Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 22-0435

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Dorothy Hampton,

Petitioner,

v. 

Leonard Thome,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BOYD, dissenting.

Suppose you tell your neighbor, “I will give you a hundred dollars 

if you cut my grass this week.” Your neighbor doesn’t cut your grass this 

week, but next week he asks you for the hundred dollars. “But you didn’t 

cut my grass last week,” you protest. “Well,” says your clever neighbor, 

“you didn’t say I wouldn’t get the money if I didn’t cut your grass!” True 

enough, you told him what he’d get if he cut your grass, but you didn’t 

say he wouldn’t get it if he didn’t.

According to the Court, you owe your neighbor a hundred dollars. 

The Texas Medical Liability Act tolls its two-year statute of limitation 

for 75 days if a claimant gives timely notice “accompanied by” a 
2

“specified” medical authorization form that identifies all of her health 

care providers. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 74.051(c), .052(a). But it 

doesn’t say the claimant doesn’t get the tolling if the claimant fails to 

give the notice, or if the notice isn’t timely, or if the notice is not 

accompanied by the authorization form, or if the form fails to identify all 

of the claimant’s health care providers. According to the Court, it simply 

“does not answer that question.” Ante at 12 n.3. But of course, it does. If 

a claimant doesn’t do what the statute says a claimant must do to get 

the tolling, that claimant doesn’t get the tolling.

Dorothy Hampton alleges Dr. Leonard Thome negligently 

released her from the hospital before he should have. But Hampton sued 

Thome more than two years after her claim accrued. As a result, the 

Texas Medical Liability Act’s statute of limitations bars her claim. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a).1 Hampton argues, however, 

that the limitations period was tolled for 75 days after she gave Thome 

written notice of her claim, and that she filed suit within that 75-day 

grace period. 

The Act provides that “[n]otice given as provided in this chapter

shall toll the applicable statute of limitations to and including a period 

of 75 days following the giving of the notice.” Id. § 74.051(c) (emphasis 

added). Notice “as provided” in Chapter 74 “must be accompanied by the

1 “Notwithstanding any other law and subject to Subsection (b), no 

health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within 

two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical 

or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization 

for which the claim is made is completed. . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 74.251(a).
3

authorization form for release of protected health information as 

required under Section 74.052.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 74.052

requires “a medical authorization in the form specified by this section.” 

Id. § 74.052(a) (emphasis added). It then “specifies” the form—not by 

describing it, but by providing it. In what can only be described as an 

uncommon statutory mandate, Section 74.052(c) states: “The medical 

authorization form required by this section shall be in the following

form,” and then sets forth the “specified” authorization form in its 

entirety. Id. § 74.052(c) (emphases added).2

By completing and providing the statutorily specified form, the 

claimant authorizes the defendant provider to “obtain and disclose,” 

within specified parameters, specified health-care information for 

specified purposes. Id. A properly completed form requires any other 

medical provider who receives the form to produce the information 

specified in the form to the defendant provider. Id. By including 

numerous blanks and checkboxes, the form requires the claimant to 

provide her name and contact information, the name of the defendant 

provider who is authorized to obtain her records, the information she is 

authorizing to be disclosed, and the specific purposes for the disclosure. 

Id.

To specify the information she is and is not authorizing to be 

disclosed, the form requires the claimant to provide the names and 

addresses of three types of providers who possess her health-care 

information: (1) providers who have treated her for the injuries her 

2 The required form is reprinted as an Appendix to this opinion.
4

claim is based on, (2) providers who have treated her during the five 

years before she received those injuries, and (3) providers she is 

excluding from the authorization because she contends the information 

they have regarding her health care “is not relevant” to her claim. Id. 

For the providers she is excluding from the authorization, the form 

requires her not only to provide their names, but to either “[l]ist” the 

“inclusive dates of examination, evaluation, or treatment to be withheld 

from disclosure,” or to “state ‘none.’” Id. 

By giving claimants the opportunity to list providers who possess 

only irrelevant information, the form permits “claimants to exclude 

irrelevant and therefore privileged information from the scope of a 

release” and “to act as gatekeepers of their own privileged health 

information.” In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. 2009). But a 

claimant who wishes to exclude a provider from the authorization 

cannot simply omit the provider’s name from the form. Id. Instead, she

must include the provider’s name and “[l]ist” the specified information. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.052(c).

We have addressed Section 74.052(c) and the form it specifies in 

several prior cases. We have noted that by actually providing the form 

itself, the statute “detail[s]” the required authorization. Tex. W. Oaks

Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 189 (Tex. 2012). It “prescribe[s]” 

not just the “form” the claimant must use, but also the “precise 

language” the form must include. Collins, 286 S.W.3d at 913. In other 

words, it prescribes both “the form and content of the required 

authorization form.” Jose Carreras, M.D., P.A. v. Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 

68, 69–70 (Tex. 2011) (emphasis added) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
5

CODE § 74.052(c)). As we explained just last term, Section 74.052(c) does 

not merely require a claimant to deliver a particular form, it requires a 

claimant “to provide a medical authorization form identifying” her 

medical providers. In re Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.3d 170, 

175–76 (Tex. 2023) (emphasis added). 

We have already agreed that, to receive the benefit of the 75-day 

tolling period, a claimant “must provide both the statutorily required 

notice and the statutorily required authorization form.” Carreras, 339 

S.W.3d at 74. And the statutorily required authorization form requires 

the claimant to provide specific information, including the names of 

providers who have her health-care information and billing records, 

even if the claimant thinks the information they have is irrelevant to 

her claims. Yet as the Court acknowledges, Hampton never provided the 

statutorily required authorization form. Instead, she provided a form in 

which she identified only two of her medical providers, omitting eleven 

providers the statutorily specified form required her to identify.

The most the Court can generously suggest is that the form she 

provided “closely resembl[es] the one required by the Legislature,” ante

at 2, yet it concedes that her form was “incomplete,” “erroneous,” and 

had “deficiencies” because it “omitted some of the required health care 

providers and omitted a provision authorizing disclosure of information 

by [Hampton’s] future health care providers.” Id. at 2, 9. More 

specifically, it omitted several providers who treated her for the injuries 

on which she bases her claims against Thome and several providers who 

had treated her within the five years before those injuries. See id. at 5. 

She did not list those providers in the third category, claiming that the 
6

information they had about her is not relevant to her claims. Instead, 

she simply failed to identify them at all, even though the statutorily 

specified form required her to list them.

The Court attempts to provide some text-based reasons why 

Hampton’s form was good enough to trigger the 75-day tolling despite 

its failure to comply with the statutory requirements. First, the Court 

says, it’s “the notice, not the medical authorization form, that triggers 

tolling.” Id. at 11. But in fact, it’s the notice “given as provided in this 

chapter” that triggers tolling and—as the Court concedes—“notice

without the required authorization form is not ‘[n]otice given as provided

in this chapter.’” Id. at 12 (emphasis added)

(quoting Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 72–73).

But, the Court asserts, the statute merely requires “a” medical 

authorization form, not a “perfect” one, and it does not “say how an 

incomplete or erroneous authorization form affects the tolling question.” 

Id. at 11–12. But of course, it does. It requires the claimant to complete 

the form expressly set forth in the statute itself, and that form requires

the claimant to fill in blanks to identify her medical providers, whether 

they treated her for her claim-based injuries during the five years before 

those injuries or for matters having no relevance to her claim at all. And 

it clearly states that tolling is available only if the claimant timely 

provides the required notice accompanied by the specified authorization. 

Under the statute’s plain language, a claimant who fails to timely 

provide the required notice with the specified authorization form cannot 

rely on the tolling period.
7

As we have said, the statutorily specified form enables the 

defendant provider to have “access to the claimant’s pertinent medical 

records.” Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 71. In fact, the statute expressly states 

that all parties are “entitled to obtain complete and unaltered copies of 

the [claimant’s] medical records” from all other parties upon request, 

and it allows the claimant to provide the specified medical authorization 

“in the form required by Section 74.052” as a means of complying with 

that requirement. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.051(d) (emphases 

added). In her pleadings, the claimant must confirm that she has “fully

complied” with Section 74.052’s requirements. Id. § 74.051(b) (emphasis 

added). If she hasn’t provided the information the statutorily specified 

form requires her to provide, she has not fully complied with Section 

74.052’s requirements. 

Despite the statute’s plain language and despite what we’ve 

previously said in Texas West Oaks Hospital, Collins, Carreras, and

Liberty County Mutual Insurance, the Court meekly suggests today that

Section 74.052 merely prescribes use of “‘the form specified’ by section

74.052,” ante at 14, not the form’s “detail[s],” Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., 371 

S.W.3d at 189, “precise language,” Collins, 286 S.W.3d at 913, and

“content” Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 69–70, “identifying” the claimant’s

providers, Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d at 175–76. But of course, 

it does. The Court acknowledges, as it must, “the possibility that a

document proffered as a medical authorization form may be so grossly

deficient on its face that it could never genuinely be called ‘a

medical authorization in the form specified by this section.’” Ante at 15

(quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.052(a)). But if all Section
8

74.052 requires is delivery of the “form” specified in Section 74.052(c),

one that fails to identify any providers is as compliant as one that fails

to identify a dozen, or a few, or even one. If, as the Court suggests, a

grossly deficient form is not good enough but a slightly (or moderately?)

deficient form is, courts will ultimately be required to draw a line

somewhere between the two and figure out which side of that line any

particular form falls on. Which means, of course, the Court’s “brightline” rule is far blurrier than the Court is willing to admit. Id. at 15.

Still purporting to rely on the statute’s text, the Court also

suggests that the statute provides for “temporary abatement” as the sole

“remedy for the plaintiff’s failure to disclose providers as required.” Id.

at 11.

3 That assertion concedes, of course, that the statute “require[s]”

claimants to “disclose providers,” contradicting the Court’s assertion

that the statute merely requires delivery of the “form.” But more

importantly, we have already rejected the Court’s argument about

abatement.

3 The statute provides for temporary abatement in two circumstances. 

First, a claimant’s failure to provide the specified authorization form with the 

notice “shall abate all further proceedings” until sixty days after the provider 

defendant receives “the required authorization.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 74.052(a). And second, if the claimant provides the required

authorization but later modifies or revokes it, the provider defendant may

choose to abate all proceedings until sixty days after the claimant provides a

“replacement authorization” that complies “with the form specified” by

Section 74.052(c). Id. § 74.052(b). If, as the Court contends, all that

Section 74.052(c) requires is use of “the form specified” without regard to its

contents, ante at 14, it would not be possible for a claimant to provide an

“authorization required by this section” and then modify it and replace it with

“the form specified by this section.” The statute’s reference to modification of

the required form, in other words, must necessarily refer to the required

contents, and not merely to the “form.”
9

The claimants in Carreras made the same argument the Court

makes today: that “service of an authorization form is unnecessary to

toll the statute of limitations because a separate remedy—abatement—

is provided for failure to accompany notice with an authorization form.”

Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 73. We expressly rejected that argument in 

Carreras, explaining that the abatement provisions apply only when a 

claimant provides notice of her claim before limitations runs, so that 

tolling is neither necessary nor required:

[A]batement has a use in situations in which 

the tolling provision is not at issue. If notice is 

provided without an authorization well 

within the statute of limitations, and the case 

could be filed sixty days later and still fall 

within the limitations period, the defendant’s 

statutory remedy is to halt proceedings until 

an authorization form is received. The 

abatement remedy fulfills that purpose.

Id. at 73–74.

As the Court notes, we addressed in Carreras the issue of whether 

tolling is available when the claimant fails to serve an authorization 

form at all, as opposed to an authorization “as required” by 

Section 74.052(c). But with regard to the statute’s abatement provisions, 

that distinction is irrelevant. Section 74.052 treats the failure to provide 

an authorization form the same as the provision of an authorization 

form that requires modification. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§§ 74.052(a), (b). Both warrant abatement. In either case, the claimant’s 

failure to provide a form or her provision of an incomplete form results 

in abatement only if the claimant provided the notice and filed suit 
10

before the two-year limitations period expired, making the tolling 

provision irrelevant. See Carreras, 339 S.W.3d at 73. If tolling is at 

issue—because the plaintiff relied on the 75-day tolling and filed after 

limitations expired but served an incomplete or erroneous medical 

authorization form—abatement would not be a remedy. See id. at 73–

74. Instead, as would occur with a failure to provide any medical 

authorization at all, tolling would not be available. See id. at 72.

Beyond its text-based arguments, the Court relies on several 

policy- or purpose-based arguments. But we are dealing with a statute

of limitations, not a common-law requirement we may revoke or modify 

based on policy preferences. None of the Court’s policy concerns justifies 

a judicial rewriting of the statute or ignoring the requirements of “the 

form specified” in Section 74.052(c). Maybe “Texas law” (meaning this 

Court? Texas courts generally? The Legislature?) “favors bright-line 

rules that enable parties and courts to know with certainty—as early in 

the litigation as possible—whether the suit is time-barred.” Ante at 3. 

But even if so, that’s irrelevant to the question of whether this statute 

imposes the kind of “bright-line rule” the Court prefers. The same is true 

about the Court’s preference that limitations periods should be “a 

threshold matter that should, whenever possible, be established with 

clarity at the outset.” Id. at 3. Maybe they should be, but whether this 

one is depends on the statute’s requirements, not on what we think it 

should (or should not) require.

I suspect that, as a Court, we do in fact prefer to minimize 

“satellite” and “protracted” litigation and appeals, and we may even 

think limitations deadlines “should always be calculable with certainty 
11

at the outset of the case.” Id. at 3, 10–11. Considering the line-drawing 

the Court’s approach requires to determine whether a particular 

authorization form is “deficient” enough, however, its approach does 

little to promote those purposes. Nor does it promote the purposes we’ve 

previously said the authorization requirement promotes—to “provide[] 

an opportunity for health care providers to investigate claims and 

possibly settle those with merit at an early stage,” and to “reduc[e] the 

costs of health care liability claims” by enabling provider defendants to 

obtain relevant medical records from non-party health care providers 

without having to rely on the “use of subpoenas or other formal 

mandatory processes.” Collins, 286 S.W.3d at 916–18. Section 74.052 

cannot promote those purposes if it doesn’t require a claimant to 

complete “the form specified” by identifying her medical providers in the 

blanks the specified form provides for that purpose.

As the Court acknowledges, statutes of limitations can indeed be 

harsh. Ante at 7. And as applied to this case, this one would be if we 

applied the statute as written. By providing the 75-day tolling period, 

the Legislature offers some leeway for some claimants, but only those 

who are willing and able to provide the information the statutorily 

specified authorization form requires. A claimant who is unwilling or 

unable to provide the information does not lose her claim for that reason. 

She simply loses the ability to rely on the 75-day tolling period and must 

bring her claims within the applicable statute of limitations, like most 

all other claimants must do. As the Court acknowledges, Hampton’s 

dilemma “could, it appears, have easily been avoided altogether by a 

slightly earlier filing.” Ante at 7.
12

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Jeffrey S. Boyd

Justice

OPINION FILED: March 8, 2024
13

APPENDIX

AUTHORIZATION FORM FOR RELEASE OF PROTECTED HEALTH 

INFORMATION

Patient Name:______

Patient Date of Birth:________

Patient Address:_________________________________ 

Street_________________ City, State, ZIP 

Patient Telephone:__________ 

Patient E-mail:_________ 

NOTICE TO PHYSICIAN OR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER: THIS 

AUTHORIZATION FORM HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE TEXAS 

LEGISLATURE PURSUANT TO SECTION 74.052, CIVIL PRACTICE 

AND REMEDIES CODE. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE 

MEDICAL AND BILLING RECORDS AS REQUESTED IN THIS 

AUTHORIZATION. 

A. I, __________ (name of patient or authorized 

representative), hereby authorize __________ (name of 

physician or other health care provider to whom the 

notice of health care claim is directed) to obtain and 

disclose (within the parameters set out below) the 

protected health information and associated billing 
14

records described below for the following specific 

purposes (check all that apply): 

[ ] To facilitate the investigation and 

evaluation of the health care claim described in the 

accompanying Notice of Health Care Claim.

[ ] Defense of any litigation arising out of 

the claim made the basis of the accompanying Notice of 

Health Care Claim.

[ ] Other - Specify:_________________

B. The health information to be obtained, used, or 

disclosed extends to and includes the verbal as well as 

written and electronic and is specifically described as 

follows: 

1. The health information and billing records 

in the custody of the physicians or health care providers 

who have examined, evaluated, or treated __________ 

(patient) in connection with the injuries alleged to 

have been sustained in connection with the claim 

asserted in the accompanying Notice of Health Care 

Claim. 
15

Names and current addresses of treating 

physicians or health care providers: 

 1.__________________________

 2.__________________________

 3.__________________________

 4.__________________________

 5.__________________________

 6.__________________________

 7.__________________________

 8.__________________________

This authorization extends to an additional physician or 

health care provider that may in the future evaluate, 

examine, or treat __________ (patient) for injuries 

alleged in connection with the claim made the basis of 

the attached Notice of Health Care Claim only if the 

claimant gives notice to the recipient of the attached 

Notice of Health Care Claim of that additional physician 

or health care provider; 

2. The health information and billing records 

in the custody of the following physicians or health 

care providers who have examined, evaluated, or treated 
16

__________ (patient) during a period commencing five 

years prior to the incident made the basis of the 

accompanying Notice of Health Care Claim.

Names and current addresses of treating 

physicians or health care providers, if applicable: 

1.__________________________ 

2.__________________________ 

3.__________________________ 

4.__________________________ 

5.__________________________ 

6.__________________________ 

7.__________________________ 

8.__________________________ 

C. Exclusions

1. Providers excluded from authorization. 

The following constitutes a list of physicians or health 

care providers possessing health care information 

concerning __________ (patient) to whom this 

authorization does not apply because I contend that such 

health care information is not relevant to the damages 

being claimed or to the physical, mental, or emotional 
17

condition of __________ (patient) arising out of the 

claim made the basis of the accompanying Notice of Health 

Care Claim. List the names of each physician or health 

care provider to whom this authorization does not extend 

and the inclusive dates of examination, evaluation, or 

treatment to be withheld from disclosure, or state 

"none": 

1.__________________________ 

2.__________________________ 

3.__________________________ 

4.__________________________ 

5.__________________________ 

6.__________________________ 

7.__________________________ 

8.__________________________

2. By initialing below, the patient or 

patient’s personal or legal representative excludes the 

following information from this authorization: 

________ HIV/AIDS test results and/or treatment 

________ Drug/alcohol/substance abuse treatment
18

________ Mental health records (mental health 

records do not include psychotherapy notes) 

________ Genetic information (including 

genetic test results)

D. The persons or class of persons to whom the patient’s 

health information and billing records will be disclosed 

or who will make use of said information are: 

1. Any and all physicians or health care 

providers providing care or treatment to __________ 

(patient); 

2. Any liability insurance entity providing 

liability insurance coverage or defense to any physician 

or health care provider to whom Notice of Health Care 

Claim has been given with regard to the care and 

treatment of __________ (patient); 

3. Any consulting or testifying experts 

employed by or on behalf of __________ (name of physician 

or health care provider to whom Notice of Health Care 

Claim has been given) with regard to the matter set out 

in the Notice of Health Care Claim accompanying this 

authorization; 
19

4. Any attorneys (including secretarial, 

clerical, experts, or paralegal staff) employed by or on 

behalf of __________ (name of physician or health care 

provider to whom Notice of Health Care Claim has been 

given) with regard to the matter set out in the Notice 

of Health Care Claim accompanying this authorization; 

5. Any trier of the law or facts relating to 

any suit filed seeking damages arising out of the medical 

care or treatment of __________ (patient). 

E. This authorization shall expire upon resolution of 

the claim asserted or at the conclusion of any litigation 

instituted in connection with the subject matter of the 

Notice of Health Care Claim accompanying this 

authorization, whichever occurs sooner. 

F. I understand that, without exception, I have the right 

to revoke this authorization at any time by giving notice 

in writing to the person or persons named in Section B 

above of my intent to revoke this authorization. I 

understand that prior actions taken in reliance on this 

authorization by a person that had permission to access 

my protected health information will not be affected. I 
20

further understand the consequence of any such 

revocation as set out in Section 74.052, Civil Practice 

and Remedies Code.

G. I understand that the signing of this authorization 

is not a condition for continued treatment, payment, 

enrollment, or eligibility for health plan benefits.

H. I understand that information used or disclosed 

pursuant to this authorization may be subject to 

redisclosure by the recipient and may no longer be 

protected by federal HIPAA privacy regulations. 

Name of Patient

____________________

Signature of Patient/Personal or Legal 

Representative 

__________

Description of Personal or Legal Representative’s 

Authority 

__________

Date

_______________