[Cite as State ex rel. Sullivan v. Ramsey, 124 Ohio St.3d 355, 2010-Ohio-252.] 

THE STATE EX REL. SULLIVAN, APPELLEE, v. RAMSEY, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Sullivan v. Ramsey, 124 Ohio St.3d 355, 2010-Ohio-252.] 

Prohibition — Trial court — Writ to prohibit trial judge from taking action while 

appeal is pending — Issuance of amended qualified domestic relations 

order while appeal from original order is pending — Trial court patently 

and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to amend order once appeal was 

perfected — Writ granted. 

(No. 2009-1118 — Submitted January 26, 2010 — Decided February 3, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-09-1118, 

2009-Ohio-2279. 

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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of prohibition (1) 

to prevent a domestic relations judge from taking any action inconsistent with the 

court of appeals’ ability to affirm, modify, or reverse the judge’s January 9, 2009 

judgment entry and qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) in an underlying 

case and (2) to vacate the judge’s amended QDRO that was issued while the 

appeal was pending. Because the judge’s action was inconsistent with the court 

of appeals’ authority to review the January 9 judgment and QDRO, we affirm the 

judgment of the court of appeals. 

Facts 

Divorce Decree 

{¶ 2} In November 1986, appellee, Daniel J. Sullivan, married Janet M. 

Sullivan. The parties had one child born during their marriage. 

{¶ 3} In July 1997, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 

Relations Division, entered a final judgment granting the Sullivans a divorce and 
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incorporating their agreement concerning all of the matters in the case, including 

the division of their property. 

{¶ 4} More specifically, the court ordered that Daniel “shall assign and 

transfer to the Plaintiff, Janet M. Sullivan, through a Qualified Domestic 

Relations Order, or separate Judgment Entry, whichever is applicable, twentyfive percent (25%) of the accrued monthly benefit that the Defendant, Daniel J. 

Sullivan, was entitled to receive as of May 14, 1997, from Defendant, Daniel J. 

Sullivan’s interest in his retirement plan with the Civil Service Retirement 

System, pursuant to the provision of the Spouse Equity Act of 1984.” (Emphasis 

sic.) The court further ordered that Janet’s “rights to designate a beneficiary, for 

survivor benefits, or other related rights under the above described plan, shall be 

subject to the terms and conditions of the plan.” 

January 2009 Judgment Entry and QDRO 

{¶ 5} After the parties divorced, no QDRO or separate judgment was 

timely entered to implement the court’s division of Daniel’s retirement plan. 

Daniel, without notice, removed his retirement plan from the Civil Service 

Retirement System and transferred it to the District of Columbia Police Officers’ 

and Firefighters’ Retirement Plan. He retired in 2003 and began receiving all of 

the pension benefits without allocating anything to Janet pursuant to the divorce 

decree. 

{¶ 6} In July 2006, Janet filed motions for the approval of a QDRO, 

retroactive benefits, and attorney fees. On January 9, 2009, appellant, Judge 

Donald L. Ramsey, sitting by assignment in the domestic relations court, granted 

the motions and held that Janet was entitled to a monthly sum of $1,325.07 from 

Daniel’s retirement plan, that Janet be awarded $76,185.92 as well as statutory 

interest for retroactive benefits due her but paid to Daniel, and that she be 

awarded $24,684 in legal fees and litigation expenses, together with statutory 

interest. Judge Ramsey held that Daniel’s deliberate actions had denied Janet 
January Term, 2010 

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“those benefits of the pension rights awarded to her pursuant to the parties’ 

divorce decree.” 

{¶ 7} On that same date, Judge Ramsey issued a QDRO reflecting the 

parties’ rights to Daniel’s pension benefits. The QDRO provided that “[t]he 

benefit to be paid from the Plan directly to the alternate payee pursuant to the 

participant’s assignment of benefits, in compliance with the D.C. Spouse Equity 

Act of 1988, as amended, shall be * * * ($1,325.07) of the participant’s gross 

monthly benefit.” 

{¶ 8} The QDRO also provided for later amendment to constitute a 

proper QDRO according to the plan administrator’s instructions: 

{¶ 9} “The intent of this Order is to provide the alternate payee with a 

retirement payment that fairly represents the alternate payee’s marital share of the 

retirement benefits set forth herein. In the event any Order submitted to the Plan 

Administrator is held not to be a Qualified Domestic Relations Order within the 

meaning of the D.C. Spouse Equity Act of 1988, as amended, the parties shall 

submit to and request this Court or any other Court of competent jurisdiction to 

amend or modify the Order, but only for the purpose of establishing or 

maintaining its qualifications as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order in such a 

manner that will reflect the parties’ and the Court’s intent as expressed herein, 

said amendment or modification Order is to be entered Nunc Pro Tunc if 

appropriate and Jurisdiction is hereby reserved for this purpose.” 

Appeal and Amended QDRO 

{¶ 10} On January 20, 2009, Daniel appealed from the January 9 

judgment entry and QDRO to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County. 

{¶ 11} On April 7, while the appeal from the January 9 judgment and 

QDRO was pending, Judge Ramsey issued an amended QDRO, which – similar 

to the original QDRO – provided that “[t]he Alternate Payee shall receive * * * 

($1,325.07) of the Participant’s gross monthly benefit, as much [sic, such] amount 
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is adjusted by any cost-of-living adjustments. The Participant shall retain all 

remaining interest in the Plan.” Judge Ramsey did not issue the amended QDRO 

as a nunc pro tunc order, as he was authorized to do under the terms of the 

original QDRO. The amended QDRO also differed in certain respects from the 

original QDRO. For example, the original QDRO specified that it was “issued 

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Sections 3105.171 and 3105.18 which relate to 

the provision of marital property rights and spousal support payments,” and the 

amended QDRO generally stated only that the order was issued “pursuant to the 

domestic relations laws of the State of Ohio.” In addition, the amended QDRO 

specified that the order was intended to be a QDRO “as that term is used in 

Section 206(d) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 

[‘ERISA’],” whereas ERISA was unmentioned in the original QDRO. 

Prohibition Case 

{¶ 12} Three weeks after Judge Ramsey issued the amended QDRO, on 

April 28, Daniel filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition 

to vacate the amended QDRO and to prevent the judge from taking any further 

action that interferes with or is inconsistent with the appellate court’s ability to 

affirm, modify, or reverse the January 9, 2009 judgment entry and QDRO. 

{¶ 13} On May 7, without waiting for a response from the judge, the court 

of appeals entered a judgment granting the writ of prohibition ordering Judge 

Ramsey to refrain from taking any action inconsistent with that court’s ability to 

affirm, modify, or reverse the January 9, 2009 judgment entry that is the subject 

of the appeal and vacating the amended QDRO. 

{¶ 14} This cause is now before the court upon the judge’s appeal as of 

right.1

Legal Analysis 

 

1. We deny Daniel’s motion to strike. 
January Term, 2010 

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Prohibition 

{¶ 15} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Daniel was 

required to establish that (1) Judge Ramsey was about to exercise judicial or 

quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and 

(3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy 

exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 

118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. Judge Ramsey 

exercised judicial authority by issuing the amended QDRO. 

{¶ 16} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 

unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 

issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 

results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” State ex rel. Mayer v. 

Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. 

Pending Appeal from Initial QDRO 

{¶ 17} The court of appeals based its issuance of the writ on the fact that 

Daniel’s appeal from the January 9 judgment entry and QDRO was pending when 

Judge Ramsey issued the amended QDRO. “[W]e have consistently held that 

once an appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters 

that are inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or 

affirm the judgment.” State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd., 96 Ohio 

St.3d 206, 2002-Ohio-3957, 772 N.E.2d 1197, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Everhart v. 

McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 18} As Judge Ramsey observes, a QDRO is different from the usual 

court order. A QDRO is an order “which creates or recognizes the existence of an 

alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all 

or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan.” 

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Section 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), 

Title 29, U.S.Code, and Section 414(p)(1)(A)(i), Title 26, U.S.Code. “The QDRO 
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must be drafted to include very specific information with explicit instructions to 

the plan administrator. It is then the responsibility of the plan administrator to 

review the order of the trial court and determine whether it constitutes a QDRO 

pursuant to Section 414(p), Title 26, U.S.Code.” (Footnote omitted.) Hoyt v. 

Hoyt (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 559 N.E.2d 1292. 

{¶ 19} “The QDRO implements a trial court’s decision of how a pension 

is to be divided incident to divorce or dissolution.” Wilson v. Wilson, 116 Ohio 

St.3d 268, 2007-Ohio-6056, 878 N.E.2d 16, ¶ 7. “[A] divorce decree is a final, 

appealable order, regardless of whether it calls for a QDRO that has not yet 

issued; the QDRO merely implements the divorce decree.” Id. at ¶ 15. 

Consequently, “[a] QDRO is merely an order in aid of execution on the property 

division ordered in the divorce or dissolution decree. So long as the QDRO is 

consistent with the decree, it does not constitute a modification, which R.C. 

3105.171(I) prohibits, and the court does not lack jurisdiction to issue it.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Bagley v. Bagley, 181 Ohio App.3d 141, 2009-Ohio-688, 908 

N.E.2d 469, ¶ 26. Therefore, when a divorce decree is appealed and there is no 

stay of the judgment pending appeal, the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction 

to issue a QDRO consistent with the decree because the order merely executes 

orders previously specified in the divorce decree. 

{¶ 20} Nevertheless, for the following reasons, Daniel’s appeal from the 

domestic relations court’s actions on January 9, 2009, granting Janet’s postdecree 

motions and issuing the original QDRO, patently and unambiguously divested 

Judge Ramsey of jurisdiction to issue the amended QDRO. 

{¶ 21} First, Daniel did not appeal from the divorce decree. Instead, he 

appealed from Judge Ramsey’s judgment on Janet’s postdecree motions and the 

associated QDRO. Once the original QDRO was appealed, Judge Ramsey lacked 

jurisdiction to modify it. See Albertson v. Ryder (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 765, 
January Term, 2010 

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769-770, 621 N.E.2d 480 (trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify QDRO when 

appeal from order was pending). 

{¶ 22} Second, there is no evidence or argument that the condition 

specified in the original QDRO for amendment or modification of the order – the 

parties’ request for it – had been met. 

{¶ 23} Third, by issuing an amended order rather than a nunc pro tunc 

order, Judge Ramsey effectively acknowledged that the original QDRO was being 

amended or modified rather than merely corrected to rectify a clerical error. See 

State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 

223, ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 164, 

656 N.E.2d 1288 (“nunc pro tunc entries ‘are limited in proper use to reflecting 

what the court actually decided, not what the court might or should have 

decided’”). 

{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, Judge Ramsey patently and 

unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to issue the amended QDRO while the original 

QDRO was being appealed. “In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of 

jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an adequate remedy of law need not be 

proven because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be 

immaterial.” State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 

N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 25} Because Judge Ramsey’s issuance of an amended QDRO was 

inconsistent with the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to review the January 9 

judgment and QDRO, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals granting the 

writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from taking any further action inconsistent 

with that court’s authority to review the judgment being appealed and to vacate 

the amended QDRO. 

Judgment affirmed. 
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 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Thomas A. Matuszak, L.L.C., and Thomas A. Matuszak; and Law Offices 

of Stephen D. Long and Stephen D. Long, for appellee. 

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borrell, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

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