The Honor able Samuel H. Ma y s, J r., United S tates Dist rict J udg e for the Western District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0546n.06 No. 08-2549 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA P laintif f-App ellee,

v. DAMA RLON CENAK

A THOMAS Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L FR OM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COU R T F OR

TH E EAST ERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: CO LE a nd M c KEA G UE , C ir c uit Judg e s; MAYS, Distr ict Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. Fo l l o wi ng investigations in 2005 and 2007 of drug traff icking by the Sunny side Gang in Sag inaw, Mi chig an, prosecutors obtained g uilty pleas fr om and convictions ag ainst n u m er o us g angmembers. Da marlon Thomas, who ple d g uilty to distributi on of cr ack c ocaine , now appe als, arguin g t hat his 230-month below-the- Sentencing -Guidelines sentenc e wa s substantively unrea sonable g iven his minor role as a street- level dea ler. W e find that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in sentencing Thomas, and so a ffirm the se ntence
. I. Ov e r t he c ours e of

se ve ra l y e ar s t

h e S u nny s i de Ga

ng , w hic h in c lud e d o ve r 1 00 me mbe rs , s old

cra ck coc aine on the South Side (or “ Sunny side” a rea ) of Sag inaw, Michig an. In 2005, the g overnme nt arre sted, indicted, and c onvicted seve ral g angmemb e r s o n f e d e r a l drug char g es. In 2007 the g ov e rnme nt l a

un c he d a se c on d inve sti g a tio n ta

rg e tin g g ang me mbe rs . Duri ngthe c ours e of thi sNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 2 - investigation, a confide ntial informant on t hree occa sions purcha sed crack from Thom as, who wa s a stree t-level de aler . I n November of 2007, the g overnme nt indicte d Thomas, along with nine other g angme mbe rs , on v ari ou s d ru g c ha rg e s. Th oma s h ims e lf

wa s c ha rg e d w ithc on sp ir ingto d istri bu te
cra ck coc aine a

nd distribution of crac k coca ine. On Au g us t 12 , 2 00 8, Th oma s p le d guil ty to c ount 9 of

the fi rs t su

pe rc e din g ind ic tmen t: distribution on J une 19, 200 7 , of more tha n 5 g rams of c ocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) a

nd 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1)( B) (iii). At that time, Thomas also admitted that he ha d in total

so ld t he c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant a pp ro xima te ly

14 .8 8 g ra

ms o f c ra c k c oc a ine in t hr e e se pa rate trans ac t ions. As part of the ple a ag ree ment, Thomas – while conc eding that he wa s subject to a mandatory

minimum sentenc e of te n y ea rs an d that he qualifie d as a c are er of fende r within the

m e an i n g o f t h e G u i d e l i n e s b e c a u s e h e h a d t w i c e b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y dr u g tr a ff ic kin g in Michig an state c ourt – specific ally rese rved the rig ht to arg ue that the c ourt should have imposed a be low -G uid e lin e s se nte nc e be c a us e his c ri min a l histo ry c a te g or y ov e r- re pr e se nte d th e se ri ou sn e ss
o f h i s c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y. Acc ording to the Presentenc ing I nvestig ation Report (PSR), Thomas w as born on August 30, 1985, and wa s raised in his g randmother ’s house. He g raduated from Sag inaw Hig h School in J une of 2003 and f

or a shor t time attended Minnesota West Community College on a footba ll scholarship. After returningto Sagina

w, Thomas beg an selling drug s for the Sunny side Gang . I n 2005 he wa s twice a rre sted for se lling cr ack coca ine; in eac h case Thomas pled g uilty to the felony

char g es and the state c ourt

jud g e s se nte nc e d T ho ma s to 36 mon ths of pr ob a tio n. F oll ow ingthe se g uil ty ple a s, Th oma s a pp are ntl y c on tin ue d to se ll c ra c k c oc a ine fo r the Sunny sid e Ga ng un til he wa s arr e ste d inNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 3 - the s ummer of

2 0 0 7
. G iv e nh is c ar e e r

o f f e n d e r s tatu s , an d

ta k in g in to a c c o u n t h is a c c e p ta n c e of

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , T h o m a s w a s s e n t e n c e d a t O f f e n s e Le v e l 3 4 w i t h a

C r i m i n a l H i s t o r

y C a t e g o r y o f V I. Th is r e su lte d in

a se nte nc ing

ra ng e un de r t

he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s o f 2 62 -3 27 mon ths

. At se nte nc ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt e xplic itl y a dd re sse d Th oma s’ s argume nt th at his

c a t e g o r i z a t i o na s a

c ar e e r o f f e n d e r s i g n i f i c an t l y o v e r s t a t e d

h i s a c tu a l c r i m i n a l h i s t o r y: [T] his ge ntleman ar

rives her e without ever having been sentence d to a day in jail, and at this point arrives with a c ar ee r offender desig nation and a se ntence rang e of a min imum te rm

of 26 2 mo nth s und e r t

he g uid e lin e s. Iappre ciate the point, which is the fa ct that the g entleman’ s treatment at sentencing in s ta te c ourt

on the pr ior se nte nc e s p ro ba

bly did an in a de qu a te job of

inf or min g him of the g ravity

of the off ense if his c onduct continued. Notwithstanding that fac t, he had any number of circ umstances wher e, with the assistance of an attorne y , he had pr oc e e de d th

ro ug h d ru g tr a ff ic kin g of fe ns e s and

ha d th e ass is tance of

c ouns e l in those instances in order to put into perspe ctive the gr avity of continued misbehavior. Irespe ctf u l l y d o n o t see that we ca n ascr ibe a leve l of fault for leniency in the imp os iti on

of thi s se nte nc e be c a

us e of the argume nt t

hat th e c ourt s w e re ino rd inate ly le nie nt i n th e e arl ie r c ir c ums tanc e s in state c ourt
. Se c on d, I hav e re vie we d a numbe r o f t

he se nte nc e s th a t w e have imp os e d w ith respe ct to the code fenda

nts larg ely

beca use of the c onside ra t i o n t h at counse l has advanc ed , t hat imposing a g uideline sentenc e in this instance would be disproportionate g iven Mr. Thomas’ role in the conspirac y or his r o l e i n the controlled substanc e distribution gr oup of folks that we re involved he re. Clearly , Ithink a g uideline sentenc e could be justified in this instance simply if one loo ks a t a com

pa rativ e pr os pe c tiv e wi th re sp e c t to any on e of tho se oth e r i nd ivi du a ls. Ther e ar e diffe renc es in criminal history , there are differ ence s in their level of participation within t he conspira cy that Ithink

d is tinguish these sets of c ircumstance s from those e arlier

case s. That is to say , Ido not find any g rounds fo r eit her a depar ture within the g uidelines or a varia nce based on 3553(a) fac tors with respec t to t ho se tw o a

rgume nts
. I do believe there is, how ever , some justification f or a modest varia

nce from the g uideline minimum based on leg itimate [ 18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) fac tors here . A re viewNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 4 - of the tra nsactions at thi s point larg ely ref lects a stre et dea ler at a re tail level. . . . Whil e his be havio r ha s b e e n c on sis te nt, re pe a te d v iol a tio ns of the law, ne ve rt

he le ss, his role and involvement in the of fe n s e i s that of a r etail distributor; he is not responsible fr om the in fo rm ation that the cour t can se e for

a g rea ter leve l of responsibility

within the org anization. Al so , in l oo kin g a t 35 53 (b ), the g e ntl e man a rr ive s h e re wi tho ut –

pe rh a ps by luc k b ut, never theless, distinguishing – juvenile re cord. . . . A nd, equally i m p o rt an t to the court, is the re mark s h e has made in court. They ref lect a disting uishable leve l of re mor se fo r h is c ir c ums tanc e . T he y a lso re fl e c t a

le ve l of de pth that I thi nk

is a lso distinguishable. . . . That said, the court
. . . afte r having g iven consideration not only to t h e gu i deline fa c tor s th a t w e have e xhaus ti vel y a dd re sse d h e re a s w e ll a s th e 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s, commits the defe ndant to the United States Bur eau of prisons for a term o f 2 30 mon ths

. (11/20/08 Sentencing Tr. (R. 220) at 14-18.) This appea l followed sentenc ing. II. Thomas argues that the district c ourt’s decision to se ntence him to 230 mont hs in prison –

a se nte nc e wh ic h w a s 3 2 mo nth s b e low the app rop ri ate Gu ide lin e s r ang e – w a s su bs tanti ve ly

unrea sonable “ when his status as a c are er of fende r substantially

overr epre sented the se riousness of [his ] cr imi na l hi sto ry

and re pr e se nte d a

dis pa ri ty fr om s e nte nc e s im

po sed up on

de fe nd ants wi th sim ila r c ri min a l hi sto ri e s and

c on vic te d o f s imi lar c on du c t.” (T ho ma s B r. a t 1. ) T he dis tr ic t c ourt , Thomas arg ues, erred by incorre ctly assessing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) f actor s, and so the sente nce: (1) wa s g reater than nece ssary , espec ially g iven that Thomas had ne ver pr eviously been se ntence d to spend time in prison on his prior felony convictions; (2) de monstrated that the district court g aveNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 5 - unrea sonable w e ig h t t o o n e 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f a c to r ( th e s u g g e s te d

G u id e li n e s r an g e ) ; a

n d ( 3 ) r e f le c te d an
unwar rante d sentenc ing dispa

rity among simil arly -situated def endants. We disag ree . Courts of appea ls review a ll sentence s “under a def ere ntial abuse-of

-discre tion standard.” Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). I n deter mining whe ther a

court a bused its sentencing discretion, we look to whether the sentenc e was both proce durally and subst antively rea sonable. See United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 ( 6th Cir. 2007). As the Supreme Court e x plained, we : must first ensure that t h e d istrict court committed no signif icant proc edura l error , such as f ailing to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guidelines rang e, tre ating t h e G u i d el i n es as m an d at o ry , fa i l i n g t o co n s i d er t h e § 3 5 5 3 (a ) f

ac t o rs , s el ec t i n g a sentenc e base d on clea

rly err oneous fac ts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenc e – including an explanation for a ny deviation from t h e Guidelines ra ng e. Assuming that the district c ourt' s sentencingdecision i s proce durally sound, the appellate court should then conside r the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence imposed under an abuse -of- discretion standa rd. When conduc ting this revie w, the court will, of course , take into ac count the totality of the c ircumstance s, including the extent of any

varia nce f rom the Guidelines r ang e. Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 50-51 (citation omitted). He re, Thoma s conce des proc edura l rea sonablene ss, but argues that his sentenc e wa s substantively unrea sonable. “A s en t ence may be conside red substantively

unrea sonable whe n the district court selec ts a sentenc e ar

bitrarily , bases the se ntence
on imp e rmis si bl e fa c tor s, fa ils to c on sid e r r e le va nt s e nte nc ingfa c tor s, or

g ive s a n unr e a so na

ble amount of we ight to any

pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Presle y , 547 F.3d 625, 630- 31 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 520 ( 6th Cir. 2008)).No. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

“‘D epar ture’ is a term of a

rt under the Guidel i n es an d i s distinct from ‘var iance .’ A 1 Guidelines ‘de parture ’ re fer s to t h e imposit ion of a sente nce outside the advisory rang e or a

n a ssi g nme nt o f a

c ri min a l hi sto ry

c a te g or y dif fe re nt tha n the oth e rw ise a

pp lic a ble c a te g or

y ma de to eff ect a sentenc e outside the ra

ng e. I mportantly , a depa rture re s u l t s fr om the district court’s application of a

particula r Guidelines pr ovision, such as § 4A1.3 or § 5, Par t K. A ‘va

rianc e’ r efe rs to the selec tion of a sentenc e outside of the advisory Guidelines rang e based upon the district court’s weig hing of one or more of the sentenc ing fac tors of § 3553(a ). While the same fa cts and a naly ses can, at times, be used to justify both a Guidelines depar ture and a varia

nce, the conc epts are distinct.” United States v. Grams , 566 F.3d 683, 686- 8 7 (6th Cir. 2009) (interna l citations and quotations omitted) (per

curiam).
- 6 - Whil e Thomas appea

rs t o argue that the district court e rre d both by not depar ting downw ard

an d b y n o tv ary i n g d o wn wa rd fa r en o u gh , i nei t h er ca s e, h i s ar gu m en t s ar e u l t i m at el y u n av ai l i n g. 1 A. Unreasonableness of Not Departing Down ward Un der the G uid elines Although he focuse s on the weig ht a ccor ded the § 3553(a) fac tors, and so see ms to be arguing primarily that the district c ourt should ha ve g rante d a g reater downw ard va rianc e, Thomas c onflates the de pa rt ur e and va ri anc e a rgume nts by

c iti ngU. S.S .G. § 4A1 .3 (b )( 1) , w hic h a pp lie s o nly

to depar tures and w hich states that “[i]f reliable information indicates that th e d ef en dant’s cr iminal history cate g ory substantially

over- repr esents the se riousness of the de fenda nt’s criminal history

or the likelihood that the defe ndant will co m m i t other c rimes, a downw ard de parture may be

war rante d.” While Thomas is corre ct that § 4A1.3(b) (1) pe rm its the district co u rt t o depar t downwar d in such circ umstances, howe ver, w e do “not r eview a decision not to impose a depa rture, ‘unless the re cord shows that the district c ourt was unawa re of , or did not understand, its discre tion to ma ke such a depa

rture.’ ” United States v. Blue, 5 5 7 F. 3 d 6 8 2 , 6 8 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Santillana , 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2008) ). As the Santillana court said, “ [w] e do notNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

Even if the district c ourt had c hosen to depa rt under § 4A1.3(b)( 1), the a uthorized 2 G u i d e l i n e s d e p artu r e u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n w a s a c tu a l l y le ss downwar d than the 32-month varia nce the district court in fac t gr anted. Give n Thomas’s ca ree r off e n d e r c a te g orization, and taking into account Thomas’s ac cepta

nce of responsibility , Thomas was se ntence d at Off ense L evel 34 with a Criminal Hi sto ry Ca te g or y of VI . T his re su lte d in

a se nte nc ingra

ng e of 26 2- 32 7 mo nt hs . A c c or din g to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)( 3)(A) – which ex plicitly limit s any downwar d depar ture unde r § 4A1.3(b) (1)

– “The extent of a downwar d depar ture under this subsec tion f or a car eer offe nder

. . . may not exceed one criminal history cate g ory .” I n other wor ds, had the district cour t relied on § 4A1.3( b)(1) to j us tif y a de pa rt ur e , th e n th e a

pp ro pr ia te Gu ide lin e s r ang e wo uld have been defi ne d b y

Of fe ns e L evel 34 and Criminal History Categ ory V. This would have r esulted in a sente ncing rang e of 235- 293 months – which, at the low end, is still f ive months more than the sentenc e the c ourt imposed. - 7 - require that a district cour t expl icitly

state that it is awar e of its discre tion to make such a de parture
. Rather , we presume that the district court under stood its di scre tion, absent clea r evide nce to the contra ry .” Santillana , 540 F.3d at 431 ( citations omitted). Her e, on the contra ry , the district court clea rly understood that it could depa rt downwa

rd, but it di d “n o t fi n d any g rounds for e ither a depar ture within the g uidelines or a va rianc e base d on 3553(a) fac tors with respec t to” the ar g ument that a Guidelines se ntence was disproportionate . Acc ording ly , we do not reviewthe district court’s decision not to depar

t downwar d under § 4A 1.3(b)( 1). 2 B. Unreasonableness of Not Var ying FurtherDown ward From the G uid elines The he art of T homas’s ar g ument is that the district court er re d b y n o t sufficie ntly

vary ing downwar d on t h e b asi s of the 3553(a ) fa ctors af ter c alculatingthe appr opriate G uidelines rang e. Acc ording to 3553(a), a

district court “sha ll impos e a s en t en ce sufficient, but not g reater than

nece ssary , to comply

with” the nee d for the se n tence to refle ct the ser iousness of the off ense, pr omo te re sp e c t f

or the law, pr ov ide jus t punis hme nt, a ff or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e , pr ote c t the pu bli c from the de fenda

nt, and provide the defe ndant with ne eded training or treatment in the most effe ctiveNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 8 - manner . See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) . Among other fa ctors, the sentencing court must also consider : the nature and c ircumstance s of the off ense; the history

and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt; the Gu ide lin e s r ang e ; and

“ the ne e d to a vo id u

nw arr ante d s e nte nc e dis pa ri tie s amon g de fe nd ants wi th simil ar r eco rd s who have been f ound g uilty

of similar conduc t.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) , (3), (4), & (6). Thoma s argues that the c ourt err ed by not vary ing dow nwar d in that the sentenc e: (1) w as g re a te r t ha n n e c e ssa ry ; ( 2) de mon str a te d th a t th e c ourt g a ve un re a so na

ble we ig ht t o th e Gu ide lin e s; and (3) ref

lected a n unwar rante d sentenc ing dispa

rity among simil arly -situated def endants. i. Im posin g A Sentence Gr eate r Than Necessar y Th oma s f ir st a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp os e d a se nte nc e g re a te r tha n wa s ne c e ssa

ry to meet the pur

poses of § 3553(a )(2) . I n support, he ci t es v ar i o u s decisions in which cour ts have considere d whether

the ca ree r off ender Guidelines ca

n produce a pena lty

g reater than ne cessa

ry . As
we state d in 2007 , how e ve r, “ [o]ur re vie w of se nte nc e s for re a so na ble ne ss i s n ot t o b e c on fu se d w ith the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ta sk

to i mpo se a

se nte nc e that is ‘s uf

fi c ie nt, bu t no t gre ate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry , to comply with the purposes’ of sentenc ing se t forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Bolds , 511 F.3d at 578. Reg ardle ss, give n Thomas’s cr iminal hist ory , the cour t did not impos e a se ntence that was g reater tha n n e c e ssa ry – e ve n g ive n th e le g iti ma te § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s. We a ddresse d a very simil ar a rg ument in United States v. Alex ander , 5 43 F .3 d 8 19 , 8 26 (6 th Cir . 2 00 8) , in

wh ic h a low -l e ve l dr

ugde a le r p le d guil ty and

wa s se nte nc e d a s a

c are e r o ff

e nd e r t o 360 months of i mprisonment. As we c oncluded in Al e x an de r in r esponding to the argument that the

s e n t e n c e w a s g r e a t e r

t h ann e c e s s ar

y:No. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 9 - Al e xan de r a

rgue s th a t hi s c ri min a l hi sto ry is o f a “ pe tty natur e ” that just ifie s a sentenc e much lowe r than 360 months of imprison m en t , a s entenc e that would be “suff icient, but not gr eate r than ne cess ary , to comply with the purposes” of sentenc ing a s set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553( a) (2 ). But Ale x ander is stil l a ca

ree r offe nder – r eg ardle ss of whethe r he c hara cter izes his prior felony convictions as “petty .” I ndeed, despite being a car eer offe nder, and despite havingalre ady abused the di strict court’s leniency when committ ing other drug- related offenses while out on bond, Alexander was sentenc ed at the low end of the rec omme n d ed Gu idelines rang e. This sug g ests that the cour t was mindful of both the “nature a nd circ umstances of

the offe nse and the history and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt.” Id. (citations omitted). J ust like the defe ndant in Alexande r , Thomas her e ar g ues that his criminal history is minor – but al so lik e Al e xan de r, Th oma s (a s he co nc e de s) wa s pre vio us ly c on vic te d of m ult ipl e fe lon ie s, and has thus appr opriately been de signated a car eer

offe nder. Mor eover , the sentenc e of 230 months for Th omas (a

32 -m on th, 12 % d ow nw ard va ri anc e ), a lon g wi th t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e xplic it

c o m m e n t s , d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rti n s e n t e n c i n g w a s c l e ar l y m i n d f u l ( a s r e qu i r e d b y § 35 53 (a )( 1) ) o f t

he natur e and c ir c ums tanc e s o f t he of fe ns e and the c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he de fe nd a nt. ii. Giving an Un reasonable Am ount of We ight t o the Guidelines as a Sentencing Fact or Thomas’s second a

rg ument is that the district court g ave too much w eig ht to Thomas’s status

a s a c are e r o ff

e nd e r u nd e r t he Gu ide lin e s. Whil e a

se nte nc e “ may

be c on sid e re d s ub sta

nti ve ly

un r e a s o n a

b le w h e nth e d is tr ic t c o u rt .
. . g iv e s anu n r e a s o n a b le a mo u n t o f

w e ig h t t o an y

p e rti nent fac tor,” Presley , 5 47 F .3 d at 63 0- 31 , the c a se law o ff e rs lit tle g uid anc e a s to wh a t an “ un re a so na ble amount of we ight” would be. I f a district c ourt entirely discounted all but one 3553(a ) fa ctor, then that c ourt wo uld pr e su ma bly be g ivi ngan unr e a so na

ble a mou nt of we ig ht to that f

a c tor . Wh e re , in contra st, a district court expli citly or implicitly

considers a

nd weig hs all pertinent fa ctors, aNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 10 - de fe nd ant c le arl y

be ars a muc h g re a te r bur de n in ar g uin g that the c ourt ha s g ive n a

n “ un re a so na

ble

a mou nt o f w e ig ht” to a

ny pa rt ic ula r o ne . A mon g the se nte nc ingfa c tor s th e dis tr ict c ourt mus t consider, moreover , the Guidelines hold a spe cial plac e: as the Supre me Court emphasized in Ga ll ,

“ a dis tr ic t cou rt shou ld b e g in a ll s e nte nc ingpr oc e e din g s b y c or re c tly c a lc ulatin g the a

pp lic a ble Guidelines ra

ng e. . . . [t] he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmar k.” Ga ll , 55 2 U .S. a t 49 . Wh ile se nte nc ing c ourt s mus t the n, wi th the Gu ide lin e s r ang e in m ind , c on sid e r a ll oth e r § 35 53 (a) fac tor s, “ dis tr ic t c ourt s mu st b e g in t he ir ana ly sis wi th t

he Gu ide lin e s and

re ma in cog nizant of them throughout the se ntencingproce ss.” Id. at 50 n.6. We have in the pa st rejec ted a defe ndant’s argument that the district court fa iled to acc ord proper weig ht to c erta in sentencingfac tors wher e the “ arguments and evide nce w ith respec t to [ the defe ndant’s] ple a for a lesser sentenc e wer e fully befor e the district judg e, and w ere expressly noted and considere d” befor e being reje cted. Conatser , 514 F .3 d at 527 . He re , s imi larl y , a ft e r c or re c tly calc ulating the appropr iate Guidelines r ang e and r ejec t ing e ither a de parture or a va rianc e on the basis of two of Thoma s’s arguments, the di strict court c oncluded that ther e wa s “some justification for a modest varianc e fr o m t h e g uideline minimum based on leg itimate 3553(a) f actor s here ,”
e x p l i c i t l y c o n s i d e r e d

t h o s e f a c t o r s , an d

t h e nv ar i e d

d o w n w ar d

s u b s t an t i a l l y. iii. Imposing a S entence That Reflects an Unw arrante d Sentencing Disp arity Thomas’s third ar g ument is that his sentence r efle cts an unwar rante d disparity

betwee n simil arly -situated def

endants. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) instructs sentenc ing courts to consider “ the need to avoid unwarr anted se ntence disparities among defe ndants with simil ar r ecor ds who have be e n f ound g uil ty of sim ila r c on du c t.” Th oma s c omp are s h is s e nte nc e fi rs t to tho se re c e ive d b y hisNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

Notably , Kevin Stephens, whose appea l ha s been c onsolidated with Thomas’s and w ho was 3 roug hly simil arly positioned in the h i er ar ch y o f the Sunny side Gang , was sentenc ed as a car eer offe nder a

nd was g iven a se ntence 32 months longer than was Thoma s’s. - 11 - c o- de fe nd ants a nd

de fe nd ants in a

re la te d c a se , a

nd then to t ho se re c e ive d b y

fi ve de fe nd a nts
s e n t e n c e d a s c ar e e r o f f e n d e r s e l s e w h e r e i nt h e c o u n t r y. Thomas’s compa

rison of hi s sentenc e to those g iven hi s co-de fenda nts is both i ncorr ect a

nd

unwar rante d. Whil e Thomas’ s sentence of 230 months may exceed the sentenc es of other Sunny side Gangmembers, in fa ct these othe r member s were not car eer offe nd er s wi thin the meaning of the Guidelines, and so we re not simil arly -situated within the meaningof § 3553(a )(6)

. Reg ardle ss, the 3 question under § 3553( a)( 6) is not nece ssarily whether a par ticular de fenda

nt rec eived a

s entenc e that was diff ere nt from the sente nces of his co-def

enda n t s . As we have stated r epeatedly , “this fac tor
c on c e rn s national

disparities betwe en def

endants with similar criminal histories conv ic te d of similar criminal con d u ct

– n ot disparities betwee n codef endants.” Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 521 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ( em p h as i s i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g United St ates v. Simmons , 501 F.3d 620, 623- 24 (6th Cir. 2007)). “Be cause § 3353(a) (6) is not conc erne d ‘with disparities betwe en one individual’s se ntence and anothe r individual’s sentenc e, despite the fact that the t wo are co- defe ndants,’ ‘the district court is n ot required to consider that ty pe of dispar ity

under § 3553( a)( 6).’” Presley , 5 4 7 F
. 3 d at 631 (e mp h as i s i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Simmons , 501 F.3d at 623-24). Thomas’s compa

rison of hi s sentence to those g iven five r andom def endants scattered throug hout the United States is only marg inally rele vant; he cannot demonstrate the exis tence of a

n at i o n al sentenc ing dispa rity for stre et-leve l dealer s sentence d as ca ree r off ender s by citing f iveNo. 08-2549

USA v. Thomas

- 12 - individual dist rict cour

t case s. I n Simmons , we ap proving ly cited a F irst Circuit case c riticizi ng exact l y t h i s s o rt of ar gument. “[A] s ingle example is about the weakest sort of proof of national pr a c tic e that c an be ima g ine d, ” we ob se rv e d, wa rn ing a g a ins t a sy ste m in wh ic h “ g re a t w e ig ht [i s] g iven to such sing ular e x amples.” Simmons , 5 0 1 F. 3 d at 6 2 6 ( q u o t i n g United States v. Sae z , 444 F.3d 15, 18- 19 (1st Cir. 2006)). As the F irst Circuit had noted, “such a compar ison [ betwee n differ ent sing ular sente nces g iven by differ ent judg es] opens the door to endless r um m aging by lawy ers throug h sentenc es in othe r case s, eac h side finding random e x amples to support a hig her or lower se ntence , as their c li en t s ’ i ntere sts dictate.” Saez , 444 F.3d at 19. A more re levant

c on sid e ratio n w ou ld b e wh e the r s ome sig nif ic ant perce ntage of d i strict courts var y downwar d signific an tl y

( o r b y mo r e th a t 3 2 mo n th s o r

1 2 % o f th e G u id e li n e s s e n te n c e ) w h e r e s tr e e t- level deale rs ar e cha

rac terized as ca

ree r o ff en d er s under the Guidelines; Thomas, howe ver, ha s not pr ov ide d a

ny e vid e nc e to that e ff

e c t. Th a t in fi ve c a se s dis tr ic t c ourt s e xer c ise d th e ir dis c re tio n to g ra nt d ow nw ard

va ri anc e s si mpl y c ann ot pr ov e that the dis tr ic t c ourt in t his c a se imp os e d a

dis pa rate
s e n t e n c e w i t h i n t h e m e an i n g o f 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 ) b y als o vary ing dow nwar d (thoug h perha ps not as much) f

rom the re commended G uidelines rang e. III . As the district court imposed a below-the -Guidelines 230-month sentenc e on Thomas a fter appropr iately

calc u l at ing the Guidelines ra ng e, explicitly

consideringthe per

tinent fac tors, and deter mining that the § 3553( a) f actor s justified a 32-month downwar d varia nce, w e fin d that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in sentencing and so AF F IRM the sentenc e.