IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CLARISSE VASQUEZ, 3:14-CV-01991-BR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner, Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

GEORGE J. WALL

1336 E. Burnside Street, Suite 130

Portland, OR 97214

(503) 236-0028

Attorney for Plaintiff

BILLY J. WILLIAMS

Acting United States Attorney

JANICE E. HEBERT

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600

Portland, OR 97204-2902

(503) 727-1011

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Case 3:14-cv-01991-BR Document 19 Filed 11/16/15 Page 1 of 20
GERALD J. HILL 

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104-7075

(206) 615-2531

Attorneys for Defendant

BROWN, Judge.

Plaintiff Clarisse Vasquez seeks judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications for 

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI and for

Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social

Security Act. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

Commissioner's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Following a review of the record, the Court REVERSES the

decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter for the

calculation and payment of benefits pursuant to Sentence Four, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). 

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and

SSI on November 4, 2010, and January 26, 2011, and alleged a

disability onset date of November 2, 2010. Tr. 194-209.1 The

1

 Citations to the official transcript of record filed by

the Commissioner on April 15, 2015, are referred to as "Tr."

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applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. An

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing on February 5,

2013. Tr. 51-77. At the hearing Plaintiff was represented by an

attorney. Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified.

The ALJ issued a decision on March 15, 2013, in which he

found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 34-43. That decision became

the final decision of the Commissioner on October 14, 2014, when

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. 

Tr. 1-5. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this

Court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision that

Plaintiff was not disabled from November 2, 2010, to November 30,

2013. On April 16, 2015, Plaintiff was found disabled from

January 5, 2015, to the present on a subsequent application. 

Accordingly, in this action Plaintiff challenges the

Commissioner’s finding that she was not disabled for the closed

period of November 2, 2010, through November 30, 2013.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in February 1960 and was 50 years old on

her alleged onset date. She completed two years of college and

has past relevant work as a care-giver and as an assembler. 

Tr. 42. 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to “bipolar, manic

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depressive, arthritis, shoulder pain, diabetes, neuropathy in

both feet, infections on legs and toes.” Tr. 224. 

STANDARDS

The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to

establish disability. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th

Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her

inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ must develop the record when there is

ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence. McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d

881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d

453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision

if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is

“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11

(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690

(9th Cir. 2009)). It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]

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but less than a preponderance. Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 690). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving

ambiguities. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it

supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Ryan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). Even

when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings

if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the

record. Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

Commissioner. Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006). 

DISABILITY EVALUATION

At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a0(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I). See

also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.

2011).

At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant does not have any medically severe

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impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). See also Keyser, 648

F.3d at 724.

At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner

determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the

listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). See also Keyser, 648

F.3d at 724. The criteria for the listed impairments, known as

Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,

appendix 1 (Listed Impairments). 

If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must

assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC). The

claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related

physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a

regular and continuing basis despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). See also Social Security Ruling

(SSR) 96-8p. “A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a

day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule." SSR 96-8p,

at *1. In other words, the Social Security Act does not require

complete incapacity to be disabled. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair

v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the

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Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform

work she has done in the past. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.

If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine

whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in

the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25. Here the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of

jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. 

Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2010). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the

testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,

subpart P, appendix 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),

416.920(g)(1).

ALJ'S FINDINGS

At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since her November 2, 2010, onset

date. Tr. 36.

At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has severe impairments

of diabetes, neuropathy, and bipolar disorder. Id.

At Step Three the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s impairments did

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not equal in severity a listed impairment and found Plaintiff

retained the RFC to perform light work with simple repetitive

tasks in a nonpublic work environment with minimal interaction

with coworkers and supervisors. Tr. 38.

At Step Four the ALJ found Plaintiff could not return to her

past relevant work as a care giver or assembler. Tr. 42.

At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of

performing other work, including small-parts assembler and

garment-folder. Tr. 43. 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by (1) finding Plaintiff’s

testimony was less than fully credible; (2) failing to develop

the record regarding her hands; and (3) failing to consider her

obesity and its effect on her ability to stand or walk. In

addition, Plaintiff contends the Appeals Council erred in finding

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

I. The ALJ erred when he found Plaintiff's testimony less than

fully credible.

 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving

ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). See also Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir.

2008). The ALJ's findings, however, must be supported by

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specific, cogent reasons. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722

(9th Cir. 1998). See also Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,

1202 (9th Cir. 2001). Unless there is affirmative evidence that

shows the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner's reason for

rejecting the claimant's testimony must be "clear and

convincing." Id. The ALJ must identify the testimony that is

not credible and the evidence that undermines the claimant's

complaints. Id. The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be

substantial. Id. at 724. See also Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208. 

General findings (e.g., "record in general" indicates

improvement) are an insufficient basis to support an adverse

credibility determination. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. See also

Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208. The ALJ must make a credibility

determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the

court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the

claimant's testimony. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th

Cir. 2002).

When deciding whether to accept a claimant's subjective

symptom testimony, "an ALJ must perform two stages of analysis: 

the Cotton analysis and an analysis of the credibility of the

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms." 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under the Cotton test, a claimant who alleges

disability based on subjective symptoms "must 

produce objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be 

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expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged." Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 344 (quoting 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988)); Cotton, 799 

F.2d at 1407-08. The Cotton test imposes only 

two requirements on the claimant: (l) she must 

produce objective medical evidence of an 

impairment or impairments; and (2) she must 

show that the impairment or combination of 

impairments could reasonably be expected to

(not that it did in fact) produce some degree 

of symptom. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. See also Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. The Medical Evidence

Plaintiff testified she was able to stand for three-to-five

minutes and that she walked best with a walker. Tr. 63. She

stated she experienced pain from bilateral neuropathy and chronic

sores on her feet. Id. Plaintiff testified she “trip[s] a lot”

from the neuropathy. Tr. 60.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements as to the severity of

her impairments less than fully credible and found Plaintiff

could stand and walk for up to six hours in an eight-hour

workday. Tr. 41. The ALJ noted "physical examination" findings

that did not substantiate Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. 

Tr. 39-41. “Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the

sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that

the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.” Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ noted the March 2011 opinion of Phong T. Dao, D.O.,

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examining physician. Tr. 330-36. Dr. Dao found Plaintiff had

“[g]ood tone bilaterally, with good active motion” and her

strength was normal at “5/5 in all extremities.” Tr. 334. 

Dr. Dao also noted Plaintiff had decreased sensation to light

touch on her feet and toes, but her gait was “within normal

limits” and she “ambulated without any limping and without any

assistive device.” Id. Dr. Dao found Plaintiff could stand or

walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday. 

Plaintiff, however, points to the objective medical evidence

that she was diagnosed as obese and the October 2011 examination

by John Edward Broom, M.D., who found “bilateral foot neuropathy

up to mid shin, wobbly gait.” Tr. 633. Plaintiff also cites the

March 28, 2011, examination in which Dr. Dao found (based on a xray) degenerative right-knee joint disease and moderate

osteoarthritis in the right knee. Tr. 335. Plaintiff also notes

repeated evidence of chronic open sores on her legs and feet. 

See examining provider Lisa Davenport, P.A.-C.(foot ulcers,

cellulitis of shins), Tr. 313; P.A. Davenport (cellulitis), 

Tr. 322; examining physician Saifullah Nizamani, M.D. (large

wounds on both legs), Tr. 420; examining provider Matya Cooksey,

F.N.P. (leg wounds), Tr. 532; examining physician Jonathan Baker,

M.D. (foot ulcers, infectious enteritis), Tr. 538; examining

provider Renaldo Barrios, N.P. (open sores on both feet, avoid

walking long distances), Tr. 543; Nurse Barrios (markedly

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decreased sensation to plantar surfaces of toes), Tr. 540. 

On this record the Court concludes Dr. Dao’s opinion that

Plaintiff can stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour day

is not a legally sufficient reason for finding Plaintiff’s

testimony less than fully credible in light of substantial

medical evidence in the record that contradicts Dr. Dao’s

opinion. In addition, Plaintiff’s testimony that she trips a lot

is verified by the fact that she fell the day after the hearing

and broke her ankle. Tr. 655.

B. Failure to Take Pain Medication

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “use of medications” does not

“suggest” her symptom testimony is true because she does not take

narcotic pain-killers. Plaintiff contends this reasoning fails

because she is limited to sedentary work and her physical pain is

caused by standing and walking. Although Plaintiff does not take

narcotic pain-killers, the record indicates Plaintiff was

prescribed the non-opioid pain medication Neurontin. Tr. 485,

498, 507. 

On this record the Court concludes the fact that Plaintiff

did not take stronger pain medication is not a legally sufficient

reason for the ALJ to find Plaintiff’s testimony was less than

fully credible.

C. Reason to Stop Working 

The ALJ noted Plaintiff testified that she lost her job

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because she was unable to concentrate, but she reported to

examining psychiatrist Gregory Nicholson, M.D., that she was

terminated from her last job for playing on the computer rather

than because of her medical impairments. Tr. 40, 343. 

Although an ALJ may consider whether a claimant’s separation

from work is unrelated to an alleged disabling condition 

(Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008)), the

Court concludes on this record that the reason for losing her

last job is not a legally sufficient reason for finding

Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible as a whole. 

D. Activities of Daily Living

The ALJ found the evidence of Plaintiff’s daily activities

suggested a greater level of functioning than her alleged

limitations. Tr. 40, 232-35. 

“While a claimant need not vegetate in a dark room in order

to be eligible for benefits, the ALJ may discredit a claimant’s

testimony when the claimant reports participation in everyday

activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work

setting.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112-13 (citations and internal

punctuation omitted). Evidence of a claimant’s activities that

conflict with a claimant’s alleged symptoms supports an adverse

credibility determination, regardless of whether the activities

demonstrate that the claimant can work. Molina, 674 F.3d at

1113.

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Plaintiff reported that she walked her dog, fed and watered

her cat, prepared meals on a daily basis, cleaned, washed

laundry, drove a car, shopped for groceries and clothes, and went

out daily. The only identified activity clearly inconsistent

with Plaintiff’s testimony that she can only stand for three-tofive minutes is shopping.

In summary, on this record the ALJ’s reasons for finding

Plaintiff’s testimony not credible are not clear and convincing,

and the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is less than fully

credible is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

II. The ALJ failed to develop the record.

Plaintiff broke her wrist in June 2012. Tr. 536. The

surgical repair failed, and she had a second surgery on 

August 21, 2012. Tr. 579, 608-10. On September 16, 2012,

Plaintiff's physicians described her as “doing well” and

recommended conservative treatment with range-of-motion exercises

“as tolerated.” Tr. 610. Plaintiff did not seek further care

for her left wrist. 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she would have

“trouble assembling parts” because of her wrist surgery and had

been told she would have “full arthritis” within a year or so. 

Tr. 75-76.

The Commissioner bears the burden of developing the record. 

DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). See also

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Mayes, 276 F.3d at 459. The duty to develop the record is

triggered when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is

inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Id.

The ALJ is required to seek additional evidence if the evidence

already in the record favors the claimant. Lewis v. Apfel, 236

F.3d 503, 514-15 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the capacity to work as a

small-parts assembler (DOT No. 929.587-010) and garment-folder

(DOT No. 789.687-066). The Dictionary of Occupational Titles

defines No. 929.587-010 as Nut-and-Bolt Assembler:

Couples and packages nuts and bolts. Screws

nut on bolt by hand and holds nut in chuck 

of nut-turning machine that spins and tightens

nut on bolt. Weighs or counts specified 

amounts of nuts and bolts, and records number

of units on production form. Pushes box or

carton along bench or onto conveyor. May tie

long bolts into bundles, using wire. May feed

nuts and bolts into hopper of machine that 

automatically couples and packages nuts and 

bolts. 

Garment Folder is defined as:

Folds garments for bagging or boxing, following

guide marks on table or using folding board 

(cardboard or metal form). Secures folds with

metal clips. May insert tissue paper between

folds. May make final inspection of garment.

May pack garments in bags and boxes {Packager, 

Hand (any industry)]. May be designated 

according to garment folded as Shirt Folder

(Garment; knitting).

Plaintiff contends the jobs identified by the ALJ require

repetitive use of the hands, and the failed surgical repair of

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her hand is objective medical evidence that she has limitations

in the use of her hand. Plaintiff also testified she would have

trouble folding garments due to shoulder pain arising from

shoulder surgery seven years ago. Tr. 75. The only evidence in

the record regarding Plaintiff's wrist, hand, or shoulder

limitations is her testimony, and that evidence favors Plaintiff.

The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s history of wrist surgeries, but he

concluded the “record does not indicate this condition would

preclude the claimant’s ability to work and the undersigned

concludes it is nonsevere.” Tr. 40-41. 

On this record the ALJ erred by failing to develop the

record as to any limitations Plaintiff may have with her hand,

wrist, or shoulder.

III. Consideration of Plaintiff’s Obesity in Evaluating her RFC

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to consider her

obesity as a severe impairment at Step Two and failing to account

for it in his evaluation of her RFC. 

“[T]he step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to

dispose of groundless claims.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Because

the ALJ proceeded beyond Step Two, the ALJ’s failure to mention

obesity at Step Two is harmless error. See Molina, 674 F.3d at

1115 (citing Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162).

SSR 02-01p, “Evaluation of Obesity,” was enacted to ensure

that obesity is fairly evaluated even though it is no longer a

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listed impairment. SSR 02-01p provides the Commissioner must

consider the effects of obesity at every step of the evaluation. 

Plaintiff is 5'6" tall and weighed between 195 and 210

pounds during the relevant period. She was diagnosed as obese

and told that weight loss would help with her knee pain. 

Tr. 530, 535, 547. Plaintiff, nevertheless, contends her obesity

contributed to her limitations of standing and walking and should

have been considered in the evaluation of her RFC.

The ALJ did not mention Plaintiff’s obesity, and, therefore,

the record does not reflect the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

obesity as a factor when he evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC. Tr. 34-

43. 

The Commissioner, nevertheless, argues the ALJ reasonably

accommodated Plaintiff’s conditions, including obesity, by

limiting her to light level work. As noted, however, there is

not any evidence in the record that the ALJ considered

Plaintiff’s obesity when he evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC. 

On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ erred

when he did not indicate in the record that he considered

Plaintiff’s obesity when he evaluated her RFC. 

IV. The Appeals Council did not err when it deemed Plaintiff's

new evidence to be irrelevant to the ALJ's March 15, 2013,

decision.

Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council new evidence

dated September 24, 2013, that she underwent amputation of her

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right leg below the knee as a result of her broken ankle. Tr. 2,

7. The Appeals Council found this new evidence occurred after

the ALJ’s March 15, 2013 decision, and, therefore, did not affect

the ALJ's decision regarding whether Plaintiff was disabled on or

before March 15, 2013. Tr. 2.

Plaintiff, however, argues this evidence demonstrates why

she was limited to sedentary work throughout the relevant period.

According to Plaintiff, her lower legs and feet were numb so she

was prone to fall, and her injuries were prone to infection

because she had diabetes with neuropathy. Plaintiff contends

such a person cannot stand or walk in the workplace for six hours

a day, five days a week. 

Defendant, in turn, argues the new evidence occurred after

the ALJ’s March 15, 2013, decision and, therefore, did not affect

the ALJ's decision as to whether Plaintiff was disabled on or

before March 15, 2013. 

On this record the Court concludes the Appeals Council did

not err when it found the evidence of Plaintiff’s subsequent

amputation of her leg was not relevant to the period prior to

March 15, 2013.

REMAND

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or

for immediate payment of benefits generally turns on the likely

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utility of further proceedings. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,

1179 (9th Cir. 2000). When "the record has been fully developed

and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award

of benefits." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir.

2004). 

The decision whether to remand this case for further

proceedings or for the payment of benefits is a decision within

the discretion of the court. Harman, 211 F.3d 1178.

The Ninth Circuit has established a three-part test "for

determining when evidence should be credited and an immediate

award of benefits directed." Id. The Court should grant an

immediate award of benefits when:

(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting . . .

evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues

that must be resolved before a determination

of disability can be made, and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled were

such evidence credited.

Id. The second and third prongs of the test often merge into a

single question: Whether the ALJ would have to award benefits if

the case were remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1178 n.2.

The Court has determined the ALJ erred when he found

Plaintiff’s testimony less than fully credible; when he failed to

develop the record regarding any functional limitations of

Plaintiff’s hand, wrist, and shoulder; and when he failed to

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consider Plaintiff’s obesity. If credited, Plaintiff’s testimony

establishes Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work and because

she was over age 50 without transferable skills, she, therefore,

was disabled according to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines Rule

201.00. Rule 201.00, 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.2,

Medical-Vocational Guidelines. Thus, the Court concludes

Plaintiff was disabled from November 2, 2010, through 

November 30,2013, based on this medical record and that no useful

purpose would be served by a remand of this matter for further

proceedings. See Harman, 211 F.3d at 117.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court REVERSES the decision of the

Commissioner and REMANDS this matter to the Commissioner pursuant

to Sentence Four, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for the immediate

calculation and payment of benefits to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 16th day of November, 2015.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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