J-S41013-19

2019 PA Super 301

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TIRRELL WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 544 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 28, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0002010-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 08, 2019

Tirrell Williams appeals pro se

1

from the trial court’s order dismissing 

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

In November 2012, Williams was charged with robbery, conspiracy, 

theft by unlawful taking, and simple assault. After a jury trial, he was 

convicted of one count each of robbery2 (threatens/fear of immediate serious 

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1 The trial court granted court-appointed PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw, 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988), on October 6, 

2017.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii) (first-degree felony).
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bodily injury), robbery (inflicts bodily injury),

3

theft by unlawful taking,

4 and 

simple assault.5 The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

On the night of January 5, 2012, Michael Stewart (Stewart) met

Amy Baird (Baird) at a bar, where Stewart had two pitchers of

beer and Baird had more than three drinks. After spending some 

time at the bar, Stewart and Baird went to Baird’s house. At the 

house, Baird told Stewart that she wanted marijuana, and Stewart 

gave Baird money to pay for marijuana. Baird used Stewart’s 

phone to order marijuana. An individual, who was not [Williams], 

came to Baird’s house and sold Baird a bag of drugs. About 

thirteen minutes later, Baird and Stewart realized that the bag 

contained a drug that was not marijuana. Baird again used

Stewart’s phone to call the individual who had originally delivered 

the drugs. Baird asked the individual to come back to the house 

with marijuana. When the individual came back, he was with 

[Williams] and two other people. The individual, [Williams], and 

the two other people will be referred to as the group.

Baird testified that she and [Williams] went to the upstairs of the

house. A short time later, they returned downstairs, where they

saw the three others in the group and Stewart in the kitchen. 

Baird testified that she again went upstairs, this time alone. Baird 

testified that while she was upstairs, she heard a commotion 

downstairs. Therefore, she went downstairs, where she saw the 

group stomping and punching Stewart, while he was on the 

kitchen floor. As mentioned above, the group included [Williams].

Stewart testified that the group surrounded him while he was in

the kitchen cleaning up hot oil. He testified that while he was

talking with one member of the group, another member would

start talking to him. Stewart testified that he was talking to

[Williams] when he heard another member of the group say, “Yo

partner, let me talk to you.” Stewart testified that he turned to

talk to the member who made the “partner” comment and was

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3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv) (second-degree felony).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
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then struck in the back of the head by [Williams]. Stewart

testified that the group beat him and punched him. One member 

of the group hit him in the head with a glass bottle, which caused 

him to fall to the floor. Stewart testified that he did not know 

which member hit him with the bottle. Stewart testified that while 

he was on the floor, the group kicked him and stomped him all 

over his body. Stewart testified that he rolled up into the fetal 

position to protect himself.

Stewart testified that[,] while he was on the floor, one member of 

the group said, “Stand this [MF] up, so I can shoot him.” Stewart 

did not know which member said this, but he felt the members 

trying to grab his arms to stand him up. Stewart testified that he 

did not let the group stand him up because he was scared that he 

would be shot and killed. Stewart testified that one member of 

the group poured hot oil on him. Stewart testified that he did not 

know which member poured the oil on him. After feeling the hot 

oil, Stewart got up and ran into the living room.

Stewart testified that[,] while he was on the floor, he could feel

members of the group going through the pockets of his pants. He 

testified that[,] before the incident, he had his wallet and cell

phone in his pockets. Stewart testified that after the incident, he 

no longer had his wallet and cell phone.

After the incident, Baird called [the] police. Officer Mark Lindauer 

(Lindauer) of the Williamsport Bureau of Police responded to the 

call. Lindauer noticed that there was grease and broken glass on 

the kitchen floor.

Stewart was taken to the hospital by ambulance. As a result of

the incident, he had a one[-]inch laceration on his head and a

headache for three to four days. In addition, he was bruised and

stiff for a week.

On October 24, 2013, a jury found [Williams] guilty of [c]ount 1

[([r]obbery)] (threaten another with or intentionally put another 

in fear of immediate serious bodily injury), [c]ount 3 [([r]obbery)] 

(inflicting bodily injury), [t]heft by [u]lawful [t]aking, and [s]imple

[a]ssault. On March 27, 2014, this [c]ourt sentenced [Williams]

to a minimum of six years and a maximum of twelve years in a

state correctional institution. The [c]ourt also sentenced

[Williams] to eight years of supervision under the Pennsylvania

Board of Probation and Parole[,] to run consecutively to the prison

term.
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Trial Court Opinion on Post-Sentence Motions, 7/28/14, at 1-3 (footnotes 

omitted).

Williams filed post-sentence motions that were denied. He filed a direct 

appeal and our Court affirmed Williams’ judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1434 MDA 2014 (Pa. Super. filed March 

20, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). On April 15, 2016, Williams filed a 

pro se PCRA petition; counsel was appointed and filed a petition to withdraw 

pursuant to Turner/Finley. After an independent review of the record and a 

conference, the court denied the petition and granted counsel’s petition to 

withdraw. Williams filed a collateral appeal; our Court vacated the PCRA 

court’s order finding that the court failed to give Williams notice of its intent 

to dismiss his PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Our Court 

remanded the matter to the trial court and “direct[ed] the PCRA court to serve 

a new Rule 907 notice on [Williams], and permit him 20 days to respond, 

raising any challenges to PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley, claims of PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness, and/or arguments regarding the merits of his 

underlying issues.” Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 431 MDA 2018, at 7-

8 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 16, 2018) (unpublished memorandum).

On November 2, 2018, the court issued Rule 907 notice to Williams; 

counsel filed another motion to withdraw. On March 6, 2019, Williams 

received another Rule 907 notice to which he filed a response. On March 28, 

2019, the PCRA court dismissed Williams’ petition. Williams filed a timely 

notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 
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errors complained of on appeal. On appeal, Williams presents the following 

issues for our consideration: 

(1) Did the PCRA [c]ourt and [c]ounsel commit an error as a 

matter of law, wherein they claimed that [Williams’] 

following issues did not contain any merit

(a) Trial counsel’s failure to file a [m]otion to 

[s]uppress[;]

(b) Trial counsel’s failure to object and move for a new 

jury pool[;]

(c) Trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of 

[p]olice[]reports and other prior testimonies [sic] at 

trial[;]

(d) Trial counsel’s failure to question the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses about the possibility of 

leniency at trial[;] and 

(e) Trial counsel’s failure to present the proper insufficient 

evidence claim or challenge all [of Williams’] 

convictions on direct appeal.

Appellant’s Brief, at 5 (emphasis deleted).

The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is whether 

that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for 

the findings in the certified record. Id.

We first address a procedural issue, namely waiver, concerning this 

appeal. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii):

[An appellant’s Rule 1925(b)] Statement shall concisely identify 

each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient 

detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge. The 

judge shall not require the citation to authorities or the record; 
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however, appellant may choose to include pertinent authorities 

and record citations in the Statement.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added). Williams’ Rule 1925(b) statement 

sets forth, in relevant part, the following issues: (1) “Counsel’s failure to 

present witnesses’ police reports at tr[ia]l” [; and] (2) “Counsel’s failure to 

question [C]ommonwealth’s witnesses about leniency.” Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 4/25/19. The trial 

court has not addressed the police report issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion due 

to the vagueness of Williams’ concise statement6. Thus, we find it waived. 

Moreover, Williams’ issue regarding failure to question witnesses about 

leniency similarly fails where it does not identify exactly which witnesses he is 

referencing. The trial court only addresses the issue as it relates to witness 

Baird; thus we find only that portion of the issue preserved for appeal 

purposes.7

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6 The trial court has indicated that it is relying upon the opinion it authored in 

dismissing Williams’ PCRA petition for purposes of this collateral appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1) (“[T]he judge who entered the order giving rise to the 

notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, 

shall within the period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least 

a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors 

complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such 

reasons may be found.”). 

7 Williams also argues in his appellate brief that “counsel did not attempt to 

question Mr. Stewart . . . in front of the fact finders, about not being charged 

with the drugs [he] admitted to buying and if that was [his] motivation for 

testifying[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 35. Because Williams’ Rule 1925(b) 

statement is vague on this issue, we also find it waived.
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We now turn to the merits of Williams’ preserved claims. Because each 

of his claims involves the ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that to 

succeed on such a claim, Williams must demonstrate by a preponderance of 

the evidence that:

(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular 

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some 

reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but 

for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010).

Williams first contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to move 

to suppress statements he made prior to being Mirandized.

8

 Specifically, he 

claims that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without first being 

advised of his right to remain silent or have counsel present during 

questioning. 

“It is the Commonwealth’s burden to establish whether [a defendant]

knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In order to do so, the 

Commonwealth must demonstrate that the proper warnings were given, and 

that the accused manifested an understanding of these warnings.” 

Commonwealth v. Baez, 21 A.3d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted).

Police are required to read a suspect his Miranda warnings when he is in 

custody and subject to interrogation. Moreover, the “prosecution may not use 

statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, stemming from a custodial 

interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates that he was apprised of 

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8 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. [I]n evaluating 

whether Miranda warnings were necessary, a court must consider the totality 

of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Gaul, 912 A.3d 252, 255 (Pa. 

2006) (citations and headnotes omitted). 

Instantly, Agent Trent Peacock, an agent with the Williamsport Bureau 

of Police, testified that on November 7, 2012, he questioned Williams 

regarding the robbery of the victim. Agent Peacock testified that before he 

conducted the interview, he advised Williams of his Miranda rights and that 

Williams waived them. N.T. Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding, 2/26/13, at 

20. In the statement he made to the agent, Williams admitted that: he was 

involved in the assault of Stewart; he threw the initial punch and kicked him; 

that his three associates also jumped in and participated in the assault; and 

no one took any of Stewart’s property. Id. at 20-21. Agent Peacock also 

testified that when he initially brought Williams in to talk to him about the 

robbery of which he was being accused, “[Williams] made statements to the 

effect that he never robbed anybody, that if he was going to rob someone it 

would be a bank, and [that the police] would never catch him because he 

would shoot it out.” N.T. Jury Trial, 10/24/13, at 121-22. 

After viewing the subject interaction between Williams and Agent 

Peacock, there is no question that Williams was in custody at the time of his 

interview. Williams was placed in a small room in the police station with the 

door closed, where he encountered the agent one-on-one. We also find that 
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the encounter rose to the level of an interrogation such that Miranda

safeguards were implicated. 

Interrogation has been defined as “questioning initiated by law 

enforcement officials.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 787 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. 

2001). The “functional equivalent” of interrogation includes “any words or 

actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably 

likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 402. Here, 

Agent Peacock specifically asked Williams “what happened that night,” and 

whether Williams “want[ed] to talk to [the agent]” about the case. See

Commonwealth Exhibit 11 (November 7, 2012 videotaped interview between 

Williams and Agent Peacock). This line of questioning certainly rises to the 

level of “interrogation,” where it was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 

response from Williams.

The videotape of the interview shows that Williams was not in fact read 

his Miranda rights until after he told Agent Peacock that he was not involved 

in the subject robbery and after the agent asked Williams if the officers that 

brought him into the station for questioning had already advised him of his 

rights. Accordingly, the prosecution was not permitted to use statements 

stemming from Agent Peacock’s custodial interrogation of Williams where he 

was not first Mirandized even where those statements were exculpatory. 

Gaul, supra; DeJesus, supra.

Despite Williams’ claim that “counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudice[d] [Williams where his] incriminating statement was used at trial 
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against him [and] made the outcome of trial a foregone conclusion,” 

Appellant’s Brief at 46, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief on this 

claim. The fact that Williams’ initial exculpatory, non-Mirandized statement 

was admitted at trial was harmless error where it did not prejudice his case 

and where there was other properly admitted inculpatory evidence 

establishing his guilt in the crimes. In addition to Williams’ own admission of 

guilt following his waiver of his Miranda rights, the victim and witness 

testimony admitted at trial established Williams’ involvement in the incident 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Fay, 344 A.2d 473 (Pa. 

1975) (failure to suppress statements not reversible error where 

Commonwealth can establish beyond reasonable doubt error was harmless); 

see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 a.2d 711 (Pa. 1998) (same). Thus, 

we find this claim meritless.

In his next issue, Williams contends that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for a new jury pool where prospective Juror #29 made a 

statement during jury selection “in [which she] announced to the jury pool 

that ‘she is familiar with the case, because [Williams] is incarcerated where 

her fiancé works as a prison guard and he comes home and tells her about 

[Williams’] case.” Appellant’s Brief, at 28. Williams asserts this statement

was prejudicial and “contaminated” the jury pool. Id.

“The purpose of voir dire is to ensure the empanel[]ing of a fair and 

impartial jury capable of following the instructions of a trial court. Even 

exposure to outside information does not ineluctably mean that a jury is unfair 
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and partial.” Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 20 (Pa. 2008). Here, 

the trial judge acknowledges that he took Juror #29 immediately back into his 

chambers following her statement made in open court during voir dire. Her 

in-court statement consisted of her acknowledging that she heard about 

Williams from a correctional officer at the prison. N.T. Potential Juror 29 Voir 

Dire, 10/2/13, at 2. While in the judge’s chambers, the Honorable Marc F. 

Lovecchio further discussed the import of the juror’s statement, asking the 

juror exactly from whom she heard about Williams and whether she could be 

fair and impartial in the instant case. Judge Lovecchio ultimately decided that 

Juror #29 should be excused from the jury pool; counsel did not object. Id.

at 3-4. Because the juror’s brief statement in front of the jury was not so 

prejudicial as to render the jury incapable of remaining fair and impartial, we 

find no merit to this claim. Tedford, supra.

Williams next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

question Commonwealth witness, Amy Baird, regarding her bias in favor of 

the prosecution where she was on probation at the time of the alleged 

incident, had been granted work release from prison sixteen days before she 

testified against Williams, and had not been charged with drug possession 

charges in the instant case.

9

“[A] witness may be impeached on cross-examination to show the 

witness’ bias, dishonesty, or defects in h[er] ability to observe, remember or 

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9 Accordingly to President Judge Nancy L. Butts’ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, 

Baird had pled guilty to driving under the influence prior to Williams being 

charged in this matter. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 4/18/19, at 2.
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recount the matter about which [s]he has testified.” Commonwealth v. 

Gwaltney, 442 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982). “[W]henever a prosecution witness 

may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal 

charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against h[er] within 

the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to 

the jury.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986). Our 

Court has held that “[a]n order placing a criminal defendant on probation does 

not constitute a final disposition of a criminal case against him” as probation 

is a conditional order “placing the defendant under the supervision and control 

of the court . . . to be followed by a final judgment of discharge [] if the 

conditions of his probation are complied with [] or by a final judgment of 

sentence on his being brought before the court following a violation of the 

terms of his probation[.]” Commonwealth v. Buksa, 655 A.2d 576, 581 

(Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).

As Williams points out in his brief, witness Baird had already been 

convicted and was serving her sentence in Lycoming County at the time she 

testified against him at trial. Therefore, at the time she testified, Baird did 

not have “outstanding criminal charges” lodged against her. However, Baird 

was on work release at the time of trial. While the law clearly designates an 

order of probation as a “non-final criminal disposition,” we have found no 

authority in this Commonwealth holding the same with regard to work release. 

We conclude, however, that the two should be treated similarly. 
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Work release is one of many county sentencing programs available as 

“Intermediate Punishment” under our Commonwealth’s administrative code. 

See Pa. Code § 451.124.10 In Commonwealth v. Melius, 100 A.3d 682 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), our Court noted that:

[T]he intent of the legislature in adopting county intermediate 

punishment programs was to give trial courts another sentencing 

option that would lie between probation and incarceration with 

respect to sentencing severity; to provide a more appropriate 

form of punishment/treatment for certain types of nonviolent 

offenders; to make the offender more accountable to the 

community; and to help reduce the county jail overcrowding 

problem. The revocation of a county intermediate 

punishment sentence is equivalent to the revocation of 

probation.

Id. at 685 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Because a county 

intermediate punishment such as work release has the same potential to be 

revoked as a sentence of probation, we hold that an order of work release is 

a “non-final criminal disposition” for purposes of cross-examining a witness 

for possible bias. Accordingly, having determined that there was a non-final 

criminal disposition in Lycoming County against Baird at the time she testified 

at Williams’ trial, it was error for counsel to fail to make the jury aware of any 

possible prosecution bias she may have had; counsel should have “explore[d

her] motive and potential bias.” Buska, 655 A.2d at 581. Despite reaching 

this conclusion, we recognize that a new trial is only required under the 

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10 Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code provides trial courts with seven 

alternative forms of criminal sentences, which include: an order of probation; 

a determination of guilt without further penalty; partial confinement; total 

confinement; a fine; county intermediate punishment; and state intermediate 

punishment. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). 
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circumstances if the error can be shown to have had an impact on the outcome 

of Williams’ case. Id. at 581 (citation omitted); Ali, supra (to prove 

ineffectiveness of counsel, appellant must show reasonable probability that

outcome of the proceedings would have been different).

Instantly, Baird testified that after she and the victim met at a bar, they

went back to her house to complete a marijuana purchase. Baird called an

individual named “Rich” to come to her house and he brought three other men 

with him, one of whom was Williams. While Baird was upstairs in the 

bathroom, she heard a commotion downstairs. Upon descending the 

staircase, Baird saw the victim, lying on the floor, being kicked and punched 

by the four men who were “all huddled around [the victim].” N.T. Trial, 

9/24/13, at 102. While Williams was one of the four men present in the home

besides Baird and the victim, Baird testified that she never saw Williams throw 

the initial punch or specifically kick the victim. Id. at 104. 

In addition to Baird, the victim also testified that Williams struck him in 

the back of the head, id. at 44, and that the perpetrators “proceeded to beat 

[him] and punch [him] and kick [him] and [break] a bottle upside [his] head.” 

Id. During the assault, the victim testified that “they were going through 

[his] pockets and everything,” id. at 45, and took his wallet and cell phone. 

Agent Peacock testified that Williams admitted to him that he had participated 

in the assault on the victim, in connection with a drug deal, and that he did 

so to take [drugs] back.” Id. at 127-29. Williams, however, denied having 

stolen the victim’s wallet or cell phone. Id. at 129. 
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Because Williams, himself, admitted to having assaulted the victim and 

because Baird testified that she did not see Williams throw the first punch or 

specifically kick and strike the victim, we do not find that counsel’s error had 

an impact on the outcome of the case. While the jury may have been entitled 

to know that Baird was on house arrest for an unrelated conviction at the time 

of Williams’ trial, any perceived bias for the prosecution would be unlikely 

where Baird’s own testimony was less damning than the defendant’s own 

admissions. Evans, supra. Thus, the error was harmless and this claim has 

no merit.

In his final issue on appeal, Williams contends that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge, on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, all 

of his convictions on direct appeal. 

On his unsuccessful direct appeal to this Court, appellate counsel 

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence11 to support Williams’ conviction for 

robbery, pursuant to section 3701(a)(1)(ii),12 a first-degree felony. See 

Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1434 MDA 2014, (Pa. Super. filed March 

20, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Thus, we will confine our review to 

Williams’ remaining convictions – robbery (inflicts bodily injury), theft by 

unlawful taking and simple assault.

____________________________________________

11 Counsel also challenged the weight of the evidence, as an alternative 

theory, for his section 3701(a)(1)(ii) conviction. 

12 Under section 3701(a)(1)(ii), “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course 

of committing a theft, he threatens another with or intentionally puts him in 

fear of immediate serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
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Williams makes a similar argument to the one he made on direct appeal, 

that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he 

committed or attempted to commit a theft. Specifically, he claims that “the 

jury was left to guess which inferences it will adopt” where the victim never 

testified he saw Williams rifle through his pockets and take his personal 

belongings or physically assault him save for the first punch. Appellant’s Brief, 

at 10. We disagree.

The victim’s testimony bears out that Williams struck the victim in the 

head and that immediately following that initial punch, the group (including 

Williams) surrounded the victim and collectively kicked and stomped on him 

until he fell into a fetal position. While on the ground, some members of the 

group went through the victim’s pockets, while others continued to strike and 

kick him, ultimately pouring hot cooking oil on him. As our Court determined 

on direct appeal:

[The victim’s] testimony . . . by itself constituted sufficient 

evidence to establish that the group committed a theft and that 

Williams and/or his cohort (with Williams’ complicity and general 

participation) put Stewart in fear of immediate serious bodily 

injury.[13]

Id. at 13. Based on the trial testimony, we agree that a jury could conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was an active and willing participant 

____________________________________________

13 Under section 3701(a)(1)(iv), “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the 

course of committing a theft, he . . . inflicts bodily injury upon another or 

threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily 

injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv) (emphasis added). 
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in events constituting robbery under section 3701(a)(1)(iv) and theft by 

unlawful taking.

14

Finally, Williams, himself, concedes in his appellate brief that he was 

guilty of simple assault. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12 (“[t]he first . . . initial 

punch and kicks . . . constitutes simple assault.”); Id. at 19 (“Taking an 

[o]ffense-specific analysis/[f]ocused examination test of this case at hand, no 

competent judge or jury would have found appellant guilty of anything other 

than the simple assault.”). Thus, we find this issue meritless. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/8/2019

____________________________________________

14 “A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful 

control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof.” 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).