Filed 1/27/22 In re Jayden D. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JAYDEN D., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B312338

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 21CCJP01335A)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOY B.,

Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL from an order the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.

John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * * 

Joy B. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s assertion of 

dependency jurisdiction over her now three-year-old son, Jayden 

D. Because the court’s assertion of jurisdiction was supported by 

substantial evidence, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Jayden was born in October 2018 to mother and Brandon 

D. (father).

Father has been incarcerated since Jayden was born. Most 

recently, father was charged with murder and with 

manufacturing a weapon while in custody. Father denies the 

murder charge, but admits that he made a makeshift knife. 

In 2020, mother started dating and, along with Jayden, 

started living with another man, H.H. H.H. was on felony 

probation in September 2017. 

In March 2021, a judge issued arrest warrants for mother 

and H.H., and a search warrant for mother’s house. In issuing 

these warrants, the judge found probable cause to believe that 

mother drove H.H. and three other members of the 62 Harvard 
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Park Brims street gang to a liquor store, where H.H. got out and 

fired his weapon. Mother subsequently admitted that she was 

present at the location of the shooting, that she was seated in the 

driver’s seat, that other people were in the car with her, and that 

shots were fired; however, mother denied that she had been 

driving, that she knew her year-long boyfriend was a gang 

member, or that she had any idea anyone would be there to 

engage in violence. H.H. was charged with attempted murder; 

mother, with being an accessory to murder.

However, mother reported that she had dropped off Jayden 

with a relative and he was not present at the liquor store.

II. Procedural Background

On March 22, 2021, the Los Angeles Department of 

Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition 

asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over 

Jayden on the grounds that (1) mother’s conduct in “allow[ing]” 

H.H., “who has a history of violence,” to “reside” with and have 

“unlimited access” to Jayden, and in being “involved in a gang 

related attempted murder drive by shooting” created a 

“detrimental and endangering home environment” that 

“endangers” Jayden’s “physical health and safety, and places 

[him] at risk of serious physical harm[] and damage,” and (2) 

father’s “criminal history,” including the most recent pending 

murder charge, “endangers” Jayden’s “physical health and safety 

and places [him] at risk of physical harm, damage and danger.” 

The Department alleged that jurisdiction was appropriate under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).1

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
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The court held a combined jurisdictional and dispositional 

hearing on May 5, 2021. At the hearing, counsel for Jayden 

urged the court to assert jurisdiction due to mother’s conduct 

because “the ongoing gang retaliation” that the February 2021 

incident invited “put[]” Jayden “at more risk.” The court 

sustained jurisdiction on both alleged grounds. Specifically, the 

court ruled that “the mere fact that [mother and father] are 

incarcerated is not by itself grounds for the court to take 

jurisdiction,” but went on to find that “the lifestyle and activities 

that mother and father are both engaging in do definitely put this 

child at substantial risk of harm.” The court also removed

Jayden from both parents, and ordered reunification services for 

mother.

Mother filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in asserting 

dependency jurisdiction over Jayden because neither sustained 

allegation from the Department’s petition is supported by 

sufficient evidence.2 We review a juvenile court’s finding of 

dependency jurisdiction for substantial evidence, asking whether 

the record—when viewed as a whole and drawing all inferences 

in support of the court’s finding—contains “‘“sufficient facts to 

2 Mother also purports to challenge the juvenile court’s 

removal of Jayden from her custody, but her argument is that 

removal is inappropriate because there was no jurisdiction. 

Thus, mother has waived the removal issue except to the extent 

it overlaps with her jurisdictional challenge. (Cf. In re A.C. 

(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“‘When an appellant . . . asserts 

[an argument] but fails to support it with reasoned argument and 

citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.’”].) 
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support [that] finding[].”’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773

(I.J.).)

As pertinent here, a juvenile court is empowered to assert 

dependency jurisdiction over a child if “[t]he child has suffered, or 

there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” 

(§ 300, subd. (b).) Risk of harm means just that: The juvenile 

court “need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to 

assume jurisdiction.” (In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 

1376, 1383 (Kadence P.); In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 

987, 993.) When it comes to assessing that risk, the juvenile 

court may look to a parent’s past behavior as a “good predictor” of 

whether the child is currently at risk. (In re T.V. (2013) 217 

Cal.App.4th 126, 133; Kadence P., at pp. 1383-1384.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that mother had placed Jayden at substantial risk of serious 

physical harm by allowing H.H. unlimited access to Jayden and 

by engaging in gang-related criminal activity with H.H. It is 

undisputed that H.H. had suffered at least one felony conviction, 

was placed on probation, and violated his probation before 

mother started dating him. Mother thereafter let H.H. move in 

with her and Jayden. Then, in February 2021, mother drove 

H.H. and other gang members to a liquor store, where H.H. got 

out and started shooting. Tellingly, mother does not dispute that 

H.H. is a gang member or that H.H. engaged in a gang-related 

shooting; she merely insists that she did not know about his gang 

affiliations or his murderous intent ahead of time. Based on the 

evidence that mother allowed Jayden to live with her companion

who has a criminal history and actively engages in gang violence, 
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the juvenile court could reasonably infer a risk of gang-related 

retaliation for the February 2021 shooting that would place 

Jayden at risk. (See Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 

Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424 [substantial evidence may rest on 

reasonable inferences].) The risk to Jayden is the same whether 

mother knew about H.H.’s gang affiliation in advance, was 

negligent in failing to learn of it in the year they cohabitated 

before the crime, or is in denial about those affiliations. 

Mother responds with six arguments.

First, she argues that the sole evidence of her involvement 

in the February 2021 shooting was the unsupported opinion of a 

single police officer. She is wrong. The record also discloses that 

a judge found sufficient evidence of mother’s and H.H.’s 

involvement in the shooting to issue arrest warrants and a search 

warrant. Coupled with mother’s selectively exculpatory 

admission to being behind the wheel of the car at the liquor store 

at the time shots were fired, the warrant and mother’s admission 

constitute sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to conclude 

that the entire affair was not merely the product of a single police 

officer’s active imagination. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) 

Mother points to her insistence that she is wholly innocent, but 

we must construe the record in the light most favorable to the 

juvenile court’s ruling, and that ruling could only be reached if 

the court found mother’s protestations of innocence not to be 

credible. It is not our job to reweigh the evidence or the juvenile 

court’s credibility findings. Along similar lines, the fact that 

mother is only charged with being involved is irrelevant: The 

pertinent standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence

(ibid.), so the absence of a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt does not matter (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557).
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Second, mother argues that there is insufficient evidence of 

H.H.’s criminal history and violence. The critical time to assess 

risk is the time of the jurisdictional hearing. (In re M.M. (2015) 

240 Cal.App.4th 703, 719.) By that time, the juvenile court knew 

of H.H.’s prior conviction and violation of probation and, 

critically, had sufficient evidence of his status as a gang member 

and the person who opened fire at the liquor store. 

Third, mother argues that any risk to Jayden was 

ameliorated by the time of the jurisdictional hearing because he 

was safely in the maternal grandmother’s custody, and maternal 

grandmother was open to having him stay with her as long as 

necessary. However, at the time of the hearing, mother was 

maintaining her innocence and had yet to be convicted. If the 

charges are dropped, a jury acquits her, or she is convicted but 

sentenced to a noncustodial sentence, there is every reason to 

believe mother would resume living with H.H. (were he also to be 

acquitted) and Jayden, thereby placing the child at risk. (Accord, 

In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 806.)

Fourth, mother argues that even if the allegations 

regarding the shooting were true, there was no risk of harm to 

Jayden because he was not present at the shooting. Mother 

misses the point here. The fact that mother lined up childcare 

before driving her boyfriend to engage in a gang-related shooting 

in no way vitiates the risk to Jayden arising from potential 

retaliation. What is more, this argument suggests that such 

behavior poses no risk to Jayden as long as he is not present 

when the crime(s) go down. Mother’s inability or unwillingness 

to acknowledge how her actions create a substantial risk of harm 

to Jayden further supports the juvenile court’s finding of risk.

(See In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1025-1026 [“In 
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evaluating risk . . . , a juvenile court should consider . . . , among 

other things, evidence of the parent’s current understanding of 

and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child”].)

Fifth, mother argues that jurisdiction may not be premised 

on a parent’s incarceration alone. This is true (e.g., In re Noe F.

(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 366), but irrelevant because the 

juvenile court was careful to explain that it was not exerting 

jurisdiction over Jayden due to his parents’ incarceration but 

rather because their underlying behavior was placing Jayden at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm.

Lastly, mother argues that there was insufficient evidence 

to support the jurisdictional finding regarding father. Because 

the evidence supporting the finding regarding mother is valid, 

and because we need only find one basis for jurisdiction (In re 

A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289), we have no occasion to 

address mother’s arguments in this regard.
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DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST