COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Chaf in, Decker and AtLee Argued at Richmond, Virginia

HARRY MICHAEL MOY, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1655-17-2 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. MARCH 27, 2018 LINDA SISK MOY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY Paul W. Cella, Judge Steven P. Hanna for appellant. No brief or argument for appellee.

Harry Moy (“husband 1 ) appeals an award of spousal s upport by the Circuit Court of Dinwiddie County to Linda Moy (“w ife”). He argues that the cir cuit court misinterpreted the parties’ separation agreement. We affirm. “[W]e view the facts, and all r easonable inferences from those facts, in the light most favorable to the party prevailing be low, [wife], in this case.” Virostko v. Virostko, 59 Va. App. 816, 819, 722 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2012). A separation agreement i s a contract, Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986), so we review the circuit court’s interpretation of that agreement de novo , Allen v. Allen, 66 Va. App. 586, 595, 789 S.E.2d 787, 791-92 (2016). In 2005, the parties executed a document entitled “Separation A greement.” The disputed provision of the separation agreemen t is the first sentence of paragraph 5, which reads as

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.

1 We use the designations “wife” and “husband” for clarity, reco gnizing that such terms actually describe the parties’ for mer, rather than current, leg al relationship.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - follows: “The husband agrees to pay the wife $350.00 a month t o help with household bills until

the divorce is final or wife obt ains a full time job, whichever comes first.” Wife never obtained a full time job, and husband never paid any of the agreed-upon mo nthly support. A final decree of divorce was entered in September of 2017, awarding wife an arre arage of $49,000 (covering the period from October 2, 2005 through May 31, 2017).

Husband now asks this Court to hol d that the support obligation contained in paragraph 5 of the separation agreement is unenforceable because the separa tion agreement contains a “patent ambiguity” in that it does “not state when said support payment would commence.” He complains that “[t]he trial court supplied a term where none ex isted, [and] gave meaning to a patent ambiguity in the Agreement.” Rule 5A:20(e) requires, in part, that an appellant provide “pri nciples of law and authorities[] relating to each a ssignment of error.” Husband’s citation to “principles of law and authorities” was cursory, at best. However, assuming without d eciding that husband’s assignment of error is not barr ed by Rule 5A:20(e), we address the merits of this appeal. The first line of the separati on agreement states that it was “ executed in triplicate, this 2nd day of September, 2005, by and between” wife and husband. The last line of the separation agreement is: “This Agreement becomes effective on the day and date first above written.” Wife signed the agreement on September 2, 2005, and husband sig ned it on September 8, 2005. In deciding when husband’s monthly payment obligation began, th e circuit court declared “that a reasonable time for those paymen ts to start would be October 2, 2005,” and so decreed. Husband’s argument that the separation agreement is missing a “ material term” is meritless. The separation agreement is clear, and the circuit court correctly interpreted it.

Affirmed.