IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0141

Filed June 3, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF A.E.,

Minor Child,

A.M., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Kimberly Ayotte, 

District Associate Judge.

A biological father, whose parental rights were previously terminated, 

challenges the denial of his motion to intervene in a child-in-need-of-assistance 

action. AFFIRMED.

Jacob van Cleaf of Van Cleaf & McCormack Law Firm, LLP, Des Moines, 

for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Charles K. Phillips, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Deborah L. Johnson of Deborah L. Johnson Law Office PC, Altoona, 

attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

This case involves the denial of a motion to intervene in a child-welfare 

case. In an unusual turn, the unsuccessful intervenor, Arthur, is the eleven-yearold child’s biological father. Arthur voluntarily terminated his parental rights when 

his daughter, A.E., was an infant. Yet Arthur maintained contact with A.E. through 

her childhood, including somewhat regular visitation, with the consent of her 

mother. 

In October 2017, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) removed 

A.E. from her mother’s care. Two years later, Arthur sought to intervene in the 

child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings under Iowa Code 

section 232.91(2) (2019) and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.407. In briefing, 

Arthur alleged he was interested in being considered a “suitable person” under 

section 232.117(3)(c).

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The juvenile court denied his motion. The court emphasized Arthur had not 

“consistently been involved in his biological daughter’s life—including no contact 

within the last year.” The court ruled intervention was not in A.E.’s best interest, 

citing her current placement with relatives, including her sibling, her need for 

permanency, and Arthur’s inconsistent contact. 

Arthur now appeals, faulting the juvenile court for evaluating his interest as 

that of a parent, though he did not claim a parental interest. On our review, framing 

 

1 That provision directs the juvenile court, after termination, to transfer 

guardianship and custody of the child to one of the following: (1) the DHS, (2) a 

child-placing agency, or (3) a non-custodial parent, other relative, or other suitable 

person. See Iowa Code § 232.117(3)(a)–(c).
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Arthur’s interest as an “other suitable person” with whom A.E. could be placed, we

find no error in the juvenile court’s denial of the motion to intervene.2 

Rule 1.407(1) sets out when a person can intervene in an action:

a. When a statute confers an unconditional right to 

intervene.[3]

b. When the applicant claims an interest relating to the 

property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the 

applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 

practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that

interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by 

existing parties.

A proposed intervenor has an “interest” if the legal proceeding will affect a legal 

right. In re A.G., 558 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1997). “An interest that is indirect, 

remote or conjectural is generally insufficient to support intervention.” Id. “[T]he 

mere interest or desire to adopt a child will not qualify as a sufficient interest.” 

H.N.B., 619 N.W.2d at 343. 

A bit of background is necessary to our analysis. A.E. was born in 2008. 

Arthur voluntarily terminated his parental rights when she was six months old, 

noting his lack of financial resources. He did not see her again until her third 

birthday. For a few years, he had regular visits with A.E. with the assent of her 

mother. At the hearing on his motion, he testified he saw A.E. “[t]hree or four” days 

 

2

In most child-welfare appeals, our review is de novo—looking at the facts and 

law anew. In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). But we review the juvenile 

court’s denial of a motion to intervene for the correction of legal error. In re H.N.B., 

619 N.W.2d 340, 342–43 (Iowa 2000). Although our review is on error, we accord 

discretion to the juvenile court’s determination whether the person seeking to 

intervene is “interested” in the matter being litigated. Id. We focus on the child’s 

welfare; the ultimate decision “must be compatible with the child’s best interests.” 

Id. at 344. 

3 No unconditional right exists under the circumstances of this case; Arthur does 

not claim such a right. 
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each week anywhere from thirty minutes to “all day plus overnight.” But Arthur

largely lost contact when the DHS removed A.E. from her mother’s care in October 

2017. He testified that after the removal he spoke with A.E. on the phone once a 

week. Even those weekly calls stopped in July 2019. 

Despite their waning interaction, Arthur still bases his motion to intervene 

on his “close, ongoing relationship with A.E.” He urges that he qualifies as an 

“other suitable person” to be considered a placement for A.E. 

The juvenile court may transfer custody to a “suitable person” after a 

dispositional hearing. Iowa Code § 232.102(1)(a). Our legislature did not define 

the term “suitable person.” In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 508 (Iowa 2014). In that 

vacuum, courts have given the term a “flexible” meaning, leaning on the particular 

facts of each intervention petition. Id. “The sufficiency of the interest asserted by 

the intervenor under the ‘suitable person’ provision is considered in light of the 

nature of the proceeding and surrounding facts and circumstances.” H.N.B., 619 

N.W.2d at 343. “[T]he closeness of the relationship between the child in interest 

and the intervenor is a critical factor in determining the sufficiency of the interest 

of an intervenor.” Id. at 344. 

The juvenile court correctly found insufficient support for Arthur’s claim that 

the strength of his relationship with A.E. secured his interest in intervening. Arthur 

knew in 2017 that A.E.’s CINA case was opened. He could have pursued a 

placement or guardianship at any point. Yet he did not seek to intervene until 

2019. The record shows Arthur has not seen A.E. for two years and stopped 

calling her six months before the hearing. Those gaps in contact undermine his 
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claim that their close relationship qualifies him as a suitable person to assume her 

care. 

What does A.E. want? Reports conflict. According to her mother, A.E. does 

not want to see Arthur or have a relationship with him. But at the hearing, A.E.’s 

attorney shared her recent conversation with the child:

I asked her, among other things, if there was anything else that she

would like the judge to know, and she said that she would like to see 

her father. And it kind of came out of the blue. I asked her when the 

last time she saw her father was, and she said when she was nine 

years old . . . .

. . . I asked what she was envisioning, and she said, you know,

like regular divorced families, every other weekend and some time 

during the week.

For the record, A.E.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed intervention. The 

GAL recognized A.E. was “a remarkable child who definitely has strong opinions 

and has thought them out.” But the GAL argued it was not in A.E.’s best interests 

to remove her from her current placement with her maternal grandparents and halfsister. By all reports, A.E. is doing well in that placement. 

Deferring to the juvenile court’s determination that Arthur lacked a sufficient 

interest in the CINA case, we find no error in the denial of his motion to intervene. 

We reach this conclusion even though A.E. expressed an interest in seeing him 

again. To be clear, this not a case in which the proposed intervenor is a stranger 

to the child. See In re B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1994) (noting 

grandparents were “strangers” to the child but still allowing intervention under the 

unique circumstances where child had an unusual genetic disorder). But neither

is it the kind of relationship with a “suitable person” that courts have found justifies

intervention. See, e.g., J.C., 857 N.W.2d at 508 (allowing established but 
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nonbiological father to intervene because he had custody of child for three years 

while mother was in prison); In re C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1991) (allowing couple to intervene and seek custody of two children when they 

babysat those children ten to fifteen hours per week, attended their medical 

appointments, gave them birthday presents, and contributed to them financially, 

noting the couple was “involved in the routine care of these children, and the 

children have come to rely upon their love and care”). 

Unlike those circumstances, Arthur’s belated and generalized desire to be 

considered a placement—and A.E.’s interest in renewing visitation with her

biological father after not seeing him for two years—do not together create a

sufficient legal interest. As voiced by her GAL, denial of the petition was in the 

child’s best interests. The court did not err in denying the motion to intervene.

AFFIRMED.