IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

GEORGE WAYNE BRADLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

Lisa R.J. Porter 

JP Law, PC 

5200 SW Meadows Rd., Suite 150 

Lake Oswego, Oregon 97035 

Attorney for plaintiff 

Billy J. Williams 

Ronald K. Silver 

United States Attorney's Office 

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 

Portland, Oregon 97201 

Sarah Mourn 

Social Security Administration 

Off ice of General Counsel 

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A 

Seattle, Washington 98104 

Attorneys for defendant 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01489-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 1 of 16
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

Plaintiff George Wayne Bradley brings this action pursuant to 

the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security ("Commissioner") . The Commissioner denied plaintiff's 

application for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title 

XVI Supplemental Security Income disability benefits. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed 

and this case is dismissed. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On 'October 18, 2010, plaintiff applied for disability 

benefits, alleging disability beginning August 30, 2006. 1 Tr. 157-

58, 116-17. His applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. Tr. 124, 139, 154, 165. On August 2, 2012, a 

hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ( "ALJ"), 

wherein plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified. A lay 

witness and vocational expert ("VE") also testified. Tr. 69-115. On 

December 28, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not 

disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 52-63. After the 

Appeals Council denied his request for review, plaintiff filed a 

1 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding the date of 

disability, as plaintiff's attorney stated in the hearing 

"[plaintiff's] real date of disability was [October 18, 2010], 

according to his own decision." Tr. 75. Because this Court 

affirms the ALJ's finding plaintiff was not disabled during the 

entire alleged period, it is not necessary to resolve the 

discrepancy. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 2 of 16
complaint in this Court. 2 Tr. 1-4. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Born January 2 4, 197 4, plaintiff was 32 years old on the 

alleged onset date of disability and 38 years old at the time of 

the hearing. Tr. 75. Plaintiff dropped out of school during the 

ninth grade. Tr. 77-78. He worked previously as a "service station 

attendant, lube servicer, industrial truck operator, warehouse 

worker, car washer, and laundry worker." Tr. 61, 78-83. Plaintiff 

alleges disability as of August 30, 2006, due to congestive heart 

failure. Tr. 116. Further, plaintiff alleges problems with his 

right hand beginning in 2010. Tr. 84. Plaintiff asserts he suffers 

from drowsiness, fatigue, headaches, back pain, weakness in his 

knees, and swelling and numbness in his right hand. Tr. 59. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is 

based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 

501 (9th Cir. 1989) Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted) . The court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. 

2 The record before the Court contains multiple incidences 

of duplication. Where evidence occurs in the record more than 

once, the Court will generally cite to the transcript pages on 

which that information first appears. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 3 of 16
Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 198 6) . Variable 

interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the 

Commissioner's interpretation is rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to 

establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th 

Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 

can be expected . . to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential 

process for determining whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. First, the 

Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in 

"substantial gainful activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

At step two, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant 

has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the 

claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of 

impairments, she is not disabled. 

At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the 

claimant's impairments, either singly or in combination, meet or 

equal "one of a number of listed impairments that the 

[Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude 

Page 4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 4 of 16
substantial gainful activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the claimant is presumptively 

disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 

482 U.S. at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant 

can still perform "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If 

the claimant can work, she is not disabled; if she cannot perform 

past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. At step 

five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national and 

local economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(g). If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is 

not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. 

THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

At step one of the five step sequential evaluation process 

outlined above, the ALJ found plaintiff "ha [d] not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since August 30, 2006, the alleged 

onset date." Tr. 57. At step two, the ALJ determined plaintiff's 

"cardiomyopathy, hypertension, 

obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, 

right carpal tunnel syndrome" 

congestive heart failure, 

degenerative disc disease, 

were severe and resulted 

and 

in 

significant work-related functional limitations. Id. At step three, 

the ALJ found plaintiff's impairments, singly and in combination, 

did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 

58. 

The ALJ then evaluated how plaintiff's impairments affected 

Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 5 of 16
his ability to work. The ALJ resolved plaintiff possessed the 

residual functional capacity ("RFC") to: 

[P]erform sedentary work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 

404.1567(a) and [20 C.F.R. §] 416.967(a) except he is 

limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs and he 

can do no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds. He is 

limited to occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching and crawling. He is limited to frequent 

handling and fingering with the right dominant upper 

extremity. He should avoid exposure to hazards such as 

unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. He requires 

a sit/stand option at will. 

At step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff could not perform 

any past relevant work. Tr. 61. At step five, based on the VE's 

testimony and considering the plaintiff's age, work experience, and 

RFC, the ALJ found plaintiff was "capable of making a successful 

adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the 

national economy." Tr. 62-63. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded 

plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. Tr. 63. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) finding him not fully 

credible; (2) improperly evaluating the lay witness statements; (3) 

conducting an improper step-three listing analysis; ( 4) not 

developing the record; and (5) improperly crafting the RFC and 

hypothetical to the VE. 

I. Credibility 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and 

convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony concerning the pain 

and functioning limitations caused by his symptoms. When a 

claimant's medically documented impairments could reasonably be 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 6 of 16
expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and 

the record contains no affirmative evidence of malingering, "the 

ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of 

symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons 

for doing so." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(citation omitted). A general assertion the claimant is not 

credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which . . . testimony 

is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not 

credible." Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the 

reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). If the "ALJ's 

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 

record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The 

ALJ's overall credibility decision may be upheld even if not all of 

the ALJ' s reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony are 

upheld. Batson v. Comm'r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) 

At the hearing, plaintiff testified he has issues with fatigue 

and drowsiness, which prevent him from working. Tr. 82. Plaintiff 

also testified he is unable to exert himself physically due to 

heart problems. Tr. 83-84. Plaintiff allegedly suffers from 

frequent headaches and back pain, and testified he has issues with 

his right hand as a result of an emergency IV placed in between his 

knuckles in 2010. Tr. 83-85. 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 7 of 16
After summarizing the hearing testimony, the ALJ determined 

plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to produce some degree of symptoms, but found plaintiff's 

"statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limited 

effects of these symptoms were not fully credible." Tr. 60. 

Specifically, the ALJ first noted plaintiff's inconsistency in his 

reports to providers regarding alcohol use. Id. In August 2011, 

plaintiff reported to his treating provider he had stopped 

consuming alcohol for about a year, but the provider noted he 

"forgot" about a police hold that had occurred a few weeks prior 

due to a drinking binge. Tr. 788. An ALJ may properly discount a 

plaintiff's testimony based on lack of truthfulness about substance 

use. Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The ALJ also noted plaintiff's physician declined to prescribe 

potentially addictive medications in response to plaintiff's 

continual visits requesting pain medications. Tr. 61; see also Tr. 

949 ("[I d]o not believe [plaintiff] is a candidate for any long 

term potentially addictive medications given his fairly recent past 

addiction history and continual visits requesting pain 

medications."). An ALJ may conclude a plaintiff's drug-seeking 

behavior was evidence of a tendency to exaggerate pain. See Edlund 

v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2001) (likelihood 

claimant was exaggerating complaints of physical pain to "feed his 

Valium addiction" supported the ALJ' s decision to reject his 

testimony) . 

Page 8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 8 of 16
The ALJ also found the plaintiff's testimony was undermined by 

his physical therapist. Tr. 60. Plaintiff argues the ALJ distorts 

the record and the physical therapist merely found physical therapy 

was not the correct treatment, without doubting the severity of 

plaintiff's pain. The ALJ noted, however, plaintiff responded 

inconsistently to certain tests during physical therapy. Tr. 60; 

see also Tr. 886 (physical therapist concluding plaintiff's pain 

"might not have an entirely physical cause") . While plaintiff 

offers a plausible alternative interpretation of the record, the 

ALJ's reading was rational and is therefore upheld. Burch, 400 F.3d 

at 679. 

The ALJ further determined plaintiff's complaints of frequent 

headaches were not supported by the record. Tr. 60. As the ALJ 

noted, only one headache is documented in the medical records. Tr. 

7 43. Al though absence of medical corroboration alone is 

insufficient to negate credibility, when combined with other 

negative credibility factors as discussed above, this lack of 

corroborating medical evidence supports the ALJ's credibility 

finding. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (absence of supporting medical 

evidence was among specific, clear and convincing reasons to 

discount plaintiff's testimony). 

Lastly, the ALJ discounted plaintiff's testimony as 

inconsistent with his activities of daily living, because 

"[t]reatment records reflect an active lifestyle despite his 

symptoms." Tr. 60. Daily activities may be used to discredit a 

claimant where they "contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

Page 9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 9 of 16
impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted). As the ALJ noted, plaintiff exercises 5 

to 10 hours per week, and can be active for 5 hours before resting. 

Tr. 60; see also Tr. 304, 633. Plaintiff also reports he can still 

work on cars despite it being difficult. Tr. 888. It was rational 

for the ALJ to conclude plaintiff's daily activities suggest a 

capacity for sedentary work. 

Because the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting plaintiff's subjective symptom statements, the ALJ' s 

credibility finding is affirmed. 

II. Lay Witness Testimony 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ improperly discredited the 

written statement from plaintiff's mother and testimony from 

plaintiff's brother. Generally, lay witness testimony describing 

a plaintiff's symptoms is "competent evidence that the ALJ must 

take into account." Molina v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 

2012). "[I]n order to discount competent lay witness testimony, the 

ALJ 'must give reasons that are germane to each witness.'" Id. 

(citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919). 

Plaintiff's mother completed a third-party questionnaire on 

December 15, 2010. 3 Tr. 280-87. She reported plaintiff cannot sit 

3 Plaintiff's mother also completed a second witness 

statement. The questions on that statement are answered in the 

first person, however, and the handwriting notably changes 

throughout the document. See Tr. 305-12. While plaintiff's mother 

indicated she completed the form, defendant is correct the report 

appears to have been completed under plaintiff's direction. 

Therefore, it was proper for the ALJ not to address the report as 

a witness statement. 

Page 10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 10 of 16
or stand for long periods, cannot walk more than short distances, 

and has problems bending and kneeling. Tr. 280, 285. She also 

reported plaintiff does laundry, wipes counters, and does light 

dusting around the house. Tr. 282. The ALJ determined plaintiff's 

mother's "allegations ... concerning [plaintiff's] activities are 

generally credible," but concluded the documented activities were 

consistent with a capacity for sedentary work. Tr. 61. 

Plaintiff's brother testified at the hearing. Tr. 93-100. He 

stated plaintiff is regularly exhausted after walking short 

distances, frequently loses balance and falls due to back pain, and 

constantly complains about headaches. Tr. 96-97. He also stated 

plaintiff is quite limited in his daily activities and cannot tie 

his shoes with his right hand, cannot vacuum because of his right 

hand and back, and cannot carry the laundry. Tr. 97-99. The ALJ 

determined plaintiff's brother's testimony was not entirely 

credible. Tr. 61. The ALJ found the "[t]reatment records do not 

document any loss of balance, falls or frequent headaches." Id. 

Further, the ALJ relied on plaintiff's report stating he is able to 

do some work on cars despite manipulative limitations. See Tr. 888. 

The ALJ properly discredited plaintiff's brother's testimony. 

By referring to inconsistencies between aspects of his testimony 

and specific instances in the record, such as plaintiff's own 

reports and an absence of corroborating evidence, the ALJ provided 

germane reasons for her rejection. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ's credibility findings 

regarding the lay witness testimony are affirmed. 

Page 11 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 11 of 16
III. Step Three Analysis 

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ erred at step three by finding 

his impairment did not meet the criteria for certain 

musculoskeletal listings. For an impairment to match a listing, a 

plaintiff must show the impairment meets all of the specified 

medical criteria. Sullivan v. ~ebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). "An 

impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter 

how severely, does not qualify." Id. 

Plaintiff relies on his carpal tunnel syndrome in his right 

hand to argue that he meets listings 1.02 and 11.14; however, both 

listings require impairment in both upper extremities. See 2 0 

C.F.R. §Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, l.02B (requiring "[i]nvolvement 

of one major peripheral joint in each upper extremity") (emphasis 

added); 20 C.F.R. §Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 11.14, ll.04B 

(requiring "[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motor 

function in two extremities") (emphasis added). The ALJ found the 

evidence indicated limitations in only one upper extremity, 

plaintiff's right arm. Tr. 59. Therefore, it was proper for the ALJ 

to determine the plaintiff's impairments do not meet the criteria 

for any musculoskeletal listing. The ALJ's step three analysis is 

affirmed. 

IV. Developing the Record 

Plaintiff further argues the ALJ failed to fully develop the 

record regarding the possibility of a medically determinable 

impairment. An ALJ has a special "duty to fully and fairly develop 

the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are 

Page 12 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 12 of 16
considered." Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). 

An ALJ's duty to develop the record, however, is "triggered only 

when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate 

to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." Mayes v. 

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff points to a consultative examination that reported 

plaintiff having poor vision, and a note by plaintiff's medical 

provider indicating corneal deposits. Tr. 447, 714. Neither of 

these documents triggered the ALJ's duty to develop the record. 

While plaintiff's medical provider recognized that the corneal 

deposits are a secondary result of certain medication, the provider 

did not discuss any specific vision issues stemming from those 

deposits. Tr. 714. Further, the consultative examination indicates 

plaintiff's poor vision is correctable with eye wear. Tr. 447. 

Impairments that can be controlled effectively with treatment are 

not disabling. Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 

1006 (9th Cir. 2006). 

V. RFC Assessment and Step Five Analysis 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ 

plaintiff's RFC assessment and, as a result, 

Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not discuss 

Blake, M. D., in plaintiff's RFC, and this 

improperly crafted 

erred at step five. 

an opinion by Erik 

constituted harmful 

error. See Tr. 694-701 (Dr. Blake's opinion). Accordingly, 

plaintiff argues the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the VE did not 

set out all of plaintiff's limitations and restrictions as 

required. 

Page.13 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 13 of 16
Among other limitations, the ALJ found plaintiff was "limited 

to frequent handling and fingering with the right dominant upper 

extremity." Tr. 58. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted Dr. 

Blake's opinion: 

[D]ue to carpal tunnel syndrome, [plaintiff] would need 

to work at a reduced pace. Symptoms would frequently 

interfere with attention and concentration. [Plaintiff] 

had limitations in reaching, handling, fingering, 

feeling, pushing and pulling with the right upper 

extremity. He could occasionally lift 10 pounds and 

frequently lift less than 10 pounds. He could perform at 

least sedentary duty work. 

Tr. 60. While the ALJ gave some weight to Dr. Blake's opinion 

"concerning the [plaintiff's] manipulative and lifting 

limitations," the ALJ found that Dr. Blake did "not specify the 

degree of manipulative limitations." Id. 

As a threshold matter, plaintiff asserts Dr. Blake opined 

plaintiff could not use his right upper extremity while performing 

sedentary jobs. I disagree with plaintiff's interpretation of Dr. 

Blake's opinion. Dr. Blake stated "[plaintiff] could perform at 

least sedentary duty work [with] regards only to his right [carpal 

tunnel syndrome]." Tr. 701 (emphasis in original). This statement 

indicates that carpal tunnel syndrome in plaintiff's right arm and 

hand limits him to sedentary work; it does not suggest plaintiff is 

unable to use his right arm. 

Further, Dr. Blake's opinion was properly determined credible 

but not specific, as it did not indicate the degree to which the 

physical function of "[f]ingering (fine manipulation)" would be 

affected. Tr. 699. The only available evidence regarding the extent 

of this limitation was plaintiff's own testimony. As discussed in 

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Case 6:14-cv-01489-AA Document 19 Filed 11/27/15 Page 14 of 16
Part I, the ALJ properly found plaintiff's testimony not fully 

credible. The ALJ's conclusion plaintiff could perform sedentary 

jobs requiring frequent handling and fingering so long as he worked 

at a reduced pace is a reasonable interpretation of Dr. Blake's 

opinion. The ALJ' s RFC assessment and step five analysis are 

affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ' s determination 

plaintiff is not disabled. 

CONCLUSION 

The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED and this case is 

DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this day of November 2015. 

r', 

Cl.1,~, Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

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