IN THE UNlTED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

KINI COSMA, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

MICHAEL & SHIRLEY MUNSON, d.b.a. 

MUNSON MOBILE HOME PARK; STEVE 

JONES; BRANDON LOVE; SANDRA 

FIELDS; JELD-WEN; DOES 1-100, inclusive; 

Defendants. 

CLARKE, Magistrate Judge. 

CaseNo. 1:14-cv-01557-CL 

REPORT& 

RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Kini Cosma ('Plaintiff') seeks to proceed informa pauperis ("IFP") (#2) in this 

action. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends Plaintiffs IFP application be denied, 

and her complaint dismissed. 

STANDARD 

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay 

a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(1 ), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts 

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despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant 

to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the 

litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l). Second, it 

must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seeks 'monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

ln regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the power under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before the service of the complaint on the 

defendants, and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply the same 

standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(q). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To 

survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must state a short 

and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state 

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard ... asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The Court is not 

required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true.IQ.,_ 

Prose pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by prose 

plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los 

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Additionally, a prose 

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litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, 

unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. ld. at 623. 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs complaint is difficult to read. She names as defendants Michael Munson and 

Shirley Munson, who own the Munson Mobile Home Park in which Plaintiff resides as a tenant; 

Steve Jones ("Jones"), the "manager-landlord" of Munson Mobile Home Park and an employee 

of .Teld-Wen; Brandon Love ("Love") and Sandra Fields, residents of the Munson Mobile Home 

Park; Jeld-Wen, an Oregon business; and 1 00 unnamed defendants. Though not named as parties 

to the suit, the pleading also alleges misconduct on the part of "Klamath County state judges, 

Oregon Federal Magistrates, Klamath County law enforcement and the community at large in 

Klamath Falls, Oregon" as well as "law enforcement in Napa, California." 

The bulk of Plaintiffs allegations relate to her rental agreement with Defendant Munson 

Mobile Home Park. As her first cause of action, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Jones has not "lived 

up to" Defendant .Teld-Wen's "mission statements, logos, and other written propaganda." 

Plaintiff asserts this "false advertis[ing]" caused her to live in unsafe conditions. 

In her second cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Jones retaliated against her for 

exercising her right to peaceably enjoy her rental property. She asserts Defendant Jones "needs 

to be held responsible for not controlling his tenent's loud, obnoxious, and hostile actions[.]" She 

describes numerous altercations with one neighbor who parked his car in a manner that blocked 

her car and "deliberately clogged up the sewer so that waste and fecal matter backed up into 

Plaintiff's trailer." After this neighbor vacated the premises, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Jones 

hired a man to intimidate Plaintiff, block her driveway, and possibly sever her van's fuel line. 

Plaintiff states Defendant Love, who is a relative of Defendant Jones, revved his truck's engine 

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and exposed Plaintiffs guest to "noxious and malodorous fumes and soot." Plaintiff claims 

Defendant Jones gave Plaintiff a 30-day eviction notice when she complained to him about these 

events. 

For her third cause of action, Plaintiff claims Defendants discriminated against her on the 

basis of her gender, sexual orientation, and opposition to unlawful activity. She alleges 

Defendants denied her the equal opportunity to enjoy the use of the Munson Mobile Home Park. 

To correct this, Plaintiff asks the Court to "grant household living arrangements away from 

tortious injuries with her three Mustangs[.]" 

The complaint contains a number of extraneous facts and allegations that have no 

apparent relationship with Plaintiffs stated claims for relief. For example, she summarizes the 

events underlying this case as "another federal and state-managed campaign where Plaintiff's 

children were kidnapped and taken captive among Gentiles in order to separate them from their 

Jewish heritage." Many vague, incoherent, and conclusory allegations are interspersed within the 

body of the pleading. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin a public nuisance; asserts violations of the just 

compensation clause of the U.S. and Oregon Constitutions; alleges Defendants are subjecting her 

to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 

repeatedly references the "community caretaking doctrine;" and discusses the state's public 

policy in favor of maintaining parks for outdoor recreation, reasonable accommodations for 

disabled tenants, and the physical and psychological effects of domestic abuse. Furthermore, 

PlaintiiT requests relief as may be appropriate under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; the 

Violence Against Women Act of2013; and the Full Faith and Credit Provision. She f:llso asks for 

$16,000 in wages for eight weeks of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. § 1589. 

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From these allegations, the Court is unable to discern a cognizable claim upon which 

relief can be granted. However, it is not absolutely clear that no amendment could cure the 

deficiencies in the complaint. Plaintiffs action should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) on the grounds that it fails to state a plausible claim for relief If Plaintiffs action 

is dismissed and she is given leave to amend her complaint, the Court should order Plaintiff to 

draft a complaint with a short and plain statement of her claim or claims against Defendants in 

compliance with Rule 8(a) such that the Court and Defendants can determine the basis of 

Plaintiffs claims. 

RI~COMMENDATION 

For the reasons stated above, this action should be dismissed. This recommendation is not 

an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of 

appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(l) should not be filed until entry of 

the district court's judgment or appealable order. 

The Report and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this 

Report and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from toclay's date. If an 

objection is filed, any response to the objection is clue within fourteen ( 14) days from the date of 

the objection. See FED. R. Civ. P. 72, 6. 

;~~er2014 

/MARK D. CLARKE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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