FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT NOVEMB ER 9, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 06- 1565 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 05-02532 CV -RW S-1 V. STEPHEN MOORE, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us ACC EN TU RE , L LP , De fendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (N ove m be r 9, 200 7) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, CA RN E S an d F A Y , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

This case is the third in a serie s of law suits filed by V. Stephen Moore (“ Pl ai nti ff

”) a ga ins t hi s e m

plo y er A cc en tur e, L L P (“ D ef

en dant” ). I n th e curr en t ro und of li tig at ion , P la int if

f al le ge s th at

D ef en dant h as dis cr im inate d a ga ins t hi m on account of his d isabilityin viol ation of the Am ericans with Disabilities Act (“ A D A ”) , 42 U . S. C. § 12 101 et . se q. , and o n a cc ount of his a ge in vio la tio n of

the Age Dis cri m in at io n i n Em pl oym en t Act(“ ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 6 21 et. s eq . Pl ai n t i ff ’s m ai nco n t en t i o ni s th at De fe n d an tre fu s edt o ac co m m o d at e P l ai n t i ff

’s request to return to work af ter an e xtended leave of absence. T he district court dis m iss ed P la int if f’ s c la im s f

or w an t of sub j ec t m atte r j ur isd ic tio n un de r Ru le 12(b)(1): Plaintiff la cked standin g because he suffer ed no injury in fact. Plaintiff no w app eal s. We affirm , alt ho ug h we d o s o o n o th er g ro un ds . Back ground

Pl ai nt iff work edforDefen da ntfro m 19 87 un ti l h e b ecame dis ab le d i n 1 99 2. T he n, D ef

en dant a cc om

m odate d P la int if

f’ s di sa bil ity by pla ci ng h im

on l eave of absence, which allow ed him to keep his health, dental, and life insurance co ve ra ge . D ef

en dant a lso a ssure d P la int if f that he w oul d c ont inu e to r ec ei ve the be ne fi ts “ fo r as lon g a s th e dis ab ili ty la ste d. ” But, in 2002 , D ef en dant i ssu ed

aPlaintiff r elies on this letter , to which he r efe rs in his complaint, as proof of his demand that he 1 be a llo we d to re tur

n to wo rk wi th r e a so na

ble a c c omm od atio n. A c op y of the le tte r w a s atta c he d to Pla int if f’ s Re sp on se to D e fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss. 3 ne wpol ic y

m em or an dum

inf orm ing P la int if

f an d othe r dis ab le d e m

plo y ee s on lon g- te rm le av e of abse nc e that the y

m ust r et ur n to w ork by

1 January

200 5 or the ir e m plo ym en t, a s w el l a s th ei r ins ur an ce c ove ra ge , w oul d be te rm inate d. In Marc h 2 00 4, Pl ai nt iff’s cou ns el sen t a l et te r to Defen da ntall eg in g ADA 1 violatio ns and dem anding that De fendant grant one of three proposed a c c o mm o d a t i o n s : ( 1 ) P l a i n t i f f r e mai n s o nl e a v e o f

ab s e n c e u n d e r

th e o l dp o l i c y, w hic h w oul d a llo whim

to re ta in h is e m

plo ym en t and i nsur an ce be ne fi ts; ( 2) Plaintiff re turns to work with rea sonable accom m odation ; or (3) P laintiff rec eives a se ve ran ce p ack ag e th atwou ldde fray the co st s o f hi s o ng oi ng he al th care . At De fendant’ s request, P laintiff provided a letter fr om his phy sician stating that Pl ai nti ff c oul d pe rf

orm w ork onali m ite d, part -t im e ba sis but that a de sc ri pti on o f the appl ic ab le pos iti on w as ne ed ed be fo re the phy sic ian c oul d c le ar P la int if f fo r wo rk . De fe n d an t , h o we v er , h as n o tp ro v i d edjo b d es cr i p t i o n s t o Pl ai n t i ff ’s ph y si ci an or o th erwi se id en ti fie d p ot en ti al ly avai labl e p os it io ns forPla in ti ff. De spite Plaintiff’ s request for ac com m odation , D efendant did not offer Plaintiff a posi tio n th at

w oul d a cc om

m odate his dis ab ili ty

and d id n ot e ve n e nga ge in the interactive process of deter m ining whether

such a positi on was available.4

A ft er f ili ng c harg es of

dis cr im inatio n w iththe E qua l E m plo ym en t O ppor tun ity Co m m iss ion( “ E E O C” ), P la int if f fi le d aput at ive c la ss a ct iona ga ins t D ef en dant i n O ct obe r 2004 , a lle gin g th at the ne wpol ic y

vio la te d th e E m

plo ym en t Re tir em en t I nc om e Se curi ty A ct ( “ E RI SA ”) . Mo or e v. A cc en tur e, L L P, N o. 1:04 CV3116-TW T (N. D. Ga . f iled Oct. 25, 2004) (“ Moore I”) . But, bef ore D ef en dant w as se rv ed

w iththe c om

pla int , P la int if

f vol unt ar ily

dis m iss ed

the sui t on 8 Decem

ber 2004. T he next day , D efendant began notify ing its disabled em plo y ee s who w er e on l eave of abse nc e, inc lud ing P la int if f, that the y

w oul d no t be term inated und er the newpolicy , but w ouldinstead retain their leave of absence s t a tu s u n d e r

th e o l dp o l i c y. E ve n so , on 2 1 D ec em

be r 2004 , P la int if

f fi le d ase co nd c la ss a ct ionsui t ag ai nst D ef en dant, se ek ing ade cl ar at or y j udgm en t tha t the ne wpol ic y , a s f orm er ly ap pl ie d, v io la te d ERI SA. Mo or e v . Accen tu re, LLP, No. 1 :0 4C V37 17 -TW T (N.D. G a. May 6, 200 5) ( “ Moo re I I” ). T he c om pla int state d th at , a lth oughthe

“ unde rl y ing iss ue s inthi s m atte r [h ad ] be enr es olv ed by D ef en dant, ” the pur

pose of f ili ng s uit w as “ to o bta in atto rn ey

f ee s f ro m D ef en dant b as ed

upo n [ the c la ss ac tio n P la int if

fs ] obt ai nin g su

bst an tia l e qui ta

ble r el ie f. ” I d. a t *1 ( al te ratio n in or igi na l) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d D ef en dant’ s m oti on t o di sm iss on g ro unds5

that Plaintiff lacked standing – th at is, inj ury in fact – to challenge the newpolicy be cau se itno lo ng er ap pl ie d t o h im . Id. at*4 . In Sep te m

be r 20 05 , aft er t he EEOC dec li ne d t o l it ig at e h is ADA andADEA claim s, P laintiff brought th e suit at issue here (“ Moore III ”). Plaintiff a sserts that D ef en dant d isc ri m inate d a ga ins t hi m on the ba sis of

his dis ab ili ty

and a ge by re fu sin g to a cc om

m odate his Marc h 20 04 r eque st t o r et ur n to w ork w ith reasonable acc omm odation or to find som e other alter native to his eventual term ination under the new le ave of absence policy . Plaintiff specifica lly alleged that D ef en dant d en ie d hi m

( 1) a cc es s to D ef

en dant’ s di sa

bil ity a cc om m odatio n pr oc es s, ( 2) an a lte rn at ive to his e ve ntu al te rm inatio n, ( 3) j ob d es cr ipt ion s f or av ai la ble pos iti ons, and ( 4) an a cc om m odate d po sit ion . S um

m ar iz ing his co m pla int , P la int if

f cl ai m s th at

“ [D ef en dant] e sse nti al ly

r ef use d to e nte r int o th e interactive process of deter m ining whether

an acc omm odated pos ition wa s av ai labl e fo r [Pl ai nt iff

]. ” De fendant filed a m otion to dism iss un der Rules 12(b)(1) and 12 (b)(6), ar gui ng tha t P la int if

f ag ai n la ck ed

standi ng t o f

ile sui t and a lso that hi s c om pla int fa ile d to state ac la im . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed the e nti re c om

pla int f or la ck of subject m atter j urisdictio n und er R ule 12(b)(1). The court reasoned that Plaintiff could no t establish an in

j ury in fact – and theref

ore lacked standing to b ring suit--Pla int if f d oe s n ot a

pp e a l th e dis mis sa l of

his AD EAc la im. 2 6 because D efendant “ never fa iled to provi de the accom m odation which [P laintiff] had previous ly

rec eived and which, when noti fied of its term ination , [ Plaintiff] requested be continu ed.” The district court also dis m issed Plaintiff’ s claim under th e A DEA an dd en i edas m o o tPl ai n t i ff ’s m o t i o nt o d i s qu al i fy De fe n d an t ’s 2 co un se l.

D isc us sio n Pl ai nti ff ’ s m ai n c ont en tio n is that D ef en dant f ai le d to e nga ge in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s r equir ed by the A D Ato de te rm ine am utu al ly a gr ee ab le ac co m m odatio n f

or his dis ab ili ty . I n part ic ular, P la int if f ar gue s th at

D ef en dant fa ile d to a cc om

m odate his r eque st, a s se t f orth i n hi s M ar ch200 4 le tte r to Defen da nt , th athe be returne d t o wo rkin an acco m m od at edpo si ti on wit h p ay . W e dis ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat P la int if f’ s c la im doe s no t present injury

in fact f or the purpose of consti tutio nal standin g. A s long as D ef en dant h ad

ale ga l du ty

und er the A D Ato en ga ge in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s of fi ndi ng P la int if

f ana cc om

m odate d po sit ion , it s f

ai lur e to e nga ge in that pr oc es s w oul d c re at e aninj ur

y in fa ct that i s bo th c onc re te and s pe ci fi c. S ee W ill iam s v.7

Bd. of Regents, 477 F. 3d 12 82, 1302 (11t h Cir. 2007 ) (stating that injury in fact

“ ar ise s f ro m the inv as ionof

ale ga lly pr ote ct ed

int er es t tha t i s su ff

ic ie ntl y c onc re te an d p art ic ul ari zed , andno t ab st ract an d i nd efi ni te ” (em ph as is ad de d) ). By “ co nf la tin g th e standi ng i nqui ry w ithr es olu tio n of

the m er its , ” the dis tr ic t c ourt i m

pr ope rl y r el ie d onstandi ng ana ly sis to dis m iss P la int if f’ s c la im under Rule 12(b)(1), even thoug h the disp ositiv e issue went to the m erits. See W oode n v. Bd . of

Re ge nts , 247 F . 3d 1 262, 128 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( “ [S tandi ng] is a thr es hol d de te rm inatio n th at is co nc ep tua lly

dis tin ct f ro m w he the r the pla int if

f is entitled to p revail on the m erits.” ). T he issue was not whether Plaintiff w as inj ur ed by D ef en dant’ s r ef

usa l t o e nga ge in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s of de te rm ini ng a re asonable accom

m odation ; instead, the issue was whether D efendant had a legal duty to do s o. T hus, r athe r than di sm iss ing P la int if f’ s c la im f or la ck of standi ng, the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have e xam ine d w he the r, a cc ep tin g P la int if f’ s a lle ga tio ns as tr ue , his c om

pla int state d ac la im

f or r el ie f unde r the A D Apur suant t o R ule 12(b)(6). See Morrison v. A m way Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 (11t h Cir. 2003 ) (“ If a j ur isd ic tio na l c ha lle nge doe s im pli cate the m er its of

the und er ly ing c la im

the n:

‘ [T ] he pr ope r co ur se of

a ct ionf or the dis tr ic t c ourt . . . is to f ind that j ur isd ic tio n ex i s t s an dd ea l wi th th e o b je ct i o nas a d i re ct at t ac ko nth e mer i t s o f t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s case . . . . ’ ” (a lteration in origin al)).8

W e ar e not

bound b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ea soni ng, how ev er . E ve n if the district court erre d by

dism issin g Plaintiff’ s claim s for lack of standing, w e m ay sti ll af fi rm it s de ci sio n ondif

fe re nt g ro unds . S ee , e . g. , P ow er s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 996 F.2d 112 1, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993 ) (“ W e af firm the j udgm ent of the district court dism issin g this action , but for r easons oth er than those used bythe district co u rt .” ). To th e e x t en t , t h er ef o re , t h at Pl ai n t i ff

’s cl ai m i s b as edo nDe fe n d an t ’s fa ilure to en ga ge in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s of f ind ing ar ea sona

ble a cc om

m odatio n fo r Pl ai nti ff

to re tur n to w ork, w e co nc lud e that P la int if f’ s c om pla int f ai ls t o st at e a cl ai m f or w hic h r el ie f m ay

be gr an te d. Under the A DA , “ [a] n em ploy er unlaw fully

discrim inates against a qualified ind ivi dua l w ithadis ab ili ty w he n th e em

plo y er f ai ls t o pr ovi de ‘ re as ona

ble ac co m m odatio ns’ f

or the dis ab ili ty

– un le ss d oin g so w oul d im pose und ue hard shi p onthe e m

plo y er . ” L uc as v. W . W . G ra ing er , I nc . , 257 F . 3d 1 249, 125 5 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S .C. § 1211 2(b)(5)(A )). Plaintiff does not allege, how ev er , that hi s c ur

re nt arr an ge m en t, w hic h a llo w s P la int if f to r em ai n on ex te nde d le av e of

abse nc e w hil e re ta ini ng h is i nsur an ce be ne fi ts, is le ss than a reasonable acc omm odation . Plaintiff’ s own com plaint acknowledged that “ [a] fter [P la int if f] be cam e dis ab le d, [ D ef

en dant] a cc om

m odate d [ Pl ai nti ff

] , pur suant t o it s obl igatio ns unde r the A D A , by pla ci ng h im

on a le av e of abse nc e. ” I nst ea d,Pla int if f’ s Ma rc h 2 00 4 le tte r t o D e fe nd ant r e qu e sti ng on e of thr e e po te nti a l a c c omm od atio ns , 3 the fi rs t of

wh ic h in c lud e d th e op tio n o f a llo wi ngPla int if f t o retai n hi s leave of

a bs e nc e status , buttresses the notion that Plaintiff’s cur rent a rra ng ement, whe reby he remains on leave of abse nce, is r e a so na ble . In ef fe c t, by a llo wi ngPla int if

f t o r e ma in o n le ave of

a bs e nc e and

the re by re ta in h is insurance benef

its, Defenda

nt affor ded Plaintiff his first choice of potential ac commodations.

9 Plaintiff ar gues that Defe ndant vi olated the AD A by ref using to accom

m odate, through the interactive ac com m odation process, P laintiff’ s additio nal request for a fo rm al pa idpo si ti on . T o e sta bli sh an A D Avio la tio n, it is not e noug h to sho wthat D ef en dant – while granting a rea sonable and full accomm odation – denied a differe nt requested ac co m m odatio n. W e have m ad e cl ear “ that an e m plo y er is not r eq uir ed to accom m odate an em

ploy ee in any

m anner in which that em ploy ee desires. ” Stew art v. Ha

ppy He rm an’ s Cheshire Bridge, Inc. , 117 F. 3d 12 78, 1285 (11t h Cir. 1997 ) (internal quotation m arks om itted). S tated m ore plainly , “ a qualified ind ivi dua l w ithadis ab ili ty is not e nti tle d to the a cc om

m odatio n of

he r ch oic e, but onl y to a re as ona

ble a cc om

m odatio n. ” I d. a t 12 86 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks om itt ed ). Abse nt an a lle ga tio n th at P la int if f’ s on goi ng arr an ge m en t w ith De fendant wa s unreasonable, we cannot conclude that Defendant had an 3 obl igatio n to of

fe r Pl ai nti ff

apa id p osi tio n or

to en ga ge oth er

w ise in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s of

f ind ing ar ea sona

ble a cc om

m odatio n f

or P la int if f. C f. W ill is v. Co no pc o, In c., 10 8 F .3d28 2, 2 85 (11 th Cir . 19 97 ) (o bs erv in g t ha t t he ADAP lai nti ff a lso mov e d in

dis tr ic t c ourt

to d isq ua lif y De fe nd ant’ s c ouns e l be c a us e , a c c or din gto 4 Plaintiff, Defe ndant’s counse l was likely to be a wi t n es s i n the ca se. B eca use the district cour

t corr ectly dismiss ed Plaintiff’s complaint, we also conclude that the district court prope rly dismiss ed as moot Plainti ff’ s motion t o disqualify Def endant’ s counsel. 10 doe s no t “ re qui re an ‘ int er ac tiv e pr oc es s’ suc h th at an e m plo y er c anbe he ld l ia

ble m erely for f ailing to engage in the process itself (re gardless of whether a ‘reaso nabl e acc omm od at io n’ co ul d i n re al it y ha ve be en m ad e fo r th e em pl oyee)”). Pl ai nt iff’s com

pl ai ntfai ls , th eref

or e, to st at e a cl ai m

forrel ie f un de r th e ADA.

C on cl us ion

Be ca use D ef en dant a ff

or de d P la int if

f re as ona ble a cc om

m odatio n by allowing him

to rem ain on leave of absence and thus to retain his in surance be ne fi ts, w e co nc lud e that D ef en dant h ad

no d uty und er the A D Ato pr ovi de Plaintiff w ith his choice of a differe nt accom m odation . To the extent, then, that Pl ai nti ff a lle ge s th at

D ef en dant v iol at ed

the A D Aby

de ny ing him

apa id p osi tio n or by r ef usi ng t o e nga ge in the int er ac tiv e pr oc es s of f ind ing ar ea sona

ble accom m odation for P laintiff to return to work, Plaintiff’ s com plaint fails to state a cl ai m fo r w h i ch we m ay g ra n tre l i ef . Ac co rd i n g l y, we a ff

i rm th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s decision to dism iss Plaintiff’ s claim , a lthou gh we do so und er R ule 12(b)(6). 411

AFFIRMED.