BLD-302 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 16-1626 

___________ 

DANIEL BRADLEY, 

 Appellant 

v. 

POLICE OFFICER BLAKE KUNTZ; 

CITY OF BETHLEHEM 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 5-14-cv-03221) 

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

June 23, 2016 

Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: July 7, 2016) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

Appellant Daniel Bradley appeals from a district court order granting Appellees’ motion 

for summary judgment. Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial 

question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 

I.O.P. 10.6. 

I. 

Bradley, acting pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being arrested 

and incarcerated for 102 days for a crime he did not commit. In his Amended Complaint, 

Bradley named as defendants the City of Bethlehem and one of its police officers, Blake 

Kuntz.1

 Bradley asserted claims against Kuntz for: (1) illegal seizure in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment; (2) deprivation of liberty and due process in violation of the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) false arrest/imprisonment; and (4) malicious 

prosecution. Additionally, Bradley brought a failure-to-train claim against the City of 

Bethlehem. 

 Bradley’s claims stem from an incident in which Rosemary Johnson directly 

accused Bradley of stealing $150.00 from her while being allowed to stay at her 

residence; Johnson alleged that Bradley was the single person with access to her home 

when the money went missing. Kuntz, who was already familiar with Johnson due to his 

work with Bethlehem’s community policing program, met with Johnson as part of his 

investigation into her claims. Although Kuntz was aware that Johnson suffered from 

mental health issues, he found that she appeared to be very clear, specific, and coherent 
3 

when discussing the facts of the theft. After his meeting with Johnson, Kuntz arrested 

Bradley pursuant to an arrest warrant, and met with Bradley on that same day. At a 

preliminary hearing, at which Johnson testified, an unlawful taking charge was bound 

over for trial while a receiving stolen property charge was dismissed. 

 Sometime after the preliminary hearing, Kuntz received a telephone call from an 

Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) regarding the charges that Bradley faced. The ADA 

explained to Kuntz that “there had been a paper provided by Mr. Bradley or his attorneys, 

documenting that Mr. Bradley had been in a mental health facility or hospital type facility 

on the date of the offense – reported date of the offense.” E.D. Pa. Case No. 14-3221, 

Docket No. 39-2, p. 21. This information had not been disclosed by either Bradley or his 

attorney at the preliminary hearing. Rather, Bradley and Appellees have agreed that the 

first time that Kuntz learned that Bradley was in a mental health facility on the reported 

date of the offense was when he received the ADA’s phone call after the preliminary 

hearing. 

 Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted the 

motion on all claims. Bradley now appeals the District Court’s order. 

 1

 Three other defendants were later voluntarily dismissed. 
4 

II. 

 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of 

orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary. See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 

F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order 

granting summary judgment because Bradley’s appeal presents no substantial question. 

3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

 To prove a malicious prosecution claim advanced under either the Fourth 

Amendment or Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted, 

inter alia, without probable cause and with malice. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 

81–82 (3d Cir. 2007) (Fourth Amendment); Kelley v. Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & 

Helpers, Local Union 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. 1988) (Pennsylvania law). 

Accordingly, in order for his malicious prosecution claims to survive summary judgment, 

Bradley was required to produce evidence that, first, he was prosecuted without probable 

cause; that is, that there was no “reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Maryland v. 

Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). He did 

not do so. The District Court correctly concluded that Kuntz had probable cause to 

believe that Bradley had committed the crime with which he was charged – namely, the 

specific testimony of Johnson in light of his experience with her in the community. 

Second, Bradley did not identify any evidence that Kuntz acted with malice when he 

initiated the criminal proceedings against him. 
5 

 Likewise, the existence of probable cause forecloses Bradley’s false 

arrest/imprisonment claims. “The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false 

arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the 

arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the 

offense.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n arrest warrant issued by a magistrate or 

judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability for false arrest.” Wilson v. 

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead, a plaintiff may prevail “in a § 1983 

action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a 

preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or 

with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a 

falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are 

material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Id. at 786-87 (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

 The District Court properly concluded that Bradley cannot meet this burden. 

Here, Bradley was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant that was obtained by Kuntz. 

Bradley concedes that Kuntz did not have the information about Bradley being in the 

hospital on the day of the theft when he applied for the warrant. Moreover, in his 

deposition, Kuntz testified that when he spoke with Bradley after his arrest, Bradley said 

nothing about his hospital admission. The evidence in the record confirms that Kuntz 

had conducted a good faith investigation in which he had interviewed the victim and 
6 

confirmed that she would have had the money at her home when she alleged that Bradley 

was a guest. Kuntz also determined Johnson was being particularly credible as opposed 

to prior interactions he had with her. Kuntz was not on notice that further investigation 

was necessary. Probable cause is not the equivalent of evidence sufficient to prove 

Bradley’s guilt. United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 2002). The District 

Court correctly concluded that Kuntz did not knowingly and deliberately, or with a 

reckless disregard for the truth, make false statements or omissions that create a 

falsehood in applying for the warrant in this case.2

 Finally, summary judgment was properly granted on Bradley’s claims of 

deprivation of liberty and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As 

an initial matter, Bradley did not respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment as to his 

Fifth Amendment claim and the District Court granted that part of the motion as 

unopposed. This was acceptable. As to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Supreme 

Court has held that “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source 

of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that 

 

2

 Bradley’s false imprisonment claim and illegal seizure claims are grounded in the 

Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures, which also turn on the 

existence of probable cause. See Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 820 (3d 

Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has made it clear that an arrest based on probable cause 

cannot become the source of a claim for false imprisonment. Baker v. McCollan, 443 

U.S. 137, 142 (1979); see also Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d 

Cir. 1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on . . . misuse of the 

criminal process is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but 

whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had 

committed the offense.”) Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on these 
7 

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the 

guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, summary judgment was correctly 

granted on these claims as duplicative of other claims asserted in the Amended 

Complaint. 

 Bradley raises a failure-to-train claim in an attempt to hold the City of Bethlehem 

liable. While this could be an alternative theory of liability, we are not persuaded that 

Bradley has demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary 

judgment. See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to 

train can serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only ‘where the failure to train amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [police] come into 

contact.’”) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). The evidence 

indicates that Bradley’s case is not one where the police demonstrated deliberate 

indifference to the rights of others. Moreover, the District Court aptly indicated that 

establishing a failure-to-train claim under § 1983 is a difficult task because plaintiffs 

“must identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with their 

injuries and must demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be 

said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations 

occurred.” Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145 (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 

1030 (3d Cir. 1991)). The City of Bethlehem was entitled to summary judgment because 

 

claims as well. 
8 

Bradley had not identified a specific training or type of training that the City had failed to 

provide Kuntz that would have prevented Bradley’s alleged injuries. 

III. 

 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question. 

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants 

summary judgment on Bradley’s complaint. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Given 

our disposition of this appeal, we deny the Motion for Appointment of Counsel.