“ No. 02 C 5327 Page3

identical factually, that parties must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that the required
amount is in controversy). We must determine, from the complaint that jurisdiction over the
case exists.

We direct the parties to file briefs within 21 days addressing this issue.

JAMES B. MORAN
Senibr Judge, U. S. District Court

FG. 4, 2003.



i

-
c_, Minute Odi Form (06/97)

Ke

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

(0)

Name of Assigned Judge James B. Moran Sitting Judge if Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 02 C 5327 ; DATE 2/4/2003
CASE Mark Cohen et al. Vs. AM General Corp.
TITLE

[In the following box (a) indicate the party fing the motion, ¢.g,, plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature

of the motion being presented.]

(11)

MOTION:
Memorandum Opinion and Order
DOCKET ENTRY:
ql) oO Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.]
(2) Q Brief in support of motion due
(3) Qa Answer brief to motion due___. Reply to answer briefdue_
@ o Ruling/Hearingon___set for___—_at
(5) QO Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__—setfor__—_ at
(6) Qo Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on__setfor__—at__
(7) Qo Trial[set for/re-set for] on__at
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial} [Hearing] held/continued toa
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]
OFRCP4¢m) (OLocal Rule 41.1 OOFRCP41(a)(1) (1 FRCP41(a)(2).
(10) a [Other docket entry] Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. We must determine, from the

complaint that jurisdiction over the case exists. We direct the parties to file briefs within 21 days

addressing this issue.

a (For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

, - —— Pe
No notices required, advised in open court,

No notices required.

~ Document.
Number

number of notices

FEB, 1,0 2003

date docketed

Notices mailed by judge’s staff.

Notified counsel by telephone.

Docketing to mail notices

Mail AO 450 form.

Bl

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

date mailed notice
courtroom

WAH deputy's
initials

OF ace
Date/time ieeeived in -
central Clerk’s Office mailing deputy initials



Seal

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARK COHEN and FIRST CHOICE
MEDICAL

Plaintiffs,

vs. No. 02 C 5327
AM GENERAL CORPORATION,

Defendant.

weve

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff leased a 1999 American General Hummer from Naperville Hummer Jeep on
July 6, 1999, for a gross capitalized cost of $84,000. To facilitate this transaction, Naperville
Hummer sold the Hummer to Mister Leasing Corporation. Defendant issued a written
warranty that covered the Hummer against defects in factory supplied material or
workmanship for three years or 36,000 miles. At the time of the lease, Mister Leasing assigned
its rights in the warranty to the plaintiffs.

Pursuant to this warranty, plaintiffs tendered the Hummer to authorized dealerships
for repairs on numerous occasions, and the dealers always agreed to perform the work at no
cost to plaintiffs. After a number of repairs, plaintiffs filed a three-count complaint in state
court alleging breach of written warranty, breach of implied warranty and revocation of
acceptance. On July 11, 2002, plaintiffs chose to sell the Hummer, receiving $49,000 in trade-
in value for the vehicle. On August 28, 2002, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, consisting
of two counts: breach of written warranty and breach of implied warranty. Defendant now

moves for summary judgment, arguing that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.

OK



No. 02 C 5327 Page 2

§2301 ef seg., does not cover lease transactions of this type and, alternatively, that plaintiffs
cannot demonstrate any damages as a matter of law.

It appears from the facts presented by the parties that we do not have jurisdiction over
this dispute. The Magnuson-Moss Act does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over suits “if
the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and
costs).” 15 U.S.C. §2310(d)(3)(B). Plaintiffs’ attorney, in an affidavit attached to the amended
complaint, states that he believes that the damages are greater than $50,000. In their amended
complaint, however, plaintiffs ask for “[t]he difference between the purchase price of the
Hummer and the trade-in allowance for the Hummer, less the value of use of the Hummer by
Plaintiffs, diminution in value of the vehicle, and all incidental and consequential damages
incurred, including inconvenience and loss of use” (plf’s am.cplt., (44, 53). Because the
plaintiffs purchased the vehicle for $84,000 and traded it in for $49,000, their complaint seeks
damages of $35,000,) plus any incidental or consequential damages. Nowhere does plaintiff
describe these alleged damages or indicate to the court how they could reach the sum of
$15,000. Thus, despite the affidavit, it is not clear that subject matter jurisdiction over this
case exists.

While defendant does not dispute plaintiffs’ attorney’s assertion or challenge
jurisdiction, the parties cannot agree to jurisdiction. E.E.0.C v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423,
1428 (7 Cir. 1996) (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975)). See Gabriel v. Mitsubishi

Motor Sales of America, Inc., 976 F.Supp. 1154 (N.D.III. 1997) (holding, in a case nearly

‘This is, of course, the maximum value of plaintiffs’ complaint. They concede that any damages must
be offset by the value of use to the plaintiffs. Moreover, in their briefing of the summary judgment motion,
plaintiffs concede that the value of their claim (depending on the method of calculation) is likely either $5,610
or $11,900, before adding in the consequential and incidental damages (plf. opp. mem. at 19, 21). The
briefing on this issue must explain how the complaint could be worth the statutory minimum.