J-S69023-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DANIEL GLEED 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 646 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered March 19, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-38-CR-0002000-2006

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2018

Daniel Gleed appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lebanon County, dismissing his first petition under the PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546. After our review, 

we vacate and remand. 

Gleed was charged with rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault of 

a child, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of 

children, and corruption of minors. The victim was nine years old at the time 

of the offenses, which occurred during the spring and summer of 2006. 

Pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, the Commonwealth nol prossed the rape 

charge and Gleed entered a guilty plea to the remaining charges. On June 

29, 2007, the court sentenced Gleed to an aggregate term of imprisonment 

of 6 to 17 years. At the time of sentencing, Gleed was informed he would be 
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required to register as a sex offender with the Pennsylvania State Police for 

life.1 Gleed did not file a direct appeal.

On September 8, 2017, following our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), Gleed filed a pro se

PCRA petition seeking a determination that he be relieved of registration 

requirements under Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”).

2 On September 12, 2017, the court entered an order appointing 

the public defender’s office as counsel, and ordered counsel to file a 

supplemental or amended PCRA petition by October 12, 2017. Order, 

9/12/17. There is no indication in the docket that counsel entered an 

appearance on behalf of Gleed.3 

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1 At that time, Megan’s Law III was in effect. 

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. In Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court held that SORNA’s purpose was punitive and its retroactive application 

to past sexual offenders violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. In response, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted legislation to 

replace the portions of SORNA that the Court invalidated. See 2018 Pa. 

Legis. Serv. Act 2018-2029 (H.B. 925) (approved June 12, 2018) (“Act 29”), 

amending Title 42 (Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated 

Statutes. Act 29 became effective on June 12, 2018. The registration 

requirements found in Subchapter I of Act 29 apply to defendants, like Gleed, 

who committed their offenses on or after April 22, 1996 (effective date of 

Megan’s Law I), but before December 20, 2012 (effective date of SORNA).

3 We note that Brian Deiderick, Esquire, is copied on the court’s orders and 

listed in the certificate of service of the Commonwealth’s filings; however, 

there is no entry of appearance on the docket, and there are no counseled 

petitions or motions filed on behalf of Gleed in the record. 
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On January 19, 2018, Gleed filed a pro se petition titled, “Supplemental 

Issue in Support of Filed PCRA,” stating that no attorney has contacted him 

and no amended petition has been filed. See Supplemental Petition, 1/19/18, 

at 1. The Commonwealth filed a response, requesting PCRA relief be granted 

in part and denied in part, in that Gleed was not subject to SORNA’s reporting 

requirements, but was subject to the appropriate registration requirements 

pursuant to General Assembly’s enactment of post-Muniz legislation. See

Commonwealth’s Response to PCRA Petition, 3/14/18. The court entered an 

order stating: “Defendant is not subject to the SORNA registration 

requirements. Defendant is required to register pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9799.55.” Order, 3/19/18. Gleed filed this pro se appeal, arguing the PCRA 

court erred in its determination that he remains subject to registration 

requirements pursuant to post-Muniz legislation. We note also that Gleed 

filed a pro se letter on May 7, 2018, indicating, again, that despite the court’s 

order appointing counsel, “no counsel had ever been named [and] no counsel 

ever contacted me.” Pro Se Letter, 5/7/18. 

To the extent Gleed’s convictions may subject him to registration under 

the post-Muniz legislative changes to SORNA or another version of Megan’s

Law, this Court offers no relief. However, without question, Gleed was entitled 
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to counsel on his first timely PCRA petition,

4 unless, based upon a Grazier5

hearing, the court determined he properly waived his right to counsel. There 

is no record of such in this case. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 

A.2d 455, 458-59 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (“Given the current time 

constraints of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545, a defendant’s first PCRA petition, where the 

rule-based right to counsel unconditionally attaches, may well be the 

defendant’s sole opportunity to seek redress for such errors and omissions. 

Without the input of an attorney, important rights and defenses may be 

forever lost.”). As such, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand this 

case for a full waiver colloquy pursuant to Grazier, supra. 

Order vacated. Case remanded with instruction to conduct a colloquy 

in accordance with Grazier. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/14/2018

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4 See Rule of Criminal Procedure 904(C): “Except as provided in paragraph 

(H) [pertaining to death penalty cases], when an unrepresented defendant 

satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure 

counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the 

defendant's first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

904(C).

5 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).