In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2862

Robbin Weaver,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 2947--Elaine Bucklo, Judge. 

Argued February 13, 2001--Decided June 21, 2001

 Before Manion, Kanne, and Evans, Circuit

Judges.

 Manion, Circuit Judge. Robbin Weaver, a

slot machine attendant, was injured on a

riverboat casino owned by Hollywood

Casino-Aurora Inc. ("Hollywood"). She

sued for relief under general maritime

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333, and

the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 688, et

seq. The district court held a bench

trial, and awarded Weaver $20,000 under

the Jones Act for pain and suffering, but

found that there was no causal connection

between the injury and some of Weaver’s

physical complaints. The district court

also denied maintenance and cure, as well

as attorneys’ fees. Weaver appeals the

causation ruling, the denial of

maintenance and cure, and the denial of

attorneys’ fees. Because the record is

insufficient to determine whether

jurisdiction existed in the district

court over Weaver’s suit, we remand for

further proceedings.

I.

 On May 15, 1995, Weaver was employed as

a slot machine attendant on the City

Lights I, a riverboat casino owned by

Hollywood./1 A movable chest of drawers

containing coins and tokens, known as a

"bank," fell on another employee. These

banks are quite heavy, weighing between
1,000 and 1,500 pounds, and Weaver

injured her left wrist while helping to

push the bank off the other employee’s

foot. This was the second time in two

days that a bank had fallen over, so

Hollywood apparently knew they were

unstable.

 Weaver filed suit in federal district

court under general maritime jurisdiction

and the Jones Act, seeking damages for

injuries arising from the incident. The

district court held a bench trial.

Hollywood argued that the district court

lacked jurisdiction under the Jones Act

because a boat whose primary purpose is

gaming is not a Jones Act vessel. In an

effort to resolve this issue, the parties

orally stipulated that the boat had

navigational equipment, engines, a crew,

and a raked bow. At the behest of

Weaver’s counsel, Hollywood also

stipulated that the boat "cruises on a

navigable waterway." Moments later,

however, in response to a question from

the court, Hollywood’s counsel stated

that the City Lights I can only travel

"[t]hree hundred yards, because there is

a dam on the one side and a bridge on the

other side." The parties also stipulated

that the purpose of the boat was

gambling.

 The district court subsequently rejected

Hollywood’s jurisdictional argument,

concluding that a gaming ship "can be a

Jones Act vessel," and holding that

"[b]ecause the defendants have not come

forward with any evidence of special

circumstances that would defeat Ms.

Weaver’s jurisdictional showing," Jones

Act jurisdiction existed. Weaver, 121

F.Supp.2d at 1170. Hollywood did not

raise the jurisdictional issue on appeal,

but during oral argument this court

raised the question, and we later ordered

supplemental briefing on whether Jones

Act and general maritime jurisdiction

existed in light of the parties’ factual

stipulations before the district court.

II.

 While Hollywood did not appeal the

district court’s holding that it had

jurisdiction under the Jones Act, and the

issue of general maritime jurisdiction

was not even discussed below, "[n]o court

may decide a case without subject matter

jurisdiction, and neither the parties nor
their lawyers may stipulate to

jurisdiction or waive arguments that the

court lacks jurisdiction." United States

v. Tittjung, 235 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.

2000). Indeed, "[i]t is the duty of this

court to ’satisfy itself not only of its

own jurisdiction, but also that of the

lower courts in a cause under review.’"

EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1428

(7th Cir. 1996) (citing Mitchell v.

Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).

Accordingly, if the parties do not do so,

then a court must raise the

jurisdictional question on its own, as we

have done in this case. See Tittjung, 235

F.3d at 335; see also Florio v. Olson,

129 F.3d 678 (1st Cir. 1997) (considering

sua sponte the question of whether

admiralty jurisdiction existed).

 We review de novo the district court’s

legal determination of whether subject

matter jurisdiction exists, CCC Inform.

Services, Inc. v. Amer. Salvage Pool

Assoc., 230 F.3d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir.

2000), and we review the district court’s

factual determinations for clear error.

See Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d

729 (7th Cir. 1991).

A. Maritime Jurisdiction/2

 The Constitution extends to Article III

courts the power to hear "all Cases of

admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."

U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2. That power

was codified at 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333(1),

which provides for "original jurisdiction

. . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of

admiralty or maritime jurisdiction . . .

." 

 Historically, the only question in

determining whether admiralty or maritime

tort jurisdiction existed was whether the

tort occurred on navigable waters. See

Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531

(1995). Over time, the test has been

refined. Now, "a party seeking to invoke

federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1333(1) over a tort

claim must satisfy conditions of location

and of connection with maritime

activity." Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534.

 There is thus a two-prong test for

jurisdiction. The locality test reflects

the traditional requirement that a tort

occur on navigable waters. The
requirement of a connection with maritime

activity, also known as the nexus test,

raises two issues. The court must first

determine whether the incident involved

has "a potentially disruptive effect on

maritime commerce," and second, whether

"’the general character’ of the ’activity

giving rise to the incident’ shows a

’substantial relationship to traditional

maritime activity.’" See Grubart, 513

U.S. at 534 (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497

U.S. 358, 364, 364 n.2, 365 (1990)). We

begin with the location test.

 1. Location on navigable waters.

 As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a]

court applying the location test must

determine whether the tort occurred on

navigable water." See id. The seminal

case on navigable rivers is The Daniel

Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870). The Daniel Ball

set forth the following test:

Those rivers must be regarded as public

navigable rivers in law which are

navigable in fact. And they are navigable

in fact when they are used, or are

susceptible of being used, in their

ordinary condition, as highways for

commerce, over which trade and travel are

or may be conducted in the customary

modes of trade and travel on water. And

they constitute navigable waters of the

United States within the meaning of the

acts of Congress, in contradistinction

from the navigable waters of the States,

when they form in their ordinary

condition by themselves, or by uniting

with other waters, a continued highway

over which commerce is or may be carried

on with other States or foreign countries

in the customary modes in which such

commerce is conducted by water.

Id. at 563. See also Grubart, 513 U.S. at

530 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at

563)./3

 The suitability of a river for

interstate commerce, i.e., navigability

in fact, is thus crucial to general

maritime jurisdiction. As we have noted

previously, "[t]he logic of requiring

commercial activity is evident. The

purpose behind the grant of admiralty

jurisdiction was the protection and

promotion of the maritime shipping

industry through the development and
application, by neutral federal courts,

of a uniform and specialized body of

federal law." Chapman, 575 F.2d at 149

(quoting Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528

F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975)). See also

Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362. "No purpose is

served by application of a uniform body

of federal law, on waters devoid of trade

and commerce, to regulate the activities

and resolve the disputes of pleasure

boaters . . . . [T]he burdening of

federal courts and the frustrating of the

purposes of state tort law would thereby

be served." Chapman, 575 F.2d at 149-50

(quoting Adams, 528 F.2d at 440-41)

(emphasis added).

 In this case, the parties stipulated

that the Fox River (on which the

riverboat casino was located) is

navigable./4 Weaver claims that this is

a factual concession that the river is

navigable in fact. Accordingly, she urges

this court to find that the location test

is satisfied.

 If this stipulation were all the record

had to offer, Weaver might be correct.

But Hollywood contends that the statement

that the Fox River was navigable was a

reference to the river generally, not to

the portion of the river where the tort

occurred, and cites for support its

statement to the district court that the

boat was confined within a small portion

of the river. Weaver has never questioned

Hollywood’s testimony that the riverboat

casino could only move "[t]hree hundred

yards, because there is a dam on the one

side and a bridge on the other side."

Hollywood thus argues that the river

cannot be navigated at the point where

the City Lights I was located.

 Indeed, the fact that a river as a whole

is navigable is not dispositive for

purposes of maritime law. See, e.g.,

Leblanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353 (2d

Cir. 1999) (dammed river not navigable

even though it was capable of supporting

interstate commerce downstream from the

location at issue). See also Three Buoys

Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts,

921 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding

non-navigable a lake with an impassable

dam); Chapman, 575 F.2d 147 (holding that

admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to

tort claims on waters which once

supported commercial transportation but

subsequently only supported recreational
activities). The key to determining

whether there are navigable waters is the

river’s present navigability where the

injury transpired.

 For example, the Second Circuit recently

held that there was no admiralty

jurisdiction in a case involving an acci

dent between a kayak and a recreational

motor boat on the Hudson River. See

Leblanc, 198 F.3d 353. In Leblanc, the

court held that the river was not

navigable at the location of the accident

because of rapids, dams, and several

waterfalls, despite the fact that other

portions of the river were navigable and

the river as a whole was historically

used for commerce. Accordingly, the

Leblanc court determined that there was

no admiralty jurisdiction.

 The case before us presents a similar

factual scenario. Based on the

stipulations in this case, it is probable

that the waters in which the City Lights

I made its 300-yard trips are not

"navigable in fact." The dam and bridge

which obstructed the City Lights I

indicate--at this location--a river which

cannot be used as a highway for maritime

commerce. A dam and bridge which prevent

a riverboat casino from traveling over

300 yards are presumably not susceptible

to commercial shipping, and thus fail the

test set forth in The Daniel Ball.

 In addition, if the enclosed portion of

the Fox River at issue here is not

navigable upstream or downstream for

commercial shipping, it is also

impossible to engage in interstate travel

from this location. This part of the

river, located in Aurora, Illinois, is

entirely intrastate. "Those cases in

which circuit courts have found dammed

waterways navigable for jurisdictional

purposes are easily distinguished by the

fact that the waterway in question formed

the border between two states, thereby

rendering it capable of supporting

interstate commerce despite the existence

of artificial dams blocking downstream

flow." Leblanc, 198 F.3d at 359. Because

the waterway in this instance is located

entirely within the state of Illinois,

and given the circumstances of this case,

we conclude that this small, enclosed,

intrastate section of river is unlikely

to qualify as a navigable water under

general maritime law./5 
 Even so, it is theoretically possible

that although the river is impassable for

the City Lights I (a boat whose

dimensions might differ significantly

from the dimensions of other craft), this

part of the river could still serve as a

continuous highway for other vessels

designed for commercial shipping. While

the record is silent on this question,

outside sources indicate that the Fox

River is very likely not navigable. A

detailed map reveals that the Fox River

is riddled with dams, both within the

confines of the city of Aurora and within

a short distance upstream and downstream

of the city./6 

 Despite these apparent obstructions to

navigation, it appears from the record

that no consideration was given to the

possibility that the evidence precluded

the river from meeting the legal test for

navigability. There was certainly no

reference to navigability in the district

court opinion. Although Hollywood argues

strenuously in its supplemental brief

that the absence of navigable waters

precluded jurisdiction, this is the first

time this claim has been raised./7

Indeed, Hollywood’s counsel only noted

that the dam and bridge were impassable

in response to a question from the

district court about how the City Lights

I navigates, a question which was not

aimed at the location test.

 In this context the parties’

stipulations could be read to concede

that the Fox River is navigable in fact.

In many cases uncontested factual

stipulations can resolve a jurisdictional

question. Cf. Workman v. United Parcel

Service, Inc., 234 F.3d 998, 999-1000

(7th Cir. 2000). District courts are not

required to second-guess the parties’

stipulations to jurisdictional facts. For

example, "[i]f the plaintiff in a

diversity suit alleges, and the defendant

admits, that the defendant is

incorporated in Delaware, the district

judge is not required to run to Moody’s

to see whether it really is a Delaware

corporation, or to insist on the

production of a certified copy of the

defendant’s certificate of

incorporation." Prizevoits v. Indiana

Bell Telephone Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th

Cir. 1996).
 However, "[t]he rule against obtaining

federal jurisdiction by consent . . .

would be ineffectual if parties by

stipulating to jurisdictional facts could

remove them entirely from judicial

scrutiny." Id. at 135 (citations

omitted). "[I]f . . . facts brought out

in pretrial discovery or at trial, fairly

shriek that there is no federal

jurisdiction, the district judge must

conduct whatever supplementary factual

proceedings are necessary to resolve the

doubt." Kanzelberger v. Kanzelberger, 782

F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1986). Although

the district court did not do so here,

the appellate court, as noted, must also

satisfy itself of federal jurisdiction

over the case, and may order a case

dismissed when there is no doubt that the

district court lacked jurisdiction. See,

e.g., id. (citing Bialac v. Harsh Bldg.

Co., 463 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1972)

(dismissing case where factual

stipulation supporting diversity of

parties was clearly false)).

 In this case, the record makes it

unlikely that jurisdiction existed, and

the district court has made no inquiry

into the navigability of the Fox River

where the City Lights I was located. A

remand is appropriate in these

circumstances so the district court may

determine whether subject matter

jurisdiction exists. See Freeman v.

Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553

(5th Cir. 1985) (remanding to district

court after trial where plaintiff’s

assertion of diverse parties was unlikely

to be true). See also Kanzelberger, 782

F.2d at 777 (citing Freeman with

approval).

 2. Connection with maritime activity.

 Hollywood also argues that the second

requirement for general maritime

jurisdiction, a "connection with maritime

activity," was not met by the facts in

the record. First, Hollywood argues that

Weaver’s injury does not have the

required potential effect on maritime

commerce. In determining whether this

requirement is met, a court must consider

the incident giving rise to the claim at

an "intermediate level of generality."

See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538. The court

should not consider the particular facts

of the case before it, but must instead
"assess the general features of the type

of incident involved to determine whether

such an incident is likely to disrupt

commercial activity." Sisson, 497 U.S. at

363.

 Weaver claims the appropriate

description of the incident would be "an

injury occurring during rescue efforts on

a vessel on navigable waters." Hollywood

counters that the better description

would be "an injury to a slot machine

attendant on a floating casino that

cannot move beyond a confined area of

water." Hollywood thus argues that the

events giving rise to Weaver’s injury

could not possibly affect maritime

commerce.

 Hollywood’s description of the incident

in this case is too narrow and specific.

Cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539 (incident

described as "damage by a vessel in

navigable water to an underwater

structure" sufficiently indicated

potentially disruptive impact on maritime

commerce); Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363

(incident described as "fire on a vessel

docked at a marina on navigable waters"

satisfied potential disruption

requirement). Weaver’s description more

closely captures the general features of

the incident, although she narrows the

focus by including the detail that she

was involved in "rescue efforts." A more

appropriate description would be an

injury on board a vessel on navigable

waters (on the condition, of course, that

the court finds that the waters are

navigable).

 The next step is to determine what the

potentiality for the disruption of

maritime commerce is, based on the

general features of the incident. The key

is not whether the incident affected

maritime commerce, but whether it could

do so. In Sisson, for example, the

Supreme Court thought it relevant that a

fire on board a recreational boat at a

marina could impact other ships engaged

in maritime commerce, even though the

boat involved was not engaged in

commerce.

 Courts have used differing standards to

determine the potential for disruption of

maritime commerce. Compare H2O Houseboat

Vacations, Inc. v. Hernandez, 103 F.3d

914 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no potential
disruption of maritime commerce where

houseboat occupants were injured by

carbon monoxide fumes which could not

harm other boats, and refusing to

speculate on possible harms where to do

so would ignore the actual incident) with

Bay Casino LLC v. M/V Royal Empress, 1999

WL 33218594 (E.D.N.Y.) (finding potential

disruption of maritime commerce where a

passenger was served liquor during a

cruise and subsequently injured plaintiff

while driving on land); Young v. Players

Lake Charles, L.L.C., 47 F.Supp. 2d 832,

835 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (excessive amount of

alcohol served to casino patron while on

navigable waters). See also Delta Country

Ventures, Inc. v. Magana, 986 F.2d 1260,

1264 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,

dissenting) (disagreeing with majority’s

level of generality, while recognizing

that "disputes about the appropriate lev

el of generality always carry with them a

certain degree of arbitrariness.").

 This case does not require us to

speculate, however. The City Lights I was

a commercial boat engaged in the

transport of passengers for profit (even

if its ultimate end was gambling), and

without doubt an injury to one of its

crew disrupts its participation in

maritime commerce. Cf. Great Lakes Dredge

& Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.3d

225, 230 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’d sub nom.

Grubart, 513 U.S. 527 (1995) ("Because

commerce on the river was actually

disrupted for more than a month, this

question answers itself. Yes, there was

such a potential. In fact, it was

realized.").

 If the district court finds on remand

that the river is navigable, then the

substantial relationship to traditional

maritime activities requirement is easily

met in this case. The Supreme Court has

held that even noncommercial vessels when

navigating in navigable waters have a

substantial relationship to traditional

maritime activities. See Foremost Ins.

Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668

(1982)./8 On this record the City

Lights I was navigating when the incident

occurred. The general character of the

riverboat’s activity thus relates to

traditional maritime activity.

Accordingly, the nexus test would be met,

and it only remains to determine on

remand whether Weaver’s injury occurred

in navigable waters.
B. The Jones Act

 Weaver alleged another basis of

jurisdiction, one on which the district

court relied, namely the Jones Act. The

Jones Act provides jurisdiction for a

"seaman" who suffers personal injury in

the course of his employment. 46 U.S.C.

sec. 688. To qualify as a seaman under

the Jones Act, "an employee’s duties must

’contribut[e] to the function of the ves

sel or to the accomplishment of its mission.’"

McDermott Int’l Inc. v. Wilander, 498

U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (quoting Offshore

Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th

Cir. 1959)). In addition, "a seaman must

have a connection to a vessel in

navigation (or to an identifiable group

of such vessels) that is substantial in

terms of both its duration and its

nature." Chandris v. Latsis, 515 U.S.

347, 368 (1995). 

 Weaver argues that "[i]n contrast to

general maritime law, there is no

locality requirement for the Jones Act .

. . ." While Weaver is correct that the

Jones Act does not focus on the location

of the vessel at the time of the injury,

Jones Act jurisdiction still requires a

relationship to navigable waters. This is

because jurisdiction under the Jones Act

"depends ’not on the place where the

injury is inflicted . . . but on the

nature of the seaman’s service, his

status as a member of the vessel, and his

relationship . . . to the vessel and its

operation in navigable waters.’"

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting

Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1,

4 (1946)) (emphasis added). Thus, a ship

with no connection to navigable waters is

not a source of Jones Act jurisdiction.

See also Johnson, 742 F.2d at 1063.

 The Third Circuit’s recent decision in

Reeves v. Mobil Dredging & Pumping Co.,

Inc., 26 F.3d 1247 (3rd Cir. 1994),

confirms this conclusion. As the Reeves

court explained, "[a]lthough the

requirement is not expressly stated in

the [Jones Act], the Supreme Court has

long required that the injury occur

through the employee’s relationship to a

vessel on a navigable body of water." See

id. at 1253 (citing Swanson, 328 U.S. at

6) (emphasis in original). Accordingly,

the Reeves court concluded that the Jones

Act did not provide jurisdiction over a
claim arising on a vessel in a man-made,

landlocked lake located entirely within

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

 If the water at issue in this case is

similarly locked between a bridge and a

dam (or is impassable to commercial

shipping because of adjacent dams both

upstream and downstream), as in Reeves

the Jones Act would not provide

jurisdiction. But as noted above, the

record sheds insufficient light on this

question. Therefore, the district court

must determine on remand whether Weaver

was employed on a boat with the requisite

relationship to navigable waters for

purposes of the Jones Act.

 Hollywood also contests the district

court’s holding that the City Lights I is

a "vessel" for Jones Act purposes. As

noted by the Fifth Circuit, the term

"vessel" has not been precisely defined

in this context. See Gremillion v. Gulf

Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 293

(5th Cir. 1995) ("[I]t has been suggested

that ’three men in a tub would also fit

within our definition, and one could

probably make a convincing case for Jonah

inside the whale.’") (quoting Burks v.

American River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69,

75 (5th Cir. 1982)). If the casino were

indefinitely moored (as the record

suggests it is now), its status as a

vessel in navigation would be doubtful.

See Pavone v. Miss. Riverboat Amusement

Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 570 (5th Cir. 1995).

There is some difference of opinion,

however, on when floating casinos which

travel on a river are Jones Act vessels.

Compare Davis v. Players Lake Charles

Riverboat, Inc., 74 F.Supp.2d 675

(W.D.La. 1999) (finding a riverboat

casino was not a vessel because any

navigation was incidental to the boat’s

primary purpose of gambling) with Wiora

v. Harrah’s Illinois Corp., 68 F.Supp.2d

988 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (Williams, J.)

(finding a riverboat casino was a vessel

where it traveled on navigable waters).

 If the riverboat casino were a

traditional craft navigating in navigable

waters, it would presumably be a vessel

and the Jones Act would apply. See

Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 293. But

Hollywood claims that the City Lights I,

in its role as a riverboat casino, is an

unconventional craft. In order to

determine vessel status for an
unconventional craft, "it is necessary to

focus upon the ’purpose for which the

craft is constructed and business in

which it is engaged.’" See id. (quoting

Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor

Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th

Cir. 1978)). According to the parties’

stipulation the purpose of the City

Lights I was gambling. Citing Davis,

Hollywood argues that the casino

therefore cannot be a Jones Act vessel,

even if it makes short trips over

navigable water.

 Weaver does not agree that the City

Lights I is an unconventional craft.

Weaver also contends that the Davis case

is bad law, and that Supreme Court

precedent requires us to consider the

activity of the City Lights I not as

gambling, but as navigation.

 We conclude based on the stipulations

regarding the boat’s engines, crew, and

other traditional vessel characteristics

that the City Lights I is or at least was

a traditional vessel. Cf. Gremillion, 904

F.2d at 293 (listing some attributes of

traditional vessels). Hollywood

nevertheless contends that the casino is

an unconventional craft because it only

navigates the Fox River to comply with

the then-Illinois statutory requirement

that gambling boats do so./9 The

problem for Hollywood is that this very

circumstance defeats their argument, even

if the City Lights I were an

unconventional craft. Navigation is so

intertwined with gambling in this

particular case that it is impossible to

extricate the one from the other. Under

the then-existing law the casino was

required to navigate the river whenever

it hosted gambling activities. In other

words, a primary purpose of the riverboat

was navigation--although it was also a

means to an end, navigation was hardly

incidental to the activities of the City

Lights I. Accordingly, jurisdiction would

exist if the district court determines on

remand that the boat at the time of the

injury had the requisite connection with

navigable waters.

III.

 The stipulations before the district

court raise serious questions whether the

district court possessed subject matter

jurisdiction over Weaver’s claims, under
both federal maritime law and the Jones

Act. Because the record is not

sufficiently developed for us to

determine whether jurisdiction exists,

this case is REMANDED for proceedings in

accord with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

/1 In light of our jurisdictional holding, we present only a brief overview of the background

events leading to Weaver’s suit, which for the

most part are not relevant to our decision below.

For a more in-depth discussion of the events

giving rise to this case, see Weaver v. Hollywood

Casino Aurora, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 1169 (N.D.

Ill. 2000). 

/2 The terms "admiralty" and "maritime" are used

interchangeably for purposes of this opinion as

the precedents discussed below use both terms. As

noted by a leading treatise, "[i]nsofar as the

reference is to substantive law, the terms

’admiralty’ and ’maritime law’ are virtually

synonymous in this country today, though the

first derives from the connection of our modern

law with the system administered in a single

English court, while the second makes a wider and

more descriptive reference." Grant Gilmore and

Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty sec.

1-1 (2d ed., 1975).

/3 The definition of "navigable waters" in one

context does not necessarily apply in other

contexts. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444

U.S. 164, 171-72 (1979). The definition of navigable waters for Commerce Clause purposes generally extends beyond the definition in the context

of maritime law. See Chapman v. United States,

575 F.2d 147, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1978) (en banc),

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893 (1978).

/4 The Fox River discussed herein should not be

confused with Wisconsin’s Fox River, the navigability of which is analyzed at length in The

Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874).

/5 It may seem strange for a boat with crew, engines, etc., to be placed in such a location. At

the time of Weaver’s injury, Illinois required

gambling facilities to travel on water. The

statute was subsequently amended to eliminate the

requirement. See 230 ILCS 10/11(1).

/6 In fact, a regional website devoted to paddleboating offers detailed instructions and Census

Bureau coordinates so that recreational parties

may portage around Aurora’s several dams. See

http://www.chicagopaddling.org.
/7 Before the district court, Hollywood’s counsel

stated that the question of whether the floating

casino was engaged in a traditional maritime

activity was the only issue raised ("I’m not

contesting that she was working aboard the vessel, that the vessel was in navigation, all the

other factors that would be considered."). R.43

at 66.

/8 Hollywood also argues that there is no substantial relationship to traditional maritime activities because the riverboat casino is not a "vessel" under maritime law. However, for these

purposes "a craft is a ’vessel’ if its purpose is

to some reasonable degree ’the transportation of

passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to

place across navigable waters.’" Great Lakes

Dredge & Dock Co., 3 F.3d at 229 (quoting Johnson

v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054,

1063 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211

(1985)). Assuming the navigable waters requirement is met, the riverboat in this case is

clearly a vessel for purposes of general maritime

jurisdiction.

/9 The fact that the casino "navigates" the Fox

River is of course not relevant to a determination whether the river is legally a "navigable

water." A craft could navigate a swimming pool

without the pool qualifying as navigable in the

sense required for jurisdiction.