alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Sherwood J. Reese 

Sherwood.reese@comcast.net 

Drew L. Johnson, P.C. 

sherwoodreese@comcast.net 

1700 Valley River Drive 

Eugene, OR 97401 

(541) 434-6466 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

UNITED STATES COURT DISTRICT COURT 

DEBORAHJ.GRAY, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

Civil No. 6:14-cv-01552-BR 

ORDER FOR ATTORNEY FEES 

PURSUANT TO EAJA 

After considering the Stipulated Motion of the parties submitted herein, Order hereby 

grants that Commissioner shall pay Plaintiff's attorney the sum of $7587.96 upon verification 

that Plaintiff has no debt to the government which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, 

pursuant to the reasoning in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 130 S. Ct. 2521, 2527 (2010) (EAJA 

awards fees subject "to a federal administrative offset if the Litigant has outstanding federal 

debts") for full settlement of all claims for fees under EAJA. 

l - ORDER FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO EAJA 

Case 6:14-cv-01552-BR Document 21 Filed 10/19/15 Page 1 of 2
If Plaintiff has no such federal debt, payment of $7587.96 shall be made to Plaintiff's 

attorneys, Drew L. Johnson, PC, and mailed to their office at 1700 Valley River Drive, Eugene, 

OR 9740 I. If Plaintiff has such debt, the check for any remaining funds after offset shall be 

made out to Plaintiff and mailed to counsel's office at the address provided above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of October Jl'.L_, 2015 

PRESENTED BY: 

By: Isl DREW L. JOHNSON 

Drew L. Johnson, OSB #75200 

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff 

u.s~~~i¥ht4~J ANNAJ. BROWN 

2 - ORDER FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO EAJA 

Case 6:14-cv-01552-BR Document 21 Filed 10/19/15 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TRADING TECHNOLOGIES )
INTERNATIONAL, INC., )
)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 04 C $312

)

eSPEED, INC., eSPEED, INTERNATIONAL,)
LTD., and ECCO WARE, LTD., )
)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In preparation for its trial against eSpeed, Inc., eSpeed International, Ltd., Ecco LLC,
and EccoWare Ltd., (collectively “eSpecd”), plaintiff Trading Technologies International, inc.
(“TT”) renews its motion to strike eSpeed’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity based
on alleged prior sale and to preclude eSpeed from offering the defense at trial. Originally
presented during this court’s absence, Judge Shadur granted TT’s motion to strike pending
review by this court. Upon our return, we affirmed Judge Shadur’s ruling, determining that
it was too late for eSpeed to file another motion for summary judgment on a previously
undisclosed defense. The sole remaining issue is TT’s request that we preclude cSpeed from
raising the new defense — invalidity based on prior sale — to the jury during trial. We decline
to do so ~ eSpeed may present its full arsenal of defenses to the jury. If, as TT contends, the
defense has no merit, the jury will so conclude. TT’s motion to preclude eSpeed from
presenting a prior sale defense at trial is denied.

Nonna B. Werrnn/

< | JAMES B. MORAN
ior Judge, U. S. District Court

Chand L_, 2007.
----

Exhibit 32.1 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

I, John L. Threshie Jr., CEO of The TirexCorporation (the "Company") do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that, to my knowledge: 

> 
1. This Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the  Company for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and  Exchange Commission (the "report"), fully complies with the requirements of  Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2. The information contained in the report fairly presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of  the Company. 

/s/________________ John L. Threshie Jr., CEO 

Date: October 13, 2005 

----
#### Life Insurance Company of Virginia *v.*Fitzgerald.

Lumpkin, J.

1. An insurance policy, issued in favor of a father oil the life of his child, had printed on the back, and referred to as a part of the policy, certain conditions and agreements, one of which was as follows: “This policy shall be void if the insured is now or shall hereafter become insured in this or' any other company or society and the total amount of insurance (including this policy) shall exceed the amounts in the following table.” Then followed a table of ages at “next birthday,”, and opposite each age was a stated amount. Opposite the figure 8 (the age apparently applicable to the child in question) the amount stated was $164. Another of these conditions or agreements on the back of the policy was as follows: “Ineontestible. — If the insured shall die after this policy shall have been in force for one or more years, and full proofs of death shall be presented within three months thereafter, and after all due premiums have been received by the company, the claim shall not be disputed except for misstatement of age.” *Held,*that the condition first mentioned was not one providing for a diminished payment if there should be additional insurance on the life of the insured, but for an avoidance of the policy if there should be. such insurance in excess of a stated amount. The second clause above quoted provided that after the policy should have been in force for one or more years, and upon the other terms therein stated, the claim should not be disputed except for' misstatement of age. Construing the two clauses together, upon the happening of the events stated in the second clause the policy could not be declared void because of insurance in excess of the stated amount mentioned in the first.

(a) This is not altered by the fact that there was another provision to the effect that if the policy should for any reason become void, all premiums paid thereon should be forfeited to the company “except as provided herein.”

2. There was no error in refusing to allow an expert in the insurance business to testify that a certain 'clause in a policy was a material provision, and that all policies written upon the lives of infants contained the same or a similar provision.

3. There was no error in the rulings complained of. The evidence authorized the verdict. The policy is somewhat vague as to the amount due; *726but, in view of the evidence and the admissions in the answer, the verdict will not be disturbed.

July 17, 1915.

Action upon insurance policy. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. June *29, 1914.*

*Etheridge & Etheridge,*for plaintiff in error.

*Frank L. Haralson*and *B. L. Milling,*contra.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
No. 03

- 14

- 00267

- CV

In the Third Court of Appeals

Austin , Texas

D AISY W ANDA G ARCIA , A PPELLANT

v.

T HOMAS L EE B AUMGARTEN , A PPELLEE

A PPEAL F ROM C AUSE N O

. D

- 1

- GN

- 12

- 002429 201 ST D ISTRICT C OURT OF T RAVIS C OUNTY , T EXAS H ON

. C HARLES R A MSEY P RESIDING

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

John L. Foster Texas Bar No. 07289000 F OSTER R AMSEY 812 San Antonio Street Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78701 512

- 476

- 4473 512

- 474

- 1606 (Fax) jfoster@fosterramsey.com Lead Counsel Stephen Case y Texas Bar No. 24065015 C ASEY L AW O FFICE , P.C. 595 Round Rock West Drive Suite 102 Round Rock, Texas 78681 Telephone: 512

- 257

- 1324 Fax: 512

- 853

- 4098 info@caseylawoffice.us

Counsel for Appellant Daisy Wand a Garcia ACCEPTED 03-14-00267-CV 4890595 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/14/2015 8:52:21 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERKPage 2 of 2 This notice hereby informs the Court of the appearance of undersigned counsel Stephen Casey for the purposes of the contemporaneously filed Emergency Motion to Abate. Attorney John L. Foster is still lead counsel for purposes of the appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Stephen Casey John L. Foster Texas Bar No. 07289000 FOSTER RAMSEY 812 San Antonio Street Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78701 512

- 476

- 4473 512

- 474

- 1606 (Fax) jfoster@fosterramsey.com Lead Counsel

Stephen Casey Texas Bar No. 24065015 C ASEY L AW O FFICE , P.C

. 595 Round Rock West Dr ive Suite 102 Round Rock, Texas 78681 Telephone: 512

- 257

- 1324 Fax: 512

- 853

- 4098 stephen@caseylawoffice.us

CERTIFICATE OF SERVI CE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing notice was served upon counsel for Appellee on Tuesday, April 14, 2015 , via elec tronic transmission:

Nicholas Laurent, Counsel for Appellee nlaurent@mcginnislaw.com

/s/ Stephen Casey
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-7658

BRIAN PETER ZATER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 03-6273

BRIAN PETER ZATER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Dennis W. Shedd and Henry M. Herlong,

Jr., District Judges. (CR-00-626, CA-02-958-3-19, CA-02-958-3-20)

Submitted: May 15, 2003 Decided: May 20, 2003
2

Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian Peter Zater, Appellant Pro Se. Stacey Denise Haynes, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
3

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Brian Peter Zater seeks to

appeal the district court’s orders denying relief on his motion

filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). 

In No. 02-7658, Zater seeks to appeal the district court’s

order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge and dismissing the portion of his § 2255 motion alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to

file a direct appeal. This court may exercise jurisdiction only

over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain

interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2000); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541 (1949). The order Zater seeks to appeal is neither a final

order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.

Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

In No. 03-6273, Zater seeks to appeal the district court’s

order dismissing the remainder of Zater’s claims under § 2255. An

appeal may not be taken from the final order in a § 2255 proceeding

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000).

A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable
4

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1040 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude

that Zater has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we

deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a certificate of

appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Salustiano John Dela Cruz DOUGLAS, a.k.a. John Douglas, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-70961.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 22, 2011.

Salustiano John Déla Cruz Douglas, Le-moore, CA, pro se.

*955OIL, Edward Earl Wiggers, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Salustiano John Déla Cruz Douglas, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of United States citizenship, *Martinez-Madera v. Holder,*559 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir.2009), and we deny the petition for review.

Douglas’s Filipino birth certificate provides evidence of his foreign birth, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alien-age, and shifts the burden of proof to Douglas to establish U.S. citizenship. *Id.*The BIA correctly determined that Douglas could not establish citizenship under former 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1978). *See id.*at 941 (8 U.S.C. § 1401 confers citizenship on a child born abroad only if his alien parent and U.S. citizen parent were married at the time of his birth). Contrary to Douglas’s contention, he also cannot establish citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1409. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (a child born out of wedlock acquires citizenship from his U.S. citizen father if, among other things, “a blood relationship between the [child] and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence”).

Douglas’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 12.1

SUMMIT PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP, L.P.
CALCULATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES SIX MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 2000
(DOLLARS IN THOUSANDS)

<TABLE>
<S>                                                           <C>
Net Income..................................................  $31,031
Interest:
  Expense incurred..........................................   18,455
  Amortization of deferred financing costs..................      475
  Rental fixed charges......................................      116
                                                              -------
          Total Earnings....................................  $50,077
                                                              =======
Fixed charges:
  Interest expense..........................................  $18,455
  Interest capitalized......................................    4,643
  Dividends to preferred unitholders in Operating
     Partnership............................................    6,210
  Rental fixed charges......................................      116
  Amortization of deferred financing costs..................      475
                                                              -------
          Total fixed charges...............................  $29,899
                                                              =======
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges..........................     1.67
                                                              =======
</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN RE

JAVIER RIVERA FRANCO,

Relator.

§

§

§

§

No. 08-24-00127-CR

AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Javier Rivera Franco, proceeding pro se, petitions this Court for writ of mandamus

to compel the Honorable Judge Lela Mays of the 283rd District Court in Dallas County, Texas, to

rule on or respond to his motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. We dismiss this proceeding for want

of subject-matter jurisdiction.

In 2007, this Court issued an opinion on the merits in Franco’s direct appeal affirming the

trial court’s judgment.1 Franco v. State, No. 08-06-00280-CR, 2007 WL 2200468 (Tex. App.—

El Paso Aug. 2, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). His direct appeal was

transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts.

1 This Court issued opinions in three companion cases, all of which were tried together in the trial court. Franco v.

State, No. 08-06-00280-CR, 2007 WL 2200468, *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 2, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (listing companion cases).
2

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001. Franco now seeks mandamus relief against Judge Lela Mays

relating to the same underlying proceedings.

Franco’s petition seeking a writ of mandamus is an original appellate proceeding which is

distinct from his direct appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 52.1. This Court has the authority to issue writs of

mandamus against a judge of a district, statutory county, statutory probate county, or county court

in the court of appeals district and all writs necessary to enforce our own jurisdiction. Tex. Gov’t

Code Ann. § 22.221(a), (b). Dallas County is in the Fifth Court of Appeals District and is not in

our appellate district. Compare id. § 22.201(f) (listing the counties comprising the Fifth District),

with id. § 22.201(i) (listing the counties comprising the Eighth District). Moreover, because

Relator’s underlying criminal case that was before us is long since final, there is no action that we

need take to enforce our own jurisdiction. See In re Jackson, No. 08-21-00033-CV, 2021 WL

732857, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 25, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus on the same grounds). Therefore, we are

without the authority to issue writ and must dismiss this proceeding.

2

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

May 20, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

2 We note that Relator filed a mandamus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in February 2024, that sought

similar relief against Judge Mays. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the writ without written order. In Re

Franco, WR-72,017-16 (Tex. Crim. App. March 27, 2024).
EXHIBIT 10


EXHIBIT 10.62




Description of Oral Extension-R. Martindale Promissory Note




Summary of Terms of the Orally Agreed upon Extension to following Simple Promissory Note (with corresponding exhibit number of original note) under which Registrant is the Borrower. No periodic payments are required and principal and interest are due on the extended due date.







	Original

	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	Note

	 
	 
	Original

	Oral

	 
	Annual


	Exhibit

	 
	Loan

	Due

	Extension

	 
	%


	Number

	Lender

	Date

	Date

	Date

	Principal

	Rate


	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	10.31

	R. Martindale

	06/18/2008

	09/21/2008

	12/31/2008

	$10,000.00

	10%
ex_272387.htm


Exhibit 10.1


 


SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


This SECOND AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Second Amendment”) is made and entered into as of August 3, 2021, by and between Rita O’Connor (the “Executive”) and PLx Pharma Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”) for the purpose of amending that one certain Employment Agreement, dated May 1, 2017, by and between the parties, as previously amended (the “Agreement”).


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants, promises and obligations set forth herein and the Agreement, the parties agree as follows:


 


Section 4.2(a) of the Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety, effective as of the date of this Second Amendment, to read as follows:


 


(a) a single payment in amount equal to one hundred fifty percent (150%) of Executive’s Base Salary in effect as of the Termination Date;


 


Except as expressly amended by this Second Amendment, the parties do hereby ratify and confirm the Agreement in its entirety.


 


Terms not defined in this Second Amendment shall have the meanings set forth in the Agreement.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Second Amendment as of the date first above written.


 


	 	
			PLX PHARMA INC.


			 


			 

			
	 	
			By:    /s/ Natasha Giordano                   


			Natasha Giordano


			President & CEO

			
	 	 



 


	 	
			EXECUTIVE


			 


			 

			
	 	
			Signature:   /s/ Rita O’Connor                    


			Print Name: Rita O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________________

)

HAROLD EDMUND STONIER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 09-0581 (PLF)

 )

LINDA SANDERS, )

)

Respondent. )

_______________________________________)

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction This is a final

appealable Order. See Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P.

SO ORDERED.

/s/________________________

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN

DATE: April 2, 2009 United States District Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
 
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 AUG-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1997
 <CASH>                                         10,037,204
<SECURITIES>                                       974,882
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,953,764
<ALLOWANCES>                                       386,011
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,126,632
<PP&E>                                           2,449,006
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,690,751
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  16,718,830
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,442,190
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                        196,343
<COMMON>                                            23,442
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,508,063
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    16,718,830
<SALES>                                          7,957,805
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 8,459,232
<CGS>                                            3,410,792
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,187,740
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1,710
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,602,606
<INCOME-TAX>                                       950,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,652,606
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,652,606
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .31
        


</TABLE>