UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JULIE K. BULLOCK,

Plaintiff,

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:14-cv-00873-KI

OPINION AND ORDER

Merrill Schneider

Schneider Kerr & Gibney Law Offices

P.O. Box 14490

Portland, OR 97293

Attorney for Plaintiff

S. Amanda Marshall

United States Attorney

District of Oregon

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Ronald K. Silver

Assistant United States Attorney

1000 SW Third Ave., Suite 600

Portland, OR 97201-2902

John C. Lamont

Special Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the General Counsel

Social Security Administration

701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 M/S 221A

Seattle, WA 98104-7075

Attorneys for Defendant

KING, Judge:

Plaintiff Julie Bullock brings this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security

Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner denying plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). I affirm

the decision of the Commissioner.

BACKGROUND

Bullock filed an application for DIB on February 9, 2010, alleging disability beginning

September 1, 2008. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After a

timely request for a hearing, Bullock, represented by counsel, appeared and testified before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on August 27, 2012.

On October 25, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding Bullock not disabled within the

meaning of the Act and therefore not entitled to benefits. This decision became the final decision

of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council declined to review it on March 27, 2014. 

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DISABILITY ANALYSIS

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for payment of disability insurance benefits 

to people who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or

mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). In addition, under the Act, supplemental security

income benefits may be available to individuals who are age 65 or over, blind, or disabled, but

who do not have insured status under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

The claimant must demonstrate an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

cause death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual will be determined to be disabled only if his

physical or mental impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous

work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind

of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and

1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining if a person is eligible for either DIB or SSI due to disability. The evaluation is

carried out by the ALJ. The claimant has the burden of proof on the first four steps. Parra v.

Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. First, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). If the claimant is engaged in such activity, disability benefits are

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. A severe impairment is one

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“which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe

impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits are denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the ALJ proceeds to the third step to determine whether the

impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Commissioner

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d)

and 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is

conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is presumed to be

disabling, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step to determine whether the impairment prevents the

claimant from performing work which the claimant performed in the past. If the claimant is able

to perform work she performed in the past, a finding of “not disabled” is made and disability

benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f).

If the claimant is unable to perform work performed in the past, the ALJ proceeds to the

fifth and final step to determine if the claimant can perform other work in the national economy

in light of his age, education, and work experience. The burden shifts to the Commissioner to

show what gainful work activities are within the claimant’s capabilities. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. 

The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to perform other work. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must affirm a denial of benefits if the denial is supported by substantial

evidence and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.

2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

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adequate to support a conclusion” and is more than a “mere scintilla” of the evidence but less

than a preponderance. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The court must uphold the ALJ’s

findings if they “are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record[,]” even if the

evidence is susceptible to multiple rational interpretations. Id.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

 The ALJ found Bullock’s severe impairments to be: major depressive disorder,

generalized anxiety disorder, and histrionic traits. These impairments, either singly or in

combination, did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the impairments listed

in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ concluded Bullock can perform a full range

of work with the following nonexertional limitations: she should be limited to simple, routine

and repetitive tasks of up to two steps; she can occasionally engage in simple decisionmaking;

she can tolerate occasional, simple changes in the work setting; she should not be required to

perform at a fast, production-rate pace; and she can tolerate occasional, superficial interaction

with the general public and co-workers. Based on this residual functional capacity (“RFC”),

Bullock cannot perform her past work but can perform other work in the national economy such

as housekeeping/cleaner, auto detailer, and hand packager.

FACTS

Born in 1964, Bullock was 44 years old at the time of her alleged onset of disability. She

had completed two years of college, and had worked part-time as a classroom aide, in a bed and

breakfast cleaning and taking reservations, in a health food store, and as a marketer and activity

director at an assisted living facility. 

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At the time of the hearing she was working about four and a half hours a week cleaning

two small offices. Her 15-year old son and 21-year old daughter were living with her, as well as

a significant other, on a three-acre property. She kept horses, a cow, dogs, cats, and chickens,

which the children helped her care for. She often asked her children to help her clean one of the

offices if she was not up to it. She shopped for the household.

She alleges onset of her disability in September of 2008, although she cannot point to any

reason in particular for choosing that date. She testified she found she was forgetting simple

things at that time, like picking her son up from school or feeding the animals. Now, she

testified, she cannot balance her checkbook, forgets to turn off her headlights, and cannot keep

track of her keys. She is also a hoarder and cannot organize her home. She takes a nap almost

every day.

She sought treatment for her depression in July of 2008, returning to the Peterson Clinic

after a four-year lapse in therapy. At that time, she was working part-time and taking care of her

mother who had dementia. She described headaches, spine discomfort, and feeling tired and

“ground down.” Tr. 261. She attended appointments every two weeks at the Peterson Clinic,

receiving naturopathic treatment for her depression until December 2009.1

She also sought treatment for her depression and insomnia from Grant County Health,

whose providers prescribed Zoloft, and then fluoxetine (also known as Prozac), in the fall of

2008. By January 2009, she reported treating her depression entirely with naturopathic

medicines but was on amitriptyline for her insomnia. Her nurse practitioner recommended

Prozac, but Bullock wanted to wait and see how the naturopathic medicines worked. At her

1Treatment notes are illegible.

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April 2009 visit, she reported trying 30 different naturopathic medicines for depression without

result; she agreed to try trazodone and either fill a prescription for Prozac or Zoloft. When she

returned a month later, she reported 50% reduction in her symptoms, but her job was terminated

due to lack of funding; she was considering seeking disability for PTSD. 

The next month, after describing Bullock’s problems maintaining her household, her

nurse practitioner opined that “it is very likely that she will be permanently, emotionally unable

to maintain active employment; in fact can barely attend to the daily needs of herself and her

family.” Tr. 308. Three months later, Bullock reported having nightmares and her nurse

practitioner advised increasing her Zoloft prescription if neural feedback did not help. By

January 2010, Bullock was working part-time and caring for her ill mother; she was not going to

counseling, not taking her vitamins, and had not increased her dose of Zoloft. Her nurse

practitioner encouraged her to increase her dose of Zoloft. 

At her March 2010 appointment, Bullock’s nurse practitioner encouraged her to get

outside and exercise. Bullock discussed a medication change at her May appointment. In

September 2010, she reported having stopped taking her medications; she also described back

pain as a result of extra yard work, feeding horses, and managing bales of hay. Her nurse

practitioner encouraged her to break up with her live-in boyfriend who was causing her extra

work without bringing any financial support to the household. At an April 2011 appointment,

Bullock’s nurse practitioner described Bullock as healthy though exhausted. He reported

Bullock’s belief that her symptoms were caused by fibromyalgia and he encouraged prescription

assistance to try Cymbalta.

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In May 2010, at the request of Disability Determination Services, Kenneth C. Dudley,

Ph.D., undertook a comprehensive psychodiagnostic exam of Bullock. His extensive 12-page

report assessed Bullock with the following impairments: major depressive disorder, mild

severity; anxiety disorder NOS; histrionic personality traits; and a Global Assessment of

Functioning score of 53-57.2

 Dr. Dudley concluded Bullock could perform work requiring

simple instructions, although she would have moderate to severe problems interacting socially;

telephone and computer based work would not pose a problem.

Beginning in February 2010 until August 2012, Bullock attended individual and group

therapy sessions at Community Counseling Solutions led by various clinicians, including Carol

Humphreys beginning in early 2011. Bullock sought out this counseling because the therapist

she had been seeing the previous year was moving. Bullock initially complained of depression,

anxiety, PTSD and insomnia, which had become worse since her divorce in 2003. She also

reported fibromyalgia. At that point her GAF score was 64.3 Tr. 645 (2/25/10). Over the course

of her treatment with Community Counseling Solutions, Bullock’s GAF scores ranged from 48

to 64 (Tr. 433, 643), but the vast majority of her scores fell in the 54 to 63 range. Tr. 597-643

(remained 63 or 64 through much of 2010 and into 2011, although fell to 60 on 8/12/10); 

2The GAF is a scale from 1-100, in ten point increments, that is used by clinicians to

determine the individual’s overall functioning. A GAF of 51-60 means “Moderate symptoms

(e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in

social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or coworkers).” The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders 34 (4th

 ed. 2000) (“DSM-IV”). 

3A GAF of 61-70 means “Some mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild

insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional

truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some

meaningful interpersonal relationships.” DSM-IV 34.

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Tr. 378-522, 584-95 (fell to 58 beginning 3/8/11, and remained between 58 and 63 on the whole;

lowest score of 48 on 4/7/11; more scores of 49-54 in May and again in late June 2011); Tr. 567-

83 (GAF of 55-57 in Jan. 2012); Tr. 523-44 (GAF of 51-55 in Feb. 2012); Tr. 678-715 (GAF of

54-63 in Mar.-May 2012); Tr. 646-59; 665-77 (GAF of 50-56 in June-Aug. 2012).4

Kara Pattinson, Ph.D., a doctor with Community Counseling Solutions, examined

Bullock over the course of two sessions, in June and July 2012, to counsel her about medications. 

Humphreys completed a functional assessment on August 2012. She assessed Bullock

with PTSD, panic disorder without agoraphobia, and major depressive disorder, recurrent and

severe, without psychotic features. She felt Bullock’s most limiting symptom was her memory,

saying, “She ‘appears’ very capable, but has quite severe short and long term memory issues.” 

Tr. 721. She believed Bullock could only work one to two hours a week.

DISCUSSION

I. Bullock’s Credibility

The ALJ noted Bullock’s activity level was inconsistent with her alleged limitations. As

additional reasons to question her testimony, he also identified non-compliance with her

medication regime, the possibility of secondary gain, and the fact that her complaints were not

supported by the objective medical record. Bullock complains the ALJ never specifically stated

why he found her testimony about memory and concentration problems not credible. 

When deciding whether to accept the subjective symptom testimony of a claimant, the

ALJ must perform a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, the claimant must produce objective

4A GAF of 41 to 50 means “Serious symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe obsessional

rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school

functioning (e.g. no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id.

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medical evidence of one or more impairments which could reasonably be expected to produce

some degree of symptom. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The

claimant is not required to show that the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the

severity of the symptom, but only to show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of

the symptom. In the second stage of the analysis, the ALJ must assess the credibility of the

claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the symptoms. Id. The ALJ “must specifically

identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence

undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). General

findings are insufficient to support an adverse credibility determination and the ALJ must rely on

substantial evidence. Id. “[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative

evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings

as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).5

Contrary to Bullock’s argument, the ALJ directly addressed Bullock’s concentration and

memory problems in a way that was sufficient to allow for meaningful review. After detailing

Bullock’s testimony, the ALJ stated, “In terms of the claimant’s alleged mental impairments and

their corresponding symptoms, the objective medical evidence does not fully support the level of

limitation claimed.” Tr. 27. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Dudley’s testing (e.g. serial sevens and fives,

percentage, simple division, verbal similarities problems, proverb interpretation, etc.) reflected

5The Commissioner preserves for appeal her disagreement with the clear and convincing

standard, rather than the more deferential regulatory requirement for factual findings supported

by substantial evidence. Def.’s Br. 9-10. The Ninth Circuit has rejected her argument. See

Burrell v. Colvin, 755 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2014) (reasserting that the ALJ must provide “specific,

clear and convincing reasons” to support a credibility analysis).

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Bullock’s “high average intellectual capacity, reasoning abilities that were above average,

attention and concentration in the average to high average range, processing speed within normal

limits, and no deficits in receptive or expressive communication.” Tr. 28. The ALJ also referred

to Dr. Dudley’s comment that the length of the interview (more than twice as long as usual) was

due to Bullock’s “noteworthy ability to specifically recall events and details, contrary to her

reported deficits of long and short-term memory.” Tr. 28. 

The ALJ’s explanation was not the kind of conclusory analysis deemed insufficient in

Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 775 F.3d 1090, 1102-03 (9th Cir.

2014), where the court held it was error for the ALJ to include a single sentence that the

claimant’s statements were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC. 

Bullock takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to account for Dr. Pattinson’s description of a

medication management session with Bullock in which Bullock’s desire to give lots of detail

interfered with completion of the interview. Bullock reads this comment as evidence of her own

concentration and focus problems. However, the ALJ’s decision reflected Dr. Pattinson’s

opinion that Bullock “had a generally linear thought process, and her cognition appeared grossly

intact despite her complaints about severe memory deficits.” Tr. 29. Further, Dr. Dudley

similarly noted Bullock’s highly detailed answers but nevertheless assessed Bullock’s

concentration as being in the average to high average level. His finding was based on his review

of the medical records and an in-person examination. Tr. 28. The ALJ’s interpretation of the

evidence regarding Bullock’s ability to concentrate is supported by substantial evidence. 

Treichler, 75 F.3d at 1098 (reviewing courts “leave it to the ALJ to determine credibility, resolve

conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record”).

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While the medical record alone is an insufficient reason to question a claimant’s

credibility, the ALJ’s reliance on other reasons–which Bullock does not question–are additional

support for his conclusion. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (medical

evidence is relevant factor, but cannot reject testimony solely on basis of medical evidence). 

Specifically, her statement that she could only walk 100 feet is belied by her contemporaneous

activities, such as hunting, bowling, doing yard work, feeding horses, and managing bales of hay. 

Compare Tr. 196 (April 2010 function report) with Tr. 247 (November 2009 hunting), Tr. 351

(September 2010 yard work), Tr. 481 (October 2011 hunting), Tr. 468 (November 2011 hunting),

Tr. 67 (hearing testimony that she hurt her back while bowling). Less than candid statements are

a relevant credibility consideration. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Bullock’s daily activities also suggest she is capable of more than she reported. She prepares

meals daily, goes in the yard a few times a day, goes into town every two to three days, shops,

takes her son to sporting events, and attends church once or twice a month. 

In addition, the ALJ found suspicious Bullock’s failure to treat her depression with

medication, or increase her dosage as prescribed. Id. (“unexplained or inadequately explained

failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment” is credibility factor); 

Tr. 27 (not taking naturopathic vitamins prescribed to her for depression; did not increase her

anti-depressant dosage as instructed); Tr. 29 (“reported that was no longer taking her antidepressant;” two years later “reported that she stopped using Cymbalta because she was afraid of

becoming dependent”). It is true one of these times her nurse practitioner instructed Bullock to

decide for herself whether to continue the medication and, thus, Bullock’s decision to stop cannot

be used against her. Nevertheless, such an instruction suggests Bullock’s mental health problems

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are not particularly severe and, in any event, there were other times when Bullock failed to

follow prescribed treatment as directed by other providers. Tr. 311 (1/2009; “she has not taken

any of the Prozac that I prescribed for her; she instead wants to try Naturopathic medicine”); 

Tr. 309 (7/2009; “due for refill of Sertraline and did not realize that she had refills available at

the pharmacy”); Tr. 307 (9/2009; “increase Zoloft to 100 mg if neural feedback does not help

with nightmares”); Tr. 306 (1/2010; Bullock “not been taking the vitamins that she takes for

depression and she never increased her dose of Zoloft to 100 mg.”); Tr. 351-53 (“strong

realization” that Zoloft is working for her 3/2010; describes Zoloft as “marginally effective”

5/2010, but interested in other options; then, 9/2010 reported she stopped taking Zoloft early in

the summer because it was not helping her).

Finally, the ALJ noted Bullock’s report to Dr. Pattinson that “all of her family was on

disability benefits for mental health-related disorders. The undersigned does not find this

information especially relevant, but it suggests a certain amount of secondary gain on the

claimant’s part, and her histrionic traits tend to support that suggestion.” Tr. 29. 

I find the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for

his determination about Bullock’s credibility.

II. Medical Evidence

Bullock challenges the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Pattinson’s assessment, as well as

Humphreys’ “other source” opinion.

A. Dr. Pattinson

The ALJ included the following regarding Dr. Pattinson’s diagnoses and examination: 

“Kara Pattinson, M.D., assessed the claimant with generalized anxiety disorder (PTSD) and

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cognitive disorder NOS. The evidence as a whole does not firmly establish PTSD or cognitive

disorder as some of the claimant’s impairments, and the undersigned does not consider them

medically determinable for the purposes of this decision.” Tr. 23. He later summarized Dr.

Pattinson’s medication-related meeting (which took place over two sessions) as follows: Bullock

had stopped using Cymbalta, even though she liked the effects of the medication, because she

was afraid of becoming dependent; all of her family was on disability benefits for mental health

problems; Bullock was alert, pleasant, well-engaged, displayed linear thinking, and had grossly

intact cognition despite complaints of severe memory problems; Dr. Pattinson diagnosed Bullock

with generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia; the doctor recommended

Cymbalta.

Bullock notes the ALJ never specified what weight he gave Dr. Pattinson’s opinion,

although he generally assigned significant weight to the accepted medical source opinions and

indicated the “reasoning behind the weight assigned to certain opinions is included in the above

analysis.” Tr. 30. Additionally, according to Bullock, the ALJ left out the following notes from

Dr. Pattinson’s examination: a rule-out diagnosis of cognitive disorder NOS, an opinion that a

psychological cognitive evaluation was indicated, and the GAF score of 50.

As an initial matter, as I quoted above, the ALJ did consider Dr. Pattinson’s rule-out

diagnoses of PTSD and cognitive disorder, but concluded the evidence did not support such

diagnoses. Bullock does not challenge the ALJ’s conclusion as to her severe impairments; in any

event, the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the form of Dr. Dudley’s

psychodiagnostic examination findings. Further, Dr. Pattinson’s suggestion that a psychological

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cognitive evaluation should be undertaken was made in the absence of knowledge of Dr.

Dudley’s examination.

The parties dispute whether the ALJ was required to assign a weight to Dr. Pattinson’s

examination notes. The Commissioner contends an ALJ need not specify the weight given when

the doctor gives no limitations. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217,

1222-23 (9th

 Cir. 2010) (not clear physician found claimant disabled; nevertheless, ALJ

incorporated observations into RFC); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595,

601 (9th Cir. 1999) (doctor failed to explain how characteristics precluded work; further, the

opinion was not supported by doctor’s own notes). In any event, the Commissioner argues, Dr.

Pattinson’s observation that Bullock had “grossly intact cognition” despite “complain[ing] of

severe memory deficits” is consistent with the ALJ’s findings. Tr. 660, 663. Finally, the

Commissioner concedes the ALJ should have discussed the GAF score, but argues it does not

represent any limitations the ALJ could have included in the RFC. 

Since the ALJ assigned “significant weight” to the treating sources, I assume the ALJ

here gave “significant weight” to Dr. Pattinson’s opinion (except to the extent he specifically

rejected her diagnoses as severe impairments). However, the GAF is irrelevant as Dr. Pattinson

did not accompany it with an opinion on Bullock’s functional limitations different from the

ALJ’s RFC assessment; Bullock herself identifies no additional limitations reflected by the GAF

score which should have been included in the RFC.6

 See 65 Fed. Reg. 50,764, 50,764-65 (“[The

GAF scale] does not have a direct correlation to the severity requirements in our mental disorder

6Further, the GAF represented a fairly rare occurrence in the years of GAF scores mostly

ranging from 54 to 63; Dr. Dudley himself found Bullock capable of working with a GAF score

of 53-57.

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listings.”). Although Bullock argues a GAF of 50 is “a disability opinion that must be addressed

by the ALJ,” citing Stark v. Shalala, 886 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Or. 1995), the case does not stand

for the proposition she offers. Pl.’s Reply 2. Rather, in discussing the GAF score, the court

stated, “The Secretary does not dispute that such a score indicates serious symptoms.” 886 F.

Supp. at 736. In addition to assigning a GAF of 50, the examining physician described the

claimant’s symptoms and test results and opined the claimant suffered from a Listing-level

mental impairment. Further, in Purvis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 57 F.

Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (D. Or. 1999), the court specifically rejected the notion that a GAF

rating of 50 by itself required a finding of disability. 

In short, the ALJ did not err as his RFC accounted for Bullock’s mental impairments and

nothing in Dr. Pattinson’s examination notes directs otherwise.

B. Humphreys

Bullock argues the ALJ failed to accurately weigh the opinion of Humphreys, Bullock's

counselor for more than a year who detailed Bullock’s memory problems in a Functional

Assessment. The ALJ rejected Humphreys’ opinion because Dr. Dudley provided objective

findings to support his opinion that Bullock did not have memory problems, the medical

evidence as a whole does not support Humphreys’ opinion, she did not start treating Bullock

until March 2011, and Bullock had not been compliant with her medications during this time. In

addition, the ALJ questioned Humphreys’ suggestion that Bullock could “appear capable” while

having severe short and long-term memory problems.

Humphreys is not a licensed physician or psychologist and, as a result, is not an

acceptable medical source; rather, she is an other-medical source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). The

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ALJ must give “reasons germane to each witness” in rejecting testimony of other-medical

sources. Turner, 613 F.3d at 1224. Bullock asserts Humphreys should be presumed to be acting

under the direction and supervision of Dr. Pattinson and, thus, an acceptable medical source, but

there is no evidence Humphreys worked under a physician’s close supervision. Gomez v.

Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 971 (9th

 Cir. 1996) (a nurse practitioner could be considered medically

acceptable source when she worked under a physician’s close supervision).

Regardless of whether the ALJ was required to give germane reasons, or specific and

legitimate reasons, the ALJ was entitled to give Dr. Dudley’s opinion greater weight since Dr.

Dudley is a licensed psychologist, has expertise most relevant to Bullock’s impairments, and

supported his findings with testing results rather than Bullock’s subjective reports. Molina, 674

F.3d at 1111, citing Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202 (“[T]he regulations give more weight to . . . the

opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their speciality over that of nonspecialists”)

and Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1272, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ALJ should have

given greater weight to a physician with the expertise that was most relevant to the patient’s

allegedly disabling condition).

The ALJ did not err in discounting Humphrey’s opinion when it conflicted with Dr.

Dudley’s evaluation.

III. Lay Testimony

Finally, Bullock points out the ALJ entirely failed to address the statements offered by her

significant other and by her daughter. Bullock admits the statements simply contain more details

about her alleged memory and concentration problems, but she contends the ALJ did not

adequately discredit her testimony and, as a result, the error is not harmless. In addition, they

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jointly reported that “sometimes” Bullock needed someone with her in public because she gets

anxious, which was not something the ALJ addressed in discussing Bullock’s testimony. As a

result, she argues, the error is not harmless. 

Lay testimony about a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence which the ALJ must

take into account unless he gives reasons for the rejection that are germane to each witness. 

Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th

 Cir. 2006). 

With respect to her memory and concentration problems, because the testimony did not

describe any limitations beyond those Bullock herself described, and because the ALJ discussed

her testimony at length and rejected her complaints based on well-supported, clear and

convincing reasons, I am confident the ALJ’s failure to give germane reasons for rejecting these

lay witness statements did not change the outcome of the case. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122.

Specifically, the ALJ determined that Bullock’s concentration and memory problems were not

supported by the extensive, objective findings of Dr. Dudley; the ALJ also pointed to

inconsistent statements, noncompliance with medications, and the possibility of secondary gain

which generally undermined Bullock’s testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ’s error was harmless. 

With respect to the lay witnesses’ single statement about Bullock’s need to have someone

with her “sometimes” due to her anxiety around people, the ALJ included a generalized anxiety

disorder as a severe impairment, and included a limitation to only occasional, superficial

interaction with the general public and co-workers. Even if I fully credited the lay witnesses’

statement, the RFC would not have been different. As a result, the ALJ’s error is harmless. 

Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056 (error in failing to discuss lay testimony not harmless unless no

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reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability

determination).

The ALJ’s error in discussing the statements of Bullock’s significant other and daughter

was harmless.

CONCLUSION

The findings of the Commissioner are based upon substantial evidence in the record and

the correct legal standards. For these reasons, the court affirms the decision of the

Commissioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 6th day of May, 2015. 

 /s/ Garr M. King 

Garr M. King

United States District Judge

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