to which she was entitled . . . while at the same time retaining the CSO property.” Westney states
that her termination was involuntary and that she is, therefore, eligible to receive payment pursuant
to Section 2.1 of the Plan.

Westney seeks the bencfits allegedly owed to her under the Plan; back pay with prejudgment
interest; compensation for past and future pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses resulting from
Defendant's alleged unlawful employment practices; punitive damages; and any further relicf that
the Court deems just and proper.

Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I and III of the Complaint, arguing that Defendant
is not a proper party under ERISA.

ERISA provides: “Any money judgment under this title against an employee benefit plan
shall be enforccable only against the plan as an entity and shall not be enforceable against any other
person unless liability against such person is established in his individual capacity under this title.”
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit has accordingly stated that, ordinarily, a plaintiff
seeking to recover benefits from a plan under ERISA may only bring suit against the plan, not
against the employer, Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1490 (7th Cir. 1996).
However, dismissal of parties other than the plan is not necessary in all such ERISA cases. An
employer can be a proper defendant in an ERISA action where the employer is also the plan
administrator, and thc employer and the plan are closely intertwined. Mein v. Carus Corp., 241 F.3d
581, 584-585 (7th Cir. 2001).

Here, an agent of the Defendant, its Chief Human Resources Officer, is the administrator of

the Plan. Further, the Defendant has the exclusive right to amend the plan or to “alter, reduce, or

eliminate” benefits under the plan, Defendant is also responsible for paying all Plan benefits for its



Leasing and Management Business Unit in the Chicago region when, in fact, there were such
positions available, for which she was qualified. On January 31, 2002, Defendant terminated
Westney, allegedly because of her sex.
After Westncy was terminated, she made a claim for bencfits pursuant to the established

Joncs Lang LaSalle Incorporated Severence Pay Plan (“Plan”). Defendant’s Chief Human Resources
Officer, Larry Deans, is the Administrator of the Plan. Scction 2.1 of the Plan states:

A regular cmployee . . . who satisfies each of the conditions and

limitations of the Plan . . . will become a participant in the Plan on the

date the participant's employment with Employer ends due to

involuntary termination on account of: job elimination, permanent

reduction in work force, or permanent shut down of a facility,

department, or subdivision.
According to the terms of the Plan, Defendant has the right to “amend the Plan at any time and to
alter, reduce, or eliminate any benefit under the Plan (in whole or in part) at any time or to terminate
the plan at any time...” The Plan also states: “All benefits payable under this Plan shall be paid
directly by the Employers out of their general assets. The Limployers shall not be required to
segregate on their books or otherwise any amount to be used for the payment of benefits under this
Plan.”

Defendant denied Westney’s claim for benefits, by categorizing her termination as a loss of

a property assignment within the Leasing and Management Business Unit, thus rendering her
ineligible to participate in the Plan, Westney maintains that there was no loss of a property

assignment because Defendant executed the new Agreement for Professional Services with the CSO

one day after it terminated the old Management Agreement. Westney claims that the transition from

the old agreement to the new was an “unscrupulous act by the Defendant to deny Westney payment



employces out of its own general assets. Thus, Defendant reasonably can be said to be “closely
intertwined” with the Plan.

Based on all of the facts alleged in the Complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to Westney, Westney has sufficiently pled that Defendant was
the administrator of the Plan and that Defendant and the Plan were closely intertwined. Therefore,
at this stage of the litigation, Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. is a proper defendant in Westney’s
ERISA claim.

Defendant also seeks to strike those portions of Counts Land Ll of Westney’s complaint that
seek compensatory damages and prejudgment interest.

Inan ERISA suit to recover bencfits, extracontractual compensatory benefits arc not available
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Harsch y, Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 655-660 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied 506 U.S. 818 (1992). Similarly, prejudgment interest is not available under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) unless such interest is a benefit specified in the plan. Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 497 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1157 (2000).

The Plan under which Westney seeks bencfits does not provide for any compensatory
benefits nor for any interest on payments that are not timely made. Therefore, these forms of relief
are unavailable to Westney under § 1132 (a)(1)(B), and the portions of Count TI of her complaint
seeking them are stricken,

In Count III of her complaint, Westney also secks unpaid benefits, compensatory damages,
and prejudgment interest under 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Under § 1140, a plaintiff may seek either unpaid

benefits or, in the alternative, equitable relief. See Anglin v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d

914, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Therefore, the portions of Count III seeking monetary equitable relief in



Minyee Order Porm (0697)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge John W. Darrah Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 7358 DATE 2/12/2003
CASE WESTNEY ys, JONES LANG LASALLE
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.)

MOTION:

DOCKET ENTRY:

qd) o Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]

(2) o Brief in support of motion due.

Q) o Answer bricfto motiondue___. Reply to answer briefdue___

(4) qa Ruling/Hearing on set for_ at

(5) q Status hearing[held/continucd to] [set for/re-set for]on__—sset fort

{6) Qo Pretrial conferencefheld/continued to} [sct for/re-set for]on ___sesetfor at
{7) a Trial[set for/re-set for] on_ at

(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing} held/continucd to___ at

(9) Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OFRCP4(m) OLocal Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(aX(1) OFRCP41(a)(2),

(10) [Other docket entry] Status hearing held and continued to 4/1/03 at 9:00 a.m. Parties to exchange
rule 26 disclosures. Enter Memorandum Opinion And Order. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Defendant’s motion to strike those portions of count IT of plaintiffs complaint secking compensatory
damages and prejudgment interest is granted. Defendant’s motion to strike such portions of count III is

denied,

(1) @f [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices requited, advised in open court

No notices required.
requil number of notices

Notices mailed by judge's staff.

EB 13 2003

Baul

Notified counsel by telephone. date docketed

wo | Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form. [een es eay
Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
o> !
courtroom: -
LG deputy's
initials

Date/time received in

central Clerk's Office ‘mailing deputy initials



the form of compensatory damages and prejudgment interest as an alternative form of relief are
properly pled.

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied. Defendant's Motion
to Strike those portions of Count ll of Plaintiff's Complaint seeking compensatory damages and

prejudgment interest is granted. Defendant's Motion to Strike such portions of Count II is denied.

Dated: er 1A, 2.002- ok a L dota -
“7 JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Judge



a.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS D0 CHETED

EASTERN DIVISION - aan

FER 4 3 2003
PAULETTE R, WESTNEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )

) No. 02 C 7358
)
a ) Judge John W. Darrah

)
JONES LANG LASALLE )
AMERICAS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Paulette R. Westney (“Westney”), brought suit against Defendant, Jones Lang
LaSalle Americas, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging unlawful employment discrimination and violations
of the Employee Retirement Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Westney seeks recovery for the ERISA
violations under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Presently before the Court is
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts IL and III of Plaintiff's Complaint, alleging RISA violations,
and Defendant’s Motion to Strike those portions of Counts II and IL that scck compensatory
damages and prejudgment interest.

Tn reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court reviews all facts alleged in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326
(7th Cir. 2000). Dismissal is only warranted if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its
claims that would entitle it to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Plaintiffs are

not required to allege all of the facts underlying their claims in the complaint. Instead, a plaintiff

need only plead the bare minimum facts necessary to put a defendant on notice of the claim so that



the defendant can file an answer. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

A reading of the Complaint supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of the
parties.

Westney worked for Defendant, a Maryland corporation and a multinational real estate
management company, beginning in 1979 as an administrative assistant. Over the years, she was
promoted occasionally, until her final promotion to the position of Vice President in 1995.

On May 3, 1999, Defendant entered into a Facility Management Agreement (“Management
Agreement”) with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra (“CSO”), which designated Westney as the
CSO Facility Manager. The termination date of the Management Agreement was April 30, 2002.

Westney worked as the Facility Manager at the CSO, as a General Manager in the downtown
area Leasing and Management Business Unit for Defendant, from May 3, 1999 until January 31,
2002. Throughout her employment as CSO Facility Manager, Westney received excellent revicws
for her performance from both Defendant and the CSO.

On January 31, 2002, Defendant prematurely and unilaterally terminated its Management
Agreement with CSO, As it was terminating the Management Agreement, Defendant was also
negotiating a new Agreement for Professional Services with CSO. Under the new agreement,
Defendant’s duties to CSO would remain essentially the same, except that the new agreement
referred to Defendant as “Consultant” rather than “Manager”; it also eliminated Westney’s position
of Facility Manager. Defendant and CSO entered into the Agreement for Professional Services on
February 1, 2002, one day after the termination of the old agreement.

Upon learning that her job would be tenninated, Westney repeatedly asked to be rcassigned

to another position. One of her supervisors told her that no such positions were available within the