FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BOBBY JOE KNIGHT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

PAM AHLIN, Executive

Director,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10-56211

D.C. No. 

2:10-cv-00039-

CAS-RZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

February 14, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed March 13, 2013

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, and 

Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion
2 KNIGHT V. AHLIN

 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

*

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

SUMMARY

*

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a 28

U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition by a California state

prisoner challenging his detention pending a civil

commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predators

Act (SVPA). Knight was convicted of rape and sentenced to

20 years. Before his expected release in 2004, the state filed

a SVPA petition and the superior court ordered that petitioner

Knight remain in custody while awaiting trial. After

challenging his detention in state court, Knight filed his

federal petition, which the district court denied under the

Younger abstention doctrine. The panel held that Younger

does not apply because the proceedings are not “ongoing.”

The panel remanded with instructions that the district court

grant a conditional writ requiring that Knight be tried within

90 days or released and the SVPA petition dismissed.

COUNSEL

Matthew B. Larsen, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Patrick D. Moran and Shirley S. N. Sun, Deputy District

Attorneys, Los Angeles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.
KNIGHT V. AHLIN 3

 According to the SVPA, the state may civilly detain a prior sex 1

offender and indefinitely commit him to state hospitals, if at trial the state

proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” that he is likely to “engage in

sexually violent criminal behavior” due to a mental disorder. See CAL.

WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6602, 6604; 6600(a)(1). The SVPA outlines the

process of commitment by civil petition, id. § 6601, and provides that

soon after the state files a petition, the Superior Court shall hold a hearing

and determine “whether there is probable cause” to believe the respondent

“is likely to engage in” sexually violent criminal behavior after his release.

Id. § 6602. If so, the court “shall order” the respondent remanded to state

custody pending trial. Id.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bobby Joe Knight is a convicted rapist who served twenty

years in California state prison. Knight’s confinement

pursuant to his prison sentence was expected to end in 2004,

but just before his release, the state filed a civil petition

against him under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act

(“SVPA”), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 et seq.

1

Knight waived his right to a probable cause hearing, and the

Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered him to remain in

custody “in a secure facility” while awaiting trial. Id. § 6602.

The state’s petition has never been tried. Between 2004

and 2009, Knight’s counsel repeatedly requested or stipulated

to numerous continuances, while Knight personally made

repeated requests for new counsel. For its part, the

government either acquiesced or agreed to the continuances.

No effort was made to push the case to trial.

In April 2009, Knight filed a pro se habeas corpus

petition in the Superior Court, claiming that his exceedingly
4 KNIGHT V. AHLIN

lengthy detention violated his constitutional rights. However,

the court denied the petition and the California appellate

courts agreed. Meanwhile, Knight remained in custody and

the SVPA petition made no progress. Knight’s counsel and

the government agreed to further continuances and came no

closer to a trial on the merits. 

On December 22, 2009, Knight turned to the federal

courts for relief and initiated another pro se habeas petition.

The district court concluded that the doctrine of Younger

abstention applied and dismissed Knight’s case. We disagree.

I. YOUNGER ABSTENTION

The Younger abstention doctrine provides that in certain

limited circumstances, federal courts may refuse to hear

plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to underlying and

ongoing state criminal or civil proceedings. See Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm.

v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

Abstention is appropriate only in “carefully defined”

circumstances, and “remains an extraordinary and narrow

exception to the general rule” that federal courts must not

decline to exercise their jurisdiction. New Orleans Pub.

Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.

350, 359 (1989); Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of

Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Younger abstention doctrine generally provides that

when: (1) the underlying “hearings at issue constitute an

ongoing state judicial proceeding”; (2) “the proceedings

implicate important state interests”; (3) “there [is] an

adequate opportunity in the state proceedings” for the federal

plaintiff “to raise constitutional challenges”; and (4) the
KNIGHT V. AHLIN 5

federal action would “enjoin” the state proceedings “or have

the practical effect of doing so,” federal courts should abstain.

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (en

banc); Potrero, 657 F.3d at 882 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

II. APPLICATION

We review the district court’s application of Younger

abstention de novo, Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 982 n.19, and

reverse. 

Younger abstention fundamentally requires an ongoing

state proceeding. See Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 973. But

Knight’s SVPA petition proceedings were not “ongoing,”

except in name only, when he filed his federal habeas

petition. See id. at 969 n.4 (“critical date” for deciding

whether Younger abstention applies is “the date the federal

action is filed”);Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th

Cir. 1987). Moreover, the state court has postponed

consideration of the case pending a decision in the federal

court. Because the proceedings are not “ongoing,” Younger

abstention does not apply. See Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of

Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988). In Walnut

Properties, Inc., we held that where the state court

proceedings had been stayed “pending resolution of the

federal proceedings,” there “were no truly ‘ongoing’

proceedings which would justify abstention.” Id. We held

that Younger “concerns are not present where a state court has

stayed its own proceedings pending resolution of the case in

a federal forum.” Id.
6 KNIGHT V. AHLIN

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s abstention and denial of the writ were

inappropriate. At oral argument, the state’s counsel indicated

that a trial on the commitment petition could be completed

within 90 days, and that the state would not oppose an order

granting an alternative writ of habeas corpus.

We therefore reverse, remand, and instruct the district

court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The writ

shall require that Knight be tried within 90 days or be

released and the SVPA petition dismissed. The writ shall

also emphasize that no further continuances of the SVPA

petition proceedings should be granted except for compelling

and extraordinary cause.

REVERSED AND REMANDED with instructions.