IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

PORTLAND DIVISION 

CORWIN DELANO ORR, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DERRICK PETERSON, MARK HALEBROWN, STEVE PINA, and DARLENE 

FELIX, 

Defendants. 

ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge: 

Civ. No. 3:14-cv-00833-AC 

FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

Prose Plaintiff Corwin Delano Orr ("Orr") filed this lawsuit against four employees of the 

Multnomah County Sheriffs Office ("MCSO") for constitutional and statutory violations which 

occurred while Orr was a prisoner at Multnomah County Detention Center ("MCDC"). Orr alleges 

claims arising out of 42 U .S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

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Amendments to the Constitution. (Am. Comp!. at 4.) He also purports to allege claims for 

negligence. Defendants Derrick Peterson ("Peterson"), Mark Hale-Brown ("Hale-Brown"), Steve 

Pina ("Pina"), and Darlene Felix ("Felix") (collectively "Defendants") now move for summary 

judgment on all of Orr's claims. After careful review of the record, the court concludes Defendants 

are entitled to summary judgment. 

Factual Background 

Orr was arrested in February 2014 for possession of cocaine, resisting arrest, and attempted 

assault of a police officer. (Declaration of Jose Martinez ("Martinez Deel.") at ii 5, Ex. 1.) 

Following his arrest, Orr was housed in MCDC to await trial. (Id.) While Deputies attempted to 

book Orr, he became disruptive and verbally threatened deputies. (Martinez Deel. at ii 7.) At the 

resulting disciplinary hearing, the MCDC hearings officer imposed two consecutive fifteen-day 

periods of disciplinary segregation and a concurrent ten-day period of disciplinary segregation. 

(Martinez Deel. at ii 8, Ex. 3.) 

During his term in segregation, Orr was housed primarily in administrative-segregation-unit 

4B ("Unit 4B"). (Id.) Because it is a "segregation unit," MCDC policies restrict inmates housed in 

Unit 4B from certain privileges enjoyed by other MCDC prisoners in less-restrictive housing units. 

Notably, inmates "placed in administrative segregation do not have access to voluntary life skill 

programs or various forms of voluntary drug or alcohol treatment." (Martinez Deel. at iit9.) 

Inmates in disciplinary segregation also have more "limited access to law library services 

than inmates" in the general population. (Martinez Deel. at ii 20.) They must make requests for legal 

materials, which are delivered to them in their cell. (Id.) Orr sought access to law-library materials 

on several occasions while he was housed in Unit 4B. (Felix Deel. Ex. 1.) On five occasions 

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between March 2014 and June 2014, the law-library coordinator provided Orr with "packets" 

containing information about§ 1983 claims. (Felix Deel., Ex. !.) 

Orr was housed in Unit 4B until his release from MCDC in June 13, 2014. (Maitinez Deel. 

at'\[ 17.) On June 21, 2014, Orr returned to MCDC custody. (Martinez Deel. at'\[ 17.) Upon his 

return, Orr was housed in "therapeutic" housing units, and later a "close custody unit which is even 

less restrictive than administrative segregation." (Martinez Deel. at'\[ 17.) 

Procedural Background 

In May 2014, Orr filed his Complaint and supportive exhibits. Shortly thereafter, Orr 

amended his Complaint on June 4, 2014. (Dkt. No. 9.) The Amended Complaint contained the 

same claims for relief and was brought against the same four defendants, but contained new 

allegations. Orr also attached a new exhibit to the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 9.) Defendants 

answered Orr's Amended Complaint on August 1, 2014, and moved for summary judgment. Orr 

did not file a response which addresses the arguments raised in Defendants' motion. Instead, on 

October 28, 2014, he filed with the court an "Affidavit of Fact" in which Orr disputes this court's 

"lawful delegation of jurisdiction." (Dkt. No. 30 at 1.) 

Legal Standard 

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 

FED. R. C1v. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no issue of fact exists 

and that the nonmovant cannot prove one or more essential elements of a claim or defense. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the movant meets his burden, the nonmovant must 

"go beyond the pleadings [] by her own affidavits ... [to] designate specific facts showing that there 

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is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory allegations which 

are unsupported by factual material such as affidavits and documentary evidence are insufficient to 

defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

On summary judgment, the court is bound to view all facts in a light most favorable to the 

nonmovant and must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Narayan v. EGL Inc., 

616 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). Further, where the nonmoving party to a motion for summary 

judgment is a prose litigant, the court must "construe liberally the filings and motions." Thomas 

v. Ponder, 611F.3d1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Discussion 

Orr's Amended Complaint alleges four claims, each brought against a different defendant. 

Instead of organizing his complaint according to the causes of action, each claim alleges multiple 

violations against one defendant. For example, in the space provided for the plaintiff to explain 

"what right under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United states has been violated," Orr 

writes: "Deprivation of due process, cruel and unusual punishment, preventing access to the courts 

and materials under the fourth and eighth amendments, deliberate indifferent [sic], negligence." 

(Am. Comp!. at 4-11.) Because of the way Orr organized his Amended Complaint, the court's 

discussion is divided by defendant, rather than by theory of recovery. However, before the court 

reaches the merits of Orr's claims, it will address the jurisdictional challenge Orr advances in his 

"Affidavit of Fact." 

I. Jurisdictional Challenge 

Instead of filing a traditional response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Orr filed an 

"Affidavit of Fact." (Dkt. No. 30.) In it, Orr contends that he has "not obtained from the court the 

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lawful delegation of jurisdiction to continue forth with this civil matter." (Dkt. No. 30 at 1.) 

Moreover, Orr argues the court has not "shown IJ]udicial [ a]uthority over the subject matter." (Dkt. 

No. 30 at 2.) Orr concludes by contending that "this Court[']s Delegation of Authority via an 

averment of jurisdiction is the lawful process to determine if this colorable court has Judicial 

Authority over this civil suit." (Dkt. No. 30 at I.) Orr filed his case in federal district court and 

submitted to its jurisdiction. Therefore, the court construes Orr's argument to be a challenge to 

federal magistrate jurisdiction over his case, particularly over Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The 

court concludes that under federal law, this court has jurisdiction to issue this Findings and 

Recommendation. 

The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 articulated the bounds of federal-magistrate-judge 

jurisdiction. That law grants federal magistrate judges jurisdiction to adjudicate all "pretrial" matters 

in civil cases except motions "for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary 

judgment, ... [and) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b )(1 )(A). Magistrate judges may adjudicate dispositive motions only if they have the 

mutual consent of the patties to that case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b )(2). Where one or more party declines 

to give consent, the judge must issue his or her "findings and recommendations" ("F&R") analyzing 

the factual and legal merits of the dispositive motion. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b )(2). Thereafter, the parties 

are given an opportunity to object to the F&R, which is reviewed by an Article III judge. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b). 

Here, the court is wholly within its jurisdiction to issue a F&R Defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss. If Orr believes this F&R contains legal or factual error, he may file objections which will 

be considered in due course by an Article Ill judge. Therefore, the court concludes Orr's challenge 

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to this court's jurisdiction is without foundation, and is not grounds to deny Defendants' Motion to 

Dismiss. 

II. Defendant Peterson 

Orr's first claim for relief primarily alleges constitutional violations against Peterson. In 

particular, Orr alleges Peterson: (1) unlawfully delegated authority to address prisoner grievances 

to subordinates; (2) through his subordinates, unlawfully refused to move Orr to a new housing unit; 

(3) unlawfully supported the "restrictions imposed upon the [fourth] floor" administrative 

segregation unit" (Am. Comp!. at 4-5); ( 4) unlawfully restricted Orr from participating in 

rehabilitative programs such as substance abuse, anger management classes, and mental health 

services. Because of these violations, Orr alleges he suffered "sleep [deprivation], mental anguish, 

"deep depression, high anxiety, and deep stress." (Am. Comp!. at 5-6.) Orr alleges no facts which 

could plausibly form the basis for a negligence claim. Defendants argue Peterson is entitled to 

summary judgment because he cannot be held vicariously liable under a "supervisor liability" theory 

and because Orr does not allege a colorable constitutional claim. 

A. Supervisor Liability 

The only allegations Orr makes regarding Peterson's own acts or omissions which could give 

rise to a claim are that Peterson unlawfully delegated responsibility to address prisoner grievances 

to a subordinate and that Peterson "supported" the "restrictions" placed on Orr while he was housed 

in administrative segregation. The remainder of Orr's first claim for relief is premised on the theory 

that Peterson, as the supervising officer, is vicariously liable for the constitutional violations caused 

by other MCSO employees. Defendants argue Peterson is entitled to summary judgment because 

he cannot be held liable "by virtue of his position and rank." The court agrees with Peterson. 

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"There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, a supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of his 

subordinates only "if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them." Id. Absent a positive act on behalf of the supervisor, 

the plaintiff must show an "affirmative link" between the supervisor's acts and the alleged 

constitutional violation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). 

Here, only one of Orr's claims could possibly proceed on a theory of supervisory liability. 

Orr alleges that Peterson "is well aware of the restrictions imposed upon the fourth floor population," 

including restrictions on participating in rehabilitative programs, but "doesn't address these 

impositions other than by way of support." (Am. Comp!. at 5.) Thus, if Orr can prove that 

withholding rehabilitative programs is a constitutional violation, he may proceed under a supervisory 

liability theory. However, courts have repeatedly held that prisoners do not have a constitutional 

right to rehabilitation, including rehabilitative programs and services. Marshall v. US., 414 U.S. 

417, 421 (1974) (no fundamental right to rehabilitation from narcotics addiction), Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (no constitutional right to rehabilitation in the context of a 

vocational instruction course). Thus, Orr cannot succeed on his claim that Peterson is liable for 

"supporting" restrictions on access to rehabilitative programs. 

B. Unlawful Delegation of Authority 

The only remaining claim Orr levies against Peterson is that he unlawfully delegated to 

subordinates the authority to respond to inmate grievances. Orr alleges Pina responded to Orr's 

inmate grievances "based on unfounded authority and supported by Captain Peterson." The court 

concludes Orr may not state a claim based on this allegation, and Peterson is entitled to summary 

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judgment. 

Although the court is skeptical whether "unlawful delegation ofauthority" may ever give rise 

for a prisoner civil-rights claim under§ 1983, the court need not address the merits of Orr's claim 

because, even if it were a cognizable claim, Orr lacks standing to raise it. 1 Atticle Three of the 

Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power [of the United States] shall extend to all cases ... 

[and] to Controversies .... " U.S. CONST. art III. Courts have held that this "case and controversy" 

clause requires that litigants have "standing" to pursue their legal claims. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 

F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010). "At an irreducible constitutional minimum, standing requires" a 

plaintiff to show: "(1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 

imminent; (2) causation; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injuty." Id. 

Here, Orr does not establish these three elements. Although Orr alleges a litany of mental and 

psychological injuries, he does not demonstrate how those injuries were caused by having his inmate 

grievances addressed by Pina instead of Peterson. Further, he does not allege or otherwise 

demonstrate the causal link between his injuries and Peterson's "unlawful" delegation of authority. 

Orr lacks standing to pursue his claim for "unlawful delegation," and the court finds in the 

alternative that he has not supported the claim with any evidence. Accordingly, Peterson is entitled 

to summary judgment on all of Orr's claims. 

III. Defendant Hale-Brown 

Orr alleges Hale-Brown violated his constitutional rights by limiting Orr's access to reading 

materials and rehabilitative programs. Specifically, Orr alleges in his second claim for relief that 

1 Although Defendants do not argue Orr lacks standing, the court has a sua sponte duty to 

consider issues ofjusticability. Bernhardt v. County of L.A., 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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Hale-Brown "consistently refused [Orr's] request for ... services." He also alleges Hale-Brown 

failed to give him notice that he would be denied these services and "refuses to change the 4B small 

book shelf library because this action falls under counseling services." (Am. Comp!. at 6-7.) 

Because these allegations do not allege a constitutional violation, the court should grant HaleBrown' s motion for summaiy judgment. 

As the court discussed supra, inmates have no constitutional right to rehabilitation or to 

rehabilitative services. Marshall, 414 U.S. at 421, Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530. Nor does Orr have a 

constitutional right any reading materials he wishes. Prisoners have a right to access to the courts, 

including reasonable access to a law library. Meeks v. Cal. Dep 't of Corr., 5 F.3d 538, *2 (9th Cir. 

1993)(unpublished), Toussaintv. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1991). However, thatright 

to library access is limited to "getting books that will help [prisoners] with a case attacking their 

conviction or complaining of their treatment." Id. No authority exists for the proposition that this 

right extends to require prisons to provide prisoners with educational books or other reading 

materials for the prisoners' ente11ainment. Thus, Orr's claims against Hale-Brown fail as a matter 

oflaw, and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of Hale-Brown. 

IV. Defendant Pina 

Orr's third claim for relief alleges constitutional violations by Pina by denying him 

rehabilitative services. However, as discussed above, Orr does not have a constitutional right to 

rehabilitative services. Thus, the com1 should grant Pina summaiy judgment. 

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V. Defendant Felix 

Orr's fourth claim for relief alleges that Felix violated his constitutional rights by refusing 

him access to the law library and legal-research materials. Defendants move for summary judgment 

and argue Orr has not pleaded, and cannot demonstrate, that he suffered an injury caused by Felix 

allegedly denying him access to the law library. The court agrees with Felix, and recommends 

summary judgment in her favor. 

"It is ... established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the 

courts." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). Flowing naturally from this right is the right 

to access to "a law library or other legal assistance" to allow prisoners to defend themselves against 

criminal charges, file habeas corpus petitions, or vindicate their fundamental civil rights. Id. at 827. 

Comts throughout the country have provided prisons and jails significant leeway in crafting creative 

ways to fulfill this right, but it is unquestioned that prisoners are entitled to meaningful legal 

resources. Id. 

However, like any other case, a prisoner seeking to bring suit for insufficient access to legal 

resources must plead the three elements of standing to move forward with his or her claim. In 

paiticular, he or she must plead that a concrete and particularized injury resulted from their lack of 

access. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). In Lewis, the Supreme Court vacated a broad 

remedial order by a special master mandating that a state's prison system adopt significant new 

procedures to ensure prisoners' access to legal resources. Id. In part, the Supreme Court determined 

the class plaintiffs failed to allege they suffered injuries caused by their inability to access a law 

library. Id. Moreover, the Court held the prisoners' injuries must be the kind which traditionally 

flow from denial of access to a law libraiy. Id. It reasoned that even if a prison's law library fell 

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below that guaranteed by the constitution, the prison's "program would remain in place at least until 

some inmate could demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being 

impeded." Id. at 353. 

Here, Defendants' declarations and exhibits put into question Orr's allegations that Felix 

repeatedly denied his requests for law-library resources and other materials necessary to pursue his 

civil claim. (Felix Deel. Ex. I.) Because On did not meaningfully respond to Defendants' motion 

for summary judgment, he does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. However, the court need 

not reach the constitutionality of MCDC law-library policies because On fails to plead that he 

suffered injury by having a "nonfrivolous legal claim" frustrated by his lack of access. Instead, he 

alleges he suffered emotional distress and sleep deprivation. These are not the types of injuries 

contemplated by the court in Lewis, and do not meet the injury requirement established in that case. 

Because On carrnot prove a necessary element for a claim under§ 1983, Felix is entitled to summary 

judgment. 

Conclusion 

For the aforementioned reasons, the court should GRANT Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment. 

Scheduling Order 

The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, 

are due April 23, 2015. Ifno objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go 

under advisement on that date. 

If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy 

of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and 

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Recommendation will go under advisement. 

DATED this 9th day of April, 2015. 

V.ACOSTA 

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