alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Walter A. Engel, Jr., Respondent. Calgon Corporation, Appellant; Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

—Harvey, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed January 15, 1985, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive benefits.

Claimant was hired under the terms of a written contract as a "commission agent” for Calgon Corporation. The agreement between claimant and Calgon provided that it could be terminated upon 30 days’ written notice. After Calgon terminated the agreement, claimant filed for unemployment insurance benefits, which were approved. Calgon now appeals from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s determination which upheld that decision upon finding that claimant was an employee of Calgon rather than an independent contractor.

Claimant was engaged in the sale of Calgon’s products. Calgon assigned him a designated geographic area to which he was to confine his sales activities. Initially, claimant was paid *841$1,500 a month which Calgon referred to as a "draw”. Claimant was responsible for servicing existing Calgon accounts and cultivating and obtaining new customers for Calgon products within his assigned area. Calgon provided sales leads to claimant. He was encouraged to submit regular reports regarding his activities to Calgon. Calgon handled all billing and collection activities on claimant’s accounts. Claimant attended meetings held by Calgon and received some preliminary training. He was supplied equipment for his use in the field as well as business cards and signs bearing the Calgon logo for his car. The record reflects that his progress and productivity were regularly reviewed by Calgon and that he was not permitted to sell products of competing companies. Calgon could either assign or withdraw existing accounts in claimant’s service area. Viewing the record as a whole, we find substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that an employer-employee relationship existed *(see, Matter of Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc. [Roberts],*60 NY2d 734, 737).

Although there is evidence in the record which would support a contrary conclusion, determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists is a question of fact for the Board and no single factor is determinative *(see, Matter of Concourse Ophthalmology Assoc. [Roberts] supra; Matter of Stroll [Roberts]*90 AD2d 635; *Matter of Mikulski [O’Keh Caterers Corp.—Roberts]*90 AD2d 633, 633-634).

Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Main, Casey and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50946

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:08-CR-57-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Lawrence Westbrook has moved for

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Westbrook has filed a response. Our independent review

of the record, counsel’s brief, and Westbrook’s response discloses no nonfrivolous

issue for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 18, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-50946

2

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20445

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FREDY RUBINA ROJAS, also known as Flaco, also known as Freddy Urbina

Rojas,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:09-CR-668-5

Before GARZA, SOUTHWICK, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Fredy Rubina Rojas has moved for

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Rubina Rojas has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 6, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 11-20445 Document: 00511877899 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2012
No. 11-20445

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

2

Case: 11-20445 Document: 00511877899 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2012
Exhibit No. 32.1


Alliance Health, Inc.


File No. 0-21071


Form 10-K


Year ended September 30, 2010





Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Alliance Health, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sarkis J. Kechejian, M. D., Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date: November 24, 2010
By:
/s/ Sarkis J. Kechejian, M. D.Sarkis J. Kechejian, M. D.Chief Executive Officer andChief Financial Officer











A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Alliance Health, Inc. and will be retained by Alliance Health, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**Exhibit 12.1**
****
********
****
****
******Summit Properties Partnership, L.P.**
****
******Calculation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges**
****
******Six Months Ended June 30, 2004**Net Income

$ 18,421Interest:Expense incurred

14,619Amortization of deferred financing costs

668Rental fixed charges

46Total

$ 33,754Fixed charges:Interest expense

$ 14,619Interest capitalized

5,045Dividends to preferred unitholders in operating parthership

2,406Rental fixed charges

46Amortization of deferred financing costs

668Total

$ 22,784Ratio of earnings to fixed charges

1.5
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 1 of 49

George S May Intl, et al v. Xcentric Ventures, et al Doc. 53

Dockets.Justia.com
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 2 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 3 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 4 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 5 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 6 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 7 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 8 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 9 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 10 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 11 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 12 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 13 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 14 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 15 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 16 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 17 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 18 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 19 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 20 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 21 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 22 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 23 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 24 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 25 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 26 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 27 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 28 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 29 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 30 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 31 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 32 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 33 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 34 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 35 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 36 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 37 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 38 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 39 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 40 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 41 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 42 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 43 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 44 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 45 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 46 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 47 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 48 of 49
Case 1:04-cv-06018 Document 53 Filed 06/29/2005 Page 49 of 49
II

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1659

To suspend temporarily the duty on calcium bis[monoethyl (3,5-di-tert-butyl4-hydroxybenzyl) phosphonate].

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 12, 1998

Mr. MOYNIHAN introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To suspend temporarily the duty on calcium bis[monoethyl

(3,5-di-tert-butyl-4-hydroxybenzyl) phosphonate].

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of

5 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is

6 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following

7 new item:

‘‘ 9902.32.16 Calcium bis[monoethyl (3,5-

di-tert-butyl-4-hydroxybenzyl)

phosphonate] (CAS No.

65140–91–2) (provided for in

subheading 2931.00.30) ........ Free No change No change On or before

12/31/2000 ’’.
2

•S 1659 IS

1 (b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendment made by this

2 section applies with respect to goods entered, or with3 drawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the

4 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.

Æ
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-60682

Summary Calendar

CLIFFORD J. CORMIER,

Petitioner,

VERSUS

BOKENCAMP DRILLING COMPANY, INC.; LOUISIANA

INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

WORKER’S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

LABOR,

Respondents.

Appeal from the Benefits Review Board, 

United States Department of Labor

(94-2490) 

April 30, 1997

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Clifford J. Cormier petitions this court for review of an

order by the Benefits Review Board of the United States Department

of Labor, arguing that attorney’s fees awarded in connection with
2

a claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,

33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et al., should have been awarded at the submitted

hourly rate of $150 rather than the awarded rate of $95 per hour.

Under 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), a successful claimant “shall be

awarded a reasonable attorney’s fee.” As a fact-intensive

decision, we review such a decision for its adherence to the

substantial evidence standard. See Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v.

Rihner, 41 F.3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 1995); Metro. Stevedore Co. v.

Brickner, 11 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence

is evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director,

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 991 F.2d 163, 165 (5th

Cir. 1993). In our review, we typically defer to the decisionmaker’s credibility choices among witnesses and evidence. Id.

The District Director’s decision regarding attorney’s fees

relied on a previously submitted fee application for work done in

which the attorney listed his hourly rate at $95. In that

application, the attorney explained the rate as comparable to the

rate charged in the community and one previously utilized by that

tribunal. It is now argued that such reliance was improper because

that hourly figure was submitted in connection with a proposed

settlement and the attorney had reduced his hourly rate for

purposes of settlement. However, there is nothing in the record

supporting such a contention. In fact, in the application for the
3

fees at issue here, the attorney provided no explanation whatsoever

for the significant increase from $95 to $150 in his claimed hourly

rate.

The petitioner does not even allege that the fees awarded were

“unreasonable,” but rather that they were not the fees as submitted

and that there is some support for awarding the submitted fee

request. All that we require in order to affirm is that the fees

be “reasonable,” see 33 U.S.C. § 928(a), as demonstrated by

evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” See

Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 991 F.2d at 165. Finding such to be

the case and employing our customary deference to the fact-finder,

we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Benefits Review Board’s order.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM EXPROFUELS,
INC.  UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED FEBRUARY 28, 1998 AND 
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH.

</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001034651
<NAME>                        EXPROFUELS, INC.
                                 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 DEC-1-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   FEB-28-1998

<CASH>                                         21898
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  129764
<ALLOWANCES>                                   10000
<INVENTORY>                                    276737
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               445273
<PP&E>                                         506229
<DEPRECIATION>                                 307490
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 678003
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1429866
<BONDS>                                        502418
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       40000
<OTHER-SE>                                     1294281
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   678003
<SALES>                                        369305
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               369305
<CGS>                                          300536
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  549952
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (370)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             9418
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (189695)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (189695)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (189695)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.05)                                  
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.05)
        



</TABLE>
EX-10.1






NOTE




	 	 	 	 	 
	Date:
	 	November 27, 2008
	Maker: Claimsnet.com, Inc.

	Payee:
	 	National Financial Corporation
	Place for Payment:
	 	14860 Montfort Dr., Suite 250, Dallas, TX  75254
	Principal Amount:
	 	Fifty Thousand U.S. dollars (USD$50,000.00)






Annual Interest Rate on Unpaid Principal from Date of Funding: Five percent (5%)



Terms of Payment: Principal and interest shall be due and payable on demand, interest being
calculated on the unpaid principal balance to the date of each installment paid, and the payment
made credited first to the discharge of interest accrued and the balance to the reduction of the
principal. Accrued and unpaid interest shall be computed on the basis of the actual days elapsed
in a year consisting of 365 days on the principal.



Annual Interest Rate on Demanded, Unpaid Amounts: The highest rate allowed by law.



Security for Payment: None



Maker promises to pay to the order of Payee at the place for payment and according to the
terms of payment the principal amount plus interest at the rates stated above. All unpaid amounts
shall be due upon demand.



On default in the payment of this note or in the performance of any obligation in any
instrument securing or collateral to it, this note and all obligations in all instruments securing
or collateral to it shall become immediately due at the election of Payee. Maker and each surety,
endorser, and guarantor waive all demands for payment, presentations for payment, notices of
intention to accelerate maturity, notices of acceleration of maturity, protest, and notices of
protest.



If this note or any instrument securing or collateral to it is given to an attorney for
collection or enforcement, or if suit is brought for collection or enforcement, or if it is
collected or enforced through probate, bankruptcy, or other judicial proceeding, then Maker shall
pay Payee reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other amounts due. Reasonable attorney’s fees
shall be 10.0% of all amounts due unless either party pleads otherwise.



Nothing in this note shall authorize the collection of interest in excess of the highest rate
allowed by law.



Maker reserves the right to prepay the outstanding principal balance of this Note, in whole or
in part, at any time and from time to time, without premium or penalty. Any such pre-payment shall
be made together with payment of interest accrued on the amount of principal being prepaid through
the date of such prepayment, and shall be applied to the installments of principal due hereunder in
the inverse order of maturity.



Each Maker is responsible for the entire amount of this note.



The terms Maker and Payee and other nouns and pronouns include the plural if more than one.



Maker shall not be deemed to be in default of this note unless and until Maker shall have been
given seven (7) days written notice and opportunity to cure such default, via certified mail return
receipt requested.



Claimsnet.com, Inc.



By:      



Don Crosbie, CEO



MAKER
(17 Misc. Rep. 277)

#### HAGGERTY v. RYAN.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

June 30, 1896.)

Appeal—Rendered Unavailing by Act of Defendant—Dismissal.

A.n appeal from an order denying a motion for a bill óf particulars to enable defendant to prepare his answer wall not be entertained where he has answered after denial of the motion.

Appeal from special term.

Action by Rose Haggerty against John Ryan. From so much of an order as denies defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars of the names of the persons in whose presence respondent alleges and intends to prove that the alleged false and defamatory utterances mentioned in the complaint were made, or that the complaint be made more definite and certain by so specifying, defendant appeals. Dismissed.

Argued before VAN WYCK, C. J., and CONLAN and O’DWYER, JJ.

James A. Ryan, for appellant.

A. H. Berrick, for respondent.

O’DWYER, J.

The defendant having moved before answer for a bill of particulars, it was necessary for him to show that the particulars were required to enable him to prepare his answer; and, it now appearing that he has answered since the making of the order on that motion, this court will not entertain the appeal, as, by his own act, defendant has deprived himself of any advantage to be gained by a reversal. Woodruff v. Austin (Sup.) 38 N. Y. Supp. 787.

The defendant also asked, in the same motion, for the particulars, in order to prevent surprise, and be prepared for trial of the cause; but on that branch, the motion being made before issue joined, it was premature. Paper Co. v. West (Sup.) 38 N. Y. Supp. 229; Pots v. Herman, 7 Misc. Rep. 5, 27 N. Y. Supp. 330. The names of the person or persons in whose presence and hearing the words were spoken seem to us to be of grave importance, as otherwise the defendant, upon the trial, may be taken wholly by surprise, by the production of testimony he is wholly unprepared to explain or contradict otherwise than by his own denial; and we think it would be a proper exercise of discretion to direct a bill of particulars specifying the names of the person- or persons in whose presence the words are claimed to have been spoken. Stiebeling v. Lockhaus, 21 Hun, 457. For this relief the defendant is granted leave to apply at special term.

The appeal must be dismissed, with $10 costs. All concur.
**Exhibit 23.1**

Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm’s Consent 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the Registration Statements of ImmunoCellular Therapeutics, Ltd. on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-171652, 333-155199, 333-151968 and 333-147278) of our report dated March 31, 2011 with respect to our audit of the financialstatements of ImmunoCellular Therapeutics, Ltd. as of December 31, 2010 and for the year ended December 31, 2010 and the period from February 25, 2004 (inception) to December 31, 2010, which report makes reference to otherauditors and is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of ImmunoCellular Therapeutics, Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2010. 

/s/ Marcum LLP 

Los Angeles, California

March 31, 2011
WILBORN LAW OFFICE, P .C. 

TIM WILBORN - OSB # 944644 

tim@wilbornlaw.com 

P.O. Box 370578 

Las Vegas, NV 89137 

Voice: (702) 240-0184 

Fax: (503) 926-9133 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MICHELLE MACMANIMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

COMMISSIONER of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 6: l 4-cv-1695-BR 

ORDER 

A supplemental award of attorney fees in the amount of $1,246.05 is hereby granted to 

Plaintiff, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The check shall be sent to 

Tim Wilborn's address, above. In accordance with the fee assignment which Plaintiff has signed, 

payment shall be made in Tim Wilborn's name if no debt subject to offset exists. 

DATEDthis,9.~dayof ~ 

Submitted by: 

s/ Tim Wilborn, OSB # 944644 

(702) 240-0184 

Attorney for Plaintiff 

ORDER - Page I 

'2016. 

Case 6:14-cv-01695-BR Document 29 Filed 08/25/16 Page 1 of 1