Filed 5/14/14 In re Jason A. CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re JASON A., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B251715 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK99578) 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

CEDRIC A., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Rudolph A. 

Diaz, Judge. Reversed. 

 Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, 

Jeanette Cauble, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

___________________________________ 
2

 Cedric A. (Father) appeals from the dispositional order following the juvenile 

court’s order finding jurisdiction over his three sons under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j) on the ground that Father knew or should 

have known that the children’s mother was engaging in the “inappropriate physical 

discipline” of the children and that he failed to protect them. We reverse the orders as to 

Father. (The children’s mother is not a party to this appeal.) 

 “Serious physical harm” is a ground for dependency jurisdiction under the 

circumstances defined in subdivisions (a), (b) and (j) of Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300. Here, however, the court did not find that Father failed to protect the 

children from “serious physical harm.” On the contrary, the court struck the allegations 

of “serious physical harm” from the petition and found instead that Mother’s slapping 

one child on his face leaving a mark and spanking two of the children with her hand and a 

belt constituted “inappropriate physical discipline.” 

 The court’s error was prejudicial. “Inappropriate physical discipline” is not 

synonymous with “serious physical harm.” The latter connotes physical abuse, not a 

personal judgment about what is appropriate. Furthermore, we cannot say based on the 

record before us that Mother’s conduct toward the children constituted “serious physical 

harm” when the court specifically found as a factual matter it did not and this finding is 

supported by the DCFS case worker who testified that not every spanking with a belt 

constitutes abuse and conceded that she didn’t know when it does and when it doesn’t. 
3

DISPOSITION 

 The jurisdictional and dispositional orders, insofar as they are based on Father’s 

conduct, are reversed.1

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J. 

We concur: 

 CHANEY, J. 

 MILLER, J.

 

1

 We take judicial notice that while this appeal was pending the court ordered Father 

and Mother have joint physical custody of Caleb and Micah and terminated jurisdiction 

over Jason. These orders do not moot Father’s appeal because the court’s jurisdictional 

findings as to him could affect him in future dependency or other proceedings. (In re 

J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1432.) 



 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.