[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Yost v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1958.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1958

THE STATE EX REL. YOST, APPELLEE, v. OMAR IBN EL KHATTAB MOSQUE,

INC., APPELLEE; OMAR IBN EL KHATTAB MOSQUE, INC., APPELLANT. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Yost v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., Slip 

Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1958.] 

Quo warranto—Writ of quo warranto may not issue when the party seeking the writ 

has not proved entitlement to it—Attorney general must commence a proper 

quo warranto action to oust one faction or the other—Motion for 

reconsideration granted—Judgment reversed.

(No. 2017-1067—Submitted March 5, 2019—Decided May 23, 2019.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 15AP-939, 2017-Ohio-4453. 

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 

________________ 

 

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} This matter is before us as a result of a motion for reconsideration 

filed by the Reash/Brey1 respondents-appellants, one of the factions purporting to 

represent Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc. (“Omar Mosque” or “the 

corporation”). Relator-appellee, the Ohio attorney general,2

 and respondentappellee, the Khan/Ball faction of the corporation, each filed memorandums 

opposing reconsideration. 

{¶ 2} The Ohio attorney general commenced this case by filing a complaint 

for a writ of quo warranto in the Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking to dissolve 

the corporation. On December 20, 2018, we affirmed the decision of the Tenth 

District granting the writ and remanding the matter to that court with the instruction 

to appoint trustees and then return the case to the common pleas court to oversee 

the dissolution of the corporation. State ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn El Khattab 

Mosque, Inc., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5112, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“Omar Ibn 

El Khattab Mosque I”). 

{¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, however, we grant the motion for 

reconsideration, vacate our decision in Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque I, reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the case with instructions to deny the 

writ. 

I. Background 

{¶ 4} Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., is an Ohio nonprofit corporation 

that was formed in 2007 as a separate entity from the Islamic Society of Greater 

Columbus (“ISGC”) pursuant to a document titled “Referendum on Reorganizing 

and Restructuring ISGC” (“the referendum”). According to the pleadings that have 

 

1. The Reash/Brey faction and the opposing group, the Khan/Ball faction, are named for the 

attorneys representing each group. 

2. The previous Ohio attorney general, Michael DeWine, instituted this case. Dave Yost succeeded 

DeWine and is automatically substituted as relator-appellee in this case. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B); 

App.R. 29(C)(1).
January Term, 2019 

3

been submitted by the parties, the referendum established a nonprofit organization, 

called the Omar Mosque Association (“OMA”), to be responsible for religious and 

philanthropic activities at the mosque. The referendum named seven individuals as 

the initial board of directors (“initial board” or “the Reash/Brey faction”) “for a 

term ending on 12/31/2009.”3 The referendum then provided, “This Board will be 

in charge of Omar Mosque and will write a Constitution and By-Laws for OMA to 

be ratified by its members no later than 12/31/2007.” 

{¶ 5} The corporation filed initial articles of incorporation with the Ohio 

secretary of state’s office on June 21, 2007. Also in 2007, the board began to raise 

money for a construction/expansion project to improve the mosque. By September 

2011, as construction was starting, the board had raised around $400,000 for the 

project. The funds were deposited into Omar Mosque’s account at JP Morgan 

Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase Bank”), and constituted 90 percent of the corporation’s 

funds. 

{¶ 6} The dispute underlying this writ action is a schism between the 

Reash/Brey faction and the Khan/Ball faction that resulted in an inability to access 

those funds. The factions disagree about the underlying cause of the schism. In 

the view of Ghassan Bin Hammam, a member of the Reash/Brey faction, the 

dispute began as a personal conflict between Ayed, one of the initial board 

members, and a concerned community member, Nasir Hassan. According to Bin 

Hammam, as the conflict escalated, “Mr. Hassan started to challenge the legitimacy 

of the Board.” The “challenge [to] the legitimacy of the Board” concerned the fact 

that after the initial board was appointed, there were no further elections. The 

referendum purportedly stated that the term of the initial board would expire at the 

end of 2009, but the initial board continued to govern beyond that date. Bin 

 

3. The initial board members included the members of the Reash/Brey faction: Mounir Ayed, 

Ghassan Bin Hammam, Nasser Kashou, Quassai Marashdeh, and Noorgul Dada. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

Hammam, however, attested that the initial board governed past 2009 without 

complaint and “with [the] consensus of the community” because certain essential 

tasks, such as establishing a formal membership roll, had not been completed due 

to the press of other Omar Mosque projects. Basil Mohamed Gohar, who—

according to the Reash/Brey faction—is the current president of the board of 

directors, attributes the division primarily to opposition from the Khan/Ball faction 

to the expansion project. 

{¶ 7} For its part, the Khan/Ball faction failed to properly admit its 

evidence, but generally argues that the schism was caused by complaints from 

members of the Khan/Ball faction about the initial board’s lack of transparency, 

failure to follow corporate formalities, refusal to hold elections, and the allegedly 

excessive salary paid to the Imam. 

{¶ 8} In response to the concerns raised by members of the Khan/Ball 

faction, the initial board scheduled a special meeting for October 8, 2011. At the 

meeting, members could vote for one of two potential resolutions: either retain the 

initial board members and add four new seats by election or elect a completely new 

board. At the October 8 meeting, the majority of attendees voted for the first option. 

Dissatisfied with the outcome of the October 8 election, two weeks later—on 

October 22—members of the Khan/Ball faction convened its own meeting, at 

which attendees elected their own schismatic board of directors (“the second 

board”).4 

{¶ 9} The second board then drafted a resolution allowing it to assume 

control of the corporation’s bank accounts at Chase Bank. Upon presentation of 

the second board’s credentials as officers, Chase Bank transferred signing authority 

to those officers. 

 

4. The second board included members of the Khan/Ball faction: Hamid Salim, Dr. Khaled 

Khamees, Mohammed Allouche, Dina Ali, Hagar Diab, Nihad Al Khalidi, and Fouad El Faour. 
January Term, 2019 

5

{¶ 10} On November 23, 2011, members from the initial board (a.k.a. the 

Reash/Brey faction) filed suit in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court in the 

name of Omar Mosque against the individual members of the second board (a.k.a. 

the Khan/Ball faction), seeking damages and equitable relief and alleging that they 

were the lawful board members. Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 

Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615. The Khan/Ball faction counterclaimed and sought 

a declaratory judgment stating that the second board was the legitimate board of 

directors of the corporation. 

{¶ 11} On February 16, 2012, the court of common pleas filed an agreed 

entry allowing Chase Bank to interplead and deposit with the clerk of courts 

$432,313.19, the amount on deposit from Omar Mosque’s three bank accounts. 

Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615, 

2012 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5679 (Mar. 2, 2012). 

{¶ 12} On August 16, 2012, the court of common pleas sua sponte 

dismissed case No. 11-CV-14615. 2012 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5674 (Aug. 16, 2012). 

The common pleas court determined that “[w]hen a dispute arises between factions 

of a congregation over who has a legitimate right to control the congregation as a 

corporate entity, the action must be brought as an action seeking a writ of quo 

warranto.” Id. at *5. 

{¶ 13} The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Masjid 

Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-807, 2013-

Ohio-2746. The court of appeals agreed with the common pleas court that 

irrespective of how the parties framed the relief they were seeking, the core issue 

that would have to be decided was the validity of the election of the second board, 

which made it a quo warranto action. Id. at ¶ 21. However, the court of appeals 

also held that the case should have been stayed instead of dismissed, because the 

common pleas court still held Omar Mosque’s funds and by dismissing the case, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

the common pleas court made it impossible for the rightful faction (whichever one 

that turned out to be) to reclaim those funds. Id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 14} On April 20, 2012, the Khan/Ball faction commenced a quo 

warranto action in the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The court’s magistrate 

recommended dismissing the complaint for lack of standing because a quo warranto 

action must be filed by the attorney general, a prosecuting attorney, or a person 

claiming an individual right to an office. State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 12AP-356, 2013-Ohio-4880, ¶ 60. The court of appeals agreed with 

and adopted the magistrate’s conclusions of law and dismissed the complaint. Id. 

at ¶ 22. We affirmed. State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed, 141 Ohio St.3d 129, 2014-Ohio4736, 22 N.E.3d 1054, ¶ 1. 

{¶ 15} Meanwhile, on October 29, 2014, in the previously stayed Franklin 

County Common Pleas case No. 11-CV-14615, the Reash/Brey faction filed 

numerous motions asking the common pleas court to reactivate the case and to 

release Omar Mosque’s funds. The common pleas court denied all the motions. 

See Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615 

(Dec. 15, 2014). The court explained that it could not release the funds until a 

determination was made as to which group was the legitimate governing authority 

of Omar Mosque. Id. The Tenth District Court of Appeals stayed consideration of 

that appeal to allow the attorney general time to decide whether to file a quo 

warranto action. Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 15AP-22 (Feb. 18, 2015). 

{¶ 16} On October 13, 2015, the attorney general filed suit against Omar 

Mosque in the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The complaint requested a writ of 

quo warranto dissolving the corporation and appointing a receiver. Pursuant to 

R.C. 2733.01(A), the attorney general could have proceeded against one faction or 

the other seeking to remove—or oust—one of the factions from the corporation. 

But instead of choosing sides, the attorney general elected to proceed under R.C. 
January Term, 2019 

7

2733.02, which authorizes a quo warranto action against a corporation in certain 

situations: 

(A) When it has offended against a law providing for its 

creation or renewal * * *; 

* * * 

(C) When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts 

to a surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises; 

(D) When it has misused a franchise, privilege, or right 

conferred upon it by law * * *. 

{¶ 17} Specifically, the complaint alleged that Omar Mosque violated three 

rules of corporate governance: (1) failing to maintain a record of its members, (2) 

failing to maintain complete accounting records and minutes, and (3) failing to hold 

annual meetings. Based on these alleged violations, the attorney general asked the 

court of appeals to issue a writ of quo warranto under R.C. 1702.52 and 2733.20, 

judicially dissolving the corporation. In addition, the attorney general asked the 

court to waive the statutory requirement of appointing a trustee and instead to 

appoint a receiver and to refer the matter to the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas to oversee all subsequent proceedings. Both the Reash/Brey faction and the 

Khan/Ball faction filed answers, purportedly on behalf of Omar Mosque. 

{¶ 18} The attorney general filed a motion for summary judgment. The 

evidence in support of the motion consisted of pleadings from prior cases, Omar 

Mosque’s initial articles of incorporation and pertinent meeting minutes, and bank 

records. In his motion, the attorney general abandoned the theory of the 

complaint—i.e., that quo warranto was proper due to the failure to observe 

corporate formalities. Rather, the motion asserted that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

the basis of the present lawsuit is the $432,313.19 in interpleaded 

funds. It is Omar Mosque, Inc.’s complete inability to access these 

funds that constitutes the charitable “abuse” and supports a finding 

that Omar Mosque, Inc. has forfeited its rights, privileges, and 

franchises under R.C. 2733.02 and 2733.20. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 19} On August 19, 2016, both factions filed responses to the motion for 

summary judgment. The Reash/Brey faction opposed the motion and submitted 

various items of evidence, including the affidavit of Basil Mohamed Gohar, the 

current president of the board of directors. The Khan/Ball faction supported the 

attorney general’s position, asking the court to grant the motion, dissolve the 

corporation, and appoint a receiver. The Khan/Ball faction’s memorandum 

included no evidence, although an affidavit from Hassan, one of the early 

opponents of the initial board, was later placed into the record as an attachment to 

an unsuccessful motion to strike portions of Gohar’s affidavit. 

{¶ 20} On November 8, 2016, the Reash/Brey faction filed its own motion 

for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that the members of the second 

board had not been validly elected. 

{¶ 21} On November 10, 2016, the magistrate issued a decision 

recommending that the court grant the attorney general’s summary-judgment 

motion. The magistrate expressed a desire to avoid favoring either faction in the 

dispute, agreeing with the attorney general that selecting one board for removal 

risked “treading closer to the exclusive religious domain of the religious entity 

* * *, given the possibility that the differences between the factions may reflect 

some element of spiritual or doctrinal conflict.” State ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn 

El Khattab Mosque, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-939, 2017-Ohio-4453, ¶ 82. 
January Term, 2019 

9

Hewing to the purely secular, the magistrate made 23 findings of fact, of which the 

following are pertinent: 

(4) The 2007 articles of incorporation for Omar Mosque, Inc. 

name an initial board of directors for a two-year term. The initial 

board continued to govern the mosque beyond 2009. 

(5) Differences between members of the congregation arose 

in relation to construction of improvements to the mosque building, 

culminating in separate meetings in October 2011 at which two 

competing boards were elected by the respective factions. 

* * * 

(17) Paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of the complaint allege that, 

pursuant to the 2007 articles of incorporation, the initial board was 

to serve through the end of 2009, but nonetheless continued to 

govern beyond that term. The answer filed by the Reash/Brey board 

admits this to the extent that the two-year terms are stated in the 

articles of incorporation, and that the board continued to serve, but 

denies that the extended terms did not comply with the corporation’s 

bylaws or constitution. 

(18) Paragraph 13 of the complaint alleges that “no special or 

annual meeting of the members of Omar Mosque, Inc. was held in 

either 2009 or 2010 for purposes of electing individuals to serve on 

the board of directors for Omar Mosque, Inc. in either 2010 or 

2011.” The answer filed by the Reash/Brey board admits this 

allegation. 

Id. at ¶ 81. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

{¶ 22} Based on these facts, the magistrate concluded that Omar Mosque 

“did not conform with the[] statutorily required corporate formalities.” Id. at ¶ 92. 

Specifically, the corporation did not maintain a record of its members, as required 

by R.C. 1702.13 and 1702.15, or hold annual meetings of voting members “for the 

election of directors and the consideration of reports,” as required by R.C. 1702.16. 

Id. at ¶ 91-92. And the magistrate connected the theories presented by the attorney 

general in the complaint and in the summary-judgment motion by concluding that 

the corporation’s failure to adhere to corporate formalities caused the resulting 

schism and subsequent inability to reclaim the corporation’s funds: 

The magistrate further finds * * * that the present situation is a direct 

result of the organization’s failure to comply with requisite 

corporate formalities, and this failure underlies the subsequent 

impasse in corporate governance. Together, the failure to conform 

to corporate requirements and the resulting loss of control over 

charitable funds may support issuance of the writ requested by the 

attorney general. 

* * * 

The magistrate further finds that the dispute would not have 

arisen, or at least not caused the corporation to lose control of its 

funds, had the corporation complied with statutory requirements 

regarding membership and annual meetings. 

Id. at ¶ 89, 91. The magistrate therefore recommended the issuance of a writ of quo 

warranto, the appointment of trustees, and referral of the case to the common pleas 

court to oversee the constitution of a successor entity. Id. at ¶ 93. 

{¶ 23} On June 22, 2017, the court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s 

findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued a writ of quo warranto. The court 
January Term, 2019 

11 

of appeals referred the case to the common pleas court to oversee the dissolution of 

the corporation and to appoint a receiver or trustees to oversee the constitution of a 

successor entity. Id. at ¶ 70. 

{¶ 24} The Reash/Brey faction timely appealed. We issued a decision 

affirming the judgment of the court of appeals. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque I, 

___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5112, ___ N.E.3d ___. The Reash/Brey faction 

then moved for reconsideration pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.02, which permits us to 

“correct decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in error.” 

State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 

N.E.2d 339 (1995) (considering former S.Ct.Prac.R. XI). 

II. Legal analysis

{¶ 25} Quo warranto “is an extraordinary remedy invoked against a 

corporation, where public interests are involved and the corporation has exercised 

a franchise, privilege or right in contravention of law, or misused a right conferred 

upon it by law.” State ex rel. Brown v. Regional Pub. Safety Serv. Corp., 47 Ohio 

App.2d 300, 303, 353 N.E.2d 851 (10th Dist.1975). In an appeal involving an 

extraordinary writ, once the appellant has established some error in the decision of 

the court of appeals, this court has plenary power to consider the case de novo. 

State ex rel. Miller v. Brady, 123 Ohio St.3d 255, 2009-Ohio-4942, 915 N.E.2d 

1183, ¶ 14; see also State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. 

Servs., 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 579, 728 N.E.2d 395 (2000) (“The court’s plenary 

authority generally refers to our ability to address the merits of a writ case without 

the necessity of a remand if the court of appeals erred in some regard”). 

{¶ 26} The standard for assessing whether the court of appeals erred in this 

case is the same one employed whenever a court of appeals reviews a trial court’s 

decision granting a motion for summary judgment: summary judgment is 

appropriate “when an examination of all relevant materials filed in the action 

reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio 

St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C). 

{¶ 27} Quo warranto will lie when a corporation has “misused a franchise, 

privilege, or right conferred upon it by law.” R.C. 2733.02(D). In an action for 

quo warranto based on a misuse of the corporate franchise, courts may order a 

partial or total ouster of the offending corporation. State ex rel. Falke v. 

Montgomery Cty. Residential Dev. Inc., 40 Ohio St.3d 71, 73, 531 N.E.2d 688 

(1988); State ex rel. Corrigan v. W. Shore Ctr., 31 Ohio St.2d 192, 193, 287 N.E.2d 

803 (1972). 

{¶ 28} In recommending dissolution of Omar Mosque, the magistrate 

concluded that Omar Mosque failed to comply with statutorily mandated corporate 

formalities and that these failures caused the entity to lose control of its charitable 

funds. DeWine, 2017-Ohio-4453, at ¶ 68, 91-92. 

{¶ 29} The magistrate identified several statutory violations by the initial 

board, including overstaying the term of office, failing to hold annual meetings, and 

failing to maintain membership lists and books and records of account. The court 

of appeals agreed with the magistrate, and although the Reash/Brey faction disputes 

that these violations occurred, we do not need to decide that issue. 

{¶ 30} Even if the initial board failed to maintain certain corporate 

formalities, the attorney general is not entitled to the requested writ dissolving the 

corporation unless he also demonstrates that “by an act done or omitted, [the] 

corporation has surrendered or forfeited its corporate rights, privileges, and 

franchises.” R.C. 2733.20. The magistrate and the court of appeals found that the 

initial board’s failure to observe corporate formalities had caused the schism and 

that the schism had resulted in the corporation’s inability to recover the interpleaded 

funds. The magistrate and the court of appeals then held that the corporation’s 

statutory violations together with the loss of control over the funds led to the 
January Term, 2019 

13 

corporation’s surrender of its rights, privileges, and franchises. But their reasoning 

is not persuasive given the evidence in the record. 

{¶ 31} According to the magistrate, “the dispute would not have arisen, or 

at least not caused the corporation to lose control of its funds, had the corporation 

complied with statutory requirements regarding membership and annual meetings.” 

DeWine, 2017-Ohio-4453, at ¶ 91. But the only evidence in the record 

demonstrates that the dispute arose over the collection and disbursement of the 

renovation funds. In fact, the magistrate reached this conclusion in the findings of 

fact. DeWine, 2017-Ohio-4453, at ¶ 81 (5) (“Differences between members of the 

congregation arose in relation to construction of improvements to the mosque 

building, culminating in separate meetings in October 2011 at which two competing 

boards were elected by the respective factions”). Based on the facts before this 

court, we find no basis to believe that a formal membership list and regular elections 

would have prevented the Khan/Ball faction from deciding to conduct its own 

meeting, elect its own officers, and attempt to assert its control over the 

corporation’s funds. 

{¶ 32} The initial board lost control of the renovation funds when the 

second board convinced Chase Bank to give the second board control over Omar 

Mosque’s accounts. Perhaps more stringent corporate bookkeeping would have 

allowed Chase Bank to assess the rightful owner of the corporate funds, had the 

bank been inclined to undertake the inquiry. But it is abundantly clear that the bank 

did not want to place itself in the middle of the dispute. In an agreed entry to 

interplead the funds, the parties stated that Chase Bank had closed the accounts 

because the account agreement between Chase Bank and the corporation provided 

that Chase Bank “ ‘may file an action in interpleader with respect to any Account 

where we have been notified of disputed claims to that Account. If any person 

asserts that a dispute exists, we are not required to determine whether that dispute 

has merit * * * .’ ” Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, Franklin C.P. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

No. 11-CV-14615, 2012 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 5679, *2 (Mar. 2, 2012), quoting the 

account agreement. The suggestion that Chase Bank would have turned over the 

funds to one faction or the other if the corporate documents had been clearer is 

unreasonable. 

{¶ 33} Nor would compliant corporate documents have induced the 

common pleas court to release those funds. The trial court, the court of appeals, 

and this court dismissed the previous cases involving these factions and their claims 

to ownership of the charitable funds for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not 

because the factions were unable to prove their right to the money. And the money 

remains frozen because a proper lawsuit to resolve the dispute has yet to be filed. 

{¶ 34} The attorney general argues that although there is no precedent for 

issuing a writ of quo warranto to dissolve a corporation under the facts of this case, 

it is necessary for the court to do so here because “the current case is unique.” He 

assures this court that 

[i]n most instances, a corporation’s failure to maintain a record of 

its members or hold annual meetings would not amount to a 

surrender of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises. In most 

instances, however, such a failure would not have resulted in a 

corporation being legally incapable of accessing $432,313.19 in 

corporate funds. 

But there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Chase Bank would have acted 

differently had the initial board properly maintained a membership list or conducted 

elections in 2010 and 2011. Nor is there any basis from which to conclude that had 

the requisite formalities been observed, the initial board would have been able to 

recover the funds. 
January Term, 2019 

15 

{¶ 35} Ultimately, a writ of quo warranto to dissolve the corporation may 

not issue here because the attorney general has elected to seek a remedy to which 

he has not proved entitlement. Despite the attorney general’s understandable 

reluctance to take sides in the dispute, by seeking this remedy of dissolution, he is

effectively taking sides. If the Khan/Ball faction is illegitimate, we would be 

rewarding its improper actions. The only way to resolve this dispute once and for 

all is for the attorney general to commence a proper quo warranto action to oust one 

faction or the other. 

{¶ 36} Upon further reflection, we find that this court’s initial decision was 

in error. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we grant the motion for 

reconsideration, vacate our decision in Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque I, reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the cause with instructions to deny 

the writ. 

Motion for reconsideration granted, 

judgment reversed, 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., 

concur. 

DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 

_________________ 

DEWINE, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 37} Last year, we reviewed the evidence in this case and a majority of 

the court decided that a writ of quo warranto should issue. State ex rel. DeWine v. 

Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-5112, ___ 

N.E.3d ___ (“Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque I”). The current court now votes to 

reconsider that decision for the sole reason that the court’s new members would 

have decided the case differently had they been given the opportunity to do so. I 

believe that reconsideration is inappropriate in this case, so I disagree with the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

majority’s decision to review and vacate the court’s decision in Omar Ibn El 

Khattab Mosque I. And because I think the majority is wrong on the merits, I 

dissent from its judgment on reconsideration as well. 

Reconsideration is not appropriate in this case 

{¶ 38} It is true that this court has the authority “to correct decisions which, 

upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in error.” State ex rel. Huebner v. 

W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339 (1996). But 

this case would seem an unlikely candidate for reconsideration. Unlike the cases 

that this court reconsidered two years ago, Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque I did not 

announce watershed new rules having a significant statewide impact. See State v. 

Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883; State v. Gonzales, 

150 Ohio St.3d 276, 2017-Ohio-777, 81 N.E.3d 419. Nor has there been any 

assertion that the court failed to consider certain arguments. See, e.g., Aalim at ¶ 1. 

And this case has little precedential value, as the outcome is entirely fact specific. 

{¶ 39} The motion for reconsideration contains substantially the same 

arguments that were originally presented to this court (except the motion now 

asserts that our initial decision was riddled with the same errors as those of the 

lower courts). Those arguments were fully addressed and decided the first time 

around, and there is no cause for their reconsideration here. 

On the merits, the majority misses the mark 

{¶ 40} The facts of this case are straightforward. Omar Ibn El Khattab 

Mosque, Inc. (“the corporation”), failed to comply with corporate formalities in the 

years following its inception and as a result lacked procedures for resolving internal 

disagreements. Disputes inevitably arose, with some members of the congregation 

contesting the initial board’s authority due in part to the board members’ having 

remained in office beyond their intended term without holding elections. A 

competing board was purportedly elected, and both boards sought control of the 
January Term, 2019 

17 

corporation and its charitable funds. The power struggle ultimately led to the 

corporation’s inability to access those funds. 

{¶ 41} R.C. 2733.02 permits the state to pursue an action in quo warranto 

against a corporation if that corporation has failed in certain respects to perform its 

essential functions. Dissolution is required when a court determines that “by an act 

done or omitted, [the] corporation has surrendered or forfeited its corporate rights, 

privileges, and franchises.” R.C. 2733.20; see also R.C. 2733.02(C). 

{¶ 42} Both the magistrate and the court of appeals concluded that the 

corporation’s failure to adhere to the statutory requirements allowed a situation to 

develop in which the competing factions vied for control of the corporation’s board 

and charitable funds. State ex rel. DeWine v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-939, 2017-Ohio-4453, ¶ 41, 89-92. And the resulting 

fight for control over the corporation led to the funds being frozen and transferred 

to the Franklin County Clerk of Courts. Id. at ¶ 8-10. As the court of appeals 

explained: 

These basic statutory requirements that Omar Mosque, Inc. 

violated would protect a corporation from the confusion and internal 

paralysis that this case has shown resulted when an internal division 

arose. Without a defined voting membership, regular meetings, and 

up-to-date membership roster, the authority of the board, and thus 

the legitimacy of the corporation itself, is no longer supported 

through recordable action. 

DeWine, 2017-Ohio-4453, at ¶ 41. 

{¶ 43} The majority concludes that the subject of the dispute between the 

factions was the intended use of the mosque’s funds and not the board’s failure to 

conform to the corporate formalities. Majority opinion at ¶ 31-33. Thus, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

majority finds no causal link between the lack of formal procedures and the 

subsequent power struggle and loss of access to the charitable funds. But the 

majority overlooks two key points. First, it is undisputed that members of the 

congregation raised concerns about the initial board’s failure to adhere to its 

statutory requirements—particularly its failure to conduct elections and its 

members’ governing beyond their original term—and that these failures caused 

members of the congregation to question the initial board’s legitimacy. Second, 

isolating the exact origin of the dispute is not necessary. Had the corporation 

adhered to the requisite formalities, there would have been a mechanism in place 

for addressing concerns, leadership would have been clearly established, and there 

would have been no question about who had control over the funds. 

{¶ 44} The majority’s conclusion that the only way to resolve this dispute 

is for the attorney general to “commence a proper quo warranto action to oust one 

faction or the other” is perplexing, given that the majority also recognizes that the 

state may pursue an action against the corporation itself rather than against one of 

the boards. Majority opinion at ¶ 35. This action was properly commenced 

pursuant to R.C. 2733.02, and the resolution sought was a sensible one. 

{¶ 45} The corporation has been unable to access the $432,313.19 in 

charitable funds raised for the benefit of the mosque and its congregation—which 

was a central reason for the nonprofit’s formation in the first place. These funds 

“have yet to be used for their intended purpose and have been inaccessible” since 

2011. 2017-Ohio-4453 at ¶ 38. Since that time, the competing factions have been 

engaged in continuous litigation seeking a declaration as to which of them has sole 

access to and control over the funds. See Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. 

Salim, Franklin C.P. No. 11-CV-14615; Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. 

Salim, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-807, 2013-Ohio-2746; State ex rel. Salim v. 

Ayed, 141 Ohio St.3d 129, 2014-Ohio-4736, 22 N.E.3d 1054. Attempts at 

reconciliation have been unsuccessful. DeWine, 2017-Ohio-4453, at ¶ 33 (25). 
January Term, 2019 

19 

Without some action by the attorney general, there would appear to be no end in 

sight to this dispute. 

{¶ 46} I think the court of appeals got it right. It is apparent from the record 

that the corporation’s failures to abide by statutory requirements and to establish 

formal procedures resulted in organizational chaos, which ultimately led to the loss 

of access to the charitable funds. The dysfunction and internal paralysis justify an 

extraordinary remedy. Thus, I would uphold the judgment of the court of appeals 

granting the writ of quo warranto, ordering the dissolution of the corporation, and 

issuing directives for the appointment of a trustee or receiver to oversee the 

establishment of a successor entity. Because the majority sees it differently, I 

respectfully dissent. 

 KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Matthew T. Green, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost. 

Blaugrund, Kessler, Myers, & Postalakis, Inc., and Fazeel S. Khan; 

Rosenberg & Ball Co., L.P.A., and David Ball, for appellee Khan/Ball faction of 

Omar Mosque. 

Reash Law Offices, L.L.C., and Maryellen Reash; and Taft, Stettinius & 

Hollister, L.L.P, and Donald C. Brey, for appellant. 

_________________