Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed Jan uary 10 , 202 3
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 22

- 00090

- CV

JACK HART , Appellant

V. MANRIQUEZ HOLDINGS, LLC , Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court

Harris County, T exas Tria l Court Cau s e No. 2021

- 53308

O P I N I O N Appellee Manriquez Holdings, L LC purchased property ne ighboring appellant Jack H art ’ s home. A f ter Manri quez Holdi ngs u ndertook a construction project on the gravel strip separating the parties ’ pr o pert ies , Ha rt sued a nd obtain ed

a temporary restraining order enj oining the construction ’ s progress.
Manri quez Holdi ngs asserted a counterclaim against Hart alleging tortious interference with contract. Hart filed a motion to dismiss the claim u nder th e2

T e xas Ci ti zens ’ Participation A ct 1 ( “ TCPA ” ) and the motion was denied by operatio n of law. F o r the reasons be low, we reverse the denial of H art ’ s TCPA motio n to di smiss and remand the cause for further proceedings.
B ACKGROUND Hart owns a home in a neigh b orhood lo ca ted north of downtow n Houston. In 2018, Manriquez Holdings purchased lots adjacent to Hart ’ s property w ith plans to build a brewery. A gravel s trip separated Hart ’ s p roperty from the lots purchased by Ma nriquez H o lding s ; Manriquez Holdings so u ght to co n v ert this strip into a paved roadway open to the public. Manriquez Holdings submitted to the City of Houston construction plans and s urveys that char acteri zed the gravel strip as an extension of a public roa dway. In July 2021, t he C ity approv e d the con st ruct ion plans . S h or t l y thereafter , Manriquez Holdings entered into a contract with Safe F l ow Utilities, Inc . ( “ S afe Flow ” ), pursuant to which Sa fe F l ow agreed to pave and improve the gravel strip for approximately $10 0,000

. On August 23, 202 1 , S afe F l ow ’ s w ork crew began s t ripping and grading the gravel strip . The following day, Hart filed a verified petition f or de clar atory and injunctive relief against Ma nriquez Holdings and the City of Houston , 2 seeking to enjoin the construction. In his petition, H art ass er te d that th e gravel strip does not qualify as a public right

- of

- way and, therefore, the C i ty of Houston had no auth ority to authorize the improvements and Manr iquez Holdings had no right to undertake them

. Accordi ng to Har t , the grave l strip consti tu te d a “ driveway ” t hat

1 The legislature am ended the TCPA eff ective September 1, 2019, for a ct i ons fi le d on or after tha t date. See Act of May 17, 2019, 86 Leg., R. S., ch. 378 , § 11 , 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 684, 687. Because Hart ’ s suit was filed after this date, all citations to the TCPA are to th e current version un less otherwise ind icated.

2 T he C i ty of Houston i s not a party to this appeal

.3

only benefited adjacent landowners

— not the p ublic at large. On August 2 5, 2021, the trial court heard and granted Hart ’ s request for a temporary restraining order. Seve ral weeks later, the t rial court he l d a hearing on Hart ’ s appli cation for a tem p o rary injunction. The trial court denied Hart ’ s ap plication

. Manri quez Holdings filed its original answer and asserted against Hart a counterclaim fo r tortious interf erence with contract. Manri qu e z Holdings alleged that H a rt “ willfully a nd i nte ntionally interfered with Manriquez Holdings ’

c ontracts with the City of Houston and Safe Flow by bringing this lawsuit. ” Hart filed an answer denying t he alle gations and assertin g affirma t ive defenses, including justification. Har t also filed a T CPA mot ion to di s miss

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem . Cod e Ann. §§ 27.001

- .011. Manriquez Holdings filed a response to Hart ’ s motio n to dism i ss and a first and second amended answer. In its second am ended answer, Manriq uez Holding s changed i ts tortious int er fe ren ce claim s o that it was premised so lely on its contract with Safe Flow. Hart filed a motion to strike portions of the affidavits Manri quez Holdi ng s attached to its TCPA response. The trial court held a hearing on Hart ’ s TCPA motio n in January 20 2 2. The trial co u rt overruled Hart ’ s evidentiary obje ctions and took the motion to dismiss under advi sement. The trial court did not rule on the motio n and it was denied by operation of law. See id . § § 27.005(a), 27.008( a). Hart filed th i s interlocutory
app eal

. See id

. § 51.014( a)(12).
A NALYSIS
In four i ssue s, Hart challenges the trial court ’ s deni al of his TCPA motion to dismiss and asserts:4

1. the tria l court erred by dismissing the portion of Manri quez Holding s ’ tortious interference cla i m premised on M anri que z Holding s ’ contract with the City of Houston ; 2. Manri quez Holdings failed to present clear and specific evidence of a p rima facie case of tortious i nterferen c e based on its con tr act with Safe Flow ; 3. Hart estab lished as a matter of law t he affirmative defense of just i f i cation; a nd 4. the trial court erred by overruling Hart ’ s evidentiar y objections.
We address these issues below

. I. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The TCPA was desig ned to protect a defendant ’ s rights of speech, petition , and associatio n while protect i n g a claima nt ’ s right to pu rsue valid l e gal claims fo r injur ies caused by the defen d ant. Montelongo v. A brea , 622 S .W.3d 290, 295 ( Tex. 2021) ( citing Tex. Civ . Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002). To effect uate this purpose, t he TCPA provide s a multi

- step p r o cess for the dismissal of a legal action

. See Tex. Civ. P rac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.003(a) , 27.005. The phrase

“ legal action ” includes “ a lawsuit, cause o f action, petition, complaint, cros s
- claim,

or counterclaim or an y other jud ici al pleading or fi l i n g that re quests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief. ” Id . § 27.001(6). First, the movan t must demonstrate that the legal action is “ based on or is in

re sponse to ” their exercise of the right of free speech, petition, o r association. Id

. § 27. 005(b )

. If the m ovant meets t his burden, the claimant may a void d ismissal by establishing “ by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential

e leme nt of the claim in question. ” Id . § 27.005(c). “ Prima facie ca s e ” refers to th e quantum of evi d e nce required to satis fy the no nmovant ’ s mi nimal factual b urden and generally refers to the amount of evidence that is sufficient as a matter of law to support a rational inference that an allegation of fact is true. In re Lipsky , 4605

S.W .3d 579, 590 (Te x
. 2015) (orig. proceeding) ; Gensetix , Inc. v. Baylor Col l. of Med. , 616 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. dism ’ d). The TC PA does not define “ clear and speci fic evidence. ” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & R e m. Code Ann. §§ 2 7.001

- 27.011. H o w ever, the supreme court ha s held that, for purposes of the TCPA, “ clear ” means “ ‘ unam biguous , ’ ‘ sure, ’ o r ‘ free from doubt , ’ ” and “ specific ” means “ ‘ explicit ’ or ‘ relating to a particular named thing. ’ ” S & S Emergency T

raining S o ls. , In c. v. E lliott , 5 6 4 S. W.3d 843, 847 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Lipsk

y , 460 S.W.3d at 590)

. But even if this showing is made , the court nonetheless must dismiss a legal action if the movant establishes a n affirmative defense that entitles it t o ju dgment

as a matter of law. Tex. C i v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 2 7.005(d).
The tria l court ’ s application of this process is subject to a de n ovo review. Adams v. Starside Custom Builde rs, LLC , 547 S.W.3d 890 , 894 (Tex. 2018). Under this standard , we “ make a n indep en dent determina t ion and apply the s ame standard used by the trial cour t in the first instance. ” Cox Media Grp., LLC v. Joselevitz , 524 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 20 17, no pet. )

. We consider the relevant pleadings, evidence a court c ould consider un d er Texas Rule of Ci vil Procedure 166a, and a ny support ing or opposing affidavits “ stating the facts on which the liability o r defense is based. ” Tex. Civ. Pr ac. & Rem. C ode Ann. § 2 7.006(a). We review these materials i n the light most fa vorable to the

n o nmovant

. See Enter. Crude GP LLC v. S ealy Partn ers, LLC , 614 S.W.3d 283, 293

- 94 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.).6

II. Application
A. Tort iou s Interference C l aim Premised on the City of Houston Con tract In its origin al answer and counterclaim , Ma n riquez Holding s p leaded a tortious interference claim premised on two contracts: one with the City of Houston and one with Safe Flow. In its second amen ded answer a n d cou nt erclaim, Man ri quez Holdings ’ tortious inter ference claim was b ase d only on its co n tract with Safe Flow.
O n appeal, H art argues t hat Manriquez H o ldings ’ amended p leading effectively nonsuited its tortious interference claim based on the City of Ho u ston contract. A s serting that “ [t]he voluntary dismissal of a claim sub ject to a pendin g TCPA motion does not moot the movan t ’ s right t o r elief, ” Hart contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss with respect to this claim.
In r e sponse, Manrique z Holdings ass erts there was never a separate legal acti on based on a co n tract with the City of Houston that created an ind ep endent

“ legal action ” subject to TCPA dismissal. Rather, Manri quez Hold ings contends , the changes made in its ame n ded ple ading consti tute “ mere amendments to factual allegations. ”
R eso lution of this i s su e is governed by our recent opinion in Saks & Co., LLC v. Li , 653 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet. h.). There, plaintiff Li was employed as a de partment store salesperson whe n she was accused of committing theft. Id . at 309

- 10. L i was arrested and held in jail for several days; the charges against her eventually were dismissed. Id . at 310

- 11. After her release, Li sued the department stor e and three other em ployees for def amation. Id . at 309. In her origina l petition, Li ’ s de famation claim was premised on statements7

made to (1) p olice officers, (2) other em ployee s, and (3) Li ’ s friends. Id . at 309, 314. The defendants filed a TCPA mot i on to dismiss. Id

. at 310. Li then filed an amended petition that alte red the factual a ll egations underlyin g her de famation claim. Id . Instead of compl aining about statements made to the police o r other employees, Li alleged that the def amatory statem e nts only were made to one of her friends. Id . at 310, 314. The trial c ourt denied the d ef endants ’ TCPA m otion to dismiss an d the defendants appealed. Id

. at 314. On appeal, the def

endants asserted that the TCPA warranted dismiss al of Li ’ s def a mation cl a ims as pleaded in b oth her original and amended petition. Id

. Agreeing with the def

end a nt s ’ argument , we held that the court “ must consider Li ’ s defamation claim as plea ded at the time [the defendants] filed their TCPA motion. ” Id

. Continuing on, we c o ncluded that the TC PA required the dismissal of Li ’ s defamat i on claim pr emised on allege d d efamatory statements made to the police and other em plo yees. See id . at 314

- 16. H owever, the TCPA did not require the dismissal of the def amation claim pleaded in Li ’ s amended petiti on , which was premised onl y on statements made to one of Li ’ s friends

. Id . at 318. Here too, we must consider Manri quez Holdings ’ tortious interfer ence claim as pleaded at the time Hart fi led his TCPA motion to dismiss

— including th o se particular alleg ations pleaded in support

. See i d . at 318. In its “ Original Answer & O riginal Counte rc laim, ” Manri quez Holdings stated, in relevant p art, as follows: Hart willfully and intentionally interfered with Manri quez Holdings ’ contracts with t

he Cit y of Houston and Safe Flow by bringing this lawsuit cla im ing that the paving of Gl e n P ark Avenue has encroached, or is en cr oaching , on his property ’ s boundary line, as well as Glen Park ’ s proper t y boundary line, without evidence and after having fil e d at l east two previous documents with the C i ty of Houston acknowledgin g its ownership o f G len Park Avenue. Hart ’ s lawsuit and the resulting temporary restraining order was a proximate cause of Manri quez Holdings ’ actual damages by ca using costly constru c tion8

d elays and additional construction work which totals at least $43, 302.44. (emphas i s added). Th is counterclaim pleads two separate tortious interference claims: one pre mised on the contract with the City of Houston and one premised on the contract with Safe Flow. Accordingly, we a nalyze the T CP A ’ s application separat ely with resp ect t o each tortious inter ference claim, beginnin g with the claim premised on the City of Houston contract

. See id

. ; see also , e.g. , Nguyen v. A BLe Comm c ’ ns , I

n c. , N o. 02

- 19

- 00069

- CV, 2020 WL 2071757, at * 7, *10

- 12 (Tex. App.

—

Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2020, n o p et.) ( reviewing the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss, the court analyzed the plaintiff ’ s tortious interference claim separately based on the tw o contracts p leaded to support the claim)

. Manri quez Holdings ’ tortious interference cla ims are based on the sam e action: Hart fil ing the underlying la wsuit. Manri quez Holdings did not argue in the trial court or on appeal against the TCPA ’ s applicabi lity in this contex t

. See Tex. C iv. Prac. & Rem. C ode Ann . § 27.005(b)(1)(B) (the TCPA app lies to a legal

a cti on b ased on “ the right to petition ” ) ; see also Judwin Props. Inc. v Lewis , 615 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [14t h Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (th e TCPA applied to a cl ai m alleging the defendant breached the c ontract by “ bringing suit ” ).
We therefore p roc eed to examine whether Ma nri quez H o ldings met its burden under the TCPA to establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each e ssential e leme nt of the claim in question. See Tex. C i v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c ). Four elements mu st b e met to establish a claim for tortious interference with cont ract : (1) the existence of a valid contract subject to interfere n ce ; (2) that the defe ndant willf u lly and intentionally interfered with the contract; (3) inju ry proximat ely caused by the de fend an t ’ s interference ; and (4) actual dam ages. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co. , 84 S.W.3d 1 98 , 207 (T e x. 2002);9

Reg ’ l Speci alty Clinic, P.A. v. S.A. Randle & Assoc s., P

. C. , 625 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Manriqu e z Hold ing s do es not identify

— and our revie w of the record did not find

— any evidence showing the existence of a valid cont ract between Manri quez Holdin gs and the C i ty of H ouston that was subject to interference. See Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 207 ; Reg ’ l Specialty Cl inic , P.A. , 625 S.W .3d at 902. Therefore, Manriquez Holdings failed to es tablish a pr ima facie case for each essential element of its tortious i nterference cla im p r emised on the City of Houston
contract

. See Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem . Cod e Ann. § 27.005(c ).
We sustain Hart ’ s fi rst issue and conclude t he trial court erred by de nying Hart ’ s TCPA motion to dismiss with respect to this claim.
B. Tortious Interference C l aim Premised on the Safe F l ow Contr act Next, we analyze whether Manriquez Holdings estab lis h ed by clear and specific eviden ce a prima facie cas e for ea c h essential e lem e nt of i t s tortious interference claim premised on the S afe Flow contract

. See i d . § 27.005(c).

1. E lements of a Tortious Interferen ce Claim As set out above, a t ortio us inte rfere nce wit h contrac t claim requires the plai ntiff to prove that the defendant willfully and intentionally inter fered with the
contract. Butnaru , 84 S.W.3d at 207; Reg ’ l Specialty Clinic, P.A. , 625 S. W.3d at 902. To show a will ful and intenti onal act of inter ferenc e, the pla i ntiff m ust produce some evid ence that the defendant was “ more than a will i ng participant an d knowingly induced one of the contracting parties to breach its obligations under a
contract. ” Reg ’ l Special ty C l i nic, P. A

. , 625 S.W.3 d at 902. S pecifi cally, t he plaint i ff must show that the interfering party (1) had actual knowle dge o f the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party , or (2) had knowledge10

of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable p erson to conclude that a contract existe d

. Jan nise v. Enter. Prod s
. Operating LLC , No. 14

- 18

- 00516

- CV , 2 0 19 WL 3432171, at * 5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op .) ; see also Reg ’ l Spe cialty Clinic, P.A. , 625 S .W.3d at 903 n.6.
We recently exam ined t his ele m en t in t he context of summa ry judgment proceedings

. See Jannise , 2019 WL 3432171, at *5

- 6. In Jannise , defendant Enterprise owned several easements that e ncumbered plaintiff Jannise ’ s land; t hese

eas em e nts per m itted Enterpr ise to oper ate an d main tain underground pipeline s. Id

. at *1

. Despite these easements, certain construction activities were undert aken on Jannise ’ s property, including travel from dump trucks filled with dirt and the us e of heavy machin ery t o remove topsoil from the easements. Id

. Enterp rise sued, alleging that th e se activities posed a safety risk to the buried pipelines. Id

. The trial court signed a temporary rest rai ning order that required Jann ise t o immediately ceas e construction on the pro perty. Id

. at *1

- 2.
Jannise asserted a cou nter claim against Enterp rise for to rtious inter ference with contra ct

. Id . at *2. Jannise argued that the construc tion activi t ies on his property were undertaken pursu a nt to a “ lucrativ e agreement ” he had with a third party and , after the re strai ning order was signed, the third party cance led the agreement. Id

. Enterp rise filed a no

- evidence summary jud gment motion challenging Jannise ’s tortious i nterference clai m , ar g uing that Jan nis e had no evidence that Ent erprise knew abou t any alleged contract

. Id . at *3 , *5. In response, Jannise a sserted that it was “ obvious fr om the circumstances of the acti viti es on [Jannis e ’ s] proper t y ” that a reasonable person would kn ow a c ontract existed. Id . at *5. Concluding that this evidenc e was insuffic ient to create a fact issue , we reasoned that “ th ere is nothing to su ggest that the facts and circumstan ces, as11

admi tted by E nterprise , indi c ated that Jannise was contracting wi th a t hird party , as

o pposed to utilizing his pr operty himself

. ” Id . (emphasis in original). Holding that

mere “ suspicion does not rise to a level sufficient to create a fact issue as to Enterp rise ’ s kn owledge, ” we co n cluded that Jannise did not pre sent any e v idence regarding the “ intentional interfer ence ” element of his claim. Id

. at *5

- 6 (emphasis in original) ; see also Reg ’ l Speci alty Clinic, P.A. , 625 S.W.3d at 902

- 03 (examining a similar issue , this court stated t hat “ suspicion without more does not rise to a level suffi cient to create a fact iss ue ” as t o kn owled ge)

. On e of ou r sister courts of appe als also examined this element in conjunction with the TCPA ’ s evidentiary burdens

. See R igUp, Inc. v. Sierra Hami l ton, LLC , 613 S.W.3d 177, 189

- 92 (Tex. App.

— A u stin 202 0, no pet.). T here, plaintiff Si erra asserted aga inst defendant RigUp claims for tortious inter ference with contract, alleging that RigUp solicited two of Sierra ’ s consult ants to leave Sierra and work for Ri gUp. Id . at 18 3, 190. Accordi ng t o Sierra, the se consultants had independent

- co ntractor agreemen t s with Sierra that contain ed a non

- compete provision an d a notice

- of

- termination requ irement

— both of which were breached when the consultants were s o licited away by RigUp

. Id . at 1 90

- 91. Ri g Up filed a TC P A motion to dismiss, which the trial court deni ed. Id . at 18 3

. On appeal, the court examined whether Sierra “ present [ed] clear and sp ecific evidence that Ri g Up was aware or should have been aware o f [the consultants ’ ] contractual o bligations to Sierra. ” Id . a t 191. To s atisfy its e videntiary burden , Sierra point ed to a cease
- and

- des ist letter it sent to Ri g Up approximately six months before the consultants left S i erra , in which Sierra “ informed R i gUp that it believed Ri gUp was int erfering with its indep endent

- contractor agreements w ith its consultan ts. ” Id . at 1 83, 191. Concluding tha t th e cease
- and

- desist letter did not constitut e “ clear and12

specific evidence ” of the element in qu estion, the c o urt held that t he letter “ did not specifically identify b y name any individuals with ex isting independen t

- contractor

a greements with Sierra or otherwise provide any information from which RigUp could have concluded [that these specific individuals] were S i erra consultants. ” Id

. at 191. Therefore, Sierra failed to offer any evidence showing that RigUp wa s

a ware of these parti cular consultants ’ agreements with Sierra when it solicited them to work for Ri gUp. Id . at 191

- 92.

2. Relevant E vidence
To support it s tortious interference claim, Manriquez Holdings p oints to the following ev idence to sh ow that Hart kne w about the con tract between M anr iquez Holdi ngs and Safe Flow or had knowledge of facts and ci r cumstances that would have le d a reason able person to con c lude th e contract existed :

• In his original petition a n d application for injunctive re lief , Hart stated that Manrique z Hol dings “ deployed sur veyors, work crews, and heavy equipment to begin constr u ction on th e ‘ driveway

. ’ ”

• I n the same p leading, Hart requ ested that the trial court en join Manri quez Holding s and its “ officers , agen ts, represen ta tives,
successo rs, assi gns, e mployees, tenants, contractors, labor e rs , or any other person acting in concer t wit h ” Manri quez Holdings fr om continuin g construction wor k on the disputed property

.

• I n the affidavit from Chris M anr iquez , president of Manrique z Holdings, he st ated that Hart “ knew that Safe F l ow was per forming construction for Manriquez Holdings becaus e , prior to co nstruction, I informed [Hart] that the c onst ruction upgrade would take pl ace. ”
3. Analysis
Before e xami n ing whether t he evidence above satisfie s the bur den imposed by the TCPA, we beg in by addressing one of Hart ’ s evidentiary objections that has b earing on ou r review of the evidence for this appeal.13

Prior to the hearin g on Hart ’ s TCPA motion, Hart filed a motion to strike objecting to t he portion of Chr is ’ s affidavit quoted above, in w hich Chris s tated that Hart “ knew that Safe F l ow was perform i n g construc tion fo r Manriquez Holdings ” because Chris “ in formed [Hart] that the construction up grade would take p l ace
. ” Hart asserte d that th e s tatements regardi ng h is knowled ge wer e conclusory and speculative. T he trial court o verruled the obj ection at th e hearing on Hart ’ s TCPA motion. On appeal, Har t argue s that this evidentiary ruling constitutes error

. We a g ree. We review th e trial cour t ’ s ruling on an e vi dentiary obj ection for an abuse of discretion. U niv. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. K ing , 417 S. W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App

. — H ouston [14th Di st.] 2013 , no pet.). The trial court abuses it s discretion when i t acts without reg ard to any gu iding rule s o r pr inciples. Id

. A conclusory statement is one that e xpresses a f actual in ference without provi d ing underly ing facts to suppor t that conclusion. Padilla v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris C t

n y. , 497 S.W.3d 78, 8 5 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [14th Dis t.] 2016, no pet.)

. Affidavits that state conclusions without provid ing un derlyi ng facts to support t hose conc l usions are not proper summary judgment evidence. 3 See id . at 86. To avoid being excluded as conclusory, an affi d avit must contain specific fac tual bases , admiss ible in evide nce, from which any conclusions are dr awn. Se e id

. Here, Chris ’ s statement th a t Hart “ kne w that Safe F l ow wa s performing
const ruction f

or Manriquez Holdings ” i s not supported by an adequate f a ctual

3 Under t he current version of t he TCPA, courts a r e instructed to consider e vidence admissible under Texas Rule o f Civil Pr ocedure 16 6a, which governs su mm ary judgment s. Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem. Code A n n. § 27. 006(a)

.14

basis. See id

. Rather, Chris ’ s affidavit only states that he told Hart “ that the constructi on upgrade w ould take place

. ” Standing al o ne, t his ge neral sta tement doe s not support the conclusio n that Hart had specific knowledge of Manr iq uez Holdings ’ contract with Saf e Flow. See id .; see also Van Der Li nd en v . Khan , 535 S.W.3d 1 79, 193 (Tex. App.

— F ort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (noting the

“ fundamenta l premise ” that “ a witness ’ s testimon y regardi ng what another person was thinking is inadmissible spec u lation and should not be consi dered ” ). Accordin gly, the tria l court erred by denying Hart ’ s eviden tiary object ion to this statement in Chr is ’ s affidavit

. See Univ. of Tex . M.D. Anderson Canc er Ctr. , 417 S.W.3d at 5

. Moving on, the r e maining evidence is i nsufficient to s atisfy Manri qu ez Holding s ’ burde n under the T CPA with respect to its tortious inter ferenc e clai m. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). Specif ically, Manriquez Ho ldings failed to p resent clear and specific evidence showing Ha r t willfully and intentionally int erfered with i t s contract wi th Safe F l ow. See id .; Butnaru , 84 S. W.3d at 207. As outlined above, the plai n tiff assert ing a claim for t or tiou s interference with con tract must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the existence of the contra ct or had knowledg e of facts th at would lead a rea sonable person to

c onclude that the contract existed. See Re g ’l Special t y Clinic, P.A. , 625 S.W .3d at 9 03 n.6 ; Jannise , 2019 WL 3432171, at * 5. Manriquez Holdin g s ’ evidence d oes not make this showing . Ma nriquez Holdings p oint s to two sta tements in Hart ’ s original petition and applic ation for injunctive relief : (1) Hart ’ s statement that Manri quez Holdings “ deployed surveyors, work crew s , and heavy equi pment to begin construction ” , and (2) H art ’ s request t hat the trial cour t en j oin Manr iquez Ho ldings and its “officers, agents, represe ntatives, successors, assigns, employees,15

tenants, contractors, lab orers, or any other person acting in concert with” Manriquez Holdings

. But t hese general references to unide ntified third part ies d o not sh ow that Hart knew or should ha ve know n that there was a specific contract between Manriquez Holdings and Safe Flow t o u ndert ake the co nstruction project

. Although Hart may h ave suspected that Manriquez Holding s had a c ontrac t w i th a third par ty to c omplet e t he construction , mere “ susp ici on ” does not constitute

ev idence showing knowledge of a specific contract or knowle d ge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude the contract existed. See Jannise , 2019 WL 3432 171, at * 5

- 6 ; see al so RigUp, I nc. , 613 S.W.3d at 191

- 92

. Ra ther , t h is evidence is equally consistent with the inference that Manri quez Holdings was undertaking t he construction upgrade itself. See Jannise , 20 1 9 WL 3432171, at * 5 ( “ there is no thing to su g gest

. . . t hat Jan nis e was co ntracting with a third party , a s op posed to utilizing the property himse lf ” ) (emphasis in original).
More over , other statements in Hart ’ s original petition and application for in j unctive relief counsel ag ainst th e inference that Hart ha d knowl ed ge of a

s pecific third

- party contract with respect to the construction upgrade. In his

r equest for expedited relief , Har t stated: “ Up on information and belief, the [cons truction] work sho w n above has been authorized by Defendant Cit y of Houston, and is being unde r take n by Defendant Manri quez Holdings, LLC

. ” (e mphasis added) . In his request for a temporary injunction, Hart stated: “ the C i ty h as effectively declared that it has the sole p o wer over and interest in the

‘ driveway ’ and parkland wher e it ha s none, and it has leveraged those non

- e xistent property in terests to permi t and authorize [Manriquez H oldings] to commence construction and development

. ” (emphasis added).
Taken in its en t ire ty, this pleading does not u nambiguously show Hart had knowle dge that a t hird party was completing the construction upgrade

. T h e16

p leading ’ s general reference to Manriquez Holdings ’ “ officers, agents, representatives, successors, assigns, employees, te n ants, contractors, [and] lab orers ” is equall y consistent with a n attempt to cover all contin gencies as it is with demonstrated knowledge of a third

- party contract. Accordingly, it does n ot constitute clear and speci fic evidence showing willful and intent i onal interfere nce with a sp ecific contract b etween Man riquez Hol di ngs and S afe Flow

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Cod e Ann. § 27.005(b); see also S & S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. , 564 S.W.3d at 847 ( “ clear ” means “ ‘ unam biguous , ’ ‘ sure, ’ o r ‘ free from d oubt , ’ ” and “ specific ” means “ ‘ explicit ’ or ‘ relating to a parti cular named thing ’ ” )

. W e sustain Hart ’ s second issue and conclude that Manriquez Ho ldings did not satisfy its burden under the TCPA to establish by clear and specifi c e vidence a
p r ima facie case fo r each essential element of its tor ti ous interference cla im based

on the Safe Flow cont rac t

. Se e Tex. Civ. Pra c. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). T h e r e f o r e , t he trial court erred by denying H art ’ s TCPA motion to dism i ss. Because of th is conclusion, we need not address Hart ’ s third issue regar di n g i ts affirmative defense of justification.
C ONCLUSION
Hav ing determined that Manri quez H o ldings failed to satisfy its burden under the TCPA with respect to its tortious i n t erference claim s , we reverse the deemed denial of Hart ’ s T C PA motion to dismis s. We re mand the ca se to the t rial
court with instructions t o dismiss Manr ique z Holdings ’ claim s a fter holding additional proceedings to awar d Hart his court costs and reasonab l e attorne y ’ s fees, as wel l as any other relief H art may be entitled to under t he TCPA. 4

4 See T ex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code A n n. § 27.00 9.17 /s/ Meagan Ha s san J ustic e
Pan el con sists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.