Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

May 4, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132528 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 132528 

 COA: 261162 

Tuscola CC: 03-008846-FH 

RONALD CLARENCE BABCOCK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 26, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

MARKMAN, J., concurs and states as follows: 

I concur in the denial of defendant’s application for leave to appeal. Although the 

trial court committed error under the Confrontation Clause by admitting the deposition 

testimony of the police officer who was merely out of town on her honeymoon, any error 

was harmless, in my judgment, because a rational jury would have convicted defendant 

beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the remaining evidence. 

Defendant was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Defendant alleges that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when the 

trial court permitted excerpts from an absent police officer’s deposition testimony to be 

read to the jury. “Harmless error analysis applies to claims concerning Confrontation 

Clause errors . . . .” People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 348 (2005). “A constitutional 

error is harmless if ‘[it is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 

found the defendant guilty absent the error.’” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 640 n 29 

(2001), quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 18 (1999). The harmless error analysis 

in this case thus rests on whether a “rational jury” would have convicted defendant 

“beyond a reasonable doubt” on the basis of untainted evidence. 
 _________________________________________ 

 

2 

In the instant case, the disputed issue concerned whether defendant possessed the 

firearm. Besides the police officer, two other witnesses testified that defendant possessed 

the firearm: Shawn Lester, defendant’s ex-girlfriend, and Cindy Pero, the sister of one of 

defendant’s friends. Lester testified that defendant selected a firearm at Wal-Mart and 

gave her money to purchase it. Lester bought the firearm and ammunition, and brought it 

home with her. Defendant took the firearm and showed Lester how to load it. Lester 

further testified that defendant removed the firearm from her home the next day. 

Lester’s testimony was corroborated by Pero. Pero testified that defendant 

brought the firearm to her home and told Pero that he intended to shoot skeet with her 

brother. Pero’s testimony was corroborated in turn by Stella Sherman, who testified that 

Lester brought the firearm from Pero’s home to Sherman’s, thereby supporting Pero’s 

testimony that the firearm had been at her home. 

The trial court then read the police officer’s deposition into evidence. The police 

officer stated that defendant admitted that he possessed the firearm. On crossexamination, the police officer acknowledged that she did not actually see defendant 

possess the firearm. 

Thus, two witnesses besides the police officer testified that defendant possessed 

the firearm. Although the ex-girlfriend may have had some motivation to falsely accuse 

defendant based on the termination of their relationship, her testimony was corroborated 

by the testimony of Pero, which was further supported by Sherman. Moreover, Pero did 

not have a similar motivation to falsely accuse defendant. Under these facts, the 

deposition testimony of the police officer that defendant possessed the firearm was 

merely cumulative. Even without the admission of the police officer’s deposition 

testimony, a “rational jury” would have found that defendant possessed the firearm 

“beyond a reasonable doubt.” Consequently, any Confrontation Clause error was 

harmless. For this reason, I concur in the denial of leave to appeal. 

KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal. 

p0501 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

May 4, 2007 

Clerk