[Cite as State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 520, 2012-Ohio-3895.]

T HE S TATE EX REL . B ROWN , A PPELLEE , v . H OOVER U NIVERSAL , I NC .,
D . B . A . J OHNSON C ONTROLS ET AL ., A PPELLANTS . [Cite as State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 520, 2012-Ohio-3895.] Workers’ compensation—Voluntary abandonment of employment—Examination of the totality of the circumstances required—Judgment affirmed. (No. 2011-0127—Submitted June 19, 2012—Decided August 30, 2012.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 10AP-21, 2010-Ohio-6174.

__________________ Per Curiam

. {¶ 1} Absent a return to other employ ment, an employee who voluntarily abandons his or her former position of employment cannot receive temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”). State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. , 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 380-381, 732 N.E.2d 355 (2000). Employment discharge can constitute a voluntary abandonment when it is a consequence of behavior that the claimant willingly undertook. State ex rel. Watts v. Schottenstein Stores Corp. , 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202 (1993). Voluntariness, however, can be imputed to a claimant’s misconduct onl y when the misconduct arises from a violation of a written work rule that (1) clearly defined the prohibited conduct, (2) identified the misconduct as a discharg eable offense, and (3) was known or should have been known to the employee. State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v.
Indus. Comm. , 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 403, 650 N.E.2d 469 (1995). {¶ 2} Appellee, LaRon Brown, was injured in 2003 while working for appellant Hoover Universa l, Inc., d.b.a. Johnson Controls. Five years later, Brown was fired for violating the company’s attendance policy. His terminationS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 was later the basis for appe llant Industrial Commission of Ohio’s denial of his request for TTC. We must determine whether the commission properly analyzed the circumstances of his firing in c oncluding that his dismissal barred TTC. {¶ 3} The attendance policy at issue gave nonprobationary employees such as Brown 16 hours of unpaid leave ev ery three months. These hours were deposited into a “bank” and, with a supe rvisor’s approval, could be used as needed. Generally, the exchange rate wa s one to one – an hour of bank time for an hour’s absence. The use of bank time to cover illness, however, was different. When an illness resulted in consecutive days off, an employee would be charged only eight hours of time for the entire absence if the employee called in each day of his or her absence and produced a doctor’s slip upon return. {¶ 4} Because only portions of the policy were entered into the record, it
is not known whether unused hours rolled over to the next quarter. It is clear, however, that employees were prohibite d from using more bank hours than they had on account, and the policy specified that violators would be fired. Brown signed an acknowledgment form indicatin g that he had received a copy of the attendance policy, had read it, and understood its contents. {¶ 5} In the first quarter of 2008, Johnson Controls charged the following withdrawals to Brown’s bank -hour account: three hours on January 30, 2008; eight hours on January 31, 2008; eight hours on March 10, 2008; and eight hours on March 11, 2008. Because Brown had exceeded the number of hours that he had on account, Brown was fired. In a grievance filed with his union, Brown apparently claimed that Johnson Controls had miscalculated the number of bank hours used, but he did not prevail. {¶ 6} Brown later moved for TTC, alleging that after his dismissal, he had become temporarily and totally disabled by injuries suffered while working. At the commission hearings that followed, the character of Brown’s termination
was debated. Johnson Controls maintained that the dismissal constituted aJanuary Term, 2012

3 voluntary abandonment of the former positi on of employment that barred TTC. Brown’s discharge, it ar gued, comported with both Watts , 68 Ohio St.3d 118, 623 N.E.2d 1202, and Louisiana-Pacific , 72 Ohio St.3d 401, 650 N.E.2d 469, because
it arose from Brown’s violation of an acknowledged written work rule that identified excessive bank-hour usag e as a dischargeable offense. {¶ 7} Brown denied that his disc harge amounted to a voluntary abandonment and challenged his employer’s reliance on Watts and LouisianaPacific . He insisted that he had not violat ed the work rule at issue because his
withdrawals had in fact not exceeded his account balance. Brown claimed that Johnson Controls should not have charged three hours to his account on January 30 because he was at a company-ordered medical exam related to his claim. He also argued that he should have been charged just eight hours total for March 10
and 11—not Johnson Controls’ 16—because those sick days were consecutive and the C-84 form requesting TTC, signed by a doctor, served as the required doctor’s slip. Return of those 11 hours to Brown’s bank would bring his quarterly withdrawal to 16, equal to the number of hours he apparently had in his account. 1 Johnson Controls did not challenge Brown’s claim that his account should not have been charged for the January 30 medi cal exam, but it stood by its assessment
of 16 hours for March 10 and 11. {¶ 8} Brown alternatively tried to disa vow understanding the bank-hour protocol. Relying on Brown’s signed acknowledgment that he had read and understood the attendance policy, a commission staff hearing officer rejected this argument and devoted her discussion to th at issue. There was no mention of the eight disputed hours arising from Brown’s consecutive-day absence in March; the

1. Evidence of record does not specify how many hours that Brown had in his account, but the tenor of his argument—as well as that of Johnson Controls—suggests that Brown had a balance of 16 hours.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 order simply concluded that Brown had vi olated the rule in question. Further appeal was refused. {¶ 9} Brown filed a complaint in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission ha d abused its discretion in finding that his termination barred TTC. The magistra te for the court of appeals found that the commission had an affirmative obligation in every termination case to evaluate whether just cause for discharge had existed and recommended that the
cause be returned to determine whethe r Brown’s bank-hour withdrawals had been properly calculated. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation. The court held that th e deliberate misc onduct necessary to support a finding of voluntary abandonm ent could not be imputed to Brown unless it was clear that he had actually violated the policy. {¶ 10} Johnson Controls now appeals to this court as of right. {¶ 11} An employment separation is deemed voluntary when it is initiated by the claimant for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury. State ex rel.
Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm. , 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 45, 531 N.E.2d 678 (1988). Although it is the employer that formalizes the employment separation when a worker is fired, dismissal is nevertheless considered employee-initiated, and hence voluntary, when it arises from the employee’s decision to engage in
conduct that he or she knows will result in termination. Watts , 68 Ohio St.3d at 121, 623 N.E.2d 1202; Louisiana-Pacific , 72 Ohio St.3d at 403, 650 N.E.2d 469. In other words, when a claimant voluntaril y misbehaves, he or she tacitly assents to the consequences. State ex rel. Galligan v. Indus. Comm. , 124 Ohio St.3d 233, 2010-Ohio-3, 921 N.E.2d 231, ¶ 11. {¶ 12} Brown argues that his discharge cannot be considered voluntary because he did not engage in prohibited conduct or did not do so knowingly. At his commission hearing, Brown asserted that his bank-hour withdrawals exceeded his available balance only because Johnson Controls improperly charged him withJanuary Term, 2012

5 16 hours, rather than eight, for consecutive sick days. This argument, in turn, raised the issue of whether a previously submitted C-84 disability form was a valid doctor’s excuse for purposes of th e consecutive-sick-day exception to the bank-hour policy. {¶ 13} The issue of the C-84 form was critical for two reasons. First, if
the C-84 was found to be a valid docto r’s excuse, it would support Brown’s assertion that he satisfied the requirements of the consecutive-sick-day exception and should have been charged just eight hours for this absence. This
determination would affect Johnson Cont rols’ bank-hour calculation. Second,
even if the C-84 were found to be inade quate, a good-faith belief that it satisfied the rule’s requirement could support Brown’ s alternative claim that his violation of the rule was neither knowing nor deliberate. {¶ 14} The hearing officer, however, discusse d none of this in her order. The omission is unacceptable. In State ex rel. Smith v. Superior’s Brand Meats,
Inc. , 76 Ohio St.3d 408, 411, 667 N.E.2d 1217 (1996), we expressly “recognize[d] the great potential for abus e in allowing a simple allegation of misconduct to preclude tempor ary total disability compensation. We therefore find it imperative to carefully examine the totality of the circumstances when such
a situation exists.” See also State ex rel. Pretty Prods., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. , 77 Ohio St.3d 5, 7, 670 N.E.2d 466 (1996); State ex rel. McKnabb v. Indus. Comm.
, 92 Ohio St.3d 559, 561, 752 N.E.2d 254 (2001); State ex rel. Daniels v. Indus.
Comm. , 99 Ohio St.3d 282, 2003-Ohio-3626, 791 N.E.2d 440, ¶ 10-12. Because such an examination did not take place, a return to the commission for further
consideration and amended order is warranted. {¶ 15} Accordingly, we hereby issue a limited writ of mandamus that
vacates the commission’s order and returns this cause to it for further
consideration and amended order. {¶ 16} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , C UPP , and M C G EE B ROWN , JJ., concur.

__________________ Gallon, Takacs, Boissoneault & Shaffer Co., L.P.A. and Theodore A. Bowman, for appellee. Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Gregory B. Denny, and Mark S. Barnes, for appellant.

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