2021 UT 35

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN ATEM JOK,

Appellant.

No. 20190826

Heard March 8, 2021

Filed June 22, 2021

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, Salt Lake City

The Honorable Ann Boyden

No. 121908775

Attorneys:

Andrea J. Garland, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Jonathan S. Bauer, Asst. Solic. Gen., 

Matthew B. Janzen, Salt Lake City, for appellee

JUSTICE HIMONAS authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE 

PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 John Atem Jok was convicted after a trial to the bench on 

two counts of sexual battery, based primarily on testimony from

the victim, Beth.

1

Jok appealed, claiming that Beth‘s testimony 

was so inherently improbable that it could not support a finding 

of guilt. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. We, in turn, 

affirm the court of appeals. Beth‘s testimony, which contains only 

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1 We employ a pseudonym for the victim.
STATE v. JOK

Opinion of the Court

2

minor inconsistencies and is supported by physical evidence, is 

far from inherently improbable.

¶2 This case also poses the question of whether defendants 

similarly situated to Jok must specifically raise inherent 

improbability before the trial court to preserve the issue for 

appeal. We hold that they do not. First, rule 52(a) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure does not require a defendant in a 

criminal matter to make a specific motion sounding in inherent 

improbability at a bench trial in order to preserve the issue. 

Second, the claim is effectively preserved without making a 

specific motion by the nature of a bench trial.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Beth lived with her friend Rachel2in Rachel‘s

apartment.3 Beth slept on the couch with sheets, blankets, and 

pillows for her bed. Beth had previously lived with her mother 

but moved out because, despite having a learning disability and 

receiving social security disability benefits, Beth wanted to be on 

her own.

¶4 About 5 p.m. on the Saturday night in question, Jok and 

his friend, David Akok, stopped by the apartment for a visit. Beth 

had never met Jok or Akok before that night. The two men 

brought some beer with them, and they sat in the living room 

with Rachel and Beth, listening to music and drinking. At some 

point, Jok and Akok went to get more alcohol. After they 

returned, Beth, Rachel, and the two men continued listening to 

music. The men drank beer, and Beth drank vodka with juice.

Beth stopped drinking at midnight because she did not drink on 

Sunday.

¶5 Around 1 a.m., Rachel went to bed. Sometime thereafter,

Beth developed a headache and laid down on the couch with Jok 

sitting on one end of the same couch and Akok on the other. Beth 

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2 Again, a pseudonym.

3 On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the district court‘s findings. See Ockey v. 

Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 34, 189 P.3d 51. We take the relevant 

evidentiary facts from the transcript of the initial jury trial and the 

exhibits received at the bench trial, which the parties and the trial 

court agreed would serve as the substantive evidence for the 

bench trial.
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Opinion of the Court

3

fell asleep on the couch between the two men. She awoke to Jok 

and Akok touching her. Jok rubbed her breasts with his hands, 

reaching under her shirt and her bra. She told him to stop. He 

removed his hands from her breasts and moved down to her 

pants. Reaching into her pants and underwear, he inserted his 

fingers into her vagina, causing a sharp pain. Beth said ―no‖ and 

again told him again to stop. Jok said nothing and removed his 

hand. Akok then began touching Beth‘s breasts. He laid on top of 

her, pinning her with his body. He grabbed her wrists and held

them down above her head. While on top of Beth, Akok pulled 

down her pants and underwear. Beth pulled them back up. He 

pulled them down again and raped Beth, despite her continued 

verbal protests. Jok stayed nearby in the room and told Beth, ―It‘s 

okay.‖

¶6 After the men were ―done,‖ Beth cleaned herself in the 

bathroom, went into Rachel‘s room, and laid on the floor. She told 

Rachel what had happened. When the two men would not leave,

Rachel called the police and reported trespassers in the apartment.

¶7 When the police arrived, Beth filled out a witness report

stating that Akok assaulted her first, and then Jok. Rachel also 

filled out a witness report in which she stated that Beth had come 

into her room at about 6 a.m. and told her that Akok had raped 

her and that Jok had touched her. Rachel stated that Beth said she 

had told the men to stop, ―but they wouldn‘t.‖

¶8 After Beth gave her statements, she was taken to the 

hospital for an examination. The nurse who examined her said 

Beth showed no sign of intoxication and understood and 

answered all of the nurse‘s questions. Beth told her that Jok had 

digitally penetrated her, and that Akok had raped her. The 

physical examination corroborated Beth‘s account, as Beth had 

bruising to the hymen most consistent with digital penetration. 

She had also sustained vaginal lacerations and redness consistent 

with non-consensual intercourse. The nurse stated that she was 

―surprised at the amount of injury‖ Beth had sustained. After the 

examination, a police detective interviewed Beth. She told him 

that after Akok attacked her, she slept on the couch for four hours 

and then awoke to Jok touching her.

¶9 The State charged Jok with two counts of forcible sexual

abuse and charged Akok with rape. At trial, Beth took the stand.

She testified that she had ―mixed up‖ the order of the events in 

her original statement to the police and that Jok had assaulted her 

first, then Akok. She also testified that she had not in fact gone 
STATE v. JOK

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4

back to sleep after being assaulted but had misunderstood the 

detective‘s questions.

¶10 Beth testified that she drank less than half a bottle of 

vodka even though at the preliminary hearing she stated that she

had consumed about half a bottle. When opposing counsel asked 

her if Akok sat at Beth‘s head or foot, Beth replied that he sat on 

the right side of the couch. When counsel repeated the question in 

a few ways to find out where Akok sat in relationship to Beth, she 

replied that she didn‘t know. Beth also indicated that she was 

confused by the questions.

¶11 On cross examination, the attorney for Mr. Akok asked 

Beth, ―While [Akok is] still holding onto your wrist, he pulls your 

pants down, you pull them back up, he pulls them down again, 

and he pushes your legs up to your chest while he's still holding 

your wrists down?‖

¶12 Beth responded, ―Yes.‖

¶13 At the close of the State‘s case, Jok and Akok moved for 

a directed verdict due to insufficient evidence based on Beth‘s 

testimony. After the court denied the motion, Akok took the stand 

and told a very different story. He testified that Beth had 

accompanied the two men to purchase alcohol earlier in the 

evening and that he and Beth had consensual sex in the car. Jok 

did not testify. A jury convicted both men on all charges. The 

defendants appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 

convictions, finding the prosecution‘s closing statements had 

deprived the men of a fair trial.

¶14 On remand, the State amended Jok‘s charges to two 

counts of sexual battery, each a class A misdemeanor. The parties 

agreed to a bench trial based on the record from the jury trial, and 

the same judge presided over Jok‘s trial on remand. The parties 

stipulated to the court receiving Rachel‘s witness statement as an 

exhibit because she was unavailable to testify. Jok did not renew 

his motion for a directed verdict. The trial court found him guilty 

on both counts.

¶15 Jok appealed his convictions, arguing that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him because Beth‘s testimony was 

inherently improbable. The court of appeals affirmed the trial 

court. Jok filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. We 

have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).
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5

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals‘ decision

for correctness. State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶ 7, 299 P.3d 1133. In 

the process, we review legal conclusions for correctness. Bangerter 

v. Petty, 2009 UT 67, ¶ 10, 225 P.3d 874. But we grant deference to 

the trial court on findings of fact and will ―overturn the district 

court‘s findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.‖4

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 58, 150 P.3d 480.

¶17 Regarding a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we 

will only reverse the fact finder‘s verdict when ―the evidence is 

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 

convicted.‖ State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 14, 210 P.3d 288

(citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶18 Jok argues the court of appeals erred in not finding 

insufficient evidence to support a conviction, claiming that Beth‘s 

testimony was inherently improbable. As a threshold matter, the 

State argues that Jok failed to preserve the claim because he did 

not specifically raise it with the trial court as required by State v. 

Holgate. 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. However, Holgate

addressed the preservation requirements only at a jury trial, see id. 

¶¶ 1-2, and Jok‘s conviction arose from a bench trial. So, Holgate

does not apply to this case. Rather, rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 

Civil Procedure governs. And under rule 52(a)(3), a defendant is 

not required to make a motion to preserve a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim at a bench trial. Moreover, a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim is effectively preserved by the nature of a bench 

trial and does not require making a specific motion. We therefore 

address Jok‘s claim on the merits.

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4 We typically grant deference to the trial court‘s findings of 

fact because the court, seeing the witnesses live, is better suited to 

assess their credibility. We apply this standard in the present case 

because the same judge presided over both the live mistrial and 

the new trial based on the record. But this may not be the correct 

standard where a different judge, who did not experience 

firsthand the evidence and witnesses, presides over a retrial based 

solely on the record. In such a situation, the trial court‘s findings 

of fact may merit less deference.
STATE v. JOK

Opinion of the Court

6

¶19 Jok argues that Beth‘s testimony cannot support a 

conviction because her testimony meets the criteria to be 

disregarded as inherently improbable. Jok claims that Beth 

materially contradicted herself and her pre-trial statements while 

on the stand. He also argues that she made patently false 

statements about the placement of Akok‘s hands during the rape 

and that her testimony has no corroborating evidence. We 

disagree with Jok‘s claims and affirm the court of appeals. In 

affirming Jok‘s conviction, we also clarify that although we have 

previously considered certain factors in setting aside a testimony 

as inherently improbable, the test has always been and remains

whether the testimony could support a conviction or whether 

―reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 

convicted.‖ State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 14, 210 P.3d 288

(citation omitted).

I. A DEFENDANT DOES NOT NEED TO RAISE A 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE CLAIM AT A BENCH TRIAL 

TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL

¶20 The State argues that our holding in State v. Holgate

requires a defendant to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim 

with the district court at a bench trial in order to preserve the 

issue for appeal. See 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (―As a general 

rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 

appeal.‖). But the State misunderstands our holding in Holgate. 

Holgate dealt exclusively with the preservation requirements at a 

jury trial, see id. ¶¶ 1-2, and so is inapplicable in this case because 

Jok‘s conviction arose from a bench trial. Rather, rule 52(a) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the preservation 

requirements for a bench trial, providing that a defendant may 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence even if the issue was not

expressly raised at a bench trial. Furthermore, the claim is 

effectively preserved at a bench trial because the judge, as the 

factfinder, necessarily examines the sufficiency of the evidence 

without requiring a specific motion to do so. We therefore find 

Jok‘s challenge preserved for appeal.

¶21 An issue is preserved for appeal when the party raises it 

―in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on 

that issue.‖ Salt Lake City v. Josephson, 2019 UT 6, ¶ 12, 435 P.3d 255

(citation omitted). We have held that the preservation rule ―serves 

two important policies.‖ Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11. First, as a 

matter of procedure, ―the trial court ought to be given an 

opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
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Opinion of the Court

7

it.‖ Id. (quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989)). 

Second, the rule safeguards against a defendant failing to make an 

objection with the strategy of ―enhanc[ing] the defendant's 

chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] 

on appeal that the Court should reverse.‖ Id. (alterations in 

original) (citation omitted).

¶22 In Holgate, we addressed the preservation requirements 

for a sufficiency of the evidence claim at a jury trial. We noted that 

the court ―has no duty under statute or rule to examine the 

sufficiency of the evidence unless the defendant moves the court 

to do so or there is an  ̳apparent‘ insufficiency.‖ Id. ¶ 16 (citation 

omitted). We held that ―as a general rule, a defendant must raise 

the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to 

preserve the issue for appeal.‖ Id. We found that this preservation 

requirement ―ensures that the issue will be brought to the trial 

court's attention and the trial court will have the opportunity to 

address the issue.‖ Id.

¶23 But Holgate delt with the preservation requirements for a 

jury trial, not a bench trial. And we expressly declined to address 

the preservation requirements for a sufficiency of the evidence 

claim arising from a bench trial. Id. ¶ 14 n.4. Rather, we noted that 

rule 52 addresses the requirements for a bench trial. Id.

¶24 Rule 52(a) provides in pertinent part that ―[i]n all actions 

tried upon the facts without a jury. . . . [a] party may later 

question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings, 

whether or not the party requested findings, objected to them, 

moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings.‖ UTAH R.

CIV. P. 52(a)(1), (3); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 81(e) (stating that the

civil procedure rules apply to criminal proceedings when there is 

not an applicable criminal rule).

¶25 Moreover, at a bench trial the judge acts as the factfinder 

and, unlike in a jury trial, has a duty to examine and make a 

finding on the sufficiency of the evidence. In this way, the issue is 

brought to the district court‘s attention each time the defendant 

argues, for example, that the State has failed to meet its burden of 

proof. And the court has the opportunity to rule on the issue 

when deliberating on the verdict. Because the district court is the 

factfinder in a bench trial and because this role necessarily 

requires the court to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, a 

defendant effectively preserves the claim at a bench trial

¶26 Because rule 52(a) allows a defendant to raise a 

sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal without first raising it 

with the district court at a bench trial and because the claim is 
STATE v. JOK

Opinion of the Court

8

effectively preserved by the nature of a bench trial, we hold that 

the issue in this case is sufficiently preserved.

II. BETH‘S TESTIMONY WAS FAR FROM INHERENTLY 

IMPROBABLE

¶27 Because we find the sufficiency of the evidence claim 

preserved, we now address Jok‘s argument that the court of 

appeals erred by not reversing his conviction. Specifically, Jok 

contends that Beth‘s testimony was so inherently improbable that 

it could not support a conviction. He argues it contained patently 

false statements and material contradictions. He also claims that 

there is no corroborating evidence to support Beth‘s testimony. 

We roundly disagree and affirm the court of appeals. Beth‘s 

testimony was overwhelmingly consistent and free from 

statements that would have cast substantial doubt on her 

testimony.

¶28 Appellate courts typically do not make credibility 

determinations, resolving any such ―conflicts in the evidence in 

favor of the jury verdict.‖ State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 

398 (citation omitted). This is because the factfinder ―serves as the 

exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight 

to be given particular evidence.‖ State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 

984 (Utah 1993). But in ―unusual circumstances‖ we may assess 

the factfinder‘s determination of the evidence. Id.

¶29 In determining sufficiency of the evidence, ―we do not 

examine whether we believe that the evidence at trial established 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 

¶ 18, 10 P.3d 346. Rather, we examine whether ―the evidence is 

sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 

the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 

convicted.‖ Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Salt Lake City v. Carrera, 2015 UT 73, ¶ 10, 358 P.3d 1067. 

In other words, a sufficiency of the evidence claim is not an 

invitation for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that 

of the jury.

¶30 A court generally engages in a two-step analysis for a 

sufficiency of the evidence determination. First, the court 

determines whether the challenged piece of evidence is of such a 

poor quality that it should be disregarded as evidence. See State v. 

Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 16, 210 P.3d 288. The court may begin by 

examining the evidence alone, but should also consider other 

evidence as appropriate that substantiates or corroborates 

otherwise dubious evidence. See id. ¶ 19 (―The existence of any 
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Opinion of the Court

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additional evidence supporting the verdict prevents the judge 

from reconsidering the witness‘s credibility.‖); Prater, 2017 UT 13, 

¶ 43, (noting that a handwritten letter and forensic evidence 

corroborated witness testimony). If the court determines that the 

challenged piece of evidence should be disregarded, it must then 

determine if sufficient evidence remains under which a reasonable 

jury could have convicted. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶¶ 20–23.

¶31 Under the umbrella of this analysis, we have attempted 

to identify some specific circumstances where disregarding a 

victim‘s testimony would result in insufficient evidence. Although 

a jury may appropriately convict a defendant on the basis of the 

―uncorroborated testimony of the victim,‖ we have recognized 

that in rare cases a court may disregard such testimony because it 

is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that it could not 

support a conviction. See id., ¶¶ 14–18 (citation omitted). Because 

other evidence may support testimony that would otherwise be 

considered improbable on its own, this testimony will generally 

be disregarded only when no corroborating evidence exists. In 

these cases, properly disregarding the testimony may result in 

insufficient evidence. Our attempt to clarify these rare 

circumstances has become known as the inherently improbable 

doctrine. See id. ¶¶ 14–17.

¶32 In our line of cases in this matter, we have identified

three factors that merit consideration under an inherently 

improbable analysis: material inconsistencies, patent falsehoods, 

and lack of corroborating evidence. See Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶¶ 33, 

34; Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 19. But we warn today against inflexible 

reliance on these factors. The proper test is, and always has been, 

whether ―reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant committed the crime.‖ Holgate, 2000 UT 

74, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). In other words, our line of cases 

dealing with inherent improbability should not be understood as 

establishing a strictly factored test. Rather, they should be read as 

examples of sufficiency of the evidence claims based on the 

consideration of witness testimony.

¶33 For example, in Robbins a stepfather convicted of 

sexually abusing his stepdaughter challenged her testimony as 

insufficient to support his conviction. 2009 UT 23 ¶ 2. Under the 

first step of the sufficiency determination, we looked at whether 

the stepdaughter‘s testimony should be disregarded. See id.

¶¶ 22–23. We found that from her pre-trial statements to her trial 

testimony, the stepdaughter repeatedly changed her story about 

whether, how much, and under what circumstances her stepfather 
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Opinion of the Court

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abused her. Id. She then attempted to explain her inconsistent 

statements by saying she had bad hearing, which was patently 

false. Id. ¶ 23. We also considered that there was no other 

evidence that a crime had been committed—the stepdaughter had 

no bruising or marks that would be consistent with her story. Id.

¶¶ 5, 23.

¶34 Other statements by the stepdaughter also lacked 

credibility, such as her explanation of why she originally told the 

DCFS investigator that she felt safe with her stepfather. She 

claimed that she had worried someone might be hiding in the 

closet listening, even though there was no closet in the room 

where they had spoken to her. Id. ¶¶ 9, 23. Additionally, we 

recognized the stepdaughter likely had motivation to lie because 

of the hostility that existed between her divorced parents. See id.

¶¶ 1, 24. Weighing the patently false, materially inconsistent, and 

improbable statements with the lack of physical evidence and 

corroborating witnesses, we concluded that the district could have 

properly disregarded her testimony. Id. ¶ 23–25. And without her 

testimony, we held there was not enough evidence to convict the 

defendant.5Id. ¶ 25.

¶35 But in State v. Prater, we found that the testimony of the 

witnesses was properly considered by the jury in a murder trial.

2017 UT 13, ¶¶1–2. The defendant argued that the witnesses had 

changed their stories after being offered a plea deal in exchange 

for their testimonies against the defendant. Id. ¶ 30. We 

considered the conflicting testimonies and motivation to lie. See id.

¶¶ 37–42. We also considered that there was forensic evidence of 

__________________________________________________________

5 The defendant in Robbins had made a motion to arrest 

judgment following the jury‘s verdict. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 11. 

The district court expressed skepticism of the stepdaughter‘s 

testimony and surprise at the verdict but, applying a narrow view 

of the inherent improbability doctrine, did not believe it had 

discretion to reassess her testimony. See id. ¶¶ 11, 24. The court 

denied the motion. Id. ¶ 11. On appeal, the issue presented was 

whether the district court had discretion under the inherent 

improbability doctrine to disregard the testimony. Id ¶ 13. We 

found it did. Id. ¶ 23. And while ―we normally afford weight to 

the trial court‘s denial of a motion to arrest judgment‖ when 

considering a sufficiency of evidence challenge, id. ¶ 24, we 

vacated Robbins‘ conviction due to ―the trial judge‘s stated 

concerns and the clear record of inconsistencies in Taylor's 

testimony.‖ Id. ¶ 25.
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the defendant‘s guilt as well as a letter written by the defendant 

suggesting he had committed the crime. Id. ¶ 43. And in that case, 

we found that the testimonies should not be disregarded. Id.

¶36 We emphasize that while the criteria relied upon in our 

previous decisions are beneficial, they are not controlling. The line 

of cases dealing with inherently improbable testimony is useful in 

weighing whether sufficient evidence exists in cases challenging 

witness testimony. But a sufficiency of the evidence claim, 

including a showing that testimony cannot support a finding of 

guilt, is not sustained by merely meeting enumerated criteria 

considered in a previous case. Rather, when weighing the 

testimony in light of the other evidence, the testimony of the 

witness must ―run so counter to human experience that it renders 

the[] testimony‖ inappropriate for consideration in sustaining a 

finding of guilt. Id. ¶ 39.

¶37 In the present case, Jok raises a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, arguing that Beth‘s testimony ―was too inherently 

improbable to support Jok‘s convictions for sexual battery.‖ In 

determining whether insufficient evidence exists to support the 

conviction, we first examine whether Beth‘s testimony should be 

disregarded.

¶38 Jok claims Beth‘s testimony contained material 

inconsistencies and a pattern of inconsistencies that precluded a 

finding that Jok, and not Akok alone, engaged in the assault.

Specifically, Jok claims that Beth‘s testimony contained material 

inconsistencies because she repeatedly confused where the two 

men sat on the couch and that, therefore, she was unable to 

adequately distinguish between them. But we disagree with Jok‘s 

characterization of the record and find that it fails to support his

assertion. Twice Beth was shown a depiction of the couch where 

she was assaulted, and twice she stated that Akok sat on the left of 

the couch and Jok sat on the right. Only once opposing counsel 

asked where the men sat—without using a visual depiction of the 

couch for reference—did Beth falter in her description and 

become confused, stating that she did not know where Akok sat. 

We find that this testimony does not reflect a material 

inconsistency because we find it reasonable, based on the record, 

to conclude that Beth merely became confused when asked the 

question without a reference.

¶39 Next, Jok claims that Beth‘s testimony was inherently 

unreliable because her statements contained a pattern of 

inconsistencies that undermined her credibility. He points out that 

Beth originally stated that Akok assaulted her first but later 
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changed the order of the attacks and that Beth told the detective

that she slept for four hours before telling her roommate what had 

happened but later said she did not sleep after the attacks. Beth 

also stated in her deposition that she had consumed about half a 

bottle of vodka but later testified that she consumed less than half 

a bottle. And Beth stated that she kept her bedding on the couch 

at all times but could not remember if she kept it on the couch 

during the day. Jok argues that these inconsistencies suggest Beth

suffered from alcohol impairment and could not remember the 

events of that night, or that only Akok, and not Jok, attacked her.

¶40 We are not troubled by these statements. Even 

considered together, they do not approach the level of 

inconsistency that may cause us to disregard a testimony. While 

Beth may have confused the order of her attackers, she was

consistent in describing the nature of the attacks and the identity 

of her attackers. And unlike the stepdaughter who attempted to 

explain her inconsistent statements with a patent falsity, Beth

explained that the reason she told the detective she had gone back 

to sleep for four hours after the assaults, when she later testified 

she had not, was that she had been confused by the detective‘s

question.

¶41 As to the amount of alcohol Beth consumed, we fail to 

find any worrisome contradiction between testimony that Beth 

drank ―about half‖ or ―less than half of a bottle of vodka.‖

Without more detail quantifying these measurements, Jok fails to 

show how the two statements are necessarily inconsistent and 

could not describe roughly the same amount of alcohol 

consumed.

¶42 Finally, Jok argues Beth‘s testimony contained a patently 

false statement because she testified that Akok held her wrists 

above her head with both of his hands while pulling down her 

pants with both of his hands ―at the same time.‖ But this is not 

necessarily a patently false statement. Jok argues that the 

statement is patently false because it would have been physically 

impossible for Akok to use both hands to hold Beth‘s wrists while 

simultaneously using both hands to pull down her pants.

¶43 We disagree with Jok‘s characterization of Beth‘s 

testimony. Unlike lying about a medical condition, as in Robbins,

the statement that two physically impossible things happened ―at 

the same time‖ in the middle of a sexual assault is not a patent 

falsity. Rather, it is an expression of an experience relating how a 

sexual assault victim perceived the attack. In other words, 

testimony that an attacker committed simultaneous traumatic acts 
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falls squarely within the realm of ―human experience.‖ See State v. 

Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 39, 392 P.3d 398. And we find no falsity in 

the testimony that, to Beth, the events seemed to occur at the same 

time.

¶44 Moreover, other evidence corroborates Beth‘s testimony 

of Jok‘s guilt. There is strong evidence of a crime. The nurse who 

examined Beth testified that Beth‘s vaginal wounds were 

consistent with her report of digital penetration and forced 

intercourse. Jok was present at the scene of the crime. The nurse 

also testified that Beth did not appear to be intoxicated and 

understood and clearly answered all the nurse‘s questions. This 

supports Beth‘s testimony that she stopped drinking at midnight 

and also refutes Jok‘s assertion that Beth was too drunk to identify 

her attackers.

¶45 Beth‘s testimony was overwhelmingly and materially 

consistent, and we find that it was sufficient to support a 

conviction. We affirm the court of appeals.

CONCLUSION

¶46 We hold that Jok‘s sufficiency of the evidence claim was 

properly preserved because rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure provides that a sufficiency of the evidence issue is 

preserved for appeal following a bench trial even if the defendant 

did not specifically raise the issue and because a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim is effectively preserved by the nature of a bench 

trial. We clarify that an inherent improbability claim doesn‘t rely 

on a factored test but, like any sufficiency of the evidence claim,

hinges on whether ―reasonable minds must have entertained a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for 

which he or she was convicted.‖ State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 18, 

10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). And we affirm the court of appeals, 

finding the victim‘s testimony materially consistent and sufficient 

to support Jok‘s conviction.