NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT 

PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

WENTIAN YANG, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA CHINESE NEWS, L.L.C.; KIM UNG; JENNY UNG; SHUO 

QIN ZEHN, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 14-0080

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2013-000842

The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

HopkinsWay PLLC, Phoenix

By Edward C. Hopkins, Jr.

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix

By William M. Fischbach

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Arizona Chinese News and Shuo Qin Zhen

Wong Fujii Carter P.C., Phoenix

By Rick K. Carter, Matthew A. Klopp, Susan Larsen

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees Kim and Jenny Ung
YANG v. AZ CHINESE NEWS

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 Wentian Yang appeals from the judgment dismissing his 

defamation and related claims against defendants Arizona Chinese News, 

L.L.C. (ACN) and Shuo Qin Zhen. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 As alleged in the complaint, Yang, an international 

businessman, assisted the Chinese Consulate General in conducting a 

passport renewal event at the Chinese Cultural Center in Phoenix on 

November 17, 2012. Kim Ung attended the event with Wu Yi, Yang’s 95-

year-old wheelchair-bound aunt, and distributed to other attendees a letter 

(Letter) Ung and his wife had written. Referring to Yang, the Letter, 

translated from Chinese, states:

He has seized the land in our village (Quanzhou Lichen 

District) in which we had invested a large amount of funds.

He falsely claimed the communist government had 

confiscated the land, according to the policy of reclaiming 

unused land that remained fallow for years, as the reason and

attempted to use horrible methods to forcibly rob the land to 

reach his own purpose.

Heavens, he made up the lie.

Every month he receives a large rental amount from it.

He is really a big liar and a villain.

Do not ever trust Wen Tian anymore, as a transnational 

swindler, to avoid fraud.

¶3 Ung also photographed Wu Yi at the event wearing a sign that 

read:
YANG v. AZ CHINESE NEWS

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Wen Tian Yang

Lying Shamelessly

Fraud Scam

Uses Public Office for Private Gain

Oversees Chinese Scam 

¶4 Ung distributed copies of the Letter and the photograph to 

media sources, including ACN. ACN subsequently published an article on 

November 21, 2012 that contained the photograph and the text of the Letter 

(November 21 Article). An ACN-edited version of the Letter (Edited Letter) 

also appeared in the November 21 Article. The Edited Letter stated:

He misused our land investment in Quanzhou, Fujian 

Province as the reason to swindle over many years around a 

hundred thousand dollars from my children.

He even cheated me of my “coffin expense” savings.

Finally, Wen Tian Yang falsely claimed the local government 

had confiscated the land as a reason and attempted to use 

horrible methods to forcibly rob our investment money.

He fabricated lies.

He has cheated us for ten years.

He took the huge rental income for himself.

Do not ever trust Wen Tian Yang, the liar.

¶5 In a written response (Yang’s Response) that was posted on 

two Chinese language websites, one of which was ACN’s, Yang challenged 

the November 21 Article’s veracity and the lawfulness of its publication by 

ACN. ACN published a reply to Yang’s Response on November 28, 2012, 

explaining as follows: “We reported the contents provided. We do not 

know what happened prior. The reporter was not present when the 

incident occurred. The picture was taken in public before many witnesses.”

(November 28 Reply).
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¶6 Yang subsequently filed a complaint against the Ungs, ACN, 

and ACN’s president, Zhen (ACN and Zhen, collectively, ACN 

Defendants). Based on the November 21 Article and the November 28 

Reply, Yang sought punitive damages and asserted the following claims 

against the ACN Defendants: (1) defamation; (2) false light invasion of 

privacy; (3) tortious interference with business relations; and (4) aiding and 

abetting.

1 The ACN Defendants successfully moved under Arizona Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Rule 12(b)(6)) to dismiss the claims against them 

that were based on the November 21 Article. According to the parties, the 

court dismissed the claims after finding the November 21 Article is subject 

to the “fair reporting privilege.”2

¶7 Upon completing discovery, the ACN Defendants moved for

summary judgment on the remaining claims. They raised the following 

three bases for relief: (1) Yang became a “limited purpose public figure” by 

publishing his Response; (2) the November 28 Reply constituted the ACN 

Defendants’ “subjective impression and opinion” of Yang’s Response; and,

(3) the November 28 Reply is subject to the self-interest privilege. The court 

granted the motion3 and entered judgment in accordance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Yang appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), -

2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2014). 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss: Yang’s Claims re November 21 Article

¶8 Yang argues the court erred in applying the fair reporting 

privilege and dismissing the defamation and false light claims that arose 

from the November 21 Article. Alternatively, Yang contends the ACN 

Defendants abused the privilege by acting with actual malice or through

excessive publication. 

 

1 Yang raised additional claims against the Ungs only. 

2 The court dismissed the claims “for the reasons set forth on the 

record.” The transcript from the oral argument at which the court issued 

its order is not in the record on appeal. 

3 Again, we cannot review the court’s “on the record” reasons for 

granting summary judgment because the transcript from the argument on 

the motion is not in the record before us. 
YANG v. AZ CHINESE NEWS

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¶9 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when “as a matter of 

law . . . plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of 

the facts susceptible of proof.” Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 

8, 284 P.3d 863, 867 (2012) (citation omitted). Consequently, we review a 

trial court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Id. Specifically, in a defamation 

case, the existence and scope of any privilege are questions of law that we 

review de novo. Sobol v. Alarcon, 212 Ariz. 315, 317 n.2, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 487, 

489 n.2 (App. 2006). Our examination is limited to the pleading itself. 

Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 419, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 344, 346 

(2008). We will “assume the truth of the well-pled factual allegations and 

indulge all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Id. However, “mere 

conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted.” Id.

¶10 The conditional fair reporting privilege provides immunity 

for defamatory publication of “a report of . . . a meeting open to the public 

that deals with a matter of public concern . . . .” Restatement (Second) of 

Torts (Restatement) § 611 (1977); see also Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 

Ariz. 609, 618, 688 P.2d 617, 626 (1984) (applying Restatement § 611). The 

scope of the privilege allows “[a]nyone [to] describe what transpired at a 

public proceeding so long as the publisher provides a fair and accurate 

rendition.” Green Acres Trust., 141 Ariz. at 618, 688 P.2d at 626. Thus, abuse 

of the privilege occurs only when the publisher does not give a fair and 

accurate report of the proceeding. Restatement § 611 cmt. a. Furthermore, 

“the privilege exists even though the publisher himself does not believe the 

defamatory words he reports to be true and even when he knows them to 

be false.” Id.

¶11 Here, ACN’s publication of the Letter and photograph of the 

displayed sign in the November 21 Article falls within the fair reporting 

privilege. As alleged in the complaint, ACN merely published the Letter 

and photograph that Ung sent to the newspaper. Other members of the 

public that attended the passport event could learn and see for themselves 

the Letter’s and sign‘s statements; thus, ACN was “merely a substitute for 

the public eye.” Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 618, 688 P.2d at 626. 

Consequently, ACN’s publication of the Letter and the photograph of the 

sign is a “fair and accurate rendition” of their respective statements. 

Additionally, the complaint does not allege the passport event was private 

or otherwise closed to the public. Indeed, the event’s title—“Chinese 

Passport Renewal Event”—indicates the event was open to all Chinese 

nationals seeking to renew their passports, a purpose which is certainly a 
YANG v. AZ CHINESE NEWS

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matter of public interest.4 See id. (noting, “If the proceeding is genuinely 

open, so that the speaker sees what any member of the public could have 

seen, and the meeting deals with a matter of public interest, the privilege 

applies.”).

¶12 Regarding the Edited Letter in the November 21 Article, Yang 

argues it is “materially different” from the Letter because it raises the 

following “three new allegations” not found in the Letter: (1) Yang 

swindled approximately $100,000; (2) Yang cheated Wu Yi out of her “coffin 

expenses”; and (3) Yang cheated his family for ten years. Yang contends 

these differences show that the Edited Letter does not fairly and accurately 

describe the events described in the Letter. We disagree.

¶13 As noted, for the fair reporting privilege to apply, the report 

must be fair and accurate. Supra ¶ 10. “Accuracy means ‘substantially 

correct,’ while fair means balanced.” Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 618, 688 

P.2d at 626 (citation omitted). In considering whether a report is fair and 

accurate, “a court must determine whether the report of the public 

proceeding carries a ‘greater sting’ in defamatory content than the original 

publication during the proceeding.” Id. at 619, 688 P.2d at 627 (citation 

omitted). 

¶14 Here, the Letter and the sign worn by Wu Yi constitute the 

original publication. Thus, we must determine whether the Edited Letter’s 

defamatory content carries a “greater sting” than the Letter and sign. We 

agree with Yang that the Edited Letter contains allegations that are not 

contained in the Letter or the sign. However, the differing allegations 

merely provide more detail regarding instances of Yang’s alleged “fraud” 

and “swindling.” For example, the Edited Letter states Yang swindled 

approximately $100,000 in addition to Wu Yi’s savings for coffin expenses 

and that he “cheated us for ten years.” The Letter and sign generally allege

Yang is a “transnational swindler” and “a big liar and a villain” who 

fraudulently seized others’ land in China. We discern no “greater sting” 

attributable to the detailed allegations in the Edited Letter compared to the 

general statements contained in the Letter and sign. Accordingly, the Edited 

 

4 The title of the November 21 Article is: “95 year old lady sits in a 

wheel chair at her nephew’s location wearing the complaint to fight for 

justice.” Consequently, it appears ACN considered as newsworthy not the 

substance of the defamatory statements, but the fact that Yang’s aunt was 

publicly displaying the sign at the passport event. 
YANG v. AZ CHINESE NEWS

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Letter is fair and accurate and therefore subject to the fair reporting 

privilege. 

¶15 For the above-stated reasons, the November 21 Article is 

subject to the fair reporting privilege.

¶16 We also reject Yang’s assertion that the ACN Defendants 

abused the fair reporting privilege because they published the November 

21 Article with actual malice towards Yang and they excessively published 

the article. 

¶17 In an effort to establish that the ACN Defendants abused the 

fair reporting privilege, Yang makes a great deal of their “actual malice” in 

publishing the November 21 Article. However, he cites no authority for the 

proposition that a publisher’s actual malice somehow renders the fair 

reporting privilege inapplicable. The cases he does cite do not address what 

effect, if any, actual malice has on the viability of a defense based on the fair 

reporting privilege. See Currier v. W. Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ariz. 290, 293, 855 

P.2d 1351, 1354 (1993) (“substantial truth” defense to defamation claim);

Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616-18, 688 P.2d at 624-26 (discussing 

conditional privileges in general and noting publication with actual malice 

abuses such privileges; further noting fair reporting privilege is “special” 

because publisher may make knowingly false defamatory statements 

without abusing the privilege); Lewis v. Oliver, 178 Ariz. 330, 335, 873 P.2d 

668, 673 (App. 1993) (communications to public officials regarding the work 

of their subordinates is subject to conditional privilege). Absent such 

authority, we are not persuaded that actual malice applies to show abuse of 

the special reporting privilege especially given that the privilege permits 

publication of information the publisher knows is false, which is a factor in 

determining actual malice in cases where other conditional privileges are 

asserted. See Heuisler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 168 Ariz. 278, 282, 812 P.2d 

1096, 1100 (App. 1991) (“Proof of actual malice requires clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendants published either with knowledge 

that the defamatory statements were false or with reckless disregard for 

whether the statements were true or false.”).

¶18 Yang contends the November 21 Article was excessively 

published because the ACN Defendants posted it online in addition to 

mailing free print copies to recipients in the United States and China. See 

Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616, 688 P.2d at 624 (“Once a defendant 

demonstrates that a conditional privilege may apply, the plaintiff may then 

prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual 

malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.”). However, Yang cites 
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no authority for his assertion that, on the facts of this case, excessive 

publishing negates the fair reporting privilege. We therefore do not 

address whether the ACN Defendants abused the fair reporting privilege 

on these bases. See Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355 n.5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 

231, 234 n.5 (App. 2007) (appellate courts “will not consider argument 

posited without authority.”); ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring appellant to

present significant arguments, set forth his or her position on the issues 

raised, and include citations to relevant authorities, statutes, and portions 

of the record.).

¶19 Because the fair reporting privilege applies to the November 

21 Article, the court properly dismissed Yang’s defamation and other

claims stemming from the publication of that article. See, e.g., Lakeshore 

Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Perry, 212 Mich. App. 396, 401, 538 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1995)

(“As with defamation actions, where the conduct allegedly causing the 

business interference is a defendant’s utterance of negative statements 

concerning a plaintiff, privileged speech is a defense.”); Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 652G (1977) (“The rules on conditional privileges to 

publish defamatory matter . . . , and on the special privileges . . . , apply to 

the publication of any matter that is an invasion of privacy.”).5

 

5 Regarding his claim for aiding and abetting, Yang merely alleged the 

following: 

ACN, Mr. Zhen, Mr. Ung, and Mrs. Ung substantially helped 

and encouraged one another to publish false and derogatory 

statements about Mr. Yang to members of the parties' 

communities.

ACN, Mr. Zhen, Mr. Ung, and Mrs. Ung substantially helped 

and encouraged one another to intentionally interfere with 

Mr. Yang's business relations.

See Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 

395 Pension Trust Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 485, ¶ 34, 38 P.3d 12, 23 (2002) (as an 

element of an aiding and abetting claim, plaintiff must prove defendant 

substantially assisted or encouraged the primary tortfeasor). Without 

further factual allegations in the complaint, the above-referenced 

allegations are conclusory and insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356, ¶ 9, 284 P.3d at 867 (“In determining 

if a complaint states a claim on which relief can be granted, courts must 
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II. Summary Judgment: ACN’s November 28 Reply

¶20 We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary 

judgment. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 199, 

¶ 15, 165 P.3d 173, 177 (App. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate 

when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if the trial court was correct 

for any reason. City of Tempe v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 201 Ariz. 106, 111, ¶ 14, 32 

P.3d 31, 36 (App. 2001).

¶21 Here, Yang did not dispute the ACN Defendants’ statement 

of facts supporting their summary judgment motion. Thus, he is 

constrained to challenging the legal basis of the court’s grant of summary 

judgment. But the various arguments Yang raises reflect his apparent 

misapprehension regarding the content and purpose of the November 28 

Reply. Our review of the November 28 Reply reveals it was published to 

address the allegations in Yang’s Response regarding the ACN Defendants’ 

purported illegal publication of the November 21 Article.

¶22 In his Response to the November 21 Article, Yang did not 

merely challenge the truthfulness of the defamatory comments contained 

in the article, he also asserted the ACN Defendants’ publication of it was 

unlawful. And by doing so, Yang inserted his views into the public 

controversy regarding the First Amendment rights of the ACN Defendants 

to publish the November 21 Article. Yang thus became a “limited purpose 

public figure” for purposes of resolving his defamation claim against the 

ACN Defendants. See Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 150 Ariz. 476, 483, 

724 P.2d 562, 569 (1986) (noting, “An individual may become a public figure 

if he ‘thrust[s] himself or his views into public controversy to influence 

others.’”) (quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979)).

¶23 As a public figure, Yang was required to produce evidence of 

the ACN Defendants’ actual malice in publishing the November 28 Reply. 

See Morris v. Warner, 160 Ariz. 55, 63, 770 P.2d 359, 367 (App. 1988). “A 

statement is made with actual malice when the declarant makes the 

statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for 

 

assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all 

reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are 

insufficient.”).
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the truth.” Id. Actual malice can only be sufficiently proved with clear and 

convincing evidence. Id.

¶24 Our review of the record reveals no evidence that the ACN 

Defendants published the November 28 Reply either knowing it contained 

false statements or with reckless disregard for its veracity. See Heuisler, 168 

Ariz. at 282, 812 P.2d at 1100 (“Proof of actual malice requires clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendants published either with knowledge 

that the defamatory statements were false or with reckless disregard for 

whether the statements were true or false.”). Accordingly, the ACN 

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim.

¶25 Because the November 28 Reply amounted to protected 

speech, Yang’s tortious interference and false light claims also were 

properly dismissed on summary judgment. See Western Technologies, Inc. v. 

Sverdrup & Parcel, Inc., 154 Ariz. 1, 5-6, 739 P.2d 1318, 1322-23 (App. 1986)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims because protected 

speech cannot be “wrongful” as a matter of law); Godbehere v. Phoenix 

Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 342, 783 P.2d 781, 788 (1989) (“As in 

defamation, a public official in a false light action must always show that 

the defendant published with knowledge of the false innuendo or with 

reckless disregard of the truth.”). Furthermore, Yang’s claim of aiding and 

abetting Yang in connection with the November 28 Reply was properly 

dismissed because, although Yang presented evidence that the ACN 

Defendants had spoken with the Ungs, he presented no evidence that ACN 

substantially helped or encouraged the Ungs to defame him. Absent 

evidence of this element of aiding and abetting, the claim was properly 

dismissed on summary judgment. See Wells Fargo Bank, 201 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 

34, 38 P.3d at 23 (elements of aiding and abetting.)
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CONCLUSION

¶26 The superior court’s orders granting the ACN Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment are affirmed.