The Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application and answer fully set forth the parties’ positions and the material facts.

1

Therefore, pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 2, we suspend the application of Tenn. R. App. P. 24, 25, and 29, and find oral

argument to be unnecessary pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 35(c). See Hammock v. Sumner Co., No.

01A01-9710-CV-00600, 1997 WL 749461 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1997) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

HARLAN THOMAS ET AL. v. JOHN CARPENTER ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cheatham County

No. 5508 George Sexton, Judge

No. M2005-00993-COA-R9-CV - Filed June 29, 2005

This interlocutory appeal involves a plaintiff who was injured while helping the contractor building

his house cut a board. The sole issue concerns whether the contractor is equitably estopped from

asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the plaintiff’s claims. The trial court determined

that, by paying the plaintiff $10,000 for his medical expenses, the contractor’s insurance company

induced the plaintiff to believe the matter would be settled amicably without the necessity of a

lawsuit. Thus, the trial court denied the contractor’s motion forsummary judgment, but granted the

contractor an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that

an interlocutory appeal will prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation. We also agree that

summary judgment is not appropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist. However, the

trier of fact should decide whether the $10,000 payment induced the plaintiff to believe that the

matter would be settled amicably, and, therefore, we vacate the trial court’s order to the extent it

makes specific findings with regard to the plaintiff’s beliefs stemming from the $10,000 payment.1

Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part

WILLIAM C.KOCH,JR., P.J., M.S., WILLIAM B.CAIN, and FRANK G.CLEMENT,JR.,JJ., delivered the

opinion of the court.

John R. Tarpley and Samuel L. Jackson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, John Carpenter

and John Carpenter Homes, Inc.

James Bryan Moseley, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Harlan Thomas and Kimberly

Thomas.
Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10 provides:

2

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify

the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no

precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion, it shall be designated

“MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any

reason in any unrelated case.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION2

I.

Harlan and Kimberly Thomas decided to build a new house in Cheatham County and hired

John Carpenter and John Carpenter Homes, Inc. as their general contractor. On October 8, 2002,

Mr. Thomas was visiting the work site when Mr. Carpenter asked for his assistance in cutting a

board. Mr. Thomas held the board while Mr. Carpenter cut it with a circular saw. At some point,

Mr. Thomas changed positions. When Mr. Carpenter restarted the saw, it jumped and cut Mr.

Thomas’s hand. Mr. Thomas was taken to the hospital where surgery was performed to repair the

damage.

Mr. Carpenter turned the matter over to his insurance company, Zurich North American

Insurance Company (“Zurich”). A few weeks after the accident, Mr. Thomas contacted Andrew

Thompson, the claims adjuster for Zurich, to get a better understanding of how his medical bills

would be handled. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Thompson spoke three times during the year following the

accident. While the parties agree that Mr. Thompson advised Mr. Thomas that his medical bills

would be paid up to $10,000, there is a dispute as to what Mr. Thompson said regarding which, if

any, additional claims would be paid and the need for Mr. Thomas to hire an attorney. There is no

dispute that Zurich actually paid Mr. Thomas $10,000 within a few months of the accident. 

On October 10, 2003, Mr. Thompson informed Mr. Thomas that he would receive no further

payments from Zurich because the one-year statute of limitations period had run. Mr. Thomas and

his wife promptly filed this lawsuit on October 14, 2003. The defendants then filed a motion for

summary judgment asserting that the complaint was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations

provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The Thomases responded that the defendants are

equitably estopped from asserting their statute of limitations defense based on the actions of Mr.

Thompson and Zurich. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, specifically

finding that the $10,000 payment made by Zurich induced Mr. Thomas to believe the matter would

be settled amicably without the necessity of a lawsuit.

II. 

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not entitled to a presumption of

correctness on appeal. City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997);
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McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996). Thusthis court must

make a fresh determination concerning whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been

met. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472

(Tenn. 1997). 

A summary judgment is warranted only when there are no genuine, material factual disputes

with regard to the claim asserted and when the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153

(Tenn. 1995). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d

423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Mike v. Po Group, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tenn. 1996). Summary

judgment cannot be granted if any doubt or uncertainty exists with regard to the facts or the

conclusions to be drawn from the facts. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) ; Byrd

v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993). Accordingly, to survive a summary judgment motion,

the nonmoving party need only demonstrate that reasonable persons might draw different

conclusions from the facts. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d at 157.

There is no dispute that the Thomases filed their complaint outside the one-year statute of

limitations. The Thomases assert, however, that the defendants are equitably estopped from

asserting the statute of limitations defense because the defendants induced them to believe the matter

would be settled amicably. The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a defendant

who has actively induced a plaintiff to delay filing suit from asserting the statute of limitations as

a defense. Fahrner v. S.W. Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn.2001). The doctrine should be

invoked sparingly, however, to defeat an otherwise valid statute of limitations defense. Hardcastle

v. Harris, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2004 WL 2821276, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm app. denied

(Tenn. 2005). Determining whether to invoke equitable estoppel requires the courts to examine the

facts and circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the defendant’s conduct is

sufficiently unfair or misleading to outweigh the public policy favoring statutes of limitations.

Hardcastle v. Harris, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2004 WL 2821276, at *11.

The party invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel bears the burden of proof. Carlton v.

Davis, No. M2002-01189-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL1923825, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm app.

denied (Tenn. 2003); Bokor v. Holder, 722 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). The focus of

the inquiry is on the defendant’s conduct and the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ reliance on that

conduct. Fahrner v. S.W. Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 146. To prevail, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

the defendant lulled it into putting off filing its suit by conduct, suggestions, or assurances that the

defendant knew or should have known would induce the plaintiff to delay filing suit. Fahrner v. S.W.

Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 145. Evidence of vague statements or ambiguous behavior by a defendant

is notsufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must identify specific promises, inducements, representations,

or assurances by the defendant that reasonably induced the plaintiff to delay filing suit. Hardcastle

v. Harris, ___ S.W.3d at ___, 2004 WL 2821276, at *11. However, actual fraud, bad faith, or intent

to mislead or deceive on the part of the defendant is not necessary to invoke equitable estoppel.

Church of Christ v. McDonald, 180 Tenn. 86, 95, 171 S.W.2d 817, 821-22 (1943). A promise to
The defendants filed a motion to bifurcate in the trial court, requesting that the statute of limitations and 3

equitable estoppel issues be tried separately, before the issues of liability and damages. The trial court declined to rule

on the motion while the interlocutory appeal was pending.

-4-

pay or otherwise satisfy the plaintiff’s claim without filing suit may be sufficient to justify

application of the doctrine. Brick Church Transmissions, Inc. v. Southern Pilot Ins. Co., 140 S.W.3d

324, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Thomases, a genuine material factual

dispute exists as to what Mr. Thompson told Mr. Thomas regarding the payment of Mr. Thomas’s

additional claims and the need for Mr. Thomas to hire a lawyer. Moreover, a genuine, material

dispute exists as to the inferences to be drawn from the conversations between Mr. Thompson and

Mr. Thomas and from the $10,000 payment made by Zurich. Accordingly, summary judgement in

not appropriate. 

Had the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment based solely on the existence

of disputed facts, we would have affirmed that decision in full. However, the trial court made a

specific finding that the $10,000 payment by Zurich “did induce the plaintiff to believe that the

matter would be settled amicably without the necessity of a lawsuit, and, for this reason, the plaintiff

delayed filing his suit.” This finding implies that the Thomases have not only avoided summary

judgment but have already prevailed on a key portion of their equitable estoppel claim as a matter

of law. What the $10,000 payment induced Mr. Thomas to believe and why he delayed filing the

lawsuit are questions which must be answered by the trier of fact after the parties have had an

opportunity to present evidence. Thus the defendants should be allowed to raise the statute of

limitations defense at trial, even though they are not entitled to a summary judgment. The plaintiffs 3

will then be able to assert once again the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and the trier of fact will

determine whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that Zurich made specific promises,

inducements, representations, or assurances that reasonably induced the plaintiffs to delay filing suit.

III.

The application for an interlocutory appeal is hereby granted. The portion of the trial court’s

January 7, 2005 order finding that the $10,000 payment “did induce the plaintiff to believe that the

matter would be settled amicably without the necessity of a lawsuit, and, for this reason, the plaintiff

delayed filing his suit” is vacated. The remainder of the order denying the motion for summary

judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. The costs of this appeal are taxed one-half to the plaintiffs and one-half to the

defendants and their surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

PER CURIAM