IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

STERLING RAY CUNIO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KATE BROWN, in her Official 

Capacity as Governor of the 

State of Oregon; COLETTE S. 

PETERS, in her Official 

Capacity as the Director of 

the Oregon Department of 

Corrections; KRISTIN WINGESYANEZ, in her Official 

Capacity as Chairperson, 

Oregon Board of Parole and 

Post-Prison Supervision; 

jointly and severally, 

Defendants. 

COFFIN, Magistrate Judge: 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01647-TC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Sterling Cunio, one of five individuals under the 

age of 17 convicted of aggravated murder between 1989 and 1995, 

filed a complaint in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants 

Kate Brown, Colette Peters, and Kristin Winges-Yanez move to 

dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) 

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). For the reasons set forth below, 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 1 of 15
defendants' motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff was born in April 1977. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") 'li 

45. In January 1994, three months shy of his 17th birthday, 

plaintiff kidnaped, robbed, and killed two people with 18-year-old 

Wilford Hill. Id. at 'li 4 9; Hallman Decl. Ex. 1. 1 Following a 

stipulated facts trial, the criminal court convicted plaintiff of 

two counts of aggravated murder, two counts of first-degree 

kidnaping, and two counts of first-degree robbery, and sentenced 

him to two consecutive sentences of life with parole, followed by 

partially-consecutive, upward-durational departure sentences 

totaling 280 months' imprisonment. FAC 'll'll 50-52; Hallman Decl. Ex. 

2 . 

At the time of plaintiff's conviction, Oregon had generally 

replaced its indeterminate sentencing and parole scheme with a 

system of determinate sentencing based on guidelines. State ex rel. 

Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592, 598, 260 P.3d 448 (2011). 

Nevertheless, juvenile aggravated murderers continued to receive 

indeterminate life sentences with the possibility of parole until 

1995. Id.; see also White v. Belleque, 2010 WL 5625800, *1 (D.Or. 

Oct. 21, 2010), adopted by .2011 WL 208262 (D.Or. Jan. 21, 2011) 

1 In moving for dismissal, defendants submitted documents 

relating to the underlying state court proceedings. See generally 

Hallman Decl. Plaintiff furnished some of the same documents, as 

well as additional materials regarding his sentencing and 

appeals; where duplicative, the Court cites to defendants' 

submissions. See generally O'Connor Decl. The parties' evidence 

is subject to judicial notice as plaintiff's complaint either 

incorporates those documents by reference or they are part of the 

public record and not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201; Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 

2001)·. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 2 of 15
("Oregon law specifically provided that juveniles who committed 

aggravated murder when under age seventeen could not be sentenced 

to death, life without parole (true life) or to a mandatory thirty 

year minimum sentence, the three sentencing options available for 

adults convicted of such an offense [such that] life imprisonment 

with no mandatory minimum" was the only available sentencing option 

in 1994) (citation omitted). In other words, Oregon law applied a 

bifurcated sentencing scheme to individuals under the age of 

seventeen convicted in a single criminal judgment of aggravated 

murder and other non-murder felonies between 1989 and 1995. 

Although the Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison 

Supervision ("Board") controls the amount of time an individual 

spends in prison for an indeterminate sentence, it did not have any 

rules governing parole decisions until 1999. Engweiler, 350 Or. at 

599. The Board's first set of juvenile aggravated murderer rules 

("JAM Rules") required it to conduct a prison term hearing and set 

a "review date" for each prisoner, which would determine a schedule 

for reviews and could ultimately result in a parole release date. 

Id. The review date was set on the basis of a matrix that 

considered the crime's severity and the inmate's criminal 

history/risk assessment. Id. If the Board denied parole, the inmate 

could petition for review after 480 months (40 years) to establish 

that he was capable of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of 

time. Id. 

In 1999, the 

plaintiff pursuant 

Board conducted a 

to the JAM Rules 

prison term hearing 

and determined that 

for 

the 

applicable unified matrix range was "life." Hallman Decl. Ex. 3. As 

a result, plaintiff could not ask the Board to review his parole 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 3 of 15
eligibility until 2039 - ten years longer than adults convicted of 

the same crime and sentenced to the mandatory minimum. Upon 

administrative review, the Board upheld its decision and the Oregon 

Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed plaintiff's petition. 

Hallman Decl. Exs. 4-5. 

In 2011, the Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the 1999 JAM 

Rules, holding that the Board did not have authority to require an 

intermediate review process where the prisoner must demonstrate 

that he is capable of rehabilitation before he is deemed eligible 

for parole consideration. Engweiler, 350 Or. at 616. Instead, the 

Board was authorized to conduct a parole hearing regarding juvenile 

aggravated murderers and either set an initial release date or 

explain why it chose not to do so. Id. at 630. Based on the 

Engweiler decision, the Board promulgated a new set of JAM Rules, 

which, in pertinent part, required it to conduct a "prison term 

hearing" and set a "projected parole release date" for inmates who 

committed aggravated murder between 1989 and 1995. Or. Admin. Rule 

255-032-0005(4). Such individuals are no longer required to 

demonstrate that they are capable of rehabilitation before the 

Board may consider them eligible for parole; rather, the projected 

parole release date is determined "in accordance with the 

guidelines and matrix that apply with respect to the date of the 

crime." Id. 

In 2012, plaintiff received a prison term hearing under the 

revised JAM Rules, during which the Board determined that the 

applicable matrix range was "576 months to life." Hallman Decl. Ex. 

6, at 2. The Board found that two aggravating factors, and one 

mitigating factor ("evidence of reduced responsibility" due to 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 4 of 15
age), existed at the time of plaintiff's 1995 entry into custody. 

Id.; see also O'Connor Decl. Ex. 4, at 4-6 (Board describing its 

procedures at plaintiff's 2012 prison term hearing). Based on that 

evidence, the Board set a unified prison term of 576 months (48 

years) - i.e. 288 months (24 years) for each count of aggravated 

murder. Hallman Decl. Ex. 6, at 2. As such, plaintiff will not be 

up for parole until his exit interview in 2042, which will be his 

first opportunity to present evidence of maturation or 

rehabilitation. Id.; FAC ~~ 40-43, 57; Or. Admin. R. 255-060-0006. 

Plaintiff's remaining determinate sentences are consecutive 

thereto; accordingly, he will only begin serving those sentences 

once paroled. Hallman Decl. Ex. 6, at 2. In addition to the 

sentences arising from the January 1994 incident, plaintiff was 

sentenced to 7 0 months' imprisonment, consecutive to all other 

sentences, for the second-degree assault he committed while 

incarcerated at the age of 20. Id. at 4; FAC ~~ 55-58. 

Plaintiff timely sought administrative review of the Board's 

2012 decision, arguing, in pertinent part, that the Board violated 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to consider 

evidence of rehabilitation and by "impos[ing] a prison term that 

effectively means [he] will spend his life in prison." Hallman 

Decl. Ex. 7, at 2-3. In May 2014, after the Board upheld its 

decision, plaintiff filed a petition with the Oregon Court of 

Appeals, renewing his constitutional arguments. See generally 

Hallman Decl. Exs. 8-9. 

In October 2014, plaintiff commenced a lawsuit in this Court 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that "Oregon's bifurcated 

sentencing scheme creates a de facto life sentence in violatio~ of" 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 5 of 15
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 

18; FAC ':![':![ 80-87. In November 2014, briefing relating to the 

Board's prison term decision was completed before the Oregon Court 

of Appeals, however, that case has not yet been set for submission 

or argument. 3 O'Connor Decl. Ex. 8, at 21; Hallman Decl. Ex. 10. In 

March 2015, defendants filed the present motion to dismiss. 

STANDARDS 

Where the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the action 

must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1). The party seeking to 

invoke the jurisdiction of the court bears the burden of 

establishing that such jurisdiction exists. Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In resolving a Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b) (1) motion, the court may hear evidence regarding 

subject-matter jurisdiction and resolve factual disputes where 

necessary: "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's 

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not 

preclude the [court] from evaluating for itself the merits of 

jurisdictional claims." Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United 

States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Similarly, where the plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted," the court must dismiss the action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

2 Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint but did not 

substantively alter the nature of his claims. 

3 Plaintiff also has an appeal pending from the circuit 

court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in 

which he alleged identical constitutional violations. FAC ':![ 21; 

O'Connor Decl. Exs. 9-16. As both parties recognize, that case' is 

not relevant to these proceedings. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 6 n.4. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 6 of 15
is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). For purposes of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) motion, 

the complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and 

its allegations are taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 

1424 (9th Cir. 1983). Bare assertions that amount to nothing more 

than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are 

conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). Rather, to state a plausible claim for 

relief, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of 

underlying facts" to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 

652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 

(2012) . 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants assert that dismissal is warranted under Younger v. 

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in light of plaintiff's coterminous 

state court proceeding. Alternatively, defendants argue that 

plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law. 

Absent "exceptional circumstances," the Younger doctrine 

precludes federal courts sitting in equity from enjoining "pending 

state criminal proceedings" or state "civil enforcement actions 

akin to criminal proceedings." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State 

Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758-59 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations 

and internal quotations omitted). Abstention by the federal 

district court is required if: (1) the state proceeding is ongoing; 

(2) that proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there 

is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in 

the state proceeding; and (4) the requested relief would enjoin or 

have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state 

Page 7 - ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 7 of 15
proceeding. Id. (citations omitted); see also Canatella v. 

California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 2005) (summarizing the 

Younger doctrine's impact on federal jurisdiction). 

Initially, plaintiff's appeal of the Board's 2012 decision 

represents the type of state proceeding covered by Younger. Maney 

v. Winges-Yanez, 2014 WL 5038302, *3 (D.Or. Oct. 8, 2014) 

(citations omitted). Furthermore, plaintiff "acknowledges [that, 

identical to this case,] his arguments [before the Oregon Court of 

Appeals rely on] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and recent 

case law interpreting those provisions." Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. 

Dismiss 23; see also Hallman Decl. Ex. 9, at 43-52 (plaintiff 

asserting in his appellate brief that he has no meaningful 

opportunity for release due to the combination of his determinate 

sentences and the Board's 2012 decision). Plaintiff also does not 

dispute that the first, second, and fourth Younger elements are 

met. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 19-28; Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 

F. 3d 965, 982-83 (9th Cir. 2004) (en bane); Maney, 2014 WL 3778309 

at *7. This case therefore hinges on the third Younger factor or 

the existence of exceptional circumstances. 

I. Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenges 

Plaintiff argues that "[t]he unique application of Oregon's 

bifurcated sentencing scheme [prevents] state court review [of] the 

merits" of his allegations regarding the combined effect of his 

indeterminate and determinate sentences. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. 

Dismiss 21-22. According to plaintiff, the Board "relied on the 

procedural bars caused by the state's bifurcated sentencing scheme 

to avoid grappling with the federal constitutional questions 

presented in the case." Id. at 24. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 8 of 15
Plaintiff's argument is premised on two misconceptions. First, 

the Board did not refuse to consider his constitutional claims and 

has not raised any procedural bars in relation thereto. See Defs.' 

Mot. Dismiss 9 (defendants are neither uare aware of" nor assert 

any uprocedural bar that would prevent plaintiff from obtaining a 

decision on the merits in the state proceeding") . Indeed, the 

record before the Court demonstrates that the Board rejected 

plaintiff's claims on the merits and is defending them before the 

Oregon Court of Appeals on the merits. See Hallman Decl. Ex. 8, at 

1-2 (Board's initial assessment of plaintiff's constitutional 

claims: "[y] ou argue that this prison term, combined with your 

consecutive (sentencing guidelines) sentences amounts to life 

imprisonment [but your] argument is not persuasive [and your] 

remaining allegations are not supported by the factual 

record, are not sufficiently developed or explained in the review 

request, are without merit, or some combination of these factors"); 

see also O'Connor Decl. Ex. 7, at 27-29 (defendants' response to 

plaintiff's pending appeal, asserting no relevant procedural 

bars) . 4 Thus, as defendants observe, while "the Board completely 

lacks any authority to review or modify plaintiff's guidelines 

sentences[,] that does not mean that the Board [or the Oregon Court 

of Appeals cannot] consider the fact that plaintiff has 280 months 

of guideline sentences consecutive to his two life terms as part of 

4 An independent review of defendants' opposition reflects 

one reference to a procedural bar concerning whether plaintiff 

upreserved or exhausted his claim that the exclusion of evidence 

about [his] institutional conduct or psychological evaluation was 

inconsistent with OAR 255-035-0022(2) ."O'Connor Decl. Ex. 7, at 

19, 28-29. This issue is unrelated to plaintiff's constitutional 

claims and immaterial to the third Younger element. 

Page 9 - ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 9 of 15
the analysis of whether the prison term 

constitutional." Defs.' Reply to Mot. Dismiss 4. 

decision was 

Second, this Court's review of sentencing and parole decisions 

is bifurcated in precisely the same way as the Oregon courts' 

review. It is well-established under the Heck doctrine that a 

plaintiff may not bring claims that lie "within the core of habeas 

corpus" in a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thornton v. Brown, 

757 F.3d 834, 840 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotations 

omitted) . As such, "a person who is in state custody may not use § 

1983 to challenge the very fact or duration of confinement." Id. at 

841 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Rather, all such 

claims must be brought under federal habeas corpus following the 

exhaustion of state remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 

489-90 (1973). As plaintiff acknowledges, Oregon law prescribes a 

similar procedure for seeking post-petition relief based on the 

alleged unlawfulness of a conviction or sentence. Pl.'s Resp. to 

Mot. Dismiss 11-14; see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.540 (a petition 

for post-conviction relief is the "exclusive means" for challenging 

the very fact or duration of confinement). 

Conversely, a plaintiff may bring claims regarding the 

conditions of his confinement, or the procedures relating to a 

parole decision, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 

U.S. 74, 82-84 (2005). Oregon law likewise provides a mechanism 

through which an inmate can challenge the constitutionality of a 

parole decision or appeal a final order of the Board. Or. Admin. R. 

255-080-0010 (5); Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335 (1). Upon review, the 

Oregon Court of Appeal may consider, amongst other things, whether 

the Board's order is "[i] nconsistent with an agency rule, an 

Page 10. ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 10 of 15
officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice" or 

is "in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision." Or. 

Rev. Stat.§§ 144.335(3), 183.482(8) (b)"; see also Dubinka v. Judges 

of Superior Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 223-24 (9th Cir. 1994) (third Younger 

factor met where the "state law [does] not impose procedural 

barriers to raising the constitutional claims in the state court 

proceedings") ( citation omitted) . 

In sum, both Oregon and federal courts may consider whether a 

prisoner's conviction or sentence is unconstitutional in only one 

type of ·proceeding: habeas corpus at the federal level and 

post-conviction relief at the state level. Both forums may also 

consider, in a separate type of proceeding, challenges to the 

lawfulness of detention, including to the constitutionality of a 

parole decision. Plaintiff's pending case with the Oregon Court of 

Appeals and this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action both fall within the 

latter category. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot show that the scope 

of relief in this Court is broader, or even different, from that 

which he can receive before the state courts .. 5 

Finally, the Court notes that similar constitutional 

5 Plaintiff relies on Meredith v. Oregon, 321 F.3d 807 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (as amended), in support of the proposition that 

Oregon's administrative procedures erect procedural bars in 

relation to his constitutional claims. As discussed herein, that 

is simply not the case. Moreover, Meredith is distinguishable, as 

that case involved entirely discrete and singular administrative 

review procedures that rendered the plaintiff's state court 

constitutional claims time-barred. Meredith, 321 F.3d at 810-20. 

By contrast, there are no timeliness issues inherent to this case 

and, unlike in Meredith, the Board did not prevent plaintiff from 

presenting evidence regarding his constitutional claims. As a 

result, the equitable and comity considerations underlying 

Meredith have no application here. See Baffert v. Cal. Horse 

Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining 

jurisdiction under Younger, and distinguishing Meredith, where 

the state forum was not inadequate on timeliness grounds). 

Page 11- ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 11 of 15
challenges to Board decisions have been held to nfall . . . within 

the carefully defined boundaries" of Younger abstention. See Sopher 

v. Washington, 2008 WL 4793173, *10 (D.Or. Oct. 30, 2008), aff'd, 

370 Fed.Appx. 846 (9th Cir. 2010) (where the plaintiff raised 

identical constitutional challenges is his state appeal of a 

circuit court decision denying mandamus relief, Younger applied to 

preclude the exercise of federal jurisdiction); see also McClure v. 

Baker, 2008 WL 268361, *1-2 (D.Or. Jan. 29, 2008) (Younger 

abstention appropriate in a constitutional challenge to Board 

procedures); Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 1027 (1995) (nan inmate already participating in 

state litigation must make his stand there rather than attempt the 

equivalent of federal-defense removal by filing an independent § 

1983 suit"). Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has an 

adequate opportunity to fairly and fully raise his federal 

constitutional claims before the Oregon Court of Appeals. 

II. Other Exceptional Circumstances 

Plaintiff contends that, even if nthe four elements of the 

Younger doctrine are satisfied, the Younger abstention doctrine 

does not apply because extraordinary circumstances render the state 

court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating [his] federal 

constitutional claims." Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 24 (citation 

and internal quotations omitted). Yet, beyond noting generally that 

n[t]his case is the continuation of years of litigation resulting 

from defendants' failure to comply with state and federal law when 

deciding how to determine the eligibility for release of 

[plaintiff] and the four other boys under 17 years old convicted of 

aggravated murder in adult court," plaintiff does not specify in 

Page 12- ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 12 of 15
what manner such circumstances are present. Id. at 24-25. 

In any event, federal courts have "confined very narrowly" the 

type of circumstances under which federal intervention is 

appropriate despite the existence of pending state criminal or 

quasi-criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (federal 

court may retain jurisdiction where, for instance, there is a 

showing of "bad faith [or] harassment" by state officials, the 

state law involved is "flagrantly and patently violative of express 

constitutional prohibitions," or there are other "extraordinary 

circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be 

shown") (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Kugler 

v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25, reh'g denied, 421 U.S. 1017 

(1975) (" [t] he very nature of extraordinary circumstances, of 

course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every 

situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, 

immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant intervention in 

state criminal proceedings ... [nevertheless, such circumstances 

must create] an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal 

equitable relief, not merely in the sense of presenting a highly 

unusual factual situation") 

Here, plaintiff does not identify the existence of any 

substantial and imminent irreparable injury. See generally FAC; 

Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss. He likewise does not cite to any 

source of law that clearly requires the Board to provide a release 

hearing sooner than 2042, 6 such that the Court cannot conclude that 

6 Plaintiff nonetheless does cite to White in support of the 

proposition that the Board was required to give him a review 

hearing. Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 15. Plaintiff's reliance on 

this case is unpersuasive in two respects. First, the Board 

Page 13- ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 13 of 15
the Board's decision clearly violated his constitutional rights. 

Id. Further, plaintiff has not cited to, and the Court is not aware 

of, any authority holding, either directly or by analogy, that a 

delay in providing an aggravated murderer, who was also sentenced 

to other serious crimes for which he must serve time, the 

meaningful opportunity to present evidence of rehabilitation or 

maturation constitutes the kind of exceptional circumstance 

contemplated by Younger. Id.; see also Carden v. Montana, 626 F~2d 

82, 8 3-8 4 (9th Cir. 198 0) (allegations of a speedy trial violation 

did not warrant federal intervention) Thus, plaintiff's belief 

that the Board wrongly denied him a release hearing does not, 

without more, preclude application of the Younger abstention 

doctrine. 

Because each of the Younger elements are met and no 

exceptional circumstances are present, this Court must decline 

jurisdiction over plaintiff's federal lawsuit. Moreover, dismissal 

is the proper remedy as plaintiff is seeking only declaratory and 

injunctive relief in these proceedings. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 

979-82. Defendants' motion is granted. 

Ill 

Ill 

Ill 

Ill 

issued new JAM Rules after White on which it based its 2012 

pris?n term decision; to date, no court has invalidated those 

rules. Second, unlike the inmates in White, plaintiff was 

convicted of two counts of aggravated murder, which resulted in 

consecutive terms of imprisonment. White, 2010 WL 5625800 at *1. 

Page 14- ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01647-TC Document 26 Filed 05/27/15 Page 14 of 15
CONCLUSION 

Defendants' motion to dismiss (doc. 20) is GRANTED and this 

~ase is DISMISSED. 

Dated this~day of May 2015. 

United Judge 

Page 15- ORDER 

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