Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1512-CR-2106|July 7, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Patricia Caress McMath

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Jackson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

July 7, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1512-CR-2106

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Angela Dow 

Davis, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G16-1407-F6-36935

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Michael Jackson appeals the revocation of his probation. He raises one issue 

which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

revoking his probation. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December 2014, Jackson pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to 

domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. The court sentenced Jackson to 

365 days with 359 days suspended to probation, and ordered that he have no 

contact with Megan Martin pursuant to the plea agreement. 

[3] On October 13, 2015, a Notice of Violation of Probation was filed alleging that 

Martin made a police report on October 6, 2015, and that Jackson violated the 

no contact order by leaving a note on her vehicle while she was at a friend’s 

house located at 7118 Gavin Drive.

[4] On October 21, 2015, the court held a hearing. Martin testified that Jackson 

was her husband, that on October 6, 2015, she and her friend Ryan Christmas 

were returning to Christmas’s house on Gavin Drive, where Martin had left her 

truck, that she observed Jackson driving his vehicle, and that she ducked down 

in Christmas’s vehicle so that Jackson would not see her.1 The State introduced 

 

1 Martin testified that this occurred at “Three-ish,” and when asked if it “was late afternoon, early evening,” 

she answered “Yeah, in the late afternoon.” Transcript at 7. The court admitted a police report “to show the 

time,” transcript at 9, and the report stated: “Occurred: 10/6/2015 at 17:20” and “Reported: 10/6/2015 at 

17:45.” State’s Exhibit 1. 
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an exhibit which Martin testified was a note that was left on her truck. The 

typewritten note provides: 

I need you. PLEASE. TODAY IS THE WORST DAY OF MY 

LIFE. I FIND OUT YOU ARE CHEATING . . . GET THE 

NEWS I JUST GOT. I WON’T SAY A WORD ABOUT 

WHAT YOU’VE DONE. JUST . . . PLEAAASE COME 

TAKE CARE OF ME I AM SOOOO LOST. 

PLLLLLLEEEEEAAASEE . . NO FIGHT NO BITCH NO 

ATTACK JUST LOVE ME . . . .

State’s Exhibit 2. On cross-examination, Martin testified that Christmas found 

the note on her truck and handed it to her. Martin later testified: “I ran 

underneath the garage door. By the time it was all the way up, [Christmas] had 

. . . come in with the note within minutes.” Transcript at 22. On redirect, the 

prosecutor asked “does [Jackson] know what kind of truck you drive,” and 

Martin replied “[y]es.” Id. at 25. 

[5] An employee of Marion County Community Corrections testified that her 

duties included dealing with the GPS system, that they kept records of GPS 

coordinates in the ordinary course of business, and that GPS coordinates for 

Jackson showed that he was at 7118 Gavin Drive at 5:09 p.m. until at least 5:10 

p.m. on October 6, 2015. When asked on cross-examination whether Jackson 

was excluded from being in that area on October 6th, the employee testified 

“[o]n that date he was not excluded from being there” and that “[i]t has since 

been added as a protected zone.” Id. at 29. 
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[6] Jackson indicated that he worked in the mortgage business, that he had 

previously asked to be placed on GPS, and that he did so “[f]or an alibi, 

basically.” Id. at 37. He testified that he received a call from a potential 

customer who asked him to come to his house on Gavin Drive, that this 

happened all of the time, and that he set up a time with the person. When 

asked if he had to obtain permission from home detention to do this, he testified 

“[t]ypically, something like this, no. . . . If I’m doing something on personal 

business, I have to get permission.” Id. at 41. He indicated that he has “a GPS 

device that goes off if [he is] in the wrong area” and that his device did not go 

off. Id. When asked if he wrote the note, Jackson testified “No, I speak better 

English than this.” Id. at 42. Jackson indicated that he did not know 

Christmas. He further indicated that he had “been here” and this was his “third 

or fourth time,” that he had been “living with the fear of can [he] make it” to 

December 11th “to save [his] job” and not go to jail, and that he has tried his 

best to stay away from Martin. Id. at 43. Jackson testified that he thought he 

was set up. 

[7] The court asked Jackson if he had any paperwork or a call slip related to his 

visit to the address on Gavin Drive, and Jackson answered that he did not, and 

he testified that he did not do a loan, that he went to the home and no one was 

there, that he did not record calls, and that he did not have a call log. The court 

asked if he was allowed to “go and do whatever you want while you are 

working as long as it’s not personal,” and Jackson replied “[w]ell, she knows 

what I do. I’ve explained to her what I do. And I try to e-mail them . . . .” Id.
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at 49. The court asked if he sent an email on October 6th, and Jackson replied: 

“No. Well, I talked to her about it and she was not in any way upset about it. 

She understood.” Id. at 50. The court asked “[a]nd it happened to be at the 

exact same address of 7118 Gavin,” and Jackson answered “Yes. I think I was 

set up. She said I was there at 1:30 and I wasn’t. It was 5:00. So she obviously 

didn’t see me.” Id. 

[8] The trial court stated that it did not believe Jackson’s version of what happened, 

that there was proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Jackson went to 

7118 Gavin Drive, the same place that a note was left, and that Martin testified 

that she saw him. The court found Jackson in violation, gave him credit for the 

time he was on home detention, and ordered that he serve the balance of his 

suspended sentence in the Marion County Jail. 

Discussion

[9] The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in revoking Jackson’s 

probation. Jackson asserts that, “[i]f indeed the typewritten note was placed on 

[Martin’s] truck by Jackson, that would be a violation of the no contact order. 

However, there is no evidence that the note was put on [Martin’s] truck by 

Jackson and no evidence that Jackson wrote the note or had it put on [Martin’s]

truck.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. He argues that he had a legitimate explanation 

for being at Gavin Drive that had nothing to do with Martin, that the only 

evidence that the note was found on Martin’s truck was hearsay evidence based 

on what Christmas told her, that Christmas did not testify so he was not 

afforded his due process right to confront him, and that there is nothing 
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inherent in Martin’s testimony that makes Christmas’s allegation substantially 

trustworthy. 

[10] The State argues that Jackson waived review of the admission of Martin’s 

testimony that Christmas found the note on her vehicle because he did not 

object to the statements, that Jackson does not argue the admission of the 

statements by Christmas to Martin were fundamental error, that Christmas’s

statement about the location of the note was substantially trustworthy, and that 

the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings. 

The State further maintains that the court’s determination that Jackson violated 

his probation was supported by substantial evidence, that Martin saw Jackson 

driving away from Christmas’s house where her truck was parked, that 

Jackson’s GPS monitor confirmed that he was at Christmas’s house for two 

minutes that evening, that Christmas found the note on Martin’s truck and 

immediately gave it to her and told her where he had found it, and that the 

court found that Jackson’s completely unsupported explanation for his presence 

at Christmas’s house was not credible. In reply, Jackson argues that “[t]he only 

relevant evidence is that Jackson was at 7118 Gavin Drive just before [Martin] 

got there and that [Martin’s] friend handed a note to [Martin]” and that,

“[h]owever, there is nothing to connect the note with Jackson.” Appellant’s 

Reply Brief at 5. 

[11] With respect to the admission of Martin’s testimony that Christmas told her 

where he discovered the note and Jackson’s right to confront Christmas, we 

observe that Jackson did not object to this portion of Martin’s testimony or 
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assert any right of confrontation. Accordingly, these issues are waived.2 See 

Marsh v. State, 818 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that the failure 

to object to hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing waives the issue 

for appeal); see also Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000) (holding, 

where the defendant contended that his right to confront witnesses was 

violated, that the defendant did not object on confrontation grounds at trial and 

that the claim of error was waived). 

[12] With respect to Jackson’s assertion the evidence is insufficient to support the 

court’s finding that he violated his probation, we note that a probation hearing 

is civil in nature and the State need only prove the alleged violations by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that we consider all the evidence most favorable 

to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence 

or judging the credibility of witnesses, and that, if there is substantial evidence 

of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a defendant has 

violated any terms of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke. Cox v. 

State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied. The record reveals that

Martin’s truck was at Christmas’s house, that Jackson knew what kind of truck 

Martin drove, that Jackson went to Christmas’s house, that, when Martin and 

Christmas were returning to Christmas’s house, Martin observed Jackson 

driving his vehicle, and that, soon after Martin went inside, Christmas handed 

 

2

Jackson does not argue that the admission of Martin’s testimony that Christmas told her where he 

discovered the note constituted fundamental error. 
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her the note. Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Jackson 

violated the terms of his probation. 

Conclusion

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking Jackson’s 

probation. 

[14] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.