IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

EUGENE DIVISION 

CONNIE L. LUTTRELL, Case No. 6:14-cv-01426-PK 

Plaintiff, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 

vs. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

KATHRYN TASSINARI 

ROBERT BARON 

Harder, Wells, Baron & Manning, PC 

474 Willamette, Suite 200 

Eugene, OR 

Attorneys for plaintiff 

BILLY J. WILLIAMS 

Interim United States Attorney 

District of Oregon 

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Case 6:14-cv-01426-PK Document 17 Filed 11/04/15 Page 1 of 15
JANICE E. HERBERT 

Assistant United States Attorney 

1000 SW Third Ave., Suite 600 

Portland, OR 97201-2902 

NICOLE JABAIL Y 

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

Office of the General Counsel 

Social Security Administration 

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 MIS 221A 

Seattle, WA 98104-7075 

Attorneys for defendant 

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge: 

Connie Luttrell ("plaintiff') seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner 

of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). This court has jurisdiction to review the 

Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on a my review of the record, the 

Commissioner's decision should be affirmed. 

Procedural Background 

Plaintiff applied for DIB on July 22, 2011, alleging disability as of September 30, 2008, due 

to reflex sympathetic dystrophy/regional pain syndrome; cervical and lumbar spondylosis with 

radiculitis, foot drop, osteophytic disease, and disc protrusions; clu·onic lymphedema with recurrent 

cellulitis; and chronic depression and anxiety. Tr. 21-25, 170-82. Her application was denied initially 

and upon reconsideration. Tr. 106-09, 112-17. A hearing was held on October 15, 2013, before an 

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Tr. 38-81. On November 1, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision 

finding plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 21-30. Plaintiff timely requested review of the ALJ' s decision and, 

after the Appeals Council denied review, plaintiff filed a complaint in this court. Tr. 1-6. 

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Factual Background 

Born on November 19, 1953, plaintiff was 54 years old on the alleged onset date of disability 

and 59 years old atthe time of the hearing. Tr. 38, 91. She is a high school graduate and attended two 

years of college. Tr. 197. Plaintiff has previous work experience as a graphic designer, dental 

assistant, caII center customer service representative, secretaty, and assembler. Id 

Standard of Review 

The court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards 

and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Hammockv. Bowen, 879 F.2d 

498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to supp01t a conclusion." Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The court must weigh 

"both the evidence that supp01ts and detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." Martinez v. 

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). "Where the evidence as a whole can suppott either a 

grant or a denial, [a coutt] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ' s." Massachi v. Astrue, 486 

F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 

The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish disability. Howard v. Heckler, 

782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986). To meet this burden, the claimant must demonstrate an 

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected ... to last for a continuous period of not less 

than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(A). 

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether 

a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 42 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the 

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Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity;" if so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

At step two, the Commissioner resolves whether the claimant has a "medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments." Id. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step three, the Commissioner evaluates whether the claimant's impairment meets or 

equals "one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to 

preclude substantial gainful activity.'' Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Ifso, the claimant is presumed 

disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant still can perform "past 

relevant work.'' Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can work, she is not disabled; if she 

cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141. 

At step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work 

existing in significant numbers in the national or local economy. Id. at 142; 20 C.F.R. § 404. l 520(g). 

If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566. 

The ALJ's Findings 

At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found plaintiff did not 

engage in substantial gainful activity from September 30, 2008 through her date last insured of June 

30, 2012. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

"cervical degenerative disc disease; LS radiculopathy with foot drop; reflex sympathetic dystrophy; 

and chronic lymphedema and vasculitis. Id. At step three, the ALJ found plaintiffs impairments did 

not meet or equal the requirements of a listed impairment. Tr. 25. 

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Accordingly, the ALJ continued the sequential evaluation process to determine how 

plaintiff's medical limitations affected her ability to work. The ALJ resolved that plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity ("RFC") to: "perform sedentmy work ... with no more than occasional 

stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, climbing, balancing, and bilateral overhead reaching ... 

occasional exposure to temperature extremes, wetness, moving machine1y, heights and similar 

hazards." Tr. 25. 

At step four, the ALJ concluded plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant work as a 

graphic designer or customer service representative. Tr. 29. Therefore, the ALJ determined plaintiff 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Tr. 30. 

Discussion 

I. Plaintiff's Credibility 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in evaluating her credibility. The Ninth Circuit relies on a twostep process for evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony about the severity and limiting 

effect of the stated symptoms. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 503 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007)). "First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Lingenfelter, 503 F Jd 

at I 036 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Second, absent evidence of malingering, "the ALJ 

can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, 

elem· and convincing reasons for doing so." Smolen v. Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Further, an ALJ "may consider ... ordina1y techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the 

claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, ... [or] other 

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testimony that appears less than candid ... . "Id. at 1284. However, a negative credibility finding 

made solely because the claimant's symptom testimony "is not substantiated affirmatively by 

objective medical evidence" is legally insufficient. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 

(9th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ's credibility finding may be upheld even if not all of the 

ALJ's rationales for rejecting claimant testimony are upheld. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197. 

The ALJ determined plaintiff was not entirely credible for the following reasons: (1) lack of 

evidence of an alleged work injmy near her alleged onset date; (2) lack of evidence regarding 

plaintiffs daily leg care needs; (3) inconsistencies regarding plaintiffs ability to walk certain 

distances; and ( 4) absence of assistive devices despite allegedly severe lower extremity impairments. 

Tr. 27-28. 

As the ALJ noted, plaintiff, in her disability report, indicated she stopped working after she 

" ... had an injmy on the job. I went to the hospital and my employer let me go." Tr. 196. On the 

same document, plaintiff reported she stopped working on her onset date of September 30, 2008. Id 

During the hearing, plaintiff explained she was working as a dental assistant for Dr. Poe when she 

fell, iajuring tendons and ligaments in her foot. Tr. 43. Plaintiff concedes the record contains no 

evidence of a hospital visit in late September 2008, which the ALJ found impugned her credibility. 

Pl.'s Br. 14-15; tr. 27. Plaintiff explains that despite the absence of evidence of an ER visit, she had 

reported leg pain and weakness to her primary physician, Dr. Rola Baker, M.D., in August 2008. 

Pl.'s Br. 15. Indeed, the cha1t note for August 5, 2008 indicates leg pain and weakness. Tr. 391. 

However, the next chait note-August 26, 2008-indicates no evidence oflower extremity weakness 

and improved chronic pain. Id. As the ALJ pointed out, subsequent September chart notes also make 

no mention of a hospital visit. Tr. 390. 

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In addition, plaintiff reported anxiety due to unemployment on September 11, 2008, which 

is at odds with her assertion that she was injured at work on September 30, 2008. See id; Tr. 196. 

Plaintiff explains the discrepancy is due to her initially alleging disability on August 1, 2008, 

"consistent with her reports to providers." Pl.'s Reply 4. Plaintifffmther notes "new job anxiety" 

was reported on August 26, 2008, and that she provided vague testimony during the hearing 

regarding the time period. Id. Thus, argues plaintiff, the record reflects plaintiff was experiencing 

pain and weakness in her legs in August and September 2008. 

However, plaintiffs argument misses the mark. The ALJ is not questioning whether plaintiff 

was experiencing leg pain at the time, but rather assessing the credibility of her statement regarding 

ending her employment following a fall at work that resulted in a trip to the hospital. Tr. 27. An ALJ 

may use ordinaiy methods of credibility assessment, including evaluation of testimony that appears 

less than candid. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Thus, the ALJ's finding is rational; even if another 

rational interpretation were possible, the court must uphold the ALJ's original finding. Tommasetti 

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The ALJ also found plaintiff less than credible based on her explanation ofleg care. Plaintiff 

testified that she spends fifteen minutes, several times per day, removing and replacing her 

compression hose, applying lotion, and elevating her legs. Tr. 27, 46, 54. Plaintiffrepotied replacing 

her hose three times per day, but she also repo11ed doing so "eve1y hour, hour and a half, [or] two 

hours." Tr. 46-47. She further stated she needed to elevate her legs for 30 minutes every two hours. 

Tr. 27, 47. The ALJ found plaintiffs assertions about the time required for her leg care were not 

substantiated in the record. Plaintiff accurately notes the record does not contain a reference to the 

amount of time plaintiff should raise her legs, or the time it takes to remove and replace her 

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compression hose. Pl. 's Br. 2-3. Although there is no dispute Dr. Baker advised plaintiff to use 

compression socks and to elevate her feet up until September 2011, there are no subsequent chart 

notes recommending that plaintiff elevate her feet. Tr. 376. Indeed, Dr. Baker's September 29, 2011 

chart note indicates plaintiffs "vasculitis/cellulitis both lower extremities ... ostensibly resolved[,]" 

and on November 10, 2011, "bilateral ankles and swelling ... [s]ignificantly resolved after taking 

Celebrex and using compression hose." Tr. 376. While plaintiff points out the doctor later 

"discussed compression hose and elevation of lower extremities[,]" his recommendation appeared 

to be in the context of either plaintiffs recent motor vehicle accident ("MV A") or "dependent edema 

secondary to salt ingestion." Tr. 369. Nonetheless, Dr. Baker indicated in his September 16, 2013 

medical evaluation that plaintiff must elevate her leg due to lymphedema and cellulitis during the 

day. Tr. 424. Absent any evidence to the contraty, the ALJ cannot show clear and convincing 

evidence that plaintiffs assertions about the time it takes to remove and replace her compression 

hose and elevate her legs are not credible. This rationale for questioning plaintiffs credibility cannot 

be upheld. 

The ALJ also impugned plaintiffs credibility based on inconsistencies regarding her ability 

to walk ce1tain distances. Tr. 27. The ALJ noted that in contrast to hearing testimony that plaintiff 

was able to walk one and a half miles, she indicated in her disability repmt that she was only able 

to walk two blocks. Tr. 27, 49, 217. As noted above, prior inconsistent statements regarding 

symptoms is a valid reason to discount a plaintiffs credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. 

The ALJ further found plaintiffs allegations regarding the severity of her impairments not 

credible because although her lumbar radiculopathy and foot drop symptomatology piqued in 2011, 

she did not use any assistive devices during that period. Tr. 27. Plaintiff argues that despite her 

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frequent falls, she did not use any assistive devices because it was awkward to do so in the 

workplace. Pl.' s Reply 3. However, the testimony plaintiff presents in support of her position does 

not necessarily bear this out: 

I just tty not to put myself in a position where I'm going to need [an 

assistive device]. That's why I don't work. Because I-it's kind of 

embarrassing when you get up to go file something or go get 

something or go get some work and you're falling all over yourself. 

Not to mention I've fallen into people, too. So - and then that last 

time, at Dr. Poe's office, when I feel I was holding a tray of 

instruments, and they flew of course. 

Id; tr. 61. The passage does not indicate that plaintiff found it awkward to have an assistive device 

in the workplace, but rather that she preferred to avoid situations where she would need such a 

device in the workplace. Id. She then explained that she did not work because she was falling 

frequently. Id Plaintiff's argument is without merit. An ALJ may invoke conservative treatment in 

discounting a plaintiff's impairment allegations. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

In sum, the ALJ provided three valid rationales for discrediting plaintiff's credibility, and one 

erroneous rationale. As recited above, a negative credibility finding may be upheld even if not all 

of the ALJ's rationales for rejecting claimant testimony are upheld. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197. 

Further, the reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to 

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony." Orteza v. Shala/a, 50 

F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, the ALJ presented specific examples for 

impugning plaintiff's credibility beyond a lack of objective evidence, and in so doing, provided clear 

and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

959 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) ("If the "ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial 

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evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing."). Accordingly, the court 

should uphold the ALJ's reasonable credibility determination. 

II. Medical Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ erred in according Dr. Baker's 2013 functional capacity 

assessment little weight. Pl. 's Br. 16-18, tr. 28. An ALJ is responsible for resolving ambiguities and 

conflicts in the medical testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

ALJ must give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted medical opinion of a 

treating or examining physician, or specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting contradicted 

opinions, so long as they are suppotted by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 

1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, treating or examining physicians are owed deference and will 

often be entitled to the greatest, if not controlling, weight. Orn, 495 F Jd at 633 (citation and internal 

quotation omitted). An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement by setting out a detailed 

summary of the facts and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation, and making findings. 

Morgan v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 FJd 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). However, "the ALJ must 

do more than offer his conclusions. He must set fotth his own interpretations and explain why they, 

rather than the doctors', are correct." Reddick, 157 F Jd at 725 (citation omitted). On this record, the 

treating and examining doctors' opinions are contradicted by the state medical examiners. Tr. 20-21. 

Accordingly, the ALJ' s reasons for rejecting the treating and examining physicians must be specific 

and legitimate, and supp01ted by substantial evidence. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. 

The ALJ found Dr. Baker's assessment of plaintiff's ability to walk is inconsistent with 

plaintiff's professed ability to walk one and a half miles. Tr. 28, 425. Plaintiff concedes Dr. Baker's 

assessment is not consistent with her testimony. Pl.'s Br. 17; Pl.'s Reply 5. Plaintiff contends, 

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however, that Dr. Baker was referring to an earlier date in the adjudication period, when plaintiff 

could only walk a few blocks with pain. Pl. 's Reply 5; tr. 376. However, there is no indication in 

Dr. Baker's September 2013 assessment that he was refening to an earlier time period. In fact, 

plaintiffs testimony that she regularly walks more than a mile at a time occurred only one month 

after Dr. Baker provided his opinion. Tr. 28, 49, 56. It therefore was not error for the ALJ to reject 

Dr. Baker's opinion insofar as it was inconsistent with plaintiffs testimony regarding her capacity 

to walk. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 601-02. The ALJ reasonably resolved the conflicting evidence. Id. 

at 599. 

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Baker's opinion that plaintiff was limited to using her hands for 

only ten percent of the day. Tr. 28, 426. The ALJ explained there was no evidence that plaintiff had 

any impairment affecting the use of her hands aside from her "cervical issue and the non-severe 

shoulder issues," which he addressed in the RFC. Id. Plaintiff argues Dr. Baker's opinion is 

suppm1ed by his report of right-sided C6 radiculitis extending into the right arm and forearm with 

tingling-type dysethesias in 2012. Tr. 367, 370. Nonetheless, plaintiff did not indicate in her 

functional report that her conditions affected the use of her hands. Tr. 217. Fut1her, in a follow-up 

letter from plaintiffs attorney, Dr. Baker indicated he misread the question in the September 2013 

assessment, and instead intended to report plaintiff had a "10% limitation" in the use of her hands. 

Tr. 265. Although the court cannot affirm the Commissioner's decision on grounds the ALJ did not 

invoke, the ALJ' s conclusion that Dr. Baker's erroneous hand limitation opinion was unsupported 

by the record is nonetheless valid. The ALJ is not required to accept a physician's opinion that is 

inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Thus, as Dr. Baker's 

September 2013 opinion regarding plaintiffs alleged hand limitations is not supported by substantial 

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evidence in the record, the ALJ did not commit error. 

Dr. Baker also indicated plaintiff would miss four days of work each month, which the ALJ 

rejected, explaining the limitation was inconsistent with her work record. Tr. 28. Indeed, Dr. Baker 

acknowledged that plaintiffs reflex sympathetic dystrophy and chronic lymphademia were 

"longstanding." Tr. 291. While plaintiff argues her previous ability to work without significant 

breaks is not material, it was not umeasonable for the ALJ to interpret the evidence in that manner. 

Presumably plaintiff would not have been able to work previously ifher longstanding impairments 

were of the severity she alleges. Futther, even if the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

interpretation, so long as the ALJ's inference is reasonable, the court must defer to the 

Commissioner's decision. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

Dr. Baker also opined plaintiff had ongoing mentally-based impairments, although the ALJ 

determined his opinion was unsuppo1ted by objective findings. Tr. 28. Indeed, Dr. Baker noted in 

his September 2013 assessment that plaintiff suffered from chronic depression and anxiety, although 

he did not assess any functional limitations. Tr. 423-24. Plaintiff argues, "the inclusion of anxiety 

and depression as conditions that plaintiff suffers from does not diminish the doctor's opinion 

regarding her physical condition." PL' s Reply 7-8. While the court agrees with plaintiffs premise, 

the ALJ merely indicated Dr. Baker's assessment was given little weight in part because the mental 

limitations were unsupported by objective findings. Tr. 28. The ALJ neither stated nor inferred Dr. 

Baker's opinions regarding physical limitations was impugned by the lack of support for the mental 

impairments. See tr. 28. Rather, the ALJ was presumably explaining why he did not include mental 

impairments at step two, and/or why mental impairments were not represented in the RFC. Thus, 

there is no indication the ALJ accorded Dr. Baker's opinions regarding plaintiffs physical 

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impairments less weight because the doctor noted a history of mental impairments. See tr. 293-94. 

As discussed above, the ALJ provided other legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Baker's 

physical restrictions as defined in the Septebmer 2013 assessment. See tr. 28. In any case, plaintiffs 

argument is unavailing as plaintiff concedes there is no evidence that she is limited by her mental 

impairments. Accordingly, any error is inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination 

and, therefore, harmless. Stout v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiff fmiher contends the ALJ ened in failing to provide reasons forrejecting Dr. Baker's 

opinion that plaintiff needed to lie down, rest, and/or elevate her legs periodically during the 

workday. Pl.' s Br. 18; Pl.' s Reply 6. Dr. Baker, in his September 2013 assessment, indicated plaintiff 

would have to lie down or rest periodically during the day: "sporadic during exacerbations - for neck 

& back pain ... leg elevation for lymphedema & cellulitis." Tr. 424. Despite the question, "[i]fyes, 

for how long, and for what reason?", the doctor did not provide any specifics. Id While plaintiff 

argues the ALJ erred by not addressing Dr. Baker's rest period testimony, the ALJ is not required 

to comment on every piece of evidence. See Howard ex. rel. Wolff\>. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 

(9th Cir. 2003). Futiher, as mentioned supra, the ALJ is not required to accept medical opinions that 

are brief, conclus01y, or inadequately suppotted by medical findings. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Dr. 

Baker's opinion failed to specify how often or for how long plaintiff needed to lie down or rest due 

to neck and back pain and to elevate her feet. Tr. 424. The ALJ's analysis of Dr. Baker's assessment 

as a whole included a number of specific, legitimate rationales for its rejection. Tr. 28. As such, the 

ALJ was not required to specifically reject evety particular statement included in the assessment. See 

Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 755 (9th Cir. 1989) ("It is true that the ALJ did not recite the magic words, 

'I reject Dr. Fox's opinion about the onset date because .... ' But our cases do not require such an 

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incantation."). 

In sum, the ALJ rationally interpreted the relevant medical evidence, resolved ambiguities 

therein, and provided legally adequate rationales for rejecting Dr. Baker's medical opinions. The 

ALJ' s findings were suppmted by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal error and, therefore, 

should be upheld. Valentine v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 

III. Past Relevant Work 

Plaintiff assigns error to the ALJ' s finding that she could perform her past relevant work as 

a graphic designer and customer service representative. Tr. 36. Plaintiff essentially repeats her 

disputes with the ALJ' s findings regarding Dr. Baker's conclusions. Pl. 's Reply 18-19. Specifically, 

plaintiff asserts her impairments would result in tardiness and excessive unscheduled breaks, per Dr. 

Baker's September 2013 opinion. Id.; tr. 424-27. However, in crafting an RFC and posing 

hypothetical questions to the VE, the ALJ need not include limitations that have been appropriately 

discounted because they are not suppmted by substantial evidence. See Osenbrockv. Apfel, 240 F.3d 

1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue; 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 

2008) (plaintiff does not establish the ALJ' s step four or five determination is incorrect simply by 

restating her assignments of error to the ALJ' s credibility and medical opinion evidence findings). 

Plaintiffs argument is unavailing. 

Recommendation 

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's decision should be AFFIRMED. 

Scheduling Order 

The above Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a United States District Judge 

for review. Objections, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and 

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Recommendation. Ifno Objections are filed, review of the Findings and Recommendation will go 

under advisement on that date. If Objections are filed, a response to the objections is due fomteen 

(14) days after being served with a copy of the Objections, and the review of the Findings and 

Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. 

DATED this 4th day of November 2015. 

Paul Papak 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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