2. Hlinois Law Applies to Count I of Coambes’ Complaint

Coambes’ ITED claim arises under Iinois law, and is “pendant” to Coambes’ federal
ADA and ADEA claims.

Pendant jurisdiction . . . exists whenever there is a claim “arising under [the]

Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be

made, under their Authority . . .,” U.S. Const., Art. TI, § 2, and the relationship

between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action

before the court comprises but one constitutional “case.”

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). “(Flederal courts exercising pendant .

. . jurisdiction must apply state law to matters of substantive law . . . ." Timmerman v. Modern

Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896, 899 n.5

(7th Cir. 1990). The court will therefore apply Illinois law to Coambes’ IED claim.
B. Coambes’ Claim of HED

1. The IMlinois Human Rights Act Preempts Coambes’ Claim of HED

The Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) is intended to “secure for all individuals within
Illinois the freedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, or unfavorable discharge from military
service ....” 775 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/1-102(A). The IHRA established the Nlinois Human
Rights Commission (“IHRC”), “an administrative body to adjudicate claims involving human

rights.” Id, at 5/8-101; Garcia v. Vill. of Mt. Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 639 (7th Cir. 2004).

For the purposes of this case, the critical provision of the IHRA reads, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an
alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILL. CoP. STAT. 5/8-

111(C). Hlinois courts have consistently held that this provision of the IHRA divests courts of


409. The Seventh Circuit, when interpreting Illinois law on IED, has followed and cited the

McGrath court. See,e.g., Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477, 490-92 (7th Cir. 2001); Van Stan v.

Fancy Colors, 125 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Coambes asserts that Smurfit’s imposition of very high sales goals onto
senior sales staff, and Smurfit’s conduct in reducing his workload (which, he asserts, made it
impossible for him to meet those goals), was extreme and outrageous behavior. Illinois courts
have found some employer behavior to be so extreme and outrageous as to rise to the level of
TED. See Pavilon v. Kaferly, pst N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (employer pressuring

employee for dates, offering employee money for sex, and threatening to kill and rape employee
\

was extreme and outrageous behavior) Milton v. Iingis Bell Tel. Co., 427 N.E.2d 829, 832-33

(ill. App. Ct. 1981) (employer forcing employee to file false and unlawful work reports, thus

subjecting the employee to potential criminal liability, was extreme and outrageous behavior).
Illinois courts, howeves] have generally not classified as “extreme and outrageous”

actions taken by an employer for legitimate reasons, where those actions “did not go well beyond

the parameters of the typical workplace dispute.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 491; see also Brackett,

689 N.E.2d at 408-09 (no extreme and outrageous behavior where a long-term employee was
summarily terminated); Lundy v. Calumet City, 567 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (ll. App. Ct. 1991) (no
extreme and outrageous behavior where employees were terminated after the results of employer-
mandated psychological tests wete made public). Here, Smurfit has implemented new
performance standards that may well be very challenging to its sales staff. Smurfit may also have
placed significant pressure on Coambes to meet these standards, while reducing his workload due

|
to his doctor’s orders. However, Smurfts actions do not rise to the level of “extreme and

7


Ii. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
1. Motions to Dismiss
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court merely looks at the

sufficiency of the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002); Autry v.

Northwest Prem. Servs., Inc., 144 F.3d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998); it does not decide whether the
plaintiff has a winning claim. Herdrich v. Pegram, M.D., 154 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1998); see

also McComnmick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 323-26 (7th Cir. 2000) (analyzing

Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) and reversing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of
claims based on §§ 1981 & 1983); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“Complaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory. . . .”). Thus,
“{a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to a state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to

Telief.” Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt.. Inc., 195 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1999) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims . . . Rule 12(b)(6)
should be employed only when the complaint does not present a legal claim.” Id. “This
simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. All well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See e.g. Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971,

977-78 (7th Cir. 1999).


jurisdiction to hear tort claims that are “inextricably linked” to alleged civil rights violations.

Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. 1997); Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc.,

639 N.E.2d 1273, 1276-77 (Ill. 1994). In other words, tort claims that present “no independent
basis for imposing liability” apart from civil rights violations are preempted by the IHRA.
Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 22; Geise, 639 N.E.2d at 1276-77. Such tort claims “must be

litigated before the [THRC) - and only before the [THRC].” Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 22.

These tort claims are not “inextricably linked with a civil rights violation [only] where a plaintiff
can establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties created by the
(THRA].” Id, at 24. The Seventh Circuit has consistently interpreted Illinois law to mean that
State law tort claims that depend on, or are “inextricably linked,” to civil rights violations are
therefore preempted by the IHRA. See Garcia, 360 F.3d at 639-640; Quantock v. Shared Mktg.
Servs., 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002); Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir.
2000); Westphal v. City of Chicago, 8 F. Supp. 2d 809, 811-812 (N.D. Ill. 1998).

In order to determine whether Coambes’ IIED claim is preempted by the IHRA, the court
must therefore inquire as to whether Coambes can establish the elements of IED “independent of

any legal duties created by the [IHRA].” Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 24, Put another way,

Coambes must show that his IKED claim is not “inextricably linked” to his civil rights claims. Id.
at 22. This Coambes cannot do. In his IED Count, Coambes alleges that Smurfit’s new sales
goals, and the accompanying pressures these goals placed on him were “brought to bear on senior
members of the corporate sales staff,” and that “(t}his was intended to cause their senior sales
staff who were mostly over the age of 50 to resign their positions or face involuntary termination

...-” Compl., 97. Coambes also alleges, in his IED Count, that “(t]he conduct of Defendant .


outrageous behavior” under Illinois law, but rather fall within “the parameters of the typical

workplace dispute.” See Honaker, 256 F.3d at 491; Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1251. Coambes has

thus failed to allege that Smurfit engaged in extreme and outrageous behavior.

TI. CONCLUSION

Coambes claim of IED is preempted by the HRA. See Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 24.
In addition, Coambes has not alleged extreme and outrageous behavior on the part of Defendant
Smurfit. See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809. Accepting all well-pled facts as true, and drawing all
inferences in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, see Jackson, 176 F.3d at 977-78, Coambes
thus “can prove no set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See

Smith, 195 F.3d at 327. Count I of Coambes’ Complaint is therefore dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

let Rig

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Judge

United States District Court

DATED: / 2-29-0F



Minute Order Porm (06/97)

United States District Court, Northern District of Dlinois

sane Magstrote Judge Charles R. Norgle “Than Asigned Judge
CASE NUMBER 04 C 4150 DATE 12/22/2004
CASE Coambes vs. Smurfit-Stone
TITLE
[In the following box (a) indicate the party filing the motion, e.g., plaintiff, defendant, 3rd party plaintif¥, and (b) state briefly the nature
MOTION: of the motion being presented.]
Smurfit-Stone’s motion to dismiss count ! [3-1]
DOCKET ENTRY:
@M a Filed motion of [ use listing in “Motion” box above.}
Q a Brief in support of motion due
@G) Oo Answer brief to motion due___- Reply to answer briefdue__.
(4) o Ruling/Hearingon___setfor___at
6) a Status hearing[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor___at |
(6) a Pretrial conference[held/continued to] [set for/re-set for]on___setfor____—_at__— |
(7) o Trial[set for/re-set for] on |
(8) a [Bench/Jury trial] [Hearing] held/continued to__—_ at
(9) oO This case is dismissed [with/without] prejudice and without costs[by/agreement/pursuant to) |
OFRCP4(m) O Local Rule 41.1 OFRCP41(a(1) CO FRCP41(a)(2).
| (Other docket entry} Smurfit-Stone’s motion to dismiss count I (3-1] is granted. |
|
aC il) [For further detail see order attached to the original minute order.] |

No notices required.
Notices mailed by judge’s staff.
Notified counsel by telephone.
Docketing to mail notices.

Mail AO 450 form.

Copy to judge/magistrate judge.

courtroom
deputy’s
initials

No notices required, advised in open court.

Peiaetet
: CU CLIN

Document
Number,
umber of novices
DEC 2¢ ile,
date docketed

date mailed notice

Date/time received in
central Clerk’s Office



+ - Was intended and calculated to cause the Plaintiff to resign his position due to his age and the
perception of his disability.” Id., ] 15.

In order to make out a claim of IED, Coambes must show, inter alia, that Smurfit’s
conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (III. 1988).

Ma
Coambes alleges that Smurfit’s conduct was extreme and outrageous because he is over fifty

lilt
lle
years old and has a disability, and Smurfit was aware of this. Coambes cannot therefore establish

the elements of TED “independent of any legal duties created by the [IHRAJ.” Maksimovic, 687
N.E.2d at 24, Coambes’ IED claim is therefore “inextricably linked” to his civil rights
allegations, and is thus preempted by the IHRA. See id, at 22; Geise, 639 N.E.2d at 1276-77.

2. Coambes has Failed to Allege Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

In order to make out a claim for ITED in Illinois, a plaintiff must show three things. First,
“the conduct involved must be truly extreme and outrageous;” second, the defendant must either
intend that its conduct create “severe emotional distress,” or know that there is a “high
probability that [its} conduct will cause severe emotional distress;” and third, the conduct must
“in fact cause severe emotional distress.” McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809. Illinois courts have
explained that the emotional harm suffered must be quite serious, and that the conduct involved
must be truly outrageous, in order to establish these elements. “The law intervenes only where
the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Id.
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46, cmt. j) (1965); Brackett v. Galesburg Clinic
Ass’n, 689 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). ILED “does not extend to ‘mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”” McGrath, 533 N.E.2d

at 809 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d) (1965)); Brackett, 689 N.E.2d at


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION
HARRY COAMBES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 04 C 4150
v. )
) Honorable Charles R. Norgle
SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER )
CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. ) Ley,
OPINION AND ORDER %e , NTE
“4 2m

CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge

Before the court is Defendant Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
Count I. For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count I is granted.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Facts

Plaintiff Harry Coambes (“Coambes”), born November 11, 1945, is a former employee of
Defendant Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation (“Smurfit”). Smurfit manufactures corrugated
packaging containers. Coambes began his employment with Smurfit in 1992, and worked in
various sales positions, including manager of corporate sales. Coambes alleges that beginning in
2001, Smurfit began to place unreasonable pressures on its senior sales staff. These pressures
were allegedly intended to cause senior sales staff over the age of fifty to either resign, or be fired
for failing to meet new extraordinarily high sales goals. Smurfit, Coambes alleges, informed

Coambes that if he did not double his yearly sales revenues, he would be terminated. In addition,

\r


Coambes alleges that Smurfit subjected him to increasingly stressful criticism of his work. Partly
as a result of these pressures, Coambes alleges, he developed heart disease.

Coambes sought medical care for his heart problems, and was advised by a physician to
reduce his travel and workload. Coambes alleges that he presented Smurfit with written
documentation from his cardiologist explaining the nature of Coambes’ heart condition, and the
necessity of a reduced workload. Nevertheless, Coambes alleges, Smurfit continued to insist that
he double his yearly sales revenue, or face termination.| Finally, Coambes alleges, Smurfit
transferred sales accounts from Coambes to younger sales associates, making it virtually
impossible for Coambes to meet his greatly increased sales goals. Coambes alleges that
Smurfit’s actions were done with full knowledge of his heart condition, and were done intending
to cause Coambes so much stress that he would be forced to resign. Eventually, Coambes
alleges, the combination of the stress and his heart condition did cause him to resign his position
with Smurfit.

B. Procedural History

On May 18, 2004, Coambes filed suit against Smurfit in the Illinois Circuit Court of Lake
County. Count I of Coambes’ Complaint alleges Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(“HED”), Count II alleges a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Count
III alleges a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Smurfit
removed the case to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c). Smurfit then filed a
Motion to Dismiss Count I of Coambes’ Complaint. Smurfit’s Motion to Dismiss Count I is

fully briefed and before the court.