alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
interim financial statements of the Company for the nine months ended September
30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such interim financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001034258
<NAME>                        Noble International, Ltd.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           2,322
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,981
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     18,112
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                52,744
<PP&E>                                          84,575
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 189,192
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,566
<BONDS>                                         25,109
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        27,779
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,858
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   189,192
<SALES>                                        116,660
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               116,660
<CGS>                                           84,803
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   84,803
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                17,278
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,717
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,133
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,722
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,411
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     6,411
<EPS-BASIC>                                     0.89
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.82



</TABLE>
#### Lorenzo GREGGE, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-16239.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 22, 2011.

Lorenzo Gregge, Jr., Chino, CA, pro se.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Lorenzo Gregge, Jr., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his health and safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim, *Resnick v. Hayes,*213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). We reverse and remand.

Gregge’s complaint, liberally construed, did not seek to allege a respondeat superior theory of liability. Rather, Gregge alleged that defendants implemented a policy that resulted in the denial of his constitutional rights. *See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego,*942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (“Supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A was premature, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Gregge shall bear his own costs on appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

 

**Certification of the Chief Financial OfficerPursuant to**

**18 U.S.C. Section 1350,**

**as Adopted Pursuant to**

**Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PRAECIS PHARMACEUTICALS INCORPORATED(the “Company”) for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, EdwardC. English, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuantto 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

 

1.  The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

2.  The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Edward  C. English |                     |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Name:                  | Edward C.  English       |
| Title:                 | Chief  Financial Officer |
| Date:                  | August 5,  2005          |
|                        |                          |  |

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 
THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-KSB AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                 AUG-1-1996
<PERIOD-END>                   JUL-31-1997
<CASH>                         400,783
<SECURITIES>                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                  1,000
<ALLOWANCES>                   0
<INVENTORY>                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>               401,783
<PP&E>                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                 401,783
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>          2,670
<BONDS>                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>          0
<PREFERRED>                    0
<COMMON>                       10,970,000
<OTHER-SE>                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>   401,783
<SALES>                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>               19,824
<CGS>                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                  10,563
<OTHER-EXPENSES>               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                0
<INCOME-TAX>                   1,161
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            0
<DISCONTINUED>                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                0
<CHANGES>                      0
<NET-INCOME>                   8,100
<EPS-PRIMARY>                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                  0
        

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Sauberan, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Count, Erie County, Doyle, J.—violation of probation.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Green, O’Donnell and Pine, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-40575

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS MENDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-98-CR-361-1

--------------------

December 22, 1999

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The federal public defender appointed to represent Carlos

Mendez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as

required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Mendez

has filed a response to counsel’s motion, asserting that the

district court erred when it declined to suppress marijuana

seized after an illegal stop, that his sentence was in violation

of the Sentencing Guidelines, and that his counsel was

ineffective because he failed to challenge the district court’s 
No. 99-40575 

-2-

application of the guidelines. Mendez also suggests that he was

not permitted to plead guilty.

The record is adequately developed for us to reject Mendez’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument. See United States v.

Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987); Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1994). Our independent review of

the briefs and the record discloses no nonfrivolous appellate

issue. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,

counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the

APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
(56 Misc. Rep. 122.)

#### O’REILLY v. SKELLY.

(Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County.

October, 1907.)

Pleading—Amendment.

Where a default in pleading is set aside, and defendant is allowed to answer, and serves an answer, she has a right to amend the same once within 20 days after its service.

Action by Sarah A. O’Reilly against Genevieve C. Skelly. Motion to,strike answer. Denied.

See 102 N. Y. Supp. 886.

Johnston & Johnston, for plaintiff.

Clarke & Clarke, for defendant.

HENDRICK, J.

The answer served on June 28, 1907, was in conformity with the order of Mr. Justice McCall of June 26th, which opened the default. If no default had occurred, the defendant would have had the absolute right to amend the answer once within 20 days after the service of the original answer, if the pleading was not amended for the purposes of delay. The default in pleading being opened, and the order opening the default having been complied with, by the payment of the costs imposed and the service of an answer conforming to that submitted on the motion to open the default, I think the defendant was in the same position, with regard to any subsequent steps in the litigation, as if no default had occurred. Hence her right to amend within 20 days the answer served in accordance *1083with the requirements of the order opening the default. In this case no delay of the trial will result because of the service of the amended answer.

Motion denied, with $10 costs.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                       3,379,776
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               26,881,581
<ALLOWANCES>                                   787,175
<INVENTORY>                                 15,666,880
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            46,912,756
<PP&E>                                     159,239,608
<DEPRECIATION>                              80,529,962
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             131,169,442
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       23,688,852
<BONDS>                                     39,249,136
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     9,426,923
<OTHER-SE>                                  55,399,966
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               131,169,442
<SALES>                                    182,589,621
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           182,589,621
<CGS>                                      139,249,481
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              139,249,481
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               378,366
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,928,483
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             15,905,299
<INCOME-TAX>                                 6,252,682
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          9,652,617
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 9,652,617
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.03<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.01<F1>
<FN>
<F1>Restated to conform to SFAS No. 128.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
 THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE HAGLER
  BAILLY, INC. UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE MONTHS
   ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
                               FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         4,998,725
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  58,587,957
<ALLOWANCES>                                   3,646,204
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               67,918,218
<PP&E>                                         16,193,474
<DEPRECIATION>                                 10,928,500
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 84,854,783
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          26,002,971
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       156,421
<OTHER-SE>                                     51,332,696
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   84,854,783
<SALES>                                        39,246,095
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               39,246,095
<CGS>                                          28,767,744
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  28,767,744
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             92,098
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,014,744
<INCOME-TAX>                                   2,073,689
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            941,055
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   941,055
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .06
        


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 27, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51351

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JORGE REYES, JR

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CR-2622-1

Before KING, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jorge Reyes, Jr., (Reyes) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute, and actual possession with intent to distribute, five or more

kilograms of cocaine. The district court denied Reyes’s motion to suppress

evidence of the cocaine. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress

evidence, this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error

and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Hunt, 253 F.3d 227, 229-30

(5th Cir. 2001). 
No. 06-51351

2

The Fourth Amendment does not protect people from all searches and

seizures, but it does protectthem from unreasonable searches and seizures. See

United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1998). At an immigration

checkpoint, such as in this case, any vehicle may be stopped even in the absence

of any individualized suspicion of illegal activity so thatthe Border Patrol Agent

may determine the citizenship status of the people passing through the

checkpoint. United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 431 (5th Cir. 2001). “The

permissible duration of an immigration checkpoint stop is therefore the time

reasonably necessary to determine the citizenship status of the persons stopped.”

Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 433. 

Agent Landrum testified that Reyes’s immigration inspection took two to

three minutes. During that brief time, the totality of the circumstances gave

Agent Landrum a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, the district

court’s finding that Reyes’s immigration inspection at the primary inspection

area was brief and did not unconstitutionally extend beyond its permissible

duration was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 431-35. The district court also did not

err in holding that Landrum properly referred Reyes’s vehicle to secondary

inspection. Id. at 435 n.32. 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1337 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1337

                  For the relief of John Andre Chalot.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 1997

  Mr. Graham introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
               referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                  For the relief of John Andre Chalot.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MODIFICATION OF EFFECTIVE DATE OF NATURALIZATION OF JOHN 
              ANDRE CHALOT.

    Notwithstanding title III of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
any predecessor provisions to such title, or any other provision of law 
relating to naturalization, for purposes of determining the eligibility 
of John Andre Chalot for relief under the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany Concerning Final Benefits to Certain United States 
Nationals Who Were Victims of National Socialist Measures of 
Persecution, signed at Bonn on September 19, 1995, John Andre Chalot is 
deemed to be a naturalized citizen of the United States as of September 
3, 1943.
                                 <all>
```
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Jessica M Waite    Research Geneticist (Plants) /ARSUserFiles/55134/Photo/Waite_Website_Photo.jpg "My research program will focus on pear genetics and genomics, addressing key questions in pear biology and important issues for the industry. My program will have a large focus on the impact of rootstocks on pear growth and development. I am interested in applying genetic tools to better understand dwarfing and precocity, graft compatibility and function, developing tools to enhance breeding efforts, as well as other topics related to architecture and physiology."


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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-1299

RALPH E. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (CA-95-51-5)

Submitted: April 16, 1998 Decided: April 28, 1998

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ralph E. Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. David Marcellus Frazier, SOCIAL

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; William David

Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Helen Campbell Altmeyer, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order affirming

the Secretary's denial of Social Security benefits. Appellant's

case was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) (1994). The magistrate judge recommended that relief

be denied and advised Appellant that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a

district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this

warning, Appellant failed to object to the magistrate judge's

recommendation.

The timely filing of objections to a magistrate judge's

recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the

substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned

that failure to object will waive appellate review. See Wright v.

Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985). See generally Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Appellant has waived appellate review

by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. We

accordingly dismiss the appeal. We deny leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED