137 Nev., Advance Opinion vis 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

GREG ELLIOT PELKOLA, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

HEIDI MARIE PELKOLA, 

Respondent. 

No. 80763 

MED 

Appeal from district court orders in a child-custody case 

granting a petition for permission to relocate and awarding attorney fees. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; David S. 

Gibson, Jr., Judge. 

Reversed and remanded. 

The Grimes Law Office and Melvin R. Grimes, Las Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Radford J. Smith, Chartered, and Radford J. Smith and Kimberly A. 

Stutzman, Henderson, 

for Respondent. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, PARRAGUIRRE, STIGLICH, and 

SILVER, JJ. 

OPINION 

By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.: 

NRS 125C.006(1)(b) provides in relevant part that a "custodial 

parent [who] intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of 

this State . . . and . . . desires to take the child" must first petition the 

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district court for permission if the noncustodial parent refuses to consent to 

relocation. In this appeal, we consider whether that provision applies only 

to relocation from Nevada to a place outside of Nevada, or also from a place 

outside of Nevada to another place outside of Nevada. We conclude that it 

applies to both. We also clarify that the district court must issue specific 

findings for each of the NRS 125C.007(1) factors and, if applicable, the NRS 

125C.007(2) factors. 

FACTS 

Appellant Greg Pelkola and respondent Heidi Pelkola divorced 

in 2014. They have three minor children, of whom they share legal custody. 

Heidi has primary physical custody of the children. 

Sometime after their divorce, Heidi petitioned the district court 

under NRS 125C.006 for permission to relocate with the children from 

Nevada to Arizona. The district court granted her petition and she and the 

children moved to Arizona. 

In October 2019, Heidi petitioned the district court under NRS 

125C.006 for permission to again relocate with the children, this time from 

Arizona to Ohio. After a hearing, the district court concluded that Heidi did 

not need permission for the current relocation, because it had already 

granted her permission to move from Nevada to Arizona. It nonetheless 

granted her petition and issued limited findings as to the relocation's effect 

on Greg's visitation rights. 

Greg now appeals, arguing that the district court 

misinterpreted NRS 125C.006, the statute under which Heidi petitioned for 

permission to relocate. He argues that it applies not just to a relocation 

from Nevada to a place outside of Nevada, but to subsequent relocations 

from a place outside of Nevada to another place outside of Nevada. He 

argues that, therefore, the district court abused its discretion by failing to 

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issue the findings that NRS 125C.007 requires for a petition under NRS 

125C.006. We agree and reverse and remand for the district court to hold 

an evidentiary hearing and issue those findings. 

DISCUSSION 

NRS 125C.006(1) applies 

The first issue is whether NRS 125C.006(1) applies here. It 

provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

1. If. . . . the custodial parent intends to 

relocate his or her residence to a place outside of 

this State or to a place within this State that is at 

such a distance that would substantially impair the 

ability of the other parent to maintain a meaningful 

relationship with the child, and . . . desires to take 

the child with him or her, the custodial parent 

shall, before relocating: 

(a) Attempt to obtain the written consent of 

the noncustodial parent to relocate with the child; 

and 

(b) If the noncustodial parent refuses to give 

that consent, petition the court for permission to 

relocate with the child. 

Greg argues that NRS 125C.006 applies here. He argues that 

its plain meaning requires permission to relocate a child to a place outside 

of Nevada—not, as the district court concluded, only from Nevada to a place 

outside of Nevada. He argues that, therefore, the plain rneaning applies not 

only to the first relocation from Nevada, but to subsequent relocations to 

other places outside Nevada. He notes that the district coures 

interpretation would allow a parent to move with the court's permission 

from Nevada to Arizona, and then simply move to Japan without permission 

or giving the other parent an opportunity to be heard. 

Heidi responds that NRS 125C.006 does not apply. She argues 

that NRS 125C.006s plain meaning applies only to "relocating out of this 

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state." She reasons that the statute does not apply here because she is not 

moving from Nevada to Ohio, but from Arizona to Ohio. She concludes that 

she need not have petitioned for permission to move to Ohio. 

We review statutory-interpretation issues de novo. Young v. 

Nev. Gaming Control Bd., 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 

(2020). We will interpret a statute by its plain meaning unless various 

exceptions apply, such as ambiguity or absurd results. Id. But the parties 

agree that none of those exceptions apply and that we should interpret NRS 

125C.006 only by its plain meaning, so we have limited our analysis 

accordingly. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) ("[I]n 

both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow 

the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame 

the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of 

matters the parties present."). 

NRS 125C.006(1) applies in two circumstances: when the 

parent with primary physical custody "intends to relocate his or her 

residence [1] to a place outside of this State or [2] to a place within this State 

that is at such a distance that would substantially impair the ability of the 

other parent to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child," and 

intends to take the child. 

Heidi's analysis of NRS 125C.006(1) is identical to the district 

court's. Both refer to the statutes "plain" meaning but reword the relevant 

portion before interpreting it. Both refer to "relocating out or Nevada, but 

the statute itself refers to "relocat[ing] . . . to a place outside of Nevada. 

NRS 125C.006(1). Their phrasing suggests that it applies only to leaving 

Nevada ("relocating out or Nevada), but the statutes true phrasing plainly 

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includes moving from a place outside of Nevada to some other place outside 

of Nevada ("relocat[ing] . . . to a place outside of Nevada). 

Heidi is the parent with primary physical custody, she intended 

to move to a place outside of Nevada (Ohio), and she intended to take the 

children, so NRS 125C.006 plainly applies here. 

The district court abused its discretion by issuing inadequate findings under 

NRS 125C.007 

Although the district court erroneously determined that NRS 

125C.006 does not apply and that Heidi did not need permission to relocate, 

it nonetheless gave her that permission and issued some findings under 

NRS 125C.007. Because NRS 125C.006 did apply and NRS 125C.007 

requires the district court to issue certain findings if NRS 125C.006 applies, 

the next issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by issuing 

inadequate findings under NRS 125C.007. 

Greg argues that it did. He notes that the district court did not 

address even the threshold requirements, such as the children's best 

interest, that the petitioning parent must prove before the district court 

considers several other relocation factors. So he asks us to remand for the 

district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings. 

Heidi responds that the district court did not need to issue the 

findings because NRS 125C.006 does not apply. She acknowledges that the 

district court made some findings but she does not address their adequacy. 

She adds that Greg waived an evidentiary hearing by agreeing that one was 

unnecessary.' 

'As we conclude, the district court must issue findings under NRS 

125C.007, so we are unpersuaded that either party may waive the necessary 

evidentiary hearing. 

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NRS 125C.007(1) requires a parent petitioning for permission 

to relocate under NRS 125C.006 to dernonstrate to the court that: 

(a) There exists a sensible, good-faith reason 

for the move, and the move is not intended to 

deprive the non-relocating parent of his or her 

parenting time; 

(b) The best interests of the child are served 

by allowing the relocating parent to relocate with 

the child; and 

(c) The child and the relocating parent will 

benefit from an actual advantage as a result of the 

relocation. 

The district court must issue specific findings for each of the 

NRS 125C.007(1) factors. See Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 451, 352 P.3d 

1139, 1143 (2015) (holding that the district court must issue specific 

findings when making a best-interest determination). The district court did 

not do so here, so it abused its discretion by permitting Heidi to relocate. 

Further, NRS 125C.007(2) provides that, if the petitioning 

parent proves the factors under NRS 125C.007(1), 

the court must then weigh the following factors and 

the impact of each on the child, the relocating 

parent and the non-relocating parent, including, 

without limitation, the extent to which the 

compelling interests of the child, the relocating 

parent and the non-relocating parent are 

accommodated: 

(a) The extent to which the relocation is likely 

to improve the quality of life for the child and the 

relocating parent; 

(b) Whether the motives of the relocating 

parent are honorable and not designed to frustrate 

or defeat any visitation rights accorded to the nonrelocating parent; 

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(c) Whether the relocating parent win comply 

with any substitute visitation orders issued by the 

court if permission to relocate is granted; 

(d) Whether the motives of the non-relocating 

parent are honorable in resisting the petition for 

permission to relocate or to what extent any 

opposition to the petition for permission to relocate 

is intended to secure a financial advantage in the 

form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise; 

(e) Whether there will be a realistic 

opportunity for the non-relocating parent to 

maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately 

foster and preserve the parental relationship 

between the child and the non-relocating parent if 

permission to relocate is granted; and 

(f) Any other factor necessary to assist the 

court in determining whether to grant permission 

to relocate. 

As with NRS 125C.007(1), the district court must issue specific 

findings for each of the applicable NRS 125C.007(2) factors. Here, the 

district court's only relevant findings were that "it does not believe that 

Heidi's move to Ohio would substantially impede the current timeshare," 

and that "Greg can still exercise his current timeshare." Those findings 

seem to allude to NRS 125C.007(2)(e), but the district court abused its 

discretion by failing to issue specific findings under the other factors, all of 

which may be applicable in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

NRS 125C.006(1)(b) applies not only to relocation from Nevada 

to a place outside of Nevada, but also from a place outside of Nevada to 

another place outside of Nevada. Further, the district court must issue 

specific findings for each of the NRS 125C.007(1) factors and, if applicable, 

the NRS 125C.007(2) factors. Because Heidi sought to move with the 

children from Arizona to Ohio and Greg did not consent, NRS 

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125C.006(1)(b) applies. And, because the district court concluded 

otherwise, it abused its discretion by failing to issue specific findings under 

the NRS 125C.007 factors. For those reasons, we reverse and remand to 

the district court for findings under each of the applicable NRS 125C.007 

factors. We also reverse the district court's award of attorney fees as to the 

petition to relocate and instruct the district court to recalculate the award 

as necessary.2 

"S;;Lte"14

6.1.7 Parraguirre 

J. 

We concur: 

A46rbal...0 

Stiglich 

J. 

J. 

Silver 

2Greg argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding 

Heidi additional attorney fees. But he cites no authority and his argument 

is not cogent, so we decline to consider it. Edwards v. Emperor's Garden 

Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006). 

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