IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 25, 2022 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DARON HALL

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 110227 Steven Sword, Judge

 

No. E2020-01634-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Daron Hall, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of

evading arrest, a Class E felony; driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended, 

a Class B misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; violating the 

“light law,” a Class C misdemeanor; and operating a motor vehicle without a proper license 

plate, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) 

(evading arrest), 55-50-504 (2018) (driving on a suspended license), 39-16-301 (2018) 

(criminal impersonation), 55-9-402 (2018) (motor vehicle light law), 55-5-114 (2018) 

(proper license plate). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to six 

years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient 

to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a 

continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., and D. KELLY THOMAS,JR., JJ., joined. 

Andrew Pate, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Daron Hall. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Edwin Alan Groves, Jr., Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Phillip Morton and Ta 

Kisha Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The Defendant’s convictions relate to a November 29, 2016 driving-related 

incident. At the trial, Knoxville Police Officer J.D. Hopkins testified that on November 

29, 2016, at 1:15 a.m., he saw a dark-colored vehicle without headlights on the roadway. 

He recalled that it was raining at the time. He said that the car drove over a hill, that he 

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followed the car, and that he saw the car, a black Nissan Maxima, stopped in the roadway. 

He said that the driver spoke to a woman who stood “on the side of the road.” Officer 

Hopkins said that he turned on his blue lights to conduct a traffic stop and that that the 

driver stopped the car on a side street. He said that he spoke to the driver, who stated he 

did not have a license, that the driver provided a Social Security number and a birthdate, 

and that the driver reported the car was a rental. 

Officer Hopkins testified that he attempted to identify the driver with the 

information the driver provided but that rain “blemished out” the Social Security number

on his notepad. He said that he spoke to the driver again and that the driver provided a 

different Social Security number, which police records showed belonged to a white male, 

although the driver was black. Officer Hopkins said that he spoke to the driver again, that 

he asked for the driver’s name, and that the driver provided the name Marvin Neal Hall. 

However, police records and photographs did not match the driver’s description. Officer 

Hopkins said that Marvin Hall’s driver’s license photograph reflected that Mr. Hall had 

pierced ears and that Officer Hopkins talked to the driver again to attempt to determine if 

the driver had pierced ears. Officer Hopkins recalled that the driver was “really tall” but 

said that the driver did not have pierced ears.1 

Officer Hopkins testified that he asked the driver to step out of the car because the 

driver had lied about his identity but that the driver “floored the car” and “took off.” He 

said that he notified dispatch that the driver fled, that he provided dispatch with a 

description of the car and the driver, and that he and his partner left the scene. 

A video recording of the traffic stop was received as an exhibit. The recording is 

consistent with Officer Hopkins’s testimony regarding the events of the traffic stop. The 

recording likewise reflects that the driver was never in the camera’s view. 

Officer Hopkins testified that later, another officer contacted him about the driver 

who fled the traffic stop because the driver matched the description of a “suspect from the 

situation” the other officer was investigating. Officer Hopkins said that, based upon 

“information” from the officer, Officer Hopkins searched a database and identified the 

Defendant as the driver of the car who fled the stop. Officer Hopkins said he obtained 

arrest warrants for the Defendant. Officer Hopkins stated that the car driven by the 

Defendant had been a rental car, that the license plate had expired in October 2016, and 

that the Defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended. Officer Hopkins identified the 

Defendant in the courtroom as the driver of the car. 

 

1 The recording of the traffic stop reflects that the driver stated he was six feet tall.
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Upon this evidence, the Defendant was convicted of evading arrest, driving while 

his license was suspended, criminal impersonation, violating the motor vehicle light law, 

and operating a motor vehicle without a proper license plate. He received an effective sixyear sentence as a career offender. This appeal followed. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. 

Although he does not allege the State failed to prove the elements of the offenses beyond 

a reasonable doubt, he argues the State failed to prove his identity as the driver. The State 

responds that the evidence is sufficient. We agree with the State. 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is “whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 

(Tenn. 2007). The State is “afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences” from that evidence. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 521. The appellate 

courts do not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence,” and questions regarding “the credibility 

of witnesses [and] the weight and value to be given the evidence . . . are resolved by the 

trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997); see State v. Sheffield, 676 

S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984).

“A crime may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a 

combination of the two.” State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 (Tenn. 1998); see State v. 

Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether 

the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)). A conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence alone. See Dorantes, 

331 S.W.3d at 380-381. 

“Identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime.” State v. Rice, 184 

S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006). Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to 

establish the perpetrator’s identity. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). The 

identity of the perpetrator is a question of fact for the jury to determine. State v. Thomas, 

158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005). “The jury decides the weight to be given to 

circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the 

extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt[.]’” Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 662 

(quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). 
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The record reflects in the light most favorable to the State that Officer Hopkins 

conducted a traffic stop and that, based upon our review of the recording of the stop, he 

interacted with the driver for approximately ten minutes before the driver fled the scene. 

Although Officer Hopkins was unable to identify the driver through any official records at 

the time of the stop, another officer provided him with the Defendant’s information because 

the officer thought the Defendant matched the description of the driver provided by Officer 

Hopkins to police dispatch. Upon viewing the Defendant’s information and photograph, 

Officer Hopkins immediately identified the Defendant as the driver. Officer Hopkins, 

likewise, identified the Defendant as the driver at the trial. We conclude that this evidence 

sufficiently established the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. 

In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the Defendant’s assertions that 

the traffic stop occurred in the early morning hours, that it was raining, and that the driver 

was tall, making it difficult for the officer to see the driver’s face. However, the 

Defendant’s arguments focus on the weight and value to be given to Officer Hopkins’s 

testimony, and any conflicts in the evidence were resolved by the jury. See Bland, 958 

S.W.2d at 65; Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d at 547. The jury credited Officer Hopkins’s testimony. 

The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. 

II. Motion to Continue

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his oral motion to 

continue on the morning of the trial. He argues that his inability to confer with trial counsel 

prejudiced his case sufficiently to create a reasonable possibility that a different outcome 

would have resulted had the court granted the motion. The State responds that the court 

did not abuse its discretion. We agree with the State. 

“[A] motion for a continuance is addressed to the sole discretion of the trial judge,” 

and the judge’s decision “will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion and 

prejudice to the defendant.” Baxter v. State, 503 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

1973); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 744 (Tenn. 2016); see State v. Goodwin, 909 

S.W.2d 35, 44 (Tenn. 1995). It is the appealing party’s burden to show how the trial 

court’s decision was prejudicial. Baxter, 503 S.W.2d at 230. The critical inquiry “is 

whether one has been deprived of his rights and whether an injustice has been done.” Id. 

As a result, the record must reflect that “the denial of the requested continuance ‘denied 

the defendant a fair trial or that the result of the trial would have been different.’” State v. 

Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584, 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting State v. Odom, 137 

S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004)); see Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 744; Goodwin, 909 S.W.2d at 

44.
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The record reflects that on April 28, 2017, the Knox County District Public 

Defender’s Office was appointed to represent the Defendant. A motion to continue the 

trial was granted at the request of the assistant district public defender on November 20, 

2017. The trial was scheduled for May 16, 2018. However, on April 11, 2018, the District 

Public Defender’s Office filed a motion seeking permission to withdraw from the case 

because of ethical obligations. The trial court took the motion under advisement and 

continued the case until April 27, 2018, at which time the court granted the motion to 

withdraw and an attorney was appointed to represent the Defendant. The trial was 

scheduled for August 15, 2018. The trial was not held on August 15, 2018, and on February 

7, 2019, the subsequent attorney appointed to represent the Defendant filed a motion to 

withdraw, citing a deterioration of communication. On March 7, 2019, the court granted 

the motion. Trial counsel was appointed on March 7, 2019, and the trial was scheduled for 

April 12, 2019, although the trial was continued for an unspecified reason. 

On July 8, 2019, trial counsel filed a motion to continue, asserting that he had 

received the discovery materials from the previous attorney on April 12, only ninety-four 

days before the July 15, 2019 trial date, that further investigation was necessary to locate a 

potential defense witness, and that the Administrative Office of the Courts denied his 

request for funds to hire an investigator. The motion also cited counsel’s multiple trials 

and hearings since his appointment. Although the record does not contain the disposition 

of the motion, the record reflects that the trial began on August 27, 2019. 

On August 27, 2019, trial counsel made an oral motion to continue the trial at the 

Defendant’s direction. The record reflects that the week before the trial, the prosecutor 

and counsel exchanged email messages regarding counsel’s inability to speak with the 

Defendant while the Defendant was in the custody of the Department of Correction because 

prison officials were “not cooperative.” The Defendant was transported to the jail at an 

unspecified time, and counsel was able to have an in-person meeting with the Defendant 

the day before the trial. Counsel told the trial court that he had not planned to request a 

continuance because he had reviewed the discovery and had prepared a trial strategy but 

that after speaking with the Defendant the previous day, the Defendant presented counsel 

with research the Defendant had conducted at the prison and wanted “an opportunity to 

have further meetings with [counsel] to consult about and possibly have [counsel] follow 

up on.” Counsel told the court that the Defendant was willing to address the court about 

his need to consult further with counsel before the trial. The court denied the request and 

stated that nearly three years had passed since the offenses. The court acknowledged that 

the Defendant had been charged with a Class E felony, along with “some minor stuff,” and 

stated that the case was not complicated and needed to be resolved. The case proceeded to 

trial. 
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion 

to continue on the morning of the trial. Although counsel advised the court that the 

Defendant had conducted research relevant to this case, the record does not reflect the 

substance of the research. Counsel conceded during oral argument before this court that 

the defense did not provide a proffer of the substance of the research in the trial court 

proceedings, and the substance was not disclosed at oral argument. Counsel stated during 

oral argument that he and the Defendant met three or four times before the trial. As a result,

the Defendant has failed to show that he was denied his right to a fair trial or that the result 

of the trial would have been different had the motion to continue been granted. 

In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the Defendant’s argument that 

because he and his counsel were denied additional time to confer about the Defendant’s 

research and because Department of Correction officials were uncooperative in allowing 

them to communicate, prejudice should be assumed. Our review for the denial of a motion 

to continue is for an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the defendant, and this court 

cannot modify this standard. See Willis, 496 S.W.3d at 744; Baxter, 503 S.W.2d at 230. 

The Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgments of the 

trial court are affirmed.

____________________________________

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE