* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. PAUL KOZINA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-10231 D.C. No. 4:08-cr-00083-PJH-13
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 18, 2012 San Francisco, California Before: REINHARDT, NOONAN, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. Paul Kozina was convicted following a jury trial of one count of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and one count of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). On appeal, Kozina 

# FILED
JUL 13 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 makes several challenges to the evidence ad mitted against him at trial. Because the facts are known to the parties, we recount them here only as necessary to explain our decision. We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Kozina claims that the facts in the affidavit underlying the February 2008 search warrant were stale and did not es tablish probable cause. Before we consider probable cause, “we may proceed directly to the issue of whether there was good faith reliance.” United States v. Crews , 502 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 923-25 (1984)). The law enforcement officers who execu ted the search relied on the warrant in good faith because of evidence thatthe drug dealing went on after the surveillance period. The evidence created “acolorable argument that the search . . . was supported by probable cause . . . . ” Crews , 502 F.3d at 1136; see also United States v. Greany , 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pitts , 6 F.3d 1366, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1993). Kozina argues that the government sought, and obtained, roving wiretaps without authorization by a high-level Justice Department official. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by wiretap and review the district court’ s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Callum , 410 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2005).3 We affirm the district court’s ru ling because the communications did not require a roving wiretap. The wireta p in this case properly permitted the interception of communications to and from an identified cell phone number, which we have defined as a “communica tions facility.” Such a wiretap does not require higher-level Justice Department authorization. See United States v. Duran , 189 F.3d 1071, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999). Kozina argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress statements that he made while his wife Angelica Rodriguez was on the phone with Zaragoza and after Rodriguez di aled the number, but before Zaragoza answered it. We review the district c ourt’s ruling de novo. Kozina’s statements while Rodriguez was on the phone, were ma de without a reasonable expectation of privacy. They were wire communications th at fell within the ambit of the wiretap order. However, statements made by Kozina after Rodriguez dialed Zaragoza but before the phone was answered were oral communications not subject to the order. It was error to admit them. See In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral Communications , 349 F.3d 1132, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2003). Reversal is not warranted, however, because this error was harmless. See United States v. Brobst , 558 F.3d 982, 996 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quintero , 38 F.3d 1317, 1331 (3d Cir. 1994).4 Kozina appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements that Rodriguez made to Zaragoza on September 29, 2007. The district court’s finding that Rodriguez’s statemen ts to Zaragoza furthered the conspiracy must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Williams , 989 F.2d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1993). The district court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, since it was reasonable to infer that R odriguez called Zaragoza in order to update him on the status of the conspiracy and pave the way for further transactions. AFFIRMED.