Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Masters Transportation, Inc. v. G&P Auto Parts, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 191075

Appellate Court 

Caption

MASTERS TRANSPORTATION, INC., MICHAEL D. CANULLI, 

and JAMES H. VENN, Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants-Appellants, 

v. G&P AUTO PARTS, INC., d/b/a Target Auto Parts #4, Defendant 

and Counterplaintiff-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Sixth Division

No. 1-19-1075

Filed

Rehearing denied

March 27, 2020

June 8, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 18-M4-35; the 

Hon. Robin D. Shoffner and the Hon. Ieshia E. Gray, Judges, 

presiding.

Judgment Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael D. Canulli, of Naperville, for appellants.

Joseph R. Lemersal, of Steven M. Shaykin, P.C., of Rolling Meadows, 

for appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Cunningham concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 This appeal concerns a replevin action by plaintiffs Masters Transportation, Inc. (Masters), 

Michael Canulli, and James Venn against defendant G&P Auto Parts, Inc., and a counterclaim 

by defendant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Following an evidentiary hearing, 

the trial court denied plaintiffs’ replevin claim, and defendant voluntarily dismissed its 

counterclaim. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the denial of replevin relief was erroneous and 

that the trial court erred in excluding certain rebuttal evidence in the evidentiary hearing. 

Defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction because plaintiffs did not timely file their 

notice of appeal. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

¶ 2 Plaintiffs filed their complaint for replevin in January 2018, alleging that Masters owned 

four buses subject to a bank lien, with Canulli and Venn as personal guarantors of the related 

loan. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant took possession of one bus in December 2015, and the 

other three buses in May 2017, the latter after Canulli informed defendant that Masters was 

going out of business. While defendant had taken possession of Masters’ buses previously to 

repair them, plaintiffs alleged that defendant took and maintained possession of the buses in 

question to compel Masters, Canulli, and Venn to pay defendant’s bills for maintenance and 

repair work. Plaintiffs alleged that Masters unsuccessfully requested the return of its buses, 

that defendant informed Masters of its intent to sell the buses at auction in February 2018, and 

that the buses were not taken “under any lawful process.” Plaintiffs sought return of the buses 

or $150,000 in damages for their alleged value, plus damages for loan payments made upon 

the buses while not in Masters’ possession, plus court costs and attorney fees.

¶ 3 Defendant filed its answer and affirmative defenses in March 2018, admitting that it took 

possession of the buses but alleging that it did so with Masters’ consent and that defendant had 

a statutory lien and a common law repairman’s lien upon the buses from maintaining and 

repairing them. Defendant alleged that it gave the requisite written notice to Masters and the 

bank before exercising its liens and that it sold three of the buses in March 2018 pursuant to 

its liens. Defendant alleged that Masters did not have a superior interest in the buses for 

purposes of a replevin claim and that defendant’s liens were superior to the bank’s security 

interests in the buses.

¶ 4 Defendant also filed a counterclaim in March 2018, alleging that it maintained and repaired 

buses for Masters pursuant to an agreement with Masters but that Masters had not paid all of 

defendant’s bills for such work. Defendant alleged that Canulli and Venn were personally 

liable because Masters “did not follow the typical corporate protocols and procedures 

necessary to provide limited liability to the shareholders of said corporation.” Defendant 

sought damages of $109,660.34, plus court costs.

¶ 5 On May 2, 2018, the circuit court set the case for a hearing on the replevin complaint for 

May 30, 2018, and the record indicates that the case was set for “trial” on that day. While the 

record does not include a transcript of proceedings for May 30, the extensive written closing 

arguments of plaintiffs and defendant referred to an evidentiary hearing or trial, with evidence 
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taken, on the replevin complaint. In the course of written closing arguments, plaintiffs filed a 

motion to reconsider the exclusion of certain rebuttal evidence at the evidentiary hearing.

¶ 6 On October 24, 2018, the court issued an order dismissing the replevin complaint, denying 

the replevin action and the motion to reconsider the exclusion of rebuttal evidence, and entering 

judgment in favor of defendant. The court made findings in support of its dispositions, 

including that defendant had statutory and common law liens on the buses at issue so that it 

had a superior right of possession. The court continued defendant’s counterclaim to November 

21, 2018.

¶ 7 On November 21, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the rebuttal evidence motion 

and the court’s ruling on lien priority and filed a separate motion for discovery, sanctions, and 

dismissal of the counterclaim.

¶ 8 On November 27, 2018, defendant filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaim.

¶ 9 On November 28, 2018, the court entered an order granting the voluntary dismissal motion 

and declaring “[t]his is a final order that disposes of this case in its entirety.” The order recited 

that the case was before the court on the voluntary dismissal motion, with no reference to 

plaintiffs’ November 21 motions. The computerized docket entries for November 28 include 

the granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss its counterclaim and the denial of a motion by 

plaintiffs. The handwritten docket entry for November 28 has no information beyond the 

judge’s name.

¶ 10 In March 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for a ruling on their November 2018 motions.

¶ 11 On April 23, 2019, the court issued an order denying “all pending motions of plaintiff” and 

stating that “a short explanation of [the court’s] ruling would be provided.” The court issued 

another order that day, reciting that its order of November 28, 2018, disposed of the entire case 

and noting that the court clerk’s entry for that day showed the denial of plaintiffs’ motion. The 

court stated that “defense counsel indicates to this court that it is his recollection that [the court] 

had a detailed hearing on plaintiff’s pending motions at the time and denied both pending 

motions on November 28, 2018.”1 The court also noted that it had no transcript for November 

28 and that plaintiffs filed no motions from then until their March 2019 motion. The court 

expressly held that “plaintiff’s motions are duplicative, untimely and have been previously 

ruled on by” the court and specifically found that the motion to reconsider the denial of rebuttal 

evidence was denied on October 24, 2018, while the motions to reconsider the court’s ruling 

on lien priority, for discovery, and to dismiss the counterclaim were denied on November 28, 

2018, because the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim rendered plaintiffs’ motion to 

dismiss the counterclaim moot.

¶ 12 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on May 23, 2019.

¶ 13 A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment or of an order disposing 

of a timely filed motion directed against a final judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 

2017).

¶ 14 Here, the court disposed of plaintiffs’ replevin complaint and motion regarding rebuttal 

evidence on October 24, 2018, in an order that made clear that the counterclaim was still 

pending. Plaintiffs filed various motions on November 21, 2018, including a motion to dismiss 

1

A different judge was presiding over the court in April 2019 than had presided in November 2018 

and earlier.
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the counterclaim and another motion regarding rebuttal evidence, while defendant filed its 

motion to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaim on November 27, 2018. The court granted the 

voluntary dismissal on November 28, 2018, in an order expressly disposing of the entire case 

but not expressly disposing of plaintiffs’ November 2018 motions. Plaintiffs then filed a 

motion in March 2019 and filed their notice of appeal within 30 days of the disposition of that 

motion.

¶ 15 We find that the record bears out the trial court’s April 2019 express finding that it disposed 

of plaintiffs’ November 2018 motions in November 2018, despite the fact that the court’s 

written order of November 28, 2018, did not expressly refer to plaintiffs’ motions. Specifically, 

docket entries show that the court disposed of at least one of plaintiffs’ pending motions on 

November 28. Conversely, while the handwritten docket entry for that date does not reflect 

any disposition of any matter, the order of that date clearly disposed of at least the voluntary 

dismissal so that the handwritten docket is of no use to us either way. Lastly, while the record 

does not include a transcript for the November 28 proceedings, we presume when faced with 

an incomplete record that the trial court’s rulings were supported by the law and facts. 

Wackrow v. Niemi, 231 Ill. 2d 418, 428 n.4 (2008); Vance v. Joyner, 2019 IL App (4th) 190136, 

¶ 82. We therefore conclude that the November 2018 order was a final disposition, as it states 

that there was nothing pending for the trial court to rule upon when plaintiffs filed their March 

2019 motion, and that the May 2019 notice of appeal was filed well over 30 days from the 

November 2018 final judgment so that it did not vest this court with jurisdiction.

¶ 16 Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.