United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 22, 2011*

Decided November 22, 2011

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 11‐1403

HENRY MOUNSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

ROBERT FREY, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 08‐cv‐760‐JPG‐PMF

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

Henry Mounson, an inmate at Tamms Correctional Center in Illinois, appeals the

grant of summary judgment against him in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that

prison administrators and health care employees violated his rights under the Eighth

Amendment and the Rehabilitation Act. Because the district court properly concluded that

Mounson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Therefore the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐1403 Page 2

Between 2005 and 2008, Mounson filed four grievances making various complaints

about treatment, or lack thereof, for throat‐related ailments. In two of the grievances, he

complained that nurses ignored his requests for medication for his throat, refused to pick up

his sick‐call request slips, and cancelled his sick‐call appointments. A third grievance stated

that prison employees misdiagnosed him with throat cancer. In a fourth throat‐related

grievance, Mounson acknowledged having throat cancer but complained that he was

denied pain medication for the side effects of radiation treatments he underwent. The

Administrative Review Board denied all four grievances, concluding that the allegations of

staff misconduct were unsubstantiated and that Mounson’s medical needs were being

addressed.

Mounson brought this § 1983 action, claiming that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs during this time when they ignored his complaints

of throat soreness or gave him only cold medicine to alleviate the pain, and—after his

throat‐cancer diagnosis in 2008—when they intentionally prevented him from receiving all

37 of his prescribed radiation treatments. Mounson also claimed that the defendants

violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by preventing him from

participating in therapy sessions.

At screening, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, District Judge Herndon dismissed the Rehabilitation

Act claim but found that Mounson’s complaint adequately stated an Eighth Amendment

claim by alleging that defendants prevented him from receiving all of his prescribed

radiation treatments. Mounson later sought to amend his complaint to reinstate his

Rehabilitation Act claim and add new defendants, but Judge Herndon denied the request.

District Judge Gilbert (to whom the case was reassigned) later adopted the

recommendation of a magistrate judge to grant summary judgment for the defendants.

Judge Gilbert found that Mounson had filed a number of grievances but all failed to meet

the requirements of exhaustion. According to the district judge, the grievances all either

preceded Mounson’s radiation treatments, could not be reasonably construed to allege

interference with his radiation treatments, or were filed after Mounson brought this lawsuit.

See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810.

Mounson’s brief on appeal is difficult to parse; he glosses over the district court’s

findings regarding exhaustion and instead introduces new claims, including intentional

food poisoning. The state interjects that the judgment must be affirmed because, as the

district judge found, Mounson failed to show that he exhausted his administrative remedies

before bringing suit.
No. 11‐1403 Page 3

The state is correct. A prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before

filing a civil suit in federal court, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and to do so he must comply with

a prison’s rules for filing a grievance, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); Maddox v. Love,

655 F.3d 709, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2011); Risher v. Lappin, 639 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2011); Little v.

Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010). In Illinois, grievances must “contain factual

details . . . including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the

subject of or otherwise involved in the complaint.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810.

See Maddox, 655 F.3d at 721. Mounson’s grievances, however, fail to assert facts

substantiating his claim that the defendants interfered with his prescribed radiation

treatments. His first two throat‐related grievances assert that nurses did not adequately

treat his throat pain but do not mention radiation treatments, and in fact predate his cancer

diagnosis. His remaining two grievances allege a cancer misdiagnosis and side effects of

radiation treatments, but again do not allege any interference with his course of treatment.

Mounson also asserts, in cursory fashion, that Judge Herndon abused his discretion

by not allowing him to amend his complaint so that he could add defendants and seek

reinstatement of his Rehabilitation Act claim. But as the judge explained, Mounson failed to

suggest how the proposed new defendants may have been individually liable, nor did he

explain why the Rehabilitation Act claim should be reinstated. The judge did not abuse his

discretion. Johnson v. Cypress Hill, 641 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2011).

Mounson also argues that Judge Herndon and the magistrate judge abused their

discretion by denying his first two motions for appointment of counsel (a third motion was

eventually granted). But Mounson had no right to court‐appointed counsel for his civil suit,

Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006

(7th Cir. 2006), and the judge reasonably denied the motions after assessing Mounson’s

efforts to obtain counsel, the complexity of the claims, and his ability to litigate his claims,

see Romanelli, 615 F.3d at 851–53; Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Finally, Mounson asserts that the proceedings were not fair and impartial because

the district judges and the magistrate judge were somehow biased against him. But

Mounson fails to substantiate this claim beyond pointing to the adverse rulings, and

“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,”

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd.,

299 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.