IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

QUENTIN BULLOCK, and JACK REID,

individually and on behalf of a

class,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MICHAEL SHEAHAN, SHERIFF OF COOK

COUNTY, in his official capacity,

and COOK COUNTY,

Defendants.

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) No. 04 C 1051

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Michael Sheahan and Cook County (collectively

“defendants”) have moved to strike and bar the expert testimony and

opinions of plaintiffs Quentin Bullock and Jack Reid’s,

individually and on behalf of a class (collectively “plaintiffs”),

retained architectural expert Donald Henry. For the following

reasons, the motion is denied.

I.

Plaintiffs’ two-count amended complaint alleges violations of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution based

on the defendants’ alleged policy and/or practice under which male

inmates, in the custody of the Cook County Department of

Corrections (“CCDC”), are subjected to strip searches upon

returning to the CCDC for out-processing after being ordered

released. Specifically, the named plaintiffs had been ordered

released after being found not guilty of the charges against them.
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Plaintiffs also complain that female inmates are not subjected to

such searches and, therefore, this policy and/or practice violates

the Equal Protection clause.

Mr. Henry is a registered architect specializing in the design

of prisons and jails. He was retained by plaintiffs to inspect

various areas within the CCDC, including the Receiving,

Classification, Diagnostic Center (“RCDC”) where the plaintiffs are

held prior to entering the housing units and being subjected to

strip searches, and to offer an opinion on whether there is

adequate space for the construction of additional bullpens to hold

male detainees who have been discharged pursuant to court order

prior to their release from custody. Female detainees who have

been discharged are allegedly placed in a holding cell in the RCDC

and directly processed out of CCDC without being strip searched or

re-entering the housing units. Defendants contend there is no

space in the RCDC to construct additional bullpens to house the

discharged male detainees so that they would not be required to

enter the housing units and undergo strip searches. 

II.

The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Fed. R.

Evid. 702, which reads

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion

or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
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sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the

product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the

witness has applied the principles and methods reliably

to the facts of the case.

For expert testimony to be admitted under Rule 702, the movant must

establish that the expert testimony is both reliable and would

assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or

determining a fact at issue in the case. See Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-91 (1993). The primary

purpose of Rule 702 is to avoid confusing and unreliable expert

testimony. See id. at 592; Loeffel Steel Prod., Inc v. Delta

Brands, Inc., 372 F. Supp.2d 1104, 1110 (N.D. Ill. 2005).

Nevertheless, “[t]he rejection of expert testimony is the exception

rather than the rule, and the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is

not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.”

Spearman Indus. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 128 F. Supp.2d

1148, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quotation omitted). Cross examination

and the presentation of contrary evidence are the “traditional and

appropriate means” of attacking expert testimony. Daubert, 509

U.S. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 

III.

Defendants do not take issue with Mr. Henry’s qualifications

as an expert, but the rigor of his methodology. As set forth in

his report, Mr. Henry reached his opinions and the conclusions

contained in his expert report “[a]fter a tour of the Cook County

Department of Corrections including the RCDC” and reviewing other
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expert reports, RCDC and basement floor plans, the Sheriff’s 2006

Status Report and charts summarizing certain computer records on

male detainees. Defendants argue that Mr. Henry has not employed

the same methodology as is standard in his professional practice

because he has not: (1) reviewed all of the written discovery in

this case; (2) considered all explanatory variables for the CCDC’s

current design, including interviewing CCDC personnel and has

relied on incomplete costs estimates; (3) created finalized

architectural drawings, instead of the sketches attached to his

report, to illustrate his proposals; and (4) formally entered the

sanitation area, which he has suggested be redesigned, but looked

into it through an open doorway instead. 

None of defendants’ objections render Mr. Henry’s opinions or

testimony unreliable or irrelevant under Daubert. See Kumho Tire

Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999) (“no one denies that an

expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on

extensive and specialized experience”). Mr. Henry is not required

to review all of the written discovery in this case in order to

render his opinions and defendants’ remaining objections are best

addressed through cross-examination. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to strike on these grounds is denied.

Defendants also take issue with Mr. Henry’s cost estimates.

They argue that his cost estimates are contrary to existing law

because they are either incomplete or too high and the Constitution
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does not require that defendants pay excessive costs in

accommodating plaintiffs. Defendants cite Block v. Rutherford, 468

U.S. 576, 588 n.9 (1984), in support. In Block, the Supreme Court

applied its ruling in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), to

determine that a jail’s ban on contact visits was reasonably

related to a legitimate government objective - internal security of

the detention facility - and did not violate the detainees’

substantive due process rights. 468 U.S. at 586. 

In this case, the complaint alleges violations of the Fourth

Amendment and the Equal Protection clause – neither of which are

addressed in the holding in Block. Accordingly, defendants’

argument is misplaced. In order to establish unreasonableness

under the Fourth Amendment, courts must balance the constitutional

rights of the detainee with the interests of the detention

facility. In doing so, courts consider four factors: (1) the scope

of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which it is

conducted; (3) the place in which it is conducted; and (4) the

justification for initiating it. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Under the

Equal Protection clause, disparity in treatment among similarly

situated individuals based on gender survives judicial scrutiny

“only by showing at least that the classification serves important

governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed

are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”

Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273-74 (7th Cir.
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1983) (quotations omitted). Mr. Henry’s testimony is not contrary

to Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection jurisprudence and,

therefore, is admissible. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to strike is

denied. 

 ENTER ORDER:

 ____________________________

 Elaine E. Bucklo

 United States District Judge

Dated: August 28, 2007