In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

STYLES TAYLOR and

KEON THOMAS,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:01‐cr‐00073‐JTM‐PRC — James T. Moody, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018 — DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2018

____________________

Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. This is a case of one tragedy beget‐

ting another. Styles Taylor and Keon Thomas grew up as no

child should: abandoned by their fathers, abused by their

mothers, and beset by poverty. With little, they, unfortu‐

nately, turned to crime. As young adults they robbed a local

gun shop, and in the process Taylor shot and killed the shop’s

owner—a 73‐year‐old, near‐deaf World War II veteran and
2 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

grandfather. Taylor and Thomas were charged with multiple

offenses, including felony murder. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j).  

Their case is now before us for a fifth time. In this appeal,

Taylor and Thomas challenge their respective life sentences as

substantively unreasonable in light of mitigating factors, most

notably, their troubled upbringings. The facts of this case are

indeed difficult, but the law is clear. Where, as here, a district

judge thoroughly examines and rejects the defendant’s miti‐

gation arguments in issuing a within‐guidelines sentence, we

presume that the sentence is reasonable. Taylor and Thomas

have not rebutted that presumption, so we affirm.  

I.

Taylor and Thomas were raised in Hammond, Indiana.

They sold drugs together but did not make enough money to

get ahead, causing them to escalate their crime. On the morn‐

ing of March 20, 2000, the pair left a birthday party at Taylor’s

home. When they returned, they shared with some of their

friends and relatives that they had just committed a robbery

and that Taylor had “hit a lick.”

The two had robbed a gun shop, Firearms Unlimited. Dur‐

ing the armed robbery, Taylor held the shop’s owner, Frank

Freund, at gun point. Some testimony suggested that Taylor

believed he saw Freund reach for a gun, causing Taylor to

shoot Freund. Other facts made that testimony implausible:

forensic evidence showed that Freund was chewing a sand‐

wich at the time Taylor shot him. Either way, Freund was hit

twice, once in the neck and once in the face. Evidence indi‐

cated that Taylor and Thomas made out with numerous fire‐

arms, which they later sold on the streets. Some of the weap‐

ons made their way to Chicago; others were never found.  
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 3

A grand jury returned an indictment against Taylor and

Thomas in April 2001 and a superseding indictment in Octo‐

ber 2003. The superseding indictment charged: Hobbs Act

conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; Hobbs Act robbery, id.; and mur‐

der during a robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j). It further charged

Taylor and Thomas with felony possession of a firearm, 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).

A jury convicted Taylor and Thomas on all counts in Sep‐

tember 2004. The government initially requested the death

penalty, but, after the jury rejected it for Taylor, the govern‐

ment dropped the request for Thomas. The district judge sen‐

tenced Taylor and Thomas to life in prison on the felony‐mur‐

der count and lengthy sentences on the remaining counts.

Taylor and Thomas appealed. We twice ordered an eviden‐

tiary hearing and supplemental proceedings on whether the

government’s peremptory challenges during voir dire vio‐

lated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). United States v. Tay‐

lor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Taylor, 277

F. App’x 610 (7th Cir. 2008). In United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d

901 (7th Cir. 2011), we ordered a new trial.  

The second trial began in May 2012, and again a jury con‐

victed Taylor and Thomas on all counts. The district judge, a

different one than the judge who previously presided overthe

case, also imposed life sentences. Taylor and Thomas again

appealed. In United States v. Taylor, 794 F.3d 705 (7th Cir.

2015), we held (and the government agreed) that the district

court procedurally erred by failing to explain its reasons for

rejecting Taylor’s and Thomas’s substantial mitigation argu‐

ments. We therefore ordered resentencing.  
4 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

II.

The district judge resentenced Taylor and Thomas in Sep‐

tember 2017. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended a

life sentence for both men because of theirfelony‐murder con‐

victions. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a). Both men also had height‐

ened criminal histories due to previous convictions.  

At sentencing, Taylor requested a below‐guidelines sen‐

tence of 30 years in prison. He argued, as he had at the previ‐

ous sentencing, that his horrific upbringing and youth at the

time of the offense merited leniency under Section 3553(a)’s

factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Taylor was born to a single

mother who did not want him. She tried to kill him in utero

by drinking heavily, abusing drugs, and even taking quinine

capsules. Taylor survived, but he was born three months

premature weighing only three and half pounds. His life still

mattered little to his mother. She repeatedly abandoned him

for stretches of time, and, when she was around, abused him.

She beat him with belts, cords, and broomsticks to discipline

him; she fed him alcohol and blew marijuana smoke in his

face to pacify him; and she called him foul names to demean

him. Her home, where Taylor usually lived, was a local site

for gambling, prostitution, and drug consumption. When his

mother was away, Taylor frequently lived with his aunt. She,

too, beat and neglected him. Taylor did have two role mod‐

els—a different aunt and his grandmother—but they both

died of cancer in Taylor’s teenage years.  

Taylor was on the streets early. As a toddler, local men

used him as a pawn in their burglaries. As a middle‐schooler,

he learned how to gamble, commit crimes, and deal drugs. He

entered the social‐services system at age 11, where profession‐

als observed his emotional, social, and sleep abnormalities.
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 5

He was diagnosed at age 13 with an IQ of 71. Unable to keep

up at school, Taylor began to accumulate a criminal record: at

age 11, he was convicted of burglary; at 16, he was convicted

of armed robbery; and at 18, he was convicted of possession

of drugs. At age 19, he committed the armed robbery with

Thomas and killed Freund.  

Taylor also highlighted at his resentencing the efforts he

has made at reform since incarceration. In prison, Taylor com‐

pleted hundreds of educational programs, achieved his GED,

and has become a better father to his children. A retesting of

his IQ put it at 92, which an expert attributed in part to the

structure of prison. Taylor further cited statistics showing that

most homicide defendants serve less‐than‐life sentences, and

he submitted that he posed a low risk of recidivism given the

age at which he would exit prison even with a 30‐year sen‐

tence.  

At Thomas’s sentencing, he too requested a below‐guide‐

lines sentence of 30 years. Like Taylor, he argued that his trou‐

bled childhood and familial disfunction warranted less than

life in prison. As an expert report submitted by Thomas

showed, his family history was rife with alcohol and drug

abuse. Thomas’s mother was no exception. She became preg‐

nant with Thomas at age 18 but continued to use drugs and

alcohol often. After Thomas’s birth, his mother struggled to

raise him and, later, his younger sister. Thomas’s mother

never held steady employment and struggled with a crack‐

cocaine addiction. She also suffered frequent abuse from the

men she dated. Thomas saw his mother beaten with a ham‐

mer, chased with a knife, and threatened with a pistol.

Thomas and his sister suffered abuse of their own, most often

at the hands of their mother. Thomas’s home, like Taylor’s,
6 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

was no place for a child, often overrun with partygoers using

illegal drugs and consuming alcohol in excess.

Thomas’s father was not around during his childhood. He

moved to Minnesota when Thomas was young. Thomas vis‐

ited occasionally, but those visits often went poorly with

Thomas witnessing his father abuse drugs, alcohol, and

women in front of him.  

Thomas also faced loss. When Thomas was age 13, his fa‐

ther’s girlfriend stabbed his father to death. Less than a year

later, one of Thomas’s closest friends died, potentially the re‐

sult of an overdose. The decedent’s sister, another one of

Thomas’s closest friends, was murdered by her boyfriend not

long after. Thomas struggled afterthese deaths, isolating him‐

self and attempting to deal with mental‐health issues. But he

never received proper treatment. He later lost two more

friends to violent deaths. Thomas also struggled in school. As

a teenager, he turned to the streets, drugs, and alcohol. He

smoked marijuana daily, drank often, and carried a gun. At

age 19, he went to prison for felony robbery. He had misde‐

meanors at ages 18 and 19 for battery and resisting law en‐

forcement.  

Thomas resubmitted an earlier expert report, which

opined that he suffered from dysthymic disorder (a form of

depression, essentially) and substance dependence. The same

expert created a table comparing Thomas’s biographical, de‐

velopmental, and psychological data to predictors of youth

violence identified by the Department of Justice. Thomas

demonstrated 23 out of the 27 factors, including childhood

maltreatment, academic failure, poverty, and exposure to vi‐

olence and racial prejudice.  
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 7

In addition to citing his disadvantaged youth at resentenc‐

ing, Thomas pointed to a few other materially mitigating

facts. First, he was not the shooter; Taylor was. Second,

Thomas had a purportedly strong record while in federal

prison, including the completion of 69 educational courses in

parenting, life skills, and cognitive thinking. Third, despite

his general absence, he had a good relationship with his son,

who has gone on to marry and enlist in the military. At resen‐

tencing, Thomas expressed remorse. He also contended, as

Taylor did, that the average homicide defendant does not

serve life in prison and that he was not a candidate for recidi‐

vism given how old he would be when he completed his

prison term, which would be lengthy in any event.

The district judge again imposed a life sentence on both

Taylor and Thomas forthe felony‐murder count, plus lengthy,

consecutive sentences for the remaining counts. For Taylor,

the judge called the crime “a senseless, thoughtless” and “cal‐

lous[ ]” killing. The district judge also rejected Taylor’s argu‐

ment—that after a 30‐year sentence, he would no longer be a

danger to society—because of Taylor’s already recidivist and

criminal history.  

The district judge then described at length Taylor’s “hor‐

rific upbringing.” He explained, however, that this case came

down to “personal choice” and Taylor’s decision to kill

Freund. The district judge considered, but gave little weight

to, Taylor’s previous low IQ score. He reasoned that Taylor’s

intelligence was not tested near the time of the crime and that

he did not think Taylor’s intelligence so abnormal that Taylor

could have not appreciated the consequences of his conduct.

The district judge further addressed a letter Taylor wrote to

the judge. In it, Taylor said that he hoped to get past this
8 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

“unfortunate life changing situation” and hoped to see “some

type of light at the end of this dark tunnel.” According to the

district judge, this reflected a lack of acceptance and personal

responsibility.  

For Thomas, the district judge provided similar reasoning.

He emphasized the heinousness of the offense and killing. He

accounted for Thomas’s awful childhood, but noted, again,

that Thomas had made the decision to partake in a violent

robbery knowing the possible consequences. As the district

judge put it:  

No child should experience with [sic] Mr. Thomas

did in growing up. No person should have to strug‐

gle with such mental health issues or substance de‐

pendence, and yet the experience is all too common.

But despite these terrible circumstances, most peo‐

ple with these characteristics do not end up in first‐

degree murders ... . [B]ased on my personal obser‐

vations and my 35‐plus years of sitting on this bench,

I can say that one important factor that separates

those who end up criminals from those who do not

is choice, personal choice ... . I have carefully con‐

sidered Mr. Thomas’s very harsh upbringing and

mental health struggles, but I have also carefully

considered his decision making.

The district judge rejected the reliance on average‐sentencing

data as unpersuasive. He further noted a concern for protect‐

ing the public from Thomas given his criminal history.

III.  

Taylor and Thomas appeal theirlife sentences. They do not

contend that the district judge procedurally erred by failing

to consider any of their mitigating arguments under Section
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 9

3553(a). They instead argue that, even after the district judge’s

full consideration, the decision to impose life sentences was

substantively unreasonable.  

This argument is a steep uphill climb for any defendant to

make. Section 3553(a) provides a template: it instructs sen‐

tencing judges to consider several factors, including the na‐

ture and circumstances of the offense, the history and charac‐

teristics of the defendant, the need to afford specific and gen‐

eral deterrence, and potentially unwarranted sentencing dis‐

parities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But it leaves to the sentencing

judge’s discretion how to fill in that template based on the

facts and circumstances of a particular case and a particular

defendant. United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir.

2016). For that reason, our review is for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2017). A

sentencing judge’s weighing of Section 3553(a)’s factors

“must fall within the bounds of reason, but those bounds are

wide.” United States v. Cunningham, 883 F.3d 690, 702 (7th Cir.

2018) (quotations and modifications omitted).  

Where, as here, a sentence falls within the properly calcu‐

lated guidelines range, our review is even more deferential:

we presume that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.

Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 498 (7th Cir. 2018). This rule holds even

when the guidelines range is life in prison. United States v.

Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 908 (7th Cir. 2010). To keep the presump‐

tion of reasonableness, a sentencing judge “need provide only

a justification for its sentence adequate to allow for meaning‐

ful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sen‐

tencing.” United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir.

2014) (per curiam). A defendant bears the burden to rebut the

presumption of reasonableness, which he may only do by
10 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145

showing that the sentence does not comport with Section

3553(a)’s factors. United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 278

(7th Cir. 2018).

Taylor and Thomas have not carried that burden. The dis‐

trict judge considered, weighed, and applied the relevant Sec‐

tion 3553(a) factors. He evaluated the history and characteris‐

tics of Taylor and Thomas, which he thought cut both ways—

they faced traumatic upbringings and likely experienced

mental‐health problems, but they, unlike many who endure

similar suffering, made the decision to turn to violent crime.

The district judge evaluated the nature and circumstances of

the offense, which he found to be a callous and heartless kill‐

ing of an innocent elderly man. And he considered the need

for both specific and general deterrence. He concluded that

Taylor and Thomas had repeatedly shown a propensity for

crime that he did not think would extinguish with age, and

the community needed to know that fatal crimes would be

severely punished. The district judge also considered and re‐

jected Taylor and Thomas’s arguments about the need to

avoid sentencing disparities, concluding that the averages

they cited were unavailing and did not account for the specif‐

ics of their crime. Indeed, as Taylor and Thomas recognized at

their sentencings, the district judge considered each of their

arguments. The life sentences he imposed accounted for the

choices Taylor and Thomas made, the severity of their crime,

and the need for deterrence.  

On appeal, Taylor and Thomas rehash arguments made to,

and rejected by, the district judge. They recount their up‐

bringings and explain how the trauma they faced in their

formative years led them to crime. We have no doubt about

the validity of those arguments, and, if the district judge had
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 11

failed to account for them, Taylor and Thomas may be entitled

to a resentencing. But he did, thoroughly, and we do not sit to

substitute our judgment with that of the sentencing judge.

E.g., United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 2015).

Taylor and Thomas also recite the arguments they made be‐

low about, for example, their growth in prison and the need

to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. It is enough to

say, again, that the district judge fully considered those argu‐

ments, and concluded that they did not outweigh the choice

Taylor and Thomas made to engage in violent crime and take

another life.  

Ordering a defendant to spend the remainder of his life in

prison, either actually or effectively, is not a punishment that

sentencing judges should mete out “lightly.” United States v.

Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 299 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)). The sen‐

tencing decisions here, however, reflect careful evaluations of

the facts and circumstances. We have no grounds to reverse.  

The district court’s judgments are therefore AFFIRMED.