IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

CECIL JEROME HATCHETT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

U.S. BANK, RICHARD DA VIS, OCWEN 

FEDERAL LOAN, MULLINIAM GROUP 

LOAN, 

Defendants. 

MOSMAN, District Judge: 

3:14-CV-876-PK 

OPINION AND 

ORDER 

Plaintiff prose Cecil Jerome Hatchett, proceeding in forma pauperis, filed this action 

against defendants identified as U.S. Bank, Richard Davis, Ocwen Federal Loan, and Mulliniam 

Group Loan on May 30, 2014. The gravamen ofHatchett's complaint is unclear, but it appears 

likely that Hatchett intends to allege defendants' liability either in connection with Hatchett's 

allegedly unacknowledged compliance with his payment obligations under a m01igage he 

characterizes as an "illegal sham loan" or in connection with the unspecified role defendants may 

purp01iedly have played in causing Hatchett twice to have been purportedly falsely convicted and 

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imprisoned by ·co mis of the State of Oregon. 1 I have considered Hatchett's pleading and all of the 

papers on file. For the reasons set forth below, I dismiss Hatchett's action sua sponte for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Such dismissal is without prejudice, and Hachett has this comi's 

leave to refile his claim or claims in the event he believes he can cure the jurisdictional and other 

infirmities identified below. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

In support of his prayer for relief, Hatchett alleges by and tlu·ough his complaint as 

follows: 

I Cecil Jerome Hatchett need a Civil Rights Attorney. Supervisory officials sued 

in their [i]ndividual capacities are answerable in a 1983 action where there is a 

causal connection [b ]etween their own actions and the claimed civil rights 

violation, $16,000,000,000 billion Dollars. 

1. The illegal sham loan started with mulliniam loan group. This Black Man 

Cecil Jerome Hatchett just got of[sic] illegal imp[r]isonment cover-up. 

2. Ocwen Federal Loan and U.S. Bank [are] tr[y]ing to cover-up a fraudulent 

payback by trying [to] act like Cecil J. Hatchett stopped paying. When Ocwen 

Loan illegally sent the payment back and then demanded tlu·ee mo[]nt[h ]s back 

Pay. Ocwen Federal loan and U.S. Bank trying to get a illegal summ[a]1y 

Judgment.[] All Cecil Jerome Hatchett's Federal Civil Rights, U. S. Constitution 

Amendment Rights must be added. 

Complaint, 1-2. In addition, Hatchett includes as exhibits to his complaint copies of two 

"MoneyGram" transfers of funds from Hatchett to "Ocwen Loan Service" in the respective 

amounts of$1,490.00 and $10.00, copies ofWalmart receipts for the two MoneyGram transfers, 

a copy of a letter signed by Hatchett on April 20, 2012, and ostensibly sent to the Oregon 

1 Hatchett appears specifically to allege defendants' liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but 

it is well established that "§ 1983 affords a 'civil remedy' for deprivations of federally protected 

rights caused by persons acting under color of state law ... ," Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 

535 (1981 ), and nothing in Hatchett's pleading or other papers suggests that any defendant acted 

at any time under color of state law, or that defendants deprived Hatchett of any constitutional or 

federal statutmy right. 

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Attorney General's office complaining that Hatchett had at that time been unable to reach an 

"Account Manager" at Ocwen to discuss Ocwen's apparent threat to foreclose on Hatchett's 

mortgage, and a copy of a letter signed by Hatchett on January 21, 2011, and ostensibly sent to 

the President and Attorney General of the United States and to the Governor of the State of 

Oregon complaining of "quiet white conspiracy hate crimes" which resulted in Hatchett's 

"experience[]" of "two illegal sham trials at Multnomah County Court-house" in connection with 

each of which Hatchett was convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration. Complaint, 

Exhs. 1-4. 

ANALYSIS 

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(h)(3) provides that "[i]fthe court determines at any time 

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(h)(3); see also Cal. Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. lvlusick, 505 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974) 

("It has long been held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction"). Moreover, 

in connection with in Jonna pauperis actions such as this, the district courts are obliged to 

dismiss sua sponte actions failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted: 

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any po1iion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the co mi determines that-

* * * 

(B) the action ... 

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] 

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted .... 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

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A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the comt lacks 

the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate the case. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. 

City of 1vfadison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension 

Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996). Under either apparent potential gravamen of Hatchett's 

complaint, this court lacks such authority. 

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Exxon 1vfobil Corp. v. 

Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005), citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 

America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, the courts presume that causes of action "lie[] 

outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 

asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; see also, e.g., Vacekv. United States Postal 

Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006). To the extent that Hatchett complains of defendants' 

alleged conduct in connection with Hatchett's efforts to comply with his loan repayment 

obligations, because the alleged facts do not give rise to any apparent federal question (as 

opposed to issues of Oregon law), this comt may only properly exercise subject-matter 

jurisdiction over Hatchett's action if it is possible to determine from his pleading that there is 

complete diversity of citizenship between Hatchett and all of the defendants; that is, this court 

may exercise diversity jurisdiction ifit appears on the face of the pleading that none of the 

defendants is a citizen of the same state as Hatchett, presumably Oregon (among other 

requirements which appear to be met here). Because it is not possible to detennine from 

Hatchett's complaint the citizenship of the defendants - in particular of individual defendant 

Richard Davis - this comt may not properly exercise diversity jurisdiction here. 

Although this jurisdictional defect could potentially be cured by amendment, other 

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Case 3:14-cv-00876-PK Document 10 Filed 07/16/14 Page 4 of 7
infhmities in Hatchett's claim, to the extent construed as arising out of his efforts to comply with 

his repayment obligations, remain apparent. First, Hatchett's prayer for $16 billion in damages is 

patently frivolous, particularly in light of Hatchett's representations in support of his in form a 

pauperis petition. Second, Hatchett fails to allege any potentially actionable conduct by any 

named defendant other than Ocwen Federal Loan, which may or may not be the same entity as 

the one to which Hatchett apparently tendered one or more payments. Third, Hatchett fails to 

indicate which state law or laws the defendants may have violated by and through their 

complained-of conduct, or any legal the01y in support of his claimed damages. 

To the extent that Hatchett complains of defendants' possible role in causing him to be 

falsely convicted and sentenced to incarceration under Oregon law, this court is barred from 

exercising jurisdiction over his action by the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pursuant to the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the federal courts lack jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over 

state court judgments. See Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 858-859 (9th Cir. 

2008); see also D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416 (1923). "The clearest case for dismissal based on the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when 'a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly 

erroneous decision by a state comi, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 

decision .... "' Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Noel v. 

Hall, 341F.3d1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the doctrine is equally applicable to bar the 

federal comis "from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal 

from a state comijudgment." Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859, quoting Kougasian v. Tlv!SL, Inc., 359 

F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 

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Case 3:14-cv-00876-PK Document 10 Filed 07/16/14 Page 5 of 7
2003). An action brought in federal comt constitutes such an appeal if "claims raised in the 

federal comt action are 'inextricably intertwined' with [a] state court's decision such that the 

adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state rnling or require the district court to 

interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules." Id, quoting Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898. 

In essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that "a party losing in state court is barred 

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United 

States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the 

loser's federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (citations 

omitted). 

Here, Hatchett's possible claims are "inextricably inte1twined" with the decisions of the 

Oregon comts to convict and sentence him. The gravamen ofHatchett's possible claim is either 

that the convictions themselves were wrongful, that the state-court proceedings were improperly 

instituted in the first instance, and/or that the state-comt proceedings were conducted improperly. 

To provide relief on any such theory would therefore require this court to review the state-court 

proceedings, which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to do. No amendment ofHatchett's 

complaint could be effective to cure this latter jurisdictional deficiency. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Hatchett's action is dismissed for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. In the event Hatchett believes he can cure the jurisdictional and other infinnities 

Ill 

I II 

II I 

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identified above, he may refile his claim in this court. Such dismissal is without prejudice to 

Hatchett's right to seek relief from the state courts. 

' 

Dated this f6_th day of July, 2014. 

Page 7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Honorable Michael osm n 

United States District Judge 

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