[Cite as State v. Clay, 2013-Ohio-4984.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

MADISON COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 CASE NO. CA2013-04-013 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 O P I N I O N 

 : 11/12/2013 

 - vs - 

 : 

JAMIE CLAY, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CRI20100137 

Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Eamon P. Costello, 59 North Main 

Street, London, Ohio 43140, for plaintiff-appellee 

Joshua Beasley, 8 East Main Street, West Jefferson, Ohio 43162, for defendant-appellant 

 

 S. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jamie Clay, appeals from a Madison County Court of 

Common Pleas decision resentencing him upon remand from this court. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm Clay's sentence. 

{¶ 2} This case is before this court for the third time on appeal. Clay was indicted on 

November 10, 2010, for one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), one count of 

possession of criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), and one count of vandalism in 
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violation of R.C. 2909.05(B)(2). Clay pled guilty to all three counts. The facts underlying 

Clay's convictions are more fully discussed in State v. Clay, 196 Ohio App.3d 305, 2011-

Ohio-5086 (12th Dist.) (Clay I). The following facts, related to the sentencing of Clay, are 

relevant to the current appeal. 

{¶ 3} On February 2, 2011, the trial court sentenced Clay to a total of six years in 

prison. Clay received a sentence of one year for the possession of criminal tools and one 

year for vandalism which were to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the five 

years he received for robbery. Clay appealed his sentence to this court. 

{¶ 4} On direct appeal, we affirmed the trial court's imposition of maximum, 

consecutive sentences. Clay I at ¶ 13. However, we reversed the portion of his sentence for 

robbery and possession of criminal tools finding these to be allied offenses of similar import. 

Id. at ¶ 27. The matter was remanded to the trial court with instructions to merge the 

offenses after the state elected which of the allied offenses to pursue. Id.

{¶ 5} Prior to Clay being resentenced, 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86 (H.B. 86) went into 

effect on September 30, 2011. H.B. 86 amended certain sentencing statutes, including R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3). Amended R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) reduced the maximum possible prison term for 

certain third-degree felonies, including third-degree felony robbery. During Clay's 

resentencing hearing on November 4, 2011, the trial court found that H.B. 86 applied to Clay 

because he was being resentenced after the effective date of H.B. 86. Accordingly, the trial 

court found that the maximum penalty it could impose for Clay's third-degree felony robbery 

conviction was 36 months, rather than five years. Thereafter, the trial court ordered a 

sentence of 36 months for the robbery offense to be served consecutively to the one-year 

sentence for vandalism. Clay again appealed his sentence. State v. Clay, 12th Dist. 

Madison No. CA2011-12-016, 2012-Ohio-5011 (Clay II). 

{¶ 6} In Clay II, Clay appealed pro se and argued that the trial court "improperly 
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imposed maximum and consecutive sentences in violation of H.B. 86." Clay II at ¶ 12. Upon 

review, this court found that the trial court's application of H.B. 86 was contrary to law. Id. at 

¶ 22. In reaching this determination, we recognized that the General Assembly only intended 

H.B. 86 to apply retroactively to offenders who fell within the exception found in R.C. 1.58(B). 

Id. at ¶ 15. Thereafter, we found that Clay did not fall within the exception in R.C. 1.58(B) 

because he had a "'penalty imposed' on the robbery and criminal tools offenses at the 

original sentencing hearing on February 2, 2011, prior to the effective date of H.B. 86." Id. at 

¶ 18. Accordingly, we reversed the sentence for robbery and remanded the matter to the trial 

court for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 22. On remand, we instructed the trial court "to apply the 

sentencing laws, including R.C. 2929.14, that were in effect prior to the effective date of H.B. 

86." Id. 

{¶ 7} The trial court held a third sentencing hearing on March 20, 2013. At this 

hearing, pursuant to this court's remand, the trial court recognized that the maximum 

sentence available was five years. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Clay to a five-year 

prison term for the robbery offense to be served consecutively to the one-year prison term for 

vandalism.1

 

{¶ 8} Clay now appeals the trial court's decision, raising one assignment of error for 

review: 

{¶ 9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ORC 1.58(B) INAPPLICABLE TO 

APPELLANT AND SENTENCING APPELLANT TO 5 YEARS ON A ROBBERY CHARGE 

WHEN THE APPLICABLE LAW ONLY ALLOWED A MAXIMUM OF 36 MONTHS. 

{¶ 10} In the current appeal, Clay makes it clear that he is challenging both "the

 

1. Clay's sentence for vandalism was affirmed in Clay I and Clay II. Clay I at ¶ 13, 27; Clay II at ¶ 24. In 

addition, in Clay I, we affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Clay I 

at ¶ 6-13. 
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sentence of February, 2, 2011, and the sentence of March 20, 2013." Clay contends that this 

court's reversal of his sentence for robbery in Clay I rendered his original February 2, 2011 

sentence void. As a result, Clay argues that the first valid sentence on the robbery offense 

was entered on November 5, 2011, after the effective date of H.B. 86, and accordingly, he 

should have received the benefit of the reduced maximum sentence pursuant to R.C. 

1.58(B). As to the March 2013 sentence, Clay asserts that this sentence is also void and 

"not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms" because at the time of the hearing, the 

maximum sentence for a third-degree felony robbery was 36 months. 

{¶ 11} In the present case, any arguments related to Clay's February 2, 2011 sentence 

are barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. "The law-of-the-case doctrine is rooted in 

principles of res judicata and issue preclusion." State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-

Ohio-6238, ¶ 35. Pursuant to this doctrine, decisions made by a reviewing court regarding 

legal questions remain the law of that case for all subsequent proceedings at both the trial 

and appellate levels. State v. Carpenter, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008-05-122, 2009-Ohio1165, ¶ 28, citing Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1 (1984). Absent extraordinary 

circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Ohio Supreme Court, an inferior court 

has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same 

case. Carpenter at ¶ 28. In essence, the doctrine compels trial courts to adhere to a 

reviewing court's mandates. State v. Blacker, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-02-012, 2011-

Ohio-3916, ¶ 29. 

{¶ 12} This court considered and rejected each of the arguments now advanced by 

Clay regarding his February 2, 2011 sentence. In Clay II, this court determined that Clay did 

not qualify under R.C. 1.58(B) to receive the reduced sentence provided by H.B. 86 as his 

penalty for the robbery offense "had already been imposed" on February 2, 2011, prior to the 

effective date of H.B. 86. Clay II at ¶ 18-19. The fact that this court reversed a portion of the 
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February 2, 2011 sentence due to an allied offense error did not negate the conclusion that 

Clay had a "penalty imposed." Id. at ¶ 18. Moreover, we noted that Clay's success in 

appealing his original sentence for robbery and possession of criminal tools did not render 

the sentence void. Id. at ¶ 21. Clay was entitled and did indeed appeal our decision in Clay 

II arguing that H.B. 86 applied to him. The Supreme Court declined to accept Clay's appeal. 

02/20/2013 Case Announcements, 2013-Ohio-553. Therefore, our decision in Clay II 

remained the law of the case. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in finding 

R.C. 1.58(B) inapplicable and sentencing Clay to five years. Clay II at ¶ 19. 

{¶ 13} Clay's challenge to his March 2013 resentencing is properly before this court. 

However, Clay asserts no new arguments challenging the trial court's decision to impose a 

five-year maximum prison term. Rather, Clay relies on the same arguments advanced 

regarding the February 2011 sentence. Clay again asserts that 1.58(B) applies, reducing the 

available maximum penalty for his third-degree felony robbery to 36 months because the 

resentencing in March 2013 occurred after the effective date of H.B. 86. However, this 

argument ignores that this court has already determined, as described above, that H.B. 86 is 

inapplicable to him. See Clay II at ¶ 14-22. Because this court has already considered these 

issues, and specifically determined that 1.58(B) does not apply to Clay, the trial court did not 

err and was required by the law of the case "to apply the sentencing laws, including R.C. 

2929.14, that were in effect prior to the effective date of H.B. 86." Id. at ¶ 22. Accordingly, 

the trial court imposed a sentence within the applicable statutory range for a third-degree 

felony robbery. Former R.C. 2929.14. 

{¶ 14} Clay's sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 15} Judgment affirmed. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., and RINGLAND, J., concur.