UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF OREGON 

REBECCA STRONG, DARRELL LYNN 

BYERS, MICHAEL A. YONALL Y, 

and DONALD L. PETERSON, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

CITY OF EUGENE, OFFICER SHAWN 

R. TROTTER (Badge #334), 

SERGEANT WILLIAM SOLESBEE 

(Badge #311 ), DETECTIVE DA VE 

BURROUGHS, and JOHN DOES 

#1-10, 

Defendants. 

AIKEN, Judge: 

Case No. 6:14-cv-01709-AA 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiffs Rebecca Strong, Darrell Byers, Michael Y onally, and Donald Peterson filed suit 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging unreasonable seizure and the use of excessive force in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment, violations of their rights to freedom of association under the First 

Amendment, and state law claims of battery, negligence, and conversion. Plaintiffs' claims arise 

from the execution of a search warrant in early 2013. 

1 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01709-AA Document 77 Filed 05/25/16 Page 1 of 10
Defendants now move for summary judgment on plaintiffs' federal claims. In tum, 

plaintiffs move for partial summary judgment on the legality of the search warrant. For the 

reasons explained below, defendants' motion is granted. The court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims and dismisses this action. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs' claims arise from the execution of a search warrant at 27259 6th Street, 

Junction City on January 11, 2013, by the Eugene Police Department's Special Weapons and 

Tactics unit (SWAT team). 

In late 2012, Eugene Police Department employees, including Officer Shawn Trotter, 

were investigating stolen vehicle traffickers. Ofc. Trotter identified plaintiff Byers as a suspected 

trafficker in stolen motorcycles and parts in association with a motorcycle gang called the Free 

Souls. Ofc. Trotter also identified Byers' rural property in Junction City as a likely location to 

find evidence of such stolen property. Trotter Deel. if 2, Ex. 1. Accordingly, Ofc. Trotter 

obtained a search warrant to search Byers' Junction City property and to seize an assembled 

motorcycle belonging to Byers, along with documents, photographs, electronic records, and "any 

other evidence of the crimes of Theft in the First Degree, and Trafficking in Vehicles with 

Destroyed or Altered VIN's or conspiracy to commit those crimes." Trotter Deel. Ex. 1 at 24. 

Officer Trotter completed a Planned Operations Risk Matrix for service of the warrant 

and met with Lt. Solesbee to discuss whether the SWAT team should serve the warrant. Lt. 

Solesbee decided to utilize the SWAT team, because he expected officers to encounter people 

with significant criminal histories; the property included multiple buildings; Byers was 

associated with an "outlaw" motorcycle gang; and multiple firearms were suspected to be on the 

property. Solesbee Deel. iii\ 4-5. In particular, officers were concerned about Patrick Munson, the 

2 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01709-AA Document 77 Filed 05/25/16 Page 2 of 10
son of plaintiff Strong. Munson had a history of suicide attempts and resistance against the 

police, neighbors reported he answered the door with a gun, he was reportedly armed with 

realistic-looking pellet guns in the past and armed with a knife during a prior arrest, and a Lane 

County Sheriffs Deputy had flagged the address for officer safety. Patrick's reported criminal 

history included arrests for menacing with a gun, strangulation, and assault. Trotter Deel. ii 3; 

Solesbee Deel. Ex. 3 at 8. 

Lt. Solesbee assigned scouts to observe the property and note the presence of children, 

dogs, or any obstacles to approaching the house. Ultimately, Lt. Solesbee decided to utilize a 

technique known as surround and call-out. SWAT members would drive armored vehicles onto 

the property, surround the buildings, identify themselves as police officers with a warrant, and 

use a loudspeaker to instruct the occupants to come out of the house. Solesbee Deel. iii\ 9, 11. 

On January 11, 2013, the SWAT team began execution of the search warrant at 

approximately 7:02 a.m. Burroughs and Trotter were not present when the SWAT team initially 

served the search warrant. Solesbee Deel. ii 15; Trotter Deel. ii 4; Burroughs Deel. ii 3. 

Byers, Strong, and Raymond Munson were at the property. Raymond Munson walked 

outside first and was placed in handcuffs and moved to the back of an SUV. Byers and Strong 

both dressed, walked outside through the front door, and were placed in handcuffs. Miller Deel. 

Ex. 1 at 26, 28-29 (First Byers Dep.); Miller Deel. Ex. 2 at 54-58 (Munson Dep.); Miller Deel. 

Ex. 3 at 34-37 (Strong Dep.). 

Strong alleges that a SW AT team member ignored her stated preexisting shoulder 

problem and injured her while placing her in handcuffs. She then was placed in "double" 

handcuffs, which apparently were more comfortable. Strong Dep. at 36-41. Lt. Solesbee, Det. 

3 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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Burroughs, and Ofc. Trotter never touched Strong or handcuffed her. Solesbee Deel. 1 17; 

Trotter Deel. 1 4; Burroughs Deel. 1 3. 

Eventually, Byers, Strong and Raymond Munson were moved off-site while the SWAT 

searched the property and buildings. During this time, officers adjusted their handcuffs upon 

their request and allowed them to move outside the van to smoke. First Byers Dep. at 31-33. 

After approximately 20-30 minutes, officers brought Byers, Strong, and Raymond 

Munson back to the home. Eventually, they were taken into the living room, where Ofc. Trotter 

read them the search warrant and asked questions. Munson Dep. at 63-65; Strong Dep. at 44-45, 

47-48; First Byers Dep. at 35-38, 41-43. Strong's handcuffs were removed and Byers' handcuffs 

were moved to the front. Strong, Byers, and Raymond Munson were allowed to go out on the 

porch to smoke cigarettes and drink coffee. Byers was later released from handcuffs. First Byers 

Dep. at 41-42. Pursuant to the search wan-ant, Ofc. Trotter seized one motorcycle belonging to 

Byers and one belonging to Strong. Strong Dep. at 61. 

Byers agreed to go to his shop to locate some paperwork. Byers drove to the shop, 

opened it, and allowed officers to look around. First Byers Dep. at 27, 47-48. Ofc. Trotter 

identified several engines he believed contained altered identification numbers, though he did not 

attempt to seize them at that time. Miller Deel. Ex. 4 at 20-23 (Second Byers Dep.); Trotter Deel. 

Ex 1 at 10-11. 

Trotter issued Byers a citation for Theft in the First Degree and Trafficking in Vehicles 

with Destroyed or Altered Vehicle Identification Numbers. According to defendants, the Lane 

County District Attorney's Office declined to prosecute, and the City Prosecutor lacked venue 

over Byers and Strong. As a result, no charges were filed against them for their possession of 

stolen or altered property. 

4 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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On February 22, 2013, Ofc. Trotter returned to Byers' shop to question Byers about the 

altered engines and an unserialized transmission. According to Byers, Trotter stated that Byers 

could go to jail if he did not consent to the release of those items. Byers signed a release and 

helped load the engines into Trotter's vehicle. The engines belonged to plaintiffs Petersen and 

Yonally. Second Byers Dep. at 25-27, 30-32; Trotter Deel. iii! 16, 17, Ex. 2. 

Byers later filed a motion against the City for return of the engines, transmission, and 

assembled motorcycle. The court denied Byers' motion, and judgment was entered in favor of 

the City. Miller Deel. Exs. 5-7. 

The City Prosecutor decided not to pursue charges against Petersen or Y onally for the 

altered engines, and the City returned the engines to Petersen and Y onally with instructions to 

reserialize the engines. Trotter Deel. iii! 19-21. 

On March 13, 2013, the City returned Strong's motorcycle to her. Trotter Deel. if 18. In 

November 2013, Byers' motorcycle was returned after he agreed to dismantle its stolen engine 

cases and return them to their rightful owner, Mutual of Enumclaw. Id. if 22; Miller Deel. Ex 8. 

Raymond Munson later brought a state lawsuit alleging claims for assault, battery, false 

arrest, negligence, and excessive force against the City and Ofc. Trotter. Defendants prevailed on 

summary judgment. Miller Deel. Exs. 10-15. 

On October 28, 2014, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Excessive Force Claims 

In their First Claim for Relief, Byers and Strong allege excessive force and unlawful 

seizure against the individual defendants. Det. Burroughs and Ofc. Trotter move for summary 

judgment on grounds that they were not involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Each 

5 - OPINION AND ORDER 

Case 6:14-cv-01709-AA Document 77 Filed 05/25/16 Page 5 of 10
defendant maintains that he played no role in the decision to employ the SW AT team and did not 

aim weapons at or initially handcuff Byers or Strong. 

In response, plaintiffs contend that material issues of fact preclude summary judgment. 

However, plaintiffs point to no specific facts to support their argument. They do not explain what 

specific actions of Det. Burroughs and Ofc. Trotter constitute participation in the alleged 

constitutional violations, aside from arriving at the scene and "standing by." See Pls.' Response 

at 6. "However, the 'integral participant' doctrine does not implicate government agents who are 

'mere bystanders."' Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiffs also contend that Boyd v. Benton Cnty, 374 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2004) supports 

their claims. However, in that case the Ninth Circuit held that the integral participation of 

officers remained an issue of fact where the officers provided armed backup during execution of 

a search warrant with a flash bang device. Id. at 780. Here, it is undisputed that Det. Burroughs 

merely assisted the search warrant affiant and did not participate in the execution of the search 

warrant. While Ofc. Trotter was the search warrant affiant, he did not make the decision to 

employ SW AT and did not arrive on the scene until the warrant was executed. Thus, I do not 

find either defendant to be an "integral participant" in the alleged use of excessive force. 

Lt. Solesbee also moves for summary judgment on grounds that he committed no actions 

to constitute excessive force. I agree. While Lt. Solesbee authorized use of the SWAT team to 

execute the search WatTant, plaintiffs do not challenge the information relied upon by Lt. 

Solesbee when he decided how to execute the warrant. To the contrary, Byers identified no 

incorrect or inaccurate facts in Trotter's search warrant affidavit. First Byers Dep. at 21-22. In 

their response to defendants' motion, plaintiffs argue only that Lt. Solesbee's decision to use the 

SWAT team "is sufficient to present an excessive force claim for the jury." Pls.' Response at 6. 

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Again, plaintiffs make no argument that the facts known to Lt. Solesbee were false or inaccurate, 

nor could they in light of Byers' deposition testimony. Given the location of the property, the 

number of buildings, and the concerns about Patrick Munson and firearms, I do not find that Lt. 

Solesbee's decision to utilize the SWAT team, in and of itself, constitutes excessive force. 

Notably, the SWAT team did not execute the search warrant in the middle of the night, they did 

not break windows or doors, and they did not deploy flash bang devices. Rather, the SW AT team 

members identified themselves and called for plaintiffs to exit the house. 

In their Second Claim for Relief, Strong and Byers also assert an excessive force claim 

against the City of Eugene. However, plaintiffs fail to establish individual liability under § 1983 

for excessive force; thus, they cannot establish that a policy or practice of the City caused such 

constitutional violation. Bravo, 665 F.3d at 1091. Regardless, plaintiffs fail to establish the 

existence of a municipal policy or the final decision of a policymaker. Rather, plaintiffs argue 

that the City unlawfully grants officers "unfettered discretion" to employ the SW AT team, and 

that the City "ratified" the decision to use excessive force. Pls.' Response at 12-13. As noted by 

defendants, plaintiffs offer no evidence to support their arguments. Plaintiffs do not identify 

which final policymaker of the City ratified which particular decision made by which 

subordinate. Rather, plaintiffs simply offer unsupported conclusions without a scintilla of 

evidentiary support. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate. 

B. Unlawful Seizure Claims 

In their Third and Fomih Claims for Relief, Strong and Byers allege unlawful seizure of 

their persons and motorcycles and damage to their property during the execution of the search 

warrant. However, it is well established that law enforcement officers are authorized to detain 

persons incident to the execution of a search warrant. Muehl er v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005). 

7 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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In challenging the seizure of their motorcycles, Strong and Byers argue for the first time 

in their motion for partial summary judgment that Trotter and Burroughs committed judicial 

deception when preparing the affidavit for search wairnnt. First, plaintiffs did not raise this issue 

in their Complaint or any time during the litigation prior to their motion. Second, Byers did not 

raise judicial deception in his motion against the City for return of the motorcycles and parts, and 

this claim is arguably precluded. Third, plaintiffs fail to present evidence of a deliberate 

falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on the part of Trotter or BmToughs when preparing 

the search warrant affidavit. The evidence cited by plaintiffs was either included in the warrant 

or was immaterial to the finding of probable cause. See Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 

965, 973 (9th Cir. 1997) (to establish judicial deception, a plaintiff "must 1) make a 'substantial 

showing' of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth and 2) establish that, but for 

the dishonesty, the challenged action would not have occurred"). In particular, the search warrant 

affidavit references "[Special Agent] Gromer's attached report," though plaintiffs dispute that the 

report was attached. Dugan Deel. Ex. A at 3 (doc. 63-1). Regardless, Gromer's report does not 

include "exonerating" evidence; it describes an investigation that was terminated due to lack of 

evidence, similar to the 2012 investigation plaintiffs cite. Dugan Deel. Ex. B (doc. 63-2). I 

further find no material falsity in the affidavit's references to prior investigations concerning the 

motorcycle or to Byers' association with a motorcycle gang. Therefore, the search warrant was 

valid and authorized seizure of the motorcycles. 

Further, plaintiffs fail to present any evidence that the destruction of property during the 

search was excessive or unreasonable. Officers did not use flash bang devices or a battering ram, 

and they did not break doors or windows. Aside from the property's front gate, through which 

defendants concede they drove, plaintiffs identify no specific property damage. Under the 

8 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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circumstances and the facts known to Lt. Solesbee - facts which are undisputed- the destruction 

of the gate was not umeasonable so as to support liability under the Fourth Amendment. Liston, 

120 F.3d at 979 ("officers executing a search warrant occasionally 'must damage property in 

order to perform their duty"') (citation omitted); cf United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829, 836-

37 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding reasonableness of a search a "close call" when officers caused 

extensive property damage with flash bang devices, a battering ram, and rubber bullets). 

Plaintiffs Yonally and Peterson also contest the seizure of their property from Byers' 

shop. However, Byers consented to the seizure of the engines and had common or apparent 

authority to do so. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) (a person with common 

authority may validly consent to search or seizure of property); United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 

877, 880-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing apparent authority). The officers were cordial and nonthreatening, and Byers signed a release, provided a hand truck, and helped load the engines into 

Ofc. Trotter's vehicle. Second Byers Depo. at 25-27. Though Byers alleges that he was told he 

could be arrested if he did not sign the release, he did not testify that he felt threatened or 

otherwise would not have cooperated with the officers. Id. at 30-32. 

C. Freedom of Association Claim 

Finally, in their Eighth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs argue that Byers was targeted because 

of his association with the Free Souls motorcycle gang, in violation of his freedom of association 

rights under the First Amendment. As defendants point out, Byers' association with the Free 

Souls motorcycle gang implicates neither the right of intimate association nor the right of 

expressive association protected by the First Amendment. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 

19, 24-25 (1989); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984); Conti v. City of 

Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1990). 

9 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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CONCLUSION 

Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 54) is GRANTED, and 

plaintiffs' federal claims are DISMISSED. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(doc. 61) is DENIED. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This action is DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated this;.()day of May 2016. 

Ann Aiken 

United States District Judge 

10 - OPINION AND ORDER 

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