# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 27, 2018

Decided April 18, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17

‐ 1601

KATHY L. THOMPSON,

Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v

.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

‐ Appellee

. Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:15

‐ CV

‐ 295

‐ TLS

Theresa L. Springmann,

Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

Kathy Thompson applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and

Supplemental Security Income (SSI), claiming disability based on maladies including

degenerative arthritis in her right knee, surgically related bilateral ankle pain and

instability, obesity, diabetes, depression, and panic attacks. After two earlier remands

ordered by the district court and the Appeals Council, an Administrative Law Judge

found Thompson’s mental impairments nonsevere and some of her physical

impairments severe but not disabling. The Appeals Council denied review, and the

district court upheld the ALJ’s decision. We conclude that the ALJ again failed to

support his decision with substantial evidence, and so we must once more vacate the

judgment and remand the case to the Social Security Administration. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp

. P. 32.1No. 17

‐ 1601 Page 2

I

The ALJ found that Thompson was disabled after March 13, 2008, when she

turned 50 and her age category changed, and so we limit our discussion to the period

before that date. The case is now focused on the period from December 20, 1998 (her

alleged onset date) to March 2008. The issue is whether she is entitled to both disability

benefits and SSI benefits for those years. Her date last insured, for purposes of disability

benefits, was December 31, 2005. Because the case was last remanded for a fresh look at

Thompson’s mental

‐ health impairments, the parties limit their discussion to that issue,

as do we.

Thompson alleges that she has been disabled since December 1998. She has only

a ninth

‐ grade education. For about 16 years, she worked as a warehouse laborer,

primarily operating a forklift, but after repeated surgical procedures on her foot and

ankle, she was unable to return to work because she could no longer stand for long

periods and “was having family problems.” She also reported that “she missed too

many days of work due to health problems and symptoms of depression.” Thompson

attempted to rejoin the workforce in 2001, but she was unsuccessful.

The first mental

‐ health evidence in the record is from January 1999, when

Thompson’s primary

‐ care physician, Dr. Daniel Edquist, noted that he was “suspicious

that she may well be somewhat depressed with her other symptoms including fatigue,

irritability as well as her increased headaches” and that he “would consider trying a

serotonin reuptake inhibitor” should a new medication that he prescribed not help her

headaches. At her next appointment in February, Thompson admitted there were

“some stresses at home” and that her husband had noticed that she was “more irritable

and cranky.” Dr. Edquist prescribed Paxil for her—a drug that treats, among other

things, anxiety and depression.

The following month Thompson reported some improvement on Paxil, but

Dr. Edquist again took note of “[p]robable depressive symptoms.” Thompson next saw

Dr. Edquist in May 1999. At that time, he increased her dosage of Paxil, even though he

observed that she was less irritable and did not seem to have the “panic type

symptoms” she previously had. In August Dr. Edquist said that Thompson had been

under some stress but that her panic attacks were well controlled on Paxil.

As of January 2000, Thompson was still taking Paxil. She saw Dr. Edquist in

September 2000 for knee pain, but he noted nothing one way or the other about herNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 3

mental health. There is no record of Thompson’s seeing Dr. Edquist again until

November 2001, but in the meantime she pursued therapy because her daughter’s

psychologist thought that she needed “services for her depression so as to be able to

maintain parenting.”

At Thompson’s August 2001 intake appointment, her therapist, Betsy Klaus,

diagnosed her with Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, Moderate, see A M

.

P SYCHIATRIC A SS ’ N

, D IAGNOSTIC AND S TATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL D ISORDERS 370

(4th ed., Text Rev. 2000). Thompson told her therapist that she had received inpatient

psychiatric treatment for three weeks in 1991. She had been discharged with a

prescription for Prozac, but she did not take it. Klaus recorded that Thompson’s

symptoms included increasing crying, rumination, isolation, and appetite, and a

decrease in sleep. Klaus also noted that Thompson had a minimal support system, was

unemployed and struggled to pay her bills, and that her daughter had significant

psychological problems. Klaus included notes from an interview with Thompson’s

previous family therapist, Dr. Miller, who wrote that Thompson gets overwhelmed,

struggles with depression, has a hard time asking for help, and is fairly isolated.

Thompson continued to see Klaus nearly every week through the end of March

2002. In October she reported that she was trying “to make changes from depressive

isolation.” Two weeks later, Klaus noted that Thompson was “bright and cheerful.” In

November, Thompson reported “feeling down” and that she was having problems with

her daughter’s behavior with more conflict in the prior two weeks. This time Klaus

recorded that Thompson was “self

‐ blaming and overwhelmed.” Thompson saw Klaus

again less than a week later and described feeling more depressed. She cried because

“she no longer kn[ew] what brought her joy” and “[o]ld hobbies and activities no

longer fit.” Thompson’s depression worsened at the end of November. At her therapy

appointment she appeared tearful and expressed an inability to forgive herself for

actions in her past.

The following day, Thompson returned to Dr. Edquist. Near the end of her

appointment Thompson told Dr. Edquist that “she had been seeing a counselor at the

Madison Center who recommended she take antidepressants” and that “she has been

under a lot of stress with her daughter’s bipolar illness and she has been having

counseling herself in the past year in regards to this.” He started her on a new

antidepressant, Celexa. Thompson described feeling a little better at her next therapy

appointment.No. 17

‐ 1601 Page 4

Dr. Edquist again saw Thompson in January 2002 to follow up on her symptoms

of anxiety and depression. Although Thompson was still having some panic attacks and

anxiety issues, she was doing “quite a bit better.” She visited Klaus the same day and

reported that she felt hopeful and noticed improvement on her new medication.

In February 2002, Thompson continued to meet with Klaus. She described herself

as having good weeks and bad weeks. For example, during one session, Thompson said

that she had made small attempts to change behaviors that contributed to her

depression. But the following week Thompson reported having a stressful week

because her daughter was suspended from school.

The next month Thompson reported improvement, yet at the same time she was

seeking social support and going through bankruptcy. Thompson stopped her therapy

at the end of March 2002 after 19 sessions. The discharge summary said that her

depression had improved. Though Klaus said the treatment was “partially” successful,

she also checked a box indicating that the reason for discharge was “[p]atient perceives

treatment goals met.”

There is no record of Thompson’s seeing Dr. Edquist for more than a year after

January 2002. (Thompson was uninsured during this time, waiting to qualify for

Medicaid.) Thompson saw another member of Dr. Edquist’s medical group in

September 2002, but other than mentioning her headaches (which Dr. Edquist had

correlated with her depression in an earlier record) there is no mention of mental

‐ health

concerns. As of October 2003, it does not appear that Thompson was still taking her

antidepressant. In January 2004, Dr. Edquist diagnosed her with depression again after

she complained of being irritable and cranky, and having sleep disturbances and

concentration difficulties. He prescribed a new antidepressant, Lexapro. Three months

later, Dr. Edquist’s note said that she was taking Celexa again and that her depression

was controlled on that medication. The following month she again was experiencing

symptoms of depression and anxiety, and so Dr. Edquist increased the dosage.

Thompson went back to Dr. Edquist in June to follow up about her depression

and anxiety. She said that she was still irritable but she did not want to increase her

dosage or change her prescription. In September 2004, after a hospitalization for chest

pain, Thompson had a checkup with Dr. Edquist, who noted that Thompson (still)

suffered from panic attacks and that she was on the same dosage of medicine.No. 17

‐ 1601 Page 5

In January 2005 Thompson saw Dr. Edquist because she felt fatigued. Dr. Edquist

noted that there were stressors at play, such as her separation from her husband, and

that she was probably suffering from depression and anxiety. He added that he was

willing to send her to get a sleep study but thought that her fatigue was more likely a

result of “her current lifestyle, her weight issues and her stressors.” Dr. Edquist offered

to refer her to counseling at the Madison Center again, but Thompson demurred.

In March 2005, Dr. R. Klion, a state

‐ agency psychologist, reviewed Thompson’s

medical records and concluded that her mental impairments were not severe. He found

that she had a history of depression, along with headaches and knee pain. Dr. Klion

rated Thompson as mildly restricted in her activities of daily living, but without

functional limitations in maintaining social functioning or concentration, persistence, or

pace. Dr. Klion noted that Thompson “states she was seen for depression in 2002” but

that she “is able to maintain a reg[ular] routine if feeling bad, or having headaches, but

at a slower pace.” He then opined that Thompson’s mental state appeared to be a result

of physical and financial problems.

In May 2005, Thompson visited Dr. Edquist for a physical disability evaluation.

Other than noting that she still took Celexa, Dr. Edquist did not refer to depression or

anxiety. But in an August treatment note, Dr. Edquist again added depression to her

diagnoses and explained that Thompson had increased stressors as she was worried

about her daughter who was in an inpatient mental health facility receiving treatment

for bipolar disorder. He also listed depression as a problem after a December

appointment.

Thompson filled out her own disability report in March 2006. She said that she

suffers from panic attacks and depression, that she stopped working because she

missed too many days because of her depression, and that she leaves her house only

once a week.

In April 2006, Thompson’s sister, Constance Kamradt, completed a third

‐ party

function report. Kamradt said she spent time with Thompson one day every couple of

weeks. Kamradt noted that before Thompson’s medical problems began, she worked

full

‐ time, cooked, cleaned, shopped, and worked outside. At the time Kamradt filled

out the report, Thompson did not need reminders to take medications or take care of

personal grooming. But Thompson struggled to spend more than five minutes making

food, leading her to subsist on sandwiches and frozen dinners. “Anything more needs

help,” said Kamradt. Daily, Thompson spent 15 to 20 minutes completing chores suchNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 6

as tidying and doing the dishes. Kamradt wrote that Thompson rarely went outside

apart from shopping for food for 30 minutes each week or going to doctors’ offices and

that Thompson’s only hobby was watching television all day. Although Kamradt

checked “yes” in response to a question asking whether Thompson spends time with

others, she added “not often.”

Kamradt circled answers reflecting that Thompson’s conditions affected her

concentration and her ability to complete tasks. Kamradt checked the “yes” box in

response to the question whether Thompson finished what she started and said

Thompson did “fine” following written and spoken instructions. Kamradt wrote that

Thompson responded to stress with “panic attacks” and “depression,” but later wrote

“goes with the flow” when asked how well Thompson handles changes in routine. Last,

Kamradt said that she had noticed unusual behaviors and fears in Thompson, including

fears of falling, holding others back, and being on her feet (and thus causing swelling

and pain).

Later that month, Dr. Nancy Link, a state

‐ agency psychologist, examined

Thompson and reviewed her medical records. Dr. Link diagnosed Thompson with

Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia and Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.

Dr. Link’s report states that Thompson “is anxious being in places where escape might

be difficult and avoids these places as a result.” Dr. Link concluded that Thompson

“displays some periods of depressed mood” and “suffers from some symptoms of

depression including depressed mood, fatigue, difficulty concentrating, and little

interest in pleasurable activities.” She opined that Thompson’s mood and affect were

depressed and anxious. Thompson reported a past suicide attempt. Thompson

maintained periods of attention for less than 15 minutes, had fair concentration, and

completed all tasks. Dr. Link found Thompson “to be functioning at a moderate level of

impaired in terms of work related activities in respect to her overall level of

functioning.”

Two days later, a state

‐ agency psychologist, Dr. William Shipley, reviewed the

medical record and opined that Thompson’s impairments were not severe. Dr. Shipley

agreed with Dr. Link’s diagnoses of Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia and Depressive

Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. He assessed Thompson’s functional limitations

(restrictions of activities of daily living; difficulties in maintaining social functioning;

and difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace) as mild and noted

that Thompson did not have any episodes of decompensation. Dr. Shipley said that

Dr. Link “did not give any medical opinions in regard to functional limitations.” This isNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 7

correct insofar as Dr. Link did not specifically address restrictions of activities of daily

living, difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace. It is, however, an overstatement, because Dr. Link

did opine more generally that Thompson was moderately impaired “in terms of work

related activities” and “in respect to her overall level of functioning.” Dr. Shipley also

noted that no other medical opinion was on file. He assessed Thompson as “capable of

understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions.” He thought that

she could pay attention to a task for extended periods based on her “activities” and that

she could maintain a normal pace and schedule. Finally, Dr. Shipley regarded

Thompson’s activities of daily living as inconsistent with the social

‐ functioning

limitations that she and her sister had described, especially the panic attacks.

In his notes from the five appointments between July 2006 and May 2007,

Dr. Edquist mentioned that Thompson had a history of depression that was stable with

Celexa, but otherwise did not mention her depression. There are no other medical

records from Dr. Edquist after this time.

II

Thompson first applied for benefits in 2004, claiming disability since 1998. Since

then, her case has wound its way through the Social Security Administration and the

courts for over thirteen years. In the most recent remand from the district court (by the

parties’ agreement), the Appeals Council ordered the ALJ to hold a new hearing to

reevaluate the severity of Thompson’s mental impairments and reassess her mental

residual functional capacity.

At her most recent hearing in August 2014 (her third), which focused on the

period from 1998 to 2008, Thompson, her daughter (Tracey Rosales), and a vocational

expert testified. Thompson testified that she takes medication but that she does not like

to go out in public because she is afraid of falling and “all kinds of things.” She feels

depressed when she goes outside since her legs always hurt, she gets irritable, and she

wants to go home. Thompson also described being tired all of the time, and said that

she has “always been fatigued.” She took a two or three hour nap each day. Thompson

also discussed having problems concentrating. She said that she has problems staying

on task and that she gets distracted. Thompson described having good and bad days

with her depression. During the relevant time period she had three good days each

week; on the bad days, she stayed in bed nearly all day.No. 17

‐ 1601 Page 8

On the topic of Thompson’s concentration, Rosales said that her mother

struggled even to sit through a movie at home and that she failed to complete jobs that

she started. She too reported that during the relevant period, her mother had about four

bad days each week.

The vocational expert (VE) testified that Thompson could not perform her past

work given the residual functional capacity described by the ALJ, which included

limitations caused by physical, but not mental, impairments, but that she could work as

an addresser, a document preparer, or a charge

‐ account clerk. The VE further opined

that if, in addition to the physical restrictions, Thompson could not engage in complex

or detailed tasks but remained capable of performing simple, routine tasks, those jobs

still would be available to Thompson. The VE conceded, however, that Thompson is

unemployable with the limitations that she reported, namely, having trouble

concentrating, staying on task, getting distracted easily, and taking daily naps. The VE

acknowledged that a worker consistently off task for more than ten percent of the work

day or one that has constantly to be redirected to a work task is not capable of full

‐ time

work. Additionally, the VE stated that a worker who misses two to three days of work

per month or more than twelve days in a year (in addition to any excused sick or

personal days) would not be able to obtain full

‐ time work. Last, the VE acknowledged

that Thompson’s daily naps would eliminate employment.

In his written decision the ALJ applied the standard multistep analysis,

see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a), and concluded that Thompson was not disabled.

As relevant here, the ALJ concluded that Thompson’s degenerative arthritis of the knee,

bilateral ankle pain and instability, and obesity were severe but that her mental

impairments—depression and anxiety/panic disorder—were not. The ALJ concluded

that these mental impairments, individually or in combination, did not meet a listing for

presumptive disability; that Thompson could perform sedentary work with several

physical restrictions; and that Thompson could perform jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy and, therefore, was not disabled.

In explaining his decision, the ALJ found Thompson’s “statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [] not entirely

credible.” He completely discarded Thompson’s and her daughter’s testimony about

spending two to four days per week in bed since 1998 with the brief comments that it

“is not found to be credible” and “[s]urely, if the claimant were that limited, she would

have sought more mental health treatment than she did, and her sister would have

reported her frequent inability to get out of bed when she completed her functionNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 9

report.” Although the ALJ did not make an express credibility determination for

Kamradt, he seems to have found her report at least partially credible, since he used it

to contradict certain statements by other witnesses. As to the weight of the

psychologists’ opinions, the ALJ gave Dr. Link’s report “no significant weight,” and the

state reviewing psychologists “great weight.”

Notably, the ALJ’s decision largely echoes (and often incorporates by reference)

his previous one, which he had been directed to reconsider in light of Thompson’s

mental impairments and Dr. Link’s opinion in particular. The ALJ expressed borderline

hostility to this instruction, remarking that “[i]n the 2010 decision, the undersigned

addressed this issue extensively and will do so again here.” The final opinion is

essentially identical to his 2010 decision.

III

Because the Appeals Council denied review, we evaluate the ALJ’s decision as

the final word of the Commissioner. Scrogham v. Colvin

, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2014).

Thompson argues that the ALJ erred by not finding her mental impairments “severe” at

Step 2, and by setting only minimal residual functional capacity limitations, because he

discredited the examining psychologist’s opinion for multiple improper reasons. Our

review of the record convinces us that Thompson is correct: the ALJ’s decision is not

supported by substantial evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin

, 838 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir.

2016); Overman v. Astrue

, 546 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2008.)

Thompson first argues that the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Link’s assessment of

her mental impairments. The ALJ thought that Dr. Link’s view was inconsistent with

her sister’s report of Thompson’s activities of daily living. But it was not. Kamradt’s

description is entirely consistent with Dr. Link’s diagnosis of moderate impairment

based on Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia and Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise

Specified. Agoraphobia is defined as “anxiety about being in places or situations from

which escape might be difficult” and “typically leads to a pervasive avoidance of a

variety of situations” such as “being alone outside the home or being home alone; being

in a crowd of people; travelling in an automobile.” A M

. P SYCHIATRIC A SS ’ N

, D IAGNOSTIC

AND S TATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL D ISORDERS 432 (4th ed., Text Rev. 2000). “Some

individuals are able to expose themselves to the feared situations, but endure these

experiences with considerable dread.” Id. Avoiding anxiety

‐ inducing experiences may

impair a person’s “ability to travel to work or to carry out homemaking responsibilities

( e.g

., grocery shopping, taking children to the doctor).” Id. In fact, Kamradt’s reportNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 10

corroborates Dr. Link’s diagnosis because she said that Thompson pervasively avoided

leaving the house and instead “stays home all the time,” limiting her grocery trips to

30 minutes—all consistent with agoraphobia. Thompson’s occasional forays into society

are not inconsistent with these fears. See Larson v. Astrue

, 615 F.3d 744, 752 (7th Cir.

2010).

Thompson next argues that the ALJ cherry

‐ picked Kamradt’s report, pointing

out only evidence that supports no more than mild functional limitations. An ALJ may

not highlight some information, while ignoring other evidence. See Scott v. Astrue

,

647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011). That is just what the ALJ did here in selectively

summarizing Kamradt’s report and then using that summary to discredit Dr. Link. For

example, the ALJ noted that Kamradt reported that “the claimant fixes simple foods,

picks up at home, does dishes, and shops for food weekly.” But the ALJ ignored the

qualifications Kamradt put on those statements. For example, Kamradt said that

Thompson required help if spending anything more than 5 minutes preparing food. She

made sandwiches and frozen dinners

. And Kamradt said that Thompson spent only 15 to

20 minutes doing chores each day. The ALJ is correct that Thompson completed weekly

grocery shopping, but he skipped over the fact that she spent only 30 minutes shopping

in a week. The ALJ said that Thompson “has no problem getting along with family,

friends or others, but stays home all the time.” This is not an accurate depiction of

Kamradt’s testimony. Kamradt stressed that Thompson did not often spend time with

others (even if she had no problem “getting along” with them), and Kamradt repeatedly

emphasized that Thompson went nowhere on a regular basis, which is consistent with

panic disorder with agoraphobia. In short, Kamradt’s report is not consistent with

Thompson’s engaging in “a broad range of activities.”

Regarding Thompson’s ability to concentrate, the ALJ merely recited the

information on one page of Kamradt’s report (“that the claimant has no problem paying

attention, can follow written and spoken instructions, and finishes tasks that she starts”)

and ignored that on the previous page, Thompson’s sister circled “Concentration” and

“Completing Tasks” as abilities that were inhibited by Thompson’s illness.

The ALJ dismissed Dr. Link’s report as “not worthy of great weight” because it

purportedly was based on Thompson’s subjective complaints and was not

“independently verified.” But any psychological examination could be said to suffer

from this criticism, and this statement ignores the professional status and judgment of

the psychologist. By refusing to confront Dr. Link’s professional assessment, the ALJ

failed to meet his obligation to weigh all of the medical evidence.No. 17

‐ 1601 Page 11

We add that Dr. Link’s report was not based merely on a subjective report by

Thompson. Dr. Link completed an objective assessment of Thompson’s mental

functioning by asking Thompson to answer questions with concrete answers, such as

math calculations. And Dr. Link wrote that “Ms. Thompson admitted to suicidal

ideation and intent in the past.” Had Dr. Link—again, an agency consultant—believed

that Thompson was dissembling rather than accurately reporting her symptoms, surely

the doctor would have said so.

Second, the ALJ’s statement is inconsistent with the rule that opinions derived

from subjective reports are not automatically suspect. See Adaire v. Colvin

, 778 F.3d 685,

688 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that giving subjective statements zero weight is fundamental

error). As Thompson argues, to discount Dr. Link’s evaluation merely because it was

“based on the claimant’s subjective report of symptoms” ignores that the subjective

report is not simply transcribed: it is filtered through the psychologist’s training and

judgment. See Price v. Colvin

, 794 F.3d 836, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2015) (psychiatrist); Adaire

,

778 F.3d at 688 (psychologist). Like a medical doctor evaluating physical pain, a

psychologist must start with the patient’s description of her own experience; this is not

a defect. Subjective complaints are nevertheless assessed according to the profession’s

objective criteria; what the psychologist puts out is not a simple transcription of the

patient’s self

‐ report. It appears that the real basis the ALJ had for ignoring Dr. Link’s

analysis is that he discredited Thompson ’s reports of her symptoms; he therefore

inappropriately substituted his own view of Thompson’s mental impairments for

Dr. Link’s. See Meuser

, 838 F.3d at 911.

Thompson next rightly criticizes the ALJ for using a semantic trick to disregard

Dr. Link’s opinion that Thompson was “functioning at a moderate level of impaired in

terms of work related activities in respect to her overall level of functioning.” The ALJ

faulted Dr. Link for failing to define the term “moderate” and for using a definition that

the ALJ thought (without any basis) was probably not the same as the one used by the

Social Security Administration. But this is not a reasonable conclusion. Dr. Link is an

agency consultative examiner and likely familiar with the terms of art the agency uses.

And even if Dr. Link used “moderate” in a nontechnical way, the ALJ had no basis for

assuming that he (alone) knew that she really meant “mild” or some other less

‐ than

‐ disabling adjective.

The ALJ also erred by discounting Dr. Link’s opinion in favor of the

nonexamining state

‐ agency psychologists, Dr. Klion and Dr. Shipley. We have said thatNo. 17

‐ 1601 Page 12

“rejecting or discounting the opinion of the agency’s own examining physician that the

claimant is disabled

... can be expected to cause a reviewing court to take notice and

await a good explanation for this unusual step.” Beardsley v. Colvin

, 758 F.3d 834, 839

(7th Cir. 2014). Generally “a contradictory opinion of a non

‐ examining physician does

not, by itself, suffice” to reject “an examining physician’s opinion.” Gudgel v. Barnhart

,

345 F.3d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 2003). Dr. Link characterized Thompson’s “difficulty in her

customary activities and daily living skills” as “moderate,” and her level of impairment

“in terms of work related activities” also as “moderate.” Dr. Klion and Dr. Shipley rated

Thompson’s functional limitations to be mild or nonexistent. The ALJ does not explain

why the nonexamining state psychologists are entitled to greater weight other than by

saying that their reports are “consistent with the function reports in the record, which

show that the claimant engages in a broad array of daily activities, gets along with

people, leaves her home for shopping and appointments, and is capable of sustained

concentration.” We have already explained why those conclusions are not supported by

the record.

Accordingly, we VACATE the decision upholding the ALJ’s denial of benefits

and REMAND to the agency for further proceedings. We encourage the agency to

assign Thompson’s file to a new ALJ, both because of the hostility the current ALJ has

shown to previous remands and because of the benefit of a fresh perspective.