Supreme Court
N o. 2018

- 24

- Appeal. ( 15

- 803

- 1 )

In re Violet G. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at (401) 2 22

- 3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. June 19, 2019 June 19, 2019- 1

- Supreme Court
N o. 2018

- 24

- Appeal. ( 15

- 803

- 1 )

In re Violet G. :

P re sent: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia , JJ. O P I N I O N Justice Goldberg , for the Court. The respondent, Jennifer L

. (respondent) , appeals from a decree entered in the Family Court that terminated her parental rights with respect to her daughter , Violet G ., who was born on December 24, 2013

. This case came before the Supreme
Court on March 28 , 2019, pursuant to an order directing the partie s to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After reviewing the parties ’ memoranda and considering their oral arguments , we are satisfied that cause has not been shown, and we proceed to decide the appe al at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decree of the Family Court.
Facts and Travel On October 5, 2016, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) filed a petition 1 in th e Family Court seeking to involuntarily ter minate the parental rights of respondent

. A neglect petition seeking commitment of Violet to the care, custody , and control of DCYF also was pending

. In the termination petition, DCYF alleged that Violet had been placed in DCYF ’ s custody or care for at least twelve months; that respondent was “offered or received services to

1 The petition also named Violet’s father ; however, he subsequently agreed to a direct consent adoption of Violet to her foster mother on January 27 , 2017.- 2

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correct the situation which led to the child being placed”; and that there was “ not a substantial probability that the child [would] be able to return safely to [respondent ’ s] care within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home.” See G.L. 1956 § 15

- 7

- 7(a)(3)

. After t he respondent declined to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights and conse nt to Violet’s adoption , the case proceeded to trial, which was held before a Family Court justice over eight trial days between February 14 and July 25, 2017 . For reasons that are not clear in the record, the neglect petition was consolidated with the te rmination petition by agreement of the parties. In light of respondent’s chronic mental illness and her love for her child , we recount the trial testimony in detail. John Parsons , Ph.D. (Dr. Parsons), an expert in the field of clinical psychology , testi fied that respondent was referred to him by DCYF for a psychological evaluation because respondent’s “mental health and capacity to care for her daughter ” was in question

. The DCYF provided Dr. Parsons with records outlining its concerns for Violet ’s care and custody, along with several of respondent’s medical records

. These records disclosed that respondent had a “significant amount of mental health history” and had been hospitalized for : (1) psychiatric reasons between fifteen and twenty times ; (2) mult iple suicide attempts ; (3) a question of substance abuse ; and (4) multiple episodes of domestic violence involving Violet’s father, both as victim and perpetrator

. D octor Parsons testified that he completed an evaluation of respondent after four separate

m eetings between August 3, 2015 , and November 13, 2015, and also conducted one parent

- child evaluation session with respondent and Violet present

. He testified that , on one occasion, respondent came into her appointment “with a bathing suit top on and shor ts [ , ] ” was “ somewhat disheveled [ , ] ” and “appeared to be in a manic state.” He described her history as : “ J ust a very,- 3

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very sad case of someone, you know , that it wasn’t her fault. She just basically has chronic
mental health issues that interfered with a ll aspects of her life.” Throughout respondent’s evaluation, Dr. Parson s testified , her “ mood was unstable ” and her speech was “pressured and
loud [,]” even though she tried, unsuccessfully, to speak in a more “moderated fashion [

. ] ” During the parent

- chi ld evaluation meeting , Violet was reluctant to separate from her foster parents, who stayed with her for the entire session. Violet would not make eye contact with respondent and whimpered throughout the session . A lthough respondent made attempts at

conv ersation with her daughter, Dr. Parsons testified , Violet refused to speak with respondent;
Dr. Parsons noted that there was “limited evidence of a positive bond.” Thereafter, respondent “became overwhelmed and was crying, and she tried to hug Violet, who pushed her away at the end of the session.”
D octor Parsons diagnosed respondent with “bipolar disorder with psychotic features [ , ] ” but no cognitive impair ment

. With respect to the goal of reunification, Dr. P arsons recommended that respondent have “act ive involvement with mental health, substance abuse treatment with random supervised toxicology screens , ” and that respondent “be given six months to resolve or ma k e improvement as far as the areas that we talked about, and if not, the Court should termina te her rights.” Joshua Cottle (Cottle) , a child protective investigator with DCYF, testified that he became involved in Violet’s case on April 29, 2015, after a telephone call received by the child abuse hotline reporting that respondent had taken too muc h of a prescribed medication. According to Cottle, he went to respondent’s mother’s home, where he encountered respondent, her parents , and Violet, who presented “no outward signs of child maltreatment.” The respondent told Cottle that she had taken two s leeping pills because Violet’s father had been arrested for- 4

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domestic violence. O n May 1, 2015, DCYF learned that Violet’s father was back in the home and that he had been arrested for violating a no - contact order

— Violet was not present during her father’s subsequent arrest . Cottle also testified that , in a prior domestic

- violence incident between the couple, respondent engaged in an act of domestic violence against Violet’s father

. Carl Desjarlais (Desjarlais) , a caseworker with DCYF , testified that he w as first assigned to Violet’s case in July 2015

. In total, Desjarlais prepared four case plans for respon dent ; he testified that reunification with Violet was the primary goal for each case plan. During their first meeting, respondent discussed her menta l

- health status and informed Desjarlais that she had a history of hospitalizations

. The r espondent disclosed that she had a medical marijuana card for headaches; however, Desjarlais testified that she was advised not to use marijuana by counselors
at Comm unity Care Alliance , a mental

- health facility respondent was attending before Desjarlais’ assignment to Violet’s case

. He also testified that respondent told him that she had attempted suicide on more than one occasion. Initially, w hile Violet was in fost er care, Desjarlais testified , respondent’s supervised visits with Violet were held weekly at the Woonsocket DCYF office. However, the visits were “difficult” and Violet , who was “very apprehensive to visit [,] ” took at least twenty minutes to warm up to r espondent each time. In November 2015 , respondent was referred to Northern Rhode Island Visitation (NRIV) for visitation

. Unfortunately, respondent’s visit s with Violet through NRIV lasted for only “two t o three weeks” because respondent “didn’t think th e visitation program had her best interest in mind, ” and she accused NRIV of conspiring with
DCYF to remove Violet

. Based upon NRIV’s discharge recommendation, respondent’s visits were changed from weekly to biweekly, and Desjarlais supervised th ose visit s.- 5

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I n February 2016, respondent was referred to the Families Together visitation program at the Providence Children’s Museum , which offers support in regard to parenting and visitation. Desjarlais informed respondent that , as the goal of reunification bec ame more viable, and if the visits progressed successfully, visits would become less restrictive, more frequent , and for a longer duration. After eighteen consecutive weekly visits, respondent was discharged from the
program ; t he discharge report conclude d that respondent struggled with visitation , and recommended a permanency plan other than reunification with Violet and that the visits again be reduced to biweekly. Desjarlais also spoke about respondent’s issues with domestic violence , which were reporte d to him in the fall of 2015, including an incident wh ere respondent punched her mother in the nose, another time when respondent cut the cords to her mother’s electrical appliances, and another time when respondent bit her mother on the wrist and breasts and would not allow her mother to leave the room. As a result, respondent was referred to Blackstone Valley Advocacy
Center , where she attended “twelve or sixteen” group counseling sessions for domestic violence. The four case plans prepared by Desjarlai s were introduced into evidence. He summarized the goals of each plan , which included mental

- health counseling, medication compliance , arriving on time for visitation with a snack or game, and following the recommendation of the providers , as well as comp leting probation requirements , including domestic

- violence counseling. He testified that , although respondent had been consistent with her visits and was currently compliant with services, he did not recommend reunification with Violet. He testified that he based his recommendation on respondent’s “history of mental health concerns,* * * her inconsistency of maintaining proper medications, ” her “ sometimes aggressive- 6

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and assaultive behavior when she is off medication [ , ] ” and his concern that , when she slee ps all day, she would not be able to supervise Violet. Amanda Grandchamp (Grandchamp), a family clinician in the Families Together program at the Providence Children’s Museum, testified that respondent attended thirteen out of fifteen scheduled visits betw een June 9, 2016 , and October 5, 2016. She described respondent as having inconsistent moods, including depression and anxiety

. Grandchamp testified that , at one meeting, respondent became “volatile and was verbally aggressive,” she “stood up and was
shout ing at points, upset at things that had been discussed during the meeting s [ , ] ” and accused the social worker of wanting to adopt Violet. Grandchamp testified that she recommend ed that visitation needed to be fully supervised and monitored, and should be bi weekly because of her

“ concerns about the relationship with Violet and Violet’s apprehensiveness and [respondent’s] mental health and lack of improvement with behavior changes.” Grandchamp recommended that an alternate permanency plan be developed

. The Fa mily Court justice reserve d decision on the termination of parental rights petition pending an opportunity for Dr. Parsons to review the documents submitted into evidence and for the parties to recall him for further testimony. However, she found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent had neglected Violet, and directed that visitation be reduced to biweekly supervised sessions. Subsequently, Dr. Parsons again testified and stated that he had seen respondent for re

- evaluation on three occasion s

— t wo session s with respondent and the third session with respondent and Violet

. During the third session, Dr. Parsons testified , Violet “was tearful; would not make eye contact with anyone[ ,] ” and was in such visible distress that he stopped the session aft er approximately twenty

- five minutes. The respondent also exhibited hostility toward Violet’s foster mother and Dr. Parsons , and was crying and screaming in the- 7

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waiting room. His expert opinion was clear and definite : reunification between respondent and Violet was a significant risk . He added that , although respondent appeared to be taking her prescribed medication and had not had any recent hospitalizations, she had not engaged in mental

- health therapy in months and had not disclosed that information. He noted that “there is no doubt that [respondent] truly loves this little girl, but my sense is with her own limited insight into her mental illness, that she doesn’t have the protective capacity [.]” D octor Parsons stated that , in his opinion, there wer e no other services that DCYF could offer to respondent to aid in reunification. The respondent testified last and provided the court with a selection of photos, which pictured Violet with respondent, respondent’s mother , and Violet’s father. The respond ent testified to her observation of one photo in particular as , “[ Violet ] has a smile on her face. She is very happy to be with me.” Among other things, respondent stated that “Mr. Desjarlais was cold, calculated and just as cold and calculated as his coh ort, * * * Dr. Parsons, as well as Amanda Grandchamp, who I found emotionally banal and just non

- engaging.” The respondent testified that she was of the opinion that she had “participated in everything on the service plan required of [her] .”
On August 30, 2017 , the Family Court justice issued a comprehensive written decision, spanning fifty

- two pages, concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
best interest of Violet . T he trial justice conducted an in

- depth review of all the te stimony, as well as relevant portions of the trial exhibit s , and made seventy

- three separate findings of fact. Sh e found , by clear and convincing evidence , that respondent was unfit because s he was unable to complete the objectives of h er case plans, whic h DCYF had carefully tailored in an effort to address the specific issues in this case. The Family Court justice then went on to find , by clear- 8

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and convincing evidence, that “DCYF developed four case plans and made reasonable efforts to assist [respondent ] with parenting and reunification with Violet to no avail due to [respondent’s] noncompliance with DCYF and service providers which renders her unfit to parent Violet now or in the foreseeable future .” Despite the efforts of DCYF and numerous service pro viders , the court found , “visitation with [respondent] and Violet has been very traumatic for Violet, there is no maternal bond between Violet and [respondent] despite two years of efforts[.]” T he Family Court justice c oncluded that “there is not a substa ntial probability that [Violet] will be able to return safely to [respondent ’ s] care within a reasonable period of time considering [ Violet’s ] age
* * * and [ her ] need for a permanent home .” Accordingly, the Family Court justice held that termination of r espondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. A decree terminating respondent’s parental rights to Violet entered on September 6, 2017, and a timely notice of appeal was filed on September 18, 2017. Standard of Review “On appeal, ‘ th is Court reviews termination of parental rights rulings by examining the record to establish whether the Family Court justice ’ s findings are supported by legal and competent evidence. ’ ” In re Amiah P. , 54 A.3d 446, 451 (R.I. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quot ing
In re Victoria L. , 950 A.2d 1168, 1174 (R.I. 2008)). “These findings are entitled to great weight, and this Court will not disturb them unless they are clearly wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Id. (quoting In re Victoria L. , 950 A.2d at 1174). Such findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See id. “Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.” I d. (quoting In re Destiny D. , 92 2 A.2d 168, 172 (R.I. 2007)). “Before terminating a parent ’ s rights to his or her child, the [Family Court] justice must find that- 9

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the parent is unfit.” Id

. “In these cases, the right to due process requires that the state support its allegations by cle ar and convincing evidence.” Id. “However, once the [Family Court] justice determines parental unfitness, ‘the best interests of the child outweigh all other considerations.’”
Id. (quoting In re Jazlyn P. , 31 A.3d 1273, 1279 (R.I. 2011 ) )

. Analysis Befo re this C ourt, respondent assigns error to the Family Court justice ’s finding of unfitness; her conclusion that DCYF made reasonable efforts to provide services to address the circumstances that led to Violet’s placement in the first instance ; and her dete rmination that the termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of Violet

. After carefully reviewing the Family Court record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that legally competent evidence exists to support the findin gs of the Family Court justice. Parental Fitness
A parent is deemed unfit when the parent has “exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to the child, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an e xtended period of time[.]” See § 15

- 7

- 7(a)(2)(vii). A finding of parental unfitness under § 15

- 7

- 7(a)(2) made by a trial justice is “entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [it is] clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceive d or overlooked material evidence.” In re Jennifer R. , 667 A.2d 535, 536 (R.I. 1995). In finding respondent unfit, t he Family Court justice ’s determination rested on respondent’s stark failure to follow through with the treatment services provided to her and her inability to reach stability in terms of her mental health , behavior that led to Violet ’s placement
in the care and custody of DCYF for over two years

. Specifically, t he Family Court justice found, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent failed to address her parenting and- 10

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substance

- abuse issues, as well as her very real need for mental

- health treatment and medication management. T he court found that reunification would be high risk and not in Violet’s best
interests because respondent’s lack of cooperation with DCYF services and failure to comply with DCYF case plans render ed her unfit to parent Violet

. Accordingly, d espite respondent ’ s contention that the record is devoid of sufficient evidence of parental unfitness, our review of the record convinces us that legally competent evidence exists to support the Family Court justice’ s findings as to parental unfitness

. Reasonable Efforts In order for the Family Court to terminate a respondent’s parental rights in accordance with § 15

- 7

- 7 (a) (2)(vii), it is incumbent upon DCYF to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made “reasonable efforts” to “encourage and strengthen the parental relationship [

. ] ” Section 15

- 7

- 7(b)(1). In addition, § 15

- 7

- 7(a)(3) mandates that DCYF establis h by clear and convincing evidence that it offered “ services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the situation that led to the [child’s] removal ” from the parent ’ s care. In re Lauren B. , 78 A

. 3d 752, 760 (R.I. 2013). Under no circumstance have w e enlarged these requirements to a point where DCYF need demonstrate that it took “extraordinary efforts [

. ] ” Id. (quoting In re Jose
Luis R.H. , 968 A.2d 875, 882 (R.I. 2009)). Rather, the law requires that DCYF employ “reasonable efforts,” and the reasona bleness of such efforts “must be determined from the ‘particular facts and circumstances of each case.’” In re Joseph S. , 788 A.2d 475, 478 (R.I. 2002) (quoting In re Kristen B. , 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989)). After reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that the Family Court justice correctly concluded that DCYF complied with its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with Violet

. Indeed, s he found that DCYF “made extraordinary efforts” to- 11

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strengthen and encourage t he parental relationship between respondent and Violet for more than two years , including four case plans, numerous suitable arrangements for visitation, and referrals
to various family services to assist with parenting, substance abuse, domestic violence, mental

health counseling , and management of medication

. See In re Jose Luis R.H. , 968 A.2d at 882

. The respondent was unwilling to or simply incapable of complying with these reasonable efforts; she refuse d to acknowledge a serious mental

- health issue th at impacts her ability to care for Violet. The Family Court justice concluded that, “[a]lthough she may attend parenting classes and counseling, [respondent] is unable or unwilling to follow the guidance, advice and counseling given to her about parenting Violet, and therefore not able to ensure the child’s safety and wellbeing

. ” Accordingly, we perceive no basis for disturbing the finding of the trial justice that DCYF made reasonable efforts at reunification, and we hold that, on this record, there was clear and convincing evidence of the same. The Best Interests of the Child Once DCYF has demonstrated parental unfitness and has shown that it made reasonable efforts at reunification, the analysis then shifts to the overarching issue of the best interest s of the child , a determination that outweighs all others. In re Kristina L. , 520 A.2d 574, 580 (R.I. 1987). In the case at bar, t he Family Court justice concluded that “[Violet] has been in DCYF care continuously since her removal in July of 2015, and t hat it is in her best interest that she be adopted by her foster family due to [respondent’s] inability to care for her now or in the
foreseeable future

. ” The Family Court justice made several findings in support of her conclusion. She noted that “Violet becomes very upset during visits with her mother [and, although] the mother clearly loves Violet, it is eviden t that [respondent ’s ] mental health issues and ‘erratic behavior,’ which this court has observed on numerous occasions throughout the trial,- 12

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is u psetting to Violet.” In addition, the trial justice detailed respondent’s behavior in front of Violet and others: “[ R espondent] gets anxious and cannot control her emotions”; “respondent can escalate and becomes angry”; and “Dr. Parsons observed [responden t] shouting at Violet and questioning her about the visits.” The Family Court j ustice concluded that “Violet is only
3 years old and her mother appears to be very scary to her.” Although we remain mindful of the “significance of severing the bond betwee n parent and child,” we are satisfied that the evidence presented in this case supported the termination of the respondent ’ s parental rights. In re Alexis L. , 972 A.2d 159, 170 (R.I. 2009) (“[T]his Court is ever cognizant of the significance of severing t he bond between parent and child[; however,] it is in the best interests of children to have a safe and nurturing environment in which to live, learn and grow.”). Accordingly, a fter careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the Family Court just ice’s findings are not clearly wrong and that s he did not overlook or misconceive material evidence. We therefore refuse to disturb the Family Court justice ’ s conclusion that termination of respondent’ s parental rights was in the best interest of Violet

. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decree of the Family Court terminating the respondent ’ s parental rights with respect to h er daughter, Violet

. The papers may be remanded to the Family Court.SU

‐ CMS

‐ 02A (revised June 2016) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case In re Violet G. Case Number No. 2018-24-Appeal. (15-803-1) Date Opinion Filed June 19, 2019 Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Inde g lia, JJ. Written By Associate Justice Maur een McKenna Goldberg Source of Appeal Providence County Family Court Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Laureen D’Ambra

Attorney(s) on Appeal For Petitioner: Karen A. Clark Department of Children, Youth & Families For Respondent:
C y nthia E. MacCausland, Esq.