alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of William Ortiz, Respondent. New York City Corporation Counsel, Appellant.

No opinion. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Sullivan, Carro, Rosenberger and Wallach, JJ.
Order entered September 12, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-00980-CV

IN RE TUNAD ENTERPRISES, INC., Relator

Original Proceeding from the 417th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 417-00618-2016

ORDER

Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Boatright

Before the Court is relator’s motion for emergency stay. In light of the Court’s opinion 

of this date denying relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, we DENY the motion as moot.

/s/ JASON BOATRIGHT 

JUSTICE
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```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1298 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1298

 To designate a Federal building located in Florence, Alabama, as the 
              ``Justice John McKinley Federal Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 20, 1997

  Mr. Shelby introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate a Federal building located in Florence, Alabama, as the 
              ``Justice John McKinley Federal Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF JUSTICE JOHN MCKINLEY FEDERAL BUILDING.

    The Federal building located at 210 North Seminary Street in 
Florence, Alabama, shall be known and designated as the ``Justice John 
McKinley Federal Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building referred to in 
section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Justice John 
McKinley Federal Building''.
                                 <all>
```
1Documents in the record refer to appellant as Keenon and Kennan; however, our

opinion will reflect appellant’s name as it appears in the trial court’s judgment.

NO. 07-02-0249-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

AUGUST 8, 2002

______________________________

KENNON SHAW, APPELLANT1

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2001-437619; HONORABLE CECIL G. PURYEAR, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

Following a plea of not guilty, on March 1, 2002, appellant Kennon Shaw was

convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone and

punishment was assessed at 50 years confinement. Appellant timely filed his motion for
2

new trial extending the time in which to perfect his appeal until May 30, 2002. Tex. R. App.

P. 26.2(a)(2). The notice of appeal, however, was not filed until the following day and was

not accompanied by a motion for extension of time reasonably explaining the delay. 

In a criminal case, the time within which to file a written notice of appeal may be

enlarged if, within 15 days after the deadline for filing the notice, the party files the notice

of appeal and a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. Because appellant’s sentence was imposed on March

1, 2002, the 15-day window for filing his notice of appeal and motion for extension of time

expired on June 14, 2002. By letter dated July 26, 2002, this Court requested that

appellant show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In

response, on August 5, 2002, counsel for appellant filed a motion for extension of time

explaining the reason for the late notice of appeal. However, when a notice of appeal, but

no timely motion for extension, is filed within the 15-day window, this Court does not have

jurisdiction to dispose of the purported appeal in any manner other than by dismissal for

want of jurisdiction. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996). Additionally,

we do not have jurisdiction to invoke Rule 2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure in

an effort to obtain jurisdiction of the case. Thus, we cannot create jurisdiction where none

exists. Id; see also Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998).

Appellant may be entitled to an out-of-time appeal by filing a post-conviction writ of

habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex. Code Crim.
3

Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2002); see also Ex Parte Garcia, 988 S.W.2d 240

(Tex.Cr.App. 1999).

Accordingly, we dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction. 

Don H. Reavis

 Justice

Do not publish.
EXHIBIT 31.2


                                CERTIFICATION

I, W. Douglas Caudell certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of YoCream International,
Inc. (the registrant);

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this annual report is being prepared;

b)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal
quarter (registrants fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) All significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over
financial reporting.


/s/ W. Douglas Caudell                                Dated:  January 29, 2004
W. Douglas Caudell, Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT
31.2**
 
 I, Lui
Chi Keung, Chief Financial Officer certify that:
 
 1. I have
reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of China Digital Media
Corporation.
 
 2. Based
on my knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this annual report;
 
 3. Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;
 
 4. The
registrant's other certifying officers and I am responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:
 
 a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this annual report is being prepared;
 
 b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this annual
report ("Evaluation Date"); and
 
 c)
presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation
Date;
 
 5. The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 
 a) all
significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which
could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's auditors any
material weaknesses in internal controls (all of which do not apply);
and
 
 b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls (all of which do
not apply); and
 
 6. The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly
report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date
of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (all of which do not
apply).
 
 Date:
April 15, 2005
 
 
 
 /s/ Lui
Chi Keung
 ________________________
 Lui Chi
Keung
 Chief
Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Thanksgiving Coffee Company, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (i) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ Paul KatzeffChief Executive OfficerMay 12, 2006
(December 16, 1986)

#### Owen P. Dunn, Respondent, v Consolidated Rail Corporation, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alvin F. Klein, J.), entered October 23, 1985, which upon a jury verdict awarded plaintiff damages in the sum of $2.9 million, is unanimously modified, on the law, so as to vacate and remand the matter for a new trial solely upon the issue of damages, and is otherwise affirmed without costs.

Plaintiff, a conductor in the rear of defendant’s train No. 897, was injured on September 23, 1980 when the car in which he was working derailed on the New York to Poughkeepsie run. He brought this action under the Federal Employees Liability Act (FELA) to recover damages for his serious injuries. The jury has properly determined that the accident was proximately caused by defendant carrier’s negligence. However, with respect to damages, the trial court, despite defendant’s appropriately noted request, failed to charge the jury that they were required to discount to present value any sum awarded for damages to accrue in the future. Defendant, on appeal, correctly cites this refusal of the trial court as error.

Even though this is a State court action, Federal substantive law under FELA is controlling. "[I]t is settled that the propriety of jury instructions concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action is an issue of 'substance’ determined by federal law.” *(St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v Dickerson,*470 US 409, 411, citing *Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v Liepelt,*444 US 490.) Where a State trial court declines to give such an instruction to guide the jury in its assessment of damages, the result is reversible error.

In view of the foregoing, we do not reach defendant’s contention that the jury’s award of damages was excessive. We have examined the other points raised by defendant-appel*229lant and find them to be without merit. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Asch and Wallach, JJ.
#### Madelyn Landsman, Appellant, v Andre C. Seyton, Respondent.

[942 NYS2d 891]—

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), entered February 25, 2011, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and against her on the issue of liability, and upon the denial of her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the defendant and against her, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability and for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the verdict is vacated, the complaint is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a trial on the issue of damages, and thereafter for entry of an appropriate judgment.

In order to set aside a jury verdict upon the ground that it is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, there must be “no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury” *(Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD2d 129, 132 [1985] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Applying this standard here, there was no valid line of reasoning or permissible inferences which could *836have led the jury to determine, at the conclusion of the liability trial, that the defendant was not at fault in the happening of the accident. Even if the jury discredited the trial testimony of the plaintiff and her husband as to the events surrounding the collision, the defendant admitted in his deposition testimony, which was read on the plaintiffs direct case, that his vehicle struck the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger in the rear, while in stop-and-go traffic. Under these circumstances, no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could have lead to a conclusion other than that the defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiffs vehicle in the rear. Furthermore, since the defendant failed to offer a nonnegligent explanation for the accident to rebut the presumption of negligence which arises from a rear-end collision, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see *Francis v Pinkhasov,*71 AD3d 630, 631 [2010]; *Kosinski v Sayers,*294 AD2d 407, 408 [2002]; *Nicoli v Whelan,*283 AD2d 623, 624 [2001]).

The plaintiffs remaining contention has been rendered academic in light of our determination, and the defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Angiolillo, J.E, Dickerson, Leventhal and Miller, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Unified Financial Services,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 (the
"Report"), I, Thomas G. Napurano, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
               operations of the Company.


                           /s/ Thomas G. Napurano
                           ---------------------------------------------------
                           Thomas G. Napurano, Chief Financial Officer of
                           Unified Financial Services, Inc.

                           August 4, 2003


         This certificate accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE DSI TOYS,
INC. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED OCTOBER 31, 1997
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                    9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,138,879
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               12,525,013
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (173,313)
<INVENTORY>                                 13,284,015
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            28,038,880
<PP&E>                                       4,693,145
<DEPRECIATION>                             (3,425,692)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              31,092,063
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       21,535,208
<BONDS>                                      4,500,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        87,190
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,969,665
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                31,092,063
<SALES>                                     61,828,627
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            61,828,627
<CGS>                                       44,531,494
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               20,779,001
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               215,778
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                74,487
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,158,138
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,424,228)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (1,592,721)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,831,507)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              (480,754)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,312,261)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.66)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.66)
        

</TABLE>