IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PENDLETON DIVISION 

PRINCE MIGUEL ISHMAEL aka C. MIGUEL 

GONZALEZ-AGUILERA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

OREGON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; ) 

C. PETERS; LIZ CRAIG, Gov't. Efficiencies & ) 

Commc'n. Admin., 

Defendants. 

JONES, District Judge: 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. 2:14-cv-01651-JO 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Prince Miguel Ishmael, aka Miguel Gonzalez-Aguilera, acting prose, sued the 

Oregon Depattment ofConections ("ODOC") and two of its employees for violation of his First 

Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. 

Ishmael asks the comt to declare mail rules OAR 291-131-0020(2) and OAR 291-131-0025(1) 

unconstitutional as they apply to the use of his religious name on correspondence. Additionally, 

he asks the court to enjoin defendants from applying the aforementioned rules to prevent him 

-1- OPINION AND ORDER 
from using his religious name on incoming and outgoing mail. Defendants moved for summary 

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc# 53) For the following 

reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND 

The following facts are undisputed. Mr. Ishmael is an inmate in the custody of the ODOC. 

Mr. Ishmael cun-ently professes to be an African Hebrew Israelite of Jerusalem, and he claims the 

religious name "Prince Miguel Ishmael." On December 1, 2013, Mr. Ishmael filed a religious 

grievance request, in which he requested to use his religious name, "Prince Michael Ismael", on mail 

correspondence. Later, on May 21, 2014, Mr. Ishmael mailed a letter to the Assistant Administrator 

of Religious Services, Mr. Young, requesting that he be allowed to use his religious name on 

incoming and outgoing mail. Construing this letter as a request to change his name, Mr. Young 

denied this request on October 21, 2014. On October 17, 2014, before receiving a response to his 

request, Mr. Ishmael filed suit. Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment on 

August 25, 2015. They argue: 

(1) ODOC is not a proper defendant for plaintiffs 1983 claim and is immune from 

suit by the Eleventh Amendment; 

(2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies through the prison's administrative review 

process before filing suit; 

(3) Individual defendants named in this lawsuit were not personally involved in the 

alleged violation of plaintiffs rights; 

(4) ODOC's mail rules did not violate plaintiffs First Amendment rights; and 

-2- OPINION AND ORDER 
(5) The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars plaintiffs claim for over-broad 

injunctive relief. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

The district cmut should grant summmy judgment if there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and the moving patty is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the 

moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the non-moving patty must go 

beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex Cmp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 322-23. (1986). A scintilla of evidence, or evidence that is merely colorable or not 

significantly probative, does not present a genuine issue of material fact. United Steelworkers of 

America v. Phelps Dodge, 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9'h Cir. 1989). Reasonable doubts as to the 

existence of a material factual issue are resolved against the moving patty and inferences drawn from 

facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. T. W: Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. 

Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9'h Cir. 1987). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Eleventh Amendment 

Absent a waiver by the state or a valid authorization from Congress, the Eleventh 

Amendment bars federal comt action for injunctive relief against agencies of the state. Dittman v. 

California, 191F.3d1020, 1024 (9'h Cir. 1999). The State of Oregon has not waived its sovereign 

immunity in this case, and the Supreme Court has explicitly held that"§ 1983 was not intended to 

abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 17 

(1985). Additionally, the Oregon Depaitment ofConections (ODOC), as an agency of the state, is 

not a "person" under§ 1983. See Will v. iv!ichigan Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). 

-3- OPINION AND ORDER 
Accordingly, the ODOC is immune from Mr. Ishmael's suit, and defendants' motion for 

summmy judgment is granted based on Eleventh Amendment immunity as it applies to the ODOC. 

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Defendants contend Mr. Ishmael's lawsuit must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust 

available administrative remedies. The exhaustion provision of the PRLA states: 

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 

Section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C.A 

§ 1997e(a). 

Its te1ms are unambiguous: A prisoner cmmot bring a claim into court before exhausting all available 

remedies. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 

Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is "an affomative defense the defendant must plead and 

prove." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). The defendant has the burden to prove that there 

was an available administrative remedy, which the prisoner failed to exhaust. Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1172 (9'h Cir. 2014). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the prisoner must 

produce evidence demonstrating that "the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly 

prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile." Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9'h Cir. 

2015) (internal citations and quotation mal'ks omitted). The ultimate burden of proof, however, rests 

with the defendant. Id. 

Defendants met their ultimate burden of proving that there was an available administrative 

remedy that the defendant failed to exhaust. Issues of a religious nature are resolved by the faculty 

chaplain or designee in consultation with the administrator of religious services. OAR 291-143-

0140. Ifinmates are dissatisfied with their religious accommodations, they may seek redress through 

-4- OPINION AND ORDER 
ODOC' s grievance review system (OAR 291, Division 109), or by filing a Discrimination Complaint 

(OAR 291, Division 6). Def. Mot. for Summaiy Judgment, Doc #53, at 8. 

While Mr. Ishmael filed an initial grievance on December 1, 2013, he did so while professing 

to be a "Messianic Jew," not an "African Hebrew Israelite and Adherent of Judaism." Def. Mot. for 

Summaiy Judgment, Doc. #53, at 4 (facts not controverted by plaintiff); See, also, Def. Exhibit #2 

at 39, Doc. #54-1 (showing Mr. Ishmael filed a religious grievance request stating he was a 

"Messianic Jew" on March 18, 2013). More importantly, Mr. Ishmael never specified in his 

grievance request foim that he wanted to use his religious name in tandem with his committed name. 

Instead, Mr. Ishmael requested to use his religious name "Prince Michael Ismael" on incoming and 

outgoing mail. Pl. Exhibit #3, Doc. 42-1. 

Prison officials are allowed to require the use of a committed name on mail correspondence. 

}.;falik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 334 (9'h Cir. 1994). Therefore, it was reasonable for prison officials 

to deny this particular grievance request. If Mr. Ishmael wishes to use his religious name in 

conjunction with his committed name on mail correspondence, he must properly exhaust his 

remedies and put defendants on notice of his requested relief before filing suit. 

I grant summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, because Mr. 

Ishmael failed to file a grievance based on his current religious beliefs, and failed to specify that he 

wanted to use his religious name in tandem with his committed name. 

Generally, when the district court finds that a prisoner failed to exhaust all available 

administrative remedies, it should dismiss without prejudice. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F .3d 1108, 1120 

(9th Cir. 2003). I consider the remaining grounds for defendants' motion to dete1mine whether 

dismissal without prejudice is appropriate here. 

-5- OPINION AND ORDER 
III. Participation of Collette Peters and Elizabeth Craig 

Defendants Collette Peters and Elizabeth Craig contend they are entitled to sunnnmy 

judgment because they were not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. A state 

official in her personal capacity is not subject to suit under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can show that 

the official, acting under color of state law, caused the alleged deprivation of a federal right. Pena 

v. Gardner, 976 F.2d469, 473 (9'h Cir. 1992). "A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, 

that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights." Barren 

v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1994 (9'h Cir. 1998). Additionally, there is generally no respondeat 

superior liability under§ 1983. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895 (9'h Cir. 2001). A supervisor is only 

liable for a constitutional violation of his subordinate under § 1983 if (1) he was personally involved 

in the constitutional deprivation or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Id 

Mr. Ishmael presents no specific facts to demonstrate that either of the defendants were 

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights or that they engaged in misconduct that 

caused the constitutional violation. Therefore, he cannot sue the defendants in their personal 

capacities. 

However, the same standard does not apply when state officials are sued in their official 

capacities for prospective injunctive relief. When the relief sought is partly prospective (i.e. to 

prevent future harm to plaintiff), then the suit is for prospective injunctive relief. See Flint v. 

Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 825 (9'h Cir. 2007) (suit was not baned by the Eleventh Amendment, 

because the sought-after injunctions served the purpose of preventing present and future harm and 

-6- OPINION AND ORDER 
could thereby not be characterized solely as retroactive injunctive relief). Therefore, Mr. Ishmael's 

suit is a suit for prospective injunctive relief. 

When sued for prospective injunctive relief, state officials are considered to be "persons" for 

the purposes of§ 1983, because "official capacity actions for prospective injunctive relief are not 

treated as actions against the state." Will v. l'vfichigan Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, n. 10 

(1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the defendants need not be 

personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations when sued in their official capacities for 

prospective injunctive relief. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464. 471 (1985) ("[A] suit against a 

state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against 

the official's office"). Instead, the plaintiff must allege that a government "policy or issue" played 

a role in the constitutional violation. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

Aside from the exhaustion issue, a suit for prospective injunctive relief against these 

defendants in their official capacities would be appropriate, because Mr. Ishmael alleged that the 

ODOC's mail policy played a role in the constitutional violation. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. 

Defendant Collette Peters in her official capacity is responsible for "the daily operation of the prisons 

and all Department of Correction employees." Defendant Elizabeth Craig in her official capacity 

"oversees the rules and polic[ies] ... for the Department ofC01Tections." Pl. Am. Comp!., Doc.# 

15, at 3. Elizabeth Craig and Collette Peters are appropriate defendants, because their office would 

presumably have some responsibility in implementing an order of injunctive relief. See Pouncil v. 

Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 576 (9'h Cir. 2012) (concluding that "[s]ecretary of the CDCR, is the proper 

defendant on a claim for prospective injunctive relief from a prison regulation, because he would be 

responsible for ensuring that the injunctive relief was carried out ... "). 

-7- OPINION AND ORDER 
Finally, while Mr. Ishmael sued Elizabeth Craig in her individual capacity, that error does 

not end the matter. Mr. Ishmael filed this action prose, and the court as a general rnle construes pro 

se complaints liberally. Tilton, 704 F.3d at 574. This liberal construction is "paiiicularly impo11ant 

in civil rights cases." Id. (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Unless it is absolutely clear 

that a pro se claimant's deficient pleading cannot be cured by amendment, he should be permitted 

an opp011unity to replead. Broughton v. Cutter Labs, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9'h Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, this argument for summary judgment in favor of Collette Peters and Elizabeth Craig 

in their official capacities cannot be sustained. 

IV. First Amendment Violation 

The defendants also claim that summary judgment should be granted on the merits. To state 

a free exercise claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that (1) the proffered belief 

is sincerely held; and (2) the claim is rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular concerns. 1Yfalik 

v. Brown, 16 F.3d at 333. "The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate 

at the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of 

incarceration, and may be cmiailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain 

prison security." ivfcElya v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9'h Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citations 

omitted). To that end, a prisoner must also show that the justification for the state's infringement 

was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 

1138 (9'h Cir. 2015). 

Defendants contend Mr. Ishmael's belief is not sincere, his claim is not rooted in religion, 

and their mail policy as applied to Mr. Ishmael fmihers a legitimate, penological interest. 

-8- OPINION AND ORDER 
A. Sincerity of Mr. Ishmael's Religious Beliefs 

Defendants claim that Mr. Ishmael's belief is not sincerely held, because Mr. Ishmael has 

filed multiple requests for religious accommodation and asserted a number of different religious 

faiths. On September 4, 2008, for example, Mr. Ishmael requested a "halal diet" and identified 

himself as a Muslim. On Janumy 17, 2012, Mr. Ishmael later claimed to be Jewish, requesting a 

kosher diet. On March 18, 2013, in another religious accommodation request for a kosher diet, Mr. 

Ishmael clarified that he was a "Messianic Jew" and that he was "not required to have Jewish lineage 

to practice a religion." Def. Exhibit #2 at 39, Doc. #54-1. Most recently, in his letter to Mr. Young 

dated September 14, 2014, Mr. Ishmael claimed that he was a "sincere believer in the Jewish faith 

and an African Hebrew Israelite of Jerusalem." Def. Exhibit#3at1, Doc. #54-1. 

While Mr. Ishmael's varied professed faiths may cast doubt on the sincerity of his current 

belief, this fact in and of itself does not mandate summary judgment for defendants as a matter of 

law. The Supreme Court has tended to presume the sincerity of religious beliefs, and it has indicated 

that the timing of one's religious conversion is immaterial in the free exercise context. See, e.g., 

Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 n. 9 (1987) ("So long as one's faith 

is religiously based at the time it is asserted, it should not matter, for constitutional purposes, whether 

that faith derived from revelation, study, up-bringing, gradual evolution, or some source that appears 

entirely incomprehensible."); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) (conscientious 

objector claims cannot be disposed of on the merits because the views were "late in c1ystallizing"). 

Additionally, the Supreme Comt has determined that, at least in the context of addressing religious 

exemptions from militmy service, "the threshold question of sincerity" is a "question of fact." 

-9- OPINION AND ORDER 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). I conclude the sincerity of Mr. Ishmael's belief 

is a question of fact that cannot be resolved as a matter of law on the present record. 

B. Claim Deeply Rooted in Religious Belief 

Defendants next contend that, even if Mr. Ishmael's beliefs are sincere, his claim is not 

deeply rooted in religious belief. According to defendants, Mr. Ishmael admitted as much in his 

letter to Mr. Young, where he stated "use of a religious name is not compelled by or central to my 

system ofreligious belief but using my religious name 'Prince Miguel Ishmael' is a part of the way 

I practice and express my religious beliefs, and is hence, a religious exercise." Def. Mot. for 

Summaty Judgment, Doc. #53, at 12; Def. Exhibit #3 at 2, Doc. #54-1. 

To be deeply rooted in religious belief, a plaintiffs claim need not be compelled by or central 

to his religion. See Hernandez v. C.IR., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial ken 

to question the centrality of patiicular beliefs or practices to the faith, or the validity of particular 

litigants' interpretation of those creeds."); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 885 (9'h Cir. 2008) 

("Here the district court impermissibly focused on whether 'consuming Halal meat is required of 

Muslims as a central tenant oflslam,' rather than on whether Shakur sincerely believes eating kosher 

meat is consistent with his faith."); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9'h Cir. 1981) ("A 

religious belief can appear to eve1y other member of the human race preposterous, yet merit the 

protection of the Bill of Rights."). 

Instead, to be rooted in religious belief, the plaintiffs claim need only be related to his 

sincerely held religious belief. In lvfalik v. Brown, for example, the comi concluded that the 

claimant's adoption of a Muslim name was rooted in religious belief because it represented an 

"exercise ofreligious freedom" related to his conversion to Islam. lvfalikv. Brown, 16 F.3d at 333. 

-10- OPINION AND ORDER 
Here, Mr. Ishmael claims that his desire to use a religious name is "a religious exercise", Pl. Am. 

Resp., Doc. #42, at 15, and defendants make no contention to the contrary. See, also, Callahan v. 

Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9'h Cir. 1981) (concluding that plaintiffs distaste for social security 

numbers was related to his religious beliefs, even though he also opposed social security numbers 

on secular grounds prior to his religious conversion). Whether Mr. Ishmael's use of his religious 

name is related to a sincere religious belief is a factual issue. 

C. Legitimate Peno logical Interest 

Defendants contend ODOC rnles requiring inmates to use only their committed name on 

written correspondence promotes the efficient processing of mail. A prison regulation that requires 

the use of an inmate's committed name to the exclusion of a religious name, however, is 

umeasonable. 1Vfalikv. Brown, 16 F.3d at 334. 

As noted previously, Mr. Ishmael failed to pursue administrative remedies regarding the use 

of both his religious name and his committed name together on c01Tespondence. His complaint 

specifies, however, that he seeks to exercise his religion by using both his religious name and his 

committed name on envelopes. In addition, he claims he attempted to mail letters containing both 

his committed and religious names, only to have staff return those letters to him, stating he must 

"only use his committed name." Pl. Am. Comp!., Doc. #15, at 4-5. In light of lvfalik v. Brown, 

questions remain as to whether the ODOC mail regulations as applied to Mr. Ishmael are reasonably 

related to a legitimate penological interest. 

V. Overbroad injunctive relief 

Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment because the injunctive relief Mr. 

Ishmael seeks is overly broad. Under the PLRA, prospective relief in any civil action must be 

-11- OPINION AND ORDER 
nanowly tailored to conect the constitutional violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(l)(A). Mr. Ishmael 

seeks the following relief: First, he asks that the court declare mail rules OAR 291-131-0020(2) and 

OAR 291-131-0025(1) unconstitutional as they apply to the use of his religious name on 

conespondence. Second, he asks that the cout1 declare that defendants violated his rights by 

prohibiting him from using his religious name in tandem with his committed name on incoming and 

outgoing mail. Third, he asks that the cou11 prevent defendants from applying the aforementioned 

rules to the use of his religious name on incoming and outgoing mail. Pl. Am. Comp!., Doc #15, at 

6. 

Defendants contend that Mr. Ishmael's requested relief is overly broad, "because it would 

invalidate the ODOC mail rules as applied to him in whole, rather than in pat1." Def. Mot. for 

Summary Judgment, Doc #53, at 15. As I construe Mr. Ishmael's complaint, he seeks to invalidate 

only the application of these rules that prohibit him from using his religious name in tandem with 

his committed name. This interpretation constitutes a natrnwly tailored request for relief, and I 

therefore reject defendants' argument in favor of summaty judgment on this ground. 

-12- OPINION AND ORDER 
CONCLUSION 

For all the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment[# 53] is 

GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against ODOC are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs claims 

against Collette Peters and Elizabeth Craig are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this 0t-day of October, 2015. 

-13- OPINION AND ORDER