alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 96-2895SI

_____________ Clifford Daniel Raper, and All Other * Similarly Situated Employees, * * Appellants, *

* v. * * State of Iowa; Iowa Department of * Public Safety, * * Appellees. *

____________________ * * John M. Varnum, Larry W. Pottridge, * Appeals from the United States and All Other Similarly Situated * District Court for the Southern Employees, * District of Iowa. * Appellants, *

* v. * * State of Iowa; Iowa Department of * Transportation, * * Appellees. *

____________________ * * Clinton Phillips, Kurt Gunther, Larry * Farrington, Steve Faber, Richard Rewis, * and All Other Similarly Situated *Employees, * Appellants, *

* v. * * Department of Corrections; State of * Iowa, * * Appellees. *

_____________________ * * Duane Kennedy, and All Other * Similarly Situated Employees, * * Appellants, *

* v. * * The Department of Natural Resources; * State of Iowa, * * Appellees. *

_____________ Submitted: February 12, 1997

Filed: June 13, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

_____________ FAGG, Circuit Judge. Clif fordDaniel Raper and other Iowa state employees brought these lawsuit s contendi ng the State of Iowa is liable for unpaid overtime under the Fair Labo r Standards Act (FLSA). Relying on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), the district court dismissed the employees’ FLSA challenge to th e-3-

employment practices of various state agencies for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.-4-

See Raper v. Iowa , 940 F. Supp. 1421, 1423-27 (S.D. Iowa 1996). In Seminole Tribe , the Supreme Court concluded that Congress lacks the power to abrogate a state’ s Elev enthAmendment immunity when it enacts legislation under the Interstat e Commerce Clause. See116 S. Ct. at 1126-28; see also Moad v. Arkansas State Police Dep’t , 111 F.3d 585, 586-87 (8th Cir. 1997) (state employees’ FLSA action seeking unpaidovertime was not authorized by the Commerce Clause). On appeal, th e employees argue the district court failed to recognize that Congress could have revoked the state’s sovereign immunity from their FLSA lawsuits under the enforcement power of the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the Sixth Circuit in Wilson-Jones v. Caviness , 99 F.3d 203, 208-11 (6th Cir. 1996), modified on other grounds , 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam ), we reject the employees’ argument because the FLSA’s overtime provisions cannot be regarded as serving a Fourteenth Amendment purpose, see id. at 210. Althou gh beyond the scope of the issues in these consolidated appeals, w e neverthel ess make clear that we leave for another day the issue of whether th e Fourteent h

Amendment gives Congress the power to override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of th e FLSA’s equal pay provisions. See Timmer v. Michigan Dep’t of Commerce , 104 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir. 1997). We thus affirm the judgment of the district court. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Petitioner, 

v. 

JIM SALMONSEN, Warden, 

Montana State Prison, 

Respondent. 

APR 12 2022 

Bowan Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER 

Representing himself, Donald McCubbins has filed a sentence calculation along 

with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, explaining that the Broadwater County District 

Court did not award credit for time served on a sentence because the court noted that 

McCubbins was a parole violator and that he would receive credit on his prior sentence. 

Upon review, we deern it appropriate to require a response to McCubbins's Petition. 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Attorney General or counsel for the Departrnent of 

Correction is GRANTED thirty days from the date of this Order in which to prepare, file, 

and serve a written response to the petition for a writ of habeas corpus together with 

appropriate documentary exhibits. 

The Clerk of the Suprerne Court is directed to provide a copy of this Order to the 

Attorney General; to counsel for the Department of Corrections; and to Petitioner 

personally. 

DATED this t 2.i4- day of April, 2022. 

Justice
#### Jose GARCIA-SANTACRUZ, a.k.a. Jose Lopez-Gomez, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71158.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted July 12, 2011.*

Filed July 19, 2011.

Charles E. Nichol, Law Offices of Charles E. Nichol, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

OIL, Jem C. Sponzo, Esquire, Paul Cyg-narowicz, Trial, Carol Federighi, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, William Charles Peachey, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

*142Before: SCHROEDER, ALARCÓN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Garcia-Santacruz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order sustaining the government’s appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision granting his application for asylum. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review, for substantial evidence factual findings, *Zehatye v. Gonzales,*458 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2006), and de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings, *Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey,*526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.2008). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Garcia-Santacruz failed to demonstrate that either his kidnaping or the threatening phone calls his mother received from guerrillas were on account of a protected ground. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); *Tecun-Florian v. INS,*207 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, Garcia-Santacruz’s asylum claim fails. *See Ochoa v. Gonzales,*406 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2005).

Because Garcia-Santacruz failed to establish his eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the higher standard of eligibility for withholding of deportation. *See Ghaly v. INS,*58 F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir.1995).

Finally, we reject Garcia-Santacruz’s contention that the IJ violated his due process rights by declining to reconsider his asylum and withholding of deportation claims on remand when the BIA had already reversed the IJ’s grant of asylum. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error to prevail in due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
APPENDIX

15558 TEKLE v. UNITED STATES
TEKLE v. UNITED STATES 15559
15560 TEKLE v. UNITED STATES
TEKLE v. UNITED STATES 15561
15562 TEKLE v. UNITED STATES
TEKLE v. UNITED STATES 15563
15564 TEKLE v. UNITED STATES
TEKLE v. UNITED STATES 15565
15566 TEKLE v. UNITED STATES

PRINTED FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS

BY THOMSON/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted

© 2007 Thomson/West.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 158 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 158

  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide improved 
 reimbursement for clinical social worker services under the medicare 
                    program, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 21, 1997

  Mr. Inouye introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide improved 
 reimbursement for clinical social worker services under the medicare 
                    program, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. IMPROVED REIMBURSEMENT FOR CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER SERVICES 
              UNDER MEDICARE.

    (a) In General.--Section 1833(a)(1)(F)(ii) of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1395l(a)(1)(F)(ii)) is amended to read as follows: 
``(ii) the amount determined by a fee schedule established by the 
Secretary,''.
    (b) Definition of Clinical Social Worker Services Expanded.--
Section 1861(hh)(2) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(hh)(2)) is amended by 
striking ``services performed by a clinical social worker (as defined 
in paragraph (1))'' and inserting ``such services and such services and 
supplies furnished as an incident to such services performed by a 
clinical social worker (as defined in paragraph (1))''.
    (c) Clinical Social Worker Services Not To Be Included in Inpatient 
Hospital Services.--Section 1861(b)(4) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
1395x(b)(4)) is amended by striking ``and services'' and inserting 
``clinical social worker services, and services''.
    (d) Treatment of Services Furnished in Inpatient Setting.--Section 
1832(a)(2)(B)(iii) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1395k(a)(2)(B)(iii)) is 
amended by striking ``and services'' and inserting ``clinical social 
worker services, and services''.
    (e) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
become effective with respect to payments made for clinical social 
worker services furnished on or after January 1, 1998.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Waypoint Financial Corp.
(the "Company") for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James
H. Moss, Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

/s/ James H. Moss
-----------------
James H. Moss,
Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

May 7, 2004

                                       32
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
LIFSCHULTZ INDUSTRIES, INC. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCORPORATED INTO THIS
REPORT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENT.
</LEGEND>

<S>                                         <C>               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      YEAR              YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           JUL-21-2000       JUL-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                JUL-21-2000       JUL-31-1999
<CASH>                                          888,000         1,175,000
<SECURITIES>                                  1,143,000           993,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                 3,260,000         3,081,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                     47,000            22,000
<INVENTORY>                                   4,558,000         3,190,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             10,241,000         8,950,000
<PP&E>                                       10,974,000         8,449,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                6,456,000         5,670,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               17,617,000        13,121,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         2,691,000         2,556,000
<BONDS>                                               0                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0                 0
<COMMON>                                          1,000             1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   12,575,000        10,467,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 17,617,000        13,121,000
<SALES>                                      19,334,000        16,254,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             19,334,000        16,254,000
<CGS>                                         9,951,000         8,828,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                17,577,000        15,023,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              127,000            39,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               1,757,000         1,231,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (351,000)         (631,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           2,108,000         1,862,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0                 0
<CHANGES>                                             0                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                  2,108,000         1,862,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                        1.92              1.70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      1.72              1.56


</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON 

JOSEPH TREADWAY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC, & GORDON, 

AYLWORTH & TAMI, P.C., fka DANIEL N. 

GORDON, P.C., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 6:14 CV 1587-TC 

ORDER 

Magistrate Judge Coffin filed his Findings and Recommendation on July 31, 2015. 

The matter is now before me. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). No 

objections have been timely filed. This relieves me of my obligation to give the factual 

findings de novo review. Lorin Corp. v. Goto & Co., Ltd., 700 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 

1982). See also Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Having reviewed the legal principles de novo, I find no error. 

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, I adopt Judge Coffin's Findings and 

Recommendation. 

Dated this __k_ day of October, 2015. 

Ann Aiken, 

~~. United States DistricOudge 

Order -- Page 1
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-7755

CHARLES E. HINTON, Petitioner - Appellant, versus JIM PENDERGRAPH, Sheriff; MICHAEL F. EASLEY, Respondents - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CA-00-331-3-1-MU) Submitted: May 31, 2001 Decided: June 6, 2001 Before WILKINS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles E. Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Charles E. Hinton seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his § 2254 motion. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Hinton’s notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket onSeptember 6, 2000. Hinton’s notice of appeal was filed on October 24, 2000. Because Hinton failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Michael J. Havala, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of First Industrial,
L.P.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including
its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the
case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and to the audit committee of the
registrants board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent
functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize
and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting. Date: May 6, 2004 /s/ Michael J. HavalaMichael J. HavalaChief Financial Officer
First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc.
PAGE 1 – ORDER

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JOSE MARISCAL FAUSTO,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF PREMO,

Respondent.

Case No. 6:14-cv-00966-JE

ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

United States Magistrate Judge John Jelderks issued Findings and Recommendation in 

this case on June 1, 2015. Dkt. 25. Judge Jelderks recommended that the Court deny the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Jose Mariscal Fausto (“Petitioner”), Dkt. 1, and enter a 

judgment dismissing this case with prejudice.

Under the Federal Magistrates Act (“Act”), the court may “accept, reject, or modify, in 

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(C). If a party files objections to a magistrate’s findings and recommendations, “the 

court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

Case 6:14-cv-00966-JE Document 27 Filed 06/26/15 Page 1 of 2
PAGE 2 – ORDER

If no party objects, the Act does not prescribe any standard of review. See Thomas v. Arn, 

474 U.S. 140, 152 (1985) (“There is no indication that Congress, in enacting [the Act], intended 

to require a district judge to review a magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed.”); 

United States. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that the 

court must review de novo magistrate’s findings and recommendations if objection is made, “but 

not otherwise”). 

Although review is not required in the absence of objections, the Act “does not preclude 

further review by the district judge[] sua sponte . . . under a de novo or any other standard.” 

Thomas, 474 U.S. at 154. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) 

recommend that “[w]hen no timely objection is filed,” the court review the magistrate’s findings 

and recommendations for “clear error on the face of the record.”

No party having made objections, this Court follows the recommendation of the Advisory 

Committee and reviews the Findings and Recommendation for clear error on the face of the 

record. No such error is apparent. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Judge Jelderk’s Findings and 

Recommendation. Dkt. 5. The Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. 1, 

and DISMISSES this case with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 26th day of June, 2015.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge

Case 6:14-cv-00966-JE Document 27 Filed 06/26/15 Page 2 of 2