IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

SANDERS LITTLE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

P ANNER, District Judge. 

MEDFORD DIVISION 

Civ. No. 3:14-cv-00974-PA 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Sanders Little ("Plaintiff'} seeks judicial review of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") finding him not disabled 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. For the reasons below, the Commissioner's decision 

is AFFIRMED. 

BACKGROUND 

Born in May 1958, Plaintiff was 52 years old on the alleged disability onset date of 

August 12, 2010. Tr. 15, 21. Plaintiff speaks English and has a limited education. Tr. 22. 

Plaintiff previously sought benefits and was denied on February 25, 2010. Tr. 13. Plaintiff did 

not appeal that decision. ld. 

Plaintiffs present application alleged disability due to epilepsy, arthritis, back pain, and 

hepatitis B. Tr. 68. Plaintiffs application was denied initially and upon review. Tr. 13. 

Plaintiff requested and was granted a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Andrew 

Page 1- ORDER 
Grace, which was held on October 26, 2012. !d. The ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not 

disabled on November 28, 2012. Tr. 23. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs subsequent 

request for review, making the ALI's decision the final Agency decision. Tr. 1-3; 20 C.F.R. § 

422.210. Plaintiff now appeals the denial of this application for benefits. 

Subsequently, Plaintiff made a successful application for benefits alleging disability from 

August 7, 2014. Pl.'s Reply Ex. A. 

DISABILITY ANALYSIS 

A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity 

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423( d)(l )(A). "Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for 

determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." 

Keyser v. Comm 'r, 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Each step is potentially dispositive. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five-step sequential process asks the following 

series of questions: 

1. Is the claimant performing "substantial gainful activity?" 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). This activity is work involving 

significant mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay 

or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510; 416.910. If the claimant is performing 

such work, she is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F .R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not performing 

substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two. 

2. Is the claimant's impairment "severe" under the Commissioner's 

regulations? 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Unless 

expected to result in death, an impairment is "severe" if it significantly 

limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a); 416.92l(a). This impairment must have lasted 

or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least _12 months. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509; 416.909. If the claimant does not have a severe 

impairment, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 

Page 2- ORDER 
416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis 

proceeds to step three. 

3. Does the claimant's severe impairment "meet or equal" one or more of the 

impairments listed in 20 C.P.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, 

then the claimant is disabled. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of 

the listed impairments, the analysis proceeds beyond step three. At that 

point, the ALJ must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess 

and determine the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC"). This 

is an assessment of work-related activities that the claimant may still 

perform on a regular and continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed 

by his or her impairments. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 404.1545(b)-(c); 

416.920(e); 416.945(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant's RFC, 

the analysis proceeds to step four. 

4. Can the claimant perform his or her "past relevant work" with this RFC 

assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.P.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform 

his or her past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 

5. Considering the claimant's RFC and age, education, and work experience, 

is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is 

not disabled. 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v); 

404.1560( c); 416.960( c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or 

she is disabled. Jd 

See also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 P.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. I d. at 953. The 

Commissioner bears the burden of proof at . step five. !d. at 953-54. At step five, the 

Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant 

numbers in the national economy, "taking into consideration the claimant's residual functional 

capacity, age, education, and work experience." Tackett v. Apfel, 180 P.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 

1999); see also 20 C.P.R. §§ 404.1566; 416.966 (describing "work which exists in the national 

economy"). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.P.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the Commissioner proves that the claimant 

is able to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the 

claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 P.3d at 953-54; Tackett, 180 P.3d at 1099. 

Page 3 -ORDER 
THE ALJ'S FINDINGS 

The ALJ performed the sequential analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of August 12, 2010. Tr. 

15. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: arthritis, 

carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 

seizure disorder. I d. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or 

medically equal a listed impairment. Tr. 17. 

In assessing the Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional 

capacity to perform light work with the following limitations: he is limited to four hours of 

standing/walking during an eight-hour workday; only occasional climbing of ramps/stairs and 

stooping; only frequent overhead reaching bilaterally; only frequent handling and fingering; no 

exposure to hazards or pulmonary irritants; and no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. Tr. 

17-18. 

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work and that 

transferability of job skills was therefore not an issue. Tr. 21-22. The ALJ further found that 

Plaintiff was approaching advanced age at the time of his application and that he had limited 

education and was capable of communicating in English. Id. At step five, based on the 

testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist 

in significant numbers in the national economy, including cafe attendant, laundry folder, and 

small products ·assembler. Tr. 22. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. 

Tr. 23. 

Page 4- ORDER 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on the proper 

legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence" means 

"more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Bray v. Comm 'r, 554 F.3d 1219, 

1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). It means 

"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 

!d. 

Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the 

Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld. Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th 

Cir. 1982). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's 

interpretation is a rational reading of the record, and this court may not substitute its judgment 

for that of the Commissioner. Burch v. Barnharf, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "However, a 

reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by 

isolating a 'specific quantum of supporting evidence."' Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007)(quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Even where findings are supported by substantial evidence, "the decision should be set 

aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the 

decision." Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968). Under sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without 

remanding the case for a rehearing. 

Page 5- ORDER 
DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) making findings on Plaintiffs handling and 

fingering limitations that were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) failing to order an 

updated consultative examination to assess Plaintiffs handling and fingering limitations; and (3) 

improperly rejecting Plaintiffs testimony. Plaintiff also asserts that the Appeals Council erred 

by not including all of Plaintiffs post-hearing evidence in the administrative record and requests 

a remand for consideration of new evidence. 

I. The ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ' s findings on Plaintiffs handling and fingering limitations 

were not supported by substantial evidence. In particular, Plaintiff points to the medical reports 

of Dr. Charles Layman, which were not presented to the ALJ but some of which were considered 

by the Appeals Council and included in the administrative record. 1 Tr. 681-83. 

On August 28, 2013, Dr. Layman noted that Plaintiff had electrodiagnostic evidence 

consistent with right carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar nerve compression in the right upper 

I 

extremity, as well as a decreased range of motion in the fingers of his right hand. Tr. 681. This 

is consistent with the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a severe 

impairment. Tr. 15. The ALJ accounted for Plaintiffs limitations by limiting him to only 

frequent handling and fingering. T r. 18. There is no indication on this record that Dr. Layman's 

report of August 28, 2013, would have resulted in a greater degree of limitation as ofNovember 

28, 2012, when the ALJ issued his decision. I conclude, therefore, that the ALJ's determination 

as to Plaintiffs limitations in handling and fingering was supported by substantial evidence. 

1 Dr. Layman examined Plaintiff after the ALJ issued his decision in November 2012. Some of Dr. Layman's 

records were· considered by the Appeals Council and included in the administrative record. The Appeals Council 

found that other records dealt with conditions outside of the period under review and declined to include them. Tr. 

2, 6. 

Page 6- ORDER 
II. The ALJ properly declined to order a consultative examination. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not develop the record adequately because he did not 

order a consultative examination to establish Plaintiff's handling and fingering limitations. 

Critical to the disability determination process "is the gathering and presentation of 

medical evidence. The burden of demonstrating disability lies with the claimant." Reed v. 

Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, "the ALJ has a duty to assist in 

developing the record." Id. at 841 (quoting Armstrong v. Comm 'r, 160 F.3d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 

1998); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)-(f), 416.912(d)-(f)). "An ALI's duty to develop the record 

further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to 

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence." Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-460 (9th 

Cir. 2001 ). "One of the means available to an ALJ to supplement an inadequate medical record 

is to order a consultative examination, i.e., 'a physical or mental examination or test purchased 

for [a claimant] at [the Commissioner's] request and expense."' Reed, 270 F.3d at 841 (quoting 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519; 416.919). 

In this case, Plaintiff was examined by Olga Senashova, M.D., on December 18, 2010. 

Tr. 477. Dr. Senashova found that Plaintiff was able to grip and hold objects, as well as grasp 

and manipulate normally. Tr. 481. Dr. Senashova also noted that Plaintiff was able to remove 

his shoes without difficulty. Tr. 479. On April 24, 2012, Plaintiff was examined by Jeffery 

Tyler, M.D., who found that Plaintiff's hands and wrists were normal, bilaterally. Tr. 589. On 

September 18, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Stephen Slattery, D.O., who noted Plaintiff's carpal 

tunnel syndrome but found that Plaintiff had a full range of motion with no edema and no 

tenderness. Tr. 612-13. 

Page 7- ORDER 
I conclude that the record before the ALJ was not so ambiguous or inadequate as to 

trigger the ALJ' s duty to develop the record. The A:LJ did not err by declining to order a 

consultative examination. 

III. The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's credibility. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiffs testimony with regard to his 

handling and fingering limitations. 

When gauging a claimant's credibility, an ALJ must engage in a two-step process. 20 

C.P.R.§§ 404.1529; 416.929. First, the ALJ must determine whether there is objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairinent that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree 

ofthe alleged symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282(9th Cir. 1996). Second, if such 

evidence exists, barring affirmative evidence of malingering,2 the ALJ must give clear and 

convincing reasons for discrediting the claimant's testimony regarding the severity of the 

symptoms. !d. at 1284; see also Lingenfelter v. As true, 504 F .3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). A 

general assertion that the Plaintiff is not credible is insufficient. The ALJ must identify what 

testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's allegations. Dodrill v. 

Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In this case, Plaintiff testified that he supports himself by collecting cans for between four 

and five hours per day. Tr. 36-37. Plaintiff testified that wrist pain and inability to grip 

interfered with his ability to collect cans. Tr. 37. This pain and grip difficulty began 

approximately one year before the hearing. Tr. 38. Plaintiff stated that on a normal day he did 

not have difficulty picking up cans, but that he struggled with heavier objects. Tr. 39. Plaintiff 

also testified that he will sometimes use a stick to pick up cans in order to work around his grip 

difficulties. !d. Plaintiff described numbness and swelling in his fingers approximately three 

2 The ALJ found no evidence of malingering inthis case. 

Page 8 -ORDER 
times per week. Tr. 40. Plaintiff testified that his doctors prescribed braces for his wrists, but 

that he could not afford the braces. Id. Plaintiffs wrist and hand problems were instead treated 

by pain management, although Plaintiffs physicians also discussed a surgical solution to 

Plaintiffs wrist problem, but Plaintiff declined that option in favor of ongoing pain management. 

Tr. 40-41. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiffs medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms. Tr. 19. The ALJ nevertheless found that 

Plaintiff was not credible because 1) the objective findings did not support the degree of 

impairment alleged by Plaintiff; 2) Plaintiffs activity level was not consistent with his claimed 

limitations; 3) Plaintiffs credibility was undermined by his drug-seeking behavior; and 4) 

Plaintiff was not compliant with recommended treatment. Tr. 19-20. Plaintiff specifically 

challenges the ALI's conclusion that Plaintiffs daily activities do not support his claimed 

limitations. 

The consistency of a claimant's daily activities with the medical record is relevant when 

determining the claimant's credibility and may constitute a clear and convincing reason to reject 

a claimant's testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. "Even when those activities suggest some 

difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant's testimony to the 

extent that they contradict claims of a totally disabling impairment." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 

1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). 

In this case, the ALJ noted that the record indicates that Plaintiff was able to spend every 

day collecting cans, carrying up to 300 cans in a bag on his shoulder. Tr. 19, 478. Plaintiff 

. testified that he spent between four and five hours collecting cans each day, pulling a hand cart 

behind him. Tr. 36-37. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to do housework, including 

Page 9 -ORDER 
vacuuming and light cleaning. Tr. 19. The ALJ also noted Plaintiffs wife's report of Plaintiffs 

daily activities, which include mowing, shopping, and paying the bills. Tr. 21. Mrs. Little's 

report indicates that Plaintiff mows the law for about 30 minutes and picks up cans "all day,'' and 

that he plays pool. Tr. 231-33. Based on the record, I conclude that the ALJ adequately 

supported his determination that Plaintiffs daily activities were inconsistent with the alleged 

level of impairment. 

The ALJ also noted Plaintiffs drug-seeking behavior, noncompliance with treatment, and 

the contradiction between Plaintiffs claimed limitations and the objective medical evidence. 

The ALJ's findings as to Plaintiffs drug-seeking behavior and noncompliance with treatment 

relate specifically to Plaintiffs back pain and seizure disorder and so are not discussed here. The 

ALJ's findings as to the objective medical evidence, however, do relate to Plaintiffs claimed 

handling and fingering limitations. 

Although subsequent medical examinations in 20 13 did find evidence of right carpal 

tunnel syndrome and decreased motion in the fingers of Plaintiffs right hand, Tr. 681, the ALJ 

noted a number of other medical sources which indicated that Plaintiff was not as significantly 

limited as claimed. In 2010, Dr. Senashova found that Plaintiff was able to grip and hold 

objects, as well as grasp and manipulate normally, Tr. 481, and noted that Plaintiff was able to 

remove his shoes without difficulty. Tr. 479. The ALJ also noted benign examination results in 

April2011 and December 2011. Tr. 19,490, 565. 

Although Plaintiff advances a different interpretation of the evidence than what the ALJ 

found, I conclude that the ALJ's credibility findings were adequately supported and constituted 

clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiffs testimony. 

Page 10- ORDER 
IV. The Appeals Council 

'"During the Appeals Council review process, a claimant may submit 'any new and 

material evidence ... which relates to the period on or before the date of the administrative law 

judge hearing decision."' Bales v. Comm 'r, No. 3:14-cv-01553, 2015 WL 5686884, at *3 (D. Or. 

Sept. 25, 2015) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.976(b)(1)); Asbury v. Colvin, 3:14-cv-1425-BR, 2015 

WL 6531325, at *4 (D. Or. Oct. 28, 2015). "If new and material evidence is submitted, the 

Appeals Council shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to the period on or 

before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). 

"[W]hen the Appeals Council considers new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision 

of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district court must 

consider when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision for substantial evidence." Brewes v. 

Comm 'r, 682 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012). 

However, when "the Appeals Council determines that the new evidence falls outside of 

the relevant time period, it has not 'considered' that evidence as that term is used in Social 

Security regulations." Bales, 2015 WL 5676884, at *3; Asbury, 2015 WL 6531325, at *4. See 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). "If you submit evidence which does not relate to the period on or 

before the date of the [ ALJ] hearing decision, the Appeals Council will return the additional 

evidence to you with an explanationas to why it did not accept the additional evidence." Bales, 

2015 WL 5686884, at *3. "The rejected evidence does not become part of the administrative 

record." !d.; Asbury, 2015 WL 6531325, at *4. 

In this case, the ALJ issued his decision finding Plaintiff not disabled on November 28, 

2012. Tr. 23. Plaintiff sought review of the ALI's. decision with the Appeals Council. In 

support of his application, Plaintiff submitted new evidence, including the medical reports of Dr. 

Page 11 -ORDER 
Charles Layman. On August 28, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Layman, who found 

"electrodiagnostic evidence consistent with right carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar nerve 

compression in the right upper extremity," as well as a "decreased range of motion in the fingers 

of [Plaintiffs] right hand." Pl.'s Br., Ex. 1, at 6. Plaintiff underwent surgery for carpal tunnel 

syndrome on his right hand on September 18, 2013, id. at 11, and on his left hand on February 

26, 2014. !d. at 1. 

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review of the ALJ' s decision on May 

28, 2014. Tr. 6. In making its decision, the Appeals Council noted that Dr. Layman's reports 

contained information about Plaintiffs condition after the ALJ's November 28, 2012 decision. 

Tr. 2. The Appeals Council therefore declined to include Dr. Layman's reports in the 

administrative record. Tr. 6. On this record, I conclude that the Appeals Council did not err 

when it declined to incorporate Dr. Layman's post-decision reports into the administrative 

record. 

V. No remand is necessary 

Remand of an ALJ decision in a social security case occurs under either sentence four or 

sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1991). A 

sentence four remand is a final judgment that the "agency erred in some respect in reaching a 

decision to deny benefits" which must be based solely on the administrative record before the 

district court. Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2002). Sentence six remands, 

by contrast, do not constitute final judgments. !d. at 855. Instead, sentence six remands are 

made absent a determination of whether the ALJ erred, and only in two situations: (1) "where the 

Commissioner requests a remand before answering the complaint," or (2) "where new, material 

. evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented to the agency." !d. at 854. The 

Page 12- ORDER 
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating materiality and good cause. Mayes, 276 F.3d at 462. 

Plaintiff seeks remand for consideration of new evidence pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). 

To be material under § 405(g), the new evidence must bear "directly and substantially on 

the matter in dispute." Id. (quoting Ward v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1982)); Luna 

v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). The claimant must also demonstrate that there is 

a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the 

administrative hearing. Mayes, 276 F.3d at 462; Luna, 623 F.3d at 1034. 

"To demonstrate good cause, the claimant must demonstrate that the new evidence was 

unavailable earlier." Mayes, 276 F.3d at 463. "A claimant does not meet the good cause 

requirement by merely obtaining a more favorable report once his or her claim has been denied." 

Id., see also Bales, 2015 WL 5686884, at *4; Gibb v. Astrue, Civil No. 09-533-HA, 2010 WL 

988467, at *3 (D. Or. Mar. 15, 2010) aff'd sub nom. Gibb v. Comm 'r, 420 F. App'x 767 (9th Cir. 

2011)). 

In this case, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Layman's reports, described in the previous 

section, constitute new material evidence justifying remand. The Commissioner contends that 

the new evidence is not material. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Layman long after the hearing 

in this case. When evidence post-dates an ALJ's decision, it can still be material. Booz v. Sec., 

734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1984); Brewes, 682 F.3d at1161-62. In Booz, the Ninth Circuit 

determined that a post-hearing medical record was material because it contained a retrospective _ 

analysis of the claimant's condition into the period under the ALJ's review. Booz, 734 F.2d at 

1380. Dr. Layman's reports contain no such retrospective analysis. In Brewes, the court held 

that the administrative record includes post-decisional material considered by the Appeals 

Page 13- ORDER 
Council. Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1161-62. In this case, the Appeals Council rejected Dr. Layman's 

reports and declined to include them in the administrative record. While Dr. Layman's reports 

would be material to a subsequent application for benefits, and it appears that Plaintiff was 

indeed later awarded benefits, I conclude that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating 

materiality. 

Nor do I find that Dr. Layman's reports create a reasonable possibility of a different 

outcome. As previously noted, the ALJ had substantial evidence in the record to support his 

findings as to Plaintiffs limitations in handling and fingering. Dr. Layman's reports support the 

ALJ's findings of carpal tunnel syndrome, but do not contain any indication of limitations in 

Plaintiffs function beyond what the ALJ determined to be present. Pl.'s Br. Ex. 1. I also note 

that Dr. Layman's reports contain statements that would tend to support rather than refute the 

ALJ's negative credibility findings with regard to Plaintiffs claimed limitations. !d. at 7 

("[Plaintiff] did come in with alcohol on his breath for the exam, and I am not sure the exam was 

totally straightforward today."). 

On this record, I decline to order a remand for consideration of Dr. Layman's reports. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the decision 

ofthe Commissioner is AFFIRMED and this action is DISMISSED. 

Page 14- ORDER 

DATED this ~ day ofDecember, 2015. 

~_k United 

OWENM. 

States 

PANNER 

District Judge 

~