1

Filed 4/11/22 In re D.H. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re D.H., a Person Coming Under 

Juvenile Court Law.

A162672

(Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. J19-00619)

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY 

CHILDREN’S AND FAMILY 

SERVICES BUREAU,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.J. et al.,

Respondents and Appellants.

Two parents whose parental rights were terminated prior to the 

Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 

(Caden C.) contend that the dependency court failed to consider the beneficial 

relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption in the manner

required by Caden C. Although we have found it necessary to remand other 

cases for reconsideration in light of Caden C., the child in this case was 

removed from the care of her biological parents within days of her birth, so 

that she had little opportunity to develop a meaningful bond with them. In 

determining that the infant’s interest in permanency and stability 

outweighed any benefit of retaining a relationship with her birth parents, the 

court considered the appropriate factors and none proscribed by Caden C.
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Therefore, remand is unnecessary, and the termination order must be 

affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

When D.H. (Child) was born, she tested positive for cocaine, opiates,

and marijuana and suffered symptoms of drug withdrawal. Mother identified 

Father as Child’s alleged father. 

Two days later, the Contra Costa County Children’s and Family 

Services Bureau (the bureau) filed a petition alleging that Child came within 

the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section

300, subdivision (b).1 At a detention hearing three days later—when Child was 

five days old—the court found that the bureau had made a prima facie 

showing that Child’s care and protection required her removal from parental 

custody; approved her placement with foster caregivers; and ordered 

paternity testing for Father and two hours of supervised visits per week for 

Mother. At a jurisdictional hearing a month later, the court sustained the

section 300 petition as amended, based on the allegations of in utero drug 

exposure.

At a dispositional hearing in September 2019, the court adjudicated 

Child a dependent; approved her foster placement; ordered continued 

reunification services and one visit per week for Mother, but none for Father, 

who had not yet taken a paternity test; and set a six-month review hearing in 

March 2020. At a November 2019 status hearing, the bureau informed the 

court that Father had undergone testing that confirmed his paternity; the 

court deemed him Child’s presumed father; and it ordered reunification 

1 All unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare & Institutions 

Code.
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services and a weekly one-hour visit for him. It also modified its prior order to 

provide for two, 2-hour visits per week for Mother.

In a report for the six-month review hearing calendared in March 2020, 

the bureau described Father’s sporadic visits, unstable living situation, and 

comments suggesting he expected Mother, not himself, to reunify with Child.

The report said that while Mother acted appropriately and lovingly in the 

visits she attended, she was missing some visits, struggling with sobriety, and

failing to communicate. The bureau recommended terminating reunification 

services for both parents.

Mother contested the recommendation, and the court set a hearing that 

was continued to July 2020 as a result of the COVID shelter-in-place order.

The bureau filed a report repeating its recommendation. The report noted

Mother’s lack of progress in drug treatment. It detailed how, in the preceding

four months, she and Father had visited Child fairly regularly when inperson visits were possible but had each used only one or two opportunities to 

videochat with Child during the recent two-month period when in-person 

visits were suspended because of the pandemic.

After further continuances, the court held a hearing in September 2020 

that it deemed a combined 6- and 12-month review, though Child was in fact 

15 months old. The bureau modified its recommendation to request that 

services continue for Father. He had grown more cooperative after realizing 

that Mother was not “working her case plan” and that he “needed to step up 

to get [Child] back,” emphasizing how much he wanted to do so.

At the September 2020 hearing, the court terminated services for

Mother but continued them for Father until the 18-month deadline in 

December 2020. It found that Mother had visited Child consistently, and 

Father had done so “intermittently.” The court ordered supervised visitation

of two hours per week for Father and one hour twice per month for Mother. It 
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set an 18-month review hearing in December 2020, shortly before the 

18-month services deadline.

For that hearing, the bureau submitted two reports that recommended

terminating Father’s services because of positive drug tests, missed tests, and 

a canceled appointment to arrange substance-abuse support. Father contested 

the recommendations, and the court set a contested hearing in January 2021.

Contending that he had created a bond with Child through in-person visits 

and had substantially complied with his case plan, Father asked the court to 

exercise its discretion to allow him further services beyond the presumptive 

18-month deadline and to continue visitation. 

The court declined, noting that Father “ha[d] visited relatively 

regularly as far as in-person visits, but the reality is the glaring risk of 

detriment . . . related to substance abuse.” The court found that the bureau 

had provided Father reasonable services, that his progress on his case plan 

had been “minimal,” and that placing Child in his custody would create a 

substantial risk of detriment. The court terminated Father’s reunification 

services, reduced his visitation to one hour per month, and scheduled a 

section 366.26 permanency-planning hearing on April 26, 2021. Father 

petitioned this court for writ relief, which this court denied. (D.H. v. Superior 

Court (Mar. 23, 2021, A161835) [nonpub. opn.].)

On April 8, the bureau submitted a report reciting that Child had lived 

with her foster caregivers for all but the first six days of her 22-month life 

and was happy, healthy, and thriving. It recommended terminating parental 

rights and setting a permanent plan of adoption: “Due to the sporadic and 

intermittent visitation and phone contact the parents have had with [Child], 

there is currently no parent/child relationship which outweighs the [benefits 

of the] permanency of adoption,” and Child is in a home “with caring mothers 

who desire to adopt her.”
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On April 21, Mother filed a motion pursuant to section 388 to reinstate 

reunification services, which was calendared on April 26 along with the 

permanency-planning review. Mother submitted a statement claiming she 

had attained sobriety, found a permanent home, rebuilt supportive family 

relationships, and was successfully raising her two other children.

At the April 26 hearing, the court first addressed Mother’s motion to 

reinstate reunification services and heard testimony from Mother about her 

visitation and current relationship with Child. The court denied the motion, 

finding that Mother’s circumstances were changing but had not changed 

enough to warrant relief, and that it would not be in Child’s best interest to 

resume reunification efforts. 2

When the court turned to section 366.26, Mother and Father objected to 

the termination of parental rights. They asked the court to preserve their 

relationships with Child by appointing her foster caregivers as her legal 

guardians rather than permitting adoption. The court addressed the factors 

relevant to whether the beneficial-relationship expectation applied, after first 

noting that it had reviewed the bureau’s report for the hearing and received 

it into evidence.

The report detailed how, in her 22 months in foster care, Child had 

roughly 62 in-person visits with Mother of one to four hours each (mostly two 

hours), while in the last 17 of those months, Child had roughly 33 in-person 

visits with Father of one to four hours each (mostly one or two hours). Many 

of the visits were joint, and several included Child’s brother and half-sister. 

During the lockdown at the start of the pandemic in spring 2020, in-person 

visits were suspended for about eight weeks. Each parent was scheduled to 

videochat regularly with Child, but Father did so only once, and Mother 

2 Mother has not sought review of the denial of the section 388 motion. 
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twice. Father also had five phone or videochats in the fall of 2020, and he and 

Mother had one jointly in February 2021.

In sum, during her first 22 months of life, Child had had contact with 

Mother an average of about three times a month, and Father twice a month. 

She had never lived or had overnight visitation with either.

All accounts of the visits in the record are positive. The bureau’s report 

includes notes on Mother’s initial visits in June and July 2019 which state 

that she sang to Child and told her repeatedly that she was her “momma” 

and loved her, while cradling, feeding, and changing her. The report describes

how, at Mother and Father’s first joint visit, in December 2019, they “spoke 

lovingly to [Child], played with different toys, and danced to music.” Other 

reports in the record positively describe other visits in December 2019 and 

January 2020, with Mother showing great care and affection and effective 

parenting, and Father attentive and affectionate. Another notes that, when 

in-person visits resumed in June 2020, Child had trouble adjusting and was 

prone to crying and fussiness, but Mother consistently tried to comfort her.3

The reports also refer to Child showing affection for and appearing 

comfortable with Mother and Father.

In her testimony at the April 26 hearing, Mother said, “She knows me.

Even though my visits has dropped down to once a month, she knows me. 

When she sees me she runs up to me . . . ,” and “she extends her arms. She

wants me to pick her up.” The visits end, Mother testified, “by hugging and 

3 The bureau’s reports for the July, September, and December 2020 

review hearings focused on the parents’ compliance with their case plans, but 

include notes positively describing Father’s and Mother’s visits with Minor in 

September–November 2020, in which each interacted attentively, sweetly, 

and playfully with Minor while caring for her needs. 
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she blows me kisses, and [in February 2021] when it was time for me [and my 

two other children] to walk off, [Child] tried to walk off with us.”

After finding Child adoptable, the court addressed the evidence of her

relationships with her parents: “I am mindful that both parents have visited

with [Child] during the course of the last 22 months. [Mother], I think, has 

made . . . slightly more visits than [Father]. From reading the report and 

having listened to the testimony it appears that the visitation has generally 

gone well, but . . . it does not appear that there is a bond that is so significant 

that it would outweigh the benefit of permanence that adoption and

termination [of parental rights] would provide.”

The court adopted the bureau’s recommendation to terminate parental 

rights and set a permanent plan of adoption. The court granted Mother’s and 

Father’s request for a final joint visit with Child. 

Mother and Father each filed timely notices of appeal.

Discussion

The sole issue raised by either parent4 is whether the court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the beneficial parental relationship exception did 

not overcome the presumptive rule at a section 366.26 hearing in favor of 

adoption and termination of parental rights.

In Caden C. the Supreme Court explained the exception’s application 

as follows: “Even when a court proceeds to select a permanent placement for 

a child who cannot be returned to a parent’s care, the parent may avoid 

termination of parental rights in certain circumstances defined by statute. 

One of these is the parental-benefit exception. What it requires a parent to 

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that the parent has regularly

4 Father’s brief joins in the legal arguments in Mother’s brief while

noting the rule that, if an order terminating parental rights is reversed as to 

one parent, it must also be reversed as to the other.
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visited with the child, that the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to 

the child. [Citations.] . . . [T]he exception applies in situations where a child 

cannot be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s relationship 

with the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive 

home, would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 629–630.) 

The court took pains to emphasize that, “[w]hen it weighs whether 

termination would be detrimental, the court is not comparing the parent’s 

attributes as custodial caregiver . . . to those of any potential adoptive 

parent(s). Nothing that happens at the section 366.26 hearing allows the 

child to return to live with the parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 634.) The juvenile court has necessarily already foreclosed that possibility 

by deciding that it must terminate reunification services. (Id. at p. 637.) 

When the court considers whether the beneficial relationship exception 

applies, “the question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent 

would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security 

of a new, adoptive home,” as opposed to an alternative permanent plan like 

guardianship that would not presumptively result in the cessation of contact 

with the parent(s). (Id. at p. 634.)

The court also emphasized that the rule is an exception to the abiding 

presumption in favor of adoption: If a juvenile court determines in a section 

366.26 hearing that a child is adoptable, “then the court shall terminate 

parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that 

termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically 

enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and 

select another permanent plan. [Citation.] . . . ‘[T]he statutory exceptions 
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merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an 

option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ ” (Id. at pp. 630–631.)

The court added that the exception is “limited in scope.” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) Quoting section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), 

the court noted that it applies if “ ‘[t]he court finds a compelling reason for 

determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or 

more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.’ ” (Ibid.) From that text, the court “readily 

discern[ed] three elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: 

(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of 

which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights 

would be detrimental to the child.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The first, regular 

visitation and contact, “is straightforward. The question is just whether 

‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court 

orders.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.) “As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the 

child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] Again here, 

the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, 

such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the 

parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between 

parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . [C]ourts 

often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about 

their parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child,

even as courts must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child 

relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern. [Citations.] . . .

[¶] Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination would be 

detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide 

whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose 
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adoption. [Citations.] Because terminating parental rights eliminates any 

legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must 

assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. 

[Citations.] What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would 

be affected by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be 

like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” 

(Id. at pp. 632–633.) Thus, the “subtle, case-specific inquiry” a court performs

is to ask, “[D]oes the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh 

‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, 

emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ ” (Id. at p. 633.)

Although the bureau disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to 

establish the first factor, and the court’s ruling is ambiguous as to whether it 

found that either parent bore their burden of proof on the second element, we 

assume that the court implicitly made substantiated positive findings on 

both. After observing that “both parents have visited with [Child] during the 

. . . last 22 months,” the court stated that, based on the evidence, “it appears 

that the visitation has generally gone well . . . .” The ultimate question 

remains whether the court abused its discretion when it found that it did “not 

appear that there is a bond that is so significant that it would outweigh the 

benefit[s] of [adoption].” 

The Caden C. court devoted much of its analysis to disapproving 

decisions that had taken unduly restrictive approaches to the beneficial 

relationship exception by relying on factors not properly considered, or 

imposing heightened, nonstatutory requirements. (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–638 & fns. 5–7 [e.g., disapproving decisions treating 

“parent’s continued struggles with the issues leading to dependency” as a 

“categorical bar to applying the exception”]. Nothing in the record suggests 
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that the juvenile court here relied on any such improper factors or applied 

any of the heightened standards rejected by Caden C.

Mother criticizes the bureau for failing to provide the court a 

qualitative evaluation of the nature of Child’s relationship and interactions 

with her, as opposed to a quantification of the number of attended and 

missed visits. She notes that the court did not have the benefit of a bonding 

study of the sort Caden C. advises courts to consider. (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4.) But Caden C. advised juvenile courts to consider 

such studies “where requested and appropriate” (ibid.), and Mother 

apparently did not request such a study. Nor, given the age of the child, is 

there any indication that such a study would have been appropriate or 

helpful. Although the bureau’s report for the section 366.26 hearing did not 

extensively describe Child’s attitude towards Mother or Father, it included

positive descriptions of several visits. And the bureau had previously 

submitted reports with extensive, detailed, positive descriptions of each 

parent’s interactions with Child during many visits. These reports were

reviewed by the same judge who conducted the section 366.26 hearing, and 

her ruling makes clear that she took those favorable reports into account in 

reaching her decision.

Mother also complains that the juvenile court’s analysis was “cursory,” 

and that it did not engage in the “subtle,” detailed discussion required by 

Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) But the comparison with 

the situation in Caden C. is inapt. That case involved a nine-year-old child 

who had a complex, emotionally intense relationship with the mother with 

whom he had lived for his first four years and for a later period of two years 

before his second removal. (Id. at p. 626.) The mother “discussed the case and 

her drug treatment in front of Caden,” who in turn “talked about alcohol and 

drug use in detail,” and who “reacted positively to living with [the foster 
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caregiver who sought to adopt him] but grew distressed at the prospect of not 

living with his mother.” (Id. at p. 627.) The juvenile court considered reports 

from two psychologists who agreed that Caden had a very strong bond with 

his mother but disagreed about whether “ ‘the narrowness of the bond poses a 

risk to [Caden’s] ability to devote his attention, energy, investment to 

developmentally appropriate tasks now of learning [and] socialization.’ ” (Ibid.)

In this case, by contrast, the juvenile court was required to consider the 

relationship of a 22-month-old child with the birth parents with whom she 

had never lived or had an overnight visit, but with whom she had had visits 

of a few hours each, albeit positive, over the course of her short life. The court 

recognized and undoubtedly sympathized with the love the birth parents had 

for the child. However, in finding that terminating parental rights would not 

be detrimental to Child, at least far less so than losing the benefits she would 

receive from adoption by loving foster parents who had cared for her since she 

was a week old, the court made a difficult decision, but it certainly did not 

abuse its discretion.

We, too, acknowledge the anguish this decision must cause the 

biological parents. However, at this point, after the child has been in the 

positive care of her foster parents for almost three years, we are compelled to 

affirm the dependency court’s decision that this is indeed in the child’s best 

interest.

Disposition

The order terminating parental rights and establishing a permanent 

plan of adoption is affirmed. 
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POLLAK, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, J.

DESAUTELS, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.