IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CHARLES LEWIS BOBO, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

PLYMOUTH HOUSING GROUP, and 

the KING COUNTY SHERIFF'S 

OFFICE, 

Defendants. 

Charles Lewis Bobo 

General Delivery 

Seattle, Washington 98101 

Pro se plaintiff 

Christopher R. Page 

Hershner Hunter, LLP 

180 East 11th Ave. 

P.O. Box 1475 

Eugene, Oregon 97440 

Attorney for defendant 

Plymouth Housing Group 

Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01071-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01071-AA Document 18 Filed 11/07/14 Page 1 of 6
AIKEN, Chief Judge: 

This is yet another in a long line of lawsuits instituted by 

pro se plaintiff Charles Bobo ("Bobo"). In the instant case, Bobo 

filed a complaint against defendants Plymouth Housing Group 

("Plymouth") and the King County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff") . 

Plymouth moves to dismiss Bobo's claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915 (e) (2), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (2), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). 

For the reasons set forth below, Plymouth's motion is granted and 

this case is dismissed. 1 

BACKGROUND 

Plymouth is a non-profit corporation that develops and 

operates subsidized housing in Seattle, Washington. On August 27, 

2010, Plymouth and Bobo entered into a Section 8 lease agreement. 

On January 24, 2014, Plymouth notified Bobo that eviction 

proceedings would be initiated unless he became current on his rent 

within three days. Because Bobo never paid the outstanding rental 

amounts, Plymouth commenced a judicial eviction action. On February 

25, 2014, the Washington Superior Court of King County held that 

Bobo was unlawfully detaining the premises and, accordingly, 

directed the Sheriff to remove Bobo from Plymouth's property. 

On July 8, 2014, Bobo filed a lawsuit in this Court, alleging 

claims for unlawful eviction and deprivation of his constitutional 

1 Bobo's claims against the Sheriff fail for the same 

reasons as those asserted against Plymouth. Therefore, the Court 

exercises its sua sponte power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to 

dismiss the Sheriff as a defendant in this action, especially in 

light of the fact that the Sheriff is not a separate legal entity 

subject to suit. Keller v. City of Portland, 1998 WL 1060222, *3 

(D.Or. Nov. 13, 1998). 

Page 2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01071-AA Document 18 Filed 11/07/14 Page 2 of 6
rights in violation of 42 U.S. C. § 198 3. 2 As relief, he seeks 

$25,000,000 in unspecified damages. On July 21, 2014, this Court 

granted Bobo' s motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). On 

September 2, 2014, Plymouth filed the present motion to dismiss. 

Bobo did not file an opposition to Plymouth's motion. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), the court must dismiss an IFP 

complaint, either sua sponte or pursuant to a motion made by the 

opposing party, if it "is frivolous or malicious" or "fails to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S. C. § 

1915 (e) (2) (B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F. 3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en bane). 

Similarly, where the plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted," the court must dismiss the action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the 

complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint 

is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and its 

allegations are taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 

1424 (9th Cir. 1983). Bare assertions, however, that amount to 

nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a 

2 Bobo does not expressly identify 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the 

basis of his claims or articulate a cognizable legal theory 

thereunder; however, to the extent Bobo did not intend to allege 

a violation of his constitutional rights, this Court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01071-AA Document 18 Filed 11/07/14 Page 3 of 6
claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). Rather, to state a 

plausible claim for relief, the complaint "must contain sufficient 

allegations of underlying facts" to support its legal conclusions. 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F. 3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012) . 

DISCUSSION 

Plymouth contends that dismissal is warranted because Bobo's 

claims are frivolous and fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. In the alternative, Plymouth argues that the Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction since it is a Washington corporation 

that has no connection to this forum. 

Bobo is proceeding pro se in this matter. Because pro se 

plaintiffs do not have the benefit of legal counsel, their 

pleadings are "held to less stringent standards" than those drafted 

by lawyers. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 

916, 923 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1000 (2012). 

Nevertheless, even construing Bobo's pleadings in the most 

favorable and liberal light, his complaint is dismissed for two 

reasons. 

First, Bobo' s claims fail at the pleadings level. Bobo' s 

complaint is conclusory and devoid of factual support. In its 

entirety, Bobo's complaint consists of three paragraphs, none of 

which provide any context or factual content. Because the 

attachments to his complaint reveal only that he was a tenant of 

Plymouth's and failed to pay his rent in a timely manner on 

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Case 6:14-cv-01071-AA Document 18 Filed 11/07/14 Page 4 of 6
numerous occasions, they do not support his legal conclusions 

regarding Plymouth's wrongful conduct. Further, even assuming that 

Plymouth can be construed as a facet of the state for the purposes 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bobo failed to allege the existence of an 

agency policy, custom, or practice that was the moving force behind 

the alleged constitutional violation at issue. Mabe v. San 

Bernadino Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Soc. Serv., 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th 

Cir. 2001). 

Second, Bobo's complaint fails as a matter of law. Bobo sued 

Plymouth on at least three other occasions for the same conduct 

that underlies this case; in each instance, the court entered a 

judgment of dismissal. Hunter Decl. Exs. 1-2; see also Rein v. 

Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (res 

judicata prevents re-litigation of "all issues connected with the 

action that were or could have been raised" where a final judgment 

on the merits exists) (citation omitted) . Moreover, the Court is 

barred from entertaining Bobo's claims to the extent they 

constitute a collateral attack on the Washington Superior Court of 

King County's judgment of eviction. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 

895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine "precludes review 

of all state court decisions in particular cases arising out of 

judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state 

court's action was unconstitutional"). 

Finally, the Court notes that Bobo has filed at least forty 

pro se complaints in the U.S. District Courts for the District of 

Oregon and the Western District of Washington. Hunter Decl. Ex. 1. 

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Case 6:14-cv-01071-AA Document 18 Filed 11/07/14 Page 5 of 6
"[A] number of those cases [have already been dismissed] upon 

finding that [Bobo] failed to state a claim upon which relief could 

be granted, that the filing was frivolous, that the Court lacked 

jurisdiction, and/or for failure to prosecute." Id.; Bobo v. Tulare 

Cnty., 2014 WL 4243785, *1-2 (D.Or. Aug. 26, 2014); Bobo v. City of 

Fresno, 2014 WL 3784103, *1-2 (D.Or. July 31, 2014); Bobo v. Ariz. 

Dep't of Econ. Sec., 2014 WL 3672926, *1-2 (D.Or. July 23, 2014). 

The Court therefore enters a Pre-Filing Order restricting plaintiff 

from further litigating this issue. See DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 

F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal courts possess the 

authority "to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by 

imposing carefully tailored restrictions") ( citation and internal 

quotations omitted). For these reasons, Plymouth's motion is 

granted. 

CONCLUSION 

Plymouth's motion to dismiss (doc. 12) is GRANTED and this 

case is DISMISSED. All pending motions are denied as moot. 

IT IS SO OR~;rr~· 

Dated this/J_ day of November 2014. 

United District Judge 

Page 6 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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