1

0 8

- 3 4 8 5

- c r ( L) U ni t ed St at es v. R i ga s UN ITED STA TES CO URT OF AP P EALS F OR TH E S ECO N D CI RCU IT Aug us t T er m 2 008 (A rgue d: M ay 5, 200 9 Dec id ed: Oct ob er 5, 2 009 ) Docket Nos. 08-3485 -cr (L) , 08-3500-cr (CON), 08-3592-cr (CON), 08-3597-cr (CON) U NI T ED S TATES O F A M ERI CA ,

Appellee , -v .- J OHN J. RI G AS and T I MO T HY J. RI GAS ,

Defenda nts-App ellants
. B ef or e: F EI NBERG , W I NT ER , and C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ges . Fo llo win g r es ent enc in g onr ema ndfr om a pr evi ou s app eal t o thi s Cou r t, see United States v. Rig as , 49 0 F .3d208 (2 d Ci r . 20 07) , d ef end ant s -a pp ell ant s challen ge thr ee d ecis io ns of th e Unit ed St ate s Di s tr

ict Cou r t f or th e So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Le on ar d B . Sa nd , Judge

): (1 ) a J un e 24 , 2008 resentencing order (in whic h the Distr ict Court supplied two rulings, one based on “limited”
r es ent enc in g, an d analt er nat ive r ul in g ap plyin g de novo r es ent enc ing) ; ( 2) a No vem ber

20, 200 7 op inio n an d o r der

denyin g de fe nd ant s ’ m ot

io n f or a new tr ial ; an d ( 3) a J anu ary 15 , 20 08
mem or and um andor der

denyin g de fe nd ant s ’ m ot

io n t o co mp el dis cov ery. We h ol d that th e Di s tr ict C ou rt w a s re qu ire d to re sen te nc e d ef en da nts de novo fol lo wi ng

the re ve rsa l o f a po rti on of d ef en da nts’
con vic ti on s by an other

pan el o f thi s Cou r t. We f ur th er ho ld—b as ed o n the D is tr ict Cou r t’ s
a lt er na tive rul in g, in wh ic h th e C ou rt re sen te nc ed de fe nd a nts de novo —that the new sentenc es were reasonable. Fina lly, w e detec t no error in the Distr

ict Court’s denials of defendants’ motions f or a
new tr ial andfo r com pelleddi s cov ery.2

Affirmed. S T EP HE N R. M C A L L I S T ER , Thomps on Ra msdell & Qualseth, P. A., La wr enc e, K S (

Neal K . Katy al, M or

ganLe gal Consulting, Wa shington, D.C., and Lawrence G. M cMich ael, Dilwo r thPa xs on , L LP , P hi lad elp hi a, P A, on the brief ), for Defendants-Ap

pellan ts . W I L L I A M F. J OHN S ON , As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney (Michael J. Garcia , United States Attorney for the So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k, a ndKather

in e P ol k Faill a, As s is tan t U ni te d S tat es At to r ney , on the brief ), United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern Di s tr ict of New Yor k, N ew Yo r k, N Y for Appellee
. Do ugl as A. B er man , St eph ano s B ib as , M ar c Mill er , Mich ael O’ Hear , M ar k O s ler , Sa nd r a Gu er r a T ho mp s on , Amicus C uriae in su pport of Defendan ts-Appella nts. J OS É A. C AB R ANES , Circuit Jud ge : We co ns id er

s ever al ch all eng es to th e t r ial ands ent enc ing of

J oh n J . Rig as , the f

or mer CEO of Ade lp hi a Com mu ni cat

io ns Corp. (“ Ade lp hi a”) , an d his s onT im othy J . Rig as , Ad elp hi a’s fo r mer CFO (t oge th er , the “ Rigas es ”) , in clu di ng the Rigas es ’ cl aim s th at thei r s ent enc es wer e pr oce du r ally ands ub s tan ti

vely un r eas on abl e. BAC KGROUND T he his to ry of

mas s ive corpo r ate fr audth at f or ms th e bac kgr ou ndof

th es e pr oce edi ngs has been set forth exhaustively in Uni te d St ate s v . Rig as , 49 0 F .3d208 , 21 2- 19 (

2d Cir . 20 07) . We s up ply her e on ly a b r

ief s um mar y of th e r elev ant

pr oce du r al his to r

y. Trial and Sent encing In September 2002, the R

igases were indic ted—along with Michael R igas, James Br own, and Michael Mulca hey, w ho were a lso executive s at Adelphia —on multiple counts of s ecurities fraud, wir e f r aud , b ank

fr aud , an d cr

im in al co ns pi r acy. I n J un e 20 04, fo llo win g a t r ial inth e Unit ed S tat es Di s tr ict Cou r t f or th e So uther n D is tr

ict of New Yor k ( Le on ar d B . Sa nd , Judge

), a jury convic ted the Rigas es of con s pi r acy, ban k f

r aud , an d s ecu r

it ies fr audbu t ac quit te d them of wir e f r aud . Mich ael3

Rigas was acqu

it te d o f c on s pi r acy an d wi r e f r aud , wi thth e ju ry r emainin g de adl ock ed o n the o th er counts; he later plea ded guilty to a charge of making a fal se entry in the books and records of Ad el ph ia in vi ol a ti on of 4 7 U .S .C . § 22 0( e) . Bro wn pl ea de d g ui lty p rio r to tri a l a nd te sti fie d a s a gov er nm ent

witnes s . M ul cahe y was acqu it te d o f all c har

ges . See Rig

as , 49 0 F .3dat 2 19. For each of the Rig ases, the initial Presentence Investigation R eports ( “PSR”), prepa red by th e Unit ed S tat es Pr ob ati onOf fi ce ( “P r ob ati onOf

fi ce”) , cal cul ate d, un der

th e Unit ed S tat es Sen te nci ng G ui del

in es (“ Guid eli nes ”) , a b as e of fe ns e lev el o f s ix a ndr eco mm end ed m ul ti pl e
s ent enc in g en han cem ent s : ( 1) tw ent y- s ix l evel s bec aus e the l os s exce ede d $1 00 mill io n; (2) f ou r lev els bec aus e t he o ff

ens e in vo lve d m or e t hanfi ft

y vi ct im s ; ( 3) tw o l evel s bec aus e the o ff ens e in vo lve d sophis ticated me ans; (4) two levels beca use defendants derived more than $1 million i n gross receipts from f inanci al institutions as a result of their of fenses; (5) two leve ls because defenda nts abused the pu bl ic tr us t; and(6 ) f

ou r lev els bec aus e app ell ant s wer e lea der s of cr im in al act ivi ty th at i nv ol ve f ive
or mor e participa nts. B ased on these cal culations, the PSRs concl uded that the total offense level for each of th e Rig as es was 46, th eir

Cr im in al H is to ry Cat ego ry was I , an d the r es ul ti ng s ent enc in g r ang e under the Guidelines wa s life impris onment. Howeve r, the Pr obation Office recommende d a term of t en ye a rs’ i mp riso nm en t a nd fiv e y ea rs’ su pe rvi sed re le a se f or Jo hn R ig a s, a nd tw en ty

ye a rs’ im pr is on men t an d f

ive year s ’ s up er

vis ed r elea s e f

or T im othy Rigas . At a s ent enc in g he ar

in g onJ un e 20 , 20 04, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t an no un cedth at i t w ould
con s id er th e Gu id eli nes andth e f

act or s in18 U .S. C. § 3 553 (a) , an d s tat ed that , init s vie w, the P SR calc ul ati on s wer e accu r ate . Af te r hear in g argum ent

fr om cou ns el, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t i mp os ed
s ent enc es th at w er e mo r e s ever e t hanth os e r eco mm end ed i n the P SR, b ut whi ch n on ethel es s fe ll significantly be low the recommende d Guidelines ranges of life imprisonment. Specifical ly, the Di s tr ict Cou r t s ent enc ed J oh n Ri gas pr in cip ally t o anaggr egat e t er m o f f if te en y ear s ’ im pr

is on men t. The C ou rt d iv

id ed hi s sen te nc e a s fol lo ws:4

• 15 yea rs on eac h of two counts of bank fraud, the sentence s to run concurrently with

eac h other;

• 5 yea rs on one count of conspiracy a nd 10 yea rs on one count of securities fr aud, the sentences to run consecutively to ea ch other and conc urrently with the bank fraud sentence; a nd

• 10 y ear s onon e co un t o f s ecu r it ies fr aud , the s ent enc es to r uncon cur r ent ly wi theach oth era nd the oth ersen te nc es. The Di stri ctC ou rt se nte nc ed Tim oth y R ig a s pri nc ip a ll y t o a n a gg re ga te te rm o f tw en ty ye a rs’ im pr is on men t, acco r di ng t o the f ollo win g cr

it er ia:

• 20 yea rs on eac h of two counts of bank fraud, the sentence s to run concurrently with

eac h other;

• 5 yea rs on one count of conspiracy, 10 yea rs on one count of securities fr aud, a nd 5 year s onano th er

cou nt of con s pi r acy, th e s ent enc es to r uncon s ecu ti vely t o eac h other and concurrently with the ba nk fraud sentence; and

• 10 yea rs on eac h of the other s ecurities fraud counts, the s entence s to run
co nc urre ntl y wit h e a ch oth era nd the oth ersen te nc es. I n ad di ti on , the Rigas fa mily an d the g ov er nm ent r each ed a s et tl eme nt

of other mat te r s , u nd er

whi ch th e Rig as es fo r fe it ed o ver

$1 b ill io n i n as s et s to Ade lp hi a. T he l iqui dat ed v alu e of

th es e as s et s was $715 million. Appeal and Resentencing The Riga ses appealed the ir convictions, and on May 24 , 2007, a nother panel of our Court af fi r medth e co nv

ict io ns onall

cou nt s exce pt

on e co un t o f b ank

fr aud—“Co un t 2 3”— fo r

whi ch i t fo un d i ns uf

fi cien t e vid enc e. Se e Ri

gas, 49 0 F .3dat 2 36, 239 . H owe ver , the p anel con clu dedth at th er e was s uf

fi cien t e vid enc e t o s up po r t a r elat ed c ou nt of ban k f r aud —“Co un t 2 2.” Id

. at 2 35- 36. T he p anel r ema nd ed the c aus e f

or r es ent enc in g. Id

. at 2 39.5

No new PSR w as prepared for r esentencing, but at the Distr ict Court’s request, the Probation Of fi ce in fo r medth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t b y let te r

th at the ap pr op r

iat e s ent enc e un der

th e Gu id eli nes was
s till l if e im pr is on men t b ecau s e t he “ aggr egat e of th e s tatut or

y ma xim um te r ms of

th e [r emainin g] counts of conviction” wa s 185 years, reduced from 215 yea rs . Speci al App. 17. The Distr ict Court conducted a resentencing hea ring on May 22, 2008 and issued a written opinion and order on June 24 , 2 00 8. The Di stri ctC ou rt h el d th a t i t w a s no t re qu ire d to re sen te nc e d ef en da nts de novo be ca use Cou nt 23 w as a s mal

l p ar t o f the o ver all

con vic ti onandr an co ncu r r ent ly wi thCou nt

22, whi ch thi s Cou r t u ph eld . Acc or di ngl y, the D is tr

ict Cou r t c on clu dedth at the r ever s al was aki n t o a “ s ent enc in g”
er r or r ath er th an a “ con

vic ti on ” er r or , an d that

on ly a “ lim it ed” r es ent enc in g was r equ ir ed. Sp ecial App. 18-19. The District Court express ly rejec ted the Rig ases’ argument that under United Sta tes v. Quin tieri , 30 6 F .3d121 7 (

2d Cir . 20 02) , r es ent enc in g ha d t o b e de novo bec aus e the r ever s al was bas ed
ona “co nv

ict io n” e r r or , n ot

a “s ent enc in g” err or , an d ch ar act er izedthis di s ti nct

io n as a “m ech ani cal”
te s t. Id
. Nevertheless, the Distr

ict Court conclude d in an a lternative holding that even unde r de novo

or “holistic” resentencing, the re was “no basis for a reduction of [a] sentence which is broader than the
r elat ive ly m in or

adj us tm ent

occ as io nedby the r ever s al o f Co un t 2 3. I nd eed , . . . the s ent enc e previously imposed was fully justified under all of the circumstances.” Spec ial A pp. 23. In reaching this con clu s io n, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t ad dr es s ed an d r ejec te d the Rigas es ’ ch all eng es to th e t wen ty -s ix level sentencing enha ncement for loss in exce ss of $100 million. The C ourt also obs erved that the Rigas es “m ade no

clai m that the reversal of [the conviction on] Count 23 . . . [affects] the strength or subs tance of the c onvictions on the 17 other counts as to which the Court of Appeals noted there was ample evidenc e.” Spe cial App. 23-24. Indeed, the Distr ict Court conclude d that the reversal on C ou nt 2 3 a lt er ed ne it he r th e a pp li ca bl e G ui de li ne s ra ng e, no r “t he serio usn ess o f th e[ ir]
. . . c rim es,
no r th e s uf fe r in g wh ichth eir

con du ct in fl ict ed o n s o m any p eop le. ” Sp ecial Ap p. 24. Des pi te ob s er

vin g that th er e was “no bas is fo r

a r edu ct io n” i n the Rigas es ’ s ent enc es , Sp ecial6

App . 23 , the D is tr

ict Cou r t i n f

act app lie d a “ mi ni mal

adj us tm ent ,” r edu cin g eachs ent enc e by th r ee year s , t o 1 2 an d 1 7 yea r s fo r J oh n an d Tim othy Rigas , r es pec ti vely. Sp ecial Ap p. 24. Mot io n f or a N ew T r ia l On July 5, 2007—prior to res entencing —defendants filed a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rul e 33 of

th e F ede r al Rules of

Cr im in al P r oce du r e onth e bas is of all eged“ne wly dis cov er ed evi den ce” o f p er ju r

y by th eir fo r mer co- def end ant J ame s B r own , wh o h ad t es ti fi ed at th e cr im in al
tr ial as a go ver nm ent

witnes s andlat er

all eged ly p r ov

id ed c on tr adi ct or

y t es ti mo ny i n a ci

vil pr oce edi ng. OnNo vem ber 20, 200 7, the D is tr

ict Cou r t d eni ed the m ot

io n o n the gr ou nd s th at ( 1) B r owndi d n ot

com mi t p er ju ry, se e U

nit ed Stat es v . Rig as , No. 02-CR -1236, 2007 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 855 90, at * 4- 11 ( S.D .N .Y. No v. 2 0, 2 007 ); (2) the p os t- tr ial dep os it io ns of B r ownandother

witnes s es ina civ il p r oce edi ng w er e ne wly av ail able , n ot new ly discover ed , s in ce d ef end ant s could hav e pu r s ued th eir te s ti mo ny b ef

or e or du r in g the c r im in al t r ial , b ut di d n ot do s o, se e i

d. at * 11- 15; and(3 ) e venif Br own’s testimony were perjured or newly discove red, it would not have affected the outcome of the
cr im in al t r ial , se e i d. at * 15- 16. Motion to Compel Discovery On Decembe r 4, 2007, defenda nts f iled a motion to compel the gove rnment to pr oduce its
no te s fr om in te r

vie ws with Car

l Ro th enb erger , Ad elp hi a’s fo r mer leadou ts id e co un s el, andother witnes s es no t c all ed b y either par ty at tr ial . D ef end ant s argue d that

th e no te s s ho ul d h ave b een disclosed to them purs uant to Br ady v. M aryland , 373 U.S. 8 3 (1963). The Distr ict Court denied the
mo ti ononJ anu ary 15 , 20 08, r eas onin g that , int er ali a , the g ov er nm ent

hadno ob lig ati onto pr od uce notes of witness es who did not testify at tr ial, a nd the defendants knew or should have k nown of Rothen ber

ger ’s exi s te nce as a po s s ib le wi tn es s andth e r elev ance of hi s te s ti mo ny. See United Sta tes v. Rig as , No. 02-CR -1236, 2008 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 2827, at *2-6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008). * * * I n thi s app eal, def

end ant s challen ge all thr ee o f the d ecis io ns of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t o ut

lin ed7

abo ve: (1 ) the J un e 24 , 20 08 r es ent enc in g or der , ( 2) th e No vem ber

20, 200 7 o pi ni onandor der denyin g the Rigas es ’ m ot

io n f or a new tr ial , an d ( 3) th e J anu ary 15 , 20 08 m emo r and um andor der denyin g the Rigas es ’ m ot

io n t o co mp el dis cov ery.

DISCUSSI ON A. R eas on ab le ne ss of

th e S en te nc es Fo llo win g United Sta tes v. B ook er , 543 U.S. 2 20 (2005), a district court has br oad la titude to “im po s e either

a Gu id eli nes s ent enc e or

a no n- Guid eli nes s ent enc e.” United Sta tes v. Sanchez , 51 7 F. 3d 651 , 66 0 (

2d Cir . 20 08) ; see also United States v. Cavera , 55 0 F .3d180 , 19 0 ( 2d Cir . 20 08) (e n b anc)
. Ac co rdi ng

ly , t he rol e o f th e C ou rt o f A pp ea ls i s li mi te d to ex a mi ni ng a sen te nc e f

or re a son a bl en ess, whi ch i s aki n t o r evi ew u nd er an “ abu s e- of

-dis cr et io n” s tan dar d. See Cavera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 90; see also Gall v. Uni ted States, 12 8 S. Ct. 586 , 59 1 ( 200 7) (h ol di ng that

“co ur ts of

app eals mu s t r evi ew all sentences—whether inside, just outs ide, or significantly outside the Guidel ines range—under a def er ent ial abu s e- of -dis cr et io n s tan dar d”) ; cf. Sims v. Blot , 53 4 F .3d117 , 13 2 (

2d Cir . 20 08) (“ A di s tr

ict

cou r t h as abu s ed i ts di s cr et io n i f i t b as ed i ts r ul

in g onan er r on eou s vie w of th e law or ona cle arly
er r on eou s as s es s men t o f the e vid enc e, o r r end er ed a d ecis io n that

cann ot be l ocat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” (alt er ati on , ci tat io ns , an d quo tat

io n m ar ks om it te d) ). T hi s s tan dar d ap pl ies “bo thto th e [s ub s tan ti

ve r eas on abl ene s s of

th e] s ent enc e it s elf

andto th e pr oce du r es emp lo yed in
ar r ivi ng a t the s ent enc e.” Uni te d St ate s v . V er kho gl y ad , 516 F.3d 1222, 1 27 (2d Cir. 2008). T he Rigas es all ege that

th eir s ent enc es wer e pr oce du r ally un r eas on abl e ins ever al way s . Principally, the Riga ses contend that the District Court did not res entence them de novo bu t i ns te ad conducted only

a limited resentenci ng hea ring. Alternativel y, the R igases argue that ev en under the Di stri ctC ou rt’ s a lt er na tive ho ld in g— for w hi ch the sco pe of re sen te nc in g w a s de novo —the Court committed several procedural e rror s, including failures to (1) conduct the individua lized a ss essment
r equ ir ed b y 18 U.S .C. § 355 3( a); (2) m ake anapp r op r iat e cal cul ati onof

lo s s to ju s ti fy

a tw ent y- s ix-8

point sentencing enha ncement; (3) exc lude an e nhance ment for bank fr aud; (4) find facts in suppor t of a sentencing e nhance ment for leading a c onspiracy; and (5) specify w ho exac tly wa s harmed before imposing a “fifty victim” sentencing enhanc ement. Defenda nts also argue that their s entence s were subs tantively

unreasonable be cause peopl e convic ted of “more serious ” crimes, such as murder and
te r r or is m, hav e be en s ent enc ed t o o nly a f ew yea r s mo r e thanth e Rig as es . 1. Scope of Resentencing The Riga ses argue principally tha t, following our decision in Quin tieri , 30 6 F .3dat 1 227 -2 8, w e have he ld that defendants must be res entence d de novo whe r e a po r ti onof

a con vic ti onhas bee n
r ever s ed o n ap peal . T he g ov er nm ent as ks us to af

fi r m o n the b as is of

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s lim it ed resentencing bec ause (1) defendants did not challe nge their sentences on the initia l appea l, thereby waiving any

arguments that the sentences were unreasonable , and (2) “the sentencing considerations
r elat in g t o Co un t T

wen ty -T hr ee wer e en ti r ely s ever abl e f r om th e co ns id er ati on s onth e other

cou nt s ,” A pp ell ee’s B r . 35
. In Quin tieri

, we distinguished betwe en co nv ic ti o n error s, for

which de novo resentencing wa s the “default rule,” a nd sentencing error s, for which li mited resentencing wa s the default rule. We he ld: Whenth e co nv

ict io n o n o ne o r

mo r e ch arges is ov er tu r nedonapp eal an d the c as e is remanded for resentencing, the constella tion of off enses of conviction has been cha nged a nd the factual mosaic related to those offens es that the distr ict court must

consult to determine the appropriate sentence i s likely a ltered. For the district court to s entence the defendant accu r ate ly an d ap pr op r

iat ely, it mu s t c on fr on t the o ff

ens es of con vic ti onandfa ct s anew . 306 F. 3d at 1 227 -2 8; se e al

so id. at 1 228 (“ [R] es ent enc ing us ually s ho ul d b e de novo when a Court of App eals r ever s es on e or

mo r e co nv ic ti o ns andr ema nd s fo r

r es ent enc in g . . . .”). Quin tieri created a “de fa ul t rul e” that de novo

r es ent enc in g is r equ

ir ed wher e a co nv

ict io n i s r ever s ed i n p ar t o n ap peal
. Quin tieri , 306 F.3d at 1229 n.6 (“Today we conclude that when a resentencing results f rom a vaca tur of a con vic ti on , we i n ef

fe ct adh er e t o the de n o v o

def ault rule . . . bec ause multiple conv ictions are ‘inextricabl y linke d’ in ca lcula ting the sentencing rang e under the guide lines.” (emphasis added))
. Moreover, we recogniz ed in Quin tieri that “when a case is remanded for de novo r es ent enc in g,9

the defendant ma y raise in the district court and, if proper ly preserved there, on appe al to the court of app eals , is s ues th at h e or

s he h ad p r evi ou s ly waive d b y f ail in g t o r ais e them .” Id

. at 1 225 . I n cl ear
con tr as t, we s tat ed that

lim it ed r es ent enc in g was th e de fa ul t rul e wh er e ther e was a sentencing er r or ; de
novo r es ent enc in g was r equ ir ed f or a sentencing er r or

on ly wh er e “o ne o r

mo r e s pec if

ic sentencing er rors

. . . would un do th e s ent enc in g cal cul ati onas a who le o r th e ‘s pi r it of th e ma nd ate ’ o th er

wis e r equ ir es de novo r es ent enc in g.” Id

. at 1 228 n. 6 ( emp has is add ed)
. Acco r di ngl

y, Quin tieri s up pl ies tw o p er ti nen t rul es : ( 1) whe r e a co un t o f acon vic ti onis
ov er tu r ned—as op po s ed t o an as pec t o f as ent enc e—r es ent enc in g m us t b e de novo ; and (2) de novo
mea ns “an ew,” id. at 1 228 , s o that a def end ant may r ais e is s ues evenif

th ey wo ul d o th er

wis e hav e been w aive d. Her e, anexp er

ien ced andr es pec te d j ud ge ex pr es s ed the v iew that th es e r ul es ar e un duly “m ech ani cal. ” Sp ecial Ap p. 19. I t i s nev er th eles s true that onmo r e thanon e oc cas io n s in ce Quin tieri , ou r Cou r t h as adh er ed t o the “ de novo default rule,” how ever cha racterized, i n successive cases where a portion of a defendant’s convic tion was overturned on appea l, eve n though the portion of the conviction tha t was overturned was unlikely to alter the ultimate sentence in any significa nt way. For example , in Uni

te d St ate s v . H er tul ar we e xplaine d that, although our reversal of [the defendant’s] § 111 convic tion change s the “constellation of off en ses” re le va nt t o se nte nc in g, the “f a ct ua l m osa ic ” m a y b e l it tl e a lt er ed . N ev er the le ss, mindful that the law e ntrus ts dis trict courts , not courts of appeal s, with the primary respons ibility for weighing the totality of circumstances releva nt to s entencing , we c onclude that, even i n these circumstances, we must vaca te the defenda nt’s s entence and remand the case to the district court s o that it may dec ide, in the first ins tance, whether a c onviction on th r ee r ath er

th an f ou r cou nt s af fe ct s it s as s es s men t o f the s ent enc in g f act or s det ail ed i n 1 8 U.S.C . § 3553(a

). 562 F. 3d 433 , 44 6 (

2d Cir . 20 09) (quo ti ng Quin tieri , 306 F.3d at 1228 ); see also United States v. Draper , 55 3 F. 3d 17 4, 17 5-7 6, 18 4 ( 2d C ir. 20 09 ) (c on cl ud in g, wh er e d ef en da nts w er e c on vi ct ed of “ wi tne ss retaliation, witness t ampering, na rcotics, and firearm charges,” that “bec ause we a re reversing the witnes s r et ali ati oncon

vic ti on s , de novo

re sen te nc in g i s requir

ed andwe ar e co mp ell ed t o r ema ndthisOur earlier decision in this case compels a c onclusion that the consequence s of the 1 convictions on Count 23 w ere far from de mi nimi s . As we o bs er

ved , the alleg ed b ank

fr aud“r elat ed to tw o o f the thr ee Co -B or r owi ng A gr eem ent s ,” Rig as , 490 F.3d at 217-18, w hich we re required to “m as k[ ] . . . d ebt s th at the Rigas fa mily [andth eir pr iva te ly- hel d co mp ani es ] o wedto Ade lp hi a.” id. at 215. Masking the R

igases’ private debt a s Adelphia’s debt wa s a cardinal g oal of their scheme to def r audAde lp hi a. Id

. ; se e al so id. at 232-33 (outlining the specific proof that would be required to s us tai n the b ank

fr audcon vic ti on s andth e me chanis m o f alle gedfr aud ); but see id. at 2 34- 35 (explaini ng that, under the circumstances, defenda nts’ mis representations t o the banks were not “material” and could not support the conviction for bank fraud on Count 23). In addition, John Rigas was or

igi nally s ent enc ed t o anaggr egat e t er m o f 1 5 yea r s ’ im pr is on men t an d r ecei

ved15- year terms on eac h of two counts of bank fraud. The most he received on a ny other count was 10 ye ars (fo r se cu ritie s fra ud

). Tim oth y R

ig a s wa s ori gi na ll y se nte nc ed to a n a gg re ga te te rm o f 20 ye a rs’ im pr is on men t, andhe w as s ent enc ed t o a t er m o f 2 0 yea r s oneachof tw o co un ts of

ban k f r aud
. The mo st he re ce iv ed on a ny oth erco un t w a s 10 ye a rs (fo r se cu ritie s fra ud ). Un de r th ese cir cum s tan ces , Co un t 2 3 was par t o f the “co ns te lla ti onof of fe ns es ” an d “f

actual mo s aic” of

this cas e, Quin tieri

, 306 F.3d at 1228 , and, sentenci ng on that count ca nnot be considered de mi nimi s . 10 mat te r to th e di s tr

ict cou r t i n an y eve nt .” ( emp has es add ed) ). I nd eed , we h ave al s o o bs er vedth at Quin tieri has particular salienc e in the post- Boo ker r egi me, un der

whi ch a D is tr

ict Cou r t m us t m ake an in di vid ual izedas s es s men t b as ed o n all the s ent enc in g f act or s in§ 35 53(a). Se e H

er tul ar , 56 2 F .3dat 446 ; Gal l , 12 8 S. Ct. 586 at 5 91; see also 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a )(1) (r equiring an a ss essment of “the nature andcir cum s tan ces of

th e of fe ns e”) ; id. at § 3553 (a)(2) (r equiring an a ss essment of the “seriousnes s of the offense,” “adequa te deterrence,” and “just punishment”). I n thi s cas e, the D is tr

ict Cou r t c on clu dedth at a de novo re sen te nc in g w a s no t re qu ire d b ec a use our Court’s reversal of the conviction on C ount 23 was more akin to a “ sentencing error” than a “co nv ict io n er r or .” T o r each this con clu s io n, th e Di s tr ict Cou r t d ecid ed f

ir s t that Cou nt s 22 a nd23 were “quite different” fr om the remainder of the indictment, such that it was unlike ly that the reversal of Count 23 would a lter the appropriate sentence. Specia l App. 19. A ccordingly , the 1 Distr ict Court ruled that it could, consistent with Quin tieri , co nd uct on ly a l im it ed r es ent enc in g. See, e.g. , Quin tieri

, 30 6 F .3dat 1 225 (“ We co ncl ud e that inthis cas e, b ecau s e we i den ti fi ed a p ar ti cul ar sentencing is s ue n eces s it ati ng r ema nd—wh ether [the d ef end ant ’s ] t ot al o ff

ens e lev el o n the c on s pi r acy count was improperly enha nced a s a result of ‘double counting ’—the remand wa s limited, not de novo
. B ecau s e t he r ema ndwas lim it ed, [the d ef end ant ] m ay no t n ow r ais e argum ent s th at h e hadan11

incentive and an opportunity to raise previously but did not raise, absent a coge nt and compell ing
r eas onfo r per mi tt in g hi m t o d o s o. ” ( emp has is add ed) ); United Sta tes v. Stanley , 54F. 3d 103 , 10 8 ( 2d Cir. 1995) (conc luding that de novo re sen te nc in g i s un ne ce ssa ry wh en the re ma nd in g c ou rt i de nti fie s a
on ly s ent enc in g er r or

anddo es no t e xp lic it

ly l im it th e s cop e of

r es ent enc in g)
. We di s agr ee wi thth e pr emi s e of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s analys is
. Quin tieri expressly created a “de fa ul t rul e” th at r es ent enc in g is r equ ir ed wher e par t o f acon

vic ti onis r ever s ed o n ap peal
. Quin tieri , 306 F. 3d at 1 228 n. 6 (

ho ld in g that

“wh en a r es ent enc in g r es ul ts fr om a vaca tu r of a con vic ti on , we i n ef fe ct adh er e t o the de novo default rule of t he Si xt h, E ig hth , N in th, a nd E le ve nth C irc ui t[s] , b ec a use
mult ip le co nv ict io ns ar e ‘i nex tr

icab ly l in ked ’ incalc ul ati ng the s ent enc in g r ang e un der th e guid eli nes .” (e mp has is add ed) ); see also Draper , 55 3 F .3dat 1 84 (sta ti ng

tha t “ be ca use we a re re ve rsin g t he wi tne ss
r et ali ati oncon

vic ti on s , de novo

re sen te nc in g i s required

” (emphasis added)). In Quin tieri , we c reated a rule, not a guide line. To the extent that a ny lang uage in Quin tieri or cas es th at p r e- dat e Quin tieri
s ugg es t o th er

wis e— see, e.g

. , Quin tieri , 30 6 F .3dat 1 228 (“ [R] es ent enc in g usual ly s ho ul d b e de novo whe n a Cou r t o f A pp eals r ever s es on e or mo r e co nv

ict io ns andr ema nd s fo r

r es ent enc in g.” (e mp has is add ed) ); United Sta tes v. Atehortva , 69 F. 3d 679 , 68 5- 86 ( 2d Cir . 19 95) (“ Whena def end ant challen ges
con vic ti on s onpar ti cul ar

cou nt s th at a r e ine

xt ri cabl y ti ed to other counts in determining the sentencing range under the guide lines, the defenda nt assum es the ris k of undoing the intricate knot of calc ulations should he succeed.” (e mphasis added))—we resolve any ambiguity toda y. In Quin tieri , th e Cou r t o f A pp eals id ent if ieda convictio n

error , not a mere sentencing error , when it reve rs ed the convictions onCou nt

23. Se e Ri

gas, 490 F.3d at 239. Acc ordingly, the R igases were entitle d to be resentenced de novo

at a pl enar y s ent enc in g r ehe ar

in g. We a lso disagree with the gove rnment’s pr oposed interpretation of Quin tieri . Acc ording to the government, if a c halle nge to a sentenc e has been w aive d, the “law of the case” doc trine and Quin tieri r equ ir e r es ent enc in g de novo on ly wh er e ( 1) th e “s pi r it of th e ma nd ate ” r equ

ir es as mu ch (such as when the reversed portion of the convic tion is “inextricably l inked” to the remai nder of the12

conviction), (2) an issue beca me releva nt only after appell ate revie w, or (3) there is a “cogent” or “co mp ell in g” r eas onfo r

r es ent enc in g de novo , such as a cha nge in c ontrolling law. Otherwise, the government argues, resentencing should be limite d, not de novo
. T he g ov er nm ent

as s um es th at thes e thr ee co ns id er ati on s app ly wh er e an a pp ell ate cou r t h as
r ever s ed a convictio n . Howeve r, it is clear from Quin tieri that the three considerations identified by the gov er nm ent

app ly o nly wh er e an a pp ell ate cou r t h as r ever s ed p ar t o f a sentence , n ot par t o f a convictio n . See 306 F. 3d at 1 229 (dis cus s in g thes e exc ept io ns un der

th e he adi ng “ I mp lic ati on s of a L im it ed Rema nd”). The “spirit of

the mandate ” and other considerations identified by the g overnment are
exce pt io ns to lim it ed r es ent enc in g f ollo win g r ever s al o f a sentence : T hat r es ent enc in g us ually s ho ul d b e de novo when a Court of Appeals reverses one or mor e convictio ns and remands for r esentencing, then, does not deviate from the rule . . . that absent explic it langua ge in the ma ndate to the contrary, resentencing should be limited when the Cou r t o f A pp eals up ho ld s th e un der lyi ng c on vic ti on s bu t d et er mi nes th at a sentence has bee n er r on eou s ly i mp os ed an d r ema nd s to cor r ect th at [ s ent enc in g] er r or . T o b e s ur e, ther e may be c ir cum s tan ces whe n we r ever s e a sentence in wh ic h th e “ spi ritof t he ma nd a te ” re qu ire s de novo sentencing, for example when the reve rs al effective ly undoes the entire “knot of calc ul ati on ,” b ut

this is no t s ucha cas e. Quin tieri , 30 6 F .3dat 1 228 (f

in al em ph as is add ed) ; se e al so id. at 1 229 n. 6 ( “B ut

whe n a r es ent enc in g is
nec es s it ate d b y on e or

mo r e s pec if

ic sentencing error s, unless correction of thos e errors would undo the sen te nc in g c a lc ul a ti on a s a wh ol e o r th e ‘ spi ritof t he ma nd a te ’ o the rw ise re qu ire s de novo resentencing, we in effect adhe re to the . . . default rule of limited resentencing. ” (emphasis added)); id. at 1230 (“[E ]ven whe n a remand is limited, a n iss ue may be raised if it arises as a res ult of events th at o ccu r af te r th e or igi nal s ent enc e.” ). In Quin tieri

, we d et er mi nedth at the b as is fo r th e pr io r r ever s al was th e de fe nd ant ’s sentence —s pec if ically, “do ub le co un ti ng, ” se e i d. a t 1 22 9— no t th e d ef

en da nt’ s convictio n . Acc or di ngl y, we he ld that there was a presumption that resentencing would be limited, not de novo , but that the defendant woul d be entitled to de novo r evi ew if he c ould s ho w that

(1 ) the “ s pi r

it of th e ma nd ate ”
re qu ire s de novo s ent enc in g, ( 2) an i s s ue b ecam e r elev ant on ly af te r th e init ial app ell ate r evi ew, o r

(3 )13

th er e is a “co gen t” or

“co mp ell in g” r eas onfo r

r es ent enc in g de novo , such as a cha nge in c ontrolling law. B y co nt r as t, th e pr

io r app eal i n the i ns tan t c as e r ever s ed a p or ti onof th e de fe nd ant s ’ convictio n , and so defendants were entitled to be resentenced de novo and, a s noted, to “raise in the distr ict court and , if pr op erly p r es er

vedth er e, o n ap peal

to th e co ur t o f a pp eals , is s ues th at h e or s he h ad pr evi ou s ly waive d b y f

ail in g t o r ais e t hem .” Id

. at 1 225
. T o r eit er ate , o n r ema nd , a dis tr ict cou r t that

is r equ ir ed t o r es ent enc e de novo mu s t r eco ns id er the sentences imposed on eac h count, as well as the aggreg ate sentence . In such circumst ance s, the

cou r t s ho ul d d et er mi ne whether th e “ch ang e[ ] ” inth e “co ns te lla ti onof of fe ns es of con vic ti on ” ha s “alt er ed” th e “f

act ual mo s aic r elat ed t o tho s e of fe ns es .” Quin tieri

, 306 F.3d at 1227 -28. If s o, the
court mus t reconsider the s entence imposed on the count or counts aff ected by the vac atur of the
con vic ti onof ano th er cou nt , as well

as onth e aggr egat e s ent enc e, i n l igh t o f the s ent enc in g f

act or s in § 3553(a ). If the court determines that the “factual mosaic ” related to a count of conviction ha s not been a ltered, no further pr ocee ding as to that count is necessary, exce pt to the extent it affects the aggr egat e s ent enc e. 2. “P r oc ed ur al

Rea son ab le ne ss” We t ur n n ow t o the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s alt er nat

ive ho ld in g, i n whichth e Cou r t i mp os ed a n ew
s ent enc e onth e as s um pt

io n that it was r es ent enc in g de novo . As no te d ab ov e, the Rigas es of fe r
mu ltip le a rgu me nts i n su pp ortof t he ir c on te nti on tha t th e D ist ric t C ou rt’ s de novo r es ent enc in g was procedurally flawed—to wit, they argue that the District Court failed to (1) conduct the in di vi du a li ze d a ssessm en t re qu ire d b y 1 8 U .S .C . § 35 53 (a ); (2 ) ma ke a n a pp rop ria te ca lc ul a ti on of l oss to ju s ti fy a tw ent y- s ix- lev el s ent enc in g en han cem ent ; ( 3) excl ud e an e nh ance men t f or ban k f r aud ; (4) find facts in s upport of

a sentencing

enhanc ement for leading a conspiracy; a nd (5) specify who

exac tl y was har medbef

or e im po s in g a “f

if ty vic ti m” s ent enc in g en han cem ent . Al th ough the Rigas es have offered addi tional reasons why their sentences were procedural ly unreasonable , we c onfine our14

di s cus s io n t o thes e argum ent s , whichcon s um ed the b ul k o f the b r ief in g onpr oce du r al
re a son a bl en ess. Reg arding the statutory requirement of an individualiz ed assess ment of wrongdoing and app r op r iat e pu ni s hm ent , see 18 U .S. C. § 3 553 (a) , we o bs er ve that pr io r to th e M ay 22 , 20 08
r es ent enc in g he ar

in g, the D is tr

ict Cou r t s ol ici te d f r om th e P r ob ati onOf

fi ce r evi s io ns to th e or

igi nal PS R. See Sp ecial Ap p. 17. At th e r es ent enc in g he ar

in g, the D is tr

ict Cou r t s tat ed o n the r eco r d that it hadals o r ead the Rigas es ’ s ent enc in g m emo r and a andwould con s id er th e f act or s in18 U .S. C. § 355 3( a). I n o ur

vie w, the Co ur t’ s wr

it te n r ul in g r ef lect s it s in fo r medcon s id er ati onof th es e f act or s . See Cavera , 55 0 F .3d

at 1 89- 190 (s tat

in g that ou r r evi ew f or pr oce du r al r eas on abl ene s s “r equ ir es th at we b e co nf

id ent th at the s ent enc e r es ul te d f r om th e di s tr

ict cou r t’ s con s id er ed j ud gm ent as to what
was nece ss ary to address the various, of ten conflicting, purposes of s entencing ”). In addition to specificall y mentioning “ the § 3553 sentenc ing considerations,” Spec ial A pp. 19, the District Court di s cus s ed the ap pl

icab le G ui del

in es r ang e ( dev ot

in g co ns id er abl e di s cus s io n t o the t wen ty -s ix l evel additur fo r lo s s caus ati on

); th e Rig as es ’ co nt

in uedargum ent

th at they “en gage d i n n o cr

im in al conduct but were themselve s victims”; the ser iousness of their off

enses; and the suff

ering ca used by the Rig ases’ crimes. Special App. 17, 19 -24. That the District Court did not pars e eve ry sentencing fa ct or in di vid ually o r

add r es s inwr

it in g eachof

def end ant s ’ s ent enc in g argum ent s do es no t r end er th e ul ti mat e s ent enc e pr oce du r ally un r eas on abl e. See United States v. Fernandez , 44 3 F .3d19, 29 (

2d Cir . 20 06) (“ We hav e im po s ed n o . . . r equ ir eme nt th at as ent enc in g ju dge pre ci se ly ide nti fy either the fa ct or s s et fo r thin§ 35 53(a) o r

s pec if ic ar gum ent s bear

in g onth e im pl eme nt ati onof th os e f act or s in
or der to com ply with h er

du ty to con s id er

all th e § 35 53(a) f

act or s alo ng w

ith the G ui del

in es app lic abl e r ang e.” ). As we h ave p r evi ou s ly s tat ed, “we p r es um e, i n the ab s enc e of r eco r d ev id enc e suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judg e has faithfully discharged he r duty to consider the
s tatut or y f act or s .” Id

. at 3 0.15

With r es pec t t o l os s caus ati on , the Rigas es argue at l eng thth at the l os s es inthis cas e, in clu di ng m os t n ot ably t he b ankr up tc y of Ade lp hi a, “‘ may

r ef lect , n ot th e [Rigas es ’] mi s r epr es ent ati on [s ], bu t c han gedeco no mi c cir cum s tan ces , ch ang ed i nv es to r exp ect ati on s , n ew in du s tr y- s pec if ic o r fi r m- s pec if

ic f act s , co ndit

io ns , o r other even ts .’” App ell ant ’s B r . 32 (q uo ti ng Dura Pha rm. v. B ro udo , 5 44 U. S. 33 6, 34 3 ( 20 05 )). The go ve rnm en t a rgu es t ha t th e a mo un t of lo ss attributable to the Rig ases’ fr aud may be mea sur ed in billions, not millions, and so even if “the e ntire dec lin e inAde lp hi a’s mar ket capi tal izat io n” w as caus ed b y a nu mb er of fa ct or s , the e vid enc e presented at trial “wa s s ufficient to demonstr ate, by a preponderanc e standard, that subs tantially all of th e de cli ne w as a ‘r eas on abl e es ti mat e’ o f the l os s .” A pp ell ee’s B r . 48
. I n cal cul ati ng the am ou nt

of lo s s un der

th e Gu id eli nes , a s ent enc in g co ur t “ nee d o nly ma ke a reasonable e stimate of the loss .” U.S.S. G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). A lthough “[d]etermining this amount is no easy task[,] . . . some estimate must be made for Guidelines’ [calcula tion] purpos es, or perpetr ato r s of

fr audwould get

a win df all .” United Sta tes v. Ebbers , 45 8 F .3d110 , 12 7 (

2d Cir . 20 06)
. Altho ughit

is true that

“[ t] he l os s mu s t b e the r es ul t o f the f r aud ,” id. at 128, a s oppos ed to other, non-fr audulent oc currences, we a gree with the District Court and the government that, rega rdless of th e pr ecis e am ou nt

of th e lo s s attr

ib ut abl e t o the Rigas es ’ f

r aud , that figur e eas ily

exce eds $10 0 milli on . F or

exam pl e, as we n ot ed i n o ur pr evi ou s op inio n i n thi s cas e, [t]he evidenc e at trial showed that throughout the period of the conspiracy, Defenda nts t ook ov er $20 0 m ill io n d ollar s fr om Ade lp hi a’s Cas h M anag eme nt Sys te m f or per s on al ex pen s es r ang in g f r om $20 0 t o p ur chas e 10 0 p air s of bed r oo m s lip per s fo r

T im othy Rigas , t o o ver

$3 milli onto pr od uce a f

ilm by EllenRigas , t o $2 00 mill io n t o p ay of

f Rigas fa mily m arginlo ans . The miss ing money w as obscured by the commingling of ca sh between Ade lphia a nd [p r iva te ly- hel d co mp ani es own ed b y the Rigas es ]. Rig as , 49 0 F .3dat 2 18. I n an y eve nt , the D is tr ict Cou r t r eas on ed that

evenif a lo s s of on ly $ 0.5 0 p er share were attributable to the R igases’ fraudulent conduct, that woul d still s atisfy the $100 million th r es ho ld fo r

th e s ent enc in g ad ju s tm ent app lie d t o the c ou nt . See Sp ecial Ap p. 22; se e al so Rig as , 49 0 F. 3d at 2 12 (

no ti ng that

onth e day

th at A del phia’ s $2. 2 b ill

io n i n p r evi ou s ly u nr eco r dedlia bi lit iesThe Riga ses f urther contend that the District Court erred in calcula ting loss by not 2 di s cou nt in g the l os s by the $ 715 milli oninliq ui dat ed p r iva te as s et s th at the Rigas fa mily p led gedas colla teral to several banks that underwrote co-borrowing agreeme nts. Appellant’s Br . 52 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.2(E)(ii) (providing that, “ [i]n a ca se involving col lateral ple dged or other wis e pr ov id ed b y t he d ef

end ant , [ lo s s s hall b e r edu cedby] th e am ou nt th e vi ct im has r eco ver ed at the t im e of s ent enc in g f

r om di s po s it

io n o f the c ollat er al”) ); se e g en er all y Rig as , 49 0 F .3dat 2 13- 18 (describing the central role of co-borrowing agreeme nts—bank loans for which A delphia and private compa nies owned by the Riga ses were jointly and several ly lia ble for the debts—in the Rigas es ’ f r aud ). We agr ee wi thth e Di s tr ict Cou r t that , ev en i f the $ 715 milli onwer e co ns id er ed, th at amount was pledg ed only to ba nks to s atisfy Adelphia ’s debts. T he colla teral could not compe nsate equ it y ho ld er s fo r

th eir s ub s tan ti al l os s es . See Sp ecial Ap p. 23. 16 wer e di s clo s ed, th e co mp any’ s s to ck p r ice d r op ped“ab ou t t

wen ty -f ive per cen t t o $2 0.3 9,” andth at Adelphia filed for bankruptcy within months). Acc ordingly, we have no trouble a ffir ming the Distr ict Court’s estimate of los s caused by the R igases’ fraud. 2 It is undisputed that, at resentencing, the gov ernment did not seek a two-leve l enhanc ement for bank fr aud in ex cess of $1 million in gross receipts. The Riga ses contend that the District Court

co nsi de re d i t a ny

wa y, ba sed on the Di stri ctC ou rt’ s co mme nt i n a foo tno te tha t th e R ig a ses’ arguments about the bank fraud enha ncement w ere “totally without merit.” Specia l App. 20 n.3 . On this bas is alo ne, we can no t c on clu de that th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e r r on eou s ly co ns id er ed anaban do ned sentencing enha ncement for bank fraud. On resentencing, the District Court agreed wi th the Pr ob ati onOf

fi ce that th e Rig as es ’ o ff

ens e lev els s urpas s ed what was r equ ir ed u nd er th e Gu id eli nes fo r a r eco mm end ed s ent enc e of lif e im pr is on men t— th e ma xim um aggr egat e s ent enc e all owab le— andth en i mp os ed s ent enc es th at w er e s ub s tan ti ally below th e app lic abl e Gu

id eli nes r ang e. As a pr act ical mat te r , ev en w

itho ut th e t wo- lev el en han cem ent

fo r ban k f r aud , the G ui del

in es would call for life impr

isonment. Accordingly , whate ver ambiguity e xists in the record with respect to the Di stri ctC ou rt’ s co nsi de ra ti on of t he ba nk fra ud en ha nc em en t i s de mi nimi s, and ce rtainly does not
r end er th e s ent enc e pr oce du r ally un r eas on abl e. We further disagree with the R igases that the Distr

ict Court erred in not making the ne cessary factual findings before adopting the PSR recommendation that the R igases’ roles in defraudingT hi s argum ent br in gs to mi ndth e wo r ds of J ud ge L ear nedHan d, who con fr on te d s im ila r 3 cir cum s tan ces dec ades ago : As is us ual in such ca ses, we are urged—inci dentally in a brief whose leng th and prolixity only serves to confus e the reade r—to s ubstitut e ourselves for the jury and try the merits over aga in. We shall not labor the point that this we cannot do; but we do wish to emphasize tha t the established charac ter of the s cheme w as alone e nough to condemn it. United Sta tes v. B ronso n , 14 5 F .2d939 , 94 2 ( 2d Cir . 19 44) (L . H and , J

.). 17 Ade lp hi a war r ant ed a f

ou r -l evel s ent enc in g en han cem ent . See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (authorizing a fourlev el ad di tu r

fo r or ganizi ng o r

leadin g a cr

im in al act ivi ty ). T he thr us t o f the Rigas es ’ ar gum ent her e is th at the D is tr

ict Cou r t f ail ed t o m ake ad equ ate fa ctual fi ndin gs to s up po r t thi s enh ance men t. Acco r di ng t o the Rigas es , h ad the D is tr ict Cou r t s cr ut

inizedth e r eco r d, it

would hav e r eali zed th at th e Rig as es mer ely o ver s aw em pl oye es who com mi tt ed f r audandwer e no t them s elv es “cr im in ally
r es po ns ib le” fo r

any m is con du ct . Ap pellan t’ s B r . 58
. We de te ct no er r or inth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s 3 conclusion, whic h “expressly adopt[ed] the position set f orth by the government [at the] sentencing hear in gs , . . . [and

] s ati s fi ed i ts ob lig ati onto mak e f actual fi ndin gs .” Uni

te d St ate s v . Ey man , 31 3 F .3d 741 , 74 5 ( 2d Cir . 20 02) . F or

th e s ame r eas on , we als o r ejec t the Rigas es ’ ar gum ent th at the D is tr

ict Court failed to specify who e xactly was harmed before imposing a “fifty victim” sentenc ing enhanc ement. 3. “S ub st an ti

ve R eas on ab le ne ss ” The Riga ses also argue that their s entence s were subs tantively unreasonable—that is, the
s ent enc es of

tw elv e ands even te en y ear s fo r J oh n an d Tim othy Rigas , r es pec ti vely, we r e “‘ gr eat er th an n eces s ary’” to acco mp lis h the p urpo s es of s ent enc in g (

ju s t p unis hm ent , d et er r enc e,
r ehab ili tat io n, et c.) . Ap pellan t’ s B r . 72 (quo ti ng 1 8 U. S.C. § 35 53(a)) . I n p ar ti cul ar , the Rigas es observe that their s entence s for “white-coll ar” crimes are only slightly shorter than the sentences of
s om e adm it te d o r

con vic te d t er r or

is ts . See App ell ant ’s B r . 74 . Wh en, at o r al ar gum ent , we i nqui r ed what a “s ub s tan ti

vely r eas on abl e” s ent enc e might be, cou ns el f

or th e Rig as es r epl

iedth at i t w asT he Rigas es do no t ar gue th at a ny p ar ti cul ar

s ent enc in g f

act or in18 U .S. C. § 3 553 (a) 4 “can [n ot ] b ear th e wei ght

as s ign ed i t u nd er

th e t ot ali ty

of cir cum s tan ces ,” Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 91. Ins tead, they

argue that the District Court “gave no spec ific consideration to any § 35 53 f act or s ,” Appella nt’s B r. 72, and ultimatel y “impose[d] punishment far greater than necessary and betray[e d] th e bal ance s truck

by § 355 3,” id. at 7 5. 18 un clea r bu t that any s ent enc e mu s t t ake ac cou nt of th e Rig as es cul pab ili ty . Where, a s here, we hav e identified “ ‘no significant procedural e rror ’ . . . , a reviewing court then ‘considers the s ubstantive reasonablene ss of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
s tan dar d, ’ t aki ng ‘ in to acco un t the t ot ali ty of th e cir cum s tan ces , in clu di ng the e xt ent of any v ar ian ce fr om th e Gu

id eli nes r ang e.’ ” Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 2 00 ( Raggi , J ., concurring) (brackets omitted) (quo ti ng Gal

l , 128 S. C t. at 597). As the en ba nc court observed in Ca vera , “[ w]e will . . . s et

as id e a di stri ctco urt ’s substan tive determination only in e xceptiona l cases where the trial c ourt’s decision ‘can no t b e lo cat ed w

ithi n the r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .’” 550 F. 3d at 1 89 (qu ot in g Rig as , 49 0 F. 3d at 2 38 ( s um mar

izi ng the ab us e- of

-dis cr et io n s tan dar d) ). Fo r

exam pl e, [a]t the subs tantive stage of reasonable ness r eview , an a ppella te court may consider whethe r a fa ct or r eli ed o n b y a s ent enc in g co ur t c an b ear th e wei ght

as s ign ed t o i t. T o b e s ur e, thi s r evi ew is def

er ent ial . As a r es ul t, we d o n ot con s id er what weig ht we wo ul d o ur s elv es hav e giv en a p ar ti cul ar

fa ct or . Rather , we c on s id er whe th er th e f act or , as exp lai nedby the dis tr ict cou r t, can b ear

th e wei ght

as s ign ed i t u nd er

th e t ot ali ty

of cir cum s tan ces inth e cas e. Ca vera , 550 F.3d at 191 (c itations omitted). Acc ordingly, our role in sentencing a ppeals is to “patrol 4 th e bo un dar

ies of r eas on abl ene s s , while hee di ng the S up r eme Cou r t’ s r ene wedmes s age that
r es po ns ib ili ty

fo r s ent enc in g is pl acedlar

gely inth e pr ecin ct s of

th e di s tr ict cou r ts .” Id

. Our decisions addres sing subs tantive reasonable ness have focused more on the process of
s ent enc in g thanonact ually d ef inin g the b ou nd ar

ies of s ub s tan ti ve r eas on abl ene s s . I ns of

ar as we have de fined as “unreasonable” a sentence that cannot be “ ‘cannot be locate d within the range of per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns ,’” Id
. at 1 89 (qu ot

in g Rig as , 49 0 F .3dat 2 38) , that

def init io n i s ob vio us ly circular—wha t is r easonable or unreasonable is what other cases have de emed reasonable or
un r eas on abl e. I t i s th er ef

or e un s urpr

is in g that s ever al co ur ts , in clu di ng o ur own , h ave c aut

io ned19

agai ns t c onver ti ng r evi ew f or s ub s tan ti ve r eas on abl ene s s in to a “r ub ber s tam p. ” United Sta tes v. Ratt o ball i , 45 2 F .3d127 , 13 2 (

2d Cir . 20 06) (“ Ou r

r evi ew f or r eas on abl ene s s , tho ughdef er ent ial , will
no t e qu ate to a ‘r ub ber

s tam p. ’”) ; see also United Sta tes v. Pinso n , 54 2 F .3d822 , 83 6- 37 ( 10th Ci r . 20 08) (“ [U ]n til the S up r eme Cou r t t ell s us other wis e[,] ap pellat e r evi ew co nt in ues to hav e an i mp or tan t r ol e to pl ay an d m us t n ot

be r egar dedas a r ub ber

s tam p. ”) ; Uni

te d St ate s v . M o reland , 43 7 F .3d424 , 43 3 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Although [a reasonablene ss ] standard clearly requires us to affor d a deg ree of deference to the sentenc ing dec isions of the distr ict court, ‘reasonablene ss ’ is not a code-word for ‘r ub ber s tam p. ’”)
. I n o th er ar eas of th e law , we e mp lo y var

io us con cep ts th at s eek t o cap tu r e the s ame id ea
r epr es ent ed i n the p hr as e “s ub s tan ti ve r eas on abl ene s s .” F or

exam pl e, we hel d that

incon s id er

in g a motion for

a newtrial in a crimina l case followi ng a jury ve rdict, the essential inquiry is whether a guilt y ver di ct is manif es tly un ju s t. See, e.g. , United Sta tes v. J osephberg , 56 2 F .3d478 , 48 8 (

2d Cir . 20 09) (“In deciding . . . a motion [for a new trial], the district court mus t take ca re not to us urp the role of the ju ry , a nd the ul ti ma te co nsi de ra ti on is w he the r le tti ng a gu il ty ve rdi ctsta nd wo ul d b e a ma ni fe st in ju s ti ce.” ). We exa mi ne i nt ent io nal to r ts by s tat e act or s un der a s im ila rly i mp r ecis e “s ho cks -thecon s cien ce” s tan dar d. See, e.g. , O’C onnor v. Pie rson , 42 6 F .3d187 , 20 3 ( 2d Cir . 20 05) (o bs er

ving that “‘the mea sur e of what is conscienc e-shocking is no calibrated y ard stick’” and that “the te st ‘points clea rly aw ay f

r om lia bi lit

y, o r clea rly t owar d i t, on ly at

th e en ds of

th e . . . s pec trum ’” (qu ot

in g County

o f S acr amen to v. Lewi s, 52 3 U. S. 8 33, 847 -4 8 ( 199 8) ). T he m ani fe s t- in ju s ti ce, s ho cks -the- con s cien ce, a nds ub s tan ti ve u nr eas on abl ene s s s tan dar ds in appell ate revie w share several common fac tors . Firs t, they are de ferential to distr ict courts and provide relief only in the proverbia l “rare ca se.” Second, they are hig hly contex tual and do not permit easy repetition in successive ca ses. T hird, they are depe ndent on the informed intuition of the

a pp el la te pa ne l t ha t a pp li es t he se st a nd a rds. In su m, the se st a nd a rds p rov id e a ba ck stop for t ho seT o s ay that a s ent enc e is “s ub s tan ti

vely un r eas on abl e” i s no t t o s ay that “no r eas on abl e 5 person” would have i mposed such a sentence. W e may general ly assume that federal judge s are “r eas on abl e” p eop le i n the c om mo ns ens e de fi ni ti onof th e t er m. No nethel es s , ev en r eas on abl e individual s can make unreasonable de cisions on occasion. The Supreme Court recogniz es this and ha s ch a rge d th e C ou rts o f A pp ea ls wit h re vi ewin g t he sub sta nc e o f se nte nc es f or re a son a bl en ess, and we cannot employ

a definition of “substantive unreasonableness” that would render the required review a dead le tter. 20 fe w cas es th at, altho ughpr oce du r ally co r r ect , wo ul d n on ethel es s dam age the ad mi ni s tr ati onof ju s ti ce be ca use the sen te nc e i mp ose d w a s sho ckin gl y h ig h, sho ckin gl y l ow , o r ot he rw ise un sup po rta bl e a s a mat te r of law. See Rita v. United

States, 55 1 U. S. 3 38, 365 (2 007 ) ( St even s , J ., c on cur r in g) (“ [A] di s tr

ict 5 judge w ho gives harsh sentences to Yankee s fans and leni ent sentences to Red Sox fans would not be
act in g r eas on ably eve n i f h er

pr oce du r al r ul

in gs wer e im pec cabl e.” ). Of cou r s e, an“in tu

it ive ” r evi ew cannot be a n invitation to mischief by tinkering with any sentence that appell ate judge s s imply do not lik e. Se e G all

, 12 8 S. Ct. at 5 97 ( “T he f

act th at the ap pellat e co ur t m igh t r eas on ably hav e co ncl ud ed that a different sentence wa s appropr iate is insufficient to just

ify reversal of the distr

ict court.”); Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 91 ( s ame ). Res po ns ib le ap pellat e r evi ew o f s ent enc es nec es s ar ily pl aces gr eat trus t i n s ent enc in g co ur ts while s till r eco gni zin g the r es po ns ib ili ty to exam in e the ac tu al s ent enc e it s elf (qui te apar t f

r om th e pr oce du r es emp lo yedinar r ivi ng a t the s ent enc e)
. App lyi ng thes e gen er al p r

in cip les of “s ub s tan ti

ve r eas on abl ene s s ” t o the i ns tan t c as e, we hav e
no tr ou bl e co ncl udin g that , inth e cir cum s tan ces pr es ent ed, th e s ent enc es im po s ed o n the Rigas es were reasonable . Indeed, we confronted many of the same arguments in reviewing the sentence of B er nar d Eb ber s , the f

or mer Chi ef Exec ut ive Of fi cer of Wor ld Com , I nc. See Ebbers, 45 8 F .3dat 1 12, 129. Ebbe rs was convic ted by a j ury on multiple counts of conspir acy and securities fraud and
r ecei veda s ent enc e co ns is ti ng p r in cip ally of

25 y ear s ’ im pr

is on men t. Id

. at 112. On a ppeal, Ebbers
argue d, amo ng o th er

thin gs , that

hi s s ent enc e was un r eas on ably lo ng, eventh ough i t w as s ho r te r th an th e r eco mm endGuid eli nes s ent enc e inth at c as e (thir ty year s to lif

e)
. Se e i d . at 129 & n .4. We
re co gn iz ed the po te nti a l sh ort co mi ng s of t he Gu id el in es se nte nc es f or “ wh it e- co ll a r” o ffe nse s,21

including the apparent disparity betwe en sentences for non-violent, corporate crimes and violent
cr im es pu ni s hab le u nd er

s tat e law : T wen ty -f ive year s is a lo ng s ent enc e f or a whi te collar

cr im e, l on ger

th an the s ent enc es routinely imposed by many states f or violent crimes, including murder, or other s erious cr im es s uchas s er

ial child mo les tat

io n. Ho weve r , Co ngr es s has di r ect ed t hat th e Gu id eli nes be a k ey co mp on ent

of s ent enc e de te r mi nat

io n. Un der

th e Gu id eli nes , it may well be that all but the most

trivial frauds in publicly traded compa nies may trigger sentences amounting to life imprisonment—Ebbers’ 25-year sentence is actual ly belowthe Guideline s level. E ven the threat of indictment on wafer-thin evidenc e of fraud may therefore compel a plea. For example , a [$ 0.1 5] decline in share price in a firm with only ha lf the number of outs tanding shares that WorldC om had would c onstitut e a loss of $ 200 million. No matter how many reasons other than the fraud may a rguably a ccount for the decline , a potentia l defendant would face an enormous jeopardy, giv en the present loss table, a nd enhanc ements for more than 250 vic tims, f

or being a le ader of a criminal activity involving 5 or more participa nts, and fo r bei ng a n o ff

icer of th e co mp any. Id
. at 129. Nonethe less, we conclude d in Ebb ers th at, inth e cir cum s tan ces pr es ent ed, s ti ff Guid eli nes
s ent enc es fo r

“wh it e- collar ” cr

im es “r ef lect [ed ] Co ngr es s ’ ju dgm ent

as to th e app r op r

iat e nat io nal po lic y f or s uchcr im es .” Id
. We a lso noted that Ebbers’ fr aud, like the Rig ases’ crimes, “were specificall y intended to c reate a fa lse picture of prof itability e ven for prof

essional analy sts ” and w ere “m ot iva te d b y . . . p er s on al f

in anci al ci r cum s tan ces .” Id
. at 1 30; se e al

so Rig as , 49 0 F .3dat 2 14 (o bs er vin g that inor der to fulf ill cer tai n o bl

igat io ns to pu r chas e Ad elp hi a s to ck, th e Rig as es “bo r r owe d f

un ds to pay A del ph ia, bu t thencaus ed A del phia t o u s e that cas h t o p ay of

f o th er fa mily deb ts ”) ; id . at 215 (“ T he g ov er nm ent

argue d, andth e ju ry app ar ent ly agr eed , that

[g ene r al] led ger entries [r ega rding co-borr owed de bt] were fraudulent and intende d to mislead stockholders and anal ys ts abo ut th e de bt th e Rig as fa mily an d [

th eir pr iva te ly- hel d co mp ani es ] o wedto Ade lp hi a.”) ; id. at 215-17 (expla ining how the R igases were personally responsible for manipulating a nd approving pu bl icly- filedear ni ngs in fo r mat io n an d o th er

dat a); id. at 237 n.42 (noting tha t the jury heard “ev id enc e of act s th at o ccu r r ed d ur

in g the p er

io d ch argedinth e in di ct men t, ” in clu di ng “ evi den ce th at A del ph ia p aidmo r e t han$50 0,0 00 f or ant iques inJ oh n Ri gas ’s po s s es s io n” a ndth at the Rigas es “used Adelphia funds and other ass ets for their personal benefit, and that of other members of theRule 33(a) of the Federal R ules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[u]pon the 6 defendant’s motion, the court may va cate a ny judgment a nd grant an newtrial if the interest of ju s ti ce s o r equ

ir es .” Rule 3 3(

b) (1 ) e s tab lis hes a th r ee- year win do w f or “m ot io n[ s ] f or a new tr ial gr ou nd ed o n n ewly

di s cov er ed e vid enc e.” 22 Rigas fa mily” ). Acco r di ngl

y, we cann ot

con clu de that

this is th e “r ar e cas e” that “‘c ann ot be l ocat ed w

ithi n th e r ang e of

per mi s s ib le d ecis io ns .’” Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 89 (qu ot in g Rig as , 490 F.3d at 238). In light of th e cir cum s tan ces of

th e f r audperpetr ate d b y the Rigas es , the s ent enc es im po s ed b y the D is tr ict Court on resentencing, whic h “reflect Cong ress ’ judgment as to the appropriate nationa l policy for
s uchcr im es ,” Ebb ers

, 458 F.3d at 129, do not constitut e a “ manifest injustice” or “shock the
con s cien ce,” anddo no t o th er wis e co mp el a c on clu s io n that th ey ar e s ub s tan ti

vely un r eas on abl e. B. M ot io n f

or a N ew T r ia l T he Rigas es als o ap peal

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s denial , inan o pi ni onfiledonNo vem ber 20, 200 7, o f thei r

Rul e 33 mo ti onfo r

a new tr ial onth e bas is of

“ne wly dis cov er ed e vid enc e.” Se e Ri gas, 6 200 7 U. S. D is t. LE XI S 85 590 , at *16 . T hey

argue , as th ey did bef

or e the D is tr

ict Cou r t, th at f

or mer co-defendant who te stif

ied as a g overnment witness—J ames Brown, the for mer Vice President of Finance a t Adelphia —gave testimony in subs equent civil proceeding s that contradicted his test imony
at tr ial
. We r evi ew m ot

io ns fo r a new tr ial un der an “ abu s e- of

-dis cr et io n” s tan dar d. See, e.g. , United States v. Owen , 50 0 F .3d83, 87 ( 2d Cir . 20 07) ; cf

. S ims , 534 F.3d at 132 (e xplainingthe “abuse-ofdi s cr et io n” s tan dar d)
. In a comprehensive opinion, the District Court compared Brown’s t estimony in a civil ca se to his test imony in the crimina l case a nd found that they were la rgely consistent and did not indica te any perjury. Specific ally , the Court found that Br own admitted to lyi ng to Adelphia ’s auditors in a “var iet y of fo r mat s ,” Rig

as , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 85 590 , at *6, s om e of

whi ch w er e exp lo r ed i n gr eat er det ail ina s ub s equ ent

civ il e nf or cem ent pr oce edi ng c on du ct ed b y the U ni te d S tat es Secu r it ies23

andExch ang e Com mi s s io n ( “SEC” ). T he D is tr ict Cou r t al s o co ncl ud ed that B r own ’s te s ti mo ny w as
no t n ewly discover

ed , b ut was s im ply ne wly av

ail able
. Id
. at *15 (“Beca use the testimony that [the Riga ses] cite could have been a vaila ble if [they] had subpoena ed these witnesses at the time of [the
cr im in al] tr ial , ther e is no new

ly dis cov er ed e vid enc e withi n the m eani ng o f Rule 3 3.”); see also Owen , 500 F. 3d at 8 9 ( “[

W]e n ow j oi n the m ajo r

it y of cir cui ts to hav e add r es s ed the i s s ue an d h ol d that Rul e 33 does not authorize district courts to grant new trials on the basis of . . . evidence [that] is not
new ly dis cov er ed, bu t m er ely n ewly availab le. ”) . F in ally, the D is tr ict Cou r t d et er mi nedth at B r own ’s ci vi l t estim on y w ou ld ha ve ha d n o e ffe cton the ou tc om e o f th e c rim in a l p rose cu ti on of t he R ig a ses. Rig as , 20 07 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 85 590 , at *15 -1 6 T he D is tr ict Cou r t’ s No vem ber

20, 200 7 o pi ni onandor der do es no t c on tai n aner r or of law, is no t b as ed o n an y cle arly er r on eou s as s es s men t o f f act s , an d i s no t o ut s id e the s cop e of per mi s s ib le dec is io ns . Acc or di ngl

y, we af fi r m the d eni al o f d ef

end ant s ’ Rule 3 3 m ot

io n f or a new tr ial
. C. M ot io n t o Co mpe l P r od uc ti onof Int er vi ew N ot es Finally, the Riga ses argue that the Distr ict Court erred in not ordering the government to produce notes fr om interviews with various witnesses—pr incipa lly notes from inter

views with C arl Rothenbe rger, Adelphia ’s for mer lead outside counsel. The R igases further contend that the government wa s const

itutionally c ompelled to disclose the notes purs uant to the rule of Brady v. Ma ry land , 373 U.S. 8 3 (1963). We revi ew a distr

ict court’s r uling on a motion to compe l discovery under an “a buse-ofdi s cr et io n” s tan dar d. See, e.g. , OSRecovery , Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc. , 46 2 F .3d87, 94 ( 2d Cir . 20 06) ; cf

. Si ms, 534 F.3d at 132 (e xplaining the “abuse-of-discr etion” standard). In this case, the District Court concluded tha t the government had no oblig ation under Br ady or the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C . § 3500—the statute codifying the gove rnment’s dis closure obligations during criminal procee dings—to disclos e its interview notes with Rothenbe rger because he di d not24

te s ti fy at the tr ial
. Se e Ri ga s, 20 08 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 28 27, at * 2; see also 18 U.S.C . § 3500(a ) (“In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the posses sion of the Unit ed S tat es whi ch w as mad e by a Go ver nm ent

witnes s or

pr os pec ti ve G ov er nm ent

witnes s (o th er than the defenda nt) s hall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection unt il s aid w it ne ss has testified on direct examin ation in th e trial of the case .” (emphasis added)). In addition, the District Court fo un d that

th e go ver nm ent

was no t i n ex clu s ive po s s es s io n o f a ny e xculp ato ry in fo r mat io n, s in ce def end ant s kn ew o f Ro th enb erger ’s r ol e at Ade lp hi a andth e f

act s abo ut whi ch h e co ul d t es ti fy ;
acco r di ngl y, Br ady di d n ot com pel di s clo s ur e of

th e go ver nm ent ’s in te r

vie w no te s with Ro th enb erger . Se e U nit ed Stat es v. P auli no , 44 5 F .3d211 , 22 4 (

2d Cir . 20 06) (“ T o es tab lis h a Br ady vio lat io n, a def end ant mu s t s ho w [ int

er ali a , that ] . . . the e vid enc e mu s t h ave b eens up pr es s ed b y the S tat e, ei th er willf ully o r in adv er te nt

ly .
. . . ” ( in te r nal qu ot ati onmar ks om it te d) ); United Sta tes v. Gaggi , 81 1 F .2d47, 59 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[N]o Brady violation oc curs if the defenda nt knew or should have know n the
es s ent ial fa ct s per mi tt

in g hi m t o t ake ad

van tag e of

any e xculp ato ry evi den ce.”). See ge nerally United St ate s v . Co ppa , 26 7 F .3d132 , 14 0 (

2d Cir . 20 01) (“ Altho ughth e go ver nm ent ’s ob lig ati on s un der Br ady ma y be thought of as a constitutional duty arising before or during the trial of a defendant, the
s cop e of th e go ver nm ent ’s con s ti tu ti on al d ut y—an d, con com it ant

ly, th e s cop e of

th e de fe nd ant ’s constitutional right—is defined retr oactive ly, by referenc e to the likel y effect that the suppress ion of evi den ce h ad o n the o ut com e of th e t r ial .”) Fi nally, th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t f ou ndth at t

he U ni te d S tat es At to r ney ’s Of

fi ce was no t i n p os s es s io n o f n ot es fr om SEC i nt er vie ws with Ro th enb erger

or other witnes s es , an d did no t h ave anob lig ati onto di s clo s e wh at they di d n ot po s s es s . Se e Ri

gas, 20 08 U .S. Di s t. LE XI S 28 27, at * 5- 6. W e d et ec t no er ror i n th e D ist ric t C ou rt’ s Ja nu a ry 15 , 2 00 8 O rde r de ny

in g d ef en da nts’ motion to compel discovery. Ac cordingly, w e affirm. CONCLUSI ON25

T o s um mar

ize: (1 ) The Di stri ctC ou rt w a s re qu ire d to re sen te nc e d ef en da nts de novo following the reve rs al of a portion of defendants’ convictions by another pane l of this Court
. (2) B as ed o n the D is tr

ict Cou r t’ s alt er nat

ive r ul in g init s J un e 24 , 20 08 r es ent enc in g or der , in wh ic h th e C ou rt re sen te nc ed de fe nd a nts de novo , we c onclude tha t the new sentence s impos ed on the Rigas es wer e pr oce du r ally ands ub s tan ti vely r eas on abl e. (3) We dete ct no error in the District Court’s November 20, 2007 opi nion and order denying th e Rig as es ’ m ot

io n f or a new tr ial
. (4 ) We det ect

no er r or inth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s J anu ary 15 , 20 08 m emo r and um andor der denyin g the Rigas es ’ m ot

io n t o co mp el dis cov ery. We hav e co ns id er ed all o f the Rigas es argum ent s onthis app eal. Fo r th e r eas on s s tat ed above, we A FFI RM the judgment of the District Court.