the sufficiency of exercise in prison. /d. at 762-64. The court held that there is no
Eighth Amendment violation where a prisoner had room in his cell to do push-ups,
sit-ups, jogging in place and step-ups. /d.

In the instant action, Crawford concedes that he had ample opportunity to
exercise. His sole complaint is that he was not able to go to the yard of his choice.
Crawford wanted to go to the bigger yard at Stateville because it had better
amenities. Such a basis is insufficient to support a claim. Also, the evidence is
clear that security concerns for PC inmates and the practical necessities for running
Stateville justified the yard allocation at Stateveille. Therefore, we grant

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the denial of recreation claim.

IIL. Denial of Access to Prison Job and Classes

Crawford also claims that he was denied the opportunity to participate in a
prison job and to attend educational or rehabilitative classes. However, the evidence
clearly shows that the limitations on job opportunities for PC inmates were made for
justified security reasons and out of a practical necessity in the operation of
Stateville.

Also, to the extent that Crawford asserts due process claims based on his
denial of access to a prison job or classes, Crawford fails to point to sufficient
evidence to support the claims. The limitations of procedural due process “allow[]

the government to deprive a citizen of ‘life, liberty, or property’ only in accordance


448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980)). Under the traditional equal protection analysis, if the
alleged class is not a suspect class, the court “will address [the plaintiff's] equal
protection claim under the familiar rational basis test, . . [and rule for the defendant]
if ‘there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.”” Zambrano y. Reinert, 291 F.3d 964, 970 (7" Cir.
2002)(quoting in part FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313
(1993)).

Crawford claims that the class of PC inmates were discriminated against and
treated differently than the general population. However, as explained above,
Crawford has failed to identify any evidence that would indicate that there were any
significant differences in the treatment of PC inmates and the general population.
The undisputed evidence clearly shows that all the measures taken in regards to PC
inmates were taken for valid security reasons in order to promote the welfare and
protection of the PC inmates such as Crawford. Crawford acknowledges in his
complaint that he himself requested that he be placed in PC. (Compl. p. 6). The
measures were also a practical necessity that was part of the logistics of operating a
large penal institution such as Stateville. Crawford has utterly failed to point to
evidence to show that his equal protection rights were violated by the treatment of
PC inmates at Stateville. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the equal protection claim.


However, nothing requires the prison to furnish law clerks or para-legals to the
inmates. Crawford also complains that he was not allowed to go to the law library
when a notary was present and was not able to access New Mexico law. However,
Crawford acknowledged that he was able to leave documents at the library which
would be signed by a notary and returned to him at his cell. (Dep. 55). The
evidence also illustrates that Crawford could have requested the new Mexico law
from the New Mexico Department of Corrections. In addition, regardless of all of
Crawford’s allegations concerning restricted access to the law library, Crawford has
failed to show how his denial of access to the law library has in any way materially
hindered his ability to pursue any legal matters. The evidence is clear that the
restrictions on his ability to go to the law library were made for valid security
reasons. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

denial of access to the courts claim.

Il. Denial of Access to Recreation

Crawford claims that his recreational activities were restricted when he was
placed in PC. As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Antonelli vy. Sheahan, 81 F.3d
1422 (7th Cir.1996), the "[l]ack of exercise may rise to a constitutional violation in
extreme and prolonged situations where movement is denied to the point that the
inmate's health is threatened." Jd. at 1432. In Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F. 3d 754 (7

Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit discussed the conditions of confinement related to


with certain procedural protections.” Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757,
768 (7" Cir. 2004). In order to succeed on a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff must establish that there is: “(1) a cognizable property interest; (2) a
deprivation of that property interest; and (3) a denial of due process.” Hudson v.
City of Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 559 (7 Cir. 2004)(quoting Buttitta v. City of
Chicago, 9 F.3d 1198, 1201 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Crawford fails to point to evidence that would show that he had a liberty or
property interest in obtaining a prison job or attending prison rehabilitation or
educational classes. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
on the claims based upon the denial of a prison job and the denial of access to

educational and rehabilitative classes.

IV. Denial of Access to Religious Activities

Crawford claims that his religious activities were restricted as a result of being
placed in PC. An inmate must be allowed “to practice his religion as long as doing
so does not unduly burden the institution.” Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th
Cir. 1990). A prison regulation that affects an inmate's First Amendment rights “is
valid only ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” A/ston v.
DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7" Cir. 1994)(Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)). In order for a prisoner to succeed on his claim that a prison has violated his

First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion, the prisoner must establish:


CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on all claims.

Samuel =e

United States District Court Judge

Dated: January 25, 2005


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID CRAWFORD, #B-71892, )
)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 03 C 4513

)

)

DONALD SNYDER, et al., )
)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge

This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion for summary judgment in its

entirety.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff David Crawford (“Crawford”) is an inmate at Pontiac Correctional
Center in Illinois. Crawford alleges that in 2003 while he was in protective custody
(“PC”) at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) he was denied certain
privileges provided to the general inmate population. Crawford complains that he

was not able to obtain a prison job, not allowed to participate in religious activities,


(1) that he espouses a bona fide religion, (2) that his beliefs are sincerely held, and
(3) that the activity he wishes to perform is essential to the practice of his religion.”
‘Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, 1 F.Supp.2d 845, 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

In the instant action Crawford claims that he is a Pentecostal and that he was
not allowed to participate in religious services and get communion. However,
Defendants have submitted undisputed evidence that indicates that in PC the prison
still provided some services by having chaplains and volunteer clergy go to the
living unit. Activities such as Bible study sessions were held in 2003 in the PC unit.
Crawford acknowledges that he attended the Bible studies and religious services that
were provided. Also, Crawford never made a written request to the Chaplain
Department in accordance with the Chaplain’s established policy. In addition, the
evidence is undisputed that religious activities for the inmates were inhibited at
times for legitimate security reasons. Therefore, we grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the denial of access to religious activities claim.

V. Equal Protection Claim

Defendants seek summary judgment on the equal protection claim.
Defendants also seek summary judgment on the equal protection claim. The Equal
Protection Clause provides “to all Americans the right to be free from invidious
discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.”

Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F. 3d 446, 453 (7" Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v. McRae,


not allowed adequate access to the prison law library, not allowed to participate in
rehabilitation and education programs, and was not allowed to engage in recreation
in certain yards at the prison. Crawford brought the instant action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983") alleging constitutional violations.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must
identify “those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial
burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by
pointing out “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” /d. at
325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest
on the allegations in the pleadings, but, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in
[Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A “genuine issue” in the context of a motion for

summary judgment is not simply a “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”


Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson vy. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc, 216 F.3d 596,
599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the
non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co, 212
F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Access to the Courts Claim

Crawford argues that he was denied adequate access to the law library. A
plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury from the denial of access to the court
in order to maintain a Section 1983 claim for denial of access. Nance v. Vieregge,
147 F.3d 589, 591 (7* Cir. 1998). For a denial of access to the courts claim “a
prisoner must show that unjustified acts or conditions ‘hindered his efforts to pursue
a legal claim.”” Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 591 (7" Cir. 1998)(quoting in part
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). Crawford complains that he was not

allowed go to the law library when para-legals and law clerks were present.