he 

recounted living a relatively harmoniously life with his wife, whom he had been married to for 

several years, "visiting occasionally with a neighbor," and "having contact in person every two 

weeks with one of his close friends." (Id.) He also told Dr. Trueblood that he has only been fired 

twice, once for "goofing off" and the other time for physical reasons. (Tr. 673-74.) The foregoing 

lends additional support to the ALJ' s finding that plaintiff was not markedly limited in his ability 

to interact appropriately with supervisors and the public. 

Even assuming, that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Trueblood's social limitations, such an 

error was harmless. See Stout v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 FJd 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(mistakes that are "nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ's ultimate disability 

conclusion" are harmless). The representative occupations identified by the VE are all unskilled, 

meaning that they "involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people." (Tr. 90-

91 ); SSR 85-15, available at 1985 WL 56857; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a). As a result, in perfmming 

these positions, plaintiff would not be required to come into contact with the public or to coordinate 

closely with a supervisor. See McCown v. Colvin, Case No. 6: 13-CV-01716-AA, 2015 WL 106056, 

*6 (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2015) (affirming the ALJ's decision under analogous circumstances). 

In sum, the ALJ provided a detailed and thorough sunnnary of the record, and reasonably 

found, based on this evidence, including plaintiffs own prior accounts, that there was no basis for 

a social restriction in the RFC. (Tr. 21-30.) The ALJ's assessment of Dr. Trueblood's opinion is 

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Case 6:14-cv-01195-AC Document 18 Filed 02/08/16 Page 17 of 19
affirmed. 

III. RFC and Step Five Finding 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC and step five finding are enoneous because they 

did not account for all of the limitations set forth in his testimony and the opinion of Dr. Trueblood. 

Although not elaborated upon in great detail or explicitly laid out as part of his RFC/step five 

challenge, plaintiff also asserts that "[t]he ALJ did not properly consider the combined effect of[his] 

multiple impairments, severe and non-severe."5 Pl.'s Opening Br. 6. 

The RFC is the maximum a claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 CFR § 404.1545. In 

determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all of a claimant's impairments, 

even those that are not severe, and evaluate "all of the relevant medical and other evidence," 

including the claimant's testimony. SSR 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184. Only limitations 

supported by substantial evidence must be incorporated into the RFC and, by extension, the 

dispositive hypothetical question posed to the VE. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

As addressed herein, the ALJ properly discredited plaintiff and Dr. Trueblood, and there is 

no indication, outside of this evidence, that plaintiff suffered from functional limitations beyond 

those outlined in the RFC during the relevant time period. In fact, no medical source opined that he 

is disabled or otherwise unable to work. Furthermore, the record controverts plaintiffs assertion that 

the ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of his mental and physical impainnents, both severe 

and non-severe. (Tr. 21-30.) Therefore, plaintiffs arguments, which are contingent upon a finding 

5 Plaintiffs reply brief implies that this argument is simply a different iteration of his 

RFC and step five challenge. See, e.g., (Pl.'s Reply Br. 14.) Nevertheless, in order to provide 

the most complete review of this appeal, the Court treats this issue separately. 

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ofharmful error in regard to the aforementioned issues, are without merit. Bayliss, 427 F3d at 1217-

18; Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ's RFC and step 

five finding are upheld. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is 

DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this __ day of February 2016. 

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r 

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_:::~:{/:.;_ .. _ .. ~ .. .... """ 

JOBN V. ACOSTA 

United. States Magistrate Judge J 

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