alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )

)

Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

SHERIFF JABANG, )

)

Appellant. )

)

No. 77969-9-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: MAR 1 1 2019

PER CURIAM - Sheriff Jabang challenges legal financial obligations

imposed following his jury convictions for second degree identity theft and

possession of a controlled substance. Jabang contends, and the State concedes,

that the $200 criminal filing fee and $100 DNA collection fee should be stricken

from his judgment and sentence due to his indigence, previous DNA collection,

statutory amendments, and State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 746-50, 426 P.3d

714 (2018).

We accept the State's concessions and remand for the trial court to strike

the filing and DNA collection fees from the judgment and sentence.

FOR THE COURT:

4r

5kuilf\tcl,
Exhibit 10.16





Simple Promissory Note Dated April 1, 2002 by and between the Thanksgiving Coffee Company and Paul and Joan Katzeff.





Simple Promissory Note





$15,000





In the City of Fort Bragg, County of Mendocino, in the State of California, on the 1 st day of April, 2002 on demand, Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. promises to pay to the order of Paul Katzeff and Joan Katzeff the principal sum of Fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) payable in a lump sum on October 1,
2002, together with interest, at 10% per annum, payable in monthly installments of $500 (or more, at the option of Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc.) on the first of the month, beginning on the 1 st day of May, 2002 and continuing until said principal and interest have been paid in full.





Obligee/Maker of Promise/s/ Joan Katzeff, President

April 1, 2002Officer, Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc.

DateBorrower/s/ Paul Katzeff

April 1, 2002Paul Katzeff, Lender

Date/s/ Joan Katzeff

April 1, 2002Joan Katzeff, Lender

Date
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Report of eTotalSource, Inc. (the “ Company ”)
      on
      Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “ Report ”),
      the
      undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
      certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:




1.  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2.  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.


Date:March
                  28, 2006
              By:
              */s/
                Terry L. Eilers*Name:Terry
                  L. EilersTitle:President
                and Chief Executive Officer




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authentications, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required
      by Section 906, has been provided by eTotalSource, Inc. will be retained by
      eTotalSource, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or
      its staff upon request.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

PRISCILLA M. SANDERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant. 

AIKEN, Judge: 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01608-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

I reversed a decision of the Commissioner denying plaintiffs application for benefits and 

remanded the case for further administrative proceedings. The Commissioner now moves to alter 

or amend the judgment, arguing that I e1Ted by improperly relying on the decision in Brink v. 

Comm 'r, 343 Fed. App'x 211 (9th Cir. 2009) rather than the decision in Stubbs-Danielson v. 

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). The motion is denied. 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01608-AA Document 26 Filed 05/13/16 Page 1 of 2
First, I clarify my discussion of Brink and Stubbs-Danielson. Contrary to the 

Commissioner's motion, I did not state that Stubbs-Danielson involved no evidence of moderate 

cognitive limitations. Rather, I noted that the record in that case included a medical source 

opinion with a "concrete" restriction to "simple tasks," thus providing support for the RFC. Op. 

& Order at 14. While I quoted the language in Brink suggesting that Stubbs-Danielson included 

no evidence of moderate restrictions, I did not make that particular finding. Instead, I found 

Brink more analogous to this case, in that the RFC assessed by the ALJ was incomplete and did 

not adequately reflect plaintiffs mental limitations due to the specific nature of the cognitive 

limitations found by Dr. Cotgageorge and endorsed by Dr. Frommelt. Id. at 14-16. 

Second, I found that the ALJ compounded the problem by relying solely on the Medical 

Vocational Guidelines (the grids) and failing to obtain vocational expert testimony, even though 

an expert was present at the hearing. Op. & Order at 16-19. Given the evidence of record 

regarding plaintiffs mental limitations, the ALJ eiTed by finding that plaintiffs non-exertional 

limitations did not significantly affect her occupational base of unskilled work at all exeiiional 

levels so as to allow reliance on the grids. See, e.g., Perkins v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3930407, at *9 

(D. Ariz. July 30, 2013) (finding that the ALJ erred by applying the grids when there was 

evidence that the claimant had non-exertional limitations related to his cognitive impairments). 

Accordingly, the Commissioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (doc. 24) is 

DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this [3~ of May, 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01608-AA Document 26 Filed 05/13/16 Page 2 of 2
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#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Gerald Rennoldson, Appellant.

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was properly convicted of vehicular manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.12) for causing the death of his passenger. Defendant’s act of driving while intoxicated was sufficient evidence of a "gross deviation” to support the jury’s determination that defendant had acted with criminal negligence *(see, People v Holt,*109 AD2d 174, 176). Here, in contrast to the case of *People v Holt (supra),*there is evidence to support the inference that defendant’s intoxication caused the death of the victim. The physical facts show that defendant, while intoxicated, drove his automobile at a high rate of speed, causing it to enter a ditch on the wrong side of the road and to travel 374 feet in the ditch, strike a culvert, roll over and continue 87 feet beyond the culvert.

We reject defendant’s contention that the ampoules used in the breathalyzer test were too old to give an accurate result. By failing to raise the issue below, defendant has failed to preserve it for our review as a matter of law *(see, People v Farrell,*58 NY2d 637, 639).

We have examined defendant’s other arguments on appeal and we find that none requires reversal. Finally, considering the circumstances of this case and defendant’s criminal record, we determine that the sentence imposed was not harsh and excessive. (Appeal from judgment of Ontario County Court, Reed, J.—vehicular manslaughter, and other offenses.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Pine, JJ.
II

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 1549

To suspend until December 31, 2002, the duty on Benzoic acid, 2-[[3-

[[(2,3-dihydro-2-oxo-1H-1H-benzimidazol-5-yl)amino]carbonyl]-2-hydroxy1-naphthalenyl]azo]-, butyl ester.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 13, 1997

Mr. CHAFEE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To suspend until December 31, 2002, the duty on Benzoic

acid, 2-[[3-[[(2,3-dihydro-2-oxo-1H-1H-benzimidazol-5-

yl)amino]carbonyl]-2-hydroxy-1-naphthalenyl]azo]-, butyl

ester.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 1549 IS

1 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON BENZOIC ACID, 2-[[3-

2 [[(2,3-DIHYDRO-2-OXO-1H-1H-BENZIMIDAZOL-5-

3 YL)AMINO]CARBONYL]-2-HYDROXY-1-NAPH4 THA-LENYL]AZO]-, BUTYL ESTER.

5 Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tar6 iff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting

7 in numerical sequence the following new subheading:

‘‘ 9902.32.XX Benzoic acid, 2-

[[3-[[(2,3-dihydro2-oxo-1H-1Hbenzimidazol-5-

yl)amino]carbonyl]-

2-hydroxy-1-

naphthalenyl]azo]-,

butyl ester provided for in

subheading

3204.17.04 ........... Free No change No change On or before

12/31/2002 ’’.

8 SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

9 The amendment made by section 1 applies with re10 spect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for

11 consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of

12 the enactment of this Act.

Æ
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 11

The following table sets forth the computation of basic and diluted earnings
per share:
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                                                                   Three months ended March 31,
                                                                                                   2000                     1999
                                                                                                ----------               ----------
<S>                                                                                             <C>                      <C>
Numerator:
Net income (loss)                                                                               (1,763,480)              (1,088,844)
Dividends on Series A preferred stock                                                               (5,703)                  (5,703)
Dividends on Series B preferred stock                                                              (52,213)                    --
                                                                                                ----------               ----------

Numerator for basic and diluted earnings (loss) per
share-income (loss) available to common shareholders                                            (1,821,396)              (1,094,547)
                                                                                                ----------               ----------

Denominator:
Denominator for basic earnings (loss) per share-
weighted average shares outstanding                                                              6,889,867                6,727,722
Effect of dilutive securities
Warrants                                                                                              --                       --
                                                                                                ----------               ----------

Dilutive potential common shares Denominator
for diluted earnings (loss) per share adjusted
weighted-average shares and assumed conversion                                                   6,889,867                6,727,722
                                                                                                ----------               ----------

Basic earnings (loss) per share                                                                      (0.26)                   (0.16)
                                                                                                ----------               ----------

Diluted earnings (loss) per share                                                                    (0.26)                   (0.16)
                                                                                                ----------               ----------


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1995
<CASH>                                         318,353
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  873,191
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,554,625
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,876,583
<PP&E>                                       1,839,860
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               5,036,716
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,078,775
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     4,597,498
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 5,036,716
<SALES>                                      7,447,096
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,447,096
<CGS>                                        5,095,080
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,095,080
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,747
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             134,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                183,118
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (121,766)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            304,884
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   304,884
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case na me: Rickey B. Newell v. Litton Loan Servicing LLC

Appellate case number: 01

- 12

- 00710

- CV

Trial court case number: 1013020A

Trial court: 165th District Court of Harris County

On March 18, 2013, appellant Rickey B. Newell and appellee Litton Loan Servicing, LLC filed a joint “Agreed Motion for Entry of Judgment,” asking us to vacate the trial court’s judgment, to declare void or valid various filings related to real pro perty, and to deny all other relief sought by the appellant in his lawsuit. The parties explain that their intention in requesting this relief is to allow Litton to begin new foreclosure proceedings against the appellant.

The parties did not specifically request that we dismiss the appeal, although as authority for their request that we enter judgment they cite to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(A), pertaining to voluntary dismissals in civil cases. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A). Rule 42 .1(a)(2)(A) permits us to “render judgment effectuating the parties’ agreements” in accordance with an agreement signed by the parties or their attorneys and filed

with the clerk. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A).

The relief sought by the parties in their jo int motion is beyond that authorized by Rule 42.1(a)(2)(A). We may not “ order a new trial merely on the agreement of the parties absent reversible error, or . . . vacate a trial court’s judgment absent reversible error or a settlement.”

Notes and Comment s, T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42. The parties do not indicate that the dispute between

them has been settled, nor do they point us to reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. For these reasons, the motion of the parties is denied

.
It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Justice Evelyn V. Keyes

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: M a rch 19, 2013
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Manuel CHIRENO-GIL, Appellant.

No. 10-2982.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Sept. 14, 2011.

Filed: Sept. 19, 2011.

*627Scott M. Cullen, Esq., Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Ap-pellee.

Scott P. Sigman, Esq., Sigman & Roch-lin, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Manuel Chireno-Gil, charging him with attempted possession with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). After the close of the government’s case in chief, Chireno-Gil moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the motion. Thereafter, the jury found Chireno-Gil guilty as charged. Chi-reno-Gil renewed his motion under Rule 29(c) to no avail. The District Court sentenced Chireno-Gil to, *inter alia,*120 months’ imprisonment. This timely appeal followed, challenging the District Court’s denial of the Rule 29 motion.1 We will affirm.

We “review[ ] the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and must credit all available inferences in favor of the government.” *United States v. Riddick,*156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir.1998). If a rational juror could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must sustain the verdict. *United States v. Cartwright,*359 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir.2004).

Chireno-Gil contends that the District Court erred because the government failed to offer evidence that permits an inference that he knew he was tendering money in exchange for a controlled substance. The District Court denied the motion summarily. After consideration of the government’s case-in-chief, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chire-no-Gil knew that the “50 kilos,” which he was about to receive in exchange for a backpack full of $35,000 in cash, were controlled substances. We will affirm.

1

. The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
#### CRANE, ET AL. V. HALL, ET AL.

(Decided April 20th, 1910.)

Appeal from Jefferson Chancery Court.

Heard before Hon. Alfred H. Benners.

*671Thompson & Thompson, and Gaston & Pettus, for appellants:

George Huddleston, for appellees.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed on motion of appellants.
#### HICKEY, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

September 22, 1896.)

Action by John F. Hickey against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company.

No opinion. Motion for a certificate denied. All concur." See 40 N. Y. Supp. 484.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Elijah White, Appellant.

[941 NYS2d 860]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Erlbaum, J.), rendered October 20, 2009, as amended October 21, 2009, convicting him of aggravated criminal contempt, grand larceny in the fourth degree, criminal contempt in the first degree (four counts), assault in the third degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the “physical injury” element of the crimes of aggravated criminal contempt and assault in the third degree was not established by legally sufficient evidence, and that, for the same reason, the verdict on those counts was against the weight of the evidence. The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the victim sustained physical injury as required to support a conviction of aggravated criminal contempt under Penal Law § 215.52 (1) is unpreserved for appellate review, as it was not raised with specificity in his motion for a trial order of dismissal *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Hawkins,*11 NY3d 484, 491-492 [2008]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]; *People v Alston,*42 AD3d 468, 469 [2007]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant sustained a physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00 (9), as required to support his convictions of aggravated criminal contempt and assault in the third degree *(see People v Bogan,*70 NY2d 860, 862-863 [1987]; *People v Rahman,*84 AD3d 1119 [2011]; *People v Delph,*269 AD2d 218 [2000]; *People v Miller,*146 AD2d 809 [1989]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of aggravated criminal contempt and assault in the third degree was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]; *People v Rahman,*84 AD3d at 1120). Skelos, J.P., Belen, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.