J-S08011-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v. MICHAEL VINCENT ORR Appellant No. 825 WDA 2015 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No: CP-26-CR-0001708-2014 BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 Appellant, Michael Orr, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County foll owing Appellant’s conviction for persons not to possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a license. 1 Upon review, we affirm. The trial court summarized the background of the c ase as follows.

On May 24, 2014, at approximately 1:29 A.M., Pennsylvania State trooper Adam Janosko and Trooper Patrick Biddle were on patrol in full uniform and driving a marked police vehicle when they observed a white Ford Escort stat ion wagon parked in the Park Memorial Cemetery, on Coolspring Street, North Union Township, Fayette County. Trooper Jano sko made contact with the driver of the vehicle, and determi ned that Appellant was the driver. Trooper Janosko observed that Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, his pupils were di lated, he was

____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1).J-S08011-16

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overly anxious and nervous, had rapid body movement s and confused speech. When Trooper Janosko asked Appell ant why he was in the cemetery at that time, Appellant stat ed that he was attempting to turn around. Trooper Janosko obs erved a burnt crochet needle, and he communicated to Appell ant that such an object was commonly used for drug use. App ellant stated that he had been smoking crack out of an emp ty “Mountain Dew” soda can and directed Trooper Janosk o to the location of the can in the back of Appellant’s vehi cle. A further search of Appellant’s vehicle led to the discovery and seizure of a .25 caliber Phoenix Arms pistol, syringes and a pil l marked 2064 over “V”, as well as the “Mountain Dew” can alleged ly used by Appellant to smoke crack. Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 8/21/15, at 1-2. Add itionally, Appellant attempted to justify the presence of the firearm in his vehicle, claiming that he placed it in his glove box to hide it from his c ousin who had been brandishing the weapon at work while intoxicated. N.T. Jury Trial, 4/8-9/15, at 64-65. Knowing that he was not supposed to poss ess a firearm, Appellant directed the troopers’ attention to the a forementioned drug paraphernalia to attempt to “lure” them away from t he firearm in the glove box. Id. at 68. Appellant filed a pretrial omnibus motion to dismis s for lack of probable cause, to suppress evidence, and as a writof habeas corpus . The trial court denied Appellant’s pretrial motion, “fi nding that physical evidence was properly seized from [Appellant’s] vehicle, the statements made by Appellant prior to being Mirandized were spontaneou s and without custodial interrogation, and the Commonwealth sufficiently es tablished a prima facie case for the charges brought against Appellant.” T .C.O., 8/21/15, at 3.J-S08011-16

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Following trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of p ersons not to possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a l icense. Id. at 1. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for a new tr ial, which the trial court denied. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant file d a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1 925(a) opinion. Appellant raises three issues for our review. 1) Whether the evidence presented at trial sufficientl y established that the defendant possessed or control led the firearm? 2) Did the trial court err in denying the defendant’s postsentence motion for a new trial as the jury verdictwas against the weight of the evidence? 3) Did the suppression court err in denying defendant’ s omnibus pre-trial motion in the nature of a motion to dismi ss; motion to suppress physical evidence and statements; and a writ of habeas corpus ? Appellant’s Brief at 7. 2

____________________________________________ 2 In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we determine “whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inference s derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwea lth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson , 894 A.2d 759, 773 (Pa. Super. 2006). “[W]here the trial court has ruled on the w eight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the under lying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” Commonwealth v. Sanders , 42 A.3d 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “In reviewing app eals from an order denying suppression, our standard of review is limi ted to determining whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are su pported by the record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those fa cts are correct. When (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S08011-16

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After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the re cord on appeal, and the relevant case law, we conclude that the trial c ourt’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, authored by Judge Linda R. Cordaro, thorou ghly and adequately disposes of Appellant’s issues on appeal. 3 See T.C.O., 8/21/15, at 3-13. We, therefore, affirm Appellant’s judgment of sente nce. We direct that a copy of the trial court’s August 21, 2015 opinion b e attached to any future filings in this case. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court, the appel late court considers only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evid ence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. When the record supports the findings of the [trial ] court, [we are] bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal concl usions drawn therefrom are in error. Commonwealth v. Frederick , 124 A.3d 748, 753-54 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Our scope of revi ew from a suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that wa s created at the suppression hearing. In re L.J. , 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013). In evaluating a trial court’s decision regarding a pre -trial habeas corpusmotion, our standard of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Dantzler , --- A.3d -- -, No. 681 EDA 2014, 2016 WL 910149, at *2 (Pa. Super. Mar . 9, 2016). 3 We note the trial court relied on pre- Commonwealth v. Gary , 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) cases for the definition and identif ication of the elements of the “limited automobile exception,” which required both probable cause and exigent circumstances for a warrantless search of a vehicle. However, as also acknowledged by the trial court later in its o pinion, in Gary , the Supreme Court abolished the exigency prerequisite i n the context of the automobile exception. T.C.O., 8/21/15, at 8 (quoti ng Gary , 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014)) (“[t]he prerequisite for a warrantl ess search [or seizure] of a motor vehicle is probable cause to search; no exi gency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle is required.”) .J-S08011-16

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/22/20161 1 1 8 Pa
. C.S.A. §610S(a)(l) 2 18 Pa. CS. A
. §6 1 06(a )( l ) vehicle w h e n th ey ob s erv e d a whi t e Ford E s co rt station wagon parked i n th e Park Mem o rial Janosko and Troop e r Patri ck B i dd l e w e r e on patro l in fu ll un i form and driv i n g a marked police On M ay 24, 20 1 4, at ap p r ox im at e l y 1 : 29 A. M ., Pe nn sy l vani a State Troope r Adam F INDINGS O

F F A CT l 925(b). denied
. App e ll an t th e r eafter file d a time l y Noti ce of Appeal and Concise I s s ue s und e r P a.R.A.P. On April 

### 29, 20 1 5, Ap pe ll ant fi led a Pos t -Sentence M o ti on for a New Trial, whic h this Cou rt Correc ti on al I ns tituti o n for a pe ri od of no t l ess th an two (2) year s n o r mo re th an four ( 4) y e ars . Licen s e 2 • On A pri l 2 7 , 2015, Appe ll an t was se nte n ce d t o u nd e r go impri sonme nt at a S t ate wa s con vi ct e d of Pos s ess i on of a Fi r earm Proh ib ited ' and Firearm N ot t o be Carri ed With o ut a 2015, by Appe ll ant M i c h ael V in cent Orr, here i naft e r "Appe ll ant". On Ap ri l 10, 2015, App e llan t B efore th e Court ar e th e "Co n c i se I ss u es" pur s u ant to P a . R.A
. P. 1 925(b) fi l ed Ju n e 

### 2,

Pa . R.A.P. 1925(b) OPINION 

### CORDA R O, Lin d

a R
. , J D efe n dan t, MI C H A EL V IN CENT ORR , N o. 1 7 08 of20 1 4

v s . P lain ti ff, IN THE COURT OF COMMON P LEAS OF FAYETTE COU N TY, PENN S YLVANIA CR I M I NAL D I V I S I O N COMMONW E AL T H O F P E NNS YL VA N I A Circulated 05/24/2016 02:29 PM2

The complaints contained in Appellant's "Concise Issues under Pa. R.A.P. l 925(b)" are as follows: Appellant was convicted of Possession of a Firearm Prohibited, a second degree felony, punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten (10) years and a maximum fine of $25,000.00. Appellant's prior record score is two (2), and this is a level five (5) offense. The offense gravity score is nine (9), and the standard range sentence is twenty-four (24) to thirty six (36) months. Appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment at a state correctional institution for a period of not less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years. Appellant was also convicted of Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, with no further penalty imposed by this Court. Appellant had previously been convicted of a felony and is prohibited from possessing firearms. Appellant is also a suspended driver due to a previous DUI conviction. Cemetery, on Coolspring Street, North Union Township, Fayette County. Trooper Janosko made contact with the driver of the vehicle, and determined that Appellant was the driver. Trooper Janosko observed that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot, his pupils were dilated, he was overly anxious and nervous, had rapid body movements and confused speech. When Trooper Janosko asked Appellant why he was in the cemetery at that time, Appellant stated that he was attempting to turn around. Trooper Janosko observed a burnt crochet needle, and he communicated to Appellant that such an object was commonly used for drug use. Appellant stated that he had been smoking crack out of an empty "Mountain Dew" soda can and directed Trooper Janosko to the location of the can in the back of Appellant's vehicle. A further search of Appellant's vehicle led to the discovery and seizure of a .25 caliber Phoenix Arms pistol, syringes and a pill marked 2064 over "V", as well as the "Mountain Dew" can allegedly used by Appellant to smoke crack.3

· 1 For organizational purposes, this opinion addresses Appellant' s Concise Is s ue No. 3 first, followed by Issue No. I and Issue No. 2. 4 This Court dismissed Count 7: Driving While BAC .02 or Greater While License Suspended of a crime and that the accused is most likely the perpetrator of that crime. Com. v. Lopez, 654 the light most favorable to the Commonwealth that sufficiently establishes both the commission v. Packard, 767 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 2001). A prima facie case consists of evidence viewed in whether the Commonwealth has established a prima facie case of the crime being charged. Com. In an Omnibus Pretrial Petition for Habeas Corpus relief, the court must determine Appellant. 4 the Commonwealth sufficiently established a prima facie case for the charges brought against Appellant prior to being Mirandized were spontaneous and without custodial interrogation, and physical evidence was properly seized from Defendant's vehicle , the statements made by writ of habeas corpus. This Court denied Appellant ' s Omnibus Pretrial Motion, finding that motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, motion to suppress evidence and statements, and a On November 11, 2014, Appellant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the nature of a ISSUE NO. 3: DID THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL MOTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ANO ST A TEMENTS; AND A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS? DISCUSSION ISSUE NO. 1: WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED OR CONTROLLED THE FIREARM?ISSUE NO. 2: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S POSTSENTENCE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AS THE JURY VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE? ISSUE NO. 3: DID THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL MOTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ANO STATEMENTS; ANO A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS? 34

T r adi ti o nall y, thi s Court h as reco g n i ze d three c at egori es of e nc o u n t e r s b e tw ee n citi ze n s
an d th e po li ce . T h es e c ate gori es in c lu d e ( 1 ) a m e r e en co u nt e r , (2) an inv es tigati ve de t e nti on, an d (3) c u s t od i al d e te n ti o n s . Co m. v . Me n denha ll , 552 Pa. 484 , 488 7 1 5 A
. 2d 1117, 1 1 19 ( 1 998 ) (c i ti ng Co m. v . Po l o, 563 P a. 21 8 , 7 59 A.2d 3 72 , 375 (2000))
. T h e fir s t of th e se , a " mer e
encou nt er" (or re qu e s t for in form ati on), w hi c h n e ed not b e s u p p ort ed by an y l e v e l o f s usp i c i o n , but carri es n o offici al compu l s i on t o s t o p or t o re s po nd
. i d. T h e s eco n d , an " inve s ti gati v e de t en ti on " mu st be suppo rt ed b y reasonabl e s us p ic i on; it s ub jec t s a s u sp e c t to a st o p and a pe ri o d of d e t e ntion , but do e s not i n vol ve such coer c ive condi tions a s t o co n sti tu te th e fu n c ti o n al Ap p ellant argu e d th at h e w a s not M i randized at the tim e h e made s t atem e n t s to th e tro ope r s and an y statemen t s ma d e s hou l d the r e fore be di s mis s ed
. T h e qu es ti o n o f l aw b e fore thi s C ourt i s whe th e r th e i niti al int e rac ti on betwee n T ro o per J ano sko and App e ll ant w as a m ere
e nco un te r o r an i nve s ti gative d ete n ti on s o as t o trigg er App e ll ant' s righ t s u nd e r Miran da
. T h i s Co urt find s th e s i tuati o n i s a cl ass ic e xamp l e o f th e fo rm e r. A.2d 115 9 (Pa
. S u p er. 1 995)
. Th e p ri m a fac i e c ase in s up port o f a defe n d ant's gu il t c o n sis t s o f evide n ce p r ese nt e d by th e Co mm o n wealth th at if accepte d as tru e , w o u l d warran t th e tri al j u dg e t o all o w th e c ase to go t o a j u ry . Com
. v . A us ti n, 5 7 5 A. 2 d 141 ( Pa
. Supe r . 1990)
. At th e heari ng
on App e ll ant' s O mn ib u s Pr e tri al M otion , th e Co mm onwealth pre se nt ed th e t esti mony of Trooper Janosko w ho stat e d th at h e seized th e fir earm fro m Ap pe llant 's v ehi cle and th at Appe ll ant was o f th e c la ss o f p eop l e pr o hibi ted fr om carry in g a fi r earm . Furth er , Troope r J anos ko re l ated th at he al s o recove r ed se veral i t em s of p arap h ernali a co n s i s t ent w ith drug us e from App e llant' s ve h icle. As suc h this Co urt det e rmi ned th at th e Commonwealth me t the prim a fac i e bu r den for th e
c harges li s ted , and de n i ed Appe ll ant ' s moti o n .

### s

In this case, Trooper Janosko and Trooper Biddle both testified that they encountered AppeJJant sitting in his vehicle at the Park Memorial Cemetery, which at the time was closed. Trooper Janosko testified that he approached Appellant's vehicle because of concerns that Appellant was present at the cemetery to vandalize headstones or to take his life at the headstone 363 Pa.Super. 488, 526 A.2d 784 (1987). To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an investigatory detention,
we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. Id To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter. 

### Id. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry must be whether> considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have thought he was being restrained had he been in the AppeJJant 's shoes. Id Among the factors the court utilizes in determining, under the totality of the circumstances, whether the detention became so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of a formal arrest are: the basis for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the suspect was transferred against his will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or dispel suspicions. Com. v. Bybel, 399 Pa.Super. 149, 158, 581 A.2d 1380, 1385 (1990). The fact that a defendant was the focus of the investigation is also a relevant factor in determining whether he was "in custody," but does not require, per se, Miranda warnings. Bybel, supra; Com. v. Fento, equivalent of an arrest. 

### Id Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause. 

### Id6

It i s w e ll se ttl e d th at th e F o urth A m e n d m e nt to th e Un i t e d St at es Con s ti tu tion and Arti c l e I , § 8 o f th e P e nn sy l v an i a Co n sti tu ti o n r e quir e that s ear c h es b e co n du c t e d p u r s u ant to a warran t iss ue d by a ne u tral and det ac h e d m agis trate . A s ear c h c o n duc t e d w ith o u t a warr an t i s g ene r all y dee m e d t o b e u nr e as o n abl e fo r c o n s tituti on al p u rp ose s . Com. v. S tew a rt , 7 40 A. 2d 71 2, 7 1 5 (P a .Sup e r. 1 999), a ff

d, 5 6 8 P a. 499 , 7 98 A
. 2 d 6 9 7 (2 002 ) ( i n te rn al c it ati o n o mitted). Whi l e the U n it ed S t ates S u p rem e Co u rt h as r ec o g n i ze d an au tomobi l e exce p tio n t o th e w arran t
r equ i r e m e n t , th e P e nn sy l vania S u p r e m e Co u rt h as n o t. Com. v . C a sa n ova , 5 7 0 P a . 6 8 2 , 8 08 A. 2 d 56 9 (2 0 02 )
. N eve rth e l ess , thi s C o urt h a s a dop t e d a limited aut o m o b i le e xcep ti o n u n d er Articl e I , § 8 of th e P e n n sy l v ania Co n s ti tu ti o n . Co m . v . M cCree, . 592 P a. 238 , 2 52 , 924 A.2d 6 2 1 , 63 0 ( 2 0 0 7 ). Sp e c i fi call y , a warr antl es s s e ar c h of an au to m o b il e m ay be conducted "w h e n of a l ove d on e. (T ransc ri p t P
. 2 4)
. T roope r B iddl e t esti fi ed th at th e T ro o p er s p ulled their v e hi c l e di ag o n al t o Ap p e ll an t 's v e hi c le so Ap p e ll an t wou l d b e fre e t o leav e s h o u l d h e s o d es ir e . (T ran sc ript P. 4 9 ). T ro o p er Jan os k o a ske d qu es tio n s o f th e Appe ll an t , an d h e a s ked for identifi catio n fro m th e App ell ant. Th e purp o se fo r whi c h Tr o o per J an o s ko app ro ac h ed th e
v eh i cl e was t o as certain th e safe ty of th e o cc u p ant( s ) , c o n s i d e rin g th e area and the ti m e o f n i g h t. Un der th e se circ u m stan c es , th i s C o u rt fi nds th at th ere w a s a " m e re enco u n t e r " b etwe en Troo p er Jan o s ko and th e Ap pe ll ant , and th er e was n o re qui re m e n t fo r th e App e ll ant t o be M i randi ze d
. Turnin g t o th e i ss u e of w h e ther T roo p er J an os ko h ad p ro bab l e c ause to sear c h Ap p e ll an t> s ve h i c l e, th i s C o urt fin d s th at th e Comm on w ealth pr e se nte d s u ffic i en t ev ide n ce t o
s u s t ai n i ts bur d e n o f s h o win g probab l e c au se. App e llan t's Omn i b us Pretri al Mo ti o n clai m ed th at Troo p e r J an os ko an d Tro o p er B i dd l e c o n du c t e d an i ll eg al se arc h and s e i z ur e of Appe ll an t an d hi s ve hicl e i n vi o l ati o n of App e ll ant' s ri g ht s u n d e r th e U n it ed S t ates and P e nn sy l vani a Co n s titu ti o n s .7

Like w i se, "ex i ge nt c ir c um s t an ces" ari se where th e n e ed fo r pro mpt pol i ce acti on is imp e r ati v e , e i th e r becau se e v i de n ce is l ike l y t o be d es troyed or bec ause th e r e exis t s a threat of p h y s i cal h arm t o po l i c e officers o r o th er i n n oc e nt i n di v i du al s. Com
. v . Cope land , 955 A. 2d 396, 4 00 (Pa
. S u per.2 00 8 ) (qu o ti ng Co m . v . S tewa rt , 74 0 A
. 2 d 7 1 2, 7 1 7 (Pa
. Sup e r.1999)). "[A] court
must b al anc e th e i n div idu al' s ri g ht t o be free fr o m unr easo n ab l e intru s ion s agai nst th e i n t e r e s t o f
soc i ety in qui c kl y an d adequ ate l y i nv es tigati ng crime an d p reve ntin g the d es tru cti on o f
e vi dence ." Id

. (quoti n g S tewart

, s up ra at 717)
. S u c h a s e ar c h i s ju sti fie d b e cause ( I ) a v e h i c le i s hi g hl y m ob i l e and th e li ke lih oo d i s th e r efo re great th at it and it s co n t e nt s may n ev e r b e fo un d i f p o li ce are p ro hibit ed fr om immobil iz in g it un til a warrant i s sec ur e d ; an d ( 2 ) o n e ' s ex p ec t atio n of privacy with respect to a m otor v ehicl e i s s i gn ifi cantl y l e ss th an that re l ati ng t o o n e's h o me o r offic e . Co m. v . H

o lz e r , 480 Pa
. 93, 389 A
. 2d 10 1 ( l 978). Furth e rm ore, w h ere an o ffi c er w ho has
n o t intrude d i nt o a c on s ti tuti o n al l y protec t ed area s ees co ntr ab and i n p l ai n v iew, su c h a s the I n de t e rminin g w h e the r p robab l e cau se ex i s t s, we app l y a t o tali ty o f the c ir cu m st an ce s tes t. Prob abl e cause i s m a d e o ut when th e fa c ts and c i r cum st anc es wh ic h ar e wi thin th e kn o wl e dg e of th e offi ce r at th e tim e o f th e arr es t , an d o f which h e ha s r eas on ab l y tru s two rth y i n formati o n , are s uffi c ient t o warran t a man of r ea so nab l e c autio n i n th e b e li ef that th e s u spec t ha ~ c ommi tte d or i s c o mmittin g a c rime
. S ee C o m. v. Thomps o n , 985 A
. 2 d 92 8 (Pa. 2 0 09) (c i tin g Co m. v . Clark

, 7 35 A
. 2 d 1 2 48 ( Pa
. 1999) ; Co m . v . R odrig u ez, 585 A
. 2 d 988 ( Pa. 1 99 1 ); T exas v. B rown , 460 U. S
. 73 0 ( 19 8 3) ; I llin o i s v . Gates, 462 U. S
. 21 3 (1 98 3 )). T h e questi on w e ask i s n o t
w h e th e r th e officer's be l i ef wa s c o rr e ct or mo r e l ikel y tru e th an false
. Id R ath e r , w e r equi r e o n l y a pro babi lity, an d n ot a pri m a fa ci e s howi n g, of c rimin al ac ti v ity. 

### Id. th er e e xi s t s p ro b abl e c ause t o se ar c h and ex i g ent ci r c um s t an ces n ecess it ati ng a se ar c h ." Casa n o v a, s upra at 21 1 ( qu o tin g S te w art , s upra at 71 5)
.8

s C L E IN s t ands for th e " C o mm on w ea lth L aw E n fo r ce m e nt I nforma ti on N e tw or k" fu rth e r , Tro oper Jan osk o tes tifi ed th at h e o b se rve d a c ro c h e t n eedle l ocated b e tween the dri ve r r eveal e d that Ap p e ll ant di d n ot p o s sess a vali d driv e r 's li c e nse. Afte r sp e aki ng w ith Ap p e ll ant in fo rmati o n thr o u g h th e C LI E N 5 and N C I C datab ases. ( Tran scri pt P
. 25). T h e database searc h Ap p ell ant , Tro o p e r Jano sko s t ate d that h e r eturn e d t o hi s p atro l ve hicl e and queri ed Appe ll an t's extre m e l y n ervo u s and exc i te d, and sp o ke v ery qui ckl y . ( T rans cript P. 25)
. Afte r spe akin g to Troo pe r Jan os ko s t at e d th at du rin g hi s c onve r sation w ith App e ll an t, Appellan t app ear ed Com . v. Gar

y, 62 5 Pa
. 18 3 , 91 A .3d 102 , 1 38 (201 4) In s um, our revi e w re v eals n o compellin g re aso n to int e rpre t Articl e I, S ecti o n 8 o f th e P e nn sy l vania Con s titu tio n as prov i d ing gr eater prot ec tion with r e gard t o warrantl ess s e arche s of m o t o r ve hicl es than d oes the F o urth A m e n d m e nt. Th erefore, we h o ld th at, i n thi s C o mmonw e alth, the l a w g o vern i n g warran tl ess s earch es of mot o r ve hicl es is c o e xt e n s ive w ith f e d e ral l aw und e r th e Fo u rth A me ndme nt. The pre re qui s ite for a warran tless searc h o f a m o tor v ehi c le i s prob abl e c ause to searc h; n o e xi gency b eyond th e inh e r e nt mob i lity o f a mo t or ve hicl e i s r e qui red
. Th e consiste nt and fi rm r e quire ment for probabl e cau se is a s tro ng an d s u ffi ci e nt safeg u ar d ag ain s t ill eg al searches o f m ot or ve hicl es, w h ose inh ere nt mobili ty and th e endl ess fa ctual c irc um s t an c es that s u c h mobility en ge nde rs c o ns titut e a pe r s e e xi ge n cy all owi n g po li c e o ffi ce r s to m ake th e d e t e rmin ation of prob abl e cau s e i n th e first in s t ance in th e fiel d
. co ndu c t a warr antle ss search of a vehicl e: Su pre m e Court in Com. v . 

### Gary, held th at m o bility i s the only exige n t circum st an ce needed to s u s pect i s dan ge rous and th e susp ec t mi g ht gain control of a weap on . ) Further, th e P e nns ylvani a (2000)(An offic e r m ay search an aut o mobil e for a weap o n if h e ha s a rea s on abl e b eli ef th e Pullano , 295 P a. Sup e r. 68, 44 0 A
. 2d 1226 (1 9 82)
. See Com . v. R o sa , 5 6 1 Pa
. 693, 751 A. 2d 189 burnt c rochet needl e in thi s c a se, th at e v i dence m ay b e s ei ze d with o ut a warran t. Co m . v.9

s id e d oo r an d driv e r ' s seat, an d th at th e n eed l e ap peare d t o b e ru st e d and b urn t on o n e e n d
. (Tran sc ri p t P
. 26)
. Troo per Jan os k o testified th at his tr ai nin g, kn ow l e d ge, and expe rie n ce w ith drug e n forceme n t l ed him to b e li e v e th at th e c ro c het n ee dl e w as b e ing u se d a s a " push ro d ", wh i ch i s co mm o nly u se d to e mpty ou t th e g l ass pip es u se d to s m o ke ill egal s ub s t an ces . (Tr anscri pt P
. 27 ). T ro op er J an o s ko t es ti fi ed th at he explai n ed the s i gni fi canc e o f the c roc h e t need l e t o Appe ll ant, an d aske d Ap pe ll ant for co n se nt t o searc h th e v e hi cle. ( Tran s c rip t P
. 2 7 )
. Appe ll an t in iti all y d e nie d permission t o searc h h is ve h i cl e. Troop e r Jan os k o t e s ti fi ed th at Appe ll ant th e n stat ed " I w an t t o ex pl ain t o y o u w h y I' m re all y in th e cemete ry . " ( T ran script P. 27 )
. App ell ant s t at ed to Tro o pe r Jano sko th at h e had fab ric ated a s moki ng d ev i ce out of a "M o unt ain De w" can an d had r ecen tl y u sed th e can t o smoke crac k cocai n e . ( Tran sc ri p t P
. 2 7 )
. S e e, e. g . , Co m . v . Ba ez, 5 54 Pa
. 66, 72 0 A
. 2d 711, 720 (l 998)(vo lunt ee r ed or spo nt an eo u s
u tt eran ces b y an i nd ividual ar e ad mi ss i b l e even with o u t Mi ran da w arnin gs . ). App e ll ant th e n dir ec t ed T r ooper B id d l e t o th e l oc ati on o f th e can i n h i s ve hi c l e . (Tran script P
. 27 ). Tro ope r Jano s ko t esti fi ed th at h e re tri e v e d the c an and c o n du c t e d a c o mp l ete searc h of th e v ehi c l e w hich reveal e d four sy rin ges an d an un loaded R ave n Arms
. 25-c alib er p i sto l in the
u n l ocked gl ove b ox of the car. App ell ant 's beh av i or and s po nt an eo u s s t atem e n ts, c ombined wi th th e ex i stence of par ap h e rn ali a i n th e ve h icle, was s uffi cien t t o w arran t Troo p e r Jano sko's
r eas on abl e b e li ef th at a crime was be i n g co mmi tt ed. B ase d u pon th e ab ov e fac t s an d c a s e l aw, th is Co urt fo u n d th at Tro ope r J ano sk o h a d pro babl e cau s e t o search App e ll ant 's ve h icle , th e
ve h ic l e was s uffi c i e ntl y m o bil e to qu a lif y as an e xi gent ci r c um stan ce, an d an y evi d e n c e seized th e r efrom i s no t s u bj e c t to s upp r e s sio n .10

h e was aw are of the firearm in s ide the glove comp artment o f his v e hicle. (Trans c ript P
. 67 )
. A s s e i z ed a Rave n' s . 25-calib er pi s t o l insid e App e llant ' s glo v e c o mpartm e nt. App e llant s tate d that Tro o per Jano s ko t es tifi e d th at whil e e x e cuting a l awfu l search of App e ll ant 's ve hicl e , h e that he is ineligible to receive a license to carry a firearm
. in e ligibl e to pos s e s s a firearm si nce 2009, that he did n o t have a licen se to carry a fir e arm , and The p arti es in this matte r stipulate d t o the following: App e llant is of the c lass of person s A pe rs on w ho ha s been convicted of an offen s e enumerate d i n s ub se cti o n ( b ), within or with o ut this C ommonwealth , reg ardle ss of the le n gth of s enten ce o r whose co ndu c t m e ets the c riteri a in subs e ction ( c ) shall n o t poss es s, u s e , c ontr o l , se ll, transfer or m anufa c ture or obtain a license to pos sess , use, c ontro l , s ell , tr an s fer or manufacture a fire arm in this C ommonwealth
. 1 8 Pa .C S.A
. § 6/0S (a)(I

)
. which state s: T h e Appellant wa s convicte d of 18 Pa
. C.S
. A. § 6 105: Pos s ession of a Fir earm Prohibite d cre dibility and we i g ht of th e evid e nc e , is fr ee to beli e ve all , p art , or non e of th e ev i d e n ce. I d l aw no fact s s upp o rtin g a finding of guilt may b e drawn
. Id T he fa c t-finder , wh e n ev alu atin g th e re g ar ding a defendant's guilt unl e s s the eviden c e i s s o w e ak and inconclusive that as a matter o f preclud e e v e ry pos sibility o f inno c en ce, and the fa c t-finder i s fre e to r eso lve any d o ubt s subs titute it s judgm e nt for th at of th e fact-find e r. Id. A d ditionally, th e e vid e nc e . at tri al n ee d n o t v. Smith, 8 63 A. 2d 1 1 72, 1176 (Pa
. Sup e r.2004). Th e Court m ay not wei g h the e videnc e or beyond a re a so n able d o ubt. Com . v. Stev e nson , 894 A.2d 75 9, 773 (Pa
. Sup er . 2006 ) qu o ting Co m . th e Comm o nwealth a s v e rdict w inn er, are s ufficient to establi s h all el e ment s of the off ens e trial, and all reaso nabl e in fer en ce s deriv e d th e refr o m, wh e n viewed in the l i gh t m o st favorable t o T h e s tan dar d wh e n r ev i e w ing th e suffi c ienc y of th e evi d ence i s wh eth er th e e v id e nce at ISSUE NO. 1: WHETH E R T H E E VIDENCE PRES E NT E D A T TRIAL SUFFI C IENTL Y EST ABLISHED T H AT TH E D E FE NDANT POS S ES S ED OR C ONTROLL E D TH E F I REARM ?11

at Nudo's and was brandishing the firearm in front of employees and customers. (Transcript P. pistol. (Transcript P. 64 ). Appellant testified that his cousin had been intoxicated while working Tire Division, Dawson, Fayette County, h i s cousin was in possession of the Raven's .25~caliber fir e arm. (Transcript P. 64). In this case, Appellant stated that while he was working at Nudo's s ubstantially greater harm that could have potentially been caused by his cousin brandishing the "The [defendant] has been charged with carrying a firearm without a license. To find the [ defendant] guilty of this offense, y ou must find that each of the following three (3) e lements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the [defendant] carried a firearm in a vehicle ... second, that the [ defendant] was not in his place of abode, that is, his home , or his fix e d place of business; and third, that the [ defendant] did not have a valid and lawfully issued license for carrying the firearm." (Transcript 

### P. 86-7). App e llant argued that his conduct in taking and hiding the fi r earm was justified to avoid a Thi s Court instrncted the jury on the char ge of possession of a firearm prohibited as follow s : "The [defendant] has been charged with possession of a firearm prohibited. To find the [defendant] guilty of this offense, you must find that the following elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the [defendant] was a person prohibited by law from pos s essing a fir e arm; second, that the [defendant], on a date more than sixty days from the time he becam e prohibited from possessing a firearm did, in fact, possess a firearm." "The term "firearm" includes any weapon that is designed or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive. It also includes the frame o r receiver of any such weapon. For a person to possess a firearm, he or she must have the intent to control and power to control the firearm." to view by the jury, was sufficient to sustain conviction for former convict not to own a firearm). in th e Commonwealth, and the weapon itself, which was admitted into evidence and thus subject testimony by clerk of courts that defendant was convicted of a crime of violence, i.e., bu r glary, l 985)(T e stimony by an arresting officer that defendant was in possession of a .357 Magnum, he was prohibited from do i ng s o. See Com. v. Bryant, 491 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. conclude that Appellant was in posses s ion of a firearm more than sixty (60) days from the time such, this Court finds that the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to allow the jury to12

403, 408 (2003)). The trial court's ruling is reversed only if the verdict "is so contrary to the the weight claim." Sanders, supra at 331 (quoting Com. v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, weight of the evidence."). In this setting, "an appellate court's role is not to consider the denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the 53 8 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189

- 90 (1994) ("One of the least assailable reasons for granting or (partially quoting Com. v. Diggs, 597 Pa. 28, 949 A.2d 873, 880 (2008)); accord Com. v. Brown, claim is the least assailable of its rulings.''' Com. v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 331 (Pa.Super.2012) "[A] trial court's denial of a post-sentence motion 'based on a weight of the evidence ISSUE NO. 2: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S POSTSENTENCE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AS THE JURY VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE? possess a firearm in his vehicle, and he was not justified in doing so. properly find, based solely on the testimony of Trooper Janosko, that the Appellant did in fact "Justification is a defense if the defendant reasonably believed that his actions were necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to someone else that was or would have been greater than the crime with which he is charged. The Commonwealth has the burden of disproving the defense of justification. Thus you may find the defendant guilty if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was not justified under the principle I have just set." (Transcript P. 87) The jury did not accept the justification defense raised by the Appellant. The jury could This Court instructed the jury on justification as follows: he felt his cousin may harm himself or others. (Transcript P. 64). before securing the firearm in the glovebox of his car. (Transcript P. 64). Appellant stated that 64) Appellant testified that he attempted to hide the firearm from his cousin multiple times13 ;:: ! l : " •
. .. .... .. : . 

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_ - \ ·-- B Y T H E COURT : fact s and ca s e l aw , this Co urt r eco mme nd s th at th e s e nt e n ce i n th i s m att er b e affi rm e d
. v e rdict i s not co ntrary to th e e vi de n c e a s t o s h oc k o ne ' s s e n s e o f ju s ti ce . Based o n th e abo v e App e ll ant did po ss e ss th e fi r earm in hi s v e hi c l e , and hi s c onduct w as n o t ju s tified
. The ju ry 's p art or n on e o f th e e v idenc e " )
. B ase d on th e C ommo n w ealth 's te s tim o n y, th e jury fo un d that th e cous in for s afe ty r e aso n s t o b e c r ed i b l e . Ny p ave r , su pra at 717 (fa ctfind e r "i s fr ee t o beli e ve all , Th e jury did not fi n d App e ll an t' s t es ti mo ny th at h e re tri e v e d th e fi rearm from hi s i nt ox i cate d B i d dl e , b o th o f whom st ate d that th ey o b se rv e d App e llant in the vehicle con tai n ing the w e apo n . Th e Co mmonw ealth pr es e nt e d t es timon y fro m T roo p e r A d am J ano sko an d T ro op er Patrick H e r e i n, thi s Co urt c on c lud e d that the j ury v erdi c t do es n o t s hock on e ' s s e n se of j u s ti c e . 40 8)
. Co m . v . Nypave r, 201 3 P A S up e r 144 , 69 A .3 d 708, 717-18 (2 013 ). e v i de n ce a s t o s h oc k o n e ' s se n se o f j us ti ce." San de r s, supra at 33 1 (quoting C h am p ney, s up ra at