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SJC-12384

MILLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS vs. M.P. & others.

1

Norfolk. October 2, 2017. - February 6, 2018.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher,

& Kafker, JJ.

Child Requiring Assistance. Statute, Construction. Words, 

"Wilfully."

Petition filed in the Norfolk County Division of the 

Juvenile Court Department on November 30, 2016.

The case was heard by Mary M. McCallum, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Katrina McCusker Rusteika, Committee for Public Counsel 

Services, for M.P.

LENK, J. The children requiring assistance (CRA) statute, 

G. L. c. 119, §§ 21, 39E-39I, confers jurisdiction upon the

Juvenile Court to intervene in the custody arrangements of 

 

1 The mother and father of M.P.
2

children who are, inter alia, "habitually truant," meaning that 

they "willfully fail[] to attend school for more than [eight]

school days in a quarter." G. L. c. 119, § 21. The statute is 

aimed at children who exhibit "misbehavior which is not 

violative of any criminal statute, but which is the cause for 

concern that it is indicative of problems or tendencies that may 

eventually lead to delinquent or criminal activity." R.L. 

Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 (2d ed. 2006 & Supp. 

2017) (Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law). In such cases, the 

Juvenile Court is tasked with examining the children's 

circumstances and determining whether changing or placing 

conditions on their custody arrangements will help deter their

potentially harmful behaviors. Id. The party that initiates a 

CRA proceeding must prove the allegations beyond a reasonable 

doubt. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

In this case, we decide whether a child, M.P., who has 

failed continually to attend school due to a combination of

physical and mental disabilities, including a severe bladder 

condition and autism, was properly adjudicated as a child 

requiring assistance on the basis of a habitual truancy CRA 

petition filed by the Millis public schools (school district).

2

To make this determination, we must address the novel question 

 

2 Millis public schools did not participate in this appeal.
3

of what it means for a child to "willfully fail[] to attend 

school." In light of the CRA statute's goal of deterring 

delinquency, the statutory requirement that a child's failure to 

attend school be wilful reflects legislative concern as to why 

the child is regularly skipping school: it contemplates 

purposeful conduct by the child. The wilfulness requirement 

thus necessitates judicial inquiry into and assessment of the 

child's reasons for not attending school. When the child's 

repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending 

delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute. Using the 

definition we set forth today, the evidence in the record does 

not support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. 

"willfully fail[ed] to attend school."

1. Background. a. Statutory scheme. The Juvenile Court 

has jurisdiction over three primary areas: delinquency and 

youthful offender cases, care and protection matters, and CRA

proceedings. G. L. c. 119, §§ 26, 39E, 54. Children in CRA 

proceedings often are said to have committed "status offenses," 

because the statute is "couched in terms of the child's 

condition rather than in terms of the commission of specific 

acts" (citation omitted). See Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law, 

supra at § 4.1. Unlike children who are adjudicated delinquent,

children requiring assistance have not committed wrongdoing
4

against another or against society, but, rather, are deemed to 

be acting against their own interests. See id.

The CRA statute defines a child requiring assistance as one 

who is between the ages of six and eighteen and who 

"(i) repeatedly runs away from the home of the child's parent, 

legal guardian or custodian; (ii) repeatedly fails to obey the 

lawful and reasonable commands of the child's parent, legal 

guardian or custodian, thereby interfering with their ability to 

adequately care for and protect the child; (iii) repeatedly 

fails to obey the lawful and reasonable regulations of the 

child's school; (iv) is habitually truant; or (v) is a sexually 

exploited child." G. L. c. 119, § 21. As relevant here, the 

CRA statute defines one who is "[h]abitually truant" as "a 

school-aged child, not excused from attendance under the lawful 

and reasonable regulations of such child's school, who willfully 

fails to attend school for more than [eight] school days in a 

quarter." Id.

CRA proceedings are initiated when a parent, legal 

guardian, custodian, or school district files an application in 

the Juvenile Court for issuance of a petition that seeks a 

determination that the child requires assistance. G. L. c. 119, 

§ 39E. Upon this filing, the court issues a summons requiring 

the child and his or her parents or guardian to appear before 

it. Id. A Juvenile Court judge then conducts a preliminary 
5

hearing to determine whether the petition should issue.3 Id. At 

this hearing, the judge may decline to accept the application 

because there is "no probable cause to believe that the child 

and family are in need of assistance," or because "the interests 

of the child would best be served by informal assistance, in 

which case the [judge] shall, with the consent of the child and 

the child's parents or guardian, refer the child to a probation 

officer for assistance." Id. Alternatively, a judge may accept 

the application and schedule a fact-finding hearing. Id. In 

order for a judge ultimately to find that the child requires

assistance, the petitioner must prove the allegations of the 

petition beyond a reasonable doubt. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

Only after a child is proved habitually truant beyond a 

reasonable doubt should the judge contemplate changes to the 

child's custody arrangements. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. The judge, 

"taking into consideration the physical and emotional welfare of 

the child, may make any of the following orders of disposition":

(1) permit the child to stay with the parents, custodians, or 

guardians, subject to conditions and limitations that the court 

 

3 Both the child and the parents or legal guardians have a 

right to counsel at all stages of CRA proceedings. G. L. 

c. 119, § 39F.
6

may choose;

4 (2) place the child in the care of a relative, 

probation officer, other qualified adult, private charitable or 

childcare agency, or other authorized or qualified private 

organization, subject to conditions and limitations; or 

(3) place the child in the custody of the Department of Children 

and Families. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. The disposition is not a 

direct order requiring the child to comply with the conditions, 

however, and the judge may not impose penalties for criminal 

contempt for the child's failure to comply.5 See Commonwealth v. 

Florence F., 429 Mass. 523, 524-525 (1999).

b. Factual background. We summarize the Juvenile Court

judge's findings of fact concerning M.P., supplemented with

certain uncontested facts in the record. See Chin v. Merriot, 

470 Mass. 527, 529 (2015).

i. Medical conditions. M.P. is a fifteen year old girl

who has been diagnosed with significant detrusor sphincter 

discoordination (bladder condition), autism spectrum disorder

 

4 These conditions include "provision for medical, 

psychological, psychiatric, educational, occupational, and 

social services, and for supervision by a court clinic or by any 

public or private organization providing counseling or guidance 

services." G. L. c. 119, § 39G.

5 The order of disposition is effective for 120 days, and 

may be extended for three additional periods of up to ninety

days each. G. L. c. 119, § 39G. After that, a new hearing is 

required. See Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 493-494 (2008). 

The disposition is no longer effective after the child's 

eighteenth birthday. G. L. c. 119, § 39G.
7

(autism), anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), 

and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

6 Her bladder condition

is such that she has difficulty voiding, and when she does so, 

she usually "leaves behind a large volume of urine." As a 

result, she needs to use the restroom frequently, often for 

hours at a time. This condition makes her predisposed to 

urinary tract infections. She also has an abnormally large 

bladder. M.P. has experienced this condition since the age of 

six, when she underwent a surgical procedure for her urinary 

tract.

7

M.P.'s bladder condition is compounded by her numerous

cognitive and emotional disorders. In kindergarten she was 

diagnosed with "pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise 

specified"; this nomenclature is now subsumed under the 

 

6 The Juvenile Court judge's findings of fact omitted M.P.'s 

diagnoses of anxiety disorder, OCD, and PTSD. These diagnoses, 

however, were contained in both doctors' letters and in service 

providers' notes, the same medical records upon which the judge 

relied without qualification.

7 In May, 2017, one of M.P.'s doctors prescribed a new 

bladder relaxation medication in the hopes of improving her 

condition. The fact-finding hearing in this case took place in 

the same month that this medication was prescribed; accordingly, 

the record is silent as to the effectiveness of this medication.
8

diagnosis of autism. In December, 2016, a child neurologist

confirmed that M.P. meets the criteria for autism.

8

The child neurologist further opined that M.P. exhibits 

many symptoms of OCD and has a "number of difficulties 

processing sensory information -- she does not like to change 

her clothes and some sounds are really bothersome." Relatedly, 

a developmental pediatrician noted that M.P.'s autism and OCD 

cause her to fixate on "obsessive rituals and rigidities that 

control every aspect of her daily life." M.P. feels that she 

cannot leave the house until her bladder is completely empty, 

which typically takes hours. If she hears noises while she is 

in the restroom, she has to begin her process of voiding from 

the beginning. She has difficulty tolerating busy and 

unpredictable settings and cannot use public restrooms. At one 

point, in order to obtain a medical evaluation, her family had 

to rent a nearby hotel room so that M.P. could have a "safe and 

comfortable place to use the bathroom." Her anxiety regarding 

 

8 The judge noted that, while the child neurologist shared 

her opinions in writing with M.P.'s school district in 

February, 2017, "no neurological testing results, evaluation 

information, data, or the like were shared with the school. It 

is unclear whether any such neurological testing, evaluation, 

etc. actually was conducted. [The child neurologist] provided 

her opinion based on her review of the literature . . . [and 

M.P.'s] medical and educational history combined with her one 

appointment with the child [in December, 2016]." The judge did 

not, however, express any doubt as to whether M.P. has autism, 

nor does the record suggest any reason to doubt this diagnosis.
9

her bladder condition is so great that she sleeps on a couch 

close to the bathroom, rather than in her own bed. She also

often will hold her urine until her parents go to sleep.

M.P. also has aversions to many practices for ordinary 

hygiene. She refuses to use feminine hygiene products or wear 

appropriate seasonal clothing. She will not shower at home and 

has only taken two showers in the past year, choosing instead to 

clean herself with body wipes that in turn cause skin 

irritation. She previously has been sent home from school for 

offensive body odor. M.P. has almost no social or peer contact 

outside her family.

In February, 2017, the developmental pediatrician concluded 

that M.P.'s anxiety and OCD were associated with PTSD. She 

opined that M.P. has medical necessity for direct one-to-one 

"home based, behavioral therapy services utilizing Applied 

Behavioral Analysis to target functional communication, social 

pragmatics and other skills in order to generalize skills across 

environments from the school to the home and general community." 

In addition, the pediatrician observed that the CRA proceeding, 

as described below, had "further impact[ed] [M.P.'s] wellbeing 

with escalating anxiety and sadness and resultant worsening of 

her emotional fragility and function." She reported that M.P.

was "not sleeping and [wa]s filled with anxiety regarding the 
10

outcome of [the] case," and urged that the CRA case "be dropped 

at once out of medical necessity."

ii. School attendance. M.P. initially was enrolled in an 

online high school, but her parents decided to place her in the 

Millis public school system for the 2016-2017 year in order to 

obtain special education services.9 She did not attend classes 

from the first day of school on August 31, 2016, through October 

20, 2016. At the start of the school year, the school district 

conducted an evaluation and the special education team 

recommended that M.P. attend an extended forty-five day 

evaluation in a therapeutic setting, because the school district 

did not believe it could provide the services that M.P. 

required. The school district enrolled her in the ACCEPT 

Collaborative Therapeutic program from October 21, 2016, until 

January 6, 2017, which provided her with a shortened school day. 

Under this program, M.P. attended only nine shortened school 

days, for a total of 10.5 hours of learning time.

The school district then arranged for home-based services 

for M.P. through a private provider, beginning on December 27, 

2016. A service provider began meeting with M.P. at her house 

from 9 A.M. until 11 A.M., Monday through Thursday, to help her 

 

9 Although the school district initially enrolled M.P. as a 

ninth grader for the 2016-2017 year, later that year she was 

offered enrollment at Keough Memorial Academy, a special 

education day school, as an eighth grader.
11

prepare to leave the house. The provider arranged for tutoring 

at home, and then helped her transition to tutoring at the 

library; M.P. demonstrated increased ability to leave the house

and was making "great strides." Notably, after a few weeks, the 

provider changed the meeting time to 12 P.M., to accommodate

both the schedule of the library and the tutor. The provider 

explained that when M.P. had a clear understanding of what was 

expected of her, she was successful in leaving the house with 

him. Occasionally, however, M.P. continued to be unable to 

leave the bathroom for long periods of time. Additionally, of 

the thirty sessions scheduled between December 27, 2016, and 

February 21, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled eight times (once for 

a holiday and once for an appointment, but otherwise for reasons 

that are not known) and the home-based service provider canceled 

four times (three times due to weather conditions, and one time 

for reasons unknown). M.P. was able to attend 55.5 per cent of 

the scheduled tutoring sessions, for a total of 33.5 hours.

On March 13, 2017, M.P. was enrolled in Keough Memorial

Academy (Keough Memorial), a special education day school

designed for children with emotional disabilities, and was to 

begin classes on March 29 of that year. Keough Memorial 

educators were aware of M.P.'s disabilities and were confident 

that they could meet her needs. M.P. was to continue with the 

home-based service provider while attending Keough Memorial, and 
12

the school district made an exception to permit the provider to 

meet M.P. on weekends, not just on school days, to help her 

maintain a routine. The provider then attempted to change his 

appointments with M.P. back to 9 A.M., so that she could be 

ready in time for the Keough Memorial school day. After this 

change, the family canceled the home-based provider sessions 

more frequently; of the twenty-four appointments scheduled 

between February 22 and May 2, 2017, M.P.'s family canceled 

twelve (once for an illness and once for an appointment, but 

otherwise for unknown reasons) and the home-based provider

canceled three (once due to weather conditions, once because of 

M.P.'s health, and once because of "unclear . . . 

expectations").

Between April 5 and April 28, 2017, the home-based provider

did not schedule any appointments because the provider wanted to 

meet M.P. in the morning, but the family wanted him to come in 

the afternoon. The provider testified, however, that M.P. never 

said that she did not want to go to school; to the contrary, 

M.P. communicated to him that she did want to attend. By

May 1, 2017, M.P. had attended only eight shortened days at 

Keough Memorial, for a total of 7.9 learning hours. She 

typically arrived near the end of the school day.

As of April 20, 2017, M.P. also became eligible for 

services with the Department of Developmental Services. That
13

month, the family arranged to have an applied behavior analyst 

from an independent organization provide an initial assessment 

of M.P. In his initial report, the analyst noted that her 

behavior "poses a serious risk to the health and wellbeing of 

herself and her family," and that her behaviors and anxieties 

had persisted and intensified despite her parents' provision of 

several accommodations and modifications. The analyst stated 

that M.P.'s "challenging behavior" arose from pain and 

discomfort due to complications regarding her bladder retention, 

which was an "automatic" or "internal" function.

As of the time of the fact-finding hearing, the analyst had

met with M.P. only a few times, but he stated that an applied 

behavior analysis therapist would soon work with M.P. for 

eighteen hours per week. He anticipated that M.P. would need 

treatment for from six months to one year. He also explained 

that M.P. conveyed on "many occasions" that "she's very excited" 

to start the program and loves school; she had been crying daily 

because of her inability to attend school.

iii. CRA proceedings. On November 30, 2016, just a few 

months after M.P.'s initial enrollment in the Millis public 

schools, the school district filed a CRA petition, alleging that 

M.P. was a child requiring assistance on the grounds that she

was habitually truant. A Juvenile Court judge held a 

preliminary hearing on December 14, 2016, and accepted the 
14

petition.10 The judge then scheduled a fact-finding hearing for

January 19, 2017, which was continued twice. A two-day factfinding hearing took place on May 4 and 26, 2017.

At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the judge 

found that M.P. was habitually truant and adjudicated her a 

child requiring assistance. The judge noted that, under the CRA

statute, a child's failure to attend school must be wilful, 

which the judge defined as "acting intentionally, as opposed to 

accidentally or involuntarily." She concluded that 

"[a]lthough . . . [M.P.'s] actions of failing to attend school 

have been attributed to her medical conditions and emotional 

challenges, they are still actions taken by the child not to 

attend school." The judge noted that none of M.P.'s assessments 

indicated that she "was either home bound or unable to benefit 

from an education," and that there was no evidence indicating 

that M.P. should be exempt from school.

The judge further found that M.P.'s parents "are now 

working hard to obtain additional therapeutic services for their 

daughter so that she can attend school." She stated that 

"[m]any of the therapeutic services assessed by the parents were 

pursued after the commencement of this CRA petition, while the 

home based therapeutic services offered by the school were not 

 

10 The record does not provide the basis for the judge's 

decision to accept the CRA petition.
15

consistently utilized by the child or the parents." Ultimately, 

however, the judge decided that M.P. "appears to be receiving 

appropriate services and no further services need be ordered at 

this time," and did not alter M.P.'s custody arrangements. 

Nonetheless, the judge stated that later dispositional review 

would be necessary to determine whether the newly implemented

services, meaning the sessions with the applied behavior 

analyst, were sufficient. The judge also excused M.P. from 

attending future hearings, noting that her time would be better 

spent in school, rather than in the CRA hearings, which

"increase[d] her stress."

M.P. appealed from the CRA determination to a single 

justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 39I. 

The single justice referred the case to a full panel of the 

Appeals Court. We then transferred the case to this court on 

our own motion. The school district did not participate in the

appeal.

2. Discussion. There is no dispute that M.P. missed more 

than eight days of school in each quarter of the 2016-2017 

school year, and that most of her absences were not excused 

"under the lawful and reasonable regulations of such child's 
16

school."

11 See G. L. c. 119, § 21. The question before us is 

whether she "willfully fail[ed] to attend school." Id. This 

court has not previously examined the meaning of this language. 

We conclude that the CRA statute's habitual truancy provision

requires purposeful conduct by the child. When the child's 

repeated failure to attend school arises from reasons portending 

delinquent behavior, it is wilful under the statute.

a. Plain meaning. We review questions of statutory 

interpretation de novo. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund

v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564–565 (2010). In order to determine 

what it means to "willfully fail[] to attend school," we turn 

first to the plain meaning of the statutory language. "Where 

the language is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given its 

'ordinary meaning.'" Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 

633 (2013). The plain meaning of a statute "must be reasonable 

and supported by the purpose and history of the statute." Id., 

quoting Wright v. Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 

455, 457–458 (1996).

We look initially "to dictionary definitions as a guide to 

a term's plain or ordinary meaning." Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 

476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017). One dictionary defines "willful" as 

"done deliberately" or "intentional," and "not accidental or 

 

11 M.P. does not challenge the lawfulness or reasonableness 

of her school's regulations regarding truancy.
17

without purpose." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 

2617 (1993). According to Black's Law Dictionary, "willful" 

means "[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily 

malicious." Black's Law Dictionary 1834 (10th ed. 2014). 

Black's Law Dictionary further states, however, that a 

"voluntary act becomes willful in law, only when it involves 

conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at 

least inexcusable carelessness, whether the act is right or 

wrong." Id. Thus, some definitions focus on the actor's 

purpose, while others focus only on whether the actor's conduct 

was voluntary or intentional.

Nor does wilfulness have a consistent meaning in our 

jurisprudence. In the adoption context, we have explained that,

while wilfulness implies intentional conduct, it does not 

require ill will. See Adoption of a Minor, 343 Mass. 292, 297 

(1961) (statute permitting adoption without consent of parent 

where parent wilfully deserts or neglects child "does not 

require that the neglect to provide be done with malevolence or 

ill will; it is enough if the conduct resulting in the failure 

to provide was not unintentional"). In criminal cases, on the 

other hand, we have held that conduct is wilful "when the actor 

intends both the conduct and its harmful consequences." 

Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 443 (2010), quoting

Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 352 (1990). See 
18

Commonwealth v. McDonald, 462 Mass. 236, 242 (2012). 

Nonetheless, "in only a few select areas of law does 'willfully'

require a showing of an intent to violate a known legal duty." 

Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Commissioner of the Dep't 

of Envtl. Protection, 466 Mass. 454, 456, 464 n.12 (2013)

(rejecting argument that wilfulness, as used in G. L. c. 21A, 

§ 16 [administrative penalties act], requires knowledge that 

"conduct will or may constitute a violation of applicable 

environmental standards," and instead holding that wilfulness 

only requires that "party who has not complied with the law knew 

or should have known of the operative facts that made their acts 

unlawful").

The question remains, then, whether wilfulness under the 

CRA statute's habitual truancy provision implies merely 

voluntary or intentional conduct, or also necessitates inquiry 

into a student's purpose in missing school.

b. Legislative history. As the term "willfully" may have 

several meanings when read in isolation, we turn to the broader 

statutory context and legislative history of the CRA statute to 

ascertain the intended meaning. See Franklin Office Park Realty 

Corp., 466 Mass. at 463 ("Although 'willful' may have several 

meanings when read in isolation, its meaning in any particular 

statute may be determined from examining the act itself as well 

as the larger statutory scheme").
19

The habitual truancy provision dates back to 1873, when the 

Legislature enacted a statute requiring each city and town in 

Massachusetts to impose criminal penalties for "habitual 

truants." See St. 1873, c. 262 § 3 ("An Act concerning truant 

children and absentees from school"). The legislation was 

enacted in response to a report from the Board of Education, 

which had collected numerous school committee reports 

complaining of a lack of proper enforcement mechanisms to 

address widespread truancy.

12 See id.; Thirty-Sixth Annual 

 

12 For example, the school committee of Barnstable noted 

that four-fifths of the crimes in New England were committed by 

those who had not been educated, and "[o]f juvenile offenders, 

ninety-five hundredths [were] from ignorant and idle homes, and 

a large number of them were truants from school at the time of 

arrest." Thirty-Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Education, 

Abstracts of School Committee Reports, at 3 (Jan. 1873). 

Peabody's committee stated that the practice of sending truant 

children to almshouses had done little to combat the growing 

problem of truancy, and called for "habitual truants" to face 

criminal sentences. Id. at 89-90. Salem's committee touted its 

then recently enacted ordinance criminalizing truancy as a means 

of deterrence. Id. at 94. Cambridge's committee, in turn, 

attributed the majority of its truancy cases to the 

"indifference, neglect or parsimony of parents," and stated that 

"reformatory institutions" were better than almshouses for 

addressing truancy. Id. at 121-122. Malden's superintendent of

public schools stated that truant children required greater 

attention because other pupils "[were] led to imitate their bad 

practices, and thus the evil [had] increased to no small 

magnitude." Id. at 139. Wakefield's school committee stated 

that "[i]gnorant boys [could] be seen every day in [the town's]

streets with nothing but mischief to occupy their time. Their 

parents [were] too indifferent to their welfare, or too imbecile 

to send them to school," and called for "strict enforcement" of 

compulsory education. Id. at 147. Clinton's committee chairman 

also called for trial judges to handle cases of truancy, noting 
20

Report of the Board of Education, Abstracts of School Committee 

Reports (Jan. 1873).

A century later, Governor Francis W. Sargent and others

recognized that to send habitual truants and other status 

offenders "away from their homes to an institution which 

deprives them of their liberty and individuality and, at times, 

inflicts physical punishment and harassment, is to blame the 

victims of society's neglect and to hinder their eventual 

rehabilitation." See F.W. Sargent, Letter to the Senate and 

House of Representatives (Nov. 20, 1972), 1973 House Doc. No. 

5593. As then Governor Sargent explained, "we now know that 

there is an alternative to institutionalization -- community 

based treatment. It is better for the child and better for the 

taxpayers." Id.

Thus, the Legislature enacted the children in need of 

services (CHINS) statute, the predecessor of the CRA statute, in 

1973. The CHINS statute decriminalized status offenses such as 

truancy by removing them from the delinquency jurisdiction of 

 

that its local truancy officer was ill-equipped to address the 

problem. Id. at 202-203. Westborough's school committee 

chairman attributed the problem of truancy to the indifference 

of parents who were often "ignorant" themselves and advocated 

for a "board of truant officers." Id. at 219. Worcester's 

truant school committee also noted that its truant officer was 

overburdened and that the children who were "not sent to school 

at all" were those whom it considered the "children most sinned 

against." Id. at 230.
21

the Juvenile Court and tasking Juvenile Court judges with 

providing "nonpunitive care to address the problem of certain 

children." See Florence F., 429 Mass. at 527, citing St. 1973, 

c. 1073; Ireland & Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.2. Notably, the

CHINS statute defined a "child in need of services" on the 

grounds of truancy in almost the same language as does the 

current CRA statute: as a child who is "between the ages of six 

and sixteen who persistently and wilfully fails to attend 

school." See 1973 Senate Doc. No. 1922; 1973 House J. 3941. 

The statute's inclusion of habitual truants is consistent with

the Legislature's recognition that education is vital to a 

child's progress. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Charles, 399 

Mass. 324, 335 (1987) ("[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and 

the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 

recognition of the importance of education . . . . It is the 

very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 

instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 

preparing him for later professional training, and in helping

him to adjust normally to his environment" [citation omitted]).

CHINS proceedings were intended to target children who 

"fall between the chairs, so to speak. They are not the 

dependent children who are clearly entitled to the full 

protection of the [J]uvenile [C]ourt. Neither are they law 

breakers entitled to whatever firm or lenient treatment the law 
22

or individual judge feels appropriate for such offenders." 

Florence F., 429 Mass. at 528, quoting In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. 

App. 3d 866, 869 (1977). The goals of the CHINS statute were 

"(a) preventing delinquency involvement; (b) fostering the 

pursuit of education; and (c) providing support to families 

during periods of emotional turbulence." Ireland & Kilcoyne, 

Juvenile Law, supra at § 4.5. See id. at § 4.1 ("the court's 

approach is that through the provision of certain rehabilitative 

or preventive services . . . the child will be diverted from the 

tendency to engage in future delinquent behavior").

The CHINS statute was significantly amended in 2012, when 

it was reformulated as the CRA statute, but the overarching 

purpose of the statute did not change. The 2012 amendments were 

enacted in response to the Legislature's recognition of the 

CHINS statute's failure to "[keep] children out of the juvenile 

justice system as the [L]egislature intended." See Press 

Release, Governor Patrick Signs Legislation to Reform Children 

in Need of Services System (Aug. 7, 2012). The amendments

sought to achieve this goal by making proceedings less 

adversarial, and to "divert cases from the courts into a system 

of community-based service providers."

13 Senate OK's Changes on 

 

13 The amendments provided for the establishment of a system 

of community-based resources and assistance to families to 

coordinate screenings, assessments, and referrals, and required 
23

Runaways, Truants, State House News Service, July 15, 2011. The 

CRA statute treats involvement of the Juvenile Court system as 

something of a last resort. See G. L. c. 119, § 39E (before CRA 

petition is filed, "the clerk shall inform the petitioner that 

the petitioner may delay filing the request and choose to have 

the child and the child's family referred to a family resource 

center, community-based services program or other . . . 

community-based services in the [J]uvenile [C]ourt district 

where the child resides and return to court at a later time to 

file an application for assistance, if needed"; clerk also is 

required to "prepare, publish and disseminate to each petitioner 

educational material relative to available family resource 

centers, community-based services programs and other entities 

designated by the [S]ecretary of [H]ealth and [H]uman 

services").

Proponents of the CRA statute reasoned that "the current 

studies suggest[ed] that children . . . who are regularly 

 

school districts to establish truancy prevention programs for 

habitually truant students before referring them to the Juvenile 

Court. See R.L. Ireland & P. Kilcoyne, Juvenile Law § 4.1 

(Supp. 2017). The revisions also made CRA proceedings 

confidential; adjusted the adjudication procedures by, inter 

alia, removing the provisions for a jury trial; and provided 

that, where a child was in need of assistance, he or she no 

longer could be placed with the Department of Youth Services or 

shackled and restrained in a delinquent juvenile facility, but 

could be placed with the Department of Children and Families. 

See id.
24

exposed to the courts are more likely to be involved in serious 

crimes later in life." Senate OK's Changes on Runaways, 

Truants, supra. See Lawmakers, Advocates Urge Overhaul of Child 

Services System, State House News Service, Mar. 30, 2011 

("Arguing that the [S]tate's [thirty-eight year old] system of 

services for troubled children forces them into the court system 

prematurely and can tear families apart, lawmakers and advocacy 

groups called yesterday for an overhaul of the system"); State 

House Rally Calls for Children's Services Reform, MetroWest 

Daily News, June 28, 2012; Politicians Push for New Way to Deal 

with Troubled Kids, MetroWest Daily News, Mar. 30, 2011 (Reis) 

("Advocates, parents and graduates of Children in Need of 

Service argue early court involvement can push adolescents into 

a life of crime"). Although CRA determinations are not entered 

on children's juvenile records, see G. L. c. 119, § 39E, 

proponents noted that the mere fact of children's involvement 

with the Juvenile Court stigmatizes them and makes them "more 

likely to be involved in serious crimes later in life." See 

State Capitol Briefs, State House News Service, July 14, 2011. 

See, e.g., Lawmakers Push New System to Serve Troubled Kids, 

State House News Service, Oct. 6, 2009; Politicians Push for New 

Way to Deal with Troubled Kids, supra.

As Senator Karen Spilka, the lead Senate sponsor of the CRA 

bill, explained:
25

"[The CHINS statute] began with good intentions. Its 

goal was to prevent children from entering the juvenile 

justice system. But the irony of this is that the court 

system was telling parents and families to go to this 

system, so we were sending messages that didn't make sense. 

We heard time and time again after many meetings that 

parents and children should not have to go to court to get 

services. The second thing we were hearing was focusing on 

the children's behavior, and this was an adversarial 

system. This was not bad for all families but it tore a 

lot of them apart. . . . The third thing was that each 

community needs to have services available for children[] 

and families; this is faster, easier, and resolves issues 

more quickly. . . . This bill removes labels from children 

and removes stigma from them . . . . [T]hat is a wonderful 

thing."

2011 House Doc. No. 3492, Senate Floor Debate, July 12, 2011.

Therefore, as with the CHINS statute, the purpose of the 

CRA statute is to "address the root causes of juvenile 

delinquency." State House Rally Calls for Children's Services 

Reform, supra. The legislative history and statutory scheme as 

a whole demonstrate that in order to determine whether a child 

has "willfully fail[ed] to attend school," a Juvenile Court 

judge must examine the child's purpose or reasons for being 

absent, so that the judge can decide whether the student's 

behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent behavior.

c. Authority in other jurisdictions. Nearly every State 

has a statute authorizing courts or law enforcement officers to 

intervene in the custody arrangements of children who are in 

need of services or supervision because, inter alia, they have 

run away from home, are truant, are beyond the control of their 
26

parents or guardians, or otherwise are jeopardizing their own 

welfare or that of others.

14 Although most of these statutes 

 

14 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 12-15-201(4), 12-15-215; Alaska 

Stat. §§ 47.10.011, 47.10.142(e); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-

201(19), 8-341(A)(2), 15-803(B); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-303(24),

9-27-322; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§§ 46b-120(5), 46b-149; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 921(6)(b); 

D.C. Code §§ 16-2301(8), 16-2320(c); Fla. Stat. §§ 984.03(9), 

984.22(2); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-11-2(11), 15-11-381, 15-11-442; 

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(B)-(D); Idaho Code Ann. § 20-505; 

705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405 / §§ 3-3, 3-24, 3-33.5; Ind. Code 

§§ 31-34-1-6, 31-34-20-1; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-2022(d), 38-

2253; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 159.150, 630.020, 630.120; La. 

Child. Code Ann. arts. 728, 730, 779; 15 Me. Rev. Stat. § 3501; 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e), 3-8A-19; Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.007(6), 260C.201; 

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-105(k), 43-21-607; Mo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 211.031; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 41-5-103(22), (51), 41-5-1512; 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320; N.H. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. §§ 169-D:2(II), 169-D:17; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:4A83, 2A:4A-89; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 32A-3B-2, 32A-3B-16; N.Y. Fam. 

Ct. Act § 712(a), 754; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27), 7B-2503; 

N.D. Cent. Code §§ 27-20-02(19), 27-20-32; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§§ 2151.022, 2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718) 

(enacted 2017); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.100; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

§§ 6302 ("[d]ependent child"), 6351; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-

3(9), 14-1-32; S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-19-20(9), 63-19-1440; S.D. 

Codified Laws §§ 26-8B-2, 26-8B-6; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-

102(26), 37-1-132; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 51.02(15), 51.03(b), 

54.05; Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103, 78A-6-105(18); 

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102, 5318; Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-228 

("[c]hild in need of services"), 16.1-278.4, 16.1-278.6; Wash. 

Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030; W. Va. Code §§ 49-1-202 

("[s]tatus offender"), 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-

402(a)(iv), 14-6-429. Colorado had similar provisions, which 

have since been repealed. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(5), 

(20)(f), repealed by Laws 1994, S.B. 94-21, § 1 (effective July 

1, 1997). The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes concerning children 

in need of services or supervision only cover children who are 

the subject of abandonment, abuse, or neglect, rather than those 

who are deemed to be engaging in improper or injurious behavior. 

See Iowa Code §§ 232.2(6), (20), 232.102; Wis. Stat. § 48.13.
27

include provisions on truancy,

15 only Massachusetts and five 

other States (Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, 

and Rhode Island) have statutory language that expressly 

includes a wilfulness component in the truancy provision.

16

 

15 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-15-201(4); Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

§ 8-201(19)(b); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(24)(A); Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 601; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120(5); D.C. Code § 16-

2301(8)(A)(i); Fla. Stat. § 984.03(9); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-

2(11); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-11(2)(C); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405

/ § 3-33.5; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2022(d)(6); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§§ 159.150, 630.020(3); La. Child. Code Ann. art. 730(1); Md.

Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-01(e)(1); Mich. Comp. Laws 

§ 712A.2(a)(4); Minn. Stat. § 260C.007(6)(14), (19); Miss. Code 

Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.031(1)(2)(a); 

Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-103(22), (51); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-

247(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62B.320(1)(a); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 169-D:2(II)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-3B-2(A); N.Y. Fam. Ct. 

Act § 712(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1501(27)(a), 7B-2503; N.D. 

Cent. Code § 27-20-02(19); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2151.022, 

2151.354; 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254 (S.B. 718); 42 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. § 6302; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 14-1-3(9), 14-1-32; S.C. Code

Ann. § 63-19-20(9); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8B-2(1); Tenn. Code

Ann. § 37-1-102(26)(A); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 51.02(15)(C); Utah 

Code Ann. §§ 53A-11-101, 78A-6-103(1)(i), 78A-6-105; Vt. Stat.

Ann. tit. 33, §§ 5102(3)(D), 5318; Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-228; 

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 43.185C.260, 28A.225.030(4); W. Va. Code 

§ 49-4-712; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-402(a)(iv).

16 Mass. G. L. c. 119, § 21 ("[c]hild requiring assistance" 

includes one who is "habitually truant," meaning he or she 

"willfully fails to attend school for more than [eight] school 

days in a quarter"); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.2(a)(4) (family 

court has jurisdiction over, inter alia, juvenile who "willfully 

and repeatedly absents himself or herself from [a] school or 

other learning program intended to meet the juvenile's 

educational needs"); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(k)(ii) 

("[c]hild in need of supervision" includes one who "willfully 

and habitually absents himself" from school); N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 169-D:2(II)(a) ("[c]hild in need of services" includes 

one "[w]ho is subject to compulsory school attendance, and who 

is habitually, willfully, and without good and sufficient cause 
28

Notwithstanding the absence of a wilfulness component in 

their comparable statutes, Minnesota and New York have, in turn,

interpreted their truancy provisions to require purposeful

conduct. See Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., 451 N.W.2d 241, 

243 (Minn. App. 1990); Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 

380-381 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995). For example, the Minnesota

Supreme Court has determined that under its "child in need of 

protection or services" framework, "[t]ruancy implies volitional 

conduct on the part of the child for which the child is 

responsible." Matter of the Welfare of B.K.J., supra. Thus, a

"child who is absent from school in obedience to a parent's 

wrongful command should not be stigmatized or confused by an 

unwarranted truancy label."17 Id. By inquiring whether the 

 

truant from school"); 2017 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 254(8)(c) (S.B. 

718) ("[c]hild or juvenile in need of supervision" includes one 

who is "willfully and voluntarily absent from school"); R.I. 

Gen. Laws § 14-1-3(9) ("[w]ayward" child includes one who is 

required to attend school and "willfully and habitually absents 

himself or herself from school"). Michigan has further held 

that a child's absences are not wilful, as required by its 

truancy statute, where they are attributable to illness and fear 

of bullying, as "Michigan courts must infer a criminal intent 

for every offense in the absence of an express or implied 

[l]egislative intent to dispense with criminal intent" (citation 

omitted). In re Napieraj, 304 Mich. App. 742, 747-748 (2014).

17 See Matter of Simon v. Doe, 165 Misc. 2d 379, 380-381

(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1995) (New York's "person in need of supervision" 

statute requires "[an] intentional failure to attend school" for 

purposes of truancy; therefore, child with extreme anxiety-based 

school phobia who was not attending school was not in need of 

supervision because her will was "overborne by anxiety").
29

child is responsible for his or her own conduct, and not simply 

whether the child is acting intentionally, Minnesota's 

instructive approach seeks to ascertain the underlying reason 

for the child's absences.

d. Wilfulness under the CRA statute. In order to 

effectuate the Legislature's goals, the phrase "willfully fails 

to attend school," as used in the CRA statute's habitual truancy 

provision, must require more than voluntary or intentional

conduct. The primary concern of the truancy provision is to 

target children who are, for instance, "playing hooky" or beyond 

their parents' control. Cf. Matter of the Welfare of L.Z., 

C.R.P., & S.L.P., 396 N.W.2d 214, 218 (Minn. 1986) ("The classic 

case of truancy is the child sent to school by his parents, who 

then skips"). We conclude that a child "willfully fails to 

attend school" when he or she acts purposefully, such that his 

or her behavior arises from reasons portending delinquent 

behavior.

18 Ascertaining the child's purpose in failing 

 

The Vermont Supreme Court declined to adopt Minnesota's 

approach because it determined that the language of the Vermont 

statute defining a truant as one who, "being subject to 

compulsory school attendance, is habitually and without 

justification truant from school," did not imply a volitional 

element. See Matter of A.V., S.T., A.C., & E.V., 176 Vt. 568, 

571 (2003).

18 Even in such cases, the intervention and other services 

contemplated under the CRA statute may be a more effective 

method of changing the child's behavior than bringing the child 
30

repeatedly to attend school allows the court to focus on whether 

the behavior is such that it can and should be deterred, and on 

whether the child's home circumstances are such that the court 

should change, or place conditions on, the child's custody 

arrangements. See G. L. c. 119, § 39G (choices available to 

Juvenile Court judge in CRA proceedings concern only custody, 

and provision of services may be merely conditions of custody). 

See also Oscar F. v. County of Worcester, 412 Mass. 38, 41 

(1992) (statute "is concerned with social and family problems. 

It does not make the kind of education that a child receives a 

central judicial concern").

We emphasize that a finding of wilfulness is a fact-based 

inquiry that will depend on the circumstances of each case. Not 

every case involving a mental or physical disability necessarily 

will shield a child from a finding of wilfulness, since not 

every disability affects a child's ability to attend school. 

Each child's purpose or reasons for missing school should be 

examined individually in order to determine whether the absences 

are wilful beyond a reasonable doubt. Given their experience 

with juveniles and with delinquency matters, Juvenile Court 

judges are uniquely situated to assess whether the child's 

 

into court. The design of the CRA statute, with its emphasis on 

community-based resources, indicates that the Legislature 

envisioned a deliberate set of escalating measures, in which 

court intervention would be the last alternative.
31

reasons for regularly missing school are of the concerning 

nature that would portend delinquency and call for deterrence.

e. Application to M.P. With this definition in mind, the 

evidence in the record does not support a finding beyond a 

reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend 

school." Even assuming that the judge correctly determined that 

M.P.'s acts of staying home were voluntary or intentional, it is 

uncontested that her purpose was to address her bladder 

condition and associated mental and emotional impairments.

While M.P. was not "home bound" per se, nor exempt from school, 

nothing of record suggests that M.P.'s behavior exhibited 

problems or tendencies that could lead toward juvenile 

delinquency. To the contrary, the Juvenile Court judge 

acknowledged that M.P. desired to go to school, and it is 

undisputed that M.P. was saddened by her inability to do so. 

Even during the short period when she established a routine with 

the in-home service provider, M.P.'s bladder condition still

interfered with her ability to leave the house.

Nor do the judge's findings and the record show that a 

modification of her custody arrangements would help improve 

M.P.'s attendance record.19 Cf. Matter of Benjamin A., 2011 N.Y. 

 

19 If, unlike here, a child's absences were the result of 

parental neglect such that the child's truant behavior was not 

found to be wilful, the child could not be adjudicated a child 
32

Slip Op. 52217, at n.14 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Oswego County Sept. 26, 

2011) (unreported) ("Even if the Court could find otherwise, a 

[person in need of services] label is not going to get Benjamin 

to school. All the services he needs to be successful are 

available to him through the school district and diversion 

services. If those services do not . . . work and Benjamin does 

not attend school, what could this Court do but remove[] him 

from his family and place him into an ill-prepared and 

overworked juvenile justice system").

We note that an incorrect CRA adjudication is not without 

consequences. Even where, as here, there is no change in 

custody, such a finding can be harmful in at least two respects. 

First, CRA proceedings could affect parents' custodial rights in 

the future; courts have considered such proceedings in care and

protection cases when terminating parental custody. See, e.g., 

 

requiring assistance by virtue of habitual truancy and the 

matter of appropriate custodial arrangements accordingly could 

not be addressed pursuant to that statute. That being said, 

however, the matter of parental neglect and custodial 

arrangements for the child may be addressed in care and 

protection proceedings brought in the Juvenile Court pursuant to 

G. L. c. 119, §§ 24, 26. Such proceedings may be brought on 

behalf of a child who "(a) is without necessary and proper 

physical or educational care and discipline; (b) is growing up 

under conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's sound 

character development; (c) lacks proper attention of the parent, 

guardian with care and custody or custodian; or (d) has a 

parent, guardian or custodian who is unwilling, incompetent or 

unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention." 

G. L. c. 119, § 24.
33

Care & Protection of Sam, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1106 (2015); 

Adoption of Odessa, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2010). Second, as 

discussed, the CRA statute was amended specifically to minimize 

children's exposure to the Juvenile Court unless court 

involvement is necessary, in order to prevent the stigma and 

other negative consequences of premature court involvement. In 

this case, the evidence showed that the CRA proceedings worsened

M.P.'s condition and increased her anxiety, stress, and 

sadness.20

The evidence of record does not support a finding beyond a 

reasonable doubt that M.P. "willfully fail[ed] to attend 

school." Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated and set 

aside. The matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for entry 

of an order dismissing the CRA petition.

So ordered.

 

20 We note that the Bureau of Special Education Appeals may 

have been a more appropriate venue in this case to ensure that 

M.P. was receiving an adequate education. See G. L. c. 71B, 

§ 2A. This administrative body has authority to provide 

"adjudicatory hearings, mediation and other forms of alternative 

dispute resolution" concerning "any matter relating to the 

identification, evaluation, education program or educational 

placement of a child with a disability or the provision of a 

free and appropriate public education to the child." Id.