alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The State v. Hill, *Appellant.*

*1.*Practice: bill of exceptions : extending time. After the time for filing a bill of exceptions has expired, the court cannot, at a subsequent term, extend it.

2. -:-. When a bill of exceptions has been filed out of time, the supreme court will exclude it from consideration.

*571
      *Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.*— Hon. C. H. S. Goodman, Judge.

Affikmed.

Defendant was indicted, and duly tried for embezzlement. The trial resulted in a conviction and sentence to imprisonment for two years. Motions for new trial and in arrest were overruled at the April term, 1887, of the Daviess circuit court. At the same term defendant took an appeal to the supreme court and an order was entered extending the time to file bill of exceptions to the first day of the next (June) term. On the ninth day of the June term the court extended the time to July 15. The bill was filed July 12.

*John Leopard*and *W. T. Sullivan*for appellant.

*John M. Wood,*Attorney-General, for the State.

The bill of exceptions was not filed in time. *Moberly Ass' n v. Frue,*79 Mo. 193; *Spencer v. Railroad,*79 Mo. 500; *ClarJcv. Bulloch,*65 Mo. 535 ; *Johnson v. Greenleaf,*73 Mo. 671; *West v.*Fowler, 55 Mo. 300 ; *State v. Broderich,*70 Mo. 622.

Bakclay, J.

— After the rulings were made on defendant’s final motions and his appeal was allowed, the cou.t, at the same term, extended his time to file bill of exceptions to the first day of the next term. When that time expired, the court, then holding another term, made an order for a further extension within which the bill was filed.

It is now insisted by the vigilant representative of the state that we cannot properly consider the bill thus filed.

*572The point seems well taken. The record in the cause having been closed at a previous term, the authority of the court thereafter to allow a bill of exceptions depended on the order to that effect made at that term in accordance with the statute on the subject.

The court could not properly, in the first instance, make an order at a subsequent term, after the cause had terminated, allowing a bill of exceptions to proceedings at the prior term. Any allowance of the bill at such a time would derive vitality only from the action of the court taken during the term when the cause was pending by virtue of which the bill could be connected with, and, by relation, made part of that record.

We are of the opinion that, after the extended time has expired, the court cannot properly make a further order of extension.

It is, hence, obligatory to exclude the bill of exceptions from consideration on this appeal.

No suggestion of any error in the record proper has been made. We have carefully reviewed it and fail to discover any.

The indictment conforms to the statute and the subsequent proceedings before Judge Goodman appear regular throughout.

The judgment is affirmed,

with the approval of Black and Brace, JJ. ; Ray, O. J., absent, and Sherwood, J., expressing no opinion.
SCWC-22-0000128

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ‘ I

K.T., Petitioner/ Petitioner

- Appellant,

vs. K.H., Respondent/ Respondent

- Appellee.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-22-0000128; CASE NO. 1DA211002876)

ORDE R REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (By: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, and Devens, JJ

. , and Circuit Judge Cahill, in place of Ginoza, J., recused) Petitioner /Petitioner-Appellant K.T.’s Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed on February 29, 2024, is hereby rejected. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai  i, April 4, 2024. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Todd W. Eddins /s/ Vladimir P. Devens /s/ Peter T. Cahill Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-22-0000128 04-APR-2024 07:53 AM Dkt. 7 ODAC
#### In the Matter of LaMonte J., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

—In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Palmer, J.), dated August 27, 1984, which, upon a fact-finding order dated August 17, 1984, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, placed him with the Division for Youth, Title III, for a period not to exceed 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated August 17, 1984 and the denial, after a hearing, of the appellant’s motion to suppress physical evidence.

Order of disposition affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellant’s contention that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him is without merit. When coupled with the indications of criminal activity, flight from the police is an important factor in determining probable cause *(see, People v Howard,*50 NY2d 583, 592, *cert denied*449 US 1023).

The appellant’s disposal of a gun during the chase by police was an abandonment of that property, and the police properly seized it. *People v Howard (supra)*does not hold to the contrary *(see, e.g., People v Chapman,*103 AD2d 494). Therefore, the Family Court Judge properly denied the appellant’s motion to suppress the gun.

With the gun properly admitted into evidence, a review of the record indicates that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant possessed a loaded gun. Thus, the Family Court Judge correctly concluded on the record at the fact-finding hearing that the appellant had committed an act which, if done by an adult, would have constituted a violation of Penal Law § 265.02 (4). Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### The People ex rel. Charles Kruse, Respondent, *v.*Charles H. Woodman et. al., as Commissioners, etc., Appellants.

(Submitted June 20, 1890;

decided October 14, 1890.)

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of New York,, entered upon an order made April 1, 1889, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon an order of the Special Term.

*Edward Browne*for appellants.

*W. Bourke Cockran*for respondent.

Agree to affirm ; no opinion.

All concur, except O’Brien, J., dissenting.

Judgment affirmed.
##### 



Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Eclipsys
Corporation (the Company) for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
the undersigned, Paul L. Ruflin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Robert J. Colletti, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished
to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

/s/ Paul L. RuflinDated:
      November 6, 2003
      
      Paul L. Ruflin
        Chief Executive Officer/s/ Robert J. CollettiDated:
      November 6, 2003
      
      Robert J. Colletti
        Chief Financial Officer




---
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1657 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 1657

  To suspend temporarily the duty on bis(2,6-dimethoxy-benzoyl)-2,4,4-
  trimethyl pentyl phosphinenoxide and 2-hydroxy-2-methyl-1-phenyl-1-
                               propanone.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 12, 1998

 Mr. Moynihan introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To suspend temporarily the duty on bis(2,6-dimethoxy-benzoyl)-2,4,4-
  trimethyl pentyl phosphinenoxide and 2-hydroxy-2-methyl-1-phenyl-1-
                               propanone.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new item:
    

         ``    9902.38.15     bis(2,6-dimethoxy-                                                                
                               benzoyl)-2,4,4-                                                                  
                               trimethyl pentyl                                                                 
                               phosphinenoxide                                                                  
                               and 2-hydroxy-2-                                                                 
                               methyl-1-phenyl-                                                                 
                               1-propanone                                                                      
                               (provided for in                                                                 
                               subheading                                                                       
                               3815.90.50).....  Free        No change        No change       On or before      
                                                                                               12/31/2000       
                                                                                                              ''

    (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by this section applies with 
respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, 
on or after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.2



FUJITSU LIMITED


The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd.
New York Branch
One World Trade Center, Suite 4911
New York, New York  10045


                                                               November 18, 1996



                               Letter of Guaranty


Dear Sir,

         In appreciation of your making loan of up to the amount of
US$25,000,000.00 (in words: U.S. Dollars twenty-five million only) to Ross
Technology, Inc. (hereinafter called the "Company"), having its principal office
in Austin, Texas and subsidiary of FUJITSU LIMITED, organized under the laws of
Japan and having its principal office at 6-1, Maruncuchi 1- chome, Chiyoda-Ku,
Tokyo 100, Japan, under a certain loan facility (hereinafter called the "Loan
Facility") between you and the Company, we hereby irrevocably guarantee the full
and principal payment by the Company of its indebtedness pursuant to the terms
of the Loan Facility, provided that in no event will our obligations and
liabilities hereunder exceed US$25,000,000.00.

         The term "Indebtedness" as used in this Guaranty means all outstanding
obligations and liabilities of the Company arising out of or in connection with
the loans made under the Loan Facility, whether principal, interest or expenses,
to be paid by the Company pursuant to the terms of the Loan Facility.

         If and to the extent the Company fails to make a full and punctual
payment pursuant to the terms of the Loan Facility, we will, within the
reasonable time of the receipt of your demand, pay you the Indebtedness subject
to the limitations set forth in the first sentence of this Guaranty.

         We hereby waive notice of acceptance of the Guaranty, and any right to
require you to proceed against the Company.
         This Company will be a continuing one and will terminate on March 31,
1998, but such termination will not release us from our obligations and
liabilities hereunder existing on and as of the date of such termination.

         This Guaranty will be governed by and construed in accordance with the
law of Japan.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature in Japanese]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

JAMES E. ROSS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 2:14-cv-00113-JAD-CWH

)

vs. ) ORDER

)

LANE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, )

)

Defendant. )

__________________________________________) 

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for E-Mail Documents (#26), filed

May 30, 3014. Claiming that his mail is being stolen, Plaintiff appears to request that he be given

access to Court’s electronic filing system. 

Pursuant to the United States District Court of the District of Nevada’s Special Order #109,

the ability to file electronically is reserved for attorneys unless the Court grants a non-attorney

authorization to use the electronic filing system (CM/ECF). Plaintiff requests that the court allow

him to use the Court’s CM/ECF system in order to file, access, and electronically serve and be

served documents in this case. Having reviewed and considered the matter, and good cause

appearing, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for E-Mail Documents (#26) is

granted. Plaintiff must comply with the following procedures in order to activate his CM/ECF

account:

a. On or before Friday, June 20, 2014, Plaintiff shall provide certification that he has

completed the CM/ECF tutorial and is familiar with Electronic Filing Procedures,

Best Practices, and the Civil & Criminal Events Menu that are accessible on this

court’s website, www.nvd.uscourts.gov.

b. Plaintiff is not authorized to file electronically until said certification is filed with

Case 6:14-cv-01235-TC Document 27 Filed 06/02/14 Page 1 of 2
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the Court within the time frame specified.

c. Upon timely filing of the certification, Plaintiff/Defendant shall contact Robert

Johnson at the CM/ECF Help Desk at (702) 464-5555 to set up a CM/ECF account.

DATED: June 2, 2014. 

______________________________________

C.W. Hoffman, Jr.

United States Magistrate Judge

2

Case 6:14-cv-01235-TC Document 27 Filed 06/02/14 Page 2 of 2
NoFire Technologies, Inc. (NFTI)
Code of Ethics for the CEO and CFO


The Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), or those performing similar functions, and
all Senior Financial Officers (including particularly the Chief Financial
Officer) are subject to the following specific policies relating to ethical
conduct and fair dealing, conflicts of interest, confidentiality of NFTI
information and compliance with law


Be committed to the highest standards of honest and ethical conduct, including
the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between their
personal and professional relationships in the performance of their duties as
CEO and Senior Financial Officers of NFTI.

Be committed to the full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure
in reports and documents that NFTI file with, or submits to, the SEC and in
other public communications  made by NFTI, of all information relating to NFTI,
its financial condition and results of operations.

Be committed to compliance with all applicable governmental laws, rules and
regulations relating to the conduct of the businesses of NFTI and to required
reports regarding the financial condition and results of business operations of
NFTI, including the laws of all countries in which NFTI operates.

Act in good faith, responsibly, with due care, competence and diligence, without
misrepresenting material facts or allowing one' s independent judgment to be
subordinated to any personal interest.

Respect the confidentiality of information acquired in the course of serving as
CEO or a Senior Financial Officer of NFTI except when authorized or otherwise
legally obligated to make disclosure. Confidential information shall not be
used for personal advantage.

Report violations of this Code of Ethics to The General Counsel or directly to
the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of NFTI, as soon as practicable
after learning of any such violation.

7 .Report to the General Counsel or Audit Committee any information concerning
(a) significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
(b) which could adversely affect NFTI's ability to record, process,
(c) summarize and report financial data or (b) any fraud, whether or not
(d) material, that involves management: or other employees who have a
(e) significant role in NFTI's financial reporting, disclosure or internal
(f) controls.

8Report to the General Counsel or Audit Committee any material violations of
the securities or other laws, rules or regulations applicable to NFTI and the
operations of its business, by NFTI or any agent thereof.

Hold themselves accountable for adherence to this Code of Ethics, and
Understand that NFTI's Board of Directors will hold them accountable, as CEO or
 Senior Financial Officers of NFTI, to this Code of Ethics.
exhibit102.htm


     

     

    
      

      

    

    


      EXHIBIT
10.2

      


      


      


      CLECO
CORPORATION

      DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLAN

      Corrective
Section 409A Amendment

      


      Whereas, Cleco Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Louisiana (the
“Company”), maintains the Cleco Corporation Deferred Compensation Plan, which
plan was first effective as of August 1, 2000, and has thereafter been amended
from time to time (the “Plan”);

      


      Whereas, such Plan constitutes
a “deferred compensation” arrangement within the meaning of Section 409A of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and was previously amended to comply
with the provisions thereof;

      


      Whereas, the Company now
desires to further amend such Plan for the purpose of complying with the
provisions of Code Section 409A

      


      Now, Therefore, the Plan shall
be amended as set forth below:

      


      1.           Effective
January 1, 2005, Section 4.3 of the Plan, concerning the deferral of option
gain, shall be deleted and such section shall be marked “Reserved.”

      


      2.           Effective
January 1, 2009, Section 4.4 of the Plan, as amended, shall provide for further
amendment to the Short Term Deferral of Bonus thereunder.

      


      This Corrective Section 409A
Amendment was approved by the Board of Directors of Cleco Corporation on
December 5, 2008, to be effective as of the dates set forth herein.

      


                Cleco
Corporation

      


                By:
/s/ George W.
Bausewine

      


                Its:
Senior Vice President,
Corporate Services

      


                Date:
December 8, 2008
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6206

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY ROOSEVELT EVANS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, 

District Judge. (5:08-cr-00054-FL-1; 5:12-cv-00290-FL)

Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: January 26, 2015

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy Roosevelt Evans, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas B. Murphy, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Kimberly Ann Moore, Jennifer 

E. Wells, Seth Morgan Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Roosevelt Evans appeals the district court’s 

order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant 

the Government’s motion to dismiss his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

United States v. Evans, Nos. 5:08-cr-00054-FL-1, 5:12-cv-00290-

FL (E.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2014); see Whiteside v. United States, ___ 

F.3d ___, 2014 WL 7245453 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2014) (en banc). 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Santos AKE-COLLI; et al., Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71494.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 21, 2011.

Samuel W. Asbury, Esquire, Asbury Law Offices, Gresham, OR, for Petitioners.

Christopher C. Fuller, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, Ari Nazarov, Michael P. Lindemann, Esquire, U.S. Department Of Justice, CM Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, ORP-District Director, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Santos Ake-Colli and his family, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that petitioners did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution because they failed to demonstrate the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to protect them. *See*
      *223
      *Nahrvani v. Gonzales,*399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, their asylum claim fails.

Because petitioners failed to meet the lower burden of proof for asylum, their claims for withholding of removal necessarily fail. *See Zehatye,*453 F.3d at 1190.

We reject petitioners’ contention that the BIA failed to address Ake-Colli’s application for cancellation of removal because it is belied by the record. In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of Ake-Colli’s cancellation of removal claim because petitioners have not raised any colorable legal challenge to that determination. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.