NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT W. BOYLAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 35391
D.C. No. 3:17

- cv - 05504

- BAT

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Submitted July 6, 2020 * * Seattle, Washington Before: NGUYEN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and SIMON, ** * District Judge. Robert Boylan appeals the Commissioner’s denial of his application for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Michael H. Simon, United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 8 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

disability insurance benefits. We set aside a denial of such benefits only when an ALJ ’ s decision is based on legal error or not support ed by substantial evidence in
the record. Revels v. Berryhill , 874 F.3d 648, 653

– 54 (9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
1. Boylan complains that th e ALJ only g a ve “some weight” to the opinion
of hi s examining psychologist , Dr. Alexander Patterson . The ALJ justified this weight b ecause Dr. Patterson’s opinion was vague as to Boylan’s exact functional
limitations

. It is true that Dr. Patterson qualif ied his opinion of Boylan’s impairments by stating that they “may” or “appear[] ” to limit Boylan’s functions

. Cf. Meanel v. Apfel , 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) ( describing a physician’s opinion that the claimant experienced “ some diminution in her concentration skills” as “fall[ing] short of an informed opinion” ). And contrary to Boylan’s assertions , the ALJ ha d no duty to develop vague evidence whe n the evidence in the record wa s adequate for the ALJ’s proper evaluation. See May es v. Massanari , 276 F.3d 453,
4 59

- 60 (9th Cir. 2001)

. Here, the record was replete with other medical evidence, including the opinion s of three non

- examining state agency physicians and Boylan’s own testimony, which the ALJ used to assess his residual fu nctional capacity (“ RFC ”)

. In any case , even if the ALJ erroneously discounted Dr. Patterson’s finding s , any error was harmless. Stubbs

- Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.3

2008)

. The ALJ concluded that Boylan’s RFC reflected Dr. Patterson’s reports of moderate impairments in Boylan’s ability to interact with people and manage work stress due to anxiety. Substantial evidence supports th e ALJ’s conclusion since the
RFC determination limited Boylan to simple tasks , only occasional interaction with the public , and no collaborative decision

- making or teamwork

. See Rounds v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin. , 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that the ALJ has the responsibility to translate and incorporate clinical fi ndings into a succinct RFC).
2

. Substantial evidence also supports t he ALJ ’s decision to discount
B oylan’s Department of V eteran Affairs disability rating

. An ALJ may disregard
the VA’s disability determination based on “persuasive, specific, [and] valid
reasons.” Berry v. Astrue , 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) . Here, t he ALJ
reasoned that Boylan’s minimal treatment history and consistently normal mental
status examinations cast doubt on the VA ’s disability rating

. This is su fficient reason to reach an independent assessment of Boylan’s dis ability rather than relying on t he
VA’s determination

. 3. Boylan also challenges the ALJ’s consideration of the re maining
medical evidence. Boyl a n takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that none of his treatment providers placed any restrictions on him that indicate he suffers from permanent disabling physical and mental impairments

. But Boylan concedes that4

the ALJ’s finding is true and fa i ls to show how he was improperly prejudiced by th e finding. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to give “some weight” to the opinion s of the three non

- examining state agency physicians

. While Boylan criticizes the ALJ for relying on the physicians’ opinions since they did not review any evidence after October 2015, the ALJ specifically explained she
consider ed new evidence as part of the RFC

. Boylan does not show how any of this
new evidence contradicts the ALJ’s RFC determin ation. Moreover , nothing
contradicts the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions of the non

- examining physicians
and Dr. Patterson were all consistent with the RFC.
4. S ubstantial evidence also supports the ALJ ’s specific, clear, and convincing reasons to d iscount Boylan’s testimony

. Lingenfelter v. Astrue , 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T] he ALJ can reject the claimant ’ s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so .” ) (simplified ). T he ALJ explained that Boylan’s testimony regarding
his physical and mental impairments conflicted with the medical evidenc e, his treatment history, and his activities of daily living. See Tommasetti v. Astrue , 533
F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). For ex ample, the ALJ noted that no physical
evaluation show ed the atrophy that would necessarily result fr o m Boylan’s claim of staying in bed for the majority of the day. With regard to Boylan’s claimed mental health impairments, the ALJ pointed out that Boylan received no treatment for nearly5

three years after his alleged onset date and only minimal and conservative tre atment,
includ ing no counseling , there after

. Lastly, while Boylan correctly points out that “disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in
the face of their limitations , ” Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) , the ALJ properly used the inco n sistency between Boylan’s claimed activities and his purported limitations to discredit his testimony.
5

. Given that s ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’ s conclusion s regarding the medical evidence and Boylan’s testimony, we find no error in the RFC
determination

. See Stubbs

- Danielson , 539 F.3d at 1175

– 76

. AFFIRMED

.