NEY GENE 

QFTEXAS 

Honorable Don Hall 

Criminal District Attorney 

McLennan County Courthouse 

Waco, Texas 

Dear Mr. Hall: 

Opinion No. C-387 

Re: Whether a person whose 

driver’s license has been 

suspended under the Safety 

Responsibility Act (Article 

67Olh, V.C.S.) must surrender such license to the 

Department of Public 

Safety on demand pursuant 

to Section 32 (4), Article 

6687b, V.C.S. 

You recently requested an opinion of this office concerning the following 

question: 

“Should a person whose driver’s 

license has been suspended under the 

provisions of the Safety Responsibility 

Act, (Article 6701h) be required to 

surrender said driver’s license on demand 

in view of Section 32 (4), Article 668713, 

V.C.S., of the Drivers License Law?” 

In order to arrive at the correct answer to your question, it is felt 

necessary to first review the legislative history of the particular acts 

involved and their relationship to each other. 

The Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, codified as 

Article 6701h, V.C.S., was first enacted in 1951 by the 52nd Legislature and 

became effective January 1, 1952. Section 31 of that Act provides as 

follows : 

“Any person whose license or registration 

shall have been suspended as herein provided, 

or whose policy of insurance or bond, when 

required under this Act, shall have been canceled or terminated, or who shall neglect to 

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Hon. Don Hall, page 2 (C-387) 

furnish other proof upon request of 

the Department shall immediately return 

his license and registration to the Department. If any person shall fail to return 

to the Department the license or registration as provided herein, the Department 

shall forthwith direct any peace officer to 

secure possession thereof and to return 

the same to the Department.” 

Section 32 (d) of the same Act states as follows: 

“(d) Any person willfully failing to 

return license or registration as required 

in Section 31 shall be fined not more than 

Five Hundred Dollars ($500) or imprisoned 

not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.” 

The two above quoted sections of Article 6701h, if valid, would provide 

a practical means for enforcement of a suspension of a driver’s license 

which has been suspended under the Safety Responsibility Act. However, 

in Attorney General’s Opinion No. C-341 (1964), this office expressed its 

opinion that Section 32 (d), quoted above, construed in connkction with 

Section 31, quoted above, is unconstitutional and void, as the term 

“immediately ” is so indefinite and uncertain that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to the meaning of the term and differ as 

to its application. Thus, as you have observed, if the various law enforcement agencies concerned with enforcement of Article 6701h follow the 

above mentioned Attorney General’s Opinion, the practical result is that 

the State, under the Safety Responsibility Act, is not afforded an effective 

course of action against the person who, after having his license suspended in accordance with the provisions of Article 6701h, shall refuse 

to return his license to the Department of Public Safety. 

However, Article 6687b, Section 32 (4), V.C.S., a portion of the 

Drivers License Law, provides that it shall be unlawful for any person: 

II 

. . . . 

“4. To fail or refuse to surrender to the 

Department on demand any operator’s, 

commercial operator’s, or chauffeur’s 

license which has been suspended, cancelled, 

or revoked as provided by law; 

!I II 

, , . . -1829- 
Hon. Don Hall, page 3 (C-387) 

Section 44 of that Act provides for penalties for violations of the provisions of Article 6687b. The question thus arises as to whether or not 

the penalty provisions of Article 6687b may be invoked and used as a 

means of enforcement against a person who refuses to return his license 

which has been suspended under the provisions of Article 6701h. Clearly, 

Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, declares it unlawful for any person to fail 

or refuse to surrender to the Department a license which has been suspended as provided by law. It does not limit the suspension covered to 

one obtained under Article 6687b. It would seem to logically follow that 

prosecution could be maintained under this Article for failure to surrender 

a license suspended under any other valid statute. 

However, it must be noted that Section 32 (4) was first enacted by the 

Legislature in 1935 [Acts 1935, 44th Legislature, 2d C.S. Page 1785, 

Ch. 466, Sec. 19 (4)]. This Article was retained in the law as it was amended 

by Acts 1937, 45th Legislature, Page 752, Ch. 369. When the old Drivers 

License Law, above quoted, was repealed in 1941, and our present law, 

Article 6687b, enacted, Section 32 (4) was included. It is thus seen that 

the provisions of Section 32 (4) have been a part of our Drivers License 

Law since 1935, some 16 years prior to the effective date of Article 6701h. 

From the above reviewed legislative history, it is therefore obvious 

that the suspensions as provided for in Article 67Olh were not in existence 

until some 16 years subsequent to the passage of Article 6687b. Since 

Section 32 (4), Article 668713, refers to all suspensions as provided by law, 

the fundamental issue to be decided in answering your question may be 

stated thusly: Is the “as provided by law ” Section 32 (4), Article 6687b, to 

be construed as applying to a suspension under a law which did not exist 

until some 16 years after Section 32 (4). It is believed evident that the 

Legislature at the time Section 32 (4) was enacted had no specific intent 

that Section 32 (4) would apply to a suspension had under Article 67Olh, 

passed some 16 years later. The answer to your question must depend 

upon the construction to be given the various statutes concerned. There 

has been found no Texas authority directly in point. 

In 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 237, is found the following language: 

II 

. . . . 

“The language of a statute may be so broad, 

and its object so general, as to reach conditions 

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Hon. Don Hall, page 4 (C-387) 

not coming into existence until a long time 

after its enactment. Indeed, it is a general 

rule of statutory construction that, in the absence 

of a contrary indication, legislative enactments, 

which are prospective in operation and which are 

couched in general and comprehensive terms 

broad enough to include unknown things that might 

spring into existence in the future, even though 

they are words of the present tense, apply alike in 

new situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, 

methods, inventions, or persons or entities coming 

into existence subsequent to their passage, where 

such situations, cases, conditions, things, subjects, 

methods, inventions, persons, or entities are of 

the same class as those specified, and can reasonably be said to come within the general purview, 

scope, purpose, and policy of the statute, the mischief sought to be prevented, and the evident 

meaning of the terms used. 

“The latter rule prevails whether the new 

subject comes into existence by statute or 

otherwise . . . .I’ 

In 82 C.J.S. Statutes, Section 319, appears the following statement: 

“Statutes framed in general terms ordinarily 

apply to cases and subjects within their terms subsequently arising, and, unless plainly indicating the 

contrary, are to be construed prospectively, especially where substantive rights are involved. Accordingly, it is a usual rule of statutory construction that 

legislative enactments in general and comprehensive 

terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all 

persons, subjects, and business within their purview 

and scope coming into existence subsequent to their 

passage. So, also, where a statute is expressed in 

general terms and in words of the present tense it 

will be construed to apply not only to things and 

conditions existing at its passage, but will also be 

given a prospective interpretation, by which it 

will apply to such as come into existence thereafter.” 

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Hon. Don Hall, page 5 (C-387) 

In Sutherland-Statutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edition, Section 5102, 

appears the following: 

“Standards established by the medium of 

legislation are usually intended to have considerable breadth with the result that a statute 

may cover many situations that do not immediately 

occur to the mind. And so it is a general rule of 

statutory construction that a statute, expressed in 

general terms and words of present or future tense, 

will be applied, not only to situations existing and 

known at the time of the enactment, but also prospectively to things and conditions that come into 

existence thereafter. Legislation must be given 

elastic operation if it is to cope with the changing 

economic and social conditions . . . . 

“The rule that a statute will operate prospectively so as to include circumstances unknown 

at the time of enactment has been employed in 

the construction of penal as well as remedial 

statutes. . . .‘I 

In Browder vs. United States of America, 312 U.S. 335, 85 L.Ed. 862, 

61 S.Ct. 599 (1941), Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the Court, made the 

following statement: 

“The fact that at the time of the passage of 

the act, passports were not customarily used by 

citizens to assure easy reentry is brought forward 

by petitioner to support the argument that Congress 

did not intend to punish uses such as the one charged 

here. There is nothing in the legislative history to 

indicate that Congress considered the question of 

use by returning citizens. Old crimes, however, 

may be committed under new conditions. Old laws 

apply to changed situations. The reach of the act 

is not sustained or opposed by the fact that it is 

sought to bring new situations under its terms. 

While a statute speaks from its enactment, even a 

criminal statute embraces everything which subsequently falls within its scope . . . .‘I (Emphasis 

added) 

- 1832- 
Hon. Don Hall, page 6 (C-387) 

It is thus seen from the authorities above quoted that the general rule 

of statutory construction is that legislation will be given a prospective 

application, and will apply to conditions and circumstances coming into 

existence subsequent to the passage of the legislation, even though the 

enacting body did not specifically intend that the new circumstance or 

condition would be covered by the legislation. The Browder case, supra, 

although not directly in point to the question here under consideration, 

indicates that the Supreme Court of the United States will follow the 

general rule as it is applied to criminal statutes, and will apply a penal 

statute to a condition arising subsequent to the enactment of the penal 

statute, even though the act complained of would not have been considered a crime at the time of the passage of the act. 

It has been previously stated that there has been found no Texas 

authority directly in point. Even so, it is felt that the Texas Courts have 

expressed a tendency to follow the general rule of statutory construction 

outlined above. In Oil Well Drilling Co. vs. Associated Indemnity Corp., 

258 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953) affirmed 153 Tex. 153, 264 S.W.2d 

697 (1954), on page 529 of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is 

found the following: 

“Moreover, we believe that our law, even 

our statutory law, is a living thing capable of 

adjustment within certain limits to meet varying 

circumstances. Our law is not forever and immutably fixed like the rules of syntax of the ancient 

dead Latin and Greek languages. An example of 

what we mean is our exemption statute, Article 3832, 

subd. 10, V.A.C.S. When passed in 1870, the statute 

named a ‘carriage’ as exempt property. The statutory language has remained unchanged to this day. 

Certainly in 1870 the Legislature did not have automobiles in mind when it used the word ‘carriage’. 

Yet our courts had no difficulty in holding that the 

word ‘carriage’ must be interpreted to include 

automobiles. Willis v. Schoelman, Tex.Civ.App., 

206 S.W.2d 283. Our views on this subject are 

all the more applicable to a statute like the one 

now under consideration, which admittedly grants 

discretionary powers to the Board.” 

It should also be noted that in Section 39, Article 6701h, the Legislature indicated that the Safety Responsibility Act should in no respect 

-1833- 
Hon. Don Hall, page 7 (C-387) 

be considered as a repeal of the then existing motor vehicle laws of the 

State, but should be construed as supplemental thereto. Also, there is 

nothing in either of the acts above discussed, either expressed or implied, which would militate against the result reached by this opinion. 

Therefore, in view of the general rule of statutory construction above set 

out, and because of the fact that there has been found no authority which 

would indicate that the Texas Courts would reach a result other than that 

of the general rule, it is the opinion of this office that your question posed 

should be answered in the affirmative, and a person whose driver’s 

license has been suspended under the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S., and who fails or refuses to surrender 

such suspended license upon demand to the Department of Public Safety 

may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance with the provisions of 

Article 6687b, V.C.S. 

SUMMARY 

A person whose driver’s license has been suspended under the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act, Article 6701h, V.C.S. and who fails 

or refuses to surrender such suspended license 

upon demand to the Department of Public Safety, 

may be prosecuted for said refusal in accordance 

with the provisions of Article 6687b, V.C.S. 

Yours very truly, 

WAGGONER CARR 

Attorney General 

Assistant 

SLK:sss 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Roger Tyler 

Brady Coleman 

Vince Taylor 

-1834- 
Hon. Don Hall, page 8(C -387) ’ 

APPROVEDFOR THEATTORNEYGENERAL 

BY: Stanton Stone 

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