Third District Court of Appeal 

State of Florida 

Opinion filed December 27, 2018. 

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 

________________ 

No. 3D17-452 

Lower Tribunal Nos. 17-376 & 17-1770 

________________ 

Daniel Junior, etc., 

Appellant, 

vs. 

James LaCroix, 

Appellee. 

 An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a) from the 

Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton Hirsch, Judge. 

 Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Michael B. 

Valdes and Oren Rosenthal, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant. 

 Woodward and Reizenstein, P.A., and Philip L. Reizenstein and Bhakti 

Kadiwar, for appellee. 

 Chad A. Reader, William C. Peachey, Erez Reuveni and Vinita B.

Andrapalliyal (Washington, D.C.), for the United States of America as amicus 

curiae. 

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and FERNANDEZ and SCALES, JJ. 

 SCALES, J. 
 2 

 

 Appellant Daniel Junior, the director of the Miami-Dade County Corrections 

and Rehabilitation Department (“Department”), appeals the trial court’s writ of 

habeas corpus that, inter alia: (1) ordered the release of the appellee James La Croix, 

notwithstanding that LaCroix was subject to a federal immigration detainer; and (2) 

declared Miami-Dade County’s policy toward federal immigration detainers to be 

unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment of the United State Constitution. 

Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of the 

subject federal immigration detainer, we reverse and quash the writ.1

I. Facts 

A. LaCroix held in custody 

 Twice in January of 2017, LaCroix was charged with driving with a suspended 

license while an habitual traffic offender, a third degree felony pursuant to section 

322.34(5) of the Florida Statutes. LaCroix was out on felony bond for the first 

offense when he was arrested for the second offense. Upon this second arrest, he was 

placed in the custody of the Department. LaCroix pleaded guilty to each offense, and 

 

1

 Because LaCroix has been deported pursuant to the subject federal immigration 

detainer, LaCroix argues that Department’s appeal is moot. Notwithstanding 

LaCroix’s mootness claim, we examine the legal appropriateness of the writ because 

the issues implicated by it are likely to recur. “It is well settled that mootness does 

not destroy an appellate court’s jurisdiction . . . when the questions raised are of great 

public importance or are likely to recur.” Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 

(Fla. 1984). 
 3 

on February 28, 2017, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to 

time served. 

 Thus, as of February 28, 2017, LaCroix was eligible for release from jail. 

While he was in custody, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

transmitted to Department a DHS Form I-247X, commonly known as a federal 

immigration detainer. In this form, an officer of the United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement represented that the federal government suspected that 

LaCroix, a Haitian national, was “a removable alien.” As such, the form requested 

that Department maintain custody of LaCroix for an additional period not to exceed 

forty-eight hours after the time he would otherwise be released from jail in order to 

allow DHS to take custody of him. 

 On March 1, 2017, LaCroix was transferred into federal custody pursuant to 

the federal immigration detainer. LaCroix remained in the county jail pursuant to 

this detainer request. At some point, LaCroix was deported from the United States.2

 B. The habeas corpus proceedings below 

On February 28, 2017, LaCroix filed in the trial court an “Emergency Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” LaCroix’s petition simply stated that Department had 

failed to release LaCroix from jail after the expiration of his sentence. Immediately 

 

2

 The record is not clear as to precisely when LaCroix was transported from the 

county jail and deported. 
 4 

after receiving LaCroix’s petition, the trial court ordered Department to file a 

response by March 2, 2017. Department met this filing deadline and, on March 2, 

2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on LaCroix’s petition. Although LaCroix 

was no longer in Department’s custody, the trial court nonetheless entered the instant 

writ of habeas corpus on March 3, 2017. Department timely appeals 

C. Miami-Dade County’s policy toward immigration detainer requests 

LaCroix’s habeas corpus proceedings unfolded against the background of 

Miami-Dade County’s efforts to adjust to evolving federal immigration policy. In 

2013, the Miami-Dade County Commission passed Resolution No. R-1008-13, 

which directed the County Mayor to implement a policy whereby Department would 

not honor a federal immigration detainer request unless: (i) the federal government 

agreed to reimburse Miami-Dade County for all expenses related to the detainer 

request, and (ii) the inmate had either a conviction for a forcible felony or a pending 

charge of a non-bondable offense. Because the federal government and Miami-Dade 

County never came to agreement over the terms of this 2013 Resolution, MiamiDade County ended its cooperation on federal immigration detainer requests. On 

January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order that, in part, would 

terminate certain federal grant funding to local government “sanctuary 

jurisdictions.” Even though Miami-Dade County had not declared itself a 

“sanctuary” county, given the discord with the federal government over County 
 5 

Resolution No. R-1008-13, the County Mayor directed Department to begin 

honoring federal immigration detainer requests again. 

The Miami-Dade County Commission convened in special session on

February 17, 2017, to consider to what extent Miami-Dade County should cooperate 

with the DHS on federal immigration detainer requests in light of the federal 

government’s apparent threat to restrict grant funding to Miami-Dade County. At 

this meeting, the County Commission adopted two Resolutions: (i) to return to 

Miami-Dade County’s pre-2013 policy of cooperation on immigration detainer 

requests so long as the federal government showed probable cause for the detainer 

(Resolution No. R-163-17); and (ii) to authorize an appropriate legal challenge in 

the event the federal government denied grant funding due to Miami-Dade County’s 

policy on federal immigration detainer requests (Resolution No. R-164-17).3

D. The Tenth Amendment basis for the trial court’s grant of the writ 

In adjudicating LaCroix’s habeas corpus petition, the trial court applied a 

Tenth Amendment analysis to Department’s continued incarceration of LaCroix.4

 

3

 As Department’s initial brief points out, the meaning and implications of the 

January 25, 2017 Executive Order; the federal government’s immigration detainer 

policies; federal grant guidelines as they relate to local government compliance with 

federal immigration law; and the status of Miami-Dade County’s own compliance 

with the relevant federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, all continued to evolve in the months 

after the trial court granted the writ of habeas corpus to LaCroix. Our focus, though, 

is on the trial court’s action of March 2-3, 2017. 
 6 

The trial court found that because the federal government has exclusive dominion 

over immigration and deportation, Department cannot be “commandeered” to 

perform the federal function of detaining prisoners for deportation purposes. In other 

words, DHS could not “conscript” Department officers and facilities to continue 

LaCroix’s custody after his state sentence expired. The trial court also found that 

President Trump’s Executive Order coerced Department compliance based on the 

threat of lost grant funding to Miami-Dade County if Department declined to 

cooperate with federal immigration detainer requests. Finally, the trial court found 

that LaCroix had standing to seek habeas corpus relief based on a Tenth Amendment 

violation. 

II. Analysis5

We quash the subject writ on the authority of Ricketts v. Palm Beach County 

Sheriff, 985 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), which held that a State trial court lacks 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a federal immigration detainer. 

 In the Ricketts case, the Palm Beach County Sheriff arrested Ricketts for a 

third degree felony and held him in the county jail. After Ricketts attempted to post 

 

4

 The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The powers 

not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 

States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 

5

 Our standard of review for a writ of habeas corpus is de novo. State v. S.M., 131 

So. 3d 780, 784 (Fla. 2013). 
 7 

bond, the Sheriff refused to accept the bond because the Sheriff had received a 

federal immigration detainer request. Ricketts sought habeas corpus relief from the 

circuit court, asserting that he was illegally detained without judicial oversight or a 

showing of probable cause. Id. at 592. The trial court denied Ricketts’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus and the Fourth District affirmed. Id. at 592-93. The Fourth 

District, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), stated: “[A] state court cannot 

adjudicate the validity of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and 

naturalization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.” Id. at 

593. 

 The Court in Ricketts recognized that, once a person in custody becomes 

subject to a valid federal immigration detainer, he or she no longer is held in the 

custody of the state. Id. On the date of his petition for habeas corpus relief, LaCroix’s 

physical location was a county jail cell, but his custodial status was established under 

federal authority. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a person in 

custody pursuant to valid federal authority. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 523-24 

(1858). 

 LaCroix seeks to distinguish Ricketts by arguing that Ricketts challenged his 

detention on due process grounds rather than on a Tenth Amendment basis. We note, 

parenthetically, that LaCroix did not raise the Tenth Amendment in his petition 

either, though the trial court based its grant of the writ on a Tenth Amendment 
 8 

rationale. In any event, LaCroix’s effort to distinguish Ricketts is immaterial in light 

of the overriding jurisdictional issue in this case. Simply put, irrespective of whether 

the challenge to the federal immigration detainer is based on an alleged due process 

violation or a Tenth Amendment violation, a state court cannot adjudicate the 

validity of a federal immigration detainer.6

 Reversed; writ of habeas corpus quashed. 

 Fernandez, J., concurs. 

 

6

 Because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

validity of the federal immigration detainer, we need not, and therefore do not, reach 

the issue of whether LaCroix has standing to assert a Tenth Amendment 

“commandeering” challenge. 
 9 

Daniel Junior, etc., v. James E. LaCroix 

Case No. 3D17-452 

 Rothenberg, C.J., specially concurring. 

 Although I completely agree with the excellent analysis performed and the 

conclusion reached in the majority opinion, I write to address the highly unusual and 

troubling procedural evolution of this case. 

 After posting a bond and obtaining a release from custody following a felony 

arrest, the defendant, James E. LaCroix (“LaCroix”), was arrested on January 28, 

2017 and charged with having committed another felony. Based upon the new 

felony arrest while out on bond, LaCroix’s bond was revoked and he remained in 

custody. On the following day, January 29, 2017, the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) submitted a Request for Voluntary Transfer form (“DHS Form I247X,” “voluntary immigrations detainer request,” or “federal detainer”) to MiamiDade County (“the County”). The voluntary immigration detainer request states that 

LaCroix had been deemed an immigration enforcement priority by DHS because “in 

the judgment of a designated senior DHS official, his [] removal would serve an 

important federal interest.” The voluntary immigration detainer request further 

provides that: there was a finding of probable cause that LaCroix is a removable 

alien; his identity had been confirmed; a final order of removal had been issued; and 

requests that the County detain LaCroix for a period of time not to exceed forty-
 10

eight hours beyond the time LaCroix would otherwise be released to allow DHS to 

assume custody of LaCroix. 

 LaCroix remained in custody from January 28, 2017 to February 28, 2017. 

On February 28, 2017, LaCroix appeared before Judge Milton Hirsch. During 

LaCroix’s appearance, Judge Hirsch accepted LaCroix’s guilty pleas to both felony 

cases, adjudicated LaCroix guilty, and sentenced LaCroix to credit for time served. 

 At the hearing, and after LaCroix’s plea, LaCroix’s counsel informed Judge 

Hirsch that, due to a federal detainer, LaCroix would not be released and thus he 

intended to file an emergency motion for LaCroix’s release. Judge Hirsch advised 

LaCroix’s to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than a motion for 

LaCroix’s release, and although no motion or petition had yet been filed, Judge 

Hirsch stated that he would enter an order directing Daniel Junior, the Director of 

the Department of Corrections (“the Department”), to respond within two days. 

Immediately thereafter, and while still at the hearing, Judge Hirsch produced and 

issued a previously prepared order with copies for distribution. In this order, Judge 

Hirsch made findings regarding mootness; made claims as to what LaCroix would 

allege even though no motion or petition had been filed, no allegations had yet been 

made, and no defenses had yet been raised; ordered Daniel Junior to respond in 

writing on or before noon on March 2, 2017 if he intended to oppose the petition; 

and set a hearing for March 2, 2017 at 1:00 p.m. 
 11

 Judge Hirsch’s order specifically states that LaCroix alleges “that he is 

charged with no Florida crime and serving no county sentence.” The order then 

finds, “If that is so, the county has neither the authority nor, presumably, the desire 

to continue to hold him in its custody.” Lastly, the order claims that LaCroix is (will 

be) alleging “that in continuing to hold him, the county acts as an agent for ICE, a 

federal entity.” 

 As directed by the trial court, LaCroix’s counsel filed an emergency petition 

for writ of habeas corpus, not an emergency motion for release. The unsworn 

petition challenged the legality of LaCroix’s continued detention beyond the 

expiration of his sentence. The petition, however, made no claim that the County 

was acting as an “agent for ICE,” as the trial court’s order contended it would allege. 

 On the next morning, March 1, 2017, and within twenty-four hours of 

LaCroix’s plea, LaCroix was released by the County and transferred into the custody 

of federal immigration officials. On March 2, 2017, as directed by the trial court, 

the County filed a response to the petition. In its response, the County attached a 

copy of DHS Form I-247X (the voluntary immigration detainer request), which 

stated that a finding of probable cause had been made by immigration officials, 

LaCroix’s identity had been confirmed, an order for LaCroix’s removal had been 

issued, and LaCroix’s detention was at the request of the federal detainer form. The 

County additionally informed the trial court that LaCroix had already been 
 12

transferred into federal immigration custody and put the trial court on notice that an 

appellate court decision, which was binding authority on the trial court, had already 

determined that the state court lacks jurisdiction to determine the issue raised in the 

petition: the validity/legality of the federal detainer. Specifically, the County cited 

to Ricketts v. Palm Beach County Sheriff, 985 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), 

which held that: (1) Ricketts could not “secure habeas corpus relief from the state 

court on the legality of his federal detainer” because “[t]he constitutionality of his 

detention pursuant to both the I-247 and I-203 federal forms is a question of law for 

the federal courts,” id. at 592-93; and (2) “a state court cannot adjudicate the validity 

of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and naturalization is within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.” Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 

202, 225 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)). 

 In its response, the County noted that, although the Third District had not yet 

spoken on the issue, the Fourth District had in Ricketts; Ricketts was “an on-allfours decision that dismissed a virtually identical petition”; and the trial court was 

required to render a similar dismissal, even if the trial court disagreed with that 

outcome. 

 After receiving the County’s response, with the attached copy of the federal 

detainer form, the trial court conducted the scheduled hearing on March 2, 2017. At 

the hearing, which was very brief, as reflected by the thirteen pages of transcript, 
 13

LaCroix’s counsel argued that LaCroix was being unlawfully detained by the County 

because he had completed his sentence and because his detention was based upon 

nothing more than a request by the federal government without probable cause. 

However, as the County had already provided proof that LaCroix was no longer 

being detained by the County and that his detention for twenty-four hours was based 

not only on probable cause, but on confirmation of his identity and a final order of 

removal, this argument was without merit. 

 LaCroix’s counsel also raised, for the first time at the hearing, that the Tenth 

Amendment barred the County’s voluntary cooperation with ICE on immigration 

detainers. In response, the County reiterated the arguments made in its written 

response and additionally informed the trial court that the final order of removal 

referenced in the detainer request means that LaCroix had already gone through the 

adjudicative process, his claim had been heard, and a final order was issued stating 

that LaCroix shall be removed from the United States. 

The County additionally argued that, although there are procedural safeguards 

which protect individuals from being held indefinitely, federal law authorizes the 

federal government and state and local agencies and detention facilities to cooperate 

with each other. If an individual wishes to attack the legality or constitutionality of 

a federal detainer request, he or she must do so in federal court, with notice to the 

federal government and by providing the federal government with an opportunity to 
 14

defend against the claims. That was not done in this case. The petition made no 

constitutional challenge; the petition was filed in state court, which has no authority 

to adjudicate such claims; and no notice was given to the federal government. 

Lastly, the County argued that Ricketts controls and that LaCroix had cited to no 

case that had concluded contrary to the Fourth District’s decision in Ricketts. Thus, 

the County argued that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

 Following the hearing, the trial court issued its order granting the petition. 

The order, which is longer that the hearing transcript, relies on “facts” wholly outside 

the record with no evidence to support them, makes findings on arguments not raised 

in the petition or at the hearing, and in many instances, it is factually incorrect. In 

fact, the order states that much of its findings are based on the trial court’s 

independent investigation and review of Miami Herald newspaper articles. 

 The order begins with its research regarding the size of the County’s 

correctional system and the number of incarcerated individuals. It then discusses 

historical data the trial court pulled from Miami Herald newspaper articles that 

discussed the number of detainer requests issued in 2012, and the vote by the MiamiDade County Commission in 2013 to no longer honor such requests. Next, the order 

cites to a Miami Herald newspaper article that referenced an executive order signed 

by President Donald Trump, which the article claimed threatened to cut federal 

grants to counties and cities that do not cooperate fully with Immigration and 
 15

Customs enforcement and forced the County Mayor to immediately reverse the 

County’s policy and to order county jails to comply with these detention requests. 

The trial court then found that the County’s correctional facilities and personnel 

“have been conscripted to lock him [LaCroix] up for and on behalf of the federal 

government and to do so at the county’s expense.” 

 The trial court’s order builds on its unsubstantiated theme of coercion by 

claiming, again without evidentiary support and even in the absence of such a claim 

by LaCroix, that the Department’s detention of LaCroix was achieved by “financial 

starvation,” rendering the Department “the cat’s paw of ICE.” In addition to these 

unsubstantiated claims, the order contends that LaCroix had argued that the 

Department’s detention of him was in violation of the “anti-commandeering 

principle of the Tenth Amendment.” 

 The order then makes findings that are contrary to the unrefuted evidence 

submitted at the hearing. For example, the order finds that the detainer request was 

founded on mere belief by ICE that it had a basis to “inquire further as to LaCroix’s

status.” The detainer request was submitted with the County’s written response to 

the trial court’s directive and contrary to the trial court’s order, it unequivocally 

states that a finding of probable cause for removal had been made and a final order 

of removal has been issued. Additionally, at the hearing, counsel for the County 

reiterated that a finding of probable cause for removal had been made, LaCroix had 
 16

been given a hearing before an immigration judge, and thereafter the immigration 

judge issued a final order for LaCroix’s removal from the United States. Upon the 

issuance of that order, federal authorities had the right to seize LaCroix. The 

County’s cooperation simply provided ICE with the option of picking LaCroix up 

from the county jail within forty-eight hours of his plea, rather than seizing him as 

he left the courtroom. Thus, the trial court’s order is factually incorrect. 

 Lastly, I feel compelled to address the trial court’s failure to follow binding 

precedent, as this is not the first time this trial judge has failed to do so. See State v. 

Washington, 114 So. 3d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). Just as in Washington, the trial 

court failed to follow binding state precedent, and instead, relied on non-state, nonbinding opinions to support its position. In Washington, this Court reminded the 

same trial judge that “[t]he decision[s] of the district courts of appeal represent the 

law of Florida unless and until they are overruled by [the Florida Supreme] Court.” 

Washington, 114 So. 3d at 185 (quoting Stanfill v. State, 383 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 

1980)). “Thus, in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind 

all Florida trial courts.” Washington, 114 So. 3d at 185 (quoting Pardo v. State, 596 

So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992)). 

 In Ricketts, the Fourth District unequivocally held that “a state court cannot 

adjudicate the validity of the federal detainer, as the area of immigration and 

naturalization is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.” 
 17

Ricketts, 985 So. 2d at 593 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982)). “The 

constitutionality of his detention pursuant to both the I-247 and I-203 federal forms 

is a question of law for the federal courts.” Id. at 592-93. As the opinion explains: 

Once appellant posts bond on his state charges or his state sentence 

expires, he will be “released” from state custody and then booked on 

the federal immigration detainer. At that point, the sheriff will not be 

holding appellant pursuant to state authority but pursuant to federal 

authority, and the legality of the detainer and the process by which he 

is held will be a question for the federal courts. 

Id. at 593 (footnote omitted). 

Just as in Ricketts, LaCroix completed his state sentence, he was booked on a 

federal immigration detainer, and he was being held pursuant to federal authority 

when the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. And, in this case, LaCroix 

was released to federal custody prior to the hearing. Thus, LaCroix’s attacks upon 

the legality and/or constitutionality of his temporary detention by the County 

pursuant to the federal detainer was not properly raised in the state circuit court and 

should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

The trial court’s findings of coercion are also not supported by the record. 

The trial court’s order claims that the County was coerced into cooperating with the 

federal government. However, the County, which was ordered to respond to the 

petition, made no such claim and the record on appeal demonstrates the opposite. 

In response to concerns by the County Mayor and the County Commissioners 

regarding the potential loss of certain federal funds if declared a “sanctuary 
 18

jurisdiction,” the County Commission called for a special meeting to be held on 

February 17, 2017 to discuss the County’s policy regarding federal immigration 

detainer requests. Prior to the meeting, a legal opinion was requested and received 

from the County Attorney’s Office. In its opinion, the County Attorney advised, 

among other things, that the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 

protected the County from being compelled to enforce a federal regulatory program, 

and any cooperation between the County and the federal government with respect to 

immigration enforcement “must, as a matter of law, be voluntary.” The opinion also 

advised that the County had not been designated a sanctuary jurisdiction, the current 

definition of sanctuary jurisdictions did not include the County, and the vast majority 

of the County’s federal funding was not at risk whether or not the County decided 

to revise its federal detainer policy. 

At the Commission meeting on February 17, 2017, the County Commission 

considered six separate resolutions offering differing levels of cooperation with the 

federal government regarding immigration detainer requests. After its discussion, 

the County Commission voted to return to its pre-2013 policy and honor federal 

detainer requests, provided a finding of probable cause for removal had been made. 

Further, the County states in its answer brief before this Court that, “To date, no 

grants issued by the Department of Justice and Homeland Security—nor any other 
 19

federal department—have been conditioned on voluntary compliance with ICE 

immigration detainers.” 

Although the Tenth Amendment protects states and local governments from 

being “commandeered” or compelled to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 

program, it does not foreclose the federal government from “encourag[ing] a State 

[or local government] to regulate in a particular way, or . . . hold out incentives to 

the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices.” New York v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 166 (1992); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 

203, 206 (1987) (holding that the federal government “may attach conditions on the 

receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power to further broad 

policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the 

recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives”). 

Notably, the County, itself, has not alleged coercion, and if the County wished 

to make such a claim, its challenge would be in federal court. 

Conclusion

In my opinion, the trial court impermissibly crossed the line between neutral 

arbiter of the facts to that of an advocate, preparing and issuing an order before the 

filing of any motion or petition by LaCroix based on arguments not made by 

LaCroix. The trial court’s order granting LaCroix’s petition also misstated the 

record evidence, improperly relied on non-record “evidence” culled from non-
 20

authoritative newspaper articles and failed to apply binding precedent. Thus, for the 

reasons articulated in the majority opinion and in this specially concurring opinion, 

I agree that reversal of the trial court’s order is mandated.