IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

TRAILERS INTL, LLC, a Nevada 3:15-cv-00171-BR (Lead Case)

corporation, and VINCENT L. 3:15-cv-00767-BR

WEBB, (Consolidated Cases)

Plaintiffs, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

MASTERCRAFT TOOLS FLORIDA, 

INC., a Florida corporation;

GLOBAL EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INC.,

a New York corporation; HOME 

DEPOT USA, INC., a Delaware

corporation; K-MART CORPORATION,

a Michigan corporation; POWER

EQUIPMENT DIRECT, INC., a

Delaware corporation; SEARS, 

ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, a New York

corporation; SKY DISTRIBUTORS OF

AMERICA, INC., a Florida 

corporation; STEVEN F. RESCH; 

XUEFENG ZHANG; ZHUHAI 

SHARP-GROUP ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.,

a foreign corporation; and XIAOFEI 

YANG,

Defendants.

STEPHEN J. JONCUS

Joncus Law, LLC

P.O. Box 838

Clackamas, OR 97015

(971) 236-1200

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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Case 3:15-cv-00171-MO Document 180 Filed 08/04/16 Page 1 of 19
J. PETER STAPLES

Chernoff Vilhauer McClung & Stenzel, LLP

601 S.W. Second Avenue, Suite 1600

Portland, OR 97204

(503) 227-5631

Attorneys for Defendants Mastercraft Tools Florida,

Inc.; Global Equipment Company, Inc.; K-Mart

Corporation; Sears, Roebuck and Company; and Xuefeng

Zhang

MAYA CHOKSI

NICHOLAS POPASTAVROS

DL Piper LLP (US)

33 Arch Street, 26th Floor

Boston, MA 02110-1447

(617) 406-6000

TAMAR DUVDEVANI

DLA Piper LLP (US)

1251 Avenue of the Americas, 27th Floor

New York, NY 10020-1104

(212) 335-4500

STELLMAN KEEHNEL

DLA Piper LLP (US)

701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7000

Seattle, WA 98104-7044

(206) 839-4888

Attorneys for Defendant Home Depot USA, Inc.

EDWARD CHOI

JULIA E. MARKLEY

Perkins Coie, LLP

1120 N.W. Couch Street, 10th Floor

Portland, OR 97209-4128

(503) 727-2053

MELISE BLAKESLEE

Sequel Technology & IP Law, PLLC

1000 Potomac Street, N.W., Suite 150-A

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 470-4815

Attorneys for Defendant Power Equipment Direct, Inc.

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BAOLIN CHEN

Chen & Mu

1000 S.W. Broadway, Suite 2150

Portland, OR 97205

(503) 222-3384

Attorneys for Defendants Zhuhai Sharp-Group Enterprise

Co., Ltd., and Xiaofei Yang

BROWN, Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion (#169) for

Summary Judgment of Defendants Zhuhai Sharp-Group Enterprise Co.,

Ltd., and Xiaofei Yang and the Motion (#171) for Partial Summary

Judgment of Plaintiffs Trailers Intl, LLC, and Vincent L. Webb.

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES both Motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, taken from the submissions of the

parties and the joint statement of agreed facts, are undisputed

unless otherwise indicated.

Plaintiff Trailers Intl (formerly UtilityMate LLC) is an

Oregon corporation, and Plaintiff Webb is the individual owner of

Trailers Intl. The company designs and develops trailer

technology. Defendant Zhuhai Sharp-Group Enterprises Co. is a

China-based manufacturer and global distributor of tools and

equipment products operating under the name of Jumbo Tools &

Equipment, and Defendant Yang is the president and CEO of Jumbo

(collectively referred to herein as the Jumbo Defendants).

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On December 1, 2009, Plaintiffs and the Jumbo Defendants

entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in which

Plaintiffs granted the Jumbo Defendants an exclusive license to

use Plaintiffs’ trailer technology, to manufacture the trailers,

and to be the worldwide distributor of the trailers in exchange

for, among other things, a $150,000.00 advance on proceeds from

trailer sales. The MOU required the Jumbo Defendants to submit

to Plaintiffs a monthly accounting of all trailers sold. 

Plaintiffs licensed the trademark and brand name “UtilityMate”

for use by the Jumbo Defendants as part of the MOU, and

Plaintiffs agreed to “extend use of any and all trademarks,

patents, copyrights” to the Jumbo Defendants to “assist in the

manufacturing and sales of all UtilityMate Products.”

The original term of the MOU was from December 1, 2009,

through December 1, 2014. On January 25, 2011, Plaintiffs and

the Jumbo Defendants agreed to extend the MOU until December 1,

2015. 

In May 2010 Plaintiffs, the Jumbo Defendants, and Defendant

Altocraft (who is not involved in the current motions) entered

into an oral agreement to have Altocraft act as the distributor

of UtilityMate trailers on the east coast of the United States

and in South America. Accordingly, on May 16, 2011, the Jumbo

Defendants entered into an Agreement with Altocraft to

“distribute Utilitymate Trailers in the east coast of US Market

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and Latin America Market.” The Agreement stated the Jumbo

Defendants had a “signed contract with Vince Webb from

UtilityMate, LLC, and had all the rights to use UtilityMate

Brand, trademark, manuals, picture and all the materials from the

website.” In the Agreement the Jumbo Defendants granted

Altocraft the same rights as the Jumbo Defendants had as the

distributor of UtilityMate Trailers.

In March 2011 the Jumbo Defendants, UtilityMate LLC, and

Dixie Sales Company, Inc., signed an agreement to distribute

UtilityMate trailers in Canada.

On April 7, 2011, Plaintiffs sent to the Jumbo Defendants a

notice of default regarding the Jumbo Defendants’ alleged failure

to abide by specific terms in the MOU and their alleged failure

to manufacture trailers to Plaintiffs’ standards. Thereafter

Plaintiffs allegedly sent second and third notices of default to

the Jumbo Defendants. The Jumbo Defendants contend they received

only the initial notice.

In June 2011 the Jumbo Defendants and Plaintiffs entered

into a Supplemental Agreement to the MOU. The Jumbo Defendants

contend the Agreement required Plaintiffs to pay the Jumbo

Defendants certain amounts within 60 days, but Plaintiffs have

not made such payments to date. The Jumbo Defendants also

contend this Agreement resolved the issues in the April Notice of

Default. Plaintiffs, however, assert the Agreement addressed the

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Jumbo Defendants’ failure to pay funds to another entity, but it

did not address any of the issues in the Notice of Default.

On October 10, 2011, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a

termination letter to the Jumbo Defendants in which Plaintiffs

advised they were revoking the Jumbo Defendants’ right to use

Plaintiffs’ intellectual property as set out in the MOU. The

Jumbo Defendants, however, did not stop manufacturing trailers

made from Plaintiffs’ designs until sometime thereafter, and

Altocraft actually received its first shipment of UtilityMate

trailers from the Jumbo Defendants after October 2011. The Jumbo

Defendants also did not report any sales of trailers to

Plaintiffs after October 2011 and did not pay Plaintiffs for any

trailers that the Jumbo Defendants had manufactured or sold after

October 2011. In addition, Altocraft continued to sell trailers

the Jumbo Defendants supplied, and those trailers were identical

to those manufactured under the MOU and bore the UtilityMate mark

and VIN information that included numbers associated with

Plaintiffs.

Sometime in 2011 Altocraft became aware of the disagreement

between the Jumbo Defendants and Plaintiffs. The Jumbo

Defendants, however, assured Altocraft that even though

Plaintiffs and the Jumbo Defendants had a disagreement about the

termination of the MOU, the Jumbo Defendants were still the

licensee, the Jumbo Defendants were still authorized to

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manufacture UtilityMate trailers, and Altocraft was still

authorized to import and to sell UtilityMate trailers using 

UtilityMate marketing materials. 

Plaintiffs and the Jumbo Defendants continued to negotiate

termination of the MOU during February 2012, but they failed 

to reach any agreement. In an email to Plaintiffs dated 

February 27, 2012, the Jumbo Defendants stated they would

“continue to perform [their] contractual duties under said

contracts and [would] resort to all means to protect [their]

contractual rights under those contracts.”

Plaintiffs contacted various distributors who had

contractual relationships with the Jumbo Defendants regarding the

sale of Plaintiffs’ trailers and advised those distributors that

they were terminating their agreement with the Jumbo Defendants. 

Plaintiffs then took steps to prevent the Jumbo Defendants from

importing and selling products bearing Plaintiffs’ logos.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

On June 12, 2015, the Jumbo Defendants (joined by other

Defendants) filed a Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively to Stay

this litigation in which they stated Plaintiffs had not initiated

arbitration to resolve the disputes between them as required by

the MOU. Following a hearing on September 25, 2015, the Court

concluded:

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[I]t is undisputed that Plaintiffs never initiated

arbitration as required by the MOU. On this record,

therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs did not

terminate the MOU in October 2011.

The Court also concluded the arbitration provision in Section 10

of the MOU was enforceable; that Plaintiffs had not established

the Jumbo Defendants had waived or otherwise indicated they were

no longer bound by the terms of the MOU; and that both Plaintiffs

and the Jumbo Defendants remained bound by the terms of the MOU

at least until December 1, 2015. The Court further concluded

Plaintiffs’ claims against all the Defendants did not fall within

the arbitration clause of the MOU.1

On February 5, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended

Complaint in which they assert eight claims against the Jumbo

Defendants as follows2:

1. First Claim against all Defendants: For copyright

infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 on the grounds that

Defendants have unlawfully used and continue to use

Plaintiffs’ copyrighted images in owners’ manuals and on

their websites.

2. Second Claim against all Defendants: For trademark

infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) on the grounds that

Defendants have unlawfully used and continue to use

Plaintiffs’ trademarks in connection with the manufacturing,

1 The Court also granted Defendant Power Equipment Direct,

Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it, and the

Court granted Plaintiffs leave to replead.

2

 Plaintiffs assert their Sixth Claim only against Defendant

Resch, who was dismissed March 20, 2016. Plaintiffs assert their

Seventh Claim against Defendant Mastercraft (aka Altocraft) only. 

As noted, Altocraft did not join the Motions now before the

Court.

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distribution, and sale of the trailers.

3. Third Claim against all Defendants: For trademark

counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) and 1116(d) on the

grounds that Defendants have unlawfully used and continue to

use trademarks on products that are identical to or

substantially indistinguishable from Plaintiffs’ trademarks.

4. Fourth Claim against all Defendants: For false

designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) on the

ground that Defendants have unlawfully used names identical

to or confusingly similar to Plaintiffs’ names on products

sold by Defendants.

5. Fifth Claim against all Defendants: For unfair

competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) on the ground that

Defendants have unlawfully passed off products that were not

manufactured by Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs’ products.

6. Eighth Claim against the Jumbo Defendants Jumbo: For

common-law conversion on the ground that the Jumbo

Defendants failed to return all blueprints, tooling, and

dies to Plaintiffs after termination of the MOU.

7. Ninth Claim against the Jumbo Defendants: For

trade-secret misappropriation on the ground that the Jumbo

Defendants unlawfully continued to use Plaintiffs'

blueprints, tooling, and dies after termination of the MOU.

8. Tenth Claim against Defendant Yang: For unfair business

practices under Oregon Revised Statute § 646.608(1)(b-c) on

the ground that Yang has unlawfully sold counterfeit

trailers that are likely to cause confusion to consumers.

The Jumbo Defendants move for summary judgment as to

Plaintiffs’ claims that are asserted against them and for summary

judgment on three of their Counterclaims3

 against Plaintiffs

(Second Counterclaim for breach of contract, Fourth Counterclaim

for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and

3

 Defendants do not seek summary judgment as to their First

Counterclaim for fraud and misrepresentation or their Third

Counterclaim for anticipatory breach.

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Fifth Counterclaim for tortious interference with economic

relations).

Plaintiffs, in turn, move for partial summary judgment on

their Second Claim against the Jumbo Defendants for trademark

infringement and seek an order from the Court finding the Jumbo

Defendants were not authorized to manufacture or to distribute

trailers using Plaintiffs’ designs and trademarks after they

revoked permission for doing so on October 10, 2011, even if the

MOU was not terminated.

STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Washington Mut. Ins. v. United

States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must show the absence of a

dispute as to a material fact. Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). In response to a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must

go beyond the pleadings and show there is a genuine dispute as to

a material fact for trial. Id. "This burden is not a light 

one. . . . The non-moving party must do more than show there is

some 'metaphysical doubt' as to the material facts at issue." In

re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(citation omitted). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine "if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party." Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sluimer

v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2010). "Summary

judgment cannot be granted where contrary inferences may be drawn

from the evidence as to material issues." Easter v. Am. W. Fin.,

381 F.3d 948, 957 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). A “mere

disagreement or bald assertion” that a genuine dispute as to a

material fact exists “will not preclude the grant of summary

judgment.” Deering v. Lassen Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 2:07-CV1521-JAM-DAD, 2011 WL 202797, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Jan. 20, 2011)

(citing Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir.

1989)). When the nonmoving party's claims are factually

implausible, that party must "come forward with more persuasive

evidence than otherwise would be necessary." LVRC Holdings LLC

v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009)(citation omitted). 

The substantive law governing a claim or a defense

determines whether a fact is material. Miller v. Glenn Miller

Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). If the

resolution of a factual dispute would not affect the outcome of

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the claim, the court may grant summary judgment. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Jumbo Defendants’ Motion (#169) for Summary Judgment

The Jumbo Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of

Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against them. The Jumbo Defendants

contend Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the MOU, which the Court

earlier determined was not properly terminated, and, therefore,

the Jumbo Defendants continued to be the authorized licensees of

Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Jumbo Defendants assert all of

Plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred as a matter of law

based on the law of the case.

The Jumbo Defendants also move for summary judgment on their

Counterclaims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of

good faith and fair dealings, and tortious interference with

economic relations. The Jumbo Defendants contend Plaintiffs 

(1) did not follow the contractual provisions to properly

terminate the MOU, (2) did not act in good faith in the

performance of the MOU, and (3) interfered with contractual

relationships between the Jumbo Defendants and others. 

Plaintiffs, in turn, argue even if the MOU was not

terminated, Plaintiffs had the right to control the quality of

the products sold under their license and could prohibit the

Jumbo Defendants from distributing products bearing Plaintiffs’

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trademark pursuant to the Lanham Act. Plaintiffs also contend

the Jumbo Defendants could not continue manufacturing and selling

goods using Plaintiff’s trademarks and designs after the Jumbo

Defendants failed to fulfill all of their obligations pursuant to

the MOU. Plaintiffs assert the Jumbo Defendants, therefore, are

not entitled to summary judgment on their Counterclaims because

they are in “total breach” of the MOU through their own conduct. 

Thus, according to Plaintiffs, any obligations that Plaintiffs

may have had under the MOU were discharged.

A. Law of the Case

The Jumbo Defendants assert the Court’s finding in its

Opinion and Order (#126) issued January 6, 2016, that the MOU was

not terminated until at least December 1, 2015, constitutes the

“law of the case” and bars Plaintiffs from bringing any claims

against them. Plaintiffs, however, contend the Court has the

power to reconsider its earlier rulings and may reconsider its

ruling as to termination of the MOU based on the evidence

submitted in opposition to the Jumbo Defendants’ Motion. In any

event, Plaintiffs argue they had a right to cancel orders and to

forbid distribution of products that did not meet their quality

standards.

The principle of the law of the case is intended to maintain

consistency during the course of a single lawsuit by avoiding

reconsideration of legal questions previously decided. All

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rulings of a trial court, however, are “subject to revision at

any time before entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The

doctrine of law of the case is discretionary rather than 

mandatory and merely expresses the general practice of courts to

decline to revisit previously decided matters. See City of Los

Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 888

(9th Cir. 2001)(citing United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565,

567-568 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Although the Court has the inherent authority to reconsider

the issue of the validity of the termination of the MOU, the

Court declines to do so here. When it denied the Jumbo

Defendants’ earlier Motion to Dismiss, the Court concluded 

“Plaintiffs’ claims against the Jumbo Defendants . . . do not

fall within the scope of the arbitration clause in the MOU.” 

Opin. and Order (#126) at 18. In their Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs assert the same claims against the Jumbo Defendants as

in their First Amended Complaint with the addition of a claim

against Defendant Yang personally for unfair business practices. 

The Court notes Plaintiffs’ claims against the Jumbo Defendants

continue to fall outside of the scope of the MOU and, therefore,

are not barred even if Plaintiffs failed to terminate the MOU

properly. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes on this record that the law

of the case does not apply as the Jumbo Defendants argue, and the

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Jumbo Defendants, therefore, are not entitled as a matter of law

to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims against them.

B. Jumbo Defendants’ Counterclaims

In the Jumbo Defendants’ Second Counterclaim they contend

Plaintiffs’ failure to follow the proper procedures for

termination of the MOU constitutes a breach of contract as a

matter of law. The Jumbo Defendants assert in their Fourth

Counterclaim for breach of the covenant of good-faith and fairdealing that the undisputed evidence shows Plaintiffs violated

the right-of-first-refusal provision of the MOU, engaged in

business dealings with others for the sale of their trailers,

failed to repay the Jumbo Defendants for their $150,000 advance

pursuant to the MOU, and failed to pay the additional

approximately $22,000 owed to the Jumbo Defendants pursuant to a

Supplemental Agreement between the parties. Finally, the Jumbo

Defendants also contend in their Fifth Counterclaim that

Plaintiffs intentionally interfered with the business

relationships between the Jumbo Defendants and other companies

and caused the cancellation of various contracts.

According to Plaintiffs, however, even if the Court finds

they did not properly terminate the MOU, Plaintiffs have the

right to control the quality of products sold under its

trademark. In fact, Plaintiffs maintain they terminated the

Jumbo Defendants’ authorization to distribute products bearing

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Plaintiffs’ trademark as a result of the Jumbo Defendants’

failure to follow proper quality controls. Plaintiffs also

assert the Jumbo Defendants did not perform their obligations

under the MOU. Thus, Plaintiffs argue the Jumbo Defendants are

in “total breach” of the MOU by their own conduct, which, in

turn, discharges Plaintiffs’ obligations under the MOU. 

Plaintiffs also assert the Jumbo Defendants never fully paid the

$150,000 advance as required under the MOU, which was intended as

an assurance of performance against future sales. Plaintiffs

also assert they paid the approximately $22,000 required under

the Supplemental Agreement. 

As a general rule a breach or nonperformance of one party’s

material promise in a bilateral contract justifies a refusal of

the second party to perform a contractual duty and discharges

that duty. Garcia v. Lupton, 3:12-cv-01930-SI, 2016 WL 107955

(D. Or. Jan. 8, 2016)(citing Wasserburger v. Am. Scientific

Chem., Inc., 267 Or. 77, 82 (1973)). Whether a breach is

sufficiently material to justify such a result ordinarily is a

question of fact. Wasserburger, at 82.

Here each party asserts the other breached their obligations 

under the MOU by their actions or their failure to act. These

competing factual contentions, however, preclude the Court from

granting the Jumbo Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

their Counterclaims against Plaintiffs. The Court, therefore,

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denies such Motion.

II. Plaintiffs’ Motion (#171) for Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment against the 

Jumbo Defendants as to a portion of their Second Claim for

trademark infringement. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the

ground that the Jumbo Defendants were not authorized to

manufacture and to distribute trailers using Plaintiffs’ designs

and trademarks after permission was revoked in the letter sent to

the Jumbo Defendants by Plaintiffs’ counsel on October 10, 2011. 

That letter specifically states: “The use of any and all

intellectual properties related to the agreement and UtilityMate

brand is hereby revoked as of the date of this letter.” 

Plaintiffs assert that even if that communication is not

interpreted as terminating the MOU, the letter terminated the

Jumbo Defendants’ authority to continue to use Plaintiffs’

trademark beginning on that date.

The Jumbo Defendants contend in response that Plaintiffs did

not include any requirements for quality control in any contract

between the parties, and, moreover, Plaintiffs “mischaracterize[]

the relevant facts.” The Jumbo Defendants also argue even if

Plaintiffs had identified relevant quality-control standards,

such obligation would merely constitute a “covenant” that was not

a condition of the license and the communication and enforcement

of such standards was “fatally deficient.”

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A trademark holder has the right to control the quality of

goods manufactured and sold under the holder’s trademark. Intel

Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, 6 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1993)(citing

El Greco Leather Prod. Co., Inc. v. Shoe World Inc., 806 F. 2d

392 (2nd Cir. 1986)). A license agreement need not contain an

express quality-control provision because trademark law rather

than the contract itself confers on the licensor the right and

obligation to exercise quality control. Miller v. Glenn Miller

Productions, Inc., 454 F. 3d 975, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here Plaintiffs accurately contend the Lanham Act provides a

trademark holder with the right to control the quality of goods

manufactured and sold under their trademark, to cancel orders,

and to forbid distribution of products that have not been

approved by the trademark holder. See El Greco Leather Prod.

Co., Inc. v. Shoe World Inc., 806 F. 2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986). 

Nevertheless, even though Plaintiffs have the right to control

the quality of products manufactured and sold under their

license, the issue on Plaintiffs’ cross-motion is whether

Plaintiffs adequately communicated those standards to the Jumbo

Defendants. Although the Jumbo Defendants assert Plaintiffs

failed to inform them regarding quality standards, Plaintiffs

maintain they did communicate in their initial Notice of Default

and subsequent communications various deficiencies of the

products, and Plaintiffs argue those communications constituted

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notice of the Jumbo Defendants’ failure to meet quality

standards. The Jumbo Defendants, however, assert any such

deficiencies were either resolved or were not set out clearly in

any other communications from Plaintiffs. 

On this record the Court concludes as to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment that there are competing issues of

material fact, and therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to

summary judgment on this issue.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion (#169) for

Summary Judgment of Defendants Zhuhai Sharp-Group Enterprise Co.,

Ltd., and Xiaofei Yang and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion (#171) for

Partial Summary Judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2016.

/s/ Anna J. Brown

 

ANNA J. BROWN

United States District Judge

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