NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SKYCORP LTD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KING COUNTY, a municipal subdivision of 

State of Washington, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-35043 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01632-JCC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 3, 2021

Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District 

Judge.

SkyCorp Ltd appeals the district court’s grant of King County’s motion to 

dismiss its claims seeking declaratory judgment arising under the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 22 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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United States Constitution. The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not 

repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in 

part and dismiss in part.

The district court appropriately dismissed SkyCorp’s Due Process Clause 

claim because SkyCorp failed to allege facts sufficient to meet the federal pleading 

standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That standard “demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and a complaint will 

not suffice if it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). 

SkyCorp’s spare and conclusory allegations that the challenged ordinance 

“expressly deprive[s] [SkyCorp] of its rights and liberties . . . in a manner which 

fails to advance any legitimate interest of King County,” and as a result “directly 

and proximately deprived [SkyCorp] of [its] property rights absent substantive due 

process of law” do not meet this standard. Thus, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of this claim.

We dismiss SkyCorp’s Dormant Commerce Clause claim, albeit on different 

grounds than the district court. Although the parties did not address standing in 

their appellate briefing, we have “an obligation to assure ourselves” of litigants’ 

standing under Article III. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340 
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(2006) (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000)). “Article III standing requires an injury that is 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v.

Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cole v. Oroville 

Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000)). In the context of 

declaratory or injunctive relief, the plaintiff also must demonstrate a “real or 

immediate threat of an irreparable injury.” Id.

SkyCorp has not alleged facts sufficient to establish standing to assert its 

Dormant Commerce Clause claim. For example, SkyCorp’s allegations regarding 

its out-of-state waste disposal are silent as to whether King County has ever 

enforced the challenged ordinance against it for such conduct in the past—or 

intends to do so in the future. Thus, absent allegations of a “real or immediate 

threat of irreparable injury,” SkyCorp cannot establish Article III standing to 

pursue its Dormant Commerce Clause claim. Id. We note, however, that King 

County acknowledged at oral argument that SkyCorp’s claims might be viable in 

the future in the event of appropriate allegations. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. Each party shall 

bear its own costs.