October 20, 1978

78-58 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE DIRECTOR, COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY

Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of

1949 (40 U.S.C. § 481)—Government Contracts—

Wage and Price Standards in Government

Procurement

This responds to your request for our opinion on several legal questions 

concerning an administration proposal to require the observance of wage and 

price guidelines by corporations and individuals as a condition for doing 

business with the Federal Government. We believe that the President has the 

statutory authority to require Government contractors to comply with wage and 

price guidelines as a prerequisite for doing business with the Government. This 

view was upheld in AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 48 U.S.L.W . 2005 (D.C. Cir. June 22, 

1979), cert, denied, 443 U.S. 915 (July 2, 1979). We also believe that the 

Government can require Government contractors to receive from their subcontractors and suppliers certificates that the latter are in compliance with wage 

and price guidelines with regard to the products and services involved in 

contracts related to the contractors’ Government work.

I. The President’s Power to Establish Procurement Policies

In § 201 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 

(“ 1949 Procurement Act” ), 40 U.S.C. § 481, Congress established that 

Government procurement policies must be designed to promote “ economy” 

and “ efficiency” in Government procurement. In § 205(a) of the 1949 

Procurement Act, 40 U.S.C. on § 486(a), Congress specifically conferred on 

the President the power to

. . . prescribe such policies and directives, not inconsistent with the 

provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to effectuate the 

provisions of said Act, which policies and directives shall govern the 

Administrator [General Services] and executive agencies ....

As interpreted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 

§ 205(a) grants broad discretion to the President to protect and advance a range

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of governmental interests, including “ the interest of the United States in all 

procurement to see that its suppliers are not over the long run increasing its 

costs . . . Contractors Association o f Eastern Penrtyslvania v. Secretary of

Labor, 442 F. (2d) 159, 170 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).

In the Contractors case, the Third Circuit considered and affirmed the 

validity of the “ Philadelphia Plan” promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 

No. 11246, 3 CFR 406 (1969), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note. The Third Circuit, as 

well as other courts of appeals, have consistently upheld the principle that 

§ 205(a) of the 1949 Procurement Act confers on the President the power to 

require nondiscrimination provisions in all Government contracts. See, e.g.,

Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F. (2d) 629 (5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 

389 U.S. 977 (1967); Southern Illinois Builders Association v. Ogilvie, 327 F. 

Supp. 1154 (S.D. 111. 1971), a ffd , 471 F. (2d) 680 (7th Cir. 1972). Prior 

Attorneys General have also opined that Executive Order No. 11246 and its 

predecessors were valid exercises of statutory authority. See 42 Op. A.G. 

97 (1961) (sustaining validity of Executive Order 10925); 42 Op. A.G. 

405 (1969) (sustaining validity of revised “ Philadelphia Plan” ).

In its most recent encounter with a challenge to Executive Order No. 11246, 

the United States Court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that decisions 

of other courts of appeals had “ candidly acknowledged the validity of the use 

by the President or Congress of the procurement process to achieve social and 

economic objectives.” United States v. New Orleans Public Services, Inc.,

553 F. (2d) 459, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 

942 (1978).1 We believe that the backdrop formed by New Orleans Public

Service and prior cases interpreting § 205(a) of the 1949 Procurement Act 

suggests that in order to assess the general validity of a program requiring 

compliance with the wage and price guidelines as a condition for doing 

business with the Government, two questions must be considered. First, is such 

a program authorized under the 1949 Procurement Act? Second, is such a 

program inconsistent with any other statutes?

A. Authority Under the 1949 Procurement Act. We conclude that the 1949 

Procurement Act authorizes the proposed requirement of compliance with the 

wage and price guidelines. The general purpose of the proposed program— to 

lower costs to the Government of the goods and services it purchases— is 

clearly consistent with the purposes of the Act. Nor does the program conflict 

with any specific provision of the Act.

'In support o f this statem ent, the court cited Roseni Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F. (2d) 

1039, 1045 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1975), and Northeast Construction Co. v. Romney, 485 F. (2d) 7 5 2 ,7 6 0 

(D .C . Cir. 1973).
B. Inconsistency With Other Statutes. The question whether the program as 

devised is inconsistent with other statutes raises more subtle and difficult 

problems. In the New Orleans Public Service case discussed above, the Fifth 

Circuit accepted the Government’s contention that Executive Order No. 11246 

was authorized not only by § 205(a) of the 1949 Procurement Act, but also by 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, which amended 

Title VII. The court concluded that the order represented “ a long standing 

program which Congress has recognized and approved.” 553 F. (2d) at 467.2 

The court’s analysis suggested that the 1949 Procurement Act, standing alone, 

did not provide sufficient authority for the order but for the fact that it was 

supported by a long history of the use of the procurement process to combat 

discrimination against minorities, a use that had been, in effect, ratified by the 

Congress.

We are unaware of any statute other than the 1949 Act which might be 

viewed as a source of statutory authority for this program. Implicit in the Fifth 

Circuit’s opinion and its discussion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube, note 2, 

supra, was the assumption that if Congress had passed some other statute which 

was inconsistent with the order, then the court may have ruled differently on the 

validity of the order.3 It follows that a statute inconsistent with this wage and 

price program would be viewed as a limitation on the power conferred by 

§ 205(a) of the 1949 Procurement Act.

The lack of other supportive statutory authority to implement this program 

does not pose a significant problem, primarily because the program is 

demonstrably more closely related to the purposes of the 1949 Procurement Act 

than the antidiscrimination programs established by Executive Order No. 

11246 and its predecessors. Thus, while courts may have felt obliged in 

Executive Order No. 11246 cases to look for additional statutory support for the 

antidiscrimination policies embodied in the order, we believe that the 1949 

Procurement Act itself provides an ample statement of relevant national policy 

and authority— to procure goods and services for the Government in an 

economical fashion.

We now turn to the more difficult question, whether the program would 

conflict with some other statute. We believe that those aspects of the program 

requiring individuals and companies doing business with the Government to

2In a footnote accompanying this conclusion, the court dismissed an argument that Executive 

Order No. 11246 constituted executive “ law m aking” of the type prohibited by the C ourt’s decision 

in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U .S. 579 (1952). See 553 F. (2d) at 467-68, n. 8.

3Such an assumption has been adopted in virtually all cases prior to New Orleans Public Service

in which the validity of Executive O rder No. 11246 has been challenged and upheld. See, Southern

Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (S.D . III. 1971), a ffd, 471 F. (2d) 680 

(7th Cir. 1972), Joyce v . McCrane, 3 2 0 F . Supp. 1284, 1291 (D. N .J. 1970); Contractors Ass' n o f

Eastern Pennsylvania'/. Secretary o f Labor, 442 F. (2d) 159, 171-175 (3d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 

404 U .S. 854 (1971).

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avoid price increases beyond a specified level may be inconsistent with 50 

U.S.C. App. § 645b. That provision reads as follows:

Nothing contained in this Act or any other Federal Act (except the 

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, the Stabilization 

Act of 1942, as amended, or the District of Columbia Emergency 

Rent Act, approved December 2, 1941, as amended), shall be 

construed to authorize the establishment by any officer or agency of 

the Government of maximum prices for any commodity or maximum 

rents for any housing accommodations.

The provision would appear to impose on the executive and judicial branches 

a rule of statutory construction that would prohibit a finding of implicit, as 

opposed to explicit, power in any Federal statute to establish “ maximum 

prices” for “ any commodity,” 4 whether the commodity is sold solely within 

the private sector or to the Government. Because the setting of a percentage 

guideline beyond which a contractor may not increase his prices charged to the 

Government would appear as the setting of a “ maximum price,” it could be 

argued that § 645b, on its face, bars the President from utilizing the 1949 

Procurement Act, or any other statute, to establish and enforce price guidelines 

even with regard to those who do business with the Government.

The legislative history of § 645b does not clearly indicate whether the 

Congress passing the provision necessarily intended it to condition a subsequently 

enacted statute, here § 205(a) of the 1949 Procurement Act. In June of 1946, 

President Truman vetoed a bill which would have extended, as amended, the 

Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (EPCA), 56 Stat. 23, because of his view 

that the bill was inadequate. Under the 1942 Act, discussed in greater detail 

below, the President was empowered to establish maximum prices with regard 

to a wide range of goods and services sold within the private sector and to the 

Government. In apparent anticipation of the President’s veto, a late amendment 

was added by Senator Moore to a bill extending various powers under the 

Second War Powers Act, 56 Stat. 176.

Most titles of the Second War Powers Act expired or were repealed by June 

30, 1950, but the Moore amendment had no express expiration date and it has 

never been repealed. Later in 1946, a law extending the EPCA (but not the 

Stabilization Act of 1942) was adopted. That law provided for ceilings on rents 

and most prices but added a number of important exceptions.

We believe that the intent of Senator Moore and the Congress in adopting 

§ 645b was limited to placing a prohibition on President Truman’s construing 

any then existing Federal statutes as conferring on him power to control prices 

until such time as he and the Congress resolved their dispute over the extension 

of the EPCA. We find nothing inconsistent with this interpretation of § 645b in 

the congressional debates on the Moore amendment, 92 Cong. Rec. 7312

■*The m eager legislative history o f the provision suggests that its reference to prices of “ any 

com m odity" was intended to include the full range o f goods and services included in the 

Emergency Price Control Act o f 1942, 56 Stat. 23. See H. Rept. No. 2395, 79th C ong., 2d sess. 

(1946); 92 Cong. Rec. 7312, 7872, 7926 (1946).

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(1946). In addition, we are unable to find any evidence that any Congress 

subsequent to the Seventy-ninth has viewed § 645b as having continued 

vitality.5

With regard to those aspects of the proposed program that require compliance with wage guidelines by employers doing business with the Government, 

a potential problem is presented by the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a, 

which generally requires Government contractors to pay minimum levels of 

wages to their employees. Should wages in the private sector rise at a greater 

rate than that established by the wage guidelines to be issued under this program 

by the Council on Wage and Price Stability, it may become necessary for the 

President to exercise his authority under 40 U.S.C. § 276a-5, § 6 of the 

Davis-Bacon Act, to suspend application of the Act.6 In addition, under Title II 

of the National Emergencies Act o f 1972, Pub. L. No. 94-412, a Presidential 

declaration of national emergency required in order to suspend Davis-Bacon 

would be subject to veto by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. We believe 

that the so-called legislative veto device such as that contained in the 1976 Act 

is unconstitutional. However, this issue has not yet been resolved by the courts 

and, therefore, were Congress to pass such a concurrent resolution, we may 

anticipate a suit to be filed attempting to block the suspension.

In considering whether the use of wage and price guidelines to control the 

price of goods and services to the Government is inconsistent with statutes 

other than the 1949 Procurement Act, we believe it is important to recognize 

that there is no history of the use of such guidelines. This is important because 

most of the decisions upon which we would rely in litigation— those upholding 

Executive Order No. 11246— were decided several decades after President 

Roosevelt first implemented an anti-discrimination program in 1941. See

Executive Order No. 8802. When the courts finally came to pass on the validity 

of Executive Order No. 11246, the authority to issue that order and its 

predecessors was historically well established. In contrast, the history of 

mandatory wage and price controls from World War II to the present suggested 

a pattern of tight congressional control over both the delegation of power to the 

President and over its exercise. Moreover, control of the wages and prices of 

Government contractors has always been treated as part of general controls over 

the entire economy.

On April 11, 1941, President Roosevelt established the Office of Price 

Administration and Civilian Supply. Executive Order No. 8734, 6 Fed. Reg.

5It could not be successfully contended that the 1949 Act implicitly repealed the Moore 

amendment given the burden usually imposed on those arguing that a statute has been repealed by 

implication. See, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U .S. 153, 187 (1978).

6The experience o f this office with a previous suspension o f Davis-Bacon in 1971 suggested 

several problems that we may expect to arise should that Act or any one of some 6 1 other similar 

statutes identified in 1961 require suspension. First, any suspension should be applied prospectively. 

Second, some contractors who deal with the Governm ent may also be subject to State laws similar 

to Davis-Bacon. See, e.g., N .Y . Labor Law , Art. 8; Cal. Labor Code §§ 1771 et seq. This office 

concluded in 1970 that suspension of Davis-Bacon would have the effect of suspending or preempting any applicable State laws.

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1917. That agency was empowered to issue formal price schedules, but relied 

for enforcement solely on publicity and persuasion. One of the functions 

conferred on the agency by § 2(d) of the order was to

Advise and make recommendations to other departments and 

agencies . . . in respect to the purchase or acquisition of materials and 

commodities by the Government [and] the prices to be paid therefor . . . .

On July 30, 1941, President Roosevelt transmitted to Congress a message 

requesting legislative authority to deal with the impact of inflationary price 

rises.7 The President pointed out that one consequence of the inflationary spiral 

was the increase in “ [c]osts to the Government.” In asking for the legislation, 

the President also stated that, “,[l]ike other defense legislation, it should expire 

with the passing of the need, within a limited time after the end of the 

emergency.”

The 77th Congress responded by enacting the Emergency Price Control Act 

of 1942. Section 1(a) declared two purposes of that Act to be: (1) insuring 

“ that defense appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices” ; and (2) 

preventing “ hardships” that would befall “ Federal, State, and local government, that would result from abnormal increases in prices.” But Congress did 

not grant power to control wages, and in the Senate report on the Act it was 

stated that wage controls

. . . could, in no event, be acceptable unless coupled with direct and 

specific determination of the salaries of management, the dividends 

of stockholders, the interest payments received by bondholders, the 

incomes of fanners or merchants of professional persons and of all 

others.8

The EPCA also dealt specifically with the regulation of the prices of 

agricultural commodities, proscribing any control until those prices exceeded 

110 percent of parity or the levels reached during any one of three previous 

periods, whichever was highest.

On October 2, 1942, Congress passed the Stabilization Act, 56 Stat. 765, 

which gave the President the power to impose ceilings over agricultural prices 

and to forbid wage raises that had not been approved by the War Labor Board. 

Under § 5(a), the Government was entitled to disregard wage payments ruled to 

be illegal for several purposes, including, inter alia, “ compensation under 

cost-plus contracts and other governmental transactions.” See, Allen v. Grand

Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954).9

In September of 1950, Congress passed the Defense Production Act (DPA), 

which granted authority to the President to control prices either selectively

7See H. Doc. No. 332, 77th C ong., 1st sess. (1941).

"See S. Rept. No. 931, 77th C ong., 2d sess. 12 (1942).

9Under the regulations published pursuant to the Stabilization Act, a determination by the 

National W ar Labor Board that wage paym ents were in contravention of that Act was “ conclusive 

upon all Executive Departments and agencies . . . for the purpose of determ ining costs or expenses 

under any contract m ade by or on behalf of the United S tates." 7 F.R. 8749 (1942).

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within one industry or sector of the economy or across the board.10 If prices 

were controlled, then wages would also be required to be controlled. The DPA, 

as had the Stabilization Act, contained an explicit provision empowering the 

President to determine whether “ any wage, salary, or other compensation” had 

been paid in violation of the controls and to “ prescribe the extent” to which 

such illegal payments could be “ disregarded by the executive departments and 

other governmental agencies” with regard to Government contracts. The 

Supreme Court later observed that the “ substance” of these two provisions was 

“ inescapably the sam e.." Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., supra, at 546.11

In the Allen case, the Government contractor argued that the regulations 

mandating the disallowance of illegal wages in computing the sums owed for 

work or goods sold to the Government were not authorized by the DPA. The 

Government’s brief discussed in detail the history of administrative sanctions to 

enforce the wage provisions of the Stabilization Act12 and noted the degree of 

oversight which'Congress had exercised during its existence.13

In 1970, Congress reentered the field of wage and price controls by enacting 

another Economic Stabilization Act, 84 Stat. 799, which generally empowered 

the President to impose wage and price controls even though President Nixon 

had specifically opposed the grant of such authority.14 Nothing in the legislative 

history of the 1970 Act suggested that Congress believed that there was any 

other statutory authority in the Executive to impose wage and price controls.

In 1971, after the President had used the authority under the 1970 Act to 

freeze wages and prices for a 90-day period, Congress considered administration and other proposals to extend the wage and price control authority beyond 

the expiration date of April 30, 1972. As finally enacted, the Stabilization Act 

Amendments of 1971 added to the President’s arsenal the power to “ stabilize” 

interest rates, corporate dividends and “ similar transfers.” 15

In enacting the 1971 amendments, Congress did much to fill in the details 

that had not been addressed by the 1970 Act. This was done as least partially in 

reponse to the decision in Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. 

Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court), in which a 

claim that the 1970 Act constituted an unconstitutional overbroad delegation of 

legislative power to the Executive had been rejected. Nothing in the Amalgamated case suggested any source of power in the President to impose wage and 

price controls other then the 1970 Act, which the Court upheld largely on the 

theory that its “ fair and equitable” standard and other statutory details were

l0The DPA, like its predecessors, contained a term ination date (June 30, 1951) for wage and 

price control authority, an authority subsequently extended, 64 Stat. 822, to April 30. 1953.

"U n d er the regulations prom ulgated pursuant to the DPA the "sanction” against employers who 

paid illegal wages to their employees in connection with work performed on Governm ent contracts 

was disallowance of the illegal wages paid in com puting the money due under the contract or from 

the Government. See 16 F. R. 6028, 6029, 7284 (1951).

l2Brief, at 43-58. 

n ld „ at 43-49.

'*See H. Rept. No. 1330, 91st C ong., 2d sess. 16 (1970) (m inority views).

I3S. Rept. No. 507, 92d C ong., 1st sess. (1971).

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sufficiently particular when the Act was read in the context of the legislation 

discussed above.

Finally in 1974, after the expiration of the 1970 Act, as amended, Congress 

enacted legislation establishing the Council on Wage and Price Stability. In 

hearings on the legislation, the administration made clear that

. . . we are not requesting the statutory authority to impose mandatory, 

wage and price controls or the authority to delay wage and price 

increases. The mere existence of such authority has in our opinion an 

adverse impact on expectations. The name of the game becomes 

“ raise prices and wages now before the Government intervenes.” 

Statutory authority to delay wage and price increases would lead to 

the belief that the Government was on its way back to mandatory 

controls. This could result in anticipatory wage and price increases 

that would be highly inflationary.16

As enacted, this legislation contained an explicit provision that nothing in it 

- “ authorizes the continuation, imposition, or reimposition of any mandatory 

economic controls.” 17

The history recounted above involved wage and price controls applicable to 

the entire economy or to specific sectors of the economy. The question of 

special efforts to impose wage and price restraint on Government contractors as 

part of procurement policy has never been addressed. Successful defense of the 

proposed program may well turn on the Government’s ability to show that the 

requirement of compliance with wage and price guidelines by those doing 

business with the Government does not constitute the kind of regulation of 

wages and prices in the general economy which Congress has assumed can be 

authorized only through a specific delegation of power to the President, or 

perhaps by direct statutory regulation by Congress itself.

The Senate recently adopted, as an amendment to S. 3077, a “ sense of the 

Senate” resolution which expressed the view that no statute, including 

specifically the 1949 Procurement Act, was intended by prior Congresses to 

confer on the President the authority for the program you have proposed. See

124 Cong. Rec. S. 16781-82 (daily ed. Sept. 30. 1978). But the resolution 

merely expresses the “ objection” of the Senate to implementation of a program 

like the one at issue here. It is not a law and it is not legally binding. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that “ the views of a subsequent 

Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” 

United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963), 

quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960).

'6See, Hearings on Cost o f Living Task Force before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs, 93d C ong., 2d sess. 67 (1974).

,7S. Rept. No. 1098, 93d C ong., 2d sess. 3 (1974). That same report had taken the position that

the bill “ would grant no m andatory or standby control authority over the econom y.” Id ., at 1.

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You asked us to address the following two questions: (1) “ would a directive 

by the President that federal agencies not procure from firms which are on the 

CWPS list be upheld in court,” and (2) “ would a directive be upheld if it 

precluded awards to firms which although in compliance with the standards for 

the products which the agency was procuring, was not in compliance for its 

other products.”

Under the first type of directive, a contractor is generally barred from doing 

business with the Government if its business activities as a whole are found to 

be in noncompliance with the wage and price guidelines established by the 

Council. Thus, a contractor whose Government-related operations are in 

compliance could nevertheless be barred because its overall operations are not 

in compliance. Under the second type of directive, a contractor who can 

convincingly separate his non-Govemment from his Government operations is 

bound to adhere to the wage and price guidelines only with regard to the latter 

operations.

We believe that the difference between the two types of directives will 

probably have little impact on the validity of the overall program if.the 

principles established in the Executive Order No. 11246 cases are applied by 

the courts to this program. We conclude this because, under the reasoning of 

Rosetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F. (2d) 1039, at 1045, n. 18 (1975), a 

program will be upheld even if the relationship between prices paid by the 

Government and the objectives of the program itself are somewhat “ attenuated.” 

See generally, United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 553 F. (2d), 

at 467-68, n. 8 .18

However, the more direct the connection between compliance with wage and 

price guidelines and lower costs to the Government, the stronger is your 

argument that the program is in furtherance of the purpose of the 1949 

Procurement Act to procure goods and services for the Government more 

economically and efficiently. Therefore the case with respect to goods and 

services supplied to the Government will be stronger than for other products of 

a Government contractor.19

Next, you raised a question whether “ a contractual requirement in a prime 

contractor’s contract that it require certification of compliance of its subcontractors and suppliers” would be upheld. A similar provision is contained in § 203 

of Executive Order No. 11246. We believe that such a provision would be 

upheld along with the basic program; neither provision would place any 

enforcement responsibility on the contractor himself.

II. Legality of the Options Under Consideration

,8Under this principle, we think a court would probably accept the argument that applying wage 

and price guidelines to all phases of a corporation’s business would, over the "lo n g ru n ," id., at 

170, decrease procurem ent costs to the Government.

19We note that in cases where a contractor cannot satisfactorily segregate his G overnm ent and 

non-Govemment related operations, debarm ent of the contractor should be possible under the 

second type o f directive without implicating the broader reach of the first type o f directive.

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You also asked whether “ the exclusion from this program of contracts 

awarded under formally advertised procedures significantly improves” the 

chances that either program would be upheld. Because there is no requirement 

that formally advertised contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder, see 41 

U.S.C. § 253(b), we believe that the inclusion of such contracts within the 

reach of the program should not significantly affect the legality of the program 

one way or the other. Again, it may be that the degree to which the total 

economy is directly affected by this program would be a factor in judicial 

consideration of an argument that the program is in effect a general, mandatory 

wage and price system which can be imposed only pursuant to congressional 

authorization.

Finally, we address the implicit issue whether debarment is an appropriate 

and authorized sanction for violation of wage and price guidelines. Under 

analogous case law, e.g., Copper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 

F. (2d) 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961), as well as those cases upholding Executive Order 

No. 11246, we believe that debarment is an appropriate remedy. At the same 

time, in at least one case sustaining debarment in the absence of explicit 

statutory authority, the court added that debarment cannot occur “ without 

either regulations establishing standards and a procedure which are both fair 

and uniform or basically fair treatment” of those debarred. Gonzalez v. 

Freeman, 334 F. (2d) 570, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1964). This case strongly suggested 

that if debarment is utilized as a remedy, scrupulous attention must be given to 

insure that the standards for exceptions are clearly established by regulation 

and that those standards are applied uniformly.

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Legal Counsel

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