orshe has suffered “injury in fact,” that the challenged action caused the injury, and that the injury can
likely be redressed by the cause of action. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992). Gerald’s relatives do not fit this description. That they may be indirectly suffering the
consequences of his being suspended does not create standing; they cannot show any deprivation of
a constitutional or statutory right because of the Board’s alleged actions or that the Board’s suspension
of Gerald is the cause of their current financial difficulties. To hold otherwise would allow any plaintiff
who is suing over a lost job to add all of his or her dependents as plaintiffs, since most of these cases

arguably have an effect on the plaintiff's family members as well.

Fifth Amendment Violations

We appreciate the thorough job the Board has done in analyzing all of the possible claims that
could arise from the complaint. With regard to any possible Fifth Amendment claims other than those
mentioned above, or § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, we do not believe the complaint

adequately states such causes of action and thus do not need to consider whether to dismiss them.

Punitive Damages

The Board argues that as a municipality, it cannot be held liable for punitive damages under 88
1981, 1983, 1985 or Title VII. We agree. See Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271
(1981) (punitive damages are not available against a municipality in a § 1983 suit). Furthermore, the
Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act bars the imposition of
punitive damages against local public entities, such as the Board of Education 745 ILCS 10/1-101

et.seq.; 745 ILCS 10/2-102.
CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we grant the Board’s motion to dismiss Counts Two, Three, Seven, Eight

and Nine of the complaint as well as strike the portion of Count One alleging due process violations

13


was precipitated by the false Warning Resolutions issued against him, and that the Board’s progressive
disciplinary procedure was not followed. For a tenured public employee such as Gerald, due process
prior to the deprivation of a property right such as a job requires that the employee be given (1) oral or
written notice of the charges; (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence; and (3) an opportunity to
tell his side of the story, either in person or in writing. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 546 (1985). So even if we accept as true the Simonsens’ allegations that all of the charges brought
against Gerald are false, the question we must answer is whether the complaint sufficiently pleads that
Gerald was denied due process in trying to vindicate himself.®

The Board responds that relevant Illinois School law as wellas the Board policies the Simonsens
attach to the complaint belie their contentions that the Board did not follow its disciplinary policies with
regard to Gerald. In deciding this motion, we may consider any documents attached to the complaint
as well as any documents provided by the defendants as long as they are referenced in the complaint
and central to the plaintiff's claims. See Wright v. Associated Insurance Cos., Inc., 29 F.3d
4244, 1247 (7" Cir. 1994). First, Gerald contends that a May 1999 hearing regarding his Warning
Resolutions which resulted in his fifteen day suspension without pay was a "sham”.® If this were the
only allegation with regard to the suspension, we could infer for the purposes of this motion that this
characterization alleges that all of the requirements of due process were not followed before Gerald was
suspended for fifteen days. However, attached to the complaint are documents which demonstrate
otherwise. A plaintiff may “plead himself out” of a cause of action by alleging facts showing that he

is not entitled to judgment. See Early v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79 (7° Cir

5 This count of the complaint encompasses 85 separate paragraphs and refers to 29 pages of
exhibits. Much of this count is difficult to follow, repetitive, and confusing. Thus, we will focus on the
major events leading up to Gerald's current dismissal hearing: his September 1999 hearing on his
grievances regarding the Warning Resolutions, his October 1999 fifteen day suspension, his suspension
pending dismissal which began at the end of the fifteen day suspension, his pre-suspension hearing
which occurred November 30, 1999, and the institution of dismissal proceedings against him.

6 It is unclear from the complaint what the difference was between the May 1999 hearing and
the September 1999 hearing. We do know that Gerald participated in a hearing in September 1999 that
he calls a “grievance hearing,” which resulted in principal Gearing upholding his fifteen day suspension.
Regardless of which suspension resulted in Gerald’s suspension, our analysis is the same.

4


Count Four

Count Four alleges that the Board retaliated against Gerald in violation of both Title VII and the
First Amendment during a variety of events. First, the allegation that principal Gearing retaliated against
Gerald in violation of Title VI! (by bringing false disciplinary charges against him) because of his
participation on the Hendricks Local School Council must be stricken. Title Vil protects individuals
based on their membership in a protected class such as race, gender or religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1); Gerald’s membership in the Local Schoo! Council is not so protected by the statute. However,
the complaint does state a claim for Title VII retaliation based on Gerald's filing of a charge at the EEOC.
Although the Board argues that the issuance of a Warning Resolution is not an “adverse employment
action” for Title Vil purposes, the complaint also alleges that the Board continued to retaliate by failing
to drop the charges against Gerald at the state hearing, which eventually led to his suspension - an
adverse employment action. Thus, we find that the complaint states a Title VIl retaliation claim.

Next, this count alleges that the Board and principal Gearing also retaliated against Gerald (again
by bringing false charges and discipline against him) because he spoke out against the Board at public
meetings.® It is true that a public employee alleging retaliation for engaging in First Amendment
protected activity must first establish that he or she was speaking out on matters of public concern.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-147 (1983). Although we suspect that Gerald's statements
at the public Board of Education meetings concerned only his own employment, and not true matters
of public concern, the complaint is vague enough about the content of the statements to compel an
inference in favor of the Simonsens. Thus we find that the complaint does allege a cause of action

under the First Amendment.

® The complaint also alleges that the Board retaliated against Gerald by deciding “to not accept
a decision favorable to Gerald Simonsen from the State Hearing Officer.“ The Board’s response
indicates that this allegation refers to a favorable decision Gerald received on his claim for
unemployment benefits. As the Board points out, no inference of retaliation can be made from this
favorable decision because unemployment decisions are not res judicata for any other proceeding or
decision. 820 ILCS 405/1900(b).


Simonsens’ complaint does in fact reference suspensions pending dismissal, and indicates that the
same procedures {including the pre-suspension notice and 30 day limit) will be followed as for
disciplinary suspensions, with the only difference being that the notification and hearing shall be
conducted by the Director of Human Resources instead of by the principal or chief administrator. Next,
it is not clear that the policy provided by the Board is the same one referenced in the complaint or
attached to it. The two policies have different numbering systems and are printed in different fonts.
Additionally, the Board policy appears to merely refer back to the policy attached to the complaint.
Thus, for the purposes of this motion, we accept the complaint’s allegation that Board procedure was
not followed with regard to the hearing, in violation of Gerald’s due process rights.

The complaint also alleges that during the pre-suspension hearing on November 30, 1999,
Gerald was not allowed to tell his side of the matter relevant to his defense and that the Board did not
explain the charges. Later in the complaint, plaintiffs contend that Gerald did in fact deny all the
charges but that the Board ignored his testimony. This inconsistency effectively pleads the Simonsens
out of the allegation that Gerald was not allowed to tell his side of the story, but does not address
whether or not he was deprived of due process by not having the charges explained to him. In
response, the Board attaches a transcript of the hearing (which the complaint references) to prove that
due process was followed and also argues that an informal pre-suspension hearing is acceptable where
the law provides for a formal trial-like post deprivation hearing. See D’Acquisto v. Washington,
640 F.Supp. 594, 614 (N.D.II. 4986). However, determining whether the pre-suspension hearing
comported with the requirements of due process would involve a consideration of the merits of the
Simonsens’ claims. Of course, we cannot consider the merits here, and instead must accept as true
the allegations that the Board did not explain the charges to Gerald during the hearing on his
suspension pending dismissal proceedings and that the Board ignored his testimony. Although the
transcript the Board provides weakens this allegation, it is not unequivocal enough to overturn it, so we

will not alter this conclusion at this stage of the proceedings.


4992). In this case, the Simonsens attach copies of the Warning Resolutions - which demonstrate that
they were informed of the charges against Gerald - as well as two letters to Gerald which discuss and
deny his written appeal of the charges and also reference a so-called “Appeal Review” that Gerald had
participated in to dispute the charges. Thus, Gerald had the opportunity to hear the charges explained
in a formal hearing and to provide his responses, not once, but twice. He cannot now maintain that he
was denied due process with respect to the first suspension.

Next we must consider whether Gerald was denied due process with respect to the imposition
ofan unpaid suspension pending a hearing on his dismissal. This charge is more complicated, and after
considering the complaint and its attachments, along with the Board’s response, we find that the
Simonsens have stated a cause of action for denial of due process. In his complaint, Gerald alleges that
he was suspended pending dismissal” immediately upon returning from his fifteen day disciplinary
suspension. Although we agree with the Board that Chicago Public Schools CEO Paul Vallas is
authorized under Illinois law to approve such as suspension pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/34-85, we must
accept for purposes of this motion the Simonsen’s allegation that the Board did not follow all of its
procedures with regard to the imposition of this suspension. First, the Board policy the Simonsens
attach to their complaint indicates that prior to any suspension, a teacher shall be given advance notice
that such action is being considered. The complaint alleges that Gerald did not receive notice of the
proposed suspension until November 12, 1999, although the suspension began on November 3, 1999.
Next, the complaint alleges that this suspension lasted longer than 30 days, in violation of the same
Board policy, and that the “pre-suspension hearing” that Gerald was afforded under the policy did not
follow correct procedures, thus denying him of his due process rights.

In response, the Board argues that the policy on which the Simonsens rely applies only to
disciplinary suspensions, not suspensions pending dismissal, and it attaches the “correct” policy for

suspensions pending dismissal. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the policy attached to the

7 As will be apparent below, a suspension pending dismissal is somewhat different than a
disciplinary suspension, such as the fifteen day suspension Gerald was given in October 1999.

5


information at issue concerned the purportedly false charges of incompetence as a teacher brought
against Gerald. Public statements regarding “charges of professional incompetence do not impose the
sort of stigma that actually infringes an employee's liberty interest to pursue an occupation.”
Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (7" Cir. 1995). Thus, even if the complaint
sufficiently alleged that the Board publicized statements about Gerald's incompetence as a teacher -
which it does not - we could not accept them as sufficiently stigmatizing to maintain this cause of

action. Count Two is therefore dismissed.

Count Three

Count Three alleges that the Board violated the Equal Protection Clause as brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Basically, the count contends that by singling out Gerald for discipline
without cause, the Board violated his equal protection rights. Although the Supreme Court has
recognized claims for violations of the equal protection clause from a “class of one,” Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), Count Three of the complaint does not make such an
allegation, instead simply stating that Gerald was singled out for discipline. In order to make an
allegation as a class of one, the Simonsens would have to contend that he was treated differently from
similarly situated individuals for no legitimate reason. However, elsewhere in the complaint, the
Simonsens allege that the Board has engaged in sham dismissals of numerous teachers and that others
have asked to be transferred away from Hendricks School because of the actions of principal Gearing.
Thus, the Simonsens cannot maintain their equal protection claim under a “class of one” theory.
Further, Count Five of the complaint, which alleges race discrimination and is not part of this motion
to dismiss, also claims violation of the Equal Protection Clause and makes similar allegations that Gerald
was singled out for discipline, in that case because of his race. Thus, we will dismiss Count Three as
it stands, since all of the allegations are encompassed by those in Count Five, which correctly states

an equal protection claim.



Minute Order Form (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge Marvin Aspen Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 01 C 3081 DATE 10/16/2001
CASE Simonsen vs. Board of Education,etal
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
of the motion being presented.]

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) Oo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) oO Brief in support of motion due

(3) a Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer brief due

(4) Oo Ruling/Hearing on__setfor___at

(5) Qo Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_____——ssetfor__— at

(6) Oo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__——sat__— i.
(7) a Trial[set for/re-set for]on____at

(8) Oo [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto at.

(9) gO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

QUFRCP4(m) OGeneral Rule 21 CIFRCP41(a)(1) CFRCP41(a)(2).

(10) Ml [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order: Defendant’s motion to dismiss (12-1)
is granted in part and denied in part. We dismiss Paulette, Pamela, Ilse and Christine Simonsen as
plaintiffs and deny the motion for preliminary injunction. We deny the plaintiffs’ request for punitive
damages from te Board. Finally we deny the Board’s motion to dismiss the remaining portions of Counts
One and Four, and recommend that a motion for summary judgment be filed which may assist in resolving
these remaining issues.

al) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.

No notices required, number of notices.

V | Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

, NY
Mail AO 450 form.
Copy to judge/magistrate judge. meen
OPOCT LP A & Od
courtroom GL esi i? aie
GL deputy’s
initials
Date/time received in ;
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy init



business do not become ‘conspirators’ when acts within the scope of their employment are said to be
discriminatory or retaliatory.” Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, 921 F.2d 108,
410 (7 Cir, 1990) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812 (1991). This holding has been extended to cover
employees and agents of a public school board, finding that they are members of the same collective
entity and thus are not individuals who may form a conspiracy in violation of § 1985. See Wright v.
I. Dept. of Children and Family Services, 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (7® Cir, 1994). The impetus
behind the so-called “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine” is to protect employees from conspiracy
liability for performing their day-to-day jobs. See Jefferson v. City of Harvey, No. 98 C 5834, 2000
WL 15097 (N.D.III., Jan. 5, 2000). It recognizes that employees or members of a corporate or public
entity cannot conspire with themselves to deprive another of his or her rights. Although the Seventh
Circuit has not held whether the doctrine also applies to conspiracy claims under §§ 1981 and 1983,
several district courts have found that in the context of public schoo! employees accused of
discrimination or retaliation, the doctrine applies to bar § 1983 conspiracy claims, a holding we follow
here as well. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of Ed. of Hononegah Community High Sch. Dist. No.
207, 833 F.Supp. 1366, 1381-82 (N.D.IIIl. 1993). We have not been able to find any cases regarding
the application of the doctrine to § 1981 cases. However, we believe that the same principals that
support the application of the intracorporate immunity doctrine to the §§ 1985 and 1983 context support
it in the § 1981 context as well. The Simonsens contend that the individual defendants all conspired
with the Board to deprive Gerald of various rights and privileges because of his race. {t would be
anomalous to hold that such a conspiracy could not exist for §§ 1985 or 1983 purposes, but that it could
for § 1981 claims, since the facts underlying all three allegations are identical. Thus, we dismiss Count

Eight in its entirety.
Count Nine
Count Nine links together many of the previous allegations of false discipline, failure to take

corrective action, and conspiracy and alleges that they violate the 5 and 14° Amendments and 42

11


Count Seven

This count of the complaint alleges that the defendants failed to correct the “hostile work
environment” at Hendricks School, and that numerous employees have transferred away from the
school because of the abuse by principal Gearing. Even reading the complaint liberally, this count does
not state a cause of action. A claim of a hostile work environment charges a type of sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII. In order to make a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a
complaint must allege acts that are “sufficiently severe or pervasive to make the workplace intolerable
for the members of the group discriminated against.” Minor v. /vy Tech. State College, 174 F.3d
855, 857-858 (7" Cir. 1999). Not only does the complaint not make any mention of actions that could
be construed as sexual harassment, but in order to bring such a claim, the plaintiffs first need to bring
the charge before the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged harassment, and receive a Notice of Right
to Sue. See Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7 Cir. 1995). The Simonsens*
mention of a Right to Sue letter concerns only their claims of gender and race discrimination, not sexual

harassment. Thus we dismiss Count Seven.

Count Eight

Count Eight invokes the 5‘" and 14°" amendments (presumably the equal protection clauses)
as well as 42 U.S.C. 8§ 1981°, 1983'°, and 1985"". The crux of this count seems to focus on a single
claim that the individual defendants all conspired with the Board to deprive Gerald of his rights by
causing “unlawful, adverse employment actions which caused great harm and suffering.” (Cplt. 1130).

The problem is that in the § 1985 context, “managers of a corporation jointly pursuing its lawful

® Section 1981 prohibits entities acting under color of state law from discriminating against
individuals on the basis of race by denying them certain civil rights.

1° Section 1983 prohibits state actors from using their authority to deprive individuals of their
civil rights.

44 Section 1985(3) prohibits individuals from conspiring in order to deprive someone of equal
protection of the laws.

10


Next, the complaint alleges that the Board did not follow correct procedures with regard to the
approval of the dismissal charges against Gerald and that it delayed the scheduling of the hearing
pending dismissal. Although the Board points out that a letter attached to the complaint hints that it
may be the Simonsens - and not the Board - who is the cause of the delay, we cannot be certain from
the letter, and thus we will allow this allegation to stand. The Simonsens must understand, however,
that if discovery produces evidence that Gerald received due process with regard to his suspensions
as required by Board policy and the law, we will entertain a short motion for summary judgment from
the Board on this count of the complaint. For now, we accept the Simonsens’ contention that Gerald
was denied due process with regard to the imposition of his suspension pending dismissal hearing and
the conduct of the November 30, 1999 hearing as well as with regard to the scheduling of his formal
dismissal hearing. However, we strike that part of count one that alleges a due process claim

concerning the imposition of the Warning Resolutions and his October 1999 fifteen day suspension.

Count Two

This count alleges that the Simonsens were deprived of the liberty interest of Gerald being able
to remain in the teaching profession by the Board's action of bringing false discipline against Gerald.
Basically, the complaint alleges that this discipline damaged Gerald's reputation, making it impossible
for him to continue as a teacher. Even if we accept as true that this discipline was wrongly instituted,
the Simonsens have not stated a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest. A claim that a government
employer has infringed an employee's liberty to pursue the occupation of his or her choice requires that
(1) the employee be stigmatized by the employer's actions; (2) the stigmatizing information be publicly
disclosed; and (3) the employee suffer a tangible loss of other employment opportunities as a result of
the public disclosure. Strasburger v. Board of Ed., Hardin County Comm. Unit Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 356 (7" Cir. 1998).

Although we find that the complaint does allege the loss of other employment opportunities,

it fails to plead that any stigmatizing information about Gerald was publicly disclosed. All of the


ac wie

The following facts are alleged in the complaint: Gerald has been employed by the Board since
1977, most recently as a teacher at Hendricks Academy, a Chicago public school.* Beginning in 1999,
he began receiving so called “Warning Resolutions” about deficiencies in his performance as a teacher
dating back to 1997. The Resolutions (which are attached to the complaint) warned that failure to
correct the deficiencies could result in further discipline. Gerald disputed the issuance of the Warning
Resolutions, arguing that they were false and baseless, but the Board did not take any action to correct
the allegedly false charges. In October 1999, principal Carol Gearing (an individual defendant) placed
Gerald ona fifteen day unpaid suspension because of the deficiencies noted in the Resolutions. Gerald
alleges that the rea! reason for the suspension was his filing of an EEOC charge as well as his
membership on the Hendricks Local School Council, which had criticized Gearing. Gerald filed
grievances related to the Warning Resolutions and suspension, which were denied after a hearing in
September 1999.

At the end of the fifteen day suspension, Gerald was removed from his teaching duties and the
Board began dismissal proceedings against him, notifying him that he had the right to a pre-suspension
hearing. The Simonsens contend that the pre-suspension hearing was a sham and that the Board did
not follow its policies for conducting the hearing in numerous ways. After the pre-suspension hearing,
the Board undertook dismissal proceedings against Gerald, which involved scheduling a formal hearing.
That hearing has commenced, but has not been concluded, and the Simonsens allege that the Board

is to blame for the delay.

Count One
Count One of the complaint alleges that the entire procedure by which Gerald was given
Warning Resolutions, placed on an un-paid fifteen day suspension and later suspended pending a

dismissal hearing, was violative of his Due Process rights. Specifically, he contends that his discipline

4 The complaint does not indicate the capacity of such employment. A document attached to
the complaint seems to indicate that at the time he was suspended, Gerald taught second grade.

3



connected to Gerald's fifteen day suspension and the portion of Count Four alleging Title Vil retaliation
because of his participation in the Hendricks local school council. Further, we dismiss Paulette, Pamela,
lise and Christine Simonsen as plaintiffs and deny the motion for preliminary injunction. We deny the
plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages from the Board. Finally, we deny the Board’s motion to dismiss
the remaining portions of Counts One and Four, and recommend that a motion for summary judgment

be filed which may assist in resolving these remaining issues. It is so ordered.

MARVIN E. <——
United States District Judge

Dated loLig Lol

14


from his teaching job; Count 3 alleges that the Board violated the Equal Protection clause of the 14h
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 8§ 1981 and 1983 by singling Gerald out for discipline and condoning false
testimony about him; Count 4 alleges that the Board and Gerald's principal retaliated against him by
filing false disciplinary charges against him after he filed a charge at the EEOC and was part of a
committee that gave the principal a poor rating; Count 5 alleges that the Board discriminated against
Gerald because of his race; Count 6 alleges that the Board discriminated against Gerald because of his
gender; Count 7 alleges that there was a hostile work environment at the school where Gerald was
employed causing many teachers there to transfer; Count 8 alleges that the defendants conspired to
intentionally deprive Gerald of his rights under the 5 and 14” Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
14983 and 1985; Count 9 is brought pursuant to the 5° and 14" amendments as well as 42 U.S.C. 8§
1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986 and alleges that the defendants failed to take action to correct the violations
against Gerald; and Count 10 alleges that the Board discriminated against Gerald because of his age.

Ona motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all “well pleaded” allegations of the complaint,
and make all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gillman v. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co., 878 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7 Cir. 1989). Because the plaintiff here is pro se, we must
construe the complaint liberally when deciding the motion to dismiss. Wilson v. Geisen, 956 F.2d
738, 739 (7"" Cir. 1992). The plaintiffs appear to have adopted a “kitchen sink” approach to drafting
their complaint - inserting boilerplate legal phrases and theories throughout and repeating facts over
and over in the hopes that some of the facts and theories will match up. Although parts of the
complaint are not well pled enough to consider, a review of each count, along with the documents the
Simonsens attach to the complaint, give us enough of a picture about the allegations to tule on the
motion’s merits. We will give a brief summary of the facts as we understand them here, and go into

more detail where necessary in our discussion of each individual! count.>

3 One difficulty we have in setting forth the facts as stated by the plaintiff is that at times, the
documents the Simonsens attach to their complaint, which become part of the complaint for the
purposes of this motion to dismiss, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contradict their allegations. As we explain
below, we cannot accept as true any allegations which are contradicted by any other part of the
complaint.


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

GERALD SIMONSEN, individually and on behalf of
Paulette Simonsen, Ilse Simonsen, Christine
Simonsen and Pamela Simonsen,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 01 C 3081
ve

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CHICAGO, et. al. )
)

7)
[> letey

Cy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARVIN E. ASPEN, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs Gerald, Paulette, Ilse, Christine and Pamela Simonsen (collectively “the Simonsens”)
have filed a rambling ten-count complaint against the Chicago Board of Education ("the Board”) as well
as various individuals affiliated with the Board, apparently regarding Gerald Simonsen’s (“Gerald”)
suspension without pay from his job as a teacher for the Chicago Public Schools.' The Board has
moved to dismiss Counts 1-4 and 7-9 of the complaint as to it as well as the Simonsen’s request for
a preliminary injunction and punitive damages, and also has moved to dismiss all of the individuals
except Gerald as plaintiffs.2 As we explain below, we grant in part and deny in part the motion.

As far as we can discern, the complaint alleges the following causes of action: Count 1 alleges
a violation of the 4°" Amendment and procedural due process under the 5" and 14%" Amendments and
42 U.S.C. 88 1981 and 1983 with respect to the hearings and grievance procedure surrounding Gerald's
suspension; Count 2 alleges encroachment on Gerald’s liberty rights in violation of due process under

the 5" and 14% Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 with respect to Gerald’s suspension

1 On August 14, 2001, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Gerald’s separately-numbered
complaint against the Chicago Teacher's Union alleging failure to represent him in his grievance against
the Board of Education.

2 Also pending before us but not part of this decision are separate motions to dismiss from all
of the individual plaintiffs.


U.S.C. 88 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, Section 1986 states that any individual who knows of a wrong
about to be committed under § 1985, and who has the power to stop or correct it and fails to do so, is
liable under that section. Since we have found that plaintiffs cannot maintain a § 1985 claim against

the defendants, we must dismiss this count as well.

Preliminary Injunction

We deny the Simonsens’ request for a preliminary injunction ordering the Board to either return
Gerald to his teaching position or convert his suspension to one with pay because even accepting all
of their allegations as true, they have not stated a claim which warrants such relief. In order to obtain
a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 4) a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) no
adequate remedy at law; 3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; 4) the plaintiff's
irreparable harm is greater than the harm to the opposing party if the injunction is granted; and 5) that
the public interest favors such an injunction. See Ferrell v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Dev., 186 F.3d 805 (7" Cir. 1999). Even without addressing the likelihood of success on the merits,
we must deny the request for preliminary injunction because the Simonsens have an adequate remedy
at law. If they are successful in their suit against the Board, the Board must fully compensate Gerald
for his lost salary, and he is entitled to reinstatement as well. 105 ILCS 5/34-85 Further, as the Board
points out “a temporary deprivation of employment does not inflict irreparable injury, and therefore does
not justify a preliminary injunction.” Shegog v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 836,

839 (7 Cir. 1999) citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 51, 89-92 (1974).

Standing of Individual Plaintiffs Other than Gerald

The Board has also moved to dismiss all of the plaintiffs other than Gerald - namely his children
and former wife - for lack of standing. We agree that Paulette, Ilse, Christine and Pamela Simonsen are
not proper plaintiffs in this matter because nothing in the complaint alleges that any defendant took any

action against them. In order to have standing to sue in federal court, an individual must show that her

12