[Cite as State v. Crosby, 2017-Ohio-8349.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DONZELLE CROSBY 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 16CA011019 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 11CR082579 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: October 30, 2017 

 

CALLAHAN, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Donzelle Crosby, appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County 

Court of Common Pleas which denied his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} The facts and initial procedural history of this case were set out in Mr. Crosby’s 

direct appeal. See State v. Crosby, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010724, 2015-Ohio-5176, ¶ 2-3.

Mr. Crosby appealed from his convictions arguing that his convictions were based on insufficient 

evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence because of contradictions in the 

testimony of the witnesses, because his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to 

Bruton evidence, hearsay evidence, and witness bolstering, and because the court erred in not 

ordering a new competency evaluation. Id. at ¶ 4, 7, 13, 21-23, 25. This Court overruled Mr. 

Crosby’s assignments of error and affirmed his convictions. Id. at ¶ 29. 
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{¶3} On March 16, 2016, Mr. Crosby filed a petition in the trial court to vacate or set 

aside his convictions, in which he argued that attorney Jack Bradley was ineffective when he 

terminated his representation of Mr. Crosby to represent a co-defendant, who ultimately testified 

against Mr. Crosby. He also argued that his trial counsel were ineffective in not raising Mr. 

Bradley’s alleged conflict, the State of Ohio denied him due process (or alternatively committed 

prosecutorial misconduct) when it entered into a plea bargain with the co-defendant and allowed 

him to testify, and the trial court denied him the right to effective assistance of counsel when it 

failed to order a hearing on the “sufficiently apparent” conflict. 

{¶4} The trial court denied Mr. Crosby’s petition in a one paragraph journal entry dated 

August 23, 2016. Mr. Crosby filed a notice of appeal from this entry, and he now presents the 

four identical issues raised in his post-conviction petition as assignments of error for this Court’s 

review. The assignments of error have been consolidated to facilitate this Court’s discussion. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

ATTORNEY JACK BRADLEY COMMITTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

OF COUNSEL WHEN HE TERMINATED REPRESENTATION WITH [MR. 

CROSBY], A CURRENT CLIENT, TO REPRESENT JEREMY BROWN, A 

CO-DEFENDANT (NEVER REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY BRADLEY) IN 

THIS AGGRAVATED MURDER PROSECUTION. JEREMY BROWN WAS 

ONE OF THE PRIMARY EVIDENTIARY WITNESSES AGAINST [MR. 

CROSBY]. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN IT FAILED TO RAISE THE 

ISSUE OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN FACED WITH JEREMY 

BROWN TESTIFYING AGAINST [MR. CROSBY]. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

THE STATE OF OHIO DENIED [MR. CROSBY] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OR 

ALTERNATIVELY COMMITTED PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT WHEN IT 
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ALLOWED [MR.] BROWN TO TESTIFY AGAINST [MR. CROSBY] 

KNOWING THAT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WERE PRESENT WHEN 

DEVELOPING THE PLEA AGREEMENT WITH JEREMY BROWN AND 

[MR. CROSBY]. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED [MR. CROSBY] THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE IT WAS SUFFICIENTLY 

APPARENT [TO] THE COURT THAT [A] CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED. 

{¶5} Mr. Crosby’s four assignments of error are restatements of his arguments 

contained in his post-conviction relief petition. However, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of 

these assignments of error because Mr. Crosby’s petition was untimely filed. 

{¶6} The decision to grant or deny a petition for post-conviction relief is committed to 

the discretion of the trial court. State v. Glynn, 9th Dist. Medina No. 02CA0090-M, 2003-Ohio1799, ¶ 4. Therefore, this Court will not disturb the decision of a trial court regarding a petition 

for post-conviction relief absent an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is more than 

an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). It arises 

where the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id. 

{¶7} R.C. 2953.21 sets forth the statutory framework governing post-conviction relief, 

and imposes time limits for the filing of petitions seeking such relief. Specifically, R.C. 

2953.21(A)(2) provides in pertinent part: 

[A] petition [for post-conviction relief] shall be filed no later than three hundred 

sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of 

appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction * * *. 

Prior to the amendment of R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) on March 23, 2015, the timeframe for filing postconviction relief petitions was 180 days. See State v. Herzberger, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 

16CA010899, 2017-Ohio-491, ¶ 8, fn. 1, quoting State v. Cunningham, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-
4 

 

61, 2016-Ohio-3106, ¶ 12, fn. 2, quoting State v. Worthington, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2014-

12-022, 2015-Ohio-3173, ¶ 43, fn. 4. The applicable filing period is determined by the date the 

petition is filed. See Cunningham at ¶ 12, fn. 2. 

{¶8} In Mr. Crosby’s direct appeal, the trial transcript was filed with this Court on 

March 16, 2015. The amendment of R.C. 2953.21, one week later, extended Mr. Crosby’s 

deadline to file a petition for post-conviction relief from 180 days to 365 days. Thus, the deadline 

for Mr. Crosby to file his post-conviction relief petition was March 15, 2016.1 However, Mr. 

Crosby filed his petition on March 16, 2016, 1 day late. Consequently, Mr. Crosby’s petition was 

untimely filed. 

{¶9} The trial court does not have authority to entertain an untimely petition for postconviction relief unless the petitioner establishes the factors contained in either R.C. 

2953.23(A)(1) or (2), which permit a late filing. Herzberger at ¶ 8. In his petition, Mr. Crosby 

argued, albeit incorrectly, that the petition was timely filed. While he cited the correct statute and 

timeframe for filing, he miscalculated the expiration of the 365-day period. Apparently 

believing his petition was timely, Mr. Crosby did not assert any arguments to permit a late filing. 

{¶10} Because Mr. Crosby filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief and 

failed to demonstrate the statutory factors to permit a late filing, the trial court lacked authority to 

consider the petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. 

Crosby’s petition and Mr. Crosby’s assignments of error are overruled. 

 

1

 Because 2016 was a leap year, the filing deadline for the petition was March 15, 2016 and not 

March 16, 2016. 
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III. 

{¶11} Mr. Crosby’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 LYNNE S. CALLAHAN 

 FOR THE COURT 

SCHAFER, P. J. 

TEODOSIO, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

DONZELLE CROSBY, Appellant, pro se. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATASHA RUIZ GUERRIERI, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.