Award filed under seal, Trustmark’s proposed Order maintains the confidentiality of the Award
by not disclosing its content, but Hancock’s proposed Order discloses some contents of the
Award, contrary to what the parties agreed, In the end, therefore, ] find that Trustmark’s

proposed Order is more appropriate.

For the reasons above, Trustmark’s Petition to Confirm an Arbitration Award is
GRANTED, and Hancock’s Cross-Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award and Motion to Strike
Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) Pctitioner’s Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award are

DENIED.

ENTER:

_ > dof

James B. Zagel ov
nited States Distfict Judge

DATE: (al b 2005



“(hen stops” in accordance with the requirements of Rule 58. Id. The only affirmative action
required of either party under the Award is for Hancock to pay Trustmark $366,330. Just like a
Court’s reasoning should appear in an opinion and not an order, the Panel’s reasoning is not
included in the Order. Instead, the proposed Order provides only “the relief to which the
prevailing party is entitled.” TDK Elecs. Corp., 321 F.3d at 679. Hancock’s proposed Order,
however, includes at least some of the Panel’s reasoning in addition to saying “who is liable for
how much.” Citizens Elec. Corp., 68 F.3d at 1021. For example, Hancock’s Order includes the
finding that the “[rJeinsurance [clontracts” at issue in the arbitration “are valid and binding,” and
that “retrocession business is covered and properly ceded to the contracts in dispute.” Its Order
also includes the Panel’s findings concerning premium owed under the contracts, less claims
allowed in the arbitration, that resulted in the Panel’s award of $366,330 to Trustmark.
Hancock’s proposed Order is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's admonition that a
judgment should omit “reasons and legal conclusions” behind a decision and should simply state
“who is liable” and for “how much,” Jd. Hancock apparently believes that the Order should
summarize the Panel’s reasoning that resulted in the Award, but the Seventh Circuit has held that
this approach should not be done in preparing ajudgment.' 7DK Elecs. Corp., 321 F.3d at 679;
Citizens Elec., 68 F.3d at 1021; Oris, 29 F.3d at 1163. Moreover, Trustmark’s proposed Order is
consistent with the Confidentiality Agreement entered into in the underlying arbitration, wherein

the parties agreed that in the context of a confirmation proceeding, they would seek to have the

1 There is an additional dispute between the parties as to whether Hancock’s proposed
Order fairly summarizes the Panel’s findings, but discussion of this issue is unnecessary in light
of my decision to exclude any summary of findings.

3



AO 450(Rev, 5/85) Judgment ina Civil Case
United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois

Eastern Division

TRUSTMARK JNSURANCE JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
COMPANY

v. Case Number: 04 C 2649
JOHN HANCOCK LIFE
INSURANCE CO.

Oo Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been
tried and the jury rendered its verdict.

| Decision by Court. This action came to hearing before the Court. The issues have
been heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment is entered in favor of Trustmark
Insurance Company and against John Hancock Life Insurance Company in the sum of
$366,330.00 pursuant the arbitration award as ordered by the Panel.

Michael W. Dobbins, Clerk of Court

Date: 6/17/2004 om ; U/ahh——

Donald Walker, Deputy Clerk



Minute Grder Foran (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Tllinois

Name of Assigned Judge James B. Zagel Sitting Judge If Other
or Magistrate Judge than Assigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 04 C 2649 DATE 6/17/2004
CASE TRUSTMARK INSURANCE CO, vs. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE CO.
TITLE
{In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.z., plaintiff, defendam, 3rd party plaintiff, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented, |
DOCKET ENTRY:
(1) a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above. |
(2) a Brief in support of motion due
(3) a Answer bricf to motion due, ___.- Reply to answer brief due_____.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon__—__setfor__ at.
(5) im) Status hearing[held/continucd to] [set for/re-set for]on set for __aat
{6) im Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on_ set for at.
(7) im ‘Tvialfset for/re-set for}on ___at__
(8) oO [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continuedto ss at_
(oy Oo This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to]

OOERCP4Gn) OLocal Rule 41.1 GFRCP41(a(1) C) FRCP41(a)(2).

(0) «o< [Other docket entry] Plaintiffs petition to confirm arbitration award is granted. Motion (5-1) to
strike plaintiff{-petitioner’s petition is denied. Cross petition (6-1) by defendant-respondent to confirm
arbitration award is denicd. Enter memorandum opinion and order.

(i) @ [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.]

No notices required, advised in open court Document

Number
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VUN 4.8 2004

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY,
a mutual insurance company organized
under the laws of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner,
No. 04 € 2649
v. Judge James B. Zagel

JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Massachusetts corporation,

Respondent. n\)
NY

JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE Wee ak
COMPANY, f/k/a John Hancock Mutual AN)
Life Insurance Company,

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
Vv,

TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Trustmark Insurance Company (‘“lrustmark”) is a mutual
insurance company organized under the laws of the State of Illinois with its principal place of
business located in Lake Forest, Illinois. Respondent John Hancock Tile Insurance Company
(“Hancock”) is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts.
The parties entered into a series of Excess of Loss Reinsurance Agrecments, each of which
contains a mandatory arbitration clause for disputes that cannot be resolved by compromise.

Such a dispute arose, and as was required, a three-member arbitration panel (the “Panel”’) was

|X



convened to resolve the dispute. On February 27, 2003, the Panel convened an organizational
mecting in Chicago, Illinois. After this meeting, the parties took depositions and obtained
documents (rom each other. From January 12-23, 2004, an arbitration hearing was held in New
York City. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Panel issued its Final Award on March 23,
2004. ‘The partics have now cross-petitioned pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9
U.S.C. § 9, for a judgment confirming the Award.

The FAA provides that an order confirming an arbitration award is a “judgment” that
should be “docketed” in the same manner “as if it were rendered” in any other civil action. 9
U.S.C. § 13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 governs the entry of judgments in civil actions,
and the Seventh Circuit has noted that such judgments “should omit reasons and collateral
matters and provide only the rclicf to which the prevailing party is entitled.” TDK Elecs. Corp. v.
Draiman, 321 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159,
1163 (7th Cir. 1994) (a judgment “should be a self-contained document, saying who has won and
what relief has been awarded, but omitting the reasons for this disposition, which should appear
in the court’s opinion”). Put more pointedly, a Rule 58 judgment “says who is liable for how
much, then stops” and does not delve into the “reasons and legal conclusions” behind a decision.
Citizens Elee. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins., 68 F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 1995).

While both Trusimark and Hancock seek the entry of an Order confirming the Award,
they disagree over its content. Trustmark seeks the entry of an Order providing that the Award is
confirmed, and that Hancock is required to pay Trustmark $366,330 as ordered by the Panel.

Trustmark’s proposed order confirming the Award does exactly what the Seventh Circuit says a

judgment should do -- it states that Hancock is liable to pay Trustmark the sum of $366,330 and