IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-782

Filed 18 April 2023

New Hanover County, No. 18CVD4048

ELIZABETH GOURLEY READ, Plaintiff,

v.

BRENDEN MICHAEL READ, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from final Order and Judgment entered 8 February 2022

by Judge Robin W. Robinson in New Hanover County District Court. Heard in the 

Court of Appeals 21 February 2023.

The Lea/Schultz Law Firm, P.C., by Ryan B. Schultz, for Defendant-Appellant.

No brief filed by Plaintiff-Appellee.

RIGGS, Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Brenden Michael Read appeals the final order and 

judgment of equitable distribution entered by the Honorable Robin W. Robinson in 

New Hanover County District Court. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. Facts & Procedural History

Defendant-Appellant married Plaintiff-Appellee Elizabeth Gourley Read on 16 

June 1990 in Raleigh, North Carolina. A year after they married, in May 1991, 

Plaintiff-Appellee decided to attend Parker Chiropractic School in Dallas, TX and the 

couple relocated to Dallas while she attended school. When she applied to school, the 
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parties were working at restaurants and like many college students could not afford 

college tuition without student loans. Therefore, they decided to take out loans to 

cover both the cost of tuition and their living expenses. 

While Plaintiff-Appellee was attending chiropractic school, DefendantAppellant took a job opening a new restaurant in Oklahoma City and he temporarily 

relocated to Oklahoma. During this time, the couple had their first child, a son, born 

in mid-1992. After two years in Oklahoma, Defendant-Appellant returned to Dallas

where he worked at a restaurant and a carpet cleaning business while PlaintiffAppellee completed chiropractic school. The couple also had a second son born in 

1994. To pay for school and to support their growing family, the parties took out 

loans exceeding the cost of tuition every trimester between March 1991 and May 

1995. 

Overall, the couple took out $193,981.40 in loans. The total cost of tuition and 

books for Plaintiff-Appellee to attend chiropractic school was $49,173. According to 

Plaintiff-Appellee’s testimony, the couple used the balance of the funds for living

expenses such as room and board, daycare for the children, diapers, and long-distance 

telephone bills between Dallas and Oklahoma. The majority of the loans were taken 

out in Plaintiff-Appellee’s name; however, Defendant-Appellant co-signed for a few

loans. 

After Plaintiff-Appellee’s graduation in 1995, the family returned to Raleigh,

where both Plaintiff-Appellee and Defendant-Appellant took jobs as waiters in 
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restaurants while Plaintiff-Appellee was taking her boards to become a licensed 

chiropractor in North Carolina. During this time, the parties applied for forbearance 

to delay the repayment of these loans. After passing her boards in 1996, PlaintiffAppellee bought North Hill Chiropractic and began running a single-person

chiropractic business. Plaintiff-Appellee used the chiropractic business to support 

the family, but the business only netted between $16,000 and $25,000 annually. The 

couple also had a third child in 1996.

In 1999, Defendant-Appellant began working in the chiropractic business as 

the office manager. Plaintiff-Appellee testified that Defendant-Appellant did not 

take a paycheck, but he did take draws from the business bank account. The parties 

continued to take hardship forbearance on the student loans based on their family 

income. 

In September 2001, the parties separated. At the time of separation, the 

student loan balance was $198,237. When they separated, Defendant-Appellant says 

the parties each took “tangible and intangible property in their own name and went 

their separate ways.” The record does not include any written agreement on the 

distribution of marital assets and debts. After the separation, Plaintiff-Appellee 

consolidated the student loans into one loan. In the seventeen years between the date 

of separation and the equitable distribution hearing, Plaintiff-Appellee made $61,331 

in payments on the loan. Defendant-Appellant did not make any payments on the 

loan. Due to the terms of the loan and the amount of owed, Plaintiff-Appellee was 
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unable to make payments on the principal and the payments were only applied to 

loan interest. The student loan was in delinquency status for many years, and at the 

time of the equitable distribution hearing, the balance of the loan had grown to 

$281,051. 

In the year prior to their separation, the parties also had an unpaid tax bill. 

The bill remained unpaid post separation and grew to $6,774.39 due to penalties. In 

2004, the IRS applied $4,351.16 of Plaintiff-Appellee’s overpayment of taxes against 

this tax bill. 

Although the parties separated in 2001, neither party filed for absolute divorce 

after the statutory one-year waiting period. However, they regularly engaged in child 

custody and child support litigation related to medical expenses for their three 

children. On 21 November 2018, seventeen years after the parties separated, 

Plaintiff-Appellee filed a complaint seeking absolute divorce and equitable 

distribution of the marital estate, which only consisted of marital debt. DefendantAppellant was served on 8 December 2018. On 8 February 2019, the trial court 

entered a divorce judgment, while preserving Plaintiff-Appellee’s pending claim for 

equitable distribution. 

Seven months later, on 25 July 2019, Defendant-Appellant filed a motion to 

dismiss, an answer, and affirmative defenses. Defendant-Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss was heard on 3 March 2020. In an order entered 22 June 2020, the trial court

denied the motion to dismiss. Prior to the equitable distribution hearing, Defendant-
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Appellant failed to respond to discovery requests for several months and PlaintiffAppellee had to file a motion to compel discovery which was granted in part on 11 

February 2021. 

Plaintiff-Appellee’s equitable distribution claim was heard in a bench trial

during the 20 April 2021 family court session in New Hanover County. The trial

court entered an order for equitable distribution on 8 February 2022, and the order 

was served on Defendant-Appellant’s attorney by mail the same day. 

Defendant-Appellant filed a timely written notice of appeal on 7 March 2022. 

II. Timeliness of Equitable Distribution Claim

On appeal Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court erred in entering 

judgment for Plaintiff-Appellee at the close of evidence because Plaintiff-Appellee’s

delay in asserting the equitable distribution claim violated the legislative intent of 

fairness and timeliness in North Carolina’s Equitable Distribution statute. We 

disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

This Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. In re Ivey, 257 

N.C. App. 622, 627, 810 S.E.2d 740, 744 (2018).

B. Analysis

The North Carolina Supreme Court has said that the question of divorce is a 

matter exclusively of legislative cognizance, and where the legislature has formally 

and clearly expressed its will, this Court is not at liberty to interpolate or superimpose 
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conditions and limitations which the statutes do not contain. Cooke v. Cooke, 164 

N.C. 272, 275, 80 S.E. 178, 179 (1913). In 1981, the North Carolina General Assembly 

created statutes to address the equitable distribution of marital property and the 

procedures for courts to follow when making an order for equitable distribution. N.C. 

Gen Stat. §§ 50-20, -21 (2021). Section 50-21(a) sets out the time at which a claim of 

equitable distribution accrues: 

At any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate 

and apart from each other, a claim for equitable 

distribution may be filed and adjudicated, either as a 

separate civil action, or together with any other action 

brought pursuant to Chapter 50 of the General Statutes, or 

as a motion in the cause as provided by G.S. 50-11(e) or (f).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(a) (emphasis added).

The legislature placed a clear time limit on a claim for equitable distribution 

in Section 50-11(e); a spouse’s right to equitable distribution under Section 50-20 is 

extinguished upon decree of absolute divorce unless the right is asserted prior to 

judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(e) (2021). An absolute divorce may be granted on 

application from either party if the parties have lived separate and apart for one year 

. . . and “a divorce under this section shall not be barred to either party. . . .” N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 50-6 (2021) (emphasis added). Once a spouse requests equitable 

distribution, the legislature provided procedures, time limits, and remedies within 

Section 50-21 and ensures the court rules “upon any matters reasonably necessary to 

effect a fair and prompt disposition of the case in the interests of justice.” N.C. Gen. 
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Stat. § 50-21. The statutes allow the court to impose appropriate sanctions on a party

for unreasonable delay; however, delays to which the parties consent are not grounds 

for sanctions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(e).

In construing statutes, this Court first ascertains the legislative purpose from 

the plain words of the statute. McKinney v. Richitelli, 357 N.C. 483, 487, 586 S.E.2d 

258, 262 (2003). Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there 

is no room for judicial interpretation, and the court must construe the statute using 

its plain meaning. Id. In applying the language of a statute, the actual words of the 

legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent; therefore, we give every word 

of the statute effect, “presuming that the legislature carefully chose each word used.” 

In re Ivey, 257 N.C. App. at 627, 810 S.E.2d at 744. Moreover, according to the canon 

of in pari materia, all parts of a statute should be reconciled with each other when 

possible and any irreconcilable ambiguity resolved in a manner that fully effectuates 

the legislative intent. Martin v. N. C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App. 

716, 719, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009). Accordingly, we construe Section 50-21 together 

with Section 50-11(e) to establish when an equitable distribution claim accrues and 

when the equitable distribution claim expires.

The equitable distribution statutes provide both parties to a divorce with 

multiple paths to bring the issue of equitable distribution to a timely and binding 

resolution. First, Section 50-20(d) allows the parties to craft their own equitable 

distribution in a written agreement, duly executed and acknowledged on the 
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distribution of the marital property or divisible property in a manner they deem to be 

equitable, and that agreement shall be binding on the parties. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

20(d) (emphasis added). Second, when the parties cannot agree on equitable 

distribution, as is common in divorce, Section 50-21(a) gives either party the right to 

bring a claim for equitable distribution, as soon as the parties separate, either as a 

separate civil action or together with any other action brought pursuant to Chapter 

50 or as a motion under Section 50-11(e) or (f). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-21(a). Finally, 

after one year of separation, either party can bring a claim for absolute divorce which 

cannot be barred by either party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6. An absolute divorce 

obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution 

under Section 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

50-11(e). While a divorce proceeding is a civil action, it is unlike any other civil action. 

Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 583-84, 339 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1986). Parties are 

held to strict compliance with statutory requirements and judgment by default is not 

permitted except as defined in Section 50-6. Id. at 584, 339 S.E.2d at 859. The 

legislative approach allows divorcing parties the flexibility to file for divorce and 

equitable distribution on a timeline that is appropriate for their unique situation.

Here, Defendant-Appellant argues that the law allowed Plaintiff-Appellee an 

indefinite amount of time to file a claim for equitable distribution which 

“unnecessarily disrupts [his] settled expectation of marital property distribution 

between the spouses.” However, the law afforded Defendant-Appellant multiple
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paths to bring binding resolution to responsibility for the marital debt. First, when 

the parties separated, Defendant-Appellant could have drawn up a written and 

executed agreement for how the parties divided the property and debts. A written, 

executed, and acknowledged agreement would have been enforceable against a future 

claim for equitable distribution. Second, Defendant-Appellant had the right to bring 

a claim for equitable distribution as soon as the parties separated in September of 

2001 or as a motion in any of their Chapter 50 litigation. Finally, DefendantAppellant had the right to bring a claim for absolute divorce as early as 5 September 

2002; once the judgment of absolute divorce was entered, any future claim for 

equitable distribution would have been untimely. 

During this seventeen-year period, in which the parties lived separate and 

apart but had not filed for absolute divorce, neither party was released from the bonds 

of matrimony, nor had they executed a written agreement for equitable distribution. 

Accordingly, on the facts of this case, neither party should have a reasonable 

expectation that the distribution of their marital debt was settled. Further, by their 

conduct in failing to make a claim for absolute divorce or equitable distribution, both 

parties consented to the delay. Therefore, the claim is not time barred, and does not 

violate the legislative intent of the Equitable Distribution Statutes.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the lower court. 

III. Motion to Dismiss and Statute of Limitations
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In the second and third assignment of error, Defendant-Appellant argues the 

trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. As part of his motion to dismiss 

and here Defendant-Appellant argues that N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52 and 56, the threeyear statute of limitations and the ten-year statute of limitations, respectively, should 

apply to claims for equitable distribution. We disagree.

Notably, Defendant-Appellant did not notice appeal of the denial of the motion 

to dismiss; however, since the motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order involving 

the merits that necessarily affect the judgment, according to Rule 46 of the Rules of 

Civil Procedure we have jurisdiction to consider the issue. N.C.R. Civ. P. 46(b) (2022).

A. Standard of Review 

A motion to dismiss under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of 

the complaint. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 185, 254 S.E.2d 611, 615 (1979) 

(citation omitted). In ruling on the motion, the allegations of the complaint must be 

viewed as admitted, and on that basis, the court must determine as a matter of law 

whether the allegations state a claim for which relief may be granted. Id.

This Court considers the pleadings de novo “to determine their legal sufficiency 

and whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.” Leary v. 

N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4, aff’d per curiam, 357 

N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003). When there is no dispute over the relevant facts, a 

lower court’s interpretation of a statute of limitation is a conclusion of law that is 
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reviewed de novo on appeal. Goetz v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 203 N.C. 

App. 421, 425, 692 S.E.2d 395, 398 (2010). 

B. Analysis 

North Carolina General Statutes §§ 50-20 and 21 govern claims for equitable 

distribution, and do not provide a statute of limitation for absolute divorce or

equitable distribution claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-20, -21. Defendant-Appellant 

conceded that the equitable distribution statutes are silent on a statute of limitation 

for an equitable distribution claim. Further, there are no North Carolina cases 

barring a claim of equitable distribution due to a statute of limitations. DefendantAppellant argues that in the absence of a specific statute, this Court should apply 

statutes of limitation from N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52(2) and 1-56, which establish a 

three-year statute of limitation for liabilities created by statute or a ten-year statute 

of limitations for all other actions, respectively, to an equitable distribution claim. 

N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52(2), -56. 

However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(e) provides the statutory limitation on 

bringing a claim for equitable distribution, requiring that the equitable distribution 

claim be asserted before the entry of the absolute divorce judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 50-11(e). The statutory language is clear: as long as the claim for equitable 

distribution is pending at the time of the absolute divorce, then the court has 

jurisdiction over the claim for equitable distribution. Bradford v. Bradford, 279 N.C. 

App. 109, 120-21, 864 S.E.2d 783, 791 (2021). The North Carolina General Assembly,
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by the plain language of Section 50-11(e), linked the allowable time frame for

equitable distribution to the timing of a claim for absolute divorce; an absolute divorce

obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution

under Section 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to the judgment of absolute

divorce. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(e). 

In the order from the motion to dismiss hearing, the trial court found that

Bruce v. Bruce was controlling, and the ten-year statute of limitation outlined in 

Section 1-56 for “all other actions” does not apply to actions for absolute divorce or 

equitable distribution. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 583, 339 S.E.2d 855, 858 

(1986). In Bruce v. Bruce, that defendant argued that an eleven-year gap between 

the date of separation and the filing of the complaint for absolute divorce and 

equitable distribution violated the ten-year statute of limitation in Section 1-56. Id.

at 579, 339 S.E.2d at 856. This Court said that separation as grounds for divorce is

a continuing offense. Id. at 582, 339 S.E.2d at 858. It begins when the parties

physically separate with the requisite intention for the separation to remain

permanent and continues to accrue so long as the parties remain separate and apart

within the meaning of the statute. Id. The Court balanced the reasons for having 

statute of limitations against the State’s public policies of endeavoring to maintain 

the marital state and the need to allow divorce for parties that have demonstrated a 

ground for divorce, concluding that the residuary statute of limitations in Section 1–

56 does not apply to actions for divorce. Id. at 583, 339 S.E.2d at 858-59. Since the 
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allowable time frame for equitable distribution and divorce are linked, and a claim 

for divorce is not barred by a statute of limitations, a claim for equitable distribution

also cannot be barred by a statute of limitations.

Defendant-Appellant cites Lawing v. Lawing to support his contention that a 

statutory goal of N.C. Gen. Stat § 50-20 is to wrap up marital affairs fairly with as

much certainty and finality as possible and therefore a statute of limitations should

apply to a claim for equitable distribution. Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. App. 159, 183, 

344 S.E.2d 100, 115 (1986) (highlighting that a policy consideration underlying the 

Equitable Distribution Act is to distribute marital property fairly and with as much 

certainty and finality as possible). However, in Lawing this Court was interpreting

the language of Section 50-20(b)(3) as authorizing the court to make distributive 

award for periods of “not more than six years after the date on which the marriage 

ceases.” Id., at 184, 344 S.E.2d at 116. The holding was providing a limit on the court

to avoid extending payment more than six years beyond the date of the equitable 

distribution order. Id. (emphasis added). The facts here are distinguishable because 

Defendant-Appellant is asking this Court to find that the legislature wanted to limit 

the time the parties have after the date of separation to make the claim for equitable 

distribution. Our case law does not support such an interpretation.

Additionally, Defendant-Appellant argues a three-year statute of limitation 

should apply to equitable distribution because, in his view of the equitable 

distribution statute, it creates a liability by state statute which is covered by N.C. 
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Gen. Stat. § 1-52(2). However, Defendant-Appellant does not cite case law supporting 

his argument that Section 1-52 applies to equitable distribution. Further, the 

argument is not persuasive because the liabilities were not created by the equitable 

distribution statute; the parties themselves created the liabilities during the 

marriage. The equitable distribution order simply apportioned responsibilities for 

those liabilities. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to 

dismiss. Additionally, we hold that a claim for equitable distribution was not barred 

by a statute of limitations under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52 or 1-56.

IV. Distribution of Marital Debt

In the fourth assignment of error, Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial 

court erred when it ordered him to pay thirty percent of the marital debt. We 

disagree.

A. Standard of Review 

The General Assembly has committed the distribution of marital property to 

the discretion of the trial courts, and the exercise of that discretion will not be 

disturbed in the absence of clear abuse of that discretion. Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C. 

App. at 162, 344 S.E.2d at 104. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling in equitable 

distribution cases receives great deference and may only be upset if it was so arbitrary 

that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. White v. White, 312 N.C. 

770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). The trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive 
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if supported by any competent evidence, even when there is evidence to the contrary. 

Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980).

B. Analysis

An equal division of the marital property is mandatory unless the court 

determines in the exercise of its discretion that such a distribution is inequitable. 

Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C. App. 58, 63, 367 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 50-20(c). When the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the 

court shall divide the marital and divisible property equitably and consider all twelve 

factors found in Section 50-20(c). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c).

To equitably distribute marital property, the trial judge must conduct a threestep analysis: (1) determine what is marital property; (2) determine the net market 

value of the marital property as of the date of separation; and (3) make an equitable 

distribution between the parties. Willis v. Willis, 86 N.C. App. 546, 550, 358 S.E.2d 

571, 573 (1987). This Court has held that in an equitable distribution, the trial court 

must consider all debts of the parties, whether the debt is one for which the parties 

are jointly liable or whether a party is individually liable. Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 

471, 475, 353 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1987). For the purpose of an equitable distribution, 

marital debt is debt that was incurred for the joint benefit of the parties without 

regard for who is legally obligated for the debt. Id. Divisible property includes all 

passive increases in marital debt, financing charges, and interest related to marital 

debt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(4). North Carolina’s equitable distribution statute 
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expressly provides that professional licenses are separate property; however, the 

court is required to consider a direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to 

help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

50-20(b)(2), -20(c)(7). 

Here, the marital property at issue is marital debt from the student loans 

incurred while Plaintiff-Appellee was attending chiropractic school and an IRS debt 

from the year prior to separation. The debts were itemized on Schedule A of the 

pretrial order for equitable distribution. As to the student loans, the trial court 

valued them as of the date of separation on 4 September 2001 to be $198,237. Even 

though Plaintiff-Appellee made payments of $61,331 on the loans after the date of 

separation, those payments were only applied to interest and the balance of the loans 

since separation increased to $281,051 due to unpaid interest. The trial court 

received evidence at trial that the total cost of tuition and supplies for PlaintiffAppellee to attend chiropractic school was $49,173, and the balance of the loan was

used for living expenses for the parties and their family while Plaintiff-Appellee

attended school. The court found that twenty-four percent of the loan was for tuition 

and seventy-six percent was for the living expenses of the family. 

The trial court considered all the factors identified in Section 50-20 in the final 

order for equitable distribution. The court considered the fact that after PlaintiffAppellee graduated from chiropractic school, she purchased a chiropractic business

in 1996 and the income from that business supported the family until the date of 
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separation in 2001. Additionally, the chiropractic business employed DefendantAppellant from 1999 until the date of separation. Because the business supported 

the family and employed Defendant-Appellant for several years, there is evidence to 

support a conclusion that Defendant-Appellant benefited from Plaintiff-Appellee’s

education. 

After considering all the factors required in Section 50-20, the trial court 

determined that an equal distribution would not be equitable. The trial court 

assigned the cost associated with tuition to Plaintiff-Appellee and divided the balance 

of the loan between the parties. This approach resulted in an assignment of thirty 

percent of the current loan balance to Defendant-Appellant and seventy percent of 

the current loan balance to Plaintiff-Appellee. The trial court did not provide 

Plaintiff-Appellee with a credit for the $61,331 in interest that she had paid on the 

student loans since the date of separation. 

As to the IRS loan, the court found that the value of the debt as of the date of 

separation was $6,774.00. The trial court found that Plaintiff-Appellee had paid 

$4,351 of the outstanding balance and charged Defendant-Appellant with the balance 

of the debt. 

After review of the trial court’s order, the findings of fact support the 

conclusions of law and comply with the procedure established for equitable 

distribution. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by making an unequal 

division of the marital debt and assigning thirty percent of the student loan balance 
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and the outstanding IRS bill to Defendant-Appellant. We affirm the order of the trial 

court.

V. Order of Monthly Payment

In the final assignment of error, Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial 

court erred when it ordered him to pay one thousand dollars a month towards the 

marital debt because it failed to make a finding of fact as to his ability to make the 

payment. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review 

When reviewing an equitable distribution order, the standard of review is 

limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion. Petty v. 

Petty, 199 N.C. App. 192, 197, 680 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2009). A trial court may be 

reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly 

unsupported by reason. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court’s order does not contain 

findings of fact that support his ability to make a thousand-dollar monthly payment 

on the marital loan. This Court has held where a party’s ability to pay an award with 

liquid assets can be ascertained from the record, then the award must be affirmed. 

Pellom v. Pellom, 194 N.C. App. 57, 69, 669 S.E.2d 323, 330 (2008).

Here, at the close of evidence, the trial court asked Defendant-Appellant for 

input on the distribution associated with the judgment. Defendant-Appellant did not 
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take any position on the record as to the distribution of his portion of the student 

loans other than to say that he was unable to make a lump sum payment for his 

portion of the loan. The trial court made a finding of fact that Defendant-Appellant 

is employed full-time as a general manager of a restaurant making ninety thousand 

dollars per year. Additionally, the court found that Defendant-Appellant does not 

have any child or alimony support obligations arising out of this marriage. We 

conclude that these findings of fact support the award of monthly payments of one 

thousand dollars on the loan. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

and affirm the order. 

VI. Conclusion

After a review of the issues, this Court holds that the claims for absolute 

divorce and equitable distribution were filed in a timely manner in accordance with 

North Carolina General Statutes. Additionally, we hold that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it ordered that Defendant-Appellant be responsible for the 

balance of the tax bill and for thirty percent of the balance of the student loan.

Finally, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered DefendantAppellant to make monthly payments on the loan.

AFFIRMED.

Judges ZACHARY and FLOOD concur.