Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway,

 Justices

Order 

May 8, 2009 

137518 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137518 

 COA: 284148 

Wayne CC: 67-142555-FC 

LA SALLE WILLIE WASHINGTON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 29, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

KELLY, C.J. (dissenting). 

In 1967, defendant shot and killed the owner of a market. When a jury was unable 

to reach a verdict on the charged offense of first-degree felony murder, the trial court 

declared a mistrial. Several weeks later, defendant pleaded guilty of second-degree 

murder. He was sentenced to a parolable term of life imprisonment. 

Defendant did not file a direct appeal. However, he later moved to withdraw his 

guilty plea because the trial court had failed to advise him that he had the right to testify 

at trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to 

appeal for lack of merit. This Court denied leave to appeal.1

Defendant filed this motion for relief from judgment in 2003. The trial court 

denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for failure to meet the 

burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

 

1 People v Washington, 390 Mich 786 (1973). 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 8, 2009 

s0505 

 

2

Defendant seeks relief from judgment because, after his sentence was pronounced, 

the Michigan Parole Board changed its policy on paroling convicts incarcerated for life 

sentences. The policy now is that “life means life,” meaning those sentenced to life terms 

are ineligible for parole. At sentencing, defendant, the trial judge, and counsel believed 

that a person sentenced to parolable life became eligible to be considered for parole and 

could be paroled after 10 years of incarceration. 

Thus, defendant claims that he is entitled to resentencing because he did not 

understand the consequences of his guilty plea. Furthermore, defendant claims that, 

because the parole board adopted the “life means life” policy after he was sentenced, the 

new policy, as applied to him, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 

Constitution.2

Defendant relies on Foster Bey v Rubitschun,

3

 a federal case in which United 

States District Judge Battani ruled that the changes in the parole board’s policy violated 

the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied to prisoners. Judge Battani noted 

that (1) the board’s understanding of its ability to exercise its discretion in light of its 

changed policies, (2) its redefinition of the eligibility procedure for non-mandatory life 

sentences, and (3) the changes in the timing and intervals of the interview and review 

process significantly disadvantaged prisoners with parolable life sentences. 

This issue has been addressed by the Court of Appeals.4

 But this Court has never 

spoken on whether the changes in the parole board’s policy constitute a violation of the 

Ex Post Facto Clause. The issue is jurisprudentially significant and a resolution of it by 

this Court is long overdue. Accordingly, the Court should grant defendant’s application 

for leave to appeal to consider the issue presented in Foster Bey and hear this case along 

with People v Stovall, ___ Mich ___ (Docket No. 137326, order entered May 8, 2009). 

 

2

 US Const, art I, § 10, cl 1. 

3 Foster Bey v Rubitschun, 2007 LEXIS 95748 (ED Mich, 2007). 

4 See People v Hill, 267 Mich App 345 (2005).