This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0316

In the Matter of the Estate of:

Orville C. Jacobson, Deceased

In the Matter of the Estate of:

Hughie Eugene Keenan, Deceased 

Filed April 25, 2016

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File Nos. 27-PA-PR-14-466/27-PA-PR-06-532

Douglas Keenan, Bloomington, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Jeffrey R. Vesel, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondents Phyllis Jordahl and Richard 

Keenan)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Jesson, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this probate matter, appellant argues that the district court erred by determining 

that a warranty deed is invalid. We affirm. 

FACTS

Appellant Douglas Keenan is the son of decedent Hughie Eugene Keenan (father) 

and decedent Alice Marilyn Keenan (mother). He is also the maternal grandson of 
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decedent Orville Jacobson (grandfather) and the maternal nephew of Phyllis Jordahl (aunt). 

Appellant’s four siblings are Richard Keenan (Richard), Robert Keenan (Robert), Todd 

Keenan (Todd), and Penny Huddleston.1 

Father died testate on October 23, 2001, and grandfather died testate on May 17, 

2002. Father’s estate proceeded to formal probate in 2006. Mother died on April 1, 2013. 

On July 1, 2014, appellant filed a petition for determination of descent of 

grandfather and an amended petition for determination of descent of father.

2

 In the 

petitions, appellant asked the district court to determine that father and grandfather each 

owned a one-quarter interest in residential property located in Anoka County at 22345 

Variolite Street NW in Nowthen (property). These claimed interests were based on an 

unrecorded warranty deed dated October 13, 1993, in which Richard, the registered owner

of the property, purportedly conveyed the property to “[grandfather, mother, father] and 

[Richard], each with an undivided one-quarter interest.” 

Aunt and Richard objected to the petitions, and a referee held a hearing on both 

petitions to determine the validity of the unrecorded 1993 deed. Appellant, who is an 

attorney, appeared pro se. Other witnesses included Robert, Richard, and aunt. Appellant 

also sought to recoup $112,960 that his parents purportedly invested in the property, but 

the referee refused to hear evidence on that subject because it was outside the scope of the 

hearing.

 

1 Todd Keenan and Penny Huddleston did not participate in any probate proceedings.

2 Appellant had also petitioned to be appointed as special administrator for the estates of 

father and grandfather, but the petitions were denied. 
3

Appellant testified that (1) his parents and grandfather knew of the deed’s existence, 

and that the deed was in the possession of his parents for about 20 years, but they did not 

record it because they could not afford to pay delinquent taxes on the property; (2) he 

drafted the deed because his parents had provided funds for the purchase of the land, 

materials for the house that was built on the land, and “several loans after that”; and (3) as 

a favor to Richard, he discussed the deed with the attorney who represented Richard’s exwife at the time of their divorce. 

Robert testified that (1) after mother died in 2013, Richard and Todd went to 

mother’s home and threw out 87 bags of paperwork with the intention of destroying the 

1993 deed, but Robert found the deed in the safe; and (2) Richard wanted to obtain a quitclaim deed to the property from mother in 2011, but she was suffering from dementia by 

that time and could not provide a legible signature. On cross examination, Robert admitted

that he had served a five-year prison sentence for manufacture of a controlled substance 

and that his license to practice medicine was revoked. 

Richard testified that (1) he built the house on the property in 1990 and he has lived 

in the house since 1991; (2) after he refused to sign the 1993 deed, he was tricked into 

signing it by appellant, who told him to sign what he thought was another sheet of paper 

so that the “house will go back to [mother] and [father] if something happens to you;” and 

(3) he was not aware of the significance of what he was signing and trusted appellant

because “he was my brother, and I believed he was my attorney.” Richard denied cleaning 

out his mother’s house after her death. 
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Aunt testified that (1) grandfather gave Richard $35,000 at the time of his divorce 

to “save his property”; (2) both grandfather and mother tithed to Richard for his ministry 

work, and the money they gave Richard was given “with no strings attached”; (3) the 

$35,000 was paid to enable Richard to buy out his ex-wife’s interest in the Anoka County 

property at the time of their divorce; and (4) the source of this money was funds that were 

either given to Richard or tithed to his ministry for that purpose. 

In an order denying the petitions for determination of descent, the referee found that 

(1) Richard received fee title as the sole owner of the property in 1997 when he agreed to 

pay his ex-wife $35,000 for her interest in the property; (2) “[t]he testimony of all three 

Keenan brothers, [appellant], Robert, and Richard, is less than credible”; (3) aunt was the 

only credible witness; (4) father and mother were unaware of the 1993 deed; (5) Richard 

did not intend to sign the deed or convey his property to others; and (6) the deed was not 

delivered to the purported grantees. 

The referee declared the 1993 deed void and denied the petitions for determination 

of descent. The referee ruled that the 1993 deed was invalid because it had not been 

delivered and because Richard did not intend to sign it or to transfer title to the purported 

grantees. The district court signed the order.3 

Appellant brought a pro se appeal to this court. No brief was filed on behalf of any 

respondent, and by order of this court, the appeal was directed to proceed on the merits. 

 

3 Robbins v. Hobart, 133 Minn. 49, 51, 157 N.W. 908, 909 (1916) (noting that in property 

matters the district court may approve and confirm a referee’s decision), Minn. Stat. 

§ 484.70, subd. 7(c) (2014) (stating that referee’s findings and order became the district 

court’s findings and order when confirmed by a judge).
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D E C I S I O N

Appellant appears to assert that the district court erred in concluding that the 1993 

deed is invalid. He argues that the deed is based on a contract between his parents and 

Richard, the deed became valid when Richard signed it, and the deed was “presumed to 

have been delivered.” We reject these arguments. 

First, “[i]t is . . . elementary that delivery of a deed is essential to transfer of title.” 

Slawik v. Loseth, 207 Minn. 137, 139, 290 N.W. 228, 229 (1940). There was conflicting 

testimony about whether the deed was delivered to the grantees, and the referee found that 

the deed was not delivered. See In re Butler, 868 N.W.2d 243, 249-50 (Minn. 2015) 

(according deference to referee’s findings that are based on credibility determinations). 

Appellant’s failure to prove that the deed was delivered to the grantees is fatal to his claim.

Second, for delivery to be valid, Richard must have intended to convey title to the 

property. See Exsted v. Exsted, 202 Minn. 521, 524-25, 279 N.W. 554, 557 (1938) 

(requiring for valid delivery of deed “an intent to convey title thereby”). Richard testified 

that he signed his name to a document for a different purpose and denied that he intended

to transfer his interest in the property by signing the document. Appellant contested this 

testimony, but the referee found in favor of Richard, and this court defers to findings based 

on credibility determinations. See Butler, 868 N.W.2d at 249-50; Hasnudeen v. Onan 

Corp., 552 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1996) (stating that appellate courts “accord[] great 

deference to a [district] court’s findings of fact because it has the advantage of hearing the 

testimony, assessing relative credibility of witnesses and acquiring a thorough 

understanding of the circumstances unique to the matter before it”). The referee’s findings 
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of fact are not clearly erroneous. See Drews v. Fed Nat’l Ass’n, 850 N.W.2d 738, 741 

(Minn. 2014) (stating that “appellate courts apply the facts as found by the district court

unless those factual findings are clearly erroneous”); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. 

Appellant next argues that the referee abused his discretion by issuing a ruling at 

the beginning of the hearing to exclude evidence that would establish the factual 

underpinnings for the transfer of interests in the property from Richard to the purported 

grantees. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are subject to an abuse-of-discretion 

standard of review. See Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. App. 2009) (“A 

district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will only be reversed if the court 

abused its discretion and the abuse of discretion prejudiced the objecting party.”). 

It is unclear from the record exactly what evidence appellant refers to in making this 

claim. Before the hearing, appellant described the issue as follows: 

[M]y grandfather, my father and my mother put in $112,960 

investment in that property and (indiscernible) from the person 

who originally bought it and then two years after that and then 

to pay off his ex-wife for – we find $112,960 that I can verify 

that was invested in that property, and we want the money 

back.

Even if this evidence had been fully credited by the referee, it does not alter the 

determination that the 1993 deed is invalid. 

Affirmed.