350, 354 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can
‘reasonably be questioned’ is to be made in light of the facts as they existed, and not as they were

surmised or reported.” Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, - - U.S. -

- , 2004 WL 524885, at * 1 (March 18, 2004) (quoting Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1302). This inquiry
is made based on a reasonable person standard, as opposed to “a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious

person.” Hook, 89 F.3d at 354 (citation omitted). Thus, trivial risks of perceived impartiality are

insufficient to warrant recusal. See id. In contrast, section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge shall
disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). The

inquiry under § 455(b)(1) is also evaluated on an objective basis. See Brokaw v. Mercer County,

235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000). Recusal under § 455(b)(1) is required “only if actual bias or

prejudice is proved by compelling evidence.” O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975,

988 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added); Hook, 89 F.3d at 355. “‘The negative bias or prejudice from
which the law of recusal protects a party must be grounded in some personal animus or malice that
the judge harbors against him, of a kind that a fairminded person could not entirely set aside when

judging certain persons or causes.’” Hook, 89 F.3d at 355 (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779

F.2d 1191, 1201 (7th Cir. 1985)).
III. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, as previously indicted, the instant motion is Plaintiff's second
motion seeking the court to recuse itself. As such, a strong argument can be made that this motion

is untimely. However, the case law in the Seventh Circuit is unclear on this point, compare United

States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 390 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that “one must raise the disqualification


which rulings support that conclusory allegation. Although Plaintiff has filed approximately seven
pleadings, the court has issued only two rulings adverse to Plaintiff. Aside from the initial motion
for recusal, which the court denied, the record in this case reveals that on March 18, 2004, the court
entered an order striking one of Plaintiff's motions. See Minute Order of March 18, 2004 [docket
entry 19-1]. The order that was stricken was styled: “Motion That Joseph Birkett, All DuPage States
Attorneys and All Court House Bailiff's Be Subjected to Hair Testing and Drug Tests By An
Independent Testing Company.” Pl.’s Mot. [docket entry 18-1]. As the heading of that motion
indicates, Plaintiff sought an order from the court compelling certain Defendants and other unrelated
persons to be subjected to drug testing. That motion was not brought pursuant to a cited Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, and no argument was presented on the issue of compelling such testing.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 (Physical and Mental Examinations of Persons). Further, such a ruling
cannot support an argument of bias. The law is clear that “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. The remedy for a
judicial ruling with which a litigant disagrees is appeal, not a motion for recusal. See id. Plaintiff
fails to prove that “a reasonable person [would] perceive[] a significant risk that the judge will
resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.” Hook, 89 F.3d at 354 (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

kote: A

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Judge
United States District Court

DATED: ¢- ~& ata


II. STANDARD OF DECISION
As a preliminary matter, and as previously stated by the court in its Order of January 26,
2004, Plaintiff cites no statute or case law in support of the present motion, and the court deems this

argument waived. See, e.g., United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 95 1, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is not

[the] court’s responsibility to research and construct the parties’ arguments.”). However, out of an
abundance of caution, the court will address Plaintiff's motion as having been brought pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 455.

Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code is a collection of various grounds for
recusal. Grounds for recusal under § 455 are divided into two sections. See Microsoft Corp. v.
United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000). Section 455(b) enumerates certain instances where recusal is
required; with subsection (1) covering bias and prejudice grounds and subsections (2-5) covering
interest and relationship grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1 -5); see also Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 547-48 (1994). The other section, § 455(a), has been termed the “‘catchall’ recusal
provision, covering both ‘interest and relationship’ and ‘bias and prejudice’ grounds,” Liteky, 510
U.S. at 548. While § 455(b) is concerned with the reality of bias, prejudice, interest or relationship;
in contrast, § 455(a) is concerned only with the appearance of impartiality. See id.

The court construes Plaintiff's motion as having been brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
and (b)(1). Section 455(a) provides: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shal! disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The inquiry under § 455(a) is based on an objective standard. See Liteky, 510
U.S. at 548. Thus, the inquiry to be made is “whether a reasonable person perceives a significant

tisk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.” Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d



of the judge at the earliest moment after knowledge of the facts demonstrating the basis for such

disqualification”) with SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding

that there are no limits on motions for recusal brought pursuant to § 455); see also Union Carbide

Corp. v. U.S. Cutting Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 1986) (questioning the Morgan

decision, and stating that it has been “uniformly rejected in the other circuits”), and the court need
not rely on the timeliness issue, as the merits of Plaintiff's motion do not warrant recusal.
Plaintiff's first argument, that the court has certain relationships with the Defendants in this
case, is without merit. “A judge’s friendship with one of the attorneys, or acquaintance with
witnesses or even parties, does not ordinarily require recusal . . . [h]owever, there are cases where
the extent of intimacy, or other circumstances, renders recusal necessary.” Recusal: Analysis of Case

Law Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144 29 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2002). This is not such a case.

According to Plaintiff's Complaint, a number of the named Defendants are attorneys and
judges.” See Pl.’s Compl. In the motion seeking recusal, Plaintiff simply provides unsupported,
conclusory allegations that “Judge Charles Norgle is a close friend and long-time acquaintance of
Defendants in this case,” Pl.’s Mot. for Recusal {| 1, and “Judge Norgle is a member of the DuPage
Bar association and socializes with Defendants.” Id, 12. The mere fact that a judge knows or
knows of an attorney, witness or litigant is insufficient to warrant recusal. Similarly, the mere fact
that a judge is a member of a bar association and socializes at such functions with attorneys or judges
who may at some point in time appear before him is insufficient to warrant recusal. One would be

hard pressed to find judges who are not members of various bar associations and other organizations;

? From the Complaint, it is not clear if the numerous attorneys and judges named therein
are sued in certain official capacities or in their individual capacities.

5


Minute Order Form (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name cr AsinedJutze | ___Charles R, Norgle Siig tude ter
CASE NUMBER 03 C 8695 DATE 4/9/2004
CASE Dr. Richard Hass vs. The RICO Enterprise, et al.
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, ¢.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented]
Plaintiffs Motion for Recusal
DOCKET ENTRY:
qa) Qo Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Oo Brief in support of motion due
(3) QO Answer brief to motion due. . Reply to answer briefdue___.
4) oO Ruling/Hearing on___set for at
(5) o Status hearing{held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on set for at
(6) oO Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for] on setfor_ ss at_
(op) oa Trial{set for/re-set for] on
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto__at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4¢mn) OLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) O FRCP41(a)(2).
ao) of [Other docket entry] Plaintiffs Motion That Judge Norgle Recuse Himself [docket entry 25-1].
is denied. See attached. Lfobe oan
(1) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court.
No notices required.

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge,

courtroom

initials

deputy’s 4

number of notices

“"Date/time received in

ses

dock iN

date maited notice

mailing deputy initials

central Clerk’s Office

thon



indeed, some judges are officers within such organizations. A contrary rule would require that
judges, upon taking an oath of office, cloister themselves from contact with the legal community and
the world at large. See United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1537 (7th Cir. 1985) (“A judge
need not cut himself off from the rest of the legal community.”); see also Cheney, — U.S. — , 2004
WL 524885, at * 3 (“A rule that required Members of this Court to remove themselves from cases
in which the official actions of friends were at issue would be utterly disabling.” (emphasis added)).
As the Seventh Circuit has stated:

In today’s legal culture friendships among judges and lawyers are common, They are

more than common; they are desirable. A judge need not cut himself off from the

rest of the legal community. Social as well as official communications among judges

and lawyers may improve the quality of legal decisions. Social interactions also

make service on the bench, quite isolated as a rule, more tolerable to judges. Many

well-qualified people would hesitate to become judges if they knew that wearing the

robe meant either discharging one's friends or risking disqualification in substantial

numbers of cases.
Id. Furthermore, in his motion, Plaintiff refers to the Defendants generally, an entity he describes
as “The RICO Enterprise,” and provides nothing more than unsupported, conclusory allegations in
support of the motion. Plaintiff fails to prove, by compelling evidence, that the court possesses an
actual bias or prejudice against or in favor of any party to this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1); see
also O’Regan, 246 F.3d at 988; Hook, 89 F.3d at 355, Additionally, a reasonable person would not
find Plaintiff's allegations to even support a fair argument that an appearance of impropriety exists.
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

Plaintiff’s second argument, that certain of the court’s rulings are indicative of bias, is also

without merit, Plaintiff states that “Judge Norgle has acted totally in the Defendants’ interest so far

and given them relief beyond statute,” Pl.’s Mot. for Recusal § 7; however, he does not indicate


ay

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
Dr. Richard Hass, )
Plaintiff, )
) No. 03 C 8695
v. )
) HONORABLE CHARLES R. NORGLE
The RICO Enterprise, )
Janet Volk Hass, ef al. )
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge:

Before the court is Plaintiffs pleading filed April 7, 2004, styled: Motion That Judge Norgle
Recuse Himself [docket entry 25-1]. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2003, Plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging that the Defendants,' collectively
referred to as “The RICO Enterprise,” had conspired to, inter alia, violate his Due Process rights by
“fixing” the outcome of cases within the Circuit Court of DuPage County. Plaintiff based federal
subject matter jurisdiction on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seg. The Complaint seems to suggest that Plaintiff's
allegations arise out of a state court divorce and child custody case; however, the complaint does not

advise the court as to what orders or judgments, if any, were entered by the state court.

' The Defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint are: “THE RICO ENTERPRISE, Janet
Volk Hass, Anita & Edwin Volk, Kenneth Abraham, Brian McKillip, Stephen Culliton, Dimitri
Dres, Michael Kinz, John Panegasser, Susan Castagnoli, Robert Downs, Jeffrey Leving, Robert
Galatzer-Levy and James Koteski.” See Pl.’s Compl.
Defendants Robert Galatzer-Levy and Michael Kintz have responded with separate
motions to dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [docket entries 4-1 and 6-1]. The record does
not reflect that other Defendants have been served.


“

On January 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed a pleading styled: Motion For Change of Venue. See
Pl.’s Mot. For Change of Venue {docket entry 8-1]. That motion sought to have the court recuse
itself, stating: “Plaintiff . . . asks for his right to a change of judge as a matter of right and for cause
....” Id. The court denied that motion, stating: “Plaintiff cites no statute or case law in support of
the present motion, and provides no argument to support recusal.” Minute Order of January 26, 2004
[docket entry 9-1]. In the order denying that motion, the court also admonished Plaintiff to review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See id.

Plaintiffs motion currently before the court again seeks the court’s recusal. See Pl.’s Mot.
for Recusal. Once again, Plaintiff cites no statute or case law in support of the present motion.
However, Plaintiff offers a number of assertions in support of recusal. First, Plaintiff alleges that
the court has certain relationships with the Defendants in this case, which warrants recusal.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “Judge Charles Norgle is a close friend and long-time
acquaintance of Defendants in this case,” id. J 1, and “Judge Norgle is a member of the DuPage Bar
association and socializes with Defendants.” Id. { 2. Second, Plaintiff argues that certain of the
court’s rulings are indicative of bias, which warrants recusal. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that
“Judge Norgle has acted totally in the Defendants’ interest so far and given them relief beyond
statute.” Id. ¥ 7. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that he has an absolute right to substitute judges
according to Illinois law. This argument is without merit, because recusal of a federal judge is
governed by federal law, see, ¢.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455, or the Due Process Clause of the United

States Constitution, see, ¢.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980), and Plaintiff's motion

is not brought pursuant to such authority. The court will address Plaintiffs remaining assertions

without the benefit of responses from Defendants.