alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>

     THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM AUDITED
CONSOLIDATED  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                                   1        
<CURRENCY>                                                  U.S.               
       
<S>                                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                             12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                       JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                         DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                                1
<CASH>                                                    40,330  
<SECURITIES>                                              47,492
<RECEIVABLES>                                             45,672  
<ALLOWANCES>                                               1,943 
<INVENTORY>                                                    0    
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         136,022
<PP&E>                                                    17,583 
<DEPRECIATION>                                             5,306 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           161,645
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                     28,016  
<BONDS>                                                    1,178   
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                   48
<COMMON>                                                      97
<OTHER-SE>                                               131,945
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             161,645
<SALES>                                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         167,705
<CGS>                                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                             71,525
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          59,591
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           3,160
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                           228
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                           36,793
<INCOME-TAX>                                               9,741
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                       27,052
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                              27,052
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                               0.70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                               0.67

        


</TABLE>
Filed: February 17, 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 98-2392(L)

(CA-97-1534-A, CA-97-1859-A)

Bryant C. Brooks,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

Burlington Coat Factory, etc., et al,

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER

The court amends its opinion filed December 30, 1998, as

follows:

On page 2, section 1, line 2 -- the judge’s name is corrected

to read "Theresa Carroll Buchanan, Magistrate Judge."

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2392

BRYANT C. BROOKS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE OF STERLING

PARK, INCORPORATED; TYRONE E. GIBSON, Manager,

Burlington Coat Factory; CHARLES E. HAYES,

JR., Security, Burlington Coat Factory; MONROE

MILSTEIN,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 98-2402

BRYANT C. BROOKS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

TYRONE E. GIBSON, Manager, Burlington Coat

Factory; CHARLES E. HAYES, JR., Security,

Burlington Coat Factory; MONROE MILSTEIN,

Defendants - Appellees.
3

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Theresa Carroll Buchanan, Magistrate Judge. (CA-97-1534-A, CA-97-1859-A)

Submitted: December 17, 1998 Decided: December 30, 1998

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bryant C. Brooks, Appellant Pro Se. Joy Cummings Fuhr, Kimberly

Rose Hillman, MCGUIRE, WOODS, BATTLE & BOOTHE, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
4

PER CURIAM:

Bryant C. Brooks appeals the district court’s orders granting

summary judgment to the Defendants and dismissing his civil

actions. We have reviewed the records and the district court’s

opinions and orders and find no reversible errors. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Brooks v.

Burlington Coat Factory, Nos. CA-97-1534-A; CA-97-1859-A (E.D. Va.

Jul. 17, 1998 & Jul. 23, 1998). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
First Amendment to Amended and Restated Supply Agreement



 Exhibit 10.1 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND 
 RESTATED SUPPLY AGREEMENT 
 THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND RESTATED SUPPLY AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”), is made as of August 26, 2008 by and between DSW Inc. an
Ohio corporation with a business address of 810 DSW Drive, Columbus, Ohio 43219 (“Supplier”), and Stein Mart, Inc., a Florida corporation with a business address of 1200 Riverplace Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida 32207 (“Stein
Mart”). 
 Background 
 A. Supplier and Stein Mart entered into an amended and restated Supply Agreement, dated as of May 30, 2006 (the “Agreement”), whereby Supplier agreed to supply Merchandise to Stein Mart. 
 B. Supplier and Stein Mart desire to amend the Agreement on the terms set forth in this Amendment. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements contained in this Amendment, and for other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, each intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 
  

	 	1.	Definitions. Defined terms used in this Amendment shall have the meaning ascribed to them in the Agreement. 

  

	 	2.	Term. Section 7.1 shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following in lieu thereof: 

 7.1 Basic Term and Renewals. The term of this Agreement shall commence on May 30, 2006 and shall continue until December 31, 2012 (the
“Initial Term”). Upon the expiration of the Initial Term, this Agreement shall automatically be extended for additional periods of three (3) years each (each such period shall be referred to as a “renewal period”) unless
either party gives the other written notice of its intent not to renew the Agreement at least one hundred and eighty (180) days prior to the expiration of the Initial Term or applicable renewal period. 
  

	 	3.	Agreement in Effect. Except as set forth herein, all other terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. 

  

	 	4.	Controlling Law. This Amendment and all questions relating to its validity, interpretation, performance and enforcement (including, without limitation, provisions concerning
limitations of actions), shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida. 

 IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties have executed and delivered this Amendment by their duly authorized officers as of the date first above written. 
  

			
	DSW INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ William L. Jordan

	Title:	 	Senior Vice President and General Counsel
	
	STEIN MART, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ James G. Delfs

	Title:	 	Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer


  

 16
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Steven Thompson, Appellant.

—Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.), rendered December 6, 1982, convicting him of attempted robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Naro, J.), after a hearing, of that branch of defendant’s omnibus motion which sought suppression of identification testimony.

Judgment affirmed.

Based upon the complainant’s testimony that she viewed the perpetrators for more than half an hour under adequate lighting conditions, during which time they were as close as four feet from her, the hearing court did not err in concluding that there was a sufficient independent source for an in-court identification. The pretrial identification was not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification *(see, Neil v Biggers,*409 US 188; *Simmons v United States,*390 US 377).

Defendant forfeited his right to challenge the court’s adverse *Sandoval*ruling by his plea of guilty *(People v Griffin,*110 AD2d 850). Were we to reach the merits of defendant’s *Sandoval*contention, we would hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the People could cross-examine defendant regarding the facts underlying two prior convictions which were of a similar nature to the instant charges if he chose to testify at a trial, since those prior crimes were highly probative of defendant’s willingness to put his self-interest before that of society *(see, People v Williams,*108 AD2d 767). Mollen, P. J., Thompson, Rubin and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
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IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

JEFF M. WEIL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant. 

MARSH, Judge 

Case No. 3:14-cv-01898-MA 

ORDER FOR EAJA FEES 

On March 21, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulated Application for Fees Pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412( d), in which the parties agree that Plaintiff should 

be awarded fees in the amount of $5,700. ECF No. 24. 

Accordingly, based on the agreement of the patiies, it is hereby ORDERED that attomeyfees 

in the amount of$5,700 shall be awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

28 U.S.C. § 2412. There are no costs or expenses. The parties agree that attorney fees will be paid 

1 - ORDER FOR EAJA FEES 

Case 3:14-cv-01898-MA Document 26 Filed 03/30/16 Page 1 of 2
to Plaintiff's attorney, subject to verification that Plaintiff does not have a debt which qualifies for 

offset against the awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasmy Offset Program as discussed in Astrue v. 

Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). 

If Plaintiff has no such debt, then the check shall be made out to Plaintiff's attorney, Richard 

F. McGinty, at Mr. McGinty's address: P.O. Box 12806, Salem, OR 97309-0806. If Plaintiff has 

a debt, then the check for any remaining funds after offset of the debt shall be made out to Plaintiff 

and mailed to Plaintiff's attorney's office at the address stated above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED this j!1_ day of MARCH, 2016. 

Malcolm 

~4-&o-t.__ F. Marsh _:;- ~ ~ 

United States District Judge 

2 - ORDER FOR EAJA FEES 

Case 3:14-cv-01898-MA Document 26 Filed 03/30/16 Page 2 of 2
II

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 1574

To prohibit the cloning of humans.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 27, 1998

Mr. CAMPBELL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

A BILL

To prohibit the cloning of humans.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Human Cloning Prohi5 bition Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDING.

7 Congress finds that the Federal Government has a

8 moral obligation to the nation to prohibit the cloning of

9 humans.

10 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON HUMAN CLONING.

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful for any per12 son to—
2

•S 1574 IS

1 (1) clone a human being; or

2 (2) conduct research for the purpose of cloning

3 a human being or otherwise creating a human em4 bryo.

5 (b) FEDERAL FUNDS.—No Federal funds may be ob6 ligated or expended to knowingly conduct or support any

7 project of research the purpose of which is to clone a

8 human being or otherwise create a human embryo.

9 (c) DEFINITION.—As used in subsection (a), the

10 terms ‘‘clone’’ and ‘‘cloning’’ mean the practice of creating

11 or attempting to create a human being by transferring the

12 nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into a

13 human egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed

14 for the purpose of, or to implant, the resulting product

15 to initiate a pregnancy that could result in the birth of

16 a human being.

17 SEC. 3. ENFORCEMENT.

18 (a) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Whoever is found to be in

19 violation of section 2 shall be subject to a civil penalty

20 of not more than $5,000 for each such violation.

21 (b) INELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL FUNDS.—An indi22 vidual found to be in violation of section 2 shall not be

23 eligible to receive any Federal funding for research regard-
3

•S 1574 IS

1 less of the type of research being conducted for a period

2 of 5 years after such violation.

Æ
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                                  CERTIFICATION
                          Accompanying Form 10-Q Report
                            of First Industrial, L.P.
            Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
                 (Chapter 63, Title 18 U.S.C.ss.1350(a) and (b))

     Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chapter 63,
Title 18 U.S.C. ss.1350(a) and (b)), each of the undersigned hereby certifies,
to his knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2002 of First Industrial, L.P. (the "Company") fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.




Dated:  November 13, 2002              /s/ Michael W. Brennan
                                       ----------------------------------
                                       Michael W. Brennan
                                       Chief Executive Officer
                                       First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc.



Dated:  November 13, 2002              /s/ Michael J. Havala
                                       ----------------------------------
                                       Michael J. Havala
                                       Chief Financial Officer
                                       First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Carlos Ventura, Also Known as Jose Mendez, Appellant.

[943 NYS2d 556]-

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered July 31, 2006, convicting him of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the third degree, and unlawful operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. By decision and order of this Court dated September 10, 2009, the appeal was dismissed *(see People v Ventura,*2009 NY Slip Op 82726[U] [2d Dept 2009]). By opinion and order of the Court of Appeals dated October 25, 2011, the decision and order of this Court was reversed and the matter was remitted to this Court for consideration of the merits of the appeal *(see People v Ventura,*17 NY3d 675 [2011]).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he knew the vehicle he was driving was stolen, as required for a conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree *(see*Penal Law § 165.50). However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we *909find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of that charge beyond a reasonable doubt *(see People v Cintron,*95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000]).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]). The evidence established that the defendant was in exclusive possession of a late-model vehicle which had been reported stolen, there was substantial damage to the dashboard, center console, and steering column, including loose wires hanging from the radio and steering column, the rearview mirror was missing, and the radio, the alarm system, and the horn were all inoperable; in addition, the glove compartment contained a bill of sale with the name of the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, the jury’s conclusion that the defendant knowingly possessed stolen property was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Kindler,*83 AD3d 964, 964-965 [2011]; *People v Bradley,*143 AD2d 276, 277 [1988]). Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Angiolillo and Eng, JJ., concur.
Opinion issued February 11 , 2021

In The 

## Court of Appeals
For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 20
- 00839
- CV

——————————— PROGRESSIVE COUNTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY , Appella nt V. MARGIE DOWDY , Appell e e

On Appeal from the 333rd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2019
- 54967

MEMORANDU M OPINION Appellant, Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company, has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. No opinion has issued in this appeal. Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1). We dismiss any oth er pending motions as moot.2 PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Guerra.
PAGE 1 – ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

WILLIAM DILLON, et al., individually, 

and on behalf of a class of others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CLACKAMAS COUNTY and CRAIG 

ROBERTS, both individually and in his 

official capacity as Sheriff,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:14-cv-820-YY

ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

United States Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You issued Findings and Recommendation

in this case on August 6, 2019. ECF 198. Judge You recommended that Defendants’ Motion to 

Decertify the Class (ECF 177) be granted. Plaintiffs filed timely objections. ECF 207.

Under the Federal Magistrates Act (“Act”), the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). If a party objects to a magistrate’s findings and recommendations, “the court shall 

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). If no party objects, 
PAGE 2 – ORDER

the Act does not prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) 

(“There is no indication that Congress, in enacting [the Act], intended to require a district judge 

to review a magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); United States. v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the court must review de novo 

magistrate’s findings and recommendations if objection is made, “but not otherwise”). 

The Court has reviewed de novo Plaintiff’s objections (ECF 207). For the reasons stated 

by Judge You, the Court ADOPTS Judge You’s Findings and Recommendation (ECF 198). 

Defendants’ Motion to Decertify the Class (ECF 177) is GRANTED. Within 14 days, Plaintiffs 

shall prepare a draft notice of decertification and submit that draft to Judge You for her review

and approval before sending the final notice to the class.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 9th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge